YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY A VIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL DEISTICAL WRITERS, THAT HAVE APPEARED IN ENGLAND IN THE LAST AND PRESENT CENTURY. WITH OBSERVATIONS UPON THEM: SOME ACCOUNT OF THE ANSWERS THAT HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED AGAINST THEM. En sebeval Hitters to a tfrivnls. By JOHN LELAND, D.D. in 1754. WITH AN APPENDIX By W. L. BROWN, D.D., PRINCIPAL OF MARESCIIAL COLLEGE, ABERDEEN, ETC. ETC. <• AN INTRODUCTION; COMPRISING A SUCCINCT VIEW OF1 THE SUBSEQUENT HISTORY OF THE CONTROVERSY, By CYRUS R. EDMONDS, AUTHOR OF " THE LIFE AND TIMES OF GENERAL WASHINGTON." LONDON: PRINTED FOR T. TEGG AND SON, CHEAPSIDE ; R. GRIFFIN AND CO., GLASGOW ; T, T. AND H. TEGG, DURLIN ; ALSO J. AND S. A. TEGG, SYDNEY AND HOBART TOWN. M.DCCC.XXXVII. I.IDDOM, CAST.LJ! BTR-EF.T, UNS.BtiSV* PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION. No man that is not utterly unacquainted with the state of things among us can be ignorant, that in the last, and especially in the present age, there have been many books published, the manifest design of which was to set aside revealed religion. Never in any country where Christianity is professed, were there such repeated attempts to subvert its divine authority, carried on sometimes under various disguises, and at other times without a disguise at all. The most noted writers on that side have been at liberty to produce their strongest objections ; these objections have been retailed by others ; and many seem to take it for granted, that Christianity hath received very sensible wounds by the several attacks that have been made upon it, and that they have greatly hurt its credit, and weakened its authority. But whosoever will be at the pains impartially to examine those of the deistical writers that have hitherto appeared among us, and to compare them with the answers which have been made to them, will find, that upon a nearer view they are far from being so formi dable as some have been apt to apprehend. And since there are few that have leisure or patience for a particular inquiry into the several writings which have appeared in this controversy, some judicious persons, who wish well to the interest of our common Christianity, have been of opinion, that it might be of real service to give a summary view of the most noted books that have been •published against revealed religion for above a century past, together with proper observations upon them. From such a view, the reader might be enabled to form some notion of the several turns this con troversy hath taken, how often the enemies of revealed religion have thought pro*per to change their methods of attack, the different dis guises and appearances they have put on, and the several schemes they have formed, all directed to one main end, viz. to set aside reve lation, and to substitute mere natural religion, or, which seems to have been the intention of some of them, no religion at all, in its room. Upon such a comparison between those that have attacked Chris tianity, and those that have been written in defence of it, it would appear, that if it be really true, that deism and infidelity have made a great progress among us, it must have been owing to something else than the force of reason and argument ; that the Christian religion is in no danger from a free and impartial inquiry; and that a 2 IV PREFACE. the most plausible objections which have been brought against it, though advanced with great confidence, and frequently repeated, have been fairly and solidly confuted. Such a view would make it manifest, that the enemies of Christianity have not generally be haved as became fair adversaries, but have rather acted as if they judged any arts lawful by which they thought they might gain their cause. And yet, notwithstanding their utmost efforts for above a century past, they have really been able to say but little against the Christian religion, considered in its original purity, as delivered by Christ and his apostles, or to invalidate the solid evidences by which it is attested and confirmed. '* For these reasons it hath been judged, that a short and compre hensive view of the deistical writers of the last and present age might be of great use. And as the course of my studies hath led me to be conversant in several of those writings which have been published on both sides in this important controversy, it was urged upon me, by some persons for whom I have a great regard, to under take this work. There was one great objection, which hindered me for some time from attempting it, and which still appeareth to me to be of no small weight, and that is, that as, according to the plan thatswas formed, it would be necessary to give an account of the answers published to the books 1 should have occasion to mention, this would oblige me to take notice of some of my own. I am sen sible how difficult it is for an author to speak of his own perform ances, in such a manner as not to intrench upon the rules of decency. If he give a favourable character of them, this will be interpreted as a proof of his vanity, any appearance of which is usually turned to his disadvantage. And on the other hand, if he should make no mention of his own books at all, where the rfature of the design in which he is engaged makes it proper for him to mention them, this might perhaps be censured as a false and affected modesty. It is no easy matter to keep clear of these extremes ; and, for this reason, it would have been a particular pleasure to me to have seen this work undertaken by another hand ; but as this hath not been done, I have chosen rather to attempt it myself, than that a work, which I cannot but think might be of real service, should be neglected. It cannot be expected, that a distinct notice should be taken of all the writers that have appeared among us against revealed religion for this century past. This, if it could be executed, would take too large a compass, and be of no great use. A view of the principal of them, or, at least, of those who have made the greatest noise, may be sufficient. And the design is not to give an historical account of the authors, or of their personal PREFACE. characters, but to give some idea of their writings, which alone we have properly to do with. The method proposed, and for the most part pursued, is this : The several writers are mentioned in the order of time in which they appeared. Some account is given of their writings, and of the several schemes they have advanced, as far as the cause of revelation is concerned. And great care has been taken to make a fair repre sentation of them, according to the best judgment I could form of their design. Some observations are added, which may help to lead the reader into a just notion of those writings, and to defect and obviate the ill tendency of them. There is also an account sub joined of the answers that were published ; not all of them, but some of the most remarkable, or such as have come under the author's special notice. And very probably some have been omitted, which might well deserve to be particularly mentioned. This may suffice to give a general idea of the following work ; at the end of which there are some reflections subjoined, which seem naturally to arise upon such a view as is here given. Observations are made on the conduct of the deists in the management of the argument. And the whole concludes with a brief representation of the evidences for the Christian religion, and its excellent nature and tendency. What has been now laid before the reader, is taken from the Pre face to the first edition : and it gives a just account of the original nature and design of this work, which was at first intended only to make up one volume. But not long after the publication of it, I was put in mind of a considerable omission I had been guilty of in making no mention of Mr. Hume, who was looked upon to be one of the most subtle writers that had of late appeared against Christianity. About the same time was published, a pompous edition of the works of the late Lord Viscount Bolingbroke, in five volumes quarto, the last three of which seemed to be principally intended against revealed, and even against some important prin ciples of what is usually called natural, religion. Some persons, for whose judgment and friendship I have a great regard, were of opinion, that, to complete the design which was proposed in publish ing the View qf the Deistical Writers, it was necessary to take a distinct notice of the writings of Mr. Hume and Lord Bolingbroke : and that in that case it might be of use to make more large and particular observations upon them, than could properly be done where a number of writers came under consideration. This produced a second volume, which, though it had the same title with the former, viz. A View of the Deistical Writers, yet differed from it in PREFACE. this, that it did not contain strictures and observations upon a variety of authors, but a large and particular consideration of the only two there examined, viz. Mr. Hume and the late Lord Bolingbroke, especially the latter. And this was judged necessary, considering his Lordship's high reputation as a writer, and that there are scarcely any of the objections against Christianity which he hath not repeated and urged in one part or other of his works, and that with a peculiar confidence, and with all the strength of reason and vivacity of imagination he was master of. And as I then thought I had finished the design, that volume ended with an Address to Deists andprofessed Christians, which appeared to me to be a proper con clusion of the whole. But after the second volume was published, some letters were sent me, relating both to that and the former volume, which put me upon reconsidering some things in them, and making farther additions and illustrations, which I thought might be of advantage to the main design. These were thrown into a Supplement, which made up a third volume, and was published separately for the use of those who had purchased the two former. It gives me some concern, that this work is become so much larger than "was at first intended, which I am afraid will prove a disadvantage to it, and disgust or discourage some readers. But I hope favourable allowances will be made, considering the extent of the design, and the variety of matters here treated of. I believe it will appear, that there are few objections which have been advanced in this controversy, but what are taken notice of in the following work, and either sufficiently obviated, or references are made to books where fuller answers are to be found. May God in his holy providence follow what is now published with his blessing, that it may prove of real service to the important interests of religion among us, to promote which, as far as my ability reaches, I shall ever account the greatest happiness of my life. And it should be the matter of our earnest prayers to God, that all those who value themselves upon the honourable name and privileges of Christians, may join in united efforts to support so glorious a cause, in which the preservation and advancement of true religion and virtue, the peace and good order of society, and the present and eternal happiness of individuals, are so nearly concerned. I have nothing farther to add, but that in this as well as the former editions the whole is conducted in a series of letters, which were written to my most worthy and much esteemed friend, the reverend Dr. Thomas Wilson, rector of Walbrook, and prebendary of West minster, in the form in which thev now appear. INTRODUCTION. The comparative inefficiency of controversy, for the establish ment and propagation of truth, has long been a point of general agreement. The almost impossibility of supplanting the notion of an opponent by this means, has passed into a proverb; and the lists of polemical contest, in particular, resemble not so much a field of battle for the dispute of territory, as an arena for fencing, in which the antagonists practise the use of weapons for the mainte nance of scanty frontiers, which are often the grounds of an endless litigation, neither admitting of decision nor appeal. It is further observable, in theological controversy, that the acri mony which it has displayed, has generally been in inverse propor tion to the importance ofthe points at issue; so that, what may be called the civil dissensions of divines, have ever been the most ran corous; and where the proximity ofthe parties has enabled them to grapple each other closely, the strife has been marked by the dead liest bitterness. Neither of these features, however, have characterized the great preliminary discussion, on the decision of which depends the very existence of all the minor points of variance among divines. The deistical controversy may be regarded as the most momentous that ever attracted the notice, and employed the energies of the human mind. In it are involved no less than the claims of the word of God on the attention of men, the truth or imposture of the entire system of Christianity, and, by inference, of every other form of religious belief; so that the eternity of man's existence, the dignity or insig nificance of his nature, the whole compass of his interests, the ex treme possibilities of good and ill — all hang suspended on the issue of this mighty contest. With these considerations, the earlier disputants, on both sides, seem to have been deeply impressed. The purer and more pro found school of Freethinkers, though they had no personal joys and consolations dependent on the result of their labours, and nothing to hope from success but the insignia of victory, yet seemed consci- INTRODUCTION. entiously convinced of the truth of their opinions, and not altogether insensible to the magnitude of the question. Accordingly, they wrote for the most part with seriousness and dignity ; they ever maintained at least the semblance of reasoning ; and even, when be trayed into sophism, they rarely seemed to lose sight of the intrinsic greatness of the subject they were discussing. It seems natural to expect, that the advocates of Christianity, whose dearest interests were embarked in the system they maintained, should conduct their part of the dispute with the most intense energy, and at the same time with a trembling cautiousness, lest a cause of such universal interest should suffer even a temporary disadvantage through any oversight of theirs. Accordingly, the writings of the earlier de fenders of revelation supply some of the most invaluable models of fair and philosophical investigation of which our literature can boast. Massive learning, relieved of its cumbrousness by masterly arrange ment — close and compact argument, which disdained in its progress any declamatory flourishes which could indicate a premature triumph — unassuming boldness and steadiness of purpose — the candour that scorned an unfair advantage, and the generosity that spared the fallen and the misguided — such were the attributes which distinguished, throughout the contest, these illustrious de fenders of the faith. The more recent aspect of the controversy • has been somewhat different. In the battle waged by philosophers, victory had plainly declared on the side of Christianity. The wretched and desperate adherents of the conquered party, have sub sequently seemed to fight, not for conquest, but existence. In their desperation they have lost their discipline ; and their opponents, consequently, in the security of success, have in some instances deemed it sufficient to chastise their insolence with the appropriate scourge of ridicule. The earlier annals of the deistical controversy have been recorded, with equal ability and fairness, by Dr. Leland, in that invaluable work of which a new edition is now offered to the public. It should not, however, be regarded as merely historical. It constitutes of itself a most masterly defence of the Christian religion, lt abounds with unanswerable arguments against every species of infidelity, and con fers upon its author the rank of an eminent defender of the authen ticity and authority of the Bible. It will be the design of the writer, in the following introductory pages, to present a cursory, but, as far as he is able, a comprehensive view of the deistical wri tings which have appeared since the publication of Dr. Leland's treatise ; and of those productions, on the evidences of the Christian religion, to which they have given rise. In one respect the execu- INTRODUCTION. tion of this task must of necessity be defective. On the one hand, the infidel writers of modern times have, for an obvious reason, be taken themselves to arguments which are undeserving of a parti cular mention here, as they have long ago been exposed and refuted. While, on the other hand, the extended promulgation of sceptical opinions in modern times, has called forth a series of works in defence of Christianity, not so substantially different as to require a separate analysis— a process inconsistent with the limits allotted to this Introduction. The most recent impugner of divine revelation, whose writings underwent the scrutiny of Dr. Leland, was David Hume. His philosophical writings, in general, were subjected to a searching analysis, and, had no other reply appeared, they would have been regarded as fully and fairly refuted. Since that time, however, the most strictly argumentative, and therefore the most formidable of his writings, (the Essay on Miracles), has been answered by Dr. George Campbell, in a work, which for perspicuity and force of reasoning, and for the candid and catholic spirit which it displays throughout, will ever be regarded as one of the highest models of theological controversy, and one of the grandest bulwarks of the Christian faith. Although the learned author of the following work has bestowed much of his labour and ingenuity upon that part of it which he has devoted to Mr. Hume's celebrated essay, yet, as Dr. Campbell's refutation has ever been regarded as the most complete and triumphant, it may be proper to present, in this place, a brief view of the line of argument he has adopted. It was the design of Mr. Hume to prove, that miracles wrought in support of a system of religion, could be rationally received only by those who witnessed them. He declares, that " a miracle sup ported by any human testimony, is more . properly a subject of derision than of argument;" and, again, that "no testimony for any kind of miracle can ever possibly amount to a probability, much less to a proof." His argument"' in "support of this position, has been thus compendiously stated by Dr. Campbell. " Experience is our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact. Experience is in some things variable, in some things uniform. A variable experience gives rise only to probability ; an uniform experience amounts to a proof. Probability always sup poses an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence proportioned to the superiority. In such cases we must balance the opposite experiments, and deduct the lesser number from the greater, in order to^know the exact force of the- superior INTRODUCTION. evidence. Our belief or assurance of any fact, from the leport of eye-witnesses, is derived from "no other principle than experience; that is, our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. Now if the fact attested partakes of the marvellous, if it is such as has sel dom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences, of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force which remains. The very same principle of experience, which gives a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another degree of assurance against the fact which they endeavour to establish ; from which contradiction there necessarily arises a counterpoise, and mutual destruction of belief and authority. Further, if the fact affirmed by the witnesses, in stead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous ; if, besides, the testimony considered apart and in itself amounts to an entire proof; in that case there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature ; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire, as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. And if so, it is an undeniable consequence, that it can not be surmounted by any proof whatever from testimony. A miracle therefore, however attested, can never be rendered credible, even in the lowest degree." The fallacies into which such writers as Mr. Hume are betrayed, will be generally found to reside in those elementary premises, in which error lies so contiguous to truth, that its divergence is the least perceptible. Accordingly, we find in his definition of a miracle, an inaccuracy which his opponent has not fully exposed. He describes it as a transgression of the laws of nature, or, as he elsewhere less figuratively expresses it, a " violation of the usual course of nature." It might seem captious, to infer from this latter expression, that every unusual event must be regarded as miraculous. A far more vital objection, however, may be urged against it. Let it be remembered, that by the very nature of his argument, the evi dence of testimony is excluded, and therefore, that our judgment respecting the ordinary course of nature must be formed solely upon personal observation. But with how few, comparatively, of the operations of nature are we personally acquainted ; in how much fewer cases can we trace them to their efficient causes ; and in how very few instances do we understand the mode or principle by which INTRODUCTION. those hidden causes effect the results which we observe ! In short, after all our dogmatizing respecting the usual course of nature, the only universal principle that we can lay down is, that every effect must have had an adequate cause ; and with this relation of cause and effect, the arguments in favour of miracles never interfere. It is, on the contrary, contended, that a peculiar cause was in these instances put into operation, and one fully adequate to the production of the effect. The evidences of which extraordinary interposition are to be found, not only in the miracles themselves, but in collateral direc tions, — as in the circumstantial fulfilment of prophecy, where the occurrence of the event, and the antecedent delivery of the predic tion, rest on the same kind of evidence with the most undoubted historical facts ; the execution of Charles I, or the existence of General Washington. These observations derive their importance, from the constant and mischievous use which the essayist makes of his definition. Dr. Campbell, however, chiefly confines his reply to that part of the argument which respects the evidence of testimony ; and, on this ground, has produced a refutation which must satisfy every candid and intelligent mind. In the execution of his design, he first de monstrates the fallacy of Mr. Hume's position, that the evidence of testimony is derived solely from experience, by showing, that prior to experience, the declarations of others have a natural and inde pendent influence on our belief. This he illustrates by noticing, that the fullest assent to testimony, however supported, is given by children, and inexperienced persons; and that increased experience inspires a diffidence rather than confidence in the statements of others. He establishes, that the presumption prior to personal knowledge, is in unison with the testimony, not against it; and removes the objection, that experience often corrects the misrepre sentations of others, by showing, that the same fact is equally true of the reports of our own memory; though it would be highly absurd to infer from hence, that the evidence of memory is derived from experience. He then adverts to the next principal position taken by the essayist, which he proves to be equally untenable. " When the fact attested," says Mr. Hume, "is such as has seldom fallen under our observation, there is a contest of two opposite experi ences, of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate upon the mind by the force which remains." After exposing, with great felicity, the show of arithmetical precision exhibited in the above argument, he proposes a case in confutation, the statement of which may be thus abridged. I have lived for some years near a ferry ; I know that the passage- INTRODUCTION. boat has crossed the river a thousand times, and as often returned safe ; but I have just met an unknown man, who assures me that it has foundered, with all its passengers, before his eyes. Here are, what Mr. Hume would call, opposite experiences. How am I to balance them 1 Must I set the two thousand instances on the one side, to the single instance alleged on the other ? In this case, I have nineteen hundred and ninety-nine chances to one that my in formation is false. Or must I, before I believe it, have two thou sand times as much evidence for the single instance, as that which I have for any of the opposite ones ? This is impossible, since for many of them, I have the evidence of my own senses. Or, once more, must the evidence I have of the veracity of the witness, be a full equivalent to the two thousand instances which oppose his statement ? This, again, is out of the question, as the witness is, by the supposition, a perfect stranger. Yet these appear to be the only modes by which the contrary experiences can be balanced. But, suppose it be said, ' What then, is such weak evidence of tes timony incapable of being refuted?' I reply, by no means; although the contrary experiences, of which Mr. Hume talks so much, are utterly unable to set it aside. For, first, it may be in validated by contradictory testimony. The next stranger whom I meet declares, that the whole tale is a fiction, for that he saw the boat and all the passengers come to land in safety. Here is a weight, thrown at once into the opposite scale, of more account than all the two thousand opposite instances put together. My former experience vanishes from, my recollection ; my mind hangs in suspense between the two contrary declarations, until it is set at ease by corroborations of the second report, by the next three or four persons whom I meet. Again, though I may not meet with any one who can contradict the original report, the testimony of my in formant may be invalidated by individuals who may successively assure me, that he is a notorious liar, and that he is continually forging such reports for the mere purpose of alarming strangers. This, though not so direct a refutation as the former, is a further means of discrediting a testimony. In» short, though the direct counter statements, supposed above, may be balanced against each other, as being of a homogeneous kind, yet the two thousand instances and the single instance, cannot be so compared, since they refer to different facts, and though of a contrary nature, are not contradic tory, and may therefore both be consistently believed. Lastly, Dr. Campbell argues, that the conclusion from experience is always general ; and runs thus — 'This is the ordinary course of nature ¦ such an event may be reasonably expected, where all the circum- INTRODUCTION. Xiii stances are entirely similar.' But this conclusion must, in parti cular cases, be exceedingly insecure, since, though all the known circumstances may be similar, many of the actual circumstances may be unknown and dissimilar. On the contrary, the evidence from testimony is always particular ; and runs thus — 'This was the fact in such an individual instance.' The evidence, therefore, resulting from experience, is necessarily so weak, compared with that which results from testimony, that the strongest conviction, built merely ou the former, may be overturned by the slightest proof exhibited by the latter. Such is an abstract of that beautiful line of argument, by which the boasted metaphysical theory, constructed by Mr. Hume against the miracles of Christianity, was fairly and finally exploded.* At its first enunciation, it occasioned much perplexity and alarm, to many sincere and even intelligent believers; while it inspired a transitory triumph throughout the ranks of infi delity. Very soon, however, the baseless structure was smitten with that memorable blow under which it fell, and it is now only remem-. bered as one of many instances, in* which the proudest champions of scepticism have, after long and loud defiance, done involuntary homage to the majesty of truth, by an ignominious fall, and an irretrievable ruin. " Thus I have shown," says Dr. Campbell, " as I proposed, that the author's reasoning proceeds on a false hypothesis. — lt supposes testimony to derive its evidence solely from experience, which is false. — It supposes by consequence, that contrary observations have a weight in opposing testimony, which the first and most acknow ledged principles of human reason, or, if you like the term better, common sense, evidently shows that they have not. — It assigns a rule for discovering the superiority of contrary evidences, which, in * A curious exemplification of that logical acuteness, in which Dr. Campbell so far surpassed his opponent, occurs in the following note, introduced in his first section. " I shall here take the liberty, though the matter be not essential to the design of this tract, to correct an oversight in the Essayist, who always supposes, that, where contrary evidences must be balanced, the probability lies in the remainder or sur plus, when the less number is subtracted from the greater. The probability does not consist in the surplus, but in the ratio, or geometrical proportion, which the numbers on the opposite sides bear to each other. I explain myself thus. In favour of one supposed event there are 100 similar instances, against it 50. In another case under consideration, the favourable instances are 60, and only 10 unfavourable. Though the difference, or arithmetical proportion, which is 50, be the same in both cases, the probability is by no means equal, as the author's way of reasoning implies. The pro bability of the first event is as 100 to 50, or 2 to 1. The probability of the second is as 60 to 10, or 6 to one. Consequently, on comparing the different examples, though both be probable, the second is thrice as probable as the first." INTRODUCTION. h the latitude there given it, tends to mislead the judgment, and which it is impossible, by any explication, to render of real use." Having disposed ofthe sophistical position, on which Mr. Hume founded the abstract and most formidable portion of his reasoning against miracles, as an evidence of Christianity, Dr. Campbell animadverts upon his opponent's method of conducting his argu ment ; and convicts him, in several instances, of a degree of logical incapacity, if not of intentional guile, as flagrant as any that can be found in the entire compass of the deistical writings. For example, he has two distinct, and even opposite uses, for the term experience, on which so much of his argument turns; and, hence, he is enabled dexterously to shift its application from one thing to another, until his reader is either convinced or totally be wildered. " It is a miracle," says Mr. Hume, " that a dead man should come to life, because that has never been observed in any age or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise that event would not merit that appellation." Here he plainly intimates, that there can only be a uniform experience against such events as have never been observed in any age or country. He is not, therefore, referring in this place to personal experience (which is the only rendering that can give force or meaning to some other branches of his argument), since personal experience does not extend to " every age and coun try." The greater part of this "experience," therefore, is solely the result of testimony ; and his argument, therefore, resolves itself into the following ludicrous paradox — " Testimony is not entitled to the least degree of faith, but as far as it is supported by such an exten sive experience as, if we had not had a previous and independent faith in testimony, we could never have acquired." Again — " A miracle," says he, " is a violation of the laws of nature, and, as a firm and unalterable experience hath established these laws, the proof against a miracle is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined." The conciseness and consecutiveness of such passages as these — the logical form into which Mr. Hume casts his grossest blunders — is at first sight somewhat startling; but, let it be remembered, that this " experience," which he terms " firm and unalterable," and, in another place, " uniform,*' has been already shown to depend almost entirely upon testimony : but this same testimony is our warrant for the truth of those very miracles against which he is contending. So that Mr. Hume appears, with all this show of demonstration, to have simply fallen into that blunder, or rather crept into that fallacy, so well known to young beginners in logic, under the name of "begging the question !" INTRODUCTION. The Dr. next alludes to a distinction, artfully suggested by Miv Hume, between events that are "contrary to our experience," and suchasare " not conformable to it ;" the latter of which, he admits, are capable of proof by testimony. A number of passages are then cited, from the essay itself, in which the author manifestly uses the terms as mutually interchangeable, and even demonstrates that they are entirely synonymous. He further puts side by side — " I own there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the ordinary course of nature, of such a kind as may admit a proof from human testimony;" and, in another place, " No testimony can ever possi bly amount to a probability, much less to a proof." Again, by a comparison of two or three other passages, he deduces a still more ridiculous contradiction. " Suppose," says the essayist, " all authors, in all languages, agree that, from the first of January, IfiOO, there was a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days ; suppose that the tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among the people — that all travellers, who return from foreign countries, bring us account of the same tradition, with out the least variation or contradiction; it is evident that our present philosophers, instead of doubting of that fact, ought to receive it for certain, and ought to search for the causes whence it may be derived." Now, before the author could believe such a miracle as this, he must at least be satisfied that the proof of it from testimony, is stronger than the proof against it from experience ; but, we have already seen, that " from the very nature of the fact, there is as direct and full a proof against the existence of any mira cle as can possibly be imagined." Whence, then, does testimony derive the evidence which can overturn such a proof as this ? The reply is, in Mr. Hume's own words, " Testimony hath no evidence, Ibut what it derives from experience ; these differ from each other, only as the species from the genus." Let us then substitute for *' Testimony " its admitted equivalent, " Experience," and Mr. Hume's argument for his eight days of darkness, assumes the fol lowing beautiful and irrefragable form : "There is- a proof of IT FROM EXPERIENCE, WHICH IS SUPERIOR TO AS ENTIRE A PROOF FROM EXPERIENCE AS CAN POSSIBLY BE IMAGINED!" Having thus triumphantly defeated the most celebrated of Mr. Hume's deistical arguments, namely that against all miracles what soever, Dr. Campbell proceeds, in the following sections, to notice severally those which respect the miracles recorded in the Bible. In the fourth section of the first part of his book, he shows there is no peculiar presumption against those which are said to have been wrought in support of religion. This he substantiates, by refuting XVI INTRODUCTION. Mr. Hume's opinion, that all such relations are to be accounted for by two powerful passions of the human mind, the passion for the mar vellous, and the religious affection. With respect to the first of these, he shows that the presumption arising from it, against historical ac counts of miracles is no greater than that against any other extraor dinary phenomena — of electricity, chemistry, or magnetism, before such phenomena has been verified by experience; yet the application of Mr. Hume's principle, in these cases, would be obviously absurd, and would arrest the progress of every department of science, by inter posing the barrier of universal scepticism. With respect, again, to the religious affection, he proves, that this principle tends as much to obstruct as to promote our belief in any given religious miracle, since no two things in nature are more diametrically opposite, than some systems of religious belief. Before, then, any force can be allowed to this latter argument, he must prove, that the religious tenets of those who testify to the Christian miracles, were in unison with the doctrines they were wrought to attest ; in other words, that their religious zeal and prejudice would have biassed them in favour of the preternatural power of those who performed them. But, unfortunately, the very contrary of this is the case. These very miracles produced a conviction, in their minds, contrary to any which they had previously entertained ; and, consequently, effected this result, not in consequence, but in spite of that " religious affec tion," to whose mighty influence Mr. Hume attributes their credu lity. In his fifth, he further shows, that there is a peculiar pre sumption in favour of the Christian miracles, on account of the vast — the infinite interests involved in that system, which they attest ; a principle of reasoning, which not only approves itself to a Christian advocate, but which is founded on an independent and obvious fitness, insomuch that it is recognised by a heathen poet and critic* The remainder ofthe first part of the Dr.'s performance is devoted to an examination of the general principle, adopted by Mr. Hume, in cases in which an overwhelming weight of evidence, seems to establish something of an extraordinary and miraculous kind. In such cases, the essayist lays down as a canon, " That the proba bility of the fact, is in the inverse ratio of the quantity of miracle there is in it." " I weigh," says he, " the one miracle against the other, and, according to the superiority which I observe, I pronounce my decision, and always leject the greater miracle." In reply, the doctor exposes the absurdity which this principle involves, namely, * Nee Deus intersit nisi dignus vindice nodus Incident. INTRODUCTION. Xvii that it is more probable that God should interpose his power, in the slightest possible degrees, and for the most frivolous purposes, than that he should exert it, with the majesty becoming a God, to sub serve the highest and eternal interests of his servants, and his sons. The first part closes, by resolving, with the most perfect fairness, the principle which Mr. Hume lays down, at the close of the first part of his essay, as its grand sum and corollary, into the following position: " That no testimony is sufficient to esteiblish a miracle; unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more improbable than the fact which it endeavours to establish!" We frequently find Mr. Hume arguing in a circle, in the minor portions of his celebrated treatise ; we learn, however, from the above conclusion, that this spinning motion is natural and necessary to his mental operations — that, in fact, the instances referred to are but diurnal rotations in a vast circular orbit. After accomplishing a vast circuit in quest of singularities and paradoxes, he returns, it seems, to the precise point from which he set out — to one of the most elemental and intuitive truths which the early dawn of reason discloses to the perception of infancy. The second part of Dr. Campbell's masterly dissertation, as it dwells more upon detail than upon great and disputed principles, requires only a cursory notice. Its substance will be found in the following synopsis. There is no presumption arising from human nature, against the miracles said to have been wrought in proof of Christianity; for, if it be objected, that the belief ofthe early pro selytes may be attributed to credulity and enthusiasm, inspired by the eloquence, fervour, or sanctity of the founders of a new religion, it may be replied, that even if this were true of a few early converts, it could not account for the accession of multitudes, continuing through successive generations, including men of the soundest and most searching order of mind, and embracing many of all ranks, conditions, and characters. That further, we have no counter tes timony, from the numerous and inveterate enemies of these early- proselytes, notwithstanding the direct appeals made to them on this subject by the apostles ; on the contrary, they admitted that notable miracles had been wrought among them. Further, although we find enthusiasts mistaken as to the origin of certain impulses of which they are conscious, yet we never find a multitude of men.how- everenthusiastic, alike mistaken as to the testimonyof their owasenses. How then can they have been mistaken as to the resurrection and ascension of Christ? In short, as absurdity is ever the last b INTRODUCTION. refuge of scepticism, the most unbelieving appear to be those, who believe that the persons who were deceived, as to these great events, were the very men* who stole and concealed the body of their Master. Nor is it less absurd to imagine that the apostles, though undeceived themselves, were confederated to deceive the rest of the world; since, apart from the high improbability, that the infamous secret should have been kept inviolate among a multitude of knaves, every motive, which can actuate to so audacious an enterprise, was want ing; and nothing but penury, disgrace, and destruction awaited those who embraced and propagated the Gospel. Nor is there any presumption, arising from the history of mankind, against the genuineness ofthe Christian miracles. So far from men in all ages having been imposed upon, as Mr. Hume boldly asserts, by ridicu lous stories of miracles, ascribed to new systems of religion, the religion of the Bible is the only religion extant which claims to have been recommended, at its first publication, by the evidence of miracles. Few enthusiasts, of any age or country, have dared to advance such a plea; and wherever they have had the boldness to recur to it, it has proved the bane, and not the support, of their cause. Moreover, the miracles alleged to have been wrought among pagan nations, by no means detract from the evidence afforded to the truth of Christianity, by the miracles of Scripture ; and this for several reasons. Many of them, for example, may be explained on natural principles, by the subsequent discoveries of science. None of them were wrought in corroboration of claims to inspiration, or in proof of the authenticity of a revelation. On the contrary, they were performed, whenever they had any reference to religion, in confirmation of a system already established, and gene rally received, and not in attestation of a new and, therefore, aggres sive religion. Above all, there is a character of meanness, jugglery, and concealment attaching to all other miracles, and a paucity and partiality of evidence attesting them, which strikingly contrasts with the undisguised openness of the Christian miracles, the uni versal assent of enemies to their genuineness, and the transparent simplicity and good faith of the writers by whom they are recorded. This convincing contrast, Dr. Campbell has developed in an ex tended and searching examination of the popish and pagan mira cles adduced by Mr. Hume ; and justly concludes, from the whole examination, that the lustre of the Gospel miracles is vastly en hanced, by comparison with the paltry counterfeits of them, exhibited both in ancient and modern times. The next point demonstrated is, that, apart from the evidence for particular facts, we have the clearest proof of the occurrence of some INTRODUCTION. ^ifc events, which, as being unconformable and opposite to the present course of nature, and the experience of mankind, must, even on Mi\ Hume's definitions, be deemed miraculous. The instance chiefly dwelt upon, is the creation of the human species, and, by inference, ofthe universe itself. The only opposing hypothesis, is that of an eternal succession of generations of mankind; a supposition, by which the eternity of existence ascribed by theists to one infinite Being, is transferred to an unbeginning series of finite creatures. This notion the Dr. opposes, by pointing to the early barbarism of all nations; thelate invention of letters, sciences, and arts; the known origin of many states and kingdoms; and the first peopling of many countries. The comparative recentness and rapidity of the progress which mankind have made, from a state of total barbarism and ignorance, to the heights of civilization and science which they now occupy, he justly infers to be inconsistent with the bare and fantastic hypothesis, of the existence of the species from eternity. While noticing this part of the deistical controversy, it may not be unseasonable to digress for a moment, in order to introduce an argument on the subject, which occurs in a sermon on Modern In fidelity, by the late Rev. Robert Hall. The entire treatise, is con fessedly one of the most masterly exhibitions of the ennobling and blessed tendency of the Christian religion, and of the debasing and destructive influence of scepticism, and, at the same time, one of the sublimest efforts of genius which our literature can boast., "When we examine a watch," says he, " or any other piece of ma chinery, we instantly perceive marks of design. The arrangement of its several parts, and the adaptation of its movements to one result, show it to be a contrivance; nor do we ever imagine the faculty of contriving to be in the watch itself, but in a separate agent. If we turn from art to nature, we behold a vast magazine of contrivances ; we see innumerable objects replete with the most exquisite design. The human eye, for example, is formed with admirable skill for the pur pose of sight, the ear, for the function of hearing. As in the pro ductions of art we never think of ascribing the power of contrivance to the machine itself, so we are certain the skill displayed in the human structure is not a property of man, since he is very imper fectly acquainted with his own formation. If there be an insepa rable relation betwixt the ideas of a contrivance and a contriver 5 and it be evident, in regard to the human structure, the designing agent is not man himself, there must undeniably be some separate invisible being, who is his former. This great Being we mean to indicate by the appellation of Deity. " This reasoning admits b ut of one reply. Why, it will be said, 62 XX INTRODUCTION. may we not suppose the world has always continued as it is ; that is, that there has been a constant succession of finite beings, appear ing and disappearing on the earth from all eternity ? I answer, whatever is supposed to have occasioned this constant succession, exclusive of an intelligent cause, will never account for the undeni able marks of design visible in all finite beings. Nor is the absurdity of supposing a contrivance without a contriver diminished by this imaginary succession ; but rather increased, by being repeated at every step of the series.* " Besides, an eternal succession of finite beings involves in it a contradiction, and is therefore plainly impossible. As the supposi tion is made to get quit of the idea of any one having existed from eternity, each of the beings in the succession must have begun in time : but the succession itself is eternal. We have then the suc cession of beings infinitely earlier than any being in the succession ; or, in other words, a series of beings running on, ad infiyiitum, before it reached any particular being, which is absurd. " From these considerations it is manifest there must be some eternal Being, or nothing could ever have existed : and since the beings which we behold bear in their whole structure evident marks of wisdom and design, it is equally certain that he who formed them is a wise and intelligent agent. " To prove the unity of this great Being, in opposition to a plura lity of Gods, it is not necessary to have recourse to metaphysical abstractions. It is sufficient to observe, that the notion of more than one author of nature is inconsistent with that harmony of design which pervades her works ; that it explains no appearances, * This paragraph has been introduced, in order to present an entire view of Mr. Hall's reasoning. It is by no means necessary to the support of the writer's position, which was completely established in the preceding paragraph ; besides which, it appears to me utterly unsatisfactory and fallacious. I conceive that the source of the error lies in the term " each," as predicated in the first branch of the argument of an infinite succession. A moment's reflection will show, that this term necessarily implies known limits, and is therefore plainly inapplicable, even in hypothesis, to an infinite series. From this results the erroneous distinction between eternity and time — the latter of which is as conventional a division of the former, as an hour is of a year. The subsequent fallacies in this line of reasoning, the reader will easily trace to those which have been pointed out ; and the ludicrous conclusion to which the author is led, derives its poignancy, less from any inherent absurdity in the specu lation which he opposes, than to the vital error involved in his first position. It is impossible to attribute the slightest degree of intentional unfairness to a writer who, like Mr. Hall, united the candour of philosophy with the majesty of o-enius. We should rather regard this as one of many instances which have come under our notice, in this introduction, of the inadequacy of mere metaphysical reasoning to establish those truths, on which [the only rays of infallible light are shed from a simple, a scanty, and a dogmatic revelation. — C. R. E. INTRODUCTION. XXI is supported by no evidence, and serves no purpose, but to embarrass and perplex our conceptions. " Such are the proofs of the existence of that great and glorious Being whom we denominate God ; and it is not presumption to say, it is impossible to find another truth in the whole compass of morals, which, according to the justest laws of reasoning, admits of such strict and rigorous demonstration." Dr. Campbell closes the dissertation which has thus passed under review, and which may be regarded as an almost perfect specimen of candid, perspicuous, and triumphant controversy, with some observations on Mr. Hume's examination of the Pentateuch. Here he first adduces Mr. Hume's own remark, that polytheism and idolatry are invariably found among rude and ancient nations ; and thus infers the genuineness of the divine revelation, given in the Pentateuch, to the early inhabitants of the world, from the purity of their religious belief. He next exposes the falsehood of one of the Essayist's remarks, that the book was probably written long after the events it relates ; and the curious absurdity of another, " that it was supported by no concurring testimony," a circumstance ob viously precluded, as most children are aware, by its long priority to any other written document. He adduces, as collateral evidence of its truth, the prevalence, among many remote nations, ofthe divi sion of time into weeks, and of various traditions, which are evidently corruptions of the relations given by Moses ; and finally offers a variety of analogical arguments in favour of the antecedent proba bility of the miracles recorded, and of the general credibility of the document. In closing, the Dr. animadverts upon a sort of final position of the Essayist, which indicates a degree of fatuity and incapacity of reasoning, scarcely exceeded in any part even of the Essay on Miracles. It is as follows, " Upon the whole, we may conclude, that the Christian religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but, even at this day, cannot be believed by any rea sonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity ; and whoever is moved by faith to assent to it ;" that is, whoever by his belief is induced to believe it, " is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience." "If any meaning," says Dr. Campbell, " can be gathered from that strange assemblage of words just now quoted, it seems to be one or other of these which follow : either, That there are not any in the world who believe the gospel ; or, That there is no want of miracles in our own time. How either of these remarks, if just, can contribute to XXH INTRODUCTION. the author's purpose, it will not, I suspect, be easy to discover. If the second remark be true, if there be no want of miracles at present, surely experience cannot be pleaded against the belief of miracles said to have been performed in time past. Again, if the first remark be true, if there be not any in the world who believe the gospel, be cause, as Mr. Hume supposes, a miracle cannot be believed without a new miracle, why all this ado to refute opinions which nobody entertains ?" Mr. Hume's treatise, respecting the authenticity and genuineness of the Pentateuch, received a far more searching and severe exami nation, in a little book entitled Letters on Infidelity, published at first anonymously, and in a subsequent edition with the name of its author, Dr. George Home, Bishop of Norwich. It commences with a letter to Dr. Adam Smith, the apologist for the life and writ ings of Mr. Hume, written in a style of the happiest satire ; it dwells more upon the details, than upon the general principles of Mr. Hume's sceptical writings ; but it convicts him, throughout, of the grossest fallacies in reasoning, of the most infamous licentious ness in his system of morals, and of the utmost ignorance and inca pacity in his criticisms on the sacred writings. It exhibits, in every page, some learning, and the most pointed and effective ridicule ; and is, perhaps, on the whole, as well calculated as any work on the subject, to remove those sceptical tendencies which Mr, Hume communicated to weak and wavering minds, by the beauties of his style, and the dogmatical impudence of his assertions. It may, perhaps, be thought, that a somewhat disproportionate degree of attention has been bestowed, in this introduction, to the deistical writings of Mr, Hume, and the apologies for Christianity to which they gave occasion. The reason for this is, that he has employed, in opposition to Christianity, a more formidable degree of ingenuity, research, and literary influence, than any writer who falls within that period of the controversy now under review. Before dismissing him, the writer deems it important to notice a single passage in one of his private letters, which shows, that with all his industry, virulence, and buffoonery, he was himself heartily ashamed of the opinions he propagated. In a letter addressed to Dr. Hugh Blair, when alluding, with every symptom of conscious defeat, to Dr. Campbell's dissertation, he says, " I could wish your friend had not denominated me an infidel writer, on account of ten or twelve pages which seem tohim to have that tendency, while I have wrote so many volumes on history, literature, politics, trade, morals, which, in that particular at least, are entirely inoffensive. Is a man to be called a drunkard because he has been seen fuddled once in his life INTRODUCTION. time ?" In what a melancholy, in what an ineffably despicable posi tion, does this sentence exhibit the boasted champion of modern infidelity ! What ! we exclaim, does he shrink from the denomi nation of an infidel writer, who has employed all his talents and learning in perverting the Old Testament, and invalidating the New ? — who has despised Moses and the prophets, and calumniated Christ and his apostles — who has habitually ridiculed the miracles, discredited the histories, maligned the tendency, and blasphemed the author of the Bible ? What, then, means the application of such language as this to Christianity — "the modern European superstition," '' the virulent poison," " the cruel enemy," " the in human tyrant," that '' chiefly contributes to render life miserable ? " Whence, then, Mr. Hume's elaborate defence of suicide, adultery, and every crime which can deface the species, till, instead of the image of God, they retain only the image of man ? And why, too, that heart-sickening effort to deaden the pangs of a death-bed without hope, by his Lucian, and his whist, and those saddest of jokes about Charon and his boat ? This is the man who slinks away from the charge of infidelity ; and, having never exhibited either the modesty or the integrity of the philosopher, abandons his last claim to that character, by disowning all interest in the grandest principles he has adopted and maintained. It might have been supposed, that the complete refutation with which Mr. Hume's Essay on Miracles had been met, by Campbell and others, would have finally destroyed that line of attack ; sub sequently, however, such varied arguments have been employed in defence of the Christian revelation, that modern sceptics have been compelled to bestir themselves to corresponding exertions; and, as new arguments have become somewhat scarce, they have betaken themselves to such as had been already exploded, with some slight changes in their mode of presenting and illustrating them. Accor dingly, the doctrine of Hume, that miracles cannot be proved by any testimony, was revived by La Place, the celebrated French astro nomer, in his work Sur les Probabilities, and supported in an elaborate criticism in the Edinburgh Review, No. 46, universally attributed to Professor Leslie. This critique, and the reasoning of La Place, which occasioned it, were answered with great ability and entire success, by the Rev. James Somerville, in a treatise which demands a moment's attention in this place. The language of La Place has been translated as follows. " Events may be so extraordinary, that they can hardly be established by any testimony. We would not give credit to a man who, affirmed that he had seen an hundred dice thrown into the air, and all fall on the same faces. INTRODUCTION. If we ourselves had been spectators of such an event, we would not believe our own eyes, till we had scrupulously examined all the cir cumstances, and assured ourselves that there was no trick nor decep tion. After such examination, we would not hesitate to admit it, notwithstanding its great improbability; and no one would have recourse to an inversion of the laws of vision, in order to account for it. This shows, that the probability of the continuance of the laws of nature is superior, in our estimation, to every other evidence, and to that of historical facts the best established. One may, there fore, judge of the weight of testimony necessary to prove a suspen sion of the laws of nature, and how fallacious it is, in such cases, to apply the common rules of evidence." After noticing the looseness of the author's expressions, as to " hardly believing" and " not believing," Mr. Somerville addresses himself to the first proposition, namely, that we would not believe a man who said that he had seen an hundred dice fall on the same faces. This fundamental position he shows to be a petitio principii, a very favourite mode of reasoning, as we have seen, with modern sceptics, since the credibility of testimony to extraordinary events is precisely the point in dispute. In showing this, however, he corrects one previous error, which, so long as it remained, rendered the above position totally irrelevant to the question, one way or the other. " We would not believe a man,"' says La Place. This is ad mitted on all hands. The question is not, whether any one man's testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, or an extraordinary event, but whether any conceivable concurrence and weight of testi mony is sufficient for that purpose. Having made this alteration, in order to give the slightest force and relevancy to the remark, it exchanges the character of a truism for that of a falsehood : for by we the writer evidently intends mankind in general ; but it is an undeniable fact, that mankind have, in all ages, believed the most extraordinary occurrences on what they regarded as valid testimony. The second position, namely, that we would believe our own eyes in the matter of the dice, may be suffered to pass as innocent ; but the reason assigned by the astronomer, for our confidence in the evidence of our eye-sight (which may be regarded as the next step in the argument) is also shown to be false, viz. our confidence in the immutability of the laws of vision. We are confident of no such thing. On the contrary, we know that a variety of physical derange ments do disturb the ordinary laws of vision. The ground of our confidence, as must appear from a moment's reflection, is that, in this particular instance, they have not been interrupted ; a fact easily, and even involuntarily, verified by observation of all other INTRODUCTION. XXV objects around. So that the conclusion falls to the ground ; and only leaves us surprised, that the great philosopher should so mis take his vocation, as to apply his theory of chances to subjects which it could not possibly elucidate. The reasoning of Professor Leslie admits of an equally easy refutation. Having fallen still more flagrantly into the erroneous assumption of Mr. Hume, that all our knowledge of the ordinary phenomena of nature is experience (a term which can only be used with propriety in reference to our own personal observation, all other knowledge being manifestly derived from testimony) ; and having next assumed, with about equal truth, that experience in these matters is perfectly uniform ; he concludes that no testimony can prevail against it. " A most unquestionable truth, without doubt," replies Mr. Somerville, " if his premises are granted, and far from requiring the metaphysical talents of Hume, or the mathe matical powers of La Place, or his reviewer, to establish. For if experience be uniform, that experience must consist of the personal experience of every individual of the human race, in every age. Nothing less can constitute uniform experience ; and if there be uniform experience on any point whatever, it is plain that no testi mony can prevail against it ; for this obvious reason, that no person could possibly be found giving such testimony. The uniformity of experience, which is assumed as the very basis of the argument, precludes the possibility of any opposite testimony. The proposi tion, therefore, which assumes that no testimony can prevail against uniformity of experience, is a mere childish truism." The reason for the confusion of experience and testimony, on the part of modern sceptics, is clearly pointed out by this ingenious writer. Real experience furnished too narrow ground for such an extensive conclusion as they wished to draw. Had they justly restricted the application of the term experience, and designated as testimony every thing prior and collateral, they would have been deprived of the plausible ground of opposing testimony to uniform experience; and, instead of saying, that no testimony is to be credited against uniform experience, they would have only been able to argue, that no testimony is to be credited against uniform testis mony, a proposition too harmless to require any attention. Had they apportioned to testimony its rightful province, it would have fol lowed, that the statement respecting miracles, and those concerning the laws of nature, as standing on the same ground, namely that of testimony, must all be tried by the same laws, the laws by which testimony is tried. " It would scarcely be worth while to bestow even a moment's INTRODUCTION. attention on the effusions of so inapt a reasoner on moral subjects as the learned Reviewer, but for the sake of noticing, and claiming for Christianity, the most singular of the arguments of La Place, which bears on the subjects of miracles — an argument which over throws Mr. Hume's deistical school from the very foundation, bury ing together in the rubbish Professor Leslie, La Place, and an undistinguished mob of little disciples, "quos fama obscura recondit." It will be recollected, that Mr. Hume's statement is, that no testi mony, for any kind of miracle, can ever possibly amount to a pro bability, much les's to a proof;'' — a position which, together with the whole theory with which it stands connected, is warmly eulogized by the Edinburgh Reviewer, and attributed to the historian as its sole and original author. It should further be borne in mind, that no less absolute or modified form of presenting this dogma will in any degree serve the purpose for which it is designed ; since, if any kind or degree of evidence, short of that of personal observation, could establish the possibility of a violation of the laws of nature, it would become necessary for the impugners of the Scripture miracles to examine, in detail, the evidence of all kinds by which they are supported, and to demonstrate its inadequacy. To such a process the sceptical school in question are remarkably disinclined ; and they therefore confine their opposition to the most abstract and metaphysical forms of argument. Bearing these considerations in mind, let the reader listen for a moment to the mathematicians. " Supposing, with M. La Place, that the greatest antiquity to which history goes back is 5000 years, or 1826213 days, the pro bability that the sun will rise again to-morrow is, according to this rule, as yfjgf; or there is 1826214 to 1 to wager in favour of that event." This obviously implies, that if a person should wager more, as, for instance, a hundred millions to one, he would act against the laws of probability. Here it is clearly shown, that there is not only " a possibility," but some probability, of the sun not rising to morrow ; it is indeed small, but it is appreciable and definable. And how will the sceptic attempt to prove, that an event which is not only possible, but, to a certain measurable degree, probable to occur to-morrow, cannot, by any evidence, be established to have happened in any past period ? " If he say," argues Mr. Somerville, ' " that it is in itself impossible, we deny it upon his own showing ; for he has proved that it is possible, and even to a certain decree probable. If he say that uniform experience is against it, we deny it, and say, that only the experience of the present generation is against it. If he say that uniform testimony is against it this we INTRODUCTION. XXvil deny also ; for it is testified, by the author of the book of Joshua, that in his time the sun stood still for a whole day ; and there is no testimony at all on the other side, as applicable to that particular day. The same observations may be applied to all the miracles recorded in Scripture. Experience is not applicable to them, for it is limited to the objects under our notice ; and testimony is so far from being against them, that there is testimony for them, and none against them. Many persons testify that they saw them happen, and none testify that they were upon the spot, and examined all the circumstances, and saw that they did not happen. As to the testi mony of those who were not there, however uniform it might be, it does not bear at all on the subject. The principles of calculation, therefore, are more in support of miracles than against them." Truly this is smiting off the head ofthe giant with his own sword! The next and only writer, after the days of Hume, who brought to the cause of infidelity a high and deserved reputation for philo sophy and letters, was Mr. Gibbon, the celebrated historian of the de cline and fall of the Roman Empire. His opposition to the cause of Christianity, was marked by less both of zeal and subtlety than the writings of Mr. Hume evinced. The latter wrote in the character of a philosopher, and regarded those as his best and most characte ristic works which related to morals and religion. Mr. Gibbon, on the contrary, offered to revealed religion only the hostility of the historian and the scholar. Accordingly, he is only known, in the ranks of deistical writers, by two chapters in his historical work, in which he details the rise and progress of Christianity, and the causes which, in his opinion, contributed to its prevalence. Nothing could be more artfully and courteously disguised, than was the thread of infidelity in this portion of his history ; and while he habitually indicates a deep veneration for that vast but silent agency, which achieved a domination over mankind, far more powerful than did the arts of senators, and the swords of the Caesars — while he recognizes the superior sublimity of that intellectual and spiritual empire, over mere physical and territorial supremacy, he repeatedly ascribes it, by sly implication, to causes the most ordinary and in adequate, and thus depreciates the dignity of its nature, and veils the divinity of its origin. The immediate effect of these chapters, was only to inspire a suspicion of the orthodoxy of the writer ; but it was not long before the Christian world settled into a deep and serious conviction of the injury which they threatened to the cause of religion. The effect of this general impression was much en hanced, by the alarming prevalence of infidel opinions. Scepticism, upon the most sacred of subjects, had of late ceased to be the ex- XXVlll INTRODUCTION. elusive distinction of philosophers. Availing themselves of the spread of education, and favoured by external and political events, its votaries had succeeded in extending its influence, and in impreg nating with its poison every rank of society. The Christian church was naturally, or rather providentially, alarmed, by the new species of opposition which she had to encounter. Her champions and her hosts were aroused ; and to their energies she owes those recent but impregnable defences with which she is now encompassed. Accord ingly, a number of writers in defence of Christianity, too great for any but a merely nominal mention, appeared to answer the asper sions of Mr. Gibbon, against the truths of revealed religion. In presenting a brief analysis of the controversy, as conducted by them, it may not be improper to quote the arrogant terms in which the historian himself, in his memoirs of his life and writings, conde scended to notice them. "Had I believed," he says, "that the majority of English readers were so fondly attached even to the name and shadow of Christianity — had I foreseen that the pious, the timid, and the prudent would feel, or affect to feel, with such exquisite sensibility, I might perhaps have softened the two invidious chapters, which would create many enemies, and concili ate few friends. But the shaft was shot, the alarm was sounded, and I could only rejoice, that, if the voice of our priests was clamo rous and bitter, their hands were disarmed from the powers of per secution. I adhered to the wise resolution of trusting myself and my writings to the candour of the public, till Mr. Davis, of Oxford, presumed to attack,- not the faith, but the fidelity of the historian. My vindication, expressive of less anger than contempt, amused for a moment the busy and idle metropolis ; and" the most rational part of the laity, and even of the clergy, appear to have been satisfied of my innocence and accuracy I would not print this vindication in quarto, lest it should be bound and preserved with the history itself. At the distance of twelve years, I calmly affirm my judgment of Davis, Chelsum, &c. A victory over such antagonists was a suffi cient humiliation. They, however, were rewarded in this world. Poor Chelsum was indeed neglected; and I dare not boast the making Dr. Watson a Bishop ; he is a prelate of large mind and liberal spirit: but1 I enjoyed the privilege of giving a royal pension to Mr. Davis, and of collating Dr. Apthorpe to an archiepiscopal living. Their success encouraged the zeal of Taylor the Arian, and Miluer the Methodist, with many others whom it would be difficult to remember, and tedious to rehearse. The list of my adversaries was graced, however, by the more respectable names of Dr. Priestley, INTRODUCTION, XXIX Sir David Dalrymple,* and Dr. White ; and every polemic, of either university, discharged his sermon or pamphlet against the impene trable silence of the Roman Historian." After some more particu lar notice of the publications of the last-mentioned persons — characterized by the same superciliousness and vanity — Mr. Gib bon concludes as follows : " Let me frankly own that I was startled at the first discharge of Ecclesiastical ordnance; but, as soon as I found that this empty noise was mischievous only in the intention* my fear was converted into indignation, and every feeling of indig nation or curiosity has since subsided in pure and placid indiffe rence." The passages in Mr. Gibbon's Historical Work, which gave rise to so much controversy, are to be found in the fifteenth and sixteenth chapters, which are devoted to the early progress of the Christian religion. " Our curiosity is naturally prompted," says he, " to inquire by what means the Christian faith obtained so remarkable a victory over the established religions of the earth. To this inquiry* an obvious but satisfactory answer may be returned ; that it was owing to the convincing evidence of the doctrine itself, and the ruling providence of its great Author." Perhaps it was this single passage which more than any other necessitated the active opposi tion of the world to the succeeding remarks. Nothing could be more disingenuous, or more dangerous, than this curious observa tion. It seems to indicate the justest views and the most stable and enlightened faith ; of both of which, the sequel of his examination proves him to be utterly destitute. Having laid down this primary principle, he proceeds to detail what he terms the secondary causes which favoured the growth of the Christian church. These he con jectures to have been the following : 1. The inflexible and, if we may use the expression, the intolerant zeal of the Christians, derived, it is true, from the Jewish religion, but purified from the narrow and unsocial spirit, which, instead of inviting, had deterred the Gentiles from embracing the laws of Moses. 2. The doctrine of a future life improved by every additional circumstance which could give weight and efficacy to that important truth. „ 3- The miraculous powers ascribed to the primitive church. 4. The pure and austere morals of the Christians. 5. The union and discipline of the Christian republic, which * Afterwards Lord Hailes. INTRODUCTION. gradually formed an independent and increasing state in the heart of the Roman empire. These reasons are, indeed, prescribed by Mr. Gibbon as secon dary; but, throughout his treatise he so systematically passes over that primary agency which, in the commencement he refers to, as giving all their efficiency to the subsidiary causes, and further, so continually throws out sly, unfair, and intangible insinuations against the truths of revelation generally, as to make it evident that he deemed the " five causes" as primary and self-sufficient, and was only studious to adopt the most effectual, but least alarming mode of disseminating his scepticism. It was to these allegations, therefore, that Dr. Watson chiefly confined his opposition, in his celebrated "Apology for Christianity" — a work which impressed the historian with a higher opinion of its author, than he entertained of any other of his opponents ; although it is unquestionable, that Mr. Davis gave him by far the most uneasiness, by attacking his historical " fidelity," while the other only impugned what he amusingly denominates his faith. Iri replying to the first cause to which Mr. Gibbon traces the spread of Christianity, Dr. Watson does not notice the obvious singularity of attributing intolerance to the unprotected feebleness of the early church — a figure of speech analogous to that by which we should ascribe sparing mercy to a couple of new born lambs, surrounded by a troop, of snarling and misbehaving wolves. Nor does he remark on the absurdity of supposing, that " the ruling providence of the great author" would have approved and employed such an agency — a lapse of memory on the part of Mr. Gibbon, apparent in one or two other of the " five causes." He chiefly confines himself to the source from which the historian derives the zeal of the early church, convicts him of ignorance and error in identifying it with the zealous exclusiveness of the Jewish system, to which the whole design and spirit ofthe Christian religion was essentially hostile, exposes his insensibility to, or wilful contempt of, the influence of that doctrine, to whose evidence he, in a moment of incautious orthodoxy, had attributed the triumphs of the cross, and points to the principles and promises of the gospel, as the only means by which that "inflexible zeal" could have been kindled and sustained. In concluding his first letter he animadverts upon a seemingly incidental statement of Mr. Gibbon, that " the contemporaries of Moses and Joshua had beheld with careless indifference, the most amazing miracles ; and that, in contradiction to every known prin- INTRODUCTION. XXXI ciple of the human mind, the Jews seem to have yielded a more ready assent to the traditions of their remote ancestors, than to the evidence of their own senses." In reply, the Doctor confutes both of the allegations, by several facts and arguments, and exposes, though not so fully and pointedly as he might have done, the latent bearing which it has against the veracity of the Old Tes tament Scriptures. The second cause alleged by Mr. Gibbon as having contributed to the early advancement of Christianity, is the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, "improved," as he expresses it, " by every additional circumstance which could give weight and efficacy to that important truth." Unfortunately, however, Dr. Watson clearly shows, that the additions " to this important doctrine," as received by the pagans, were by no means calculated to give "weight and efficacy" to it ; but, on the contrary, were adapted to repel them from its adoption. The bare notion of a future state, was not an innovation upon the heathen mythology. The novelty consisted in the doctrine of probation and responsibility, and the resurrection of the dead ; and this, as connected with eternal punishment as the consequence of their habitually cherished vices, was very unlikely to attract them to the ranks of Christianity. He next opposes the historian's suggestion, that the Gentiles were con verted by their fears of Christ's second coming, of the final judg ment, and the general conflagration — showing, first, that the mere declarations of a few despised and ignorant men, were utterly inade quate to inspire those fears ; and further that, notwithstanding the frequent use of such terms as, " We who are alive and remain," the apostles themselves did not expect the second advent of their Mas ter, but, on the contrary, speak of their own approaching decease, in language which clearly indicates the opposite opinion. The various prophecies contained in the epistles, which point to future and remote corruptions of Christianity, and which are universally believed to have had their fulfilment in the prevalence of the popish religion, more fully establish this point. In noticing the third cause adduced by Mr. Gibbon, to account for the early spread of the Christian religion, namely, the miraculous powers ascribed to the primitive church, it is impossible not to notice the characteristic slyness with which the author has concealed a satire and a fallacy in the terms. What can Mr. Gibbon mean in the use of the word ascribed ? If he means that these miraculous powers were falsely claimed and conceded, what becomes of his preliminary acknowledgment of the "evidence of the doctrine itself, and the ruling providence of its Author ?" If, on the other XXXII INTRODUCTION. hand, he grants that these powers were really possessed, where is the fairness, nay, the common honesty, of employing a term which he knew would leave -upon the mind of the majority of his readers a false and pernicious impression ? But, apart from this, a fallacy lies in this part of Mr. Gibbon's reasoning, which it is still more important to expose. The kind of miraculous power, a claim to which is charged by Mr. Gibbon upon the primitive church, is such that any pretensions to it would rather have impeded than promoted the cause of Christianity. "They consisted," he says, "of divine in spirations, conveyed, sometimes in the form of a waking, sometimes a sleeping vision, and were liberally bestowed on all ranks of the faithful — on women as on elders, on boys as well as on bishops." The obvious reply to these representations may be given in the words of Bishop Watson : "Cast your eye, Sir," says he, " upon the church of Rome, and ask yourself (I put the question to your heart, and beg you will consult that for an answer ; ask yourself) whether her absurd pre tensions to that very kind of miraculous powers you have here displayed as operating to the increase of Christianity, have not converted half her members to Protestantism, and the other half to infidelity ? Neither the sword of the civil magistrate, nor the pos session of the keys of heaven, nor the terrors of her spiritual thun der, have been able to keep within her pale even those who have been bred up in her faith ; how, then, should you think, that the very cause which hath almost extinguished Christianity among Christians, should have established it among pagans ? I beg I may not be misunderstood ; I do not take upon me to say, that all the miracles recorded in the history of the primitive church after the apostolical age, were forgeries ; it is foreign to the present purpose to deliver any opinion upon that subject : but I do beg leave to in sist upon this, that such of them as were forgeries, must in that, learned age, by their easy detection, have rather impeded than accelerated the progress of Christianity ; and it appears very proba ble to me, that nothing but the recent prevailing evidence of real, unquestioned, apostolical miracles, could have secured the infant church from being destroyed by those which were falsely ascribed to it." The next cause to which Mr. Gibbon ascribes the growth of the new religion, is " the pure and austere morals of the Christians." This would, at first- sight, appear an unexceptionable position ; as the purifying tendency of Christian truth, is not only one of its noblest distinctions, but one of its most legitimate and effectual recommendations. Such apparently fair admissions, however as INTRODUCTION. XXXiii this, should always have the effect of putting the reader of Mr. Gibbon's writings on his guard, against some particularly covert and formidable invasions of Christianity, which they generally introduce. Thu.s, in the close of the very paragraph in which the above statements occur, we find him accounting for this superior sanctity. "As it is my intention," says he, "to remark only on such human causes as were permitted to second the influence of revelation, I shall slightly mention two motives, which might natu rally render the lives of the primitive Christians much purer and more austere than those of their pagan contemporaries, or their de generate successors ; repentance for their past sins, and the laudable desire of supporting the reputation of the society in which they were engaged." That even these motives should secure a higher degree of moral excellence, than was found among contemporary pagans, will be readily understood ; though the principle on which this consideration accounts for the superiority of the primitive Chris tians over their "degenerate successors," seem somewhat obscure ; since if they were successors, in other words true Christians, the same repentance, and care for the reputation of their fraternity, would be possessed alike by both. But further than this, to account for the purity of Christian morals by any such considerations, is at once to betray a strange wa t of acquaintance with human nature, and either the most contemptible ignorance or the most contemp tuous disregard of those grand truths, to the reception of which alone the Christian ascribes whatever measure of holiness he may possess. Besides, the admission, erroneous as it is in Mr. Gibbon's application of it, has very obviously the further attribute of insin cerity ; and was probably designed to disarm the reader of his sus picion, and thus to prepare him for the heedless reception of the sentiments and sophisms of infidelity. Accordingly, in the course of the same chapter, we find him distributing the motives to virtue and general excellence, under two cardinal principles ; the love of pleasure, and the love of action. " The character," says he, " in which both the one and the other should be united and harmonised, would seem-to constitute the most perfect idea of human nature. The insensible and inactive disposition, which should be supposed alike destitute of both, would be rejected, by the common consent of mankind, as utterly incapable of procuring any happiness to the individual, or any public benefit to the world." " But," he immediately continues, " it was not in this world that the primitive Christians were desirous of making themselves either agreeable or useful." What construction can sophistry itself affix to this last sentence, except that the Christians were destitute of every motive INTRODUCTION. to excellence, usefulness, or happiness ? and how does this repre sentation agree with his former one, that such was the excellency of their character, as to subdue the inveterate hostility of Jews and Romans, and to win them to the faith of the gospel ? A similar insinuation occurs in the very next page. After descanting on the simplicity and undue self-denial of the early disciples of Jesus, he adds, " It is always easy, as well as agreeable, for the inferior ranks of mankind to claim a merit, from the contempt of that pomp and pleasure which fortune has placed beyond their reach. The virtue of the primitive Christians, like that of the first Romans''. J was very frequently guarded by poverty and ignorance." What are we to think of a writer, who alternately with such assassin-like attacks as these, has the mingled meanness and audacity (for milder terms would be inappropriate) to offer to the majesty of the Christian religion his courtly but insulting obeisance ! In noticing the fourth and last of Mr. Gibbon's reasons, it will only be necessary to point attention to the terms he adopts, from which the general tone of his disquisition upon it may be easily in ferred. This he alleges to have been '' The union and discipline of the Christian Republic, which gradually formed an independent and increasing state in the heart of the Roman Empire." Would anyone suppose that this language referred to the primitive Christian church, and was adduced to account for the early prevalence of that spiritual kingdom which, as its founder declared, was " not of this world " ! The attention of the reader is ingeniously diverted from apostles and converts to popes and cardinals, and he learns insensibly to class the best and purest times of Christianity among the ages of its foulest corruptions. The object of the historian in this, the closing part of his argument, is consistent with that which he has at once conceded and promoted, throughout the portion of his history under review. It is to unspiritualize religion ; to confound that extraordinary association which is based on a community of belief, experience, affections, and hopes, with those which are merely civil and political ; to keep out of sight the special relation which the Divine Being sustains to the former; and to represent it as a system ingeniously devised, for obtaining a vast but imperceptible influence over mankind, by imposing on their credulity those notions which, while they would not bear the scrutiny of the philosopher, had a salutary effect on the morals of the great mass of society. Hence the use of such terms, as the " Christian Republic," " a large and increasing state," with a variety of others, calculated to insinuate into the mind the most vital errors, with that imperceptible gentle ness which should neither disturb its prejudices, nor awaken its fears. INTRODUCTION. It need not excite surprise, still less need it intrude .uiy doubts respecting the evidence of revealed religion, that so covert a mode of attack should in many instances have met with success; and even where this has not been the result, the dangers through which the reader has securely passed, have remained undetected. A strik ing instance of this is afforded by a late distinguished philosopher, Sir James Mackintosh. In allusion to the five causes to which, as we have seen, Mr. Gibbon ascribes the triumphs of Christianity, Sir James writes : " Perhaps those which he enumerates, are among the most obvious. They might all be safely adopted by a Christian writer, with some change in the language and manner." That this extraordinary man should not have perceived a hostility to religion, in these chapters, far more mischievous than any that can belong to mere manner, is doubtless to be attributed, not to any defect of acuteness, still less to a leaning to sceptical opinions, but solely to that generous candour, which is the invariable distinction of a phi losophic mind, but which, when unchastened with experience and caution, is too apt to concede sincerity to all who are ingenious enough to conceal their duplicity. The latter part of Bishop Watson's reply to Gibbon, is occupied in animadversions upon the closing portion of his fifteenth chapter ; in which he manifestly impugns the authenticity of the New Tes tament histories: though still with that degree of adroitness, and simulation of respect, which he ever maintained ; and which, while it rendered "his work more dangerous, gave to it a character of un utterable meanness. Having delicately insinuated doubts and reflections upon the statements of divine revelation, throughout those chapters of his history which he devotes to its consideration, he attempts, in the last paragraph of the fifteenth, to leave a per manent impression on the mind of the reader, against that invalu able kind of evidence for the truth of Christianity, derived from miracles. The tone of reproach which he affects, in noticing the unbelief of the ancient heathen, is peculiarly characteristic; and the whole paragraph, by its mingled malignity, cowardice, and duplicity, stigmatizes its author in the ranks of infidelity, as " the least exalted spirit that fell," " But how shall we excuse," says he, " the supine inattention of the pagan and philosophic world, to those evidences which were presented by the hand of Omnipotence, not to their reason, but to their senses ? During the age of Christ, of his apostles, and of their first disciples, the doctrine which they preached was confirmed by innumerable prodigies. The lame walked, the blind saw, the sick were healed, the dead were raised, demons were expelled, and XXXVI INTRODUCTION. the laws of nature were frequently suspended for the benefit of the church. But the sages of Greece and Rome turned aside from the awful spectacle, and pursuing the ordinary occupations of life and study, appeared unconscious of any alterations in the moral or physical government of the world. Under the reign of Tiberius, the whole earth, or at least a celebrated province of the Roman empire, was involved in a preternatural darkness of three hours. Even this miraculous event, which ought to have excited the won der, the curiosity, and the devotion of mankind, passed without notice in an age of science and history. It happened during the lifetime of Seneca and the elder Pliny, who must have experienced the immediate effects, or received the earliest intelligence of the prodigy. Each of these philosophers, in a laborious work, has re corded all the great phenomena of nature, earthquakes, meteors, comets, and eclipses, which his indefatigable curiosity could collect. Both the one and the other have omitted to mention the greatest phenomenon to which the mortal eye has been witness since the creation of the globe. A distinct chapter of Pliny is designed for eclipses of an extraordinary nature and unusual duration : but he contents himself with describing the singular defect of light which followed the murder of Csesar, when, during the greatest part of the year, the orb of the sun appeared pale and without splendour. This season of obscurity, which cannot surely be compared with the preternatural darkness of the Passion, had been already celebrated by most of the poets and historians of that memorable age." Respecting the first allegation of the historian, viz., that the Christian miracles were unnoticed by learned and observant heathens, Dr. Watson remarks, first, the comparative infrequency of these miracles, and the consequent probability that no contem porary historian ever witnessed them, for otherwise they would un doubtedly have, noticed them, since they do not hesitate to record the silly juggles of Vespasian; secondly, that so far from being in attentive to those wonders, by which the Divine Being attested the inspiration of his early servants, multitudes of pagans saw and be lieved, and forsaking all hopes of worldly honour, riches, or security, devoted themselves to the profession of Christianity; and lastly, that the miracles of the Christians were attributed by many to magic, and were, therefore, deemed unworthy of notice by contem porary annalists. With regard to the preternatural darkness at the crucifixion, the Dr. shows that it was probably partial, and therefore the less obvious to universal notice, by these considerations. First, from the fact of Jesus having seen from the cross his mother and John, though there is reason to believe that INTRODUCTION. XXXVH they were at some short distance; secondly, because the same word used by the same historian, is elsewhere employed to denote a darkness which must necessarily have been very slight ; and thirdly, because the term translated "all the earth," may with great propriety be translated " all the region," by which version the silence of contemporary but foreign historians is easily explained. Such are the principal features of the controversy, as carried on by the Bishop of Llandaff against the Roman historian. As far as regards its influence upon the public mind, Dr. Watson's Apology, by dwelling chiefly upon the cardinal topics involved in Mr. Gibbon's five reasons for the spread of Christianity, has been by far the most successful of the replies. Those of Mr. Davies, and of Sir David Dalrymple, were devoted to a closer examination of those inaccuracies, and ingenious and almost imperceptible fallacies which render the historian's treatise so dangerous, by gradually impressing sentiments which in the commencement he had the hypocrisy to disavow, and which, to the last, he never had the courage to defend. But notwithstanding their evil design and pernicious tendency, the effect of Mr. Gibbon's writings was exceedingly circumscribed. Their learning and their magni tude alike limited their influence, while the more concise and popular replies of his opponents still further promoted this result. Neither of these circumstances affected the individual who next claims our notice. Thomas Pai ne was eminently qualified to influ ence the minds ofthe vulgar. His style of writing was perspicuous and pointed, abounding with wit, and rendered still more influential by the circumstances into which he was introduced by the American war and the French Revolution. His aversion to the Christian religion was undisguised and unbounded; and perhaps there are few men who have met with such melancholy success in their attempts to seduce mankind from the enjoyments and prospects of religion, to the chill and dreary shades of infidelity. This effect was greatly enhanced by his political writings, which lent to his name a degree of splendour highly favourable to the reception of his religious tenets. In these there was scarcely any thing that was new; most of his objections to Christianity had been triumphantly refuted many times before ; and if all had not shared the' same fate, it was because, in his incredible ignorance of the Christian religion and Scriptures, he had fallen into some errors, of which his more cautious predecessors had never dreamed. When it is remembered, that in his principal work, entitled "The Age of Reason," Mr. Paine attempts to invalidate the genuineness and authenticity of the entire Scripture histories, prophecies, gospels, INTRODUCTION. and epistles ; and to pick out innumerable inconsistencies, without the remotest pretensions either to scholarship, theological knowledge, or common sincerity, it will readily be supposed that this is not the place in which his innumerable representations can be exposed. They have already been most ably refuted by a number of eminent divines ; among whom we may mention, as the principal, Bishop Watson, in his Apology for the Bible, Thomas Scott, in his Vindi cation of the Divine Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, and Andrew Fuller, in his " Gospel its own Witness." Of all his objec tions against revealed religion, there is but one that has the slightest pretensions to originality ; and as this one argument has been com pletely answered by Mr. Fuller, and subsequently, by a similar process of reasoning, but with greater prolixity, and gorgeousness of illustration, by Dr. Chalmers, it will suffice to confine our notice of Mr. Paine's writings to a brief detail of this branch of the con troversy. His argument is founded upon the recent discoveries of Astronomy, which render probable the existence of a plurality of worlds. It may be stated in the following manner. It is highly probable that this world is but an insignificant point in the creation, surrounded on all sides by myriads of globes, inhabited by intelli gent beings ; but if so, how incredible is it that it should have engrossed so vast a portion of the Divine regard ; that in this little inhabited speck God himself should become incarnate, and thus accomplish results so mighty as to be without a parallel in the history of his eternal administration so far as it is known to us. Of this ap parent disproportion he makes the most, in his opposition to the Chris tian revelation. " Though it is not," he says, " a direct article of the Christian system, that this world which we inhabit is the whole of the habitable creation, yet it is so worked up therewith, from whatis called the Mosaic account of the creation, the story of Eve and the apple, and the counterpart of that story, the death ofthe Son of God, that to believe otherwise, that is, to believe that God created a plurality of worlds, at least as numerous as what we call stars, renders the Christian system of faith at once little and ridiculous, and scatters, it in the mind like feathers in the air. The two beliefs cannot be held together in the same mind; and he who thinks he believes both, has thought but little of either." With these views he attempts to show, that the Scriptures recognise this as the only world ; and to exhibit the absurdity of supposing, either that in this world only this manifestation of Divine condescension was made, or that every other world had been similarly visited. Against these statements Mr. Fuller offers the following arguments. INTRODUCTION. 1. That so far from "the two beliefs" being inconsistent with each other, they have been held together by some of the greatest of men. 2. That so far from "the Christian system of faith forming itself upon the idea of only one world," it distinctly reveals in addition a world of happiness, and a world of misery; and nowhere implies that these three states comprehend the whole inhabited creation. 3. That if the notion of a plurality of worlds interfere in any degree with the doctrines of revelation, it should obviously be aban doned, since at best it is matter, not of belief, but merely of opinion aud conjecture, while the system of opinion with which it is alleged to interfere, comes supported by an irrefragable body of evidence. The author next proposed to show, that admitting the intelligent creation to be as extensive as modern philosophy supposes, the cre dibility of redemption is not thereby weakened, but on the contrary in many respects is strengthened and aggrandized. After premi sing the incalculable importance with which the condition of immor tality invests the nature of man, and the consequent fitness of a vast expenditure of means to secure his happiness, he argues the consistency of the Scripture doctrine of redemption, with the sup posed magnitude of creation, from the following considerations. 1. Whatever be its extent, we have no proof that it contains any beings who have apostatized from God, except men and angels. 2. Whatever be its extent, there is no inconsistency in supposing that a particular part of it may be chosen from the rest, as a theatre on which the great Author of all things would perform his most glorious works. 3. For such a display, that spot would probably be chosen wherein the greatest efforts had been made to dishonour God. 4. The events which have thus transpired, in this little insigni- cant world, are competent to fill God's whole dominions with great and everlasting joy. He further argues, that the credibility of the Gospel scheme is enhanced by the supposed magnitude ofthe creation, on the follow ing grounds. 1. The Scripture teaches us first, that God's regard to man is an astonishing manifestation of his condescension, and that on account of the disparity between him and the celestial creation. 2. That before creation, this world was marked out by eternal wisdom, as the theatre of this great manifestation. 3. That the mediation of Christ is represented as bearing a refe rence to the whole creation, by bringing them into union with the church of God. xl INTRODUCTION. 4. That thus, through the mediation of Christ, not only is the whole creation represented as augmenting the blessedness of the church, but the church as augmenting the blessedness of the whole creation. 5. The Scriptures teach us, that the earth itself, with all its re deemed inhabitants, shall, at a future period, be purified, and reunited to the holy empire of God : and Lastly. That even the punishment of the finally impenitent, is represented as appointed for an impressive example to the whole creation. By this admirable train of reasoning Mr. Fuller meets one of the most recent of the aggressions of philosophy and rationalism against the truths of revelation: and so long as that reasoning shall remain on record, it is not presumptuous to predict that the ingenious speculation of Paine will be consigned, together with the dishonest sophistry of Hume, and the respectful treachery of Gibbon, to unbroken and lasting forgetfulness. On the whole, we cannot dismiss the deistical writings of Paine, with any more respect than is claimed by the modern infidels whose works have previously come under review. In point of learning, repu tation, and influence, he stood far below the great historians; while his ignorance of his principal subject, theology, and of the Bible in particular, was the most gross and contemptible that it is possible to imagine. His virulence and bitterness of spirit against every thing related to religion, clearly showed that his opposition was not that of philosophy, but "of prejudice ; while the cowardice of his nature, and the impurity of his morals, to which the absolute filthi- ness of his person was a tolerably faithful index, proved that his in fidelity grew out of his fears, and that, like the miserable Rochester, he knew, in fact, no objection to the Bible, but a bad life. Degraded, however, as he was in a social point of view, below the ordinary level of human nature, he was a man of great acuteness, of much original wit, and one of the most masterly political writers of his day ; all which gave to his theological works a vogue and influ ence, which, from their intrinsic worth lessness, they could not other wise have obtained. Accordingly, they were productive for a time of an accession to the ranks of infidelity, both in France and in this country, augmenting at once the numbers, the confidence, and the virulence of the deistical school. The replies, however, to which reference has already been made, together with the many and in valuable works on the evidences of Christianity, to which the writ ings of Paine indirectly gave rise, have established the authenticity INTRODUCTION. xii of revelation on new and impregnable grounds ; and have proved by their result, that detected sophisms are quite as incapable of revival as exploded superstitions. Subsequently to the publication of the " Age of Reason,'' the deistical controversy has been carried on in this country, by the offensive party, with such a total destitution of originality, argu mentative power, and ingenuity, as scarcely to repay the tedious task of perusing it. Philosophical freedom of thought has long ceased to be the distinction of the sceptic ; and nothing but levity, insolence, obscenity, and a daring contempt of every sacred and social obligation, remain to distinguish him from the believer in the Gospel. To draw from their obscurity those writers whose opposi tion to Christianity is confined to offensive sneers and indecent ribaldry, to which it is alike impossible and improper to reply, would be gratuitously to circulate the poison without the antidote. As little is it necessary to extend the notoriety which has been ob tained by some modern deists, solely by the refutations which their productions have received at the hands of the learned and the good — to publish'the infamy of a Carlile because Mr. Carson* conde scended to rebuke him, or the blasphemy of a Taylor because the enormity and pestilence of his wickedness enlisted against him the learning and piety of Dr. Smith.t It only remains to notice two modern infidel schools, whose opposition to religion is analogous to that which has been already noticed, and which was founded on modern astronomical discovery. Like that exploded argument, those of the schools in question, unable to stand alone, claim sup port from the partial and short-sighted deductions of philosophy, " falsely so called." The one founds its hostility to revealed religion, on the recent discoveries of Geology ; and the other, with Robert Owen at its head, connects that hostility with the wildest dogmas and most empirical nostrums of political economy. The investigations of geologists have led to the discovery of cer tain organic remains, both animal and vegetable, to which they are compelled to assign a date long prior to any embraced in the Mosaic chronology. These phenomena have been seized upon, as invalidating the authenticity of the Mosaic record ; and while infi- * The Truth ofthe Gospel demonstrated from the character of God manifested in the Atonement. A Letter to Mr. Richard Carlile, by Alexander Carson. — Edinburgh, 1820. t An Answer to a Paper, entitled " Manifesto of the Christian Evidence Society," by John Pye Smith, T>. D. The above manifesto may be regarded, as marking the ulti mate boundary to which the gross ignoiance and incompetency of modern deists has attained ; and as constituting the last effort of that party, of sufficient importance to deserve a mention in these pages. xiii INTRODUCTION. dels, on the one hand, have rejoiced in an unexpected triumph over the pretensions of revelation generally, not a few Christian writers, with more zeal than judgment, have preferred a most unfounded charge of deism against the science and the students of geology. Amongst the earliest defenders of the Christian religion, from this new species of invasion, was Dr. Chalmers. Subsequently, how ever, the argument has been so luminously stated by Dr. Buckland in his Bridgewater Treatise on Geology, that he may with propriety be regarded as setting the question at rest. His argument may be thus stated. First, That it is as unreasonable to expect a history of geological phenomena in the Mosaic history, as to look for a specific mention of the satellites of Jupiter, or the rings of Saturn. That the object ofthe historian was simply to reveal the history of the human race, and only records the origin of the earth itself, and the heavenly bodies, in order to teach that they were not eternal and self-existent, but the offspring of divine wisdom and power : and Secondly, That the first verse of Genesis, which is the principal object of attack, may be fairly appealed to by the Christian geolo gist, as expressing, by the word beginning, an undefined period of time — as containing a brief statement of the creation of the material elements, at a time distinctly preceding the operations of the first day. That it is not affirmed, that God created the heavens and the earth in the first day, but in the beginning ; and that this begin ning may have been an epoch at an unmeasured distance, followed by periods of undefined duration, during which the physical opera tions disclosed by geology'were going on. The system of opinion which bears the name of Mr. Owen is far more comprehensive. It is levelled alike against the fundamental principles of morals, every pretension of the Scriptures, and every principle and feeling of a religious nature, that ever has been enter tained by the human race, in any age or country. With what may be called the ethical part of Mr. Owen's creed we have nothing to do. It may be briefly stated in his own words. " It does not be long," says he, " to the constitution of man, or the original nature of his constitution, that there can be merit or demerit in the opinions or feelings of a single human being." So much for morals. With respect to religion, he advocates, somewhat whimsically, the existence of a First Cause; whom, in innocent acquiescence with the prejudices of "the old world," he agrees to call "God;" but denies that man has ever had the means of acquainting himself, in the slightest degree, with his attributes, character, or conduct; as if we were any more able to ascertain the existence of God, irre spectively of his attributes, than we are to demonstrate the existence INTRODUCTION. xliH of matter irrespectively ofthe only properties of it which meet our senses, — extension, impenetrability, and the rest ! But we have said that his religious opinions rest upon a certain system of political economy. This connexion may be thus ex plained. He advocates the perfection of human nature; and attri butes the misery and wickedness which prevail in the world, to the law makers, and not the law breakers. In concurrence with this opinion, he pleads for the community of property, the dissolu tion of the present regime of marriage, and the universal license of the innocent propensities of human nature. Hence he discards the Christian religion, as a system of superstition and priestcraft, calculated to repress the indulgence of the natural appetites, and to limit the happiness of mankind. " The basis," he says, " of the religion of truth, is the knowledge that the laws of nature have given the power to adult man, so to control the mental faculties, and physical powers of his infant, as to force it to receive error, however absurd or inconsistent, or to imbibe truth, only known to be truth by its undeviating consistency with the ascertained laws of nature." He thus presupposes, as existing in the mind of man, a perfect knowledge of all the laws which control the physical and the intellectual world ; and by a just deduction, repudiates revela tion, as an impertinent interference with this inscrutable wisdom. The relation then betwixt his views of religion and political economy is obvious. Assuming that nothing is necessary to the perfection of human nature, but a rational and educational social system, he deems religion unnecessary and perplexing; and contends that praise and blame have ever hitherto been. perversely awarded; and that the obedience to the ascertained laws of nature, or, in other words, to the dictates of inclination, will expel selfishness, sin, and religion, with all their dependent miseries, from the world, and leave mankind a race of immaculate ephemera ! To reply to such mere assumptions, it might suffice us to point Mr. Owen to that vast body of evidence, by which the authenticity of revelation, as a whole, and the truth of its doctrines respectively, are proved by every species of argument, historical, abstract, and experimental, and of which Mr. Owen indicates, in every sentence, the densest ignorance. But, on an attentive perusal of his writings, we feel even this to be unnecessary. Apart from the habitual assumption of every principle which has been refuted in every age of the world, and by the universal experience of mankind — apart from his assum ing, as a perfectly easy task, to expel from the human mind, by a process of education, selfishness, envy, malice, and all uncharitable ness, we find such a hopeless haziness of intellect, as threatens Xliv INTRODUCTION. almost to paralyze the energy, and exclude the light, of divine truth itself. Hence he exhibits an insensibility to evidence, and a reck less audacity of assertion, which is perfectly astounding. He states, for example, that all the religions of the world are founded on the same suppositions, and that they are the following. 1. That there is an absolute necessity to believe all that the priests declare. 2. That the blackest of crimes is to disbelieve what they pro mulgate as divine truths. 3. That there is the same criminality in loving or hating, what the priests all over the world say should be loved or hated. 4. That for believing and loving what the priests say should be disbelieved or hated, men shall be eternally rewarded or punished. " You thus perceive," he continues, " that when religion is stripped of the mysteries with which the priests of all times and countries have invested it, all its divinity vanishes ; and it stands before the astonished world, in all its naked deformity of vice, hypocrisy, and imbecility; In consequence of this discovery, all testimony handed down to us from our remote and ignorant ances tors, when opposed to facts, or the unchanging laws of nature, will not hereafter be received into any intelligent or superior mind. Such will be aware, that, of necessity, the universe must be one great truth, (!) composed of all the facts which it contains," &.c. &c. To reply to such rabid stuff as this, would be to waste the time of the writer, and the patience of the reader. It does not fall within the scope of this introduction, to notice the progress of Deism in other nations. It might be sufficient to re joice, that the mantle of the ancient Freethinkers is now only em ployed, to veil from the public view the demoralizing and disgusting filthiness of their successors. The opinions of Mr. Owen, however, will lead the recollection of the reader to the School of Rationalists, who usurp the name of Christians in Germany. These, like the raving Apostle of the " New Moral World," appoint human philosophy as the supreme arbiter of religious truth; and while they ridicule the inspiration of the Bible, regarding prophets as patriotic bards, and Jesus and his apostles as promulgating important truths by justifiable frauds, yet allow the system to continue, as "a muzzle for the brute," until the transform ing efficacy of philosophical morality shall have rendered its influ ence unnecessary. We have already seen, in the course of this brief review, the fallacies and iniquities of successive schools of infidelity, falling INTRODUCTION. xiv before the power of the truth of the Gospel. It is gratifying to know, that this ostentatious usurpation of the dignities of religion, is fast falling into contempt. We have already followed many of the devices of a corrupt ingenuity to the long home of forgetfulness ; and we delight to fortify, by experience, the confident hope, that in every succeeding attempt to overcloud the lustre of the gospel, the thin and empty mists of human folly will roll away beneath a dis tant horizon, before the ever brightening beams of the Sun of Righ teousness. CONTENTS. / Page. Letter I. — Some account of those that first took upon themselves the name of deists — Observations on Lord Herbert of Cherbury's Scheme 1 Letter II. — Farther Observations on Lord Herbert's Scheme . . . .12 Postscript^-An account of a remarkable Incident relating to Lord Herbert of Cher- bury — Reflections upon it .......... 19 Letter HI.— Observations on Mr. Hobbes's Writings 26 Letter IV. — Reflections on Mr. Charles Blount's and Mr. Toland's Writings . 31 Letter V. — The Earl of Shaftesbury's Writings examined 39 Letter VI. — The Account given of the Earl of Shaftesbury's Writings in the fore going Letter, vindicated ........... 53 Letter VII. — An Account of Mr. CoUins's Discourse of Free-thinking, and of his Book intitled The Grounds of the Christian Religion ..... 63 Letter VIII. — Mr. Woolston's Discourses on the Miracles of our Saviour considered 81 Letter IX. — An Account of Dr. Tindal's Christianity as old as the Creation . . 90 Letter X. — Dr. Morgan's Book, called The Moral Philosopher examined . . 108 Letter XL —The Pamphlet intitled Christianity not founded on Argument examined 123 Letter XII. — A Pamphlet intitled The Resurrection of Jesus considered, exam ined, and confuted ............ 136 Le( ter XIII. — An Account of Mr. Chubb's posthumous Works . . . .157 Letter XIV. — Some further Remarks on Mr. Chubb's posthumous Works . . 171 Letter XV. — Observations on a Pamplet intitled Deism fairly stated, and fully vindicated — A brief Account of Lord Bolingbroke's Attempt against the Scrip tures, in his Letters on the Study and Use of History ..... 195 Letter XVI. — Some general Observations upon Mr. Hume's Scheme in his Philo sophical Essays .... ......... 209 Letter XVII. — Observations on Mr. Hume's Essay concerning a particular Provi dence and a future state 220 Letter XVIII. — An Examination of the first part of Mr. Hume's Essay on Miracles which is designed to show, that Miracles are incapable of being proved by any Evidence whatsoever . 229 Letter XIX. — Reflections on the second Part of Mr. Hume's Essay on Miracles, ivhich is designed to show, that in fact there never was a miraculous Event, established upon such Evidence as can reasonably be depended upon — A par ticular Examination of what he has offered concerning the Miracles attributed to the Abbe de Paris . . . . . . . . . . . . 244 Letter XX. — Additional Observations relating to Mr. Hume, with Remarks on an ingenious Paper, containing an Examination of Mr. Hume's Arguments in his Essay on Miracles ............ 270 Letter XXL — Farther Reflections relating to the Abbe de Paris, and the great Sanctity ascribed to him — Observations on some Passages in Mr. Hume's Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, relating to Self-denial, Mortifica tion, and Humility . . . . 285 Postscript. — An Account of Mr. Douglas's Book, intitled The Criterion, or Mira cles examined, &c. ............ 29J Letter XXII. — General Remarks on Lord Bolingbroke's posthumous Works . 298 xlviii CONTENTS. Page. •Letter XXIII.— An Inquiry into Lord Bolingbroke's Proofs of the Being and ^ Attributes of God, and his Sentiments concerning the divine Perfections . . 309 Letter XXIV.— Lord Bolingbroke's Account ofthe Doctrines of divine Providence considered ; and the Objections against a particular Providence examined . 328 Letter XXV. — Lord Bolingbroke's Sentiments concerning the Immortality of the Soul and a future State, examined ......... 344 Letter XXVI.— Observations on Lord Bolingbroke's Accouutof the Law of Nature 362 Letter XXVII.— An Examination of what Lord Bolingbroke has offered concern ing Revelation in general 376 Letter XXVIII. — Lord Bolingbroke's strange Representation ofthe Jewish Reve lation examined ... ......... 397 Letter XXIX.— Lord Bolingbroke's Objections against the divine Original and Authority ofthe Scriptures of the Old Testament considered . . . .427 Letter XXX. — Farther Objections of Lord Bolingbroke against the Mosaic Writings, and the Scriptures of the Old Testament, considered . . . 440 Letter XXXI. — Reflections upon the favourable Representations made by Lord Bolingbroke, ofthe excellent Nature and Design ofthe original Christian Reve lation. Those Passages which seemed designed to expose the Doctrines, and invalidate the Proofs and Evidences of Christianity, considered . . . 468 Letter XXXII. — Lord Bolingbroke's Objections against the Laws and Doctrines of Christianity 496 Letter XXXIII. — The Christian Doctrine of future Retributions vindicated. Con clusion of the Observations on Lord Bolingbroke's posthumous Works . . 514 Letter XXXIV. — Designed to introduce the Reflections on the late Lord Boling broke's Letters on the Study and Use of History, which are subjoined at large . 531 Letter XXXV. — The Account of the Deistical Writers closed, with general Reflections on those Writers . . . . . . . . . .613 Letter XXXVI. — A Summary of the Evidences of Christianity .... 626 The Conclusion. — In an Address to Deists and professed Christians . . . 651 Appendix. — Reflections on the present State of Things in these Nations . . 608 N.B. For a fuller account of the Contents, see the Head preceding each Letter. And for the subject matter of the Reflections on Lord Bolingbroke's Letters on the Study and Use of History, see the Contents prefixed to that Piece, p. 535, &c. A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS, &c. IN SEVERAL LETTERS TO A FRIEND. LETTER I. Some Account of those that first took upon them the Name of Deists. — Lord Herbert of Cherbury, one of the most eminent deistical Writers that appeared in England in the last Age. — His attempt to form Deism into a System. — Observations upon his Scheme, and Upon the five Principles in which he makes all Religion to consist. — It is shown that the Knowledge of them was very imperfect and defective in the heathen World ; and that a Revelation from God for clearing and confirming those important Principles might be of great advantage. Dear Sir, I now enter upon the task you have enjoined me, the giving some account of the principal deistical writers that have appeared among us for above a century past. The reasons given by you and other judicious friends, have convinced me that such a work might be of use, if properly executed ; we only differed as to the fitness of the person that was to execute it. My objections have been over ruled ; I must therefore set about it as well as I can : and if I were sure that others would look upon this attempt with the same favour able eye that your candour and friendship for me will incline you to do, I should be in no great pain about the success of it* The name of Deists, as applied to those who are no friends to revealed religion, is said to have been first assumed about the middle .of the sixteenth cenutry, by some gentlemen in France and Italy, who were willing to cover their opposition to the Christian revelation by a more honourable name than that of atheists. One of the first authors, as far as I can find, that makes express mention of them, is Viret, a divine of great eminence among the first reformers, who in the epistle dedicatory prefixed to the second tome of his Instruction Chretienne, which was published in 1563, speaks of some persons in that time who called themselves by a new name, that of deists. These, he tells us, professed to believe a God, but K 2 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. I- showed no regard to Jesus Christ, and considered the doctrine of the apostles and evangelists as fables and dreams. He adds that they laughed at all religion, notwithstanding they conformed them selves, with regard to the outward appearance, to the religion of those with whom they were obliged to live, or whom they were desirous of pleasing, or whom they feared. Some of them, as he observes, professed to believe the immortality of the soul ; others were of the Epicurean opinion in this point, as well as about the providence of God with respect to mankind, as if he did not concern himself in the government of human affairs. He adds, that many among them set up for learning and philosophy, and were looked upon to be persons of an acute and subtle genius ; and that, not content to perish alone in their error, they took pains to spread the poison, and to infect and corrupt others, by their impious discourses and bad -examples.* I leave it to you to judge, how far the account this learned author gives of the persons that in his time called themselves deists, is applicable to those among us who take upon them the same title, and which they seem to prefer to that of Christians, by which the disciples of Jesus have hitherto thought it their glory to be distin guished. That which properly characterizes these deists is, that they reject all revealed religion, and discard all pretences to it, as owing to imposture or enthusiasm. In this they all agree, and in professing a regard for natural religion, though they are far from being agreed in their notions of it. They are classed by some of their own writers into two sorts, mortal and immortal deists.f The latter acknowledge a future state : the former deny it, or at least represent it as a very uncertain thing : and though these are, by some among themselves, represented under a very disadvantageous character, and as little better than atheists, they are, it is to be feared, the more numerous of the two. Indeed some of their most eminent modern writers seem to be very easy about these differences. With them all are true deists who oppose revelation, whether they own future rewards and punishments or not ; and they speak with great regard of those disinterested deists who profess to pursue virtue for its own«ake, without regard to future retributions. J In giving an account of the deistical writers that have appeared in these nations (for I shall not meddle with those of a foreign growth), I shall go back to the former part of the last century ; and the first I shall mention, and who deserves a particular notice, is that learned nobleman, Lord Edward Herbert, Baron of Cherburv. He may be justly regarded as the most eminent of the deistical writers, and in several respects superior to those that succeeded him. He may be also considered as the first remarkable deist in order of time, that appeared among us as a writer in the last century; for the first edition of his book de Veritate was in 1624, when it was first *¦ Bayle's Dictionary, article Viret. + Oracles of Reason p. 99 } Christianity as old as the Creation, p. 33*}, 333. cd. 8vo. Let. I. LORD HERBERT OP CIIERBURY. 3 published at Paris. It was afterwards published at London, as was also his book de Causis Error um, to which is subjoined his treatise de Religione Laid. Some years after this, and when the author was dead, his celebrated work de Religione Gentilium was published at Amsterdam, in 1663, in quarto ; and it was afterwards re-printed there in 1700, in octavo, whioh is the edition I make use of; and an English translation of it was published at London in 1705. His Lordship seems to have been one of the first that formed Deism into a system, and asserted the sufficiency, universality, and absolute perfection, of natural religion, with a view to discard all extraordinary revelation as useless and needless. He seems to assume to himself the glory of having accomplished it with great labour, and a diligent inspection into all religions, and applauds himself for it, as happier than any Archimedes.* This universal religion he reduceth to five articles, which he frequently mentioneth in all his works. 1. That there is one supreme God. 2. That he is chiefly to be worshipped. 3. That piety and virtue are the prin cipal part of his worship. 4. That we must repent of our sins ; andjf we do so, God will pardon them. 5. That there are rewards for good men, and punishments for bad men, in a future state ; or, as he sometimes expresseth it, both here and hereafter. These he represents as common notices inscribed by God on the minds of all men, and undertakes to show that they were universally acknow ledged in all nations, ages, and religions. This is particularly the design of his book de Religione Gentilium ; though it is but com paratively a small part of that work which tendeth directly to prove that these articles universally obtained : the far greater part of it is taken up with an account of the heathen religion and ceremonies, which he bath performed with an abundance of learning, and hath intermixed many softening apologies for the pagan superstition and idolatry. As he represents these five articles as absolutely necessary, tbe five pillars, as he calls them, on which all religion is built ; so h& endeavours to show that they alone are sufficient, and that nothing- can be added to them which can tend to render any man more virtuous, or a better man. But then he subjoins this limitation, " provided these articles be well explained in their full latitu'de."f This universal religion which all men agree in, his Lordship repre sents to be the only religion of which there can be any certainty, and he endeavours to show the great advantages that would arise from men's embracing this religion, and this only. One of the reasons he offers to recommend it is this, that this catholic or universal religion answers the ultimate design of the holy Scriptures. " Sacrarum literarumfini ultimo intentionique quadrat." He adds, that " all the doctrines there taught aim at the establishment of these five catholic articles, as we have often hinted ; there is no sacrament, rite, or ceremony there enjoined, but what aims, or seems * De Relig. Gentil. <.-. 15. init. -f Appendix to Relig. Laici, qu. 3d. b 2 4 A VIEW OP THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. I. to aim, at the establishment of these five articles." See his reasons at the end of his Religio Laid. One would be apt to think by what this noble writer here offers, that he must have a very favourable opinion of Christianity as con tained in the holy Scriptures ; since he represents it as the great design of all its doctrines, and even of the rites and sacraments there enjotned, to establish those great principles in which he makes reli gion properly to consist. Accordingly he expressly declares in the above-mentioned treatise, that it was far from his intention to do harm to the best religion, as he there calls Christianity, or the true faith, but rather to establish both.* But I am sorry that I am obliged to say, that, notwithstanding these fair professions, his Lordship on all occasions insinuateth pre judices against all revealed religion, as absolutely uncertain, and of little or no use. He inveigheth promiscuously, as many others have done since, against all pretences to revelation, without making a distinction between the false and the true. He often speaks to the disadvantage of particular religion, which is a name he bestoweth on the Christian religion, and any revelation that is not actually known and promulgated to the whole world : and he representeth it as containing doctrines, which disgust some men against all religion, and therefore is for recommending what he calls the universal reli gion, as the best way to prevent men's having no religion at all. And particularly he insinuates, that the Christian religion granteth pardon on too easy terms, and derogateth from the obligations to virtue ;t a reflection which is manifestly owing to a misapprehension or misrepresentation of the doctrine of Christianity on this head. So he elsewhere supposeth, that the faith there required is no more than a bare assent to the doctrines there taught ; though nothing is capable of a clearer proof, than that the faith on which so great a stress is laid in the gospel covenant is to be understood of a vital operative principle, which purifieth the heart, and is productive of good works ; and that the necessity of true holiness and virtue is there strongly inculcated. The charge he advanceth against Chris tianity might be more justly retorted upon himself, who, though he mentions it to the praise of his universal religion, that it giveth no license to sin, but bindeth men strictly to the severity of virtue, yet to show what reason sinners have to hope for pardon, offereth several pleas and excuses that tend to extenuate the guilt of sin. Particularly he urgeth, that men's sins are not for the most part committed out of enmity against God, or to cast dishonour upon him, but with a view to their own particular advantage or pleasure, and are chosen by them under the appearance of some good4 And in his book de Veritate he declares, that those are not lightly to be condemned, who are carried to sin by their particular bodily con stitution ; and he instances particularly in the rage of lust and * Relig. Laici, p. 28. t The Appendix to his Relig. Laici, qu. 6. t Dc Relig. Gentil. p. 268. Dr. Tindal talks in the same strain. Christianity as old as the Creation, p. 32. ed. 8vo. Let. I. LORD HERBERT OF CHERBURY. 5 anger ; no more than a dropsical person is to be blamed for his immoderate thirst, or a lethargic person for his laziness and inac tivity. He adds, indeed, that he does not set up as an apologist for wicked men, but yet that we ought to pass a mild censure upon those who are carried to sin by a corporeal and almost necessary propensity to vice. Neque tamen me hie conscelerali cujusvis patro- num sisto ; sed in id solummodo contendo, ut mitiori sententia de Us statuamus, qui corporea, brutali, et tantum non necessaria propensione in peccata prolabuntur. This apology may be carried very far, so as to open a wide door to licentiousness, and would soon introduce a very loose morality. But not to insist upon this, I would observe that the principal design of his treatise de Religione Laid seems to be to show, that the people can never attain to any satisfaction as to the truth and certainty of any particular revelation, and therefore must rest in the five articles agreed to by all religions. This particularly is the intention of his fourth and fifth queries in the appendix to that treatise. In his fourth query he supposes, that the things which are added to those common principles from the doctrines of faith are uncertain in their original ; and that though God is true, the Laics can never be certain that what is pretended to be a revelation from God is indeed a true revelation from God. In his fifth query he urgeth, that supposing the originals to be true, yet they are uncertain in their explications. To this purpose he takes notice of the multiplicity of sects among Christians ; and that the Laics can never be sufficiently sure of the meaning of the revelation, concerning which there are so many controversies ; that in order to arrive at any certainty in these matters, it would be necessary either to learn all languages, to read all the celebrated writers, and to consult all those learned men that have not written, a method which is manifestly absurd and impracticable ; or else to have recourse to a supreme judge- of controversies appointed by common consent. It is an observation that will undoubtedly occur to you on this occasion, that his Lordship here maketh use precisely of the same way of talking, to show that the Laics can have no certainty about any revelation at all, which the writers of the Romish Church have frequently urged to show the necessity the people are under to rely entirely upon the authority of the Church or Pope, because of the difficulties or the impossibility of their coming to any certainty in the way of examination or private judgment. But if the Laity cannot be certain of revealed religion, because of the controversies that have been raised about the articles of it, for the same reason it may be said, that they can arrive at no certainty with respect to his Lordship's catholic universal religion : for though he repre sented! men as universally agreed in the five articles in which he makes that religion to consist, it is undeniable that there have been great controversies about them; and that the modern deists, as well as ancient philosophers, are divided in their sentiments in rela tion to them, especially when explained, as he requireth they should 6 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. I. be, in their full latitude. He ought not therefore to make a thing's being controverted to be a proof, of its uncertainty, and that men can come to no satisfaction about it ; a principle which he and other deists often insist upon, but which manifestly leads to universal scepticism. But this is not the only instance, in which arguments have been brought against Christianity, that in their consequences tend to subvert all religion, and all evidence and certainty of reason. From this general view of Lord Herbert's scheme, it sufficiently appears that his design was to overturn all revealed, or, as he calls it, particular religion, and to establish that natural and universal religion, the clearness and perfection of which he so much extols, in its room, as that which alone ought to be acknowledged and em braced as true and divine. I shall now freely lay before you some observations that have occurred to me in considering the scheme of this noble author. One is this, that he hath carried his account of natural religion much farther than some others of the deists have done. It were to be wished, that all that glory in this character would agree with this noble Lord in a hearty reception of those articles which he representeth as so essentially necessary, and of such vast importance. These he would have to be explained in their full extent, and that except they be properly explained they are not sufficient. Thus explained, they include the belief not only of the existence, but the attributes of God ; of some of which, in his book de Veritate, he gives a good account, and of his providence and moral government. He asserts, that God is to be worshipped, and that this worship in- cludeth our offering up to him our prayers and thanksgivings ;*' that piety and virtue are absolutely necessary to our acceptance with God ; and he particularly urget'h the necessity of observing the ten commandments ; that we are obliged to repent of our sins in order to our obtaining forgiveness, and that this repentance in- cludeth both a sorrow for our sins, and a turning from them to the right way. He also insisteth upon the belief of the immortality of the soul, and a future state of rewards and punishments, in which God will recompense men according to their actions, and even accord ing lo their thoughts.^ These things he supposeth to be common notices, so clear that he can scarce be accounted a reasonable crea ture who denieth them. And yet I am afraid, if all these things are to be looked upon as necessary, many that call themselves deists will be as loath to admit his Lordship's natural and catholic religion, as Christianity itself. There is reason to apprehend, that some of their strongest prejudices against Christianity arise from its setting those principles in too clear a light, and enforcing them in too strong a manner. It is true, that when they are for putting a fair gloss upon deism, and asserting the sufficiency and perfection of natural religion abstracted from all revelation, they are willing to have it * De Veritate, p. 271, 272. t De Relig. Gentil. p. 283. Let. I. LORD HERBERT OF CHERBURY. 7 thought that their religion includeth the belief of those important articles. They are then obliged to have recourse to his Lordship's system, and the arms he hath furnished them with ; but at other times they make it plainly appear that they are far from being fixed in these principles. His Lordship declares, that it is necessary these articles should be well explained : but indeed they are expressed in very general and indefinite terms, and there is no great likelihood of their agreeing in the explications of them. It is a thing well known, that many who have made no small figure among our modern deists have denied some of his Lordship's five articles, at least taken in the extent in which he seems willing to understand them. God's moral government and particular providence ; his worship, especially as it includes prayer and praise ; man's free agency, the immortality of the soul, and a future state of retributions, have made no part of their creed. Some of them have been far from pleading for that strictness of virtue which his Lordship tells us natural religion obliges men to ; and, instead of urging the necessity of repentance, have, after Spinosa, represented it as a mean, an unreasonable, and wretched thing.* And the rewards and punishments of a future state have been exploded under the notion of bribes and terrors, a regard'to which argueth a sordid and mercenary temper of soul, in consistent with a true and generous virtue. Another reflection that it is proper to make on Lord Herbert's scheme is this : that these five principles, in which he makes his universal religion to consist, were not so very clear and well known to all mankind, as to make an external revelation needless or use less. His Lordship indeed supposeth them to be common notices, inscribed by a divine hand in the minds of men ; and accordingly he sets himself to prove, with a great show of learning, in his book de Religione Gentilium, that these principles were universally be lieved and acknowledged by the people in all ages, countries, and religions. But any man that carefully examines his book will find, that all that he really proves is no more than this ; that there were some imperfect vestiges of these important truths preserved among the Gentiles, and that the knowledge of them was never absolutely and totally extinguished, which will be easily allowed. But he has not proved, that the people, or even all those that passed for wise and learned, had a distinct knowledge and assurance of those prin ciples, especially if taken in their just extent. The testimonies he hath produced, by no means prove such an universal agreement : what he seemeth principally to rely upon is the reasonableness and evidence of the principles themselves, which he supposeth to be so plain, that no rational man can be ignorant of them. Thus he de clares, that he would sooner doubt whether the beams of the sun shone upon those regions,, than suppose that the knowledge of God, the evidences of whose existence and perfections are so obvious from * Poenitentia virtus non est, sive ex ratione non oritur -. quem facti pcenitet bis miser seu impotens est. Spin. Eth. Pt. 4. Prop. 54. 8 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. I. his works, did not enlighten their minds.* And he cannot be per suaded, that any of them worshipped the sun as the chief deity, because of the incredible absurdity of such a practice, which he well exposes.t But when we are inquiring what men do in fact believe and practise, we are not to judge of it from what we apprehend it is reasonable for them to believe and practise. If this were a proper place to take a distinct view of the proofs he hath offered in relation to his famous five articles, it would be no hard matter to show, that, according to his own representation of the case, they were not so universally acknowledged and clearly known among the Gentiles, as to make a farther revelation and en forcement of them to be of no use or advantage. This might be particularly shown with regard to the first and second of these articles, viz., That there is one supreme God, and that this God is to be worshipped ; which are principles of the greatest importance, and which lie at the foundation of all the rest. Notwithstanding the pains he hath taken to excuse and palliate the pagan supersti tion and idolatry, and to prove that they worshipped the one true God, the same that we adore, under various names, and by various attributes ; yet he owns, that what were at first only different names came, in process of time, as superstition increased, to be regarded and worshipped as different gods. It is plain, from express and formal passages, produced by him from ancient writers, that some nations worshipped no other deities but the sun, moon, and stars. When in the third chapter of his book de Relig. Gentil. he mentions the names of the Deity which were in use among the Hebrews, and shows that those names and titles were also used among the Gen tiles ; he owneth that the Hebrews appropriated these names and titles to the one supreme God, superior to the sun, but that the Gentiles understood by them no other than the sun itself. He thinks it indeed probable that the worship they rendered to the sun was symbolical, and that they intended to worship God by the sun, as his most glorious sensible image ; and sometimes he is very positive that they did so, and that they rendered no proper worship to any but the supreme God ; but at other times he speaks very doubtfully about it, and pretends not positively to assert it, but leaves the reader to his own judgment in this matter."!' And else where he acknowledges, that the people perhaps did not sufficiently understand this symbolical worship. Symbolicum ilium culium hand satis forsan intellexit ? § It is indeed a little strange, that if the notion and belief of one only supreme God universally obtained among the Gentiles, none but the Hebrews should have made the acknowledgment of the one supreme God, the Maker and Lord of the universe, the fundamental article of their religion ; and that in the laws of other states, particularly among the learned and polite naticms of Greece and Rome, polytheism was established, and the » De Relig. Gentil. p. 225. + Ibid. p. 27, 247. \ Ibid. p. 25, 310. § Ibid. 293. Let. I. LORD HERBERT OP CHERBURY. 9 public worship was directed to be offered to a multiplicity of deities. Many of the heathens, by his own acknowledgment, thought that the God they were to worship should be visible, and looked upon it to be incongruous, that he who demanded worship from all should hide himself from his worshippers.* And though it was a notion which generally obtained among them, that some kind of external worship was necessary to be rendered to their deities, yet as to the manner of their worship he doth not deny that some of the heathen rites were ridiculous, others absurd, and even impious. To which it may be added, that some of their wisest men acknowledged, that they were ignorant of the proper manner in which God is to be worshipped, except he himself, or some person sent by him, should please to reveal it. There is a remarkable passage in Plato's second Alcibiad, which hath been often quoted. Socrates meeting Alcibi ades, who was going to the temple to pray, proves to him that he knew not how to perform that duty aright, and that therefore it was not safe for him to do it ; but that he should wait for a divine in structor to teach him how to behave both towards the gods and men ; and that it was necessary that God should scatter the dark ness which covered his soul, that he might#be put in a condition to discern good and evil. To the same purpose, Iamblichus, in Vita Pythag. c. 28. speaking of the principles of divine worship, saith, " It is manifest that those things are to be done which are pleasing " to God ; but what they are it is not easy to know, except a man " were taught them by God himself, or by some person that had " received them from God, or obtained the knowledge of them by " some divine means." The third article mentioned by his Lordship as universally agreed on is, that piety and virtue are the principal part of God's worship. But not to argue that the proof he brings of an universal agreement in this principle seems to be very defective, this article would be of no great use, except men were also generally agreed as to the nature and extent of true piety and virtue. And it can scarce be reason ably denied, that a revelation from God, pointing out our way to us, and containing a clear signification of the divine will, with regard to the particulars of the duty required of us, would be of great use. Lord Herbert himself, after having mentioned some virtues which were honoured among the Pagans, acknowledgeth, that besides these there were many other things looked upon to be necessary to true piety, especially those things which showed a devout or grateful temper towards the gods, and the observance of the public rites and ceremonies of religion ; which is in other words to say, that the joining in superstitious and idolatrous worship (for such the esta blished public worship was) made up a necessary part of the heathen piety and virtue, and was counted a principal ingredient in a good man's character. As to the fourth article, that men must repent of their sins, and * De Relig. Gentil. p. 26. t Ioid- 250' 10 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. I. that if they do so God will pardon them, it might easily be shown that the Gentiles were far from being agreed what are to be accounted sins ; since some sins and vices of a very enormous kind were not only practised and pleaded for by some of their philosophers, but permitted and countenanced by the public laws, nor were they agreed what is included in a true repentance. His Lordship himself ac- knowledgeth, that the ancients seldom used the word repentance in the sense in which we take it ;* and that they did not look upon it to be an atonement from all crimes, but for those of a less heinous nature ; and that they generally looked upon other things to be also necessary, and laid the principal stress upon lustrations, and the rites of their religion, for purifying and absolving them from guilt. And any one who duly considers that the dispensing of pardon is an act of the divine prerogative, the exercise of which depends upon what seemeth most fit to his supreme governing wisdom, cannot but be sensible that it must needs be a great advantage to be assured, by an express revelation from God, upon what terms the pardon of sin is to be obtained, and how far it is to extend. With regard to the fifth article, about future rewards and punish ments, which he representeth to be, as it really is, of vast importance, though he sometimes expresses himself as if the heathens were generally agreed, that good men would be rewarded with eternal life ; at other times he intimates that they only agreed in this, that there would be rewards and punishments in a future state; and sometimes that they held this only, that there would be rewards for good men, and punishments for bad men, either in this life or after it. And he himself frequently owns in his book de Veritate, that what kind of rewards shall be conferred, or punishments inflicted, cannot be certainly known from the light of natural reason. -|- ': But we need not insist farther on these things. His Lordship himself fairly granteth, that the knowledge the Gentiles had of the the One Supreme God was lame and imperfect ; which he attributes to the sloth or cunning of the priests, who neglected to instruct the people, or instructed them wrong ; and that from thence it came to pass, that the rays of the divine light being intercepted, a wonderful darkness overspread the minds of the vulgar. " Unde etiam factum, " ut radiis divini luminis interceptis, mira caligo vulgi animis obducta " esset." % And he observes, that by what was added by the priests, poets, and philosophers, the whole fabric of truth was in danger of falling to the ground. Tota inclinata in casumque prona nutavit veritatis fabrica.§ And at the close of this book de Relig. Gentil. he owns, that at length the purer parts of divine worship being- neglected, the whole of religion sunk by degrees into superstition : and that those five articles were almost overwhelmed with a heavy load of errors, so as to be perceived only by the wiser sort of men, a perspicacioribus viris, i. e. by those who had a penetration above the vulgar. || » De Relig. Gentil. p. 268. f De Veritate, p. 57, et alibi. t De Relig. Gentil. p. 225. § Ibid. p. 283. || ]bid. p. 310. Let, I. LORD HERBERT OF CHERBURY. 11 Now, this being a true representation of the case as it stood in fact, whatever it was owing to, it can scarce be reasonably denied, that if God should, in compassion to the corrupt and ignorant state of mankind, grant an express revelation of his will; to clear and restore those great principles which had been so much obscured and perverted, to recover men to the right knowledge and worship of God, and to explain and enforce the main important parts of their duty, this would be of signal benefit to the world, and a remarkable proof and effect of his great goodness. His Lordship, indeed, in several parts of his works, throws out hints and suspicions as if either such a revelation from God could not be given, or at least that there can be no way of knowing, or being assured, that such a revelation has been really given; but he no where offers any proof of it. The general invectives he so frequently makes against priests, oracles, impostures, prove nothing ; except it be allowed to be a reasonable principle, that because there have been false pretenders to revelation, therefore there never was nor can be a true one ; a way of talking and reasoning this, that might pass among the inferior tribe of deis tical writers, but which is absolutely unworthy of his Lordship's sense and learning. Whereas, it may rather be gathered from it, that man kind in all ages have been generally persuaded, that it was both possible for God to grant an extraordinary revelation of his will, and that, if he did it would be of great advantage. Impostors have built upon this principle ; but this doth not show the principle itself to be false, which hath as good a title to pass for a common notion, as some of the five articles which he representeth to be so clear and universally acknowledged. The only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the many impostures and false revelations which have been put upon mankind is, not that all pretences to revelation are false and vain, but that we ought to be very careful to distin guish the false from the true, and impartially to consider and examine the proofs that are brought, and not to receive any revelation without sufficient credentials of its divine authority. But it would be a most unreasonable limitation of the divine power and wisdom to affirm, either that God cannot make extraordinary discoveries of his will to particular persons, in such a manner that the persons to whom they are immediately communicated may be certain that they came from God ; or that he cannot commission and enable such persons to communicate to others what they have received from him, or cannot furnish them with such credentials of their divine mission, as may be sufficient to convince the world that they were sent of God, and to make it reasonable for others to receive the doctrines and laws which such persons deliver in his name. And it hath been proved, with great strength and evidence, that this hath actually been the case with regard to the Christian revelation. There are other reflections that might be made on Lord Herbert's system. But I am willing to give you and myself a little respite, and shall therefore reserve them to be the subject of another letter. 12 A VIEW OP THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Lct' ll- LETTER II. Farther Observations on Lord Herbert's Scheme.— The Philosophers not qualified to recover Mankind from the Darkness and Corruption into which they were fallen — The Usefulness of the Christian Revelation to that Purpose.— Its not having been universally promulgated in all Nations and Ages, no just prejudice against it.— Other Objections of Lord Herbert considered.— Writers that have appeared against him. Sir, In my former letter an account was given of Lord Herbert's scheme ; and it was shown that, taking the state of mankind and of the Gentile world as it really was, according to his own representa tion of the case, an express revelation from God, confirmed by his divine authority, for clearing and enforcing those articles which his Lordship supposeth to be necessary, would be of great use. I now add, that in fact the Christian revelation hath been of signal advan tage to the world, for. giving men a clearer knowledge and fuller certainty of those important truths than they had before. Our noble author indeed speaks with admiration of the ancient philoso phers, as capable of instructing men in a proper manner, if they would have attended to their instructions: but then he owns, that the people had little regard to the purer doctrine of the philosophers.* And, indeed, I do not see how it could be expected that they should place any dependence upon their dictates, which were for the most part regarded only as the tenets of their several schools, in which the people had little concern. They were not the ministers of religion, nor could pretend to any authority that should make them be regarded as the guides and instructors of mankind, or cause their opinions to pass for laws. The most eminent among them were con tradicted by others of great name : many of them laboured to make all things appear doubtful and uncertain ; and those of them that had the noblest notions frequently affected to conceal them, or were afraid to divulge them. What Alcinous hath observed concerning Plato, with respect to the inquiry concerning the chief good, might be applied to some other matters of great importance. " That which '' is worthy of all honour, such is the supreme Good, he conceived "not easy to be found, and, if found, not safe to be declared." f His Lordship assureth us, that the philosophers were always dis-. pleased with the superstitious worship of the people. But, if this was the case, they seem to have been very improper persons to reclaim them from it, since it was an universal maxim among them, and par ticularly recommended by one of the best of them, Epictetus, that * De Relig. Gentil. p. 310. f Sec Alcinoiib's Doctrine of Plato, C. 27, in Stanley's Lives of the riiilobophei*. Let. II. LORD HERBERT OP CIIERBURY. 13 every man ought to worship according to the laws or customs of his country : * and it is well known that their established worship was polytheism and idolatry. Varro, in a passage quoted by his Lord ship, divides the heathen theology into three kinds ; the fabulous, which belonged to the poets ; the -physical, which was that of the philosophers ; and the civil. He speaks with disregard of the two former, and represents the last as that in which the people were con cerned, and which alone could be of real use to them : and this he explaineth to be that which was established by the laws, and admin istered by the priests, and which showed what gods they were publicly to worship, what rites they were to observe, and what sacri fices it was proper for any man to offer.-f- If a reformation of the world by the philosophers was not to be expected, for the reasons now given, his Loi'dship will own it was not to be hoped for from the priests, against whom he bitterly inveighs, as the author of all superstition, and of the great corruption of religion in the heathen world. And as little was it to be expected from the lawgivers and great men of the state, who generally patron ized the established superstition, of which they themselves had been in a great measure the authors or promoters, and were ready to punish any that opposed it. And if there were any of them who were for reforming and correcting some abuses in the public superstitions, and exploding some of the grosser fables that were received among the people, as his Lordship observes Mutius Scaevola the chief Pontiff', and Varro, were for doing, he owns that the attempts were vain and ineffectual, because the errors and superstitions were become invete rate. % This being the true state of the case, it is hard to see what other method could be taken, that would prove so effectual to recover mankind from their superstition and idolatry, as the giving an extraordinary revelation, attended with sufficient credentials, to instruct men in the name of God, concerning the nature of true religion, to assure them of the certainty of its great principles, and to enforce the practice of its important duties by the strongest and most prevailing motives. And, accordingly, when Christianity appeared with the most illus trious attestations of a divine mission and revelation from heaven, it effected what no precepts or doctrines of the philosophers had been able to do. The pagan polytheism and superstition fell before it : and it hath actually produced this great advantage, that the princi ples upon which our author layeth so much stress have been better known and understood, and more universally acknowledged, than they were before. It is incontestable, that Christians are more gene rally agreed in those great principles, than ever men were in the pagan world. They are set in a clearer light, and men come to a o-reater certainty about them. That they are so far preserved among the Mahometans, was also originally owing to the light of the Jewish and Christian revelations. And it is very probable that his Lordship * Epict. Ei.c'niiid. c. 38. f De Relig. Gentil. p. 306, 307. \ Ibid. p. 311. 14 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. IL himself is very much obliged to Christianity, though he doth not acknowledge it, for the full persuasion he every where expressed! as to these important articles ; several of which were denied by some, and doubted by others of the ancient philosophers. Though, therefore, it is not to be wondered at, that those among the deists who have an aversion to these principles, when taken in their just extent, should be against Christianity, yet Lord Herbert, who asserteth them to be of such vast consequence, ought, one should think, to have been very thankful to God for having enforced them by an express and well attested revelation, and given them a divine sanction. And if he were sincere in the acknowledgment he some times makes, that the explaining and enforcing those great principles is the ultimate design of the holy Scripture, to which all its doctrines, and even its rights and sacraments tend, he ought certainly to have entertained very favourable thoughts of Christianity, of its doctrines as well as precepts, and even of its rites and positive institutions. But that which seemeth principally to have prejudiced his Lord ship against Christianity is, that it is what he calleth a particular religion ; whereas the true religion must be universal, and promul gated to all mankind. He frequently urgeth that nothing less than such an universal religion as he pleadeth for can support the honour of God's universal providence, and the care he exerciseth towards the whole human race ; which no particular religion can do ; and that otherwise the Gentiles must be supposed to be universally lost and damned, which it were cruel and injurious to God to imagine. This is what hath been often urged and repeated by the deists since. To this it may be justly answered, that those who maintain the Christian revelation may think as honourably as any others consis tently can, of the universal care and providence of God towards mankind. No where is this more clearly asserted than in the sacred writings, which declare God's universal goodness and benignity towards the human race in strong terms ; and that he hath been continually doing them good, and hath never left himself without witness among them. We must not indeed carry this so far as to assert that all men have an actual knowledge of the great principles of religion, and of their duty, because we may imagine that the universal care of providence towards mankind requireth that it should be so ; which seems to be the course of his Lordship's reasoning ; for this is contrary to evident and undeniable fact and experience. But we acknowledge that God hath given to all men the principle of reason, together with a natural sense of right and wrong, which would be of great use to assist them in the knowledge of religion, and to direct them in the practice of their duty, if duly cultivated and improved to the utmost that it is naturally capable of. But besides this, Christians generally maintain, and the holy Scriptures lead us to think, that God hath from time to time made extraor dinary discoveries of his will to mankind ; that some such discoveries were made to the first ancestors of the human race, who were bound Let. II. LORD HERBERT OF CHERBURY. 15 by all obligations to transmit them to their posterity ; that therefore there was an original universal religion, embraced by the first parents of mankind, and transmitted from them to their descendants; that accordingly some of the most eminent ancient philosophers ascribed the knowledge and belief of some of the great principles insisted upon by this noble author, to a tradition derived from the most early ages, though his Lordship never maketh the least mention of tradition, as one source of that knowledge and belief of these things, which obtaineth among the nations; that this religion, which was both originally derived from revelation, and agreeable to nature and reason, was gradually obscured, and became greatly corrupted, though still some remarkable traces and vestiges of it remained among the Gentiles ; that God was pleased, in his wise and good providence, to interpose by various methods, and by raising up excellent persons from time to time to keep those remains of the ancient religion from being totally extinguished ; that at last he was graciously pleased to send his Son into the world, a person of divine dignity and glory, to recover men to his true knowledge and pure worship, to direct and assist them in the practice of their duty, to show them the true means of their reconciliation and acceptance with God, and to bring life and immortality into the most clear and open light; that this revelation was attended with the most illustrious attestations, and made a wonderful progress through a considerable part of the known world, and would have spread still farther, if it had met with such a reception as the excellency and importance of it well deserved ; and finally, that as to those to whom it was actually communicated, God will deal with them in a just, a wise, and equitable way, and will make all proper allowances for any want of the advantages which others enjoy. The asserters of the Christian revelation are under no obligations to limit God's universal benevolence. They leave those that are destitute of this revelation to God's infinite mercy ; - and can think more favourably of their case, than those consistently can do, who will not allow that they were under any great darkness, and suppose them to have acted in manifest opposition to the most clear universal light. The objection arising against the Christian revelation, for want of its being universally known and promulgated, hath been often con sidered and obviated, nor is this a proper place to enter upon a large particular discussion of it. At present it may be sufficient to observe that the objection proceeds upon a wrong foundation, viz., that the universal goodness and benignity of the common Parent of the uni verse require that he should communicate his benefits to all his creatures alike, and in equal degrees. It is evident, in fact, that in the distribution of his benefits God acteth as a free and sovereign benefactor, dispensing them in very various degrees, always un doubtedly for wise reasons, but those reasons often not known to us. It cannot reasonably rbe denied, that he hath made some whole classes of being superior to others in valuable gifts and endowments, and capacities for happiness ; and some individuals of the same class 16 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. IL of beings are favoured with much greater advantages than others. And, if we look particularly into God's dealings with the human lace, we may observe a very remarkable variety. Some are from the beginning endued with much greater natural abilities and more excellent dispositions, and are placed in a more favourable situation and happier circumstances. Some whole nations are eminently dis tinguished from others, not only with respect to many other advan tages of human life, but with respect to the means of moral improve ment, and are furnished with more excellent helps for making a progress in wisdom and virtue, and consequently in true happiness. All these differences between persons and nations are under the direction of divine providence, as all must own that acknowledgeth a providence, as his Lordship professeth to do. And those that are distinguished from others by superior advantages, ought to be thank ful to God for those advantages, and to ascribe them to his goodness, and not deny that God hath given them those advantages, because there are others that have them not, or not in an equal degree. Since therefore the distinguishing some persons and nations with valuable advantages above others is not inconsistent with the uni versal benignity of the great Parent of mankind (for if it were, he would not do it), it can never be proved, that he may not grant a revelation to any part of mankind, except at the same time it be granted equally to the whole world. Indeed, if all men every where were required actually to believe that revelation, and were to be con demned for not believing it, it would be necessary to have it univer sally promulgated : but since the actual belief of it is required of those only to whom it is actually published, and they to whom it is not made known are not put into a worse condition than if there had been no such revelation granted at all, no argument can be brought to show that it is inconsistent with the divine wisdom or goodness, to grant such a revelation to some part of mankind, though it be not actually promulgated to the whole human race ; especially if, in its own nature and original intention, it was fitted and designed to be of universal extent; which is the case ofthe Christian revela tion. Those therefore who are so circumstanced as to have an op portunity of knowing it, ought to be very thankful to God on that account, and not refuse or reject their own advantages and privileges, because all others are not partakers of them as well as they. This would be a most absurd and irrational conduct. I shall only further observe, that this author seems frequently to make it a great objection against what he calls particular religion, that it insisteth upon other things as necessary, besides the religion of nature, as contained in these five articles. Religion, according to him, is notitiarum communium symbolutn,* a creed containing com mon notions of truths ; and these common notices he reduceth to the five above-mentioned. But will any man undertake to prove, that God cannot reveal any truths to mankind, but precisely these » De Ycrit. p. 55. 221. Let. II. LORD HERBERT OP CHERBURY. 1/ five articles, or that all useful religious knowledge is wholly absorpt in them? May there not be truths which, though not precisely the same with those articles, may be of great use for clearing and con firming them, for instructing men in the fuller knowledge of Godi and of his will, and of the methods of his grace towards us, or for directing' us in our duty, and animating us to the practice of it? And must all these be discarded at once, as of no use in religion, because they are distinct from the articles so often referred to? Or must a well-attested revelation be rejected, because it containeth some things of this kind ? Our noble author himself, though he supposes these articles to be absolutely necessary, seems not to be quite sure that they are sufficient : for he observes, that God's judgments and proceedings are not fully known to any man : and therefore he will not take upon him positively to pronounce, that these articles are sufficient. Quam ob eausam neque eos sufficere protinus dixerim* But if they should be supposed to comprehend all that is required from the heathens, who never had the light of the Christian revelation, it doth not follow that they are also alone sufficient for those to whom this revelation is made known : for supposing God to give an extraordinary revelation of his will fof restoring religion when greatly corrupted, and clearly directing men in the way of salvation, and helping forward their improvement iri divine knowledge, and in a holy and virtuous practice, as it would be a signal advantage to those to whom such a revelation is given^ so it must necessarily lay them under additional obligations. Some things would, in consequence of it, be necessary to be believed and done, by those to whom this "revelation is made known, which they were not so expressly obliged to believe and practise before : and it would be a strange thing to complain against that revelation on this account, or accuse it of falsehood, and to choose rather to be without the signal advantage of such a revelation, and its glorious benefits, privileges, and hopes, than to be obliged to receive the discoveries it brings, and to practise the duties which result from them. One of the first English writers that published animadversions on Lord Herbert's scheme (for I shall not take notice of what some learned foreigners have done this way) was Mr. Richard Baxter, in a book published in 1671, which he calls More Reasons for the Christian Religion, and no Reason against it : and which he designed as an appendix to his excellent treatise of the reasons of the Chris tian religion. One part of this book contains, " Animadversions on a Tractate de Veritate, written by the noble and learned Lord Edward Herbert, Baron of Cherbury." This writer makes judicious reflections on several passages in that book, but takes no notice of his Tract de Religione Laici, nor of that learned work de Religione Gentilium, which probably he had not seen. The celebrated Mr. Locke, in his Essay on Human Understanding, hath some observa tions on Lord Herbert's five articles, to show, that, however reason;- 5 De Relig. Gentil. p. 293. C 18 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. II. able they may appear to be, they cannot be justly accounted common notices in the sense in which that Lord represents them ; viz. as clearly inscribed by the hand of God in the minds of all men.* And in his Reasonableness qf Christianity as delivered in the Scriptures, he hath, without formally mentioning Lord Herbert, furnished a proper antidote against his scheme, by showing, with great clearness and force, the usefulness of divine revelation, for setting the great principles of the law of nature, and the important duties of religion and morality in a strong and convincing light, and enforcing them with the most powerful motives ; and that the mere natural unassisted light of reason was, as things were circumstanced, insufficient and ineffectual for that purpose.t This matter is also fully and distinctly treated in Dr. Whitby's learned work, intituled, The Necessity and Usefulness of the Christian Revelation, by Reason ofthe Corruptions of the Principles of natural Religion among Jews and Heathens. London, 8vo. 1705. The only author among us, that I know, who hath formally con sidered the whole of Lord Herbert's scheme, and undertaken a direct answer to his writings, is the reverend Mr. Halyburton, pro fessor of divinity in the University of St. Andrews, in a book which was published after the author's death, at Edinburgh, in 1714, 4to. intituled, Natural Religion insufficient, and Revealed necessary to Man's Happiness " in which, particularly, the writings of the learned Lord Herbert, the great patron of Deism ; to wit, his books de Veritate, de Religione Gentilium, and his Religio Laici, in so far as they assert nature's light able to conduct us to future blessedness, are considered, and fully answered." In this elaborate performance he sets himself largely and distinctly to show that the light of nature is greatly defective, even with respect to the discoveries of a Deity, and the worship that is to- be rendered to him ; with respect to the inquiry concerning man's true happiness ; with respect to the rule of duty, and the motives for enforcing obedience : that it is unable certainly to discover the means of obtaining pardon of sin, or to eradicate inclinations to sin, and subdue its power. And, lastly, he argues its insufficiency, from a general view of the experi ence of the world. He afterwards proceeds distinctly to consider the five articles to which the Lord Herbert reduces his catholic reli gion. He answers the proofs his Lordship has brought to show that these articles did universally obtain ; and, on the contrary, offers several proofs to show that they did not so obtain. And he endeavours distinctly to answer the principal arguments and pleas urged by Lord Herbert, and, after him, by Mr. Blount, for the sufficiency of natural religion. Whosoever carefully examines what this learned and pious author has offered on these several heads will find many excellent things ; though the narrowness of his notions in some points hath prejudiced some persons against his work, and * Essay on Human Understanding, book i. c. 3, $. 15, 16, 17, 18 19. f See his works, vol. ii. p. 574, & seq. 4th edit. Let. II. LORD HERBERT OP CHERBURY. 19 hindered them from regarding and considering it so much as it deserves. I shall here conclude my account of Lord Herbert, in which I have been the more particular, because as he was one of the first, so he was confessedly one of the greatest writers that have appeared among us in the deistical cause. POSTSCRIPT. A remarkable Incident relating to Lord Herbert considered. Sir, After I had finished the two foregoing letters, I saw a large anonymous letter, which was sent to you, and by you communicated to me, relating to Lord Herbert of Cherbury. This letter deserves particular notice ; and what I have to observe upon it may be pro perly inserted here, immediately after the observations which have been made upon that noble writer in the preceding letters. I readily agree with this gentleman in acknowledging, what, as he observes, Mr. Baxter owns in his animadversions on Lord Herbert's tract de Veritate, that there are excellent things in that book, and that many of the rules there proposed may be of great use. But I had no occasion to take particular notice of them, as I proposed only to make some general observations on his Lordship's scheme, as far as the cause of Christianity is concerned. I hope the writer of that letter, who appears to be a man of sense, and a friend to Christianity, as well as a great admirer of Lord Herbert, will find, on perusing the foregoing reflections, that I have done his Lordship justice, and not pushed the charge against him farther than there is just ground for it. What I have there said is perfectly agreeable to what this ingenious gentleman has observed in this letter ; where, after having said that Lord Llerbert is commonly reputed to have been the first starter of Deism in the last century, he adds, " Sup posing the charge to be true, as I greatly suspect it is, yet I am convinced upon several good reasons, that he was nevertheless a deist of more honour, and of greater candour and decency, as he was of far greater parts and learning, than many that have appeared under that denomination since.'' He subjoins, " Had he lived in these days, wherein the subject, then new, has been thoroughly canvassed, and no stone left unturned to find out the truth, and bring it into fair light, I own I have charity enough to suppose, and almost to believe, that Lord Herbert would either have been an advocate for revelation, or at least have forborne opposing it. This gentleman takes notice of a manuscript which he had lately seen, containing the life ofthe Lord Llerbert of Cherbury, drawn up from memorials penned by himself, and which is now in the pos session of a gentleman of distinction whom he does not name. He c 2 20 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. II. mentions that Lord's good conduct when he was ambassador at Paris, and some other things that do not come within the compass of my design, which is not to give an account of the lives and characters of the authors I mention, but only to consider their writings, and these no farther than they relate to the controversy between the Christians and the deists. But there is one thing in that manuscript life of Lord Herbert, which the writer of the anony mous letter calls a surprising incident, and which is indeed of such a nature, that I cannot pass it by without a particular notice. After having observed that Lord Herbert's tract de Veritate was his favourite work, he produceth a large extract relating to it, in that Lord's own words, signifying, that though it had been approved by some very learned men to whom he had shown it, among whom he mentions Grotius, yet as the frame of his whole book was so different from what had been written heretofore[on this subject, and he apprehended he should meet with much opposition, he did con sider, whether it were not better for him for a while to suppress it. And then his Lordship proceeds thus : " Being thus doubtful, in my chamber, one fair day in the sum mer, my casement being open towards the south, the sun shining clear, and no wind stirring, I took my book de Veritate in my hands, and, kneeling on my knees, devoutly said these words. 0 thou eternal God, author qf this light which now shines upon me, and giver of all inward illuminations ; Ido beseech thee, of thine infinite goodness, to pardon a greater request than a sinner ought to make : I am not satisfied enough, whether I shall publish this book : if it be for thy glory, I beseech thee give me some sign from heaven; if not I shall suppress it. I had no sooner spoken these words, but a loud, though yet gentle noise, came forth from the heavens (for it was like nothing on earth) ; which did so cheer and comfort me, that 1 took my petition as granted, and that I had the sign I demanded ; whereupon also I resolved to print my book. This, how strange soever it may seem, I protest before the eternal God, is true : neither am I any way superstitiously deceived herein : since I did not only clearly hear the noise, but in the serenest sky that ever I saw, being without all cloud, did, to my thinking, see the place from whence it came." The ingenious writer of the letter says, he will make no remarks on this incident, but sends it as he finds it; but he makes no doubt, that some observations upon this and other things in that life would be acceptable to the friends of religion. I shall mention some reflections that have occurred to me upon this occasion. I have no doubt of his Lordship's sincerity in this account. The seriousair with which he relates it, and the solemn protestation he makes, as in the presence of the eternal God, will not suffer us to question the truth of what he relates ; viz. that he both made that address to God which he mentions, and that, in consequence of this, he was persuaded that he heard the noise he takes notice of, and Let. II. LORD HERBERT OF CHERBURY. 21 which he took to come from heaven, and regarded as a mark of God's approbation of the request he had made ; and accordingly this great man was determined by it to publish this book. He seems to have considered it as a kind of imprimatur given to it from heaven, and as signifying the divine approbation of the book itself, and of what was contained in it. I cannot help thinking, that if any writer, zealous for Christianity, had given such an account of himself, as praying for and expecting a sign from heaven to determine his doubt, whether he should pub lish a book he had composed in favour of the Christian cause ; and upon hearing a noise, which he took to be from heaven, had looked upon it as a mark of the divine approbation, and as a call to publish that book ; it would have passed for a high fit of enthusiasm, and would no doubt have subjected the author to much ridicule among the gentlemen that oppose revealed religion. What judgment they will pass upon it in Lord Herbert's case I do not know : but con sidering the great partiality they have often shown in their own favour and against Christianity, it is not improbable, that some of them may be apt to interpret this incident as giving a divine sanc tion to a book, which contains indeed several important truths, but withal hath some principles which are unfavourable to the Christian religion; or at least, they may be willing to have it believed that this is as much to be depended upon as the signs and attestations said to be given from heaven to the first preachers and publishers of the gospel revelation. There are some things observable in Lord Herbert's solemn address to God which, I think, are highly commendable, and would incline one to think very favourably of his Lordship's intentions. He discovereth in it a great veneration for the Deity, and a deep sense of his dependence upon him as the author of light, and the giver of all inward illuminations. This is agreeable to the senti ments of the best and wisest men in all ages ; but yet I think it may be justly doubted, whether an address of such a particular kind as that made by his Lordship was proper or regular. It does not seem to me, that we are well founded to apply for or to expect an extraordinary sign from heaven, for determining doubts concern ing the expediency of publishing a book. Methinks, if a man hath used his best endeavours to find out truth, and (which certainly ought not to be neglected) hath humbly applied to God to assist and direct him in his inquiries ; if he hath the testimony of his own conscience to the uprightness of his own intentions, and that he is not actuated by pride and vain glory, by an affectation of singularity or any worldly sinister ends and views ; and if he is satisfied, upon the most diligent and impartial examination, that what he hath advanced is both true and of great importance to mankind, and is only afraid of the opposition it may meet with ; 1 think, in such a case, especially if he hath also the advice of good and judicious friends concerning it, he hath sufficient grounds to proceed upon, and doth not need a particular sign from heaven to determine him. 22 A VIEW OP THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. II. This seems to be a putting it on a wrong foot, since God hath not in his word given us any ground to expect that he will answer such a request ; nor is their any reason to expect it from the nature of the thing. His Lordship himself seems to have suspected that such an address and expectation wasnot regular, when he begs of God to pardon it, as being a greater request than a sinner ought to make. I believe it will be acknowledged, that sudden impressions, or supposed signs from heaven, like that upon which Lord Herbert seemeth to lay so great a stress, are very equivocal, and not much to be depended upon for information in truth, or direction in duty: They may lay persons open to mistake and delusion. It cannot be denied, that, in such cases, men are in danger of being imposed upon by the warmth of their own imaginations, especially if they be wrought up to a strong desire and expectation of an extraordinary sign from heaven, in favour of a design which they heartily wish should succeed. I think it is evident, from his own account of it, that this was Lord Herbert's case. His mind was full of his book, highly pre possessed in favour of its truth and usefulness. He seems not to have been diffident of the truth and goodness of the book itself, but only to have been in doubt about the expediency of its publication ; and he took a very extraordinary way to obtain direction concerning it. Nothing less would satisfy him than a sign from heaven ; and it is plain that he was big with expectation. His imagination was warmed with the hope of a sign that should be a mark of the divine approbation. It is not to be wondered at, that a mind thus pre pared should be disposed to interpret any incident that should happen, in favour of its own prepossessions, and as countenancing the purpose he had entertained in his own breast. Taking it in this view, nothing happened, but what may reasonably enough be accounted for, without supposing anything supernatural in the case. He doth not mention any articulate voice, or words spoken to him as from heaven, directing him what to do, or signifying an appro bation of his design ; he only maketh mention of a noise that seemed to him to come from heaven. He giveth no particular ac count what kind of noise it was, but only that it was loud arid yet gentle, and that it came from heaven, ferr it was like nothing on earth ; that it was in a serene sky, and that to his thinking, lie saw the place from whence it came. In this situation of his mind, any noise that happened at that precise juncture, and which had some thing unusual in it (and it is easy to suppose several things of this kind), might be apt to make an impression on his imagination. I shall only put one supposition, and it is this, that at that time it might happen to thunder at a distance, which might well be in sum mer-time, though in that part of the sky which was within his view there was no cloud to be seen, and all seemed perfectly serene; and the " noise of thunder heard remote " (to use Milton's phrase) com ing at that instant when the soul was filled with expectation of something extraordinary, would undoubtedly greatly affect him, and Let. II. LORD HERBERT OP CHERBURY'. 23 might be regarded as a sign of approbation from heaven, which was what he sought for; and then no wonder that it comforted and cheered him, as his Lordship observes it did. It is, I must confess, a great satisfaction to me to reflect, that the evidence of the Christian religion doth not depend upon such equi vocal signs as this. The attestations given to the first preachers and publishers of the gospel were of such a kind, that, supposing them to have really happened, they could not reasonably, or with the least appearance of probability, be ascribed to anything but a divine interposition ; and therefore might justly be regarded as marks of the divine approbation of the Christian scheme. Upon this occasion, I cannot help drawing some kind of parallel in my own mind, between this incident that happened to this noble Lord, and that extraordinary appearance from heaven which St. Paul gives an account of; and which, with what followed upon it, had such an effect upon him, as to conquer his obstinate prejudices, and to engage him to profess and preach that faith in Christ which he himself had zealously persecuted before. I believe the warmest advocates for Christianity would be ready to own, that if that great apostle had had no better account to give of the reasons and motives of his conversion than such a sign from heaven as Lord Herbert mentions, this would have been a very slender foundation either for himself or others to go upon, in receiving the Christian doctrine as of divine original. But the slightest comparison of the cases may let us see that there is a wide and amazing difference between them. Lord Herbert's mind was prepossessed with the expectation of a sign from heaven ; he sought it, he applied to God for it, he had an hope that something of this kind would happen : and when the thing came which he took for a sign, it was in favour of what he no doubt strongly wished and desired before : yet, prepossessed as his imagination was, he heard no voice of words, nor articulate language, signifying to him the divine will. But St. Paul was the farthest in the world from desiring or expecting a sign from heaven in favour ofthe religion of Jesus : on the contrary, his mind was at that very instant wholly possessed with the strongest prejudices against it. He was then going to Damascus, with a commission from the high- priest to seize the disciples of Jesus, and bring them to Jerusalem to be punished ; and he was persuaded in his own conscience that he was right in doing so. He breathed out threatnings and slaughter against them, as the sacred writer expresseth it : and he himself tells us, that he verily thought with himself, that he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth. In this circum stance of things, if we should suppose him seized with a sudden pang of enthusiasm, though this is by no means likely to have hap pened to him, as he was travelling along the road at noon-day, with several others in his company ; but if we should suppose that some thing of this kind happened to him, and 'that he saw an extraor dinary light from heaven, which he took to be a sign that heaven approved the work in which he was then engaged ; or if he had 24 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. II. thought he also heard a voice from above speaking to him, and ani mating him to go on, and courageously to execute the commission he had received from the high-priest, and promising him success in it, there might possibly be some pretence for ascribing it to the working of an over-heated imagination, filled with the design he was upon, which engaged all his thoughts and resolutions. But it is plain that, in the temper he was then in, he could not have the least expectation of Jesus of Nazareth's appearing to him with a celestial splendour and glory, calling to him with a majestic voice from heaven, and in words which he distinctly heard, reproving him for his enmity to him, and persecuting rage against his disciples, appointing him his minister and apostle, and commissioning him to preach the gospel to the Gentiles, and to invite them to a participa tion of the" benefits and privileges of his kingdom ; which were things the most remote from his apprehension that could possihly be conceived. I need not here particularly repeat all the circumstances of a story so well known as that of the divine appearance which occasioned St. Paul's conversion ; but taking in the whole as he himself re- lateth it, it is absolutely impossible that it should have been the effect of his own enthusiastic imagination, considering how his mind was at that time disposed, to which may be added the consequent effects which showed the reality of it. Struck blind with the glory of the appearance, he was obliged to be led to Damascus ; and it was only by the laying on of Ananias' hands in the name of Jesus, that he had his sight restored. There was immediately a wonderful change in his dispositions, notions, and inclinations. He became enlightened at once, without human instruction, in a perfect know ledge of the religion of Jesus, than which nothing could be more contrary in many points to the pharisaical principles and prejudices he had so deeply imbibed. He was endued with the most extra ordinary gifts of the Holy Ghost, and had a power of communica ting those gifts to others, by the laying on of his hands in the name of a crucified and risen Jesus and in the same sacred name was enabled to perform the most illustrious miracles. These were mat ters of fact in which he could not be deceived himself, and of which there were numbers of witnesses : and accordingly he went through the nations preaching Jesus Christ, and him crucified, as the Saviour and Lord ; which he did with such evidence, and had such extraordinary attestations from heaven accompanying him, that vast numbers were brought over by his ministry to embrace a religion which was absolutely contrary to their most rooted prejudices, incli nations, and interests. There might possibly be some suspicions with regard to the rela tion of a fact so circumstanced as was that of Lord Herbert. It might be thought possible, that an author might feign an approba tion from heaven in favour of some peculiar notions he had enter tained, and of a book of which he was very fond, and upon which he seems to have valued himself ; not that I think there is any Let. II. LORD HERBERT OF CHERBURY. 25 reasonable ground of suspicion, that this noble writer feigned what he relates concerning this incident ; but yet some may suppose, that an author might possibly be under some temptation to deviate from the rules of truth in such a case. But no such suspicion can be entertained in St. Paul's case, that he should have feigned a heavenly appearance in favour of areligion which he was well known to have hated, persecuted, and despised, and which was absolutely contrary to the prejudices to which he had been so obstinately addicted, and to all his worldly expectations, connections, and interests : to which it may be added, that he gave the highest pos sible proof of his own sincere belief of the fact as he has related it, by his inviolable adherence to that religion to which he was by this extraordinary means converted ; that he exposed himself by it to the different persecutions, and to the greatest and most various labours and sufferings that any one man ever endured ; and which he bore with an invincible constancy, and even with a divine exulta tion and joy, supported by the testimony of a good conscience, and the hope of a glorious reward in the heavenly world. Upon the whole, let us put the supposition, that Lord Herbert, in the account he hath given of what happened to him, has had the strictest regard to truth (which, for my part, I have no doubt of), and that the account St. Paul hath given of the extraordinary appearance to him from heaven is also true, there is this vast dif ference between the cases : that, granting all that happened to Lord Herbert to have been as he relates it, there is nothing in it but what may be accounted for in some such manner as that mentioned above, without supposing any thing supernatural in the case ; but, granting the truth ofthe relation which St. Paul gives ofthe divine appearance to him, with the effects that followed upon it, there is no possibility of accounting for it in a natural way, or indeed in any other manner than by owning an extraordinary and supernatural interposition. Though therefore the former, granting it to be true, can by no means be depended upon as a certain mark of the appro bation of heaven given to Lord Herbert's book ; yet the latter, sup posing it in like manner true, affordeth a convincing proof of an extraordinary attestation given from heaven to the divine mission and glory of a crucified Jesus, and to the truth and divine original of the Christian revelation. I may perhaps be thought to have expatiated too much in my reflections on this occasion ; but I hope I shall be excused when it is considered, that the incident is of so uncommon a nature ; that it relateth to a person of Lord Herbert's character and eminence ; and that the account of it is extracted from memorials written by him self. I shall make no farther remarks on the anonymous letter, than to observe, that the writer of it makes mention of the answers to Lord Herbert, published by Mr. Baxter and Mr. Halyburton. He also takes notice of the Weekly Miscellany, as having lately appeared against him. The two former I have taken notice of above ; the 26 A VIEW OP THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. III. latter I have not seen, and therefore know not how far some of the observations there made may have coincided with mine. LETTER III. Observations on Mr. Hobbes's Writings.— He sometimes professeth a Regard to the Scripture as the Word and Law of God ; at other times ridicules Inspiration or Revelation. — He attempts to invalidate the sacred Canon, and makes Religion and the Authority of Scripture to depend entirely on the Authority of the Magistrate. — His strange Maxims in Morality and Politics.— His Scheme tends to subvert Natural Religion as well as Revealed. — Confuted by several learned Authors. Sir, In my two former letters some observations were made on the writings of that eminent deist, Lord Herbert of Cherbury. The next writer I shall mention was in several respects of a different character from that noble Lord, though also very famous in his time, the noted Mr. Thomas Hobbes of Malmsbury. There have been few persons whose writings have had a more pernicious influ ence in spreading irreligion and infidelity than his ; yet as none of his treatises are directly levelled against revealed religion, I shall content myself with some brief general reflections upon them. He sometimes affects to speak with veneration of the sacred writings. He expressly declareth, that though the laws of nature are not laws as they proceed from nature, yet, " as they are given by God in holy Scripture, they are properly called laws ; for the holy Scripture is the voice of God, ruling all things by the greatest right."* But though he seems here to make the laws of Scripture to be the laws of God, and to derive their force from his supreme authority, yet in many other passages, some of which I shall have occasion to mention, he supposeth them to have no authority but what they derive from the prince or civil power. He sometimes seems to acknowledge inspiration to be a supernatural gift, and the immediate hand of God ; at other times he treats the pretence to it as a sign of madness; and, by a jingle upon the words, represents God's speaking to the ancient prophets in a dream or vision, to be no more than their dreaming that he spoke to them, or dreaming between sleeping and waking.f To weaken the authority of the sacred Canon, he endeavours to show, that the books of Moses, and the historical writings of the Old Testament, were not written by * De Cive, carr. iii. sect. 33. t Lcviath. p. 196. Let. III. MR. HOBBES'S WRITINGS. 27 those whose names they bear, and that they are derived to us from no other authority but that of Esdras, who restored them when they were lost :* a supposition in which he hath been since followed by others on the same side, and very lately by a noble Lord ; though the absurdity of it is manifest, and hath been fully exposed.-)- As to the writings of the New Testament, he acknowledgeth, that they are as ancient as the times of the apostles, and that they were written by persons who lived in those times, some of whom saw the things which they relate ; which is what many of our modern deists seem unwilling to own. And though he insinuates that the copies of the Scriptures were but few, and only in the hands of the ecclesiastics, yet he adds, that he sees no reason to doubt, but that the books of the New Testament, as we have them, are the true registers of those things which were done and said by the prophets and apostles.*): But then he most absurdly pretends, that they were not received as of divine authority in the Christian church, till they were declared to be so by the council of Laodicea, in the year after Christ 364 : though nothing is capable of a clearer proof, than that their authority was acknowledged among Chrisntians from the apostolic times. He expressly asserts, that we have no assurance of the certainty of Scripture, but the authority of the church, and this he resolveth into the authority qf the commonwealth ; and declares, that till the sovereign ruler had prescribed them, " the precepts of Scripture were not obligatory laws,-but only counsel and advice, which he that was counselled might without injustice refuse to observe, and being contrary to the laws could not without injustice observe ;" that the word of the interpreter of Scripture is the word of God, and the sovereign magistrate is the interpreter of Scripture, and of all doc trines, to whose authority we must stand .§ Yea, he carrieth it so far as to pronounce, that Christians are bound in conscience to obey the laws of , an infidel king in matters of religion ; that " thought is free ; but when it comes to confession of faith, the private reason must submit to the public, that is to say, to God's lieutenant." And accordingly, he alloweth the subject, being com manded by the sovereign, to deny Christ in words, holding firmly in his heart the faith of Christ : and that in that case, " it is not he that denieth Christ before men, but his governor and the laws of his country. || And he expressly declareth, that idolatry to which a man is compelled by the terror of death is not idolatry. And this being the case, it is not to be wondered at, that he speaks with contempt of the ancient martyrs. In this the succeeding deists have not failed to imitate him. They have reproached those excel lent persons as having died as a fool dieth;% as if it were a ridiculous * Leviath. p. 200, 201, 203. t Reflections on Lord Bolingbroke's Letters, p. 51, &c. t Leviath. p. 204. i Quest, concerning Liberty, p. 136. De Give, c. 17. Leviath. p. 169, 283, 284. || Ibid. p. 238, 271. U See Christianity not founded on Argument, p. 32, 33. 28 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. HI and senseless thing to endure hardships and sufferings, for the sake of truth and conscience : and yet those have been always justly admired, who have exposed themselves to the greatest dangers in a noble cause, and who would not do a base thing to save their lives. Mr. Hobbes acknowledgeth the existence of God, and that we must of necessity arise from the effects which we behold, to the eternal Power of all powers, and Cause of all causes; and he blames those as absurd who call the world, or the soul of the world, God : but he denies that we know any more of him than that he exists, and seems plainly to make him corporeal ; for he affirms, that that which is not body is nothing at all :* and though he sometimes seems to acknowledge religion and its obligations, and that there is an honour and worship due to God, prayer, thanksgiving, oblations, &c, yet he advanceth principles which evidently tend to subvert all religion. The account he gives of it is this, " that from the fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed, ariseth religion, not allowed superstition." And he else where resolveth religion into things which he himself derides; viz. " opinions of ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion to what men fear, and taking of things casual for prognostics."! He takes pains in many of his works to prove man to be a necessary agent, and expressly asserts the materiality and mortality of the human soul ; and he represents the doctrine concerning the distinction between soul and body in man to be an error contracted by the contagion of the demonology of the Greeks. We may observe by the way the great difference there is in this respect between Mr. Hobbes and Lord Herbert. This noble writer has reckoned the notion and belief of a future state among the common notices naturally obvious to the minds of all men : but the account Mr. Hobbes is pleased to give of it is this, that the belief of a future state after death " is a belief grounded upon other men's saying, that they knew it supernaturally, or that they knew those, that knew them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally."'!' That we may have the better notion of this extraordinary writer, it may not be amiss to mention some other of his maxims. He asserts, that by the law of nature every man hath a right to all things, and over all persons, and that the natural condition of man is a state of war, a war of all men against all men : that there is no way so reasonable for any man as to anticipate, that is, by force and wiles to master all the persons of others that he can, so long till he sees no other power great enough to endanger him : that the civil laws are the only rules of good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest ; and that antecedently to such laws every action is in its own nature indifferent : that there is nothing good or evil in itself, nor any common laws constituting what is naturally just and unjust; that all things are measured by what every man judgeth fit, where there is no civil government, and by the laws of society where there * Leviath. p. 214, 371. t Ibid. p. 53. } Ibid. p. 74. Let. III. MR. IIOBBES'S WRITINGS. 29 is one :* that rhe power of the sovereign is absolute, and that he is not bound by any compacts with his subjects : that nothing the sovereign can do to the subject can properly be called injurious or wrong; and that the kings word is sufficient to take anything from any subject, if there be need, and the king is the judge of that need.f In Mr. Hobbes we have a remarkable instance what strange extravagances men of wit and genius may fall into, who, whilst they value themselves upon their superior penetration, and laugh at popular errors and superstition, often give in to notions so wild and ridiculous, as none of the people that govern themselves by plain common sense could be guilty of. It will hardly be thought too severe a censure to say, that Mr. Hobbes's scheme strikes at the foundation of all religion, both natural and revealed : that it tendeth not only to subvert the authority of the Scripture, but to destroy God's moral administration : that it confoundeth the natural dif ferences of good and evil, virtue and vice, and taketh away the dis tinction between soul and body, and the liberty of human actions : that it destroyeth the best principles of the human nature, and, instead of that innate benevolence and social disposition which should unite men together, supposeth all men to be naturally in a state of war with one another : that it erecteth an absolute tyranny in the state and church, which it confounds, and maketh the will of the prince or governing power, the sole standard of right and wrong; and that it destroyeth all the rights of private conscience, and, indeed, leaveth no room for conscience at all. But notwithstanding the ill tendency of many of Mr. Hobbes's principles, yet the agreeableness of his style, of which he was a great master, joined to his dogmatical way of pronouncing with a very decisive air, and the very oddness and apparent novelty of his notions, gave them a great run for a time, and did no small mischief. He himself boasted of the good reception his Leviathan met with among many of our gentry: but the manifold absurdities and inconsistencies of his scheme, and the pernicious consequences of it to religion, morality, and the civil government, have been so well exposed, and set in so clear a light, that there are not many of our modern deists that would be thought openly to espouse his system in its full extent : though indeed it cannot be denied, that there are not a few things in their writings borrowed from his, and that some of them have chosen rather to follow him than Lord Herbert in several of his principles, and particularly in asserting the materiality and mortality of the human soul, and denying man's free agency. Mr. Hobbes met with many learned adversaries, among whom we may particularly reckon Dr. Seth Ward, afterwards bishop of Salisbury, and archbishop Bramhal. The latter argued with great * De Cive, c vi. s. 18. c. x. s. 1. c. 12. s. i. Leviath. p. 21, 25, 60, 61, 62, 63, 72, t Leviath. p. 90, 106. 30 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. Ill, acuteness against that part of the scheme which relates to liberty and necessity, and afterwards attacked the whole of his system, in a piece called the Catching ofthe Leviathan, published at London in 1658; in which he undertakes to demonstrate, out of Mr. Hobbes's own works, that no man who is thoroughly an Hobbist can be "a good Christian, or a good commonwealth's man, or reconcile himself to himself." The reverend Mr. Tenison, after wards archbishop of Canterbury, gave a summary view of Mr. Mr. Hobbes's principles, with a judicious confutation of them, in a book called The Creed of Mr. Hobbes examined, published in 1670. To these may be added, the famous Earl of Clarendon, who wrote A brief View and Survey qf the dangerous and pernicious Errors to the Church and State in Mi: Hobbes's Book entitled " Leviathan." This was published in 1676. Bishop Parker, Mr. Tyrrel, but, above all, Bishop Cumberland, in his justly celebrated work de Ijegibus Naturce, did also distinguish themselves in th is controversy. It is to be observed, that the learned writers who opposed Mr. Hobbes did not so much apply themselves to vindicate revealed religion, or the Christian system, as to establish the great principles of all religion and morality, which his scheme tended to subvert : and to show, that they had a real foundation in reason and nature. In this they certainly did good service to religion : yet some of the enemies of revelation endeavoured to take advantage of it, as if this showed that there is no other religion but the law of nature, and that any extraordinary revelation is needless and useless. Thus, on every supposition, these gentlemen seem resolved to carry their cause against Christianity. If there he no law of nature, no real difference, in the nature of things, between moral good and evil, virtue and vice, there is no such thing as religion at all, and con sequently no Christian religion. On the other hand, if it be proved that there is such a thing as the religion and law of nature, which is founded in the very nature and relations of things, and agreeable to right reason, then it is concluded, that this alone is sufficient, and that it is clear and obvious to all mankind, and therefore they need no revelation to instruct them in it, or assure them of it. A very wrong conclusion this ! since it is manifest that a well attested revelation from God would be of very great use, both farther to clear and confirm some of the important principles of natural reli gion, which, though in themselves reasonable, were in fact greatly obscured and perverted in the corrupt state of mankind ; and also to instruct men in things which, however highly useful to be known, they could not have clearly discovered or been fully assured of, by the mere unassisted light of nature, without a divine revelation. This might lead one into a train of reflections on the connection there is between natural and revealed religion : but I must content myself with giving short hints of things : to enlarge farther upon them would not suit my present design. You will probably hear from me again soon : and in the mean time, I am, 8cc. Let. IV. mr. blount's writings. 31 LETTER IV. Mr. Charles Blount's Notes on the Life of ApoUonius Tyana8us, designed to expose Christianity.- — His Religio Laici copied, for the most part, from Lord Herbert. — He had a chief hand in the Oracles of Reason. — He attacks the Doctrine of a Mediator, as unworthy of God. — His remarkable Concession, that it is not safe to trust to Deism alone, without Christianity joined with it. — Mr. Toland, another deistical Writer; very fond of asserting Paradoxes. — The Design of his Amyntor to render the Canon of the New Testament uncertain. — He gives a large Catalogue of spurious Gospels, and attempts to show that they were equally received and acknow ledged in the primitive Times, with the Gospels which are now looked upon as authentic The contrary fully proved in the Answers that were made to him. Sir, Among those who openly avowed the cause of Deism, and seemed zealous to promote it,may be reckoned Charles Blount, Esq. In 1680 he published a translation of the two first books of Philostratus's Life of ApoUonius Tyanaus, with large notes, which are manifestly intended to strike at revealed religion. ApoUonius, you know, was a Pytha gorean philosopher that lived in the first century, whose character and miracles were opposed by the pagans to those of our Lord Jesus Christ. Hierocles wrote a book to this purpose, which was answered by Eusebius, who hath plainly proved, that Philostratus was a vain and fabulous writer, and that his accounts are full of romantic stories and ridiculous fables : and whoever impartially considers Philostratus's book, which is still extant, must be convinced that Eusebius's censure upon it is just. Nothing can be supposed more different than Philostratus's manner of writing, stuffed with rhetorical flourishes and vain ostentations of learning, is from the plain, sober, artless narration of the evangelists, which hath all the characters of genuine unaffected simplicity, and a sincere regard to truth : to which it may be added, that Apollonius's philosophy, and the wonders he is said to have wrought, all tended to uphold the reign ing established superstition and idolatry, which at the same time had all worldly advantages on its side, and yet was not able to oppose the progress of Christianity, which triumphed over it,, though des titute of all those advantages, and though it had all the powers of the world against it :— a manifest proof this, how vastly superior the evidence of our Saviour's divine character and miracles was to any thing that could be produced in opposition to it ! And yet many of our modern deists have been fond of running the parallel between ApoUonius and Jesus Christ. Mr. Blount, in his notes, has thrown out several insinuations against- the miracles of our Saviour, in which he has been followed and even exceeded by some succeeding writers, of whom I may afterwards give some account. 32 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. IV. This gentleman has on several occasions discovered a strong pre judice against the Scriptures, and shown how willing he is to lay hold on whatsoever he thinks may expose them : it could be only owing to this, that he finds fault with that manner of expression, he opened his mouth, and said :* a censure which may be thought to proceed from an extraordinary nicety, rather than a true justness of taste. But though this, and other oriental idioms and forms of speech, may differ from what is usual among us, the language of Scripture has been always admired by the best judges. In 1683 the same gentleman published a small book intitled Religio Laici, which is little more than a translation of Lord Her bert's treatise of the same name. The additions and improvements he has made are so few, and of such small moment, as not to deserve a distinct consideration, and therefore I shall refer to the reflections already made on Lord Herbert's scheme. Some years after, in 1693, there was another book published, in which Mr. Blount had a principal concern, and which was plainly inteuded to propagate infidelity. It had a pompous title, The Oracles of Reason, and was published after Mr. Blount's unhappy end, by his friend Mr. Charles Gildon, who ushered it into the world by a preface in defence of self-murder, which that gentleman had been guilty of, to get rid of the uneasiness of a passion which proved too violent for him. The title of the book seemed to promise demonstration, as if it were intended to serve as an infallible guide in matters of religion : but there is little order or method in it, or regularity of design. It is a collection of different pieces, consisting for the most part of letters between Mr. Blount and his friends, intermixed with fragments and translations from some Greek and Latin authors, done with no great exactness. That part of the book which relates to natural religion and its sufficiency, proceeds chiefly upon Lord Herbert's plan. There are two of the tracts particularly remarkable this way : the one is A Summary Account of the Deist's Religion, by Mr. Blount : the other is a letter from A. W. to Mr. Blount, concerning natural religion, as opposed to divine revelation. In the former of these, Mr. Blount, having set himself to show that God is not to be worshipped by an image or by sacrifices, next endeavoureth to prove that he is not to be worshipped by a mediator. He pretends that the worship of God by a mediator derogateth from his infinite mercy, equally as an image doth from his spirituality and infinity. But his argument is founded upon a misapprehension or misre presentation of the gospel scheme. Far from derogating from the mercy or goodness of God, the appointment of such a mediator as the gospel proposeth is one of the most signal instances of his grace and goodness towards mankind : it is a wise and gracious provision for exercising his mercy towards guilty creatures, in such a way as is most becoming his own glorious government and perfections, and "" Blount's Notes on Philostratus, p. 69. Let. IV. MR. BLOUNT'S WRITINGS. 33 most conducive to their peace and comfort, and most proper to remove their guilty jealousies and fears. But he farther urgeth, that if God appointed the mediator, this shows that he was really reconciled to the world before, and conse quently that there was no need of a mediator. It showeth, indeed, that God had kind thoughts of mercy, and gracious intentions towards the human race ; but this doth not prove that therefore the appointment of a mediator was needless. On the contrary, his wisdom determined him to take this method as the properest way of exercising his mercy, and dispensing the effects of his goodness; of which he is certainly the fittest judge : and whosoever duly con siders the sublime idea given us in the gospel of the mediator, the work upon which he was sent, and the offices he was invested with, may observe such characters of the divine wisdom and good ness in it, such a regard to the honour of God, and to the comfort, and benefit, and happiness of mankind, as ought greatly to recom mend the gospel scheme. But the distinct consideration of these things would take up more room than the present design will allow. To this tract is prefixed a letter from Mr. Blount to Dr. Syden ham, in which there is this remarkable passage : that " undoubtedly, " in our travels to the other world, the common road is the safest ; " and though Deism is a good manuring of a man's conscience, yet " certainly, if sowed with Christianity, it will produce the most ''plentiful crop." Here he seems plainly to own, that it is not safe to trust to Deism alone, if Christianity be not joined with it*. As to the other tract I mentioned, the letter written by A. W. to Mr. Blount, concerning natural religion as opposed to divine revela tion, the chief heads of natural religion are there reduced to seven articles. 1. That there is an infinite and eternal God, creator of all things. 2. That he governs the world by his providence. 3. That it is our duty to worship and obey him as our creator and governor. 4. That our worship consists in prayer to him, and praise of him. 5. That our obedience consists in the rules of right reason, the practice of which is moral virtue. 6. That we are to expect rewards and punishments hereafter according to our actions in this life, which includes the soul's immortality, and is proved by our admitting pro vidence. 7. That when we err from the rules of our duty, we ought to repent, and trust in God's mercy for pardonf. Here Lord Her bert's five articles, which were all that he accounted necessary, are enlarged to seven, which indeed may be regarded as farther explica tions of the former : and with other explications they might be en larged to a still greater number. What was observed concerning Lord Herbert's articles may be applied to these. It will be ac knowledged, that they are agreeable to right reason ; but this is no proof that therefore an express divine revelation would not be need ful, in the present state of mankind, to set them in a stronger light, and give them additional force. Several of the deists would be far Oracles of Reason, p 87. 91. t Ibid. p. 197. v 34 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let IV' from agreeing with this writer in some of the articles he mentions. The first article runs thus, that there is one eternal self-existent God, creator of all things ; where it is plainly supposed, that the world was created ; and yet, in another part of that book, Mr. Blount has taken the pains to translate a large fragment of Ocellus Lucanus, which is designed to prove the eternity of the world :* and it appears that he himself does not disapprove it. In another part of these pretended Oracles, in a letter from Mr. Gildon to Mr. Blount, the opinion of the origin of good and evil, from two different eternal principles, the one good, the other evil, is represented as not unrea sonable.-)- In another of the above-mentioned seven articles it is declared, that the worship we owe to God consists in prayer to Him, and praise qf Him : and yet it is well known, that this has been contested and denied by some of the ancient philosophers and modern deists ; and Mr. Blount himself, in his notes upon the life of ApoUonius Tyanseus, having observed that some of the heathens used no prayers at all, insinuates, in their names, objections against that duty."j" With regard to the fifth article, that our obedience consists in the rules qf right i-eason, the practice whereof is moral virtue, this is easily said in general ; but there is no great likelihood, that, if they were to come to a particular explication, they would agree what is to be looked upon as included in the rules of right reason, and in the practice of moral virtue. Some of them would probably think it reasonable to indulge the appetites and passions in instances which others would not think reasonable or proper : even in a point of such consequence as self-murder, some of the ancient philosophers and modern deists have pleaded for it, whilst others have condemned it; and it is openly justified (as was before observed) in the preface to these Oracles of Reason. One should therefore think no reasonable man could deny, that express precepts, determining by a divine authority the particulars of moral duty, would be of great advantage. As to the article of future rewards and punishments, and the soul's immortality, this is represented by Mr. Blount, in a letter to the right honourable the most ingenious Strephon, and by A. W. in his letter to Mr. Blount, as a necessary part of natural religion; and yet he observes, that the ancient heathens disagreed about it.§ In another part of these Oracles, it is declared to be probable, that the soul of man is not of an entirely distinct nature from the body, but only a purer material composition. || Now the soul's materiality is not very consistent with the doctrine of its immortality : and from this we may judge of A. W.'s argument against Christianity, that " if the reasons of the Christian religion " were evident, there would be no longer any contention or difference " about it : and if all do not agree in it, those marks of truth in " it are not visible, which are necessary to draw our assent."! This argument, if it were good for any thing, would prove that there are * Oracles of Reason, p. 212—228. f IM. p. 194. i Notes on Philostratus, p. 38. § Oracles of Reason, p. 201. || Ibid. p. 154, 187. f Ibid. p. 201, 206. Let. IV, mr. blount's writinos. 35 no visible marks of truth in natural religion, no more than in re vealed ; since it cannot be denied that men differ about the one as well as the other : but the truth is, the argument doth not conclude in either case. There are several things in the Oracles of Reason which are par ticularly designed against the holy Scriptures, and which have been repeated by others since : but the sacred writings have been fully vindicated against those exceptions. Mr. Blount has particularly attacked the writings of Moses, and the' most considerable part of what he has offered to this purpose is borrowed either from the learned author of the Arclxzologia-Philosophicce, who, though he differed in some things from what is generally looked upon as the true interpretation of Moses's sense, was far from intending to sub vert the authority of the Mosaic writings; or from the author of the hypothesis of the Pre- Adamites, who afterwards retracted his own book. From this writer Mr. Blount hath given us a literal trans lation for several pages together, in different parts of this book, without making the least acknowledgment of it, or taking any notice of the answers that had been returned. In like manner he hath thought proper to repeat the objections which have been fre quently urged against the Mosaic writings, from the irreconcilable- ness of the accounts there given with the antiquities pretended to by the most learned heathen nations, particularly the Chaldeans and Egyptians. Our great Stillingfleet had, in the first book of his Origines Sacrtz, very amply considered that matter, and clearly shown the vanity of those pretences ; yet they are here again ad vanced with as much confidence as if they had never been refuted. The same observation may be made with regard to the arguments of Ocellus Lucanus about the eternity of the world, which are trans lated and produced with great pomp by Mr. Blount, though they had been unanswerably exposed in the last-mentioned learned treatise*. The Oracles qf Reason were animadverted upon by Mr. John Bradley, in a book published at London in 1699, in rimo. intitled. An Impartial View qf the Truth of Christianity, with the His tory of the Life and Miracles qf ApoUonius Tyanaus : to ivhich are added, some Reflections on a Book called " Oracles qf Reason." This book I have not seen. Dr. Nichols's Conference with a Theist was also particularly designed by the learned and ingenious author in opposition to the Oraclts of Reason ; and he hath not left any material part of that book unanswered. The first part of this Con ference was published at London in 12mo. in 1696, and the other three parts in the following years. But what deserveth our special notice, Mr. Gildon, the publisher of the Oracles, qf Reason, and who had recommended them to the world with a pompous eulogium, was afterwards, upon mature consideration, convinced of his error ; of which he gave a remarkable proof, in a good book which he pub- * Origines Sacrse, book iii. c. 2. f. -1-, 5, 6, 7. n 2 :J6 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. IV- lished some years after, in 1705, intitled The Deist's Manual. It is observable, that the greatest part of this book is taken up in vindi cating the doctrines of the existence and attributes of God, his pro vidence and government of the world, the immortality of the soul, and a future state : and his reason for it was, as he himself intimates, because many of the deists, with whom he was well acquainted, did really deny those great principles which lie at the foundation of all religion, or at least represented them as doubtful and uncertain ; and their not admitting natural religion in its just extent formed some of their principal prejudices against the Christian revelation. The next writer of whom I shall give some account is Mr. Toland, who, though he called himself a Christian, made it very much the business of his life to serve the cause of infidelity, and to unsettle men's minds with regard to religion. There are many things in his writings which show, that he was very fond of asserting things that had an appearance of novelty, however destitute of reason or proba bility; a remarkable instance of which he has given in his strange attempt to prove that motion is essential to matter. See his letters to Serena, 'Letter IIL* In another book, which he calls Pantheis ticon, published in 1720, he has shown himself a favourer and ad mirer of the Pantheistic philosophy, i. e. that of Spinosa, which acknowledgeth no other God but the universe. The first thing that made Mr. Toland taken notice of, was his Christianity not mysterious ; ot; a Discourse showing, that there is Nothing in the Gospel contrary to Reason, nor above it, and that no Christian Doctrine can be properly called a mystery. This was published in 1696, and was animadverted upon by several writers of learning and reputation, as Mr. Becconsal, Mr. Beverly, Mr. John Norris, Dr. Payne, Mr. Synge, afterwards archbishop of Tuam, and Mr. Brown, afterwards bishop of Cork. In 1709 he published at the Hague two Latin dissertations. The first is intitled, Adeisidamon, sive Titus Livius a superstitione vindica tus. In qua dissertatione probatur Livium historicum in sacris, prodigiis, et ostentis enar- randis, haudquaquam fuisse credulwm aut superstitiosum : ipsamque superstitionem non minus Reipublicee (si non magis) exitiosam esse, quam purum putum atheismum. The second dissertation bears the title of Origines Judaicee, sive Strabonis de Mose et religione Ju- daica historia breviter illustrata. In this dissertation he seems to prefer the account of this pagan author concerning Moses and the Jewish religion, before that which was given by the Jews themselves. These two dissertations were answered by Mr. la Faye, minister at Utrecht, in a book printed in 1709, and intitled, Defensio religionis, nee non Mosis et gentis Judaica, contra duas dissertationes Joannis Tolandi; and by Mr. Benoit, minister at Delft, in his Melange de remarques critiques, historiques, philosophiques, theologiques, sur les deux dissertations de Mr. Toland, intituli.es, I'un V Homme sans super stition, et V autre les origines Juddiques, printed at Delft in 1712. * This is confuted in Dr. Clarke's Demonstration, <**:c. p. 24. Edit, 7th. Let. IV. MR. toland's writings. 37 But what I shall here particularly take notice of, and by which he hath chiefly distinguished himself, is the pains he hath taken to invalidate the authority of the sacred Canon of the New Testament, and to render it uncertain and precarious. This seems to have been the design of the book he calls Amyntor, which he published in 1698, and in which he hath given a catalogue of books, attributed in the primitive times to Jesus Christ, his apostles, and other emi nent persons, " together with remarks and observations relating to the Canon of Scripture." He hath there raked together whatever he could find relating to the spurious gospels and pretended sacred books, which appeared in the early ages of the Christian church. These he hath produced with great pomp, to the number of eighty and upwards'; and though they were most of them evidently false and ridiculous, and carried the plainest marks of forgery and impos ture, of which, no doubt, he was very sensible, yet he has done what he could to represent them as of equal authority with the four gospels and other sacred books of the New Testament, now received among Christians. To this end he has taken advantage of the un wary and ill-grounded hypotheses of some learned men, and has endeavoured to prove, that the books of the present Canon lay con cealed in the coffers of private persons till the latter times of Trajan or Adrian, and were not known to the clergy or churches of those times, nor distinguished from the spurious works of heretics ; and that the Scriptures which we now receive as canonical, and others which we now reject, were indifferently and promiscuously cited and appealed to by the most ancient Christian writers. His design in all this manifestly is to show, that the gospels, and other sacred writings of the New Testament, now acknowledged as canonical, really deserve no greater credit, and are no more to be depended upon, than those books which are rejected and exploded as forgeries ; and yet he had the confidence to pretend, in a book he afterwards published, that his intention in his Amyntor was not to invalidate, but to illustrate and confirm, the Canon of the New Testament.* This may serve as one instance, among the many that might be produced, of the writer's sincerity. Several good answers were returned to Toland's Amyntor. Mr. (afterwards) Dr. Samuel Clarke published a small tract in 1699, in- titled, Some Reflections on that part ofthe Book called " Amyntor," which relates to the Writings of the primitive Fathers, and the Canon of the New Testament. In this he gave an early specimen of those talents which he afterwards employed to so great advan tage in the defence of Christianity. The same book was afterwards answered by the ingenious Mr, Stephen Nye, in his Historical Ac count and Defence of the Canon of the New Testament, in Answer * See Toland's preface to his Nazarenus, p. 9. This very odd book was well answered by Mr. (afterwards) Dr. Mangey, in his Remarks upon Nazarenus ,- on which Mr. Toland made some reflections, in a Tract he called Mangoneutes. Mr. Paterson also published his Anti- Nazarenus, in answer to Mr. Toland's book. And Dr. Tho mas Brett took some notice of it in the Preface to his Tradition necessary to explain and interpret the Holy Scriptures. 38 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. IV. to "Amyntor" ; and by Mr. Richardson, in his Canon qf the Neiu Testament Vindicated, whose work hath been justly and generally esteemed, as executed with great learning and judgment. To these may be added, Mr. Jones, who hath considered this matter dis tinctly, and at large, in his New and Full Method of settling the Canonical Authority of the New Testament, which was published at London in 1726, in two volumes 8vo. ; to which a third small one was afterwards added, published in 1727, but left unfinished by reason of the author's death. These learned writers have plainly shown Mr. Toland's great un fairness and disingenuity in his whole management ofthe argument : That he has frequently imposed upon his readers by false quotations, or by grossly misrepresenting the authors he cites : That he has been guilty of great blunders and ridiculous mistakes : That several of the writings he produces, as having been written in the apostolic age, were forged so late as the third or fourth century : That by far the greatest part of those writings, of which he hath given so pom pous a catalogue, and which he would put upon the world as most ancient and apostolical, are expressly rejected by the authors whom he himself refers to, as spurious and apocryphal, or even as absurd and impious forgeries : That as to those few of them which are not expressly rejected and condemned by the writers who have men tioned them, it doth not appear by any one testimony, that they were ever generally received and acknowledged in the Christian church, or equalled with the books of the sacred Canon : and that even those authors who have been thought to quote some of them with approbation, yet expressly declare, that none but the four gospels were received in the Christian church, as of divine authority : That though some of the false gospels, that they might the better pass upon the people, were compiled out of the genuine gospels, with such additions, omissions, and interpolations, as might best answer the design of the compilers, this did not hinder their being generally rejected; whereas the four gospels, the same which we now receive, were generally acknowledged from the beginning : That these and other sacred books of the New Testament were, even in the earliest ages, spread into distant countries, and were in the possession of great numbers of persons, and read in the churches as divine : And finally, that several of the genuine writers of the three first centuries have left us catalogues of the sacred books of the New Testament, but in none of these catalogues do any of the apocryphal books appear. To set this whole matter in a clearer light, Mr. Jones has given us a complete enumeration of all the apocryphal books of the New Testament, and made a critical inquiry into each of these books, Avith an English version of those of them which are now extant, and a particular proof that none of them were ever admitted into the Canon ; and he hath distinctly produced and considered every testi mony relating to them that is to be found in any Christian writer or writers of the first four centuries after Christ. Let. V. EARL OF SHAFTESBURY. 39 Upon all that hath been written on this subject, it is a just and natural reflection, that as the number of spurious gospels which were rejected by the primitive Christians shows, how scrupulous they were not to admit any books as canonical, but those of whose truth and authenticity they had sufficient proofs ; so their admitting and receiving with so general a consent, the four gospels which are now in our hands, affordeth a strong argument, that they had un doubted evidence of the genuine truth and certainty of the evange lical records, which fully satisfied them who lived nearest those times, and who had the best opportunities of knowing ; and that to this it was owing, that these, and no others, were generally received and acknowledged as of divine authority. On this occasion it is proper to mention Dr. Lardner's excellent work of the Credibility of the Gospel History ; in the second part of which, consisting of several volumes, he hath made a full and accurate collection, of the passages which are to be found in the writers, of the first ages ofthe Christian church, relating to the four gospels, and other sacred books of the New Testament. This he hath executed with so much fidelity and diligence, and with such exactness of judgment, that the English reader, who hath not op portunity to consult the originals, will be able to judge for himself, upon considering the passages of the original authors, which are very faithfully translated. This affordeth so clear and continued a proof of their having been generally received in the earliest ages of the Christian church, that one would hope it should put an end to this part of the controversy. LETTER V. The Eajl of Shaftesbury, a fine and much admired Writer Not very consistent in the Account he gives of Christianity. — He casteth Reflections on the Doctrine of future Rewards and Punishments, as if it were of Disservice to the Interests of Virtue. — The contrary shown from his own Acknowledgments. — His Lordship resolves the credit of holy Writ wholly into the Authority and Appointment ofthe State. — He frequently takes Occasion to expose the Scriptures, and represents them as uncertain, and not to be depended upon. — What he saith concerning Ridicule, as the Test and Criterion of Truth, examined. — It is shown, that a turn to Ridicule is not the properest Disposition for finding out Truth ; and that there is great danger of its being misapplied. — His Lordship's own Writings furnish Instances of such a wrong Application. — Authors mentioned that have written against him. Sir, It gives me a real concern, that, among the writers who have appeared against revealed religion, I am obliged to take notice of the noble author of the Characteristics. Some indeed are not will ing to allow that he is to be reckoned in this number. Passages 40 A VIEW OP THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. V. are produced out of some of his writings, in which he expresseth very favourable sentiments of Christianity. This he doth particu larly in a preface, which, and I believe justly, is ascribed to his Lordship as the author, prefixed to a volume of select sermons of Dr. Benjamin Whichcot, published in 1698. In that preface he finds fault with those in this profane age that represent not only the institution of preaching, but even the gospel itself, and our holy religion, to be a fraud. He expresseth his hope, that from some things in these sermons, even they that are prejudiced against Chris tianity may be induced to like it the better; and that the vein of goodness which appears throughout these discourses will make such as are already Christians prize Christianity the more ; and the fair- nessf ingenuity, and impartiality, which they learn from hence, will be a security to them against the contrary temper of those other irreconcilable enemies to our holy faith. In 1716 some of his letters were published at London, under the title of Several Letters written by a noble Lord to a Young Man in the University, 8vo. In these letters, which were written a few years before the Earl of Shaftesbury's death, in the years 1707, 1708, 1709, there are excel lent sentiments and advices, and some which seem to discover a real regard for the Christian religion. It were greatly to be wished, on many accounts, that his Lord ship had always expressed himself in an uniform manner on this subject. No impartial man will deny him the praise of a fine genius. The quality of the writer, his lively and beautiful imagina tion, the delicacy of taste he hath shown in many instances, and the graces and embellishments of his style, though perhaps sometimes too affected, have procured him many admirers. To which may be added, his refined sentiments on the beauty and excellence of virtue, and that he hath often spoken honourably of a wise and good pro vidence, which ministers and governs the whole in the best manner; and hath strongly asserted, in opposition to Mr. Hobbes, the natural differences between good and evil ; and that man was originally formed for society, and the exercise of mutual kindness and bene volence; and not only so, but for religion and piety too.* These things have very much prejudiced many persons in his favour, and prepared them for receiving, almost implicitly, whatever he hath advanced. And yet it cannot be denied, that there are many things in his books, which seem to be evidently calculated to cast contempt upon Christianity and the holy Scriptures. It is in the Characteristics that we are properly to look for an ac count of his Lordship's sentiments. They were first published in three vols. 8vo. in 1711; and the last part of his life was employed in revising them, and preparing for a new and most correct edition of them, which accordingly was published immediately after his death. In them he completed the whole of his works which he in tended should be made public ; and these books are so generally * Characteristics, vol. iii. p. 224. Let. V. EARL OF SHAFTESBURY. 41 read, and by many so much admired, that it is necessary to take notice of those things in them which seem to have a bad aspect on religion, and to be of a dangerous influence and tendency. Of this kind are the frequent reflections he hath cast on the doctrine of future rewards and punishments. This, as I observed in a former letter, is represented by Lord Herbert as a fundamental article of natural religion ; and though he carries it too far, in mak ing it an innate principle, in which all mankind are, and have been always agreed ; yet it cannot be denied, that there were some notices and traces of it generally spread among the nations, though mixed with much obscurity, and which probably had a great effect in pre serving the remains of religion and virtue among the people, though contradicted by several sects of their philosophers. It is the great advantage and glory of Christianity, that it hath cleared and con firmed this important principle, and hath brought life and immor tality into an open light. But the author of the Characteristics frequently expresseth himself in a manner, which tendeth to raise a prejudice against this great principle of natural and revealed religion, as if it were of little use in morals, yea, and in many cases of a bad tendency. Thus, after having made an elegant representa tion of the happy state of things in the heathen world, and the liberty and harmony which then prevailed, he proceeds to show the different state of things among Christians, which he seems chiefly to attribute to the notion and belief of a future state. " A new sort of policy (saith he) which extends itself to another world, and con siders the future lives and happiness of men rather than the present, has made us leap beyond the bounds of natural humanity; and, out of a supernatural charity, has taught us the way of plaguing one another most heartily. It has raised an antipathy which no tem poral interest could ever do, and intailed upon us a mutual hatred to all eternity. The saving of souls is now the heroic passion of exalted spirits."* This is not the only place where his Lordship speaks with ridicule of the saving of souls, and of those who act for their souls' sakes, and make a careful provision for hereafter.^ And he elsewhere tells us, speaking of the expectation of God's dispensing rewards and punishments in a future life, that " an ex pectation and dependency so miraculous and extraordinary as this is, must naturally take off from other inferior dependencies and en couragements. Where infinite rewards are thus enforced, and the imagination strongly turned towards them, the other common and natural motives to goodness are apt to be neglected, and lose much by disuse. Other interests are hardly so much as computed, whilst the mind is thus transported in the pursuit of a high advantage, and self-interest, so narrowly confined within ourselves. On this ac count, all other affections to our friends, relations, or mankind, are often slightly regarded, as being worldly, and of little moment in respect of the interest of our souls.*};" To the same purpose he * Characteristics, vol. 1. p. 18, 19. edit. Sth. f Ibid. vol. iii. p. 302. \ Ibid. vol. ii. p. 68 42 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. V. represents it, as if the Christian were so urged to have his conver sation in heaven, as not to be obliged to enter into any engagements with this lower world, or to concern himself either with the busi nesses of life, or with the offices of private friendship, or the service of the public: and that these are to be regarded as embarrassments to him in. working out his own salvation.* It seems to be a natural inference from all this, that, according to his representation of the matter, it were better for mankind not to believe, or have any regard to a future state at all ; for if the belief be weak, he tells us it will be of the worst consequence. "There can (says he) in some respects be nothing more fatal to virtue than the weak and uncertain belief of future rewards and punishments : for the stress being wholly laid on this foundation, if this foundation seem to fail, there is no farther prop or security to men's virtue, f" And, on the other hand, if the belief be strong, and deeply impressed on the mind, it will cause men to neglect the interests and duties of this present life, the duties they owe to their friends, their neighbours, and their country. This is the account his Lordship gives of it ; but it is grossly misrepresented : for since that virtue and goodness which is to be rewarded hereafter includes, according to the scripture account of it, the doing good here on earth as far as we have an opportunity, and even a diligence in the business of our several callings, and the exercise of social duties, it is evidently wrong to say, that a regard to the recompenses of a future state must carry us off from those duties, when, on the contrary, it bindeth us more strongly to the performance of them. Our having our conversation in heaven is not designed to cause us to neglect the duties incumbent upon us here on earth ; for these are most expressly enjoined in the gospel- law, as being comprehended in that righteousness which intitleth us to that future glory ; but that we should not take up with the inferior things of this present world as our proper ultimate portion and happiness, but raise our views to a nobler state, where we hope to arrive to the true felicity and perfection of our natures. And' this certainly is an admirable lesson, highly to the honour of Christianity; since it is a too great affection and esteem for worldly enjoyments that puts men upon wrong .pursuits, and is the principal source of the greatest disorders of human life. Several other passages might be produced, in which his Lordship seems to represent the belief and expectation of a future state as of pernicious influence. Thus he observes, " that the principle of self- love, which is naturally so prevailing in us, is improved and made stronger every day by the exercise of the passions on a subject of more extended interest;" (by which he refers to the expectation of eternal happiness in a future state) '-and that there may be reason to apprehend, that a temper of this kind will extend itself through all the parts of life. And this has a tendency to create a stricter attention to self-good and private interest, and must insen- * Characteristics, vol. 1. p. 99, 100. t Ibid, vol. ii. p. 69. Let. V. EARL OF SHAFTESBURY. 43 sibly diminish the affection towards public good, or the interest of society, and introduce a certain narrowness of spirit, which is observable in devout persons of almost all religions and persua sions."* Here he lays a heavy charge on the hope of future happi ness ; as if it had a bad tendency, to spread an inordinate criminal selfishness through the whole of human life, to diminish the public good affections, and introduce a narrowness of spirit. A most unjust charge this ! Since it might easily be shown, that the belief and hope of such an happiness as the gospel sets before us, and which is there represented as a state of perfect goodness and the most extended benevolence, and for which that charity which seeketh not her own is one of the best preparatives, has a tendency, if rightly understood, to enlarge the heart, to purify and ennoble the soul, and raise it above the little narrow interests of the fleshly self, and to fill it with the highest idea of God, and his immense goodness. But his Lordship urges, that " those who talk of the rewards of virtue make it so very mercenary a thing, and have talked so much of its rewards, that one can hardly tell what there is in it after all that is worth rewarding.-)- He observes that the most heroic virtue, private friendship, and zeal for the public,% have little notice taken * Characteristics, vol. ii. p. 58. + Ibid. vol. i. p. 97. $ It has been noted by the deistical writers, that zeal for the public, or love to a man's country, which was so much inculcated by some of the ancient philosophers and moralists, is passed over in the gospel ; and this is mentioned as a defect in the Chris tian morality. But if the matter be rightly considered, there is no just foundation for this objection. To have recommended as by a divine authority, what the Romans generally understood by love to their country, a strong passion for the glory of it, and which often carried them to do great injustice to those of other nations, would not have been suited to the nature of a revelation, which was designed for the general good of mankind, and to promote universal benevolence. And if our Saviour had exhorted the Jews in the name of God to a zeal for their country and its liberties, this, in the dis position they were then in, cciuld have been looked upon in no other light, than as stir ring them up to tumults and insurrections. But of love to our country, as it signifies a true and affectionate concern for the public good, he gave an admirable example ; and his example hath the force of a precept, according to the Christian system. This will be evident to any one that impartially considers the affection he showed to the Jewish nation, from whom he sprung according to the flesh ; the amiable concern he expressed for the miseries he foresaw were coming upon them, and the endeavours he used to pre vent those evils, by checking the tumultuous spirit which was then working among them, and engaging them to a peaceable subjection to the Roman government. The same observation may be made with regard to the apostles and first publishers of Christianity after our Saviour's resurrection. If they had in the name of God urged it upon the Jews and Gentiles, among whom they preached the gospel, to be zealous for their country, and bad promised divine rewards to so heroic a virtue, this would undoubtedly have been regarded as an attempt to raise disturbances in the state. It could not, as things were circumstanced, have produced any good effects, and might probably have had very bad ones. But if by zeal for the public be meant a hearty desire and endeavour to promote thepublic good, and the real welfare of the community, nothing can be better fitted to answer that end than the Christian law. It hath a manifest tendency, wherever it is sincerely believed and embraced, to make good magistrates, and faithful and peaceable subjects, and to render men truly useful to the public, by engaging them to a diligent discharge of the duties of their several stations and relations, and to the practice of universal righteousness. Christianity, which requires us to exert so noble a spirit of disinterested benevolence, as to be ready to lay down our lives for the brethren, 1 John iii. 16, would certainly engage and animate us, if properly called to it, even to lay down our lives for the good of the community. A virtuous regard to the public happiness, and a contributing as far as in us lies to pro- 44 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. V. of them in our holy religion, nor have any reward promised them : though if they be comprehended in the things that are lovely, and virtuous, and praiseworthy, they are both commanded there, and shall according to the gospel scheme be rewarded ; but his Lordship who supposes the contrary, mentions it as an advantage, that no premium or penalty being enforced in these cases, it leaves more room for disinterestedness, the virtue is a. free choice, and the magna nimity is left entire.* And does not this insinuate, that if no reward had been promised at all, to any part of our duty, it would have been the better for us, and our virtues would have been the more excellent ? In like manner he represents that resignation to God, which depends upon the hope of infinite retributions or rewards, to be a false resignation, which discovers no worth nor virtue; since it is only a man's resigning his present life and pleasure conditionally, for that which he himself owns to be beyond an equivalent.'!' And yet this right honourable author himself acknowledgeth, that if by the hope of reward be understood the hope and desire of virtuous enjoyments, or of the very practice and exercise of virtue in another life, it is far from being derogatory to virtue, but is rather an evidence of our loving it."f And nothing is more evident to any one that is acquainted with the holy Scriptures, than that though the future happiness is there sometimes metaphorically described under splendid sensible images, which his Lordship is pleased to reflect upon as trifling and childish, § yet the idea there given us of it is the noblest, the sublimest, that can be conceived. It is repre sented as a state of consummate holiness, goodness, and purity, where we shall arrive fo the true perfection of our natures ; a state into which nothing shall enter that defileth ; where the spirits of the just shall be made perfect, and even their bodies shall be refined to a wonderful degree ; where they shall be associated to the glorious general assembly of holy and happy souls, and to the most excellent part of God's creation, with whom they shall cultivate an eternal friendship and harmony ; and, which is chiefly to be considered, where they shall be admitted to the immediate vision of the Deity, and shall be transformed, as far as they are capable of it, into the divine likeness. Such is the happiness the gospel setteth before us, and which certainly furnisheth a motive fitted to work upon the worthiest minds. And the being animated by the hope of such a reward hath nothing mean or mercenary in it, but rather is an argu ment of a great and noble soul, And even as to the fear of punishment, this also may be of signal use to restrain the exorbitancies of the passions, to check the career of. vice, and to awaken men to serious thoughts, and thereby put them in the way of better impressions. His Lordship himself mote it in our several stations, make a part of that excellent and praise-worthy conduct, which it is the great design of the Christian religion to promote, and which, according to the divine promises there given us, shall be crowned with a glorious reward. * Characteristics, p. 98, 99, 100, 101. t Ibid. vol. ii. p. 59. J Ibid. vol. ii. p. 55, 56. § Ibid. vol. i. p. 282. Let. V. EARL OF SHAFTESBURY. 45 asserteth the usefulness of punishments, as well as rewards, in all well-regulated governments. And with respect to future punish ments he acknowledgeth, that " this service of fear be allowed ever so low and base, yet religion being still a discipline and progress of the soul towards perfection, the motive of reward and punishment is primary, and of the highest moment with us, till being capable of more sublime instructions, we are led from this servile state to the generous service of affection and love."* And he elsewhere expressly declareth, that " the hope of future rewards, and fear of future punishments, how mercenary or servile soever it may be accounted, is yet in many instances a great advantage, security, and support to virtue;" and he offereth several considerations to prove that it is so.f I cannot therefore help thinking that this admired writer has done very wrong in throwing out so many insinuations against the doctrine of future retributions, and against the holy Scriptures and Christian divines for insisting so much upon it, as though it were of ill influence to morals. I am persuaded, that any one who duly considers the state of mankind, and what a mighty influence our hopes and fears have upon us by the very frame of our nature, must be sensible, that if the Scripture had only contained fine and elegant discourses on the beauty of virtue, and the deformity of vice, instead of proposing the sanctions of eternal rewards and punishments, it would neither have been so becoming the majesty and dignity of the supreme legislator, nor so well fitted to answer the end of a revelation designed for common use. The Scripture, indeed, doth every where suppose, and frequently representeth the excellence of holiness and virtue, and the turpitude and deformity of vice and sin, and the good effects of the one, and bad effects of the other, even in this present state. But it is the great advantage of the Christian revelation, that it carrieth our views beyond this narrow transitory scene to a future eternal state, and deriveth its most important motives from thence,_ which he himself acknowledgeth to be of infinitely greater force ; and, which is very odd, he seemeth to make the very force of those motives an objection against insisting upon them, as if they would render all other motives and considerations useless. The prejudices his Lordship hath conceived against Christianity sufficiently appear from several of those passages that have been mentioned ; to which many others might be added. He is pleased, indeed, more than once to declare himself a very orthodox believer. He hath assured us, in his ironical way, of his steady orthodoxy, and entire submission to the truly Christian and Catholic doctrines of our holy church, as by law established : and that he faithfully embraces the holy mysteries of our religion even in the minutest par ticulars, notwithstanding their amazing depth.% For which he gives this reason, that "when the supreme powers have given their sanc tion to a religious record or pious writ, it becomes immoral and * Characteristics, vol. ii. p. 63, 273. t Ibid. vol. ii. p. GO, & seq. % Ibid. vol. iii. p. 315, 316. 46 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. V. profane in any one to deny or dispute the divine authority of the least line or syllable contained in it."* To the same purpose he elsewhere declares, that the mysteries of religion are to be determined by those to whom the state has assigned the guardianship and pro mulgation ofthe divine oracles ; and that the authority and direction ofthe law is the only security against heterodoxy and error, and the only warrant for the authority of our sacred symbols.^ So that according to him, Christianity has no other foundation than what will serve a false religion as well as the true. And elsewhere, in the person of the sceptic, he talks of our visible sovereign's answering for us in matters of religion.% In tnis llis Lordship exactly agrees with Mr. Hobbes: he is, indeed, far from asserting with that writer, that there is nothing good or evil in its own nature, and that virtue and vice depend wholly on human authority and laws ; this he on all occasions strenuously argueth against.' But he comes into another part of his scheme, the making the magistrate or supreme civil power, the sole judge of religious truth aud orthodoxy, and resolving all doctrines and opinions in religion, and the authority of what shall be accounted holy writ, into the appointment of the state, a scheme which absolutely destroyeth the rights of private judgment and conscience, and which evidently condemneth the conduct and judgment of Christ and his apostles, and the primitive Christians at the first plantation of Christianity, and of those excel lent men that stood up for the reformation of it since. But notwithstanding our noble author's pretended veneration and submission to the holy writ by public authority established, he hath taken occasion to expose the Scripture, as far as in him lay, to ridicule and contempt, of which many instances might, be produced. Not to mention the insinuations he has thrown out relating to par ticular passages both in the Old Testament and the New, he hath endeavoured to expose the spirit of prophecy, and made a ludicrous representation of it, and compared it with the extravagancies ofthe maddest enthusiasts. § Miracles he will not allow to be any proofs, though ever so certain ;|| or that there is any ground to believe their having been done, but the authority of our governors, and of those whom the state hath appointed the guardians of holy writ.% He speaks with ridicule, as other deistical writers have often done, of what he calls the specious pretence of moral certainty, and matter of fact,** and insinuates, that the facts recorded in the gospels are absolutely uncertain, and that he that relies upon those accounts must be a sceptical Christian.-\-f He represents St. Paul as speaking sceptically, and as no way certain or positive as to the revelation made to him, though the contrary is manifest from the apostle's own most express declarations.^ The very encomiums he sometimes pretends to bestow upon the Scriptures are of such a kind, as tend * Characteristics, p. 231. t Ibid. p. 71. vol. i. p. 360. * Ibid. vol. ii. p. 353. § Ibid. vol. i. p. 45. vol. iii. p. 67. |] Ibid. vol. ii. p. 3.31, 332. f Ibid. vol. iii. p. 71, 73. *• Ibid. vol. i. p. 44. ft Ibid. vol. iii. n 72. }j Ibid. p. 74. 75. ' Let. V. EARL OF SHAFTESBURY. 47 rather to give a low and mean idea of them. Thus he commends the poetical parts of Scripture, Job, Psalms, Proverbs, and other entire volumes of the sacred collection, as full of humorous dis courses, and jocular wit; and saith, that the sacred writers "had recourse to humour and diversion, as a proper means to promote religion, and strengthen the established faith." In like manner he tells us, thatourSaviour's discourses were sharp, witty, and humorous; and that his miracles were done with a certain air of festivity ; and so that it is impossible not to be moved in a pleasant manner at their recital; i. e. it is impossible not to laugh at them.* But though he seemeth here to commend his good humour, as he calls it, and else where represents Christianity as, in the main, a witty good-natured religion, he insinuateth that this may be all an artful pretence to cover deep designs and schemes laid for worldly ambition and power. Having observed, that the affection and love which pro cures a true adherence to the new religious foundation, must depend either on a real or counterfeit goodness in the religious founder, whom he had called before the divinely -authorized istructer find spiritual chief; he adds, that " whatever ambitious spirit may inspire him, whatever savage zeal or persecuting principle may be in reserve, ready to disclose itself, when authority and power is once obtained, the first scene of doctrine however fails not to present us with the agreeable views of joy, love, meekness, gentleness, and modera tion. "f I believe few that consider how this is introduced, will doubt its being designed as an insinuation against the character of the holy Jesus ; an insinuation for which there is not the least foundation in his whole conduct, or in the scheme of religion he hath taught, and which therefore is as malicious as it is groundless. Agreeably to this he elsewhere intimates, that the gospel was only a scheme of the clergy for aggrandizing their own power. He represents it as a natural suspicion of those who are called sceptical : " that the holy records themselves were no other than the pure invention and artificial compliment of an interested party, in behalf of the richest corporation, and most profitable monopoly, which could, be erected in the world. "X But any one that impartially considers the idea of religion set before us in the New Testament, in its primitive simplicity, will be apt to look upon that which his Lordship representeth as a natural supposition to be the most unrea sonable supposition in the world. If an ambitious and self- interested clergy, and particularly the favourers of the papal hierarchy, had been to forge a gospel or sacred records to counte nance their own claims, or if they had had it in their power to have corrupted and new-modelled them in their favour, the Christian religion and worship would in many instances have been very dif ferent from what it now appeareth to be in the sacred writings of the New Testament. Mr. Hobbes himself was so sensible of this, even where he inveighs against the clergy, as endeavouring to put * Characteristics, vol. iii. p. 118, 122, 123. t Ibid. p. 1 14, 115. J Ibid. p. 336. 48 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. V. their own laws upon the Christian people for the laws of God, and pretends that the books of the New Testament were in the first ages in the hands only of the ecclesiastics, that he adds, " he is persuaded they did not falsify the Scripture ; because, if they had had an intention so to do, they would surely have made them more favour able to their power over Christian princes, and civil sovereignty, than they are."* His Lordship on many occasions insinuates, that the original records of Christianity are not at all to be depended upon. He frequently repeats the charge of corruptions and interpolations ; and particularly concludes the last Miscellany of his third volume with a heap of objections against the Scriptures, drawn fram the great number of copies, various readings, different glosses and interpreta tions, apocryphal and canonical books, frauds of those through whose hands they have been transmitted to us, 8tc.f These objec tions are put into the mouth of a gentleman, whom he makes go off the stage with an air of triumph, as they were unanswerable ; and yet they are no other than what have been frequently considered and obviated by the learned defenders of the Christian cause. Dr. Tindal hath since urged all these objections, and more of the same kind, more largely and with greater force than his Lordship hath done ; and a full answer hath been returned to them, sufficient to satisfy an impartial inquirer."}; I have already dwelt longer on this right honourable author than I at first intended ; but you will undoubtedly expect that, before I leave him, I should take some notice of that part of his scheme, where he seems to set up ridicule as "the best and surest criterion of truth : this deserves the rather to be considered, because there is not perhaps any part of his writings of which a worse use hath been made. I am sensible that some ingenious writers have been of opinion, that in this his Lordship has been greatly misunder stood or misrepresented ; that his opinion, if fairly examined, amounts only to this, that ridicule may be of excellent use, either against ridicule itself, when false and misapplied, or against grave, specious, and delusive impostures ; that he distinguishes between true and false ridicule, and between genteel wit, and scurrilous buffoonery, which, without decency or distinction, raises a laugh from every thing. This he condemneth, as justly offensive, and unworthy of a gentleman and a man of sense. He would have religion treated with good manners, and is for subjectino- ridicule to the judgment of reason ; and he declares, that as he isln earnest in defending raillery, so he can be sober in the use of it. Several passages are produced to this purpose. § But whatever apology may be made for this noble writer, I think it cannot be denied, that he has frequently expressed himself very incautiously on this head, and in a manner that may lead persons into a very wrong method * Hobbes's Leviath. p. 203, 204. t Characteristics, vol. iii. p. 317 34.4. \ See particularly Answer to Christianity as old as the Creation, vol. ii. chap 5 7 8 § Characteristics, vol. i. p. 11, 63, 83, 85, 128 ' ' ' ' Let. V. EARL OF SHAFTESBURY. 49 of inquiring and judging concerning truth. He not only expressly calls ridicule a test, and a criterion of truth, but declares for apply ing it to every thing, and in all cases. He would have us carry the rule of ridicule constantly with us, i. e. that we must be always in a disposition to apply ridicule to whatever offers, to see whether it will bear.* He observes, that " truth may bear all lights ; and one of those principal lights or natural mediums, by which things are to be viewed in order to a thorough recognition, is ridicule itself, or that manner of proof (for so he calls it) by which we dis cern whatever is liable to just raillery on any subject :"+ and though he doth not approve the seeking to raise a laugh for every thing, yet he thinks it right to seek in every thing what justly may be laughed at.% He declares, that " he hardly cares so much as to think on the subject of religion, much less to write on it, without endeavouring to put himself in as good a humour as possible ;"§ i. e. treating it, as he himself expresseth it, in a way of wit and raillery, pleasantry and mirth. And, indeed, what kind of ridicule his Lordship is for, and how he is for applying it in matters of religion, plainly appears from many specimens he has given us of it in several parts of his works; especially in his third volume, which is designed as a kind of review and defence of all his other treatises. The best and wisest men in all ages have always recommended a calm attention and sobriety of mind, a cool and impartial examina tion and inquiry, as the properest disposition for finding out truth, and judging concerning it. But according to his Lordship's repre sentation of the case, those that apply themselves to the searching out truth, or judging what is really true, serious, and excellent, must endeavour to put themselves in a merry humour, to raise up a gaiety of spirit, and seek whether in the object they are examining they cannot find out something that may be justly laughed at. And it is great odds, that a man who is thus disposed will find out something fit, as he imagines, to excite his mirth, in the most serious and important subject in the world. Such a temper is so far from being an help to a fair and unprejudiced inquiry, that it is one of the greatest hindrances to it. A strong turn to ridicule hath a tendency to disqualify a man for cool and sedate reflection, and to render him impatient ofthe pains that are necessary to a rational and deliberate search. A calm dispassionate love of truth, with a disposition to examine carefully and judge impartially, and a pre vailing inclination to jest and raillery, seldom meet together in the same mind. This discovereth rather an odd turn and vivacity of imagination, than strong reason and sound judgment; and it would be a strange attempt to set up wit and imagination, instead of reason and judgment, for a judge and umpire in matters of the greatest consequence. Our noble author indeed frequently observes, that truth cannot ** Characteristics, p.- 11, 12-. f Ibid. vol. i. p. 61. X Ibid. p. 128. § Ibid. p. 128. 50 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. V . be hurt by ridicule, since, when the ridicule is wrong placed, it will not hold. " Nothing is ridiculous, but what is deformed, nor is any thing proof against raillery, but what is handsome and just ; this weapon therefore can never bear an edge against virtue and honesty, and bears against every thing contrary to it."* It will be readily allowed, that truth and honesty cannot be the subject of just ridi cule ; but then this supposeth, that ridicule itself must be brought to the test of cool reason ; and accordingly his Lordship acknow ledges, that it is in reality a serious study to temper and regulate that humour.f And thus, after all, we are to return to gravity and serious reason as the ultimate test and criterion of ridicule and of every thing else. But though the most excellent things cannot be justly ridiculed; and ridicule, when thus applied, will, in the judg ment of wise and thinking men, render him that useth it ridiculous; yet there are many persons on whom it will have a very different effect. .The ridicule will be apt to create prejudices in their minds, and to inspire them with a contempt, or at least a disregard of things, which, when represented in a proper light, appear to be of the greatest worth and importance. The face qf truth indeed, as his Lordship observes, is not less fair and beautiful for all the counter feit vizards that have been put upon it ; yet these vizards may so conceal and disguise its beauty, as to make it look a quite different thing from what it really is. It cannot be denied, that truth, piety, and virtue, have often been the subjects of ridicule ; and bad, but witty men have met with too much success in exposing them to the derision and contempt, instead of recommending them to the esteem and veneration of mankind. It is our author's own obser vation, that false earnest is ridiculed, but the false jest passes secure. And though he says, he cannot conceive how any man should be laughed out qf his wits, as some have been frightened out of them, yet there have been and are too many instances of persons that have been laughed out of their religion, honesty, and virtue. Weak ahd unstable minds have been driven into atheism, profaneness, and vice, by the force of ridicule, and have been made ashamed of that which they ought to esteem their glory. His Lordship is pleased to represent ridicule as the fittest way of dealing with enthusiasts and venders of miracles and prophecy ; and having mentioned the reveries of the French prophets, and 'recom mended Bartlemy-Fair drollery, as proper to be used on such occasions, he gives a broad hint, that if this method had been taken against the Reformation, or against Christianity at its first rise, it would have been effectual to destroy it, without having recourse to persecution. % He has here plainly let us know in what light he regardeth our holy religion. On other occasions, he declares only for genteel raillery : but here it seems what he calls the Bartlemy- Fair method, which I believe will hardly pass for very genteel rail- * Characteristics, vol, 1. p. 11, 128, 129. t ibid p 128 t Ibid. vol. i. p. 28, 29. Let. V. EARL OF SHAFTESBURY. 51 lery, is supposed to be sufficient, not only against that set of enthusiasts who were called the French prophets, but against Chris tianity itself. But he seems not to have considered, that the great author and first publishers of the Christian religion were scoffed and derided, as well as exposed to grievous sufferings and torments, and that they had trial qf cruel mockings, as well as of bonds and impri sonments. It appears from what remains of the works of Celsus, as well as from what Ceecilius saith in Minucius Felix, that no sarcasm or ridicule was spared among the heathens, by which they thought they could expose Christianity; though when they found this ineffectual to suppress it, they from time to time had recourse to more violent and sanguinary methods : and indeed those that have been most prone to scoff at religion and truth have often been most prone to persecute it too. A scornful and contemptuous spirit, which is an usual attendant on ridicule, is apt to proceed to farther extremes ; nor am I sure, that they, who on all occasions throw out the bitterest sarcasms against religion and its ministers, would not, if it were in their power, give more substantial proofs of their aver sion. His Loidship indeed honoureth that raillery and ridicule which he recommends, with the name of good humour ; and by shuffling one of these for the other, and playing upon the words, maketh himself merry with his reader. But good humour taken in the best sense, for what he calls the sweetest, kindest disposition, is a different thing from that sneering faculty, which disposes men to cast contempt upon persons and things, and which is often managed in a manner little consistent with a true benevolence. The proper use of ridicule is to expose such follies and absur dities as scarce deserve or admit a very serious consideration ; but to recommend raillery and ridicule as fit to be employed on all occa sions, and upon the most weighty and important subjects, and as the properest means for discerning truth, appears to be an inverting the just order of things. It is, even when innocently used,, for the most part a trifling employment ; and a man of great genius cannot addict himself much to it, without descending beneath his character. Indeed there needs no more to give one a disgust at this pretended test of truth, than to consider the use his Lordship has made of it. When he is in any degree serious, he shows how capable he is to inform and please his reader ; but when he gives a loose to gaiety and ridicule, he often writes in a manner unworthy of himself. And I am apt to think, that if nothing of his had been published, but the two first treatises of his first volume, and the third volume, in which he chiefly indulges himself in those liberties, he would have generally passed in the world for a sprightly and ingenious, but very trifling writer. He often throws out his sneers and flirts against every thing that comes in his way ; and with a mixture of low and solemn phrase, and grave ridicule, he sometimes manages it so, that it is not very easy to discern his true sentiments, and what it is that he really aims at. This is not very consistent with the rule he himself has laid down more than once; viz. That '' it is « k2 52 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. V- a mean, impotent, and dull sort of wit, which leaves sensible per sons in a doubt, and at a loss to understand what one's real mind is." And, again, he censures " such a feigned gravity, as immoral and illiberal, foreign to the character of a good writer, a gentleman, and a man of sense."* There seems to be no other way of screening him from his own censure, but by supposing that he imagined his true intention with regard to Christianity and the holy Scriptures might be perceived, by any sensible person, through his concealed ridicule. And it must be acknowledged that, for the most part, it is so ; though, in some particular places, it is hard to know whether he be in jest or earnest. By this covered way of ridicule he some times steals upon the reader before he is aware, and, under the guise of a friend, gives a more dangerous blow, than if he had acted the part of an open and avowed enemy. Upon the whole it may be justly said, that in this noble and ingenious author we have a remarkable instance of the wrong application of that talent of ridicule, of which he was so great a master. And if it has succeeded ill in his hands, how much more may it be expected to do so in those who, for want of his genius, are not able to rise above low buffoonery, nor capable of distinguish ing gross and scurrilous raillery and scandal from wit and delicate ridicule ! His Lordship hath since had many awkward imitators, and probably will have more, who will be apt to apply his test of ridicule, not only, as he himself hath given them an example, against revealed religion, but against all religion, even that which is called natura], and against that virtue, of which, in his serious moods, he hath professed himself so great an admirer. I shall conclude my account of this celebrated author with observing, that the Characteristics have been attacked, or at least some particular passages in them have been occasionally animad verted upon by several learned writers, by Bishop Berkley, Dr. Wotton, Dr. Warburton, and others. That part of his Lordship's scheme which represents a regard to future rewards, as derogating from the dignity and excellence of virtue, hath been particularly considered by Mr. Balguy, in a short but judicious tract, written, like his other tracts, in a very polite and masterly manner. It is intitled, A Letter to a Deist, concerning the Beauty and Excellency of Moral Virtue, and the Support and Improvement which it receives from the Christian Revelation, 8vo. 1729. But I know of none that has undertaken to answer the whole, but Mr. (now) Dr. John Brown, in a treatise intitled, Essays on the Characteristics, published in 1750. This work is divided into three essays 5 the first is on ridicule, considered as a test of truth ; the second is on the obliga tions of men to virtue, and the necessity of religious principles ; the third is on the revealed religion and Christianity. Under these several heads, he hath considered whatever appeared to be most obnoxious in the writings of our noble author. Characteristics, vol. i. p. 63, vol. iii. p. 2-^5. Let. VI. EARL OF SHAFTESBURY. 53 The length of this letter may seem to need an apology. But you, I know, will agree with me, that as it was proper, in pursuance of the design in which I am engaged, to take notice of this admired writer, so it was necessary to make such observations as might help to obviate the prejudices so many are apt to entertain in his favour, to the disadvantage even of Christianity itself. LETTER VI. The Account given of the Earl of Shaftesbury's Writings in the foregoing Letter, vindicated against the Exceptions that had been made against it The being influ enced by the Hope of tbe Reward promised in the Gospel hath nothing in it disin genuous and slavish. — It is not inconsistent with loving Virtue for its own sake, but tends rather to heighten our Esteem for its Worth and Amiableness. — The Earl of Shaftesbury seems, in his Inquiry concerning Virtue, to erect such a Scheme of Virtue as is independent of Religion, and may subsist without it The Apology he makes for doing so. — The close Connection there is between Religion and Virtue shown from his own Principles and Acknowledgments. — Virtue not wholly confined to good Actions towards Mankind, but takes in proper Affections towards the Deity as an essential Part of it. — He acknowledges that Man is born to Religion. A remarkable Passage of Lord Bolingbroke's to the same Purpose. Sir, When I first published the View of the Deistical Writers, the foregoing letter contained the whole of what I then intended with regard to the observations on the Earl of Shaftesbury. But not long after the publication of it, some persons, who profess to be real friends to Christianity, and I doubt not are so, let me know that they wished I had not put his Lordship into the list of deistical writers; and they thought the charge against him had in some instances been carried too far. This put me upon revising what I had written relating to that matter with great care; and if I had found just cause to think, that in this instance I had been mistaken in the judgment I had formed, I should have thought myself obliged publicly to acknowledge it. For when I formed the design of tak ing a view of the deistical writers, I fixed it as a rule to myself, to make a fair representation, as far as I was able, of the sentiments of those writers, and not to push the charge against them farther than there appeared to me to be just ground for. And it would have given me a real pleasure to have reason to rank so fine a writer as the Earl of Shaftesbury among the friends of the Christian cause. But upon the most impartial inquiry I was able to make, I have not seen reason to retract any thing I had offered with regard to that nohle Lord. I thought it necessary, therefore, in the Sup plement to the View of the Deistical Writers, to publish a letter on that subject, which I shall here subjoin to the preceding one, 54 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. VI. that the reader may have all before him which relates to that noble writer in one view. It can scarce, I think, be denied by any impartial person who hath read the Characteristics without prejudice, which are the only works he avowed, and which had his last hand, that there are several passages in them, which seem plainly intended to expose Christianity and the holy Scriptures. And there is great reason to apprehend, that not a few have heen unwarily led to entertain un happy prejudices against revealed religion, and the authority of the Scriptures, through too great an admiration of his Lordship's writ ings. Some instances of this kind have come under my own par ticular observation; and therefore it appeareth to me, upon the most mature consideration, that I could not, in consistency with the de sign I had in view, omit the making some observations upon that admired author, as far as the cause of Christianity is concerned. That part of my observations on Lord Shaftesbury's works which I find hath been particularly excepted against, is the account given of his sentiments with regard to future rewards and punish ments. It hath been urged, that his design in what, he has written on this subject was, not to insinuate that we ought not to be influ enced by a regard to future rewards and punishments, the useful ness of which he plainly acknowledgeth ; but only to show, that it is wrong to be actuated merely by a view to the reward, or by a fear ofthe punishment, without any real inward love to virtue, or any real hatred and abhorrence of vice. To this purpose his Lordship observes, that " to be bribed only, or terrified into an honest practice, bespeaks little of real honesty or worth ; and that if virtue be not really estimable in itself, he can see nothing estimable in following it for the sake of a bargain."* He asks, " how shall we deny that to serve God by compulsion, or for interest merely, is servile and mer cenary ?f And he puts the case of a person's being incited by the hope of reward to do the good he hates, and restrained by the fear of punishment from doing'the ill to which he is not otherwise in the least degree averse ;" and observes, that " there is in this case no virtue whatsoever."*): If his Lordship had said no more than this, he would have said no more than every real friend to Christianity will allow ; though in this case there would still be great reason to complain of his Lordship's having made a very unfair representa tion of the sense of those divines who think it necessary to urge the motives drawn from future rewards and punishments. It is true, that if the belief of future retributions should have no other effect than the putting some restraint upon men's outward evil actions, and regulating their external behaviour, even this would be of great advantage to the community ; but this is far from being the only or principal thing intended. Those certainly must know little of the nature and tendency of the Christian religion who should endeavour to persuade themselves or others, that though a * Characteristics, vol. 1. p. 97. t Ibid, vol. ii. p. 272. *j Ibid. p. 55. Let. VI. EARL OF SHAFTESBURY. 55 man had a real love of vice in his heart, and only abstained from some outward vicious practices for fear of punishment, and though he had an inward aversion to true goodness and virtue, and only performed some outward acts that had a fair appearance ; this alone would denominate him a good man, and intitle him to the future reward ; for this were to suppose, that though he were really a vicious and bad man, without that purity and sincerity of heart on which the Scriptures lay so great a stress, yet the practising some external acts of obedience, destitute of all true goodness and of virtuous affections, would intitle him to the favour of God, and to that eternal happiness which is promised in the gospel. If any persons should teach this, I would readily join with his Lordship in condemning them. But he hath not contented himself with strik ing at the supposed wrong sentiments of divines, whom he loves on all occasions to expose. There are several passages in his Lord ship's writings which appear to be directly intended to represent the insisting, so much as is done in the gospel, upon the eternal rewards and punishments of a future state, as having a bad influ ence on the moral temper, and particularly as tending to strengthen an inordinate selfishness, and to diminish the affections towards public good, and to make men neglect what they owe to their friends, and to their country. He plainly intimates the disadvan tages accruing to virtue from the having irrfinite rewards in view, and that in that case the common and natural motives to goodness are apt to be neglected, and lose much by disuse* He represents the being influenced by a regard to future rewards and punishments as at the best disingenuous, servile, and qf the slavish kind; and to this he opposes a liberal service, and the principle of love, and the loving God and virtue for God and virtue's sake ;-f- and accordingly he deter mines, that those duties, to which men are carried without any view to such rewards, are for that reason more noble and excellent, and argue a higher degree of virtue. If the case really were as his Lordship is pleased to represent it, it must certainly give a very dis advantageous idea of Christianity ; as if the insisting upon those most important motives, drawn from a future eternal world, which our Saviour came to set in the strongest light, tended to introduce and cherish a wrong temper of mind, narrow and selfish, disingenu ous and servile, to weaken our benevolent affections both public and private, and to take us off from the duties and offices ofthe civil and social life. At that rate it could not be said that the gospel is a friend to society and to mankind ; and instead of promoting the practice of true virtue, it would rather derogate from it, and degrade it from its proper dignity and excellence. It was therefore neces sary to show, as I endeavoured to do in my observations on Lord Shaftesbury's writings, that this is far from being a just representa tion of the nature and tendency of the Christian doctrine of future * Several passages to this purpose were produced out of tbe Characteristics in the preceding Letter, which I need not here repeat. f See Characteristics, vol. ii. p. 271, 272, 273. A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. VI. rewards and punishments. The most noble and extensive benevo lence, exerting itself in all proper effects and instances, in opposition to a narrow selfish disposition, is what Christianity every where recommendeth and enforceth in the most engaging manner ; and it is its peculiar advantage, that it carrieth our views to a better state, where the benevolence which is now begun shall be completed, and shall be exercised in a more enlarged sphere, and extend to a nobler society. And can the hope of this possibly tend to diminish our benevolence, or must it not rather heighten and improve it? When a man hath a firm and steady persuasion, that the Supreme Being will reward his persevering constancy in a virtuous course with everlasting felicity, this, instead of weakening his inward affection to virtue, and his moral sense of its worth and excellency, must in the nature of things greatly confirm and establish it. There is there fore an entire consistency between the loving virtue for its own sake, i. e. as his Lordship explains it, because it is amiable in itself* and the being animated to the pursuit and practice of it by such rewards as the gospel proposeth ; for it never appears more excellent and lovely, than when it is considered as recommending us to the favour and approbation of Him, who is the supreme original Goodness and Excellence, and as preparing us for a complete happiness in a future state, where it shall be raised to the highest degree of beauty and perfection. In like manner it must mightily strengthen our abhor rence of vice, and our sense of its turpitude and malignity, to con sider it as not only at present injurious and disgraceful to our nature, but as an opposition to the will and law of the most wise and righ teous governor of the world, who will in a future state of retribution inflict awful punishments upon those who now obstinately persist in a presumptuous course of vice and wickedness. Our noble author himself, when he proposeth to show what obli gation there is to virtue, or what reason to embrace it, which is the subject of the second book of his Inquiry, resolveth it into this, that moral rectitude or virtue must be the advantage, and vice the misery and disadvantage qf every creature; and that it is the crea ture's interest to be holy, good, and virtuous.f To prove this seems to be the entire design of that book, which he concludes with observing, that virtue is the good, and vice the ill qf every one. He seems indeed, in displaying the advantages of the one and dis advantages of the other, to confine himself wholly to this present life, and to abstract from all consideration of a future state. But if the representing virtue be to our interest here on earth, and condu cive to our present happiness, be a just ground of obligation to virtue, and a proper reason to embrace it, which his second book is designed to show, then surely, if it can be proved, that it tendeth not only to our happiness here, but to procure us a perfect happiness in a future state of existence, this must mightily heighten the obligation to virtue, and strengthen the reason for embracing it. If havino- * Characteristics, vol. ii. p. 67, f Ibid. p. 81, 98. Let. VI. EARL OF SHAFTESBURY. 57 regard to the present advantages of virtue be consistent in his scheme with loving virtue for its own sake, and as amiable in itself, and doth not render the embracing it a mercenary or slavish service, why should it be inconsistent with a liberal service to be assured that it shall make us happy for ever ? Or why should they be ac counted greater friends or admirers of virtue, who consider its excel lency only with regard to the narrow limits of this transitory life, than they who regard it as extending its beneficial influence to a nobler state of existence, and who believe that it shall flourish in unfading beauty and glory to eternity ? That an affection in itself worthy and excellent should grow less so, by considering it as so pleasing to the Supreme Being, that he will reward it with ever lasting happiness, and raise it to the highest perfection it is capable of in a future state, would be a strange way of reasoning. It was observed in the account given of the Earl of Shaftesbury's writings, in the preceding letter, that there are several passages in which he acknowledgeth, that the hope of future rewards, and fear of future punishments, is a great advantage, security, and support to virtue. If these passages had been concealed or disguised, there might have been just ground of complaint. But they were fairly laid before the reader, as well as those that seemed to be of a con trary import, that he might be able to form a judgment of his Lord ship's sentiments, how far he is consistent with himself, and whether the censures be well founded, which he passeth upon those who insist upon the rewards promised in the gospel as powerful motives to virtue. He chargeth them as " reducing religion to such a phi losophy, as to leave no room for the principle of love — and as build ing a future state on the ruins of virtue, and thereby betraying reli gion and the cause of God."* He representeth them as if they were against a liberal service, flowing from an esteem and love of God, or a sense of duty and gratitude, and a love of the dutiful and grateful part, as good and amiable in. itself, t And he expressly declareth, that ''the hope of future reward, and fear of future punishment, cannot consist in reality with virtue or goodness if it either stands as essen tial to any moral performance, or as a considerable motive to any act, of which some better affection ought alone to be a sufficient cause."*); Here he seems not willing to allow, that the regard to future retri butions ought to be so much as a considerable motive to well-doing ; and asserteth, that to be influenced by it as such a motive cannot consist in reality with virtue or goodness. This is in effect to say, that we ought not to be influenced by a regard to future rewards and punishments at all ; for if they be believed and regarded at all, they must be a considerable motive : since, as he himself observes, where infinite rewards are firmly believed, they must needs have a mighty influence, and will over-balance other motives.? If there fore it be inconsistent with true virtue or goodness, to be influenced * Characteristics, vol. ii. p. 272, 279. f Ibid. vol. ii. p. 270. t Ibid. p. 58. § Ibid. p. 68. 58 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. VI by them as a considerable motive, it is wrong to propose them to mankind ; for why should they be proposed, or to what purpose believed, if it be inconsistent with true goodness to be influenced by them in proportion to their worth or importance ? His Lordship elsewhere observes, " that, by making rewards and punishments " (i. e. the rewards and punishments proposed in the gospel ; for to these he evidently refers) " the principal motives to duty, the Chris tian religion in particular is overthrown, and the greatest principle, that of fove, rejected."* When he here brings so heavy a charge against those who make the rewards of the gospel their principal motives, his meaning seems to be this : That they make the hope of future eternal happiness a more powerful motive than the present satisfaction and advantages virtue hath a tendency to produce, which are the motives he so largely insists upon, and which he calls the common and natural motives to goodness. And is the being more animated by the consideration of that eternal happiness which is the promised reward of virtue, than by any of the advantages it yields in this present state (though these also are allowed to have their proper weight and influence) so great a fault, as to deserve to be represented as a subverting of all religion, and particularly the Christian? If the eternal life promised in the gospel be rightly understood, the hope of it includeth a due regard to the glory of God, to our own highest happiness, and to the excellence of virtue and true holiness ; all which are here united, and are the worthiest motives that can be proposed to the human mjnd. There is a perfect harmony between this hope, and what his Lordship so much extols, the principle of divine love, such as separates from every thing worldly, sensual, and meanly interested ; nor can it be justly said, concerning this hope of the gospel reward, what he saith of a violent affection towards private good, that the more there is of it, the less room there is for an affection towards goodness itself, or any good and deserving object, worthy of love and admiration for its own sake, such as God is universally acknowledged to be.i The very reward itself includeth the perfection of love and goodness ; and the happi ness promised principally consisteth in a conformity to God, and in the fruition of him ; and therefore the being powerfully animated with the hope of it is perfectly consistent with the highest love and admiration qf the Deity, on account of his own infinite excellency. It appeareth to me, upon considering and comparing what hath been produced out of Lord Shaftesbury's writings, that though his Lordship's good sense would not allow him absolutely to deny the usefulness of believing future retributions, yet he hath in effect en deavoured on several occasions to cast a slur upon Christianity, for proposing and insisting upon what he calls infinite rewards ; and thus he hath attempted to turn that to its disadvantage which is its greatest glory, viz. its setting the important retributions of a future state in the clearest and strongest light, and teaching us to raise our * Characteristics, vol. ii. p. 279. t Ibid. p. 58, 59. Let. VI. EARL OF SHAFTESBURY. 59 affections and views to things invisible and eternal. His Lordship hath, upon the most careful and diligent revisal of his works, suf fered those obnoxious passages still to continue there. Nor will any man wonder at this, who considereth the design and tendency of many other passages in his writings : That he hath taken occasion to ridicule the spirit of prophecy, and to burlesque several passages of holy writ : That he hath represented the Scriptures as absolutely uncertain, and the important facts by which Christianity is attested, as not to be depended upon : That he hath insinuated injurious re flections upon the character and intentions of the blessed Founder of our holy religion: That he hath represented our faith in the gospel as having no other foundation than the authority of the state; and hath hinted, that it could hardly have stood the test of ridicule, and even of Bartholomew-fair drollery, had it been applied to it at its first appearance.* As I have been engaged so far in an examination of Lord Shaftes bury's writings, 1 shall take this occasion to make some farther ob servations on his celebrated Inquiry concerning Virtue. He sets out with observing, that " religion and virtue appear to be so nearly related, that they are generally presumed inseparable companions ; but that the practice of the world does not seem in this respect to be answerable to our speculations ;" That " many who have had the appearance of great zeal in religion, have yet wanted the common affections of humanity. \ Others again, who have been considered as mere atheists, have yet been observed to practise the rules of morality, and act in many cases with such good meaning and affection towards mankind, as might seem to force an acknowledgment of their being virtuous."! His Lordship therefore proposeth to inquire, " What honesty or virtue is, consi dered by itself, and in what manner it is influenced by religion ; how far religion necessarily implies virtue ; and whether it be a true say ing, that it is impossible for an atheist to be virtuous, or share any real degree of honesty and merit. "\ In that part of the Inquiry, in which he proposeth to show what virtue is, he seems to make it properly consist in good affections towards mankind, or in a man's having " his disposition of mind and temper suitable and agreeing to the good of his kind, or of the system in which he is included, and of which he constituteth a part."|| And he had before declared, that some who have been considered as mere atheists have acted with such good affection towards mankind, as might seem to force an acknowledgment that they are virtuous. * See all this clearly shown, p. 63, and seq. f It will readily be acknowledged, that the appearance of religion is often separated from true virtue ; but real practical religion necessarily comprehendeth virtue ; and as far as we are deficient in the practice of virtue, we are deficient in what religion indis pensably requireth of us. t Characteristics, vol. ii. p. 5, 6. § . Ibid. p. 7. || Ibid. p. 31. 77, 78. 86, 87, and passim. GO A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. VI. And as this is. the notion his Lordship gives of the nature of virtue, so when he treats of the obligation to virtue, and the reason there is to embrace it, which is the subject of the second book of the Inquiry, he seems to place it in its tendency to promote our happiness in this present life, without taking any notice of a future state. Accordingly, many have looked upon the Inquiry as designed to set up such a notion of virtue and its obligations, as is independent on religion, and may subsist without it. And in the progress of that Inquiry, his Lordship takes occasion to compare atheism with superstition or false religion, and plainly gives the former the pre ference ; and seems sometimes to speak tenderly of it. Having ob served, that nothing can possibly, in a rational creature, exclude a principle of virtue, or render it ineffectual, except what either, "1. Takes away the natural and just sense of right and wrong ; 2. Or creates a wrong sense of it; 3. Or causes the right sense of it to be opposed by contrary affections."* As to the first case, the taking away the natural sense of right and wrong, he will not allow that atheism, or any speculative opinion, persuasion, or belief, is capable immediately or directly to exclude or destroy it ; and that it can do it no other way than indirectly by the intervention of opposite affec tions, casually excited by such belief .f As to the second case, the - wrong sense, or false imagination of right and wrong, he says, that, " however atheism may be indirectly an occasion of men's losing a good and sufficient sense of right and wrong, it will not, as atheism merely, be the occasion of setting up a false species of it ; which only false religion, or fantastical opinion, derived immediately from superstition and credulity, is able to effect."! As to the third case, which renders a principle of virtue ineffectual, viz. its being opposed by contrary affections, he says, that " atheism, though it be plainly deficient, and without remedy, in the case of ill judgment on the happiness of virtue, yet it is not indeed of necessity the cause of such ill judgment ; for without an absolute assent to any hypo thesis of theism, the advantages of virtue may possibly be seen and owned, and a high opinion of it established in the mind."§ Our noble author was sensible of the offence he had given, by seeming to speak favourably of atheists, and by erecting a system of virtue independent of religion, or the belief of a Deity ; and in a treatise he published some years after the Inquiry, intitled, The Moralists, a Philosophical Rhapsody , makes an apology for it : That "he has endeavoured to keep the fairest measures he could with men of this sort," (viz. atheistical persons, and men of no religion) " alluring them all he was able, and arguing with a perfect indif- ferency even on the subject of a Deity ; having this one chief aim and intention, how in the first place to reconcile those persons to the principles of virtue, that by this means a way might be laid * Characteristics, vol. ii. p. 40. t Ibid. p. 44. 15. J Ibid. p. 46 51 52 § Ibid. p. 69. Let. VI. EARL OF SHAFTESBURY. Gl open to religion, by removing those greatest, if not only obstacles to it, which arise from the vices and passions of men. That it is upon this account chiefly he endeavours to establish virtue upon principles by which he is able to argue with those who are not yet inclined to own a God or future state. — He owns he has made virtue his chief subject, and in some measure independent on reli gion ; yet he fancies he may possibly appear at last as high a divine as he is a moralist;" — And says, " He will venture to affirm, that whosoever sincerely defends virtue, and is a realist in morality, must of necessity in a manner, by the same scheme of reasoning, prove as very a realist in divinity."* And elsewhere he says, that " we may justly as well as charitably conclude, that it was his design, in ap plying himself to the men of looser principles, to lead them into such an apprehension of the constitution of mankind, and of human affairs, as might form in them a notion of order in things, and draw hence an acknowledgment of the wisdom, goodness, and beauty, which is Supreme ; that being thus far become proselytes, they might be prepared for that divine love which our religion would teach them, when once they should embrace it, and form them selves to its sacred character. "f This must be owned to be a handsome apology ; so that if we take his Lordship's own account of his intention in his Inquiry, it was not to favour atheism, but rather to reclaim men from it ; to reconcile atheists to the principles of virtue, and thereby bring them to a good opinion of religion. It may no doubt be of real service to the interests of virtue, to endeavour to make men sensible of its great excellence in itself, and its present natural advantages, which his Lordship sets forth at large, and in a very elegant manner ; and this is no more than hath been often represented by those divines, who yet think it necessary to insist on the rewards and punishments of a future state. There are indeed many that have said, what no man who knows the world and the history of mankind can deny, that in the present situation of human affairs, a steady adherence to virtue often subjects a man to severe trials and sufferings ; and that it frequently happeneth, that bad and vicious men are in very pros perous outward circumstances ; but I scarce know any that have maintained what his Lordship calls that unfortunate opinion, viz. that " virtue is naturally an enemy to happiness in life ;" or who suppose, that " virtue is the natural ill, and vice the natural good of any creature."*}* Nor would any friend to Christianity have found fault with his Lordship's endeavouring to show, that by the very frame of the human constitution, virtue has a friendly influence to promote our satisfaction and happiness, even in this present life ; and that vice has naturally a contrary tendency. But certainly it was no way necessary to his design, supposing it to have been, as he professes, to serve the cause of virtue in the world, to throw out so many insinuations as he has done against the being influenced by » Characteristics, vol. ii. p. 266, 268. f Ibid. p. 279. i Ibid. p. 71, 72. 62 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. VI. a regard to future rewards and punishments; as if it aTgued a higher degree of virtue to have no regard to them at all. And though in several passages he shows the advantage which arises to virtue from religion and the belief of a deity, yet whilst he seems to allow that virtue may subsist, and even be carried to a considerable degree without it, I am afraid it will give encouragement to those he calls the men of looser principles ; .and that instead of reclaiming them from atheism, it will tend to make them easy in it, by leading them to think they may be good and virtuous men without any reli gion at all. His Lordship seems, from a desire of keeping the fairest measures, as he expresses it, with men of this sort, to have carried his com plaisance too far, when he asserts, that atheism has no direct ten dency either to take away and destroy the natural arid just sense of right and wrong, or to the setting up a false species of it. This is not a proper place to enter into a distinct consideration of this sub ject. I shall content myself with producing some passages from the most applauded doctor of modern atheism, Spinosa, and who hath taken the most pains to form it into a system. He proposeth, in the fifteenth chapter of his Tractatus Theologico-politicus, to treat of the natural and civil right qf every man. De jure uniuscuj usque uaturali of strong holds, casting down imaginations, or reasonings, and every high thing that exalteth itself against tke knowledge of God, and bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience qf Christ, is produced by this writer to show that the gospel is not only without all evidence, but contrary to reason. And yet the manifest design of it is to show, not that the gospel had no evidence to support it, but that the evidences accompanying it were so strong and convin cing, as were vastly superior to any arguments or reasonings that could be brought against it. But there is no injunction there laid upon Christians, as the author pretends, " to lay reason under the most absolute restraint and prohibition, and not to permit it the least opportunity or freedom to exert itself, or interpose upon any occasion whatsoever."* Another argument with which he makes a mighty parade is to this purpose, that no religion can be rational that is not founded on a free and impartial examination.-]- And sueh examination sup poses a perfect neutrality to the principles which are examined, and even a temporal disbelief of them, which is what the gospel con- demneth. But this proceeds upon a wrong account of the nature of free examination and inquiry. It is not necessary to a just in quiry into doctrines or facts, that a man should be absolutely indif ferent to them before he begins that inquiry, much less that he should actually disbelieve them ; as if he must necessarily commence atheist, before he can fairly examine into the proofs of the existence of God. It is sufficient to a candid examination, that a man ap- plieth himself to it with a mind open to conviction, and a disposition to embrace truth on which side soever it shall appear, and to receive the evidence that shall arise in the course of the trial. And if the inquiry relateth to principles in which we have been instructed, then, supposing those principles to be in themselves rational and well founded, it may well happen, that, in inquiring into the grounds of them, a fair examination may be carried on without seeing cause to disbelieve, or doubt of them through the whole course of the enquiry ; which in that case will end in a fuller conviction of them than before. But there is no argument on which he seems to place a greater stress, to show that Christianity is not founded on reason and evi dence, than this, that we are there authoritatively commanded to believe, and penalties are denounced against us if we do not believe ; whereas it is plain, that " no proposition can be tendered to our reason with penalties annexed, or under the restraint of threats and authority ;"*(; since assent or dissent is an independent event, under no influence of ours." Men are constantly determined to believe according to the evidence that appeareth to them, and the will hath nothing to do with it ; and therefore there can be no virtue in be lieving truth, or fault in rejecting it. And he expressly affirms, "that a determination either right or wrong in matters which are not self-evident, and in which there is anything of induction or in- * Christianity not founded on Argument, p. 84. f Ibid. p. 5. f Ibid. p. 8. K 130 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XI. ference, is equally meritorious."* This is a very convenient plea for infidelity, and so it is for atheism itself; since it proceeds upon this foundation, that men can never be obliged to believe any prin ciples at all in which there is any thing of induction or inference, nor consequently those relating to the existence of God and a pro vidence. And if there be no fault in disbelieving those principles, there can be no fault in refusing to obey, or worship him. which necessarily dependeth upon the belief of his existence. But the foundation this goes upon is manifestly false ; as if men were always, and in all cases, determined by mere evidence, and that assent and dissent were therefore necessary acts, and absolutely out of their power. Nothing is more undeniable from common observation and experience, than that the will and affections have a great influence on the judgment; and that we have a great deal of freedom in the right or wrong use of our reasoning faculties, and consequently are liable to praise or blame on that account. Let the proofs that are offered be ever so plain, we may choose whether we will attend to them ; or we may turn our eyes from the evidence ; or, if we profess to examine, may, through prepossession and wrong dispositions of mind, institute a slight, a partial, and defective examination. Men may be, and often are, so biassed by the influence of affections and interests, as to cause things to appear to them in a quite different light than otherwise they would do. All the world owns, that a candour and simplicity of heart, the love of truth, and a readiness to embrace it when fairly proposed, is a very commendable disposi tion of mind ; and that refusing to receive it through the influence of corrupt affections and passions is really culpable. But this espe cially holdeth in truths of a religious and moral nature. Our be lieving or disbelieving them is very much influenced by the good or bad dispositions of our minds, and must have a great effect upon the practice ; and therefore in these cases to receive and embrace these truths may be an important duty, and to disbelieve or reject them may be highly criminal ; and God may very justly interpose his authority to require the one, and warn men against the other. The author all along supposeth, that the faith required in the gospel is no more than a bare assent of the understanding, and the unbelief there condemned is a mere speculative dissent. But this is a wrong representation ; nothing is more evident than that the faith required in the gospel of those to whom it is made known, that faith to which the promises are made, is a complex thing : it includeth a love of truth, and a disposition to embrace and profess it, which, in the circumstances in which Christianity first appeared, argued a great deal both of candour and fortitude ; and it is always repre sented to be of a vital operative nature, a principle of holy obedience, and which purifieth the heart, and leadeth men to do the will of God, and obey his commands. And such a faith is certainly a virtue, and very properly the subject of a divine command ; and the * Christianity not founded on Argument, p. 17, 18. Let. XI. "CHRISTIANITY NOT FOUNDED ON ARGUMENT." 131 unbelief there condemned is supposed to proceed from men's being under the influence of corrupt affections and prejudices, and from their unwillingness to receive the truth, because their deeds are evil. It is expressed by their shutting their eyes, and hardening their hearts, lest they should see with their eyes, and understand with their hearts, and be converted and healed. And this certainly argueth a bad and vicious disposition of soul, and leadeth to dis obedience ; and is therefore very properly forbidden in the divine law. With regard to human laws, when they are once sufficiently pro mulgated, it would scarce be accepted as a plea for men's neglecting or breaking those laws, that they are not satisfied that they are the king's laws ; and that no man can be justly obliged, under the re straint of authority and penalties, to assent to this proposition, that these are the king's laws ; since assent is not in our own power. It is very probable, that a way would soon be found to overrule this plea, and convince them that authority could interpose in this manner. In like manner, it seems to be obvious to the common sense and reason of mankind, that if God hath given a revelation or discovery of his will, concerning doctrines and laws of importance to our duty and happiness, and hath caused them to be promulgated with such evi dence as he knoweth to be sufficient to convince reasonable and well- disposed minds, that will carefully attend to it, he hath an un doubted right to require those to whom this revelation is published to receive and to obey it. And if, through the influence of corrupt affections and lusts, those to whom this revelation is made known refuse to receive it, he can justly punish them for their culpable neg lect, obstinacy, and disobedience. Our author himself, speaking of the Spirit's working faith in all men, saith, though in evident contradiction to his own scheme, that " the tender of this convic tion, however potent in its influence, may yet depend greatly upon the proper dispositions of our minds to give it a reception for its efficacy; and so far will give place, and afford ample matter of trial and probation, and become indeed a test of our obedience. And that in this case disbelief and guilt have a meaning when put to gether ; since the compliance required is, not a compliance out of our power, nor any longer that of the understanding, but of the will, in its nature free, and therefore accountable ; and though we are not by any means chargeable for the effects of our apprehension, yet there is no reason but that we may be with all justice called to the strictest account for our obstinacy, impiety, and perverseness."* I shall only take notice of one thing more, and which is indeed the most plausible thing in his whole book, and that is, that the generality of mankind, even of those among whom Christianity is published, cannot be obliged to believe it, because they have not a capacity to discern and judge of the proofs and arguments which are brought for it. But though it should be allowed, that they * Christianity not founded on Argument," p. C4. K 2 132 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XI. could not of themselves trace those proofs and evidences, yet there are few but may be made sensible of the force of those proofs and evidences, when set before them by others. And this is sufficient. It is evident to any one that knows mankind, that we are so con stituted, as to stand in need of mutual assistance and information, in matters of great consequence to our duty and happiness. Most of the principles of science of every kind are things that must be taught ; and there are few that reason out those principles for themselves, but proceed upon them as demonstrated by others, and apply themselves to practice the rules that are founded on those principles. In like manner religion must be taught, or the most of mankind will know but little of it. And if it requireth care and application to understand its doctrines and precepts, and the evi dences whereby it is confirmed, this is no argument at all, either against its reasonableness or excellence ; for nothing that is truly excellent in knowledge or practice is to be attained to without care and diligence. It is every man's duty in this case to take in what helps and informations he can get ; and if we can come to perceive the evidence by the assistance of others, this will answer the pur poses of religion as well as if we could do it merely by the force of our own reason without any assistance at all. It would undoubtedly be a thing above the capacity of the gene rality of mankind, and what the most learned would not be well fitted for, to trace out all the parts of religion and morality by a regular deduction from the first principles in a way of abstracted reasoning ; and therefore it is a great advantage, that God hath given a clear revelation of his will, containing, in plain and express propositions, the principles and doctrines which are of greatest im portance to be known, and the duties which are most necessary to be practised. Such a revelation is set before us in the gospel; and the evident marks of disinterestedness that appear in it, without the least traces of a worldly spirit or design, the purity and excellence of its doctrines and precepts, and the uniform tendency of the whole for promoting the glory of God, and the good of mankind, and the cause of virtue and righteousness in the world, furnish arguments obvious to common capacities, that this religion owed not its rise to human policy, to the arts of impostors, or to evil beings, but was of a godlike and heavenly original. And as to historical evidence, persons of common sound understanding may be made sensible, by the help of the learned, that we have all the evidence ofthe truth of the extraordinary facts, whereby the divine authority of the Chris tian religion was attested, which can be reasonably desired. That most of those facts were of a public nature, which might have been easily detected and exposed if they had been false ; in which case that religion, which had nothing else to support it, and was desti tute of all worldly advantages, must have fallen at once. But that this was so far from being the case, that the greatest enemies of Christianity are not able to deny, that, upon the credit of those facts, this religion, though directly opposite to the prejudices which Let. XL "CHRISTIANITY NOT FOUNDED ON ARGUMENT." 133 then universally obtained, and though it had the most unsurmount- able difficulties to encounter with, and had all the powers of the world engaged against it, soon made a wonderful progress both among Jews and Gentiles ; which, as things were circumstanced, cannot otherwise be accounted for, than by admitting the truth of those extraordinary facts. That the original revelation itself, to gether with an account of those facts, was committed to writing in the very age in which that revelation was first given, and those facts were done ; which is a sure method of conveyance, though oral tra dition is a very uncertain one : And that these accounts, which were written by persons who were perfectly acquainted with the things they relate, and which have all the characters of purity, artless un disguised simplicity, and an impartial regard to truth, that any writings can possibly have, were in that very age received with great veneration, as of sacred authority. The copies of them were soon spread abroad into many different countries : they were read in the public assemblies, translated into various languages, and they have been ever since so constantly cited and appealed to in every age by persons of different sects and parties, many of whom have transcribed large portions of them into their writings, that it may be justly said, they have been transmitted with a continued evi dence, far greater than can be produced for any other books in the world ; and that a general corruption of them, if any had attempted it, would have been an impossible thing. There is nothing in all this, but what persons of common sound sense, who are desirous of information, may be sufficiently assured of by the assistance of the learned : and when, besides this, they feel the power and influence of the doctrines and motives proposed in those sacred writings upon their own hearts, comforting them in all the vicissitudes of mortal life, and animating them to all virtue and goodness, this completeth their satisfaction and assurance ; especially when it is farther consi dered, that we are taught in Scripture to hope, that God's gracious assistances will not be wanting to those that with honest hearts and upright intentions endeavour to know and do the will of God. For if any man will do his will, saith our Saviour, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself, John vii. 17. Our author, in order to shew that the generality of mankind are incapable of judging of the evidence for Christianity, hath taken upon him to pronounce, that there are few that are capable of rea soning at all, if there is the least of induction or inference in the case.* And this, if it proveth that they are under no obligation to believe Christianity, equally proveth, that they are under no obli gation to believe natural religion, not even the existence of a God, or a providence ; since here there is certainly room for induction and inference. But the truth is, this is a very false and base repre sentation of human nature : it would follow from it, that the gene- * Christianity not founded on Argument, p. 17, 18. 134 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let XI. rality of men are incapable of moral agency, of virtue and vice, or of being governed by laws ; for this supposeth them capable of under standing what those laws are, and what is the duty required of them, and of making inferences and deductions. And with regard to religion, and its proofs and evidences, it can scarce be doubted, that if men applied themselves to it with the same care and diligence that they generally do in matters of much less consequence, they would attain to such a sense of religion and its evidences, as would both make it reasonable for them to believe it, and to govern their practice by it. There were several good answers published to Christianity not founded on Argument. One of the first that appeared was that written by Dr. Doddridge, which I remember to have read with pleasure, but as I have not had an opportunity of seeing it for some years, cannot give a particular account of it. I shall confine myself to those answers which I have now by me. The first I shall mention is entitled, The Reasonableness of the Christian Religion, as delivered in the Scriptures, being an answer to a late Treatise, entitled, " Christianity not founded on Argument," by George Benson, afterwards Dr. Benson, London, 8vo. 1743. This may be regarded not merely as an answer to that pamphlet, but as a good defence of Christianity in general, and so the learned author designed it. It consisteth of three parts. In the first part, after having settled the meaning of the -wore\ faith, and shown what that faith is, which the gospel requireth of those to whom it is made known, and to which rewards are there annexed, and that it is really a virtue ; and what that unbelief is which is there forbidden and condemned, and that it is really a vice ; he goes on to produce some of the principal arguments which prove the truth of the Christian religion. He first considers what are usually called the internal evidences of Christianity, the reasonableness of its doctrines, of its moral precepts, of its positive institutions, and of the sanctions by which it is enforced ; and then considers the external evidence aris ing from prophecy and miracles, particularly from the resurrection of Christ, and the extraordinary gifts of the Holy Ghost poured forth upon the apostles and first Christians. These things are here set in a fair and agreeable light ; and it is also shown, that the ac counts given of these things in the New Testament may he de pended on, and that we have sufficient evidence of the truth and authenticity of the gospel records. In the second part a solid answer is given to the several objections and difficulties proposed by the author, with a view to show that religion cannot be a rational thing. The third part contains a distinct explication.of those texts of Scripture which he had perverted and misapplied. And there is scarce any one text cited or referred to in his whole book which is not here particularly considered. Not long after this, there was another valuable answer published, entitled, The Christian's Faith a rational Assent, in Answer to a Pamphlet, entitled, " Christianity not founded on Argument," by Let. XI. "CHRISTIANITY NOT FOUNDED ON ARGUMENT." 135 Thomas Randolph, D.D., London, 1744. It was published in two parts, and divided into six chapters. In the first, the question in dispute is clearly stated, which is reduced to this : whether the Christian faith be founded on argument, and is ordinarily attainable in a rational way, or is to be acquired only by a particular revela tion imparted supernaturally to every individual? And he under takes, in opposition to the author of that pamphlet, to shew, that the Christian's faith ought to be founded upon the conviction of the understanding, and that it is a rational assent, by whieh he means, that just and satisfactory reasons may be given for the hope and faith we profess. He considers the nature of assent, and shows, that we are not wholly passive in believing or disbelieving, but have a great compass of liberty in the use of those faculties on which assent depends ; and that therefore faith may be a virtue, and argue a good disposition of mind, and unbelief be vicious and criminal. In his second chapter, he fairly examines and clearly confutes the author's arguments drawn from the nature of reason and religion : and in the third, the arguments from Scripture, by which he pretends to prove, that we are not to use our understandings in matters of religion. In his fourth chapter, he inquires into the author's own scheme, and the principle of gospel evidence which he has thought fit to assign, which he wholly resolveth into an immediate, infallible, supernatural revelation, darted with an irresistible light into the mind of every particular person : the absurdity of this Dr. Randolph exposes, and answers the pretended proofs brought from Scripture in support of it. The fifth chapter contains a good account of the proofs of the Christian religion, with a particular consideration of the objections of this writer against miracles and traditional testi mony. Lastly, he takes notice of the reflections thrown out by the author of that pamphlet against the Church of England in par ticular. You will probably expect, that I should take some notice of ano ther answer, which appeared about the same time, and which also met with a favourable reception from the public, viz. Remarks on a late Pamphlet, entitled, " Christianity not founded on Argument.'' These remarks, which were drawn up by me at your own desire, were contained in two letters that were published separately, London, 1744. The design of this answer, which was much shorter than either of the former, was not to enter upon a distinct and particular account of the evidences which are usually produced in proof of the Christian religion, which the author of these letters had considered largely on some former occasions, but to represent in a clear and concise manner the absurdity and ill tendency, as well as manifold inconsistencies, of this writer's scheme ; to give a plain confutation of the principal arguments from Scripture and reason, by which he has pretended to support it, and to detect and expose his fallacies and misrepresentations. But it is time to take leave of this writer, whom I have taken the more particular notice of, because some of his objections are managed with great art, and have a specious appearance. 136 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITER?. Let. XII. LETTER XII. The Resurrection of Christ an Article that lies at the Foundation of the Christian Faith. — Attacked with great Confidence in a Pamphlet, entitled, The Resurrection of Jesus considered. — What this Writer offers to prove, that Christ did not foretel his own Resurrection, and- that the Story of the Chief Priests setting a Watch at the Sepulchre is a Forgery and Fiction, examined and confuted Observations on the extraordinary Way he takes to fix Contradictions on the Evangelists. — The Rules by which he would judge of their Accounts would not be endured, if applied to any other Writings. — He insists on farther Evidence of Christ's Resurrection ; and yet plainly intimates, that no Evidence that could be given would satisfy him. — Extra vagant Demands of the Deistical Writers on this Head considered. — The Evidence that was actually given, the properest that could be given. — The seeming Variations among the Evangelists, if rightly considered, furnish a Proof of the Truth and Genuineness of the Gospel Records. — An Account ofthe Answers published to this Author, especially of Mr. West's Observations on the History and Resurrection of Jesus Christ. — Sir George Littleton's Observations on the Conversion and Apostleship ef St. Paul commended. Sir, The resurrection of Christ is an article of vast importance, which lieth at the foundation of Christianity : if this faileth, the Christian religion cannot be maintained, or may be proved to be false. If Christ be not risen (saith St. Paul), then is our preaching vain, your faith is also vain, 1 Cor. xv. 14. On the other hand, if this holdeth good, the divine mission and authority of the blessed Founder of our holy religion is established. This is what he himself appealed to, as the great and ultimate proof, which was to convince mankind that he was what he professed himself to be, the Son of God, the Saviour of the world. If he had been an artful impostor, it can scarce be supposed that he would have appealed to such a proof as this, which would have been the most effectual way he could have taken to detect and expose the vanity of his own pretences, and overturn the whole scheme of his religion : or, if he had been an enthusiast, and was imposed upon by the warmth of his own imagi nation, to believe that God would indeed raise him from the dead, the event would have effectually shown the folly and madness of his expectations. And, therefore, since he put the proof of his divine mission upon a thing of so extraordinary a nature, which manifestly exceeded all human power, and was actually enabled to accomplish it, this shows, both that he certainly knew that he was sent of God, and that he really was so. And indeed it cannot be conceived how a more illustrious attestation could possibly have been given to him from heaven, than his resurrection from the jdead, in accomplish ment of his own prediction, and what followed' upon it, his ascension into heaven, and the extraordinary effusion ofthe Holy Ghost upon his disciples, as he himself had promised. This the enemies of our holy religion are sensible of; and therefore, though they have sometimes affected to argue, that, supposing Christ to have really risen from Let. XII. " THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS CONSIDERED." 137 the dead, this would not be a valid proof of the truth ofthe Chris tian revelation,* they have in all ages bent their utmost efforts against it. Celsus employed all his wit and malice to ridicule it ; so have others done since : of late Mr. Woolston had distinguished himself this way ; and no part of his discourse on the miracles of our Saviour was so much laboured, as that wherein he endeavoured to show, that the account given by the evangelists of Christ's resurrection is a false and incredible story. But the weakness of his objections was clearly shown in the answers that were made to him; among which The Trial of the Witnesses, 8tc. was especially remark able, both for the strength of the reasoning, and the ingenious and polite manner of treating the argument. Mr. Woolston himself never attempted to vindicate that part of his Discourse against the answers that had been given to it. But after several years had passed, a bold adventurer appears in a pamphlet, intitled, The Resurrection of Jesus considered, in Answer to the Trial of the Witnesses, by a Moral Philosopher, London, 1744; so this gentle man thinks proper to style himself, as Dr. Morgan had done before him. Like that writer, he appears to be of great vivacity, and no small degree of confidence, and to have a high opinion of his own abilities and performances ; and, like him, seems resolved to put all the arts of controversy in practice, by which he thinks he might carry his point, without being very solicitous whether they are pro perly reconcileable to truth or candour. He has with great diligence raked together all that a lively imagination, animated with the most determined malice, could invent or suggest, for misrepresenting and exposing the gospel-history ; nor does he, as some others had done, any where pretend a regard to the religion of Jesus, but all along openly declares against it ; in which he is so far to be commended, if he had but acted the part of a fair, as he doth of a professed adversary. The principal things observable in this treatise, with relation to the declared design of it, the overthrowing the accounts that are given us of the resurrection of Jesus, may be reduced to these three heads : 1. He undertakes to prove, that Christ did not foretel his death and resurrection at all, neither to the Jewish priests and Pha risees, por to his own disciples; and that all that the evangelists say on this head is mere fiction and forgery. 2. That the whole story of the Jewish priests and rulers setting a watch at the sepulchre, and sealirjg the stone, is false, and a most absurd and incredible fiction. 3. That the accounts given by the evangelists of Christ's resurrec tion are in every part inconsistent and self-contradictory, and carry plain marks of fraud and imposture. I shall make some observations on each of these ; and that I may not return to this subject again, shall take notice, as I go along, of some things advanced by Mr. Chubb, in his posthumous works, to enforce the objections of this writer. * See a Letter, said to be written by Mr. Collins, to the author of the " Discourse on the Grounds, &c." in answer to Mr. Green's Letters, published in 1726. 138 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XII. It is of great importance to our author's cause to prove, if he was able to do it, that Jesus did not foretel his own death and resurrec tion : for if he did foretel it, and it was known that he did so, this makes the precautions taken by the chief priests to prevent an im position in this matter absolutely necessary ; and the whole story is perfectly consistent. Besides that, as hath been already hinted, his foretelling a thing of such a nature, which, if he had been an impos tor, he must have known it would be absolutely out of his power to accomplish, and which yet was actually fulfilled, affords the most convincing proof, that he was really that extraordinary and divine person he professed himself to be. Our author saw this, and there fore has made an attempt to show, that Jesus did not foretel his death and resurrection, neither to the Jewish priests and Pharisees, nor to his own disciples. With regard to the former, it appeareth from the testimony of the evangelists, St. Matthew and St. Luke, that when the Scribes and Pharisees desired Jesus to show them a sign from heaven, he told them, that no sign should be given, but the sign qf the prophet Jonas. And St. M atthew farther informs us, that he then openly declared to them, that as Jonas was three days and three nights in the whale's belly, so should the Son of man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth, Matth. xii. 38, 39, 40. Which plainly supposed, that, in that space of time, he should, after lying in the earth or grave, rise out of it, as Jonas came alive out of the belly of the fish. From this prediction therefore, which was uttered more than once in the hearing ofthe Scribes and Pharisees, they might gather that he intended to signify that he should rise again from the dead. What this writer hath offered against this is very trifling. Because St. Luke, in mentioning what our Saviour said concerning the sign of the prophet Jonas, doth not expressly take notice of his declaring, that the Son of man should lie three days and nights in the heart of the earth, he pretends that this is a proof that St. Matthew forged it, Whereas all that it proves is, that St. Matthew hath given a fuller relation of what our Saviour said on that occasion, than St. Luke hath done ; though what the latter relateth concerning Christ's mentioning the sign of the pro phet Jonas, plainly implieth it. He also repeats what Mr. Woolston had urged, that Christ did not lie three days and nights in the grave ; of which I took some notice before in my remarks on Mr. Woolston's discourses. He farther hints at what Mr. Chubb, who wrote after our author, and endeavours to reinforce his objections, has enlarged upon for several pages together,* that Jesus could not have made such a declaration as this, that no sign should be given to that wicked and adulterous generation, but the sign ofthe prophet Jonas ; both be cause their being a wicked generation was rather a reason for giving them a sign, since in that case they needed it most, and the design of his coming was to call sinners to repentance ; and because in fact Christ did work signs and wonders among them after this. But to * Chubb's posthumous works, vol. i. p. 342 — 347. Let. XII. " THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS CONSIDERED." ]39 take off the force of this, it is sufficient to observe, that by com paring Matth. xvi. 1. Luke xi. 16. Mark viii. 11. it appeareth, that the sign they demanded was a sign from heaven, by which they probably meant some glorious appearance in the heavens. They had a little before attributed his miracles to Beelzebub : and now they insisted that he should give them a particular kind of sign ; and it was perfectly consistent with his character to refuse to humour them in this demand, which he well knew proceeded from a cavilling temper, and not from minds honestly willing to submit to evidence. But though he refused to give them at that time precisely such a sign as they demanded, he yet both continued to work miracles among them, and referred them to his resurrection, which, taking in the circumstances that attended it, and followed upon it, was, in the fullest and properest sense, a sign from heaven, and was suf ficient to convince them, if they were disposed to receive conviction. To this it may be added, what St. John informs us of, that in a discourse addressed to a great number of the Jews, among whom were several of his malicious enemies, he plainly spoke of his laying down his life, and taking it again, and declared that this command ment he had received of his Father, John x. 17, 18, 19, 20. As to his own disciples, under which character others besides the twelve apostles are often comprehended, the author himself ac- knowledgeth, that the evangelists represent him as having declared to them in plain and express terms, on five different occasions, that he should suffer and die, and rise again on the third day. But be cause they tell us, that the disciples did not understand this saying, and that it was hid from them, and that they questioned among them selves, what this rising from the dead should mean, he would have the whole pass for forgery and fiction. He thinks it incredible, that twelve men could hear such plain expressions, so clearly foretelling his dying and rising again, and yet not be able to understand them. But this is easily accounted for, considering that the disciples were at that time under the power of those prejudices, which then gene rally prevailed among the Jews, relating to the Messiah. They could not conceive how the Messiah, who, according to their notions of things, was to abide for ever, and not die at all,* could be sub ject to sufferings and death ; nor consequently how he should rise again from the dead. When therefore they heard Jesus, whom they looked upon to be the Messiah, talk of his dying and rising again on the third day, they thought it must be understood in some mys tical or figurative sense, and that some meaning which they did not at present comprehend lay hid under those expressions, however plain they might appear; so that this only shows the dulness of their apprehensions, and the force of their prejudices, and at the same time the impartiality of the evangelical historians who have recorded it. But though the disciples could not conceive how Christ should die and rise again on the third day, yet as he so often * See John xii. 34. 140 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XII. repeated it on different occasions, without ever giving the least injunction to them to conceal it, it may justly be supposed that the saying got abroad, and was known to many. And this coming to the ears of the Jewish chief priests and Pharisees, who also knew what he had said to some of the Pharisees and Scribes concerning the sign of the prophet Jonas, was a sufficient foundation to them to say to Pilate, We remember that that deceiver said (not that he said to us, as this gentleman thinks fit to quote it, but that he said), while he was yet alive, after three days I will rise again. There needed no more to put them upon all proper precautions to prevent an impos ture in this matter. This leads me to take some notice of the second main thing this writer insisteth upon, which is, that the story St. Matthew tells of the chief priests setting a watch at the sepulchre, and sealing the stone, is a false and absurd fiction. Mr. Woolston had allowed the truth of the story, and built one of his principal arguments against the resurrection of Jesus upon the circumstance of sealing the stone. And this argument was mightily cried up for a while. But our author had the sagacity to discern, that if this was admitted, it would afford a strong presumption of the truth and reality of Christ's resurrection ; and therefore thinks it more for the interest of his cause to deny it. The chief thing he urgeth against the story pro ceeds upon the supposition, that Jesus did not foretel his resurrec tion at all, nor had the Jewish priests and Pharisees heard that he had foretold it ; and therefore it is absurd to think they would give themselves concern about it. But the falsehood of this supposition hath been already shown; nor is there any thing in the whole story, as related by St. Matthew, that is not perfectly consistent, and highly probable. It is very natural to suppose, considering their characters and dispositions, and the circumstances of the case, that they would take the fittest precautions that the disciples of Jesus might not have it in their power to pretend he was risen from the dead, as it was reported he had foretold ; and there could not be a more probable method fixed upon for this pur pose, than the setting a watch to guard the sepulchre, and sealing the stone that was rolled to the mouth of it. And though we should allow them to have known, as this writer affirms they did, that Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea had wound up the body in linen and spices, which showed they did not expect his resurrection, yet they knew he had other disciples : and besides might suspect, that all this preparation for embalming the body, was only the better to cover their design of carrying it away. What he farther urgeth concerning their believing him to have been, what they called him to Pilate, a deceiver, instead of being an argument, as he would have it to be, against their using this precaution, would furnish a strong reason for it ; since in that case they might be apt to suspect that his disciples would act the part of deceivers too, and endeavour to carry on the imposture, which therefore they were resolved to prevent. And they might think this one of the most effectual methods they could take to convince the people, many of whom Let. XII. "THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS CONSIDERED." 141 they knew had a high veneration for Jesus, that he was a false pro phet, by showing the falsehood of his prediction, concerning his rising again the third day, which would justify their own conduct in putting him to death. This author thinks it incredible, that the Jews should bribe the soldiers to be silent, when they themselves must upon their report have been convinced of the truth of the fact. But their conduct on this occasion was no other than might be expected from persons of their character. Whosoever considers their determined malice and envy against Jesus, who had unmasked their hypocrisy, and opposed their traditions ; how deeply their reputation was engaged, and their authority with the people, as well as that of the Sanhedrim, who claimed to themselves a power of trying prophets, and had con demned him as a false prophet and blasphemer, must be sensible how unwilling they would be to have it thought, that they had wrongfully procured a most excellent person to be crucified, and that they would take all possible methods, by stifling the evidence, to throw off the odium from themselves. To which may be added the power of their prejudices, which would not suffer them to imagine, that a person who had been crucified could possibly be their Messiah, which was absolutely subversive of all their maxims. They who, when they could not deny his miracles, ascribed them to a diabolical power, showed what they were capable of. And indeed the force of obstinate prejudice, hatred, envy, pride, and a desire of maintaining their own authority, all which concurred in this case, is amazing, and hath often caused persons to stand out against the clearest evidence. The last thing he hath to offer is, that St. Matthew is the only evangelist who relateth the story of sealing the stone, and placing the watch ; but this is of small moment : St. Matthew's relation of it is sufficient. He wrote his gospel, by tbe consent of all antiquity, the first of the evangelists, in a few years after our Lord's ascension, and designed it especially for the use of the Jewish converts ; and his relating this story in a gospel published among the Jews, and so early in that very age when the story must have been fresh in remembrance, and when, if false, it might have been easily con tradicted, shows that it was a thing well known, and that he was fully assured of the truth of it, and in no fear of being detected in a falsehood. And what farther confirmeth this, is his referring to a report as current among the Jews at the time when he wrote, concerning the disciples having stolen the body, whilst the soldiers that were set to watch the sepulchre slept. The story indeed was not very consistent ; but yet, as the case is circumstanced, it was the best thing they had to say. The body was gone out of the sepulchre; either therefore it must be acknowledged that he rose again from the dead, or that his disciples had taken it away ; and this, if done at all, must have been done either with the connivance of the guards that were set to watch it, or when they were asleep ; the guards, if charged with having connived at it, and with having been bribed by 142 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XII. the disciples, would have been obliged to justify themselves against that charge, and would have told the fact as it really happened ; there was nothing therefore left but to pretend that it was done whilst they were asleep. And yet the rulers never pretended to convict the disciples of having stolen the body, nor instituted any process against them on that account ; but contented themselves with threatening to punish them if they preached the resurrection of Jesus, which yet they boldly avowed to their faces. As to the author's insinuation, how came St. Matthew to know of the angel's appearing to the soldiers with such circumstances of terror, if they were hired to conceal it, this is easily accounted for ; it is only said that some ofthe watch went and told the chief priests, Matt, xxviii. 11. It may therefore be reasonably supposed, that others of them might, immediately after the thing happened, tell it to some other persons ; yea, it might probably happen, that some of those who were then hired and bribed might discover it afterwards, when all was over ; or that some of the priests, many of whom were afterwards converted to the Christian faith, as we learn from Acts vi. 7, might have known and divulged it. Thus it appeareth, that this writer's principal objections against this story, and which he insisteth upon as manifest proofs of the absolute falsehood and forgery of the gospel history, are of no force. And yet he taketh upon him to pronounce, that it is in all views absurd to suppose, that the priests and Pharisees should guard against a resurrection, fraudulent or real. He next proceeds to inquire how the witnesses agree in their evidence, and endeavoureth to prove, that the accounts the evan gelists give of the resurrection of Jesus are in every part incon sistent and self-contradictory, and carry plain marks of fraud and imposture. And here I shall not enter into a distinct examination ofthe several more minute particulars he insisteth upon, which are all considered and discussed in the answers that were made to him, but shall content myself with some general observations upon his management of the subject ; and first I would observe, that he has thought fit to consider the accounts of the three evangelists, Mat thew, Mark, and Luke, separately from St. John ; whereas they ought all to be taken together, since they all relate to the same fact of Christ's resurrection ; he positively asserteth, that the three evan gelists mention in general but three appearances of Jesus ; whereas there are plainly seven appearances of Jesus after his resurrection referred to by them, besides two others peculiarly mentioned by St. John : 1. His appearing to Mary Magdalen alone, Mark xvi. 9. John xx. 14, 15, 16, 17. 2. His appearing to the women, Matthew xxviii. 9. 3. His appearing to the two disciples going to Emmaus, Mark xvi. 12. Luke xxiv. 13 — 32. 4. His appearing to Simon Peter, Luke xxiv. 34. 1 Cor. xv. 5. 5. His appearing to the eleven as they sat at meat on the evening of the day on which he rose, Luke xxiv. 36—43. John xx. 19 — 23. 6. His appearing to his disciples on a mountain in Galilee, Matt, xxviii. 16, 17. 7. His Let. XII. " THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS CONSIDERED." 143 appearing to his disciples on the day of his ascension, Mark xvi. 19, 20. Luke xxiv. 50, 51, 52. Acts i. 6—11. Besides these, there are two other appearances of Jesus recorded by St. John, which are not taken notice of by the other evangelists; one is, that to the eleven, when St. Thomas was with them, eight days after the first, John xx. 26 — 29. The other is, that at the sea of Tiberias, to seven of the disciples, John xxi. 1—14. Here are nine distinct appearances pointed out by the evangelists, which were at different times, and are plainly marked out by distinct characters. But this author, in order to have a pretence for charging these writers with contradic tions, thinks fit to confound these different appearances ; and the different circumstances and variations, which show that they belong to different appearances, are represented by him as so many incon sistencies in the relation of the same appearance. But by this way of management, instead of proving contradictions upon the evan gelists, he only proves his own unfairness and absurdity. Thus e. g. St. Luke relates an appearance of Jesus to his disciples at Jerusalem, on the very evening of the resurrection day ; St. Matthew tells of an appearance of his to his disciples at a mountain in Galilee, which must have been some time after. The time and place of these appearances are manifestly different ; which should lead every person of candour to regard them as different appearances ; but our author is pleased to suppose them to relate to the same appearance, and then chargeth these different circumstances as to time and place, as so many contradictions and inconsistencies. This must be owned to be a very extraordinary way of proceeding ; and at this rate it will be easy to expose the most authentic history that ever was written. There is another rule frequently made use of by this writer, and upon which his charge of contradictions against the evangelists prin cipally dependeth, and that is, that if any one of them takes notice of any circumstance or event not mentioned by the rest, this is to pass for a proof of fiction and forgery. According to this new rule of criticism, where several historians give an account of the same facts, if some of them relate those facts with more, and some with fewer circumstances, this shall be sufficient absolutely to destroy the credit of the whole ; and they that omit a circumstance, or say nothingatall about it,mustbe looked upon as contradicting those that mention it. Upon this principle, St. Mark and St. Luke are made to contradict one another ; because the latter mentions Bethany or Mount Olivet as the place from whence Jesus ascended, and the former, in mentioning Christ's ascension, takes no notice of the place from whence he ascended. In like manner it is pretended, that St. Matthew and St. John, in contradiction to the two other evangelists, say, that Jesus never ascended at all, because they give no distinct account of his ascension, though they evidently suppose it ; and there are more references to it in St. John's gospel, than in any one of the evangelists : see John vi. 62. vii. 39. xiv. 2, 28. xvi. 7, 16, 28. xvii. 5, 11. xx. 17. So because the last mentioned evan- 144 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XII. gelist is the only one of them that mentions the piercing the side of Jesus with a spear, of which he himself was an eye-witness, and gives an account of some appearances of Jesus to his disciples not mentioned by the other evangelist, this shows, according to our author, that he forged those accounts, and that his evidence destroys theirs, or they his ; though one design of his writing his gospel was to take notice of things which they had omitted ; nor do any of them give the least hint that they proposed distinctly to recount all Christ's appearances. In order to fix the charge of contradictions and inconsistencies upon the evangelists, he pretendeth, that, according to St. Luke, our Lord ascended the very evening of the day of his resurrection. The only proof he bringeth for so strange an assertion is, that St. Luke, immediately after having given an account of our Lord's appearing to the eleven disciples, and others with them, Luke xxiv. 36, and which, by comparing ver. 29 and 33, was pretty late in the evening of the day on which he rose, tells us, that he led them out as far as Bethany, where he was parted from them, and carried up into heaven, ver. 50, 51. And this he might justly say, rthough there was an interval of several days between the one and the other; and it is manifest from other accounts there was, and particularly from what St. Luke himself saith in the beginning of the Acts of the Apostles. It is plain that he intends here only to give a summary narration ; and, therefore, after having taken notice of his first appearance to the eleven, the account of which ends at ver. 43, he passeth over the other appearances without a distinct mention; only giving the sub stance of what Jesus said on some of those occasions, and which he introduces thus, ehfe Se civto"iq, which may be thus understood, he said besides, or moreover, unto them ; and then he proceeds to give a short account of Christ's ascension, and of what followed upon it, which he more distinctly relateth in the book of the Acts. St. Luke observes, that the women, when they went to the sepul chre, found not the body of Jesus, Luke xxiv. 3. This our candid author represents as if he had said, that they never saw Jesus at all after his resurrection, dead or alive ; and then would have this, which is a manifest perversion of St. Luke's meaning, pass for a contradiction to the other evangelists, who tell that Jesus was seen of the women after he rose again from the dead. To prove that the other evangelists contradict St. John, he represents St. Matthew, Mark, and Luke, as expressly declaring, that Jesus appeared to the eleven disciples but once after his resurrection; and yet certain it is, that not one of them says any such thing. Nor do the evangelists any where say, as he affirms they do, that Jesus appeared but to a very few after he rose from the dead, which he thinks contradicts the story of the hundred and twenty, and five hundred, mentioned by the author of the Acts and St. Paul. He might as well have pre tended, as Mr. Chubb did afterwards, though without offering the least proof to support it, that the word hundred in that passage, Acts i. 15, is an interpolation, and that instead of an hundred and Let. XII. "THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS CONSIDERED." 145 twenty, it should be read twenty.* Such wretched shifts only discover a fixed resolution not to believe any accounts that should be given. Our author endeavours to take great advantage, in which he is followed by the last-mentioned writer, of what is told us concerning Christ's appearing to the two disciples going to Emmaus. Because they did not for some time know Jesus, it is argued, that he had not a true body, and that they could not be afterwards sure that it was he ; since, if their senses were deceived at first, they might be so afterwards too ; and the like may be supposed, as to all Christ's other appearances to his disciples. That the two disciples did not at first know Jesus, is plain from the story ; and this may be accounted for in a natural way, if we suppose, that besides some change which there might be in his countenance, occasioned by his sufferings and death, he might on purpose alter the tone of his voice, or have something in his garb, his air and manner, different from what had been usual with him before, or in some other way disguise himself: which seems to be signified, when St. Mark, referring to this, saith, he appeared in another form, Mark xvi. 12. And this might hinder them from knowing him, considering how little at that time they expected to see him. Or, if we should suppose, that he employed a miraculous power to prevent their at first knowing him, which was done for a valuable end, that he might have the better opportunity of instructing them in a familiar way in the true mean ing of the Scriptures relating to the Messiah, his sufferings and glory, and thereby the better prepare them for the discovery he intended afterwards to make of himself; it by no means follows, that, because they were withheld from knowing him for a while, therefore when he fully discovered himself to them, they could not be certain that it was he. It is plain, that they had afterwards such convincing proofs that it was Jesus, as left no room for doubt in their minds. And that very evening he showed himself again to them, and to the eleven apostles, and others with them ; and the more effectually to convince them, showed them his hands and feet, and ate and drank before them ; and by the proofs which were given them, both on that and on other occasions, they had as full evidence of the reality of his risen body, as they could have of any thing that came to them confirmed by the testimony of their senses. And to suppose an extraordinary miraculous power employed all along to deceive them, and overrule all their senses, would be to suppose as great a power employed to make them believe a falsehood, i. e. to make them believe that Jesus was risen when he was not so, as would have sufficed for the truth of the resurrection ; since it would have been as easy for the divine power to have raised his body really from the dead, as to give all those proofs and evidences that were given of a true body without the reality. As to his appearing among them when the doors were shut, which is also urged against the truth of his risen body, all that can be fairly concluded from it * Chubb's Posthumous Works, vol i. p. 378. L 146 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XII. is, that when the doors were shut, which the evangelist tells us was for fear of the Jews, Jesus came suddenly among them, opening the doors at once by his miraculous power ; not that his body passed through the doors by a penetration of dimensions, which is the con struction the author puts upon it ; for this would have entirely des troyed our Lord's own argument, which he used at that very time to convince them that he had a real body. " Behold (saith he), my hands and feet, that it is I myself. Handle me, and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see me have." See Luke xxiv. 36, 39, compared with John xx. 19, 20. It is observable that this writer, in his great eagerness to expose the evangelical accounts, seems not to consider that some of the arguments he hath produced may be turned against him, and prove the contrary to what he produced them for. - He frequently lays a mighty stress on those passages which relate to the disciples not having understood our Saviour, when he foretold his resurrection before his death, and to their doubting of his resurrection after it. And yet it is this very thing that gives the greatest force to their tes timony. If they had been prepossessed beforehand with a strong belief that he would rise again, or if they had immediately believed that he* was risen from the dead upon the first message that was brought to them, it would undoubtedly have been ascribed to the warmth of their imagination, and to a too forward credulity ; but as the case is circumstanced, there is no room for this pretence. It is plain, that nothing but the irresistible evidence of their senses brought them to believe at all ; and their believing it so firmly at last, so as to be ready to seal their testimony to it with their blood, shows that they were constrained to believe by an evidence which they could not withstand, and which absolutely removed . their doubts, and overcame all their prejudices. The account given by the evangelists of Christ's resurrection is farther confirmed by the testimony of St. Paul, who mentions his having been seen by Peter, by James, and by the twelve apostles ; concerning which he had many opportunities of informing himself from the persons themselves. He also maketh mention of his having been seen of above five hundred brethren at once, and expressly affirms, as a thing he was well assured of, that the greater part of them were alive at the time when he wrote this ; and it is not to be doubted, that he had seen and known many of them, to whose living testimonies he could then appeal. These things he refers the Corinthians to in his epistle, as things known to be cer tainly true, and which could not be contested, and concerning which he himself had spoken to them more at large when he was with them, 1 Cor. xv. 1, 2, 3, &c. And in a dispute which he there maintaineth against some who denied the future resurrection of the dead, he principally argueth from the resurrection of Christ, as a fact so fully proved, that they could not deny it. Yet our author is pleased to reject all this at once, because St Paul writes by hear say, i. e. because he was not himself present at those appearances, though he had the account from those who were so : and so fond is Let. XII. " THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS CONSIDERD. 147 he of this thought, that he repeats it, as his manner is, in three or four different parts of his book. According to this rule, an historian is not to be credited in any fact of which he himself was not an eye witness, though he might have undoubted assurance of it; a maxim which would destroy the credit of the best historians now in the world. But one should think this writer would at least allow, that St. Paul ought to be credited, when, after mentioning Christ's having appeared to others, he affirms, that he himself had seen Jesus, 1 Cor. xv. 8. ix. 1. But it seems this also is to be rejected, under pretence that he only saw him in a vision ; though it was at noon-day, as he was travelling with several others in his company, and which was attended with such remarkable circumstances, and produced such real effects, that if he could not be sure of this, no man can be certain of any thing that he hears or sees. Mr. Chubb indeed, who faithfully treads in our author's steps, takes upon him to affirm, that St. Paul's testimony weakens, instead of strengthen ing, the evidence of Christ's resurrection ; for which he gives this reason, that though St. Paul had known Jesus before his resurrec tion, which it doth not appear he did, yet as that glorified body must have been different from what if had appeared to be whilst he was on earth, he could not be a proper judge ofthe identity of that body with that body which had been crucified.* But it is to be considered, that what St. Paul was to be convinced of, and of which he himself was afterwards to be a witness, was, that Jesus was raised again, and invested with a divine dominion and glory. And of this the appearing of Jesus to him in the manner he did, as he was goino- to Damascus, and assuring him by a voice from heaven, that it was Jesus whom he had persecuted who then spoke to him, attended with such amazing displays of a divine glory and splendour, together with the remarkable consequences which then followed upon it, especially the extraordinary miraculous gifts and powers with which he himself was endued, and which he was enabled to confer upon others in the name of a risen Jesus, exhibited the most illustrious and convincing proof and evidence that could possibly be desired, and which absolutely overcame all the strong and obstinate pre judices with which his mind was at that very time possessed. So that all things considered, there never was a testimony which deserved greater regard than that of St. Paul, and accordingly it has justly had the greatest weight in all ages. I pass by other instances that might be mentioned of our author's great unfairness and disingenuity, particularly his gross perversions of several passages of Scripture, and putting a meaning upon them contrary to the plain intention of the writers, with many other things which are fully detected and exposed by his learned answer ers. But what is wanting in reasoning, is made up in confidence. He boldly pronounceth, that " the witnesses do not all agree in one circumstance, but palpably contradict one another in every par ticular; and that such inconsistencies, improbabilities, absurdities, * Chubb's Posthumous Works, vol. I. 1,2 148 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XII. and contradictions, would destroy the credit of other histories ;" but he sneeringly adds, " that the faith of this is founded on a rock."* And I believe it will hardly be thought too severe a censure to say, that any man who would treat any other historians as this writer hath treated the evangelists, and who would advance such rules of judging concerning any other books whatsoever, as he seems to think fair with regard to theirs, would, instead of passing for a can did and judicious critic, be generally exploded as a malicious and impertinent caviller, that had betrayed a great defect of sense, manners, or honesty. In my remarks on Mr. Woolston's discourses in tbe seventh letter, notice was taken of that grand objection, that our Lord ought to have appeared publicly to the chief priests and rulers of the Jews after his resurrection. I shall not repeat what is there offered in answer to it ; but shall only observe, that our author has endeavoured to strengthen. that objection by pretending, that Jesus had actually engaged to do so ; and that " not to appear to the Jews when he had promised it, and put the truth of his mission upon it, was a denying the truth of his mission, and a falsifying his word."* Thus he represents it, as if the evangelists had said, that Christ promised to appear publicly to the Jews, and particularly to their chief priests and rulers after his resurrection. But this is entirely his own fiction ; our Lord made no such promise. He declared indeed, that a sign, like that of the prophet Jonas, should be given to that evil and adulterous generation, i. e. that suf ficient evidence should be given to convince them of the truth of his resurrection. And such evidence there was given, if their minds had been open to conviction ; and vast numbers of the Jews were actually convinced by it. But this writer carrieth it still farther ; he thinks Jesus should have shown himself to the Jews as their deliverer from the Roman yoke, and as their temporal king, that he might prove that he was the Messiah, and fulfil the pro phecies. A reflection occurs to me on this occasion, which you will allow me to mention : It relates to the several demands that have been made by these gentlemen with regard to the evidence, which they pretend ought to have been given to the Jews of our Saviour's re surrection. The author of Christianity not founded on Argument thinks, that Jesus ought to have taken one turn in the market-place in the presence of all the people, and that " this might have spared both the painful labours and lives of so many holy vouchers. "% Mr. Chubb insists upon it, that when Christ was risen, " he should have repaired to the house of some friend, and made it the place of his residence the time he staid upon earth, that so the rest of his friends, and all others, might know where to see him, and have access to him."§ And if he had done so, and been publicly visited, and the people had gathered together in crowds, as might in that case have * Resurrection of Jesus considered, p. 56, 57, 58. ¦'¦"•• Ibid. p. 59, 61. t Christianity not founded on Argument, p. 68. § Posthumous Works, vol. I. Let. XII. " THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS CONSIDERED." 149 been expected, this might have awakened the jealousy both of the Jewish chief priests and rulers, and of the Roman government, and might, in the temper the Jews were then in, have probably produced tumults and insurrections, which would have brought a great slur upon Christianity at its first appearance. And so undoubtedly these gentlemen would have had it; for, according to our author, if Jesus had appeared publicly to the Jews after his resurrection, this would not have been sufficient, if he did not also head their armies. And then to be sure this would have been insisted upon as a manifest proof, that the whole scheme of his religion was false, and a mere piece of carnal policy. I cannot help thinking upon the whole, that after all the clamour that hath been raised against it, the evidence which was actually given of our Lord's resurrection was the properest thatcould begiven. His making a public personal appearance to the people of the Jews would have been on many accounts improper, and might probably have had bad consequences. But besides the evidence arising from the testimony ofthe soldiers, who had been set to watch the sepul chre, which was well known to the chief priests, and, notwithstand ing all their precautions, had come to the knowledge of others too ; besides this, his appearing, in the manner he did, to a considerable number of persons, who had been immediately acquainted with him, to whom he frequently showed himself alive after his passion by many infallible proofs during the course of forty days ; his ascend ing afterwards into heaven in their sight, and the effusion of the Holy Ghost in his extraordinary miraculous gifts and powers, as he himself had promised, upon his disciples, the authorized witnesses of his resurrection, which was done in the most public manner pos sible, before many thousands of persons of all nations, which were then assembled at Jerusalem ; all this, with the following divine at testations that were given them, to confirm their testimony where- ever they went, preaching the gospel for many years together, to which testimony they unalterably adhered, in opposition to the greatest sufferings and persecutions to which it exposed them ; all this taken together furnished the most proper and convincing evi dence, not only of Christ's resurrection, but of his exaltation to glory. And accordingly we find in fact, that his resurrectiop was accom panied with such proof and evidence, as convinced many myriads (for so it should be rendered) of the Jewish nation, and among them great numbers of the priests, Acts vi. 7. xxi. 20. and brought them over, contrary to all their prejudices, to acknowledge one that had been crucified by the heads of their own nation for their Mes siah, their Saviour, and their Lord ; and afterwards convinced vast numbers of the Gentiles, and gained them over to a religion the most opposite that could be imagined, not only to their prejudices and superstitions, but to their vices, and which exposed its profes sors to the most grievous reproaches, persecutions, and sufferings. But to return to our author : —Whosoever carefully considers and compares what he hath offered may easily perceive, that, whatever pretences he may make of demanding other and farther evidence of 150 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XII. Christ's resurrection than was given, no evidence that could have been given of it would have satisfied him. If Jesus had shown him self alive, not only to the Jewish rulers, but to every single person of the Jewish nation, he would have been as far from believing it as he is now ; for he intimates, that it would be necessary that Christ should appear again in every age, and every country, and to every particular person ; and that all the miracles should be wrought over again :* And even this, upon his principles, would not be sufficient ; for he lets us know more than once, that in these cases we are not to trust our own eyesight. He roundly asserteth, that " every mira cle is an absurdity to common sense and understanding, and con trary to all the attributes of God."f And that "pretended facts, which are contrary to nature, can have no natural evidence ; and that these facts cannot be admitted on any evidence, because they in their own nature exclude all evidence, and allow of no possible proof."*); This point he hath laboured for several pages together, where he strongly asserteth (for I do not find that he bringeth any thing that can be properly called a proof,) that miracles are impos sible. And he had better have stuck entirely to this, since if" he could but have proved it, he might have saved himself the trouble of writing the rest of his book. There is another extraordinary passage in this writer, which de serves to have a particular notice taken of it. After having treated the account given by St. John ofthe piercing of Christ's side with a spear, and of which he himself was any eye-witness, as a fiction, for no other reason but because the other evangelists do not mention it: he insinuates, that if his side.was not thus pierced, he might not be really dead when he was put into the sepulchre ; and then no wonder that he rose again.§ Thus it comes out, that he doubteth even of the death of Jesus, which neither Jews nor heathens ever doubted of. Was there ever a more obstinate or unreasonable incredulity ? He might as well doubt, whether there ever was such a person as Jesus, or his apostles, or whether ever the Christian religion was pro pagated in the world at all. And indeed if, as he affirms, the resur rection of Christ was the most incredible story that could be told, and the evidence that was given for it was the worst evidence that could be given, \\ he might have argued more plausibly than he hath done in most other cases, that it was impossible, as the case was circum stanced, that such a silly story should ever make its way into the world, either among Jews or Gentiles, considering the religion that was founded upon it was absolutely contrary to their most prevailing prejudices, and had no worldly advantages on its side, but all the powers of the world engaged against it ; that therefore it is absurd to suppose that Christianity made any progress at all in the first ages, though there is no fact of which we have fuller evidence. And then he would only have one step to advance farther, and which is indeed the natural consequence of this, and that is, to doubt whether * Resurrection of Jesus considered, p. 62. f Ibid. p. 51, 52. t Ibid p 73 74 § Ibid. p. 50. || Ibid. p. 67. ' Let. XII. "THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS CONSIDERED.'' 15 1 there is any such thing as the religion of Jesus, or any persons in the world that now profess it. I shall conclude my remarks upon this writer with observing, that the very variations among the evangelists, which he produceth as so many contradictions, do really confirm the truth of the main facts. What he seemeth to insist upon is, that every one of them should tell all the same facts, in the same order and manner, and with the same circumstances, neither more nor less ; and that no one of them should mention any thing which is not related by all the rest. And if they had done so, then no doubt this would have been improved as a plain argument, that the whole was a concerted fiction ; and that to derive a credit to it, it was pretended to have been written and published by four different persons at different times, whereas these four pretended historians were really but one historian, or, if they were different, they only transcribed one ano ther. But as the case now stands with the evangelists, there is a harmony in the main facts, and in the substance of Christ's dis courses ; and yet at the same time there is a considerable variety in the order and manner -of their narration; such a variety as plainly sheweth these accounts to have been written by different historians, not copied from one another ; and that they did not write by con cert, in which case they would have been more careful to shun all appearance of contradiction. They write with an unaffected sim plicity, and with a confidence of truth, as becometh those that were fully assured of what they relate ; each writeth what he knew best, or what he thought properest to take notice of; and yet notwith standing the seeming variations in the order of their narration, and that some facts, or circumstances of facts, are taken notice of by some of them which are not mentioned by others, it will be found, if narrowly examined, that there is no contradiction between them, and that their accounts may be fairly reconciled. And it is to be hoped, that this author's attempt to expose their authority, however ill intended, will only tend to strengthen it ; since though his malice and prejudice are very apparent, and though it is plain that he came to examine their accounts, not with a calm, impartial, and dispassionate temper of mind, but with a resolution, if possible, to find out absurdities and contradictions in them ; yet he has not been able to make good the charge. It turns out, that they are perfectly consistent, and that their seeming contradictions admit of a just reconciliation . - jji | I have been carried farther than I at first intended in making observations upon this pamphlet, which gives a true sample of the deistical spirit, and may be regarded as one of the boldest and openest attacks that was ever made upon that grand article of the Christian faith, the resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ. And I have been the larger and more particular in my remarks upon it, both because of the importance of the subject, which concerneth the very foundation of our holy religion, and because I thought it might be of use to take this occasion to obviate some of the most plausible objections that have been urged against it. And what 152 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XII. hath been here offered may equally serve to take off the force of that part of Mr. Chubb's posthumous works which relates to the same point, and which he hath very much laboured. But though this letter may seem already to have exceeded its due bounds, it will be necessary, according to the method I have hitherto pursued, to take notice of the answers that were made to this book. Dr. Samuel Chandler, who had on some former occa sions appeared to great advantage in the defence of Christianity, published on this occasion a valuable treatise, entitled, " The Wit nesses of the Resurrection of Jesus re-examined, and their Testimony proved entirely consistent," London, 1744. It is divided into eight chapters. In the first, it is shewn, that the sufferings and glory of Christ were foretold by the ancient prophets. In the second, that Christ plainly foretold his own sufferings and death, and resurrec tion to his own disciples. In the third, that he declared his death and resurrection publicly to the Jews. In the fourth, it is proved, that the Jewish rulers and Pharisees procured a guard to be set on the sepulchre of Jesus; and a solid answer is returned to the author's objections against it. The fifth chapter relateth to the appearance of the angels to the soldiers ; the propriety of which is vindicated against his exceptions. The sixth chapter is concerning the appearances of the angels to the women after the resurrection. The seventh treats of the several appearances of Christ to the women and to his disciples ; and this author's charge of inconsis tencies in the evangelic accounts is distinctly considered. In the eighth chapter, Dr. Chandler concludes with summing up the evi dence for the resurrection of Jesus, which he hath done with great clearness and judgment. About the same time there was another answer published by a learned and ingenious but anonymous author, which is entitled, " The Evidence of the Resurrection cleared, in Answer to ' The Re surrection of Jesus considered.' " He follows the author of that pamphlet closely, and shews, that he grossly misrepresents the ar guments in the "Trial of the Witnesses," which he undertakes to answer, and that he uses the evangelists still worse. The things which we have mentioned, as taken notice of by Dr. Chandler, are also considered by this writer; particularly it is clearly proved, that Christ foretold his death and resurrection, both to his own disciples and to the Jews ; and the author's reasoning and exceptions against the story of setting the guard, and sealing the stone, are shown to be vain and groundless. The accounts given by the evangelists of the appearances of the angels to the women, and of Christ to them and to the disciples, are distinctly considered; and the seeming variations, which the author pretends to be so many contradictions, are accounted for, though in a way somewhat different from Dr. Chandler. The solutions of these difficulties proposed by each of these learned writers, are very ingenious, and may suffice to obviate the charge of contradictions the author hath brought against the evangelists ; but some of them are judged not to be quite so clear and natural, as those afterwards given by Mr. West. This anonymous Let. XII. "THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS CONSIDERED." 153 writer concludes with a distinct examination of what the author of " The Resurrection of Jesus considered" had offered against miracles in general. He hath clearly and judiciously exposed the weakness and fallacy of those reasonings, whereby that author pretendeth to prove, that miracles are impossible both in a physical and moral sense ; that they are contrary to God's immutability ; that they are perfectly needless, and answer no valuable end at all ; and that if they were once necessary, they would be always necessary. Besides the two answers above-mentioned, there was another then published, which I have not seen, and of which therefore I cannot give a parti cular account, though from the character I have heard of it, as well as from the known abilities ofthe author, I make no doubt of its being well executed ; it is entitled, " An Address to Deists, being a Proof of Revealed Religion from Miracles and Prophecies, in Answer to a Book entitled, ' The Resurrection of Jesus considered/ by John Jackson, Rector of Rossington, London, 8vo., 1774." Some time after, there was another book published, which was also occasioned by "The Resurrection of Jesus considered," and which particularly engaged the attention of the public, both by its own excellence, and because the author of it was a layman ; it is entitled, " Observations on the History and Resurrection of Jesus Christ," by Gilbert West, Esquire, London, 1747. He very justly commends the two learned and ingenious answers above-mentioned, as containing a solid confutation of many objections against Chris tianity advanced by the author of "The Resurrection of Jesus con- sided ;" but declares himself not to have been so fully satisfied with the manner of their clearing the sacred writers from the contradic tions charged upon them. This put him upon examining the Scrip tures themselves, and comparing the several accounts of the evan gelists with each other, which he hath done with great exactness ; and the result of his enquiries was, that by carefully distinguishing the different appearances and events recorded by the evangelists, several of which had been hitherto confounded, he hath happily re moved the difficulties and inconsistencies charged upon them, and hath taken away the very foundation of the principal objections that have been so often repeated almost from the beginning of Christianity to this day. I shall not enter upon the particulars of his scheme, which may be seen with great advantage in his book. I shall only observe, that he hath not made use of strained and ar bitrary suppositions, but such as seem clearly to arise from the ac counts of the evangelists, carefully considered and compared. By comparing the several parts of the history together, he hath made it to appear, that the women came at different times to the .sepulchre, and in different companies, and not all at once, as many have supposed; that there were several distinct appearances of angels, of which he reckons three, besides that to the Roman sol diers, viz. to the other Mary and Salome, to Mary Magdalene, to Joanna and others with her ; that these several facts were reported to the apostles at different times, and by different persons ; that there were two distinct appearances of Christ to the women ; one 154 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XII. of which was to Mary Magdalene alone, the other to the other Mary and Salome ; that St. Peter was twice at the sepulchre, once with St. John, after the first report by Mary Magdalene, concerning the body's not being found in the sepulchre ; the second time after the report made by Joanna, and the women with her, of the appearing of the angels to them. He observes, that Christian writers, dazzled by some few points of resemblance, have confounded these different facts, and thereby given great advantage to the infidel; whereas, the facts being rightly distinguished, all the objections against this part of the gospel history, as contradictory and inconsistent, en tirely vanish; and it appeareth, that the evangelists, instead of clashing and disagreeing, mutually confirm, illustrate, and support each other's evidence. This learned gentleman hath made excellent and judicious re flections upon the several incidents in the history of the resurrec tion, and upon the older in which they happened, and in which the several proofs of the resurrection were laid before the apostles, He shows, that the discovery of it which was made to them was wisely ordered to be gradual ; and that as they were to be the chosen witnesses of the resurrection of Jesus, there was a great propriety in the several steps that were taken to give them the highest conviction of it. There is a train of witnesses, a succession of miraculous events, mutually strengthening and illustrating each other, equally and jointly concurring to prove one and the same fact. And whereas their doubting and unbelief, spoken of by the. evangelists, seem principally to have consisted in this, that though they might believe that Christ had appeared to those who declared they had seen him, yet they did not believe that he had appeared to them with a real body, therefore, in condescension to their infirmity, he gave them the fullest evidence of the reality of his bodily appearance. The proofs of Christ's resurrection laid before the apostles are digested by Mr. West under four heads. 1. The testimony of those that had seen him after he was risen. 2. The evidence of their own senses. 3. The accomplishment of the words he had spoken to them, while he was yet with them. 4. The fulfilling of the things which were written in the law of Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms, concerning him ; of which Mr. West hath given a judicious summary. Upon recapitulating the several particulars which constitute the evidence of the resurrection, he concludes, that never was there any fact more fully proved than the resurrection of Jesus Christ ; and that those who were appointed to be the witnesses of it had every kind of proof, that in the like circumstances the most scrupulous could demand, or the most incredulous imagine. Having considered the proofs of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, as they were laid before the apostles, he proceeds to consider some of the arguments that may induce us, at this distance of time, to believe that Christ rose from the dead ; and these he re- duceth to two principal heads : The testimony of the chosen wit- Let. XII. " THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS CONSIDERED." 155 nesses of the resurrection recorded in the Scriptures ; and the exis tence of the Christian religion. With regard to the former, he showeth, that the apostles and evangelists had the two qualities necessary to establish the credit of a witness, a perfect knowledge of the facts he gives testimony to, and a fair unblemished character ; and that their testimony is trans mitted down in writings either penned by themselves, or authorized by their inspection and approbation. He offereth several conside rations to show the genuineness of those writings, and takes notice both of the internal marks of the veracity of the sacred writers, observable in the Scriptures, and of the external proofs of their veracity and inspiration ; especially the exact accomplishment of the prophecies recorded in those writings. He instances, in those relating to the different states of Jews and Gentiles, different not only from each other, but from that in which both were at the time when those prophecies were written. He observes, that there are several particulars relating to the condition of the Jewish nation, which were most expressly foretold ; as the destruction of the city and temple of Jerusalem, and the signs preceding that destruction; the miseries of the Jews before, at, and after the famous siege of that city ; the general dispersion of that people, the duration of their calamity, and their wonderful preservation under it ; and finally, their restoration. And since the other parts of these predictions have been exactly accomplished, there is great reason to think, the last will be so too in the proper season. He concludes the whole with the argument drawn from the pre sent existence ofthe Christian religion; and showeth, that, without supposing the truth of Christ's resurrection, there is no accounting for the propagation and present existence of Christianity in so many regions of the world. To set this in a proper light, he repre- senteth, in an elegant and striking manner, the great difficulties this religion had to struggle with at its first appearance, and the inabilities of its first preachers, humanly speaking, to oppose and overcome those obstacles. They had the superstition and prejudices of the Jews to encounter with ; and at the same time, religion, cus tom, law, policy, pride, interest, vice, and even philosophy, united the heathen world against Christianity. Its opposers were possessed of all the wisdom, power, and authority of the world ; the preachers of it were weak and contemptible ; yet it triumphed over all oppo sition. And this, as the case was circumstanced, afforded a mani fest proof of a divine interposition, and of the truth of the extra ordinary facts by which it was supported ; the principal of which is the resurrection of Jesus Christ. Thus have I endeavoured to give some idea of this excellent per formance, and have been the more particular in my account of it, because a work of this kind, done by a lay-man, is apt to be more taken notice of and received with less prejudice ; and for the same reason, though it does not come so directly within my present design, I hope you will indulge me in giving some account of a short, but justly admired treatise, which appeared soon after, and 156 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XII. was also written by a learned lay-man, Sir George Littleton. It is entitled, " Observations on the Conversion and Apostleship of St. Paul, in a Letter to Gilbert West, Esquire, London, 1747." The great advantage of this performance is, that the evidence for Christianity is here drawn to one point of view, for the use of those who will not attend to a long series of argument. The design is to show, that the conversion and apostleship of St. Paul, alone con sidered, is of itself a demonstration sufficient to prove Christianity to be a divine revelation. This design is very happily executed. He first considereth the account St. Paul himself hath given of the miraculous manner of his conversion; and thence argueth, that it must of necessity be, that the person attesting these things of him self either was an impostor, who said what he knew to be false, with an intent to deceive ; or he was an enthusiast, who by the force of an over-heated imagination imposed upon himself; or he was deceived by the fraud of others; or lastly, what he declared to be the cause of his conversion, and to have happened in conse quence of it, did all really happen ; and therefore the Christian religion is a divine revelation. That he was not an impostor, he proves, by showing, with admirable clearness and strength, that he could have no rational motive to undertake such an imposture ; nor could possibly have carried it on with any success by the means we know he employed. With equal evidence he showeth that St. Paul was not an enthusiast; that he had not those dispositions which are essential ingredients in that character ; and that he could not possi bly have imposed on himself by any power of enthusiasm, either with regard to the miracle that caused his conversion, or to the con sequential effects of it, or to some other circumstances which he bears testimony to in his Epistles ; especially the miracles wrought by him, and the extraordinary gifts conferred upon him, and upon the Christian converts to whom he wrote. To suppose all this to have been only owing to the strength of his own imagination, when there was in reality no such thing at all, is to suppose him to have been all this time quite out of his senses ; and then it is absolutely impossible to account, how such a distempered enthusiast and mad man could make such a progress, as we know he did, in converting the Gentile world. He next proceeds to show, that St. Paul was not deceived by the fraud of* others ; if the disciples of Christ could have conceived so strange a thought as that of turning his persecutor into his apostle, they could not possibly have effected it in the manner in which it was effected, with the extraordinary con sequences that followed upon it. It is evident, then, that what he said of himself could not be imputed to the deceit of others, no more than to wilful imposture, or enthusiasm; and then it followeth, that what he relateth to have been the cause of his conversion, and to have happened in consequence of it, did all really happen, and therefore the Christian religion is a divine revelation. He concludeth with some good observations to show, that the mysteries of the Christian religion do not furnish any just reason for rejecting the strong and convincing evidence with which it is attended ; that Let. XIII. mr chubb's posthumous works. 157 there are several incomprehensible difficulties in deism itself ; such as those relating to the origin of moral evil, the reconciling the pre science of God with the free-will of man, which Mr. Locke owns he could not do, though he acknowledged both, the creation of the world in time, or the eternal production of it. And yet no wise man, because of these difficulties, would deny the being, the attri butes, or the providence of God. But it is time to conclude this long epistle ; and here I intended, as you know, to have closed my accounts of the deistical wri ters. But as you insist upon it, that, in order to complete this design, it will be necessary to take a more particular notice than I have done of Mr. Chubb's Posthumous Works, this will engage me to continue my correspondence on this head for some time longer. LETTER XIII. An Account of Mr. Chubb's Posthumous Works ; his specious Professions, and the advantageous Character he gives of his own Writings — He doth not allow a particu lar Providence, or that Prayer to God is a Duty— His Uncertainty and Inconsis tency with Respect to a future State of Existence, and a future Judgment — He absolutely rejects the Jewish Revelation — His Objections against it briefly obviated — He expresses a good Opinion of Mahometanism, and will not allow that it was propagated by the Sword — He seems to acknowledge Christ's divine Mission, and sometimes gives a favourable Account of Christianity ; but it is shown, that he hath done all he can to weaken and expose it, and to subvert its Credit and divine Autho rity. Sir, Among the deistical writers of this present age, Mr. Chubb made no inconsiderable figure. He was, though not a man of learning, regarded by many as a person of strong natural parts and acuteness, and who had a clear manner of expression. He was the author of a great number of tracts, in some of which he put on the appearance of a friend to Christianity; though it was no difficult matter to discern that his true intention was to betray it. One of the most remarkable of these tracts was his " True Gospel of Jesus Christ asserted ;" in which, under pretence of asserting the gospel of Christ in its genuine simplicity, he really endeavoured to subvert and expose it. This was answered by Mr. Joseph Hallet, in a valuable tract, entitled, " The consistent Christian ; being a Confu tation of the errors advanced in Mr. Chubb's Book, entitled, ' The true Gospel of Jesus Christ asserted, relating to the Necessity of Faith, the Nature of the Gospel, the Inspiration of the Apostles, &c.' with Remarks on his Dissertation on Providence, 8vo. 1738." Another noted tract of Mr. Chubb's was, his " Discourse on Mira cles, in which he proposed to give a representation of the various 158 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIII. reasonings that relate to the subject of miracles. But it is manifest, that his intention was not to clear, but to perplex the subject ; and to show, that the proof from miracles is not at all to be depended upon. To this there was a solid and full answer returned by Mr. Abra ham Le Moine, which was published at London, 8vo, 1747. Several of Mr. Chubb's tracts were also answered by Mr. Caleb Fleming; but his answers I have not seen. What I propose to consider are those that are called his " Posthumous Works," some of which were printed in his own life-time, and the rest carefully corrected and prepared by himself for the press, and published after his death, in two volumes, 8vo, London, 1748. The first volume begins with a short tract, entitled, " Remarks on the Scriptures." But the far greater part of this volume, and the entire second volume, is taken up with what is called " The Author's Farewell to his Readers, comprehending a variety of Tracts on the most important subjects of religion." It is divided into eleven large sections; and the prin cipal design he appears to have had in view is, to destroy, as far as in him lay, the credit and authority of the Christian revelation. I know of no answer that has been published to this book, and there fore shall be more particular in my remarks upon it, to obviate in some measure the mischief it is fitted to produce. It is plain, from several hints which he hath given us, that he looked upon himself to be a writer of no small importance. He declares, that he hath treated the several subjects he has " discussed with plainness and freedom, and of course must have ministered to the pleasure of the intelligent part of mankind, whether they approved his sentiments or not."* He begins the first section of what he calls his Farewell lo his Readers, with expressing his hope, that his " correspondence with them by writing for many years past, has been not altogether useless nor unacceptable to them."f And in the last section of his Farewell, which he calls his Conclusion, he expresseth himself as one that in these his last writings, was leaving a very valuable legacy to the world. I know few authors, who have taken leave of their readers with a greater air of solemnity than he has done. He calls God to witness to the goodness of his inten tions ; and declares, that in what he has offered to the world, he has " appealed to the understanding, and not to the passions of men :"% That with sincerity and truth he can say, he has had a real concern and regard to the present well-being of his fellow-creatures, as well as to their future happiness :" And that as he was " in the decline of life, and perhaps not far from the conclusion of it, and being in the full exercise of his intellectual faculties, which are not in the least clouded or impaired, he chose to take his leave of the world as a writer, hoping, that what he has offered to public consi deration has had, and may have, some good effect upon the minds and lives of his readers."§ And he concludes the whole with again assuring his readers, that he has laid before them, in the plainest * Posthumous Works, vol. i. p. 64, 65. t Ibid. p. 97. i Ibid. vol. ii. p. 354, 355. § Ibid. vol. ii. p. 357, 359, 361. Let. XIII. mr. chubb's tosthumous works. 159 manner he was able, both in this discourse, and in what he had before published to the world, those truths which he thought to be of the highest importance. And so, saith he, " I bid you farewell, hoping to be a sharer with you of the divine favour, in that peaceful and happy state, which God hath prepared for the virtuous and faithful, in some other future world." Who that considers these solemn expressions, would be apt to suspect, that this very author, in these his farewell discourses, has not only used his utmost efforts to expose Christianity and the holy Scriptures, but has endeavoured to weaken some of the most impor tant principles of natural religion ? He had, in one of his tracts formerly published, shown himself to be no friend to the doctrine of a particular providence ; and there are several passages in his " Posthumous Works," which look that way. He plainly intimates, that he looks upon God as having- nothing now to do with the good or evil that is done among man kind ;* and that men's natural abilities or endowments of body or mind, their fortunes, situation in the world, and other circumstances or advantages by which one man is distinguished from another, are things that entirely depend upon second causes, and in which pro vidence does not interpose at all.-f- And when he endeavours to show, that no proof can be brought for a future state from the pre sent unequal distribution of things, his argument amounteth in effect to this, that providence hath nothing to do with these present inequalities, nor concerneth itself with some men's being in a pros perous condition or circumstances, and others in a calamitous or suffering state.*): He evidently supposes all along, that God doth not interpose in any thing where second causes are concerned :§ So that all agency of divine providence in disposing, governing, and overruling second causes, in which so much of the wisdom of God's providential administrations doth consist, is, upon his scheme, abso lutely excluded. Agreeably to this, he discardeth all hope or expectation of divine assistance in the practice of that which is good ; though he owns, that something of this kind hath been generally believed in all religion?. This is the design of a considerable part of the first section of his " Farewell to his Readers ;"|| which would deserve to be particularly examined, if this were a proper place for it. I shall only observe, that what he seems to lay a principal stress upon, to set aside the notion of divine influences or assistances, is, that we have no way of certainly distinguishing them from the operations of our own minds ; whereas, supposing this to be the case, all that it would prove is, not that there are no gracious assistances or influences communicated at all, but that they are ordinarily communicated in a way perfectly agreeable to the just order of our faculties, and without putting any unnatural constraint upon them. * Posthumous Works, vol. i. p. 127. f Ibid. p. 225. * Ibid. vol. i. p. 394, 395. $ See concerning a particular providence, Woolaston's Religion of Nature deline ated, p. 98, and seq. I| Posthumous Works, vol. i. p. 114, and seq. 160 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIII And as he allows no particular interposition of divine providence in human affairs, it is not to be wondered at, that he has done what he can to show, that prayer to God is no part of natural religion.* He supposes it as a thing certain, that God doth not fulfil our requests by granting what we pray for, since things will go on in their natural course, whether we pray to God or not. He owns in deed, that prayer, considered as a positive institution, may be of use, by introducing proper refections, and thereby proper affections and actions; and provided it be made use of only for this purpose, with out expecting to obtain any thing from God in consequence of it, he thinks it cannot be said to be a mocking of God ; but yet he ap prehends that even in this case, there is still an impropriety in it, and puts the question, whether such an impropriety should be a bar to prayer, or whether it be displeasing to God; and he plainly intimates, that in his opinion it is so.f I need not take particular notice of the objections he hath urged against the duty of prayer, which have been often sufficiently obviated ;£• but I think it is evi dent, that there is little room left, upon this author's scheme, for what hath been hitherto looked upon by the wisest and best of men to be a principal part of true piety, or of the duty we owe to God, viz. a constant religious dependence upon his wise and good provi dence, a thankful sense of his goodness, and gratitude to him for the benefits we receive, a patient submission and resignation to his will under afflictions, an ingenuous trust and affiance in him, and a look ing up to him for his gracious assistances to help our sincere en deavours. The doctrines concerning the immortality of the soul, and a future state of retributions, are justly regarded as important parts of natural religion, and have been acknowledged to be so by some of the deists themselves. Mr. Blount, in a letter to the right honour able and most ingenious Strephon, in the Oracles of Reason, says, "There are many arguments from reason and philosophy to prove the immortality of the soul, together with its rewards and punish ments ; but that there is no argument of greater weight with him, than the absolute necessity and convenience that it should be so, as well to complete the justice of God, as to perfect the happiness of man, not only in this world, but in that which is to come.'' Another deistical writer observes,^ that " to say, man's soul dies with the body is a desperate conclusion, which saps the foundation of human happiness. "§ And one would think, by some passages in Mr. Chubb's book, that he was of the same opinion. He begins the first section of his Farewell with assuring his readers, that what he hath principally aimed at in all his writings, has been both to evince, and to impress deeply upon their minds, a just sense of those truths, which are of the highest concern to them ; and one of those truths which he there expressly mentions is this, " that God will reward or punish * Posthumous Works, vol. i. p. 287, {fee. f Ibid. p. 283, 284. \ Religion of Nature delineated, p. 125, 126. and Benson's tract On the End and Design of Prayer. § Letter to the Deists, p 25, cited by Halyburton. L3t. XIII. MR. CHUBB'S POSTHUMOUS WORKS. 1()1 men in another world, according as they have by their good or bad behaviour, rendered themselves the proper objects of cither in this."* He repeats this again in very strong expressions at the end of his tenth section, where he proposes to set before the reader, the sum total, as he expresseth it, of his principles ;f and again, in what he calls his conclusion, he speaks of God's calling our species to an ac count for their practice and behaviour, "at which tribunal," saith he, "he will most certainly deal with me, and the rest of mankind, injustice and equity, according to the truth and reality of our re spective cases." And in the very last words of his " Farewell to his Readers," which I cited before, he declares his hope " to be a sharer with them of the divine favour in that peaceful and happy state, which God hath prepared for the virtuous and faithful, in some other future world.":]: And yet, notwithstanding these express and repeated declarations concerning a future state of existence, and a future judgment and retribution, he hath taken pains to unsettle the minds of men in these important points. In his fourth section, in which he professedly enquireth concern ing a future state of existence to men, he representeth it as abso" lutely doubtful, whether the soul be material or immaterial ; whether it be distinct from the body; and, if it be, whether it is equally perishable as the body, and shall die with it, or shall subsist after the dissolution of the body. These are points which, he says, he can not possibly determine, because he has nothing to ground such de termination upon ; and at the same time he declareth, that " if tho soul be perishable with the body, there can surely be no place for argument with regard to a future state of existence to men, or a future retribution, because when the human frame is once dissolved by death, then man ceases to be, and is no more."§ In'what follows, he declares himself quite unsatisfied with the arguments which are brought to prove, that the soul is not material, or that matter is not capable of intelligence ; and though he doth not take upon him ex pressly to determine that point, it is easy to see that he inclineth most to the materialists ;|| and after having declared, that the philo sophical arguments and reasonings on this head are too abstract and subtle for him to understand, and that therefore he cannot form any judgment about them, nor draw any conclusion from them, he adds, that divine revelation does not afford a proper ground of certainty with respect to man's future existence, because we cannot come to any certainty with regard to the divine original of any external reve lation.^] He finds fault with St. Paul for saying, that life ami im mortality are brought to light by the gospel, and will not allow that the resurrection of Christ, supposing it true, though he takes a great deal of pains to show that it is not so, proves either the possibility or certainty of a resurrection and a future state.*"* Thus it appears, that, in this section, where he professedly treateth of a future state * Posthumous Works, vol. i. p. 97, 99. t Ibid. vol. ii. p. 3-18, 349. t Ibid. p. 355. § Ibid. vol. i. p. 312, 313. || Ibid, p 317, 318, 124, 326. U Ibid. p. 327, 328. " * Ibid. p. 333, and seq. M 162 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIII. of existence to men, he does all he can to render it absolutely un certain, and to show that no proof can be given of it, either from reason or revelation ; and yet, that he may make a show of saying something, he concludes this section with observing, that from man's being an accountable creature, there arises a probability, that there will be a future state of existence to men ; the farther consideration of which he reserves for the following section, which is concerning a future judgment and retribution. In this therefore, which is his fifth section, the reader might per haps expect some determination of this point ; and yet, though this is a pretty long section, the proper subject of which is the future judgment, it is managed in such a manner, as to leave the reader at an uncertainty about it, and as much at a loss as before. He begins indeed with observing, that " man, by his faculties and endowments, is an accountable creature, accountable for his behaviour to all whom it may concern, namely, to the intelligent world, and also to the Deity, who is the most perfect intelligence."* But he absolutely discards the proof that is drawn from the present unequal distribu tions of divine providence. This argument he states very unfairly, and endeavours to place it in a ridiculous light. He compares men's different conditions here on earth to that of horses, some of whom meet with bad masters, and others happen to have good ones ; and pretends, the argument would equally conclude for a future retribution with regard to all other animals, as it does for the species of mankind ;f but, admitting there will be a future retribution, he thinks it may be doubted, whether it shall be universally extended to all our species. He plainly intimates, that, in his opinion, those who die in their youth will not be called into judgment, nor those who act a very low part in life ; and he seems to think, that those only shall be called to an account whose lives have been of much greater consequence to the world, and who have been greatly sub servient to the public good, or hurt of mankind :% So that, accord ing to his representation of the case, supposing there were to be a future judgment and retribution, it is what the generality of mankind would have little concern in. And as, upon his scheme, there are but few who shall be called to an account, so it is but for some par ticular actions that they shall be accountable. He observes, that no man ever intended to do dishonour to God, or to be injurious to him, however foolishly they may have used the names or terms by which the Deity is characterized; and that therefore there will be no en quiry at the last judgment about such offences as these; i. e. about blasphemies against God. The only offence man can be guilty of against God is, he thinks, the want of a just sense of his kindness and beneficence, and the not making a public profession of gratitude to him; but whether this will make a part of the grand inquest, he declares himself certainly unable to judge ; and he plainly insinuates, that in his opinion it will not ; since " among men it has been looked upon to be a mark of greatness of soul, rather to despise and over- » Posthumous Works, vol. i. p. 387. t Ibid. p. 395. { Ibid. p. 400. Let. XIII. MR. chubb's TOSTHUMOUS WORKS. 163 look such ingratitude, than to show any resentment of it."* The only thing, therefore, for which he supposes men shall be ac countable, is for the injuries or benefits they do to one another; and even as to these, he seems not to allow, that the good or evil particular persons do to one another, will come into judgment, but only " the good or bad part men act, by voluntarily contributing to the good or hurt of the commonweal."f He afterwards setteth him self to show, that things would be as well ordered in the world with out the supposition and expectation of a future judgment, as with it; that men's duties and obligations would still be the same, and so would the motives to adhere to virtue, and to avoid vice ; nor is the belief of it of any great advantage to society :J To all which it may be added, that here again, in treating concerning a future judgment, he takes care to repeat what he had said in the foregoing section, viz. that if the soul be perishable, and is dissolved with the body, then this world seems to be man's all, and that on such a supposi tion, a resurrection or restoration, and a future retribution, seem to be excluded ; and at the same time he declareth, that whether the soul perisheth with the body or not, is a thing which admitteth of no proof.§ So that, upon the whole, he really leaveth it as a matter quite uncertain, whether there shall be a future judgment or not ; and yet, when he has a mind to make a boast of the good tendency of his principles, he is for making a merit of it, that it is one of those important truths, which he has taken pains to inculcate on the minds of men. I have insisted the longer upon these things, that I may unmask the fair pretences of this author, who sets up for an uncommon degree of openness and candour. His admirers may hence see how consistent he is, and how far his professions are to be depended on. I shall now consider what he hath offered in this his solemn Farewell to his Readers, with regard to revealed religion. As to revelation in general, he seems to make a very fair conces sion. "When men (saith he) are sunk into gross ignorance and error, and are greatly vitiated in their affections and actions, then God may, for any reason I can see to the contrary, kindly interpose, by a special application of his-power and providence, and reveal to men such useful truths as otherwise they might be ignorant of, or might not attend to; and also lay before them such rules of life as they ought to walk by ; and likewise press their obedience with proper motives, and thereby lead them to repentance and reforma- tion."|| But, as he was afraid that in this he had made too large a concession, he adds, " but then that it is so, and when it is so, will in the nature of the thing be matter of doubt and disputation." And in his sixth section, where he treateth expressly of revelation, he asserteth, that, in what way soever God communicateth know ledge to men, "it must be a matter of uncertainty, whether the revelation be divine or not, because we have no rule to judge, or from * Posthumous Works, vol. i. p 391, 392. t Ibid. p. 395, 397. i Ibid. p. 401, 410. § Ibid. p. .399. || ibid. p. 292, 293. *U 2 164 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIII which we can with certainty distinguish divine revelation from delu sion ;" and that if this be the case with those who receive the reve lation at first hand, then surely it must be uncertain to those who receive it from them.* Thus, though he seems to grant that God may on some occasions kindly interpose by a special application qf his power and providence, to reveal to men useful truths, and to direct and excite them to their duty ; yet he will not allow that he can communicate the knowledge of his will in such a way, as to give them a sufficient satisfying assurance that it is a divine revelation, and came from him. This is a most presumptuous and unreasonable limitation ofthe divine power and wisdom, and is in effect the same thing as to say, that he cannot communicate any revelation of his will to mankind at all; even though his goodness should dispose him to do so, and their circumstances should require it. Dr. Tindal had in effect said the same thing with our author ; and what he offered to this purpose was fully considered and obviated in the answers that were made to him.f From the question concerning revelation in general, Mr. Chubb proceeds, in his sixth section, to make some observations on the Jew ish, Mahometan, and Christian revelation in particular. The first of these he absolutely rejecteth. He pretends, that God's moral character is sullied by it ; that St. Peter and St. Paul condemn it as unworthy ofthe Deity ; that it had a vast multipli city of rites and ceremonies, which he supposes to be perfectly ar bitrary, and instituted without any reason at all ; that it represents God as acting partially, in choosing the Jewish nation to be a pecu liar people ; and that, in that constitution, a twelfth part of the people lived idly on the labour of the rest ; that the appearances of God to the patriarchs, to Moses, &c. could only belong to a local circumscribed deity; and that the God of Israel was not the Supreme Being, but only some tutelar subordinate god, consonant to the pagan idolatry; and that his conduct in ordering the Israelites to extirpate the Canaanites was inconsistent with the moral cha racter ofthe Deity. This is tbe sum of what he urges, for several pages together in his sixth section, with regard to the Jewish reve lation. J And he had insisted upon the same things before at greater length in his second section,§ where he also condemns the punish ing idolatry with death under the Jewish constitution as unjust, and as tending to justify persecution for conscience' sake. These, and other objections to the same purpose, had been urged with great vivacity by Dr. Morgan, in his " Moral Philosopher," and were fully considered and obviated in the first and second volumes of "The divine Authority ofthe Old and. New Testament asserted." Mr. Chubb has thought fit to repeat the objections,, without giving any new strength to them that I can find, or taking off the force of the answers which had been returned. * Posthumous Works, vol. ii. p. 5. t Conybeare's Defence of Revealed Religion, chap. vii. Answer to Christianity ns old as the Creation, vol. ii. chap. 1. t Posthumous Works, vol. ii. p. 19—29. § Ibid. vol. i. p. 189—231. Let. XIII. mr. chubb's posthumous works. 165 Referring therefore to what I have more largely insisted upon in the books now mentioned, I shall at present only observe in brief, that the idea given of God in the Jewish Scriptures, of his greatness and majesty, of his power and wisdom, of his justice, goodness, and purity, and of his universal presence and dominion, is the noblest that can be conceived by the human mind, and the most fitted to produce holy affections and dispositions towards him : That nothing can be more evident, than that the God proposed to the Jews, as the proper object of their worship, is the one living and true God, the sovereign Lord of the universe, who created all things by his power, who preserveth and governeth all things by his providence : That as to the divine appearances mentioned in the Old Testament, no argument can be brought to prove, that the sovereign Lord of the universe may not see fit on some occasions to exhibit himself by a visible external glory and splendour, in order to strike men with a more strong and lively sense of his immediate presence ; or that he may not in that case make use of a glorious subordinate being or beings of an order superior to man ; and some such beings have been acknowledged by the best and wisest men in all ages, in delivering messages' in his name : That it is no way inconsistent with God's universal care and providence towards mankind, to make extraordinary discoveries of his will to particular persons, or to a people, or to give them wise and excellent laws, and establish a constitution among them, the fundamental principle of which is the acknowledgment and adoration of the one living and true God, in opposition to all idolatry. Nor is there the least shadow of reason to prove, that he could not in such a case make the observance of this the principal condition on which the national privileges and benefits he thought fit to confer upon that people should be sus pended ; in which case, whosoever was guilty of idolatry under that peculiar constitution, was justly obnoxious to the penalties inflicted upon the enemies and subverters of the community. That as to God's choosing the people of Israel, they not only proceeded from ancestors, eminent for piety and virtue, and pure adorers of the Deity, but may be justly supposed, at the time of God's erecting that sacred polity among them, to have been, notwithstanding ail their faults, freer from idolatry and other vices than any of the neighbouring nations. They seem to have been much better than the people of Egypt, from whence they were delivered ; or than the Canaanites, whose land was given them, and who appear to have been a most wicked and abandoned race of men, universally guilty, not only ofthe grossest idolatries, but of the most monstrous vices and abominations of all kinds. And if God saw fit on that occasion to order them to be extirpated, as a monument to all ages of his just detestation of such crimes and vices, this cannot be proved to be inconsistent with the character of the wise and righteous governor ofthe world ; though our author represents this as a millstone that hangs at the neck of the Mosaic dispensation. With respect to the laws that were given to the people of Israel, those of a moral nature, of which there is a comprehensive summary in the Ten Command- 106 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIII. ments, are unquestionably holy and excellent ; the judicial laws are wise and equitable ; and the positive precepts, though many and various, wisely suited to the state and circumstances of that time and people. The reasons of several of them may be asssigned even at this distance ; and that there were very proper reasons for the rest may be justly supposed. And St. Peter and St. Paul, even when they represent them as burdensome, plainly show, that they look upon them to have been originally instituted for" wise ends, though no longer to be observed, when a more perfect dispensation was introduced, to which they were designed to be subservient. The appointing the Priests and Levites, and distributing them among the other tribes, is so far from being a just objection against that constitution, that it may be justly regarded as a wise and ex cellent institution, well fitted for preserving and spreading the knowledge of religion, and the law among the people, and instruct ing them' in their duty ; and the provision made for them was justly due, both as a reward for their service, and as an equivalent for their not having had a distinct portion and share of the land as signed them with the other tribes. Finally, the Mosaic constitution was attended at its first establishment with the most glorious and amazing demonstrations of a divine power and majesty, and which plainly shewed an extraordinary divine interposition ; and these facts were done not in secret, but in the most open public manner, of which the whole nation were witnesses ; and the memory of them constantly preserved, both by solemn public memorials, and in au thentic records, which have all the characters of genuine antiquity, simplicity, and a sincere regard to truth, and have been always re garded by the whole nation with the profoundest veneration. Nor is there any just foundation for the author's pretence, that the sa cred history was entirely in the hands of the priests, or that from Solomon's time to the Babylonish captivity none had access to it but the high-priest, and that in that captivity their law was entirely destroyed and lost ;* a supposition that has been frequently re peated by the deistical writers, though the absurdity of it has been fully exposed. Though Mr. Chubb hath absolutely rejected the Jewish revela tion, he speaks very favourably of that of Mahomet, t Among other instances of his regard to it, he takes upon him to pronounce, that " it cannot surely be true, that the great prevalence of Maho- metanism was owing to its being propagated by the sword ; because it must have prevailed to a very great degree before the sword could have been drawn in its favour." And yet it is a thing capable of the clearest proof, that Mahometanism from its first appearance was propagated by the sword. This was what Mahomet himself most expressly required and recommended, and he accordingly spread his religion considerably by force of arms in his life-time; and imme diately after his death, the chief apostles of Mahometanism were captains and mighty generals, who spread their conquests far and * Posthumous Works, vol. ii. p. 26, 27. t Ibid. p. 30, &c. Let. XIII. mr. chubb's posthumous works. 167 wide. Our author concludes his account of Mahometanism with saying, "whether the Mahometan revelation be of a divine original, or not, there seems to be a plausible pretence, arising from the cir cumstances of things, for stamping a divine character upon it."*" As to the Christian revelation, it is evident he has done all in his power to expose it ; and yet he seems plainly to acknowledge Christ's divine mission. "That there was such a person as Jesus Christ, and that he, in the main, did and taught as is recorded of him, appears (saith he) to be probable, because it is improbable that Christianity should take place in the way and to the degree it did, or at least that we are told it did, supposing the history of Christ's life and ministry to be a fiction." He adds, that " if such power attended Jesus Christ in the exercise of his ministry, as the history sets forth, then seeing his ministry and the power that at tended it seems, at least in general, to have terminated in the public good, it is more likely that God was the primary agent in the exer cise of that power, than any other invisible being. And then it is probable, that Jesus Christ, upon whose will the immediate exercise of that power depended, would not use that power to impose upon and mislead mankind to their hurt, seeing that power appears to have been well directed and applied in other respects, and seeing he was accountable to his principal for the abuse of it." He adds — *' from these premises, or from this general view of the case, I think this conclusion follows, viz. it is probable Christ's mission was divine; at least it appears so to me from the light or information I have received concerning it."f And as he seems here to acknow ledge Christ's mission to be divine, so he undertakes to give an account what was the subject of his mission, or what it was that he was sent to publish to the world. This he reduceth to three main principles, for which he referreth to a tract he had formerly pub lished, entitled, "The true Gospel of Christ," viz. 1. That nothing but a conformity of mind and life to the eternal rule of righteousness will render men acceptable to God. 2. That when men have de viated from that rule, nothing but a thorough repentance and re formation will render them the proper objects of God's mercy. And lastly, that God will judge the world in righteousness, and will render to every man according as his works shall be. He adds, that these propositions seem to him to contain the sum and substance of Christ's ministry ; and as they are altogether worthy of the Deity, so, he thinks, they may with propriety and truth be called, the Gospel of Jesus Christ. This is what he declares in his second volume, p. 82,. 83 ; and he had said the same thing before, vol. i. p. 98, 99, where he observes, that " these things contain the sub stance of what Christ was in a special manner sent of God to ac quaint the world with." And again he declares, that by Chris tianity he means, " that revelation of God's will which Christ was in a special and particular manner sent to acquaint the world with ; and as far as the writings of the apostles are consonant with it, they * Posthumous Works, vol. ii. p. 40. t Ibid. p. 41— 43, compared with p. 394—396. 168 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIII. come under the denomination of Christianity :"* where he seems fairly to own, that Christ was sent in a particular and special man ner to acquaint the world with a revelation of God's will. He also acknowledges, that " the writings of the apostles contain excellent cautions, advices, and instructions, which serve for the right con ducting our affections and actions : That the Christian revelation, one would hope, was kindly intended to guide men's understandings into the knowledge of those truths, in which their highest interest is concerned, and to engage them to be justly affected therewith, and act accordingly ; and that it naturally tends to reform the vices, and rightly to direct the affections and behaviour of men." And finally, " that it may perhaps be a piece of justice due to Chris tianity (could it be certainly determined what it is, and could it be separated from every thing that hath been blended with it), to ac knowledge that it yields a much clearer light, and is a more safe guide to mankind, than any other traditionary religion, as being better adapted to improve and perfect human nature."-]- These things would naturally lead us to think, that he had a friendly design towards Christianity and the holy Scriptures. But, notwithstanding all these specious professions, whosoever reads what he calls his "Farewell to his Readers," with ever so little attention, must be convinced, that the principal design of it was to subvert the credit and divine authority of the Christian reve lation. Though he declares, that he looks upon it to be probable that Christ's mission was divine, yet he has taken great pains to show, that the proofs which are brought for it are not at all to be depended upon. Having observed, that the two principal arguments or evi dences usually insisted on to prove the divine original of the Chris tian revelation are prophecy and miracles, he uses his utmost efforts to invalidate both these : two long sections of his " Farewell to his Readers" are employed this way, viz. the seventh and eighth: and as to the resurrection of Christ, he labours for nearly fifty pages together to represent it as an absurd and incredible thing."]; In his ninth section, in which he proposes to treat ofthe personal character of Jesus Christ, he does all he can to expose the account given of his being born of a virgin, as a fiction. § And whereas Christ is represented as having been perfect, and without sin, he will have it to be understood, not that he was absolutely sinless, but that no public or gross miscarriages could be charged upon him.|| The highest character he seems willing to allow him is, that he was the " founder ofthe Christian sect,"^] or, as he elsewhere expresseth it, that he " collected a body of disciples, and laid a foundation for a new sect among the Jews;** for he supposes, that, according to Jesus's original intention, Christianity was only designed to be a supplement to Judaism, and that the Mosaical constitution was to continue always in full force, and that his gospel was to be preached * Posthumous Works, vol. ii. p. 316. t Ibid. p. 297, 344,347,370. j Ibid. vol. i. p. 333, &c. § Ibid. vol. ii. p.2C8— 285. || Ibid. vol. ii. p. 269. j_ II Ibid. vol. i. p. 50. ** Ibid. vol. ii. p. 395. Let. XIII. mr. chubb's posthumous works. 100 only to the Jews in all nations, and not to the Gentiles at all, though the apostles afterwards deviated from his plan.* He owns indeed, that he advanced some proper precepts of his own, in which he seemed to correct the constitutions of Moses; but he endeavours to show, that in these he made alterations for the worse, and that those precepts by which he is thought to have been most distin guished, instead of being more excellent than those of other teachers and law-givers, are really less excellent, and less perfect; and, if taken in their proper and natural sense, are contrary to the reason of things, and inconsistent with the welfare and happiness of man kind. This is the principal design he appears to have had in view, in what he calls. " Remarks on the Scriptures ;" which is the first tract in his " Posthumous Works." In some of the passages above cited, he seems to give a favour able account of Christianity, and proceeds so far as to specify what the true gospel of Christ is, and what that message is, which he allows Christ was sent of God to deliver to the world ; yet in plain contradiction to himself, he asserts in several parts of his book, that it is utterly uncertain what message Christ was sent to publish to the world, or wherein true Christianity doth consist. This is what he particularly endeavoureth to show in his sixth section.-]- And in that very passage before cited, where he pretends that it is a piece of justice due to Christianity, to acknowledge, that it yields a much clearer light, and is a more' safe guide than any other traditionary religion, he at the same time insinuates, that it cannot be defined or determined what Christianity is.% He asserts, that " it has been so loosely and indeterminately delivered to the world, that nothing but contention and confusion has attended it from its first promulgation to this time ; and that the books of the New Testament have been so far from being a remedy to this evil, that they have contributed to it."§ Accordingly, he expressly calls the New Testament, that fountain of confusion and contradiction.^ And whereas Mr. Chilling worth had said, that the Bible is the religion of Protestants, Mr. Chubb thinks, that " unless it be so interpreted as to be made con formable to the great rule of right and wrong, which, he says, in some instances cannot be done without force and violence, it must be an unsafe guide to mankind ;"^[ and that to appeal to Scripture " would be a certain way to perplexity and dissatisfaction, but not to find out the truth." ** And before this he had said, that " the Bible has been the grand source of heresies and schisms ; and that it exhibits doctrines seemingly the most opposite, some of which are greatly dishonourable to God, others the most injurious to men."-]-]- I think it is not easy to give a worse idea of the Scriptures than this author has done. If his account of them be a just one, it must be very dangerous to read them ; and it would be a kindness to keep th 3m out ofthe hands of the people ; for he seems directly to charge all this upon the Scriptures themselves, and not upon the fault of * Posthumous Works, vol. ii. p. 85, 86. 168. t Ibid. p. 72—122. t Ibid. p. 370. $ Ibid. p. 57. 31.3. || Ibid. p. 246, 247. If Ibid. p. 326. ** Ibid. p. 335. tf Ibid. vol. i. p. 0. 57. 170 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIII. those that pervert and abuse them. And yet this very consistent writer declares against locking up the Bible from the people, and that " this is most unsafe, as it has put the people so far under the power of the clergy, as to involve tnem in the most gross ignorance and superstition, and the most absolute slavery both in civil and religious matters."* Is not this plainly to acknowledge, that the being well acquainted with the holy Scriptures is one of the best preservatives against ignorance, priestcraft, and superstition, and a great advantage and security to truth and liberty? And what then must we think of the attempt made by him and other deistical writers to expose and. vilify the holy Scriptures, and destroy all vene ration for them in the minds of men, which, if believed, must in duce an absolute neglect, and even contempt, of those sacred writ ings? Ought not this, by his own acknowledgment, to be regarded as an attempt to bring us back into the most gross ignorance, super stition, and slavery ? As a farther proof of the author's good-will towards Christianity, it maybe observed, that he represents it as savouring of enthusiasm; and he explains enthusiasm to be " a groundless persuasion, that the Deity dictates and impresses upon the mind of the promulger the subject-matter of his ministry, and therefore such ministry is sup posed to be not of or from men, but of and from God."f And as he here supposes Christianity to be the product of enthusiasm so he elsewhere charges the apostles and first publishers of Christianity with imposture. He represents them as capable of giving a false testimony to serve the Christian cause, and that they acted upon this principle, " that truth in some cases may and ought to be dis pensed with, and made to give way to falsehood and dissimulation;" and upon this he asks, " How then will the miracles wrought by Jesus Christ and his apostles be proved to be other than impostures? supposing them to-be much better attested than at present they appear to be."~|: These and other things that might be mentioned may let us into the true spirit and design of this writer, and may help us to judge of the protestations he has made with great solemnity in the con clusion of his " Farewell to his Readers." " If any say, that what I have written is out of disrespect to the person and ministry of Jesus Christ, the accusation is false." And he adds, " as upon the Christian scheme, Jesus Christ will be the judge of quick and dead, so I assure my readers, that in this view and upon this con sideration, I have no disagreeable apprehension on account of any thing that I have published to the world."§ Having given this general idea of our author's work, I shall in my next letter offer some remarks upon those parts of his book which may seem to require a more particular consideration. * Posthumous Works, vol. ii. p. 327. 345. t Ibid. p. 49. 53. | Ibid. p. 92, 93. 130, 131. 230, 231. § Ibid. p. 533. Let. XIV. mr. chubb's posthumous works. 171 LETTER XIV. Some farther Remarks on Mr. Chubb's Posthumous Works — The unfair Representa tion he makes of our Saviour's Precepts in his Sermon on the Mount. — His gross Perversions of Scripture. — His Charge against it, as uncertain, and as having been greatly depraved and corrupted by the Church of Rome, considered. — Observations upon the Attempt he makes to invalidate the Proof from Prophecy and Miracles — The Parallel he draws between the Propagation of Christianity and the Progress of Methodism examined. — The Falsehood of his Pretence, that the Apostles quite changed the original Plan of Christianity, and that they laid a Scheme for worldly Wealth and Power. — His Invectives against St. Paul malicious and unjust. — He re presents all Religions to be alike with regard to the Favour of God, and pretends to direct Men to an infallible Guide. Sir, In my last, I gave a general account of Mr. Chubb's posthumous treatises. I shall now add some farther observations relating to some parts of those tracts which may seem to deserve to be more particu larly considered. Of this kind is the attempt he hath made to expose our Saviour's precepts in his admirable sermon on the mount, which is designed to teach the most pure and excellent morality. In several of these pre cepts, our Lord evidently maketh use of a proverbial way of speak ing, short and comprehensive aphorisms, delivered in phrases, some of which may perhaps appear not so usual among us, but which were familiar to those to whom they were at first delivered. Every one knows, that, in such cases, every expression is not to be taken in the utmost strictness, but the general intention is to be regarded, which is plain enough to an honest and attentive mind. But this writer seems resolved to take them in the most absurd sense he can possibly put upon them. Thus, he interprets the precept against re sisting evil, which is manifestly intended to check and suppress private revenge, and to teach us that wise lesson, " that it is better in many cases, patiently to bear injuries, especially in smaller in stances, than to give way to a keen and forward resentment and retaliation of them," as if it were designed absolutely, and in all cases, to forbid us to shun our guard against the evils and injuries offered to us, and required us rather to expose ourselves to those evils. But this certainly could not be the intention of that excellent teacher, who exhorteth his disciples to be wise as serpents in avoid ing evil, as well as innocent as doves; and directeth them, instead of needlessly exposing themselves, when persecuted in one city, to flee unto another. The precept about loving our enemies is designed to restrain and heal that bitter and malevolent spirit which men are so apt to indulge, and to carry benevolence to the noblest height. It teacheth us, that no private enmities or disgusts should cause us to forget the common ties of humanity : that with regard to our ene mies themselves, we should be earnestly desirous of their amendment and true happiness, and should be ready, when a proper opportunity 172 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIV. offers, to do them good offices, and to overcome their enmity with kindness, which is the noblest victory. But our candid author would have it to be understood to signify, that we should put no difference in our affection and esteem between good and bad men, but should have an equal complacency in persons of the vilest characters as in those of the best.* And because our Saviour speaks of God's doing good, in the methods of his common providence, even to the un thankful and the evil, he pretends, that, according to his represent ation, the perfection of the Supreme Being consisteth in his being affected towards all intelligent beings alike, and showing equal love and favour to the righteous and to the wicked ; than which nothing can be more contrary to Christ's manifest intention, and to the whole tenor of his teaching and ministry. Our Lord's excellent dis course against anxious cares, and a distracting or distrustful thought- fulness for to-morrow, he interprets as designed to recommend thoughtlessness and indolence, and absolutely to forbid that thought- fulness and industry, which man's present indigent condition, and the present constitution of things make necessary. ,f And the precept by which we are directed not to lay up for ourselves treasures on earth, but to lay up for ourselves treasures in heaven, which is plainly in tended to check a too eager pursuit of worldly riches, and a placing our chief happiness in these things, he represents as if it were de signed absolutely to condemn all worldly acquisitions, however law fully obtained, and well used and employed. In like manner, he interprets what our Saviour says in a parabolical way, Luke xvi. 12, 13. concerning inviting the poor, the blind, and the lame ; and which, as may be gathered from the context by comparing ver. 7, &c. was designed to rebuke the vanity of expensive and ostentatious entertainments, whilst the poor and indigent were neglected ; as if it were his intention, that all Christians should deny themselves the pleasure of ever entertaining, or being entertained by friends, rela tions, and those of their own rank, and were to confine themselves wholly to the company, conversation, and friendship ofthe poor, the maimed, the lame, and the blind .-"j; though it is very evident from his own practice, that our Lord Jesus was far from discouraging an agreeable intercourse and conversation among friends, and the offices and entertainments of the social life ; and I dare say, not one either of the Jews, or of his own disciples, ever understood him in this sense. But Mr. Chubb takes upon him to pronounce, that these and the like precepts are all to be understood in the most strict literal sense, and do not admit of any limitation, or any palliating interpretation to be put upon them ; and he represents them as the proper precepts of Christianity, peculiar, as he expresseth it, to the Christian sect, and in which their founder's honour is peculiarly concerned; and pre tends, that the observance of these alone, in the absurd sense he puts upon them, is what constitutes a true Christian. And as these are the precepts that are acknowledged to be peculiarly Christian, he * Posthumous Works, vol. i. p. 18, 19. f Ibid. p. 22, 23. t Ibid. p. 25, 26. Let. XIV. MR. chubb's posthumous works. 173 thinks that from thence a judgment may be formed, whether there be any just ground for boasting, that Christian morals are much more excellent and perfect, than any other system of morals that hath been exhibited to men.* Nothing can possibly be more unfair and disingenuous, than this conduct of our author. No man of candour, who considers the deep wisdom and good sense which appeareth in our Saviour's discourses, can reasonably suppose, that it was his intention to recommend such absurd instructions and advices as they must have been, according to this writer's representation of them. Our Lord's design, in his excellent sermon on the mount, was not, as he himself declares, to destroy the law and the prophets ; it was to vindicate them from the narrow and corrupt glosses of the Jewish doctors. And what could be more worthy of a teacher sent from God, the great Saviour and lover of mankind, than to forbid the being angry without a cause, all injurious and reproachful expressions, all adultery and impurity, even in heart and thought; and to recommend purity, charity, meekness, benevolence, the forgiveness of injuries, and even a ren dering good for evil, and overcoming evil with good ? to warn men against an excessive love of worldly riches, which hath in all ages been the source of numberless evils and disorders among mankind, and engage them to raise their affections and views to things of a far higher and nobler nature, things celestial and eternal ? to direct men to a calm contentment and dependance on divine providence, in every condition, as the best preservative against those anxious dis tracting cares and solicitudes, which, when they prevail, destroy the relish of life? What our Saviour hath delivered on these, and on other heads of great importance to the happiness of mankind, is comprehended in short maxims, strongly and closely expressed, which makes them more apt to strike, and more easily remembered ; but without descending to particular exceptions and limitations, which, for the most part, common sense, and the nature ofthe thing, easily direct to. He, who was perfectly acquainted with human nature, very well knew, that there was no great danger of men's taking them in too strict a sense, and that they would be forward enough to find out limitations for themselves. And any one that impartially considers the variety of matters treated of, in that excellent sermon on the mount, such a vast extent of pure and noble morals comprised in so small a compass, and delivered with the most comprehensive brevity, will be apt to admire the wisdom of this heavenly teacher, and to have a just dislike of a writer that could turn those admirable lessons to the disadvantage of the holy Jesus and the Christian religion. And I am persuaded, that any man who should treat the maxims and wise sayings of the philosophers or great men of antiquity, as this author has done those of our Saviour, would be regarded by all rational and thinking men among the Deists themselves, as a rude and impertinent caviller. What renders Mr. Chubb more inexcusable is, that he himself seems to have been very » Posthumous Works, vol. i. p 27, 28. 31. 39, 40. 174 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIV. sensible, that those precepts were not intended in the sense he has thought fit to put upon them ; for though, in what he calls " Remarks on the Scriptures," he contends, as hath been shown, that no other interpretation ought to be admitted, yet in another part of his " Posthumous Works," viz. in the ninth section of his " Farewell," where he professes to treat concerning the personal character of Jesus Christ, he produces these very precepts as in stances of Christ's figurative way of speaking, and plainly owns, that they ought not to be taken, nor were originally intended, in the strict literal sense he had put upon them. To this purpose he par ticularly mentions the precepts of not resisting evil, of loving our enemies, and giving to every one that asketh ;* and from thence concludes, that we must use our reason in judging of the sense of Scripture, and of our Saviour's precepts; which will be readily allowed. The Scripture undoubtedly supposeth us to be reasonable creatures, and our Saviour addresseth himself to us as such ; but it by no means follows, as he insinuates, that because we are to use our understandings in judging of the sense of Scripture, and all laws, that therefore our own reason could guide us as well without them, and that these precepts are of no use, and that it is of no advantage to have them enforced by a divine authority. It may not be improper on this occasion to take notice of some other of his gross perversions of Scripture." A signal instance of this kind we have in the same tract, in which he makes so strange a representation of several of our Saviour's precepts. Speaking of that noted passage, 1 John ii. 1,2, " My little children, these things write I unto you, that ye sin not ; and if any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous ; and he is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins ofthe whole world." He observes, that " this passage may be sup posed to bespeak comfort and safety to a wicked Christian, i. e. to a wicked man who is a believer in Jesus Christ, and professes disciple- ship to him ; and that it is but for a man to apply these words of John to himself, and " the practice of vice is made easy to him."f That this could not possibly be St. John's meaning in this passage, is evident from the whole tenour of his epistle, and particularly from the words immediately following, in which he declares, " hereby we do know that we know him," i. e. Jesus Christ, "if we keep his commandments. He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him," ver. 3, 4. Our author himself is sensible, that the interpretation he hath given of this passage is not consistent with what St. John hath said in other parts of his epistle. But that gives him no concern ; it will only show that St. John contradicts himself; which is what he would have him thought to do; and therefore with an unparalleled assurance he insisteth upon it, that the account he hath given of St. John's meaning, is the true one, " whatever St. John, or any other writer of the New Testament, in opposition to this, may have * Posthumous Works, vol. ii. p. 289, 293, 294, &c. t Ibid. vol. i. p. 37, 38. Let. XIV. mr. chubb's posthumous works. 175 elsewhere said to the contrary." His manner of expressing himself plainly shows, that he is resolved this shall be St. John's sense, con trary to his own most express declarations, and to the entire strain of the New Testament ; because he thinks it tends to expose Chris tianity, though in reality by such a procedure he has only exposed himself. But he urgeth, that " if Christ be the propitiation for all sins, then the most wicked Christian must needs be in a safe and comfortable state ; and even wicked pagans and infidels, as well as Christians, penitent and impenitent, because God would not be so unreasonable and unjust, as to take double satisfaction for the same offences." And in some other parts of his book, he inveighs against the doctrine of Christ's being the propitiation for sins, as contrary to truth, and the eternal reason of things.* But in all that he has said on this head, he either discovers a gross ignorance of the Scripture- doctrine of Christ's being the propitiation for our sins, or makes a wilful misrepresentation of it ; since nothing can be more evident than it is from the whole New Testament, that Christ's dying for our sins was not designed to free men from an obligation to holiness and obedience, but rather to lay them under stronger engagements to it ; and that according to the gospel covenant, none can expect an interest in the benefits arising from Christ's sufferings and sacrifice, or from his mediation and intercession, but those that turn from their sins by a sincere repentance, and who submit to be governed by his holy and most excellent laws. The doctrine of Christ's satis faction, rightly understood, is so far from giving the least encourage ment to sin, that it tendeth to impress men's hearts with the deepest sense of the heinous evils and malignity of sin, and of God's just displeasure against it. Not only do those who teach that doctrine as delivered in the Scriptures, insist as strongly as any others upon the necessity of repentance and personal holiness, in order to their acceptance with God, but they maintain, that at the same time that God promiseth pardon to the truly penitent, he taketh care to dis pense the pardon in such a way, as to make an awful declaration of his hatred against sin, and to vindicate the authority of his govern ment and laws. What can have a greater tendency to prevent our abusing his pardoning mercy, and to excite in us a holy fear of offending him, than to consider that he would not receive even penitent sinners to his grace and favour, without a sacrifice of infi nite virtue offered up on their behalf, consisting in the perfect obedience and sufferings of the great Mediator? And that it was upon the merit of his obedience and sufferings, that that covenant was founded and established, in which God hath graciously engaged to accept of our repentance, and to reward our sincere though imperfect obedience with eternal life ? Many other instances might be mentioned of Mr. Chubb's strange glosses upon Scripture. He seems particularly to take pleasure in misrepresenting and exposing the writings of St. Paul. Thus, be cause that great apostle, in arguing against the false Jewish teachers, * Posthumous Works, vol. i. p. 250, and vol. ii. p. 112, 113, 304. 176 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIV. who insisted upon the observance of the Mosaic law and ceremonies, as absolutely necessary to salvation under the gospel, urgeth, that, if they were justified by the law, they were fallen from grace, i.M e. from the grace ofthe gospel, and the way of justification there pro posed, Gal. v. 4. he charges him with maintaining in the height of his zeal, that " obedience to the law of Moses was incompatible with salvation ;" and that let men otherwise be ever so good and excel lent persons, this error concerning the obligation of the Mosaic law would exclude them from the favour of God, and from eternal salva tion. And in this, saith he, the Apostle must surely have greatly erred.* But it ought to be considered, that those Jewish teachers, whom St. Paul there opposes, are represented as men of corrupt minds, who acted from worldly and sinister ends and views, and who were not strict in keeping the law themselves, though they were for binding it upon others, Gal. vi. 12, 13. And the apostle there ex pressly declareth, that in Christ Jesus, or under the gospel dispen sation, " neither circumcision availeth any thing, nor uncircumcision," i. e. neither the observance nor non-observance of these outward rites, but faith which worketh by love, or, as he elsewhere expresseth it, the new creature, i. e. a real sanctifying change of heart and life. See Gal. v. 6. vi. 15. 1 Cor. vii. 19. Again, he pretends, that St. Paul represents the calling of the Gentiles as not originally designed by God, or as an effect of his goodness towards the Gentiles, but as springing only from his having taken up a pique or resentment against the Jews, which, he says, " is a spring of action much too low, and altogether unworthy of the supreme Deity."f But nothing is more evident than that this apostle frequently ascribes the calling of the Gentiles to the free grace and gratuitous favour of God, and speaks of it in noble terms, as having been designed in the councils of the divine wisdom and love before the foundation of the world, Eph. i. 3, 4, 5, 6. iii. 8, 9. Farther to expose that excellent apostle, he represents it, as if in saying, that "if in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men the most miserable," 1 Cor. xv. 19. he intended to signify, that the practice of piety and virtue is not in its own nature so eligible, or so conducive to the real satisfaction of this present life, as that of vice and sin. Nor will he allow that St. Paul in this part of the argument has any reference to the case of persecution ; and yet certain it is, that he most expressly refers to it, ver. 29, 30, 31, 32; and his evident design is to signify the unhappy condition Christians would be reduced to, under the grie vous persecutions to which they were then exposed, if it were not for their future hopes. But he especially finds great fault with St. Paul for his doctrine concerning subjection to the hio-her powers, Rom. xiii. 1. 6. as if it were calculated for promoting tyranny and slavery. This he insists upon for several pages together, in two different parts of his Posthumous Works ; and yet the apostle's doc trine, rightly considered, is admirable. He shows, that obedience to the civil powers is a duty which Christianity enjoins ; that it was not * Posthumous Works, vol. ii. p. 96, 97. |- Ibid. p. 88. Let. XIV. MR. chubb's posthumous works 177 designed to exempt men from subjection to their lawful governors, though heathens, or to relax the bands of civil duty and allegiance. He doth not meddle with the questions concerning the rights of Senates, or particular forms of polity, but speaks of the duty of private persons, and therefore presses their obedience and subjection, without restrictions and limitations ; and to have mentioned such restrictions would certainly have been of bad consequence; especi ally considering the seditious dispositions of the Jews, and how they were then affected. But our author is not willing to allow, that religion has any thing to do with obedience to our civil governors ; and, in express opposition to St. Paul, declares, that government cannot be said to be the ordinance, or by the appointment of God. He maintains, that the proper argument for obliging men to subjec tion and obedience is, not government's being the ordinance of God, but its being necessary to the well-being of mankind. And does not the apostle manifestly urge this ? He both raiseth our views to the original of government in tbe authority and appointment of God himself, and pointeth out to us the proper ends of government, and its great usefulness to mankind, and excellently argueth from both these. So that he is far from what this writer here thinks fit to charge him with, a fallacious and injurious way of reasoning. He takes particular notice of the allegory* St. Paul makes use of, Gal. iv. 21, &c. and uses his utmost endeavours to place it in a most ridiculous light. Nothing can be more unfair and disingen uous than the account he is pleased to give of it, in which he en tirely misrepresents the design and strain of t.he apostle's discourse. But a particular examination of what he offers, with regard to this and several other passages of Scripture, would carry me too far. It is sufficient to observe, that a careful and unprejudiced consideration of the context, and a comparing one part of Scripture with another, might easily have set him right as to the sense of most of the pas sages he mentions ; or he might have found his difficulties cleared by able and judicious commentators, if he had been as willing to have his objections satisfied, as he was to raise them, or as a sincere inquirer after truth ought to be. Candid critics, if they meet with a passage in Homer, Plato, Aristotle, Tully, or any other celebrated profane author of antiquity, which at first view has something in it that they cannot well explain or account for, arc very unwilling to charge the original author with nonsense and absurdity, and think themselves obliged to use their utmost endeavours to find out a con venient or favourable sense of the passage in question. But with this writer, and many others of the same class, it seems to be a rule to interpret every passage of Scripture in the most absurd sense that can possibly be put upon it. Several passages were produced in my former letter, to which many others might be added, in which Mr. Chubb exclaims against * Mr. Collins had endeavoured to expose that allegory ; and the design and consis tency of it was fully cleared in the answers that were made to that writer. Nor has Mr. Chubb offered any thing upon it that can be called new. N 178 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIV. the Scripture as the source of endless contentions and divisions, as if it were to be charged with all the absurd and contradictory opin ions, that have at any time been grafted upon it. This he represents, as owing to its being " expressed in a loose indeterminate way, which would be a defect in a human composition, but is scarce sup- posable in the case of divine revelation."* But it is no argument, that a thing is loosely and indeterminately expressed, because men differ or contend about the sense of it. This is owing to other causes. Supposing a divine revelation given to mankind, ever so clear and determinate, it could scarcely be avoided, without a constant miraculous interposition, irresistibly impressing and overruling the minds of all men, but that there would be a difference of sentiments and opinions among mankind, about many things in it; and yet this would not hinder but that such a revelation would be of signal use for instructing men in things of great importance. The fallacy of such a way of arguing, as if men's differing about any thing were a proof of its uncertainty, has been often exposed, as what would banish all religion, truth, reason, and evidence, out of the world ; yet this is a common-place with the deistical writers, to which they have recourse on all occasions. Many made use of it before our author ; and since the publishing of his works, a late right honour able writer hath been pleased to renew the charge. I shall not here repeat what I have elsewhere offered in answer to his Lordship, and which will equally serve to obviate all that Mr. Chubb hath advanced on this head.-J- The same observation may be made with regard to his attempts against the sacred canon. He pretends, as others have done before him, that there is no proof that the books of the New Testament were written in the first age of the Christian church ; that there were many spurious gospels in the primitive times, and that the Chris tians had no way of distinguishing the genuine from the false. These, and other things to the same purpose, he very frequently repeats in several parts of his " Farewell to his Readers," as if he thought the frequent repetition of them would persuade his readers of their truth. But I shall not need to take any particular notice of them here, but refer to what was said on this subject in the fourth letter, where some account is given of the answers that were made to Toland's Amyntor ; to which may be added, what hath been lately offered in answer to the same objections, when urged by the noble writer last-mentioned.*]: Mr. Chubb hath also raised a great clamour about the corruption of Scripture. He layeth it down as a principle, that if God gave a revelation for the use of mankind, he would take care that it should be transmitted safe and uncorrupted to all succeeding gene rations; and would, by a particular and constant application of his power and providence, have defended it from all injury, wherever it was promulged, and whatever language it was rendered into. He * Posthumous Works, vol. ii. p. 246, 247. f Reflections on Lord Bolingbroke's Letters, p. 125, &c. \ Ibid. p. 98, &c. Let. XIV. MR. chubb's posthumous works. 17!) intimates, that God ought to have punished with a sudden death, as in the case of Ananias and Sapphira, every man that had committed any error, either in transcribing or translating it. And if this had been the case, the consequence would have been, that no man would have ventured to transcribe or translate it at all ; and this, no doubt, is what these gentlemen would wish. But there is no necessity for having recourse to such extraordinary methods ; we have sufficient evidence to satisfy any reasonable person, that this revelation is transmitted to us, without any such corruptions or alterations as can destroy the usefulness of that revelation, or defeat the important ends for which it was originally given. This hath been often clearly shown. Our author indeed pronounces with great confidence, that '' it is a thing abundantly evident, that the Christian revelation hath been greatly depraved and corrupted ; that its pretended guardians have extracted the mystery of iniquity from it ; and that we have received the books referred to from that grand fountain of cor ruption the church of Rome, who must have been naturally, and almost unavoidably led to corrupt them in those times of ignorance, to justify herself in all other corruptions and abuses." This he fre quently repeats, as his manner is, in several parts of his book, and it hath been often urged by the deistical writers ;* and it must be ac knowledged, that if a general corruption of the Scriptures could have been possibly effected, none had so good an opportunity, or a stronger temptation to attempt it, than the church of Rome ; and yet it is evident in fact, that they have not corrupted the Scriptures in those instances in which it was most their interest, and we might imagine also most in their inclination, to have corrupted them. There might be some pretence for such a charge, if there had been any express and formal passages inserted in the New Testament, in favour of the papal supremacy, of St. Peter's having been Bishop of Rome, the worship of images, the invocation of saints and angels, purgatory, the communion in one kind, against priests' marriage, and in favour of the monastic vows, &c. ; but our author hath not attempted to produce any passages of this kind; and he himself has observed, that " the New Testament was not sufficient to support the weight of the constitution of the church of Rome, and therefore its builders prudently annexed tradition to it."i" He also finds fault with their locking up the Bible from the laity, as what hath put them so far under the power of the clergy, as to involve them in gross ignorance, superstition, and slavery. Thus, this very consistent writer, with a view to expose the New Testament, would persuade us, that popery is taught and founded there, and yet would have the Bible kept in the hands of the people as a proper preservative against it. The arguments in favour of the Jewish and Christian revelation from prophecy and miracles have always been looked upon as of great weight ; and Mr. Chubb hath taken great pains to invalidate both these. With regard to prophecy, which is the entire subject of the seventh section of his " Farewell to his Readers,"*|; he pre- * Posthumous Works, vol. ii. p. 65, 66, 118, 121, \2l. t Ibid. p. 58. ± Ibid. vol. ii. p. 139—174. N 2 180 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIV. tends not to deny, that there may be true prophecy ; that God may certainly foreknow future events, and may enable persons to foretel them; but he denies, that the prediction of future events can be ad mitted as an evidence of divine revelation, because a prophecy can never be known to be a true prophecy till it be fulfilled ; and there fore can never be a proof or evidence at the time of its delivery, be cause it must appear as yet uncertain. His argument here proceeds upon a wrong supposition, as if the advocates for revelation main tained, that the mere prediction of a future event, even before the completion of it, were alone a sufficient proof to those who heard the prediction, ofthe divine mission ofthe persons who delivered it. This was far from being the only proof that was given either of the Mosaic or Christian revelation. They were both of them at their first promulgation attested and established by an amazing succes sion of the most wonderful works, and which plainly argued an ex traordinary divine interposition ; besides which, both Moses and the prophets under the Old Testament, and our Lord Jesus Christ and his apostles under the New, were enabled to give many express predictions of future events ; some of which related to things which were to happen in their own time, and received a speedy accomplish ment ; others related to events that were not to happen till some ages after the prediction, and these also received their accomplish ment in the proper season. And this, added to the other evidences, exhibited a farther illustrious proof of a divine interposition in favour of the Jewish and Christian revelation, and shows, that the first publishers of it were extraordinarily inspired by God, who, by the author's own acknowledgment, can alone foresee and foretell future contingent events. It was wisely ordered, that miracles and prophecy should go together ; whereby not only the most striking evidence was given to the truth and divinity of the revelation, at the time when it was first promulgated, but provision was made that there should be a growing evidence, which might acquire new force and strength, by the successive accomplishment of the prophecies in the several different periods to which they refer. Indeed, if it were only a single prediction or two, the fulfilling of them might be looked upon to be accidental, and to amount to no more than a lucky conjecture ; but a series of prophecies, such as is set before us in the sacred writings, many of them relating to things of a most contingent nature, removed at the distance of several ages, and which depended upon things that no human sagacity could foresee, must be ascribed to an extraordinary divine assistance ; and it can not reasonably be supposed, that God would impart his prescience to give credit to impostors, who falsely pretended to be inspired by him to deliver doctrines and laws to mankind. As to that part of the evidence of Christ's divine mission, which resulteth from the prophecies of the Old Testament, this had been fully considered in the controversy between Mr. Collins and his ad versaries, of which some account was given in the sixth letter. What Mr. Chubb has offered on this head is very inconsiderable ; but he has one reflection that may deserve some notice ; it is this: Let. XIV. mr. chubb's posthumous works. 181 That, " supposing those prophecies to have been fulfilled in Jesus Christ, they are not so much to be regarded as an evidence of the divine authority of the Christian revelation, as of the divine charac ter of its primary promulger, who, being a free being, must have been at liberty whether he would have faithfully delivered those truths to the world, that had been delivered to him by his principal. And this," saith he, " must of necessity be the case of all divine revelation."* But, supposing there was a series of prophecy, relat ing to a wonderful person, who was to appear, at a time prefixed, as a divine teacher and Lord, and who was to erect a dispensation of truth and righteousness, and that his coming, person, offices, miracles, sufferings, and the glories that should follow, were de scribed and pointed out by many remarkable predictions, delivered at sundry times and in divers manners, all which were fulfilled in Jesus Christ, and in him only ; this certainly must be looked upon as an illustrious attestation, not only to the divinity of his mission, but to the truth of the revelation he brought in the name of God ; for it were most absurd to suppose, that God would have inspired so many persons, in different ages, to foretell his coming and cha racter as a divine teacher of truth and righteousness, if he had not perfectly foreknown that he would certainly fulfil that character, and fulfil the great trust reposed in him. And the preparing mankind for his coming by such a succession of prophecies, and pointing him out by the most glorious and peculiar characters, so many ages before his actual appearing, tended to give him an attestation of a peculiar kind, and which was never equalled in any other case. With regard to the prophecies of Daniel, this author thinks it is impossible " that God should deliver a prophecy so darkly, as that one man only, and he a prodigy, amidst the millions of men that have taken place since that prophecy was delivered, should be able to discover the true sense and meaning of it ;"f where he goes upon a supposition which is manifestly false, viz. that no man before Sir Isaac Newton was ever able to discover the meaning and intent of Daniel's prophecies. Many there have been who have laboured happily this way, both formerly and of late ; and though there are several things in those prophecies that are attended with great diffi culty, there are others of the predictions contained in that book, which are so clear, that the application of them is comparatively easy. And they have been wonderfully verified, in a manner which shews they could only have proceeded from that all-seeing mind which presides over contingencies, and clearly sees through the suc cession of ages. And the predictions there given relating to the Messiah, the design and end of his coming, and the desolation of the Jewish city and temple that should be connected with it, are of such a nature, as to give a most remarkable attestation to our Lord Jesus Christ, as the true promised Messiah. And it may be ob served by the way, that this shews the vanity and falsehood of another of our author's suppositions, who pretends, that the Jewish " Posthumous Works, p. 152, 153. t Ibid. p. 147, 148. lfcS2 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIV. expectation of th.e Messiah was solely owing to the notion they had of their being God's peculiar people, from whence it was natural for them to believe, that God would raise them up a glorious deliverer, who should exalt their nation to the highest degree of prosperity and grandeur ; and that the prophets humoured them in this their notion and expectation : For if this had been the case, the prophets would not have spoken of a suffering Messiah ; nor would they have foretold, as they have done, his being rejected by the Jews, and the judgments which should be then executed upon that nation, and that the Gentiles should be partakers of the benefits of his kingdom. This writer, who seems to value himself upon thinking out of the common way, can see nothing extraordinary in the predictions re lating to the calamities and dispersions of the Jews, and their won derful preservation, under all their dispersions aud calamities, for a long succession of ages ; and yet certain it is, that their being so generally dispersed among all nations over the whole earth, and being still preserved as a distinct people, notwithstanding the un exampled discouragements, reproaches, and sufferings, to which they have been exposed, is one of the most wonderful things, taken in all its circumstances, that is to be found in the whole history of mankind ; and as it hath no parallel, its being so plainly foretold above three thousand years ago (for so long it is since the time of Moses, who first prophecied of it) is a most signal instance of a true prophetic spirit; and could only be owing to the inspiration of that omniscient Being, who " declareth the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things which are not yet done." I shall only take notice of one observation more, which our author hath made with regard to the proof from prophecy, viz. that it ap pears from St. Paul's account, that the gift of prophecy was a dis tinct gift from that of knowledge, 1 Cor. xii. 8, 9, 10, and " that they had no connection or dependence upon one another ;" and he thinks therefore, " that a person's foretelling things to come, does not prove a superiority of knowledge, and that the prophet's know ledge exends faith et" than the prophecies he delivers." But if we examine that passage of St. Paul which he refers to, we shall find it is far from answering the end he proposes by it, viz. to invalidate the proof from prophecy in favour of the Christian revelation. The apostle is there speaking of the several gifts of the Holy Ghost, which were poured forth on many ofthe Christian converts in that first age, in various proportions and degrees according to his will. One of these was, that of prophecy. It is not certain, that by prophecy, in that particular passage, is to be understood the foretelling things to come ; for the word prophecy is sometimes taken in that epistle in another sense ; but allowing it to be so, since it appears from other passages that such a gift there was in the first age of the Christian church (and it was what our Saviour had promised, John xvi. 13), in that case it must be said, that such a gift, if really con ferred, could only proceed from God, or his Holy Spirit ; and as those extraordinary gifts, of which this was one, were communi- Let. XIV. mr. chubb's posthumous works. 183 cated by the laying on of the hands of the apostles in the name of a crucified and risen Jesus, the conferring these gifts on any of the Christian converts may be justly regarded as a most illus trious proof of a divine interposition in favour of Christianity, and of the divine mission of the apostles, the first authorized publishers of it. Having considered the principal things this writer has urged on the head of prophecy, I shall take some notice of what he hath offered concerning the proof from miracles ; this is the subject of his eighth section.* He will not allow, that miracles can be any proof of the divine mission of persons or truth of doctrines. What he chiefly insisteth upon to this purpose is, that the power of working miracles may be equally annexed to falsehood and truth ; and whereas it might be objected, that God will not suffer miraculous power to be misapplied, because, were that the case, mankind would be greatly exposed to imposition, he answers, " that when a miracle is once wrought, it must and will be in the option of the operator to apply that power as he pleases, either well or ill, nor could God prevent it, otherwise than by destroying his being or his agency." But supposing, which is the present supposition, a real power of working miracles communicated from God, with a view to give attestation to the divine mission of persons sent to instruct the world in important truths, it is absurd to suppose, that he would continue that power to them, if they applied it to the confirming of falsehood ; or that he would have given them that power for attest ing truth, if he foresaw they would use it in favour of falsehood: and in that case he must have foreseen it. With regard to the power of working miracles in the first age of the Christian church, it was not at the option of the persons who had that power to use it when or to what purpose they pleased. They could only work those miracles, when and upon what occasion it seemed fit to the Holy Ghost that they should do them ; in which case they had an extra ordinary impulse, which is usually called the faith of miracles, which was a kind of direction to them, when to work those miracles, and whereby they knew and were persuaded that God would enable them to do them. The proper use and design of those miracles was, to confirm the testimony given by the apostles to our Saviour and his resurrection, and the truth of the doctrines they taught as received from him; nor can any one proof be brought, though he takes it for granted, that any false teachers in that age did, by virtue of any extraordinary gift or powers of the Holy Ghost com municated to them, work miracles to confirm the false doctrines they preached. On the contrary, St. Paul appeals to the Galatians themselves, as in a matter of fact which could not be contested, that miracles were only wrought, and the extraordinary gifts of the Spirit communicated, in attestation to that true doctrine of the gospel which he had preached, and not to that other gospel, as he calleth it, which the false teachers would have imposed upon them» * Posthumous Works, vol. ii. p. 177—249. 184 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIV. Gal. iii. 2, 5. But I have elsewhere considered this matter at large, and shall not here repeat what was there offered.* But what our author chiefly bends himself to prove is, that the accounts given us of the miracles recorded in the New Testament are false or uncertain, and not at all to be depended on. To this purpose he mentions several of our Saviour's miracles, and repeats the same objections against them that had been urged by Mr. Woolston before, and to which solid answers had been returned. Every thing in the evangelical accounts that appears to him strange or extraordinary, he rejects at once. I cannot here enter into a distinct consideration of the several particulars he allegeth. I shall only mention one, on which he seems to lay a greater stress than any of the rest, and which he insists upon more than once, as alone sufficient to destroy the credit of the evangelical historians. It relates to the account given of our Saviour's temptations in the wilderness. It will be readily owned, that the fact referred to is of a very extraordinary nature. But a thing may be very strange and wonderful, and yet very true, and is to be received as such, if it comes to us vouched by a sufficient authority; and in this case the authority is sufficient ; for I think it cannot reasonably be doubted, that the account came originally from our Lord himself, since no other could be supposed to know it, and that it was well known to the apostles and disciples to have come from him. It is distinctly related by two of the evangelists, St. Matthew and St. Luke, and referred to by a third, St. Mark. St. John, according to the method he pursues, of insisting chiefly upon things not mentioned by the rest, had no occasion to take notice of it. There is not the least reason to suppose, that the evangelists would have inserted such an account as this, if they had not been assured that the infor mation came from Christ himself; and his authority is a sufficient warrant for believing it ; nor is our author able to prove, that there is any thing here ascribed to Satan, which he might not be able, or might not be permitted to perform. In what manner he pretended to show to our Saviour, " all the kingdoms of the world, and all the glory of them," we are not told ; nor is there any necessity here of taking the word all in the strictest sense. But in what way soever this was done, concerning which we cannot pretend certainly to judge, this writer doth not know enough of the case to pronounce it impossible. Supposing there are evil spirits, can any man take upon him positively to determine how far their power and ability may extend ? And that there are both good and evil spirits supe rior to man, hath been the general belief of mankind in all nations and ages, and even of the best and wisest of men ; nor can a sha dow of reason be brought to prove the existence of such spirits to be either impossible or improbable, though our author, in his great wisdom, has all along rejected all accounts where there is any mention made of angels or devils, with as much confidence, as if he could clearly demonstrate that there cannot possibly be any such thing. * Divine Authority of the Old and New Test, asserted, vol. i. p. 380 387. Let. XIV. mr. chubb's posthumous works. 185 He frequently speaks of the weakness and credulity of the sacred historians, and represents the accounts given in the gospels, and in the Acts of the Apostles, as mere fictions, more like Jewish fables, or popish legends, than real facts* He expressly declares, " that some of the popish miracles, though generally rejected by Protestants as fraud and imposture, are better attested than any of the miracles which were wrought, or supposed to be wrought, in the first century ; and that had the like strict scrutiny been made in former times that is at present, those ancient miracles would have been rejected. "-J- But every thinking person will easily see a mighty difference in the case between miracles wrought before persons highly prejudiced in their favour, and in proof of the reigning religion, where power and interest is on their side, and where there is not a full liberty allowed to make a strict inquiry in the view of enemies themselves, and where the publie prejudices lie on the other side, and power, interest, and authority are engaged against them. There will always be ground of suspicion in the former case, not equally so in the latter. The miracles said to be wrought by the Romish church, are done in countries where Popery is the established religion, and have power, and the prejudices of the people, and an evident worldly interest, on their side ; and they are not performed openly in the view of Pro testants and for their conviction, in places where there is a full liberty of examining into all the circumstances relating to them ; whereas the miracles whereby Christianity was established, were done openly, and in the view of enemies, able and willing to have detected the imposture, if there had been any ; they were done to establish a scheme of religion, the most opposite that could be imagined to the prevailing prejudices both of Jews and Gentiles, and even to the prejudices that had possessed the minds of the very per sons by whom these miracles were wrought ; and when all the power and authority of the world, as well as the influence and artifices of the priesthood, and every worldly advantage, lay wholly on the other side ; and yet vast numbers were brought over to receive a crucified Jesus as their Saviour and their Lord, in that very age, by the evidence of those miracles and extraordinary facts, concerning which they had the best opportunity of being informed, in opposition to all their worldly interests, and their most inveterate prejudices. In vain then it is to inveigh, as this writer does, against the historians, and to pretend, that " they were weak enough to give credit to any relations they might pick up, and had courage enough to put upon the world whatever might be put upon them ;"% for the things related by them are of such a public nature, that if they had been false, it would have been the easiest thing in the world for their enemies, of whom there were many, to have detected them ; which would have crushed this religion in its infancy. Our author himself is sensible how difficult it would have been to impose facts of so extraordinary and so public a nature, as those recorded in the gos pels, and in the Acts of the Apostles, in the very age in which the * Ubi supra, p. 192, 193. t Ibid. p. 226, 227. t Posthumous Works, p. 194. 186 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIV. facts were said to be done ; and therefore, without so much as attempting to offer the least proof, takes upon him to affirm, that the accounts of these facts were not published till a long time after, when there was nobody alive that could contradict them ; and he declares as positively as if he could prove it to be so, that they were not made public till the second century, which he represents as an age of fiction and forgery. This is what he particularly affirms con cerning the accounts given in the Acts of the Apostles ; though it is evident from the book itself, that it was written in the apostolical age, and before the second imprisonment or the death of St. Paul. In the second century, Christianity had already made a wonderful progress through the nations, of which there are unquestionable proofs ; and by a strange absurdity he supposes, that the extraor dinary facts whereby the Christian religion was attested and con firmed, were not published till that time, i. e. that they were not heard of or made public, till long after the founding of the Christian church, though it was wholly upon the credit of those facts that the Christian church was founded. He pretends farther, that the accounts of these things " were kept as a treasure in the hands of believers, not known to unbelievers, who therefore had it not in their power to confute them, or detect the fraud ;"* and yet certain it is, that the apostles went every where preaching the religion of Jesus to an unbelieving world. All those to whom the first publishers of Christianity preached the gospel, and published the accounts of the important facts on which it was founded, were at first unbelievers ; and it was upon the convincing assurance they had of the truth of these facts, that they were brought over to embrace it, and of unbe lieving Jews or heathens became Christians, or believers in Jesus Christ. And whereas he adds, that " those facts were not published at or near the place of the performance, but in Greece, Italy, &c, where the people could not contradict them ;" he seems not to have considered, that all these things were first published in Judea, where the first Christian churches were founded ; and that great numbers of Jews were converted in the places where all the facts were done. It was not till after they had been published some years in Judea, that they were made known to the Gentiles. And in all those countries where the gospel was preached, there were vast numbers of Jews, who had a continual correspondence with those in Judea, and went frequently to Jerusalem to the public feasts, and could there fore easily procure information whether those facts were as they had been represented. I shall not need to make any observations upon what Mr. Chubb hafli offered against the accounts given by the evangelists of our Lord's resurrection ; for, as he has only enlarged on some of the same objections which had been advanced by the author of " The Resurrection of Jesus considered," it may be sufficient to refer to what has been said on this subject in the twelfth letter. Having considered the attempts made by Mr. Chubb to invalidate * Posthumous Works, vol ii. p. 203—205. Let. XIV. mr. chubb's posthumous works. 187 the argument in behalf of divine revelation from prophecy and mira cles, it will not be improper to take some notice of what hath been offered to take off the force of the argument, which he. hath fre quently urged, from the wonderful propagation of Christianity, in behalf of its divine original. He acknowledgeth, that " it is impro bable that Christianity should take place, and prevail in the woild, and to the degree it did, or at least that we are told it did, supposing the history of Christ's life and ministry to be a fiction ;"* but then, as if he had granted too much, he observes, that " the present run of Methodism, without any miraculous power attending it, or any external evidence to back it, takes off from the weight and force of the argument."-]- He often returns to this, and in several parts of his book seems willing to run a parallel between the progress of Christianity and that of Methodism. But this only shows the strong prejudices of those who glory in the character of free-thinkers, and how forward they are to catch at the slightest pretences for set ting aside the evidences brought in favour of Christianity ; for in reality there can be no reasonable parallel drawn between the one and the other. There is no great wonder in it, that professed Chris tians, pretending to a high degree of purity and piety, and to teach true scriptural Christianity, should make some progress (not in pagan and Mahometan, or even in Popish countries ; for I do not find our Methodists take upon them to make many conversions there, but) in a country where scriptural Christianity is professed, and a full toleration allowed. There is nothing in this but what may be easily accounted for, without supposing any thing supernatural in the case. They do not pretend to new extraordinary revelations, nor appeal to any miraculous facts, as the French prophets did ; in which case the failure of those facts might easily subject them to a detection ; but they build upon the religion already received among us, and only pretend to explain and enforce the doctrines there taught. But the case was entirely different with regard to the apostles and first publishers of Christianity. The religion they preached, and . especially the great fundamental article of it, the receiving a crucified Jesus for their Saviour and Lord, was contrary to the most rooted prejudices both of Jews and Gentiles ; it tended entirely to subvert the whole system of the pagan superstition and idolatry, and also the pleasing hopes the Jews had entertained concerning a temporal Messiah, who should raise their nation to the height of secular dominion and grandeur ; it was holy and self-denying in its nature and tendency, and was designed not to flatter, but to subdue and mortify, the corrupt lusts and passions of men ; it appealed to facts of the most extraordinary and public nature, and which could not fail being detected, if they had been false ; the first publishers of it were not only destitute of every worldly advantage, but had the most insur mountable difficulties to encounter with; they were exposed, to the most grievous persecutions, reproaches, and sufferings, and had all the powers of the world engaged against them ; that therefore they * Posthumous Works, vol. ii. p. 40, 41. t Ibid, marginal note. 188 A VIEW OF the deistical writers. Let. XIV. should be able in such circumstances to bring over vast numbers both of Jews and Gentiles to the faith of the crucified Jesus, and that the religion they taught should in spite of all opposition prevail, and at length overturn the whole established superstition, which had every worldly advantage to support it ; this cannot be reason ably accounted for, without supposing' the interposition of a divine power, and the truth of the extraordinary facts on which it was founded. Mr. Chubb seems to lay a particular stress on the great change which, he pretends, took place in Christianity, whilst in its most pri mitive state. He affirms, that " the apostles set out upon two prin ciples, which may be considered as the foundation or corner-stone of the Christian building. 1. That Christianity is a supplement to Judaism, and therefore was to be grafted upon it; and that the law of Moses was not to be abolished, but still continued. 2. That the Gospel was a favour to be vouchsafed to the Jews only, and that to them only it was to be preached." And he pretends, that " the apostles were unavoidably led into these principles by their Master himself:" but that " in a little time they quite changed the original scheme or plan of Christianity, and dug up and destroyed the foun dations they themselves had laid :" and then he asks, " How do we know in what instances they may be depended upon ? and if they acted wrong in this, how does it appear that they ever acted right?"* This he returns to on several occasions. But this whole matter is entirely misrepresented : it is plain from several hints given by our Lord himself during his personal ministry, that it was really his in tention, and the design upon which he was sent, to erect a new and more perfect dispensation than the Mosaical was, though it was not as yet a proper season to make a public declaration of it; that his gospel was to be preached not to the Jews only, but also to the Gen tiles ; and that the latter were to be taken into his church, and to be made partakers of his benefits, and of the great salvation he came to procure. Any one will be convinced of this, who impartially con siders the following passages, Matth. viii. 10, 11, 12. xv. 10, 11. xxi. 43. John iv. 21, 23. x. 16. The utmost that our author's pre tence can be made to amount to, is really no more than this : that the apostles, for some time after our Lord's ascension, were not en tirely freed from their Jewish prejudices. And supposing, which was really the case, that the Jewish dispensation was originally from God, and was designed to give way to the more perfect dispensation of the gospel, for which it was preparatory, there was a great pro priety in it that the change should not be brought about all at once, which might have been too great a shock even to honest and well- disposed minds. The gradual method of unfolding the Christian scheme, and dispelling the apostles' prejudices, instead of being a just objection, shows that the whole was conducted with a divine wisdom and goodness : and their having continued for some time under these prejudices, giveth a mighty force to their testimony, * Posthumous Works, vol. ii. p. 84, & seq. Let. XIV. mr. chubb's posthumous works. 189 and furnisheth a manifest proof that the Christian dispensation was not of their own invention, nor was owing to a sudden pang of en thusiasm ; since it was with such difficulty that they themselves were brought to discern and embrace it, considered in its proper harmony. And it was only owing to the strength ofthe overpower ing light and evidence, that all their prejudices were at length over come and dispelled. Besides the two principles mentioned above, Mr. Chubb has thought fit to take notice of a third, which he also pretends was a fundamental principle of Christianity, as laid down by the apostles, viz. " That the disciples of Christ were to have one common stock or property, of which the clergy were constituted the trustees and directors :" and he thinks, that " from this it appears, how ground less that pretence must be, that the apostles and ministers of Jesus Christ could have no worldly advantage in view, when they went forth to preach the gospel ; whereas nothing can be more evident, than that they had a fair prospect of, and a very plausible pretence for, gathering great riches into their hands, as keepers and managers of the church's property or treasure." This he is so fond of, that he insisteth upon it for several pages together.* And the author of the Resurrection of Jesus considered had hinted at the same thing before him, to show, that the apostles were interested witnesses, and that therefore their testimony to Christ's resurrection is not to be de pended on.t But all this is built on a false foundation ; for there was no divine or apostolical constitution obliging Christians to put their whole worldly substance into the common stock, and to com mit it to the apostles as the directors. It appeareth plainly from St. Peter's words to Ananias, that it was a matter which depended entirely on the free choice of the Christian converts, and was the effect of their voluntary zeal and charity; and it was an illustrious proof ofthe strong conviction and persuasion they had of the truth of the gospel, and of those great and extraordinary facts by which Christianity was supported. This was the more remarkable, as it was at Jerusalem that this was done, soon after our Lord's resurrec tion and ascension, and the extraordinary' effusion of the Holy Ghost on the day of Pentecost, and where they had the best oppor tunity of knowing the evidences of those facts. But whatever was done this way, in the extraordinary circumstances in which the first Christians were placed, it is manifest from some passages in the New Testament, and particularly from St. Paul's directions to the Corinthians, that this was not designed to be generally obligatory upon all Christians. See 1 Cor. xvi. 1, 2. 2 Cor. viii. 9. And indeed it seems to have been peculiar to those at Jerusalem ; for which un doubtedly there were particular reasons ; and even there, so far were the apostles from claiming to themselves the direction of the pub lic stock, that they expressly refused to have any thing to do with the management of it, that they might apply themselves to their proper work, the ministry of the word ; and it was given into the * Posthumous Works, p. 102—110. -j- Resurrection of Jesus considered, p. 68. 190 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIV. hands of persons of unexceptionable characters, chosen by the Chris tian society for that purpose, that they might impartially distribute out of the common stock to those that needed it, Acts vi. 1, 2. 3. If the apostles had been actuated by worldly views, they would cer tainly have chosen a scheme of religion, more cunningly accommo dated to the prevailing humours and prejudices of mankind; for what prospect could they have of persuading people to give up their treasures and worldly substance into their hands, by preaching up to the Jews a person that had been condemned and crucified by the chief priests and rulers of their own nation for their Messiah, and preaching up to the Gentiles a crucified Jew for their Lord and Saviour? Our author himself is sensible of this, and therefore at the same time that he talks of the fair worldly prospect they had, he owns that these prospects must have depended upon their expect ing success in their ministry, and upon their being persuaded that they had God and his promises on their side, and that Christ would be with them, as he had foretold, to the end of the world: * so that, according to his own way of stating the case, and indeed according to the reason of the thing, their prospect of success was founded in the firm belief they had of the truth and divinity of Christ's mission, and of his resurrection and exaltation to glory. So inconsistent is this writer's hypothesis, that, in order to make good his charge of worldly interested views against the apostles, he is forced to go upon a supposition of the truth of the illustrious attestations that were given to the Christian religion, and which he elsewhere endeavours to invalidate. And yet, supposing the apostles to have believed what fhetvc Lord had told them, they could have no worldly ad vantage to expect ; since he had assured them, that they should be exposed to all manner of reproaches, persecutions, and sufferings, both from Jews and Gentiles, and should be hated qf all men for his name's sake. And this was actually the case : what the apostles got by preaching up the religion of Jesus is in a very affecting man ner represented by St. Paul, who was one of them : from whence it is manifest, that never were there any persons exposed to a greater variety of hardships and sufferings, 1 Cor. iv. 9. 11, 12, 13. xv. 19. 32. 2 Cor. iv. 8, 9, 10, 11. xi. 23—28. It is particularly evident, that this last mentioned great apostle could have no worldly advantage in view in embracing Christianity. His interests, reputation, and prejudices, lay wholly the other way, and tended strongly to bias him against it. Nothing but conviction, and the power of evidence, could overcome his obstinacy; after which he became the most eminently instrumental to propagate the Christian religion in the world, of which he had been a most zealous persecutor before. And this seems to be the cause of that peculiar rancour and prejudice, which this writer every-where discovers against him. The best judges have admired the strength and close ness of St. Paul's reasoning ; this particularly was the judgment of one of the best reasoners of the age, Mr. Locke, who studied his * Posthumous Woiks, v..I. ii. p. 108, 109. Let. XIV. mr. chubb's posthumous works. 191 writings with great application. But our author has thought fit to represent him as a loose unguarded writer; who did not attend to his own argument, or to the subject. He frequently charges him with drawing wrong conclusions from his premises ; and that his epistles were crude, indigested performances, which were probably sent as they were first wrote, without being revised by him ; and that this sometimes involved him in confusion. He endeavours to give the most absurd and ridiculous turn possible to several passages in his writings; some instances of which were taken notice of above, to which many others might be added. Not content with this, he represents this excellent person, who was no less remarkable for his humility than for his many other virtues, as a vain-glorious boaster, and treats the account which, with a remarkable modesty, and as it were by constraint, he gives of his labours and sufferings, as a bravado, and past all belief. * He accuses him and St. James as guilty of the most gross and notorious dissimulation and hypocrisy, and represents him as the great author of pious frauds in religion : and that he acted upon this principle, " that truth in some cases may and ought to be dispensed with ;" and that therefore he and the other apostles were capable of giving a false testimony to serve the Christian cause.f But this certainly was not St. Paul's prin ciple ; he has condemned in the strongest terms those who main tained, that it is lawful to lie for the glory of God, and to do evil that good may come qf it ,- which is the great principle upon which pious frauds are built, Rom. iii. 5, 6. All that Mr. Chubb has ad vanced, to prove the heavy charge he has brought against this great apostle, is reducible to two facts. The one is, his saying before the council, that of the hope and resurrection of the dead he was called in question, Acts xxiii. 6. ; upon which our author observes, that in this " he acted a deceitful part, and coined a lie to save himself, since he was not called in question about the resurrection, nor was this any part of the charge against him."*]; But that the preaching through Jesus Christ the resurrection of the dead, was one reason of the persecution which was raised against Christ's disciples ; and that this was what particularly excited the rage of the Sadducees against them, of which party the high priest, or at least many of those about him, and who were men of power and interest, appear to have been, is plain from the account given in the Acts of the Apostles, chap. iv. 1, 2, 3. v. 17. And it was very allowable for the apostle to take advantage of this, for creating a division among his adversaries, who were not themselves agreed what charge to bring against him. This is a proof of his prudence and address, and that he did not run upon his sufferings with a blind enthusiastic heat; but it is no proof of his dishonesty. The other instance upon which the charge of hy pocrisy and lying against St. Paul is founded, is taken from what he did at Jerusalem, by St. James's advice, in purifying himself in the temple, Acts xxi. 20— 26.§ But if this had been fairly repre- * Posthumous Works, vol. ii. p. 364, 365. t Ibid. p. 92, ise. 235, &c. t Ibid. vol. i. p. 330, 331. vol. ii. p. 238. § Ibid. vol. i. p. 92, 93. 98. 192 A VI.'W OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIV. sented, it would have appeared, that there was nothing in his con duct on this occasion inconsistent with honesty and integrity. What the Jewish Christians had been informed of concerning St. Paul was, that he had taught the Jews which were among the Gentiles to for sake Moses, saying, that they ought not to circumcise their children, neither to walk after the customs, ver 21. They represented him as having taught, that it was absolutely unlawful for the Jews to cir cumcise their children, or to observe the Jewish rites. This accu sation was false : St. Paul had not taught this; he only had argued against the necessity of observing that law, and had urged Jews and Gentiles to a mutual forbearance with one another in this matter. And what he did pursuant to the advice of St. James, showed that he did not look upon it to be then unlawful to observe the Jewish rites ; and that he judged it both lawful and expedient in some cases to observe them, for avoiding scandal ; and upon this principle he proceeded in circumcising Timothy. This whole matter had been set in a clear light, and the wisdom and consistency of the conduct of St. Paul and the other apostles fully justified, in the answers that were made to the Moral Philosopher. But Mr. Chubb repeats the charge, without troubling himself to take off the force of what had been offered for clearing it. After what hath been observed, it will be no surprize to find, that this writer represents the being converted to Christianity as of no importance at all, and that he frequently lets us know, that he looks upon all religions to be alike, with regard to the favour of God. " The turning from Mahometanism to Christianity," says he, " or from Christianity to Mahometanism, is only a laying aside one ex ternal form of religion, and making use of another, which is of no more real benefit, than a man's changing the colour of his clothes, by putting off a red coat, and putting on a blue one in its stead."* He elsewhere represents it as an indifferent matter, " whether aman aman adopts Judaism, or Paganism, or Mahometanism, or Chris tianity ;" and what is more extraordinary, he would put this upon us, as St. Peter's sentiment as well as his own ; and endeavours, after his manner, to prove it from that noted passage, Acts x, 34, 35. Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons ; but in every nation, he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is ac cepted with him. He pretends, that St. Peter here teacheth, " that faith in any religious leader, or his ministry, is altogether super numerary, and that he hath excluded both faith and infidelity out of the case :"f as if the apostle there designed to tell Cornelius, that it was of no manner of importance whether he believed in Jesus Christ or not; which is to make him speak in direct contradiction to the very design of his being sent to Cornelius, and of all his sub sequent discourse to him. St. Peter signifieth indeed, in the words cited by this author, that whosoever in any nation, like Cornelius, truly feared and worshipped God, and practised righteousness, should be accepted of him, though not belonging to the Jewish * Posthumous Works, vol. ii. p. 33, 34. f lb'0*- vol. i. p. 295 302. Let. XIV. mr. chubb's posthumous works. 193 nation, or initiated into the Mosaic polity ; but he certainly never intended to signify, that the embracing Christianity was a matter of mere indifference. Cornelius's piety and good dispositions would have rendered him acceptable to God, though he had not heard of Christ; but when he had an opportunity of being informed, that very piety and fear of God led him to receive those significations of the divine will, and to believe in Jesus Christ whom he had sent. The great importance and advantage of faith in Christ, in such a case, is evidently supposed in St. Peter's whole discourse, who was extraordinarily sent on purpose to instruct him in it. This writer thinks proper to find fault with the author of the Acts of the Apostles, for laying so great a stress on the conversion of Jews or heathens to Christianity, which, in his opinion, is "of little consequence as to the favour of God, or their future safety, because, if they were virtuous and good men, they were secure without such conversion, and if they were bad vicious men, they were not se cured by it."* But if they were good men before, and were thereby put in the way of greater improvements in goodness, more fully instructed in religion, raised to more glorious hopes, and furnished^ with more excellent helps, and more powerful animating encou ragements to all virtue and universal righteousness ; or if they were bad men, involved in gross ignorance and idolatry, super stition and vice, which was the general character of the heathens when the gospel appeared, and by turning to Christianity were brought to the knowledge and pure adoration of the only true God, and engaged to forsake their evil ways, and to live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world ; and no other were accounted true Christian converts ; this, by the author's own acknowledgment, must have been a signal advantage. He himself had said a little before, " if the revela tion referred to could furnish me with useful knowledge, or with a better rule of life, or with more powerful excitements to the practice of virtue and true religion, than at present I am in possession of, and thereby I should be made a wiser and a better man, then I acknowledge, that such conviction would be bene ficial to me in proportion to such improvement."+ This is evi dently the case of the Christian revelation, wherever it is sincerely believed and embraced, and men give themselves up to its divine conduct ; and therefore those to whom this revelation is offered, and who yet despise and reject it, are justly chargeable with great guilt ; for it cannot be a slight guilt to reject the valuable means and helps which God hath, in his infinite wisdom and goodness, provided, for promoting our spiritual improvement, and engaging and enabling us to work out our own salvation : nor can any thing be more unreasonable than to pretend, as the enemies of revelation have often done, that because virtue and righteousness are what God approves, therefore faith is unnecessary, and of no consequence at all. The very contrary follows from it : for, if moral improve- » Posthumous Works, vol. ii. p. 33. t Ibid. p. 32. o 194 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIV. ment and true holiness be of such vast importance, then certainly the best and properest means for attaining to it are very needful, and to be highly valued ; and such are the means and helps which the religion of Jesus affordeth, as laid down in the Holy Scrip tures : and to reject those means and assistances, under pretence of obtaining the end without them, is a most absurd and criminal conduct, justly displeasing in the sight of God, and a most un worthy return to his infinite goodness. I shall conclude my remarks on Mr. Chubb's Posthumous Works, with taking notice of a remarkable passage at the end of the eighth section of his Farewell to his Readers. After having done all he could to expose the Scriptures, and shew that it is not safe to appeal to them, he draws this conclusion from the whole: that "this shews "the great propriety of our returning back to that prior rule of action, " which is the ground and foundation of moral truth, and conse- " quently of moral certainty ; viz. that eternal and invariable rule of " right and wrong, as to an infallible guide, and as the solid ground " of our peace and safety, which rule we are too easily diverted " from.*" He seems to speak here, as if Christians, and those that were for adhering to Scripture as their rule, had no regard to the rule of right and wrong, or to the nature and reason of things, which is a gross misrepresentation ; and as if the deists were under the conduct of an infallible guide. Particularly it is to be supposed, that he would have it to be understood that he himself hath taken care to follow the infallible guide he recommends : but if we are to judge by the effect it has had upon himself, we have no great encouragement to entertain a very favourable opinion of thead van tage we shall obtain by forsaking the Scripture, under pretence of follow ing such a guide. For what is it, that his infallible guide has directed him to? It has inclined him to deny a particular providence, or that God now interposeth in ordering or governing the affairs of men, and the events relating to them, whether with regard to nations or particular persons, and consequently has directed him not to make a dependence on providence, a trust in God, or resignation to his will, any part of his religion : it hath taught him not to expect any gracious assistances from God, or to apply to him for them : it leaveth him at a loss whether it be proper to pray to God at all, and inclineth him to think that it is the safest way to let it alone : nor doth this guide inform him, whether men's souls are material or immaterial, or whether they shall subsist after death, or shall die and perish with the body, or whether there shall be a future state in which God will call men to an account for their actions : or, if there shall be a future judgment, his guide leadeth him to apprehend that it shall extend but to a small part of the human race, and but to a few of the actions they perform ; that they shall not be called to an account for the blasphemies they may have uttered against God, or for any neglect of duties that more immediately relate to the Deity, or for private injuries they do to one another, or for any * Posthumous Works, vol. ii. p. 219. Let. XV. " 11EIS.1I FAIRLY STATED,'' &C 19,<) actions at all but those which concern tlie public; and how far these are to extend, he hath not thought fit to inform us. I cannot see therefore but that it is much better to follow the light the Scripture affordeth us, which giveth us clear instructions in these and other things of great importance, concerning which our author's infallible guide, according to his account of the matter, hath given him no directions at all, or hath given him wrong ones. I have now finished my observations on Mr. Chubb's Posthumous Works, which I have perhaps enlarged upon more than they really deserve. But I have chosen to do it, both because they seem to be of a dangerous tendency, and well fitted to do mischief, and have by some persons been very much extolled, and because there has been no answer, that I know of, given to those books. I do not love to make reflections that seem to bear hard upon any man's integrity : but I think it cannot be denied, that, notwithstanding his great pretences to plainness and candour, and an impartial love of truth and liberty, there are very apparent marks of great disingenuity in his writings. The nature of this work would not admit of my entering into a more minute examination ; but there are few things of consequence in his two volumes which are, not here taken notice of. LETTER XV. Observations uponn Pamphlet, intitled, Deism fairly Stated, and fully Vindicated. — The Author's pompous Account of Deism, and his way of stating the Question between Christians and Deists, considered. — Concerning the differences among Christians about the Way of knowing the Scriptures to be the Word of God. — The Charge he brings against the Christian Religion, as consisting only of unintelligible Doctrines and useless Institutions, and his Pretence, that the Moral Precepts do not belong to Christianity at all, but are the Property of Deists, shewn to be vain and groundless. — The Cor ruption? of Christians no just Argument against true Christianity. — A brief Account of Lord Bolingbroke's Attempt against the Scriptures in his Letters on the Study and Use of History. Sir, Having considered pretty largely Mr. Chubb's Posthumous Works, I shall now send you some observations upon a pamphlet, which, though originally written by another hand, is said to have been revised by Mr. Chubb, and to have undergone considerable alterations and amendments : it is intitled Deism fairly Stated, and fully Vindicated, and was published in 1746. And as it hath been much boasted of, I shall distinctly consider both the account the author of it gives of deism, and the attempt he hath made to expose the Christian revelation. In his account of deism he treads in the steps of Dr. Tindal, and o 2 196 a View of the deistical writers. Let. XV. it might be sufficient to refer to the remarks that have been made ¦"to" upon that writer's scheme, of which some account was given in the tenth Letter. But let us examine our author's pretensions more distinctly. He tells us that "deism is no other than the religion essential to man, the true original religion of nature and reason.*" And because Christian divines have asserted, that the gospel contains the true religion of reason and nature, he represents them, and particularly the present bishop of London, and Mr. (now Dr.) Samuel Chandler, as acknowledging, that "deism is the alone excellence and true glory " of Christianity," and pretends that what he has cited from them proves, that "deism is all in the Christian institution that can pos- "sibly approve itself to the true genuine reason of man.f" And accordingly he declares, that "every thing that is enjoined in the " gospel to be believed as a rational doctrine, or practised as a "natural duty, relating to God, our neighbours, and ourselves, is an "established part of deism."]:" And through his whole book he supposes deism to comprehend every doctrine and precept which is founded in reason and nature, or, as he sometimes expresseth it, in truth and reason, i. e. it comprehendeth every doctrine and precept that is true and just and reasonable. That we may judge of the fairness of this writer in stating the point, it is proper to observe, that the thing he would be thought to vindicate is the religion of those that call themselves deists, and who reject revelation, and oppose Christianity. This is the only deism in question, and which it concerneth him to state and vindicate. But he has thought fit all along to represent deism and natural religion as terms of the same signification ; whereas deism, as we are now considering it, is to be understood, not precisely of natural religion, as comprehending those truths which have a real foundation in reason and nature, and which is so far from being opposite to Christianity, that it is one great design of the gospel to clear and enforce it; but of that religion which every man is to find out for himself by the mere force of natural reason, independent of all revelation, and exclusive of it. It is concerning this that the inquiry properly proceeds. Dr. Tindal was sensible of it; and therefore is for sending every man to the oracle in his own breast as the only guide to duty and happiness, which alone he is to consult, without having any regard to revelation : and accordingly he frequently represents the religion of nature as so clearly known to all men, even to those that cannot read in their mother tongue, as to render any farther revelation perfectly needless and useless. But if the question be concerning natural religion in this sense, it is far from deserving all the fine encomiums which this writer, after Dr. Tindal, so liberally bestows upon : he represents it as so perfect, that nothing can be added to it : and therefore will not allow, that Chris tianity can be said to be "grounded on natural religion, or to be an * Deism fairly Stated, &c. p. 5. t Ibid. p. G. } Ibid. p. 7. Let. XV. " deism fairly stated," &c. 197 "improvement of it:" for he declares, that he "cannot possibly " conceive how an entire and perfect structure (which is the case of " natural religion) can be only a foundation of a perfect structure, " or how a perfect religion can be improved.*" Here he securely assumes the very thing in question, viz. that the religion which every man knoweth of himself by his own unassisted reason is so perfect, as to be incapable of receiving any addition or improvement, even from divine revelation: which is in other words to say, that every man by his own reason, exclusively of all revelation, takes in the whole of religious truth and duty, which is founded in the nature of things, and knows as much of it already as God can teach him : and that a divine revelation can give him no farther light or stronger assurance, relating to any thing that it is proper for him to believe or practise in religion, than what his bare reason informs him of without it. Among the encomiums which our author bestows upon deism, one is, that it is " no other than the religion essential to manj-f- " a phrase that he and others of the deistical writers seem fond of. But will these sagacious gentlemen undertake to inform the world what kind or degree of religion is essential to the human nature ? Or, if they could oblige the world with that discovery, is nothing valuable in religion but what is essential to man ? If revelation discovereth to us some things of importance which we could not attain to the knowledge of by bare unassisted reason; or giveth us farther assurances concerning some things, as to which we were doubtful before, and setteth them in a clearer light ; or exhibiteth a more complete system of duty ; or furnisheth more powerful mo tives to animate us to the practice of it ; must all these dis coveries be rejected, under pretence that what we thus receive by revelation is not essential to man? Might not all improvements of every kind be discarded for the same reason? And so man must be left in his pure essentials. And then what a fine figure would the human nature make ! Besides this general account of deism, our author takes upon him to exhibit some fundamental credenda of a deist ; and he might easily find a plausible scheme of natural religion formed ready to his hand by Christian writers, and then put it upon the. world for pure genuine deism. Among these fundamental articles of the reli gion of a deist, he reckons the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments. But is this a point in which the deists are agreed '! Lord Bolingbroke every-where sets up for a deist of the first rank, and glories in that character, and yet he does all he can to weaken or subvert that which is here put upon us as a fundamental article of the deistical creed : and Mr. Chubb, who no doubt would pass with our author for a true deist, though sometimes, like this writer, he makes a great shew of believing not only the truth but the im portance of that doctrine, yet in several passages of his Fareivell to his Readers, and especially in his fourth and fifth sections, where" he * Deism fairly Stated, <5cc. p. 13. t Ibid. p. 513. 198 a view of the deistical writers. Let. XV treats professedly of this subject, setteth himself to shew that it is altogether uncertain, and incapable of being proved, and that the probability lies against it.* Thus it is that these gentlemen are sometimes willing to make a fair appearance with their principles, till persons are drawn in, and fully initiated in the mysteries of deism. This author gives us twelve propositions with great pomp, most of which have nothing to do with the debate between Christians and deists, and others of them are very ambiguous, f In his seventh proposition he layeth it down as a principle, that "to govern our "conduct by our reason is our duty, and all that God requireth of us." If the meaning be, that God requireth nothing from us but what we know by our bare unassisted reason to be our duty, and that jf any thing farther be revealed to be our duty, we are not obliged to per form it, because we did not know it to be so by our own natural reason independently of that revelation, it is false and absurd : for when God requireth us to be governed by our reason, it must be supposed to be his intention, that we should take in all proper helps and assistances. And if he is pleased in his great goodness to give us additional discoveries of his will and our duty for enlightening and assisting our reason, then certainly we are obliged, and it is what reason itself and the religion of nature requireth of us, to pay a regard to those discoveries ; so as to believe the truths which he has been pleased to reveal, and to practise those duties which he has seen fit to enjoin: and not to do so would be highly criminal. The four last of his twelve propositions are designed to shew, that reason and nature sufficiently instruct us without revelation, as to the methods of reconciliation with the Deity, when we have offen ded him by our sins, and give us a certain assurance that God will reinstate us in his favour upon our repentance and reformation. I have elsewhere considered this subject at large in answer to Tindal, who had particularly insisted upon it."); At present I shall only ob serve, that though nature and reason seem to^direct us to repentance and reformation in case of our being conscious of having offended God and transgressed his holy laws, yet reason and nature could not give us certain information, how far repentance shall be available to avert the punishment we had incurred, or what shall be the extent of the divine forgiveness, or how far an obedience like ours, mixed with many failures and defects, and which faileth short in many instances of what the divine law requires, shall be rewarded. We do not know enough of God, of the reasons and ends ofthe divine govern ment, and of what may be necessary for vindicating the authority of his laws, to be able to pronounce with certainty, by the meue light of our own unassisted reason, what measures his governing wisdom and righteousness may think fit to take with regard to guilty creatures that have sinned against him. Will any reasonable man pretend, that God himself cannot discover any thing to us, which it * S-e before, p. 2«0, & seq. t Deism fairly Slated, kc. p. 37—40. } The Answer to Christianity as old as the Creation, vol. i. c. 6. Let. XV. " DEISM FAIRLY STATED," cVc. 199 may be proper for us to know, relating to the methods of his dealings towards us, the terms of our acceptance with him, or the retributions of a future state, but what we ourselves knew as well before f Or, if he should condescend to make discoveries to us of this sort, and give us assurances relating to matters of such great importance, ought we not to be thankful for such discoveries? especially since it is certain in fact, that men in all ages and nations have been under great anxieties" and uncertainties about the proper means of pro pitiating an offended Deity. Our author mentions it to the praise of deism, that " it is that religion of nature and reason, which was believed and practised by Socrates, and those of old," whom he represents as having been ornaments to human nature.* Thus he seems to think it a greater honour to be a disciple of Socrates than of Jesus Christ. But why are we to be turned back to the religion of Socrates, who have a light so vastly superior to that which he enjoyed ? However he may be justly commended for having attained so far, considering the circumstances he was under (though in many things he fell in with the established superstition of his age and country), is this a reason why we should be sent to that philosopher to learn a right scheme of religion, when we have a far more excellent one in our hands, and recommended by a much higher authority? He was himself sensible of his need of farther assistances, and a divine instructor ; and shall we who have that inestimable advantage, de spise the light given us from heaven, and be desirous to return to that state of darkness and uncertainty of which he complained, and from which he wanted to be delivered ? The remarks that have been made will help us to judge of those passages in which he pretendeth to give the true state of the ques tion between deists and Christians. " The single question," saith he, " between Christians and deists is, whether the belief of rational doctrines, and the practice of natural duties, are all that are strictly necessary with regard to the divine approbation, and consequently human happiness ?"-f- And again, when he professes to come to the point, he says, "The grand foundation of the difference be tween the deists and the religious of all other persuasions is, whe ther any doctrine or precept that has not its foundation apparently in reason or nature, can be of the essence of religion, and with propriety be said to be a religious doctrine or precept."*); Here he supposes, and it runs through his whole book, that nothing can be properly said to belong to religion, but what plainly appeareth to the understanding of every man, without any assistance from divine revelation, to be founded in nature and reason. The ques tion then, though not clearly stated by this writer, is this: whether God can make any additional discoveries in relation to doctrines to be believed, or duties to be practised, concerning which we had no certain information by the bare light of unassisted nature and rea- * Deism fairlv Stated, p. 5. t Ibid. p. 7. See also p. 8—10. X Ibid. p. 14. 200 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XV. son ? And if God hath made such discoveries, whether it would not in that case be necessary, that those to whom these discoveries are made should believe those doctrines, and practise those duties ? Whether, because our own natural reason did not inform us of them without revelation, therefore when they are revealed to us, we may safely and innocently reject them as useless and unnecessary, and as not belonging to religion at all ? Or whether reason and nature do not require it of us as an indispenable duty, to pay a just sub mission and regard to the significations and discoveries of the di vine will concerning truth or duty, in whatever way they are made known to us ? These are questions, which one should think would admit of an easy decision : since nothing could be more absurd, than to lay it down as a principle, that God can make no farther discoveries of truth and duty to be believed and practised by us, but what all men know of themselves by their own unassisted rea son ; or that, if he should, we are not obliged to receive or regard these discoveries. It is very usual with the deistical writers, and this author among the rest,' to put the question, whether reason or revelation be the best guide, as if there were an opposition or inconsistency between them : but the proper question is, whether reason left merely to itself, and with the many frailties, corruptions, and defects to which it is now subject, or reason with the assistance of divine revelation, be the best guide to duty and happiness ? Revelation indeed would be of little use, if we were to take his account of it. He tells us, that by " pure revelation must be meant, that which is of such a nature as to be quite out of reason's province to form any judg ment about it: That matters supernatural are incapable of an exa mination by natural reason, or of being approved as reasonable : And that surely no man can be rationally convinced of what lies quite out of the reach of his reasoning faculties to form any judg ment at all about."* This he frequently repeats, and seems to value himself upon this way of putting the case. But it is grossly misrepresented. None of the friends of revelation understand by it, that about which we are not capable of forming any judgment at all : on the contrary, they generally agree that we must make use of our reason, both in judging of the evidences of divine revelation, whereby it is proved to be from God, and of the sense and meaning of its doctrines and precepts. But our author thinks fit to play upon the word supernatural, as if by it were meant that which is absolutely unintelligible and absurd ; whereas a thing may be so far supernatural, that we could not have discovered it merely by our own reason without a divine revelation, and yet, when discovered to us, we may be able to form a judgment concerning it, and may see it to be worthy of God, and of an excellent tendency, and as such our reason may approve it. Having considered that part of the pamphlet in which the author pretends to give a fair state and vindication of deism as opposed to * Deism fairly Stated, p. 2, 24. Let. XV. " DEISM FAIRLY STATED," «&:C, 201 revelation, I shall now take some notice of what he hath advanced with regard to the Christian revelation in particular. He says, "the material question between rational Christians and deists depends upon the proof that is made by Christians, that the Scriptures are a divine revelation, and the very word of God ; for if this point be proved, the controversy is at an end." But here he complains of the want of unanimity among Christians, in a point of such importance. "The Roman Catholics say, We know the Scriptures to be the word of God, only by the testimony of the church ; and among Protestants, some say, They are known to be the word of God by themselves, to those only whose eyes the Spirit of God is pleased to open, to perceive the characters of divine truth impressed on them : others maintain, that they will manifestly ap pear to be the word of God by themselves, upon an honest inves tigation of mere natural reason, to any man who shall impartially exercise it about them.'-* But if the matter be rightly considered, there is not so great a difference among Christian writers about the way of knowing the Scriptures to be the word of God, as is pretended. Christians in general are agreed, that the extraordi nary facts recorded in the gospel are true, and that those facts prove the divine mission of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the truth and divinity of that scheme of religion which was published to the world in his name. They agree, that the Scriptures contain a faithful and authentic account of the doctrines and laws deliv ered by Christ and his apostles, and of the illustrious attestations whereby they were confirmed : That they were committed to writ ing by the apostles themselves, who were eye and ear witnesses of what they relate, or by their most intimate companions, and were published in the first age of the Christian church, the age in which those doctrines and laws were delivered, and the facts were done : That these writings have remarkable internal cha racters of truth and divinity in the goodness and excellence of the doctrines, the purity of the precepts, the force and power of the motives, that unaffected simplicity and impartial regard to truth which everywhere appears, and in the admirable tendency of the whole to promote the glory of God,' and the good of man kind, without any traces or views of "worldly policy, ambition, avarice, or sensuality. And though some talk of these characters as discernible by the aid of the Holy Spirit, and others by the investigation of human reason, yet neither do the former intend to exclude human reason from having any concern in that inquiry, nor do the latter design to exclude the assistance of the Holy Spirit ; since it is generally acknowledged among Christians, and is highly agreeable to reason itself, that it is proper to apply to God, the author of light, and giver of all inward illumination, as Lord Herbert calls him, to assist us in our inquiries, and by pu rifying our souls from vicious affections, and corrupt prejudices, to prepare our minds for a due reception of religious and moral * Deism fairly Stated, p. 16—24. 202 . A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XV. truth. I add, that though some have talked of corruptions in the sacred writings, yet Christians are generally agreed, that the Scriptures are transmitted to us without any such general corrup tion as to make any alteration in the doctrines and facts, and that they are delivered down to us by a credible uninterrupted tradition, greater than can be produced for any other books in the world ; by the testimony not merely ofthe church in one age, but in every age, from the time in which they were written ; and not merely by any one party of Christians, but by those of different sects and parties, by friends and enemies. Any one that considereth the several things now mentioned, and which have been often urged by Christians of all denominations, by the best of the Popish, as well as Protestant writers, who have appeared in defence of Chris tianity, will see that there is a more general agreement among them, in what concerneth the proofs of the divine original and au thority of the sacred writings, than our author seems willing to allow. With regard to prophecy and miracles, which are insisted on by all Christian writers as proofs of the divinity of the Christian reli gion, he will not allow them to be any proofs of it all ; because they do not prove, that "the collection of tracts commonly called the Bible were written by the persons respectively whose names they bear; that the Deity immediately dictated to each writer the subject matter contained therein ; and that these books have been faithfully transmitted down to us without any corruption, altera tion, addition, or diminution."* Mr. Chubb has the same thought, and seems very fond of it, for he has it over and over again in his Farewell to his Readers. But if prophecies and miracles exhibited sufficient credentials to the divine mission of our Lord Jesus Christ and of his apostles, who published to the world the doctrines and laws ofthe Christian religion ; and if the Scriptures contain a just and faithful account of those prophecies and miracles, and of the doctrines and laws so attested and confirmed, and delivered by those divinely authorized teachers: dotb not this lay a just foun dation for receiving those doctrines and laws as of divine authority? As to their being written by the persons whose names they bear, and their being safely transmitted to us, without any material cor ruption or alteration, this needeth no miracles to prove it ; it must be proved by other mediums, such as by the acknowledgment of all mankind are sufficient to prove things of that kind. If these writings can be traced up, as they certainly may, from our own times, by unquestionable evidence, to the very age in which they were written ; and if they have been all along acknowledged to have been written by those to whom they are ascribed, and even the enemies who lived nearest those times never contested it; and if it can be demonstrated, that, as the case was circumstanced, a general corruption of those writings in the doctrines and facts, if any had attempted it, would have been an impossible thing ; this * Deism fairly Stated, p. 22, 26. Let. XV. "deism fairly stated,'' Sec. 203 ought to satisfy an impartial inquirer ; and this is capable of as clear a proof as the nature of the thing can admit, and which, as hath been already hinted, is superior to what can be produced for any other book in the world. And the man that would doubt of such evidence in any other case, would be looked upon as ridicu lously scrupulous, and be thought to carry his scepticism to an un reasonable height. As to the subject matter of the Christian revelation, this writer is for stripping it of every doctrine that is founded in nature and reason; though there are several important doctrines of that kind, e. g. those relating to the attributes and providence of God and a state of future retributions, which Christianity was manifestly intended to confirm and establish, and set in a clearer light. If we are to take his account of it, it consisteth wholly of specula tive, metaphysical, unintelligible doctrines, which lie out of the reach of reason to determine whether they be true or false, or to pass any judgment at all about them; and of positive institutions which he pretends by the confession of Christian divines are no constituent parts of religion.* By saying they are no constituent parts of religion, he evidently intends, that they have nothing to do with religion, and are of no use or significancy at all ; whereas the divines he refers to agree, that the positive institutions of Christianity do belong to religion as valuable instrumental duties which have a tendency to subserve and promote the great ends of all religion, and are, when rightly improved, of signal use and benefit. After having observed, that many parts of Scripture are mys terious and unintelligible, he saith, that to suppose that God gives forth unintelligible instructions and propositions to his creatures is to prove him, in fact, a mere trifer.f And he urges, that " as certain as a being of perfect rectitude has given a revelation so certain it is, that not any thing in that revelation can be found on a strict inquiry unrevealed, i. e. not understood by men of learning, penetration, diligence, and industry.";}" The design of this is to insinuate, that if there be any one thing in the Bible even in the prophetical parts of it, which is not understood by men of learning and diligence, the whole is false; or if there be any circumstance in the revelation obscure, it cannot be a 'true divine revelation. But may it not reasonably be supposed, that in a revelation designed not merely for any one particular age, but for the use of mankind in every succeeding age, as there are many things, and those of the greatest importance, sufficiently clear and intelligible at all times, so there may be some things not well understood at one time, which afterwards are cleared up by farther inquiry, or a more diligent search, or by comparing predictions with events? Or, may not things which are revealed to us as far as it is necessary they should be so, yet have some things attending them, the manner of which we are not able * Deism fairly Stated, p. 2, 6, 16, 21, 58. t Ibid. p. 26, 34. ' Ibid. p. 83. 204 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XV. clearly to explain jand understand ? Is not this the case of many important points of what is called natural religion, relating to the providence and attributes of God, the divine eternity, immen sity, omniscience, the creation of the world, &c. ? And must we reject what we do understand, and the great usefulness of which we clearly apprehend, because there is something relating to it which we cannot distinctly conceive ! As to the objections he makes against some particular doctrines of Christianity, as unintelligible and absurd, or at least as absolutely useless, this entirely depends upon the strange and unfair represent ation he has been pleased to make of them. Thus he supposes Christians to maintain it as a doctrine of Scripture, that "an original, " uncompounded, immaterial, and pure spirit, should, like one ofthe "derived, compounded, material, human species, have a Son."* As if Christians understood God's having a Son, in the same gross, literal, and carnal sense in which one man begets another. He pronounces, that "the supposed satisfaction for sin by Christ's "death is a doctrine entirely repugnant to reason, and as such ought to " be rejected with scorn. "f Mr. Chubb has passed the same censure upon it, which is owing to the absurd light in which he has thought fit to represent it, concerning which see before. But the doc trine of our redemption and reconciliation through the obedience and sufferings of our Lord Jesus Christ, considered as taught in the holy Scriptures, hath nothing in it but what is worthy of God, and of an excellent tendency. He mentions another doctrine, which he owns to be intelligible enough, but represents it as good for nothing, and as of no more consequence to the world in general, than there being a burning mountain in the kingdom of Naples, is an advantage to the people of of England. And he thinks " it is greatly improbable, that God "should especially interpose to acquaintthe world with what mankind "would do altogether as well without.";}' The doctrine he here refers to is that of God's judging the world by Jesus Christ. But this, rightly considered, is a noble part of the gospel scheme, and capable of being improved to the most excellent purposes. It renders the whole harmonious and consistent, in that the same glorious and divine Person by whom God made the world, and by whom as the great in strument he carried on his gracious designs for recovering mankind from their ruinous and lost estate, is appointed to be the judge of all men, and dispenser of future retributions. And what farther shews the propriety of appointing Christ to be the judge is, that this is the last perfective act of the kingdom and dominion committed to him as Mediator, and that it is to be regarded as a reward of his amazing hu miliation and self-abasement, and of his unparalleled obedience and sufferings in our nature, in compliance with his heavenly father's will. To which it may be added, that nothing can be fuller of comfort to good men, than that the benevolent Saviour of mankind will judge the * Deism fairly Stated, p. 66. t Ibid. p. 41. t Deism fairly Stated, p. 35. Let. XV. " DEISM FAIRLY STATED," &C. 205 world in the father's name ; since it yields a satisfactory proof, that it is the will of God, that the judgment should be conducted, not with the utmost rigour of unallayed justice, but with great equity, so as to make all proper allowances for human weakness and infirmity, as far as is consistent with unbiassed truth and righteousness. And at the same time it hath a manifest tendency to strike an awe into the impenitent rejecters of the divine grace and goodness, to consider that they must be accountable to that Lord and Saviour whom they rejected and despised. What a mighty enforcement must it give to his authority and laws, that he himself shall call us to an account as to our obedience or disobedience to those laws, and will have it in his power to fulfil his own glorious promises to them that believe and obey him, and to execute his awful threatenings against the finally impenitent and disobedient. There are several other things he repeats which are urged by almost every deistical writer, and which I have had occasion frequently to mention, such as the contradictory interpretations put on several passages of Scripture, different translations, errors of transcribers, 8cc. But that which he seems to lay a particular stress upon is the cor ruption of Christians. He speaks of the abominable wickedness that has rode triumphant in the Christian world : and that " the Americans " have too much reason to consider the coming of Christians and " Christianity among them as the greatest evil and curse that ever " befel them.*" But if professed Christians have made religion a cover for their ambition, avarice, and cruelty, Christianity is not ac countable for this. And whosoever considers the best accounts of the Americans before Christianity came among them ; their gross ignorance and barbarity, their human sacrifices, and the abominable vices and customs which prevailed among them,-j- must be sensible, that if the pure religion of Jesus, as taught in the gospel by Christ and his apostles, had been published and received among them in its genuine purity and simplicity, it would have been the happiest thing that could have befallen them; and the greatest fault is, that little care has been taken to instruct them and the other heathen nations, in the true Christian religion as delivered in the holy Scriptures. Notwithstanding the corruptions so complained of in the Christian world, it is undeniable, that what there is of knowledge and true religion among men, is principally where Christianity is professed. But if all were true that is pretended concerning the depravity of those that call themselves Christians, it would only prove, that they are very much fallen from the religion they profess, but not that Christianity itself is false, or was not originally from God. Whilst it can be shewn, as it may be with the utmost evidence, that considered in itself, and as contained in the Scriptures, it is of the most excellent tendency, and that the uniform design of its doctrines, precepts, promises, and threatenings, is to promote the cause of virtue and righteousness in the world, and to reclaim men from vice and wickedness ; it is certainly very unreasonable and * Deism fairly Stated, p. 47, 48. t Bayle's Dictionary, article Leon [Peter Cuccade]. 205 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XV, unfair to make Christianity answerable for the abuses and corrup tions it condemneth. If every thing must be rejected which hath been abused, government and civil polity, knowledge and literature, religion, liberty, and reason itself, must be discarded. One of the most remarkable things in the tract we are now con sidering is, that the author will not allow that the moral precepts of Christianity properly belong to it all, or make any part of the Chris tian religion. He pretends, that Christian divines, in order to render Christianity amiable, have decked her with the graceful ornaments of moral precepts; whereas in Christianity the moral precepts are but borrowed ware, the property of the deists, and as much distinguished from Christianity, as Christianity is from Mahometanism. Thus he hath found out an admirable expedient to strip Christianity of what hath been hitherto esteemed one of its principal glories. The holy and excellent precepts which the great Author of our religion taught and enjoined in the name of God, and to enforce which by the most weighty and important motives was one great design of his and his apostles' ministry, do not, it seems, belong to Christianity at all. Moral precepts, according to this writer, make no part of divine revelation, and of the scheme of religion delivered in the Gospel ; though to clear and shew them in their just extent, and enforce them by a divine authority, and by the most prevailing motives, seems to be one of the noblest ends for which a divine revelation could be given to mankind. Supposing, which was really the case, that the world was sunk into an amazing darkness and corruption, there was nothing that was more wanted than to have a pure system of morals, containing the whole of our duty with respect to God, our neighbours, and ourselves, delivered, not as the opinions of wise men and philo sophers, but as the laws of God himself, and enforced by all the sanctions of a divine authority, and by ail the charms of a divine grace and goodness. This is what hath been done by the Christian ( revelation ; and its great usefulness to this purpose, and the need the world stood in of it, is excellently represented by Mr. Locke, in his Reasonableness of Christianity, * quoted at large by Dr. Benson in his remarks on this pamphlet, who very j ustly observes, that this great man had fully obviated before-hand all that the author of Deism fairly Slated hath advanced on this subject. The last argument he urgeth against the Christian revelation is drawn from its not having been universally spread in all ages and na tions. I shall not say any thing here to this objection, which hath been often repeated and answered. It had been particularly insisted upon by Dr. Tindal, and was fully considered in the answers that were made to him. Some notice was taken of it in the observations on Lord Herbert's scheme. And it may be observed, as Mr. Chubb himself seems to think, that no great stress should be laid upon it; and he will not take upon him to affirm, that the non-universality of a revelation is a just objection against its divinity.-f- Soon after Deism fairly Stated, &c. appeared, Dr. Benson pub- * Locke's Works, vol. ii. p. 575 — 579. 4th edit. t Posthumous Works, vol. i. p. 218, 219. Let. XV. bolingbroke's letters. 207 lished animadversions upon it, in the second edition of the Reason ableness of Christianity as delivered in the Scriptures, London, 1746: To which there is added an appendix, in which he solidly vindicates the arguments he had offered in his Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. against the exceptions of this writer, and charges him not only with false reasonings, but with gross misrepresentations. The same charge is urged against him in a tract published by the Reverend Mr. Capel Berrow, though without his name, intitled, Deism not con sistent with the Religion of Nature and Reason ; — " wherein are ob viated the most popular objections brought against Christianity, " those especially which are urged by a moral philosopher, in a late "extraordinary pamphlet, styled Deism fairly Stated, and fully Viri- "dicated, in a letter to a friend — London, 1751." There were other answers to Deism fairly Stated, which I have not seen. I shall con clude my reflections upon it with observing, that this pamphlet fur nishes remarkable instances to verify the observation I had occasion to make before* concerning the unfair conduct of the deistical writers, and the strange liberties they take in misrepresenting the sense of the Christian writers whom they quote. It may not be improper here to take some notice of the attempt made against the authority of the sacred writings in the late Lord Bolingbroke's Letters ou the Study and Use of History. In some of these letters he hath used his utmost efforts to subvert the credit of the scripture history ; but the method he has made use of to this purpose seems not to be well chosen, nor consistent with itself. A principal reason which his Lordship produces to invalidate the credit and authority of the old Testament history is, that the Greeks were not acquainted with it ; and that their accounts, particularly with regard to the Assyrian empire, do not agree with the accounts given of it in Scripture. And yet he himself has taken great pains to shew that the ancient Greeks were fabulous writers, and that their accounts, of ancient times, either with regard to other nations, or their own, are not to be depended on : and accordingly he hath let us know, that if they had perfectly agreed with the accounts given in the Jew ish Scriptures, he would have had very little regard to them, and would not have looked upon this to be any argument of their truth. Many learned writers have produced testimonies from heathen authors, tending to strengthen some remarkable passages in the scripture his tory. This his Lordship finds great fault with, and chargeth it as a most partial and absurd conduct to admit the testimony of the heathen writers, if they happen at any time to agree with the scripture ac counts, and to reject their testimony when against them. But if the matter be fairly weighed, there is nothing in this but what is very reasonable: for, considering the strong prejudices of the heathens against the Jews, whose whole religion and policy were so opposite to theirs, it is evident that no great stress can be laid upon what they say against them, and their history ; and yet if any thing be found in their writings, which tendeth to confirm the facts recorded • * See above, let. vii. 208 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XV. in the Jewish sacred books, it is just to take advantage of this; since it is plain this could not be owing to a favourable preposses sion towards the Jews, or their histories, but to the force of truth, or to some traditions which they looked upon as authentic. For though the testimonies are not much to be regarded, when they are to the prejudice of those for whom they have a declared aversion, yet the testimony of enemies in favour of those to whom they are known to be enemies, has been always looked upon to be of great weight. In order to invalidate the Scripture history, his Lordship has thought fit to repeat what had been often mentioned by the writers on that side : That the Jewish sacred books were lost in the Baby lonish captivity ; that there have been such corruptions and alter ations in the copies, that there can be no dependence upon them ; that there is no proof of the Gospels having been written in the apostolic age ; that they were not distinguished from the spurious gospels ; that there had been formerly evidence against Christi anity, but that it was destroyed ; that the Christian clergy, through whose hands the Scriptures have been transmitted to us, were guilty of numberless frauds and corruptions : and that the many differences among Christians about the sense of Scripture show, that it is absolutely uncertain ; and that there is now no certain standard of Christianity at all. These and other objections, which his Lordship hath displayed with no small ostentation, I shall not here take any particular notice of, having considered and obviated them in the Reflections on Lord Bolingbroke's Letters on the Study and Use qf History, especially as far as they relate to Christianity and the Holy Scriptures, published at London, 8vo. 1753. About the same time, the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Clogher published A Vindication of the Histories of the Old and New Tes tament, in Answer to the Objections of the late Lord Bolingbroke : in which he hath both detected and exposed several mistakes his Lordship had fallen into with respect to other ancient authors whom he cites, and hath vindicated the sacred writings against the attempts made in those Letters to invalidate their credit and divine authority. — These, with Mr. Harvey's Remarks on Lord Boling broke's Letters, as far as they relate to the History of the Old Tes tament, are the only answers I have seen to his Lordship's Letters on the Study and Use of History. But we shall soon have occa sion to return to this noble Lord, who afterwards, in his posthu mous works, appeared still more openly against the Christian cause, and even against what have been hitherto accounted some of the most important principles of natural religion. Let. XVI. mr. iiume. 209 LETTER XVI. Mr. Hume, a subtle and ingenious Writer, but extremely sceptical and fond of Novelty. — He proposes to free Bletaphysics from that Jargon and Obscurity which has served only as a Shelter to Superstition and Error. — His Doctrine concerning the Relation of Cause and Effect examined. — He declares, that the Knowledge of this Relation is of the highest Importance, and that all our Reasons concerning- Matter of Fact and Experience, and concerning the Existence of any Being, are founded upon it. — Yet he sets himself to show, that there is no real Connexion between Cause and Effect, and that there can he no certain, nor even probable, reasoning from the one to the other. — Reflections upon the great Absurdity and pernicious Consequences of thi3 Scheme — The Inconsistencies this Writer hath fallen into. Sir, I now send you some observations upon Mr. Hume, an ingeni ous writer, who hath lately appeared against the Christian cause, and that in a manner which seems to have something new in it, and different from what others had written before him, especially in what he calls his Philosophical Essays concerning Human Un derstanding. The second edition of this book, with additions and corrections, which is what I have now before me, was published in London, 1750. This gentleman must be acknowledged to be a subtle writer, of a very metaphysical genius, and has a neat and agreeable manner of expression. But it is obvious to every judi cious reader, that he hath, in many instances, carried scepticism to an unreasonable height; and seemeth everywhere to affect an air of making new observations and discoveries. His writings seem, for the most part, to be calculated rather to amuse, or even con found, than to instruct and enlighten the understanding ; and there are not a few things in them, which strike at the foundation of natural, as well as the proofs and evidences of revealed, religion. This appeareth to me to be, in a particular manner, the character of his Philosophical Essays : and you will, perhaps, be of the same opinion, when you have considered the remarks I now send you. If we were to form a judgment of these Essays, from the account he himself is pleased to give of them, and of his intention in writ ing them, our notion of them would be highly to their advantage. Having taken notice of the abstractedness of metaphysical specula tions, he says, that he has, " in the following Essays, " endeavoured to throw some light upon subjects, from which uncertainty has hitherto deterred the wise, and obscurity the ignorant." He pro poses " to unite the boundaries of the different species of philo sophy, by reconciling profound inquiry with clearness, and truth with novelty ;" and thinks "it will be happy, if, reasoning in this easy manner, he can undermine the foundations of an abstruse philosophy, which seems to have served hitherto only as a shelter p 210 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XVI. to superstition, and a cover to absurdity and error."* He under takes to " banish all that jargon, which has so long taken posses sion of metaphysical reasonings, and drawn such disgrace upon them."f And after having represented all the received systems of philosophy, and all common theories, as extremely defective, he pro mises to " avoid all jargon and confusion, in treating of such subtle and profound subjects."*); That part of these Essays, which I shall first take notice of, and which is indeed of a very uncommon strain, and seems to lie at the foundation of many of those extraordinary things which he afterwards advances, is what he proposes to consider, p. 47, $• seq.; where he observes, that "it is a subject worthy curiosity, to in quire, what is the nature of that evidence, which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact, beyond the present testimony of our senses, or the records of our memory." He observes, that " this part of philosophy has been little cultivated either by the ancients or moderns :" but though it is difficult, it may be " useful, by destroying that implicit faith and credulity, which is the bane of all reasoning and free inquiry."^ After such a pompous profes sion, one would be apt to expect something extremely deserving of our attention. Let us therefore examine into his scheme, that we may know what it really is ; and then our way will be clear to make the necessary remarks upon it. He observes, that " the relation of cause and effect is necessary to the subsistence of our species, and the regulation of our con duct in every circumstance and occurrence of human life. With out this, we should never have been able to adjust means to ends, nor employ our rational powers either to the producing of good, or avoiding of evil."|| And, accordingly, he expressly declares, that " if there be any relation, any object, which it imports us to know perfectly, it is that of cause and effect : on this we found all our reasonings, concerning matter of fact and experience; and by this alone we retain any assurance concerning objects, that are removed from the present testimony of our memory and senses :" and that " the existence of any Being can only be known by argu ments from its cause, or its effect."** It appeareth then, that by his own acknowledgment, it is of the highest importance to know the relation of cause and effect. Let us now see what instruction he gives us with regard to that relation. He absolutely denies, that this relation can possibly be known a priori, and asserts, that it entirely arises from experience :ff that it is this only " that teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of another.""];"); But he takes a great deal of pains to show that experience cannot furnish a reasonable foundation for such an inference. He had laid it down as a principle, that all arguments * Philosophical Essays, p. [8, 19. t Ibid. p. 27,28. X Ibid. p. 97, 106, 107. § Ibid. p. 47, 48, 49. || Ibid., p. 89. 90. ** Ibid. p. 123, 258. tt Ibid. p. 50, ;">2, 53. XX Ibid. p. 258. Let. XVI. MR, HUME. 211 from experience can at best only be probable ; but he will not allow even this in the present case: he sets himself to prove, that " not so much as any probable arguments can be drawn from cause to effect, or from effect to cause:"* that " the conjunction of the effect with the cause is entirely arbitrary, not only in its first con ception, a priori, but after it is suggested by experience :"f that, "indeed, in fact, we infer the one from the other; but that this is not by a chain of reasoning; nor is there any medium which may enable the mind to draw such an inference."); The only ground of such an inference is, the supposed resemblance between the past and future : but that it is impossible any argument from experience should prove that resemblance : and yet if there be not such a resemblance, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. "§ He positively asserts, that "we know only by experience the frequent conjunction of objects, without being ever able to comprehend anything like connexion between them. "|| And he frequently observes, that the connexion is only in our own thoughts or conceptions, not in the things themselves ; and resolves the conjunction between cause and effect, and the inference drawn from the one to the other, wholly into custom ; that it is a " customary connexion in the thought or imagination be twixt one object, and its usual attendant;''** that custom, he always calls a habit ;ff and represents it as owing to a repetition of acts ; at other times, he ascribes it to an instinct, or mechanical tendency, and represents it as a necessary act of the mind, and infallible in its operations :");*); yet afterwards, speaking of the same custom or instinct, he says, that, like other instincts, it may be fallacious and deceitful.^ The great argument he produces, and upon which he lays the greatest stress, to show that we can have no certainty in our con clusions concerning the relation of cause and effect, nor reason from one to the other, is, that we have no idea of that connexion which unites the effect to the cause, "or of the force, power, or energy, in the cause, which produces the effect; nor consequently, any medium whereby we can infer the one from the other. He sets himself particularly to show, that neither external objects give us the idea of power, nor reflections on the operations of our own minds.|||| If what our author offers on this head had been only to display the subtlety of his metaphysical genius, and show how little we are able distinctly to explain the manner even of those things of which we have the greatest certainty, we should have allowed him to amuse himself, and his readers, with a little philosophical play. But what he here advances, concerning cause and effect, power and connexion, he makes the foundation of conclusions relating to matters of great importance, — * Philosophical Essays, p. 62, 63. t Ibid. p. 53, 54. J Ibid. p. 60, 61. § Ibid. p. 65,66. || Ibid. p. 114. ** Ibid. p. 123. tt Ibid. p. 73, 74,91, 120. }J Ibid. 73,91. §$ Ibid. p. 251. UU Ibid. p. 105, 106. p 2 212 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XVI. Hez nugee seria ducunt In mala By endeavouring to destroy all reasoning from causes to effects, or from effects to causes, and not allowing that we can so much as probably infer the one from the other, by arguing either a priori, or from experience, he subverts, as far as in him lies, the very foundation of those reasonings, that are drawn from the effects which we behold in the frame of the universe, to the existence of one supreme, intelligent, all-powerful cause; and accordingly we shall find that he himself afterwards applies this principle to this very purpose. Another use that he makes *of this doctrine con cerning cause and effect i«, what we would not have expected from it, to confound all difference between physical and moral causes ; and to show that the latter have the same kind of causality with the former. This is the purport of his eighth essay, which is con cerning liberty and necessity :* though if he argued consistently, he must deny that there is any such thing in nature as necessity, or necessary connexion ; or that there is either physical or moral cause at all. You will scarce expect, that I should enter upon a laborious confutation of so whimsical a scheme, though proposed to the world with great pomp, and represented by the author himself as of vast importance. I shall content myself with making some ge neral observations upon it. And first, whereas this writer frequently, throughout these essays, lays a mighty stress upon experience, as the great guide of human life, and the only foundation of all other knowledge, especially with respect to matter of fact, and the existence of objects, he here plainly endeavours to show, that there can be no argument from experience at all ; nor can any reasonable conclusion be drawn from it : for he will not allow, that argument can be drawn or inference made from experience, but what is founded on the supposed rela tion or connexion betwixt cause and effect. If therefore there be no relation or connexion between cause and effect at all, in the nature of things, which it is the whole design of his reasoning on this subject to shew, then all certainty of experience' all proof from it, entirely fail ; all experience, as he himself expresses it, becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion.^ Secondly, Another remark I would make upon Mr. Hume's way of arguing is, that it proceeds upon a wrong foundation, and which is contrary to truth and reason, viz. that we cannot have any reason able certainty of the truth of a thing, [or that it really is, when we cannot distinctly explain the manner of it, or how it is. The sum of his argumentation, as I have already hinted with relation to cause and effect, is, that we cannot be certain of any such thing as power or energy, because we cannot conceive or explain precisely wherein it consists, or how it operates. But this is a very fallacious way of reasoning. Though we cannot metaphysically explain the manner * Philosophical Essays, p. 129, and seq. t Ibid. p. 66. Let. XVI. mr. hume. 213 in which the cause operateth upon the effect, yet we may, in many cases, be sure that there is a connexion between them ; and that where there are certain effects produced, there are powers correspon dent or adequate to the production of those effects. The mind, in such cases, when it sees an effect produced, is led, by a quick and undoubted process of reasoning, to acknowledge that there must be a cause which hath the power of producing it; or else we must say, that it is produced without any cause at all, or that nothing in nature hath any power of producing it ; which is the greatest of all absurdi ties. He urgeth, that " it must be allowed, that when we know a power, we know that very circumstance in the cause, by which it is enabled to produce the effect." And then he asks, "Do we pretend to be acquainted with the nature of the human soul and the nature of an idea, or the aptitude of the one to produce the other ?"* But certainly we may know, that there is something in the cause which produceth the effect, though we cannot distinctly explain what that circumstance in the cause is, by which it is enabled to produce it. We must not deny, that there is in the mind a power of raising up ideas, and recalling them, and fixing the attention upon them, because we cannot explain how this is done. The argument Mr. Hume offers to prove, that we can have no assurance of the reality of force or power, viz. because we can not distinctly conceive or explain how it operateth, would equally prove, that we cannot be sure that we have any ideas at all, because we cannot well explain the nature of an ideas, or how it is formed in the mind. He himself, on another occasion, observes against Malebranche, and the modern Cartesians, who deny all power and activity in second causes, and ascribe ali to God ; that " we are indeed ignorant of the manner in which bodies operate upon one another ; and so we are of the manner or force by which the mind, even the supreme mind, operates, either on itself or on bodv. Were our ignorance therefore a sufficient reason for rejecting any thing, we should be led into that principle of refusing all energy to the Supreme Being, as much as to the grossest matter."f He here seems to censure it as a wrong way of arguing, to deny that a thing is, because we cannot distinctly conceive the manner how it is; or to make" our ignorance of any thing a sufficient reason for rejecting it ; and yet it is manifest, that his own reasoning against power or causality, force or energy, depends upon this prin ciple ; and indeed, by comparing the several parts of his scheme, there is too much reason to apprehend, that he had it in view to deny all force and energy, and all power whatsoever, in the Su preme as well as in secondary causes ; or at least to represent it as very uncertain. I think this gentleman would have done better to have said, as a late ingenious author of his own country, " We have no adequate idea of power ; we see evidently that there must be such a thing in nature ; but we cannot conceive how it acts, nor what connects the producing cause with the produced effect." Che- * Philosophical Essays, p. 110, 111. t Ibid. p. 117, 118. 214 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XVI. valier Ramsay's principles of natural and revealed religion, vol. i. p. 109. Thirdly, A third remark is, that many of our author's arguings on this subject are contrary to the most evident dictates of common sense. Such is that, where he asserts, that not so much as a pro bable argument can be drawn, in any case, from experience, con cerning the connexion betwixt cause and effect ; or from whence we may conclude, that from a similar cause we may expect similar effects.* Thus, e. g. according to his way of reasoning, it cannot so much as probably be concluded from experience, that if a quan tity of dry gunpowder be laid in any place, and fire be applied to it, it will cause an explosion ; or that if it hath such an effect to day, a like quantity of powder, the same way circumstanced, will produce the same effect to-morrow. No probable reason can be brought to show, that that which has had the effect in thousands of instances in time past, will, though all circumstances appear perfectly similar, have the same effect in time future. He grants, indeed, that, in such cases, the mind is determined to draw the inference ; yet he asserts, that the understanding has no part in the operation. But surely, when, from observation and experience, we come to know and judge of the ordinary course of nature, the understanding may justly draw a probable argument or conclusion, that from such and such causes, so circumstanced, such effects will follow. This inference is perfectly rational. And it is a strange way of talking, that, even from a number of uniform experiments, we cannot so much as probably infer a connexion between the cause and the effect, the sensible qualities and the secret powers. The reason he gives, is, that " if there be any suspicion, that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, experience can give rise to no inference or conclusion."f But is the probability of a thing destroyed, according to any way of reasoning allowed hitherto, because it is barely possible it may happen otherwise, though there are ten thousand to one against it? Mr. Hume elsewhere, when arguing against miracles, lays it down as a principle, that there is a constant uniformity in the course of nature, never to be violated ; but here, in order to show, that no probable reason can be brought from experience, concerning the connexion of cause and effect, he supposes, that there may be a suspicion that the course of nature may change. Thus this gen tleman knows how to assume and alter principles, as best suits his own present convenience. Reason leadeth us to conclude, that the course of nature is the appointment and constitution of that most wise and powerful Being, who made the world, and settled that law and order which he judged fittest and properest ; and then reason leadeth us also to conclude, that, except in very ex traordinary cases, the same order will continue ; and extraordinary cases do not hinder the probability of the ordinary course. So that reason affords a proper medium for a probable conclusion con- * Philosophical Essays, p. 61—63. t Ibid. p. 65, 66. Let. XVI. mr. hume. 215 ceming what effects are to be expected. He affirms, indeed, that all inferences of this kind are only the effects of custom or habit, not of reasoning.* But why is custom or habit here mentioned in opposition to reason, or as exclusive of it? May they not both concur? It is evident that they often go together, and mutually strengthen one another. Custom alone, without reason, is often not to be depended on ; but in this case reason gives its suffrage ; and, in all arguings in experimental philosophy, reason argues from similar causes to similar effects. It is by reason we draw those inferences, and the inferences are rational. It must not be said, that in this case there is no reasoning at all ; but that the reason ing is often so obvious, that it carries conviction by the very con stitution of the human mind, which naturally acquiesceth in it as satisfactory. It seems evident, that the great Author of our being- hath formed our minds, so as to reason in this manner; and he would not have done this, if it had not been both of great use in hu man life to make such inferences, and if there were not a real foundation for it in the nature of things. This writer himself owns, that " none but a fool or a madman will ever pretend to dispute the authority of experience, or to reject that great guide of human life: but he thinks it may be allowed a philosopher to have so much curiosity as to examine the principle of human na ture, which gives this weighty authority to experience."!-" But I cannot help thinking, that if we were to judge of philosophy by the specimen this gentleman hath given of it in this instance, many would be apt to conclude, that there is a great difference, and even opposition, between philosophy and common sense ; that what is so obvious and apparent to the common sense and reason of man kind, that he is a fool and a madman who doubts of it, yet in phi losophy is not so much as probable. Another instance, in which our author's scheme is not very reconcilable to the common sentiments of mankind, is, that he says, that " though we learn, by experience, the frequent conjunction oi objects, yet we are unable to comprehend any thing like connexion between them ; and that there appears not in all nature any thing- like connexion, conceivable by us ; all events are entirely loose and separate ; one event follows another ; but we never observe any tie betwixt them ; they seem conjoined, but never connected.""); But it is evident, that in many cases we have a distinct idea of con junction or contiguity, as in a heap of sand ; and of connexion, as betwixt cause and effect ; and the connexion in this case is not merely in our thoughts, as this gentleman is pleased to represent it ; but this very connexion in our thoughts is founded on a con nexion which we perceive in the things themselves. They are not connected as cause and effect, because we think them so ; but we perceive them to be connected, because we find they are so : nor is this owing merely to a custom or habit in our minds, but there is in nature a real foundation for it. * Philosophical Essays, p. 73, 7-1, & passim. t Ibid. 63, 66. X Ibid. p. 120. 216 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XVI Fourthly, Another remark which occurs to me upon consider ing Mr. Hume's scheme, is, that he hath fallen into several incon sistencies and contradictions ; and, indeed, it is not to be wondered at, that a man who argueth against common sense, however subtle and ingenious he may otherwise be, should also be inconsistent with himself. I have already taken notice of the passages in which he representeth experience as uncertain, and that not so much as a probable argument can be drawn from it ; and yet in his sixth essay; which is concerning probability, he shews that experience may not only furnish probable conclusions, but what he calls proofs ; which he explains to be such arguments from experience, as leave no room for doubt or opposition*. And he frequently speaks of experience in very high terms, as a certain guide. Again, in several passages above referred to, he expressly declares, that in making experimental conclusions, there is no place for reasoning ; that the inference in this case is entirely owing to custom, and the understanding has no part in it ; and yet he elsewhere owns, that there is great scope of reasoning in inferences of this kind from observation and experience ; and that not only men greatly surpass the inferior animals in this way of reasoning, but that one man very much excels another.4/- And he declares, that " all our reasonings are founded on a species of analogy ; where the causes are entirely similar, the analogy is perfect ; and the inference drawn from it is regarded as certain and conclusive;""); though he had said, that " it is impossible that any arguments from experience can prove such a resemblance." § An other inconsistency, which may be observed in Mr. Hume's reason ing on this subject, is, that though he represents the connexion betwixt cause and effect to be only a connexion in our thoughts, not in the things themselves,|| yet he asserts, that " there is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature, and the suc cession of our ideas ; and though the powers and forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us, yet our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the same train with other works of nature ;"** where he seems to suppose, that there is a real connexion in the nature of things, to which the connexion in our minds correspondeth. The general strain of his arguing in several of his essays, seems to be designed to prove, if it proves any thing, that we cannot be sure that there is any such thing as cause or causal connexion in the universe ; yet he says, " it is universally allowed that nothing exists without a cause of its existence; and that chance is a negative word, and means not any real power which has any where a being in nature."ff Here-he falls into the com mon way of speaking, that every thing which existeth must have a cause of its existence ; otherwise we must acknowledge the opera tion of chanoe. And he observes, that " there is no such thino- as chance in the world." J*): Causes therefore must be acknowledged, * Philosophical Essays, p. 93. t Ibid., p. 170, 171. 1 Ibid p 165. $ Ibid., p. 66. || Ibid., p. 123, 126. ** Ibid., p. 90. tt Ibid.,' p! 151. XX Ibid., p. 93. Let. XVL mr. iiume. 217 though we cannot explain the manner of their causality. And he himself, in reckoning up the principles of the connexion of our ideas, distinctly mentions resemblance, contiguity, and causation ; and this last he makes to be the most common and useful of all ; * and yet, in the course of his reasoning, he really leaves no place for causation, distinct from similarity or resemblance, and contiguity. It may be mentioned, as another instance of his inconsistency, that he frequently makes power and necessary connexion the same thing ; and argues, that if there be any connexion between cause and effect at all, it must be a necessary one ; for that cannot be called a cause, that is not necessarily connected with the effect ;-f and yet, in his Essay on liberty and necessity, when speaking of the influence of motives upon the mind, he saith, that, " as this influence is usually conjoined with the action, it must be esteemed a cause, and be looked upon as an instance of the necessity which we would esta blish ;'' J where he plainly supposeth, that it is not essential to the notion of a cause, that it is infallibly and always connected with the effect; but that it is sufficient, if it be usually joined with it. And to the same purpose, he saith, that " all causes are not conjoined to their usual effects, with like constancy and uniformity." § Indeed, his whole Essay on Liberty and Necessity, though seemingly built upon the scheme he had advanced in his foregoing Essays, with relation to cause and effect, is really not reconcileable to it. In all his reasonings in these Essays, concerning cause and effect, he had argued, that there is no such thing as necessary connexion, or in deed any connexion at all, betwixt cause and effect; and upon this scheme, it is idle to talk of a necessity either in physical or moral causes. And yet in his Essay on Liberty and Necessity, he plainly argues upon the supposition of a real connexion ; though he wi 11 only call it a conjunction betwixt cause and effect. And he all along supposeth the influence of causes, and the power of motives ; and that a necessity must be acknowledged in moral as well as physical causes. He would have us to begin the question concern ing Liberty and Necessity, not " by examining the faculties of the soul, but by examining the operations of body, and of brute unin telligent matter." || And with regard to this, he observes, that "it is universally allowed, that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a necessary force ; and that every effect is so precisely deter mined by the nature and energy of its cause, that no other effect, in such particular circumstances, could possibly have resulted from the operation of its cause ;"** and he expressly asserteth, that " the con junction betwixt motives and voluntary actions, is as regular and uniform as that betwixt the cause and effect, in any part of nature. "ff Thus we see, that he can acknowledge cause and effect, and the connexion betwixt them, when he has a mind to take advantage of this, for overthrowing the liberty of human actions. And he con- * Philosophical Essays, p. 32, 84. t Ibid., p. 93, 103, 151. X Ibid., p. 154. J Ibid., p. 138. || Ibid., p. 147. ¦** Ibid., p. 131, 132. tt Ibid., p. 141. 218 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XVI. eludes the Essay, with taking notice of the objection which might be raised against what he had advanced, viz., that " if voluntary actions be subjected to the same laws of necessity with the opera tions of matter, there is a continued chain of necessary causes, pre ordained and pre-determined, reaching from the original cause of all, to every single volition of every human creature. While we act, we are at the same time acted upon. There is no contingency any where in the universe, no indifferency, no liberty." This objection he putteth very strongly;* and yet I cannot see, that, according to the hypothesis he had advanced in the foregoing Essays, there can be any just foundation for it; for if there be only a mere conjunc tion of events, but no causal influence, it cannot be said, that, whilst we act, we are acted upon. On the contrary,, nothing is acted upon, nor is there any power, force, or energy in nature. All events are loose, separate, and unconnected, and only follow one an other without connexion ; and therefore there can be no continued chain of necessary causes at all. This would be the proper answer, according to the principles he had laid down, if he had thought those principles would bear. But he hath not thought fit to make use of it ; but, in contradiction to his own scheme, seems here to admit a chain of necessary causes, physical and moral, in order to load Providence ; and plainly represents the objection as unanswer- able.f Thus I have considered, pretty largely, our author's extraordinary scheme ; and the observations that have been made may help us to j udge of this gentleman's character as a writer, whether it deserveth all the admiration and applause, which he himself, as well as others, have been willing to bestow upon it. We may see, by what hath been observed, how far he hath answered what he had prepared the reader to expect, clearness and precision, in his way of treating these curious and sublime subjects. He had particularly proposed, with regard to power, force, and energy, " to fix, if possible, the precise meaning of these terms ; and thereby remove part of that obscurity which is so much complained of in this species of philo sophy." % What Mr. Hume hath offered, concerning cause and effect, puts me in mind of a remarkable passage in lord Bolingbroke's posthu mous works, which I shall mention on this occasion. " Whatever knowledge," saith his lordship, " we acquire of apparent causes, we can acquire none of real causality, or that power, that virtue, what ever it be, by which one being acts on another, and becomes a cause. We may call this by different names, according to the different effects of it; but to know it in its first principles, to know the nature of it, would be to know as God himself knows ; and therefore this will be always unknown to us, in causes that seem to be most under our inspection, as well as in others that are the most remote from it." And he represents those "philosophers as ridicu lous, who, when they have discovered a real actual cause, in its * Philosophical Essays, p. 157, 158. t Ibid., p. 162. } Ibid., p. 101, 102. Let. XVI. mr. Hume. 219 effects, by the phasnomena, reject it, because they cannot conceive its causality, nor assign a sufficient reason why and how it is."* This may seem to bear hard upon Mr. Hume ; but what is more to be wondered at, he hath in effect passed a censure upon himself. He indeed gives a high encomium on sceptical philosophy, in the beginning of his sixth Essay ; that "every passion is mortified by it, but the love of truth ; and that passion never is, nor can be carried to too high a degree. It is surprising therefore, that this philosophy, which, in almost every instance, must be harmless and innocent, should be the subject of so much groundless reproach and obloquy."4- But afterwards, in his twelfth Essay, which is of the academical or sceptical philosophy, he gives no advantageous notion of scepticism. He says, that " the grand scope of all the inquiries and disputes of the sceptics is, to destroy reason by ratiocination and argument.""); And, speaking ofthe sceptical objections against the relation of cause and effect, he saith, that " while the sceptic insists upon these topics, he seems, for the time at least, to destroy all assurance and conviction ;" and then he adds, that " these argu ments might be displayed at a greater length, if any durable good or benefit to society could ever be expected to result from them. For," saith he, " here is the chief, and most confounding objection to excessive scepticism, that no durable good can ever be expected from it, while it remains in its full force and vigour."§ And he had said, that "nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end, over any abstract reasoning whatsoever ; " || and if so, I think we may justly conclude, that any abstract reasoning which is contrary to the plain voice of nature ought to be rejected as false and trifling, and of no real use or service to mankind. But it were well, if the worst thing that could be said of our author's excessive scepticism were, that it is trifling and useless. It will soon appear, that, as he hath managed it, it is of a pernicious tendency ; but you will probably be of opinion, that enough hath been said of this gentleman, and his oddities, for the present. I am, &c. * Lord Bolingbroke's Works, vol. iii. p. 541. t Philosophical Essays, p. 70. X Philosophical Essays, p. 245. § Ibid., p. 251. J| Ibid., p. 71. 220 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XVII. LETTER XVII. Observations on Mr. Hume's Essay concerning a particular Providence and a future State — His Attempt to shew, that we cannot justly argue from the Course of Nature to a particular intelligent Cause, because the subject lies entirely beyond the Reach of human Experience, and because God is a singular Cause, and the Universe a sin gular Effect ; and therefore we cannot argue by a Comparison with any other Cause, or any other Effect — His Argument examined, whereby he pretends to prove, that, since we know God only by the Effects in the Works of Nature, we can judge of his Proceedings no farther than we can now see of them, and therefore cannot infer aDy Rewards or Punishments beyond what are already known by Experience or Observa tion — The Usefulness of believing future Retributions acknowledged by Mr. Hume, and that the contrary Doctrine is inconsistent with good Policy. Sir, It appears from what was observed in my former letter, that few writers have carried scepticism in philosophy to a greater height than Mr. Hume. I now proceed to consider those things in his writings that seem to be more directly and immediately designed against religion. Some part of what he calls his Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding, manifestly tends to sub vert the very foundations of natural religion, or its most important principles. Another part of them is particularly levelled against the proofs and evidences of the Christian revelation. The former is what I shall first consider, and shall therefore exa mine the eleventh of those essays, the title of which is concerning a particular Providence and a future state. Mr. Hume introduces what he offers in this essay as sceptical paradoxes advanced by a friend, and pretends by no means to approve of them. He proposes some objections as from himself, to his friend's way of arguing, but takes care to do it in such a manner as to give his friend a superi ority in the argument ; and some of the worst parts of his essay are directly prfeposed in his own person. The essay may be con sidered as consisting of two parts. The one seems to be designed against the existence of God, or of one supreme intelligent cause of the universe ; the other, which appears to be the main intention of the essay, is particularly levelled against the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. I shall begin with the former, because it comes first in order to be considered, though it is not particularly mentioned till towards the conclusion of the essay. He observes, in the person of his Epi curean friend, that " while we argue from the course of nature, and infer a particular intelligent cause, which at first bestowed and still preserves order in the universe, we embrace a principle which is both uncertain and useless." The reason he gives why it is uncer tain is, " because the subject lies entirely beyond the reach of human Let. XVII. mr. hume. 221 experience."* This is a specimen of the use our author would make of the principles he had laid down in the preceding essays. He had represented experience as the only foundation of our knowledge with respect to matter of fact, and the existence of objects : that it is by experience alone that we know the relation of cause and effect: and he had also asserted, that not so much as a probable argument can be drawn from experience to lay a foundation for our reasoning from cause to effect, or from effect to cause. I shall not add any thing here to what was offered in my former letter to show the ab surdity, the confusion, and inconsistency of these principles. I shall only observe, that this very writer, who had represented all argu ments drawn from experience, with relation to cause and effect, as absolutely uncertain, yet makes -it an objection against the argument from the course of nature to an intelligent cause, that the subject lies entirely beyond the reach of human experience. What the meaning of this is, it is not easy to apprehend. It will be readily allowed, that we do not know by experience the whole course of nature ; yet enough of it falls within the reach even of human ob servation and experience, to lay a reasonable foundation for inferring from it a supreme intelligent cause. In that part of the universe which cometh under our notice and observation, we may behold such illustrious characters of wisdom, power, and goodness, as de termine us, by the most natural way of reasoning in the world, to acknowledge a most wise, and powerful, and benign Author and Cause of the Universe. The inference is not beyond the reach of our faculties, but is one of the most obvious that offereth to the human mind. But perhaps what the author intends by observing, that this subject lies entirely beyond the reach of human experience, is this : that notwithstanding the admirable marks of wisdom and design which we behold in the course of nature and order of things, we cannot argue from thence to prove a wise and intelligent Cause of the universe, or that, there was any wisdom employed in the formation of it, because neither we, nor any of the human race, were present at the making of it, or saw how it was made. This must be owned to be a very extraordinary way of reasoning, and I believe you will easily excuse me if I do not attempt a confutation of it. Mr. Hume, after having argued thus in.the person of his Epicu rean friend, comes in the conclusion of this essay to propose another argument as for himself. " I much doubt," saith he, " whether it be possible for a cause to be known only by its effect, or to be of so singular and particular a nature as to have no parallel, and no similarity with any other cause or object that has ever fallen under our observation. It is only when two species of objects are found to be constantly conjoined, that we can infer the one from the other : and were an effect presented which was entirely singular, and could not be comprehended under any known species, I do not see that we could form any conjecture or inference at all concerning its * Philosophical Essays, p. 224. 222 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XVII. cause. If experience, and observation, and analogy, be indeed the only guides we can reasonably follow in inferences of this nature, both the effect and cause must bear a similarity and resemblance to other effects and causes which we know, and which we have found in many instances to be conjoined with each other."* Mr. Hume leaves it to his friend's reflections to prosecute the consequences of this principle, which, he had hinted before, might lead into reasonings of too nice and delicate a nature to be insisted on. . The argument, as he hath managed it, is indeed sufficiently obscure and perplexed ; but the general intention of it seems to be this ; that all our ar- guings from cause to effect, or from effect to cause, proceed upon analogy, or the comparing similar causes with similar effects. Where therefore there is supposed to be a singular cause, to which there is no parallel (though he much doubts whether there can be a cause of so singular a nature), and a singular effect, there can be no arguing from the one to the other ; because in that case we cannot argue by a comparison with any other cause, or any other effect. Except, therefore, we can find another world to compare this with, and an intelligent cause of that world, we cannot argue from the effects in this present world to an intelligent cause : i. e. we cannot be sure there is one God, except we can prove there is one other God at least ; or that this world was formed and produced by a wise intelli gent cause, unless we know of another world like this, which was also formed by a wise intelligent cause, and perhaps not then neither: for he seems to insist upon it that there should be many instances of such causes and effects being conjoined with each other, in order to lay a proper foundation for observation, experience, and analogy, the only guides we can reasonably follow in inferences of this nature. He immediately after observes, that " according to the antagonists of Epicurus, the universe, an effect quite singular and unparalleled, is always supposed to be the proof of a deity, a cause no less singular and unparalleled." If, by calling the universe a singular and unpa ralleled effect, he intends to signify that no other universe has come under our observation, it is very true ; but it by no means follows that we cannot argue from the evident marks of wisdom and design which we may observe in this universe that we do know, because we do not know any thing of any other universe. This grand uni versal system, and even that small part of it that we are more par ticularly acquainted with, comprehendeth such an amazing variety of phsenomena, all which exhibit the most incontestable proofs of admirable wisdom, power, and diffusive goodness, that one would think it scarce possible for a reasonable mind to resist the evidence. But such is this subtle metaphysical gentleman's way of arguing in a matter of the highest consequence, the absurdity of which is ob vious to any man of plain understanding. It is of a piece with what he had advanced before, that there is no such thing as cause or effect at all, nor can any probable inference be drawn from the one to the other ; than which, as hath been already shown, nothing * Philosophical Essays, p. 232, 233. Let. XVII. MB. hume. 223 can be more inconsistent with common sense, and the reason of all mankind. The other thing observable in this essay, and which seems to be the principal intention of it, relateth to the proof of a providence and a future state. He introduces his friend as putting himself in the place of Epicurus, and making an harangue to the people of Athens, to prove that the principles of his philosophy were as inno cent and salutary as those of any other philosophers. The course of his reasoning or declamation is this : that " the chief or sole ar gument brought by philosophers for a Divine existence is derived from the order of nature ; where there appear such marks of intelli gence and design, that they think it extravagant to assign for its cause, either chance, or the blind unguided force of matter : that this is an argument drawn from effects to causes ; and that when we infer any particular cause from an effect, we must proportion the one to the other, and can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause any qualities, but what are exactly sufficient to produce the effect ; and if we ascribe to it farther qualities, or affirm it capable of pro ducing any other effect, we only indulge the license of conjecture, without reason or authority."* That therefore " allowing God to be the author of the existence or order of the universe, it follows, that he possesses that precise degree of power, intelligence, and be nevolence, which appears in his workmanship, but nothing farther can ever be proved.4/ Those therefore are vain reasoners, and re verse the order of nature, who instead of regarding this present life, and the present scene of things, as the sole object of their contem plation, render it a passage to something farther. The Divinity may indeed possibly possess attributes which we have never seen ex erted, and may be governed by principles of action, which we cannot discover to be satisfied : but we can never have reason to infer any attributes, or any principles of action in him, but so far as we know them to be exerted or satisfied." He asks, " Are there any marks of distributive justice in the world?" And if it be said, that "the justice of God exerts itself in part, but not in its full extent," he answers, " that we, have no reason to give it any particular extent, but only so far as we see it at present exert itself."4: That " indeed when we find that any work has proceeded from the skill and in dustry of man, who is a being whom we know by experience, and whose nature we are acquainted with, we can draw a hundred in ferences concerning what may be expected from him, and these in ferences will all be founded on experience and observation. But since the Deity is known to us only by his productions, and as a single being in the universe, not comprehended under any species or genus, from whose experienced attributes or qualities we can by analogy infer any attribute or quality in him, we can only infer such . attributes or perfections, and such a degree of those attributes, as is precisely adapted to the effect we examine ; but farther attributes or farther degrees of those attributes, we can never be authorized to * Philosophical Essays, p. 215. t Ibid. p. 220. X Ibid. p. 203. 224 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XVII. infer or suppose by any rules of just reasoning." He adds, that " the great source of our mistakes on this subject is this : we tacitly consider ourselves as in the place of the Supreme Being, and con clude that he will on every occasion observe tbe same conduct, which we ourselves in his situation would have embraced as reason able and eligible ; whereas it must evidently appear contrary to all rules of analogy to reason from the intentions and projects of men to those of a Being so different, and so much superior — so remote and incomprehensible, who bears less analogy to any other being in the universe than the sun to a waxen taper." He concludes, therefore, " that no new fact can ever be inferred from the religious hypothesis : no reward or punishment expected or dreaded beyond what is already known by practice and observation."* This is a faithful extract of the argument in this essay, drawn together as closely as I could, without the repetitions with which it aboundeth. I shall now make a few remarks upon it. The whole of his reasoning depends upon this maxim, that when once we have traced an effect up to its cause, we can never ascribe any thing to the cause but what is precisely proportioned to the effect, and what we ourselves discern to be so ; nor can we infer any thing farther concerning the cause, than what the effect, or the pre sent appearance of it, necessarily leads to. He had to the same purpose observed, in a former essay, that " it is allowed by all phi losophers, that the effect is the measure of the power."4- But this is far from being universally true; for we, in many instances, clearly perceive that a cause can produce an effect which it doth not actually produce, or a greater effect than it hath actually produced. This gentleman's whole reasoning proceeds upon confounding necessary and free causes ; and indeed he seems not willing to allow any dis tinction between them, or that there are any other but necessary and material causes.*); A necessary cause acts up to the utmost of its power, and therefore the effect must be exactly proportioned to it. But the case is manifestly different as to free and voluntary causes. They may have a power of producing effects which they do not actually produce ; and, as they act from discernment and choice, we may, in many cases, reasonably ascribe to them farther views than what we discern or discover in their present course of action. This author himself owns, that this may be reasonably done with respect to man, whom we know by experience, and whose nature and conduct we are acquainted with ; but denies that the same way of arguing will hold with respect to the Deity. But surely, when once we come from the consideration of his works to the knowledge of a self-existent and absolutely perfect Being, we may, from the nature of that self-existent and absolutely perfect cause, reasonably conclude, that he is able to produce certain effects beyond what actually come under our present notice and observation, and indeed that he can do whatsoever doth not imply a contradic tion. This universe is a vast, a glorious, and amazing system, com prehending an infinite variety of parts ; and it is but a small part * Philosophical Essays, p. 230. t Ibid. p. 125. f Ibid. p. 131, 132, 141, 151. Let. XVII. mr. hume. 225 of it that comes under our more immediate notice. But we know enough to be convinced, that it demonstrateth a wisdom as well as power beyond all imagination great and wonderful: and we may justly conclude the same concerning those parts of the universe that we are not acquainted with. And for any man to say, that we cannot reasonably ascribe any degree of wisdom or power to God, but what is exactly proportioned to that part of the universal frame which comes under our own particular observation, is a very strange way of arguing ! The proofs of the wisdom and the power of God, as appearing in our part of the system, are so striking, that it is hard to conceive how any man, that is not under the influence of the most obstinate prejudice, can refuse to submit to their force : and yet there are many phenomena, the reasons and ends of which we are not at present able to assign. The proper conduct in such a case is, to believe there are most wise reasons for these things, though we do not now discern those reasons, and to argue from the uncontested characters of wisdom in things that we do know, that this most wise and powerful agent, the author of nature, hath also acted with admirable wisdom in those things, the designs and ends of which we do not know. It would be wrong therefore to confine the measures of his wisdom precisely to what appeareth to our narrow apprehensions, in that part of his works which faileth under our immediate inspection. This was the great fault of the Epicureans, and other atheistical philosophers, who, judging by their own narrow views, urged several things as proofs of the want of wisdom and contrivance, which, upon a fuller know ledge of the works of nature, furnish farther convincing proofs of the wisdom of the great Former of all things. In like manner, with respect to his goodness, there are number less things in this present constitution, which lead us to regard him as a most benign and benevolent Being. And therefore it is highly reasonable that, when we meet with any phenomena which we can not reconcile with our ideas of the divine goodness, we should con clude that it is only for want of having the whole of things before us, and considering them in their connexion and harmony, that they appear to us with, a disorderly aspect. And it is very just in such a case to make use of any reasonable hypothesis, which tendeth to set the goodness of God in a fair and consistent light. The same way of reasoning holds with regard to the justice and righteousness of God as the great Governor ofthe world. We may reasonably conclude, from the intimate sense we have of the excel lency of such a character, and the great evil and deformity of in justice and unrighteousness, which sense is implanted in us by the author of our being, and from the natural rewards of virtue, and Sunishment of vice, even in the present constitution of things, that e is a lover of righteousness and virtue, and an enemy to vice and wickedness. Our author himself makes his Epicurean friend ac knowledge that, in the present order of things, virtue is attended with more peace of mind and with many other advantages above vice ;* * Philosophical Essays, p. 221. Q 226 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XVII. and yet it cannot be denied that there are many instances ob vious to common observation, in which vice seemeth to flourish and prosper, and virtue to be exposed to great evils and calamities. What is to be concluded from this ? Is it that because the justice of God here showeth itself only in part, and not in its full extent (to use our author's expression), therefore righteousness in God is imperfect in its degree, and that he doth not possess it in the full extent of that perfection, nor will ever exert it any farther than we see him exert it in this present state ? This were an unreason able conclusion, concerning a being of such admirable perfection, whose righteousness as well as wisdom must be supposed to be in finitely superior to ours. It is natural, therefore, to think that this present life is only a part of the divine scheme, which shall be com pleted in a future state. But he urgeth, that the great source of our mistakes on this subject is, that " we tacitly consider ourselves as in the place of the Supreme Being, and conclude that he will on every occasion observe the same conduct which we ourselves in his situation would have embraced as reasonable and eligible. Whereas it must evi dently appear contrary to all rules of analogy, to reason from the intentions and purposes of men to those of a Being so different and so much superior, so remote and incomprehensible."* But though it were the highest absurdity to pretend to tie down the infinite in comprehensible Being to our scanty model and measures of acting, and to assume he will on every occasion (for so our author is pleased to put the case) observe the same conduct, that we should judge eligible; since there maybe innumerable things concerning which we are unable to form any proper judgment, for want of having the same comprehensive view of things that he hath; yet on the other hand, there are some cases so manifest, that we may safely pronounce concerning them, as worthy or unworthy of the divine perfections. And as our own natures are the work of God, we may reasonably argue from the traces of excellencies in our selves to the infinitely superior perfections in the great Author of the universe, still taking care to remove all those limitations and defects with which those qualities are attended in us. This is what Mr. Hume himself elsewhere allows in his Essay on the Origin of our Ideas. " The idea of God," saith he, " as meaning an in finitely intelligent, wise, and good being, arises from reflecting on the operations of our own minds, and augmenting those qualities of goodness and wisdom without bound or limit." See his Phi losophical Essays, p. 24, 25. Since therefore we cannot possibly help regarding goodness and benevolence, justice and righteousness, as necessary ingredients in a worthy and excellent character, and as among the noblest excellencies of an intellectual being, we are unavoidably led to conclude that they are to be found in the highest possible degree of eminency in the absolutely perfect Being, the Author and Governor of the world. These are not mere arbitrary * Philosophical Essays, p. 230. Let. XVII. MR. HUME. 227 suppositions, but are evidently founded in nature and reason ; and though in many particular instances we, through the narrowness of our views, cannot be proper judges of the grounds and reasons of the divine administration, yet in general we have reason to conclude, that if there be such a thing as goodness and righteousness in God, or any perfection in him correspondent to what is called goodness and righteousness in us, he will order it so that in the final issue of things a remarkable difference shall be made between the righteous and the wicked ; that at one time or other, jind taking in the whole of existence, virtue, though now for a time it may be greatly afflicted and oppressed, shall meet with its due reward ; and vice and wickedness, though now it may seem to prosper and triumph, shall receive its proper punishment. Since therefore, by the observation of all ages, it hath often happened, that in the present course of human affairs, good and excellent persons have been unhappy, and exposed to many evils and sufferings, and bad and vicious men have been in very prosperous circumstances, and have had a large affluence of all worldly enjoyments, even to the ends of their lives, and that, as this gentleman himself elsewhere expresseth it, " such is the confusion and disorder of human affairs, that no per fect economy or regular distribution of happiness or misery is in this life ever to be expected ;"* it seems reasonable to conclude, that there shall be a future state of existence, in which these apparent irregularities shall be set right, and there shall be a more perfect distribution of rewards and punishments to men according to their moral conduct. There is nothing in this way of arguing but what is conformable to the soundest principles of reason, and to the natural feelings of the human heart. But though a future state of retributions in general be probable, yet as many doubts might still be apt to rise in our minds concerning it, an express re velation from God, assuring us of it in his name, and more distinctly pointing out the nature and certainty of those retributions, would be of the most signal advantage. I shall have occasion to resume this subject, when I come to consider what Lord Bolingbroke hath more largely offered in re lation to it. At present it is proper to observe that though Mr. Hume seems to allow his epicurean friend's reasoning to be just, yet he owns, that " in fact men do not reason after that manner ;" and that " they draw many consequences from the belief of a divine existence, and suppose that the deity will inflict punish ments on vice, and bestow rewards on virtue, beyond what appears in the ordinary course of nature. Whether this reasoning of theirs, "adds he, " be just or not, is no matter; its influence on their life and conduct must still be the same. And those who attempt to disabuse them of such prejudices, may, for aught I know, be good reasoners, but I cannot allow them to be good citizens and politicians; since they free men from one restraint upon their passions, and make tbe infringement of the laws of * Moral and Political Essays, p. 224, 225. Q 2 228 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XVII. equity and society in one respect more easy and secure."* I think it follows from this by his own account, that he did not act a wise or good part, the part of a friend to the public or to mankind, in publishing this Essay, the manifest design of which is to persuade men, that there is no just foundation in reason for expecting a future state of rewards and punishments at all. Nor is the concession he here makes very favourable to what he addeth in the next page, concerning the universal liberty to be allowed by the state to all kinds of philosophy. According to his own way of representing it, Epicurus must have been cast, if he had pleaded his cause before the people ; and the principal design of this Essay, which seems to be to show not only the reasonableness, but harmlessness, of that philosophy, is lost ; for if the spreading of those principles and reasonings is contrary to the rules of good policy, and the cha racter of good citizens ; if they have a tendency to free men from a strong restraint upon their passions, and to make the infringement ofthe laws of equity and society more easy and secure; then such principles and reasonings, according to his way of representing the matter, ought in good policy to be restrained, as having a bad in fluence on the community. There is one passage more in this Essay which may deserve some notice. It is in page 230, where he observes, that " God discovers himself by some faint traces or outlines, beyond Which we have no authority to ascribe to him any attribute or perfection. What we imagine to be a superior perfection may really be a defect. Or, were it ever so much a perfection, the ascribing it to the Supreme Being, where it appears not to have been really exerted to the full in his works, savours more of flattery and panegyric, than of just reasoning and sound philosophy." The course of his arguing seems to be this : That it would savour oi flattery, not of sound reasoning, to ascribe any attribue or perfection to God, which appears not to have been exerted to the full in his works. And he had observed before, that" it is impossible for us to know anything ofthe cause, but what we have antecedently, not inferred, but discovered to the full in the effect."4/ It is plain therefore, that according to him we ought not to ascribe any perfection to God, but what is not merely inferred, but discovered to the full in his works. It is also manifest, that according to him there is no attribute or perfection of the Deity exerted or discovered to the full in his works ; for he had said just before, that he discovers himself only by some faint traces or outlines. The natural conclusion from these premises taken together is plainly this : that it would be flattery and presumption in us to ascribe any attribute or perfection to God at all. And now I leave it to you to judge of the obligations the world is under to this writer. In one part of his Essay he makes an attempt to subvert the proof of the existence of a God, or a supreme intelligent cause of the universe ; and here he insinuates that it would be wrong to ascribe any perfection or attribute to him at all. And the main * Philosophical Essays, p. 231. f Ibid., p. 222. ' Let. XVIII. mr. hume. 229 design of the whole Essay is to show, than no argument can be drawn from any of his perfections, to make it probable that there shall be rewards and punishments in a future state, though he acknowledgeth that it is of great advantage to makind to believe .them. You will not wonder after this, that this gentleman, who has endeavoured to shake the foundations of natural religion, should use his utmost efforts to subvert the evidences of the Christian reve lation. What he hath offered this way will be the subject of some future letters. LETTER XVIII. An Examination of Mr. Hume's Essay on Miracles — A Summary of the first Part of that Essay, which is designed to show, that Miracles are incapable of being proved by any Testimony or Evidence whatsoever — His main Principle examined, that Ex perience is our only Guide in reasoning concerning Matters of Fact ; and that Miracles being contrary to the established Laws of Nature, there is an uniform Experience a*gainst the Existence of any Miracle — It is shown that no Argument can be drawn from Experience, to- prove that Miracles are impossible, or that they have not been actually wrought — Miracles not above the Power of God, nor unworthy of his Wisdom — Valuable Ends may be assigned for Miracles — They are capable of being proved by proper Testimony — This applied to the Resurrection of Christ. — And it is shown, that the evidence set before us in Scripture is every way sufficient to satisfy us of the truth of it, supposing that Evidence to have been really given as there represented. Sir, I now proceed to consider Mr. Hume's celebrated Essay on Miracles, which is the tenth of his Philosophical Essays, and has been mightily admired and extolled, as a masterly and unanswerable piece. I think no impartial man will say so, that has read the ingenious and judicious answer made to it by the Rev. Mr. Adams, now rector of Shrewsbury. It is entitled, An Essay in answer to Mr. Hume's Essay on Miracles, by William Adams, M. A. That which I have by me is the second edition, with additions, London, 1754. Besides this, I have seen a short but excellent discourse, by the Rev. Dr. Rutherforth, entitled, The Credibility of Miracles defended against the Author of the Philosophical Essays, " in a discourse delivered at the primary visitation of the Right Rev. Thomas Lord Bishop of Ely. — Cambridge, 1751." These in my opinion are sufficient. But since you desire that I would also take a particular notice of Mr. Hume's Essay, I shall obey your com mands, and enter on a distinct consideration of this boasted per formance. Mr. Hume introduceth his Essay on Miracles in a very pompous manner, as might be expected from one who sets up in his Philo- 230 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XVIII. sophical Essays, for teaching men better methods of reasoning than any philosopher had done before him. He had taken care at every turn to let his readers know how much they are obliged to him, for throwing new light on the most curious and sublime effects, with regard to which the most celebrated philosophers had been extremely defective in their researches. And now he begins his Essay on Miracles with declaring, that " he flatters himself that he has dis covered an argument, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion; and, consequently, will be useful as long as the world endures ; for so long," he presumes, " will the account of miracles and prodigies be found in all profane history." * This Essay consisteth of two parts. The first, which reacheth from p. 173 to p. 186, is designed to show, that no evidence which can be given, however seemingly full and strong, can be a sufficient ground for believing the truth and existence of miracles; or, in other words, that miracles are, in the nature of things, incapable of being proved by any evidence or testimony whatsoever. The second part is intended to show, that supposing a miracle capable of being proved by full and sufficient evidence or testimony, yet, in fact, there never was a miraculous event in any history established upon such evidence. The first is what he seems principally to rely upon; and, indeed, if this can be proved, it will make any particular inquiry into the testimony produced for miracles needless. The method he makes use of in the first part of his Essay, to show that no evidence or testimony that can be given is a sufficient ground for a reasonable assent to the truth and existence of miracles, is this : He lays it down as an undoubted principle, that experience is our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact ; and at the same time insinuates, that this guide is far from being infallible, and is apt to lead us into errors and mistakes. He observes, that the validity and credibility of human testimony is wholly founded upon experience r That in judging how far a testi mony is to be depended upon, we balance the opposite circum stances, which may create any doubt or uncertainty : That the evidence arising from testimony may be destroyed, either by the contrariety and opposition of the testimony, or by the consideration of the nature of the facts themselves : That when the facts partake of the marvellous and extraordinary, there are two opposite experiences with regard to them ; and that which is the most credible is to be preferred, though still with a diminution of its credibility, in pro portion to the force of the other which is opposed to it : That this holdeth still more strongly in the case of miracles, which are sup posed to be contrary to the laws of nature ; for experience being our only guide, and an uniform experience having established those , , laws, there must be an uniform experience against the existence of any miracle ; and an uniform experience amounts to a full and entire proof. To suppose, therefore, any testimony to be a proof of a * Philosophical Essays, p. 174. Let. XVIII. mr. hume. 231 miracle, is to suppose one full proof for a miracle, opposed to another full proof in the nature of .the thing against it, in which case those proofs destroy one another. Finally, that we are not to believe any testimony concerning a miracle, except the falsehood of that testimony should be more miraculous than the miracle itself which it is designed to establish. He also gives a hint, that as it is impossible for us to know the attributes or actions of God, otherwise than from the experience which we have of his productions, we cannot be sure that he can effect miracles, which are contrary to all our experience, and the established course of nature ; and therefore miracles are impossible to be proved by any evidence. Having given this general idea of this first part of Mr. Hume's Essay on Miracles, I shall now proceed to a more particular exami nation of it. It is manifest that the main principle, which lieth at the founda tion of his whole scheme, is this : that experience is our only " guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact." * You will have observed, from what hath been remarked in my former letters, that this author brings up the word experience upon all occasions. It is, as he hath managed it, a kind of cant term, proposed in a loose, indeterminate way, so that it is not easy to form a clear idea of it, or of what this writer precisely intends by it. He had declared, that it is only by experience that we come to know the existence of objects ; that it is only by experience that we know the relation between cause and effect ; and at the same time had endeavoured to show, that experience cannot furnish so much as even a probable argument concerning any connexion betwixt cause and effect, or by which we can draw any conclusion from the one to the other. He had afterwards applied the same term, experience, to show that no argument can be brought to prove the existence of one supreme intelligent Cause of the universe, because this is a subject that lies entirely beyond the reach of human experience ; and that we can have no proof of a future state of retributions, because we know no more concerning providence than what we learn from experience in this present state. And now he comes to try the force of this formidable word against the existence of miracles, and to raise an argument against them from experience. But that we may not lose ourselves in the ambiguity of the term as he employs it, let us distinctly examine what sense it bears, as applied to the present question. In judging of the truth of the maxim he hath laid down, viz., that experience is our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact, it is to be considered, that the question we are now upon properly relates, not to future events, as the author seems sometimes to put it,f but to past matter of fact. What are we, therefore, to understand by that experience, which he makes to be our only guide in reasoning concerning them ? Is it our own particular personal experience, or is it the experience of others, as well as our own ? And if of others, is it the experience * Philosophical Essays, p. 174. t Ibid. p. 175. 232 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XVIII. of some others only, or of all mankind ? If it be understood thus, that every man's own personal observation and experience is to be his only guide in reasoning concerning mat'.ers of fact, so that no man is to believe anything with relation to any facts whatsoever, but what is agreeable to what he hath himself observed or known in the course of his own particular experience ; this would be very absurd, and would reduce each man's knowledge of facts into a very narrow compass; it would destroy the use and credit of history, and of a great part^of experimental philosophy, and bring us into a state of general ignorance and barbarism. Or is the word experience to be taken in a larger and more extensive sense, as com prehending, not merely any particular man's experience, but that of others too? In this case we have no way of knowing experience, but by testimony. And here the question recurs, Is it to be under stood of the experience of all mankind, or of some persons only ? If the experience referred to be the experience or observation of some persons only, or of a part of mankind, how can this be de pended on as a certain guide ? For why should their experience be the guide, exclusively of that of others ? and how do we know, but that many facts may be agreeable to the experience of others, which are not to theirs ? But if the experience referred to be the experi ence of all mankind in general, that must take in the experience both of all men of the present age, and of those in past times and ages, it must be acknowledged that this rule and criterion is not easily applicable ; for will any man say, that we are to believe no facts but what are agreeable to the experience of mankind in all ages ? Are we, in order to this, to take in whatsoever any man or men, in any age or country, have had experience of? and to judge by this how far it is reasonable to believe any past fact or facts, of which we ourselves have not had sensible evidence ? Even on this view of the case, it might probably take in many facts of a very extraordinary nature, and which have happened out of the common course of things ; of which there have been instances in the expe rience and observation of different nations and ages. And at this rate experience will not be inconsistent with the belief even of miracles themselves, of which there have been several instances recorded in the history of mankind. But farther, in reasoning from experience, either our own or that of others, concerning matters of fact, it is to be considered, what it is that we propose to judge or determine by experience in relation to them. Is it whether these facts are possible, or whether they are probable, or whether they have been actually done ? As to the possibility of facts, experience, indeed, or the observation of similar events known to ourselves or others, may assure us that facts or events are possible, but not that the contrary is impossible. Con cerning this, experience cannot decide anything at all. We cannot conclude any event to be impossible, merely because we have had no experience of the like, or because it is contrary to our own observation and experience, or to the experience of others; for> as this gentleman observes in another part of his Essays, " the contrary Let. XVIII. mr. uume. 233 of every matter of fact is still possible, because it can never imply a contradiction."* And again he says, speaking of matters of fact, " there are no demonstrative arguments in the case ; since it implies no contradiction, that the course of nature may change."f No argument, therefore, can be brought to demonstrate anything or fact to be impossible, merely because it is contrary to the course of our own observation and experience, and that of mankind, provided it doth not imply a contradiction, or provided there be a power capable of effecting it. Another thing to be considered, with regard to facts, is, whether they are probable : And here experience, or the observation of similar events, made by ourselves or others, may be of great use, to assist us in forming a judgment concerning the probability of past facts, or in forming conjectures concerning future ones. But if the question be, Whether an event has actually hap pened, or a fact has been done ; concerning this, experience, taken from an observation of similar events, or the ordinary course of causes and effects, cannot give us any assurance or certainty to proceed upon. We cannot certainly conclude, that any fact or event has been done, merely because we or others have had expe rience or observation of a fact or event of a like nature ; nor, on the other hand, can we conclude that such a certain event hath not happened, or that such a fact hath not been actually done, because we have not had experience of a like action or event being done, or have had experience of the contrary being done. The rule, there fore, which he lays down, of judging which side is supported by the greater number of experiments, and of balancing the opposite experiments, and deducting the lesser number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence,"); is very uncertain and fallacious, if employed in judging whether matters of fact have been really done ; for the fact referred to, and the evidence attending it, may be so circumstanced, that, though it be a fact of a singular nature, and to which many instances of a different kind may be opposed, we may yet have such an assurance of its having been actually done, as may reasonably produce a sufficient con viction in the mind. The proper way of judging whether a fact or event, of which we ourselves have not had sensible evidence, hath been actually done, is by competent testimony. And this, in common language, is distinguished from experience, though this writer artfully confounds them. This, therefore, is what we are next to consider, viz., the force of human testimony, and how far it is to be depended upon. And with regard to the validity of the evidence arising from human testimony, he observes, that " there is no species of reason ing more common, more useful, and even necessary to human life, than that derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators." The whole certainty or assurance arising from testimony he resolveth into what he calls past expe rience. That " it is .derived from no other principle than our obser- * Philosophical Essays, p. 48. t Ibid. p. 62. X Ibid. p. 176. 234 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XVIII. vation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual con formity of facts to the report of witnesses." And he mentions, as grounds of the belief of human testimony, that " men have com monly an inclination to truth, and a sentiment of probity ; that they are sensible to shame when detected in a falsehood ; and that these are qualities discovered by experience to be inherent in human nature."* But he might have put the case much more strongly, by observing, that human testimony, by the acknowledgment of all mankind, may be so circumstanced, as to produce an infallible assurance, or an evidence so strong, that, as our author expresseth it in another case, none but a fool or a madman would doubt of it. It is a little too loose to say in general, that it is founded only on past experience. It hath its foundation in the very nature of things, in the constitution of the world and of mankind, and in the appointment of the Author of our being, who, it is manifest, hath formed and designed us to be in numberless instances determined by this evidence, which often comes with such force, that we cannot refuse our assent to it without the greatest absurdity, and putting a manifest constraint upon our nature.4^ Mr. Hume himself, in his Essay on Liberty and Necessity, hath run a parallel between moral and physical evidence, and hath endeavoured to show that the one is as much to be depended on as the other. He expressly saith, that " when we consider how aptly natural and moral evidence link together, and form only one chain of argument, we shall make no scruple to allow, that they are of the same nature, and derived from the same principles. "J It will be easily granted, what our author here observes, that " there are a number of circumstances to be taken into consideration in all judgments of this kind ; and that we must balance the oppo site circumstances that create any doubt or uncertainty ; and when we discover a-superiority on any side, we incline to" it, but still with a diminution of assurance in proportion to the force of its antago nist.'^ Among the particulars which may diminish or destroy the force of any argument drawn from human testimony, he mentions the contrariety of the evidence, contradictions of witnesses, their sus picious character, &c. : and then proceeds to take notice of " what may be drawn from the nature of the fact attested, supposing it to partake of the extraordinary and the marvellous." He argueth, that " in that case the evidence resulting from the testimony receives a diminution greater or less in proportion as the fact is more or less unusual. When the fact attested is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences, of which the one destroys the other as far its force goes ; and the su perior can only operate upon the mind by the force which remains." This is a plausible, but a very fallacious way of reasoning. A thing may be very unusual, and yet, if confirmed by proper testimony, its being unusual may not diminish its credit, or produce in the mind of * Philosophical Essays, p. 176, 177. t Ditton on the Resurrection, part 2. X Philosophical Essays, p. 144. $ Ibid. p. 177. Let. XVIII. mr. hume. 235 a thinking person a doubt or suspicion concerning it. Indeed, vulgar minds, who judge of every thing by their own narrow notions, and by what they themselves have seen, are often apt to reject and disbelieve a thing, that is not conformable to their own particular customs or experience. But wiser men, and those of more enlarged minds, judge otherwise; and, provided a thing comes to them suf ficiently attested and confirmed by good evidence, make its being unusual no objection at all to its credibility. Many uncommon facts facts, and unusual phenomena of nature, are believed by the most sagacious philosophers, and received as true without hesitation, upon the testimony of persons who were worthy of credit, without follow ing the author's rules, or making their own want of experience or observation an objection against those accounts. And upon this dependeth no small part of our knowledge. Mr. Adams hath very well illustrated this by several instances, and hath justly observed, " that the most uniform experience is sometimes outweighed by a single testimony ; because experience in this case is only a negative evidence, and the slightest positive testimony is for the most part an overbalance to the strongest negative evidence that can be pro duced." * Our author here very improperly talks of a contest between two opposite experiences, the one of which destroys the other. For when 1 believe a thing unusual, I do not believe a thing opposite to mine own experience, but different from it, or a thing of which I have had no experience ; though if it were a thing contrary to my own expe rience, provided it were confirmed by sufficient testimony, this is not a valid argument against its trufli, nor a sufficient reason for dis believing it. This gentleman himself hath mentioned a remarkable instance of this kind in the Indian prince, who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of frost. This instance, though he laboureth the point here, and in an additional note at the end of his book, is not at all favourable to his scheme. He acknowledgeth, that in this case of freezing, the event follows contrary to the rules of analogy, and is such as a rational Indian would not look for. The constant experience in those countries, according to which the waters are always fluid, and never in a state of hardness and solidity, is against freezing. This, according to his way of reasoning, might be regarded as a proof drawn from constant experience, and the uniform course of nature, as far as they knew it. Here then is an instance, in which it is reasonable for men to believe upon good evidence an event no way conformable to their experience, and con trary to the rule of analogy, which he yet seems to make the only rule by which we are to judge of the credibility and truth of facts. From the consideration of facts that are unusual, he proceeds to those that are miraculous, which is what he hath principally in view ; and with regard to these, he endeavoureth to show that no testimony at all is to be admitted. " Let us suppose," saith he, " that the fact * Adams's Essay in answer to Hume on Miracles, p. 19, 20. 236 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XVIII. which they affirm, instead of being only marvellous, is really mira culous ; and suppose also that the testimony, considered apart, and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that case there is' proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force in proportion to that of its antagonist."* It may be proper to remark here, that this writer had in a former essay defined a proof to be such an argument drawn from experience, as leaves no room for doubt or opposition.f Admitting this definition, it is improper and absurd for him to talk of proof against proof ; for since a proof, according to his own account of it, leaves no room for doubt or opposition ; where there is a proper proof of a fact there cannot be a proper proof at the same time against it ; for one truth cannot contradict another truth. No doubt his intention is to sig nify that there can be no proof given of a miracle at all, and that the proof is only on the other side ; for he there adds, " A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature ; and as a firm and unalterable experience hath established those laws" [he should have said, hath discovered to us that these are the established laws, i. e., that this is the ordinary course of nature] " the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from ex perience can possibly be imagined." He repeats this again after ward, and observes, that there must be an uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit the appellation ; and as an uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle." "f He seems to have a very high opinion of the force of this way of reasoning, and therefore takes care to put his reader again in mind of it in the latter part of his Essay. " 'Tis his experience alone," saith he, " which gives authority to human testimony; and 'tis the same experience that assures us of the laws of nature. When therefore these two kinds of experience are contrary, we have nothing to do but to substract the one from the other. And this substraction with regard to all popular religions amounts to an entire annihilation." § And it is chiefly upon this that he foundeth the arrogant censure, which, with an unparalleled assurance, he passeth upon all that believe the Christian religion, that " whosoever is moved by faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the prin ciples of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe whatever is most contrary to custom and experience." It is thus that he concludes his Essay, as if he had for ever silenced all the advocates for Christianity, and they must henceforth either renounce their faith, or submit to pass with men of his superior understanding for persons miraculously stupid, and utterly lost to all reason and common sense. Let us therefore- examine what there is in this argument that can support such a peculiar strain of confidence ; and I believe it will * Philosophical Essays, p. 108. t Ibid., p. 93. x Ibid., p. 181. § Ibid., p. 202, 203. Let. XVIII. mr. hume. 237 appear that never was there weaker reasoning set off with so much pomp and parade. There is one general observation that may be sufficiently obvious to any man, who brings with him common sense and attention, and which is alone sufficient to show the fallacy of this boasted argu ment ; and it is this : that the proof arising from experience, on which he layeth so mighty a stress, amounteth to no more than this, that we learn from it what is conformable to the ordinary course and . order of things, but we cannot learn or pronounce from experience that it is impossible things or events should happen in any particular instance contrary to that course. We cannot therefore pronounce such an event, though it be contrary to the usual course of things, to be impossible ; in which case no testimony whatsoever could prove it. And if it be possible, there is place for testimony. And this testimony may be so strong and so circumstanced, as to make it reasonable for us to believe it. And if we have sufficient evidence to convince us that such an event hath actually happened, however extraordinary or miraculous, no argument drawn from experience can prove that it hath not happened. I would observe by the way, that when this gentleman talks of an uniform experience, and a firm and unalterable experience, against the existence of all miracles, if he means by it such an universal experience of all mankind as hath never been counteracted in any single instance, this is plainly sup posing the very thing in question, and which he hath no right to sup pose, because, by his own acknowledgment, mankind have believed in all ages that miracles have really been wrought. By uniform experience, therefore, in this argument must be understood, the general or ordinary experience of mankind in the usual course of things. And it is so far from being true, as he confidently affirms, that such an uniform experience amounts to a full and direct proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle, that it is no proof against it at all. Let us judge of this by his own definition of a miracle. " A miracle," saith he, " may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a par ticular volition of the Deity, or by the interposal of some invisible agent." Now our uniform experience affordeth a full and direct proof, that such or such an event is agreeable to the established laws of nature, or to the usual course of things ; but it yieldeth no proof at all, that there cannot in any particular instance happen any event contrary to that usual course of things, or to what we have hitherto experienced ; or that such an event may not be brought about by a particular volition of the Deity, as our author expresseth it, for valuable ends worthy of his wisdom and goodness. He cannot therefore make his argument properly bear, except he" can prove that miracles are absolutely impossible. And this is what he sometimes' seems willing to attempt. Thus, speaking of some miracles pretended to have been fully attested, he asks, "What have we to oppose to such a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute impossibility, or miraculous nature of the event?"* where he seems * Philosophical Essays, p. 195. 238 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XVIII. to make the miraculous nature of an event, and the absolute impos sibility of it, to be the same thing. And he elsewhere makes an attempt to prove, that we have no reason to think that God himself can effect a miracle. He urges, that though the Being to whom the miracle is ascribed, be in this case Almighty, it does not, upon that account, become a whit more probable ; since it is impossible for us to know the attributes or acts of a Being, otherwise than from the experience we have of his productions in the usual course of nature."* But when once we conclude, from the effects in the works of nature, that he is Almighty, as this gentleman seems here to grant, we may, from his being Almighty, reasonably infer that he can do many things which we do not know that he hath actually done, and can produce many effects which he hath not actually produced ; for an Almighty Being can do any thing that doth not imply a contradic tion ; and it can never be proved that a miracle, or an event contrary to the usual course of nature, implieth a contradiction. This writer himself expressly acknowledgeth, in a passage I cited before, that " it implies no contradiction, that the course of nature may change;"f and he repeats it again afterwards, that " the course of nature may change." j And as to the extraordinariness of any fact, he saith, that " even in the most familiar events, the energy of the cause is as unintelligible, as in the most extraordinary and unusual." § What we call the course of nature is the appointment of God, and the continuance of it dependeth upon his power and will ; it is no more difficult for him to act contrary to it in any particular instance, than to act according to it. The one is in itself as easy to Almighty Power as the other. The true question then is concerning the divine will, whether it can be supposed that God, having established the course of nature, will ever permit or order a deviation from that regular course, which his own wisdom hath established ; and with regard to this, it will be readily granted, that it is highly proper and wisely appointed, that in the ordinary state of things, what are com monly called the laws of nature should be maintained, and that things should generally go on in a fixed stated course and order; without which there could be no regular study or knowledge of nature, no use or advantage of experience, either for the acquisition of science, or the conduct of life. But though it is manifestly proper that these laws, or this course of things, should generally take place, it would be an inexcusable presumption to affirm that God, having established these laws and this course of nature in the beginning, hath bound himself never to act otherwise than accord ing to those laws. There may be very good reasons, worthy of his great wisdom, for his acting sometimes contrary to the usual order of things. Nor can it in that case be justly pretended that this would be contrary to the immutability of God, which is Spinosa's great argument against miracles ; for those very variations which appear so extraordinary to us, are comprehended within the general plan of his providence, and make a part of his original design. * Philosophical Essays, p. 95. t Ibid., p. 62. f Ibid., p. 66. § Ibid., p. 114. Let. XVIII. mr. hume. 239 The same infinite wisdom which appointed or established those natural laws, did also appoint the deviations from them, or that they should be overruled on some particular occasions ; which occasions were also perfectly foreseen from the beginning by his all compre hending mind. If things were always to go on without the least variation in the stated course, men might be apt to overlook or question a most wise governing providence, and to ascribe things (as some have done) to a fixed immutable fate or blind necessity, which they call nature. It may therefore be becoming the wisdom of God to appoint that there should be, on particular occasions, deviations from the usual established course of things. Such ex traordinary operations and appearances may tend to awaken in man kind a sense of a Supreme disposer and governor of the world, who is a most wise and free as well as powerful agent, and hath an absolute dominion over nature ; and may also answer important ends and purposes of moral government, for displaying God's justice and mercy, but especially for giving attestation to the divine mission of persons, whom he seeth fit to send on extraordary errands, for instructing and reforming mankind, and for bringing discoveries of the highest importance to direct men to true religion and happiness. It appeareth then, that no argument can be brought from ex perience to prove, either that miracles are impossible to the power of God, or that they can never be agreeable to his will ; and there fore it is far from yielding a direct and full proof against the exist ence of miracles. It may illustrate this to consider some of the instances he himself mentions. " Lead cannot of itself remain suspended in the air. Fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water." Our uniform experience proves, that this is the usual and ordinary course of things, and agreeable to the known laws of nature; it proves, that lead cannot naturally and ordinarily, or by- its own force, be suspended in the air ; but it affordeth no proof at all, that it cannot be thus suspended in a particular instance by the will of God, or by a supernatural force or power. In like manner our experience proves, that fire consumes wood in the natural course of things ; but it yieldeth no proof, that, in a particular instance, the force of fire may not be suspended or overruled, and the wood preserved from being consumed by the interposal of an invisible agent. Another instance he mentions is, that "it is a miracle that a dead man should come to life ; because that has never been observed in any age or country ;"* but its never having been observed, if that had been the case, would have furnished no proof at all that a dead man cannot be raised to life by the power and will of God, when a most valuable a»d important end is to be answered by it. And if we have good evidence to convince us, that a man had been really dead, and that that man was afterwards really restored to life, (and this is a matter of fact of which our senses can judge, as well as of any other fact whatsoever) no argu ment can be drawn from experience to prove that it could not be * Philosophical Essays, p. 181. 240 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XVIII. so. Our experience would indeed afford a proof, that no merely natural human power could effect it ; or that it is a thing really miraculous, and contrary to the usual course of nature; but it would not amount to a full and direct proof, nor indeed to any proof at all, that it could not be effected by the divine power. And now we may judge of the propriety of the inference he draws from the argument, as he had managed it. " The plain consequence is," saith he, " and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention, that no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more mira culous than the fact which it endeavours to establish ; and even in that case, there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superiority only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force which remains after deducting the inferior. When any one tells me that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately con sult with myself whether it be more probable that this person should ever deceive or be deceived, or that the fact he relates should really have happened ; I weigh the one miracle against the other, and, according to the superiority which I discover, I pronounce my deci sion, and always reject the greater miracle."* You cannot but observe here, this writer's jingle upon the word miracle. As he had talked of proof against proof, so he here talks as if in the case he is supposing there were miracle against miracle ; or as if the question were concerning two extraordinary miraculous facts, the one of which is opposed to the other. But whereas in that case one should think the greater miracle ought to take place against the lesser, this gentleman, with whom miracle and absurdity is the same thing, declares that he always rejects the greater miracle. But to quit this poor jingle, it is allowed, that the raising a dead man to life must, if ever it happened, have been a very signal miracle ; i. e. as he defines it, a violation of the law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity. The question therefore is, whether any evidence is given which may be depended on, to assure us, that however strange or extraordinary this event may be, yet it hath actually happened. That the thing itself is possible to the Deity, however it may be contrary to the usual course of nature, cannot be reasonably contested ; because it cannot be proved to involve a con tradiction, or any thing beyond the reach of Almighty power. For it would be to the last degree absurd to say, that he who formed this stupendous system, or who contrived and fabricated the wonder ful frame of the human body, and originally gave it a principle of life, could not raise a dead man to life. It would be a contradiction, that the same man should be living and dead at the same time, but not that he who was dead should afterwards be restored to life ; and therefore if it be the will of God, and his wisdom and goodness seeth it proper for answering any very important purposes, he is able to effect it. But then, whether he hath actually effected it, is an other question ; and here it will be readily owned, that in a case of * Philosophical Essays, p. 182. Let. XVIII. mr. hume. 24l so extraordinary a nature, the evidence or testimony upon which we receive it, ought to be very strong and cogent. Mr. Hume is pleased here to put the case in a very loose and general way. "When any one tells me," saith he, " that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact he relates should really have happened." He puts it as if there was nothing to depend upon but the testimony of a single person ; without any assignable reason for such an extraordinary event ; and when thus proposed, naked of all circumstances, no wonder that it hath an odd appearance ! But that we may bring the question to a fair issue, let us apply to it what our author without doubt had principally in his view, the resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ. Taking the case therefore according to the representation given of it in the Holy Scriptures, let us examine whether, supposing all those circumstances to concur which are there exhibited, thev do not amount to a full and satis factory evidence, sufficient to lay a just foundation for a reasonable assent to it. Let us then suppose, that in a series of writings pub lished by different persons in different ages, and all of them incorr- testably written long before the event happened, a glorious and wonderful person was foretold and described by the most extraordi nary characters, who should be sent from heaven to teach and in struct mankind, to guide them in the way of salvation, and to intro duce an excellent dispensation of truth and righteousness. That not only the nation and family from which he was to spring, the place of his birth, and time of his appearing, was distinctly pointed out, but it was foretold that he should endure the most grievous sufferings and death, and that afterwards he should be exalted to a divine dominion and glory, and that the Gentiles should be enlight ened by his doctrine, and receive his law. That accordingly, at the time which had been signified in these predictions, that admirable person appeared. That he taught a most pure and heavenly doc trine, prescribed the most holy and excellent laws, and brought the most perfect scheme of religion which had ever been published to the world ; and at the same time exhibited in his own sacred life and practice an example of the most consummate holiness and goodness. That in proof of his divine mission he performed the most wonder ful works, manifestly transcending the utmost efforts of all human power or skill, and this in a vast number of instances, and in the most open and public manner, for a course of years together. That he most clearly and expressly foretold that he was to undergo the most grievous sufferings, and a cruel and ignominious death, and should afterwards rise again from the dead oa the third day. And to this he appealed as the most convincing proof of his divine mis sion. That accordingly he suffered the death of the cross, in the face of a vast multitude of spectators ; and notwithstanding the chief men of the Jewish nation, by whose instigation he was cruci fied, took the most prudent and effectual precautions to prevent an imposition in this matter, he rose again from the dead at the time 242 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XVIII. appointed, with circumstances of great glory, in a manner which struck terror into the guards who were set to watch the sepulchre. That afterwards he showed himself alive to many of those who were most intimately acquainted with him, and who, far from discovering a too forward credulity, could not be brought to believe it, till they found themselves constrained to do so by the testimony of all their senses. That as a farther proof of his resurrection and exaltation, they who witnessed it were themselves enabled to perform the most wonderful miracles in his name, and by power derived from him, and were endued with the most extraordinary gifts and powers, that they might spread his religion through the world, amidst the great est oppositions and discouragements. That accordingly this reli gion, though propagated by the seemingly meanest and most un likely instruments, and not only destitute of all worldly advantages, but directly opposite to the prevailing superstitions, prejudices, and vices both of Jews and Gentiles, and though it exposed its publish ers and followers to all manner of reproaches, persecutions, and sufferings, yet in that very age made the most surprising progress; in consequence of which, the religion of Jesus was established in a considerable part of the world, and so continueth unto this day. Such is the view of the evidence of the resurrection of Jesus ; and, taking it altogether, it forms such a concatenation of proofs, asis every way suitable to the importance of the fact, and which was never equalled in any other case. To suppose all this evidence to have been given in attestation to a falsehood, involveth in it the most palpable absurdities. It is to suppose, either that God would employ his own prescience and power to give testimony to an im postor, by a series of the most illustrious prophecies and numerous uncontrolled miracles ; or that good beings, superior to man, would extraordinarily interpose for the same purpose, to countenance and derive credit to a person falsely pretending to be sent from God, and feigning to act in his name ; or that evil spirits would use all their arts and their power to attest and confirm a religion, the manifest tendency of which was to destroy idolatr)', superstition, and vice, wherever it was sincerely believed and embraced, and to recover mankind to holiness and happiness ; which is a contradiction to their very nature and character. It is to suppose that a number of persons would combine in attesting falsehoods in favour of a person who they knew had deceived them, and of a religion con trary to their most inveterate and favourite prejudices, and by which they had a prospect of gaining nothing but misery, reproach, suffer ings, and death ; which is absolutely contrary to all the principles and passions of the human nature. It is to suppose that persons of the greatest simplicity and plainness would act the part of the vilest impostors ; or that men who were so bad, so false, and impious, as to be capable of carrying on a series of the most "solemn imposi tions in the name of God himself, would, at the hazard of all that is dear to men, and in manifest opposition to all their ^worldly interests, endeavour to bring over the nations to embrace a holy and self-denying institution; or that they were enthusiasts, who were Let. XVIII. mr. hume. 243 carried away by the heat of their own distempered brains to imagine that for a series of years together, the most extraordinary facts were done before their eyes, though no such things were done at all, and that they were themselves enabled actually to perform the most wonderful works in the most open and public manner, though they performed no such works. It is to suppose that such mad enthu siasts, who were also mean and contemptible in their condition, and for the most part ignorant and illiterate, were not only capable of forming the noblest scheme of religion which was ever published to mankind, but were able to overcome all the learning, wealth, power, and eloquence of the world, all the bigotry and superstition of the nations, all the influence and artifices of the priests, all the power and authority of the magistrates. That they did this by only alleging that they had a commission in the name of a person who had been crucified, whom they affirmed, but without giving any proof of it, to have been risen from the dead, and to be exalted as the Saviour and Lord of mankind. All this is such a complication of absurdities, as cannot be admitted but upon principles that are absolutely abhorrent to the common sense and reason of men. It were easy to enlarge farther on this subject ; but this may suffice at present, especially considering that Mr. Adams hath urged many things to this purpose with great clearness and force, in his answer to Mr. Hume's Essay, p. 31 — 36. And what is there to oppose to all this? Nothing but the single difficulty of restoring a dead man to life, which is indeed a very extraordinary and miraculous event, but is not above the power of God to effect, and, supposing a good and valid reason can be assigned for it worthy ofthe divine wisdom and goodness, involveth in it no absurdity at all. And such a reason it certainly was, to give an illustrious attestation to the divine mission of the holy Jesus, and to the divine original of the most excellent dispensation of religion that was ever published among men. To talk, as this author does, of the diminution of the evidence in pro portion to the difficulty of the case, is trifling ; for the evidence is here supposed to be fully proportioned to the difficulty and import ance of the case ; since there is both a power assigned every way able to effect it, and a valuable end, which makes it reasonable to think it was becoming the divine wisdom and goodness to interpose for effecting it. You will perhaps think this may be sufficient with regard to the first part of Mr. Hume's Essay on Miracles. In my next, I shall endeavour to make it appear that we have the highest reason to think that the evidence, which hath been argued to be sufficient if given, was really and actually given ; and shall answer the several considerations he hath offered to show, that supposing miracles capable of being proved by evidence or testimony, yet no evidence was ever actually given for miracles, which can be reasonably depended upon. r 2 244 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIX. LETTER XIX. Reflections on the second Part of Mr. Hume's Essay on Miracles, which is designed to show, that in fact there never was a miraculous Event established upon such Evidence as can be depended on — What he offers, concerning the necessary Conditions and Qualifications of Witnesses in the Case of Miracles, considered — It is shown that the Witnesses to the Miracles in Proof of Christianity had all the Conditions and Qualifications that can be required to render any Testimony good and valid — Con cerning the Proneness of Mankind in all Ages to believe wonders, especially in Matters of Religion — This no Reason for rejecting all Miracles without further Examination — The Miracles wrought in Proof of Christianity not done in an ignorant and barbarous Age — His Pretence that different Miracles wrought in favour of dif ferent Religions destroy one another, and show that none of them are true — The Absurdity of this Way of Reasoning shown — Instances produced by him of Miracles well attested, and which yet ought to be rejected as false and incredible — A particular Examination of what he hath offered concerning the Miracles attributed to the Abbt; de Paris, and which he pretends much surpass those of our Saviour in Credit and Authority. SIR, I now proceed to consider the second part of Mr. Hume's Essay on Miracles. The first was designed to show that miracles are in capable of being proved by any evidence whatsoever, and that no evidence or testimony that could be given, let us suppose it ever so full and strong, would be a sufficient ground for believing the truth and existence of miracles. And now in his second part he proceeds to show, that supposing a miracle capable of being proved by full and sufficient evidence or testimony, yet in fact, there never was a miraculous event in any history established upon such evidence as can reasonably be depended upon. To this purpose he offereth several considerations. The first is designed to prove that no wit nesses have ever been produced for any miracle, which have all the necessary conditions and qualifications, to render their testimony credible. The second consideration is drawn from the proneness there has been in mankind in all ages to believe wonders ; and the more for their being absurd and incredible ; especially in matters of religion ; and that therefore in this case all men of sense should reject them without further examination. His third observation is, that they are always found to abound most among ignorant and barbarous nations. His fourth observation is drawn from the oppo site miracles wrought in different religions which destroy one an other ; so that there is no miracle wrought, but what is opposed by an infinite number of others. He then goes on to give an account of some miraculous facts which seem to be well attested, and yet are to be rejected as false and incredible. This is the substance of this part of his Essay, which he concludes with an insolent boast, Let. XIX. mr. hume. 245 as if he thought he had so clearly demonstrated what he undertook, that no man who had not his understanding miraculously subverted could oppose it. But I apprehend it will appear, upon a distinct examination of what he hath offered, that there is little ground for such confident boasting. The principal consideration is that which he hath mentioned in the first place, drawn from the want of competent testimony to ascertain the truth of miraculous facts. He affirms, " that there is not to be found in all history any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestionable good sense, education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves ; of such undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to deceive others ; of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great deal to lose in case of being detected in any falsehood ; and at the same time attesting facts performed in such a public manner, and in so celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection unavoidable ; all which circumstances are requisite to give us a full assurance in the testimony of men."* Here he supposes that where these circumstances Concur, we may have full assurance in the testimony qf men concerning the facts they relate, however extraordinary and unusual. Let us therefore examine the conditions and qualifications he insists upon, as neces sary to render a testimony good and valid, and apply them to the testimony of the witnesses of Christianity, and the extraordinary miraculous facts whereby it was confirmed, especially that of our Saviour's resurrection. The first thing he insisteth upon is, that the miracle should be attested by a sufficient number qf men. He hath not told us what number of witnesses he takes to be sufficient in such a case. In some cases very few may be sufficient ; yea, a single evidence may be so circumstanced as to produce a sufficient assurance and con viction in the mind, even concerning a fact of an extraordinary nature ; though where there is a concurrence of many good wit nesses, it is undoubtedly an advantage, and tendeth to give farther force to the evidence. And as to this, Christianity hath all the advantages that can reasonably be desired. All the apostles were the authorized witnesses of the principal facts by which Christianity is attested ; so were the seventy disciples, and the hundred-and- twenty, mentioned Acts ii. 15, 21, 22, who hadjbeen with Jesus from the commencement of his personal ministry to his ascension into heaven ; to which might be added many others who had seen his illustrious miracles, as well as heard his excellent instructions. The accounts of these things were published in that very age, and the facts were represented as having been done, and the discourses as having been delivered, in the presence of multitudes ; so that in effect they appealed to thousands in Judea, Jerusalem, and Galilee. It is true, that as to the resurrection of Christ, this was not a fact done before all the people ; but there was a number of witnesses to it, sufficient to attest any fact. Christ showed himself * Philosophical Essays, p. 183. 246 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL writers. Let. XIX. alive after his passion to several persons at different times, whose testimony give mutual support and force to one another. He showed himself also to all the apostles in a body, to several other disciples, and at last to five hundred at once. To which it may be added, that all the extraordinary facts and wonderful works wrought by the apostles and first publishers of Christianity, many of which were of a very public nature, and done in the view of multitudes, came in aid of their testimony. As to the qualifications of the witnesses, the first thing he re quireth is that " they should be of such unquestionable good sense, education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in them selves." The reason why this gentleman here mentiorieth learning and education as necessary qualifications in witnesses, is evident. It is undoubtedly with a view to exclude the apostles, who, except St. Paul, appear not to have been persons of education and learn ing. But no court of judicature, in inquiring into facts, looks upon it to be necessary that the person giving testimony to the truth of those facts should be persons who had a learned education ; it is sufficient if they appear to be persons of sound sense and honest characters, and that the facts were such that they had an oppor tunity of being well acquainted with. And thus it was with regard to the first witnesses of Christianity. They were not indeed persons eminent for their learning, knowledge, and experience in the world ; if they had been so, this might probably have been regarded as a suspicious circumstance, as if they themselves laid the scheme, and it was the effect of their own art and contrivance. But they were persons of plain sense, and sound understanding, and perfectly acquainted with the facts they relate. This sufficiently appeareth from their writings, and the accounts they have left us. Their narrations are plain and consistent, delivered in a simple, unaffected style, without any pomp of words or ostentation of eloquence or literature on the one hand, and on the other without any of the rants of enthusiasm. All is calm, cool, and sedate, the argument of a composed spirit. There is nothing that betrayeth an over heated imagination ; nor do they ever fly out into passionate excla mations, even where the subject might seem to warrant it. The facts they relate were of such a nature, and so circumstanced, that they could not themselves be deceived in them, supposing they had their senses, or be made to believe they were done before their eyes when they were not done. This must be acknowledged as to the facts done during Christ's personal ministry. For they were con stantly with him in his going out and coming in, and had an oppor tunity of observing those facts in all their circumstances for a course of years together, and therefore could be as perfectly assured of them as any man can be of any facts whatsoever, which he himself hears and sees. And as to his resurrection, they were not forward rashly to give credit to it by an enthusiastic heat ; they examined it scrupulously, and would not receive it, till compelled by irresistible evidence, and by the testimony of all their senses. The next thing he insisteth upon is, that " the witnesses should Let. XIX. MR. HUME. 247 be of such undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all sus picion of any design to deceive others." Apply this to the wit nesses of the miraculous facts whereby Christianity was attested, and it will appear that never were there persons who were more remote from all reasonable suspicion qf fraud, or a design to impose falsehoods upon mankind. They appeared by their whole temper and conduct to be persons of great probity and unaffected sim plicity, strangers to artful cunning, and the refinements of human policy. It mightily strengthens this when it is considered, that as the case was circumstanced, they could have no temptation to en deavour to impose these things upon the world if they had not been true, but had the strongest inducements to the contrary. They could have no prospect of serving their worldly interest, or answer ing the ends of ambition, by preaching up a religion, contrary to all the prevailing passions and prejudices of Jews and Gentiles, a principal article of which was salvation through a crucified Jesus. They could scarce have had a reasonable expectation of gaining so much as a single proselyte, to so absurd and foolish a scheme, as it must have been, supposing they had known that all was false, and that Jesus had never risen at all. How could it have been expected in such a case, that they should be able to persuade the Jews to receive for their Messiah one that had been put to an ignominious death by the heads of their nation, as an impostor or deceiver ? or that they should persuade the Gentiles to acknowledge and worship a crucified Jew for their Lord, in preference to their long-adored deities, and to abandon all their darling superstitions for a strict and self-denying discipline ? The only thing that can be pretended as a possible inducement to them, to endeavour to impose upon mankind, is what this writer afterwards mentions. " What greater temptation," saith he, " than to appear a missionary, a prophet, and ambassador from heaven ? Who would not encounter many dangers and difficulties to attain so sublime a character ? Or if persuaded of it himself, would scruple a pious fraud in prospect of so holy an end ?" * But there is no room for such a suspicion in the case we are now considering. If they had pretended a reve lation in favour of a Messiah, suited to the Jewish carnal notions and prejudices, who was to erect a mighty worldly dominion, arrayed with all the pomp of secular glory and grandeur, they might have expected honour and applause in being looked upon as his ministers. But what honour could they propose from being re garded as the disciples and apostles of one that had been condemned and put to a shameful death by public authority ? To set up as his ambassadors, and pretend to be inspired by his spirit, and to be commissioned by him to go through the world, preaching up Jesus Christ, and him crucified ; this was in all appearance the readiest way they could take to expose themselves to general scorn, derision, and reproach ; and they must have been absolutely out of their senses to have expected "that any veneration should be paid to them * Philosophical Essays, p. 200. 248 A view of the deistical writers. Let. XIX. under this character, supposing they had no other proof to bring of their crucified master's being risen, and exalted in glory as the universal Lord and Saviour, but their own word. Thus it appears, that they could have no inducements or temptations, according to all the principles or motives that usually work upon the human mind, to attempt to impose this scheme of religion, and the facts by which it was supported, if they had known them to be false ; and if they had been false, they must have known them to be so. But this is not all. They had the strongest possible inducements to the contrary. The scheme of religion they preached, and which these facts were designed to attest, was directly opposite to their own most rooted prejudices. On the supposition of Christ's not having risen, they must have been sensible that he had deceived them; that the promises and predictions with which he amused them were false ; and that consequently they cauld have no hopes from him, either in this world or in the next. At the same time they could not but foresee, that "by pretending he was risen from the dead, and setting him up for the Messiah after he had been cru cified, they should incur the indignation of the body of their own nation, and the hatred and contempt of those in chief authority among them. They could not possibly expect anything but what they met with, persecutions, reproaches, shame, and sufferings, both from Jews and Gentiles. Their exposing themselves to these things may be accounted for, if they were persuaded that what they wit nessed was really true, though even in that case it required great virtue and constancy and divine supports. But that they should, in manifest opposition to their own religious prejudices and worldly interests, without the least prospect of any thing to be gained by it here or hereafter, persist to the very death in attesting a falsehood, known by themselves to be so ; and that they should, for the sake of one who they knew had deceived them, expose themselves to the .greatest evils and sufferings, to which all men have naturally the strongest aversion, is a supposition that cannot be admitted with the least appearance of reason, as being absolutely subversive of all the principles and passions of human nature. Our author ought to acknowledge the force of this reasoning, since he taketh pains throughout his whole Essay on Liberty and Necessity, to show, that we may in many cases argue as surely and strongly from the power and influence of motives on the human mind, as from the influence of physical causes ; and that there is as great a certainty and as necessary a connexion in what are called moral causes as in physical. This author undoubtedly in that Essay carrieth it too far, when, in order to subvert human liberty, he would have it thought, that in all cases the power of motives worketh with as ne cessary a force upon the mind, as any physical cause doth upon the effect. But that in many particular cases things may be so cir cumstanced with regard to moral causes, as to afford a certainty equal to what arises from physical, cannot reasonably be denied. And such is the case here put. And he expressly declareth, that "we cannot make use of a more convincing argument than to prove, Let. XIX. mr. hume. 249 that the actions ascribed to any person are contrary to the course of nature, and that no human motives in such circumstances could ever induce them to such conduct."* This writer farther requireth, that " the witnesses should be of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind as to have a great deal to lose in case of being detected in any falsehood." If the meaning be, that they must be persons distinguished by their rank and situation in the world, and of great reputation for knowledge and for the eminency of their station and figure in life ; this in the case here referred to would, instead of strengthening, have greatly weakened the force of their testimony. It might have been said, with some show of plausibility, that such persons, by their know ledge and abilities, their reputation and interest, might have it in their power to» countenance and propagate an imposture among the people, and give it some credit in the world. If the facts recorded in the gospel, the miracles and resurrection of Jesus Christ, had been patronised and attested by the chief priests and rulers of the Jewish nation, it would undoubtedly have been pretended that they had political designs in view, and that, considering their au thority and influence, they might more easily impose those things upon the multitude. On this view of things the evidence for those important facts would have been far less convincing than now it is. And therefore the divine wisdom hath ordered it far better, in ap pointing that the first witnesses of the gospel were not the worldly wise, mighty, or noble, but persons of mean condition, and yet of honest characters, without power, authority, or interest. And whereas this writer urgeth, that the witnesses ought to be of such reputation as to have a great deal to lose in case of being detected in a falsehood, it ought to be considered that a man of true probity, though in a low condition, may be as unwilling to be branded as a cheat and an impostor, and as desirous to preserve his good name, which may be almost all he has to value himself upon, as persons of greater figure and eminence in the world, who may more easily find means to support themselves, and to evade detection and punishment. The apostles indeed rejoiced that they were counted worthy to suffer shame for the name of Christ, Acts v. 41. But this was not owing to their being insensible to shame, but to the testimony of a good conscience, and to the full persuasion they had of Christ's divine mission, and the divinity of the religion they preached in his name. This particularly was the principle upon which St. Paul acted, who was a man of reputation among the Jews, and would never have made a sacrifice of this, and of all his worldly interests and expectations, to join himself to a despised persecuted party, and against whom he himself had conceived the strongest prejudices, if he had not been brought over, by an evi dence which he was not able to resist, to the acknowledgment of the Christian faith, and of the extraordinary facts of which it was esta blished. * Philosophical Essays, p. 135. 250 a view of the deistical writers. Let. XIX. The last thing he insisteth upon is, that the facts attested by the witnesses should be " performed in such a public manner, and iu so celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection un avoidable." This may be applied with the greatest propriety to the extraordinary and miraculous facts by which Christianity was attested. Justly doth St. Paul appeal to King Agrippa, in the admirable apology he made before him and the Roman governor, Festus, and which was delivered before a numerous and august assembly of Jews and Romans, that none of these things were hidden from him ; for, saith he, this thing was not done in a corner, Acts xxvi. 26. Christ's whole personal ministry, and the wonderful works he wrought were transacted, not in a private and secret, but in the most open and public manner possible, in places of the greatest concourse, and before multitudes of people assembled from all parts. The same may be said of many of the miracles wrought by the apostles, in the name and by the power of a risen Jesus ; and particularly never was there any event of a more public nature than the extraordinary effusion of the Holy Ghost on the day of Pentecost. The first publishers of Christianity preached the re ligion of Jesus, and performed miracles in confirmation of it, not merely in small villages, or obscure parts of the country, but in populous cities, in those parts of the world that were most cele brated for the liberal arts, learning, and politeness. They published their religion, and the wonderful facts by which it was supported throughout the Lesser Asia, Greece, Italy ; in the cities of Jeru salem, Antioch, Ephesus, Corinth, Thessalonica, Philippi, Athens, and Rome itself. If therefore their pretences had been false, they could scarce have possibly escaped a detection ; especially con sidering that they were everywhere under the eye of watchful adversaries, unbelieving Jews as well as heathens, who would not have failed to detect and expose the imposture, if there had been any. As to what the author afterwards allegeth, that "in the infancy of new religions the wise and learned commonly esteem the matter too inconsiderable to deserve their attention and regard; and when afterwards they would willingly detect the cheat, in order to undeceive the deluded multitude, the season is now gone, and the records and witnesses who might clear up the matter, are perished beyond recovery ;"* this pretence hath no place in the case we are now considering with regard to Christianity. That religion met with the greatest opposition even in its infancy. Per sons of principal authority in the nation where it first arose, bent their attention and employed their power to suppress it. And in all places where it was afterwards propagated, there were unbelieving Jews, who used their utmost efforts to stir up the heathens against it, who of themselves were strongly inclined by their own preju dices to oppose it ; and this at the very time when, if the facts had been false, it would have been the easiest thing in the world to have detected the falsehood, which in that case must have been * Philosophical Essays, p. 203. Let. XIX. mr. hume. 251 known to thousands ; since many of the facts appealed to were of a very public nature. Thus 1 have considered the conditions and qualifications he in sisteth upon, as necessary to give us a full assurance fn the testi mony qf men with regard to miracles ; and have shown that all the conditions that can be reasonably desired, concur with the highest degree of evidence, in the testimony given by the apostles and first witnesses of Christianity, to the extraordinary facts whereby its divine authority was established. Their testimony had some ad vantages which no other testimony ever had. St. Luke observes, that with great power gave the apostles witness of the resurrection of the Lord Jesus, Acts iv. 33. The testimony they gave was accom panied with a divine power. The force of their .testimony did not depend merely on their own veracity, but may be said to have been confirmed by the attestation of God himself. It is with the utmost propriety, therefore, that the sacred writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews representeth God, as bearing them witness, both with signs and wonders, and with divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to his own will, Heb. ii. 4. And it is incontestably true in fact, that so strong and convincing was the evidence, that great numbers both of Jews and Gentiles were brought over in that very age, to the faith of a crucified and risen Saviour. Nor was this the effect of a too forward credulity, since it was in direct oppo sition to their prejudices, passions, and worldly interests. The principles and inducements which usually lead men to form wrong and partial judgments, lay wholly on the other side, and, instead of being favourable to Christianity, tended rather to determine men to disbelieve and reject it, so that it may be justly said, that the propagation of that scheme of religion which is held forth in the gospel had something in it so wonderful, taking in all the circum stances of the case, that it affordeth a manifest and most convincing proof of the truth of the extraordinary facts upon which it was founded. I now proceed to make some observations upon the other con siderations this gentleman offers in the second part of his Essay, and which indeed can at best pass for no more that presumptions, and only show, that the testimony given to miracles is not rashly to be admitted, and that great care and caution is necessary in judging of them, which will be easily allowed. The second consideration, and upon which he seems to lay a great stress, is this : " that we may observe in human nature a principle which, if strictly examined, will be found to diminish extremely the assurance we might have from human testimony in any kind of prodigy." He says, " that though for the most part we readily reject any fact that is unusual and incredible in an ordinary degree, yet when anything is affirmed utterly absurd and miraculous, the mind rather more readily admits such a fact, upon account of that very circumstance which ought to destroy all its authority. The passion of surprise and wonder arising from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of 252 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIX. those events from which it is derived. But if the spirit of re ligion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common sense ; and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all pretensions to authority."* And again he observes, that " should a miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion, men in all ages have been so much imposed on by the ridiculous stories of this kind, that this very circumstance will be a full proof of a cheat, and sufficient with all men of sense, not only to make them reject the fact, but even reject it without farther examination." And he repeats it again, that it should make us form a general resolution never to lend any attention to it, with whatever specious pretext it may be covered."4- He here undertaketh to answer for all men qf sense that they will reject all miracles produced in proof of religion without farther examination, because men in all ages have been much imposed on by ridiculous stories of this kind. But this certainly is the language, not of reason and good sense, which will dispose a man fairly to examine, but of the most obstinate prepossession and prejudice. No kinds of historical facts, whether of an ordinary or extraordinary nature, can be mentioned, in which men have frequently been imposed upon. But that is no just reason for rejecting such facts at once without examination; and the man that would do so, instead of proving his superior good sense, would only render himself ridiculous. That there have been ¦ many false miracles will be readily acknowledged; but this doth not prove that there never have been any true ones. It ought indeed to make us very cautious, and to examine miracles carefully before we receive them ; but it is no reason at all, or a very absurd one, for rejecting them all. at once without examination and inquiry. Thus to reject them can only be justified upon this principle, that it is not possible that there should be a true miracle wrought in favour of any system of religion. But by what medium will he un dertake to prove this ? He seems expressly to admit, that in other cases "there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony. "J This concession is not very consistent with what he had laboured in the first part of his Essay to show, with regard to all miracles in general, via., that they are incapable of being proved by any testimony. But now, provided miracles be not produced in proof of religion, he seems willing to allow, that they may possibly admit of proof from human testimony. The only case therefore in which they are never to be believed, is when they are pretended to be wrought in favour of religion. But in this he seems to have both the reason of the thing and the general sense of mankind against him. It is certainly more reasonable to believe a miracle, when a valuable end can be assigned for it, than to believe it when we cannot discern any important end to be answered by it at all. And one of the most valuable ends for which a miracle can be sup posed to be wrought seems to be this, to give an attestation to the divine mission of persons sent to instruct mankind in religious * Philosophical Essays, p. 184, 185: t Ibid. p. 204, 205. X Ibid. p. 203. Let. XIX. mr. nuME. 253 truths of great importance, and to lead them in the way of salva tion. Our author seems sometimes to lay a mighty stress on the general opinion and common sentiments of mankind.* And there are few notions, which, by his own acknowledgment, have more generally obtained in all nations and ages than this, that there have been miracles actually wrought on some occasions, especially in matters of religion, and that they are to be regarded as proofs of a divine interposition. This is a principle which seems to be con formable to the natural sense of the human mind. The observation he makes concerning the agreeable emotion pro duced by the passion of wonder and surprise, and the strong pro pensity there is in mankind to the extraordinary and the marvellous, proves nothing against this principle. The passion of wonder and surprise was certainly not given us in vain, but for very wise pur poses ; and it may be presumed that this passion, as well as others, may be rightly exercised upon proper objects. But I cannot agree with this gentleman, that men are naturally disposed and inclined to believe a thing the rather for its being utterly absurd and mira culous, especially in matters of religion. They may indeed, and often do, believe absurdities ; but they never believe a thing merely because it is absurd, but because, taking all considerations together, they do not look upon it to be absurd. It may be observed, by the way, that this writer here makes absurd and miraculous to be terms of the same signification, whereas they are very different ideas. A miracle, when supposed to be wrought by a power adequate to the effect, and for excellent ends, is indeed wonderful, but has no absurdity in it at all. It is true, there have often been very absurd things recommended to popular belief under the notion of miracles, and such pretended miracles have been received without much examination, when wrought in favour of the established super stition. But even real miracles are received with difficulty, when they are wrought in opposition to it; and where the influence of the priesthood, the prejudices of the vulgar, and the authority of the magistrate, are on the one side, which was the case of Christianity at its first appearance. Considering the nature of that religion, how contrary it was to the prevailing notions and prejudices both of Jews and Gentiles, the strictness of the morals it prescribed, the scheme of salvation through a crucified Saviour which it pro posed, the meanness of the instruments by which it was propa gated, and the numberless difficulties it had to encounter with ; the miracles wrought in attestation of it could not have met with a favourable reception in the world, if there had not been the most convincing evidence of their being really wrought. The strangeness of the facts, instead of producing belief, would rather have turned to its disadvantage, and could scarce have failed being detected in such circumstances, if they had been false. His third observation is, that it " forms a very strong presump tion against all supernatural relations, that they are always found * Essays Moral and Political, p. 307. 254 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIX. chiefly to abound among ignorant and barbarous nations ; pr if a civilized people have ever given admission to any of them, they have received them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors."* But no presumption can be drawn from this to the prejudice of Chris tianity, which did not make its appearance in an ignorant and bar barous age, but at a time when the world was greatly civilized, and in nations where arts and learning had made a very great pro gress. And it must be considered, that it had not only their in veterate prejudices, their darling passions, and inclinations; but their pretended miracles to encounter with extraordinary facts re ceived from their ancestors, who transmitted them, as he expresseth it, with that inviolable sanction and authority, which always attends ancient and received opinions. How strong and cogent therefore must the force of the evidence in behalf of the Christian religion, and the extraordinary miraculous facts designed to support it, have been, which, in the hands of such mean instruments, could make so great a progress in a civilized and enlightened age, and prove too hard for the religion of the empire ; which, besides its being interwoven with the civil establishment, had the prescription of many ages to plead, and was supported by pretended miracles, prodigies, and oracles ! Mr. Hume is pleased to take notice on this occasion of the management of that cunning impostor Alex ander.-4- But though, the better to carry on the cheat, he had laid the scene among the barbarous Paphlagonians, who were reckoned among the most stupid and ignorant of the human race ; and not only put in practice all the arts of imposture (though it doth not appear, that he pretended to work miracles among the people, or put the proof of his authority upon them), but had procured a pow erful interest among the great to support him, he and his impos tures soon sunk into oblivion, and so undoubtedly would Chris tianity too have done, if its extraordinary facts had no better foun dation in truth and fact than his pretensions had. " I may add," " saith he, " as a fourth reason which diminishes the authority of prodigies, that there is no testimony for any, even those which have not been expressly detected, that is not opposed by an infinite number of witnesses ; so that not only the miracle destroys the credit of the testimony, but even the testi mony destroys itself." He goes on to observe, that " in matters of religion whatever is different is contrary ; that it is impossible that all these different religions should be established on a solid foundation; that every miracle pretended to have been wrought in any of these religions, as it is designed to establish that parti cular system, has the same force to overthrow every other system ; and consequently to destroy the credit of those miracles on which that system was established. So that all the prodigies of different religions are to be regarded as contrary facts, and the evidences of those prodigies as opposite to one another."4: This writer is here * Philosophical Essays, p. 186, 187. t Ibid. p. 188, 189.. f Ibid. p. 190, 191. Let. XIX. mr. hume. 255 pleased to confound prodigies and miracles, which ought to be dis tinguished. Many things that have passed under the notion of prodigies, are very far from being miracles, in the strict and proper sense in which we are now considering them : and if we speak of miracles properly so called, the supposition he here goes upon, viz. that all religions have been founded upon miracles, and have put the proof of their authority upon them, is manifestly false. It is well known, that Mahomet did not pretend to establish his religion by miracles ; nor indeed can it be proved, that any systems of reli gion had any tolerable pretension of being originally founded upon miracles, but the Jewish and the Christian ; and these, though in some respects different, are not contrary, but mutually support each other ; the former being introductive and preparatory to the latter. But if his supposition should be admitted, that all religions in the world have been founded upon the credit of miracles, it is hard to comprehend the force of his reasoning. By what logic doth it follow, that because miracles have been believed by mankind in all ages and nations to have been wrought in proof of religion, therefore miracles were never really wrought at all in proof of reli gion, nor are they ever to be believed in any single instance ? With the same force it may be argued, that because there have been and are many opposite schemes of religion in the world, therefore their being opposite to one another proves that they are all false, and that there is no such thing as true religion in the world at all. But let us suppose ever so great a number of false hoods opposed to truth, that opposition of falsehood to truth doth not make truth to be less true, or destroy the certainty and evi dence of it. Supposing the religions to be opposite, and that miracles are said to be wrought in attestation of those opposite religions, it may indeed be fairly concluded that they cannot be all true, but not that none of them is so. Our author himself seems to be apprehensive, that this might be looked upon as a fallacious way of reasoning. " This argument," says he, " may appear very subtle and refined ; but is not in reality different from the rea soning of a judge, who supposes, that the credit of two witnesses, maintaining a crime against any one, is destroyed by the testimony of two others, who affirm him to have been two hundred leagues distant at the same instant when the crime is said to have been committed."* This gentleman has here given us a most extraor dinary specimen, how well qualified he would be to-determine causes if he sat in a court of judicature. If there came several witnesses before him, and their testimony was opposite to one another, he would without farther examination reject them all at once, and make their opposition to one another to be alone a proof that they were all false, and none of them to be depended upon. But it hath been hitherto thought reasonable, when testimonies are oppo site, to weigh and compare those testimonies, in order to form a proper judgment concerning them. In case of alibi's, which is the * Philosophical Essays, p. 192. 256 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIX. case the author here puts, the testimonies do not always destroy one another. A just and impartial judge will not immediately reject the testimonies on both sides without examination, because they contradict one another, which is the method our author seems here to recommend as reasonable, but will carefully compare them, that he may find out on which side the truth lies, and which of the testimonies is most to be credited, and will give his judgment accordingly. This certainly is the course which right reason pre- scribeth in all cases, where there is an opposition of testimony, and which it is to be presumed this gentleman himself would recom mend in every case, but where the cause of religion is concerned. For here, notwithstanding all his pretensions to freedom of think ing, his prejudices are so strong, that he is for proceeding by dif ferent weights and measures from what he and all mankind would judge reasonable in every other instance. He hath showed him self so little qualified to judge impartially in matters of this na ture, that I believe men of sense, to use his own phrase, will lay very little stress on any judgment he shall think fit to pronounce in this cause. The only part of Mr. Hume's Essay on Miracles which now re- maineth to be considered, is that which relates to some particular accounts of miraculous facts, which he would have us believe are as well or better attested, than those recorded in the Gospels, and yet are to be rejected as false and incredible. The first instance he mentioneth is that of the Emperor Vespasian's curing a blind and a lame man at Alexandria, and which he affirms is one of the best attested miracles in all profane history. This has been urged by almost every deistical writer who hath treated of miracles : and how little it is to the purpose in the present controversy hath been often shown. Not to repeat what Mr. Adams hath well urged concerning it, it may be sufficient to observe, that it appeareth from the accounts given us bythe historians who mention it,* that the design of these miracles was to give weight to the autho rity of Vespasian, newly made Emperor by the great men and the army, and to make it be believed that his elevation to the imperial throne was approved by the gods. I believe every reasonable man will be of opinion, that in any case of this kind, there is ground to suspect artifice and management. And who would be so presump tuous as to make too narrow a scrutiny into the truth of miracles, in which the interests of the great, and the authority of a mighty Emperor, were so nearly concentrated ? And if, as this writer ob serves, from Tacitus, some who were present continued to relate these facts, even after Vespasian and his family were no longer in possession of the empire ; it doth not appear, that the persons re ferred to were such as had been in the secret of the management, which probably lay in few hands ; or if they were, it is not to be wondered at that they should afterwards be unwilling to own the part they had in this affair ; especially since no methods were made use of to oblige them to discover the fraud. * Tacit. Hist. lib. 4. versus finem. Sueton. in Vespas. cap. 8. Let.- XIX. mr. hume. 257 The next instance he produceth is the miracle pretended to have been wrought at Saragossa, and mentioned by Cardinal De Retz, who, by Mr. Hume's own account, did not believe it. But cer tainly a man must have his head very oddly turned, to attempt to draw a parallel between the miracles of our Saviour and his apostles, and miracles pretended to have been wrought in a country where the inquisition is established, where the influence and inte rests of the priests, the superstitions and prejudices of the people, and the authority of the civil magistrate, are all combined to sup port the credit of those miracles, and where it would be extremely dangerous to make a strict inquiry into the truth of them ; and even the expressing the least doubt concerning them, might expose a man to the most terrible of all evils and sufferings. But that which Mr. Hume seems to lay the greatest stress upon, and on which he enlarges for some pages together, is, the miracles reported to have been wrought at the tomb of the Abbe de Paris. Having observed, that in the Recueil des Miracles de V Abbe de Paris, there is a parallel run between the miracles of our Saviour and those of the Abbe, he pronounces, that " if the inspired writers were to be considered merely as human testimony, the French au thor is very moderate in his comparison, since he might with some appearance of reason pretend, that the Jansenist miracles much surpass the others in credit and authority."* This has been of late a favourite topic with the deists. Great triumphs have been raised upon it, as if it were alone sufficient to destroy the credit of the miraculous facts recorded in the New Testament. I shall therefore make some observations upon it, though in doing so I shall be obliged to take notice of several things which Mr. Adams hath already observed, in his judicious reflections upon this subject, in his answer to Mr. Hume's Essay on Miracles, from page 65 to page 78. The account Mr. Hume pretends to give of this whole affair is very unfair and disingenuous, and is absolutely unworthy of any man that makes pretensions to a free and impartial inquiry. He positively asserts, that the miraculous facts were so strongly proved, that the Molinists or Jesuits were never able distinctly to refute or detect them ; and that they could not deny the truth of the facts, but ascribed them to witchcraft and the devil. Yet certain it is, that the Jesuits or Molinists did deny many of the facts to be true as the Jansenists related them ; that they asserted them to be false, and plainly proved several of them to be so. Particu larly the Archbishop of Sens distinctly insisted upon twenty-two of those pretended miraculous facts, all which he charged as owing to falsehood and imposture. He farther observes, that twenty-two of the Cures or Rectors of Paris pressed the Archbishop of Paris to examine those miracles, and asserted them to be known to the whole world. But he knew, or might have known, that some of those very miracles which those * Philosophical Essays, p. 196. s 258 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIX. gentlemen desired might be particularly inquired into, and which they represented as undeniably true and certain, were afterwards examined, and the perjury of the principal witnesses plainly de tected.* And the Archbishop, who, he tells us, wisely forbore an inquiry, caused a public judicial inquest to be made, as Mr. Adams observes, and in an ordinance of November 8, 1735, published the most convincing proofs, that the miracles so strongly vouched by the Cures, were forged and counterfeited.-f- Mr. Hume is pleased to observe, that " the Molinist party tried to discredit those miracles in one instance, that of Mademoiselle le Franc, but were not able to do it :" where he speaks, as if this were the single instance in which they tried to discredit those miracles, which is far from being true. This indeed was taken particular notice of because it was the first history of a miraculous fact which the Jansenists thought fit to publish, with a pompous dissertation prefixed. It was cried up as of such unquestionable truth, that it could not be denied without doubting of the most certain facts : and yet the story was proved to be false in the most material circumstances, by forty witnesses judicially examined upon oath. It was plainly proved, that she was considerably better of her maladies before she went to the tomb at all : that she was no stronger when she returned from the tomb than she was when she went to it: and that she still stood in need of remedies after wards. Mr. Hume indeed takes upon him to declare, that the proceedings were the most irregular in the world, particularly in citing but a few of the Jansenist witnesses, whom they tampered with : and then he adds, " besides they were soon overwhelmed with a cloud of new witnesses, an hundred and twenty in number, who gave oath for the miracles." He doth not say, they all gave oath for this particular miracle, but for the miracles : and indeed most of these testimonies were very little to the purpose, and seemed to be designed rather for parade and show than for proof; and nothing turned more to the disadvantage of the Jansenists, than their endeavouring still to maintain the credit of this miracle, after the falsehood of it had been so evidently detected : the more witnesses they endeavoured to produce for this, the more they ren dered themselves suspected in all the rest. They alleged some want of formality in the proceedings, but were never able to dis prove the principal circumstances of the facts alleged on the other side, and which were absolutely inconsistent with the truth and reality of the miracle. "j; Mr. Hume refers his reader to the Recueil des Miracles de VAbbt de Paris, in three volumes : but especially to the famous book of Mr. de Montgeron, a counsellor or judge of the parliament of Paris, and which was dedicated to the French King. But if he had read on both sides, or had thought fit to lay the matter fairly before his * Des Voeux's Critique Generale, p. 242, 243. t Adam's Essay, p. 71. X This whole matter is set in a clear light in Mr. Des Voeux's Dissertation sur les Miracles, &c, p. 46, 49, and in bis Critique Generate, p. 204, 231, 232. Let. XIX. mr. hume. 259 reader, he might have informed him that these books have been solidly answered by Mr. des Voeux, a very ingenious and judicious author, who had himself been bred up among the Jansenists, and was at Paris part of the time that this scene was carrying on. See his Lettres sur les Miracles, published in 1735, and his Cri tique Generate du Livre de Mr. de Montgeron, in 1741. See also what relates to this subject in the 19th and 20th tomes ofthe Bib liotheque Raisonnee. There never was perhaps a book written with a greater air of assurance and confidence, than that of Mr. de Montgeron. He intitles it, The Truth of the Miracles wrought by the Intercession of M. de Paris and other Appellants, demonstrated against M. the Archbishop qf Sens. It was natural therefore to expect, that he would have attempted to justify all those miracles which that pre late had attacked. But of twenty-two which are distinctly insisted upon by the Archbishop, there are seventeen which Mr. de Mont geron does not meddle with. He hath passed by those of them against which the strongest charges of falsehood and imposture lay. Five of the miracles attacked by the Archbishop, he takes pains to justify; to which he has added four more, which that pre late had not distinctly considered. Mr. des Voeux, who has ex amined this work of Mr. de Montgeron with great care and j udg- ment, hath plainly shown, that there are everywhere to be dis covered in it marks of the strongest prepossession.* Carried away by the power of his prejudices, and by his affection to the Jansenist cause, to which he was greatly attached, he has in several instances disguised and misrepresented facts in a manner which cannot be excused or vindicated. The last-mentioned author has charged him with faults, not merely of inadvertency, but with di rect falsifications designed to impose upon the public. See the sixth letter of his Critique Generate, page 208, et seq. Mr. Hume has taken care not to give his reader the least hint of any thing of this nature. The remarks which have been now made may help us to judge of Mr. Hume's conduct in his management of this subject. I shall now proceed to make some observations upon the remark able differences there are between the miracles recorded in the gospels, and those ascribed to the Abbe de Paris ; by considering which it will appear, that no argument can be justly drawn from the latter to discredit the former, or to invalidate the proofs pro duced for them. I. One observation of no small weight is this : at the time when the miracles of the Abbe de Paris first appeared, there was a strong and numerous party in France, and which was under the conduct of very able and learned men, who were strongly prepos sessed in favour of that cause which those miracles seemed to be intended to support: and it might naturally be expected, that these would use all their interest and influence for maintaining and * The character of Mr. de Montgeron is well represented by Mr. Adams, in his An swer to Hume, p. 74, 75. S 2 260 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIX. spreading the credit of them among the people. And so it actu ally happened. The first rumours of these miracles were eagerly laid hold on ; and they were cried up as real and certain miracles, and as giving a clear decision of Heaven on the side of the appel lants, even before there was any regular proof so much as pre tended to be given for them.*- To which it may be added, that the beginning 'of this whole affair was at a very promising con juncture, viz. when the Cardinal de Noailles was archbishop of Paris ; who, whatever may be said of his capacity and integrity, which Mr. Hume highly extols, was well known to be greatly inclined to favour the cause of the appellants. It was therefore a situation of things very favourable to the credit of those miracles, that they first appeared under his administration, and were tried before his officials ; and though the succeeding archbishop was no friend to the Jansenists, yet when once the credit of those miracles was in some measure established, and they had got the popular vogue on their side, the affair was more easily carried on. But at the first appearance of Christianity, the circumstances of things were entirely different. There were indeed parties among the Jews, the most powerful of which were the Pharisees and Sad ducees, besides the priests and rulers of the Jews, and the Sanhe drim, or great council of the nation : but not one of these afforded the ieast countenance to the first witnesses and publishers of the Christian religion. Our Lord, far from addicting himself to any party, freely declared against what was amiss in every one of them: he opposed the distinguishing tenets of the Sadducees ; the tradi tions, superstitions, and hypocrisy of the Pharisees, and the pre judices of the vulgar. Christianity proceeded upon a principle directly contrary to that, in which all parties among the Jews were agreed, viz. upon the doctrine of a spiritual kingdom, and a suf fering Messiah : and accordingly all the different sects and parties, all the powers civil and ecclesiastical, united their interests and endeavours to oppose and suppress it. Whatever suspicion there fore might be entertained with regard to the miracles said to have been wrought at the tomb of the Abbe de Paris, which had a strong party from the beginning prepared to receive and support them, no such suspicion can reasonably be admitted as to the truth and reality of the extraordinary facts whereby Christianity was attested, which, as the case was circumstanced, could scarce pos sibly have made their way in the manner they did, or have escaped detection, if they had not been true. II. Another consideration, which shows a remarkable difference between the miracles recorded to have been wrought by our Sa viour and his apostles, and those ascribed to the Abbe de Paris, is this : That the former carry plain characters of a divine interpo sition, and a supernatural power ; and the latter, even taking their own account of them, do not appear to be evidently miraculous, as they may be accounted for without supposing any thing properly * Critique Generate, let. vi. Let. XIX. MR. HUME. 261 supernatural in the case. Our Lord Jesus Christ not only healed all manner of diseases, but he raised the dead : he commanded the winds and the seas, and they obeyed him : he searched the hearts, and knew the thoughts of men : he gave many express and circum stantial predictions of future contingencies, both relating to his own sufferings and death, and to his consequent resurrection and exaltation, and relating to the calamities that should come upon the Jews, the destruction of Jerusalem and the temple, and the wonderful propagation and establishment of his church and king dom in the world, which it was impossible for any man, judging by the rules of human probability, to foresee: he not only per formed the most wonderful works himself, but he imparted the same miraculous power to his disciples, and poured forth upon them the extraordinary gifts ofthe Holy Ghost, as he had promised and fore told ; gifts of the most admirable nature, which were never paral leled before or since, and which were peculiarly fitted for spreading and propagating the Christian religion. With regard to these, and other things which might be mentioned, no man has ever pre tended to draw a comparison between the miracles ascribed to the Abbe de Paris, and those of our Saviour; and accordingly one of the most zealous and able advocates for the former, M. Le Gros, expressly acknowledgeth, that there is an infinite difference between them, and declares that he will never forget that difference. The only instance in which a parallel is pretended to be drawn, is with regard to miraculous cures, which, alone considered, are the most uncertain and equivocal of all miracles. Diseases have often been surprisingly cured, without anything that can be properly called miraculous in the case. Wonderful has been the effect of medi cines administered in certain circumstances ; and some maladies, after having long resisted all the art and power of remedies, have gone off of themselves by the force of nature, or by some surprising and unexpected turn, in a manner that, cannot be distinctly ex plained. Yet it may be observed, that there were several circum stances attending the miraculous cures wrought by our Saviour and his apostles, which plainly showed them to be divine. The cures were wrought in an instant, by a commanding word. The blind, the lame, those that laboured under the most obstinate and inveterate diseases, found themselves immediately restored at once with an Almighty facility. If there had been only a few instances of this kind, it might possibly have been attributed to some odd accident, or hidden cause, which could not be accounted for ; but the instances of such complete and instantaneous cures wrought by our Saviour were very numerous. They extended to all manner of diseases, and to all persons without exception who applied to him : yea, he cured some that did not apply to him, who did not know him, or who were his enemies, and had no expectation'of a cure, in which cases it could not be pretended that imagination had any share. In all these respects, there was a remarkable difference between the miraculous cures wrought by our Saviour, and those pretended to have been wrought at the tomb of the Abbe de Paris. 262 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIX. Several of their most boasted cures, and which were pretended to have been sudden and perfected at once, appear from their own accounts to have been carried on by slow degrees, and therefore might have been brought about in a natural way. Some of these cures were days, weeks, and even months, before they were per fected. One nine days' devotion followed another, and they were suffered to languish, and continue praying and supplicating for a considerable time together ; and if the cure happened, and the distemper came to a crisis during the course of their long attend ance, and whilst they were continuing their devotions, this passed for a miraculous cure, though it might well be done without any miracle at all : especially as several of those persons continued to be taking remedies, even whilst they were attending at the tomb. It is manifest from the relations published by themselves, that with regard to several of those who were pretended to be miraculously cured, their maladies had already begun to abate, and they had found considerable ease and relief in a natural way before they came to the tomb at all ; and some of them seem by the force of their imagi nation to have believed themselves cured, when they were not so, or to have taken a temporary relief for an absolute cure. Several of the cures, the accounts of which were published with great pomp, could not with any propriety be said to have been perfected at all ; since the persons said to have been cured, still continued infirm, and had returns of their former disorders. This can scaice be supposed, if the cures had been really miraculous, and owing to an extraordinary exertion of the power of God, who would not have left his own work imperfect. See all these things fully proved by many instances, in M. des Voeux's Lettres sur les Miracles; particularly in the fifth of these letters. To all which it may be added, that of the vast numbers who came to the tomb to be cured, and who had recourse to the Abbe's intercession, there were but few on whom the cures were wrought, in comparison of those who found no benefit at all, though they applied to him with the utmost devotion, and continued to do so for a long time together: and indeed, considering how many there were that applied for help and cure, and how much they were pre possessed with the notions countenanced in the Romish church, of the power of departed saints, of the prevalency of their intercession, and the efficacy of their relics, and to what a height their imagina tion was raised by their prejudices in favour of the appellants, by the high opinion they had of the Abbe's extraordinary sanctity, by the rumours of miracles daily spread and propagated, and by the vast crowds which attended at the tomb, it would have been really a wonder, if, amongst the multitudes that came for cure, there had not been several who found themselves greatly relieved. The ad vocates for the miracles mightily extol the extraordinary faith and confidence the sick persons had in the intercession of the blessed Deacon, as they call him : and the force of their imagination, when carried to so extraordinary a pitch, might in some particular cases produce great effects. Many wonderful instances to this purpose Let. XIX. MR. HUME. 26a have been observed and recorded by the ablest physicians, by which it appears what a mighty influence imagination, accompanied with strong passions, hath often had upon human bodies, especially in the cure of diseases : it hath often done more in a short time this way, than a long course of medicines have been able to accom plish. It is not therefore to be much wondered at, that as the case was circumstanced, amidst such a multitude of persons some surprising cures were wrought : but it could not be expected that the effect would be constant and uniform. If it answered in some instances, it would fail in many more : and accordingly so it was with regard to these pretended miraculous cures. And if this had been the case in the extraordinary cures wrought by our Saviour, there would have been ground of suspicion, that what some have alleged might possibly have been true, that his miracles owed their force, not to any supernatural energy, but to the power of imagi nation. But taking these miracles as they are recorded in the gos pels, it is manifest, that there can be no just ground for such a pre tence. They exhibit evident proofs of a divine interposition, which cannot be said of those reported to have been wrought at the Abbe's tomb. M. de Montgeron, in his book dedicated to the King, published an account of eight or nine cures ; and it is to be supposed, that he fixed upon those which he thought had the ap pearance of being most signally miraculous ; and yet the very first of those miracles, viz. that affirmed to have been wrought upon Don Alphonso de Palacio, appeareth plainly, by taking the whole of the relation as M. Montgeron himself hath given it, to have had nothing in it properly miraculous, as Mr. Adams hath clearly shown.* And with regard both to that and the other miracles so pompously displayed by M. de Montgeron, M. Des Voeux has very ingeniously and judiciously, after a distinct examination of each of them, made it appear, that they might have been wrought without supposing any miraculous or supernatural interposition at all. See the last letter of his Critique Generate. III. Another consideration, which shows the great difference there is between the miracles wrought at the first establishment of Christianity, and those said to have been wrought at the tomb of the Abbe de Paris, and that no argument can reasonably be brought from the latter to the prejudice of the former, is taken from the many suspicious circumstances attending the latter, from which the former were entirely free. Christ's miracles were wrought, in a grave and decent, in a great but simple manner, becoming one sent of God, without any absurd or ridiculous ceremonies, or super stitious observances. But the miracles of the Abbe de Paris were attended with circumstances that had all the marks of superstition, and which seemed designed and fitted to strike the imagination. The earth of his tomb was often made use of, or the waters of the well of his house. The nine days' devotion was constantly used, and frequently repeated again and again by the same persons ; a * Adams's Essay, in Answer to Hume, p. 76, 77. 264 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XIX. ceremony derived originally from the Pagans, and which hath been condemned as superstitious by some eminent divines of the Romish church.* Another circumstance to be observed, with relation to Christ's miracles, is, that, as hath been already hinted, they were not only perfected at once, but the persons found themselves healed and restored without trouble or difficulty. But in the case of the cures affirmed to have been wrought at the Abbe's tomb, it appeareth from their own accounts, not only that they were gradual and slow, but that the persons on whom these cures were wrought, frequently suffered the most grievous and excessive pains and torments, and which they themselves represent to have been greater than ever they had felt before, or were able to express ; and these pains often continued for several days together in the utmost extremity.f To which may be added, the violent agitations and convulsions, which became so usual on these occasions, that they came at length to be regarded as symptoms of the miraculous cures ; though they could not be properly regarded in this view, since many of those who had those convulsions found no relief in their maladies, and even grew worse than before. They were frequently attended with strange contortions, sometimes frightful, sometimes ridiculous, and sometimes inconsistent with the rules of modesty and decency .J And accordingly they have been condemned by some of the most eminent Jansenist divines. In 1735 there was published at Paris a remarkable piece, intitled, Consultation sur les Convulsions, signed by thirty appellant doctors, men of great reputation among the Jansenists for learning, judgment, and probity; the greater part of whom had at first entertained favourable thoughts of those convulsions ; and some of them had publicly declared them to be the work of God. But now they pronounced them to be unworthy of God, of his infinite majesty, wisdom, and goodness : They declared that it was a folly, a fanaticism, a scandal, and intone word, a blas phemy against God, to attribute to him these operations ; and did not scruple to intimate, that they rendered the miraculous cures, to which they were pretended to be annexed, suspected. These doctors, who were called the Consultants, condemned all the con vulsions in general. Others of the Jansenist divines, whom M. de Montgeron has distinguished by the title of the Antisecouristes, and whom he acknowledges to be among the most zealous appellants, and to be persons of great merit and eminence, though they did * Lettres sur les Miracles, p. 258, 259, 336, 337. t Lettres sur les Miracles, p. 339, & seq. X Some of those that were seized with these convulsions, or pretended to be so, were guilty ofthe most extravagant follies. They pretended to prophesy, and uttered several predictions, which the event soon proved to be false. One of them went so far as to foretel, that the church-yard of St. Medard, which had been shut up by the King's order, should be opened, and that M. de Paris should appear in the church, in the pre sence of great numbers of people, on the first of May following. See this and other remarkable things relating to these' convulsions, in M. Vernet's Traite de la Verite de la Religion Chretienne, sect. 7, chap. xxii. xxiii. And there cannot be a greater proof of the power of M. de Montgeron's prejudices, than that in the last edition of his book, in three volumes 4to. he has particularly applied himself to support and justify these convulsions. Let. XIX. mr. hume. 265 not condemn all the convulsions, yet passed a very severe censure upon those of them which that gentleman looks upon to be the most extraordinary and miraculous of all. And with regard to these convulsions in general, it may be observed, that by the ac knowledgment of the most skilful physicians, nervous affections have frequently produced strange symptoms; that they are often of a catching contagious nature, and easily communicated ; and that they may be counterfeited by art. Many of those that were seized by M. Heraut, the Lieutenant of Police, acknowledged to him that they had counterfeited convulsions ; in consequence of which there was an ordinance published by the King, January 27, 1732, for searching out and apprehending those impostors. And yet Mr. Hume has thought proper to represent it, as if M. Heraut, though he had full power to seize and examine the witnesses, and subjects of these miracles, could never reach any thing satisfactory against them. These must be owned to be circumstances, which administer just grounds of suspicion, and which make a wide difference be tween the miracles pretended to have been wrought at the tomb of the Abbe de Paris, and those that were performed by our Saviour, and by the apostles in his name. IV. The next observation I shall make is this ; that several of the miracles ascribed to the Abbe, and which were pretended to be proved by many witnesses, were afterwards clearly convicted of falsehood and imposture ; which brings a great discredit upon all the rest ; whereas nothing of this kind can be alleged against the miracles by which Christianity was attested. The affair of Anne le Franc, of which some account was given above, shows, as M. Des Voeux justly observes, how little dependence is to be had upon informations in this cause directed by Jansenists. But this is not the only instance of this kind. They had published that La Dalmaix had been miraculously cured by the Abbe's inter cession ; and this was proved by a letter pretended to have been written by herself. And yet this pretended miraculous cure was afterwards denied by the person herself, by her mother, and all her sisters : and by a sentence of a court of judicature of May 17, 1737, a person was declared to be convicted of having forged that, and some other letters, under the name of Dalmaix. * The Sieur le Doux openly retracted the relation of a miracle said to have been wrought upon himself. M. Des Voeux gives several other instances of false miracles, published by the Jansenists, and afterwards ac knowledged to be so.-}- Jean Nivet was represented, by decisive in formations, as cured of his deafness, and yet it is certain that he was deaf after, as well as before. The record of the informations made by Mr. Thomassin is full of contradictions, which discover the false hood and perjury of the principal actress, and of the only witness of the miracle, as the Archbishop of Sens has well proved : though many of these proofs are passed over in silence by M. le Gros, who undertook to answer him. % Some of the witnesses and persons con- * Vernet ubi supra, cap. xxi. t Lettres sur les Miracles, p. 171, et. seq. Critique Generale, p. 204, &c. 233,334, X Ibid. p. 24,2, 243. 266 a view of the deistical writers. Let. XIX. cerned withdrew, to escape the search that was made for them, and to shun the examination and inquiry which the king had ordered ; and others, who had attested that they were cured by the interces sion ofthe Abbe de Paris, afterwards retracted it. The certificates themselves, on which so great a stress is laid, tend in many in stances to increase the suspicion against those facts, which they were designed to confirm. The very number of those certificates, many of which are nothing at all to the purpose, and serve only for show, are plain proofs of art and design. The manner of drawing up those certificates, and the relations of the miracles, and the style and form of expression, show, that the persons in whose names they are drawn had the assistance of persons, of a capacity much superior to their own. Long pieces, in a correct style, and in perfect good order, were published under the name of mean and illiterate persons. M. le Gros owns, that the relation of Genevieve Colin was reformed as to the style, by a person whom she desired to do it. Thus they had it in their power, under pretence of reforming, to alter it, and got the simple person to sign the whole. Five witnesses in the case of Anne le Franc depose, that their certificates left with the notary were altered, falsified, and embellished with divers circumstances. Many of the relations which were at first published, and were not thought full enough, were afterwards suppressed, and do not appear in M. de Montgeron's collection ; and others more ample were sub stituted in their stead, and embellished with many striking circum stances, which were omitted in the first relation. Many ofthe wit nesses in their depositions carry it farther than, according to their own account, they could have any certain knowledge. Some of them appear to have been surprized into their testimonies by false or imperfect representations ; and artifices were employed to procure certificates from physicians, without bringing the case fully before them, or suffering them fairly to examine it. To all which it may be added, that there is great reason to sus pect, that many poor people feigned maladies, and pretended to be cured, on purpose to procure the gifts and benefactions of others ; which many of them did to good advantage. It is well known, and has been often proved, that in the Romish church there have been instances of persons, who made a trade of feigning maladies, and pretending to be miraculously cured. Such a one was Catharine de Pres, who was afterwards convicted by her own confession ; of which Father Le Brun hath given a particular account, Hist. Crit, des Prat. Superstit. liv. ii. cap. 4. who hath also detected several other false miracles which had been believed by numbers of that church. And may we not reasonably suspect the same of many poor people who came to the tomb of the Abbe de Paris? See all these things shown in M. Des Voeux's Lettres sur les Miracles, Letters V, VI. and especially in Letters VII. and VIII. of his Cri tique Generale, where he particularly examineth every one of the miracles produced by M. de Montgeron. It is his observation, that the more carefully we consider those relations, and compare them with the pieces that are designed to justify them, the more plainly Let. XIX. mr. hume. 267 the falsehood of them appeareth. And accordingly he hath found out not merely a single contradiction, but numerous contradictions, in the relations of the several miracles, compared with the certifi cates, and the pieces produced in justification of them. And there fore he asks with good reason, what becomes of demonstrations built on such relations and such certificates ? He very properly observes, that the falsity even of a small number of facts, which are pretended to be proved by, certificates, that were collected by those who took pains to verify the miracles, are sufficient to discredit all others founded on such certificates. If the same things could have been justly objected against the miracles recorded in the New Testament, Christianity, considering the other disadvantages it laboured under, could never have been estab lished. But the case with regard to these miracles was very differ ent. They were not indeed proved by certificates, which may be procured by art and management. The first publishers of the Chris tian religion did not go about to collect evidences and testimonies ; nor was there any need of their doing so in facts that were publicly known, and the reality of which their enemies themselves were not able to deny. They acted with greater simplicity, and with an open confidence of truth. Their narrations are plain and artless ; nor do they take pains to prepossess or influence the reader, either by art ful insinuations, or too violent assertions ; which our author men tions as a suspicious circumstance. Never were any of their ene mies able to convict them of falsehood. Far from ever denying the facts they had witnessed, or withdrawing for fear of having those facts inquired into, as several did in the other case, they openly avowed those facts before the public tribunals, and before persons of the highest authority : they never varied in their testimony, but per sisted in it with an unfainting constancy, and sealed it with their blood. And it gives no small weight to their testimony, that they witnessed for facts, which were designed to confirm a scheme of religion contrary to their own most rooted prejudices. Nor can it be alleged, that they were themselves divided about the reality and di vinity of the miracles wrought by Christ and his apostles, much less that they rejected and condemned many of them as foolish, scanda lous, and injurious to the Divine Majesty ; which was the censure passed upon some of the extraordinary facts relating to the Abbe de Paris, by the most eminent Jansenist divines. Finally, the last observation I shall make is this : that the mira cles of our Saviour and his apostles appear to have been wrought for an end worthy of the divine wisdom and goodness. The declared design of them was to give an attestation to the divine mission of the most excellent person that ever appeared in the world, and to confirm the best scheme of religion that was ever published, the most manifestly conducive to the glory of God, and to the salvation of mankind. Here was an end worthy of God, and for which it was fit for him to interpose in the most extraordinary manner. Accord ingly this religion, thus attested and confirmed, was established in the world, and soon triumphed over all opposition. All the power 268 a view of the deistical writers. Let. XIX. of the adversary, civil or sacerdotal, could not put a stop to its pro gress, or to the wonderful works done in confirmation of it. The effects which followed, considering the amazing difficulties it had to struggle with, and the seeming weakness and meanness of the in struments made use of to propagate it, proved the reality of those miracles, and that the whole was carried on by a divine power. But if we turn our views on the other hand to the miracles pretended to have been wrought at the tomb of the Abbe de Paris, it doth not appear that they answered any valuable end. There has indeed been an end found out for them, viz. to give a testimony from heaven to the cause of the appellants. But we may justly conclude from the wisdom of God, that in that case it would have been so ordered, as to make it evident that this was the intention of them, and that he would have taken care that no opposition from them should prevail, to defeat the design for which he interposed in so extraordinary a manner. But this was far from being the case. Mr. Hume indeed tells us, that " no Jansenist was ever at a loss to account for the cessation ofthe miracles, when the church-yard was shut up by the king's edict. 'Twas the touch of the tomb which operated those ex traordinary effects, and when no one could approach the tomb, no effect could be expected."* But supposing that the design of those extraordinary divine interpositions was to give a testimony from heaven to the cause of the appellants, it is absurd to imagine, that it would have been in the power of an earthly prince, by shut ting up the tomb, to put a stop to the course of the miraculous operations, and to render the design of God of none effect.4- . It strengthens this, when it is farther considered, that the whole affair of these pretended miracles turned in the issue rather to the disad vantage ofthe cause it was designed to confirm. It hath been already observed, that some of the most eminent among the appellant doc tors, and who were most zealously attached to that cause, were greatly scandalized at several of those miracles, and especially at the extraordinary convulsions which generally attended them. The cen sures they passed upon them gave occasion to bitter contentions, and mutual severe reproaches and accusations. Some of the Jansenist writers themselves complain, that whereas before there was an entire and perfect union and harmony among them, as if they had been all of one heart and soul, there have been since that time cruel divisions and animosities, so that those who were friends before became irre concilable enemies. % And can it be imagined, that God would execute his designs in so imperfect a manner that he would exert his own divine power to give testimony to that cause, and yet do it in such a way as to weaken that cause instead of supporting it, to raise prejudices against it in the minds of enemies, instead of gain- * Philosophical Essays, p. 208. t M. de Montgeron indeed will not allow that the miraculous operations ceased at the shutting up of the tomb ; but by the miraculous operations he principally under stands the convulsions, which continued still to be carried on : but which many of tho principal Jansenists were far from looking upon as tokens of a divine interposition, X Crit. Gener. lettre v. p. 159. h seq. Let. XIX. mr. hume. 269 ing them, and to divide and offend the friends of it, instead of con firming and uniting them ? Upon the whole, with regard to the attestations given to Christianity, all was wise, consistent, worthy of God, and suited to the end for which it was designed. But the other is a broken, incoherent scheme, which cannot be reconciled to itself, nor made to consist with the wisdom and harmony of the di vine proceedings. The former therefore is highly credible, though the latter is not so. The several considerations which have been mentioned do each of them singly, much more all of them together, show such signal differences between the miracles recorded in the gospels and those ascribed to the Abbe de Paris, that it must argue a peculiar degree of confidence to pretend to run a parallel between the one and the other, much more to affirm, as Mr. Hume has done, that the latter much surpass the former in credit and authority. This only shows how gladly these gentlemen would lay hold on any pretence to in validate the evidences of Christianity. Thus, Mr. Chubb, in a dis course he published on miracles, in which he pretends impartially to represent the reasonings on both sides, produced with great pomp a pretended miracle wrought in the Cevennes in 1703, and repre sented it as of equal credit with those of the gospel. M. le Moyne, in his answer to him, hath evinced the falsehood of that story in a manner that admits of no reply :* and yet it is not improbable, that some future deist may see fit some time or other to revive that story, and oppose it to the miracles recorded in the New Testament. Mr. Hume concludes his Essay with applauding his own perfor mance, and is the better pleased with the way of reasoning he has made use of, as he thinks, " it may serve to confound those dange rous friends, or disguised enemies to the Christian religion, who have undertaken to defend it by the principles of human reason. Our most holy religion," saith he, " is founded on faith, not on rea son :f and it is a sure method of exposing it, to put it to such a trial, as it is by no means fitted to endure." And he calls those, * Le Moyne on Miracles, p. 422, &c. + This author, who takes care to make the principles of his philosophy subservient to his designs against religion, in the fifth of his Philosophical Essays, where be under takes to treat of the nature of belief, gives such an account of it as seems to exclude reason from any share in it at all. He makes the difference between faith and fiction to consist wholly in some sentiment of feeling, which is annexed to the former, not to the latter : That the sentiment of belief is nothing but the conception of an object more lively and forcible, more intense and steady than what attends the mere fiction of the imagination ; and that this manner of conception arises from the customary conjunction ofthe object with something present to the memory or senses. See his Philosophical Essays, p. 80 — 84. This gentleman is here, as in many other places, sufficiently obscure, nor is it easy to form a distinct notion of what he intends. But his design seems to be to exclude reason or the understanding from having any thing to do with belief, as if reason never had any influence in producing, directing, or regula ting it ; which is to open a wide door to enthusiasm. But this is contrary to what we may all observe, and frequently experience. We in several cases clearly perceive, that we have reason to regard some things as fictitious, and others as true and real. And the reasons which show the difference between a fiction and a reality show, that we ought in reason to believe the one and not the other; and so reason may go before the sentiment of belief, and lay a just foundation for it, and be instrumental to produce it. And in this case the belief may be said to be strictly rational. 270 a view of the deistical writers. Let. XX. who undertake to defend religion by reason, pretended Christians* Such a mean and ungenerous sneer is below animadversion ; all that can be gathered from it is, that these gentlemen are very uneasy at the attempts which have been made to defend Christianity in a way of reason and argument. They, it seems, are mightily concerned for the preservation of our holy faith, and in their great friendship for that cause would give it up as indefensible. And if the best way of befriending the Christian religion be to endeavour to subvert the evidences by which it is established, our author hath taken effectual care to convince the world of his friendly intentions towards it. As to the brief hints he hath given towards the end of his Essay against the Mosaic history, and the miracles recorded there, I shall not here take any notice of themr both because Mr. Adams hath clearly and succinctly obviated them, in his answer to that Essay, p. 88 — 94, and because I shall have occasion to resume this subject, when I come to make observations on Lord Bolingbroke's Posthumous Works, who hath with great virulence and bitterness used his ut most efforts to expose the Mosaic writings. LETTER XX. Additional Observations relating to Mr. Hume. — A Transcript of an ingenious Paper, containing an Examination of Mr. Hume's Arguments in his Essay on Miracles. — Observations upon it. — The Evidence of Matters of Fact may be so circumstanced as to produce a full Assurance. — Mr. Hume artfully confounds the Evidence of past Facts with the Probability of the future. — We may be certain of a matter of Fact after it hath happened, though it might before-hand seem very improbable that it would happen .Where full Evidence is given of a Fact, there must not always be a Deduction made on the Account of its being unusual and extraordinary There is strong and positive Evidence of the Miracles wrought in Attestation of Christi anity, and no Evidence against them — The miraculous Nature of the Facts no Proof that the Facts were not done A Summary of Mr. Hume's Argument against the Evidence of Miracles — The Weakness of it shown. — Considering the vast Impor tance of Religion to our Happiness, the bare Possibility of its being true should be sufficient to engage our Compliance. Sir, The four preceding letters comprehend all the observations that were made upon Mr. Hume in the second volume of the " View of the Deistical Writers," 8vo. edit. But soon after that volume was published, I received a letter from a gentleman of sense and learn ing, which particularly relates to that part of it which was designed in answer to Mr. Hume. He was pleased to say it gave him uncom mon satisfaction, and at the same time sent me a paper which he seemed to be very well pleased with, that had been drawn up by a young gentleman, then lately dead. It was designed as a confutation * Philosophical Essays, p. 204, 205. Let. XX. MR. HUME. 271 of Mr. Hume upon his own principles, which he thought had not been sufficiently attended to in the answers that had been made to that writer ; and he allowed me, if 1 should be of opinion that any thing in it might be serviceable to a farther confutation of Mr. Hume, to make use of his sentiments either by way of note or appendix, as I should judge most convenient. I returned an answer, in a letter which I shall here insert, as it containeth some reflections that may be of advantage in relation to the controversy with Mr. Hume; but first it will be proper to lay before the reader the paper itself here referred to, which is concisely drawn, and runs thus : — AN EXAMINATION OF MR. HUME's ARGUMENTS IN HIS ESSAY ON MIRACLES. The objects of human understanding may be distinguished either into propositions asserting the relation between general ideas, or matters of fact. In the former kind we can arrive at certainty, by means of a faculty in our souls, which perceives this relation either instantly or intimately, which is called Intuition, or else by intermediate ideas, which called Demonstration. But we can only form a judgment of the latter by experience. No reasoning a priori will discover to us, that water will suffocate, or the fire consume us, or that the loadstone will attract steel; and therefore no judgment can be made concerning the truth or falsehood of matters of fact, but what is constantly regulated by custom and experience, and can therefore never go higher than probability. When we have frequently observed a particular event to happen in certain circumstances, the mind naturally makes an induction, that it will happen again in the same circumstances. When this observation has been long, constant, and uninterrupted, there our belief that it will happen again approaches infinitely near to cer tainty. Thus no man has the least doubt of the sun's rising to morrow, or that the tide will ebb and flow at its accustomed periods ; but where our observations are broken upon by frequent interruptions and exceptions to the contrary, then we expect such an event with the least degree of assurance; and in all intermediate cases, our ex pectations are always in proportion to the constancy and regularity of the experience. This method of reasoning is not connected by any medium or change of steps, but is plainly to be observed in all animate beings, brutes as well as men.* And it would be as absurd to ask a reason, why we expect to happen again, that which has regularly come to pass a great many times before, as it is to inquire, why the mind perceives a relation between certain ideas. * May not the long sought after distinction between brutes and men consist in this : That whereas the human understanding comprehends both classes, the brutal sagacity is confined only to matters of fact? 272 a view of the deistical. writers. Let. XX. They are both distinct faculties of the soul ; and as it has been authorized by some writers of distinction, to give the denomination of sense to the internal as well as external perceptions, the one may be called the speculative, and the other the probable sense. From this last-mentioned principle Mr. Hume has deduced an argument to show, that there is great improbability against the be lief of any miraculous fact, how well soever attested ; and as religion may seem to be greatly affected by this conclusion (supposing it to be true), before we come directly to consider the argument, it may not be amiss to inquire how far religion, as a practical institution, may be concerned therein. And for this purpose it is to be observed, that probable evidence for the truth or falsehood of any matter of fact differs essentially from demonstration, in that the former admits of degrees, in the greatest variety, from the highest moral certainty down to the lowest presumption ; which the latter does not. Let it also be further observed, that probable evidence is in its nature but an imperfect kind of information, the highest degree of which can never reach absolute certainty, or full proof; and yet to mankind, with regard to their practice, it is in many cases the very guide of their lives. Most of our actions are determined by the highest degrees of pro bability ; as for instance, what we do in consequence of the sun's rising to morrow; of the seasons regularly succeeding one another; and that certain kinds of meat and drink will nourish. Others are determined by lesser degrees. Thus rhubarb does not always purge ; nor is opium a soporific to every person that takes it ; and yet for all that they are of constant use for these purposes in medicine. In all cases of moment, when to act or forbear may be attended with considerable damage, no wise man makes the least scruple of doing what he apprehends may be of advantage to him, even though the thing was doubtful, and one side of the question as supportable as the other; but in matters of the utmost consequence, a prudent man will think himself obliged to take notice even of the lowest proba bility, and will act accordingly. A great many instances might be given in the common pursuits of life, where a man would be con sidered as out of his senses, who would not act, and with great dili gence and application too, not only upon an over-chance, but even where the probability might be greatly against his success. Suppose a criminal under sentence of death were promised a par don, if he threw twelve with a pair of dice at one throw ; here the probability is thirty-six to one against him, and yet he would be looked upon as mad if he did not try. Nothing in such a case would hinder a man from trying, but the absolute impossibility of the event. Let us now apply this method of reasoning to the practice of religion. And supposing the arguments against miracles were far more probable than the evidence for them, yet the vast importance of religion to our happiness in every respect would still be very suf ficient to recommend it to the practice of every prudent man ; and Lat. XX. MR. HUME. 273 the bare possibility that it might prove true, were there nothing else to support it, would engage his assent and compliance ; or else he must be supposed to act differently in this respect to what he gene rally does in all the other concerns of his life. So that whether Mr. Hume's reasonings be true or false, religion has still sufficient evidence to influence the practice of every wise and considerate man. This being premised, let us now proceed to consider Mr. Hume's arguments. His reasoning may be briefly expressed in this manner : We have had a long, universal, and uninterrupted experience, that no events have happened contrary to the course of nature, from con stant and unvaried observations ; we have therefore a full proof, that the uniform course has not been broke in upon, nor will be, by any particular exceptions. But the observation of truth depending upon, and constantly following human testimony, is by no means universal and uninterrupted, and therefore it does not amount to a full proof, that it either has, or will follow it in any particular instance. And therefore the proof arising from any human testimony can never equal the proof that is deduced against a miracle from the very nature of the fact. This I take to be a full and fair state of this gentleman's rea soning. But the answer is very plain ; if by human testimony he would mean the evidence of any one single man indifferently taken, then indeed his second proposition would be true ; but then the conclu sion will by no means follow from it; but if by human testimony he would understand the evidence of any collection of men, then the second proposition is false, and consequently the conclusion must be so too. That twelve honest persons should combine to assert a falsehood, at the hazard of their lives, without any view to private interest, and with the certain prospect of losing every thing that is and ought to be dear to mankind in this world, is, according to his own way of reasoning, as great a miracle, to all intents and purposes, as any interruption in the common course of nature; because no history has ever mentioned any such thing, nor has any man in any age ever had experience of such a fact. But here it may be objected, that though it be allowed to be as great a miracle for twelve honest men to attest a falsehood, contrary to their plain interest in every respect, as that any alteration should happen in the common course of nature, yet these evidences being equal, they only destroy one another, and still leave the mind in suspense. This objection draws all its force from Mr. Hume's assertion, that an uniform and uninterrupted experience amounts to a full proof, which when examined will not be found true ; and indeed I wonder that a writer of his accuracy should venture on such an expression, since it is confessed on all hands, that all our reasonings concerning matters of fact ever fall short of certainty, or full proof. And besides, the very same objection which he makes against the veracity of human testimony, to weaken its authenticity, may be re- T 274 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XX. torted with equal force against his unvaried certainty of the course of nature ; for doubtless the number of approved histories we have relating to miracles, will as much lessen the probability of what he calls a full proof on his side of the question, as all the forgeries and falsehoods that are brought to discredit human testimony, will weaken it on the other. But the best way to be assured of the falsehood of this objection is to examine it by what we find in our own minds ; for that must not be admitted as an universal principle, which is not true in every particular instance. According to Mr. Hume, we have a full proof of any fact attested by twelve honest disinterested persons. But would not the probability be increased, and our belief of such a fact be the stronger, if the number of witnesses were doubled ? I own, my mind immediately assents to it. But if this be true, it will then evi: dently follow, that the proof against a miracle, arising from the na ture of the fact, may, and has been exceeded by contrary human testimony. Suppose, as before, that the testimony of twelve persons is just equal to it, and we have the evidence of twenty for any particular miracle recorded in the Gospel ; then subtracting the weaker evidence from the stronger, we shall have the positive evidence of eight per sons, for the truth of a common matter of fact. Q. E. D. The answer I returned to the letter in which this paper was en closed, was in substance as follows : Sir. I am very much obliged to you for the kind manner in which you have expressed yourself with regard to me : and it is a pleasure to me to find, that my reply to Mr. Hume is approved by a gentleman of so much good sense, and of such eminency in his profession, as I am well informed you are accounted to be. I agree with you, that Mr. Hume is an elegant and subtile writer, and one ofthe most dangerous enemies to Christianity that has ap peared among us. He has a very specious way of managing an argument. But his subtilty seems to have qualified him not so much for clearing an obscure cause, as for puzzling a clear one. Many things in his Philosophical Essays have a very plausible appearance, as well as an uncommon turn, which he visibly affects; but, upon a close examination of them, I think one may venture to pronounce, that few authors can be mentioned who have fallen into greater absurdities and inconsistencies. And it were to be wished there was not a sufficient ground for the severe censure you pass upon him, when you say, that, " with all his art, he has plainly dis covered a bad heart, by throwing out some bitter sneers against the Christian revelation, which are absolutely inconsistent with a serious belief, or indeed with any regard for it, though in some parts of his writings he affects a different way of speaking." You observe, that " we seem to be greatly deficient in the logic of probability, a point which Mr. Hume had studied with great Let. XX. MR. HUME. 275 accuracy." And I readily own, that there is a great appearance of accuracy in what Mr. Hume hath advanced concerning the grounds and degrees of probability, and the different degrees of assent due to it. But though what he hath offered this way seems plausi ble in general, he hath been far from being fair or exact in his appli cation of it. The paper you have sent enclosed to me, and which you tell me was drawn up by the young gentleman you mention, contains a sketch of an attempt to show how Mr. Hume might be confuted, on his own principles, and is executed in such a manner, that one cannot but regret, that a gentleman of so promising a genius, and who might have proved signally useful, was snatched away by a fever about the twentieth year of his age. You allow me to make what use of it I judge proper, and seem to expect that I should tell you my sentiments of it with the utmost frankness and candour. And this obligeth me to acquaint you, that though I look upon the confutation of Mr. Hume in the way this gentleman hath managed it to be subtile and ingenious, yet in some things it doth not seem to me to be quite so clear and satisfactory, as were to be wished in a matter of so great consequence. He has, I think, from a desire of confuting Mr. Hume upon his own principles, been led to make too large concessions to that gentleman, and hath proceeded upon some of his principles as true and valid, which I think may be justly contested. Mr. Hume frequently intimates, that there neither is nor can be any certainty in the evidence given concerning matters of fact, or in human testimony, which can be securely depended on ; and that at best, it can be only probable. And the ingenious author of the paper, having observed, after Mr. Hume, that we can form no judg ment concerning the truth or falsehood of matter of fact, but what is constantly regulated by custom or experience, adds, that " it can never go higher than probability." And again he saith, that " pro bable evidence is in its nature but an imperfect kind of information ; the highest degree of which cannot reach absolute certainty or full proof;" where he seems not to allow, that the evidence concern ing matters of fact can ever arrive at such a certainty as to make up a full proof. And he repeats it again, that " it is confessed on all hands, that all our reasonings concerning matters of fact ever fall short of certainty or full proof." And yet if we allow Mr. Hume's de finition of a full proof, that it is " such an argument from experience as leaves no room for doubt or opposition," the evidence fora matter of fact may be so circumstanced as to amount to a full proof, and even to a certainty ; for I can see no reason for confining certainty to the evidence we have by intuition or by demonstration. In treat ing of certainty as distinguished from probability, a two-fold cer tainty may very properly be allowed. The one is the certainty by intuition or by demonstration ; the other is, a certainty relating to matter of fact. This is indeed of a different kind from the former; but I think it may no less justly be called certainty, when it so fully satisfietb the mind, as to leave not the least room for doubt t 2 276 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XX concerning it, and produceth a full assurance. And that this is often the case with relation to matters of fact cannot reasonably be denied. The words sure and certain are frequently applied in com mon language to things of this kind, and, for aught I can see, very properly. And in the best and exactest writers, it is often described under the term of moral certainty, an expression which this gentle man himself makes use of.* And it is a great mistake to imagine, that the word moral in that case is always used as a term of diminu tion, as if it were not to be entirely depended upon. It is only designed to show that this certainty is of a different kind, and pro- ceedeth upon different grounds, from that which ariseth from demon stration ; but yet it may produce as strong an assurance in the mind, and which may undoubtedly be depended upon. That there was a war carried on in England in the last century between King and Parliament, I only know by human testimony. But will any man say that for that reason I cannot be sure of it ? Many cases might be mentioned with regard to matters of fact which we know, by human testimony, the evidence of which is so strong and con vincing, that we can no more reasonably doubt of it, than of the truth of any proposition which comes to us demonstrated by the strictest reasoning. Mr. Hume himself seems sensible, that it would be wrong to say, that every thing which is not matter of demonstration comes only under the notion of probability. And therefore, though he frequently seems to class all matters of fact under the head of probabilities, yet, in the beginning of his Essay on Probability, he seems to find fault with Mr. Locke for dividing all arguments into demonstrative and probable; and observes, that to conform our language more to common use, we should divide argu ments into demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities ; where he seems to place what he calls proofs, which he explains to be such argu ments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition, in a higher class than probabilities. And Mr. Locke himself, though he seems to confine certainty to demonstration, yet allows concerning some probabilities arising from human testimony, that " they rise so near to certainty, that they govern our thoughts as absolutely, and influence our actions as fully, as the most evident demonstra tion ; and in what concerns us, we make little or no difference between them and certain knowledge. Our belief thus grounded rises to assurance."t And in that case I think probability is too low a word, and not sufficiently expressive, or properly applicable to * The ingenious gentleman seems to grant what may be sufficient, when he saith, that probability "in some cases approaches infinitely near to certainty." If it be allowed, that matter of fact may be so certain, that the mind may be fully assured of it, and so as to leave no room for a reasonable doubt, this is all that is really necessary in the present controversy. And this is what Mr. Hume himself seems sometimes to allow. But at other times, he gives such an account of human testimony as tends to render it in all cases uncertain. And the design of his representing it as never rising higher than probability, seems to be to convey an idea of uncertainty and doubt as inseparably attending all human testimony. And to guard against the wrong use that may be made of this, is the design of what I have here observed. t Essay on Human Understanding, book iv. chap. xv. sect 6. Let. XX. mr. hume. 277 things of this kind. For according to Mr. Locke's account of it, and the common usage of the word, that it is said to be probable which is likely to be true, and of which we have no certainty, but only some inducements, as Mr. Locke speaks, to believe and receive them as true. Another thing observable in Mr. Hume's reasoning on this sub ject is, that in treating of probability or the evidence of facts, which he foundeth wholly upon experience, he confoundeth the evidence of past facts with that of the future ; and the young gentleman himself seems not sufficiently to distinguish them. The instances he produceth to show, that the judgments which the mind forms concerning the probability of events will always be in proportion to the constancy and regularity qf the experience, all relate to the proba bility of future events from the experience of the past. But the question about the probability of any future fact hath properly nothing to do in the present controversy between Mr. Hume and his adversaries, which relateth wholly to the evidence of past facts ; and it is only an instance of this writer's art, that, by confounding these different questions, he may perplex the debate, and throw dust in the eyes of his readers. It will be granted, that with rela tion to future facts or events, the utmost evidence we can attain to from past observation or experience is a high degree of probability ; but with relation to past matters of fact, we may in many cases arrive at a certainty, or what Mr. Hume calls a full proof; yea, it often happens, that the evidence of past facts may be so circum stanced, that we may be certain that such an event really came to pass,. though, if the question had been put before the event, the proba bility from past experience would have been greatly against it. Nothing therefore can be more weak and fallacious than Mr. Hume's reasoning, when from this principle of forming conclusions concerning future events from past experience, he endeavours to deduce an argument against the belief of any miraculous fact, how well soever attested. For though, if the question were concerning a future miracle in any particular instance, if we should judge merely from past experience, the probability might seem to lie against it; yet if the question be concerning a past miraculous fact, there may be such proof of it, as may not leave room for a reasonable doubt that the miracle was really done, though be fore it was done it might seem highly improbable that it would be done. Another fallacy Mr. Hume is guilty of, is his supposing that in all cases where the fact, in itself considered, is unusual, and out of the way of common experience, whatever be the evidence given for it, there must still be a deduction made, and the assent given to it is always weakened in proportion to the unusualness of the fact. Now this doth not always hold. A fact of an extraordinary nature may come to us confirmed by an evidence so strong, as to produce a full and undoubted assurance of its having been done ; and in such a case there is no deduction to be made; nor is the assent we give to the truth of the fact at all weakened on the account of its being 278 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITER?. Let. XX. unusual and extraordinary. Thus e. g. that a great king should be openly put to death by his own subjects, upon a pretended formal trial before a court of judicature, is very unusual, and before it came to pass would have appeared highly improbable; but after it hap pened, there is such evidence of the fact as to produce a full assu- , ranee that it was really done ; and the man who should go about seriously to make a doubt of it, and make a formal deduction from the credit of the evidence, on the account of the strangeness of the fact, and should pretend that we must believe it with an assent only proportioned to the evidence which remaineth after that deduction, would, under pretence of extraordinary accuracy, only render him self ridiculous, lt will indeed be readily owned, that more and greater evidence may be justly required with regard to a thing that is unusual and out of Ihe common course, than is required for a common fact ; but when there is evidence given sufficient to satisfy the mind, its being unusual and extraordinary ought not to be urged asa reason for not giving a full credit to it, or for pretending that the testimony concerning it is not to be depended upon. For the evidence for a fact out of the course of common observation and experience may be so circumstanced, as to leave no room for the least reasonable doubt ; and the assent to it may be as strong and firm as to any the most common and ordinary event ; nor is any thing in that case to be deducted from the credit of the evidence, under pretence of the fact's being unusual or even miraculous. You will allow me on this occasion to take notice of a passage in your letter, in which, after having observed that Mr. Hume had studied the point about probability, and treated upon it with great accuracy, you give it as your opinion, that " the best way of answering him would be in the way himself has chalked out, by comparing the degrees of probability in the evidence on both sides, and deducting the inferior." Here you seem to suppose, that there is evidence on both sides in the case of miracles, and that, upon balancing the evidence, that which hath the higher degrees of pro bability ought to be preferred, at the same time making a deduc tion from it in proportion to the weight of the contrary evidence. But the supposition you here proceed upon appears to me to be a wrong one, viz. that in the case in question there is evidence on both sides, and consequently an opposition of evidence, i. e. evi dence against the miracles wrought in proof of Christianity, as well as evidence for them. There is indeed positive strong evidence on one side, to show that those facts were really done ; an evidence drawn from testimony so circumstantiated, that it hath all the qua lifications which could be reasonably desired to render it full and satisfactory.* But what evidence is there on the other side ? No counter-evidence or testimony to show the falsehood of this is pre tended by Mr. Hume to be produced; nor are there any circum stances mentioned, attending the evidence itself, which may justly tend to render it suspicious. Nothing is opposed to it but the * See this fully shown in answer to Mr. Hume, p. 206, and seq. Let. XX. mr. iiume. 279 miraculous nature of the facts, or their being contrary to the usual course of nature ; and this cannot properly be said to be any evi dence to prove that the facts were not done, or that the testimony given to them was false. Nor needs there any deduction to be made in the assent we give to such a full and sufficient testimony as is here supposed, on that account ; because, as the case was circum stanced, it was proper that those facts should be beyond and out of the common course of nature and experience ; and it was agreeable to the wisdom of God, and to the excellent ends for which those facts were designed, that they should be so ; since otherwise they would not have answered the intention, which was to give a divine attestation to an important revelation ofthe highest use and benefit to mankind. lt is an observation of the ingenious author of the paper you sent me, " That twelve honest persons should combine to assert a false hood, at the hazard of their lives, without any view to private in terest, and with the certain prospect of losing every thing that is and ought to be dear to mankind in this world, is, according to Mr. Hume's own way of reasoning, as great a miracle, to all intents and purposes, as any interruption in the common course of nature." But then he observes, that the thing these witnesses are supposed to attest being also a miracle, contrary to the usual course of nature, it may be objected, that these evidences being equal, they only de stroy one another, and still leave the mind in suspense. The answer he gives to this does not seem to me to be sufficiently clear. He first observes, that " this objection draws all its force from Mr. Hume's assertion, that an uniform and uninterrupted experience is a full proof, which when examined will not be found true, because it is confessed on all hands, that all our reasonings concerning mat ters of fact ever fall short of certainty, or full proof." But besides that this doth not always hold, since it has been shewn, that our reasonings concerning matters of fact may in some cases amount to such a certainty as may be justly called a full proof, it may still be urged, that an uniform uninterrupted experience, though not strictly a full proof, yet is such a proof against a miracle as is able to coun terbalance the evidence for it; in which case the objection still holds, and the mind is kept in suspense. And the gentleman him self seems afterwards to grant, that a fact's being contrary to the usual course of nature affordeth such a proof against it from the nature of the thing, as is sufficient to counterpoise the evidence of twelve such witnesses as are supposed, though he thinks it would not do so, if the number of witnesses were doubled ; and that this shews that the proof against a miracle arising from the nature of the fact may be exceeded by contrary human testimony, which is what Mr. Hume denies. And he argues, that if we suppose the testimony of twelve persons for a miracle to be just equal to the evidence arising from the nature of the thing against it, and that we have the evidence of twenty for any particular miracle recorded in the Gospel, then substracting the weaker evidence from the stronger, we shall have a surplus of the positive testimony of eight persons, without any thing to oppose it. 280 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XX, I am persuaded, that the design of the ingenious gentleman, in putting the case after this manner, was to signify it as his real opi nion, that the testimony of twelve such witnesses as are here sup posed, in proof of a miracle's having been really wrought, did not more than countervail the argument against it arising from the strangeness of the fact; but he had a mind to put the case as strongly as he could in favour of Mr. Hume, and yet to show, that there might still be an excess of proof, according to his own account, on the side of miracles ; which destroys his main hypothesis, that the evidence for a miracle can never exceed the evidence against it. It appears to me however, that this is making too large a concession, and that it is not the properest way of putting the case. It pro- ceedeth upon the supposition, which hath been already shown to be a wrong one, that a thing's being miraculous, or contrary to the usual course of nature, is alone in all circumstances a proper proof or evidence against the truth of the fact ; whereas the case may be so circumstanced, that the miraculousness of the fact is in reality no proof or evidence against it at all. It will indeed be acknowledged, as was before hinted, that greater evidence is required with regard to a fact which is miraculous, than for any fact in the common and ordinary course. But when such evidence is given, to prove that a miraculous fact was really done, as is suitable to the importance of the fact, and which cannot be rejected without admitting supposi tions which are manifestly absurd ; in such a case, a thing's being miraculous is no just reason for not giving a full assent to the testi mony concerning it. For its being miraculous, in the case that hath been put, hath nothing in it absurd or incredible ; whereas that twelve men of sound minds and honest characters should combine to attest a falsehood, in opposition to all their worldly interests and prejudices, and to every principle that can be supposed to influence human nature, without any assignable cause for such a conduct (which has been shown to be the case with regard to the witnesses for Christianity), is absolutely absurd, nor can in any way be ac counted for. As to the pretence, that in this case there is a miracle on both sides, and that the one is to be opposed to the other, and destroys its evidence ; this sophism, which has imposed upon many, and in which the chief strength of Mr. Hume's essay lies, deriveth its whole force from an abuse of the word miracle, and a confound ing, as this writer hath artfully done, a miracle and an absurdity, as if it were the same thing. That twelve men should, in the circum stances supposed, combine to attest a falsehood, at the hazard of their lives and of every thing dear to men, cannot properly be called a miracle, according to any definition that can be reasonably given of a miracle, or even according to Mr. Hume's own definition of a miracle, that " it is a transgression of a law of nature by a par ticular volition of the Deity, or by the interposal of some invisible agent;" but is a manifest absurdity. But in the case of an extra ordinary event, contrary to the usual course of natural causes, and wrought for a very valuable purpose, and by a power adequate to the effect, there is indeed a proper miracle, but no absurdity at all. Let. XX. mr. hume. 281 It is true, that its being unusual and out of the ordinary course of observation and experience, is a good reason for not believing it without a strong and convincing evidence, a much stronger evidence than would be necessary in common and ordinary facts. But when there is an evidence of its having actually been done, which hath all the requisites that can be justly demanded in such a case, and at the same time sufficient reasons are assigned, worthy of the divine wisdom and goodness, to show that it was proper to be done, its being unusual and extraordinary is no proof at all that it hath not been done, nor can in any propriety of language be called an evidence against it ; and therefore no substraction is to be made from the credit given to such a supposed full and sufficient evidence merely on this account. Perhaps my meaning will be better understood, by applying it to a particular instance ; and I choose to mention that which is the principal miracle in proof of Christianity, our Lord's resurrection. The fact itself was evidently miraculous, and required a divine power to accomplish it. It was therefore necessary, in ordeij to lay a just foundation for believing it, that there should be such an evidence given as was proportioned to the importance and extraordinariness of the fact. And that the evidence which was given of it was really such an evidence, appears, I think, plainly from what I have elsewhere observed concerning it.* But if we should put the case thus : that not only was the fact extraordinary in itself, and out of the common course of nature, but the evidence given of it was insufficient, and not to be depended upon, and had circumstances attending it which brought it under a just suspicion : or, if contrary evidence was produced to invalidate it ; e. g. if the soldiers that watched the sepulchre, instead of pretending that the body of Jesus was stolen away whilst they were asleep, which was no evidence at all, and was a plain acknowledgment that they knew nothing at all of the matter, had declared that the disciples came with a powerful band of armed men, and overpowered the guard, and carried away the body ; or, if any of the Jews had averred, that they were present and awake when the soldiers slept, and that they saw the disciples carry away the body ; or, if any of the disciples to whom Jesus appeared, and who professed to have seen and con versed with him after his resurrection, had afterwards declared, that they were among the disciples at those times when he was pre tended to have appeared, and that they saw no such appearances, nor heard any such conversations as were pretended. On this sup position, it might be properly said that there was evidence given on both sides, viz. for and against Christ's resurrection, and conse quently that there was a real opposition of evidence ; in which case it would be necessary carefully to examine the evidences, and com pare them one with another, in order to judge which of them de served the greater credit, and how far one of them weakened or im paired the force of the other. But as the case was circumstanced, since there was a very strong positive evidence given, that Christ really rose from the dead, and showed himself alive after his resur- * See above, p. 202, and seq. 282 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XX. rection by many infallible proofs, and no contrary evidence produced against it, nor any thing alleged to render the evidence that was given of it justly suspected; and since there are also very good rea sons assigned, worthy of the divine wisdom and goodness, which rendered it highly proper that Christ should be raised from the dead ; on this view of the case, the extraordinariness of the fact, alone considered, cannot properly be- called an evidence against the truth of it, nor be justly urged as a reason for not yielding a full assent to the evidence concerning it ; for it was necessary to the ends pro posed by the divine wisdom, that the fact should be of an extraor dinary and miraculous nature ; and if it had not been so, it would not have answered those ends. I think therefore it may justly be affirmed, that, taking the case in all its circumstances, considering the great strength and force of the evidence that is given for the fact, and the many concurring proofs and attestations by which it was confirmed, together with the excellent and important ends for which it was designed, there is as just ground to believe that Christ rose again from the dead, as that he was crucified ; though the latter be a fact not out of the ordinary course of nature, and the former was evidently so. And here it may not be improper to mention a remark able observation of Mr. Locke. He had, in giving an account of the grounds of probability, supposed one ground ofittobe the conformity of a thing with our own knowledge, observation, and experience; and after taking notice of several things to this purpose, he observes, that " though common experience and the ordinary course of things have justly a mighty influence on the minds of men, to make them give or refuse credit to any thing proposed to their belief, yet there is one case wherein the strangeness of the fact lessens not the assent to a fair testimony given of it ; for where such supernatural events are suitable to ends aimed at by him who has the power to change the course of nature ; there under such circumstances they may be fitter to procure belief, by how much the more they are beyond or contrary to common observation. This is the proper case of mira cles, which, well attested, do not only find credit themselves, but give it also to other truths which need such a confirmation."* Thus this great master of reason is so far from thinking with Mr. Hume, that a thing's being miraculous, or beyond the common course of observation and experience, absolutely destroys all evi dence of testimony that can be given concerning the truth of the fact, that in his opinion it doth not so much as lessen the assent given to it upon a fair testimony; provided the supernatural facts thus attested were suitable to the ends of the divine wisdom and goodness, i. e. wrought in attestation to a revelation of the highest importance, and of the most excellent tendency ; and that in that case the more evidently miraculous the fact is, the fitter it is to answer the end proposed by it. The ingenious author of the paper you sent me has very properly summed up Mr. Hume's argument against the evidence of miracles, * Locke's Essay on Human Understanding, book iv. chap. xvi. sec. 13. Let. XX. mr. hume. 283 thus : We have had a long, universal, and uninterrupted experience, that no events have happened contrary to the course of nature, from constant and unvaried observations. We have therefore a full proof, that this uniform course has not been broken in upon, nor will be, by any particular exceptions. But the observation of truth depending upon, and constantly fol lowing human testimony, is by no means universal and uninter rupted ; and therefore it does not amount to a full proof, that it either has or will follow in any particular instance. And therefore the proof arising from any human testimony, can never equal the proof that is deduced against a miracle from the very nature of the fact. This he takes to be a full and fair state of Mr. Hume's reasoning; and it appears to me to be so. And he says, " The answer is plain. If by human testimony he would mean of any one single man indif ferently taken, then his second proposition would be true ; but then the conclusion would by no means follow from it : but if by human testimony he would understand the evidence of any collection of men, then the second proposition is false, and consequently the conclusion is so too." This answer relateth only to the second proposition.* But it might have been said, that neither of the propositions are to be de pended upon, and that they are utterly insufficient to support the conclusion he would draw from them. For as to the first proposi tion, it assumes the very point in question ; it affirms, that no events have ever happened contrary to the course of nature ; and that this we know by a long, universal, and uninterrupted experience. If this be meant universal and uninterrupted experience of all mankind in all ages, which alone can be of any force in the present argument, how doth it appear that we know by universal and uninterrupted experience, that no such events have ever happened ! Are there not several events of this kind recorded by credible testimonies to have happened ? The whole argument then is upon a wrong foundation. It proceedeth upon an universal and uninterrupted experience, not broken in upon in any instance. And there is good testimony to prove, that it hath been broken in upon in several instances. And if it hath been broken in upon in any instances, no argument can be brought from experience to prove that it hath not, or may not be broken in upon ; and so the whole reasoning falls. If it be alleged, that these testimonies, or indeed any testimonies at all, ought not to be admitted in this case, the question returns, for what reason ought they not to be admitted ? If the reason be, as it must be according to Mr. Hume, because there is an universal uninterrupted experience * Though the ingenious gentleman hath not directly and formally answered the first proposition, yet he hath plainly shown that he doth not admit it, when he saith, that " the very same objection Mr. Hume makes against the veracity of human testimony, to weaken its authenticity, may be retorted with equal force against his unvaried certainty of the course of nature. And that doubtless the many approved histories we have relating to miracles, will as much lessen the probability of what he calls a full proof on his side of the question, as all the forgeries and falsehoods that are brought to discredit human testimony will weaken it on the other." 284 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XX- against them, this is to take it for granted, that no such events have ever happened ; for if there have been any instances of such events, the experience is not universal and uninterrupted. So that we see what the boasted argument against miracles from uniform experi ence comes to. It in effect comes to this, that no such events have ever happened, because no such events have ever happened. As to the second proposition, though if we speak of human testi mony in general, it will be easily allowed, that it is not to be abso lutely and universally depended upon ; yet, as hath been already hinted, it may in particular instances be so circumstanced, as to yield a satisfying assurance, or what may not improperly be called a full proof. Even the testimony of a particular person may in some cases be so circumstanced, as to leave no room for reasonable sus picion or doubt. But especially if we speak of what this gentleman calls a collection qf men, this may in some cases be so strong, as to produce a full and entire conviction, however improbable the attested fact might otherwise appear to be. And therefore if we meet with any testimonies relating to particular events of an extraordinary nature, they are not immediately to be rejected, under pretence of their being contrary to past experience; but we must carefully examine the evidence brought for them, whether it be of such a kind as to make it reasonable for us to believe them ; and that the evidence brought for miraculous facts recorded in the gospel are of this kind hath been often clearly shown. The only farther reflection I shall make on this gentleman's paper is, that it contains good and proper observations concerning our being determined in matters of practice by probabilities ; that in all cases of moment, where to act or forbear may be attended with consider able damage, no wise man makes the least scruple of doing what he apprehends may be of advantage to him, even though the thing were doubtful ; but in matters of the utmost consequence, a prudent man will think himself obliged to take notice of the lowest probability, and will act accordingly. This he applies to the practice of religion, and observes, that considering the vast importance of religion to our happiness in every respect, the bare possibility that it might prove true, were there nothing eise to support it, would engage his assent and compliance ; or else he must be supposed to act differently in this respect to what he generally does in all the other concerns of his life. This observation is not entirely new, but it is handsomely illus trated by this gentleman, and seems very proper to show, that those who neglect and despise religion, do in this, notwithstanding their boasted pretences, act contrary to the plain dictates of reason and good sense. But we need not have recourse to this supposition. The evidence on the side of religion is vastly superior. And if this be the case, no words can sufficiently express the folly and unreason ableness of their conduct, who take up with slight prejudices and presumptions in opposition to it ; and by choosing darkness rather than light, and rejecting the great salvation offered in the gospel, run Let. XXI. mr, hume. 285 the utmost hazard of exposing themselves to a heavy condemnation and punishment. Thus I have taken the liberty you allowed me of giving my thoughts upon the paper you sent me. I cannot but look upon the young gentleman's attempt to be a laudable and ingenious one, though there are some things in his way of managing the argument, which seem not to have been thoroughly considered, and which, I am satisfied, he would have altered, if he had lived to take an accurate review ofthe subject. This, with a few additions since made to it, is the substance of the answer I returned to the worthy gentleman who had written to me, and which I have here inserted, because there are some things in it that may tend to the farther illustration of what I had offered in my remarks on Mr. Hume's " Essay on Miracles." My next will contain some additional observations relating to the Abb6 de Paris, and the miracles attributed to him ; together with reflections on some passages in Mr. Hume's " Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals," which seem to be intended to expose Christianity. LETTER XXI. Some Reflections on the extraordinary Sanctity ascribed to the Abbe de Paris. — He carried Superstition to a strange excess, and by his extraordinary Austerities volunta rily hastened his own Death. — His Character and course of Life, of a different kind from that rational and solid Piety and Virtue which is recommended in the Gospel. — Observations on some Passages in Mr. Hume's Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. — He reckons Self-denial, Mortification, and Humility among the Monkish Virtues, and represents them as not only useless, but as having a bad Influence on tbe Temper and Conduct. — The Nature of Self-denial explained, and its great Use fulness and Excellence shown. — What is to be understood by the Mortification required by the Gospel. — This also is a reasonable and necessary Part of our Duty — Virtue, according to Mr. Hume, hath nothing to do with Sufferance. — But by the Acknowledgment of the wisest Moralists, one important Office of it is to support and bear us up under Adversity. — The Nature of Humility explained. — It is an excellent and amiable Virtue. Sir, The miracles ofthe Abbe de Paris have made so great a noise in the world, and so much advantage hath been taken of them by the enemies of Christianity, and particularly by Mr. Hume, that I thought it necessary to consider them pretty largely above in the nineteenth Letter. Some things have occurred since, which have some relation to that matter, and which I shall here take notice of. In that Letter, p. 258, mention is made of the high opinion the people had conceived of the Abbe's extraordinary sanctity, as what tended very much to raise their expectations of miracles to be 286 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XAL wrought at his tomb, and by his intercession. If we enquire whence this opinion of his extraordinary sanctity arose, and upon what it was founded, we shall find it to have been principally owing to the excessive austerities in which he exercised himself for several years; of which, therefore, and of some remarkable things in his life and his character, it may not be improper to give some account. The par ticulars I shall mention are set forth at large by the learned Mr. Mosheim, in a dissertation on the Miracles of the Abbe de Paris, and which I did not meet with till after the publication of the second volume ofthe View ofthe Deistical Writers. It is intitled, Inquisitio in veritatem miraculorum Francisci de Paris secculi -nostri thaumaturgi.* What he there tells us concerning Mons. de Paris is faithfully taken from those who hold him in the highest admira tion, the Jansenistical writers. And from their accounts it suffi ciently appears, that his whole life, and especially the latter part of it, was one continued scene of the most absurd superstition, and which he carried to an excess that may be thought to border upon madness. He was the eldest son of an ancient, rich, and honourable family, and therefore born to an opulent fortune ; though his father, when he saw his turn of mind, very prudently left him but a part of it, and that in the hands and under the care of his younger brother. But though he still had an ample provision made for him, he voluntarily deprived himself of all the conveniences, and even the necessaries, of life. He chose one obscure hole or cottage after another to live in, and often mixed with beggars, whom he resembled so much in his customs, sordid and tattered garb, and whole manner of his life, that he was sometimes taken for one, and was never better pleased, than when this exposed him in the streets and ways to derision and contempt. Poverty was what he so much affected, that though he applied to his brother for what his father had left him, yet that he might not have the appearance of being rich, he chose not to take it as what was legally due to him, but to supplicate for it in the humblest terms, as for an alms freely bestowed upon a miserable object that had nothing of his own. And yet afterwards in his last will, he disposed of it as his own to various uses as he thought fit, especially for the benefit of those who had been sufferers for the Jansenist cause. For several of the last years of his life, he seemed to make it his business to contrive ways to weaken or harass, and torment his body, and thereby hasten his own death. Whilst he gave away his income to the poor, he himself volunta rily endured all the evils and hardships which attended the extremity of want and poverty. Mean aud wretched was his garb ; black bread, water, and herbs, but without oil, salt, or vinegar, or any thing to give them savour, was his only sustenance, and that but once a day. He lay upon the ground, and was worn away with continual watching. After his death were found, his hair shirt, an * Vide Jo. Laur. Moshemii Dissertationumad Historiam Ecclesiasticam pcrtinentium volumen secundum. Let. XXI. mr. home. 287 iron cross, a girdle, stomacher, and bracelets of the same metal, all bestuck with sharp points. These were the instruments of penitence, with which he was wont to chastise himself, the 'plain marks of which he bore on his body. By such a course he brought himself not only into great weakness of body, but into disorders of mind ; and this, which was the natural effect of his manner of living, he attributed to the influence of the devil, whom God had in just judg ment permitted to punish him for his sins. And in enquiring into the causes of the divine displeasure, he fixed upon this, that he had still too great a love for human learning and knowledge, and there fore from thenceforth did all he could to divest himself of it, and would have sold his well-furnished library, if he had not been pre vented by some of his friends, whose interest it was to preserve it. For two years together he refused to come to the holy supper, under pretence that it was not lawful for him to come, God having required him to abstain from it; and it was with great difficulty that he was brought to it at last, by the threatenings and even reproaches of his confessor. Finally, that no kind of misery might be wanting to him, he chose for his companion, to dwell with him in his cottage, a man that was looked upon to be crazy, and who treated him in the most injurious manner. He did all he could to hide himself from his friends, in one sorry cottage after another ; and about a month before his death, fixed himself in a little lodge in the corner of a gar den, exposed to the sun and wind. When by such severities he had brought himself into an universal bad habit of body, and it was visible to his friends, that if he continued in that course he could not long support under it, a physician was called in, who only desired him to remove to a more commodious habitation, to allow himself more sleep, and a better diet, and especially to take nourishing broths for restoring his enfeebled constitution. But all the persuasions of his physician, confessor, and of his friends, and the tears of an only brother, could not prevail with him to follow an advice so rea sonable and practicable; though he was assured, that, if he used that method, there was great hope of his recovery, and that his life could not be preserved without it. And when at last, to satisfy their ~ importunity, he seemed so far to comply, as to be willing to take some broth, it was only an appearance of complying, for he took care to give such orders to the person who was to prepare it for him, that it really yielded little or no nourishment. Thus it was manifest, that he had determined to hasten, as much as in him lay, his own death. And accordingly he told his confessor, that his life had nothing in it to make it worth a Christian's care to preserve it. His friends acknowledge, that his death was the effect "of the almost incredible austerities that he exercised during the last four years of his life." His great admirer the Abbe de Asfeld testifies, that he heard him declare it as his purpose to yield himself a slow sacrifice to divine justice. This his extraordinary course of austerities, together with the zeal he expressed to the very last for the Jansenist cause, which he showed also by the dispositions he made in his will, as well as by "288 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXI, his appealing, as with his dying breath, to a future general council against the constitution Unigenitus, procured him so extraordinary a reputation, that he has passed for one of the greatest saints that ever appeared in the Christian church. No sooner was he dead, but an innumerable multitude of people ran to his corpse, some of whom kissed his feet, others cut off part of his hair as a remedy against all manner of evil ; others brought books or bits of cloth to touch his body, as believing it filled with a divine virtue. Thus were they prepared to believe and expect the most wonderful things. Whosoever impartially considers the several things that have been mentioned, and which are amply verified in the places referred to in the margin,* will not think the learned Mosheim in the wrong, when he pronounceth, that it cannot in consistency with reason be supposed, that God should extraordinarily interpose by his own divine power, to do honour to the bones and ashes of a man weak and superstitious to a degree of folly, and who was knowingly and wilfully accessory to his own death. In vain do his admirers, as he himself had done, extol his thus destroying himself as an offering up himself a voluntary sacrifice to divine justice. If a man should under the same pretence dispatch himself at once with a pistol or poniard, would this be thought a proper justification of his con duct ? And yet I see not why the pretence might not as well hold in the one case as in the other ; since it makes no great difference, whether the death was swifter or slower, provided it was brought on with a deliberate intention and design. How different is this from the beautiful and noble idea of piety and virtue which the gospel furnisheth us with, and from the per fect pattern of moral excellence which is set us by our blessed Saviour himself in his own holy life and practice ! That the great apostle St. Paul was far from encouraging such austerities as tended to hurt and destroy the bodily health, sufficiently appears from the advice he gave to Timothy, " Drink no longer water, but use a little wine, for thy stomach's sake, and thine often infirmities," 1 Tim. v. 23. He condemneth those that, under pretence of extraordinary purity, were for observing the ordinances and traditions of men, "Touch not, taste not, handle not;" and brands their practice under the name of " will-worship, a voluntary humility, and neglect ing," or, as the word might be rendered, " not sparing the body," Col. ii. 20 — 23. That which in the case of Abbe de Paris is cried up by his admirers as a carrying religion to the highest degree of perfection, viz. his abstaining from flesh, and confining himself to herbs, is represented by the apostle Paul as a sign of weakness in the faith, Rom. xiv. 2. It hath always appeared to me to be the glory of the Christian religion, as prescribed in the New Testament, that the piety it teacheth us is solid and rational, remote from all superstitious extremes, worthy of a God of infinite wisdom and goodness to require, and becoming the true dignity of the reasonable nature. It * Mosheim, ut supra, from p. 364 to p. 395. Let. XXI. mr. hume. 2ii!> comprehendeth not only immediate acts of devotion towards God, but a diligent performance of all relative duties, and the faithful discharge ofthe various offices incumbent upon us in the civil and social life. It requireth us indeed to bear with a noble fortitude the greatest evils, when we are regularly called to suffer for the cause of God, but not rashly to expose ourselves to those evils, or to bring them upon ourselves. The wise and beneficent author of nature hath stored the whole world about us with a variety of benefits ; and can it be thought to be agreeable to his will, that instead of tasting his goodness in the blessings he vouchsafeth us, we should make a merit of never allow ing ourselves to enjoy them ? How much more rational is it to receive those blessings with thankfulness, and enjoy them with tem perance, according to that of St. Paul, " Every creature of God is good, and nothing to be refused, if it be received with thanksgiving; for it is sanctified by the word of God and prayer," 1 Tim. iv. 4, 5. Can it be pleasing to our merciful heavenly Father, that we should not merely humble and chasten ourselves on special occasions, but make it our constant business to torment ourselves, and to impair and destroy the bodies he hath given us, and thereby unfit ourselves for the proper offices of life ? Is it reasonable to imagine, thatunder the mild dispensation of the gospel, which breathes an ingenuous cheerful spirit, and raiseth us to the noble liberty of the children of God, the best way of recommending ourselves to his favour should be to deny ourselves all the comforts he affordeth us, and to pass our lives in perpetual sadness and abstinence ? Could it be said in that case, that " godliness is profitable unto all things, having pro mise ofthe life that now is, and of that which is to come ?" 1 Tim. iv. 8. It is true, that mortification and self-denial are important gospel duties, but how different from the extremes of superstitious rigour will appear, when I come to vindicate the evangelical morality against the objections of Mr. Hume. It was not till Christians began to degenerate from that lovely form of rational, solid piety and virtue, of which Christ himself exhibited the most perfect example, that they laid so mighty a stress on those severe and rigorous aus terities, which neither our Saviour nor his apostles had commanded. And in this respect some of those who were anciently deemed heretical sects carried it to a greater degree of strictness than the orthodox themselves. And many zealots there have been in false religions, and particularly some of the heathen devotees in the East Indies, who in severe penances, and rigid austerities, and in volun tary torments inflicted on their own bodies, have far exceeded the Abb6 de Paris himself. I think no farther observations need be made with regard to Mr. Hume's " Essay on Miracles," which is directly levelled against Christianity. But any one that is acquainted with his writings must be sensible, that he often takes occasion to throw out insinua tions against religion, which he usually represents either under the notion of superstition or enthusiasm. Even the morals of the gos pel have not escaped his censure, though their excellence is such u 290 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXI as to have forced acknowledgments from some of those who have been strongly prejudiced against it. There is a passage to this purpose in his " Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals," which deserves particular notice. In that Inquiry, as in all his other works, he assumes the merit of making new discoveries, and placing things in a better light than any man had done before him ; and wonders that a theory so simple and obvious as that which he hath advanced, could have escaped the most elaborate scrutiny and examination.* I will not deny that there are in that Inquiry some good and curious observations ; but I can see little that can be properly called new in his theory of morals, except his extending the notion of virtue (and it is concerning the principles of morals, and therefore concerning moral virtue, that his Inquiry proceeds) so as to comprehend under it every agreeable quality and accomplishment, such as wit, ingenuity, eloquence, quick ness of conception, facility of expression, delicacy qf taste in the finer arts, politeness,f cleanliness, and even force of body. % I cannot see what valuable end it can answer in a treatise of morals to extend tbe notion of virtue so far. It is of high importance to mankind rightly to distinguish things that are morally good and excellent from those which are not so ; and therefore great care should be taken that both our ideas of these things, and the expressions de signed to signify them, should be kept distinct. Wit, eloquence, and what we call natural parts, as well as acquired learning, polite ness, cleanliness, and even strength of body, are no doubt real ad vantages, and when under a proper direction, and rightly applied, are both ornamental and useful, and are therefore not to be neglected, but, as far as we are able, to be cultivated and improved. This will be easily acknowledged ; and if this be all Mr. Hume intends, it is far from being a new discovery. But these things make properly no part of moral virtue ; nor can a man be said to be good and vir tuous on the account of his being possessed of those qualities. He may have wit, eloquence, a polite behaviour, a fine taste in the arts, great bodily strength and resolution, and yet be really a bad man. And when these things are separated from good dispositions of the heart, from probity, benevolence, fidelity, integrity, gratitude, instead * Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, p. 172. t It has been hinted to me by a worthy friend, that some have thought I did wrong in not allowing politeness to be ranked among the moral virtues. And therefore to prevent mistakes, I now observe, that if by politeness be meant a kind,, obliging beha viour, expressive of humanity and benevolence, and flowing from it, it may be justly reckoned among the virtues ; and in this sense a plain countryman, who is good-na tured and obliging in his deportment to the utmost of his power, may be said to be truly a polite man. But this seems not to be the usual acceptation of the word in our language. By politeness is commonly understood a being well versed in the forms of what is usually called good breeding, and a genteel behaviour. And taken in that sense, how ever agreeable and ornamental it may be, I apprehend it is not properly a moral virtue; nor is the want of it a vice. And 1 believe it will scarce be denied, that a man may be really a good and worthy person, and yet not be what the world calls a polite well- bred man. X See the 6th, 7th, and 8th sections of the Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, particularly p. 127, 128, 131, 135, 137, 162, 165. Let. XXI. MR. HUMB. 21)1 of rendering a man useful to the community, they qualify him for doing a great deal of mischief. These qualities therefore should be carefully distinguished from those which constitute a good moral character, and which ought to be principally recommended to the esteem and approbation of mankind, as having in themselves a real invariable worth and excellence, and as deriving a merit and value to every other quality. Nor is it proper, in a treatise of morals, which pretends to any degree of accuracy, to confound them all to gether under one common appellation of virtue. And as Mr. Hume enlargeth his notion of virtue, so as to take in several things that do not seem properly to belong to the moral dis positions and qualities, so he excludeth from that character some things which are recommended in the gospel as of importance to the moral temper and conduct, particularly humility and self-denial. He observes, that "celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self- denial, humility, solitude, and the whole train of monkish virtues, are every where rejected by men of sense, because they serve no manner of purpose ; they neither advance a man's fortune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of society, neither qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor increase his power of self-enjoyment On the contrary, they cross all these desirable ends, stupify the understanding, and harden the heart, obscure the fancy, and sour the temper."* Our author is here pleased to class humility, mortification, and self-denial, which are evidently required in the gospel, with penances, celibacy, and what he calls the monkish virtues ; and pronounceth concerning all alike, that they are rejected by all. mew of sense, and not only serve no manner of purpose, but have a bad influence in stupifying the un derstanding, hardening the heart, and souring the temper. This is no doubt to cast a slur upon the gospel scheme of morality. And on the other hand he cries up his own theory of morals, as repre senting Virtue in all her engaging charms. That " nothing appears but gentleness, humanity, beneficence, affability, nay even at proper intervals, play, frolic, and gaieiy. She talks not of useless austeri ties and rigours, sufferance and self-denial, 8cc.''t A scheme of morals .which includeth play, frolic, and gaiety, and has nothing to do with self-denial, mortification, and sufferance, will no doubt be very agreeable to many in this gay and frolicsome age. But let us examine more distinctly what ground there is for our author's cen sures, as far as the Christian morals are concerned. To begin with that which he seemeth to have a particular aversion to, self-denial. This is certainly what our Saviour expressly re quireth of those who would approve themselves his faithful disci ples. He insisteth upon it, as an essential condition of their disciple- ship, they should deny themselves — Mat. xvi. 24. Mark viii. 34. And if we do not suffer ourselves to be frightened by the mere sound of words, but consider what is really intended, this is one of the most useful lessons of morality, and a necessary ingredient in a * Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, p. 171. t Ibid. p. 188. 292 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXI. truly excellent and virtuous character. One thing intended in this self-denial is the restraining and governing our appetites and pas sions, and keeping them within proper bounds, and in a due sub jection to the higher powers of reason and conscience; and this is certainly an important part of self-government and discipline, and is undoubtedly a noble attainment, and which argueth a true great ness of soul. And however difficult or disagreeable it may at first be to the animal part of our natures, it is really necessary to our happiness, and layeth the best foundation for a solid tranquillity and satisfaction of niind. Again, if we take self-denial for a readiness to deny our private interest and advantage for valuable and excel lent ends, for the honour of God, or the public good, for promoting the happiness of others, or our own eternal salvation, and for serv ing the cause of truth and righteousness in the world ; in this view nothing can be more noble and praiseworthy. And indeed whoever considers that an inordinate selfishness, and addictedness to a narrow fleshly interest, and the gratification of the carnal appetites and passions, is the source of the chief disorders of human life, will be apt to look upon self-denial to be of great consequence to morals. Without some degree of self-denial, nothing truly great, noble, or generous is to be achieved or attained. He that cannot bear to deny himself upon proper occasions, will never be of any great use either to himself or to others, nor can make any progress in the most virtuous and excellent endowments, or even in agreeable qua lities, and true politeness. This writer himself, speaking of the love of fame, which, he tells us, rules in all generous minds, observes, that as this prevaileth, the animal conveniences sink gradually in their value.* And elsewhere, in the person of the Stoic philoso pher, he saith, that "we must often make such important sacri fices, as those of life and fortune, to virtue :" And that " the man of virtue looks down with contempt on all the allurements of plea sure, and all the menaces of danger — toils, dangers, and death itself carry their charms, when we brave them for the public good."t And even after having told us, that virtue talks not of sufferance and self-denial, he adds, that " virtue never willingly parts with any pleasure, but in hope of ample compensation in some other period of their lives. The sole trouble she demands is of a just calculation, and a steady preference of the greater happiness.""]; Here he allows, that virtue may reasonably part with present pleasure, in hope of an ample compensation in some other period of our lives, when upon a just calculation it contributes to our greater happiness. But then he seems to confine the hope of the compensation which virtue is to look for, to some future period of this present life, which, consider ing the shortness and uncertainty of it, is little to be depended on, and may perhaps be thought not a sufficient foundation for a man's denying himself present pleasures and advantages. But the gospel * Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, p. 188.. t Moral and Political Essays, u. 213. ' Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, p. 188. Let. XXI. mr. hume. 203 proposeth a much more noble and powerful consideration, viz. the securing a future everlasting happiness; and supposing the cer tainty of this, of which we have the fullest assurance given us, no thing can be more agreeable to all the rules of reason and just cal culation, than to part with present pleasure, or to undergo present hardships, to obtain it. What hath been offered with regard to the important duty of self- denial may help us to form a just notion of mortification, which is nearly connected with it, and which our author also findeth great fault with. The chief thing intended by it is the subduing our fleshly appetites, and our vicious and irregular inclinations and de sires. To this purpose it is required of us, that we " mortify the deeds of the body," Rom. viii. 13. that we "mortify our members that are on the earth, fornication, uncleanness, inordinate affection, evil concupiscence, and covetousness, which is idolatry," Col. iii. 5.; and that we "crucify the flesh, with the affections and lusts," Gal. v. 24. Mortification taken in this view is a noble act of virtue, and absolutely necessary to maintain the dominion of the spirit over the flesh, the superiority of reason over the inferior appetites. Where these prevail, they tend to stupify the understanding, and harden the heart, and hinder a man from being a valuable member of society, which is what Mr. Hume most unjustly chargetb upon that mortification and self-denial which is required in the gospel. Mor tification is properly opposed to that indulging and pampering the flesh, which tendeth to nourish and strengthen those appetites and lusts, which it is the part of a wise and virtuous man to correct and subdue. Even fasting upon proper seasons and occasions, however ridiculed by Mr. Hume and others, may answer a very valuable end, and make a useful part of self-discipline. It may tend both to the health of the body, and to keep the mind more clean and vigorous, as well as, when accompanied with prayer, promote a true spirit of devotion. But in this as in every thing else, the Christian religion, considered in its original purity as laid down in the New Testament,' preserveth a most wise moderation, and is far from carrying things to extremes, as superstition hath often done. It doth not any where insist upon excessive, or what our author calls useless rigours and austerities. And so far is that mortification which the Gospel prescribeth, and which is nothing more than the keeping the body under a just discipline, and in a due subjection to the law of the mind, from being inconsistent with the true pleasure and satisfac tion of life, that it layeth the most solid foundation for it. Mr. Hume himself takes notice of the " supreme joy which is to be found in the victories over vice, when men are taught to govern their pas sions, to reform their vices, and subdue their worst enemies, which inhabit within their own bosoms."* Not only does this gentleman find fault with self-denial and mor tification, but with sufferance. Virtue, according to his representa- tion^ of it, talks not of sufferance and self-denial. And yet certain * Mural and Political Essays, p. 213. 204 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXI. it is, that among the best moralists of all ages it has been accounted one of the principal offices of virtue, to support us with a steady fortitude under all the evils that befal us in this present state, and enable us patiently and even cheerfully to bear them. A virtue that cannot suffer adversity, nor bear us up under it with dignity, and in a proper manner, is of little value in a world where we are ex posed to such a variety of troubles and sorrows. And in this the Gospel morality is infinitely superior to that of the most admired pagan philosophers. Mr. Hume has reckoned among virtues "an undisturbed philosophical tranquillity, superior to pain, sorrow, anxiety, and each assault of adverse fortune."* But what is this philosophical tranquillity, so much boasted of, relying only upon itself, compared with that which ariseth from the consolations set before us in the gospel, from the assurances of divine assistances and supports, from the love of God and sense of his favour, from the lively animating hopes of glory, and the eternal rewards which shall crown our patience, and persevering continuance in well doing? The last thing 1 shall take notice of, as represented under a dis advantageous character by Mr. Hume, though highly commended and insisted on by our Saviour, is humility ; aud this rightly under stood is one of the most amiable virtues, and greatest ornaments of the human nature. Our author is pleased to talk of a certain degree of pride and self -valuation, the want of which is a vice, and the opposite of which is meanness. f But to call a proper generosity of mind, which is above a mean or base thing, pride, is an abuse of words, which ought not to be admitted, if we would speak with exactness, in an inquiry concerning morals. It is to give the name of an odious vice to a very worthy disposition of soul. The gospel humility is a very different thing from meanness. It is very consis tent with such a just self-valuation, as raiseth us above every thing false, mean, base, and impure, and keepeth us from doing any thing unbecoming the dignity of the reasonable nature, and the glorious character and privileges we are invested with as Christians. True humility doth not absolutely exclude all sense of our own good qualities and attainments ; but it tempers the sense we have of them with a just conviction of our absolute dependance upon God for every good thing we are possessed of, and of our manifold sins, in firmities, and defects. It is oppose to a vain-glorious boasting and self-sufficiency, and to such a high conceit of our abilities and merits, as puffeth us up with a presumptuous confidence in our selves, and contempt of others, and which is indeed one of the greatest hinderances to our progress in the most excellent and worthy attainments. It roanifesteth itself towards God, by an entire unreserved subjection and resignation to his authority and will, by proper acknowledgments of our own unworthiness before him, and a sense of our continual dependance upon him, and con stant need of his gracious assistance. And it expresseth itself « Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, p. 152. t Ibid. p. 146, 1 17. Let. XXI. mr. hume. 295 towards men, by causing us to yield a due submission to our supe riors, and to be affable and condescending to our inferiors, courteous and obliging towards our equals, in honour preferring one another, as St. Paul expresseth it, and ready to bear with each other's weak nesses and absurdities. In a word, it diffuseth its kindly influence through the whole of our deportment, and all the offices of life. Nothing is so hateful as pride and arrogance. And true humility is so amiable, so engaging, so necessary to render a person agree able, that no man can hope to please, who hath not at least the appearance of it. Our author himself observes, that " among well-bred people, a mutual deference is affected, contempt of others disguised ;"* and that " as we are naturally proud and selfish, and apt to assume the preference above others, a polite man is taught to behave with deference towards those he converses with, and to yield the superiority to them in all the common occurrences of society."f So that, according to him, a show of humility and -preferring others to ourselves, is a necessary part of good behaviour ; and yet he is pleased to reckon humility among those things that neither render a man a more valuable member of society, nor qualify bim for the entertainment of company, but on the contrary cross those desirable purposes, and harden the heart, and sour the temper. But enough of Mr. Hume, who, if we may judge of him by his writings, will scarce be charged with the fault of having carried humility to an excess. A pity it is that he hath not made a better use of his abilities and talents, which might have laid a just foundation for acquiring the praise he seems so fond of, as well as rendered him really useful to the world, if he had been as industri ous to employ them in serving and promoting the excellent cause of religion, as he hath unhappily been in endeavouring to weaken and expose it! POSTCRIPT. After great part of this work was finished, and sent to the press, I met with a book, which I have read with great pleasure, entitled, " The Criterion ; or, Miracles Examined, with a View to expose the Pretensions of Pagans and Papists ; to compare the miraculous Powers recorded in the New Testament, with those said to subsist in latter Times ; and to show the great and material Difference between them in point of evidence ; from whence it will appear, that the former must be true, and the latter may be false." The subject is evidently both curious and important, and is treated by the author, who, I hear, is the Rev. Mr. Douglass, in a judicious * Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, p. 161, 162. t Moral and Politi cal Essays, p. 184, 185. 296 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXI. and masterly way. It was published at London in 1754, and therefore before the publication of the second volume of the " View of the Deistical Writers." And if I had then seen it, I should cer tainly have thought myself obliged to take particular notice of it. The worthy author has made judicious observations upon Mr. Hume's "Essay on Miracles," especially that part of it which relateth to the Miracles ascribed to the Abbe de Paris, which he has insisted on for an hundred pages together. And it is no small satisfaction to me, that there is a perfect harmony between what this learned author has written on this subject, and what I have published in the preceding part of this work, though neither of us knew of the other's work. He shows, as I have endeavoured to do, that fraud and imposture were plainly detected in several instances ; and that where the facts were true, natural causes suffi cient to produce the effect may be assigned, without supposing any thing miraculous in the case. This he has particularly shown, with regard to each of the miracles insisted on by Mr. de Montgeron, which he accounts for' in the same way that Mr. des Voeux hath more largely done, though he had not seen that gentleman's valuable writings, to which I have frequently referred for a fuller account of those things, which I could do little more than hint at. The reader will find in Mr. Douglass's work a full proof of the wonderful force of the imagination, and the mighty influence that strong impressions made upon the mind, and vehement passions raised there, may have in producing surprising changes on the body, and particularly in removing diseases ; of which he hath produced several well-attested instances, no less extraordinary than those attri buted to the Abbe de Paris, and which yet cannot reasonably be pretended to be properly miraculous. As I have thought myself obliged to take notice of that part of this gentleman's book, which hath so near a connection with the work in which I have been engaged ; so it is but just to observe, that it is also, with regard to every other part of it, a learned and accu rate performance. What he proposes to show is, that the evidence for the gospel facts is as extraordinary as the facts themselves; and that no just sus picion of fraud or falsehood appeareth in the accounts ; while every thing is the reverse, with regard to the evidence brought for the pagan or popish miracles. He observes, that the extraordinary facts ascribed to a miraculous interposition among the Pagans of old, or the Christians of latter times, are all reducible to these two classes. The accounts are either such as, from the circumstances thereof, appear to be false ; or, the the facts are such as, by the nature thereof, they do not appear to be miraculous. As to the first, the general rules he lays down, by which we may try the pretended miracles amongst Pagans and Papists, and which may set forth the grounds on which we suppose them to be false, are these three : That either they were not pub lished to the world till long after the time when they were said to be performed : Or, they were not published in the places where it is Let. XXI. mr. hume. 297 pretended the facts were wrought, but were propagated only at a great distance from the scene of action : Or, they were suffered to pass without due examination, because they coincided with the favourite opinions and prejudices of those to whom they were reported ; or, because the accounts were encouraged and supported by those who alone had the power of detecting the fraud, and could prevent any examination, which might tend to undeceive the world. These observations he applies to the pagan and popish miracles; some of the most remarkable of which he distinctly mentions, and shows, that there are none of them that do not labour under one or other of these defects. After considering those pretended miracles, which, from the circumstances of the accounts given of them, appear to be false, he next proceedeth to those works, which, though they may be true, and ascribed by ignorance, art, or credulity, to supernatural causes, yet are really natural, and may be accounted for, without supposing any miraculous interposition ; and here he enters on a large and particular discussion of the miracles attributed to the Abbe de Paris, and of some other miracles that have been much boasted of in the Romish church. Having fully examined and exposed the pagan and popish mira cles, he next proceeds to show, that the objections made against them, and which administer just grounds of suspicion, cannot be urged against the gospel miracles. And here he distinctly shows, First, that the facts were such that, from the nature of them, they must needs be miraculous, and cannot be accounted for in a natural way, or by any power of imagination, or strong impressions made upon the mind ; and, Secondly, that those facts are such as, from the circumstances of them, they cannot be false. And to this pur pose, he makes it appear, that they were published and appealed to at the time when they were performed, and were coeval with the preaching of Christianity, which was manifestly founded upon them. They were also published and attested at the places where the scene of them was laid, and on the spot on which they were wrought ; and the circumstances, under which they were first pub lished, give us an assurance, that they underwent a strict examina tion, and consequently that they could not have escaped detection had they been impostures. Mr. Douglass thinks it not sufficient barely to prove, that the testimony for the gospel-miracles is stronger than that which sup- porteth any other pretended miracles ; he further shows, by a variety of considerations, that it is the strongest that can be sup posed, or that from the nature of the thing could be had. And then he proceeds to observe, that, besides the unexceptionable proof from testimony, the credibility of the gospel-miracles is confirmed to us, by collateral evidences of the most striking nature, and which no spurious miracles can boast of; such as the great change that was thereby introduced into the state of religion ; the proofs that God was with the first publishers of Christianity, in other instances besides those of miracles, particularly in assisting them supernatu- 298 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXII. rally in the knowledge of the scheme of religion which they taught, and of which they were not capable of being the authors or inven tors, and enabling them to give clear predictions of future events. And particularly he insisteth upon that most express and circum stantial prediction of the destruction of the city and temple of Jerusalem, and the dispersion of the Jewish nation, as a demon stration that Jesus acted under a supernatural influence. The last thing he urgeth as a collateral evidence is, that the miracles recorded in Scripture were performed by those who assumed the character of prophets, or teachers sent from God, and their miracles were intended as credentials to establish their claim, to add autho rity to the messages they delivered, and the laws they taught : a character which, he shows, both the pagan and popish miracles are entirely destitute of. This is a brief account of the plan of Mr. Douglass's work, which fully answereth the title ; and it is with great pleasure I take this opportunity to acknowledge the merit ofthe learned author, and the service he hath done to the Christian and Protestant cause. I am Sir, &c. LETTER XXII. Lord Bolingbroke's Posthumous Works an insolent Attempt upon Religion, natural and revealed Not written according to the Laws of Method. — His fair Professions, and the advantageous Account he gives of his own Design. — He exalteth himself above all that have written before him, Ancients and Moderns ; blames the Free thinkers for taking unbecoming Liberties ; yet writes himself without any Regard to the Rules of Decency His outrageous Invectives against the Holy Scriptures, par ticularly the Writings of Moses and St. Paul. — The severe Censures he passeth on the most celebrated Heathen Philosophers. — But, above all, tbe virulent and con temptuous Reproaches he casteth upon Christian Philosophers and Divines A general Account of his Scheme, and the main Principles to which it is reducible. Sir, Th e account you gave me of the late pompous edition of the works of the late Lord Viscount Bolingbroke in five large volumes 4to. made me very desirous to see them. But it was some time after the publication of them, before I had an opportunity of grati fying my curiosity. I have now read them with some care and at tention. The works he had published in his own life-time, and which are republished in this edition, had created a high opinion of the genius and abilities of the author. In them he had treated chiefly concern ing matters of a political nature; and it were greatly to be wished for his own reputation, and for the benefit of mankind, that he had confined himself to subjects of that kind, in that part of his works which he designed to be published after his decease. These his Let. XXII, LORD BOLINGBROKE. 299 posthumous works make by far the greater part of this collection. His " Letters on the Study and Use of History," which were pub lished before the rest, had prepared the world not to look for any thing from him, that was friendly to Christianity or the holy Scrip tures. But I am apt to think, that the extreme insolence, the viru lence and contempt with which in his other posthumous works he hath treated those things that have been hitherto accounted most sacred among Christians, and the open attacks he hath made upon some important principles of natural religion itself, have exceeded whatever was expected or imagined. There is ground to apprehend, that the quality and reputation of the author, his high pretensions to reason and freedom of thought, his great command of words, and the positive and dictatorial air he every where assumes, may be apt to impose upon many readers, and may do mischief in an age too well prepared already for receiving such impressions. Upon these considerations, you have been pleased to think, that a distinct ex amination of this writer might help fo furnish a very proper supple ment to the view which hath been taken of the deistical writers of the last and present century. I was, I must confess, not very fond of the employment ; for what pleasure could be proposed in raking into such a heap of materials, which are thrown together without much order, and among which one is sure to meet with many things shocking to any man that has a just veneration for our holy religion, and who hath its honour and interests really at heart ? Before I enter on a distinct consideration of what Lord Boling broke hath offered both against natural and revealed religion, I shall make some general observations on his spirit and design, and his manner of treating the subjects he has undertaken, which may help us to form a judgment of his character as a writer, and how far he is to be depended upon. The manner of writing his Lordship hath generally chosen is by way of essay. He has been far from confining himself to the laws of method ; and perhaps thought it beneath so great a genius to stoop to common rules. But there is certainly a medium between being too stiff and pedantic, and too loose and negligent. He is sensible that he has not been very methodical, and seems to please himself in it. He declares, that " he does not observe in these Essays, any more than he used to do in conversation, a just propor tion in the members of his discourse ;"* and that he has thrown his. reflections upon paper as they "occurred to his thoughts, and as the frequent interruptions to which he was exposed would give him leave."t He condescends to make a kind of apology for this way of writing, when he says, "I will endeavour not to be tedious; and this endeavour will succeed the better perhaps by declining any over- strict observation of method.""): But I am apt to think he would have been less tedious, and more enlightening to his reader, if he had been more observant of the rules of method. He might then have avoided many of those repetitions and digressions, which so * Works, vol. iii. p. 160. t Ibid. p. 556. X Ibid. 318. 300 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXII. frequently recur in these Essays, and which, notwithstanding all the advantages of his style, and the vivacity of his imagination, often prove, if I may judge of others by myself, very disagreeable and irksome to the reader. As to his design in these writings, if we are to take his own word for it, very great advantage might be expected from them to man kind. He believes " few men have consulted others, both the living and the dead, with less precipitation, and in a greater spirit of doci lity, than he has done: He distrusted himself, not his teachers, men of the greatest name, ancient and modern. But he found at last, that it was safer to trust himself than them, and to proceed by the light of his own understanding, than to wander after those ignes fatui of philosophy."* He is sensible that " it is the modest, not the presumptuous inquirer, who makes a real and safe progress in the discovery of divine truth ;"f and that " candour and knowledge are qualifications which should always go together, and are inseparable from the love of truth, and promote one another in the discovery of it." J He contents himself to be " governed by the dictates of nature, and is therefore in no danger of becoming atheistical, super stitious, or sceptical. "§ In his introduction to his Essays, in a letter to Mr. Pope, he gives a most pompous account of his intentions, and evidently raiseth himself above the greatest men, ancient and modern. He " repre sents metaphysical divines and philosophers, as having bewildered themselves, and a great part of mankind, in such inextricable laby rinths of hypothetical reasonings, that few can find their way back, and none can find it forward into the road of truth."|| He declares that, " natural theology, and natural religion, have been corrupted to such a degree, that it is grown, and was long since, as necessary to plead the cause of God against the divine as against the atheist; to assert his existence against the latter, to defend his attributes against the former, and to justify his providence against both."H That " truth and falsehood, knowledge and ignorance, revelations of the Creator, inventions of the creature, dictates of reason, sallies of enthusiasm, have been blended so long together in systems of the ology, that it may be thought dangerous to separate them."** And he seems to think this was a task reserved for him. He proposes " to distinguish genuine and pure theism from the prophane mix tures of human imagination ; and to go to the root of that error which encourages our curiosity, sustains our pride, fortifies our pre judices, and gives pretence to delusion ; to discover the true nature of human knowledge, how far it extends, how far it is real, and where and how it begins to be fantastical ;tt that the gaudy visions of error being dispelled, men may be accustomed to the simplicity of truth." For this he expects to be " treated with scorn and con tempt by the whole theological and metaphysical tribe, and railed * Works, vol. iii p. 320. \ Ibid. p. 344. X Ibid, p 492 § Ibid. vol. v. p. 492. || Ibid. vol. iii. p. 327. j Ibid. p. 327,'328. *? Ibid. p. 331. ft Ibid. p. 328. Let. XXII. LORD BOLINGBROKE, 30] at as an infidel."* But " laying aside all the immense volumes of fathers and councils, schoolmen, casuists, and controversial writers, he is determined to seek for genuine Christianity with that simpli city of spirit with which it is taught in the gospel by Christ him self, "f The guides he proposes to follow are, " the works and the word of God.""): And he declares, that " for himself he thought it much better not to write at all, than to write under any restraint from delivering the whole truth of things as it appeared to him."| But though he thus professes an impartial love of truth, and to deliver his sentiments with freedom, yet he seems resolved, where he happens to differ from the received opinion, not to show a decent regard to the established religion of his country. He praiseth Scsb- vola and Varro, who, he says, " both thought that things evidently false mightdeserve an outward respect, when they are interwoven with a system of government. This outward respect every good subject will show them in such a case. He will not propagate those errors, but he will be cautious how he propagates even truth in opposition to them."|| He blames not only that arbitrary tyrannical spirit that puts on the mask of religious zeal, but that presumptuous factious spirit that has appeared under the mask of liberty ; and which, if it should prevail, would destroy at once the general influence of religion, by shaking the foundations of it which education had laid. But he thinks, " there is a middle way between these extremes, in which a reasonable man and a good citizen may diiect his steps."1T It is to be presumed therefore, that he would have it thought that this is the way he himself hath taken. He mentions with approbation the maxims of the Soufys, a sect of philosophers in Persia; one of which is : " If you find no reason to doubt concerning the opinions of your fathers, keep to them, they will be sufficient for you. If you find any reason to doubt concerning them, seek the truth quietly, but take care not to disturb the minds of other men." He profes seth to proceed by these rules, and blameth some who are called Free-thinkers for imagining, that as every man has a right to think and judge for himself, he has therefore a right of speaking according to the full freedom of his thoughts. The freedom belongs to him as a rational creature : He lies under the restraint as a member of society."** But notwithstanding these fair professions, perhaps there scarce ever was an author who had less regard to the rules of decency in writing than Lord Bolingbroke. The holy Scriptures are re ceived with great veneration among Christians ; and the religion there taught is the religion publicly professed and established in these nations; and therefore, according to his own rule, ought to be treated with a proper respect. And yet on many occasions he throws out the most outrageous abuse against those sacred writings, and the authors of them. He compares the history of the Pentateuch to the romances Don Quixote was so fond » Works, vol. iii. p. 330. t Ibid. p. 339. X Ibid- p. 347. § Ibid. vol. iv. p. 54. || Ibid. vol. iii. p. 331. 1 Ibid. p. 332. ** Ibid. p. 333, 334. 302 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXII. of; and pronounces that they who receive them as authentic are not much less mad than he.* That " it is no less than blasphemy to assert the Jewish Scriptures to have been divinely inspired ;" and he represents those that attempt to justify them as having " ill hearts as well as heads, and as worse than atheists, though they may pass for saints. "f He chargeth those with impiety, who would impose on us, as the word of God, a book which contains scarce any thing that is not repugnant to the wisdom, power, and other attributes of a Supreme All-perfect Being. "J And he roundly pronounceth, that " there are gross defects and palpable falsehoods in almost every page of the Scriptures, and the whole tenor of them is such, as no man, who acknowledges a Supreme All-perfect Being, can believe to be his word."§ This is a brief specimen of his invectives against the sacred writings of the Old Testament, and which he repeateth on many occasions. He affecteth indeed to speak with seeming respect of Christianity, yet he has not only endeavoured to invalidate the evidences that are brought to support it, but he passeth the severest censures upon doctrines which he himself representeth as original and essential doctrines of the Christian religion. He makes the most injurious representation of the doctrine of our redemption by the blood of Christ, and chargeth it as repugnant to all our ideas of order, of justice, of goodness, and even of theism. || And after a most virulent invective against the Jewish notion of God, as partial, cruel, arbitrary, and unjust, he asserts, that the character imputed to him by the Christian doctrine of redemption, and future punishments, is as bad or worse. H Great is the contempt and reproach he hath poured forth upon St. Paul, who was the penman of a considerable part of the New Testament, and whose name and writings have been always deservedly had in great veneration in the Christian church. He chargeth him with dissimulation and falsehood, and even with madness.** He asserts that his gospel was different from that of Christ, and contradictory to it;tt that he writes confusedly, obscurely, and unintelligibly ; — and where his gospel is intelligible, ' it is often absurd, profane, and trifling.|.*j: Some of those gentlemen who have shown little respect for the holy Scriptures, have yet spoke with admiration of many of the sages of antiquity ; but Lord Bolingbroke has on all occasions treated the greatest men of all ages with the utmost contempt and scorn. It is allowable indeed for sincere and impartial inquirers after truth, to differ from persons of high reputation for knowledge and learning, ancient and modern : and sometimes it is the more necessary to point out their errors, lest the authority of great names should lead men aside from truth. But whilst we think ourselves obliged to detect their mistakes, there is a decent regard to be paid them : it would be wrong to treat them in a reproachful and con temptuous manner. Yet this is what our author hath done. If all * Works, vol. iii. p. 280. f Ibid. p. 299, 306. 1 Ibid p 308 § Ibid. p. 298. || Ibid. vol. iv. p. 318. vol. v. p. 291,532. t Ibid. p. 532, 533. ** Ibid. vol. iv. p. 172, 306. ft Ibid. p. 313, 327, 328. if Ibid. vol. iii. p. 330, 331. Let. XXII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 303 the passages wese laid together, in which he hath inveighed against the wisest and most learned men of all ages, especially the philoso phers, metaphysicians, and divines, they would fill no small volume. And indeed these kind of declamatory invectives recur so often in these Essays, as cannot but create great disgust to every reader of taste. I shall mention a few passages out of a multitude that might be pro duced, and which may serve as a sample of the rest. He saith of the philosophers, that " they seem to acquire knowledge only as a necessary step to error, and grow so fond of the latter, that they esteem it no longer human, but raise it by an imaginary apotheosis up to a divine science ; that these searchers after truth, these lovers of wisdom, are nothing better than venders of false wares ; and the most irrational of all proceedings pass for the utmost efforts of hu man reason."* He represents metaphysical divines and philoso phers as having " wandered many thousand years in imaginary iight and darkness."t He frequently chargeth them with madness, and sometimes with blasphemy; and that they " staggered about, and jostled one another in their dreams."*); Speaking of Plato and Aristotle, he says, " their works have been preserved, perhaps more to the detriment than to the advancement of learning." § And though he sometimes commends Socrates, he pronounces, that he " substituted fantastical ideas instead of real knowledge, and cor rupted science to the very source;" that "he lost himself in the clouds — when he declared, that the two offices of philosophy are, the contemplation of God, and the abstracting of the soul from cor poreal sense ;" and that he and Plato were mad enough to think themselves capable of such contemplation and such abstraction. || Besides many occasional passages scattered throughout these Essays, there are several large sections which contain almost nothing else than invectives against Plato and his philosophy. He says," that philosopher " treated every subject, whether corporeal or intellectual, like a bombast poet, and a mad theologian :" f that " he who reads Plato's works like a man in his senses, will be tempted to think on many occasions that the author was not so ;" and that " no man ever dreamed so wildly as this author wrote." ** He chargeth him with a " false sublime in style, and that no writer can sink lower than he into a tedious socratical irony, into certain flimsy hypothetical reasonings that prove nothing, and into allusions that are mere vulgarisms, and that neither explain nor enforce any thing that wants to be explained or enforced, "ff He represents all the commentators and translators of Plato as dull or mad ; and calls Ficinus delirious, and Dacier simple and a bigot, and a Platonic madman.%% The true reason of the particular dislike he every-where expresses against that philosopher seems to be what he calls his " rambling speculations about the divine and spiritual nature, about immaterial substances, * Works, vol. iii. p. 490. t Ibid. vol. iv. p. 8. X Ibid. vol. iii. p. 553, 554. vol. iv. p. 129. 150. § Ibid. vol. iii. p. 392. || Ibid. vol. iv. p. 113. f Ibid. p. 129. ** Ibid. p. 344. 357. tt Ibid. p. 140, 141. 353, 354. XX Ibid. p. 107. 140. 355. 304 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXII. about the immortality of the soul, and about the rewards and punish ments of a future state."* As to the Stoics, he declares, " that their theology and morality were alike absurd:" that, in endeavouring to account how it came that there is evil in the world, and that the best men have often the greatest share of this evil, " they talked mere nonsense, figurative, sublime, metaphysical, but nonsense still."-]- The ancient theists in general he represents as having been seduced many ways into a confederacy with the atheists, and particularly blames them for pre tending to connect moral attributes, such as we conceive them, with the physical attributes of God ; which, he affirms, gave great ad vantage to the objections of the atheists."!; But there is no sort of men against whom he inveighs with greater license of reproach than the Christian divines and philosophers. He frequently speaks of the ancient fathers with the utmost con tempt : that they were superstitious, credulous, lying men; — and that " the greatest of them were unfit to write or speak on any sub ject that required closeness of reasoning, an evangelical candour, and even common ingenuousness. "§ As to the more modern di vines, he takes every occasion of insulting and abusing them. Not onlv doth he represent them as declaimers who have little respect for their readers, — as hired to defend the Christian system, — and as seeking nothing more than the honour of the gown, by having the last word in every dispute ;" || but he says, " they talk a great deal of blasphemy on the head of internal divine characters of Scrip ture." If He often repeats it, that atheists deny God, but the divines defame him, which, he thinks, is the worse qf the two. He charges them with madness, and worse than madness :** that " they have re course to trifling distinction, and dogmatical affirmations, the last retrenchments of obstinacy :"f+ that " of all fools, the most pre sumptuous, and at the same time most trifling, are metaphysical philosophers and divines."*);*]; He charges them, in an address he makes to God, with " owning his existence only to censure his works, and the dispensations of his providence.''§§ And frequently represents them as in alliance with the atheists, as betraying the cause of God to them, and as doing their best, in concert with these their allies, to destroy both the goodness and justice ot God. ||[[ He de clares, that " he who follows them cannot avoid presumption and profaneness, and must be much upon his guard to avoid blas phemy :" f f " that the preachers of natural and revealed religion have been loudest in their clamours against Providence, and have done nothing more than repeat what the atheists have said ; — and that they attempt to prove that the Supreme Being is the tyrant of the world he governs." (a) And the same charge he advanceth against the Christian philosophers in general. * Works, vol. iv. p. 347, 348. t Ibid. vol. ». p. 247. 317. X Ibid. p. 316. § Ibid. vol. iii. p. 337, 338. vol. iv. p. 586. || Ibid. p. 290. vol. v. p. 286.314. t Ibid. vol. iii. p. 272. ** Ibid. vol. iv. p. 273, tt Ibid. vol. v. p. 188. ft Ibid. p. 493. §§ Ibid. p. 339. |||| Ibid. p. 341. 346, 393, &C. tt Ibid. p. 461. (a) Ibid. vol. v. p. 4.94, 485. Let. XXII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 303 But besides these general invectives against Christian philoso phers and divines, he hath, particularly attacked some of the most celebrated names in a manner little reconcileable to good manners and the decency which ought to be observed towards persons of dis tinguished reputation, even when we think them in the wrong. Speaking of " many reverend persons, who," he says, " have had their heads turned by a preternatural fermentation of the brain, or a philosophical delirium," — be observes, " that none has been more so than Dr. Cudworth. — He read too much to think enough." He represents him as having " given a nonsensical paraphrase of non sense;" — and that " the good man passed his life in the study of an unmeaning jargon : and as he learned, so he taught."* He charges Bishop Cumberland with " metaphysical jargon, and theo logical, blasphemy." t Stillingfleet; is spoken of with contempt ; as also Huet, Bochart, and the Christian antiquaries."); Nor is arch bishop Tillotson treated with greater regard. He talks in a very slighting way of those that have written on the law of nature, par ticularly Grotius, Selden, and Puffendorf: that they "puzzle and perplex the plainest thing in the world, and seem to be great writers on this subject, by much the same right as he might be called a great traveller, who should go from London to Paris by the Cape of Good Hope." § There is none of the Christian philosophers of whom he speaks with so much respect as Mr. Locke ; yet he represents him as having " dreamed that he had a power of forming abstract ideas ;" and mentions this as a proof, that there is such a thing as a philosophical delirium." || And he charges it upon him as a great inconsistency, that he should write a Commentary on St. Paul's Epistles, and a Discourse on the Reasonableness of Christianity, after he had written an Essay on Human Understanding.^ But there is no one person whom he treats with so much rudeness and insolence as the late eminently learned Dr. Samuel Clarke. Hb calls him a presumptuous dogmatist, and represents him as having " impiously advanced, that we know the rule God governs by as well as he, — and that, like another Eunomius, he presumes to know God, his moral nature at least, and to teach others to know him, as well as he knows himself."** He chargeth him with & foolish and wicked rhodomontade, " with pretending to make infallible demon strations, like the Pope's decrees, and sending every one to the devil who does not believe in them ;f-f- and with a rhapsody of presump tuous reasonings, of profane absurdities, of evasions that seem to answer while they only perplex, and in one word, the most arbitrary and least reasonable suppositions."*):"); He saith, that " the retrench ments cast up by him are feeble beyond belief." That " he boasts like a bully, who looks fierce, speaks big, and is little to be feared." §§ Not only does he call him an audacious and vain sophist, \\ || but he * Works, vol. iii. p. ,353. vol. iv. p. 92. t Ibid. vol. v. p. 82. X Ibid. vol. iii. p. 264. vol. iv. p. 13. § Ibid. vol. v. p. 68. || Ibid. vol. ii. p. 441, 442. t Ib;d- vol. iv. p. 166. 295. ** Ibid. vol. iii. p. '52. vol. v. p. 449. tt Ibid- P- 252. Xi Ibid. p. 293. §§ Ibid. p. 280. 293. || || Ibid. p. 293. X 306 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXII. carries it so far as to say, that " he and WoUaston do in effect re nounce God, as much as the rankest of the atheistical tribe.* With regard to thelastmentionedcelebrated writer, Mr. WoUaston, besides the severe reproach cast upon him in the passage I have just cited, Lord Bolingbroke elsewhere treats him as ''' a licentious maker of hypotheses — and a whining philosopher." He represents all that he hath said about the immortality of the soul " as a string of arbitrary suppositions ;" and that " his discourse on that subject is such as'would lead one to think, that the philosopher who held it was a patient of Dr. Monro's not yet perfectly restored to his senses.f He acknowledges him indeed to have been a man of parts and learning, but charges him with writing nonsense; that Ire, and such as he, were learned lunatics ; and he treats his way of arguing about a future state, as a specimen of that sort of madness which is called a dementia quoad*lioc.% The same censure he passeth on the late Lord President of Scotland, " that he was indeed a man of capacity, good sense, and knowledge, but was in a delirium, and mad, quoad hoc, when he wrote against Tindal."§ You cannot but have observed, in reading over several of the pas sages which have been produced, that it is familiar with Lord Bolingbroke to represent those as mad and out of their senses who happen to differ from him, at least as mad with regard to the par ticular point in difference. I shall only mention one passage more to this purpose out of the many that might be produced. Having compared the reasoners a priori to persons in Bedlam, and the several sorts of madmen there, he adds, that " atheists are one sort of mad men, many divines and theists another sort;'' and that these sorts of madmen are principally to be found in colleges and schools, where different sects have rendered this sort of madness.which is occasion ally elsewhere, both epidemical and traditional. "|| If one were to imitate this author's manner of talking, one might be apt to charge him as being seized with a sort of madness, when certain subjects come in his way — metaphysics ; artificial theology : Plato and Pla tonic philosophy ; spiritual substance, and incorporeal essence ; hut, above all, the Christian divines and clergy. These, when he hap pens to meet with them, bring one of his fits upon him, and often set him a raving for several pages together. But I confess I too much dislike such a way of writing to make recriminations of- this kind. And yet his lordship tells -the divines of the discretion of their adver saries, and would have them return it with discretion. And he re presents the orthodox bullies, as he calls them, as " affecting to tri umph over men, who employ but part of their strength, as tiring them with impertinent paradoxes, and provoking them with unjust reflec tions, and often by the foulest language."!! I am apt to think, that by this time you are weary of reading over such a heap of abusive reflections, so unbecoming any man of learu- * Works, p. 184, 485. t Ibid. vol. iii. p. 515, 518, vol. v. p. 398. X Ibid. vol. v. p. 474. $ Ibid. p. 5*3. 11 Ibid. p. 3C9, 370. t Ibid. vol. iii. p. 272, 273. Let. XXII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 3Q-7 ing and education, much more one so conversant in the polite world as Lord Bolingbroke has been. The transcribing them out of his Essays was no very agreeable employment. But they so often occur there, and make so remarkable a part of the works of this right honourable author, that it was absolutely necessary to take some notice of them. One thing may be safely collected from his writing after this manner, viz. that he had a very high opinion of the supe riority of his own understanding, and a sovereign contempt for all those that were in different sentiments from him, whether philoso phers, ancient or modern, or divines, but especially for the latter. If we examine what foundation there is for these high preten sions, or what new and important discoveries this writer hath made in religion or philosophy, which may be of real use to mankind, the principal things in his scheme may be reduced to the following heads : 1. That there is one Supreme All-perfect Being, the eternal and original cause of all things, of almighty power and infinite wisdom ; but that we must not pretend to ascribe to him any moral attri butes, distinct from his physical, especially holiness, justice, and goodness; that he has not these attributes, according to the ideas we conceive of them, nor any thing equivalent to those qualities as they are in us ; and that to pretend to deduce moral obligations from those attributes, or to talk of imitating God in his moral attributes, is enthusiasm or blasphemy. 2. That God made the world, and established the laws of this system at the beginning ; but that he doth not now concern himself in the affairs of men ; or that if he doth, his providence only extend- eth to collective bodies, but hath no regard to individuals, to their actions, or to the events that befal them. 3. That the soul is not a distinct substance from the body ; that the whole man is dissolved at death; and that though it may be use ful to mankind to believe the doctrine of future rewards and punish ments, yet it is a fiction, which hath no real foundation in nature and reason ; and that to pretend to argue for future retributions from the apprehended unequal distributions of this present state, is absurd and blasphemous, and is to cast the most unworthy reflec tions on divine Providence. 4. That the law of nature is what reason discovereth to us con cerning our duty as founded in the human system; that it is clear and obvious to all mankind ; but has been obscured and perverted by ancient philosophers and modern divines ; that it has not been set in a proper light by those who have undertaken to treat of it ; and therefore he hath represented it in its genuine purity and simplicity ; and that the sanction of that law relate to men not individually, but collectively considered. 5. That from the clearness and sufficiency of the law of nature, it may be concluded, that God hath made no other revelation of his will to mankind ; and that there is no need or use for any extraor dinary supernatural revelation. 6. That it is profane and blasphemous to ascribe the Jewish x 2 308 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXII. Scriptures to revelation or inspiration from God ; that the history contained there is false and incredible, and the scheme of religion taught in those writings is absolutely unworthy of God, and repug nant to his divine perfections. 7. That the New Testament consists of two different gospels, opposite to one another, that of Christ and that of St. Paul ; that Christianity in its genuine simplicity, as taught by Jesus Christ, and contained in the evangelical writings, is a benevolent institution, and may be regarded as a republication of the law of nature, or rather of 'the theology of Plato ; that the morals it teaches are pure, but no other than the philosophers had taught before, and that some of its precepts are not agreeable to the natural law ; and some of its ori ginal doctrines, particularly those relating to the redemption of mankind by the death of Christ, and to future rewards and punish ments, are absurd, and inconsistent with the attributes of God. These appear to me to be the most remarkable things in the late Lord Bolingbroke's " Posthumous Works," as far as natural and revealed religion is concerned. And the method I propose to pursue in my observations upon them is this : I shall first consider the attempts he hath made to subvert the main principles that lie at the foundation of all religion, viz., those relating to the moral attributes of God, a particular providence extending to the individuals of the human race, the immortality of the soul, and a future state of retributions. I shall next examine the account he hath given of the law of nature, and of the duties and sanctions of that law. After which it will be proper to consider what he hath offered concerning divine, revelation in general, with a view to show that an extraordinary revelation of the will of God to mankind is absolutely needless, and that therefore we may conclude that God hath never given such a revelation at all. I shall proceed, in the next place, to a particular and distinct examination of the objections he hath urged against the truth and divine original of the Mosaic revelation, and the Scriptures of the Old Testament; and shall conclude with considering what more directly relateth to the Christian revelation properly so called, to its proofs and evidences, and to its laws and doctrines, all which he hath endeavoured to expose. This I hope may be sufficient to answer the design I have in view, which is to obviate the principal mischiefs to religion, which Lord Bolingbroke's Works seem fitted to produce. Other things there are in these volumes, which might furnish matter for many reflec tions, but which I shall take little or no notice of, as they do not come within the compass of the plan I propose. I am, &c. Let. XXIII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. UOO LETTER XXIII. Lord Bolingbroke asserts the Existence of God against the Atheists, but rejects the Argument a priori, and that drawn from the general Consent of Mankind. — He is for reducing all the divine Attributes to Wisdom and Power, and blames the Divines for distinguishing between the physical and moral Attributes. — He asserts, that we cannot ascribe Goodness and Justice to God, according to our Ideas of them, nor argue with any Certainty about them That it is absurd to deduce moral Obliga tions from the moral Attributes of God, or to pretend to imitate him in those Attributes. — Observations upon his Scheme. — It is shown, that the moral Attri butes are necessarily included in the Idea of the absolutely perfect Being. The Author's Objections against ascribing those Attributes to God, or distinguishing them from his physical Attributes, particularly considered. — His manifold Inconsis tencies and Contradictions. Sir, In my last a general account was given of the scheme Lord Bolingbroke seems to have had in view in his Posthumous Works, and of the main principles to which it is reducible. I now proceed to a more distinct examination of those principles ; and shall begin with that which lieth at the foundation of all religion, the existence and attributes of God. And it must be acknowledged, that his Lordship every-where in the strongest terms asserteth the existence of the one Supreme All-perfect Being, the Great Author of the universe. Lie represents this as strictly demonstrable, and treats the opinion of the atheists as infinitely absurd ; and that they can only cavil, but cannot reason, against the existence ofthe first cause ; of which, he thinks, we may be in reason as sure as of our own exis tence. There are several passages in his works, in which he ex presseth himself devoutly with regard to the Supreme Being, and professeth seriously to adore him. And there are some instances of his addressing him with great solemnity, and in a religious manner.* I need not take any notice of what he hath briefly offered for de monstrating the existence of a Deity. t He has said nothing on this head, but what has been frequently urged to great advantage by others before him; and particularly by Dr. Clarke, in what his Lordship is pleased to call his pretended demonstration of the being and attributes of God.\ Our author indeed is for confining the proof to the argument a posteriori, and is for absolutely rejecting the argument a priori, whereas Dr. Clarke insists upon both ; and I cannot help thinking that both may be highly useful ; and that they are then most effec tual, and come with the greatest force, when they come in aid of one another. As Lord Bolingbroke rejects the argument a priori for the exis tence and perfections of God, so he seems not willing to allow that * See particularly vol. iii. p. 247, 356. vol. v. p. 338, &c. t Works, vol. iii. p. 353, 354. ' Ibid. p. 52. 310 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXIII. which is drawn from the general consent of mankind. He says, it will indeed prove, that men generally believed a God, but not that such a Being exists ; and he represents it as trifling to insist upon it.* And in a letter occasioned by one of Archbishop Tillotson's sermons, vol. iii. p. 257, and seq. he finds fault with that great divine for mak ing use of that argument, and disingenuously represents it, as if he had rested the proof of a Deity principally upon it ;t which he is far from doing, though it must be acknowledged to be a considera tion of great weight. He particularly blames the Archbishop for ascribing this consent to the nature of the human mind, on which God has impressed an innate idea of himself; but he owns, that afterwards he softens it by saying, that " the human mind is so dis posed, that men may discover, in the due use of its faculties, that there is a God." X And he speaks of some divines who explain it thus ; that the belief of God is founded on a certain natural propor tion there is between this great truth and the conceptions of the human mind. But our author thinks, that " such a natural and in timate proportion between the existence of God, and the conceptions of the human mind, may appear chimerical, and perhaps is so;"^ and observes, that " polytheism was more conformable to the natural conceptions of the human mind, especially in the most ancient and ignorant ages, than the belief of One first intelligent Cause, the sole Creator, Preserver, and Governor of all things." Yet he afterwards declares, that " the idea of an All-wise and All-powerful Being, the first cause of all things, is so proportionable to human reason, that it must have been received into the minds of men, as soon as they began to contemplate the face of nature, and to exercise their reason in such contemplations."|| And in his reflections on M. Mauper- tuis, who had slighted the argument from the general consent of mankind, he observes, that " it is general enough to show the pro portion which this truth bears to the universal reason qf mankind."^ You cannot but observe here, that he directly makes use of that manner of expression which he had before blamed others for using. But it will be proper more distinctly to inquire into the idea this writer gives of God, and of the divine perfections. The only attri butes of God which he insisteth upon as necessary to be known by us are, his power and wisdom. " We rise," says he, " from a know ledge of ourselves, and of the works of God, to a knowledge of his existence, and his wisdom and power, which we call infinite."** He blames those who presume to define the moral attributes of an All- perfect Being ; and thinks " we ought to content ourselves lo know that he exists by the necessity of his nature, and that his wisdom and power are infinite."tt He declares, that a "self-existent Being, the first Cause of all things, infinitely powerful and infinitely wise, is the God of natural theology ; that as the whole system of the uni verse bears witness to this truth, so the whole system of natural * Works, vol. iii. p. 247. t Ibid. p. 258,' 267. t Ibid p 258 i Ibid. r. 259, 260. || Ibid. vol. iv. p. 195. 324 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXIII, made us happy, and has put it into our power to make ourselves happier, by a due use of our reason, which leads us into the practice of moral virtue, and all the duties of society."* "That we are obliged to our Creator for a certain rule, and sufficient means of arriving at happiness, and have none to blame but ourselves when we fail of it."t " That God made us to be happy here. He may make us happier in another system of being. That there is even in this world much more good than evil, and the present state of man kind is happy in it." "f " And that the end of the 'human state is human happiness." § You are, I doubt not, by this time prepared for what I proposed to show in the last place, the contradictions and inconsistencies our author has fallen into in treating of this subject. I suppose vou to bear in mind the severe censures he hath passed upon the divines for pretending to connect the physical and moral attributes of God and for ascribing to him moral attributes, justice and goodness, accordinc to our ideas. And now I desire you to compare the passages already produced with those that follow. God shows us our duty, " by which we stand in the relation of subjects and servants to a gracious and beneficent Lord and Master who gave us laws neither captious nor ambiguous, and who commands us nothing which it is not our interest to perfbrm."|| He here sup poses it to be a thing evident from the law of nature, that we stand in relation to God as our gracious and beneficent Lord and Master who has our interest and happiness in view in the very laws he enjoins. And is not this plainly to ascribe goodness to him, even according to our ideas of goodness? And elsewhere he represents it, as if he could not ask more of a beneficent Creator than he has done for us. f He says, " the theist acknowledges whatever God has done to be just and good in itself, though it doth not appear such in every instance, conformably to his ideas of justice and o-ood- ness. He imputes the difference to the defect of his ideas, and not to any defect of the divine attributes. Where he sees them, he owns them explicitly ; where he does not see them, he pronounces nothing about them. He is as far from denying them" (that is, from denying the justice and goodness of God), " as he is from denying the wisdom and power of God."** The most orthodox divine could hardly express himself more fully on this head than Lord Bolingbroke has here done. To the same purpose he intro duces a meditation or soliloquy of a sincere and devout theist in which he represents him as saying, among other things " Man enjoys numberless benefits by the fitness of his nature to° this con stitution, unasked, unmerited, freely bestowed. The wisdom and goodness of God are therefore manifest. May I enjoy thankfully the benefits bestowed on me by the divine liberality; may I receive the evils to which I am exposed patiently, nay, willingly !"ff But what deserves particularly to be remarked is, that whereas he * W,?rlf,V01' £p* 384* * ir3''?;-?- 388;c, * Ibid' p' 391> 392' § ^id. p. 544. Hid. p. 97. IT Ibid. p. 481. •* ]Did D 31, 010 t + Ibid. p. 338, 339-See, also 1. iii. p. 353 P' ' Let. XXIII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 325 represents the ascribing goodness and justice to God according to our ideas, to be what gives great advantage to the atheists with re gard to the original of evil ; as if he thought it impossible to reconcile the evil that is in the world with God's moral attributes, and the sup position of his being good and righteous and holy, as well as power ful and wise ; he .has taken great pains to confute his own arguments. For not a few of his fragments and essays in his fifth volume are taken up in endeavouring to remove and answer that objection, and to show that the evil there is in the present constitu tion of things in this world, is reconcileable to the justice and goodness of God, even according to the ideas we form of them.* He undertakes to defend the goodness of God against the atheists and divines.t And having, as he pretends, done this, he proceeds to vindicate the justice and righteousness of God against the same confederates.^. Thus the same author who had used his utmost efforts to show, in opposition to the divines, that moral attributes, particularly justice and goodness, ought not to be ascribed to God according to the ideas we conceive of them, and that we cannot form any judgment concerning them, takes upon him afterwards to vindicate those very attributes against the divines, who, he pretends, are for destroying them. So strangely inconsistent is this writer's scheme, that on the one hand, With a view to invalidate the argu ment for a state of future retributions drawn from the moral attri butes of God, he endeavours to take away those attributes, or confound them with the physical, and to show that there is no such thing as goodness or justice in God according to our ideas, nor any thing equivalent to them ; and that the phenomena are repugnant to those attributes ; and on the other hand, with the same view of weakening or destroying the argument for a future state from those attributes, he sets himself to prove, that the present state of things is sufficiently conformable to our ideas of the divine justice and good ness, and that these attributes are so fully exercised or displayed here, that there is no need for any further manifestation or display of them hereafter. I shall only produce one passage more, and it is a very remarkable one. Towards the conclusion of his last volume, when he pretends to draw a line of separation between natural and artificial theology, he observes, that by that, viz. natural theology, " we are taught to acknowledge and adore the infinite wisdom and power of God, manifested in every part of his creation, and ascribe goodness and justice to him wherever he intended that we should so ascribe them, that is, wherever either his works, or the dispensations of his provi dence, do as necessarily communicate these notions to our minds, as those of wisdom and power are communicated to us in the whole extent of both. Wherever they are not so communicated, we may assume very reasonably, that it is on motives strictly conformable to all the divine attributes, and therefore to goodness and justice, though * See vol. y. frag. 45, 44, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54. t Ibid. p. 335. X Ibid. p. 393. 326 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXIII. unknown to us, from whom so many circumstances, with a relation to which the divine providence acts, must be often concealed ; or, we may resolve all into the wisdom of God, and not presume to account for them morally."* The last part of this passage hath a reference to his scheme of resolving all into the divine wisdom. But you cannot but observe here, that after his repeated invectives against the divines, and against artificial theology, for ascribing moral attri butes to God, justice and goodness, according to our ideas of them, he has in effect here acknowledged all that the divines themselves teach. They believe that God is always good and just, though they do not pretend to account for the exercise of goodness and justice in every particular instance ; but that enough we know to convince us of both ; the notions of which, this writer himself here owns to be, in many instances at least, necessarily communicated to us from his works ; and surely then we should endeavour to resemble him in these his moral perfections, as far as we know them. Before I conclude this letter, I shall take some notice, because I shall not afterwards have so proper an opportunity for it, of what he hath observed concerning eternal ideas in God, and concerning the eternal reasons and fitnesses of things. He finds great fault with Dr. Cudworth, Dr. Clarke, and others, for talking of ideas in God, as if they supposed his manner of know ing to be exactly the same with ours ; which certainly was far from their intention. He pronounces, that " the doctrine of eternal ideas in the divine mind has been much abused by those who are in the delirium of metaphysical theology. It cannot be understood in a literal sense." And he thinks " such a way of talking is profane as well as presumptuous; and that it is silly too, and mere cant."t He has several observations, which are for the most part very just, to show, that God's manner of knowing is very different from ours, and that he does not know by the help or intervention of ideas as we do.}. I need not take particular notice of those observations, which contain little in them, that will not be acknowledged by those whom he has thought to oppose. The rash and improper use ofthe word ideas, as applied to God, hath no doubt led to mistakes, and to wrong and unwarrantable ways of expression ; as any one must be convinced that knows what contentions there have been in the schools about the divine ideas, which have given rise to arrogant and foolish questions, scarce consistent with the veneration that is due to the supreme incomprehensible Being. Yet the modest use of that expression is not to be too rigidly censured. Our author him self, who blames it so much in others, hath on several occasions fal len into the same manner of expression himself. Thus he observes, that "it might be determined in the divine ideas, that there should be a gradation of life and intellect throughout the universe :"§ and he repeats it again, "that this appeared necessary or fit in the divine ideas, that is, to speak more rationally, to the supreme divine reason or intention."!! Where he useth the term divine ideas as * Works, vol. v. p. 517. | Ibid. vol. iii. p. 356. t Ibid. p. 355—357. vol. v. p. 35—38. * Ibid vol v i> 337 || Ibid. p. 365. " ' ' Let. XXIII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 327 equivalent to the divine reason, and intention, though ho thinks the latter more proper. He elsewhere declares, that " the ideas of God, if we may ascribe ideas to him, no more than his ways, are those of man."* And in one of his most celebrated pieces, published in his own lifetime, he saith, that " God in his eternal ideas, for we are able to conceive no other manner of knowing, has prescribed to him self that rule by which he governs the universe he created."f Here he not only ascribes ideas to God, but eternal ideas, by which God hath prescribed to himself a rule for his governing the world. This rule he there explaineth to be " a fitness arising from the various natures, and more various relations of things, in the system which he hath constituted ;" which fitness he there supposeth to have been known to God in his eternal ideas. And yet he hath frequently inveighed against Dr. Clarke, for speaking of the eternal reasons and relations of things. This particularly is the subject of the second, fifty-eighth, and fifty-ninth of his fragments and essays in the fifth volume of his works. He treats that learned divine as if he maintained, that these reasons and fitnesses of things were real natures, existing independently of God, and co-eternal with him ; and yet he himself, speaking of Dr. Cudworth and others, observeth, that when they talk of eternal ideas and essences independent on the will of God, "they do not mean by these eternal independent natures, any natures at all, but such intelligible essences and rationes of things, as are objects of the mind."} And it is his own observa tion, that " God knew from all eternity every system that he created in time — the relations things should bear — and the proportions they should have ;"§ and that " to the divine omniscience the future is like the present;" and therefore he thinks it improper to talk of prescience in God. He represents it as " a great truth, that the whole series of things is at all times actually present to the divine mind, so that we may say properly, that God knows things, because they are actual to him." H According to his own representation therefore it may be justly said, that all the fitnesses and relations of things were from the beginning actually present to the divine mind. And he accordingly declares, that God was determined by his infinite wisdom to proceed with his creatures in all the exertions ot his power, according to the fitness of things ;f or in other words, as he elsewhere expresseth it, God does not govern by mere arbitrary will, but always does that which is fittest to be done ; and which he from all eternity saw would be fittest to be done. And this seems to be all that is really intended by those who speak of the eternal reasons and fitnesses of things. Whether therefore the manner of expression be strictly proper or not, this writer had no right to pass so severe a censure upon it as he has done, since it comes so near to his own. But I believe you will think it is time to quit this subject, and pass on to some other things in Lord Bolingbroke's works, which * Works, vol. v. p. 344. t Idea of a Patriot King, in vol.t.iii. of his Works, p. 53. X Works, p. 15. § Ibid. p. 7. || Ibid. vol. v.. p. 457, 458. f Ibid. p. 435. 328 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXIV. which will dese I am yours, &c relate to things of no small importance, and which will deserve a particular consideration. LETTER XXIV. The Doctrine of Divine Providence nearly connected with that of the Existence of God. — Lord Bolingbroke's Account of it considered. — He acknowledges a general but denies a particular Providence, and asserts, that Providence relates only to col lective Bodies, but doth not extend to Individuals. — The true Notion of Providence stated.— What we are to understand by a particular Providence. — The Reasonable ness of believing it, and the great Importance of it shown The contrary Scheme is absurd, and inconsistent with itself, and of the worst Consequence to Mankind. The Objections against a particular Providence examined.— Concerning occasional Interpositions They are not properly miraculous, nor Deviations from the general Laws of Providence, but Applications of those Laws to particular Cases To acknowledge such Interpositions is not to suppose the World governed by Miracles, nor to introduce an universal Theocracy like the Jewish. — Angels may be employed in particular Cases as Ministers of Providence. Sir, The doctrine of divine providence hath a very near connexion with that of the existence of the Deity, and is no less necessary to be believed. To acknowledge a God that brought all things into existence, and yet to deny that he afterwards taketh care of the creatures he hath made, or that he exerciseth any inspection over them, as a moral governor, or concerneth himself about their actions, and the events relating to them, is, with regard to all the purposes of religion, the same thing as not to acknowledge a God at all. It is one great excellence of the holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, that they every where teach us to have a constant regard to the divine providence, as presiding over the universal system, and all the orders of beings in it, and as in a particular manner exercising a continual care and inspection towards mankind, observing all their actions, and ordering and disposing the events relating to them with infinite wisdom, righteousness, and goodness. But this doctrine of providence, which, one should think, ought mightily to recommend the Scriptures to every good mind, seems to have been one principal ground of the prejudices which Lord Bolingbroke hath conceived against those sacred writings. It is true, that he frequently affecteth to show a zeal for divine providence ; he sets up as an advocate for its proceedings against the divines, who, he pretends, join with the atheists in misrepresenting and opposing it. But if his scheme be narrowly examined, it will appear, that, notwithstanding his fair pretences, he doth not acknowledge a providence in that sense in which it is most useful and necessary to believe it. He declares, that " in asserting the justice of providence, he has Let. XXIV. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 320 chosen rather to insist on the most visible and undeniable course of a general providence, than to assume a dispensation of particular providences."* He observes, that " the world is governed by laws, which the Creator imposed on the physical and moral systems, when he willed them into existence, and which must be in force as long as they last ; and any change in which would be a change in the systems themselves. These laws are invariable, but they are general, and from this generality what we call contingencies arise."-f- " The course of things rolls on through a vast variety of contingent events ; for such they are to our apprehension ; according to the first impressions of motion that were given it by the first Mover, and under the direction of an universal providence. "J "As to the brute animals, they are left under the direction of instinct ; and as to men, God has given his human creatures the materials of physical and moral happiness, in the physical and moral constitution of things. He has given them faculties and powers, necessary to collect and apply these materials, and to carry on the work— this the Creator has done for us. What we shall do for ourselves, he has left to the freedom of our elections. This is the plan of divine wisdom ; and we know nothing more particular, and indeed nothing more at all, of the dispensations of providence than this."§ This then is all the part he allows to providence in the moral world, that God has given man reason, and, as he elsewhere observes, passion,|| and has left him to the freedom of his own will, without ever concerning himself farther about the individuals of the human race, or exercising any inspection over men's moral conduct, in order to the rewarding the good, or punishing the bad. That this is his intention is manifest, by comparing this with other passages. He expressly declares, that " it is plain from the whole course of God's providence, that he regards his human creatures collectively, not individually, how worthy soever every one of them deems himself to be a particular object ofthe divine care. "11 This, of God's regarding men collectively, not individually, is what he frequently repeats; and it appears to be a principal point in his scheme. With the same view he declares, that the sanctions of the law of nature relate not to individuals, but to collective bodies.** He finds fault with the notion, which, he says, obtained among the heathens, " that God was constantly attentive to the affairs of men."t-|- And he asserts, that " God may foresee, or rather see, all the most contingent events that happen in the course of his general providence ; but not provide for particular cases, nor determine the existence of particular men.""|;^ He observes, that " the divine pro vidence has provided means to punish individuals, by directing men to form societies, and to establish laws, in the execution of which civil magistrates are the vicegerents of providence ; and when the immorality of individuals becomes that of a whole society, then the * Works, vol. v. p. 414. t Ibid. p. 416. X Ibid. p. 379. $ Ibid. p. 473, 474. || Ibid. p. 417. It Ibid. p. 431. 11 * Ibid. p. 90. tt Ibid. p. 211. tl Ibid. p. 462. 330 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXIV. judgments of God follow, and men are punished collectively in the course of a general providence." So that he allows no punishments bv providence for individuals, but those which are executed by the civil magistrates. And if a man can escape punishment from them, he has nothing to fear from God, except the whole community be as bad as himself ; and even then the punishment may not happen in that or the next age, till he shall be no more. Our author indeed sometimes declares, that " he neither affirms nor denies particular providences."* And after having observed, that there is little credit to be given to the reports concerning par ticular acts of providence, wrought on particular occasions, he acids, that " yet he will not presume to deny, that there have been any such."f He makes the same declaration afterwards towards the end of his book4 But notwithstanding these professions, it is a point that he hath very much laboured to destroy, the belief of a particular providence. This is the express design of several of his Fragments and Essays in the fifth volume of his works; especially of the fifty-fifth, fifty-sixth, fifty-seventh, sixty-second, and sixty-fourth, of those Essays ; in all which he argues directly, and in some of them largely, against that doctrine. And after having observed, that what we find in the book qf nature is undoubtedly the word of God, he asserts, that " there we shall find no foundation for the scheme of a particular providence."^ He declares indeed, " that he will not be so uncharitable as to say, that divines mean to blaspheme [in their doctrines of a particular provi dence]," yet that this he will take upon him to say, that he " who follows them cannot avoid presumption and profaneness, and must be much on his guard against blasphemy."! That I may observe some order in my reflections upon this subject, I shall first offer some observations for stating the right notion of divine providence, and what we are to understand by a particular providence ; and then shall proceed to show the absurdity and ill consequences of the author's scheme ; and lastly, consider the argu ments he hath urged in support of it, and the objections he hath made against the doctrine of a particular providence. By the doctrine of providence I understand the doctrine of an all- perfect mind, preserving and governing the vast universe in all its parts, presiding over all the creatures, especially rational moral agents, inspecting their conduct, and superintending and ordering the events relating to them, in the best and fittest manner, with in finite wisdom, righteousness, and equity. And such a providence cannot reasonably be denied by those, who believe that the world was originally formed by a most wise and powerful and infinitely perfect Cause and Author ; for whatever reasons induced him to create the world, which may be justly supposed to have been for the communication of his goodness, and for the joint exercise and display of his glorious attributes and perfections, must equally dis pose him to take care of it, and govern it, when made. Accord- * Woiks, vol. v. p. 413, 4*4. t Ibid. p. 420. f Ibid 510 <* Ibid. p. 471. || Ibid. p. 401. Let. XXIV. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 331 ingly the Epicureans and others who denied a providence, did also deny that the world was made by God, and attributed the formation of it, not to the wisdom, the power, and will of an intelligent cause, but to a wild chance, or fortuitous concourse of atoms, or to an equally blind fatal necessity. And so far their scheme, however false and absurd, was consistent with itself. For they could find no effectual way to exclude God from the government of the world, which was what they wanted to get rid of, but by excluding him from the making of it too. Supposing one supreme absolutely- perfect Cause and Author of all things, who made this vast uni verse, and all the orders of beings in it, which is what Lord Boling broke not only allows, but expressly asserts, it follows by the most evident consequence, that the same infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, which gave existence to the world and all things in it, still presideth over the universal frame in all its parts. The beau tiful and constant order which is still maintained in the inanimate material system, plainly sheweth, that this stupendous frame of na ture, consisting of such an inconceivable variety of parts, is under the constant superintendence of a most wise and powerful presiding mind, ever present to his own work. But the providence of God is especially to be considered as exercised towards reasonable crea tures, moral agents, which are undoubtedly the noblest and most excellent of his creatures. The material system, whatever order or beauty appeareth in it, is not itself conscious of that beauty and order. Nor are mere sensitive beings capable of making proper re flections upon it, or of admiring, adoring, obeying the great Parent of the universe. This is the sole privilege of rational intelligent beings. If therefore the providence of God extendeth to any of his creatures at all, we may be sure that he exerciseth a special care over his reasonable creatures ; and since he hath given them such noble faculties and moral powers, will govern them in a way suitable to those faculties and powers. And this certainly is the most ad mirable part of the divine administration in the government of the universe. For to govern numberless myriads of active intelligent beings, in their several orders and degrees, each of whom have a will and choice of their own, and a power of determining their own actions ; to exercise a constant superintendency over them, and to order the events relating to them, and to dispense to them proper retributions, not only according to their outward actions, but the inward dispositions and principles from which those actions flow ; I say, thus to govern them, without infringing the liberty which be- longeth to them as moral agents, must needs argue a wisdom as well as power that exceedeth our comprehension. Yet who will undertake to prove that this is impossible, or even difficult, to an infinite, all-comprehending mind ? We may reasonably conceive that that immense Being, whose essence possesseth every part of this vast universe, is present to every individual of the human race. And if- that most wise, holy, and absolutely-perfect Being, the Great Governor ofthe world, be always present to every individual of the human race, then every individual, and all their particular actions, 332 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXIV. cases, and circumstances, must be under his providential inspection and superintendency. And as he knoweth all these things when they actually happen, so he, to whom, by our author's own ac knowledgment, future things are as if they were present, saw them before they came to pass. And therefore it was not difficult for him to form such a comprehensive scheme of things in his infinite mind, as should extend to all their particular cases, and the events relating to them, in a manner perfectly consistent with the exercise of their reasonable moral powers, and the use of their own en deavours. And now it appears what is to be understood by the doctrine of a particular providence. It signifies, that Providence extends its care to the particulars or individuals of the human race, which is what this writer denies : that God exerciseth a continual inspection over them, and knoweth and observeth both the good and evil ac tions they perform, and even the most secret affections and disposi tions of their hearts : that he observeth them not merely as an unconcerned spectator, who is perfectly indifferent about them, but as the supreme ruler and judge, so as to govern them with infinite wisdom, in a way consistent with their moral agency, and to reward or punish them in the properest manner, and in the fittest season. And as all their actions, so the events which befall them, are under his supreme direction and superintendency. Particular events are, in the ordinary course of things, ordered in such a manner, as is subordinate to the general laws of providence relating to the physi cal and moral world. And what are usually called occasional in terpositions, are properly to be considered as applications of general laws to particular eases and occasions. They make a part of the universal plan of providence, and are appointed and provided for in it, as having been perfectly foreseen from the beginning, and origi nally intended in the government of reasonable beings. The doctrine of a particular providence taken in this view is of vast consequence, and, if duly considered and believed, could scarce fail to have a happy influence over our whole temper and deport ment. How solicitous, how earnestly desirous should this make us to approve ourselves to our supreme governor and judge, and to walk always as in his sight! What an animating consideration is it, when we set about the performance of a good action, to be assured, that God in his holy providence observeth the good deed in every circumstance, and is ready to assist and support us in it, and most certainly will not suffer it to pass unrewarded ! On the other hand, what an effectual restraint would it be to wicked actions, if we had this thought strongly impressed upon our minds, that they are all perfectly known in every circumstance to the most wise and righ teous governor of the world ; and that if he should not at present follow them with immediate punishment, yet the time is coming, when he will call us to a strict account for them ! Finally, a firm belief of a particular providence, as most wisely ordering and dis posing the events relating to particular persons, is a source of satis faction and comfort amidst all the uncertainties and fluctuations of Let. XXIV. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 333 this present world. No consideration is so well fitted to produce a cheerful resignation, and an inward solid peace and joy of heart, as this : that all things, all particular cases and circumstances, are under the direction and government of the most perfect wisdom, righteousness, and goodness ; and that nothing can befall us without the direction or permission of the supreme disposer. Nothing therefore could be worse founded than the boasts of the Epicureans, who expected to be applauded as friends and benefac tors to mankind, on the account of their endeavours to deliver them from the apprehensions of a providence. This might indeed be some relief to very bad men, and tend to make them easy in their sins; but it was an attempt to rob good men of that which is the chief support and comfort of their lives, and the most powerful en couragement to the steady uniform practice of piety and virtue. Lord Bolingbroke therefore was very ill employed, when he used his utmost efforts to destroy the doctrine of providence, as extend ing its care and inspection to individuals ; since without this, the acknowledgment of what he calls a general providence would be of no great advantage, and would be, with regard to all the purposes of religion, little better than to deny that there is a providence at all. This leads me to what I proposed to show in the next place, viz. the absurdity and the ill consequences of the scheme his Lordship hath advanced. It is an absurd and inconsistent scheme. He pretends to allow, that God's providence extends to nations and large communities, that it regards men collectively, but not individually. But it is hard to conceive how a proper care could be taken of collective bodies, if the individuals of which they were composed were abso lutely neglected, and no regard had to them at all. A human go vernment, that would have no regard to the cases of particular per sons, to do them right or secure them from wrong, could scarce be accounted a government. Besides it may be asked what his Lord ship means by collective bodies. There was a time when men had not yet formed themselves into political societies ; must it be said that they were then not the objects of providence at all ? Or, will it be allowed that providence extended its care to them whilst they were only in families ? And how could families, either larger or smaller, be taken care of, if the individuals, of which families con sist, were neglected ? And when several families united together, and formed larger communities, must it be said, that providence quitted its care of the families to which it had extended before, and confined its inspection to those larger communities ? And then it might be enquired, how large must a community be, in order to its being the proper object of divine providence ? Does providence take notice of single cities, or smaller republics, or only of those communities which are become so numerous as to be united into large nations or empires ? It may be farther asked, in what sense is it to be understood, that providence extends its care to collective bodies ? All that he understands by it seems to be this : that " the 334 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXIV. course of things has been always the same ; that national virtue and national vice have always produced national happiness or misery in a due proportion, and are by consequence the great sanctions of the law of nature."* The appointing this general constitution then seems to be all the concern that he allows to divine providence with regard to large communities or collective bodies ; and the only sanc tions he allows of the law of nature (as I shall have occasion more distinctly to show, when I come to consider the account he gives of that law) are the public happiness or miseries of large societies or nations ; and these are often some ages in operating. It frequently happens, that nations and large communities continue for a consi derable time in great outward prosperity, when there is little na tional virtue remaining. And our author himself acknowledges, that the motives drawn from the effects of virtue and vice on col lective bodies, are "such as particular persons will be apt to think do not concern them, because they consider themselves as indivi duals, and catch at pleasure rather than happiness."f And as nations are made up of families and smaller societies, if these be not well constituted, as they cannot be where there is no sense of reli gion, no fear of God, or regard to a providence as extending to indi viduals, there cannot be much national order or virtue. Lord Bolingbroke would, in my opinion, have been more consis tent with himself, if he had absolutely denied that providence hath any regard to mankind at al', than to pretend that it extends to collective bodies, but not to individuals; for the same arguments, which prove a providence as extending to mankind in general, do also, if rightly considered, prove that it is exercised towards particu lar persons, and extendeth to particular cases and circumstances. This writer sets himself, as hath been already observed, with great appearance of zeal, to vindicate the goodness and justice of divine providence in its dispensations towards mankind, in opposition both to atheists and divines. But how the justice and goodness of pro vidence towards mankind can be vindicated, if no regard be had to individuals, it is hard to see. He himself observes, that "justice requires that punishments should be measured out in various de grees and measures, according to the various circumstances of par ticular cases, and in proportion to them.";]: And again he repeats it, "that justice requires that rewards and punishments should be measured out in every particular case, in proportion to the merit and demerit of each individual."§ How then can he pretend to vin dicate the justice of providence in this present state, when he makes it essential to justice that regard should be had to the case of indi viduals, and yet affirms that providence doth not consider men indi vidually at all, but only collectively? And as his scheme is absurd and inconsistent with itself, so it is attended with the most pernicious consequences, which ou°-ht to create a horror of it in every well-disposed mind. If providence * Works, vol. v. p. 472. t Ibid. vol. iv. p. 228. t Ibid, vol, v. p 494. § Ibid p. 495. Let. XXIV. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 335 hath no regard to individuals, there can be no sense of the divine favour for good actions, no fear of the divine displeasure for evil ones ; and, as will appear to be his Lordship's sentiment, no future account to be apprehended. Thus every man is left to do what is right in his own eyes, without the dread of a supreme Governor and Judge. It is true, God hath established general laws at the begin ning, but he concerneth himself no farther. And our author will not allow that in these general laws, or the plan originally formed in the divine mind, God had any regard unto, or made any provision for, particular persons, actions, or events. Good men therefore have no resource in their calamities ; no ground to apply to God for support under them ; no expectation of assistance from him, or from any other being acting under his direction, as the ministers and in struments of his providence : they are deprived of the comforts arising from a consciousness of his special approbation and compla cency, and from the prospects of reward from him here or hereafter. Thus hope is excluded, which, as his, Lordship observes, " above all things softens the evils of this life, and is that cordial drop which sweetens every bitter potion, even the last."* On the other hand, wicked men have nothing to fear from God for their evil actions. He says indeed, in a passage cited above, that " providence has pro vided means to punish individuals, by directing men to form socie ties, and to establish laws, in the execution of which civil magis trates are the vicegerents of providence ;" but I do not see with what propriety upon his scheme civil magistrates can be said to be the vicegerents of providence ; for if providence doth not consider men individually at all, how can magistrates, in punishing indivi duals, be regarded as the vicegerents of providence? Or, if provi dence constituted them its vicegerents, and there were no sanctions at all proposed for particular persons but those of the civil laws, it would follow, that men may be as wicked as they will, and give as great a loose as they please to their appetites and passions, provided they can manage so as to escape punishment from human judicato ries, which a man may do, and yet be a very bad man. Human magistrates are often themselves corrupt. Solomon's observation is certainly j ust : / have seen the place of judgment, that wickedness was there, and the place of righteousness, that iniquity was there, Eccl. iii. 16. Very unjust things are often done under colour of forms of law. Or, suppose the laws good, and the magistrates just and up right, no human laws can reward or punish inward good or bad affections, intentions, and dispositions of the heart. If therefore there were no regard to a supreme Governor or Judge, to the divine approbation or displeasure, as extending to individuals, or to a future account, there is great reason to think, that mankind in general would be far more wicked and dissolute than they are. It is his Lordship's observation, that "amidst the contingencies of human affairs, the odds will always be on the side of appetite — which reason cannot quite subdue in the strongest minds, and by * Works, vol. v. p. 379. 336 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXIV. which she is perpetually subdued in the weakest."* And accord ingly the ablest politicians have thought the aids of religion, which especially includes a regard to providence as extending to indivi duals, absolutely necessary for strengthening the bands of civil government. I shall now consider the arguments Lord Bolingbroke hath offered in support of his scheme, and the objections he hath ad vanced against the doctrine of a particular providence. He frequently intimates, that the doctrine of a particular provi dence is needless ; " since the ordinary course of things, preserved and conducted by a general providence, is sufficient to confirm what the law of nature and reason teaches us."-]- But it appears from what hath been already observed, that the doctrine of a general providence, as he understands it, i. e. a providence that has no regard to individuals at all, to their actions, or to the events that befall them, is far from being sufficient to the purposes of religion and virtue, or of human societies : that it neither furnisheth proper comfort and supports for the encouragement of good men, nor is sufficient to strike terror into bad men, and to be a restraint to vice and wickedness. It hath also been shown, that the notion of a general providence, as excluding all regard to individuals, and to their actions and concernments, cannot be supported, nor made to consist with reason or with itself. And whereas it is represented as a degrading the divine Majesty, to suppose him to concern himself about what relates to such inconsiderable beings, as are the indi viduals of the human race : this objection, though varnished over with a pretence of consulting God's honour, doth at the bottom argue mean and unworthy notions of him. It is in effect a judging of God by our own imperfections. Our views are narrow and limited, and cannot take in many things at once, nor attend to smaller matters without neglecting things of greater consequence : but it is otherwise with a Being of infinite perfection, who is inti mately present to every part of this vast universe, and knoweth and taketh care of all things at once, with the same ease as if he had only one single thing to attend to. He is capable of exercising a most wise providential care towards all his creatures in a way suited to their several natures, conditions, and circumstances : nor can the multiplicity of things occasion the least confusion or perplexity in his all-comprehending mind. The arguments which he urgeth against a particular providence, in the fifty-seventh of his Fragments and Essays, for several pages together,*!" proceed upon a continued misrepresentation of the sense of those whom he has thought fit to oppose. He there chargeth the divines as maintaining, that God ought by particular providences to interpose in every single instance, for giving an immediate reward to every good action, and for punishing every evil one, even in this present state. He supposes them also to hold, that some men are necessarily determined to good actions by divine influences com- * Works, vol. v. p. 479. t Ibid. p. 404. j Ibid. p. 424, & seq. Let. XXIV. LORD BOLING-BROKE. 337 municated to them, and others for want of those influences un avoidably determined to evil ; and then he argues, that on such a supposition there would be no room for free choice, nor consequently for virtue or vice, merit or demerit, nor therefore justice or injus tice.* He urgeth further, that if good men were constantly and remarkably distinguished by a particular providence, it would be apt to produce presumption in them, to destroy or prevent their benevolence, and consequently their goodness; and to harden the wicked :f and that even on that supposition, the providence of God could not be vindicated in the opinion of mankind, or of di vines themselves, since still it would not be agreed who were good men. The Mahometans, Christians, and different sects of the latter, would insist upon it, that goodness includes a belief of their distinguishing tenets, and an attachment to their several systems of religion. " One would pass for a good man at Rome, another at Geneva," &lc.% But he seems not to have considered, that upon the supposition he puts, there could be no place for this objection : since if every good man and good action was to be immediately and remarkably distinguished by a particular interposition of divine providence, and every bad man and evil action to be immediately punished, there would be no room left for men's passing different judgments concerning the goodness or badness of persons or actions; for on that supposition, there would be a visible determination of heaven in favour of every good man and good action ; so that no man could doubt, upon seeing any person thus remarkably favour ed and distinguished, that he was really good, whatever denomina tion he might pass under. But the truth is, no divine ever ad vanced such an hypothesis as he here argueth against. By the doc trine of a particular providence, they do not mean a constant par ticular interposition of divine providence for rewarding every good man and virtuous action, and punishing every bad man and every wicked action, in an immediate and visible manner .here on earth : on the contrary, they universally maintain, that this present state is a state of trial and discipline ; and that it would be no way agree able to the nature of such a state to have all good men and good actions immediately and remarkably rewarded, and all wicked men immediately punished : that the temporary sufferings of good men, and the prosperity of the wicked, are permitted for very wise ends, and may be reasonably and consistently accounted for, on the sup position that this present life is a state of trial ; though they could not well be accounted for, if this were designed to be a state of final retributions, or to be the only state of existence allotted us. The greatest part of what he offers against a particular providence in the sixty-second of his Fragments and Essays, relates to occa sional interpositions, which he pretends would be miracles if they were real. " Such," he says, " they would be strictly, whether they were contrary to the established course of nature or not ; for the miracle consists in the extraordinary interposition, as much as * Works, vol. v. p. 425, 426. t Ibid. p. 428, 429. X Ibid. p. 431, 132. 7. 338 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXIV. in the nature ofthe thing brought to pass ; that the miracle would be as real in the one case as in the other ; and the reality might be made evident enough by the occasion, by the circumstance, by the repetition of it on similar occasions, and in similar circumstances ; and, above all, by this circumstance, that the assumed particular providence was a direct answer to particular prayers and acts of de votion offered up to procure it."* Here he takes upon him to give a new and arbitrary definition of a miracle. Though a thing hath nothing in it contrary to the established course of nature, yet it is to be regarded as a miracle, if there be supposed to be any special agency of the divine providence in it, suited to particular occasions and circumstances; and, above all, if it be supposed to come in answer to prayer. But if the occasional interpositions he refers to be perfectly agreeable to the general laws of nature and of provi dence, and be only special applications of general laws to particular occasions, I do not see how they can be properly said to be miracu lous at all; or how their being supposed to come in answer to prayer can make them so. But he urgeth farther, that " if providence were directed accord ing to the particular desires, and even wants, of persons equally well qualified and entitled to the divine favour, the whole order of nature, physical and moral, would be subverted, the affairs of man kind would fall into the utmost confusion — and if this scheme were true, the world would be governed by miracles, till miracles lost their name."-f' But all this proceeds upon a great mistake of the point in ques tion. None of the divines that hold a particular providence, i. e. a providence which extendeth its care to particular persons or indi viduals of the human race, maintain or suppose, that God must interpose to satisfy all the different desires and prayers of men, many of which, as he observes, are repugnant to one another. If the prayers be of the right kind, such as reason and religion prescribe, they must be always offered up with this condition or limitation, which the Scripture expressly directs us to, viz. that we must desire the things we pray for, so far and no farther than they are agreeable to the divine will, and to what it seemeth fit to God in his infinite wisdom to appoint. Supposing therefore a good man doth not obtain the particular blessing he prays for, he may rest satisfied in this, that it is what the divine wisdom doth not see fit to grant; and he only desired it under that condition. Or if he receives that particular good thing he prayed for, and regards it as an answer to his prayer, still there is nothing miraculous in the case. There is nothing done in contravention to the usual course of things which the divine wisdom hath established. It may justly be supposed to be a law of the moral world, that it is proper for us, in testimony of our dependence upon God, and in acknowledgment of his provi dence, to apply to him by prayer for the blessings we stand in need of: and that prayer so qualified as God requireth, proceeding from » Woiks, vol. v. p. 458, 459. t Ibid. p. 400. Let. XXIV. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 339 an honest and upright heart, and from good affections and inten tions, and accompanied with the use of proper endeavours on our parts, is among the means appointed by divine wisdom for obtain ing the most valuable benefits, especially those of a spiritual nature. And the blessings thus communicated may be justly said to be com municated, not in a miraculous way, but in a way that is perfectly agreeable to the general laws of providence, and the order which the divine wisdom hath appointed. Any one that considers this will easily see how little what our author has here offered is to the purpose ; and yet he goes on to declaim after his manner, that par ticular providence puts a force on the mechanical laws of nature, and on the freedom of the will, in a multitude of instances ; and that those who maintain this doctrine suppose, that the laws of gravitation must be sometimes suspended, sometimes precipitated, in compliance with men's desires, and the tottering edifice must be kept miraculously from falling.* Among the extraordinary interpositions of divine providence, he reckons " the metaphysical or physical influence of spirits, sugges tions, silent communications, injections of ideas. These things," he declares, " he cannot comprehend ; and he compares them to the altering or suspending the course of the sun, or revolu tions of the earth, in the physical system. And that all such in terpositions in the intellectual system, as should give thoughts and new dispositions to the minds of men, cannot be conceived without altering in every such instance the natural progression of the human understanding, and that freedom of the will which every man is conscious that he has.''-f- Our author has here let us know what he thinks of all revelations, inspirations, or communica tions from God the Supreme Spirit, or from subordinate created spirits, to the human mind ; that he regards them as inconsistent with the laws of the intellectual system, and the natural progression of the human understanding, or essential freedom of the will. But whence could he know enough of the laws of the intellectual system, to be able to pronounce that this is inconsistent with those laws ? That one man may suggest or communicate thoughts and ideas to another by words and language, and that there is nothing in this contrary to the nature and order of the understanding, or freedom of the will, is universally acknowledged : and why then should it be thought inconsistent with these, for God himself, or spiritual beings superior to man, to communicate thoughts or ideas to the human mind ? The most natural way of working upon men as, reasonable creatures, and of influencing their actions in a way agreeable to the just order of their faculties, is by suggesting proper thoughts or ideas to their minds, and our not being able particularly to explain how this is done, is no just objection against it. This writer him self elsewhere, speaking of that extraordinary action of God upon the mind which the word Inspiration is now used to denote, expressly acknowledges, that " it is no more incomprehensible than the ordi- ¦ "> Works, vol. v. p. 460. t Ibid p. 411, 415. 340 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXIV. nary action of mind On body, or body on mind."* And indeed it cannot without the highest absurdity be denied, that God can work upon the spirits of men by an immediate influence, and yet in such a way as is perfectly agreeable to their rational natures, and which may not put any constraint upon the freedom of their wills. And many cases may be supposed, in which his doing so may answer valuable ends. It may also be easily conceived, that he can make impressions upon men's minds by various other means, which he may make use of in his wise and sovereign providence to this pur pose, without at all infringing the order of things in the natural or moral world. He farther argues, that to suppose a providence extending to individuals, and particular occasional interpositions, "is to suppose that there are as many providences as there are men ;" or, as he else where expresseth it, that "common providence would break into a multitude of particular providences for the supply of wants, and grant of petitions.")"'' But there is no real foundation for this pre tence. There is one universal providence, which may be considered as extending to particular persons and cases, all of which are per fectly known to God, and (as was before hinted), occasion no con fusion or distraction in his infinite mind. Our author indeed declares, that " they who have attempted to show that God may act by particular and occasional interpositions, consistently with the preservation of the general order, appear to him quite unintelligi ble.""!: If it were so, our not being able distinctly to show how par ticular occasional interpositions may consist with the doctrine of a general providence, would be no argument at all against it; since, as he himself observes upon another occasion, " It is impertinent to deny the existence of any phenomenon, merely because we can not account for it."§ And yet we may easily conceive in general, that they are perfectly reconcileable, since, as hath been already hinted, these occasional interpositions are usually no more than ihe applications of the general laws of providence to particular cases and circumstances. That there may be, or that there have been, such interpositions, he does not pretend absolutely to deny ; but he says, that "we have no foundation for them in our own experience, or in any history except that of the Bible." || And yet soon after observes, that " every religion boasts of many instances, wherein the divine providence has been thus exercised. "H* And certain it is, that this hath been the general sentiment of mankind. Besides the ordinary course of things, which is to be regarded as under the constant care and direction of a sovereign providence, there have been events of a remarkable and uncommon nature, though not properly miraculous, of which there are accounts in the most authentic histories, and in which men have been apt to acknow ledge a special interposition of divine providence. The most impor tant events have been brought about by the seemingly smallest and #* Works, vol. iii. p. 468. t Ibid. p. 420. J Ibid. p. 414. $ Ibid. p. 468. || Ibid. vol. v. p. 414. ^ Ibid. p. 413. Let. XXIV. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 341 most unlikely means. Things have been often strangely conducted through many intricate turns to produce events contrary to all human expectation. Actions have been over-ruled to effects and issues quite opposite to the intentions of the actors. The most artful schemes of human policy have been strangely baffled and disappointed. Surprising changes have been wrought upon the spirits of men, and restraints laid upon their passions, in a manner that can scarce be accounted for, and upon which great events have depended. Such things have naturally led mankind to acknowledge a divine hand, and a providence, over-ruling human affairs. I am sensible many of those who honour themselves with the title of free-thinkers will be apt to ascribe this to superstition or enthusiasm. But what right have they to pronounce against the general sentiments of mankind, and which seem to have arisen from the observation of events which argue the over-ruling interposition of a superior invi sible agency? He observes, with a sneer, that " there is many an old woman who his ready to relate, with much spiritual pride, the particular provi dences that attended her and hers."* As to the charge of spiritual pride, it is no more than he hath advanced against all that believe a particular providence, interesting itself in the affairs of men ; the belief of which he imputeth to high notions qf human importance. That he himself had high notions of his own sagacity cannot be doubted ; but the sentiments he is pleased to ascribe to the old woman, seem to me to be more reasonable, and would, if generally entertained, have a much better influence on mankind than his own. Is it not much better, and more agreeable to reason and nature, for dependent creatures to regard the benefits they receive, and the good events which befall them, as owing to the interposi tion of a most wise and benign providence, and to acknowledge with thankfulness the condescending care and goodness of God, in such instances ; than to pass them over with a regardless eye, from an apprehension that God doth not concern himself with the affairs of men ; that he is utterly unmindful of individuals, and taketh no notice of their actions, or of the events that relate to them ? And this is the goodly scheme which this author hath taken so much pains to establish. But he urgeth, that it is of no use to acknowledge particular interpositions of divine providence, since they cannot be distin guished from events that happen in the course of God's general providence. " The effects," saith he, '' that are assumed of parti cular providences, are either false, or undistinguishable from those of a general providence, and become particular by nothing more than the application which vain superstition or pious fraud makes of them."t And he observes, that this holds with respect to the case not only of particular persons, but of collective bodies. " Their circumstances are so nearly alike, and they return so often to be equally objects of these supposed providences, that no man * Bolingbroke's Works, vol. v. p. 418. t Ibid. p. 420. See also p. 450, 342 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXIV. will dare to determine where these providences have been, or should have been employed, and where not."* It appears then, that though he sometimes seems to acknowledge the care of divine provi dence as extending to collective bodies, though not to individuals, yet in reality he does not admit that providence interposes with regard to the one more than the other ; or that in either case we can justly ascribe any of the events that befall men, whether individually or collectively considered, to divine providence ; since we cannot discern or distinguish in what events providence has been employed, and in what not. But the truth is, we need not be put to the diffi culty of thus distinguishing, if we believe that providence is really concerned in them all. It over-ruleth both the affairs and events relating to nations and to particular persons, disposing and govern ing them in the fittest manner, according to what seemeth most fit to his infinite wisdom, to which all circumstances are perfectly known. And even where the events seem contrary, prosperous to one nation or particular person, adverse to another, providence is to be regarded in both. For we can never err in judging that all events whatsoever are under the wise direction and superintendency of a sovereign providence, though, when we undertake to assign the particular reasons of God's providential dispensations, we may easily be mistaken. Our author farther objecteth against the doctrine of a particular providence, that it supposes all mankind to be under an universal theocracy like the Jewish ; and he observes, that even in that case it would not have the effect to engage men to virtue, or deter them from vice and wickedness, any more than it did the Jews.t But he here confoundeth things that are of distinct consideration. The heathens, and all mankind in all ages, have been under the care and superintendency of divine providence, and even of a particular pro vidence, in the sense in which we are now considering it ; i. e. a providence, which extendeth to the individuals of the human race, inspecting their actions, and disposing and governing the events relating to them. But they were not under the Jewish theocracy, which was a peculiar constitution, established for very wise purposes, the reasons and ends of which I shall afterwards have occasion more particularly to consider. At present I shall only observe, that though under that constitution we may justly suppose there were extraordinary interpositions in a way of mercy and judgment, both national, and relating to particular persons, more frequently than there would have been under another constitution; yet the design of it was not, as our author supposes, that providence should interpose for giving a present immediate reward to every good man, and every good action, and for immediately punishing every bad one. We find frequent pathetical complaints even under that dispensation, of the calamities and sufferings of good men, and the prosperity of the wicked. This gave occasion to the 37th and 73d Psalms. See - also Psalm xvii. 14. — Jer. xii. 1, 2. The proper ultimate reward of » Works, vol. v. p. 460. t Ibid. p. 430. Let. XXIV. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 3-13 good men, and punishment of the wicked, was still reserved for a future state of retributions, which, though not expressly mentioned in their law, was believed and expected ; as appeareth from what Solomon hath said concerning it, Eccles. iii. 16, 17. xii. 14. I shall conclude this letter with taking notice of an observation of our author, which is designed to take off the force of an argument that Mr. WoUaston had offered. " It will be of little service," saith he, " to the scheme of particular providences, to say, like WoUas ton, that there may be incorporeal, or at least invisible beings, of intel lect and powers superior to man, and capable of mighty things ; and that these beings may be the ministers of God, and the authors of those providences." He pretends, that there is no proof that there are such beings ; and ridicules the doctrine of Genii or Daemons, as having been " owing to ancient astrologers, and the knaves or madmen that professed theurgic magic." And he argues, that "if these angels act by the immediate command of God, it is in opposi tion to his general providence, and to supply the defects of it; and that it is to give up the government over mankind to those beings."* But it is with an ill grace that this writer seems here to question the existence of angels, when yet he frequently intimates, that there are many orders of beings much superior to man, and that man is of the lowest order of intellectual beings. He represents it as a thing highly probable, that " there is a gradation from man through va rious forms of sense, intelligence, and reason, up to beings unknown to us, whose rank in the intellectual world is even above our con ception.""!" And that " there may be as much difference between some other creatures of God and man, as there is between man and an oyster."J And if it be allowed, that there are created intelli gences much superior to man, where is the absurdity of supposing that they are employed by divine wisdom as the instruments and agents of providence in its administrations towards the human race 1 Higher orders of creatures may, in the original plan of providence, be designed to assist, and exercise some superintendency over the lower. It may reasonably be conceived, that this may contribute to promote the beauty and order of the universe, and to connect the different orders of beings, and to carry on a proper intercourse be tween them. It is certain, that the existence, and the interposition of such beings on special occasions, have been generally believed by mankind in all ages. And it is clearly determined in the revelation contained in the holy Scripture ; so that it may be now assumed not merely as a reasonable hypothesis, but as a truth that can be de pended upon. Nor does the making use of angels as agents or in struments in the administrations of providence argue any defect of providence, as he is pleased to insinuate, which still oversees and directs the whole. For when God makes use of instruments in the course of his providence, it is not because, like human governors, he is unable to do it immediately by himself, and cannot be personally present : for he is still present to every part of the creation ; and all * Works, vol. v. p. 403, 464. t Ibid. p. 320, 330. ' Ibid. vol. iv. p. 177. 3-14 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXV. things are under his direction and superintendency. But he is pleased to make use of some of his creatures as instruments in con ferring benefits, or inflicting chastisements upon others, for the better carrying on the order and economy of his kingdom, and for many wise ends which we cannot pretend at present distinctly to assign. In my next I shall consider what Lord Bolingbroke hath of fered concerning the immortality of the soul, and a future state of retributions, which will let us farther into the true intention of his scheme. I am, &c. LETTER XXV Favourable Declarations of Lord Bolingbroke concerning the Immortality of the Soul, and a future State.— He represents it as having been believed from the earliest Antiquity, and acknowledges the great Usefulness of that doctrine. — Yet it appears from many Passages in his Works,- that he himself was not for admitting it. — He treats it as an Egyptian invention, taken up without Reason, a vulgar error, which was rejected when Men began to examine. — He will not allow that the Soul is a spi ritual Substance distinct from the Body, and pretends that all the Phenomena lead us to think that the Soul dies with the Body Reflections upon this. — The immate riality of the Soul argued from its essential Properties, which are entirely different from the Properties of Matter, and incompatible with them. — The Author's objec tions answered. — Concerning the moral Argument for a future State drawn from the unequal Distributions of this present State. — Lord Bolingbroke's Charge against this Way of arguing, as blasphemous and injurious to divine Providence, considered.— His great Inconsistency in setting up as an Advocate for the Goodness and Justice of Providence — That Maxim, " Whatever [is, is best," examined.— If rightly under stood, it is not inconsistent with the Belief of a future State. Sir, Having considered the attempt made by Lord Bolingbroke against God's moral attributes, and against the doctrine of provi dence, as exercising a care and inspection over the individuals ofthe human race, I now come to another part of his -scheme, and which seems to be designed to set aside the immortality of the soul, and a future state of retributions. I join these together, because there is a close connection between them, and his Lordship frequently repre sents the one of these as the consequence of the other. That I may make a fair representation of his sentiments, I shall first produce those passages, in which he seems to express himself very favourably with respect to the doctrine of a future state, and then shall'compare them with other passages which have a contrary aspect, that we may be the better able to form a just notion of his real design. He observes, that " the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, Let. XXV. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 345 and a future state of rewards and punishments, began to be taught long before we have any light into antiquity ; and when we begin to have any, we find it established :# That it was strongly inculcated from time immemorial, and as early as the most ancient and learned nations appear to us." And he expressly acknowledges the useful ness of that doctrine to mankind, as well as its great antiquity. He declares, that " the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, which supposes the immortality of the soul, is no doubt a great restraint to men."f That " it was invented by the ancient theists, philosophers, and legislators, to give an additional strength to the sanctions of the law of nature ; and that this motive every man who believes it may and must apply to himself, and hope the reward, and fear the punishment, for his secret as well as public actions, nay, for his thoughts as well as his actions :"*(: That " the greater part of the heathen philosophers did their utmost to encou rage the belief of future rewards and punishments, that they might allure men to virtue, and deter them from vice the more effectu ally.'^ He observes, that " the hypothesis of a life after this, served two purposes : The one was, that it furnished an answer to the objections of the atheists with respect to the present unequal distribution of good and evil." This seems unnecessary to him, because he looks upon the accusation to be void of any foundation. But the other purpose he says, "was no doubt very necessary, since the belief of future rewards and punishments could not fail to have some effect on the manners of men, to encourage virtue, and to restrain vice." Accordingly he calls it " a doctrine useful to all religions, and incorporated into all~*the systems of Paganism." || And he says, " the heathen legislators might have reason to add the terrors of another life to that of the judgments of God, and the laws of men. "IT And as he owns, that this doctrine is very useful to mankind, so he does not pretend positively to deny the truth of it. He intro duces a plain man of common sound sense declaring his sentiments upon this subject, and that though he could not affirm, he would not deny the immortality of the soul ; and that there was nothing to tempt him to deny it ; since whatever other worlds there may be, the same God still governs ; and that he has no more to fear from him in one world than in another : That, like the auditor in Tully's first Tusculan disputation, he is .pleased with the prospect of immor tality.** Again, he observes, that reason " will neither affirm nor deny that there is a future state ; and that the doctrine of rewards and punishments in it has so great a tendency to enforce the civil laws, and to restrain the vices of men, that reason, which cannot decide for it on principles of natural theology, will not decide against it on principles of good policy. Let this doctrine rest on the authority of revelation. A theist, who does not believe the * Bolingbroke's Works, vol. v. p. 237. f Ibid- vo1- ui- P- 559- X Ibid. vol. v. p. 288. § Ibid. p. 220. || Ibid. vol. v. p. 238. f Ibid. p. 488. ** Ibid. vol. iii. p. 558, 559. 34G A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXV. revelation, can have no aversion to the doctrine."* After having mentioned the scheme of a future state proposed in the "Analogy ofReason and Revelation," part 1. cap. 1. he says, " This hypothe sis may be received ; and that it does not so much as imply any thing repugnant to the perfections of the divine nature." He adds, " I receive with joy the expectations it raises in my mind. And the ancient and modern Epicureans provoke my indignation, when they boast as a mighty acquisition their pretended certainty that the body and the soul die together. If they had this certainty, could this discovery be so very comfortable ? I should have no difficulty which to choose, if the option was proposed to me, to exist after death, or to die whole."+ If we were to judge of the author's real sentiments by such pas sages as these, we might be apt to think, that though he was not certain of the immortality of the soul, and a future state, yet he was much inclined to favour that doctrine, as not only useful, but probable too. But there are other passages by which it appears, that, notwithstanding these fair professions, he did not really acknowledge or believe that doctrine himself; and, as far as his rea soning or authority could go, has endeavoured to weaken, if not destroy, the belief of it in the minds of others too. He represents this doctrine as at best no more than a useful in vention. He expressly says, that " the ancient theists, polytheists, philosophers, and legislators, invented the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, to give an additional strength to the sanctions of the law of nature ;"*}: and particularly, that the invention of it was owing to Egypt, the mother qf good policy as well as superstition.^ The general prevalency of this opinion he attributes to the predomi nant pride of the human heart ; and that " every one was flattered by a system that raised him in imagination above corporeal nature, and made him hope to pass in immortality in the fellowship of the gods.|| And after having said, that it cannot be demonstrated by reason, he adds, " it was originally an hypothesis, and may therefore be a vulgar error ; it was taken upon trust by the people, till it came to be disputed and denied by such as did examine."^ So that he supposes, that those who believed it took it upon trust without reason or examination, and that they who examined rejected it. He pronounces, that the reasonings employed by divines in proof of a future state are " problematical and futile ;" and that " the immor tality of the soul rests on moral proofs, and those proofs are precari ous, to say no worse of them."** After seeming to speak very favourably, in a passage cited above, of the hypothesis of a future state advanced in Butler's Analogy, he says, " it has no foundation in reason, and is purely imaginary." Lie frequently supposes a con nexion between the immortality of the soul and a future state ; that the latter is in consequence of the former ; and he has endeavoured to Works, vol. v. 322. 489. f Ibid, p. 491, 492. See also ibid. p. 500. 507. X Ibid. p. 288. § Ibid. p. 352, 489. || Ibid. p. 237. f Ibid. p. 352. ** Ibid. p. 323. 501. Let. XXV. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 347 subvert the foundation of that immortality, by denying that the soul is a distinct substance from the body. This is what he hath set himself pretty largely to show in several parts of his " Essay concerning the Nature, Extent, and Reality of Human Knowledge," which takes up nearly one half of the third volume of his works ; especi ally in the first, eighth, and ninth sections of that Essay. He expressly asserts, " that there is not any thing, philosophically speaking, which obliges us to conclude, that we are compounded of material and immaterial substance :"* That " immaterial spirits, considered as distinct substances, are, in truth, the creatures of metaphysics and theology :"f That " human pride was indulged by heathen philosophers and Platonic Christians ; and since they could not make man participant of the divine nature by his body, they thought fit to add a distinct spiritual to his corporeal substance, and to assume him to be a compound of both."*(: And that " the notions that prevail about soul, spiritual substance, and spiritual operations and things, took their rise in schools, where such doc trines were taught as men would be sent to Bedlam for teaching at this day."§ He has a long marginal note, vol. iii. p. 514, et. seq. which is particularly designed to answer Mr. Wollaston's arguments for the immortality of the soul. He there affirms, that " it neither has been, nor can be proved, that the soul is a distinct substance united to the body :" That " to suppose the soul may preserve a faculty of thinking when the body is destroyed, is assumed without any evidence from the phenomena ; nay, against a strong presump tion derived from them :" That " whilst we are alive, we pre serve the capacity, or rather faculty, of thinking, as we do of moving, and other faculties plainly corporeal. When we are dead, all these faculties are dead with us :" and, as he thinks, "it might as reasonably be said, we shall walk eternally, as think eternally." He says, " the word soul, in philosophical con sideration, taken for a distinct substance united to the body," may be parallel with " the primum mobile, and element of fire, which were names invented to signify things which have no existence ;" and adds, that " this figment of a soul, if it be a figment, received strength from the superstitious theology of the heathens." || He represents the hypothesis of two distinct substances in man as more " inconceivable and absurd," than that of those who say there is no such thing as material substance, or a material world :"f and yet he says, " that there is material substance no man can doubt — and that those who doubted it have either done it to exercise their wit, or have been transported by overheated imaginations into a philoso phical delirium."** He pronounces, that for philosophers to main tain that the soul is an immaterial being, is as if they should agree "that twice two makes five."tf And though, in a passage cited before, he introduces a plain man saying, That as he could not * Works, vol. iii. p. 363, 364. + Ibid. p. 427. X Ibid. p. 480. Ubid. p. 534, 535. || Ibid. p. 516, 517, 518. IT Ibid. p. 522. ** Ibid. p. 379, tt Ibid. p. 536. 348 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXV. affirm, so he would not deny a future state, yet he makes him de clare, that, " revelation apart, all the phenomena from our birth to our death seem repugnant to the immateriality and immortality of the soul ; so that he is forced to conclude with Lucretius, -Gigni pariter cum corpore, et una Crescere sentimus, pariterque senescere mentem." That " God had given him reason to distinguish and judge, and external and internal sense, by which to perceive and reflect ; but that this very reason showed him the absurdity of embracing an opinion, concerning body and mind, which neither of these senses supports."* I believe you will be of opinion, upon considering what has been now produced, that Lord Bolingbroke has left us little room to doubt of his real sentiments in this matter. I shall now examine whether he has offered any thing that is of force sufficient to invalidate a doctrine, the belief of which he himself acknowledges to be of great use to mankind. As to that which lies at the foundation of his scheme, viz. his denying that the soul is a spiritual or immaterial substance distinct from the body, I do not find that he has produced any thing which can be called a proof that such a supposition is unreasonable. He indeed inveighs against metaphysicians and divines for talking about spiritual and immaterial essences and substances ; he charges them with fantastical ideas, and a pneumatical madness. But such invec tives, which he repeats on all occasions, will hardly pass for argu ments. He doth not pretend to say, as some have done, that spiritual or immaterial substance implies a contradiction. He blames Spinosa for maintaining that there is but one substance, that of matter ; and asserts, " though we do not know the manner of God's being, yet we acknowledge him to be immaterial, because a thousand absurdi ties, and such as imply the strongest contradiction, result from the supposition, that the Supreme Being is a system of matter.''f He says indeed, that " of any other spirit we neither have nor can have any knowledge;" and that "all spirits are hypothetical, but the Infinite Spirit, the Father of Spirits."*}: But if there are other beings, whose essential properties are inconsistent with the known properties of matter, and particularly if our own souls are so, and if absurd consequences would follow from the supposing them to be material beings, may it not be reasonably argued, that they are sub stances of a different kind from what we call matter or body? The only way we have, by his own acknowledgment, of knowing dif ferent substances, is by their different qualities or properties. He observes, that " sensitive knowledge is not sufficient to know the inward constitution of substances, and their real essence, but is sufficient to prove to us their existence, and to distinguish them by * Works, vol. iii. p. 557. f Ioid- P- 321- 503. X Ibid. p. 321. 427. Let. XXV. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 349 their effects;"* And that "the complex idea we have of every substance is nothing more than a combination of several sensible ideas, which determine the apparent nature of it to us." He de clares, that "he cannot conceive, a substance otherwise than rela tively to its modes, as something in which those modes subsist ;"f and blames the philosophers for " talking of matter and spirit as if they had a perfect idea of both, when in truth they knew nothing of either, but a few phenomena insufficient to frame any hypo thesis.""!; Yet he himself speaks of material substance, as a thing " we perfectly know and are assured of, whilst we only assume or guess at spiritual or immaterial substance."^ But we have as much reason to be assured of the latter as of the former, since in neither case the substance or essence itself is the object of our sense, but we certainly infer it from the properties, which we know in the one case as well as in the other. He does not pretend to deny that th existence of spiritual substance is possible.|| Why then should not he allow their actual existence, since there are properties or quali ties, from which it may reasonably be inferred, that they actually do exist? He finds great fault with Mr. Locke for endeavouring to show, that the notion of spirit involves no more difficulty or obscurity in it than that of body, and that we know no more of the solid than we do of the thinking substance, nor how we are extended than how we think. In opposition to this he asserts, that we have clear ideas of the primary properties belonging to body, which are solidity and extension, but that we have not a positive idea of any one primary property of spirit; and the only proof tie brings for this is, that actual thought is not the essence of spirit. But if, instead of actual thought being the essence of the soul, the faculty of thinking be supposed to be one of its primary essential qualities or properties, this is what we have as clear an idea of as we have of solidity and extension.H He himself elsewhere observes, that " our ideas of re flection are as clear and distinct as those of sensation, and convey knowledge that may be said to be more real:"** And that "the ideas we have of thought by reflection, and -of some few modes of thinking, are as clear as those we have of extension, and the modes of extension by sensation. "tt Why then may we not from those ideas infer a thinking; as well as from the other a solid extended substance ? and that these substances are absolutely distinct, and of different natures, since their properties manifestly are so ? He hath himself acknowledged enough to show the reasonableness of this conclusion. " That we live, and move, and think," saith he, " and that there must be something in the constitution of our sys tem of being, beyond the known properties of matter, to produce such phenomena as these are undeniable truths." He adds indeed, " what that something is, we know not ; and surely it is » Works, vol. iii. p. 371. + Ibid. p. 524. { Ibid. p. 509, 510, 512. § Ibid. p. 509. || Ibid. p. 5C9. If Ibid. p. 510, 511, 512. ** Ibid., p 365. tt Ibid. p. 427. 350 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXV. high time we should be convinced that we cannot know it."* But though we cannot describe its intimate essence, we may know enough of it to be convinced, that it is not matter. It is to no pur pose to pretend, that there may be unknown properties of matter, by which it may be rendered capable of thinking ; for the properties of matter that we do know are inconsistent with the power of self- motion and consciousness. It is true, that he censures those as proud dogmatists, who bestow the epithets of inert, senseless, stupid, passive, upon matter ;t but in his calmer mood, when he is not car ried away by the spirit of opposition, and has not his hypothesis in view, he owns, that " matter is purely passive, and can act no otherwise than it is acted upon.''"|" It is therefore inconsistent with its nature to ascribe to it a principle of self-motion. He expressly acknowledges, that "our idea of thought is not in cluded in the idea of matter. "§ And that intellect is certainly above the " power of motion and figure, according to all the ideas we have of them ; and therefore (saith he) I embrace very readily the opinion of those who assume, that God has been pleased to superadd to several systems of matter, in such proportions as his infinite wisdom has thought fit, the power of thinking. || This is an hypothesis he seems fond of; he frequently refers to it, and says it is little less than blasphemy to deny it.H Mr. Locke, as he ob serves, supposed, that God might, if he pleased, give to certain sys tems of created senseless matter, put together as he thinks fit, some degree of sense, perception, and thought. But what Mr. Locke had advanced as barely possible, for aught he knew, to Almighty Power, our author assumes as having been actually done, and as continually done in the ordinary course of things. But I think we may safely leave it to any unprejudiced judgment, whether it be not more reasonable and more philosophical, to assign different substances as the subjects of properties s'o entirely different, than to suppose properties merely superadded by omnipotency to which they do not naturally belong ? Why should Lord Bolingbroke have been so backward to acknowledge a distinct substance from matter as the subject of these properties, when he himself was obliged to acknowledge, that the idea of thought is not included in the idea qf matter, and that intellect is above the power of motion and figure, ac cording to all the ideas toe have of them ? Is it agreeable to the divine wisdom, or to the order of things, to suppose, that God, in the general course of his providence, continually superadds preter natural or supernatural properties and powers to things not natu rally fitted to receive them, rather than that he hath produced spiritual substances, to which by the original constitution of their natures these properties and powers do belong? It hath been often shown by those that have treated this subject, that the essential properties of body and spirit are not only distinct, but incompatible, * Works, yol. iii. p. 509. t Ibid. p. 25. j Ibid vol v p 47*> § Ibid. vol. iii. p. 364. || Ibid. vol. v. p. 35. -f lbid.'vol.'iii'. p! 364." Let. XXV. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 351 and that therefore they cannot belong to the same substance, but must be the properties of different substances. Matter being a solid, figurable, divisible substance, consisting always of separable, nay of actually separate and distinct parts, it is evident, from the very nature of it, that it is not one indivisible substance, but is compounded of innumerable little substances, which are really dis tinct, though contiguous ; so that if the intelligent substance in us were corporeal, it would be a compound of many intelligences and consciousnesses, which could not be one and the same individual intelligence and consciousness. Matter therefore is not a subject capable of an individual consciousness, which consequently must have some other subject to reside in. This argument is pursued with admirable clearness and force by the learned Dr. Clarke, in his letter to Mr. Dodwell, and in his several defences of it against Mr. Collins, who pushed the argument for the materiality of the soul as far as it could bear. Nor do I find that Lord Bolingbroke hath advanced any thing that can be called new upon this subject. He supposes, but does not prove, all the species of intellectual beings to be material, and talks of an intellectual spring common to them all ; which, he says, is the same spring in all, but differently tempered, so as to have different degrees of force and elasticity in some from what it has in others; and he resolves the surprising- variety of its effects into the apparent difference in the constitutions or organization of animals.* But it is justly argued, on the other hand, that it is absurd to suppose, that that which is unintelligent and insensible before organization, can become intelligent and self- conscious by organization, since organization does not alter the nature and essence of things. These observations seem to me sufficient to take off the force of what Lord Bolingbroke hath advanced, to shew that the soul is not an immaterial substance distinct from the body.— His view in it is plain ; it is to destroy the proof of its immortality, and to bring in this conclusion, that since it is not a distinct substance from the body, it must die with it. He pretends indeed, that the opinion of the soul's immateriality adds no strength to that of its immortality, and blames the metaphysical divines for clogging the belief of the immortality ofthe soul with that of its immateriality ; and that by resting too much on the latter they weaken the former.-}- But the true reason of his finding fault with it is, that the immateriality of the human soul furnisheth a strong presumption in favour of its immortality, or at least that it may survive when the body is dis solved. That he himself is sensible of this, appears from what he acknowledges, that " on supposition of the soul's being a different substance from matter, philosophers argue admirably well a priori, and prove with great plausibility, that this mind, this soul, this spirit, is not material, and is immortal." He urges indeed, that " this assumption cannot stand an examination a posteriori ;"J that is, as he elsewhere observes, all the phenomena from our birth to ?Works, vol. iii. p. 526, 527. f Ibid. p. 535. 539. J Ibid. p. 509. 352 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXV. our death seem repugnant to the immateriality and immortality of the soul. But all that these phenomena prove is, not that body and soul are one and the same substance, but that there is a close union between them, which there may be, and yet they may be substances of very different natures ; and that they really are so appears, as has been already shown, from their different essential properties. The laws of this union were appointed by the author of the human frame : and by virtue of those laws, soul and body have a mutual influence upon one another whilst that union subsists. But it by no means follows, that, when this union is dissolved, both these substances, so different from one another, do alike fall into the dust. Nor can this be concluded from the phenomena. — We see indeed what becomes of the fleshy corruptible body ; but we cannot pretend to decide, that therefore the thinking immaterial substance is dissolved too, or to determine what becomes of it. But he urgeth, that though " thinking and unthinking sub stances should be supposed ever so distinct from one another, yet as assumed souls were given to inform bodies, both are necessary to complete the human system ; and that neither of them could exist or act in a state of total separation from the other."* And he ob serves, that Mr. WoUaston is so sensible of this, that he supposes, that there is, besides the body which perishes, some fine vehicle that dwells with the soul in the brain, and goes off with it at death. Our author has not offered any thing to shew the absurdity of this supposition, except by calling such a vehicle the shirt of the soul, and talking of the soul's flying away in its shirt into the open fields of heaven; which may, for aught I know, pass with some persons for witty banter, but has no argument in it. Very able philosophers, both ancient and modern, have supposed, that all created spirits are attended with material vehicles. But whatever becomes of this sup position with regard to the human soul, I do not see how it follows, that a substance which is essentially active, intellective, and voli- tive, should lose all intellect, action, and volition, merely on its being separated from a material substance to which it was united, and which is naturally void of these qualities. However it might be bound by the laws of that union for a time, there is no reason to think it should be still subject to those laws, and that it should be unable to act or think at all, after this union is dissolved. The only thing farther which hath any appearance of argument is, that " if the philosopher asserts, that whatever thinks is a simple being, immaterial, indissoluble, and therefore immortal, — we must be reduced, if we receive this hypothesis, to suppose that other ani mals besides have immaterial or immortal souls."f And if it be allowed, that other animals have immaterial souls too, I do not see what absurdity follows from it ; or why it may not be reasonably supposed, that there may be innumerable gradations of immaterial beings of very different capacities, and intended for different ends and uses. But our author urges against those who suppose sensi- * Works, vol. iii. p. 517. t Ibid. p. 528, Let. XXV. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 353 rive souls in brutes, and a rational soul in man, that " the power of thinking is as necessary to perception of the slightest sensation, as it is to geometrical reasoning; and that it manifestly implies a contradiction to say, that a substance capable of thought by its nature in one degree or instance, is by its nature incapable of it in any other."* But I see not the least absurdity in this; except it be said, that it necessarily follows, that a sub stance capable of thought or sense in the lowest degree, must be essentially capable of thought or sense in the highest degree. I can easily conceive, that a nature may be supposed capable of the former, and not of the latter. And must not he say so too, since he asserts that brutes think, and yet I believe will hardly affirm that they are capable as well as men of geometrical reasoning ? There is no absurdity in supposing immaterial souls, which have sensitive perceptions, and are capable of sensitive happiness, without ever rising beyond this, or being properly capable of moral agency. And supposing the brutes to have immaterial sensitive souls which are not annihilated at death, what becomes of them after death, whether they are made use of to animate other bodies, or what is done with them, we cannot tell. Nor is our not being able to assign any use for them so much as a presumption that they answer no end at all, or that they do not exist. There may be a thousand ways which the Lord of nature may have of disposing of them, which we know nothing of. It appears from what hath been offered, that there is a real foun dation in reason for the doctrine of the soul's immortality, and that therefore there is no need to resolve it, as this writer seems willing to do, into the pride of the human heart. It is his own observation, "that men were conscious ever since there race existed, that there is an active thinking principle in their composition.— That there are corporeal natures, we have sensitive knowledge: that there are spiri tual natures distinct from all these, we have no knowledge at all. We only infer that there are such, because we know that we think, and are not able to conceive how material systems can think, "f And this certainly is a very reasonable inference, as reasonable as it is to infer a material substance from the affections and properties of matter. But though it is agreeable to reason to believe, that the human soul is immaterial and immortal, this doth not imply, as his lord ship is pleased to insinuate, that " it is immortal by the necessity of its nature, as God is self-existent by the necessity of his."*|: Nor is it so understood by those who maintain the natural immortality of the human soul. What they intend by it is only this : That God made the soul originally of such a nature as to be fitted and designed for an immortal duration; not naturally liable, as tbe body is, to corruption and dissolution ; but not, as if it were rendered so neces sarily existent as to be independent of God himself. Still it is in his power to annihilate it, if he seeth fit to put an end to its exis tence, though there is no reason to think that he will ever do so : for * Works, vol. iii. p. 531. t Ibid. p. 5.30. f Ibid. p. 559. A A 354 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXV. since it was fitted for immortality by his own original constitution, this may be regarded as an indication of his will, that it shall con tinue in immortal being, though still in a dependence on the power and will of the Creator. It is proper to observe here, that our author hath acknowledged several things which furnish a very reasonable presumption in favour of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. One is, the universal prevalence of that doctrine from the oldest antiquity. For this seems to show, that it is agreeable to the natural sentiments of the human mind ; or at least that it was derived from a primitive uni versal tradition received from the first ancestors of the human race, and which was originally owing to divine revelation. Both these may probably have contributed to the general spreading of this notion. This writer, according to his custom, varies on this head; for, after having expressly asserted, that this doctrine was inculcated from time immemorial, and that it began to be taught long before we have any light into antiquity* he pretends to assign the original of it, and ascribes the invention of it to Egypt, and that it came from thence to the Greeks, to whom it was brought by Orpheus, and from the Greeks to the Romans.f But we find it was equally re ceived among the most barbarous as among the most polite nations. The ancient Indians, Scythians, Gauls, Germans, Britons, as well as Greeks and Romans, believed that souls are immortal, and that men should live in another state after death. There were scarce any among the Americans, when the Europeans first arrived there, who doubted of it. It has been almost as generally believed as the exis tence of God ; so that it may well pass for a common notion. Another thing taken notice of by this writer, and to which he partly ascribes the belief of the soul's immortality, is what he calls the powerful desire of continuing to exist. He observes, that this desire was so strong, that " the multitude in the pagan world were ready to embrace the hope of immortality, though it was accom panied with the fear of damnation.""]; This strong desire of future existence appears by his own account to be natural to the human mind. And would the author of our beings have so constituted us, if the object of this desire was vain, and if there were no future ex istence to expect ? Is not this powerful desire or expectation of immortality, which is implanted in the human heart, an argument that he that made us, formed and designed us, not merely for this present state and transitory life, but for afuture state of existence? Lord Bolingbroke further observes, that one great cause of the spreading of this doctrine was its being encouraged by the politi cians and legislators, as well as philosophers, on the account of its great usefulness to mankind, and because they looked upon it to be necessary to enforce the sanctions of the law of nature.^ Now the great usefulness and necessity of this doctrine is no small argument of its truth. For if men are so framed, that they cannot be properly governed without the hopes or fears of a future state ; if these are » Works, vol. v. p. 237. 308. 'Ibid, p. 352. 480. * Ibid. 237. § Ibid. p. 281.351. Let. XXV. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 3j."> necessary to preserve order and good government in the world, to allure and engage men to virtue, and deter them from vice and wickedness; this shows that the author of their beings designed them for immortality, and a future state, and that consequently such a state there really is ; except it be said, that he formed our natures so as to make it necessary to govern us by a lie, and by false motives, and imaginary hopes and fears. It sufficiently appears from what has been already observed, that our author, by denying that the soul is an immaterial substance dis tinct from the body, hath done what he could to take away the force of the natural argument for a future state of existence and retributions after this life is at an end. It remains that we take notice of what he hath offered to destroy the moral arguments usually brought for it from the supposed unequal distributions of this present state. He sets himself at great length to prove, that the supposition is absolutely false and groundless ; that it is highly injurious to God ; and tendeth to cast the most blasphemous reflec tions upon his providence. In the management of this argument, he hath broke out into the most opprobrious invectives against the Christian divines and philosophers, whom he abuses and traduces without the least regard to decency. He frequently charges them as in a confederacy with the atheists ; and represents them as " complaining of the uniform conduct of that providence of God which is over all his works, and censuring their Creator in the government of the world, which he has made and preserves. — That they have done nothing more than repeat what all the atheists, from Democritus and Epicurus, have said : That they have pushed their arguments on this subject so far, that the whole tribe of these writers, like WoUaston and Clarke, do in effect renounce God, as much as the rankest of the atheistical tribe :" And he undertakes to prove this, to their shame to be true.* That " the heathen deists defended the divine providence against the atheists who attacked it, and recommended a cheerful resignation to all the dispensations of it; whereas Christian divines have made a common cause with the atheists, to attack providence, and to murmur against the neces sary submission that they pay."t That " the Christian philoso phers, far from defending the providence of God, have joined in the clamour against it." That " they have brought the self-existent Being to the bar of humanity, — and he has been tried, convicted, and condemned, like the governor of a province, or any other inferior magistrate.""]: Accordingly he sets up as a zealous advocate for the " goodness and righteousness of divine providence in the present constitution of things, and with great solemnity undertakes to plead the cause qf God against atheists and divines." He affirms, that, " notwithstand ing the human race is exposed to various evils, there is no ground for complaint, but abundant cause for thankfulness."§ That " if we are subject to many evils, physical and moral, we can show * Works, vol. v. p. 484, 485. f Ibid. p. 480. J Ibid. p. 488. § Ibid. 333,331. 356 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXV. much more good of both kinds, which God hath bestowed upon us, or put it into our power to procure ourselves." — That the means to soften or prevent evils, the chief of which he reckons to be hope, are " so many instances of the positive goodness of God :"* that " neither the goodness or justice of God require that we should be better, nor happier than we are ;"f that man "enjoys numberless benefits by the fitness of his nature to the constitution of the world, unasked, unmerited, freely bestowed.""]: He asserts, in opposition to atheists anddivines, that "the general state of mankind in the present scheme of providence is not only tolerable, but happy : — and that there is in this world so much more good than evil, and the general state of mankind is so ljappy in it, that there is no room for the exaggerated descriptions that have been made of human misery ;"§ that " God has made us happy, and has put it into our power to make ourselves happier, by a due use of our reason, which leads us to the practice of moral virtue, and to all the duties of society ;"|| that " good men are often unhappy, and bad men happy, has," he says, " been a subject of invective rather than argument, to Epicurus, Cotta, and others among the ancients, and to eminent divines among the moderns. "if And he particularly examines the instances pro duced by Cotta in Cicero against the providence of God, and shows what Balbus might have answered.** He finds great fault with Dr. Clarke for saying, that " it is certain, from the moral attributes of God, that there must be such a future state of existence, as that, by an exact distribution of rewards and punishments, all the present disorders and inequalities may be set right, and that the whole scheme of providence may appear at its consummation to be a design worthy of infinite wisdom, justice, and goodness." See Clarke's Evidences of Natural aud Revealed Religion, prop. IV. For this he calls him audacious and vain sophist ; and that " according to these men, it appears actually unworthy of them at present. "ff And in opposition, as he pretends, to divines, he shows the general tendency of virtue to promote happiness, and of vice to produce misery.J"t These things he enlarges upon in several of his Fragments and Essays in the fifth volume of his works. See particularly the forty- third, forty-fourth, forty-eighth, forty-ninth, fiftieth, fifty-first, fifty- second, fifty-third, and fifty-fourth of those Fragments. It will be necessary here to make some observations ; and a few will be sufficient. And 1. My first reflection is this: that Lord Bolingbroke had no just pretensions to value himself upon being an advocate for the goodness and righteousness of divine providence, nor could properly attempt to vindicate it, in consistency with his scheme. He had taken pains to show, that moral attributes are not to be ascribed to God as distinguished from his physical attributes ; that there is no such thing as justice and goodness in God, according to our ideas * Works, vol. v. p. 336. f Ibid. p. 512. t Ibid. p. 339. $ Ibid. p. 392. || Ibid p. 384. if ibid. p. 394. ** Ibid. p. 404, k seq. tt Ibid. p. 395. if Ibid. p. 399, & seq. Let. XXV. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 357 of them, nor can we form any judgment concerning them; and that there are many phenomena in the present course of things, which are absolutely repugnant to those moral attributes. But in that part of his book where he undertakes to justify the providence of God in this present state, he not only supposes justice and goodness in God, but that they are conspicuous in the whole course of his dispensations, and that the present state of things is agreeable to. our ideas of those attributes. Another consideration which shows his great inconsistency is, that at the same time that he sets up as an advocate for the goodness and justice of providence in this pre sent state, he yet will not allow that providence considers men individually at all, though he himself owns that justice has neces sarily a respect to individuals. I had occasion to observe in my last letter, that he asserts, that "justice requires most certainly that rewards and punishments should be measured out in every particular case in proportion to the merit and demerit of each individual."* With what consistency then can he undertake to demonstrate the justice of providence in this present state, when he makes it essen tial to justice, that regard should be had to the cases and circum stances of individuals, and yet affirms, that providence in this pre sent state hath no regard to individuals ? And he seems to make its not extending to individuals here, an argument that it shall not extend to them in a future state ; for he mentions it as an absurdity in the Christian system, that " the proceedings of the future state will be the very reverse of the present ; for that then every individual human creature is to be tried, whereas here they are considered only collectively ; that the most secret actions, nay, the very thoughts of the heart, will be laid open, and sentence will be pronounced accordingly ;"t where he seems to argue, that because individuals are not called to an account, or rewarded and punished here, accord ing to their particular merits or demerits, therefore they shall not be so hereafter ; whereas the argument seems to hold stronglyihe other way, supposing the justice of divine providence; that since justice necessarily requires that a regard should be had to men's particular actions, cases, and circumstances, and since there is not an exact distribution of rewards and punishments to individuals in this pre sent state, according to the personal merit or demerit of each individual, therefore there shall be a future state, in which this shall be done, and the righteousness of providence shall be fully mani fested and vindicated. And it cannot but appear a little extraordi nary, that this author should make such a mighty parade of his zeal for vindicating the justice of divine providence, when according to his scheme the justice of providence cannot consistently be said to be exercised or displayed, either here or hereafter. 2ndly. It is proper farther to observe, that what Lord Bolingbroke hath offered with so much pomp for vindicating the proceedings of divine providence in the present constitution of things, hath nothing in it that can be called new, or which had not been said as well, or * Works, vol. v. p. 405. t Ibid. p. 494. 358 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Lot. XXV. better, by Christian divines and philosophers before him. They have frequently shown, that this present world is full of the effects and instances of the divine goodness : that many of those that are called natural evils are the effects of wise general laws, which are best upon the whole : that the evils of this life are, for the most part, tolerable, and overbalanced by the blessings bestowed upon us, which, ordinarily speaking, are much superior to those evils: that in the present constitution, virtue has a manifest tendency, in the ordi nary course of things, to produce happiness, and vice misery ; and that this constitution is the effect of a wise and good providence ; from whence it may be concluded, that the great Author and Governor of the world approves the one, and disapproves the other : so that it may be justly said in general, that good and virtuous per sons enjoy more true satisfaction and happiness, even in this present life, than the bad and vicious. Divines may say much more on this head than this author could consistently do. They maintain a pro vidence which extends even to the individuals of the human race* that good men may consider themselves as continually under God's wise and fatherly care and inspection ; that they may regard the good things they enjoy as the effects of his goodness, and are pro vided with the properest consolations and supports under all the evils of this present life, being persuaded that God, who knoweth their circumstances, will overrule all these things for their benefit; and that they are part of the discipline appointed to prepare them for a better state ; the prospects of which diffuse joy and comfort through all the gloomy scenes of adversity they may here meet with. But in his scheme there is no solid foundation for that tranquillity of mind, of which he speaks in such high terms, as the inseparable companion of virtue, and for that hope, which, he says, gives a relish to all the comforts, and takes off the bitter relish from all the mis fortunes of life. If providence doth not concern itself about indi viduals, the good man hath no effectual support under his calamities. And it is worthy of observation, that our author himself, in vindi cating the justice and goodness of providence in this present state, is sometimes obliged to have recourse to the hypothesis of a particu lar providence. Some of the answers he puts in the mouth of Balbus, as what he might have opposed to Cotta's harangue against providence, proceed upon the supposition of a providence which hath a regard to the cases and circumstances of individuals.* And with regard to public calamities, one of the ways he takes of accounting for them is this, that " they may be considered as chastisements, when there are any to be amended by partaking in them, or being spectators of them.— And that they should teach mankind to adore and fear that providence, which governs the world by particular as well as general dispensations."f A third reflection is this : That though it be very true in general, that, in the present constitution of things, virtue hath a manifest tendency to promote our happiness, and vice to produce misery, yet * Works, vol. v. p. 412. t Ibid. p. 380, 381. Let. XXV. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 359 it cannot be denied, that it often happeneth in particular cases, that as to the outward dispensations of providence, there is not a constant and remarkable difference made between the righteous and the wicked here on earth : That persons of eminent virtue have fre quently been overwhelmed with evils and calamities of various kinds, and have perished under them, without any recompense of that virtue, if there be no future state; and that wicked men have often been remarkably prosperous, and have met with great success in their undertakings, and have continued prosperous to the end of their lives. These things have been observed in all ages. And ac cordingly he expressly owns, that " the ancient theists were per suaded, that nothing less than the existence of all mankind in a future state, and a more exact distribution of rewards and punish ments, could excuse the assumed, irregular, and unjust proceedings of providence in this life, on which atheists founded their objec tions.''* He frequently intimates, that this was one great reason of the philosophers assuming the doctrine of future rewards and punish ments; though sometimes he seems to contradict this, and to say, that the heathens did not take in the hypothesis of a future state in order to vindicate the conduct of divine providence.t But without endeavouring to reconcile this writer to himself, which it is often impossible to do, we may proceed upon it as a certain thing, that it hath been generally acknowledged in all ages, that good men have been often in a very calamitous condition in this present state, and bad men in very prosperous circumstances. It is true, that, as our author observes, we may be deceived, and think those to be good men who are not so ; but in many cases we may certainly pronounce, that those who by their actions plainly show themselves to be bad men, the unjust, the fraudulent, the cruel, and oppressive, prosper and flourish, whilst men, whom it were the height of uncharitable ness not to suppose persons of great goodness, integrity, and gene rous honesty, suffer even by their very virtues, and are exposed to grievous oppressions and reproach, without any redress from human judicatories. It is bis own observation, that " there is room for much contingency in the physical and moral world, under the government of a general providence, and that amidst these contin gencies, happiness, outward happiness at least, may fall to the lot of the wicked, and outward unhappiness to the lot of good men.""]: Mr. Hume has represented this matter with spirit and elegance in the twenty-first of his moral and political Essays ; where he ob serves, that " though virtue be undoubtedly the best choice where it can be attained, yet such is the confusion and disorder of human affairs, that no perfect economy, or regular distribution of happiness or misery, is in this life ever to be expected. Not only are the goods of fortune, and endowments of the body, unequally distributed between the virtuous and the vicious ; but the most worthy cha racter, by the very economy of the passions, doth not always enjoy the highest felicity. Though all vice is pernicious, the disturbance * Works, vol. v. p. 308. t Compare vol. v. 238, 487. ' Ibid. p. 485. 3G0 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXV. or pain is not measured out by nature with exact proportion to the degrees of vice ; nor is the man of highest virtue, even abstracting from external accidents, always the most happy. A gloomy and melancholy temper may be found in very worthy characters that have a great sense of honour and integrity ; and yet this alone may embitter life, and render a person completely miserable. On the other hand, a selfish villain may possess a spring and alacrity of temper, a certain gaiety of heart, which will compensate the uneasi ness and remorse arising from all the other vices. If a man be liable to a vice or imperfection, it may often happen, that a good quality which he possesses along with it, will render him more mise rable, than if he were completely vicious. A sense of shame in an imperfoct character is certainly a virtue, but produces great uneasi ness and remorse, from which the abandoned villain is entirely free."* Though I lay no great stress on Mr. Hume's authority, yet I be lieve this representation will be acknowledged to be agreeable to observation and experience. And if it be so, what can be more natural or reasonable, than the hypothesis of a future state, where the rewards of virtue, and punishments of vice, shall be more equally and regularly proportioned than they can ordinarily be in this pre sent state? It is hard to produce an instance of grosser calumny and abuse than our author is guilty of, when he advanceth it as a general charge against the Christian divines, that " they have made a com mon cause with atheists to attack providence, and to murmur against the necessary submission that they pay." And he gives it as the character of the Christian, that " he goes murmuring and complain ing through this life against the justice of God, and therefore de serves little to taste of his goodness in a future state."-f But this is strangely misrepresented. The Christian, instructed by the holy Scriptures, believes, that God is perfectly just and righteous in ail his ways : He is taught to regard all the good things he enjoys as flowing from God's paternal benignity ; all the evils and afflictions he endures, as ordered and governed for the most wise and righteous ends. If there be any thing in the divine dispensations at present, which he cannot well account for, or reconcile, he is far from accu sing God, or entertaining a hard thought of his justice or goodness. He believes, that these things are all wisely ordered, or permitted; that they are what may be expected in a state of trial and discipline, and make a part of the scheme of divine providence, which will ap pear, when the whole comes to be viewed in its proper connection and harmony, to have been ordered with the most perfect wisdom, righteousness, and goodness. This present state only makes a part of the glorious plan ; and they are the persons that defame and mis- * Hume's moral and political Essays, p. 244, 245. t Works, vol. v. p. 486. It is in the same spirit of misrepresentation and abuse, that be thinks lit to charge Christians with assuming, that happiness consists princi pally in health, and the advantages of fortune, and with pretending " to keep an account with God, and to barter so much virtue, and so many acts of devotion, against so many digues of honour, power, or riches.'' Vol. v. p. 401, 402. Let. XXV. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 361 represent providence, who are for separating and disjointing the admirable scheme. What a strange perversion is it to represent the hope and expectation which Christians entertain of a future state, as arguing a bad temper of mind, and tending to render them un worthy to taste of the divine goodness hereafter ! As if it were a fault and a vice to aspire to a state where our nature shall be raised to the perfection of holiness and virtue, where true piety shall re ceive its proper and full reward, and the glory of the divine perfec tions shall be most illustriously displayed. As to the nature and extent of those future rewards and punish ments, they will come more properly to be considered, when I come to examine the objections he hath advanced against the accounts that are given of them in the gospel. The only thing farther which I shall at present take notice of is, the use which he makes of that maxim, that Whatsoever is, is right. He insinuates as if Christian divines were not for acknowledging, that whatsoever God does is right ; which he looks upon to be a most certain and important principle ; and that upon this principle we ought to rest satisfied, that what is done in this present state is right, without looking forward to a future state, or taking it into the account at all. For the explaining the principle our author mentions, Whatsoever is, is right, it must be observed, that it is not to be applied to every particular incident considered independently, and as confined to the present moment, without any dependence on what went before, or follows after. The maxim would not be true or just taken in this view. The meaning therefore must be, that whatever is, considered as a part of the universal scheme of providence, and taken in its proper harmony and connexion with the past and future, as well as with the present appointed course of things, is rightly and fitly ordered. Thus, e. g. suppose a good man reduced to the greatest misery and distress, and conflicting with the sorest evils and cala mities, it is fit he should be so, because, considering that event in its connexion, and taking in the past and future, it is permitted or ap pointed for wise reasons, and is therefore best upon the whole ; but considered independently, and as no part of the scheme of provi dence, or as separated from the other parts of that scheme, it is not in itself the best nor fittest. This maxim, therefore, which this writer makes use of with a view to set aside a future state, is, if understood in that sense in which alone it is true, perfectly consis tent with the belief of a future state, and even leadeth us to the acknowledgment of it. If we believe that God always does that which is fittest to be done, and yet meet with some things which we find it hard to reconcile to our ideas ofthe divine wisdom, righteous ness, and goodness, our persuasion, that he always does that which is right, will put us upon endeavouring to reconcile those appear ances ; and if a probable hypothesis offers for reconciling them, it is perfectly consistent with the veneration we owe to the Deity to embrace that hypothesis; especially if it be not arbitrary, but hath a real foundation in the nature of things ; and such is the hypothesis 362 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVI. of a future state of retributions. There is great reason to believe, that the thinking principle in man is an immaterial substance, quite distinct from the body, and which shall not be dissolved with it; and there are many things that seem to show, he was not designed merely for this present transitory life on earth. The strong desire of immortality, so natural to the human mind ; the vast capacities and faculties of the human soul, capable of making an immortal pro gress in knowledge, wisdom, and virtue, compared with the small advances we have an opportunity of making in this present state; our being formed moral agents, accountable creatures, which seems plainly to show, that it was designed by the Author of our beings, and who hath given us a law for the rule of our duty, that we should be hereafter called to an account for our conduct ; of which we have some forebodings in the judgment our own consciences naturally pass upon our actions ; these, and other things that might be men tioned, seem to show, that man was not designed merely for this present state. And since there are several reasons which lead us to look upon a future state of existence as probable, it is a most natural thought, that then the seeming inequalities of this present state will be rectified ; and that the consideration of that state is to be taken in, in forming a judgment concerning God's providential dispensations. And if with all this there be an express revelation from God, assuring us of a future state, the evidence is complete, and there is all the reason in the world to draw an argument from that state to solve present contrary appearances. I am yours, 8cc. LETTER XXVI. Observations on Lord Bolingbroke's Account of the Law of Nature. — He asserts it to be so plain and obvious to the meanest Understanding, that Men cannot be mis taken about it. — The contrary shown from his own Acknowledgment. — He makes Self-Love the only original Spring from which our moral Duties and Affections flow ; yet supposes universal Benevolence to be the fundamental Law of our Nature. He declares that we are obliged by the Law of Nature to place our Hope and Trust in God, and address ourselves to him. — This shown to be inconsistent with the Prin ciples he had advanced. — He asserts Polygamy to be founded in tbe Law of Nature. —He will not allow, that there is any such thing as natural Shame or Modesty The Account he gives of the Sanctions of the Law of Nature, considered He admits no Sanctions of that Law with respect to Individuals. — The ill Consequences of his Scheme to the Interests of Morality and Virtue, represented. Sir, From the observations that have been made in the foregoing letters, I think it sufficiently appears, that Lord Bolingbroke hath endeavoured to subvert, or at least to perplex and confound, some of the main principles of what is usually called natural religion. I Let. XXVI. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 363 shall now proceed to examine the account he hath given of the law of nature, considered as a rule of duty. He frequently speaks in the highest terms of the clearness, the sufficiency, and perfection of that law. He represents it as the only standing revelation of the will of God to mankind, and which renders every other revelation needless. Very learned and able men have treated of the law of nature ; but our author seems not at all satisfied with what they have written on that subject. He says, " they have been more in tent to show their learning and acuteness, than to set their subject in a clear and sufficient light : — That, instead of setting up a light sufficient to enlighten a large room, they go about with a small taper, and, whilst they illuminate one corner, darken the rest : — That they puzzle and perplex the plainest thing in the world, some times by citations little to the purpose, or of little authority ; some times by a great apparatus of abstract reasoning, and by dint of explanation. — Read Selden and Grotius, read Cumberland, read Puffendorf, if you have leisure or patience for it. — There are many curious researches, no doubt, and many excellent observations in these writers ; but they seem to be great writers on this subject, by much the same right as he might be called a great traveller who should go from London to Paris by the Cape of Good Hope."* I think it is not easy to convey a more contemptible idea of any writers, than he hath here done of these great men. It is to be supposed therefore, that he proposes to lead men a more clear and direct way to the knowledge of the law of nature; especially since he hath declared, that "all that can be said to any real or useful purpose concerning that law, is extremely plain."t Besides occasional passages in which he makes mention of the law of nature, this is the principal subject of several of the Fragments and Essays of which his fifth volume consists, particularly ofthe third, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, and twenty-second, of these Fragments and Essays. But all these together are far from making up any thing that can with the least propriety be called a treatise on the law of nature ; and, as his Lordship generally seems to think himself above treating things in a methodical way, we are left to collect his sentiments by comparing several parts of his works together, and forming a judgment as well as we can. He has neither distinctly explained the principles of that law, nor pursued those principles to their regular consequences, nor formed any deductions from them that can be of great use for the direction and instruction of mankind. As to the law of nature in general, he tells us, that " the law of nature is the law of reason. A right use of that faculty which God hath given us, collects that law from the nature of things, as they stand in the system which he has constituted.""]: Or, as he else where expresseth it, " It is a law which God has given to all his human creatures, enacted in the constitution of their natures, and discernible by the use of the faculties he has given them."§ He * Works, vol. v. p. 68. t Ibid. p. 67. X Ibid- P- 83. § Ibid. p. 99. 364 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVI- calls it, " the revelation God has made of his will by his works. And what is the will of God," saith he, "is a question easily an swered. To answer this, we need go no higher than the moral obli gations that arise in our own system, and of which we have very adequate ideas. The nature of the human system is independent on man, and yet he is obliged to derive the rules of his conduct from it. By employing our reason to collect the will of God from the fund of our nature physical and moral, and by contemplating frequently and seriously the laws that are plainly and necessarily deducible from them, we may acquire not only a particular know ledge of those laws, but a general, and, in some sort, an habitual knowledge of the manner in which God is pleased to exercise his supreme power in this system, beyond which we have no concern."* This law he represents as absolutely certain, and obvious to all mankind. " Natural revelation (for so," saith he, " I will call it) produces knowledge, a series of intuitive knowledge from the first principles to the last conclusions. The phenomena of nature are the 'first principles ; and reason, i. e. a realdivine illumination, leads us from one necessary truth to another, through the whole course of these demonstrations.— In all these cases we know, we do not be- lieve."t He asserts, that " we more certainly know the will of God in this way than we can know it in any other."*!: " And that the tables of the natural law are hung up in the works of God, and are obvious to the sight of all men, so obvious that no man who is able to read the plainest characters can mistake them."§ And accord ingly he declares, that " the will of God, signified by the law of nature, and revealed by his works, is a revelation that admits of no doubt, and shows the road to happiness to all mankind. "|| I shall only mention one passage more, among many that might be pro duced to the same purpose. Having asserted, that " natural religion is the original revelation which God has made of himself, and of his will, to all mankind in the constitution of things, and in the order of his providence ; he observes, that human reason is able to discover in the original revelation every conceivable duty that we owe to God as our Creator, and to man as our fellow creature : that this system of duty is fully proportioned by infinite wisdom to the human state, and the end of its human happiness. — Natural religion therefore, is relatively perfect; it is immutable; as long as God and man con tinue to be what they are, and to stand in the same relations to one another." He adds, " if it does not follow necessarily from this, sure I am that it follows probably, that God has made no other reve lation of himself and of his will to mankind.^ This is evidently the main point our author had in view, in extolling so mightily as he has done the absolute perfection, certainty, and clearness of the law of nature. From the several passages which have been produced, it appears, that by the law of nature he understands what we may collect by * Works, vol. v. p. 100. 154. 178. 196, 271. t Ibid. vol. iv. p. 276. ± Ibid. p. S287. § Ibid. v. p. 153. || Ibid. p. 196. % Ibid. p. 543, 544. Let. XXVI. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 305 our reason, concerning the will of God and our duty, from the con sideration of his works, but especially from the constitution of the human system, or, as he expresseth it, from the fund of our nature, physical and moral. Let us therefore enquire what account he gives ofthe human system. He observes, that " man has two principles of determination, affections and passions, excited by apparent good, and reason, which is a sluggard, and cannot be so excited. Reason must be willed into action ; and as this can rarely happen, when the will is already determined by affections and passions, so when it does happen, a sort of composition generally happens between the two principles; and if the affections and passions cannot govern ab solutely, they obtain more indulgence from reason than they deserve, or than she would show them if she were entirely free from their force, and free from their conduct."* He expressly declares, that "the appetites, passions, and the immediate objects of pleasure, will be always of greater force to determine us than reason ;"f and that " amidst the contingencies that must arise from the constitution of every individual, he needs not go about to prove that the odds will always be on the side of appetite ; from which affections arise, as affections grow up afterwards into passions, which reason cannot always subdue in the strongest minds, and by which she is perpe tually subdued in the weakest."*!: At the same time that he speaks in such strong terms of the great power and prevalency of the ap petites and passions, he will not allow that the Creator hath im planted in the human mind any thing that can be called a natural sense of good and evil, of right or wrong. He treats those as enthu siasts in ethics, and as rendering natural religion ridiculous, who maintain, that there is " a moral sense or instinct, by which men distinguish what is morally good from what is morally evil, and per ceive an agreeable or disagreeable intellectual sensation accord ingly.'^ "This," he says, "may be acquired in some sort by long habit, and by true philosophical devotion, but that it is whimsical to assume it to be natural."!! And now we may form some judgment, how far our author's de clarations concerning the absolute clearness, as well as certainty, of the law of nature, are to be depended on, which he makes with a view to show that all extraordinary revelation is entirely needless. He tells us, that " the law of nature has all the clearness, all the precision that God can give, or man desire ;" which he proves, be cause "the nature of our system, as far as the morality of actions is concerned, is sufficiently known to us, and the laws of our nature consequently, since they result from it."f It is to be observed, that the clearness and precision he here attributes to the law of nature is supposed by him to be of such a kind as to be obvious to all mankind. And the only way he allows to any of the human race for knowing that law and his own duty, is by sending him for information con cerning it to the works of God, and especially to the human system, * Works, vol. v. p. 150. See also ibid. p. 116. 137. 227. t Ibid. p. 267, 268. X Ibid. p. 479. § Ibid. p. 86. || Ibid. p. 479. IT Ibid. p. 26. 97. 366 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVI. and the laws that result from it. And is this so easy a task to every man, even the most illiterate ? Can it be said that this is, as he affirms, " intelligible at all times, and in all places alike, and pro portioned to the meanest understanding?"* Is every man well qualified to search into the fund of his nature, physical and moral, and to form his conclusions accordingly, and draw up a system of religion, of laws and rules for his own conduct ? How can he con sistently suppose, that the human system is sufficiently known to all, when according to him some of the wisest men in all ages, and mankind in general, have been mistaken even in a point of such importance relating to it, as the supposing the soul to be a distinct substance from the body ? Besides which, the knowledge of the human system takes in a due consideration of our senses, reason, appetites, and passions. All these must be considered, that we may know wherein consisteth the proper order and harmony of our powers, which of them are to be subordinate, and which to govern ; what are the just limits of our appetites and passions ; how far and in what instances they are to be gratified, and how far restrained. And is every particular person, if left to himself, able by the mere force of his own reason to consider and compare all these, and from thence to make the proper deductions, and acquire a particular knowledge, as our author requires, of those laws that are deducible from this system ? He has another remarkable passage to the same purpose, which it may be proper to take some notice of. " Whether the word of God," saith he, " be his word, may be, and hath been disputed by theists : but whether the works of God be his works, neither has been nor can be disputed by any such. Natural religion therefore being founded on human nature, which is the work of God, and the necessary conditions of human happiness, which are imposed by the whole system of it, every man who receives the law of nature re ceives it on his own authority, and not on the authority of other men known or unknown, and in their natural state as fallible as himself. It is not communicated to him only by tradition and his tory : it is a perpetual standing revelation, always made, always making, and as present in these days as in the days of Adam to all his offspring."f Here every man is directed, in forming a scheme of the law of nature for himself, to despise all other authority, and rely wholly on his own. It is even mentioned as an advantage, that he receives it on his own authority, i. e. that he has no other proof or authority for it, but the deductions he himself forms by his own reason ; though that reason is, as this writer owns, for the most part influenced and overborne by the appetites and passions. — And this is cried up as a standing revelation to all the sons of Adam. But if we apply this magnificent talk concerning the divine certainty and clearness of the law of nature, to what our author plainly in tends by it, the deductions drawn by every man for himself concern ing his duty, and what he thinks most conducive to his happiness, * Works, vol. v. p. 94. t Ibid. p. 92. Let. XXVI. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 367 the fallacy of his way of arguing will immediately appear ; for though the works of God are certainly the works of God, and it will not be denied that the human nature is his work, it doth not follow that the conclusions formed by every particular person, from that nature, and from the works of God, concerning duty and moral ob ligation, are to be certainly depended upon. When therefore he asserts, that " the contents of the law of nature are objects of such a certainty, as the author of nature alone can communicate,"* if the design be to signify, that the judgment every man forms for himself by his own reason, and upon his own authority, as he ex presseth it, concerning the law of nature, hath such a divine cer tainty in it, it is manifestly false. He confounds the objective cer tainty of the law as founded in the nature of things, with the certainty of the judgment men form concerning it; which are very different things. However certain the law of nature is in itself, men may greatly mistake and misapprehend it. And it is certain in fact that they do stand in great need of particular instruction to enable them to acquire a right knowledge of it. And surely a divine in struction concerning it, by persons extraordinarily sent and com missioned to publish a revelation of the will of God to mankind, and who give sufficient proofs of their divine mission, must be of the highest advantage. This writer himself, though he so often extols the absolute clear ness, certainty, and perfection ofthe law of nature, i. e. of the judg ment men form by reason concerning it ; yet at other times makes acknowledgments which quite destroy the argument he would draw from it against the necessity or usefulness of extraordinary revela tion. He had affirmed in a passage cited above, that " natural revelation (for so," says he, "I will call it,) produces a series of intuitive knowledge from the first principles to the last conclusions;" where he seems to make both the great principles of the law of nature, and the conclusions that are drawn from it, to be infallibly certain ; and yet he elsewhere declares that the laws of nature are general, and intimates that a multitude of false deductions and wrong applications have been often made of that law.t Among several. passages to this purpose, there is one that deserves particular notice. After having said, that " it is in vain to attempt to know any thing more than God has showed us in the actual constitution of things," he adds, that even when we judge of them thus, and make particular applications of the general laws of nature, we are very liable to mistakes. — That there are things fit and unfit, right and wrong, just and unjust, in the human system, and discernible by human reason, as far as our natural imperfections admit, I acknow ledge most readily. But from the difficulty we have to judge, and from the uncertainty of our judgments in a multitude of cases which lie beyond our bounds, I would demonstrate the folly of those who affect to have knowledge beyond them. They are unable on many occasions to deduce from the constitution of their own system, and * Works, vol. v. p. 23. t Ibid. p. 154. 368 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVI. the laws of their own nature, with precision and certainty, what these require of them; and what is right or wrong, just or unjust, for them to do."* To this may be added the acknowledgment he hath made, that " the law of nature is hid from our sight by all the variegated clouds of civil laws and customs. Some gleams of true light may be seen through them ; but they render it a dubious light, and it can be no better to those who have the keenest sight, till those interpositions are removed. "f So that after all his boasts, as if the law of nature were so clear and obvious to all men that they cannot mistake it, he owns it to have been hid from our sight by the clouds of civil laws and customs, and that it is rendered a dubious light even to those who have the keenest sight. And surely nothing can be more proper to remove and dispel these interposi tions of contrary laws and customs, than the light of divine revelation enforced by a divine authority. He himself observes, that ''Eusebius, in his first book of his evangelical prepara tion, gives a long catalogue of absurd laws and customs, con tradictory to the law of nature in all ages and countries, for a very good purpose, to show in several instances, how such absurd laws and customs as these have been reformed by the gospel, that is, by a law which renewed and confirmed the original law of nature.""J: These observations may suffice with regard to what Lord Boling broke hath offered concerning the law of nature in general, and its absolute certainty and clearness to all mankind : I shall now proceed to make some particular reflections on the account he gives of the contents of that law, or the duties which are there prescribed ; as also of the grounds of the obligation of that law, and the sanction whereby it is enforced. I. With regard to the contents or matter of the law of nature, he observed, that " self-love, .directed by instinct to mutual pleasure, made the union between man and woman. Self-love made that of parents and children : self-love begat sociability : and reason, a principle of human nature as well as instinct, improved it, extended it to relations more remote, and united several families into one community, as instinct had united several individuals into one family." See the third of his Fragments and Essays in his fifth volume. And he treats this more largely in the sixth of those Essays, where he observes, that " there is such a thing as natural reason implanted in us by the author of our nature ; but that reason would come too slowly to regulate the conduct of human life, if the All-wise Creator had not implanted in us another principle, that of self-love; which is the original spring of human actions, under the di rection of instinct first, and reason afterwards. "§ — " That instinct and reason may be considered as distinct promulgations of the same law. Self-love directs necessarily to* sociability. — Instinct leads us to it by the sense of pleasure, and reason confirms us in it by a sense of happi- * Works, vol.v. p. 414 f Il)id P- 105. X Ibid. p. 100, 101. § Ibid. p. 79. Let. XXVI. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 369 ness."* — — " Sociability is the foundation of human happiness ; so ciety cannot be maintained without benevolence, justice, and other social virtues. Those virtues therefore are the foundation of society. And thus are we led from the instinctive to the rational law of nature. Self-love operates in all these stages. We love our selves, we love our families, we love the particular societies to which we belong ; and our benevolence extends at last to the whole race of mankind. Like so many different vortices, the centre of all is self-love; and that which is the most distant from it is the weakest."-!/ It appears from this account of the law of nature, that he makes self-love to be the original spring of all human actions, the funda mental principle of the law of nature, and centre of the moral system, to which all the lines of it tend, and in which they terminate ; and yet he elsewhere calls " universal benevolence, benevolence to all rational beings, the great and fundamental principle of the law of nature ;"% and asserts, that " the first principle of the religion of nature and reason is a sociability that flows from universal benevo lence. "§ In the passages above cited, he had expressly affirmed, that self-love begets sociability, and had resolved benevolence into self-love as the original principle from which it flows ; but here he makes sociability to flow from universal benevolence. I do not well see how this can be made to consist upon his scheme. Those may justly regard universal benevolence as a fundamental law of our nature, who suppose a social principle, and a benevolent disposition, distinct from self-love, to be an original disposition, natural to the human heart, and implanted by the Author of our beings ; but if self-love be, as he represents it, the only original spring of human actions, and the centre of the whole system, universal benevolence cannot be properly represented as the fundamental law of our nature. Upon this scheme the private interest of the individual, whenever it happens to come in competition with the public good, ought to be preferred. Lord Bolingbroke endeavours to answer Carneades's argument against justice, who urged, that "either there is no such thing as justice, or it would be extremely foolish, because that in providing for the good of others, the just would hurt themselves. "|| This argument seems to me to be conclusive upon his Lordship's scheme. For supposing, which seems to be his sentiment, that there is no natural sense of right and wrong, of moral beauty and deformity, implanted in the human heart; and that at the same time a man is persuaded that providence has no regard to indivi duals, to their actions, or the events which befall them ; and that therefore he has nothing to hope or to fear from God ; and that this life is the whole of his existence; and if he is also made to think, that self-love is the original spring of human actions, and the cen tral point to which all must tend ; and that a tendency to promote his own happiness, his present happiness, is what gives the law of * Works, vol. v. p. 80, 81. t Ibid. p. 82. } Ibid. vol. iv. p. 282. vol. v. p. 98. § Ibid. p. 196. || Ibid, p 103. B B 370 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVI. nature its obligation, which, as shall be shown, is what Lord Bo lingbroke avows : upon these principles, if in any particular instance an unjust action may turn to his own advantage, and he knows he is safe in committing it, he is justified in doing that action, when a strict regard to justice, or fidelity to his word and promise, would do him hurt. For his present advantage and interest in this un certain life is what he is to have principally in view, and to which every thing else must be subordinate. In the eleventh of his Fragments and Essays, in which he parti cularly treats of sociability, he observes, that "it is owing to our being determined by self-love to seek our pleasure and utility in society ; and that when these ends are sufficiently answered, natural sociability declines, and natural insociability commences. The in fluence of self-love reaches no farther; and when men are once formed into societies, those societies become individuals, and thus self-love, which promoted union among men, promotes discord among them."* So that, according to him, self-love first produces sociableness, and puts men upon forming societies; and when so cieties are once formed, this same self-love produces unsociableness and discord between those societies. And if this be the case, I cannot see how he can maintain, as he sometimes does, that uni versal benevolence flows from self-love, when, according to his ac count of it, it is only a very limited sociableness which is produced by self-love ; and self-love, instead of promoting an universal bene volence, destroys it. With regard to the particular duties included in the law of nature, there is little in these Essays that can be of use, either to show what those duties are, or how they are deducible from that law. What he saith on this head is for the most part very general. As to the duties we owe to God, he observes, that " the reli gion and law of nature shows us the Supreme Being manifested in all his works to be the true and only object of our adoration ; and that it teaches us to worship him in spirit and in truth, that is, in wardly and sincerely." But he seems to confine the worship pre scribed in that law to inward worship. He adds, that " in the existence God has given us, and in the benefits which attach us strongly to it, this shows him to be the first and greatest object of our gratitude : and in the established order of things, subject to so many vicissitudes, and yet so constant, this religion shows him to be the reasonable as well as necessary object of our resignation : and finally, in the wants, distresses, and dangers which those vicis situdes bring frequently upon us, to be the comfortable object of our hope — in which hope, the religion of nature will teach us no doubt to address ourselves to the Almighty, in a manner consistent with an entire resignation to his will, as some ofthe heathens did."* These are undoubtedly important duties. But it is not easy to see what plea there is for making God the comfortable object of our hope in the wants, distresses, and dangers we are exposed to, or for * Works, vol. v. p. 115. f Ibid. p. 97, 98. Let. XXVI. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 371 addressing ourselves to him in an entire resignation to his will and to his providence, if he exerciseth no care of individuals at all, nor concerneth himself about their actions, their particular cases and circumstances, in this present state, nor will ever recompense their piety and virtue in a future one. The scheme our author hath ad vanced on these heads, appeareth to me to be absolutely inconsistent with what he himself here representeth as important duties of the law of nature. As to other particular duties required in that law, he says, " No doubt can be entertained whether the law of nature forbids idolatry, blasphemy, murder, theft, and I think incest, at least in the highest instance of it." * These things he only mentions ; but that which he most largely insists upon, as a precept of the law of nature, is polygamy. This is the subject of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth, of his Fragments and Essays. The principal argument which he brings to prove that polygamy is agreeable to the law of nature, and is a duty bound upon us by that law, is, that it con tributes to the increase and propagation of the human species. He owns that " monogamy, or the confinement of one husband to one wife while they both live, will unite the care of both parents in breeding up subjects of the commonwealth :" but he asserts, that " it will not serve as effectually, nor in as great numbers, to the be getting them."t But it would not be a hard matter to show, that polygamy, if universally allowed (and it must be so if it were a law of nature), would not tend to the increase of mankind upon the whole, but the contrary."): Seeing if one man had many wives, several men must be without any, considering that providence has ordered such an equality in numbers between the sexes ; and that, as hath been observed by those who have examined this matter with the greatest accuracy, there are generally more men born into the world, than women. This shows, that in the order of nature, and according to the present constitution of things, more than one woman is not ordinarily designed for one man. And I believe it will scarce be denied to be probable, that twenty men married to twenty women would have more children among them, than one man married to twenty women. The constant ordinary course of providence throughout the world with respect to the proportion be tween the sexes is, as Moses represents it to have been in the be ginning, one man to one woman. And it is observable, that accord ing to his account, polygamy had no place either at the first original of the human race, or at the reparation of mankind immediately after the deluge, though in both these cases the speedy multiplica tion of the human species seemed to be necessary. If therefore we judge, as Lord Bolingbroke would have us judge, of the law of nature by the constitution of our system, monogamy is more agree able to that law, and a more perfect institution than polygamy. But * Works, vol. v. p. 156. t Ibid. p. 163. X See, concerning this, the Rev. Dean Delany's excellent Reflections oi Po'y. gamy. B 13 2 3/2 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVI. I shall have occasion to resume this subject, when I come to con sider his observations against the Christian law on this account. I do not find that he any where represents adultery as a violation of the law of nature ; he rather intimates the contrary, when he gives it as a reason why in Greece and Rome, and several other states, a plurality of wives was prohibited, and monogamy en couraged, " because, notwithstanding their entering into single marriages, nothing hindered them, nor their wives neither, except the want of opportunity, from indulging their lust with others in spite of their sacred bonds, and the legal property they had in one another's persons." And he thinks it cannot be doubted that such considerations have the same effect upon Christians, who look upon those marriages to have been instituted by God himself.* But 1 am persuaded the ancient pagans would not have alleged or admitted the reason he gives for reconciling them to single marriages : as if no man or woman entered into the marriage-bond, but with a resolution to violate it as often as an opportunity offered. If that had been the case, adultery would not have been so infamous a thing, nor so severely punished, as it was in the best ages of Greece and Rome. Nor were adulteries common among them, till an universal disso luteness and corruption of manners prevailed, which prepared things by degrees for the dissolution of their state. He plainly supposes all men and women to be unchaste ; and that there is no such thing as conjugal fidelity and chastity either among heathens or Chris tians. Such a way of representing things is generally looked upon as a suspicious sign of a vicious and corrupt heart, which judges of the rest of mankind by its own depraved inclinations. And that his Lordship had no great notion of the virtue or obligation of chastity, farther appears from the account he gives of " the motives of that modesty, with which almost all mankind, even the most savage, con ceal the parts, and remove out of sight to perform the act, of gene ration." He says, " the latent principle of this shame or modesty, is a vanity inherent in our nature, which makes us fond of showing how superior we are to other animals, and to hide how much we participate of the same nature." As if the savage nations carried their refinements so far, which would be an argument against eating in open view, since in this we equally participate ofthe same nature with other animals. He adds, that " an uncontrolled and undis turbed indulgence to their mutual lust, is one of the principal reasons for the solitude wherein the two sexes affect to copulate." So that this shame and modesty, which forbids public copulations of human creatures like brutes, is at last resolved into an excessive prevalence of lust. He concludes therefore, that " this shame is artificial, and has been inspired by human laws, by prejudice and the like."t As to incest, he seems to think the law of nature forbids none but that of the highest kind, viz. " the conjunction between fathers and daughters, sons and mothers :" and whether this is forbidden by that law he is not very positive ; but inclines to think it is forbidden; * Works, vol. v. p. 1G7. t Ibid. p. 174. Let. XXVI. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 373 not for any repugnancy or abhorrence in nature to such copulations, which he treats as a pretence that scarce deserves an answer, but. because " as parents are the chief magistrates of families, every thing that tends to diminish a reverence for them, or to convert it into some, other sentiment, diminishes their authority, and dissolves the order of these little commonwealths."* He mentions nations, " among whom no regard was paid to the degrees of consanguinity and affinity, but brothers mixed with sisters, fathers with their daughters, and sons with their mothers : that they were had in abomination by the Jews, who were in return held in contempt by them and all others : that two of these nations, the Egyptians and Babylonians, had been masters of the Jews in every sense, and from whom the Greeks and Romans derived all their knowledge ; and perhaps the first use of letters :"t And he observes, that " Eve was in some sort the daughter of Adam. She was literally bone of his bone, and flesh of his flesh."J This seems to be mentioned by him with a design to give some sort of patronage for the conjunction between fathers and daughters. But Eve could with no propriety be called the daughter of Adam; though they might both be called the children of God : Adam did not beget or form Eve, but God formed them both.§ He concludes, that " increase and multiply is the law of nature. The manner in which this precept shall be executed with the greatest advantage to society, is the law of man." So that the only law of nature that he allows in this case, is the natural instinct to increase and multiply. Fornication, adultery, incest, are all left at large to political considerations, and human laws, and to what men shall think most for their pleasure and the propagation of the species, without any divine law to restrain or regulate them ; which is to open a wide door for a licentious indulgence to the carnal appetite. The last thing I propose to consider with regard to Lord Boling broke's account ofthe law of nature is, the ground ofthe obligation of that law, and the sanctions whereby it is enforced. As to the ground of its obligation, or from whence the obliging force of that law arises, he observes, that that which makes it pro perly obligatory is, not its being the will and appointment of God, but its being conducive to human happiness. To this purpose he declares, that " though the Supreme Being willed into existence this system, and by consequence all the relations of things con tained in it; yet it is not this will, it is in truth the constitution of the system alone, that imposes these laws on mankind originally, whatever power made this system."— " The morality of actions," * Works, vol. v. p. 175. t Ibid. p. 172, 173. 175. X Ibid. p. 176, § Though our author seems in some of the passages above cited to speak of this worst kind of incest in softening terms, which show no great abhorrence of it, yet when he takes notice, in a sneering way, of the edifying anecdote of Lot's daughters, he calls that incest a monstrous crime, and intimateth as if, according to the Mosaic ac count, the goodness of their intention sanctified it. Vol. v. p. 112. But Moses con tented himself with relating the fact as it really happened; nor can it possibly be sup posed, that he had any design to sanctify that crime, which is forbidden and condemned in his law in the strongest terms, and censured as an abomination. 374 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVI. he thinks, " doth not consist in this, that they are prescribed by will, even by the will of God : but it is this, that they are the means, however imposed the practice of them may be, of acquiring happi ness agreeable to our nature." And he seems to find fault with those who " think there can be no law of nature, or at least that it can not pass for a law in the sense of obliging and binding, without a God :" though he owns, that " it is more fully and effectually so to the theist, than to the atheist."* But though he has here ex pressly declared, that it is not the will of God, but it is the consti tution of the human system, which imposes these laws originally on mankind ; yet afterwards, in opposition to Grotius, he asserts the law of nature to be the positive law of God in every sense, a law of will, and blames that great man, and others, for distinguishing between the law of nature, and the positive law of God to man.f With regard to the sanctions of the law of nature, he expressly affirms, that the penalties which make the sanction of natural law, affect nations collectively, not men individually.*!: This is not an occasional thought, but is a fixed part of his scheme, and which he frequently repeats. § The only penalties or sanctions which he al lows properly to belong to the law of nature, are the public evils which affects nations. With regard to particular persons, tbere are no divine sanctions to enforce that law. But the punishment of in dividuals is left wholly to the laws enacted by every community. And it is certain that there are many breaches of the natural law, which do not make men liable to any punishment by the civil laws. There is no punishment provided by those laws, nor any, according to our author's account, by the law of nature, for1 secret crimes, however enormous ; nor do these laws ever punish internal bad dis positions, any vices of the heart, or irregular and corrupt affections. A man may be safely as wicked as he pleases, provided he can manage so as to escape punishment by the laws of his country, which very bad men, and those that are guilty of great vices, may easily, and frequently do, evade. No other penalties has he to fear (for I do not find that he ever reckons inward remorse or stings of conscience among the sanctions ofthe natural law), except he hap pens to be involved in national calamities ; among which he mentions oppression, famine, pestilence, wars, and captivities ; and in these it often happens, that good men as well as the wicked and vicious are involved. So that he allows no punishments as proper divine sanc tions of the law of nature, but what are common to those that keep that law, as well as to those who violate it. All that he offers to prove, that this divine sanction, as he calls it, of the natural law is sufficient, amounts to this, that the sanctions of the law of Moses, which is pretended to be a positive law given by God to his chosen people, consisted only in temporal pains and penalties, and those only such as affected the nation in general, and not individuals, This, as far as the law of Moses is concerned, will be afterwards ex- * Works, vol.iv. p. 283, 284. t Ibid. vol. v. p. 87. ' } Ibid. p. 90. 4 See particularly vol. iv. p. 288. vol. v. p. 472. 474. 494, 495, Let. XXVI. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 375 amined. At present I shall only observe, that it is a strange way of arguing, to endeavour to prove, that the sanction of the law of nature is divine, because it is the same with the sanction of the law of Moses, which in our author's opinion was not divine.* Allow me, before I conclude this letter, to make a brief represen tation of that scheme of morality, or of the law of nature, which his Lordship's principles naturally lead to. The rule he lays down for judging of the law of nature, or of moral obligation, is this : That man is to judge of it from his own nature, and the system he is in. And man, according to his account of him, is merely a superior animal, whose views are confined to this present life, and who has no reasonable prospect of existing in any other state. God has given him appetites and passions ; these appetites lead him to pleasure, which is their only object. He has reason indeed ; but this reason is only to enable him to provide and contrive what is most conducive to his happiness ; that is, what will yield him a continued permanent series ofthe most agreeable sen sations or pleasures, which is the definition of happiness.-)- And if no regard be had to futurity, he must govern himself by what he thinks most conducive to his interest, or his pleasure, in his present circumstances. The constitution of his nature is his only guide; God has given him no other, and concerns himself no farther about him, nor will ever call him to an account for his actions. In this constitution his flesh or body is his all; there is no distinct imma terial principle ; nor has he any moral sense or feelings naturally implanted in his heart; and therefore to please the flesh, and pur sue its interest, or gratify its appetites and inclinations, must be his principal end. Only he must take care so to gratify them, as not to expose himself to the penalties of human laws, which are the only sanctions ofthe law of nature for particular persons. He may with out any check of conscience debauch his neighbour's wife, when he has an opportunity of doing it safely ; and needs be under no re straint to the indulging his lusts, from shame or modesty, which is only an artificial thing, owing to prejudice or pride. As to the re fined sentiments of subjecting the appetites to reason, or the sub jecting a man's own private interest, or that of his family, to the r public good of the community, this cannot be reasonably done upon his scheme. It is urged indeed, that " the good of individuals is so closely connected with the good of society, that the means of pro moting the one cannot be separated from those of promoting the other."*!: But though it is generally so, yet it may happen in par ticular cases, that these interests may be separated. It may be more for a man's private interest to break the laws of his country ; and if he can find his own private advantage, or gratify his ambition, his love of power, or of riches, in doing what is prejudicial to the community, there is nothing to restrain him from it, provided he can do it safely ; for self-love is the centre of tbe whole moral system, and the more extended the circle is, the weaker it grows. So that * Works, vol. v. p. 91. t Ibid. p. 377, 378. J Ibid. p. 103. 376 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVII. the love of a man's country must be far weaker than his love of himself, or regard to his own particular interest, which must be his supreme governing principle and end. But I shall not pursue this any farther. How far such a system of morals would be for the good of mankind, it is easy to see; and it seems to me fairly deducible from Lord Bolingbroke's principles taken in their just connection, though I do not pretend to charge his Lordship with expressly acknowledging or avowing all these con sequences ; and sometimes he advances what is inconsistent with them. LETTER XXVII. An Examination of what Lord Bolingbroke hath offered concerning Revelation in general. — He asserts that mankind had no Need of an extraordinary Revelation The contrary fully shown. — A divine Revelation very needful to instruct men in the most important Principles of Religion, especially those relating to the Unity, the Perfections, and Providence of God; the worship that is to be rendered to him ; moral Duty taken in its just Extent; the chief Good and Happiness of Man; the Terms of our Acceptance with God, and the Means of Reconciliation when we have offended him ; and the Rewards and Punishments of a future State It may be concluded from the Necessities of Mankind, that a Revelation was communicated from the Beginning. — A Notion and Belief of this has very generally obtained.— The wisest Men of Antiquity sensible that bare Reason alone is not sufficient to enforce Doctrines and Laws with a due Authority upon Mankind — The most cele brated Philosophers acknowledged their Want of divine Revelation The Author's Exceptions against this examined.— Under Pretence of extolling the great Effects which a true divine Revelation must have produced, he endeavours to show, that no true divine Revelation was ever really given. — His Scheme tends, contrary to his own Intention, to show the Usefulness and Necessity of divine Revelation. Sir, Any one that reads Lord Bolingbroke's Works with attention must be convinced, that one principal design he had in view, was to destroy the authority of the divine revelation in general, and of the Jewish and Christian in particular. I shall consider what he hath offered with regard to each of these ; and shall begin with what relates to divine revelation in general. As to the possibility of an extraordinary revelation communicated from God to men, his Lordship hath no where thought fit expressly to deny it ; though he hath made some attempts which seem to look that way. He frequently treats the notion of communion with God and communications from God to men, as a great absurdity, and the supposition of which is wholly owing to the pride of the human heart ; and has declared, that he cannot "comprehend the metaphy sical or physical influence of spirits, suggestions, silent communica tions, injection of ideas. — And that all such interpositions in the intellectual system cannot be conceived, without altering, in every Let. XXVII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 377 such instance, the natural progression ofthe human understanding, and the freedom of the will."* Yet in a long digression about in spiration, in his " Essay concerning the Nature, Extent, and Reality, of Human Knowledge," after having done what he could to expose and ridicule it, he expressly owns, that " an extraordinary action of God on the human mind, which the word inspiration is here used to denote, is not more inconceivable than the ordinary action of mind on body, or of body on mind." — And that " it is im pertinent to deny the existence of any phenomenon, merely because we cannot account for it." But he urges, that " it would be silly to assume inspiration to be true, because God can act mysteriously, i. e. in ways unknown to us, on his creature man."t Nor was any of the divines, whom he treats on all occasions with so much con tempt, ever so silly, as to assume inspiration to be true, merely be cause it is possible. The actual truth of it must be proved by other arguments. I shall therefore take it for granted, that an extraordinary revela tion from God to men, for instructing and directing them in the knowledge of important truth, of his will and their duty, is possible ; and that such a revelation might be so circumstanced, as to be of real and signal advantage, our author himself seems sometimes will ing to allow. After having observed, that we cannot be obliged to believe against reason, he adds, that "when a revelation hath all the authenticity of human testimony, when it appears consistent in all its parts, and when it contains nothing inconsistent with any real knowledge we have ofthe supreme all-perfect Being, and of natural religion, such a revelation is to be received with the most profound reverence, with the most entire submission, and with the most un feigned thanksgiving."*!: This goes upon a supposition that an extra ordinary revelation from God is not only possible, but may be of signal benefit to mankind ; and, if really communicated, ought to be received with great thankfulness. And he declares that he does not " presume to assert, that God has made no such particular reve lations of his will to mankind ;" though he adds, that the "opinion that there have been such revelations, is not in any degree so agree able to the notions of infinite knowledge and wisdom, as the con trary opinion. "§ What he principally bends himself to prove is, that mankind had no need of supernatural revelation ; and that therefore it is no way probable that God would extraordinarily interpose to give such dis coveries of his will. For this purpose he mightily extols the abso lute clearness and perfection of the law of nature ; from whence, he thinks, it follows, " that God has made no other revelation of him self, and of his will to mankind." Many of the Fragments and Essays in his fifth volume are particularly intended to invalidate what Dr. Clarke had urged to show the need the world stood in of a divine revelation. See particularly from the twenty-third to the * Works, vol. v. p. 414,415. — See concerning this above, Letter VII. t Ibid. vol. iii. p. 468. X Ibid. vol. iv. p. 279.— See also. vol. v. p. 201. § Ibid. p. 544. 378 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVII. twenty-eight of his Fragments and Essays ; as also the thirty-third and thirty-fourth. But if we abstract from the overbearing confi dence, and assuming air, so familiar to Lord Bolingbroke, we shall find very little in those essays, which is of any consequence against what that very learned writer had advanced. The reflections that were made in my last letter on what his Lord ship had offered concerned the absolute clearness of the law or religion of nature to all mankind, might suffice to show, that there is no just foundation for the inference he would draw from it. But it will be proper to enter upon a more particular and distinct con sideration of this matter. And to set it in a fair light, I shall men tion some things of high importance to mankind, with regard to which they stand in great need of particular instruction, and of hav ing them cleared and ascertained by a divine revelation. Such are the articles relating to the unity, the perfection, and providence of God, the worship that is to be rendered to him, moral duty taken in its just extent, the chief good and happiness of man, the terms of our acceptance with God, and the means of reconciliation when we have offended him, and the rewards and punishments of a future state. 1. The first and fundamental principle of all religion relates to the unity, the perfections, and providence of the one true God, the su preme original Cause of all things, the Maker and Governor of the world. This is justly represented by our author as the angular stone of religion. And it comes to us confirmed by so many con vincing proofs, that one would have been apt to expect that all mankind in all ages should have agreed in acknowledging it; and yet certain it is, that there is scarce any thing in which they have fallen into more pernicious errors, than in their notions relating to this great and fundamental article. This writer finds great fault with Mr. Locke for asserting, in his " Reasonableness of Chris tianity," that the heathens were deficient in the first article of natural religion, the knowledge of one God, the Maker of all things : and yet this is no more than what Lord Bolingbroke him self acknowledges in strong terms. He observes, that " though the first men could doubt no more, that some cause of the world, than that the world itself, existed, yet a consequence of this great event, and of the surprise, ignorance, and inexperience, of mankind must have been much doubt and uncertainty concerning the first cause : * that the variety of the phsenomena which struck their sense would lead them to imagine a variety of causes. — That accordingly polytheism and idolatry prevailed almost every-where, and therefore seems more conformable to human ideas abstracted from the first appearance of things, and better proportioned, by an analogy of human conceptions, to the uncultivated reason of mankind, and to understandings not sufficiently informed." He adds, that " poly theism, and the consequence of it, idolatry, were avowed and taught by legislators and philosophers, and they prevailed more * Works, vol. iii. p. 253. Let. XXVII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 379 easily, because they were more conformable to the natural concep tions of the human mind, than the belief of one first intelligent Cause, the sole Creator, Preserver, and Governor of all things."* And though he insinuates, that " afterwards, when nations became civilized, and wise constitutions of government were formed, men could not be ignorant of this great principle," yet he owns, that " the vulgar among the Greeks and Romans, and all the learned nations of the east, acknowledged a multitude of divinities, to which they ascribed every excellence and every defect of their own nature." t He endeavours indeed to apologize for them, by saying, that '' the worship of this multiplicity of gods did not interfere with the supreme Being in the minds of those that worshipped them." "I" But in plain contradiction to this, he elsewhere saith, that " they lost sight of him, and suffered imaginary beings to intercept the worship due to him alone." § And speaking of the crowd of imaginary divinities among the heathens, supercelcstial and celestial gods, whole gods, and half gods, &c. he says, that " they intercepted the worship of the supreme Being; and that this monstrous assemblage made the object of vulgar adoration."|| And indeed nothing can be more evident than it is from all the remaining monuments of paganism, that the public worship prescribed and established by their laws was paid to a multiplicity of deities ; nor was there any injunction in any of their laws, that the supreme God, and he only, was to be adored. The legislators, by his own ac knowledgment, " thought it dangerous to cure, and useful to con firm, the popular superstition." % He is pleased indeed to give a magnificent account of the pagan mysteries, as what were intended by tbe heathen legislators for re forming the manners and religion of the people. He asserts as positively as if he knew it, that " there are good grounds to be per suaded, that the whole system of polytheism was unravelled in the greater mysteries, or that no more of it was retained than was con sistent with monotheism, with the belief of one supreme self-existent Being :" and yet he ridicules those who pretend to give a minute and circumstantial account of those mysteries, as if they had assisted at the celebration of them. " These rites," he says, " were kept secret, under the severest penalties, above two thousand years : how then can we hope to have them revealed to us now?"** He owns however, that " the vulgar gods still kept their places there, and the absurdities of polytheism were retained, however mitigated: and that the lesser mysteries preserved, and the greater tolerated, the fictitious divinities which superstition and poetry had invented, such as Jupiter, Mercury, and Venus, as well as the rites and cere monies instituted in honour of them, " which,'' he says, " were practised even by those who were consummated in the greater mysteries." And that thus it was particularly in the Eleusinian mysteries, which were the most sacred of them all.tf It gives one * Works, vol. iii. p. 259, 260. f Ibid. vol. iv. p. 199, 200. X Ibid. vol. v. p. 305. § Ibid. vol. iv. p. 80. || Ibid. p. 461. f Ibid. p. 51. ** Ibid. p. 58. ff Ibid. p. 74. 380 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WHITERS. Let. XXVII. no very advantageous notion of the nature and design of those mysteries, that Socrates would not be initiated in them. And cer tain it is, . that, notwithstanding this boasted expedient, the people, particularly the Athenians, who were remarkably strict in the cele bration of those mysteries, still grew more and more addicted to their superstitions and idolatries, which were never at a greater height than when Christianity appeared. With regard to the philosophers, he tells us, " they knew as well as we know, that there is a first intelligent cause of all things, and that the infinite wisdom and power of this Being made and preserves the universe, and that his providence governs it.* But it cannot be denied, that some whole sects of them did not acknowledge the one supreme God, the Maker and Governor of the world : others of them, as the Sceptics and Academics, represented these things as matters of doubtful disputation." And as to those of them who ac knowledged the existence ofthe monad or unity, he himself tells us, that they neglected to worship him, and conformed to the practice of idolatry, though not to the doctrines of polytheism." t And such persons were certainly very unfit to instruct and reform mankind in this important article. And after giving a very lively description of the prevailing polytheism and idolatry, he adds, that " thus the vulgar believed, and thus the priests encouraged, whilst the philo sophers, overborne by the torrent of polytheism, suffered them thus to believe, in ages when true theism was reputed atheism.""}: Some of the greatest philosophers were of opinion, that God was not to be named, or discoursed of among the vulgar, because they were not capable of forming a just notion of him. Plato in his book of laws did not prescribe to the people the worship ofthe one Supreme God, because he looked upon him to be incomprehensible ; and that what he is, or how he is to be worshipped, is not to be described or declared. But he appointed twelve solemn festivals to be observed, to the honour of the twelve principal gods, and proposed the worship ofthe stars, whose divinity he recommended. See his eighth book of laws, and his Epinomis, or appendix to his book of laws. There was need therefore of an extraordinary divine interposition to awaken the attention of mankind to this great and fundamental article of all religion. To divine revelation it was owing, that the belief, and acknowledgment, and adoration of the one true God, and of him only, was established among the Jews, whilst the learned and civilized nations all around them were immersed in the most stupid idolatry and polytheism. And this writer acknowledges, that " our Saviour found the world in a state of error concerning this first principle of natural religion : and that the spreading of Christianity has contributed to destroy polytheism and idolatry." § As the existence and unity of the one true God, so his attributes and perfections, and his governing providence, are of high import ance to be clearly and certainly known. With regard to the divine attributes and perfections, Lord Bolingbroke observes, that " though * Works, vol. v. p. 217. t Ibid. vol. iv. p. 48. X Ibid. p. 200. § Ibid. p. 24 1. Let. XXVII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 381 theists will concur in ascribing all possible perfections to tbe su preme Being, yet they will always differ when they descend into any detail, and pretend to be particular about them ; as they have always differed in their notions of those perfections."* A revelation from God therefore, in which he declares his own divine attributes and perfections, must be of great advantage to mankind ; and it is what one should think every true theist would wish for, that God would be graciously pleased to make a discovery of himself, and of his own glorious perfections, which may direct and assist men in forming just and worthy notions of them, especially of what it most nearly concerneth us to know, his moral attributes. And as to the knowledge and belief of his governing providence, in this also the heathens were greatly deficient. He observes, speaking of some of the philosophers who acknowledged the monad, or first unity, that " they reduced him in some sort to a nonentity, an abstract or notional Being, and banished him almost entirely out of the system of his works."-)- Tacitus, having represented it as un certain, whether human affairs were governed by fate and immu table necessity, or by chance, observes, that the wisest of the ancients were of different sentiments about it ; and that many had this opinion deeply fixed in their minds, that neither our beginning, nor our end, nor men at all, were minded by the Gods. Mihi hczc ac talia audienti in incerto judicium est, fatone res hu mana,, et necessitate immutabili, an forte volvantur ; quippe sapien- tissimos veterum, quique eorum sectam amulantur, diversos reperies, at multis insitam opinionem non initia nostra, nonflnem, non denique homines diis cura. Tacit. Annal. lib. 6. Some, like our author, who pretended to own a general, denied a particular providence, which extends to the individuals of the human race; and, under pretence of high thoughts of the divine majesty, were for secluding him from any concern with human actions or affairs. This then is another matter of great importance, in which an extraordinary revelation from God would be of signal use. For if he should condescend by any well-attested revelation to assure men of his concern even for the individuals of mankind, to declare his kind and gracious intentions towards them, and his cog nizance of their actions, and the events that relate to them, this would greatly contribute to remove their doubts, and would lay the foundation for an ingenuous confidence, an entire resignation, a cheerful hope, and steady dependence. It appears, from these short hints, of how great advantage a well-attested revelation from God might be for instructing us in the certain knowledge of God, of his attributes, and his providence — : things of the highest moment in religion, and on which the duty and happiness of mankind in a great measure depend. 2dly, Another thing that it is proper to observe here is, that a * Works, vol. v. p. 235. t Ibid. vol. iv. p. 466. 382 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVII. divine revelation is very needful to teach men not only to know and acknowledge the one true God, his attributes, and providence, but to instruct them how to worship him in an acceptable manner. Dr. Clarke had urged, that "bare reason cannot discover in what manner, and with what kind of service God will be worshipped." Lord Bolingbroke takes notice of this, and in answer to it observes, that " bare reason cannot discover how any external service that man can pay should be acceptable to the supreme and all-perfect Being." He acknowledges, that an inward adoration, a gratitude to God for his benefits, and resignation to his providence, is neces sary;* and that the law of nature teaches us " to worship God in spirit and in truth, that is, inwardly and sincerely." t He seems to confine the worship required in the law of nature to inward worship, the devotion of the heart. But if it be necessary that meu should worship the supreme Being inwardly, it seems highly proper that there should be some outward acts of religious homage, openly ex pressive of that inward adoration, reverence and gratitude. With out some such external acts of worship, men cannot join in social acts of devotion, or in rendering to God public worship, without which scarce any appearance' of religion can be maintained in the world. It is the voice of nature and reason, in which all mankind have generally agreed, that there should be external as well as in ternal worship rendered to God, and that there should be sacred rites appointed for the better regulating and ordering that external worship. Accordingly he owns, that " the best and wisest of the heathens approved the political institutions of an external service, as far as they helped to keep up a lively sense of these duties in the minds of men, and to promote the practice of them :" J and he had declared before, that " there may be laws and institutions relating to such outward rites and observances, which may be proper and even necessary means to promote the observation of those duties." But he will not allow that " any such laws can be divine ordinances; they can only pass for human institutions." $ But I cannot see upon what foundation it can be pretended, that God cannot insti tute ordinances relating to the external rites of divine worship, when it is owned, that such ordinances may be instituted by men, and may be useful to keep up a lively sense of the great duties of religion in the minds of men, and to promote the observance and practice of them. It is undeniably manifest, from the experience and observa tion of all ages, that there is nothing in which men have been more apt to err, than in what regards the external rites of religious worship; and that, when left merely to human imagination and in vention, these things have often hindered, instead of promoting, the main ends of all religion. This shows how needful it was, that God should himself institute that external religious service, which is so necessary, and in which yet mankind have been so prone to fall into the errors and extravagances of superstition. Our author himself takes notice of " the numberless ridiculous and cruel rites of * Works, vol. v. p. 208. t Ibid. p. 98. X Ibid. p. 208. § Ibid. p. 98. Let. XXVII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 383 paganism, which were held necessary to obtain the favour, and avert the anger of heaven."* And surely there could not be a more proper and effectual preservative against these absurd superstitions, than for God to institute the external rites of his own worship, and for men to keep close to his institutions. This was certainly one valuable end for which we may suppose it proper that God should extraordinarily interpose to reveal his will to mankind, viz. for di recting them in the external worship he would have rendered to him, that it might be regulated in such a manner, as to be a fit means of promoting inward worship, and answering the main ends of religion. 3dly, Another thing of great importance to mankind to know, and in which a revelation from God is very needful, and of signal use, is moral duty taken in its just extent. Lord Bolingbroke himself represents it as taking in our duty towards God and man, according to the different relations in which we stand to both.f To which may be added, the duties and virtues which relate, to self- government, and the conducting and regulating our own appetites and passions. Now the only way we have of being fully instructed and directed in the knowledge and practice of our duty, if all regard to extraordinary divine revelation be thrown out of the case, is either for every man to collect the whole of his duty for himself, merely by the force of his own reason and observation, or to follow the instructions and directions of philosophers and moralists, or the institutions of civil laws. As to the first, there are many passages in our author's writings, that represent the law of nature in its whole extent, as so clear and obvious to the meanest understanding, that man cannot be mistaken in it. He frequently talks as if every man was able, without any instruction, by considering the works of God, and the constitution of the human system, to furnish out a scheme of natural religion for himself, including the main principles and duties of the law of nature. But this pretence is so contrary to matter-of-fact, and to the experience and observation of all ages, and has been so often exposed, that I need not take any farther pains, besides the hints given in my former letter, to show the absurdity of it, especially as I had occasion to consider it at large in the answer to Tindal. The bulk of mankind, therefore, must be sent for the knowledge of their duty, either to the instructions of their teachers and wise men, or to the institutions of civil laws. As to the former, if by teachers be meant the heathen priests, as distinguished from the philosophers (though our author says that in the earlier ages they were the same), I believe those of his senti ments will easily allow, that they were not very proper to instruct mankind in the right knowledge of religion, and in the true doc trine of morals. But with regard to the philosophers, though he represents them as venders of' false wares, and frequently spends whole pages in invectives against them, yet when he has a mind to * Works, vol. v. p. 208. t Ibid. p. 154. 543, 544. 384 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVII. show that there was no need of a divine revelation, he thinks fit to represent them as very proper and sufficient guides and instructors to mankind. Dr. Clarke, in his " Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion," had offered several considerations to prove that they were not so. Lord Bolingbroke endeavours to take off the force of his observations, especially in the twenty-third, twenty -fifth, and twenty-sixth of his Fragments and Essays. And whereas that learned writer had asserted, that " the heathen philosophers were never able to prove clearly and distinctly enough, to persons of all capacities, the obligations of virtue, and the will of God in matters of morality — and that they were not able to frame to themselves any complete, and regular, and consistent scheme or system of things ;" in opposition to this, his Lordship affirms, that " there is no one moral virtue, 'which has not been taught, explained, and proved, by the heathen philosophers, both occasionally and purposely : That they all agreed, that the practice of virtue was of necessary and indispensable obligation, and that the happiness of mankind depended upon it, in general, and in particular : And that they all agreed also what was virtue, and what was vice."* And he again insisteth upon it, that " there is no one moral precept in the whole gospel which was not taught by the philosophers ; and that this is strongly and largely exemplified by Huetius, in the third book of his Alnetana Qutzstiones." And he blames Dr. Clarke for conceal ing it.f There are two observations which I shall make upon what his Lordship has here offered. The first is this : That if it were true, that there is no moral pre cept enjoined in the gospel, but what may be found in the writings of some one or other of the heathen philosophers, this would not be sufficient to enforce those duties upon mankind, or to convince them of their obligations to perform them. When so many of the philosophers wrote upon moral subjects, it may be supposed, that one or other of thern might, by a happy conjecture, light upon some of the most sublime precepts of the gospel morality. But what was it to mankind what a particular philosopher, or even sect of philosophers, maintained or taught in their schools 1 They were not the public teachers of religion ; and was it likely that their refined speculations, unenforced by any authority, and contradicted by others among themselves, should have any great influence upon mankind, and be regarded by them as divine laws, especially with regard to matters in which the gratification of their appetites and passions was concerned, and their own prevailing inclinations were to be restrained or governed ? They might, after hearing the rea sonings of the philosophers, think they were not obliged to govern themselves by their dictates, however plausible, and seemingly rational. Whereas a divine revelation, clearly ascertaining and determining their duty in plain and express propositions, would carry far stronger conviction, and when received and believed, would * Works, vol. v. p. 204, 205. t Ibid. p. 218. Let. XXVII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 305 leave no room to doubt of their obligation. And he himself seems to acknowledge the usefulness of the Christian revelation to enforce the practice qf morality by a superior authority.* My second reflection is this : That what this writer assumes as true is evidently false, namely, that the philosophers taught the whole of our duty in the same extent as it is taught in the Gospel. Moral duty by his own account of it, comprehendeth the duty we owe to God as well as to our fellow-creatures. As to the social and civil duties, on which the peace and order of political societies immediately depend, these were generally acknowledged by the several sects of philosophers ; though the regard that was paid by the people to these duties, was more the effect of civil laws than of the doctrines and dictates of the philosophers. But as to that part of our duty which relates to God, with what face or consistency can it be pretended, that this was taught by the philosophers in the same extent that it is in the gospel ? Our author makes the adora tion of the one true God, and of him only, to be a fundamental obligation of the law of nature, and idolatry to be forbidden in that law. And certain it is, that the most celebrated philosophers, instead of instructing the people aright in this important part of their duty, fell in themselves with the common superstition and idolatry, and directed men to conform in their religious worship to the rites and laws of their several countries ; by which polytheism was established, and the public worship was directed to a multipli city of deities. And as to that part of duty which relateth to the government of the appetites and passions, it is evident the philosophers were far from being agreed what was virtue and what was vice. Some were for giving much greater indulgence than others to the fleshly sensual appetites and passions ; and even the unnatural sin was not only permitted, but recommended, by some of them who were of great name. He affirms, that " of a moral kind there were, properly speaking, no disputes among philosophers- They were disputes about insig nificant speculations, and no more. For the morality of Zeno, and of Epicurus, reduced to practice were the same."-)- As if it were a trifling dispute, whether the world was formed by a most wise, benign, and powerful Cause and Author, or by a fortuitous jumble of atoms ; whether the world and mankind are governed by a most wise and righteous Providence ; or whether there is no providence of God at all with regard to human affairs. It is evident, that sub mission to God, dependence upon his providence, gratitude for his benefits, and resignation to his will, concerning which, some of the Stoics laid excellent things, could make no part of the morality of Epicurus. Thus were the philosophers divided in tbe most important points of religion, and consequently in the duties resulting from it. But what the philosophers were not qualified to do, was perhaps * Works, vol. v. p. 294. t Ibid. p. 219. 386 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVII. effected by the legislators, and the institutions of civil laws. This is what our author seems to lay the principal stress upon. He observes, that " some few particular men may discover, explain, and press upon others the moral obligations that are incumbent upon all, and our moral state will be little improved by it : but that for this purpose governments have been instituted, laws have been made, customs established, and men have been deterred from immorality, by various punishments which human justice inflicts ;"* where he supposes human governments and laws to be the only effec tual means for the security and improvement of virtue. But it is manifest, that, as I had occasion to observe before, the civil laws of any community are very imperfect measures of virtue, or moral obliga tion. A man may obey those laws, and yet be far from being truly virtuous ; he may not be obnoxious to the penalties of those laws, and yet be a very vicious and bad man. Some of the most worthy and excellent affections and dispositions are unrewarded by those laws ; and some of the worst affections unpunished. The heart, the proper seat of virtue and vice, is not within the cog nizance of civil laws, or human governments. And what farther shows that civil laws and customs are not to be depended upon for direction in matters of morality, is, that it has often happened, that those laws and customs have been contrary to the rules of real reli gion and virtue. This writer, indeed, has taken upon him to assert, that " whatever violations of the law of nature may have been committed by particular men, yet none that were deemed to besuch, and perhaps few that might be called strictly such, have been enacted into laws, or have grown up into established customs."-)- And that " the tables of the natural law, which are hung up in the works of God., are obvious to the sight of all men ; and, therefore, no political society ever formed a system of laws in direct and avowed contradiction to them. ''% But though no legislators ever declared in plain terms, that the laws they enacted were contrary to the law of nature, which it were absurd to suppose, yet that many laws have been enacted which were really contrary to that law, is both undeniably evident from many well-known instances of such laws, and is what he himself is obliged to acknowledge. He observes, that " the law of nature has been blended with many absurd and contradictory laws in all ages and countries, as well as with customs, which, if they arose independent on laws, have obtained the force of laws:§" And that "errors about the law of nature, and contradictions to it, abound, and have always abounded, in the laws and customs of society."|| Laying all these things together, it is manifest, that men stood in great need of a divine revelation, to give them a clear and certain direction concerning moral duty taken in its just extent. The laws of nature, according to our author, are general, and men have betn always very prone to make wrong deductions from them ; and there- * Works, vol. v. p. 480, 481. t Ibid. p. 151. X Ibid p. 153. § Ibid. p. 100. || Ibid. p. 153.— See also ibid. p. 197. 201. Let. XXVII. . LORD BOLINGBROKE. 387 fore if God should be pleased, in a way of extraordinary revelation, to give a system of laws to mankind, plainly pointing out the particulars of their duty, and determining it by his own divine authority, whereby even the vulgar part of mankind might be certainly assured of their duty in the most important instances, and what it is that God required of them ; this would both give them the best direction, and would, where really believed and received, have an influence in bind ing their moral obligations upon them, whieh could not be expected, either from the dictates of philosophers, or the force of human laws. And, accordingly, some of the wisest lawgivers of antiquity, in order to give their laws greater authority on the minds of men, endeavoured to make them pass upon the people for divine. And this writer himself declares, that " nothing may seem in speculation so proper to enforce moral obligation, as a true revelation, or a reve lation believed to be' true."* Mr. Locke, in his " Reasonableness of Christianity," hath fully considered this matter ; where he hath shown the insufficiency of human reason, unassisted by revelation, in its great and proper business of morality. His Lordship has taken some notice of this. But the account he is pleased to give of Mr. Locke's argument is so poor and trifling, that though it be as fine a piece of reasoning as can be met with on this subject, it is hard to know it in his representation of it. This any man will be convinced of, that compares it as it stands in Mr. Locke's works, vol. ii. p. 573, et seq. edit. fol. 1740, with what Lord Bolingbroke hath offered upon it, vol. iv. p. 295, 296. 4thly. It is a point of great importance to mankind to be in structed to form right notions of happiness, or wherein their chief good, and the proper felicity of the human nature, doth consist. His lordship hath taken notice of what Dr. Clarke had observed, that, according to Varro, " there were no less than two hundred and fourscore different opinions about what was the chief good or final happiness of man." He says, " that there were so many may be doubted ; but that they must have been extremely various, is certain. The summum bonum, or supreme good of man, as it was understood and taught by the heathen philosophers, was a subject wherein every man had a right to pronounce for himself, and no man had a right to pronounce for another. These disputes were there fore very trifling."+ But certainly if there be an enquiry of the utmost importance to mankind, it is that about the chief good. For to be wrong in this will lead a man wrong in his whole course ; since his chief good must be his principal governing end. His Lordship is for leaving every man to judge of this for himself, and that no man has a right to judge for another. And since he makes happiness to be what every man must pursue by the law and dictates of nature, and that the morality of actions, and the proper ground of their obligation, " consist in this, that they are the means of acquiring happiness agreeable to our nature ;"% if men fix a wrong happiness to themselves, it will put them upon improper * Works, vol. v. p. 268. t Ibid. p. 206. J Ibid. p. 283, 284. C C 2 388 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVII. measures, and give a wrong direction to their moral conduct. And certain it is, that there is nothing in which men are more apt to be mistaken, and to form wrong judgments, than this. This author makes a distinction between pleasure-and happiness, and observes, that instinct and appetite lead to the former, and reason to the lat ter. But he owns, that most men are apt to confound these ; and he himself defines happiness to be a continued permanent series of agreeable sensations or pleasures.* And must every man be left to himself, without any farther direction, to judge of his duty and hap piness, from what he thinks will produce in him a series of the most agreeable sensations and pleasures ; and that, abstracting (for so our author would have it) from all consideration of another life, and a future account ? If the passions be brought into the consultation (and they will be apt to force themselves in, and claim being heard), the judgment that is formed is like to be very unequal and uncertain; especially considering the influence they have, by his own account, in bringing over reason to pronounce on their side, or at least to come to a kind of composition with them. It must needs therefore be a mighty advantage to have this determined for us by a divine authority ; and nothing could be more worthy of the divine wisdom and goodness, than to grant an extraordinary revelation for instructing men in what relates to the true happiness and perfection of their nature, and directing them in the way that leads to it. 5thly. Another thing which it highly concerneth men to be well informed of, relateth to the terms of their acceptance with God, and the means of reconciliation when they have offended him ; and this is a very proper subject for a divine revelation. Dr. Clarke had urged this, in his Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion.] But his Lordship, who had undertaken to answer him, thinks this to be of small consequence, and scarce worth enquiring about. He pronounces, that "neither reason nor experience will lead us to enquire, what propitiation God will accept, nor in what manner a reconciliation between the Supreme Being, and this worm man, is to be made.":)" Indeed upon his scheme it would be to little pur pose to make such an enquiry, since he would have us believe that God doth not concern himself at all about the individuals of the human race, nor taketh any notice of their actions, so as to be pleased or displeased with them, or to reward or punish them on the account of those actions. I shall not repeat what hath been already offered to show that this scheme is contrary to reason, and, if pursued to its genuine consequences, would be subversive of all virtue and good order in the world. At present I shall only farther observe, that if men are reasonable creatures, moral agents, and if God hath given them a law, as this writer sometimes not only allows, but asserts, and which must be acknowledged, if the law of nature be God's law; then they must certainly be under indispensable obligations to obey that law; nor can it consistently be supposed, that the great * Works, vol. v. p. 378. t Clarke's Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion, p. 293. x Works, vol. v. p. 209. Let. XXVII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 3gQ Governor ofthe world is perfectly indifferent, whether his reasonable creatures obey his law or not. A transgression of that law, which is the will of God, must certainly have a monstrous malignity in it, as it is an offence committed by his reasonable creatures, and the sub jects of his moral government, against the majesty and authority, as well as goodness, of the supreme universal Lord and Sovereign of the universe. And how can such creatures as we are pretend positively to pronounce what punishment sin deserves, or how far it may seem fit to God in his governing wisdom and righteousness to punish his offending creatures, or upon what terms he will pardon their transgressions, and restore them to his grace and favour, or how far that pardon is to extend? These are things which manifestly depend upon what seemeth most fit to his infinite wisdom, and concerning which we could not presume to form a certain judg ment, if he should not declare his will concerning it. As to what our author adds, that ''repentance, as it implies amendment, is one ofthe doctrines of natural religion ; and he does not so much as suspect, that any farther revelation is necessary to establish it ;" it will be easily owned, that repentance and amend ment are necessary when we have sinned against God ; and that this is a doctrine of natural religion : but that this alone is sufficient to avert the penalty we had incurred by disobedience, natural reason cannot assure us. It is certain, that to establish this rule inhuman governments would go a great way to dissolve all order and govern ment. And who can undertake to affirm, that in the divine govern ment it must be an established rule, that as often as ever sinners repent, they must not only be freed from the punishment they had incurred, but be received to the divine favour, and their imperfect obedience rewarded, as if they had not offended, without any farther expedient to secure and vindicate the authority of his laws ? It is evident, that in the natural course of things, as ordered by divine providence, repentance and amendment do not avert many of those evils which may be regarded as the punishments of men's crimes. They often labour under evils brought upon them by those vices of which they have heartily repented, and feel the penal effects of their evil courses, even after they have forsaken them. And since by this constitu tion the Author of nature hath declared, that repentance alone shall not free men in all cases from punishment, who can take upon him to determine, that our great offended Sovereign, the most wise and righteous Lord and Governor of the world, may not judge some thing farther necessary to show his displeasure against sin, and to vindicate the majesty of his government, and the authority of his laws '? And, accordingly, the natural sense of mankind hath generally led them to be anxiously solicitous, when they were sen sible of their having offended God, to use some means to avert the divine displeasure. Their fears have given occasion to much superstition, and many expedients have been devised, which have been generally of such a kind, as to show how improper judges men are of those things, if left to themselves. A divine revelation would undoubtedly give the best and surest direction in matters of this. 390 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVII. nature, and the fullest satisfaction to the mind. It properly belongeth to God to determine upon what terms he will be propi tiated to guilty creatures, how far his forgiveness shall extend, and what graces and favours he shall think fit to confer upon them. The last thing I shall mention, as what shows the great need of divine revelation, relates to the rewards and punishments of a future state. That this is a doctrine of vast importance to mankind, for engaging them to virtue, and restraining their vices, appears from this writer's own express acknowledgments. Several passages were produced to this purpose in my ninth letter. At the same time he hath endeavoured to show, that we have no assurance of it by human reason, but that it rather leadeth us to believe the contrary. And yet he does not pretend absolutely to affirm, that it is evident to reason there is no such state at all. Since therefore it is of great importance to mankind to believe a state of future retributions, and yet we have not sufficient assurance of it by human unassisted rea son, it must certainly be a proper subject of divine revelation. Some of the Deists, indeed, have in this case thought proper to take a different method. In order to avoid the argument brought from hence to show the necessity or the advantage of an extraordinary revelation, they have pretended, that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and a future state, is so evident to the natural reason of mankind, and hath been so generally believed in all ages and nations, that there was no need of a revelation to assure men of it. But Lord Bolingbroke hath precluded himself from this way of ar guing, since he hath taken pains to prove, that this doctrine is not founded in reason. And though he sometimes delares it to have been urged and recommended by the wisest men among the ancients, he represents it as if it were what they regarded rather as an useful doctrine than a true one, and as if they did not really believe it themselves, though they thought it necessary that the people should believe it. He affirms, that " the greatest part of the philosophers did their utmost to establish the belief of rewards and punishments in a future life, that they might allure to virtue, and deter from vice, more effectually."* Yet afterwards he tells us, that " the most zealous asserters of a supreme Being, and warmest defenders of his providence, and they who were the most persuaded of the necessity of religion to preserve government, either rejected the doctrine of a future state, or they admitted it by halves, i. e. they did not admit future punishments:" and that ""this doctrine was never firmly enough established in the philosophical, whatever it was in the vul gar creed." Yea, he asserts, that " it was not only problematical in the opinions of theistical philosophers, butit seems in several instances to have had little hold on vulgar opinion :" as he endeavours to show, by a remarkable quotation from Cicero, Orat. pro A. Cluentio; which he seems well pleased with, and refers to more than once.t The truth is, it would be equally wrong to affirm, that all the pbi- *¦ Works, vol. v. p. 222. t ibid. p. 354, 355. '187. Let. XXVII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 391 losophers believed it, and that none of them did so. It is wrong on the one hand to pretend, as Lord Bolingbroke has done, that there is no foundation for it in reason ; or on the other, that it so clear and demonstrable from human reason, that there was no need of a divine revelation farther to confirm and enforce it. The arguments for a future state in general, especially those of a moral kind, are of great weight : but yet there are several things to be opposed to them, which diminish the evidence, and will minister ground of sus picion and doubt, if considered merely on the foot of natural reason. And as to the nature, greatness, and duration, of those future rewards and punishments, it is evident that unassisted reason can give us"no information concerning it which can be depended upon. We stand in great need, therefore, of an extraordinary revelation to assure us of that invisible state. This plainly follows from what his Lordship hath advanced. He represents " the rewards and punish ments of a future state as the great bands that attach men to revealed religion:" and introduces his plain man as saying, that "it would be for the interest of these, and several other doctrines, to let them rest on the authority of revelation."* And he directly declares, " that this doctrine must stand on the bottom of revelation, or on none. On this bottom it would do some good most certainly, and it could do no hurt."-f- The several considerations which have been offered may suffice to show the need the world stood in of an extraordinary revelation ; and that therefore it may be reasonably concluded from the wisdom and goodness of God, that mankind have not been universally, and at all times, left without the assistance of such a revelation. It is particularly probable, from the circumstances of men in the first ages of the world, that they were not left altogether destitute of means that seemed so necessary to furnish them with a right know ledge of God, and of their duty. This writer himself observes, in a passage cited above, that " a consequence of the surprise, inexpe rience, and ignorance, ofthe first men, must have been much doubt and uncertainty concerning the first Cause." And that " to prove the unity of the first Cause required more observation, and deeper reflection, than the first men could make. "J And after having observed, that " the precepts of the law of nature are general, and that reason must be employed to make proper and necessary deduc tions from those precepts, and to apply them in every case that concerns our duty to God and man," he adds, that " human reason being at best fallible, and having been little informed by experience in the early ages, a multitude of false deductions, and wrong appli cations, could not fail to be made."§ It is therefore highly probable, from the goodness of God, and the necessities of mankind, that he would graciously interpose to make some discoveries of himself, and of his will, in the earliest ages, to the first parents and ancestors of the human race, to be by them communicated to their offspring, for * Works, vol. iii. p. 557.— See also vol. v. p. 322. 353. t Ibid. p. 488. X Ibid. p. 259. $ Ibid- vol. v. p. 154. 392 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVII. instructing them in the main important principles of all religion, and directing them in the principal articles of moral duty. And as this may be plainly gathered from the accounts given us in Scripture, so there are several facts in the history of mankind that almost ne cessarily lead us to such a supposition. To this may principally be ascribed the general belief of some of the main principles of reli gion, which obtained before men had made any considerable im provements in philosophy, or the art of reasoning ; particularly re lating to the creation of the world, the immortality of the soul, and a future state, which were generally received even among the most illiterate and barbarous nations, and were probably derived from a tradition transmitted from the first ages, and originally owing to divine revelation. And accordingly it has been almost universally believed among mankind, that divine revelations have been com municated ; which belief may be probably ascribed to traditional accounts of such revelations, as well as to the natural sense men have generally had of their need of such assistances. There has been no such thing as mere natural religion, abstracting from all divine revelation, professed in any age, or in any nation of the world. Lord Bolingbroke, in his inquiries this way, is forced to have recourse to China, and to the fabulous ages of their history, answering pretty much to the golden age of the poets, when he supposes they were governed by mere natural religion.* But of this he produceth no proofs. And if the ages there referred to relate, as they probably do, to the early patriarchal times, the ori ginal revelation might have been preserved in some degree of purity, though in process of time it became greatly corrupted there, as well as in other nations. It adds a great weight to all that has been observed, that the greatest men of antiquity seem to have been sensible, that bare reason alone was not sufficient to enforce doctrines and laws with a proper force upon mankind, without a divine authority and revela tion. Our author observes, that " the most celebrated philosophers and lawgivers did enforce their doctrines and laws by a divine au thority, and call in an higher principle to the assistance of philoso- * Bolingbroke's Works, vol. v. p. 228, 229. His Lordship expresses himself on this head with a caution and modesty not usual with him. He saith, that "among the countries with which we are better acquainted, he can find none where natural religion was established in its full extent and purity, as it seems to have been once in China." It may be observed by the way, that having highly extolled the ancient Chinese sage6, le takes notice ofthe concise manner in which they expressed themselves, whenever they spoke of the Supreme Beingv And that, " their refining successors have endea voured, in part at least, to found their atheism upon what those sages had advanced." Vol. v. p. 228. I think, according to this account, there must have been a great ob scurity in their manner of expressing themselves concerning the Divinity ; and that they were greatly deficient in the instructions they gave with regard to this great funda mental article of all religion. How vastly superior in this respect was Moses to all those admired sages, in whose writings, and in every part of the holy scriptures, tbe existence, the perfections, and providence of God, are asserted and described in so plain and strong a manner, as is fitted to lead people of common capacities to the firm belief, obedience, and adoration of the Supreme Being, the great Creator and Governor of the world ! Let. XXVII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 393 phy than bare reason." He instances in "Zoroaster, Hostanes, the Magi, Minos, Pythagoras, Numa, &c. and all those who founded or formed religions and commonwealths ; who made these preten sions, and passed for persons divinely inspired and commissioned."* This shows that they built upon a principle deeply laid in the human nature, concerning the need we stand in of a divine authority and revelation, and which was probably strengthened by some re mains of ancient traditions relating to such revelations. But „as those philosophers and lawgivers he speaks of produced no proper and authentic credentials, it could not be expected to have a very lasting and extensive effect ; and yet the very pretences to it gave their laws and institutions a force, which otherwise they would not have had. But as the several sects of philosophers in subse quent ages among- the Greeks and Romans only stood on the foot of their own reasonings, and could not pretend to a divine authority, this very much hindered the effect of their instructions. And indeed the best and wisest among them confessed their sense of the want of a divine revelation, and hoped for something of that nature. This is what Dr. Clarke has shown by express testimonies : nor does Lord Bolingbroke deny it. He says, "it must be admitted that Plato insinuates in many places the want, or the necessity of a divine revelation, to discover the external service God requires, and the expiation for sirf, and to give stronger assurances of the rewards and punishments that await men in another world."-)- But he thinks it absurd and trifling to bring the opinion of Socrates, Plato, and other philosophers, concerning their want of " divine revelation, and their hopes that it would be supplied, as a proof that the want was. real, and that, after it had been long complained of, it was sup plied."} He attempts to show that their want was not real, as if he knew better what they wanted than they themselves did, and were a more proper judge ofthe true state of their case than they were. He repeats what he had said before, that there is no moral precept taught in the gospel which they did not teach ; and that " the phe nomena that discovered to them the existence of God, discovered the divine will in all the extent of moral obligation ;"§ as if it were equally easy to discover the whole extent of moral obligation, as to discover the existence of the Deity. He adds, that " they could not know a revealed religion, nor any real want of it, before the re velation was made." That they could be acquainted with the reve lation before it was given, will be readily granted ; but it doth not follow, that they could not be sensible of their want of it. He pro nounces however, that " their complaints, and their expectations, were founded in proud curiosity, and vain presumption." It was pride, it seems, to be sensible of their ignorance, and need of farther instruction ; it was presumption to hope or to desire any farther illumination in things concerning which they were in doubt, and which it was of great importance to them to know. He adds, that Works, vol. v. p. 227. t Ibid. p. 214, 215. f Ibid. p. 216. § Ibid. p. 217. 394 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVII. " the knowledge they had was such as the Author of nature had thought sufficient, since he had given them no more ;" and con cludes, that " for Dr. Clarke to deduce from the supposed reason ableness of their- complaints, the necessity of a farther revelation, is to weigh his own opinion and theirs against providence."* But allowing the necessity of revelation, there is no just pretence for arraigning the conduct of divine providence : for however needful a revelation is supposed to be for giving men Tull assurance and in formation concerning things of high importance, yet those to whom that revelation never was made known, shall not be accountable for what they never had an opportunity of knowing. Besides, our author goes upon the supposition, that the world had been left all along without the assistance of divine revelation, and that the hea thens had never had an opportunity of knowing more of religion than they actually did know. But this is a wrong supposition. God had been pleased to make revelations and discoveries of him self, and of his will, from the beginning ; which, if they had been duly improved, and carefully transmitted, as the importance of them deserved, would have been of vast advantage. Great remains of this original religion continued for a long time among the nations ; and these traditions, together with their own reason, duly improved, might have preserved the main principles of religion and morals among them. And if, through the negligence and corruption of mankind, this true primitive religion was in a great measure lost and confounded in polytheism and idolatry, no blame could be cast upon divine providence ; nor could the wisdom and righteousness of God have been justly arraigned, though no more had ever been done for the human race. But supposing, which was really the case, that God was graciously pleased, at that time, and in that manner which seemed fittest to his infinite wisdom, to communicate a clearer and fuller discovery and revelation of his will than had been ever yet given to mankind, for recovering them from the igno rance, idolatry, and corruption, into which they were generally fallen, this certainly ought to be acknowledged with great thankful ness, as a most signal instance of the divine goodness and love to mankind, and concern for human happiness. There is one passage more which may deserve some notice. Having observed, that bishop Wilkins seems to place the chief distinction of human nature not in reason in general, but in religion, the apprehension of a Deity, and the expectation of a future state, which no creature below man doth partake of; he remarks upon it, that " they who suppose all men incapable to attain a full know ledge of natural religion and theology without revelation, take from us the very essence and form of man, according to the bishop, and deny that any of us have that degree of reason which is necessary to distinguish our species, and sufficient to lead us to the unity of the first intelligent Cause of all things."f But the bishop, by repre senting man to be a religious creature, only intended to signify, that * Works, vol. v. p. 220. t Ibid. vol. iv. p. 71. Let. XXVII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 395 he is naturally capable of knowing, and being instructed in it, which the brutes are not ; but it is not to be understood, as if all men had naturally an actual knowledge of religion, which is contrary to fact and experience ; or as if all men were capable of attaining to a full knowledge of it merely by the. force of their own reason, with out any instruction or assistance at all. Man's being formed a religious creature does not hinder the use and necessity of instruc tion. It is still supposed, that all proper helps and assistances are to be taken in. And notwithstanding his natural capacities, he would never attain to such a knowledge of religion without the as sistance of divine revelation, as he may attain to by that assistance. These things are perfectly consistent : man's being in his original design a religious creature, and his standing in need of divine reve lation to instruct him in religion, and give him a fuller knowledge of it. Revelation supposes hirn a creature capable of religion, and applies to him as such. It may not be improper to observe here, that this writer, who leaves no method unattempted which he thinks may answer his design, seems sometimes to cry up the great efficacy of a true divine revelation, and the mighty effects it must have produced, if it had actually been made, with a view to show that never was there any revelation really given to mankind . He says, that " unexception able revelations, real miracles, and certain traditions, could never prove ineffectual :"* That " if the revelations that have been pre tended, had not been pretended only ; if the same divine wisdom that shows both the existence and will of God in his works, had prescribed any particular form of worship to mankind, and had in spired the particular application of his general laws, the necessary consequence would have been, that the system of religion and go vernment would have been uniform through the whole world, as well as conformable to nature and reason, and the state of mankind would have arrived at human perfection."t He proceeds so far as to declare, that in a supernatural dispensation, the divine omnipotence should have imposed it on all mankind, so as necessarily to engage their assent^ And that it must have forced conviction, and taken away even the possibility qf doubt.§ Can any thing be more unrea sonable 1 As if revelation could be of no use at all, except by an irresistible force it overpowered all men's understandings and wills. But surely, if God gives men clear discoveries of his will and their duty, this must be acknowledged to be a glorious instance of his wisdom and goodness, though he does not absolutely constrain them to assent, which would be to take away their free agency, and to destroy the economy of his providence. May we not here apply in the case of revelation what he himself saith with regard to reason ? " It may be truly said, that God, when he gave us reason, left us to our free-will, to make a proper or improper use of it ; so that we are obliged to our Creator, for a certain rule, and sufficient means * Works, vol. iv. p. 224. t Ibid. vol. v. p. 201. X Ibid. vol. iv. p. 267. § Ibid. p. 210. 396 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVII. of arriving at happiness, and have none to blame but ourselves when we fail of it. It is not reason, but perverse will, that makes men fall short of attainable happiness. And we are self-condemned when we deviate from the rule."* This holds strongly with regard to revelation. God hath been graciously pleased to reveal doctrines and laws to mankind, of great use and advantage for instructing them in the knowledge of religion, and directing them in the way to happiness. But when he has done this, and confirmed that reve lation with sufficient credentials, still he thinks fit, as the wise moral Governor, to leave them to their free-will, and the exercise of their own moral powers ; and thus deals with them as reasonable crea tures, and moral agents. If they do not receive, and make a rio-ht use of this advantage, the divine wisdom and goodness is not to be blamed, but their own obstinacy and perverseness. But though a revelation, if really given, cannot be supposed to come with such force as irresistibly to constrain men's assent, and though it fail of producing all those effects which might be justly expected, and which it is naturally fitted to produce, yet it may be of very great use and benefit to mankind. This writer represents the general reformation of men as an impossible thing : He observes that neither human nor divine laws have been able to reform the manners of men effectually ; yet he owns, that " this is so far from making natural or revealed religion, or any means that tend to the reformation of mankind, unnecessary, that it makes them all more necessary. — And that nothing should be neglected that tends to en force moral obligation, and all the doctrines of natural relio-ion. And that nothing may seem in speculation so proper to this purpose as a true revelation, or a revelation believed to be true."f And he afterwards says, that " if the conflict between virtue and vice in the great commonwealth of mankind was not maintained by religious and civil institutions, the human state would be intolerable.";]; Those therefore must be very ill employed, and can in no sense be regarded as the friends and benefactors of mankind, who take pains to destroy these institutions, to subvert the main principles of natural and revealed religion, and thereby to destroy all the influence it might have on the minds of men. If the reformation of mankind be so difficult, notwithstanding all the powers of reason, and all the force of the additional light, and powerful motives, which revelation furnishes, what could be expected, if all these were laid aside, and men were taught to have no regard to them at all? I shall conclude with observing, that Lord Bolingbroke's scheme, contrary to his own intention, seems to furnish arguments to prove the great usefulness and necessity of divine revelation. He has en deavoured to show, that we can have no certainty, if we judge by the phenomena, concerning the moral attributes of God, his justice and goodness : That no argument can be brought from reason in proof of a particular providence, though he does not pretend to say it is impossible : That the immortality of the soul, and a future * Works, vol. v. p. 288. t Ibid. p. 267, 268. ^ Ibid. p. 227. Let. XXVIII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 397 state, though useful to be believed, are things which we have no ground from reason to believe, and which reason will neither affirm nor deny : That the laws of nature are general, and the particulars of moral duty derived from them are very uncertain, and in which men have been always very apt to mistake, and make wrong con clusions. Now if it be of high importance, as it manifestly is, that men should be assured of the moral attributes of God; that they should believe a particular providence, extending to the individuals ofthe human race, and exercising an inspection over them, and their actions and affairs ; that they should believe the immortality of the soul, and a state of future rewards and punishments; and that they should be rightly instructed in the particulars of moral duty ; if all these be of unquestionable importance to be believed and known by mankind (and yet we can, according to him, have no assurance of them by mere natural reason), then there is great need of an extra ordinary divine revelation to give us a proper certainty in these matters ; and a well-attested revelation assuring us of these things, and furnishing us with proper instructions concerning them, ought to be received with the highest thankfulness. LETTER XXVIII. Lord Bolingbroke's strange Representation of the Jewish Revelation. — His Attempts against the Truth of the Mosaic History The Antiquity, Impartiality, and great Usefulness of that History shown. — The Pretence, that Moses was not a contem porary Author, and that his History is not confirmed by collateral Testimony, and that there is no Proof that the Pentateuch was written by Moses, examined The Mosaic History and Laws not forged in tbe Time of the Judges, nor in that of the Kings, nor after (he Babylonish Captivity. — The Charge of Inconsistencies in the Mosaic Accounts considered. — The grand Objection against the Mosaic History, drawn from the incredible Nature of the Facts themselves, examined at large. — The Reason and Propriety of erecting the Mosaic Polity. — No Absurdity in supposing God to have selected the Jews as a peculiar People. — The great and amazing Dif ference between them and the heathen Nations, as to the Acknowledgment and Adoration of the one true God, and him only. — The good Effects of the Jewish Constitution, and the valuable Ends which were answered by it. — It is no just Ob jection against the Truth of the Scriptures, that they come to us through the Hands of the Jews. Sir, Having considered what Lord Bolingbroke hath offered with regard to divine revelation in general, 1 now proceed to examine the objections he has advanced against the Jewish and Christian reve lation. Of the latter he. sometimes speaks with seeming respect and decency; but with regard to the former, he sets no bounds to invective and abuse. He here allows himself without reserve in all the licentiousness of reproach. Far from admitting it to be a true divine revelation, he every-where represents it as the very worst con- 398 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVIII. stitution that ever pretended to a divine original, and as even worse than atheism. Besides occasional passages every-where interspersed in his writ ings, there are some parts of his works, where he sets himself pur posely and at large to expose the Mosaic revelation. This is the principal design of the long letter in the third volume of his works, occasioned by one of Archbishop Tillotson's sermons ; as also of the second section of his third essay in the fourth volume, which is on the Rise and Progress of Monotheism ; and ofthe fifteenth, twentieth, twenty-first, seventy-third, seventy-fifth, of his Fragments and Essays in the fifth volume. In considering Lord Bolingbroke's objections against the holy scriptures of the 01# Testament, and especially against the books of Moses, I shall distinctly examine what he hath offered against the truth of the scripture history, and against the divine authority of the sacred writings. This is the method he himself hath pointed out in the above-mentioned letter, occasioned by onejof Archbishop Tillotson's sermons. I shall begin with considering his objections against the truth of the history. But first it will not be improper to make some general observations upon the scripture history, and especially that which is contained in the Mosaic writings. And first it deserves our veneration and regard on the account of its great antiquity. We have no accounts that can in any degree be depended upon, or that have any pretence to be received as au thentic records, prior to the Mosaic history, or indeed till some ages after it was written. But though it relateth to the most ancient times, it is observable that it doth not run up the history to a fabu lous and incredible antiquity, as the Egyptians, Chaldeans, and some other nations did. Moses's account of the time of the creation of the world, the general deluge, &c. reduces the age of the world within the rules of a moderate computation, perfectly consistent with the best accounts, we have of the origin of nations, the founding of cities and empires, the novelty of arts and sciences, and of the most useful inventions of human life ; all which leads us to assign an age to the world which comports very well with the Mosaic his tory, but is no way compatible with the extravagant antiquities of other eastern nations. Another thing which should greatly recommend the scripture his tory to our own esteem, is the remarkable simplicity and imparti ality of it. It contains a plain narration of facts, delivered in a simple unaffected style, without art or ornament. And never was there any history that discovered a more equal and unbiassed regard to truth. Several things are there recorded, which, if the historian had not laid it down as a rule to himself, not only not to contradict the truth, but not to conceal or disguise it, would not have been mentioned. Of this kind is what our author refers to concerning Jacob's obtaining the birth-right and blessing by fraud.* For * Works, vol. iii. p. 304. Let. XXVIII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 399 though it is plain, from the prophecy that was given forth before the birth of the children, that the blessing was originally designed for Jacob the younger in preference to Esau the elder, yet the method Jacob took, by the advice of his mother Rebekah, to engage his father Issaac to pronounce the blessing upon him, had an appear ance of art and circumvention, which, considering the known jea lousy and antipathy between the Edomites and the people of Israel, and the occasion it might give to the former to insult and reproach the latter, it might be expected an Israelitish historian would have endeavoured to conceal. To the same impartial regard to truth it is owing, that Reuben's incest, and that of Judah with his daughter- in-law Tamar, from which descended the principal families of the noble tribe of Judah, are recorded ; as is also the cruel and perfidi ous act of Simeon and Levi, the latter Moses's own ancestor, and the curse pronounced upon them by Jacob on the account of it. This writer indeed, who seems determined at all hazards, and upon every supposition, to find fault with the sacred historians, has en deavoured to turn even their impartiality to their disadvantage. Having mentioned common sense and common honesty, he says, that "the Jews, or the penmen of their traditions, had so little of either, that they represent sometimes a patriarch like Jacob, and sometimes a saintlike David, by characters that belong to none but the worst of men."* This according to our author's manner is highly exag gerated. But I think nothing can be a stronger proof of the most unreasonable prejudice, than to produce that as an instance of the want of common sense and common honesty, in those writings, which in any other writers in the world would be regarded as the highest proof of their honesty, their candour, and impartiality ; viz. their not taking pains to disguise or conceal the faults of the most eminent of their ancestors ; especially when it appears, that this is not done from a principle of malignity, or to detract from their merits, since their good actions, and the worthy parts of their character, are also impartially represented, but merely from a regard to truth, and from an unaffected simplicity, which every-where appears in their writ ings, in a manner scarce to be paralleled in any other historians, and which derives a mighty credit to all their narrations. But what above all shows the impartiality of Moses, and of the other sacred historians of the Old Testament, is, their relating without disguise, not only the faults of their great men, but the frequent revolts and infidelities of the Israelites, and the punishments which befel them on that account. Lord Bolingbroke has indeed discovered, what no man but himself would have been apt to suspect, that even this was intended to flatter their pride and vanity ; " because though they are represented as rebellious children, yet still as favourite chil dren— Notwithstanding all their revolts, God's predilection for this chosen people still subsists. — And he renews his promises to them of future glory and triumph,— a Messiah, a kingdom that should destroy all others, and last eternally."t As to the kingdom of the * Works, vol. v. p. 194. t Ibidl voU "'' !>• 281'- 400 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVIII. Messiah, which he refers to as promised to the Jews, it was to be of a spiritual nature, and was not to be confined to the people of Israel alone, but to be of general benefit to mankind. . And even the reject ing of that Messiah by the body of their nation, and the punish ments and desolations to which this should expose them, were fore told. And it was certainly a most extraordinary expedient to flatter the vanity of a people, to represent them as having carried it most ungratefully towards God for all his benefits, and though not abso lutely and finally rejected, yet as having frequently drawn upon themselves the most signal effects of the divine displeasure. If the view of the sacred historians had been to flatter the pride and pre sumption of that people, surely they might have represented tnem as the objects of the divine favour, without giving such an account of their conduct; from which their enemies have taken occasion bitterly to reproach them, as the most ungrateful and obstinate race of men that ever appeared upon earth. Nothing could have induced them to record facts which seemed to give such a disadvantageous idea of their nation, but an honest and impartial regard to truth, rarely to be found in other historians. But that which especially distinguished Moses, and the other sacred historians, is the spirit of unaffected piety that every-where breathes in their writings. We may observe throughout a profound veneration for the Deity, a zeal for the glory of his great name, a desire of promoting his true fear and worship, and the practice of righteousness, and to engage men to a dutiful obedience to his holy and excellent laws. Their history was not written merely for poli tical ends and views, or to gratify curiosity, but for nobler purposes. The Mosaical history opens with an account of the creation of the world, which, by the author's own acknowledgment, is an article of the highest moment in religion. It gives an account of the forma tion of man, of his primitive state, and his fall from that state, of the universal deluge, the most remarkable event that ever happened to mankind, of the lives of some of the patriarchs, and of many most signal acts of providence, upon which depended the erection and establishment of a sacred polity, the proper design of which was to engage men to the adoration of the one living and true God, the Maker and Governor of the world, and of him only, in oppo sition to all idolatry and polytheism. The recording these things was not only of immediate use to the people among whom they were first published, but hath had a great effect in all ages ever since, to promote a reverence of the Supreme Being among those who have received these sacred writings ; and it tended also to prepare the way for the last and most perfect revelation of the divine will that was ever given to mankind. Nothing therefore can be more unjust than the censure he hath been pleased to pass on a great part of the Mosaic history, that it is fit only to amuse children ivith.* Let us now consider the objections he hath advanced against this history. • Works, vol. iii. p. 304. Let. XXVIII. LORD BOLINGBROKE, /JO] And first, he urges that Moses was not a contemporary author. This is not true with respect to a considerable part of the history recorded in the Pentateuch. Many of the things which are most objected against, especially the extraordinary facts done in Egypt, at the Red Sea, at the promulgation of the law at Sinai, and dur ing the sojourning of the Israelites in the wilderness, were things to which Moses was not only contemporary, but of which he was himself an eye-witness. As to that part of the history which is contained in the book of Genesis, and which relateth to events which happened before the time of Moses, it cannot be justly objected against on that account ; except it be laid down as a rule, that no history is to be believed, which was written by an author who was not contem porary to all the facts which he relates. But this has never yet been allowed as a maxim in judging of the credit of any history ; and, if admitted, would discard some of the best histories now in the world. Nor does our author himself pretend to insist upon it as a general rule; but he wants to know " where Moses got his materials, when he wrote the book of Genesis." A most unreasonable demand at this distance of time ! As to the far greater part of that book, which relates to the lives of the patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, and to the first settlement of the Israelites in Egypt, these are evidently things of which he may be supposed to have had full information. And with regard to the events which happened be fore the time of Abraham, the accounts given of them by Moses are generally very short; consisting for the most part of little more than the genealogies of persons and families, interspersed with a few brief anecdotes, the memory of which was easily preserved. The most remarkable event during that period, and of which Moses gives the most particular account, was the universal deluge. And this must have been then very well known. His not giving into the extravagant antiquities of some of the eastern nations, and his not attempting to fill up that period with such fabulous romantic ac counts as have been invented since his time, among Jews, Chris tians, and Mahometans, is a strong presumption in his favour; and the plainness, simplicity, and impartial love of truth, which, as hath been already observed, appears in his history, makes it reasonable to believe, that he had the accounts he gives from memorials which he knew might be depended upon. What ways they had of trans mitting the memory of things in those ancient times, we cannot at this distance distinctly explain, but that they had several ways of doing this we may be well assured. And it has been often observed by learned men, through how few stages the tradition might run from Adam to Abraham, and from him to Moses, considering the long lives of the first men.* The only thing mentioned by this writer as what Moses could not have received by history or tradition, is the circumstantial account given by hirn of the creation of the * Mr. Hume makes the great length of men's lives, as recorded in the Mosaic his tory, to be an objection against it. Essay on Miracles, p. 206. But Lord Boling broke allows, that the lives of men in the first ages of the world vnre probably much longer than ours. Vol iii. p. 244. D D 402 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVIII. world : with regard to which he observes, that " Adam himself could only have related to him some of the circumstances of the sixth day, but nothing that preceded this." It will be easily allowed, that the account of this must have been originally owing to extra ordinary revelation. And very worthy it was of the divine wisdom to grant such a revelation to the first parents and ancestors of the human race, since it was a matter of great importance to mankind to be well acquainted with it; and our author himself owns, that " it leads men to acknowledge a Supreme Being, by a proof levelled to the meanest understanding."* And it may be justly concluded, that the account of this was transmitted with great care from our first parents to their descendants, and preserved among the most religious of them : which might the better be done, if, as is very probable, the observance of the seventh day was appointed from the beginning to preserve the memorial of it. So that the preservation of this very important tradition may be accounted for, even ab stracting from Moses's divine inspiration, which, if in any thing tradition had become imperfect, might easily enable him to supply the defects of it. Another objection, on which his Lordship seems to lay a great stress, for invalidating the authority of the Mosaic history, is, that the principal facts are not confirmed by collateral testimony : and by collateral testimony he understands, the testimony of those who had no common interest of country, religion, or profession.-]- But such collateral testimony as this is no way necessary to the authen ticity of history. Many histories are very reasonably believed which have no such collateral testimony to confirm them. Such testimony is frequently not to be had, nor could reasonably be expected with relation to many of the facts recorded by Moses. As to that part of the Mosaic history, which relateth to the times of greatest anti quity, little help can be expected from collateral testimony, since there is no history of those times now extant so ancient as his own. And yet there are considerable traces of tradition which have been preserved among other nations, concerning some of the most remark able events during that period, as hath been often shown by learned men;:}: especially with relation to that which is the most extraordi- * Works, vol. iii. p. 253. t Ibid. p. 281, 282. X His Lordship frequently speaks with great contempt of the attempts made by the learned to support the history of Moses by collateral testimonies, those of Egyptians, Phoenicians, Chaldeans, and even Greeks. See particularly vol. iii. p. 280, 281. Yet he says, " The man who gives the least credit to the Mosaic history, will agree very readily, that these five books contain traditions of a very great antiquity ; some of which were preserved and propagated by other nations as well as the Israelites, and by other historians as well as Moses. Many of them may be true, though they will not serve as vouchers for one another." And he farther observes, that "three or four ancient neighbouring nations, of whom we have some knowledge, seemed to have a common fund of traditions, which they varied according to their different systems of religion, philosophy, and policy." Ibid. p. 282. And since he here supposes, that the nations he refers to had different systems of religion and policy, and were evidently neither of the same country, nation, or religion, with the people of Israel, the testi monies they give to the facts recorded in the Mosaic wiitings may be justly regarded us collateral testimony, even according to the account he himself is pleaded to give of it, viz. that it is the testimony of those who had no common interest qf country, religion, or Let. XXVIII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 4();} nary of them all, the universal deluge. Nor can any thino' be more false and contrary to known fact, than what this writer boldly affirms, that " the tradition of Noah's deluge is vouched by no other authority than that of Moses; and that the memory of that catas trophe was known only to one people, and preserved in one corner of the earth." * Not only has there been a general tradition in con firmation of it,f but there are many proofs of it all over the earth, many phsenomena which plainly lead us to acknowledge that there has been such a deluge, and which cannot otherwise be reasonably accounted for. With respect to that part of the history which rclateth to the laws given to the Israelites, and the extraordinary facts whereby the authority of those laws was established, they were not only things of which Moses had certain knowledge, and in which he could not be mistaken, but they were of a most public nature, and to which the whole nation were witnesses. The facts were of such a kind, that the accounts of them could not possibly have been im posed by Moses at that time upon the people, if they had not been true, nor could they have been made to believe that they were done before their eyes, if they had not been done. And these facts hav ing been all along from that time received by that people, together with the laws in confirmation of which they were wrought, furnish- eth a proof of authenticity to this part ofthe Mosaic history, which can scarce be paralleled in any other. I do not see how the force of this can be avoided, supposing Moses to be the author of the Pentateuch. But this is what Lord Bolingbroke thinks cannot be proved. He has made a kind of representation after his own way of what Mr. Abbadie has offered to this purpose ; and adds, that it would be hard to find an ex ample of greater trifling.:': But whosoever will take pains to examine profession. So that after all his clamours against the Mosaic history for want of colla teral testimony, he himself in effect owns, that, in several instances at least, and with regard to some of the facts there related, collateral testimonies may be produced, which therefore are very properly taken notice of by the learned. These testimonies relate to several things in the Mosaic account ofthe creation. The long lives ofthe first men— the general deluge, with some of the remarkable particulars recorded by Moses relating to it — the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah — the excellent character of Abraham, and several particulars in his life, and that of Isaac and Jacob — Joseph's being envied by his brethren, and sold into Egypt — his great advancement there, and wise adminis tration, and preserving Egypt in a time of famine — many things relating to Moses him self — his great wisdom — his being opposed by the Egyptian magicians — his leading the Israelites out of Egypt, whilst the Egyptians who pursued them were compelled to desist — his bringing them through the deserts of Arabia to Mount Sinai — the law given by him as from God — his noble notions of the Deity, and prohibiting the representing or worshipping him by any corporeal images — -many of the peculiarities of that law, different from those of other nations. Tbe reader may see most of these things col lected by Grotius de Verit. Relig. Christ, lib. i. sec. IC. I think any impartial person will be of opinion, that there is as much collateral testimony as could be reasonably ex pected concerning things of such remote antiquity, and from persons who were not of the Jewish nation or religion, and several of whom were professed enemies to both. * Works, vol. iii. p. 224. t See concerning this, Grotius de Verit. Relig. Christ, lib. 1. sec. 16. bee also Revektion examined with Candour, parti, dissert. 13, 14. ' Works, vol. iii. p. 275, 276. D D 2 404 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVIII. the argument, not as he is pleased to represent it, but as it stands in Mr. Abbadie's own book, will find how little he has offered that can in any degree take off tbe force of his reasoning. Indeed it is hard to know what greater proof can reasonably be desired of Moses's being the author of the Pentateuch than is given. The whole nation, among whom those books have been always received with great veneration, as containing the most authentic accounts of their history and their laws, have constantly attributed them to Moses. All those of foreign nations that have mentioned their history or their laws, have always supposed Moses to have been the author of them. Never has it been denied till these latter ages, after so long a possession, upon some cavils and exceptions, which are really trifling, and which have been sufficiently answered. And - if all this will not be allowed to be a proof, it is impossible that any thing of this nature should ever be proved. It hath all the proof which the nature of the thing can admit of; and it would be un reasonable, by Lord Bolingbroke's own acknowledgment, to demand more. " Common sense," saith he, " requires that every thing proposed to the understanding, should be accompanied with such proof as the nature of it can furnish. He who requires more, is guilty of absurdity ; he who requires less, of rashness."* There is then all the evidence which can be desired in such a case, that the books containing the original history and laws given to the people of Israel were written by Moses, as the whole nation to whom the history belonged, and who were governed by those laws, and received them as the rule of their polity, have constantly affirmed. And of this they must be allowed to be competent witnesses. His Lordship indeed, with a view to show how little the testimony of the Jews is to be depended upon, and how easily those laws might be imposed upon them, mentions the little time that it took to estab lish the divine authority of the Alcoran among the Arabs, a people not more incapable to judge of Mahomet and his book, than we may suppose the Israelites to have been to judge of Moses and his book, if he left any, whether of law alone, or of history and law both."+ But this observation is little to the purpose. The Arabians were sufficient vouchers, that the Alcoran was the book left them by Mahomet, containing the revelations he pretended to have received from heaven. In this they are to be credited. So are the Jews, that the books containing the original history and laws of their nation were written by Moses. As to the divine authority of those laws, this must be tried by other arguments. But however stupid we may suppose the Arabians to have been, it would not have been in the power of Mahomet to have made them believe, that they themselves had heard his laws distinctly delivered with the most amazing solemnity from heaven in the presence of above six hundred thousand men, if there had been no such thing : or that he wrought a series of stupendous miracles before their eyes, if he had not done so. And accordingly he was too wise to put the proof of his own * Works, vol. iii. p. 246. t Ibid. p. 278. Let. XXVIII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 405 divine mission, or of the authority of his laws, upon facts of such a nature ; which would have been the most effectual way he could have taken to detect and expose his own imposture. But he pre tended to have received communications and revelations from hea ven, the truth of which depended upon his own credit. The same observation may be made concerning those celebrated lawgivers of antiquity, who pretended to have received their laws from the gods, as Minos, Numa, and others. None of them ever put the proof of the divine authority of their laws upon public facts of the most miraculous and extraordinary nature, done in the presence of all the people, and for the truth of which they appealed to them. They pretended to directions from oracles, or to secret communications with the deity, of which the people had no proof, and which they received solely upon their authority. But Moses put the proof of the divine authority of his laws upon sensible facts, of the most public nature, and of which the whole body of the people, to whom these laws were given, were witnesses. Appeals were made to the people, at the time when these laws were delivered, concerning those facts as done in their sight, and which they themselves could not possibly deny. The accounts of those facts are so interwoven with the laws, that they cannot be separated. Some of the principal motives to engage the people to an observance of those laws are founded on those facts. Many of the laws were peculiarly designed to preserve the remembrance of the facts, and cannot be otherwise accounted for than by supposing the truth of those facts to which they relate. And this was the professed design of the institution of several of their sacred rites, which were appointed to be solemnly observed by the whole of the nation, in every age from the beginning of their polity, i. e. from the time when they first received these .laws, and their constitution was established. There were several public monuments, which subsisted several ages, to perpetuate the memory of the most remarkable of those facts. The people were commanded, as by divine authority, frequently to consider those facts, and to take care to transmit them to their children. To which it may be added, that in all the remaining writings published at different times, and in different ages, among that nation, whether of an historical, moral, or devotional kind, there is a constant refer ence to those facts as of undoubted credit and authority. They are repeated on so many different occasions, so often and solemnly appealed to, that it appeareth, with the utmost evidence which the thing is capable of, that these facts have been all along universally known and acknowledged, and the remembrance of them constantly kept up among that people. And upon the truth and authority of these facts, their peculiar constitution, whereby they were so remark ably distinguished from all other nations, was plainly founded ; nor can it well be conceived, how it could have been established among them without those facts. It strengthens all this, when it is con sidered, that scarce ever was there any people so well fitted by their constitution for preserving and transmitting the remembrance of their laws and facts, as the people of Israel. Their weekly Sabbath, 406 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVIII. the observance of which was bound upon them in the strictest manner, and which was a constant memorial to them of their reU gion and law : the sabbatical years, an institution of the most extraordinary nature, and which furnished a visible proof of the divine original and authority of that law, and in which it was ordered to be publicly read to the whole nation assembled together at their solemn festivals : the exact care that was taken to keep up the dis tinction of tribes, and the genealogies of the several families in their tribes, on which their legal right to their inheritances and posses sions depended, and which they could trace to the time when the first division of the land was made, and their constitution estab lished, with which the laws and facts were intimately connected : all these things laid them under peculiar obligations, and gave them peculiar advantages for preserving the remembrance of their law, and the facts done in attestation to it. Taking these considerations together, the evidence for the laws and facts is as strong as can rea sonably be desired for any facts done in past ages. And I am per suaded the evidence would never have been contested, if it had not been for the pretended incredibility of the facts themselves. But before I come to consider this, I shall take notice of some other exceptions made by Lord Bolingbroke to the credit of this history. He mentions it as a suspicious circumstance, that " the priests in Egypt and Judea were intrusted with the public records," and that this shows how little they are to be depended upon.* And he asks, " With what face can we suspect the authenticity of the Egyptian accounts by Manetho and others, which were compiled and preserved by Egyptian priests, when we received the Old Tes tament on the faith of Jewish scribes, a most ignorant and lying race Vf But it is a great mistake, or gross misrepresentation to pretend, that the Jewish history and sacred writings, particularly those of Moses, were in the hands of the priests, or Jewish scribes, alone. If, like the Egyptian laws and records, they had been wrapt up in sacred characters and hieroglyphics, which the priests only understood, and of which they alone were the authorised guardians and interpreters, and which were carefully disguised and concealed from the people, there might be some ground for this pretence. But, on the contrary, their history and laws were put into the com mon language; the people were commanded to make themselves thoroughly acquainted with the laws that were given them, and with the history of those facts by which their law was established. It was urged upon them in the name of God himself, to meditate upon them continually, to speak of them in their houses, and teach them diligently to their children. They were taught to believe that their interest in the favour of God, their public and private happiness, depended upon it. No part of their history and laws was kept as a secret from the people ; all was done open and undisguised. And this was so different from the arts of impostors, or of designing politicians, as affords a strong presumption, that all was founded on truth and fact. * Works, vol. iii. 22J, 226. t Ibid. p. 20,3. Let. XXVIII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 407 Our author is very willing to have it believed, that these writings were forged after the time of Moses ; and the time he seems to fix upon as the likeliest for such a forgery is that of the Judges.* But there is not the least foundation for such a supposition. To sup pose them to have been forged in the time of Joshua, or the elders that immediately succeeded him, is the same thing as to suppose them to have been forged in the days of Moses himself. It must then have been very well known, whether these were the laws that were given by Moses, and whether the facts there referred to as things of public notoriety, and known to the whole nation, were really done or not ; since great numbers must have been able to con tradict or detect them, if they had been false : and after the death of Joshua, and the elders that had lived in the time of Moses, and seen those mighty acts, who could have had authority enough to have imposed those laws and facts upon the people? The deliver ance out of Egypt, the sojourning of the Israelites in the wilderness, the laws and constitutions appointed by Moses in the name of God, the extraordinary facts said to have been wrought by him, their introduction into Canaan, and the manner of their settlement there, must have been comparatively fresh in their remembrance. It appears by Jephthah's answer to the king of the Ammonites, that the people of Israel were in his time very well acquainted with their own history, and with what had happened to them in the time of Moses, Judges xi. 12, 8tc. The same thing appears from the Song of Deborah, ch. v. 4, 5, and from the answer of Gideon, ch. vi. 13. And it cannot without great absurdity be supposed, that they could at that time have had a body of laws imposed upon them as the laws of Moses, and laws by which their nation had been governed ever since his time, though they had not known those laws before : or, that they could have been make to believe, that the facts referred to in those books were facts of which their whole nation had been witnesses, and which they themselves had received from their ances^ tors, and the memory of which had been constantly preserved among * His Lordship is pleased to observe, that "the four centuries the Israelites passed under their Judges, may be well compared to the heroical " (by which he understands the fabulous) "ages ofthe Greeks." The reason he gives for this is pretty extraordi nary. He says, " those of the Greeks were generally bastards of some god or other ; and those of the Jews were always appointed by God to defend his people, and destroy their enemies. " As if the being a bastard of some god or other, and the being appointed by God for delivering and defending his people, were of the same significancy, and equally absurd and fabulous : though under such a polity as the Mosaical was, their having their Judges and deliverers extraordinarily raised and appointed by God, had nothing in it but what was perfectly agreeable to the nature of their constitution. And whereas he mentions it to the disadvantage of the Jewish history under that period, that we there read of Ehud an assassin, and Jephthah a robber, and David a captain qf ban ditti, it may be observed, that this last does not properly belong to the times of the Judges, and is only thrown in out of his great good will to the memory of that illus trious prince ; and as to the two former, without entering into a particular considera tion of the accounts which are given of them,t it may be justly affirmed, that these instances do not afford a shadow of a proof, that the history is fabulous, and doth not contain a true account of facts. t See concerning Ehud, Answer to Christianity as oil as the Creation, Vol. ii. jv. 334. 2d edit. 408 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVIII. them, though they had never heard of these facts : or, that such and such sacred rites and ordinances had been instituted, and constantly observed and solemnized in their nation, in remembrance of those facts, if till then they had been utter strangers to the observance of those rites. And what renders this still more improbable is, that during that period there was for the most part no general governor who had authority over the whole, as the kings had afterwards. The several tribes seem to have been very much in a state of inde pendency, and to have. had the government within themselves. Few of their Judges exercised an authority over all the tribes; nor were any of them priests till the time of Eli. In such a state of things, how was it possible to have imposed a new body of laws and history upon the whole nation, especially laws so different from the laws and customs of all other countries, and which enacted the severest penal ties against the idolatries to which the neighbouring nations were so strongly addicted, and which the Israelites were so prone to imitate? If some of the tribes had received them, what like lihood is there that all would have done so, or would have regarded them as the laws of Moses, and as obligatory on the whole com munity, when they were so contrary to their own inclinations, and had never been imposed upon their nation before ? Nothing less than such an authority as that which Moses claimed in the name of God himself, and which was enforced by such illustrious divine attestations, could have prevailed with them to have submitted to those laws, or to have received those facts. To which it may be added, that it is manifest from the account given in the book of Judges, which is the only account of that time that we have to depend upon, that the general state of things during that period was this : the people frequently fell into a compliance with the idolatrous rites of the neighbouring countries ; but when public calamities befel them, and which they regarded as punishments upon them for their transgressions of their law, they were made sensible of their guilt, and again returned to the observance of it, and to the adora tion of the only true God as there prescribed ; and they were encouraged by the great things God had formerly done for their nation, to apply to him for deliverance from their oppressors. So that every thing during that period shows, that the law of Moses,- and the worship of God and of him alone, free from idolatry and polytheism, was then the established constitution, which they them selves regarded as of divine authority, notwithstanding they too often suffered themselves to be seduced into deviations from it. After the era of the Judges followed that of the Kings. King David lived very early in that period ; and it appears with the utmost evidence, from the history and writings of that great prince, that the law of Moses was then held in the highest veneration, as of divine authority, and that the facts there recorded were universally believed and acknowledged ; and though some of the succeeding Kings deviated from that -law into the idolatries of their neighbouring nations, yet that law never lost its authority, and the observance of it was soon restored. The design of the prophets, of whom there Let. XXVIII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 409 was a succession during that period, was to keep the people close to the observance of that law : and the extraordinary facts by which the authority of it was established, were still had in remembrance : and on the credit of that law, and of those extraordinary facts, they still looked upon themselves to be God's peculiar people. This writer indeed takes upon him to assert, that " there were times when they had actually no body of law among them, particularly in the reign of Josiah, when it had been long lost."* But there is no ground to suppose, that ever there was a time under any of their Kings, when they had actually no body of laws among them, or that the book of the law of Moses had been ever entirely lost. This cannot be justly concluded from the surprise expressed at Hilkiah's the High Priest's finding the book of the law of the Lord in the temple, when they repaired it in Josiah 's reign ; for this is justly supposed to be either the original book of the law written by Moses himself, and ordered to be lodged in a coffer at the side of the ark, and which was found when the ark was removed, on occa sion of the temple and holy of holies being repaired ; or at least an authentic copy of great antiquity and authority, kept in the temple, and which might have been neglected, or thought to have been lost. But it would be absurd to imagine, that there was no copy of the law at all remaining in any private hands, or in the hands of any of the priests or prophets. And it may very reasonably be conceived, that upon finding an authentic book of the law of such venerable antiquity, the attention of tbe King and great men might be more thoroughly awakened to the things contained there, and they might make a much stronger impression upon them, than they had ever done before, even supposing they had read or heard the same things out of some other copy of the law, of 'less authority, and which was not so much to be depended upon. There is not one word in the account that is given us of this matter, of what our author mentions, concerning the little time the reading of the book in the presence of the King took up ; from whence he concludes, that it contained nothing but the law strictly so called, or tbe recapitulation of it in the book of Deuteronomy : though if that copy had contained no more than the book of Deuteronomy, this is a collection not only of the principal laws given by Moses, but of the extraordinary and miraculous facts whereby the divine authority of the law was attested. As to what he insinuates, that all the sacred writings of the Jews were composed after the captivity, and that Esdras- and his successors compiled the written law,t I shall not add any thing here to what I have elsewhere offered to demonstrate the palpable falsehood and absurdity of such a supposition.*): I shall only at present observe, that the preserving of the Pentateuch among the Samaritans, between whom, from the time of their first settling in that country, and the Jews, there was a fixed antipathy and oppo sition, affordeth a plain proof, that the code of the Mosaic history * Works, vol. iii. p. 276. t Ibid. vol. iv. p. 339. vol. v. p. 229. X See " Reflections on Lord Bolingbroke's Letters on the Study and Use of History," p. 51, & seq. 410 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVIII. and laws was not the invention or composition of Esdras, but had been preserved among the Israelites of the ten tribes, in place of whom the Samaritans came. And the remarkable conformity there is between the Samaritan and Jewish code of the Pentateuch, both in the laws and in the facts, gives a signal confirmation of the antiquity and integrity of the Mosaic history and laws, and how far the Hebrew code is- to be depended upon. But to proceed to Lord Bolingbroke's farther objections. In order to destroy the credit of the Mosaic history, be hath taken all occasions to charge it with inconsistencies and contradictions. Thus he tells us, that the Mosaic account is plainly inconsistent with itself, in supposing that the unity of God was the original tradition derived from Adam, and yet that it was lost, and polytheism estab lished in its stead in the days of Serah ; or at least of Terah and Abraham, four hundred years after the deluge. He thinks it absurd to suppose, " that the knowledge of the existence of that God who had destroyed and restored the world, just before, could be wholly lost in the memory of mankind, and his worship entirely forgot, whilst the eye-witnesses of the deluge were yet alive."* The whole force of this objection depends upon his own absurd way of stating the case, as if the knowledge of the only true God were supposed to be then entirely lost and forgotten among mankind. True reli gion and the true worship of God might have been considerably cor rupted in that time, and idolatry might have made a great progress, though the knowledge ofthe true God was not entirely lost and for gotten among men ; as our author himself, when it is for his purpose, thinks fit to own. With the same view of proving inconsistencies on the Mosaic his tory, he observes, that " it is repugnant to human nature to suppose, that the Israelites should, in the course of so few generations, become confirmed and hardened idolators in Egypt, and should in so short a time not only forget the traditions of their fathers, and the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob ; but that they should have been as much wedded to idolatry as the Egyptians themselves were."t He himself furnishest an answer to this, when he observes, that " poly theism and idolatry have a close connection with the ideas and affections of rude and ignorant men." And that " the vulgar embrace polytheism and idolatry very easily, even after the true doc trine of a divine unity has been taught and received.""); Itmay well be conceived, that during their abode in Egypt the Israelites might have contracted a great fondness for the Egyptian customs. They might be allured by the power and splendour of the Egyptians, to entertain a good opinion of their religion ; and the extreme misery and distress to which they were reduced by their servitude, might lead many of them to question the promises made to Abraham and their ancestors, and make them more ready to deviate from the reli gion derived to them from their fathers ; though there is no reason to think they entirely forgot it, but mixed idolatrous rites with it. * Works, vol. vi. p. 19, 20.217, 218. t Ibid. p. 222, 223. i Ibid. p. 21, 22.. Let. XXVIII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 411 And even after their deliverance from Egypt, the idolatrous habits and customs many of them had so deeply imbibed, were not soon laid aside. It may easily be supposed, that they would endeavour to reconcile and unite them with the religion Moses taught them. And this seems particularly to have been the case with regard to the worship of the golden calf. He mentions it as an incredible thing, that " they forgot the true God even when he conducted them through the desert : they revolted from him even whilst the peals of thunder that proclaimed his descent on the mountain rattled in their ears, and whilst he dictated his laws to them."* He adds, that " if the miracles recorded to have been wrought had been really wrought, nothing less than the greatest of all miracles could have made these real miracles ineffectual." " I know farther," says he, " most intuitively, that no creature of the same nature as I am of, and I presume the Israelites were human creatures, could resist the evidence of such revelations, such miracles, and such traditions, as are recorded in the Bible : That they must have terrified the most audacious, and have convinced the most incredulous."t Thus, with a view to destroy the credit of the Mosaic history, he cries up the irresistible force of the revelations and miracles wrought among the Israelites. But perhaps he could not be so sure, as he pretends, what he himself might have done in those circumstances. There is scarce any answering for the extravagance and inconsistencies which human nature may fall into. But he goes all along upon a wrong supposition, as he had done before, as if the Israelites had entirely forgotten God, or intended absolutely to abandon his worship. This was not their intention in the instance he seems to have had parti cularly in his view, their worshipping the golden calf. For it is evident, they did not design to renounce the one true God, the God of Israel, and to discard his worship. This appears from Aaron's proclaiming on that occasion a feast to the Lord, Jehovah ; and from the people's declaring, These be thy Gods, 0 Israel; or, as it is elsewhere rendered, This is thy God, that brought thee out ofthe land qf Egypt, Exod. xxxii. 4, 5, compared with Nehem. ix. 18. Nothing can be plainer than that they intended by it to worship the God of Israel, who they knew had so lately brought them out of the land of Egypt ; and that the worship they rendered to the calf was not designed to terminate there, but was done with a reference to the Lord Jehovah, whom they were for worshipping by that symbol. They might therefore flatter themselves, that this was consistent with their acknowledging no other God but one, which had been so solemnly enjoined them ; and that the prohibition of bowing down before any image was designed only to forbid the worshipping false gods, not the true God by such a symbol. This indeed was an in excusable contravention of the law, which had been just promul gated with great solemnity, and which was intended to forbid then- worshipping and bowing down before any image of the Deity, under any pretence whatsoever. But it was what minds, so strongly pre- * Works, vol. iv. p. 223. t H*id' P- 223- 412 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVIII. possessed with the notions and prejudices they had imbibed in Egypt, might be supposed capable of falling into. I would observe, by the way, that the recording this story affords a signal proof of the impartiality of the sacred historian. Nothing but the strictest regard to truth could have prevailed with him to have inserted a thing which has been so often mentioned to the dishonour of that people, even by their own writers, and by others ever since. And it is very probable, that if the people in after-times durst have made any alteration in the original sacred records, they would have struck it out for the same reason for which Josephus has omitted it, as he has done some other things which he thought would turn to the discredit of his nation. Another attempt this writer makes against the credit ofthe Mosaic history, relates to the account given of their exode. He thinks it incredible, that "the Israelites should bear the oppressions of the Egyptians, when they were become so vastly numerous, and could bring six hundred thousand fighting men into the field, which was an army sufficient to have conquered Egypt."* But what could be expected from an undisciplined and unarmed multitude, however numerous, against the force of a powerful kingdom ? especially when their spirits had been depressed by a long slavery, and a series of grievous oppressions; in which cases vast multitudes have been kept in subjection by a very few, of which there are many instances in history. In what follows he lets us know, that he thinks the accounts given by pagan authors of their exode not wholly fabulous, and that " an epidemical infectious distemper in the Lower Egypt, might make Pharaoh desirous to drive the inhabitants of that part of his kingdom into the neighbouring deserts. — That many of the inhabitants of the Lower Egypt were included with the Israelites in that transmigration ; and that a common distemper, rather than a common religion, united them in it." And again, he mentions it as a reason of the Israelites staying forty years in the wilderness, that " it was a sufficient time to wear out the leprosy, with which pro fane history assures us, they were infected ."-f Thus he is for reviv ing a false and scandalous story, the absurdity of which has been so often exposed. The different accounts given by the pagan authors relating to that matter will naturally lead every intelligent reader to conclude, that the Egyptians endeavoured to conceal and disguise the truth. They could not deny the departure ofthe Israelites out of Egypt, and that it was in a manner and with circumstances very disagreeable to them ; yet they did not think it consistent with the honour of their own nation, to relate the fact with all its circum stances as it really happened. But of all the stories they trumped up on that occasion, that of the Israelites being expelled on the account of their being generally infected with the leprosy, is the most foolish and ridiculous. It appears indeed by the laws and constitutions of Moses, that there were leprosies, and other cuta neous distempers, among the Israelites, as well as among the neigh- * Works, vol. v. p. 151. t Ibid. p. 142. 144, 145. Let. XXVIII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 413 bouring nations in that part ofthe world ; but it also appears, with invincible evidence, that the body of that people were not infected with those distempers, and that there were comparatively very few who were so ; since the infected were ordered to be put out of the camp, and were treated in such a way as they could not have been treated, if a great part of the people had been leprous. But any story is catched at, however void of all appearance of truth, that tends to cast disgrace upon the Jews, and the holy scriptures. The only remaining objection against the Mosaic history, and which indeed seems to be what he layeth the principal stress upon, is, that it is repugnant to the experience of mankind. That " in credible anecdotes are not mentioned seldom or occasionally in them, as in Livy or other historians, but the whole history is founded on such, and consists of little else." He compares those that speak of the Pentateuch as an authentic history to Don Quixote, and represents them as not much less mad than he was. " When I sit down (says he) to read this history, I am ready to think myself transported into a sort of fairy land, where every thing is done by magic and enchantment ; where a system of nature very different from ours prevails; and all I meet with is repugnant to my expe rience, and to the clearest and most distinct ideas I have. Almost every event in it is incredible in its causes or consequences, and I must accept ov reject the whole."* What his Lordship says amounts in other words to this : that this history gives an account of a series of miraculous facts and events, which were not according to the usual and ordinary course of things. This will be easily ac knowledged. But it is denied, that this is a just or sufficient objection against the truth or authenticity of the history, or a valid reason why it should be rejected. On the contrary, if the facts there related had been only of the ordinary kind, they would not have answered the end which the divine wisdom had in view. It was necessary, as the case was circumstanced, that they should be mira culous, and therefore their being miraculous is not a proof of their being false ; and, considered in their causes and consequences, they are so far from being incredible, that, taking in their causes and consequences, they claim our belief and veneration. The way of arguing made use of by our author, and others of the deistical writers in such cases, deserves to be remarked. If the facts advanced in proof of a divine revelation may possibly be accounted for in a na tural way, then they are no miracles at all, and cannot give a suffi cient attestation to the truth and authority of a supernatural revela tion; and if they are of an extraordinary nature, and out of the common course of our experience, and manifestly transcend all human power, then the very extraordinariness of the facts, and their being miraculous, though it is proper in such circumstances they should be so, is made a reason for rejecting them. But that we may consider this matter more distinctly, it is to be observed, that it cannot be pretended, that the facts recorded in the * Works, vol iii p. 280. 414 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVIII. books of Moses are absolutely impossible, or beyond the power of God to effect. If any reason therefore can be assigned to show, that it was proper they should be wrought, and that it was worthy ofthe divine wisdom to interpose in so extraordinary a way, those facts, however miraculous they are supposed to be, become credible. And if to this it be added, that we have all the proofs that these facts were actually done, which the nature of the thing can admit of, or which could be reasonably desired, supposing those things to have really happened, this is all that can be justly expected, and it would be unreasonable to insist on more. The case that is here supposed is this : That when the nations had fallen from the worship and adoration of the one true God, and him only, and became involved in superstition, polytheism, and idolatry, which was still growing and spreading, and in danger of becoming universal, it pleased God, in his great wisdom and good ness, in order to put a check to the spreading idolatry, and to pre serve his knowledge and worship among men, to interpose in an extraordinary way, by establishing among a people chosen for that purpose a constitution of a peculiar kind, the fundamental principle of which was the acknowledgment and adoration of the one true God, in opposition to all idolatry and polytheism. And, in order to give weight to this constitution, it was so ordered, that its divine authority was confirmed by a series of wonderful acts, which ex hibited the most illustrious displays of his divine power and glory. And this constitution was designed farther to prepare the way for another dispensation, which was intended to be of a more general extent, and in which religion was in due season to be published to the world in its most perfect form. This is a general view of the case : let us now examine it more distinctly. And first, that at the time when the law of Moses and the Is- raelitish constitution where first established, idolatry and polytheism were generally spread through the nations, is a fact that can scarce be contested. This appears from all the remaining monuments of those times, as far as we can carry our inquiries. Nor could Lord Bolingbroke deny it. On the contrary he acknowledges, as shall be more particularly observed afterwards, that so great and general was the attachment of the people to idolatry and polytheism, that the most celebrated legislators of antiquity were everywhere obliged to fall in with it. And he himself asserts, that " polytheism and idolatry, have so close a connexion, with the ideas and affections of rude and ignorant men, that one of them could not fail to be their first religious principle, nor the other their first religious practice."* This may be thought to be carrying it too far; but it is certain, that if we judge from fact and experience, there would have been little hope or expectation of recovering mankind from the idolatry and corruption into which they were fallen, without some extraordinary Works, vol. iv. p. 21. Let. XXVIII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 415 expedient, above what either the legislators or philosophers were able to effect. If therefore it pleased God to interpose in an extraordinary man ner for this purpose, it ought to be acknowledged to have been a signal instance both of his wisdom and of his goodness. Our author himself represents it as a fundamental article ofthe religion of nature, that " the Supreme Being is the true, and only true, object of our adoration."* He calls this that first and great principle qf natural theology, and the angular stone of true theism. If ever there fore it was worthy of God to interpose at all, or to concern himself with the affairs of men, here was a proper occasion for it, for main taining and preserving that fundamental principle of all religion, which was become so greatly corrupted and perverted among men, and overwhelmed under an amazing load of superstitions and idolatries. This accordingly was the excellent design of the Mosaic consti tution, and of all the extraordinary attestations whereby the divine authority of it was established. It is undeniably manifest, that the chief aim of that whole dispensation, and the principal point to which all its laws were directed, was to establish the worship and adoration of the one true God, the maker and preserver of all things, the supreme Lord and governor of the world, and of him alone ; and to forbid and suppress, as far as its influence reached, that idolatry and superstition, which the wise men of other nations humoured and encouraged, and thought it impossible to subdue. If we compare the Mosaic institution with theirs, we shall find a vast difference between them. Lord Bolingbroke, speaking of the mighty degree of wealth and power to which the ancient priests, who were also the ancient philosophers and wise men, arrived in Egypt, Ethiopia, and the great eastern kingdoms, tells us, that " the general scheme of their policy seems to have been this. They built their whole system of philosophy on tbe superstitious opinions and practices that had prevailed in days of the greatest ignorance. They had other expedients which they employed artfully and suc cessfully. Most of their doctrines were wrapped up in the sacred veil of allegory. Most of them were propagated in the mysterious cypher of sacred dialects, of sacerdotal letters, and of hieroglyphical characters ; and the useful distinction of an outward and inward doctrine was invented, one for the vulgar, and one for the initiated."t He afterwards observes, that "the worship of one God, and the simplicity of natural religion, would not serve their turn. Gods were multiplied ; that devotions, and all the profitable rites and ceremonies that belong them, might be so too. The invisible Mithras, without the visible, would have been of little value to the Magi."} It ought therefore to give us a very advantageous notion of the divinity of the law of Moses, and the truth of his pretensions, that the method he took was entirely different ; and that he was far from making use of those arts and expedients, which the ancient • Works, vol. v. p. 98. t Ibid. vol. iv. p. 42, 43, 44, J Ibid. p. 49. 416 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVIII. priests and sages of the east thought necessary. Lie did not found his theology on false popular opinions ; on the contrary, the funda mental principle of his system was subversive of that polytheism, which his Lordship represents as the natural belief of men in the first uncultivated ages, and to which a great part of mankind in every age have been undeniably very prone. No variety or multi plicity of Gods was allowed in his constitution : no false or idola trous devotions, in order to bring a greater revenue to the priests. He did not conceal his doctrines and laws in the cypher of sacred dialects, and sacerdotal letters, and hieroglyphical characters. His laws and doctrines were all designed for public universal use ; and there was no such thing in his system as secret doctrines, to be communicated only to a few, and concealed from the vulgar. On the contrary, it was a maxim that lay at the foundation of that con stitution, that all the people were to be instructed in the knowledge and worship of the one true God, free from idolatry, and to be made acquainted with his laws, and the duties there required. And though our author speaks of the allegories in the Old Testament, as if allegory passed for a literal relation qf facts among them, it is certain, that in the historical parts of the Bible, particularly in the Mosaic history, the facts are generally delivered in a plain, simple, narrative style, obvious to the capacities of the people. His Lordship speaks with high approbation of the celebrated legislators of antiquity, whom he represents as the first, and he sup poses the best missionaries that have been seen in the world* He instances in Mercury, Zoroaster, Zamolxis, Minos, Charondas, Numa ; and having told us, that they all, to give the greater sanc tion to their religious and civil institutions, pretended to communi cations with their gods, or to revelations from them, he declares, that "he believes it probable, that many of the reformers of man kind had discovered the existence of the one Supreme Beihg ; but this knowledge might seem to them not sufficiently adapted to the character of the people with whom they had to do." He adds, that " it was necessary in their opinion to suit their doctrine to the gross conceptions of the people, and to raise such affections and passions by human images, and by objects that made strong impressions on sense, as might be opposed with success to such as were raised by sensible images and objects too, and were destructive of order, and pernicious to society. They employed, for reforming the manners of the half-savage people they civilized, the dread of superior powers, maintained and cultivated by superstition, and applied by policy ."t Thus Lord Bolingbroke, notwithstanding the zeal he pro fesses for true theism, is pleased mightily to admire and applaud the ancient legislators, who, by his own account, countenanced and encouraged polytheism and idolatry ; whilst he abuses and vilifies Moses, the main design of whose law was to forbid and suppress it. Indeed, the method he took was such as showed that his law had an higher original than human policy. He established the wor- * Works, vol. iv. p. 25. t Ibid. p. 26, 27. Let. XXVIII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. .,- ship of the one true God, the Creator and Governor of the universe and of him only, as the foundation and central point of his whole system. Nor did he, in order to suit his doctrine to the gross concep tions of the people, indulge them in that idolatry and polytheism to which the nations were so generally and strongly addicted. All worship of inferior deities was prohibited; and he expressly forbade the Hebrews to represent the pure essence of the Deity by any cor poreal form, that he might accustom them to a more spiritual adora tion ofthe Supreme Being; and if, as our author alleges, he adopted some of the Egyptian rites and customs in accommoda tion to the weakness and prejudices of the people,* though this is far from being so certain as he pretends,t we may be sure they were only such as might be innocently used, and not such as had a ten dency to lead the people into idolatry, or out of which idolatry arose; for all things of this kind he strongly and most expressly prohibited ; and therefore commanded the people not to do after the doings of the land of Egypt, or to walk after their ordinances, Lev. xviii. 3. The other legislators pretended, as well as he, to commu nications with the Divinity; yet whatever their private opinion might be, they durst not so much as attempt to take the people off from the superstition and idolatry they were so fond of. The reason was, they were sensible that their communication with the Deity was only pretended ; and therefore they could not depend upon any extraordinary assistance to carry their designs into execution'; * Works, vol. iv. 31. 44. t lt appears, indeed, from the accounts of the Egyptian rites and customs given by some ancient writers, that there is a resemblance betweeii some of those rites and cus toms, and those that were instituted in the Mosaical law; but there is no proof that the latter was derived from the former ; nor, indeed, is there any proof which can be depended on, that those particular rites were in use among the Egyptians so early as the time of Moses, since the authors who mention them are of a much later date. And, notwithstanding all that hath been said of the improbability ofthe Egyptians borrowing them from the Israelites, yet the very high opinion the Egyptians of his time had con ceived of Moses, as appeareth from Exod. xi. 3. and the great impressions which we may well suppose to have beeii made upon them by the extraordinary divine interposi tions, in favour of the Israelites, at their departure out of Egypt, and during their abode in the wilderness, as well as at their entrance into the land of Canaan, of which the Egyptians could scarce be ignorant, might give occasion to their copying after some of the Mosaic institutions. They might possibly apprehend, that this would tend to draw down divine blessings upon them, or to avert judgments and calamities. These observances they might afterwardsjretain, though, in succeeding ages, when the first impres sions were over, they were too proiul, to acknowledge from whence they had originally derived them. Besides, it should be considered, that ofthe several rites and customs com mon to the Israelites and Egyptians, might be derived to both from the patriarchal times. The famous M. le Clerc, notwithstanding the zeal he frequently expresseth for the hypothesis, that many of the Mosaic rites were instituted in imitation of the Egyptians, yet in his notes on Levit. xxiii. 10. speaking of the offering up of the first-fruits to God, observes, that this was neither derived from the Egyptians to the Hebrews, nor from the Hebrews to the Egyptians, but was derived to both from the earliest ages, and pro bably was originally of divine appointment. The same he thinks of the oblation of sacrifices ; and adds, that there were perhaps many other things which both people derived from the same source. Et alice forte nndta ex aiquo indidem traxit uterque populus. So that many of those Jewish observances which some learned men, and M. le Clerc among the rest, have been fond of deriving from the Egyptians, had probably been in use in the times of the ancient patriarchs, and were retained, and farther con firmed, as well as other additional rites instituted, in the law of Moses. E E 418 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVIII. but Moses not only pretended to have received his laws from God, but knew that it really was so, and was able to give the most con vincing proofs of his divine mission. He was sure of a supernatu ral assistance, and this enabled him to accomplish what the ablest legislators of antiquity did not dare to attempt. His Lordship observes, that " the Israelites had the most singular establishment, ecclesiastical and civil, that ever was formed."* And it must be acknowledged to have been in many respects very different from that which obtained in other nations. And it can hardly be con ceived, how, as things were circumstanced, it could have been established among the Israelites, but in an extraordinary and mira culous way. The very nature of the constitution furnishes a strong presumption of the truth of the miraculous facts by which the authority of it was attested and confirmed, and rendereth the whole account consistent and credible. The chief objection which is urged against this, is drawn from the absurdity of supposing, that God should select a pe'ople to him self, among whom he would erect a peculiar constitution for pre serving his knowledge and worship, apart from the rest of mankind. Or, however, " if he had thought fit, that the sacred deposit should be trusted to a people chosen to preserve it till the coming of the Messiah, no people was less fit than the Israelites to be chosen for this great trust, on every account. They broke the trust continually. The revelations made to them were, as Mr. Locke observes, shut up in a little corner of the world, amongst a people, by that very law which they received with it, excluded from a com merce and communication with the rest of mankind. A people so little known, and contemned by those that knew them, were very unfit and unable to propagate the doctrine of one God in the world." He asks, " Wherefore then was this deposit made to them ? lt was of no use to other nations before the coming of Christ, nor served to prepare them for the reception of the gospel. And after his coming, it was in this great respect of little use, if of any, to the Jews themselves. ''-f- There is scarce any thing that has been more the subject of ridi cule, than the Jews being a chosen race, distinguished from all other nations of the earth. And yet that the Jews were remarkably dis tinguished above other nations, for the knowledge and worship of the one true God, is a matter of fact which cannot possibly be denied. Whosoever reads the monuments of heathen antiquity, of which there are very large jemains extant, the constitution of their laws, and system of their policy, and the writings of their historians, poets, and philosophers, and compares them with the Jewish, will find an astonishing difference that cannot but strike every man who con siders it. It must be acknowledged, that many of the heathen nations, particularly those of Greece and Rome, were renowned for learning and politeness, peculiarly eminent for their knowledge in the liberal arts and sciences, and for the fineness of their taste in * Works, vol. v. p. 144. f Ibid. p. 242, 243. Let. XXVIII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 419 works of genius and literature, which has rendered them the admi ration of all succeeding ages. But in matters of religion we meet every where with the most unquestionable proofs of the grossest idolatry and polytheism, in which not only were the vulgar univer sally involved, but it was countenanced and practised by the wisest and greatest men. That public worship which was instituted by their most celebrated legislators, and a conformity to which was re commended by the philosophers, was directed to a multiplicity of deities. On the other hand, if we turn our views to the Jews, a people no way eminent for their knowledge in the arts and sciences, we shall find that monotheism,' the first and great principle, as he calls it, of natural theology, the acknowledgment and worship of the one true God, the Maker and Lord of the universe, and of him only, was the fundamental principleof theirconstitution and of their state; all worship of inferior deities, and of the true God by imao-es, was most expressly prohibited in their laws.* If we examine their writ ings, we may observe, that they every where discover the profoundest veneration for the Deity ; they abound with the sublimest senti ments of his divine Majesty, his incomparable perfections, his supreme dominion, and all-disposing providence, and every where express an utter detestation of all idolatry and polytheism. Nor is this the spirit of their moral and devotional writings only, but of their historical too ; the principal design of which is to promote the great ends of religion, by representing the happy state of their nation, when they adhered to the worship of God, and persisted in obedience to his laws, and the calamities and miseries that befel them as a punishment for their defections and revolts. Their very poetry was vastly different from that of the heathen nations ; not designed, like theirs, to celebrate the praises, the amours, the exploits of their * Lord Bolingbroke takes notice, thai Moses had made the destruction of idolatrous worship a principal object of his laws ; and the zeal against images was great among the Jews. But he pretends that it was only carved or embossed images that were held in horror; but a flat figure, either painted or embroidered, was allowed; as, he thinks, is very clear from a passage which he has read, quoted from Maimonides. And he inti mates, that " picture-worship came from the Jews to the Christians, as did that of carved images from the pagans." See vol. iv. p. 308. If that were the casuistry, as he calls it, of the Jews, it is certainly not chargeable on their law, which most expressly prohibited the worshipping, npt only of graven images, but the likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or in the earth beneath. But this is one instance, among many which might be produced, of the wrong use his Lordship has made of his too super ficial reading. He was ready to take up with tbe slightest appearances in favour of any darling point he had in view. He has here confounded the making or drawing pictures or images with the worshipping them. Neither Maimonides, nor any other Jewish author, ever pretended that it was lawful for them to worship painted, any more than carved images. But as to the lawfulness of making images, or of painting and embroi dering them, there were different opinions. Some carried it so far, that they were not for allowing any figures at all, either painted or carved, not so much as for ornament, for fear of giving occasion to idolatry. Others thought it lawful to have the figures of animals either painted or carved, except those of men, which were not allowed to be carved or embossed, though they might be painted, or drawn upon a plane ; but neither the one nor the other were to be worshipped. If his Lordship had consulted Mr. Selden, whom he hath sometimes quoted, he would have found all this distinctly re presented. De jure nat. et gent, apud Hebr. lib. xi. cap. 6, 7, 8, 9. There is no foun dation, therefore, for his new discovery, that picture-worship came from the Jews to the Christians. E F. 2 420 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL AVRITERS. Let. XXVIII. fictitious deities, but fitted to inspire the noblest ideas of God, and containing the most elevated descriptions of his glory and perfection. It is natural therefore to enquire whence comes this amazing dif ference between the Jews and the most learned and civilized heathen nations in the knowledge and worship of the Deity. It is his Lord ship's own observation, that "without revelation the belief of the unity of God could not be the faith of any one people, till observa tion and meditation, till a full and vigorous exercise of reason, made it such."* And again, he tells us, that " the rational, the orthodox belief was not established, nor could be so, till the manhood of phi losophy."-!; How comes it then, that the public acknowledgment and adoration of the one true God, free from polytheism and idola try, was the established religion of the Jews only ? Were they the only people who had reason in a full and vigorous exercise, and among whom philosophy was arrived at its manhood 1 If so, it is wrong to represent them, as the deistical writers have frequently done, as the most stupid of the human race, a people ignorant and barbarous, as he and Mr. Hume calls them. Nor had he a right to laugh at Mr. Abbadie, who, he says, has represented them as a nation of sages and philosophers.^ It will be readily allowed, that the Jews were not of themselves more wise and knowing, or better philosophers than other nations, or that they had made deeper ob servations and reflections ; on the contrary, they were inferior to some in several branches of science. We have all the reason there fore in the world to conclude, that, if left to themselxes, they would have been involved in the common polytheism and idolatry, as well as the nations round them ; and that it was owing only to their having had the advantage of an extraordinary revelation, and to their peculiar constitution, which was of divine original, and which had been confirmed by the most illustrious attestations, that they became so remarkably distinguished. Lord Bolingbroke was very sensible how unfavourable this is to his cause, and therefore finds great fault with Mr. Locke for assum ing, that the belief and worship ofthe one true God was the national religion of the Israelites alone, and that it was their particular pri vilege and advantage to know the true God, and his true worship, whilst the heathen nations were in a state of darkness and igno rance. To take off the force of this seems to be the principal design of his third Essay, which is of the rise and progress of monotheism.^ But what he offers to this purpose is extremely trifling. He is forced quite to alter the true state of the question, and supposes Mr. Locke and the Christian divines to assert, that there was not any knowledge or worship of the true God in the world at all before the erection of the Israelitish polity ; and that all the nations, except the Israelites, had been ignorant of the true God from the begin ning. And then he argues, that " this implies that the Israelites were a nation from the beginning;" and gravely asks, "Were they * Works, vol. iv. p. 20. t Ibid. p. 22, 23. ' Ibid. vol. iii. p. 283. § Ibid. vol. iv. p. 187. et seq, Let. XXVIII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 42 J so, if we reckon from Adam, or even from Noah, or even from the vocation of their father Abraham ?"* Thus he frames a ridiculous hypothesis for his adversaries, and then endeavours to expose it ; whereas they maintain, what he thinks fit to deny, that the know ledge and worship of the true God was the original primitive religion of mankind, derived from the first parents and ancestors of the human race ; but that before the time of Moses, the nations were generally lapsed into pofytheism and idolatry, which appears from his own acknowledgment to have been the case. He affirms indeed, " it is plain that the knowledge of the one true God would have been preserved in the world, if no such people as the Jews had ever been. And nothing can be more impertinent than the hypothesis, that this people, the least fit perhaps on many accounts that could have been chosen, was chosen to preserve this knowledge. It was acquired, and it was preserved indepen dently of them, among the heathen philosophers. And it might have become, and probably did become, the national belief in coun tries unknown to us, or even in those who were fallen back into igno rance, before they appear in the traditions we have."+ What an extraordinary way of talking is this ! He argues from the supposed national belief of countries unknown to us, and of which he confesses we had no traditions extant, to show that religion would have been preserved in the world, if no such people as the Jews had ever been. As to the heathen philosophers, among whom, he says, the know ledge of the true God was preserved, it is certain, and he himself frequently owns it, that whatever knowledge some of them had this way, it was of little use to hinder tbe polytheism and idolatry of the people ; and that, instead of reclaiming them from it, they fell in it with themselves, and even encouraged and advised the people to a compliance with the public laws and customs, by which polytheism was established. Thus it appears, that after all the outcry and ridicule against the Jews as the unfittest people in the world to have tbe sacred deposit of the acknowledgment and adoration of the one true God committed to them, they were the only people concerning whom we have any proofs that they made a public national acknowledgment of this great principle, and among whom it was established as the funda mental law of their state.J It is urged indeed, that their constitu- * Works, vol. iv. p. 233. t Ibid. p. 79. X His Lordship shows a strange unwillingness, that the Jews should have the honour of having had the knowledge and worship of the true God among them, in a degree far superior to other nations. Sometimes he insinuateth, as some others of the deistical writers have done, that the Israelites borrowed it from the Egyptians (though accord ing to his own representation of the case, this was among the Egyptians part ^of their secret doctrine, not communicated to the vulgar), or from the Babylonians. And then the wonder will be how it came to pass, that the knowledge and worship ofthe one true God was preserved among the Jews, whilst the Egyptians and Babylonians were im mersed in the most absurd and stupid idolatries. He thinks he might venture to affirm, that Abraham himself learned the orthodox faith, viz. relating to the knowledge an d _ wor ship of the one true God, in Egypt and the neighbouring countries* And he had said. the same thing before.t There cannot be a greater proof of unreasonable".pi'ejudice than * Works, vol. iv. p. 203. t Ibid. vol. iii. p. 299. 422 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVIII. tion had little effect upon them ; that " their history is little else than a relation of their rebelling and repenting ; and these rebellions, not those of particular men, surprised and hurried into disobedience by their passions, but national deliberate violations of the law, in de fiance of the Supreme Being."* But if we compare the history of the Jews with that of the heathen nations, we shall find a very re markable difference between them. Notwithstanding all the faults and defections of the former, and though they too often fell into idolatries and vicious practices, in a conformity to the customs ofthe neighbouring countries, they again recovered from them, and re turned to the acknowledgment and adoration of the one true God, and him only, and often continued for a considerable number of years together in the profession and practice of the true religion, free from idolatry ; of which there are many proofs in all the ages of their nation, from the days of Moses to the Babylonish captivity ; during the time of their Judges, Kings, &c. as every one knows that is at all acquainted with their history. This was owing to the revelation they enjoyed ; they still had recourse to their law, and by that reformed themselves, and returned to the pure worship of God according to that law ; to which, after the Babylonish captivity, in which they had suffered so much for their defections and revolts, they adhered more closely than ever. But among the heathen nations, even those of them that were most learned and civilized, such as the Grecians and Romans, all was one continued course of polytheism, and the most absurd idolatries ; nor can we name any period of their history, in which they laid aside the public poly theism, and returned to the acknowledgment and adoration of the one true God, and of him only. It must be said, therefore, that the Jewish history doth indeed furnish plain proofs of what the author. observes, the proneness of mankind in all ages to polytheism and idolatry; but it shows at the same time, that, by virtue of their pe culiar constitution, the worship of God was maintained among them in a manner in which it was not in any other nation ; and this affordeth a signal proof of the benefit of revelation, and how far su perior it is to the efforts of the wisest lawgivers and philosophers. It appears then, that the Mosaic constitution did answer very valuable ends. By this there was a people preserved, among whom the knowledge and adoration of the one living and true God was maintained, in a world over-run with superstition and idolatry, and to whom an admirable system of laws was given.' And notwith standing all that is said about the people of Israel being shut up in a corner of the earth, they were placed in an advantageous situation, in the centre of the then known world, between Egypt and this. It is surmised not only without evidence, but against it, since nothing can be plainer from the account given us of Abraham, than that he knew and worshipped the one true God before he came into Canaan at all, and therefore long before he went into Egypt. Nor did he learn it from tbe Chaldeans, among whom idolatry had then made a considerable progress, as appears from Josh. xxiv. 2. And agreeably to this is the universal tradition of the East; that he was the great restorer of the ancient true religion, which had been corrupted with idolatry. * Works, vol. v. p. 136. Let. XXVIII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 423 Arabia on the one hand, and Syria, Chaldea, and Assyria on the other, among whom the first great empires were erected, and from whence knowledge and learning seem to have been derived to the western parts ofthe world. And they were also in the neighbour hood of Sidon and Tyre, the greatest emporiums in the world, from whence ships went to all parts, even the most distant countries. Their peculiar constitution, whereby they were so remarkably dis tinguished from other nations, together with the extraordinary things God had done for them, had a natural tendency to put the neighbouring people upon enquiring into the design of all this, which would be apt to lead them to the adoration of the one true God, and into the knowledge of the true religion in its most necessary and important principles, and to discover to them the folly and unreason ableness of their own superstition and idolatry. That this was really part of the design which the divine wisdom had in view in this con stitution, and that therefore it was intended to be of use to other nations besides the people of Israel, plainly appears from many pas sages of Scripture.* They were indeed kept distinct from other people, and it was necessary for wise ends they should be so ; but they were always ready to receive among them those of other nations that worshipped the one true God, though they did not conform to the peculiar rites of their polity ; and in the most flourishing times of their state,-particularly in the reigns of David and Solomon, they had an extensive dominion and correspondence ; and afterwards they had frequent intercourse with Egypt, Syria, Assyria, Chaldea, and Persia. And if we consider what is related concerning the Queen of Sheba, and Hiram, King of Tyre, as well as the memorable de crees of Nebuchadnezzar, King of Babylon, Darius the Mede, Cyrus, Darius Hystaspes, and Artaxerxes, Kings of Persia, the greatest monarchs then upon earth, and who published to the world the regard and veneration they had for the Lord Jehovah, the God whom the Jews worshipped ; it is very probable that the fame of their laws, and the remarkable interpositions of providence on their behalf, spread far and wide among the nations, and contributed, in more instances than is commonly imagined, to keep up some know ledge of the true God, the Maker and Lord of the universe, and to give some check to the prevailing idolatry, and to preserve the ancient patriarchal religion from being utterly extinguished. To which it may be added, that, in the latter times of their state, vast numbers of the Jews were dispersed through Egypt, Babylonia, Persia, and other parts of the east; and afterwards through the Lesser Asia, and the several parts of the Roman empire : and they every-where turned many of the Gentiles from the common idolatry and polytheism ; which the philosophers were scarce able to effect in a single instance. It appears then, that the setting apart .that people in so extraordinary a manner, the revelation that was given them, and the marvellous acts of divine providence towards them, * See particularly Exod. vii. 15. ix. 16. xiv. 4. Numb. xiv. 13, 14, 21. Deut. iv. 6. I Kings viii. 41, 42, 43. Psal. xxvi. 3. 424 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVIII were fitted for having an extensive effect for the advantage of other nations as well as their own, and actually had that effect in multi tudes of instances. By this constitution, there was a light set up, shining in a dark place, to which other nations might have recourse. And if, instead of making use of it as they ought to have done, they generally neglected it, and even hated and despised the Jews for having a religion so opposite to their own, and condemning their superstitions and idolatries ; the fault is to be charged upon them selves, who neglected those means and helps, as they had done before the discoveries made to them by ancient tradition, and which had been originally derived from revelation, and by the light of nature, and the works of creation and providence. Besides this, what farther shows the great propriety and usefulness of this pecu liar constitution, and the revelation given to the people of Israel, is, that it had a great tendency to prepare the world for receiving that more perfect dispensation which was to succeed it, and which was to be of a more general extent, and to be more universally diffused. The first harvest of converts to Christianity was among the Jews and their proselytes, of whom great numbers were brought over to the Christian faith. The Jewish Scriptures were generally dis persed, and had spread the knowledge of God, and had raised an expectation of a glorious and divine person, by whom a new and most excellent dispensation was to be introduced, and the Gentiles were to be brought over, more generally than had hitherto been done, from their superstitions and idolatries, from their abominable vices and corruptions, to the pure worship of God, and the know ledge and practice of true religion. This glorious person was fore told and described in the Jewish prophecies by many remarkable characters, which being accomplished in our Saviour gave a most illustrious attestation to his divine mission. And these prophecies were kept more clear and distinct, by being in the hands of a pe culiar people as the depositaries of them : whereas if they had been, like other traditions, left merely at large among the nations, they would probably in process of time have been corrupted and lost, and the testimony arising from them must have fallen. Taking all these considerations together, it appears, that the pe culiar Jewish economy answered many valuable and important ends : and that therefore it was no way unworthy of the divine wisdom to interpose in an extraordinary manner to give a divine attestation to it. And that the miraculous facts, if really done, were every way sufficient for this purpose, our author himself does not deny. On the contrary, he looks upon them to have been so strong and convincing, that it would have been impossible to resist them; and he thinks they must have been sufficient, if they had been really done, to have brought over all mankind to the belief and acknowledgment of the one true God, not only in that age, but in all succeeding ages. His manner of expressing himself is remark able. He says, that " the reviving and continuing the primitive faith and worship by such a series of revelations and miracles among one people, would have made any revival of them unnecessary Let. XXVIII. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 425 among any other ; because they would have been more than suffi cient to continue them uncorrupted over the whole world ; not only till the vocation of Abraham, four hundred years after the deluge ¦ not only till the coming of the Messiah, two thousand years after that, but even to this hour, and to the consummation of all things." * Not to insist upon the great absurdity of his supposing, that the miracles wrought among the Israelites so long after the vocation of Abraham, would have been sufficient to have kept the true religion uncorrupted till the vocation of Abraham, a blunder which could only have been owing to the most inexcusable negligence in writ ing; I think it follows from his own concessions, that the miracles and other extraordinary methods made use of for the establishment ofthe Mosaic economy, were of such a nature as to be well fitted to the end for which they were designed, the revival and establish ment of the worship of the one true God, in opposition to idolatry and polytheism. And though it be wrong to suppose, as he most absurdly does, that they must have established it among all man kind, and have prevented all deviations from it in all ages and nations ; yet it will be acknowledged, that those facts were of such a kind as to have been sufficient to convince all those to whom they were known, that the laws, in attestation to which they were wrought, were of a divine original. Accordingly the people of Israel, notwithstanding their proneness to idolatry, and their obsti nate prejudices, were brought to submit to those laws, as of divine authority, and to receive them as the rule of their polity. And though they fell off on several occasions to a compliance with the idolatries -of the neighbouring nations, which they mixed with their own rites, yet the remembrance and belief of those facts, which al ways continued among them, had mighty effects, in every age of their state, to bring them back to the true worship of God,- and to an obedience to their laws. And they have had a great effect ever since, wherever they have been believed, to fill men with a holy fear of God, and with the most adoring thoughts of his divine un equalled majesty and glory. This effect they continue to have among Christians, and are like to have to the end of the world. It is no just objection against the truth of the facts, that they come to us through the hands of the Jews : for what other testi mony can be reasonably desired, or can the nature of the thing ad mit of, than the concurrent testimony of that people, to whom the laws were given, and among whom the facts were done ? A testi mony continued throughout all the ages of their nation, and appear ing in all their records and monuments. The facts were done among themselves, and therefore in the nature of things could only be witnessed by themselves. If those of any other nation had recorded them, they must have had their accounts from the people of Israel : and if they had declared their belief of those facts, and of the divine authority of those laws, there would have been an equal pretence for rejecting their testimony, as for rejecting that of * Works, vol. iv. p. 214. 426 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXVIII. the Jews. But it is in truth very absurd to make it an objection, that the accounts of these facts are transmitted to us by those who were the only proper persons to give an account of those facts, and by whom alone those accounts could have been originally given, if they had been true. If it be pretended, that the facts were feigned by them to do honour to their nation, it must be considered, that, as was before hinted, they are so circumstanced, and mixed with such disadvantageous accounts of the temper and conduct of that people, as no man would have feigned who had their honour in view, or who had not a greater regard to the truth of the facts, than to the humouring and flattering that people. For it is plain, that the facts might have been so contrived, if they had been fictitious, as to have saved the honour of their nation, and not to have given occasion to the severe censures and reproaches which have been cast upon them in all ages on that account. And what farther derives great credit to the relations of those extraordinary and miraculous facts, is, that the books in which they are contained not only appear to have been written with an unaffected simplicity, and a sincere impartial regard to truth, mixed with a profound veneration for the Deity, but they contain the most remarkable predictions of future events, which it was impossible for any human sagacity to foresee; particularly relating to the future fates of that nation ; the surpris ing revolutions they should undergo ; the calamities, captivities, and desolations, that should befal them ; their being scattered and dispersed all over the face of the earth, and every where exposed to hatred, contempt, and reproach, and yet still wonderfully preserved as a distinct people, as we see they are at this day ; notwithstand ing they have for so many ages lost their genealogies, and been de prived of their most valued privileges, and rendered incapable of exercising their most solemn sacred rites as prescribed in their law, and without any prophets raised up among them, and acknowledged by themselves as such, to support their hopes. These are things for which no parallel can be found in any other nation upon earth. So that the present state of that people, in all respects so extra ordinary, is a living proof of the truth and divinity of those writings which contain an account of the laws that were originally given them, and of the wonderful facts by which those laws were enforced and established. This is a proof still stronger to us, than it could have been in the ages soon after those books were written, and affordeth one instance in which the evidence of those facts, instead of being diminished by time, has acquired new strength and force. You will forgive the length of this letter, as I was willing to lay together in one view all that I thought necessary for clearing and establishing the truth of the Mosaic history against our author's objections, and which, if it be well supported, the divinity of those laws, and of that constitution, follows with invincible evidence. Let. XXIX. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 427 LETTER XXIX. The excellent Nature and Tendency of the Mosaic Writings and the Scriptures of the Old Testament.— Lord Bolingbroke treats it as Blasphemy to say that they are di vinely inspired. — A Summary of his Objections against their divine Original and Authority. — His Charge against the Scriptures, as giving mean and unworthy Ideas of God, considered at large — The Representations he himself gives of God, and of his Providence, shown to be unworthy, and of the worst Consequence. — Concerning God's being represented in Scripture as entering into Covenant with Man. — The Pretence of his being described as a tutelary God to Abraham, and to the People of Israel, and of his being degraded to the meanest Offices and Employments, distinctly examined. — The Passages in which bodily Parts seem to be ascribed to God, not designed to be taken in a literal Sense The Scripture itself sufficiently guards against a wrong Interpretation of those Passages. — In what Sense human Passions and Affections are attributed to the Supreme Being. — A remarkable PassiTge of Mr. Collins to this Purpose. Sir, The design of my last letter was to vindicate the truth and credit of the Mosaic history, and of the extraordinary facts there related. And if that history be admitted as true, the divine original and authority of the Mosaic constitution is established. But besides the external proofs arising from the extraordinary and miraculous facts, whosoever with an unprejudiced mind looks into the revelation itself as contained in the sacred writings of the Old Testament, may ob serve remarkable internal characters, which demonstrate its excellent nature and tendency. At present I shall observe, that we are there taught to form the worthiest notions of God, of hjs incomparable perfections, and of his governing providence, as extending over all his works, particularly towards mankind. We are at the same time instructed in the true state of our own case, as we are weak, de pendent, guilty creatures, and are directed to place our whole hope and trust in God alone, and to refer all to him, as our chiefest good, and highest end ; to be thankful to him for all the good things we enjoy, and to be patient and resigned to his will under all the afflictive events that befal us. Our moral duty is there set before us in its just extent. The particulars of it are laid down in plain and express precepts, enforced upon us in the name and by the authority of God himself, whose love of righteousness, goodness, and purity, and j ust detestation of vice and wickedness, are repre sented in the strongest manner. Those sacred writings every-where abound with the most encouraging declarations of his grace and mercy towards the truly penitent, and with the most awful denun ciations of his just displeasure against obstinate presumptuous trans gressors. And the important lesson which runs through the whole is this, that we are to make the pleasing and serving God the chief business of our lives, and that our happiness consisteth in his favour, which is only to be obtained in the uniform practice of piety and virtue. 428 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXIX. Such evidently is the nature and tendency of the sacred writings of the Old Testament. But very different is the representation made of them by Lord Bolingbroke. Not content with endeavour ing to destroy the credit of the history, he hath, by arguments drawn from the nature ofthe revelation itself contained in the Jewish Scriptures, used his utmost efforts to show, that it is absolutely unworthy of God ; that " there are marks of an human original in those books, which point out plainly the fraud and the impos ture :"* and that " it is no less than blasphemy to assert them to be divinely inspired." f The objections he has advanced against the Scriptures of the Old Testament, and especially against the Mosaic writings, are princi pally these that follow : 1. That they give the most unworthy ideas of the Supreme Being: they degrade him to the meanest offices and employments, and attribute to him human passions, and even the worst of human im perfections. 2. Some of the laws there given are absolutely contrary to the law of nature, which is the law of God, and therefore cannot be of divine original. He instanceth particularly in the command for extirpat ing the Canaanites, and for punishing idolaters with death. 3. The first principle of the law of Moses is insociability ; and it took the Jews out of all moral obligations to the rest of man kind. 4. There are several passages in the Mosaic writings, which are false, absurd, and unphilosophical ; as particularly the account there given of the creation of the world, and the fall of man. 5. The sanctions of the law of Moses were wholly of a temporal nature, and were contrived and fitted to humour and gratify the ap petites and passions ; without any regard to a future state of rewards and punishments. These are the principal objections urged by Lord Bolingbroke against the divine authority of the Scriptures of the Old Testament, and particularly of the books of Moses. There are some other smaller exceptions, which I shall take notice of as they come in my way. 1. The first class of objections relateth to the mean and unworthy representations that are made to us in Scripture of the Supreme Being. It hath always been accounted one of the distinguishing excellencies of the sacred writings, that they abound with the most just and sublime descriptions ofthe Deity, which have a manifest tendency to raise our minds to the most worthy and exalted concep tions of his divine majesty, and his incomparable excellencies and perfections. Our author himself thinks fit to acknowledge, that " there are many passages in Scripture, which give most sublime ideas of the majesty of the Supreme Being :'' And that " the con ceptions which the Jews entertained of the Supreme Being were very othodox in the eye of reason ; and their psalmists, and their • Works, vol. iii. p. 286. t Ibid. p. 299. Let. XXIX. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 429 prophets, strained their imaginations to express the most elevated sentiments of God, and of his works, and of the methods of his pro vidence."* If therefore there be any passages which, literally taken, seem to be unworthy of God, they ought, by all the rules of candour and fair criticism to be interpreted in a consistency with these ; since it cannot be reasonably supposed, that those who entertained such noble and sublime sentiments of the Divinity, should at the same time, as he would persuade us they did, form the meanest and unworthiest conceptions of him. But let us consider the particulars of his charge : and it amounts in effect to this : That the scriptures degrade the Supreme Being, by representing him as descending to the meanest offices and employ ments : and that they attribute to him human passions, and even the worst of human imperfections. As to the first part of the charge, the degrading the Divine Ma jesty to the meanest, the unworthiest, offices and employments, he observes, that, according to the Mosaic account, " the Supreme Being condescended to be the tutelary God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and under this character he acted a part which a sensible heathen, not transported by presumptuous notions of bis own im portance, nor by the impudence of enthusiasm, would have thouo-ht too mean and too low for any of his inferior gods or demons. "t This objection he frequently repeats in various forms. He introduces one of the heathen sages as alleging, that among the Mosaic supersti tions there was one, which could be charged neither on the Egyp tians, nor any other heathen nation, and which surpassed the most extravagant of theirs ; and this was, that the Supreme Being is represented as having taken upon him a name, which was a very magnificent one indeed, and such as might denote the Supreme Being, but still a name by which he might be distinguished as the tutelar God of one family first, and then of one nation particularly, and almost exclusively of all others. "J But there is no passage where he pushes this objection more strongly, than in p. 463 of vol. iv. where he observes, that " the eternal and infinite Being is repre sented in the Jewish histories, and in the whole system of their religion, as a local tutelar deity, carried about in a trunk, or residing in a temple ; as an ally, who had entered into covenant with their fathers ; as a king, who had actually held the reins of their govern ment; and as an industrious magistrate, who descended into all the particulars of religious and civil administration, even into the most minute and meanest. Thus were the Jews accustomed to familiarize themselves with the Supreme Being, and to imagine that he fami liarized with them, and to figure him to themselves receiving their sacrifices, and listening to their prayers, sometimes at least, as grossly as Lucian represents Jupiter." He seems to think the hea thens were in the right, when they blamed the Jews for " bringing the first and only God too near to man, and making him an actor * Works, vol. iii. p. 99. vol. iv. p. 463. t Ibid. vol. iii. p. 304. X Ibid. vol. iv. p. 34. 430 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXIX. immediately, and personally as it were, in the creation and govern- ment of the world."* And he had before observed, that, according to the scripture, " the correspondence between God and man was often immediate, and even intimate and familiar with his elect, and with such purified souls as were prepared for it. And that the whole tenor of the sacred writings represented the Supreme Being in frequent conferences with his creatures : God covenanting and making bargains with man, and man with God : God holding the language of man, reasoning, arguing, expostulating, in a very human manner, animated by human affections, and appealing to human knowledge, "f Before I enter on a particular discussion of what his Lordship hath here offered, it is proper to observe, that though, in a passage just now cited, the Jews seemed to be blamed for bringing the Supreme Being too mar. to man, and supposing him to be an actor immedi ately, and as it were personally, in the government of the world; yet he elsewhere finds fault with the heathen philosophers for excluding the Monad, or supreme unity, from the creation and government of the world, and banishing him almost entirely from the system of his works, whereby he became in some sort a nonentity, an abstract or no tional being.% And he censures them for " imaging a divine mo narchy, on a human plan, the administration of which was not carried on by the immediate agency of God himself, but mediately, as in terrestrial monarchies, by that of inferior agents, according to the ranks and provinces allotted them."§ And to this notion he thinks a considerable "part of the heathen idolatry is to be ascribed." It is hard to know what idea this writer would have us form ofthe divine government. On the one hand, he seems to think it a demeaning the majesty of the Supreme Being to suppose him to act immediately , and personally, as it were, in the government of the world ; and on the other hand, he will not allow, that the divine administration is carried on mediately by the ministry of inferior agents. And if God does not govern the world, either by his own personal immediate agency, or by that of subordinate agents and instruments, it cannot easily be conceived in what sense he can be said to govern the world at all. Indeed any one that impartially considers the several passages above mentioned, relating to the Jewish scriptures, and many others of the like kind, which occur in Lord Bolingbroke's writings, and compares them with the scheme which he himself hath advanced, and of which an account was given in the eighth letter, will be apt to think that the real original ground of his prejudices against the sacred writings is this : That they every where represent God as interesting himself in the affairs of men : whereas he looks upon it to be unworthy of the divine majesty to suppose that he now con cerneth himself about them, or exerciseth any care with respect to the individuals of the human race. And since he asserts, that " the •Works, vol. iv. p. 463. t Iui<]- P- 155- X Ibid. p. 460. § Ibid. p. 73. Let. XXIX. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 43] most elevated of finite intelligent beings are not a jot nearer to the Supreme Intelligence than the lowest,"* he must, upon his scheme, think it as unbecoming the majesty of God to exercise any special care towards the highest of angelical beings, or whatever inhabitants there may be in any part of this vast universe, as towards the indi viduals of mankind. This scheme is not only, as was shown before, of a most pernicious tendency, and manifestly subversive of all reli gion and the fear of God, but at the bottom argueth, notwithstand ing all its glorious pretences, very dishonourable and unworthy conceptions of the Supreme Being. For either it supposeth him not to be present to the creatures he hath made, which is to deny the immensity of his essence, or that, if he be present, he hath not a certain knowledge of them, and of their actions and affairs, and consequently is not omniscient; though our author himself says, "It may be demonstrated, that the All-perfect Being must be om niscient, as well as self-existent."t Or that if he hath a perfect knowledge of the actions and affairs of his reasonable creatures, yet he is absolutely indifferent about them, whether they obey his laws or not; whether good or evil, virtue or vice, happiness or misery,' prevail in the moral world. This must be owned to be very well suited to the character of an Epicurean deity, whose happiness con sisteth in an..eternal indolence, and who is supposed to be of a nice and delicate constitution, unable to bear the noise, the clamours, and confusion, of this lower world, but is no way consistent with the idea of the infinitely-perfect Being. How much nobler is the idea that is given us of the Deity in the holy scriptures ! where he is represented as filling heaven and earth with his presence, and exer cising a constant inspection over all his creatures, and all their actions, as disposing and ordering all events, without distraction or confusion, in such a manner, as in the final issue of things to pro vide for the happiness of those that sincerely obey him, and go on in the practice of righteousness and virtue, and to manifest a just displeasure against those who obstinately persist in an impertinent course of vice and wickedness ; and in a word, as governing the world, and all the orders of beings in it, with infinite wisdom, righ teousness, and equity, and with the same almighty facility with which he created them ! Such an idea of God is not only of the greatest consequence to the interests of religion and virtue in the world, butjs infinitely more august and noble in itself, and more conformable to the highest notions we can form of infinite perfection, than that which this writer would substitute in its stead. I shall not add any thing here to what was offered in my eighth Letter, concerning a particular providence, as extending even to the individuals of the human race. If providence doth not interpose in human affairs at all, it cannot be expected that God should at any time communicate extraordinary discoveries and revelations of his will to mankind. But if, as hath been shown, providence doth concern itself even for individuals, and for promoting human happi- * Works, vol. iv. p. 183. t Ibid. vol. v. p. 36. 432 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXIX. ness, in a way consistent with moral agency, it is very reasonable to suppose, that it may please God to make discoveries and revelations of his will, for promoting the knowledge and practice of religion and virtue in the word, and that he may communicate such discoveries to particular persons, or to larger communities, in such a way as may best answer the intentions of his wise and holy providence, of which he must be allowed to be the properest judge. And if he seeth fit to make such revelations of his will, they must be commu nicated in such a manner as is accommodated to human understand ings, and fitted to work* upon human affections : and therefore, if they be addressed to men in a way ot reasoning, arguing, and ex postulation, it would be absurd to make this an objection, as this writer seems to do, since there is nothing in this, but what is wisely suited to the end we may suppose the Supreme Wisdom and Good ness to have had in view in giving such revelations. He represents it as altogether unworthy of the Supreme Being to suppose him to enter into covenant with man ; and in order to ex pose this, he is pleased to represent it under the mean idea of God's making bargains with man, or man with God. . But if we consider what is really intended by it, we shall find, that a covenant in this case is properly to be understood of a conditional promise, whereby blessings and benefits are promised on God's part, and duties re quired on ours : it is a law of God enjoining obedience, with a pro mise or promises annexed to it, by which God condescendeth to oblige himself to confer certain benefits upon his creatures, the sub jects of his moral government, if they fulfil and obey the injunctions he hath laid upon them, and comply with the terms which he hath appointed. And considered in this view, it is so far from being a just objection against the sacred writings, that it may be regarded as their great excellence, and what should mightily recommend them to our esteem, that God is there represented as dealing with man in a way of covenant ; that is, in a way admirably suited to us as we are reasonable creatures, moral agents. By this God doth not divest himself of his character and authority as our supreme universal Lord. He hath an undoubted right to give laws to his creatures, and lay what commands or injunctions upon them he seeth fit, in a way of absolute sovereignty, without bringing himself under any promises and engagements ; but he condescendeth, in his marvellous wisdom and goodness, to encourage and animate our obedience by express promises and assurances of his grace and favour ; and we on our parts bring ourselves under the most solemn engagements, which bind us more strictly to our duty, by our own express consent ; than which no way of dealing with us can have a greater tendency to promote our comfort, and the interests of reli gion and virtue in the world. As to the particular covenant made with Abraham, and God's en: gaging, as he loves to express it, to be a tutejary God to him ; this put into other words signifies no more than this, that it pleased God to grant to this excellent person express promises of his special grace and favour, upon condition of his faith and obedience ; and Let. XXIX. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 433 particularly, that he promised to give the land of Canaan to his de scendants ; and that from him should proceed that glorious person, who had been promised from the beginning, and who was actually to come into the world in the fulness of time, and in whom all the families of the earth were to be blessed. This covenant made with Abraham was not only proper, as it was a distinguishing mark of the divine favour and goodness to a person, who was an eminent example of piety and virtue, and the fame of whose excellent quali ties is spread all over the east, even to this day, but as it made a part of a glorious scheme which the divine wisdom had in view, and which was to be accomplished in the fittest season, and to be of extensive benefit to mankind. So that this particular covenant was really intended in a subserviency to the general good. With regard to the covenant made with the people of Israel at Horeb, the design of it was to erect a sacred polity, the fundamental article of which was the acknowledgment and adoration of the one true God, the Maker and Governor of the world, free from all idola try and polytheism. This transaction was carried on with a majesty and solemnity becoming the great Lord of the universe, and which tended to inspire the profoundest veneration for him, and for the laws he was pleased to promulgate. And at the same time it was wisely ordered, that the people should bind themselves by their own express consent, and solemn stipulation, to receive that con stitution, and obey those laws. The moral laws given to that people were excellent: the judicial laws just and equitable: the ceremonial laws were instituted for wise reasons, some of which we are able to assign at this distance ; and there is no doubt to be made, that if we were well acquainted with the circumstances of that time and people, we should be convinced of the great propriety of many of those ceremonious injunctions, which now we are not able particularly to account for. Our author talks of the priest's wearing a ridiculous cap and breast-plate, fringes, and bells, and thinks it absurd to suppose, that such trifles as these were the insti tutions qf divine wisdom.* But it was wisely ordered under that constitution, that nothing relating to divine worship should be left to their own invention. It was judged proper to give them rules descending even to minute particulars, and to confine them to those rules, the more effectually to hinder them from deviating into end less superstitions. The particulars referred to, contributed to pro mote order and decency in the externals of religious service ; nor was there any thing in the Jewish instituted rites absurd, indecent, ridiculous, or impure, as were many of the rites in use among the pagan nations. As to God's being a tutelary Deity to the people of Israel, this, if stripped of the form of expression which he has chosen in order to ridicule it, only signifies, that God was pleased to make special reve lations and discoveries of his will to that people, and to give them holy and excellent laws, at the same time promising, if they obeyed * Works, vol. v. p. 98. F F 434 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXIX. those laws, to grant them his special protection, to honour them with great privileges and advantages, and to make them happy in the effects of his grace and favour; and threatening, if they proved obstinate and disobedient, to inflict upon them awful punishments, the tokens of his righteous displeasure. And that there is any thing in this unbecoming the wise and righteous Lord and Governor of the world, supposing him to concern himself in human affairs, this writer has not proved, except confident assertions must pass for proofs. And as to his being the King of Israel, this is not to be understood as if he did not still continue to be the universal Sovereign and Lord of all mankind. He was never regarded as having di vested himself of that character. No where is his universal domi nion and governing providence, as extending to all his creatures, and especially to the whole human race, more strongly asserted, or more nobly described, than in the Jewish Scriptures. But it pleased him, for wise purposes, to erect a peculiar constitution among the people of Israel, according to which he condescended to be, in a special sense, their King and Sovereign. And what we are to un derstand by it is properly this : that he gave them laws at the first establishment of their polity, which were to be the rule of their state, and by which they were to be governed ; and upon their ob servance of which the preservation of their national privileges de pended ; and that he raised up judges and governors, who were to rule them in his name, and as by his authority, and to be the leaders and generals of their armies, for delivering them from their enemies and oppressors ; and he was pleased also to give them direction in matters of great and public moment, by the oracle of Urim and Thummim, which was by his appointment established among them for that purpose. There was nothing in all this but what was wisely suited to the nature and design of that particular constitu tion, and tended to confirm and establish that people in the belief and adoration of the one true God, and to exhibit a glorious sensible proof of his governing providence among them. But the theocracy was never designed to supersede the office and authority of the or dinary magistrates, as this writer seems to insinuate, by telling us, that under that constitution God " acted as an industrious magis trate, who descended into all the particulars of religious and civil administration, even into the most minute and meanest." For though the laws were originally given by God, the execution of those laws was ordinarily vested in the magistrates appointed for that purpose, and chosen by the people in their several tribes. So they were in the days of Moses, and under the judges, when the people were more properly and immediately under the administra tion of the theocracy. But it is farther urged, that God is represented in the Jewish Scriptures as a local Deity, residing and dwelling in a temple, or carried about by the Levites in a wooden chest or trunk. The author seems fond of this observation, for he has it over three or four times on different occasions. But by this reflection he has exposed him self rather than the Jews. That people, instructed by their Scrip- Let. XXIX. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 435 tures, had nobler notions of the Deity than to be capable of imagin ing, that the Lord of the universe, who, they were taught to believe, made and governeth the world, and filleth heaven and earth, was shut up and confined in a wooden chest. It is true, that the more effectually to preserve that people from idolatry, and to impress and affect their minds with a lively sense of God's special presence among them, there was one sacred place appointed, the tabernacle first, and the temple afterwards, which was peculiarly dedicated to his solemn worship and service. There their most solemn acts of devotion were to be performed ; and there was the ark or sacred chest he speaks of, in which were deposited the tables of the original covenant between God and them ; there also was a cloud of glory, the majestic symbol of God's immediate presence. It cannot be reasonably denied, that God may, if he thinks fit, give illustrious exhibitions of his divine presence and majesty by a visible external glory and splendour, in certain places, or on certain occasions. But it doth not follow, that he is therefore a limited Being, or that his essence is circumscribed, or confined to that particular place, where it pleaseth him thus peculiarly to manifest his special presence. How far the Israelites were from forming such mean notions ofthe Divinity as this writer is pleased to insinuate, we have an authentic proof in the admirable prayer offered up by Solomon at the dedica tion ofthe temple, in the name and presence of all the people; in which he addresseth himself to God in that noble manner : But will God indeed dwell on the earth ? Behold, the heaven and heaven of heavens cannot contain thee ! how much less this house which I have builded! 1 Kings viii. 27. See also Isa. lxvi. 1. It has often given me great pleasure to reflect upon what every one that impartially considers the scriptures of the Old Testament must be sensible of, that the Jews, if they governed themselves by their sacred writings, were instructed, in their ideas of God, to unite the most incomprehensible greatness and majesty, and the most marvellous grace and condescension : .to regard him as filling heaven and earth with the immensity of his presence, and yet as vouch safing to grant visible tokens and symbols of his special presence among them by his ark and temple : as humbling himself even in beholding the things that are done in heaven, and yet as regarding the things that are done in the earth. They acknowledged the glorious hosts of angels as the attendants ofthe divine majesty, the blessed ministers of his power and wisdom : but still as infinitely inferior, and even chargeable with folly before him : and instead of erecting them into deities, and adoring them as the heathens did, they called upon them to join with them in worshipping and ador ing the supreme universal Lord. They were ready to cry out, with a devout admiration in the contemplation of God's unequalled dig nity and glory, Who in the heavens can be compared unto the Lord? What is man, that thou art mindful of him'? But they did not under this pretence represent him as'taking no notice of men, or their concernments. They considered him as infinitely raised above the highest of his creatures, yet not neglecting or despising f f2 436 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXIX. the meanest : That his name is exalted above all blessing and praise, and yet he hath a gracious regard to our prayers and praises, if offered up from sincere and upright hearts. Thus they were taught in Scripture to celebrate and adore his matchless grace and conde scending goodness, without impairing the splendour and glory of his infinite majesty. And accordingly, in the patterns of devotion that are set before us in Scripture, we may observe the most adoring thoughts, the most sublime conceptions, of God's unsearchable greatness, and supreme dominion, and spotless purity ; and the most humbling sense of human weakness, guilt and unworthiness, mixed with an ingenuous confidence in his infinite grace and sovereign mercy. Thus I have considered pretty largely that part ofthe objection, which chargeth the Scriptures with degrading the Deity to mean and unworthy offices and employments, and shall now take some notice of the other part of the charge, viz. that the Scriptures ascribe to him bodily parts, and human passions and affections, and even those ofthe worst kind. With respect to the former, he observeth, that the Jewish Scrip tures ascribe to God " not only corporeal appearances, but corporeal action, and all the instruments of it, eyes, ears, mouth, hands, and feet. — And that they are apt in many places to make those who read them represent the Supreme Being to themselves like an old man looking out of the clouds.''* He says, " the literal signification of such expressions is abominable." And he ridicules those who throw what he calls a flimsy allegorical veil over them, as having stolen it from the wardrobe qf Epicurus. But the ridicule lights upon him self, who I believe was the first man that would have thought of having recourse to Epicurus to interpret the sense of Moses. There needs no more than common attention, and a comparing the Scrip ture with itself, to be convinced that it is incapable of the absurd representation he would put upon those passages. He observes in deed, that "images taken from corporeal substance, from corporeal action, and from the instruments of it, cannot give us notions in any degree proper, of God's manner of being, nor of that divine incon ceivable energy in which the action of God consists." Nor are those expressions of hands, feet, eyes, and ears, when ascribed to God in scripture, designed to signify either the manner of his being, or of his divine energy, concerning which there are many noble expres sions in the sacred writings, which have an admirable sublimity in them ; but by an easy metaphor, understood by all the world, hands signify power, eyes and ears signify knowledge. And whereas he adds, that " they cannot exalt, they must debase our conceptions, and accustom the mind insensibly to confound divine with human ideas and notions, God with man ;" the answer is obvious : That sufficient care is taken in the holy scriptures to prevent this, by fur nishing us with the most sublime ideas of the Divinity that can pos sibly enter into the human mind. God's incomprehensible majesty, * Works, vol. v. p. 520. Let. XXIX. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 437 his immense greatness, his almighty power, the infiniteness of his understanding, his omnipresence, are frequently represented and described in so admirable a manner, as shows, with the last degree of evidence, that the expressions which seem to ascribe bodily parts and members to him cannot be understood in a gross literal sense. Our author himself, ascribing motives to God, observes, that " we must speak of God after the manner of men."*' And indeed we must either not speak of God at all, or we must speak of him in ways of expression, originally derived from something relating to our own bodies or minds. This writer elsewhere insinuates, that we resem ble God no more in our souls than we do in our bodies; and that to say his intellect is like ours, is as bad as the anthropomorphites.-f/ So that, according to him, expressions drawn from the faculties of the soul, are as improper as those drawn from the members of the body. Thus, under pretence of a profound veneration for the Deity, we must not speak of God at all, as some of the ancient philosopheis thought it unlawful to name him, or to worship him, except in silence. Yea, we must not so much as think of him; for our ideas of God fall, no doubt, infinitely short of his real majesty and glory, as well as our expressions. But it may be observed, that this forward cen- surer falls into that way of talking himself which he finds fault with in the holy scriptures. He represents God as speaking to men by the law of nature ; he calls it the voice of God, and the word of God. He speaks of the hands qf God,% and of his seeing all things. And though he represents the ascribing ideas to God as no less improper, and even profane, than the ascribing hands and feet to him, yet on several occasions he talks of the divine ideas. But he farther urges, that the scriptures attribute to God human affections and passions, and even those of the worst kind ; that "they impute such things to the Divinity as would be a disgrace to humanity :"§ That " the Jewish system contained such instances of partiality in love and hatred, of furious anger, and unrelenting- vengeance, in a long series of arbitrary judgments, as no people on earth but this would have ascribed, 1 do not say to God, but to the worst of those monsters, who are suffered or sent by God, for a short time, to punish the iniquities of men.''|| To the same purpose he afterwards observes, that according to the representations made in scripture, God " loves with partiality, his mercy is arbitrary, and depends on mere will — And towards mankind his anger is often furious, his hatred inveterate, his vengeance unrelenting; but when the wicked repent of their sins, he repents sometimes of his severity." And then he asks, " What a description is this of the All-perfect Being?" But this description is his own, and is founded on a gross misrepresentation of the true intention and design of the sacred writ ings. As to loving with partiality, if by that be meant his favour ing and distinguishing some with greater privileges and advantages, and giving them more valuable means of improvement than others ; * Works, vol. v. p. 468. f !"id- P- 35- t Ibid- vol. iv. p. 395, § Ibid. vol. iii. p. 299. || Ibid. vol. v. p._515. 430 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXIX. nothing can be more evident, than that this has been often and still is done in the course of his providence. Nor is this any more to be found fault with, than his making different species of beings, some vastly transcending others in their faculties, and capacities for hap piness. He is the absolute Lord and dispenser of his own gifts, and his goodness is that of a free and sovereign Benefactor; and it would be the height of absurdity and profaneness to pretend to tie him down to give to all men precisely the same capacities, the same advantages and opportunities, and to limit him so, that he shall not dispense his gifts in such measures and proportions as he thinks fit, nor shall have it in his power to do any thing for any one person or people, but what he does precisely for every person and for all people. But if by partiality be meant partiality in judgment, and in the distribution of rewards and punishments, it is very unjust to charge the holy scriptures as attributing such partiality to the Supreme Being. There is nothing more strongly and expressly asserted there, than that God accepteth not the persons of men, and that he judgeth without respect qf persons. It is evident, not merely from a single passage, but from the whole tenor of the sacred writ ings, that the righteous Lord loveth righteousness; that he exten deth his favour to all those ofthe human race, of whatever family or nation, who sincerely love and obey him, and go on in a course of real piety and virtue ; that such persons alone can hope for an interest in his favour, and to obtain the divine acceptance and appro bation ; and that all wicked and presumptuous sinners, of whatso ever nation or profession, shall be exposed to his just displeasure. Nor are there any such things ascribed to God in scripture as arbi trary judgments. And whereas this author charges it as unworthy of God to represent him as repenting of his severity when the wicked repent of their sins ; the thing really intended by this must be ac knowledged to be agreeable to the best ideas we can form of his governing wisdom, righteousness, and goodness ; for it only signi fies, that when sinners forsake their evil ways, God is graciously pleased to change the methods of his dealings towards them, and is willing to receive them to his grace and favour. But in reality there is no change in the divine purposes or counsels. The change that is wjought is in the mind and temper of the sinner ; God acts uniformly according to tbe stated rules of his administrations ; and nothing has happened but what he perfectly foreknew."* But re- * His Lordship seems to think it an unanswerable objection against the Mosaic writings, that in the account there given of the flood, God is represented as having "repented that he made man." But it is manifest, that this is only an emphatical way of expression, to signify God's just displeasure at the great and universal wickedness of mankind, and at their having so far fallen from the noble end of their creation ; and that therefore, after having tried the methods of indulgence towards them, he saw fit to send a destructive deluge for ex terminating that incorrigible race. And it is plain, that according to the doctrine of the sacred writings, which every where represent God as foreknowing tbe actions of men, this corruption of mankind was what he foresaw from the beginning; and the punishing them in this manner made a part of the original scheme of divine providence, though it did not actually take effect till the proper time came for executing it. As to what he mentions in a sneering way, concerning God's smelting the sweet savour of Let. XXIX. LORD BOLINGBROKE. 439 penting, in a strict and proper sense, as it is a mark of human im perfection and mutability, is expressly denied of God in the holy scripture; where we are assured, that God is not as the son of man that he should repent. As to the expressions of anger, wrath, fury, hatred, vengeance, as ascribed to God in the sacred writings, it is a thing so obvious that it can scarce be mistaken, that these are only strong expressions, designed to impress the hearts of men with a more lively. sense of God's righteous displeasure against sin and wickedness, and reso lution to punish it ; which it is of the highest importance to man kind to consider and believe. Any one that allows himself to think impartially, must be sensible, that such ways of representing things are absolutely necessary in a revelation designed for common use ; and that it is far more for the good of the world in general, and for promoting the interests of virtue, and restraining vice and wicked ness, that men should conceive of God as loving and taking pleasure in the good and righteous, and as full of just resentment against evil-doers, than as utterly unconcerned about the actions and affairs of men, or alike affected towards the righteous and the wicked. Yea, the former notions are not only more useful, and of better in fluence, but more just and rational in themselves, and more worthy of the All-perfect Being. For what idea is this of God, to represent him as neither delighting in order and virtue, nor displeased with vice and wickedness, but solacing himself in an eternal indolence, and no-way concerned about the good or ill-behaviour, the happiness or misery of his reasonable creatures ! A God destitute of all affec tions, or of any thing correspondent to them, would not be the most perfect Being. There are spiritual affections, which have nothing to do with body, and which as properly belong to spirits or minds, as intellect or will ; and I can as easily suppose them destitute of the latter as of the former. Our affections indeed have usually a great mixture of bodily passions, and consequently of imperfection ; but there are affections of a nobler kind, and which we may conceive in pure spirits ; yea, they cannot be conceived without them ; nor can we avoid ascribing some affections, or what is analagous or equiva lent to them, to God, provided we remove from them all those im perfections and defects with which they are attended in us. A love of order, goodness, purity, virtue, and a just detestation of moral evil, is absolutely inseparable from the idea of the Infinitely-perfect Being, the most wise and righteous Governor of the world. I shall conclude my observations on this part of Lord Bolingbroke's book with a passage from an author whom no man will suppose to Noah's burnt offering, it is sufficient to observe, that the design of the expression is plain and easily intelligible, viz. to signify God's gracious acceptance of the act of devo tion performed by that good man, to acknowledge his gratitude, and implore the divine mercy ; and that on that occasion God was pleased, after having made so signal a display of his justice, to allay and dissipate the fears which might be apt to arise in the hearts of men, and to assure them of his merciful intentions towards them, and that he would not any more send an universal deluge upon the earth ; of which the rainbow in the clouds should be a constant memorial. 440 A VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS. Let. XXX. have been prejudiced in favour of the Scriptures ; it is Mr. Anthony Collins, in an Essay, which he published in 1707, concerning the Use of Reason in Propositions, the Evidence whereof depends upon Human Testimony. After having observed, that " one use of reason in things which by the testimony of men are supposed to come from God, is to endeavour to find out such a sense of a supposed divine revelation as is agreeable to the discoveries of our reason, if the words under any kind of construction will bear it, though at first view they may seem repugnant to reason, and to one another;" he adds. " this is certainly a great piece of justice, and what is due to words that upon the least evidence can be supposed to come from God, especially since expressions that do literally quadrate with the maxims of reason and philosophy, are necessary to make a revelation have any effect upon common people's minds. For was not God to be represented by expressions, which, literally understood, attribute to him human passions and actions, they who by their occupations in the world are incapable of those more just ideas which men of thought know to belong to that Being, would perhaps think him incapable of taking cognizance of their actions; and therefore to make a revelation useful and credible in itself, it must consist of words whose literal meaning is false, but whose real meaning is con sistent with the justest notions of reason and philosophy. And therefore we ought to examine whether the words under any con struction will bear a reasonable sense," p. 17, 18. Mr. Collins then applies this observation to the revelation which we acknowledge, and considers those passages of scripture where God is said to rest, repent, be angry,