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Gift of
WINTHROP E. DWIGHT
1928

THE
EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA

" Seras lo que debes ser,
Y sino, no seras nada." San Martin.

THE EMANCIPATION OF
SOUTH AMERICA
BEING A CONDENSED TRANSLATION
EY
WILLIAM PILLING

THE HISTORY OF SAN MARTIN
By
GENERAL DON BARTOLOME MITRE
FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE ARGENTINE BEPUBLIC

LONDON: CHAPMAN & HALL, Ltd.
1893

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

The title of this translation is the second title of the
original " History of San Martin." This transposition of
title is an index to the relation which the translation bears
to the original. This latter is truly a biography of San
Martin, whose life could not be understood unless very full
account were given of the events in which he took so
prominent a part, therefore the biography is also a history.
No man who plays a prominent part in the history of a
revolution can escape becoming involved in disputes with
his contemporaries, and in many intricate questions which
are of interest only to a very small number of their suc
cessors. These disputes and these questions greatly affect
the career of a man, but have small influence upon the
history of a Nation. Of such troubles San Martin had his
full share, his biographer has entered fully into them, and
with much detail has given proofs of the correctness of the
view he takes of them. These details are, for the most
part, suppressed in the translation, and all matters con
cerning San Martin himself are greatly curtailed, while
prominence is given to the events of the times in which the

Vlll TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
scene passes. The translation is thus a history in which
enter the biographies of the two principal personages, San
Martin and Bolivar.
This translation is intended only for the general mass
of English-speaking readers, to whom minute details are
wearisome, and is thus in every part a condensation of the
copious accounts which are given in the original of the
stirring events described. The student of history will not
find in it that ample information which he requires, in
order fully to understand the subject in all its bearings ; for
him the original provides a mine of historic wealth,
enriched as it is with notes and with a voluminous
appendix.
William Pilling.
London, March, 1893.

CONTENTS.

PAGE
Translator's Preface  vii
Prologue  xxvii

CHAPTER I.
historical introduction.
The Argument of the Book — Synopsis of the South American Revolu
tion — The Action of America upon Europe — The Colonization
of Spanish America — The Colonization of North America-
Colonial Policy in both Americas — The Emancipation of North
America — The Affiliation of the Revolution of South America —
The Moral Revolution of South America — The Precursor of the
Emancipation of South America — The Races of South America ;
the Creole — The First Throes of Revolution — The Growth of the
Revolution — Attempts at Monarchy in South America — Retro
spection 

CHAPTER II.
SAN MARTIN IN EUROPE AND IN AMERICA.
1778 — l8l2.
His Birth and Parentage — Leave's for Spain — His Career in the
Spanish Army — Africa — France — St. Vincent — Portugal — Cadiz
— Society of Lautaro — Argonilla — Baylen — Tudela — Albuera —
Lord Macduff — London — Buenos Ayres — Outbreak of the Revo
lution — Experiments in Government — The Influence of San
Martin — Personal Appearance and Character of San Martin . 31

X CONTENTS.
CHAPTER III.
THE LAUTARO LODGE.
1812 — 1813.
The First Triumvirate— Political Parties— The Mounted Grenadiers

PAGE

—Military School— The Lautaro Lodge— Battle of Tucuman—
Revolution of 8th October— The Second Triumvirate— Military
Plans  43

CHAPTER IV.
SAN LORENZO.
1813 — 1814.
Battle of the Cerrito — Meeting of the Constituent Assembly — Reforms
— Spanish Depredations on the Fluvial Coasts — The Action of
San Lorenzo — Battle of Salta — Influence of the Lodge — Disasters
of Vilcapugio and Ayohuma — Argentine Generals — San Martin
takes Command of the Army of the North — Appointment of the
Supreme Director .  53

CHAPTER V.
UPPER PERU.
1814.
The Problem of the Argentine Revolution — The Geography and
Ethnology of Upper Peru — Outbreak and Progress of the Revo
lution in Upper Peru — Cruelties of the Spaniards —Composition
of the Royalist Army — Arenales — His Campaign from Cocha
bamba to Santa Cruz— Battle of La Florida — Results of these
Operations  64

CHAPTER VI.
THE WAR IN THE NORTH.
1814.
The Army of Tucuman— Preparations of Pezuela— Plans of San
Martin — The New Military School — Popular Movement in
Salta — Martin Guemes — The Gauchos of Salta — Operations of
the Royalists— The Fall of Monte Video— Retreat of Pezuela—
San Martin's Secret Plan— His Illness — Is appointed Governor
ofCuyo ....  72

CONTENTS. Xi
CHAPTER VII.
THE CHILENO-ARGENTINE REVOLUTION.
l8lO — l8ll.

PAGE

Chilian and Argentine Society compared— Martinez Rozas— Popular
Excitement — Loss of Power by Governor Carrasco — The South
of Chile — O'Higgins— Deposition of Carrasco — Establishment of
a Junta — Resemblances of the Two Revolutions — Argentine-
Chilian Alliance — Freedom of Commerce — Mutiny in Santiago
— Installation of the First General Congress — Defeat of the
Radicals — Rozas at Concepcion  80

CHAPTER VIIL
PROGRESS AND FALL OF THE CHILIAN REVOLUTION.
l8ll — 1814.
The Three Carreras— A New Junta — Dissolution of Congress-
Armed Protest by Rozas — Valdivia — The First Newspaper —
Death of Rozas — The Chilian Flag— Carrera again Dictator —
Abascal— Pareja lands at Valdivia — Battle of San Carlos— Siege
of Chilian — O'Higgins made General-in-Chief — Argentine
Auxiliaries — Arrival of Gainza — Lastra named Supreme
Director — Capture of Talca — Mackenna at Membrillar —
Defence of Quecheraguas— Mediation of the British Commodore
— Treaty of Lircay — The Carreras again in Power — Invasion of
Osorio — Siege of Rancagua — Flight of O'Higgins and Carrera . 91

CHAPTER IX.
CUYO.
1814 — 1815.
The District of Cuyo — Policy of San Martin — Reception of Chilian
Refugees — Trouble with Carrera — Fall of Alvear — Cuyo be
comes an Independant State — Self-sacrifice of the People of
Cuyo — Revenues of Cuyo — Characteristics of San Martin —
Anecdotes of San Martin — Royalist Successes — The Banquet at
Mendoza  108

CHAPTER X.
THE SPY SYSTEM OF THE PATRIOTS.
1815— 1816.
The Restoration of Spanish Domination in Chile — Cruelties of the
Royalists — Nationalist Reaction — The Plans of Abascal — San

Xll CONTENTS.

Martin establishes Secret Agencies in Chile — His Spy System —
Preparations of the Chilian Patriots— Marc6 del Pont— Manuel
Rodriguez — Brown and the Argentine Privateers — Loss of "the
Uribe — Capture of the Consequencia — Blockade of Callao —
Attack on Guayaquil' — Loss of the Trinidad — Return of the
Squadron  ¦ ll7

CHAPTER XI.
THE IDEA OF THE PASSAGE OF THE ANDES.
1815—1816.
Opposition to the Plans of San Martin — He receives Permission to
assume the Offensive — Also Supplies of Guns and War Material
— Collects the Grenadiers — Balcarce Provisional Director — The
Lodge in Mendoza — Tomas Guido  1 24

CHAPTER XII.
THE ARMY OF THE ANDES.
l8l6— 1817.
Composition of the Army — Freeing the Slaves — Fray Beltran — The
Arsenal — Powder Factory — Cloth Factory — Pueyrred6n elected
President — Declaration of Independence — Interview at C6rdoba
— Condarco — Maps of the Passes of the Andes — Concentration
of the Army — The Function of the 17th January, 1817 — The
Flag of the Army of the Andes . . . . . . .126

CHAPTER XIII.
THE PASSAGE OF THE ANDES.
1817.
The Southern Andes— Passes of the Andes— Stratagems of San
Martin— The Pehuenche Indians— Preparations of Marc6  Pre
parations at Mendoza— Pueyrred6n— Detachments flanking
the Main Army— Instructions from Government — The Sierra of
Chacabuco — Occupation of Coquimbo by Cabot — Capture of
Copiap6— Capture of Talca — March of the Main Army — The
Affair at Pichueta — Capture of Achupallas — Juan Lavalle 
Capture of the Guardia Vieja— Putaendo— Defeat of Atero— Con
centration of the Army at the Foot of Chacabuco— The Judg
ment of Posterity  132

CONTENTS. Xlil
CHAPTER XIV.
CHACABUCO. 1817.
PAGE
The Sierra of Chacabuco — Atero occupies Chacabuco — Maroto ap
pointed to command the Royalist Army — Moonlight March of
the Patriots — The Royalist Vanguard driven in — Advance of
the Main Body — Repulse of O'Higgins — Soler takes the Posi
tion in Flank — Total Rout of the Royalists — Barafiao — Occupa
tion of Santiago — O'Higgins elected Supreme Director — Marc6
taken Prisoner — San Bruno shot — Reception of the News in
Buenos Ayres — San Martin returns to Buenos Ayres . . 144

CHAPTER XV.
THE FIRST CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH OF CHILE.
1817.
The Mistakes committed by San Martin — Ordonez — Las Heras marches
to the South — Occupation of Concepcion — The Action of Gavilan
— O'Higgins takes Command — Freyre captures the Forts of
Arauco — Treaty with the Indians of Arauco — Operations
against Talcahuano — French Officers — The Assault of the
Morro — Las Heras is withdrawn from the captured Outwork . 151

CHAPTER XVI.
ARGENTINE-CHILENO ALLIANCE.
1817.
Origin and Results of this Alliance — San Martin in Buenos Ayres —
Carrera's Trip to North America — His Return and Arrest by
Pueyrredon — The Mission of Condarco to London — Quintana
Deputy Director — Coinage of Chilian Money — " The Legion of
Merit " — Guido as Argentine Representative — Irizarri appointed
Chilian Agent in Europe — Monarchical Ideas — Chilian Jealousy
of Argentine Influence — The Conspiracy of the Carreras — Two
of the Brothers imprisoned at Mendoza — Life of San Martin at
Santiago — The " Tertulias " — Commodore Bowles takes a Secret
Agent to Lima ....  157

PAGE

XIV CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XVII.
CANCHA-RAYADA. 1817 — 1818.
The Political State of Chile— Pezuela appointed Viceroy of Peru— His
Policy — Osorio lands at Talcahuano with Reinforcements— The
Patriot Forces — Retreat of O'Higgins — March of Osorio on
Santiago — Proclamation of Independence — Concentration of
the Patriot Army— Affair on the Lontue— Retreat of Osorio—
The Halt at Talca— The Night Attack at Cancha-rayada—
Dispersion of the Patriot Army — O'Higgins wounded — Mas
terly Retreat of Las Heras — Panic in the Capital — Return of
O'Higgins and San Martin — Reorganization of the Army— The
Camp on the Plain of Maip6  • • t^S

CHAPTER XVIII.
MAIPd. I8l8.
Confusion of the Royalists after Cancha-rayada — They march on
Santiago— The Plain of Maip6— Position of the Patriots-
Desertion of General Brayer— Battle of Maip6— Results of the
Battle — Osorio collects a Small Force at Talcahuano — Zapiola
takes Command in the South — Osorio evacuates Talcahuano . 174

CHAPTER XIX.
AFTER MAIPO.
. 1818.
Execution at Mendoza of Don Luis and Don Juan Jose Carrera — Con
stitutional Reform in Chile — Tragic Fate of Dr. Rodriguez — The
Secret Correspondence of Osorio — San Martin leaves for Buenos
Ayres — His Arrangements with Pueyrred6n — Monarchical Illu
sions — Bolivar — Spain  181

CHAPTER XX.
THE FIRST NAVAL CAMPAIGN ON THE PACIFIC.
1818.
The Naval Resources of Chile — Ships purchased by Government —
Affair of the Esmeralda — Blanco Encalada — Another Convoy
from Spain — The Mutiny of the Trinidad— -The Chilian

CONTENTS. XV
Squadron leaves Valparaiso — The Capture of the Maria Isabel
—Capture of Five Transports— The Return of the Squadron—
Cochrane— The Two Wives  186

CHAPTER XXI.
THE REPASSAGE OF THE ANDES.
l8l8— 1819.
The Last Campaign in Chile — Another Conspiracy of Carrera's —
Proclamation to the Peruvian People — Correspondence with
Bolivar — San Martin withdraws a Division to Mendoza— The
Tragedy at San Luis — Definite Arrangements for the Expedition
to Peru — Retirement of Pueyrred6n  194

CHAPTER XXII.
COCHRANE  CALLAO  VALDIVIA.
1819  1820.
The Character of Cochrane — He sails for Callao — The Spanish
Squadron — The First Attack on Callao — Loss of a Fireship —
Capture of the Montezuma — Return to Valparaiso — -Manufacture
of War Rockets — Second Attack on Callao — Inefficiency of the
Rockets — Guise captures Pisco — Death of Colonel Charles —
Capture of Transports at Guayaquil — Escape of the Prueba —
Cochrane's New Scheme — Valdivia — Capture of the Potrillo —
Reinforcements at Talcahuano — Return to Valdivia — Capture of
the Southern Forts — Evacuation of the Northern Forts — Wreck
of the Intrepido — Surrender of the City — Repulse at Chiloe —
Return  200

CHAPTER XXIII.
THE DISOBEDIENCE OF SAN MARTIN.
1819 — 1820.
The Perplexities of San Martin — Popular Sentiment in Spain — The
Expedition assembling at Cadiz — Discontent among the Troops
— O'Donnell crushes the Conspiracy — San Martin summoned
to Buenos Ayres — His Proposal to O'Higgins and Cochrane—
The Gaucho Chieftains — San Martin again ordered to Buenos
Ayres — The Plans of Government — The Due de Luca — Uprising
of the Argentine People — San Martin still hesitates — Mutiny of
the Army of the North — San Martin sends in his Resignation —
Critique on his Behaviour 

xvi CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XXIV.
THE CONVENTION OF RANCAGUA.
l820.
PAGB
The Spanish Revolution of 1820- Return of San Martin to Chile-
Mutiny of the Detachment at San Juan — The Remnant of the
Division crosses the Andes to Chile — Rout of Cepeda — The
Reign of Anarchy in the United Provinces — The Convention of
Officers at Rancagua — The Disobedience of San Martin en
dorsed by the Army — Cochrane aspires to the Command-in-
Chief— San Martin appointed Generalissimo — The Presence of
the Army of the Andes a Danger to Chile  216

CHAPTER XXV.
PERU. 182O.
The Colonial Era in Peru — Lima — The Peruvian People — Viceroy
Abascal — The Native Army — Pezuela — La Serna — Revolutionary
Outbreaks — The Insurrection of Cuzco — Secret Societies —
Correspondence with San Martin — Dissolution of the Native
Army — Olafieta — Camba — Valdes — The Royalist Forces . . 223

CHAPTER XXVI.
THE EXPEDITION TO PERU.
1820.
San Martin's Address to the Argentine People — Composition of the
Expedition — Sailing of the Expedition— Disembarkation at Pisco
— Occupation of Pisco by Las Heras — Proclamation by San
Martin — Pezuela proposes Peace — The Commissioners meet at
Miraflores — Arrange an Armistice — The Terms proposed —
Negotiations broken off — Expedition of Arenales to the High
lands — Re- embarkation of the Army ...... 230

CHAPTER XXVII.
THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN.
1820  1821.
The Coming Campaigns — The Pageant at Callao — Expedition from
Ancon — Guayaquil — Revolution of Guayaquil — The Esmeralda

CONTENTS. xvii

PAGE

Frigate cut out by Cochrane — The Expedition lands at Huacho
— Huara — Cavalry Skirmish at Chancay — The Numancia
Battalion joins the Patriots — Discontent in Peru — The Inde
pendence of Trujillo— Torre-Tagle— Junction with Arenales—
The Guerillas — The Provisional Regulation . . . .235

CHAPTER XXVIII.
THE FIRST CAMPAIGN IN THE HIGHLANDS.
1820 — 182I.
The Natural Division of Peru— The Highlands of Peru— The Flying
Column under Arenales — Defeat of Quimper — The Invasion of
the Highlands — The Battle of Pasco — Retreat of Aldao from
lea — Massacres of Indians by Ricafort — The Sack of Cangallo
and Huancayo — Aldao establishes himself at Huancayo — Are
nales rejoins San Martin  ' . , . 245

CHAPTER XXIX.
THE ARMISTICE OF PUNCHAUCA.
l82I.
Prospects of the Royalists — Spanish Councils of War — Deposition of
Pezuela — Proposals of Peace — The Conference at Retes — State
of the Two Armies — The Royal Commissioner — The Patriot
Army moves to Ancon — Proclamation from King Ferdinand —
Effect in Columbia — Effect in Mexico — Course of the Revolution
in Mexico — Iturbide — The " Plan de Iguala" — Success of the
Plan — Fate of Iturbide — The Conference of Punchauca — Armis
tice ofPunchauca — Interview between San Martin and LaSerna
¦ — Mistaken Policy of San Martin — The Conference renewed at
Miraflores — Prolongation of the Armistice — Captain Basil Hall
— Canterac moves to the Highlands — Return of the Patriot
Army to Huacho — La Serna evacuates Lima — Occupation of
Lima by the Patriots — Proclamation and Inactivity of San
Martin  '  249

CHAPTER XXX.
THE SECOND CAMPAIGN IN THE HIGHLANDS.
1821.
Aldao and his Indian Levies — Gamarra takes Command — Is driven
out by Ricafort — Ricafort returns to Lima — Arenales marches
from Huara— The Successes of Arenales cut short by the

XV111 CONTENTS.

Armistice— Character of Arenales — His Expostulations against
the Mistaken Policy of San Martin being unheeded he rejoins
him at Lima— Repulse of La Serna by the Mountaineers of
Jauja 

261

CHAPTER XXXI.
THE EXPEDITION TO THE SOUTH.
1821.
Conspiracy to capture Callao — Miller sent South with a small Force
— Lands at Pisco — Insurrection at Cuzco — Cochrane applies to
Chile for Aid — Ravages of Fever at Chincha — Cochrane sails for
Arica — Capture of Arica — Evacuation of Tacna — Miller marches
Inland — Capture of Mirave — Occupation of Moquegua — Miller
retreats to Tacna and to Arica — Miller establishes himself at
lea — Loss of the San Martin  265

CHAPTER XXXII.
PERU INDEPENDENT. 1821.
The Continental Campaign — Lack of National Spirit in Peru — Con
vention of Notables at Lima — Declaration of Independence —
Capture of Ships by Cochrane at Callao — Attempted Surprise by
Las Heras — Overtures of Cochrane to La Mar — San Martin
appoints himself " Protector of Peru " — Decree against the
Spaniards — Banishment of the Archbishop — Tragic Fate of Jos6
Miguel Carrera  270

CHAPTER XXXIII.
THE PROTECTORATE OF PERU.
1821 — 1822.
The Captain of the Army of the Andes — Royalist Expedition for the
Relief of Callao — The Defile of Espiritu Santo — Outburst of En
thusiasm in Lima — Manoeuvres in Front of Lima — Retreat of
Canterac — Feeble Pursuit of the Royalists — Capitulation of
Callao — Reforms of San Martin— The Order of the Sun — Dete
rioration in the Spirit of the Army — Subsidy from the City of
Lima — Conspiracy in the Army — Monarchical Ideas of San
Martin — Monteagudo and the " Patriotic Society of Lima " —
Mission of Garcia del Rio to Europe ...... 277

CONTENTS. xix
CHAPTER XXXIV.
SAN MARTIN AND COCHRANE.
1821 — 1822.
Mutual Invectives of Two Heroes— San Martin fails to fulfil his * °E
Promises to the Fleet — A Stormy Interview — Cochrane seizes
Treasure— Cochrane pays his Men with Government Funds 
And sails for Guayaquil — Surrender of Two Spanish Frigates to
Peruvian Agents — Cochrane attempts to seize the Venganza —
Returns to Callao and Captures the Montezuma — Returns to
Chile and abandons the Pacific — The New Peruvian Navy . 287
CHAPTER XXXV.
THE DISASTER AT ICA.
182I — 1822.
Royalist Headquarters established at Cuzco — Expedition under
Loriga against Pasco — Defeat of Otero — Burning of Cangallo —
San Martin sends a Contingent to the Assistance of Bolfvar —
And Summons the First Peruvian Congress — Torre-Tagle
Deputy- Protector — Expedition to lea — Rout of the Patriots by
Canterac — Barbarous Treatment of Spaniards by Monteagudo . 292
CHAPTER XXXVI.
THE REVOLUTIONS IN QUITO AND VENEZUELA.
. 1809 — l8l2.
The Northern Zone of South America — The First Outbreak at Quito
— The Revolution at Caracas — Commencement of the Reaction
— SIMON Bolivar — His Appearance and Character — His Edu
cation — His First Visit to Europe — His Second Visit to Europe
— His Life at Caracas — Reception of the Envoys by the British
Government — Bolivar meets Miranda in London — Brings him
back with him to Venezuela — Action of the Regency of Cadiz —
The Patriot Junta sends an Army against Coro — Reception of
Miranda — His Plan for a Constitution — First Congress of
Venezuela — Declaration of Independence — Revolt of the
Canarians — Revolt at Valencia — Capture of Valencia by Miranda
— Adoption of a Federal Constitution — General Discontent —
Carora sacked by Monteverde — The Royalists of Guayana —
Destruction of the Patriot Flotilla — The Great Earthquake —
San Carlos burned by Monteverde — Miranda is appointed
Dictator — Successes of the Royalists — Monteverde is repulsed
in an Attack on the Entrenched Camp at Victoria — Insurrection
of the Slaves — Loss of Puerto- Cabello — Miranda treats for Peace
— The Capitulation — Miranda is imprisoned by his Officers —
Cruelties of Monteverde — Death of Miranda .... 296

XX CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XXXVII.
THE REVOLUTIONS IN NEW GRANADA AND QUITO.
1809 — 1813.
PAGE
Excitement in New Granada — Expedition against Quito — Reinstal
lation of the late Captain-General of Quito— Massacres by the
Royalist Soldiery — Revolution at Cartagena — Outbreak on the
Plains of Casanare — A Junta established at Pamplona — And at
Socorro — Pacific Revolution at Bogota — Establishment of a
Junta — Social Anarchy — Proposals to summon a Congress — The
State of Cundinamarca — Narifio appointed Dictator — Congress
adopts the Federal System of Government and retires to Ibague
— The Province of Cartagena declares itself an Independent
State — Preparations of the Royalists — Torices named Dictator
of Cartagena — Operations against Santa Marta — Arrival of a
New Viceroy — The First Victory of the Patriots — Another In
surrection in Quito — Successes of Montufar and Macaulay —
Treachery of the Pastusos — La Vendee of the Revolution —
Installation oi a Junta at Quito — Operations in the South — Quito
declares itself an Independent State — Murder of Ruiz de Cas
tillo—Victory of the Royalists at Mocha — Capture of Quito —
Massacres at Popayan — The Policy of Narifio — The Congress at,
Leiva — Dr. Camilo Torres named President — Civil War — Ar
rival of another Viceroy — Cundinamarca and Antioquia declare
themselves Independent States — Congress places Narifio in
Command of the Army — Successes of Narifio — His Passage oi
the River Juanambu — Dispersion of his Army — He is sent in
Irons to Spain — Operations of Bolivar against Santa Marta —
Defeat of an Expedition from Cartagena — Bolivar conceives the
Idea of Reconquering Venezuela — He crosses the Cordillera —
His Memorial to the People of New Granada — President Torres
adopts his Idea  312

CHAPTER XXXVIII.
THE RECONQUEST OF VENEZUELA.
1813.
Pacification " by Monteverde — The Signal for Revolt — Triste —
The Expedition to the Mainland — Cruelties of Zuazola — Defeat
of the Royalists at Maturin — The Island of Margarita — Aris-
mendi — Siege of Cumana. — Cajigal retreats to Guayana — Marino
named Dictator of the Eastern Provinces — The Expedition of
Bricefio — Defeat of Correa by Castillo — Bolivar's Commission
from the Congress of Granada — Capture of Menda and Trujillo
— Bolivar fulminates a Decree of Extermination against all
Royalists — Marti Defeated by Rivas — Rout of Izquierdo — Valen
cia and Caracas evacuated by Royalists — The Genius of Bolivar
— His Triumphant Entry into Caracas — He proclaims Himself

-CONTENTS. XXI
PAGE
Dictator— Lays Siege to Puerto Cabello — The Reaction — Second
Decree of Bolivar — Arrival of Reinforcements at Puerto Cabello
— Death of Girardot — Victory of Las Trincheras — Honours to
Bolfvar at Caracas — The Order of the "Liberators" — Boves,
Morales, and Yafiez — They rouse the Llaneros — Campo-Elias —
Defeat of Boves at Mosquitero — Massacre of Royalists at Cala
bozo — Repulse of Patriots at Barquisimeto — Battle of Araure — •
Effects of the Dual Dictatorship — Reappearance of Boves on the
Scene — The Patriots are driven from the Plains — General Revul
sion of Feeling  324

CHAPTER XXXIX.
THE SECOND FALL OF VENEZUELA.
T814.
Bolivar discloses a New Phase of his Character — The Assembly of
Caracas — His Treaty with Marino — Defeat and Death of Yafiez
— Action at La Puerta — Repulse of Morales at Victoria — Suc
cesses of Rivas — The Massacres of Caracas and La Guayra —
Preparations of Bolivar — His Defence of the Entrenchments of
San Mateo — Heroism of Recaurte — Defence of Caracas by Rivas
— Of Valencia by Urdaneta — Action at Boca Chica — Marino
defeated at San Carlos — First Battle at Carabobo — Rout of the
Patriots at La Puerta — Capitulation of Valencia — D'Eluyar
raises the Siege of Puerto-Cabello — Bolivar evacuates Caracas
— Entrenches Himself at Aragua — Retreats to Barcelona — Cap
ture of Aragua by Morales — Bolivar is accused of Treachery — -
Retires to Curacpa — Repulse of Morales at Maturin — Massacre
at Cumani — Rout of the Patriots at Urica — Death of Boves —
Capture of Maturin by Morales — Death of Rivas — The Last
Patriot Army under Urdaneta seeks Refuge in New Granada . 343

CHAPTER XL.
THE DISSOLUTION OF NEW GRANADA.
1815 — 1817.
The Fall of Constitutional Government in Spain — Jealousy of Native
Troops — Bolfvar takes Command of the Army of New Granada —
Capture of Bogota — Fresh Honours to Bolivar — Bolfvar makes
War on Cartagena — And retires to Jamaica — His Memorials —
Morillo arrives from Spain with a Powerful Squadron, and takes
Command of the Royalists — Miyares secures the Isthmus of
Panama — Morillo's Instructions — Reduction of the Island of Mar-
\ garita — Loss of the San Pedro — Morillo occupies Caracas —
And sails thence for Cartagena— Cartagena — The Siege of
Cartagena— The Fortress and City are evacuated by the Patriots
b

XXII CONTENTS.
PAGE
—Repulse of Calzada from the Plains of Casanare— Defeat of
the Patriots at Balaga— Further Successes of Calzada— Madrid
is defeated by Samano in the South— Fresh Disturbances in
Venezuela— Offers of Amnesty — Establishment of Military Rule
at Bogota — Executions — Morillo returns to Venezuela — Cruelties
of Samano— Death of La Pola — Samano is appointed Viceroy
by Morillo  '  3S3

CHAPTER XLI.
THE THIRD WAR IN VENEZUELA.
1815 — 1817.
Position of Affairs in Venezuela — The Fresh Outbreak on the Island
of Margarita— Paez — His First Action — Revulsion of Opinion
among the Llaneros— The Army of the Apure — Successes of
Cedefio — Attempt to assassinate Bolivar — Bolfvar goes to Haiti
— The Expedition from Cayos — The Landing at Margarita —
Bolfvar is named Supreme Chief — The Expedition proceeds to
Cariipano — Bolfvar proceeds to Ocumare — Defeat of Bolfvar by
Morales — Bolivar's Flight from Ocumare — Successes of Mac-
Gregor — The Army of the Centre — Bolfvar returns to Haiti —
Defeat of Lopez by MacGregor — Piar defeats Morales at Jun-
cal — Paez lays Siege to San Fernando — The Spaniards eva
cuate the Island of Margarita — Bolfvar leaves Haiti with a
Second Expedition — Piar marches on Guayana — Forces the Pas
sage of the Cauca — Occupies the Missions of Coronf — Bolfvar
again defeated — And leaves for Guayana — Capture of Barce
lona by the Royalists — The True Base of Operations — Advance
of La Torre from New Granada — Is totally defeated by Paez —
And descends the River to Angostura — Is again defeated by
Piar at San Felix — Marino summons a Congress — Morillo puts
an End to the Farce — Brion forces his Way up the Orinoco —
Flight of La Torre — Conspiracy of Piar and Marino — Execution
of Piar — Banishment of Marino ....... 365

CHAPTER XLII.
THE REORGANIZATION OF VENEZUELA.
1817 — 1819.
The Expedition of Morillo and Canterac against the Island of Mar
garita — The Action at Matasiete — The Massacre at Juan Griego-
—Morillo returns to Caracas — Position of Patriots and of
Royalists — The Civil Administration of Bolfvar — Rout of Saraza
at Hogaza — The Horse Marines — Bolfvar surprises Morillo at
Calabozo — Retreat of the Royalists to Sombrero — Defeat of
Bolfvar at La Puerta — Capture of San Fernando by Paez—

CONTENTS. xxiii PAGE
Defeat of Paez at Cojedes — Defeat of Cedeno by Morales — And
of Morales by Paez — Marino takes Cumana, and refuses Alle
giance to the Liberator — Bolfvar raises a New Army, and is
reconciled to Marino — Santander sent to Casanare — Bolivar's
Idea of a Constitution — The Congress of Angostura — Bolfvar is
named President of Venezuela — The Foreign Auxiliaries — Luis
Mendez — Colonel Hippisley — Colonel Wilson — Campbell — Gil-
mour — Genera] English — Colonel Elsom — General MacGregor —
General Devereux — Colonel Montilla — Morillo opens the Cam
paign — Tactics of Paez — Morillo reoccupies San Fernando — -The
Affair of "Las Queseras del Medio" — Bolivar's New Idea . 380

CHAPTER XLIII.
BOY ACA — COLUMBIA— CARABO BO.
1819 — 1822.
Bolivar joins Santander — The Passage of the Cordillera — The Expe
dition halts in the Valley of Sagamoso — Skilful Manoeuvres of
Bolfvar — He captures the City of Tunja — -Battle of Boyaca —
Bolfvar occupies Bogota — His Activity and the Honours paid
Him — Founds the Republic of Columbia — Cruelty of Santander
— Bolfvar returns to Angostura— Changes during his Absence
— Decrees of Congress — Bolfvar named Provisional President of
Columbia — Military Operations on the North Coast — Arrival of
the Irish Legion at Margarita — Paez retakes San Fernando —
The Armistice of Trujillo — Morillo returns to Spain — Revolu
tion in Maracaibo — Operations of Montilla — Bolfvar again takes
the Field — Battle of Carabobo — Bolfvar for the Second Time
enters Caracas.in Triumph — The Constituent Congress — Bolfvar
is named President — Capitulation of Cartagena— The Provinces
of the Isthmus declare their Independence — Fall of Chagres and
Portobello — Bolfvar leaves for the South — Activity of Morales
— He capitulates — Puerto Cabello is taken by Paez . . 394

CHAPTER XLIV.
THE WAR IN QUITO.
1821 — 1822.
Operations in the South of Columbia — Sucre — He leads an Expedi
tion to Guayaquil — His Victory at Yahuachf — His Defeat at
Ambato — Arrival of Murgedn from Spain — Bolfvar marches on
Quito with a Fresh Army — Battle of Bombona — He retreats to
Patia — San Martin sends a Contingent to aid Sucre — Manoeuvres
of the Opposing Armies — The Cavalry Affair at Rio Bamba —
Battle of Pichincha — Surrender of Quito— Capitulation of Garcia
and of the Pastusos— Praetorianism— Bolfvar enters Quito in
Triumph  4°°

XXIV CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XLV.
GUAYAQUIL. 1822.
PAG*
The Meeting and Merging of Two Revolutions — The Protectorate of
Guayaquil — Defeat of the Provincial Army at Ambato— Arrival
of Sucre — The Revolt of Puerto- Viejo — Arrival of Salazar — La
Mar takes Command of the Provincial Forces — The Question of
Guayaquil  414-
CHAPTER XLVI.
THE INTERVIEW AT GUAYAQUIL.
1822.
The Influence of Individuals — The Illusions of San Martin — Bolfvar
becomes Jealous of Argentine Influence — The Entry of Bolfvar
into Guayaquil — He annexes the Province to Columbia — The
Arrival of San Martin — The Conference — The Banquet — The
Bail — Departure of San Martin — Result of the Conference —
Remarkable Letter from San Martin to Bolfvar .... 41&

CHAPTER XLVII.
THE ABDICATION OF SAN MARTIN.
1822.
Disturbances in Lima — Banishment of Monteagudo — Return of San
Martin — The First Congress of Peru — The Resignation of San
Martin — Honours decreed to him by Congress — He leaves
Peru — His Illness in Chile — He retires to Mendoza . . . 426*

CHAPTER XLVIII.
THE FIRST NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF PERU.
1822 — 1823.
The State of Peru — Appointment of a Junta — Bolfvar offers Assist-
ancer which is declined — The Plan of Campaign — The Army of
the South — Dilatory Movements of Alvarado — The Advance of
the Royalists — Battle of Torata — The Rout of Moquegua — ¦
Activity of Miller — Withdrawal of the Columbian Contingent —
Arenales leaves Peru — Riva-Aguero named President — Prepa
rations for a Fresh Campaign — English Loan — Despatch of a

CONTENTS. XXV

PAGE.

Peruvian Army to the South under Santa Cruz— Capture of Lima
by Canterac — Sucre brings another Columbian Contingent to
Peru — Bolfvar is named Generalissimo — Canterac returns to
the Highlands — Plans of Sucre — Manoeuvres of Santa Cruz — He
captures La Paz — Gamarra occupies Oruro — Retreat of Santa
Cruz— Indecisive Action at Zepita — Dispersion of the Patriot
Army — Orderly Retreat of Sucre — Appeals to San Martin for
Help — Reconstruction of Congress — Arrival of Bolfvar — His *
Reception — His Appearance — He is Master of Peru . . -431.

CHAPTER XLIX.
JUNIN— AYACUCHO.
1823 — 1824.
The Day- Dreams of Bolfvar — Rivadavia — Treaty between Columbia
and Buenos Ayres — Overtures from Spain to Buenos Ayres — The
Mission of Alzaga to the West and North — Treatment of the Argen
tine Contingent by Peru — Mutiny of the Garrison of Callao — Hoist
ing the Flag ol Spain — Falucho — Dissolution of the Army of the
Andes — Monet occupies Lima and Callao — Treachery of Torre-
Tagle — Ships burned by Guise in Harbour — Bolfvar named
Dictator — Execution of Argentine Officers by Monet — Illness of
Bolfvar — His Preparations — Olafieta rebels against the Viceroy
— Bolfvar marches on Jauja — Advance of Canterac — Cavalry
Action at Junin — Rapid Retreat of Canterac — Bolfvar returns
to Lima — Movement against him in the Congress of Columbia —
The Spanish Naval Squadron — Manoeuvres of Sucre — Advance
of Royalists from Cuzco — Sucre concentrates his Forces — The
Royalists gain his Rear — Victory or Death — Victory of Aya-
, cucho  443,

CHAPTER L.
APOGEE, DECLINE, AND FALL OF BOLIVAR.
1824 — 1830.
Results of the Victory of Ayacucho — The Twofold Nature of the
Revolution — Assassination of Monteagudo — Bolfvar summons a
Congress at Panama — His Theatrical Proceedings — Upper Peru
becomes an Independent State — -Tendency of the Policy of
Bolfvar — He leaves Lima for Potosf — The Banquet at Arequipa
— Bolfvar meets Argentine Envoys at Potosf — His Proposals to-
them — Opinions of the Press of Buenos Ayres — He draws up a.
Constitution for Bolivia — Attempt to assassinate Bolfvar at
Lima — Adoption of a New Constitution by Peru — The Grandi
Confederation of the Andes — The Nature of the Proposed Mono
cracy—Revolution in Venezuela — Bolfvar Returns to Columbia — ¦

XXVI

CONTENTS.

Revolutions in Peru and Bolivia — The Convention of Ocafia —
Bolfvar is again named Dictator of New Granada — Conspiracy
against him at Bogota— He declares War against Peru — His
Monarchical Proposals— Rebellion at Antioquia— Venezuela be
comes an Independent State — The Constituent Congress at
Bogoti — Bolfvar resigns — Mosquera is elected President of
New Granada — Pension assigned to Bolfvar .... 458

EPILOGUE.
The Verdict of Posterity — The Tragedy of Emancipation — San
Martin goes to Europe — His Return to Buenos Ayres — Bolfvar
in Retirement — Anarchy in New Granada — Establishment of the
Republic of Ecuador — Death of Bolfvar — His Last Words — Life
of San Martin in Exile — His Death — His Remains are brought
back to Buenos Ayres — The Work of the Two Liberators
compared — The Nature of True Greatness ....

470

TRANSLATOR'S APPENDIX.
I. — The Spanish Colonial System .
II. — Personal Appearance of San Martin
III.— The Rocket-Tubes at Callao .
IV. — Description of a Suspension Bridge
V. — The Ideas of San Martin
VI. — A Venezuelan Picture presented to the City of New York
VII.— The Battle of Carabobo 

477
478 478 478
479 480 481

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES.
Alvarado — Arenales — Brown — Cochrane — Guemes — Las Heras —
Lavalle — Miller — Necochea — O'Higgins — Paez .... 484

PROLOGUE.

The object of this book is to give a biography of General
Jose de San Martin, combining therewith the history of
the emancipation of South America. It is a necessary
complement to the History of Belgrano, written thirty
years ago. These two histories display the Argentine
Revolution in its two principal aspects; one relates the
development of a nation, the other the effect of this
development upon the emancipation of a continent.
This history is based, for the most part, upon documents
hitherto unpublished, some of which are truly posthumous
revelations which throw new light upon mysterious or
little known events, or correct errors resulting from
defective information.
I believe I have consulted all the books, pamphlets,
newspapers and fly-sheets which have ever been printed
concerning San Martin, and of manuscripts I have a col
lection of at least 10,000 documents, bound in 73 thick
volumes, which it is my purpose to deposit in the National
Library. The most important of these sources of information has
been the archive of General San Martin himself, which
was placed at my disposal by his son-in-law, the late Don
Mariano Balcarce. I have also consulted the archives of

XXviii PROLOGUE.
this city from the year 1812 to the year 1824, without
which it would have been impossible to compile a com
plete history. The archives of the Director Pueyrredon,
-which were given to me by his son, have also been of great
service to me, as also those of General O'Higgins, Don
Tomds Godoy Cruz, General Las Heras, and others. I
have also acquired much verbal information from con
versations held with many of the contemporaries of San
Martin, and with some of his companions in arms.
In addition to consulting all available maps and plans
relating to the campaigns of San Martin, I have inspected
in person the routes followed by the army of the Andes and
bave made sketches myself of the scene of memorable
•events when plans were not forthcoming.
This book will not be the historical monument which
posterity will some day consecrate to the immortal memory
of San Martin, but those who do at some future date erect
it, will herein find abundant materials, stones finished or
but roughly cut, with which solidly to lay out the
foundations. BARTOLOME MlTRE.
Buenos Ayres, 1887.

Here follows, on 25 pages, a list of unpublished manu
scripts consulted in the compilation of this work, which
manuscripts will be deposited in the National Library of
Buenos Ayres.
William Pilling.

THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.

CHAPTER I.
historical introduction.

The Argument of the Book.
Three great names stand forth conspicuous in the annals
of America, those of Washington, Bolivar, San Mar
tin. Of Washington, the great leader of the Democracy
of the North ; of Bolivar and of San Martin, who were the
Emancipators of the southern half of the continent. The
Atory of the life-work of the latter of these two is the
Argument of this book.
^ The scene of action passes on a vast theatre, a territory
extending for more than fifty degrees of latitude, from
C. ape Horn to the Tropic of Cancer, and occupies twenty
yei'&rs of strife. The starting-point of this history is the
Argentine revolution ; it follows the course of this revolu
tion ^ as it spreads over the continent, and its object is to
explain the laws which governed the establishment of a
fami;»ly of new Republics, and the fundamental principles
from ^Vhich they sprang.
Thi/1^ argument is dual and complex, for it treats both of
politicaVl revolution and of social evolution. It shows
how the i*A_rgentine revolution became a propaganda to the
world outside, of the principles upon which it was based,
and how ul ider these auspices independent and sovereign
B

2 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
nations sprang into existence, with forms and tendencies
in the same likeness and similitude. It shows the procla
mation of a new international law, which only permits of
alliance against an enemy in the name of a common des
tiny, and forbids conquests and annexations. It shows
also the failure of the attempt in Columbia to unite the
emancipated colonies artificially into a monocracy in oppo
sition to natural law and to the new idea of the rights of
man inaugurated by the Argentine revolution.
The two hegemonies, the Argentine and the Columbian,
unite to set the seal upon the emancipation of South
America. San Martin and Bolivar cross the continent
from the Atlantic to the Pacific by different routes, giving
liberty to enslaved peoples, founding new nations, and
meeting as together they enclose the colonial system in its
last entrenchments, they bring the two opposing systems
face to face, the shock resulting in the triumph of the
superior principle.
Thus considered, the history of the emancipation of
South America presents a homogeneous character, with ,
tmity of action and with one dominant idea, which in the (',
midst of accidental deviations reveals the existence of aw
law giving one accordant significance to facts accom-r
plished. •
The study of the theatre of the war of independence
shows that the scene passes in two distinct revolutionary j
areas — one at the south, comprehending the United Pro
vinces of the River Plate, Chile, and Upper Peru ; f .he
other, at the north, comprehending Venezuela, NewG'ra-
nada, and Quito. The strife and the triumph procd 3ed
simultaneously in each area until the two revolutions, l^Iike
to two masses obeying a reciprocal attraction, converge
towards the centre. This plan, drawn up and carriexd out
by the two great Liberators, emancipates South Ar.nerica
by the combined military action of the revolted colonies
which action has at once the ideal unity of a poer/ n. and the
precision of a machine. /

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 3
The unity of this action is clearly displayed in the
general lines of the life of San Martin, and gives to his
historic figure an importance far transcending both his
deeds and his designs. He was born in an obscure
American town, which disappeared as he commenced to
figure upon the scene ; thus America in its entirety be
came his country. He grew up as a soldier in the Old
World, fighting by sea and on land in company with the
first soldiers of the age, and so prepared himself for his
warlike mission, unwitting of his destiny. In the New
World he commenced his career by establishing tactics
and discipline as his base of operations, and from their
combination produced his machine of war. He consoli
dated the independence of the United Provinces of the
River Plate as the point from which he might start for the
conquest of South America. In command of the army of
the North, his name is associated with the revolution of
Upper Peru ; as he passed the Andes in prosecution
of his own plan, he became identified with the revolution
of Chile, and after consolidating the independence of this
country he initiated the first international alliance in
America. He secured the command of the Pacific, with
out which the independence of America was at that time
impossible, and gave liberty to Lower Peru. He then
carried the revolutionary standard of the allies to the foot
of Pichincha, where he met the liberator of Columbia.
Under the equator, which divides the two theatres of the
war, he clasped hands with Bolivar. Thus ended his
grand campaign; at the apogee of his power he disap
peared from the scene, knowing that his mission was ful
filled, that his strength was exhausted, and condemned
himself to exile, faithful to the ruling maxim of his life,
Seras lo que debes ser ; y sino, no seras nada.*
From exile he looked upon the results of his life-work :
the definitive political organization of South America in
* " Thou shalt be that which thou oughtest to be ; if not, thou slialt be
nothing." B 2

4 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
accordance with geographical divisions, the foundation of
a new constellation of independent States in obedience to
natural laws as by him instinctively foreseen. He saw
without envy that Bolivar, with whom he shared the glory
of the redemption of a new world, wore the crown of the
final triumph, though he knew that both as a politician
and as a soldier he was his superior. Then the wild dream
of Bolivar that he could found an empire of dependent
republics under the auspices of Columbia faded away, and
gave place to the Argentine plan of independent republics
heralded by San Martin.
Synopsis of the South American Revolution.
It has been said that posterity will look upon the eman
cipation of South America as the most important political
phenomenon of the nineteenth century, both in itself
and from the probable extent of its future consequences.
The immediate result was to bring into existence a new
group of independent nations, founded on democratic
principles, in open opposition to the right of conquest and
to the dogmas of monarchy and absolutism which yet
prevailed in the Old World. These new nations were
organized on the principle of equality, and were emanci
pated from privilege, and thus offered an entirely fresh
field for experiment in the development of the physical
and moral faculties of man. This movement thus consti
tutes one of the most drastic changes ever effected in the
condition of the human race.
The first throes of this revolution were felt at the two
extremities and in the centre of South America in the
year 1809. In 1810 all the Spanish American colonies
rose up in rebellion as by one innate impulse, and pro
claimed the principle of self-government. Six years later
all, save one, of these insurrections were quelled.
The United Provinces of the River Plate alone main
tained their position, and after declaring their own inde-

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 5
pendence they gave to the conquered colonies the signal
for the great and final struggle by making common cause
with them.
In 1 8 1 7 the Argentine revolution drew up a plan for the
emancipation of the continent, took the offensive, crossed
the Andes, and liberated Chile ; in union with Chile
obtained command of the Pacific, liberated Peru and
carried her arms to the equator in aid of the revolution
of Columbia. This vigorous impulse was felt in the
extreme north of this southern continent, which in its turn
defeated and expelled the champions of the old system,
went through a similar evolution, and crossed the Andes
to the point where the two forces united. The Highlands
of Peru became the scene of the final struggle. Then the
Spanish American colonies were free by their own
strength, and from the chaos sprang up a new world.
During the progress of these events, the United States
of the North, the pioneers of the Republican era, recog
nised the independence of the new republics (1822), as
" an expression of the simple truth," and declared —
" The peoples of South America have a right to break
the chains which bind them to their mother country, to
assume the rank of nations among the sovereign nations
of the world, and to establish institutions in accordance
with natural laws dictated by God himself."
As a consequence of this recognition the United States,
in the year 1823, promulgated the famous Monroe Doctrine
which, in opposition to the Bull of Alexander VI., esta
blished a new principle of international law under the
formula — " America for the Americans."
Free England, who at first looked favourably upon the
revolution, began, in 1 8 1 8, to lean towards Spain and the
Holy Alliance, advocating an arrangement on the basis
of the " commercial freedom " of the colonies. The diplo
matists of Washington interfered in favour of their com
plete emancipation, and Lafayette, in support of this idea,
declared to the Government of France : —

6 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
" Any opposition which may be made to the indepen
dence of the New World may cause suffering but wilL
not imperil the idea."
Thus, much before the final triumph, the emancipation
of the new continent was accepted as an accomplished
fact, and the attitude of the United States supported by
England turned the scales of diplomacy in its favour in
1823. When at the Congress of Verona the party of
reaction proposed a contrary policy, Canning, Prime
Minister of Great Britain, wrote to Grenville those
memorable words which re-echoed through two hemi
spheres : —
"The battle has been fierce, but it is won. The nail is
clenched ; Spanish America is free. Novus sceclorum
nascitur or do ! "
The battle of Ayacucho was the response to these
words, and Canning could then exclaim : —
" I have called a new world into existence to redress
the balance of the old."

The Action of America upon Europe.
The land discovered by Christopher Columbus, which
completed the physical world, was destined to re-establish
its general equilibrium at the moment the base thereof
was shaken.
Before the end of the fifteenth century Europe had lost
its moral and political equilibrium. After the invasion of
the barbarians, which imbued it with a new principle of
life without destroying the germ of decay left by the fall
of the Roman Empire, its civilization was again on the
point of collapse. Not one homogeneous nation there
existed, her productive energy was exhausted, liberty
was but a latent hope, privilege was the dominant law,
politics were founded on the principles of Macchiavelli, all
healthy evolution in the path of progress was impossible.

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 7
A fresh invasion from the East advanced under the
standard of the Crescent, and the despotism of Mussulman
fanaticism was the last hope of the people. Europe, shut
in between the Danube and the Pillars of Hercules,
seemed lost ; the discovery of a new world alone could
save her.
This discovery restored harmony to the discordant
elements, gave new life to Christianity, and saved the
liberties of mankind. The Reformation, which came
immediately afterwards, engrafted upon the consciences
of men the germ of the democratic principles of the Bible,
which, transplanted to a new world, later on regenerated
the effete civilization brought from Europe, and spread it
as a vital principle of politics all the world over.
The popular belief that the fountain of eternal youth
was to be found on the new continent discovered by
Columbus, was no vain imagination. The decrepit civili
zation of the Old World drew fresh youth and strength
from the virgin soil of America, the genius of progress
therein latent developed rapidly in the genial air. The
opening of this new and vast field to human activity, was
truly a renovation of social order in accordance with
natural law, and resulted in the organization of a demo
cracy based upon labour. To this end it was only neces
sary that the European, leaving his old traditions behind
him, should, on a vacant continent, work out his own
destiny under the guidance of healthy instinct.

The Colonization of Spanish America.
In the repartition of the new continent the worst lot fell
to the southern half. Spain and Portugal carried their
feudal absolutism to their colonies, but they could not
plant there their systems of privilege, of aristocracy, or of
social inequality. The good and the bad seed alike were
modified by cultivation in a new soil, the natural product

8 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
being democracy. The mode of colonization contributed
to this result. The most trustworthy annals of the Indies
recognise the fact that the conquest was achieved at the
expense of the conquerors, without any drafts on the royal
treasury. Hence arose that spirit of self-reliance which
they bequeathed to their descendants. A rebel world
grew up under the auspices of absolutism. The colonial
constitution, which inculcated a personal despotism and
excluded the idea of a common country, contributed fatally
to this result. Spanish America was looked upon as the
personal property of the Spanish monarch, in virtue of the
Bull of Alexander VI. Thus the colony did not form a part
of the nation, and was united to her only by allegiance to
a common sovereign. When the monarch disappeared,
his power lapsed to his vassals ; the logical and legal
result being the separation of the colonies from the mother
country. The government of the colonies was entrusted to the
Council of the Indies, represented politically by a Vice
roy, and in law by the Audiencia, the bounds of whose
authority were ill-defined. In municipal affairs, the
Cabildos, derived from the free communities of the mother
country, were nominally the representatives of the people.
In them lay the germs of democracy, as they possessed the
right to call public meetings for the settlement of their
own affairs by vote, which right, for long in abeyance,
became an active power when supported by popular
force. The great extent of the country, the want of moral
cohesion, the admixture of races, the general corruption of
manners, the absence of an ideal, the lack of political and
industrial activity, and the profound ignorance of the
masses, all contributed to produce a state of semi-bar
barism by the side of a weakly civilization, and vitiated
the entire social organism. From this embryo was to
spring a new republican world, the product of the germs
latent within it.

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

The Colonization of North America.
North America, more fortunate, was colonized by a
nation which had practical notions of liberty, and by a
race better prepared for self-government. The process
commenced a century later. The colonists easily adapted
themselves to a climate similar to that of the mother
country, and founded there a new home to which they
were bound by free institutions. Originally the English
colonies were looked upon as Crown provinces, and were
ruled by privileged companies, and by a Council similar
to that of the Indies, the monarch reserving to himself, as
in Spain, the supreme legislative authority and the right
of appointment, without giving any legislative rights.
The colonists of Virginia, by their own energy, soon
acquired some political rights, which were secured to them
by royal charters. This example was followed by the
colonists of Maryland. Colonial assemblies absorbed the
privileges of the companies, and the royal charters formed
later on the basis of republican institutions.
After the planters of Virginia and Maryland came the
Pilgrim Fathers of New England, who, flying from
persecution in Europe, sought liberty of conscience in the
New World. Authors of the great revolution, they were
deeply imbued with the republican spirit, and with the
democratic spirit of Switzerland and of the Netherlands, in
which latter country they had seen their ideal of the ruler
of a free people in the austere person of William of
Orange, the antetype of Washington. In accordance with
these ideas, they established at once a form of popular
government hitherto unknown, based upon just laws.
Finally came the Quakers, who proclaimed freedom of the
intellect as an innate and inalienable right, and drew up
their constitution on the basis of democratic equality,
absolute and universal ; in this anticipating the most
advanced of the modern era. Under William Penn they

10 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
established the representative colony of Pennsylvania, the
nucleus and the type of the great republic of the United
States. Such was the genesis of democratic liberty, destined to
become universal. Colonial Policy in both Americas.
The commercial monopoly which Spain adopted as a
system on the discovery of America, had an influence
quite as evil upon herself as upon her colonies. The
intention was that Spain should draw to herself the
wealth of the New World, by keeping in her own hands
the exchange of European manufactures for the pro-
j ducts of America. Every industry which might compete
with those of the Peninsula was prohibited in America.
At first Seville, and afterwards Cadiz, was declared to
be the only port from which ships laden with
merchandise could sail, or at which they could land
cargoes of colonial produce. All direct trade between the
colonies themselves was forbidden. The restrictive
system was completed by collecting all the merchant
vessels into annual or biennial convoys sailing in charge
of ships of war to or from Portobello and Panama. Mer
chandise so introduced, was carried across the isthmus
and distributed by way of the Pacific and by land to
Potosi, where the Southern and Atlantic Provinces could
supply themselves at prices five or six hundred per cent.
over the original cost. Such a system could only spring
from a mind enfeebled by the possession of absolute
power, and could only be tolerated by a race of slaves.
Before one century had elapsed, the population of Spain
was reduced by one-half, her manufacturing industries
were ruined, her mercantile marine no longer existed, her
trade was in the hands of foreign smugglers, and the gold
and silver of the New World went everywhere except to
Spain* When Spain, taught by experience, sought to
* See Appendix I.

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. ii
remedy the evil, it was already too late, her colonies on
the southern continent were lost to her. Neither force
nor love, nor a common interest, bound the disinherited
children to their parent ; the separation was complete,
and the independence of the colonies a question of time
and of opportunity.
The colonial system of Spain was not an invention, it
was an ancient tradition, it was the economic theory of
the epoch reduced to practice. England followed the
same system, committing even greater errors in the estab
lishment of privileged companies, such as the East India
Company, giving territories to them on a feudal basis,
the monarch reserving absolute authority over commercial
relations. In practice these errors furnished their own remedies.
Tyrannical laws fell into disuse from the resistance of
colonies armed with municipal rights. Thus the results
sought by England were achieved without great violence
and with advantage both to the mother country and to her
colonies. The navigation laws of 1650 — 1666 gave supre
macy to the mercantile marine of England, and by shut
ting out foreign competition from her markets, monopo
lised the trade with the colonies. This monopoly in
skilful hands, colonized North America and corrected to
some extent the errors of the system. In 1652, under
Cromwell, freedom of commerce was established between
England and her colonies, the right being given to the
colonists to tax themselves by the votes of their represen
tatives and to regulate their own Customs duties. This
was almost independence. Even when their charters were
mutilated or abrogated by the Stuarts, this doctrine was
respected by common consent. When England disregarded
it came the revolution.
The Emancipation of North America.
A special question of constitutional law concerning

12 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Customs duties, was the immediate cause of the revolu
tion in North America. The revolution of South America
arose from a question of fundamental principles.
The Stamp Tax imposed by England on her colonies was
repealed on the ground that it was an internal tax, but
Parliament sanctioned the imposition of Customs duties
on the ground that they were an external tax, the produce
of the colonies being subject to the will of the king. The
colonists protested and took a further step by declaring
that the Mutiny Act had nothing to do with them, as it
was sanctioned by a Parliament in which they were not
represented. They called out their municipal militia, and
so in 1774 commenced the great struggle for the emanci
pation of America. During ten years their resistance had
been kept within the limits of the laws, but from this
moment they took their stand on the wide basis of natural
and ideal right, independent of law and of tradition.
The Declaration of Independence on the 4th July, 1776,
was the proclamation of an innate universal human right,
of a new theory of government independent of precedent,
inspired by natural law, by philosophy, and by political
science. This declaration became, as has been said,
" The profession of faith of all the liberals of the
world." The echo of these theories was heard in France, and by
her was transmitted to the Latin nations of both hemi
spheres. The people embraced them with enthusiasm.
Up to that time two schools of politics had divided the
empire of free thought. The historical school, led by
Montesquieu, looked upon the constitution of England as
the finished work of experience and of human logic. The
philosophical school, led by Rousseau, denied the value of
experience and^ thought to establish liberty and the sove
reignty of the people by seeking " the best form of asso
ciation for the defence and protection of each associate
against the force of all, so that each one should obey only
himself and remain free as before." This second doctrine

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 13
formulated in the constitution of the United States, be
came a new principle in political science, and as such met
with general acceptance throughout the colonies of South
America. The most important feature of the revolution^of North
America is not the achievement of her national independ
ence, but her emancipation, political, intellectual, and
moral, in the name of human rights and in constitutional
form. From this moment, English constitutionalism
ceased to be a model, and the English constitution to be
an ideal, even among the English themselves, who have
had to recognise their descendants and political pupils as
their masters.
The spirit of free England, anticipating the verdict of
posterity, justified insurrection in America. Statesmen
and thinkers such as Chatham and Burke, sympathised
in the movement, declaring, " There is no monopoly of
principle," but its effect upon France was still more
marked, being the outcome of the reasonings of her
philosophers. Thus it was that America reacted for the second time
upon Europe with most beneficial effect. On the third
occasion the part of teacher is played by South America.
The Affiliation of the Revolution of South
America.
Hardly was Peru conquered by the Spanish race, than
it became the theatre of civil war. The conquerors,
headed by Gonzalo Pizarro, rebelled against their king in
the name of their rights as conquerors, cut off the head of
the king's representative and burned the Royal Standard.
Hardly had one generation time to grow up in America,
ere a son of Hernan Cortez, in whose veins flowed the
blood of the celebrated Indian Dona Marina, conspired to
give independence to Mexico in the name of the same
territorial rights invoked by Pizarro. The far off colony

14 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
of Paraguay was from the first a turbulent municipal
republic. The colonists deposed their royally appointed
governors with shouts of " Death to Tyrants," elected
rulers of their own, and did as they liked for more than
twenty-five years (1535-60). These and many other similar
facts, prove that the colonization of South America was
imbued from the commencement with the principle of
individuality and with the instinct of independence, which
naturally resulted in emancipation and democracy.
These insurrections were outbursts of Castillian spirit,
but early in the eighteenth century, Creoles begin to call
themselves with pride Americans, and for the first time
is heard in Potosi the cry of Liberty. In 171 1 the half-
breeds proclaimed a mulatto King of Venezuela. In 1733
the Creoles rose in arms and compelled the abrogation ot
the commercial monopoly of the " Compania Guipuz-
coana de Caracas." In 1730 two thousand half-breeds at
Cochabamba (Upper Peru), made armed protest against
the poll-tax, and acquired the right to elect Creoles as
officers of justice to the exclusion of Spaniards. In 1765
the Creoles of Quito rose in armed insurrection against
the imposition of direct taxes. None of these outbreaks
had as yet any definite political character. The em
bryonic republic of Paraguay gave the first example of
a revolutionary movement based upon the sovereignty of
the people.
Jose Antequera, by birth an American but educated
in Spain, appeared on the scene during a dispute between
the governor of Paraguay and the Cabildo of Asuncion.
The people named him governor by acclamation. He
placed himself at their head, in opposition to the theo
cratic rule of the Jesuits, who were ruining the country.
He fought pitched battles against the royal troops and
was blessed as a saviour, but died on the scaffold as a
traitor to his king.
After his death, his pupil Fernando Mompox organized
the popular party under the name of the Comuneros,

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 15
deposed another governor and established a governing
Junta, but was also overcome.
In 1 78 1 the Comuneros broke out in insurrection in New
Granada, but the movement was suppressed.
These were not events of great historical importance,
but they show that throughout the period of Spanish
domination, the rule of the mother country was irksome
to the Spaniards themselves, and was hateful to all
Americans.

The Moral Revolution of South America.
There can be no revolution until the ideas of men
become the conscience of the mass, and until the passions
of men become a public force, because " it is man and not
events which constitute the world." The revolution was
accomplished in the man of South America before the end
of the eighteenth century ; after that all his actions have
one object and one meaning. Emancipation was no
longer an instinct, it became an active passion.
Spain through jealousy of England joined France in
aiding the rebels of the North, and her recognition of the
independence of the new republic was virtually the abdi
cation of her own authority over the South. A randa-r-rrrrs"
of Jhe^fixsJL^iate^Tnen_ of_his time, advised his sovereign
in..-i7_&3_to_fores.tall the-inavitabTeTutnTrHby^rn"aTcing~^ne
infante King pf Mexico, one King of Pensand one King
of tliilMainland, taking to himself the rank of Emperor.
The King of Spain shut his ears to these counsels.
The revolution of 17S9 proved that the ideas embodied
in the Declaration of Independence were of universal
application. The monarchs of Europe took the alarm
and formed reactionary leagues. To South America
these ideas were conveyed by educated Creoles, who
travelling in Europe learned them from French writers.
" The Rights of Man " was translated, printed in secret,
and circulated through New Granada by AtrtomoNarii

16 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Charged with this as a crime, no proof could be brought
against him as no copy of the book could be found,
tortures failing to extract information from suspects. He
was banished to Africa, his property confiscated, and his
original copy of the work was burnt by the public execu
tioner. From the men of culture the new ideas filtered
to the masses, transforming their minds by the creation of
an ideal, which each one interpreted in accordance with
his own talents, interests, or prejudices.

The Precursor of the Emancipation of South
America.
During some years previously an ardent apostle of
human liberty had wandered about the world. He was a
dreamer with confused ideas and undisciplined attain
ments, a generous minded warrior, above all, a man of
strong will. A soldier of Washington, a comrade of
Lafayette, a general under Dumouriez,* a companion of
Madame Roland in her prison, a confidant of Pitt in
his schemes of insurrection in the colonies of Spanish
America, distinguished by Catharine II. of Russia, whose
favours he put aside in deference to his austere mission,
looked upon by Napoleon as a lunatic with a spark of the
sacred fire, Francisco Miranda, a native of Caracas,
was the first to foresee the great destinies of republican
America, and the first to raise the banner of freedom on
the southern continent.
He it was who organised the revolutionary efforts ot
South Americans in Europe ; establishing an understand
ing with the Creoles of the colonies. It was he who
towards the close of the eighteenth century founded in
* Miranda served with great distinction in the campaigns of Valmy and
Jemappes, and commanded the right wing of the Republican army at the disas
trous affair of Neerwinden. He was afterwards imprisoned by the Directory on
suspicion of being implicated in the defection of Dumouriez, whose treachery he
had denounced, but escaped and fled to England. — Tr.

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 17
London the political society, the " Gran Reunion Ameri
cana," to which they were all affiliated. In this society
were initiated in the mysteries of future liberty, O'Higgins
of Chile, Narino of New Granada, Montufar and Rocafuerte
of Quito, Caro of Cuba, who represented the patriots of
Peru, Alvear, an Argentine, and others who later on
became illustrious. Here the two great liberators, BOLI
VAR and San Martin, took an oath to work out the
triumph of the cause of the emancipation of South
America. This society was the type of the secret societies which,
transplanted to the theatre of action, impressed its seal
upon the characters of those who directed the revolution
of South America. They inoculated it with the true
American idea, which, heedless of frontiers and disregard
ing all obstacles, looked upon the enslaved colonies as
one, with one aspiration, with one love, and with one
hatred of their common master. This gave cohesion to
the revolution in America, and ensured triumph by the
union of all forces to one common end. Here was the
point of contact of all Creoles, wherever they might work
for independence and for liberty. Here is the explanation
of the identity of the original movements in spite of the
isolation of each colony.
Miranda sought to interest the whole world in the cause
of independence ; chiefly he sought the help of England.
Three times (1790 — 1801) he obtained a promise of moral
and material support from Pitt, with the co-operation of
the United States. European complications and the
hesitation of the cabinet at Washington, prevented the
fulfilment of these promises. In 1791 he published a letter
to the Americans, in which he attacked the colonial system
of Spain, declaring that nature had separated America
from Spain by the interposition of the ocean, thus emanci
pating her sons from the mother country, and that they —
" Were free by natural right received from the Creator ;
that the moment had arrived for opening up a new era of
c

iS THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
prosperity ; and with the aid of Providence, to raise up in
America a grand family of brothers united by a common
interest." Failing in his attempt to secure the help of England and
the United States, Miranda ventured upon the enterprise
by himself. In the year 1806 he made two attempts to
kindle the fire of revolution in his native country. He
landed on the mainland at Ocumare with two hundred
men, and at Vela de Coro with five hundred. None
responded to his call, but the cry was heard, and its echo
resounded through two worlds.
England, on the death of Pitt, abandoning his projects
for the emancipation of the colonies of Spanish America,
attempted to conquer them for herself, and was twice
defeated at Buenos Ayres in 1806 and 1807. Miranda
was pleased at this defeat, and in 1808 wrote to congratu
late the Cabildo of Buenos Ayres. At the same time he
wrote to the Cabildo of Caracas, giving notice of the
invasion of Spain by Napoleon, advising them to take
charge of the government and to send deputies to London
to arrange the future course of the New World. At the
same time he published in London a pamphlet written in
English by an Englishman, in which from the defeat of
the English was drawn a lesson, based upon the opinion
of General Auchmuty, that the Creoles would only make
alliance with England on condition of their own indepen
dence. Miranda translated this pamphlet into Spanish,
and added a sketch of a constitution for the new States
proposed, the dominant idea of which was a federal
republic on a basis of independent Cabildos.
As the victory of Buenos Ayres made a great noise in
the world, and more especially in the hearts of Americans,
this propaganda fell in with the new sentiment of nation
ality, disclosed in the words of Don Cornelio Saavedra in
his address to the Patricios* of Buenos Ayres in 1807:
* A native regiment which had taken a prominent part in the repulse of the
English. — 'Is..

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. ic,
"Those born in the Indies, whose spirits are undaunted,
are in no way inferior to the Spaniards of Europe, and in
valour give place to none."

The Races of South America. — The Creole.
Five races, which for historic purposes may be looked
upon as three only, peopled the Southern Continent at the
outbreak of the War of Independence : the European
Spaniards, the Spanish-American Creoles, and the half-
breeds ; also the indigenous Indians, and the negroes from
Africa. The Spaniards formed a privileged class, and by
reason of their origin enjoyed both political and social
pre-eminence. The Indians and the negroes formed the
servile class. The half-breeds, derived from a mixture of
three races, formed an intermediate class, and in some
places were in a large majority. The Creoles, direct
descendants of Spaniards, of pure blood, but modified in
character by contact with the half-breeds, were the true sons
of the soil, and constituted the basis of society. Generally
the most numerous, they were always the civilising force
of the colony. They were the most energetic, the most
intelligent and imaginative ; and with all their inherited
vices and their want of preparation for freedom, were the
only ones animated by an innate sentiment of patriotism.
Those born in South America thus formed a race apart,
an oppressed race, who saw in their ancestors and in their
contemporaries not fathers and brothers, but masters. The
colonial system placed, to a certain extent, all natives of
the soil upon the same level, and drew a broad line of
distinction between the Spanish-American colonists and
their mother country. Spain, by reason of distance,
yielded to her colonists greater freedom and more muni
cipal rights than she gave to her own sons in their own
land, but her absolute government could not bind her
colonies to her by the tie of nationality. Men of Spanish
c 2

20 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
birth looked upon the colonies as feudal territory, over
which they, as beings of a superior race, were the natural
lords, and thought that if only a shoemaker remained
in Castile, this shoemaker had the right to govern all
America. The natural aspiration of slaves is for freedom, and that
of oppressed races who know their own strength is to
assume their place in the human family. In this double
aspiration lay the germ of revolution in America. In 1780
the indigenous race under Tupac-Amaru, a descendant
of the Incas, rose en masse in Peru against their oppres
sors, but were naturally defeated. They possessed no
great social force, and did not represent the cause of
civilized America. The day of the Creoles had not yet
come, but they saw nothing to admire, to love, or to respect
in Spain. An absolute King, generally an imbecile, was
the sole point of contact between them. Their mother
country was to them neither a country nor a mother. The
instinct of independence became a passion, even more
vehement in those who resided in Spain than in those who
had never left their own hearths. Thus it was that the
leaders who did most for the revolution came from Spain.
In the struggle each race took its own special part.
The Creoles formed the vanguard and directed the move
ments. The indigenous races formed the first line in
Mexico, but elsewhere they were only useful as auxiliaries.
In South America the half-breeds formed the rank and
file of the armies of the revolution. The Argentine gaucho,
with the fatalism of the Arab and the strength of the
Cossack, gave the type to the cavalry, renowned for the
impetuosity of their charge from La Plata to Chimborazo.
The llaneros* of Venezuela, half-breeds for the most part,
formed the famous squadrons of Columbia, whose feats
were celebrated from the Orinoco to Potosi. The rotosf of
Chile, mostly of Indian blood, formed with Argentines in
solid battalions, who measured their strength with Spanish
* Men of the plains, from llano = a plain. t Countrymen.

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 21
regiments, victors over the soldiers of Napoleon in the
Peninsula. The manumitted negroes gave their contin
gent to the American infantry, showing the warlike
qualities of their race. In Upper Peru the indigenous
races kept alive for ten years the flames of insurrection
when the patriot armies were defeated. The cholos of the
Highlands of Peru espoused the cause of the king, and
were highly esteemed as infantry by the Spanish generals,
more especially on account of the extraordinary rapidity
of their marches.
The Creole of South America is a sturdy off-shoot of
that civilizing Indo-European race to which is reserved
the government of the world. It is his mission to com
plete the democratization of the American continent and
to found a new order of things destined to live and pro
gress. He has impressed the peculiarities of his character
upon the new nationalities.
When the revolution broke out in 1810, it was said that
South America would become English or French; when
it triumphed, that the continent would sink back into
barbarism. By the will and the work of the Creole, it
became American, republican, and civilized.
The First Throes of Revolution.
The initial outbreaks of the year 1809, were in some
parts of a more radical character than were those of the
following year, when the first political formula of the
rebellion was merely a demand for relative and provi
sional independence, for a compromise between democracy
and monarchy upon the basis of autonomy.
The doctrine that on the disappearance of the monarch
his sovereignty reverted to his people, was for the first,
time boldly proclaimed in Mexico. From this it was^
deduced that they had the right to appoint governing
Juntas for their own security, and owed no allegiance to
those established in Spain at the time of the French in-

22 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
vasion. Hence arose disputes between the Creoles and
the Spaniards, and between the Audiencia and the Vice
roy, which at the end of 1809 changed the movement into
a conspiracy for independence.
In Quito the commotion assumed more definite forms.
The colonial authorities were overturned and a governing
Junta was set up, which took to itself the attributes of
sovereignty and raised troops for its own defence. They
exhorted the peoples of America by a proclamation to
follow the example, announcing that " law has resumed
its authority under the equator," and that " the rights of
man were, by the disappearance of despotism, no longer
at the mercy of arbitrary power." The authors of this
premature revolution were overcome and put to death in
prison. In Upper Peru, the city of Chuquisaca was the first to
move. In May, 1809, the Creoles, at the instigation of the
Audiencia, tumultuously deposed the constituted authori
ties, and set up an independent government. In July
the city of La Paz followed the example. Under the name
of the Junta Tuitiva, an independent government composed
exclusively of Americans was established, which raised
an army, and hung on a gallows those who denied its
authority. Both these revolts were suppressed by the
combined arms of the neighbouring Viceroyalties of Peru
and La Plata. The leaders of the insurrection of La Paz
died either on the field of battle or on the gallows. One
of the latter before being thrown off cried out : — " The fire
which I have lighted shall never be quenched." Their
heads and limbs were nailed to the posts which mark out
the public roads in that country, but before they had
rotted away the fire was again burning in Upper Peru.
By the quelling of these conspiracies it was thought that
the danger was averted, but as was said by the Viceroy of
Peru fifty years before, on the first revolt of the Comuneros
of Paraguay, " it was but a covering up of the fire with
ashes."

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 23

The Growth of the Revolution.
In the year 18 10 the drama of revolution unfolded itself
upon a vast continental scene, with a unity of action which
from the first attracted the attention of the world. All the
Spanish American colonies with the exception of Lower
Peru, arose in rebellion simultaneously, and proclaimed
one political doctrine. Some historians have thought
that this movement was the result of an external impulse,
and that the subsequent separation was as the falling of
unripe fruit. Others, better informed, look upon this
separation as a necessity : " The union of Spain with
America, possible under an absolute regime, was incom
patible with representative government and with the politi
cal equality of the citizens." The truth is that the South
American revolution was inspired by an innate sentiment
of patriotism, in obedience to conservative instinct, and
by its nature tended to independence.
The divorce of the colonies from the mother country\
took place at a critical moment, when their union was
hurtful to them both. If America was not prepared for I
self-government, and if her attempts at self-government
almost exhausted the forces already weakened by the
struggle, what would then have been her condition had
she remained under the rule of unnatural laws which con
demned her to a lingering death, a prey to vices inoculated
by an evil system ?
It cannot be denied that without the invasion of Spain
by Napoleon in 1808, and the consequent disappearance of
the dynasty of Spain, the revolution would have been de
layed ; but this does not imply that America was not ripe
for emancipation, the opportunity was nothing more than
the spark setting fire to the combustibles already prepared
for burning.
The Provisional Government established in Spain antici
pated the complaints of the colonists, and recognised by

24 ThE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
its acts the justice of their cause, fomenting their resistance
as much by its concessions as by its refusals. The
Regency of Cadiz called upon Americans to join the
national Cortes, thus raising them to the rank of freemen,
but at the same time gave them only one deputy, chosen
by itself, for each million of inhabitants, while to the
natives of the Peninsula, for the most part under the
yoke of the foreigner, it gave one deputy for each hun
dred thousand. The essential difference lay in the diver
gence of their political opinions. The Regency maintained
"The American dominions are an integral part of Spain,"
from which it deduced the right of Spain to rule America
in the absence of the sovereign. Americans, as we have
already seen, maintained that the crown was the only link
between them. Take away this fundamental divergence
of opinion, and the reason for the revolution disappears,
the insurrection loses its legality, and the question
becomes one of national representation, having no relation
either to independence or to autonomy.
The colonial authorities were deposed without resist
ance by the force of public opinion, and new ones were
instituted without any rupture of relations with the mother
country, though all foresaw the logical end of the process.
In answer to this moderate policy, the Regency refused to
the colonies that freedom of trade which it had proposed
to give them, avoided the mediation of England, and, with
out attempting to arrive peacefully at an understanding,
stigmatised the Americans as rebels and declared war
against them, punishing as high treason in them that
which the Spaniards themselves had done in Spain. It
was then (1811) that Venezuela declared herself indepen
dent, and gave herself a republican constitution.
South America was ill-prepared for the struggle; she
had neither soldiers nor politicians, she had to improvise
all she needed. Spain in alliance with England and sup
ported by the first nations of the world, was mistress of
the seas, her armies triumphant in Europe, were stronger

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 25
than before the French invasion, nevertheless South
America unaided accepted the challenge, and triumphed
all alone.
The meeting of the Cortes and the promulgation of the
Constitution of 18 12, instead of reconciling the mother
country with her colonies, fanned the flames of insurrec
tion, and by concessions encouraged the spirit of inde
pendence. When in 1814 the King was restored, America
was still governed in his name, and the movement having
been crushed in Venezuela the revolution was placed in a
false position. The refusal of America to surrender with
out conditions to absolute power, was replied to by the
proclamation of a war of reconquest, and amicable
arrangement was no longer possible.
In 1820 despotism triumphed in Europe under the
banners of absolute kings allied against the liberties of
the people, but in South America the cause of indepen
dence, fostered by the example of the United States, was
successful. From this epoch the reaction of American
thought is felt in the Parliament of England, and influ
ences even Spain herself, where the armies collected to
stamp out revolution in America, turn against the abso
lute king and re-establish a constitutional regime. This
is a critical moment: upon the triumph or the defeat of
revolution in South America depend the destinies of two
worlds. Five years later on, victory crowned her efforts, America
is republican, independent, and free. From this moment
the current of history, which has for three centuries carried
despotism from the East to the West, now turns back ; the
action of the principles of American regeneration flows
from West to East and spreads over Europe until stopped
by the barrier of Islamism. Greece cries out for emanci
pation, and Europe instead of joining to crush her aspira
tions, runs to help her. Portugal becomes free by the
example and influence of her American colonies, who send
back to her her absolute kings, transformed into consti-

&

26 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
tutional rulers. In France the revolution of 1789 revives
in a compromise between monarchy and a republic, its
champions being a comrade of Washington and an emi
grant prince who had studied American democracy at
close quarters. Take away the South American revolu
tion of the year '10, suppose it to be suppressed in 1820,
or eliminate the final triumph of 1825, and the republic
of the United States remains the sole representative of
liberty ; and the world, even with the help of free Eng
land, lies grovelling under the sway of absolutism.

Attempts at Monarchy in South America.
Had the idea of Aranda been adopted in 1783, it is
probable that a bastard monarchy would have been estab
lished in America, upon which time would have impressed
the seal of democracy. Had the King of Spain removed
his throne to America in 1808, as did he of Portugal, it is
possible that the course of the revolution might have been
changed under dynastic auspices, delaying the advent of
the republic and perchance accelerating constitutional
stability. These two opportunities being lost, the revolu
tion could only develop in accordance with its own nature
and become essentially a republican movement.
The Pilgrim Fathers of New England and the Quakers of
Pennsylvania carried with them the seed of republicanism.
The Cavaliers who colonized Virginia became republicans
by founding a new country of a distinct type, which pro
duced Washington. The Spanish colonists of South Ame
rica brought with them no such ideas but only germs of
individualism, from which time developed desires for inde
pendence and for equality. The indigenous races knew
nothing of any form of government except monarchy.
The Creoles were born republicans. The idea of establish
ing a monarchy never sprang from a Creole brain, and
when proposed was looked upon by them only as a com-

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 27
promise or as an artificial expedient when it was not
folly. In 1808 the English constitution was the ideal of
thinkers trained in the school of Montesquieu. In 18 10
the social contract of Rousseau was their gospel, and the
revolution of that year assumed spontaneously a popular
form, producing municipal republics, whereby the course
of opinion became exclusively democratic.
When early reverses damped the republican hopes of
Argentine leaders, they looked to the establishment of a
monarchy under the protection of the Great Powers as a
means of securing independence and constitutional free
dom. In 1 8 14 it was proposed to crown an Infante of
Spain King of La Plata. In 1816 that same Congress
which declared the independence of the Argentine Pro
vinces, embraced the idea of crowning a descendant of the
Incas at Cuzco, and uniting Peru and the River Plate
under his rule, a proposition quenched in ridicule. The
same Congress, in 1819, after swearing to and promul
gating a republican constitution, sought in Europe for a
king, lowering their character in the eyes of the world,
and bringing accusations of treachery upon themselves
from their own countrymen.
This reaction took place precisely at the time when the
perseverance of the republicans had gained for them uni
versal sympathy, when the United States threw her shield
over the infant peoples to protect them from the attacks of
the Holy Alliance, and when England, after declaring that
she would not recognise " the revolutionary governments
of America," became convinced of her mistake. The
agents of this policy were men such as Rivadavia, who
stands in America second alone to Washington as the
representative statesman of a free people ; such as Bel
grano, the type of republican virtue; and such as San
Martin, who, a republican at heart, had no faith in demo
cracy, yet founded republics which by natural law became
democracies. When San Martin ignored this law, his
career as a liberator came to an end.. So also, later on,

28 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
fell Bolivar in the attempt to convert democracy into
monocracy. The only American liberator who in his folly
crowned himself emperor— Iturbide in Mexico— died on
the scaffold, a presage of the sad end of another emperor,
whose corpse was sent back to Europe as a protest
against the imposition of monarchy.
The Empire of Brazil is apparently a proof of the possi
bility of establishing monarchy in America, but the con
trary is the fact. Brazil is a democratic empire, founded
upon the principle of the sovereignty of the people, with
out any privileged class or hereditary nobility, and has
nothing monarchical about it except the name.

Retrospection.
When the war was over and the continent at peace,
Bolivar exclaimed, "I blush to say it, independence is
the only good we have achieved at the cost of all else."
Even at this price independence was solid gain, for it
was life. The continuance of the colonial system was
death by decomposition. Independence was, moreover,
the establishment of the democratic republic, a system
under which all losses may be retrieved. South America
has no reason to complain of the task allotted to her in
working out the destiny of humanity.
In the first decade of this century the republic of the
United States was a sun without satellites. The appa
rition of a group of new nations from the colonial nebula
of the South, formed, for the first time in the political
world, a planetary system of republics governed by natural
laws. An entire continent, almost one half the globe,
extending from pole to pole and washed by the two
greatest of the oceans, became republican.
At that time there were but two republics in the world —
in Europe, Switzerland ; in America, the United States.
The influence of the latter was not yet felt, but the new
system of republics soon became a power of the first rank.

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 2q
The republics of South America were strong enough
to conquer their independence, but they lacked the
elements of self-government. They had passed at one
bound from slavery to freedom, and it took them more
than one generation to eradicate evils produced by three
centuries of misgovernment. In the war they had
expended not only their blood, their treasure, and their
vital energy, but also their intellectual strength. Wealth
came to them with independence, but the want of the
elements of self-government made them an easy prey to
anarchy and despotism, from which the conservative
instinct at length saved them. Still they suffer the evils
of inexperience, but nothing is lost while republican insti
tutions, the great work of the revolution, are preserved.
No people so ill-prepared for the change could have
done better. Even the United States passed through a
critical period of transition, which imperilled their exis
tence as an organised nation. The republics of South
America have suffered greatly from misgovernment, but
the instincts of the people have ever been superior to the
incapacity of their rulers. Had they continued subject to
Spain, they would have died of inanition ; had the English
invasion been successful, they might now be colonies of
England, such as Australia and Canada, and might
possibly be richer in material wealth than they are, but
they would not be independent nations, charged with the
mission of creating new elements of progress ; they would
but feebly reflect a far-off light. South America would
but exist as an appendage of Europe, and Europe would
be subject to the Holy Alliance of absolute kings.
If South America has not realised all the hopes
awakened by the revolution, still it cannot be said that
she has faltered in her course. She has resolved for her
self the problem of life, educated herself in the hard school
of experience, and by sorrow has purged away her vices.
Giving the lie to sinister presage, which condemned her
to absorption by inferior races, the energetic Creole has

30 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
assimilated them, giving them freedom and dignity, or,
when necessary, has suppressed them. With help from
the most superior races of the world, acclimatized upon
her hospitable shores, the reins of government have been
secured to him. Her regenerated population doubles
itself in twenty or thirty years ; before the end of the next
century South America will number four hundred millions
of freemen, North America five hundred millions, and all
America will be Republican and Democratic.
To these great results, following the example of Wash
ington and equal to Bolivar, will have contributed, with
such talents as he possessed, the founder of three
republics, the emancipator of one-half of South America,
whose history will now be told.

CHAPTER II.
SAN MARTIN IN EUROPE AND IN AMERICA.
1778— 1812.
Jose de San Martin was born on the 25th February,
1778, at the town of Yapeyu in Misiones, and was the
fourth son of Captain Don Juan de San Martin who was
at that time Lieutenant-Governor of the Department of
Yapeyu. When he was eight years old the family went
to Spain, and he became a pupil in the Seminary of Nobles
at Madrid, where he remained only two years, and
learned little beyond the rudiments of mathematics and
something of drawing. Before he was twelve years old,
he joined the "Murcia" regiment as a cadet. The
uniform of this regiment was white and blue, the same
colours the mature soldier afterwards carried in triumph
over half a continent.
His first campaign was in Africa, where he received his
baptism of fire in battle against the Moors. When in garri
son at Oran in 1791, the city, at that time besieged by the
Moors, was destroyed by an earthquake. In 1 793 he joined
the army of Aragon, and served under Ricardos against
the republicans of France on their own territory. This
experience was of great value to him, as Ricardos was
the best tactician among the Spanish generals of that
day. After two successful actions at Masden and Truilles,
Ricardos was forced to retire to the foot of the mountains,
where he maintained his position for twenty days against

32 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
the constant attacks of the enemy, and San Martin so
distinguished himself that he was promoted to the rank of
sub-lieutenant. In the following May, after the death of Ricardos, the
"Murcia" formed part of the garrison of Port Vendres,
which, after beating off two attacks of the French, was
forced to retreat to Collioure and there surrendered. San
Martin gained another step by his conduct in these affairs.
In 1795 the peace of Basilea freed the young lieutenant
from his parole. In the following year his father died, and
the treaty of San Ildefonso brought Spain as an ally of the
French republic into collision with Great Britain. On the
14th February, 1797, the "Murcia," on board the Spanish
Mediterranean squadron, took part in the disastrous affair
off Cape Saint Vincent. On the 15th August, 1798, San
Martin was marine officer on the Santa Dorotea, when that
ship was captured after a desperate defence, by the Eng
lish 64-gun ship Lion, and being thus for the second time
debarred from active service, he devoted his leisure to the
study of mathematics and drawing.
In the year 1800 at the head of a company of his old
regiment, he took part in the serio-comic war with
Portugal known as the " War of the Oranges," and was
present at the siege of Olivenza. After the Peace of
Amiens in 1802, his regiment was employed in the
blockade of Gibraltar and Ceuta, and in 1 804 we find him
in garrison at Cadiz, as second captain of a light infantry
regiment, where his conduct during a pestilence was as
honourable to him as had been his conduct in the field.
By the Treaty of Fontainebleau, in 1807, France and
Spain divided Portugal and her colonies between them,
and a column of 6,000 Spanish troops under Solano
invaded Portugal. The regiment to which San Martin
was attached, captured the town of Yelves, but took no
further part in the campaign.
The emeute of the 2nd May at Madrid, gave the signal
for an outbreak of popular indignation, against the usurpa-

SAN MARTIN IN EUROPE. 33
tions of Napoleon. The news reached the army of Solano
when on the march for Cadiz. Solano was at first unde
cided what course to adopt, but his appointment as
Captain- General of Andalucia and Governor of Cadiz
being confirmed by the French, he on the 28th May
issued a proclamation condemning the insurrection. The
people flocked in crowds to the palace, shouting for an
immediate attack upon the French squadron lying in the
harbour ; in the confusion some shots were fired. San
Martin, who was officer of the guard, withdrew his troops
into the house and closed the door. It was blown in by
a cannon-shot, but time had been gained for the escape
of Solano across the roof to a neighbouring house,
where, however, he was soon afterwards found and cruelly
butchered. This tragedy was never effaced from the memory of
San Martin, and without doubt greatly affected his policy
on many subsequent occasions. In spite of his love of
liberty he ever after looked with horror upon mobs, and
upon governments who relied upon them. He considered
that intelligence supported by orderly strength should
hold the government of the world. Nevertheless his
reason and his heart must have told him that the cause
of Spain was just, and that the executions on the Prado
of Madrid on the 2nd May were more barbarous and less
justifiable than was the murder of Solano.
About this time it is said that Miranda visited Cadiz in
disguise, but for this report we can find no foundation.
He was the founder and organiser of the secret societies to
which South Americans throughout Europe were already
affiliated, but Spain was the last country in Europe in
which such societies were established. Cadiz being the
one port open to American trade, became naturally at
this time the centre of the revolutionary propaganda.
In the early years of the nineteenth century an asso
ciation styled " Sociedad de Lautaro," or " Caballeros
Racionales," had ramifications all over Spain, and was
D

34 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
affiliated with the "Gran Reunion Americana" estab
lished in London by Miranda. This society had in Cadiz
alone in the year 1808 more than forty members, some ol
them grandees of Spain. Those of the first grade were
pledged to work for the independence of America ; those
of the second swore " to recognise no government in
America as legitimate unless it was elected by the free
and spontaneous will of the people, and to work for the
foundation of the republican system." Of this society
San Martin became a member. An American by birth, a
revolutionist by instinct, and a republican by conviction,
he was, perchance, without knowing it, an adept of
Miranda, and was destined to make the dream of the
master a reality, when the bones of that master lay rotting
on the mud banks upon which his eye might at this time
often rest.
At the same time with San Martin three other members
joined the lodge ; Alvear, who was his confidant till he
became jealous of his fame ; Jose Miguel Carrera, who
was to die cursing him ; and, most modest of all, the
naval lieutenant Matias Zapiola, who was afterwards his
right arm on many a hard-fought field. San Martin was
the least brilliant and the poorest of them all ; his com
rades recognised the superiority of his talents as a soldier,
and said that he did the thinking for them all, but in the
great revolutionary drama that all foresaw they assigned
to him only the place of a stern warrior ; Alvear and
Carrera, the most arrogant and the most ambitious, were
to be the heroes.
The general rising in Spain found San Martin in his
place as an officer of light infantry under the command
of Colonel Menacho. He was soon promoted, and his
regiment joined the second division of the army of Anda
lucia, commanded by the Marquis of Coupigni. When
the French under Dupont crossed the Sierra Morena, he
was placed in charge of the line of the Guadalquivir. On
the 28th J me, 1808, he led a mixed column against the

SAN MARTIN IN EUROPE. 35
advanced guard of the enemy, and charged a detachment
of cavalry with such impetuosity at the head of twenty-one
hussars, that he killed seventeen of the enemy, took four
prisoners and all their horses, and retired in triumph, in
the face of very superior numbers. This action was
greatly applauded by the whole army, a badge of honour
was given to all who charged with him, and he was
appointed captain in the Bourbon regiment " on account
of distinguished conduct in the action at Argonilla."
This small triumph was the precursor of one of the
greatest victories of the epoch. Before one month had
elapsed, the imperial eagles of Napoleon were beaten by
an army of recruits inspired by patriotism, and Captain
San Martin was mentioned with distinction in the order
of the day of the battle of Baylen.
The road to Madrid being opened by this victory the
army of Andalucia entered the capital in triumph, and
San Martin received, with his commission as lieutenant-
colonel, a gold medal for his conduct in the battle.
He was afterwards present at the disaster of Tudela,
and in the retreat to Cadiz, and in 18 10 was appointed
aide-de-camp to the Marquis of Coupigni. In 181 1 he
took part in the bloody battle of Albuera, where the
French were defeated by an allied army under General
Beresford, the same who five years previously had capi
tulated to Liniers at Buenos Ayres. The same year he-
joined the Sagunto regiment, the escutcheon of which
was a sun with this motto " Hee nubila tolunt obstantia
solvens " — dissipates clouds and removes obstacles. This
was the last Spanish standard under which San Martin
fought, and its symbol was identical with that of the flag
of the as yet unthought of army of the Andes.
The prophecy of the dying Pitt was realised. Napoleon
had stirred up against himself a national war and was
irremediably lost. Spain allied with Great Britain, in
saving herself, saved Europe from his brutal domination,
and the American Creole having paid with usury his debt
d 2

3fa THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
to the mother country could now honourably leave her. San
Martin had fought under her flag for twenty years, he had
seen the strategy of great generals, had learned the tactics
of every arm in the service ; the pupil was now a master
able to give lessons. He turned his eyes to his own
country, and seeing her in difficulty resolved to return
and consecrate his life to her service.
The confidant of his projects and sentiments on this
occasion was a singular personage. Lord Macduff, after
wards Earl of Fife, was a Scotch noble descended from
that Shakespearean hero who slew Macbeth. He was in
Vienna when the Spanish insurrection broke out in 1808,
he came over at once and enlisted as a simple volunteer.
As such he took part in most of the great battles- of the
time, in one of which he was seriously wounded, and was
given the rank of a General of Spain for his services.
Then it was that San Martin and Macduff became
acquainted ; their generous natures had a profound sym
pathy each for the other, their friendship was enhanced by
the dangers they shared, and continued so long as both
lived. By his help and by the interposition of Sir Charles
Stuart, a diplomatic agent in Spain, San Martin obtained
a passport for London, and received from his friend letters
of introduction, and letters of credit of which he made
no use.
In London he met his comrades Alvear and Zapiola,
and other South Americans who were there at the time.
All belonged to the secret society founded in London by
Miranda, in which Bolivar had just taken the oath, before
leaving for Venezuela in company with the illustrious
master. San Martin and his two comrades were initiated
in the fifth and last grade, and in January, 181 2, embarked
on the George Canning for the River Plate. On the 9th
March they reached Buenos Ayres, accompanied by
various officers who came to offer their swords in the
cause of independence.
The moment was a critical one in the history of the

ARRIVAL OF SAN MARTIN IN AMERICA. 37
American revolution ; the serious work was just commenc
ing; the real struggle between Patriots and Royalists
was yet to come, and the discordance of the various
elements of society only now became apparent.
The Argentine revolution had provoked insurrection in
Chile, both by diplomacy and by example. Her first army
of volunteers had marched to Upper Peru with the object
of striking the enemy in the centre of his power; and in
November, 18 10, had won the first victory of the war at
Suipacha, but was eight months later defeated at Huaqui,
and compelled to retreat to Tucuman. Buenos Ayres had
attempted to gain command of the rivers by arming a
small squadron, which was destroyed by the enemy in the
Parana. A Portuguese army of four thousand men held
the line of the Uruguay. Paraguay had commenced a
system of isolation, almost of hostility.
The movement in Chile, at first successful, was in 18 12
threatened by an expedition from Peru, and the young
Republic unfortunately put her trust in Jose Miguel
Carrera, who, with some attractive qualities, possessed no
solid talents, either military or political.
In this same month of March an earthquake destroyed
the city of Caracas. Reaction triumphed over Miranda in
Venezuela ; only in New Granada did the revolutionary
cause maintain a footing for some time longer. In 18 15
all the insurrections in South America had been sup
pressed, save only the Argentine revolution, which was
never overpowered.
Meantime the viceroyalty of Peru, holding a central
position, with a strong army and the command of the sea,
was the centre of reaction ; and the masses of the people
not yet implicated in the revolution, began to look un
favourably upon it, as their eyes were opened to the perils
it invoked and to the sacrifices it involved.
The Argentine revolution had as yet no fixed plan. In
¦so rudimentary a state of society the actual leaders had
but little power to direct the latent strength of the people,

38 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
and even among themselves opinions were divided, some
believing that the centralisation of power in the city of
Buenos Ayres was the only means of ensuring the success
of the revolutionary movement, while to others decentrali
zation seemed the one necessary condition of national life.
The revolution arose in the cities ; its legality was based
upon municipal rights, and could not long maintain its
original form. It could only live by a wider popularity
based upon the sovereignty of the people at large. For
tunately the men at this time at the helm were the most
intelligent, energetic, and foreseeing who ever acted to
gether on this stage.
The first Executive Government, installed on the 25th
May, 1 8 10, was a Junta, in imitation of those established
in Spain to resist the domination of the French. Modified
a year later by the admission of deputies from the pro
vinces, it became a many-headed monster, useless alike
for debate and for administration. It was succeeded by a
Triumvirate under the name of " The Executive Govern
ment," which, by the aid of those men, saved the State
from shipwreck.
Such was the situation of The United Provinces of
the River Plate when San Martin landed on Argen
tine soil.
Twenty-six years before, while yet a child, he had left
his native land ; now he returned in the ripeness of man
hood, tempered in the struggles of life, tutored in the art
of war, initiated in the mysteries of secret societies formed
for the propagation of the new ideas of liberty. The new
champion brought to the American cause tactics and
discipline applied both to politics and to war; and, in
embryo, a vast plan for a continental campaign which
should embrace half a world and should result in its
independence. It has been said that San Martin was not a man but a
mission, and, in truth, seldom has the influence of one
man upon the destinies of humanity been greater than

CHARACTER OF SAN MARTIN. 39
was his. He was at once the arm and the head of the
Argentine hegemony ; he combined the evolutions of
armies with those of nations, marking each evolution with
some achievement either political or military; obtained
great results with the least possible means, and without
waste of strength ; and showed how a people may be
redeemed without being oppressed. His character is even
yet an historical enigma.
The grandeur of those whose names attain immortality
is measured not so much by their deeds or by their talents
as by the effect their memory has upon the consciences of
men, causing them to vibrate from one generation to an
other in sympathy with an idea or with a passion. The
moral grandeur of San Martin consists in this : that
nothing is known of the secret ambitions of his life ; that
he was in everything disinterested ; that he confined him
self strictly to his mission ; and that he died in silence,
showing neither weakness, pride, nor bitterness at seeing
his work triumphant and his part in it forgotten.
San Martin was a man of stalwart frame ; his face was
the reflex of his mind, a fiery spirit hidden under a studi
ous reserve of manner, which at times exploded. His
head, which was of medium size, he carried very erect.
His thick black hair he always wore cut short ; the
straight high forehead indicated the presence of a strong
and healthy brain. The darkness of his complexion was
deepened by exposure ; his large black eyes were fringed
by long lashes and overhung by heavy eyebrows, which
met when he frowned ; these eyes were the characteristic
feature of his face, disclosing the intensity of his nature,
but hiding his purpose. His nose was long, aquiline, and
prominent ; mouth small, with firm red lips ; teeth strong
and white. His chin and jaw showed strength of will and
the absence of animal passions. His voice was rough,
his gestures simple, and his whole person inspired at once
respect and sympathy.* * See Appendix II.

40 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
San Martin gave verbal orders with great precision,
and in ordinary conversation was fond of a joke. He
wrote laconically in a style of his own, and was much
given to reading French authors. Very reserved and of
warm affections, he was a great observer of men, studying
how he might best avail himself of such talents as they
possessed. Haughty by nature, unobtrusive both by
temperament and by system, he forced upon himself a
stoical disregard of injuries. He was studiously moderate,
and patient in the elaboration of his plans. A slave to
duty himself, he was tolerant of human- frailty in others,
but could be severe when severity was requisite. He was,
as with truth and with posthumous justice he has been
atyled by Vicuna Mackenna, "the greatest of the Creoles.
of the New World."

I.— Map of the Viceroyalty of La Plata and of the Kingdom of Chile,
excluding Upper Peru and Southern Patagonia.

CHAPTER III.
THE LAUTARO LODGE.
1812 — 1813.
The Provisional Junta, which was established at Buenos
Ayres on the 25th May, 1810, was a simple evolution of
historic and municipal rights, and was legalised by the
election of deputies to it from the Cabildos. This • body
was subsequently reconstructed, but this measure and the
creation of Provincial Juntas were retrograde movements,
arising from a latent tendency to decentralisation, in
which lay the germ of the federal system of a later day.
The next step was the creation of a Triumvirate, which,
being a more centralised form of government, responded
to the immediate needs of the revolution, and was a neces
sity of the time.
In the Junta the conservative and revolutionary ele
ments of society were both represented, but the Trium
virate represented no party, and was merely an anonymous
Dictator. The revolution had as yet no defined policy,
and thus afforded no basis for the development of the
democratic idea.
A Legislative Assembly was convened, formed of de
puties from the various provinces, which drew up a consti
tution which virtually gave back the executive power to
the Cabildos. This Assembly was dissolved by the Trium
virate, a measure greatly applauded by the public, but
which attacked the fundamental principle of government.

44 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
The Triumvirate then drew up and decreed a constitu
tion of its own, providing for the periodical election of the
Executive by a mixed assembly of notables and of repre
sentatives of different towns, who should also act as a
legislative council until the convention of a National
Congress. These measures were far from satisfying the require
ments of the democratic party, who called for the 'imme
diate convocation of a National Congress, which would
give form and life to the Republic, though government
was still carried on in the name of the King. The Trium
virate opposed the convocation of a Constituent Assembly,
considering the time for this had not yet come. Hence
came about a fourth political evolution, more dangerous-
and more important than any of the others.
San Martin returned to his native country a man
unknown, but with a certain repute as a brave soldier and
a skilful tactician. His comrade, Alvear, on the contrary,
came of a family already well known in the River Plate.
Ambitious of glory and of power, and of a brilliant imagi
nation, he was a great contrast to San Martin, and
assumed an attitude of protection to him, recommending
him to the Government of the United Provinces as a good
soldier. Eight days after his arrival San Martin was confirmed
in his rank as a lieutenant-colonel, and was entrusted
with the organization of a squadron of cavalry, in which
Alvear held the rank of major and Zapiola that of captain.
This was the origin of the famous regiment of mounted
grenadiers, which fought in all the battles of the War of
Independence, which gave to America nineteen generals
and more than two hundred officers, and of which, after
shedding its blood and spreading its bones across the
continent from La Plata to Pichincha, a remnant returned
under the command of a trooper who in thirteen years had
fought his way up to the rank of colonel, and brought back
their old standard with them.

THE MOUNTED GRENADIERS. 45
The experience of San Martin in Spain had taught him
that success is not possible in a long war without a solid
military organization. He had seen the Spanish armies,
ever routed in spite of their heroism, when remoulded
under English discipline triumph over the first soldiers
of Europe. He knew that Spain, once free from war in
the Peninsula, would send her best troops and her best
generals to America. Coolly he studied the situation, and
came to the conclusion that the war was but commencing,
that the armies of the revolution had no consistence, that
there was no plan of operations and no preparation for
future emergencies. He said nothing of this publicly, but
quietly set to work to found a new military school. Under
his command the first squadron of the mounted grenadiers
became the school of a generation of heroes. He did as
Cromwell did in his day ; he made one regiment the model
for an army. Under strict discipline, which did not re
press individual energy, he formed soldier and officer
alike, one by one, instilling into them a passion for duty
and that cool courage which is the secret of success.
His first work was to instruct the officers, who under
his guidance became the monitors of the future school.
To the companions of his voyage he added men who had
already seen service in the war, preferring those who had
risen from the ranks, but took none of higher rank than
lieutenant. To them he added cadets, chosen from re
spectable families of the city of Buenos Ayres. He was
their master both in tactics and in the use of arms, and
taught them both to study and to manoeuvre with heads
erect. Their nerves he tried by nocturnal surprises, those
who failed being dismissed, as he wished " to have only
lions in the regiment."
He also established a sort of vigilance committee among
them, and in extreme cases gave permission to fight duels.
On the first Sunday in each month he presided at a meet
ing of this committee. In an adjoining room each officer
wrote on a blank ticket an account of any misconduct he

46 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
had observed. These tickets were folded and dropped
into the hat of the Major, and were then inspected by him
self. If among them was any accusation, the accused was
sent from the room while the matter was discussed. A
committee of inquiry was named and directed to report at
a special meeting, where each officer gave his opinion in
writing, and a secret ballot decided whether the accused
should remain in the corps or not. In the first case the
president, in the name of the committee and in their pre
sence, gave a full apology to the accused ; in the second, a
special committee was appointed to wait upon him and
procure his resignation, he being at the same time notified
that if he continued to wear the uniform he would be for
cibly stripped of it by the first officer he met.
This tribunal had a concise and severe code which clas
sified transgressions worthy of punishment, from the act of
ducking the head in danger to that of refusing to fight a
duel, be it just or unjust ; also striking a woman, even if
insulted by her ; and included all sorts of personal mis
conduct. The troopers were all carefully selected, short men not
being admitted. He subjected them to strict discipline,
and armed them with the long sabre of Napoleon's cuiras
siers, telling them that with this weapon they could split
like a melon the head of any Goth* they met. In their
first skirmish they gave practical proof of the truth of this
lesson. Finally, he gave to each trooper a war-name, for
bidding him to answer to any other.
Other squadrons were formed on the model of this one
till a regiment was embodied, and Government sent San
Martin his commission as colonel with these words : —
" Government sends you a commission as colonel of the
mounted grenadiers, and hopes that by the continuance
of your steadiness and zeal you may present the country
with a corps capable alone of securing the liberties of your
fellow-citizens." * A term of opprobrium given at that time to Spaniards  Tr.

THE LAUTARO LODGE. 47
Meantime San Martin had married Dofia Maria de los
Remedios Escalada, a beautiful girl of one of the first
families of the city.
San Martin made no pretence of being a politician, but
among friends he spoke plainly his opinions : —
"Until now the United Provinces have fought for no
one knows what, without a flag, and without any avowed
principles to explain the origin and tendency of the insur
rection. We must declare ourselves independent if we
wish to be known and respected."
With these ideas he did not hesitate to join those who
desired the convocation of a Constituent Congress, but he
saw the necessity of establishing some powerful nucleus
of political force which should bring superior intelligence
to influence popular movements, preparing among a few
that which should be the apparent will of all. This idea
he, aided by Alvear, carried into effect by the installation
of the celebrated secret society known as The Lautaro
Lodge, which exercised so great and so mysterious an
influence upon the destinies of the revolution.
This Lodge was established in Buenos Ayres about the
middle of the year 181 2. Its members were of all political
parties, but the majority were of the party at that time
dominant in the State. The society was organised in
various grades ; in the first, neophytes were initiated
according to the ritual of the Masonic lodges which were
introduced into Buenos Ayres prior to the outbreak of the
revolution ; in the higher grades they were initiated into
the higher purposes of the society, and behind these was
hidden the central lodge (Logia Matriz), in which lay the
supreme power of the society.
The declared object of the Lodge was : —
" To work systematically for the independence and
happiness of America, proceeding with honour and
justice." Thus membership was exclusively confined to men of
American birth. By its constitution, if any of the brother-

48 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
hood was elected supreme ruler of the State, he could take
no important step without consulting the Lodge ; he could
not appoint a diplomatic agent, general-in-chief, governor
of a province, judge of an upper court, high church digni
tary, nor general officers, and could not punish any
member of the brotherhood, by his own authority. It was
a law of the Society that all members should mutually
assist each other in all the exigencies of civil life ; that at
the risk of life they should uphold the decrees of the
Lodge ; and should inform it of anything which could
influence public opinion, or affect the public security. To
reveal the secret of the existence of the Lodge " by word
or by sign " was punishable by death by such means " as
might be found convenient." This penalty, was, however,
only intended to have a moral effect. By an addition to
the constitution, it was arranged that when any brother of
the Logia Matriz was named general of an army or
governor of a province, he should have power to establish
an affiliated society, with a smaller number of members.
The Society failed to secure the adhesion of the members
of the then Government, but most of the popular leaders
joined the Lodge, and its ramifications soon extended to
all classes, the most notable adherent being Dr. Don
Bernardo Monteagudo, who had great influence among the
younger citizens.
Very exaggerated ideas have been held as to the influ
ence of the Lautaro Lodge. Events have been attributed to
its action and it has been held responsible for executions
and crimes with which the Society had nothing whatever to
do. It has been made the scapegoat of all the mistakes
and errors of the epoch. The Lodge of Lautaro was not a
machine of government or of speculative propaganda, it
was an engine of revolution, of war against a common
enemy, and of defence against internal dangers. In this
sense it greatly contributed to give tone and direction to
the revolution, concentrating the forces of government,
giving unity and regularity to political evolutions, and a

THE MILITARY SITUATION. 49
vigorous impulse to military operations. Under its auspices
was created the first popular Assembly which gave form to
the sovereignty of the people ; to it was due that spirit of
propaganda which characterized the Argentine revolution,
and the maintenance of the alliance with Chile, which
gave independence to half the continent ; but there was
danger in the secrecy of its debates, and in the irrespon
sibility of its collective power, which was manifest when
it became a tool in the hands of personal ambition. The
limited sphere in which its influence was felt proves that
the Argentine revolution was impelled by forces of much
greater power, and obeyed general laws over which it had
no control.
The Portuguese army, then holding the left bank of the
Uruguay, had agreed to retire within the frontier in pur
suance of an armistice arranged, on the 26th May, 1812,
by the interposition of the English minister, between the
United Provinces and the Court of Rio Janeiro. The
Spanish flag yet floated on the walls of Monte Video, but
the road was now open and a strong patriot army was
concentrated on the right bank of the Uruguay.
In Buenos Ayres public spirit revived on the discovery
of a vast conspiracy of European Spaniards under Alzaga,
which was to have broken out on the 5th July, in concert
with the forces in Monte Video and the Spanish squadron
in the roadstead, aided by the Portuguese army, which had
not yet retired. The Triumvirate punished the conspira
tors with great severity, and the base of operations was
solidly secured.
In the North the situation was less promising. The
Royalist army, after completing the subjugation of Upper
Peru, advanced in triumph to the heart of the United
Provinces, and invaded the Province of Tucuman. The
relics of the Patriot army were in retreat, under command
of Belgrano, and it was only hoped that they might reach
Cordoba in safety. At this critical juncture Belgrano, dis
regarding the positive orders of Government, turned on
E

50 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
the enemy, who were double in number to his own forces,
and completely routed them on the 24th September, near
to the city of Tucuman, capturing flags and cannon, and
thus saved the Argentine revolution.
By the constitution drawn up by the Triumvirate, it was
established that one of their number should retire every
six months. On the expiration of the first six months,
they convened another Assembly to elect one in place of
the outgoing Triumvir. This Assembly, repeating the
errors of the previous one, took upon itself the attributes
of a representative body. Government dissolved it as it
had the former one, and called upon Don Juan Martin
Pueyrredon to fill the vacant chair ; but the national spirit
was no longer confined within the limits of the munici
pality of Buenos Ayres, and demanded the immediate con
vocation of a National Congress, elected by the people.
The Triumvirate proposed that a third Assembly should
devote itself to drawing up a plan for the election of the
Congress. This Assembly accordingly met on the 6th
October, in the midst of the excitement caused by the
news of the victory of Tucuman, and elected as Trium
vir a nominee of the Executive. Public opinion saw in
this only a continuance of the provisional system and was
greatly incensed, both against the Triumvirate and against
the Assembly.
Behind the popular movement was the Lautaro Lodge
under the direction of Monteagudo, who secured the
concurrence of San Martin and his grenadiers, as also
that of Alvear. This movement was much more carefully
prepared than that of the 25th May, 18 10, or than that of
the 5 th and 6th April, 181 1. The leaders drew up a plan
of operations, defining the parts to be played by the
people, by the corporations, and by the troops. They
chose beforehand the members of the future Government,
and even made a programme of the policy they should
pursue. At half-past eleven on the night of the 7th October the

THE REVOLUTION OF 1812. 51
troops of the garrison commenced to defile into the Plaza
Victoria, and took up positions in front of the Cabildo.
The grenadiers, with sabres sheathed, were headed by San
Martin and Alvear ; after them came Colonel Ortiz
Ocampo with the 2nd regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Pinto with the cavalry. At daybreak on the 8th, the bell
of the municipality was rung and the people commenced
to assemble. Soon three hundred persons, among whom
were the principal members of the religious orders, occu
pied the galleries of the Chamber and presented to the
Cabildo a petition with more than three hundred signa
tures, asking —
" Under protection of the military for the suspension of
the Assembly and the deposition of the Triumvirate, so that
the Cabildo, reassuming the authority delegated to it by
the people on the 22nd May, 1810, might immediately
create a new Executive encharged to convene a truly-
national Assembly."
The Cabildo acceded to everything, declaring by procla
mation that the Assembly when convened should have
supreme power within limits defined by the towns, in
order to draw up a Constitution. They also appointed an
executive, consisting of Don Juan Jose Passo, Don Nicolas
Rodriguez Pefia, and Don Antonio Alvarez Jonte, under
the rules of the Provisional Statute. All which was
submitted to the people and approved of by acclamation.
This revolution, which was municipal in its form, was
essentially national aud democratic in its tendency. The
principle of the sovereignty of the people was recognised
by calling a general Congress ; the old traditions, which
gave supremacy to the capital, were set aside ; and the
first bold step was taken in the path of independence.
The new Triumvirate lost no time in setting about their
appointed task; the Constituent Assembly was speedily
convened, the victorious army of Tucuman was strongly
reinforced, and another army was despatched to besiege
Monte Video. E 2

52 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Thus in the space of seven months from the arrival of
San Martin in Buenos Ayres the aspect of affairs was
completely changed. Government was consolidated, its
policy defined, public spirit was aroused, and the revolu
tion, with two armies, boldly displayed the flag of inde
pendence. But the military situation was precarious,
everything depended upon the result of a battle.
Monte Video was a fortress of the second class, was
defended by 335 guns, of which 175 were in battery, was
garrisoned by more than 3,000 troops and by 2,000 militia,
and was further protected by a squadron of 14 ships of
war, mounting 210 guns, and by a flotilla, while the United
Provinces had not even a gunboat. Here was the centre
of reaction and the natural base for any expedition from
the Peninsula, while the state of relations with Brazil
increased the danger from this quarter.
The Royalist army, beaten at Tucuman, had been
strongly reinforced, and lay entrenched at Salta, waiting
the arrival of another army from Upper Peru.
Government summoned a council of military chiefs — of
whom San Martin was one — and of influential citizens, to
aid the Cabildo in devising measures to meet these
threatening dangers. It was decided that Monte Video
must be taken at any cost, and that Belgrano should be
instructed to drive the enemy from Salta, in order to open
the road to the centre of the Spanish power at Lima.

CHAPTER IV.
SAN LORENZO.
1813 — 1814.
On the 31st December, 1812, the vanguard of the army
sent against Monte Video, under the command of Colonel
Rondeau, completely defeated a strong sortie of the garri
son and laid siege to the city.
On the 31st January, 18 13, the general Constituent
Assembly met in Buenos Ayres. The majority were
members of the Lautaro Lodge, so there was no longer
that anarchy of opinion which had neutralized the former
Assemblies. For the moment it fulfilled popular aspira
tions ; the nominal sovereignty of the King of Spain was
eclipsed, his name disappeared for ever from public docu
ments, the escutcheons of Spain were torn down, titles of
nobility, the Inquisition, and judicial torture were abo
lished. The effigy of former monarchs was substituted on
coins by the seal of the United Provinces — a sun with rays
and a Phrygian cap, within a wreath of laurel. The
colours of the Spanish flag were replaced by the blue and
white of the Patriot cockade, and the last link with the
mother country was broken by declaring the supremacy of
the National Courts of Law. Everything was reformed,
even to the prayers of the priests and the songs of the
people, who now in inspired verse saluted,
" A new and glorious Nation,
With a conquered lion at her feet." *
* A quotation from " Oid Mortales ! " the Argentine national hymn.

54 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
So was inaugurated the sovereignty of the Argentine
people ; a formal Declaration of Independence was now
all that was wanting for the establishment of a republic.
The armies in the field swore obedience to the Assembly
and marched with enthusiasm under the new flag upon
the fortifications of Monte Video and upon the entrench
ments of Salta; only upon the water did the spirit of
revolution as yet make no progress. The maritime power
of Spain seemed invincible in America ; her ships of
war dominated the coasts from California on the Pacific
to the Gulf of Mexico on the Atlantic. The sailors of
Monte Video dominated the River Plate and its affluents.
One day they bombarded Buenos Ayres, another they
spread terror along the banks of the Uruguay, and sacked
defenceless towns on the Parana. Batteries were thrown
up on the banks in front of Rosario and at Punta Gorda,
which only diverted attack from these points to others
more defenceless.
In October, 1812, the towns of San Nicolas and San
Pedro, on the western bank of the Parana, were cannon
aded and sacked. Then, with the object of diverting the
attention of the Patriots from the siege of Monte Video,
cutting off all communication by the rivers with the
interior, and of procuring supplies for the garrison of
Monte Video, a flotilla was organised under the command
of a noted smuggler, Ruiz by name, on which was shipped
a detachment of infantry, led by a red-haired Biscayan,
named Zabala, a man of colossal stature and of approved
valour. The Government of Buenos Ayres, hearing of this expe
dition, ordered the battery at Rosario to be dismantled
and the guns to be sent higher up the Parana, to Punta
Gorda, wherejbe garrison was strengthened. The colonel
of the mounted grenadiers also received orders to march
with two squadrons for the protection of the coast from
Zarate to Santa Fe.
The Royalist expedition, under convoy of three small

SAN LORENZO. 55
¦ships of war, concentrated at the mouth of the Guazu,
below the delta of the Parana, about the middle of
January, and were there delayed by a north wind, so
that when San Martin reached the coast they were only
commencing the ascent of the main river. Keeping his
troops out of sight, San Martin, disguised in the hat and
poncho of a countryman, kept watch upon their move
ments from the bank, by day and by night. On the 28th
January they passed San Nicolas, and on the 29th anchored
above Rosario, without having as yet made any attempt
to land.
Escalada, commandant of Rosario, collected twenty-two
men, carrying muskets, and thirty horsemen, and with a
small gun prepared to make what resistance he could.
At daybreak on the 30th the flotilla cast anchor inside
the island of San Lorenzo, which lies in the middle of the
river about seventeen miles to the north of Rosario. The
western bank here consists of high bluffs, affording no
landing-places except where narrow paths were cut
through them to the water's edge ; in front of one of
these cuttings the flotilla anchored. Beyond the low
trees which bordered the edge of the bluff stood the lonely
monastery of San Carlos, a two-storey building with a
belfry on the roof.
About a hundred men landed, but all the provisions
they could obtain from the peaceful friars were a few fowls
and melons ; all cattle had been withdrawn from the coast.
As the monastery bell struck half-past seven, a cloud of
dust was seen on the Rosario road. It was Escalada,
with his fifty men and his one small gun. The Spaniards
retreated with drums beating to their boats, and Escalada
opened fire upon them from the edge of the bluff, but was
obliged to draw off as the guns of the flotilla had much
longer range than his one piece.
On the night of the 31st, a Paraguayan prisoner
escaped from the flotilla, swimming ashore on a bundle
of sticks. From him the Patriots learned that the whole

56 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
force of the enemy did not exceed three hundred and fifty
men, that they were mounting two small guns, intending
to land next day in greater force for the purpose of
searching the monastery for treasure which they supposed
to be there hidden, and that after securing the treasure
they intended to proceed up the river, passing the batteries
of Punta Gorda by night, if they could not destroy them,
and so cut off the trade with Paraguay.
Escalada sent out messengers with this news, one of
whom met San Martin and his grenadiers, who, following
the windings of the river had been left behind by the
flotilla, which was favoured by a southerly breeze. For
tunately the wind now chopped round to the north and
delayed the intended landing, so that when San Martin,
by forced marches, reached the post-house of San Lorenzo,
three miles from the monastery, on the night of the 2nd
February, nothing had yet been done. At the post-house
he found fresh horses waiting for him, sent there by
Escalada. In front of the post-house stood an old carriage without
horses. Two troopers rode up to it, and asked : —
"Who is here?"
" A traveller," answered a sleepy voice.
Another horseman rode up saying —
"Be careful; this is not an enemy, but an Englishman
on his way to Paraguay."
The traveller put his head out of one of the windows of
the coach, and thinking he recognized the figure and
voice, said : —
" Surely you are Colonel San Martin ? "
" If so, you have a friend here, Mr. Robertson," answered
the other.
And so it was ; this was the well-known traveller,
William Parish Robertson, who was destined to witness
the memorable events of the next day, and to record
what he saw.
The two friends laughed together at their unexpected

SAN LORENZO. 57
meeting in the dark, and San Martin spoke of his
project. " The enemy has double the number of men that we
have, but I doubt if they get the better of us."
" So say I," replied the Englishman, offering his visitors
wine to drink to their success, and asking permission to
go with them.
" Agreed," answered San Martin, " but take care ; it is
no part of your duty to fight. I will give you a horse, but
if the day goes against us you must run for it."
Then, giving the order to mount, he put himself with his
friend at the head of the silent troopers, and soon after
midnight reached the monastery, which they entered by a
gateway in the rear of the edifice.
All the cells were vacant : not a sound was to be heard
in the cloisters. The gate being shut the troopers dis
mounted in the large courtyard. The Colonel enjoined
silence upon them, and forbade them to light fires.
" It brought to mind," says the English traveller, " the
Greek host hidden in the bowels of the wooden horse, so
fatal to Troy."
San Martin, with a night-glass, ascended the tower of
the church, and saw by their lanterns that the enemy was
yet there. He then carefully reconnoitered the country
round him, and from information furnished by Escalada
formed his plans.
On the river face of the monastery a level plain, apt for
cavalry manoeuvres, extended for three hundred and fifty
yards to the edge of the bluff. Two winding paths, one
only of which was practicable for infantry in formation,
led to the beach below. He then withdrew his men from
the courtyard and formed them, holding their horses by
the bridle, behind the cloisters and outhouses, leaving
Escalada vand his volunteers within the edifice. At dawn
he again mounted the tower. At five o'clock, as the
shades of night melted away, boats laden with armed men,
were seen to leave the flotilla for the shore. At half-past

58 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
five, two small columns of infantry marched up the main
path. Then San Martin came down from his post of observa
tion, and, meeting Robertson at the foot of the stairs, said:—
" In two minutes more we shall be upon them, sword
in hand."
A few paces off his orderly held his charger ready, a fine
cream-coloured horse, fully caparisoned. In a moment he
was in the saddle. Drawing his curved sabre he galloped
off to his grenadiers, who were now to enter into action
for the first time, and in a few words exhorted them to
remember his lessons, and, above all, not to fire a shot,
but to trust to their lances and sabres. He put himself at
the head of the second squadron and gave command of the
first to Captain Jose Bermudez, directing him to attack the
flank and cut off the retreat of the invaders, and added : —
" We will meet in the centre of the enemy's columns ;
there I will give you further orders."
The enemy, about two hundred and fifty strong, had in
the meantime advanced some two hundred and odd yards.
They came on quickly to the sound of drums and fifes, and
with a flag, in two parallel columns of half companies,
with two four-pound guns between the columns and a
little in advance. Then was heard for the first time the
war clarion of the mounted grenadiers.
From the right and from the left of the monastery the
two squadrons dashed forward at full gallop, sabre in
hand. San Martin led the attack on the left, Bermudez
that on the right. San Martin being nearest was the first
to fall on the enemy. The fire of the two guns failed to
check the onset ; the heads of the Spanish columns were
thrown into disorder, but, falling back, opened a heavy fire
of musketry. San Martin with his squadron encountered
the column led by Zabala in person ; his horse was killed
by the first volley, and a fierce hand-to-hand fight raged
round him as he lay upon the ground caught by the leg
by his fallen steed, in which he received a slight sabre cut

SAN LORENZO. 50
in the face. A Spanish soldier ran forward to bayonet
him, but was run through the body with a lance by a
grenadier named Baigorria. Another trooper, named
Juan Bautista Cabral, sprang from the saddle and
released his leader from the fallen horse, and fell him
self pierced by two mortal wounds, shouting : —
" I die content ! We have beaten the enemy."
Almost at the same moment, Cornet Bouchard killed
the bearer of the Spanish ensign and captured the flag.
The other column was also driven back by the charge
of the squadron led by Bermudez, and the Spaniards
abandoning their guns, retreated to the bluff, where they
attempted to form square under protection of the guns of
the flotilla. Bermudez leading a second charge upon
them was mortally wounded by a cannon-shot, and
Lieutenant Manuel Diaz Velez, carried away by his
enthusiasm, fell with his horse over the bluff, with a ball
in his forehead, and two bayonet wounds in his chest,
but the Spaniards were driven headlong to the beach,
leaving behind them, besides their flag, their guns and
fifty muskets, forty dead and fourteen prisoners. Many
of those who escaped were wounded, one of these being
Zabala, their leader.
The grenadiers had fifteen killed and twenty-seven
wounded, among whom each of the United Provinces had
at least one representative. Lieutenant Diaz Velez, being
taken prisoner, was carried on board the flotilla.
San Martin assisted by Robertson, generously furnished
the flotilla with fresh supplies for their wounded, and
arranged for an exchange of prisoners, giving up those he
had captured for three previously taken by the boats and
for his wounded officer; but Velez died in the arms of
his comrades a few hours after. One of these released
prisoners was a Paraguayan named Jose Felix Bogado ;
he at once enlisted in the regiment, and during thirteen
years' service with it, from San Lorenzo to Ayacucho, won
his way up to the rank of Colonel, and then returned to

60 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Buenos Ayres, accompanied by seven of the original
troopers of the corps.
Still covered with the blood and dust of the fight, San
Martin signed the despatch announcing his victory, under
the shade of an old pine-tree which still stands in the
garden of San Lorenzo.
The affair of San Lorenzo, though of little military
importance, had a most beneficial effect upon the Patriot
cause. The safety of the towns on the banks of the
Parana and Uruguay was secured ; communication with
Entre Rios, which was the base of the army besieging
Monte Video, was maintained ; the expected supplies to
this city were cut off; the trade with Paraguay was pre
served; and above all, a new general given to the army
and new vigour to the spirits of the men.
Three days afterwards, the discomfited flotilla descended
the Parana, laden with wounded instead of plunder, and
carried the news to Monte Video. At the same time San
Martin returned to Buenos Ayres, and the enthusiasm of
his reception somewhat deadened the calumnies which
already began to embitter his life.
On the 20th February the Spanish army entrenched
at Salta was completely routed by General Belgrano ; the
third victory in less than three months. The revolution
of the 8th October and the influence of the Lautaro Lodge
were justified by these results.
When San Martin returned to Buenos Ayres, he found
that political parties, confined within the limits of the
capital, weakened by local animosities, and ultimately
enclosed by the four walls of the Lodge, had degenerated
into circles ruled by personal influences, and like most of
the influential men of that day he became imbued with
the belief that a constitutional monarchy backed by
Europe was the true solution of the political problem.
Neither he nor they saw that the sentiment of the people
was essentially republican.
Secret societies have been at times the only means of

ARGENTINE GENERALS. 6t
organization left to an enslaved people, but they have
never accompanied the development of revolutionary
ideas; as a general rule they have produced nothing
beyond abortive conspiracies ; among a free people they
are impotent. Thus the continuance of the secret and
irresponsible influence of the Lautaro Lodge, could have
no other effect than to weaken the power of the General
Assembly, its own creation.
Within the Lodge itself there soon arose two distinct
parties, one strove only for democratic independence, the
other was a personal party with Alvear at its head, which
presently absorbed the whole society.
The dream of Alvear was military glory and a dictator
ship. His friend Carrera was at this time (May, 1813),
both a dictator and a general in his own country ; he took
him as his model, but was clear-sighted enough to see
that their circumstances were not identical.
In June, 1813, the army of the North a second time
invaded Upper Peru under the orders of Belgrano, but
was badly beaten at Vilcapugio on the 1 st October, and
almost destroyed at Ayohuma on the 14th November.
The remnant retreated to its former position, and Belgrano
requested to be relieved of the command.
The United Provinces had not at this time any general
conspicuous for military genius. The laurels gained by
Don Antonio Gonsalez Balcarce at Suipacha were blighted
at the Desaguadero. His brother, Don Martin Balcarce,
was in Chili in command of Argentine auxiliaries. The
victory of Don Jose Rondeau, in front of Monte Video, was
the first and last of his career ; he lacked the qualities of a
commander-in-chief. Belgrano was wanting both in
technical knowledge and in warlike instinct, but was the
best of them all. Of the generals of division, none had
as yet shown any capacity for separate command. The
revolution which had been so far opposed by mediocre
generals and badly-organized troops, had now to contend
against skilful generals and well-disciplined troops.

62 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Alvear applied for the command of the army of the
North. San Martin, who considered the expedition
against Monte Video of more importance, willingly gave
place to him, but Alvear, ever vacillating and loth to leave
the field of politics, changed his mind and recommended
San Martin for the post. San Martin was anxious to
free himself from the trammels of party in order to gain
freedom of action in the course he had marked out for
himself; he accordingly accepted the command of a rein
forcement for the army of the North, and received instruc
tions to assume the command-in-chief if he should deem
it advisable.
This reinforcement consisted of the 7th battalion of
infantry, 700 strong, two squadrons of the mounted
grenadiers, and 100 artillerymen, and reached Tucuman
before the close of the year 18 13. Soon after San Martin
and Belgrano met at Yatasto on the road to Salta, and '
swore friendship to each other, an oath most faithfully
kept by both.
These two celebrated men had never met before, but
had for some time corresponded. San Martin presented
himself as a subordinate, but Belgrano looked to him as
a master in the art of war, and regarded him as his
successor. After some delay, due to the reluctance of San
Martin to supersede his friend, he at length assumed the
command on receipt of positive orders to that effect from
Government, Belgrano remaining with him in command
of a regiment. Belgrano died in the belief that San
Martin was the tutelar genius of South America, and San
Martin to the end of his days honoured the memory of his
illustrious friend as that of one of the purest patriots of
the New World.
On the 22 nd January, 18 14, the executive power was
concentrated in one person, who took the title of Supreme
Director. Don Gervasio Antonio Posadas was selected by
the Lodge to fill this post, and was duly elected by the
General Assembly. No one was more surprised than

SAN MARTIN AT TUCUMAN 63
himself at this appointment, for which his only special
recommendation was that he was the uncle of Alvear, who
for the present contented himself with the command of
the army of the capital, until such time as he could take
command of the army of Monte Video, and there achieve
such military glory as should entitle him to supreme
power. The first care of San Martin, on assuming command of
the army of the North, was to insist upon the regular
payment of his men. There existed in the army chest
a sum of thirty-six thousand dollars, drawn from Upper
Peru, which Government had directed should be paid over
to the General Treasury. San Martin disobeyed the order
and applied the money as he wished, giving Government
at the same time his reasons for so doing. Government
approved of his conduct as justified by necessity, for the
army was at the time in the last stage of destitution.

CHAPTER V
UPPER PERU.
1814.
The military policy of the United Provinces had three
distinct ends : first, to construct a new nation within the
geographical limits of the old Viceroyalty of the River
Plate ; second, to aid in the establishment of other South
American nations, who would be their natural allies ; and
third, to carry their arms beyond their frontiers for the re
moval of obstacles to their expansion. Hence the expedi
tions to Paraguay and Monte Video, the aid given to the
insurgents in Chile, and the war waged with the Viceroyalty
of Peru. The army of the North, as the embodiment of this
threefold policy, was styled " The Auxiliary Army oi
Peru," and its mission was to incorporate the Provinces
of Upper Peru as a portion of the old Viceroyalty, to cap
ture Lima, the centre of Spanish power in South America,
and to bring Lower Peru into an alliance similar to that
already contracted with Chile.
For four years Upper Peru had been the battlefield of
the Patriots and Royalists ; it was now completely in the
power of the latter. The four provinces known as Upper
Peru are shut in by mountain ranges, and have no fluvial
communication with either ocean. Situate within the
tropics, their high tablelands and intervening valleys fur
nish at once examples of perpetual winter and perpetual
spring, and yield all the natural products of the globe.
Upper Peru is divided by two spurs from the Andes
into three districts. The western range runs parallel to
the Pacific Ocean from the desert of Atacama — which is a

UPPER PERU. 65
high tableland — to the first valleys of Lower Peru on the
coast, cutting off an arid and thinly-peopled district. The
central plain, well peopled but inclement, is the natural
road from the Argentine Republic to Lower Peru, and
was the theatre of operations during the preceding cam
paigns. The eastern range, with lofty peaks covered with
perpetual snow, looks down upon a truly intertropical
paradise. At its foot extends to the west the smiling
valley of Clisa, where stands the city of Cochabamba,
with easy access over the hills to the central plateau, and
to Chuquisaca by valleys on the south-east. Behind
Cochabamba and to the east of the range lies the Valle
Grande, which collects the mountain streams and delivers
them to the Amazon. More to the north-east lies Santa
Cruz da la Sierra in the midst of a vast grassy plain,
which slopes gradually away to the confines of Brazil,
Paraguay, and the Argentine Chaco.
The social organization of Upper Peru was a continua
tion of the system of the Incas, complicated by the
antagonism of races. Europeans had established them
selves in six cities, whose former inhabitants, driven out
to the ice-covered hills or to the torrid valleys, worked as
serfs for their lords and masters as cultivators of the soil
or as miners. The lower class in these cities consisted of
half-breeds, and formed the greater part of the popula
tion. All the rest of the country was peopled exclusively
by two indigenous races, who paid a capitation tax, and
had no civil rights. The language of the conquerors was
unintelligible to the mass of the people.
In this country the first rebellion against the domina
tion of Spain was quenched in blood in 1809, but news
of the revolution of Buenos Ayres in 18 10 rekindled the
smouldering embers. The movement was supported by
Argentine troops under Balcarce, who won the first vic
tory of the war at Suipacha, but was afterwards totally
defeated on the Desaguadero. The Patriots of Cocha
bamba being thus left alone, fought another battle by
themselves at Sipe-Sipe on the 13th August, 181 1, but
f

66 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Avere defeated. The repulse of the second invasion under
Belgrano in 1813 was another great disappointment to
them, but still the spirit of the people was not crushed.
There was, however, no cohesion among them ; they had
the courage to resist and to die on the field of battle or on
the scaffold, but they were unable to concert any plan of
action; thus these successive disasters greatly weakened
the ties which bound them to the Patriots of Buenos
Ayres, but vain were the efforts of the Spaniards to over
come the passive resistance of the people. Heads of
rebels were exposed along the public roads, the properties
of such as had fled were confiscated and sold, towns were
sacked, military commissions terrorized the country, pri
soners taken in the last campaign were sold as slaves to
the owners of the vineyards and plantations of Peru, but
still insurrectionary movements constantly broke out ;
even the Indians, armed with nothing more than clubs,
slings, and arrows, braved death with the utmost stoicism,
certain that they would be avenged. The Spanish general,
unable either to retreat or to advance, established his
headquarters at Tupiza ; and while a portion of his army
kept open communications in the rear, his vanguard
advanced to Salta, constantly harassed by the country
people, who rose in arms on the retreat of the Patriot army
to Tucuman.
The army which had twice defeated the armies of the
United Provinces was almost entirely composed of natives
of the Highlands of Lower Peru. They were men inured
to hardships and privations, untiring on the march, faith
ful to their flag, obedient to their officers, and undaunted
under fire. They were half-breeds, who spoke the same
language as the people of the country in which they
fought. The climate of this country was the same as that
of their own, and they were accustomed to the peculiar
requirements of mountain warfare. All this gave them
great advantages over the Argentine troops on that field
of action, and the remembrance of defeats disheartened
the Patriot army.

ARENALES. 67
Belgrano after the rout of Ayohuma had left Colonel
Don Juan Antonio Alvarez de Arenales as governor
of Cochabamba and commandant of the Patriot forces in
the rear of the enemy, and Colonel Don Ignacio Warnes
as governor of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, under the orders
of Arenales. Only men of their stamp could have under
taken the desperate enterprise of keeping alive the flames
of insurrection in the mountains of Upper Peru after such
disasters. Arenales is one of the most extraordinary characters of
the Argentine revolution. Born in Spain and educated in
Buenos Ayres, he embraced with ardour the American
cause, and took a prominent part in the insurrection at
Chuquisaca in 1809. Taken prisoner, he was sent to Peru,
and remained in the casemates of Callao till set at liberty
by the Cortes of Cadiz in 181 2. At the time of the battle
of Tucuman he was in Salta, and there headed a patriotic
movement which was immediately quelled. Previous to
the battle of Salta he had joined the army of Belgrano,
and accompanied it to Upper Peru. To austere manners,
tenacity of purpose, and untiring activity he added the
virtues of a good citizen, great talents as an administrator,
inflexible will, and a brain fertile in warlike stratagems.
His face never displayed any signs of either pleasure or
pain, and his stern look and voice joined to his lion-like
head, marked him as one born to command ; but under all
lay a warm heart, more anxious to do right than to win
glory. Warnes was of English descent, but was born in Buenos
Ayres, and in 1807 had distinguished himself in defence
of his native city.
San Martin, on learning from Belgrano the character of
Arenales, at once opened communications with him, and
on two occasions sent him arms and ammunition, with
officers, to aid him in his operations.
While Belgrano was in Upper Peru, Colonel Landivar,
a Spaniard, was made prisoner at Santa Cruz de la Sierra.
This man had been one of the most merciless agents of
F2

68 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Goyeneche, and he was kept for trial by the General, " not
for having fought against our system, but for the murders,
robberies, burnings, violences, extortions, and other ex
cesses perpetrated by him in contravention of the laws of
war." It was proved that he had executed fifty-four
prisoners of war, whose heads and arms had been cut off
and nailed to posts on the public roads. The accused
alleged that he had only ordered the execution of thirty-
three individuals, and that in obedience to express orders
from Goyeneche, which he produced in evidence. The
defence was ably conducted by an officer of the Grena
diers, who pleaded that the prisoner having acted only in
obedience to the orders of his superior could not be looked
upon as other than a prisoner of war. The Court pro
nounced sentence of death, which sentence was laid before
San Martin on the 13 th January, 18 14, who at once signed
it without consulting Government.
This trial gives an idea of the mode in which war was
waged in Upper Peru. The cruelties of the Spaniards
produced reprisals on the part of the insurgents, which
so filled the land with bloodshed that "the inhabitants
looked calmly upon these scenes ; no one hesitated to risk
his own life, and all sought to shed the blood of those of
the other party." Such was the war into which Arenales
now entered as leader of the fifth insurrection of Cocha
bamba. The Royalist army being in possession of the central
plateau the position of Arenales at Cochabamba was
untenable, but the road by the Valle Grande was open to
him ; he could join Warnes at Santa Cruz de la Sierra,
and communicate with the Argentine Provinces by the
Chaco, and from Santa Cruz he could march over well-
wooded plains to Chuquisaca.
On the 29th November he commenced his retreat with
sixty musketeers, four small guns, a few cavalry, and a
crowd of countrymen armed with clubs and slings, who
covered his flanks and rear. In the valley of Misque he
attempted to make a stand, but was forced across the

UPPER PERU. 6)
Cordillera to the head waters of the eastern streams.
Overtaken at Chilian, he beat off his pursuers, and
reached the Valle Grande, where he recruited his forces,
forming an infantry battalion of one hundred and sixty-
five men, and two squadrons of cavalry, and was joined by
some guerilla chiefs.
The insurrection spread, and Pezuela despatched
Colonel Blanco with six hundred men and three light
guns, to subdue it. On his march Blanco met with six
heads nailed to posts, a gage of defiance from the guerillas
who swarmed in the adjacent valleys.
On the 4th February the two armies met. The Patriots
had at first the advantage, till a part of their raw troops
were seized with panic ; the Royalists captured their guns
and remained masters of the field. Blanco shot his
prisoners, and cut off the heads of three leaders, after
which he retreated to Chilian for reinforcements.
Arenales retreated to the frontier of Santa Cruz, taking
his arms and spare ammunition with him on mule-back.
Reinforced by Warnes he halted at Abapo on the Rio
Grande, and in March had two hundred and four infantry
and four small guns. Warnes refused to recognise his
authority, and took up a position for himself at Horcas
with a thousand men, advancing his outposts to Herradura
and Petacas, passes of the Cordillera considered impreg
nable, as they were nothing more than flights of stairs cut
in the sides of the mountain.
At the same time the Indians of the Chaco along the
banks of the river Pilcomayo rose up in favour of the
Patriots ; guerilla chiefs aroused a part of the Province of
La Plata ; and the towns in Blanco's rear were again in
insurrection. Pezuela despatched Colonel Benavente with
five hundred men, against this new insurrection ; but in
spite of sundry advantages gained by both columns,
Benavente was so weakened that he was soon reduced to
inaction, and Blanco, whose troops suffered greatly from
fever, was forced to evacuate the Valle Grande early in
April and to retreat to Misque.

70 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Arenales, while encamped at Tumina, received informa
tion that Blanco, resuming the offensive, had forced the
passes of Herradura and Petacas, and had dispersed the
division under Warnes. He at once marched towards the
scene of action, and met Warnes at the head of only three
hundred men. The latter, learning wisdom by his reverses,
placed himself under his orders. Blanco had in the mean
time taken the city of Santa Cruz, and was now coming in
search of them with six hundred men, of whom one-half
were regular infantry.
On the 24th May the Royalists came in sight, and the
Patriots retreated by a narrow defile, leaving a small
party to draw on the enemy. At dawn on the 25th they
reached the town of La Florida, on the river Piray.
Arenales took up a position on the right of this small
river, in an open space where the bank was about two
yards high. Below, the river spread out, while in front
lay a wide plain. His flanks were protected by dense
brushwood ; the town was behind him. He planted his
guns on the open, placed his cavalry in ambuscade on
each flank, with Warnes in command on the right and De
la Riva on the left. At the foot of the bank he opened a
trench, concealed by sand and brushwood, where he
stationed his infantry, kneeling, and awaited the attack.
His entire force numbered about eight hundred men.
Just before noon the same day a dropping fire was
heard in the woods in front. It came from the outpost,
who were retreating before the enemy. Soon after that
the Royalist column debouched from the wood, preceded
by skirmishers. Blanco drew up his men on the plain,
with strong cavalry reserves on the flanks, and opened
fire with his four-pounders. Then, as the infantry ad
vanced firing, the Patriot guns opened upon them. When
the skirmishers entered the river, the entrenched infantry
poured in a volley, and, springing from their shelter,
charged through the smoke with such impetuosity that,
aided by the cavalry on the left, they completely routed
the enemy, Colonel Blanco remaining dead upon the field.

BATTLE OF LA FLORIDA. 71
Arenales headed the pursuit in person with so little
caution that he was attacked by a group of fugitives, who
left him for dead with fourteen wounds, three of them in
the face. His men rushed in and saved him, carrying
him on their shoulders back to the camp.
Two flags, two guns, two hundred muskets, one hundred
killed, and ninety-nine prisoners, were the trophies of this
victory, while the Patriots lost only one man killed and
twenty-one' wounded, including their leader.
Such was the action of La Florida, which saved Santa
Cruz de la Sierra and compelled the retreat of the Royalist
army from Salta. It gives the name to one of the prin
cipal streets of Buenos Ayres. For it Arenales was raised
to the rank of general, and a badge of honour was decreed
to the troops engaged.
Arenales was no sooner well of his wounds than he
marched with his division and reoccupied the Valle
Grande, routing a Royalist force of two hundred men at
Postrer Valle on the 4th July, but was on the 5th August
himself defeated at Sumapaita. Afterwards reinforced by
Padilla with a body of Indian slingers, he forced Bena
vente to retreat from Tomina, and again reoccupied the
Valle Grande.
Eighteen months he maintained this extraordinary war
at a cost to the enemy of 1,300 men in killed, wounded,
and missing, entering Cochabamba at last in triumph,
and joining the Argentine army with 1,200 men.
Over the vast plains of La Plata the revolutionary spirit
had spread almost unopposed, but where mountain ranges
marked out the limits of Upper Peru the movement could
only advance by force of arms. The map of the old Vice-
royalty did not coincide with that of the social revolution
of the United Provinces. Upper Peru had been the high
road from Buenos Ayres to Lima in time of peace; it now
remained for San Martin to decide whether the same road
was strategically the proper road to Lima or not, in time
of war.

CHAPTER VI.
the war in the north.
1814.
The Army of the North when reinforced, barely num
bered 2,000 men, mostly recruits, among whom desertion
was frequent. Disorganized, short of officers, and badly
clothed, it was quite incapable of making head against
the enemy. Jujui and Salta were held by the victorious
Spaniards, who threatened the whole of the northern
frontier. San Martin was more especially troubled by
the lack of officers and the general want of discipline in
the troops.
Pezuela, the Spanish general who had defeated Belgrano
at Vilcapugio and Ayohuma, had established his head
quarters at Tupiza on the frontier of Upper Peru, and
ordered a levy of two to three thousand men in the High
lands of Lower Peru. He also formed two battalions out
of contingents from the nearer valleys of Chichas and
Ciuti, raising his army to about four thousand regulars.
His vanguard under Ramirez, one thousand five hundred
to two thousand strong, with eight guns, occupied Jujui,
and his cavalry scoured the country as far as Salta. San
Martin's outposts also reached almost to this city, and at
this time the men of the city and of the country round
about, rose en masse and formed a sort of vanguard to the
Army of the North.
San Martin had at that time no regular plan, he neither
knew his own resources nor the designs of the enemy, and

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY. 73
confined his efforts to the reorganization of the army.
After consultation with Colonel Dorrego, who commanded
the advanced posts, he determined to confide these posi
tions to the district militia and to concentrate his regular
forces in Tucuman. In carrying out this plan he received
most valuable assistance from the devotion of the country
people, who masked all his movements and prevented the
enemy from discovering anything either of his intentions
or of his strength.
His first step was the construction of an entrenched
camp to the north of the city, which put a stop to deser
tion, and he increased the number of his troops by recruit
ing. Here he stood on the defensive and limited his
efforts to aiding the popular movements in Salta, Cocha
bamba, and Santa Cruz de la Sierra.
In this entrenched camp, which is known to history as
the citadel of Tucuman, he established a school of instruc
tion, holding up the mounted grenadiers as a model for
the rest of his force. Belgrano was a most docile pupil,
but Dorrego, though his talents were highly esteemed by
San Martin, was sent off to Santiago del Estero for insub
ordinate conduct. Belgrano soon afterwards left the
army, giving as his last advice to his friends the maxim,
" that war must be waged not with arms alone but with
the force of public opinion," which maxim was at that
time exemplified by facts, for the Royalist armies held only
the ground on which they stood, and their movements were
paralyzed by the popular insurrections all around them.
In the Province of Salta the revolutionary movement
was mosc pronounced. The first popular manifestation in
the city produced the organization of the civic militia. In
1810 the urban guard was raised by the voluntary enlist
ment of youths of respectable families. Then arose spon
taneously among the peasants of the campana, a corps
of cavalry, with the instincts of the Cossacks, and the
qualities of the Mamelukes, headed by a chieftain who
made his name famous for deeds of prowess.

74 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Martin Guemes had first borne arms against the
English in the reconquest of Buenos Ayres in 1806 and in
the memorable defence of 1807. He with his men, formed
the vanguard of the first Patriot army which invaded
Upper Peru. His horsemen penetrated as far as Potosi,
and covered every movement of the Patriots. At Suipacha
he did good service. In 181 1 he escorted the prisoners
of the campaign to Buenos Ayres, where he was appointed
to the general staff with the rank of captain. In 1813
he took part in the second siege of Monte Video, and was
absent from his native province at the time of Belgrano's
expedition, but when San Martin took command of the
army he was at Santiago del Estero on his way back.
The insurrection of Salta in the face of the victorious
enemy, was carried out with equal deliberation and
courage. The population emigrated en masse, the peasants
abandoned their huts and the towns were left desolate. In
the capital even the tongues were taken from the church
bells, lest the enemy should use them to celebrate their
victories. Two old friars alone remained in each convent
to administer the sacraments to the sick and aged who
could not go away.
When the Royalist vanguard occupied the city of Salta
a lieutenant, named Ezenarro, was detached with thirty
men to occupy a district thirty-two miles to the south in
the valley of Lerma. The first Sunday after his arrival,
one of the men of the place after morning mass, said : —
"We must rise against this canalla."
" With what arms ? " asked another.
" With those we take from them," said yet another.
A proprietor, named Luis Burela, put himself at their
head, surprised the guard, disarmed Ezenarro and his
men, and sent them prisoners to Tucuman. Then, with
the arms they had captured, they marched to within ten
miles of Salta, where they were met by a company of
Spanish troops, whom they charged at once, and com
pletely routed, taking most of the men with their leader

THE GAUCHOS OF SALTA. 75
prisoners, and sending them also to Tucuman. Another
proprietor, named Pedro Zabala, followed the example of
Burela, armed his peons and some volunteers and took
the field.
So began the resistance to the enemy, in which the
whole people speedily joined, so that Salta became a bul
wark to the United Provinces impregnable to Royalist
arms, solely by the force of public opinion roused to action.
The Province of Salta, which at that time formed a part
of the jurisdiction of Jujui, enters within the first spurs
of the Andes which branch from the second of the two
ranges which enclose Upper Peru, and has the same
physical characteristics, plains, mountains, and an inter
mediate tropical zone. Its possession was thus of great
importance to the invaders, as it was the gate to Argen
tine territory. The occupation of Jujui opened the road
to the plains and valleys of Salta, but even the occupation
of Salta itself did not secure their position. The agricul
tural lands, from which alone supplies could be drawn,
lay in valleys to the south of the capital, and it was this
part of the Province the guerillas undertook to defend.
The nature of the country eminently adapted it to guerilla
warfare. The inhabitants were a hard-working race of
men, strong, active, and inured to hardships, individually
brave, and with a natural instinct for the class of warfare
they waged. They were horsemen, accustomed to go
either up or down hill at full speed, whose ordinary equip
ment enabled them to gallop unharmed through thorny
brushwood. They were good marksmen, either from the
tree-tops or from horseback, or on foot from behind their
horses if need were. San Martin made no mistake when
he entrusted to them the task of keeping the Royalists at
bay while he was engaged in the reorganization of the
regular army at Tucuman. He had seen in Spain what
might be accomplished by this class of irregular troops.
Pezuela, deceived by false despatches which San Martin
caused to fall into his hands, believed that these raw

-6 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
levies were the vanguard of the Patriot army advancing on
Salta,"and in consequence lost much valuable time waiting
for reinforcements.
In March the Royalist vanguard advanced from Salta
into the valley of Lerma, in search of supplies, under the
command of Colonel Saturnino Castro, a native of Salta,
who had the repute of being the first cavalry officer of the
Royalist army of Peru, and whose valour had decided the
day at Vilcapugio. The guerillas, who became known to
history as the Gauchos of Salta, greatly harassed the
progress of the expedition, swarming in the woods along
the line of march, cutting off stragglers, driving in small
detachments, and firing upon the main body from any
convenient shelter.
On the 24th, videttes on the Guachipas River at the
end of the valley, descried fifty-six of the enemy, under
Captain Fajardo, approaching them. Captain Saravia
collected thirty men armed with short muskets, and a
group of peasantry with clubs and pikes, charged upon
them and completely routed them, killing eleven including
the captain, and making twenty-seven prisoners, while he
had only three men killed and one wounded.
Meantime Guemes had entered the Sierra to the east of
Salta, and on the 9th and 1 8th, two parties of his Gauchos
surprised two detachments of the enemy. On the 29th he
came so close to the city that Castro sallied out against
him for about a league with eighty men, but was com
pletely routed, with the loss of half his force.
For this feat Guemes was named Commandant-General
of the Vanguard, and on the recommendation of San
Martin, was raised to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.
Guemes then occupied the approaches to the city and
harassed the garrison by daily attacks upon the suburbs.
Being reinforced from Jujui, the Royalists then organised
two expeditions of 500 men each. One, composed of
a battalion of infantry and a squadron of light horse
under Colonel Alvarez, marched early in June into the

THE WAR IN THE NORTH. 77
valley of Lerma. At the town of Sumalao, Alvarez found the
vanguard of the Guachipas awaiting him. The Patriot out
posts were driven in, but the main body sheltered by trees
and broken ground, poured so heavy a fire upon him that
he was forced to return to the city, with many killed and
wounded, and with the loss of all the supplies he had seized.
The other column, also composed of infantry and cavalry,
was under the command of Colonel Marquiegui, who like
Castro was a native of Salta, and of great repute for skill
and knowledge of the country. This column marched to
the east and was met by Guemes in person, who made so
stubborn a resistance that it was also forced back to the
city, and the siege was re-established.
Pezuela had drawn in his reserves and advanced to
Jujui. Thence he sent orders to Colonel Marquiegui to
march with one hundred infantry and one hundred and
fifty horse, by the north-eastern frontiers of Tucuman and
Santiago del Estero, to the rear of the advanced guard of
the Patriots on the river Pasaje. Marquiegui carried
out his instructions with great skill, captured several
forts, and learned from prisoners that the army of San
Martin consisted only of three thousand recruits, and
that the vanguard which gave them so much trouble, was
nothing but a swarm of undisciplined Gauchos ; but he also
learned that the object of the campaign, which was the
relief of Monte Video, was now impossible, that city having
already fallen.
When news of this expedition reached Tucuman, Guemes
was immediately reinforced by one hundred infantry and
one hundred mounted grenadiers, and Marquiegui
retreated, marching one hundred leagues in a semicircle,
but was prevented from carrying off either horses or cattle.
This was the last attempt at invasion ; five thousand men
were not enough to capture Tucuman, much less to con
quer the country. Pezuela withdrew his troops beyond
the frontier, and sent off a strong detachment to Cuzco to
crush an insurrection which had broken out in that city.

78 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
The object of the Royalist invasion was, by a powerful
diversion, to compel the Argentine Government to with
draw their army from the Banda Oriental for the protection
of the northern provinces, but meantime that government
had armed and equipped a small naval force, which, under
the command of an Irishman named Brown, had, on the
1 6th May, defeated and almost destroyed the Spanish
squadron stationed at Monte Video, which city soon after
surrendered to the Argentine army then besieging it under
the command of Alvear.
Before the conclusion of these events, the General of the
Army of the North had disappeared from the theatre of
war. San Martin, after careful study of the question, had
clearly discerned that the road by Upper Peru was not
the true strategical line of the South American revolu
tion. His idea was to carry the war to the West, to pass
the Andes, to occupy Chile, to secure the dominion of the
Pacific, and to attack Lower Peru on the flank, continuing
military operations to the North merely as a subordinate
detail of the main design.
This plan, the merits of which were not appreciated by
his contemporaries until it was crowned with victory, is
looked upon by posterity as not merely the most simple, but
as the only possible plan which could give the desired result.
It was then held to be folly, whilst in reality the folly lay
in persevering in the attempt to reach Lima with insuffi
cient means and by an impracticable route. Knowing that
it would be looked upon as folly, San Martin kept his idea
to himself, as his secret, as he himself styled it in confi
dential intercourse, waiting to disclose it for the day when
he should hold in his hand the thunderbolt which was to
shatter the power of Spain in America. Three months
after taking command of the Army of the North, he
wrote to his friend, Don Nicolas Rodriguez Pena : 
"Don't flatter yourself with thinking of what I can do
here. I shall do nothing, and nothing here pleases me. Our
country can do nothing more here than act on the defensive,

THE IDEA OF SAN MARTIN. 79
for which war the brave Gauchos of Salta suffice, if aided
by two squadrons of regular troops. To think otherwise
is to throw men and money into an abyss. I have already
told you my secret. A small, well-disciplined army in
Mendoza, to cross to Chile and finish off the Goths there,
aiding a government of trusty friends to put an end to the
anarchy which reigns. Allying our forces, we shall then
go by sea to Lima. This is our course, and no other."
This idea, which was a secret in 18 14, and which would,
if divulged, have caused its author to be looked upon as a
lunatic, is the idea which has given San Martin his place
in the history of the world, and which finally changed the
destinies of South America.
With such plans in his head, San Martin could not rest
content with the command of the Army of the North.
Further, his rival, Alvear, after crowning himself with the
laurels of victory at Monte Video, aspired also to those of
Peru. Doubtless, with his enterprising character and
sparks of genius, he would have broken the routine of the
previous campaigns, and San Martin was willing to yield
his post to him, asking for himself, as for a resting-place,
the government of the obscure province of Mendoza, by
which he threw dust in the eyes, not only of the enemies
of America but also in those of his own friends, imitating
the tactics of William the Silent, to whose character his
own bears some analogy.
In addition he was, towards the end of April, attacked
by an affection of the lungs, which obliged him to leave
Don Francisco Fernandez de la Cruz in command of the
army, and to retire, by the advice of his physician, to the
Sierra of Cordoba, in search of a drier climate.
On the 1 oth August, 18 14, the ex-General of the Army
of the North was appointed Governor of Cuyo. From
that moment he lived only for his idea. Mendoza was
the starting-point in the realization of his plans ; it was
the soil whence sprang the legions which were to liberate
America.

CHAPTER VII.
the chileno-argentine revolution.
1810 — 18 1 1.
In September, 1814, San Martin took charge of the
Government of Cuyo. The revolution in Chile had then
lasted four years and was about to succumb, a prey to
intestine discords and to the arms of Peru. In order to
understand what followed we must first know what pre
ceded the appearance of San Martin upon the scene.
Never were two peoples more analogous and less alike
than the peoples of Chile and of the United Provinces.
Both countries were situate at the southern extremity of
the new continent, under the same degrees of latitude, but
while one was shut up between the mountains and the
sea, the other spread over vast plains. The first was
agricultural, the second pastoral and commercial. Chile
possessed a territorial aristocracy, and a population of
half-breeds, whose relations were somewhat feudal in
character. The Argentine people were by nature demo
cratic. Both people sprang from the same origin, and
were in temperament alike.
The colonization of Mexico and Peru was an imitation
of the feudal system of Europe ; the labour of an enslaved
race was utilized for the production of the precious metals.
The colonization of the River Plate and of Chile was
effected by the colonists themselves. Assimilating in
some degree the indigenous races, they conquered their

THE COLONIZATION OF CHILE. 81
territories from a warlike people, and, in so doing,
developed their own aptitude for war, while they supplied
themselves with the first necessaries of life by their own
labour. While the colonists of the River Plate crossed immense
deserts and reached the Pacific by way of Upper Peru, the
colonists of Chile crossed the Andes from Arauco and
established themselves to the east of the Cordillera at
Mendoza, opening for themselves a road to the A tlantic.
Thus the city of Mendoza, capital of the Argentine Pro
vince of Cuyo, was a bond of union between the two
countries. During the colonial epoch Chile had vegetated in
obscurity amid peace and plenty, but the Provinces of the
River Plate had lived in a state of almost constant
warfare with their neighbours the Portuguese, with the
English, and with the Indians, which gave them some
knowledge of their own strength, and inoculated them
with new ideas. These ideas filtered across the Cordillera
to Chile, and there smouldered till, in the year 1810, the
flames of revolution burst out in both countries almost
simultaneously. The kingdom of Chile, as it was called, was colonized
under the auspices of Peru, but was, in 1778, separated
from this Viceroyalty and placed under the orders of a
governor, who was at the same time President of the Real
Audiencia. These two authorities, with the Cabildos
granted to some cities, constituted the whole political,
judicial, and municipal system of the colony. The separa
tion from Peru inspired the colonists with instinctive ideas
of independent autonomy, till the death of the then gover
nor, Munoz Guzman, on the 10th February, 1808, plunged
the hitherto pacific colony into a fever of expectancy.
The Home Government followed no fixed system in the
appointment of the superior authorities in the colonies.
Their nomination came from the Crown direct ; sometimes
vacancies were provided for beforehand, sometimes the
G

82 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
colonists were empowered to make a provisional appoint
ment ; but, latterly, that power was, as a rule, vested in
the Audiencia. In 1806 all this was changed by Royal
decree, which enacted that, in case of a vacancy, the
military official of the highest rank then in the colony
should assume the vacant post. On the death of Munoz
Guzman, the Audiencia of Chile raised its own President
to the vacant office. The officers stationed on the frontier
•of Araucania protested against this appointment, and
proclaimed Colonel Don Francisco Garcia Carrasco Pro
visional Governor and Captain-General, and the Audien
cia was forced to yield.
The new Captain- General took with him to the capital,
as his secretary and councillor, a man who had for many
years resided at Concepcion, who had great influence in
the south and was highly thought of throughout the
country. This was Dr. Don Juan Martinez de Rozas, an
Argentine, born in Mendoza, who was at that time forty-
nine years of age. He was a graduate of the University
of Cordoba, and a fellow-student with Dr. Castelli, through
"whom he afterwards entered into political relations with
Belgrano. In various official positions in Chile he had
gained experience of public affairs, and his wife was a
daughter of one of the principal families of the South. Of
a passionate character, he was at the same time prudent,
was well read in the current literature of the day, and was
the leading spirit in a group of men who discussed among
themselves the future destinies of America.
The new Captain-General was a man of limited intelli
gence, violent in his proceedings, and with no firmness of
character. Thus he soon made himself hated, and was
despised by all. His one passion was cock-fighting, his
greatest pleasure was in listening to jokes, and his affec
tions were concentrated upon a domestic of African race,
through whose hands all favours were bestowed. The
whole aim of Rozas was to make him an instrument for
social and political reform. To this end he strove to raise

CHILE IN l8lO. 83
the Cabildo of Santiago into a position analogous to that
of Buenos Ayres, and to use it as a counterpoise to that of
the Audiencia. The Governor, by his advice, added twelve
new members to this body, influential citizens, most of
whom were men of advanced opinions. The immediate
result of this innovation was to inoculate this assembly
with revolutionary ideas.
Ferdinand VII. being now a prisoner of Napoleon, the
Creoles thought that the time had come to replace the
colonial system by a government of their own, but the
Spaniards, who thought only of preserving their own
privileges, protested against the idea. The two parties
soon came into collision. The Governor cancelled the
decree which added twelve members to the Cabildo, and
quarrelled first with the Audiencia and then with Dr.
Rozas. The Spaniards strove to reconcile him with the Audien
cia, and advised him to fortify the hill of Santa Lucia
which commands the city, and to arm their partisans ; but
finding their counsels set at nought, they denounced him
to the Viceroy of Buenos Ayres as unfit for the post he
held. He, on his part, appealed for help both to the
Viceroy of Buenos Ayres and to him of Peru.
At the same time several leading Chilians, aided by
young Argentines resident at Santiago, opened communica
tions with the popular leaders of Buenos Ayres. Carrasco
then tried what intimidation would do. On the 25th May,
1 8 10, the same day on which the Viceroy of Buenos Ayres
was deposed by the people, he ordered the arrest of three
of the principal citizens of Santiago, as advocates of revo
lutionary ideas. The municipal authorities protested, and
convened an open Cabildo, which cited the Governor
before them. He thought at first of resistance, but 3,000
men filled the Plaza. He could not depend upon the
troops, and at the request of the Audiencia he presented
himself, amid the shouts of the populace who clamoured
for his deposition. G 2

84 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
A new Procurator, elected by the Cabildo, the previous
one being among the prisoners, opened the case by declar
ing that it was the will of the people that the prisoners
should be set free, and that the Cabildo would remain
sitting till it was done. This was the first time that such a
thing as "the will of the people" had been heard of in
Chile, and the speech of the new tribune was loudly
applauded. Carrasco yielded, and decreed not only the liberation of
the prisoners, but also the dismissal from their posts of
those who had aided in the arbitrary measure. He also
accepted the control of an Assessor, without whose autho
rization his judicial acts should, in future, be invalid.
These decrees were endorsed by the Audiencia, which was
a virtual dismissal from office of the last Governor and
Captain-General of Chile.
From that day the latent spirit of revolution gained
ground, but the efforts of the Patriots were as yet limited
to theoretical discussions. Their head-quarters were in
Santiago, the warlike Province of Concepcion was their
base, and their teaching came from Buenos Ayres, " the
Athens of the New World," as it is styled by a Chilian
historian. The growth of public opinion in Santiago, and
the news constantly arriving from Spain, more especially
that of the battle of Ocafia, kept the interest alive.
The south of Chile, whose capital was Concepcion,
virtually formed a distinct country. The people called
themselves " Penquistos," to distinguish themselves from
their northern neighbours, who styled themselves " Chi
lians." Their troublesome neighbours, the Indians of
Araucania, had accustomed them to war ; their pastoral
and agricultural pursuits made them strong and hardy.
Their society included a class of free peasantry, among
whom the army of the frontier found recruits, and from
whom sprang the most distinguished leaders on both sides
in the war which followed. The man of most influence in
this district in 1809 was Dr. Rozas, who, after his quarrel

THE FIRST JUNTA OF CHILE. 85
with Carrasco, returned to Concepcion and began openly
to work for independence.
He advised that Chile, without renouncing her allegi
ance t<~> her captive sovereign, should provisionally appoint
a National government, after the example set by the Pro
vinces of Spain, which idea he advocated in a manuscript
circular, for at that day there was no printing-press in
Chile. Among the co-workers with Rozas was a wealthy pro
prietor of the South named Don Bernardo O'Higgins,
son of the celebrated Viceroy of the same name. Educated
in Europe he spoke English, and was, by reason of his
Irish descent, partial to the institutions of England. A
disciple and confidant of Miranda he had been affiliated
in his lodge, swearing as did San Martin and Bolivar to
work for the liberty of the New World.
Carrasco kept the prisoners in gaol in spite of his pro
mise to the Cabildo, and issued a decree establishing a
special Junta to keep watch over the advocates of the new
ideas. The excitement in Santiago increased, and eight
hundred armed citizens demanded the institution of a
governing Junta, in imitation of that established in Buenos
Ayres on the 25th May. The Audiencia prevailed upon
Carrasco to resign his power into the hands of the Count
de la Conquista, a Chilian noble, who was eighty-five years
of age. The Patriots were not satisfied, but as they suc
ceeded in surrounding the new Governor by councillors in
whom they could trust, they for a time acquiesced.
About the end of July an emissary from Belgrano and
Castelli crossed the Andes. The Patriots, stimulated by
the news he brought, determined to persist in their pre
vious design, and induced the Count to convene an open
Cabildo on the 18th September. To ensure their triumph
the Cabildo called out the city militia, and the proprietors
of Santiago filled the suburbs with their armed tenantry.
They were also joined by some officers of the garrison. In
spite of the protest of the Audiencia, the Count laid down

86 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
his baton of command, and the Cabildo appointed a
governing Junta of seven members, of whom Dr. Rozas
was one, the Count being named President.
The new Government was accepted by the whole coun
try, but nothing was changed until the arrival of Dr.
Rozas, who on the 2nd November entered the capital
in triumph, between lines of troops, amid salvoes of artil
lery, the clang of bells, music, and loud acclamations.
All that night the city was illuminated and fireworks
blazed in his honour. Never had Santiago witnessed such
an ovation.
The Chilian revolution resembled that of Buenos Ayres,
in that it was Parliamentary and legal, initiated and
carried out within the precincts of the municipal forum ;
and that it triumphed by the force of opinion, without
violence, in the name of the public weal. Both followed
the same formula, the resumption of their own rights,
without a rupture with the mother country and protesting
fidelity to the legitimate sovereign. The first was an
aristocratic revolution, the second was democratic and
radical ; but, both were essentially American and obeyed
the same historic law. Thus from the beginning, the two
nations were bound together by fraternal ties and by a
common cause.
The news of the installation of the Junta of Chile was
received in Buenos Ayres with transports of joy, and the
thunder of their guns on the nth October, reverberated
in the hearts of the Chilian people. Buenos Ayres pro
posed at once an alliance offensive and defensive, assuring
the Chilians that England would recognise any constitu
tion they might give themselves, now that Spain had
fallen. Rozas, in return, presented a plan for a vast con
tinental confederation, which idea found an eager advo
cate in Alvarez Jonte, the Argentine envoy, who as a
practical exposition of it, asked Chile for an auxiliary force
in aid of the Argentine Government against the reac
tionary movement which had its headquarters in Monte
Video.

REVOLT OF THE ROYALISTS. 87
The Cabildo opposed the project, but Rozas had the
majority .of the Junta with him, and in 181 1 a decree was
published for the despatch of an auxiliary force of 500
men, and authorizing the Argentine envoy to enlist 2,000
recruits. This sealed the alliance of the two countries and
united their destinies for good or evil. Of the promised
contingent, 100 dragoons and 200 infantry reached Buenos
Ayres on the 14th June, 181 1, and met with an enthusiastic
reception. The Patriot party soon became divided into two fac
tions. The Radicals, who aimed at independence, were
headed by Rozas, and had in their front line the Argen
tine residents. The death of the Count de la Conquista in
February, 181 1, left Rozas at the head of affairs, but his
power was more apparent than real. Against him, at the
head of the Moderate party, was ranged the Cabildo,
sustained by the Creole aristocracy, whose timid temporis
ing policy almost placed them in line with the party of
reaction. The Royalist, called the Goth or Saracen party,
recognized the leadership of the Audiencia, accused Rozas
of personal ambition and even of aspiring to the crown.
Rozas had no such ambition and lacked even the spon
taneous courage of the man of action. Through all this
opposition he carried on his plan of reform, of which free
dom of commerce was the most important feature. This
was proclaimed in February, 181 1, with the result that in
a few months the revenue was doubled and was soon after
quadrupled. He also raised troops and summoned a
general Congress of Deputies from the Provinces, whose
election was based upon the limitations established by
municipal precedent.
The 1 st April was the day appointed for the elections.
That same day a part of the garrison of Santiago muti
nied under Colonel Figueroa, who was a friend of Rozas.
At first the daring Royalist was successful, and occupied
the Plaza, placing himself under the orders of the Audi
encia, who however, declined all responsibility. Rozas,
who alone of his colleagues preserved his presence of

88 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
mind, ordered the rest of the troops to march against the
mutineers. The two forces met in the Plaza and opened
fire on each other simultaneously, at close quarters. The
affair soon ended in favour of the Patriots, young Manuel
Dorrego, of Buenos Ayres, at that time a student of the
University, particularly distinguishing himself in the
fight. Figueroa took refuge in a convent, where he was cap
tured by Rozas at the head of a party of citizens, was
tried that same night, sentenced to death " as a traitor to
his country and the government," and was shot the next
morning at four o'clock. The bodies of five of the muti
neers who had been killed, were hung on a gallows in the
Plaza on the afternoon of the ist, and next day proclama
tion was made that all who conspired against the State
would be similarly punished.
Immediately afterwards the Audiencia was dissolved,
and with it disappeared the last semblance of monarchical
authority in Chile.
Meantime the elections passed off quietly in the rest of
the country. In the Centre the Creole oligarchy triumphed,
the great proprietors being elected by their tenants with
out opposition ; but in the South and in some of the
northern districts, the Radicals were successful.
Following the example of Buenos Ayres, the Deputies
were incorporated with the executive, in spite of the just
protest of the Cabildo, which revenged itself by procuring
the election of twelve deputies for the capital in place of
the six it ought to have had according to the electoral
census. On the 6th May the interrupted election took place in
Santiago. The candidates of Rozas being defeated from
this day his power waned.
Congress met on the 4th July. Out of forty members
Rozas could only count upon thirteen votes. On the same
day the Junta resigned, and the " High Congress "
assumed the executive power. Rozas in an eloquent

THE FIRST CONGRESS OF CHILE. 89
speech gave a sketch of his policy, which he recom
mended for their adoption, and was listened to with deep
attention by the whole Assembly ; for the moment all the
discordant opinions vibrated in harmony.
It is an interesting question whether this early estab
lishment of the Parliamentary system was of benefit or
was an evil to Chile. The Chilian historian, Vicuna Mac-
kenna, considers it premature. He says, " the dictator
ship of a Caesar rather than that of a Cicero" would have
been preferable for a people without constitutional educa
tion. Gervinus thinks that it assured to Chile, later on,
that tranquillity so wanting in the other republics of
South America, Lastarria, more philosophical than
either, observes that the establishment of the doctrine of
the sovereignty of the people, even under such restrictions
as placed them in the hands of a few only, was the true
way to weaken colonial prejudices and to arouse the idea
of the dignity of man. The fact is that it was the natural
outcome of the feudal character of Chilian society. In the
Parliamentary drama the people played the part of the
Greek chorus, which repeated the words of the principal
actor. Chile soon remedied the error, copied from Buenos
Ayres, of incorporating Congress with the Executive,
which shows the existence of a hidden force neutralising
the effect of an evil example.
The revolutions of Holland and the United States had
shown the world that a regulating Congress was compa
tible with a dictatorship ; and even in South America it
was seen later on that no dictatorship, however powerful,
could disregard the will of the people from whom its
authority was derived. In Chile less than in any other
¦colony was this possible; nevertheless it is certain that
Rozas convened this Congress in obedience to a solemn
promise exacted from him by O'Higgins as a condition of
his support.
The Moderate party, which had a large majority in
Congress, knew not what use to make of their power; they

90 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
were without experience, without plans, and had no fixed
ideas ; most of them desired only peace and security for
their properties. The minority had clearer views ; they
aimed at raising their leader to the head of the State, and
at independence.
On the 27th July an English ship of war reached
Valparaiso, whose captain was commissioned by the
Viceroy of Peru, with credentials from the Regency of
Spain, to receive the subsidy which Chile was expected
to contribute for the maintenance of the war in the Penin
sula. One million six hundred thousand dollars had been
deposited in the treasury for this purpose. The Mode
rates and the Royalists were for paying the amount at
once, but O'Higgins, speaking for the Liberals, said : —
"Although we are in a minority we shall know how to
supply that defect by our energy and our courage ; we are
sufficient to oppose effectually the delivery of this money,
of which our country threatened with invasion has need."
This bold protest decided the question in the negative.
The Liberals afterwards proposed the appointment of
an Executive of three ; one for each of the three territorial
divisions of the country, the North, the South, and the
Centre. The Moderates accepted the idea but put off the
election. The Liberals then attempted to intimidate
Congress by popular tumults, sadly compromising their
leader by these sinister manoeuvres. Congress .showed
more firmness than could have been expected from its
composition, and the defeated minority seceded from the
Assembly. The majority then named three of their own
party as the Junta, and Rozas, looking upon his cause as
lost, retired to Concepcion, where he was received in
triumph, and set up an opposition Junta, the South recall
ing its members from Congress.
Congress then drew up a constitution, so unworkable
that it only served to show their utter lack of all political
knowledge. It never came into operation.

CHAPTER VIIL
PROGRESS AND FALL OF THE CHILIAN REVOLUTION.
l8ll — 1814.
THE disappearance of the Radical party in Congress, the
reactionary policy of the Conservatives, and the proceed
ings of Rozas at Concepcion, had most evil effect upon
the course of the revolution in Chile. Liberalism became
anarchy, and the Moderates became mixed up with the
Spanish party. At this juncture Don Jose Miguel Car
rera returned to his native land.
Carrera was a scion of one of the most distinguished
families of Chile, and was at that time twenty-seven years
of age. He had fought in Spain against the French, and
brought with him a major's commission, granted by the
Junta of Galicia, and the brilliant uniform of an hussar.
He had two brothers, officers in the army of Chile. The
elder, Juan Jose, was a man of herculean strength, but of
feeble intellect, wanting in moral courage, and full of envy
of his more talented brother. The youngest and most
amiable of the three, was named Luis, and was at that
time twenty years of age. In danger he was always found
in the front rank, and was devoted to Jose Miguel. These
three had a sister, Javiera, of great beauty and of mascu
line strength of mind ; she was skilful in intrigue and
ambitious, but was distinguished both by social and
domestic virtues ; her intrepid spirit made her the Egeria
of her brothers.

92 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Jose Miguel was a man of action, and a thinker so far
as his unruly nature would permit ; of vehement passions,
and licentious life, a ready writer and a brilliant speaker,
of good presence and of attractive manners, but with an
overweening sense of his own importance. He was a sort
of an Alcibiades shorn of his great qualities.
Carrera presented himself publicly to Congress, dressed
in his brilliant uniform, offered his services and his sword,
and then entered into secret negotiations with the Liberal
party, through the powerful family of Larrain. With
them he organized a popular demonstration by which the
Government was upset on the 4th September, a new Junta
of five members was appointed, six of the members of
Congress for the capital were dismissed as illegally
elected, and three seats were declared vacant.
Congress had hesitated to grant the request of the
Government of Buenos Ayres for forty quintals of gun
powder from the factory in Chile ; the new Government
sent off two hundred quintals. It reduced the taxes,
reformed some abuses in administration, encouraged
industry, armed the militia, and had the glory of making
Chile the first nation in America to abolish slavery.
The principal posts were monopolised by the Larrain
family, greatly to the disgust of Carrera. One of this
family boasting that the legislative, executive, and judi
cial presidencies were all held by them, Carrera asked : —
"And who has the presidency of the bayonets r"
Dazzled by his popularity, he now only thought of how
to overturn the new Government, and even sought and
obtained help from the Spanish party to this end.
On the 15th November Juan Jcse Carrera mutinied
with his battalion and seized the barracks of the artillery.
Luis headed the artillerymen and dragged the guns into
the street, the roll of their wheels on the pavement giving
the signal for a fresh revolution. Jose Miguel put himself
at the head of the mutiny, and summoned the Executive
and Congress to meet and hear the petitions of the people.

PROGRESS OF THE CHILIAN REVOLUTION. 93
He was joined only by the Spanish party, who shouted for
the dissolution of the Junta and of Congress. The next
day an open Cabildo was convened, which named a new
Junta, composed of Jose Miguel Carrera, as representative
of the capital, Gaspar Marin for the North, and Rozas, or
in his absence Don Bernardo O'Higgins, for the South.
This resolution was presented to Congress by the military
chiefs, and Congress, after some delay, authorised the
appointment of the new Junta.
On the 27th November, on pretext that he was in
danger of assassination, Carrera made several arrests.
He himself took one of the prisoners to the barracks,
made him kneel before a crucifix, and by threatening
him with immediate execution, forced from him a decla
ration against the others. The trial which followed
proved the innocence of the accused. Called to account
by his colleagues and by Congress, he, on the 2nd Decem
ber, demanded the dissolution of the latter, occupied the
Legislative Palace with troops, and forced from the Assem
bly a decree to that effect. Marin and O'Higgins protested
and withdrew from the Junta. Carrera replaced them by
one of his own partisans and by a noted leader of the
Spanish party.
The two political parties, which represented the aris
tocracy and democracy of Chile, disappeared, and the
country fell under the domination of a military oligarchy,
which setting aside laws, juntas, and congresses, depended
only on the army for support. Juan Jose Carrera was
raised to the rank of brigadier-general, and his brothers
were made lieutenant-colonels, with special decorations
for their services.
Public opinion was entirely against the Carreras, all
eyes turned to the South and to Rozas as the only man
who could vindicate the law. Rozas protested against
the mutiny and offered his assistance to Congress, but he
was in an anomalous position. By leaving the capital
and setting up an opposition Junta at Concepcion, he had

94 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
entered upon dangerous ground and had sapped the base
of his moral power ; he had destroyed the territorial unity
of the revolution and had aroused provincial jealousies.
Thus Carrera, though destitute of political principle, and
seeking only his own aggrandisement, was the true repre
sentative of the cause of national unity.
The Centre of Chile is divided from the South by the
river Maule. Carrera stationed an army on the north
bank, while, through the intervention of O'Higgins, he
conferred with Rozas. On the 12th January, 181 2, a con
vention was drawn up by three plenipotentiaries, which
recognised the South, Centre, and North as three distinct
provinces, each of which should name one member of an
Executive, until a Constituent Congress could be convened.
Carrera was in no haste to ratify this convention, till an
army from the South advanced to the line of the Maule.
A collision was prevented by an interview on the
25th April between the two leaders, who verbally agreed
to the ratification of the convention and the re-installation
of Congress. This agreement was hailed with joy through
out the country, and Carrera was received in triumph on
his return to Santiago.
It was not patriotism nor fear of the Penquistos, which
induced Carrera to restore the Congress he had dissolved ;
the Argentine Government, appealed to by the Govern
ment of Concepcion, had offered their mediation, but the
most serious matter was that the province of Valdivia
had on the 12th March declared itself Royalist, and pro
claimed Carrera Captain-General of the kingdom, an
appointment which he indignantly rejected.
Valdivia occupied the extreme south of the country, had
a seaport with fortifications which were considered im
pregnable, and was supported by the Archipelago of
Chiloe, where the people were all Royalists and had a
Royalist garrison.
Early in 18 12 the first printing-press was established in
Chile, and on the 13th February appeared the first news-

PROGRESS OF THE CHILIAN REVOLUTION. 95
paper, entitled La Aurora de Chile, edited by Camilo
Enriquez, a priest, assisted by an Argentine named Vera y
Pintado, and by Irrizarra of Guatemala. From the United
States, together with the printing-press, came Mr. Poin
sett as consular agent, who introduced a new element
into the political opinions of the country, democratic
ideas, which new ideas found at first little acceptance
save in the army, where they were fostered by Carrera as
a counterpoise to the federal ideas which had gained
strength during the recent events.
On the night of the 9th July a revolutionary movement
broke out in Concepcion, headed by the partisans of
Rozas, but secretly fomented by the Spanish party, which
dissolved the Provincial Junta. Rozas went to Santiago,
whence he was banished by Carrera to Mendoza, and died
there on the 3rd March, 1813.
Carrera was now without a rival, and the revolution
gained in unity and in strength. The various parties
commenced to fuse together, with his authority as a
common centre, and the desire for independence became
more marked. When Consul Poinsett celebrated his
national anniversary of the 4th July, the flag of the stars
and stripes was seen entwined with an unknown tri-
coloured flag, bearing a lone star in one of its corners.
This unknown flag was the new flag of Chile. On the
1 6th July the tricoloured cockade was worn by all the
citizens of Santiago, and on the 30th September the new
flag was formally recognised as the national ensign.
Nevertheless independence was not then declared, still
government was carried on in the name of Ferdinand VII.,
while the Carreras went about the city at night in dis
guise, with groups of young men, pulling down the escut
cheons of the Creole aristocracy.
In order to test his popularity, Carrera then sent in his
resignation, which the Cabildo refused to accept. In con
sequence of a misunderstanding with his brother, Juan
Jose, who was still envious of him, he repeated his resig-

96 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
nation, but in conjunction with his brother Luis, reserved
the command of the army. His father, Don Ignacio, was
appointed to succeed him, and supported by Don Juan
Jose adopted a reactionary policy, which was opposed by
Jose Miguel and Luis, at the head of the troops.
The two brothers, assisted by two friends, then drew up
a plan for a constitution, which was presented to the
Junta by one of their adherents. This plan created a
Senate of seven members, and contained two clauses which
provided that : —
" Ferdinand VII. was king on condition of accepting
and swearing the Constitution made by the people," and
" no decree emanating from authority outside the territory
shall have any effect, those who obey it being punished
as traitors to the State."
These clauses were accepted by the Junta, but Don
Ignacio Carrera, being afraid to sign them, retired from
the Government, and Don Jose Miguel returned to office.
Carrera was again dictator, and opposition was silent
in the face of a new danger. A Royalist army had
invaded Chilian territory and occupied the South. He
was now the champion of a noble cause ; all the military
chiefs, even those who opposed his policy, obeyed him
willingly ; the people saw in danger the justification of a
strong government ; the military repute he had brought
with him from Europe caused him to be regarded as the
first soldier of his country.
Abascal, Viceroy of Peru, was then more than seventy
years old. By firmness and prudence he had maintained
peace in his Viceroyalty in the midst of the commotions
which stirred all Spanish America. More than that, he
had made Peru the centre of the Royalist reaction, had
crushed rebellion in Upper Peru, had made war on the
Argentine provinces, had sent an expedition to Quito, and
had kept Chiloe under his orders. He had watched the
Chilian revolution from its commencement, waiting for a
favourable opportunity to attack it. Antonio Pareia an

ARRIVAL OF A ROYALIST EXPEDITION. 97
experienced soldier, was named Commandant-General of
Valdivia and Chiloe, and early in 18 13 reached the island
with five vessels, a number of officers, fifty soldiers, and
fifty thousand dollars.
He quickly organised the militia of the Archipelago,
with the garrison as a nucleus, and crossed to Valdivia
with 1,400 men, where he incorporated the garrison of
that fortress, raising his force to over 2,000 men. These
he arranged in three divisions, each with six guns, and
re-embarking, sailed northwards, keeping his destination
secret. Three days afterwards, on the 26th March, he
landed in the bay of San Vicente, taking the town of
Talcahuano in the rear, and threatening Concepcion in
front. Talcahuano was taken by assault ; the garrison of
Concepcion mutinied and gave up the city. Thus speedily
he was master of the South, and further strengthened his
force by the garrisons of Arauco.
With 2,000 regulars, from 2,000 to 3,000 militia, and
with twenty-five guns, he opened the campaign early in
April. At Chilian the country rose in his favour, increas
ing his force to 6,000 men, with whom he occupied the
line of the river Nuble, which lies to the south of the
Maule. Carrera was equally active ; he proclaimed himself
General-in-chief with full powers, declared war against
the Viceroy of Peru, set up a gibbet in the Plaza of San
tiago, on which to hang all who should hold communica
tion with the enemy, and caused the imposition of a forced
loan of two hundred and sixty thousand dollars upon
those hostile to the revolution, which measures inspired
general enthusiasm and confidence.
On the 1 st April he established his headquarters to the
north of the Maule, with merely an escort, and gave
orders for the concentration of the army at Talca. His
friend, Consul Poinsett, accompanied him as a volunteer,
and the same day he was joined by O'Higgins, who forgot
his resentment, an example followed by Mackenna, who
H

98 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
was a talented engineer. Calling in the militia of the
South, who remained faithful, in twenty days he was at
the head of 10,000 men, from whom he organised an army
of 2,500 regulars, badly armed, and as many lancers of the-
militia, with sixteen field-pieces.
The campaign opened with a piece of good fortune
which greatly encouraged the Patriots. It chanced that
an officer sent with 500 men to surprise the vanguard of
the enemy at a pass on the Maule, misunderstood his
orders, and on the night of the 27th April fell in with the
main body of the Royalists, some five or six thousand
strong. Not knowing who they were, he attacked them
and captured the whole of the artillery. At dawn the
enemy recovered from their panic, pursued him and recap
tured the guns and prisoners. The loss of the Patriots in
killed and wounded was four times that of the Royalists,
but the moral effect was that of a victory. The greater
part of the irregular cavalry deserted from Pareja, who
nevertheless advanced to the Maule. The army was
drawn up to force the passage, when the men from Chiloe
and Valdivia threw down their arms and refused to go
further ; they cared nothing for the Royalist cause beyond
the Maule. Pareja, lying on a stretcher, stricken with a
mortal disease, ordered a retreat, on which the rest of the
irregulars dispersed, and he was left with little more than
a thousand men.
Carrera knew nothing of what had occurred, and let
fifteen days pass before he made up his mind to cross the
river. The Patriot vanguard under Luis Carrera came up
with Pareja on the 15th May, as he was about to pass the
Nuble. The Royalists halted, the dying general mounted
on horseback for the last time, and placed Captain San
chez in command. Sanchez at once occupied some rising
ground, where he threw up an entrenchment with his
baggage, and formed his infantry in square, and opened
fire with twenty-seven guns upon the Patriots, checking
their advance. Carrera then took the command, and on

BATTLE OF SAN CARLOS. 99
the arrival of Don Juan Jose with the second division,
drew up his infantry in line with cavalry on the flanks to
surround the enemy. Don Juan Jose, without waiting
for orders, attacked the position and was driven back ; the
same fate befell another battalion which followed his
example. The guns were dismounted at the first shot.
The cavalry which had passed to the rear of the enemy,
were dispersed by artillery fire, and the infantry fell back
in disorder. The third division, under O'Higgins and
Mackenna, then came up and prevented the advance of
the enemy, which would have turned the repulse into a
rout. Night put a stop to this strange affair, and Carrera
retreated in disorder to San Carlos..
Sanchez crossed the Nuble with all his artillery, without
further molestation, and retreated to Chilian, with a loss
of six killed and fifteen wounded.
This battle of San Carlos showed that Carrera was
destitute of military talent ; but he had the strength of
mind to reject the councils of his disheartened officers,
who advised him to withdraw the army beyond the Maule,
and for the first time drew up a definite plan of operations.
With one part of his army he occupied Concepcion and
Talcahuano; cutting off the retreat of the enemy by sea,
and despatched O'Higgins with his division to Arauco,
securing the South, but in these manoeuvres he lost much
time, and one detachment of 650 men left in reserve on
the Nuble, was captured by a Royalist force from
Chilian. Sanchez was an obscure soldier, born in Galicia, of no
real genius, but quick-sighted, of great tenacity, and
devoted to the cause he served. At Chilian he entrenched
himself, aided by the people, who were all Royalists, and
by the preaching friars, who had there a convent, which
soon became a well-provisioned citadel.
When Carrera, against the advice of O'Higgins and
Mackenna, determined at the end of July to besiege
Chilian, it was already winter, the season of heavy rains
H 2

ioo THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
On the 3rd August, Mackenna established a battery of six
guns, at four hundred and fifty yards from the trenches.
The following morning Sanchez made a vigorous sally but
was driven back. The same afternoon he made another
attack upon a reserve battery, under the fire of his own
redoubts, a ball from which blew up the ammunition of the
battery, causing great confusion. Carrera ordered the
battery to be abandoned, but his officers disobeyed him,
and O'Higgins coming up to the rescue, the enemy was
again repulsed.
The losses were considerable on both sides, but the
sufferings of the besiegers were augmented by the incle
mency of the weather. « A convoy of ammunition for Car
rera was intercepted by Royalist guerillas, thirty miles
from the encampment, and delivered to Sanchez, whose
supplies were running short. On the 5th Sanchez made
another attack upon the advanced battery, which was
bravely repelled by Luis Carrera. The Patriot general
then ordered an assault upon the town, which was beaten
off by the townspeople themselves. The spirit of the
Patriot army was broken, deaths and desertions greatly
reduced their numbers. Carrera summoned the garrison
to surrender. Sanchez replied by proposing an armistice,
during which the Patriots should recross the Maule. A
council of war was called, and against the advice of Mac
kenna the siege was raised. On the 14th August the
Patriot army encamped on the banks of the Itata, and
from this moment their cause declined.
Carrera again fell into the error of dividing his army.
He posted one division near the mouth of the Itata, under
command of his brother Juan Jose, to protect the line of
the Maule, and O'Higgins was despatched with a weak
division to secure the frontier on the Bio-Bio. With the
rest of his forces he went to Concepcion, while his guerillas
scoured the country in every direction. This was just what
suited Sanchez, who could do nothing with a strong force
in front of him. He had plenty of irregulars who knew

THE AFFAIR OF "EL ROBLE." 101
the country well, and split up his force into flying columns
to the north and south. The depredations of the Patriots
stirred up the resistance of the people, and various detach
ments were cut up in detail. O'Higgins could not prevent
the reconquest of the line of the Bio-Bio and the occupation
of Arauco, by which supplies were drawn by the Royalists
from Valdivia and Chiloe.
At the end of September Carrera was shut up in Con
cepcion, and the Patriot army was blockaded in three
separate divisions. He ordered their concentration at
Concepcion. Juan Jose Carrera reached the Membrillar
near to the junction of the Diguillin with the Itata early in
October, where he was forced to entrench himself. Car
rera then marched to meet O'Higgins, and joined him at
the pass of " El Roble," some ten miles to the east of Mem
brillar. The united forces, about 1,000 strong, encamped on
ground badly chosen. Sanchez, joining the irregulars with
a division from Chilian, attacked them there on the night of
the 19th October. In the confusion Carrera jumped his horse
into the river and went off to join his brother, receiving a
lance wound in his flight. His absence was not noticed,
but O'Higgins, after three hours' firing, led a bayonet
charge upon the enemy, and drove them across the river-
When Carrera returned to the camp he saluted O'Higgins
as " the saviour of the division and of the country," and in
his official despatch spoke of him as " the first of soldiers,
capable of uniting in himself the glories of Chile." These
words were his own abdication, his military star was
eclipsed. After this affair Carrera again changed his plan. He
left his brother and O'Higgins at the confluence of the
Diguillin and Itata, protected by fieldworks, and returned
to Concepcion. This destroyed his prestige in the army
and in public opinion ; the Press gave the signal of general
discontent ; even from the pulpit the disastrous influence
of the three Carreras was condemned.
When Carrera took command of the army his place as

I02 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Dictator was for a time filled by his brother Juan Jose ;
when he also took the field his two colleagues resigned.
The Corporations and the Senate then named a new Junta
of three, chosen from the Moderate party, two of whom
were enemies of Carrera. The new Junta were active in
furnishing supplies until the raising of the siege of Chilian
and the revolt of the province of Concepcion produced
strained relations between them and Carrera.
The capital became excited by the adverse course of the
war, and the Liberals of 1811 clamoured for a change in
the constitution. The Press advocated the adoption of a
more Republican system. On the 8th October a meeting
of the corporations, convened by the Junta, confirmed
them in power, but directed that the seat of Government
should be removed to Talca. Don Jose Ignacio Cienfuegos,
a man of great influence in the South and an enemy of
Carrera, joined the Junta, and Larrain, ex-President of the
late Congress, and also an enemy of Carrera, was left in
charge of the affairs at Santiago. Government had organ
ized in the capital a new battalion officered by their own
adherents, and had asked for a supply of arms from Buenos
Ayres. The 300 Chilian auxiliaries came back from that
city, and the Argentine Government, in return for their
services, had decreed that an Argentine auxiliary force of
equal number should march to the assistance of Chile. This
column, raised in the provinces of Cordoba and Mendoza,
crossed the Andes under the command of Don Juan Gre
gorio Las Heras, and were warmly welcomed. Their
first duty was to escort the Junta to Talca, where Colonel
Don Marcos Balcarce took command of the contingent.
The Junta, on receiving news of the affair at El Roble,
resolved to remove Carrera from the command, and first
thought of replacing him by Balcarce, but, yielding to
national sentiment, decided to appoint Colonel O'Higgins,
whose tried valour and civic virtues gave him great popu
larity, both in the army and throughout the country. This
appointment in February, 18 14, had an evil effect upon the

O'HIGGINS TAKES THE COMMAND. 103
army, where Carrera had still many partizans, splitting it
into two parties. Carrera left for the capital accompanied
by his brother Luis, but on the road they were taken
prisoners by a party of Royalist irregulars under Barafiao,
and carried off to Chilian.
The army of which O'Higgins took command consisted
of about 2,500 men dispersed in fractions, disheartened,
and badly armed and equipped. On the 31st January a
reinforcement of Royalist troops landed at Arauco, consist
ing of 800 men and six guns under Brigadier-General
Gainza, appointed by the Viceroy as successor to Pareja.
Eight days later he crossed the Bio-Bio and joined San
chez at Chilian, without meeting an insurgent on his
march. O'Higgins stationed one division of his army at Mem
brillar, while with the rest he marched to the line of the
Bio-Bio to intercept the supplies of the enemy. This plan
was as bad as those of Carrera. Mackenna, left in com
mand at Membrillar, had under his orders on the 14th
February, 800 infantry, 100 dragoons, and sixteen guns.
Soon after the country around was occupied by the light
troops of the enemy, so that he was obliged to make sallies
in force to procure supplies and forage. On one of these
occasions, when he had taken a considerable number of
cattle his rear-guard was attacked by a much stronger
force, which was driven off with heavy loss by Las Heras
with 100 of the Argentine auxiliaries.
Meantime a Royalist detachment of 300 men had crossed
the Maule, and on the 4th March attacked the city of
Talca, from which the Junta had already withdrawn. The
feeble garrison made a stout resistance under Colonel
Spano, a Spaniard who had joined the Patriots in 1809,
but was overpowered, Spano dying wrapped in the tri-
coloured flag he had so bravely defended.
This blow spread consternation in Santiago. The people
crowded to the Plaza, and Irizarri proposed the appoint
ment of a Dictator, following the example of the Roman

104 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Republic in times of danger, and Colonel Lastra, Governor
of Valparaiso, was named Supreme Director. The new
Government in a few days organized a force of 1,500 men
with six guns, and placed in command a young man named
Don Manuel Blanco Encalada, but these raw troops
were repulsed in an attack upon Talca, and were after
wards completely, routed at Cancha-Rayada on the 27th
March. The position of Mackenna at Membrillar became very
difficult. The loss of Talca cut his communications with
the capital; he threw up more entrenchments and re
mained steadily on the defensive. O'Higgins started to
his assistance on the 1 6th March, leaving weak garrisons
in Concepcion and Talcahuana. It was time ; Gainza was
already between them. On the 19th O'Higgins drove in
the Royalist vanguard at Quilo, and Gainza, withdrawing
the garrison from Chilian, fell next day upon Mackenna,
but was beaten off with the loss of eighty killed.
On the 23rd O'Higgins joined Mackenna, and next day
moved off northwards with 2,600 infantry, 600 cavalry, and
twenty guns. Gainza, harassing his rear, marched in the
same direction ; victory would lie with him who could first
cross the Maule. O'Higgins, by a skilful manoeuvre, cap
tured a pass, and throwing up defences of brushwood in his
rear, beat off an attack, and crossed on the 4th April. Gainza
crossed by a different pass on the same day, and tried to
stop the march of the Patriot army at a pass on the Claro
River. On the 7th O'Higgins forced the pass, and the two
armies faced each other between that river and the Lontue-
At Quecheraguas O'Higgins threw up entrenchments, and
on the 8th and 9th beat off attacks of the enemy, giving
time for the arrival of reinforcements from Santiago. Gainza
then retreated to Talca, and the garrisons of Concepcion
and Talcahuano capitulated.
By this time the Anglo-Spanish armies had driven the
French from Spain, and the Government of Spain called
upon the insurgent colonies to send deputies to Cortes. In

FALL OF THE CHILIAN REVOLUTION. 105
Mexico the Royalist arms were triumphant ; the rising star
of Bolivar at Caracas was about to suffer eclipse ; the revo
lutions of Quito, Venezuela, and New Granada were crushed;
Lima, still the great centre of reaction, prepared yet another
expedition for the conquest of Chile ; only in the united
provinces of the River Plate did the revolution still hold its
ground. In these circumstances Hillyar, commodore of
the British squadron of the Pacific, offered his mediation
to the Viceroy of Peru for the pacification of Chile. His
offer was accepted, and he reached Santiago just after the
successful defence of Quecheraguas. Government ap
pointed O'Higgins and Mackenna to conduct the nego
tiation. It was accordingly arranged on the 3rd May that
Chile should return to the state of the year 181 1, under the
rule of a provisional Junta subject to the Regency of Spain ;
that the Royalist troops should withdraw from Chile within
one month ; that Chile should send deputies to the Penin
sula to settle all disputes, and should do what she could
to help the cause of Spain. This arrangement, which is
known as the Treaty of Lircay, was badly received in the
Royalist camp, and also by public opinion in Chile, and
resulted in nothing more than a truce.
It is a question whether these terms were agreed upon
in good faith by either party. So far as Gainza was con
cerned, they saved him from certain defeat.
Don Francisco Antonio Pinto, diplomatic agent of Chile
in London, was instructed to repair to Madrid in represen
tation of her interests, but the Royalist troops were not
withdrawn, and the Government remained in the hands of
Lastra as Supreme Director. Chile was resolved upon
liberty at any cost, and public opinion, which had forced
on the treaty, was now equally pronounced against it.
The alliance between Chile and the United Provinces
was de facto at an end, and the Argentine auxiliaries were
withdrawn from the army to Santiago. On the 22nd July
a mutiny in the barracks restored the Carreras to power.
They proclaimed themselves the saviours of the country.

ic6 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
By the Treaty of Lircay Don Jose Miguel and Don Luis
were excluded from the arrangement for a mutual ex
change of prisoners ; they were to be sent by sea to Val
paraiso, and thence banished into honourable exile; but,
escaping from their prison at Chilian, they had reached
the capital and raised this mutiny, in which style of work
Don Jose Miguel displayed more skill than he had done
in the field against the national enemy. A provisional
Junta was named by the noisy shouts of an open Cabildo, •
of which Carrera made himself president.
Had Carrera torn up the Treaty of Lircay, he would
have had both reason and patriotism on his side, but his
first step was to confirm the clause relating to freedom of
commerce with Peru and to exhort the people to preserve
peace. As before, he had neither ideas nor courage, and in
his hands Congress, army, and revolution were all lost
together. In spite of the protests of Las Heras, the Ar
gentine auxiliaries were ignominiously expelled from the
capital, on the pretext that it was their duty to assist the
Government when called upon. O'Higgins counselled
them to observe absolute neutrality in all civil disputes,
following the example of the Chilian auxiliaries in Buenos
Ayres in the revolution of 1812, and at the invitation of
the Cabildo marched his army upon Santiago. Carrera
met him on the plains of Maipo, where, for the first time,
Chilian blood was shed by Chilians, and O'Higgins was
defeated. Meantime, the Viceroy of Peru had refused to ratify the
treaty of peace, had despatched a fresh expedition to Tal
cahuano, and General Osorio at the head of 5,000 men was
now marching on the capital. In this emergency O'Hig
gins put himself and the remnants of his force under
the orders of Carrera, who speedily collected five or six
thousand men, who might have done something had they
been well led, but neither he nor O'Higgins showed any
capacity for command. The latter, with 1,700 men, was
cut off from the main body and shut up in Rancagua,

FALL OF THE CHILIAN REVOLUTION. 107
where he defended himself with desperate valour for thirty-
two hours against the whole army of the Royalists, till, his
ammunition being exhausted, he cut his way through the
enemy at the head of 300 men, and rejoined Carrera, who
had retreated to Santiago.
Here all was confusion ; and the people having lost con
fidence in their own leaders were ready to shout for the
King. Las Heras, marching south with the Argentine
auxiliaries, met O'Higgins in full retreat towards the Cor
dillera, and protected the rear until the fugitives from
Santiago were safe on Argentine soil.
Carrera busied himself . only in trying to secure the
public treasure, which he packed on mules and carried off
with him beyond Santa Rosa, but he was overtaken and
the treasure fell into the hands of his pursuers on the
slopes of Los Papeles on the 1 ith October. On the night
of the 13th he crossed the snow-line on the summit, bid
ding farewell to his country, which he was never to see
again. So ended the first period of the revolution of Chile, which
is styled " the time of the old country." The new country
was yet to come. Argentines and Chilians in alliance
were yet to raise from the dust the banners of Rancagua,
and to bear them triumphant to the Equator.

CHAPTER IX.
CUYO.
i 8 14 — 1815.
The district of Cuyo lies to the east of the Cordillera,
between 310 and 350 south latitude, and extends east
ward to the 66° of west longitude, where the Andean for
mation dies away in the vast plain of the Argentine
Pampa. Here the snow waters flowing from the mountain
ranges lose themselves in lakes, or cut for themselves
channels through the sandy soil, forming a network of
inland rivers, which flow on undeterminately till they
disappear. Peopled by colonists from East, and West,
this region was the point of union between two separate
peoples, in whose alliance lay the destinies of all the
Spanish colonies washed by the Pacific.
Mendoza, San Juan, and San Luis, were grouped
together to form the Province of Cuyo, when San Martin
was named Governor in 18 14. Here he found the materials
he required for the great enterprise he had in view. In
1810 the inhabitants of this province were barely 40,000 in
number, but they were a hard-working, thrifty race, easily
amenable to discipline. Traders from Mendoza and San
Juan crossed the Andes to Chile, and the Pampa to Buenos
Ayres, with troops of carts drawn by bullocks, or with
troops of pack-mules, laden with wine, dried fruits, and
flour. The men of San Luis were graziers of cattle and
of sheep, famed for their skill as horsemen and as Indian

CUYO. 1 09
fighters. Without knowledge of the character of this
people it is impossible to comprehend how San Martin
could in this one Province raise an invincible army which,
sustained by it alone for three years, liberated two re
publics and spread the principles of the Argentine revolu
tion over an entire continent.
Determined to keep free from all personal obligations to
the instruments of his policy, San Martin refused to
occupy the house allotted to him by the Cabildo of Men
doza, gave up half his salary as Governor, and, in 1815,
sent his wife back to Buenos Ayres in pursuance of the
system of rigid economy which he imposed upon himself
and carried out ruthlessly in every department of his
administration. In January, 1815, he was promoted by
Government to the rank of General of Brigade, which
appointment he accepted only on the understanding that
he should resign it as soon as the State was secured from
Spanish domination, and steadily refused any further pro
motion. Some historians have seen in this systematic
self-abnegation, an imitation of the Cardinal who hobbled
on crutches to seize the keys of Saint Peter. Doubtless he
had his ambitions, but no such design appears in the
course of his life, which was consecrated to his own people
to the complete sacrifice of all personal interest.
According to him Chile was the citadel of America, and
must be reconquered at any cost. In Mendoza he met
many of the fugitives who crossed the Andes after the
disaster of Rancagua, and speedily learned from them
that the collapse of the revolution was due to the in
capacity of Carrera, and to see in O'Higgins the man of
the future. He and the Mendocinos received these fugi
tives with open arms and with generous hospitality; but
Carrera, though an exile on foreign soil, arrogated to him
self a position as chief of an independent nation, and as
such issued decrees from the barracks where he and his
suite were quartered.
San Martin asserted his authority with firmness and

no THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
with great prudence, but these Chilians introduced an
element of disorder into the Province. Conflicts were fre
quent between the police and the dispersed soldiery, who
refused obedience to any but their own officers, and con
tinued the internecine dispute which had resulted so fatally
. on the plains of Maipo.
San Martin put a summary end to this disorder, by sur
rounding the barracks where Carrera and his partisans
were lodged, with the troops of Las Heras and O'Higgins.
Carrera was forced to retire to San Luis, whence he after
wards proceeded to Buenos Ayres, and his adherents dis
persed. At the same time a commission of Chilians was
appointed to collect the remnant of the treasure brought
from Santiago, which was lodged in the coffers of the Pro
vince until such time as it might be employed for the
liberation of Chile. Thus was Carrera crushed by the man
of iron, and his insensate ambition no more troubled the
destinies of his native country. Nevertheless he was well
received in Buenos Ayres by Alvear, who about that time
became Supreme Director of the United Provinces. He
and Carrera were kindred spirits. Together they had
served in Spain, and together they had dreamed dreams
of power and dominion in their own land ; now jealousy of
San Martin became a further tie between them.
In January, 1815, San Martin, alleging the state of his
health as a reason, sent in his resignation to the Supreme
Director, who at once accepted it and named Don Gregorio
Perdriel as his successor. Perdriel proceeded at once to
Mendoza, but the leading men of the city assembled in
open Cabildo and, supported by the mass of the people,
refused to accept this new Governor, and insisted upon the
withdrawal of his resignation by San Martin. Perdriel was
recalled to Buenos Ayres, and Alvear was himself deposed
in April by a mutiny of the troops in the capital. General
Rondeau, who was at that time in command of the army
of Peru, was named by the Cabildo as his successor.
Alvear in his fall dragged with him the Assembly of the

MEASURES ADOPTED BY SAN MARTIN. in
year 1813, and the Cabildo instructed the new Government
to call at once a National Congress elected by universal
suffrage. The men of Mendoza applauded the deposition
of Alvear, and declared that they would not, in future,
recognise any National authority save one based upon the
will of the entire people. In logical pursuance of which
declaration they decreed that the nomination of their
Governor by the central power was null and void, and by
acclamation named San Martin as the Governor elected by
themselves. The Cabildos of San Luis and San Juan con
firmed this declaration and decree, so that the Province of
Cuyo became for the time an independent State, ruled by
a Governor of its own selection.
The problem now before San Martin was one of extreme
difficulty. From this small society he proposed to raise
an army and to replenish an empty treasury without
exhausting the sources of production and without waste,
by innoculating all with his own ideas, and so leading
them, each man in his own station, and according to his
capacity, to work zealously together for one end. He
turned the whole Province of Cuyo into an association of
workers and fighters, whose co-operation should result in
the reconquest of Chile.
He commenced by the invocation of the war-spirit
among them, organizing their militia, and forming even
the children into regiments, doing military exercise and
carrying their own flags. He invited foreign residents to
enlist, among whom the most forward were the English,
who raised at their own cost a free company of light
infantry, having the right to name their own officers. But
the nucleus of his army he formed of well-disciplined
troops. This spirit he kept alive by exaggerated reports
of the strength of the enemy in Chile, and by alarms of an
imminent invasion. The people seconded his efforts by
voluntary contributions for the public service. They lent
mules, horses, and harness, whenever they were required,
sure of receiving them back when the need had passed

U2 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
over; cartmen and muleteers carried ammunition and
supplies, and the landowners pastured his troop-horses,
free of charge, seeking no other payment than general
approbation. Punishment for minor offences was inflicted
in fines, which were paid into the public treasury, the
ordinary taxes were rigidly enforced. Cuyo bled money
at every pore for the redemption of South America.
To give to his exactions the character of legal contribu
tions, authorized by the will of the people, he used the
Cabildos as his agents, their authority, as a sort of Parlia
ment, giving a moral support to measures which were in
reality arbitrary decrees ; and he was well supported by
the Lieutenant-Governors of San Luis and San Juan, men
of inflexible will in everything relating to the public
service. In 1814, the general revenues of the Province, raised by
customs duties and municipal taxes, amounted to nearly
180,000 dollars. The reconquest of Chile by the Spaniards,
which put an end to the trans- Andine trade, cut off two-
thirds of this revenue, so that in 1815 it was insufficient to
meet current expenses. Voluntary subscriptions failed to
supply the deficiency ; a forced loan was levied upon the
Spanish residents. But these were mere expedients.
Export duties were imposed, a monthly war contribution
was established, the tithes and the fund for the redemption
of Indian captives, and the intestate estates of deceased
Spaniards, were sequestered ; a general property tax was
levied, and forced loans from Spaniards and Portuguese
were frequently exacted. Unpaid volunteers were never
wanting when assistance was required in preparing the
outfit of the army.
News was received that an expedition of 10,000 men had
left Spain for the River Plate under the command of
Morillo. San Martin called for a public subscription in
aid of the general government. The ladies of Mendoza,
headed by his own wife, set a noble example by throwing
their jewels into the public chest. The fall of Monte Video

HABITS OF SAN MARTIN. 113
diverted the course of the expedition, but the funds col
lected remained in the treasury.
Amid all the din of military preparation the material
interests of the Province were not neglected. Education
was studiously fomented, vaccination was introduced,
much attention was bestowed upon the public promenades
and upon the system of irrigation, and the most rigid
economy was enforced in every branch of the administra
tion. The people saw in San Martin a father whom they
loved, and a ruler whom they respected. His manners
contributed to his authority and to the popularity gained
by his deeds. His austere figure aptly symbolised the
paternal despotism he established, and gave him a certain
mysterious prestige. Alone among many friends, but
without one confidant, nor even a councillor, he looked
after everything himself, with no more help than that of
one secretary and two clerks. His want of education has
caused some historians to decry his talents. It was the
same with William of Orange and with Washington. They
shone not by their intellect, but by their deeds and by
their personal character. As Macaulay says of Cromwell,
he spoke folly and did great things. Or, as Pascal says,
the heart has reason of which reason knows nothing.
In San Martin the will was the dominant characteristic.
He worked not by inspiration but by calculation, searching
carefully first for the thing necessary to be done, and then
doing it. It has been said of him that he was not a person
but a system. He wore almost constantly the plain
uniform of the mounted grenadiers, with the Argentine
cockade on his cocked hat. He was an early riser, and
usually spent all the morning at his desk. At mid-day he
went to the kitchen, chose two plates of the food prepared,
and frequently ate it there standing, washing it down with
two glasses of wine. In the winter he would afterwards
take a short walk and smoke a cigarette of black tobacco ;
in summer he would sleep for two hours on a skin stretched
in the verandah. All the year round he drank coffee which
I

n4 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
he prepared himself; then, after another spell at his desk,
would spend the afternoon inspecting the public offices.
In the evening his house was open to visitors, who were
forbidden to talk politics, but if invited to a game at chess
found him a doughty adversary. At ten o'clock he wished
them good-night and, after a light supper, retired to his
couch. But if illness prevented him from sleeping he
would rise and repair to his desk.
The system of government followed by San Martin in
Cuyo somewhat resembled that of Sancho Panza in his
island of Barrataria, or that of the legendary King Zafa-
dola, who visited his taxpayers in their houses, asking
them how they could expect him to govern if they did not
pay the taxes ?
An officer presented a petition for extra rations, as his
salary was not enough to live on.
"All officers are in the same case," was the answer.
A man of San Juan, who had been made prisoner by the
Spaniards in Chile and released on parole, claimed exemp
tion from service in the army on that account.
" The Governor takes that responsibility upon himself,
you are at liberty to attack the enemy. But if your hands
are tied by a ridiculous prejudice they shall be untied by
a platoon." The wife of a sergeant asked pardon for some neglect of
duty by her husband.
" I have nothing to do with women, but with soldiers
subject to military discipline."
A prisoner applied for his release in the name of the
patron saint of the army.
" He did enough for you in saving your life."
A farmer being accused of speaking against "La
Patria," he annulled the sentence on condition that the
accused should send ten dozen pumpkins for the supply
of the troops.
To try the temper of his officers he got up a bull-fight
and sent them into the ring as " torreadores." As he

ANECDOTES OF SAN MARTIN. 115
applauded their courage he turned to O'Higgins, who was
beside him, and said : —
"These lunatics are the men we want to smash up the
Spaniards." One day he went to the powder factory in full uniform,
booted and spurred, and was refused admission by the
sentry. He came back in a linen suit with slippers on,
and was admitted. After which he gave orders that the
sentry should be relieved, and with great formality pre
sented him with an ounce of gold.
One day an officer presented himself, asking for the
citizen Don Jos6 de San Martin, and being admitted, con
fessed to him that he had lost at play regimental money
which had been entrusted to him. San Martin opened a
cabinet, took out gold coins to the amount named, and
gave them to him, saying : — •
"Pay this money into the regimental chest, and keep
the secret ; for if General San Martin ever hears that
you have told of it, he will have you shot upon the
spot." Two Franciscan friars who, according to him, had shown
themselves unfriendly to " political regeneration," were
forbidden by him to confess or to preach, and were put
under arrest in their convent until further orders. He
instructed the parish priests to preach of " the justice with
which America had adopted the system of liberty " ; and
seeing that they failed to do so, he further warned them
that severe measures would be adopted if they neglected
" so sacred a duty."
Among his contemporaries there were, at that time, but
few who estimated him at his real value. He himself
indulged in no illusions on the matter, but stoically
trusted to time and patience to give him his true place
among them. As he wrote to Godoy Cruz, concerning
reports which were in circulation : " You will say that I
was vexed. Yes, my friend, somewhat ; but, after reflec
tion, I followed the example of Diogenes, I dived into a
1 2

116 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
butt of philosophy. A public man must suffer anything in
order that the vessel may reach her port."
At that time he suffered from chronic disease, and could
only sleep for a few minutes at once seated on a chair, and
was compelled to take opium to gain needful rest.
On the 29th November, 1815, the army under Rondeau
was completely defeated by Pezuela at Sipe-Sipe in Upper
Peru. Morillo's expedition was triumphant in Columbia,
and the Royalists sang Te Deums both in Europe and in
America. In these days of despair San Martin invited
his officers to a banquet. Never did he appear in better
spirits. When the dessert was placed on the board he rose
to his feet and in a loud voice proposed a toast : —
" To the first shot fired beyond the Andes against the
oppressors of Chile."
His words found echo in every heart. Confidence
revived. From that moment the passage of the Andes
and the reconquest of Chile ceased to be a vague idea, it
became a plan of campaign which was to change the
aspect of the war.

CHAPTER X.
THE SPY SYSTEM OF THE PATRIOTS.
1815— 1816.
The restoration of royalty in Chile was attended with
such excesses as might have been expected had some
foreign power triumphed over the country. A system of
blood and fire was established for its pacification, which
had the natural result of reanimating the spirit of resist
ance. The great majority of the people were tired of war,
and failed to see that revolutionary anarchy was any
improvement on colonial despotism ; they were anxious
only for peace, and welcomed their conqueror as a liber
ator. A moderate policy might have consolidated Spanish
power in Chile for a considerable time, but these excesses
fanned into a blaze the embers of the old patriotic spirit,
which was buried under the ashes of Rancagua.
Osorio was by nature inclined to clemency, but the
instructions of Viceroy Abascal prohibited him from
adopting any such course, and the Spaniards who sur
rounded him urged upon him the necessity of the most
severe measures of repression. Yielding to these influ
ences he became the instrument of a pitiless persecution,
the result of which was to arouse the spirit of insurrection
in every Chilian heart.
Forced loans and arbitrary contributions formed the
sources of his revenue, and so crushed all industry that
soon even these sources dried up, and supplies could only

n8 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
be obtained by confiscations. All the civilizing reforms-
of the revolutionary epoch were abolished, and the old
monopolies were re-established. The most distinguished
patriots were exiled to the island of Juan Fernandez ; all
the native inhabitants were classified as " suspects," and
many were murdered in the prisons by the soldiery. A
new spirit of patriotism was engendered by misery and
despair. Spaniards again became a privileged class, they
occupied all the public offices, they alone were allowed to
carry arms, their testimony only was received in the
courts. Every native Chilian had to be in his own house
at nine o'clock at night, and could not travel even the
shortest distance without a permit. Fights between the
soldiery and the "rotos," as the men of the labouring class
are called, were of daily occurrence. Many men of the
Talavera regiment, which was particularly obnoxious,
were murdered by the populace. Even the Chilian troops,
which had done such good service under Sanchez and
other leaders, were most thanklessly treated. Commis
sions won by their officers on the field of battle were not
recognised, their pay was scanty, and the pensions of their
widows were not paid at all.
At the commencement of 1815 Osorio had 5,000 men,
perfectly armed and equipped, under his orders. His
instructions were, as soon as he had pacified the country,
to cross the Andes with 3,000 men, and to act in Cuyo
and Cordoba in combination with Pezuela. Abascal had
the converse of the same idea, which was later on carried
out by San Martin. Small bodies of armed men had
frequently crossed the Andes, but it is not the number of
the troops employed, nor the power of the peoples in con
flict, which constitutes the fame of such achievements,
that fame lies in their motives and results. In this lay the
importance of the passage of the Alps by Hannibal and
by Napoleon ; and the passage of the Andes by San Martin
and by Bolivar, are famous as parts of a great scheme for
the emancipation of a continent. Osorio was not the man

THE SPY SYSTEM OF THE PATRIOTS. 119
for such an enterprise, and his force was so weakened by
detachments in aid of Pezuela, that he never at
tempted it.
The disasters suffered by the Patriots in this year were
not fruitless ; time was gained, in which San Martin per
fected his preparations, and this he lengthened by en
tering into a correspondence with Osorio, proposing some
arrangement for the prevention of further bloodshed. He
also took advantage of the correspondence so established
to set on foot an extensive system of spies and secret
agents all over Chile, by whose means he propagated false
intelligence of such great military preparations in Men
doza as filled Osorio with fears of an immediate invasion,
and had still more effect upon the feebler spirit of Marco
del Pont, who relieved him of the command in December.
The secret agents, who rendered the greatest service to
San Martin, he found among the Chilian refugees in Men
doza. When the talents or social position of any of these
men inspired him with confidence, he put them under
arrest on some charge of treachery, from which he aided
them to escape and fly across the Andes, " from his
tyranny." Their alleged sufferings disarmed the suspi
cions of the Spanish rulers of Chile to the extent that
some of them were actually employed by. them to procure
information from the eastern side of the Andes. By their
help San Martin discovered that several Spaniards in
Mendoza held secret communications with Osorio. He
arrested them, and by threats of immediate execution,
compelled them to show him all the letters they received,
and to return answers dictated by him. His principal
care was to persuade the Spaniards that the projected
expedition would attack the south of Chile, in order to
induce them to relax their vigilance in the quarter which
was really menaced, and to concentrate their troops in
positions where they could be of no service.
His agents were incessantly occupied in furnishing him
with details concerning the number, armament, and posi

120 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
tions of the Royalist forces, and in stirring up the Chilian
people to co-operate with the invading army. Thus the
whole country was soon on the watch for the moment
when their liberators would pass the Andes. The name of
San Martin became so popular, that his agents had no
difficulty in obtaining all the help they needed; horses
were always to be had when they wanted them, and they
were warned in time of any danger which threatened
them. Chilian patriots, among whom the most active was
Manuel Rodriguez, also secretly organised bands of volun
teers, who waited but the signal to rise in arms. Some of
them gave their lives for the cause on the gallows. Marco
del Pont adopted the most severe measures of repression,
which only served to fan the flame of discontent.
In September, 1816, Rodriguez imprudently raised the
flag of insurrection in the south of Chile. His raw troops
were speedily dispersed, but San Martin made good use of
his mistake by writing him an angry despatch, telling him
that he had ruined his plans by drawing the Royalist forces
to the south and causing them to occupy the passes by
which he had hoped to cross the Cordillera. This despatch
he caused to fall into the hands of Marco del Pont, whose
attention was thus again diverted from the real point of
danger. At this time Brown, the gallant Irishman who had driven
the Spanish naval forces from the River Plate, and had
been rewarded by the gift of his flagship, the Hercules,
again offered his ship and his services to the Argentine
Government. He was well supplied with guns, small
arms, and ammunition, and was granted letters of marque
as a privateer. On the 15th October, 181 5, he sailed from
Buenos Ayres for the Pacific with Captain Buchardo, a
Frenchman, as his second in command. His squadron
consisted of four vessels — the Hercules of 20 guns, com
manded by Michael Brown; the Trinidad of 16 guns,
commanded by Walter Chitty ; the Halcon, commanded

BROWN'S CRUISE ON THE PACIFIC. 121
by Buchardo, which three vessels were brigs ; and the
armed quetch Uribe, named after its commander, a Chilian,
who had been a colleague of Carrera in the late revolution.
The crews of the two first were almost entirely English.
The Halcon had a mixed crew of Chilians and Argentines,
and her marines were commanded by Ramon Freyre. The
crew of the quetch were all Chilians, and she carried a
black flag as a sign of no quarter. It was stipulated that
any prizes they might make should be sold in Buenos
Ayres, one-ninth the prize money to go to Government,
two-ninths to the Commodore, and the rest was to be
divided among the officers and crews.
San Martin took care to inform Marco of this expedition
by means of his secret agents, and at the same time spread
through Chile a rumour that an army from 4,000 to 7,000
men was assembled in Mendoza for the passage of the
Andes. Marco, terrified at the idea of being attacked
both by land and sea, issued the most injudicious orders
to his subordinates, scattered his forces, and applied to the
Viceroy for naval support.
The Hercules and the Trinidad, in the attempt to double
Cape Horn, were driven into the Straits of Magellan by a
tempest, where they both received serious injury from
sunken rocks, but, being repaired, reached the barren
island of Mocha in the Southern Sea, where they were
joined by the Halcon. The quetch was wrecked, the cap
tain and master being drowned. Brown with his two
ships, and Buchardo with his one, then sailed by different
courses to Callao, where they reunited to blockade the
port, and captured two large prizes, one of which, the Con-
sequencia, was armed and added to the squadron. On the
21st January, 1816, they sailed boldly into the harbour,
and forced the Spanish ships to take refuge under the guns
of the batteries.
On the night of the 22 nd the gallant Commodore attacked
the Royalist flotilla with five armed boats, but was beaten
off with a loss of thirt)'- killed and wounded. After main-

122 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
taining the blockade for three weeks, they sailed for
Guayaquil, The fort at the entrance to this port was
taken by assault by Freyre with the crew of the Halcon,
who effected a landing under the fire of the guns of the
squadron. The Commodore then entered the port with
the Trinidad, captured a schooner carrying marines, and
took the first battery with four brass guns, which were
transferred to the schooner. He then attacked another
battery, but a sudden squall drove the Trinidad ashore,
and he was forced to haul down his flag to prevent the
massacre of his men by the Spanish infantry. He himself
stripped off his clothes and sprang overboard intending
to swim to the schooner, but seeing that the Spaniards
were commencing to kill their prisoners, he climbed on
board again, seized a lighted match, ran down to the
magazine, and threatened to blow up the ship with all on
board unless the laws of war were respected. This daring
action brought the Spaniards to their senses, the slaughter
was stopped, and Brown, with no other clothing than the
Argentine flag which he wrapped round him, was led a
prisoner on shore.
Buchardo, with the rest of the squadron, attacked an
other battery in the hope of rescuing his comrades, but
was beaten off. One of the prisoners taken on the Conse-
quencia off Callao was Mendiburo, the Governor of this pro
vince, and the commandant of Guayaquil was so eager to
get rid of his enemies that he proposed an exchange of
prisoners, which was at once accepted. The three remain
ing vessels with the schooner then left the port.
On the open sea the jealousy latent in the hearts of the
two commanders broke into an open flame. Each of these
two adventurers considered that the other deserved hang
ing at the yardarm ; but in times of danger they had most
nobly supported each other. Now they agreed to separate,
dividing the plunder between them, and Buchardo returned
with the Consequencia to Buenos Ayres. Brown sailed on
to Santa F6 in New Granada, but, finding that city occu-

BROWN'S CRUISE ON THE PACIFIC. 123
pied by Royalist troops, he followed his late comrade to
the Atlantic.
The Argentine Government had hoped great things from
this expedition, and had written to San Martin to hold
himself ready to take advantage of any movement it might
occasion in Chile ; but the astute general replied that a
naval force, to be of any effective aid to an invading
general, must consist of ships . of, war, not oi privateers,
and must be under his orders. The result showed that it
was but of slight service to the cause, arid was a waste of
material which might have been much more usefully
employed.

CHAPTER XL
THE IDEA OF THE PASSAGE OF THE ANDES.
1815—1816.
The plans of San Martin were not in accordance with the
ideas which prevailed in the military circles of the United
Provinces. The many disasters which had befallen
Argentine armies in Upper Peru had failed to show either
the leaders of those armies or Government that the true
road to Lima did not lie through those mountain passes.
He did not obtrude his opinions upon any one, still his
idea at times leaked out in despatches, and after the fate
of Alvear, met with a somewhat better reception at head
quarters. Carrera had made a proposal to Government
for a foolhardy attempt upon Coquimbo, which was rejected
after a consultation with San Martin, but his application
for permission to assume the offensive had also been
refused. He then caused a report to be circulated in Chile
that he was about to march his army to the north, to
reinforce the routed forces of Rondeau, in the hope that
Marco might be induced to cross the Andes and attack
Mendoza, and by representing this danger to Government,
he succeeded in persuading them to send him some light
field guns and other war material, of which he was in
need ; and also to grant him power to assume the offensive
in spring. He also prevailed upon them to unite the
scattered squadrons of the mounted grenadiers, and to
place them under his orders, as the nucleus of a cavalry
brigade.

THE IDEA OF THE PASSAGE OF THE ANDES. 125
In March, 1816, a detachment of the grenadiers, under
Aldao, made a successful reconnaissance by the Uspallata
Pass, of the Royalist positions on the western slopes of
the Andes, and brought back much useful information ;
but true to his principle of concealing his plans, San
Martin reported to Government that the central passes
were so well defended that the only practical course was
by those to the south of Mendoza ; and also that advanced
field works were necessary about Uspallata, in order to
secure the Province of Cuyo as the base of operations.
This procured him a further much needed supply of guns.
In April General Balcarce, the hero of Suipacha, suc
ceeded Alvarez as Provisional Director, and San Martin
was thenceforward much better supported by the central
power ; military supplies were sent to him on a much more
liberal scale than under the previous administration.
The power of the Lautaro Lodge had fallen with Alvear,
but the society still existed, and San Martin now estab
lished a branch in Mendoza, in which the principal
leaders of the Chilian refugees, and many of the foremost
men of Cuyo, were affiliated.
At this time he received most efficient assistance from
his friend Don Tomas Guido, who had first met him in
London, and who had afterwards in Tucuman learned
from him something of his ideas in regard to the conduct
of the war. Guido drew up a memorial and presented it
to the Supreme Director, in which he warmly supported
the idea of attacking Peru by way of Chile ; and his aid
became still more efficacious when the meeting of the
Congress of Tucuman, a few weeks later on, placed the
administration of affairs in new hands.

CHAPTER XII.
THE ARMY OF THE ANDES.
1816 — 1817.
The organization of the Army of the Andes is one of the
most extraordinary feats recorded in military history. It
was a war machine, composed of men filled with the spirit
of the Argentine Revolution and with a passion for things
American, without which spirit and without which passion
it could never have achieved the task before it. Never was
the military automaton more thoroughly endued with
human energy.
The auxiliary corps of Las Heras formed the nucleus
of this army, to which was soon added two companies of
the 8th Regiment from Buenos Ayres, with four field guns.
In 181 5 Colonel Zapiola joined it with two squadrons of
the Grenadiers. These corps were greatly strengthened
by volunteers, who joined them in Cuyo.
In 1 8 1 6 the sew Government appointed by the Congress
of Tucuman, constituted it formally as The Army OF THE
Andes, under the command of San Martin as Captain-
General, with General Soler as chief of the Staff, and
further strengthened it with the 7th Regiment of Infantry
from Buenos Ayres, and additions to the 8th; Colonel
Conde being placed in command of the 8th, and Colonel
Cramer, a Frenchman, who had served under Napoleon, in
command of the 7th. The nth, under Las Heras, was
divided into two battalions, of which the second became

THE ARMY OF THE ANDES. 127
the 1 st Light Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Alvarado.
A fifth squadron under Necochea was added to the Grena
diers. Thus early in September the army numbered 2,300
men with the flags, a force still insufficient for the work,
but recruiting went on briskly.
The question of giving freedom to all slaves who would
enlist being under discussion at Tucuman, San Martin
spread the report in Cuyo that the idea was to be carried
out, and advised the Cabildos to prevail upon the slave
owners to set their slaves free before the project became
law. There was much unwillingness to accede to this
proposition, but at length it was resolved to set two-thirds
of the slaves free, the manumission not to be effective until
the army crossed the Andes. This gave a further rein
forcement of 710 men to the infantry. Before the end of
the year the army numbered 4,000 men, almost all of whom
were Argentines. The Chilian emigrants were organized
into a reserve as the nucleus for the future army of Chile.
This reserve was placed under command of O'Higgins,
who received a commission as a General of the United
Provinces, but within it were many partizans of Carrera,
upon whom San Martin looked with suspicion.
This army was sustained by a combination of patriotic
subscriptions, gratuitous services, and of regular and
arbitrary taxes. Some carried arms, others gave money
or labour, all the inhabitants of Cuyo contributed in some
way or another to the great work. For the furnishing of
arms, powder and equipments, special measures were
adopted. San Martin found the man he wanted for this
work in a mendicant friar named Luis Beltran. This
Beltran was a native of Mendoza, and being in Chile at
the time of the revolution had joined the Patriots and
served as an artilleryman at the siege of Chilian. After
Rancagua he returned on foot to his own country, with a
bag of tools of his own making on his shoulders. Self-
taught, he was at once a mathematician and a chemist, an
artilleryman and a maker of watches or of fireworks, a

128 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
carpenter, an architect, a blacksmith, a draughtsman, a
cobbler, and a physician. ' In addition he was of a robust
constitution and of soldierly bearing. He became one of
the chaplains of the new army. San Martin soon dis
covered his extraordinary talents, and entrusted him with
the establishment of an arsenal. Soon he had three
hundred workmen under his orders, all of whom were
taught by himself. He cast cannon, shot, and shell, melt
ing down the church bells when other metal was not to be
had ; he made limbers for the guns, saddles for the
cavalry, knapsacks and shoes for the infantry, and all
other kinds of necessary equipment; forged horse-shoes
and bayonets, repaired damaged muskets, and in his
leisure moments drew on the walls of his grimy workshop
designs for carriages specially adapted for the conveyance
of war material over the steep passes of the Andes. In
1816, he took off his friar's frock, donned the uniform
of a lieutenant of artillery, with a monthly salary of 25
dollars, and became the Archimedes of the Army of the
Andes. In addition to this arsenal, San Martin established a
laboratory of saltpetre and a powder factory, in charge of
his aide-de-camp Major Condarco, using water power to
work the machines. This factory produced excellent
gunpowder, sufficient for the supply of the army, at very
small cost. He also set up a manufactory of army cloth,
which cloth was dyed blue, and uniforms for the troops
were made of it by the women of Mendoza, free of charge.
A military tribunal was created, and the medical staff was
organized under Dr. Paroissien, a naturalised English
man. The commissariat and treasury were also placed
under the strictest regulations. Everything was prepared
for an offensive war, and for distant operations.
In May, 181 6, the scheme was almost upset by the per
sistence of the Central Government in prosecuting the
war in Upper Peru. San Martin had taken great interest
in the projected Congress of Tucuman since the idea was

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. 129
first mooted, looking upon it as the last hope of the revo
lution. Four deputies were sent from Cuyo, who were all
friends of his, and who took deep interest in his plan.
One of them, Don Juan Martin Pueyrredon, was elected
President. The majority of this Congress were in favour of the
establishment of a constitutional monarchy. San Martin
and Belgrano, who commanded the armies of Cuyo and
the North, were the pillars of the State edifice, and, though
San Martin was in theory a Republican, they both shared
in this opinion, but both were equally convinced that the
first step should be a Declaration of Independence, in
. order to put an end to the present anomalous position,
in which they, still nominally subject to the King of
Spain, made war upon Spain under a flag of their
own. Thus the Declaration of Independence on the 9th
July was welcomed by San Martin as a master stroke
of policy.
Don Juan Martin Pueyrredon, now President of the
United Provinces, had already so far adopted the mili
tary ideas of San Martin, that on the 16th June he had
given orders for the despatch of men and arms to Cuyo,
but San Martin was not content with mere acquiescence
in his plans, he wanted the hearty approval and concur
rence of the Chief of the State. He accordingly left
Mendoza for Cordoba on the 1 5th July, and there met the
President. The conference lasted three days and resulted
in a complete understanding between them.
Then as no maps existed of the passes of the Andes,
he sent his aide-de-camp Condarco, who was a skilful
engineer, with a copy of the Declaration of Independence
to the Governor of Chile.
" But," he said to him as he gave him his instructions,
" your real errand is to reconnoitre for me the roads by
Los Patos and Uspallata. Without making a note, you
must bring back in your head a plan of them both. I
shall send you by Los Patos which is the longest road,
K

130 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
and as they are certain to send you back at once, if they
don't hang you, you will return by Uspallata, which is the
nearest way."
As San Martin had anticipated, the copy of the declara
tion which Condarco presented to Marco del Pont, was
burned by the public hangman of Santiago, and the
messenger was sent back at once with scant courtesy,
but in his receptive brain he brought with him plans of
both roads, which he drew out on paper at his leisure, and
these plans so obtained, became the chart of the first
operations of the Army of the Andes.
In the early spring, San Martin brought the various
corps of his army from their cantonments, and encamped
them on an open plain about a league to the north of
Mendoza, where the recruits were thoroughly drilled, and
the whole force was taught to act in concert. Every hour
of the day had its allotted work, and in the evening the
¦officers attended classes for instruction in tactics. To
complete its organization, a printing press was added to
the stores, from which bulletins of victory were to issue to
the world, teaching to the liberated people the princi
ples of the Argentine revolution, which the soldiery sup
ported with their bayonets.
On the 17th January, 181 7, there was high holiday in
the city of Mendoza. The streets and plaza were deco
rated with flags and streamers. The whole army marched
in to salute the Virgen del Carmen as its patron saint, and
to receive a special army flag embroidered by the ladies of
the city. When the usual formalities were over, San
Martin ascended a platform in the great square with the
flag in his hand, and waving it over his head, said in a
voice which could be heard by all : —
" Soldiers ! This is the first independent flag which has
been blessed in America."
One great shout of " Viva la Patria ! " rose from the
people and the troops in answer.
Then he added —

THE FLAG OF THE ARMY. 131
" Soldiers ! Swear to sustain it and to die in defence of
it, as I swear to do."
" We swear ! " was the answer from four thousand
throats. A triple discharge of musketry and twenty-five
guns, then saluted this new flag, the flag of redemption for
one-half of South America, which passed the Cordillera,
waved in triumph along the Pacific Coast, floated over the
foundations of two new Republics, aided in the liberation
of another, and after sixty-four years, served as a funeral
pall to the body of the hero, who thus delivered it to the
care of the immortal Army of the Andes.

K 2

CHAPTER XIII.
THE PASSAGE OF THE ANDES.
1817.
" What spoils my sleep is not the strength of the enemy,
but how to pass those immense mountains," said San
Martin, as from Mendoza he gazed upon the snow-clad
summits of the Andes, which as a mighty barrier separate
the wide plains of the Argentine Pampa from the smiling
valleys of Chili, through twenty-two degrees of latitude,
from the desert of Atacama to Cape Horn.
These mountains at 330 south latitude divide into two
parallel ranges, one running southward along the borders
of the Pacific Ocean, the other forming the grand Cordillera
upon which San Martin gazed from Mendoza. The coast
range is a succession of granite hills with rounded summits
and gentle slopes, like to the waves of a petrified sea. The
great Cordillera is in its centre composed of three or four
ranges of conical and sharply-defined peaks which rise one
over the other to a height of 21,000 feet above the level of
the sea, crowned with perpetual snow. At its feet lie deep
valleys, from which perpendicular precipices rise up to the
clouds, and the mighty condors wheeling in airy circles at
that dizzy height are the only living things to be seen.
There are also lakes fed by torrents of melted snow which,
pouring down the mountain sides into these valleys, find
at times no exit, their path being closed by immense heaps
of debris hurled from the lofty summits by the force of ice

THE PASSES OF THE ANDES. 133
and water. These immense groups of mountains are tra
versed by rugged defiles, and narrow paths, the result of
volcanic action, wind along the edges of precipices, while
below roar the mountain streams carrying great rocks
along with them, tossing them about as though they were
straws. Here nature displays her giant strength as an
artificer, decking herself with no other ornaments than the
cactus, mosses, and thorny plants ; everywhere are seen
traces of the world in embryo, as it emerged from chaos in
the process of creation.
Between the Cordillera and the coast range stretches a
great central valley, cut across in places by spurs from
the higher mountains, which take an oblique line to the
south till they lose themselves in the ocean, or reappear as
solitary islands or as clusters of islands, which are the
summits of mountains springing from the bed of the sea.
The great Cordillera can only be crossed at certain
passes. Those which have connection with our history
are : in the centre, those of Uspallata and Los Patos, in
front of Mendoza and San Juan ; to the north, those of
La Ramada and Come-Caballos, by which the Argentine
province of La Rioja communicates with Coquimbo and
Copiapo ; and to the south, that of the Planchon, which
gives access to the valley of Talca, and that of the Portillo
which leads to the plain of Maipo and to the capital of
Chile. These passes, from 9,000 feet to 12,000 feet above
the level of the sea, are covered with snow in winter, and
are practicable only in the height of summer. Until then
they had been crossed only by small detachments of sol
diery, or by troops of mules, the paths being in many
places so narrow as only to give room for one mounted
man at a time. The passage of a numerous army with
guns' and baggage was held to be impossible and had
never been thought of till the feat was accomplished by
San Martin. Food and forage for men, mules, and horses
had to be carried with them, and it was necessary to reach
the other side in force sufficient to overcome a watchful

134 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
enemy; to concentrate the different columns upon his
weak points; and to make all the preparations secretly,
so that the army might rush like a thunderbolt from the
western slopes of the mountains and do battle in the open
plain. San Martin, by his complex spy system, had deluded
the enemy into the belief that the invasion would come
from the passes of the south ; his real intentions he had
kept from friends and enemies alike. In September, 1816,
he invited the Pehuenche Indians, who occupied the east
ern slopes of the Andes commanding the entrances to the
passes of the Planchon and Portillo, to a conference at the
fort of San Carlos to the south of Mendoza. With the
invitation he sent them many mules laden with spirits and
wine, with sweetmeats, cloth, and glass beads for the
women, horse gear and clothes for the men. In savage
pomp they came ; the warriors, followed by their women,
rode up to the fort on the day appointed in full war cos
tume, flourishing their long lances, and commenced pro
ceedings by a sham fight in the Indian fashion, dashing
at full speed round the fort, from whose walls a gun was
fired every five minutes and was answered by Indian yells.
Then the chiefs entered the fort and were told by San
Martin that the Spaniards were foreigners who intended
to rob them of their lands, their cattle, their women, and
children ; and that he desired to pass through their country
with an army, to go by the Planchon and Portillo Passes
to the country the other side of the mountains, there to
destroy these Spaniards. The Indian chiefs listened to
his request and granted him the permission he required,
after which they, with their warriors, gave themselves up
to an orgy which lasted eight days.
On the sixth day San Martin returned to Mendoza satis
fied that the Indians, with their usual perfidy, would at
once inform Marc6 of his project, and took care that their
information was confirmed by the agents of Marco in Men
doza, who sent him despatches to the same purport, die-

THE PASSAGE OF THE ANDES. 135
tated by San Martin. At the same time San Martin
advised the Government and his friend Guido that he had
arranged with the Indians for supplies of cattle and horses,
and for help in his expedition, without in any case giving
a hint of his real intentions.
Marco, harassed by the alarming news sent him by his
supposed spies in Mendoza, and annoyed by the guerillas
under Martin Rodriguez, who infested the country between
the Maule and the Maipo, and sacked villages even in the
vicinity of the capital itself, adopted most ill- conceived
and contradictory measures. He fortified the ports and
organised a flotilla to act against an imaginary naval force,
which his spies in Cuyo informed him had already left
Buenos Ayres. He cut trenches in the pass of Uspallata ;
made a map of the southern provinces, and a survey of the
mouths of the passes in that district ; strengthened the
guards at all the passes ; after concentrating his troops,
scattered them again all over the country ; and followed
the example of San Martin by holding a great conference
with the Indians of Arauco.
The policy of San Martin was successful ; the Captain-
General of Chile attempted to defend the whole of his fron
tier and had no idea where the real attack was to come
from. One only of his many councillors advised him to
concentrate the army on the capital,, and there make ready
for whatever might happen. Instead of that, he increased
the general discontent by arbitrary exactions, till all classes
of the people longed for the appearance of San Martin and
made ready to help him as best they could. Small parties
. of troops were on several occasions attacked and routed by
armed bands of the peasantry, and the bandit Neyra made
himself famous by similar exploits.
In the encampment at Mendoza matters were far diffe
rent ; there methodical activity and automatic obedience
blended with intelligent enthusiasm ; there one far-seeing
will reigned supreme. There everything was known that
Marco either thought or did, each man worked diligently

136 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
at his appointed task, and all trusted blindly in their chief.
The forges blazed day and night, the arsenal turned out
cartridges by the hundred thousand. Fray Beltran made
special carriages for the artillery, adapted to the mountain
passes, the guns themselves were to be carried on the
backs of mules ; slings were prepared for carrying them
over dangerous places, and sleds of raw hide in which
they might be hauled up by men when the gradients were
too steep for the mules.
The General-in-Chief, silent and reserved, thought for
all, inspected everything, and provided for every contin
gency. Large provision was made of charqtiicdn, a food
much in vogue among the muleteers, composed of beef
dried in the sun, roasted, and ground to powder, then
mixed with fat and Chile pepper and pounded into small
compass. A soldier could carry enough of this in his
knapsack to last him eight days. Mixed up with hot
water and maize meal ready roasted, it formed a soup at
once nutritious and appetising. San Luis alone furnished
2,000 arrobas, and the total provision amounted to 3,500
arrobas (87,200 lbs.). The soldiers made for themselves
closed sandals of raw hide called tamangos, which were
lined with fragments of old clothes collected for that pur
pose from all the province. Water-bottles were made from
the horns of the animals slaughtered in the encampment,
and slings were made for them out of the rough edges of
the cloth from which their uniforms were made. The
sabres of the cavalry were carefully sharpened, but they
had only three trumpets till Government sent them two
more. Thirty thousand horseshoes were prepared, which
was a great innovation, as the Argentines were not accus
tomed to shoe their horses ; without them the hoofs of the
cavalry horses would have been worn down in the transit
over the stony passes. Four cables, each 1 70 feet long,
and two anchors formed a portable bridge. Cuyo alone
furnished 13,000 mules, but the promises of Government to
replenish the exhausted treasury were not fulfilled. A
rebellion had broken out in Cordoba which taxed the

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY. 137
resources of Pueyrredon to the utmost to repress ; but he
aided San Martin in every way he possibly could, with
clothes, saddles, tents, and arms, and wrote him : — " Don't
ask me for anything more unless you wish to hear that I
have hung myself to a beam in the fort." And also : " You
may well say that among us there has never been seen
an army so well fitted out ; but neither has there been seen
a Director who had equal confidence in a general, and, it
must be added, never a general who so well merited that
confidence as yourself. After all, my mind would be
easier if you had another thousand good soldiers with
you." Everything was ready. The army consisted of 3,000/
infantry in four battalions, led by Alvarado, Cramer, Conde
and Las Heras ; five squadrons of the mounted grenadiers,
700 sabres, led by Zapiola, Melian, Ramallo, Escalada,
and Necochea ; and 250 artillery, with ten 6-pounders,
two howitzers, and nine 4-pounder mountain guns, under
command of La Plaza. Twelve hundred mounted militia
from Cuyo accompanied the army, besides muleteers and
artisans. The army was arranged in three divisions, each entirely
independent of the others. The vanguard under Soler,
and the reserve under O'Higgins, marched by the pass of
Los Patos. Las Heras with the artillery marched by that
of Uspallata, which was the only one practicable for guns
and ammunition. All the food necessary for fifteen days
they took with them, also 600 bullocks for slaughter, and
a special supply of onions and garlic, very necessary at
high levels both for man and beast.
As flankers to the main army, a detachment of militia
and Chilian emigrants left San Juan under Cabot, by the
pass of La Ramada, marching upon Coquimbo, and
another left Rioja by the pass of Vinchina, marching on
Copiapo and Huasco. To the south another detachment,
composed of mounted infantry, grenadiers, and Chilians,
marched under the Chilian Captain Freyre, by the Plan
chon pass, in support of the Chilian guerillas, and were

138 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
aided by a party of thirty dragoons under Captain Lemos,
who went by the Portillo Pass.
Both the main body and the detachments had orders to
debouch on Chilian territory from the 6th to the 8th
February, 1817. Each general of division was given by
San Martin himself a pen-and-ink plan of the route he
was to follow, with notes and written instructions. San
Martin himself went by the pass of Los Patos, but had
arranged a system of flag-signals by which Las Heras
could communicate with him across the intervening
valleys. His last instructions from Government were : —
"The consolidation of the independence of America
from the Kings of Spain and their successors, and the
glory of the United Provinces of the South, are the only
motives of this campaign. This you will make public in
your proclamations, by your agents in the cities, and by
all possible means. The army must be impressed with
this principle, and shall have no thought of pillage, op
pression, or of conquest, or that there is any idea of holding
the country of those we help."
He was also authorized to raise a national army in
Chile, which should remain under his orders even when a
new Government was established; was prohibited from
capitulating with the enemy under any circumstances ;
and was charged to avoid any interference in party ques
tions among the Chilians. He was also authorized, after
the re-establishment of the municipality of Santiago, to
preside over the free election of a provisional president.
He was instructed to use his influence to postpone the
election of a Congress until Chile was entirely free from
the enemy, and to persuade the Chilians to send deputies
to the Congress of the United Provinces, in order to
establish a perpetual alliance between the two countries.
As the leading files of the army entered the passes,
San Martin, on the 24th January, 181 7, wrote to Godoy
Cruz : —

THE PASSAGE OF THE ANDES. 139
" This afternoon I leave to join the army. God grant
me success in this great enterprise."
The plan of the campaign, as drawn up by San Martin
on the 15th June, 18 16, was to cross the Cordillera by the
passes of Uspallata and Los Patos, to re-unite his forces
in the plain beyond, there to beat the principal force of
the enemy and to seize the capital.
The principal spur from the main range which cuts the
central valley of Chile is that which springs from the great
peak of Aconcagua. From this spur a smaller one
branches off, which is called the Sierra of Chacabuco, and
runs parallel to the main spur, enclosing between them
the parallel valleys of Putaendo and Aconcagua, watered
by two streams bearing the same names, which ultimately
unite to form the river Aconcagua, which empties itself in
the ocean beyond the coast range of hills. The road by
Uspallata passes to the south of the great peak and
through the valley of Aconcagua to the frontier town of
Santa Rosa. The road by Los Patos is much longer, and,
passing to the north of Aconcagua, leads by the valley of
Putaendo to the narrow pass of Achupallas, which lies to
the west of Santa Rosa. Thus any force stationed at this
point would be placed between two fires by the converg
ence of the two divisions, and if it retreated to the Sierra
of Chacabuco which lay to the south, would leave the plain
of Chacabuco available for the concentration of the army.
Chacabuco was thus the strategic point upon the occu
pation of which depended the issue of the whole cam
paign. Meantime Cabot had left San Juan on the 12th January,
and on the 8th February issued from the northern passes.
The whole province of Coquimbo rose in arms to welcome
him. Captain Ceballos, detached by him, routed a Royalist
force of a hundred men on the plains of Salala, capturing
two small guns and forty prisoners. By the 12th Cabot
was master of the entire province. On the same day
Davila, with the detachment from Rioja, took the city of

140 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Copiapo. The whole of the north of Chile was in the
power of the invaders.
On that same 12th February Freyre, at the other ex
treme of the line of operations, occupied the city of Talca,
after a skirmish on the plains, cutting all communication
between the capital and the south. He represented
himself to be the vanguard of the main army, and was
joined at once by the Chilian guerillas and by Neyra.
It was only on the eve of departure that San Martin
explained his plan in its entirety to his generals. On the
1 8th January Las Heras marched with a flying column
by Uspallata, with instructions to entrench himself at
Chacabuco, but to retreat if attacked by superior forces.
Two days in his rear marched Beltran with the artillery.
The main body marched on the 19th by Los Patos; the
vanguard was commanded by Soler, and one day's march
in his rear came the reserve under O'Higgins. Groups
of pioneers preceded the columns, clearing the way for
them. Soler had instructions to debouch on the 8th
February into the valley of Putaendo, to seize the bridge
which crosses the river Aconcagua in front of the town of
San Felipe, to occupy that position, thence to open com
munications with Las Heras, and, if possible, to attack
the enemy in the rear at Santa Rosa.
All the troops were mounted on mules, and marched
in single file along the narrow paths, each twenty men
being in care of a muleteer, the length of each day's
march being decided by the facilities for grass and water
at the halting-places. Not only was the road itself by
Los Patos more difficult than that by Uspallata, but on
account of the greater elevation, and of its vicinity to the
eternal snow of the higher peaks, the cold was very much
more intense ; it freezes hard there every night, even at
midsummer, and the rarefaction of the air caused many of
the men to drop from the ranks.
Marco had despatched 1,000 men under Colonel Atero to
reconnoitre the pass of Uspallata, and on the 24th January

THE PASSAGE OF THE ANDES. 141
the advanced posts of Las Heras were attacked by the
enemy at Pichueta, on the eastern slope of the Cordillera.
A reinforcement under Major Martinez drove the Royal
ists, after two hours' fighting, across the summit. San
Martin, on hearing of this, at once despatched Major
Arcos with 200 men to seize the pass of Achupallas. On
the 4th February Arcos found the guard there strongly
reinforced ; he attacked at once, and the day was decided
by Lieutenant Juan Lavalle, of the mounted grenadiers,
who here led the first of those desperate charges of cavalry
for which he was afterwards so renowned.
At three in the morning of the 2nd February Las Heras
crossed the summit of the Cordillera, and on the 4th, at
sundown, an advanced post of the Royalists at Guardia
Vieja was attacked by Major Martinez, and carried at the
point of the bayonet ; after which Las Heras, in obedience
to express orders from San Martin, retired upon his re
serve. On the 5th the alarm was given in the valleys of
Putaendo and Aconcagua by the fugitives from Guardia
Vieja and Achupallas, but Atero, deceived by the counter
march of Las Heras into the idea that he was in full
retreat, left the pass of Uspallata open, and marched with
700 men to meet the invaders at Achupallas. Thus, with
out further trouble, Las Heras debouched on the 8th on to
the plain and occupied Santa Rosa.
Soler, with the escort and two squadrons of 'grenadiers,
had hurried on to the assistance of the small force at
Achupallas, and thence on the 6th descended into the
valley of Putaendo with all his cavalry. Necochea was
then detached with 100 men of the escort against the town
of San Felipe. On the morning of the 7 th he was met by
Atero, and, by feigning to retreat in the face of such
superior numbers, induced the Royalist leader to follow
him up the valley with 300 horsemen, leaving his guns
and infantry in a strong position on high ground behind
him. When he had drawn him well away from his re
serve, Necochea suddenly wheeled his men into line and

142 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
charged, breaking up the enemy completely, and driving
him back to the shelter of his guns, with a loss of 30
killed and 4 prisoners. Atero, after this repulse, retreated
with all speed to San Felipe, destroying the bridge over
the Aconcagua river. The fugitives reported that the
enemy were tall men armed with very long swords, whose
charge no cavalry in Chile could resist. On the 8th the
two divisions encamped in the valley of Putaendo, and
were welcomed with enthusiasm by the inhabitants.
On the 9th the broken bridge was repaired by the
sappers, and while the whole army crossed, a squadron of
grenadiers under Melian advanced to the hill of Chaca
buco, and were there met by advanced parties of the
column under Las Heras. Beltran had lost 6,000 mules
out of 10,000, and two-thirds of his horses, but he brought
all his guns with him.
Thus the preliminary operations were crowned with
success. A strategic combination of movements over a
frontage of 1,300 miles was completed in every point on
the day prefixed by the author of the plan. He had
reason to be proud of the exploit, but neither then or at
any later date was he ever known to boast of it. He had
at that time much else to think of, his cavalry horses were
for the most part foundered by the passage of the rugged
defiles, and he had no time to lose if he was to fight a
decisive battle on the 1 5th as he had promised.
The judgment of posterity is unanimous in respect to
the importance of the passage of the Andes by San Martin,
not alone as a great military feat, but also for the influence
it had upon the final result of the struggle for emancipa
tion. Spanish historians speak of it as the turning-point
of the contest between Spain and her colonies. In
German military schools it is cited as an example of the
importance of discipline in an army, and of the value of
foresight and attention to details on the part of a general.
The passage of the Andes by San Martin was a feat
requiring greater strategy and skill than the passages of

THE PASSAGE OF THE ANDES. 143
the Alps by Hannibal and by Napoleon ; it was unequalled
till Bolivar repeated the exploit on the equator. If com
pared with the two former, it is seen to be a much greater
achievement than either of them from its effects upon the
destinies of the human race. In place of vengeance,
greed, or of ambition, San Martin was animated by the
hope of giving liberty and independence to a new world.
The passage of the Andes by San Martin resulted in
Maipo ; the passage of the Andes by Bolivar resulted in
Boyaca ; two decisive victories which liberated entire
peoples from the slavery of foreign despotism ; the pas
sages of the Alps by Hannibal and by Napoleon resulted
only in the sterile victories of Trebia and of Marengo.

CHAPTER XIV.
CHACABUCO. 1817.
FROM San Felipe, San Martin sent off a trusty spy to
Santiago with instructions to bring him back, on the third
day, information of the movements of the enemy. He
then set himself to work to prepare for battle, mounting
his artillery and concentrating the different divisions.
On the 10th February all the army was united on the
open plain at the foot of the slope of Chacabuco.
On the 10th and nth the engineers, protected by skir
mishers, reconnoitred the roads and passes leading across
the Sierra. On the 1 ith the spy returned, bringing answers
to San Martin from his agents in the capital, and copies
of the secret orders of Marco. The spy had visited the
barracks of the Royalist troops, and had counted those on
the march for Chacabuco. San Martin then summoned a
council of war.
The Sierra of Chacabuco rises to a height of 4,300 feet
above the level of the sea. About three miles before
reaching the summit, the main road from Santa Rosa to
Santiago divides into two paths. That to the left, which
is the shortest but also the steeper of the two, is still only
a bridle-path ; the other is now the main road, but was at
that time little known. Both lead to the plain of Chaca
buco, but the points at which they descend from the heights
are nearly two miles distant one from the other. The left-

CHACABUCO. 145
hand path first reaches the lower ground near the head of
a valley about three miles long, down which it winds until
it joins the other path at the farmhouse of Chacabuco,
which stands at the head of the plain.
From the summit of the Sierra the whole country is seen
spreading out as a beautiful panorama. The plain at the
foot, extending southwards some seven miles in the direc
tion of Santiago, is shut in by the hills of Colina, through
which there is a path. Behind lie the great masses of the
Cordillera, to the west the spur runs on till it joins the
coast range, as yet unseen.
San Martin informed his officers that he had determined
to advance without waiting for the rest of his artillery, and
to fight the decisive battle before the enemy had time to
concentrate his forces. The army was to march in two
columns by the diverging paths, which columns should
debouch simultaneously upon the plain beyond, and attack
the Royalist position in front and on the flank. The column
of the right was put under command of Soler, and con
sisted of 2,100 men, with seven light guns. That of the
left, under command of O'Higgins, consisted of 1,500 men,
with two guns. The latter was to engage the attention of
the enemy in front, without attacking the position, while
Soler marched upon his left flank and rear, when a general
advance would decide the day.
Atero, after the skirmish in the valley of Putaendo, had
retreated to Chacabuco, and Marco hurriedly sent rein
forcements, offering the soldiery a reward of twenty dollars
for each one of the enemy killed, and twelve for each
prisoner; but, at the same time, he secretly sent off his
baggage to Valparaiso, and not until the 10th did he
appoint a commander for the army assembling at Chaca
buco. He then selected Colonel Maroto of the Talavera
regiment, who reached the headquarters at the farmhouse
on the evening of the nth. Maroto found under his orders
1,500 infantry, 500 cavalry, and five guns, a force far in
ferior in numbers to that of the invaders, and depressed in
L

r46 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
spirit, but they were the flower of the Spanish army. All
that he had time to do that evening .was to strengthen an
outpost which was stationed on the summit in a position
which commanded the eastern pass, purposing to occupy
the heights with his entire force on the following day.
At two in the morning of the 12th February, under
a bright moon, the Argentine army commenced their
advance, the infantry leaving their knapsacks behind
them. Flanking parties from Soler's division were the
first to meet the enemy, but had barely time to exchange
a few shots when the position was attacked by O'Higgins,
who drove this advanced guard before him over the sum
mit. The Royalists retreated in good order upon the
main body, which had advanced three miles up the valley
at dawn of day.
Maroto, believing that the whole force of the Patriots
was in pursuit of his vanguard by the main road, withdrew
his army across the valley, which was intersected by a
muddy stream, and took up a strong position on the oppo
site slope, placing two of his guns so as to command the
mouth of the pass, and extending his line to a hill on his
extreme left, where he established a strong force of in
fantry, with the cavalry in the rear.
Zapiola, with three squadrons of the grenadiers, harassed
the retreat of the Royalist vanguard, but could make no
impression upon it, the ground being unfavourable for
cavalry, but he succeeded in preventing the enemy from
occupying two hills at the mouth of the pass, where they
might have seriously hindered the advance of O'Higgins ;
and advanced into the valley till forced to retire by the
fire of the two guns in position in front.
At 1 1 A.M. O'Higgins debouched from the pass, and
drew up his infantry in line on the open ground under fire
of the enemy. For an hour he contented himself with
returning their fire and beating off their skirmishers, till,
as he afterwards said himself, his blood was boiling to be

CHACABUCO. 147
at them. In his excitement he forgot the positive orders
of San Martin to wait for Soler before attacking the
enemy, and gave the word to charge. His men advanced
with alacrity, but were soon entangled in the muddy
stream, which they in vain attempted to cross under the
fire of the enemy, and finally retreated in disorder to the
mouth of the pass.
San Martin, sitting on his war-horse, saw from the
heights above the repulse of his lieutenant. At once he
sent off his aide-de-camp Condarco to hasten the march of
Soler. This is the incident in his life which is commemo
rated in the equestrian statue which now graces the Plaza
San Martin in Buenos Ayres.
He then galloped down the slope and joined O'Higgins.
As he reached the lower ground, he noticed an extra
ordinary movement in the ranks of the enemy, and then
descried the head of Soler's column advancing rapidly on
his flank.
O'Higgins again advanced, while the grenadiers under
Zapiola charged the centre of the enemy, and sabred his
artillerymen at their guns. The position was carried by
the bayonet, and the Royalist infantry formed square on
their centre. Colonel Alvarado, with the vanguard of the
right wing, at the same time captured the hill on the left
flank of the Royalists, while Necochea and Escalada
charged the cavalry in the rear. The victors then fell
simultaneously upon the square, which was speedily
broken. Some of the fugitives made for the farmhouse in
their rear, but found their retreat cut off by Soler, and
were forced to surrender at discretion ; others tried to
escape by the valley, and there fell under the sabres of the
grenadiers. The Royalists lost in this action 500 killed, 600 prisoners,
all their artillery, a standard, and two flags ; while the
loss of the Patriots was 12 killed and 120 wounded. But
the moral effects of the victory were still greater; the
L 2

148 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
disaster of Chacabuco spread panic among the adherents
of the Royal cause all over Chile. Only three men were
undismayed — Barafiao, Ordonez, and Sanchez.
Barafiao, on the march with his hussars to join the
army, was met at the entrance to the plain of Chacabuco
by news of the disaster. He countermarched to Santiago,
and offered Marco to take up an infantry soldier behind
each of his horsemen, and to fall upon the Patriot camp
by night ; but Marco thought of nothing but his own
safety, and fled to Valparaiso, leaving the capital in the
hands of the populace.
On the 13th the Patriot army was in full march upon
Santiago, Necochea, with his squadron of grenadiers,
being sent in advance to maintain order in the city; where
the next day the army entered amid the enthusiastic
plaudits of the inhabitants. As a Chilian historian says :
" San Martin, occupied in carrying out his vast plans,
cared little for these futile manifestations. He thought
only of the resources for carrying on the work which he
had gained by the victory."
On the 15th he issued a proclamation convoking an
assembly of notables, who should name three electors for
each of the provinces of Santiago, Concepcion, and
Coquimbo, in order that they might appoint a chief for
the State.
The Assembly, to the number of one hundred, met under
the presidency of Don Francisco Ruiz Tagle, the pro
visional Governor, and declared that —
"They were unanimous in naming Don Jose de San
Martin as Governor of Chile with full powers."
San Martin refused to accept the appointment, and sum
moned another Assembly, to the number of two hundred
and ten, which by acclamation named General O'Higgins
Supreme Director of the State, which was what San
Martin desired. The new Director appointed Don Miguel
Zafiartu his Minister of the Interior, and Lieutenant-
Colonel Zenteno, San Martin's secretary, Minister of War

CHACABUCO. 149
and Marine; and then issued a proclamation to the people
and addressed a note to the foreign Powers.
When Marco left the capital, his troops at once dis
persed. Some of them, with Maroto at their head, reached
Valparaiso, and at once embarked. The rest were made
prisoners, among them Marco himself, who had not even
energy sufficient for a rapid flight. San Martin received
the late Governor-General with great affability.
" Give me that white hand," said he, with bluff sarcasm ;
and, leading him to an inner room, he conversed privately
with him for two hours, and then dismissed him.
San Bruno, who had murdered prisoners in the public
jail, was also taken prisoner, and, being sent at once for
trial, was quickly sentenced, and shot in the great square,
which was an act of simple justice.
News of the victory of Chacabuco was received in Buenos
Ayres on the 24th February. All day shouts of triumph
echoed through the streets, while cannon roared from the
fort and from the ships of the squadron anchored in the
roadstead. The captured flags were hung out from the
balconies of the Cabildo, grouped round a portrait of the
victorious general. Medals were decreed to the soldiers
who had fought under him, and to himself a special badge
of honour, while his daughter, Maria Mercedes, received a
life-pension of 600 dollars per annum, which her father
devoted to her education.
Government also sent San Martin his commission as
Brigadier - General, the highest military grade in the
Argentine service. He, in accordance with his previously
expressed determination, declined the honour, but asked
for further supplies of men, arms, and money, to carry on
the "ampaign, and appointed himself General-in-Chief of
the um.sd Argentine and Chilian armies.
After arranging with the Chilian authorities for the
formation of a naval squadron, and establishing in Santiago
a Supreme Council of the Lautaro Lodge, half Chilians
and half Argentines, he announced his intention of return-

150 , THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
ing to Buenos Ayres to concert measures with Government
for the prosecution of the war.
The Cabildo of Santiago offered him ten thousand ounces
of gold for the expenses of his journey, which he declined
to accept for himself, but devoted it to the establishment
of a public library in that city.
One month after the battle he passed by the scene of his
late victory, and saw there a mound of earth, under which
lay the dead of the 12 th February of the Patriot army,
most of them negroes from Cuyo, liberated slaves. This
mound was the first landmark of the War of Emancipation.

CHAPTER XV.
THE. FIRST CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH OF CHILE.
1817.
After the victory of Chacabuco, San Martin made three
mistakes, two of mere detail, but one of importance, which
had an evil influence upon his later operations. The
campaign which ought to have finished immediately was
thus prolonged, and he was compelled to fight four more
battles to accomplish the reconquest of Chile, retarding by
three years the prosecution of his great enterprise.
On the 1 2th February he remained encamped on the
1 field of battle instead of pursuing the enemy at least to the
end of the plain of Chacabuco. The following day, instead
of marching upon the capital he ought to have pursued the
fugitives to Valparaiso. By this mistake 1,600 veteran troops
escaped to Peru, to act against him later on. But his
great mistake consisted in his neglect to secure the fruits
of ' his victory by an immediate campaign in the South.
The military strength of Chile lay in the South — the people
were warlike, the royal cause had there many partisans,
and the country was full of strong military positions, in
especial the fortress of Valdivia, backed by the islands of
iChiloe, a sea-port by which reinforcements from Peru
could be poured into the country. Looking far ahead, the
victor of Chacabuco overlooked that which was close at
hand. Ordonez was an officer of great talent, who up to that

152 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
time had had no opportunity of distinguishing himself.
He and San Martin had fought side by side against Napo
leon. At the close of the war he was a colonel, and with
this rank he came to America in 181 5 as Governor of
Concepcion. He was there still and now came, forward
as the most doughty opponent of his old comrade. He
had no regular troops with him ; but ably seconded by
Sanchez, he summoned the militia, collected the soldiery
dispersed to the north of the Maule, garrisoned the fron
tier of Arauco, fortified the Peninsula of Talcahuano,
aided by the royal squadron, made large provision of
supplies, and scoured the country from the Bio-Bio to the
Maule with his light troops. For two months he was
unmolested, and had time to organize a division of 1,000
men, and to receive a reinforcement from Lima of 1,600
regulars. Freyre, after his success at Talca, had contented him
self with intercepting communications, and his force was
weakened by Rodriguez, who marched his guerillas to the
North, while his instructions from San Martin to collect
horses and cattle for the main army were neglected. At
the same time several smaller parties of the Patriots were
cut up by the Royalists.
San Martin did not totally neglect the South. On the
1 8th February a column of 1,000 men under Las Heras,
left Santiago, and on the 4th March crossed the Maule
and joined Freyre at Diguillin, but he marched so slowly
that the enemy had plenty of time to prepare for him.
O'Higgins, who was left in supreme command by San
Martin, was greatly irritated at this delay, and in April
marched himself to his assistance, with 800 men. But his
progress was just as slow as that of Las Heras, who in
the meantime, after calling a council of his officers to
attest the meagreness of his equipment for such an expe
dition, marched resolutely on Concepcion, encamping on
the 4th April at a farmhouse near to that city.
Ordonez, who had been watching his movements, fell

BATTLE OF THE G AVI LAN. 153
upon him at night with 700 light troops, but was beaten
off with the loss of two guns ; and the next day Las Heras
occupied Concepcion.
Concepcion lies on the northern bank of the Bio-Bio, at
the head, of the peninsula of Talcahuano, and about five
miles distant from the fortified town of the same name.
Las Heras was thus in a critical position ; he dare not
retreat, and his force was insufficient to attack Ordonez
in his entrenchments. He built a small fort on the Gavi-
lan Hill, to the south-west of Concepcion, and waited
for O'Higgins. On the 1st May four Spanish vessels
anchored in the Bay of Talcahuano, bringing the 1,600
fugitives from Chacabuco, who had been sent back from
Peru to reinforce the garrison, and Ordonez thought him
self strong enough to resume the offensive. On the night
of the 4th he sallied out with 700 men and four guns to
attack the left flank of the position held by Las Heras,
while Colonel Morgado, with 400 men and two guns
attacked on the right, and a small force in boats rowed up
the Bio-Bio to menace the city from the river. The action
commenced at daybreak and was hotly contested for three
hours, until Freyre, who commanded on the right of the
position, having routed Morgado and captured his two
guns, came to the assistance of Las Heras, and Ordonez
was compelled to retreat, hotly pursued by the grenadiers
under Medina, who captured one of his guns. The
flotilla was beaten off by two companies of the 7th Regi
ment, which arrived during the action. The loss of the
Royalists in this smart affair was 192 killed and 80
prisoners. The Patriots had 6 killed and 62 wounded.
When all was over O'Higgins arrived upon the scene,
and in his satisfaction at the victory forgot all his dis
pleasure. He took the command, and at once commenced
operations against Talcahuano. Ordonez having com
mand of the sea and the Bio-Bio, had easy communication
with the ports of Arauco, which both furnished supplies
and harassed the left flank of the Patriots. Freyre, with a

f54 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
flying column of 300 men, was detached to capture these
forts. On the 12th May, Captain Cienfuegos, with sixty
men, crossed the Bio-Bio and took the fort of El Naci
miento, after which two other forts nearer to Concepcion
surrendered. The key of this line was the fortress of
Arauco, situate at its western extremity on the sea-coast.
Freyre incorporated the detachment under Cienfuegos, and
on the 26th May encamped on the River Carampague in
the vicinity of this fort. The garrison, to the number of
200 men, sallied out to dispute the passage of the river.
Freyre, with 50 grenadiers and 50 infantry mounted en
croupe, crossed the river lower down, and fell upon the
Royalists with such impetuosity, while the rest of his force
attacked them in front, that he completely routed them,
and the following day captured the fort, with eleven guns
and large stores of ammunition, having lost eleven men
drowned in the passage of the river, and one man wounded.
A militia captain named Diaz rallied the dispersed sol
diery, and adding to them some 400 Indians, returned to
the attack. Cienfuegos, who had been left in command,
met this new foe on the open, but was completely beaten,
and Arauco was reoccupied by the Royalists on the
3rd June, to be retaken by Freyre on the 17th July.
O'Higgins then made a treaty with the Indians of Arauco,
and so secured their neutrality.
Meantime an advanced post had been established in the
vicinity of Talcahuano, and frequent skirmishes took place
with the garrison, in which the Patriots had always the
advantage. On the 22nd July the army advanced within
cannon shot of the line of forts which crossed the penin
sula, but was compelled by heavy rain to retire on the
24th. Ordonez kept his main force within the line of his
entrenchments, but officers of his raised bodies of guerillas
in the rear of the Patriots, cutting off supplies, while
detachments in boats made frequent descents on the coast
line of Arauco, losing many men, but greatly harassing
the Patriots.

SIEGE OF TALCAHUANO. 155
Talcahuano was by nature a strong position, but was
made stronger still by art. The garrison consisted of 1,700
men and seventy heavy guns were mounted on the forts,
while a frigate, a brig of war, and five gunboats in the
bay, and a boat with one heavy gun on the western side of
the peninsula, enfiladed the approach from the South. It
was called by O'Higgins the Chilian Gibraltar, and here it
was that Ordonez by far-seeing prudence, held the united
forces of Chile and the United Provinces in check for three
years. During the winter O'Higgins had strengthened his army
with several battalions of Chilian recruits ; in October he
had nearly 4,000 men under his immediate command, and
was also joined by two French officers of distinction. The
first, General Brayer, came with a great military reputa
tion, gained in the wars of the French Republic and under
Napoleon ; but his arrogance soon lost him the sympathy
and confidence of his new comrades. The other, Alberto
D'Albe, Captain of Engineers, was also a man of great
experience, and being of a more modest character, ren
dered great service to the American cause.
Heavy rains paralysed operations until spring was well
advanced ; but on the 25th November, O'Higgins again
moved forward to some high ground within cannon shot
of the line of entrenchments. The plan of attack was
drawn up by General Brayer. On the extreme left of the
Royalist position was an outwork called the Morro,
against this the main attack was to be directed, while the
attention of the enemy was diverted by false attacks on
the rest of the line. O'Higgins and most of his officers
were in favour of an attack upon the other flank ; but San
Martin being consulted, gave his opinion in favour of
Brayer' s plan, which was accordingly adopted. A desul
tory cannonade was maintained for several days, when a
north wind springing up, which prevented the Spanish
men-of-war from aiding in the defence of the line, the
columns marched to the attack in the early morning of the

156 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
6th December. The attack on the Morro was led by
Major Beauchef and Captain Videla, with a mixed force
of Chilians and Argentines. Mounting on the shoulders
of their men they scaled the outer wall, and tore down a
portion of the stockade behind, when such a heavy fire
was poured upon them that Videla being killed and
Beauchef severely wounded, the column could advance no
farther, till Las Heras brought up the supports, when the
position was carried by the bayonet. At the same time a
Spanish gunboat on the Bio-Bio was captured by some
boats led by an Englishman named Manning, and an
unauthorised attack by Conde on the centre was repulsed.
At daybreak Las Heras found to his dismay that the
Morro was merely an advanced work, and that he was still
outside of the line of entrenchments. Colonel Boedo fell
in attempting to force his way beyond ; the guns of two
forts on the heights, those of the frigate Venganza, and
those of some gunboats converged their fire upon the
conquered outwork, causing heavy losses ; in spite of
which Las Heras maintained his position till O'Higgins
sent him orders to retire, which he did in good order, after
spiking the guns he had captured, and carrying with him
his wounded and prisoners. The loss of the Patriots was
150 killed and 280 wounded.
This disaster put an end for the time to all offensive
operations, and on the day of the assault another strong
reinforcement of Royalist troops embarked at Callao for
Talcahuano.

CHAPTER XVI.
ARGENTINE-CHILENO ALLIANCE.
1817.
The alliance between Argentina and Chile, sealed with
the blood of her soldiers in the assault on Talcahuano, is
the most important factor of this epoch in the struggle
for the emancipation of America, whether the objects of the
alliance be spoken of or whether its results be summed up.
This alliance, the first celebrated in the New World
between independent nations, was no artificial combina
tion ; it arose from the natural tendencies, and from the
reciprocal interests of two peoples, and its effects were felt
from Cape Horn to the Equator. Never did two allied
nations work more cordially together for one end, never
were greater deeds accomplished with such feeble resources.
Without this alliance the struggle for independence would
either have failed or would have been indefinitely retarded.
It originated in the help given by each country to the
other in the first years of the struggle, from 181 1 to 1814.
The fall of Chile in the latter year only strengthened the
bond ; it was then seen to be an absolute necessity to
both. Chile alone could not free herself from her oppres
sors, and Argentina without her had no military road by
which she could reach her enemy, while she herself lay
open to assault.
The Argentine Republic undertook the conquest of
Chile for three reasons : first, as a measure of self-defence ;

158 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
second, to secure the dominion of the Pacific ; as a means
to the complete emancipation of South America, which
was the third reason for, and the final object of, the under
taking. San Martin was the soul of the alliance, O'Hig
gins was the connecting link, the Army of the Andes the
muscle and sinew, and the Lautaro Lodge the secret
mechanism. It was to establish this alliance that San
Martin had so hurriedly left for Buenos Ayres after the
victory of Chacabuco.
San Martin recrossed the Andes without other company
than his favourite aide-de-camp O'Brien, and a guide. As
he left Mendoza on the 19th March, he received a letter
from Pueyrredon, telling him that a war was imminent
with the Portuguese of the Banda Oriental, for which arms
and money would be required from Chile, and that in a few
days he expected five armed ships, which Carrera was
bringing from North America, which he would send on to
Valparaiso and place at his orders.
The Portuguese had occupied the Banda Oriental in
1 8 1 6, with the tacit connivance of the Argentine Govern
ment, and Pueyrredon was at that time striving to avoid a
rupture by diplomacy. But a war with the Portuguese
formed no part of the plans of San Martin, who, at the
end of March, reached Buenos Ayres, and avoiding a
triumphal entry, which was preparing for him, went to
business at once.
Fifteen days afterwards he commenced his return journey,
having made such arrangements as he could for the equip
ment and support of a naval squadron on the Pacific,
promising, as General-in-Chief, help from Chile to the
extent of 300,000 dollars.
Don Jose Miguel Carrera had in the year 181 5 managed
to raise 20,000 dollars among his personal friends in Buenos
Ayres, and with this, had gone off to the United States to
raise a naval squadron for an expedition to Chile. By
lavish promises he had prevailed upon some merchants in
New York and Baltimore to sell him five ships, fully

ARGENTINE-CHILENO ALLIANCE. 159
equipped. In one of these, the corvette Clifton, he reached
Buenos Ayres on the gth February, 181 7. Pueyrredon
not only refused to pay for the ships, but also prohibited
the further progress of the expedition, knowing that the
presence of the Carreras in Chile would be most prejudicial
to the cause of the alliance. A few days afterwards the
brig Savage arrived from Baltimore, and Carrera formed
a plan for escaping with the two ships, but his intention
being denounced to Pueyrredon by one of the French
adventurers who had come with him, he was arrested as a
conspirator, and confined in the Retiro Barracks, where
San Martin visited him on the 12th April. Carrera haugh
tily refused to shake hands with him, and rejected his
repeated offers to arrange matters for him with Pueyrredon.
They never met again.
San Martin and Pueyrredon both wrote to O'Higgins,
proposing that Chile should pension the three brothers
Carrera, in recognition of their former services. But
O'Higgins considered that such a measure would offer
a reward to crime. Carrera soon afterwards escaped
from prison and fled to Monte Video; later on he
became conspicuous in the ranks of the enemies of Bueftos
Ayres. On the 1 ith May San Martin was again in Chile, and
was received in triumph at the capital, the enthusiasm of
the people being increased by the news received the same
day of the victory of Las Heras at Gavilan.
The same day he sent his friend and aide-de-camp,
Alvarez Condarco, off, by way of Buenos Ayres, to Lon
don, with money to purchase another ship of war. Con
darco had also another mission, which is enveloped in
mystery, and is pointed to as a stain on the reputation of
San Martin and O'Higgins. A certain sum was to be left
in deposit in London for their private account. The docu
ments relating to this matter are written in cypher, and
have remained secret for more than sixty years. Only
three persons have read them, of whom two are dead,

160 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
the third is the author of this history.* The amount
cannot have exceeded 29,500 dollars, a sum which San
Martin had most certainly earned, while the rigid exact
ness of all his dealings with public money placed in his
hands is unquestioned. He steadily refused all recom
pense for his services ; he did accept the hospitality of the
city of Santiago when there, but the yearly expenses of
his establishment did not exceed 3,000 dollars.
In pursuance of the Alliance, the Government of Chile
remitted 40,000 dollars to Buenos Ayres for the army of
Upper Peru, and the Argentine Government sent a thou
sand new muskets for the use of the Chilian army. The
maintenance of the Army of the Andes, and the filling up
of death vacancies, was assumed by Chile, and there was
no further question on either side of pecuniary respon
sibility. When O'Higgins in April went to take command of the
Army of the South, he left Colonel Don Hilarion de la
Quintana as his deputy at Santiago. Quintana was an
Argentine, a family connection and an aide-de-camp of
San Martin. Thus the supreme power in the State was
made subject to Argentine influence under the direction of
the Lautaro Lodge. This appointment wounded the
national susceptibilities of the people, was contrary to the
policy adopted by the Argentine government, and pro
voked open declarations that " Chile owed nothing to the
Army of the Andes."
To destroy this impression, government, on establishing
a military school, reserved twelve nominations of cadets
for natives of the Province of Cuyo, professing "eternal
* It appears that Condarco, when in London, purchased the ship Cumlerland,
mounting sixty guns, for 160,000 dols., giving an order for that amount on the
Government of Chile, and paying as a deposit 25,000 dols., which sum, being
returned to him on payment of his draft, he placed in the hands of someone
in whom he had confidence, on account of O'Higgins and San Martin. His
confidence was misplaced, his English friend lost the money in gambling on the
Stock Exchange, and San Martin found himself penniless when he landed in
England in 1824. — Tr.

ARGENTINE-CHILENO ALLIANCE. i£l
gratitude to the illustrious peoples of the Rio de la
Plata." But international gratitude is always a burden, and the
Chilians saw in it no reason for confiding the highest post
in the State to a foreigner.
Such was the position of affairs when San Martin re
turned from Buenos Ayres. Quintana and O'Higgins then
both wished him to take charge of the administration.
He refused, and advised O'Higgins to appoint a Chilian in
place of Quintana.
One of the chief administrative acts of Quintana was to
commence the coinage of Chilian money, with an appro
priate inscription indicative of the establishment of Chile
as a sovereign State. One thousand dollars of this coin
age were given to San Martin and Belgrano for distribu
tion as medals among the Argentine troops.
At this time Pueyrredon appointed Don Tomas Guido
Argentine representative in Chile, and his official recep
tion at Santiago on the 17th May was one of the great
events of the year. Quintana, as one result of these
renewed relations, sent Irizarri to Europe as the diplo
matic agent of Chile, with instructions to act in conjunc
tion with the diplomatic agent of the United Provinces,
wherever he might be. Rivadavia was at that time
Argentine representative in Europe, and to him were sent
fresh powers and instructions to treat for the establish
ment of an independent monarchy in America.
O'Higgins, from his headquarters at Concepcion, issued
a decree creating a " Legion of Merit," in imitation of the
Legion of Honour created by Napoleon. This institution
had an aristocratic tendency, as its members enjoyed
special privileges; it was, therefore, unpopular, and the
Argentine Government would permit no privileges to such
Argentine citizens as received the distinction. San Martin
looked more favourably upon it, as it responded to his idea
of creating a special military class independent of local
influences. M

162 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
One of the results of the restoration of Chile by Argen
tine arms was to give preponderance to one of the parties
into which the country was divided. The Argentines,
while recognizing the independence of the country and
establishing a national government, had imposed a dictator
upon the country, postponing indefinitely its constitutional
organization. The Government of O'Higgins had against
it not only its old adversaries, but also a large number of
Chilians who were jealous of foreign influence. They took
Carrera as their chief, and National Autonomy as their
watchword, while they were animated only by personal
ambition. Dofia Javiera de Valdes, sister of the Carreras, resided
at that time in Buenos Ayres. At her house there were
daily meetings of Chilian emigrants who were hostile to
O'Higgins. Among them a plot was hatched. She her
self was the life and soul of the conspiracy. It was decided
that several of the conspirators should cross the Andes to
prepare their friends in Chile for an outbreak, and should
be followed by Don Luis and by Don Juan Jose Carrera,
who should keep quiet until joined by Don Jose Miguel,
who would go round Cape Horn from Monte Video, in the
ship General Scott, which he was expecting from New
York. They thought they had only to land in the country
to be received with acclamation and placed in charge of
her destinies. All that they feared was the Argentine
army, which was to be expelled, O'Higgins was to be
banished from the country as a traitor, San Martin was to
be tried by court-martial as a criminal, and all who re
sisted them were to be put to death. It was an absurd
and criminal project which, if only partially successful,
would have ruined Chile for the second time.
The first party of the conspirators crossed the Andes in
July. Luis Carrera, disguised as a peon, was arrested at
Mendoza for robbing the mails. Juan Jose, travelling.
under a false name and accompanied by a post-boy, was
caught in a hailstorm during the night near San Luis;

THE CONSPIRACY OF THE CARRERAS. 163
the boy died, he was arrested on suspicion of murder, and
afterwards sent on to Mendoza and imprisoned with his
brother. Luzuriaga, Governor of Mendoza, sent full ac
counts of these occurrences to Santiago. Meantime the
other conspirators had arrived at a farmhouse belonging
to the Carrera family, and had been put under arrest as
a measure of precaution, in consequence of warnings from
Buenos Ayres. These news from Mendoza made it certain
that some conspiracy was on foot. Numerous arrests
among the partisans of Carrera followed, the most notable
among the prisoners being Dr. Don Manuel Rodriguez.
Some said that the Government was the author of the
conspiracy. The general excitement was so great that
Quintana could no longer maintain his position, and even
tually Don Luis de la Cruz, a native Chilian, chosen by
the Lautaro Lodge, was appointed Deputy Director.
San Martin, the guest of the Chilian people, residing in
a palace, still continued the simple, hard-working manner
of life he had adopted in Mendoza. He dined alone at
1 P.M., but at 4 P.M. a state dinner was served at which
Guido presided. At dessert he joined the company and
took coffee with them. In the evening his saloon was a
favourite resort of the best society of the city, the soiree
being invariably opened by singing the Argentine National
Hymn, after which San Martin led off the first minuet.
These " tertulias " were celebrated in the society annals of
the day ; and not a few of the Argentine officers fell cap
tive to the beauty and grace of the girls of Santiago, Las
Heras and Guido among the number.
San Martin had small sympathy for the Chilian people ;
their manners and character did not please his austere
mind, and he was not the sort of man to make many
friends. In his own country he had but three, Belgrano,
Pueyrredon, and Godoy Cruz ; in Chile he had but one,
O'Higgins. He also suffered much at this time from
neuralgia and rheumatism, and could only sleep by an
immoderate use of morphia. He thought that he could
M 2

1 64 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
not live much longer; those about him thought the same
and sent notice of their fears to Buenos Ayres, in con
sequence of which General Antonio Gonzalez Balcarce, the
hero of Suipacha, was sent to join him as his second in
command. In spite of his forebodings San Martin did not falter in
the prosecution of his great enterprise, and taking advan
tage of his friendship with Captain Bowles, Commodore of
the British Pacific squadron, he sent, under his care, a
trusty agent to Lima with letters to the Viceroy proposing
an exchange of prisoners. This he was anxious to effect,
not only for the sake of the prisoners and their friends in
both countries, but also for the purpose of procuring an
official recognition of Chile as a belligerent power. But
under these was a third purpose, to him of more import
ance than either of the others. His messenger was a
confidential agent, who might thus have a pretext for
meeting the leaders of society in Lima, and opportunity
for sounding them, and for spreading among them the
Argentine ideas of which he was the champion.

CHAPTER XVII.
CANCHA-RAYADA. 1817 — 18x8.
The year 1 8 1 7 had commenced with a victory and ended
with a defeat, the year 18 18 was to commence with a
defeat to be followed by a victory which would decide
the fate of Chile. From that moment all the forces of the
revolution in South America would converge from the
extremities towards the centre, shutting up the colonial
power of Spain in its last stronghold, Peru, where the
two great liberators of the South and the North, San
Martin and Bolivar, would join hands.
In the epoch at which we have now arrived, Chile had as
yet no definite form, but possessed all the elements of a
vigorous nationality, patriotism, energy, and a pronounced
tendency to independence ; a democracy yet in embryo,
combined with an aristocracy at once territorial and poli
tical. The instincts of the masses decided them for the
cause of independence, while their political organization
assumed the most elemental form, that of a people become
an army, under the direction of a class and under a mili
tary dictatorship to which all were subject. The revolu
tion and the leveling pressure of despotic rule, had de
stroyed provincialism and the social inequalities which
stood in the way of national unity ; common misfortunes
and common efforts had created public spirit. Indepen
dence thus became a fact, and the establishment of a

1 66 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
republic the necessary sequence. With the assent of all
the convocation of a Congress was still postponed, but the
political situation was compact. Yet there was some
resistance to this system of government: the educated
classes accepted it only as a transient necessity, and there
were still some partisans of the royal cause in the South.
Among the rulers themselves there were still some who
clung to the fallen party of the Carreras ; but for the
presence of Argentine bayonets and the influence of San
Martin the intestine dispute would have broken out
afresh. Viceroy Abascal, who had crushed the revolution in
Upper Peru, in Quito, and in Chile, had in 1815 been
replaced by General Pezuela, and the army of Upper Peru
was put under the command of General La Serna. Pe
zuela lacked the talents of his predecessor but he con
tinued his policy. Seeing Chile threatened by an invasion
from Mendoza, he ordered La Serna to effect a diversion
by marching on Tucuman. But La Serna was held in
check by the Gauchos of Salta and Jujui under Martin
Guemes, and the successful passage of the Andes by San
Martin forced upon him a disastrous retreat.
Pezuela did not fully appreciate the importance of the
victory of Chacabuco, and contented himself with sending
back the fugitives, in the belief that the Royalist army was
still able to hold the country unaided. The defeat of
Ordonez at Gavilan opened his eyes to the danger, and the
arrival of reinforcements from Spain enabled him to fit
out a fourth expedition. While busied in these prepara
tions, the British ship of war Amphion, Captain Bowles,
anchored at Callao, bringing Don Domingo Torres as
special envoy from San Martin. So far as its ostensible
object was concerned the mission was a complete failure,
but Torres succeeded in communicating with the Patriots
of Peru, and took back with him in January, 1818, full
particulars of the expedition which followed close upon
his heels.

CANCHA-RAYADA. 167
• Three thousand four hundred well equipped men reached
Talcahuano early in January, in four ships mounting
234 guns. Most of these were veteran troops, and were
commanded by General Osorio, the conqueror of Chile
in 1814, who was sent to supersede Ordonez. His in
structions were, after driving the Patriot army to the north
of the Maule, to re-embark his entire force, land in the
neighbourhood of Valparaiso, and march on the capital,
The plan was apparently a good one, but was drawn out
in ignorance of the strength of the Patriots. The losses
in the army of the Andes • had all been made up, and the
new Chilian army by this time almost equalled it in
number. The united army now consisted of 9,000 men, of
whom three-fourths were well drilled troops, while the
total force collected at Talcahuano did not much exceed
5,000 men with twelve guns.
The cannon which roared a welcome to the Spanish
squadron at Talcahuano, were heard by the Patriot army
then in full retreat upon the capital. Osorio saw at once
that he had failed to surprise the enemy, and that all
chance of an easy landing in the neighbourhood of Valpa
raiso was at an end. He despatched the squadron to
blockade that port, and after fifteen days spent in organiz
ing his forces at Concepcion, he marched for the North,
, stimulated to activity by Ordonez. On the :2 th February
his advanced posts on the Maule heard the salute fired by
O'Higgins at Talca, in celebration of the first anniversary
of Chacabuco.
The roles were now changed ; the general of the Army
of the Andes, instead of choosing the place of invasion on
a line of 1,300 miles of Cordillera, had now to defend 1,300
miles of coast. He expected the enemy to land near
Valparaiso, and in December had written to O'Higgins to
make every preparation for a rapid retreat, leaving the
country behind him destitute of horses and supplies.
O'Higgins commenced his retreat on the 1st January, 1818.
and on the 20th reached Talca, accompanied by more than

168 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
50,000 people with their cattle and horses, and there pro
claimed triumphantly the Independence of the Chilian
Republic, which, in default of a Congress, had been decreed
by a general vote of the Chilian people on the 17th
November previous.
At Santiago, Don Luis de la Cruz, Deputy Director,
presided at a solemn ceremony in the great square. Guido
was the bearer of the standard of the new Nation ; beside
it the President of the Municipality carried that of the
United Provinces. The Declaration of Independence being
read, De la Cruz was the first to swear to maintain it, he
was followed by the Bishop and by San Martin ; then the
people kneeling down, repeated the oath, and commemo
rative medals were distributed among them.
Meantime San Martin had drawn the greater part of his
troops from the city and had established an encampment
at Las Tablas near the coast, in readiness to meet the
enemy at any point, giving the command there to Balcarce,
and looking himself to the construction of bridges over
the rivers to the south of Santiago, to facilitate the con
centration of the different corps when requisite.
By the end of February he was no longer in doubt as to
the intentions of the enemy. O'Higgins was directed to
evacuate Talca and retreat sixty miles to the north. Early
in March the concentration was complete, and San Martin
had under his command 4,500 infantry, 1,500 cavalry and
thirty-three guns.
On the 4th March, Osorio crossed the Maule and en
camped at Talca. On the 14th the united army broke up
from quarters and marched against him. The same day
the Royalist army left Talca, and Primo de Rivera, chief of
the staff, crossed the river Lontue with a strong detach
ment of infantry and cavalry to reconnoitre the position
and force of the Patriots, of which Osorio as yet knew
nothing, recrossing the river the same night. On the 1 5th,
Freyre, supported by Brayer with the bulk of the cavalry
and eight guns, crossed the river with 200 light horse,

CANCHA-RAYADA. i6g
advanced to Quecheraguas, where the Royalist vanguard
was quartered, and summoned Primo de Rivera to sur
render, but receiving no support from Brayer, who did
not even cross the river, he was forced to retire with the
loss of seventeen men. Rivera after this success retreated
upon his reserves at Camarico.
On the 1 6th, the entire Patriot army crossed the Lontue
and encamped at Quecheraguas, while Osorio retired pre
cipitately. San Martin, afraid that he would repass the
Maule, marched inland to cut him off. The two armies
marched on parallel lines at a distance of only seven miles
one from the other ; both crossed the Lircay on the 19th. On
the afternoon of the same day, Osorio, whose rear was
greatly harassed by the Patriot cavalry under Balcarce,
wheeled into line in an excellent position, his right resting
on the suburbs of Talca, his left on the Claro River, and
his front defended by a stretch of broken ground known
as the Cancha-Rayada, which he occupied with 500 horse.
Balcarce, ignorant of the nature of the ground, charged
this advanced corps, and coming under fire of the Royalist
artillery, was compelled to retire in disorder. O'Higgins,
with twenty guns, forced back the enemy's right wing into
the suburbs of Talca, but as darkness came on, decisive
action had to be postponed till next day.
In the twilight the Royalist generals, after gazing upon
the Patriot army from the church towers of Talca, held a
council of war. Before them was an enemy greatly supe
rior in numbers, behind them flowed a deep and rapid
river. Osorio talked of continuing the retreat to Talca
huano, but was overruled by Ordonez, who said that the
attempt could only result in the total destruction of the
army, and advised a night attack upon the Patriot posi
tion. Most of the officers supported him, and Osorio
retired to a convent, leaving him in command. At 8 p.m.,
under a cloudy sky, Ordonez drew up his army in line of
battle, with cavalry on the wings and guns in the intervals
between the different battalions. He himself took charge

170 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
of the centre, Primo de Rivera led the right wing and
Colonel Latorre the left ; so, in deep silence, they marched
across the Cancha-Rayada, straight upon the watch-fires
of the Patriot vanguard.
Meantime San Martin, warned by a spy of what was
going forward in the Royalist camp, and seeing that his
troops were in the worst possible position to resist a night
attack, had marched several battalions and the Chilian
artillery from his front to a strong position on his extreme
right. The broken nature of the ground much retarded
the manoeuvre, and the rest of the army had not moved at
all when the cavalry outposts gave warning of the ap
proach of the enemy.
The right of the Royalist army, having the least dis
tance to march, was the first to come into action, and was
received by O'Higgins with so heavy a fire, whilst at the
same time a detached company under Captain Dehesa
opened fire on their left, that for a moment the advance
was checked, till Ordonez in person led them again to the
charge. O'Higgins had his horse killed under him and
received a ball in the elbow. From this moment all was
confusion in the Patriot camp. The artillery was aban
doned and the grenadiers on the extreme left, roused from
sleep by the firing, fled in a panic. The cavalry of the
right retired upon the reserves, and were received by
a volley of musketry under the belief that they were
Spaniards. Alvarado, with the ist Light Infantry, passed
behind the Royalist line and joined the right wing, being
also taken for a Spanish corps and losing twenty-one men
by the fire of his own friends before the mistake was dis
covered. The 2nd Chilian infantry, under command of
an Italian officer, moved to the rear, and also reached the
right wing in safety.
Ordonez pushed on to a hill in the rear of the Patriot
position, then halted and opened fire in every direction.
One of these chance shots killed an aide-de-camp of San
Martin at his side, and after some fruitless efforts to restore

CANCHA-RAYADA. 171
order he was forced to repass the Lircay with the fugi
tives, and was followed by O'Higgins with the remains
of his division and the reserve artillery. All seemed
lost. It was eleven o'clock, and the autumn moon shone
down through the heavy clouds upon the plain so lately
occupied by an army. In the distance were heard occa
sional shots and the gallop of Spanish horse in pursuit,
while the right wing in its secure position listened in
silence, receiving no orders and knowing nothing of what
had happened. The commander, Colonel Quintana, had
gone off for orders and had not returned. The officers held
a council of war and put themselves under command of
Las Heras. He found himself with 3,500 men, but had no
ammunition for his guns and no cavalry. He placed his
guns in front, and, forming his infantry into one compact
column, commenced his retreat soon after midnight, pur
sued by a squadron of Royalist horse, which did not dare
to attack him. At daybreak he was sixteen miles from the
field of battle. He rested for an hour, and found that 500
men had deserted during the night. At 1 o a.m. he con
tinued his march, and at five in the afternoon reached
Quecheraguas, where he remained till midnight, when he
crossed the Lontue, and, resuming his march next morn
ing, reached Chimbarongo at midday, where he received
news that San Martin and O'Higgins were at San Fer
nando with the 8th battalion, occupied in collecting the
dispersed cavalry.
(HI San Martin came to meet him, and praised the soldiers
for their steady behaviour. He was by no means cast
down, and directed Las Heras to continue his march
to Santiago. O'Higgins suffered much from his wound,
but was more determined than ever.
By the dispersion of Cancha-Rayada the Patriots lost 120
killed, 22 guns, and 4 flags, but the nucleus of the army
was saved, and with it the independence of America. The
Royalists had more than 200 killed and wounded, and had

172 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
so many missing that they could not at once follow up
their victory.
News of the disaster reached Santiago on the afternoon
of the 2 1 st, carried there by some of the principal officers,
among them being Brayer. According to them every
thing was lost, San Martin killed, and O'Higgins mortally
wounded. Consternation spread over the city, and shouts
of " Viva el Rey ! " were heard occasionally in the streets.
Some talked of flying to Mendoza, or to the ships at Val
paraiso. The Royalists and some of the leading citizens
opened communications with the conqueror. One of them
even had a horse shod with silver to present to him on his
arrival. No one slept that night in Santiago.
Government hastily resolved to erect a fort on the
southern road, and to send the public treasure to the North
for safety, while they called in outlying detachments of
troops and summoned the National Guard. The next day
news was received that San Martin was at San Fernando.
Brayer, interrogated by the Deputy Director, affirmed
that the country could never recover from such a defeat,
an opinion which was warmly disputed by Guido. On
the 23rd April a despatch was received from San Martin
announcing the safe retreat of Las Heras, and stating
that he had 4,000 men under his orders. Still the panic
was not allayed, and Dr. Rodriguez, taking advantage of
the circumstances, rode on horseback through the streets,
haranguing the people till he induced them to meet in an
open Cabildo and appoint him coadjutor to La Cruz. His
fantastic measures were of no real use, but they served the
temporary purpose of raising the spirits of the people till
the real leaders arrived upon the scene.
Early the next morning O'Higgins reached the city. He
soon put an end to disorder, purchased horses, and prepared
supplies of ammunition. On the 25th he was joined by
San Martin, who, worn out by fatigue and want of sleep,
yet found strength as he drew rein at the gate of his palace
to make the one speech of his life, in which he assured the

CANCHA-RA YADA . 1 73
excited people that the cause of Chile would yet triumph,
and promised them soon a day of glory for America.
On the same day a council of war was held in his apart
ments, at which O'Higgins was present, when it was
resolved to establish a camp on the plain of Maipo about
seven miles to the south of the city, there to await the
approach of the enemy. On the 28th Las Heras joined
the army with his division, and day and night were spent
in active preparation.
Public confidence revived, but San Martin trusted
nothing to fortune, he prepared for any contingency, gave
secret orders for concentration on Coquimbo in case of a
second reverse, established stores of supplies on the way
there, and despatched Colonel de la Cruz to organize the
northern provinces. He also established guards at the
entrances to the passes of the Andes, and a park at Santa
Rosa, so as to secure his retreat to the east. Further, he
stationed a strong corps of cavalry at Rancagua, fifteen
miles to the south of his camp.
Ten days after the dispersion the united army was
reorganized and ready for the fray. It consisted of five
battalions of Chilian and four of Argentine infantry, in all
nearly 4,000 strong, two regiments of Argentine and one
of Chilian cavalry with 1,000 sabres and twenty- two guns,
in all more than 5,000 men.

CHAPTER XVIII.
MAIPO.

At daybreak on the 20th March the Royalist army,
although triumphant, was in utter confusion. Only one
battalion, that of Arequipa, under Rodil, had not dis
persed. Osorio, leaving his convent, rode over the field of
battle, endeavouring to estimate the value of the victory
he had done nothing to win. The orderly retreat of Las
Heras filled him with apprehension, and his own cavalry
was worn out. He crossed the Lircay and advanced to
Pangue, from whence he despatched Ordonez with a fly
ing column in pursuit, and returned with the rest of his
force to Talca to reorganize. Ordonez reached Quechera
guas the next day, when Las Heras had already crossed
the Lontue. On the 24th he was joined by Osorio with
the rest of the army.
The country was a desert ; the roads were inundated by
the waters from the irrigating ditches which the Patriots
had cut as they retreated ; the Royalist general could learn
nothing of the position or condition of the Patriot army.
Marching blindly on, he reached San Fernando on the
28th, and sent forward a detachment of 200 horse, which,
being attacked and dispersed by sixty grenadiers under
Captain Cajaravilla on the 30th, were the first to give him
certain information that there still remained an enemy in
front of him.
On the 31st the Royal army, 5,500 strong, crossed the

MAIPO. 175
Cachapoal, and advanced so cautiously that only on the
afternoon of the 2nd April did it encamp on the left bank
of the Maipo. Leaving the main road, Osorio crossed by
a ford lower down, and encamped at Calera on the 3rd,
moving on in the afternoon to the farmhouse of Espejo,
where he established his headquarters, with the Patriot
army close at hand. On the 4th he held a council of war,
and proposed to retire on Valparaiso. Ordonez, Rivera,
and the principal officers opposed this idea, so it was
resolved to fight the next day.
The scene of the decisive battle of the 5th April, 18 18,
is a plain bounded on the east by the river Mapocho,
which divides the city of Santiago, on the north by a
range of hills which separates it from the valley of Acon
cagua, and on the south by the river Maipo,* which gives
it its name. The west of this plain consists of a series of
downs, with some low hills, covered with natural grasses
and occasional clumps of thorny trees. From Santiago
there runs in this direction a stretch of high land called
the " Loma Blanca," from the chalky nature of the soil.
On the crest of this Loma the Patriot army was encamped.
In front of the western extremity of this Loma rose another
of triangular form, beyond the south-western angle of which
stood the farmhouse of Espejo, communicating with the
higher ground by a sloping road of about twenty-five yards
in width, shut in by vineyards and by the mud walls of
enclosures, and crossed at the foot by a ditch. This Loma
was occupied by the Royalist army. Between the two
Lomas lay a stretch of low ground, varying in width from
300 to 1,250 yards, which was shut in on the west by a
hillock which formed a sort of advanced work on the left
of the Royalist position.
The position held by the Patriot army commanded the
three roads from the capital to the passes of the Maipo,
and the road to Valparaiso. For its further security San
* This word Maipd is commonly spelt in Buenos Ayres Maipu, which is the
Pehuenche way of pronouncing it.

176 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Martin had entrenched the city, and garrisoned it with
1,000 militia and one battalion of infantry, under com
mand of O'Higgins, whose wound precluded him from
service in the field. The army was in three divisions : the
first, under Las Heras, on the right ; the second, under
Alvarado, on the left ; and a reserve in a second line, under
Quintana. Balcarce was in general command of the
infantry, San Martin keeping the cavalry and the reserve
under his own orders. San Martin issued the most pre
cise orders for the regulation of the troops in action,
especially enjoining upon every corps, whether cavalry or
infantry, that they should never await a charge from the
enemy, but that, when fifty paces distant, they should rush
forward with sabre or bayonet.
During the whole day of the 4th April skirmishers of
the Patriot army were constantly engaged with the enemy
advancing from the fords of the Maipo. Early on the
morning of the 5th San Martin, attended by O'Brien and
D'Albe, with a small escort, rode to the edge of the Loma
to watch for himself the movements of the foe. He feared
that they would go far to the west and secure the road to
Valparaiso for retreat in case of a reverse. As he saw
them occupy the high ground in front of him with their
left only extending to the road, he exclaimed : —
"What brutes these Spaniards are ! Osorio is a greater
fool than I thought him. I take the sun for witness that
the day is ours."
At that moment the sun shone forth over the snowy
crests of the Andes from a cloudless sky upon him.
At half-past ten the Patriot army advanced by the crest
of the Loma from its camping-ground. On the march,
Marshal Brayer presented himself to San Martin, asking
permission to retire to the Baths of Colina.
" You have the same permission you took on the field
of Talca," replied San Martin. " But as half an hour will
decide the fate of Chile, as the enemy is in sight, and the
baths are thirteen leagues off, you may stay if you can."

MAIPO. 177
The Marshal answered that he could' not " because of
an old wound in the leg."
" Sefior General," replied San Martin, " the lowest
drummer in the united army has more honour than you."
And, turning rein, he gave orders to Balcarce to announce
to the army that the general of twenty years of warfare
was cashiered for unworthy conduct.
On reaching the edge of the Loma, the army was drawn
up in order of battle, four heavy guns in the centre, the
light pieces and the cavalry on the wings, and the reserve
two hundred yards in the rear.
The first movement of the Royalist general was to
detach Primo de Rivera with eight companies of infantry
and four guns to occupy the detached hill on his left,
threatening the right of the Patriots, taking them in
flank if they crossed the low ground, and securing, as he
thought, the road to Valparaiso ; Morgado, with some
cavalry, keeping up the connection with the main body.
The crest of the Loma was occupied by the infantry in two
divisions with four guns each, the rest of the cavalry being
stationed on the extreme right. Both armies were in such
excellent positions that neither could attack except at a
disadvantage. San Martin, uncertain of the whereabouts of the enemy's
artillery, was the first to open fire with his four heavy
guns from the centre. The reply gave him the information
he required, and he at once ordered the two divisions to
attack the enemy. Las Heras advanced resolutely with
the nth battalion, under the fire of the four guns on the
hill, to another hill to the right of Primo de Rivera, while
the grenadiers, under Escalada, Medina, and Zapiola, drove
Morgado and his horsemen in confusion from the field.
Rivera was thus cut off from the main body. At the same
time the left wing crossed the hollow, ascended the slope
in front of them, and reached the high ground without see
ing an enemy, but were then vigorously charged by the
bulk of the Royalist infantry, under Ordonez and Morla,
N

178 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
and driven back with heavy loss ; but the Royalists pur
suing them down the slope were in their turn forced to
retire by a withering fire from the . Chilian guns, under
Borgono, which had remained on the crest of the Loma
Blanca. San Martin now sent orders to the reserve to advance at
once, in support of the left wing, by an oblique movement
across the low ground, so as to fall upon the flank of the
Spanish infantry. On his way Quintana was joined by
three battalions of those that had been driven back, and
fell with great impetuosity upon the Royalists, who, how
ever, held their ground most tenaciously. Meantime
Freyre, with the Chilian cavalry, had charged and put to
flight the Royalist cavalry on the right, and now came
back upon the other flank of the Spanish infantry.
Alvarado, having rallied his broken division, came to the
assistance of Quintana with Borgono and his eight guns.
Osorio, after sending orders to Rivera to withdraw from
his advanced position, fled, leaving Ordonez in command,
who at once commenced to retreat in excellent order upon
the farmhouse of Espejo.
At this moment O'Higgins, wounded as he was, appeared
upon the field, and, meeting San Martin, greeted him as
the saviour of Chile ; but it was already five o'clock, and
the battle was not yet won. Ordonez, with heavy loss,
had made good his retreat to the farmhouse, where he
made the most active preparations for defence.
Las Heras, in pursuit of the left wing, was the first to
arrive there, but found several detached corps there before
him. He immediately ordered the occupation of the high
grounds around it, which commanded the position, but
Balcarce coming up ordered an immediate attack by the
road. Colonel Thompson, with a battalion of Chilian light
infantry, led the assault, but was beaten back with grape
and musketry, losing 250 killed, and all his officers
wounded. Borgono and Blanco Encalada from the high
ground then opened fire with seventeen guns, and soon
drove the enemy from his outer defences into the houses

MAIPO.

179

and vineyards. Then the nth battalion, supported by
pickets of the 7th and 8th, broke their way through the
mud walls and took the houses by assault. The carnage
was frightful till Las Heras succeeded in putting a stop
to it.
Ordonez and all his principal officers, with the exception
of Rodil, who escaped, gave up their swords to Las Heras,
and the victory was complete. This was the hardest
fought battle in all" the War of Independence. The
Royalists lost 1,000 killed, twelve guns, four flags, and a
great quantity of small arms, ammunition, and baggage
captured ; and one general, four colonels, seven lieutenant-
colonels, 150 officers, and 2,200 men were made prisoners.
The Patriots lost more than 1,000 men killed and wounded,
the greatest sufferers being the freed negroes of Cuyo, of
whom more than half remained upon the field.
Great tactical skill was displayed by San Martin in this
battle. The victory was achieved by the opportune attack
of the reserve upon the weakest flank of the enemy. Like
Epaminondas, he won only two great battles, and both by
the oblique movement invented by the Greek general. Its
importance was only equalled by that of Boyaca and that
of Ayacucho ; and without Maipo neither the one nor the
other would have been fought. Maipo crushed the spirit
of the Spanish army in America, and that of all adherents
to the cause of royalty from Mexico to Peru. It had,
further, the singular merit of being won by a beaten army
fifteen days after its defeat.
The Arequipa battalion retreated in good order, under
Rodil, but dispersed after crossing the Maule. This bat
talion and the dispersed cavalry were all who escaped
from the field. San Martin had witnessed the flight of
Osorio, and sent O'Brien after him with a party of cavalry.
However, he escaped by the coast, leaving his carriage,
with all his correspondence, in the hands of his pursuer,
and reached Talcahuano on the 1 4th April with fourteen
men. There he was joined by 600 more of the fugitives
— all that remained of the victors of Cancha-Rayada.
N 2

180 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
San Martin made small use of his victory. He at once
despatched Freyre in pursuit with a party of cavalry, but
not until the guerillas began to commit depredations did
he send Zapiola with 250 grenadiers to maintain order in
the South. Osorio made use of this respite to strengthen
himself in Concepcion and Talcahuano, and, by calling in
outlying detachments, succeeded in collecting 1,200 men
by the middle of May.
Pezuela, who fully appreciated the magnitude of the
disaster, wrote to the Viceroy of New Granada and Vene
zuela for reinforcements. Samano sent him the Numancia
battalion, 1,200 strong, weakening himself at the time that
he was threatened by Bolivar ; but Morillo could send him
none from Venezuela, and he confined his efforts to making
preparations against invasion, leaving Osorio unaided to
sustain himself in Chile as he could.
On the 21st May Osorio sent two detachments across
the Nuble, one of which surprised the town of Parrol.
Zapiola sent off Captain Cajaravilla with 200 horse to re
take the town, which task he gallantly accomplished,
capturing 70 prisoners ; while Lieutenant Rodriguez of the
grenadiers cut the other detachment to pieces at Quirihue.
This put a stop to the efforts of the Royalists for that time,
and Zapiola, being reinforced, determined to attack Chilian,
where Colonel Lantano was in command with a garrison
of 500 men. The expedition was confided to Cajaravilla,
who attempted to carry the place by assault, but was
beaten off and compelled to retire.
Osorio, fearing that he would be attacked in the spring
by the whole united army, resolved to evacuate Talca
huano, and to return to Peru. Accordingly, on the 5th
September, he left Colonel Sanchez in command of the
Chilian Royalists, and, after dismantling the fortifications,
sailed for Callao on the 8th with thirty-five heavy guns,
a great quantity of war material, and 700 Spanish troops
—all that remained of the strong reinforcement he had
brought with him.

CHAPTER XIX.
AFTER MAIPO.
1818.
The same day on which the despatch announcing the
victory of Maipo reached Mendoza, Don Luis and Don
Juan Jose Carrera were shot in that city. The suit against
them had been carried on in a most irregular manner,
both in Mendoza and in Santiago. Don Luis was accused
and convicted of having violated a mail bag ; Don Juan
Jose was accused of the murder of a boy, of which there
was no proof. Both were indicted for conspiracy against
Chile in Argentine territory, and in Chile for high treason.
It was at 6nce an international, criminal, and political
case, and was tried by two courts of different nationalities,
and totally independent of one another. The Argentine
Government was by accident, and San Martin indirectly
mixed up in it. Questions of jurisdiction arose, and the
case was still pending when, in February, 1 8 1 8, Don Luis
was discovered to be engaged in a conspiracy against the
Government of Cuyo.
After the disaster of Cancha-Rayada fugitives from Chile
spread panic through the province, and Luzuriaga, the
Governor, asked permission to send the accused to Buenos
Ayres ; he was apprehensive of what might happen
should another defeat bring upon him a flood of Chilian
emigrants, but the municipality called upon him in the
name of the people to finish the case at once. He then
appointed three judges to try the case, of whom one
was Dr. Monteagudo, who was one of the fugitives from
Chile. On the 8th April at 3 P.M. both the accused were
sentenced to death ; at 5 P.M. they were shot. They fell not

182 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
so much in expiation of crimes committed as in sacrifice to
the necessities of the Argentine-Chileno Alliance.
San Martin, writing of this affair, says : —
"After the action of Maipo, I used all my influence
with the Government of Chile in favour of the Carreras,
and I procured a pardon for them, but it was then too
late." O'Higgins had acceded to his request when they
were no longer dangerous.
Now that the victory of Maipo had secured the indepen
dence of Chile, the latent spirit of opposition to the dicta
torial government of O'Higgins again broke out. The
most moderate desired the establishment of a constitu
tional regime ; the more extreme deemed that the time
had come for a radical reform. Among these were the
old adherents of the Carreras, who from local patriotism
were inimical to the Argentine-Chileno Alliance, and to the
influence of San Martin. Dr. Rodriguez was one of them,
and aspired to be their leader. During the forty-eight
hours of his rule, in the confusion which followed the dis
aster of Cancha-Rayada, he had raised a squadron of horse,
which he styled the Hussars of Death, entirely composed
of men disaffected to the Government. He now declared
that they would bring the rulers of the people to order.
O'Higgins saw in this corps a focus of sedition, and
ordered it to be disbanded. Rodriguez protested but was
compelled to submit. Rodriguez was at once a guerilla
chief and a demagogue ; he was a lawyer who wore the
epaulets of a colonel. He was a true patriot, but had
neither judgment nor foresight, and infused his own dis
orderly spirit into the agitation.
The municipality of the capital called upon the Director
to convene an open Cabildo. It met on the 17th April.
Rodriguez called upon the Assembly to declare itself a
representative body until the convocation of a Congress,
and as such superior in authority to the actual rulers of
the State. The motion was carried. O'Higgins ordered
the arrest of Rodriguez, and the ferment subsided.
O'Higgins then decreed the appointment of seven prin-

SECRET CORRESPONDENCE OF OSORIO. 183
cipal citizens as a committee to draw up a plan of a pro
visional constitution, which " should define the powers of
each authority and should establish on a solid basis the
rights of citizens." A constitution was accordingly drawn
up and promulgated.
Rodriguez was sent under arrest to the barracks of
Alvarado's battalion under charge of a Spanish officer
named Navarro, who was told by Alvarado and Montea
gudo that Government desired " the extermination of
Rodriguez," for the sake of public tranquillity and the
existence of the army. On the 23rd May the battalion left
Santiago for Quillota, where Rodriguez was to be tried by
court-martial as a disturber of public order. On the march
an officer presented Rodriguez with a cigarette on which
was written, " It would be well for you to fly." * On the
evening of the 24th the party encamped on the banks of
a stream. As night fell Navarro, with a corporal and two
men carrying carbines, walked with Rodriguez into a
gorge near by. Soon after a shot was fired. " Rodriguez
is dead," said some officers in the encampment. Next
morning his body was found covered with stones and
twigs; his escort said he had tried to escape, and the
affair was hushed up.
Of all the trophies of the victory of Maipo, San Martin
had reserved only one for himself; this was the portfolio
containing the secret correspondence of Osorio, which
was found in his carriage when it was captured by O'Brien.
On the morning of Sunday, the 12th April, San Martin,
attended only by O'Brien, and taking the portfolio with
him, rode out from Santiago some seven miles to a
secluded spot called "El Salto." Procuring a chair from
a house close by he seated himself under the shade of a
tree, opened the portfolio and read the contents carefully.
They were letters written by several of the leading citizens
of Santiago to Osorio after the affair of Cancha-Rayada,
declarations of their loyalty. Then asking for a small fire
of sticks to be lighted in front of him, he burned them one
* Huya que le conviene.

184 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
by one, the wind carrying away their ashes ; proofs of
treachery which arose only from panic, were buried in
oblivion. No one but himself ever knew who were the
writers of these letters.
The next day he left for Buenos Ayres, on the same
errand which had caused his sudden journey after Chaca
buco, to concert measures for an expedition to Peru. On
the nth May, again avoiding a triumphal entry, he
quietly took up his residence in his own house in the
Argentine capital. Again the Argentine Government
decreed him a commission as Brigadier-General ; again he
declined all promotion, but Congress insisted upon giving
him a public vote of thanks, and a crowd of Argentine
poets celebrated his victory in verse.
San Martin spent the whole of June in consultation with
the members of the Lautaro Lodge, upon the means of
fitting out a squadron for the Pacific. In July it was
resolved that 500,000 dollars should be raised by a loan
for that object, and soon afterwards Don Miguel Zafiartu
was officially received in Buenos Ayres as the representa
tive of Chile.
San Martin then returned to Mendoza and made two
attempts to cross the Cordillera, but was driven back by
snowstorms, and remained there all the winter, nothing
loth, for he found himself much more at home among the
simple, bluff-spoken Cuyanos than in the more polished
society of Santiago.
About the end of July he received a letter from Pueyr
redon telling him not to draw upon the treasury as he had
been authorized to do, for it was found impossible to raise
the projected loan. San Martin at once sent in his resig
nation, which caused such consternation in official circles
that he was again authorized to draw for the full amount
specified. At that time there arrived in Mendoza various
remittances of coin from Chile to merchants in Buenos
Ayres. San Martin seized this money on the pretext that
transit was not safe, which was quite true, and gave the
owners drafts on the national treasury in exchange.

AFTER MAIPO. 185
Pueyrredon, with great difficulty managed to pay these
drafts on presentation, but he wrote to San Martin : —
" If you do that again, I am bankrupt, and we are lost."
With these resources and other remittances which fol
lowed, San Martin replenished the empty chest of the
Army of the Andes with 200,000 dollars, and the situation
was saved.
His spare time in Mendoza he filled up by making
elaborate calculations concerning the men, arms, and
equipment necessary for his projected expedition to Peru,
while Pueyrredon and the diplomatic corps were as fully
occupied in the construction of a scheme which was to
render the expedition unnecessary. It was proposed that
a conference of European powers should nominate a sove
reign who should unite all the Spanish colonies south of
the Equator under his sway. Of this monarchy San
Martin and his army was to be the right arm. Of all
this San Martin was fully informed, and to the scheme he
made no opposition, but went on all the same with his
calculations, till he crossed the Andes in October, and on
the 29th of that month dismounted at the gate of his
palace in Santiago full of hope, for his last letter from
Pueyrredon announced the despatch of two vessels of war
for service on the Pacific.
Bolivar, victorious in Venezuela and encouraged by the
victory of Maipo, was at this time preparing for another
passage of the Andes.
Spain in eight years of warfare had sent sixteen expe
ditions to America, with more than 40,000 veteran troops,
had expended seventy-five millions of dollars, and seemed
in no way as yet inclined to relinquish the attempt to
subdue her rebellious colonies. She had yet 100,000
soldiers and militia in America, and was preparing a fresh
expedition of 20,000 men for despatch to the River Plate.
Thus while diplomatists amused themselves and the
world with visionary schemes for securing the indepen
dence of America, those more nearly interested in the
question thought only of settling it by fire and sword.

CHAPTER XX.
THE FIRST NAVAL CAMPAIGN ON THE PACIFIC.
1818.
When San Martin in 1814 at Tucuman first made a
sketch of his continental campaign, he saw that the true
road from Chile to Lima was by sea. At that time both
oceans, from California on the Pacific to the Gulf of Mexico
on the Atlantic, were dominated by the Spanish navy.
Chile had but a few fishing-boats among the islands of the
South Pacific, yet from the extent of her sea-line, from
the number of her ports, and by her geographical position,
shut in on a narrow strip of land between the Andes and
the sea, Chile was eminently ^fitted to be a great naval
power. Travelling by land was so difficult, that the sea
was the natural road of communication between the
different districts. In the forests of Arauco the pine and the
oak tree flourished luxuriantly, her valleys produced hemp
and flax in abundance. In the bowels of the earth were
stored up vast supplies of copper, iron, and coal. Chaca
buco and Maipo had secured the independence of Chile,
but without a fleet further progress was impossible.
After Chacabuco the Spanish flag was still kept flying
on the forts of Valparaiso. Deceived by this stratagem,
the Spanish brig Aguila entered the harbour and was
captured. She was armed with 16 guns and named the
Pueyrredon, and an Irishman named Morris was put in
command. His first exploit was to sail to the island of

THE FIRST CHILIAN SHIPS. 187
Juan Fernandez to the rescue of the Patriots there im
prisoned by Marco and by Osorio.
Some months afterwards the Wyndham frigate of 44
guns anchored at Valparaiso. She belonged to the East
India Company, and at the suggestion of Alvarez Con
darco, then in London,- had been sent there for sale.
Guido raised a loan among the merchants of Valparaiso,
and gave the guarantee of the Argentine Government for
50,000 dollars, so that the Government of Chile, in spite of
the exhausted state of the treasury just before Maipo,
purchased the ship for 180,000 dollars, and named her the
Lautaro. She shipped a crew of 100 sailors of various
nationalities, and 250 Chilians, soldiers, boatmen, and
fishermen. The marines were placed under the command
of Captain Miller, an Englishman, and command of the
ship was given to Captain O'Brien,* who had served in
the English navy, with Turner as lieutenant. All the
officers were either English or North Americans, except
Miller; not one of them could give orders in Spanish.
" Nevertheless," says Miller, in his Memoirs, " ten hours
after sailing she fought and fought well."
The Spanish Pacific squadron at this time consisted of
17 ships, mounting 331 guns. After the victory of Maipo,
O'Higgins ordered his two ships to put to sea in search of
the Spanish ships which had been blockading Valparaiso.
They sailed on the afternoon of the 26th April. At day
break on the 27th the Lautaro sighted the 44-gun frigate
Esmeralda making for the port, followed at some miles
distance by the 18-gun brig Pezuela. O'Brien hoisted the
English flag and sailed straight for her, till off her quarter
and to windward, when he hauled down the English flag,
hoisted the Chilian, and ran into her, exchanging a broad
side. Followed by thirty or forty men, he then leaped on
board, driving the Spaniards from the upper deck, and
hauling down her flag. A shot from the lower deck killed
* No relation to O'Brien the aide-de-camp.

188 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
him, and he fell, shouting, " Stick to her, boys ! The ship's
ours." But while the fighting went on the ships had separated.
Turner, thinking the enemy was captured, sent off a boat
with eighteen men to assist, and sailed off in the Lautaro
against the Pezuela, which hauled down her flag without
firing a shot. Meantime Coig, commander of the Esme
ralda, had rallied his men, recaptured the upper deck,
drove the rest of the assailants overboard, and on the
return of the Lautaro made off, accompanied by the
Pezuela, for Talcahuano, both of them being swifter ships
than the Lautaro. On their way back to port the Chilian
vessels captured a Spanish brig, whose value more than
covered the cost of the Lautaro.
Government then bought an American privateer mount
ing 20 guns, and named her the Chacabuco. Soon after
wards an American brig mounting 16 guns was pur
chased, and named the Araucano. In August the ship
Cumberland, purchased by Condarco in London, arrived,
and was named the San Martin.
Chile had thus rapidly acquired a small fleet of her
own, and, looking about for an admiral, she chose Don
Manuel Blanco Encalada, a young officer of artillery.
Born in Buenos Ayres of a Chilian mother, Encalada had
adopted Chile as his country ; he had held a separate com
mand before the disaster of Rancagua, was among the
Patriot prisoners rescued by the Pueyrredon from the
island of Juan Fernandez, was present at Cancha-Rayada,
and had distinguished himself at Maipo. He had pre
viously served in the Spanish navy as a junior officer,
and was at this time twenty-eight years of age.
On the 21st May a Spanish expedition of eleven trans
ports, two of which were armed vessels, under convoy of
the 50-gun ship Maria Isabel, sailed from Cadiz for the
Pacific, carrying two battalions of the regiment of Can-
tabria, 1,600 strong, a regiment of cavalry of 300 sabres,
180 artillerymen and pioneers, with 8,000 spare muskets.

THE FIRST NAVAL CAMPAIGN ON THE PACIFIC. 189
One of the transports was in such bad condition that
they were forced to leave her at Teneriffe, and distribute
her men among the other ships. Five degrees north of
the equator the convoy was dispersed by adverse winds.
On the 25th July the British brig Lady Warren reached
Buenos Ayres, and reported having seen them about a
month before. In consequence of this information the
Argentine Government sent off the brig Lucy, flying the
Chilian flag, and the brig Intrepido, flying the Argentine
flag, each carrying 18 guns, with orders to double Cape
Horn and join the Chilian squadron. At the same time
word was sent to San Martin to invite the Chilian
Government to despatch all their squadron against the
expedition. On the 26th August one of the transports named the
Trinidad, with 180 soldiers on board, cast anchor at
Ensenada, a port on the River Plate, some forty miles
to the south of Buenos Ayres. She had separated from
the convoy to the north of the equator, when the troops,
headed by two sergeants and a corporal, had mutinied,
shot their officers, and had compelled the master to sail for
Buenos Ayres. The Argentine Government thus came to
know the signals and the point of reunion of the expe
dition, which information they at once sent on to Chile.
Soon after this the 36-gun frigate Horacio, which had
been purchased in the United States by Aguirre, the
Argentine commissioner, reached Buenos Ayres, and
announced that she was followed by the Curacio of the
same armament.
On the 1 9th October the San Martin, Captain Wilkin
son, the Lautaro, Captain Wooster, the Chacabuco, Captain
Diaz, and the Araucano, Lieutenant Morris, sailed from
Valparaiso. The squadron mounted 142 guns, and was
manned by 1,100 men, most of whom were Chilians. The
officers were nearly all English or North Americans. As
O'Higgins, who had gone to the port to hurry on their
departure, rode up the hill on his return to Santiago, he

190 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
looked upon the four ships spreading their sails to a fresh
sou' -wester, while the Chilian flag fluttered in the breeze
from their mast-heads, and exclaimed, —
" Four ships gave the western continent to Spain ; these
four will take it from her."
On losing sight of land, Blanco Encalada opened the
sealed instructions which had been given him, and found
that he was ordered to the island of Mocha to await the
Spanish convoy. The native Chilians were for the most
part quite fresh to the service, but Miller, who sailed with
the squadron, writes of them : —
"The native marines and sailors showed their good
qualities, both as soldiers and sailors, by ready obedience ;
soon afterwards they showed bravery also."
A strong wind separated the Chacabuco from her con
sorts, who cast anchor on the 26th October at the Island of
Santa Maria to await her, while the Araucano was sent
back to reconnoitre the bay of Talcahuano, about forty
miles to the north.
As the ships flew the Spanish flag a boat came off bring
ing a letter from the Admiral of the Spanish convoy to
any transport that might touch there. This letter con
firmed information already received from a whaler that the
Maria Isabel had been there five days before accompanied
by four transports, and had gone on to Talcahuano, while
the rest of the convoy with crews sick and out of pro
visions had been unable to double Cape Horn.
Blanco Encalada sailed at once for Talcahuano. On the
night of the 27th he arrived there with two ships, and
learned that the Maria Lsabel was alone in the bay ; the
transports, after landing 800 men, had gone on to Callao.
On the morning of the 28th, with a fresh breeze, the two
Chilian ships entered the bay and saw the Spanish ship at
anchor under the batteries.
The Maria Isabel fired a blank cartridge and hoisted her
flag. The San Martin replied with another blank car
tridge and hoisted the English flag. When within musket

CAPTURE OF THE "MARIA ISABEL:' 191
shot both the Chilian ships hoisted their own flag with
loud cheers, which immediately produced a broadside from
the Spaniard. The San Martin replied with another and
cast anchor within pistol-shot of the enemy, on which the
Spaniard cut his cables and ran aground. Part of the
crew landed in boats while the rest kept up a fire from the
poop. The Chilian ships continued to fire till her flag was
hauled down, when two boats put off to her with fifty men
under Lieutenants Compton and Belez, and took prisoners
seventy men and five officers of the Cantabria regiment.
Encalada then landed two companies of marines to
dislodge the Royalist troops on shore, who kept up a fire
on the prize from behind walls on the beach ; but Sanchez
coming up with a strong force from Concepcion, compelled
them to re-embark. In spite of the fire from shore every
effort was made to set the prize afloat, but without success
on account of the wind which blew from the sea.
During the following night preparations were made by
both parties to continue the struggle next day. Sanchez
placed four guns in battery on the beach, while Encalada
swung the Lautaro round by an anchor from the poop, and
brought her guns to bear on this battery and on the fort of
San Agustin, which commanded the entrance of the bay.
At daybreak on the 29th both sides opened fire within
pistol-shot of each other. About eleven o'clock a stiff
breeze came up from the south, a cable was passed from
the San Martin to the prize, the anchor was weighed, the
sails spread with great rapidity, and she was towed off
amid shouts of " Viva la Patria ! " from the Chilians,
mingled with loud "hurrahs" from the English sailors.
The Chilian squadron celebrated their victory by a salute
of twenty-one guns, and sailed out of the bay in triumph
with their prize, which they at once named the O'Higgins.
The four ships of the Chilian squadron met again at the
island of Santa Maria and were there joined by the Argen
tine brig Intrepido, Captain Carter, and the Galvarino
under Captains Guise and Spry, who had both served in

iy2 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
the English navy. The squadron now consisted of nine
vessels, including the O'Higgins, with 234 guns.
One after another the rest of the transports fell into the
hands of the Patriots to the number of five, with 700
prisoners. Four only, with 800 men, had reached Callao-
From that date Spain lost for ever the dominion of the
Pacific. The road for the expedition to Peru lay open.
Thirty-eight days after the four ships had sailed from
Valparaiso, thirteen vessels carrying the Chilian flag
anchored in line in the bay, amid the enthusiastic accla
mations of the people.
On the 2 8th November, 1 8 1 8, there anchored in the bay
of Valparaiso a ship bringing as passenger one of the first
sailors of Great Britain, who was yet to increase his fame
by exploits in the New World. His name was THOMAS
Alexander Cochrane, a name made famous by extra
ordinary deeds of derring-do. Born in Scotland of noble
family, and lately a member of the British Parliament, he
had been conspicuous among the Radical opposition, and
was both hated and feared by the ruling party. Mixed up in
Stock Exchange transactions of a doubtful character, he
was condemned to a heavy fine and to exposure in the pil
lory, and was expelled from the House of Commons. The
people paid his fine by subscription, Government remitted
the degrading part of the sentence, and he was re-elected
by the county he had represented. But he had had enough
and more than enough of political life ; he preferred exile
and heroic adventures, and accepted the offers which were
made him by Condarco and Alvarez Jonte, the agents of
Chile and of San Martin in London. He decided to devote
his services to the cause of independence in South America.
Ere leaving his native country a farewell banquet was
given to him by his admirers, at which he boldly pro
claimed his radical principles in impassioned words, which
give the key to his character — extreme in everything, in
heroism, in hatred, or in love. The Chilian Vice-Admiral,
in no way vainglorious of his recent triumph, acknow-

ARRIVAL OF COCHRANE. 193
ledged at once the superiority of Cochrane. He resigned
the command of the squadron, and Cochrane was appointed
Vice- Admiral in his stead.
Blanco Encalada was married to one of the most beauti
ful women in Chile ; the wife of Cochrane, who came with
him, was a most worthy type of British beauty, and was
idolized by her husband. These two young wives became
the stars of Chilian society on shore, whilst on the ocean
the two Admirals sustained in honour the star of the
young Republic which was emblazoned on the flag floating
from the mast-heads of the fleet which now dominated the
Pacific.

0

CHAPTER XXI.
THE REPASSAGE OF THE ANDES.
1818— 1819.
While in the years 1818 and 1819 the independence of
Chile became firmly established, and in the north of the
continent the revolution crossed the Andes and invaded
New Granada, the prospects of the United Provinces clouded
over ; civil war blazed on the coasts of La Plata, and
public opinion in Chile turned against the American policy
of San Martin, while a fresh expedition of 20,000 men was
assembling at Cadiz, destined for the River Plate.
In the South of Chile Chilian and Talcahuano were the
strongholds of the Royalists. Concepcion was the centre of
the reaction, while Valdivia and Chiloe gave them access
to the sea. San Martin saw that no expedition to Peru
was possible while this enemy remained in his rear. In
September, 1 8 1 8, Zapiola was strongly reinforced and was
instructed to commence operations, but his force was still
unequal to the task. In November Balcarce was sent
south with an army of 3,400 men and eight light field-
pieces. In order to avoid useless bloodshed, San Martin
proposed an arrangement to Sanchez for the evacuation of
the territory. Sanchez referred him to the Viceroy of
Peru. In December Freyre crossed the Nuble with the van
guard and occupied Chilian, which was evacuated on his
approach. In January Balcarce arrived with the bulk of

ANOTHER CONSPIRACY OF THE CARRERAS. 195
the army, but Sanchez had already retreated from Concep
cion and Talcahuano, and in spite of an active pursuit by
Escalada and Alvarado crossed the Bio-Bio with small
loss, and shut himself up in the fortress of Valdivia. This
is spoken of as the last campaign in Chile, but bands of
Indians and banditti still for three years infested the
southern provinces.
Jose Miguel Carrera, still in Monte Video, fulminating
vows of vengeance against Pueyrredon, San Martin, and
O'Higgins, there met some French adventurers whom he
succeeded in interesting in his cause. They went on to
Buenos Ayres, and, after many secret consultations at the
hoUse of Dona Javiera, three of them left for Chile in No
vember with a troop of bullock carts. Pueyrredon received
secret information that another conspiracy was on foot,
and sent a party after them to arrest them. One of them,
named Young, attempting to resist, was shot. The other
two, with some of their accomplices who had remained in
Buenos Ayres, were tried by court-martial on a charge of
conspiracy to assassinate. Three were acquitted, the other
two, Robert and Lagresse, were shot on the Plaza del
Retiro on the 3rd April, 18 19, protesting their innocence
to the last.
San Martin, on his return to Chile, found that the suc
cesses of the Chilian fleet had greatly relaxed the eagerness
of the Government for the projected expedition. Now that
they had command of the sea they were safe from invasion,
and the treasury was so exhausted that the pay of his sol
diers was very irregular. The people also murmured
against a Government which relied for support upon
Argentine bayonets. Nevertheless, he and O'Higgins
both issued proclamations to the Peruvian people, an
nouncing an expedition for the purpose of giving liberty
to Peru : " So that they would become a nation with a
Government established by themselves, in accordance with
their own customs, with their situation, and with their
inclinations." O 2

196 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Further, the Chilian envoy Irizarri, passing through
Buenos Ayres on his way to England, there signed a
treaty of alliance with the Argentine Government : — " To
put an end to Spanish domination in Peru by means of a
combined expedition."
In June, 1818, Bolivar stretched out the right hand of
fellowship to the Argentine people by an official letter to
the Government, and by a proclamation to "the inhabi
tants of the River Plate," in which he sets forth his
favourite policy of a union of all the peoples of South
America. Some months later on O'Higgins wrote to
Bolivar, proposing to him an alliance based upon the
continental ideas of San Martin.
San Martin had written from Mendoza to the Govern
ment of Chile and to Balcarce, informing them of his plans
for the expedition to Peru, giving three months for collect
ing the necessary supplies. When he reached Santiago
nothing had been done, and the revenues were mortgaged
for months to come. He then wrote to the Argentine
Government, giving a most miserable account of the finan
cial state of Chile, and the consequent inefficiency of the
Army of the Andes, which he suggested should be with
drawn from Chile as the projected expedition was for the
time impossible. He also wrote to the Government of
Chile, expressing his fears of the speedy dissolution of the
united army, and proposed that a part of it should be
employed in desultory attacks on the coasts of Peru, while
he himself resigned the command.
On receiving no satisfactory reply, he concentrated the
Army of the Andes at the upper part of the valley of Acon
cagua, crossed over himself with a small detachment to
Mendoza, and was soon after followed by a division of 1,200
men, by which operation he brought pressure to bear on
the Chilian Government by leaving them to their own
resources, while he recruited his cavalry in their own
country, and preserved Cuyo from being drawn into the
vortex of anarchy which at that time desolated the United

MUTINY OF SPANISH PRISONERS. 197
Provinces. In this internecine strife he took no part what
ever, but the presence of a portion of his army in Mendoza
strengthened the hands of Government and aided greatly
in bringing about a truce.
The first news which San Martin heard on his arrival in
Mendoza was an account of a terrible tragedy which had
just occurred in San Luis. This city was the prison of the
principal captives of Maipo and Chacabuco. They were
well treated by Dupuy, the Deputy-Governor, who had
only a picket of militia under his orders, and who trusted
more to the wide Pampa which surrounded them than to
prison walls for their security. The officers were not con
fined in the public prison, but lived in houses and mixed
freely with the people. They were so many that they
thought they would have no difficulty in overpowering the
small garrison. A plan of escape had been for months
discussed among them, when, on the 1st February, 1819,
Dupuy, on account of the disturbed state of the country
round, issued an order that they were not to leave their
houses after sundown. Captain Carretero of the Burgos
regiment was the head of the conspirators. On the even
ing of the 7th he invited a number of his comrades to
breakfast with him the next morning, proposing to spend
the day killing vermin in his orchard. At six o'clock next
morning twenty officers met at his house ; he led them
into the orchard and gave them a light breakfast of bread
and cheese washed down with brandy; then, drawing a
poniard, he told them that in an hour they would all be
free or dead, and distributed ten knives among them,
telling the rest to arm themselves with sticks. Captain La
Madrid was sent with ten men to seize the barracks, Cap
tain Salvador, with six, to capture the prison and set the
prisoners at liberty; while he went off to join Ordonez,
Primo de Rivera, and Morla, who, with their orderlies,
would make sure of the Deputy-Governor.
The first party reached the barracks, disarmed the sentry,
and overpowered the guard. In an inner yard were a

rg8 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
number of Gaucho rebels under arrest, among them being
one who afterwards acquired terrible notoriety as a Gaucho
chieftain — Juan Facundo Quiroga. Quiroga led his fellow-
prisoners to the assistance of the soldiers, and, armed only
with the broken shaft of a lance, fought so fiercely that all
the assailants except one were killed, and he was badly
wounded. The party sent against the prison on crossing the great
square were met by the officer in command of the militia,
who was galloping about with his sabre drawn, calling
the people to arms. Armed men poured out of the houses
upon them ; only one escaped, the rest being killed.
Meantime Carretero, Morgado, and Morla had gone to
Dupuy's house and asked to see him. Being admitted,
they set upon him, and after a short struggle threw him
down, when Ordonez and Primo de Rivera entered with
their orderlies, bringing the sentry with them, after shut
ting the outer door. But a militia captain and a doctor
who were with Dupuy, had escaped and gave the alarm.
A number of the townspeople, headed by a young officer
named Pringles, surrounded the house with shouts of
"Death to the Goths." Dupuy rushed to the door and
opened it, the crowd poured in. Ordonez, Morla, Carre
tero, and Morgado were killed. Primo de Rivera, finding
a loaded carbine in an ante-room, shot himself through the
head. Of forty conspirators twenty-four were killed, the rest
were tried by a court-martial, of which Dr. Monteagudo
was President. Eight were acquitted, seven were shot,
but young Ordonez, a nephew of the General, was spared,
partly on account of his youth, and partly because he was
engaged to a young lady of the city, whose relatives inter
fered on his behalf. He was afterwards set at liberty by
San Martin, who also gave Quiroga his freedom as a
reward for his bravery, a favour which Quiroga never
forgot. Marco del Pont, ex-Governor of Chile, was also at that

THE REPASS AGE OF THE ANDES. 199
time a prisoner in San Luis, but took no part in the con
spiracy and was not molested.
The repassage of the Andes by a portion of the army
had the effect San Martin expected upon the Government
of Chile. On his return from San Luis to Mendoza he
found despatches awaiting him from Guido, from O'Hig
gins, and from the Lautaro Lodge, informing him that all
were convinced that the safety of the country depended
upon the despatch of the expedition to Peru. At the end
of March Major Borgono arrived as the representative of
the Lodge, fully authorised to arrange all the details with
him. San Martin required an army of from 4,000 to 6,000
men, and a supply of 500,000 dols., of which he would
provide 200,000 dols., furnished by the Argentine Govern
ment. He also accepted the rank of Brigadier-General in
the Chilian army, which was again offered to him.
By return of post he received the ratification by the
Lodge of the arrangement made with Borgono, and an
order to proceed at once to Chile to superintend the pre
parations. It was in these circumstances, when he gave himself up
entirely to the great work of his life, that he separated
from his wife for the last time. She returned to Buenos
Ayres never to see him again in this world. When he
again saw his native land she was dead, leaving him one
only daughter, who went with him into exile.
On the 19th June, 18 19, Pueyrredon retired from public
life into that obscurity which is the fate of great men when
their appointed task is accomplished.

CHAPTER XXII.
COCHRANE — CALLAO — VALDIVIA.
1819 — 1820.
The new Admiral when hoisting his pennant on the
O'Higgins might, after the manner of the old Dutch
admirals, have nailed a broom to his masthead ; his com
mission was to sweep the Spanish fleet from the Pacific.
This ideal hero was one of the first sailors of the first
navy of the world, and became indisputably the first in the
naval annals of three Nations of South America, yet he
never was master of his own destiny, he founded no school
which should endue posterity with his spirit. With great
faculties, both moral and intellectual, he had no political
talent, there was no method in what he did. His exploits
were performed under many flags, and in both the Old
and in the New World, but he made no country his own.
He left his native land with curses, he parted from Chile,
from Peru, from Brazil, and from Greece in anger, stig
matizing them as ungrateful. He valued his deeds in gold
as though they had been merchandize. Yet, in the abstract
he was a lover of liberty ; he placed his sword and his
genius only at the service of some noble cause.
On the 14th January, 18 19, he sailed from Valparaiso
with four ships, the San Martin, O'Higgins, Lautaro, and
Chacabuco, leaving Rear-Admiral Blanco Encalada to
follow him. On the 10th February he was off Callao.
The bay of Callao is one of the largest on the South

COCHRANE ATTACKS CALLAO. 201
Pacific. Near its centre stands the city of Callao, on the
shore at the foot of the coast range of the Cordillera, three
miles from the pass through it, which gives access to the
beautiful valley of Rimac, in which stands the city of
Lima. The port of Callao is a roadstead shut in by two
islands. One of them, named San Lorenzo, is seven miles
in length, and shelters the roadstead from all winds except
those which blow from the west. Off its southern point
lies a smaller island called the Fronton. The open water
between the two islands is the main entrance to the inner
bay, but between the Fronton and the land there is a much
narrower passage, called the Boqueron, in which there are
only five fathoms of water and many rocks. To the north
of the island of San Lorenzo lies a sandbank, off the
mouth of the river Rimac, which is called the Bocanegra.
The old walls of the city of Callao were destroyed by an
earthquake in 1746. In their place three great circular
castles were erected, crowned with lofty towers. Between
them stretched the batteries of the arsenal and of San
Joaquin, mounted with 165 heavy guns, which swept the
whole of the roadstead. Under their fire the Spanish
squadron lay at anchor, consisting of the Esmeralda and
Venganza, 44 gun frigates ; the corvette Scbastiana, of 36
guns; the brigs Pezuela, Maipo, and Potrillo, each of 18
guns; the schooner Montezuma, of 7 guns; the Aranzazu
of 5 guns ; and twenty-six gunboats, besides six armed
merchant vessels.
The 2 8th February was the day fixed upon by Cochrane
for the attack ; the same cay Pezuela had arranged for a
review of the squadron and a sham fight. At daybreak a
thick fog covered the bay, and the Viceroy embarked on
the brig Maipo, the better to watch the manoeuvres. At
eleven o'clock, as the fog commenced to lift, the sailors of
the Maipo, then near to the island of San Lorenzo, saw a
fine ship flying the Spanish flag skirting the sandbank of
the Bocanegra. The Viceroy wished to speak her, but the
commander of the brig refused to go nearer as he would

202 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
lose the wind. Pezuela was thus saved from falling a
prisoner to Cochrane. The strange ship was the O'Hig
gins, which sailed on into the bay and captured a gun
boat, followed only by the Lautaro, the other two ships
being unable to enter the harbour for want of wind.
Favoured by the fog the two ships anchored within
range of the batteries, hoisted the Chilian flag, and opened
fire, but at nightfall slowly retired, with a few killed and
wounded, and some damage to spars and rigging.
The next day the two ships again approached and drove
the gunboats under shelter of the batteries, the Spaniards
not daring to do more than remain on the defensive when
they heard who was in command.
Cochrane had hoped to take the enemy by surprise, but
having failed to do so he now tried to repeat his exploit of
the Basque Roads, for which purpose he took possession
of the island of San Lorenzo, and set to work to make two
fire-ships. On the night of the 22nd March he engaged
the attention of the batteries with his four ships while one
of his fire-ships drifted down on to the Spanish squadron.
But the fire-ship ran aground and was struck by a shot
from the batteries, when the wind dying away he was
forced to leave her to sink.
On the 24th he again attacked, and succeeded in cap
turing the schooner Montezitma and some merchant vessels
and gunboats. The O'Higgins, at some distance from her
consorts, was becalmed in a fog, and the Spaniards put off
from shore in boats with the intention of boarding her.
Fortunately a light wind sprang up before they reached
her, and they were seen in time and beaten off.
Cochrane then retired to the neighbouring port of
Huacho in search of fresh water, and was there joined by
Blanco Encalada with the Galvarino and the Pueyrredon.
Leaving the Rear-Admiral with four ships to blockade
Callao, Cochrane sailed northwards, distributing procla
mations from O'Higgins and San Martin, and also one
from himself, among the people along the coast. At one

COCHRANE AGAIN ATTACKS CALLAO. 203
place he landed and captured some brass cannon ; then
returning to Callao he found that Blanco Encalada had
gone south in search of provisions, and seeing nothing
more was to be done at present, he followed him.
Cochrane had brought with him from England a
mechanic who had worked with Congreve at the Arsenal
at Woolwich. He now set him at work to make rockets,
and made trialof them in the bay of Valparaiso, express
ing himself as perfectly satisfied with them. Government
also furnished him with a nine inch mortar which had
been sent from Buenos Ayres, and a 28-gun frigate, pur
chased in the United States and named the Independencia,
was added to the squadron. A brigade of 400 marines
was also organized under the command of an English
officer of experience named Charles, with Major Miller as
his second.
The Pueyrredoit, the Intrepido, and the Montezuma, were
sent southward on a cruise in search of some Spanish
ships which were reported to be on the way from Europe,
and, on the 12th September, Cochrane and Blanco En
calada again sailed from Valparaiso with six ships of war,
and two of the transports which had been captured by
Blanco Encalada on his first cruise, and which were
intended for fire-ships.
Cochrane had such faith in the terrible power of his new
rockets that he was confident of success, and wrote to
O'Higgins that at eight o'clock on the night of the 24th,
the Spanish squadron at Callao would be in flames.
On the 28th September he anchored off the island of
San Lorenzo, and on the 30th sent a challenge on shore
to the enemy to come out and fight ship to ship. The
Spaniards, who had in the meantime greatly strengthened
their defences, by surrounding their ships with a boom,
and had prepared furnaces to heat shot, returned a laconic
refusal. This time the attack was to be made by four pontoon
batteries, one carrying the mortar, two carrying rocket-

204 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
tubes, and the other the ammunition. On the night of the
2nd October, Miller led the van in the Galvarino, with the
mortar in tow, the Pueyrredon followed, towing the ammu
nition. Then came the other two pontoons towed by the
Araucano, Captain Hind, and the Independencia, Captain
Charles. All the crews of the pontoons wore life belts.
The action was commenced by the mortar, which, opened
fire at less than eight hundred yards distance from the
boom, and sunk a gunboat. But after throwing several
shells into the batteries, the mortar bed broke away from
its bearings, and no more could be done. The distance
was too great for the rockets which fell harmlessly into the
water, and under the heavy fire from the batteries it was
impossible to run closer in. A red-hot shot struck the
pontoon commanded by Hind, and caused an explosion
by which twelve men were badly burned. The Galvarino
was struck several times, and Lieutenant Bayley was cut
in two by a shot. At dawn the pontoons were recalled.
In a subsequent attack an attempt was made to destroy
the boom by a fire-ship, but the wind dying away, she
became a target for the enemy's guns ; she was already
sinking when the match was lighted by Lieutenant Mor-
gall, and she blew up before reaching the boom.
The rockets were found to be so inefficient, that Coch
rane desisted for the time from any further attempt.*
The day after the last attack, a large ship was seen
making for the port, which on sighting the Chilian
squadron sheered off again. Cochrane followed, but
taking her for a whaler, he returned to his anchorage
and afterwards sailed to Arica. On his return he again
saw the same ship, which sent a boat on shore. This
ship was the 50-gun frigate Prueba, one of the vesssls
which had been reported to be on the way from Europe.
Three had left Spain in company bound for Callao, but
one being found to be unseaworthy, had put back on
* See Appendix III.

COCHRANE SAILS FOR VALDIVIA. 205
reaching the line, and the other had foundered off Cape
Horn. Cochrane decided upon pursuing the Prueba, but as he
had many sick he first sent Blanco Encalada with them
to Valparaiso in the San Martin and Independencia, and
despatched Captain Guise with the Lautaro, the Galvarino,
and a transport with 350 marines on board, to Pisco, with
orders to land there and procure a supply of fresh pro
visions. He then with the other three ships sailed for
Guayaquil, where he captured two transports, each of
which mounted twenty guns. From his prisoners he
learned that the Prueba had been there, but after sending
her guns on shore to lighten her, had gone up the river,
and was now at anchor in shallow water under the pro
tection of some shore batteries.
Soon after this he was rejoined by Guise, who had
successfully accomplished the task allotted to him, but
with some loss. He had found Pisco garrisoned by a
force of 800 men, who were driven out by the marines at
the point of the bayonet after some hard fighting, in which
Colonel Charles was killed and Miller received three
wounds. After holding the town for four days, he re-
embarked the marines and sailed for Guayaquil.
Cochrane then sent the Lautaro to Valparaiso in charge
of the prizes, and leaving the Pueyrredon and the Galva
rino at the island of Puna, which commands the Gulf of
Guayaquil, to keep watch over the Prueba, he sailed for
the port of Santa, which lies to the north of Callao. Here
he was soon joined by other ships of the squadron, which
he sent back to Valparaiso, and sailed away south by
himself in the O'Higgins. He was sorely disappointed
with the ill-success of his attempts on Callao, and would
not return to Valparaiso till he could return in triumph.
He was turning over in his mind a daring scheme, equal
to any that he had so far accomplished.
Pacing to and fro one day on his quarter-deck, as the
good ship sailed steadily on towards the colder regions of

206 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
the South, he met Miller, who, in spite of his wounds, had
taken command of the marines on the O'Higgins, and
asked him —
"What would they say if with this one ship I took
Valdivia ? "
As Miller made no answer, he added —
" They would call me a lunatic."
Lunatic or not, this was the exploit he had determined
on attempting, and he further explained himself.
" Operations which the enemy does not expect are
almost certain to succeed if well carried out. Victory is
always an answer to a charge of rashness."
Valdivia from its fortifications and from its natural
strength, was looked upon as the Gibraltar of America.
The bay of Valdivia is an estuary into which the river
Valdivia falls by two channels, forming an island known
as the Isla del Rey. This estuary, which runs nearly due
east and west, is about seven miles long, and its width at
the mouth is about three miles, gradually diminishing
until the width is little more than one mile, when the bay
itself opens out in a magnificent sheet of water. In the
centre of this bay and in front of the western point of the
Isla del Rey stands a small island called the Mancera.
On this bay there are several landing-places, but only one
port, the Corral, and the coasts on both sides are fringed
with steep or perpendicular rocks, and covered with dense
brushwood. The bay has thus two coasts, one to the
south the other to the north, which are separated by a
wide space of open water, by the river Valdivia, and by
the Isla del Rey. The northern part is inaccessible from
the ocean, but at the western extremity of the southern
part there is a landing-place where ships were accustomed
to take in water.
At this time Valdivia was defended by nine forts and
batteries, distributed on both sides of the bay, and armed
with 128 guns. Two of these forts stood on the islands,
and commanded both mouths of the river. On the north

COCHRANE CAPTURES VALDIVIA. 207
the entrance to the bay was guarded by an impregnable
castle, called the Niebla, cut out of the solid rock, and by
a battery, called Fort Piojo. On the south were the
English fort, which commanded the watering-place, the
fort of San Carlos, on a small peninsula, and Fort Amar-
gos, whose fire crossed that of the Niebla. The entrance
was further defended by the Chorocomayo redoubt and by
the Castle of the Corral. Both these forts were masked by
a dense forest, and the ground about them is so broken
that their only communication by land was by a narrow
path winding among the rocks and through the forest,
and crossing a gulley which was commanded by the guns
of both forts. Valdivia was ordinarily garrisoned by 800
troops and by as many militia, but at this time the militia
were absent.
On the 18th January, 1820, the O'Higgins sailed into the
bay, flying the Spanish flag. The Spaniards believed her
to be the Prueba. Cochrane signalled for a pilot, who was
sent off to him with a guard of honour, whom he made
prisoners, and learned from them that the Potrillo was
expected with money to pay the troops. He then pro
ceeded in his gig to inspect the entrance to the river,
under fire of the forts, for by this time his true character
was discovered. Two days afterwards he captured the
Potrillo, which had 20,000 dollars on board, but seeing that
he had not men enough for an attack upon the place, he
then went off for Talcahuano in search of more.
On the 22nd the O'Higgins reached Talcahuano, and
was fortunate enough to find there the Intrepido and the
Montezuma. Colonel Freyre, who was then in command
of the fortress, eagerly entered into Cochrane's plans, and
gave him 250 men under command of Major Beauchef.
With this reinforcement he sailed again for Valdivia. On
leaving the harbour the O'Higgins struck on a rock and
commenced to make water rapidly, but the leak was
patched up, Cochrane infusing his own spirit into his men,
and declaring that she would float as far as Valdivia.

208 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
When out of sight of land he transhipped the marines
from his flag-ship to the other two vessels, and went on
with them, flying the Spanish flag till he arrived off the
bay of Valdivia on the 3rd February, and signalled to the
English fort for a pilot. But his ruse was discovered and
the fort opened fire on him. Then, in spite of a heavy sea
running, he determined to effect a landing in two long
boats and a gig in which he went himself.
At the sound of the cannonade reinforcements had come
up from the other forts, so that the garrison now numbered
360 men, of whom a detachment of 65 was thrown forward
to protect the landing-place. At sundown Miller landed
with 75 marines and drove in this detachment. He was
followed by Beauchef with his 250 infantry, who pushed on
up a narrow path and drew on himself the fire of the gar
rison, while Sub-Lieutenant Vidal skirted the wall of the
fort, and finding a side entrance fired a volley in their
rear, which so alarmed the defenders that they fled in
panic, carrying with them the reserve who were drawn up
on an open space behind.
Beauchef vigorousry pursued the fugitives from fort to
fort along the narrow path, till at daybreak the English
fort, San Carlos, Amargos, Chorocomayo, and Corral were
all in the hands of the Patriots, who had only nine men
killed and 34 wounded. One hundred of the enemy escaped
in boats, as many more were killed, the rest were either
prisoners or dispersed.
At daybreak on the 4th the Montezuma and Intrepido
sailed into the bay under the fire of the northern forts. To
dislodge the enemy from these positions, 200 men were
re-embarked, but the Intrepido ran on a sandbank off the
Island of Mancera and sank; thus ended the career of the
only Argentine ship which figured in the celebrated
Chilian squadron of the Pacific.
Soon afterwards the O'Higgins appeared, and the Span
iards, abandoning the northern forts and the islands, fled
to the city. The O'Higgins was leaking so badly that she

COCHRANE BEATEN OFF AT CHILOE. 209
was run aground in the mud to keep her from sinking.
The next day the city was taken without resistance. Spain
lost her last base of operations in the south of Chile, and
Chile was now in possession of all her own territory except
the islands of Chiloe.
Cochrane thought to finish his cruise by the capture of
these islands, but Colonel Quintanilla, who was in com
mand, was better prepared than was the garrison of Val
divia. A landing was effected on the 17th; a body of
infantry was driven back and a' battery was captured, but
Miller, who led the assault on the principal fort, was
again wounded, and the attack was repulsed. But the
dominion of the Pacific was secured, and Cochrane returned
in triumph. At Santiago he met San Martin, who, leaving
Mendoza on the 20th January, had again crossed the
Andes in pursuit of his great enterprise, and now found
the road to Peru opened for him by the heroism of the
great Admiral.

CHAPTER XXIII.
The Disobedience of San Martin.
1819 — 1820.
Three great duties pressed upon San Martin when he
withdrew a part of his army to the east of the Andes.
First, the prosecution of his plans for the liberation of
America ; second, his duty as a soldier to support the
constituted authorities of his country in a time of civil
war ; and third, his duty as an Argentine in view of the
expected expedition from Spain against the River Plate.
His opinion was in respect to the first, " that if the
expedition to Peru is not carried out, everything will go to
the devil ; " in regard to the second, he had an invincible
repugnance to mix himself up in internecine strife ; in
regard to the third, he could fight against Spain just as
well on the West coast as on the East.
Thus, when he had procured through the Lodge au
thority from the central government to proceed with his
plans, he thought only of how to carry them out, but fears
of the expedition from Spain for some time yet perturbed
all his combinations.
The Court of Spain thought with this new expedition
of 20,000 men against Buenos Ayres to strike a
mortal blow at the heart of the revolution in South
America ; but matters had changed considerably since the
year 181 5, when the last great expedition under Morillo,
originally intended for Buenos Ayres, had been diverted
to Venezuela. The insurrection had made great progress,

SPAIN PREPARES A LAST EXPEDITION. 21 r
and above all, Portugal was no longer the ally of Spain.
and had seized Monte Video, which was the necessary
base of any operations against Buenos Ayres. Further,
the war against the colonies was very unpopular in Spain,
not only among the people but in the army.
In spite of all this, the preparations were pushed for
ward. Six ships of the line, thirteen frigates, three
corvettes, ten brigs, three schooners, twenty-nine gun
boats, and forty transports, with from 18,000 to 20,000
troops, were under orders to rendezvous at Cadiz, under
command of the Count of Abisbal, better known to
history as Jose O'Donnell.
The Argentine Government had secret agents in Cadiz,
who kept them well informed of all that went on. These
men reported great discontent among the troops in canton
ments on the island of Leon, and that there was a con
spiracy on foot to proclaim the Constitution of the year XII.,
in which most of the superior officers were implicated.
General O'Donnell, aided by General Sarsfield, affected
to join the conspiracy in order to discover the plan of it,
but when it was on the eve of breaking out, issued a pro
clamation to the troops, calling upon them to adhere to
their allegiance, and promising them, among other rewards
for their loyalty, that they should not be sent to America.
The leaders of the conspiracy were without difficulty
arrested, but the projected expedition was thus prevented
from sailing. In July, 18 19, yellow fever broke out in the
army ; but in spite of all this, Government was still resolved
to send off the expedition. The Count of Calderon was
put in command, and the Minister of Marine was in
structed, in September, to embark the troops at once.
In July of this same year 18 19, General Rondeau was, by
the influence of the Lautaro Lodge, appointed Supreme
Director of the United Provinces in place of Pueyrredon.
This was merely a change of names, the reins of power re
mained as before in the hands of the oligarchy which had
ruled for so many years. One of the first acts of the new
r 2

212 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Government was to send for San Martin to come to
Buenos Ayres, to consult on the measures to be adopted
in view of the threatened expedition from Spain. San
Martin was himself full of apprehension, but without con
sulting his own Government, he proposed to O'Higgins
that the Chilian squadron, under Cochrane, and in the pay
of the Argentine Government, should sail to meet the
expedition on the Atlantic and destroy it in the open sea,
offering to pay at once 50,000 dollars towards the
expenses. This scheme would, he thought, have great attraction
for the enterprising spirit of the Admiral, but Cochrane,
bent upon destroying the Spanish fleet at Callao, would
not listen to it until the business in hand was accom
plished, when there would, he said, be ample time yet to
meet the new fleet on the Atlantic and blow them to pieces
with his Congreve rockets.
In answer to a second letter from Rondeau in August.
San Martin offered to march with 4,000 men, of whom
3,000 would be cavalry, to drive the Spaniards into
the river, as he had done before at San Lorenzo ; " with
sixteen squadrons and thirty light field pieces we can be
sure of victory."
In October news was received in Buenos Ayres that
O'Donnell had rebelled against the Spanish Government,
and had marched with the army of Cadiz upon Madrid.
This news was false, but it had the effect of causing Ron
deau to countermand the orders for the concentration of
the army.
Meantime the truce between the central Government
and the Gaucho chieftains of the interior had come to an
end. Ramirez from Entre Rios, and Artigas from the
Banda Oriental, had joined hands with Lopez of Santa
Fe, and war had again broken out on the northern frontier
of Buenos Ayres. For the third time Government looked
to San Martin for help, and ordered him to Buenos Ayres,
with the division quartered at Mendoza. Just at the same

CIVIL WAR IN BUENOS AYRES. 213
time he received advices from Chile that all was ready for
the proposed expedition to Peru. San Martin hesitated,
but wrote to Government that he was about to march to
Buenos Ayres with 2,000 cavalry and eight guns, but
should leave his infantry in Mendoza. One battalion
of infantry was quartered in San Juan, the grenadiers
were in San Luis, and his total force of regular troops in
Cuyo was now raised by recruiting to 2,200 men, besides
which he had called out the militia of San Luis to the
number of 2,000 men.
The idea of Government was to concentrate the whole
army in the Province of Buenos Ayres to the number of 8,000
or 10,000 men, ready to act either against the Spaniards or
against the Gaucho hordes, but as the latter numbered only
1,500, it was a most cowardly measure to abandon the
northern frontier, menaced by the Royalists of Upper
Peru, and to break the terms of the alliance with Chile,
and could only have ended in the isolation of Buenos
Ayres from the rest of the provinces. The civil war was a
spontaneous effervescence of the people, and could not be
cured by the sabre. It arose not only from the semi-
barbarous instincts of the masses, but also from the dis
content of the more educated classes with a political
system which was not in accordance with the principles of
the Revolution, and this discontent permeated the ranks
of the army itself.
Rondeau, in pursuance of his plan, took the field with
the Army of Buenos Ayres, and marched to the northern
frontier of the Province, against the Gaucho hordes, seek
ing a junction with the Army of the North, coming from
Cordoba. His army alone was superior in number to the
enemy. Why, then, did he send for another army from
Cuyo ?
The real object of this concentration was that Gomez,
the Argentine envoy in Paris, had entered into an
arrangement with the French Government to crown the
Duke of Luca, a Prince of the House of Bourbon, King of
the United Provinces ; France engaging on her part to

214 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
divert the projected expedition from the River Plate, and
to secure the acquiescence of Portugal and the evacuation
of the Banda Oriental by marrying the future king to a
Brazilian Princess. Congress, setting at naught the
Republican constitution so lately sworn, and without any
attempt to consult the will of the people, sanctioned this
arrangement in secret session, and on the 12th November
authorised their agent to conclude the treaty. As the
Spanish expedition would thus be set free to act against
Mexico, Venezuela, or New Granada, or to reinforce the
Government of Peru, this was an act of treachery to the
programme of the revolution and a desertion of the cause
of America.
Rondeau was the last weak representative of the
centralized system of government, which had so far led
the revolution ; now the Argentine people took the matter
into their own hands, and by civil strife crushed out the
last remnant of the colonial system. Now was heard for
the first time among them the word Federation. The
people, groaning under a load of taxation to supply
revenues in the disposal of which they had no voice, found
the domination of Buenos Ayres equally oppressive with
that of Spain, and gave a new interpretation to the word
liberty : they now construed it to mean provincial inde
pendence. At the close of the year 1 8 1 9 the Army of the Andes
was the only Argentine representative of the American
propaganda. Stationed on foreign soil, it had escaped
the contagion of party spirit, which had infected all the
other armies of the Republic, and was ready to follow its
great captain whithersoever he should choose to lead it.
Still San Martin hesitated. To obey Rondeau was to
plunge into civil strife, to the destruction of his great
plan ; his regard for discipline impelled him to obey at
any cost. He had already given orders to march, when
news reached him that the Province of Tucuman had
declared itself independent ; that the army under Belgrano
had mutinied and imprisoned its general ; and that there

THE DISOBEDIENCE OF SAN MARTIN. 215
was a similar conspiracy on foot in Cordoba among the
officers of the army there, which had ramifications even in
Cuyo. He was suffering severely at the time from rheumatism,
and leaving Alvarado in command of the division in Cuyo,
he retired to the baths of Cauquenes in Chile, after
writing to Rondeau that in view of these complications he
had postponed the departure of the army until further
orders ; but before that he had written to O'Higgins
asking him to collect mules in the valley of Aconcagua, in
readiness for the day when he should recross the Andes.
Neither Rondeau nor Congress seem to have had any
idea of the true state of affairs ; they still thought that they
could control public opinion by force, and the answer to
the despatch from San Martin was a fresh order to him to
march at once with all his army to Buenos Ayres. To this
San Martin replied by sending in his resignation for the
third time. Government refused to accept it, but gave
him leave of absence until his health was restored.
The conduct of San Martin at this time has been very
severely criticised, but there is no „ question that his
2,000 men would have been of no real assistance to
Government, which fell a victim to its own errors and
incapacity ; and it is equally unquestionable that without
him the expedition to Peru would never have set out.
Without his co-operation the success of Bolivar in Colum
bia is highly problematical, and it is certain that had
the Royalists been able to send another expedition from
Upper Peru, they would have met no effective resistance
in the northern provinces of what is now the Argentine
Republic. San Martin took upon himself the " terrible responsi
bility " of this disobedience, an act by which the accom
plishment of the mission of emancipation which the
Argentine people had undertaken was finally secured.
Condemned by his contemporaries, he appeals to the
judgment of posterity.

CHAPTER XXIV.
the convention of rancagua.
1820
The army of Cadiz, decimated by yellow fever, was for
sanitary reasons dispersed. On the 1st January, 1820,
Don Rafael del Riego, Colonel of the regiment of Asturias,
then in quarters at the village Cabezas de San Juan, pro
claimed in front of his regiment the constitution of the
year XII., opening an era of liberty for his own country,
and putting an end to an era of war in America. The
revolution triumphed, the King was forced to swear the
constitution, and, by common accord between the people
and the government, a new policy was inaugurated in
regard to the insurgent colonies, one that sought to solve
peacefully the question which the appeal to arms had only
made more complicated.
It was at this juncture that San Martin by his disobedi
ence saved from destruction in the vortex of civil war the
one army which could secure the emancipation of America.
San Martin crossed the Andes carried in a litter, but it
was not in mineral baths that he sought the cure for his
rheumatism and neuralgia ; that cure he sought and found
in the active prosecution of the plan which lay at his
heart. Immediately on his arrival in Chile, he proceeded to
concert measures with O'Higgins for the despatch of the
expedition. He offered to bring over from Mendoza 2,000

MUTINY AT SAN JUAN. 217
men and ten guns, but terrible news soon reached him.
The mutiny of the Army of the North had been followed
two days after by a similar • mutiny in the ist battalion
light infantry of his own army, then in quarters at San
Juan. San Martin thought he had secured Cuyo from the
anarchy that prevailed by the presence of his disciplined
troops, but when distinguished officers of his own army
and of that of Belgrano headed mutineers and joined
hands with Gaucho chieftains, he saw that the elements
of order were dissolved. The Army of the North, under
command of General Cruz, was on the march to join
Rondeau, when in the Province of Santa Fe it made a
truce with the Gaucho levies, styled " montoneras," and
retreated to Cordoba, and there established a new system
of military rule, withdrawing itself both from the civil
war and from the war of emancipation.
The battalion quartered at San Juan was in reality a
small corps d'armee, having both artillery and cavalry
attached to it. It numbered 900 men and was under the
command of Colonel Sequeira, a gallant officer, but a
martinet who was greatly disliked by his men. At day
break on the 9th January the men, headed by their
sergeants, silently left their barracks, occupied the Plaza,
and made a party of the civic guard prisoners, killing the
officer; while the Colonel and some of his officers were
left in the barracks under guard of a company. Some
disaffected officers then took command, shouting, " Viva
la Federacion ! " and "Down with the tyrant !" but they
had no plan of action, and soon quarrelled amongst them
selves, and the Colonel and the officers who were with
him were murdered. Alvarado marched against them
from Mendoza, but fearing to trust his own men went
back again. San Martin sent offers of pardon, which were
rejected ; the spirit of anarchy prevailed everywhere.
The Governor of Cuyo and his deputy both resigned.
The mutinous battalion soon after dispersed, and the

218 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Province of San Juan declared itself an independent state.
Alvarado then, in obedience to orders from San Martin,
joined him in Chile with 1,000 cavalry and two guns,
leaving Godoy Cruz as Governor of Mendoza.
On the ist February, 1820, the Army of Buenos Ayres
was totally defeated at Cepeda by the Montonera horse
men. Congress was soon after dissolved, and the nation
split up into fragments, of which each one was a small
republic, and most of them fell under the rule of petty
chieftains. From this chaos was presently to rise up a
new people, with well-defined divisions and with one
national spirit. For a time the Army of the Andes obeyed
no superior authority, but it still upheld the Argentine
flag on foreign soil, and followed the lead of its own
General. Such being the state of affairs, San Martin, on the 28th
January, wrote officially to O'Higgins, asking him if he
could still dispose of 6,000 men for the expedition, but
stating that 4,000 were absolutely necessary. O'Higgins
replied that he could promise 4,000 only, fully equipped.
San Martin agreed that they should march under the
Chilian flag, but stipulated that the Army of the Andes
should carry its own, as representing the United Provinces.
Thus San Martin took upon himself the "terrible respon
sibility " of disposing of Argentine troops and military
stores, without any authority so to do from his own govern
ment. In order to relieve himself in some measure of this
responsibility, he convened a meeting of the officers of the
Army of the Andes, then in cantonments at Rancagua,
under the Presidency of Las Heras. He himself was not
present, but a letter from him was read, which showed
that as the Government from which he derived his com
mission no longer existed, the army was de facto without
a General, and called upon them to appoint one, to whom
he offered his services in any capacity.
San Martin had requested them to vote without discus
sion, but Colonel Martinez and several officers opposed

THE CONVENTION OF RANCAGUA. 219
this, on the ground that the commission of General-in-
Chief was granted for a specific purpose which was not yet
accomplished, and was therefore not cancelled by the fall
of the Government by which it had been conferred. In
these terms a document was drawn up and signed by all
the officers.
Las Heras, in writing to San Martin an account of the
result of the meeting, expressed his great surprise that he
should have given him such a task, and said that many of
his best friends felt themselves greatly aggrieved at the
proposition, as the commissions of all of them were derived
from the same authority as that of the General-in-Chief.
Thus the army endorsed the disobedience of their General,
an act which under any other leader would have had a
most evil effect upon its discipline.
While the preparations of the Chilian Government went
slowly forward a new difficulty arose. Cochrane, proud
of his recent triumph in Valdivia, aspired to the command-
in-chief of the expedition to Peru. Devoid as he was of
all political talent, a more unfit leader for such an enter
prise it would have been difficult to find. Peru was not to
be conquered, it was to be liberated ; he thought only of
conquest. He might have won a battle, but he would
never have founded a nation. His dream seems to have
been inspired by the examples of Drake and Anson, who
made great profit by gallant feats of arms ; he purposed to
enrich himself and his sailors by plundering the coasts of
Peru. San Martin was an American, and thought only
of his great purpose, nothing of its results to himself. On
the 6th May, 1820, San Martin was appointed by the
Senate and by the popular vote, Generalissimo of the
expedition. Still Cochrane insisted, and several times sent in his
resignation. Government was about to appoint Guise to
the command of the fleet, as Spry and many others of the
English officers preferred him to Cochrane, but this was
prevented by the intervention of San Martin, and the

230 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
proud sailor at last submitted, though with a bad grace,
after another fruitless attempt to supplant San Martin by
Freyre. The Chilian Government was not to be led astray
by national susceptibility, and knew that no Chilian officer
could compare with San Martin in military capacity.
San Martin knew the importance of a thorough under
standing between himself and the Admiral, and went to
visit him at Valparaiso, but in spite of his friendly over
tures there was never much cordiality between them.
The presence of San Martin and his army was not only
a great burden to the Chilian treasury, but it was also a
political peril, of which Government was well aware.
Party spirit was only kept in check by the danger which
menaced the country from Peru, and personal ambition
would impel party leaders to seek the aid of so powerful
an auxiliary so long as it was at hand. The Government
of Chile in sending off the expedition, thus performed a
deed of heroism which was not only conducive to their
own security as a nation, and was worthy of the gratitude
of America, but was also one that saved the political
situation in their own country.

IL— Map of the Viceroyalty of Peru, including Upper Peru.

CHAPTER XXV.
PERU. 1820.
Peru was the first of the American colonies in which, at
the era of the Conquest, the spirit of rebellion against the
Mother Country broke out. During the Colonial epoch
the mixed races frequently rebelled against their Spanish
masters. At the end of the eighteenth century Tupac-
Amaru, who came of the old royal race of the Incas, made
an attempt to restore the kingdom of his forefathers. But
these insurrections had no root in the soil, they were but
the convulsive efforts of a conquered race reduced to
slavery. When they were quelled the country remained
at peace for many long years. Peru, like to one of the
tracts of perennial calm upon the ocean, felt nothing of
the currents which ebbed and flowed around her ; she was
isolated from the world ; the movements which convulsed
America in 1 809 and 1 8 1 o were hardly felt there. The
instinct of nationality, which is the germ of independence,
was not entirely wanting ; but there was no cohesion
among the masses of the people, whose inertness presented
a dead weight against the progress of the revolutionary
idea. Peru was at the Conquest truly an imperial colony,
embracing all the Spanish possessions in South America,
from Cape Horn to the Equator. The word Peru be
came synonymous with wealth. After the creation of the
Viceroyalties of New Granada and La Plata, that of Peru

224 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
still stretched over a vast area, extending 25 degrees south
of the Equator, and from the Pacific to the frontiers of
Brazil, while its central position gave it a paramount
influence over all its neighbours.
Lima was the capital of this imperial colony. This city
stands not far from the sea, in a beautiful valley, at the
foot of the Western Cordillera, where rain never falls, and
where the thunder is heard to roll and the lightning is
seen to flash but once in a century. A transparent veil
of clouds tempers the fiery rays of the sun, while the
moist southern breeze imparts a softness to the atmo
sphere which has its reflex in the temperament of the
people. Lima rivalled Mexico in wealth, and was the seat of a
viceregal court, with its privileges, its pomps, and its
enervating vices. It was also surrounded with walls,
and Callao, with its castles and batteries, was but the port
of the great city. She had also an official Church, a
corrupt clergy, and an inquisition, the only one which had
burnt heretics in America. Three-fifths of her population,
like to that of ancient Rome, was composed of slaves,
freedmen, and tributary Indians, with a passion for bull
fights they had learnt from the Spaniards, and for chicha,*
which they inherited from the Incas. Her women were
celebrated for beauty and grace, and she was the natal
city of the patron saint of America, Santa Rosa de Lima,
among whose relics are shown the dice with which she
played with her Divine spouse.
Situate in the tropic of Capricorn Peru has every climate
known in the world, ranging from the torrid zone at the
sea level to the eternal snow of her Cordillera. The
Creoles of Peru were by nature intelligent, and cultivated
science and the arts. They had also a literature of their
own. The Mercurio Peruano, published in the eighteenth
century, was the first periodical printed in South America.
* An intoxicating drink made from maize.

PERU.

225

The University of Lima was as famous in America as
that of Salamanca in Spain ; the skill of her physicians
was renowned all over the continent. Peru was also the
centre of the Royalist reaction ; for ten years she had held
the revolution in check. Thus it was when the emancipat
ing armies from the north and from the south closed in
upon her in the year 1820. She was the Carthage of San
Martin. At the outbreak of the revolution Peru proper had a
population of about a million and a half, and Upper Peru
had nearly half a million. Of these the indigenous races
formed about half, mixed races a fifth, negro slaves about
fifty thousand, and Spaniards hardly a seventh, the re
mainder being Creoles, the descendants of Europeans born
in America. The North and the South of Peru were two
separate countries, which looked with jealousy one on the
other, even for many years after they became one nation.
The highlands of the interior and the lowlands of the
coast were also two entirely different regions. The in
habitants of the lowlands were enervated by the climate,
but the mixed races which inhabited the hills were very
athletic, and made excellent infantry.
Spaniards and Creoles dwelt in cities on the coast, or
in fertile valleys among the mountains. The indigenous
races, who were serfs, were almost entirely confined to the
hills ; the mixed, races and free negroes formed the work
ing classes of the cities ; the farms were cultivated by
African slaves. The Peruvians were thus a people who
had no cohesion among them, and were easily dominated
by the powerful military clique which ruled the colony,
while their passive inertness was a formidable barrier to
the spread of revolutionary ideas among them.
In 18 10 General Abascal was Viceroy of Peru; he was
already old, but was possessed of great talents, both
political and military. He was one in whom prudence
was blended with decision and with perseverance. The
flames of insurrection blazed around him, but he showed
Q

226 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
a bold front to the storm, and made Peru the citadel of the
colonial power. If it had been possible to conquer the
revolution he would have conquered it ; as it was he
greatly retarded its progress.
To counteract the contagion of the revolutionary spirit,
he inspired the Peruvians with a spirit of devoted loyalty
to the mother country, and to her exiled King. On the
basis of the few Spanish troops he had with him, he raised
a native army, recruited in the Highlands and officered by
Peruvians. Their own generals led them to victory, till
the struggle, from being a revolt against the domination
of Spain assumed the aspect of a civil war, in which
Americans fought against Americans in defence of
American ideas.
Thus Abascal quelled the rebellion in Quito, stemmed
the tide of Argentine invasion, and reconquered Chile.
He was then reinforced by troops from Spain, led by
generals who had proved their skill in the War of the
Peninsula. The revolution was crushed wherever it had
broken out, save only in the United Provinces and in a
part of Venezuela. In 1817 the passage of the Andes by
San Martin put a stop to his success. Chacabuco and
Maipd turned the tide of victory against him, and the
Royalist reaction was shut up in the Highlands of Peru,
where the principle of loyalty to the flag of Spain had
taken deep root in the hearts of the people.
Meantime Abascal had retired from the scene, full of
years and of glory, and left Pezuela, the hero of Upper
Peru, as Viceroy in his place. In 18 1 6 General Jose de La
Serna had arrived from Spain with reinforcements, and
with a commission as General-in-Chief of the armies of
Upper Peru. He was an experienced soldier, but was
characterized by a moderation which made him at times
Irresolute. In politics he professed Liberal principles,
and soon acquired a great ascendency over the army, in
troducing a new influence which later on had very impor
tant effects.

REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN PERU. 227
Although Peru was the centre of the Royalist reaction,
nevertheless the American sentiment of independence was
still latent within her, but the want of cohesion among
the various races which formed her people rendered her
helpless to work out her own destiny. All nations have
passed through these periods of impotence. Chile and
New Granada, under much better conditions, would never
have redeemed themselves without Argentine and Colum
bian intervention.
The revolutionary movements of the year 1809 found
an echo in Lima, and a young lawyer named Mateo Silva
fell a victim to his patriotic ardour, dying in the case
mates of Callao, after six years of imprisonment. In 18 10
another conspiracy was discovered, and was also crushed ;
but the progress of Liberal opinion in Spain had its effect
in Peru. From the mother country came liberty of the
press in 181 1, and in 1812 the establishment of Cabildos
was decreed by the Regency of Spain, when Peruvians
for the first time made use of the right of election. But
when the Spanish Constitution fell in 18 14, liberty of
speech fell with it in the capital of Peru.
In 181 1, 1 812, and 1813, various insurrectionary move
ments, fomented by Argentine emissaries, broke out in
Upper Peru, but were promptly crushed with great
severity. In 18 14 a much more formidable insurrection
broke out in Cuzco, the ancient capital of the Incas, in
which the clergy took a prominent part. In August a
Junta was formed under the auspices of the Cabildos,
General Pumacahua, a pure Indian, being named Presi
dent, and Jose Angulo Captain-General. The new Govern
ment erected two gibbets in the principal square as a sign
of their authority, devised a flag, raised an army, cast
small cannon, and despatched emissaries to enter into
alliance with the Argentine Provinces. Their first opera
tions were crowned with success. Arequipa fell into
their hands, and an expedition to the east captured the
city of La Paz ; but their hordes of half-naked Indians,
Q2

228 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
armed with pikes and slings, were totally routed in two
battles with great slaughter by troops from Lima, sup
ported by militia. General Ramirez, being detached
from the army of operations in Salta with 1,200 men and
four guns, speedily retook La Paz and Arequipa, and in
March, 18 15, marched against the insurgents under
Pumacahua, 20,000 strong with thirty-seven guns, cut
them to pieces, and put an end to the insurrection. The
head of Pumacahua was stuck on a post in the great
square of Cuzco. Angulo and other leaders were shot.
From that time the Patriots of Peru thought no more of
achieving liberty by their own efforts, but they continued
their propaganda among the people by means of secret
societies, which had their head-quarters in Lima. In 1817
these societies opened communication with San Martin,
who responded to their overtures by sending Torres on a
special mission to Lima, as is recorded in Chapter XVII.
Torres in his secret interview received very valuable infor
mation from the Patriot leaders concerning the plans of
the Viceroy and the forces at his disposal, and concerted
with them the means of regular communication. The
subsequent appearance of the Chilian squadron on the
coast, and the proclamations of O'Higgins, San Martin,
and Cochrane, greatly raised their hopes, and information
furnished by them was of great service to the admiral in
his operations. He was accompanied by Alvarez Jonte,
who acted as intermediary between him and the Patriots
of Peru, and was the bearer of special instructions to them
from San Martin, who directed them to make no insurrec
tionary movement until he was in a position to support
them, when local outbreaks might be of service in dis
tracting the attention of the enemy.
San Martin also sent off to Peru three young officers of
his, who were Peruvians by birth, one of whom betrayed
his trust, and caused the arrest of several of the Patriots ;
but the other two fulfilled their mission with great skill,
so that even in the army the revolutionary spirit made

THE ROYALIST ARMY. 229
great progress. Colonel Gamarra, who was in command
of troops drawn from Upper Peru, was discovered to have
secret correspondence with Belgrano, but the Viceroy
dared not prosecute him from fear of arousing a mutiny
among his men.
Pezuela was fully alive to the dangers of his position,
and wrote earnestly to Spain for support. At the same
time he instructed his successor in command of the Army
of Upper Peru, to advance into Argentine territory. La
Serna was driven back by Martin Guemes and his
gauchos, but in this campaign saw such evidence of the
superior quality of his troops that he thought it necessary
to take precautions against possible disloyalty among
them. He accordingly put an end to their independent
organization, and drafted them into his Spanish regiments,
a measure which was eventually productive of great evil
to the Royalist cause.
The American officers were all staunch Royalists, but
the Spanish officers were more or less infected with the
new ideas. Thus, the morale of the Army of Upper Peru
became greatly deteriorated. A part of it was soon after
withdrawn to Lower Peru to reinforce the army there, in
preparation for meeting the threatened invasion from Chile,
upon which La Serna, alleging that he held his commis
sion direct from the King, and had the right to dispose of
his troops as he chose, threw up his command. Olafieta,
a Peruvian and an ardent Royalist, was appointed to
succeed him, and La Serna retired to Lima.
The Royalist army was at this time led by many distin
guished officers, among them being Camba, the historian,
and Valdes, who was held by Americans to be the most
skilful and the most noble of all their adversaries. The
army which held Lima was more than 8,000 strong, that of
Upper Peru was more than 7,000. The total force, includ
ing detached garrisons, consisted of 23,000 men, against
whom San Martin matched himself with 4,000 men in the
last struggle for the independence of America.

CHAPTER XXVI.
THE EXPEDITION TO PERU.
1820.
From Valparaiso, on the 22 nd July, 1820, when on the
eve of sailing on his daring enterprise, San Martin ad
dressed a proclamation to his fellow-countrymen in justi
fication of his refusal to enter into their civil discords,
showing how the intervention of his army could only have
added to their miseries, prophesying that when tired of
anarchy they would seek refuge in oppression, and con
cluding : —
" Whatever be my lot in the campaign of Peru, I shall
prove that ever since I returned to my native land her
independence has occupied my every thought, and that I
have never had other ambition than to merit the hatred
of the ungrateful and the esteem of the virtuous."
Later on he wrote to the Cabildo of Buenos Ayres,
announcing the departure of the expedition, and declaring
that :—
"From the moment a central authority is established
the Army of the Andes will hold itself subject to its
orders." The expedition took the name of " The Liberating Army
of Peru." It consisted of six battalions of infantry and
two regiments of cavalry, in all 4,430 officers and men, of
which more than half belonged to the Army of the Andes,
with thirty-one guns, two howitzers, and two mortars,

THE LIBERATING EXPEDITION. 231
and also spare arms and equipment for 15,000 men.
General Las Heras was chief of the staff, having with him
Arenales and Luzuriaga ; Guido also went with his friend
the general-in-chief as aide-de-camp, with the rank of
colonel. The squadron consisted of eight ships-of-war, mounting
247 guns, victualled for six months, and carrying 1,600
seamen and marines, of whom 600 were foreigners, chiefly
English ; also of sixteen transports, with four months'
provisions for the troops, and eleven gunboats. The mili
tary chest contained 180,392 dollars in coin and in letters
of credit.
On the 20th August the expedition sailed from Val
paraiso, Cochrane leading the way in the O'Higgins, San
Martin and his staff bringing up the rear in the San
Martin. The Chilian Congress had drawn up most im
plicit instructions for San Martin for the regulation of his
policy in establishing an independent Government in Peru.
O'Higgins had issued a proclamation to the Peruvian
people, telling them that the object of the expedition was
simply to liberate them from Spanish domination, and
that they should be perfectly free to adopt any form of
government they thought best ; he knew also that in the
face of a foe greatly superior in strength no general could
afford to tie himself down to one fixed line of conduct ; he
therefore never delivered these instructions to San Martin,
but left him perfectly free to carry out his own plan as he
might deem it best. To Cochrane his instructions were
very explicit, absolute obedience in everything to the
orders of the commander-in-chief.
San Martin had thought of landing in the south of Peru,
and effecting a junction with Belgrano ; recent events
rendered this impossible. His object now was to avoid
coming into contact with the Royalist forces and to pre
vent their concentration, while he won over the people to
act in concert with him, and arranged a combined plan of
action with Bolivar, who was now master of New Granada.

232 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
With these ends in view he effected a landing at Pisco,
after a pleasant voyage of eighteen days, with the idea of
drawing the attention of the enemy to the south and away
from the real base of his operations, which he purposed
establishing in the northernmost province of Trujillo.
Cochrane tried in vain to persuade him to land near to
Callao and march at once upon Lima.
The beach of Pisco is a long stretch of sand, lying at
the foot of the Cordillera, about 1 60 miles south of Lima.
In it the sea has cut out the bay of Paracas, seven miles to
the north of which stands the town of Pisco, close to fertile
valleys running up between spurs from the great mountain
range. The first division, under Las Heras, disembarked in the
bay on the 8th September, and the same evening occupied
the town without resistance. On the 13th the whole army
was on shore and encamped in the valley of Chincha, while
scouting parties scoured the country.
The Viceroy had scattered his forces all along the coast
from Guayaquil to Arica. A detachment of 500 infantry,
100 horse, and two guns, under Colonel Quimper, was
stationed at Pisco, but fled precipitately when the squad
ron anchored in the bay.
On landing San Martin issued a proclamation to his
army : —
"Remember that you are come, not to conquer but to
liberate a people ; the Peruvians are our brothers."
He denounced the most severe penalties on any found
plundering or maltreating the inhabitants, and also issued
a proclamation to the Peruvians, telling them that the
new constitution established in Spain had in no way
changed her colonial system : —
" The last Viceroy of Peru endeavours to maintain his
decrepid authority. I come to put an end to this epoch of
sorrow and humiliation."
The invaders drew plentiful supplies from the surround
ing country, mounted their cavalry and recruited their

THE LANDING AT PISCO. 233
infantry with 600 slaves, giving freedom to all who would
join their ranks.
Pezuela, very much against his will but in obedience to
¦orders received from the Home Government, was at this
time preparing for the public swearing of the new consti
tution, when, on the nth September, he received news
<of the landing at Pisco. He at once sent a squadron of
militia to reinforce Quimper, and stationed Colonel Camba
with 2,000 horse on the high road from Lima to Pisco, and,
in accordance with his instructions, proposed peace to San
Martin, on condition that Chile should send representa
tives to the Spanish Cortes to arrange their differences.
Similar proposals he also sent off to the United Provinces.
By this measure he recognised Chile and the United Pro
vinces as belligerent powers, but without directly acknow
ledging their independence.
San Martin appointed Guido and Garcia del Rio com
missioners to treat with those of the Viceroy, who were the
Count Villar de Fuente and Captain Capaz, late comman
der of the Maria Isabel. These commissioners met at the
town of Miraflores, seven miles from Lima, and at once
arranged an armistice.
The Chilian commissioners declined to accept the
Spanish Constitution, and rejected the proposal to send
Chilian deputies to the Cortes, on which the Royalist com
missioners proposed that the invading army should return
to Chile, and that everything should remain in statu quo,
whilst Chilian representatives went to Spain and there
arranged matters with the Home Government. The others
acceded to the proposition that Chile should send repre
sentatives to Spain, but proposed that the army should
occupy the provinces of Potosi, Cochabamba, Chuquisaca,
and La Paz, considered to be the Argentine section of
Upper Peru ; that the Spanish garrison of Chiloe should
be included in the armistice; and that in case Bolivar
should conclude a similar armistice with Morillo, the Vice
roy of Peru should not reinforce the garrison of Quito.

234 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Neither party would consent to any modification of the
terms proposed by them, so the conference came to an end
on the ist October. In a private interview with the Vice
roy the Chilian commissioners had insisted upon the inde
pendence of Peru as a preliminary step to any arrange
ment, but had expressed their willingness to accept a
Prince of the Royal House of Spain as monarch of Spanish
America. The Viceroy and his commissioners threw the blame of
the rupture of the negotiations upon San Martin, which
accusation he answered in a dignified address to the
Peruvian people.
The armistice came to an end on the 5th October, and
on the same day Arenales left the encampment in the
valley of Chincha, at the head of a strong detachment of
the Patriot army, for the Highlands, while San Martin
masked the movement by manoeuvring with the rest of his
army on the road to Lima.
On the 24th October, San Martin issued a decree estab
lishing the flag and escutcheon of the new Republic of
Peru, the flag white and scarlet, the escutcheon a sun
rising over mountains with a tranquil sea at their feet.
On the following day he re-embarked his army and sailed
off for the North, apparently leaving Arenales behind him,
but in reality going off to meet him.
Cochrane in his Memoirs severely criticises the disem
barkation and delay at Pisco, but Camba, who was better
able to judge, speaks of this measure as the first step in
the destruction of the military power of Peru. The same
opinion was expressed by Pezuela in his report to Govern
ment. Cochrane seems to have been anxious only to
conquer the country; the object of San Martin was to
revolutionize it by winning the confidence of the Peruvian
people, and so securing their concurrence in founding a
republic of their own, which concurrence as yet only a
minority of them were prepared to give.

CHAPTER XXVII.
THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN.
1820 — 1821.
The Generalissimo of the Liberating Army of Peru had two
campaigns before him — one military, of which he carried
the plans in his own head ; the other political, the secret
ramifications of which were in his own hands. The first
described a circle, one half of which was drawn along the
coast by the keels of Cochrane's ships ; the other half was
drawn through the Highlands of Peru by the feet of the
flying column under Arenales. These two halves sepa
rated at Pisco to reunite in the north, enclosing Lima
between them.
The second was more complicated. The idea was to
raise into activity the moral force of public opinion, stir
ring up a spirit of insurrection among the Peruvian people,
without the aid of which his military force was inadequate
to the task before it. From Pisco he flooded the country
with proclamations, and organized secret agencies in Lima
and throughout the interior.
On the 29th October the squadron sighted the island of
San Lorenzo, and, passing it, entered the Bay of Callao,
sailing in regular order beyond the range of the batteries,
a glorious pageant. The ships of war came first, with their
crews at quarters and the guns run out. Then came the
long line of transports, their decks crowded with troops in

236 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
all the varied uniforms of the Liberating Army, including
those of the division left behind under Arenales. The
walls of the city and the heights behind were crowded with
spectators. One of these spectators, who has described
the scene, says: "The Liberating expedition and the
capital of Peru were on mutual exhibition."
A part of the squadron remained to blockade Callao,
the rest, with the transports, sailed on to the Bay of Ancon,
twenty-two miles to the north of Lima. Two hundred
infantry and forty of the grenadiers, under Captain
Brandzen, landed, under command of Major Reyes, a
Peruvian, with the object of occupying the village of
Chancay, and collecting horses and provisions.
The Royalist army, encamped at Asnapuquio, six miles
from Lima, sent against them a column of 600 men, under
Colonel Valdes, upon which Reyes retired. Brandzen, who
brought up the rear with his forty horsemen, turned upon
the enemy as they passed a narrow defile, and charged
with such impetuosity that he drove their cavalry back in
confusion upon the infantry, and gained time for Reyes to
make good his retreat with all the cattle he had collected.
Meantime two important events had occurred. Guaya
quil had pronounced in favour of the Revolution, and
Cochrane had cut out the frigate Esmeralda from under the
guns of Callac.
The province of Guayaquil, once a dependency of Peru,
now formed part of the Viceroyalty of New Granada, being
attached to the district governed by the Captain-General
of Quito, but from the exigencies of the moment was for a
time again under the rule of the Viceroy of Peru. The
port of Guayaquil was the arsenal of Spain on the Pacific,
and, Callao being blockaded, was now the last refuge of
the navy dispersed by Cochrane, and was garrisoned by a
strong battalion of Spanish infantry.
Quito had remained quiet since the outbreak of 1809,
but the advance of Bolivar on the north, the invasion of
Peru by San Martin, and the victories of Cochrane on the

REVOLUTION IN GUAYAQUIL. 237
Pacific, aroused a dangerous excitement among the people.
On the 9th October a part of the garrison of Guayaquil
rose in arms, and was supported by the people. The
Province joined the movement, declared itself independent,
appointed a Junta, and placed itself under the protection
of San Martin and Bolivar. Melchor Aymerich, an expe
rienced officer, was at this time Captain-General of Quito,
and had 5,000 men under his command, exclusive of the
garrison of Guayaquil.
The active spirit of Cochrane found nothing more to do
upon the ocean. The Spanish fleet was reduced to three
frigates, the. Prueba, the lrenganza, and the Esmeralda. The
two first, after bringing from the southern ports a division
of the army of Upper Peru, had taken refuge at Guayaquil.
Cochrane boldly determined to capture the other frigate
by cutting her and some smaller vessels out from under
the fire of the 250 guns mounted on the batteries of Callao,
a feat which would increase his renown, and might induce
San Martin to adopt more active operations against Lima,
for the Admiral had no sympathy for his dilatory proceed
ings. He informed San Martin of his intention, and the
Generalissimo accepted the idea with enthusiasm.
Anchored near to the Esmeralda were the corvette Sebas-
tiana, two brigs, two schooners, and three armed merchant
vessels, within a semicircular line of twenty gunboats, all
shut in by a boom, through which there was only one
narrow entrance. Cochrane asked for volunteers. The
whole of his crews offered themselves. From them he
selected 160 seamen and 80 marines. Three days he
employed in preparing fourteen boats, and in instructing
the men. On the night of the 4th November the flotilla
assembled alongside the flag-ship, under lee of the island
of San Lorenzo, where they could not be seen from shore.
On the 5th the three other vessels of the blockading
squadron were sent for a cruise outside. The Spaniards,
thinking the blockade was raised, celebrated the occasion
by a banquet on the Esmeralda. After sundown, amid

238 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
complete silence, an address from the Admiral was passed
round the boats : —
"The moment of glory is approaching. I hope that the
Chilians will fight as they have been accustomed to do,
and that the English will act as they have ever done at
home and abroad."
Men and officers were all dressed in white, Cochrane
himself wearing a blue band round his arm. At half-past
ten the fourteen boats pulled with muffled oars silently
away in two parallel lines, one led by Captain Crosbie,
the other by Captain Guise. Cochrane went himself in
another boat ahead of the rest. The British frigate
Hyperion, and the United States frigate Macedonia, lay at
anchor outside the boom. As the boats passed by the
latter ship, her officers, in low voices, wished the crews
good luck ; but an officer of the Hyperion, who shouted
" Hurrah ! " as he saw them, was put under arrest, for
Cochrane was not popular with the commanders of British
ships, whatever sympathies he might have among the men.
The last boat of the flotilla remained alongside the Mace
donia, and Cochrane, knowing nothing of the desertion,
went on, followed by only thirteen boats.
It was very dark when at midnight they reached the
passage through the boom. It was guarded by a gunboat.
Cochrane, pistol in hand, sprang on board, threatening
instant death to any man who spoke. The crew surren
dered, and the boats rowed on unperceived straight for the
Esmeralda, where Captain Coig and his officers, after their
banquet, were playing cards in the cabin. Cochrane,
leaping into the chains, was the first on board, but was
knocked back into the boat by the sentry on the poop.
In a moment he was up again, followed by his crew. The
sentry fired, but was immediately cut down.
" Up, my lads ! she's ours ! " shouted Cochrane to the
other boats, and then hailed the tops, which were already
occupied by men previously told off for the purpose. The
sails of the ship were at his orders, but the deck was yet

COCHRANE CUTS OUT THE "ESMERALDA." 239
held by the Spanish marines, who had seized their arms
on hearing the shot fired by the sentry.
Cochrane, with the boats led by Crosbie, had boarded
on the starboard quarter ; now Guise and his division
boarded on the port side. The two parties met on the
quarter-deck, Guise and Cochrane shaking hands in the
enthusiasm of the moment. From the forecastle the marines
opened fire upon them. Cochrane was shot through the
thigh. Seating himself on a gun, he bound up the wound
with his handkerchief, and ordered a charge on the enemy.
Twice the assailants were beaten back, and Guise was
wounded ; but again he led on the boarders, and the crew
of the Esmeralda were either forced overboard or driven
below the hatches.
The alarm-gun roared from the castle of Real Felipe ; a
gunboat opened fire on the frigate, by which Captain Coig
was severely wounded, and one Chilian and two English
seamen were killed. The other ships beat to quarters.
Guise, who was now in command, saw the imprudence of
attempting any further captures. He ordered the cables
to be cut, the sails were set, and the Esmeralda sailed
away in the hands of her captors. The ships and the
shore batteries opened a heavy fire upon her. Some of the
shot passing over the Hyperion and Macedonia, these ves
sels hung out distinguishing lights. This contingency
Cochrane had foreseen. Immediately similar lights were
displayed on the Esmeralda, and at half-past two she
anchored off the island of San Lorenzo. The boats fol
lowed her with two gunboats in tow which they captured
as she sailed off.
The loss of the expedition was eleven killed and thirty
wounded. The Spaniards lost about 160 men killed or
drowned, and 200 prisoners.
The Royalists on shore accused the neutral ships of
complicity in this shameful defeat, more especially the
men of the Macedonia, whose sympathy for the cause of
South American Independence was well known. Next

840 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
day, when one of her boats was sent ashore as usual for
provisions, the crew was barbarously massacred by the
infuriated populace.
Cochrane sent a flag of truce on shore proposing an
exchange of prisoners, to which the Viceroy acceded.
About 200 Chilians and Argentines, who had languished
for years in the casemates of Callao, thus recovered their
liberty. The Esmeralda was renamed the Valdivia, in honour of
Cochrane's victory of the year before.
The moral effects of the capture of the Esmeralda were
very great, but from a political point of view the revolu
tion in Guayaquil was of yet more importance. Still San
Martin turned a deaf ear to the counsels of Cochrane,
who advised an immediate advance upon Lima, and on
the 9th the convoy weighed anchor at Ancon, and sailed
to the port of Huacho, which lies ninety miles to the north
of Callao. On the 10th the disembarkation commenced,
and D'Albe, the French engineer, threw up three redoubts
to secure the place. He also improvised a mole to facilitate
communication with the squadron.
The army marched inland, and on the 17th encamped in
the beautiful valley of Huara, which is well watered, and
abounds in trees, and was reputed healthy ; but fevers are
endemical along the coast in the summer, and dysentery
in the autumn.
This valley is seven miles broad by fifty-two miles in
length, and is intersected by a river of the same name
which flows from the Cordillera to the sea. This river is
fordable at several points, but offers many strong positions
for defence against superior forces, of which San Martin
took advantage, and established himself solidly on its
bank, ready to act either on the defensive or on the offen
sive, as occasion might require. In his front stretched a
sandy desert, while one of his flanks rested on Huacho,
and the other on the Sierra. In this position he held
Lima in check, cut off all communication between the

SKIRMISH AT CHANCAY. 241
northern provinces and the capital, could either advance
or retreat at his pleasure, and was ready to effect a
junction with Arenales when he should make his appear
ance. Pezuela occupied the entrenched camp at Asnapuquio
with nearly 7,000 men. He had sent off a small division
against Arenales, and now threw out a vanguard of about
2,000 men to keep watch over the movements of San
Martin. With this vanguard was the battalion of Nu-
mancia, the men of which were for the most part natives
of Venezuela, and the officers were all Americans. The
emissaries of San Martin had been actively at work with
this battalion, and both officers and men now only waited
for an opportunity to join the army of the Patriots. San
Martin determined to give them this opportunity.
The cavalry being now well mounted, he detached
Alvarado with 700 horse against the enemy's vanguard.
Alvarado marched away along the coast on the 24th
November, sending Lieutenant Pringles in advance with
eighteen grenadiers, as escort to a messenger who carried
a missive to inform the disaffected regiment of the approach
of the Patriot cavalry, and was charged to concert measures
with them for their evasion. Pringles had strict orders
not to fight on any account, but, after marching all night,
he found himself at daybreak on the 27th close to the
entire vanguard. In front was an advance party consist
ing of a squadron of dragoons led by Valdes. Upon them
he charged impetuously with his eighteen men, but was
beaten back. Finding his retreat cut off by another
squadron, he attempted to cut his way through it, but lost
three men killed and eleven wounded. Seeing escape
was impossible, he then plunged into the sea with such of
his men as could follow him, but, when Valdes galloped
forward promising quarter, he surrendered.
The fifteen prisoners were paraded in triumph through
the streets of Lima, where the account of this skirmish
excited great enthusiasm. They were afterwards ex-
R

242 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
changed, and Pringles was tried by court-martial. He
was censured for disobedience to orders, but both he and
his companions received a badge of honour bearing the
words, " Glory to the vanquished in Chancay."
The skirmish with Pringles disclosed to Valdes the
proximity of the Patriot cavalry, on which he retired from
the coast into the valley of Chancay, placing the Numancia
battalion on guard in the pass. Alvarado found his way
into the valley by another pass ; but his men and horses
were so fatigued by the rapid march that he was forced to
withdraw to a neighbouring farm in search of rest and
forage. On the ist December he again came up with
the enemy, who retreated through a rugged defile, the
Numancia battalion being left seven miles to the rear of
the main body. On the 3rd this battalion took advantage
of its position to join the Patriot column unmolested, a
welcome contingent of 650 bayonets.
San Martin declared that " the battalion belongs to the
army of Columbia, but shall remain incorporated with the
army of Peru till the close of the war." He showed his
confidence in his new troops by confiding the flag of the
Liberating army to their care.
These events encouraged the spirit of insurrection
throughout Peru, which extended even into the ranks of
the army. Hardly a day passed without some desertions
being reported. On the 8th December thirty-eight officers
and a cadet fled from Lima, and the leaders began to lose
confidence in each other. Some of the principal citizens
of Lima presented an address to the Viceroy, urging upon
him the necessity of an honourable capitulation with
San Martin. He was generally blamed for the untoward
progress of the war, but was, in reality, powerless, his
authority being undermined by a conspiracy which existed
in the army to supplant him by La Serna.
On the 29th November San Martin drove the Royalists
out of the populous department of Huaylas, which lay in
his rear. The people, to the number of 70,000, swore the

REVOLUTION AT TROJILLO. 243
independence of Peru, immediately after which the whole
of the Northern Provinces pronounced spontaneously in
favour of the Revolution.
These were the producing provinces of Peru, and the
chief source of the wealth of the Viceroyalty. They were
almost entirely included in the Intendency of Trujillo, and
had a mixed population of some 300,000 souls.
A Peruvian general, known as the Marquis of Torre-
Tagle, was at that time Governor of Trujillo, and had been
in secret correspondence with San Martin since he landed
at Pisco. On the 24th December Torre-Tagle convened
an open Cabildo at Trujillo, when, after showing the hope
lessness of resistance to the superior force of San Martin,
he advised submission. The Royalists, headed by the
Bishop, stoutly opposed the proposition. He answered
their arguments by shutting them up in prison, and on
the 29th raised the banner invented at Pisco, and, with the
mass of the people, swore to maintain the independence
of Peru. In memory of this event, Trujillo bears to this
day the name of " Departamento de la Libertad."
Torre-Tagle then called upon the city of Piura to join
the movement. This city was garrisoned by a Royalist
battalion, and the people were unarmed ; but the attitude
of the Patriot leaders was so determined that the soldiery
disbanded. In this way the whole of the North of Peru,
from Chancay to Guayaquil, fell into the hands of the
Patriots, and San Martin secured a safe base of operations,
from which he could draw supplies and horses, and which
gave him at once a reinforcement of 430 infantry and 200
cavalry. On the 5th January, 1821, San Martin advanced with
his whole army to Retes, seeking a junction with Arenales.
La Serna, who was now in command of the Royalist army,
with Canterac as chief of the staff, immediately prepared
to attack him in a most disadvantageous position, but lost
so many days in these preparations in consequence of the
inefficient state of the army, that the friends of San Martin
R 2

244 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
in Lima had time to advise him of his danger. Meantime
he was joined by Arenales, and at once retired to his
former position in the valley of Huara. The opportunity
thus lost greatly increased the unpopularity of the Viceroy
with the army. The effects of the blockade of Callao by
Cochrane began now to be severely felt in Lima, and were
greatly aggravated by the operations of bands of guerillas
which San Martin had organized among the country-
people. An Argentine from Salta named Villar, who had
been a prisoner in the casemates of Callao, was the com
mander of these guerillas. They infested all the roads
leading to the capital, and frequently destroyed small
detached parties of troops or outposts of the Royalist
army. From Huara San Martin decreed a " Provisional Regu
lation," by which the territory occupied by the Patriots
was divided into four departments, each under a President,
who had under him governors of districts, while a Court
of Appeal was established at Trujillo. This was the first
attempt at Constitutional administration in Peru, and pre
pared the way for a National Government.
In three months San Martin had achieved success as
great as the winning of a pitched battle could have given
him, a result which amply falsifies the accusations of
inactivity or timidity which have been brought against
him, for these successes were gained by an army of 4,000
men opposed to one of 23,000.

CHAP IER XXVIII.
THE FIRST CAMPAIGN IN THE HIGHLANDS.
1820 — 1821.
Peru may be looked upon as a conglomeration of moun
tains, enclosed within a sort of triangle, whose base on
the third degree of south latitude measures about eight
hundred miles, from which it extends southward for about
fifteen hundred miles to the southern frontier of Upper
Peru on the eighteenth degree of south latitude, where the
width of the triangle is reduced to about sixty miles. This
territory comprises three zones ; the coast zone, the high
land zone, and the mountain zone. Along the shores of
the Pacific ocean lies a belt of sand, never more than sixty
miles in width, cut by twenty-three rivers, which flow
from the Highlands to the sea through fertile valleys,
separated by deserts of sand-hills, moved to and fro by
the winds ; on which sand-hills there is no sign of vege
tation, neither are there birds in the air, nor reptiles on
the earth ; a far-stretching series of deserts on which rain
never falls. This is the region now in part occupied by
San Martin and his army.
On the east of this " Tierra Caliente " rises abruptly
the western range of the Andes ; further still to the east
stretches the huge line of the true Cordillera. Between
these ranges there lies in Upper Peru a vast tableland,
but in Lower Peru the intervening space is intersected by
numerous valleys and by the Andine lakes, which are
sometimes as much as 16,000 feet above the level of the
sea. Under the Viceroys, Lower Peru was divided into eight

246 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
" Intendencias " : the most northern of these was that of
Trujillo, which was also the largest in extent, and by
geographical position formed a distinct country. Those
of Lima and Arequipa extended along the coast, those of
Cuzco and Puno lay further inland to the South, bordering
upon Upper Peru ; while in the centre lay the Intenden
cias of Huancavelica, Huamanga, and Tarma. These three
form the Highlands of Peru, and are intersected in every
direction by foaming torrents, passable only by suspen
sion bridges hanging from cables of raw hide.* The only
roads from the coast into this region pass by deep gorges
through the coast range of the Cordillera, and wind round
the higher mountains along the edge of precipices, ever
ascending till they reach the tableland lying between the
range and the main Cordillera.
General Arenales had already distinguished himself in
mountain warfare, as is set forth in Chapter V., and was
thus selected by San Martin at Pisco to command the
flying column, which was to make its way through the
Highlands and rejoin the main army in the North, which
went by sea. The chief object of this expedition was to
spread the revolutionary propaganda through the interior
of the country, but it would also distract the attention of
the enemy, and possibly prevent the concentration of his
forces at Lima.
The column consisted of two battalions of infantry under
Major Dehesa and Colonel Aldunate ; one squadron of
cavalry under Major Lavalle, and two guns. Colonel
Rojas was chief of the staff. On the night of the 5th Octo
ber Arenales marched in a south-easterly direction upon
lea, where Colonel Quimper was stationed with 800 men.
At his approach two companies of infantry passed over to
him, and Quimper hastily retreated along the coast. He
was pursued by Rojas with 250 men, and overtaken at
the village of Nasca. The Patriot cavalry, led by Lavalle,
charged at once, and taking the Royalists by surprise,
utterly routed them, with a loss of 41 killed and 86
* For a description of a similar bridge in Chile, see Appendix TV.

BATTLE OF PASCO.

247

prisoners. On the following day, the 16th October,
Lieutenant Suarez, with thirty light horse, captured the
baggage, so that the first force detached from the army of
Lima against the expedition was totally destroyed.
The movements of Arenales were so well masked by
the manoeuvres of the main army, that the Viceroy knew
nothing of them until the 30th October, and then allowed
several days to pass before he sent off reinforcements into
the menaced district. Thus Arenales ascended the moun
tain passes unopposed, and on the 31st October occupied
the city of Huamanga, after a march of 255 miles in ten
days. Here he gave his troops some rest, but sent out
detachments under Lavalle and Rojas, who routed several
parties of the enemy very superior in number, and cap
tured the city of Tarma, so that by the 2 1 st November he
was in complete possession of the valley of Jauja, which is
watered by the Rio Grande.
After arming the militia and giving some political
organization to the liberated districts, he marched on
Pasco, which O'Reilly had occupied with a division of
1,000 men, sent from Lima. On the morning of the
6th December, during a heavy fall of snow, he occupied a
hill in front of the town but separated from it by a small
lake and by marshes. O'Reilly on perceiving him, drew
up his men in front of the town, but the Patriot infantry
led by Aldunate and Dehesa, advanced resolutely under
fire of the artillery, and drove them back into the town at
the point of the bayonet, where they dispersed, while
Lavalle, wading through the marshes, charged the enemy's
cavalry and put them to flight.
The trophies of this smart action were 343 prisoners,
including General O'Reilly and Colonel Santa Cruz, a
regimental flag, and two guns ; but the most important
effect of the victory was to open the road for communica
tion with San Martin at Huara.
Arenales had left a strong rear-guard at lea under two
officers named Bermudez and Aldao, who being attacked
by very superior forces, were compelled to follow the main

248 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
body up the mountain passes to Huancayo, and were
much harassed on their way by hordes of Indian slingers.
Meantime the Spanish General, Ricafort, who was on
the march from Arequipa to Lima with a detachment of
the reserve, heard of the doings of Arenales and ascended
from the coast into the Highlands, where he was joined
by a reinforcement from Cuzco, and having collected
1,300 men marched upon Huamanga. Here he was met
by a horde of Indians, who had broken out in insurrection,
and having got possession of some guns and a few mus
kets, opened fire upon him from the high ground in front
of their city. He had no great difficulty in defeating them
and gave no quarter. The fugitives being joined by other
parties of insurgents, then occupied the village of Can-
gallo with about 4,000 men. Ricafort marched against
them with 400 infantry and 200 horse, and again routed
them on the 2nd December, killing a thousand of them
without losing one man. The village was sacked and
burnt. Ricafort then returned to Huamanga, and then learning
that Bermudez and Aldao had put themselves at the head
of the insurgents of Huancayo, marched against them with
his whole force, dispersed the raw Indian levies, captured
the town and sacked it. Aldao, who with a small body
of horse, had greatly distinguished himself in this affair,
retired to Jauja, where, quarrelling with Bermudez, he put
himself at the head of the insurrection in conjunction with
Otero, an Argentine, who had been appointed Governor
by the Patriots. Then learning that Arenales had marched
to the coast, he retreated to Reyes, but afterwards hearing
that Ricafort had withdrawn his force from the Highlands
and gone to Lima, he returned, re-occupied Huancayo,
and raised an army of 5,000 Indians, to which he gave
same rough sort of military organization.
Arenales rejoined the main army on the 8th January,
1 82 1, after a triumphant march of 840 miles through the
centre of the enemy's territory, with a hostile army on
each side of him.

CHAPTER XXIX.
THE ARMISTICE OF PUNCHAUCA.
1821.
At the commencement of the year 1821 the Royalist cause
appeared completely lost in Peru. Pezuela, at a council
of general officers, declared, without reserve, " the impos
sibility of continuing the defence of the country."
This speaks highly for the political and military talents
of San Martin, who in four short months had achieved this
result. That the Spanish leaders, abandoned by the
mother country, should raise up the fallen standard of the
King, and with resources drawn from the country itself
should maintain the struggle for yet another four years,
speaks quite as highly for their talents and energy.
When Badajoz was besieged by the French in 181 1,
Colonel Menacho, who was San Martin's first chief, was in
command of the garrison. He died, and in a council of
war then held, one officer only voted for holding out. The
city surrendered. The following year the Regency, with
the approval of the Cortes, declared that in such a case,
" if one officer voted for resistance, even though he was a
subaltern, the garrison should not capitulate, and the said
officer should take the command." The leaders of the
Spanish forces in Peru maintained that this decision gave
them the right to refuse to surrender. The Liberal ideas
brought by late reinforcements from Spain, while they
weakened political authority, strengthened the power of
the military element.

2S0 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
The ill-concerted measures adopted by the Viceroy to
meet invasion, the timid prosecution of the war, and the
successes of the Patriots, deepened the antagonism of the
different parties into which the Royalist camp was divided.
The idea of treachery on the part of the Viceroy became
general ; it was believed that he contemplated a shameful
capitulation. Before adopting extreme measures, the
Liberal leaders, headed by La Serna and Vald6s, prevailed
upon Pezuela to create a " Junta of War," which worked
like a fifth wheel in a coach ; and the inactivity of the
Viceroy on the occasion when San Martin advanced to
Retes, precipitated matters. It was resolved to depose
him. On the night of 28th January, 1821, La Serna withdrew
from the encampment at Asnapuquio. The next day
Canterac and Valdes paraded the army, and the officers
being convened to a council of war, summoned the Viceroy
to lay down the supreme command in four hours, " as the
only means of preventing disturbances and preserving
Peru to Spain." Pezuela resigned, and the power fell
into the hands of the Spanish Constitutionalists, who were
thus forced, in defence of the rights of the mother country,
to fight in the cause of an absolute King, against their own
principles as upheld by the Patriots of America.
The first act of La Serna, now Viceroy, was to invite
San Martin to send Commissioners to a conference, for
the purpose of putting an end to the disputes between
Spaniards and Americans. San Martin joyfully acceded,
and named Guido and Alvarado representatives of the
Patriot cause. La Serna on his side appointed Colonels
Valdes and Loriga.
The Commissioners met at a farm-house near Retes,
when the Spanish officers presented a modification of the
proposals of Miraflores, on the basis of the acceptance of
the Spanish Constitution. The others declined to nego
tiate on any other basis than the recognition of the inde
pendence of Peru.

CONFERENCE AT RETES. 251
Alvarado then asked Loriga to walk out with him,
leaving the other two to discuss the question. The
Spanish officer accepted the invitation, and during their
promenade informed Alvarado that they thought of aban
doning Lima and retiring to the more healthy Highlands,
where, with abundant supplies at command, they could
easily beat off any attack of the Patriots. This informa
tion was the only immediate result of the conference, but
it gave rise to further negotiations, on the basis of the
establishment of an independent monarchy in Peru.
The change of Viceroys in no way improved the posi
tion of the Royalists ; on the contrary, fresh disasters
befell the army of Lima, and the new general fell into the
same errors as his predecessor. The scarcity of provisions
became worse in the city, and yellow fever broke out in
the army, while the arrival of a royal commissioner from
Spain prevented La Serna from taking any decided step.
The condition of the Patriot army at Huara was not
much better. It also suffered greatly from fever, so that
barely a thousand men were fit for service. San Martin
himself fell ill, but his guerillas cut off supplies from Lima,
and expeditions along the coast or into the Highlands
kept the enemy in continual alarm.
On the 25th March the envoy from the new Government
of Spain, a naval officer named Abreu, arrived at Huara,
where he was well received. Four days he remained
there, holding long conversations with San Martin, for
whom he conceived a great admiration. At his instigation
La Serna attempted to negotiate privately with San
Martin, but San Martin replied that he would listen to
nothing which was not proposed officially, and about the
same time sent a column of his sickly troops, commanded
by Miller, to act under Cochrane's orders against Callao,
and another under Arenales into the Highlands. Then
leaving a strong rear-guard in charge of the hospitals and
park at Huara, he embarked the rest of his troops in
transports, and dropped down the coast to Ancon, whence

252 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
his cavalry, aided by guerillas, scoured the country, and
shut up the Royalists within a small triangle formed by
the encampment at Asnapuquio, Lima, and Callao, and
there awaited the opening of a formal negotiation.
After the Liberal movement in Spain in 1820 the revolu-
sionists of South America were no longer spoken of as
rebels Or insurgents, but were recognized by the Home
Government as belligerents, and were now invited by
King Ferdinand, by a proclamation, to treat for peace
with their brethren of the old country, " as their equals,"
but they were offered only the Constitution of 1812, which
they had already rejected by declaring themselves inde
pendent, and were threatened with forcible compulsion in
case of refusal. This olive-branch of peace, wafted across
the seas, only supplied fresh fuel to the flames of war.
Envoys from Spain bearing this message of peace had
reached the northern part of the continent in December,
1820, during an armistice between Bolivar and Morillo.
They had persuaded Bolivar to send Columbian commis
sioners to Spain, but in April, 1821, before anything could
be known as to their prospects of success, hostilities
recommenced, and there were no further attempts at
negotiation. To Mexico also the same message was sent, a message
apparently one of peace and conciliation, which, when
looked into, was seen to mean submission or war, and to
which, in Mexico as elsewhere, answer was given in one
formula, independence or war.
When in 1820 the revolution broke out in Spain the
revolution in Mexico was crushed. General Vicente
Guerrero, with a handful of men, alone upheld the flag of
insurrection in the rough country to the south. In Mexico
the movement was chiefly the work of the indigenous
element of the population, and assumed the character of a
rising of the proletariat against the superior classes, thus
arousing a spirit of resistance in the country itself, which
powerfully aided the efforts of the Royalist troops for its

THE REVOLUTION IN MEXICO. 253
suppression. But amid this discord of opinions a senti
ment for independence was latent in the hearts of all, so
that the defeat of the insurrection combined with the
Liberal movement in Spain to bring about a pacific evo
lution. The proclamation of a Liberal regime in the mother
country produced in Mexico a split among the various
parties who had upheld the colonial system. While
Spaniards became Absolutists or Constitutionalists, the
natives became Republicans or Monarchists. Apodaca
was at that time Viceroy. He put himself at the head of
a reaction, and is said to have been incited thereto by the
King, who, fearful of the fate of Louis XVL, proposed
withdrawing from Europe to Mexico, there to reign with
absolute power, free from the trammels of a Constitution.
This reaction could not triumph without the aid of the
native Monarchists.
Among the Creoles who had served in the Royalist
ranks, and had distinguished himself by cruelties to his
own countrymen, was a man named Agustin Iturbide,
then thirty-seven years of age. Unscrupulous in the pur
suit of wealth, of life either dissolute or ascetic as best
served his interests, and with some natural talent, he
was possessed by a secret ambition, in which race-
patriotism had a place. His sleep was broken by envious
dreams of the laurels gained by Bolivar and San Martin,
and though lacking the great qualities of either of them,
he aspired to be the liberator of Central America. This
was the man selected by Apodaca to aid his plan of re
action, by leading the natives to support his policy. He
appointed him Commandant-General of the South, and
sent him with a division of native troops to stamp out
the embers of insurrection kept alive by Guerrero.
Iturbide soon came to an understanding with Guerrero
and threw off the mask.
On the 24th February, 1820, in the town of Iguala, one
hundred and twenty-seven miles from the city of Mexico,

254 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Iturbide published a document known to history as the
" Plan of Iguala." In it he proclaimed the independence
of Mexico, and at the same time hoisted a flag symbolic
of the new revolution, a tri-colour, white, red, and green ;
white signifying religious purity, red signifying friend
ship with Spain, and green signifying the hope of eman
cipation. The plan was in three parts, from which it took
the name of the plan of the "three guarantees," a name
which was also applied to the army which upheld it. The
first part stipulated the establishment of the Catholic reli
gion to the exclusion of every other ; the second part
declared Mexico an independent state, under a monar
chical government tempered by a constitution ; the third
part stipulated the union of Americans and Europeans.
King Ferdinand was recognized as Emperor of Mexico, if
he would come and swear to the constitution, and after
him his brothers in natural succession ; in default of
whom, Congress should name a prince of one of the
royal houses of Europe. Further, the equality of all the
races — indigenous, African, and European — was pro
claimed, without other distinction between them than that
given by individual merit or virtue.
The leaders of the insurrection, with Guerrero, abjuring
for the moment their Republican principles, placed them
selves under the orders of Iturbide for the sake of national
independence. The Creoles who had opposed the revolu
tion gave in their adhesion to the new " Plan." The
clergy adopted it in hatred of the reforms of the Spanish
Liberals ; the Spanish Absolutists in hatred of the Consti
tution ; and the Constitutionalists for the sake of peace.
The whole country pronounced in favour of the " Plan of
Iguala." The Royalists, conquered without fighting, held
only the capital, the port of Vera Cruz, and the fortress of
San Juan de Ulua. In July, 1821, Iturbide was acclaimed
Liberator of the country.
By this means a solution was found for the dilemma —
submission, or independence and war. The bond with the

THE CONFERENCE AT PUNCHAUCA. 255:
mother country was untied but was not broken. Thus was
it understood by O'Donoju, the successor to Apodaca, who
subscribed to the " Plan of Iguala " by treaty, in August,
1821. In Brazil, about this time, took place an evolution
similar to the plan proposed by Iturbide, while in Columbia
the armistice was broken, and in Peru negotiations, based
on ideas similar to those enunciated in the " Plan of
Iguala," came to an end.
We have nothing more to do with the history of Mexico.
Suffice it that the Spanish Government rejected the treaty
signed by O'Donoju ; that Mexico was lost for ever to
Spain ; that Iturbide seated himself on the vacant throne
and was crowned Emperor, only to be deposed soon after
wards and banished. On attempting to recover his dignity
he was shot.
The negotiations initiated confidentially by the Viceroy
in Peru were more formally carried forward by an official
invitation from him. La Serna appointed Don Manuel de
Llano y Najera and Don Mariano Galdiano, both of whom
were Americans, as colleagues to Abreu. San Martin ap
pointed Guido, Garcia del Rio, and Jose Ignacio de la
Rosa, formerly Governor of San Juan, to -represent the
Patriots. The farm-house of Punchauca, fifteen miles from
Lima, was made the meeting place of the Commissioners.
Neither party made any preliminary stipulation, both pro
fessed to be anxious for peace and union.
The Royalist Commissioners were instructed to propose
the acceptance of the Spanish Constitution, with some con
cessions in detail, in accordance with the spirit of the pro
clamation of King Ferdinand. Those of the Patriots were
instructed by San Martin to reject the Spanish Constitu
tion as a bond of union, and to insist upon the recog
nition of the independence of Chile, of the Provinces of the
River Plate, and of Peru, without consenting to any
armistice, except on this basis. In case it were proposed
that the Patriots should send Commissioners to Spain to

256 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
treat of this matter, they were to demand, as a preliminary,
the evacuation of Lima, and were to refuse to enter into
any treaty for the conduct of the war, which had been
spoken of, as it had up to then been carried on in accord
ance with the law of Nations.
The Royalist Commissioners opened the discussion by
presenting a note, on the 4th May, 1821, stating that in
regard to the suggestion made by San Martin at Mira
flores, that independence should be secured by the estab
lishment of a monarchy with a sovereign from the royal
house of Spain, they had no power to make any such
arrangement, and recommended the adoption of the
Spanish Constitution since it was a proof of the liberal
sentiments of the Spanish Government and of their desire
for reconciliation. Further, they proposed an armistice,
while commissioners were sent by both parties to Spain,
as had been done by Bolivar in Columbia. To this the
Patriot Commissioners replied, on the day following, that
no negotiations could be entertained except on the basis
of the recognition of independence, but in view of the
inability of the Spanish Commanders to make this recog
nition, they were willing to consent to a suspension of
arms, with some guarantee, and that they hoped no
further mention would be made of the Spanish Constitu
tion, the very name being obnoxious to the liberties of the
New World.
To this no answer was given, but an armistice of sixteen
months was proposed by the Royalist Commissioners.
Then the Patriots demanded that the fortifications of
Callao should be handed over to them intact, as a
guarantee, to be delivered up if hostilities should again
break out, and their note concluded as follows : —
" If Don Jose de San Martin be determined to achieve
the independence of America by arms or by negotiation, he
is no less desirous of uniting this part of the New World
to the mother country by those bonds of friendship and
commerce which would redound to the prosperity of both."

THE CONFERENCE AT PUNCHAUCA. 257
To the surprise of the Patriot Commissioners themselves,
the Viceroy acceded to the terms of the proposed armistice,
only stipulating that he should withdraw twelve heavy
guns from Callao. It then became easy to arrange the
terms of a provisional armistice of twenty days, during
which it was stipulated that La Serna and San Martin,
accompanied by their respective commissioners, should
meet on the 23rd May.
Neither party seems to have acted in good faith on this
occasion. La Serna had written, on the 7th April, to his
generals in the Highlands, that he did not believe that the
negotiation would lead to any result, and instructed them
to occupy advantageous positions which they might hold
during a possible suspension of hostilities. San' Martin
afterwards declared, in a confidential letter to O'Higgins,
that the division of Arenales required a rest after passing
through the Highlands, and that he himself had twelve
hundred sick. He knew very well that arrogant Spain
would never admit a recognition of independence which
was forced upon her.
On the 2nd June, the interview between San Martin and
La Serna took place at Punchauca. The two leaders met
very cordially, with expressions of mutual esteem. San
Martin proposed the appointment of a regency for the
independent government of Peru, until the arrival of a
prince of the Royal House of Spain ; the said regency to
consist of La Serna as President, with two colleagues, one
named by the Royalists, the other by the Patriots, and
offered to go himself to Spain as a commissioner to
arrange matters with the Home Government.
Abreu expressed himself warmly in favour of the pro
position, and the Viceroy appeared willing to accept it,
but desired to consult the various corporations of the Vice-
royalty before concluding so important an arrangement,
and promised an answer in two days. They then dis
cussed, informally, the mode in which the troops of both
armies should unite in the public square of Lima to
S

258 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
solemnise the declaration of the independence of Peru.
To the interview succeeded a banquet, at which the most
friendly toasts were exchanged.
In all this the policy of San Martin was fundamentally
wrong. He had no authority to make any such proposi
tion. It was not in accordance with the principles for
which he fought, and the applause with which it was
received by the Monarchists of the Holy Alliance, implies
its condemnation by the Republicans of America.
La Serna was more clear-sighted. Instead of consulting
the corporations he consulted his officers, who, without
absolutely rejecting the proposition, declined to accept it
immediately, as it was in direct contravention of their
orders, which forbade them to treat on the basis of colonial
independence. On this, La Serna 'sent Valdes and Camba to
arrange, if possible, with San Martin for a suspension of
hostilities, until he had time to consult the Home Govern
ment. On the refusal of San Martin to listen to this pro
posal the commissioners again met at Miraflores, and, as
neither party was ready to resume hostilities, the armistice
was prolonged for twelve days, and San Martin consented
to relax the blockade of Lima so as to permit the entrance
of supplies sufficient for the daily wants of the citizens,
" as he did not make war upon the people." This measure
greatly increased the power of the partisans of the Patriot
cause in the capital, and they prevailed upon the Cabildo
to make a representation to the Viceroy in favour of peace,
to which representation he paid no attention, and it pro
duced great irritation in the army.
At this time San Martin received a visit from Captain
Basil Hall, of the British navy, who, in his Journal, has given
a very graphic account of the policy of the great General.*
During the rest of the armistice the Commissioners kept
up appearances by still continuing to meet, while both
parties actively prepared for the resumption of hostilities.
La Serna detached Canterac with the most healthy of his
* See Appendix V.

THE ROYALISTS EVACUATE LIMA. 259
troops, to occupy Huancavelica, thus to be ready to meet
the advance of Arenales into the Highlands. San Martin
returned with all his army to Huacho.
On the 4th July, the armistice having run out, La Serna
publicly announced his determination to abandon Lima,
and delegated the supreme authority to the Marquis of
Montemira. He left a garrison of 2,000 men in the fortifi
cations of Callao, 1,000 sick in the hospitals, and, on the
morning of the 6th, marched off with barely 2,000 men, by
the valley of Cafiete.
The city was panic struck. The leading Spaniards fled
with their families to Callao. The women rushed to the
monasteries. San Martin hastened to reassure the people
by a letter to the Archbishop, and, faithful to his declared
policy, made no attempt to occupy the city. A deputation
of the inhabitants waited upon him, asking his protection :
whereupon he ordered the guerillas, of whom they were
most afraid, to retire from the neighbourhood, and sur
rounded the city with a cordon of regular troops, placing
them under the orders of the civil governor. Still the
citizens could not believe that he was acting in good faith
till an order from the Governor to a regiment of cavalry,
which had encamped a mile and a half from the city, to
retire to a greater distance, was at once obeyed, when con
fidence was restored, and, at the invitation of the authorities,
at sundown on the 9th, a division of the army entered the
city amid the shouts of the populace.
The next day, after sundown, San Martin, accompanied
only by an aide-de-camp, rode quietly through the streets
of the city to the palace of the Viceroys, where the citizens
thronged to give him welcome, and the members of the
Cabildo, hurriedly convened, presented him with an
address. He soon wearied of their enthusiastic protesta
tions of regard, and, remounting his horse at half past ten,
he rode out to the village of Mirones, half-way to Callao,
where he had established the headquarters of his army, as
a preliminary step to laying siege to the fortress.
S 2

260 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
On the nth he issued various proclamations to the
citizens, and the royal arms were torn down from over the
doors of the public offices, the escutcheon of Peru being
put in their place, with the inscription Lima Independiente.
San Martin also issued a proclamation to the inhabitants
of the liberated departments, calling them to arms, and
promising, with their assistance, to finish the campaign in
forty days. But he took no active measures in furtherance
of this project. Apparently he attached too much import
ance to the possession of Lima, for, with the exception of
Trujillo, the country had as yet made no effort to second
him, and remained passively watching the course of
events. The Viceroy, with his dispirited army, was allowed to
retreat almost unmolested, though his loss by desertion
was very great. Canterac was already securely estab
lished in the Highlands. San Martin here repeated the
mistake he was guilty of after Chacabuco. Again he
showed want of energy in following up a victory. He
attached too much importance to the success which had so
far attended his political combinations.

CHAPTER XXX.
THE SECOND CAMPAIGN IN THE HIGHLANDS.
1821.
When Arenales rejoined the main army at Huara, and
Ricafort descended by the mountain passes to Lima, Aldao
and his Indian hordes were left in possession of the greater
part of the Highlands, opposed only by a division under
Carratala, who held Huancavelica and Huamanga. Aldao
had given his Indians some sort of organization, styling
the cavalry " The Mounted Grenadiers of Peru," and the
infantry, "The Loyalists of Peru," under which names
they figured as the two first Peruvian regiments on the
muster roll of the liberating army. San Martin had small
faith in such troops, nevertheless, as a step towards form
ing a native army, he appointed Colonel Gamarra, a
Peruvian, Commandant-General of the Highlands, and in
February sent him, with a number of officers of all ranks,
to take the command.
About the same time Ricafort returned to Huanca
velica, and one of the first measures of La Serna after
he became Viceroy, was to send Valdes with 1,200 men
to support him. The united forces of the Royalists num
bered 2,500 men, but on advancing against Aldao, they
found that the suspension bridges over the Rio Grande
had been cut by the Indians. Nevertheless they found a
place at which they could ford the stream and easily put
<to flight the raw levies opposed to them.

262 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Before they could reach Gamarra, he had retreated from
Jauja and Pasco with 600 of Aldao's men, by the pass of
Oyuna, where his men dispersed. Carratala remained
watching the pass, while Valdes and Ricafort returned by
Canta to Lima ; but were so harassed on the march
by Vidal's guerillas, that an entire company of light
infantry were taken prisoners, and Ricafort, badly wounded,
was carried into Lima on a stretcher.
It was then that Arenales marched from Huara on his
second expedition to the Highlands. The purpose of this
expedition was to hasten the evacuation of Lima and to
occupy such positions as would prevent the Royalists
from re-establishing themselves in the Highlands ; then
to open communications at lea with another expedition,
which was sent along the coast southwards under Miller.
For the first of these purposes the guerillas, guarding the
passes from Lima, were instructed to obey all orders
received from Arenales. In case of disaster, Arenales was
instructed to retire on the reserve stationed at Huaylas.
The division of Arenales consisted of 2,200 men, the
column under Miller of 600, thus San Martin was left with
about 3,000 sick and convalescent in front of the Royalist
Army of 7,000.
The troops sent with Arenales, worn out by the endemic
fevers of the coast, were more like spectres than men, so
that the first movements of the expedition were very slow.
The Cordillera was crossed by the Oyon Pass on the 6th
May. The heights were covered with snow and the cold
was intense. Aldao with the remnants of his division led
the van. Pasco was occupied on the nth, and Carratala
retired precipitately. Tarma and Jauja were taken on the
20th and 23rd, and Carratala continuing to retreat, the
valley of Huancayo lay open to the Patriots on the 25th.
Arenales now prepared for a vigorous attack upon Car
ratala, when advice reached him of the signing of the
armistice of Punchauca, which put a stop to operations for
the present, retired to Jauja and employed himself in

ARENALES. 263
reorganizing his force, now swelled by recruiting to over
4,000 men.
Arenales was a peculiar character. Austere and subtile,
his military ideas were as conspicuous for foresight as for
audacity, while his every act was inspired by a sense ol
justice and duty. He was very strict with his subordinates,
who both feared and respected him. He went about
attended only by an orderly, had only one spare charger
and one baggage mule. He himself saddled and unsad
dled his horse, and shod him himself also. He mended
his own boots and uniform, and was so careless of dress
that San Martin at times had his valise replenished for
him, unknown to him. On the march he carried his own
provisions in his saddle-bags — a cheese and a piece of
cold beef. San Martin styled him " Mi companero," and
was more familiar with him than with any one else. He
responded by exact obedience to orders, but did not
scruple to criticise them whenever he thought proper..
From Jauja Arenales wrote San Martin, earnestly im
pressing upon him the advisability of transferring his
whole force to the Highlands, leaving Lima to be watched
by the fleet, but at the conclusion of the armistice he
resumed operations by marching against Canterac, who
had passed the Cordillera, when, on the 12th July, he
received a despatch from San Martin, ordering him to
retire on Pasco or on Lima, if menaced by the enemy.
Arenales saw clearly that this movement would entail
the destruction of his division ; he had heard of the evacua
tion of Lima, but knew nothing of the movements of La
Serna. In his perplexity he called a council of war, at
which it was decided to retire to Huancayo.
This movement was the salvation of Canterac, who had
lost so heavily on the march from Lima, that he reached
Huancavelica with only 1,500 starving men. La Serna,
marching on Jauja, found the passes occupied by the
mountaineers, who rolled great rocks down the mountain
slopes upon his troops, so that, after heavy loss, he was

264 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
forced to retreat, after throwing several guns into the
river. Then following the route previously taken by Can
terac, he joined him on the 4th August, the united force
numbering barely 4,000 men, of whom many were sick.
At Huancayo Arenales found that Vidal and his gue
rillas had withdrawn to Lima, on which he continued his
retreat to Jauja. Thence he wrote again to San Martin,
showing him how the occupation of Lima would be as
disastrous to the Patriot as it had been to the Royalist
army, but in obedience to orders continued his retreat,
losing hundreds of his new recruits by desertion.
Again he wrote to San Martin, proposing a new plan of
campaign, which would compensate for the loss of the
Highlands. The answer he received was an order to
continue his retreat to Lima.
The division entered the capital in triumph on the day
set apart for the celebration of the Independence of Peru,
which by these mistaken measures was virtually postponed
for another four years.

CHAPTER XXXI.
THE EXPEDITION TO THE SOUTH.
1821.
Cochrane, having failed to persuade San Martin to under
take active operations against Lima, and not content with
the role imposed upon him of simply blockading Callao,
set his fertile brain to work to devise some means of cap
turing these fortifications.
San Martin entered heartily into his plans, and by
means of his secret agents opened communications with
some of the subordinate officers of the fortress, and placed
Miller with 550 men under the orders of the Admiral.
Nails, made in Lima for the purpose, were distributed
among the conspirators, who were to spike the guns when
an attack was made on the northern forts ; a part of the
garrison was bought over, and false keys were made to
open the gates ; but the Viceroy, who seemed to be quite
as well served by his spies as San Martin was by his,
took measures to circumvent these plans, so nothing was
attempted. Cochrane then proposed, with a small force of infantry
moved rapidly by sea from place to place, to wear out the
Royalist army by continual marchings to and fro ; and
San Martin at last resolved to send an expedition to the
South, to co-operate with the movements of Arenales in
the Highlands. Six hundred picked infantry and eighty

266 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
horse under Miller, were placed at the disposal of Coch
rane for this purpose.
On the 22nd March Miller and his troops landed at
Pisco, and took possession of the town of Chincha, under
protection of the guns of the San Martin, O'Higgins, and
Valdivia, an attack on an advanced party by Colonel
Loriga being beaten off by Captain Videla.
On the same day an insurrectionary movement took
place in Cuzco, headed by Colonel Lavin, an Argentine,
formerly an ardent Royalist, but at this time under arrest
in that city on account of an abortive conspiracy at Are
quipa. The insurrection was put down, all the insurgents,
including Lavin, being killed.
Leaving Miller at Chincha, the Admiral then sailed off
to Cerro Azul, but being unable to effect a landing on
account of the heavy sea, he wrote to San Martin again,
advising an attack on Lima, and later on asked for a fur
ther reinforcement of infantry for an attack on Cerro Azul,
which was the key to the provinces of the south. San
Martin could spare no more men, whereupon he wrote to
O'Higgins, asking for a contingent which would enable
Miller to penetrate into Upper Peru. San Martin also
wrote in support of this suggestion, but the Chilian Govern
ment replied that they could do no more, which was the
simple truth. Meantime the Spaniards at Pisco and their
adherents suffered heavily from forced contributions, to the
great discredit of the expedition.
The Viceroy, on hearing of the landing at Pisco, des
patched a division, under Camba, to watch the movements
of the Patriots. Inland from Pisco lay two beautiful val
leys, the Chincha Alta and the Chincha Baja. Camba
encamped in the first of these valleys, while Miller moved
up from the town and encamped in the second. For a
month the two parties sat watching, each the other, nothing
doing, then an enemy more to be feared than either came
down on both of them, the endemic fever of the coast, the
tertian ague. Both those beautiful valleys became hos-

MILLER'S EXPEDITION TO THE SOUTH. 267
pitals, where officers and men alike lay prostrate. Coch-
rane's idea of wearing out the Royalist army by fruitless
marchings to and fro was by no means easy of [accom
plishment, yet still he persevered. On the 22nd April the
expedition was re-embarked, Miller being carried on board,
while most of his men were barely able to hold their
muskets. Cochrane then sailed away for Arica, where there was a
six-gun battery and a garrison of 300 men. After a fruit
less cannonade, 250 men were landed higher up the coast
in, two divisions, one of which, led by Miller, marched on
the city of Tacna ; while Major Soler of the grenadiers
marched with the other upon Arica, which is the port of
Tacna. Arica was evacuated by the enemy on his ap
proach, and Soler, starting in pursuit, captured a string of
mules on the road to Lima, which were laden with 120,000
dollars in specie. Effects to the value of 300,000 dollars,
the property of Spaniards resident in Lima, were also con
fiscated in the town and shipped on board the San Martin.
Miller was received with enthusiasm at Tacna, and was
joined by many volunteers. The garrisons of both the
city and the port passed over to him, and were embodied
in a new battalion styled " The Loyalists of Peru." Coch
rane presented the new corps with a flag, a golden sun on
a blue ground.
One of the volunteers was a Peruvian named Landa, a
man of gigantic stature, and well acquainted with the
country, who had served in the ranks of the Royalists. To
the service which he subsequently rendered to the Patriots
much of the success of the expedition may be attributed.
Another of the volunteers was Colonel Portocarrero, also a
Peruvian, who was one of the secret agents of San Martin.
Miller had now 900 men under his orders, of whom 400
were drilled troops, and determined to enter upon a formal
campaign. Rumour had greatly exaggerated the number
of his forces, and all the country about was in a ferment.
General Ramirez, who was stationed at Puno, directed

568 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
several detached corps to concentrate on the river Ilo,
under Colonel Santos la Hera, to resist the invasion.
Miller, who was kept well informed by Portocarrero and
Landa, started to prevent this concentration of the Roy
alists. He reached the river Samba on the 20th May,
and at midnight, after a forced march of eighteen hours
across a desert, reached the Ilo, opposite to the village of
Mirave, where La Hera was encamped. An advanced
picket gave the alarm, but two Englishmen, named Hill
•and Hunn, with twenty men, forded the river, and drew off
the attention of the enemy, while Miller and the bulk of
his force crossed unmolested in the darkness. At daybreak
Miller attacked the village, and carried it after a sharp
struggle, in which young Welsh, Cochrane's physician,
who accompanied the expedition as a volunteer, was
killed. Hardly had the last fugitives of La Hera's party disap
peared when Colonel Rivero came in sight, with another
detachment from Puno, mounted on mules. A few rockets
put them to flight.
The same afternoon Miller started in pursuit, and on the
24th reached the city of Moquegua, where Portocarrero was
Deputy Governor, who at once passed over to him. The
remains of La Hera's force had been overtaken and made
prisoners by Soler, and on the 26th Miller overtook Rivero,
and either killed or made prisoners nearly all his party.
In fifteen days from landing Miller with his small force had
put more then a thousand of the enemy hors de combat, and
•Cochrane wrote to San Martin, telling him that in eight
•days more they would have Arequipa.
La Hera, having met in his flight with other parties on
the march to join him, now turned upon Miller and tried
to cut off his retreat, but Miller reached Tacna in safety,
and was there met by the news of the armistice of Pun-
chauca. During the suspension of hostilities Miller employed his
time in drilling his raw troops, while Ramirez collected

LOSS OF THE " SAN MARTIN." 269.
2,000 men to oppose him ; Cochrane returned to Callao,
leaving only three small transports at Arica, which very
soon followed him.
Miller, left to himself,- was at the expiration of the
armistice compelled to retreat to Arica, where he seized
four merchant vessels and embarked with those of his par
tisans who were most seriously compromised, leaving his-
sick to the care of La Hera, who, grateful for kindness
shown by Miller to his prisoners, gave them every possible
attention. A great contrast to the general procedure of
the Royalist leaders.
Miller, now raised to the rank of colonel, sailed from
Arica on the 22nd July, and, being unable by reason of the
heavy sea to land near Islay for an attempt on Arequipa,.
turned north and landed at Pisco. After destroying a
Royalist force under Santalla, he established himself at lea
and assumed command of the district.
As a diversion this expedition was more successful than
could have been expected from the small force employed,
thanks to the brilliant qualities displayed by Miller in
separate command. Greater results might have been
achieved by the employment of a larger force, but with
out reinforcements from Chile, that could only have been
accomplished at the expense of more important objects.
This campaign concluded with a disaster. The San
Martin, already laden with booty, had, in defiance of
the armistice, seized a cargo of wheat at Mollendo, and
went to the bottom when discharging at Chorillos ; a fate
ominous of that which was soon to overtake her great
namesake.

CHAPTER XXXII.
PERU INDEPENDENT. 1821.
On the 6th July, 1821, the Patriots entered Lima; on
the 24th June was fought the battle of Carabobo, the
Waterloo of the Royalists of Columbia. San Martin's
plan of a continental campaign was on the point of reali
zation ; he from the south, and Bolivar from the north,
converged to a common centre. The only troops which
now upheld the standard of the King, were those which
still held the Highlands of Peru, the province of Quito,
and one isolated fortress, soon about to surrender. On the
ocean, only three vessels, the remnant of the naval power
of Spain, crushed by Cochrane on the Pacific, wandered to
and fro like phantom ships. The definitive triumph was
but a question of time. Never before was plan on so vast
a scale carried out with such mathematical precision — a
plan, nevertheless, sketched out in accordance with the
designs of inevitable fate.
As was said by the first captain of the age and as was
recorded by an American thinker, "All the great cap
tains who have undertaken great emprises have carried
them out in conformity with the rules of art, adapting the
force employed to the obstacle to be overcome, knowing
that events are not the work of chance, but obey those
laws which rule the destinies of men."
When the two liberators of South America violated
these laws, one straying from the path, the other blinded

PERU INDEPENDENT. 271
by ambition, both fell ; one deliberately, as he found him
self wanting in strength to complete his mission ; the
other cast down by the irresistible forces which he had
arrayed against himself.
The emancipation of America was no longer in ques
tion, the independence of Peru was assured, whatever
might be the errors of men or the vicissitudes of the
struggle. But this, though clear to the superior minds
which presided over the scene, was not perceived by those
more immediately concerned. This was more especially
the case in Peru, where the idea of the revolution had as
yet taken no deep root ; that spirit of nationality which
would secure the triumph at any cost was not yet aroused.
San Martin sought to awaken this spirit by a solemn
declaration of independence.
The position of San Martin was complex ; before Ame
rica he stood as a liberator, he was the arbiter of the
destinies of Peru ; he was a general of two republics who
had confided their armies to his care ; and as a great
leader he was responsible to his conscience. As he
entered the " City of the Kings " in triumph he was at
the apogee of his glory, but as Rothschild the banker
said, it requires ten times more skill and prudence to keep
a fortune than to make one.
San Martin wrote to O'Higgins : —
" At last, by patience, we have compelled the enemy to
abandon the capital of the Pizarros ; at last our labours
are crowned by seeing the independence of America secure
— Peru is free — I now see before me the end of my public
life, and watch how I can leave this heavy charge in safe
hands, so that I may retire into some quiet corner and live
as a man should live."
His public declarations were also grave and moderate,
but the exaggerated importance he gave to the possession
of Lima, led him to abandon the Highlands, where lay the
decision of the question, and showed that, to some extent,
his judgment was warped by success.

272 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
At the time of the occupation of Lima, San Martin
published in his camp a bulletin written by Monteagudo,
which is a declaration of political principles, and gives a
reason for the policy which he pursued. Treating of the
war as almost at an end, he offers a restricted liberty for the
establishment of order, but makes no profession of political
faith, national independence being the only point which
is definitely established.
On the 14th July, San Martin convened a meeting of
the principal citizens of Lima, nominated by the Cabildo.
At this meeting the following resolution was carried : —
" The general will is decided for the independence of
Peru of Spanish domination, or of that of any other
foreign power."
Which declaration was sanctioned by the applause of
the people.
On the 28th July the independence of Peru was solemnly
proclaimed with imposing ceremony in the great square
of Lima, San Martin displaying the new flag of Peru,
amid the roar of cannon and the acclamations of the
people who, as the procession passed through the main
streets of the city, showered flowers and perfumes upon it.
Cochrane, who looked on from a balcony of the viceregal
palace, was singled out for a special ovation by the popu
lace. Medals commemorative of the occasion were after
wards distributed among the people.
San Martin sent back to Chile the flags captured at
Rancagua, and to Buenos Ayres five flags and two Spanish
standards, as trophies of the victories of the united army.
While these pompous ceremonies went on, the siege of
Callao was vigorously prosecuted by Las Heras, who re
pulsed several sorties of the garrison, but as e had no
siege train, he could not venture an assault. Cochrane
offered to land guns from the fleet, but as the garrison had
only provisions for two months, more reliance was placed
on a strict blockade.
The garrison seeing their situation desperate, resolved

THE SIEGE OF CALLAO. 273
to scuttle their ships, and commenced by the corvette San
Sebastiano, on which Cochrane wrote again to San Martin
urging an immediate assault ; then perceiving a gap in the
boom which surrounded the remaining ships, he on the
night of the 24th July, sent eight boats under Captain
Crosbie, who cut out from under the batteries the 34-gun
corvette Resolucion, two smaller vessels and sundry boats,
without any loss on his part.
On the 14th August Las Heras made an attempt to cap
ture the fortress by surprise. He had noticed that the
gates of the Castle Real Felipe were frequently left open,
and the drawbridges lowered. The distance from his line
to the walls was about 3,000 yards, which cavalry could
cross at a gallop in ten or twelve minutes. A body of
horse supported by infantry made a sudden rush from
Bella Vista, the centre of his line, but in spite of their
•speed, the enemy perceived them in time to raise the
bridge leading to the inner fortifications. The cavalry
galloped through the streets of the town, sabred strag
glers and made several prisoners, among the latter being
the wounded general Ricafort.
On the same day, Cochrane made overtures to the
governor, La Mar, very unworthy of his high renown.
He had an idea that silver bullion to the value of thirty
millions of dollars was stored up in Callao, besides much
-other property belonging to the wealthy. Spaniards of
Lima. He proposed that La Mar should surrender the
fortress to him and give him up one-third the treasure,
•engaging in return to furnish ships in which he, and any
he chose to take with him, might escape with the rest of
the treasure.
Cochrane states in his Memoirs, that he required the
money to pay his crews, and denies that he had any
ulterior object, but he himself acknowledges that if he had
gained possession of the forts, he would have forced San
Martin to keep his promise to leave the Peruvians free to
choose their own government. T

274 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
The logical sequence of the Declaration of Independence,
was the establishment of a National Government in Peru,
but it was of prime necessity that the new government
should not only govern but should carry on the war.
There was great difficulty in organizing any such govern
ment, as there was no social nucleus round which the
heterogeneous population might gather, and Peru had not
one citizen who possessed either prestige or moral autho
rity. A deputation from the Cabildo of Lima waited upon
San Martin, praying him to take the reins of government
into his own hands. He answered somewhat enigmati
cally, that circumstances had already given him the
supreme power, and he should keep it so long as he con
sidered it necessary for the public welfare. The Lautaro
Lodge, in which the majority were officers of the united
army, then addressed him to the same effect, declaring
that the public safety required him to place himself at the
head of an administration.
On the 3rd August, 1821, he issued a decree, whereby
he gave himself the title of " Protector of Peru," uniting in
his own person the supreme administrative authority, both
military and political. No one in the world, except Crom
well, had ever taken upon himself this title with this
authority. America alarmed, thought he had done so
from ambition, and saw in him a future despot, but she
thought wrong; a dictatorship was necessary, and in
taking it he ensured the speedy loss of all his power.
The Protector named Dr. Unanue, a Peruvian of great
reputed wisdom but of no experience, his Minister of
Finance ; Garcia del Rio, Minister of Foreign Affairs ; and
Monteagudo, Minister of War and Marine. Riva Aguero
was named President of the department of Lima, and Las
Heras took command of the army.
La Serna, on receiving official notification of this step,
wrote to San Martin, telling him with some irony that he
thought the title of Liberator suited him better than that
of Protector, and that the people who had so spontaneously

SAN MARTIN " PROTECTOR OF PERU:' 275
sworn to uphold the independence of Peru, would just as
readily swear to uphold the new Spanish constitution.
O'Higgins enthusiastically approved of it, seeing in it the
only means of carrying the great work they had both at
heart to a successful termination.
The first official act of the Protector was to issue a
decree against the Spaniards, drawn up by Monteagudo,
and showing evidence of his intemperate spirit, but it was
also in accordance with the calculating spirit of San
Martin. On leaving Valparaiso, San Martin had published a
proclamation to "The Spanish Europeans resident in
Peru," declaring that he wished to behave generously to
them, providing they made no opposition to the indepen
dence of the country. During the negotiations at Mira
flores and Punchauca, he had endeavoured to propitiate
the Spanish civilians, but when hostilities had again
broken out and he was master of Lima, the splenetic
behaviour of the Spanish residents, made him resolve to
crush them.
He now declared that the persons and properties of all
Spaniards who would live in peace and swear the inde
pendence of the country, should be respected ; that those
who would not trust to this promise, should ask for pass
ports and should leave the country with their movable
goods ; but that those who submitted to the Government
and secretly worked against it, would be prosecuted with
the utmost rigour of the law, and their estates confiscated ;
and wound up by saying : —
"I know what passes in the most secret corner of yoar-
houses. Tremble, if you abuse my indulgence. Let this,.
be the last time that I have to remind you that your des
tiny is irrevocable and you must submit to it."
Public safety in no way justified such rigour, which was a
violation of promises given. But there was more in this
decree than excessive severity and intemperance of lan
guage, it formed part of a financial plan. War is war,
12

2;(j THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
and the independence of South America was in great part
paid for by Spanish fortunes, wrested from their owners by
forced loans and by confiscations. It was now the turn of
the Spaniards of Peru to contribute their share. San
Martin had made use of this system in Mendoza, he had
recommended it in Chile. Sentimental characters do not
lead great causes to victory in the struggle of life. All
the same, the measure was unjustifiable in the absence of
any overt act on the part of the Spaniards.
One result of this new system of persecution, was the
banishment of the Archbishop of Lima, a man of eminent
piety and eighty years of age, who, though a Royalist,
had aided San Martin in quieting the city on his arrival;
he had authorized with his presence the municipal council
which had declared the country independent; he had
assisted at the Te Deum which celebrated the declaration.
Most of the Peruvian clergy were ardent Patriots, but not
so the high dignitaries of the church. San Martin took
advantage of a mere pretext to send him his passport and
an order to leave the country in twenty-four hours.
On the 4th September, 182 i, when San Martin was, as
Protector of Peru, in the apogee of his power, his old
enemy Jose. Miguel Carrera, died cursing him in Mendoza.
Associated with Artigas, Ramirez, Bustos, and others of
the Gaucho chieftains of the Argentine Provinces, Carrera
had distinguished himself among them for rancorous
hatred of Buenos Ayres. Unfortunate in all his enterprises,
he was at length captured, and shot as a bandit, upon the
same bench where his brothers had perished before him.

CHAPTER XXXIII.
THE PROTECTORATE : OF PERU.
1821 — 1822.
Peru was independent, but she had not achieved indepen
dence for herself; neither did she know how to organize
a Government when she had one of her own ; for everything
she was indebted to outside help — principally to San Mar
tin, who was now Protector of Peru, but whose power
depended upon the help of Peru, and upon the support of
the two armies he had brought with him. But in Peru the
national spirit which he had awakened had a latent ten
dency to turn against him as a stranger, and in the armies
the spirit of discipline was relaxed in direct consequence
of that act of disobedience of his own which had plaped
him at their head. The bond of union which still gave
strength to these discordant elements was the Lautaro
Lodge, over which his influence was still supreme.
As Arenales had foreseen, Lima became the Capua of
the liberating army ; everything appeared to be left to the
slow action of time. The military officers murmured and
conspired, while Cochrane strove in every way he could to
preserve the fleet from the enervation which was Peru-
vianising the army.
Far otherwise passed their time the Royalist leaders in
the Highlands. Masters of a healthy country abounding
in resources, a reaction had set in in their favour, when the
people found themselves deserted and bethought them of

278 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
the sacrifices they had made. In fifty days La Serna was
ready to assume the offensive. At Callao there was great
provision of arms much needed in the Highlands ; the
garrison, if left alone, must soon succumb to hunger. A
carefully selected division of 2,500 infantry and 900 horse,
with seven guns, was put under command of Canterac,
with Vald6s as chief of the staff, and sent to the relief of
the beleaguered stronghold, while La Serna remained
with the rest of the army at Jauja.
Canterac marched on the 25th August, crossed the Cor
dillera, and descended by the pass of San Mateo towards
Lima without meeting a single foe. At Santiago de Tuna,
fifty miles from the capital, he divided his force into two
columns, with orders to concentrate at Cienaguilla, eigh
teen miles to the south of Lima. Loriga, with the left
column and nearly all the cavalry, went by the defile of
Espiritu Santo, cutting to pieces a small Patriot force on
his way.
The main column, under Canterac himself, kept straight
on for the valley of Rimac, to give the Patriots the idea
that he was marching straight on the capital ; but during
the following night he turned off to the left, seeking the
other road by Espiritu Santo. The way was across the
slopes of the mountains, over an unknown country where
there was no water, and which was so cut up by abrupt
descents that horsemen and infantry alike lost their foot
ing and fell over precipices. The unpopularity of the
Spaniards was so great that they could not find one guide
in all the transit. On the 4th September they reached a
barren stretch of sand over which, dying of thirst under a
tropical sun, they plodded wearily along; two companies
could have destroyed them all. The soldiers threw them
selves on the ground utterly prostrate ; immediate promo
tion was offered to the first who should find water ; not a
man stirred. Yet they were little more than a mile from
the river Lurin. At last Canterac himself found water ;
and those who were strong enough to move filled flasks

ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE CALLAO. 279
and carried the precious liquid to their dying comrades,
only just in time to save the life of Valdes, who com
manded the rear-guard. On the 5th they rejoined Loriga's
column at Cienaguilla.
San Martin was in the theatre when news of this inva
sion reached him on the 4th September. From his box he
called the people to arms ; the new national hymn was
sung by the officers present, the audience joining in the
chorus, and the greatest enthusiasm prevailed.
San Martin was ill-prepared to meet such an emergency,
and was equally ill-informed. On the 5th he knew nothing
of the concentration of the enemy in the valley of Lurin,
and announced that 200 or 300 men were descending by
the pass of San Mateo ; but he calmly made such arrange
ments as he could. The unarmed militia flocked to their
barracks, the walls were manned by volunteers, the gates
were entrusted to the civic guard. These precautions
sufficed to keep Canterac from attacking the city ; his
chief object was Callao.
The united army was superior in number to the invaders,
but was of very inferior quality. It consisted of 5,830
men, of whom 2,095 paraded under the Argentine stan
dard, 1,595 tinder the Chilian, the rest were Peruvians.
San Martin drew up his forces a mile and a half to the
south of the city, on the banks of the river Surco an affluent
of the Rimac, which was crossed by three bridges. The
position was a very strong one, and commanded the roads
to the south and east of Lima. The cavalry was stationed
on the right flank, and skirmishers were thrown out on
the roads in front.
Canterac did not dare to attack him, but drew up his
army on the 9th in three parallel columns — cavalry, in
fantry, and baggage — with a squadron of cavalry in the
rear, and marched by his left flank to the plain of San
Borja, flanking the position occupied by the Patriots. San
Martin drew back his right wing and took up a fresh posi
tion ; then, as the enemy remained quiet, he moved further

28o THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
to the right, in his turn outflanking the enemy. Canterac
then took up a fresh position, at right angles to the former
and facing towards the city. During the night San Martin
again moved forward his right wing. The next day Can
terac retired under the guns of Callao, and San Martin,
rubbing his hands, exclaimed to Las Heras : —
" They are lost ! They have not food for fifteen days ! "
Soon after this Cochrane rode up. Las Heras asked
him to persuade the General to attack at once, which
Cochrane attempted. San Martin answered him curtly :—
" My measures are taken."
By-and-by, as San Martin was listening to the report of
a countryman, Cochrane ordered the man away, saying :—
"The General has no time to listen to follies."
San Martin frowned, and, turning rein, rode off t6 his
quarters. Cochrane followed him and again urged him to
attack, offering to lead the cavalry himself. The answer
of the Protector was : —
"I only am responsible for the welfare of Peru."
San Martin and Cochrane never met again.
The Patriot army then advanced half way on the main
road from Lima to Callao, and a field battery was thrown
up at La Legua, mounting six guns and two howitzers.
The only way for the Royalists to save Callao was to-
supply the garrison with provisions, which were only to be
obtained by taking Lima, or by occupying the suburbs,
neither of which was possible. Canterac could only retreat,
leaving Callao to its fate. The joy of the garrison on wel
coming the reinforcement was short-lived, they were only
so many more mouths to feed. Canterac had instructions
from the Viceroy in this case to destroy the fortifications
and bring away the garrison, with as much of the arma
ment as he could carry off, but La Mar refused to abandon
the Spanish families which had taken refuge with him.
Some English merchants offered to supply provisions by
water for 100,000 dols. in cash, and an order for 400,000=
dols. on the Treasury of Arequipa. The Treasury was-

RETREAT OF CANTERAC. 281
almost empty, but the amount was made up by the private
resources of the refugees, and by the officers and men of
Canterac's division, who contributed the pay they had
received. Instead of being able to bring away arms, Canterac
found it necessary to leave behind five out of the seven
light guns he had brought with him. The situation of the
Royalists was very critical ; in two days eight officers and
200 men had deserted, the rest were eating their horses.
Three days more of this, and even retreat would be im
possible. On the 1 6th, at four o'clock in the afternoon, the division
marched from Callao on the main road to Lima. Canterac,
with some light troops and his two guns, made a feint
against the battery of La Legua to hide his real intention,
while the bulk of his force moved to the left, crossed the
Rimac, and turned north, Canterac, with his detachment,
covering the retreat under the fire of a Chilian brig-of-war,
which caused some loss.
Protected by the darkness, Canterac marched all night
along the coast, and next day occupied the valley of Cara-
baillo, nine miles to the north of Lima, from which a road
passes through the Cordillera to Jauja. Here he halted to
rest and feed his weary troops.
San Martin, in spite of the eagerness of his army, had
watched the retreat in silence, and only on the 17th de
spatched Las Heras with a strong force in pursuit. But
the inactivity of San Martin seems to have been communi
cated to Las Heras ; he showed little of his wonted energy,
and on the 19th gave up the pursuit to Miller, with a de
tachment of 700 infantry, 125 horse, and 500 guerillas.
Meantime the Royalist division was falling to pieces —
hundreds of the men and even some officers deserted.
Miller was not dilatory in his movements, but erred on the
side of rashness ; he outmarched the enemy, trying to cut
off his retreat, and was on two occasions dislodged with
heavy loss from positions he had taken up. After that he

282 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
contented himself with attacks on the rear-guard, and fol
lowed right through the Cordillera, where, on the 27th, he
found in a hut, abandoned by his comrades, the body of
Colonel Sanchez, the hero of San Carlos and Chilian.
On the ist March Canterac reached Jauja; he had lost
one-third of his force, but had sustained his reputation as
a gallant soldier and an able tactician.
San Martin, after the retreat of Canterac, summoned La
Mar to surrender, offering honourable terms of capitula
tion, to which, after some delay, La Mar acceded. The
troops were permitted to march out with their arms and
standards, the Spaniards being allowed to retire to Are
quipa, while the militia dispersed . to their homes. Three
months were given to the officers and the civil employes
in which to find the means of leaving the country if they
did not choose to remain.
On the 2 ist September the Peruvian flag was hoisted on
the castles of Callao. La Mar, who as a Peruvian sym
pathised with the Patriot cause, resigned his rank and
honours into the hands of the Viceroy and retired into
private life.
San Martin thus won another victory without risking his
army. As a Peruvian historian says : — " He overcame a
powerful army by the simple force of public opinion and
by skilful tactics." The strongest fortress in South America
was now in his power, with several hundred guns of all
calibres, thousands of muskets, and great stores of ammu
nition. He was now free to turn his arms to the north for
the liberation of Quito in answer to a request from Bolivar,
and could then return with reinforcements to put an end to
the war. But the role of Fabius is one not generally
appreciated ; prudence is often mistaken for timidity ; the
general who prefers the shield to the sword offends the
pride of his soldiers. San Martin gained by his policy
great fame as a tactician, but he lowered his renown as a
resolute soldier.
In the first six months of the Protectorate of San Martin

ORGANIZATION OF PERU. 283
the foundations were laid of the administrative organiza
tion and the political constitution of Peru. One of his first
measures was to create a national army. Under the name
of the " Peruvian Legion " he organized a division, recruited
among the natives, composed of a regiment of infantry
under Miller, one of cavalry under Brandzen, and a com
pany of artillery with four guns. He reorganized the
finances and reformed the commercial system. He abo
lished the personal service of the indigenous races, the
poll-tax, and other oppressive customs. He manumitted
all slaves who would join the army, and declared free all
who might in future be born of slave parents. Corporal
punishment was forbidden in the public schools ; a national
library was founded ; the press was set free from all unne
cessary restrictions ; torture and excessive punishments
were abolished. All which reforms and many others were
carried out in pursuance of ideas brought by Monteagudo
from the River Plate.
San Martin also issued a decree defining his own powers,
and recognised such debts of the late authorities as had
not been contracted for war purposes ; but he did not draw
up any plan for the political organization of the country,
leaving that question for future solution.
The Peruvian nobility were left with their titles and
escutcheons; San Martin looked upon them as a social
influence of which good use might be made. He also insti
tuted a new order, the " Order of the Sun," in imitation of
the " Legion of Honour," instituted by Napoleon, as had
previously been done in Chile by the institution of " The
Legion of Merit " ; and also a special decoration for women
who distinguished themselves by services in the Patriot
cause, a gold medal with a suitable inscription, which,
however, was distributed with more gallantry than discre
tion, and gave rise to much scandal, some of which has
not even yet died out. All this was in preparation for the
establishment of that monarchy, the idea of which was
still in the air.

284 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
San Martin also decreed to himself an annual salary of
30,000 dols., of which he spent the greater part in presents
and in public displays ; but even so, this brought much
adverse criticism upon him, and contributed to give cur
rency to a report then commonly circulated about him,
that he entertained the inane project of crowning himself
King. The people in their ballads sang of him as their
future Emperor, and it became a habit among the officers
of the army to speak of him as " King Joseph."
Up to that time the American spirit of independence and
the love of glory had sufficed to bind together the units of
the army; the alloy of gold had not yet destroyed the
temper of their swords. Badly fed, badly dressed, with
only half their pay when they had any, suffering from all
sorts of privation and disease, they had never received any
pecuniary reward for their services. The Government of
Chile had promised to give the victors of Maipo the land
on which they had achieved that crowning triumph, but
the promise was never fulfilled. The municipality of Lima
now gave to San Martin 500,000 dols., arising from the
sale of the properties of Spanish residents which had been
confiscated, for distribution among his principal officers,
and offered to the rest who should continue in the service
grants of land in the provinces yet to be conquered. San
Martin distributed the half million dollars among twenty
officers — 25,000 dols. to each one — which was in those days
a fortune ; but this, instead of binding them to his cause,
produced resentments and jealousies, as is ever the case
when self-interest enters into the relations between man
and man, of which he was soon to have sad proof.
In October he received information that a conspiracy to
depose him existed among the higher officers of the army.
He summoned them to a secret council and disclosed the
matter to them, but received very unsatisfactory replies.
That such a conspiracy existed appears certain, but it
was not yet mature, and the inquiry was sufficient to dis
sipate it. Colonel Heres, of the Numancia battalion, was

POLITICAL IDEAS OF SAN MARTIN. 285
removed from his command, with many thanks for his
distinguished services, and retired to Columbia, his native
land. Las Heras and several other officers resigned their
commands, and Alvarado, who appears to have been also
one of the conspirators, was named General-in-Chief. San
Martin had thus the sad certainty that although the dis
affection had not spread among the junior officers, nor
among the rank and file, the sympathies of the army were
no longer with him as they had been at Rancagua.
The chief cause of the general discontent was his advo
cacy of monarchical principles ; he sacrificed his own prin
ciples in favour of what he considered the most practicable
system. In his own words : —
" The evils which afflict the new States of America arise
not from the people, but from the Constitutions under
which they live*. These Constitutions should harmonise
with their instruction, education, and habits of life. They
should not have the best laws, but those most suited to
their character, maintaining the barriers which separate
the different classes of society, so that the most intelligent
class may preserve its natural preponderance."
His ideal of legislation was based upon the precepts of
Solon, an oligarchy of intelligence counterbalanced by a
Conservative plutocracy. He forgot that in his own country
he had seen safety only in the establishment of a sovereign
Congress, and that the advocacy of monarchical ideas had
there only fanned the flames of anarchy ; that he himself
had been forced to disobey when he was called upon to
support a monarch elected by a secret committee ; he for
got that he himself had founded a republic in Chile, and
had sketched out a republican constitution for Peru, and
that, with the exception of Mexico, every one of these new
States had adopted the Democratic Republican system as
a necessity of the age.
San Martin also failed to see that he must work in har
mony with Bolivar, who had just established the Republic
of Columbia, and with the great Democratic Republic of

286 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
the United States. He also failed to see that it was in;
sympathy with these views that England had withdrawn
from the Holy Alliance, and looked upon the republican
form of government as the sine qud non of independence in
America. He was led astray by his Minister, Montea
gudo, who was just as blind as himself to the inevitable
tendency of the age.
In order to educate public opinion Monteagudo had
established in Lima a literary society, styled " The Patriotic
Society of Lima," for the discussion of political questions,
in which he openly advocated the establishment of a
monarchy. The Protectorate of San Martin was based upon the
express condition "that he should give place to the
government which the Peruvian people should select " ;
but before he had held office five months he and his Council
decided to send a mission to Europe to negotiate an alli
ance with Great Britain, and to accept a prince of the
reigning family as a Constitutional monarch. In case this
proposition was rejected, they were then to make a similar
proposal to the Government of Russia ; and that failing.
then to any European prince ; last of all, to the Prince of
Luca, the imaginary sovereign of the River Plate.
This mission was confided to Garcia del Rio, who pro
ceeded to Europe accompanied by Dr. Paroissiens ; but,
better instructed by subsequent events, Garcia took no step
in prosecution of the ostensible object of his journey, con
tenting himself with a general advocacy in the European
press of the cause of the Patriots in America.

CHAPTER XXXIV.
SAN MARTIN AND COCHRANE.
1821 — 1822.
History seeks in vain to blot from her pages the invec
tives hurled at each other by the two heroes of the liberat
ing expedition to Peru. They themselves have perpe
tuated them in documents, in which each appeals to the
judgment of the world.
Cochrane has insulted and calumniated San Martin by
calling him a sanguinary tyrant, an incompetent general,
a hypocrite, a thief, a drunkard, &c, &c.
San Martin, through his ministers, accused Cochrane of
depredations akin to piracy, and of being an embezzler of
public property, who made traffic with the naval force
placed under his command.
The Admiral, who thought nothing great but his own
deeds and his own hatred, extreme in everything, who had
spoken of his own country as a degraded nation, ruled
by a parliament of scoundrels, looked upon the South
American revolution as a commercial transaction, carried
on by a set of intriguing, cowardly rascals.
San Martin, more prudent, returned him insult for insult
by other hands, but he did not descend to calumny, and
when the angry moment had passed, troubled himself no
more about him.
The antecedents of this quarrel we have already
sketched. Though seeking to make common cause with

288 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
him, San Martin never confided in Cochrane, had a very
low idea of his merits as a leader of troops on land, and
found reason to repent of such trust as he did place in him
on such service. This the Admiral attributed to jealousy.
In the squadron itself there was a party inimical to
Cochrane. Guise and Spry drew up a protest against the
new name given to the Esmeralda, and were tried by
court-martial for breach of discipline, but San Martin, who
saw in Guise a future admiral, took him under his protec
tion, and made Spry one of his aides-de-camp.
In the inscription on the medals struck in celebration of
the Declaration of Independence, no mention was made of
the fleet. At this Cochrane took umbrage and would
accept no excuse. From this time he became very press
ing in his demands for the arrears of pay due to his crews,
speaking clearly of the danger of a mutiny. These arrears
dated from before the sailing of the expedition ; the
foreigners were only kept on board by an express promise
from San Martin to pay everything and a year's pay as
bounty, when he took Lima. He also decreed a dona
tion of 50,000 dollars to the captors of the Esmeralda.
Neither of these promises were fulfilled.
On the 4th August, 1821, Cochrane went himself to, the
palace to urge these claims, and alleges that San Martin
refused any money except as part of the purchase, money
of the ships which should be sold to Peru. This is denied
by Monteagudo and Garcia del Rio, who were present. It
was then that he was informed by San Martin himself
that he had assumed the title of Protector of Peru, upon
which Cochrane, now looking upon himself as the repre
sentative of Chile, reiterated his claims. San Martin
acknowledged his responsibility for the year's pay he had
promised as bounty, and. for the 50,000 dollars promised to
the captors of the Es?neralda, but denied that he was in
any way responsible for the pay of crews in the service of
Chile, and told Cochrane he might take his ships and go
where he pleased, but regretting his hasty words, he then

SEIZURE OF TREASURE BY COCHRANE. 289
stretched out his hand to the Admiral, asking him to for
get what had passed.
" I will forget when I can," replied Cochrane.
The Admiral seems also to have regretted his haste, for
on returning on board he wrote to San Martin a letter in
English, full of profuse compliments, to which San Martin
replied in similar terms, but neither of them touched at
all upon the question between them. The correspondence
continued, but no money was paid, and Cochrane wrote to
O'Higgins that he could not answer for the loyalty of his
crews, who were in want of common necessaries, and
hinted his fears that they would seize the ships and turn
pirates. When Cochrane returned on board, after the refusal of
San Martin to attack Canterac (see last chapter), he found
his men on the verge of mutiny. On the approach of
Canterac, San Martin had, as a measure of precaution, sent
the coin and bullion from the mint and treasury on board
a ship at anchor at Ancon, and had given permission to
private individuals to embark their valuables on the trans
ports, or on board of neutral vessels. When Cochrane
heard of this, he seized the whole of this treasure, under
pretext that they were contraband shipments, but gave
receipts for the packages. He received a peremptory
order to return them to their owners, but wrote to San
Martin that he could not obey the order, as he had no
other means of preventing a mutiny, than by paying his
men with whatever money he could lay hands on..
If the blockade were raised Callao could not be captured,
so San Martin was forced to temporise, and insisted only
on the restitution of private property, to which Cochrane
acceded. When Callao surrendered, the Peruvian Government
ordered Cochrane to give up the rest of the treasure to an
official of the War Office. Cochrane regretted that his duty
to Chile obliged him to prevent by any means in his power
insubordination and rebellion in the Chilian fleet. San
u

390 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Martin then gave way, and Cochrane distributed one year's
pay to all his crews, but kept the rest of the money for the
general use of the squadron. After this, many of the
seamen deserted to spend their money on shore, which
occasioned so much disorder, that San Martin ordered
Cochrane to return to Chile and report to his own govern
ment. Cochrane denied the right of the Protector of Peru to
give any such order, but some days after weighed anchor
and left the harbour.
San Martin then wrote to O'Higgins, proposing to de
clare Cochrane an outlaw, but O'Higgins was too clear
sighted to commit any such folly, and acknowledged
that they themselves were much to blame for what had
occurred. Besides which Cochrane's conduct gave great
satisfaction to the Chilian people, and he himself had sent
a despatch to the Chilian Government, informing them
that he was sailing to Guayaquil to careen the O'Higgins,
and to look for the two Spanish frigates Prueba and Ven
ganza. Cochrane was incapable of treachery to the cause he had
adopted, he was the same hero as before, with all his
defects and all his great qualities. His intention on leav
ing Callao was to complete his great work, by driving the
last vestiges of Spanish domination from the Pacific. He
sent the Lautaro and the Galvarino back to Chile, and
with the rest of his ships reached Guayaquil on the 1 8th
October, where he spent six weeks in repairing them.
On the 3rd December he sailed again, looking into
every bay and inlet along the coast as far as California for
his prey. The two frigates had been employed on trans
port service, by various Spanish authorities on the Pacific
coast, and on the 4th December had left Panama for
Guayaquil, where they capitulated to Salazar and La Mar.
who were there at the time as representatives of Peru.
The Prueba was sent off by them to Callao to give her
self up to the Peruvian Government, but the Venganza

COCHRANE RETURNS TO CHILE. 29I
remained at Guayaquil to make some necessary repairs,
and she was still there when Cochrane returned on the
3rd March. The Admiral sent an armed boat to seize her
and hoist the Chilian flag ; the people manned the batteries
and threatened to sink her ; upon which he consented to
leave her with them, until the question of ownership was
decided by the governments of Chile and Peru.
Cochrane then sailed South, and touching at one of the
northern ports of Peru, was refused either provisions or
water by the authorities, who had special orders to that
effect from the Protector. In great dudgeon he went on
to Callao, where the appearance of his ships caused great
alarm. The Prueba, now the Protector, under command of
Captain Guise, was manned by troops from shore, and
anchored under the batteries.
Cochrane sent an angry missive to the Minister of
Marine, complaining of the treatment he had met with,
and again demanded payment of the debts owing to him.
The Minister went off to see him, invited him ashore and
offered him the command of an expedition against the
Philippine Islands. Cochrane was not to be appeased by
words. A few days after that, the schooner Montezuma
sailed close past him without saluting. He threatened to
fire on her and compelled her to cast anchor, then board
ing her he hauled down the Peruvian flag and hoisted the
Chilian. It seemed as though the quarrel would culmin
ate in actual fighting, till on the 10th May Cochrane sailed
for Valparaiso, where he was welcomed in triumph, and
his conduct received official approbation.
Soon after, Cochrane left for ever the shores of the
Pacific, whose waves will murmur the record of his glorious
deeds to the end of time.
Having now one ship of war, the Peruvian Government
commenced to organize a navy, which they placed under
the command of Blanco Encalada.

u 2

CHAPTER XXXV.
# THE DISASTER AT ICA.
1821 — 1822.
After the return of the expedition from Callao, La Serna
removed his head-quarters to Cuzco, leaving the bulk of the
army behind him in the valley of Jauja, under Canterac.
He strengthened the garrisons of Puno, Arequipa, and
Tacna, and entrusted the defence of the southern coast to
the army of Upper Peru.
Canterac detached two light columns under Loriga
against Pasco, where the insurrection had still a footing
under Otero, who had 200 regulars with him and 5,000
Indians. On the approach of Loriga, Otero marched out
to attack him, and fell upon him suddenly, in the early
morning of the 7th December, at the village of El Cerro,
where the Royalists had halted to collect supplies. In the
confusion a part of the ammunition blew up, and the troops
in the darkness were seized with panic, but Loriga suc
ceeded in rallying them, occupied the church and some
neighbouring houses, and waited for daylight, when he in
his turn attacked the Patriots, and completely routed them,
killing 700 Indians.
In Upper Peru,yLanza, the guerilla chief, maintained
himself in the^ [mountains between Cochabamba and La
Paz. In Potosi a mutiny broke out among the troops, which
was quelled by General Maroto.

SAN MARTIN SUMMONS A CONGRESS. 293
The Indians of Cangallo and Huamanga again rose in
arms ; but the former town was burned by Carratala, and
the Viceroy issued a decree forbidding any attempt to
rebuild it. The Government of Peru erected a monument
to the memory of the unfortunate town, and Buenos Ayres
named one of her principal streets Cangallo, as a lasting
record of this barbarous deed.
But these transitory events had no effect upon the war
itself, the Cordillera formed a barrier between the oppos
ing forces which neither of them could pass. The Royalists
still outnumbered the Patriots, two to one, but the terri
tory occupied by them, extending from Pasco to the Ar
gentine frontier, was so enormous, that they were nowhere
strong. Bolivar was on the march against Quito ; success would
enable him to assist San Martin to crush the Royalist
forces in Peru, but no cordial alliance was possible with
Bolivar until all these new nations had agreed upon one
common form of government, and the unsettled state of
Guayaquil, which was claimed as a province by both
Columbia and Peru, threatened to produce discord between
them. San Martin rose to the emergency. He sent a contin
gent of 1,500 men from Peru to assist Bolivar in his opera
tions against Quito, and so secured his success. Then,
setting on one side his monarchical ideas, he, on the
27th December, 182 1, issued a decree summoning a Con
gress : —
" To establish a definitive form of government, and to
give to the country the constitution best adapted to it."
He at the same time appointed the Marquis of Torre-
Tagle Deputy-Protector, while he himself went off to
Guayaquil in the hope of obtaining an interview with
Bolivar. Not daring to leave La Serna unmolested while he
arranged with the Liberator of the North the plans for
united and decisive action, he despatched General Tristan

294 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
and Colonel Gamarra, both Peruvians, with 2,000 men, to
occupy the valley of lea, and spread a false report that
Arenales was about to return with another expedition to
the Highlands. La Serna was too well informed to trouble
himself about reports, and knew well the quality of the two
Patriots now in command at lea.
Early in April Canterac, with 2,000 men and three guns,
marched from Jauja, and Valdes with 500 from Arequipa.
The Patriot army evacuated lea at their approach, but
their retreat by night was intercepted, they were thrown
into disorder and cut to pieces. The Royalists made more
than 1,000 prisoners, including fifty officers, took four guns
and two flags, and returned in triumph, after shooting one
in every five of the officers of the Numancia battalion,
whom they had made prisoners.
Tristan and Gamarra were tried by court-martial, and
shown to be utterly incompetent for such a command ; but
the chief blame of the disaster fell upon San Martin him
self, who had appointed them.
This defeat was in some measure compensated the fol
lowing month by the fall of Quito, which terminated the
war in the North, and San Martin not having been able to
effect his proposed interview with Bolivar, who did not
come to Guayaquil when expected, when he returned to
Lima left the civil administration in the hands of Torre-
Tagle, and devoted his attention exclusively to the army.
He issued a proclamation in which he promised the Peru
vian people that the war should be concluded in the year
1822, then current, and on the 4th July signed a provisional
treaty with Columbia.
At the same time he applied for help to the Government
of Chile, and to the governors of the various Argentine
Provinces, bordering the eastern slopes of the Andes, now
de facto independent States, an endeavour to unite all
Spanish America in one grand effort to crush the Royalist
cause in its last stronghold, the Highlands of Peru.
Still harping on the ideas he had disclosed at Pun-

THE LAST EFFORTS OF SAN MARTIN. 295
chauca and Miraflores, he also wrote to La Serna, propos^-
ing a cessation of hostilities, on the basis of the recognition
of the independence of Peru. To this the Viceroy returned
a curt answer, "That however beneficial independence
might be to Peru, it could only be hoped for or established
by decree of the nation (Spain)."
San Martin also wrote to the same effect to Bolivar, but
found that their ideas did not at all coincide. And wrote
to O'Higgins proposing a naval expedition to the coasts
of Spain.
Torre-Tagle was but the nominal head of the civil
Administration, the real ruler was his Minister, Montea
gudo, an inveterate enemy of all Spaniards, who thought
the true way to victory was to make the struggle one of
race. On the 31st December he issued a decree, that all
Spaniards who had not been naturalised should leave the
country; in January, that they should also forfeit half
their property ; and in February, that the infraction of
these decrees should entail banishment and confiscation.
After the disaster of lea still more barbarous decrees were
issued, and a commission was appointed to enforce them.
Two great forces from the South and from the North
were about to join hands in the great work in which they
were both engaged. We have sketched the progress of
the revolution from the banks of La Plata, across the Cor
dillera, and by the Pacific to Peru ; it is now time to turn
our attention to its progress from the Spanish Main
through New Granada and Columbia to the frontiers of
Peru at Quito.

CHAPTER XXXVI.
THE REVOLUTIONS IN QUITO AND VENEZUELA.
1809 — 1812.
Spanish America on the Southern Continent, is divided
geographically and socially into two great systems, which
are nevertheless analogous, having the same origin and
the same language. Simultaneously they felt the same
impulse, simultaneously arose in both sections the spirit of
independence. In each section one man took the lead,
devoting his life to the cause which was at once his own
and that of his race ; yet were these two men of character
wholly different. The one, cool and calculating, was
devoid of personal ambition ; the other, whose dreams
were of glory and of power, was its slave. Yet in each
glowed the passion for emancipation, and each in his own
way accomplished the task before him. The one, San
Martin, gave liberty to the South, the other, Bolivar, gave
liberty to the North. They joined, and the social equili
brium was established.
The northern zone of the Continent extends about
twenty degrees north of the Equator, from the frontiers of
Peru to Panama and the Carribean sea. In 1810 this
zone comprehended the Viceroyalty of New Granada, the
Captain-Generalcy of Venezuela, and the Presidency of
Quito ; three political divisions marked out by geographi
cal lines, and peopled by several heterogeneous races. At
that date New Granada had 1,400,000 inhabitants, Vene
zuela 900,000, and Quito 600,000. Of these, 1,234,000 were

VENEZUELA.

299

white, Europeans and Creoles, 913,000 were of indigenous
races, 615,000 of mixed races, and 138,000 were negro
slaves. Santa Fe de Bogota was the capital of New
Granada, Caracas was the capital of Venezuela. The City
of Quito, situate high above the level of the sea, had been
the centre of pre-Columbian civilization ; during the colo
nial epoch it was at times attached to the Viceroyalty of
New Granada, at times to that of Peru. The district of
which this city was the capital has been styled the Thibet
of the New World.
The two parallel ranges of the Andes, which form the
valley of Chile, unite to the north of Argentine territory,
but again separate in Peru, and running northward en
close Quito and the valley of Popayan, which forms the
extreme south of New Granada. They then again diverge,
this time into three branches, one of which forms the
isthmus of Panama, while the others extend to the north
east as far as the Gulf of Mexico, wide valleys interposing
between each range.
To the east of the most easterly of these ranges lies a
vast plain, drained by the great river Orinoco and its
tributaries. Situate under the tropic of Cancer summer and
winter are there unknown, but the season from March to
September is one of constant rain. During the interven
ing months, the rivers leave their beds and convert the
vast plain into as vast a sea. When the waters retire, the
plains are covered with luxuriant pasturage, giving suste
nance to millions of cattle and horses, which are herded by
a semi-civilized race of horsemen, known as the " Uane-
ros " of Columbia, a race similar to the " gauchos " of the
Argentine pampa. The Uaneros live in lonely huts, and
pass their days in the saddle. Inured to fatigue and
danger, they are sober and abstemious, dress in the most
simple manner, are dexterous in the use of the lance, and
are splendid swimmers. Endowed with such qualities, and
led by men of their own race, their deeds eclipse those of
the most renowned heroes of antiquity.

300 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
The Columbian revolution broke out separately, in each
of the three great sections. The first outbreak took place
at Quito in August, 1809, almost simultaneously with
similar movements in Mexico and in Upper Peru. The
Captain-General, Ruiz de Castillo, was deposed, and a
Junta was appointed. The movement was crushed by the
combined forces of New Granada and Peru, and the leaders
were put to death in prison in August, 1810. They were
the first martyrs in the cause of independence in South
America. These outbreaks, simultaneous but unconnected, pro
ceeded from identical causes ; these causes not being
removed, the consequent effects were naturally reproduced,
and found echo^all over the Continent.
On the 25th May, 18 10, the star of liberty arose in
Buenos Ayres, but previous to that date, on the 19th April
of the same year, the municipality of Caracas, joined by
deputies from the people, deposed Emparan, the Captain-
General, denied the authority of the Regency of Cadiz,
and appointed a Junta to rule over the " United Provinces
of Venezuela," in the name of the King. The leader of this
movement was a canon of the church, named Madariaga,
by birth a Chilian, and a member of the Secret Society
established by Miranda, whom he had met in London.
His associates were Roscio and Ponte, men of noble
character, whose political knowledge was more theoretical
than practical. Most of the Provinces answered the call
of the capital by deposing their governors and appointing
Juntas. The Central Junta issued a Manifesto to the other
colonies of Spanish America, inviting them to form a
continental league, for mutual protection. No such league
was formed, but the example was everywhere followed.
The first act of the Junta was to summon a Congress,
elected by the people, into whose hands they proposed to
surrender their provisional authority.
The northern provinces of Maracaibo and Coro had not

SIMON BOLIVAR. 301
deposed their governors, Generals Miyares and Ceballos.
These two officers denounced the movement, and com
menced to raise troops to oppose it. The Junta took
precautionary measures so as to be prepared against any
attack, and meantime sent envoys to the United States
and to England ; looking to the latter power for protection
in the event of an invasion of Venezuela by the French.
Don Luis Mendez, Don Andres Bello, and Don Simon
B0L1VAR, a colonel of militia, were selected for this
mission. Bolivar was at that time twenty-seven years of age.
There was nothing heroic in his appearance ; he was
short in stature, thin and narrow-chested, but his rugged,
irregular features, gave a look of energy to his sallow
countenance. His hair was black and curly ; his high
narrow forehead was deeply seamed with horizontal lines ;
he had thick, sensual lips, and beautiful teeth ; his large
black eyes were sunk deep in their orbits, and sparkled
with an unsteady light, indicative of his character. He
looked like one possessed by a latent fire, a man of feverish
activity, combined with duplicity and arrogance ; his pro
file was that of a deep thinker. Altogether his aspect was
that of a man of great ideas, but of small judgment ; his
deeds do not belie that impression.
At the age of three years he was left an orphan, heir to
a rich patrimony, with hundreds of slaves. His tutor was
a philosopher of the school of the Cynics ; the ideas he
learned from him were so extravagant as to verge on
lunacy, but he carried them with him throughout his life,
and they moulded his career. From him he learned to
dream of an ideal form of government, neither monarchical
nor republican, in which all offices should be held for life.
This tutor was named Simon Rodriguez, and was born in
Caracas, the natural son of a priest.
Before he was seventeen years of age, Bolivar went to
Europe ; he was in Paris when Bonaparte was named
First Consul, and professed enthusiastic admiration for his

302 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
character. In Europe he married a daughter of the noble
Venezuelan family of Del Toro, and then returned to
Caracas. In the third year after his marriage, he lost his
wife, and made a second voyage to Europe, where he again
met his tutor. In his company he visited the scenes made
immortal by Rousseau, whose "Nouvelle Heloise" was
his favourite book, and saw Napoleon crowned King of
Italy at Milan. They went on to Rome, and from Mount
Aventine looked over the ruins of the great city of the
Caesars. In a moment of enthusiasm the Acolyte seized
the hands of his master, and swore to liberate his native
land. Six more years passed, and the revolution broke out in
Venezuela, without any open help from him. He was then
leading the life of a feudal lord, in wealth and in luxury,
produced by the toil of slaves ; yet though he took no open
part in this revolution, he had done something to prepare
it. He was on intimate terms with the Captain-General
and had betrayed his secrets to the conspirators.
Soon after their arrival in London, the three envoys
obtained a private audience with the Marquis of Wellesley,
who was at that time Minister of Foreign Affairs. Bolivar,
who talked French fluently, was the spokesman. Forget
ting his role as a diplomatist, he made a speech in which
he spoke harshly of Spain, and of his desire and of his
hopes for the absolute independence of Venezuela; and
most indiscreetly presented, not only the credentials of the
envoys, but their instructions also.
The British Minister listened coldly, and glancing his
eye over the papers, replied that the ideas he had heard
expressed were in open contradiction to the documents.
These credentials were conferred by a Junta ruling in the
name of King Ferdinand, and the object of the mission
was stated to be an arrangement with the Regency of
Cadiz in order to prevent a rupture. Bolivar had read
neither the credentials nor the instructions. As they
retired, he candidly confessed his negligence to his com-

BOLIVAR IN LONDON. 303
panions, and agreed that the instructions showed both
foresight and wisdom.
This is a true sample of Bolivar's character, both as a
politician and as a soldier ; ever pre-occupied by some idea
of his own, he took no thought of the obstacles in his way,
and gave no heed to the opinions of others ; he blindly
pursued his own dreams and his own designs. Victor or
vanquished he always persevered, reading with "his mind's
eye," as he said himself, no other documents than those
written on his brain by his master Simon Rodriguez. His
ruling idea at this moment was independence, and he went
straight for it.
In spite of this diplomatic slip, the British Government
answered the envoys according to the tenor of their instruc
tions, and replied that they could not interfere in any
question concerning the government of any country which
recognised the King of Spain as its sovereign, but they
offered their mediation for the reconciliation of the Colonies
of Spain with the mother country. They had previously
forwarded instructions to the governors of the British West
Indies to protect the new governments in South America
against French aggression. They now issued fresh circulars
to the same effect, more especially recommending them to
cultivate amicable relations with these new governments,
whether or no they recognised the authority of the Regency
of Cadiz.
This was satisfactory, but the result was owing to British
policy, not to the skill of the envoys.
In London Bolivar became acquainted with General
Miranda, and being initiated as a member of his Secret
Society, renewed the oath he had made on the sacred hill
of Rome, to work for the independence and liberty of
South America. Contact with the ardent spirit of the
Apostle of emancipation blew into a flame the embers
lighted by the teachings of Rodriguez ; again Bolivar for
got his instructions, which forbade him to have anything
to do with the plans of Miranda. He thought that his

304 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
presence would give fresh impulse to the idea of indepen
dence, and invited him to accompany the envoys on their
return. Miranda accepted the invitation, and they landed
at Caracas in December.
When news of the revolution in Venezuela reached
Cadiz, the Regency proclaimed the leaders of the move
ment rebels, and, declining the mediation of Great Britain,
declared war against them, and ordered a blockade of the
coast. Cortabarria, a member of the Council of the In
dies, was charged with the task of subduing them, [and
Miyares was appointed captain-general in place of Em-
paran. In the Spanish West India Islands preparation
was made to sustain the decrees of the Regency by force.
Thus the first link in the chain which bound the colonies
of the Spanish Main to the mother country was broken.
The Central Junta of Caracas responded by raising an
army of 2,500 men ; placed the Marquis Del Toro in com
mand, and sent him against Coro, the head-quarters of the
Royalist reaction. On the 28th November the army
attacked the town, but was beaten off. Its retreat was
intercepted by a division of 800 men, but it forced its way
on and reached Caracas with heavy loss, harassed on the
way by a hostile population.
When Miranda again landed on American soil he was
sixty years of age. The people received him with ova
tions ; Government appointed him lieutenant-general of
their army ; youthful citizens looked to him as the oracle
of their future destinies ; the soldiery regarded him as the
herald of victory ; yet at first his influence was not felt in
public affairs.
Grave, taciturn, and dogmatic, with unflinching opinions
formed in solitude, Miranda discussed nothing, though he
sought to make proselytes. Government appointed him,
with Roscio and Ustariz, republicans of the North Ameri
can school, to draw up a plan for a Constitution on the
basis of the federation of the Provinces. The old dreamer,
who mixed up classic traditions with modern theories,

THE FIRST CONGRESS OF VENEZUELA. 305
sought to combine them with the worn-out institutions of
the colonial epoch. According to his plan, the adminis
tration should be entrusted to two Incas (Roman consuls),
appointed for ten years ; the rest of the plan was modelled
on the municipal institutions of the colonies. He was far
behind the day in which he lived. To propagate his doc
trines, and to foment the spirit of independence, he with
Bolivar organized a political club on the model of that of
the Girondins, of which he had been a conspicuous member.
The first Congress of Venezuela was convened on the
2nd March, 1 8 1 1 ; thirty deputies from various Provinces
were present, Miranda was one of them. This Congress
appointed an Executive Junta of three members, created
a High Court of Justice in place of the Audiencia ;
and named Roscio, Ustariz, and Tobar commissioners to
draw up a Constitution. The question of independence
was then discussed. Miranda, who was the leading advo
cate of an immediate declaration, carried the measure, by
a majority, on the 5th July. The same day the flag raised
by Miranda in 1 806, stripes of yellow, blue, and red, was
adopted as the national ensign of Venezuela. Thus Vene
zuela was the first independent republic in South America.
Many of the inhabitants of Caracas were natives of
the Canary Islands. Among them the agents of Corta-
barria found the leaders for a reactionary movement,
which broke out on the nth July. The insurgents were
quickly surrounded by the populace, aided by a part of the
garrison, and compelled to surrender. The greater part of
those taken in arms were banished, but the leaders were
put to death and their heads were exposed on the public
roads ; sad presage of the war of extermination which was
to deluge the soil of Venezuela with blood.
On the same day a more formidable outbreak took place
at Valencia. The inhabitants armed, as they said, in the
cause of religion, and entrenched the city. An army corps
under Del Toro marched against them, but was beaten off,
on which Miranda was placed in command. A strong out-
x

306 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
work was carried by assault, but the army was again
repulsed in an attack on the great square. Bolivar and
Del Toro were both present in this affair.
Miranda, after receiving a reinforcement, again attacked
the city. Proceeding more cautiously, he gradually shut
up the Royalists in the great square, where want of water
soon compelled them to surrender at discretion. This
short campaign cost the Patriots 800 men in killed alone,
but Miranda did not sully his victory by bloodshed, and
Congress released all the prisoners, an act of clemency
which was severely blamed, in view of the severity with
which the Canarians of Caracas had been treated.
The debate on the Constitution produced a lengthy dis
cussion in Congress. A plan drawn up by Ustariz, which
was an adaptation of the Constitution of the United States,
was adopted almost unanimously, but Miranda voted
against it, alleging that a Federal Constitution was not
suited to the country.
Valencia was declared the capital of the new Republic.
Congress being in want of funds, had issued a paper
currency for the payment of their employes of all classes ;
its rapid depreciation in value brought about a state of
misery and discontent which enervated the spirit of the
revolution. Cortabarria recruited 1,000 men in Puerto Rico and
sent them, under Cajigal, to reinforce the Royalists of the
Western Provinces, where the reaction gained ground
every day.
Popular leaders rose up on every side in defence of the
cause of Spain ; their successes served to display the
strength of the country itself, and to prepare weapons for
the revolution when its principles were understood and
adopted by the people.
In February, 1812, a small detachment of 230 men, under
a naval officer named Monteverde, marched from Coro,
raised all the country as far as Barquisimeto, and at
Carora defeated a Patriot force of 700 men. The town of

THE EARTHQUAKE OF 1812. 307
Carora was sacked, and many Patriots were shot without
trial. In the east of Venezuela, Spanish Guayana had declared
against the revolution. Colonel Moreno marched with
1,400 men to rescue the Province from the Royalists, and
being joined by various scattered detachments of the
Patriots, collected a flotilla of twenty- eight gunboats on
the Orinoco, and threatened the town of Angostura,
which stands on the northern bank near to the mouth of
that river.
On the 25th March, 1812, the Royalists, with nine
schooners and eight gunboats, attacked the Patriot flotilla
in the bay of Lorondo, and after two days' fighting com
pletely destroyed it. Moreno retreated, and eventually
fled, while the remnant of his force capitulated at the
town of Maturin.
On the 26th March, 181 2, in the afternoon of a calm day,
a great roar was heard under the hills of Merida. The
ground commenced to rock to and fro in violent oscilla
tions. In less than a minute the cities of Merida, Bar-
quisimeto, San Felipe, La Guayra, and Caracas were
nothing more than heaps of ruins, under which 20,000
people lay entombed. In the capital almost all the garri
son perished. At Barquisimeto the greater part of a divi
sion of 1,000 men which was on the march to arrest the
progress of Monteverde, with a large amount of military
stores, were buried. Under these ruins the first Republic
of Venezuela found a grave.
This earthquake was felt only in territory occupied by
the revolutionists ; the Provinces of Coro, Maracaibo, and
Guayana, which were faithful to the King, suffered nothing.
The clergy, who were for the most part Royalists, made
use of the fact, pointing to it as a chastisement of Heaven
upon impious men and upon rebels. Fear entered into
the hearts of the people, and dismay into those of the
Patriots. Monteverde dug seven guns and much war material from
x 2

308 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
beneath the ruins of Barquisimeto, armed the people, and
raised his force to 1,000 men. At San Jose a division of
1,300 raw recruits sallied out to meet him ; one squadron
passed over to him, the rest were cut to pieces. The pri
soners were butchered, and the neighbouring town of San
Carlos was sacked and burned. The cities of Merida and
Trujillo declared for the King. The common people, and
deserters from the Patriot armies, flocked to Monteverde ;
he marched upon Valencia. Forty-five days after his
departure from Coro he entered the Federal capital in
triumph. Affairs were now in so critical a state that Miranda was
appointed Dictator. He established his head-quarters at
Victoria, between Valencia and Caracas, and advanced
with 4,000 men against the former city. During a skir
mish between outposts an entire company passed over to
the Royalists, and Miranda retreated to a position which
he strengthened with field-works. The hero of Valmy and
Jemappes, whose name is inscribed on the Triumphal Arch
at the Barriere d'Etoile, seems to have disappeared under
the cloak of the Dictator, and the irresolute General of
Maestrich and Nerwinde reappeared on a new scene.
Colonel Antofianzas, detached by Monteverde to the
plains of Caracas, took the town of Calabozo by assault,
and put the garrison to the sword. Then being joined by
a Spaniard named TOMAS Boves, he attacked San Juan
de los Morros, where not only the fighting men, but the
old men, women, and children, were butchered.
The Province of Barinas declared for the King, and
Monteverde, being now secure in his rear, twice attacked
Miranda in his entrenchments, but was each time repulsed
with heavy loss. Having received reinforcements from
Coro, he made a third attack, and was again repulsed,
but, undismayed, he made a flank movement and turned
the position of the Patriots, whereupon Miranda, though
with a force greatly superior in number to his adversary,
set fire to his stores, and retired precipitately, on the night

SUCCESSES OF THE ROYALISTS. 309
of the 1 7th June, to Victoria. Monteverde, at the head of
a small detachment, again attacked him in his new posi
tion, and caused great confusion in the encampment, but
was eventually beaten off.
The Royalist leader had now more than 3,000 men
under his orders, and, being joined by Antofianzas, made
a general attack on the entrenchments thrown up by
Miranda at Victoria on the 29th June, but was repulsed
with heavy loss after expending all his ammunition.
Miranda made no attempt to pursue him, and in a coun
cil of war it was decided to retreat to Valencia. A Spaniard
prevailed upon Monteverde to disregard the decision of
the council, and to remain where he was for three days.
These three days were the last of this revolution.
On the 24th June a general insurrection of the slaves
broke out in the valleys to the south-east of Caracas.
Miranda had decreed liberty to all slaves who would join
the Patriot armies. Their Spanish owners preferred to
arm them themselves to fight against the Patriots. The
negroes committed all manner of excesses, attacked
several towns, maltreated the white inhabitants, and came
so near to Caracas that Miranda was compelled to detach
troops against them.
Bolivar had been placed in command of the city of
Puerto Cabello. During a temporary absence of his, the
Spanish prisoners, who were numerous, gained over the
garrison of the citadel, and took possession of it. Bolivar
attempted to retake it with the troops quartered in the
city ; his advance posts went over to the enemy. On the
4th July Monteverde approached ; Bolivar sent out 200
men against him. They were beaten, and only seven men
with one officer returned. On this the rest of his troops
disbanded, and, with seven officers, he fled by sea to La
Guayra. When Miranda heard of this he exclaimed,
" Venezuela is stricken to the heart."
The Royalists had now the whole of the west and the
plains ; they dominated both banks of the Orinoco and

310 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
the sea coast ; the Patriots held barely a third of the terri
tory of Venezuela. The army still numbered 5,000 men,
mostly recruits, but the general had no confidence in them,
nor had his subordinates any longer faith in him. Every
one accused Miranda of having caused the miseries they
suffered : some called him a traitor. In despair he sum
moned a council, and by their advice opened negotiations
with the enemy.
In order to be in a better position to treat, Miranda
made an attack upon the enemy's lines, and routed several
detached parties of the Royalist troops, after which he
proposed a suspension of hostilities. The proposition was
accepted by Monteverde, on condition that the Royalist
troops should be permitted to advance on Caracas.
Miranda then made further proposals, and authorised
his commissioners to sign a capitulation, which should
guarantee the freedom and properties of the insurgents.
Some of his officers protested against this, and advised
him to risk ' everything 'on the chance of a battle, but in
reality all wished for peace, and he knew it. A capitula
tion, though a defeat, would do more for Venezuela than
would a passing victory ; public opinion had veered round
and was master of the situation. It was necessary that
Venezuela should suffer the yoke of the victorious reaction,
in order that she might know what it meant, and might
gather up her forces for the decisive struggle.
The capitulation was agreed to by Monteverde, and by
the commissioners appointed by Miranda, on the basis of
the complete submission of the Patriots and a general
amnesty. Miranda, after some hesitation, acceded to
these terms, and withdrew to Caracas. The troops either
joined the Royalist forces or dispersed.
On the 30th July Monteverde entered Caracas in
triumph, while Miranda, with Bolivar and several of his
principal officers, trusting not at all to the capitulation,
left for La Guayra, intending to fly by sea. The captain
of an English ship had offered a passage to Miranda, and

IMPRISONMENT AND DEATH OF MIRANDA. 311
urged him to embark at once. Bolivar and the others pre
vented him from going on board, saying that he required
rest. They dined together, and after Miranda had retired,
twelve officers formed themselves into a sort of secret
tribunal, and decided that he, as the author of the capitu
lation, ought to share the fate of the rest. Bolivar accused
him of receiving bribes from the Spaniards, and voted for
his death as a traitor to the cause of independence, but it
was resolved to detain him. Before dawn Bolivar went to
his room, removed his sword and pistols, and then awoke
him. He was made prisoner by his own friends and shut
up in the castle of San Carlos.
Monteverde paid no attention whatever to the terms of
the capitulation. The prisons were filled with citizens ;
Bolivar hid himself, but all except two of the other mem
bers of the secret tribunal were among the prisoners.
Many died in the dungeons, and the Canarians had their
revenge in the open plunder of all who had taken part
against them.
Miranda was sent to Puerto Cabello and loaded with
chains. From his dungeon he addressed a memorial to
the Supreme Court, demanding, in the name of the new
Spanish Constitution, the liberty of his comrades as
guaranteed by the capitulation, but he asked nothing for
himself. His protest was unheeded, and he, being sent to
Spain, languished for three years in a dungeon at Cadiz,
where he died miserably on the 14th July, 18 16, and was
buried in the mud banks, over which the waters of the
Mediterranean ebb and flow, in front of that city.
Bolivar, after remaining for some days in hiding, was
presented by a Spanish friend of his to Monteverde, who
gave him a passport " in recompense for his service to the
King in the imprisonment of Miranda."

CHAPTER XXXVII.
THE REVOLUTIONS IN NEW GRANADA AND QUITO.
1809 — 1813.
The events in Spain in the year 1808 produced great
excitement in New Granada, which was increased in the
following year by receipt of advices of the revolution in
Quito, mentioned in the last chapter. On the 9th Sep
tember, 1809, Amar, the Viceroy, summoned an assembly
of the Corporations and of leading citizens of the capital,
and sought counsel from them. Men of American birth,
who were members of this assembly, not only spoke in
favour of the Junta of Quito, but asked for the establish
ment of a similar government at Santa Fe de Bogota.
Spaniards advised the immediate dissolution of the revo
lutionary government. Amar followed the counsel of the
latter, and sent a column of 300 men to dissolve the Junta ;
at the same time the Viceroy of Peru sent 800 men on
the same errand.
The Junta of Quito had already raised three battalions
of infantry, and sent two companies with three guns
against the detachment from New Granada, but these
troops, while on the march, were completely routed by the
inhabitants of the Province of Pasto on the 16th October.
The revolutionists, dismayed at this disaster, on receiving
promise of an amnesty, replaced Castillo, the late captain-
general, in command.
When the two expeditions reached Quito the amnesty
was set aside. The leaders of the revolution were arrested,

NEW GRANADA. 313
some were sentenced to death, others to penal servitude.
The indignant populace attacked and captured one of the
barracks, but were promptly driven out again by the
soldiery and dispersed. The soldiers then proceeded to
the public gaol, where the prisoners were confined, and
killed twenty-five of them ; after which they spread about
the streets, and killed eighty citizens, among the victims
being three women and three children. The butchery was
only stopped by the intercession of the Bishop.
Castillo, horrified at these excesses, hastily convened an
assembly of the civil and ecclesiastical authorities and of
leading citizens. With their concurrence he proclaimed a
general pardon, and sent the Peruvian troops, who had
taken the lead in the massacres, back to Lima.
Word of these atrocities reached New Granada at the
same time that news arrived of the revolution in Vene
zuela, and produced an immediate effervescence throughout
the country.
In New Granada, according to one of their own writers,
" all the races of the world had come together to mingle
their blood, their traditions, their strength, and their
character, and united in the work of civilization."
Two-thirds of the population were white, residing mostly
in the towns and cities, hence the revolution took here a
civic form, and was greatly hampered by local jealousies
and by divergencies of opinion among the leaders.
The first revolutionary movement occurred at Cartagena,
where the people, headed by their Cabildo, demanded a
Junta. With the intervention of an agent of the Regency
of Cadiz, then in the city, a Junta of three was appointed,
of whom the actual governor was one ; but as he openly
showed his dissatisfaction with this arrangement, he was
banished to Havana on the 1 ith June, 1810.
To the east of the most easterly range of the Cordillera
lie the wide plains of Casanare ; here two youths raised
the standard of insurrection. They were joined by some
small groups of the country people, which were dispersed

314 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
by troops sent against them by the Viceroy. The leaders
were put to death, and their heads were sent to the
capital. On the 4th July a Junta was set up by the Cabildo of
Pamplona. At Socorro two companies of the line and some militia
were quartered. In a moment of false alarm they fired
upon an assemblage of the people. Eight thousand citi
zens arose in arms and besieged them in their barracks.
A Junta was formed of eight deputies elected by the
people, and the government was placed in their hands.
At Bogota everything was ripe for a revolution. Several
attempts had been made without result, but the news from
Venezuela and from the provinces, and above all the
expectation of the speedy arrival of commissioners from
the Regency of Cadiz, decided the Patriots to make an
other attempt, which was precipitated by an incident. On
the 20th July a Spaniard spoke contemptuously of Ameri
cans ; the people rushed tumultuously to the great square,
demanding an open Cabildo and a Junta. They were
supported by the municipal authorities. The Viceroy
declined to accede to their wish. The bells of the
churches were rung, and six or seven thousand armed men
assembled in front of the public offices. The Viceroy had
a thousand troops. A conflict seemed imminent, when at
last he gave way, and sanctioned the summoning of a
special Cabildo.
At six o'clock the same evening the Cabildo met. The
debate was stormy, Dr. Camilo Torres taking the lead.
The Patriots demanded a Junta, the Spaniards sought to
gain time by resisting the proposition. One of the popular
orators declared that any man who left his place before a
Junta was appointed, was a traitor to his country. The
speech was applauded by the people outside. A Junta
was named, with the Viceroy, who was very popular, as
President, and was installed in office at three in the
morning of the 21st July.

ANARCHY IN NEW GRANADA. 315
The Junta drew up a constitution, on the basis of a
federal union of the various provinces. The sovereignty
of King Ferdinand was recognised, and also the authority
of the Regency of Cadiz, so long as it should exist. This
was a compromise on all sides, and the Junta being over
awed by the popular leaders, had no real power. Later
on the Viceroy was deposed, and the Junta was instructed
to govern in the name of the King in complete indepen
dence of any other authority in Spain. Two days after
wards Montufar and Villavicencio arrived as commis
sioners from Spain, but were powerless to do more than
accept what was already done. Montufar, who was en
trusted with a special mission to Quito, continued his
journey to that city, where we shall presently find him at
the head of the revolutionists.
Anarchy and reaction were not slow to follow on these
hasty steps. Local jealousies, which had been kept in
check by the colonial system ; divergence of opinion be
tween the. leaders of the movement ; the antagonistic in
terests of Americans and Spaniards, and the instincts of
the masses who grouped themselves on geographical lines,
all combined to bring on complications in which the
strength of the country was wasted without any good result.
The Junta sent a circular to the provinces inviting them
to send deputies to a Congress. Nearly every province
followed the example of the capital by appointing a Junta,
but some of them refused to send deputies to a Congress,
preferring to consider themselves independent republics.
Cartagena refused to acknowledge in any way the
authority of the Junta of the capital, and invited the other
provinces to send deputies to a Congress in that city. One
province only acceded to this proposition, but it sufficed
to prevent the assemblage of the Congress at Bogota, and
postponed the formation of a central government, which
was the urgent necessity of the moment.
The revolutionary leaders in the capital then tried a
new plan. They formed the Province of Santa Fe, of

316 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
which Bogota was the chief city, into a monarchical re
public, which they called " The State of Cundinamarca,"
its ancient [name, with a legislature of two chambers, and
Dr. Lozano was named President during the captivity of
the King.
Lozano, after several fruitless attempts to bring about a
general understanding, succeeded at last in assembling
a Congress, but the want of a central government had pro
duced such anarchy that the people, inflamed by the writ
ings oLDon Antonio Narifio, who advocated a centralized
government, deposed Lozano, and on the 19th September,
181 1, appointed Narifio Dictator.
Congress continued the debate on the Constitution, and
adopted the federal system by a majority, but had no
power to establish it, and withdrew from the capital, where
it was overawed by the popular leaders, to the small town
of Ibague, in the Province of Mariquita.
On the nth November, 181 1, the Province of Cartagena
declared itself an independent State, and the Eastern
Provinces endeavoured to join the Confederation of Vene
zuela. Meantime the Royalists made no attempt to oppose the
revolution in the great centres of population, but secured
all the country to the south of the Province of Santa Fe, and
established^ their base of operations at Quito, with Guaya
quil as their port on the Pacific. To the north they held
the Provinces of the Isthmus of Panama, with the fortress
of Portobello, and also the city and Province of Santa
Marta on the western bank of the Magdalena, and the Pro
vince of Rio Hacha, also on the Magdalena, but further
inland. The insurgent Province of Cartagena, lying on
the coast, was thus isolated from the other provinces which
had declared for the revolution.
The Royalists established a second base of operations
at Santa Marta, where they raised an army of 1,500 men,
besides militia, and were reinforced by a battalion of
Spanish troops from Cuba, while three Spanish ships-of-

EFFORTS OF THE ROYALLSTS. 317
war guarded the coast, and either sunk or captured a
Patriot flotilla sent against them from Cartagena in March,
1812. Dr. Torices, a young man, twenty-four years of age,
being named Dictator by the Constituent Convention of
Cartagena, fitted out another flotilla, which he placed
under the command of a French adventurer named Laba
tut, and sent it against the Royalists, who had crossed the
Magdalena. Labatut drove them from the lower part of
the river, and then returned and captured the city of Santa
Marta in January, 18 13.
At this time Don Jose Domingo Perez, who had been
appointed Viceroy of New Granada by the Regency of
Cadiz, reached Portobello, but his authority was not recog
nised by the insurgent provinces.
On the outbreak of the revolution Colonel Tacon was
Governor of Popayan. By his . energy he prevented
the installation of a Junta in that city, but the Patriots set
one up in the small town of Cali. The Governor sent
troops against them. Santa Fe sent 300 men, under
Colonel Baraya, to their assistance, on which basis they
raised an army of 1,100 men, mostly Indians, armed with
lances. Tacon led another army, 1,500 strong, against
them, but was attacked and defeated by Baraya on the
28th March, 181 1. This was the first victory gained by
the Patriots of New Granada, and Tacon was forced to
retire to the valley of Pasto, where he stood at bay in the
passes leading to Quito, while Popayan fell into the hands
of the revolutionists.
Meantime a fresh insurrection had taken place at Quito,
and Tacon, after raising the Royalist population of the
valleys, marched upon that city with 600 men. The new
Government sent against him Don Pedro Montufar, the
envoy from the Regency of Cadiz, and Tacon, being
deserted by the greater part of his men, retreated to the
coast, where he received help from Guayaquil, but was
again defeated and withdrew to Peru.

318 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Montufar easily dispersed the Royalist levies in the
valley of Pasto, and returned to Quito, but the Royalists
soon reassembled, and, incited by the priests, attacked the
city of Popayan, but were beaten off, and were totally
dispersed on the night following by a sortie of the garri
son, which was headed by a young North American named
Macaulay. A portion of them, aided by fresh levies, cap
tured the city of Pasto before Macaulay could reach the
place, but he prevailed upon them to give up their pri
soners, and then marched away by night to join a column
advancing from Quito. Being again attacked by these
men of the valleys, he arranged a truce with them, which
they made use of to surprise his camp, killing 200 men
and making 400 prisoners, he himself being among these
latter, with Caicedo, the late commandant of Pasto.
These valleys of Pasto and Patia were the Vend6e of the
revolution of New Granada, and the reaction was now
there triumphant.
Don Pedro Montufar, in the capacity of commissioner
from the Regency of Cadiz, had reached Bogota after the
pacific triumph of the revolution in that city. He had
acceded to the new state of affairs, and had afterwards
gone on to Quito, where he was received with enthusiasm.
Under his auspices a Junta was there installed on the 19th
September, 18 10, under the presidency of Ruiz de Castillo,
the late captain-general, but the authority of this Junta
was not recognised by the Southern Provinces, where
Peruvian influence was supreme. The Junta then raised
an army of 2,000 men, which it placed under the command
of Montufar, with orders to reduce these provinces to
submission. At the same time Molina, who had been appointed by
the Viceroy of Peru captain-general of Quito in place of
Ruiz de Castillo, reached Guayaquil, where he raised an
army for the defence of these provinces. Neither Molina
nor Montufar had much confidence in their troops, and
confined their operations to desultory skirmishes, until, on

COLLAPSE OF THE REVOLUTION IN QUITO. 319
the nth December, the citizens of Quito deposed Ruiz de
Castillo from his post as President of the Junta, summoned
a Congress, and declared Quito to be an independent
State. Ruiz retired to a convent, from which he was
dragged by a mob and brutally murdered.
In the following year Marshal Montes arrived from Peru
to take command of the Royalist forces, and on the 2nd
September, 1812, defeated the Patriots at Mocha, giving
no quarter. Montufar raised a new army, and took up a
position on some precipices which covered the road to
the capital, but Montes, marching for nine days by a cir
cuitous route over the rugged slopes of Chimborazo, gained
his rear and obliged him to retreat.
The Patriots then fortified the city of Quito, and de"
clared they would hold out to the last extremity, but it was
taken by assault on the 3rd November. Montufar retired
northwards with the remnant of his force, but was pursued
by Colonel Samano, who beat him twice and captured all
his guns. Samano following out his instructions, shot all
superior officers who fell into his hands, and, going on to
Pasto where the prisoners of Popayan were confined, he
shot one in every five of the officers and one in every ten
of the soldiers, the victims being chosen by lot. Caicedo
and Macaulay were among them. Thus was crushed the
second revolution in Quito.
While the reaction closed in upon New Granada, the
interior of the country was a prey to anarchy. Federalism
struggled against centralization, Cundinamarca against
the provinces, Narifio against Congress, till all was chaos.
Narifio pursued his policy of centralization by sending
troops into the districts around the capital and annexing
them to .what he called " the legal province." Congress
protested from its retreat at Ibague. Baraya, with the dis
trict of Tunja, pronounced in favour of Congress, and
defeated a force sent by Narifio to reduce the Province of
Socorro. Narifio was forced to come to terms, and re
signed, but was reinstated by the citizens of the capital,

320 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
who, on the nth September, again proclaimed him Dic
tator, with absolute powers.
Congress, with eleven deputies who represented seven
provinces, met soon after at Leiva and named Dr. Torres
President. Torres, who was an enemy of Narifiols, soon
found a pretext for an open rupture with him. Civil war
broke out ; Baraya, in command of the Federal troops,
defeated Narifio and laid siege to Bogota, but was re
pulsed and totally defeated in an ill-planned attack upon
the city.
At this time Marshal Montalvo, a Cuban by birth,
arrived as Viceroy in place of Perez. Patriotism, ener
vated by civil strife, revived. On the 16th July, 1813,
Cundinamarca declared itself an independent State, and
the Province of Antioquia followed the example. Narifio
came to an arrangement with Congress, and offered troops
to reinforce the army which was sent against the Royalists
now advancing from the south.
General Samano had occupied the city of Popayan with
2,000 men, and now menaced the Province of Antioquia.
Congress placed the Federal army under the command of
Narifio, giving him the rank of lieutenant-general. Narifio
then abdicated the dictatorship and marched against the
enemy. His first operations were successful ; he defeated
the main body under Samano, occupied Popayan on the
31st December, and on the 13th January, 181 3, again
defeated the Royalist army, which fled to Pasto, but he
made no attempt to follow up his victories. General
Aymerich, who then replaced Samano in command, was
allowed two months in which to reorganize his scattered
forces. Then Narifio again advanced with 1,400 men, and
made his way through the guerillas, who swarmed in the
valley of Patia, to the Juanambu river, where he found that
the fords were defended by batteries. He forced a passage
by one ford, but was driven back by Aymerich, who after
wards retreated.
This river Juanambu is an impetuous torrent, rushino-

DEFEAT OF NARINO. 321
westward between precipitous cliffs from the slopes of the
eastern Cordillera. The few fords are only occasionally
passable, and the river is generally crossed by means of
baskets or troughs of raw hide slung upon cables stretched
from bank to bank, which are called " taravitas." The
Patriot army was delayed twenty days in crossing by
means of taravitas established by themselves, and then
advancing again encountered the enemy strongly posted
on the hills of Chacabamba.
The position was carried, with heavy loss, after four
hours of desperate fighting. Again the Royalist army
retreated, but the country people rose en masse in defence
of their homes and drove back the Patriot vanguard, which
was led by Narifio in person. Fugitives from this skirmish
reported that he was taken prisoner ; the main body was
seized with panic, spiked their guns, and fled precipitately ;
only 900 reached Popayan. Narifio, returning with thirteen
men to his encampment, found himself without an army.
Deserted by his men he wandered alone for some days on
the mountains, living on such wild fruits as he could find,
then giving himself up he was sent in irons to Spain.
Bolivar, after leaving Caracas, resided for some time at
Curacoa,. and then offered his services to the independent
Government of Cartagena. He was appointed military
commandant of the district of Barrancas, on the Upper
Magdalena, and resolved to make a campaign of his own
against the Royalists of Santa Marta, who obstructed the
navigation of the river. Here the future Liberator first
showed his genius for enterprise.
At the head of a small party of militia, he attacked the
fortified town of Teneriffe, drove out the garrison, captur
ing their guns and boats, and then took the town of Mom-
pox. Labatut, who commanded the Patriot flotilla acting
against Santa Marta, complained of this to the Dictator
as an intrusion upon his sphere of operations ; but Torices
reinforced Bolivar with some regular troops and fifteen
armed boats, with which he ascended the river, and after
Y

322 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
sundry successful skirmishes entered the city of Ocafia in
triumph in January, 1813.
In March, Labatut was driven from Santa Marta, and
the coast line was occupied by the Royalists. Torices
himself then led an expedition against them by sea, but
was defeated with the loss of his artillery on the 13th May,
Colonel Chatillon, who commanded the infantry, being
killed. The Royalists, being reinforced from Venezuela, thert
collected an army of 2,600 men in the Province of Barinas,
under command of a naval officer named Tiscar, sent
Colonel Correa with 1,000 men against Pamplona, and
700 men by another route to co-operate with him.
Colonel Castillo Rada, an officer of New Granada, who
was raising troops in the Province of Pamplona, applied
to Bolivar for help. Bolivar then conceived the daring
plan of attempting the reconquest of Venezuela, and wrote
to Torices and to Dr. Torres, showing them the advisa
bility of carrying the war into the enemy's territory.
Without waiting for an answer from either of them, he
marched with 400 men by a stony pass across the moun
tain range in front of Ocafia, drove in the outposts of the
enemy, and, spreading the report that he was followed by
a large army, crossed the river Zulia in one canoe, and on
the 28th February fell upon Correa. After four hours'
sharp firing, the fight was decided by a furious charge with
the bayonet ; the Royalists were totally defeated, with the
loss of all their artillery, and Bolivar was soon after joined
by Castillo Rada with the troops he had raised in Pamp
lona. Bolviar's idea of reconquering Venezuela was looked
upon as folly, just as San Martin's idea of reconquering
Chile was when he first broached it. Happily, Bolivar
also found a Pueyrredon to believe in him. He had pub
lished a memorial which produced a profound sensation in
New Granada. In it he disclosed for the first time his
peculiar ideas on the organization of a Republican Govern-

INVASION OF VENEZUELA BY BOLIVAR. 323
ment, and on the proper mode of conducting the war.
Explaining the causes of the fall of the Republic of Vene
zuela, he said : —
" Our rulers did not consult codes which would teach
them the practical science of government, but those drawn
up by dreamers who built republics in the air en the basis
of the perfectability of human nature. We had philo
sophers as leaders, philanthropy for legislation, argu
ments instead of tactics, and sophists for soldiers."
He also denounced the federal form of government as
contrary to the interests of young societies in face of a
foreign war, and the folly of placing trust in raw levies in
place of devoting all their energy to the organization of
regular troops, and wound up by insisting that the safety
of New Granada lay in the reconquest of Venezuela.
President Torres read this memorial with great atten
tion, and though it clashed with his ideas as a federal, he
saw that it was the work of a deep thinker who was also
a man of action, and the language used appealed both to
his reason and to his heart. The successes achieved by
Bolivar in his first daring attempt decided him. He re
solved upon the reconquest of Venezuela.

Y 2

CHAPTER XXXVIII.
THE RECONQUEST OF VENEZUELA.
1813.
By the surrender of Miranda Monteverde was left unop
posed in Venezuela, and was made Captain-General, with
the title of " Pacificator." He commenced his work of
pacification by deeds from which the warmest partisans of
Spain now turn away their eyes in horror. He violated
the capitulation by imprisoning so many citizens that the
gaols could not hold them ; many died of hunger and
suffocation in filthy dungeons. In the provinces his reign
of terror assumed forms still more barbarous ; the whole
country seemed given up to hordes of banditti.
Colonel Cerveris, pro-consul of Cumana, acted with
such inhumanity as even disgusted the hard hearts of
his superiors, who replaced him by Antofianzas, and the
Audiencia complained of his misconduct to the Home
Government. All this was but the prelude to a war of
extermination, which was provoked by the Royalists by
murders, by mutilations and by torture.
The people, cowed in spirit by their sufferings, by their
political calamities, and by the natural catastrophes
which had befallen them, were only too anxious for rest on
any terms under the domination of the colonial system.
Clemency would have kept them peaceful, but the reign
of terror drove superstitious fears from their minds,
and changed weakness into strength. They fled from
their persecutors into the woods and mountains ; the
leaders emigrated. Misery and despair created a desire
for vengeance in the breasts of the most timid.

DESCENT OF MARINO ON THE EASTERN COAST. 325
A handful of exiles gave the signal from a rock in the
Antilles, and the whole of the eastern part of the territory
rose in rebellion.
Famous in the history of the New World is the gulf
called "Triste," discovered by Columbus on his third
voyage, when he, without knowing it, landed for the first
time on the Continent of which he was in search. At its
mouth, between the eastern extremity of the Peninsula of
Paria and the island of Trinidad, there lies a smaller
island called Chacachacare ; on it the fugitives from
Cumana took refuge. Though only forty-five in number,
they resolved to renew the war and to raise the country
against the Spaniards. A gallant youth of good family,
from the island of Margarita, Santiago Marino by name,
put himself at their head. Manuel Piar, a handsome
mulatto, two brothers, Jose Francisco and Bernardo
Bermudez, and the engineer Ascue, formed his staff. With
no other arms than six muskets and some pistols, they
landed on the coast on the 13th March, 18 13, surprised a
guard, captured twenty-three muskets, and marched reso
lutely on the fortified town of Giiiria. The garrison, who
were all natives, joined them ; on the 16th March they
had 200 well-armed men.
With seventy-five men Bernardo Bermudez took the town
of Maturin, where there was a deposit of military stores ; his
brother fortified Irapa on the Gulf, and Marino made this
place his head-quarters.
Cerveris had a small flotilla on the Gulf and 400
men, but did not dare to act on the offensive until,
being reinforced by a Basque named Zuazola with 300
men, he sent him to retake Maturin. Zuazola easily
overcame a small Patriot force which opposed his march,
slaughtered them without mercy, and sent boxes full of
human ears to Cumana as trophies of his victory. He
then tried to induce those of the country people who
had fled to the woods to return to their homes, by giving
them assurances of safety, but all who presented themselves
were either killed or mutilated, men, women and children.

326 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Some were flayed alive, some were tied two and two
together by the shoulders and thrown into a lake.
Colonel Fernandez de la Hoz, governor of Barcelona,
having joined Zuazola, they attacked Maturin with
¦1,500 men. In the absence of Bermudez, Piar was in
command, and had 500 men with him. By a sudden
attack upon them with his cavalry, he threw the Royalists
into such disorder that they were forced to retreat. In April
they again advanced and were this time completely routed.
Monteverde, who had looked upon the invasion as the
escapade of a wild boy, now became alarmed and
marched on Maturin with 2,000 men, but his troops
were thrown into disorder by the heavy fire of cannon
and musketry which was poured upon them from the
town, and a charge of cavalry led by Piar completed
the rout. Monteverde escaped with difficulty, leaving
400 dead upon the field, and lost all his guns and
baggage. Marshal Cajigal, who was now placed in com
mand of the district, remained strictly on the defensive at
Barcelona, while the Patriots threatened Cumana.
The island of Margarita lies in the Carribean Sea, off
the mouth of the Gulf of Cariaco, on which the city of
Cumana is situate, and is about thirty-five miles from the
mainland. It is divided by a range of mountains which
run down the centre from east to west ; the north and
south coasts are thus completely separate, the only com
munication between them being by a narrow defile, easy
of defence. Asuncion, the capital, lies inland on the south
side, and is dominated by the fortress of Santa Rosa, but
has a port on the coast, which is defended by the castle of
Pampatar. The north side of the island is known as the
district of Juan Griego, and has a good port on the Carri
bean Sea, which is defended by a blockhouse. The
possession of Margarita was of great importance to both
parties, not only by reason of its situation, but also
because the inhabitants, being mostly sailors and fisher
men, would be of great assistance in naval operations
along the coast.

REVOLT ON THE ISLAND OF MARGARITA. 327
At that time Colonel Pascual Martinez, a petty tyrant of
the Cerveris type, was governor of Margarita. The Audi
encia reproved him for his conduct, and ordered certain
prisoners on the mainland who had been accused by him,
to be set at liberty. Furious at this, he declared that if
any one of these men set foot on the island he would shoot
him. Among the prisoners so set at liberty was a man of
mixed race, who from being a fisherman had risen to be
one of the largest proprietors on the island. This man,
Juan Bauptista Arismendi by name, was a sort of chieftain
among his fellows, a rude hero of the people, a man of
vehement passions combined with innate sagacity, and of
an adventurous spirit. On the fall of Miranda he was
accused of treason and hid himself. Governor Martinez
seized his wife and children and threatened to shoot them
if they did not disclose his hiding-place. Arismendi gave
himself up, his property was confiscated, his family
reduced to poverty, and he himself was sent as a prisoner
to La Guayra. He swore vengeance.
Being released, he returned to the island and was
thrown into a dungeon. The populace rose en masse.
Martinez shut himself up with a garrison in the castle of
Pampatar, but was forced to surrender ; Arismendi was
made governor and kept his vow of vengeance. Martinez
and twenty-nine Spaniards who were with him were shot.
Arismendi immediately opened communications with
Marino, offering to assist him in any way in his power.
Marino, who was now besieging Cumana, asked for a flotilla
to blockade the place. Arismendi sent him three armed
schooners and eleven boats under an Italian named
Bianchi, with a supply of arms and ammunition for the
Patriot forces. Cumana was thus speedily invested both
by land and sea.
Cumana was well fortified and was defended by a garri
son of 800 men with forty guns, under command of
Governor Antofianzas. The Patriots dared not attempt
an assault, but their blockade soon reduced the city to
extremities. Antofianzas, taking advantage of the care-

328 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
less watch kept by the Patriot flotilla, shipped a portion of
his force on some small craft, and sailed away, as he said,
in search of help, leaving the fortress in charge of a subor
dinate officer. This officer, seeing his position hopeless,
entered into arrangements for a capitulation, but while the
negotiation was in progress, spiked his guns, embarked
the remainder of the garrison in such boats as they could
lay hold of, and followed Antofianzas, who had not suc
ceeded in escaping from the Gulf. After rejoining him a
fresh breeze sprang up, and the fugitives again set sail in
eight small vessels, but were attacked by Bianchi as they
left the Gulf. Only three vessels escaped, on one of which
was Antofianzas, who soon after died of a wound received
in the action.
The city was occupied by the Patriots, and twenty-five
prisoners of distinction were shot, at the instigation of
Jos6'Bermudez. Marino then marched against Cerveris, who retreated,
after shooting Bernardo Bermudez, who was lying in a
hospital dangerously wounded.
Piar, with a strong column, occupied Barcelona, which
was evacuated on his approach by Cajigal, who retired to
Guayana. When he reached the Orinoco, a man named
Jose Tomas Boves, who had served under Antofianzas and
Zuazola, and a Canarian named Morales, asked to be left
behind, in order that they might raise the Llaneros against
the Patriots. Cajigal gave them permission to make the
attempt, and also left with them one hundred men and
some supplies. This small force became the nucleus of a
powerful army, which was destined to crush the Republic
of Venezuela for the second time.
Jose Bermudez, with another column, captured several
towns on the coast of the Gulf of Paria, and furious at the
death of his brother, killed every Royalist who fell into his
hands. In eight months all the eastern part of Venezuela was
thus reconquered by the Patriots, who named Marino
Dictator of the Provinces of Cumana and Barcelona, and

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST OF VENEZUELA. 329
of the island of Margarita, with Piar as his second in com
mand, at the same time that Bolivar entered Caracas in
triumph and was acclaimed Dictator of the West after one
of the most extraordinary campaigns of the epoch, which
in some respects resembles the first campaign of Buona
parte in Italy.
While Bolivar, after his victory over Correa, was await
ing due authorization from the Government of New
Granada to proceed with his scheme of reconquest, a
young lawyer named Bricefio, who had been a member of
the Congress of Caracas, maddened at the excesses of
Monteverde, presented to him a plan he had published
in Cartagena, which he with others had sworn to carry
out. His design was to make a general massacre of "the
cursed race of European Spaniards and of the Canarians."
Bolivar and Castillo Rada, who shared the command
with him, assented to it with the proviso " those found
with arms in their hands."
Bricefio started off on his campaign of murder with one
hundred and forty sworn assassins, and a few days after
sent back two heads as a trophy, a present which excited
the horror of the two commanders. Bricefio was soon
after defeated and made prisoner by a very superior force,
and was shot at Barinas, which execution was afterwards
used by Bolivar as a pretext for cruel reprisals.
The Government of New Granada adopted the idea of
Bolivar ; the Republic of Venezuela should be restored
under its auspices, and the federal form of government
should be re-established under the previous authorities.
The invading army was to be a liberating army only, and
should take no part in the internal affairs of the sister
republic, which should be called upon to pay the expenses
of the expedition. Bolivar accepted these conditions, and
swore to carry them out faithfully.
His first step was to detach Castillo Rada with 800 men
against Correa. Castillo defeated the Royalist army in a
sharply contested action, and drove it back to Trujillo,
but then withdrew his forces and resigned his command

330 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
through jealousy of Bolivar, thinking that his fellow-
countrymen would prefer him as a leader to a Venezuelan.
But Torres did not hesitate, he chose Bolivar to command
the Granadian contingent, conferred the rank of brigadier
upon him, and ordered him at once to drive the Royalists
out of the Provinces of Merida and Trujillo, after which he
was to await instructions, which would be conveyed to
him by commissioners from Congress, who would accom
pany him in all his future operations as those of the
Convention accompanied the armies of Revolutionary
France. Bolivar had barely 600 men, while he was opposed by
6,000, who were so posted that wherever he attacked
them they were always two to one. The first invasion
of Bolivar along the western slopes of the eastern range
of the Cordillera which crosses the territory of Vene
zuela, was a series of flashes of lightning which ended in
a thunderbolt. On the 30th May he took Merida un
opposed. The city raised a battalion of 500 infantry and
a squadron of cavalry to reinforce his army. His van
guard, under Girardot, then occupied Trujillo, and a
strong detachment under D'Eluyar forced Correa to take
refuge in Maracaibo.
The garrison of Trujillo retreated to Carache, a town
devoted to the Royalist cause, but were driven out by
Girardot, who shot all the Spaniards who were taken
prisoners, and the town was declared "infamous" by
Bolivar in a proclamation. In fifty days there was not an
enemy left in either province.
From this time Bolivar assumed a new attitude, as the
independent representative of the Republic of Venezuela,
and became a sort of Dictator. In contravention of the
express orders of the Government of New Granada, he on
the 15th June fulminated in a proclamation an order for
the extermination of all Royalists, which he established
by decree on the 6th September as a fundamental law of
Venezuela. The atrocities committed by Monteverde and
his myrmidons produced their natural effect.

BOLIVAR'S DECREE OF EXTERMINATION. 331
" Every Spaniard who does not conspire against tyranny
in favour of the just cause, in the most active and effica
cious manner, shall be held to be an enemy, shall be
punished as a traitor, and shall be put to death."
A new system of dates was also adopted by him : —
" Third year of Independence and first of the War to the
Death." This decree of extermination has found many apologists;
with the exception of some Spaniards no one has con
demned it as an act of personal atrocity. Only two men
have utterly censured it. One of them, an historian of
Venezuela named Gonzalez, says : —
" It created thousands of enemies to the Republic in the
interior, and alienated exterior sympathy. It was the fury
of a storm, a stain upon our history."
The other who condemned it was" Bolivar himself, who
in his last days spoke of it as a " delirium."
This struggle did not assume a ferocious character until
the indigenous races took part in it. The Spanish
leaders, Miyares, Ceballos and Cajigal, always acted with
humanity and repressed the excesses of their subordinates,
as also did Cortabarria, the agent of the Regency. Nothing
that the Royalists had yet done could in any way justify
this decree as a measure of retaliation.
At Trujillo Bolivar received orders from the Government
of New Granada to proceed no further. As his ambition
was to encircle his brow with the civic crown as liberator
of his native land, to pause was to endanger the advan
tage he had already gained. From the east came echoes
of the success achieved by Marino and his comrades, but
he aspired to be the man who should rescue the ruins of
Caracas, the city of his birth, from the enemy. They might
forestall him. On his own responsibility he went on.
Tiscar, the Spanish general, who occupied Barinas with
1,300 men, had done nothing to prevent the capture of
M6rida and Trujillo, but at last determined to cut off the
retreat of the invaders, and detached Colonel Marti with
700 men for that purpose. Bolivar at once crossed the

332 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
mountains in his front with a strong vanguard, after
detaching Rivas and Urdaneta with 500 men, by a more
southerly route, in the same direction. On the ist July
Rivas found himself confronted by the entire column under
Marti in a very strong position, from which he drove the
Royalists to another stronger still, where he on the next
day completely defeated them after five hours fighting,
capturing a gun and 400 prisoners, all the Spaniards
among whom were at once shot.
Tiscar retreated on the approach of Bolivar, who
occupied Barinas on the 6th July, taking 13 guns and a
large quantity of military stores, while Tiscar was so
actively pursued by Girardot, that his men dispersed, and
he fled to Guayana.
At Barinas, Bolivar raised some new battalions and
several squadrons of cavalry, and separated this increased
force into three divisions under Urdaneta, Girardot, and
Rivas, which he dispersed in such a manner as must have
ensured defeat in the face of an active enemy, but his
manoeuvres, imprudent as they were, resulted in the most
brilliant success. Rivas, with 600 men, totally defeated
1,000 Royalists under Colonel Oberto on the 22nd July,
and then recrossing the mountains for the third time in
one month, rejoined Bolivar and Girardot.
Bolivar, who had now 1,500 men, marched rapidly against
Colonel Izquierdo, who was encamped on the plain of
Taguanes. Izquierdo, who had only 1,000 men, retreated in
close column on Valencia, hotly pursued by the Patriots.
After six hours marching, the Patriot cavalry headed the
column, which was atonce charged bythe infantry and totally
destroyed, Izquierdo himself falling mortally wounded.
Monteverde on hearing of the fall of Barinas, had gone
to Valencia, but seemed perfectly bewildered by the rapid
movements of Bolivar, and did nothing to assist his scat
tered divisions. Tardily, he left Valencia with some
infantry and cavalry to support Izquierdo, but was met by
the news of his defeat, and fled to Puerto Cabello, while

BOLIVAR ENTERS CARACAS IN TRIUMPH. 333
Bolivar entered Valencia unopposed, capturing thirty
heavy guns and large quantities of military stores.
The garrison of Caracas, composed of civic guards and
volunteers, for the most part dispersed, and General Fierro,
who was in command, made overtures to Bolivar for a
capitulation. Bolivar granted honourable terms, guaran
teeing the lives and properties of the inhabitants, on
condition that all the Province, including the fortress of
Puerto Cabello, was given up. Fierro, without waiting to
make a formal surrender, fled to La Guayra and escaped,
but Monteverde refused to ratify the capitulation.
If Bolivar with his usual activity, had marched on
Puerto Cabello, he must have captured it, as the fortifica
tions were dismantled. Instead of this, he vaingloriously
marched to receive the ovation which awaited him in
Caracas, and gave Monteverde twenty days in which to
prepare for defence.
In this campaign, Bolivar showed that though he had
had no military education, he possessed the talents of a
great revolutionary leader, and the inspiration of genius.
At one step he gained a place among the celebrated
captains of his time ; he drew out his plans quickly and
executed them with daring resolution, while he lost no
time in securing the fruits of his victories. With 600 men,
in ninety days, he had fought six battles, defeated and
dispersed 4,500 men, captured fifty guns and three deposits
of war material, had re-conquered the whole of western
Venezuela from the Cordillera to the sea, and had restored
the Republic. Never with such small means was so much
accomplished, over so vast an extent of country, in so short
a time. Bolivar entered Caracas in triumph on the 6th August •
the bells rang, the cannon roared, and the people shouted
in applause of their liberator ; his path was strewed with
flowers, blessings were showered upon his head. Beautiful
girls, belonging to the principal families of the city,
dressed in white and wearing the national colours, led his

334 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
horse by the bridle and crowned him with laurels. The
prison doors were opened and the captive Patriots set free,
and he did not sully his triumph by one act of vengeance, in
spite of his terrible decree of extermination which had
been ruthlessly carried out on every field of battle.
Two days later he announced the re-establishment of the
Republic, but he did not restore the federal system, to
which he was opposed on principle, and which was not
consistent with the public safety. He proclaimed himself
Dictator with the title of "Liberator," and in this he
showed both foresight and patriotism ; the restoration of
the old system would have certainly entailed anarchy and
defeat. There were thus two Dictators in Venezuela, Marino in
the East, Bolivar in the West. Marino sent commissioners
to Bolivar to treat concerning the form of government which
should be adopted. Bolivar hesitated, he saw the necessity
of establishing a firm central authority, and meanwhile
Marino, who had by this time a powerful army, did nothing
against the common enemy.
On the 25th August Bolivar laid siege to Puerto Cabello.
His Granadian troops stormed the outer defences and
drove the garrison into the castle. Then batteries were
erected on the coast, which beat off three Spanish brigs of
war whose fire had raked the lines of the besiegers. On
the night of the 31st an assault was made, but the only
result of it was that Zuazola, who commanded an outwork,
was made prisoner. Bolivar offered to exchange him for
one of his own officers who had been captured. Monte
verde refused, whereupon Zuazola was hanged on a gallows
in front of the walls.
¦ The Royalists were defeated, but they were not con
quered ; they soon recovered from their stupor, and reports
of reactionary movements came from all sides. Then on
the 6th September the Dictator fulminated another decree,
his last thunderbolt in this war to the death, which
produced one of the most dreadful hecatombs of which

DEATH OF GIRARDOT. 335
history bears record. He declared that all Americans
who should even be suspected of being Royalists were
traitors to their country. |This extreme and ill-advised
measure greatly contributed to the defeat of Bolivar in the
campaign now commencing. Such is the logic of Destiny!
On the 1 6th September the frigate Venganza arrived at
Puerto Cabello from Spain, accompanied by an armed
schooner and six transports, with the Granada regiment,
1,200 strong, under command of Colonel Salomon. Bolivar
raised the siege and retired to Valencia.
Monteverde, encouraged by the retreat of the Patriots
and by the reinforcement he had received, took the field on
the 26th September with 1,600 men. But he had no fixed
plan and committed the grave mistake of dividing his
force. He himself took up a position on the road to
Valencia at a place called Las Trincheras, and detached
500 men by another road to the heights of Barbula.
Bolivar remained quiet for four days, unable to divine his
intentions, and then sent Girardot and D'Eluyar with the
Granadian troops against the enemy at Barbula, while a
column under Urdaneta went in support. On the 30th
September the Royalists were driven from this strong
position, but Girardot fell, shot through the head in the
moment of victory. His troops, in revenge, asked per
mission to attack the main body at Las Trincheras by
themselves. Bolivar acceded to their request but sup
ported them with 1,000 of his own troops. Monteverde
was driven out of the entrenchments he had thrown up,
with heavy loss, on the 3rd October. He himself being
wounded returned to Puerto Cabello, leaving Salomon in
command till he should recover, and the Patriots under
D'Eluyar again laid siege to this fortress.
Bolivar, eager for fresh ovations, decreed sumptuous
funeral honours to the memory of Girardot, to whose valour
both New Granada and Venezuela owed their greatest
victories. The citizens wore mourning for a month ; his
heart was taken out and carried to Caracas to be deposited

330 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
in the Cathedral, his body was sent to Antioquia, his native
province, and his pay was secured to his posterity.
Bolivar himself accompanied the funeral procession to
Caracas. On the 14th October, the day of the obsequies, twenty of
the civic functionaries of the capital assembled and
decreed that Bolivar should be appointed Captain-General
of the armies of Venezuela with the title of " Liberator,"
which he had already bestowed upon himself, and that the
inscription "Bolivar, Liberator of Venezuela" should be
inscribed over the gateways of all the public offices.
Posterity has confirmed this title to him, but its accept
ance at that time, when the reaction was gaining ground
every day, was a symptom of inordinate personal vanity.
In return for this compliment Bolivar instituted the
military order of " The Liberators " ; a star with seven
rays, symbolical of the seven provinces of the Republic,
given as a decoration to those who should merit it by
deeds of arms, and which carried with it certain privileges.
This order was more democratic than those instituted by
O'Higgins and San Martin in Chile and Peru, as it was for
lifetime only, and was less aristocratic than the order of
Cincinnatus created by Washington.
The time which Bolivar wasted in theatrical displays
the Royalists made good use of for their own purposes.
Boves was a Spaniard by birth, whose real name was
Rodriguez. In his youth he was condemned to eight
years penal servitude at Puerto Cabello for piracy, but was
released chiefly through the intervention of a man whose
name he then adopted in gratitude. He joined the revolu
tion when it first broke out, but being looked upon as
disaffected he was thrown into prison at Calabozo till that
town was retaken by Antofianzas, when he joined the
Royalists and took part in the butchery at San Juan de
los Morros. Morales, his companion and second in com
mand, had served as a volunteer with the Royalists at
Barcelona, and was made a sub-lieutenant of artillery by

BOVES ROUSES THE LLANEROS. 337
Monteverde. These two men were both endowed with the
warlike instinct, were both distinguished by indefatigable
activity and by an iron will ; they were just the sort of
men to act as leaders of semi-barbarous troops. But
Boves, with all his ignorance and brutality, had some
thing of moral elevation about him : he fought for a cause,
not for rapine. Morales took an actual pleasure in cruel
deeds, and was of insatiable rapacity. These two men
were the first to discover the latent strength of the people,
which the revolution later on assimilated to itself. Up to
this time the revolutionary movement had been confined
to the cities and towns ; Bolivar with all his perspicacity
never suspected that the main strength of the country lay
on the plains around them.
When these two men were left on the north bank of the
Orinoco by Cajigal they adopted Bolivar's plan of rous
ing the country by proclamations. They called the
Llaneros to arms, offering them bloodshed and booty in
the cause of the King, with pain of death to all who dis
regarded the summons. Each man presented himself on
horseback with a lance ; in each district a squadron was
formed which took its name. Boves taught them the
secret of victory, which was to have no fear of death, to
go straight on and never look behind. In a very short
time they had 2,500 men embodied, an army of horsemen
such as had never yet been seen in America.
Colonel Jose Yafiez, a Canarian, was a man of the same
stamp as Boves and Morales, but of greater military
skill. After the dispersion of the column by Tiscar, he
had retreated to San Fernando on the Apure River, and
with some help from Guayana, had there organized an
infantry corps of 500 men, which he named the " Numan
cia" battalion. He also raised two regiments of Llanero
cavalry, each 500 strong. With this force he invaded
Barinas in September, before the waters had retired
from the plains.
Boves opened his campaign by surprising a column of
z

338 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
1,000 men which had been sent against him, near Cala
bozo, on the 20th September. The cavalry passed over to
him, the infantry he routed. He murdered all his
prisoners, and then took and sacked the small town of
Cura. Now there appeared upon the scene another singular
character, of the iron temperament of Boves, with all his
ferocity and courage, who raised a barrier to his impe
tuous onslaught. Nothing was known of him except that
he was a Spaniard who had come to America very young,
and had married an American wife. When Bolivar
opened his campaign of emancipation, this man had
headed the rising at Merida ; then, leaving wife and
children, he raised a battalion and devoted himself body
and soul to the cause of independence. Throughout the
campaign he distinguished himself by his indomitable
valour and by his cruelty to prisoners, to whom he gave no
quarter. The cause of his hatred to his fellow country
men is unknown. He was accustomed to say : —
" When the Spaniards are all killed then I will cut my
own throat, so that there shall not be one left."
The name of this man was Vicente Campo Elias. At
Las Trincheras he was raised to the rank of lieutenant-
colonel for conspicuous bravery. This was the man to
send against Boves.
He marched from Valencia with 1,000 infantry and 1,500
cavalry. Boves with 2,500 horse, and Morales with 500 in
fantry, waited for him at a place called Mosquitero, at the
entrance to the plains. On the 14th October the armies
met. Boves charged the left wing of the Patriots with his
usual impetuosity, and carried all before him, but Campo
Elias, caring nothing for this, rushed upon the main body
of the Royalists, and routed them completely in fifteen
minutes. Morales escaped badly wounded, but nearly the
whole of his infantry were butchered, and the Llanero
horse were cut to pieces. Boves and Morales fled with
twenty men beyond the Apure, and the state of the plains
rendered pursuit impossible.

ADVANCE OF THE ROYALISTS FROM CORO. 339
Campo Elias contented himself by retaking the town of
Calabozo, and killing every man in the place for having
given assistance to Boves. Unarmed Venezuelans were
butchered by Venezuelan troops at Calabozo in the name
of Liberty on the same day on which Bolivar was greeted
in Caracas as the Liberator. This cruel deed - decided
the Llaneros. Seeing that there was no mercy for them,
they abandoned their homes and looked to Boves for
their revenge. The decree of extermination began to
bear fruit.
Ceballos, who commanded at Coro, on hearing that
reinforcements had reached Puerto Cabello, drew up a plan
for the concerted action of the scattered bands of Royalists.
With such men as he could collect, he sallied forth, and
after routing two detachments of Patriots took Barqui
simeto, where he was attacked by Bolivar and Urdaneta.
Bolivar captured the town with a handful of horse, but his
main body was totally routed by the Spanish infantry led
by Ceballos, who, after his victory, crossed the Cordillera,
and at Araure, in the valley of Caracas, effected a junc
tion with , the column under Yafiez. Salomon, instead of
joining him, marched with 1,000 men to the heights of
Vigirima, to the west of the city of Caracas, and there
entrenched himself.
Bolivar was then at Valencia with the Granadian con
tingent. He collected what other troops he could ; Rivas
brought up the garrison of Caracas, with a battalion of 500
students from the University. After two days' fighting,
Salomon was on the 25th October driven back to Puerto
Cabello with the loss of four guns. Bolivar then turned
his attention to Ceballos, and by drawing 1,500 men
. from the force under Campo Elias, he had by the 1 st
December collected a force of 3,000 men. Ceballos had
3,500 men and ten guns, posted in a strong position on the
slopes of the mountains, at the town of Araure. Here
Bolivar attacked him on the 4th December. One Patriot
battalion advancing incautiously was cut to pieces, but
Bolivar, nothing daunted, brought up the rest of his
z 2

34° THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
troops, and ordered a charge with the bayonet, which was-
his favourite manoeuvre. He was no tactician ; he hurled
his men in masses upon the enemy, and trusted to their
valour. Yafiez attempted to take the attacking column
on the flank with his cavalry, but was himself taken in
flank by the Patriot cavalry, and utterly routed. Ceballos,.
after a stubborn resistance, was completely defeated, losing
500 killed, 400 prisoners, and all his guns. He fled to
Guayana, 800 of his infantry escaped in the same direc
tion, and Yafiez fled to the Apure with 200 men. This was
the first pitched battle won by Bolivar.
After the rout of Barquisimeto, Bolivar had formed1
the fugitives into a battalion, which, in punishment of
their cowardice, he called the " Nameless Battalion," tell
ing them that they should have no flag till they did
something to merit one. This corps greatly distinguished
itself at the battle of Araure. Bolivar now presented it
with the flag of the Numancia battalion, which had been
captured in the fight, and renamed it "The Victor of
Araure." Salomon had again taken the field with 1,300 men, but
on hearing of the defeat of Araure, he again retired to
Coro, harassed on his way by detached parties of the
Patriots, and losing two guns and more than half his men-
Bolivar then marched to assist] D'Eluyar in the siege of
Puerto Cabello. The moment was propitious ; the Spanish
ships of war had left for the Havana, and Piar, with the flotilla
from Cumana, had established a blockade, cutting off the
garrison from all supplies. Monteverde had been dis
missed in disgrace from his command ; Ceballos, who had
been appointed to succeed him, was a fugitive in Guayana,
where also was Cajigal, who had been appointed by the
Home Government Captain-General of Venezuela, and
had as yet done nothing. Still the garrison, which was
only 600 strong, held out.
Meantime the dual dictatorship brought forth its natural
fruit. The victories of the West were sterile without the

BOVES RAISES ANOTHER ARMY. 341
concurrence of the army of the East. Marino refused to
•combine operations with Bolivar until he was recognised
as the supreme ruler of the territory he possessed. The
Liberator modestly entreated him to march upon the
plains, where Boves and Yafiez were recruiting. Far from
doing this, though such action was necessary to his own
security, he even recalled his flotilla from Puerto Cabello,
but Piar listened to the appeals of Bolivar, and continued
the blockade. The result was that Bolivar, being unable
to attend to the siege of Puerto Cabello and to the war
upon the plains at the same time, Boves and Yafiez were
speedily in a position to assume the offensive. Boves,
more especially, with that wonderful energy which hesi
tated at no means, however terrible they might be, to the
end before him, again took the field, two months after his
¦defeat by Campo Elias.
On the ist November he summoned all able-bodied men
to join him, proclaimed war to the knife against the
Patriots, decreed that their goods should be distributed
-among his troops, and, finally, liberated all slaves who
would enlist under the banners of the King. The Llaneros,
irritated by the massacre of Calabozo, and eager for plun
der, flocked in masses to his standard. From Guayana
came 100 infantry and one gun. By the middle of Decem
ber he had 3,000 cavalry, the blades of whose lances were
forged from the spikes torn from the railings of windows.
With this horde he descended to the lower plains. On
the 14th December he routed a division of 1,000 men at
San Marcos, and occupied Calabozo, slaughtering without
mercy, and enriching his troops with booty. He then
overran the whole plain lying between the windward coast
¦range and the Gulf of Paria. For further operations he
needed infantry, and set to work to make some. At the
;same time Yafiez, with some help from Guayana, organized
a. force of 2,000 men on the Apure, and captured the city
of Barinas, while Cajigal and Ceballos raised another army
on the leeward coast.

342 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Bolivar was reduced to Caracas and the neighbouring
valleys, with a feeble reserve in Valencia, and was con
stantly harassed by Royalist guerillas. Urdaneta, who
had marched on Coro, was forced to return to his assist
ance. Marino, with 3,500 men distributed along the coasts of
Barcelona and Cumana, and in the adjacent valleys, did
nothing. All the rest of Venezuela was occupied by
Royalists ; the country people were everywhere in favour
of the reaction, and the Patriots were forced to seek
refuge in the cities. The Patriot armies were entirely
without guides, no one would give them any information.
Despatches to the various commanders could only be
forwarded from head-quarters under strong escort. At
times only four men out of an escort reached their desti
nation. Public opinion had returned to the state in which
it was left by the earthquake of 1812.
Columbian historians attribute this revulsion of feeling
to Bolivar's decree of extermination, and to the excesses
authorized by him. Bolivar was to fall as Miranda had
fallen before him, but from different causes. Ever the
logic of Destiny !

CHAPTER XXXIX.
THE SECOND FALL OF VENEZUELA.
1814.
A Dictatorship was a necessity of the time, but the
powers of a Dictator to be efficient must be united in one
person. Bolivar shared his power with Marino, the
alleged rights of both rested upon force only. To put an
end to this anomaly Bolivar determined upon an appeal
to public opinion. It was impossible to summon a Con
gress, he therefore convened an Assembly composed of
the civil corporations and of the heads of families of the
city of Caracas.
Now was disclosed another phase of his complex
character; never in any public man were seen greater
contradictions between word and deed. A prey to insa
tiable ambition he was eager for uncontrolled power, but
repudiated it in theory. In South America he was the
inventor of the system of resignations, which has had
great vogue since his time. He had supreme power in
his hands, and resigned it, protesting that he would never
again accept it, but took it back on conditions imposed by
himself. Throughout his career, he ever invoked the high
authority of Congresses as the representatives of public
opinion ; sometimes he gave way to them, more frequently
he imposed his will upon them ; but he always sought their
sanction for his acts, and so compelled them to share
responsibility with him.
To the Assembly he now convened at Caracas, to which by

344 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
a convenient fiction he attributed representative authority,
he gave an account of his administration, and into its
hands he abdicated the power he had bestowed upon him
self, only to receive it back again intact. He made three
speeches ; in the first he abdicated the Dictatorship, and
pronounced a warm eulogium upon his own deeds ; in the
second, he gave a biographical sketch of his own life, and
showed from it that it was impossible for him to continue
in the exercise of unlimited power ; in the third, he again
accepted the Dictatorship, which was bestowed upon him
without conditions by the acclamations of the Assembly.
His next step was to endeavour to secure the co-opera
tion of Marino, by recognising his authority in the eastern
provinces, and in January, 1814, a treaty was signed
between them. But it was too late now, their union
merely prolonged the struggle.
Yafiez was advancing with 1,000 men by the eastern
slopes of the Cordillera. Urdaneta crossed the range, and
on the 2nd February met him with 700 men at Ospino.
Yafiez led a charge of the Llanero horse upon the Patriot
infantry, but was killed, and his troops dispersed. His
body was cut into fragments, which were sent as trophies
to the scenes of his atrocities. Calzada, who took the
command, in revenge burned the town of Ospino and then
retreated. Campo Elias was detached with 1,500 men against
Boves and his hordes of Llanero horse. He marched to
the town of Cura, where it was arranged that he should
be joined by Marino, but Marino never came. Boves
detached Rosete with 1,200 men to Ocumare, a town lying
to the west of Caracas, which was feebly defended, and
the inhabitants, men, women, and children, were all but
chered ; even those who had taken refuge in the church
found there no safety.
On the 3rd February Campo Elias and Boves met at
La Puerta. The Patriots were crushed by overwhelming
numbers, and all the infantry perished, but Boves was
badly wounded. Campo Elias, with the remains of his

THE MASSACRE AT LA GUAYRA. 345
force, retreated to the narrow pass of Cabrera in front of
Valencia, where he threw up entrenchments.
Morales, who now took command of the Royalists,
advanced with 1,000 horse and 300 infantry by the valley
of Aragua to Victoria, which city he attacked on the 10th
February. Here Rivas was in command of the Patriots,
but had hard work to hold the position against the
superior numbers of the Royalists, till Campo Elias
suddenly appeared at the head of 220 horse, and Morales
was beaten off with the loss of all his artillery, and retired
to Cura.
Rivas then marched with 800 men upon the town of
Charavaye, then occupied by the column under Rosete,
and cut the Royalists to pieces, giving no quarter. He
then re-took Ocumare, and finding the streets strewn with
dead bodies, swore an oath of vengeance, in which oath
he was joined by Arismendi, who held the command at
Caracas in his absence. This vow was most fearfully
fulfilled. Arismendi finding the prisons of La Guayra full of
Spaniards, wrote to Bolivar who was at Valencia, asking
instructions, and stating that their presence was a danger
to the capital. The answer was an order for the immediate
execution of all of them, except such as had taken out
letters of naturalization.
"The Secretary of the Liberator is a fool," said Aris
mendi, " he has put with the exception instead of including."
Then with a refinement of cruelty, he set the prisoners
to work to erect a great funeral pile on which their bodies
should be burned. When the pile was ready the massacre
commenced, the prisoners were brought in groups, from
the dungeons ; to the sound of the trumpet the soldiers
fell upon them with bayonet, axe, and poniard, and cast
their quivering bodies into the flames. Very little powder
was burned on the eight days during which the slaughter
lasted. Eight hundred and sixty-six victims perished,
among them being many who had saved the lives of
Patriots at the risk of their own.

346 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
These horrible massacres were the natural fruit of
Bolivar's decree of extermination. They utterly failed to
accomplish their purpose, that of stamping out the spirit
of reaction, and only served as a pretext for the perpetra
tion of equally brutal atrocities by the Royalists.
Bolivar, who had only 1,500 infantry and 600 cavalry,
could not advance into the open country against Boves,
who had at least four times that number of resolute horse
men, but the capital was safe against an assault by such
troops. He fortified Valencia and armed a flotilla on the
lake, strengthened the pass at Cabrera, occupied Victoria,
and threw up field-works at San Mateo, where he estab
lished his head-quarters, while he waited for Marino. The
position was well chosen ; on the heights which surrounded
it stood a country-house which was his own property, to
the east of which lay one of the most valuable of his
patrimonial estates. But in place of Marino, Boves, whose
wound was by this time healed, appeared in his front on
the 25th February, at the head of 2,000 light infantry and
5,000 horse.
Morales was completely routed in an attack on his right
flank, and Boves himself was repulsed in an attack on the
centre, but captured some outworks on the right. Bolivar
sent a reinforcement under Villapol and Campo ' Elias.
Both these leaders were killed, but the son of the former,
Captain Villapol, restored the day, drove the Royalists
from the positions they had captured, and though badly
wounded, held his ground till nightfall. Boves, who was
again severely wounded, was carried off the field by his
men, and Morales resumed the command.
In this desperate fighting the Royalists had exhausted
their ammunition, and were for fifteen days compelled to
remain inactive, till on the nth March Morales again
attacked the entrenchments, but was again repulsed. On
the 17th Boves again took command, and was on the 20th
beaten off in a third attack.
The Patriot magazine was established in the country-
house to the rear of the position. On the 25th March

HEROISM OF RICAURTE. 347
Boves detached a column of infantry to make its way by
the heights beyond the Patriot lines, to capture this maga
zine, while he himself led a general attack in front. The
magazine was in charge of a young officer, a native of
New Granada, named Ricaurte, who had only fifteen men
with him. When this young officer saw the infantry
column rushing down upon him from the heights, he knew
that it was hopeless to attempt to defend the house. He
sent off his men, and remaining alone he waited till the
enemy burst in upon him with shouts of triumph, when he
fired the magazine, and he himself and the greater part
of the Royalist column were blown into the air together.
When Bolivar saw the flight of the small garrison, he
thought that all was lost. He dismounted from his horse
and ran into the ranks, calling to his soldiers that he
would die with them, but the Royalists were so terrified
by the sudden destruction of their column of infantry, that
they desisted from the attack and withdrew, leaving 800
dead and wounded behind them.
While attacking the lines of San Mateo, Boves had
detached a strong column under Rosete to make an
attempt upon the capital. Rivas was ill in bed, and 800
of the youth of the city sallied out under Arismendi to
meet the enemy on the open plain, but were cut to pieces
on the nth March. Bolivar sent 300 picked troops under
Colonel Montilla to the assistance of the garrison. With
this reinforcement Rivas managed to organize a column
of 900 men, and leading them out in person, lying on a
stretcher, he totally defeated Rosete on the 20th March at
Ocumare, and the capital was saved.
Cajigal, the new Captain-General, had established his
head-quarters at Coro, and had formed a column of 1,000
men from the remnants of various shattered battalions.
These troops he placed under command of Ceballos, who
drove Urdaneta before him out of Barquisimeto. Urdaneta
then endeavoured to hold San Carlos, but was driven
thence by Calzada, and took refuge in Valencia, where the
war material of the Patriots was stored. Here he received

348 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
orders from Bolivar to resist to the last extremity, and to
send 200 men to aid D'Eluyar in the siege of Puerto
Cabello. Urdaneta obeyed orders, but was left with only
280 muskets to make head as he could against the united
forces of Ceballos and Calzada, who now attacked Valencia
with 3,000 men. The Royalists had no artillery, but by
dint of numbers they drove the Patriots from the outworks,
and cut off the supply of water from the garrison. Urdaneta
called a council of his officers, when it was agreed that if
the inner line of defence was forced, the garrison should
retire to the artillery barracks and blow the place up. The
example of Ricaurte had enflamed their hearts.
Boves for some time made no further attempt on the
lines of San Mateo, and the dispirited Llaneros began to
desert, but the situation of Bolivar was desperate. His
only chance lay in the speedy arrival of Marino, who was
at last advancing by forced marches from the East, and
was sweeping the plains in the rear of the Royalists.
Then Boves after one more desperate assault upon the
lines, which was repulsed, retreated to La Puerta, to stop
the advance of Marino from the plains. But Marino
succeeded in turning this position and established himself
at the Boca Chica. Here he was attacked by Boves on
the 31st March, but forced him to retreat with a loss of 500
killed, and occupied the city of Victoria.
Ceballos then, fearing an attack on his rear by the united
forces of Bolivar and Marino, raised the siege of Valencia
and retired to San Carlos, to await reinforcements which
Boves was collecting on the plains. Here he was attacked
by Marino on the 17th April. Marino was so destitute of
military capacity that the troops under his immediate
command dispersed at the first volley, but Urdaneta rallied
the infantry and retired to Valencia.
Cajigal then brought up a strong reinforcement and took
command of the Royalists. Bolivar, after being joined by
Rivas with 800 men from Caracas, advanced against him.
After some manoeuvring the armies met on the plain of
Carabobo, and Bolivar won a complete victory. The

DEFEAT OF THE PATRIOTS AT LA PUERTA. 349
Royalists lost 300 killed and all their guns and flags, while
the Patriots had only 1 2 killed and 40 wounded.
Bolivar was victorious over the Spanish generals, but
the strength of the people was against him. The inde
fatigable Boves had received large supplies of arms and
ammunition from Guayana, and again rushed upon him
from the plains with about 7,000 men, of whom more than
2,000 were infantry. Bolivar, instead of massing his troops
to make head against this new danger, detached Marino
against Boves with only 2,300 men, while he sent Urdaneta
with 700 men off westward, and another division of 1,100
in pursuit of Cajigal and Ceballos. But this latter corps
joined Marino, who then in complete ignorance of the
superior strength of the Royalist leader, determined to
wait for Boves at La Puerta, in a most unfavourable
position. Bolivar joined him too late to remedy the evil.
The Patriots were overwhelmed by a desperate charge of
the Llanero horse on the 14th June, and were slaughtered
without mercy; at least 1,200 were left dead upon the field;
Boves himself reported that 2,800 were killed.
Bolivar fled to Caracas, but instead of making some
attempt to reunite his shattered forces, maintained the
siege of Puerto Cabello and instructed the garrison of
Valencia to hold out to the last extremity. A small
detachment of 250 men defending the pass of Cabrera was
overwhelmed, every man was killed, and Valencia was
forced to capitulate to Boves, who, in spite of his oath to
spare the lives of the garrison, butchered them all, and
many of the inhabitants of the town also. D'Eluyar being
isolated, spiked his guns and embarked his troops on the
flotilla. Urdaneta was left alone in the West ; Bolivar
evacuated Caracas and withdrew to the East, carrying
with him all the jewels and specie he could find in the
churches, and embarrassed by the multitude of fugitives
who fled with him. He reached Aragua with 2,000 men
and at once commenced to throw up entrenchments.
Marino sent him 1,000 men under Bermudez from Cumana,
and some supplies of war material.

350 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
On the 1 8th August, the position at Aragua was attacked
by Morales with a horde of 8,000 negroes, mulattos, and
Indians. The Patriots defended themselves with the reso
lution of despair, but after two hours fighting, in which
entire battalions had perished, Bolivar retreated with a
part of his force on Barcelona. Bermudez still held the
position for two hours longer, and then fled to Maturin
with the remnant of his cavalry. The butchery which
followed was frightful, more than 3,000 were killed in cold
blood, even the townsfolk who sought refuge in the church
had their throats cut in the sacred edifice. The loss of the
Royalists was nearly 2,000 in killed and wounded.
Bolivar, Marino, Rivas, Piar and D'Eluyar met at
Cumana, and resolved to concentrate the resistance at
Giiiria, a position easily defended, while the flotilla kept
open their communications by sea. Bolivar had shipped
the treasure brought by him from Caracas on board of
these vessels. Bianchi, who was still in command, deter
mined to seize it. Bolivar and Marifio hearing of his
intention, embarked with him as he sailed for the island of
Margarita. He gave two vessels up to them with all the
jewels and two-thirds of the specie, retaining the rest as
payment for the prizes he had made, upon which the two
Dictators returned to the mainland.
On the 3rd September they landed at Carupano, where
they found that they had been proscribed as traitors who
had deserted their comrades, while Rivas and Piar had
taken the command. Piar had the intention of treating
Bolivar as he had treated Miranda, but Rivas set him at
liberty and arrested Marino. At this juncture Bianchi
returned, and by threats saved them both. Bolivar gave
up the treasure to Rivas and retired to Curacoa, leaving
behind him an address to the people in which he disdain
fully left his justification to the future : —
" I swear to you that this title (Liberator), which your
gratitude bestowed upon me when I broke your chains,
shall not be in vain. I swear to you that Liberator or

VICTORY AND DEATH OF BOVES. 351
dead, I shall ever merit the honour you have done me ; no
human power can turn me from my course."
When he had gone, Rivas took the supreme command,
but the genius of Bolivar was wanting. On the 26th
August Cumana pronounced for the Royalists. Bermudez,
-entrenched at Maturin, was attacked by Morales with a
greatly superior force, but sallying out, utterly routed him,
killing 2,000 of his men. He was then joined by Rivas ;
between them they assembled nearly 5,000 men. Piar,
disregarding the orders of Rivas to join him, marched on
Cumana, which he retook and collected 2,000 men, but was
then attacked by Boves and totally defeated.
Boves then retook Cumana, and put every man to death
who fell into his hands. It is said that more than a
thousand victims perished in this massacre. Cumana was
left a desert. Boves was then joined by Morales, who had
reorganized his army, and together they marched on
Maturin at the head of 7,000 men. The Patriots sallied
out to meet them under the command of Rivas and
Bermudez. With very inferior numbers they met the Royalist army
at Urica to the west of Maturin, on the 5th December.
Boves drew up his men in two lines and awaited their
onslaught. An impetuous charge of the Patriot cavalry
broke the right wing of the Royalists, and Boves, ever
ioremost in a melee, was killed by a lance thrust. Morales,
with the left and the reserve, restored the combat and
gained a complete victory. No quarter was given and the
last army of the Republic was destroyed.
Morales was by acclamation named General-in-Chief of
the " Windward Army," which was the name which had
been given to this Royalist force by its late commander,
and lost no time in marching upon Maturin, which city
was well fortified and had a good supply of artillery, but
the garrison, only 600 in number, was but poorly armed.
After an obstinate defence which caused severe losses to
the Royalist army, this last bulwark of the Patriots was

352 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
captured on the nth December. Bermudez escaped with
200 men, but Rivas flying alone, was overtaken and killed,
and his head, covered with the Phrygian cap of Liberty,
was exposed in an iron cage on the road from Caracas to
La Guayra. According to contemporary writers more
than 3,000 victims were slaughtered by Morales after his
victory. The peace of the tomb reigned in Venezuela.
Three popular leaders still kept up the flames of insur
rection at the head waters of the Orinoco and its tribu
taries : Zaraza, Monagas, and Cedefio, who afterwards
became celebrated as Guerilleros. In the West all was
quiet after the rout of La Puerta. The column under
Urdaneta, so imprudently detached by Bolivar after Cara
bobo, was cut off when Boves occupied Valencia. Urda
neta retreated with 1,000 men, and being hotly pressed by
Calzada, crossed the frontier into New Granada. He then
detached 200 infantry and some cavalry officers to defend
the Province of Casanare. This small detachment became
the nucleus of the famous Army of the Apure, which
changed the destinies of Venezuela, by leading the people
to embrace the cause of the revolution. Among these
cavalry officers was one named Jose Antonio Paez, a
man till then unknown, who was soon to become the
Achilles of Venezuela, and was to eclipse by his deeds the
fabulous prowess of the heroes of Homer.
There now only remained one spot of Venezuelan
territory over which still floated the flag of the Republic,
the island of Margarita, where Arismendi and Bermudez:
with some few followers had found asylum.

CHAPTER XL.
THE DISSOLUTION OF NEW GRANADA.
1815— 1817.
The second fall of the Republic of Venezuela was coinci
dent in point of time with the fall of constitutional govern
ment in the mother* country, and the absolute King of
Spain and of the Indies, after subjugating his vassals in
the Peninsula, turned his attention to subduing by force of
arms his insurgent colonists beyond the seas.
Up to that time, with the exception of New Granada and!
Venezuela, none of the colonies of Spanish America had
declared themselves independent, or had adopted the
republican form of government. They made war on those
who upheld the Royal standard, but they were governed'
by rulers of their own choosing in the name of the captive
King. Thus, naturally, Venezuela and New Granada were
the first of these colonies to receive attention.
In the year 181 3 these two colonies had been united by
the Spanish authorities under one nominal government,
Marshal Montalvo being appointed Viceroy. The Penin
sular troops had made but a poor show in the war in
Venezuela; the two restorations had been achieved by
native troops under the command of Monteverde, Boves,
and Morales, who looked with contempt upon the Spanish
generals as they condemned their excesses, and who re
fused all obedience to the colonial authorities. Thus ,
Montalvo looked upon the preponderance of the native
element as a source of danger, and as a dishonour to the .-
A A

354 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
cause of royalty, and had applied to the Home Govern
ment for reinforcements. New Granada was now to be
the theatre of war, and thither went Bolivar, either to
take part in it or to seek help for another reconquest of
Venezuela. He presented himself to the Congress assembled at
Tunja. Camilo Torres, the President, thanked him for his
distinguished services, saying that Venezuela was not lost
so long as Bolivar lived. He was at once put in command
of a corps of 1,800 men, of which Urdaneta's column formed
a part, and was sent to reduce Cundinamarca, which still
held aloof from the Federal Government. In view of the
danger which now threatened the Republic, Congress had
appointed a Supreme Junta, whose authority was recog
nised by all the provinces except Cartagena and Cundi
namarca. Santa F6 de Bogota was the arsenal of the
Republic, the subjugation of Cundinamarca was therefore
necessary. Bolivar prosecuted his campaign with his usual activity.
At his approach all the towns of Cundinamarca declared
in favour of Congress ; Bogota, the capital, where Alvarez,
who had been left in command by his nephew, Narifio,
when he marched for the South, had entrenched himself,
alone offered any resistance. Bolivar laid siege to the
city, and by a series of vigorous assaults shut up the garri
son in the principal square, and cut off their supply of
water. Alvarez was forced to capitulate.
Congress then changed the seat of government to
Bogota; the Republic had at last possession of its own
capital, and the Government was greatly strengthened.
Bolivar was named Captain-General of the Confederation,
his title of Liberator was recognised, and another was
bestowed upon him, that of " Illustrious Pacificator." Of
course Bolivar made a speech on this occasion, and pro
phesied that the Army of New Granada would break the
chains of all the oppressed peoples of South America.
The new plan of Bolivar was to advance by the coast to
Coro. Government gave him three battalions of infantry

CIVIL WAR IN NEW GRANADA. 355
and a squadron of cavalry, in all 2,000 men, with orders
to seek supplies, of arms and ammunition at Cartagena.
Colonel Castillo, who was Governor of this Province,
prompted by his old jealousy of Bolivar, and listening to
the counsels of Marino and Montillo, who had taken re
fuge at Cartagena, refused these supplies. Bolivar estab
lished his head-quarters at the beautiful city of Mompox
and remained inactive, passing his time in feasts and
parades, and in intrigues against the local government,
till his money was spent and he had lost half his troops by
sickness and desertion.
Then, with only one gun, he laid siege to Cartagena,
the strongest fortress in South America, till a powerful
Spanish expedition landed on the coast and brought him
to his senses. On the 8th May, 1815, he handed over the
relics of his army to Castillo, and took leave of his men in
a sentimental address, in which he expressed his sorrow at
not being able to share in the triumphs which awaited
them. He then withdrew to Jamaica, but ere he went fired
a parting shot, declaring : —
" Cartagena prefers her own destruction to the duty of
obedience to the Federal Government."
A shot which [recoiled upon himself, for he also had
preferred his own destruction to obedience, and had
inoculated the Granadian Republic with a new germ of
¦dissolution. In Jamaica he published a memorial in his own defence,
which rather strengthens the case against him. Soon after
that, under the signature of " A South American," he pub
lished another memorial upon the Revolution in South
America, and upon the future organization of the new
republics, which is a refutation of the chimerical plan of a
•Continental monocracy which he attempted to establish
later on. In this memorial he advocated the absolute
independence of each separate colony, "but New Granada
shall unite with Venezuela, and this nation shall be called
Columbia." A prophetic vision !
The reinforcements applied for by Montalvo reached
A A 2

35<> THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Cumana early in April. One ship-of-the-line, three fri
gates, and twenty-one smaller ships of war came in con
voy of a fleet of sixty transports, carrying 10,600 men and
a siege train. This was the greatest effort which had as
yet been made by the mother country to crush the insur
rection in South America, and it was the last. The troops
were selected from regiments which had fought against
the armies of Napoleon, and had been educated in the
school of Wellington. They were under the command of
Marshal Morillo, the best of all the Spanish generals of
that time. Originally a sergeant of marines, he had won
his way by distinguished valour to his present high posi
tion. He had seen hard service among the Spanish
guerillas, and had learned the art of war in the Anglo-
Spanish armies. He was no great military genius, but he
had respectable talents and was a good fighter. He was
popular among the soldiery, but was a strict disciplinarian,
and tenacious in his enterprises. He was cruel by system,
not from inclination, but was also of a suspicious and pas
sionate temperament. He knew nothing of the country
he was sent to pacify, and his instructions gave him no
information of any value, being drawn up in complete
ignorance of the actual state of South America, and were
instinct with contempt for the Creole inhabitants, a con
tempt in which he also shared.
This expedition was originally intended for the River
Plate, but on the fall of Monte Video its destination was
changed. At the same time, as Panama was considered
to be the key to the continent, another expedition of
2,500 men was sent, under command of General Miyares,
to Vera Cruz for the purpose of securing the Isthmus.
Morillo was instructed to overrun the mainland from
Guayana to Darien, first of all reducing the island of Mar
garita. He was then to take Cartagena, subdue New
Granada, and to re-establish order in Venezuela. All this
was thought so easy that he was further instructed to send
his spare troops to Peru and Mexico. Vast as was this
plan, Morillo accomplished it in the time given him for

ARRIVAL OF MORILLO' S EXPEDITION. 357
the purpose. In the course of the year 1 8 1 5 all the insur
gent colonies of Spain were reduced to submission, with
the exception of the Provinces of the River Plate.
The rest of the instructions were drawn up in terms of
benevolence towards the Americans. The atrocities com
mitted under the Royal flag were severely censured, and
the troops who had taken part in them were directed to be
withdrawn from the theatre of action, but ample power
was given to Morillo to deviate from these instructions
when he thought it necessary, and he had also permission
to suppress the tribunals of justice. Thus everything was
left to his discretion.
The first man with whom Morillo spoke in the New
World was Morales, who was now master of the east of
Venezuela, and had fitted out a flotilla for an attack upon
the island of Margarita. Early in April the expedition
was sighted from the coast of Cumana ; Morales sailed out
to meet it with three brigs, manned by a division of infantry,
to place himself at the orders of the general. Camba, the
historian, who was present, says that his European soldiers
gazed in astonishment upon the decks of these three small
vessels as they sailed through the Spanish fleet. They
were crowded with dark-skinned men wearing round straw
hats, a waistcloth, with a cartridge-box buckled over it
and, in general, no other raiment. If these were the victors
what must the vanquished be like ! An unfortunate first
impression to receive, which gave them a false idea of the
work before them. " Venezuela and Caracas were lost
after the arrival of first-class troops, who were well com
manded." In accordance with his instructions, Morillo went on to
the island of Margarita with all his army, reinforced by
three thousand of Morales' troops, shipped on the flotilla.
The Patriot cruisers had captured one of the vessels of the
convoy, so that the strength of the expedition was known.
Bermudez proposed to resist to the last extremity, but
finding no support fled to Cartagena. Arismendi gave
himself up, and was kindly received by Morillo, who seated

358 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
him at his own table, apparently forgetting his massacre
of eight hundred Spaniards. On the 9th April, 18 15, the
island was occupied without resistance. Morillo issued a
proclamation offering an amnesty to all insurgents who
would give themselves up, and kept his word ; but fifteen
men who gave themselves up to Morales were slaughtered.
The first success and the first disaster of the expedition
came together. The ship-of-the-line San Pedro, the most
powerful vessel of the squadron, caught fire and was a
total loss, the military chest and a great quantity of war
like stores being burned with her.
The generous behaviour of Morillo at Margarita pro
cured him a favourable reception at Caracas, where he
arrived on the nth May, but his first act was to levy a
forced loan to replace the treasure lost on the San Pedro.
He then proceeded to confiscate the properties of all who
had taken part in the Revolution, and of those who were
absent or who were suspected, the amount so taken being
estimated at fifteen millions of dollars. General Moxo, a
man of cruel and rapacious character, was made Governor
of Venezuela ; the Audiencia and all the civil tribunals
were suppressed, and were replaced by councils of war.
A military despotism was established.
Morillo had now 1 6,000 men under his command, includ
ing the native troops. He sent a battalion of light infantry
to Puerto Rico, a division of 1,700 men to Peru, 3,000 men
were told off as the garrison of Venezuela, and Calzada's
division, in Barinas, was reinforced by European troops.
Then with 5,000 Europeans and 3,500 native troops under
Morales, embarked in fifty-six ships, he sailed on the 12th
July for the leeward coast to commence operations against
New Granada.
The employment of native troops was in accordance
with his instructions, but the measure produced discontent
in his ranks. These troops were despised by the Spaniards,
and had no wish to leave their native country. More than
a thousand of the Llaneros deserted rather than embark.
The way in which they were treated aroused in them the

THE FORTRESS OF CARTAGENA. 359
native instinct for independence, of which they soon be
came the most doughty champions.
Morillo landed at Santa. Marta, intent upon the capture
of Cartagena; The garrison was weak, was short of arms
and of provisions, and was cut off from help either by sea
or by land, but was nevertheless resolute to resist to the
last extremity. The ground was cleared for three leagues
round, outlying posts were called in, a flotilla was armed
for the defence of the bay, sixty guns were added to the
eighty-four already mounted on the batteries, martial law
was proclaimed, and all men capable of bearing arms were
compelled to serve. The garrison was thus increased to
3,600 men, of whom 1,300 were regular troops. The com
mand was at first given to Castillo, but he was soon after
replaced by Bermudez, and Montilla was named Major-
Gen eral.
• Cartagena was then the strongest fortress in America. It
was captured hy the French in 1697, but when the English,
under Admiral Vernon, attacked it in the year 1741 they
were beaten off, although they had 9,00,0 soldiers in addition
to a powerful fleet. It was built upon a promontory running
into the sea, and is so separated from the mainland by
marshes that it may be considered an island — a sort of
military Venice. The city proper is situate to the north
west of this promontory, and to the west of it lies a suburb
called Getzemani, which communicates with the city by
a fortified bridge thrown across a deep canal, and is closed
at each end by a stockade. Getzemani is also joined to
the mainland by another bridge of similar construction.
The fortress, the city, and the suburb, were all enclosed
on the land side by high walls and bastions. To the east,
beyond the swamps, and about half a mile from the walls,
stood a castle on a hill, called San Lazaro, whose fire swept
all the city, but was itself under the fire of a fortified hill,
called La Popa, which commanded all the approaches.
The most accessible part of the city was the bay, which
runs from north to south, and is nearly a mile in length.
This bay is shut in from the Gulf of Mexico by two islands,

360 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
which leave only two practicable entrances — the Boca
Grande, by which Admiral Vernon penetrated, and which
was afterwards closed by orders from Spain, and the Boca
Chica, which was defended by two castles on the island
and by batteries on the coast. The flotilla consisted of a
corvette, seven schooners, and some gunboats, aided in
shallow water by a sort of armed rafts called " bongos."
Morillo detached Morales, with his division, across the
Magdalena, to blockade the city by land while he block
aded it by sea, his idea being to starve out the garrison.
The heavy rains of the season and frequent tempests
made the work of the siege very arduous to the Royalists,
filling their hospitals with sick. On the 25th October the
city was bombarded, with no other effect than to kill a
few women and children. Several assaults were made
upon various outworks, which were repulsed, but in
November the larger island was captured by Morales.
Two batteries were placed upon it and upon the adjacent
shore, the fire from which swept the bay and prevented
fishing, thus destroying one great resource of the city,
where hunger soon proved more formidable than shot and
shell. Fevers broke out, rats and hides were eaten by the
starving garrison, sentinels were found dead at their posts
when parties were sent to relieve them, but no one talked
of surrender. At last it was determined to drive from the
city two thousand useless mouths, old men, women, and
children. It was a procession of spectres ; only one-third
of them reached the advanced posts of the besiegers, the
rest sank down and perished on the way. The survivors
were kindly received by the Spaniards, but Morillo wrote
to the Patriot leaders that if they did not surrender in
three days he would drive the fugitives back into the city.
On that day, the 4th December, three hundred persons
died of hunger in the streets ; it was impossible to hold out
longer, but still they would not surrender,
On the night of the 5th the guns on the hill of La Popa,
and on the castle of San Lazaro, were spiked. At dawn
on the day following, a remnant of two thousand men

CAPTURE OF CARTAGENA BY MORILLO. 361
-embarked on the flotilla, crossed the bay under the fire of
the Royalist batteries, took on board the garrisons of the
batteries at the Boca Chica, and on the 7th put to sea in
a storm which dispersed the blockading squadron.
Morillo entered the city on the 6th December, and
found it a hospital of dying men, and a cemetery of dead
bodies, which lay all about the streets ; the very air was
poison. The siege had lasted one hundred and eight days.
It was calculated that six thousand had died in the city
of hunger and disease, besides those who were killed in the
various attacks. The loss of the besiegers was nearly
three thousand five hundred men.
The victory was stained by an act of barbarism. Morales,
who had occupied the batteries at the Boca Chica, on their
•evacuation by the Patriots, offered an amnesty to all fugi
tives who would present themselves. Four hundred old
men, women, and children, and some fishermen who had
hidden in the brushwood covering the island, presented
themselves. The throats of every one of them were cut on
the seashore by his orders. Morillo was more humane, but
Castillo, who had hidden himself, was put to death by his
command, and his body was exposed on a gibbet. The
same fate was meted out to six of the principal citizens,
among them being Garcia Toledo, who had headed the
revolution in 18 10. At the same time the Inquisition was
re-established. Calzada, advancing from Barinas to aid in the subjuga
tion of New Granada, attempted first to clear the plains of
Casanare of the Patriot light horse, but being beaten by
them on the ist October, he crossed the Cordillera with
1,800 infantry and 500 cavalry, routed various detached
parties of Patriots who came in his way, and totally
defeated their main body at Balaga on the 25th November.
He then occupied Pamplona, where he found the streets
strewn with the corpses of Spaniards, who had been bar
barously murdered by the Patriots when they evacuated
that city.
Congress now again made Torres President, with dicta-

362 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
torial powers, and appointed Torices Vice - President,
Torres raised an army of 2,500 recruits, with which he
forced Calzada, who was advancing on the capital, to
retreat to Ocafia. But Calzada, after receiving some rein
forcements, turned upon him and completely routed him
on the 22 nd February. The three Provinces of Pamplona,
Socorro, and Antioquia were then occupied by the
Royalists, and the capital lay defenceless. Torres re
signed, and a physician named Madrid was appointed in
his place. He called for volunteers ; only six men offered
themselves. Cundinamarca, which had been forced into the Union,
had remained disaffected, and now became openly Royalist.
The rest of the country was worn out, and was only eager
for peace. Congress authorised Madrid to negotiate with
Morillo, and dissolved itself. The new President retired
to the South with the remnant of the army, and joined the
division of Popayan under Mejia, who then marched
against a Royalist force under Samano, which was advanc
ing from Quito, and was totally defeated.
Morillo left a strong garrison at Cartagena and divided
the rest of his diminished force into four light columns for
the complete subjugation of the country. Bogota fell
without a shot being fired, but while he was at Ocafia with
the reserve, news reached him that Venezuela was again
in commotion, that a fresh insurrection had broken out in
the island of Margarita, and that the emigrants, headed
by Bolivar, were preparing an expedition to rekindle the
flames of revolution on the mainland. Seriously alarmed,
he sent Morales with a division back to Venezuela to
secure his base of operations.
Morillo now, for the first time, appreciated the magni
tude of the enterprise he had undertaken, and, with rare
perspicuity, foresaw its fatal termination. He wrote to
the Home Government that, in spite of his success, he could
not without reinforcements bring the Llaneros into sub
jection, and that it was necessary to establish a military
government, and so crush rebellion by the use of the same

MORILLO CRUSHES THE REVOLUTION IN NEW GRANADA. 363.
means which had been employed at the time of the con
quest. He then published an amnesty to all officers of the
revolutionary armies, from captain downwards, who would
lay down their arms, but he put to death all superior
officers who fell into his hands, quartering their bodies
and exposing their heads in cages.
General La Torre, who commanded at Bogota,rpublished
a similar amnesty to civil officials, for which step he was
severely censured by Morillo, and in May, 18 16, the
prisons of the capital were full.
Morillo then went there himself, avoiding a public
reception and entering the city by night. La Torre and
Calzada were again censured for receiving presents from
rebels ; the first was, as a punishment, sent off to the
plains, and the second to Ciicuta. The amnesty was then
annulled, and severe decrees were published against all
who should either write or speak on forbidden subjects.
On the 30th May, which was the birthday of the King,
the women of the city presented themselves, imploring
mercy for their fathers, sons, and husbands. Morillo
received them roughly and sent them off with insults.
The prisons being insufficient to accommodate the multi
tude of prisoners, some were confined in the convents. He
searched the city archives for pretexts to increase their
number, and a military tribunal was established to try
them. Villavicencio, Montufar, Lozano, Camilo Torres, and
Torices were executed, being shot in the back as traitors,
and their bodies were hung on gibbets. Baraya and
Mejia shared the same fate. Caldas, the philosopher, whose
scientific labours had won him world-wide fame, was sen
tenced to death, and when Morillo was entreated to spare
the life of so illustrious a man, he answered savagely : —
" Spain has no need of sages."
One hundred and twenty-five victims perished on the
scaffold, of whom a fifth part were graduates of the Uni
versity. The properties of all victims were confiscated ;
their families were reduced to misery; the entire male

364 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
population was classified as convicts, and gangs of them
were forced to work on the public roads. Truly the system
adopted by the Spaniards at the conquest was now re
established in America in the cause of Spanish absolutism,
and for a King who was spoken of by his own mother as
" tiger heart and mule head."
Bloodshed and absolute power clouded the mental facul
ties of Morillo ; he dreamed of destroying the Argentine
Republic, and of then returning in triumph to Mexico to
repeat there the cruelties of Cortes, but the course of events
in Venezuela soon opened his eyes. He left a garrison of
3,800 men at Bogota, Venezuelans and Pastusos, and with
4,000 Spanish troops crossed the Cordillera in November,
181 6, taking some prisoners with him to shoot on the
frontier line. This march convinced him, for the second
time, of his impotence to prosecute his enterprise ; by his
own confession, he could neither pass the rivers nor procure
supplies without the help of the Llaneros who went with him.
fti General Samano remained in command at Bogota. His
first act was to erect a gallows in the great square, in front
of the windows of his palace, and to set up four execution-
posts (banquillos) on the public promenade. One of his
first victims was a beautiful young woman, convicted of
sending information to the Patriot guerillas on the plains
of Casanare. She was shot in the back, with seven men
implicated in the same affair. She died encouraging her
companions to meet their fate like men, and prophesying
that her death would soon be revenged. Under the name
of La Pola her memory is still preserved in the songs of
her native land.
Morillo, finding Samano so apt a pupil in his school of
terrorism, made him Viceroy in place of Montalvo, whose
more humane nature shrank from the perpetration of such
cruelties.

CHAPTER XLI.
THE THIRD "WAR IN VENEZUELA.
1815— 1817.
In none "of the colonies of Spanish America was the
struggle for emancipation so stubborn, so heroic, and so
tragical, as in Venezuela. In the North of the Continent
she was the nucleus of the revolution, gave it both its
military power and its political basis, and supplied to it
the genius of Bolivar. Twice conquered, she yet arose a
third time against her oppressors.
After the rout of Urica, and the catastrophe of Maturin,
the remnants of the Republican army of the East were
dispersed as guerillas along the banks and about the head
waters of the Orinoco, and on the plains of Barcelona,
while the insurrection was still unquelled on the plains of
Casanare. A fresh signal for a general revolt was given
by the island of Margarita immediately after the departure
of Morillo on his expedition against New Granada. The
Royalist governor, Colonel Urreistieta, to assert his
authority, ordered the arrest of Arismendi. Fifteen hun
dred of the islanders rose in arms. The governor ordered
the troops to give no quarter to the insurgents, gave them
permission to pillage as they chose, and burned two towns
in accordance with instructions received from General
Moxo. The insurgents accepted the challenge of war to
the knife. Arismendi put himself at their head, and took
possession of the northern half of the island, captured by
assault the fort at the Villa del Norte, and put to death the
whole of the garrison, who numbered 200 men. Then on

366 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
the 15th November, 1815, he laid siege to the capital and
shut up the governor in the castle of Santa Rosa. His
army numbered 4,300 infantry and 200 cavalry, badly
armed, but all resolute men.
On the plains of Casanare the scattered groups of gue
rillas were organized by Paez into an army. Jose Antonio
Paez was a native of Barinas, and was at this time twenty-
six years old. He had served bravely throughout the
campaign of the reconquest, but had never attracted special
notice ; now he was to show his great talents as a leader.
He was a genuine Creole, of Caucasian race, with some
mixture of native blood ; a man of herculean strength, a
breaker-in of wild horses, and an untiring swimmer. Skil
ful in the use of lance and sword, in moments of danger he
was ever in the front rank, and had great influence over
his men, both by his personal and by his moral qualities.
They were accustomed to call him " Uncle " when address
ing him. If any soldier committed a crime or showed
unwillingness to obey orders it was his custom to challenge
him to single combat. Whether the challenge were ac
cepted or not he was always the victor, either physically
or morally. After the excitement of a battle his nervous
system would frequently give way, and he would fall to
the ground, apparently lifeless. His plans were always
carefully thought out and rapidly executed. He at this
time knew neither how to read nor write, and was in no
sense a politician, but was of a kindly, generous nature,
and of very superior intelligence. In times of peace he
was easily led, but in times of danger he led every one.
His usual dress was a blouse of blue cloth, with a cloak
thrown over his shoulders ; a slouched hat, the front rim
turned up and decorated with the cockade of Venezuela ;
and the gaiters of a Llanero. He wore a Toledo sword,
and invariably carried a long lance.
Paez was serving as a simple captain with a small corps
of Patriots which held the town of Guadalito, when news
was brought of the approach of the Spanish governor of
Barinas, with 1,100 horse and 300 infantry. The officer

VICTORY OF PAEZ AT GUADALLTO. 367
in command proposed to retreat. Paez requested permis
sion to remain with one squadron to defend the town.
Most of the other officers present approved of the proposi
tion, on which the commander said angrily,
" Then let Paez command you, and those who choose
may follow me to Casanare."
Paez, left with 500 men, marched out to meet the enemy,
whom he found on the 16th February, 18 16, near to the
sources of the Apure. Paez, advancing alone to recon
noitre the position, had his horse killed under him by a
musket-ball. It was near nightfall ; some advised him to
wait for daylight.
" It is as dark for them as it is for us," said Paez, and
shouted to his men, " Comrades, they have killed my horse.
If you will not revenge his death I will revenge him alone,
and will die in the enemy's ranks."
The men shouted back that they would go wherever he
would lead them. He formed them in two lines and led
them on under a heavy fire. Such was the fury of the
charge that two-thirds of the Royalist cavalry were driven
in confusion from the field. As he led an attack upon
their second line his horse was wounded, and burst the
girths of the saddle with his plunges. The attack was
beaten off. Springing on to the first horse he could catch,
Paez rallied his men and again charged at full speed upon
the rest of the Royalist cavalry, and bore them down in
the rush. While the Patriots pursued the broken cavalry
the Spanish infantry retreated through the woods. Four
hundred killed and two hundred prisoners were the
trophies of the day. Paez treated his" prisoners so Well
that they all voluntarily took service with him.
This brilliant affair attracted the attention of the
Llaneros, who were weary of the brutal rule of Boves and
Morales, and won them over to the cause of independence.
Paez became at once the first general of cavalry in
America. He was the bond of union between the Llaneros
and the Patriots. He was proclaimed the chieftain of the
plains, and from the recruits who poured in to join his

368 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
standard he organized the famous Army of the Apure. On
taking command he told his men that he would do his best
to merit the confidence they had placed in him, but ex
horted them above all to put faith in Divine Providence.
In September, 1816, he invaded the Province of Barinas.
While the Army of the Apure was thus gathering itself
together, the parties of guerillas, scattered along the banks
of the Upper Orinoco, and on the eastern plains, also
collected, forming divisions of as many as 1,500 men,
under Monagas, Saraza and Cedefio. The Governor of
Guayana sent a strong column against Cedefio, which was
completely routed by him on the 8th March, 18 16. A
second expedition of 1,500 men, sent in boats up the Ori
noco, had no better fortune, and was forced to retire to
Angostura, the capital of Guayana.
While Bolivar, in exile at Kingston, Jamaica, was turn
ing over in his mind many plans for renewing the War of
Independence, he had a narrow escape from assassination.
A slave of his who had followed his fortunes went one
night into his room when all was dark, and seeing a man
asleep in his hammock, gave him two stabs with a poniard,
killing him on the spot. The dead man was found to be a
poor emigrant named Amestoy, who, knowing that Boli
var would not sleep at home that night, occupied his room.
The slave was caught, and confessed that it was his inten
tion to kill Bolivar, but said not a word about accomplices.
He was hung, but it was generally believed that an emis
sary of General Moxo had paid him to do the deed.
From Jamaica Bolivar crossed to the island of Santo
Domingo, hearing on his way of the fall of Cartagena,
where, too late, he had been offered the command. The
famous mulatto, Alexander Petion, was at that time
President of Haiti. He was an ardent partisan of the
emancipation of Spanish America, and not only supplied
Bolivar with arms for another expedition, but opened a
credit for him for the necessary expenses with the house of
a wealthy English merchant named Robert Sutherland.
Bolivar also met here a Dutch shipbuilder named Luis

BOLIVAR ORGANIZES AN EXPEDITION AT HAITI. 369
Brion, who, becoming deeply interested both in him and in
his designs, placed seven armed schooners at his orders,
with 3,500 muskets, and offered his life and fortune in the
same cause.
Bolivar commenced his preparations early in 18 16, at
the port of Cayos de San Luis, which has given its name
to this famous expedition. There the refugees from Carta
gena, and many officers from New Granada and Venezuela
had collected. Among them were Piar, Marifio, Bermu
dez, Montilla, Soublette, the English Colonel MacGregor,
who had served with Miranda, Doucoudray-Holstein, and
Francisco Zea. There was anarchy among them ; many
of them refused to recognise the authority of Bolivar.
Petion interposed his influence, and Brion declared that he
would entrust his ships and armament to no one but to the
Liberator. He was at length accepted as leader of the
expedition, from which Montilla, who had challenged
Bolivar, and Bermudez, who had led the opposition, were
excluded. Brion, with the title of Admiral of Venezuela, took com
mand of the squadron, which sailed from Cayos on the
1 6th March, 18 16. The expedition consisted of 300 men,
whom Bolivar afterwards compared to the 300 Spartans of
Leonidas, as he compared his reconquest of Venezuela
to the redemption of Jerusalem by the Crusaders. They
reached the island of Margarita early in May, finding
there the Spanish brig Intrepido and the schooner Rita,
which Brion boarded and captured, after a desperate resis
tance in which three-fourths of their crews were killed.
The expedition then disembarked at the port of Juan
Griego, the Royalists concentrating their forces at Pam-
patar and Porlamar.
Bolivar and Arismendi then conjointly convened a
meeting of the officers of the Patriot army, and of the
principal inhabitants, in the church at La Villa del Norte,
in order to name the supreme ruler of the Republic they
were about to restore. In accordance with his custom,
Bolivar immediately renounced all pretensions to so im-
B B

370 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
portant a post, which, as he had already arranged the
matter with Arismendi, was merely one way of securing
his own appointment. On the 7th May he was named
" Supreme Chief," with power to do whatever he might
find necessary for the salvation of the country. Marifio
was named second in command.
On the 8th May Bolivar published a proclamation to the
people of Venezuela, announcing that the National Con
gress would be reinstalled, and authorising the free towns
to elect deputies, who should have the same sovereign
powers as in the former epoch.
The expedition, reinforced by four ships from the island,
then went on to Carupano, on the coast of Paria, capturing
two armed vessels of the enemy and the fort, which was
abandoned by the garrison. Here Bolivar established his
head-quarters on the ist June.
Rumour had greatly exaggerated the strength of the
force he brought with him, but Bolivar made small use of
the stupor into which the Royalists were thrown. He
detached Piar to Maturin and Marifio to Giiiria, but
remained himself at ; Carupano, issuing pompous bulletins,
in which he renounced his former system of a war of
extermination, as a mistake. Also, in fulfilment of a pro
mise to Petion, he published a decree giving liberty to all
slaves, and called the people to arms, but no one joined
him. He then convened an assembly of the townsfolk,
who at his suggestion decreed the centralization of the
powers of government. The federal system was abolished
in Venezuela.
But a month of precious time was thus lost. Twenty days
after the disembarkation, his advanced posts were driven
in, and he was besieged by a division of 1,300 men, while
a Spanish squadron threatened his communications by
sea . Marifio sent him a strong reinforcement, but Brion
refused to risk his ships in an unequal fight with the
Spanish squadron. Meantime the guerilla leaders of the
East proclaimed him general-in-chief, and desired his
presence.

DEFEAT OF BOLIVAR AT OCUMARE. 371
Rejecting the advice of Piar to occupy Guayana as a
base of operations, he re-embarked his small force, and
again landed on the 5th July at Ocumare, between
Caracas and Puerto Cabello. This step can only be
explained by his anxiety to rescue his native city from the
Royalists, a preoccupation which was to cost him the loss
of three campaigns. Again rejecting the advice of his
officers, who wished to effect a junction with the guerillas
and so form an army, he detached Soublette with the bulk
of his men to occupy the pass of Cabrera, and a smaller
force along the coast in search of recruits, while he landed
a printing press and issued more bulletins, and Brion went
off on a cruise leaving him one armed brig and two small
schooners. On the same day on which Bolivar landed at Ocumare,
Morales reached Valencia, with the division detached by
Morillo after the surrender of Cartagena. In the face of
such a superior force, Soublette was compelled to retire to
a strong position on the heights of Ocumare. Bolivar
went to his assistance with 1 50 recruits, but the combined
force was completely routed by Morales on the 13th July.
MacGregor was then sent off with a detachment south
wards to Choroni, while Soublette protected the retreat of
Bolivar with the artillery to Ocumare, where he intended
to re-embark. While engaged at night in this operation,
he received word that the enemy were entering the town.
It was a false alarm, Soublette still held his ground, but
his men were panic-struck, and Bolivar, without inquiring
into the truth of the report, abandoned his sick and
wounded, and fled on board the brig where his stores of
war material were already in safety. He sailed at once
and reached the island of Bonaire on the 1 6th July. Here
he was joined by Brion, and sailed with him for Choroni,
where he learned that Soublette and MacGregor had
marched inland and had taken refuge in the valleys of
Aragua. Returning to Bonaire he there met Bermudez,
and with him sailed off to join Marifio at Giiiria.
Soublette and MacGregor had joined forces at Choroni,
B B 2

372 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
the latter taking the command. Two days he waited for
news of Bolivar and then marched off for the plains with
600 infantry and 30 horse. Dispersing a Royalist detach
ment which attempted to bar the passage of the hills, he
occupied Victoria and routed another detachment under
Rosete. On the ist August he was met by a squadron of
Saraza's guerillas, who were in search of him, and on the
2nd August routed another division of 1,200 Royalists at
Quebrada-Honda. The next day he was joined by Saraza
and Monagas with their divisions of guerillas, and was
master of the plains of Barcelona, while Cedefio held his
ground on the Upper Orinoco. So was formed the army
which was afterwards known as " the Army of the Centre,"
which, in conjunction with that of the Apure, decided the
destinies of Venezuela. Of this army MacGregor was
recognised as general-in-chief.
At Giiiria Bolivar met with but a sorry reception, the
troops of Marifio refused to obey him, and the island of
Margarita declined to recognise his authority. Bermudez
charged him with cowardice for deserting his soldiers
when in danger. Amid threats and jeers he was forced to
re-embark and returned to Haiti, where he was coldly
received by Petion. The people were incensed against
him and had lost all faith in him. Nevertheless, Bolivar
was the man not only for the revolution in Columbia, but
for the emancipation of South America. None so well as
he could rise superior to adverse fortune, none had such
power as he over the petty chieftains, none but he could
organize the discordant elements of the revolution into
the strength of a warlike nation. Spite of his ignorance
of military tactics and of his puerile vanity, he was the
genius of the revolution in the North of the Continent.
The sacred fire of liberty and of patriotism burned within
him and inspired him. As he himself said, he would yet
merit the title of Liberator. History owes to him this
justice as she turns this disgraceful page.
After the departure of Bolivar, Marifio was named
general of the army at Giiiria, with Bermudez as his

VICTORIES OF THE ARMY OF THE CENTRE. 373
second in command, but his authority did not extend
beyond the peninsula of Paria.
After occupying the plains of Barcelona, MacGregor
marched upon the city. A Royalist force, which, under
the command of Colonel Lopez, occupied the town of
Aragua, sallied out to meet him. The action was hotly
contested, but was decided by desperate charges of the
Llanero horse led by Saraza and Monagas, and by a
bayonet charge led by MacGregor in person. The
Royalists lost 500 killed, 300 prisoners, and one gun.
Barcelona was evacuated by the Royalists on the 12th
September, after they had murdered many of the towns
folk and plundered many of the houses, but MacGregor
was now threatened by Morales, who had advanced to
Aragua with 3,000 men. He sent to Arismendi, Marifio,
and Piar for assistance. Piar, who was then besieging
Cumana, came at once with all his troops and took the
command. On the 27th September the two armies met
at the Playon del Juncal, near to Barcelona. MacGregor,
supported by the fire of Piar's artillery, led a bayonet
charge which decided the day. The Royalists were totally
routed, with a loss of 300 killed and 400 prisoners. After
this victory MacGregor, worn out with fatigue and
unwilling to brook the domineering ways of Piar, with
drew to Margarita.
Paez, by skilful manoeuvres, forced his old opponent,
Colonel Lopez, to retreat to the line of the Apure in
October. The town of San Fernando on this river was
the key of the plains ; he resolved to seize it, but had no
boats in which to cross the river. The Royalists had a
flotilla of four " flecheras " * and seven long-boats, manned
by 400 men. An officer named Pefia had committed some
fault. Paez ordered him as a punishment to get himself
killed by the enemy. He crossed the river in a canoe with
eight men, at midday, and threw the Royalist camp into
* A "flechera" is a flat-bottomed boat, capable of carrying one or two guns,
and is very swift. Managed by Venezuelan boatmen, they rendered great service
in this war.

374 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
confusion. In the skirmishes which followed, Colonel
Lopez was killed and the Patriots seized seven boats.
Paez then crossed the river, and in December laid siege to
San Fernando. There he received news that La Torre
and Morillo were on the march from New Granada to the
plains watered by the Arauca and Apure.
Marifio and Bermudez were engaged in the siege of
Cumana, aided by the flotilla from Margarita. The
Spanish garrison was about to evacuate the city, when the
Royalist force on the island abandoned it and came to
their assistance. The Patriots were forced to raise the
siege. At the close of the year 1816 the Patriot armies had
gained many advantages, but they felt the need of a head
to give cohesion to their efforts. With the army of the
centre were many of the partisans of Bolivar. Backed by
Arismendi they induced the army to demand his recall.
Assisted by Petion and by Brion he organized another
expedition, sailed from Haiti on the 21st December, and
reached Barcelona at the same time as Arismendi, who
brought a strong reinforcement from the island of Mar
garita. But the Army of the Centre was no longer there. Piar
had seen from the beginning that descents on the coasts
and incursions on to the plains would lead to no satisfactory
result, that the Orinoco was the true line of action, and
that Guayana was the true base of operations. Bolivar,
without any plan, had hovered round Caracas like a moth
round a candle, and had burned his wings. Even Cedefio,
the rude guerilla, had seen more clearly, as was shown by
his success on the Upper Orinoco. Morillo himself had
seen the same thing, and ere leaving New Granada had
written to the Home Government, impressing upon them
the importance of preserving the line of the Orinoco. Piar,
after the victory of Juncal, found himself in command of
an army, and at once proceeded to carry out his idea, thus
saving the Patriot cause by forcing Bolivar to give up his
pursuit of a phantom at Caracas. He left a small garrison

PIAR MARCHES TO GUAYANA.. 375
at Barcelona, left the guerillas to defend the plains, and
marched for Guayana.
The Royalists had a powerful flotilla on the Orinoco,
and had fortified Angostura, which was the capital of
Guayana. Piar cut down trees in the woods and made
small boats, captured two boats from the enemy, and
forced the passage of the Cauca in front of the Royalist
camp. The guerillas, under Cedefio, swam the river on
horseback, fighting with the crews of the Royalist gun
boats as they passed, and on reaching the opposite shore
charged upon the encampment, driving out the enemy
before them.
Piar then marched upon Angostura, but was repulsed
in every attempt to take the city by assault. Desisting
for a time, he passed behind the city to the mission station
at Coroni, where supplies were plentiful. One of his offi
cers cut the throats of twenty-two friars who were given
into his custody, and received no reprimand for his bar
barity. In fact this cruel deed greatly increased the
popularity of the Patriots in the country round about, as
these friars were hated by their Indian neophytes.
At Coroni Piar established a regular administration,
which was of great service to the Patriot cause, as the
armies were by it afterwards regularly supplied with cattle
and corn. By these successes Piar acquired great fame,
which for a time eclipsed even that of Bolivar himself.
All the Patriot leaders had now done something except
Bolivar, but when he assumed the command for the second
time he was another man : more grave and more thought
ful than he had been. But he was not yet a true soldier ;
he still took audacity for inspiration, and launched forth
on enterprises without first of all adapting the means to
the end desired. Immediately on landing at Barcelona he
issued a proclamation that he was about to liberate the
Province of Caracas, and in twenty hours set forth on
his expedition with a force of 600 men. A Royalist detach
ment lay in his way in an entrenched position on the river
Unare. Without any reconnaissance Bolivar rushed at it.

376 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Forty horse fell upon his rear, threw his attacking column
into confusion and totally destroyed it.
The Liberator was lost again. He was now in a worse
plight than when he fled from Cariipano. He wrote to
Piar and Cedefio to abandon their attempt on Guayana,
and to Paez, Monagas, and Saraza that they should come
to the protection of Barcelona. All this was utter folly,
for Morillo, with 4,000 men, already covered the approach
to Caracas, and La Torre, with Calzada, occupied the
higher plains. Meantime he fortified himself in Barcelona,
and mustered 600 more recruits. He turned the Franciscan
convent into a regular citadel and sent for Marifio. Marifio,
forgetting his jealousy, marched from Cumana and joined
him with 1,200 men. Bolivar then left 700 men in Barcelona,
and naming Aragua as the point of concentration for the
scattered forces of the Patriots, he went off to Guayana to
persuade Piar to join him in an invasion of Caracas.
On the 7th April, 1817, Barcelona was attacked and
taken by the Royalists, who cut the throats of the whole
of the garrison, and in addition killed 300 old men, women,
and sick. Marifio retreated to the peninsula of Paria and
again declared himself independent, while Bermudez and
other leaders got together 500 men and awaited orders
from Bolivar on the plains.
The Liberator, attended by fifteen officers, met Piar
near Angostura and found that he was already in posses
sion of all the open country. The behaviour of the negro
general was noble and patriotic. He showed no jealousy
of his superior, who had come to seize the laurels which he
had won in spite of him, and set to work to show him that
Guayana must be the base of a successful campaign. The
veil fell from the eyes of Bolivar ; for the first time he saw
before him the true theatre of the war. Leaving Monagas
to hold the plains of Barcelona with his guerillas, he sum
moned Bermudez, Arismendi, and Saraza to join him, and
the revolution was saved, thanks to Piar.
The Royalists held the coastline from Coro to Cumana
with the army of Caracas, 5,000 strong. The divisions of

SUCCESSES OF PAEZ. 377
La Torre and Calzada, 4,000 picked troops, with 1,500
Llanero horse, had concentrated at Guadalito on the Apure,
and in January had forced Paez to raise the siege of San
Fernando. Paez sent a small force against them to draw
them on. La Torre, who had no idea of his force, fell into
the trap, and advanced with all his army on to a wide
plain covered with dry reeds. Here the fugitives were
joined by the main body, and facing about, charged
furiously upon the Royalist cavalry, dispersed them com
pletely, and then by repeated charges forced the infantry
to form square. Then Paez, with fifty men whom he had
detailed for the purpose, set fire to the reeds all round
them. Fortunately for them they found a marsh, into
which they plunged, with the mud up to their waists, until
the fire burned itself out, when they hurriedly retreated,
leaving Paez in possession of the whole country round.
This famous deed of arms confirmed the authority of Paez
over the Llaneros, and put him into a position to overrun
the Province of Barinas. He concluded his glorious cam
paign by placing himself voluntarily at the orders of Boli
var, on condition that he might still protect the province
he had conquered. Morillo, who was well aware of the im
portance of the Province of Guayana, detached La Torre
with a strong force to drive out the Patriots, while he
marched with 3,000 men to reduce the island of Margarita.
La Torre embarked his force at San Fernando and
descended the Apure and the Orinoco to Angostura,
without meeting any resistance, and manoeuvred to draw
Piar from the Missions of Coroni, hoping then to capture
them by crossing the river at Angostura. But Piar
divined his intentions, and leaving a reserve of horses on
the right bank, he marched by the left bank to the vicinity
of Angostura, then, after nightfall, leaving his camp-fires
burning, he rapidly countermarched to his former position.
La Torre crossed the river as he had proposed, but was
met by Piar at San Felix on the nth April, 1817. The
Spanish infantry, advancing in three columns with cavalry
on the flanks, were received by volleys of musketry and

378 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
showers of arrows. The Patriots, among whom were
1,200 Indians from the Missions, armed with bows and
pikes, then charged, and a furious hand to hand fight
ensued, in which the Spaniards were totally routed. La
Torre escaped with seventeen men, but all the rest of his
Spanish troops were killed. Piar spared the lives of all
the Creoles among the Royalists who would join his ranks.
Bolivar, on his return from an expedition to the plains,
where he had a narrow escape from falling in with Morillo,
then on the march for Margarita, found himself at the head
of a respectable army. All the Patriot leaders now recog
nised his authority except Marifio, who summoned a Con
gress at Cariaco, of which Zea and Admiral Brion were
members. This Congress appointed an executive Junta,
of which Bolivar was named one, and gave Marino the
title of general-in-chief.
Morillo soon put an end to this farce; he overran the
peninsula of Paria, sank the Patriot flotilla, and dispersed
Marino's army, shooting all prisoners taken. Those who
escaped, headed by Urdaneta and Colonel SUCRE, a name
soon to become famous, went to join Bolivar in Guayana,
while Marifio, with a few followers, fled to Maturin.
Until the Patriots had the dominion of the Orinoco their
tenure of Guayana was insecure. Bolivar armed and
organized a flotilla of flecheras, but what was more to the
purpose, Brion again came to assist him with five brigs,
some schooners and more flecheras from Margarita. These
vessels were commanded by a mulatto named Diaz.
One part of the Royalist flotilla was engaged in the de
fence of Angostura and Guayana Vieja, which still held
out ; the other guarded the mouth of the Orinoco under the
protection of the forts. Diaz being sent by Brion to
explore the position of this latter detachment, was attacked
by sixteen Royalist flecheras, and lost two of his boats.
With three flecheras which remained to him, he then
attacked the Royalists, recovered his two boats, captured
two of theirs, sank five, and compelled the rest to retreat
in confusion. Brion then entered the river under full sail.

CONSPIRACY AND DEATH OF PIAR. 379
At the approach of Brion, La Torre evacuated Angostura
and was soon afterwards obliged by hunger to abandon
Guayana Vieja, the last position held by the Royalists in
Guayana. The remnant of his army, which now num
bered only 600 men, he embarked on 32 vessels and gained
the open sea in safety.
Piar, though he had recognized the authority of Bolivar,
was in his heart disaffected and entered into a conspiracy
with Marino to restrict his authority by the appointment of
a Junta of War ; he also gained over Arismendi to his
views. Bolivar prudently quelled this attempt at sedition
by counsels and threats conveyed privately to the con
spirators. Piar, in alarm, asked leave to withdraw from the
army on pretext of illness, and retired to Upata, where he
continued his intrigues till Bolivar wrote a friendly letter
to him asking him to desist. He then fled to Maturin and
concerted with Marifio a plan of independent action.
The position of Bolivar was now one of great danger ;
the troops of the army of Guayana were for the most part
men of colour, Piar was very popular with them, and was
accused of an intention to produce among them a mutiny of
race. Bolivar gave orders to Cedefio to arrest Piar. The
negro chieftain made no resistance, and was brought to
Angostura for trial by a court-martial, under the presidency
of Brion. He was sentenced to death for disobedience,
sedition, and desertion.
Bolivar confirmed the sentence and he was shot in the
great square of Angostura on the :6th October, 1817, dying
as bravely as he had lived. If not an act of justice, this
execution was warranted by necessity. It was the only
means of preventing a civil war, which would have ended
in the destruction of the army.
Marifio was still in arms at Cumana with 400 men.
Bolivar sent Bermudez with his corps to arrest him. Ber
mudez being an old friend of Marifio's, procured his
banishment. Bolivar was now rid of opposition, but still
his power was far from being well consolidated.

CHAPTER XLII.
THE REORGANIZATION OF VENEZUELA.
1817 — 1819.
The Home Government, on hearing of the third insurrection
on the island of Margarita, sent a reinforcement of 2,800
men under the command of General Canterac. Morillo on
his way to that island with his 3,000 men met Canterac at
Barcelona, and, embarking his troops in twenty vessels,
sailed with him for Margarita.
Brion had left the island with his flotilla for the Orinoco.
Arismendi was also absent, and General Gomez, who had
been left in command, had but 1,100 infantry badly
equipped, 200 cavalry, and some few artillerymen.
On the 1 5th July the troops effected a landing under the
protection of the guns of the squadron. Canterac had
thought that the mere sight of his fresh troops would
suffice to disperse the insurgents, but his division suffered
a heavy loss ere they could make good their footing on the
island. Morillo's first step was to publish a proclamation, in
which he offered pardon to all insurgents who would lay
down their arms, but threatened all who should resist
with extermination. Gomez rejected the offer of pardon
and made every preparation for a stubborn resistance,
strengthening the fortified positions, and piling up heaps
of stones on the heights for want of better ammunition.
The castles of Porlamar and Pampatar were evacuated
by the Patriots after a slight resistance, but they spiked

DEFENCE OF THE ISLAND OF MARGARITA. 381
the guns and concentrated their forces in the city of
Asuncion. Morillo marched inland to cut them off from
the north of the island, and was met on the 31st July by a
body of 500 Patriots who had entrenched themselves on
very broken ground, covered with brushwood, at a place
called Matasiete. It took Morillo eight hours of hard
fighting to drive them from this position, but his losses
were so heavy that he was forced to return the next day to
Pampatar. He then occupied the town of San Juan, which
is situate in a break in the range of hills which divides the
island, and so cut off the communications of the main
body of the Patriots with the port of Juan Griego, where
their flotilla was stationed. On the 8th August the fort
which protected the town was taken by assault after a
desperate resistance. The garrison of this fort only con
sisted originally of 200 men, the survivors of whom fled to
a lake near by, and refusing to surrender were massacred,
Morillo killing eighteen of them with his own hand. The
scene of this butchery is known to this day as " The Lake
of the Martyrs."
Had Morillo persevered there is no doubt that he would
have conquered the whole island, but adverse intelligence
recalled him to the mainland. After losing 1,000 men he
re-embarked the rest, and on the 20th August, 181 7,
established his head-quarters at Caracas.
Morillo now adopted a more humane policy. He pub
lished a general amnesty, abolished the military tribunals,
and re-established the Audiencia and the Civil Courts. The
aspect of the war had changed greatly in his absence.
Paez had invaded Barinas, taken the capital of that
province, and had routed a strong Royalist division at San
Carlos, sacking the town and shooting all his European
prisoners. But the plains were now covered with water, so
nothing could be done against him. Bolivar had posses
sion of the line of the Orinoco. Saraza's guerillas,
strengthened by an infantry corps, protected the right
flank of Paez. Monagas occupied the plains of Barcelona,
and the Province of Cumana was held by Bermudez.

382 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Canterac was sent off to Peru with his sorely diminished
division. The garrison of Caracas and the division of La
Torre held the line of the coast. Aldama, with another
division, covered the line of the Lower Apure and protected
San Fernando, and Calzada, with a light cavalry division,
disputed with Paez the possession of the Province of
Barinas. The peninsula of Paria, and the cities of Cumana
and Barcelona were held by 800 men, and the rest of the
Royalist forces were distributed in various forts along the
coast. Neither party had any plan of operations, both
were waiting to see what the other would do.
Bolivar was at this time the one conspicuous figure in
America. He received a despatch from the Director of the
United Provinces of La Plata congratulating him upon his
success, and prophesying the speedy union of their arms
in the same cause. Bolivar replied by an address to the
Argentine people : — •
"The Republic of Venezuela, though plunged in mourn
ing, offers you brotherhood. When, covered with laurels,
she has crushed the tyrants who profane her soil, then she
will invite your concurrence, that our emblem be the
Union of South America."
As steps towards constitutional government by the in
stallation of a Congress Bolivar established a High Court
of Justice, and on the 30th October presided at the opening
of a Council of State to which he entrusted the manage
ment of civil affairs in his absence, hoping to strengthen
his authority by " the first of all forces, public opinion."
Bolivar then ascended the Orinoco with 1,500 well
equipped troops, and crossed to the left bank, at about a
hundred miles from Angostura. His intention was to join
Saraza, who had 2,500 men, and with his aid to crush
Morillo and retake Caracas. At the same time he wrote to
Paez to co-operate in the scheme by advancing from
Barinas. But on the 2nd December Saraza allowed him
self to be surprised and completely routed by La Torre at
Hogaza. The Patriots suffered a loss of 1,200 killed with
three guns and all their flags, while the Royalists had only

THE HORSE MARINES. 383
200 killed and wounded, among the latter being La Torre
himself. Bolivar was forced to recross the Orinoco and return to
Angostura. Then with some reinforcements he again
ascended the river to join Paez, who, on the advance of
Morillo and La Torre had prudently retired to Calabozo.
The two commanders having united their forces marched
with 2,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry on San Fernando.
On reaching the river Apure, Bolivar looked in vain for
the boats which Paez had promised to provide, while on
the opposite side were a number of canoes under guard of a
Royalist gunboat and three armed flecheras. Bolivar was
dressed in a green spencer with red facings and three rows
of buttons ; on his head was a dragoon's helmet, which
had been sent him as a sample ; he wore Llanero gaiters,
and carried in his hand a short lance with a black pennon
adorned with a skull and cross bones, under which might
be read the inscription " Liberty or Death."
" Where are your boats ? " asked Bolivar of Paez.
" There they are," said Paez, pointing to the enemy's
boats. " How shall we take them ? "
" With cavalry," answered Paez.
" And where are these horse marines ? " asked Bolivar.
Paez turned to his guard of honour, and picking out fifty
men under Colonel Aramendi, he put himself at their head,
shouting : —
" Into the water, boys ! Follow your Uncle ! "
Then putting spurs to his horse he plunged into the
river, followed by his men lance in hand, and yelling to
frighten off the alligators which swarmed around them.
The armed boats opened fire upon them, but without
effect ; the terrified crews jumped overboard, and fourteen
boats were captured.
" If I had not seen it, I never would have believed it
possible ! " said Bolivar.
Bolivar simply established a blockade of San Fernando,
and marched without loss of time against Morillo, who

384 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
had assembled 1,600 infantry and 300 horsemen near to
Calabozo. His movements were so rapid that Morillo was
taken by surprise on the morning of the 10th February,
1 8 1 8, and was himself involved in the rout of his cavalry,
and borne from the field by the fugitives. One company
of light infantry covered the retreat, and perished to the
last man. Morillo shut himself up in Calabozo, which was
defended by four redoubts, while Bolivar withdrew to rest
his men.
Morillo, without cavalry and without supplies, saw that
resistance was hopeless ; he buried his guns, and on the
night of the 14th February marched off towards Sombrero
on the river Guarico, taking his sick and wounded with
him. At midday, on the 15th, he was overtaken by
Bolivar with his cavalry. The horsemen could make no
impression on the solid columns of the Spanish infantry,
but they delayed their march and so gave time for the
Patriot infantry to come up. During the night which
followed Morillo continued his retreat, and the next day
reached the wooded country about Sombrero. Here he took
up a strong position on the river Guarico, where he re
pulsed several attacks of the Patriot infantry, and after
nightfall, by a forced march, reached the valleys of Aragua.
Bolivar, still with Caracas on the brain, retired to
Calabozo, where he had a stormy conference with Paez.
The Llanero chieftain insisted that to attempt an offensive
campaign while the fortress of San Fernando was still held
by the Royalists was to lose the command of the plains.
Bolivar let Paez depart with his division, but marched
himself with 1,000 raw infantry and 1,200 horse for the
valleys of Aragua, where he greatly increased his force by
recruits. At Victoria he established a reserve under
Urdaneta, and detached his cavalry and 200 infantry to
occupy the pass at Cabrera. Morillo, who had concen
trated his forces at Valencia, surprised Saraza at Cabrera,
routed Monagas at Maracay on the road to Caracas,
and advanced upon Victoria. Bolivar was compelled to
make a hasty retreat.

VICTORIES OF THE ROYALISTS. 385
He halted at La Puerta, for him a most ominous posi
tion, and was there attacked on the morning of the 16th
March by the Royalist vanguard under Morales. He
succeeded in repulsing this attack, but Morillo, in person,
led up the main body, and though himself wounded, very
quickly drove the Patriots from the field, with the loss of
400 killed and 600 wounded.
Bolivar lost in this battle even his private papers, and
seemed to have lost his head also. He exposed himself in
the most reckless manner wherever the fight was hottest,
seeming to court death as some expiation of the errors he
had committed. Fortunately for him, on the 6th March
Paez had captured San Fernando, with twenty guns, eigh
teen armed vessels, and seventy-three flecheras, and now
came to his assistance; as did also Cedefio with his guerillas.
La Torre, who had taken command of the Royalists,
found another army in front of him when he advanced to
Calabozo. He retreated to the heights of Ortiz on the
river Poga, which command the entrance to the valleys.
Here he was attacked by Bolivar and Paez with 800
infantry and 2,000 horse. The strength of his position
enabled him to repulse several assaults, after which he
prudently retreated to Cura, and later on to San Carlos.
Bolivar then detached Paez against San Carlos, and
marched with the bulk of his force further to the West,
always aiming at Caracas. Paez was met at Cojedes by
La Torre with a very superior force. Carried away by his
impetuosity, he charged at the head of one squadron, and
bore down all before him, but found on his return to the
field that his army had disappeared. Overwhelmed by num
bers the infantry had been cut to pieces, the cavalry had
fled. Paez returned to San Fernando with less than half
the force with which he had commenced the campaign.
Still worse fortune befell Bolivar. He abandoned the
plains and advanced into a country swarming with de
tached parties of Royalists. He, with his staff, were
attacked at night as they slept in hammocks in a wood.
He threw off his green spencer and brass helmet and
C C

386 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
escaped on foot, but wandered about all alone till next
day, when he fell in with his dispersed troops, flying from
their encampment where they had been surprised, and
ultimately rejoined Paez at San Fernando.
Bolivar, downcast and sick but not disheartened, im
mediately set to work to raise fresh troops, and sent
Cedefio with 1,300 mento re-occupy the plains of Calabozo.
Cedefio was cut to pieces by Morales, who then advanced
towards the Apure, but was there totally routed by Paez
on the 28th May, 1818. Then came on the rainy season,
and both parties were forced to remain in quarters. The
Patriot army no longer existed, all the infantry had dis
appeared, the arms were ruined and the ammunition was
exhausted. The Liberator had lost both his credit as a
general and his civil authority. All threw upon him the
blame for the ill-success of the Patriot arms, and time,
which has enhanced his glory, confirms in this instance the
judgment of his contemporaries. But there was yet the
nucleus of an army on the Apure, and Guayana was still
secure. The position of the Royalists was not much better.
Morillo had 12,000 men scattered about in detachments,
but he had neither money, arms, nor supplies. As he
himself reported to the Viceroy of Peru : —
" Twelve pitched battles, in which the best officers and
troops of the enemy have fallen, have not lowered their
pride or lessened the vigour of their attacks upon us."
The Spanish squadron lay idle at Puerto Cabello, while
Argentine and Venezuelan privateers scoured the Carribean
Sea with the ports of Margarita as their head-quarters.
In the East the Patriot arms had been equally unfor
tunate. Marifio, recalled by his partisans and supported
by Gomez, Governor of Margarita, had again established
himself at Cumana and openly renounced all allegiance to
the Liberator. Bermudez, who remained faithful, was
routed and driven across the Orinoco with the loss of
his artillery. Monagas was isolated on the plains of
Barcelona.

MEASURES ADOPTED BY BOLIVAR. 387
Bolivar returned to Angostura, leaving Paez in com
mand of the Army of the Apure, and with indomitable
energy set to work to create a new army. He raised
recruits in the Missions of Coroni, re-organized the divi
sions of Saraza and Monagas, while Bermudez recruited
his forces in Guayana. Brion brought him 5,000 muskets
and a large supply of military stores from the West India
Islands. He also effected a reconciliation with Marifio
and made him general of the Army of Cumana. The
Army of the Apure, at the instigation of Colonel Wilson,
an Englishman who had joined it with a contingent of
volunteers, proclaimed Paez general-in-chief. This appoint
ment was confirmed by the Llaneros, who adored him, but
Paez, taking no notice of this, assisted the Liberator in
every way he could.
Bolivar then sent General Santander, with 1,200 muskets
and a group of officers, to raise a new army in the Province
of Casanare, from the parties of Patriots scattered on the
plains, with orders to threaten the frontier of New Granada,
which step had very important results.
Santander was a native of New Granada, he had served
through all the campaigns of the revolution, and was a
well-educated man of great intelligence.
Bolivar also issued a prophetic proclamation to the
people of New Granada : —
" The day of America has come. No human power can
stay the course of Nature guided by Providence. Before
the sun has again run his annual course altars to Liberty
will arise throughout your land."
Bolivar's next step was to re-ascend the Orinoco with
twenty vessels and some infantry to reinforce the Army
of the Apure. He had a friendly interview with Paez, and
leaving him in command, returned to Angostura to attend
to the claims of civil government.
The country was not satisfied with the arbitrary govern
ment of one man, and demanded some sort of popular
representation. Bolivar calmly reviewed the situation and
acquiesced. He re-organized the Council of State, which
C C 2

388 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
had fallen to pieces in his absence, and charged it with
the convention of a Constituent Congress. An electoral
scheme was drawn up on the basis of joining Venezuela
and New Granada in one Republic, and on the 22nd
October, 181 8, Bolivar published this plan in a proclama
tion, in which as usual he renounced all claim to the
supreme power, but contradicted himself by saying : —
" The first day of peace will be the last of my authority."
The world was beginning now to turn its eyes to the
great movement in Spanish America. The figure of
Bolivar stood forth prominently. San Martin had fought
and won the Battle of Maipo, and was preparing for the
conquest of Peru. O'Higgins wrote from Chile to Bolivar,
recognising him as a champion in the cause of America : —
"The cause which Chile defends is the same in which
Buenos Ayres, New Granada, Mexico, and Venezuela are
engaged ; it is that of the whole Continent of America."
Spain solicited the intervention of the European Powers
to bring about a reconciliation. Bolivar replied by a
solemn declaration : —
" That the Republic of Venezuela, by right Divine and
human, is emancipated from the Spanish nation ; that she
neither had solicited nor would admit, the mediation of
the Great Powers ; that she would only treat with Spain
as with an equal; and that the people of Venezuela, in
defence of their sovereign rights, were resolved to bury
themselves under its ruins, if Spain, Europe, and all the
world were to unite to keep them under Spanish domi
nation." On the 15th February, 1819, the second Congress of
Venezuela was solemnly installed at Angostura. Into its
hands the Dictator resigned his absolute power, and in a
speech disclosed for the first time his plan of constitutional
organization, the union of Venezuela and New Granada in
one nation. He spoke in favour of democratic govern
ment, and against the system of federation, as organically
weak. At the same time he showed that no Democracy
had ever had the stability of Monarchies and Aristo-

REORGANIZATION OF VENEZUELA. 389
cracies, and held up the constitution of England as a
model, at once Republican and Conservative. He proposed
an hereditary Senate as the base of the constitutional
edifice. In regard to the executive, the idea of a life
President, which he had learned from his master, Simon
Rodriguez, was in his head, but he dared not as yet
propose it, it would not have met with any support : —
" The executive power in a Republic must be strong, for
all conspire against it. In a Monarchy the power should
rest in the legislature, for all conspire in favour of the
monarch." On the 10th February, 1819, Congress unanimously
elected him President, and from that day he always
respected the liberty and opinions of that body ; although
he still remained de facto Dictator, he appealed to them
in every emergency. When he abandoned Congress he
fell. Congress established a life Senate in place of the here
ditary Senate proposed by Bolivar, and adopted a cen
tralized form of government ; fixed the presidential term
at four years, the President being eligible for re-election
once but not oftener ; and arranged the other public
offices on the republican system. This constitution had
yet to be submitted to the vote of the people ; this was at
present impossible, and it never was actually adopted, the
framework alone being established.
By decree, unlimited powers were granted to the Presi
dent in all provinces which were the theatre of war, and
it was also decreed that the Vice-President should have no
authority over the armies. This was in fact the creation
of a military dictatorship.
Bolivar delegated his power to Don Francisco Antonio
Zea, with the title of Vice-President. Zea being a native
of New Granada, this appointment formed a link between
the sister colonies. Bolivar then took the field, followed
by a battalion of 500 English, under command of Colonel
Elsom, which had been raised in England in the preceding
year.

390 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Often have we made mention of European officers and
men in the Patriot armies, more especially of Englishmen.
Venezuela, spite of the virile strength of her men, and of
their heroic efforts during eight years of struggle against
the disciplined armies of Spain, was the only Republic of
South America to seek the help of foreign volunteers, and
which had in her pay entire corps of foreign soldiers
commanded by their own officers. Bolivar was something
of a cosmopolitan, and had none of the prejudices of his
fellow-countrymen against foreigners. More a soldier by
instinct than by education, he knew that results are only
to be obtained by method and discipline. He saw how
San Martin, with an army well organized and well led,
had triumphed over the best of the Spanish troops, and
understood that he himself needed a more solid nucleus
for his armies than the light horsemen of the plains, and a
better disciplined infantry, to ensure success. Taught by
his late disasters, which were the result both of his own
imprudence and of the lack of cohesion in his troops, he
was convinced that without a properly disciplined army
any advantage he might gain would be ephemeral, and
that if he did eventually triumph, he would stand as a
conqueror over ruins. Learning these lessons, he grew
from a mere warrior to be a great captain ; without the
science and mathematical precision of San Martin, but
with greater boldness and with a heavier crop of laurels:
In 1 815 endeavours had been made to raise an auxiliary
corps of Irish, but it was only in 1 8 1 7 that a system of
enlisting volunteers was instituted in England, through the
agency of Don Luis Lopez Mendez, who was at that time
the representative of Venezuela in London. Without this
assistance and efficient co-operation, Bolivar averred that
he would have accomplished nothing in the famous cam
paign of 1 819, for which he was now preparing.
The soldiers received a bounty of $80 on enlisting, were
paid two shillings a day and rations, and were to receive
at the conclusion of the war $500 and an allotment of
land.

THE FOREIGN AUXILIARIES. 39
In the year 181 7, various English and German officers
made contracts with Mendez to take to Venezuela organ
ized corps of artillery, lancers, hussars, and rifles. The
first expedition to leave England consisted of 1 20 hussars
and lancers, under Colonel Hippisley. Their brilliant
uniforms gave them more the appearance of a theatrical
troupe than a body of soldiers going on active service ;
nevertheless they became the basis of a corps of regular
cavalry. Colonel Wilson and Colonel Skeenen organized another
corps of cavalry, but Skeenen with 300 men suffered ship
wreck on the coast of France. Campbell took out the
nucleus of a battalion of riflemen, which afterwards did
good service in Columbia ; and a subaltern named
Gilmour, with the title of Colonel, and with 90 men,
formed the basis of a brigade of artillery.
Such enlistments were contrary to law in England, but
in 1818 and in 18 19 the number of volunteers increased
considerably. General English, who had gone through
the Peninsular War with Wellington, contracted for a
division of 1,200 English, which about this time reached
the Island of Margarita, and subsequently became the
celebrated Carabobo battalion. The 500 men under
Colonel Elsom, who accompanied Bolivar to the Apure,
were at first called the " British Legion," but were • after
wards named the " Albion " battalion. Colonel Elsom had
also brought out 300 Germans under Colonel Uzlar, who
had been enlisted at Brussels, which corps was landed at
Margarita. General MacGregor, of whom we already know some
thing, brought a foreign legion of 800 men. Besides
smaller contingents, General Devereux, who had initiated
the idea, brought an Irish legion, in which a son of the
great Irish Tribune, O'Connell, was an officer.
On hearing of the arrival of General English and others
at Margarita, Bolivar sent Urdaneta there to organize
them. Urdaneta found 1,200 English and 300 Germans.
These troops were destined for operations on the coast of

3?2 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Cumana and Caracas, but were at this time almost in open
mutiny against their officers. They were brought to order
by the exertions of Colonel Montilla, who had become
reconciled to Bolivar. He was the last of Bolivar's
enemies to become reconciled, and from this time to the
end stood faithfully by him. Montilla had served in Spain,
and had travelled much in Europe ; he spoke the languages
of these foreigners and understood their customs. He was
also energetic and was possessed of some military skill.
These acquirements gave him considerable influence over
the auxiliaries, which he turned to good account.
On the 30th January, 1819, Morillo paraded 6,500 men,
in seven battalions and sixteen squadrons, all perfectly
equipped, and opened the campaign by advancing on San
Fernando. Paez burned that city on his approach, and
retired south of the Arauca with 4,000 men, among whom
was a squadron of English dragoons. The Royalists
dragged canoes with them across the plains, and on the
4th February forced the passage of the river.
Paez then changed his tactics : he sent his infantry to
the rear, and remained himself facing the enemy, with
1,500 men well mounted. Morillo saw small parties of
the enemy, who hovered on his flanks and rear, but who
fled from him over the vast plain whenever they were
attacked. He detached Morales with 3,000 men to recon
noitre and to drive in cattle. On the 14th February one
of his squadrons was so occupied when Paez suddenly
rushed upon it with 1,200 men, chased the fugitives to the
encampment, charged the reserve, and then retired at full
speed. After nightfall he again appeared in the rear.
Morillo wearied out his troops in ineffectual pursuit, till
after nine days of marchings to and fro upon the immense
plain, he retreated to the Apure. He then threw up fresh
entrenchments at San Fernando, and making that place
his head-quarters, detached divisions to occupy Barinas,
Calabozo, and Sombrero. At this juncture Bolivar arrived,
and at once assumed the offensive, but had the worst of it

THE AFFAIR OF " LAS QUESERAS DEL MEDIA?' 393
in two small affairs, and prudently withdrew^beyond the
Arauco. Again Morillo advanced. On the 3rd April Paez, with
150 picked horsemen, swam the river and galloped towards
the camp. Eight hundred of the Royalist cavalry, with two
small guns, sallied out to meet him. He slowly retreated,
drawing them on to a place called "Las Queseras del
Medio," where a battalion of infantry lay in ambush by the
river. Then splitting his men into groups of twenty, he
charged the enemy on all sides, forcing them under the
fire of the infantry, and recrossed the river with two killed
and a few wounded, leaving the plain strewn with the
dead of the enemy.* Morillo again retreated, and the rains
put an end to further operations.
Bolivar, ever impatient of inactivity, heard at this time
that Santander had raised 1,200 infantry and 600 horse in
Casanare, and had driven back a Royalist army of 2,300
men under Colonel Barreiro, who had marched against
him from New Granada. This gave him an idea; he
resolved to cross the Cordillera and save Venezuela by
reconquering New Granada. He summoned a council of
war, and the idea was received with enthusiasm by his
officers. It was decided that Paez, with a part of the army,
should attract the attention of Morillo and of the Army of
New Granada upon the plains of Barinas ; that Urdaneta
and Montilla should embark the auxiliaries on the vessels
of Brion's squadron, and should make a descent on the
coasts of Caracas, menacing the rear of the Royalist army;
while he with the rest of the Army of the Apure, and with
the forces of Santander, should cross the Cordillera, and
capture the capital of New Granada.
This was the greatest stroke of strategy that had
emanated from the fertile genius of Bolivar. It changed
the whole aspect of affairs, and had a similar effect to the
passage of the Andes by San Martin.
* See Appendix VI.

CHAPTER XLIII.
BOYACA— COLUMBIA — CARABOBO.
1819-1822.
In order to join Santander in Casanare Bolivar had to
cross an immense plain, covered at this season with water,
and had to swim seven deep rivers, taking his war mate
rial with him. Then lay before him the most difficult part
of his enterprise, the passage of the snow-covered Cor
dillera in the depth of winter. All this he accomplished.
He joined Santander at the foot of the Andes, at the
sources of the river Casanare, on the nth June, 1819.
His army now comprised four battalions of infantry, one
of which, the " Albion," was composed entirely of English,
two squadrons of lancers, and one of carabineers, with a
regiment called the "Guides of Apure," part of which
was English also. Two thousand five hundred men, well
armed, but nearly naked.
Santander led the van with the Casanare division, and
entered the mountain defiles by a road which leads to the
centre of the Province of Tunja. This point was held by
Colonel Barreiro with 2,000 infantry and 400 horse, with
advanced posts on the Cordillera. A reserve of 1,000
men was stationed at Bogota ; at Cartagena, and in the
valley of Cauca were other detachments, and there was
still another Royalist army at Quito. Bolivar, who had
fewer men, trusted much to the effect of surprise, and
counted upon the support of the inhabitants.
As the invading army left the plains for the mountains

PASSAGE OF THE ANDES BY BOLIVAR. 395
the scene changed. The snowy peaks of the eastern
range of the Cordillera appeared in the distance, while
instead of the peaceful lake through which they had
waded they were met by great masses of water tumbling
from the heights. The roads ran along the edges of pre
cipices, and were bordered by gigantic trees, upon whose
tops rested the clouds, which dissolved themselves in in
cessant rain. After four days' march the horses were
foundered; an entire squadron of Llaneros deserted on
finding themselves on foot. The torrents were crossed
on narrow trembling bridges, formed of trunks of trees, or
by means of the aerial " taravitas." Where they were
fordable the current was so strong that the infantry had to
pass two by two, with their arms thrown round each
others shoulders, and woe to him who lost his footing, he
lost his life too. Bolivar frequently passed and repassed
these torrents on horseback, carrying behind him the sick
and weakly, or the women who accompanied his men.
The temperature was moist and warm ; life was sup
portable by the aid of a little firewood ; but as they as
cended the mountain the scene changed again. Immense
rocks piled one upon another, and hills of snow, bounded
the view on every side ; below lay the clouds, veiling the
depths of the abyss ; an ice-cold wind cut through the
stoutest clothing. At these heights no other noise is
heard than that of the roaring torrents left behind, and
the scream of the condor circling round the snowy peaks
above. Vegetation disappears, only lichens are to be
seen clinging to the rocks, and a tall plant bearing plumes
instead of leaves, and crowned with yellow flowers, like to
a funeral torch. To make the scene more dreary yet, the
path was marked out by crosses erected in memory of
travellers who had perished by the way.
On entering this glacial region the provisions gave out,
the cattle they had brought with them as their chief resource
could go no further. They reached the summit by the
Paya pass, where a battalion could hold an entire army in
check. It was held by an outpost of 300 men, who were

396 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
dislodged by the vanguard under Santander without much
difficulty. Now the men began to murmur, and Bolivar called a
council of war, to which he showed that still greater
difficulties yet lay before them, and asked if they would per
severe or not. All were of opinion that they should go
on, a decision which infused fresh spirit into the weary
troops. In this passage more than a hundred men died of cold,
fifty of whom were English ; no horse had survived. It
was necessary to leave the spare arms, and even some of
those that were carried by the soldiers. It was a mere
skeleton of an army which reached the beautiful valley of
Sagamoso, in the heart of the Province of Tunja, on the
6th July, 1 8 19. From this point Bolivar sent back assist
ance to the stragglers left behind, collected horses, de
tached parties to scour the country around, and communi
cated with some few guerillas who still roamed about.
The enemy, knowing nothing of his numbers, took up
strong positions, and remained on the defensive.
But Bolivar could not remain long inactive. Barreiro
occupied a position which commanded the main road to
Bogota ; it was necessary to attack him before he could
receive reinforcements from that city or from Morillo. No
sooner had he his army once more in hand than by a
skilful flank movement Bolivar established himself on
Barreiro's rear, in a country abounding in resources. The
Royalists were forced to evacuate their entrenchments,
and a hard fought but indecisive action took place in the
swamps of Vargas on the 25th July, after which Bolivar
recrossed the Sagamoso river, and forced Barreiro to again
change his position. Then, deceiving him by a retreat in
the daytime, he rapidly countermarched by night, and on
the 5th August captured the city of Tunja, where he found
good store of arms and war material, and placed himself
between Barreiro's force and the army of Bogota.
Barreiro, finding his communications cut, marched reso
lutely on the capital; but it was too late. Bolivar had

BATTLE OF BOYACA. 397
command of all the roads, and seeing that the Royalists
were advancing by the shortest route, which crosses the
small river Boyaca by a bridge, he posted his army on the
right bank and waited for them.
The battle of the 7th August commenced upon the
bridge itself, where the Spanish skirmishers were driven
back. Barreiro then formed his infantry in columns, with
cavalry on the flanks, throwing out a battalion of light
infantry on the right, whose fire might enfilade the attack
ing column of the Patriots. The Patriot centre and right
wing drove in an advanced party of Royalist infantry, and
crossing a shallow stream threw themselves upon the left
flank of the Royalist army, while the left wing and the
cavalry attacked in front. The Royalist cavalry fled, the
infantry retreated to a fresh position, but on a second
attack threw down their arms. The vanguard, under
Santander, accounted for all who were not with the main
body. The victory was complete. Anzuategui, who led the
infantry of the right and centre, and Rondon, who led the
final charge of the Llanero horse, were the heroes of the
day. The English auxiliaries were seen for the first time
under fire, and showed that British solidity for which they
were always famous. The trophies of the victory were
1,600 prisoners, including Barreiro himself, and 37 officers,
100 killed, and all the artillery and small arms.
Boyaca is, after Maipo, the great battle, of South
America. It gave the preponderance to the Patriot arms >
ihTfre~North of the Continent, as Maipo had done in the
South. It gave New Granada to the Patriots, and isolated
Morillo in Venezuela.
Bogota was panic-stricken. Samano fled with 200 men
to Cartagena, abandoning the archives and nearly a
million dollars in the treasury. The rest of the garrison
retreated under Colonel Calzada to the North. Bolivar,
with a small escort, entered the capital in triumph on the
10th August, amid the shouts and blessings of the popu
lace. This victory was not stained with blood. Bolivat

398 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
was no longer the man of 1813 and 1814. He shot one
only of the prisoners he took, the man who had headed the
mutiny at Puerto Cabello in 181 2. By incessant activity,
he soon became master of the whole country, which re
sponded with enthusiasm to his call. He raised new
battalions and organized a fresh army to make head
against Morillo.
Where Bolivar triumphed there could be no lack of
honours. Washington and San Martin avoided ostenta
tious demonstrations of gratitude, but Bolivar delighted in
them. The municipality of Bogota gave him a cross of
honour, a triumphal entry, and a crown of laurel. A
picture of Liberty supported by Bolivar was set up in the
council chamber, and it was decreed that the anniversary
of the great battle should be celebrated for ever. The
crown of laurel sat well upon his head, upon that of Wash
ington it would have been a caricature.
But, great as was Bolivar's vanity, there was room also
in his head for great ideas. Making use of the ample
powers conferred upon him by the Congress of Venezuela
he founded the Republic of Columbia, which was the
dream of his life, and named Santander Vice-President of
New Granada.
During a temporary absence of Bolivar, Santander shot
the thirty-eight Royalist officers who were taken prisoners
at Boyaca, with Barreiro at their head, and finished off the
hecatomb with a countryman who had protested against it
on seeing the blood-stained benches. Santander justified
his cruelty by saying that it was done in retaliation of
similar barbarities committed by Barreiro ; but some said
it was done in revenge for the death of his mother, occa
sioned by the privations she had suffered while hiding her
self from the persecutions of Samano.
Bolivar returned to Angostura on. the 1 ith December, and
found that affairs had greatly changed there during his
absence. Zea had been deposed by a revolution, and
Arismendi was now Vice-President. Marino was General-
in-Chief, and he himself was branded as a deserter for

THE REPUBLIC OF COLUMBIA. 399
having undertaken the reconquest of New Granada with
out authority from Congress. The news of Boyaca had
fallen as a thunderbolt among the disaffected, and his
return quelled them utterly. He acted with great magna
nimity, pardoned everything, resumed his authority, and
announced to Congress the union of Venezuela and New
Granada, calling upon it to give legal consistency to an
accomplished fact.
Congress, enlarged by the addition of five New Granadian
deputies from the Province of Casanare, decreed the estab
lishment of the Republic of Columbia, in three great
departments : Venezuela, Quito, and Cundinamarca, each
ruled by a Vice-President. A new city, which should be
called Bolivar, was to be the capital. The tri-coloured flag
raised by Miranda in 1806 was to be the flag of the new
nation. A Constituent Congress was convened, to assemble
at Ciicuta on the frontier of Venezuela. Bolivar was
named provisional President of Columbia, Santander Vice-
President of Cundinamarca, and Roscio Vice-President of
Venezuela. The day of the installation of the Republic
was fixed for the 25th December.
This great political business being settled, war again
called for the attention of the Liberator. The Spanish
armies in the north and west of Venezuela, and in Quito
and Cartagena, amounted altogether to nearly 20,000 men,
and reinforcements were expected from Spain. The new
Republic was still beset by dangers, while the strength of
the country was well-nigh exhausted.
Urdaneta and Montilla had been unfortunate in their
expedition. Urdaneta captured Barcelona on the 17th
July, but being there attacked by very superior forces was
compelled to re-embark his men and retire to Paria, where
with some reinforcements he made an attack on Cumana
on the 5th August, but was beaten off and withdrew to
Maturin, with a greatly diminished force. MacGregor
took Portobello on the 10th April, but was soon after driven
out again with heavy loss. On the 5th October he took
Rio Hacha, but the conduct of his troops was so bad that

400 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
the citizens rose in arms against them, and forced him to
re-embark. Happily at this time the first division of the
Irish Legion, 1,200 strong, reached the island of Margarita.
Bolivar placed them under the command of Montilla, with
orders to threaten Cartagena and co-operate with the Army
of New Granada on the Lower Magdalena, while the Army
of the Apure advanced from the plains of Caracas upon
the capital.
Paez had invaded Barinas with cavalry, but was soon
forced to retire, after which Diaz captured ten armed
flecheras on the Apure river, and on the 30th September
the Patriots retook San Fernando, which gave them com
plete command of the Orinoco.
Morillo, thunderstruck by the invasion of New Granada,
remained inactive at Calabozo, and simply detached La
Torre with 1,000 men to the valley of Ciicuta, whence he
was driven back by the division under Soublette, which
crossed the hills against him from Pamplona.
Soublette then joined Paez on the plains in his advance
upon Caracas. Bolivar reinforced them with two bat
talions of infantry, one of which was English, and sent a
strong column of Venezuelan troops, under Colonel Valdez,
to the south of New Granada, in order to act against Quito.
Morillo, uncertain what to do, confined his attention to
securing his base of operations in the western provinces
of Venezuela.
Happily for America, and for Spain also, the reinforce
ments expected from Europe never arrived. They could
but have prolonged the struggle. The revolution of 1820
prevented them from leaving the mother country. The
new policy of Spain was felt as much in the north as in
the south of the Continent. At the same time that San
Martin broke up the armistice of Miraflores, Bolivar signed
one with Morillo at Trujillo. When negotiations for peace,
recommenced as Punchauca, hostilities were renewed in
Venezuela. The armistice signed by Bolivar and Morillo on the 25th
November, 1820, was of great service to the Patriots, giv-

RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES. 401
ing them much-needed breathing time, in which the country
recovered somewhat from the exhaustion produced by the
long continuance of the struggle, and the institutions of
the new Republic became to some degree consolidated.
Now that the establishment of constitutional government
in Spain gave hopes of a possible reconciliation, commis
sioners were sent to the mother country to treat for peace,
and Morillo, despairing of ultimate success, resigned his
command and returned to Europe, leaving La Torre as
General-in-Chief of the Royalist armies.
The armistice was badly observed by both parties, more
especially so by the Patriots. While it was still in force,
and while the commissioners from Columbia were at
Madrid, on the 28th January, 1821, the Province of Mara-
caibo declared itself independent, and made overtures for
a union with the Republic of Columbia. La Torre declared
that he should look upon the occupation of this province
by the Patriots as an act of hostility. Bolivar acknow
ledged that such would be the case, but stated that the
Revolution itself was an accomplished fact, and as such
he had a right to support it. The armistice was accord
ingly declared to be at an end on the 28th April, 1821.
During this interval of repose the Patriot armies had
been considerably strengthened. While the armistice still
lasted Montilla had taken Rio Hacha and Santa Marta,
and was now besieging Cartagena with 3,000 men. Boli
var had 5,000 men at Barinas, and Paez was in his rear
with 4,000 more. Bermudez with 2,000 men threatened
Caracas from the East ; the army of New Granada held the
valley of the Magdalena. La Torre had 9,000 men besides
the garrisons of the towns on the coast, but his communi
cations were interrupted by the revolution in Maracaibo.
Bermudez after retaking Caracas and meeting with
varied fortune in desultory skirmishes, was compelled to
retire, but his operations were of great effect in occupying
the attention of a considerable portion of the Royalist
army. Bolivar established his head-quarters at San Carlos,
where he was joined by Urdaneta's division and part of.
D D

402 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
the cavalry of the Army of the Apure, and then marched
with 6,000 men in search of the enemy. La Torre had
5,000 men under his immediate orders, including a strong
body of cavalry commanded by Morales, but, uncertain of
Bolivar's intentions, he detached two battalions of infantry
and one squadron of cavalry to reinforce a Royalist di
vision which was stationed at Barquisimeto, thus materially
weakening his force on the eve of a decisive action. The
rest of his army he drew up on the wide plain of Carabobo,
at the foot of the passes leading through the Cordillera.
Bolivar, after surprising the principal pass, on the 23rd
June, occupied the heights looking down upon the plain.
He could only descend at the risk of having his troops cut
up in detail before they could deploy on open ground. As '
Bolivar hesitated, a guide told him of another road which
would lead him to the flank of the enemy. The next
morning he detached Paez, with 1,500 horse, the Apure
battalion, and the British legion, to attack the right flank
of the Royalists, while he with the bulk of the army re
mained on the heights ready to descend by the main pass
when the coast was clear.
The exit from the smaller pass was through a belt of
woods and across a stream, commanded by a hillock which
was occupied by a detachment of Royalists. The Apure
battalion was in front, led by Paez in person. La Torre,
with three battalions and under cover of a heavy fire of
artillery, attacked this battalion as it left the pass, and
threw it into disorder, but the British legion, led by
Colonel Ferrier, came quickly to its assistance, deployed
in line, and with the front rank kneeling poured in so
heavy a fire that the advance of the Royalists was checked.
The Apure rallied, and the cavalry charged on the right
flank. Ferrier, having burned all his cartridges, led on his
men with the bayonet and drove the enemy before him,
while the Llanero horse rode them down, and their ranks
were disordered by the flight of their own cavalry. One
battalion stubbornly kept its formation, and repulsed every
charge made upon it during a retreat of twenty miles until

BATTLE OF CARABOBO. 403
it rejoined the rest of the routed army, which took refuge
in Puerto Cabello.*
This battle, the complement of that of Boyaca, which has
been called the Columbian Waterloo, secured for ever thel
independence of Venezuela and New Granada, as Maipo \
and the expedition to Peru had secured that of the South ; /
the three battles combining to prepare the definitive
triumph of the emancipation of South America.
Bolivar entered Caracas for the second time in triumph;
no one could now deny him the glory of being the Liber
ator of his country. His retention of the supreme power,
both civil and military, was more than ever a necessity.
This was exactly the moment he chose for another
resignation ; but there was a reason for it.
The Constituent Congress was convened at Ciicuta on
the 6th May. It was composed entirely of civilians, of
whom the greater number were lawyers, and was radically
republican, opposed both to the abuses of military rule and
to the anti-democratic theories of the Liberator. His
resignation was thus at once a protest against accusations
made against him, and an indirect way of influencing
public opinion.
Congress took no notice of his resignation, but quietly
debated and enacted the Constitution of Columbia. It
decided that the President should hold office for four years
and should not be eligible for re-election ; that the General-
in-Chief of the army should, while on active service, have
no political power, which was equivalent to the abolition
of the military dictatorship ; and that the Constitution
should not be reformed for ten years. It only adopted
the ideas of Bolivar in one respect, which was in the
establishment of a centralized system of government. His
plans of a life presidency and of an hereditary Senate, as
also the life Senate decreed by the Congress of Angostura,
were rejected. Bogota was declared the capital of the
Republic ; Bolivar, " as he feared," was named President,
and Santander Vice-President. * See Appendix VII.
D D 2

404 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Bolivar repeated his resignation, but added that he
would yield if Congress persisted. Congress did persist,
upon which he made an eloquent speech, in which he
said : —
"A man, such as I am, is a dangerous citizen under a
popular government. I wish to be a simple citizen in
order to be free, and that all may be so likewise."
The Dictator of Columbia, reduced in theory to the posi
tion of a Constitutional President, showed on this occasion,
as on all others, that though ambitious he was not a despot,
and had no wish to be. He swore the Constitution and
proclaimed it, and devoting himself to his military duties
left the administration in the hands of the Vice-President,
but on the gth October, 1 82 1 , he procured the passage of a
law by Congress which gave him absolute power over the
army, and empowered him to organize, as he pleased, the
Provinces he might liberate until he saw fit to place them
under the Constitution of the Republic.
On the ist October, 182 1, Cartagena capitulated to Mon
tilla after a siege of fourteen months. The Provinces of
Panama and Veraguas, situate on the Isthmus, immediately
declared themselves independent, and announced their
intention of joining the Republic of Columbia. On the
28th November the fortresses of Chagres and Portobello fell
into the hands of the Patriots. In Venezuela the Spaniards,
with 5,000 men, now held only Cumana and Puerto Car
bello on the Windward Coast. In order to round off the
territory of Columbia it was now only necessary to sub
jugate Quito. Thither converged the victorious armies of
Bolivar from the North, and those of San Martin from the
South. San Martin was already in possession of one half
of Peru, and had one foot on Guayaquil.
On the ist August, 1822, Bolivar left Ciicuta for the
South. Before going he divided Venezuela into three
military departments under Marino, Paez, and Bermudez,
placing them under the superior orders of Soublette. On
the 1 6th October Cumana surrendered to Bermudez.
Puerto Cabello was still held by a Royalist garrison of

CAPITULATION OF MORALES. 405
4,000 men under Morales, who, at this time, succeeded La
Torre in command. Morales displayed such activity and
energy as for a time changed the aspect of the war. With
1,200 men he went by sea to Maracaibo, took that city on
the 7th September, and on the 12th November routed a
division of 1,000 men under Montilla. Then he overran
the Province of Santa Marta, and on the 3rd December
occupied the Province of Coro. But in January, 1823,
Santa Marta was retaken by Montilla, and Coro by
Soublette. Colonel Padilla with a Patriot flotilla, which
had greatly aided in the capture of Cartagena, entered Lake
Maracaibo under the fire of the forts, and on the 24th July
totally defeated the Spanish squadron which was there
stationed. On the 3rd August Morales capitulated.
Puerto Cabello was taken by assault by Paez on the 7th
.and 8th November, 1823, and the war in this part of the
Continent was at an end.

CHAPTER XLIV.
THE WAR IN QUITO.
1821 — 1822.
After the battle of Boyaca, the defeated Royalists had
retreated to the Highland Provinces of Pasto and Patia, in
the south of Columbia, and were there strongly reinforced
by Aymerich, Captain-General of Quito. General Valdez
was sent against them, with three battalions of infantry,
one of which was the Albion. On the 6th June, 1820,
Valdez was attacked by 1,100 infantry under Calzada at
the town of Pitayo to the north-west of Popayan. His
vanguard was driven in, but the Albion re-established the
fight, and decided the day by an impetuous charge with
the bayonet ; the Royalists retreated to Patia,
Valdez being reinforced, then occupied the city of
Popayan with an army of 2,300 men, which was soon
reduced to 1,000 by sickness and desertion. Then in
January, 182 1, in obedience to positive orders from Bolivar,
he marched into the Province of Pasto. The Patianos, as
was their custom, gave him free passage, but closed in
upon his rear, cutting his communications with Popayan.
He marched upon the city of Pasto, surrounded by enemies.
Colonel Garcia who had succeeded Calzada in command,
waited for him with 850 men in the pass of Jenay, and on
the 2nd February, completely defeated him. The Albion
battalion suffered very heavily in this action, and it was
only the armistice of Trujillo which saved Valdez from
total destruction.
On the resumption of hostilities, General Torres, who

SUCRE OCCUPIES GUAYAQUIL. 407
had succeeded Valdez in command, was forced by Garcia
to shut himself up in Popayan. He afterwards marched
with 1,800 men upon Pasto, but suffered such heavy losses
by sickness and desertion, that he was compelled to retreat,
and in August he abandoned Popayan.
The Royalists of Patia and Pasto, aided from Quito,
might have prolonged the war indefinitely but that the
operations of San Martin and Cochrane threw their base
open to attack, and the revolution of Guayaquil cut off all
communication between Quito and the Pacific. Bolivar
saw this, and as Quito was not included in the armistice
of Trujillo, determined to attack from the South as well as
from the North, and at the same time open for himself a
road to the Pacific. Looking about for an officer to whom
he could entrust the undertaking, he chose General Sucre,
who was at that time Minister of War of the Republic of
Columbia. Sucre was a native of Cumana, had received a scientific
education, and had served from his early youth in all the
campaigns of the revolution of Venezuela, under Miranda,
Piar, and Bolivar. Bolivar said of him : —
" Sucre has the best organized head in all Columbia."
San Martin, who never met him, wrote of him in after
years, that he was one of the most noteworthy men pro
duced by the Republic of Columbia, and of greater military
skill than even Bolivar himself.
The mission confided to Sucre was both political and
military. He was to aid the new State of Guayaquil
against the Royalists, and was to induce her to join the
Republic of Columbia. At Popayan he collected a thousand
of the dispersed troops, and reached Guayaquil by sea in
May, 1 82 1 . He found that the majority of the people were
in favour of union with Peru, and that they had already
suffered defeat in their first brush with the Royalists.
At this juncture the flotilla and a battalion of native
troops revolted in the name of the King. Sucre put down
the movement, and thus became master of the situation,
and commander-in-chief of all the forces.

408 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
At the head of a combined army, Sucre then marched
j against the Royalists, who under Aymerich were descend
ing the mountain slopes from Quito, in two separate
'¦ columns. One of these columns he totally defeated at
Yahuachi on the 19th August, and compelled the other,
which was led by Aymerich himself, to return to Quito
with heavy loss. He then ascended the slopes of Chim-
borazo and occupied the plateau of Ambato, but was here
attacked by Colonel Gonzalez with very superior forces,
and was completely defeated, with a loss of 300 killed and
640 prisoners. He himself was wounded, and returned to
his former position with a remnant of his force. Here he
was fortunately reinforced by a battalion of 500 Columbian
infantry, and as Aymerich did not follow up the victory,
held his ground, till on the 20th November he arranged an
armistice of ninety days.
At this time the Royalists, whose total force of regular
troops amounted to 3,000 men, in the Provinces of Cuenca,
Quito, and Pasto, received a reinforcement of 800 men,
under General Murgeon, who had been appointed Viceroy
of New Granada on the death of Samano. Murgeon had
arrived from Europe at Puerto Cabello with a smaller
force, which being increased by La Torre, he led across the
Isthmus to Panama, whence he went by sea to Atacames,
and from there marched for sixty miles through a dense
forest and then over the Cordillera to Quito, where he
arrived on the 24th December, 1821, and took the com
mand. When New Granada was secure, Bolivar wrote to O'Hig
gins that : — " The Army of Columbia was about to march
on Quito with orders to co-operate with the Argentine-
Chileno Army in their operations against Lima," but after
that, affairs in the North distracted his attention. After
the fall of Cartagena, he wrote to San Martin, proposing
to take 4,000 men across the isthmus, and by sea to Peru,
to aid him in crushing the Royalists in the centre .of their
power, leaving them in their positions on the equatorial
Andes till afterwards. But the defeat suffered by Sucre,

BATTLE OF BOMBONA.

409

and the arrival of Murgeon, determined him first of all to
prosecute the war in the south of Columbia.
Under the name of the "Columbian Guard," Bolivar had
organized an army, with which he incorporated at Popayan
the remnants of the division of General Torres, raising his
total force to about 3,000 men. During his march through
a hostile country, he was compelled to leave 1,000 sick in
the hospitals, and with the rest reached the frontiers of
Quito on the 24th March, 1822. Avoiding .a conflict with
the Pastusos, which had so often proved fatal to the Patriot
arms, he turned to the right and tried to find a pass over
the River Guaitara, a mountain torrent whose course lies
at the bottom of an almost impassable abyss. Finding one
suspension bridge cut, he marched to the left in search of
another, and on the 7th April came upon the Royalist
army under Garcia, strongly posted between the river and
the volcano of Pasto. It was already past noon, but
Bolivar seeing that to retreat was impossible, attacked the
enemy at once. He drew up his army on the plain of
Bombona, and sent a column against the left wing of the
enemy, where the ground presented fewer difficulties than
on their right and centre. This column being repulsed,
then attacked the centre of the position and was almost
annihilated in the attempt to force its way through an
abatis which covered this part of the Royalist line.
Meantime another column, directed against the right wing
of the Royalists, had detached a battalion of light infantry,
which climbed the face of the mountain and secured a
commanding position on the flank of the enemy, on which
Bolivar made another attack upon the centre with a bat
talion drawn from the reserve. This attack was also
repulsed, but when night came on the Royalists hurriedly
retreated, abandoning their artillery. The Patriots were
left masters of the field, but it was a Phyrric victory, they
had lost 600 men in killed and wounded, while the loss of
the Royalists was not over 250.
Bolivar remained for eight days encamped on the plateau
of Bombona, and then retreated, leaving 300 sick and

410 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
wounded behind him. During the retreat his losses were
very heavy, but at Patia he received reinforcements from
Popayan. The climate and the people were both against
him ; two months he remained inactive, uncertain what to
do, when news reached him that Sucre, aided by a con
tingent of Argentine-Peruvian troops, sent to his assistance
by San Martin, had taken Quito. The moment had arrived
in which the two revolutions of the North and of the South
of the Continent joined hands on the Equator, in accordance
with the plan of San Martin.
On the eve of setting out on his first expedition against
Quito, Sucre had written to San Martin asking for his co
operation. After his defeat at Ambato, he wrote again,
this time to the Peruvian Minister of War, showing the
danger which threatened Guayaquil. From Columbia he
received a reinforcement of 500 men, but this was quite
insufficient to enable him to take the field. Again he
wrote to the Protector of Peru, and San Martin now
resolved to give him efficient help.
General Arenales, who was president of the department
of Trujillo, had a division stationed on the Peruvian fron
tier of Quito. San Martin sent him orders to march with
it to the assistance of Sucre. Arenales was ill, and
declined the command, which was then bestowed upon
Colonel Santa Cruz, and by a convention the Republic of
Columbia undertook to pay the troops, and to supply the
places of all who might fall in war. The auxiliary division
consisted of about 1,200 men, among them being one
squadron of the mounted grenadiers, under command of
Lieutenant-Colonel Juan Lavalle.
Sucre left Guayaquil with such troops as he had, and
joined the auxiliaries in the Province of Cuenca in Feb
ruary, 1822, forming an army of 2,000 men, and in March
went in search of the enemy. While on the march Colonel
Santa Cruz received a despatch from the Government of
Peru directing him to withdraw from the army at once
with his contingent, which strange order arose from the
misunderstanding concerning Guayaquil. Santa Cruz

CA VALRY A CTION A T RIO BAMBA . 4 1 1
showed the despatch to Sucre, who forbade him to act
upon it, telling him that he was no longer under the orders
of the Protector. Fortunately the officers of the contin
gent upheld the authority of Sucre, whose firmness on this
occasion prevented a great disaster, and a few days later
a despatch was received from San Martin himself cancel
ling the order.
The situation of the Royalists was now very difficult.
The Army of Quito, though numbering 2,000 good soldiers,
was isolated, and might defend the mountain passes, but
was powerless to take the offensive. The affair at Bombona
had greatly depressed the spirits of the Pastusos. Mur-
ge6n had died of despair on seeing the untoward course of
events, and Aymerich was again in command.
Aymerich detached Colonel Lopez with 1,500 men to
protect the western passes. Lopez stationed himself at
Rio Bamba, but was out-manoeuvred by Sucre, who entered
the valley at the foot of Chimborazo. In accordance with
his instructions, Lopez avoided an action, and slowly
retreated from one impregnable position to another, till
on the 21st April, 1822, Sucre managed to gain his rear by
an undefended pass. The Royalists retreated to another
position behind the town of Rio Bamba. As they were
marching, Lavalle took advantage of a faulty manoeuvre,
and with ninety-six grenadiers charged the whole of their
cavalry, 420 in number, and drove them in confusion upon
the positions held by their infantry. Then retreating at
full trot, he was joined by thirty Columbian dragoons. The
Royalist horse having rallied, came down upon him at full
gallop, upon which he wheeled round, charged them again,
and completely routed them, with a loss of 52 killed and
40 wounded. One Argentine and one Columbian were
killed and twenty were wounded, and the Royalist horse
were of no further use in that campaign .
The infantry continued their retreat to the inaccessible
position of Jalupano. Then Sucre, by a flank march of
four days over the snow- covered heights of Cotopaxi,
gained the valley of Chillo, 1 4 miles from Quito, but found

.412 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
the enemy again in an inaccessible position between him
and the city. On the night of the 23rd May, during heavy
rain, the Patriot army defiled by a narrow road, covered
with loose stones, over the slopes of the volcano of
Pichincha, and at eight o'clock the next morning reached
the heights overlooking the city of Quito, where the steep
mountain side below them was covered by a forest of trees
and brushwood.
Before the whole army had reached this position the
Royalists had ascended the mountain side, and rushed out
of the forest upon the 2nd battalion of Peru, which led the
van. Colonel Olazabal, who was in command, stubbornly
held his ground till his ammunition was exhausted. The
position was held by one battalion after another, as it came
up, so long as any cartridges were left, but the reserve
ammunition was far in the rear, and the Royalists gained
ground. A Columbian regiment charged with the bayonet
and recovered the position. Then the Royalists advancing
under shelter of the trees, endeavoured to turn the left flank
of the Patriots, but were in their turn taken in flank by
three companies of the Albion battalion and driven back
in confusion. Colonel Cordova then brought up his regi
ment of Columbian infantry, and, with the aid of the
Albion, drove the Royalists down the steep mountain side
in utter rout. On such ground the cavalry on neither side
could come into action, but the Royalist horse, drawn up
as a reserve in the suburbs of the city, was attacked later
on by the Patriot cavalry and dispersed.
Sucre then summoned the city to surrender. Next day,
the 25th May, 1822, Aymerich capitulated. The Royalists
lost 160 officers and 1,100 men taken prisoners, 400 killed
and 190 wounded, 14 guns, and all their flags. The
Patriots had 200 killed, of whom half belonged to the
auxiliaries from Peru, and 1 40 wounded.
I The victory of Pichincha was the seal of the continental
/alliance, and concluded the war in the North. Garcia,
with his isolated force, capitulated to Bolivar, but the
indomitable Pastusos refused to lay down their arms till

BATTLE OF PICHINCHA. 413
Garcia appealed to Padilla, Bishop of Popayan, who had
hitherto, both by his preaching and by his example, en
couraged them in their fanatic loyalty to the King of Spain.
Thanks to Bishop Padilla, a capitulation was agreed upon,
by which these brave mountaineers were secured in pos
session of all their local laws and customs.
The Liberator entered Pasto in triumph, and thence,
on the 8th June, addressed a bulletin to the Columbian
people : —
" From the banks of the Orinoco to the Andes of Peru the
liberating army, marching from one triumph to another,
has covered with its protecting arms the whole of Columbia.
Share with me the ocean of joy which bathes my heart,
and raise in your own hearts altars to this army which has
conquered for you glory, peace, and liberty."
The deification of the armies of Columbia inaugurated
praetorianism in South America, which was soon to press
heavily upon the independent States, and was to bring the
career of Bolivar to an end. The soldiery began to look
upon the people they had freed as upon men whom they
had conquered. The victors of Pichincha declared that
Quito was annexed to Columbia. The municipality pro
tested, and were banished from the city. Nevertheless,
Bolivar on his arrival was received with enthusiasm. On
the 16th June he made a triumphal entry, and was pre
sented with a laurel wreath of gold, the third he had
received in commemoration of his victories.
The two Liberators of the North and of the South were
now about to meet on the dividing line of their several
• campaigns. Their triumphant armies converged upon
Peru. History presents no other example of so vast a
military combination, carried out with steady perseverance
for twelve long years, ending in the concentration of the
forces of an entire continent upon one strategical point,
which concentration gave the final victory.

CHAPTER XLV.
GUAYAQUIL. 1822.
Up to this time the struggle for emancipation, both in the
South and in the North of the Continent had been the result
of the instinctive desire for independence which was com
mon to all the people of Spanish America, but towards the
conclusion of this struggle, the peculiar idiosyncracy of
each separate people began to show itself in action, and
the ideas and personal interests of different leaders came
into collision. Nevertheless the fundamental principles of
the Revolution remained unchanged. The movement was
essentially Republican, based on local autonomy. The
monarchical ideas of San Martin, and the dreams of
Bolivar of a continental union, left not a trace behind.
The popular movements of the North and of the South of
the Continent, joined hands at Quito ; the diverse principles
of the two great leaders came into conflict at Guayaquil.
When the Province of Guayaquil declared herself inde
pendent, she placed herself under the protection of the
troops of San Martin and Bolivar, and became an apple
of discord between the two leaders. Both accepted the
Protectorate, San Martin with the idea of annexing the
Province to Peru, Bolivar with the intention of annexing
it to Columbia. In November, 1820, San Martin sent
Guido and Luzuriaga to negotiate a treaty of alliance,
which should place the province under his control ; when

ARRIVAL OF COMMISSIONERS FROM PERU. 415
they arrived the situation had changed. Guayaquil had
sent 1,500 men against Quito, under the command of Luis
Urdaneta, an officer from Venezuela. Urdaneta easily
overran the Province of Cuenca, but on advancing towards
the capital was met on the plateau of Ambato by Colonel
Gonzalez, with 600 regular troops, and was completely
defeated, on the 20th November. An Argentine officer
named Garcia rallied the dispersed troops and led them
back against the enemy, but was also routed on the 3rd
January, 1821. Garcia was taken prisoner, and being put
to death, his head was exposed in an iron cage at one of
the entrances of the capital.
The city of Guayaquil was thrown into consternation at
this disaster, but the commissioners were well received,
and Luzuriaga being placed in command of the remaining
troops, checked the advance of the enemy, until the rainy
season covered the low grounds with water and put an
end to military operations ; after which the commissioners
returned to Peru, without having made any definite
arrangement. The division of Sucre, sent by Bolivar, arrived in May,
1 82 1, and for a time the influence of Columbia prevailed,
but the defeat of Sucre and the retreat of Bolivar from
Pasto, turned the eyes of the people again to San Martin,
who had by this time taken the city of Lima. It was then
that San Martin decided to take a part in the war in Quito,
and sent the contingent which did such good service at
Pichincha. On the 1 6th December, 1821, the district of Puerto Viejo
declared itself a part of Columbia, and was supported by
the Columbian officers. The Junta of Guayaquil pro
nounced this an act of rebellion, and resolved on measures
of repression. Civil war appeared imminent, when Sucre
interposed, and by calming the zeal of his subordinates,
restored tranquillity.
On the 30th November, 1821, Salazar had arrived as
Peruvian Minister, with instructions from the Protector to

416 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
adopt, a waiting policy, which, in the face of a resolute
opposition, was to ensure defeat. The Junta, which, as
also the majority of the people, was in favour of annexation
to Peru, complained to Salazar of the overbearing conduct
of the Columbian troops, on which La Mar was sent from
Peru to take command of the provincial forces.
Bolivar, who was resolved to include in the new Re
public of Columbia the whole of the late Viceroyalty of
New Granada, now sent Don Joaquin Mosquera to Peru
as Minister of Columbia, to arrange the question of limits,
and on the eve of marching against Quito, sent a note to
the Junta, saying that " the Government of Guayaquil
knows that it cannot remain an independent State ; that
Columbia cannot give up any of her legitimate rights ;
and that there was no human power which could deprive
her of a hand's breadth of her territory."
The Province of Guayaquil had been at various times a
dependency of the Viceroyalty of Peru, but on the forma
tion of the Viceroyalty of New Granada it became definitely
an integral part of Quito, which was a dependency of the
new Viceroyalty. During the disturbances of 1809 and
1 8 10, Abascal, Viceroy of Peru, had for military purposes
taken charge of the province, as he had done of the out
lying districts of Upper Peru, which belonged to the Vice-
royalty of the River Plate. But this arrangement came to
an end in 1819, by a decree from the Court of Madrid.
Without Guayaquil Quito was cut off from all communi
cation with the Pacific.
The Junta of Guayaquil appealed to San Martin, who
replied that if they boldly declared Guayaquil an indepen
dent State he would assist them by force if necessary, but
that he would make no complaint if they chose to join the
Republic of Columbia. At the same time he wrote to
Bolivar, asking him to let the people decide for them
selves. The attitude adopted by Bolivar was one of defiance ;
that adopted by San Martin, if more correct, was not based

THE QUESTION OF GUAYAQUIL. ^ 417
either on good policy or on good military tactics. Bolivar
could not recede without consenting to the mutilation of
Columbia, a republic of his own creation. , The direct
intervention of San Martin endangered an open rupture
between them, which would upset the plans of both.
Under these sinister auspices took place the interview
previously arranged between San Martin and Bolivar, at
Guayaquil, which had been postponed in consequence of
the exigencies of the war.

E E

CHAPTER XLVI.
THE INTERVIEW AT GUAYAQUIL.
1822.
Once only do astronomers record the meeting of two
comets at the point of intersection of their eccentric orbits.
Almost as rare in the records of mankind is the meeting
of two men who have made the history there recorded.
After Washington, San Martin and Bolivar are the only
two men of the New World whose names figure in the
catalogue of the heroes of humanity at large. They were
greater as liberators than as men of thought, but the
influence of the deeds accomplished by them yet lives and
works in their posterity.
Events are the logical sequence of causes which have
preceded them, nevertheless they are moulded by the
influence of individuals. If Columbus had never lived,
America would at some later date have been discovered by
some one else. If Cromwell had never lived the Revolu
tion would have occurred in England all the same, but
without him it would not have triumphed. The emanci
pation of the British colonies of North America must in
any case have produced a great Republic, but it was
Washington who impressed upon the democracy the seal
of his moral greatness. The French Revolution was the
natural outcome of what had preceded it, but had it been
directed by others than those who did direct it the result

THE INFLUENCE OF GREAT LEADERS. 419
might have been better. The insurrection in South Ame
rica was a spontaneous movement, resulting from historical
antecedents and from the circumstances of the time, but
the triumph would have been delayed, and the losses in
the struggle would have been greater, but for the genius of
San Martin and Bolivar, who directed the discordant
elements to one definite end.
San Martin acted more from calculation than from in
spiration, Bolivar more from instinct than from method,
yet both were necessary, each in his own place. While
they went with the current they were mere agents, but
they laid hold of the forces that were in action, condensed
them, and impelled them to act on one general plan by
them devised, which was unseen by the masses. And they
worked in concert, the idea of San Martin being carried
to a successful ending by Bolivar. Neither could alone
have achieved the emancipation of the Continent.
Now these two men were to meet for the first time, under
the fiery arch of the Equator, with the ocean on one hand,
on the other the giant range of the Andes. The world
listens intently and hears nothing of what they say. One
quietly disappears, saying words which have no meaning
in them ; the other as quietly takes his place. For twenty
years all is mystery ; then the veil is partially drawn
aside, and it is seen that there is no mystery, that nothing
had happened save what everyone knew was certain tobefall.
Only now that the masks have fallen we can read in the
character of each one of them the motives which made
the one relentless in his purpose and forced abdication on
the other.
San Martin sent an auxiliary force to aid in the war in
Quito without making conditions of any kind, and expected
to receive help in Peru on the same terms, but/ after Pichin
cha, Bolivar was master of the situation, and could dic
tate his own terms. San Martin indulged the illusion that
he was still one of the arbiters of South America, that
Bolivar would share with him his political and his military
power, and that in conference they would arrange together
E E 2

420 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
the destinies of the nations by them emancipated. With
out other plan, he sought that interview with the Liberator
which was to decide his own destiny and was to paralyze
his career.
Guayaquil was the only province of the late Viceroyalty
of New Granada which was not yet absorbed in the new
Republic of Columbia. With this acquisition her territory
would stretch from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and Bolivar
would lay his powerful hand upon Peru, " the last battle
field of America " as San Martin expressed it. Bolivar
was' now arbiter of the destinies of South America, and
could not tolerate opposition from San Martin. His policy,
a union of personal ambition with grand designs of eman
cipation, now began to show itself.
At Quito he saw for the first time the troops of San
Martin, and could compare them with his own. He
marked their soldierly bearing and strict discipline, more
especially he noted the Argentine mounted grenadiers,
and saw that, compared with them, his own Llaneros,
brave as had been their deeds, were but an undisciplined
mob of horsemen. From that time there arose in his heart
that jealousy of Argentine influence which was presently
to mould his policy.
At a banquet given in his honour at Quito he exclaimed
in his enthusiasm : —
" The day is not far distant when I will carry the flag of
Columbia triumphant to Argentina."
Five Argentine officers were present, and Juan Lavalle,
rising to his feet, proposed a toast : —
" To the independence of America, and of the Argentine
Republic." There were no more toasts.
On the nth July Bolivar entered Guayaquil, under
triumphal arches inscribed with his name. The gunboats
on the river hauled down the white and blue flag of Guaya
quil and hoisted the tri-colour of Columbia.
"What, so soon! "he exclaimed, thinking this was a
signal for the incorporation of the Province. But when the

MEETING OF SAN MARTIN AND BOLIVAR. 42.1
boats had fired a salute up again" went the white and blue
flag, and was hailed by a unanimous shout of, " Viva Guay-
quil independiente ! "
He replaced his cocked hat, which he had till then car
ried in his hand, and the procession went on, but the
incident excited much comment in the city, and especially
in the Peruvian legation.
The intentions of Bolivar were no secret ; he had brought
1,500 men with him, who occupied the city. Within
twenty-four hours of his triumphal entry a deputation of
his partisans waited upon the municipality and asked
them to proclaim the Province a part of the Republic of
Columbia. They refused, alleging that the decision of the
question lay with the representatives of the people, who
were then in Assembly. The application was repeated,
and was again refused.
On the 13th July an appeal was made to Bolivar himself.
Bolivar sent his secretary to the Junta and an aide-de
camp to the Assembly, to announce to them that in conse
quence of the anarchy which prevailed he had assumed the
supreme power, and had annexed the Province to Columbia.
The Junta resigned and fled on board the Peruvian squad
ron, then lying at anchor in the harbour. San Martin
had sent this squadron in support of his own partisans,
thinking that Bolivar was yet in Quito, but the Liberator
had been too quick for him.
On the 25th July San Martin himself arrived in the
schooner Macedonia. Bolivar sent off two of his aides-de-
camp to salute him, and to offer him hospitality "on
Columbian soil." The next day he disembarked amid
files of silent soldiery and crowds of enthusiastic people.
Bolivar, dressed in full uniform and surrounded by his
staff, awaited him at a house which had been prepared for
him. The two heroes met, and embraced for the first and
last time, at the foot of the staircase, and turning, entered
the house arm-in-arm. In .the salon the Liberator pre
sented his generals ; then the authorities of the city came
to bid him welcome. A deputation of ladies presented an

422 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
address to him ; then a beautiful girl of eighteen years of
age placed a laurel wreath of gold upon his head. San
Martin, little accustomed to such theatrical ceremonies,
flushed and took the crown from his head, but said that he
would keep it for the sake of the patriotic sentiment that
inspired the gift, and for the sake of those who bestowed it,
in memory of these happy days.
The two representatives of the Revolution being left
alone, walked up and down the salon together, but what
they said to each other could not be heard by those in the
ante-room. Bolivar appeared to be agitated, San Martin
was calm and self-possessed. They shut the door and
talked together for more than an hour and a half. Bolivar
then retired, impenetrable, and grave as a sphinx. San
Martin accompanied him to the foot of the staircase, and
they took a friendly leave of each other. Later on the
Protector paid a visit to the Liberator, one of mere cere
mony, which lasted only half an hour.
The next day, the 2 7th, San Martin sent his baggage on
board the schooner, saying that he should sail after attend
ing the great ball given in his honour, and at one P.M. went
again to call on the Liberator, remaining closeted with
him for four hours.
At five p.m. they sat down together to a splendid ban
quet. When the time for toasts arrived, Bolivar stood up
and proposed one : —
" To the two greatest men of South America — General
San Martin and myself."
San Martin then proposed another : —
" To the speedy conclusion of the war ; to the organization
of the different Republics of the Continent ; and to the health
of the Liberator of Columbia ; " words that indicated the
thoughts which occupied his mind.
They then passed to the ball-room, where Bolivar gave
himself up with juvenile ardour to the delights of the
waltz, of which he was passionately fond. The rude
behaviour of the Columbian officers, who were roughly
reproved by Bolivar, gave a grotesque aspect to the scene.

DEPARTURE OF SAN MARTIN, 423
San Martin looked coldly on, evidently pre-occupied with
thoughts of a much more serious nature. At one A.M. he
called his aide-de-camp, Guido, to him, and said : —
"Let us go ; I cannot stand this riot."
Bolivar had already taken leave of him ; a chamberlain
showed them out by a private door, and accompanied them
to the landing place. An hour afterwards the Macedonia
was under way.
The next day San Martin rose early and was silent and
pre-occupied. After breakfast, as he was walking the
deck, he exclaimed : —
" The Liberator has been too quick for us."
On reaching Callao he commissioned General Cruz to
write to O'Higgins : —
" The Liberator is not the man we took him to be ; "
words which are a compendium of the results of the inter
view. Of what parsed between them no account was
published, but at that time there were only two questions
which could be discussed between them : the conclusion of
the war, and the political organization of the new States.
What occurred at the famous conference at Tilsit is as
well known as though all the world had been there to
listen ; the interview at Guayaquil is still more easy to
reproduce, illuminated as the subject is by later disclosures
from the pen of San Martin himself.
The unsteady glance and ill-concealed vanity of Bolivar
produced repulsion in San Martin, who read his character
at once, but Bolivar, full of himself, failed to penetrate the
calm exterior of San Martin ; he learned nothing of his
ideas, and looked upon him as one who owed his victories
to fortune more than to genius.
Bolivar had in his head a confused plan for the consoli
dation of America, in which everything was to hinge upon
his own personality. San Martin, who had no personal
ambition, said of him : —
"His feats of arms entitle him to be considered the most
extraordinary character that South America has produced ;
of a constancy to which difficulties only add strength."

424 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
But he had none of the frankness of a soldier, and disclosed!
nothing of these plans to San Martin ; there was, therefore,
nothing to discuss between them — on that point they could
treat only of facts already accomplished.
San Martin expatiated upon the importance of bringing"
the war to an end. Three or four thousand Columbian
troops, placed at his orders, would enable him to finish it
in three months. Bolivar offered him only three battalions,,
and the war lasted for yet another three years. San
Martin then offered to serve under him, if he would only
take a sufficient force with him. Bolivar declined the
offer, alleging that he could not leave Columbian territory
without special authority from Congress. San Martin then
saw that the Liberator would not make common cause
with him, that one or the other must give way, and it is
probable that he then formed the resolution of retiring
from the scene.
The organization of the new States was the only other
subject on which they could exchange opinions. Doubtless
San Martin set forth his reasons for believing that in the
establishment of independent monarchies lay the solution
of the question, the people not being yet so educated in
the principles of self-government as to be capable of sus
taining the common responsibility of democratic rule, and
Bolivar would scout the idea, showing that monarchy was
a European, not an American institution ; his own power,,
as the head of a republic, was greater than that of any
constitutional king. Deep in his mind lay the teachings
of his old master, Simon Rodriguez, who had taught him
that the bestowal of all offices for life was the means
whereby stability could be given to democracy. The result
of this talk was seen in the toast which San Martin pro
posed at the subsequent banquet : —
" To the Republics of South America."
Was there more than this ? Likely enough. The reserve
which both maintained on the subject for so many years is
an indication that such was the case. San Martin foresaw
the failure of his scheme, and silence became a patriotic

SELF-ABNEGATION OF SAN MARTIN. 425,
duty, lest he should place arms in the hands of the enemy.
Bolivar, recognising the moral superiority of his rival, felt
abashed in the presence of such abnegation, and cared not
to speak of that which could only throw a slur upon his
own fame.
On the return of San Martin to Peru, he announced
publicly his satisfaction with the result of the interview,
the conclusion of a South American alliance, and the
speedy arrival of a reinforcement of three battalions of
Columbian troops. But immediately afterwards he wrote
to Bolivar, setting forth the great numerical superiority
of the Royalist forces, and showing that much more
efficient help was needed to put an end to the war. He
concluded with these remarkable words : —
" My decision is irrevocable. I have convened the first
Congress of Peru ; the day after its installation I shall
leave for Chile, convinced that my presence is the only
obstacle which keeps you from coming to Peru with
your army.
" For me it would have been the height of happiness to
have concluded the War of Independence under the orders
of a General to whom America owes her liberty. Destiny
has decreed otherwise, and I must resign myself to it."
This letter explains one of the principal causes of his
retirement from public life, and may be considered as his
political testament. He yields his self-imposed task into
the hands of a more fortunate rival, congratulating him
upon the glory of finishing the great work.
By the bearer of this letter he also sent Bolivar a fowl
ing-piece, a brace of pistols, and a war-horse to carry him
on his next campaign, with this special note; —
"¦ Receive, General, this remembrance from the first of
1 your admirers, with the expression of my sincere desire
that you may have the glory of finishing the war for the
independence of South America."
' History records not in her pages an act of self-abnega
tion executed with more conscientiousness and with greater
modesty.

CHAPTER XLVII.
THE ABDICATION OF SAN MARTIN.
1822.
During the absence of San Martin at Guayaquil an event
had occurred at Lima which must have confirmed him in
his intention of retiring from public life. The people had
risen against the Government, and though the movement
was not directed against him, it showed him the instability
of his power. Before his departure the Council of State
had consulted him as to what they should do in case of the
death or incapacity of his delegate, Torre-Tagle. San
Martin left with them a sealed paper, in which he ap
pointed General Alvarado to that post in case it became
vacant. On the 25th July fifty citizens of Lima, at the instiga
tion of Riva-Aguero, presented a petition to Torre-Tagle,
asking him to dismiss his minister Monteagudo, whose
tyrannical procedures and private immoralities had dis
gusted everyone. At the same time they addressed a note
to the municipality, asking them for support in delivering
the city and the country at large from " the oppression and
despotism under which they suffered"; and one of their
number was sent to notify the Government that in case
this petition was not complied with they would convene
an open Cabildo.
Riva-Agiiero, who was president of the municipality,
acceded to their request, and demanded the immediate
imprisonment of the obnoxious minister. Government

BANISHMENT OF MONTEAGUDO. 427
replied that they would take the matter into consideration
next day.
At half past ten at night the people assembled in crowds
at the gates of the municipal building and round the
government house, calling loudly for the deposition of the
minister. Monteagudo resigned. The municipality de
manded his imprisonment, which was decreed, and Mon
teagudo remained under arrest in his own house.
Meantime the army remained quietly in barracks,
Alvarado not choosing to interfere, although he wrote to
the municipality that if the disorders continued he might
be compelled to take steps to restore tranquillity. But the
popular excitement day by day increased. As one of their
own leaders said, " The peace-loving Peruvians appeared
to have changed into raging lions." National sentiment
was aroused against the foreigners who ruled them, repub
lican sentiment against the monarchical proposals of the
Government. Fly-sheets of the most seditious tendency
circulated from hand to hand.
On the 29th the municipality again met and demanded
the banishment of Monteagudo. He was banished.
On the 20th August San Martin returned, and was re
ceived with enthusiasm by the people. Riva-Agiiero and
the principal leaders presented themselves and assured him
of their adhesion, but he was not deceived. He saw that
they were tired of his rule, that the army was no longer
devoted to him, that he had erred in the choice of his
deputy, and of his ministers, and that he himself was
no longer necessary, and might even become an ob
stacle to the complete independence of the country. He
could only re-establish his authority by means of re
pression, which were repugnant to him ; he preferred to
leave the Peruvians to work out their destiny for them
selves. Then it was that he wrote the memorable letter to
Bolivar, of which mention was made in the last chapter.
Also he wrote to O'Higgins, alleging bad health as the
cause of his retirement : —
" I am tired of hearing them call me tyrant, that I wish

428 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
to make myself King, Emperor, the Devil. On the other
hand, my health is broken, this climate is killing me. My
youth was' sacrificed to the service of Spain, my manhood
to my own country. I think I have now the right to dis
pose of my old age."
Twenty-five years later the publication of his letter to
Bolivar disclosed the true motive of his retirement. He
sacrificed himself from duty, and from necessity, and kept
silence. But he did not purpose to leave Peru defenceless. He
set to work with the greatest activity to place the army on
the best possible footing. At the end of August he had
more than 1 1,000 men under arms, and expected 1,000 men
from Chile to join in an expedition against the inter
mediate ports, and drew up a plan for. the next campaign,
which would probably have been decisive if he had led the
troops himself.
On the 20th September, 1822, the first Constituent Con
gress of Peru was installed with great pomp. San Martin,
in its presence, took off the bi-coloured sash he wore as
the emblem of his authority, made a short speech, laid six
folded sheets of paper upon the table, and retired amid the
plaudits of the Assembly. The first sheet being opened
was found to be a renunciation of all future command.
Congress passed a vote of thanks "to the first soldier of
Liberty," and named him generalissimo, of the land, and
naval forces of the Republic, with a pension of 12,000
dollars a-year.
San Martin accepted the title and the pension, but refused
to serve, giving good reasons therefor : —
" My presence in Peru after the powers I have wielded
Would be inconsistent with the dignity of Congress, and
with my own. I have kept the promise I made to Peru,
but if some day her liberty be in danger I shall glory in
joining as a citizen in her defence."
Congress then voted him the title of " Founder of .the
Liberty of Peru," with the right to wear the sash he had
laid down, and with the rank of Captain-General ; decreed

SAN MARTIN LEAVES PERU. 429
to him the same pension as Washington had enjoyed ; that
a statue should be erected to him with inscriptions com
memorative of his services ; that a bust of him should be
placed in the National Library he had established ; and
that he should receive all the honours due to one of the
actual executive.
Up to this time San Martin had said no word to anyone
¦of his intention to leave the country, but that same even
ing at his country-house he told Guido, who had gone there
with him. Guido expostulated with him, and tried all
means to dissuade him from his intention, till at last he
told him in confidence his real reasons for going : —
" There is not room in Peru for both Bolivar and myself.
He will shrink from nothing to come to Peru ; it may not
be in my power to avoid a conflict if I am here. Let him
come, so that America may triumph. It shall not be San
Martin who will give a day of delight to the enemy."
It was ten o'clock ; his orderly announced that all was
ready ; the General embraced his faithful friend, mounted
on horseback, and rode away through the darkness. Next
morning Guido found a letter of farewell from him lying
at the head of his bed, and Alvarado received another, but
San Martin had embarked that same night on the brig
Belgrano, and had left Peru for ever.
All that he took with him were 120 doubloons, the standard
of Pizarro, and the golden bell of the Inquisition of Lima.
In Chile he had the farm which had been given him, and
a small sum of money left with a friend, most of which
was lost. The Government of Peru, hearing of his poverty,
sent him 2,000 dollars, with which, after an illness of two
months in Chile, he crossed to Mendoza early in 1823, and
while living there as a farmer, heard of the banishment of
O'Higgins, and of the death of his own wife.
The reasons for his sudden departure were for long a
mystery to all, except to Bolivar and to Guido. Some
looked upon it as an act of self-abnegation, some as one of
desertion. Time has solved the problem. The step was
taken after mature reflection, and was the result of deep

430 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
insight into his own character, into those of the men about
him, and into surrounding circumstances. Bolivar was
master of the situation, he recognised this fact, and left
the field open for him to put the seal to their joint labours
in his own way.
On the night of his departure he issued a farewell address
to the Peruvian people, in which no mention was made of
these facts. He gave no sufficient reason for so leaving
them, and this caused much obloquy to be thrown upon his
name. But he did so wittingly, for the disclosure of the
true character of Bolivar would have predisposed the
Peruvians against him, and his aid was necessary to their
complete deliverance.
The public life of San Martin ends here, but the remains
of the army which he had organized for the liberation of
Chile, continued its glorious career in Peru until the eman
cipation of South America was accomplished.

X

! CHAPTER XLVIII.
THE FIRST NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF PERU.
1822 — 1823.
ONE of the heaviest charges brought by his contemporaries
against San Martin, and which history has repeated, is the
precipitate manner of his retirement from Peru. He left
his army under the command of a General without prestige;
he left the country in the hands of a Government which
had no authority; and he made no provision for an
efficient Government. If he had delayed his departure
until he had arranged all this it is probable that he would
never have gone at all. The fact is that he left everything
in a state of complete disorganization. It was more than
an abdication, he abandoned the country.
Congress instead of appointing at once an efficient
executive appointed a governing Junta of three of its own
members, two of whom were foreigners. General La Mar,
a native of Quito, was President ; his colleagues were Don
Felipe Alvarado, a brother of the Argentine General, and
Don Manuel Salazar y Baquijano, Count of Vista Florida,
a citizen of Lima, and a leader of society. The selection
pleased nobody. The popular party, headed by Riva-
Agiiero, commenced to conspire. The new Government
had no support, save in Congress itself. Abandoned by
the Protector, the only hope of Peru was now in the
Liberator. Bolivar no sooner saw the coast clear than he wrote to the
new Government offering them a reinforcement of 4,000

432 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
men, and promising, if these were not sufficient, six or
eight thousand more. Bolivar had not seen that San
Martin was eager to open the way for him ; San Martin
had failed to see that by rousing the national spirit of the
Peruvians he had shut them off from help. Government
¦suspected the intentions of Bolivar, and coldly declined his
proffered assistance. The answer was long in coming, and
Bolivar in alarm wrote to General Castillo, the commander
of the Columbian contingent, not to incur any risk of defeat,
but rather to retire on Columbia, and afterwards notified
these instructions to the Government of Peru.
Jealousy of foreign influence then induced Congress to
decree that all vacancies in the civil, military, and naval
services should be filled by Peruvians alone, and then set
to work to debate what constitution they should give to
the country.
The nation was named " The Peruvian Republic ; " the
constitution was. drawn up on the basis of popular
sovereignty, and a special clause was inserted providing that
-executive offices should be neither for life nor hereditary,
which was directed against Bolivar.
The plan drawn up by San Martin for the ensuing cam
paign depended upon the efficient co-operation of two
armies ; one acting in the South under Alvarado, the other
in the Centre under Arenales.
The whole line of the main Cordillera was held by the
Royalists, but the Patriots commanding the sea had the
•choice of the point of attack. The bulk of the Royalists,
under Canterac, occupied the Centre of their line from
Jauja to Huancayo. Arequipa was weakly garrisoned.
La Serna had his head-quarters at Cuzco with a reserve at
Puno. Olafieto was at Potosi, and Valdes was fully
occupied in Upper Peru by Lanza the guerilla chieftain.
Consequently, a simultaneous attack from the South and
Centre would place the main army between two fires.
This plan was adopted by Government.
The Army of the South, consisting of 1,700 Argentines,
1,200 Chilians, and about 1,600 Peruvians, with ten light

THE EXPEDITION TO THE SOUTH. 433
field pieces, embarked on transports at Callao in Septem
ber. Alvarado wished to take the Columbian contingent
also, but Castillo refused to go. The expedition did not
sail till October, and was fifty-seven days on the voyage ;
a most unfavourable commencement which presaged a
catastrophe. On the 3rd December the convoy reached Arica, but
Alvarado sent one battalion to Iquiqui, which landed there
on the 7th. Miller, with a very small force, had performed
wonders in the previous campaign in this district, but
Alvarado remained three weeks at Arica without doing
anything. He consulted Miller, who told him anything was
right if it was only done quickly. He then detached Miller
with 120 men further north to make a diversion, and
occupied Tacna with a strong vanguard under General
Martinez. These long delays had given the Royalists time
to concentrate their forces, and the indefatigable Valdes,
with a flying column of 800 men, descended the hills,
crossed the sandy plain, and on the ist January, 1823,
encamped in a fertile valley about twelve miles from the
city. The Patriots were so superior in number that his
position was one of great peril ; nevertheless he put on a
bold front, and while Martinez was wasting time in an
attempt to surround him, he succeeded in effecting his
retreat during the night and the following day to the foot
of the hills at Moquegua.
On the 13th January Alvarado occupied the valley of
Locumba, but again by dilatory movements lost his chance
of overwhelming a small force of Royalists which had been
detached by Vald6s to watch him. Valdes, who was
expecting Canterac with a strong force, allowed Alvarado
to occupy the city of Moquegua on the 18th without
resistance, but then prepared to dispute his further
progress. Beyond Moquegua the ground rises in abrupt steps
which give great facilities for defence. The Royalist
skirmishers covered the heights, and detached parties lay
in ambush in the hollows. One by one they were driven
F F

434 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
from these positions, but at Torata Valdes drew up his
force in line of battle. On the afternoon of the 19th the
two armies faced each other, and the Patriots advanced to
the attack. A Spanish battalion in skirmishing order
covered the centre, and at the same moment the heights
beyond were occupied by an advanced party of Canterac's
division, whose shouts of " Viva el Rey ! " re-echoed from
the mountain sides. Canterac strengthened his right flank
and beat back a vigorous attack of the left wing of the
Patriots, upon which the whole Royalist line advanced
and drove the Patriot infantry, who had exhausted their
ammunition, before them in utter rout with great slaughter.
The Patriots lost about 500 men killed and wounded, the
Royalists about half that number. The Peruvian legion,
which was now for the first time under fire, distinguished
itself by its steady behaviour.
The routed battalions rallied under the fire of their
artillery, but during the following night the whole army
retreated, and encamped next day at Moquegua, seventeen
miles from the field of battle. The ammunition was nearly
exhausted. Alvarado summoned a council of war, but
the advice of his officers was so discordant, that before he
had formed any resolution the enemy was again in his
front on the 2 1 st.
Alvarado then took up a strong position, with his left
resting upon the suburbs of the city, and his line extending
along the ridge of a steep declivity, broken in the centre
by a road which was swept by the fire of his artillery. His
right rested upon a bare hill. Valdes, with two battalions
and two squadrons of horse, seized this hill and turned the
right flank of the Patriots, while the rest of the Royalist
cavalry menaced the left, and Canterac led the main body
against the ridge. Alvarado wheeled back his right wing,
and for a short time the Patriots held their ground with
great determination, but were at length driven from the
position and totally routed with a loss of 700 in killed and
wounded, and 1,000 prisoners. The mounted grenadiers,
led by Lavalle, made two desperate charges to cover the

ROUT OF THE PATRIOTS AT MOQUEGUA. 435
retreat, but were in their turn overwhelmed by the Royalist
horse. About 1,000 men reached Ilo with General Martinez, and
embarking there, returned to Lima. Alvarado went to
Iquiqui in search of the detachment he had left there, and
on the 14th February landed a small party on shore, which
was all either captured or destroyed by Olafieta, who had
occupied the city. Alvarado then invited Olafieta to a
conference concerning the prisoners, and found this
general to be so disaffected to the Viceroy and his adherents,
whom he styled " traitorous Liberals," that he declared his
intention of separating from them and confining himself to
the defence of Upper Peru for the King.
Miller, with his 120 men, accomplished more than all
the rest of the army ; he alarmed all the South, and kept
the whole reserve under Caratala in check.
Meantime Arenales lost much time in endeavouring to
persuade General Castillo to incorporate his auxiliaries
with the army he was organizing for the attack on the
centre of the Royalists. Castillo refused to join at first, on
the plea that success was doubtful, and then demanded
that a Peruvian should be appointed to command the
allied army. His demand being refused, he then asked
permission to retire altogether from the country. Govern
ment, anxious to free itself from so arrogant an ally,
furnished transports, and the Columbian contingent left
Peru for Guayaquil, taking with it the Numancia battalion,
600 strong, which Bolivar had claimed, as being a
Columbian corps. This Columbian contingent had cost
Peru 1 90,000 dollars and had been of no service whatever.
Nevertheless Arenales, who hoped to make up by speed
for paucity of numbers, had organized a column of 2,000
men, when Martinez arrived with a remnant of the Army
of the South. The news brought by him produced great
irritation, but by no means disheartened the people, who
were confident of ultimate success. Their anger was
turned . against Government ; the army encamped at
Miraflores was almost in open revolt. Arenales was
F F 2

436 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
asked to put himself at the head of the movement, but this
stout soldier would have none of it, and giving up the
command to Santa Cruz left Peru for ever.
The leaders of the army headed by General Martinez, on
the 26th February, 1823, presented an address to Congress,
asking that Riva-Agiiero might be placed at the head of
the Executive. The city militia supported them. Con
gress yielded, and on the 27th Riva-Agiiero was named
President of the Republic, and afterwards Grand Marshal
of the armies, although he was simply a colonel of militia
and had never been under fire.
Riva-Agiiero was a true representative of the people,
and his popularity was enhanced by his activity and by the
skill shown in the first measures he adopted. He re
organized the army, making Santa Cruz general-in-chief,
and Martinez general of the division of the Andes and
Chile. He reopened relations with Chile, and wrote to*
Bolivar accepting the help which Congress had refused-
Bolivar made a treaty with him, in which he promised
6,000 men, who were to be equipped and paid by Peru,
Chile promised a further contingent of from 2,000 to 2,500-
men, and 1,500 muskets in addition. San Martin in
Mendoza pushed on the organization o\\ an Argentine
division, which was to operate on the frontiers of Salta,
under the orders of Urdininea. At the same time news was
received that the Peruvian commissioners, in London, had
abandoned their monarchical schemes, and had effected a
loan of one million two hundred thousand pounds sterling,
which was ratified by Congress.
Before two months had passed Peru had an army of
5,000 men ready for the field, in addition to the Argentine
and Chilian auxiliaries, who were 2^500 more. Riva-
Agiiero determined upon another expedition to the
intermediate ports, directed against Arequipa and Puno,
while another army, composed of troops of the four Allied
Nations, should advance by Jauja upon the centre, a
repetition of the previous plan. Bolivar approved of the
plan when his opinion was asked, and promised his 6,ooo»

RECAPTURE OF LIMA BY CANTERAC. 437
-men. Chile again promised a fresh contingent, which
should be sent to the south of Peru, and offered to supply
horses for the expedition. The Royalists, ignorant of these
preparations, made ready on their part for an attack upon
Lima. Five thousand Peruvian troops left Callao in May for the
South under General Santa Cruz, with Colonel Gamarra as
chief of the staff. For the first time Peru had an army of
her own, commanded by Peruvian generals. Before leav
ing, Santa Cruz presented himself to Congress and swore
to return triumphant or to die. He did neither the one
thing nor the other.
Santa Cruz showed more activity than Alvarado had
done. On the 17th June the convoy reached Arica. On
that same day Canterac, with an army of 9,000 men, rushed
down from the Highlands and captured Lima. The ex
pedition was thus isolated, but the move was a false one on
the part of the Royalists.
Bolivar did not share in the general confidence, he was
more clear sighted than most others, as is seen in a notable
letter which he wrote at this time to General Sucre. He
had concentrated his forces at Guayaquil, and on hearing
of the disasters of Torata and Moquegua, before signing the
treaty of which we have already made mention, he at once
sent off an expedition of 3,000 men under Sucre, with
instructions to gain possession of the fortresses of Callao
at any cost. Sucre, whom he called " his right arm," was
also named minister plenipotentiary to Peru, and was sent
to prepare the way for the accomplishment of the secret
designs of the Liberator, who saw that Peru would soon
be in a condition to welcome him as her saviour.
The occupation of Lima by the Royalists was a mistake,
it gave them no military advantage while Callao and the
ocean were held by the Patriots. The Government fled to
Callao, and the army collected under shelter of the guns
of that fortress. Sucre was made general-in-chief. Con
gress dispersed ; some of the members went over to the
•enemy ; but a minority, who were hostile to Riva-Agiiero,

438 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
kept together, and sent for Bolivar on the 19th Juue, 1823,-
giving him the title of Generalissimo and ample powers for.
the salvation of the country. Riva-Agiiero retained the
title of President, but was sent out of the way to Trujillo.
Bolivar accepted the inyitation, saying that " for a long
time his heart had yearned towards Peru." Pending his
arrival Sucre exercised his powers as his representative ;
the secret wish of Bolivar was accomplished, he was master
of Peru.
The Viceroy soon perceived the mistake he had made,
and recalled his army from Lima. On the 16th July Can
terac evacuated the city, and returned to the Highlands
unmolested. On the 20th Sucre sailed southwards with
3,000 Columbians and Chilians and a squadron of Peruvian
cavalry, leaving an army of Peruvians, Argentines, and
Columbians at Lima with orders to occupy Jauja and
secure the line of the Apurimac. His intention was to
combine the movements of the three armies, with Arequipa
as the base of his operations, and to advance on Cuzco
with 8,000 or 12,000 men, but when he reached the south
coast Santa Cruz was already far inland. He then landed
at Quilca and marched on Arequipa ; but the same day
Santa Cruz had fought a battle of doubtful result on the
borders of Lake Titicaca.
Santa Cruz had changed the plan. Instead of keeping
his army together he had divided it into two columns,
directed against Upper Peru. With the first he landed
near Ilo, and advanced to Moquegua, while the second,
under command of Gamarra, landed at Arica, and occupied
Tacna. Here he remained till the middle of July, awaiting
the Chilian contingent ; but as it did not come he, on the
13th July, ascended the Cordillera, crossed the Desaguadero
by the bridge of the Inca without opposition, and on the
8th August occupied the city of La Paz. Gamarra at the
same time marched by the Tacora road, crossed the Desa
guadero lower down, and occupied the city of Oruro, which
is about 170 miles from La Paz.
Olafieta, who was retreating towards Potosi with 1,500

SECOND EXPEDITION TO THE SOUTH. 439
men, was almost surprised by Gamarra, of whose move
ments he knew nothing, and withdrew to the South.
Gamarra was then joined by Lanza, the Guerilla chieftain,
with 600 men, and learned that Urdininea, with the Argen
tine division, was advancing from Salta ; but he lost the
opportunity of destroying Olafieta, which was part of the
plan of Santa Cruz, by remaining inactive at Oruro.
Santa Cruz, hearing that La Serna was concentrating
his scattered divisions at Puno, then turned back to cover
the line of the Desaguadero, and stationed himself on the
left bank at the bridge of the Inca. Valdes advanced
against him with 2,000 men, but finding the bridge was de
fended by artillery, he withdrew to the town of Zepita.
Santa Cruz crossed the bridge and went after him, and
overtook him in a strong position between the mountains
and the lake of Titicaca. By a feigned retreat he drew
Valdes into the plain, where two Peruvian squadrons cut
the Royalist horse to pieces, but the attack upon the in
fantry was less successful, and night put a stop to the action.
Both sides claimed the victory, but Valdes retreated, and
soon after Santa Cruz returned to his position on the Desa
guadero. This was the first and last battle of the expe
dition. La Serna joined Valdes at Zepita, and crossed the Desa
guadero with 4,500 men. Santa Cruz retreated before him,
and on the 8th September joined Gamarra to the south of
Oruro. He then manoeuvred to prevent a junction between
La Serna and Olafieta, who was returning from Potosi
with 2,500 men, but La Serna by a flank march over the
heights succeeded in effecting the junction on the 14th
September. Santa Cruz thought himself lost, and without
attempting to bring on an action in which the chances
would have been in his favour, retreated precipitately. The
retreat soon became a flight, arms and baggage were
thrown away, and he recrossed the Desaguadero utterly
routed, without fighting and without even seeing an enemy.
He left a company of infantry with two guns to defend the
bridge, who capitulated to the Royalist vanguard at the

440 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
first summons. Barely 1,000 men reached the coast, and
the Chilian contingent, which just then arrived, returned
at once to their own country.
Sucre, seeking to affect a junction with Santa Cruz, had
shown in the prosecution of his arduous task both the pru
dence and the ability of a master in the art of war. At
Arequipa he heard of the fight at Zepita, and marched on
Puno supposing that Santa Cruz was still holding his
ground at the bridge of the Inca, but was met by the in
telligence of the total dispersion of the Patriot army, and
of the concentration of the Royalists. Placing himself so
as to cover the flight of the fugitives, he steadily retreated
and re-embarked at Quilca.
Before the result of the first expedition to the inter
mediate ports was known, two of the admirers of San
Martin had written to him in his retirement at Mendoza,
telling him that " the hand of San Martin alone can crown
his work and give liberty to Peru." Even Riva-Aguero
wrote to him, beseeching him to return to public life.
After the disasters of Torata and Moquegua, the eyes of
all Peruvians were turned to their late Protector, and a
multitude of letters to the same effect reached him in his
solitude. The new Government of Chile wrote to him
that posterity would forget his immense services unless he
completed his work. After the failure of the second expe
dition a council of Peruvian officers, headed by General
Porto Carrero and Admiral Guise, with the authorization
of Riva-Agiiero, passed a resolution that all Peruvians of
every class called upon their Protector to fly to their
assistance, now that their country was in danger. Guido
wrote to him that all Patriots looked to him for help.
Riva-Agiiero, who had quarrelled with Congress, and was
opposed to the alliance with Columbia, offered him the
supreme power, by a special messenger. But San Martin
had no faith in Riva-Agiiero, and wrote to him to re
establish the authority of Congress, and on his refusal,
rejected his offers with disdain.
Riva-Agiiero, in his semi-exile at Trujillo, had dissolved

ARRIVAL OF BOLIVAR IN PERU. 441"
Congress, and on the 19th July had convened a Senate of
his own selection, but he had no support in public opinion. -
On the 6th July thirteen members of the late Congress
met at Lima, called up some substitutes, formed themselves
into a sovereign Congress, appointed Torre-Tagle chief of
the Executive, and on the 8th August declared Riva-Agiiero
an outlaw. He replied by declaring them traitors and
their decrees null and void. He then collected an army of
some sort, proposed an armistice to the Spaniards and
offered to dismiss the auxiliaries. But the auxiliaries
refused to recognise his authority, and the Columbian troops
called upon him to lay down the command.
Then came Bolivar. The castles of Callao thundered
him a welcome ; Lima decked herself in flags in his honour.
He landed in Peru on the ist September; no American
ever received so enthusiastic a reception. Congress made
an appearance of consulting him, but in reality only awaited
his orders. As at Caracas, at Angostura, in New Granada,
and at Cucuta, he renounced all claim to civil power,
placing only his sword at their disposal. Congress paid
no attention to these empty phrases, invested him as
Liberator with supreme authority, both military and civil,
and voted him an annual salary of 50,000 dollars, which,
with his usual disinterestedness, he declined to touch.
At a banquet which followed, the name of San Martin
was not mentioned among the many toasts proposed.
Whereupon Bolivar rising to his feet proposed one
himself: —
" To the good genius of America, which brought General
San Martin with his liberating army from the banks of La
Plata to the shores of Peru ; and to General O'Higgins
who had sent him on from Chile."
Then as the banquet drew to an end, he proposed
another : —
" That the peoples of America may never raise a throne
upon their soil."
At night as he entered the theatre, the whole audience
rose to their feet. He occupied the official box with the

442 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
President, under a drapery of the festooned flags of Peru
and Columbia.
Procter, an English traveller who was present on this
occasion, thus describes him : —
"He is very thin, but his whole person shows great
activity. His features are well formed, but are worn by
fatigue and anxiety. The fire of his black eyes draws
attention at once. Never did the exterior give a more
exact idea of the man himself. Egoism, determination,
activity, intrigue, and a persevering spirit, are clearly .
expressed in his bearing, and in each movement of his
body." Bolivar's first care was to put an end to the dispute with
Riva-Agiiero, but finding all friendly overtures unsuc
cessful, he resolved upon using force."" The country seemed
on the verge of a civil war, when his own troops mutinied ,
against the ex-President. He disappeared from public
life, and the danger was averted.
Bolivar remained absolute master of Peru. He thought
that all America was now his.

CHAPTER XLIX.
JUNIN— AYACUCHO.
1823 — 1824.
The day-dreams of men often mould the course of their lives.
The day-dream of Bolivar was the unification of South
America. It was in pursuance of this dream that he
created a great military power, and carried his arms in
triumph over half the Continent. His first step was the
creation of Columbia. Then he dreamed of a South
American Confederation, ruled by an international assem
bly, after the manner of the Achaian League of ancient
Greece ; and, at last, of a monocracy under the protection
of Columbian bayonets. Then the dream became delirium.
In the treaties with Chile and Peru, forming an alliance
offensive and defensive, it was stipulated by Bolivar : —
" That an Assembly should be convened of the American
States, composed of plenipotentiaries, with the object of
establishing on a solid basis intimate relations between
each and all of them, which may serve as a council when
great questions arise, as a point of contact in common
danger, as an interpreter of treaties in case of a misunder
standing, and as an arbitrator and conciliator in disputes
and difficulties."
On the field of diplomacy the Liberator of Columbia
came for the first time in contact with Don Bernardino
Rivadavia, the highest personification of the Liberalism of
South America. One was at the head of four great States,
the other was the constitutional minister of a province.

444 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Bolivar aspired to the laurel crown of an American Caesar,
Rivadavia to that of a pacific liberator.
Rivadavia was at this time the soul of the Provinces of
La Plata, which were separated by political shipwreck.
The Argentine Republic, exhausted by her great struggle
for the independence of America, and prostrated by civil
conflict, took no more part in the continental war, but her
soldiers still fought for her in far-off lands ; her integral
parts, in spite of separation, had still cohesion and sought
reunion. A centre of attraction was wanting to this constel
lation of fourteen wandering stars — Buenos Ayres provided
that centre. Rivadavia welded this province into a State,
which became the organic cell of national life. On the
small theatre of a province, the representative system of a
republic was seen for the first time at work in South
America. These institutions, which were then a novelty
in the world, except in the United States and partially in
England, showed to the peoples of South America what
the republican system was; from Buenos Ayres they
spread over the entire Continent.
The Argentine Republic was then threatened with the
war which broke out two years later. The new Empire of
Brazil had occupied by force the Banda Oriental, which
was one of the United Provinces; the Government of
Buenos Ayres, inspired by Rivadavia, faced the question
with all its consequences. In these circumstances, in
January, 1823, Don Joaquin Mosquera arrived in Buenos
Ayres as minister plenipotentiary of Columbia. Riva
davia was provisionally in charge of the Government. He
rejected at once the idea of a Congress with power to
decide international disputes. The treaty was reduced to
a defensive alliance, in support of their independence from
Spanish or from any other foreign domination. As Riva
davia explained to the Legislature : —
" The treaty proposed by Columbia did not fulfil the
requisite conditions, since it only recognised the existence
of governments and not their legitimacy."
The idea of Rivadavia was to complete the triumph of

SPANISH COMMISSIONERS AT BUENOS AYRES. 445
the revolution by a peaceful understanding with the mother
country, in which all the late colonies should unite.
When King Ferdinand, in 1820, sent a royal commission
to the River Plate with the object of "putting an end to
differences existing between members of the same family,""
the Government, of Buenos Ayres replied that it could listen
to no proposition which was not based upon the recogni
tion of independence, which declaration served as a pre
cedent. The treaty with Columbia was signed on the 8th March,.
1823, was ratified by the Government of Columbia on the-
10th June, 1824, and by the Argentine Congress on the 7th
June, 1825.
Almost simultaneously with Mosquera, there arrived in
Buenos Ayres two new commissioners from the King of
Spain. The Spanish Cortes, re-installed at Cadiz in 1820,
was composed of Liberals, who saw that these ancient colo
nies could not be subjected by force, and attempted to
settle the question by negotiation. , These commissioners-
brought no proper credentials, but were simply appointed
by' the King, under Liberal pressure, to listen to proposals,
and to arrange provisional treaties of commerce. Their
real object was to divide the different republics which were
at war with Spain. Buenos Ayres was looked upon as the
centre of the revolutionary spirit ; the commissioners were
instructed to recognise the independence of the United
Provinces, and so to separate them from Peru and Co
lumbia. Rivadavia drew up a resolution which was sanctioned at
once by the Legislature : — < •
"Government shall negotiate no treaties of neutrality,.
of peace;: nor of commerce with Spain, until after the
cessation of war in all the new States, of the American
Continent, and not until after the recognition of their
independence." On this basis an arrangement was drawn up, in which ai
suspension of hostilities for eighteen months was stipu
lated, during which time the Province of Buenos Ayres

446 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
should negotiate the acquiescence of the other American
governments. Meantime commercial relations were re-established with
Spain, contraband of war being excepted. But it was an
illusion on the part of Rivadavia to hope that the question
with Spain could be settled by any other mode than by
arms. There was yet a further stipulation. As France had
voted 20 millions of dollars in aid of the restoration of abso
lutism in Spain, in agreement with the Holy Alliance,
from which England was already separated, the Govern
ment of Buenos Ayres was authorized to negotiate for
an equal sum among the States of America " to uphold
the representative system in Spain." Don Felix Alzaga
was, with this object, appointed plenipotentiary to the
Governments of Chile, Peru, and Columbia. At the same
time General Las Heras was sent as a commissioner to
the Royalist authorities in Peru, to arrange an armistice
with them, in conjunction with General Arenales, who was
at that time in command on the northern frontier.
Buenos Ayres, in spite of the dangers which surrounded
her, thus performed her duty to her sister States, boldly
confronting the alliance of the absolute kings, and thereby
gained the goodwill of England ; but the convention was
rejected in Chile through the intervention of the Colum
bian minister. Alzaga then went on to Peru and presented
it to both Presidents, to Torre-Tagle and to Riva-Agiiero.
The first made use of it to open a traitorous correspond
ence with the Royalists, the other used it as a plea for
arranging an armistice of his own, and for sending back
the Columbian auxiliaries ; but, strange to say, it was
accepted by Bolivar as a way out of his difficulties, he
merely stipulating that it should, first of all, be ratified by
the Spaniards. His object was to gain time for the arrival
of reinforcements from Columbia.
At the beginning of 1824 the situation of the Patriots in
Peru was very precarious. The Royalists had 18,000 men,
flushed with recent victories ; the Patriots had only half

MUTINY AT CALLAO. 447
that number. At this juncture an event happened which
had for a time most disastrous effects upon the fortunes of
Peru. Just as the Spaniards were making a last effort to
regain the dominion of the Pacific the Patriots lost the
fortress of Callao, while, almost simultaneously, President
Torre-Tagle passed over to the Royalists, taking with him
a part of the national forces, and the Spaniards re-occu
pied Lima.
The Argentine contingent was very discontented ; the
Peruvians were jealous of them and treated them as
foreigners, tolerated only on account of their services.
They were badly clothed and fed, their pay was both irre
gular and insufficient ; the Government by whose autho
rity they had become an army no longer existed ; the
general to whom they owed their existence had deserted
them. In March, 1823, they had applied for protection to
the Government of Buenos Ayres, and had been adopted
by the Province, then the only representative of the nation.
Bolivar commenced to prepare for offensive operations
by concentrating his forces at Pativilca, about 140
¦ miles to the north of Lima, and withdrawing most of the
Columbian garrison from Callao, supplied their place with
the Rio de la Plata regiment and the 1 ith battalion of the
Andes, putting the whole garrison under command of
General Alvarado.
On the night of the 4th February, 1824, the rank and file
of the garrison mutinied under two Argentine sergeants,
named Moyano and Oliva, and imprisoned their officers.
Their first demands were for 100,000 dollars as arrears of
pay, and that they should be sent back to their own
country. While Government hesitated to accede to these
terms the spirit of insubordination gained strength among
the soldiery, their own leaders could not prevent excesses.
Among other Spanish prisoners in the dungeons, was a
Colonel Casariego, whom Oliva had known in Chile ; the
two sergeants took counsel with him, and by his advice
.released the Spanish prisoners and put their own officers
in the dungeons. He then persuaded them that their

448 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
situation was desperate, and that their only chance of
safety lay in embracing the Royalist cause and hoisting
the Spanish flag. The troops were reorganized and placed
under Spanish officers. Moyano was made a colonel and
Oliva a lieutenant-colonel, all sergeants and corporals
were promoted, and a messenger was sent to Canterac
placing the fortress at his disposal.
On the 7 th February the flag of Spain was raised on
one of the towers. A negro soldier of the Rio de la Plata
regiment, a native of Buenos Ayres, known by the nick
name of " Falucho," refused to mount guard over the flag
against which he had so often fought. He broke his
musket against the flag-staff, and was shot, shouting —
" Viva Buenos Ayres ! "
The mounted grenadiers who were encamped in the
valley of Canete, mutinied also, and marched to join their
comrades at Callao on the 14th February, but when they
saw the Spanish flag flying over the walls they released
their officers. One hundred and twenty of them returned
to their allegiance, and represented their country in the
liberating armies to the end of the war. Thus by mutiny
and by treachery was dissolved the celebrated Army of the
Andes. As soon as Canterac heard, of the mutiny at Callao, he
sent a strong division under Monet from the Highlands,
which joined the division of Rodil in the valley of lea and
marched on Lima. Torre-Tagle, who with his Minister of
War, was in secret correspondence with the Royalists,
joined them with some Peruvian troops, and issued a pro
clamation against Bolivar.
The Royalists were now masters of the Highlands, and
of all the centre and south of Peru, and aimed at the
dominion of the sea as wTell. A part of the Peruvian
squadron was stationed at Callao. Admiral Guise with
the Protector frigate and four armed boats, entered the port
under the fire of the forts, boarded the frigate Guayas,
formerly Venganza, and burned her, as also the Santa Rosa*
and some merchant vessels, on the 25th February. The

BOLIVAR AT PATIVILCA.

449

brig of war Balcarce was the only vessel saved, but the
Royalists were expecting two Spanish frigates.
Bolivar issued terrible decrees for the evacuation of
Lima, which were not obeyed, but on the ioth February
Congress appointed him Dictator.
Monet occupied Lima without resistance, but did not
remain there. He left Rodil in command at Callao, and
returned to the Highlands, taking the officers of the former
garrison with him as prisoners.
These officers, 160 in number, were forced to march on
foot up the mountain passes to Jauja. On the third night,
as they were passing through a narrow defile, two of them,
by preconcerted arrangement, slipped into a ditch where
they could not be seen, the two who were next them con
cealing their retreat so that the evasion was not discovered
till they reached the next halt. Monet ordered two of the
prisoners to be shot in place of those who had escaped.
They were all drawn up in line by General Camba, and
told to draw lots, which were presented to them in a
helmet. Several lots had been drawn blank, when two
officers stepped forward saying that they were the men
who had concealed the escape of the fugitives. With one
exception all the other officers called for the drawing to go
on, but Camba decided that these two should pay the
forfeit of their lives, and they were shot.
One of them, Domingo Millan, was a native of Tucuman,
and of middle age. He drew out from the lining of his
uniform coat the medals of Tucuman and Salta, pinned
them on his breast, and died shouting, "Viva la Patria!"
The other, Manuel Prudon, was a native of Buenos Ayres,
and only twenty-four years of age. He died with the
calmness of a martyr, shouting, " Viva Buenos Ayres ! "
Bolivar had fallen dangerously ill at his head-quarters
at Pativilca ; for six days he lay unconscious. When he
was yet in the first stage of convalescence, news reached
him of the mutiny of Callao, and of the treason of Torre-
Tagle. Mosquera went to visit him, and found him seated
in a rocking-chair in the orchard, his head tied up in a
G G

450 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
white handkerchief. He was deadly pale, and his voice
was hollow with weakness.
" What do you think of doing now ? " asked Mosquera.
" Of triumphing," replied he, undauntedly. Misfortune
only seemed to strengthen his spirit.
He retreated with 7,000 men to Trujillo, made the
Southern Provinces of Columbia his base of operations,
and wrote to Vice-President Santander asking for rein
forcements :
"The interests of all America are at stake; nothing
must be trusted to probabilities, still less to chance or
fortune." On the nth May, 1824, Congress authorised a levy of
50,000 men, and 3,000 men were sent to join him at once.
Before the enemy suspected that he was about to move,
he had concentrated his army at the foot of the northern
Cordillera, in three divisions of infantry, under Cordoba,
Lara, and La Mar, and one of cavalry, under Necochea.
Sucre was chief of the staff.
At this time Olafieta, who was in Upper Peru with 4,000
men, refused any longer to obey the orders of the Viceroy.
He had heard from Buenos Ayres that, by the help of
France, Ferdinand had abolished the Constitution of 1 820,
and was once more an absolute king. La Serna sent
Valdes against him, and some severe fighting took place
between them, in which Valdes had the advantage, when
he was recalled by the Viceroy.
Bolivar took advantage of the absence of Valdes to
commence operations, and marched on Jauja by the road
which had twice led Arenales to victory, covering his
advance by a cloud of Peruvian guerillas, under whose
protection Sucre marked out the daily route of the army,
and provided supplies. Bolivar ascended the range at its
highest point in the direction of Pasco, hoping to surprise
the enemy, and on the 2nd August passed 9,000 men in
review about twenty-five miles from that city, on which
occasion he was accompanied by O'Higgins and by Mon
teagudo, who had returned from exile. On the 4th Miller,

CAVALRY ACTION AT JUNIN. 451
who had been detached with a party of cavalry, brought
word that Canterac was advancing from Jauja with all his
army. To the south of Pasco, at the head-waters of the Rio
Grande, commences the great lake of Reyes, which lies
between the two ranges of the Cordillera, and occupies all
the low ground as far as the entrance of the valley of Jauja.
On its eastern bank there runs a level road, on the
western bank is another which leads to Junin, and is much
rougher. At the southern extremity of the lake lies the
plain of Junin, broken by numerous hillocks, and cut up
by streams and marshes filled by the overflow from the
lake. On the ist August Canterac had advanced with his
cavalry along the eastern road to reconnoitre, and learned
to his surprise that Bolivar was already on the other side
the lake. He retreated rapidly, and rejoined his infantry
on the 5th August. On the 6th, at two o'clock in the
afternoon, he found himself face to face with the Patriot
army on the plain of Junin. Their infantry held the
heights beyond, while their cavalry appeared about to
charge him. Bolivar had marched along the eastern
slopes of the western range, halting only in strong posi
tions, showing a cautiousness which was not usual with
him. On seeing the Royalist army, he sent Necochea in
front with 900 horse. The ground was so contracted by a
hill on one side and by a marsh on the other, that at five
o'clock Necochea had only two squadrons of Columbian
horse on the plain, when he was attacked by the whole of
the Royalist cavalry, 1,300 strong, led by Canterac in
person. The Columbian lancers received the charge with great
steadiness, but were driven back upon their supports, who
were still entangled in the defile. The Royalist horse,
greatly disordered by their rapid advance, entered the
defile with the fugitives. Necochea, pierced by seven
lance wounds, was trampled under foot and made prisoner.
Colonel Suarez, with the first squadron of Peruvian
G G 2

452 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
hussars, had drawn his men into an angle of the marsh,
and, letting the rout pass by, charged the pursuers in the
rear. The fugitives were rallied by Miller, who led them
again to the charge, and drove the Royalists from the
field. In forty-five minutes the whole affair was over, and
not a shot was fired. The Royalists lost 250 killed by
lance and sabre ; the, Patriots lost 150 between killed and
wounded, and rescued Necochea. The fugitives took
shelter under the fire of their infantry, which at once
retreated. Such was the celebrated action of Junin, which broko
the prestige of the Royalist army, and prepared the way
for the final triumph. Bolivar, who had seen the rout of
the first squadrons, thought he had lost his cavalry, and
returned to the infantry, who were a league behind. He
only learned the defeat of the enemy from a pencil note
sent him by Miller after sundown. The hussars who did
such good service were afterwards styled the Hussars of
Junin, in reward for their gallant behaviour.
Canterac, who was greatly disheartened by this disaster,
which was chiefly the result of his own precipitate con
duct in charging without a reserve over ground of which
he knew nothing, evacuated the valley of Jauja, and re
treated so rapidly that in two days he was more than a
hundred miles from the scene of the action, and his in
fantry was quite worn out ; but he did not stop until he
had crossed the Apurimac, more than five hundred miles
from Junin, and lost between 2,000 and 3,000 men by
desertion on the way. La Serna sent him a reinforcement
of 1,500 men, and recalled Valdes to Cuzco. Canterac
had fled from his own shadow, for he was not pursued.
Bolivar rested for three days on the field of battle, took
ten days to occupy the valley of Jauja, and remained
nearly a month at Huamanga. In September he crossed
the river Pampas, an affluent of the Apurimac, and threat
ened Cuzco from the sources of that river, his right flank
being covered by a spur from the Cordillera, but did not
consider himself strong enough to attempt anything more

THE SPANIARDS AGAIN DOMINATE THE PACIFIC. 453
now that the rainy season was at hand. He also learned
that a loan, projected by San Martin, had been success
fully launched in London, and that a million dollars were
expected immediately. Leaving Sucre in command, he
returned to Lima in October.
Before leaving he received notice that on the 28th July
the Congress of Columbia had abrogated the law confer
ring extraordinary powers upon him, which he might no
longer exercise now that he was in a foreign country.
This was the first sign of Parliamentary resistance to his
autocratic tendencies. The Liberals now formed a powerful
party in Congress under the leadership of Vice-President
Santander, who thought more of the interests of New
Granada than of those of the Republic at large.
Bolivar received the blow with dignity, comprehending
that he had brought it upon himself by taking charge of
the government of a foreign state, and notified Sucre that
he would only interfere in military operations as President
of Peru. Sucre, who was not ambitious, and was devoted
to Bolivar, advised him to pay no attention to the new
law, and declared that he himself would have no direct
communication with the Government of Columbia, looking
to Bolivar alone for orders. Both kept their promises,
Bolivar leaving complete liberty of action to Sucre, who
followed his instructions except in the conduct of military
operations, in which he knew that his talents were superior
to those of the Liberator.
Bolivar again established his head-quarters at Pativilca,
but found matters much changed for the worse. The
arrival of the Spanish ship-of-the-line Asia and of the
20-gun brig Aquiles had given the naval preponderance to
the Royalists. These ships were joined by a corvette and
a brig from Chiloe, and there was one brig already at
Callao, which Guise had failed to capture. After an
exchange of shots with the Spaniards, Guise, with the
Peruvian squadron, was forced to seek shelter at Guaya
quil. A detachment of the Patriot army had been defeated

454 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
near Lima ; Chile remained inactive ; but Bolivar, still
undaunted, collected such forces as he could assemble at
Pativilca, and urgently requested a further reinforcement
of 6,000 men from Columbia in aid of Sucre, whose posi
tion was very precarious.
Bolivar also returned to his old project of an American
Congress, summoning it to meet on the 7th December at
Panama, as the most central point for all the world, and
addressed circulars to that effect to the Governments of
Mexico, Columbia, Guatemala, Buenos Ayres, Chile, Brazil,
and later on to the United States.
While occupied in these dreams, he heard that the
Royalists had advanced from Cuzco, manoeuvring to cut
off the retreat of Sucre ; then there was silence. Eight
days afterwards the fate of America was decided at Aya-
cucho. Upon one point only Bolivar and Sucre were not agreed.
Bolivar had left instructions with Sucre to keep his army
together at all risks; but he, thinking his position a dan
gerous one, spread his troops over the whole district, and
advanced himself, with a light division, as far as Mamara
on the road to Cuzco, and from there sent Miller on with
the grenadiers to reconnoitre. When Bolivar heard oi
these manoeuvres he wrote to Sucre impressing upon him
his maxim that —
" Union is strength. You expose yourself to the loss of
a battle for the sake of occupying some more leagues of
territory. The liberty of Peru will not be won by occupy
ing land, but by a victory upon it."
Sucre replied, saying that he would obey orders ; but
had only just sent off the letter when he received advice
from Miller that the enemy was advancing in mass, and
only twenty-five miles distant. His army was spread
over an extent of ninety miles ; before he could concentrate
the Royalists were in his rear. As he retreated he received
a further despatch from Bolivar authorising him to fight if
he thought it necessary.
Sucre had under-estimated the strength of the Royalists.

MANOEUVRES OF SUCRE. 455
By calling in the outlying divisions La Serna had, on the
24th October, assembled 10,000 men, in three divisions of
infantry under Canterac, Valdes, and Monet, and one of
cavalry, which he commanded himself, with ten guns.
Sucre had only 7,000 men and two guns.
La Serna manoeuvred to cut off Sucre from his base,
moving in a semicircle of which the Patriots held the
centre. Sucre was thus enabled to concentrate his forces,
and choose for himself the field of battle. He retreated on
Huamanga, but on the 24th November, at the river Pampas,
he found that the enemy by forced marches was there
before him. The river lay between them. Three days
were spent in manoeuvres, after which Sucre crossed the
river, but on the 2nd December found the heights of Matara
in his front already occupied by the Royalists. Wheeling
rapidly to his right, he passed by a gorge towards the
valley of Acrocos, but his rearguard under Lara was over
taken in the pass by Vald6s. One Columbian battalion
was cut to pieces, and two more were dispersed with the
loss of a gun on the 3rd December ; but the further advance
of the Royalists was checked by the main body stationed
on the heights beyond. The two armies encamped for the
night with the gorge between them.
The next day Sucre gained the valley of Acrocos and
offered battle. But La Serna, anxious to cut him off from
Jauja, marched round the left flank of the Patriots and
again gained their rear, cutting all the bridges and closing
the defiles to prevent their retreat. The people of the
valleys rose in favour of the Royalists. A Patriot column,
advancing from Jauja to join Sucre, was driven back ; his
sick were killed in the hospitals ; and he had lost 600 men
in the retreat. For him it was now victory or death.
He drew up his army in the valley of Ayacucho, his
flanks resting on the mountain ranges to the east and to
the west, while the Royalists occupied the heights in front.
Cordoba commanded on the right, Miller in the centre,
and La Mar on the left, and a reserve of three battalions
was commanded by Lara.

456 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
On the morning of Thursday, the 9th December, 1824,
the sun rose gloriously over the peaks of the eastern Cor
dillera. Sucre galloped from end to end of his line, telling
his men that on their valour that day hung the destinies
of South America. At nine in the morning the Royalists
descended from the heights to the attack. At ten o'clock
they debouched upon the plain, and the left and centre
advanced in mass, led by the Viceroy himself. The Roy
alist right, under Valdes, was the first to engage, and
drove in the Patriot skirmishers ; but the Peruvian in
fantry stood firm, and a battalion of Columbians was sent
to aid them.
Sucre then ordered Cordoba to charge with the right wing,
supported by Miller's cavalry. The young general, who
was only twenty-five years of age, advanced rapidly in
two parallel columns, and threw himself with great im
petuosity upon the Royalist centre. Eight squadrons of
Royalist cavalry who charged him were driven back by
the Columbian horse under Silva. Monet, whose division
had not yet been engaged, came to the assistance of the
left centre, but was attacked by the reserve under Lara,
and driven back in confusion. Three more squadrons
were then thrown forward, and were exterminated by the
Columbian lancers. La Serna strove in vain to rally his
disordered soldiery ; he was borne from his horse with six
wounds, and made prisoner, with more than 1,000 of his
men. Meantime Valdes had turned the left flank of the Patriots,
and the Peruvian division, under La Mar, began to give
way, when the Columbian battalion came to their assist
ance, followed by the Peruvian hussars and the Argentine
grenadiers, led by Miller, who charged with such fury that
the Royalist infantry were thrown into confusion, and all
the guns were captured.
It was one o'clock, Valdes in despair, sat down on a
rock, waiting for death ; but his officers forced him away,
back to the heights, where many of the Royalist generals
were already assembled, with such troops as they could

VICTORY OF AYACUCHO. 457
collect. Canterac took the command, and capitulated
with Sucre. The war of independence was at an end,
emancipation was secured. In the words of a poet :
" We passed one thousand years
In one hour at Ayacucho."
Ayacucho is known in America as the Battle of the
Generals. Fourteen Spanish generals, with all their sub
ordinate officers, gave up their swords this day. The
Royalists lost 1,400 killed and 700 wounded; the Patriots
300 killed and 600 wounded. One-fourth of all who entered
into action were placed hors-de-combat.
Ayacucho crowned the joint work of San Martin and
Bolivar. The victories of Chacabuco and Maipo were
united to those of Boyaca and Carabobo, with the golden
link forged at Ayacucho by the genius of Sucre.

CHAPTER L.
APOGEE, DECLINE, AND FALL OF BOLIVAR.
1824 — 1830.
The victory of Ayacucho put an end to the War of Inde
pendence in South America. All the Royalist forces in
Lower Peru capitulated, with the exception of those under
command of Rodil, who with a garrison of 2,200 men, held
Callao for a year longer. Besieged by land and blockaded
by sea, he surrendered in January, 1826, " after the garri
son had eaten all the horses, cats, and dogs in the place."*
In Upper Peru the cities of Cuzco, Arequipa, and Puno
opened their gates to the victor, who crossed the Desa
guadero, and was received in triumph at La Paz, Oruro,
Potosi, and Chuquisaca. The Royalist army under Olafieta
was dissolved by a mutiny, in which that General was
killed, and Sucre, after overrunning the country, convened
an Assembly to decide upon its future policy.
The Spanish squadron abandoned the coasts of Peru and
dispersed in the Pacific. The island of Chiloe was the last
position held by the Spaniards, but soon shared the fate of
Callao. The poet of the century, perched in imagination
on the summit of Chimborazo, cast his eyes over the New
World and saw not one enslaved people.
Bolivar was now at the apogee of his glorious career, his
name was famous throughout the world, South America
acclaimed him as her Liberator. The exaggerated honours
which were paid to him were but clouds of impure incense
* " The English in South America." By M. G. Mulhall.

THE NATURE OF THE REVOLUTION. 459
which could not obscure his real heroism, and which a
breath of common sense would have dispersed. He had
the power to solve the political problem in a manner
which would have made him the equal of Washington, but
it was not in his nature so to do. He lacked the moral
strength to keep a cool head at the height to which he had
attained. As was the case with San Martin, the apogee of
his career marked the commencement of his decline.
One of the most noteworthy phenomena of the revolution
in South America is the contrast between the qualities of
the leaders and the instincts of the masses of the people.
Emancipation came in the process of natural evolution,
organized and directed by popular leaders, who had only
one principle in common with those they led, the instinct
of independence. They devoted their attention to mechani
cal facts, and for the most part knew nothing of the hidden
forces of the movement they professed to guide.
The revolution in South America was twofold in its
action, internal and external. One force was directed
against the common enemy, the other against the elemen
tary organism of the peoples themselves. The spirit of
South America was genuinely democratic, so could not
be other than republican. The first development was into
anarchy, from which was to arise a new national life. To
check this anarchy monarchical projects were hatched in
the United Provinces, which resulted in their dissolution.
The idea of establishing a monarchy in Peru destroyed
the moral power of San Martin. The empire of Mexico
furnished proof enough of the error of this plan. The
prolonged dictatorship of O'Higgins in Chile brought
him to the ground. The oligarchical theories of Bolivar,
which tended to monocracy, were rejected by Congresses of
Republicans, and brought about his fall. The Liberators,
with all their power and all their glory, could not turn the
revolution from its natural sphere of action ; the day they
ceased to go wdth it they were cast aside as obstacles to
the march of progress.
When the independence of America was secured at

460 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Ayacucho, the mission of Bolivar as a Liberator came to an
end. His duty, his honour, and even his interest, called
upon him to retire from Peru, leaving the redeemed peoples
to work out their own destinies. Monteagudo was the
only one to give him such advice. On the night of the
28th January, 1825, Monteagudo was assassinated in a
lonely street in Lima. His death is a mystery ; by some
it is attributed to political enmity, by some to private
revenge. Bolivar in person conducted the enquiry into the
matter, and kept the secret to himself.
Among the papers left by Monteagudo was found an
essay upon the necessity of a general federation of the
Spanish-speaking peoples of South America, based upon
the plan of the Congress of Panama. An alliance of the
republics of the New World was proposed, as a counter
poise to the Holy Alliance of the sovereigns of Europe.
Suspicion was thrown upon the designs of the new empire
of Brazil ; Chile and the Argentine Republic were accused
of lukewarmness in the common cause ; and it was
suggested that an appeal for help should be addressed to
Great Britain and to the United States.
Bolivar adopted the idea as a development of his own
plan, and again summoned a Congress at Panama, in the
hope of organizing it himself. The United States accepted
the invitation to send representatives, on condition of being
permitted to remain neutral ; England also, but only in
order to have witnesses of her own to what went on ; Brazil
as a mere form ; and the Argentine Republic and Chile,
with reservations. Deputies from Peru, Mexico, Columbia,
and Guatemala were the only ones who attended the Con
gress. When this shadowy Congress escaped from his
influence Bolivar compared it to " that fool of a Greek,
who, standing on a rock, pretended to guide the ships
sailing round him."
His next step was, for the fourth time, to send in his
resignation as President of Columbia. Congress declined
to receive it with unanimity, but in silence. At the same
time he sent two commissioners to Vice-President San-

ORGANIZATION OF UPPER PERU. 461
tander to announce his intention of " proceeding to Argen
tine territory to establish the independence of South
America by assisting the Patriots." Santander replied by
reminding him that Congress had only authorised him to
carry on war outside the territory of Columbia " for the
security of the Republic of Peru."
His third theatrical step was to resign the dictatorship
of Peru, and to accept it again for reasons directly contrary
to those on which he had based his resignation, and with
the farcical condition that " the odious word dictatorship "
should be no longer used. Congress also voted him a
million of dollars as a reward for his services, which he
refused for himself, but accepted in the name of various
charities, to which they were never applied.* The servility
of the Congress of Peru was repugnant even to Bolivar,
and was censured by his Columbian partisans.
The general Assembly of the Provinces of Upper Peiu,
convened by Sucre, went even further than Congress had
done. They declared Bolivar to be "the first-born son
of the New World, the saviour of the people," and on the
19th July, 1825, placed themselves under the protection of
his sword and of his wisdom. They declared themselves
independent of Lower Peru, called their country the
" Republic of Bolivar," and placed the supreme executive
power in his hands so long as he should reside among
them, Sucre acting as his delegate in his absence. This
Assembly then dissolved, and on the 6th October a Consti
tuent Assembly was convened, which applied to Bolivar for
a Constitution, and for a garrison of 2,000 Columbian
troops. In July Bolivar offered to help the Chilians to drive the
Spaniards from the island of Chiloe. They declined other
help than a subsidy, which did not meet his views, as his
design was to bring them under his sway by the help of
Columbian troops. From the Congress of Columbia he
had procured authority to take the Peruvian fleet and army
* The amount thus voted was, after his death, paid to the heirs of Bolivar.

462 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
to Columbia, under pretext of defending it from a French
invasion, and so brought upon himself an accusation that
he wished to oppress her with foreign bayonets. His
policy tended to the establishment of a Praetorian Empire,
an uncrowned monarchy supported by a standing army.
Leaving Lower Peru under the rule of a Council he then
went to Upper Peru. His journey from Lima to Potosi
was one triumphal march. The cities presented him with
golden keys, and with war-horses equipped with golden
harness. At Arequipa General Alvarado gave a rural
banquet in his honour, at which the Argentine " Asado "
was the principal dish. There was abundance of claret
to wash down the roast beef, but he asked for champagne,
in which he indulged to an extent not usual with him. A
toast was given to the unification of South America, on
which he remarked that he would soon tread Argentine
soil. Colonel Dehesa, also excited by wine, told him : —
"My countrymen do not welcome Dictators to their
territory." Bolivar sprang upon the table in a fury, and crushing
glasses and plates under the heels of his boots, shouted —
" Thus will I trample upon the Argentine Republic."
An ebullition of temper roused by the opposition of the
press of Buenos Ayres to his anti-democratic plans.
At Potosi he was met by General Alvear and Dr. Diaz
Velez, envoys sent by the Argentine Government to
congratulate him on his successes. He thanked them but
refused to treat further with them, alleging as an excuse
the absence of his Minister of Foreign Affairs. Afterwards,
on learning that the Brazilians had occupied two provinces
of Upper Peru, he managed to dispense with the aid of this
official. When at Arequipa, he had offered General Alvarado
to send 6,000 men to aid the Argentines in the war
with which they were threatened by Brazil. Alvarado had
declined the offer. This incident now gave a plausible
pretext for his interference in the question. On the 18th
and 19th October he held private conferences with the

THE IDEAS OF BOLIVAR. 463
Argentine envoys, which greatly enlightened them as to his
extravagant ideas. Among other proposals he asked per
mission to cross Argentine territory with a Columbian
army to overturn the despotism of Dr. Francia in Paraguay,
which could not be granted, as all Argentine governments
had steadily followed a policy of non-intervention in the
internal affairs of other nations.
He met them again at Chuquisaca, but the interview
had no definite result, and the occupation of the Province
of Tarija, which was formerly one of the United Provinces,
by Columbian troops, nearly produced an open rupture.
Rivadavia, who was about that time elected President
of the United Provinces, looked upon Bolivar and his army
as a danger, but the idea of his armed intervention in
Argentine affairs was welcomed by the Opposition press of
Buenos Ayres. They echoed his words that : —
"The Argentine Republic could not triumph alone over
the Emperor of Brazil, and could not even organize itself
without the help of the genius of America."
But the Liberal press commenced to analyze the ten
dencies of the proposed Monocracy, and their words found
echo in the public opinion of Bolivia, Peru, and Columbia.
Chile was the first state to join the United Provinces in
open opposition to his views.
Bolivar then returned to .Lima, and on the 25th May,
1826, sent to Upper Peru a draft of a constitution for the
Republic of Bolivia.
All the works of Bolivar, both political and military,
are so impressed with his own character that it has been
necessary to invent special words to express them. His
system of warfare was a melange of the warlike propen
sities of the indigenous races with European discipline.
With little knowledge of tactics, and with less strategy, he
gained his victories by audacity, by impetuosity in attack,
and by unfailing constancy in defeat, somewhat after the
style of Charles XII. His power was symbolized by a new
title, involving a permanent Dictatorship; he called himself
the Liberator. His policy was neither democratic, nor

464 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
aristocratic, nor autocratic ; the historian has had to invent
a word to describe it, MONOCRATIC. For the new Republic
formed in Upper Peru he invented a new name, derived
from his own, Bolivia.
The constitution drawn up by him for the new State is
an amalgam of ancient traditions with modern practice.
It has something of the Greek Republic, something of
Roman CaBsarism, something of the English Monarchy,
something of the consular constitution of Napoleon. The
base of the system is a President, nominated for life, with
power to name his successor, and elected by a representa
tive assembly, appointed by an electoral body. The legis
lative power was shared by three chambers, one of which
exercised a species of censorship over the other two, like
to that of the Council of the Areopagos of Athens.
With some slight modifications, this constitution was
adopted bythe Constituent Assembly, andSucre was elected
President, but with power subordinate to that of the Libera
tor when he was there.
But Bolivia was too small a sphere of action for Bolivar.
For the realisation of his plan it was now necessary to
impose the same constitution upon Peru and Columbia,
binding the three States together by one supreme authority,
vested in his own person as the Liberator.
When the Congress of Peru re-assembled there appeared
in it a new national party, opposed to the Dictatorship and
to the continued presence of Columbian troops. Govern
ment then found that the elections were irregular, and fifty-
two of the deputies asked for their own dissolution. At
the same time the discovery of a conspiracy against the
Dictator sent some victims into banishment, and brought
others to the scaffold.
While preparations were being made for a new election,
Bolivar threatened to leave Peru to its fate. With the
most abject servility all classes besought him not to desert
them ; one high dignitary actually asked him to set his foot
on his neck that he might have the honour of bearing the
weight of the greatest man of the age. Still he remained

MONOCRACY. 465
obdurate, until a deputation of ladies waited upon him, to
whom he gracefully yielded, and so brought the farce to
an end.
The Electoral College of Lima met on the 6th August,
and within a hedge of Columbian bayonets voted with
unanimity the abrogation of the Constitution of 1823,
and the adoption of the Bolivian Constitution. The ex
ample was followed by the Provincial Colleges, the new
Constitution became law, and Bolivar was acclaimed per
petual President. Of course he declined the honour, but
accepted it as soon as it was offered to him a second time.
Now for Columbia. But meantime his idea had achieved
a further development, " The Grand Confederation of the
Andes." Bolivia was to remain as one unit, Peru was to
be divided into two, and Columbia into four States, each
one with a President for life, satellites to the central power
of the Liberator. Sucre pronounced in favour of the new
plan, Santander accepted it, and the Columbian leaders
offered it the support of their swords. On this basis a
treaty was signed between Bolivia and Peru, giving the
two nations one Federal Congress, to which each should
send nine deputies ; but a special clause was added, that
at the death of the Liberator each Republic should be at
liberty to withdraw from the union.
" My funeral will then be as sanguinary as that of Alex
ander," said Bolivar.
Much must be forgiven to Bolivar for the good by him
accomplished. He did not wish to be a tyrant, but he did
not understand that a people cannot be at once half free
and half enslaved. His plan of a Monocracy was a reac
tion against the Revolution and against the independence
of the new Republics ; it was a return to another colonial
system, even worse than the one which had been destroyed.
The paternal government of a distant and hereditary
monarch was a less evil than would be a government depen
dent upon the life of one man. A crown had been offered
to Bolivar, he had rejected the idea with scorn, but he now
demanded a power greater than that of any king.
HH

466 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
Engaged in these dreams Bolivar had led for two years
in Lima the voluptuous life of an Eastern prince, when evil
news reached him from his native country, which he had
apparently quite forgotten. The Venezuelans, with Paez
at their head, had risen against the general Government,.
and had demanded federal autonomy. In New Granada
the Liberal press vigorously attacked the principle of
Monocracy.. In September, 1826, he went to Guayaquil
and resumed his absolute powers as President of the Re
public of Columbia. From there he went on to Bogota,
and was met by a deputation of the people and of the
authorities, who assured him " that he could count upon
their obedience under the Constitution and under the laws
which he had sworn to respect and uphold." He answered
angrily that he expected a welcome and not advice.
After that he went on to Venezuela, where he made terms
with Paez, and agreed to a reform of the Constitution of
Ciicuta, which in 1821 he had sworn should remain un
changed for ten years. But public opinion no longer
supported him ; the Liberal press of Bogota, under the in
fluence of Santander, fiercely attacked his policy.
On the 6th February, 1827, he again sent in his resigna
tion. His example was followed by Santander. Congress
declined to accept either resignation, but Bolivar's was
declined by 56 votes against 24, while Santander's was-
declined by 70 against 4. Both retained their offices, but
from this time he and Santander became the heads of two
antagonistic parties.
While affairs were in this state in Columbia, the people
of Peru and Bolivia, aided by the garrisons of Columbian
troops, deposed their life Presidents. Sucre made some
attempt to re-establish his power, but being attacked by a
Peruvian army under Gamarra, he withdrew from Bolivia
in October, 1827, taking the Columbian troops with hinu
The news of these events was received with rejoicing at
Bogota ; Santander pronounced his approval of the con
duct of the troops. All were tired of Bolivar.

PRjETORIANISM. 467
' Columbia had been an efficient war machine in the hands
of Bolivar by which the independence of South America was
secured, but was an anachronism as a nation. The
interests of the different sections were antagonistic, and
the military organization given to the country only
strengthened the germs of disorder. Venezuela and New
Granada were geographically marked out as independent
nations. Quito from historical antecedents aspired to
autonomy. Had Bolivar abstained from his dreams of
conquest, and devoted his energies to the consolidation of
his own "country, he might perhaps have organized it into
one nation under a federal form of government, but that
was not a task suited to his genius. When his own
bayonets turned against him he went so far as to despair
of the Republican system altogether, and sought the pro
tection of a foreign King for the last fragment of his
shattered Monocracy.
On the 9th April, 1828, he assembled a Convention at
Ocafia for the reform of the Constitution of 1821. The
partisans of Santander were in a majority, and the Conven
tion "Was dissolved on the 10th June by the desertion of the
partisans of Bolivar.
On the 13th June a popular Junta assembled at Bogota,
at which GeneraTCordoba proposed the re-establishment of
the Dictatorship in the person of Bolivar. Bolivar
accepted the office, and suppressed that of Vice-President.
Military rule became dominant, those who opposed the
measure were banished as disturbers of public order, the
study of political economy was prohibited in the Uni
versities, and liberty of [ the press was suspended, but
Bolivar promised to convene another Constituent Congress
a year from that1 time. According to Gervinus, the
Liberator now tore off the mask and showed the vulgar
ambition which lay beneath, yet he was not a tyrant, he
was simply a despot driving he knew not whither.
- The young men talked of the dagger of Brutus, but an
attempt to assassinate him failed, and the principal con-
H H 2

468 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
spirators died on the gibbet. Santander, who had joined
the conspiracy but had opposed the assassination, was sent
into exile.
The Columbian troops which had mutinied in Peru
brought civil war to Guayaquil. Rebellion broke out in
the Province of Pasto. Bolivar declared war against Peru.
Peru sent a fleet and an army and captured Guayaquil.*
Their army was defeated by Sucre, but Bolivar, after losing
3,000 men in the marshes in an attempt to retake the city,
made peace.
Bolivar had appealed in vain to the Ministers of the
United States and of Great Britain to interfere for the
prevention of anarchy. He now proposed to Colonel
Campbell, the British charge' d'affaires, to appoint a
Prince of some one of the reigning families of Europe
King of Columbia. Many of the chief dignitaries of
Bogota accepted this idea, and came to an understanding
on the point with Messrs Campbell and Bresson, the
diplomatic agents of Great Britain and France, but Bolivar,
three months after he knew of this, suddenly told them in
September, 1829, that the idea could not be carried out,
and that it was necessary to separate Venezuela from
Columbia. The idea of a monarchy found no acceptance with the
people. On the 14th September a rebellion, headed by
General Cordoba, broke out at Antioquia, but was crushed,
and Cordoba was brutally murdered. At the end of this
year, Venezuela declared herself an independent Republic,
under the Presidency of General Paez, and pronounced
sentence of perpetual exile against Bolivar.
On the 30th January, 1 830, Bolivar convened at Bogota
the Constituent Congress he had promised, and concluded
his message : —
" I blush to say that independence is the only good thing
we have gained by the sacrifice of all else."
He then retired to his country-house at Fucha ; never-
* Admiral Guise, who commanded the Peruvian fleet, was killed in the
attack. — Tr.

RESIGNATION OF BOLIVAR. 469
theless a party, strong both in Congress and among the
people, desired his re-election, and he for some time
expected it, but seeing that the bulk even of his old
friends opposed it, he on the 27th April sent in a formal
resignation, couched in very simple terms, which was
accepted. Don Joaquin Mosquera, leader of the Liberal party, was
elected President, but Congress decreed that Bolivar " was
the first and best citizen of Columbia," and assigned him a
pension of 30,000 dollars a year, for his great wealth had
all disappeared.

EPILOGUE.

Posterity has pronounced judgment upon the two libe
rators of South America, upon San Martin and upon
Bolivar. They were both great men, the greatest after Wash
ington that America has produced. Both fulfilled their
mission. The one gave the first signal for a continental
war, the other carried it to a glorious termination. With
out San Martin at the South and Bolivar at the North it
is impossible to conceive how the forces of the revolution
could have worked together towards one end ; neither is it
possible to conceive how one could have completed his
task without the other. Nevertheless, as politicians both
went astray; neither reached the level of the public opinion
of their day, and both failed to comprehend the instincts of
the masses they led. They were military leaders only, and
knew not how to direct the organic evolution of the peoples.
Time, which dissipates false and enhances true glory,
has thrown much light upon matters which during their
lifetime seemed obscure. Their outlines are now seen
clearly against the horizon of history ; they stand forth as
symbols of the epoch which gave birth to a new republican
world, the greatest political phenomenon of the nineteenth
century. The Argentine Republic and Chile, led by San Martin,
were victorious in the South, and carried their arms from
sea to sea, and from the temperate zone to the equator.

THE EMANCIPATORS OF SOUTH AMERICA. 471
There the entire forces of the revolution of South America
joined hands; there the two liberators embraced, and
separated for ever.
Columbia, led by Bolivar, gave victory to the revolution
in the North ; secured the independence of Peru and
Bolivia, and guaranteed that of the other Republics of the
Southern Continent. San Martin yielded the completion
of the task to Bolivar, and by his abdication gave a high
example of civic virtue. Bolivar crowned the work ; the
triumph belongs to both. Their fate was equal, both died
in exile.
The fate of the emancipators of South America is tragical.
The first revolutionists of La Paz and of Quito died on the
scaffold. Miranda, the apostle of liberty, betrayed by his
own people to his enemies, died alone and naked in a
-dungeon. Moreno, the priest of the Argentine revolution,
and the teacher of the democratic idea, died at sea and
found a grave in the ocean. Hidalgo, the first popular
leader of Mexico, was executed as a criminal. Belgrano,
the first champion of Argentine independence, who saved
the revolution at Tucuman and Salta, died obscurely, while
civil war raged round him. O'Higgins, the hero of Chile,
died in exile, as Carrera his rival had done before him.
Iturbide, the real liberator of Mexico, fell a victim to his
own ambitior. Montufar, the leader of the revolution in
Quito, and his comrade Villavicencio, promoter of that of
Cartagena, were strangled. The first Presidents of New
Granada, Losano and Torres, fell sacrifices to the restora
tion of colotial terrorism. Piar, who found the true base
for the insurrection in Columbia, was shot by Bolivar, to
whom he had shown the way to victory. Rivadavia, the
civil genius of South America, who gave form to her repre
sentative institutions, died in exile. Sucre, the conqueror
of Ayacucho, was murdered by his own men on a lonely
road. Boiivar and San Martin died in banishment.
San Martin when he saw that his life's work was accom
plished, left Mendoza for Buenos Ayres, where he was
received with indifference and contempt. Neither country

472 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
wife, nor home, was left to him, there was not even a place
in the Argentine Army for the man who had led the armies
of three Republics to victory. At the close of the year
1823 he took his orphan daughter in his arms and retired
into exile. In Europe he found himself penniless. Five
years later he returned to Buenos Ayres, seeking to end
his days in his native country ; the war with Brazil had
just concluded.
On the 12th February, 1829, the anniversary of his
triumphs at San Lorenzo and at Chacabuco, the ship which
carried him anchored in the roadstead, and he was greeted
with this contemptuous denunciation in the city press : —
" General San Martin has returned to his native country
after five years' absence, but after knowing that peace
was concluded with the Emperor of Brazil."
His answer had been given two thousand years before,
by the mouth of Scipio, when he was insulted by his fellow
countrymen on the anniversary of one of his great battles : —
" On such a day as this I saved Rome."
San Martin did not repeat this answer, he returned in
silence into exile. His reply was given frjom the tomb
many years later : — I
" I desire that my heart may rest in Bueno^ Ayres."
Bolivar, after his last resignation was accepted, retired
to the neighbourhood of Cartagena, and there heard of the
death of Sucre, who had written to him two years previously,
that unless they withdrew in time they would lose their
heads. He was dying, but still indulged ambitious designs.
He had prophesied anarchy and it came. He looked on
complacently, and even encouraged it, but was greatly
mortified by a notification from his friend Mosquera, that
Venezuela demanded his banishment as a condition of
peace. "No, no, I will not go dishonoured," he exclaimed.
His partisans said that he alone could restore quietude,
and they seemed right. Part of Venezuela and New
Granada rose in arms to demand the re-establi^hment of
his dictatorship. Quito and Guayaquil separated from

DEATH OF BOLIVAR. 475
Columbia, and in May, 1830, formed themselves into an
independent State, under the name of The Republic of
Ecuador. At Bogota the Government of Mosquera was upset, and
civil war broke out. The friends of Bolivar, triumphant in
the capital under Urdaneta, called upon him to put himself
at their head, and to re-establish the Union of Columbia.
He was weak enough to accept the invitation. Death
saved him from the disgrace of becoming a leader in an
internecine war between States to which he had given
independence. His sickness increasing, he retired to Santa Marta to
breathe the fresh sea air. At the Quinta of San Pedro,
seven miles from that city, he breathed his last. Seated
in an arm-chair to receive extreme unction, his last words
addressed to the Columbian people, which had been written
down to his dictation, were read over to him : —
" My wishes are for the happiness of my country. If my
death weaken the divisions, and help to consolidate union,
I shall go to the tomb content."
He added in a hoarse voice : —
" Yes, to the tomb, to which I am sent by my fellow-
citizens, but I forgive them. Oh ! that I could take with
me the consolation of knowing that they will keep united."
These were the last sensible words that he was heard to
speak. Delirium supervened, and he died on the 17th
December, 1831, at the age of forty-seven years four
months and twenty-three days.
In October, 1832, San Martin, then resident in France,
was attacked by cholera. He was living in great poverty
on the proceeds of the sale of the house given him by the
Argentine Congress after the victory of Maipo. He thought
he was to die in a hospital. The Spanish banker Aguada,
who had been a comrade of his in the Peninsular War,
came to his assistance, saved his life, and relieved his
distress. He gave him the small country-house of Grand
Bourg, on the banks of the Seine, close to that old elm
which, according to tradition, was planted by the soldiers

474 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
of Henry IV., when besieging Paris. There, surrounded
by trees and flowers which he tended himself, he passed
many quiet years, complaining sometimes of the ingratitude
of men, deploring the sad state of the peoples for whom he
had done so much, but never despairing of their destiny.
•Once only did his old enthusiasm blaze out. He thought
the independence and honour of his country were threat
ened by France and England in the questions of 1845 —
1849, and came from his seclusion to show that America
could not be conquered by Europe. Subsequently, in his
will, he left his sword to the Argentine Dictator : —
"As1 a proof of the satisfaction with which I, as an
Argentine, have seen the firmness of General Rozas in
defending the honour of the Republic against the unjust
pretensions of the foreigners who sought her humiliation."
As the end approached, his eyes were obscured by
cataract. Reading, which was with him a passion, was
forbidden him. He went to Boulogne to breathe the sea
•air, as Bolivar had done. On the 13th August, 1850, as
he was standing on the beach, gazing with dim eyes over
the Channel, he felt the first mortal symptom. He pressed
his hand to his heart, and with a feeble smile said to his
faithful daughter : — " C'est l'orage qui mene au port." On
the 17th of the same month he died in her arms, at the age
of seventy-two years and six months.
Chile and the Argentine Republic have raised statues to
him. Peru owes him one, which she has decreed. The
Argentine people, now united and consolidated as he
desired, brought back his mortal remains to his own
country, and in May, 1 880, laid them to rest in the Cathedral
of Buenos Ayres, as those of the greatest man among them.
In San Martin and Bolivar were combined, in unequal
proportions, the two elements which make history : the
active element which produces immediate effect in deeds,
and the passive element from which springs the future. The
effect of their combination marks the present and influences
posterity. The political work of Bolivar died with him ;
that of San Martin lives after him ; South America has

DEATH OF SAN MARTIN. 475
organized itself as foreshadowed by his genius, within the
geographical lines he drew out with his sword.
The Argentine Republic instructed her General :—
"That no idea of oppression or conquest carried her
arms beyond her territory ; that the independence of the
United Provinces was the purpose of the campaign."
Thus, when Chile was free, alliance was made with her
on the basis of their mutual independence. Nations were
emancipated and left to work out their destinies themselves.
This was the work of San Martin as a liberator, and has
produced an international equilibrium in South America,
to which Europe has not yet attained,
A very different plan was followed by Bolivar. Under
his leadership frontiers disappeared ; Venezuela, New
Granada, and Quito, became one giant nation, powerful for
war, but intrinsically weak from lack of geographical and
social cohesion. Bolivar freed Peru from Spain, only to
make her a parasite of Columbia, and of Upper Peru he
made a feudal territory dependent upon himself. He tried
to establish a monocratic empire in opposition to natural
laws and to the tendencies of the Revolution ; to bring
back the colonial system in defiance of the democratic
instincts of the people.
In Bolivia the two systems met face to face. The Argen
tine Republic, true to her principles, yielded her historic
rights over that territory and recognised the independence
of Upper Peru, but she barred the further progress of
Bolivar, who sought to impose his own system on Para
guay. The ephemeral structure of the monocracy fell to
pieces by its own weight, and the whole of the Continent
became definitely organized on the geographical system
represented by San Martin.
The glory of Bolivar is imperishable, and his action as a
liberator was more decisive in his day, but none of his
designs or of his ideals survived him. The work of San
Martin remains an enduring monument to his memory.
The chief characteristic of San Martin was his dis
interestedness. He struggles, destroys, and rebuilds as he

476 THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.
can ; he commands, obeys, abdicates, and condemns him
self to eternal silence and eternal exile. Seldom has the
influence of one man had more decisive effect on the
destinies of a people. The greatness of those who attain
to immortality is not measured by their talents, but by the
effect exercised by their memory upon the conscience
of humanity, making it vibrate from generation to genera
tion with a passion or with an idea. Of such was San
Martin, whose influence still lives, not by reason of any
genius he possessed, but by reason of his character.
San Martin conceived great plans, political and military,
which appeared at first to be folly, but when believed in
became facts. He organized disciplined armies, and
infused into them his own spirit. He founded republics,
not for his own aggrandisement, but that men might live
in freedom. He made himself powerful, only that by this
power he might accomplish his destined task ; he abdicated
and went into exile, not from egoism or from cowardice,
but in homage to his own principles and for the sake of his
cause. He is the first captain in the New World, the only
one who has given lessons in modern strategy on a new
theatre of war. With all his intellectual deficiencies and
his political errors the Revolution of South America has
produced no other who was his equal.
Faithful to the maxims of his life, HE WAS THAT WHICH
HE OUGHT TO BE, and rather than be that which he ought not
to be he preferred TO BE nothing. For this his name
shall be immortal.

TRANSLATOR'S APPENDIX.

" The sole purpose for which the Americans existed was held to be
that of collecting together the precious metals for the Spaniards; and
if the wild horses and cattle which overrun the country could have
been trained to perform this office the inhabitants might have been
altogether dispensed with, and the colonial system would then have
been perfect. Unfortunately, however, for that system, the South
-Americans . . . finding that the Spaniards neither could nor would
furnish them with an adequate supply of European products, invited
•the assistance of other nations. To this call the other nations were not
slow to listen, and in process of time there was established one of the
most extraordinary systems of organized smuggling which the world
fever saw. This was known under the name of the contraband or
-forced trade, and was carried on in armed vessels, well manned, and
-prepared to fight their way to the coast, and to resist the coast
blockades of Spain. This singular system of warlike commerce was
conducted by the Dutch, Portuguese, French, English, and latterly
!by the North Americans. In this way goods to an immense value
¦were distributed over South America, and . . . along with the goods
i no small portion of knowledge found entrance, in spite of the increased
exertions of the Inquisition. . . . Many foreigners, too, by means of
-bribes and other arts, succeeded in getting into the country, so that
the progress of intelligence was encouraged, to the utter despair of the
Spaniards, who knew no other method of governing the colonies but
that of brute force." — From the Journal of Captain Basil Hall,
R.N., F.R.S., on the Coasts of Chile, Peru, and Mexico, in the years
.1820, 1821, 1822.

478 TRANSLATOR'S APPENDIX.

II.
Captain Basil Hall, who paid a visit to San Martin, in the month
of June, 1821, on board the schooner Montezuma, then at anchor in
the Callao Roads, thus describes his personal appearance : —
" General San Martin is a tall, erect, well-proportioned, handsome
man, with a large aquiline nose, thick black hair and immense bushy
whiskers, extending from ear to ear under the chin ; his complexion
is deep olive, and his eye, which is large, prominent, and piercing,,
jet black; his whole appearance being highly military. He is
thoroughly well bred, and unaffectedly simple in his manners ;.
exceedingly cordial and engaging, and possessed evidently of great
kindliness of disposition ; in short, I have never seen any person the
enchantment of whose address was more irresistible."

III.
" It has been stated that the filling of the tubes was, from motives
of parsimony, entrusted to Spanish prisoners, who, as was found on
examination, had embraced every opportunity of inserting handfuls
of sand, sawdust, and even manure at intervals in the tubes, thus
impeding the progress of combustion ; whilst in the majority of
instances they had so thoroughly mixed the neutralizing matter with
the ingredients supplied, that the charge would not ignite at all, the
result being complete failure in the object of the expedition." —
Autobiography of a Seaman, by Lord Dundonald.

IV.
"... This bridge is curious from its simplicity, and from the
close resemblance it bears to the iron bridges of suspension recently
introduced into England, to which, in principle, it is precisely similar.
It consists of a narrow roadway of plariks, laid crosswise, with their
ends resting on straight ropes, suspended by means of short lines to
a set of thicker ropes drawn across the stream from bank to bank.

BASIL HALL'S OPINION OF SAN MARTIN. 479.
These strong sustaining cords are six in number, three at each side
of the bridge, and hang in flat curves, one above another, the short
vertical lines supporting the roadway being so disposed as to distri
bute the weight equally. The main or suspending ropes are firmly
secured to the angles of the rock on one side at the height of thirty
feet from the stream ; but the opposite bank being low, it has been
found necessary to correct the consequent inclination in some degree,
by carrying the ropes over a high wooden framework, and attaching
them afterwards to trees and to posts driven into the bank. The
clear span from the frame or pier on one side to the face of the rock
on the other is one hundred and twenty-three feet. The materials
being very elastic the bridge waved up and down with our weight,
and vibrated from side to side in so alarming a manner that, at the
recommendation of the guide, we dismounted and drove our horses,
one by one, before us ; but it must be owned, neither man nor horse
appeared much at ease during the passage." — Journal of Captain
Basil Hall.

V.
"... How far his professions were sincere, or, if sincere, his-
plans were wise, it is now very difficult to say. They certainly
appeared to many people very judicious at the time, and they were
uniformly followed by the success which he anticipated.
"... On the 25th June I had an interview with General San
Martin, on board a little schooner anchored in Callao Roads. . . .
There was little at first sight in his appearance to engage attention ;
but when he rose up and began to speak, his great superiority over
every other person I had seen in South America -was sufficiently-
apparent. He received us in a very homely style, on the deck of his
vessel, dressed in a surtout coat and a large fur cap, seated at a table
made of a few loose planks laid along the top of two empty casks.
"... Several persons came on board privately from Lima, to
discuss the state of affairs, upon which occasion his views and feelings
were distinctly stated : and I saw nothing, in his conduct afterwards
to cast a doubt upon the sincerity with which he then spoke. The
contest in Peru, he said, was not of an ordinary description ; not a
war of conquest and glory, but entirely of opinion ; it was a war of

480 TRANSLATOR'S APPENDIX.
new and liberal principles against prejudice, bigotry, and tyranny.
People ask why I don't march to Lima at once ; so I might, and
instantly would, were it suitable to my views, which it is not. I do
not want military renown ; I have no ambition to be the conqueror
of Peru ; I want solely to liberate the country from oppression. Of
what use would Lima be to me, if the inhabitants were hostile in
political sentiment? How could the cause of independence be
advanced by my holding Lima, or even the whole country, in
¦military possession ? Far different are my views. I wish to have
all men thinking with me, and do not choose to advance a step
beyond the march of public opinion.
"... I have been gaining, day by day, fresh allies in the hearts
of the people, the only certain allies in such a war.
"... Public opinion is an engine newly introduced into this
country; the Spaniards, who are utterly incapable of directing it, have
prohibited its use ; but they shall now experience its strength and
importance. "... When all was quiet in the capital I went to Callao,
and hearing that San Martin was in the Roads, waited on him on
board his yacht. I found him possessed of correct information as to
all that was passing; but he seemed in no hurry to enter the city, and
appeared, above all things, anxious to avoid any appearance of acting
the part of a conqueror. ' For the last ten years,' said he, ' I have
been unremittingly employed against the Spaniards, or rather, in
favour of this country, for I am not against any one who is not hostile
to the cause of independence. All I wish is that this country should
be managed by itself, and by itself alone. As to the manner in which
it is to be governed that belongs not at all to me. I propose simply
to give the people the means of declaring themselves independent,
and of establishing a suitable form of government ; after which I
shall consider I have done enough, and leave them.'" — Journal of
Captain Basil Hall.

VI.
In January, 1891, a number of Venezuelans presented the city of
New York with a painting commemorative of this deed iof arms, in
token of their gratitude for honours paid to the memory of their hero,
who died an exile in that city.

BATTLElOF CARABOBO. 481
This painting is thus described in the Tribune : —
"The canvas is 9 J- by 15^ feet in size, and was brought to this
country mounted and handsomely framed. It represents the famous
cavalry manoeuvre of General Paez at the battle of Queseras del
Medio. In this battle General Paez took 119 men, about half his
force, and started to meet the Spanish cavalry. As the latter ad
vanced Paez turned his men in full retreat toward a thicket where he
had concealed the rest of his force. At the ambuscade Paez suddenly
turned and charged the Spaniards, who fled in terror. The artist
has pictured the scene at this moment. The general is mounted on
a superb horse, which he has pulled sharply back on its haunches as
he gives the order, ' Vuelvan cara! ' (face about), On one side are
his troopers, rough-looking fellows, carrying long-handled spears;
their clothing, saddles, trappings, and equipments are all characteristic
of their country. In the distance the Spanish cavalry are seen charg
ing, in ignorance of the trap, into which they are about to fall. The
Venezuelan artist, Michelena, who received his education in Paris,
has found abundant room for vivid colouring in the tropical landscape
and sky, and the gaudy garments of his figures."

VII.
The following account of the battle of Carabobo was written by an
officer of the British legion, and was published in All the Year
Round. " We halted at dusk on the 23rd at the foot of the ridge. The
rain fell in torrents all night, and reminded us of the night before
Waterloo. Next morning the sky was cloudless when we stood to
arms, and presently Bolivar sent us the order to advance. We were
moving to get round the enemy's right flank, where his guns and
infantry were partly hidden by trees and broken ground. Bolfvar,
after reconnoitring, ordered us to attack by a deep ravine between
the Spanish infantry and artillery. The enemy's guns opened fire and
our men began to fall. Meantime the Bravos de Apure had advanced
within pistol-shot of the Spaniards, and received such a murderous
volley from 3,000 muskets that they broke and fled back in disorder
upon us.
" It was a critical moment, but we managed to keep our ground
II

482 TRANSLATOR'S APPENDIX.
till the fugitives had got through our ranks back into the ravine, and
then our grenadier company, gallantly led by Captain Minchin,
formed up and poured in their fire upon the Spaniards, who were
only a few paces from them. Checked by this volley, the enemy fell
back a little, while our men, pressing eagerly on, formed and delivered
their fire, company after company.
" Receding before our fire and the long line of British bayonets,
the Spaniards fell back to the position from which they had rushed
in pursuit of the Apure Bravos. But from thence they kept up a
tremendous fire upon us, which we returned as rapidly as we could.
As they outnumbered us in the ratio of four to one, and were strongly
posted and supported by guns, we waited for reinforcements before
storming their position. Not a man, however, came to help us, and
after an hour passed in this manner our ammunition failed. It then
really seemed to be all over with us. We tried as best we could to
make signals of our distress ; the men kept springing their ramrods,
and Colonel Thomas Ferrier, our commanding officer, apprized
General Paez of our situation, and called on him to get up a supply
of cartridges. It came at last, but by this many of our officers and
men had fallen, and among them Colonel Ferrier. You may imagine
we were not long in breaking open the ammunition boxes ; the men
numbered off anew, and after delivering a couple of volleys we pre
pared to charge. At this moment our cavalry, passing as before by
our right flank, charged, with General Paez at their head. They
went on very gallantly, but soon came galloping back, and passed
again to our rear, without having done any execution on the enemy,
while they had themselves suffered considerably.
" Why Bolfvar at this time, and indeed during the period since
our first advance, sent us no support I have never been able to guess.
Whatever the motive, it is certain that the second and third divisions
of the army quietly looked on while we were being slaughtered, and
made no attempt to help us. The curses of our men were loud and
deep, but seeing that they must not expect any help they made up
their minds to carry the enemy's position or perish. Out of nine
hundred men we had not above six hundred left. Captain Scott,
who succeeded Colonel Ferrier, had fallen, and had bequeathed the
command to Captain Minchin ; and the colours of the regiment had
seven times changed hands, and had been literally cut to ribands,
and dyed with the blood of the gallant fellows who carried them.
But, in spite of all this, the word was passed to charge with the

BATTLE OF CARABOBO. 483
bayonet, and on we went, keeping our line as steadily as on a parade
day, and with a loud " hurrah" we were upon them. I must do the
Spaniards the justice to say that they met us gallantly, and the
struggle was for a brief time fierce, and the event doubtful. But the
bayonet in the hands of British soldiers, more especially such a for
lorn hope as we were, is irresistible. The Spaniards, five to one as
they were, began to give ground, and at last broke and fled.
" Then it was, and not till then, that two companies of the Tira-
dores came up to our help, and our cavalry, hitherto of little use,
fiercely pursued the retreating enemy.

" The remains of the corps passed before the Liberator with
trailed arms at double quick, and received with a cheer, but without
halting, his words, ' Salvadores de mi Patria ! ' "

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES.

Alvarado was in the year 1827 banished from Peru in conse
quence of the jealousy of the Peruvians of their Argentine allies. In
1829 he was for a month Governor of Mendoza, but was driven out
by Aldao. In 183 1 he was for a short time Governor of Salta, and
again in 1855. He died in that city in the year 1872.
Arenales. — This stout old soldier was from 1824 to 1827 Gover
nor of Salta, where the remnants of the Royalist army of Olafieta
surrendered to him in 1825. He died in Bolivia in the year 1831.
Brown. — William Brown was born at Foxford, Co. Mayo, Ireland,
in the year 1777, and made his first appearance in the River Plate
as master of a trading brig which was wrecked at Ensenada. He
afterwards established the first regular sailing packet between Buenos
Ayres and Monte Video, but two years later adopted a career more in
accordance with his daring genius. In 18 14 he took command of
the first naval squadron fitted out by the Government of Buenos
Ayres. His first exploit was the capture of the island of Martin
Garcia, after which he attacked and defeated the Spanish fleet
stationed at Monte Video ; and his subsequent blockade of that port
compelled the garrison to surrender to General Alvear, who was then
besieging the city. After his cruise in the Pacific, recounted in
Chapter X., he went to the West Indies, where his ship was seized
and confiscated by the British naval authorities, on the plea that he
was a pirate. After a vain attempt to procure redress in England he
returned to Buenos Ayres, where he lived quietly, till in January,
1826, he again took command of the Argentine squadron, and drove

BROWN— COCHRANE— GUEMES. 485
off the Brazilian fleet, which was blockading Buenos Ayres. During
this and the following year he fought several desperate actions against
greatly superior forces, and invariably came off with honour. In
1842 he was in command of the Argentine squadron, which totally
destroyed the Uruguayan flotilla at Costa Brava, which was led by
Garibaldi, and afterwards blockaded the port of Monte Video, till in
August, 1845, his ships were confiscated by the British and French
naval squadrons, without any declaration of war.
After that he lived in retirement at his country-house in the suburbs
of the city of Buenos Ayres, till the 3rd May, 1857, when he died,
surrounded by his family, and was buried at the cemetery of the
Recoleta, where a fine monument to his memory was afterwards
erected by his widow.

Cochrane, the eldest son of the ninth Earl of Dundonald, was
bom at Annesfield, Lanarkshire, on the 14th December, 1775. After
leaving Chile he entered the service of Brazil, and again distinguished
himself by deeds of daring, which were as ill-requited as were his
exploits on the Pacific. In 1825 he returned to England, where he
found his popularity had grown during his absence, but soon after
joined in the struggle for the independence of Greece, when for the
first time in his career he found no opportunity of distinguishing
himself. At the accession of William IV, he received tardy and imperfect
reparation for the injustice from which he had suffered. His rank in
the British Navy was restored to him, and in 1831 he succeeded his
father in the Earldom of Dundonald. In 1841 he became Vice-
Admiral of the Blue. During the Crimean War he presented to
Government a plan for the total destruction of the Russian fleet,
which was not accepted. He died at Kensington on the 30th Octo
ber, i860, and was buried in Westminster Abbey.
Guemes was Governor of Salta from May, 18 15, to May, 1820.
In the former year he made himself master of the city and Province
of Jujui also, and refused to recognise the authority of the National
Government, and even went so far as to harass the march of the
Army of the North, which was then retreating from Upper Peru,
under command of General Rondeau. But the citizens of Jujui
refused to obey him, and he was outlawed by Rondeau, who seized

486 BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES.
the city of Salta, but came to a peaceable understanding with him in
the following year.
In 182 1 he led an expedition from Salta against Tucuman, in
conjunction with another expedition from Jujui, but was defeated.
On his return he found the citizens of Salta in insurrection against
him, but their army passed over to him, and he easily re-established
his authority. In June of that year the city of Salta was captured
by a party of Royalists under Valdes. After nightfall he rode with
a small escort into the principal square, not knowing what had
occurred, and was received by a volley. He was severely wounded,
but kept his seat in the saddle, and returned to his encampment,
where he died ten days afterwards.
Las Heras was in April, 1824, elected Governor of the Province
of Buenos Ayres, in succession to Don Martin Rodriguez, under
whose beneficent mle the country had made great progress. Las Heras
followed in the steps of his predecessor, but was in March, 1826, de
posed by the National Constituent Congress, which assumed the
powers of a sovereign congress, and decreed the federalization of the
province. Las Heras refused to listen to those of his friends who
wished him to resist this unconstitutional proceeding, and retired into
private life. He died in Chile in the year 1866, in the eighty-sixth
year of his age.
Lavalle, after the conclusion of the War of Independence, returned
to Buenos Ayres, and commanded a division in the Argentine army,
which was sent against Brazil in the year 1826. At Ituzaingo he
again displayed the same reckless daring for which he was distinguished
in Chile and in Peru. In November, 1828, he returned to Buenos
Ayres, after the conclusion of the war, in command of the first division
of the army, and encamped to the north of the city. On the ist De
cember he headed a revolt by which Don Manuel Dorrego, who was
then Governor, was deposed, and was named Provisional Governor
in his stead. On the 9th of the same month he completely defeated
the Government forces at Navarro, and on the 13th ordered the sum
mary execution of Dorrego, who had been taken prisoner the day pre
vious. On the 26th April in the following year he was attacked at
the Puente Marquez by greatly superior forces under Rozas and Lopez,
but maintained the unequal fight till sundown. He eventually came
to terms with Rozas, and retired to Monte Video. Some years after-

LAVALLE — MILLER — PAEZ. 487
wards he joined the Argentine refugees in that city in a conspiracy
against the Dictatorship of Rozas, and in 1840 headed an expedition
into Argentine territory, where, after several defeats, he was on the 9th
October, 1841, killed by a scouting party of Government troops near
to the Bolivian frontier.

Miller was born at Wingham, Kent, in the year 1796. For four
years he served in the Royal Artillery, under Wellington, in Spain. In
the year 1817 he went out to Buenos Ayres with the intention, of en
gaging in commercial pursuits, but was diverted from that intention
by an English lady then resident in that city, who said to him, "Were
I a young man I would never abandon the profession of arms for one
of mere money-making." He was presented to Don Juan Martin
Pueyrredon, who gave him a letter of introduction to General San
Martin, who gave him a commission in the artillery under Colonel
Plaza, with whom he was present at the disaster of Cancha-Rayada.
In 1826 Miller returned to England, and met with a very flattering
Teception. In 1844, and again in 1851, he represented the British
Government in the Sandwich Islands. In the latter year he returned
to Peru, where he enjoyed the title of Grand Marshal of Ayacucho,
and died on board H. M.S. Naiad 'at Callao on the 31st October, 1861,
and was buried in the English cemetery. Before his burial two bullets
were extracted from his body, which showed the marks of twenty-two
wounds. Necochea was banished from Peru in 1826, at the same time as
Alvarado and other Argentine officers, but afterwards returned to
Lima, and died at Miraflores near to that city in the year 1849. He
also was a Marshal in the Peruvian army.
O'Higgins never returned to Chile after his banishment, and died
at Lima on the 24th October, 1842, in the seventy-third year of his
age. In the year 1869 his remains were taken back to his native
¦country, and in 1872 an equestrian statue of him was erected in the
.great square of Santiago.
pAEZ.  In the year 183 1 Paez was elected first Constitutional Pre
sident of the Independent Republic of Venezuela, and remained in
office for four years. In 1838 he was again elected President, and

488 BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES.
was presented by Congress with a sword of honour. He also in the
same year received another sword of honour from William IV., King
of Great Britain and Ireland. In 1842 he brought back the remains
of Bolfvar from New Granada, and buried them with great pomp at
Caracas, the natal city of the Liberator. In 1843 he again retired
into private life, but in 1850 took part in a revolutionary movement,
brought on by the mal-administration of President Monagas, in con
sequence of which he was banished from the country, and retired to
the city of New York, where he died in the year 1874. His remains
were some years afterwards taken back to his native country, and
re-interred with the honours due to his illustrious services.

INDEX.

Abascal, 96, 117, 118, 166, 225,
226, 416
Action of America upon Europe, 25
 the Revolution, 459
Affiliation of the Revolution of
South America, 13
Aldao, 125, 247, 248, 261, 262
Alvarez Jonte, 86, 192, 228
Alvear, 34, 36, 44, 47, 50, 61, 62,
78, 79, no, 462
Alvarado, 127, 137, 147, 170, 176,
178, 183, 195, 215, 217, 218, 241,
242, 250, 251, 285, 426, 427, 420,
. 43^. 433. 434. 435. 437> 447. 4°2
Arenales, 67, 69, 234, 241, 243, 246,
247, 248, 251, 261, 262, 263, 276,
410, 432, 435, 446, 485
Arismendi, 327, 345, 352, 357, 365,
369.373.374.376,380,398
Armistice of Punchauca, 256
 Trujillo, 400
Array of the Andes, 125, 136, 448
 Apure, 368, 400
 Centre, 372, 374
Arrival of MoriUo's Expedition at
Cumana, 356
Assassination of Rodriguez, 183
 Monteagudo, 460
Atero, 140, 141
Aymerich, 237, 320, 406, 408, 411,
412

Balcarce, A. G., 61, 125, 164
 Marcos, 61, 102, 169,
177. !94

Barafiao, 103, 148

Baraya, ^17,319, 363
Barreiro, 393, 394, 396, 397, 398
Battle of Ambato, 408, 415
 Aragua, 3j3
 Araure, 340
 Ayacucho, 456
 Ayohuma, 61
 Balaga, 361
 Barbula, 335
 Boca-Chica, 348
—  Bomboni, 409
 Boyaca, 397
 Calabozo, 384
 Carabobo, 348, 402
 Cepeda, 218
 Chacabuco, 147
 Cojedes, 385
 El Cerrito, 53
 El Gavilan, 153
 El Roble, 10 1
 Guadalito, 367, 377
 Hogaza, 382
 Huamanga, 248
 Jenay, 406
 -Junin, 451
 La Florida, 70
 La Puerta, 344, 349, 385
 Las Trincheras, 335
 Las Queseras del Medio,
393
 Maipo, 106, 177, 178, 179
 Matasiete, 381
 Mocha, 319
 Moquegua, 434
 ¦ Mosquitero, 338 ,
 Ocumare, 347, 371
 Ospino, 344

KK

49°

INDEX.

Battle of Pasco, 247
 Quebrada- Honda, 372
 Pichincha, 412
 Pitayo, 406
 Playon del Juncal, 3J3
 Salta, 60
 San Carlos, 98
 San Felix, 377
 San Lorenzo, 58
 San Marcos, 341
 Suipacha, 37
 Torata, 434
 Tucuman, 50
 Unare, 375
 Urica, 351
 Vargas, 396
 Vilcapugio, 61
 Yahuachi, 408
 Zepita, 439
Beauchef, 156, 207, 208
Belgrano, 49, 52, 60, 6i, 62, 73,
129, 163, 214, 471
Beltran, 127, 140, 142
Bermudez, Jose F., 325, 328, 349,
350. 35ij 352. 357>
359. 369, 372. 374.
376, 379. 381, 386,
387, 401, 404
 Bernardo, 325, 328
Blanco-Encalada, 104, 178, 188,
190, 191, 193, 200, 202, 203, 291
Bog'ado, 59
Bolivar, 118, 143, 164, 180, 185,
196, 231, 233, 236, 252,
270, 282, 285, 293, 294,
295
 His person, parentage,
and education, 301 ; his mar
riage, return, and second trip to
Europe, 301 ; his mission to
London, 302 ; his character, 303 ;
meets Miranda, 303 ; returns
with him to Caracas, 304 ; is
present at the capture of Valen
cia, 306 ; is placed in command
at Puerto-Cabello, 309 ; is de
serted by his troops and flies,
309 ; at La Guayra he with others
imprisons Miranda, 311 ; he is
allowed to leave the country,
311 ; retires to Curagoa, 321 , is
appointed to a command by Car

tagena, 321 ; commences to
show his genius, 321 ; conceives
the idea of reconquering Vene
zuela, 322 ; crosses the moun
tains and wins his first victory,
322 ; publishes a memorial, 322 ;
Government accepts his idea,
329 ; makes him a brigadier-
general, 330 ; he publishes a
decree of extermination against
Spaniards, 330 ; and defeats
the Royalists in several engage
ments, 332 ; synopsis of his
campaign, 333 ; he enters Cara
cas in triumph, 333 ; and gives
himself the title of " Liberator,"
334 ; he lays siege to Puerto-
Cabello, 334 ; fulminates an
other decree against American
Royalists, 334 ; defeats the
Royalists at Las Trincheras,
335 ; institutes the military order
of " The Liberators," 336 ; is
defeated at Barquisimeto, 339 ;
concentrates his troops and de
feats Ceballos at Araure, 340 ;
he marches to Puerto-Cabello,
340 ; is compelled to retire on
Valencia, 342; he convenes an
Assembly at Caracas, 343 ; re
signs his Dictatorship but is
reappointed, 344; makes a treaty
with Marino, 344 ; entrenches
himself at San Mateo, 346 ; and
repulses several attacks, 346 ;
defeats Cajigal at Carabobo,
348 ; but is himself defeated by
Boves at La Puerta, 349 ; and
retreats to Aragua, 349 ; but is
driven out by Morales and re
tires on Barcelona, 350; embarks
at Giiiria to protect treasure,
and returns to find himself pro
scribed as a traitor, on which he
gives up the treasure and retires
to Curacoa, 350 ; he returns to
New Granada, 354; is put in
command of a force sent against
Cundinamarca, takes Bogota,
and is named Captain-General,
354 ; lays siege to Cartagena,
355 ; he retires to Jamaica, 355 ;

INDEX.

491

Bolivar — continued.
publishes a memorial, 355 ; nar
rowly escapes assassination,
368; goes to Santo Domingo,
368 ; organizes an expedition at
Cayos de San Luis and sails for
the mainland, 369 ; is named
"Supreme Chief" at Margarita,
370 ; addresses a proclamation
to the people of Venezuela, 370 ;
decrees liberty to slaves, 370;
from Carupano sails to Ocumare,
371 ; is defeated by Morales and
flies to Bonaire, 371 ; and from
Giiiria returns to Haiti, 372 ; is
recalled to Barcelona, 374 ;
is defeated at Unare, 375 ;
goes to Guayana, 376 ; is
appointed to a Junta, 378 ; he
organises a flotilla, 378 ; dis
covers a conspiracy against him
and shoots Piar, 379 ; sends an
address to the Argentine people,
382 ; goes up the Orinoco, 382 ;
drives Morillo before him from
Calabozo, 384 ; and marches to
Aragua, 384 ; is defeated by
Morillo at La Puerta, 385 ; re
ceives reinforcements and drives
La Torre to San Carlos, 385 ;
his men are dispersed in a night
attack, 383 ; returns to Angos
tura, 387 ; sends Santander to
occupy Casanare, 387 ; prepares
for the convention of a Congress,
388 ; and declines the interven
tion of the Great Powers, 388 ;
is elected President of Venezuela,
389; he recruits auxiliary troops
in Europe, 390 ; and resolves to
reconquer New Granada, 393 ;
he joins Santander in Casanare,
394; and crosses the Andes, 395 ;
encamps at Sagamoso, 396 ;
fights an indecisive action at
Vargas, 396 ; and wins a com
plete victory at Boyaca, 397 ; he
enters Bogota in triumph, 397 ;
and returns to Angostura, 398 ;
Congress decrees the establish
ment of the Republic of Columbia,
399; Bolfvar is named provisional

President, 399 ; he arranges an
armistice with Morillo, 400 ; re
opens the campaign and wins a
decisive victory at Carabobo,
402 ; he enters Caracas in tri
umph, 403 ; and is named Presi
dent of Columbia, 403 ; he sends
Sucre to Guayaquil, 407 ; pro
poses to aid San Martin, 408 ;
Marches on Quito, 409 ; wins
the battle of Bombona, 409 ; and
retreats to Patia, 409 ; enters
Quito in triumph, 413 ; and goes
, on to Guayaquil, 420 ; annexes
that province to Columbia, 42 1 ;
he receives San Martin as an
honoured guest, 42 1 ; his confer
ence with San Martin, 422 ; he
offers to assist Peru, 431, 436 ;
sends Sucre to Peru with 3,000
men, 437 ; enters Lima in tri
umph, 441; Proctor's description
of him, 442 ; his projects, 443 ;
concentrates his forces at Pati
vilca, 447 ; is appointed Dictator,
449 ; he retreats to Trujillo, 450 ;
marches on Jauja, 450 ; his
cavalry routs the Royalist horse
at Junin, 451 ; he returns to Lima
and the Congress of Columbia
abrogates his extraordinary
powers, 453 ; he again collects
troops at Pativilca, 454 ; sum
mons an American Congress,
454, 460 ; his resignation is
declined, 461 ; tendency of his
policy, 462 ; his triumphal march
to Potosf, 462 ; he confers with
Argentine envoys, 463 ; founds
the Republic of Bolivia, 463 ;
character of his work, 463 ; Con
spiracy against him at Lima.
464 ; is appointed perpetual
President, 405 ; draws up a plan
for a " Grand confederation of
the Andes,' ' 465 ; he returns to
Bogoti, 466 ; summons a Con
vention at Ocafia, 467 ; becomes
a military Dictator and narrowly
escapes assassination, 467 ; de
clares war against Peru, 468 ;
he resigns office, 469 ; his life in

492

INDEX.

Bolfvar — continued.
retirement, 472; his death, 473;
his remains are brought back to
Caracas and buried there witli
great pomp by Paez in 1842, 488
Borgono, 178, 199
Boves, 308, 328, 336, 337, 338, 341,
344, 346, 347, 348, 349, 351, 353
Bowles, Captain, 164, 166
Brandzen, 235
Brayer, 155, 168, 172. 176
Brown, 78, 120, 121, 122,484
Brion, 369, 370, 372, 374, 378, 380,
387, 393
Buchardo, 121, 122
Cabot, 137, 139
Cajigal, 306, 326, 328, 331, 337,
340, 341, 347, 348, 349
Callao, description of, 201
 first attack on, 201
¦  second attack on, 204
Caldas the philosopher, 363
Calzada, 344, 347, 348, 352, 358,
361, 362, 363, 376, 371, 382, 397,
406
Camba, 229, 233, 234, 258, 266
Campbell, 391
Campo-Elias, 338, 344, 345, 346
Cancha-rayada, 104. 170
Cangallo burned, 248, 293
Canning, 6
Canterac, 243, 250, 258, 260, 263,
264, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 289,
292, 294, 380, 382, 432, 433, 434,
437. 448> 45i. 452, 455, 457
Capture of the Esmeralda, 237
 Intrepido and Rita,
369
 Maria Isabel, 191
 Resolucion, 273
 Barcelona, 376, 399
 Barinas. 332, 341,381
 Bogota, 354 •
 Calabozo, 339, 341
 Caracas, 333, 401
 ¦ Chagres and Portobelo,
404
 Chiloe, 458
 ¦ Coro, 405
 Cuman4, 328, 351, 404
=  Guayaquil, 468

Capture of Lima, 437
 •  Maracaibo, 405
 Maturin, 325, 352
 Merida, 330
 Pamplona, 361
 Popayan, 406
 Puerto-Cabello, 405
 San Carlos, 347
 San Fernando, 385, 400
 Santa Marta, 405
 Trujillo, 330
 Valdivia, 208
 Valencia, 306, 308, 332,
349
 Victoria, 372
Carrera, Jos6 Miguel, 34, 61, 91,92,
93, 97> 98> 99> I0°. I0I>
102, 103, 106, 107, 109,
no, 124, 158, 195,276
 .  Juan, Jose, 91, 92, 93,
99, 100, 101, 102, 162,
181
 Luis, 91, 92, 93, 98, 100,
103, 106, 162, 181
 Dona Javiera, 91, 162, 195
 Ignacio, 96
Castillo- Rada, 322, 329, 355, 359,
36i
Ceballos, 331, 339, 340, 341,347.
348,349
Cedefio, 352, 368, 374, 375, 376,
379.385.386
Chacabuco, description of Plain of,
144. H5
Character of Arenales, 263
 Paez, 366
 Sucre, 407
Charles, Colonel, killed at Pisco,
205
Chillin, 97, 99, 101, 103
Chiloe, 97, 98, 101, 151, 209, 458
Chincha, fever at, 266
Civil war in Chile, 106
 New Granada, 320,355
Cochrane, 192, 193, 200, 201, 202,
203, 204, 206, 207,208,
209,212,219,231,232, 234,236,237,238,239,240,251, 265, 266,267,
269,270,272,273,277,
280, 287, 288, 289, 290,
291, 485

INDEX.

493

Cochrane attempts a private treaty
with La Mar, 273
Colonial Policy, 10
Colonisation of Spanish America, 7
 North America, 9
 Chile, 80
Concepcion, 97, 100, 101, 104, 194
Condarco, 128, 129, 130, 159, 188,
192
Conde, 126, 137, 156
Confiscations of Spanish property,
266, 267, 276, 295
Conference at Chuquisaca, 463
— —  Guayaquil, 422, 424
 Miraflores, 233, 258
 Potosi, 462
 Punchauca, 255, 256,
J257
 Retes, 250, 251
Congress at Angostura, 388
 Bogota, 315, 468
 Caracas, 305
 Cariaco, 378
 Cucuta, 403
 Ibague, 316
—  Lima, 428, 441
 Santiago, 88
¦ Tucuman, 1;

Congreve rockets made in Valpa
raiso, 203, 478
Conspiracy of the Carreras, 159,
162
 to betray Callao, 265
Constitution of 1812, 25
Convention of Rancagua, 218
Cordillera of the Andes, 132
C6rdoba, 412, 450, 455, 456, 467,
468
Cost of the war to Spain, 185
Cramer, 126, 137
Creole, the, of South America, 21
Cruelties of the Royalists, 324, 325,
338, 344. 349. 350,
35I,352,36i, 363,376,
381
 the Patriots, 327, 328,
33°. 339, 345> 301)375.
381, 398
D'Albe, 155, 176, 240
Declaration of Independence at Bo
gota, 316

Declaration of Independence at
Caracas, 305
 Cartaeena, 316
 Guayaquil, 237
 Lima, 272
 Maracaibo, 401
 Panama, 404
 Santiago, 168
 Tucuman, 129
 — Veraguas, 404
 by Ecuador, 473
 Venezuela, 468
D'Eluyar, 330, 335,340, 349, 350
Description of Callao, 201
 Cartagena, 359
 Chacabuco, 144, 145
 "Flecheras," 373
 Island of Margarita,
326
 Peru, 223, 245
 Royalist levies by
Camba, 357
 "Taravitas," 321
 the Northern Zone,
296, 299
 the Plain of Maip6,
175
 Upper Peru, 65
 Valdivia, 206
Dehesa, 170, 246, 247, 462
Devereux, 391
Disaster at lea, 294
Dispersion of Cancha-rayada, 170
 ;  El Desaguadero, 439
Dorrego, 73, 88
Earthquake, the great, of 1812, 37,
3°7
Effect of the Revolution, 28
Elections, first in Peru, 227
Emancipation of North America,
11
English, 391
Escalada, 137, 147, 177, 195
Europe, state of, in fifteenth cen
tury, 6
Evacuation of Margarita, 374
 Talcahuano, 180
Execution of Carrera, Juan Jos£,
181
 Luis 181

494

INDEX.

Execution of Carrera, Jos6 Miguel,
276
 Patriot prisoners, 449
 Royalist prisoners,
398
 La Pola, 364
 Piar, 397
 San Bruno, 149
 Torres, &c, 363
 Two conspirators in
Buenos Ayres, 195
Expedition from Cayos, 369
 Haiti, 374
 Triste, 325
 of Canterac, 380
 Morillo, 356
Exploits of the Chilian Squadron,
188, 190, 192
Falucho, death of, 448
Fate of the Emancipators of South
America, 471
Ferrier, 402
Flag of Army of the Andes, 130
 Chile, 95
- — — Columbia, 399
 Mexico, 254
 Peru, 234
 • Venezuela, 305
Flecheras, Description of, 373
Flotilla, Patriot, destroyed at
Lorondo, 307
Foreign Auxiliaries in Venezuela,
39°. 39 1
Formation of the Chilian Navy,
186, 187
Freyre, Ramon, 121, 122, 137, 140,
152, 153, 154, l68. 178, 180, 194,
207, 219
Gainza, 103, 104, 105
Gamarra, 229, 261, 262, 294, 437,
438, 439, 466
Garcia del Rio, 255, 274, 286, 288
Gauchos, the, of Salta, 75
Gilmour, 391
Girardot, 330, 332, 335
Godoy Cruz, 138, 163, 218
Guayaquil, 236, 294, 317, 318, 404,
407, 410, 414, 416
Guemes, Martin, 74, 76, 166, 229,
485

Guido, 125, 161, 172, 199. 25°, 255,
414, 429
Guise, 191, 205, 219, 238, 239, 288,
291, 440, 448, 453, 468
Hall, Captain Basil, 258
Heroism of Ricaurte, 347
Hillyar, 105
Hippesley, 391
Horse Marines, 383
Institution of "The Legion of
Merit," by O'Higgins, 161
Institution of " The Order of the
Sun," by San Martin, 283
Institution of " The Order of the
Liberators," by Bolivar, 336
Instructions given to Morillo, 356
International Law, A New, 2
Interview between San Martin and
La Serna, 257
Interview between San Martin and
Bolivar, 422
Invasion of Spain by Napoleon,
23
Irizarn, 103, 161, 196
Iturbide, 253, 254, 255
Jujui. 75
Lautaro Lodge, see "Sociedad."
La Aurora de Chile, newspaper,
95
Lafayette, 6
La Mar, 273, 280, 282, 416, 431,
450.455.456
Lanza, 267, 292, 432, 439
La Pola, death of, 364
Las Heras, 102, 103, 106, 107, no,
124, 137, 140, 141, 142, 152, 153,
155, 156, 171, 173, 174, 176, 177,
179, 218, 219, 232, 273, 274, 281,
285, 446. 486
La Serna, 166, 226, 229, 242, 243,
250, 251. 255, 257, 258, 259, 261,
263, 274, 278, 292, 293,295, 432,
439. 45°, 452, 455
La Torre, 363, 374, 376, 377, 378,
379. 382, 383, 385, 400, 401, 402,
405, 408
Lavalle, Juan, 141, 246, 247, 410.
411,420,434,486

INDEX.

495

Liberal ideas, effect of, on the
Royalist armies, 229, 249
Liberating army of Peru, 230
Lima, the Capua of the liberating
army, 277
Lircay, treaty of, 105
Llaneros, the, 299, 337, 339, 341,
34s, 358, 362, 364, 367, 373, 377,
387
Loriga, 250, 251, 278, 292
Loss of the Intrepido, 208
 San Martin, 269
 San Pedro, 358
Lozano, 316, 363, 471
Luzuriaga, 163, 414, 415

Macaulay, 318
Macduff, Lord, 36
MacGregor, 369,372, 373, 391, 399
Mackenna, 97, 99, 100, 103, 104,
i°5
Manning, 156
March of Canterac across a desert,
278
Marco" del Pont, 119, 130, 134, 135,
140, 145, 148, 149, 198
Marino, 325, 327, 331, 334, 341,
342, 343, 344, 346, 348, 349, 350,
35L 355. 369, 37°- 372. 373. 374.
376, 378, 379- 386, 398, 4°4
Maroto, 145, 146, 149, 292
Martinez, Enrique, 141, 218, 433,
435. 436
Massacre of a boat's crew, 240
 ¦  at Calabozo, 308, 339
 Juan Griego, 381
 La Guayra, 345
 Ocumare, 344
 Pasto, 319
 Quito, 313
 San Jos6, 308
¦  San Juan de los
Morros, 308
Medina, 153, 177
Melian, 137, 142
Mendoza, 109
Mendez, Luis, 301, 390, 391
Mercurio Peruano, newspaper, 224
Mexico, 21, 105, 252, 253, 254, 300
Miller, 187, 190, 203, 204, 205, 206,
208, 209, 251, 262, 265, 266, 267,

268, 269, 281, 431, 435, 450, 452,
454. 455. 456, 487
Miranda, early life of, 16 ; he
establishes a secret society in
London, 17 ; his first attempt at
revolution, 18 ; he meets Bolivar
in London, 303 ; and returns with
him to Caracas, 304 ; his cordial
reception, 304 ; is appointed to
draw up a constitution, 304 ; he
organises a political club, 305 ;
he is sent against Valencia, 305 ;
which he captures, 306 ; he is
named Dictator,3o8; hemarches
on Valencia and entrenches him
self, 308 ; he retreats to Victoria,
309 ; repels several attacks on
his position, 309 ; the slaves rise
against the Patriots, 309 ; the
Patriots lose faith in him, 310;
he capitulates and withdraws to
La Guayra, 310 ; he is made
prisoner by his officers, 311 ; and
is sent to Spain, where he dies in
a dungeon, 311, 471
Mission of Alzaga from Buenos
Ayres, 446
Monagas, 352, 368, 372, 373, 375,
381, 384, 386, 387
Monarchy, attempts at, in South
America, 26, 185, 213, 234, 257,
286, 468
Montalvo, 320, 353, 355, 364
Monteagudo, 48, 50, 181, 183, 198,
272, 274, 275, 283, 286, 288, 295,
426, 427, 456, 460
Monteverde, 306, 307, 308, 309,
310, 311, 325, 326, 332, 334, 335,
337,353 , „ „,
Monte Video, 52, 54, 60, 78, 86
Montilla, 347, 355, 359, 369, 392,
393,399,400,401,405
Montufar, 315, 317, 318, 363, 471
Morales, 328, 336, 337, 338, 345,
346. 350, 35L 352, 353, 357. 358,
360, 361, 362, 372, 373, 386, 392,
402, 405
Moral Revolution of South Ame
rica, 15
Morgado, 153, 177, 108
Morillo, 112, 116, 180, 233, 252,
356, 357. 358, 359, 36o, 361, 362,

496

INDEX.

363, 364, 365, 374, 376, 371, 378,
380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 392, 393,
396, 397, 400
Morla, 177, 197, 198
Mosquera, 416, 444, 445, 469, 472,
473
Mounted Grenadiers, the, 44, 54,
124, 420, 448
Murdering Expedition of Bricefio,
329
Murder of Castillo de Ruiz, 319
 General Solano, 33
 ¦  C6rdoba, 468
Murge6n, 408, 409, 411
Mutiny at Callao, 447
¦  San Juan, 217
Narifio, 15, 316, 319, 320, 321
Naval capacities ot Chile, 186
Necochea, 127, 137, 141, 147, 148,
450, 451, 487 . . ,
New Granada, characteristics of,
3'3
O'Brien, 158, 176, 179, 183
 Captain, 187
Occupation of Lima, 259
O'Connell, 391
O'Donohu, 255
O'Higgins, 83, 89, 93, 97, 99, 100,
101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107,
109, no, 127, 137, 140, 145, 146,
147, 148, 152, 153, 154, 155, 159,
161, 162, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171,
172, 173, i76, ^S. 181, 190, 195,
196, 199, 218, 289, 290, 295, 388,
429. 45°. 47i. 487
Olafieta, 229, 432, 435, 439, 450,
458
Ordonez, 148, 151, 152, 153, 154,
155. 167, 169, 17°, 175, 177, i78i

179. J97. '98
O'Re"

teilly, 247
Osorio, 106, 117, 118, 167, 168,
169, 174, 175, 176, 178, 179, 180,
183
Paez, 352, 366, 367, 373, 374, 376,
377, 381,382,383, 384,385,387,
392. 393, 4°°. 40I> 402, 4°4. 4°5,
466, 468, 487
Pareja, 96, 98

Parliamentary system established
in Chile, 88
Parroissien, 128, 286
Passage of the Andes by San Mar
tin, 140, 141
 Bolfvar, 395, 396
Peru, description of, 223, 224, 225,
245
Peruvian Infantry, the, 66
Peti6n, 368, 369, 370, 372
Pezuela, 69, 73, 75, 77, 116, 118,
166, 180, 201, 226, 229, 233, 234,
241, 249, 250
Piar, 325, 326, 328, 329, 350, 351,
369, 37°. 371- 373, 374, 375, 376>
377, 378, 379- 47i
Pitt, his sympathy withAmerica, 17
Plan of Iguala, the, 254, 255
Plan, the, of Emancipation, 2
Poinsett, 95, 97
Posadas, 62
Prsetorianism, advent of, 413
Preparations in Spain for a last
expedition, 211
Primo de Rivera, 168, 169, 170,
175, 177, 197. 198
Pringles, 198, 241, 242
Proclamations, 230, 231, 232, 234,
260, 330, 370, 380, 387, 388, 413
Proctor's description of Bolivar,
442
Pueyrredon, 129, 137, 158, 159,161,
163, 185,. 199
Pumacahua, 227, 228
Public Library endowed by San
Martin at Santiago, 150
Quimper, 232, 233, 246
Quintana, 160, 161, 163, 171, 178
Quiroga, 198
Quito, 22, 233, 236, 270, 293, 300,
312, 313> 317, 3i8, 3I9> 4°°,404,
407, 408, 410, 411, 412, 413, 467
Races, the, of South America, 19
Rancagua, 106, 218
Reaction at Bogota, 362
 Coro and Maracaibo,
300, 304, 306
 Guayana, 307
Recognition of new Republics by
United States, 5

INDEX.

497

Representative system, the first,
established in South America at
Buenos Ayres, 444
Repulse at Angostura, 375
 Chiloe, 209
 <  Coro, 304
 Guarico, 384
 • Ortiz, 385
 San Carlos, 348
 ¦  San Mateo, 347
 Valencia, 306
¦ Victoria, 308

Revolt of the Canarians at Caracas,
305
Revolt at Valencia, 305
Revolt on Island of Margarita,
327. 365
Revolution, first throes of, in South
America, 21
 of 1812, Buenos Ayres, 51
 •  of 1820, in Spain, 216
 at Bogoti, 314
 Caracas, 300
 =  Cartagena, 313
 Casanare, 313
 Guayaquil, 236
 ¦  Maracaibo, 401
 •  Pamplona, 314
 .  Santiago, 83
 Socorro, 314
 Trujillo, 243
Ricafort, 248, 261, 262, 273
Riva-Aguero, 274, 426, 427, 431,
436,437. 44°, 441- 442,446
Rivadavia, 161, 443, 444, 445, 446,
463. 47i
Rivas, 332, 339, 345, 347, 348, 350,
351,352
Robertson, William Parish, 56
Rodil, 174,179, 448, 449, 458
Rodriguez, Manuel, 120, 135, 152,
163, 172, 182, 183
¦  Simon, tutor of Bolfvar,
301, 302, 424
Rondeau, 53, 61, no, 116, 211,
212, 213, 214, 217
Royalist Armies, strength of, 229
Royal Commission from Spain, 445
Rozas, Juan Martinez de, 82, 86,
87, 9°, 93, 95„
Ruiz de Castillo, 300, 313, 318,
3J9

Salta, Province of, 75
Samano, 180, 319, 320, 364, 397,
398, 408
Sanchez, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103,
148, 152, 180, 191, 194, 282
San Juan, 109
San Luis, 109
San Martin, his birth and parent
age, 31 ; he joins the Spanish
army, 32 ; his campaigns against
the French, 35 ; he returns to
Buenos Ayres, 36 ; his personal
appearance, 39 ; he organizes
the mounted grenadiers, 44 ;
he founds the Lautaro Lodge,
47 ; he joins in the revolution of
1 8 12, 51 ; he fights the action of
San Lorenzo, 58 ; and takes
command of the Army of the
North, 62 ; he entrenches a camp
at Tucuman, 73 ; he draws up a
secret plan of campaign, 79 ; he
is appointed Governor of Cuyo,
79 ; reaches Mendoza, 109 ; is
elected Governor by the Cabil
dos, 111 ; he establishes spies
in Chile, 119; and organises the
Army of the Andes, 125 ; he
treats with the Indians, 134 ;
the equipment of the army, 136 ;
he marches from Mendoza, 139 ;
encamps in the valley of Puta
endo, 142 ; wins the battle of
Chacabuco, 147 ; and occupies
Santiago, 148 ; he endows a
public library and returns to
Buenos Ayres, 150 ; arranges
for a fleet on the Pacific and for
an alliance with Chile, 158 ; he
marches against Osorio, 168 ;
his army is dispersed at Can
cha-rayada, 170; he reorganizes
the army at Maip6, 173 ; and
wins a complete victory, 177,
178, 179 ; he again visits Buenos
Ayres, 184 ; he plans an expedi
tion to Periu, 196 ; and with
draws a part of his army from
Chile, 196; disregards the orders
of Government, 214, 215 ; and
returns to Chile, 216 ; he con
venes a meeting of officers at

498

INDEX.

San Martin — continued.
Rancagua, 218 ; is appointed
generalissimo of the united
army, 219 ; on the eve of sailing
he issues a proclamation to his
fellow-countrymen, 230 ; the in
structions given him by the
Chilian Government, 231 ; his
plan of campaign, 231 ; he
lands at Pisco, 232 ; treats with
the Viceroy, 233 ; he estab
lishes by decree the flag and
escutcheon of the Republic of
Peru, 234 ; re-embarks, leaving
Arenales behind him, 234 ; his
plans, political and military,
234; he sails past Callao, 235 ;
lands a detachment at Ancon,
235 ; and sails for Huacho,
240 ; lands and encamps in the
valley of Huara, 240 ; the " Nu
mancia " battalion deserts to
him, 242 ; he is joined by the
northern provinces, 243 ; he ad
vances to Retes, 243 ; is joined
by Arenales, and retires, 244 ;
he publishes a " Provisional
Regulation," 244 ; is invited to
a conference by La Serna, 250 ;
he arranges an armistice, 257 ;
and meets the Viceroy, 257 ; he
enters Lima, 259 ; recalls Are
nales from the Highlands, 264;
he sends Cochrane and Miller
to the south, 266 ; his position,
271 ; he convenes a meeting of
citizens, 272 ; and adopts the
title " Protector of Peru," 274 ;
he issues rigorous decrees
against the Spaniards, 275 ; the
Royalists attempt to relieve
Callao, 278 ; he sees Cochrane
for the last time, 280; he de
clines to attack Canterac, 280 ;
he organises a Peruvian army,
283; institutes the "Order of
the Sun," 283 ; the munici
pality of Lima gives a subsidy
to the officers of the army, 284 ;
he discovers a conspiracy against
him, 284 ; his ideas of legisla
tion, 285 ; his dispute with Coch

rane, 287 ; he summons a Con
gress, 293 ; sends another expe
dition to lea, 293 ; attempts to
treat with the Viceroy, 295 ; he
sends a contingent to assist
Sucre, 410 ; sails to Guayaquil,
421; he meets Bolivar, 421;
his conference with him, 422 ;
he returns to Peru, 423 ; his
opinion of Bolfvar, 423 ; his letter
to Bolivar, 425 ; his letter to
O'Higgins, 427 ; he draws up a
plan for a new campaign, and
opens the first Congress of Peru,
428 ; his abdication, 428 ;
leaves Peru for ever, 429 ; and
retires to Mendoza, 429 ; he
organizes an auxiliary force,
436 ; he is besought to return to
Peru, 440 ; returns to Buenos
Ayres, 471 ; goes to Europe,
472 ; returns to be insulted, and
goes back, 472 ; is assisted by
Aguada, 473 ; he bequeaths his
sword to Rozas, 474; his death,
474 ; his remains are brought
back to Buenos Ayres, 474
San Martin, Maria Mercedes de,
J49, !99, 472,474
Santa Cruz, 410, 436, 437.438, 439,
440
Santa Cruz de la Sierra, 65
Santander, 387, 393, 394, 398, 450,
453, 46t> 466, 468
Saraza, 352, 368, 372, 373, 376, 381,
382, 384, 387
Sequence of causes, the, 418
Ships burned at Callao by Guise,
448
Siege of Callao, 272, 273, 280, 282,
458
 Cartagena, 360, 361, 401,
4°4,
 Chilian, 100
 Cumana, 374
 Puerto-Cabello, 334, 335,
„ 34°, 348, 349
 Rancagua, 107
 San Fernando, 374, 377
 .Talcahuano, 155, 156
 Valencia, 348
Skeenen, 391

INDEX.

499

Skirmish at Achupallas, 141
 Carora, 306
 :  Chancay, 236, 241
 Guachipas, 76
 ¦ Guardia- Vieja, 141
 Mirave, 268
 Rio Bamba, 411
 San Fernando, 374
 San Josd, 308
 Wasca, 246
Sociedad de Lautaro, 33, 47, 50,
60, 125, 149, 160, 163, 184, 199,
211
Soler, 124, 137, 140, 141, 145, 146,
H7
Soublette, 369, 372, 400
Spano, Colonel, death of, 103
Spry, 191, 219, 288
Successes of Narifio, 320
Sucre, 378, 407, 408, 410, 411, 415,
437, 438, 440, 450, 453, 454- 455,
456, 457, 458, 461, 464. 465. 466,
468, 471, 472
Surrender of the Prueba and Ven
ganza, 290
 Valencia, 305
Sutherland, Robert, 368
Talca, 97, 103, 104, 152, 167, 168,
169
Talcahuano, 97, 104, 106, 152, 154,
155, l67, 179. x94
"Taravitas," 321
Thompson, 178

Torices, 317, 321, 322, 362, 363
Torres, Camilo, 314, 320, 322, 323,
330,354-361,363,47!
Torre-Tagle, 243, 293, 294, 295,
426,441,446,447, 448
Tragedy of San Luis, 197, 198
Treaty between Columbia and the
Argentine Congress, 445
Tristan, 293, 294
University of Lima, 225
Upper Peru, 22, 61, 62, 65, 227, 300
Urdaneta, 332, 335, 342, 344, 347,
348, 349, 352, 354, 378, 391, 393,
399,401,473
Uzlar, 391
Valdes, 229, 235, 241, 250, 258,
261, 262, 278, 279, 294, 432, 433,
434, 439, 450, 452, 455- 456
Valdivia, 97, 98, 101, 151, 195, 206,
207, 208
Venezuela, 24, 299
Warnes, 67, 69
Wellesley, Marquis of, 302
Wilson, 387,391
Yafiez, 337, 339, 340, 341, 344
Zapiola, 34, 36, 44, I27> l37> H6>
H7, l77> lgo, 194
Zea, 369, 378, 389, 398
Zuazola, 325, 334

THE END.

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