YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

GIFT OF
FREDERICK SHELDON PARKER
B.A., LL.B.
YALE 1873

IC

;ics3iis

TO&e onlg authoriiel) CFbltion.
HISTOEY OF THE
CONSULATE AM) THE EMPIEE
OP
FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.
FORMING A SEQUEL TO
" THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION."

BT
M. A. THIERS,
LATE PRIME MINISTER OF FRANCE,
MEMBER OP THE FRENCH ACADEMY, AND OF THE INSTITUTE,
&C. &C. &C.
TRANSLATED BY
D. FORBES CAMPBELL, Esq.
WITH THE SANCTION AND APPROVAL OF THE AUTHOR.

VOL. I.

LONDON:
HENRY GOLBURN, GREAT MARLBOROUGH STREET,
SOLD ALSO HI
CHAPMAN AND HALL, STRAND.
1845.

C. WHITING, BEAUFORT HOUSE, STRAND.

ADVERTISEMENT.
The Hsitorical Introduction, which the Author in
tended to have prefixed to the First Volume of this
"Work, but which, from unavoidable circumstances, he
was unable to complete in time for the present pub
lication, will be given with the Third Volume, now in
the press ; and a List of the Illustrations, with Direc
tions to the Binder, and a copious Index, will appear in
the last volume.

EDITOR'S PREFACE.

The period embraced by this work (1800 to 1815)
forms decidedly the most important era in the History
of Modern Times. Whatever difference of opinion may
exist respecting the character of the principal actor
throughout this eventful epoch, — who occupies the
stage from the commencement of the drama to its
very close, — it is impossible to deny him transcendent
military genius, combined with political and legis
lative talents of the highest order. By means of these,
and by the force of circumstances, as well as by
his insatiable ambition, his iron will, and his almost
superhuman energies and activity, he not only raised
himself with giant strides to the sovereignty over
a .mighty Empire, but achieved those wonders which
throw an air of romance around the age of Napoleon.
Profiting by the pusillanimity, the supineness, or the
treachery of his antagonists, he trampled upon dynas
ties which had endured for centuries, imposed his
sovereign will on those which he deigned to spare ;
and, wielding the resources of nearly all continental

vi editor's preface.
Europe, found but One Power able to stem the torrent
of his victorious arms.
Glorious and unparalleled as was the youthful career
of him,
" Who, born no King, made Monarchs draw his car ;
Whose game was empires, and whose stakes were thrones ;
Whose table, earth — whose dice were human bones," —
stirring as were the events of these heroic times, still the
most intensely interesting, and at the same time the most
instructive, page in his biography is that which records
his downfal.
Napoleon was England's foe. Yet, where is the gene
rous mind that does not thrill with sympathy when it
reverts to the " Adieux de Fontainebleau," or the cap
tivity of St. Helena ? In the words of the poet,
" Though first in glory, deepest in reverse,
He tasted empire's blessings and its curse."
On the qualifications of the author of this work it
would be superfluous to descant. If the eminent talents
of M. Thiers, as a Statesman, were not well known to
the whole world, the merits of his preliminary « History
of the French Revolution" would irresistibly claim the
pubhc favour in behalf of this new production of his
accomplished mind, which becomes invested with a
deeper importance to us the nearer the history ap-
proaches to our own times, and the more British in
terests are involved in the events which it records

EDITOR s PREFACE. Vll
Having filled, at different times, the high offices of Mi
nister of the Interior, of Finance, of Foreign Affairs, and
President of the Council, M. Thiers has enjoyed facili
ties beyond the reach of every other biographer of
Napoleon, for procuring, from exclusive and authentic
sources, the choicest materials for his present work. As
" gardien de Farche" (guardian of the archives of the
state), he had access to diplomatic papers and other
documents of the highest importance, hitherto known
m only to a privileged few, and the publication of which
cannot fail to produce a great sensation.
From private sources M. Thiers has also derived
much valuable information. Many interesting Memoirs,
Diaries, ' and Letters — all hitherto unpublished, and
most of them destined, for political reasons, to remain so
— have been placed at his disposal; while all the lead
ing characters of the Empire, who were alive when the
author undertook the present history, have supphed him
with a mass of incidents and anecdotes which have
never before appeared in print, and the accuracy and
value of which may be inferred from the fact of these
parties having been themselves eye-witnesses of, or
actors in, the great events of the period.
In his descriptions of the Campaigns of Napoleon and
his Generals, the illustrious Author has availed himself
of the Archives of the French War Office, and the priy
vate memoranda of several Marshals of the Empire, and
thus every military operation, manoeuvre, or siege, de-

Viii EDITOR'S PREFACE.
scribed, is in strict conformity with the original sketches,
plans, and despatches of those in command. To military
readers this circumstance must greatly enhance the value
of these volumes.
D. FORBES CAMPBELL. f

London, March, 1845.

CONTENTS OF
THE FIRST VOLUME.

BOOK I.
CONSTITUTION OF THE YEAR VIII. PAGE
The Provisional Consuls enter upon their Functions— Division of Duties
between Sieyes and General Bonaparte — The General secures for himself
the Administration of Affairs, and leaves the digesting of the new Consti
tution to Sieyes— State of France in Brumaire, Tear VHI. — Disorder in
the Administration of the Finances — Extreme Destitution of the Armies —
Disturbances in La Vendee — Agitation of the Revolutionary Party in some
of the Cities of the South — First Efforts of the Provisional Consuls to
restore Order in the different Departments of-the Government — Appoint
ment of Cambaceres to the Ministry of Justice, Laplace to the Ministry
of the Interior, Fouche to the Ministry of the Police, Talleyrand to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berthier to the Ministry of War, Forfait to
the Ministry of the Marine, Gaudin to the Ministry of the Finances —
First Financial Measures— Suppression of the Progressive Forced Loan —
Institution of the Agency of Direct Contributions, and immediate prepara
tion of the Assessments left in arrear for several Years — Creation of
Bonds of the Receivers-general — Confidence begins to be restored ; the
Bankers of Paris lend the Government the first Funds that it has need of
— Relief sent to the Armies— Political Acts of the Provisional Consuls —
Repeal of the Law of Hostages ; Release of the Priests in confinement, and
of the Persons shipwrecked off Calais — Parleys with the Chiefs of the
Royalist Party — Suspension of Arms in La Vendee concluded with
Messrs. de Bourmont, d'Autichamp, and de Chatillon — Commencement
of Relations with Foreign Cabinets — State of Europe — England and
VOL. I. h

X CONTENTS. PAGE
Austria bent on continuing the War— Paul I. irritated against his Allies,
is disposed to withdraw from the CoaUtion, and to accede to the System
of Neutrality adopted by Prussia— Importance of Prussia at that Moment
—General Bonaparte sends his Aide-de-Camp, Duroc, to Berlin— Rumours
of Peace — Sensible Improvement in the material and moral State of
France, in consequence of the first Acts of the Provisional Consuls— The
Subject of the Constitution begins to be taken up-Plan of Sieyes long
before projected and matured— Lists of Notables, the Conservative Senate,
the Legislative Body, the Tribunate, the Grand Elector— Disagreement
between Sieyes and Bonaparte relative to the Organisation of the Ex
ecutive Power— Danger of a Rupture between those two Personages —
They are reconciled through the Mediation of Friends — The Grand
Elector superseded by Three Consuls — Adoption of the Constitution of
the Year VHI., and the Commencement of its Operation fixed for the
4th of Nivose  3

BOOK II.
INTERNAL GOVERNMENT.
Definitive Estabhshment of the Consular Government — Composition of the
Senate, of the Legislative Body, of the Tribunate, and of the Council of
State {Conseil d'Etat) — The First Consul's Manifesto to the Powers of
Europe — Public Offers of Peace made to England and to Austria — Procla
mation addressed to La Vendee — Opening of the First Session — Germs of
Opposition in the Tribunate — -Speeches of the Tribunes Duveyrier and
Benjamin Constant — A considerable Majority approves the Measures of
the Consuls — Numerous Laws for the Organisation of Public Bodies —
Institution of Prefectures and of Sub-Prefectures — Creation of Tribunals of
First Instance, and of Appeal — The List of Emigrants closed and discon
tinued — Restoration of the Right to dispose of Property by Will — Law
relating to Income and Expenditure — The Bank of France — Sequel
of Negotiations with European Powers — Refusal of England to entertain
the Proposals of Peace — Warm Debate on this subject in the British
Parliament — The Refusal of Austria couched in milder, but not less firm
Terms than that of England — Necessity for recommencing Hostilities — On
the Rejection of his Overtures by the Belligerent Powers, the First Consul
endeavours to propitiate Prussia, and frankly explains his Views— He
strives to bring the War in La Vendee to a close before commencing the
Campaign of 1800— Position of Parties in La Vendee— Proceedings of the
Abbe Bernier— Peace of Montfaucon— Messrs. d'Auticbamp, de Chatillon,
de Bourmont, and Georges Cadoudal, proceed to Paris and see the First
Consul— M. de Frotte is shot— Final Submission of La Vendee— Troops
are put in march for the Frontiers— The Session of the Year VIH. closes
in quiet— Police Regulations in regard to the Press— Funeral Ceremony on
the Occasion of the Death of Washington— The First Consul takes up
his Abode at the Palace of the Tuileries   65

CONTENTS. xi
BOOK III.
ULM AND GENOA. PAGE
Preparations for War — Forces of the Coalition in 1800 — Army of Baron Me-
las in Liguria ; of Marshal Kray in Swabia — Plan of the Campaign of the
Austrians — Importance of Switzerland in this War — Plan of General Bo
naparte — He forms the Resolution to make use of Switzerland, in order to
debouch on the Flank of Kray, and in the Rear of Melas — The Part which
he destines for Moreau, and that which he destines for Himself — Creation
of the Army of Reserve — Instructions to Massena — Commencement of
Hostilities — Melas attacks the Army of Liguria on the Apennines, and
divides it into two Halves, one of which is driven back towards the Var,
the other upon Genoa — Description of Genoa — Massena, blocked up in
Genoa, prepares for an obstinate Resistance — Heroic Combats of Massena
—The First Consul urges Moreau to commence Operations in Germany,
that he may be able to succour Massena the sooner — Passage of the Rhine
at four Points. — Moreau succeeds in concentrating three out of four Corps,
and falls upon the Austrians at Engen and Stockach — Battles of Engen
and Moskirch — Retreat of the Austrians upon the Danube— St. Cyr's en
gagement at Biberach — Kray posts himself in the entrenched Camp of Ulm
— Moreau manoeuvres to dislodge him — False Movements of Moreau ; but
not productive of any disastrous Result — Moreau definitively shuts up
Kray in Ulm, and takes a strong Position in advance of Augsburg, to
await the Result of Events in Italy — Summary of Moreau's Operations —
Character of that General  129

BOOK IV.
MARENGO.
Impatience of the First Consul for News from Germany — On receiving Intel
ligence of Moreau's Success, he resolves to set out for Italy — Extreme
Distress of the Garrison of Genoa — Fortitude of Massena — The First Consul
hastens to his Relief and to execute the Plan of crossing the High Alps — De
parture of the First Consul; his sham Visitto Dijon; his Arrival at Martig-
ny, in the Valais — Choice of the St. Bernard for crossing the Great Chain —
Means devised for forwarding the Artillery, the Ammunition, the Provisions,
and the whole of the Materiel — Commencement of the Passage — Inexpres
sible Difficulties surmounted by the Enthusiasm of the Troops — Unexpected
Obstacle of Fort de Bard— Surprise and Mortification of the Army at the
Sight of that Fort, deemed at first impregnable — The Infantry and the
Cavalry make a Circuit and avoid the Obstacle — The Artillery drawn on
by Hand under the Fire of the Fort — Ivrea taken — The Army deploys on
the Plains of Piedmont before the Austrians are aware of its Existence arfd

XU CONTENTS. PAGE
its March—Simultaneous Passage of the St. Gothard bythe Detachment
from Germany— Plan of General Bonaparte, when once in Lombardy— He
determines to proceed to Milan, to rally the Troops from Germany, and to
envelope Melas — The long Elusions of Melas suddenly destroyed — Mortifi
cation of that old General — His Orders for evacuating the Banks of the
Var and the Environs of Genoa — Last Extremities of Massena — The abso
lute Impossibility of feeding the Soldiers and the Inhabitants of Genoa
compels him to surrender — Honourable Capitulation — The Austrians,
having taken Genoa, concentrate themselves in Piedmont — Importance of
the Route from Alexandria to Piacenza — Eagerness of both Armies to oc
cupy Piacenza — The French arrive there first — Position of La Stradella
chosen by the First Consul for enveloping Melas — Halt of some Days in
that Position — Conceiving that the Austrians have escaped him, the First
Consul goes in quest of them, and falls in with them unexpectedly in the
Plain of Marengo — Battle of Marengo, lost, and regained — Happy inspira
tion of Desaix, and his Death — Grief of the First Consul — Despair of the
Austrians, and Convention of Alexandria, by which they give up Italy and
all its Fortresses to the French Army— The -First Consul is employed for
some Days at Milan in settling the Affairs of Italy — Conclave at Venice,
and Elevation of Pius Vn. to the CPapacy— Return of the First Consul to
Paris— Enthusiasm excited by his Presence — Operations on the Danube —
Passage of that River below Ulm — Victory of Hochstett — Moreau con
quers all Bavaria as far as the Inn — Armistice in Germany as well as in
Italy — Commencement of Negotiations for Peace— Arrival of M. St.
Julien, sent by the Emperor of Germany to Paris— Fete of the 14th of
July at the Invalides  197

BOOK I.

CONSTITUTION OF THE YEAR VHI.
The Provisional Consuls enter upon their Functions — Division of Duties
between Sieyes and General Bonaparte — The General secures for himself
the Administration of Affairs,- and leaves the digesting of the new Consti
tution to Sieyes — State of France in Brumaire, Year VIII. — Disorder in
the Administration of the Finances — Extreme Destitution of the Armies —
Disturbances in La Vendue — Agitation of the Revolutionary Party in some
of the Cities of the South — First efforts of the Provisional Consuls to
restore order in the different Departments of the Government — Ap
pointment of Cambaceres to the Ministry of Justice, Laplace to the Mi
nistry of the Interior, Fouche to the Ministry of the Police, Talley
rand to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berthier to the Ministry of
War, Forfait to the Ministry of the "Marine, Gaudin to the Ministry of
the Finances — First Financial Measures — Suppression of the Progressive
Forced Loan — Institution of the Agency of Direct Contributions, and
immediate preparation of the Assessments left in arrear for several
years — Creation of Bonds of the P. eceivers-general — Confidence begins
to be restored ; the Bankers of Paris lend the Government the first
Funds that it has need of — Relief sent to the Armies — Political Acts of
the Provisional Consuls — Repeal of the Law of Hostages ; Release of the
Priests in confinement, and of the Persons shipwrecked off Calais — Parleys
with the Chiefs of the Royalist Party — Suspension of Arms in La Vendee
concluded with Messrs. de Bourmont, d'Autichamp, and de Chatillon —
Commencement of Relations with. Foreign Cabinets — State of Europe —
England and Austria bent on continuing the War — Paul I. irritated
against his Allies, is disposed to withdraw from the Coalition, and to
accede to the System of Neutrality adopted by Prussia — Importance of
Prussia at that Moment — General Bonaparte sends his Aide-de-Camp,
Duroc, to Berlin — Rumours of Peace — Sensible Improvement in the ma
terial and moral State of France, in consequence of the first Acts of the
Provisional Consuls — The Subject of the Constitution begins to be taken
up — Plan of Sieyes long before projected and matured — Lists of Notables,
the Conservative Senate, the Legislative Body, the Tribunate, the Grand
Elector — Disagreement between Sieyes and Bonaparte relative to the Or
ganization of the Executive Power — Danger of a Rupture between those
two Personages — They are reconciled through the Mediation of Friends
' — The Grand Elector superseded by Three Consuls — Adoption of the Con
stitution of the Year VIII., and the Commencement of its Operation
fixed for the 4th of Nivose.

VOL. I.

MAF®ILS®M 3B®KTAFA3EffIE

G-^2S<s^> Ji?,^^^

HISTORY OF
THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE
OF
FRANCE DNDEK
NAPOLEON.

BOOK I.
CONSTITUTION OF THE YEAR VIII.
The events of the 18th of Brumaire had terminated the ex
istence of the Directory.
The men who, after the storms of the Convention, devised
that sort of republic, were not thoroughly convinced of the ex
cellence and solidity of their work ; but, on emerging from the
reign of blood which they had just witnessed, it was difficult for
them to do better or otherwise than they did. It was impossible,
in fact, to think of the Bourbons, to whom public opinion was
decidedly hostile ; it was equally impossible for them to throw
themselves into the arms of an illustrious general ; for, at that
period, none of our military men had acquired sufficient glory
to subjugate the national mind. All illusions, moreover, were
not yet dispelled by experience. The nation had just escaped
from the hands of the Committee of Public Welfare ; it had yet
tried only the sanguinary republic of '93, consisting of a single
assembly, which exercised all the powers at once : a last trial
was yet left to be made, that of a moderate_._republic, in which
the supreme power should b^^urrictously divided, and the admi-'|
nistration of which should be committed to new men, who had
b 2

4 HISTORY OF THE [NoV- ' -
had no hand in those excesses which had filled France withhor-'
ror. The Directory was in consequence i devised. ,
This new scheme of a republic lasted four years, from the 14th
of Brumaire, year IV, till the 18th of Brumaire, year VIII. It
was set on foot honestly and heartily by men, most of whom
were upright, and animated by excellent intentions, borne per
sons of violent character or suspected integrity, such as Barras
for instance, had contrived to introduce themselves into the list
of governors, who, during those four years, transmitted the
supreme power from one to another; but Rewbell, La Reveillere-
Lepeaux, Le Tourneur, Carnot, Barthelemy, Roger-Ducos,
Sieyes, were men of integrity, some of them of considerable
ability, and the last, M. Sieyes, possessed a very superior mind.
And yet the directorial republic had very soon exhibited a scene
of distressing confusion : less cruelty but more anarchy — such
had been the character of the new government. The Directory
gave up guillotining ; it only transported. It ceased to force
people to take assignats upon pain of death ; but it paid nobody.
Our soldiers, without arms and without bread, were beaten in
stead of being victorious. Terror had been succeeded by a feel
ing of intolerable uneasiness. And, as weakness also has its gusts
of passion, this republic, moderate in intention, had finished with
two measures that were absolutely tyrannical — the progressive
forced loan and the law of the hostages. This latter measure,
in particular, though there was nothing sanguinary in it, was
one of the most odious vexations invented by the cruel and fer
tile imagination of parties.
Is it surprising that France, to which the Bourbons could not
be presented in 1799, ancTwhich, after the ill success of the di
rectorial constitution, began to have no faith_jn_th.e_.repubiic—
is it surprising, I say, that France should throw herself into the
arms of that young general who had conquered Italy and Egypt,
a stranger to all the parties, affecting to disdain them all, en
dowed with an energetic will, showing equal aptness for military
and civil affairs, and affording glimpses of an ambition which,
instead of alarming the nation, was then hailed by it as a hope'!
Less glory than he had acquired would have sufficed to enable a
man to seize the reins of government ; for, some time pre
viously, General Joubert had been sent to No vi./ that he might
there earn those titles which he still wanted for effecting the
revolution, since styled in our annals that of the 18th of Bru
maire. The unfortunate Joubert was defeated and fell at Novi ;
but young Bonaparte always fortunate and victorious, at least
at that time, escaping the dangers of the sea as well as the dan
gers of battles, had returned from Egyptto FranI i„ an almost
miraculous manner ; and, on his first appearance, the DireSory
succumbed. _ All parties hastened to meet him, demandlmrof
him order, victory, and peace. '"8 ot
It was not, however, in a day that the authority of one could

Nov. 1799.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 5
supersede that mob-government where so many, alternately
oppressed or oppressors, had enjoyed for a moment a share of
the supreme power. It was necessary to save appearances, and,
in order to induce harassed France to submit to absolute power,jj
to lead her to it through a glorious, restorative, and semi-repub-|
lican government. It was requisite, ia short, that the Consul
late should pave the way to the Empire.
It is this portion of our contemporary history of which I am
now about to treat. Fifteen years have elapsed since I recorded!
.the events of our first revolution. Those fifteen years have j
been passed amid the storms of public life : I have seen an <
ancient throne crumble to pieces and a new throne rise up ; I
have seen the French revolution pursue its invincible course :
and though the scenes which I have witnessed have not ex
cited in me any great surprise, I have not the presumption
to believe that the experience of men and of business has
taught me nothing; I have the confidence, on the contrary,
of having learned much, and of thus being more apt per
haps to appreciate and describe the great things done by our
fathers during those heroic times. But I am certain that ex
perience has not frozen within me the generous sentiments of
my youth ; I am certain that I love, as I ever did love, the^
liberties and the glory of France. -^
I now resume my narrative from the 18th Brumaire, year
VIII. (November 9th, 1799).
The law of the 19th of Brumaire, which instituted the Pro
visional Consulate, being passed, the three new consuls, Bona
parte, Sieyes, and Roger-Ducos, left St. Cloud, and repaired
to Paris. Sieyes and Roger-Ducos, members of the late
Directory, were already settled in the palace of the Luxem
bourg. Bonaparte quitted his small house in the Rue de
laVictoire, and, with his wife, his adopted children, and his
¦aides-de-camp, took up his residence in the apartments of the
Petit- Luxembourg. There, in proximity to his two colleagues,
surrounded by the fragments of the late government and the
elements of the new one, he fell to work with that unerring
and rapid intelligence, and with that extraordinary activity,
which had always marked his operations in the field.
With him had been associated two colleagues, Roger-Ducos
and Sieyes, both of whom had belonged to the Directory, and
both been busily engaged in destroying that government which
they despised. Sieyes, in particular, had been placed beside
General Bonaparte, because he was the second personage of
the republic. Autru)r_of^lifi_grjmd^sJ_ajid,bestxoncepH'ions of
the French revolution, such as tha union,. of .the three orders,
the division , of Ftance_jnto departments, the insTHution of the
•xi atiQnaT^uard , „Siey es, des titute *oF _eloipeiice,TJuauri rivalled
Mirabje^jn_.the„eariv_days ^of our revolution, when oratory
conferred more power than all other qualifications; and now

HISTORY OF THE [Nov.

1799.

that universal war assigned the first place to mihtary gen™
Sieves, who had never worn a sword, was almost the equal
of General Bonaparte; so great is power of mind, even un
accompanied bythe talents which render it useful or applica
ble But now that it was necessary to lend a hand to business,
Sieyes, who was indolent, peevish, obstinate m his ideas, irri
tated or upset by the slightest contradiction, could not long vie
in influence with his young colleague, who was capable of work
ing night and day, whom no contradiction ruffled, who was
abrupt but not testy, who could win the goodwill of men when
he pleased, and who, at any rate, when he neglected to do so,
had always the alternative of carrying his point by force.
There was, however, a task which was generally assigned to
Sieyes — that of preparing the new Constitution, which the pro
visional consuls were charged to digest, and to propose to France
without much delay. At this period people were still some
what imbued with the ideas of the eighteenth century ; it was
less generally but yet too much believed, that human institu
tions might be purely a work of mind, and that the constitution
of a nation might spring ready made from the brain of a legis
lator. Assuredly, if the French revolution must have had a
Solon or a Lycurgus, M. Sieyes was worthy of being so ; hut
there is only one real legislator in modern times, — that is, expe
rience. This idea was not so common then as it is now-a-days,
and it was universally agreed that M. Sieyes should be the
author of the new constitution : this was hoped, this was said;
it was asserted that he possessed one, which was the result of
long meditation ; that it was a profound, an admirable produc
tion, and that, being now rid of the obstacles which the revolu
tionary passions threw in his way, he could bring it forward ;
that he would be the legislator, and General Bonaparte the ad
ministrator of the new government, and that between them
they would render France powerful and happy. Every period
of the revolution had had its illusions : the present period is
not free from them ; but these, it is true, are likely to be the
last. '
' It was, therefore, agreed by common consent that Sieyes
should prepare the constitution, and that General Bonaparte
should govern It was urgent, in fact, that some one should'
govern ; for the state of the country in all respects was deplofff
^able: the disorder moral and material, was at its height J
The stanch revolutionists, beaten at St. Cloud still had par
tisans in the Society of the Riding House (Mantg a it Cs
but they numbered among them .C^fi^™^
m our armies: Bernadotte, a man; of moderate* aSlSS^nd
of a vain and ambitious disposition; Augereau, a brave' sol
dier, supremely unreasonable, and luckily possessing but little

Nov. 1799.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 7
influence ; lastly, Jourdan, a good citizen and a good general,
whose military miscarriages had soured his temper, and thrown
him into an exaggerated opposition. There was reason to fear
that the fugitives of the Council of Five Hundred would as
semble in some considerable city, — form there a sort of Legisla
tive Body and Directory, and rally round them the men who*
still retained all the ardour of the revolutionary sentiments,
some because they were compromised by excesses, or were in
possession of national domains ; others because they loved the
republican system for its own sake, and were afraid lest they
should see it overturned by the hand of a new Cromwell. Such
an attempt would have occasioned serious~embarrassment in a
juncture already extremely difficult, and apprehensions were
entertained that it might be made in Paris itself. -
In regard to the opposite faction also, there was ground for
serious fears ; for La Vendgejw_as-again in..a~flame.~-M. de Ch&-
tillon on the right bank-of the Loire, M. d'Autichamp on the
left bank, Georges Cadoudal in the Morbihan, M. de Bourmont
in Le Maine, M. de Frott6 on the coa'st of Normandy, all ex
cited and supported by the English, had renewed the civil war.
The law respecting hostages, the weakness of the government,
the defeats of our armies — such were the motives which had in
duced them to take up arms again. M. de Chatillon had for a
moment occupied Nantes ; he had entered the city but made
no stay in it. This circumstance had been sufficient to induce
the large communes in the insurgent districts to throw up hasty
entrenchments, and to surround themselves with palisades when
they could not have the protection of walls. Some, with a view
to provide for their own defence, retained the little money which
the insurgent country contributed to the public exchequer, al
leging that, since the government did nothing for their protec
tion, it was right that they should take care of themselves.
The Directory, though resolved to shun the excesses of the
Convention, had not been able to resist all the violent measures
which the war in La Vendee, as soon" as it broke out again,
led the revolutionary party to propose. Hurried along by the
movement of the popular mind, it had passed the law of the
hostages, by virtue of which all relations or supposed accom-A
plices of the Vendeans were to be confined and to be punished!
with certain penalties, by way of repressing acts committed in '
the localities for which they were responsible as hostages. This
unjust and violent law had but inflamed the passions, without
disarming a single hand in La Vendee, and it had excited inex
pressible animosity against the Directory.
The war abroad had been somewhat less disastrous towards
the conclusion of the last campaigns. The victories of General^
Massena at Zurich, and of General Brune at the Texel, had driven \
back the enemy to a considerable distance from our frontiers ;
but our soldiers were in a state of absolute destitution. They

HISTORY OF THE [Nov.

1799.

were neither paid, clothed, nor fed. The army_ w£lch.^ ?*'.
feated the combined English and Russians in Holland, having
the advantage of being maintained by the Batavian republic,
was better off than the others; but the army of the Rhine,
which had lost the battle of Stockach, and that of Helvetia,
which had gained the battle of Zurich, were in the utmost want.
The army of the Rhine, stationed on French ground, practised
there, without mercy and without benefit, the system of requi
sitions; that of Helvetia subsisted by means of war contribu- •
tions imposed upon Basle, Zurich, Berne — contributions badly
levied and badly employed, and which, quite insufficient for the
subsistence of the soldiers, revolted the spirit of independence
and economy that distinguishes the Swiss. The army of Italy, ,
which, since the disasters of Novi and the Trebbia, had fallen
back upon the Apennines into a sterile country ravaged by the
war, was a prey to disease and the most distressing priva
tions. Those soldiers, who had endured the greatest reverses
with unshaken constancy, and had shown heroic fortitude in ill
fortune, covered with rags, consumed by fever and famine, soli
cited charity on the roads in the Apennines, having nothing
to eat but the far from nutritious fruits growing in the arid soil
of those parts. Many of them deserted or joined the troops of
banditti that infested the high roads in the south, as well as in
the west, of France. Whole corps were seen quitting their posts <
without orders from their generals, and occupying others where
they hoped' to live less wretchedly. The sea, scoured by the
English, exhibited in all directions none but an enemy's flag,
and never brought them any succour. There were divisions
¦whose pay had been withheld for eighteen months. Some pro
visions were levied by means of requisitions ; but as for mus-
quets, cannon, and ammunition, which are not to be procured ;]
by requisitions — the want of these our soldiers had no means
of supplying. The horses, already inadequate to the services of
the artillery and of the cavalry, were almost all swept off by
disease and famine.
Such were the results of a weak, ill-regulated administration,
and more especially of extreme financial embarrassment. The
armies of the republic had, for several years, lived upon assignats
and victory The assignats no longer existed ; and Victory, .
after suddenly forsaking us, had scarcely begun to show herself
again to our legions and had not yet opened to them the
abundant plains of Germany and Italy.
It is necessary to give here an idea of our financial situation-
the principal cause ot the sufferings of our armies This situa
tion outdid all that had ever been Len at former periods The
Constituent Assembly had committed two fiS I, with had
been remedied, to a certain extent, by means of the assLats
but or which since the discredit of that paper-money, Ee'
was left no palliative. Ihese two faults were, firstly, the sup-

Nov. 1799.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 9
pression of the indirect contributions imposed upon liquors,
salt, and articles of consumption in general ; secondly, the right
granted to the municipal administrations to make themselves'
the assessments of the land-tax and of the other direct con
tributions. By the suppression of the indirect contributions the treasury
had lost, without compensation, one-third of its revenues. The
produce of the domains of the State being reduced to almost
nothing by a vicious administration, that of the registration by
the falling off of private transactions, and that of the customs
by the war, the direct contributions formed almost the only re
source of the exchequer ; but these contributions amounting to
about 3 00,000,000 in abudget of 500,000,000, were extraordinarily
in arrear. There were outstanding debits for the year V., the year
VI ., and the year VII. The assessments for the year VI. were
not completed,- for the year VII., one-third yet remained to be
made out ; and for the current year, that is to say, the year
VIII., they were scarcely begun. Owing to this delay in the
preparation of the assessments, the current contributions could
not be levied, and the accumulation of the contributions in ar
rear occasioned new difficulties to the collectors, who frequently
had to demand payment for several years at once.
This state of things proceeded from the adoption of a prin
ciple apparently just, but in reality mischievous, namety, that
of leaving the local administrations to tax themselves, in some
measure, by preparing the assessments themselves. The det-
partmental and municipal administrations were then conjoined,
as every one knows. Instead of prefects, sub-prefects, an<l
maires, who were instituted at a later period, there were attache( I
to all these administrations commissioners, having a consultativi
voice, and whose duty it was to originate and urge the accelera^
tion of the administrative operations, but not to execute thesa
themselves. The system of cantonal municipalities, uniting the]
44,000 communes of France into 5000 collective communesi
had increased the disorder. All local affairs were^suspended j
but what was a still greater misfoVFune7~fhe'"'Twb"gran3 affairs of
the State, the recruiting of the army and the collection of the
taxes, ^were"3completely neglected. To make amends for this
default of administrative action, the 5000 commissioners at
tached to the cantonal municipalities were charged with the
duty of accelerating the preparation of the assessments ; but
they had not the only power which could be efficacious, that of
acting themselves ; and besides, engaged in a thousand different
occupations, they paid but little attention to that important
work, the preparation of the assessments. The indemnity
granted to them for this service, being much more expensive
than it has been since the institution of the office of the direct
contributions, was a heavy charge to the treasury, and without
any corresponding advantage.

10 HISTORY OF THE [Nov. 17
Thus the direct contributions, the principal branch of the
revenue of the State, were not collected. Besides ^P8™*™?
deficit arising from the default of receipts, there was another,
arising from the amount of the expenditure, which at that time
far exceeded the income. The ordinary expenditure might have
been provided for by means of a revenue of about 500 000,000;
but the war had raised it to nearly 700,000,000. Nothing was
left to meet the deficiency but the national domains, absorbed
for the greater part, and which it was, moreover, difficult to realise
to advantage, because the definitive triumph of the revolution
was still a matter of great doubt.
This state of things had led to revolting abuses and to a si
tuation which it is necessary to describe for the instruction of
nations and governments.
The assignats, as we have just observed, had long ceased to
exist. The mandats which succeeded them, had disappeared
also. Paper money was, therefore, completely abandoned;
and, greafas the void might be, it was- -better npt to fill it up at
all for the present, than to fill it, as had before been done, with
a forced paper, which was scarcely taken in payments, though
forced, and which uselessly furnished occasion for the exercise
of all the rigours of the law, in order to compel its acceptance.
In lieu of this suppressed paper-money the following system
was introduced.
In the first place, the government ceased to pay the civil func
tionaries, even in paper, so that in Brumaire, year VIII., they
bad received nothing for ten months. It was necessary, how
ever, to give something to the rentiers and to the pensioners of
the state. To these were delivered bons d'arrerage, the sole va
lue of which consisted in their being taken as money in payment
of the contributions. The pay of the troops was withheld; but
what the armies took upon the spot for their subsistence was
paid for by means of bons de requisition, likewise receivable in dis
charge of the taxes. The companies which had contracted to
supply some of the wants of the soldier, performing that service
ill, and sometimes not at all, obtained, instead of money, orders
upon the first receipts of the treasury ; and bv virtue of titles
of this sort, granted very arbitrarily, they laid their hands upon
almost all the cash that found its way into the public exchequer.
Lastly resorptions on the national domains, receivable in pay-
Sf't d0^ms were another sort of paper money
ttt 2 IS I' ™ Tr T- ^ enumerated, and contribut-
ing to the most inghtful stock-jobbing
an/sold in the market of ^g^tSS^^
est whisper of good or bad news, they were the subfec 0f a
ruinous speculation for the State, and of a deplorable dWorali
- sation for the pubhc. The men of business, depositaries of

Nov. 1799.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 11

I

all the ready money, could procure them at a very easy rate.
They bought them up from the rentiers, the contractors, or
the other holders, at the lowest price ; then sent them in to
the treasury in payment of the contributions, passing for 10O
francs what had cost them at most eighty, and sometimes sixty
or fifty. The collectors themselves embarked in this kind of
speculation, and, while they received money from part of the
tax-payers, they paid into the coffers of the state at par the
paper which they had bought at the lowest rate. Thus very few
persons paid their contributions in cash ; there was too much
inducement to discharge them in paper. In this manner, the
treasury scarcely ever received any specie, and its distress, in
consequence, increased every day.
As the irritation against the Vendeans had produced the law
of the hostages, the irritation against the jobbers had led, in
like manner, to the measure of the progressive forced loan,
destined to reach the great capitalists, and to make them con
tribute to the expenses of the war. This is what had been
called in France, during the days of terror, the tax upon the
rich ; it is what in England was denominated the income-tax —
a tax to which Mr. Pitt had at this time recourse, in order to
carry on the furious war which he was waging against France.
This tax, proportioned not to the extent of immoveable pro
perty, which constitutes a sure basis, but to the supposed wealth
of individuals, was feasible, though with considerable trouble,
in England, where order prevailed, and the fury of parties did not
make the assessment of fortunes a medium of vengeance. But j
it was not feasible in France, for amidst the disorders of the j
times, the tax-jury had been a sort of revolutionary committee, t
capriciously attributing wealth or poverty at the dictates of its \
passions, and never passing for just even when it was just, which ¦
is almost equivalent to never being so. The government durst
not bring forward this measure, as formerly, under the mere
simple form of a tax ; they disguised ifunder the name of a
forced loan, repayable, it was said, in national property r and di
vided, according to the supposed faculties of each, by an assess
ment jury.
Thus this measure had become one of the calamities of thev
moment. That and the law of the hostages formed the two
grievances most frequently alleged against the Directory. It
was not the cause, as it was asserted, of the poverty of the
treasury, a poverty arising from a complication of circumstances ;
but it had kent aloof the rich speculators, whose aidjwas indis
pensable to the goveTrlHientr-an-d : of whom it was under the
absolute necessity of availing itself, if but for a moment, that it
might be able to shift without them afterwards.
This financial situation was, as we have said, the principal ^
cause of the destitution and the reverses of our armies. Being-
well known to the foreign powers, it inspired them with confi-

12 HISTORY OF THE [Nov. 1799.
dence that they should conquer us with a little perseverance.
The two victories of Zurich and the Texel had, to be sure,
removed those powers somewhat farther from the object winch
they had in view, but not diverted them from the pursuit.
Austria, proud of having reconquered Italy, was determined to
fight to the last extremity rather than yield again. Her bear
ing there was that of an absolute power. Occupying Piedmont
Tuscany, the Roman States, she had not recalled either the
King of Sardinia to Turin, or the Grand Duke of Tuscany to
Florence, or the pontifical government to Rome. The defeat
of Korsakoff and SuwarofF at Zurich, gave her less concern than
might have been expected. It was in her eyes a check for the
Russian arms, not for the Austrian ; a fault of Generals Korsa
koff and SuwarofF, — a military mishap not very difficult to be
retrieved, and of no great consequence unless it should disgust
the Russians with the war. But she confidently hoped, by means
of British influence and subsidies, to bring them back into the
field. As for England, rich from the income tax, which already pro
duced more than 200,000,000f. a year ; blockading Malta, which
she expected soon to take by famine; intercepting all succours
sent to our army in Egypt, which she hoped before long to
reduce by privations and force, England was fully resolved to
pursue all the objects which her policy flattered itself with the
prospect of attaining, before she laid down her arms. She cal
culated, moreover, upon a sort of social dissolution in France,
which would soon change our country into an open country,
accessible to whomsoever might think fit to enter it.
Prussia, the only one of the northern powers that had not
taken part in the war, maintained a reserve full of coldness
towards the French government. Spain, obliged by the treaty
of St. Ildefonso to make common cause with us, appeared ex
tremely grieved at this community of interests. No one, in
deed, seemed to care about having relations with a government
that was ready to fall. The victories of Zurich and the Texel
had regained it an outward show of respect, but not the
confidence of the cabinets with which it was at peace or in
alliance. *
Thus at home, La Vendee again in insurrection, abroad, the
pnncipa powers of Europe in arms, rendered the danger of the
war doubly pressing. It was necessary, by the adoption 0f
some financial measure, to supply the first wants of the
famished armies; it was nepp^nrvr t„ ' ¦ •va"LO
them forward to o-ilt !?cessa*V to re-organise them, to move
them lorwaro, to give them able commanders to arlrl t,pw
cabinets option of £%&£££?&£*£
¦Srance, »hich rendered some so confident in the result of the
war, other, so shy ,n their relations ,vith o.i and all this e„»U

Nov. 1799.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 13
only be accomplished by a strong government, able to curb
parties, and to enforce unity of action, without which there
cannot be, in the exertions that it makes to save itself, either
harmony, or energy, or success.
The disease had arrived at that height which is frequently
followed by a favourable turn, on one condition indeed, that
the patient has sufficient strength left to get over the crisis.
Fortunately, the strength of France was still great. The revo-\
lution, though decried by those whom it had jostled, or i
whose illusions it had not realised, was, after all, the cause of!
justice and of reason, and it still excited the attachment which)
a great cause always excites. It had, moreover, numerous par-( '"
tisans, bound to its fortunes, in all those who had acquired
new situations, bought the possessions of emigrants, or 1"
acted a part by which they had compromised themselves. In
short, the nation was not so exhausted, morally and physically,
as to submit quietly to the invasion of its territory by the
Austrians and Russians. On the contrary, it felt indignant at
this idea : its armies swarmed with admirable soldiers, officers,
generals, who needed only a good direction. All these forces
were ready to unite spontaneously in a single hand, if that
hand was capable of directing them. Circumstances, there- .
fore, favoured the man of genius who was'^about to present j
himself, for genius itself has need of circumstances.
Had young Bonaparte, for example, come forward in 1789,.
even with his talents and his glory, to preserve French society, at \
that time tending on all sides to dissolution, because its ele
ments had become incompatible, in vain would he have propped
it with his mighty arms : his human strength would have availed,-'
nothing against the powers of Nature. At this period, on the
contrary, when that old society, broken up, as it was requisite;
that it should be/ before it was recast in a new mould, pre-j;
sented only scattered elements,/but tending of themselves toy
approximate, it was prepared to accommodate itself to all the!
efforts of the able hand that knew how to grapple it. Generar
Bonaparte, therefore, had for him both his own genius and the
favour of circumstances. He had a whole society to organise, /
but a society willing to be organised and by him, because it had im-jl
mense confidence in him, inspired by his unparalleled successes.'
The law which decreed the Provisional Consulship, conferred
extensive powers on the three consuls. This law invested
them with the plenitude of the " directorial power ;" it specially
charged them to "restore order in all the departments of the
administration," to " restore domestic tranquillity," and to
" obtain for France an honourable and solid peace." It asso
ciated with them two legislative commissions, of twenty -five mem
bers each, selected from the Council of the Ancients and that of
the Five Hundred, to supply the place of the Legislative Body,
and to give a legal character to the acts of the Consuls. It

!4 HISTORY OF THE [NoV. 1799.
authorised these two commissions to decree all necessary mea
sures, on the proposition of the executive authority. It confided
to them, moreover, the highly important duty of preparing the
new constitution. And yet, as such powers could not be con
ferred on them for an unlimited time, the same law enacted
that, on the 1st of the following Ventose, the two Councils of
the Ancients and the Five Hundred should have full right to
assemble again, if, in the interim, a new constitution had not
been promulgated and accepted. In that event the members of
the then Legislative Body would retain their powers, excepting
sixty of them, erased from the list of the councils by an extra
ordinary measure. The eventual re-assembling being fixed for
the 1st of Ventose, the dictatorship confided to the Provisional
consuls was limited to three months. It was, in fact, a real
dictatorship with which they had been invested : for these
commissions, deliberating with closed doors; divided into
different sections, of finances, legislation, constitution ; meeting
together only to legalise what the government had to propose
to them ; were the surest and most convenient instruments for
acting with promptness. For the rest, there was little reason to
fear that these powers would be abused ; for, when there is so
much good to be done, and so short a space to do it in, men do
not waste time in doing evil.
On the very day that the three Provisional Consuls removed
to the Luxembourg, they met to deliberate on the most urgent
affairs of the State. It was the 11th of November, 1799 (20th
of Brumaire). It was necessary to choose a president ; the age
and position of M. Sieyes seemed to call him to that distinc
tion, but Roger Ducos, though his friend, as if carried away by
the feeling of the moment, said to General Bonaparte, " Take
the arm-chair, and let us deliberate." Bonaparte immediately
complied. The official acts of the Provisional Consuls, how
ever, made no mention of a president. They entered into a
first summary examination of the state of the country. Young
Bonaparte was ignorant of many things, but he guessed intui
tively those which he was not acquainted with. He had carried on
war, provided for the maintenance of numerous armies, admi
nistered conquered provinces, negotiated with Europe: he could
not have served a better apprenticeship in the art of governing.
ichUTtW mmdS' ,but f0r those al°ne> war is an excellent
Ittol^r, TunlTnSt°COmm^d' t0 decid^ but above
all to govern. Ihus the new Consul appeared to have on all
fecial men thlonlv^T' Particularly ^er he had heard
He was still deficient in a SDerip* nt b„~ i j
able in the exercise of the .-^e1JrgSj£,£S»-
not of men generally, but of individuals. As for men £ "^l,

Nov. 1799.] CONSULATE' AND THE EMPIRE. 15
his knowledge of them was profound ; but, having always lived
with the armies, he was a stranger to the individuals who had
figured in the revolution. To supply this deficiency he had
recourse to the testimony of his colleagues. But, gifted with
rapid penetration and a prodigious memory, he very soon made
himself as well acquainted with the personnel of the government
as with that of his army.
After this first conference, the parts were taken and accepted.
The young general, without waiting for the opinion of his col
leagues, gave his own at the instant, summed up and settled
every affair with the decision of an acting man. I t_was evident
that the h^ul_sjon_would^thenc&for-th--proceed from him jdqne.
They separated, after agreeing upon the things most urgent to
be done ; and Sieyes, with a resignation which does honour to
his reason and his patriotism, said in the evening to Messrs.
de Talleyrand and Rcederer, " We have a master who knows
how to do every thing, who can do every thing, and who will do
every thing." He thence wisely concluded that it was best to
let him act, for, at that moment, personal rivalries would have
ruined France. It was anew agreed, by a sort of voluntary
division of the official duties, that, during this dictatorship,
which it was necessary to render brief and serviceable, General
Bonaparte should govern, and that M. Sieyes should undertake
the preparation of the constitution. This, as we have already
said, was a task which public opinion adjudged to the latter,
and in the accomplishment of which his colleague was not dis
posed to cross him much, a single point excepted — the organiza
tion of the executive power.
The most urgent matter of all was the composition of the
ministry. In a monarchy, it is the first men in a country who
are called to it. In a republic, those first men having become
themselves the heads of the republic, there are left for the mi
nistry only second-rate men, mere clerks, without any respon
sibility, because the real responsibility has ascended higher.
When such persons as M. Sieyes and General Bonaparte were
Consuls, highly distinguished men, like Messrs. Fouche, Camba
ceres, Reinhart, de Talleyrand, could not be real ministers. The
choice of them had no other importance than a certain political
signification and the due dispatch of business. It is in this
respect alone that their selection can be considered as of any
moment. The lawyer Cambaceres, a scholar and a philosopher, whom
we shall notice more particularly by and by, was retained, with
out opposition, as minister of justice. After a brisk discussion
among the Consuls, M. Fouche" was continued in the ministry of
the police. M. Sieyes would have rejected him, because, he
said, he was not to be depended on, and a creature of Barras',
the Director. General Bonaparte supported him, and caused
-him to be confirmed in his post. He considered himself bound

16 HISTORY OF THE [NoV. 1799.
to this course by the services which Fouche had done him
during the events of the 18th of Brumaire. Besides, he united
to a very shrewd mind a profound knowledge of the men and
things of the revolution. Public opinion, at that time, had
marked him out for the minister of police, as M. de ^lalleyrand,
from his familiarity with courts, his experience in _ business of
importance, his acute understanding, and his conciliatory spirit,
was marked out for the minister of foreign affairs. M. Fouche
was retained ; but such was the animosity of the revolutionists
against M. de Talleyrand, either on account of his constant con
nexion with the moderate party, or in consequence of the part
which he had played in recent events, that it was found expe
dient to defer for a few weeks his return to the ministry for
foreign affairs. M. de Reinhart was kept for a fortnight longer
in that post. General Berthier, the faithful companion of the
conqueror of Italy and Egypt, the inseparable chief of his staff,
who could so thoroughly comprehend and issue his orders, —
General Berthier received the portfolio of war, in the place of
M. Dubois-Crance, who was considered as much too warm in
his opinions. M.Quinette was- superseded in the ministry of
the interior by an illustrious savant, M. de La Place. This was
a signal and just homage paid to science, but it was not a
service rendered to the administration. His superior genius
was not fitted for the details of business. M. Forfait, au engi
neer and naval constructor of ability, succeeded M. Bourdon
(de l'Oise) in the ministry of the marine.
— — At this moment, the most important choice to be made, per
haps, wras that for minister of the finances. In the departments
already specified, the Consuls could supply the place of the
ministers, especially in the two most important departments — war
and foreign affairs ; General Bonaparte, in fact, could perfectly
well perform all the duties of Messrs. Berthier and de Reinhart.
But that was not the case with the finances. This is a subject
upon which technical knowledge is indispensable; and there was
inot in the ministry that went out with the Directory any man
i Wv iC<iuld labour effectively at a reorganization of the finances,
I which had become necessary and urgent. There was a person
who had formerly been chief clerk, a man not of a brilliant but
of a solid understanding, and possessing great experience, who
had rendered both during the old system and in the early period
LfZ^rl W lh°Se °bsCUre but valuable administrative
services, with which governments cannot dispense, and which
aUuyde°hegre wasTo * \ ^^ The first ^*to ^m I
wiu^uahfi'edl J^ofme^Tou^6 f^ , M" Si^S'
discovered M. <LL?^iri3£?%£ ^I* them'. had
his hands the portfolio of the filnce^^T^0 «« t0
dechned the offer made to him under an «^ g?£5£*

Nov. 1799.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 17
which wanted the first requisites of credit, strength and the
appearance of stability. But when power seemed to fall with
out opposition into able and firm hands, he could no longer feel
"the same repugnance. General Bonaparte, having- a decided
partiality for practical men, joined without hesitation in the
opinion of his colleague, Sieyes, and offered to M. Gaudin the
administration of the finances. M. Gaudin accepted this post, in
which he never ceased, for fifteen years, to render eminent services.
All the departments of the ministry were thus filled. Another
appointment was added to the preceding — that of M. Maret,
since Duke of Bassano, who became secretary to the Consuls,
with the title of secretary of state. Charged to prepare for the
Consuls the elements of their labour, frequently to draw up their
resolutions, and to communicate them to the heads of different
departments, to keep the secrets of the State, he had a kind of
ministry, destined sometimes to make up for, to complete, or
to control the others. A cultivated mind, a certain acquaint
ance with Europe, with which he had already negotiated, parti
cularly at Lisle, with Lord Malmesbury, a tenacious memory, a
fidelity not to be shaken, caused him to become one of the most
serviceable, and most constantly employed fellow-labourers
about General Bonaparte. In those who served him, the gene
ral preferred exactness and intelligence to brilliancy. It is a
partiality common to superior geniuses, which desire to be
comprehended and obeyed, but want no substitute. Such was
the secret 'of the high favour also enjoyed by M. Berthier for
twenty years. M. Maret, though far from equalling him, had,
in civil affairs, some of the merits displayed by the illustri
ous chief of the staff in his military career.
General Lefebvre was retained in the command of the 17th
military division. It will be recollected that, at first, in the
morning of the 18th of Brumaire, he had shown some hesitation,
and that he had afterwards blindly thrown himself into the
arms of the new dictator. He was rewarded for it by the I7tb
military division and the command of Paris. Thenceforward,.
his fidelity might be depended upon.
Members of the two Councils, who had distinguished. them
selves by their co-operation in the 18th of Brumaire, were sent
into the provinces to explain and justify that event, and, if
necessary, to supersede such of the agents of authority as might
prove either refractory or inadequate to their functions. The
result of the 18th of Brujn.aire. was., everywhere, hailed .with joy. ^.
the revolutionary party had, nevertheless, in the men compro*
mised by their excesses, adherents who might have become
dangerous, especially towards the provinces of the SouthJ-
Where they did show themselves, the gilded youth, as they were]
called, were quite ready to come to blows with them. The
defeat or the victory of either, might have produced serious
inconveniences. VOL. I. C

18 HISTORY OF THE [NoV. 1799.
Some changes were made in the distribution of the great
military commands. General Moreau, deeply irritated against
the Directory, which had so ill rewarded Ins patriotic devoted-
ness during the campaign of 1799, had consented to become the
lieutenant of General Bonaparte, to assist him in consummating
the revolution of the 18th of Brumaire. At the head of 300
men, he had condescended to act the part of keeper of the
Luxembourg, the palace in which the Directors found them
selves prisoners while their deposition was determined on at St.
Cloud. General Bonaparte, who, by skilfully feeding the pride
and the resentments of Moreau,. had induced him to accept that
singular post, owed him some compensation. He united the
two armies of the Rhine and of Helvetia into one, and gave him
the command of it. This was the most numerous, the finest
army of the Republic, and it could not have been put into better
hands. General Moreau had gained but little glory during
the last campaign. His services, though substantial, especially
when, with a handful of men, he stopped the triumphant career
of SuwarofF, were nevertheless no victories, and were not appre
ciated at their proper value. At this period the battle of Zurich
bad eclipsed every thing. Besides, the political conduct of
jMoreau on the 18th of Fructidor, when he denounced Pichegru
either too soon or too late, had injured him in public opi
nion, and caused him to be considered as a weak character,
wholly beneath himself when he was not upon the field of
battle. General Bonaparte, therefore, raised him considerably
by conferring on him so extensive a command; and he came to
another very wise determination. The legions of the Rhine
and of Helvetia comprehended the most ardent republicans of
the army, and many who were envious of the glory acquired in
Italy and in Egypt. Massena commanded them, and he had
but little affection for General Bonaparte, though subjugated
by his genius. In regard to him, he passed alternately from
admiration to ill-humour. There was reason to fear, on his
part, some unpleasant demonstration on account of the 18th of
Brumaire. The choice of Moreau cut short all possible mani
festations, by removing an ill-disposed general from a discon
tented army. This choice was likewise a good one in a military
point of view ; for this army of the Rhine and of Helvetia was
destined, in case the war were renewed, to operate in Germany,
and no one had so thoroughly studied this part of the theatre of
war as Moreau. r
Massena was sent to thp armtr „r t* i j. i i
soldiers that he was p°r feltlv aJoulI 1' l^T* ""*, am°ng
able for him to be ?dected fSe ™ * V }^/a^^
mitted in 1799, and th conSuiator of Z* ^ ft *"?£ ^
Bonaparte in 1796. Separated TcZ t "^ °f General
bad just won I W^^£s^J^^^J5
to be transferred to a new army, to which the Directory was

Nov. 1799.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 19
odious, and where he would find none but approvers of the 18th
of Brumaire. _ This choice, like the preceding, was highly judi
cious in a military point of view. It was the Apennines that
the French would have to dispute with the Austrians ; and, for
a war of this kind, on this theatre of operations, Massena had
not his equal.
After they had decided upon theseindispensable appointments,
the Consuls had to direct their attention to an affair not less
urgent, namely, that of the finances. Before they could obtain;
money from the capitalists, it was requisite that they should give
them the satisfaction of suppressing the progressive forced loan,'
which, like the law of the hostages, had incurred universal re-l
probation. The forced loan, as well as the law of the hostages,
was far from having produced all the evils that were attributed
to it. But these two measures, truly paltry in regard to utility,
were vicious in a moral point of view, inasmuch as they revived
the most odious recollections of the reign of terror. All, there
fore, agreed in condemning them. The revolutionists them
selves, who, in their patriotic ardour, had demanded these mea
sures of the Directory, by a reaction very common in parties,
had suddenly declared themselves hostile to them as soon as
they perceived their failure and unpopularity.
No sooner was Gaudin installed minister than, by order of the
Consuls, he submitted to the legislative commissions a reso
lution, the object of which was the suppression of the progres
sive forced loan. This suppression took place amidst universal j
applause. In lieu of the forced loan there was substituted a ;
war-supply, consisting of an addition of 25 per cent, to the
principal of the land-tax, the tax on moveable property, and
the personal tax. This supply was payable, like the other taxes,
in money or state paper of any kind ; but, owing to the
urgency of the case, it was required that half the amount should
be paid in cash.
The war-supply, which had thus superseded the progressive
forced loan, could not furnish immediate relief, for it was
only to be levied upon the assessments of the direct contribu
tions, and at the same time as those contributions, of which it
was in reality but an augmentation, in the proportion of one-
fourth. It was requisite for the current service, and more par
ticularly for the troops, that the treasury should be immediately
replenished. M. Gaudin, on the strength of this new measure,
destined more especially to please the great capitalists, appealed
to the principal bankers of the capital, and applied to them for
assistance, the urgency of which was felt by all. General Bo
naparte entered into direct communication with them, and the
sum of 12,000,000 in cash was immediately lent to the govern
ment. It was to be repaid out of the first receipts of the war
contribution. This accommodation was a great boon, and reflected honour
C2

20 HISTORY OF THE [Nov. 1799.J
on the public spirit of the bankers of the capital. But it was;
a supply for a few days only. More durable supplies were
We have seen, at the beginning of this book, how the sup
pression of the indirect contributions, decreed at the very out
set of the revolution, had reduced the treasury to the mere pro- .
duce of the direct contributions ; how this revenue had itself
been almost annulled by the delay in the preparation of the
assessments; lastly, how the assignats, the ordinary medium
for supplying all deficits, having totally disappeared, recourse
was had to papers of various kinds, which, not having the forced
currency of coin, were no longer a clog, as before, to private
transactions, but left the government without resources, and
gave rise to the most hideous stock -jobbing. It was necessary
to put an end to this state of things, and to reorganise the col
lection, if the government wished to- open again the sources of
the public revenue, and, with the sources of the public revenue,
those of credit.
In every country where there exist taxes on property and
person, which we term in France direct contributions, it is re
quisite to have a return of that property, with an estimate of its
produce, and a list of the names of persons, with an estimate
of their pecuniary means ; it is requisite that these returns be
modified every year, according to the transfer of property from
hand to hand, according to the birth, death, or removal of per
sons ; it is then requisite to apportion every year among the
properties and the persons the amount of taxes that has been
decreed ; lastly, there must be a collection, at once exact and
prudent: exact, to ensure the receipts; prudent, not to harass
the payers. Nothing of this kind existed in the year VIII.
(1799). The register of real property {cadastre), a work which has occu-,
pied the last forty years,* was not yet begun. There were ancient
terriers in some communes, and a general return of properties
undertaken in the time of the Constituent Assembly. These data, .
though by no means accurate, were turned to account. But the
operations which consist in revising the lists of properties and
persons, according to their incessantchanges, and in apportioning
annually among them the amount of taxes decreed— these opera-
JhT^ji^rP"17 ^^te what is called the preparation of
whose Z!S' T616 M\ t0 the ^nicipal administrations, to
^^ST^:^tt:r 7 bT alread? adverfc\d-
lowest bidder; thl is to those lT^ .V? ^ t0 ^
cheapest rate. These coSicto™ ^P™*™*0*}** duty at the
them [to receivers, who acted as int °™ the,funds levied by
 ' act^asintermediates (agents) between
* The reader will perceive that this nor.-nr, ~f ,i i '
years ago—Translator. P°' ton of tlle work ™» written some

Nov. 1799.]' CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 21
them and the receiver-general. Both the one and the other
were in arrear. The disorder prevailing in every department
did not permit a strict eye to be kept upon them. Besides, the
non-preparation of the assessments always furnished them with
a plausible pretext for deferring the payments, and stock-jobbing
with the means of making those payments in depreciated paper.
In short, they received little, and paid in less.
On the recommendation of M. Gaudin, the Consuls were not s
afraid to revert to certain practices of the old government, which !
experience had proved to be sound and useful. Upon the im- ]
proved model of the anient administration of the vingtiemes,
there was instituted the agency of direct contributions, hitherto
constantly rejected, from the mischievous idea of leaving the
local administrations to tax themselves. A director and an in
spector in each department, and 840 comptrollers, distributed
in greater or less number in the arrondissements, were them
selves to perform the duty of preparing the assessments ; that
is to say, to draw up the list of properties and persons, to ascer
tain the changes which had taken place during the year, and to
charge them with their fair proportion of the tax. Thus, in
stead of the 5000 cantonal commissioners, who could do
no more than urge the communes to the preparation of the
assessments, there were to be 99 directors, 99 inspectors, and
840 comptrollers, performing the duty themselves, at an expense
to the state of three millions instead of five.. It was hoped that
in six weeks this administration would be completely organised,
and that in two or three months it would have finished the
third yet remaining to be made of the assessments of the year
VII. (the last year), all those of the year VIII. (the current,
year), lastly all those of the year IX. (the next year).
Courage was required to overcome some prejudices, but;/
General Bonaparte was .not, .the_man to let prejudices^stophim.
The legislative commissions, debating with closed doors, adopted
the proposed plan after some observations. Guarantees were
granted to such persons liable to the contribution as had claims
to make — guarantees which have since been rendered more
secure by means of the institution of the councils of prefec
ture. The basis of all regular contribution was thus re
established. This done, it was requisite to organise the collection and the
payment of the funds into the treasury.
At the present day, in consequence of the perfect order which
the Empire and the subsequent governments have successively
introduced into our finances, the levy of the funds of the trea
sury is executed with a facility and a regularity that leave-
nothing to be desired. Collectors receive, month by month,
the direct contributions, that is to say the taxes imposed upon
land, buildings, and persons, which they pay over to the parti
cular receiver stationed in the principal place of every arron-

22 HISTORY OF THE [Nov. 1799.?
dissement, and the latter to the receiver-general resident in the
chief town of the department. The receivers of the indirect
contributions, consisting of customs levied on the frontiers upon
foreign merchandize, duties of registration chargeable on trans-
fers of property and on judicial acts ; lastly, duties imposed
upon articles of consumption of various kinds, such as liquors,
tobacco, salt, &c. : the receivers of these contributions pay
over the proceeds as they receive them to the particular re
ceiver, and the latter again to the receiver-general, the real
banker of the state, whose duty it is to amass the funds, and to
dispose of them agreeably to the orders transmitted to him by
the administration of the treasury.
The equal distribution of the public burdens and the general
prosperity have rendered the payment of taxes so easy at the
present day ; moreover, the periodical returns, which contain a
summary of all the operations connected with the receipts and
expenditure, have become so clear; that the taxes are paid on
the day specified — frequently before — and that the precise date of
their receipt and appropriation is also known. Thus government
has found means to establish a system grounded on the truth
itself of facts, according as they take place. It is, therefore, in
the nature of the direct contributions levied upon property and
persons (and thus a species of rent), to be capable of being fixed
beforehand, both as to the amount and as to the term of pay
ment. They are demanded, therefore, a twelfth at a time, and
monthly. The receivers are debited with them, that is to say,
constituted debtors for their amount, every month. But it ia
presumed that they have not received them till two or three
months after each twelfth or instalment is due, in order to leave
them the means of exercising forbearance towards the payers,
and, at the same time, to create in themselves a motive for getting
in the tax; for, if they receive it before the time at which they
have to pay it in, they derive a profit, by interest, proportionate
to the dispatch of the collection. It is, on the contrary, in the
nature of the indirect contributions, (which are levied only upon
the importations of foreign goods into France, upon the trans
fers of property, or upon the consumption of articles of dif
ferent sorts,) to be received but irregularly, and according to
tne extent ofthe transactions in the articles upon which they
are laid 1 he receivers are therefore debited, that is to say,
^m(?S£t^™,,for them' at the verY moment when they
tr^Hn^T ^d%andnot ^ twelft^ and monthly, as is
the practice for the direct contributions. Every ten days the
™t1^ tion'aeTceiveVLteSf' n° "^ for what kind of contribu-
E; SftSSTSSrSSaKSr' r n the sur with which
the public services. OnX ^SL^ZV^^

Nov. 1799.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. . 23
pays any sum whatever on account of the State, before he is in
debt to it, the State, in its turn, gives him credit for the interest.
A balance is afterwards struck between the interest owring by
the receiver-general upon the sums that have remained in his
hands beyond the time prescribed, and the interest due by the
treasury upon the sums that have been advanced to it; so that
not a single day's interest is lost either by the one or the other ;
and the receiver-general becomes a real banker, having a run
ning account with the treasury, obliged to hold constantly at the
disposal of the government the funds which the wants of the
service may require, no matter to what extent.
Such is the system which experience on the one hand, and
the improved circumstances of the tax-payers on the other, have
gradually introduced in the collection of the funds of the
treasury. But at the period the history of which we are recording, the
taxes came in irregularly, and the system of accounts was con
fused. The collector who was in arrear might allege the delay in
the preparation of the assessments, or the distress of those from
whom they were to be levied ; he could, moreover, conceal the
amount of his receipts, owing to the want of clearness in the
returns of the operations. The government knew not, as at
present, what was passing every day in the several thousand
coffers, great and small, composing the general exchequer of the
State. M. Gaudin proposed, and prevailed on General Bonaparte to
adopt, a system borrowed in a great measure from the old govern
ment, an ingenious system, which has gradually led us to the
organization at present established. This system was that of
bills of the receivers-general. These receivers, real bankers of
the treasury, as we have called them, were to give bills, falling
due from month to month, for the total amount of the direct
contributions, that is to say, for 300,000,000f. of the 500,000,000f.
then composing the budget of the State. These bills, when due,
were made payable at the office of the receiver-general. To com
pensate for the delay afforded to the contributor in paying his
tax, it was assumed that each twelfth was discharged about four
months after the period when it was due. Thus the bills -for
the twelfth, payable on the 31st of January, were to be drawn
so as to fall due on the 31st of May; by which means the
receiver-general, having before him a term of four months, was
at once enabled to grant indulgence to the payer of the tax, and
stimulated to obtain payment earlier ; for, if he could get it ia
before the expiration of two months instead of four, he gained
two months' interest.
This ' combination, besides possessing the advantage of
sparing the payer of the tax and interesting the collector in
getting it in, had the merit of preventing the receivers-general ~"
from delaying payment; for the treasury had bills of exchange

24 BISTOBT OF THE [N»'- ""{
and the collection had been ensured; the receiveis-generat
Ling unable to pay punctually unless they were supplied
¦nunctually But, this being accomplished by the means which
we have stated, it was easy to establish the system of bills;
and independently of the advantages enumerated, it was
attended with this, that, on the first day of the year, it placed
at the disposal of the treasury the 300,000,000 f. of direct con
tributions, in bills of exchange, which could be surely and
easily discounted.
To give credit to this paper, destined to answer the purpose
which the royal bons fulfil at this day in France, and the ex
chequer bills in England, the caisse d'amortisseme?it (sinking
fund) was devised. This institution, which we shall see, ere
long, entrusted with the management of the entire public debt,.
had at first no other object than to support the bills of the receiver-
general. The manner in which this was managed was as fol-
Ioavs. The collectors of the public money, as a guarantee for
their operations, gave at that time a security in immoveable
property only. This kind of security, exposing the State to the
difficulties of a forced ejectment, when it was obliged to pro
ceed against the granter, did not sufficiently answer the object
of its institution. It was therefore determined to require of
the receivers a security in money. They were then making
such large profits, by jobbing with the produce of the tax itself,.
as to submit cheerfully to this condition rather than resign
their posts.
These securities, paid into the caisse d,amortissement, were
destined to serve as a guarantee to the bills. Every bill, when
due, was to be paid at the office of the receiver-general, or, in de
fault, at that of the caisse d'amortissement, which was to dis
charge it on presentation, if protested, out of the security
of the granter. The bill, in consequence, immediately equalled -
in character the best commercial paper. Nor was this the only
advantage of that combination. Probablv a small portion of ,
the securities might suffice to uphold the credit of the bills, for
™L? fti receVvers-§eneral would be tempted to suffer their
dismal of rL° f d! *e SUrPlus would then be left at the>
S ttd g toatSSovheaCbl mlght f6"16 f°r [" ^ ^
The government hadThereW ^^ °T 7"*?: ¦
the advantage of givW „su° i f' J mCanS °f th,S ^s^tio^
procuring fo°r itself T cfrtab si™"? *? the bills' and °f
forthwith available-a r 'urc whiY^' **' miSh* be made
seasonably. resouice which, just then, came most
Such was the system of collerrirm .,„,i f
a short time placid the treaty Us^TSn'sS? £

Nov. 1799.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 25
we have seen, in making up the assessments of the contribu
tions, and in putting them in a train to be collected with punc
tuality and dispatch ; in then drawing bills on the principal
receivers for the total amount of the tax — bills readily dis
counted, owing to the means devised to enable the receivers-
general to discharge their obligations themselves, or which the-
caisse d"amortissement could discharge for them.
We have adverted to the direct contributions only. As for
the indirect contributions, which did not come in regularly or
by twelfths, the receivers-general were, after the receipt of
them, but not till then, to transmit to the treasury bills at siqht
on their chest ; so that these were not available till after the
drawer had received the amount. This part of the service,
which left too great an enjoyment of funds to the receivers-
general, was subsequently improved.
At the moment of the introduction of every new system,
there are inconveniences of transition, arising from the difficulty
of adjusting the present state of things with that which one
purposes to create in its stead. Thus the bons d'arrerages
delivered to the rentiers, the bons de requisition delivered to the
farmers, whose commodities had been taken on the spot, lastly,
the delegations on funds to be paid into the chests, delivered
with a culpable licence to certain contractors, were liable to>
derange all the calculations. Different methods were adopted
to remedy the inconveniences which resulted from the presence
of all these papers in the circulation. The bons d'arrerages r
given to the rentiers, had exclusively the favour of being still
received in payment of taxes; but the amount of them for the
current year was known, and by so much the sum of the obliga
tions which the receivers-general were to subscribe was diminished.
As for the bons de requisition and the delegations, papers of
suspicious origin, and the amount of which was unknown, they
were subjected to a particular liquidation. They were dis
charged at a later period, partly with national property, partly
" with paper of different kinds, and with due regard to equity.
By paying the rentiers in money, as it was proposed soon to
do, whenever the clue receipt of the contributions should be
secured ; by providing for the armies, and relieving them from
the necessity of recurring to the system of requisitions; by obsti
nately refusing to the contractors the irregular delegations, which
had. before been granted to them on the receipts of the treasury ;>
the government could not fail to dry up the source of the
paper circulation, and to re-establish everywhere the collection
of taxes in cash.
With these means, devised for ensuring the revenues of the
State, were combined measures, some of them quite legitimate
at any time, others still having the character of expedients and
the excuse of necessity. The purchasers of national domains,
doing as every body then did, that is to say, disregarding the-,

26 HISTORY OF THE [NoV. 1
laws, withheld the price of the immoveable property which they
had bought. They were required to pay it within four months,
upon patn of forfeiture. This obligation could not but bring
in a great part of the paper in circulation, which was specially
receivable in payment for national domains. Certain classes of
purchasers were to pav a portion of the price in cash, fror this
portion they were obliged to sign negotiable engagements.
These papers were safe and easy to be disposed of ; for those
who had signed them were threatened with the loss of their
purchases, if they suffered their engagements to be protested^
National domains to thevalueof300,000,000f.or400,000,00©f.,
still remained unsold. This value, entirely hypothetical, founded
on the estimates of 1790, might, if better times were waited for,
be worth double, treble, and even more. The best course would
have been not to dispose of them. Urgent necessity, however,
caused recourse to be had to a new alienation. It was decided
that rescriptions, representative of the price of the domains
proposed to be sold, should be negotiated to speculators, to the
amount of 150,000,000f. Luckily, a very small part only of
this sum was issued.
Lastly, a scheme was adopted for representing by paper of
the same kind the capital of certain ground-rents belonging to
the State, and which anterior laws had permitted the debtors
to redeem. This produced well-nigh 40,000,000f. The parties
who owed these rents had ceased to pay them, without
having, however, effected their redemption. Paper, destined to
represent this capital of 40,000,000f., and negotiable, like the
rescriptions on the national domains, through the medium of
stockbrokers, was issued.
These emissions of artificial securities were the last concessions
made to pressing wants. Disposed of to speculators, they were
destined to procure some resources till the re- establishment
of the finances, which there was reason to expect from the
punctual preparation of the assessments, and the system of
the bills of the receivers-general. For the rest, these papers, as
we shall see by and by, were issued with great reserve, and had
aS™a loTp™ olT' mmt**> '^ depimajion and the
Tu. m,;v, 1UW price of the resources of the State.
themselves hL. i T ^arious themes, undoubtedly good in
£e£ Foundtfont ^"^ °nthe solid% of the Government
stored ; if the executive powerSSntv^H ^ ™T ^^^ ""
in the execution of its plans if TfP3 ed vlSour and perseverance
new administration of the dire-V^T u Se-d weU and sPeedily the
care to require that the assessment ^''m^ ifit took constant
imt in irain to be collected "STSpti ^ T^6 °ut> and
bills of the receivers-general s^nt?rePuSCn,bed; tha* the
.hen d»e; ^.U^^^g*^,*

Nov. 1799.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 27
deposited in the caisse d'amorlissement in sufficient amount to up
hold the credit of the bills ; if, finally, it abandoned for ever
those ruinous expedients, such as bons d'arrerages, bons de re
quisition, and delegations, which it had promised itself to re
nounce. If all this were effected, it was certain to obtain the
beneficial results which were expected from the new financial
system. There was reason to hope for it too from the in
telligence and the firmness of General Bonaparte. All these
plans he had himself discussed, approved, nay, frequently modi
fied and improved ; he appreciated their importance and their
merit, and he was firmly resolved to see that they were strictly
executed. No sooner were they decided upon than they were
sent to the legislative commissions, which converted them into
laws, without the loss of a moment. Twenty days sufficed for
conceiving, for digesting, for clothing them with a legal cha
racter, and for carrying them partly into effect. General
Bonaparte was at work several times a week with the minister
of the finances, and he thus took the best method of putting an
end to those pernicious delegations, which were frequently
granted on the solicitation or througb the corrupting influence
of the contractors. Every week/he made the ministers bring
him a statement of their necessary expenses; he compared it
with the statement of the probable receipts furnished by the
treasury, and divided among them the real resources, in pro
portion to the wants of each. He disposed, therefore, of that
only which was certain to be collected ; and, in consequence of
this firmness, the principal abuse, that of the delegations, was
fated very soon to disappear.
In the mean time, till the assessments were completed, and
put in a train to be collected, and till the bills of the receivers-
general were transmitted to the treasury and discounted, the
government had for its present wants, besides the 12,000,000f.
lent by some of the bankers, the sums lodged by the receivers-
general in the caisse d'amortis sement, whatever amount could be
raised, through stock-brokers, upon the newly-created securities,
and, lastly, the current income or receipts, with which, most
imperfect as it was, a shift had hitherto been made. The
confidence inspired by the Provisional Consuls had a good
effect upon the brokers; means were found to negotiate the
new securities with them, though not a creature would have
taken them a few days before.
It was by these united means that the government was
enabled to relieve the naked and famished armies, and to pro
cure for them a first supply, of which they were in such urgent
want. So great was the disorder that, even at the office of the
minister of war, there were no returns of the troops, their num
ber, and their quarters. The office of the artillery was the only
one which possessed returns of this kind for the troops of that
arm. But, as the army was neither fed nor clothed, as the bat-

TNov. 1799.
28 HISTORY OF THE L1>luv
talions of conscripts, raised in the departments and equipped
with the Ions defourniture, had been most frequency o amsed
without the intervention of the central aiithouty, fatter' .new
scarcely any thing concerning them. General Bonaparte w as
oblgedto send officers of the staff to the armies themselves to
procure such documents as he wanted. He transmitted at the
same time, to the different corps, some supplies, but very inade
quate to the extent of their necessities. Addressing them, by
proclamation, in that language which he could render so impres
sive for soldiers, he conjured them to have patience a few days
longer, and to display, under hardships, the same courage which
they had oft displayed in battle.
" Soldiers," said he, " your wants are great : all possible
measures are taken to supply them. The first quality of a
soldier is constancy in enduring fatigue and privation ; valour,
is but the second. Several corps have quitted their positions ;
they have turned a deaf ear to the voice of their officers. The
17th Light is of this number. Are they all dead then — those
heroes who fought at Castiglione, at Rivoli, and at Neumarck?
They would have perished rather than abandon their colours,
and they would have recalled their young comrades to honour and
to their duty. Soldiers, your rations have not been regularly,
distributed, you say. What would you have done, if, like the
4th and 22d Light, and the 18th and 32d of the line, you had
found 3-ourselves in the midst of a desert, without bread or
water, feeding on horses' and mules' flesh ? ' Victory will give
us bread,' said they — and you quit your colours !
" Soldiers of Italy, a new general commands you : he was
always in the advanced guard in the most brilliant days of your
glory. Surround him with your confidence ; he will restore
victory to your ranks.
" I shall have a daily account sent me of the conduct of each
corps, and especially of that of the 17th Light, and of the 63d of
the line: they will recollect the confidence that I had in them."
The administration of the finances, and that of the armies,
were not the only departments of the government which claimed,'
m a pressing manner, the attention of the new Consuls. It was
necessary at the same time, to revoke those rigours, unworthy of
LT™ ?uma*V: government, which the violence of the parties
had wrung from the weakness of the expiring Directory ; it was
"T^lTelTrl °TdeT\ tWened bere ^ t^ V ndeans
of tri8tr0fdBrum£eereV0lUtl0niStS' CXaSPerated at the e™ts
iJ^SS^T^S^ ™ ^nsuls was relative to.
the Vendeans and Chouan rLnons b W "^ ^ relati°nS °f
the revolted provinces, punisW^l ^1 ^ COmmitted in
with transportation, t ^^£%?^m£%°*™.
forced loan, and, with much better reasonT the pul^X^

Nov. 1799.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. , '"" 29

s

version. It was, in fact, only under the influence of the blind
passions of this time, that men durst render the relations of the
insurgents responsible for acts which they had not committed,
even though they wished them success. The Consuls dealt with
this law as they had done with the law of the progressive forced
loan : they proposed its repeal to the legislative commissions, by
which it was immediately decreed. General Bonaparte went
himself to the prison of the Temple, where many of these
hostages were confined, to break tlieir fetters with his glorious
hands, and to receive those numerous benedictions, wliich the
reparative acts of the Consulate so invariably and so justly
called forth.
To this measure were added others of a like kind, which
stamped the policy of the Provisional Consuls with a precisely
similar character. Many priests, though they had taken that
oath as to the civil constitution of the clergy which became the
origin of the schism, had nevertheless been persecuted. These
priests, who were distinguished by the epithet assermentes
(sworn), were some of them concealed or fugitives ; others im
prisoned in the isles of Re and Oleron. The Consuls issued
orders for the release of all who were still in confinement. This
measure had the effect of drawing from their retreats, or bring
ing back to France, all the priests of the same class, who had
sought their safety in flight or concealment.
Several emigrants, shipwrecked off Calais, had been for some
time a subject of deep interest to the public mind. These un
fortunate persons, placed between the horrors of shipwreck and
the rigour of the laws against emigration, had not hesitated
to throw themselves on the shore of France, not imagining that
their country could be as pitiless to them as the tempest. The
partisans of measures of severity alleged, and the thing was
nearly certain, that these emigrants were going to La Vendee, to
take part in the renewal of the civil war; and they thence con
cluded that it was right to apply to them the terrible laws of the
time against emigration. But public humanj^;, luckily awakened,
was adverse to this mode of reasoning. The question had been K
several times resolved in a contrary spirit. At the instigation
of the new Consuls it was finally decided that these emigrants
should be liberated, but transported out of the territories of the
Republic. Among them were several members of the highest
families in France, and, in particular, that duke de Choiseul, j
whom we have since found invariably among the steady friends jj
of a discreet liberty, the only liberty that honest men can love 1
and deferidT""""*"
The acts which we have just recorded gave universal satis
faction. Admire the difference that can exist between one
government and another ! Had these acts emanated from
the Directory, they would have been termed unworthy conces
sions made to the emigrant party: emanating from the new

rNTov. 1799.
30 HISTORY OF THE LXNOV
consular government, at the head of which fip"^mu3ttious
general, w\ose presence wherever ^he ^ h PP- *be »
it is, that to be moderate with honour and with benefit, one must
neinSthis firsTmornent, it was only in regard to the revolutionary
party that the policy of the Provisional Consuls was deficient
ni moderation. It was with this party that the recent struggle-
had been on the 18th and 19th of Brumaire. Some irritation
and distrust were naturally felt towards it ; and, among these acts
of a conciliatory and reparative policy, severity was exercised
against it alone. The news of the 18th of Brumaire had pro
duced a strong sensation among the patriots- of -tho-Sowth-. " The
socie^es-affliat^-ixf'tHe- plirent~soci'ety~-of Ihe'Riding House,
formed in Paris, manifested redoubled indignation. It was re
ported that the deputies, deprived by the law of the 19th of
Brumaire jafJbeir^ualftyof members of- the legislative body,
were about to assemble atTbuloTiseJforTrie~plirp"rjse of-installing
there a sort of Directory. General Bonaparte, now that he had
in his hands the government and the army, was afraid of nothing.
He had shown, on the 13th of Vendemiaire, that he well- knew
how to quell insurrections, and he felt no uneasiness about what
a few het=hfiad.ed...^iatriots, without soldiers, were able to do.
But his colleagues, Sieyes and Roger-Ducos, had not the like
confidence. Several of the ministers joined them, and they
persuaded him that it was necessary to take precautions. In
clined himself, from disposition, to energetic measures, though
disposed, to moderation from policy, he consented to doom
thirty-eight members of the revolutionary party to transportation,
and eighteen others to confinement at La RocheUe. Among the
number were wretches, and one, in particular, who boasted of
having murdered the princess de Lamballe ; but there were also
honourable men, members of the two Councils, and one distin
guished and respectable personage, General Jourdan. His
pubhc opposition to the 18th of Brumaire had at the moment
excited some apprehensions. To inscribe the name of such a
man m such a list was a fault upon a fault.
rJnW -0pimon' though unfavourably disposed towards the
wilh = !' %^\lraSUreWi}h ^^ aDd alm°St
that th^v JL a- as ™e version to severity, to reactions,
Sfo h3 thems lvTs°to3 I™ 7^ T^ ^^ ^
strances poured £ Lmilon"?8 °1 " ^"^ Rem°n"
very higlfones, in favour *£££"''"* S°T ,<* .them 'T
of proscription. The Court ofP^ , " lncluded « this list
jn behalf of one of its mZlers 4T TT^^ a memorial
Reserved that so much Trouble houu'l H Uln' Th° had not
M. de Talleyrand, always ^^ ^^^4

Nov. 1799.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 31
in his proceedings, whom the revolutionary party contributed
by its aversion to keep out of the ministry of foreign affairs,
had the good feeling to interpose in favour of one Jorry, who
had publicly insulted him. He did so, he said, for fear the in
sertion of this vulgar offender's name in the list of the new
proscripts might be attributed to revenge on his part. His
published letter did him honour, and saved the person for whom
he pleaded. In compliance with a public demand, as it were,
General Jourdan's name was also erased. Most fortunately, the
speedy and favourable turn taken by events allowed the abro
gation of this act, which -was only an accidental deviation from
a course otherwise firm and straightforward.
General Bonaparte had sent his devoted lieutenant, General
Lannes, to Toulouse. On the mere appearance of this officer,
all preparations for resistance ceased. Tranquillity was restored
in the city of Toulouse ; the societies auxiliary to that of the
Riding House were shut up in all the cities of the South. The
hot-headed revolutionists soon saw that public opinion, re-acting
against them, had ceased to be in their favour, and they per
ceived at the head of the government a man whom nobody
could hope to be able to resist. Besides, the most rational of
them could not forget that it was this same man who, on the
13th of Vendemiaire, had dispersed the royalist bands of the
sections of Paris, which had risen against the Convention, and
who, under the Directory, by lending a hand to the government,
had furnished it with the means of bringing about the 18th of
Fructidor. They submitted, therefore : the most violent utter
ing some cries of rage which were soon stifled ; the others
hoping at least that under the military government of thfi_ new|
Cromwell, as they then called him, the revolution and France,'
wouToTnot be conquered for the advantage of the Bourbons, thi
English, the Austrians, and the Russians. \
A single act of resistance, not by force, but by legal means,
was offered to the 18th of Brumaire. The president of the
criminal tribunal of the Yonne, named Barnabe, following the
example of the ancient parliaments, refused to register the law
of the 19th of Brumaire, constituting the provisional govern
ment. This magistrate, denounced to the legislative commis
sions, was charged with having refused to perform his duties,
suspended, and removed from his seat. He submitted to his
fate with resignation and dignity.
The speedy defeat of these attempts at resistance allowed the
government to rescind a measure which was in contradiction
with its prudent policy. On a report from Cambaceres, minis
ter of justice, stating that order was re-established in the
departments, and that the laws were everywhere executed with
out impediment, the transportation decreed against the thirty-
eight individuals, and the confinement at RocheUe of eighteen

rffov. 1799.
32 niSTORY OF THE U*"
others, were commuted into mere surveillance, and this, too,
"Thrmtsurfwaf'soon eclipsed by the series of sensible,
iudicious and vLorous acts which marked the new government
l!a Vendrie had,ln its turn, created some uneasiness. A recen
rising had been attempted towards the end of the Direc torn
But the accession of General Bonaparte completely changed the
face of things, and the views entertained m all parts of the
Republic. • The leaders of the new royalist insurrection had
been excited to take up arms as much by the late severities of
the Directory, as by the hope of the speedy overthrow of that
o-overnment." But, on the one hand, the repeal of the law of
the hostages, the liberation of the priests, the grant of life to
the shipwrecked emigrants, had a conciliatory effect ; while, on
the other, the attainment of General Bonaparte to power put
an end to all hope of witnessing the dissolution of the order of
things which had sprung from the revolution. The 18th of
Brumaire had been productive of a change of sentiment in La
Vendee, as in other quarters, and given birth to feelings alto
gether new.
The royalist chiefs, some of whom were fighting in the fields
of La Vendee, while others were in Paris engaged in political
intrigues, worked up, like every party which seeks to overturn
a government, to a continual activity of mind, and incessantly
in quest of new combinations for rendering their cause tri
umphant, conceived that there might perhaps be some way of
coming to an understanding with General Bonaparte. They
thought that so eminent a personage could not be very desirous
of figuring for a few days on the shifting stage of the French-
revolution, only to disappear, like his predecessors, in the
abyss opened beneath their feet; and that he would much
rather occupy a place in a peaceable and regularly constituted
^monarchy, of which he would be the ornament and support.
They were, in short, so credulous as to hope that the part of
Monk would suit a man who considered even that of Crom
well as not great enough for him. They availed themselves of
the medium of one of those foreign diplomatic agents, who,
under the pretext of studying the country to which they are
accredited, dabble in all the underhand intrigues of parties, and
obtained an introduction to General Bonaparte. Messrs. Hyde
tele Si s^ep An°%ne were the royalists who ventured to
'iud^niertwhil85^ *£ dem°nstrate how very erroneous the
lave been This ^ v™6* °f General Bonaparte must
sTngtTand It Vea toe^Sd™' 1 "^ ^ °f ^
party! If he was not fond ofdLi i ^'^ °f *"?
Revolution; if he did notb^etlhe f'uU Z£ t itSy

NOV. 1799.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 33
which it had promised, he desired that total social reform,/
which it was its object to accomplish. He desired, therefore,
the triumph of that Revolution ; he desired the glory of termi-^,
nating it, and making it lead to a peaceful and regular state of .,,
things ; he desired to remain its head, with no matter what title,
under no matter what form of government : but as for being the
instrument of any other power than that of Providence, he had
already too much glory, and consciousness of his strength, to
consent to that,
He gave audience to Messrs. Hyde de Neuville and d'Andigne,
listened to their insinuations, more or less plain, and frankly
declared his intentions, which were to put an end to persecutions,*'
to reconcile. all the parties with the government; but to let none v
of them triumph, excepting that of the Revolution itself — of the
Revolution, understood in its better signification. He expressed
his fixed determination to treat with the Vendean insurgents on
reasonable conditions, or to exterminate them to the last man. .
This interview, then, led to nothing, and only served to make the
royalist party better acquainted with the general.
While these negotiations were taking place in Paris be- r
tween General Bonaparte and some friends of the Bourbons, ,'
others were carried on in La Vendee itself, between the leaders ;,
of the insurrection and the generals of the. Republic. Towards \
the end of the Directory, when nobody knew whom to obey, a
sort of laxity, nearly approaching to disloyalty, had crept into the
army which guarded La Vendee ; and more than one republican
officer, doubting the existence of the Republic much longer, had
turned their eyes towards the royalist party. Every thing having
changed with the accession of Bonaparte, these communications,
which had well nigh become dangerous, became, on the contrary,
useful, and the parleys took a new direction. The royalist
leaders, who drew to them the officers of the republican army,
were drawn in their turn, by those same officers, towards the
government of the Republic. It was pointed out to them how
little chance there was of conquering the conqueror of Italy and
Egypt, and what hopes they might indulge of obtaining from
him a mild and reparative system, which would render the con
dition of all parties peaceable and agreeable. This language
was not without success. At this moment there was at the head
of the army of the West a discreet, conciliatory, and trusty
officer, who had been much employed by General Hoche at
the time of the first pacification of La Vendue : this was General
Hedouville. He made himself master of all that was going
forward, and offered to communicate his information to the new
Consul. The latter at once availed himself of it, and ordered General
Hedouville to treat with the Vendean chiefs. These chiefs, in
timidated by the presence of General Bonaparte in power, mani
fested a disposition to come to terms. .There were difficulties in
VOL. I. D

34 HISTORY OF THE [Nov. 17 9.
the way of signing a capitulation forthwith, and of agreeing upon
the articles of that capitulation; but a suspension of arms was
not attended with the same difficulties. The chiefs offered to
sign one immediately. The offer was accepted on behalf of the
government, and, in a few days, Messrs. de Chatillon, d Auti-
champ, and de Bourmont, signed a suspension of arms for La
Vendee and part of Bretagne. It was agreed that they should
address themselves to Georges Cadoudal and to M. de Frotte,
and propose to them to adopt the like course in the Morbihan
and Normandy.
This act of the new government was not long in hand, for it
was accomplished at the beginning of Frimaire, about twenty
days after the installation of the Provisional Consuls. It afforded
general satisfaction, and led to surmises that the pacification! of
La Vendue was nearer than it could possibly be.
Some rumours of the like kind respecting foreign powers
likewise led people to hope, from the lucky star of General
Bonaparte, for a speedy re-establishment of the peace of Europe.
As we have said at the beginning of this book, Prussia and
Spain alone were at peace with France, the former always showing
coldness, the latter always embarrassed by her community of
interests with us. Russia, Austria, England, and all the lesser
powers in their train, both in Italy and in Germany, kept up an
obstinate conflict with the French Republic. England, with
whom the war was a mere question, of Jjnancej had resolved this
./question for herself DyestaMislirng the income-tax, which already—
/yielded an abundant revenue. Shejiecided, therefore,, to con
tinue hostilities,' that she might have time to take Malta, which
sbe was then blockading,' and^reduce the French army in Egypt
by blockading that country too. Austria, in possession of all
Italy, was determined to risk every thing rather than restore
that conquest. But the chivalrous Paul I., who had rushed into
the war from an inspiration of his wild enthusiasm, had just
seen his arms humbled at Zurich, and had, on this account, con
ceived a keen resentment against every body, but especially
against Austria. He had been persuaded that the latter was the
sole cause of this mischance ; for her soldiers bound, in terms
of a concerted movement, to advance on the Rhine, and to re
linquish Switzerland to the Russians, had; by quitting the position
of Zurich too soon, left Korsakoff exposed alone to the attack
ot Massena, who, having vanquished Korsakoff, had afterwards
rofof^h^l flWar0W- PaulL considered this as the
excited evervfcnPapS ^ aCt of treachery. Mistrust once
bad ^nJ^rZ^.TT^ him in an ^P^asant light. He
princes whom the French'RepubH/wPJr i^f161' ?""0neS *"
Austria had everywher hXted her ad hurledfr?m *em. Now,
recalled to ^cOW^^dJ%J%^S[' and had not
began to say to himse/thatf ^fa^gE^, £

Nov. 1799.] ' CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 35
was the dupe of allies who acted solely from interest. Fickle to
excess, he gave himself up to these new sentiments as violently
as he had before abandoned himself to the contrary sentiments.
One other circumstance had exasperated him in the highest
degree ; the Russian flag had been struck at Ancona, and the
Austrian hoisted in its stead. This was but a wrong done by an
inferior officer, but a wrong, of whatever kind it might be, that
touched him to the quick.
The sentiments of absolute princes, in spite of their pretensions
to secrecy, break forth as speedily as the sentiments of free
nations : the former, in fact, will not be repressed any more than
the latter. This new result of the battle of Zurich began to
be known all over Europe, and this was not the less fortunate
for us.
On this news, Austria and England redoubled their attentions
to Paul I. Suwarow, the invincible Suwarow (as he was called
before he encountered Massena) had been loaded with distinc
tions of all sorts. But the chagrin of the Russian general was
no more soothed than the resentment of the czar. A quite new
manifestation, on the part of Paul I., served more especially
to excite apprehensions that he would soon abandon the
coalition. In the first heat of his zeal for the coalition, he had declared
war against Spain, because she made common cause with France,
and he had well-nigh Issued a similar declaration against Swe
den, Denmark, and Prussia, because those powers determined
to remain neuter. With Prussia his relations had entirely
ceased. Since the late events, he appeared to be in much bet
ter humour with the courts against which he had before been so
inimically disposed, and sent, in particular, to Berlin, a diplo
matist who possessed his confidence, M. de Krudener, who was
directed to proceed thither as a mere traveller, but with the
secret commission to re-establish relations between the two
courts of Prussia and Russia.
We had then at Berlin a prudent and able agent, M. OttOj
whose name was afterwards associated with the most important
events of that period. He had apprised the government of-,
the new state of things. It was evident, in fact, that if we were
inclined to peace rather than war, the key of the situation was
in Berlin. Spain, thrown to the extremity of Europe by her
geographical position, and of politics by the weakness of her
government — Spain could.be of no utility. But Prussia, placed
in the midst of the belligerent powers, having remained neuter
in spite of their strong solicitations, ill thought of at first by all
the cabinets, in the first heat of the coalition ; afterwards more
favourably judged, since they had grown more calm; — Prussia
became the centre of influence, especially since Russia appeared
to court her. What had been called pusillanimity in her, now
began to pass for wisdom. This court, if it were to take up
D2

'36 HISTORY OF THE [NoV. 1799,
energetically the part that seemed to be assigned to it by events,
mi-ht serve for a link between France and Europe, might even
impose its mediation, that method, so much employed since
and with such profit, of interfering seasonably between weary
adversaries, and of reaping all the fruits both of the war, which
one has not waged, and of the peace which one has dictated.
Had Prussia dared to do this, she would not have played a
grander part since the days of the great Frederick.
At this period, there was on the throne of Prussia a young
king, honest, full of good intentions, passionately fond of peace,
and who never ceased to deplore the fault committed by his
father, in throwing away, upon a mad war against the French
Republic, the military glory and the treasure accumulated by the
great Frederick. Now, replaced in pacific relations with the
French Republic, he availed himself of them to retrieve by his
economy the treasure left by his great-uncle, and wasted by his
father. In his Council he had an able, intellectual minister,
M. d'Haugwitz, gifted in the highest degree with the talent of
eluding difficulties ; a partisan , like his master, of a pacific policy,
but more ambitious than he, and believing that from a well-
directed neutrality more extensive aggrandisements might be
derived for Prussia than from war itself. At that time, indeed,
this might be true. He therefore urged his sovereign to
assume actively the part of mediator and pacificator of the Con
tinent. The part, no doubt, was a very great one for the young.
and timid Frederick William ; but this prince was able to fill it
to a greater or less extent, and to take upon himself a portion,
if not the whole.
General Bonaparte, having perceived all this, immediately
^began diligently to caress the court of Prussia. It had at one time
been very convenient for him to be a member of the Institute,
that he might figure by that title only at certain solemnities,
especially at the festival held on the 21st of January, at which
he did not choose to appear in a political character ; it was noff
convenient for him to be a general and to have aides-de-camp to
send off whithersoever he thought fit. The idea occurred to him
to follow the example of sovereigns who, on ascending the
throne, despatch high dignitaries to announce their accession.
we did, in tact, the same thing with less show, by sending to
Berlin one of his aides-de-camp, which an entirely military head
Jo betnd'iS * /r^ ^nture to do, without appearing to
Spackv was onePnr id ^°ng th°Se wh° Served h™ in *at
had returned from Eryjtwhh wJ ™ \ ^ 7™ Dur0C' wh<>
some reflection of the^lorv of tnP§P ',fnd b°re °n his bn"!
ordered him to proceed fortS t/T^ The new ConSul
King and Queen of Prus ia, to pLent hi ' % 1° mpliment fte
witha mission of courtesy & ^, W^^rf

Dec. 1799.] consulate and the empire. 37
any occasion that might offer, to explain the last revolution
which had just been effected in France, to represent it as a return
to order, to sound traditions, and, above all, to pacific sentiments.
Duroc was to flatter the young king, and to hint that the
French government would be glad to make him, if he pleased,
the arbiter of the future peace. The Republic, strengthened by
the victories of the Texel and of Zurich, and by others, for
which the name of General Bonaparte was a pledge in future,
could, without fear for her dignity, present herself with the olive
branch of peace in her hand.
While he was despatching Duroc to Berlin, General Bonaparte
performed, in the name of the Provisional Consuls, several acts
¦designed to produce a similar impression abroad. In the first
place, after having for some time deferred the entry of M. de
Talleyrand upon the ministry of foreign affairs, he at length
¦called him to it. The post could not have been conferred on a
personage more conciliatory, more fitted to treat with Europe, s
more capable of pleastlrgrHay, even flattering it, without lower
ing the French cabinet from its elevated position. We shall
have other occasions for portraying this singular and remark
able character. Suffice it here to observe, that the choice of this
personage clearly proved that, without passing from energy tc
weakness, the French, government was abandoning the policy
of passions for the policy of calculation. There was nothing,!
¦even to that exquisite elegance of manners, peculiar to M. de
Talleyrand, that was not an advantage for the new position
which government sought to assume towards foreign powers.
General Bonaparte made some other diplomatic appointments,
conceived in the same spirit. Though M. Otto, charge d'affaires
at Berlin, since M. Sieyes quitted that post, was an excellent
agent, still he was but a mere charge d'affaires. Another desti
nation, in which he soon made himself very useful, was assigned
to him, and the appointment of minister at Berlin was given to
General Beurnonville, an old friend of Lafayette's, long the pri
soner of Austria, and one of those members of the minority of
the French noblesse, who had, in 1789, sincerely embraced the
cause of the Revolution. General Beurnonville was a straight- -
forward soldier; open, sincere, moderate in opinion, and perfectly
qualified for a fit representative of the new government. Austria,
whose prisoner he had long been, inspired him with a hatred,
which was a sort of passport in Berlin, where nearly the same
sentiments prevailed in regard to , that power as in the time of
the great Frederick.
For our representative at Madrid we had one of the dema
gogues of former years, a man without any sort of influence, who
has left no name in the diplomatic world, into which events had
-accidentally thrown him. He was superseded by a Constituent,
¦a discreet, clever, well-informed man, who figured with honour

38 HISTORY OF THE PeC'
in the diplomatic events of that time : ^.J™^,*^
"Lastlv in the place of a creature of the Directory s, named
GZldfe M Bourgoing was sent to Copenhagen, where the
S^rf maritime n^trality, so flagrantly violated by Eng
land, were likely to produce sentiments favourable to us. All
these appointments were excellent, and well ca culated to indi
cate the spirit of prudence and moderation, which began to pre
vail in the relations of France with foreign powers.
To the selection of these persons the consuls were solicitous
to add certain acts, which might serve for answer to a charge
generally circulated in the courts of Europe, alleging that the
French Republic w-as incessantly violating the law of nations, or
s the treaties concluded with her. Assuredly she had not violated
If the law of nations and treaties so much as Austria, England,
land all the courts at war with us ; but it was the practice to
tassert that it was impossible to have relations with an unstable,
passionate government, represented by new men, who never
considered themselves bound by their engagements, or by the
traditions of European public law. This reproach might be
flung back, with greater justice, upon the cabinets of Europe,
who had clone worse, without having the excuse either of revo
lutionary passions or of continual changes of government. To
convey a better idea of the policy of the Consuls, General
Bonaparte performed an act of justice towards the unfortunate
Knights of Malta, who, when possession was taken of the
island, had been promised that such of them as belonged to the
French tongue should not be treated in France as emigrants.
Hitherto they had not been able to benefit by this condition of
their capitulation, either in regard to their persons, or in regard
to their possessions. General Bonaparte caused them to be
put into the complete enjoyment of the advantage granted in
that capitulation.
In respect to Denmark, he adopted a measure, excellent in its
effect, and benevolently equitable. There were in the ports of
France many Danish vessels, detained by the Directory, by way
of reprisals in regard to neutral's. They were accused of
neglecting to uphold the rights of maritime neutrality, of sub
mitting to be searched bv the English, and allowing French pro
perty with which they were loaded, to be seized on board of them.
The Directory had declared that it would order them to be sub
jected to precisely the same acts of violence as they endured
on the part of the English, to compel them to defend with more
energy the principles of the law of nations, in virtue of which
they navigated. This would certainly have been but justice, if,
en3- t^ ITtl f^r6 reSPect> the? had ^t chosen to
emp oy it; but the unfortunate Danes did the best they could,
andit was narsh to punish them for the violence of oThers by
the violence of ourselves. I„ pursuance of this svste°™any

Dec. 1799.] consulate and the empire. 39
of their merchantmen had been detained. General Bonaparte
ordered them all to be released, in token of a more equitable
and more moderate policy.
Duroc, who was sent to Berlin, speedily arrived there, and"
was presented by M. Otto, who was still in that capital. Ac
cording to the strict rules of etiquette, Duroc, a mere aide-de
camp, could not be placed in direct communication with the
court. All these rules were set aside for an officer attached to
the person of General Bonaparte. He was received by the
king, by the queen, and incessantly invited to Potsdam.
Curiosity had as great a share as policy in these attentions ; for
glory, in addition to its lustre, has material advantages in public
affairs. To see, to hear, the aide-de-camp, Duroc, was like
approaching, though distantly, the extraordinary man whom the
whole world was talking of. Duroc had borne a part in the
battles of the Pyramids, Mount Tabor, and Aboukir. He was
asked a thousand questions, and he answered them simply,
truly, and without exaggeration. He appeared mild, polite,
modest, deeply submissive to his general, and furnished a most
advantageous idea of the kind of behaviour which that general
imposed upon all about him. The success of Duroc in Berlin
was complete. The queen manifested the greatest kindness
for him, and in all quarters people began to talk of the French
Republic in more favourable terms. Duroc found the young
king highly pleased to see a strong and moderate government
at length established in Paris, and, above all, flattered at being
courted at one and the same time by Russia and France,
earnestly desiring to play the part of mediator, but having more
desire than ability; showing, nevertheless, great zeal and ardour
for performing it.
The success of this mission engaged the courts of Europe, and
re-echoed as far as Paris itself. The idea of a speedy peace
soon began to gain ground. A very specious circumstance, but
in itself of little consequence, contributed singularly to the pro
pagation of this idea. The French and Austrian armies were in
presence of each other along the Rhine, and on the crests of the
Alps and the Apennines. On the Rhine, they were stopped by
an obstacle sufficient to prevent any serious operation ; for the
passage of the Rhine by either was too great an enterprise to ok
undertaken, unless with the determination to open the cani-\
paign. It was now the month of Frimaire, that is, December';
that was, therefore, not to be thought of. Skirmishes on th?
banks of the river became, under these circumstances, a useless
effusion of blood. An armistice was agreed upon for this
frontier. As for that of the Alps and the Apennines, the case
was different. In that country, abounding in such diversity of
situations, a well combined operation in this or that valley
might procure an enviable position for the resumption of
Operations. The parties, therefore, would not tie their hands in

40 HISTORY OF the [Dec. 1799.
that quarter, and no armistice took place there. But attention
was paid only to that which had been just signed upon the
Rhine; and among the happy changes which people pleased
themselves with expecting from the new government, was
classed the possibility, nay, the probability of a speedy peace.
In public evils there are always a real evil and an imaginary
evil, the one contributing to render the other insupportable. It
is a great point gained to do away with the imaginary evil ; for
you diminish the sense of the real evil and inspire him who has
to endure it with the patience to await the cure, and above all
a disposition to submit to the proposed remedy. Under the
Directory people had made up their minds not to expect any
thing from a weak, disrespected government, which, in order to
repress faction proceeded to violence, without obtaining any
of the effects of strength. Every thing that it did was taken in
bad part; people would not expect from it any good, neither
would they even beheve it, when, by accident, it accomplished
some little. Victory which had seemed to return to that go
vernment in the last days of its existence,-victory, which would
honour g yt° "' had n0t 6Ven Served t0Sainit
in ^T^T1 °f G^eral BonaParte> of whom the public was
in the habit of expecting every thing, in point of success, had
tZf n J1" d£Tltl0I\ The in-gmaiy evil was cured;
people hackocnfidence; they took every thing in good part
His acts were certainly good in themselves; for it was good to
'Hi nnsl ,°SrgeS' t0 "^^ the Priests> t0 manifest pacific
dispositions to Europe; but above all the public was disposed
ZlrZ lderthei? as such- f symptom of approach such as the
lerT tfTw &l a,ld«-.de-camP' » armistice of no cons*
were 1 ^ lY" Y jUSt been siSned on the Rhine,
confided f If 6d aS P!edSes °f Peace. Such is the spell of
Sf fo that V7 thl?g f°r a government at its outset;
money flowed ^ °°nsuh it: was immense. Accordingly,
whTch7 tlten wuln feaSry' fr0m the ^easury to the armies
foftLe thafwere nro686 fi;Sti. ^PJ51168' waited with patience
power reputedTo bePs, ed them ^ and b^ Overawed by a
mitted: C oppressbr10',-*0 all^^^e, the^jwties sub- <
oppress anymore thTonn leS7lth°Ut e^ngVnght to
that they should no Ion. P t partles with the confidence
plished, therefore, was nodo'nhf °pPres«ed" The good accom-
yet permitted to be done m!, \f J, f 5 but a11 that time had not
One thing was already ^S^ h,0Pe-
report of those who had tran«!£ a ln a11. <lUarters, on the daily
Consul; it was said that this soldW °usiness with the young
general of the present time and l'« ? Wh°m Was Placed n°
was, moreover, a consummate -uirl -C?Y &ny of Past times,

Dec. 1799.] consulate and the empire. 41
self, to whom he had listened with attention, whom he had even
enlightened by the justness and the promptness of his views,
whom he had besides protected against oppositions of every kind,
had not left him without being subjugated, and filled with a_drni=-
ration. This they admitted the more cheerfully, since it had
become all at once the fashion to think and to say so. Some
times we do see false merit succeed for a season in captivating the
popular mind, and commanding extravagant admiration; but
sometimes also it happens that genuine merit, that genius itself,
inspires this sort of caprice, which then becomes a passion.
It was but a month since Bonaparte had seized the direction of
affairs, and the impression already produced around him by his
powerful mind was general and profound. The good-natured
Roger-Ducos could talk of nothing else ; the humorist Sieyes,)
little disposed to give way to mere fashion, especially when he was
not the favourite of it, acknowledged the superiority, the uni-
versality.of that genius for government, and paid the purest of
homageDy leaving it to act. The panegyrists from conviction
were joined by those who praised from interest, and who, seeing
in General Bonaparte the evident chief of the new Republic, set
no bounds to the expression of their enthusiasm. General
Bonaparte had among his admirers, and, by the by, very sin
cere ones, Messrs. de Talleyrand, Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely,
Rcederer, Boulay (de la Meurthe), Defermon, Real, Dufresne,
&c, who everywhere repeated that never were seen such prompt
ness, such decision, such a grasp of mind, or such prodigious
activity ; and it is very true that what he had already accom
plished in one month in all the departments of the government
was immense, and, what is rarely the case, that, in this instance,
the reality equalled, all the inventions of flattery.
In all quarters he was considered as the man to whom the new
constitution would attribute the greatest share of the executive
power. People desired notji Cromwell ; this must be admitted '
to the honour of th'e~men of that day ;"and thejfriei*d*"of the
general said aloud that the parts of Ceesar and Cromwell were
worn out, and unworthy of the genius and the virtues of the
young saviour of France. What they wished was, that a suffiTi
eient concentration of the supreme authority in his hands, with
certain guarantees for liberty, should allow him to govern the
Republic prosperously and gloriously. Such was the wish oXthe^
moderate revoJu|h^sts,..thei)u,.the.,most numerou.s.*'"kThe jnthu-
siasttc"rev5^Tjor^ ypung^general as
a Cro"fnweiror a^ajsar, ,.de^jr^nexexyieJesj^jn,.Qr.der-Jiat they
nngtlt~§ecuTe"their Jieads^or their nationalmdomains,_that--he
shoT3laT5aVe_toajslto,lteep-^^ the ^4s§lE^is-
The^oydTists begged him to save J;hem from the_j£vclutionists
and-trrreconsti'fute "the supreme power, with some vague hope
that he would restore it to them after he had reconstituted it ;
and they were disposed, in that event, to pay him for the restitu-

42 history of the [Dec- 1799"
tion, were it even with the dignity of constable of Louis XVIII.,
if it must be so. „ ,
Thus all awarded to him the supreme power, more or less
completely, for a longer or shorter period, but with different
views. The new legislator, Sieyes, had therefore to make a place
for him in the new constitution which he was preparing. But
M. Sieyes was a dogmatic legislator, labouring -for the nature of
things, at least so he conceived, and not, for circumstances, still
less for one man, whoever he might be. The reader may judge
of this from what follows.
While his indefatigable colleague was governing, M. Sieyes
had at length applied himself to the task that was assigned to
him. To give a constitution to France, not one of those
ephemeral constitutions, the ridiculous offspring of ignorance
and the passions of parties, but a scientific constitution, founded
on the observation of societies arid the lessons" of experience,
|had been the day-dream of his life. In his solitary and morose
meditations he was incessantly engaged upon it. He had pon
dered over it amidst the sincere but inconsiderate proceedings
of the Constituent Assembly, amidst the gloomy frenzy of the
Convention, amidst the weaknesses of the Directory. At each
epoch he had remodelled his work ; he had at length made
up his mind, and, his mind once made up, he would not alter
any part of his plan. He would not sacrifice a whit of it to the
circumstances of the times, not even to the principal character
of the day, to General Bonaparte, for whom, however, it was
absolutely necessary to prepare a place adapted to the genius
and the character of him who was to occupy it.
This singular legislator, always meditating, but seldom writing
any more than acting, had never yet committed his constitution
to paper. It was in his head, from which it was now requisite
that he should draw it forth. This was no easy matter for him,
whatever desire he might feel to see it brought forward, and
converted into law. He was urgently pressed to make it
known, and at length decided to communicate his ideas to one
of his friends, M. Boulay de la Meurthe, who undertook to
write it down from the conversations which they should have
together. In this manner that remarkable conception was
gradually collected with accuracy, and preserved for posterity,
of which it is worthy.
_M Sieyes had made a powerful effort of mind to reconcile
,• the Republic and the monarchy; he had borrowed freely from
each such points as were useful and nece but, while
hadTkef SSt, ' h6 had ™lently distrusted-. both. He
tnS3/ ?reCaUt,°nS aSainst ^e demagogue spirit, on
the one hand and against the royal power, on the other He
had thus produced a scientific and completed work, but in
which every thing was so nicely balanced that if it were
a scientific and complicated work, "compact enough as a whole

Dec. 1799.] ' consulate and the empire. 43
but which, if modified for and by General Bonaparte, or deprived )
of one of its counterpoises, might, contrary to the intention
of its author, lead to nothing short of despotism. \
The first care of M. Sieyes in his combinations had been to
guard against demagogue passions. Without stripping the
nation completely of that immense participation in public
affairs, which it had enjoyed so unfortunately for itself, he
wished to leave to it a power which it could not abuse. An '
expression, which, for the first time, perhaps, was in every
mouth, that of representative government, conveys an accurate
idea of the feeling afloat at this period. It was understood by
this expression that the nation was to take part in its govern
ment, only by intermediate persons, that is to say, that it was
to be represented; and, as we shall soon see, it was but very
indirectly that it was intended to be so.
The elections under the Directory had brought in by turns,
the royalists at one period, the Jacobins at another, and it had
been found expedient to exclude by violence the former on the
18th of Fructidor, the latter on the 22d of Floreal. Thus the
system of elections, and especially of direct elections, had be
come highly suspicious to every body. Perhaps, if. the govern
ment had ventured to reduce the total number of~ the electors
to ~bne "hundred and fifty or two hundred, thousand, it might
have -tried to brave once more the electoral agitations. But an
electoral body, reduced to about the proportions of ours, would
have given offence but not security to the public. Twohundred
thousand electors granted to a nation, which had recently en-j
joyed universal suffrage, would have appeared an aristocracy a
and at the same time electors, how small soever their number,!
choosing directly their representatives, with liberty to give way
to all the passions of the moment, would have appeared a
renewal of the continual reactions which had been witnessed
under the Directory. A direct but restricted mode of election,*
such as now exists among us, was, therefore, out of the question. \
M. Sieyes, with ,his habitual dogmatism, had made a maxim for
himself. " Confidence," said he, " must come from below,
and power from above." To realise this maxim, he had ac
cordingly devised the system of national representation which
we are about to describe.
Every person of the age of twenty-one years, having the quality
of Frenchman, was to be obliged, if tie wished to enjoy his
rights, to get his name entered in a list called the Civic Register.
This might give a total of five or six million citizens ad- J
mitted to the exercise of their political rights. They were to \
meet by arrondissements (this circumscription, which did not
then exist, was to be proposed,) and to choose one-tenth of their
number. This designation of one-tenth would produce a first
list of five or six hundred thousand persons. These five or six
hundred thousand persons, meeting, in their turn, by depart-

44 history of the [Dec. 1799.
ments, and again choosing one-tenth from among themselves,
were called to form a second list, comprehending fifty or sixty
thousand citizens. These proceeded to a third selection and
reducing themselves again to one-tenth, formed the last list,
which was limited to five or six thousand candidates. Ihese
three lists were called lists of notability.
The first, of five or six hundred thousand persons, was called
the list of the communal notability; from it were to be taken
the members of the municipal administrations, those of the
councils of arrondissement, and other administrators on a par
with them, such as the maires, the functionaries whom we now
call sub-prefects, the judges of first instance, &c. The second
list, of fifty or sixty thousand persons, was called the list of the
departmental notability, and from this were to be chosen the
members of the departmental councils, the functionaries since
called prefects, the judges of appeal ; in short, all the functionaries
of that order. The last and third list, of five or six thousand
persons, constituted the list of the national notability ; and from
this were to be taken, obligatorily, all the members of the Legis
lative Body, all the functionaries of the higher order, councillors
of state, ministers, judges of the Court of Cassation, &c, &c. M.
Sieyes, borrowing a figure from geometry, to afford an idea of
this national representation — broad at the base, narrow at the
top — called it a pyramid.
Thus we see that, without attributing to the nation the right
of choosing itself the delegates charged to represent it, or the'
functionaries charged to govern it, M. Sieyes confined his inge
nuity to the formation of a list of candidates, from which were
to be selected both the representatives of the country and the
agents of the Executive. Every year the mass of the citizens
were to assemble for the purpose of erasing from these lists
those names that were not worthy to appear there, and to replace
them by others. It is to be remarked that if, on the one hand,
this power of designation was extremely indirect ; on the other,
it comprehended not only the members of the deliberative assem
blies, but the executive functionaries themselves. .Thisisless
and more than what is usually to be found in the monarchical
representative system. However, the agents called to perform
functions purely special, and not implying any political confi
dence such, for instance, as those belonfing to the financial
department, or agents called to perform functions so difficult
that merit, when it is met with, ought to be taken wherever it
may be found such as generals ancl ambassadors-these agents
Sy obligatorily from the lists of the nota-
We have shown howM. Sieves n^....- ^ i •
« confidence come from below?' £ u s nof ex^l ?"?' "^
" power descend from above." plam how he made
Under the influence of the impressions of the day, he

Dec. 1799.] consulate and the empire. 45
dreaded election, because he had recently seen passionate elec-"/
tors choose representatives as passionate as they were them
selves. He renounced it therefore, and intended that, in these
lists of notability formed by the public confidence, the legislative
power, and the executive power, should be authorised to desig
nate their own members, and thus constitute themselves. He
imposed on them no other limit than that of selecting from the
lists of notability. But, before we explain the mode of formation
of the powers, we must describe their organisation.
The legislative power was to be organised as follows : firstly,
the Legislative Body, properly so called, placed between two
opposite bodies, theTrihunate and the Council of State ; secondly,
apart and above, the Conservative Senate.
The Legislative Body was to be composed of three hundred
members, who were to hear the laws discussed, not themselves
to discuss them, and to vote silently. How, and between whom
the discussion took place, is now to be shown.
A body of one hundred members, called the Tribunate,1
charged to represent in this constitution the liberal, innovating,
spirit of inquiry, received communication of the laws, dis
cussed them in public, and voted, merely to decide whether it
should advocate their adoption or rejection before the Legislative
Body. It was then to appoint three of its members, to support
before the Legislative Body the opinion which had prevailed in
its own bosom.
A Council of State, the origin of that which now exists, but
superior in importance and in attributions, was attached to
the government, to draw up the proposed laws; it presented
them to the Legislative Body, and sent three of its members to
discuss them in opposition to the orators of the Tribunate.
Thus the Council of State pleading for, the Tribunate against
(that is to say, if the latter had disapproved the law), the Legis
lative Body voted in silence the adoption or rejection. Its vote
alone gave the character of law to the propositions of the go
vernment. The Council of State was moreover to complete the
laws by appending the regulations necessary for their execution.
Lastly came the Senate. This body, composed of one hundred
members, took no part in these legislative labours. It was
charged, spontaneously, or on the denunciation of the Tribunate,
to annul any law or any act of government which should appear
to it to be tainted with unconstitutionality. For this reason it
was called Conservative Senate. It was to be composed of men
who had attained mature age, excluded, bythe mere fact of their
belonging to the Senate, from all active functions, being conse
quently confined exclusively to their part of conservators and
having a considerable interest in performing it well, for M.
Sieyes intended that a handsome salary should be attached
to it.

46 history of the [Dee-
Such were the attributions of the deliberative powers. Here
follows their mode of formation.
The Senate composed itself by electing its own members out
of the list of the national notability. It nominated also the
members of the Legislative Body, of the Tribunate, and of the
Court of Cassation, choosing them by ballot out of that same
list of the national notability.
The executive power was likewise the author of its own for
mation, by choosing all its agents out of whichever of the
three lists of notability corresponded with the offices that were
to be filled up. It took the ministers, the councillors of State,
in short, the superior agents, from the list of the national nota
bility. From the list of the departmental notability it took, in
the first place, the councillors of department, who, like the
councillors of State, were considered as purely administrative
authorities ; it also took from it the prefects and the functiona
ries of each department ; and, lastly, from the list of the com
munal notability, it selected the municipal councils, the maires,
and all the functionaries of the like order.
Thus, as M. Sieyes designed, "confidence came from below,
power came from above."
But as, above the legislative power there was a supreme
creator, namely the Senate, so there was required, above the
executive power, a supreme creator, that should appoint the
ministers, who were then to appoint the functionaries, down to
the lowest step of the hierarchy. At the head of this executive
power, then, there was to.be a generative power. M. Sieyes had
given its possessor aname analogous to his function; he had called
him the Grand Elector. This supreme magistrate was confined
exclusively to one act : he was to choose two superior agents,
the only ones of their rank and kind, called, the one Consul of
peace, the other Consul of war. These then nominated the
ministers, who, under their personal responsibility, selected all
the agents of power from the lists of notability, governed, ,-.
administered, in short, managed the affairs of the State.
A magnificent existence was destined for this Grand Elector.
He was the generative principle of the government, and he was
likewise the outward representative of it. That inaction to which
M. Sieyes purposed to confine the Senators, to ensure their im
partiality and to which he had attached a yearly revenue of
100,000 livres in national domains,-that inaction, imposed upon
the Grand Elector from a similar motive, was to be accompanied
with a much more splendid income than that of the Senators,
for his vocation was to represent the entire Republic. M. Sieyes
to^eSeS? suTas thT T f ^^ ("40>000^ m^
ncent residences, such as the Tuileries in Paris, and Versailles
m the country, bes.des a guard of 3000 men. It waTin hi.
name that justice was to be administered, that the laws were to

Dec. 1799.] consulate and the empire. 47
be promulgated, and the acts of government executed. It was
to him that the foreign ministers were to be accredited, and
with his signature that the treaties with foreign powers were to
be provided. In short, he united with the important function
of choosing the two active heads of the government the splen
dour, call it vain, if you please, of outward state : in him was to
glitter all the luxury of a polished, elegant, and magnificent
nation. This Grand Elector himself must be supplied either by elec
tion or by hereditary succession. In the latter case, he would
be a king, and monarchy would be re-established in France.
But this M. Sieyes, whether he wished it or not, would not have
ventured openly to propose. He therefore assigned to the most
impartial of the bodies of the State, the Senate, the election of
this supreme magistrate, who himself was placed so high solely
that he might be as impartial as possible in his two selections.
A last formidable clause completed this complex machine.
The Senate, which had the power to annul any unconstitu- {,
tional act, law, or measure of the government, was endowed sj
moreover with the faculty of removing the Grand Elector from )
his functions by nominating him senator against his will. This ]
was what M. Sieyes called absorbing. The Senate might pursue j
the same course in regard to any citizen, whose importance or '
whose talents gave umbrage to the Republic. Thus there were
given to the citizen doomed to compulsory inaction by absorption <
into the Senate, — there were given to him, by way of indemnifi
cation, the importance, the well-paid idleness, of the members
of a body which could not act of itself, but which could, by its
veto, prevent all action whatsoever.
In this singular but profound conception, who can fail to dis
cover an image, faint, indistinct, perhaps designed to be so, of
representative monarchy ? This Legislative Body, this Senate,
this Grand Elector, were virtually a lower house, an upper house,
a king, the whole resting upon a sort of universal suffrage, but
with such precautions that democracy, aristocracy, royalty,
admitted into this constitution, were no sooner admitted than
nullified by it. Those lists of notability, from which the de
liberative bodies and the executive functionaries were alike to be
selected, what were they but universal suffrage, — universal, but
null ? for they formed so vast a circle of candidateship, that the
obligation to choose from this circle was an absolute power of
election granted to the government and to the Senate. That
mute Legislative Body, listening to the discussion of the law,
but taking no part itself in that discussion, having at its side the
Tribunate; and whose mission it was to oppose in debate the
Council of State, was but a sort of house of Commons cut in
two, one half having the right of voting, the other that of
speaking, and both nullified by this very separation ; for the
first was liable to fall asleep in the silence, the second to ex-

48 HISTORY OF THE

[Dec. 1799.
haust itself in barren debates. That Senate, nominating itself
and all the deliberative bodies, nominating the head ot tlie ex
ecutive power, and, if need were, absorbing him into its bosom;
that Senate, possessing all this power, but deprived I of _ active
functions, taking no part in new laws, but merely authorised to
annul any that were unconstitutional ; that Senate, reduced to a
sort of inaction, that it might be the more disinterested, and
animated solely by the sentiment of conservation ; that Senate
was an ingenious but exaggerated imitation of a titled aristocracy,
taking little part in the movement of affairs, sometimes checking
it by its veto, and receiving into its bosom the men who, after a
stormy career, gladly seek repose amidst a grave, influential,
and honoured body. Lastly, that Grand Elector was nothing
jbut royalty, confined to the nearly inactive yet important part
;of choosing the acting chiefs of the government ; it was royalty,
but with infinite precautions against its origin and its duration,
for it issued from the urn of the Senate, and might, upon oc
casion, be flung back into it again. In short, that universal
suffrage, that Legislative Body, that Tribunate, that Senate, that
Grand Elector, thus constituted, weakened, neutralised, the one
by the other, attested a prodigious effort of the human mind, in
order to combine all the known forms of government in one con
stitution, but for the purpose of afterwards annulling them by
dint of precautions.
Representative monarchy, it must be confessed, has, with
less trouble and effort, by trusting more to human nature, pro
cured, for two centuries past, an animated but not subversive
liberty, for one of the first nations of the world. Simple and
natural in its means, tlieJELrJJash^ee«stit-wtion~adj^^
aristocracy, and demoj^aGy_^j&eji,.after admitting them, it suffers
them to act freely, jmpo*ing~^jpon'4liem-'nojpjJier^6'n'dTtion hut
to govern by common consent. It does not limit the king to
this or thatactTit does not draw him forth by election, to
plunge him back afterwards ; it does not debar the peers from
active functions ; it does not deprive the elective assembly of
speech ; it does not grant universal suffrage, to render it null
afterwards by rendering it indirect ; it allows royalty and aris
tocracy to spring from their natural source, hereditary succession;
it admits of a king, of hereditary peers, but, on the other hand,
it leaves the nation to choose directly, according to its tastes or
its passions of the day, an assembly which, empowered to grant
or to refuse to royalty the means of governing, thus obliges it
; to take for directing chiefs of the government those men who
rtJ 12!! ^m the Public confidence. All that Sieyes,
they merely moderate too rapid an impulsion: the dective
chamber, full of the passions of the country, but checked bv two
other powers, chooses, in fact, the real leaders ofthe Stale,

Dec. 1799.] consulate and the empire. 49
raises them to the government, upholds them in it, or over
throws them, if they have ceased to correspond with its senti
ments. Here is a simple, a true constitution, because it is the
production of nature and of time, and not, like that of M.
Sieyes, the scientific but artificial work of a mind disgusted with
monarchy by the reign of the last Bourbons, and filled with
-dread of a republic by ten years of storms.
Now, let us suppose the times more calm ; let us suppose
this constitution of M. Sieyes put peaceably in practice, at a
period when the need of a powerful hand, like that of General
Bonaparte, would not have over-ruled all other considerations;
let us suppose that vast notability established, that Senate freely
drawing from its own bosom the bodies of the State, and the
head of the government, what would have happened ? Ere longi
the nation would have ceased to take any interest in the re-l
newal of the lists, which would be but an impotent medium for!
expressing its sentiments ; these lists would have become almost
permanent ; the Senate would have selected from them, at its
pleasure, the bodies of the State and the Grand Elector; and,
nominating the head of the executive power, having authority to
remove him at any moment, holding him in absolute dependence,
it would have been nearly every thing ; it would have been —
what? — the Venetian aristocracy, with its golden book, with its
pompous and impotent doge, charged every year to marry the
Adriatic Sea — a curious spectacle, and worthy of contemplation !
M. Sieyes, a man of profound and elevated mind, sincerely
attached to the liberty of his country, had, in ten years, run
round that circle of agitations, terrors, and disgusts, which had
led most of the republics of the middle ages, and the most cele
brated of them, that of Venice, to the golden book and a
nominal chief. He had arrived at last at the Venetian aristo
cracy, constituted for the benefit of the men of tile Revolution,
since it attributed, for ten years, to those who had exercised ;
functions since 1789, the privilege of figuring by right in the lists I
of notability; and he purposed, moreover, to reserve for himself j
and for three or four principal personages of the day the faculty of ;
composing, for the first time, all the bodies of the State.
But aristocracy is not to be created off-hand ; despotism alone
is. That harassed society could not find repose but in the arms
of a powerful chief. In this extraordinary Constitution every .
thing Avas admired, every thing admitted, every thing excepting
the Grand Elector, with his magnificent income, and apparently
nothing to do. In his stead was substituted an energetic and
active chief, General Bonaparte; and, by the change of a single
spring, this Constitution was destined, without any participation
of its author, to lead to the imperial despotism, which, with a
Conservative Senate, with a mute Legislative Body, we have seen
governing France for fifteen years, in a glorious but arbitrary
manner. VOL. i. E

1

ec.

1799.

50 history of the [P
When M. Sieyes had, with great effort, contrived to draw forth
all these combinations from the recesses of his mind, where they
had long been, as it were, buried, he laid them before his friend,
M. Boulay de la Meurthe, who committed them to paper, and
before various members of the two legislative commissions, by
whom they were communicated to those around them. The two
legislative commissions had divided into sections, and in each of
the two was a section of the Constitution. To these two united
sections M. Sieyes, when he could make himself master of his
ideas, explained his system. That system struck and astonished
every one by the novelty, the singularity, and the infinite art
of the combinations.
In the first place, the interests of the auditors of M. Sieyes
were not overlooked ; for he had, as we have observed, adopted
a transitory disposition, which was absolutely necessary. With
a view to save the Revolution, by keeping in power the men who
had been actors in it, he proposed a resolution nearly resembling
that by which the Convention had perpetuated itself in the two
Councils of the Ancients and the Five Hundred. He proposed
that all the men who, since 1789, had exercised public functions,
who had been members of the different assemblies, legislative,
departmental, or municipal, should have a right to be entered in
the lists of notability, and that these lists should not be made up
afresh for ten years. Moreover, Messrs. Sieyes, Roger-Ducos,
and General Bonaparte, were to appoint, for the first time, the
members of the bodies of the State, in virtue of the right which
they attributed to themselves of framing the new Constitution.
This disposition was bold, but indispensable; for, it is to he
observed, that all the new men who came in by means of the
elections, animated with a spirit of reaction then general, in
dulging, moreover, the ordinary propensity to censure what one
has not done, openly expressed a detestation of the acts and the
men of the Revolution, even when they held its principles. M.
Sieyes had, therefore, taken his precautions against the necessity
for a new 18th of Fructidor, by ensuring for ten years the put
ting in practice his Constitution by hands of which he was sure.
The ideas of M. Sieyes were suited to all interests. Every one
already thought that he was certain of being a senator, legislator,
councillor of State, or tribune; and to these charges liberal sala
ries were attached.
But, setting interest aside, the combinations seemed equally
new and skiltul. Men are easily filled with enthusiasm for mili
tary genius; but they as readily conceive an enthusiasm for what
has the appearance of depth of mind. Sieyes, the legislator, had
his enthusiasts, as well as General Bonaparte had his. The fists
iJlM^/rt*6114^'* of eombinations, especially
in the state of d.scredi .into which the elective system had fallen,
since the elections which returned the Clichyans, excluded by
the revolution of Fructidor, and the Jacobins, excluded by means

Dec. 1799.]: consulate and the empire. 51
of the scissions. The idea of a Council of State and a Tribunate
maintaining opposite sides of each question, before a mute Legis
lative Body, pleased persons weary of discussions, and urgently
demanding repose. The Senate, placed so high, and moreover
so useful for preserving harmony, had the power to get rid of
eminent and dangerous citizens by ostracism : all this found
numerous admirers.
The Grand Elector alone appeared a singularity to men who* \
having not yet reflected much on the English Constitution, did \
not comprehend a magistracy, limited to the sole duty of choos*
ing the superior agents of the government. They thought thatt
there was too little power for a king, and too much state and|
pomp for the mere president of a republic. In short, every bodyj
agreed that the place was not adapted to him who was to fill it,
namely, General Bonaparte. This place had too much shadow,
and too little real power; too much shadow, because it was
necessary to avoid alarming the public, by making the return
to monarchy too manifest; too little real power, because an
almost unlimited authority was needed by the man who was
charged to reorganize France. Certain minds, incapable of com-
prefienaling-th«-di§intgrestedness of a profound thinker, who had
studied only to make his conceptions harmonize together, and
not to combine the springs of his Constitution in a personal in
terest, these persons affirmed that the Grand Elector could not
have been invented for so active a character as General Bona
parte; that, of course, M. Sieyes could have devised it only for
himself; that he reserved for himself this place, and destined
that of Consul of war for his young colleague. This was a paltry
and malicious conjecture. With great power of thought, M.
Sieyes combined remarkable shrewdness of observation, and he
had too just a conception of his own personal position, and that
of the conqueror of Italy, to imagine that he himself could be
that kind of elective king, and General Bonaparte merely his
minister. In this he had obeyed solely the spirit of system.
Other interpreters, less malevolent, believed, in their turn, that
M. Sieyes did actually destine the post of Grand Elector for
General Bonaparte, but with a view to tie his hands, and, above
all, to cause him to be speedily, absorbed by the Conservative
Senate. The friends of liberty were not displeased with him
for it. The partisans of General Bonaparte could not speak of
this device of the Grand Elector without inveighing against it ;
and among them Lucien Bonaparte, who alternately crossed or
served the head of his family, but always capriciously, without
consistency or discretion ; sometimes acting the part of a bro
ther, passionately promoting the greatness of his brother; at
others, the citizen hostile to despotism, Lucien Bonaparte de
claimed with violence against the plan of M. Sieyes. He loudly
declared that there needed a president of the Republic, a Council
of State, and very little more ; that the country was tired of
e2

52 history of the [Dec. 1799.
babblers, and wanted only men of action. These inconsiderate
speeches were of a nature to produce the most mischievous
effect; but, fortunately, no great importance was attached to
the words of Lucien.
Amidst his incessant occupations, General Bonaparte had
heard the rumours circulated around him respecting the plan of
M. Sieyes. He left his colleague to proceed, in accordance
with a sort of division of attributions agreed upon between
them ; and he declined meddling with the Constitution till the
time should arrive for digesting it definitively, promising him
self, no doubt, to accommodate to his liking the place that was
destined for him. The reports, however, which reached him
from all quarters, at last irritated him, and he expressed his
displeasure with his usual warmth of language — a wrarmth
which was to be regretted, and which he was not always
master of.
The disapprobation which he expressed respecting some of
the ideas of the plan of the Constitution reached the author.
M. Sieyes was deeply pained by it. He was, in fact, afraid
that, having lost, from the ignorance and violence of preceding
times, the opportunity of becoming the legislator of France, he
should lose it once more through the despotic humour of the
colleague he had given himself in effecting the 18th of Bru
maire. Though a stranger to intrigue, and destitute of activity,
he bestirred himself more than ever to gain, one by one, the
members of the two legislative sections.
Meanwhile, his friend, M. Boulay de la Meurthe, and two
intimate friends of General Bonaparte's, Messrs. Rcederer and de
Talleyrand, anxious to preserve harmony between two so im
portant personages, actively exerted themselves to reconcile
them. M. Boulay de la Meurthe had accepted the commission
to transcribe the ideas of M. Sieyes, and had thus become the
confidant of his plan. M. Roederer was an old Constituent, a
clever man, a genuine politician after the fashion of the
eighteenth century, very fond of reasoning about the origin and
organization of societies, and framing plans of constitutions, ]
adding to this very decided monarchical predilections. M. de
Talleyrand, capable of comprehending and appreciating minds,
even the most contrary to his own, was alike touched by the
acting genius of young Bonaparte, and the speculative genius of
Sieyes, the philosopher ; he had a bias for both. He thought,
besides that these two men had need of one another, and
earnestly strove to promote the success of the affairs of the new
government. Messrs. Boulay de la Meurthe, Rcederer, and de
Talleyrand^ therefore exerted themselves to reconcile the
HE iSLl »t T at°r, ^ ^rview was prepared; it was
ispi ^^^^~ fas
mend the matter. General Bonaparte was under the impresioa

Dec. 1799.] consulate and the empire. 53
of the reports made to him concerning the Grand Elector, in
active, and liable to be absorbed by the Senate ; M. Sieyes was
soured by the condemnatory expressions which were attributed
to the general, and which had been, no doubt, exaggerated.
They met in the worst humour, did nothing but disagree, and
used the bitterest language to one another. M. Sieyes, who
needed composure for explaining his ideas, did not develop
them, on this occasion, with sufficient clearness and coherence.
General Bonaparte, on his part, was abrupt and impatient. They
inveighed against each other, and parted almost at enmity.
The mediators, in alarm, renewed their efforts to repair the ill
effect of this interview. They told M. Sieyes that he ought to
discuss with patience, to take pains to convince the general,
and, above all, to concede some points ; they said to the general
that, in this case, more forbearance than he exercised was re
quired ; that, without the support of M. Sieyes, and his authority
over the Council of the Ancients, General Bonaparte would
never have been able to obtain, on the 18th of Brumaire, the
decree which had put power into his hand : that M. Sieyes, as
a political personage, had immense influence with the public ; and
that, in case of a conflict between the legislator and the general,
many would declare in favour of the legislator, as the repre
sentative of the Revolution and of liberty, oppressed by a
soldier. The first moment was not favourable for attempting
a reconciliation ; it was necessary to wait a while. Messrs.
Boulay de la Meurthe and Roederer devised fresh models of ex
ecutive power, which should remove the two difficulties on which
General Bonaparte appeared inflexible — the inaction of the
Grand Elector, and the threat of ostracism suspended over his
head. They first thought of a Consul, with two colleagues to
assist him ; then of a Grand Elector, as M. Sieyes had pro
jected, who should nominate the two Consuls of peace and of
war, but also attend their deliberations, and decide between
them. This was not enough to satisfy General Bonaparte, and
it was a great deal too much for M. Sieyes, whose plan was thus
overthrown. Whenever it was proposed to M. Sieyes to make\
the head of the executive power participate in the government,
" It is a bit of the ancient monarchy/' he would say, " that you
want to give me. I won't have it." In fact, he would hear
nothing but the royalty of England, minus the title of king,
irremoveability, and hereditary succession. This was still very
far from the mark, and M. Sieyes, with that promptness,
of discouragement incident to speculative minds/ when they
find obstacles thrown in their way by the nature of things, M»
Sieyes said that he would have nothing further to do with the
matter ; that he would quit Paris, retire to the country, and leave
young Bonaparte alone, with his nascent despotism revealed to
every eye. " He means to go ?" said the general ; " let him.
I will get a Constitution drawn up by Roederer, propose it to

ec.

1799.

54 HISTORY OF THE [P'
the two legislative sections, and satisfy public opinion, which
requires the affair to be settled." He deceived himself when he
talked in that manner, for it was still too early to show France
his sword quite unsheathed; he would have met with unexpected
resistance in more quarters than one. ......
Nevertheless, these two men, who, in spite of their instinctive
dislike, had managed to agree for a moment to consummate the
18th of Brumaire, were destined to come to an understanding
once more to make a constitution. The reports which were
circulated had roused the legislative commissions ; they knew
what language Lucien Bonaparte held; how decided a tone the
general took upon the subject; what a disposition to relinquish
every thing was manifested by M. Sieyes. They said to them
selves, and very justly, that, after all, it was on them the task of
framing a constitution properly devolved ; that they ought
to do their duty, draw up a plan, present it to the Consuls, and
force them to agree, after effecting a reasonable compromise be
tween them.
They accordingly fell to work; and, as the ideas of M.' Sieyes
had been communicated to some of the members of the commis
sion, and had been approved by these, they adopted his plan as
the basis of theirs. To a . systematic mind, the adoption of all
its ideas save one causes it almost as much vexation as the re
jection of the whole. To take the plan of M. Sieyes for the
basis of the new Constitution, was, nevertheless, an important
concession. He began, at length, to grow somewhat calmer; and
General Bonaparte, seeing the commissions apply themselves to
their task, and prosecute it resolutely, became himself a great
deal milder. This moment was seized for a new attempt at re
conciliation. A second interview took place between M. Sieyes
and the general, at which Messrs. Boulay de la Meurthe,
Roederer, and de Talleyrand, were present. This time the two
principal interlocutors were more calm, and more disposed to
agree. Instead of jostling one another as before, by dwelling,
in preference, on the points upon which they disagreed, they
strove, on the contrary, to arrive at a better understanding, by
introducing those topics only upon which their opinions chimed.
M. Sieyes was moderate and full of tact; the general displayed his
usual good sense and originality of mind. The subject of their
conversation was the state of France, the Vices of the preceding
constitutions, and the precautions to be taken in a new consti
tution to prevent the past disorders. On all this they could not
fail to agree. They separated, therefore, pleased with one ano
ther; and they promised, as soon as the sections had finished
then, work to call them together, for the purpose of adopting or
modifying their propositions and, at length, relinquishing the
provisional system, which betran tr, ^i;„„i h"1=,""j5
f M. Sieyes hid thenceforwarT the ^^"fluT"7 A
j his Grand Elector, and some .tiK.Vai ConSva-

Dec. 1799.] consulate and the empire. 55
tive Senate, he should carry the adoption of his entire Con
stitution. In the first ten days of Frimaire (from the 20th of November
to the 1st of December) the sections had completed their plan.
General Bonaparte summoned them to his residence, to meetings
at which the Consuls were to be present. Some members of
the sections thought this convocation not very consistent with
their dignity ; and yet, having made up their minds to pass over
many difficulties, to concede much to the man who was so
necessary, they complied with the summons.
The sittings commenced immediately. At the first, M. Sieyes
was charged to communicate his plan, since that plan was the
very foundation of the work of the commissions. This he did
with a force of thought and language which produced the
strongest impression on his hearers. " All this is fine and pro
found," said the general ; " yet there are several points which
deserve serious discussion. But let us proceed regularly; let
us consider consecutively the different parts of the plan, and
choose a secretary. Citizen Daunou, take the pen." Thus it
was that M. Daunou became the compiler of the new Constitu
tion. This labour occupied several sittings, and the following
resolutions were agreed upon.
The lists of the communal, departmental, and national nota
bility were successively adopted. They were too well calculated
to neutralise the popular action, by rendering it indirect, not to
suit the apprehensions of the moment, and the notions of Genera]
Bonaparte. Two accessory provisions, the one conformable^
the other contrary, to the ideas of M. Sieyes, were adopted. It ,
was decided that the functionaries of every kind should not be
obligatorily chosen from the lists of notability, unless when the
Constitution should have designated them by name. No objec
tion, indeed, was made to the selection of the members of the
deliberative bodies, the consuls, the ministers, the judges, the
administrators, from these lists ; but generals, ambassadors ! that
appeared exorbitant. The second decision was relative, not
to the groundwork of the plan, but to the necessity of adapting
it to the then state of things. Instead of putting off the re
formation of the lists for ten years, it was deferred to the year IX,
that is to say, for one year ; and it was agreed that all the mem
bers of the great bodies of the State should be nominated im
mediately by an act of the constituent power, and that the
persons so nominated should be entered as of right in the
first lists. The revision, instead of being annual, was to be
triennial. They next proceeded to the organisation of the great powers.
The maxim of M. Sieyes, "confidence ought to come from be
low, power ought to come from above," entirely prevailed. The \
right of electing was placed above ; but with the obligation to \
choose out of the lists of notability. The Senate of M. Sieyes

56 history of the [Dec 17991
was adopted, as well as the Legislative Body, placed between
the Council of State and the Tribunate. The Senate was to
choose from the lists of notability, in the first place the senators
themselves, then the members of the Legislative Body, of the
Tribunate, of the Court of Cassation, of the Commission of
Accountability (since Court of Accounts), and, lastly, the chief
or chiefs of the executive power. However, the Senate — and this
was a considerable limitation of its attributions — was to nomi
nate the senators only upon the presentation of three candidates,
one proposed by the Consuls, another by the Legislative Body,.
and the third by the Tribunate. As for the Council of State,
this body, forming part of the executive power, was to be nomi
nated by that power. Besides the faculty of making the most
important nominations, the Senate received the supreme attri
bution of repealing laws or acts of the government tainted with
unconstitutionality. For the rest, it was not to have any part
in the making of the laws ; and its members could not exercise
active functions.
The Legislative Body, mute, agreeably to the plan of M.
Sieyes, was to listen to the contradictory arguments of three
councillors of State and three tribunes, and then to vote, with
out discussion, on the propositions of the government.
The Tribunate alone had the faculty of publicly discussing
the laws ; but it was to vote merely for the purpose of deciding-
what opinion it should support before the Legislative Body.
Its vote, even negative, did not prevent the law from being lawr
if the Legislative Body had adopted it. The Tribunate had not
the initiative of legal propositions ; but it could express its-
wishes ; it received petitions, and transmitted them to the diffe
rent authorities whom they concerned.
The Senate was to consist of 80 members instead of 100, as
M. Sieyes at first desired : 60 to be nominated immediately, 20
in the course of the ensuing ten years. The Legislative Body
was to be composed of 300 members, the Tribunate of 100.
The Senators were to enjoy a salarv of 25,000 francs per
annum; the legislators 10,000; the tribunes 15,000. So far
the plan of M. Sieyes was adopted entire, excepting some
limitations in the authority of the Senate. But this plan was.
destined to undergo considerable modification in the organiza
tion of the executive power.
This was the capital point, and on this General Bonaparte was-
inflexible. M. Sieyes, already resigned to the rejection of
this part of his plan, was nevertheless invited to explain
his idea^. Accordingly he proposed the institution of the
Grand Elector before the assembled commissions. No one, it
must be admitted, not even General Bonaparte, had then re
flected sufficiently on the organization of the powers in a frea
government, to comprehend the profundity of that conception,
/and to discover the analogy which it presented with the W of

Dec. 1799.] consulate and the empire. 57
the English monarchy. But General Bonaparte, had he turned
his mind to the consideration of the question in this point of
view, would not have assented to it on any account, from mo
tives purely personal, and which it is easy to comprehend. He
criticised with sarcastic humour this Grand Elector. Concern
ing his splendid idleness he said what all kings say, only with
less wit than he, and less foundation ; for, in presence of a
subverted society to reorganize, of sanguinary factions to quell,
of the world to conquer, it was excusable to wish to reserve for
himself the full and free employment of his genius. But if, in
these first days of the Consulate, when there were so many
things to be done, he was perhaps right in not suffering his
talents to be fettered ; afterwards, sublime victim of misfortune
at St. Helena, he must have regretted the liberty that was given
him to exercise them without restraint. Cramped in the em
ployment of his faculties, undoubtedly he would not have
achieved such mighty things, but he would not have attempted
such extravagant things ; and his sceptre and his sword would
probably have remained till his death in his glorious hands.
"Your Grand Elector," said he to M. Sieyes, "is a do-
nothing king, and the time of do-nothing kings is gone by.
What man of head and heart would submit to such a sluggish
life, at the price of six millions and an abode in the Tuileries 1
What ! nominate persons who act and not act oneself ! it is
inadmissible. And, then, you think by this device to prevent
your Grand Elector from intermeddling in the government.
Were I this Grand Elector, I would nevertheless engage to do
all that you wished me not to do. I would say to the. two-
consuls of peace and war, ' If you do not choose such a person,
or if you do not take such a measure, I will turn you out.*
And I would soon oblige them to act as I pleased. I would
make myself master again in a round-about way."
Here General Bonaparte himself, with his usual sagacity,
penetrated the truth, and discovered that this inaction of the-
Grand Elector was not a state of nullity ; for this supreme ma
gistrate had, at certain moments, the means of reappearing omni
potent in the arena where the parties were disputing for power,
by coming to withdraw it from the one for the purpose of con-s
ferring it on the other. But this superintendence of English!
royalty over the government could not suit that ardent youngl
man ; and he must be pardoned for it, for this was_n.either the|
Blasa-nor- the time for constitutional royalty.
I he Grand Elector perished under the sarcasms of the young
general, and under a power much greater than that of sarcasms ,,
the power of present necessity. At that time; a real dictator- j
ship was, in fact, required, and the authority attributed to the j
Grand~ElecT6Twa¥TaTTronf adequate to the wants of the mo- '
ment. There was another part of the institution proposed by M„

58 history of the £Dec. 1799.
Sieyes which General Bonaparte as decidedly rejected, because
he could not help regarding it as a snare : this was the faculty
of absorption assigned to the Senate, not only m regard to the
Grand Elector, but to every eminent citizen whose greatness
might give umbrage.
The general would not consent that, after several years' emi
nent services, any one should have the power to bury him alive
in the bosom of the Senate, and to reduce him to forced idle
ness, for a pension of 25,000 francs. He obtained satisfaction
on this new point ; and the executive power was definitively
organized in the following manner.
It was agreed to institute a First Consul, accompanied by two
others, to disguise in some measure the omnipotence of the
former. This First Consul had the direct and sole nomi
nation of the members of the general administration of the
Republic, of the members of the departmental and municipal
Councils, of the administrators since called prefects and sub-
prefects, of the municipal agents, &c. He had the nomination
of all military and naval officers, of the councillors of State, of
the ministers sent to foreign powers, of the civil and criminal
j udges, excepting the juges de paix and the members of the
Court of Cassation. He could not depose the judges when
once appointed: irremoveability was therefore substituted to
election, as a guarantee of independence.
Besides the nomination of the administrative officers, military
and judicial, the First Consul had the entire government, the
direction of war and diplomacy; he signed treaties, without
prejudice to their discussion and adoption by the Legislative
Body, in the same form as laws. In these various functions he
was to be assisted by the two other Consuls, who had merely a
consultative voice, but who could record their opinion in a
register of deliberations kept for that purpose. Evidently,
those two Consuls were placed there to mask the immense au
thority assigned to General Bonaparte — an authority, the
duration of which was pretty long, and might even become per
petual ; for the three Consuls were elected for ten years, and,
moreover, indefinitely re-eligible. A vestige of the absorption
devised by M. Sieyes was retained. The First Consul on
quitting office, by resignation or otherwise, became a senator
m full right, that is to say, was thenceforward excluded from
public functions. The two other Consuls, not having exercised
the plenitude of power, were at liberty to refuse this well-
endowed but nullifying appointment, and were not to become
senators unless they consented to be so
-f The Snnn;11811*1 v" s° We an annual allowance of 500,000
francs (20,000/ sterling), and each of the others of 150,000
francs (6,000* sterling) All three were to reside in the Tuile
ries. A consular guard was to attend them
Such were the principal provisions of the famous Consti-

Dec. 1799.] consulate and the empire. 59
tution of the year VIII. Thus M. Sieyes saw the attributions
of the Senate curtailed, and an all-powerful chief substituted for
his inactive Grand Elector ; which caused his Constitution to
lead, a few years later, not to aristocracy but to despotism.
This Constitution comprehended no declaration of rights, I
but, by means of some general provisions, it guaranteed indi
vidual liberty, the inviolability of the citizen's dwelling, the J
responsibility of ministers, and that of the inferior agents,'
without prejudice, in the case of the latter, to the previous ap
probation of prosecution bythe Council of State. It stipulated
that a law might, in certain departments, and in certain extraor
dinary cases, suspend the action of the Constitution, which was
equivalent to what we have since called, putting in a state of
siege. It ensured pensions to the widows and children of
soldiers, and lastly, by a sort of reversion to ideas long pro
scribed, it laid down as a principle that national rewards might
be granted to men who should have rendered eminent services.
This was the germ of an institution since celebrated : that of
the Legion of Honour.
The plan of M. Sieyes contained two forcible and admirable j
ideas, both of which have been retained in our administrative!
organization ; the divjsionjcJ the country into arrondissements i
and the Council of State.
Thus M. Sieyes was the author of all the administrative cir
cumscriptions of France. He had already conceived the division
into departments and induced its adoption ; he wished on tins
occasion that the cantonal administrations, which existed to the
number of five thousand, should be superseded by administra
tions of arrondissement, which, much less numerous, were a
more convenient intermediate between the commune and the
department. The principle only was laid down in the Constitu
tion ; but it was agreed that a law should ere long reform, upon this
principle, the administrative system in France, and put an end
to the communal anarchy, a melancholy picture of which has
been given above. There was to be a tribunal of first instance
for each arrondissement, and a tribunal of appeal for several
united departments.
The second of the creations of M. Sieyes, which belongs ex
clusively to himself, is the Council of State, a deliberative body
attached to the executive power, preparing the laws, supporting
them before the legislative power, adding to them the regulations
which ought to accompany the laws, and rendering the laws
administrative. This is the most practical of his conceptions,
and, with the preceding, it must outlive the present and subsist
in future times. To the honour of this legislator be it said, j
Time has swept away all the ephemeral Constitutions of the Re- j
volution, but the only parts of these Constitutions which have j
survived have been his work.
It was not enough to settle the dispositions of the new Con-

60 history of the [Dec. 1799.
stitution; it was indispensable to add to it the personnel of the
powers, to seek it in the men of the Revolution, and even to
designate it in the constitutional act. It was requisite, there
fore, after determining all the dispositions that have just been
enumerated, to direct attention to the choice of the persons.
General Bonaparte was nominated First Consul for ten years.
It cannot be said that he was chosen, so strongly was he indi
cated by the situation : he was accepted from the hands of vic
tory and necessity. His position once fixed, the next point
was to find one for M. Sieyes. This great personage had little
turn for business, and still less for secondary parts. It did not
suit him to be the assistant of young Bonaparte, and he refused,
in consequence, to be second Consul. We shall see presently
what place more conformable to his character was assigned to
him. For second Consul was chosen M. Cambaceres, an emi
nent lawyer, who had acquired high importance among the
political characters of the time by great knowledge, prudence,
and tact. He was at this period minister of justice. M. Lebrun,
a distinguished writer, who had drawn up the Maupeou edicts,
classed, under the old government, among the men disposed to
wise reforms, ever faithful to the cause of moderate Revolution,
well versed in financial matters, and too mild to be a trouble
some contradictor, M. Lebrun was selected for third Consul.
M. Cambaceres could ably second General Bonaparte in the ad
ministration of justice ; M. Lebrun could be a useful assistant
to him in the administration of the finances ; and both could aid
him essentially without crossing him in any way. It was impos
sible to associate more suitably the men destined to compose
the new government ; and from these appointments were
to flow all the others in the organization of the executive
power. It was necessary to proceed to the composition of the delibe
rative bodies. There the natural part for M. Sieyes was pointed
out of itself. It had been written in the Constitution that the
Senate should elect the members of all the deliberative bodies.
The point was to decide who should compose the Senate for the
first time. It was decreed by a special article of the Consti
tution that Messrs. Sieyes and Roger-Ducos, who were about to
cease to be Consuls, conjointly with Messrs. Cambaceres and
Lebrun, who were on the point of becoming so, should nomi-
nat® the a°solute majority of the Senate, that is, 31 members out
of 60. I he 31 senators elected in this manner were then to
elect by ballot the 29 who were deficient. The Senate, as soon
as it was complete was to compose the Legislative Body, the
Tribunate, and the Court of Cassation
By means of these different combinations, General Bonaparte
found himself at the head of the executive power, but, at the
same time, a sort of delicacy was observed in excluding him
from the composition of the deliberative bodies called to control

Dec. 1799.] consulate and the empire. 61
his acts ; this duty was left principally to M. Sieyes, whose
active part would then be finished, and to him the presidency of
the Senate was ensured, as a retirement. The positions were
thus suitably settled and appearances saved.
*It was decided that the Constitution should be submitted to
the national opinion, by means of registers opened at the mairies,
and at the offices of the justices of peace, notaries, and clerks
of the tribunals, and that, till its acceptance, of which no doubt
appeared to be entertained, the First Consul, the retiring
Consuls, and the two Consuls elect, should proceed to make
those appointments with which they were charged, so that, on
the 1st of Niv6se the great powers of the State might be con
stituted, and ready to put in practice the new Constitution. It
was indispensable to put an end to that dictatorship of the Pro
visional Consuls, which began to produce a gloom in some
minds, and to satisfy the general impatience that was felt to see
at last a definitive government established. Every body, in's
fact, longed for a stable and just government, which should!
ensure the strength and unity of power, without stifling all I
liberty ; under which honest and capable men, of all ranks and!
of all parties, should find the place that was due to them. \
These wishesjjit mustjbe, admitted,. ikjv&g.not impossible ,to
satisfyunder the Constitution Lof„th,e year VIII j it would even '
have satisfied~lKem^ompletely, but for those violences to i
which it was subjected at a later period by an extraordinary!
genius, which, however, favoured as it was by circumstances, !
would have overthrown much stronger barriers than those that i
the legislative work of M. Sieyes, or any other which it was then. \
possible to devise, could have opposed to it.
The Constitution, decreed in the night between the 12th. >
and the 13th of December, (21st and 22nd Frimaire,) was pro
mulgated on the 15th of December, 1799, to the great satis
faction of its authors, and of the public itself.
It charmed the minds of all by the novelty of the ideas, by
the skill of the contrivances. Every body began to feel confi
dence in it, and in the men who were about to carry it into
execution. It was preceded by the following preamble : —
" Citizens !
" The Constitution, now promulgated, puts an end to the
uncertainty caused by the Provisional Government in the exter
nal relations, and in the internal and military situation of the
Republic. " It places in the institutions which it establishes the first
magistrates, whose devotedness has appeared necessary to its
activity. " The Constitution is founded on the true principles of repre-

62 history of the [Dec. 1799.
sentative government, on the sacred rights of property, of
equality, and of liberty.
" The powers which it institutes will be strong and stable,
as they must be, in order to guarantee the rights of the citizens^
and the interests of the State.
" Citizens ! The Revolution is confined to the principles which
commenced it : it is finished."
' Two such men as General Bonaparte and M. Sieyes proclaim
ing in 1800, " The Revolution is finished!" What a singular
proof of the illusions of the human mind ! Still it must be
admitted that something was finished — that was anarchy.
_ Great was the joy of all those, who had had a hand in this
work, to see it finished. Some of the ideas of M. Sieyes had
been rejected ; nearly his whole Constitution was nevertheless
adopted, and, without an absolute power, like that of Solon,
Lycurgus, or Mahomet, a power which, in our times of doubt,.
no man can obtain, it was scarcely possible to infuse a larger
portion of his conception into the Constitution of a great
people. And, such as it was, if the conqueror of Marengo had
not afterwards made two considerable changes in it — the ad
dition of the imperial succession, and the retrenchment of the
Tribunate — this Constitution might have furnished a career
which would not have been the triumph of absolute power.
M. Sieyes, having put the sword which had served to over
throw the Directory into the hand of General Bonaparte,
having framed a Constitution, was about to consign France to
the devouring activity of the young Consul, and to retire, for
his own part, into that meditative idleness, which he preferred
to the stirring bustle of business. The new First Consul was
desirous to give to the legislator of France a testimonial of
national gratitude : at his instigation, the gift of the estate of
Crosne was proposed to the legislative commissions. This
gift was decreed, and announced to M. Sieyes with the noblest
expressions of public gratitude. M. Sieyes was, highly gratified;
for, notwithstanding an incontestable probity, he had a relish
for the indulgences of fortune, and he could not but be touched
also by the dignified and delicate manner in which this national
recompense was bestowed on him.
Preparations were then made for putting the Constitution in
force in the first days of January, 1800, (Niv6se, year VIII.,)
that is, in the first days of the year which was about to close
that extraordinary century.

Dec. 1799.] consulate and the empire. 63

BOOK IL

internal government.
Definitive Establishment of the Consular Government — Composition of the
Senate, of the Legislative Body, of the Tribunate, and of the Council of
State (Conseil tfEtat) — The First Consul's Manifesto to the Powers of
Europe — Public Offers of Peace made to England and to Austria — Procla
im mation addressed to La Vendee — Opening of the First Session — Germs of
^Opposition in the Tribunate — Speeches of the Tribunes, Duveyrier and
"' Benjamin Constant — A considerable Majority approves the Measures of
the Consuls — Numerous Laws for the Organization of Public Bodies —
Institution of Prefectures and of Sub-Prefectures — Creation of Tribunals of
First Instance, and of Appeal — The List of Emigrants closed and discon
tinued — Restoration of the Right to dispose of Property by Will — Law
relating to Income and Expenditure. — The Bank of France — Sequel
of Negotiations with European Powers — Refusal of England to entertain-
the Proposals of Peace— Warm Debate on This'Subject in the British
Parliament — The Refusal of Austria couched in milder, but not less firm
Terms than that of England — Necessity for recommencing Hostilities — On
the Rejection of his Overtures bytne'Belligerent Powers, the First Consul
endeavours to propitiate Prussia, and frankly explains his Views — He
strives to bring the War in La Vendue to a close before commencing the
Campaign of 1800 — Position of Parties in La Vendee — Proceedings of the
Abbe Bernier— Peace of Montfaucon — Messrs. d'Autichamp, de Chatillon,
de Bourmont, and Georges Cadoudal, proceed to Paris and see the First
Consul— M. de Frotte is shot— Final Submission of La Vendee— Troops
are put in march for the Frontiers— The Session of the Year VIII. closes
in quiet — Police regulations in regard to the Press — Funeral Ceremony on
the Occasion"oT~the Death of Washington— The First Consul takes up t
his Abode at the Palace of the Tuileries.

( 65 )

BOOK II.
INTERNAL GOVERNMENT.
The 4th Niv6se of the year VIII. (25th of December, 1799),
was the day appointed for the entry of the Consuls on their
functions, and the first sitting of the Conservative Senate.
Numerous appointments were necessarily made prior to that
¦date, it being requisite to organise both the Executive power,
and the Senate, before they could proceed to business.
General Bonaparte, upon whom it devolved to appoint the
agents of the Executive Power, as well as Messrs. Sieyes,
Roger-Ducos, Cambaceres, and Lebrun, who were entrusted
with the selection of the members of the Senate (who again, in
their turn, had to choose the members of the Legislative Body
and the Tribunate), were beset by solicitations from every
quarter. The applicants sought to be appointed either Senators
or members of the Legislative Body, Tribunes, Councillors of
State, or Prefects; and really these important posts, all con
ferring handsome emoluments, and all to be filled up at once,
were calculated to tempt the ambitious. Many fiery revolu
tionists, enemies of the 18th Brumaire, were already wonderfully
appeased. Many of those waverers, who only make up their
minds after success, were beginning to express their sentiments
aloud. There was at that time, as there always is, an expression
of the day, which depicted to a nicety the state of the public
mind. " We must speak out" (il faut se montrer), were words
in every mouth ; " we must show that, far from wishing to throw
fresh obstacles in the way of the new Government, we are, on
the contrary, ready to assist in overcoming those which
surround it;" which, in reality, meant, that the speaker was
anxious to attract the notice of the five personages who had all
the patronage in their hands. Among the applicants, there
were even some who, to secure their appointment to the
Tribunate, promised their zealous support to the Consular
government, although they had beforehand made up their
minds to pursue towards it a system of vexatious annoyance.
In revolutions, when the fire of the passions begins to burn
low, cupidity may be seen to succeed violence, and the terror
of the spectator is almost suddenly changed into disgust. Were
VOL. I. F

66 history of the [Dec. 1799.
it not that deeds of lofty virtue and heroic actions covered
with their lustre the sad details ; and especially were it not that
the vast and beneficial results which nations derive from social
revolutions compensated for the present evil by an immensity
of good to come, we might well turn our eyes from the spectacle
which they present to the world. But they are the trials to
which Providence subjects human society for its regeneration,
and we ought, therefore, to study with care, and, if possible,
with advantage, the scene alternately repulsive and sublime.
It appears that the impulse thus given to the ambitious of all
classes was strong enough to attract the attention of public
writers, and to afford a subject for their pens. Even the Moniteur,
which was not yet an official organ, but became so a few days
later (the 7th Nivose) — ;the Moniteur felt called on to stigmatise
the meanness displayed by the applicants.
" Since the Constitution," said that paper, " has created a
number of well-paid posts, how many people are in a stir ! how
many faces, little known, are anxious to show themselves ! how
many forgotten names are again wriggling under the dust of the
Revolution ! how many haughty republicans of the year VII.
are humbling themselves, that they may reach the ear of the
man of power, who can provide for them ! What numbers of
Brutuses are soliciting appointments ! how many men of slender
abilities are extolled to the skies! what trifling services are
exaggerated! how many bloody spots are hidden from sight!
This wonderful change of scene has taken plaee in a moment.
Let us hope that the hero of liberty, he who has hitherto dis
tinguished himself in the Revolution only by conferring benefits,
will view these manoeuvres with the disgust which they excite
in every noble mind, and that he will not tolerate the attempt
of a crowd of obscure or disreputable individuals to shroud
themselves under the rays of his glory." — Moniteur of the 3rd
Nivose. Let us, however, in fairness, separate the good from the bad,
and let it not be supposed that the above picture was that of
the whole nation. If there were men who demeaned themselves,
and others who, without stooping so low, yet put themselves
forward, some at least awaited in a becoming manner the appeal
which the government was about to make to their intelligence
and zeal. If M. Constant, for instance, sought to be admitted
to the Tribunate with eagerness and great assurances of de-
votedness to the- Bonaparte family, Messrs. de Tracy, Volney,
Monge, Carnot, Ginguene, and Ducis, made no applications, but
left it to the free choice of the constituent power to include them
or not in that vast nomination of public functionaries.
On the 24th of December (3rd Nivose) the new Consuls met,
and proceeded to appoint the members of the Council of State, in
order that the installation of the Government might take place
the next day, 25th of December (4th Nivose). Messrs. Sieyes

Dec. 1799.] consulate and the empire. 67
and Roger-Ducos, the two Consuls going out, along with Messrs.
Cambaceres and Lebrun, the two coming into office, then pro
ceeded to the Luxembourg to nominate thirty-one members (one
more than a moiety) of the Senate, in order that that body might
meet on the following day, choose the remaining members, and
proceed to the formation of the great deliberating bodies.
The Council of State was divided into five sections ; the first
of the finances, the second of civil and criminal legislation, the
third of wrar, the fourth of the marine, the fifth of the interior.
Each section was to be presided over by a Councillor of State,
and the entire Council by the First Consul ; or, in his absence,
by one of his two colleagues, Cambaceres or Lebrun.
Each section was to draw up the bills (projets de lot), and the
regulations relating to the matters within its competence. These
bills and regulations were afterwards to be discussed in a gene
ral assembly of all the sections. The Council of State was
further charged to decide contested points of administration, and
disputes as to competence, both betwixt the civil tribunals and
the administration, and between the tribunals themselves. These
are the very powers which it exercises at the present day ; but
at that period it possessed solely the privilege of drawing up the
laws, with the exclusive right to discuss them before the Legis
lative Body; and, further, it was made acquainted with great
government questions, and sometimes with those of foreign
policy, as several instances in the sequel will show. The Council
of State, therefore, was not at that period a mere Council of
Administration, but a real Council of Government.
Several members of that Body were also charged, in the dif
ferent ministerial departments, with certain specific services, to
which it was thought desirable either to attach greater import
ance, or to secure extraordinary attention : these were the de
partments of Public Instruction, the Treasury, the Domains
(Woods and Forests), the Colonies, and Public Works. The
Councillors of State charged with the management of these
various branches were placed under the authority of the proper
Minister. The members of the Council of State were to enjoy
the handsome salary of 25,000 francs (1000Z. sterling) each, and
the Presidents 35,000 francs each (1400/. sterling). These sums,
it must be borne in mind, were, at that time, more considerable
than they would be now-a-days. The appointments to the Coun
cil of State were more sought after than the appointments to the
Senate, because, besides enjoying the same emoluments as the
Senators and equal rank, the Councillors participated, as much
as the ministers themselves, in the management of the most im
portant business.
The principal members of this important body were — in the
section of war, Messrs. Lacuee, Brune, and Marmont; in the
section of the marine, Messrs. De Champagny, Ganteaume, and
Fleurieu ; in the section of the finances, Messrs. Defermon,
F 2

68 history of the [Dec. 1799.
Duchatel, and Dufresne ; in the section of justice, Messrs.
Boulay de la Meurthe, Berlier, and Real; in the section of
the interior, Messrs. Roederer, Cretet, Chaptal, Regnault de
Saint-Jean-d'Angely, and Fourcroy. The five presidents were
Messrs. Brune, Ganteaume, Defermon, Boulay de la Meurthe,
and Roederer. It would certainly have been impossible to
select names of greater note, or talents more genuine and
diverse. I must observe, that the French Revolution had been prodi
giously prolific of men of talent in every profession, and that
there were materials for composing a most diversified, able, and,
let me add, glorious phalanx of government officers : provided
only that no attention were, in future, paid to the exclusions
pronounced by one party against another. This was the course
pursued by the new Consul. He appointed, for instance, to the
section of the finances, M. Devaisnes, loudly accused, at that
time, of Royalism ; but possessing, in that branch of business,
a practical knowledge which had been, and has since been,
extremely useful.
On the same day, 24th of December (3rd Nivose), Messrs.
Sieyes, Roger-Ducos, Cambaceres, and Lebrun, met for the
purpose of nominating twenty-nine senators, who, with the two
Consuls about to go out of office, should form together thirty-
one members. The list, as might be supposed, had been pre
viously prepared ; it contained names of high standing, such as
Messrs. Berthollet, Laplace (lately minister of the interior),
Monge, Tracy, Volney, Cabanis, Kellerman, Garat, Lacepede,
and Ducis. The last named declined the post.
On the following day, 25th of December (4th Niv6se), the
Council of State met for the first time. The Consuls, accom
panied by the ministers, were present at the sitting. The sub
ject under deliberation was a bill to fix the reciprocal relations of
the great bodies of the State. Several measures, which it was
necessary to prepare for presentation to the Legislative Body in
the approaching session, were also agreed upon.
The Senate, on the other hand, met at the palace of the
Luxembourg, and proceeded to elect twenty-nine new members,
who, added to the thirty-one already chosen, made the number
of Senators in all sixty. The reader will remember that this
number was subsequently to be increased to eighty. The sup
plemental list also contained some very distinguished characters,
such as Messrs. Lagrange, Darcet, Francois de Neufchateau,
Daubenton, Bougainville, Perregaux the banker; and, lastly, a
man of very old family, M. de Choiseul- Praslin.
In the following days the Senate was engaged in forming the
Legislative Body and the Tribunate. For the Legislative Body
they chose the moderate men of every period ; members of the
Constituent Assembly, of the Legislative Assembly, of the Na
tional Convention, and of the Five Hundred. Care was taken

Dec. 1799.] consulate and the empire 69
to select from these different assemblies such men as had little
courted distinction and popularity, or panted for success in the
turmoil of public affairs ; whilst those who were known for the
contrary tastes were reserved for the Tribunate. Consequently,
the three hundred names which composed the Legislative Body
could not be very brilliant ; and it would be difficult to discover
in that numerous list two or three names which are known at
the present day. One of them was the modest and brave
Latour-d'Auvergne, a hero worthy of antiquity for his virtues,
his exploits, and his glorious end.
Among the hundred members of the Tribunate, selected
with the very natural, but ere long bitterly repented, object
of affording a field for active, stirring minds, desirous of
fame, were many celebrated personages, some of whose names
may be somewhat effaced, but are not altogether forgotten
at this hour. They were Messrs. Chenier, Andrieux, Chau-
velin, Stanislas de Girardin, Benjamin Constant, Daunou,
Riouffe, Berenger, Ganilh, Ginguene, Laromiguiere, Jean
Baptiste Say, &c.
No sooner was the formation of these bodies terminated,
than the edifices assigned to them were got ready. The Tui
leries was reserved for the three Consuls ; the Luxembourg was
appropriated to the Senate, the Palais Bourbon to the Legisla
tive Body, and the Palais Royal to the Tribunate.
Several hundred thousand francs were expended in making
the Tuileries habitable, and, until the completion of the neces
sary repairs, the Consuls took up their residence at the Petit
Luxembourg. General Bonaparte had already effected much since his return
from Egypt : he had overthrown the Directory, and acquired
an authority, apparently inferior, but in reality superior, to that
of constitutional monarchy. But he had only just possessed
himself of that authority, and it yet remained for him to
legitimatise its assumption by measures of utility and great
actions. He had still an immense deal to accomplish, and his
first attempts at reorganisation were only one effort, already
successful, it is true, but which still left the country exposed to
sad disorder and deep suffering : there were still, penury at the
Treasury, privation in the armies, the flame of civil war in La
Vendee, hesitation on the part of the neutral powers, and a
determination truly obstinate to continue the struggle on the
part of the belligerent powers. Still, that assumption of power,
succeeding his first toils, and preceding the immense task which
he felt the confidence of ere long accomplishing, charmed his
ambitious soul.
To celebrate the installation of his government, he performed
a series of acts, purposely accumulated, and in which there were
discernible profound policy, heartfelt joy, and that generosity
which satisfaction imparts to every feeling and benevolent mind.

70 history of the [Dec. 1799.
These measures were successively announced between the 25th of
December (4th Nivose) the day of the installation of the Consular
government and the 1st of January, 1800 (11th Niv6se), the
day of the opening of the first legislative session.
In the first place, a judgment of the Council of State of the
27th of December (6th Nivose) declared that the laws which ex
eluded the relations of emigrants and the former nobles from
public functions, should cease as a matter of course, because
these laws w7ere at variance with the principles of the new
Constitution. A certain number of individuals belonging to the revolu
tionary party had been condemned, as we have before seen, to
banishment or imprisonment, in consequence of a measure
adopted, with little reflection, a few days after the 18th Bru
maire. The banishment and imprisonment had been mitigated
to surveillance of the political police. A decree of the 5th Ni
vose did away even with the surveillance. Having made this repa
ration to those who had well nigh experienced his severity, the
First Consul performed a more important and more necessary
act of justice towards the victims of the Directory and of the
preceding governments.
Such as had been banished without a regular trial were au
thorised to return to France, upon condition that they should
reside in the places assigned. This measure extended to per
sons proscribed at every period, but more especially to the
proscripts of the 18th Fructidor. Messrs. Boissy-cTAnglas,
Dumolard, and Pastoret were recalled, and the first was autho
rised to reside at Annonay, the second at Grenoble, and the
third at Dijon. Messrs. Carnot, Portalis, Quatremere-Quincey, ,>•
Simeon, Villaret-Joyeuse, Barbe-Marbois, and Barrere, were also
recalled and authorised to reside in Paris. The care taken to
assign the capital for their place of abode to such men as
Messrs. Carnot, Simeon, and Portalis, although they were not
natives of it, clearly indicated that the Government had its eye
upon them, and meant to turn their talents to account.
Other measures were adopted in respect of religious worship
and its free celebration. On the 28th of December (7th Niv6se)
it was decreed that the edifices set apart for religious ceremonies
should continue to be used for these purposes, or should be
again appropriated to them,, in case they had not been already
restored to the ministers of the different persuasions. Certain
local authorities, wishing to obstruct the exercise of the Catholic
worship, forbade the opening of the churches on Sundays, and
only allowed it on the Dicadi. The Consuls reversed the mu
nicipal decisions of this sort, and added to the restitution of the
religious edifices the free permission to make use of them on the
days appointed by each persuasion. For the present, however, they
did not dare to prohibit the ceremonies of the Theophilanthro
pists, which took place in the churches, on certain days of the

Dec. 1799.] consulate and the empire. 71
week, and which were viewed as profanations by the Ca
tholics. The Consuls caused the form of engagement which was re
quired from the priests to be modified. Hitherto they had been
called on to take a special oath to the civil constitution of the
Clergy — an oath which obliged them to recognise a legislation,
at variance, according to some of them, with the laws of the
Church. It was suggested only to impose on them a simple
promise of obedience to the Constitution of the State ; which
no one of them could reasonably scruple to give, without re
fusing that obedience to Ccesar which the Catholic religion so
rigorously prescribes. This is what was afterwards termed the
promise, as distinguished from the oath, and which led a great
number of priests immediately to resume their religious duties.
The assermentes, priests who took the oath, had already enjoyed
the favour of the Government ; it was.;now the turn of the non-
assermentes (nonjurors). V
To the preceding measures the new rFirst Consul added one
which must have appeared to every one as peculiarly his own,
since it recalled to mind matters which were in a manner
personal to himself. He had negotiated with the deceased
Pope, Pius VI., and signed, at the gates of Rome, the treaty
of Tolentino. He had, ever since the year 1797, affected to
show great respect for this head of the Catholic Church, and
had received from his Holiness marked testimonies of good
will. Pius VI., who died at Valence, in Dauphine, had not
yet obtained the honours of burial. His mortal remains were
deposited in a sacristy. General Bonaparte, on his way home
from Egypt, saw Cardinal Spina at Valence, learned these par
ticulars, and resolved soon to make amends for this most un
becoming neglect.
Accordingly, on the 30th of December (9th Niv6se), he in
duced the Consuls to join in a decree, grounded on the noblest
considerations. " The Consuls," so ran this decree, " considering that the
body of Pius VI. has, for six months, been deposited in the
town of Valence, without having yet had the honours of
sepulture granted to it ;
" That, though this old man, respectable for his misfortunes,
may have been for a moment the enemy of France, it was only
because he was misled by the counsels of those who surrounded
his advanced years ;
" That it is befitting the dignity of the French nation, and
conformable, to its character, to show its respect for a man
who occupied one of the highest offices upon earth ;
" The Consuls decree," &c. &c. The clauses which followed
directed not only that funeral honours should be paid to the
Pontiff's remains, but that a monument should also record the
rank of the departed Prince.

72 history of the [Dec. 1799.
This demonstration produced more effect, perhaps, than the
most humane measures would have done, because it struck the
imagination, accustomed to other spectacles. Immense numbers
thronged, in consequence, to Valence, to avail themselves of the
authorisation thus given for making a religious manifestation.
The list of the revolutionary festivals contained one conceived
in a truly woful spirit, namely, that which was celebrated on
the 21st of January.* Whatever might be the sentiments of
the men of all parties respecting the tragic event connected
with that date, it was a barbarous festival, which was designed
to commemorate a sanguinary catastrophe. In the time of the
Directory, General Bonaparte had shown a strong repugnance-
to attend at it ; not that he had then any-idea of honouring
royalty, which he was one day to re-establish for his own profit,
but he liked to defy publicly the passions which he did not
share. Now that he had become the head of the government,
he instigated the legislative commissions to decide that in-
future there should be no more than two festivals — that of the
14th of July, the anniversary of the first day of the Revolution,.
and that of the 1st of Vendemiaire, the anniversary of the first
day of the Republic. " These days," said he, " are imperishable
in the memory of the citizens ; they were hailed by all French
men with unanimous transports, and awaken no recollectionr
tending to produce division among the friends of the Republic."
It needed all the power, all the boldness, of the head of the
new government to venture upon a series of measures which,
though just, politic, and moral in themselves, nevertheless
appeared to hot-headed enthusiasts so many preliminary acts of
a complete counter-revolution. But, in doing all this, General
Bonaparte took care to set the first example himself of the obli
vion of political animosities, sometimes to rouse with emphasis
that sense of glory by which he led the men of the time, and
raised them above the base and furious passions of parties.
Thus General Augereau had offended him by unbecoming
conduct on the 18th of Brumaire; he nevertheless appointed
him to the command of the army in Holland.
" Show," he wrote to him, in a letter which was published,.
" show, in all the acts that your command will give you occasion
to perform, that you are above those miserable party dissensions,
the recoil of which has unfortunately, for these ten years, torn
France in pieces  If circumstances oblige me to take the
field in person, be assured that I shall not leave you in Holland,
and that I shall never forget the glorious day of Castiglione."
At the same time he instituted arms of honour, a prelude
to the foundation of the Legion of Honour. French demo
cracy, after such vehement demonstrations of its horror of
personal distinctions, could, at most, tolerate at that time
* The anniversary of the execution of Louis XVI.

Dec. 1799.] consulate and the empire. 73
rewards for military actions. In pursuance of an article of
the Constitution, the- First Consul caused a resolution to be
passed, that, for every brilliant actioVi, a musket of honour should
te presented to the infantry, a carabine of honour to the cavalry,
grenadoes of honour to the artillery, and, lastly, swords of
honour to officers of all ranks. The First Consul followed up
the institution, decreed on the 25th of December (4th Nivose),
by positive acts. Next day he awarded a sword to General St.
Cyr, for .a brilliant action which he had just fought in the
Apennines. " I offer you," said he to him, " in token of my
, satisfaction, a handsome sword, which you will wear on days of
battle. Let the soldiers under your command know that I am
content with them, and that I hope to be still more so."
To thes'e acts, which proclaimed the actual assumption of
power, which marked the character of his government, and
clearly showed his disposition to set himself above all party
passions, the First Consul immediately added proceedings of
higher importance, as well in regard to La Vendee, as to the
European powers.
A suspension of arms had been signed with the Vendeans,
conferences with them had begun, and yet the pacification was
no forwarder. General Bonaparte had left little doubt in the
minds of the royalists, who had addressed themselves to him for
the purpose of sounding his intentions, and ascertaining whether
he would not be satisfied with being the restorer, the support,
the first subject, of the house of Bourbon. He had undeceived
them, by showing himself irrevocably attached to the cause of
the French Revolution. This frankness in his declarations had
not tended to promote the conciliation that was begun. The
Vendean chiefs hesitated. They were placed between fear,
excited by the vigour of the new government, and the solicita
tions of the emigrants in London, who were authorised to
promise them, on behalf of Mr, Pitt, arms, money, and troops.
It was on a fresh insurrection in La Vendee that England par
ticularly reckoned. She purposed making on that part of our
coast an attempt similar to that which had been tried in Hol
land. The failure of that expedition had not discouraged her;
and she earnestly solicited of the Emperor Paul the co-operation
of his troops, without much chance, indeed, of obtaining it.
Prussia, which began to testify a sort of interest for the consular
government, Prussia never ceased repeating to Duroc, the aide-
de-camp, and to M. Otto, the charge d'affaires of France, " Get
La Vendee off your hands, for it is there that the most serious
blows will be levelled at you."
Of this General Bonaparte was aware. Not only did La
Vendee weaken the armies of the Republic by absorbing part of
their forces, but to him civil war seemed both a misfortune and
a sort of dishonour for a government, as it attested a deplorable
internal condition. He had, therefore, taken the most efficacious

74 history of the [Dec. 1799.
measures for bringing that business to a conclusion. He had
recalled from Holland a portion of the army which, under Ge
neral Brune, had recently defeated the combined English and
Russians; he had added to it part of the garrison of Paris,
which he could diminish considerably without apprehension, the
spell of his name serving in lieu of material force ; and in this
manner lie had contrived to assemble in the West an excellent
army of about 60,000 men. General Brune was placed at the
head of this force, with the recommendation to retain, as his
principal lieutenant, the prudent and conciliatory Hedouville,
who held all the threads of the negotiation with the royalists.
The name of General Brune was an answer to those who
reckoned upon a new landing of the Anglo-Russians. But, be
fore striking a decisive blow, if the conditions of the pacification
were not finally accepted, the First Consul deemed it right to
address the Vendeans on the very day of his installation.
On the 29th of December (8th Nivose) he addressed a procla
mation and a decree of the Consuls to the departments of the
West. He said to them, " An impious war threatens a se
cond time to set the departments of the West in a flame. The
duty of the first magistrates of the Republic is to prevent its
spreading, and to extinguish it in its focus, but they are unwil
ling to employ force, till they have exhausted all the means of
persuasion and justice."
Drawing a line between criminal men, sold to foreigners, for
ever irreconcileable with the Republic, and misguided citizens,
who, by engaging in civil war, intended only to resist cruel per
secutions, the First Consul referred to all the measures calcu
lated to win the confidence of the latter, and to bring them
over to the new government, such as the repeal of the law
concerning the hostages, the restoration of the churches to the
priests, the liberty allowed to every one to keep Sunday; he
further promised a full and entire amnesty to those who should
submit, abandon the assemblages of insurgents, and lay down
the arms furnished by England. But he added that the most
severe measures would be immediately taken against those who
should persist in insurrection. He announced the suspension
of the Constitution, that is, the employment of extraordinary
authorities in those places where insurgent bands should con
tinue to appear in arms. " The government," it was said, at the
conclusion of the proclamation of the Consuls, " will forgive;
it will pardon the repentant ; its clemency shall be complete
and absolute: but it will punish every one who, after this
declaration, shall dare to resist the national sovereignty. But,
mo ; henceforward we will be actuated by only one sentiment—
the love of our country. The ministers of a God of peace
will be the first promoters of reconciliation and concord. Let
them speak to their flocks in that language which pervades the
Word of their divine master; let them repair to those temples

Dec. 1799.] consulate and the empire. 75
which are again opened to them, and offer the sacrifice that shall
atone for the crimes of war and for the blood which it has caused
to be spilt."
This proclamation, seconded by a formidable force, was cal
culated to make an impression, especially as it emanated from a
new government, which had no hand whatever in the excesses
and faults that had served as a pretext for civil war.
Having proceeded in this manner towards our enemies at home,
the First Consul, addressing himself to our enemies abroad,
resolved to take a formal step towards the two powers which
had not yet given any sign of a return to pacific sentiments, and
seemed, on the contrary, to be obstinately bent on the prosecu
tion of the war: we mean Austria and Great Britain.
Prussia, as we have seen, had received Duroc in the most
flattering manner, and was every day giving more expressive
testimonies of sympathy for the First Consul. Satisfied with
the footing on which she stood with him, she wished success to
his government against anarchy, success to his arms against Aus
tria. As for the scheme of offering herself as mediatrix, she
still cherished the idea, but durst not take the first step, con
ceiving that peace was yet far distant, and being unwilling to enter
rashly upon a course, the bearing of which it was impossible
to foresee. In fact, whoever observed attentively the state of
things in Europe, might easily perceive that, to loosen the ties
which bound England and Austria, there would need another
campaign. The court of Madrid had likewise beheld with satis
faction the accession of General Bonaparte, because with him
the alliance of France and Spain seemed at once more honour
able and more profitable. But the horizon was not completely
clear in any quarter. General Bonaparte resolved, therefore,
the very same day that the Constitution invested him officially
with a new authority, to address, himself to the decidedly hos
tile powers, for the purpose of offering them peace, and publicly
showing that it was their own fault if they refused it. After
that, he could resort to war, having the opinion of the world
on his side.
In the first place, all the French diplomatic agents previously
appointed, (but who had not yet left Paris, because it was de
sirable that they should be accredited in the name of the
government 'definitively constituted) were instructed to proceed
to their respective posts. General Beurnonville set out for
Berlin, M. Alquier for Madrid, M. de Semonville for the
Hague, M. Bourgoing for Copenhagen. General Beurnonville
was to pay an adroit and flattering compliment to the King of
Prussia by asking him for a bust of the great Frederick, to be
placed in the grand gallery of Diana, _ in the Tuileries. The
First Consul was at that time arranging in this gallery the busts
of all the great men whom he particularly admired. M. Alquier,
besides conveying to Madrid the kindest assurances to the king

76 HISTORY OF THE [Dec. 1799.
and to the queen, was charged with a present for the Prince of
Peace, who possessed considerable influence, though he was
no longer minister. This present consisted of fine specimens
of arms, made at the manufactory of Versailles, famous at that
time throughout all Europe for the excellence of its productions.
This done, the First Consul turned his attention to the step
proposed to be taken towards the two hostile powers, England
and Austria. In general, it is customary to disguise such
steps, to precede them by indirect overtures, in order to guard
against the humiliation of a refusal. General Bonaparte, in ad
dressing England and Austria, meant to address the world ; and
for this purpose he needed a solemn overture, deviating entirely
from the accustomed forms, which should appeal to the hearts
of the sovereigns themselves, and flatter or embarrass them.
Accordingly, instead of transmitting notes to Lord Grenville or
M. de Thugut, he wrote directly to the King of England and
the Emperor of Germany two letters, which the ministers of
those courts were desired to submit to their Sovereigns.
The letter destined for the King of England was in tliese terms :
"Paris, 5th Niv6se, year VIII. (Dec. 26th, 1799).
" Sire,
" Called by the wish of the French nation to fill the chief magis
tracy of the Republic, I think it fitting, on entering upon office, to
make a direct communication on the subject to your Majesty.
" Is the war which for eight years has ravaged the four quar
ters of the globe to be eternal ? Are there then no means of
coming to an understanding ?
" How can the two most enlightened nations of Europe,
stronger and more powerful than their safety and independence
require, sacrifice to ideas of vain greatness the blessings of com
merce, internal prosperity, and domestic happiness ? How can
they help feeling that peace is the first of wants, as well as the
first of glories !
" These sentiments cannot be strange to your majesty, who
governs a free nation, and with the sole aim to render it happy.
" In this overture, your majesty will discover only my sin
cere desire to contribute efficaciously, for the second time, to
the general pacification by a prompt procedure, entirely confi
dential, and divested of those forms, which, neces'sary perhaps
for disguising the dependence of weak States, betray only in
strong States a'mutual desire to deceive one another.
" France, England, by the abuse of their strength, may for a
long time to cpme, for the misfortune of all nations, retard its
exhaustion : but I dare assert, the lot of all civilised nations is
attached to the termination of a warwhich has thrown the whole
world into a conflagration. Signed, . " Bonaparte,
" First Consul of the French Republic."

Jan. 1800.] consulate and the empire. 77
On the same day, the First Consul addressed the following
letter to the Emperor of Germany : —
"On returning to Europe, after an absence of eighteen
months, I find the war rekindled between the French Republic
and your Majesty.
" The French nation calls me to occupy the chief magistracy.
" A stranger to every feeling of vain glory, the first of my
wishes is to stop the effusion of the blood that is about to be
spilt. Every thing forebodes that, in the next campaign, nu
merous and ably directed armies will triple the number of the
victims hitherto sacrificed, by the resumption of hostilities.
The known character of your majesty leaves me no doubt
respecting the wish of your heart. If that wish alone is con
sulted, I perceive a possibility of reconciling the interests of the
two nations.
" In the communications which I have previously had with
your majesty, you have personally testified some regard for me.
I request you to consider the step which I am taking as pro
ceeding from a desire to make a return for it, and to convince
you more and more of the very high respect which I entertain
for your Majesty. Signed, " Bonaparte,
" First Consul of the French Republic."
Such was the language in which the First Consul communi
cated his accession, as well to the parties that divided France,
as to the cabinets coalesced against her. He offered peace,
preparing to secure it by force, if he could not obtain it by
amicable means. His intention was to employ the winter in
making a short and decisive campaign in La Vendee, that, in
spring, he might be able to move upon the Rhine and the
Alps such troops as, on the termination of the war at home,
should be available for the war abroad.
While awaiting the result of these proceedings, he opened
the legislative session on the 1st of January, 1800 (llthNivdse,
year VIII.), and resolved to devote that session of four months
to the preparation of sound laws, and to the administrative reor
ganisation of France, which was scarcely commenced. He had
just appointed his brother Lucien minister of the interior, in lieu
of Laplace the mathematician, and M. Abrial, a very worthy
man, and very attentive to. business, as minister of justice, in
the room of M. Cambaceres, who had become Consul.
On the 1st of January, 1800, the Senate, the Legislative
Body, and the Tribunate, assembled. The Senate elected M.
Sieyes for president; the Legislative Body elected M. Pen-in
of Vosges; the Tribunate, M. Daunou. Numerous bills
(projets de loi) were immediately presented to the Legislative
Body.

78 history of the [Jan. 1800.
At the sight of these deliberative assemblies meeting afresh,
a sort of anxiety prevailed. People were weary of agitation;
they longed for repose ; they were cured of that violent fond
ness for political eloquence, which France had felt in '89, when
Mirabeau, Barnave, Maury, Cazales, opened for it an entirely
new career of glory, that of the tribune. The animosity against
the bar was general ; there was no favour but for men of action,
capable of procuring victory and peace for France. Still people
had not yet resolved on the establishment of an absolute power;
and they had no wish that all liberty, all temperate discussion,
should be stifled. If the power of action, which a new legis
lator had just placed in the Constitution, by the creation of a
First Consul, and the selection for that magistracy of the
greatest captain of the age; if that power were incompatible
with liberty, they were ready to sacrifice the latter ; but every
body would have been delighted at the reconciliation of liberty
and strength, if it were possible. It was not vulgar agitators or
obstinate republicans who entertained these sentiments ; it was
men of discreet, enlightened minds, whom it would have pained
to see the Revolution belie itself so soon and so completely.
Accordingly, the indifferent asked themselves with curiosity,
the good citizens with real uneasiness, what bearing the Tribu
nate, the only body which had liberty of speech, would assume
towards the new government, and how the government would
endure an opposition, if an opposition should happen to be
formed. When a reaction takes place, be that reaction ever so general,
it does not hurry all along with it ; and it irritates, nay, even
shocks, those whom it does not hurry along. Messrs. Chenier,
Andrieux, Ginguene, Daunou, and Benjamin Constant, who had
seats in the Tribunate, Messrs. de Tracy, Volney, and Cabanis,
who were members of the Senate, while they deplored the crimes
of the Reign of terror, were not disposed to think that the French
Revolution was wrong in its conduct towards its adversaries.
The monarchical and religious doctrines, which were perceptibly
gaining ground, galled them, as did still more the immoderate
haste with which this return to ancient ideas was effected. This
produced in them a dissatisfaction, which they took no pains to
disguise. Most of them were sincere. Strongly attached to the
Revolution, they wished for it almost entire, excepting the
blood and the spoliations, and had little taste for that which
people imagined they could descry in the profound conception
of the new dictator. That priests should not be persecuted,
good ! But that they should be favoured so far as to be rein
stated at the altar was too much for these stanch votaries of the
philosophy of the eighteenth century. That a little more unity
and strength should be given to government, good aoain ! But
that this principle should be carried to such an extent as to re
establish monarchical unity for the benefit of a military man,"

Jan. 1800.] consulate and the empire. 79
this was far too much in their estimation. For the rest — as it is
always the case — their motives were various. If such were the
opinions of Messrs. Chenier, Ginguene, Daunou, Tracy, and
Cabanis, they could not be those of M. Constant, who, most
assuredly had not imbibed in the society of the Necker family,
in which he moved, either an aversion to religious ideas, or an
exclusive fondness for the French Revolution. On attaining to
the Tribunate, thanks to the solicitations of his friends, he had,
nevertheless, become, in a few days, the most restless and the
cleverest of the new opposition. He was actuated by his sar
castic humour, but more especially by the discontent of the
Necker family, which he participated. Madame de Stael, who,
in her single person, then represented that illustrious family, had
greatly admired General Bonaparte ; and it would have been an
easy matter for him to win the good will of one whose sprightly
imagination was alive to every thing that was great. But, though
endowed with as much understanding as genius, he had offended,
by expressions not the most decorous, a woman whom he dis
liked, because he found in her pretensions above her sex ; and
he had produced in her heart an irritation, which, if not for
midable, was at least annoying. Every fault, however slight,
produces its fruit. The First Consul was soon to reap the fruit
of his, in meeting with a very untoward opposition from those
who were under the influence of the persuasive mind of Madame
de Stael. Of this number was M. Constant.
The Palais Royal had been assigned to the Tribunate,
assuredly not from design, but solely from necessity; the
Tuileries had been given up to the head of the government;
the Luxembourg, previously appropriated to the Council of the
Ancients, had naturally been assigned to the Senate ; the Palais
Bourbon had been set aside for the Legislative Body. Thus there
was no building but the Palais Royal that could be allotted to
the Tribunate. Such was, in certain minds, the disposition to
take the simplest acts amiss, that they complained bitterly of
the choice of this palace, and alleged that it was with a view to
lower the Tribunate that it had been made to meet in the ordinary
haunt of vice and debauchery. Certain articles of regulation
were under discussion in this assembly on the 2nd and 3rd of
January, when, all at once, M. Duveyrier, one of its members,
rose to complain of some measures, injurious, as he said, to
several proprietors of establishments which had existed for
years in the Palais Royal. There was nothing interesting in
the case of the complainants, and, moreover, they had received
compensation. D uveyrier inveighed warmly against these alleged
acts of injustice, and said that the national representation ought
not to be made unpopular, by being rendered responsible for harsh
acts committed in its name. Then, passing to the choice of the
locality, " I am not one of those," said he, " who are offended
because it has been thought fit to select for the meetings of the

80 HISTORY OF THE [Jan- 1800.
Tribunate a place which is the ordinary theatre of vice and of
every kind of excesses ; in this I see neither danger nor any
allusion injurious to us. I pay homage, on the contrary, to the
popular intention of those who wished that the tribunes of the
people should sit amidst the people ; that the defenders of liberty
should meet in a place that witnessed the first triumphs of
liberty. I thank them for having allowed us the means of
viewing, from this very tribune, the spot on which the noble
Camille Desmoulins, giving the signal for a glorious movement,
displayed that national cockade, our most glorious trophy, our
eternal rallying sign ; that cockade which gave birth to so many
prodigies, to which so many heroes owe the celebrity of their
arms, and which we will not lay down but with life. I thank
them for having enabled us to see that spot, which, if people
were inclined to erect an idol of fifteen days, would remind
us of the fall of an idol of fifteen centuries."
This off-hand attack produced a strong sensation in the assem
bly, and before long in Paris. TheTribunate passed to the order
of the day, the majority of its members disapproving such a
sally. But the effect was not the less powerful; and it was a
bad beginning for an assembly, which, if it wished to save
liberty from the dangers with which it was threatened by a
reaction at that time general, should have observed infinite
caution, as well in regard to persons ready to take alarm, as to
a head of the government who was easily irritated.
Such a scene could not fail to have consequences. The anger
of the First Consul was vehement, and the humble adorers of
his nascent power raised a loud outcry. Messrs. Stanislas de
Girardin, de Chauvelin, and some others, who, without being
disposed to resign all independence in the presence of the new
government, yet disapproved this unseasonable opposition,
spoke in the following sitting, and, in order to neutralize the effect
of the speech of Duveyrier, proposed the taking of a sort of
oath to the Constitution.
" Before we proceed to our labours " said M. de Girardin,
" I think we ought to give the nation a signal testimony of our
attachment to the Constitution. I do not propose to you to swear
that you will uphold it. I know, and you know as well as I do,
the uselessness of oaths ; but I think it may be useful, on entering
on our duties, to promise to perform them faithfully. Let us fol
low the example of the Conservative Senate and of the Council of
State, and we shall thus fix the opinion that ought to be formed
of us ; we shall silence malice, which is already bruiting that the
Tribunate is an organized resistance against the government.
No ! the Tribunate is not a focus of opposition, but a focus
of intelligence. No ! the Tribunate does not mean to combat
without ceasing the acts of the government; it is ready, on the
contrary, to hail them with joy, when they shall be in harmony
with the pubhc interest. The Tribunate will strive to allay the

Jan. 1800/J consulate and the empire. 81
passions of the day, instead of exciting them. Its moderation
must place itself between all the factions to dissolve and to re
unite them. It was the moderates who effected the 18th Brumairet

that salutary and glorious rlriy, wmrh Trr-im rrl Fr dun frnm in-
nyasioiurincip
but let us beware of returning to excesses which have so often

nn glorious d
forrTo^gnnmhy a^r\ foreign invasion. In order to save the Re-
pubTicTlet us return to the principles on which it was founded,

brought it to the brink of perdition. If we see from this place
the spot where, for the first time, the emblem of liberty was dis
played, from this place, too, we see the spot where were conceived
those crimes which imbrued the Revolution in blood. For my
own part, I am far from congratulating myself on the choice
which has been made of this palace for the place of our meetings ;
on the contrary, I regret it : but still the events of which it re
minds us are, happily, long gone by. The time for vehement
harangues, for appeals to the seditious groups of the Palais
Royal, is past. If, however, certain declamations- can no longer
ruin us, they may delay the return of fairer prospects. Spread
ing from this tribune throughout Paris, from Paris over all
Europe, they may create alarm, furnish pretexts, and retard that
peace which all of us desire  Peace," added M. de Girar
din, "peace ought incessantly to occupy our thoughts; and if we
keep this important interest continually in view, we shall no
longer indulge in such expressions as those which the other
day escaped one of our colleagues, on which none of us ani
madverted, because they were irrelevant, for we know no idol
in France." He concluded his speech by moving that each
member should make the following declaration : — " I promise
faithfully to perform the functions which the Constitution has
assigned to me."
This proposition was adopted. M. Duveyrier, vexed at the
scandal produced by his speech, strove to excuse himself, and
desired to be the first to make the declaration suggested by M.
de Girardin, which all the members of the Tribunate cheerfully
repeated after him.
] The effect of the previous scene was, therefore, somewhat re
paired. The First Consul, nevertheless, conceived an insu
perable aversion for the Tribunate, which, it is true, he would
have felt for any free assembly, using and abusing the liberty of
speech ; and he caused some extremely bitter observations on
the tribunes of France and the tribunes of Rome to be inserted
in the Moniteur.
The following sittings produced fresh manifestations, quite
as much to be regretted as the preceding. The first propo
sition of the government was designed to regulate the forms to
be observed in the presentation, discussion, and adoption of
bills (projets de his). This was one of the points neglected by
the Constitution of the year VIII., and left to the legislature.
In the proposed arrangements, no great deference was shown
vol. i. g

82 history OF the [Jan. 1800.
to the Tribunate. The plan of the government provided that
the laws should be carried by three Councillors of State to the
Legislative Body, and afterwards communicated to the Tribunate,
and that, on a day fixed by the government, the Tribunate was
to be ready to discuss them, through the medium of its three
orators, before the Legislative Body. The Tribunate, however,
was allowed to demand a delay of the Legislative Body, which
was to decide whether that delay could be granted. It must
be confessed that the Tribunate was here treated very uncere
moniously ; for it was expected to have finished its task by a
given day, which one would scarcely dare to require of a section
of the Council of State, or of any Ministerial department. No
body would, now-a-days, presume to prescribe to any deliberative
assembly the day and the term of a discussion ; this is a point
which, even in cases of urgency, is left to its intelligence and its
zeal. But parliamentary courtesies, which, like politeness, are the
offspring of usage, could not precede, with us, the practice of
representative government. From revolutionary violence, we
: passed, almost without transition, to military rudeness. The
! commissions, which had recently, for a month, exercised the
legislative power, had, by their discussion with closed doors,
' and their dispatch of laws in twenty-four hours, humoured the
taste of the First Consul, who always wanted to be served and
, satisfied at the moment. This may account for, but cannot ex-
louse, the objectionable details of the government plan.
The rising opposition of the Tribunate had, therefore, good
j reason for attacking this plan ; but, after commencing with an
indecorous scene, it was unlucky for it to have to combat the
first proposition emanating from the Consuls ; because it in
duced a belief that a resolution was taken to attack everything ;
and to this misfortune it added the fault of the form, which was
-^ vexatious. The most violent attack proceeded from M. Con-
_ stant. In a clever and ironical speech, such as he knew how to
make, he required that the Tribunate should have a fixed time
for examining the bills (projets de Ms) which should be sub
mitted to it, and that it should not be expected to examine them
at a gallop. He adverted, on this subject, to the danger of the
laws of urgency passed during the Revolution, which had always
proved disastrous laws ; he asked why such care was taken, to
hurry business so rapidly through the Tribunate ; why it was
already considered so hostile, that government was anxious to
abridge as much as possible the passage of the laws through that
house. " All this," he added, " proceeds from the false idea that
we are only an opposition body, destined to do nothing but to
thwart the government incessantly; which is not the case,
which cannot be the case, which would lower us in public
opinion. This false notion has stamped all the clauses of this
plan with a restless and unreasonable impatience : the propo
sitions are presented to us flying, as it were, in the hope that we

Jan. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 83
may not be able to lay hold of them ; they are to be hurried
away from our examination, like an enemy's army, and to be
transformed into laws before we can overtake them."
Many stinging reflections were mingled with this long speech, f
which produced a very strong sensation. M. Constant had
taken particular care to insist that the Tribunate was not a body
specially devoted to contradiction ; that it would not contradict,
unless compelled by the public interest to do so ; but he had
repeated these protestations in a manner and tone designed to
belie their sincerity, and manifest the intention of systematic
opposition which he was taking such pains to deny.
Riouffe, the tribune, known for his faithful and courageous
friendship for the proscribed Girondins, was one of those whom.
the horrors of '93 had so shocked, that they were ready to throw
themselves blindly into the arms of the new government, what
ever that government might do. He, therefore, rose to repel
the attacks, in his opinion indecorous, of M. Constant.
" Distrust," said he, " so offensive as that manifested yester
day, would be sufficient to break off all further communication
in the intercourse between man and man ; and it would be im
possible that authorities destined to live together could long
treat with one another, if courtesy were not a sacred duty, from
which they must never depart."
The speaker then declared that, for his part, he had an abso
lute confidence in the government ; and he entered upon a
panegyric of the First Consul, true, but too long, and in terms
not sufficiently measured. " When one speaker," said he,
" here praises Camille Desmoulins, and another the National
Convention, I will not confine myself to a conspiratory silence ;
I too will praise him whom the whole world praises ; having
hitherto eulogized proscribed virtue alone, I will assume a new
kind of courage, that of celebrating genius in the bosom of power
and of victory ; I shall congratulate myself on beholding, at the
head of the Republic, him who has gained for the French nation
the title of the Great Nation ; I will proclaim him great, clement,
just  " Proceeding thus, M. Riouffe compared General
Bonaparte with Csesar and Hannibal ; and, by this avowal of
a legitimate but unseasonable admiration, he provoked a very
unlucky manifestation. Several voices interrupted him. " Keep
to the question," they cried. " I," replied M. Riouffe, " will
speak of the man whom the whole world admires  " " Ques
tion, question," repeated the interrupters ; and he was obliged
to confine himself to the subject under consideration.
Whether M. Riouffe had provoked the impatience of the
interrupters by the sincere, but diffuse and unskilful exposition
of his sentiments, or whether the admiration which he felt was
not shared in the same degree by the members of the Tribunate,
the effect produced by his speech was not happy.
62

84 history OF the [Jan. 1800:
M. de Chauvelin endeavoured to correct it by a speech in
favour of the proposed law.
He acknowledged its defects. " But the circumstances," said
"he, " the circumstances in which we are placed, the state of se
veral departments, which may call for prompt, nay, even urgent
measures ; important political considerations ; calumny, which
is watching us; the divisions, which she already takes delight in
supposing the existence of ; the pressing need of union between
the powers — all induce us to vote the adoption of the bill
{projet) that has been laid before us."
The bill was, in fact, put to the vote, and adopted by a ma
jority which ought to have satisfied and encouraged the govern
ment ; 54 votes against 26 decided that the orators of the
Tribunate, commissioned to speak before the Legislative Body,
should support the proposed law. The Legislative Body re
ceived it still more favourably, and adopted it by a majority of
203 voices against 23. This was as much as could be wished;
for a majority of two-thirds, after all, in the Tribunate, (a body
whose opposition decided nothing, since it did not vote the
laws,) and a majority of nine-tenths in the Legislative Body
(the only body whose vote was decisive) ought to have satisfied
the First Consul and his adherents, and rendered them in
different to this last manifestation of liberal spirit, and indulgent
towards breaches of form, which, after all, were a right of liberty
itself. But the First Consul, who could not be seriously
alarmed, appeared, nevertheless, touched to the quick, and ex
pressed himself in the strongest terms. He began to make
frequent use of the press, and, though he was not fond of it, he
was, nevertheless, glad to employ it for his own interest. He
caused an article to be inserted in the Moniteur of the 8th of
January (18th Nivose), which was wholly improper, and in which
he himself undertook to demonstrate the insignificance of that
opposition, to show that it was no part of a systematic plan
to thwart the government, and attributed it, in some minds, to a
desire of visionary perfection in human laws, in others to a
wish to make a noise. " Thus," added the official journal,
" every thing authorises us to conclude that there does not
exist in the Tribunate any combined and systematic opposition,
in short, any real opposition. But every one is athirst for
glory, every one wishes to consign his name to the hundred
tongues of Fame ; and some men have yet to learn that one
arrives with less certainty at consideration by the ambition of
making fine speeches, than by perseverance in serving usefully,
nay, obscurely, that public which applauds and judges."
This manner of treating a great body of the State was far
from becoming ; it proved, on the part of the First Consul, a
disposition to do just what he pleased, and, on the part of
France, a disposition to put up with every thin*

Jan. 1800.] consulate and the empieb- 8?
These impressions, however, soon gave pla£as Ts so wfl f?"
vast labours of the government, in which the £e*he court>) the
and the Tribunate were called to participate, soon R^s ' ° ?°n~
attention of all parties, and occupied them exclusively, ""'i ±. °n ies
Consul caused two bills ( prqjets de hi) of very great importa?^'
to be submitted to the Legislative Body. One related to tn!'
departmental and municipal administration, and became the
famous law of the 28th Pluviose, year VIIL, which established
the administrative centralisation in France : the other had for
its object the organisation of justice — an organisation which
still exists. To these two bills (projets) were added others
relative to emigrants, whose condition it was urgently necessary
to regulate; to the right of making wills, there-establishment
of which was demanded by all families ; to the prize court,
which it was requisite to establish on account of our relations
with neutrals ; to the appointment of new collectors of taxes,
who were found to be needed ; lastly, to the receipts and ex
penditure of the year VIII.
The administration of France, as we have shown above, was
in frightful disorder in 1799- In all countries there are two
kinds of business to be despatched ; that of the State, which
comprehends recruiting, taxes, works of public utility, the en
forcement of the laws ; and that of the provinces and communes,
which consists in the managements of the local interests of every
kind. If a country is left to itself, that is to say, if it is not
governed by a general administration, at once intelligent and
strong, the first kind of business, that of the State, is not
done at all ; the second finds, in the provincial or communal
interest, a principle of zeal, but of a zeal that is capricious, un
equal, unjust, and rarely enlightened. The provincial or com
munal administrations are assuredly not wanting in inclination
to attend to what particularly concerns them ; but they are
wasteful, annoying, and always hostile to the common rule.
The tyrannical singularities of the middle age in Europe had no
other origin. As soon as the central authority withdraws from.
a country, there is no kind of disorder to which the local
interests are not ready to abandon themselves, their own ruin
included. In 1789, wherever the communes had enjoyed any
liberty, they were in a state of bankruptcy. Most of the free
•cities of Germany, when they were suppressed in 1803, were
completely ruined. Thus, without a strong, general adminis
tration, the business of the State is not done at all, and local
business very ill done.
The Constituent Assembly and the National Convention,
¦after they had successively remodelled the administrative or
ganisation of France, arrived at a state of things which was
anarchy itself; collective administrations, of all degrees, per
petually deliberating, never acting, having at their side com
missioners of the central government, charged to press forward

84 HI'sTORY OF the [Jan. 1800.
M. de Chauvelii of the business of the State, or the execution
favour of the jut denied the power of acting themselves — such
He ackncartmental and municipal system in force on the 18th
he, " th-e. As for the municipal system, in particular, there
verr been formed a sort of cantonal municipalities, which only
Increased this administrative confusion.
The number of the communes had been found too large, for
it exceeded 40,000. The superintendence over such a number
of petty local governments, already very difficult in itself,
became impossible for authorities constituted as the authorities
at that time were. The prefects are now adequate to it, with
the assistance of the sub-prefects, on condition that they are
very assiduous. But let us suppose that there were no prefects
arid sub-prefects, but in their place petty deliberative assemblies,
and we shall comprehend what disorder must prevail in such an
administration. These forty and odd thousand communes
were, therefore, reduced to five thousand cantonal municipalities,
composed of the union of several communes into one. It
was intended, in thus uniting several communes under one
government, to give them a government in the first place, and,
in the next, to place them nearer to the central authority, and
more under its eye. The consequence soon was, a still more
frightful confusion than that which this measure was designed to
put an end to. These five thousand cantonal municipalities were
too numerous,, and too far distant from the central authority to
be under its eye ; and, without being brought nearer to the
government, they were mischievously removed farther from the
population which they were destined to govern. The communal
administration is made to be placed as near as possible to the
spot. The magistrate, who registers the births, the deaths, and
the marriages, who attends to the police and the salubrity of the
place, who keeps in repair the fountain, the church, and the hos
pital, of the village or town, ought to reside in the village or the
town itself, to live, in short, amidst his fellow- citizens. These
cantonal municipalities had, therefore, led to a useless displace
ment of the domestic authority, without having brought the local
affairs sufficiently within the ken of government for it to watch
them. Add to this, that nothing was then properly done, owing
to the disorder of the time, and the reader may form some con
ception of the confusion that must have resulted from the vice
of the institution, aggravated by the vice of circumstances.
A last cause of disorder had associated itself with all the
others. It is not only necessary to carry on the business of the
State and of the communes ; it is also requisite to judge ; for
the citizens may have reason to complain, sometimes that, in
marking out a street or a road, their property has been en
croached on ; at others, that, in the valuation of their possessions
for the purpose of taxing them, they have been unjustly valued.
Under the ancient government, the ordinary justice, the only

Jan. 1800.] consulate and the empire. 87
curb at that time to the executive authority, (as was so well ex
pressed in the resistance of the parliaments to the court,) the
ordinary justice had assumed cognizance in all cases of con
tentieux administratif (points at issue between the authorities
and private individuals). This was a serious inconvenience,
for civil judges are bad dispensers of administrative justice,
being in a manner strangers to the subject. Our first legis
lators, during the Revolution, perfectly sensible of this in
convenience, imagined that they could resolve the difficulty
by relinquishing the whole of the contentieux administratif
to the petty local assemblies, to which they had consigned the
administration. Now, figure to yourself these collective ad
ministrations superseding what, at this day, we call prefects,
sub-prefects, maires, charged to do all that they do, and to
decide, moreover, all questions that are now submitted to the
councils of prefecture, and you will have a tolerably just
idea of the confusion which then reigned. Even with the
spirit of order which now prevails, the result would be a chaos :
add to this the revolutionary passions, and you will comprehend
how much worse a chaos this must be. Hence it was that the
assessments of the contributions were never finished, that the
collection of the taxes was several years in arrear, that the
finances were in ruin, the armies in distress. The recruiting
alone was sometimes carried into execution, owing to the revo
lutionary passions, which had produced the evil, but which
had contributed to remedy it in part ; for, having for their
principle au inordinate but ardent love of France, her great
ness, and her liberty, they impelled the populace eagerly to
join the army.
In such a posture of affairs the First Consul may be said toi»-
have been a special envoy of Providence. His simple, clear un
derstanding, guided by an active and resolute character, was
destined to lead him to the solution of these difficulties. The
Constitution had placed at the head of the State an executive
power and a legislative power : the executive power concen
trated almost entirely in a single hand; and the legislative
power divided into several deliberative assemblies. It was
natural to place, at each step of the administrative ladder, a
representative of the executive power, specially charged to act ;
and, at his side, merely to check or to enlighten, but not to act
in his stead, a small deliberative assembly, such as a council of
department, of arrondissement, or of commune. To this simple,
luminous, fertile idea we owe the excellent administration which
exists at this day in France. The. First Consul decided to have
in" each department a prefect, charged not to urge a collective
administration to the despatch of the business of the State, but to
do it himself ; charged, at the same time, to manage the de
partmental affairs, but conjointly with a council of department,
and from the resources voted by that council. As the system

88 HISTORY OF THE [Jan. 1800.
of cantonal municipalities was universally condemned, and M.
Sieyes, author of all the circumscriptions of France, had, in the
new Constitution, laid down the principle of the circumscription
by arrondissement, the First Consul resolved to employ it, in
order to dispense with cantonal administrations. To begin
with, the communal administration was replaced where it ought
to be, that is, in the commune itself, town, or village; and
between the commune and the department there was created an
intermediate administrative step, that is, the arrondissement.
Between the prefect and the maire there was to be a sub- prefect,
charged, under the superintendence of the prefect, with directing
a certain number of communes, sixty, eighty, a hundred, more
or fewer, according to the importance of the department.
Lastly, in the commune itself there was to be a maire, with
executive power, and possessing further, a deliberative voice in
the municipal council — a maire, a direct and dependent agent
of the general authority for the despatch of the business of the
State ; the agent of the commune in all local affairs, managing
the interests of the latter jointly with it, under the superin
tendence, however, of the prefect and of the sub-prefect, and
consequently of the State.
Such is that admirable hierarchy, to which France owes an
administration incomparable for the energy, the. precision, of its
action and the accuracy of its accounts, and which is so excel
lent, that, in six months, as we shall see by and by, it was suffi
cient to restore order in France, under the impulsion, it is true,
of a unique genius, the First Consul, and under a favour of
circumstances unique also ; for there prevailed everywhere a
horror of disorder, an ardent longing for order, disgust with
prating, and a liking for prompt and positive results.
There was still left the question of the contentieux, that is to
say, of the administrative justice, charged to take care that the
tax-payer should not be burdened beyond his ability ; that those
having property on the bank of a rivulet or in a street, should not
be exposed to encroachments ; that the contractor for works to be
paid for by the town or the State should find a judge of his con
tracts with the commune or the government — a difficult matter,
the ordinary tribunals being admitted to be improper for decid
ing this kind of case. The principle of a judicious division of
powers was again applied here with great advantage. The pre
fect, the sub-prefect, the maire, charged with the administrative
action, might be suspected of partiality, inclined to make their
will prevail, for the injured applicant for justice usually has to
complain of their own acts. The councils of department, of arron
dissement and of commune, might and ought to appear objec
tionable also, for they most frequently have a contrary interest to
the plaintiff. The administration of justice, moreover, is a long
and continual labour, and neither the Councils of department nor
the Communal councils were meant hereafter to be permanent.

Jan. 1800.] consulate and the empire. 89
The First Consul wanted them for about a fortnight in the year,
just long enough to submit their affairs to them, to take their
advice, to make them vote their expenses. What was wanted,
on the contrary, was an administrative tribunal sitting without
interruption. A special court was, therefore, instituted, a tri
bunal of four or five judges, sitting by the side of the prefect,
judging with him, a sort of miniature Council of State, expound
ing the law to the prefect, as the Council of State lends its legal
knowledge to ministers, subject, moreover, to the jurisdiction
of this supreme Council by way of appeal. These are the tri
bunals still called at the present time councils of prefecture, and
the equity of which has never been disputed.
Such was the provincial and communal government in
France: a single head, prefect, sub-prefect, or maire, transacting
all the .business ; a deliberative council, the council of depart
ment, of arrondissement, or of commune, voting the local
expenses; then a small judicial body, placed beside the prefect
merely to dispense administrative justice s^ government subor
dinate, in an absolute manner, to the general government in all
affairs of the State, superintended and directed, but having its
own views in all departmental and communal affairs"} Order
has not ceased to reign, any more than justice, since this ex
cellent and simple institution has existed among us, that is to
say, for nearly half a century : be it understood, however, that
the words order and justice, like all the words of human lan
guage, have but a relative value, and signify that there have
been in France, in the administrative department, as little dis
order, as little injustice, as can possibly be wished, in a great
country. The First Consul naturally desired that the prefects, sub-
prefects, andmaires, should be in the nomination of the executive
power, for they were its direct agents ; they ought to be fraught
with its will ; and even in local affairs which they had to
manage, according to local views, it was requisite that they
should render them subservient to the general policy of the
State. But it would not have been natural for the executive
power to nominate the members of the councils of department,
of arrondissement, and of commune, charged to check the
agents of the administration, and to vote them supplies. It
was the Constitution which led him to this claim, and which
justified it. " Confidence must come from below," said M.
Sieyes ; " power must come from above." According to this
maxim, the nation gave its confidence by inscription in the lists
of notability ; the supreme authority conferred power by choosing
its agents out of these lists. The Senate was charged to elect
all the political deliberative bodies. Now the councils, engaged
with local interests, being considered as forming part of the
general administration of the Republic, the executive power,
according to the Constitution, was to nominate them, and to

90 HISTORY OF THE [Jan. 1800.
select them out of the lists of notability. By virtue, therefore,
of the spirit, and even of the. letter of the Constitution, the
First Consul was to choose out of the lists of the departmental
notability the members of the councils of department ; out of
the lists of the notability of arrondissement the members of the
councils of arrondissement ; lastly, out of the lists of the com
munal notability the members of the municipal councils. This
power, excessive in ordinary times, was necessary at this mo
ment. Election, in fact, was as impossible for the formation
of the local councils, as it was for the formation of the great
political assemblies. It would but have given rise to mis
chievous agitations, and yielded petty triumphs to all the
extreme parties, instead of producing a peaceful and salutary
fusion of all the moderate parties — a fusion which was indis
pensable for founding a new society with the collected wrecks
of the old.
The judicial organisation was planned with equal skill. It
had the twofold object of placing justice nearer to those who
needed it, and, at the same time, of ensuring to them, above the
local justice, if they chose to have recourse to it, tribunals of
appeal, distant, but placed high, and possessing intelligence and
impartiality, in proportion to the height of their position.
Our first revolutionary legislators, owing to the aversion ex
cited by the parliaments, had suppressed the courts of appeal,
and placed in each department a single tribunal, presenting a
first step of jurisdiction for litigants (justiciables) of the de
partment, and a second step of jurisdiction, a tribunal of appeal,
for the neighbouring departments. The appeal was made, not
from an inferior tribunal to a superior tribunal, but from a
neighbouring tribunal to a neighbouring tribunal. Below, were
the justices of peace ; above, the court of cassation. The single
tribunal for the department being found too far distant for
those who had occasion to resort to it, the competence of
justices of peace had been extended, so as to dispense the
citizens from going too often to the chief town. There had
also been instituted four or five hundred correctional tribunals,
charged with repressing petty misdemeanours. The criminal
jury sat at the chief town, the seat of the central tribunal.
This judicial organisation had not succeeded better than the
cantonal municipalities. The justices of peace, whose compe
tence had been extended too far, were not equal to their task.
The courts of the first class, being seated at the chief town
were placed too far off; the courts of appeal became nearly
illusory, for appeal is useless, unless it be to a tribunal of
superior intelligence. Supreme courts, like the parliaments
formerly, hke the royal courts at the present day, numbering
among their members many eminent magistrates, and around
them a renowned bar, present a superiority of knowledge to
Which one may be tempted to recur; but to appeal from one

Jan. 1800.] consulate and the empire. 91
tribunal of first instance to another tribunal of first instance is
preposterous. The tribunals of correctional police were likewise
too numerous, and confined, moreover, to a single purpose. It
was evidently necessary to reform this judicial organisation. The
First Consul, adopting the ideas of his colleague, Cambaceres,
to whom he lent, on this occasion, the support of his sound
sense and of his courage, caused that organisation to be adopted,
which exists at the present day.
The circumscription of arrondissement, which had just been
devised for the departmental administration, offered very great
facility for the judicial administration. It presented the
means of creating a first local court, placed very near to the
litigants, without prejudice to the right of recurring to a court
of appeal, placed farther off, and higher. There was instituted,
therefore, a tribunal of first instance for each arrondissement,
forming a first degree of jurisdiction ; then, without fear of
appearing to re-establish the ancient parliaments, the govern
ment determined to create tribunals of appeal. One for each
department would be too much in point of number, too little
as regarded the elevation of jurisdiction. Twenty-nine were
created : this gave them nearly the importance of the ancient
parliaments, and they were stationed in places which had for
merly enjoyed the presence of those supreme courts. This was
a restoration of an advantage to the localities which had been de
prived of it. They were old depositaries of judicial traditions,
the wrecks of which deserved to be collected. The bars of Aix,
Dijon, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Rennes, and Paris, were so many
constellations of science and of talent, which it was necessary.
to light up again.
-5 The tribunals of first instance, established in each depart
ment, were charged, at the same time, with the correctional
tpolice, which rendered them doubly useful, and placed civil and
repressive justice at the first step in the arrondissement.
Criminal justice, always confided to the jury, was to be ad
ministered in the chief town of the department only," by means
of judges detaching themselves from the tribunals of appeal,
and coming to direct the jury; in short, to hold assizes. This
part was not completed till a later period.
The department of justice, called the justice of peace, was to
be reduced to a more limited competence, by means of the pre
ceding arrangements. The law destined to reform it was deferred
till the following session, for it was impossible to do every thing
at once. But the determination was to retain, not without im
proving it, that justice of the people, paternal, expeditious, and
not expensive. Above the judicial edifice was kept, with some
modifications, and a repressive jurisdiction over all the magis
trates, the Tribunal of Cassation, one of the best institutions of
the French Revolution — a tribunal which is not destined to
decide a third time what the tribunals of first instance and appeal

92 history of the [Jan. 1800.
have already tried twice, but which, disregarding the merits of
the suit, intervenes only when any doubt arises relative to the
construction of the law, determines that construction by a series
of decrees, and thus adds to the unity of the text, emanating
from the legislature, the unity of interpretation emanating from
a supreme jurisdiction, common to the whole territory.
It is, therefore, from this year 1800 — a year so eventful—
that our judicial organisation takes dale : it has since consisted
of nearly two thousand juges de paix, popular magistrates, dis
pensing justice to the poor at little expense ; of nearly three
hundred tribunals of first instance, one for each arrondissement,
dispensing civil and correctional justice at the first step; of
twenty-nine supreme tribunals,* dispensing civil justice on
appeal, and criminal justice by means of detached judges, who
repair to the chief town of each department to hold assizes;
lastly, of the Court of Cassation, placed above the whole judicial
hierarchy, interpreting the laws, and completing the unity of
legislation by the unity of jurisprudence.
The two laws in question were too urgently required, and too
ably conceived to meet with serious obstacles. They had, never
theless, to sustain more than one attack in the Tribunate.
Paltry objections were raised against the administrative system
proposed. Little complaint was made of the concentration of
authority in the hands of prefects, sub-prefects, maires, for that
was in unison with the ideas of the day, and copied from the
Constitution, which placed one sole chief at the head of the
State ; but there were persons who complained of the creation
of three steps in the administrative ladder — the department,
the arrondissement, the commune. They alleged, in particular,
that the commune ought not to be reconstituted, because there
would not be found maires sufficiently well-informed. It was,
however, the restoration of domestic authority, and, in this i
point of view, the most popular conception that could be
devised. As for the judicial organization, some said it was
a restoration of parliaments ; they complained, in particular,
of the jurisdiction attributed to the Tribunal of Cassation over
the inferior magistrates — all of them objections scarcely worth
remembering. The two laws proposed were nevertheless
adopted. Twenty or thirty voices, composing the bulk of the
opposition in the Tribunate, voted against these laws, but
three-fourths declared in favour of them. Bv the Legislative
Body they were adopted almost unanimously. 'The law relative
to the departmental administration took the date, so celebrated
ever since, of the 28th Pluviose, year VIII. That relating to
the judicial organization was dated 27th Ventose, year VIII.
• We here give only approximative numbers, because the number of the
tribunals has varied incessantly since that period, in consequence of the
changes of territory which France has undergone. At the present time, for
instance, there are but twenty-seven royal courts, or tribunals of appeal

Jan. 1800.] consulate and the empire. 93
The First Consul, having no intention to leave them a dead
letter in the Bulletin des Lois, nominated forthwith the prefects,
sub-prefects, and maires. He was liable to commit more than
one mistake, as must invariably happen when a great number of
functionaries are hastily chosen at once. But an enlightened
and vigilant government soon rectifies any errors in its first ap
pointments. It is sufficient if the general spirit of them has
been good. Now, the spirit of these appointments was ex
cellent; it was at once firm, impartial, and conciliatory. The
First Consul picked out from among all parties men reputed to
be honest and capable, excluding only such as were violent, and
even selecting some of the latter, if experience and time had led
them back to moderation, which then formed the essential
characteristic of his policy. He called to prefectures — which
were important and well paid offices, for to some of them were
attached salaries of 12,000, 15,000, and as much as 24,000 francs ;
equivalent to double what these amounts would be at present — to
prefectures he called persons who had figured with credit in the
great political assemblies, and who clearly indicated the tendency
of his selections ; for men, if they are not either things or
principles, represent them, at least, in the eyes of the people.
The First Consul appointed at Marseilles, for example, M.
Charles Lacroix, ex-minister of foreign affairs ; at Saintes, M.
Francais, of Nantes ; at Lyons, M. Verninhac, formerly ambas
sador; at Nantes, M. Letourneur, late a member of the
Directory; at Brussels, M. de Pontecoulant ; at Rouen, M.
Beugnot; at Amiens, M. Quinette; at Ghent, M. Faypoult,
formerly minister of the finances. All these persons, and
others, who were picked out from among the Constituent
Assembly, the Legislative Assembly, the Convention, or the Five
Hundred, from among the ministers, directors, and ambas
sadors of the Republic, were fitted to confer lustre on the new
administrative functions, and to give to the government of the
provinces the importance which it deserves to have. Most of
them retained their places during the whole reign of the First
Consul and Emperor. One of them, M. de Jessaint, was still
prefect four years ago. For the prefecture of Paris the First
Consul chose M. Frochot. He gave him, for colleague at the
prefecture of police, M. Dubois, a magistrate, whose energy was
useful in clearing the capital of all the evil-doers whom the
parties had vomited forth into its bosom.
The same spirit presided over the judicial appointments.
Honourable names, chosen from the ancient bar, the ancient
magistracy, were combined, as much as possible, with new names
borne by men of probity. When he could adorn these posts with
striking names, the First Consul never failed to do so, for he
was fond of eclat in every thing, and the time had arrived when
it was possible, without too much danger, to borrow from the
past. A magistrate of the name of d'Aguesseau was first on the

94 HISTORY OF the [Jan. 1800.
list of judicial nominations, in quality of president of the tribunal
• of appeal of Paris, now the Royal Court. No sooner were these
functionaries appointed, than they received orders to set out
immediately to take possession of their posts, and to contribute,
each in his line, to the work of reorganization, which the young
general made his constant occupation, of which he purposed to
make his glory, and which, even after his prodigious victories,
has, in fact, remained his most solid glory.
It was necessary to attend to every thing at once in that
society, turned completely topsy-turvy. The emigrants, at
the same time so criminal and so unfortunate, just objects alike
of interest and aversion, for in their ranks were to be found men
cruelly persecuted, and bad Frenchmen who had conspired
against their country — the emigrants deserved the particular
attention of the government. According to the last legislative
enactment, a decree of the Directory or of the departmental
administrations was sufficient to place any absent individual on
the list of emigrants; from that moment all the property of such
absent person was confiscated, and, if he was ever found upon
the territory of the Republic, the law condemned him to death.
A great number of persons, who had really emigrated, or
only concealed themselves, not having been yet inscribed on
the fatal list, either because they had been forgotten, or because
no enemy happened to denounce them, were liable to be still
inscribed there. Many lived in a state of perpetual alarm. To
place them on that list at this time, it was sufficient for that
enemy once to fall in with them, and they were then exposed
to the operation of the laws of proscription. As for those who
had been inscribed deservedly or not, they were arriving in great
numbers to obtain their erasure. Their rash eagerness attested
the confidence that was placed in the humanity of the govern
ment, but gave offence to certain revolutionists, some of whom
had outrages against the returning emigrants to reproach them
selves with, while others had acquired possession of their
property. This was a new source of disorder; and, if it was
necessary to cease to proscribe, it was equally necessary not
to expose men who had taken part in the Revolution, even
violently, to lead an uneasy life. To all those who had com
promised themselves for it, the Revolution owed an entire
security; for, unfortunately, men are in general either coldly
selfish, or violent partisans of the cause which they have
espoused, and, in this latter case, moderation is not their usual
merit. This state of things called urgently for a remedy. The govern
ment presented a bill (projet de hi), the first clause of which
was designed to close the famous list of emigrants. From the
4th Nivose, year VIII. (December 25th, 1799), the day on which
the Constitution was put in force, the list was declared to be
closed; that is to say, the fact of absence posterior to that date

Jan. 1800.] consulate and the empire. 95
could no longer be construed as emigration, and visited with the
same penalties. People were permitted, in future, to absent
themselves, to go from France to foreign countries, to come from
foreign countries into France, without its being a punishable
offence ; for it is true, that for ten years to absent oneself
had been a crime. Liberty to go and come was thus restored
to all the citizens.
To this first clause was added the following: persons who had
incurred, more or less, the charge of emigration, some of whom
had quitted the territory of the Republic but for a moment,
Others merely concealed themselves to escape persecution, and
who had fortunately been omitted in the list of emigrants, could
not thenceforward be inscribed, unless by virtue of a decision of
the ordinary tribunals ; that is to say, of the jury. This was
closing the list, in some measure, for them also ; for, with the
present spirit of the tribunals, there was no danger of its being
increased by new names.
Lastly, while those who had not yet been inscribed were
handed over to the tribunals, and the guarantees of ordinary
justice were thus ensured to them, those who, having been
unduly inscribed, or, alleging that they had been so, claimed
their erasure, were referred to the administrative authority.
Here the indulgent intention of the new government in regard
to them was perceptible ; for the new administrative authorities
chosen by it, full of its spirit, could not fail to lend a favourable
ear to claims of this kind. It was sufficient, in fact, to produce
certificates of residence in any place whatever in France, cer
tificates frequently false, to prove that one had been unjustly
declared absent, and get one's name erased. With the general
disposition to violate tyrannical laws, this method of obtaining
erasure could not fail of succeeding. Emigrants desirous of
obtaining their erasure were, moreover, allowed to enter France,
under the surveillance of the political police. In the language
of the time, this was called obtaining surveillances ; great
numbers of them were delivered ; and thus the emigrants who
were in most haste were enabled to anticipate the moment of
their erasure. These surveillances even became a definitive re
call for most of those who availed themselves of them.
As for the emigrants whose names could not be removed
from the fatal list, on account of the notoriety of their emigration,
the existing laws in regard to them were retained. The spirit
of the time was such, that no other course could be pursued ;
for, if one felt pity for unfortunate persons, one was irritated
against guilty men, who had left the French territory to bear
arms against their native country, or to bring upon it the arms
of foreigners. For the rest, in all cases, the erased or not
erased had no claim upon their properties which had been sold.
The sales were irrevocable, both by virtue of the Constitution,
and in consequence of the dispositions of the new law. Those

96 history of the [Jan. 1800.
who had obtained their erasure, and whose prqperty had been
sequestrated without being sold, could alone indulge a hope of
its eventual recovery.
Such was the law proposed and adopted by an immense ma
jority, notwithstanding some censures in the Tribunate from
those who deemed that too much favour, or not enough, was
shown in it to the emigrants.
Among the legal enactments then in force, which appeared in
tolerably tyrannical, was the interdiction of the right to bequeath
property by will. The then existing laws allowed a dying person
to dispose of no more than one tenth of his fortune, if he had
children, and of one sixth, if he had none. These dispositions
had been the result of the first revolutionary indignation against
the abuses of the ancient French society, aristocratic society, in
which paternal vanity, desirous sometimes to provide for an
eldest son, sometimes to force the affections of his children by
ill-assorted matches, despoiled some for the benefit of others.
Giving way to one of those gusts of indignation so common to
the human mind, the government, instead of reducing the pa
ternal authority within just limits, had completely fettered it.
A father could no longer reward or punish. He could, if he had
children, dispose of nothing, or very little more, in favour of him
who had deserved all his affection ; and what is more extraor
dinary, if he had only nephews, near or distant, he could not
give away more tiym an almost insignificant part of his fortune,
namely, a sixth. iThis was a downright outrage on the right of
property; and one of the severities of the revolutionary system
that was most keenly felf^for Death sweeps off victims every
day, and thousands expired without having the powrer to obey
the dictates of their hearts in behalf of those who served, at
tended, cheered them in their old age.
It was not possible that such a reform as this could be delayed
till the Civil Code should be drawn up. rA law was proposed
for re-establishing the right to dispose of property by will within
certain limits"> By virtue of this law, the dying father who had
fewer than four children might dispose by will of a fourth of his
fortune, of a fifth if he had fewer than five, and so on in the
same proportion. He might dispose of half when he had only
ascending or collateral relations, of the whole when he had no
kindred qualified to inherit.
<This measure was most attacked in the Tribunate, particularly
by Andrieux, an honest, sincere man, but more sparkling than
enlightened. He alleged that it was a return to the abuses of
the right of primogeniture, to the violences practised under the
ancient >ystem upon children of rank, &c. This law passed,
like the others, by an immense majority.
By another law the government instituted a tribunal of prizes,
which had become indispensable for rendering impartial justice
to neutrals and for conciliating them by better treatment. Lastly,

Jan. 1800.] consulate and the empire. 97
it called the attention of the two assemblies to the laws concern
ing the finances.
On this point there was little to say to the Legislative Body,
the two legislative commissions having already passed the re
quisite laws. The administrative operations undertaken by the
government in pursuance of these laws, with a view to reor
ganise the finances, were scarcely a subject for discussion. At
any rate, it was necessary to settle, were it but for form's sake,
the budget of the year VIII. If the collection had been regular,
if the taxes imposed had been punctually paid, and not only paid
by those on whom they were assessed, but faithfully handed
over by the depositaries of the public money, the finances of the
State would have been in a tolerable condition. The ordinary
taxes might produce about 430,000,000; and this was the
amount to which the government hoped to reduce the public
expenditure in time of peace ; nay, it even flattered itself with
the prospect of bringing it down considerably lower. Expe
rience soon proved that it was not possible, even in time of
peace, to keep it under 500,000,000 ; but it proved also that it
would be easy to raise that sum from the taxes, without in
creasing the rates. This estimate does not include the ex
penses of collection or the local expenses, which would raise
the budget of that period, calculating as we now do, to 600,000,000
or 630,000,000.
It was only with reference to the war expenditure that the
insufficiency of the receipts was great and 'certain ; and in this
there is nothing extraordinary, for it is the same everywhere.
In no country whatever can war be carried on with the ordinary
revenues of peace. If it could be done, it would be a proof that
in time of peace the taxes were unnecessarily high. But, owing
to the confusion of late years, nobody could tell if, with war,
the budget would amount to 600,000,000, 700,000,000, or
800,000,000. On this point each made different conjectures.
Experience proved likewise that the addition of about
150,000,000 to the ordinary budget would be sufficient to
' defray the expenses of the war, that is, with victorious armies
living in an enemy's country. The budget of the year was
therefore estimated at 600,000,000, for receipts as well as expen
diture. As the ordinary revenues amounted to 430,000,000
there was a deficiency of 170,000,000. But this was not the
real difficulty. On emerging from a financial chaos, it would
have been too much to have attempted to equalize, all at once,
the receipts and the expenditure. It was first necessary to get
in the ordinary taxes. If this first result could be attained, the
government was sure to have speedily wherewithal to meet the
most urgent necessities, for credit would very soon feel the effect,
and, with the paper of different kinds enumerated elsewhere,
which had been created, it had in its hands the means of obtain
ing from moneyed men the funds requisite for all the ser-
VOL. I. H

98 history of the [Jan. 1800.
vices. Such was the object of the unremitting efforts of JM.
Gaudin, seconded against all the difficulties which he en
countered by the resolute and persevering will of the First
Consul. The agents of the direct contributions recently
established, displayed the greatest activity. The assessments
were far advanced, and already in the course of collection. The
bills of the receivers-general began to find their way into the
coffers of the treasury, and to be discounted at a rate of interest
that was not over usurious. The difficulty in carrying out this
system of bills consisted always in the quantity of paper cir
culating, which it was difficult to ascertain, especially with
reference to each general receipt. A receiver vvho ought to
gather 20,000,000, for example, could not sign bills for that
sum, if he had to take 6,000,000 or 8,000,000 in dead assets,
in bons d'arrerage, bons de requisition, &c. The minister ap
plied himself to withdraw these papers, to estimate what amount
in them was likely to figure in each general receipt, and to make
the receivers-general sign bills for the sum in cash which, as he
calculated, would come into their coffers.
During this same session, there was instituted a new class of
accountable officers destined to ensure the more punctual
transmission of moneys to the treasury ; these were the receivers
of arrondissement. Hitherto there had been no other inter
mediate person between the collectors placed near the tax
payers and the receiver-general residing in the chief town, than
the clerks of receipts, agents of the receiver-general, dependents
of his, telling the truth to him alone. It was, nevertheless, one
of the points of passage where the payment of money into the
public chests might be best watched and ascertained. This point
had been unfortunately neglected. Particular receivers were now
appointed in each arrondissement, dependent on the State, bound
to report to it what they received and what they paid to the
receiver-general, well-informed and disinterested witnesses as to
the sums actually collected, for they made no profit by the stop
page of the public funds in the hands of the accountable officers.
From this institution the government derived the advantage of
being more accurately informed of the state of the receipts,
and of getting into its hands new securities in ready money,
which would be a matter of indifference now, but was not so
then ; lastly, it had the further advantage of introducing the
system of circumscription by arrondissement, recently devised.
Civil and correctional justice and a considerable part of the
communal administration had been already established at the
centre of the arrondissement; by fixing there also part of the
financial administration, greater benefit was derived from this cir
cumscription, which certain persons alleged to be only an arbitrary
subdivision of territory. Since it had, on certain accounts, been
deemed indispensable, one could not do better than multiply the
use of it, and render it real, instead of artificial, as it was

Jan. 1800.] consulate and the empire. 99
accused of being. The prefects and sub-prefects had orders to
visit the receivers, and, by inspecting their books, to check the
punctuality of their payments. For this there is now, fortu
nately, no occasion ; but, at the period which we are describing,
when every thing was but roughly sketched,, it was applying
useful stimulants to accountable officers, to send prefects and
sub-prefects to inspect their chests.
The reorganisation of the finances could not, therefore, proceed
more rapidly. But public assemblies appreciate only realised
results. People could not see all the truly useful things intro
duced into the interior of the administration. In the Tribunate
they descanted endlessly on the great question of the equaliza
tion of the receipts and the expenditure; they complained of
the deficit ; they brought forward a thousand schemes, and there
were members so irrational as to propose to negative the finan
cial measures under discussion, till the government should find
some expedient for securing equilibrium between the receipts
and the expenditure. But all these propositions led to no results.
The proposed laws were adopted by a great majority in the Tribu
nate, and almost unanimously in the Legislative Body.
An institution, worthy of being mentioned in history, was
added to those, the creation of which has already been recorded ;
this was the Bank of France. The old discounting establish
ments had perished amidst the disorders of the Revolution ; it
was not possible, however, for. Paris to dispense with a bank.
In every commercial centre, where a certain activity prevails,
there is wanted a convenient circulating medium for payments,
that is to say, a paper money, and an establishment discounting,
on a large scale, the bills of merchants. These two branches
of business indeed, work well together; for the cash received,
in exchange for circulating notes, furnishes the very funds
that may be lent to the community in the shape of discounts.
In fact, wherever there is any business doing, however incon
siderable, a bank must prosper, if it discounts none but good
paper, and if it issues no more notes than are wanted; in short,
if it confines its operations to the legitimate wants of the
place where it is established. This was what required to be
done in Paris, and what could not fail to succeed, if it were well
done. This new bank was to do business not only with private
persons, but also with the treasury, and thus if it made profits,
it had also services to render. The government had recourse
to the principal bankers of the capital; M. Perregaux, a
financier whose name is connected with all the eminent services
rendered at that time to the State, put himself at their head,
and an association of wealthy capitalists was formed for the
establishment of a bank, called the Bank of France, the same
that still exists. The capital was fixed at 30,000,000 francs.
This bank was to be managed by fifteen directors, and a com
mittee of three persons, since replaced by a governor. According
H2

100 HISTORY OF THE [Jan. 1800.
to its statutes, it was to discount commercial paper, originating
in legitimate and not fictitious transactions, to issue notes circu
lating like money, and to abstain from all speculations foreign to
discount and bullion business. Adhering to its statutes, it
has become the most flourishing establishment of the kind
known in the world. We shall see presently what was done
by the government to impart to the operations of this bank
that energy and scope which caused it to prosper from the
very first days of its existence.
While the consular government, in concert with the Legislative
Body, was devoting itself to these vast labours of internal
administration, the negotiations with the powers, friendly or
belligerent, were continued without interruption. The letter of
the First Consul to the King of England elicited an im
mediate answer. The First Consul had written on the 26th
of December (5th Niv6se); the answer was dated the 4th-
of January (14th Nivose). The resolution of the English
cabinet was, in fact, taken beforehand, and it had no need to
deliberate. In 1797, indeed, England might think of treating,
and send Lord Malmesbury to Lille, when her finances were
embarrassed, when Austria was obliged to sign the peace of the
Continent at Campo-Formio: but now that the income-tax had
more than replenished her exchequer, now that Austria, again at
war with us, had pushed her armies to our frontiers, now that
she was bent on wresting from us the important positions of Malta
and Egypt, and on avenging the affront of the Texel, peace could
"•*iiot be very desirable to that power. She had, besides, a still
stronger reason for refusing it ; this was, that war suited the
"Kpassions and the interests of Mr. Pitt. This celebrated head of
the British cabinet had made the war with France his mission,
J^ns glory, the foundation of his political existence. If peace
became necessary, he should, perhaps, be obliged to retire. / He
brought to the conflict that obstinacy of character which, com
bined with his rhetorical talents, had made him a powerful, but
not very enlightened statesman. The reply could not be
doubtful; it was negative and uncivil. The answer was not
addressed directly to the First Consul; but, adhering to the
custom, an excellent one, by the by, of communicating from
minister to minister, the English cabinet replied in a note from
Lord Gienville to M. de Talleyrand.
This note clumsily betrayed the displeasure caused to Mr. Pitt
by this challenge, not to war, but to peace, addressed by the
First Consul to England. It contained a recapitulation, ever
lastingly repeated for several years, of the origin of the war; it
imputed the first aggression to the French Republic; reproached
it, in violent language, with the ravages committed in Germany,
in Holland, in Switzerland, and in Italy; it made mention even of
rapine practised by our generals in the latter country; and, coupled
with this reproach, that of a design to overthrow, everywhere, the

Jan. 1800.] consulate and the empire. 101
throne and the altar ; and then, coming to the late overtures of
the First Consul, the English minister said that these feigned
pacific demonstrations were not the first of the same kind ; that
the various revolutionary governments, successively erected and
overthrown for ten years past, had more than once made similar
overtures; that his Majesty the King of Great Britain could not
yet discover, in what was passing in France, a change of prin
ciples capable of satisfying and tranquillising Europe; that the
only change which could give it complete security would be the
re-establishment of the house of Bourbon ; that then alone social
order would appear to be out of danger ; that, for the rest, the re-
establishment of that house was not made the absolute condition
of peace with the French Republic, but that, until new symptoms
more significant and more satisfactory, England would persist
in fighting as well for her own safety as for that of her allies.
This indecorous note, which was disapproved by sensible men
in all countries, did little honour to Mr. Pitt; it indicated in him
more passion than understanding. It proved that a new go
vernment needs many victories to make itself respected ; for the
present government had already gained numerous and signal
victories, but evidently it needed still greater. The First
Consul was not disconcerted, and, wishing to profit by the
favourable position which the moderation of his conduct gave
him in the eyes of the world, he returned a mild but firm answer,
not again in the form of a letter to the king, but in the form of
a despatch addressed to Lord Grenville, the minister for foreign
affairs. Recapitulating, in a few words, the .first events of the
war, he proved, in very temperate language, that France had
taken up arms solely for the purpose of resisting a European
•conspiracy, formed against her safety ; admitting the calamities
which the Revolution had brought upon the whole world, he in
sinuated, by the way, that those who had persecuted the French
Republic with such rancour ought, by right, to reproach them
selves with being the real cause of the violences so often de
plored. " But," added he, " what is the use of reverting to these
circumstances ? Here is now a government disposed to put an
-end to the war ; is the war to be endless, because this or the
•other was the aggressor ? And, unless there is a desire to render
it interminable, ought not an end to be put to these incessant
recriminations ? Assuredly no one can hope to obtain from
France the re-establishment of the Bourbons; is it, then,
decorous to make insinuations such as those which have been
indulged in? And what would be said, if France, in her com
munications, were to call upon England to replace on the throne
that family of the Stuarts which descended from it only in the
last century ? But, setting aside all these irritating questions,"
added the note dictated by the First Consul, " if you deplore,
like us, the evils of war, let us agree to a suspension of arms ;
let us fix upon a town, Dunkirk, for instance, or any other, at

102 history of the [Jan. 1800.
your option, where the negotiators shall meet ; the French go
vernment places at the disposal of Great Britain passports for
the ministers whom she shall have invested with her powers."
This calm attitude produced the effect usually produced by a
cool man on an angry man ; it drew from Lord Grenville a reply
still more vehement, more acrimonious, more illogical, than his
first note. In this reply, the English minister sought to palliate
the blunder which he had committed in adverting to the house
of Bourbon ; answered that it was not for that house that war
was waged, but for the safety of all governments, and again de
clared that hostilities would be prosecuted without relaxation.
This last communication was dated the 20th of January (30th
Nivose). There was not another word to be said. General
Bonaparte had done enough : confiding in his glory, he had not
been afraid to offer peace ; he had offered it, without much hope,
but in perfect sincerity ; and by this step he had gained the two
fold advantage of unveiling the unreasonable passions of Mr.
Pitt, as well to the eyes of France as to the eyes of the English
opposition. Happy had it been, if he had at all times
united with his power that moderation of conduct so skilfully
turned to account !
The communications of Austria were more decorous, without
affording more hope of peace. That power, not imagining that
the intentions of the First Consul, though very pacific, could go
so far as the relinquishment of Italy in her favour, was resolved
to continue the war ; but, acquainted with the conqueror of Cas-
tiglione and Rivoli, knowing that whoever had him for adversary
must not be too confident of victory, she would not bar every
way to ulterior negotiations.
As if Austria had an understanding with England respecting
form, the answer of the emperor to the First Consul was a
despatch from M. Thugut to M. de Talleyrand. This despatch
was dated the 15th of January (25th Nivose). The substance
was the same as that of the English notes. If war was carried
on, it alleged that it was only to preserve Europe from a general
convulsion: Austria wished for nothing more than to see France
disposed to peace; but what guarantee did she offer for her new
dispositions? It was admitted, however, that, under the First
Consul, there was reason to hope for more moderation at home
and abroad, more stability of purpose, more fidelity to engage
ments made ; and that there would thence result more chances
for a solid and lasting peace. This happy change was expected
from his eminent talents; but, without saying so, it was in
sinuated that, when it should be completely effected, it wouldbe
time enough to think of negotiating.
The First Consul, acting with Austria as with England, was
not to be put off with this evasive explanation. Without being
discouraged by the vagueness of the answer, he resolved to re
duce the cabinet of Vienna to the necessity of giving a positive

Jan. 1800.] consulate and the empire. 103
explanation, and of refusing or accepting peace in a categorical
manner. On the 28th of February (9th Vent6se), M. de Talley
rand was directed to write to M. de Thugut, and to offer to take
for the basis of negotiations the treaty of Campo-Formio. This
treaty, he said, had been an act of great moderation towards the
Emperor of Austria on the part of General Bonaparte; for,
having it in his power, in 1797, to extort great sacrifices from
that prince, owing to the threatening position of the French
army at the gates of Vienna, he had, in the hope of a durable
peace, preferred moderate advantages to more extensive advan
tages ; he had even incurred the censure of the Directory, added
the French minister, by his clemency to the imperial court.
Lastly, M. de Talleyrand declared that Austria should receive
in Italy the indemnifications which, by the treaty of Campo
Formio, were promised her in Germany.
To comprehend the drift of the propositions of the First Con
sul, we must recollect that the treaty of Campo-Formio gave, to
France, Belgium and Luxemburg; to the Cisalpine Republic,
Lombardy, Mantua, the Legations, &c. ; and that Austria re
ceived, by way of indemnification, Venice and the greater part
of the Venetian states. With respect to the line of the Rhine,
embracing, besides Belgium and Luxemburg, the countries
comprised between the Meuse, the Moselle, and the Rhine, in
short, what we now call the Rhenish Provinces, Austria was to
mediate for the purpose of obtaining the cession of them to
France by the Germanic Empire. Austria, on her own part,
ceded, henceforward, the county of Falkenstein, situated be
tween Lorraine and Alsace, and engaged to open to the French
troops the gates of Mayence, which she occupied on behalf of
the Empire. By way of compensation, Austria was to receive the
bishopric of Salzburg, contiguous to Bavaria, when the ecclesias
tical provinces should be secularised. Tliese various arrange
ments were to be negotiated at the congress of Rastadt, termi
nated so tragically in 1799 by the murder of the French pleni
potentiaries. Such was the treaty of Campo-Formio.
In offering this treaty as the basis of a new negotiation, the First
Consul, therefore, did not resolve the question of the line of the
Rhine in regard to the Rhenish Provinces; he decided only the
question respecting Belgium, irrevocably ceded to France, leav
ing the question of the Rhenish Provinces to an ulterior negotia
tion with the Empire ; and, by offering in Italy the compensations
formerly stipulated in Germany, he insinuated that the success
obtained by Austria in Italy should be taken into consideration,
and have the effect of placing her in a better position in that
country. He added that, for the second-rate powers of Europe,
there should be stipulated a system of guarantees, calculated
to restore in its full force that law of nations, on which the
safety and the happiness of nations essentially depend, lhis
was an allusion to the invasion of Switzerland, of Piedmont, ot

104 history of the [Jan. 1800.
Tuscany, of the Papal States, and of Naples, for which the
Directory was so bitterly reproached, and which had been made
the pretext for the second coalition ; it was a pretty clear offer to
re-establish those different States, and thus to make Europe
easy concerning the alleged invasions of the French Republic.
More could not be granted : and nothing but the need which
France then had of peace could have induced the First Consul
to make such offers. And, as he never did things by halves, he
addressed to Austria, as well as to England, the formal proposi
tion of a suspension of arms, not only on the Rhine, where that
suspension already existed, but also on the Alps and the Apen
nines, where it did not yet exist.
On the 24th of March (3rd Germinal), M. de Thugut replied,
and in very moderate terms, that the treaty of Campo-Formio,
• violated as soon as concluded, did not contain a system of paci
fication capable of satisfying the belligerent powers; that the
true principle, adopted in all negotiations, was to take for basis
the state in which the fortune of arms had left each power; that
this was the only basis on which Austria could treat. M. de
Thugut added that, before proceeding any farther he had an
inquiry to make relative to the form of the negotiation; that
it was important for him to know whether France would admit
the negotiators of all the States at war, in order to arrive at a
general peace, the only one which was fair and prudent, the only
one to which Austria could accede.
This language proved two things : firstly, that Austria, in pro
posing for the point of departure the actual state, that is to say,
the situation in which the last campaign had left each power,
cherished high pretensions in regard to Italy; secondly, that she
would not separate from England, to whom she was closely
bound by subsidiary treaties. This fidelity to England was, on
her part, a duty imposed by her position, which, as we shall
see by and by, influenced the turn of the negotiations and of
the war.
Such an answer, though civil in its terms, left little hope of
coming to an understanding, since it made the conduct of a power .
disposed to listen to some words of peace, depend on the conduct
of a power determined not to listen to any. General Bonaparte,
nevertheless, directed a reply to be sent to this effect: that, in
offering indemnifications in Italy, for those stipulated formerly in
Germany, he proposed implicitly to start, not from the status
ante helium, but from the status post bellum, that is, to take into
account the successes of Austria in Italy; that the overtures
made by him to England proved his desire to render the peace
general ; that he had little hope, however, from a negotiation
common to all the belligerent powers, as England was adverse to
accommodation; but that he admitted purely and simply the
propositions of Austria ; that he awaited, in consequence, the
designation of the place where they might treat; and that, as

Jan. 1800.] consulate and the empire. 105
there was a determination to continue to fight, it ought to be
fixed out of the theatre of the war.
Austria declared that, such being the intentions of the French
cabinet, she would communicate with her allies; but that, till
she had consulted them, it would be impossible to fix upon any
particular place. This was deferring the negotiation for an in
definite term. ,_
The First Consul, in addressing tliese overtures to England '
and Austria, had not indulged in any illusion as to their result;
but he wished to try the effect of pacific advances, in the first
place, because he desired peace, considering it as necessary for
the organisation of the new government; secondly, because he
judged that this step would raise him in the estimation of France t
and of Europe.
His calculations were completely justified by what passed in"
the English parliament. Mr. Pitt, by his uncourteous manner of.
replying to the overtures of France, drew upon himself violent and
deserved attacks. Never had the opposition of Fox and Sheridan
been more nobly inspired ; never had it shed such lustre, and
merited more justly the esteem of the honest men of all countries.
In fact, there was scarcely any motive to justify the continu
ance of the war ; for England was then in a position to obtain all
that she could reasonably wish. It is true that she would
scarcely have obtained the relinquishment of Egypt; but, as she
was willing, a few months afterwards, to leave it to us (the ulte
rior negotiations will prove this), she might have consented to it
at once; and, at this price, she would have retained her con
quests, the Indies included, and she would have spared herself
the immense dangers to which her obstinacy exposed her at a
later period. It was, therefore, at bottom, nothing but a minis
terial interest which induced the British cabinet to prosecute the
war with such rancour. The animadversions of the opposition
were strong, and incessantly repeated. They demanded and ob
tained copies of the papers relative to the negotiation, and the
most violent debates on the subject ensued. The ministers in
sisted that it was impossible to negotiate with the French
government, because there was no safety in treating with it; that
by its bad faith it had successively drawn upon itself war with
the whole world, Denmark and Sweden excepted, and that its
relations, even with these two countries, were impaired ; that
peace with this government was deceitful and ruinous, witness
the States of Italy; that, after having been the aggressor to
wards all the princes of Europe, it designed to dethrone them
all; for it was consumed by an incessant thirst for conquest and
destruction ; that General Bonaparte offered no more guaran
tees than his predecessors; that, if the new French government
was no longer terrorist, it was still revolutionary, and with
the French Revolution no hope of peace or truce could be in
dulged ; that, if it could not be annihilated, it must at least

106 history of the [Jan. 1800.
be exhausted, till it was so weakened that there was nothing fur
ther to be feared from it. The English ministers, especially
Lord Grenville, made use of the most insulting language in
speaking of the First Consul. They treated him much as they
had done Robespierre.
Fox, Sheridan, Tierney, the Duke of Bedford, and Lord Hol
land, replied with the highest reason to these allegations. "You
ask who was the aggressor," said they, "and what signifies
that ? You say that it was France ; France says that it was
England. Must we then continue to tear each other in pieces
till we can agree about this point of history? And of what con
sequence is it who was the aggressor, if the one whom you accuse
of being so makes the first offer to lay down arms ? You say
that it is impossible to treat with the French government ; but
you yourselves sent Lord Malmesbury to Lille to treat with the
Directory. Prussia and Spain have treated with the French
Republic, and have had no reason to complain of it. You talk
of the crimes of that government ; but your ally, the court of
Naples, is committing crimes infinitely more atrocious than those
of the Convention ; for it has not the excuse of popular excite
ment. You talk of ambition; but Russia, Prussia, and Austria
have partitioned Poland ; but Austria has just reconquered Italy,
without restoring their dominions to the princes whom France
had dispossessed; you are yourselves seizing India, part of the
Spanish colonies, and all the Dutch colonies. Who will dare to
proclaim himself more disinterested than another in this conflict
of rage and avidity, in wliich all the States are engaged? Either
you will never treat with the French Republic, or you will never
find a more favourable moment than the present ; for an ener
getic man, a man who is obeyed, has just seized the supreme
power, and seems disposed to exercise it with justice and mo
deration. Is it worthy of the English government to cover with
abuse an illustrious personage, the head of one of the first nations
in the world, and who is at least a great captain, whatever may
be the vices or the virtues which time shall hereafter develop in
him ? Unless we say that we are determined to exhaust Great
Britain, her blood, her treasures, all her most valuable resources,
for the re-establishment of the house of Bourbon, we can assign
no good reason for refusing to treat at this moment."
To arguments so conclusive and so clear, no reply could be given.
Mr. Tierney, seizing the occasion offered by the" fault which the
English administration had committed, in adverting, in its notes,
to the re-establishment of the house of Bourbon, made a special
motion against that house. He proposed the adoption of a formal
resolution, declaring the separation of the cause of England
from the cause of the Bourbons, a race so pernicious to both
countries, he exclaimed, to Great Britain as well as to France!
" I have heard," he continued, " I have heard many partisans
of the administration of Mr. Pitt assert, that the French go-

Jan. 1800.] consulate and the empire. 107
vernment, not having proposed a collective negotiation, there
might be just cause for refusing a separate negotiation, which
would weaken by severing us from our allies ; but I have not
met with one who did not severely censure this manner of fixing
the term of the war at the restoration of the house of Bourbon."
And it is true, as Tierney said, that every body had censured
that fault, and that the cabinet of Vienna, less influenced by
passion than the British cabinet, had taken good care not to
imitate if. The English ministers replied that they had not
introduced that condition as absolute and indispensable, but
they were told, and truly, that the mention of it constituted a
violation of the law of nations — an attack on the liberty of
nations. " And what would you say," cried Mr. Tierney (re
peating here the argument of the French cabinet), " what would
you say if General Bonaparte, when victorious, should declare
that he would not treat unless with the Stuarts ? Besides,"
added he, " is it out of gratitude to the house of Bourbon that
you are lavishing our blood and our . treasure ? Recollect the
American war ! Or is it not rather for the principle that it
represents? Will you, then, rouse against yourselves all the
passions that excited France to rise against the Bourbons?
Will you draw upon yourselves the animosity of all those who
will not have any more nobles — of all those who will not have
any more tithes or feudal rights — of all those who have acquired
national domains — of all those who have borne arms ten years
for the French Revolution? Will you, then, drain to the last
drop the blood of so many Frenchmen, before you think of
negotiating ? I move," concluded Mr. Tierney, " that England
separates her cause from that of the house of Bourbon."
On another occasion, the celebrated Sheridan, always the
boldest and the most pungent of speakers,— Sheridan turned the
debate upon a very sore point for the British cabinet — the expe
dition to Holland, in consequence of which the English and
Russians, defeated by General Brune, had been obliged to capi
tulate. " It seems," said Mr. Sheridan, " that if our govern
ment cannot conclude treaties of peace with the French Republic,
it can at least conclude capitulations. I ask it to explain to us
the motives of that which it has signed for the evacuation of
Holland." Mr. Dundas, thus challenged, assigned three mo
tives for the expedition to Holland : the first, to detach the
United Provinces from France; the second, to diminish the
maritime strength of France, and to augment that of England,
by taking the Dutch fleet; the third, to make a useful diversion
for the allies ; and he added, that the British cabinet had suc
ceeded in two points out of the three, since it had possession of
the fleet, and had contributed to the victory gained at Novi, by
drawing to Holland the troops destined for Italy. No sooner
had the minister finished, than Sheridan, closing upon him,
retorted, with incomparable point : " Yes, you credited the

108 history of the [Jan. 1800.
reports of emigrants, and risked upon the continent an English
army, to cover it with disgrace. You sought to detach Hol
land from France, and you have attached it to her more strongly
than ever, by filling it with indignation at the iniquitous seizure
of its fleet and of its colonies. You have possession, you say, of
the Dutch fleet; but by an unheard of, an odious, proceeding, by
exciting the crews to riutiny, by exhibiting a spectacle of the
most mischievous kind, that of sailors revolting against their
officers, violating that discipline which constitutes the strength
of navies and the greatness of our nation. You have thus igno-
miniously seized on that fleet, not for England, at any rate, but
for the stadtholder; for you have been obliged to declare that it
was for him, and not for England. Lastly, you have rendered a
service to the Austrian army at Novi ; that is possible ; but do you
boast, then, ministers of the King of Great Britain, of having saved
an Austrian army by giving up an English army to slaughter?"
These virulent attacks did not prevent Mr. Pitt from obtaining
immense financial supplies, about 44,000,000/. sterling, (nearly
double the budget of France at that period); the authorisation
to grant subsidies to Austria, and to the States of Southern Ger
many; important additions to the income-tax, which already
produced 7,200,OOOZ. sterling per annum ; a new suspension of
the Habeas Corpus; and, lastly, the important measure of a
union with Ireland. But in England the public was deeply
moved by so much sound reason and eloquence. Rational men
throughout all Europe were struck by the wrongs done to France,
and, victory siding with justice, Mr. Pitt was destined ere long to
atone, by severe humiliations, for the superciliousness of his
policy towards the First Consul. Meanwhile, Mr. Pitt was
enabled to furnish the coalition with the means for a new cam
paign; the last, it is true, on account of the exhaustion of the
belligerent parties, and the most fiercely contested, precisely
because it was to be the last.
In this critical juncture, the First Consul sought to derive
from the court of Prussia all the utility that could be expected,
from it for the present. That court would not have been able,
in the face of such powerful adversaries, to restore peace in any
other way than by having recourse to an armed mediation, a
part not impossible for it to play, but totally inconsistent with
the views of the young king, who was applying himself to
recruit his treasury and his army, while all around him were
exhausting themselves. This prince had already sounded the
belligerent powers, and had found them so far from the mark,
that he had renounced the office of interposing between them.
Besides, the Prussian cabinet had certain interested views of its
own. It had no objection that France should exhaust Austria,
and that she should exhaust herself, in a prolonged struggle ;
but it would have wished her to relinquish part of the line of
the Rhine, and, contenting herself with Belgium and Luxem-

Jan. 1800.] consulate and the empire. 109-
burg, in that quarter, not to lay claim to the Rhenish provinces.
It urged the First Consul to adopt these views, hinting that
France and Prussia, if less close neighbours, would be the better
friends, while the European cabinets, soothed by this moderation
of France, would be the more inclined to peace. But, though
the First Consul had used great reserve in explaining himself on
this point, at bottom there was very little hope of deciding him
to this sacrifice ; and in all this the cabinet of Berlin could not
perceive any prospect of such a peace as could alone satisfy
Prussia, and merit her active intervention. It was, therefore,
prodigal of advice, administered in a dogmatic though friendly
shape, but it abstained from acting.
Still this cabinet might be useful in maintaining the neutrality
of the north of Germany, in persuading as many German
princes as possible to enter into that neutrality; lastly, in
detaching the Emperor Paul from the coalition. As for these
objects, it did labour with zeal to accomplish them, because it
was solicitous to strengthen and extend the neutrality of the
north of Germany, and particularly to bring over Russia to its
views. Paul, ever extreme in his sentiments, became every
day more exasperated against Austria and England ; he declared
publicly that he would certainly oblige Austria to replace the-
Italian princes on their thrones, which she had reconquered with
the arms of Russia, and England to restore to the Order of Malta
that island fortress, which she was on the point of reducing ;
he manifested a strange passion for that ancient order of
chivalry, and had made himself its Grand Master. He blamed
the manner in which the overtures of the First Consul had been
received in London and Vienna, and, from his communications
with Prussia, which had become confidential, it might be per
ceived that he would have been glad if similar overtures had
been addressed to himself. The First Consul, in fact, had not
ventured upon this step, for fear of what might happen with a
character such as that of the czar. Prussia, apprised of all
these particulars, communicated them to the French cabinet,,
which turned them to its advantage. •
Before opening the campaign, for the season for military
operations was approaching, the First Consul desired the at
tendance of M. Sandoz, the Prussian minister, and on the 5th
of March (14th Vent6se) had a distinct and complete explanation
with him'. After recapitulating at length all that he had done
for restoring peace, and all the invincible obstacles and want
of courtesy which he had met with, he made known the ex
tent of his military preparations, and, without unveiling his
profound combinations, gave the Prussian minister a glimpse of
the magnitude of the resources which France still possessed..
Hfe then declared that, full of confidence in Prussia, he expected
her to make fresh efforts to reconcile the belligerent powers,
while he should be engaged in fighting; that, in default of a;

110 HISTORY OF THE [Jan. 1800.
general peace, of which there was little probability before a new
campaign, he looked for two services from King Frederick
William — the reconciliation of the Republic with Paul I., and
a direct interposition with the Elector of Bavaria to withdraw
that prince from the coalition. " Make up matters for us with
Paul," said General Bonaparte; "decide, at the same time,
the Elector of Bavaria to refuse his troops and his territory
to the coalition, and you will have rendered us two services
which shall not be forgotten. If the Elector accedes to our
requisitions, you may promise him all the consideration he
can desire during the war, and the best treatment at the
peace." The First Consul explained his ulterior views to the Prussian
envoy. He declared to him that, the treaty of Campo-Formio
being the basis offered for the future negotiation, our frontier on
the side of the Rhine would be a question to be discussed
afterwards with the Empire ; that the independence of Holland,
Switzerland, and the Italian States should be formally gua
ranteed. Without explaining himself upon the point where the
Rhine should cease to bound the French frontier, he merely said
that nobody could suppose that France would relinquish the left
bank at all events above Mayence, but that, below that place, the
Moselle or the Meuse might serve for boundary. There could
be no question as to France retaining Belgium and Luxemburg.
.He added, in conclusion, that, if Prussia rendered France the
'services wliich she was in a position to render her, he would en
gage to leave to the cabinet of Berlin a considerable influence
in the negotiations for peace. This was, in fact, the point of
which Prussia was most tenacious, for she wished to take part in
these negotiations for the purpose of settling the German frontiers
in the manner best suited to her views.
This communication, so seasonably and frankly made, produced
the best effect in Berlin. The king replied that, with respect to
the Emperor Paul, he had already employed his good offices,
and would further employ them, to reconcile him with France ;
that, as for Bavaria, encompassed on all sides by Austria, he
could do nothing; but that, if the Emperor Paul could be
brought round, it might, perhaps, be possible, through the com
bined efforts of Prussia and Russia, to withdraw the Elector from
the coalition.
After all these judiciously concerted proceedings, nothing re
gained but to open hostilities as speedily as possible. "The
season for them, however, had not yet quite arrived, and it was
likely to arrive later than usual this year, because France had to
reorganise her armies, in part disbanded, and Austria had to fill
the chasm left by Russia in the ranks of the coalition. The
First Consul thought that the moment was come for settling
matters in La Vendee ; in the first place, for putting an end to
the odious spectacle of civil war ; and, in the second, for ren-

jt/ i

Jan. 1800.] consulate and the empire. Ill
dering disposable, and transferring to the Rhine and the Alps,
the excellent troops which La Vendee detained in the interior of
the Republic.
The intimations addressed to the insurgent provinces, concur
rently with the offers of peace made to the foreign powers, had
produced the greatest effect there. These intimations had been
supported by an imposing force of about 60,000 men, drawn
from Holland, from the interior, and even from Paris. The
First Consul had had the boldness to stay in Paris, then full of
the scum of every party, with a garrison of 2300 men ; and this
boldness he had carried to such a length as to publish the fact.
In reply to the English ministers, who alleged that the consular
government was not more solid than the preceding governments,
he had printed a comparative statement of the troops in London
and in Paris. The result showed, that London was guarded by
14,600 men, Paris by 2300. This number was scarcely suffi
cient to supply the ordinary police guards, which are stationed
at the great public establishments, and at the residences of the
high functionaries. Evidently the name of General Bonaparte
guarded Paris.
Be this as it may, the insurgent provinces found themselves
enveloped, before they were aware, by a formidable army, and
thus placed between an immediate and generous peace and the
certainty of a war of extermination. Messrs. d'Andigne and
Hyde de Neuville, after their interviews with the First Consul,
had dismissed all their illusions, and ceased to believe that he
would some day re-establish the Bourbons. No more did they
believe that there would be any chance of conquering such a
man. M. Hyde de Neuville, who had been sent by the Count
d'Artois to ascertain the state of things, determined to return to
London, unwilling, for his own part, to forsake the cause of the
Bourbons, but convinced of the impossibility of continuing the
war, and leaving to all the leaders the advice to do what the
necessity of times and places should command each of them,
M. d'Andigne returned to Vendee, to report what he had seen.
The term of the suspension of arms was about to expire. It
was requisite that the leaders of the royalist party should either
sign a definitive peace, or decide to engage immediately in a
mortal struggle with a formidable army. In 1793, in the first
enthusiasm of the insurrection, they had not been able to con
quer the 16,000 men of the garrison of Mayence, and had fought
heroic and sanguinary battles, with no other result than to suc
cumb at last. What could they now do against 60,000 men,
the first troops in Europe, half of whom only had just been suffi
cient to drive the Russians and the English into the sea? Evi
dently nothing: and this opinion was universal in the insurgent
provinces; at any rate, it was entertained, more or less, in each
of them. On the left bank of the Loire, between Saumur, Nantes,
and Les Sables, in short in old Vendee, drained of men and ot

112 HISTORY OF the [Jan. 1800.
every thing, people were wearied out: there the}7 estimated this
last assumption of arms, occasioned by the weakness and the
severities of the Directory, at its real value, that is to say, as a
piece of folly. On the right bank, about Mans, a country which
had also been the theatre of a desperate struggle, these senti
ments predominated. In Lower Normandy, where the insurrec
tion was of more recent date, where M. de Frotte, a young,
active, crafty, and ambitious chief, was the leader of the royalists,
a greater disposition was shown to continue the war. This was
also the case in the Morbihan, where the distance from Paris,
the vicinity of the sea, and the nature of the ground, offered more
resources, and where Georges Cadoudal, a cbief of ferocious and
indomitable energy, upheld the courage of his partisans. In
these two latter provinces, the more frequent communications
with the English contributed to produce a more obstinate
resistance. From one end of La Vendee and Bretagne to the other, con
sultations were held respecting the course to be pursued. The*
emigrants paid by England, whose attachment to the cause was
expressed in going incessantly to and fro, and who had not to
endure all the consequences of the insurrection, were in fierce
quarrel with the country people, on whom the burden of the
civil war pressed without intermission. The former insisted that
the struggle should be kept up ; the latter, on the contrary, that
it should be relinquished. These representatives of an interest
more English than royalist, said that the government of the
Consuls must perish, like all the other revolutionary govern
ments, after a few days of deceitful appearance; that it must
perish from the disorder of the finances and of the administra
tion ; that the Russian and English armies were to send a de
tachment to Vendee, to lend a hand to the French royalists;
that the latter, if they would but have patience for a few days,
would be enabled to reap the fruit of ten years' efforts and
combats; and that, by persisting, they would probably have the
honour of conducting the victorious Bourbons to Paris. Those
insurgents, who were not in the habit of running off to London,
and living there upon English money, who staid in the country
with their peasants, who saw their estates laid waste, their houses
burned, their wives and children exposed to hunger and to
death — these said that General Bonaparte had never failed in
what he had undertaken ; that in Paris, instead of believing that
all was falling into dissolution, people believed, on the contrary,
that all would be retrieved by the lucky hand of the new chief
of the Republic ; that this Republic, which was said to be ex
hausted, had just shown them an army of 60,000 men ; that those
Russians and those English who were so extolled had recently
laid down their arms before one half of this very army ; that it
was easy enough in London to form fine plans, to talk of attach
ment and fortitude, when people were at a distance from the

Jan. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 113
spot, from events, and from their consequences ; that they
ought to be guarded in what they said on this subject, in the
presence of men who, for eight years, had borne alone the
brunt of a most calamitous civil war. Some of these exhausted
royalists even went so far as to insinuate that general Bona
parte, in his impulsion towards what was right, after restoring
peace, putting an end to persecution, and raising the altars again,
would, perhaps, re-establish the throne also ; and they repeated
the idle stories which had ceased to be current among the leading
royalists, since the interviews between Messrs. d'Andigne and
Hyde de Neuville with the First Consul, but which still found
some credence among the lowest classes of the insurgent popula
tion, and contributed to reconcile their minds to the new govern
ment. In the heart of old Vendee, there was an humble priest, the
Abbe Bernier, cure of St. Laud, destined soon to take part in
the affairs of the Republic and of the Empire, who, by superior
intelligence and natural talents, had acquired a powerful as
cendency over the royalist chiefs. He had closely observed
that long insurrection, which had led to nothing but calamities ;
he judged that the cause of the Bourbons was lost, at least for
the moment ; and he believed that it was not possible to save
any thing from the general wreck produced by the French Re
volution, but the ancient altar of Christianity. Enlightened
on this point by the acts of the First Consul, and by frequent
communications with general Hedouville, he felt no further
doubt ; and he reckoned upon it that, in submitting, the royalists
might ensure peace, the end of their persecutions, and toleration,
at least, if not protection, for their religious worship. He,
therefore, recommended submission to all the old chiefs, of the
left bank, and, by his influence, silenced the braggarts going
and returning between La Vendee and London. A meeting took
place at Montfaucon, and there, in a council of the royalist
officers, the Abbe Bernier decided M. d'Autichamp, a young
nobleman of distinguished bravery, but docile towards superior
intelligence, to lay down arms on behalf of the province. The
capitulation was signed on the 18th of January (28th Nivose).
The Republic promised an entire amnesty, respect for public
worship, remission of the taxes for some time in the ravaged
provinces, and erasure of all the chiefs from the list of emigrants.
The royalists promised, in return, complete submission, and the
immediate surrender of their arms.
On the same- day, January the 18th, the Abbe Bernier wrote
to general Hedouville, " Your wishes and mine are accomplished.
This day, at two o'clock, peace was thankfully accepted by all
the chiefs and officers of the left bank of the Loire. The right
bank will undoubtedly follow this example, and the olive of
peace will replace, on both banks of the Loire, the gloomy cy
presses which war has planted there. I charge Messrs. cje
VOL. I. I

114 HISTORY OF THE [Jan. 1800.
Baurollier, Duboucher, and Renou to carry you the happy
tidings. I recommend them to the kindness of the government
and to yours. Unjustly inscribed in the fatal list of 1793, they
have been stripped of all their property. This sacrifice they
have made to the necessity of circumstances, and have been on
that account not the less desirous of peace. This peace is your
work; maintain it, general, by justice and beneficence. Your
glory and your happiness are linked to it. 'I will do all that
lies in my power in fulfilment of your salutary intentions ; wis
dom commands, humanity wills it. My heart belongs entirely
to the country wherein I dwell, and its happiness is the most
ardent of my wishes. " Bernier."
This example produced its effect. Two days afterwards, the
insurgents of the right bank, commanded by an old and brave
nobleman, M. de Chatillon, and disgusted, like him, of serving
the views of England rather than the cause of royalism, sub
mitted : all old Vendee was thus pacified. Extreme was the
joy, both in the country, where royalism prevailed, and in the
towns where reigned, on the contrary, the spirit of the Revolu
tion. In several towns, such as Nantes and Angers, the royalist
chiefs, wearing the tri-coloured cockade, were received in
triumph, and entertained like brothers. In all quarters, people
began to surrender their arms, and to submit in good earnest,
under the influence of an opinion, which gradually became
general, that war, without restoring the Bourbons, would lead
to nothing but bloodshed and the devastation of the country;
that submission, on the contrary, would ensure quiet, safety,
and the re-establishment of religion, which, of all things, was
most fervently desired.
In Bretagne and Normandy, however, the pacification met with
greater obstacles. The war in these parts was more recent, as
we have just observed, and had not so completely exhausted the
courage of those engaged in it; besides, it produced there dis
graceful emolument, while in La Vendee nothing accrued from
it but sufferings. It was in the centre of Bretagne and towards
Normandy, that all the Chouans, that is, men whom insurrection
had habituated to plunder, and who could not now do without
it, had taken refuge. They made war more fiercely upon the
chests of the tax collectors, upon the diligences, and upon the
proprietors of national domains, than upon the Republic. They
were in connexion with a troop of persons of infamous character
resident in Paris, and from these received the information which
guided them in their expeditions. Lastly, in Le Morbihan, which
was the seat of the most obstinate insurrection, Georges, the only
implacable one of all the Vendean chiefs, received from the Eng
lish, money and supplies of different kinds, to enable him to pro
long his resistance ; hence he was not at all disposed to submit.
But preparations had been made for crushing such of the

Jan. 1800.] consulate and the empire. 115
royalist chiefs as would mrt submit. On the 21st of January
(1st of Pluvi6se), general Chabot, breaking the suspension of
arms, marched against the bands in the centre of Bretagne, com
manded by Messrs. de Bourmont and de la Prevalaye. Near
the commune of Melay, he overtook M. de Bourmont, who, at
the head of 4000 Chouans, defended himself vigorously ; but
was, nevertheless, obliged to give way to the republicans, accus
tomed to put to rout other soldiers than peasants. It was not
without great difficulty that he himself, after incurring the
greatest danger, found means to escape. Being soon convinced
that he could not do more for his own cause, he surrendered his
arms on the 24th of January (4th Pluvi6se).
General Chabot then marched upon Rennes, intending to
proceed thence towards the extremity of Bretagne, where
general Brune was concentrating a large force. On the 25th
of January (5th Pluvi6se), several columns, setting out from
Vannes, Auray, and Elven, under generals Harty and Gency, fell
in at Grandchamp with the bands of Georges. The two
republican generals were escorting towards Vannes a convoy of
corn and cattle, which they had seized in the insurgent district.
The Chouans, having attempted to retake this convoy, the
escorting columns enveloped them, and, in spite of the most
vigorous resistance, killed 400 men, and several chiefs, and com
pletely routed them. Two days thereafter, on the 27th, 300
more Chouans perished in a very smart action at Hennebon,
which utterly destroyed all the hopes of the insurrection. Very
near the coast were lying an English 80-gun ship, and some
frigates, which could see how chimerical were the illusions with
which the British government had been amused. The truth was,
each party had deceived the other, the British government in
promising a new expedition like that to Holland, the Bretons in
announcing a general rising. Royalists, recently landed, had
great difficulty to get off in boats to the English squadron, and
were received like emigrants who had promised much, but per
formed little. Georges was reduced to the necessity of laying
down his arms, and gave up 20,000 muskets and twenty pieces
of cannon, which he had just received from the English.
In Lower Normandy, generals Gardanne and Chambarlhac,
detached from the garrison of Paris, were in pursuit of M. de
Frotte, a young chief full of devotion to the Royalist cause, and
who, like Georges, was bent on continuing the struggle. Some
severe fighting took place at different points. At length, on the
25th January (5th Pluviose), M. de Frotte was overtaken by
general Gardanne, at the iron works of Cosse, near la Motte-
Fouquet, and lost many men. On the 26th (6th Pluviose), Du-
boisgny, one of the chiefs, was attacked in his chateau of the
same name, near Fougeres, and,, like M. de Frotte, susta.ned
considerable loss. Lastly, on the 27th (7th Pluviose), general
Chambarlhac surrounded some companies of Chouans in the
I 2

116 history of the [Feb. 1800.
environs of St. Christophe, not far from Alencon, and put them
to the sword.
M. de Frotte, perceiving, like the others, but unfortunately
too late, that all resistance was useless against the numerous
columns which had assailed the country, M. de Frotte thought
it high time to submit. He wrote, demanding peace, to general
Hedouville, who, at that moment, was at Angers, and, while
awaiting an answer, proposed a suspension of arms to general
Chambarlhac. The latter replied that he had no powers to
treat, that he would write to the government to obtain them,
but that, in the mean time, he could not take it upon him to
suspend hostilities, unless M. de Frotte consented to deliver up
the arms of his soldiers immediately. This was precisely what
M. de Frotte had the greatest objection to do. He consented,
indeed, to submit, and to sign a momentary pacification, but on
condition of remaining armed, so that he might afterwai'ds seize
the first favourable occasion for recommencing the war. He
even wrote letters to his lieutenants, in which, while enjoining
them to surrender, he recommended to them to retain their
arms. During this interval, the First Consul, irritated at the
obstinacy of M. de Frotte, gave orders that no quarter should be
given to him, and that an example should be made on his
person. M. de Frotte, uneasy at receiving no answer to his
propositions, wished to place himself in communication with
general Guidal, commanding the department of the Orne, and
was apprehended with six of his men while inquiring for him.
The letters found upon him, which contained orders to his
followers to surrender, but to keep their arms, were regarded as
treachery. He was conducted to Verneuil, and given up to a
military commission.
The news of his apprehension having reached Paris, a great
number of intercessors beset the First Consul, and obtained an
order for suspending the proceedings; this was equivalent toa
pardon. But the courier bearing the order of the government
arrived too late. The Constitution being suspended in the
insurgent departments, M. de Frotte had been tried summarily,
and, when the reprieve arrived, that young and valiant chief
had already suffered the penalty of his obstinacy. The duplicity
of his conduct, though clearly proved, was not so culpable but
that we must deeply regret such an execution, the only one, by
the by, which stained this hapoy conclusion of the civil war
with blood. '
From that day, the departments of the West were entirely
pacified. The discretion of general Hedouville, the vigour and
promptness of the means employed, the weariness of the insur
gents, the mixture of confidence and fear infused into them by
the i-irst Consul, brought about this rapid pacification. It was
completely finished by the end of February, 1800 (the first days
ot Ventose). Ihe disarming was carried into effect everywhere.

Feb. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 117
There were left only highway robbers, whom active and relent
less justice was soon to overtake. The troops on duty in the
West wereput in march for Paris; they were required to carry
out the vast designs of the First Consul.
The Constitution, suspended in the four departments of the
Loire-Inferieure, Ille et Vilaine, Morbihan, and C6tes-du-Nord,
was again put in force, and most of the chiefs who came to lay
down their arms, were successively drawn to Paris, with the in
tention of placing them in communication with the First Consul.
The latter was well aware that it was not sufficient to wrest the
arms from their hands, but that it was necessary to master their
spirits, susceptible of enthusiasm, and to direct them toward
some noble object. He wished to draw the royalist chiefs along
with him in the immense career opened at that moment to all
the French, to lead them to fortune, to glory, by the path of
danger, which they were accustomed to travel. He sent them
invitations to come to see him. His renown, which awakened
a strong desire to approach him in all those who had opportunity
for doing so ; his beneficence, already much extolled in La
Vendee, and to which there had been occasion to appeal in behalf
of the numerous victims of the civil war, were, with the royalist
chiefs, so many honourable motives for visiting him. The
First Consul admitted, and favourably received, in the first
place, the Abbe Bernier, then Messrs. de Bourmont, d'Auti-
champ, de Chatillon, and, lastly, Georges Cadoudal himself.
He took particular notice of the Abbe Bernier, and resolved to
attach him to himself, by employing him in difficult affairs of the
Church. He conversed frequently with the military chiefs, touched
them by his noble language, and induced some of them to serve
in the French armies. He even found means to win the heart of
M. de Chatillon, who returned to his retreat, married, and
became the usual intercessor, and one always listened to, for his
fellow-citizens, when they had any act of justice or humanity to
solicit of the First Consul. It is by means of glory, clemency,
and beneficence, that an end is put to revolutions.
Georges alone withstood this high influence. When he was
conducted to the Tuileries, the aide-de-camp ordered to intro
duce him conceived such apprehensions from his look, that he
deemed it unsafe to shut the door of the First Consul's cabinet, and
went every now and then to steal a glance at what was passing.
The interview was long. In vain general Bonaparte addressed
the words " native country and glory" to the ears of Georges ;
in vain he held out even the bait of ambition to the heart of that
fierce champion of the civil war ; he had no success, and he felt
convinced himself that he had failed when he looked at the face
of his visiter. Georges, on leaving him, set out for England
with M. Hyde de Neuville. Several times, when giving his
fellow-traveller an account of this interview, he exclaimed,

118 HISTORY OF the [Feb. 1800.
showing his vigorous arms, " What a blunder I committed in
not strangling that fellow !"
This prompt pacification of La Vendee produced a strong
effect on the public mind. Some malevolent persons, who would
not account for it by its natural causes, that is to say, by the
energy of the physical means employed, by the wisdom of the
moral means, and bythe influence of the great name of the
First Consul, asserted that secret conventions had been made"
with the Vendeans, in which some important satisfaction had
been promised them. They did not say plainly, but they in
sinuated, that this would, perhaps, turn out to be much more
than the re-establishment of the principles of the ancient
system, that of the Bourbons themselves. It was the news
mongers of the revolutionary party who circulated these ridi
culous stories : but sensible people, appreciating better the acts
of general Bonaparte, said to themselves that men never did
such great things for others, and felt convinced that, if he was not
labouring solely for France, it was at least for himself, and not
for the Bourbons. On the whole, the pacification of La Vendee
was, in the estimation of all, one of the most fortunate events,
foreboding a more important and more difficult peace — the peace
of Europe.
Before opening the campaign this year, the First Consul
hastened to close the session of the Legislative Body, and to
press the adoption of the numerous bills (prqjets de Ms) which
he had presented. Some members of the Tribunate complained
of the rapidity with which they were required to discuss and vote.
:i We are," said Sedillez, an impartial and moderate man, " we
are hurried away in a whirlwind of urgency, the rapid movement
of which is directed towards the object of our wishes. Is it not
better to give way to the impetuosity of this movement than to
run the risk of impeding its progress? Next year we shall ex
amine, with more deliberation, the bills (projets) presented, and
we shall rectify what may need rectifying." Every thing, in
fact, was advancing hastily towards tli'at goal which the First
Consul had proposed to himself. The laws voted were carried
into execution; the functionaries appointed were repairing to
their posts. The new prefects entered upon office, and the ad
ministration resumed, in all its parts, a harmony, an activity,
which it had never before had. The arrears of taxes flowed
into the coffers of the treasury, since the completion of the
assessments enabled the collectors to demand payment from the
taxpayers in legal form. Every day, new measures denoted
more clearly the political march of the government. A second
list of prescripts had j ust obtained the favour of recall. Among
these figured a number of writers. Messrs. de Fontanes, de La
Harpe, Suard, Sicard, Michaud, Fievee, were recalled from
exile, or authorised to leave their retreats. The members of the

Feb. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE empire. 119
Constituent Assembly, known for having voted the abolition of
the feudal institutions, were exempted from all the severities
launched at them under the Convention and the Directory. A
famous prescript of the 18th of Fructidor, who negotiated and
signed the first treaty of peace concluded by the Republic, the
ex-director, Barthelemy, was, on the proposition of the Consuls,
nominated Senator. Lastly, another prescript of the same date,
Carnot, recently returned from exile, and since then appointed
inspector of reviews, was now appointed minister of war, in lieu
of general Berthier, who was setting out to take the command
of one of the armies of the Republic. The name of Carnot was
then a great military name, with which was associated the recol
lection of the victories of the Convention in '93; and, though
the name of general Bonaparte was" sufficient to make the
coalition tremble, still that of Carnot, added to his, produced an
additional sensation among the foreign staffs.
The session drawing towards a close, the opposition in the
Tribunate made a last effort, which caused some agitation,
though it was repulsed by a great majority. The Legislative
Body was to sit but four months. No term had been fixed for
the sessions of the Tribunate. That body, therefore, was at
liberty to meet, though the absence of the Legislative Body left
it without occupation. A motion was made that it should
create an employment for its time by means of the petitions
which it alone was charged to receive, and the wishes which it
was authorised to express concerning matters of general interest.
M. Benjamin Constant proposed to refer these petitions to
distinct commissions, to keep them continually at work, and to
reserve for themselves, by this method, not only the discussion
of all the acts of the government, a thing perfectly legitimate in
itself, but their permanent discussion during the twelve months
of the year. This proposition was negatived, in so far as it was
objectionable. It was decided that the Tribunate should meet
once a fortnight, to hear a report on petitions, and that this
report should be drawn up by .the bureau of the assembly,
composed of the president and the secretaries. Confined within
these limits, the proposition gave no cause for uneasiness.
With the exception of this last effort, the close of the session
was perfectly peaceable, even in the Tribunate. The plans of
the government had there obtained such a majority, that it
required very great susceptibility to be angry with that body
for the opposition of a score of its members. The First Consul,
disposed as he was not to put up with any thing unpleasant,
resolved to let that pass. Thus this first session, termed that of
the year VIIL, realised, in no respect, the fears which certain
propagators of bad news affected to entertain. If„ at a later
period, things had continued at this point, people would have
made shift with this last semblance of deliberative assemblies.

120 HISTORY OF THE [Feb. 1800.
That alarmed generation and the chief whom it had adopted
would alike have supported them.
Shortly before the close of the session, the First Consul took
a measure relative to the periodical press, which would now-a-
days be nothing less than utterly impracticable, but which,
at that time, owing to the silence of the Constitution, was-
a measure perfectly legal, and, owing to the spirit of the
time, nearly insignificant. The Constitution, in fact, took no-
notice of the periodical press, and it will appear astonishing that
so important a liberty as that of writing had not even obtained
special mention in the fundamental law of the State. But, in
those days, the tribune, as well that of the assemblies as that of
the clubs, had been, with the revolutionary passions, the fa
vourite channel for displaying themselves ; and the liberty of
speech had been so much used, that the liberty of writing was
thought little of. At the epoch of the 18th of Fructidor, the
press was rather more employed, but chiefly by the royalists, and
it excited such irritation against itself among the revolutionists,.
that they afterwards felt "very little interest for it. It was,
therefore, suffered to be proscribed on the 18th of Fructidor, and
to be omitted in framing the Constitution of the year VIIL,
and thenceforth abandoned to the good pleasure of the go
vernment. The First Consul, vvho had endured with little patience the
attacks of the royalist journals, when he was merely general of
the army of Italy, began now to be uneasy about the indis
cretions committed by the press in regard to his military
operations, and the virulent attacks against foreign governments, |
in which it indulged. ^Applying himself in a most particular
manner to reconcile the Republic with Europe, he was appre
hensive lest the republican papers, launching out against foreign
cabinets, especially since the refusal of the offers of Fiance,
should frustrate all his efforts at reconciliation. The King of
Prussia, in particular, had found reason to complain of some
French journals, and had expressed his displeasure^ The First
Consul, who was desirous to efface everywhere the traces of
violence, and who, moreover, was not restrained, in regard to-
the liberty of the press, by any firm and established public
opinion, such as exists in our days, took a decision by which he
suppressed a great number of journals, and specified those which
should have the privilege of continuing to appear. This ar
rangement was to remain in force till the general peace. The jour
nals retained were thirteen in number. These were, the Moni
teur Universel, the Journal des Debuts, the Journal de Paris,
the Bien-Informe, the Publiciste, the Ami des Lois, the Clef du
Cabinet, the Citoyen Francais, the Gazette de France, the Jour
nal des Hommes Libres, the Journal du Soir, the Journal des.
Def'enseurs de la Patrie, and the Decade Philosophique.

Feb. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 121
These favoured journals were, moreover, apprised that such
ot them as should publish articles against the Constitution
against the armies, their glory, or their interest, or should pub
lish invectives against any foreign government, friends or allies
of France, should be immediately suppressed.
This measure, which would appear so extraordinary at the
present day, was received without murmur and without astonish
ment, for the value of things is dependent on the spirit that pre
vails. ^
The votes required of the citizens on the subject of the new
Constitution had been collected and counted. The result of
this operation was communicated to the Senate, to the Legisla
tive Body, and to the Tribunate, by a message from the Consuls.
None of the anterior Constitutions had been accepted by so
large a number of votes.
In 1793, 1,800,000 votes had been recorded in favour of the
Constitution of that epoch, and 11,000 against it; for the Di
rectorial Constitution of 1795, the numbers were 1,057,000
favourable votes, and 49,000 negative votes. This time, more
than 3,000,000 voters had come forward ; of tliese 3,000,000
adopted the Constitution, and 1500 only rejected it.* Most
assuredly these vain formalities have no weight with serious
minds. It is not from these vulgar and frequently lying signs,
but from the moral aspect of a society, that its will is to be in
ferred. But the difference in the number of voters had, in this
case, an incontestable signification. It proved, at least, how
general was the sentiment that called for a strong and reparative
government, capable of ensuring order, victoiy, and peace.
The First Consul, before his departure for the army, at length
decided on an important step : he took up his abode in the
Tuileries. Considering the disposition of many to find in him a
Caesar, a Cromwell, destined to put an end to the reign of
anarchy by the reign of power, this removal to the palace of kings
was a bold and delicate step, not on account of any resistance
that it could provoke, but of the moral effect which it might
possibly produce.
The First Consul caused it to be preceded by an imposing and
skilfully contrived ceremony. Washington was just dead. The
decease of this illustrious personage, who had filled the conclu
sion of the last century with his name, was a subject of regret
for all the friends of freedom in Europe. The First Consul,
judging that a manifestation on this subject would be oppor
tune, addressed the following order of the day to the armies : —
"Washington is dead! That great man fought against
* The exact numbers were as follow : in 1793, 1,801, 918 favourable votes,
and 11,610 dissentient ; in 1795, 1,057,390 favourable votes, and 49,955 dis
sentient; in 1800, out of 3,012,569 voters, 3,011,007 were favourable, and
1562 dissentient

122 history of the [March 1800.
tyranny ; he consolidated the independence of his country. His
name will ever be dear to the French nation, as to all the free
men of both worlds, and especially to French soldiers, who,
like him and his American soldiers, are fighting for equality and
liberty." In consequence, a ten days' mourning was ordered.
This mourning was to consist in a piece of black crape suspended
from all the colours of the Republic. The First Consul did not
stop there : he gave directions for a noble and simple ceremony to
take place in the church of the Invalides, called in the ephemeral
language of the time, " the Temple of Mars." The colours taken
in Egypt had not yet been presented to the government. General
Lannes was charged to deliver them, on this occasion, to the
minister of war, beneath the magnificent dome erected by the
great king for our country's veterans.
On the 9th of February (20th Pluviose), all the authorities
having assembled at the Invalides, General Lannes presented to
Berthier, minister of war, ninety-six pair of colours, taken at the
Pyramids, at Mount Tabor, and at Aboukir. He made a short
martial speech, to which Berthier gave a similar reply. The
latter was seated between two invalids a hundred years old, facing
the bust of Washington, overhung by a thousand flags, trophies
won from Europe by the armies of republican Fiance.
Not far from this spot a tribune was prepared. A prescript,
who owed his liberty to the policy of the First Consul ascended
to it: this was M. de Fontanes; a pure and brilliant writer, the
last who employed that French language, 'formerly so perfect,
but now swept with the eighteenth century into the abyss of
the past. In studied but splendid language, M. de Fontanes
delivered a funeral oration on the hero of America. He cele
brated the military virtues of Washington, his valour, his wis
dom, his disinterestedness: he placed far above the military
genius, which knows how to gain victories, the reparative genius,
which understands how to put an end to civil wars, to close the
wounds of the country, and to give peace to the world. Evoking
the shade of Washington, he called also to witness the shades of
Turenne, of Catinat, of Conde, and speaking, as it were, in the
name of these great men, he delivered, in the most delicate and
appropriate language, a panegyric, which for once was full of
nobleness, because it was full of lessons of wisdom.
"Yes," he exclaimed in conclusion ; "yes, thy counsels will
be listened to, O Washington ! O warrior ! O legislator ! 0
citizen without reproach ! He who while yet young sur
passed thee in battles, shall close, like thee, with his triumphant
hands the wounds of his country. Ere long — we have pledges
for it in his will, and in his martial genius, if that should unfor
tunately be necessary— ere long the hymn of peace will resound
in this temple of war ; then will a universal feeling of joy efface
from memory all injustices and all oppressions  already
the oppressed forget their sufferings and put their trust in the

March 1800.] consulate and the empire. 123
future !  The acclamations of all ages will celebrate
the hero who shall confer this benefit on France, and on the
world which she has too long shaken."
This speech being finished, black crape was fastened to all
the colours, and the French Republic was deemed to be in
mourning for the founder of the American Republic., like the
monarchies which put themselves in mourning for the losses
sustained by each other. What did this ceremony still re
quire, , before it could equal in grandeur those funeral scenes
at which Louis XIV. was wont to be present, and to hear
the praise of one of his warriors from the lips of Flechier or of
Bossuet? Of a surety it was neither in the greatness of the
events or of the men that aught was lacking; for the orator was
speaking of Washington before general Bonaparte, he was
speaking amidst an audience which had also beheld Charleses
ascending the scaffold, and even crowned female heads following
them to it. He might introduce at choice the names of Fieurus:,
Arcole, Rivoli, Zurich, the Pyramids, and these magnificent vic
tories would assuredly serve to impart not less grandeur to an
harangue, than those of the Dunes and Rocroy ! What, them.
was wanting to render this solemnity truly grand ? There was
wanting what the greatest of men himself could not infuse into
it ; there was wanting, in the first place, religion ; , not that which
men affect and strain to possess, but that which is sincere and
spontaneous, and without which the dead are always but coldly
celebrated ; there was wanting the genius of Bossuet, for there
are species of greatness which never reappear in nations, and if the
Turennes and the Cond6s have successors, the Bossuets have
none; lastly, there was wanting a certain sincerity, for this homage
toa hero renowned above all for his disinterestedness was too vi
sibly affected. Still, let us not believe, with the herd of vulgar
interpreters, that on this occasion all was pure hypocrisy: no
doubt there was some, but there were also the ordinary illusions
of the time and of all times. Men, in fact, deceive themselves
more frequently than they deceive others. Many Frenchmen,
like the Romans under Augustus, still believed in the Republic,
because its name was assiduously pronounced ; and it is not very
certain that the institutor of this funeral ceremony, that general
Bonaparte himself, did not deceive himself while celebrating
Washington, and fancy, in fact, that in France as in Americana
man might be the first citizen/ without being king or emperor.
This ceremony was the prelude to the installation of the three
Consuls in the Tuileries. The repairs required by that palace
had been for a considerable time in progress ; the traces left by
the Convention were effaced: the red caps, which it had or
dered to be placed amidst the gilded ceilings, were removed.
The First Consul was to occupy the apartments on the' first
floor, the same appropriated by the present reigning family for
evening receptions. His wife and her children were to occupy

124 history of the [March .1800.
apartments on the entresol. The gallery of Diana was, as at
present, the vestibule, through which one was obliged to pass,
in order to reach the abode of the head of the State. The First
Consul caused it to be adorned with busts representing a series
of great men, and took pains to mark, by the choice of these
busts, the predilections of his mind : there were Demosthenes,
Alexander, Hannibal, Scipio, Brutus, Cicero, Cato, Caesar,
Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Conde, Duguai-Trouin, Marlbo
rough, Eugene, Marshal Saxe, Washington, Frederick the
Great, Mirabeau, Dugominier, Dampierre, Marceau, Joubert,
that is to say, warriors and orators, champions of liberty and
conquerors, heroes of the ancient monarchy and of the Repub
lic; lastly, four generals of the Revolution, who had fallen in
battle. To assemble around him the glories of all ages and of
all countries, as he was desirous of assembling all the parties
around his government — such was on all occasions the dispo
sition which he was fond of manifesting.
But he was not to occupy the Tuileries exclusively. His two
colleagues were to reside there too. Lebrun was lodged in the
pavilion of Flora. As for Cambaceres, who ranked before Le
brun, he refused to take up his abode in this palace of kings.
This personage, possessing consummate prudence, perhaps the
only man of his time who had not given way to any illusion, this
personage said to his colleague Lebrun, " It would be wrong for
us to go and live in the Tuileries; it is not a fitting place for us,
and, for my part, I shall not go. General Bonaparte will soon
want to live there alone, and then we should have to move out.
'Tis better not to go there at all." Neither did he go, but he
contrived to get a handsome house in the Place du Carrousel
assigned to him, and this he retained as long as Napoleon re
tained the Empire.
When all was arranged, a few days after the funeral cere
mony at the Invalides, the First Consul resolved to take pos
session of the Tuileries publicly. He did so, in great state.
On the 19th of February (the 30th Pluvi6se), he quitted
the Luxembourg to repair to his new palace, preceded and fol
lowed by an imposing escort. The fine regiments which had
recently marched from Holland into La Vendee, from La Vendee
to Paris, and which were soon to signalise themselves for the
hundredth time on the plains of Germany and Italy, those regi
ments, commanded by Lannes, Murat, Bessieres, opened the pro
cession. Then came, in carriages almost all hired, the ministers,
the Council of State, the public authorities; then in a hand
some coach, drawn by six white horses, the three Consuls
themselves. These horses were particularly suited to the occa
sion ; they were the same that the Emperor of Germany had given
to General Bonaparte on concluding the peace of Campo-Formio.
The general had also been presented by that sovereign with a
magnificent sword, which he took care to wear on that day.

March 1800.] consulate and the empire. 125
Thus he exhibited about him all that served to remind the
public of the warrior-peacemaker. The concourse of people col
lected in the streets and on the quays leading to the Tuileries,
hailed his presence with loud acclamations. These acclama
tions were sincere, for they greeted in him the glory of France
and the commencement of her prosperity. On reaching the
Carrousel, the coach of the Consuls was received by the con
sular guard, and passed between two guard-houses, erected, one
on the right, the other on the left of the palace-yard. On one
of these was still seen this inscription : " Royalty in France is
abolished, and shall never be re-established."
No sooner had he entered the court than the First Consul
mounted a horse and reviewed the troops drawn up before the
palace. When opposite to the colours of the 96th, the 43rd, and
the 30th demi-brigades, colours blackened, torn by balls, he
saluted them, and was saluted in his turn bythe shoutsof the
soldiers. After passing along their ranks, he stationed bimself
before the pavilion of Flora, and saw them defile before him.
Over his head, on the balcony of the palace, were the other two
Consuls, the principal authorities, lastly, his family, who began
to have rank in the State. When the review was over, he
went up to the apartments; the minister of the interior pre
sented to him the civil authorities ; the minister of war pre
sented the military authorities ; the minister of the marine all
the naval officers who chanced to be in Paris. In the course
of the day, entertainments were given in the Tuileries and in
the houses of the ministers.
The service of the consular palace was regulated as follows :
M. Benezech, councillor of state, formerly minister of the in
terior, was charged with the general administration of this
palace. The aides-de-camp, and Duroc in particular, were to
clo the honours, and to supply the place of that multitude of
officers of all kinds, that usually fill the spacious apartments of
European sovereigns. Every fortnight, on the 2nd and 17th of
each month, the First Consul received the diplomatic body.
Once in the decade, on different days, but at fixed hours, he re
ceived the Senators, the members of the Legislative Body, of the
Tribunate, and of the Tribunal of Cassation. The functionaries
who wished to have audience with him had to address themselves
to the ministers, to whose department they belonged, in order
to be presented to him. On the 2nd Ventose (the 21st of Feb
ruary), two days after his installation at the Tuileries, he gave
audience to the diplomatic body. Surrounded by a numerous
staff, he received the envoys of the States who were not at war
with the Republic. Introduced by M. Benezech, presented by
the minister for foreign affairs, they delivered their credentials
to the First Consul, who handed them to the minister, nearly
in the same manner as sovereigns do in monarchical govern
ments. The foreign ministers who figured at this audience

126 HISTORY OP THE [March 1800.
were M. de Musquiz, ambassador of Spain; M. de SandozRol-
lin, minister of Prussia; M. de Schimmelpenninck, ambassador
of Holland; M. de Serbelloni, envoy of the Cisalpine Repub
lic; lastly, the charges d'affaires of Denmark, Sweden, Switzer
land, Baden, Hesse-Cassel, Rome, Genoa, &c. — {Moniteur, 4th
Ventose, year VIII.)
The presentation over, these different ministers were intro
duced to Madame Bonaparte.
Every five days, the First Consul reviewed the regiments
passing through Paris on their way to the frontiers. It was
then that he showed himself to the troops and to the multitude,
always eager to see him. Thin, pale, stooping upon his horse,
he inspired not less interest than admiration by a severe and
melancholy beauty, by an appearance of ill health, which began
to excite great uneasiness, for never was the preservation of any
man so ardently wished for as his.
After these reviews, the officers of the troops were admitted
to his table. The foreign ministers, the members of the assem
blies, the magistrates and functionaries, were invited to enter
tainments, at which a moderate luxury prevailed. At this nascent
court, there were not yet either ladies of honour or chamber
lains : its tone was certainly austere, but already rather elegant.
Care was taken to avoid the habits of the Directory, under
which a ridiculous imitation of ancient costume, joined to licen
tiousness of manners, had taken away all dignity from the ex
ternal representation of the government. There was little con
versation ; people observed one another ; their eyes were fixed
upon the extraordinary personage who had already achieved
such great things, and who gave reason to hope for still greater.
They waited for his questions; they answered with deference.
The day after he had taken up his abode at the Tuileries,
General Bonaparte, going over the palace with M. de Bour-
rienne, his secretary, said to him, " Well, Bourrienne, here we
are, then, in the Tuileries ! . . . . And here we must stay now."

March 1800.] consulate and the empire. 127

BOOK III.

ULM AND GENOA.
Preparations for War — Forces of the Coalition in 1800 — Army of Baron
Melas in Liguria ; of Marshal Kray in Swabia— Plan of Campaign of the
Austrians — Importance of Switzerland in this War — Plan of Genera] Bo
naparte — He forms the Resolution to make use of Switzerland, in order to
debouch on the Flank of Kray, and in the Rear of Melas — The Part which
he destines for Moreau, and that which he destines for Himself — Creation
of the Army of Reserve — Instructions to Massena — Commencement of
Hostilities — Melas attacks the Army of Liguria on the Apennines, and
divides it into two halves, one of which is driven back towards the Var,
the other upon Genoa — Description of Genoa  Massena, blocked up in
Genoa, prepares for an obstinate Resistance — Heroic Combats of Masse'na
— The First Consul urges Moreau to commence Operations in Germany,
that he may be able to succour Massena the sooner — Passage of the Rhine
at four Points — Moreau succeeds in concentrating three out of four Corps,
and falls upon the Austrians at Engen and Stockach — Battles of Engen
and Mbsskirch — Retreat of the Austrians upon the Danube — St. Cyr's en
gagement at Biberach — Kray posts himself in the entrenched Camp of Ulm
— Moreau manoeuvres to dislodge him — False Movements of Moreau ; but
not productive of any disastrous Result — Moreau definitively shuts up
Kray in Ulm, and takes a strong Position in advance of Augsburg, to
await the Result of Events in Italy— Summary of Moreau's Operations-
Character of that General.

( 129 )

BOOK III.
ULM AND GENOA,
After addressing urgent overtures to Europe to obtain
peace, overtures which would not have been befitting from any
one but a general covered with glory ; the First Consul had no
course left but war, preparations for which had, indeed, been
making with great activity during the whole winter of 1799-1800
(year VIII). This war was at once the most legitimate, and one
of the most glorious, of those heroic times.
Austria, though observing greater moderation in forms than
England, had nevertheless come to the same conclusions, and
refused peace. The vain hope of keeping in Italy the advan
tageous situation which she owed to the victories of Suwarow,
the English subsidies, the erroneous opinion that France,
drained of men and money, could not undertake another
campaign, but above all, the fatal obstinacy of M. de Thugut,
who represented the war party at Vienna, with as much infatua
tion as Mr. Pitt in London, and who, in regard to this question,
was instigated much more by personal passion than by genuine
patriotism — all these causes conjoined had induced the Aus
trian cabinet to commit one of the greatest political faults, that
of not profiting by a favourable situation for negotiating. It
required a most extraordinary blindness, to believe that such
successes as had been owing to the incapacity of the Directory
would continue to be obtained in the face of a new government,
already completely organised, active even to prodigy, and di
rected by the first captain of the age.
The archduke Charles, who united to real military talents
great moderation and modesty, had pointed out all the dangers
incident to the continuance of the war, and the difficulty of
making head against the celebrated adversary, who was about to
enter the lists. By way of answer, the command of the Austrian
forces was taken from him ; 'and the government had thus de
prived itself of the only general who could command them with
any chance of success. His disgrace had been disguised under
the title of governor of Bohemia. The imperial army bitterly
regretted that prince, though the baron de Kray, who was ap
pointed his successor, had highly distinguished himself during
VOL. I. K

130 history op the [March 1800.
the last campaign in Italy. Kray was a brave, able, and expe
rienced officer, and proved himself not unworthy of the com
mand that had been conferred upon him.
To fill the chasm left by the Russians in the ranks of the co
alition, Austria, seconded by the subsidies of England, obtained
from the States of the Empire a considerable addition to their
contingents. A special treaty, signed on the 16th of March,
by Mr. Wickham, British minister to the elector of Bavaria,
bound that prince to furnish, besides his legal contingent as a
member of the Empire, a supplementary corps of 12,000 Bava
rians. A treaty of the same kind, signed on the 12th of April,
with the duke of Wurtemberg, procured another corps of 6000
Wurtembergers for the army of the coalition. Lastly, on the
30th of April, the same negotiator obtained from the elector of
Mayence, a corps of from 4000 to 6000 of his subjects, on the
same financial conditions. Besides the expenses of recruiting,
equipment, and maintenance of their troops, England guaranteed
to the coalesced German princes, that no treaty should be made
with France without them, and engaged to obtain restitution
of their dominions, be the issue of the war what it might; and
she made them promise in return not to listen to any proposi
tion for a separate peace.
Of these German troops, the Bavarians were the best ; next
came those of Wurtemberg ; but the Mayence troops were but
militia, without discipline and without valour. Independently
of these regular contingents, the peasants of the Black Forest
had been instigated to arm by frightful accounts of the ravages
of the French, who, at this period, committed much less devas
tation than the Imperialists in the fertile fields of unfortunate
Germany. The imperial army in Swabia, including all these auxiliaries,
amounted to nearly 150,000 men, 30,000 of whom were quartered
in the fortresses, and 120,000 present with the active army.
It was provided with a numerous artillery, good, though inferior
to the French artillery, and, above all, with a superb cavalry,
such as it is customary to have in the Austrian armies. The
emperor had, moreover, 120,000 men in Lombardy, under baron
de Melas. An English squadron of considerable force, sta
tioned in the Mediterranean, and cruising incessantly in the gulf
of Genoa, supported all the operations of the Austrians in Italy.
It was to disembark an auxiliary corps of Enghsh and emi
grants, then collected at Mahon, and amounting, it was said,
to 20,000 men. It was agreed that this corps should be landed
at Toulon itself, in case the imperial army, ordered to operate
against the Apennines, should be fortunate enough to force the
line of the Var.
There had been hopes of uniting some Russian with English
troops, and landing them on the coast of France, in order to ex
cite insurrections in Belgium , in Bretagne, and in La Vendee. The

March 1800.] consulate and the empire. 131
perfectly voluntary inaction of the Russians, and the pacification
of La Vendee, had thwarted that operation, from which the
allie had expected much.
It was, therefore, a mass of nearly 300,000 men ; 150,000 in
Swabia, 120,000 in Italy, 20,000 at Mahon, supported by the
whole English navy, that was to prosecute the war against
France. This force, it must be allowed, would have been very
inadequate against France, reorganised and in possession of all,
her means ; but, against France, scarcely emerged from the
chaos into which she had been plunged by the weakness pf the
Directory, it was a considerable force, with which her enemies
might have obtained important results, had they known how to
employ it. It must be added, that it was a real forcej liable to
suffer little diminution, because the 300,000 men of which it was
composed were seasoned to hardship, and already upon the
frontiers which they were to attack — an important circumstance,
for every raw army finds it difficult to withstand the first shocks
of war, and if it has, moreover, a long march to make before it
meets an enemy, it decreases in proportion to the distance
which must be traversed.
Let us now see how the allied troops were distributed, and
the plan according to which they were to act.
M. de Kray, at the head of the 150,000 men, whom he com
manded, occupied Swabia, posted in the middle of the angle
formed in that country by the Rhine, when, after running from
east to west, from Constance to Basle, it turns abruptly to
the north from Basle to Strasburg. In this position, Kray,
having Switzerland on his left flank, Alsace on his right, ob
served all the passages of the Rhine, by which the French
might penetrate into Germany. He had not the presumption
to cross that river, and to invade the territory of the Republic ;
his part, at the commencement of the campaign, required him to
be less active. The initiative of the operations was reserved for
the army of Italy, 120,000 strong, and posted, in consequence
of the advantages which it had obtained in 1799, at the very
foot of the Apennines. It was" to blockade Genoa, to reduce
it, if possible, then to cross the Apennines and the Var, and to
march upon Toulon, — where the English, and the emigrants of
the South, commanded by general Willot, one of the proscripts
of Fructidor, were to join the Austrians. This new invasion of
a province, containing our principal naval establishment, was
particularly agreeable to the English ; and to them must be, in
a great measure, attributed this plan, afterwards so severely
criticised. When the Austrian army in Italy, which, owing to
the climate of Liguria, could commence the campaign before
that in Swabia, should have penetrated into Provence, it was
supposed that the First Consul would withdraw his troops from
the Rhine to cover the Var, and that marshal Kray would then
have the means of entering into action. Switzerland, being thus
K2

132 history of the [March 1800.
hemmed in, and, as it were, strangled between two victorious
armies, must naturally fall, so that it would be unnecessary to
renew against it the impotent efforts of the preceding cam
paign. The exploits of Lecourbe and Massena in the Alps,
had given the Austrians a great distaste for any great opera
tion/specially directed against Switzerland. In regard to that
country, the intention was to confine themselves to mere obser
vation. The extreme left of marshal Kray was to take upon
itself this duty in Swabia ; the cavalry of Melas, useless in the
Apennines, was to perform it in Lombardy. The plan of the
Austrians consisted, therefore, in temporising in Swabia, in ope
rating early in Italy, in advancing on that side to the Var;
then, when the French, drawn towards the Var, should strip the
Rhine, in crossing that river and afterwards advancing in two
masses, one eastward by Basle, the other to the south by Nice,
and in thus levelling, without attack, the formidable barrier of
Switzerland. Competent judges of military operations have severely cen
sured Austria, for having neglected Switzerland; as this per
mitted general Bonaparte to debouch from it, and to throw
himself on the flank of marshal Kray, and on the rear of baron
Melas. We are of opinion that, as the reader will presently
be enabled to judge by the relation of the facts, no absolutely
sure plan was possible, in presence of general Bonaparte, and
with the irreparable disadvantage of Switzerland left in the
hands of the French.
To obtain a clear conception of this memorable campaign,
and to judge soundly of the precise designs of the belligerent
parties, we must figure to ourselves exactly the position of
Switzerland, and the influence which it must have upon the
military operations, at that point in particular, at which the
operations had arrived.
It is towards the eastern frontiers of France that .the Alps
begin to rise in the centre of the European continent. They
then run eastward, separating Germany from Italy; and from
them descend on one side the Danube and its tributaries, on the
other, the Po and all the streams of which that large river is
composed. The part of the Alps nearest to France is that
which forms Switzerland. Their prolongation constitutes the
Tyrol, belonging for ages to Austria.
When Austrian armies advance towards France, they are
obliged to ascend the valley of the Danube, on the one hand,
the valley of the Po, on the other, divided into two acting
masses by the long chain of the Alps. While they are in
Bavaria and in Lombardy, these two masses can communicate
across the Alps by the Tyrol, which belongs to the emperor ;
but, when they arrive in Swabia, on the Upper Danube, in
Piedmont, on the Upper Po, they find themselves separated
from one another, without any possible communication across

March 1800.] consulate and the empire. 133
the Alps, because Switzerland, independent and neutral, is
usually closed against to them.
This neutrality of Switzerland is a barrier which the policy
of Europe has wisely placed between France and Austria, to
, diminish the points of attack between those two formidable
powers. If, in fact, Switzerland is open to Austria, the latter
may advance with her armies, communicating freely from the
valley of the Danube to the valley of the Po, and threatening
the frontiers of France from Basle to Nice. This is an immense
danger to France, for she is obliged to be on her guard every
where, from the mouths of the Rhine to the mouths of the
Rhone ; whereas, if the Swiss Alps are closed, she can concen
trate all her forces on the Rhine, regardless of the attack that
comes from the south, since the Imperialists never succeeded
in any operation upon the Var, on account of the length of the
circuit. The advantage of the Swiss neutrality is, therefore,
important for France.
But it is not less important for Austria, nay, perhaps even
more so. If, in fact, Switzerland becomes the theatre of hos
tilities, the French army can overrun it first ; and, since its
foot-soldiers are intelligent, agile, brave, and as fit for mountain
warfare as for that of the plain, it has many chances of main
taining its footing there. A proof of this is exhibited in this
very campaign of 1799. If, in fact, the Alps are attacked by
the great chain, on the side next to Italy, it offers the re
sistance which Lecourbe offered to Suwarow, in the gorges of
the St. Gothard ; if they are attacked on the German side, in
the lower part, it offers, behind the lakes and rivers, the re
sistance which Massena offered behind the lake of Zurich, and
which terminated in the memorable battle of that name. Now,
when the French army retains possession of Switzerland, it
has a most threatening position, of which it can avail itself to
produce extraordinary results, as will be seen, by and by, in the
account of the operations of general Bonaparte.
In fact, the two Austrian ^rmies, which are, the one in
Swabia, the other in Piedrnont, separated by the whole extent
of Switzerland, have no means of communicating with each
other ; and the French, debouching by the lake of Constance,
on the one hand, by the high Alps on the other, may throw
themselves either upon the flanks of the army in Swabia, or on
the rear of the army in Italy. This danger it is impossible to
avoid, whatever plan may be adopted, unless, by retreating
fifty leagues, retrograding as far as Bavaria, on the one side, and
as far as Lombardy, on the other.
The Austrians, then, must do one of these things — either,
giving up all the advantages of the last campaign, they must
abandon to us both Swabia and Piedmont ; or, refusing such a
sacrifice, they must endeavour to carry Switzerland by a prin-

134 history of the [March 1800.
cipal attack, in which they could not succeed, for it would be
attacking in front an almost insurmountable obstacle, against
which they had already failed ; or they must divide themselves
into two great armies, as they did, remaining separated by
Switzerland, which would thus be placed on their flanks and on
their rear. By this latter course they would have it in their
power,1^ it is true, to diminish one of their armies considerably,
in order to strengthen the other, and, for instance, leave baron
Melas but few troops, only just sufficient to keep Massena in
check, and increase the army in Swabia to 200,000 men ; or do
the contrary, by collecting their principal force in Piedmont.
But, in one case, it would be abandoning Italy— Italy, the sole
object and the ardently desired prize of the war ; in the other,
it would be giving up, without a battle, the Rhine, the Black
Forest, the sources of the Danube, and shortening, by so much,
tbe route of the French to Vienna ; it would be, in fact, in
either case, doing the most advantageous thing in the world for
us ; for, by the increase of one of the two armies to 200,000
men, the victory would be given to that power of the two which
had general Bonaparte on its side. He was, in fact, the only
general of that time capable of manoeuvring 200,000 men
at once.
There was, then, no perfectly safe plan for Austria, when the
French were masters of Switzerland, which, be it observed by
the by, proves that the Swiss neutrality is a very happy device
for both powers. It adds, in fact, to their defensive means, by
diminishing their offensive means ; that is to say, it gives to
their security all that it takes away from their aggressive
power. Nothing better could be contrived for the preservation
of general peace.
The Austrians, then, had not many courses to take, and,
notwithstanding all that has been said, they took, perhaps, the
only one they could take, by deciding to temporise in Swabia,
to operate energetically in Italy, remaining separated by the
barrier of Switzerland, which git was impossible for them to
remove. But in this position there was more than one way of
conducting themselves, and it must be acknowledged that they
did not adopt the best ; that they did not even foresee any of
the dangers which threatened them. Persisting in their belief
that the French armies were exhausted ; not supposing that the
army of Germany was capable of taking the offensive, and
crossing the Rhine, before 150,000 Austrians posted in the
Black Forest ; still less supposing it possible to cross the Alps,
'without road, and in the snowy season ; not seeing, besides,
the third army which might be tempted to cross them, they in
dulged a confidence which proved fatal to them. To do them
justice, it must also be acknowledged that many persons would
have made the same mistake which they did ; for their security

March 1800.] consulate and the empire. 135
reposed on obstacles apparently invincible. But experience
soon taught them that, before an adversary like general Bona
parte, all security, even though founded on insurmountable
barriers, whether rivers or mountains of ice, was deceitful, and
might become fatal.
France had two armies, that of Germany, increased by the
junction of the armies of the Rhine and of Helvetia to 130,000
men; that of Liguria, reduced to 40,000 at most. In the
troops of Holland, La Vendee, and the interior, there were the
widely scattered elements of a third army; but superior ad
ministrative ability could alone assemble it, and on the sudden,
at the point where its presence was wanted. General Bonaparte
formed a plan for employing these various means as follows.
Massena, with the army of Liguria, not augmented, merely
supplied with provisions and ammunition, was ordered to keep
on the Apennines, between Genoa and Nice, and there take
post as at Thermopylae. The army of Germany, under Moreau,
strengthened as much as possible, was to make, along the whole
course of the Rhine from Strasburg to Basle, from Basle to
Constance, feigned demonstrations of crossing, then march
rapidly behind the curtain formed by that river, ascend it to
Schaffhausen, there throw over it four bridges at once, debouch
in mass on the flank of marshal Kray, surprise him, drive him
in disorder upon the Upper Danube, out-march him, if possible,
cut him off from the route to Vienna, perhaps envelop him,
and inflict on him one of those memorable disasters of .which
the present century has furnished more than one example. If
the army of Moreau had not this luck, it might, at least, drive
Kray upon Ulm and Ratisbon, oblige him thus to descend the
Danube, and remove him from the Alps, so as to prevent him
from ever sending succours thither. This done, it had orders
to detach its right wing towards Switzerland, for the purpose of
seconding there the perilous operation which general Bonaparte
had reserved for himself to execute. The third army, called
the army of reserve, the elements of which scarcely existed,
was to form between Geneva a?id Dijon, and to await the issue
of the first events, in readiness to succour Moreau, in case of
need. But, if Moreau had succeeded in a part, at least, of his
plan, this army of reserve, advancing under general Bonaparte
to Geneva, from Geneva into the Valais, giving the hand to the
detachment drawn from the army of Germany, then crossing
the St. Bernard, over ice and snow, was, by a prodigy greater
than that of Hannibal, to fall upon Piedmont, to take the baron
de Melas, occupied with the siege of Genoa, in the rear, en
velop him, bring him to a decisive battle, and, if it won it, to
oblige him to lay down his arms.
Assuredly, if ' the execution were correspondent with such a
plan, never would a finer conception have honoured the genius
of a commander, ancient or modern. But, it is the execution

136 history of the [March 1800.
alone that gives their value to great military combinations, for,
deprived of this merit, they are but vain chimeras.
The execution, in this case, consisted in an infinity of diffi
culties to be overcome — in the reorganisation of the armies of
the Rhine and of Liguria, in the creation of the army of reserve,
in keeping secret the creation and destination of that army;
lastly, in the two-fold passage of the Rhine and of the Alps, —
the second equal to the most extraordinary things which the
art of war has ever attempted.
The very first care of general Bonaparte had been to recruit
the army. The desertions to the interior, disease, and battle,
had reduced it to 250,000 men, which one would scarcely
believe, at a moment wben France made head against a general
coalition, if the fact were not attested by authentic documents.
Fortunately, these 250,000 men were perfectly inured to war,
capable of withstanding an enemy double in number. The
First Consul had demanded 100,000 conscripts of the Legis
lative Body, which had granted them with truly patriotic cheer
fulness. The war was so legitimate, so evidently necessary,
after the offers of peace were refused, that mere hesitation
would have been criminal. Of this, however, there was no
reason to be apprehensive, and the eagerness of the Legislative
Body was carried to enthusiasm. These 100,000 young con
scripts, combined with 250,000 old soldiers, could not fail to
form an excellent composition for an army. The prefects re
cently instituted, and who were already at their posts, imparted
to the recruiting an activity which it had never yet had. But it
would take five or six months before these conscripts could join
their corps, drilled and fit for service. The First Consul re
solved to keep in the interior all the corps exhausted by the
war, and to employ them as skeletons, in which the new levy
should be placed. On the other hand, he moved towards the
frontiers all the corps capable of taking the field, and took care
to transfer all the soldiers fit for service from the ranks of those
who were to remain in the interior into the ranks of those
who were going to fight. If, in proceeding thus, he could
find 200,000 men to place immediately in line, it was as much
as he could do. Under his powerful and skilful hand, however,
this number was sufficient.
He made an appeal, at the same time, to the patriotic senti
ments of France. Addressing himself to the soldiers of the
first requisitions, whom the general discouragement produced
by our reverses had brought back to their homes, he made those
rejoin by force who had left their corps without leave, and he ap
pealed to the zeal of those who had regular furloughs ; he endea
voured to excite military tastes in all the young men whose
imaginations were inflamed by the name of general Bonaparte.
Though the enthusiasm of the first days of the Revolution had
cooled, the sight of the enemy on our frontiers reanimated all

March 1800.] consulate and the empire. 137
hearts ; and that assistance which was still to be derived from
the devotedness of volunteers was an advantage not to be
despised. To this attention bestowed on the recruiting the First Consul
added some useful reforms relating to the administration and
the composition of the army. In the first place, he instituted
inspectors of reviews, charged to ascertain the number of men
present under arms, and to save the treasury from paying for
soldiers who were present only on paper. In the artillery he
made a change of the greatest importance. The horses which
drew the gun-carriages were then driven by men belonging to
the waggon-train, who, not being restrained by a sense of
honour, like the other soldiers, cut the traces of their horses at
the first danger, and fled, leaving their guns in the hands of the
enemy. The First Consul justly thought that the driver, whose
duty it is to bring the piece to the place of battle, renders as
valuable a service as the gunner, whose business it is to work
it; that he incurs the same danger, and needs the same moral
motive, that is, honour. He, therefore, converted the artillery-
drivers into soldiers, wearing the uniform, and constituting part
of the regiments of that arm. They formed 10,000 or 12,000
horsemen, who were expected to show as much zeal in bringing
up their guns before an enemy, or in carrying them off with
speed, as those did whose duty it was to load, point, and fire
tnem. This reform was only begun, and could not produce all
its useful consequences till a later period.
The artillery and the cavalry were likewise in want of horses.
The First Consul ordered a forced and extraordinary levy of
every thirtieth horse, having neither time nor means to make
purchases. It was a hard but inevitable necessity. The armies
were first to supply themselves in the country around them, and
then, by degrees, further and further off, in the contiguous
provinces. The First Consul had sent to Massena such pecuniary
supplies as could be spared, for the relief of the unfortunate
army of Liguria. From 60,000 men, of whom it was composed
by the junction of the army of Lombardy and that of Naples,
after the sanguinary battle of the Trebbia, it was reduced by
privations to 40,000 at most, presenting but thirty and some
odd thousand fighting men. Corn, which could neither come
from Piedmont, occupied by the Austrians, nor from the sea,
guarded by the English, was very scarce. These unfortunate
soldiers had nothing to subsist upon but the crops of the
Apennines, little better than nothing, as everybody knows.
They would not; go into the hospitals, destitute of the most
needful articles of food ; and they were seen, on the road from
Nice to Genoa, wasted by famine and fever, exhibiting the most
deplorable of sights— that of brave men left by the country
which they were defending to perish for want.

138 history of the [March 1800.
Massena, on receiving the money sent by the government,
had made some purchases at Marseilles, bought up all the corn
in that city, and shipped it for Genoa. Unfortunately, during
this winter, the wind, not less rigorous than the enemy, con
tinually retarded arrivals at Genoa from Marseilles, and re
placed, in some measure, the blockade which the English could
not keep up in the stormy season. A few vessels had, neverthe
less, got in with their cargoes, and bread was again dealt out to
the soldiers of Liguria. The government had sent them arms,
shoes, some clothing, and hopes. As for military energy,
nothing needed to be done to inspire them with that ; for never
had France seen soldiers endure such reverses with such forti
tude. Those conquerors at Castiglione, at Arcole, at Rivoli,
had borne unflinchingly the defeats of Cassano, of Novi, of the
Trebbia ; the temper which they had acquired could not be
impaired under the strokes of Fortune. Besides, the presence
of general Bonaparte at the head of the government, and of
general Massena at the head of the army, would have infused
into them new courage, had -they needed it. So they were but
fed, clothed, and armed, the most important services might be
obtained from them. In these respects the government did its
best. Massena, by some examples of severity, re-established
discipline, shaken among them, and collected thirty and some
thousand men, impatient to start again, under his command, for
fertile Italy.
The instructions given by the First Consul for his guidance
were ably conceived. Three narrow passages led across the
Apennines from the inland slope to the maritime slope ; these
were the passage of the Bocchetta, debouching upon Genoa;
that of Cadibona, upon Savona ; that of Tende, upon Nice.
The First Consul enjoined Massena to leave only weak detach
ments at the Col de Tende, and at the Col de Cadibona, just
sufficient to observe them, and to concentrate a force of
25,000 or 30,000 men, upon Genoa. That city being strongly
occupied, an invasion of the south of France was scarcely to be
presumed, and, at any rate, not much to be feared ; for the
Austrians would certainly not be rash enough to advance
beyond the Var upon Toulon and the Bouches du Rhone,
while Massena was in their rear. Massena might, moreover,
fall, with his 30,000 assembled troops, upon those corps which
should have passed the defiles of the Apennines. It was not
likely, considering the nature of the country, with its narrow
ravines and steep precipices, that he should meet with more
than 30,000 men at once. He had, therefore, the means of
making head everywhere against the enemy. Unluckily, this
plan could not be carried into execution but by a general pos
sessing the prodigious dexterity of the conqueror of Montenotte.
For the rest, the First Consul was sure of having in Massena an
obstinate defender of the steep heights of the Apennines, and

March 1800.] consulate and the empire. 139
who would find such employment for Melas as should detain
him in Liguria during the whole time necessary for the combined
movement of the French armies.
Nevertheless, it must be confessed, the army of Liguria was
treated somewhat like a sacrificed army : not an additional man
was sent to it ; it was merely supplied with some materiel, and
no more of that than was barely necessary. It was elsewhere
that the principal efforts of the government were directed, be
cause it was elsewhere that the great blows were to be struck.
The army of Liguria was exposed to the risk of perishing, in
order to give others time to be victorious. Such is that dire
fatality of war, which passes from the head of the one to the
head of the other, obliging these to die that those may live and
triumph !
The army treated with most particular attention was that
commanded by Moreau, and destined to act in Swabia. To
this was sent all that could be spared, both in men and in
materiel. The utmost efforts were made to ensure to it a com
plete artillery and abundant means of passage, that it might be
able to cross the Rhine on a sudden, and, if possible, at a single
point. General Moreau, of whom it has been said the First Con
sul was so jealous, was, therefore, about to have under his com
mand the finest and most numerous army of the Republic, about
130,000 men, while Massena was to have no more than 36,000,
and the First Consul 40,000 at most. This was not, however,
a mere compliment paid to the vanity of Moreau. More serious
motives had determined this distribution of the forces. The
operation destined to throw Kray upon Ulm and Ratisbon was
of the highest importance for the general success of the' cam
paign ; for, in presence of those two powerful Austrian armies,
which were advancing towards our frontiers, it was requisite
first to drive back the one before it was possible to cross the
Alps in the rear of the other. This first operation, therefore,
was to be attempted with decisive means, which should render
the success infallible. The First Consul, highly as he estimated
Moreau, estimated himself much higher ; if either of them, must
dispense with great means, he thought that he could shift with
out them better than Moreau. The sentiment which guided
him on this occasion was a nobler sentiment than even gene
rosity in great affairs of State ; it was love of the public weal ;
this he preferred to the interest of every body, to that of others,
and to his own.
This army of the Rhine, though wearing, like the other
armies of the Republic, the rags of indigence, was _ superb.
Some conscripts had joined it, but in small number, just suf
ficient to infuse youth into it. By far the greater part of it
was composed of those old soldiers, who, under the command
of Pichegru, Kleber, Hoche, and Moreau, had conquered Hol
land and the banks of the Rhine, crossed that river several

140 history of the [March 1800.
times, and even penetrated to the Danube. It could not have
been said, without injustice, that they were braver than the
soldiers of Italy ; but they exhibited all the qualities of accom
plished troops : — they were discreet, sober, wrell disciplined, intel
ligent, and intrepid. The officers were worthy of the men.
The distribution of this army into detached divisions, complete
in all arms, and acting in separate corps, had developed to the
highest point the talents of each general of division. These
generals had equal but diverse merits. There was Lecourbe,
the ablest officer of his time in mountain warfare, — Lecourbe,
whose glorious name was repeated by the echoes of the Alps :
there was Richepanse, who combined rare intelligence with
audacious bravery, and who soon afterwards rendered Moreau,
in the fields of Hohenlinden, the most important service that
lieutenant ever rendered to his general : there^was St. Cyr, with
a mind cool and profound, and a disposition not the most
sociable, but endowed with all the qualities of commander-in-
chief: there was, lastly, young Ney, whom heroic courage,
guided by a happy instinct for war, had already rendered
popular in all the armies of the Republic. At the head of these
lieutenants was Moreau, a man of sluggish, sometimes indeci
sive, but solid mind, and whose indecisions terminated in wise
and firm resolutions, when he was face to face with the danger.
Experience had singularly formed and extended his military
coup d'ceil. But, while his military genius expanded in the
school of war, his civil character, weak, yielding to all influences,
had already succumbed, and was destined again to succumb,
under the trials of politics, which strong and truly exalted minds
alone are capable of surmounting. At any rate, the unhappy
passion of jealousy had not yet stained the purity of his heart
and corrupted his patriotism. From his experience, his habit
of command, his high renown, he was, after general Bonaparte,
the only man capable, at that time, of commanding 100,000
men. The plan of operations prescribed to him by the First Con
sul consisted in debouching in Swabia, at the point which would
best permit him to act on the extreme left of marshal Kray, in
such a manner as to outflank him, to cut him off from Bavaria, to
shut him up between the Upper Danube and the Rhine ; in which
case the Austrian army in Swabia would be undone. To ac
complish this^/it would be necessary to cross the Rhine, not at
two or three points, but at one only, the nearest possible to
Constance; an operation singularly bold and difficult, for it
consisted in transporting across a river, and in presence of an
enemy, 100,000 men, with all their materiel; and, it must be
confessed that, before Wagram, no general ever crossed a
river under the conditions stated. Accordingly, it required
great address to deceive the Austrians as to the point that
would be chosen ; with great address, great boldness in the

March 1800.] consulate and the empire. 141
execution of the passage, and, lastly, what is always needed,
good luck. The First Consul had ordered a considerable quan
tity of boats to be collected in the tributaries of the Rhine, and
particularly in the Aar, that three or four bridges might be
thrown over at once, at the distance of a few hundred fathoms
from each other. The only point then was to gain access for
these combinations to the cold and far from audacious mind of
Moreau. After these attentions paid with unremitting zeal to the
troops of Liguria and Germany, the First Consul had applied
his energies to the creation of an army which soon ac
complished the greatest things, under the title of army of
reserve. In order that it might fulfil its object, it was requisite not only
to create it, but to create it while encouraging an universal
disbelief in the possibility of the thing. We shall show in what
manner he proceeded to obtain this twofold result.
The First Consul had contrived to find in Holland, and in
the forces accumulated in Paris by the Directory, the means of
pacifying La Vendee at a seasonable time ; he contrived to find
in La Vendee, when pacified, the necessary resources for cre
ating an army, which, thrown unexpectedly on the theatre of
military operations, must change the destinies of war. In
writing to General Brune, commander-in-chief in the West, he
addressed to him these beautiful words, which so well express
his manner of operating, and that of the great masters in the
art of administration and of war : — " Let me know if, besides
the five demi-brigades for which I have applied to you by my last
courier, you can spare one or two demi-brigades more, on con
dition of their being sent back in three months. We must
make up our minds to stride over France as we formerly did
over the valley of the Adige; after all, it is only performing ten
days' march in one." (14th of Ventose, year VIIL; March 5th,
1800. Archives in the State Paper Office.)
Though the English must have conceived an aversion to fur
ther descents on the continent since their adventure at the
Texel, and particularly since the withdrawal of the Russians
from the coalition, the immense extent of our coast from the
Zuyder Zee to the Gulf of Gascony, could not be relinquished
to them without any means of defence, the pacification of La
Vendee being moreover so recent. The First Consul, therefore,
left in Holland a force half French, half Dutch, to guard that
valuable country : he gave the command of it to Augereau. It
was formed into active divisions, complete in all arms and ready
to march. When it was pretty certain, from the course of the
operations, that no landing was to be apprehended, this corps of
Augereau's was to march up the Rhine, and to cover the rear of
Moreau in Germany. Out of the 60,000 men collected on the
coast of Normandy and Bretagne, the First Consul selected the

142 history of the [March 1800.
thinnest demi-brigades, and charged them to guard the insur
gent country. He took care still further to reduce their effec
tive strength, by sending off to the active army the soldiers
capable of serving, and thus fitted them for receiving a greater
number of conscripts, whom they were to train at the same
time that they guarded the coast. He formed them into five
small camps, comprising artillery, cavalry, infantry, ready to
march at the first signal, and commanded by good officers. Two
of these camps were in Belgium, one at Liege, another at Maes-
tricht, both destined to secure that country, agitated by the
priests, and to co-operate, if need were, in the defence of Hol
land. There was one at Lille, ready to throw itself upon the
Somme and Normandy, another at St. L6, and a third at Rennes.
This last was the most numerous : it contained from 7000 to 8000
soldiers. The others were from 4000 to 5000. The camps con
tained about 30,000 men. They were about to be doubled, at
least, by the arrival of the fresh recruits. They were to perform
the duty of the police both in the recently conquered countries,
such as Belgium, and in the recently pacified countries, such
as Normandy, Bretagne, and Poitou. The First Consul had
ordered search to be made in the woods for concealed arms.
He had begun to form, by the allurement of high pay, three or
four battalions, composed of all those men who had contracted
adventurous habits in the civil war ; and he purposed, but
without saying so, to send them to Egypt. As for the chiefs, he
had assigned to them residences remote from the theatre of
the civil war, and had soothed the mortification of this exile by
pensions amply sufficient to make them truly comfortable.
These arrangements made, there remained, of the 60,000 men
collected for the pacification of the interior, about 30,000 ex
cellent soldiers, embodied in the demi-brigades which had suf
fered least. Some had returned to Paris, after the operations
executed in Normandy against M. de Frotte. The others were
in Bretagne and in La Vendee. The First Consul formed them
into three fine war-divisions, two in Bretagne itself, at Rennes
and at Nantes, the third in Paris. These divisions were to pre
pare for service with the utmost dispatch, to provide themselves
with such materiel as was at hand, and to procure the rest on
their march, by such means as we shall presently specify. They
had orders to repair to the eastern frontier, with rapid strides,
to use the words of the First Consul, as the army of Italy for
merly strode over the valley of the Adige. It was certain that
they would arrive in Switzerland in the month of April.
There was another resource, namely, the depots of the army
of Egypt, stationed in the south of France, and which had
never been able to send recruits to their corps, because it was
impossible for them to cross the sea, incessantly watched by the
Enghsh. By throwing a few conscripts into these depots, there
might be formed fourteen very fine battalions, quite capable of

March 1800.] consulate and The empire. 143
taking the field. Orders were given to despatch them towards
Lyons, as soon as they should be equipped. This formed a
fourth excellent division, and capable of rendering good ser
vice. What is most difficult and takes the longest time in the com
position of an army is the organisation of the artillery. The
First Consul, by resolving to form this army of reserve in the
east, had, in the dep6ts of Auxonne, Besancon, and Briancon,
the means of collecting, in personnel and materiel, a force of sixty
pieces of cannon. Two very able officers of artillery, general's
Marmont and Gassendi, and who were devotedly attached to
the First Consul, were despatched from Paris with orders to get
ready these sixty pieces of cannon in the different depots, but
without divulging where they were to be concentrated or used.
A place of rendezvous for all these scattered forces was yet
to be indicated. If an attempt had been made to conceal such
preparations by silence, that very silence would have had the
effect of giving the alarm. The First Consul wished to deceive
the enemy by the very noise that he was about to make. He
inserted in the Moniteur a decree of the Consuls for the crea
tion of an army of reserve, which was to be formed at Dijon,
and to be composed of 60,000 men. Berthier set off post for
Dijon, to commence the organisation of it. The reader will re
collect that Berthier was more master of his time since the entry
of Carnot upon the ministry of war. A warm appeal was made
to the old volunteers of the Revolution, who, after one or two
campaigns, had returned to their homes. They were beseeched ¦
to repair to Dijon. A small quantity of materiel and a few
conscripts were sent thither with great parade. Old officers,
despatched to that point, exhibited an appearance of skeletons,
for commencing the instruction of the conscripts. The news
paper writers, who were not permitted to touch on military
affairs without great circumspection, were allowed to say what
they pleased about the army organising at Dijon, and to fill
their columns with particulars concerning it. This was sufficient
to attract the spies of all Europe, and accordingly they did not
fail to repair thither in great number.
If the divisions formed at Nantes, Rennes, and Paris, with
the troops drawn from La Vendee ; if the division formed at
Toulon, Marseilles, Avignon, with the dep6ts of the army of
Egypt; if the artillery prepared at Besancon, Auxonne, and
Briancon, with the resources of these arsenals, had been assem
bled at Dijon, it would have been all over with the secret of the
First Consul : every body would have been aware of the exist
ence of the army of reserve. But he took good care not to act
in that manner. Those divisions were marched off towards Ge
neva and Lausanne by different routes, so that the public atten
tion was not particularly drawn to any one point. They passed
for reinforcements destined for the army of the Rhine, which,

144 history of the [March 1800.
being spread from Strasburg to Constance, might well appear
to be the goal towards which these reinforcements were march
ing. The preparations in materiel, ordered in the arsenals of
Auxonne and Besancon, passed for a supplement of artillery
destined for the same army. Those making at Briancon were
supposed to relate to the troops in Liguria. The First Consul
caused a quantity of spirits to be sent to Geneva; but neither
did this supply betray its real destination, since our army in
Germany had its base of operations in Switzerland. He ordered
2,000,000 rations of biscuit to be made in the departments bor
dering on the Rhone : these were destined for the subsistence
of the army of reserve amidst the sterility of the Alps;
1,800,000 rations were secretly sent up the Rhine to Geneva,
and the other 200,000 despatched with ostentation to Toulon,
to induce a belief that these unusual supplies were made for
the navy. Lastly, the divisions in march, conducted slowly
and without fatiguing them, towards Geneva and Lausanne —
they had, in fact, half of March, and the whole of April to per
form the distance — received by the way such things as they
were in need of — shoes, clothing, muskets, horses. The First
Consul, having settled in his own mind the route which they
were to follow, and carefully ascertained the nature of their
wants, forwarded to every place through which they were to
pass a supply, sometimes of one thing, sometimes of another,
taking good care not to excite attention by a large assemblage
of stores at a single point. The correspondence relative to
these preparations was not carried on through the war-office,
but confined between himself and the commanders of corps, and
sent by trusty aides-de-camp, who travelled post to and fro, saw
every thing with their own eyes, did every thing directly, fur
nished with the irresistible orders of the First Consul, and igno
rant all the while of the general plan which they were fur
thering. The secret, confined to the First Consul and Berthier, and
two or three generals of engineers and artillery, to whom it was
absolutely necessary to communicate the plan of the campaign,
was strictly kept. None of them would have betrayed it, be
cause secrecy is an act of obedience, which governments obtain
in proportion to the ascendency which they exercise. On this
ground, that of the First Consul had no indiscretion to fear.
The foreign spies who thronged to Dijon, finding there only a
few conscripts, a few volunteers, and a few old officers, fancied
themselves extremely shrewd in discovering that there was no
thing serious in the matter; that the First Consul evidently made
all this noise merely to frighten baron de Melas, to prevent
him from penetrating by the mouths of the Rhone, and per
suading him that he should find in the south of France an army
of reserve capable of stopping him. Such was the construction
put upon the matter by all who believect themselves to be good

March 1800.] consulate and the empire. 145
judges of it; and the English newspapers were soon filled with
thousands upon thousands of squibs. Among the caricatures
of the day, was one on the army of reserve; it represented a
child leading an invalid with a wooden leg.
This was just what the First Consul wanted : his only wish
was to see himself laughed at for the moment. Meanwhile,
his divisions were marching, his materiel was preparing towards
the eastern frontiers, and, in the first days of May, an army,
formed in a trice, would be ready either to support Moreau, or
to throw itself on the other side of the Alps, and change the face
of events there.
The First Consul had not neglected the navy. After the
cruise which admiral Bruix had made in the preceding year in
the Mediterranean, with the combined forces of France and
Spain, the grand fleet, under his command, had returned to
Brest. It was composed of fifteen Spanish ships, and about a
score of French, in the whole little short of forty sail. Twenty
English ships were blockading it at the moment. The First
Consul took advantage of the first financial resources which he
had succeeded in creating, to send some provisions and part of
the arrears of pay to this fleet. He enjoined it not to suffer
itself to be blockaded ; if it had but thirty sail against twenty
to put to sea on the first occasion, were it even obliged to fight;
and if it was possible to keep at sea, to pass the Straits of
Gibraltar, to steer thence for Toulon, to take in convoy there
some vessels laden with supplies for Egypt, and then to raise
the blockade of Malta and Alexandria. The coast once clear,
commerce alone would suffice for revictualling the French gar
risons scattered along the shores of the Mediterranean.
Such was the attention paid by the First Consul to military
affairs, while, with Messrs. Sieyes, Cambaceres, Talleyrand, Gau
din, and other participators in his labours, he was engaged in
organising the government, in re-establishing the finances, in
creating a civil and judicial administration, lastly, in negotiating
with Europe. But it was not enough to conceive plans, to
prepare for the execution of them ; it was necessary to instil his
ideas into the heads of his lieutenants, who, though amenable
to his consular authority, were not so completely subservient
then as they were afterwards, when, with the titles of marshals
of the Empire, they obeyed an Emperor. The plan prescribed
to Moreau, in particular, had turned his cold and timid head
topsy-turvy. That general was frightened at the boldness of
the operation which he was ordered to perform. We have
already described the country on which he was to operate. The
Rhine, we have said, runs from east to west between Constance
and Basle, turns northward at Basle, passing by Brisach, Stras
burg, and Mayence. In the angle which it thus describes is
what is called the Black Forest, a woody and mountainous tract,
intersected by defiles, wjiich lead from the valley of the Rhine
VOL. I. L

146 history OF THE [March 1800.
to that of the Danube. The French army and the Austrian
army occupied, in some measure, the three sides ot a triangle:
the French army occupied two, from Strasburg to Basle, from
Basle to Schaffhausen ; the Austrian army one only„from Stras
burg to Constance. The latter, therefore, had the advantage of
a more easy concentration. Kray, having his left under Prince
Reuss in the environs of Constance, his right in the defiles of
the Black Forest, nearly to Strasburg, his centre at Donau-
Eschingen, at the point of intersection of all the roads, could con
centrate. his forces speedily before the very spot which Moreau
might choose for crossing the Rhine, whether between Strasburg
and Basle, or between Basle and Constance. Such was the
subject of the French general's uneasiness. He feared that
Kray, presenting himself with his whole force at the point of
passage, might render that passage impracticable, perhaps even
disastrous. The First Consul had no such apprehensions. He conceived,
on the contrary, that the French army might very easily concen
trate itself on the left flank of Kray, and thus turn it. On
this account, he desired, as we have already said, that, taking
advantage of the curtain which covered it, that is to say, of the
Rhine, it should ascend that river on a sudden ; that it should
assemble between Basle and Schaffhausen; that, with boats
secretly provided in the tributary streams, it should throw
across four bridges on one and the same morning ; and that it
should debouch to the number of 80,000 or 100,000 men,between
Stockach and Donau-Eschingen, falling upon the flank of Kray,
cutting him off from his reserves and from his left, and driving
him in disorder upon the Upper Danube. He thought that, if this
operation were executed with promptness and vigour, the Aus
trian army in Germany might be destroyed. What he did at a
later period, setting out from a different point, but in the same
parts, about Ulm ; what he did this same year by the St. Ber
nard, proves that this plan had in it nothing but what was
perfectly practicable. He was of opinion that the French army,
not operating in an enemy's country, since it would ascend by
the left bank, having only to march without fighting, might,
with certain precautions, steal two or three marches upon Kray,
and that it would be at the point of passage, before that general
had collected sufficient means to prevent it.
This was the plan which had disturbed the mind of Moreau,
unaccustomed to these bold combinations. He was fearful that
Kray, receiving timely intelligence, would advance with the mass
of his forces to meet the French army, and would drive it into
the river. Moreau would rather avail himself of the existing
bridges at Strasburg, Brisach, and Basle, for debouching in
several columns on the right bank; he proposed in this man
ner to divide the attention of the Austrians, to draw them prin
cipally towards the defiles of the Black Forest, corresponding

March 1800.] consulate and the empire. 147
with the bridges of Strasburg and Brisach, then, after enticing
them into these defiles, slip away suddenly, march along the
Rhine with the columns which should have crossed that river,
and post himself before Schaffhausen, to cover the rest of the
army while debouching there.
Moreau's plan was not without merit, but neither was it with
out serious inconveniences ; for, if it tended to avoid the danger
of a single passage executed in mass, it had, by dividing this
operation, the inconvenience of dividing the forces, of throwing
two or three detached columns upon the enemy's.ground, of
making them perform a dangerous flank march as far as Schaff
hausen, where they were to cover the last and principal passage
of the river. Lastly, this plan had the disadvantage of securing
few or no results ; for it did not throw the French army entire
and all at once upon the left flank of marshal Kray ; which would
have been the only way to overpower the Austrian general, and
to cut him off from Bavaria.
It is a sight worthy of the attention of History, that of these
two men, opposed to each other in an interesting circumstance,
which exhibited so conspicuously their diversities in mind and
character. The plan of Moreau, as is frequently the case
with the plans of second-rate men, had only the appearances of
prudence ; but it might succeed in the execution, for, we must
incessantly repeat it, the execution redeems every thing : some
times it causes the best combinations to miscarry, and the
worst to succeed. Moreau persisted, therefore, in his ideas.
The First Consul, wishing to persuade him by means of a
chosen agent, summoned to Paris general Dessoles, chief of
the staff of the army of Germany, possessing an acute, pene
trating mind, worthy of serving for a link between two power
ful and susceptible men ; for he had a desire to conciliate his
superiors, which is not always found in subordinates. The
First Consul, therefore, called him to Paris about the middle
of March (end of Ventose), and kept him there several days.
After explaining his ideas to him, he made him perfectly com
prehend them, and even prefer them to those of Moreau.
General Dessoles, nevertheless, persisted in advising the First
Consul to adopt Moreau's plan, because it was necessary, in
his opinion, to leave the general who operates/ to act according
to his own ideas and character/when he is^moreover a man worthy
of the command entrusted to'bim. "Your plan," said he to the
First Consul, "is grander, more decisive, probably also more sure;
but it is not adapted to the genius of him who is to execute it.
You have a way of carrying on wary which is superior to any
other ; Moreau has his, inferior, no doubt, to yours, but yet
excellent. Leave him to act; he will act well, slowly, perhaps,
but surely ; and he will procure for you all the results that you
need for the success of your general combinations. If, on the
other hand, you insist on the execution of your ideas, you will
L 2

148 history of the [AP1-il 180&
upset him, you will even offend him, and you will obtain nothing
from him, by wanting to obt.ain too much." The First Consul,
as well versed in the knowledge of men as in that of his pro
fession, appreciated the wisdom of the advice of general Des
soles, and gave way. " You are right," said he ; "Moreau is not
capable of appreciating and executing the plan which I have con
ceived. Let him do as he pleases, provided he throws marshal
Kray upon Ulm and Ratisbon, and afterwards sends back his
left wing, in time, upon Switzerland. The plan, which he does
not comprehend, which he dares not venture to execute, I will
execute myself, on another part of the theatre of war. What he
dares not do on the Rhine, I will do on the Alps. He may, by
and by, regret the glory which he relinquishes to me." Proud
and profound words, containing an entire military prophecy,
as the reader will be able to judge presently.*
The manner of crossing the Rhine being thus left to Moreau,
there was still one point left to settle. The First Consul much
wished that the right wing, commanded by Lecourbe, should
remain in reserve on the Swiss territory, quite ready to support
Moreau, if he needed it, but that it should not penetrate into
Germany, if its presence there was not indispensable ; in order
that it might not have to retrograde for the purpose of co
operating among the Alps. He knew, however, what a diffi
cult thing it is to take from a commander-in-chief a detachment
of his army, when operations are once commenced. Moreau
insisted on having Lecourbe, engaging to return him to gene
ral Bonaparte, as soon as he should have driven marshal Kray
upon Ulm. The First Consul complied with this desire, re
solved to concede every thing to maintain harmony ; but he
required Moreau to sign an agreement, by which he engaged, •¦
after he had thrown the Austrians upon Ulm, to detach
Lecourbe, with 20,000 or 25,000 men towards the Alps. This
agreement was signed at Basle, between Moreau and Berthier,
the latter being officially considered as general-in- chief of the
army of reserve.
General Dessoles had left Paris, after he had completely
settled all the points in discussion with the First Consul. Their
plans were concerted : every thing was ready for opening the
campaign, and it was important to commence operations imme
diately, m order that, Moreau having executed early the part of
the plan which concerned him, the First Consul might throw
himself to the other side of the Alps, and extricate Massena be
fore he vyas overwhelmed, for he was struggling with 36,000 men
against 120,000. The First Consul wishfd that Moreau should
open the campaign by the middle of April, or the end of that
month at latest But his solicitations were vain : Moreau was
not ready, and he had neither activity, nor a mind fertile in

general DdJoieeshrseif:n ^ ^^ *° 'eCeive this ««»unt from the lips of

April 1800.] consulate and the empire. 149
resources, which make amends for the insufficiency of means.
While he was delaying, the Austrians, adhering to their plan of
taking the initiative in Italy, attacked Massena and commenced
with that general a struggle which the disproportion of strength
has rendered worthy of everlasting remembrance.
The army of Liguria comprehended, at most, 36,000 men
fit for active service, and distributed in the following manner.
Thirteen or fourteen thousand men, under general Suchet,
forming the left of the army, occupied the Col de Tende, Nice,
and the line of the Var. A corps detached from that wing,
about 4000 strong, under the command of general Thureuu,
was posted on Mont Cenis. There were consequently 18,000
men engaged in guarding the frontier of France, from Mont
Cenis to the Col de Tende.
Ten or twelve thousand men, under general Soult, forming
the centre of the army, defended the two principal debouches
of the Apennines, that which descends from the upper Bormida
upon Savona and Finale, and that of the Bocchetta, which
descends upon Genoa.
Seven or eight thousand men, very nearly, under the intrepid
Miollis, occupied Genoa, and a Col which debouches near that
city, on the opposite side to that of the Bocchetta. Thus, the
second half of this army, 18,000 men, or thereabouts, defended
the Apennines and Liguria. The danger of a separation between
these two portions of the army, that which occupied Nice, and
that which occupied Genoa, was evident.
These 36,000 French had opposed to them the 120,000
Austrians under the baron de Melas, perfectly recruited, fed,
revictualled, thanks to the abundance of all things in Italy,
and to the subsidies with which England furnished Austria.
General Kaim, with the heavy artillery, the cavalry, and a
corps of infantry, in all 50,000 men, had been left in Piedmont,
to serve for rear-guard there, and to observe the debouches
from Switzerland. Melas, with 70,000 men, the greater part
infantry, had advanced towards the defiles of the Apennines.
He had, besides the sttperiority in number, the advantage of
concentric position ; for Massena was obliged with 30,000 men
(the surplus occupying Mont Cenis) to guard the semicircle
formed by the Maritime Alps and the Apennines, from Nice to
Genoa — a semicircle not less than forty leagues in extent. <
General Melas, on the contrary, placed on the other side of
the mountains, in the centre of this semicircle, between Coni,
Ceva, and Gavi, had but a little way to go, in order to reach
one or the other of the points which he proposed to attack.
He could easily make false demonstrations on one of these
points, and then, striking off rapidly for the other, act upon
it en masse. Massena, threatened in this manner, had forty
leagues to travel, in going from Nice to the relief of Genoa,
or from Genoa to the relief of Nice.

150 history of the [April 1800.
It was upon these circumstances viewed as a whole that the
instructions given by the First Consul to Massena were founded
— instructions already referred to in a general manner, but
which it is necessary to recapitulate rather more in detail.
Three roads, fit for artillery, led from one side of the moun
tains to the other: that which, by way of Turin, Coni, and
Tende, debouches upon Nice and the Var ; the second, ascend
ing the valley of the Bormida, leads by the Col of Cadibona,
towards Savona ; lastly, that of the Bocchetta, which, by
Tortona and Gavi, descends, on the left of Genoa, into the
valley of the Polcevera. The danger was lest baron de Melas
should bring his whole force to bear upon the second of
these debouches, cut the French army in two, and throw half
upon Nice and half upon Genoa. Perceiving this danger, the
First Consul addressed to Massena, in letters full of admirable
foresight (March 5th and 12th), instructions, the substance
of which I shall here give — Beware, said he, of having too
extended a line. Have few men upon the Alps and at the Col
de Tende, where the snow will defend you. Leave some
detachments about Nice and the surrounding forts ; have four-
fifths of your force at Genoa and in the environs. The enemy
will debouch upon your right towards Genoa, upon your centre
towards Savona, probably on both points at once. Refuse one
of the two attacks, and fall with your whole united force upon
one of the enemy's columns. The ground will not permit
him to avail himself of his superiority in artillery and cavalry;
he will be able to attack you with infantry alone ; yours is
infinitely superior to his, and, favoured by the nature of the
ground, it may make amends for deficiency in number. In this
broken country, if you manoeuvre well, you may, with 30,000
men, beat 60,000, and to carry 60,000 infantry into Liguria,
M. de Melas must have 90,000, which presupposes a total army
of 120,000 men, at least. M. de Melas has neither your
activity nor your talents ; you have no reason to be afraid of
him. If he appears towards Nice, while you are at Genoa, let
him march ; don't stir : he will not venture to push very far,
while you remain in Liguria, ready to fall upon his rear, or
upon the troops left in Piedmont.
Various causes prevented Massena from following this pru-
* dent advice. In the first place, he was surprised by the sudden
irruption of the Austrians, before he had time to rectify the
position of his troops, and to make his definitive arrangements:
secondly, he had not sufficient provisions in the city of Genoa
to concentrate his whole army there. Fearful of consuming the
provisions, which the place would have great need of, in case of
a siege, he wished to make use of the resources of Nice, which
were much more abundant. Lastly, it must be confessed,
Massena did not sufficiently comprehend all the profundity of
the instructions of his superior, to disregard the inconveniences,

April 1800.] consulate and the empire. 151
real enough, it is true, of a general concentration upon Genoa.
Massena was, perhaps, the first of the generals of his time on a
field of battle ; in point of character, he was equal to the most
resolute generals of any age ; but, though he had abundance of
natural talent, the extent of his views fell short of the prompt
ness of his coup d'ceil and the energy of his mind.
Thus, for want of time, for want of provisions, for want also
of being sufficiently impressed with the importance of the step,
he did not concentrate his forces soon enough upon Genoa, and
was surprised by the Austrians. The latter opened the campaign
on the 5th of April (the 15th Germinal), that is to say much
earlier than one would have expected hostilities to be resumed.
Baron de Melas advanced, with about 70,000 or 75,000 men, to
force the chain of the Apennines. His lieutenants, Ott and
Hohenzollern, were despatched with 25,000 men upon Genoa.
General Ott, with 15,000, ascending the Trebbia, approached
by the cols of Scoffera and Monte-Creto, which debouch upon
the right of Genoa; Hohenzollern, with 10,000, threatened the
Bocchetta, which debouches upon the left of that city. Baron
de Melas, with 50,000 men, ascended the Bormida, and attacked
simultaneously all the positions of what we have called the
middle road, which runs by way of Cadibona to Savona. His
intention, as the First Consul had foreseen, was to force our
centre and to separate general Suchet from general Soult, who
gave the hand to each other at about this point. A violent
struggle ensued, from the sources of the Tanaro and of the
Bormida to the scarped summits overlooking Genoa. Generals
Elsnitz and Melas sustained obstinate encounters with Suchet
at Rocca-Barbena, Sette-Pani, Melogno, and Santo Jacobo ;
with Soult at Montelegino, Stella, Cadibona, and Savona. The
soldiers of the Republic, profiting by this mountainous country,
availing- themselves of all the accidents of the ground, de
fended themselves with incomparable bravery, inflicted on the
enemy a loss three times as great as their own, for their fire was
poured down upon dense and deep masses ; but, obliged to
fight without ceasing against troops continually renewed, they
were at length forced to fall back, vanquished by exhaustion and
fatigue more than by the Austrians. Generals Suchet and
Soult were compelled to separate, and to retire, the one upon
Borghetto, the other upon Savona. The French line was thus*
broken, as might easily be foreseen ; one half of the army of
Liguria was thrown upon Nice ; the other doomed to shut itself
up in Genoa.
On the side of Genoa itself, the success had been equally
balanced. The attack on the Bocchetta, attempted by count Ho
henzollern, with too few troops to worst the French, that is with
about 10,000 men against 5000, was repulsed by Gazan's division.
But, on the right of Genoa, that is, towards the positions of the
Monte-Creto and of Scoffera, which afford access to the valley of

152 history of the [April 1800.
Bisagno, general Ott, having vanquished the division of Miol-
lis, which had not 4000 men to oppose to 15,000, descended
on the back slope of the Apennines, and, surrounding all the
forts which covered the city, displayed the Austrian colours to
the affrighted Genoese. The English squadron at the same
time hoisted the British flag. If the inhabitants of the city
were patriots and partisans of the French, the peasants of the
neighbouring valleys, attached to the aristocratic party, as the
Calabrese in the kingdom of Naples were to queen Caroline,
as the Vendeans in France were to the Bourbons, rose at the
sight of the soldiers of the coalition. They rang the alarm bell
in all the villages. A baron d'Aspres, attached to the imperial
service, and possessing some influence in the country, excited
them to revolt. In- the evening of the 6th of April, the unfor
tunate inhabitants of Genoa, seeing the fires of the Austrians
on the surrounding mountains, on the sea the English flag fly
ing, began to be afraid that the oligarchy, already mad with joy,
would in a few days re-establish its detested empire.
But the intrepid Massena was amidst them. Though sepa
rated from Suchet by the attack directed against his centre, he
still numbered from 15,000 to 18,000 men ; and, supported by
such a garrison, he could defy any enemy whatever to force
before his face the gates of Genoa.
To enable the reader to comprehend the operations executed
by the French general during the memorable siege, it is neces
sary to describe the theatre on which it took place.
Genoa is seated at the very bottom of the beautiful gulf which
bears its name, at the foot of a spur of the Apennines. This
spur, running from north to south down to the very water, be
fore plunging into it, separates into two ridges, one turning to
the east, the other to the west, thus forming an inclined trian
gle, the apex of which is connected with the Apennines, while
the base is supported upon the sea. It is at the base of this
triangle, and, be it remarked, with the ordinary irregularity of
nature, that Genoa spreads itself out in long streets, bordered
with magnificent palaces. Nature and art had done much for
its defence. On the side next the sea, two moles, running
towards one another so as almost to cross, formed the port, and
defended it against hostile squadrons. On the land side, a first
bastioned rampart surrounds the densest and most populous
part of the city. An outer rampart of vast extent, and bastioned
like the preceding, was carried along the heights, which, as we
have just said, describe a triangular figure around Genoa. Two
forts, constructed storywise, one above another, Spur fort and
Diamond fort, were placed at the apex of this triangular figure,
and covered by their commanding fire the whole of the fortifi
cations. But this was not all that was done to keep the enemy at a
great distance. If you turn your back to the sea and your face

April 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 153
to Genoa, you have the east on your right, the west on your
left. Two small rivers, the Bisagno on the east, or the right,
the Polcevera on the west, or the left, wash the two sides of the
outer rampart. The Bisagno descends from those same
heights of the Monte-Creto and Scoffera, which you must cross
when you come from the back of the Apennines, in ascending
the Trebbia. That side of the valley of the Bisagno, which is
opposite to the city, is called the Monte-Ratti, and presents
several positions, from the heights of which great mischief might
have been done to Genoa, if they had not been occupied.
Great care had, therefore, been taken to crown them with three
forts, those of Ouezzi, Richelieu, and St. Tecle. The valley of
the Polcevera, on the contrary, situated on the left of Genoa,
and descending from the heights of the Bocchetta, offers no
commanding position requiring works of art for the defence of
the city. But a straggling suburb, on the sea-side, that of San
Pietro di Arena, presented a mass of building useful and easy
to be defended.
Thus the fortification of Genoa presented a triangle, inclined
fifteen degrees to the horizon, having an extent of 9000 fathoms,
connected by its apex with the Apennines, washed at the base
by the sea, and bordered on its two sides by the Bisagno on
the east, and the Polcevera on the west. The Spur fort, and
above tbat Fort Diamond, covered its summit. Forts Riche
lieu, St. Tecle, and Quezzi, prevented destructive fires from
being poured from the flanks of Monte-Ratti upon the city of
marble palaces.
Such was Genoa at that day ; such were its defences, which
art, time, and contributions imposed upon France, have since
greatly improved.
Massena had it still in his pow-er to assemble 18,000 men.
If, with such a garrison, in so strong a fortress, he had had a
sufficient stock of provisions, he would have been invincible.
We shall see what character can effect in war, for retrieving a
fault of combination or of foresight.
Massena, determined to oppose an energetic resistance to the
enemy, purposed to do immediately two very important things ;
the first consisted in driving back beyond the Apennines the
Austrians who pressed Genoa too closely; the second in effect
ing a junction with general Suchet, by a movement in concert
with that general, along the line of the Corniche.
To execute the first design, it was requisite that he should
dislodge the Austrians from the Bisagno, on the one hand,
and the Polcevera, on the other, and that he should drive them,
by the Monte Creto and the Bocchetta, to the other side of the
mountains from which they had come. Without losing a day,
on the very next after their first appearance, that is, on the
7th of April (17th Germinal), he sallied from Genoa, on the
east side, and traversed the valley of the Bisagno, followed

154 HISTORY OF THE [April 1800.
by the brave division of Miollis, which had been obliged,
two days before, to withdraw from before the greatly superior
forces of general Ott. He reinforced it with part of the re
serve, and, placing himself at its head, marched in two columns:
the right, under general d'Arnaud, kept close to the shore, and
proceeded towards Quinto; the left, under Miollis, directed its
course towards the acclivities of Monte Ratti. A third column,
under general Petitot, followed, marching up the bottom of the
valley of the Bisagno, which winds at the foot of Monte-Ratti.
Such was the precision of the movement of these three columns,
that their fire was heard at the same moment on all the points
at once. General d'Arnaud, by one slope, general Miollis, by
the other, forced their way with the utmost vigour to the heights
of the Monte Ratti.
The presence of Massena himself, and the desire of reveng
ing the surprise of the preceding day, animated the soldiers.
The Austrians were hurled into the torrents, and lost all their
positions. General d'Arnaud passed on, and, following the crest
of the heights, reached the very summit of the Apennines, the
Col of Scoffera. Massena, followed by some companies of re
serve, descended into the valley of the Bisagno, to join Petitot's
column. Thus reinforced, this latter column repulsed the ene
my everywhere, and, ascending the river, lent its support to
general d'Arnaud's movement on Scoffera. Entangled in the
winding valleys, the Austrians left Massena 1500 prisoners, and
at their head that baron d'Aspres, who had instigated the revolt
of the peasants of La Fonte Buona.
When, on the evening of the same day, Massena returned to
Genoa, after delivering the Genoese from the sight of the enemy,
and bringing back as prisoner that officer whose speedy tri
umphal arrival was announced, the joy of the patriotic, and most
numerous, portion of the population, was extreme. He was
greeted with acclamations. The inhabitants had provided litters
for carrying the wounded, and wine and broth to refresh them,
and they disputed the honour of receiving them into their
houses. After this act of vigour towards the east, the most important
side to clear, because upon that only the city was closely pressed
by the Austrians, Massena resolved to take advantage of the
respite procured him by the last success, for making an effort
towards the west, that is, towards Savona, and thereby re
establishing his communications with general Suchet. To secure
Genoa from all attack during his absence, he divided the troops
left him into two corps; the right under general Miollis, the left
under general Soult. The corps of general Miollis was des
tined to guard Genoa with two divisions. D'Arnaud's division
was to defend the east side, fronting the Bisagno; Spital's divi
sion, the west, fronting the Polcevera. The left corps, under
general Soult, was charged to keep the field with the two divi-

April 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 155
sions of Gardanne and Gazan. It was with this force, of about
10,000 men, that Massena purposed to approach Savona, send
ing a secret express to Suchet, with orders to attempt a simul
taneous movement upon the same point. Gardanne's division
was directed along the shore, and Gazan's upon the crests of the
Apennines, with the intention of inducing the enemy, by the
appearance of two separate columns, to split his forces. After
wards manoeuvring rapidly on this ground, with which he was
perfectly acquainted, Massena meant, according to circumstances,
to unite these two divisions into one, so as to cut to pieces,
either on the tops of the Apennines, or along the coast, any
corps of the enemy that might be most exposed to his attacks.
He commanded Gardanne's division in person ; and had con
signed Gazan's to general Soult. His intention was to follow
the coast by Voltri, Varaggio, and Savona ; his lieutenant,
general Soult, had orders to ascend by Aqua-Bianca and San-
Pietro del Alba, upon Sassello.
On the morning of the 9th of April, our troops commenced
their movement. The baron de Melas, after cutting the French
army in two, purposed to shut up Massena in Genoa, and at
the same time to contract his own line, which was too extended,
for it embraced a space of at least fifteen leagues, from the val
ley of the Tanaro to that of the Trebbia. The two armies met
in their movement, and upon this broken ground ensued a most
obstinate and at the same time confused conflict. While Mas
sena marched in two columns, the baron de Melas was marching
in three, and count Hohenzollern, forming a fourth, tried a new
attack on the Bocchetta. Ten thousand French were about to
meet more than 40,000 Austrians.
General Soult, defiling by Voltri, perceived on his right the
Austrians, who had passed the Bocchetta, and crowned the
surrounding heights. On arriving at a place called Aqua Santa
they might threaten the rear of the French columns, and pre
vent their return towards Genoa. General Soult thought it
prudent to drive them back : a brilliant action was the conse
quence ; colonel Mouton, since marshal, and count Lobau, com
manding the 3rd demi-brigade, displayed extraordinary valour.
General Soult took some cannon and prisoners, and, in spite of
a host of enemies, gained the mountain road to Sassello. The
time spent in this action, (which could not prevent the ulterior
advance of the Austrians upon the rear of our columns,) made
it impossible for Soult to reach Sassello, on the other side of
the Apennines, by the time that general Massena was awaiting
him there. The latter had marched along the sea, and next day,
April the 10th, he was in the environs of Varaggio, formed into
two columns, and seeking to enter into communication by the
heights with the corps of general Soult, whom he supposed to
be at Sassello. The enemy, whose force was ten times the num
ber of ours, endeavoured to envelop Massena's two small

156 HISTORY OF THE [April 1800.
columns, and especially the left, which he commanded in per
son. Massena, relying upon his right column and upon the
movement of general Soult towards Sassello, resisted for a long
time, with 1200 men, a corps of from 8000 to 10,000, and dis
played extraordinary firmness on this occasion. Being obliged
to retreat, and having lost sight of his right column, which had
fallen behind, in consequence of a tardy distribution of provisions,
he set out in search of it, amidst frightful precipices and bands
of revolted peasants. Having at last fallen in with it, he ordered
it to rejoin the rest of Gardanne's division, which had conti
nued to follow the coast by Varaggio and Cogoletto. The diffi
culty of concerting his movements among this multitude of
enemies, and in so broken a country, having prevented the
timely meeting of general Soult's corps with the corps of gene
ral Massena, the latter resolved to rally his troops, to ascend
the crest of the Apennines on his right, to join his lieutenant,
and then fall upon the Austrian corps scattered in those valleys.
But our harassed troops had dispersed upon the roads, and
could not be collected in time. Massena then determined to
send to general Soult all who were capable of marching, to serve
for a reinforcement; and with the rest, consisting of wounded
and exhausted soldiers, he continued to follow the sea-coast, and
regained the approaches of Genoa, in order to cover the retreat
of the corps d'armee, and to ensure its re-entry into the place.
Reduced to a handful of men, he had several times to sustain
the most disproportionate conflicts ; and, in one of these actions,
a French battalion, taken unawares, having given way before a
charge of Szekler hussars, he himself charged those hussars with
thirty horse, and drove them back. He finally posted him
self at Voltri, for the purpose of awaiting there the return of
general Soult. The latter, thrown into the mountains, among
detachments of the enemy five or six times as numerous, was
exposed to great dangers there; and, after the most glorious
efforts, he must have succumbed at last but for the succours so
seasonably sent to him by Massena. Reinforced in time, he was
enabled to regain the road to Genoa, after sustaining with ad
vantage a most arduous and most unequal contest. He at length
rejoined his general-in-chief, and both re-entered Genoa, cutting
their way, and bringing with them 4000 prisoners. General
Suchet, on his part, had endeavoured to rejoin his general-in-
chief, but he had found it impossible to penetrate the enormous
mass of the Austrian army.
The Genoese were transported with admiration at the sight
of the French general entering their city for the second time,
preceded by columns of prisoners. His ascendency had become
all-powerful. The army and the population obeyed him with
the profoundest submission.
Massena might, from that moment, consider himself as de
finitively shut up in Genoa; but he had no intention to suffer

April 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 157
himself to be pressed too closely. His design was to keep the
enemy continually at a distance from the walls, to exhaust him
by incessant fights, to occupy him in such a manner that he
could neither force the Var, nor retire to Lombardy, nor oppose
the projected march of the First Consul across the Alps.
No sooner had he returned, on the 18th of April (28th Ger
minal), than he directed his attention to the internal police and
the provisioning of the place. Fearful lest the Genoese nobles
might practise treachery, he took precautions against any sur
prise on their part. The national guard, composed of Ligurian
patriots, supported by a French force, encamped in the principal
square in the city, with lighted matches to the guns, the national
guard was to assemble whenever the drums should beat to arms.
Such of the inhabitants as did not belong to it were ordered to
retire, at this signal, to their houses. The armed troops alone
were authorised to traverse the streets. At ordinary times, the
inhabitants were to be at home by ten o'clock at night, and
assemblages at any time were strictly prohibited.
Massena had collected the corn to be found in Genoa, pro
mising to pay, and actually paying for it, when it was brought
cheerfully; seizing it by means of domiciliary visits, when the
owners refused to deliver it. After securing all the corn, he
put both army and populace upon rations, and had thus pro
cured wherewithal to feed his soldiers and the poor inhabitants
during the first fortnight of the siege. This fortnight had
nearly elapsed; but there were still left provisions, which the
money of the wealthy drew forth at a high price from certain
secret stores, and for their sole use. By order of Massena a
fresh search was made, and there was found a sufficiency of the
ordinary kinds of grain, rye, oats, and others, to supply the
citizens and the army with coarse bread for another fortnight.
It was hoped that some lucky gale of wind might drive off the
English, and bring some cargoes of provisions into the harbour.
Some assistance was expected from the Corsican and Ligurian
privateers, which had been furnished with letters of marque for
the capture of vessels laden with corn. In short, Massena
had determined to hold out to the last extremities, and he had
resolved, rather than submit, to feed the troops upon the cacao
with which the warehouses of Genoa were abundantly stocked.
Being supplied with some money, sent by the First Consul, he
hoarded this for extreme cases, and also made use of it for
affording occasional relief to his unfortunate soldiers, under
their cruel privations. Already, in this series of encounters,
several thousand men had been put hors de combat, and a great
number were in the hospitals. In the forts, upon the two ram
parts of the place, and in reserve, there was left an active force
of about 12,000 combatants.
In this desperate state of things, Massena, appearing every
day with calm and serene countenance, at length communicated

158 HISTORY OF THE [April 1800.
to others the courage with, which he was himself animated His
aide-de-camp, Franceschi, embarked in a small boat to proceed
to the coast of Nice, and thence to repair to the First Consul
in order to acquaint him with the hardships, the exploits, and
the pressing dangers of the army of Liguria.
On the morning of the 30th of April (10th Floreal), a general
cannonade, thundering on. all points at once; on the east to
wards the Bisagno, on the west towards the Polcevera, lastly,
along the coast itself, proceeding from a division of gun-boats,
announced some grand attempt of the enemy's. The Austrians,
in fact, brought forward a great force on that day. The count
of Hohenzollern attacked the plateau of the Two Brothers, on
which Fort Diamond was erected. After some fierce efforts, he
made himself master of the plateau, and summoned Fort Dia
mond. In reply to this summons, the brave officer who com
manded it declared, that he would not surrender the post
committed to his honour till he was compelled by main force.
This fort was of the greatest importance, since it commanded
the Spur Fort, and, consequently, the whole ramparts. The
Austrian camp of Coronata, situated on the banks of the Polce
vera, towards the west front, opened a vehement fire on the
suburb of San Pietro di Arena, and several attacks were made
at the same time, for the purpose of cooping us in a narrower
space than we occupied in this quarter. On the opposite side,
that is to say, towards the Bisagno, the enemy surrounded Fort
Richelieu, and unluckily took Fort Quezzi, which was not
completely finished when the siege began. Lastly, he made
himself master of the village of St. Martin d'Albaro, situated
below Fort St. Tecle, and he was near occupying a formidable
position, that of La Madona del Monte, from which the city of
Genoa might be cannonaded. The soldiers of general d'Arnaud
had already abandoned the last houses of the village of St. Mar
tin d'Albaro ; scarcely any of them now kept their ranks, many
having dispersed themselves in irregular parties. Massena
hastened to the spot, rallied them himself, renewed the fight,
and arrested the enemy.
Half the day was already gone : it was high time to repair the
mischief. Massena instantly repaired to Genoa, and made
™i?£j dl?P°sitions- He gave to general Soult the 73rd and
106th demi-brigades, and ordered him to retake the plateau of
the l wo brothers. But, wishing first to recover Fort Quezzi,
«lf l.i°ff M-6n-my to e™cuate St. Martin d'Albaro, he him-
foJcin, it wfth ft divfion aSainst *at point, after rein-
the fine. battah°ns borrowed from the 2nd and the 3rd of
tin^^'d^lSLS^ t0 ?\ch^e' turned St" Mf
ravine of the Sturla, took 12 ^ Wh° had °CCUPied [t int°the
covered the right of the French ^ S°me Pnsoners, and thus
s me drench columns advancing upon Fort

April 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 159
Quezzi. While the brave colonel Mouton, at the head of two
battalions of the 3rd, attacked this Fort Quezzi in front, adju
tant-general Hector was directed to turn the Monte Ratti by
the heights of Fort Richelieu. In spite of unparalleled efforts,
the brave colonel Mouton was repulsed, but he did not yield
ground, till he received a ball which went through his chest, and
left him nearly dead on the field of battle. Massena, who had
no more than two battalions, pushed one upon the right flank
of the position occupied by the enemy, and directed half of the
other upon the left flank of the same position. A fierce encoun
ter took place around this Fort Quezzi. Too close to fire, the
combatants fought with stones and with the butt of the musket.
Our soldiers were nearly overpowered by numbers. Massena
then took the half battalion which he had left, put himself at
the head of it, and decided the victory. Fort Quezzi was re
taken. The Austrians, driven from position to position, left a great
number of dead, wounded, and prisoners. At this instant
Massena, who had deferred the attack on the plateau of the
Two Brothers, profiting by the effect produced by these ad
vantages, sent orders to general Soult to take it. The general
of brigade, Spital, was sent to attack this plateau, which was
long disputed. At length, our soldiers retook it, and thus, after
a whole day's fighting, they recovered at once the plateau of the
Two Brothers, which commanded the extreme point of the
place, Fort Quezzi, the posts of St. Martin d'Albaro and of La
Madona del Monte, in short, all the important positions, without
which the siege of Genoa was impossible for the Austrians.
Massena returned in the evening to Genoa, carrying with him
the ladders which the enemy had provided for scaling the walls.
The Austrians had lost on this day 1600 prisoners, 2400
killed and wounded, about 4000 men. Including these, Massena
had taken from them, or killed, 12,000 or 15,000 men since the
opening of hostilities ; and, what was a still more serious matter,
he had exhausted the moral force of their army by the unparal
leled efforts which he had obliged them to make.
No time was lost in setting about the repair of Fort Que'zzi.
This work, which seemed likely to take a month, was finished
in three days, by means of five or six hundred barrels of earth,
which were brought by the soldiers, and served to form the
entrenchments. On the 5th of May (15th Floreal), a small
vessel laden with corn brought a supply for five days. It was
a most valuable addition to the stock of provisions, by this time
reduced very low. But it became urgent to relieve the place,
otherwise it could not hold out long. Of bread it was likely to
be very soon destitute.
General Suchet, on his part, finding himself overpowered
from the crests of the Apennines,- had been obliged to quit the
position of Borghetto, to abandon even the Roya, which was

160 HISTORY OF THE [April 1800.
no longer tenable, the enemy marching at full liberty by the Col
de Tende, and threatening Nice and the Var. Nice was even
occupied by the baron de Melas, who entered that city tri
umphantly, glad to tread a soil, which the Republic had declared
to be French territory. But general Suchet rallied behind the
Var, in a position which has long furnished a study for our
officers of engineers. The bridge of St. Laurent on the Var,
covered by a tetedepont, presented a defile of 400 fathoms to
pass, and might be considered as an insurmountable obstacle.
The whole right bank, guarded by the French, was covered
with batteries, from the mouth of the river to the mountains.
The forts of Montalban and Vintimille, situated in advance of
the Var, had been occupied by French garrisons at the moment
of the evacuation of Nice. That of Montalban, situated on the
rear of the Austrians, at an elevation which rendered it visible
from the camp of the French, was surmounted by a telegraph,
by means of which general Suchet received notice of all the
movements of the enemy. All the disposable troops of all
arms had been brought together from the contiguous depart
ments, so that he still numbered 14,000 men, who, screened by
good entrenchments, were in a position difficult to be stormed.
On the receipt of these tidings from Liguria, the First Consul
despatched urgent remonstrances to Moreau, to decide him to
commence hostilities. It was a month since every thing had
been settled between them, and no further difficulty imputable
to the government impeded the army of the Rhine. But
Moreau, naturally rather slow, unwilling to commit himself
upon an enemy's territory but with the full certainty of success,
deferred wrongly the commencement of the operations. In fact,
any delay made by him in opening the campaign was a delay to
the opening of the campaign by the army of reserve, and a cruel
prolongation of the extremities which Massena and his brave
soldiers were suffering. Hasten — such was the language ad
dressed to Moreau from Paris — hasten, by your successes, to
accelerate the moment when Massena may be relieved. That
general is in want of provisions ; for this fortnight he has been
maintaining a desperate struggle, with his emaciated soldiers.
I address myself to your patriotism, to your own interest ; for,
if Massena should be obliged to capitulate, it would be necessary
to take from you part of your forces, and hurry to the Rhone, to
the succour of the southern departments. — At last a formal
order was given to him, by the telegraph, to pass the Rhine.
The reasons which prevented Moreau from opening the cam
paign would have been good under less urgent circumstances.
Alsace was exhausted ; Switzerland, in particular, over-run for
two years by the armies of all Europe, was totally drained
of resources. The inhabitants, unable to support their chil
dren, were under the necessity of emigrating with them,
from the poor cantons into the rich ones. The ruined

April 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 161
families thus consigned them to the bounty of families which
still possessed some means of subsistence. Nothing could be
demanded from such a country, which, besides, it would have
been impolitic to exasperate, for it was the "point cCappui" of
our two principal armies. Moreau, as we have seen, was living
upon the stores provided for our fortresses on the Rhine, in
case of siege. This, however, was not the real motive of his
delay ; it would have been a motive, on the contrary, for hasten
ing, with all possible speed, to procure subsistence in an enemy's
country ; but his artillery and cavalry were in want of horses.
He had no camp equipage, no implements ; if he had materials
for throwing a bridge, that was the utmost. Nevertheless, con
sidering the urgency of the circumstances, he consented to
make shift without such things as were yet wanting, hoping to
procure them by the way. So excellent was the composition
of his army, that it could make amends for the deficiency of
what it had not, dispense with it, or take it by force. At the
end of April (the first days of Floreal), Moreau, therefore, de
cided to open this campaign, the most glorious in his life, and
one of the most memorable in our annals.
He had at his disposal, as we have seen, about 130,000 men,
rather more than fewer. About 30,000 men occupied the
( fortresses of Strasburg, Landau, Mayence, the tetes de pont of
Basle, Brisach, Kehl, and Cassel. Out of these 30,000, 6000
or 7000, under General Moncey, guarded the valleys of the St.
Gothard and the Simplon, to close them against the Austrians,
in case they attempted to penetrate into them. The active
army thus numbered 100,000 men, ready to take the field.
The infantry, in particular, was superb ; it numbered 82,000
men ; the artillery 5000, with 116 pieces of cannon ; the cavalry
13,000. As the reader will perceive, the numbers of the artillery
and the cavalry were far below the usual proportions ; but
their composition was excellent ; and, besides, the quality of
the infantry enabled it to dispense with those auxiliary arms.
Moreau divided his army into four corps ; Lecourbe com
manded the right, 25,000 strong, and stationed from the Lake
of Constance to Schaffhausen. A second corps, called the corps
of reserve, amounting to nearly 30,000 men, and under the im
mediate command of Moreau, occupied the territory of Basle.
A third, of 25,000 men, forming the centre, under St. Cyr, was
distributed about Old and New Brisach. Lastly, general St.
Suzanne, at the head of about 20,000 men, after ascending from
Mayence to Strasburg, occupied Strasburg and Kehl, and
formed the left of the army.
Moreau had for years past adopted this system of splitting his
forces into separate corps, each complete in infantry, artillery,
and cavalry, capable of shifting for themselves, wherever they
might be, but subject to the inconvenience, as experience soon
demonstrated, of readily parting company and acting by them-
VOL. I. M

162 HISTORY OF THE [April 1800.
selves, especially when the commander-in-chief did not exercise
his authority with sufficient vigour to enforce at all times their
co-operation in the general plan. This inconvenience was further
aggravated by one step in particular, which Moreau adopted in
this campaign ; it was that of assuming to himself the direct
command of one of the corps d'armee, under the name of re
serve. St. Cyr, who had long served with Moreau, and who had
great influence with him, strongly opposed this combination,*
alleging that it absorbed the general-in-chief, made him stoop
to a part that was not his, and, above all, that it was injurious
to the other portions of the army, rarely so well treated as the
troops placed under the general staff. But these animadversions,
the justice of which was more than once demonstrated in this
campaign, did not prevail. Moreau persisted in his resolution,
out of complaisance for the wishes of a coterie. Having already en
trusted the direction of his staff to general Dessoles, and desirous,
nevertheless, of creating an appointment for general Lahorie,
one of those dangerous friends who, at a later period, contri
buted to his ruin, he made him second in command of the
reserve. This circumstance produced a coolness between
Moreau and St. Cyr, which soon waxed into open rupture.
M. de Kray, the adversary of Moreau, had, as we have said,
150,000 men, 40,000 of whom were in the fortresses on the
Rhine and Danube, and 110,000 in the active army. The
infantry, mixed with Bavarians, Wurtembergers, Mayencers,
was middling. The cavalry was superb ; it numbered 26,000
horse. The numerous and well-served artillery consisted of 300
pieces of cannon. The right of the Austrians, under the com
mand of M. de Sztarray, observed the course of the Rhine,
between Mayence and Rastadt, connecting itself with the levies
of Mayence peasants commanded by the baron d'Albini. Ge
neral de Kienmayer covered the debouche of Strasburg, in
advance of Kinzig. Major Giulay, with a brigade, held the
Hollengrund, and observed Old Brisach. The bulk of the
Austrian army was encamped behind the defiles of the Black
Forest, at Donau-Eschingen and Willingen, at the junction of the
roads leading from the Rhine to the Danube. Forty thousand
men were assembled at this point. M. de Kray had placed in
the Forest Towns a strong advanced guard, under the archduke
Ferdinand, with directions to observe the Basle road ; he had
left a numerous rear-guard, under prince Joseph of Lorraine, at
Stockach, to cover the magazines established in that town, to
guard the roads to Ulm and Munich, and to connect himself
with the Lake of Constance, where Williams, an Englishman,
commanded a flotilla. Lastly, prince Reuss, at the head of
30,000 men, partly Austrian regiments, partly Tyrolese militia,
* See ou this subject the Memoires du Marechal Saint-Cyr, campaign of
1800.

April 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 163
occupied the Rheinthal, from the Grisons to the Lake of
Constance. This was considered as the left of the imperial
army. M. de Kray, at the centre of this net, spread around
him, flattered himself that he should be informed of the slightest
movement of the French.
The plan of Moreau already detailed, and which consisted in
debouching by the three bridges of Strasburg, Brisach, and
Basle, and in then stealing away and ascending the Rhine to
Schaffhausen, had been adopted without modification.* On
the 25th of April, Moreau put his troops in motion. He pro
ceeded himself to Strasburg, where he joined the corps of St.
Suzanne, that, by his presence' at that point, he might cause it
to be inferred, that it was his intention to act by the direct road
from Strasburg across the Black Forest. He had taken another
precaution the better to mask his movements, which was not
to assemble his forces beforehand. The demi-brigades marched
from their very cantonments directly to the place where they
were to pass the Rhine, and thus joined on their route
the corps of which they formed part. Every thing being
thus arranged, three imposing heads of columns, acting simul
taneously within a space of thirty leagues, crossed at the same
instant the bridges of Strasburg, Old Brisach, and Basle. This
was on the 25th of April.
General St. Suzanne, who commanded the extreme left and
had crossed at Strasburg, swept all that he found before him. He
fell in here and therewith detached corps, which made no great
resistance. However, not desiring to involve himself in serious
actions, he halted between Renchen and Offenburg, threaten
ing at once the valleys of the Renchen and of the Kinzig ; but
striving most especially to persuade the Austrians that his
intention was to gain the Danube by way of the Black Fo
rest, and by following the valley of the Kinzig. At the same
instant, St. Cyr debouched from Old Brisach, and advanced to
Freiburg, briskly driving the enemy's detachments before him;
but observing, hke St. Suzanne, the precaution not to push on
too far. He experienced some resistance before Freiburg. The
Austrians had entrenched the heights surrounding that town, and
placed behind the entrenchments troops of peasants, raised in
the mountains of Swabia, upon pretext of defending their homes
against the ravages of the French. These could not keep their
ground. Freiburg was occupied in a twinkling. Some of these
unfortunate peasants were slaughtered, and the others were not
again seen during the remainder of the campaign. St. Cyr
* Marshal St. Cyr, in his Memoires, appears to be in error on this point.
The First Consul had adopted the plan entire. This fact is attested by a
letter of general Dessoles, contained in the Memorial de la Guerre, and by
the manuscript correspondence.
m2

164 HISTORY OF THE [April 1800.
posted himself in such a manner as to induce a belief that he
had designs on the Hbllengrund (Val d'Enfer).
The reserve debouched on the same day by the bridge of
Basle, and, not meeting with any obstacle, pushed a division,
that of Richepanse, towards Schlingen and Kandern, to give
the hand to St. Cyr's corps, which, in two days, was to ascend
the Rhine.
During the whole of the 26th of April (6th Floreal), St.
Suzanne remained in position in advance of Strasburg, St.
Cyr in advance of Brisach. Tlie reserve, which had debouched
from Basle, finished deploying, while awaiting the movement
of the two corps destined to ascend the Rhine, till they were in
a line with itself. Moreau left Strasburg, to return to his
head-quarters, which were in the centre of the reserve.
The 27th was likewise spent in misleading the enemy, as to
the direction of our columns. The Austrians might naturally
expect a decided movement by the Kinzig and the Hbllengrund.
These two defiles are, in fact, the most direct route for an
army advancing from the Rhine to the Danube, for they open
at some distance from one another, run in the same direction,
and at length unite between Donau-Eschingen and Hufingen,
not far from Schaffhausen, at which point was the corps of
general Lecourbe. It was natural to suppose that the two
strong columns, of from 20,000 to 25,000 men each, which
appeared at the entrance of these defiles, would really pursue
that direction, to give the hand to Lecourbe. In order to'
guard them the better, M. de Kray detached twelve squadrons
and nine battalions from Willingen, and sent them as reinforce
ments to general Kienmayer. He was obliged to weaken
Stockach, to supply the place of the troops which he had
detached from Willingen.
But, in the night of the 27th, and on the 28th, while M. de
Kray was falling into the snare, the direction of the French
columns was suddenly changed. St. Suzanne fell back upon
Strasburg, recrossed the Rhine with his whole corps, and
ascended the left bank, that he might not have to make too
long a flank movement in an enemy's country. On reaching
New Brisach, he again crossed to the right bank, and took the
place of St. Cyr before Freiburg, as if he was about to enter
the Hbllengrund. St. Cyr, on his part, turning off to the
right, but without quitting' the German side, marched along the
bank of the river with his artillery, his cavalry, and his baggage ;
and, while his heavy materiel thus followed the level country, a
great part of his infantry marched on the flank of the mountains,
by St. Hubert, Neuhof, Todnau. and St. Blaise. Moreau's ob
ject in pursuing this course was, to avoid encumbering the banks
of the Rhine, to reconnoitre the heights of the Black Forest,
full of Austrian detachments, and to cross, nearer to their

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 165
sources, the rivers which descend from those heights to the
Rhine, through the territory of the Forest Towns. These rivers
are the Wiesen, the Alb, and the Wutach. Unluckily, St. Cyr
had reckoned on finding roads where none really existed. He
was obliged to traverse a frightful country, always near the
«nemy, and without artillery. Still he was not too long delayed,
nor prevented from arriving at St. Blaise, on the Alb, by the
appointed day.
At the same time, Moreau ascended the Rhine with the
reserve, remaining, like St. Cyr, on the German bank. Riche
panse, who commanded the advanced guard, after he had seen St.
Cyr's artillery and cavalry debouch, which artillery and cavalry,
as we have just said, followed the bank of the Rhine, set out for
St. Blaise, to connect himself, in the mountains, with the
infantry of the same corps. Generals Delmas and Leclerc, who
commanded the two other divisions of the reserve, were directed
upon Sbckingen, and then upon Alb, before the bridge of
Albruck. < This bridge was covered by entrenchments. Adju
tant-general Cohorn, marching at the head of a battalion of the
14th light, two battalions of the 50th, and of the 4th hussars,
advanced in columns upon the entrenchments, and carried them.
He then leaped upon the shoulders of a grenadier, passed the
Alb in that manner, and did not leave the enemy time to
¦destroy the bridge. He took some cannon and prisoners.
On the 29th of April (9th Floreal), the centre, under St.
Cyr, and the reserve, under Moreau, were in line on the Alb,
from the abbey of St. Blaise to the influx of the Alb into the
Rhine. St. Suzanne arrived at New Breisach, by the left bank;
on our extreme right, Lecourbe assembled his corps between
Diesenhofen and Schaffhausen, ready to execute his passage,
when St. Cyr and Moreau should have ascended the Rhine till
they were on a line with him. On the 30th of April, St.
Suzanne crossed the Rhine, and appeared at the entrance of
the Hbllengrund. St. Cyr remained in the environs of St.
Blaise. Moreau advanced towards the Wutach. At length,
¦on the 1st of May (11th Floreal), the army made its last and
most decisive movement, and made it successfully. M. de
Kray had begun to perceive his mistake, and now recalled
the corps which had entered too far into the defiles of the
Black Forest. St. Suzanne, who was to pass through the Hol-
lengrund, which debouches upon the very positions that the
French armv was to occupy, when it should have completed its
movement, found the . troops of Kienmayer in retreat, and
closely pursued them. St. Cyr kept on the skirts of the arch
duke Ferdinand's corps, and pushed it from Bettmarmgen to
Stiihlingen on the Wutach, where he arrived in the evening.
The troops of Moreau crossed the Wutach without encounter
ing much resistance, repaired the bridge, which wanted scarcely
any thing but a few planks, and endeavoured to connect them-

166 HISTORY OF THE [May 1800.
selves by their right with Schaffhausen, where Lecourbe was,
and by their left with Stiihlingen, where St. Cyr was. This was
the moment that Lecourbe was to choose for crossing the
Rhine. On the very morning of the 1st of May, thirty-one
pieces of cannon were placed on the heights of the left bank of
the river, to sweep by their fire the environs of the village of
Reichlingen. Twenty-five boats transported general Molitor,
with two battalions, to the right bank, to protect the construc
tion of a bridge, long prepared in the Aar, In an hour and a
half this bridge was thrown over. General Vandamme crossed,
with a great part of the troops of Lecourbe's corps, and occupied
in an instant the roads leading to Engen and Stockach, im
portant points of the enemy's line. He took the small town
of Stein and the fort of Hohentwiel, reputed to be impregnable,
and well supplied both with provisions and artillery. Goulu's
brigade, crossing at the same time towards Paradis, met with a
very smart resistance at the village of Busingen, but soon over
came it. Lastly, Lorges' division entered Schaffhausen in the
evening, and effected its junction with the troops of Moreau.
Thus, in the evening of the 1st of May, the whole army was
beyond the Rhine. The three principal corps, under command
of St. Cyr, Moreau, and Lecourbe, forming a mass of between
75,000 or 80,000 men, occupied a line which passed through
Bondorf, Stiihlingen, Schaffhausen, Radolfzell, to a point on the
Lake of Constance. They were ready to march upon Engen and
Stockach, threatening at once the line of retreat and the magazines
of the enemy. St. Suzanne, with the left, 20,000 strong, pursued
the Austrians in the defile of the Hbllengrund, waiting till the
bulk of the French army should, in advancing, have cleared the
outlet of that defile, before he debouched on the Upper Danube,
and joined the other corps.
This movement, then, was effected in six days, and in the
most successful manner. Moreau, presenting three heads of
columns by the bridges of Strasburg, Brisach, and Basle, had
drawn the enemy towards those three debouches ; then, stealing
away all at once, and marching to the right along the Rhine, two
of his corps on the German bank, one on the French bank, he had
ascended as high as Schaffhausen, where he had covered Le
courbe's passage. Fifteen hundred prisoners, six field-pieces with
their horses, forty pieces of ordnance in the fort of Hohentwiel,
and some magazines, had been taken. The men had everywhere
shown a steadiness, a resolution, which could only be expected of
veteran troops, full of confidence in themselves and in their leaders.
All the objections urged against this plan are certainly silenced
by its success. Rarely indeed do we see movements so compli
cated succeed more completely, the enemy fall into the snare
with greater credulity, or the commanders of corps co-operate
with more precision. At the same time, this plan of the
prudent Moreau's was attended with at least as many dangers

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 167
as that of the First Consul, which he rejected as too rash: for
St. Cyr and Moreau had exposed their flank for several succes
sive days, in their march along the Rhine, cooped up between
the mountains and the river ; St. Cyr had been for an instant
separated from his artillery; and now St. Suzanne was engaged
alone in the Hbllengrund. If marshal Kray, by a sudden inspi
ration, had thrown himself upon St. Cyr, Moreau, or St. Su
zanne, he would have had a chance of routing a detached corps,
which might have caused a retrograde movement of the whole
French army. But Moreau had two advantages in his favour :
in the first place he took the offensive, which always discon
certs the enemy ; secondly, he had excellent troops, who were
capable of repairing any unforeseen accident by their firmness,
who did even repair, as we shall see presently, more than one
fault of the commander-in-chief's by their mettle in action.
The moment approached when the two armies, after manoeu
vring, one to pass the Rhine, the other to prevent that passage,
were at length to meet beyond the river. On the 2nd of May
(12th Floreal), Moreau prepared for this encounter; but, not
supposing it to be so near as it really was, he neglected to take
measures of precaution, either sufficiently prompt or sufficiently
complete. He resolved to dispatch Lecourbe, with his 25,000
men, for Stockach, where were at once the rear-guard of the
-Austrians, their magazines, their communications with the Vor-
arlberg, and prince Reuss. This was following the letter of the
plan concerted with the First Consul; for M. de Kray, cut off
from Stockach, would be separated from the Lake of Constance,
and consequently from the Alps. Moreau, therefore, ordered
Lecourbe to set out on the morning of the 3rd of May (13th
Floreal) to take Stockach from the prince of Lorraine- Vaude-
mont, who with 12,000 men occupied that important point.
As for Moreau, he advanced himself with all the reserve upon
Engen, keeping an eye upon Lecourbe, and ready to fly to his
assistance, if that should be necessary. He directed St. Cyr to
advance, and occupy an extended position from Bettmaringen
and Bondorf to Engen, so as to connect himself with him on one
side, and to give a hand on the other to St. Suzanne, who was
soon to issue from the Hbllengrund (Val d'Enfer) .
Moreau marched then, in order of battle, having his back to
the Rhine, his right to the Lake of Constance, his left to the
debouches of the Black Forest, presenting a front of fifteen
leagues, exactly parallel to the line of retreat which the Aus
trians must pursue, if they retreated from Donau-Eschmgen to
Stockach, whither many interests summoned them. It was a
very extended position, especially so near to the enemy, and
which, before an active and resolute adversary, would have ex
posed the French army to serious consequences. Fortunately
for us, the army of M. de Kray was still less concentrated than
Moreau's. M. de Kray, whose position was at first better

168 HISTORY OF the [May 1800.
adapted than ours for a rapid concentration, since he occupied,
from Constance to Strasburg, the base of a triangle, the two
sides of which we occupied, M. de Kray, surprised now by our
movement, having already upon his left flank three fourths of
the French assembled and transported across the river, was in a
difficult situation. He had given to the detachments of the
Austrian army which were near the Rhine hasty orders to fall
back, by the Black Forest, upon the Upper Danube ; but a
prompt and well-concerted operation could alone extricate them
from the danger. In order the better to comprehend the ma
noeuvres, let us take a survey of the theatre of these operations.
That mountainous and wooded tract called the Black Forest,
around which the Rhine winds, without penetrating into it, and
which it leaves to pursue its course northward, this tract con
tains an insignificant spring, which gives rise to a river, extremely
modest at its birth, but destined to become one of the largest rivers
in the world ; namely, the Danube. It pours forth this stream
to the east, in which direction it flows, inclining, it is true, a
little to the north, being forced into that direction by the pro
jecting foot of the Alps, which it skirts all the way to Vienna.
It collects in its course all the streams that descend from this
long chain of mountains, which is the cause of its sudden mag
nitude, after so humble an origin.
When an Austrian general defends against the French the
valley of the Danube, the ordinary route to his country, he has
two courses to pursue. He may, when the French have found
means to penetrate into it by Switzerland and the Black Forest, —
he may either skirt the foot of the Alps, supporting his left
upon the mountains, his right upon the Danube, and succes
sively defending all the rivers that run into it, such as the Iller,
the Lech, the Isar, the Inn; or, quitting the Alps, place himself
a cheval (i. e. occupy both banks) on the Danube, descend the
river, making a stand at the important positions which it pre
sents, as those of Ulm, Ratisbon, &c, ready to cover himself with
its bed, which grows gradually wider, or to fall upon the impru
dent adversary who shall have made a false manoeuvre. The latter
course has been the more generally preferred by Austrian tacti
cians. Marshal de Kray had it in his choice to adopt the one or the
other; either to support himself upon the Alps, or to ma
noeuvre on the Danube. In supporting himself upon the Alps,
he would unknowingly thwart the plan of the First Consul,
who, in order to descend in safety from those lofty mountains
upon the rear of the baron de Melas, wished to keep the im
perial army in Swabia aloof from Switzerland and the Tyrol;
but he would sacrifice his right wing, too far advanced towards
the Rhine, without knowing what would become of it. By
adopting, on the other hand, the plan of manoeuvring on both
banks of the Danube, he would certainly rally his right wing,

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 169
but would separate himself from his left wing, commanded by
prince Reuss, though without sacrificing it, for it had in the
Tyrol an asylum and an employment for its forces. He would
fall in, it is true, with the views of the First Consul, still with
out knowing it, by moving away from the Alps ; this, however,
was a minor evil ; for, were he even to support himself upon
them, he would probably never think of throwing himself into
Lombardy, to succour the baron de Melas. The plan, then,
which presented the least inconvenience, which was most ac-
co dant with the course usually pursued by the imperial armies,
was to concentrate himself on the Upper, Danube. But, in
order to succeed, it was requisite to adopt this course promptly
and resolutely. Unfortunately for him, M. de Kray had im
mense magazines at Stockach, near the Lake of Constance,
with a strong rear-guard of 12,000 men, under the command of
the prince of Lorraine-Vaudemont. He ought, then, to have
transported his rear-guard immediately from Stockach to the
Upper Danube, and to have repaired thither himself, sacrificing
his magazines, which, at any rate, there would not have been
time to evacuate. This was not what he did; but, with the in
tention, however, of manoeuvring afterwards on the Danube,
he sent M. de Nauendorff, with the centre of the Austrian
army, upon Engen, to succour Stockach. He ordered prince
Ferdinand, who was in the Black Forest, to repair to the same
point, and his right, under Messrs. Sztarray and de Kienmayer,
to leave the Rhine and to rejoin him with the utmost expe
dition. There is this great inconvenience attached to those vast
magazines of provisions customary among the Germans, that
the movements of an army must be thus regulated by them.
The French dispense with magazines, and spread themselves in
the evening over the country to procure subsistence, without dis
cipline suffering to any extent from this practice. They are active,'
industrious, and contrive to be at one and the same time ma
rauding and with their colours. The German troops are rarely
exposed to this trial, without dispersing and becoming disor
ganised. There is certainly one advantage in possessing maga
zines, that of bearing less heavily upon the country occupied,
and not exasperating it against the invading army.
Moreau, marching with his right upon Stockach, with his re
serve upon Engen, while the corps of St. Cyr extended itself to
give the hand to St. Suzanne, was likely, therefore, to meet with
the rear-guard of M. de Kray at Stockach, with his centre at
Engen, and to skirt the troops of prince Ferdinand, who was
in march to rejoin the main body of- the Austrian army. An
unexpected battle must result from this meeting, a circumstance
which frequently happens in war, when plans have not been
matured by superior minds, capable of foreseeing and directing
events.

170 HISTORY OF THE [May 1800.
Ever since morning, Lecourbe had been in march for Stockach,
throwing outLorges' division on the left, to connect him with Mo
reau, pushing Montrichard's division, with Nansouty's reserve
cavalry, straight forward, on the high road from Schaffhausen to
Stockach; lastly, sending Vandamme's division to the right, be
tween Stockach and theLake of Constance. Thelatterwas divided
into two brigades; one, under general Leval, manoeuvring in such
a manner as to cut off Stockach from the Lake of Constance, by
Bodmann and Sernadingen, met with no resistance, for prince
Reuss, who might have shown himself there, took little pains
to communicate with his commander-in-chief; the other, under
general Molitor, directed by Vandamme in person, marched to
the rear of Stockach by a cross-road, while Nansouty and Mont-
richard proceeded thither direct by the high road from Schaff
hausen. There were seen in the depths of the woods infantry
falling back, and cavalry reconnoitring the country while falling
back also. At length they arrived at the positions which the Aus
trians seemed disposed to defend. Montrichard found them in
order of battle beyond the village of Steusslingen, covered by a
large body of cavalry. The French infantry passed through that
village in two columns, and deployed to the right and left,
threatening the enemy upon his flanks. At the same moment,
the cavalry of Montrichard's division, supported by the whole
of Nansouty's reserve, debouched from Steusslingen, charged
vigorously, and overthrew the imperialists, who retreated to
Neuzingen. This position was the second, and the principal of
those which covered Stockach. It supported itself upon that
of Wahlwyes, which Vandamme threatened at the moment with
Molitor's brigade. A numerous infantry was perceived, barring
the extremity of the village of Neuzingen, supported on the
right and left upon woods, and covered by cannon. It would
require a very vigorous effort to dislodge it. Montrichard
caused it to be turned by a height called the Hellemberg, while
Vandamme, having passed Wahlwyes, debouched on the rear
of Neuzingen. The position was carried, and Lecourbe's whole
corps being united, debouched en masse upon Stockach, and
took it. The Austrians endeavoured to make one more stand
against us beyond Stockach, and to keep us in check. They
presented 4000 men in order of battle, covered by all their
cavalry. Nansouty's regiments charged this cavalry, and threw
it in disorder upon the infantry, which, this time, thought only
of surrendering. Lecourbe took 4000 prisoners, 8 pieces of
cannon, 500 horses, and the immense magazines in Stockach.
It could not be otherwise. Lecourbe, with troops capable of
fighting an enemy greatly superior in number, had, moreover,
twice the number of men that the prince of Lorraine had,
though he had detached Lorges' division, to connect itself with
Moreau. His task was finished early ; and, had more vigour

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 171
and unity been displayed in these operations, he might and
he ought to have been employed elsewhere, as we shall see
presently. Lorges' division, destined to serve for a link between Le
courbe and Moreau, had separated into two brigades. Goulu's
brigade had marched upon Aach, to scour the country between
Stockach and Engen, and, finding no enemy to fight, had turned
off to Stockach, where it became useless. General Lorges,
with the rest of his division, having joined Moreau's troops,
accompanied them towards Engen.
Moreau, with all that was called the corps of reserve, had
been marching ever since morning upon Engen. M. de Kray,
at the same instant, passed through that place on his way to
Stockach, to save his magazines. He soon perceived, from the
number of troops deploying before him, that there would be a
battle, instead of a reconnaissance; and he stopped short for the
purpose of giving battle, trusting to the mass of 40,000 men
which he had at hand, and to the strength of the positions to
which chance had just conducted him. On leaving, towards
Schaffhausen, the banks of the Rhine for those of the Danube, in
that confused, broken country, where the declivities are inconsi
derable, there is a small valley, that of the Aach, which conveys
to the Lake of Constance those waters that do not run either
into the Rhine or into the Danube. In this valley is seated the
small town of Engen. To descend to Engen, you must first
climb a series of wooded heights, very difficult of access. These
heights the Austrians occupied with their infantry ; they had
their cavalry in the plain of Engen. It was requisite for Mo
reau to dislodge them from these heights, and then to descend
into the plain, and engage the imperial cavalry there. He marched
himself at the head of Delmas' and Bastoul's divisions, and half
of Lorges' division. He had directed Richepanse's division
upon his left, along what is called the Blumenfeld road. The
latter, passing through a series of valleys, was to turn the
enemy's positions by less defended approaches ; and all together,
if they succeeded, were then to descend en masse upon Engen.
Lorges, who had outstripped a little the reserve troops, found
a strong body of the enemy near Waterdingen, and, before at
tacking, he waited for Delmas' division, which soon came up.
They then charged all together, and dislodged the Austrians.
Having arrived at this point, they had to climb the heights
which surround Engen, and for this purpose it was necessary for
them to traverse rather steep plateaux, commanded on the right
by a position called the Maulberg ; on the left, by a very lofty
peak, known by the name of the peak of Hohenhewen. Lorges
was charged to attack the Maulberg. After a slight cannonade
he charged that point. The enemy gave way. Delmas, then
turning to the left, directed his course to a wood, which sur
rounded the peak of Hohenhewen, and which was occupied by

172 history of the [May 1800.
eight battalions of the enemy's infantry. Two battalions of the
46th advanced upon this wood without firing, while general
Grandjean and adjutant-general Cohorn turned it with a detach
ment. No sooner had the two battalions of the 46th received
the enemy's fire, than they rushed upon him with bayonets fixed.
The eight Austrian battalions, finding themselves so vigorously
attacked in front, and turned on their right, abandoned the
wood. Our troops, having taken the principal positions that
defended the approaches to the valley of Engen, had only to
descend into that valley, through which runs a large rivulet.
The enemy had retired to the peak of Hohenhewen ; he had
placed his artillery and his infantry on the declivities, and drawn
up 12,000 cavalry in order of battle in the plain of Engen. Mo
reau intended at first to take the peak of Hohenhewen, and
immediately ordered Delmas' division to attack it. That divi
sion, on leaving the wood, of which it had gained possession,
was exposed to a destructive fire, which it bravely endured.
General Jocopin, putting himself at the head of the infantry,
ascended the slopes of the peak, and received a ball in his thigh ;
but general Grandjean turned the position. Adjutant-general
Cohorn, whom we have seen crossing the Alb on the shoulders
of a grenadier, rushed to the summit with a battalion, and dis
lodged the Austrians. Our troops were then in possession of
all the heights that commanded the plain of Engen, and could
deploy there without difficulty. The enemy retired to the other
side of the plain, beyond the rivulet which runs through it, and
to the foot of a chain of hills that form the opposite confine. He
had drawn up in front his numerous cavalry, with great part of
his artillery, and, in rear, in the hollow of a valley, at the en
trance of which stands the little village of Ehingen, a strong
reserve of grenadiers. Such was the imposing force still to be
overthrown, ere the battle should be ours.
Meanwhile, a brisk fire was heard from beyond the peak of
Hohenhewen, and a great distance beyond it, along that belt
of wooded heights surrounding Engen. It was Richepanse's
division, engaged with the troops to which M. de Kray had
assigned this part of the field of battle. General Richepanse
had been obliged to separate his division into two brigades, to
take two positions, one called Leipferdingen, the other Water-
dingen, at the very extremity of the valleys into which he had
entered. There he maintained an obstinate action, alternately
successful and repulsed, when, luckily for him, the vanguard
of St. Cyr's corps began to make its appearance. These
troops came very late, owing to a want of harmony in Moreau's
dispositions. St. Cyr ought to have come to St. Suzanne's as
sistance with one of these divisions ; he had been obliged to
wait for Nev, who was delayed by the want of provisions, to
w;ait even for his artillery, which had always been behind ever
since the passage of the Rhine ; he had, moreover, had incessant

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 173
encounters with prince Ferdinand during his march, and, having
only one division out of three to oppose to him, he had been
obliged to advance with care and caution. He came up at last
to the assistance of Richepanse, at the moment when M. de
Kray was making a last vigorous effort against the latter, to
prevent him from debouching upon Engen.
Moreau, judging of the danger of Richepanse from the brisk
ness of the fire, resolved to draw the Austrians upon their left,
and, to this end, he thought fit to attack the village of Ehingen,
which formed the support of their position on the other side of
the plain. Here, as we have just seen, the enemy had posted,
at the foot of a chain of hills, his artillery, his cavalry, besides a
reserve of grenadiers, in a valley the entrance to which was
formed by the village of Ehingen. General Bontemps proceeded
thither with the 67th demi-brigade, two battalions of the 10th
light, and two squadrons of the 5th hussars. General d'Hautpoul
followed him, with the reserve of the cavalry. These troops,
marching in columns in the plain, under the fire of a battery of
twelve pieces of cannon, dashed' bravely upon the village' of
Ehingen, and carried it. But, all at once, the eight battalions
of grenadiers, in reserve, charged them in turn. The Aus
trian cavalry supported these eight battalions of grenadiers
by a vigorous charge, and this unexpected storm obliged our
soldiers to give up the village. The cavalry of general d'Hautpoul
was driven back by the great mass of imperial cavalry. The
brave general Bontemps received a severe wound amidst this
confusion. At this moment, the firing on our left, beyond the
peak of Hohenhewen, redoubled in violence, proclaiming the
danger of Richepanse, who persisted, but thus far unsuccess
fully, in the attempt to force the belt of heights.
Moreau, who, in trying emergencies, possessed the firmness
of a truly martial spirit, instantly appreciated the gravity of
this situation, and resolved upon a vigorous blow, that he might
remain master of the field of battle. He caused the remnant of
Bastoul's division to advance, placed himself at the head of a few
companies of grenadiers, inflamed tlieir courage, led them to the
charge, overthrew all that came in his way, and restored Ehingen
to our victorious troops. While he was deciding the day
at that point, Richepanse, on his part, was performing pro
digies of valour. St. Cyr, rejoined by Ney, and definitively
delivered from the archduke Ferdinand, sent forward general
Roussel's brigade. This brigade vied in courage with the troops.
of Richepanse which had been so long engaged, and assisted
them to storm the heights so obstinately contended for. In
all directions our arms were successful, but at the cost of great
efforts and much bloodshed. The 4th demi-brigade alone had
lost from 500 to 600 men in these conflicts.
Night began to fall; the ardour of the French was redoubled,
while the courage of the Austrians sank, on learning the tidings

174 history of the [May 1800.
of the rout of the prince of Lorraine- Vaudemont at Stockach.
M. de Kray, fearful of being turned by Stockach, gave orders
for retreat. He hastened to regain the Danube by Tuttlingen
and Liptingen.
The losses of the French army in this series of obstinate
actions were very considerable. In killed and wounded it had
2000 men horsde combat; but the Austrian army had more than
3000, besides 4000 or 5000 prisoners remaining in our hands.
The French troops, by their extraordinary bravery, had cor
rected the defects of the general plan. This plan, in fact, was
far from perfect, and its weak points can now be appreciated.
In the first place, it is easy to judge, from the results them
selves, the inconvenience of having passed the Rhine at several
points. Owing to this manner of operating, there were no
more than three corps ready to march together ; and even then
the third, that of St. Cyr, had been paralysed by the necessity
of giving the hand to the fourth, which was left behind. To
this system of crossing at several points was also chargeable
the delay of St. Cyr's artillery, which had contributed not a
little to retard the assistance given to Richepanse. As for the
battle itself, Moreau, with 25,000 men, had been obliged to
fight 40,000 at Engen, while Lecourbe, with 20,000, had only
12,000 to fight at Stockach, while St. Cyr was nearly unoc
cupied, or confined to the part of mere observation. The latter,
accused of having arrived too late, affirmed that he had not
received, during the day, a single aide-de-camp from the head
quarters. Never, or very rarely, will such things be seen on
the fields of battle where the First Consul commanded. Still,
a general must possess high merit to act as Moreau acted.
Once in presence of danger, he had behaved with a calmness,
a vigour, that never forsook him ; and, seconded by the valour
of the troops, he had, after all, won the victory, and acquired a
decided superiority over the enemy.
He encamped with his army on the field of battle. If, on the
following day, he had vigorously .pushed M. de Kray, on the
road from Stockach to the Danube, he would probably have
thrown him into disorder. But Moreau had not ardour enough
in his character, and was too sparing of his troops,' to execute
such rapid movements, which, no doubt, fatigue men at the
moment, but, in reality, save their blood and their strength, by
accelerating the results. The 4th of May (14th Floreal) was
employed in rectifying the position of the army, and in marching
slowly towards the Danube. St. Cyr marched by Tuttlingen,
Moreau and Lecourbe by Mbsskirch, keeping an eye continually
upon their right, and upon the debouches from the Vorarlberg,
by which prince Reuss might have arrived.
M. de Kray was not yet resigned to the idea of giving up the
ground without fighting. His army was already much discon
certed, and reduced, moreover, by nearlv 10,000 men. It was

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 175
wrong in him to persist in exposing it to a new encounter with
the French, before he had passed the Danube, and been joined
by generals Kienmayer and Sztarray, who were on march from
the banks of the Rhine through the Black Forest, at the same
time as the French corps of St. Suzanne. He needed the shelter
of a great river, the respite of a few days, and reinforcements, that
the moral energy of the Austrian army might recover itself. The
position of Mbsskirch, which Moreau allowed him time to re-
occupy, inspired M. de Kray with the imprudent but courageous
resolution to give battle once more.
This position of Mbsskirch is, in fact, very strong. The
high road, which runs through Engen and Stockach to the
Danube is exposed, a little before reaching Mbsskirch, to the
fire of a large and elevated plateau, called the plateau of Krum-
bach. It leaves it on the left, then enters a tract covered with
wood, in which it forms a long defile. It afterwards debouches
into open ground, at the extremity of which are seen the little
town of Mbsskirch on the right, and the village of Heudorf on
the left. Behind Mbsskirch runs a line of heights stretching
continuously from Mbsskirch to Heudorf ; which latter place
they also connect, in the rear and on the left, with the plateau of
Krumbach : so that the road, passing first under the plateau of
Krumbach, then burying itself in a wood, debouches at last
uncovered, under the fire of the heights, extending from Mbss
kirch to Heudorf.
M. de Kray had crowned this position with a formidable
artillery. - The prince of Lorraine, forming the left of the Aus
trians, occupied Mbsskirch and the surrounding heights. M. de
Nauendorf, forming their centre, was deployed above Heudorf,
with a reserve of grenadiers in his rear. M. de Wrede, with
the Bavarians, the archduke Ferdinand, and general Giulay
united, composed the right of the imperial army on the plateau
of Krumbach.
Moreau did not calculate much more on a battle at Mbsskirch
than he had calculated upon one at Engen. Suspecting, how
ever, that he might meet with some resistance at Mbsskirch, he
had apprised Lecourbe of it, and sent him word that an effort
would probably be necessary at that point, without, however,
giving him the precise orders for concentration, which comport
with the imminence of a great battle. Lecourbe, keeping at the
head of the army, and marching with three divisions, had thrown
Vandamme's division to some distance on his right, to continue
to observe the movements of prince Reuss towards the Vorarl
berg." Part of this division, under general Molitor, was to
direct itself by the Pfullendorf and Klosterwald road^ upon
the flank of Mbsskirch. Lecourbe, with Montrichard's and
Lorges' divisions, and the reserve cavalry, was to advance by
the high road which we have just described, and which, after
passing beneath Krumbach, debouches through the woods,in front
of Mbsskirch. Moreau followed the same road/keeping at some

176 HISTORY OF THE [May 1800.
distance in the rear. St. Cyr flanked at a considerable dis
tance the left of Moreau, occupying both banks of the Danube,
towards Tuttlingen. These assuredly were not fitting dispositions
for a great battle. Vandamme ought not to have been thrown
alone, with half a division, upon the flank of the position of Mbss
kirch. Lecourbe ought to have been directed with his whole
corps upon this quarter. Moreau should not have set out so
late, nor have crowded himself into the same road as Lecourbe,
and into the defile of a wood. Lastly, St. Cyr should not have
been left at such a distance.
Be this as it may, Lecourbe moved forward in the morning,
conformably with the dispositions adopted. When opposite to
Krumbach, he left that plateau on his left, and entered the
defile of the wood. Some advanced guards met with in this
defile were speedily driven back. He arrived at the debouche.
Here was seen the uncovered ground at the extremity of which
Mbsskirch is situated, bordered on all sides by heights crowned
with the artillery of the Austrians. As soon as the heads of
columns appeared, five pieces of artillery, firing in front from the
side next to Mbsskirch, twenty others firing in flank, from the
side towards Heudorf, poured forth a shower of balls and grape-
shot. Two battalions of light infantry posted themselves on
the margin of the wood, and three regiments of cavalry, the
9th hussars, the 12th chasseurs, the 11th dragoons, pushed for
ward rapidly, to protect the establishment of our artillery.
Under the fire of these twenty-five pieces, playing upon them
in all directions, our squadrons were obliged to fall back. Fifteen
pieces of cannon, which general Montrichard had endeavoured to
oppose to the Austrian artillery, were partly dismounted. The
light infantry itself was forced to take shelter in the woods.
The Austrian cavalry attempted to charge us in its turn, but
was vigorously repulsed. Still, as often as general Montrichard
tried to debouch from the woods, a violent fire stopped
his columns. It soon became evident that this was not the
true point of attack for forcing Mbsskirch ; that, on the con
trary, it was on the right, following the cross-road from Klos-
terwald, by which Vandamme was advancing. But the latter
had not yet come up, on account of the distance that he had to
march. Meanwhile, Lecourbe determined to make an attempt
upon Heudorf, by filing on his left along the skirt of the woods.
In spite of a violent fire of artillery and musketry, the 10th
light entered the village of Heudorf: but it was repulsed by
superior forces; and, while the cavalry was hastening to its
support, the Austrian artillery, placed on the slope behind
Heudorf, compelled it to make a retrograde movement. Thus,
this second attempt to debouch .on the left was not more suc
cessful than that which had been made to debouch directly
upon Mbsskirch.
Encouraged by our check, the Austrians were then disposed

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 177
to assume the offensive, and endeavoured to debouch from the
village of Heudorf, upon Lorges' division. But this was taking
too great a liberty with such brave troops. The 38th formed
into column and marched forward, under a fire of grape-shot
from eight pieces of cannon. It advanced with admirable cool
ness, and penetrated, with fixed bayonets, into Heudorf. On a
steep, rising ground behind this village were woods, and in those
woods dense masses of Austrian infantry. Superior forces rushed
upon this gallant demi-brigade ; overwhelmed by numbers, it
fell back. The 67th came up to its assistance, and immediately
rallied it. Both together again charged. The entire division
hastened to the spot, carried the village, cleared those redoubtable
heights, and made itself master of that woody retreat, from
which the enemy had vomited upon us a terrific fire. While
this severe combat was taking place on our left, around the
village of Heudorf, Vandamme, on our right, debouched at
last upon Mbsskirch, at the head of Molitor's brigade. He
drew it up skilfully for the attack, in spite of the Austrian
infantry, which opened a destructive fire from the suburb of
Mbsskirch. This brave, band charged with fury, and penetrated
into Mbsskirch, while two battalions turned the position by the
heights. Montrichard, still ensconced in the woods, chose this
movement for debouching on the open ground, which had at
first been so fatal to us. He threw himself upon four columns,
and that in the face of the artillery of the Austrians, already
somewhat staggered by the sight of these simultaneous attacks.
Montrichard's four columns came up, passed a ravine which
runs along the foot of the heights, gamed the plateau of Mbss
kirch, at the moment when Vandamme's troops, which had en
tered Mbsskirch, began to debouch from it. The Austrians
were everywhere put to flight. Their reserve, stationed a little
in the rear, at Rohrdorf, would then have acted in its turn, but
was kept in check by the united divisions of Vandamme and
Montrichard. We were now masters of the whole line from Mbsskirch to
Heudorf. But M. de Kray, detecting with great judgment the
vulnerable point of our position, moved off part of his forces,
in the direction of the plateau of Krumbach, on our left, whence
he threatened our flank and our rear. Lorges' division, which
occupied Heudorf, was in danger of being overpowered. The
entire reserve of the Austrian grenadiers had assailed that un
fortunate division, which, after taking and retaking Heudorf
several times, was exhausted with fatigue. It could no longer
withstand the fire of the artillery and the mass of Austrian
infantry. Luckily Moreau, apprised by the violence of the
cannonade, had hastened his march. At length, he arrived
at the entrance of the wood with his corps, formed of
Delmas', Bastoul's, and Richepanse's divisions. He lost no
time in sending Delmas' division to the left upon Heudorf to
VOL. i. N

178 HISTORY OF THE [May 1800.
the assistance of Lorges' division. This brave detachment
changed the aspect of things, drove back the Austrian grena
diers, and retook Heudorf, as well as the woods above it. But
if we received reinforcements, so did M. de Kray too. His
right, composed of the archduke Ferdinand and general Giulay,
whom St. Cyr had followed, foot by foot, ever since the com
mencement of operations, but followed at too great a distance, —
this right, rapidly brought upon the field of battle, was directed
between Heudorf and Krumbach, upon the very flank of
Delmas' division, and put it in danger of being surrounded.
Part of the latter instantly faced about to the left. The 57th,
which had earned in Italy the surname of the Terrible, formed
in order of battle, and disputed the ground for more than an
hour against the Austrian masses, under the fire of sixteen pieces
of artillery, to which general Delmas could oppose no more than
five, that were soon dismounted. This tremendous fire that
heroic band endured without flinching, and kept the enemy in
check. Moreau, hastening from one corps to another, to place
or to support them, led Bastoul's division to the assistance of
Delmas' division. He came up at the moment when the
Austrians, unable to overthrow Delmas' division, were seeking
to deprive it of the aid of Bastoul's division, by deploying on
the plateau of Krumbach, in order to intercept our communi
cations. They were already descending from that plateau, and
had even reached our waggon train. Thus the battle, after
commencing at Mbsskirch, extended to Heudorf, and from
Heudorf to Krumbach, embracing the entire angle of that vast
position, and covering it with fire, and blood, and devastation.
At this critical moment, Bastoul's division worthily supported the
efforts of Delmas' division ; but it was liable to be surrounded,
if the enemy should succeed in descending from the plateau of
Krumbach, and gaining possession of the high road by which
our troops were arriving. Fortunately, Richepanse's division,
brought up in time to the decisive point, formed in columns of
attack, climbed the plateau of Krumbach under a destructive
fire, and overwhelmed the archduke Ferdinand, who intended to
overwhelm us. After this effort, M. de Kray had no force left
to act against Richepanse, and was obliged to give the signal for
retreat. From Krumbach to Heudorf, from Heudorf to
Mbsskirch, we were everywhere victorious.
At this moment, St. Cyr's corps was but a few leagues off, at
Neuhausen-ob-Eke. If he had debouched, the Austrian army
must have been destroyed, and, instead of an ordinary victory,
we should have gained one of those splendid victories which put
an end to a campaign. What fatal inaction, then, kept him use
less, so near to the spot where he might have decided the issue
of the war ? This is a question which it is very' difficult to
resolve. St. Cyr alleged, on the following day, that no orders
had been sent to him. Moreau replied that he had sent orders

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 179
by several aides-de-camp. St. Cyr rejoined that he was so
near the place where the battle was fought, that, if a single
officer had been dispatched to him, that officer must have in
fallibly arrived. Moreau's coterie insisted that St. Cyr, with a
spite unworthy of a brother in arms, had purposely left his
comrades to be crushed at Mbsskirch, as he had done at Engen.
Thus, in military life as in civil life, men are jealous of,
accuse, calumniate one another ! Human passions are every
where the same, and war, most assuredly, is not capable of
cooling them, moderating them, and rendering them just. The
truth is, that St. Cyr, discontented with the coterie which had
gained possession of Moreau's ear, affected to confine himself to
the command of his own corps, at the head of which he operated
with extraordinary perfection ; but he never made amends for
oversights of the commander-in-chief, and waited, before acting,
for orders which a lieutenant ought to be able to anticipate,
especially when he hears the cannon. St. Cyr, in alleging the
proximity, to prove that, if orders had been sent to him, he
must have received them, accused himself ; for this proximity
rendered him inexcusable for not hastening, with one division
at least, to the spot/where a tremendous cannonade indicated a
violent conflict, arid, perhaps, serious dangers. But whatever
faults he committed upon this occasion were, ere long, to be
redeemed by important services.
Both Austrians and French were exhausted at the close of
this day. Amidst the confusion of battle, the number of dead
and wounded is never accurately known. At Mbsskirch, that
number must have been great. Three thousand men of the French
must have fallen, and nearly twice as, many in the Austrian
army. But the French army was full of confidence ; it had
won" the field of battle, and purposed to quit it next day, and to
follow up that series of actions, which, without having yet pro
cured it any decisive results, nevertheless ensured to it an
uninterrupted superiority over the enemy. The Austrian army,
on the contrary, severely shaken, was not capable of keeping up
such a contest long.
After the account which we have just given, every reader
may easily conceive what censures have been passed upon the
operations of Moreau. * He had marched upon a field of battle,
without first reconnoitring it ; he had directed too few troops
upon the true point of attack, which was the road from
Klosterwald to Mbsskirch, debouching -on the flank of that little
town ; he had set out late, had made all his corps, one after
another, pass through a wood, from which it was impossible to
debouch without losing a great many men ; lastly, he had not
brought St. Cyr upon the ground, where his presence would
have been decisive. M. de Kray, on his part, after he had

* See Memoires de St. Cyr, torn. vi. p. 215, et seq. Campaign 1800.
N2

180 HISTORY OF THE [May 1800.
judiciously directed his effort upon the vulnerable point, upon
our left, had committed the fault of suffering Mbsskirch to be
taken ; but it must be said, in his justification, that his troops
were far from equalling the French troops, in regard to intel
ligence and firmness. Besides, they began to lose confidence ;
and it was no longer easy to make them endure the sight and
the attack of the French.
On the following day, the 6th of May (16th Floreal), M. de
Kray hastened to get behind the Danube, in order to connect
himself at last with that great line of operations. Now was
the time for following him up, for rendering the passage of the
river impossible, at least hazardous, for him. Moreau marched
in line, his left to the Danube, quite close to the point where
the Austrians were crossing, having it in his power to crush
them, if he had suddenly wheeled to his left. St. Cyr formed, at
the moment, the wing supported upon the Danube. Not having
been engaged on the preceding day, he was in a state to act,
and was desirous to act. He saw, with his own eyes, the im
perial troops crowding, with a sort of precipitation, upon the
point of Sigmaringen. The Danube, making a bend there,
formed a promontory, on which the Austrian army had flocked
together, in its anxiety to get to the other side of the river.
St. Cyr, distinctly perceiving it, at the distance of short
cannon-range, crowded into a space scarcely sufficient for a
division, and so much startled at the sight of the French, that,
before the mere brigade of Ney, it suspended its passage, drew
up in order of battle, and covered itself with the fire of sixty
pieces of cannon, — St. Cyr, seeing it thus accumulated and
alarmed, felt sure he could drive it into the Danube by a single
charge of his whole corps. He ordered forward a few pieces of
cannon, every discharge of which swept away whole files, but
which could not be expected to remain in battery before M. de
Kray's sixty pieces of artillery. He hoped to draw the attention
of Moreau by the report of this cannonade, and to bring him
from the corps of reserve to the corps on the left. As he did
not come, he sent an officer, to apprise him of the circum
stances, and to obtain his order for attacking. But their union
was at an end. It was believed by the officers of the staff, or
they affected to believe, that St. Cyr wished again to move to
the left, with a view to detach himself more, and to act alone.
He was answered by an order to move to the right, to connect
himself more closely than he was accustomed to do with the
corps of reserve, which formed the centre of the army. This
measure is indispensable, he was told, that the commander-
in-chief may have it in his power to dispose of your troops in
case of need. * The drift of this order plainly indicated the
humour of the general-in-chief and of those around him. It was

* St. Cyr, torn. vi. p. 201.

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 181
evident that Moreau suffered himself to be engrossed by the
command of a single corps, and that his weakness of character
was giving birth to intestine divisions, mischievous in any
place, but still more mischievous in armies than anywhere else.
M. de Kray could, therefore, flee without danger, and rally
his army beyond the Danube. M. de Kienmayer rejoined him
there with the troops arriving from the banks of the Rhine; and
he was closely followed by M. de Sztarray.
Moreau's army had found vast magazines at Stockach and
Donau-Eschingen : it was in want of nothing; it was inspirited
by success and by the continual offensive which it had taken.
On the 7th and 8th of May (17th and 18th Floreal), Moreau
continued to march with his left to the Danube, presenting a
line of battle still too extended, and frequently halting, to give
St. Suzanne time to come up.
On the 9th (19th Floreal) Moreau, knowing that St. Suzanne
who had come along the left bank of the Danube, was at length
opposite to the army, left his head-quarters for a day, and
crossed the Danube, to inspect the troops which had just ar
rived. These .troops formed thenceforward his left wing, while.
St. Cyr became the centre, and the corps of reserve was really
toue used as a reserve, conformably with its appellation.
_ According to all probability, M. de Kray, ifltent on resting
his army, would keep beyond the Danube, and we might con
tinue on the 9th to make a march in advance, without encoun
tering the enemy. Moreau directed the right, that is to say,
Lecourbe, to proceed on the 9th to between Wurzach and Och-
senhausen ; the reserve to advance to Ochsenhausen itself;
lastly, the centre, that is to say St. Cyr, to proceed beyond Bi-
berach, the left in observation on the Danube. In this order
the army advanced very near to the Iller, describing a line pa
rallel to that tributary of the Danube. Moreau set out on the
morning of the 9th, thinking to devote an entire day to the
corps of St. Suzanne.
Now, M. de Kray had been induced to take a new and un
expected resolution, by the advice of a council of war, which
had judged it prudent to save the immense magazines of Bibe-
rach, and not abandon them, like those of Engen and Stockach,
to tbe French. He, therefore, crossed to the right bank of the
Danube with his whole army, by Riedlingen, and posted himself
in front and rear of Biberach. This place had already been the
theatre of a battle gained in 1796 by Moreau, thanks more espe
cially to St. Cyr. This field was again to witness the success
of our troops, and of St. Cyr himself.
Biberach is situated in a valley overflowed by the Riess. This
valley is so swampy that a man on horseback cannot attempt to
pass through it without perishing, so that people are obliged to
pass through Biberach itself, and over the little bridge conti
guous to that small town. You penetrate into this valley by

182 HISTORY of the [May 1800.
following a sort of defile, formed between the heights, those of
the Galgenberg on the one hand, those of Mittelbiberach on the
other. On clearing this defile, Biberach suddenly appears in
view. You cross the marsh of the Riess over the bridge ad
joining to the town, and beyond that marsh, you perceive a
superb position, called the Mettenberg, upon which an army
well provided with artillery might make a firm stand. M. de
Kray could not think of posting himself in advance of the de
file, having so narrow an outlet for retreat ; he could only place
himself in rear of Biberach, beyond the Riess, on the Metten
berg itself. Neither could he leave Biberach uncovered. Ac
cordingly, after stationing the bulk of his army on the position
of the Mettenberg, he placed a corps of eight or ten battalions
and a dozen squadrons in advance of the defile of Mittelbibe
rach, to retard the march of the French, and to give time for
evacuating or destroying the greater part of his magazines.
This plan was perilous, especially with a demoralized army.
St. Cyr having received orders to go and pass the night a little
beyond Biberach, soon discovered the position which the Aus
trians had taken. He was deeply mortified at not having the
commander-in-chief, or at least the chief of his staff, near him,
that he might obtain suitable orders, and turn this meeting "to
account. Mordtu was absent; general Dessoles was not there.
If St. Cyr had had his forces together, he would not have hesi
tated to risk an attack with his corps alone : unfortunately, they
were partly dispersed. Being obliged to observe the Danube
on his left, he had devoted to this object the best of his divi
sions, that of Ney. He dispatched several officers in search of
general Ney, but in consequence of the latter having followed
the winding banks of the river, and owing also to the frightful
state of the roads, it was not easy to reach him, or obtain any
support from his division. To attack a mass of 60,000 men, at
least, St. Cyr had but the two divisions of Tharreau and Bara-
guay d'Hilliers, with the reserve cavalry of general Sahuc at
tached to his corps. The demoralization of the enemy tempted
him strongly, but the disproportion of strength made him hesi
tate, when, all at once, was heard the firing of general Riche
panse, who, having orders to keep himself in communication
with St. Cyr, and to cross the Riess by the bridge of Biberach,
. arrived at the same point by a cross-road, that of Reichenbach.
St. Cyr, having at his disposal the fine division of Richepanse,
and being enabled to fill the gap left in his corps by the ab
sence of Ney, hesitated no longer. He thought that, if the
detachment left in advance of Biberach were overthrown, the
defeat of this corps of from 8000 to 10,000 men' would be rather
more serious than the defeat of a mere advanced guard, and that
the courage of the enemy might be severely shaken by it.
Accordingly, without so much as halting to dispose his troops
for an attack, he gave orders to the eighteen battalions and

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 183
twenty-four squadrons, which he had at hand, to advance at quick
step, and charge the 10,000 Austrians who barred the passage
of the defile. Overthrown by this sudden shock, the Austrians
rushed pell-mell to Biberach and into the valley of the Riess.
It would have been easy to take almost all of them, but St. Cyr
would not, fearing lest, if he allowed his soldiers to pursue them,
he might not be able to rally his divisions, and make use of them
in the principal operation. He contented himself with entering
Biberach, establishing himself there, and ensuring the preserva
tion of the magazines. Having strongly occupied that point, and
provided a retreat for himself, let what might happen, he crossed
the Riess. Richepanse had just arrived upon his right, by the
Reichenbach road. Reinforced by this new division, St. Cyr
crossed the Riess by the bridge of Biberach, and advanced him
self to observe the position of the enemy. At this moment,
the some odd thousand men, so suddenly thrown into the Riess,
were ascending through the ranks of the Austrian army, which
opened to let them pass, and at sight of him, it was easy to dis
cover how much that army was alarmed. St. Cyr ordered forward
a number of tirailleurs, who approached and bearded the enemy,
without any of his tirailleurs making their appearance to throw
them into the ravine. These detached soldiers were answered by
general discharges, such as proceed from an E#righted body of
men, striving to keep up their courage by making a noise. St. Cyr
was, in an action, one of the ablest of the tacticians that have
appeared among us. On perceiving the state of the Austrian
army, he instantly decided what was to be done. He ordered
Tharreau's and Baraguay's divisions to be drawn up in two co
lumns, formed a third of Richepanse's division, and placed the
cavalry en echelons on the wings. These arrangements made, he
put all his columns in motion at once. They ascended the accli
vities of the Mettenberg with unparalleled steadiness. The Aus
trians, at the sight of these soldiers climbing with such calmness
a formidable position, and from which an army thrice their
number might hurl them into the marshes of the Riess, were
seized with astonishment and terror. M. de Kray ordered a re
trograde movement; his soldiers did not execute it according to
his intention, for, after a few volleys,, they gave up the ground of
the Mettenberg, and at length fled in disorder, leaving to St. Cyr's
corps several thousand prisoners and immense magazines, which
served to victual the French army for a long time. Night pre
vented the pursuit. In the midst of these events, Moreau ar
rived, and though there was a coolness between him and St. Cyr,
yet the next day, in the presence of Carnot, minister of war, he tes
tified to him his sense of high satisfaction. Moreau, separated at
this moment from the mischievous friends by wnom he was beset
at head-quarters, could be just towards a lieutenant, who had
fought and conquered without his presence and without his orders.
The French army was completely victorious ; the Austrians

184 history of the [May 1800.
were no longer capable of making a stand, and it might now
advance unopposed. M. de Kray had sent, one cannot com
prehend why, a detachment to defend the magazines of Mem-
mingen. Memmingen lay in Lecourbe's route. This place was
occupied, the detachment routed, and the magazines were taken.
This was the 10th of May (20th Floreal). On the 11th and
12th, M. de Kray retired definitively upon Ulm, and Moreau:
continued to march in an extended line nearly perpendicular
to the Danube. On the 13th of May, he was beyond the Iller,
without having encountered any serious resistance in the pas
sage of that river. The right and the reserve were at Unger-
hausen, Kellmilntz, Iller-Aicheim, and Illertissen. St. Cyr was
placed at the conflux of the Iller and the Danube, a, cheval upon
the Iller, occupying the bridge of Unterkirchberg, and connect
ing himself with St. Suzanne, who was advancing along the left
bank of the Danube. From the abbey of Wiblingen, where
Key's division was, and where St. Cyr had his head-quarters,
the Austrian troops might be distinctly seen in the vast en
trenched camp of Ulm.
The two armies had just been rejoined by all their detached
corps. Marshal de Kray had recalled M. de Kienmayer to him
in the preceding days, and afterwards M. de Sztarray. Moreau,
having the corpsjaf St. Suzanne at hand, was now in full force.
Both armies had sustained losses ; but those of the Austrians were
far more considerable than ours. They were estimated at 30,000
men, in prisoners, dead, and wounded. On this point history is
reduced to conjectures ; for, on days of battle, generals always
diminish their losses, and when they apply to their governments
for reinforcements, they as constantly exaggerate the number of
the dead, wounded, and sick. Thus one never knows with perfect
accuracy the total of the soldiers really present under arms. M.
de Kray, having taken the field with 110,000 or 115,000 men,
composing the active army, and 35,000 or 40,000 in the fortresses,
could now have had but 80,000 at most, and those worn out with
fatigue, and completely demoralized.
The loss of the French army was estimated at 4000 killed,
6000 or 7000 wounded ; some ill of fever, some prisoners ; in
all, 12,000 or 13,000 men, actually unfit for service; 4000 or
5000 of whom were likely to be again fit for service after a little
rest. This calculation reduced Moreau's active force, for the mo
ment, to 90,000 men, or rather less. But he would soon be
obliged to part with a strong detachment, according to the agree
ment signed with general Berthier at the opening of the campaign.
It was stipulated in this agreement that, as soon as M. de Kray
was driven to the distance of eight or ten marches from the Lake
of Constance, Lecourbe should fall back upon the Alps, to join
the army of reserve. The position of Massena urgently required/
the_ execution of this engagement ; and it was not any silly
desire to check Moreau amidst his successes which caused

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 185
Lecourbe's corps to be called off; but the most legitimate
of reasons, that of saving Genoa and Liguria. The army of re
serve, collected with such exertions, contained no more than
40,000 men belonging to troops inured to war: it certainly
needed a reinforcement, to place it in a condition to attempt
the extraordinary operation which it was about to undertake
beyond the Alps.
The First Consul, impatient to act in the direction of
Italy, wishing at the same time to avoid offending Moreau, and
yet to ensure the execution of his orders, made choice of the
minister of war himself, of Carnot, to carry to the head-quarters
of the army of the Rhine the formal injunction to detach Le
courbe towards the St. Gothard. The letters which accom
panied this order were full of cordiality, and irresistible in
argument. The First Consul was well aware that it was not
Lecourbe and 25,000 men who would be sent him; but if 15,000
or 16,000 only were sent, he should be satisfied.
Moreau received Carnot with chagrin; he, nevertheless,
punctually executed the orders which that minister brought him.
Carnot, like a good citizen, took pains to remove any feeling
of dissatisfaction on the part of the weak-minded general,
ever so easily deceived, and revived his confidence towards the
First Consul, which detestable busy-bodies f'ere striving to
destroy. Some historians, flatterers of Moreau, but flatterers only since
1815, have raised the detachment taken from the army of Ger
many to 25,000 men. Moreau himself, in his reply to the First
Consul, did not estimate it at more than 17,800 ; and this num
ber was exaggerated. Not more than from 15,000 to 16,000
soldiers marched into Switzerland to climb the St. Gothard.
Moreau then had about 72,000 fighting men left, and soon after
wards 75,000, through the recovery of his sick and disabled.*
It was more than were needed for beating 80,000 Austrians.
M. de Kray had no more, in fact, and they were altogether
dispirited, and incapable of standing the slightest serious en
counter with the French.
In order that the enemy might remain ignorant of this dimi
nution of his forces, Moreau determined not to alter the former
distribution and positions of the army ; but to take the 16,000
men whom he destined for the First Consul out of all the exist
ing corps. Each of these corps furnished its contingent, and thus
this reduction of strength was disguised in the best possible man-
* It is from Moreau's own correspondence that I extract these figures.
All the calculations of that correspondence are exaggerated in Moreau's
favour. He estimates the battalions retained by him at 650 men, and those
belonging to the detachment sent to Italy at 700. The calculation cannot be
correct ; for, if he sent the corps just as they were, and the battalions were
reduced to 650 in his army, they could not have been 700 in the corps which
were detached from it.

186 history of the [May 1800.
ner. Moreau wished to keep Lecourbe, who, singly, was worth
many thousand men. Lecourbe wras left him, and the command
of the detachment given to the brave general Lorges. Carnot
returned to Paris, as soon as he had witnessed the departure of
the troops destined to cross the St. Gothard.
This operation took place on the 11th, 12th, and 13th of
May (21st, 22nd, and 23rd Floreal). The French army under
Moreau numbered about 72,000 combatants, exclusively .of the
garrisons of the fortresses, the division of Helvetia, and what
might be returned to it by the hospitals. It was, for the rest,
of the same effective strength as before the arrival of St. Su
zanne's corps, a strength which had been sufficient to make it
invariably victorious.
M. de Kray had established himself at Ulm, where an en
trenched camp had long been prepared for the purpose of afford
ing a stronghold to the imperial troops. Of the two systems of
defence which we have described, that which requires the
retreating army to skirt the foot of the Alps, covering
itself with all the tributaries of the Danube ; or to keep a cheval
upon that river, in order to manoeuvre upon both banks ; the
second had been preferred by the Aulic Council, and was skil
fully followed by M. de Kray. The first would be judicious,
in case it were desirable to keep the two armies of Italy and
Germany in permanent communication. It presents but little
strength in its first stages ; for the Iller, the Lech, the Isar, the
Inn, become but successively obstacles of any consequence ; and
the last alone becomes a considerable obstacle, though not an
invincible one, for there is none of that kind in war. But an
army which, renouncing the communications with Italy, keeps
to the Danube itself, having all the bridges at its disposal,
destroying them successively as it retires, possessing the means
of crossing from one bank to the other, while the enemy
is fixed upon one only ; able, if that enemy attempts to push
on directly for Vienna, to follow him under shelter of the Da
nube, and throw itself upon his rear, to punish him for the first
fault that he may commit ; an army so placed is in the position
generally regarded as the best for covering Austria.
M. de Kray, then, had posted himself at Ulm, where import
ant works had been carrying on for his support. It is well
known that, at this point, the left bank of the Danube, formed
of the first acclivities of the mountains of Swabia, is always
higher than the right bank. Ulm is at the foot of the heights
of the left bank, on the Danube itself. Its walls had been re
paired. A tete de pont had been constructed on the opposite
bank. All the heights in the rear of Ulm, and particularly the
Michelsberg, were covered with artillery. If the French ap
proached by the right bank, the Austrian army, supporting one
of its wings upon Ulm, the other upon the elevated convent of
Elchingen, covered by the river, and sweeping with its fire the

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 187
low ground of the right bank, would be unassailable. If the
French approached on the left bank, then the Austrian army had
a position quite as secure. To form a correct idea of it, the reader
should know that the position of Ulm is covered on the left
bank by the river Blau, which descends from the mountains of
Swabia, and throws itself into the Danube, quite close to Ulm,
forming at the same time a deep ravine. If, then, the French
crossed the Danube above Ulm, to attack by the left bank, the
Austrian army would change position. Instead of facing the
banks of the Danube, it would turn its back on it, and cover
itself by the course of the Blau. It would have its left wing
upon Ulm, its centre at the Michelsberg, its right wing at Lahr
and Jungingen. It would be necessary to make several marches
upon the left bank, to turn this new position, and then to aban
don the right bank entirely, which might frustrate all the com
binations of the campaign, by uncovering the route to the Alps.
Such was the camp in which the exhausted soldiers of M. de
Kray found shelter for a time.
St. Cyr was at the convent of Wiblingen. From the windows
of that convent, he distinctly saw, even without telescope, the
position of the Austrians. Full of confidence in the daring of
the French, he offered, and several general officers along with
him, to take the enemy's camp by main force. ' They answered
for the success with their lives ; and it must be confessed that
if the audacity of some of them, such as Ney and Richepanse,
might have excited mistrust, yet St. Cyr, the tactician, a man of
cool, methodical, sure mind" deserved the highest confidence.
But Moreau was too prudent to risk an attack of this kind, and
to afford M. de Kray the chance of gaining a defensive battle. It
is true that, if Moreau were successful, the Austrian army, thrown
into the Danube, would be half destroyed, and the campaign
finished. But if Moreau failed in his attack, he would be obliged
to fall back ; the campaign in Germany would be endangered ;
and, worse than all this, the decisive campaign in Italy would,
perhaps, be rendered impracticable. Moreau acted in war, not
grandly, but safely. He let those brave men who engaged to
throw the Austrians into the river talk on, and refused to at
tempt an attack by main force. The war of manoeuvres was the
course then left. The French might cross to the left bank
above Ulm, a movement which we have just described; but, m
order to turn the Austrians in this position, they would be
obliged to proceed so far on the left bank, that Switzerland
would cease to be covered, and that the detachment sent to
wards the Alps would be compromised. By continuing on the
right bank, they might descend the Danube to a good distance
below Ulm, cross it out of reach of the Austrians, and make them
selves masters of their position, by cutting them off from the
Lower Danube. But, by descending the river, the rear ol the
army would be exposed,.and the route to Switzerland again left

188 history of the [May 1800.
uncovered. Moreau, therefore, renounced all idea of dislodging
M. de Kray by any of these means; and though, with troops
such as his he might have hazarded any thing, yet he is not to
be censured for such caution, and, above all, for being so scrupu
lous in pursuing the plan which most effectually covered the
operations of the First Consul, his chief, but his rival.
He then resolved to adopt a manoeuvre, which was the true
one, namely, to march for Augsburg, that is to say, to abandon
the course of the Danube, to cross its tributaries, and to de
molish ail the lines of defence of the Austrians by a direct
march upon the heart of the empire. This manoeuvre, seriously
executed, would infallibly have induced M. de Kray to leave
the Danube and his camp at Ulm, and drawn him after the
French army. It was very bold, yet did not uncover the Alps,
since it placed Moreau constantly at their foot. But there was
no half course to take : he ought either to have remained in
active before Ulm, or to have advanced resolutely upon Augs
burg and Munich, for a mere demonstration was not capable
of deceiving M. de Kray, and could only expose the corps left
in observation near Ulm. Moreau here committed a fault,
which had well nigh produced serious consequences.
On the 13th, 14th, and 15th of May, he crossed the Iller.
Leaving St. Suzanne by himself on the left bank of the Danube,
and St. Cyr at the conflux of the Iller and the Danube, he
pushed the corps of reserve upon the Guntz to Babenhausen,
Lecourbe beyond the Guntz to Erkheim, and a corps of
flankers to Kempten, on the route of the Tyrol. In this sin
gular position, extending twenty leagues, touching Ulm on one
side, threatening Augsburg on the other, he could not inspire
M. de Kray with the slightest dread of a march upon Munich,
and could at most but tempt him to throw himself en masse
upon the corps of St. Suzanne, remaining alone on the left of
the Danube. Had M. de Kray yielded to this last temptation,
and employed his whole force, it would have been all over with
St. Suzanne..
The orders issued on the 15th (25th Floreal) to St. Cyr,
were executed on the morning of the 16th, when St. Suzanne
was attacked at Erbach by a prodigious mass of cavalry. His
right division, commanded by general Legrand, was at Erbach
and Papelau, along the Danube; his left division, commanded
by Souham, was at Blaubeuren, a, cheval on the Blau ; the
reserve, under general Colaud, a little in the rear of the two
divisions. The action commenced by a multitude of horse
surrounding our columns on all sides. While our soldiers were
charged by numerous squadrons, masses of infantry, sallying
from Ulm and ascending the Danube, threatened us with a more
serious attack. Two columns of infantry and cavalry advanced,
the one upon Erbach, to attack and envelop the two brigades
composing Legrand's division, the other on Papelau, to cut off

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 189
Legrand's division from Souham's division. General Legrand
then made his troops perform a retrograde movement. They
fell back slowly through the woods, and then had to debouch
on the plateaux between Donaurieden and Ringingen. The
troops executed this retreating movement with remarkable
steadiness. They were several hours giving up a small tract of
ground, halting every moment, forming in squares, and ha
rassing with their terrible fire the cavalry which pursued
them. Souham's division, attacked.on both flanks, wasobliged
to execute a similar movement, and to concentrate itself upon
Blaubeuren, behind the Blau, driving into the deep ravine
formed by that river such of the Austrians as pressed them
too closely.
It was Legrand's division that was in most danger, because
it was placed near the Danube, and for this reason the enemy
wished to overwhelm it, in order to intercept all the succours
that might arrive from the other side of the river. The two
brigades of which it was composed continued valiantly to de
fend themselves, till, at the moment when the -infantry was
retiring, and the light artillery replacing its pieces on the fore
part of the carriages, to retire also, the enemy's cavalry, return
ing to the charge, dashed suddenly upon that unfortunate
division. The brave adjutant- general, Levasseur, who had
been dismounted in a charge, sprung upon a horse, galloped to
the 10th regiment of cavalry, which was leaving the field of battle,
brought it back' to the enemy, charged the Austrian squadrons,
ten times superior in number, and checked their progress. The
artillery had time to carry off their guns, to take a position in
the rear, and in its turn to protect the cavalry which had come
to its rescue.
During this interval, general St. Suzanne had come up, with
part of Colaud's division, to the assistance of Legrand's division.
General Decaen, with the remainder, had gone to Blaubeuren,
to succour Souham's division. The action was therefore re
newed; but, in spite of this effort, it might terminate in a
disastrous manner; for there was reason to fear that the
Austrian army would fall en masse upon the corps of St. Suzanne.
Fortunately, St. Cyr, posted on the other side of the Danube,
did not leave his comrades to be routed this time, as he had
been frequently accused of doing ; he hastened up with all
possible expedition. Hearing the cannonade on the left bank,
he had sent off aides-de-camp after aides-de-camp, to bring his
divisions from the banks of the Iller to the banks of the Danube.
He had ordered no time to be lost, the advanced posts to fall
back immediately, but the bulk of the troops to be dispatched
at the instant, without waiting for those posts. A corps left
behind was to collect them. As for himself, stationed on the
bridge of Uhterkirchberg, which is upon the Iller, as soon as
a corps arrived, whether infantry, cavalry, or artillery, he sent

190 HISTORY OF the [May 1800.
it with all speed towards the Danube, preferring a momentary
disorder to loss of time. He had then repaired in person to
the very bank of the Danube. The enemy, fearing lest St.
Suzanne might be succoured, had destroyed all the bridges
as high as Dischingen. Seeing St. Cyr endeavouring to find a
ford or to repair a bridge, he had drawn up part of his troops
along the left bank, to make head against those of St. Cyr,
posted upon the right bank. He had, moreover, commenced
a brisk cannonade, and St. Cyr had lost not a moment in re
plying to it. This combat with artillery, kept up from one
side of the river to the other, excited in the Austrians who had
sallied from Ulm some fears for their retreat, caused them to
fall back, extricated St. Suzanne a little, and infused into the
ranks of our unfortunate soldiers, who had for above twelve
hours maintained a desperate conflict, the most lively joy and
quite new ardour. They applied to St. Suzanne for permission
to advance, which was granted them. All our divisions then
moved at once ; they drove back the Austrians under the can
non of Ulm ; but, in traversing the field of battle, which they
were overjoyed to recover, they found it strewed with our dead
and wounded. For the rest, the loss of the Austrians was not
less than ours. Fifteen thousand French had fought all day
against 36,000 men, 12,000 of whom were cavalry. M. de
Kray was present the whole time on the field of battle.
But for the bravery of the troops and the energy and talents
of the generals, the fault which Moreau had committed would
have been punished by the loss of our left wing. Moreau im
mediately repaired to that wing ; and, as if his thoughts had
been suddenly drawn to that quarter by mere accident, he
resolved to make his whole army cross to the left bank of
the river.
On the 17th (27th Floreal), leaving St. Suzanne to rest him
self in the positions of the preceding day, he led back St. Cyr's
corps between the Iller*and the Danube. He pushed the re
serve, which was under his own command, to Unterkirchberg
on the Iller itself, and ordered Lecourbe to fall back between
the Guntz and Weissenhorn. On the 18th, the army made a
second movement towards its left ; St. Suzanne was moved to
beyond the Blau ; St. Cyr to beyond the Danube ; the reserve
to Gocklingen, on the Danube itself, ready to cross the river.
On the 19th, the manoeuvre was still more decided ; St.
Suzanne had completely turned Ulm; he had his head-quarters
at Urspring ; St. Cyr was on both banks of the Blau, his head
quarters being at Blaubeuren; the reserve had passed the
Danube between Erbach and the Blau ; and Lecourbe was
ready to cross that river.
Every thing seemed to denote an attack by main force on the
entrenched camp of Ulm. In this new position, M. de Kray
had his left at Ulm, his centre on the Blau, his right at

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 191
Elchingen. He had, therefore, his back to the Danube, and
defended the reverse of the position of Ulm. Moreau, after he
had made an attentive reconnaissance, disappointed the ex
pectations of his lieutenants, who fancied that they discovered
a serious plan in this movement upon his left, and who, more
over, were desirous of a bold attempt on the camp of
the Austrians, because they considered success as infallible.
St. Cyr again insisted, but he was not listened to. Moreau
resolved to be gone, unwilling to risk an attack by main force
along the Blau, equally unwilling entirely to turn the position
by its left, for fear of uncovering Switzerland too much. He
ordered the whole army to cross once more to the right bank.
On the 20th of May and the following days, the army de
camped, to the great vexation of the soldiers and of the
generals, who reckoned upon an assault; and to the great
astonishment of the Austrians, who were in dread of one.
These false movements were attended with the great disad
vantage of somewhat raising the courage of the Austrian army,
without, however, abating that of the French army, which it
was difficult to shake, so conscious was it of its own supe
riority. Moreau might have attempted a movement which we
have described above, and which, executed subsequently, ob
tained him a glorious triumph. This was to descend the
Danube, to threaten M. de Kray with a passage below Ulm,
and to oblige him to decamp, by making him uneasy about his
line of communication. But Moreau was still fearful of un
covering the route to the Alps. He, therefore, had some thoughts
of making a second demonstration upon Augsburg, to endeavour
once more to deceive the Austrians, and to persuade them that,
leaving Ulm behind him, he was marching definitively upon
Bavaria, perhaps even upon Austria. On the 22nd of May (2nd
Prairial), the whole French army had recrossed the Danube ;
Lecourbe, with the right wing, threatened Augsburg by Lands-
berg ; and St. Suzanne, with the left wing, kept at some distance
from the Danube, between Dellmensingen and Achstetten.
That same day, the 22nd, prince Ferdinand, at the head of
12,000 men, half of them, at least, cavalry, with a view either
to keep us near Ulm or to discover our intentions, made an
attack on St. Suzanne, which was warmly repulsed. The
troops behaved with their accustomed vigour, and general
Decaen distinguished himself. On the following days, Moreau
continued his movement. On the 27th of May (7th Prairial),
Lecourbe, with equal boldness and intelligence, made himself
master of the bridge of Landsberg on the Lech, and, on the
28th, entered Augsburg; M. de Kray was not to be shaken by
this demonstration, and remained obstinately in Ulm. This, it
must be confessed, was the best of his determinations, and that
which did most honour to his firmness and his judgment.
From that moment, Moreau confined himself to a calculated

192 HISTORY OF THE [May 1800.
inaction. He rectified his position, and rendered it better.
Instead of forming a long line, the extremity only of which
touched the Danube, a position which exposed our left corps
to unequal combats with the whole Austrian army, he executed
a change of front, and, henceforward facing the Danube, he
ranged himself parallel to that river, but at a considerable dis
tance, his left supported upon the Iller, his right upon the
Guntz, his rear-guard occupying Augsburg, and a corps of
flankers observing the Tyrol. The French army thus formed
a mass sufficiently dense to have nothing to fear from a separate
attack on one of its wings, and could not incur any other risk
but that of a general engagement, which all in our ranks wished
for, because it would result in the utter ruin of the imperial
army. In this position, now irreproachable, it was Moreau's intention
to await the issue of the campaign which the First Consul was
at that moment undertaking beyond the Alps. His lieutenants
strongly urged him to resume active operations ; he persisted
in replying that it would be imprudent to do more till he had
news from Italy ; that, if General Bonaparte succeeded in that
part of the theatre of war, they should then try a decisive ma
noeuvre against M. de Kray ; that, if the French army was not
successful beyond the Alps, they should be greatly embarrassed
by the very progress which they should have made in Bavaria.
The enterprise of General Bonaparte, of which Moreau was in
the secret, had in it something extraordinary for a mind like
his; it is not, therefore, surprising that he should have felt
anxiety, and have determined not to advance farther, before he
knew for certain how it fared with the army of reserve.
In consequence of this determination, Moreau had warm alter
cations with some of his lieutenants, especially with St. Cyr.
The latter complained of the inaction to which they were con
fined, and more particularly of the partiality that prevailed in
the distribution of rations to the different corps of the army. His,
he said, was often without bread, while that of the commander-
in-chief, beside which it was posted, wanted for nothing Not
that there was any want of supplies since the capture of the
enemy's magazines, but of the means of conveyance. St. Cyr
had more than one altercation on this subject; he had evidently
fallen out with the staff which was about Moreau, and this was,
at bottom, the cause of those unfortunate misunderstandings.
General Grenier had just arrived. St. Cyr wished Moreau to
give that general the command of the army of reserve, that he
might be able to release himself from prepossessions and par
tiality — inevitable consequences of commanding in person. Un
luckily, Moreau would not do any thing of the kind : St. Cyr
then retired, upon the pretext of health, and deprived the army
of the ablest of its general officers. For the rest, St. Cyr was
made to command himself, not to obey. General Suzanne re-

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 193
tired also, in consequence of similar misunderstandings. He
was sent upon the Rhine, to form a corps destined to cover the
rear of the army of Germany, and to check the force under
baron d'Albini. General Grenier took the place, of St. Cyr,
and Richepanse that of St. Suzanne. Moreau, whose soldiers
were well supplied with provisions, and who was strongly
established in his new position, resolved to wait, and wrote to
the First Consul in the following terms, which perfectly express
his situation and his intentions : —
" Babenhausen, 7th Prairial, year VIII. (May 27th, 1800.)
" We are looking with impatience, citizen Consul, for tidings
of your success. M. de Kray and I are fumbling here — he, to
keep about Ulm — I, to make him leave the post.
" It would have been dangerous, particularly for you, if I
had transferred the war to the left bank of the Danube. Our
present position has forced the prince de Reuss to move off
to the debouches of the Tyrol, and to the sources of the Lech
and the Iller ; so that he cannot inconvenience you.
" Pray let me hear from you, and let me know how I can
best serve you 
" Should M. de Kray move forward, I shall again fall back to
Memmingen ; I shall make general Lecourbe join me there,
and we shall fight. Should he march upon Augsburg, I shall
march thither too ; he will lose the support of Ulm, and then
we shall see what is to be done to cover you.
" It would be more advantageous for us to operate upon the
left bank of the Danube, and make Wurtemberg and Fran
conia contribute to our support; but that would not suit you,
since the enemy might send detachments into Italy, while leaving
us to ravage the territory of the empire.
" Be assured of my attachment. (Signed) " Moreau."
A month and two days had elapsed, and if Moreau had not
obtained those prompt and decisive results which terminate a
whole campaign at one blow, as he might have done by passing
the Rhine at a single point, towards Schaffhausen, by throwing
himself en masse upon the left of M. de Kray, and by fighting
the battles of Engen and Mbsskirch with his undivided force ;
or as he might likewise have done by throwing the Austrian
army into the Danube at Sigmaringen, by dislodging it, by
main force, from the camp at Ulm, or by obliging it to decamp
by a serious manoeuvre upon Augsburg ; still he had fulfilled
the essential condition of the plan of the campaign; he had
passed the Rhine without accident, in the teeth of the Aus
trian army ; he had fought two great battles with it, and, though
the concentration of his forces had been very defective, he
had gained those battles by his firmness and his superior
, VOL. I. °

194 HISTORY OF THE [May 1800.
generalship in the hour of action ; lastly, notwithstanding his
fumbling before Ulm, he had shut up the Austrians around that
place, and kept them blockaded there, cutting them off from the
route to Bavaria and the Tyrol, and having it in his power to await
himself, in a good position, the turn of events in Italy. If we do
not find in him those superior, decided talents, which distinguish
great captains, we find at least a prudent, calm mind, repairing,
by its coolness, the faults of too confined an understanding
and too irresolute a character ; in a word, we find an ex
cellent general, such as other nations would fain have possessed,
and such as Europe had none to equal; for it was the lot
of France, at that period, — of France, which already had general
Bonaparte, to possess also Moreau, Kleber, Desaix, Massena,
St. Cyr, that is to say, the best second-rate generals ; and be
it borne in mind that she had already produced Dumouriez and
Pichegru ! uTime of marvellous memory ! which ought to in
spire us with some confidence in ourselves, and prove to
Europe that all our glory in the present century is not due to a
single man, that it is not the result of that very rare chancjL
which begets such geniuses as Hannibal, Csesar, and NapoleonJ
What might chiefly be alleged against Moreau was a Want
of vigour in command ; his suffering himself to be surrounded,
controlled, by a military coterie ; his allowing misunderstand
ings to arise around him, depriving himself, in consequence,
of his best officers, and not knowing how to correct, by force
of character, a vicious organisation of the army, which disposed
his lieutenants to part company, and to acts of bad military
brotherhood. Moreau's chief fault, as we have said several
times, as we shall too often have occasion to repeat, lay in his
character. Would that there were a veil to conceal from our
view, and capable of concealing from others, the sad sequel in
after years ! Would that there were nought to damp our admi
ration of the noble and wary exploits of that warrior, whose
heart jealousy and exile had not yet estranged !
We must now transport ourselves to a different theatre, to
witness also a very different spectacle. Providence, so rich in
contrasts, will there exhibit to us a different mind, a different
character, a different fortune, and, for the honour of our
country, soldiers still the same, that is to say, still intelligent,
devoted, and intrepid.

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 195

BOOK IV.

MARENGO.

Impatience of the First Consul for News from Germany — On receiving Intel-.
ligence of Moreau's Success, he resolves to set out for Italy— Extreme
Distress of the Garrison of Genoa— Fortitude of Massena— The First Consul
hastens to hisRelief and to execute the Plan of crossing the High Alps — De
parture of the First Consul ; his sham Visit to Dijon ; his Arrival at Martig-
ny, in the Valais — Choice of the St. Bernard for crossing the Great Chain —
Means devised for forwarding the Artillery, the Ammunition, the Provisions,
and the whole of the Materiel — Commencement of the Passage — Inexpres
sible Difficulties surmounted by the Enthusiasm of the Troops — Unexpected
Obstacle of Fort de Bard— Surprise and Mortification of the Army at the
Sight of that Fort, deemed at first impregnable — The Infantry and the
Cavalry make a Circuit and avoid the Obstacle — The Artillery drawn on
by Hand under the Fire of the Fort — Ivrea taken — The Army deploys on
the Plains of Piedmont before the Austrians are aware of its Existence and
its March — Simultaneous Passage of the St. Gothard by the Detachment
from Germany — Plan of General Bonaparte, when once in Lombardy — He
determines to proceed to Milan, to rally the Troops from Germany, and to
envelop Melas — The long Illusions of Melas suddenly destroyed — Mortifi
cation of that old General — His Orders for evacuating the Banks of the
Var and the Environs of Genoa— Last Extremities of Massena — The abso
lute Impossibility of feeding the Soldiers and the Inhabitants of Genoa
compels him to surrender — Honourable Capitulation — The Austrians,
having taken Genoa, concentrate themselves in Piedmont — Importance of
the Route from Alexandria to Piacenza — Eagerness of both Armies to oc
cupy Piacenza — The French arrive there first — Position of La Stradella
chosen by the First Consul for enveloping Melas — Halt of some Days in
that Position — Conceiving that the Austrians have escaped him, the First
Consul goes in quest of them, and falls in with them unexpectedly in the
Plain of Marengo — Battle of Marengo, lost, and regained — Happy inspir
ation of Desaix, and his Death — Grief of the First Consul — Despair of the
Austrians, and Convention of Alexandria, by which they give up Italy and •
all its Fortresses to the French Army — The First Consul is employed for<
some Days at Milan in settling the Affairs of Italy — Conclave at Venice, \
and Elevation of Pius VII. to the Papacy— Return of the First Consul to '.
Paris — Enthusiasm excited by his Presence — Operations on the Danube — <
Pas'sage of that River below Ulm — Victory of Hochstett — Moreau con- j
quers all Bavaria as far as the Inn — Armistice in Germany as well as in j
Italy— Commencement of Negotiations for Peace— Arrival of M. St. j
Julien, sent by the Emperor of Germany to Paris— F£te of the 14th of;
July at the Invalides.
o 2

{ 197 )

BOOK IV.
MARENGO.
The First Consul was only waiting for news of the success
of the army of the Rhine, to descend into the plains of Italy :
for, unless Moreau were successful, he could not spare a
detachment of his troops, and M. de Kray was not so com
pletely separated from M. de Melas,/ as to render it safe to
manoeuvre with freedom on the rear 'of the latter. The First
Consul, therefore, waited with extreme impatience, resolved to
leave Paris and to take the command of the army of reserve, as
soon as he should have certain and perfectly satisfactory intel
ligence concerning the operations of Moreau. Time pressed,
in fact, for Massena was reduced in Genoa to the most cruel
extremities. We left him there, struggling against the
whole force of the Austrians, with an army worn out with
fatigue, and, in spite of its prodigious inferiority, daily inflicting
on the enemy considerable losses. On the 10th of May, gene
ral Ott, having indulged in an indecorous bravado, and informed
Massena that he should fire his guns for a victory gained over
general Suchet — a piece of news which was false, by the by —
the illustrious defender of Genoa made an energetic reply to
this bravado. He sallied from Genoa in two columns. The
left, commanded by general Soult, ascended the Bisagno, and
turned the Monte Ratti ; the other, under Miollis, attacked the
Monte Ratti in front. The Austrians, vigorously assailed, were
thrown into the ravines, and lost that important position and
1500 prisoners. In the evening, Massena returned triumphant
to the city of Genoa ; and, on the following morning, he wrote
to general Ott, that he was firing his guns for his victory on
the preceding day : an heroic revenge, and worthy of his noble
-soul !
But this was the last . of his successes, for his debilitated
soldiers could scarcely support the weight of their arms. On
the 13th of May (23rd Floreal) this energetic officer, yielding to
the advice of his generals, consented, almost in spite of himself,
to an operation, the result of which was most disastrous. The
object of this operation was to take the Monte Creto, an im
portant position, which it would certainly have been most

198 HISTORY OF THE [May 1800.'
desirable to wrest from the Austrians, because they would then
have been removed to a considerable distance from Genoa :
but, unfortunately, there was little chance of its success. Mas
sena, though he had the greatest confidence in his army, for he
daily required and obtained of it the most strenuous efforts,
did not think it capable of carrying a position, which the enemy
would defend with all his forces. He would have preferred an
expedition to Porto Fino, along the sea coast, to seize a consi
derable store of provisions, which he knew there was in that
quarter. Contrary to his custom, however, he gave way to his
lieutenants, and, on the morning of the 13th, marched upon the
Monte Creto. The battle was at first extremely brilliant : un
luckily, a terrible storm, which lasted some hours, broke the
energies of our troops. The enemy had concentrated a large
force on this point, and he drove back our soldiers, dying of
hunger and fatigue, into the valleys. General Soult, making it
a point of honour to succeed in an expedition which he had
advised, rallied around him the third demi-brigade, led it back
against the enemy, and might, perhaps, have triumphed, had
not a ball, fracturing his leg, extended him on the field of
battle. His men would have carried him off, but they had not
time ; and this general, who had zealously seconded Massena
during the whole siege, was left in the hands of the enemy.
The army returned much mortified to Genoa ; but still it
brought back some prisoners. During the engagement, a riot of
women had taken place in the city. These wretched creatures,
urged by want, ran through the streets ringing bells, and de
manding bread. They were soon dispersed, and the French
general was thenceforward almost wholly occupied in providing
subsistence for the population of Genoa, which showed, in other
respects, the noblest devotedness. There had been succes
sively procured, as we have seen, corn for a fortnight at first,
and afterwards for another fortnight. Subsequently, a vessel en
tering the harbour of Genoa unexpectedly, had brought enough for
five days, so that supplies had been obtained for above a month.
The place had been blockaded ever since the 5th of April, and
these resources had lasted till the 10th of May. Seeing the
store of provisions diminish, he had reduced the ration allowed
daily to the people and to the army. Soup, made with herbs
and a small quantity of meat still left in the city, was substituted
for it. The wealthy inhabitants, indeed, found means to supply
themselves, at a most exorbitant price, with victuals, which had
escaped the search made by the police, for the purpose of apply
ing them to the general use. Thus Massena had occasion to
trouble himself about the poor only, by whom the dearth was
particularly felt. He had imposed a contribution/m the opu
lent class for their, benefit'and^Kicl thus won them?o the side
of the French. For the rest, the majority of the population,
dreading the Austrians, and the political system of which they

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 199
were the champions, were determined, to second Massena by
their resignation. Struck by the energy of his character, their
obedience to him was equal to their admiratidn. Nevertheless,
the oligarchic party, making tools of some famishing wretches,
strove to annoy him by all possible contrivances. To overawe
them, Massena made his battalions bivouack in the principal
places of the city, with lighted matches to their guns. But the
bread upon which the people were still subsisting, and which was
made of oats, beans, and all the sorts of grain that could be
procured, was on the point of being exhausted : of meat, too,
the city was likely to be destitute. On the 20th of May, there
would be left only such articles as it was almost impossible to
use for food. It was, therefore, urgent to raise the blockade of
the place before the 20th of May, in order to prevent Mas
sena being made prisoner, with his whole army, and baron Melas,
who would then have 30,000 men more at his disposal, from
returning to Piedmont, to close the debouches of the Alps.
The aide-de-camp Franceschi, charged to carry this intelli
gence to the government, and who had contrived, by means of
address and audacity, to pass through the Austrians and the
English, had communicated to the First Consul the deplorable
state of the fortress of Genoa. In consequence, the First Con
sul redoubled his efforts to put the army of reserve in a con
dition to cross the Alps. It was on this account that he had
sent Carnot to Germany, with a formal order of the Consuls,
to send off the detachment destined to pass the St. Gothard.
He himself, occupied day and night, corresponding with Ber
thier, who was organising the divisions of infantry and cavalry,
with Gassendi and Marmont, who were organising the artillery,
with Mareseot, who was making reconnaissances along the
whole line of the Alps, he urged them all with that persuasive
ardour, which enabled him to lead the French from the banks
of the Po to the banks of the Jordan, from the banks of the
Jordan to those of the Danube and the Borysthenes. He was
not to quit Paris himself till the last moment, unwilling, to
relinquish the political government of France, and to leave free
scope to intriguers and plotters, any longer than he could pos
sibly help. Meanwhile, the divisions which had set out from
La Vendee, Bretagne, Paris, and the banks of the Rhone, were
traversing the vast extent of the territory of the Republic, and
their heads of columns already made their appearance in Swit
zerland. There were still at Dijon the depots of the corps,
besides some conscripts and some volunteers, sent to that city,
to give currency in Europe to the opinion, that the army of Dijon
was a mere fable, destined solely to frighten M. de Melas. Thus
far all had proceeded according to wish ; the illusion on the part
of the Austrians was complete. The movements of troops that
were making towards Switzerland, scarcely perceived, owing to

200 history of the [May 1800.
)he dispersion of the corps, passed for reinforcements sent to
the army in Germany.
At length, every thing being ready, the First Consul made
his last arrangements. He received a message from the Senate,
from the Tribunate, and from the Legislative Body, conveying
to him the wishes of the nation that he might soon return
conqueror and peace-maker. He replied with a studied so
lemnity. His answer was intended to concur with the articles
of the Moniteur in proving that his journey, announced with so
much parade, was, like the army of reserve, a feint, and nothing
more. He charged Cambaceres, the Consul, to preside in his
place over the Council of State, which at that time was, in
some measure, the entire government. Lebrun, the Consul, was
commissioned to supervise the administration of the finances.
He said to each of them : " Be firm ; if any event happens, be
not uneasy. 1 will come back like lightning, to crush the
audacious wretches who shall dare to lay hands upon the go
vernment." He particularly charged his brothers, who were
attached to him by a more personal interest, to inform him of
every thing, and to give him a signal to return, if his presence
should become necessary. While he was ostentatiously pub
lishing his departure, the Consuls and the ministers, on the
contrary, were to tell the newsmongers, in confidence, that the
First Consul was leaving Paris for a few days, and merely to
review^ the troops ready to take the field.
For the rest, he set out full of hope and satisfaction. His
army contained many conscripts, but it contained also, and in
much greater number, soldiers inured to war, accustomed to
conquer, commanded by officers trained in his school ; he had,
moreover, absolute confidence in the profound conception of
his plan. According to the most recent intelligence, M. de
Melas continued advancing into Liguria, half his forces against
Genoa, half against the Var. On these tidings, the First
Consul had not the least doubt of the success of his enterprise,
nay, he already fixed, in his ardent imagination, the very point
where he should meet and overwhelm the Austrian army. One
day, before, he set out, lying upon his maps, and placing upon
them marks of different colours, to denote the position of the
French and the Austrians, he said before his secretary, who
listened with surprise and curiosity, " Poor M. de Melas ! He
will pass through Turin, fall back upon Alexandria. ... I shall
cross the Po, overtake him on the road to Piacenza, in the
plains of the Scrivia, and I will beat him there, just there ;" and,
at these words, he laid down one of his marks at San Giuliano.
The reader will presently be able to judge what an extradrdinary
vision of the future this was.
He left Paris on the morning of the 6th of May, before it was
light, taking with him his aide-de-camp, Duroc, and his secre-

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 201
•
tary, M. de Bourrienne. On reaching Dijon, he reviewed the
depots, and the conscripts,-' who had been assembled there, but
without materiel, without any of the accessories indispensable
for an army ready to take the field. After this review, which
was designed to confirm the spies still more in the belief that
the army of Dijon was a pure invention, he proceeded to Ge
neva, and from Geneva to Lausanne, where all was really serious,
where every thing that was done would tend to undeceive the
incredulous, but would undeceive them too late for them to
send off information that could still be useful to Vienna.
On the 13th of May, General Bonaparte reviewed part of his
troops, and conferred with the officers whom he had appointed
to meet him, for the purpose of giving him an account of what
they had done, and of receiving his last orders. General Ma-
rescot, charged with the reconnaissance of the Alps, was the
one whom he was most impatient to hear. On a comparison of
all the passes, it was in favour of the St. "Bernard that this
officer of engineers decided ; but he considered the operation
as extremely difficult. " Difficult, granted ; but is it possible ?"
replied the First Consul. " I think so," rejoined general Ma-
rescot, a but with extraordinary efforts." " Then, let us start,"
was the only answer of the First Consul.
It is time to explain the motives which decided him to choose
the St. Bernard. The St. Gothard was reserved for the troops
coming from Germany, and led by general Moncey. This
passage was situated on their route, and was capable of fur
nishing subsistence for 15,000 men at most; for the valleys of
Upper Switzerland were totally spoiled by the presence of the
belligerent armies. There were left the passes of the Simplon,
the Great St. Bernard, and Mont Cenis. These were not, as
at the present clay, crossed by high roads. It was necessary to
dismount the carriages at the foot of the mountain, to forward
them upon sledges, and to remount them on the other side.
These passes presented all three nearly the same difficulties.
Still, Mont Cenis, being more frequented, more beaten than the
others, presented, perhaps, on that account, fewer material
obstacles ; but it debouched upon Turin, that is to say, in the
midst of the Austrians, too near them, and was not sufficiently
adapted to the plan for enveloping them. The Simplon, on
the contrary, the most distant of all from the point of departure,
presented the opposite inconveniences. It debouched, it is
true, in the environs of Milan, in a rich country, far enough
from the Austrians, and quite in their rear ; but it presented one
very great difficulty, namely, that of the distances. To get to
it in fact, it would have been necessary to ascend the whole
length of the Valais with the materiel of the army, which would
have required means of transport that we had not at our dis
posal. Amidst the arid and ice-covered valleys, which the
troops would have to traverse, they would be obliged to carry

202 HISTORY OF THE [May 1800.
every thing with them, and it was not a matter of indifference
to have a score leagues more to travel. In the case of the
passage of the St. Bernard, on the contrary, there was no
farther, to go than the road from Villeneuve to Martigny, that
is, from the extremity of the Lake of Geneva, the point where
tbe means of navigation ceased, to the foot of the mountain. It
was a very little distance across. Besides, the St. Bernard de
bouched in the valley of Aosta upon Ivrea, between the two
roads of Turin and Milan, in a very favourable direction for en
veloping the Austrians. Though more difficult, perhaps more
dangerous, it deserved the preference, on account of the short
ness of the passage.
The First Consul, therefore, decided to lead the principal
mass of his forces over the St. Bernard itself. He took with
him all that was best in the army of reserve, about 40,000 men,
35,000 infantry and artillery, 5000 cavalry. At the same time,
wishing to draw off the attention of the Austrians, he conceived
the idea of making some detachments, which could not be
united with the bulk of the army, descend by other passes.
Not far from the Great St. Bernard is the Little St. Bernard,
which, from the heights of Savoy, debouches also in the valley
of Aosta. The First Consul directed general Chabran, with the
70th demi-brigade, and some battalions of the East, full of
conscripts, upon this pass. This division, numbering from
5000 to 6000 men, was to rejoin the principal column about
Ivrea. Lastly, general Thurreau, who, with 4000 men, troops
of Liguria, defended Mont Cenis, had orders to perform that
passage, and to attempt to penetrate to Turin. Thus the
French army was to descend from the Alps by four passes at
once, the St. Gothard, the Great and Little St. Bernard, and
Mont Cenis. The principal mass, 40,000 strong, acting in
the centre of this semicircle, had the certainty of being joined
by the 15,000 troops coming from Germany, as well as by the
troops of general Chabran, and, perhaps, those of general
Thurreau, which would compose a total force of about 65,000
men, and disconcert the enemy, not knowing, from the ap
pearance of all these corps, towards which point to direct his
resistance. The points of passage being fixed upon, it was necessary to
turn attention to the operation itself, which consisted in throwing
60,000 men, with their materiel, to the other side of the Alps,
without beaten roads, across rocks and glaciers, at the most for
midable season of the year, that of the melting of the snow.
It is a very troublesome thing to have a park of artillery only
to drag with you, for each piece of cannon requires several
carriages after it, and, for sixty pieces of cannon, it would be
necessary to have about 300 ; but, in those elevated valleys,
some of them doomed to sterility by everlasting winter, others
scarcely large enough to feed their scanty inhabitants, no

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 203
means of subsistence were to be found. Bread would have to
be carried for the men, and even forage for the horses. The
difficulty, therefore, was immense. From Geneva to Villeneuve
all was easy, thanks to Lake Leman, and a navigation, equally
commodious and rapid, of eighteen leagues. But from Ville
neuve, the extreme point of the lake, to Ivrea, the debouche by
which you enter the rich plain of Piedmont, you have forty-five
leagues to travel, ten of them over the rocks and the glaciers of
the great chain. The route to Martigny, and from Martigny to
St. Pierre, was good for the carriages. There they would begin
to ascend tracks covered with snow, scarcely more than two
or three feet wide, bordered by precipices, liable, in the heat of
the day, to be overwhelmed by frightful avalanches. In these
tracks,, they would have about ten leagues to march, ere they
reached, on the other side of the St. Bernard, the village of St.
Remy, in the valley of Aosta. There they would find a road pass
able for carriages, which led through Aosta, Chatillon, Bard, and
Ivrea, into the plain of Piedmont. Of all these points, one
only was mentioned as being capable of presenting any dif
ficulty ; this was that of Bard, where, it was said, there existed
a fort, which some Italian officers had heard talked of, but
which did not seem likely to offer any serious obstacle. They
had, therefore, as we have just said, forty-five leagues to travel,
carrying every thing with them, from the Lake of Geneva to
the plains of Piedmont, and, of these forty-five leagues, ten
without any roads passable for carriages.
The following were the dispositions devised bythe First Con
sul for the conveyance of the materiel, and executed under the
direction of the generals Marescot, Marmont, and Gassendi.
Immense stores of corn, biscuit, and oats, had been sent by the
Lake of Geneva to Villeneuve. General Bonaparte, knowing
that, with money, the assistance of the robust mountaineers of
the Alps might easily be obtained, had sent to the spot a consi
derable sumin hard cash. All the chars-a-banc of the country,
all the mules, and all the peasants, had therefore been drawn, at
a high price, to this point, but during the last days only. By
these means, bread, biscuit, forage, wine, brandy, had been con
veyed from Villeneuve to Martigny, and from Martigny to St.
Pierre, at the foot of the mountain. A sufficient quantity of
live cattle had been driven to the same place. The artillery,
with its waggons, had been removed thither. A company of
workmen, stationed at the foot of the Col, at St. Pierre, was
employed in dismounting the guns and taking the carriages to
pieces, which pieces were marked with numbers, in order that
they might be carried by mules. The guns themselves, sepa
rated from their carriages, were to be placed on sledges with
low wheels, prepared at Auxonne. As for the ammunition of
the infantry and artillery, there had been provided a multitude

204 HISTORY of the [May 1800.
of small chests, which might easily be placed upon mules and
conveyed, like all the rest, by means of the beasts of burden of
the country. A second company of workmen, provided with
camp-forges, was to cross the mountain with the first division, to
establish itself in the village of St. Remy, where the beaten road
began again, to put the gun-carriages together, and to remount
the pieces. Such was the enormous task that was undertaken.
There had been added to the army a company of pontonniers,
unprovided with materials requisite for forming bridges, but
destined to employ such as could not fail to be obtained by con
quest in Italy.
The First Consul had, moreover, taken care to gain the as
sistance of the monks residing in the Hospice of the Great St.
Bernard. The whole world knows/that pious recluses, settled
there for ages, live in these frightful solitudes, above the in
habited regions, for the purpose of saving travellers overtaken
by bad weather, and sometimes buried in the snow. The First
Consul had sent them, at the last moment, a sum of money,
that they might, collect a great quantity of bread, cheese, and
wine. An hospital was prepared at St. Pierre, at the foot of
the Col, and a second on the other side of the mountains at St.
Remy. These two hospitals were to forward the wounded and
the sick, if there were any, to larger hospitals established at
Martigny and at Villeneuve.
All these arrangements being completed, the troops began to
appear. General Bonaparte, established at Lausanne, in
spected them all, spoke to them, animated them with the
ardour that filled himself, and prepared them for the glorious
enterprise, which History would place beside the great expedi
tion of Hannibal. He had taken care to order two inspections,
a first at Lausanne, a second at Villeneuve. There every in
fantry and cavalry soldier was to be inspected, and, by means
of temporary magazines formed in each of those places, the
men were furnished with such shoes, clothing, and arms, as
they needed. The precaution was useful, for, notwithstanding
all the pains that he had taken, the First Consul saw veterans
arrive, whose clothes were worn out, and whose arms were
unserviceable. He complained vehemently on this subject,
and caused the omissions, arising from the" hurry or the neg
ligence of the agents, always inevitable to a certain degree, to be
supplied. He had even carried his foresight to such an extent/
as to cause saddlers' workshops to be placed at the foot of the
Col, for repairing the harness of the artillery. He had himself
written several letters on this subject, apparently so trivial;
and we mention this circumstance, for the instruction of gene
rals and the governments to whom the lives of men are en
trusted, and who have frequently either the idleness or the
vanity to neglect such details. Nothing, in fact, that can con-

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 205
tribute to the success of operations and to the safety of the
soldiers, is beneath the genius or the rank of the officers who
command. The divisions marched en echelon from the Jura to the foot
of the St. Bernard, to avoid confusion. The First Consul
was at Martigny, in a convent of Bernardins. There he issued
all orders, and was in constant correspondence with Paris, and
with the other armies of the Republic. He received intelligence
from Liguria/ that M. de Melas, still swayed by the greatest
illusions, was most zealously exerting himself to take Genoa,
and to force the bridge of the Var. Satisfied on this important
point, he at length gave orders for the passage. As for himself,
he remained on this side of the St. Bernard, that he might cor
respond as long as possible with the government, and dispatch
every thing himself across the mountains. Berthier, on the
contrary, was to proceed to the other side of the St. Bernard,
to receive the divisions and the materiel, which the First Con
sul was to send to him.
Lannes passed first, at the head of the advanced guard, in the
night between the 14th and 15th of May (24th and 25th Floreal).
He commanded six regiments of picked troops, perfectly armed,
and which, under this fiery leader, sometimes insubordinate,
but always so able and so valiant, gaily commenced this
adventurous march. They set out between twelve o'clock and
two in the morning, to gain the start of the moment when the
heat of the sun, melting the snow, brings down mountains of
ice upon the head of the rash travellers who venture into these
frightful gorges. It took eight hours to reach the summit of
the Col, on which the Hospice of St. Bernard is situated, and
two hours only to descend to St. Remy : consequently, there
was time to pass before the moment of the greatest danger.
The soldiers surmounted with ardour the difficulties of this
route. They were heavily laden, for they had been obliged to
carry biscuit for several days, and along with the biscuit a great
quantity of ball cartridges. They climbed those steep tracks,
singing amidst the precipices, dreaming of the conquest of
that Italy, where they had so often tasted the delights of
victory, and having a noble presentiment of the immortal
glory which they were about to acquire. The labour was not
so great for the infantry as for the cavalry. These walked
themselves, leading their horses by the bridle. There was no
danger in ascending,, but in the descent, the path, being very
narrow, obliging them to walk before the horse, they were
liable, if the animal made a false step, to be dragged by him
into the abyss. Some accidents of this kind, not many, did
actually happen, and some horses perished, but scarcely any of
the men. Towards morning, they reached the Hospice, and
there a surprise, provided by the First Consul, renewed the
strength and the good humour of those brave troops. The

206 HISTORY OF the [May 1800.
monks, having supplied themselves with the requisite provi
sions, had prepared tables, and served out a ration of bread,
cheese, and wine, to every soldier. After resting for a moment,
they resumed their march, and descended to St. Remy, without
any unpleasant accident. Lannes immediately estabhshed him
self on the back of the mountain, and made all the necessary
dispositions for receiving the other divisions, and particularly
the materiel.
One of the divisions of the army was to pass every day. The
operation would, therefore, last several days, especially on
account of the materiel, which it was requisite to forward with
the divisions. While the troops were successively coming up,
others fell to work. The provisions and ammunition were
moved off first. For this part of the materiel, which might be
divided, and placed on the backs of mules in small chests,
the difficulty was not so great as for the rest. It consisted
only in the insufficiency of the means of transport; for, not
withstanding the lavish expenditure of money, there were not
so many mules as were required for the enormous weight that
was to be carried to the other side of the St. Bernard. How
ever, the provisions and ammunition, having crossed along with
the divisions of the army, and with the assistance of the soldiers,
the artillery at length demanded attention. The gun-carriages
and the ammunition waggons had been taken to pieces, as we
have said, and placed upon mules. The cannon themselves
were still left, and their weight could not be reduced by the
division of the load. With the twelve-pounders, in particular,
and with the howitzers, the difficulty was greater than had been
at first expected. The sledges upon wheels, constructed in the
arsenals, could not be used. A method was contrived, tried
immediately, and found to answer : this was, to split the trunks
of fir trees in two, to hollow them out, to encase each piece of
artillery within two of these half trunks, and to drag it thus
covered, along the ravines. Owing to these precautions, no
collision could damage it. Mules were harnessed to this singu
lar load, and served to draw several pieces to the summit of the
Col. But the descent was more difficult : that could only be
effected by strength of arms, and by incurring infinite dangers,
because it was necessary to keep hold of the piece, and, while
holding, to prevent it from slipping down the precipices. Un
fortunately, the mules began to be knocked up. The muleteers
also, a great number of whom were required, were exhausted.
It was then proposed to have recourse to other means. The
peasants of the environs were offered so much as a thousand
francs for every piece of cannon which they should agree to drag
from St. Pierre to St. Remy. It took a hundred men to drag each,
one day to get it up and another to get it down. Some hun
dreds of peasants came forward, and actually took several pieces
of cannon across, under the direction of artillerymen. But

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 207
even the allurement of gain was not strong enough/ to induce
them to repeat the effort. All of them disappeared, and though
officers were sent in quest of them, and made large offers to
bring them back, these were of no avail, so that it was found
necessary to ask the soldiers of the divisions to drag their
artillery themselves. From such devoted soldiers, any thing
might be obtained. To encourage them, they were promised
the money which the disheartened peasants would not earn ; but
they refused it, saying that it was a point of honour for a body
of troops to save their cannon, and they laid hold of the for
saken pieces. Parties of one hundred men, successively quit
ting the ranks, dragged them, each in its turn. The band
played enlivening airs at difficult points of the passage, and
encouraged them to surmount obstacles of so novel a nature.
On reaching the summit of the mountain, they found refresh
ment prepared by the monks of St. Bernard ; and they took
some rest before they made greater and more perilous efforts in
the descent. In this manner, Chambarlhac's and Monnier's
divisions dragged their artillery themselves; and, as the advanced
hour did not permit them to descend the same day, they chose
rather to bivouac on the snow than to leave their cannon.
Luckily, the weather was serene; so that they had not its
inclemencvto endure, in addition to the difficulties of the
ground. On the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th of May, the divisions
continued to cross, with the provisions, ammunition, and artil
lery. The First Consul, still quartered at Martigny, urged the
forwarding of the materiel; Berthier, on the other side of the
St. Bernard, received it, and had it repaired by the workmen.
The First Consul, whose foresight was ever active, bethought
him immediately of pushing Lannes, who already had his divi
sion collected, and some four-pounders ready to start, upon the
debouche of the mountains, for the purpose of securing it. He
ordered him to advance to Ivrea, and to take that town, with a
view to make himself master of the entrance to the plain of
Piedmont. Lannes marched, on the 16th and 17th of May,
upon Aosta, where he found some Croats, who were driven
into the bottom of the valley; he then proceeded towards the
little town of Chatillon, where he arrived on the 18th. A bat
talion of the enemy, which happened to be there, was put
to rout, and lost a good number of prisoners. Lannes then
entered the valley, which, as the troops descended, gradually
widened, and exhibited to the delighted eyes of our men habi
tations, trees, cultivated fields, all the forerunners, in short, of
Italian fertility. These brave fellows marched gaily forward,
when the valley, again contracting, presented a narrow gorge,
closed by a fort bristling with cannon. This was the fort of
Bard, already pointed out as an obstacle by several Italian
officers, but as an obstacle that might be surmounted. The

208 history of the [May 1800.
officers of engineers attached to the advanced guard went for
ward, and, after a hasty reconnaissance, declared that the fort
completely obstructed the road through the valley, and that it
could not be passed without forcing this barrier, which seemed
nearly insurmountable. This intelligence, circulated in the
division, excited the most painful surprise. The nature of that
unforeseen obstacle was this : —
The valley of Aosta is traversed by a river, which receives
all the streams from the St. Bernard, and which, by the name
of Dora Baltea, discharges itself into the Po. On approaching
Bard the valley contracts ; the road, running between the foot
of the mountains and the bed of the river, becomes gradually
narrower, and, at length, a rock, which seems to have fallen from
the neighbouring heights into the middle of the valley, closes it
almost completely. The river then runs on one side of the
rock, the road on the other. This road, bordered by houses,
composes the whole town of Bard. On the summit of the rock,
a fort, impregnable from its position, though ill-constructed,
sweeps with its fire, on the right, the course of the Dora Bal
tea, on the left, the long street which forms the very little town
of Bard. Drawbridges closed the entry and the outlet of this
single street. A garrison, not numerous, but wrell officered,
occupied the fort.
Lannes, who was not a man to be daunted, immediately dis
patched a few companies of grenadiers, who let down the draw
bridges, and entered Bard, in spite of a very brisk fire. The
commandant of Bard poured forth a shower of balls, chiefly
howitzer, upon the unfortunate town ; but, at length, he paused,
out of consideration for the inhabitants. Lannes' division posted
itself outside. It was evidently impossible for the materiel of
an army to pass under the fire of the fort, which swept the
road in all directions. Lannes immediately made his report to
Berthier, who hastened to the spot, and perceived with horror
how difficult the obstacle which had just revealed itself was to
overcome. General Marescot was sent for; he examined the
fort, and declared it to be almost impregnable, not on account
of its construction, which was indifferent, but its position,
which was completely detached. The steepness of the rock
scarcely admitted of escalade; as for the walls, though they
were not covered by any earthworks, they could not be battered
in breach, because there were no means of establishing a bat
tery suitably placed for reaching them. Still, it was possible,
by dint of strength, to hoist upon the neighbouring heights a
few pieces of small calibre. Berthier gave orders accordingly.
The soldiers, who were made for arduous enterprises, laboured
to get up two four-pounders, and even two eight-pounders. They
at length succeeded in hoisting them up on the mountain of
Albaredo, which commands the fort and rock of Bard; and
a downward fire suddenly opened, excited some astonish-

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 209
ment in the garrison. Not disheartened, however, it replied,
and dismounted one of our pieces, which was of too small
calibre. Marescot declared that there was no hope of taking the fort,
and that they must think of some other way of overcoming the
•obstacle. Reconnaissances were made on the left, along the
windings of the mountain of Albaredo, and at length there was
found a path which, amidst many dangers — many more than the
St. Bernard itself had presented — led to the high road of the
valley, which rejoined below the fort, at St. Donaz. This path,
though crossing a mountain of the second order, was at least as
difficult to traverse as the St. Bernard; because it was fre
quented only by shepherds and their flocks. If it should be
necessary to go through a second operation, like that which
had just been executed, and pass this new Col by again dis
mounting and remounting of the artillery, and dragging it along
with similar efforts, the strength of the army might prove inade
quate, and this materiel, so often taken to pieces and put together,
might likewise be rendered unfit for use. Berthier, in alarm,
instantly issued counter-orders to the columns that were succes
sively arriving, and caused the advance of the men and the.
materiel to -be everywhere suspended, that the army might not
come any further, lest it should at last have to turn back. In a
moment, an alarm was spread upon the rear, and the troops
imagined that they were stopped in this glorious enterprise.
Berthier sent several couriers to the First Consul/ to apprise
him of this unexpected disappointment. '
The latter was still at Martigny, purposing not to cross the
St. Bernard till, with his own eyes, he had seen the last portions
of the materiel dispatched. These tidings of an obstacle deemed
insurmountable, gave him at first a kind of shock; but he
soon recovered himself, and obstinately refused to entertain the
idea of a retrograde movement. Nothing in the world could
have induced him to submit to such an extremity. He thought
that,if one of the highest mountains of the globe had not stopped
him, a secondary rock would not be capable of baffling his cou
rage and his genius. " They will take the fort," said he, " by a
bold stroke : if it is not to be taken, it must be turned. Besides,
provided the infantry and cavalry can pass with a few four-
pounders, they will proceed to Ivrea, at the entrance of the
plain, and there wait till the heavy artillery can follow them.
If this heavy artillery cannot clear the obstacle that has pre
sented itself; and if, to replace it, they must take that of the
enemy, the French infantry is numerous and brave enough to
fall upon the Austrian artillery, and to carry off their guns."
Again he resorted to the study of his maps ; he questioned a
great number of Italian 'officers, and, learning from them that
other roads led from Aosta to the surrounding valleys, he wrote
letter after letter to Berthier, forbidding him to interrupt the
VOL. I. *"

210 HISTORY OF THE 9^7 1800^
movement of the army, and indicated with astonishing preci-
sion the reconnaissances that ought to be made around the fort
of Bard. Satisfied that no serious danger could arise, except
from the arrival of a hostile corps to close the debouche of Ivrea,
he enjoined Berthier to send Lannes on by the path of Alba-
redo, and to make him there take a strong position, covered
from the Austrian artillery and cavalry. " Provided Lannes
keep the door of the valley," added the First Consul, " no mat
ter what may occur — at worst we can but lose a little time.
We have a sufficient quantity of provisions to wait, and we shall
gain our point at last, either by turning, or by overcoming the
obstacle which stops us at this moment."
Having given these instructions to Berthier, he addressed
his last orders to general Moncey, who was to debouch from
the St. Gothard ; to general Chabran, who, crossing the Little
. St. Bernard, would come right upon the fort of Bard ; and he
at length determined to cross the mountains himself. Before
he set out, he received intelligence from the Var, that, on the
14th of May (24th Floreal), the baron de Melas was still at
Nice. As it was now the 20th of May, it was not to be sup
posed that the Austrian general had hurried, in the space of
six days, from Nice to Ivrea. He set out, therefore, to cross
the Col, before daylight on the 20th. He was accompanied by
Duroc, his aide-de-camp, and de Bourrienne, his secretary.
Artists have delineated him crossing the Alpine heights mounted
on a fiery steed. The plain truth is, that he ascended the St.
Bernard in that gray surtout which he usually wore, upon a
mule, led by a guide belonging to the country, evincing, even
in the difficult passes, the abstraction of a mind occupied else
where, conversing with the officers scattered on the road, and
then, at intervals, questioning the guide who attended him,
making him relate the particulars of his life, his pleasures, his
'pains, like an idle traveller, who has nothing better to do. This
guide, who was quite young, gave him a simple recital of the
details of his obscure existence, and especially the vexation he
felt, because, for want of a little money, he could not marry one
of the girlsof his valley. The First Consul, sometimes listen
ing, sometimes questioning the passengers with whom the
mountain was covered, arrived at the Hospice, where the worthy
monks gave him a warm reception. No sooner had he alighted
trom Lis mule than he wrote a note which he handed to his guide,
desiring him to be sure and deliver it to the quarter-master of the
army, who had been left on the other side of the St. Bernard. In
the evening, the young man, on returning to St. Pierre, learned
TihTI^Z PT^UI teller it was whom he had guided
a house TndTf,; ?at g6neral Bonaparte had ordered that
diatelv and h^tl ffi should be ^n to him imme
diately, and that he should be supplied, in short with the
means requisite for marrying and for realising all the dreams of

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 211
his modest ambition. This mountaineer died not long since,
in his own country, the owner of land given to him by the ruler
of the world. fThis singular act of beneficence, at a moment
when his mind was engaged by such mighty interests, is worthy
of attention. If there were nothing in it but a mere conqueror's
caprice, dispensing at random good or evil, alternately over
throwing empires or rearing a cottage, it may be useful to record
such caprices, if only to tempt the masters of the earth fo imi
tation ; but such an act reveals something more. The human
soul, in those moments when it is filled with ardent desires,
is disposed to kindness ; it does good by way of meriting that
which it is soliciting of Providence^
The First Consul halted for a short time with the monks,
thanked them for their attentions to his army, and made
them a magnificent present, for the relief of the poor and of
travellers. He descended rapidly, suffering himself, according to the cus
tom of the country, to glide down upon the snow, and arrived
the same evening at Etroubles. Next day, after paying some
attention to the park of artillery and to the provisions, he set
out for Aosta and Bard. Having ascertained that all he had
been told was true, he resolved to send the infantry, the cavalry,
and the four-pounders, by the path of Albaredo, which would
be possible, if the path were repaired. All the troops were to
go and take possession of the debouche of the mountains in ad-
Vance of Ivrea, and the First Consul designed, meanwhile, to
make some attempt on the fort, or at least find means to turn
this obstacle, by making his artillery cross one of the neigh
bouring Cols. He ordered general Lecchi, at the head of the
Italians, to ascend on the left, to penetrate by the Grassoney
road into the valley of the Sesia, which terminates near the
Simplon and Lake Maggiore.
The object of this movement was to keep the Simplon roaS
open, to give the hand to a detachment that was desfcending by
it, and to reconnoitre, in short, all the roads passable for wheel-
carriages. The First Consul, at the same time, directed his attention to
the fort of Bard. The French were in possession of the only
street composing the town, but could only pass through it
under such a shower of balls that it would be scarcely possible
to get through with artillery, though the distance was but two
or three hundred fathoms. The,commandant was summoned,
but he replied with firmness, like a man fully sensible of the
importance of the post entrusted to his courage. Force alone,
then, could make us masters of the pass. The artillery which
had been planted on the mountain of Albaredo produced no
great effect; an escalade was attempted on the outer mclosure
of the fort ; but some brave grenadiers, and Dufour, an ex
cellent officer, were uselessly wounded or killed. All the
p 2

212 history of the [May 1800.
while, the troops were proceeding along the path of Albaredo.
Fifteen hundred labourers had done the most urgent repairs
required by that path. In places where it was narrow, it had
been widened by the removal of gravel from the sides ; too
rapid slopes had been diminished by cutting steps to prevent
the feet from slipping ; in other places, trunks of trees were
thrown over ravines, which it would otherwise have been too
difficult to cross, and used as bridges. The army advanced succes
sively, man by man, the cavalry leading their horses by the bridle.
The Austrian officer commanding the fort of Bard, seeing our
troops filing in this manner, and mortified at not having it in
his power to stop their march, sent word to M. de Melas, that
he had witnessed the passage of a whole army, infantry and
cavalry, without possessing the means of obstructing it, but he
pledged his life that it would arrive without a single piece of
cannon. Meanwhile, our artillery made a remarkably bold attempt ;
this was, to pass with a piece beneath the very guns of the fort,
under favour of the night. The enemy, unluckily warned by
the noise, threw pot-grenadoes, which lighted the road as
though it had been broad day, and enabled them to pour upon
it a shower of projectiles. Out of thirteen artillerymen who
had volunteered to draw that piece of cannon, seven were killed
or wounded. This was sufficient to dishearten the bravest men;
when an ingenious method, though withal a very dangerous one,
was thought of. The street was covered with straw and dung;
tow was fastened about the pieces, so as to prevent the slightest
sound from the jar of those masses of metal upon their
carriages ; the horses were unharnessed, bold artillerymen,
dragging them by main strength, ventured to pass under the
batteries of the fort, along the street of Bard. This contrivance
succeeded completely. The enemy, who fired from time to
ftme, by way of precaution, hit some of our gunners ; but very
soon, in spite of this fire, all the heavy artillery was removed
beyond the defile, and this formidable obstacle, which had given
the First Consul more concern than the St. Bernard itself,
was overcome. The artillery horses had taken the path of
Albaredo. While this bold operation was performing, Lannes, marching
at the head of his infantry, carried, on the 22nd of May, the
town of Ivrea, which had not been repaired since the wars of
Louis XIV., and which, from a singular but tardy presentiment,
the Austrian staff had just set about arming. The defences
of Ivrea consisted in a citadel, detached from the body of the
place, and in bastioned ramparts. The brave general Watrin,
at the head of his division, attacked the citadel ; Lannes him
self advanced against the body of the place, aad the soldiers
took both by escalade. Five or six thousand Austrians, half of
them cavalry, who were there, retired in the utmost haste.

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 213
Lannes made some prisoners, drove them out of the valley, and
took up a position at the entrance of the plain of Piedmont, at the
points designated by the First Consul. Some days later, and
the town of Ivrea, defended by the Austrians, would have been
not an insuperable obstacle, but a serious annoyance. Cannon
and provisions were found there ; Lannes completed its arma
ment, and. victualled it, so as to make it, in case of reverse, one
of the supports of our line of retreat.
While these events were passing, general Chabran was de
scending with his division by the 'Little St. Bernard ; and, as that
division contained many conscripts recently incorporated, it was
employed in the blockade of the fort of Bard, which would not
hold out long, when it should see itself without resource, and
the artillery beyond its reach, so that it could no longer stop
its march. General Thurreau, at the head of a corps of 4000
men, carried the debouche of Susa, made 1500 prisoners, and
took some cannon. He was obliged to halt at the entrance of
the valley, between Suza and Bussolino. General Lecchi, with
the Italians, turning the valley of the Sesia, repulsed de Rohan's
division, took some hundreds of men from it, disengaged the
debouche of the Simplon, and gave a hand to a detachment of
the division left in Switzerland at the commencement of the
campaign. Lastly, the corps of general Moncey, distributed
en echelon over a great space in the valley of the St. Gothard,
began to ascend the heights.
Thus the general movement of the army was effected upon
all points, with complete success. It was time to leave the
valley of Aosta. Lannes, always at the advanced-guard, quitted
that valley on the 26th of May (6th Prairial), and no longer
hesitated to show himself in the plain. The Austrian general,
Haddick, was charged to watch this debouche of the Alps with
some thousand infantry and his numerous cavalry. He was
covered by a little river, the Chiusella, which falls into the
Dora Baltea. • A bridge served for crossing this stream.
Lannes marched briskly thither with his infantry. A fire of
artillery, sudden and well directed, received our battalions, but
did not prevent them from advancing. The brave colonel
Macon entered the bed of the river with his demi-brigade,
crossed it above arid below the bridge, and clambered up the
opposite bank. The Austrian cavalry, commanded by general
Palfy, then determined to charge this demi-brigade. The
general fell dead, and his men were dispersed. The French,
rejoined by the rest of Lannes' division, advanced, pursuing
the enemy with their accustomed vivacity. General Haddick,
taking advantage of the disorder of this pursuit, pushed on his
squadrons at the most seasonable moment. The 6th light was
obliged to halt ; but the 22nd, formed in close column, repulsed
by its fire alone this new charge of the Austrian cavalry. Some
thousand horse then dashed forward at once to try a last effort

214 history of the [May 1800.
against our infantry. The 40th and 22nd demi-brigades,
formed in square, sustained with extraordinary firmness this
formidable shock. Three times they were charged, and three
times the enemy's squadrons were foiled by their bayonets.
General Haddick, finding himself unable to withstand the ad
vanced guard of the French army, gave orders for retreating,
and, after losing many men, killed or wounded, and some
prisoners, he relinquished the plain of Piedmont to Lannes, and
retired behind the Oreo. Lannes continued his march, and,
on the 28th of May (8th Prairial), proceeded towards Chivasso,
on the bank of the Po. The Austrians, alarmed at this sudden
invasion, hastened to evacuate Turin. Barks were descending
the Po, laden with corn, rice, ammunition, and wounded. '
Lannes seized all these convoys. The abundance prepared by
the Austrians for their army was soon to give delight to ours.
Thirteen days had elapsed, and the stupendous enterprise of the
First Consul had completely succeeded. An army of 40,000 men,
infantry, cavalry, artillery, had crossed, without beaten roads,
the highest mountains in Europe, dragging by main strength.
its artillery over the snow, or pushing it under the murderous
fire of a fort, and almost close to the muzzle of its guns. A
division of 5000 men had descended the Little St. Bernard ;
another of 4000 had debouched by Mont Cenis ; a detachment
occupied the Simplon ; lastly, a corps of 15,000 French, under
general Moncey, was on the top of the St. Gothard. There
were thus in all sixty and odd thousand soldiers about to enter
Italy, still separated, it is true, from one another by considerable
distances, but certain of soon rallying around a principal mass
of 40,000 men, who were debouching by Ivrea, at the centre of
the semicircle of the Alps. And this extraordinary march was
not a whim of a general who, to turn an adversary, ran the risk
of being turned himself. Master of the valley of Aosta, of the
Simplon, and of the St. Gothard, general Bonaparte was
certain that, if he lost a battle, he should have it in his power
to return to the point from which he had set out ; at the worst,
he could only sacrifice some of his artillery, if he were closely
pressed on his march. Having thenceforward nothing to con->
ceal, he repaired in person to Chivasso, harangued the troops,
congratulated them on their firmness before the Austrian
cavalry, announced the important results which he foresaw,
showed himself not only to his soldiers, but to the Italians, to
the Austrians, that he might now scare, by his formidable
presence, the enemy whom before he wished to lull into pro
found security.
What was baron de Melas about in the mean time 1 Made
quite easy, by the cabinet of Vienna and by his own agents,
respecting that fabulous army of reserve, this general continued
the siege of Genoa, and the attack on the bridge of the Var.
He had suffered considerable losses at these two points ; but,

May 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 215
for the rest, he persisted in believing that the assemblages made
at Dijon were but a rabble of conscripts, destined to fill the
gaps in the ranks of the two armies of the Rhine and of Liguria.
Intelligence, which reached him about the middle of May, gave
him some uneasiness about his rear ; nevertheless, he soon dis
missed his apprehensions, and resumed the notion that the
troops collected at Dijon were to march direct down the Saone
and the Rhone, to join the corps of general Suchet on the Var.
Instead of sending troops by the Col de Tende into Piedmont,
he kept all his forces, under general Elsnitz, before the bridge
of the Var. At length the French columns, debouching from
all the valleys of the Alps at once, seen and described with the
roost complete certainty by general Wukassowich, roused him
a» last from his illusions, but still without entirely undeceiving
him. He left general Ott with 30,000 men before Genoa,
geaeral Elsnitz with 20,000 before the bridge of the Var ; the
latter were to be reinforced by the troops of general St. Julien,
which became disposable after the reduction of Savona ; and he
tuned back, with a detachment of 10,000 men, across the Col
de Tende, for Coni. On the 22nd of May, he reached the
latter place. Till this moment, the Austrian general had con
ceived that the French troops which had been met with were
only bodies of conscripts, employed to make a demonstration
on hi; rear, to induce him to break up the siege of Genoa ; and
he cotld not yet think that it was general Bonaparte himself, at
the had of a large army. But this last illusion of his speedily
vanished. One of his officers, who was perfectly acquainted
with tie person of general Bonaparte, was sent to Chivasso, on
the baik of the Po. This officer beheld with his own eyes the
conqueor of Castiglione and Riyoli, and dispatched intelligence
to that effect to his commander-in-chief, who, not till then,
could estimate the whole extent of his danger ; for it was not of
an assenblage of conscripts, that the First Consul would have
deigned to take the command. This was not all ; it was doubted
whether the French had cannon, but the report of their artillery
had jus: been heard at the Chiusella. The estimable old general,
who hai displayed incontestable ability during the preceding
campaigi, was thenceforth a prey to the most cruel anxiety.
Every ray added to his alarm, for he soon learned that general
Monceys heads of columns were descending from the St.
Gothard _ . .
He wis, in fact, in a situation peculiarly critical. Out of
120,000 nen, he had lost at least 25,000 men before Genoa and
the Var. Those which he had left were dispersed : general Ott,
with 30,<00 men, was before Genoa; general Elsnitz, with
25,000, before the bridge of the Var ; general Kaim, charged to
guard the debouches of Susa and Pignerol with about 12,000
men, hadlost Susa, and was retiring upon Turin. General Had
dick, who.with nearly 9000, was to guard the valleys of Aosta and

216 HISTORY OF THE [May 1800.
the Sesia, had just fallen back before Lannes ; general Wukas-
sowich, who, with 10,000 men, was observing the valleys of the
Simplon and of the St. Gothard — what was to become of him
before Moncey ? Baron de Melas himself was at Turin, with a
corps of 10,000 men, brought back from Nice. Was it not
general Bonaparte's intention to sweep down amidst all these
scattered corps, to beat them one after another, and to destroy
them? Perhaps there would still have been time to take salu
tary resolutions, provided they had been planned and executed
immediately; but the Austrian general lost some days in
recovering himself, in coming to a definitive opinion respecting
the plans of his adversary, in forming his own, and in making
tip his mind to the sacrifices that must attend a concentration of
bis forces ; for he should be obliged to abandon at once tiu
Var, perhaps Genoa, and certainly a great part of Piedmont.
While he was yet deliberating, general Bonaparte, on his part,
had formed his determinations with his accustomed promptness
and resolution. The determinations which he had to take were
not less grave than those of his (adversary. If the Austrtms
were scattered, so were the French; for they were descending by
Mont Cenis, by the Great and Little St. Bernard, by the Sim
plon, and by the St. Gothard. It was necessary to unite tiem,
then to cut off all retreat from baron de Melas ; and, lasty, to
raise the blockade of Massena, who, at that moment, must )e re
duced to the last extremity. /
When he had descended the St. Bernard, general Bonjparte
had on his right Mont Cenis and Turin, on his left, fie St.
Gothard and Milan, and, fifty leagues before him, Gema and
Massena. What course was he to take? To appuy Jn the
right upon Mont Cenis, in order to call in the 4000 mer1 under
general Thurreau, would be of little advantage. He wodd thus
run the risk of meeting immediately with M. de Melasj which,
to be sure, would not be very dangerous, dispersed as hi forces
were ; but, by appuying to the right, he should relintpish to
him on the left the Milan or Piacenza road to retreat Vy. It
was, indeed, not worth while to have made such great efjbrts to
throw himself across the Alps upon the communication] of the
enemy, if, after having occupied them, he were to leaje them
open. To proceed straight forward, to cross the Po, fa fly to
Genoa, amidst dispersed corps of the Austrian army, nidecting
general Thurreau on his right, general Moncey on his feft, and
endangering all his own communications, would not be jise, not
worthy of the prudence which had combined all the par^ of this
plan with as much reflection as boldness. He knew ^ot what
assemblage of forces might be met with upon that mite; he
should sacrifice his line of retreat towards the Alps, b} leaving
to themselves generals Thurreau and Moncey, who wjild most
probably be obliged to faU back on Mont Cenis anf the St.
Gothard, God knows after what adventures. It had bten better

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 217
to succour Massena direct by Toulon; Nice, and Genoa. From
all these considerations, there was evidently left but one course
to pursue ; namely, to appuy to the left towards the St. Gothard
and Milan, and to give the hand to general Moncey's 15,000
men. In that manner he should unite with himself the princi
pal detachment of the army, which would raise its number to
60,000 fighting men ; he should occupy the capital of Upper
Italy ; he should raise the people on the rear of the Austrians ;
he should take all their magazines; he should make himself
master of the line of the Po, and of all the bridges over that
great river ; lastly, by putting himself in a condition to attack
upon either bank, he should stop M. de Melas, by whichever
route he should attempt to escape. It is true that, by this plan,
the succour to be sent to Massena would be delayed for eight
or ten days, which was unfortunate. But general Bonaparte
imagined that his presence in Italy would be sufficient to extri
cate the army of Liguria; for he believed that M. de Melas
would lose no time in calling in to him the corps which were
investing Genoa and the bridge of the Var. At any rate, gene
rals Massena and Suchet had accomplished the object assigned
to them, by detaining M. de Melas on the Apennines, by fa
tiguing him, by exhausting him, but, above all, by preventing
him from closing the debouches of the Alps. The defender of
Genoa, if he must succumb, would but consummate the long
series of sacrifices imposed upon the noble and unfortunate
army of Liguria, for the success of a vast combination.
Having formed his resolution, general Bonaparte made his ar
rangements with the utmost promptness, and directed his whole
army upon the left bank of the Po. He called in his park of
artillery, which had just been put in order ; he enjoined Lannes
to collect all the boats taken at Chivasso, to place them as if he
was about to throw a bridge, and to cross into Piedmont. His
intention was to deceive M. de Melas a second time in regard
to his plans, and he was as successful as the first time. On
seeing the movements ordered by general Bonaparte, M. de
Melas, striving to flatter himself till the last moment, was fain
to hope that the French had been able to cross the Alps in very
small number only. He thought that general Bonaparte, as
every thing induced him to suppose, had no other motive for
crossing the Po, but to enter Turin, and to give the hand
towards Mont Cenis to general Thurreau ; he thought that he
might keep him in check by breaking down all the bridges, arid
by disputing the passage of the Po with about 30,000 men. He
conceived, therefore, a hope to defend himself on this line,
without making the twofold sacrifice of the positions occupied on
the Var and of the advantages gained before Genoa. In con
sequence, M. de Melas assembled general Haddick, who had
returned from the valley of Aosta, general Kaim, posted at the
debouche of Susa, the 10,000 men brought with him from

218 HISTORY OF the [June 1800.
Nice, besides a fresh detachment drawn from the Var ; amount
ing, when united, to 30,000 men ; and, supposing that we had
no more, he hoped with this force to dispute the river which
separated the two armies-
The First Consul took no pains to destroy this new illusion
of his adversary's, and, leaving him occupied towards Turin with
this concentration of force, he all at once fell back upon Milan.
Lannes, who was apparently destined to ascend the Po, in order
to march from Chivasso upon Turin, on the contrary, sud
denly descended it. He advanced by Crescentino and Trino upon
Pavia, where the Imperialists had immense magazines of provi
sions, ammunition, artillery, and the most important of their
communications, since it commanded the passage both of the
Po and of the Tessino. Murat marched by Vercelli upon the
point of Buffalora. The entire army followed this general
movement upon Milan; it arrived on the 31st of May before
the Tessino. That river is broad and deep. The French had
no craft for crossing, and on the other side appeared a numerous
cavalry belonging to the corps of Wukassowich, which was
guarding the Simplon and that part of the debouches of the
Alps. Behind the Tessino runs the Naviglio Grande, a large
canal, which crosses the country to Milan. This canal runs, for
a certain distance, parallel to the course of the river, from which
it branches off; it is, moreover, very near it. The enemy's
cavalry, cooped up on a narrow slip of ground between, the
Tessino and the canal, was extremely cramped in its movements,
and could scarcely use its force. Adjutant-general Girard took
some craft, which the peasants of the environs had concealed near
Galiate, and with which they were eager to furnish the army.
He crossed with a small body of men, and fell upon the Aus
trian advanced guard. Successively reinforced by these barks,
which kept going and returning, and supported by the fire of
the artillery, he repulsed the cavalry, which durst not advance
too far on ground so disadvantageous for it, and obliged it to
recross the Naviglio Grande at a point called the bridge of Tur
bigo. Thus, at one blow, he cleared the Naviglio and the
Tessino. But general Wukassowich came up with Laudon's
brigade of infantry, and endeavoured to penetrate into the vil
lage of Turbigo. Girardin then had upon his hands four or five
thousand infantry, while he had no more than a few hundred
men to oppose to them. He kept his ground for several suc
cessive hours with great presence of mind and courage, and
finally saved the bridge of Turbigo, the loss of which would
have thrown the French on this side of the Naviglio Grande,
and, perhaps, even the Tessino. While he was thus gallantly
defending himself, general Monnier, who had found means to
cross a little below, came to his assistance, and charging Lau
don's troops, drove them from Turbigo. This line, which was to
check the French army, was thus passed at the cost of a mere

June 1800.] consulate and the empire. 219
advanced-guard action. Next day, the 1st of June (12th Prai
rial), Boudet's division crossed near Buffalora, and the whole
arniy advanced upon Milan. Wukassowich, apprehensive of
being caught between the main army, which was advancing in
Lombardy, and Moncey's corps, which was descending the St;
Gothard, retired precipitately, and ordered Dedovich's brigade,
which was at the foot of the mountains, to fall back behind the
Adda by Cassano. He himself went to seek refuge behind the
Adda, by Milan and Lodi, after leaving a garrison of 2800 men
in the citadel of Milan. There was now no obstacle to check
the French army. It could enter the capital of Lombardy,
which had groaned for above a year under the yoke of the Aus
trians. Thus far those unfortunate Italians had heard talk of
nothing but the successes of M, de Melas and the distress of the
French. The caricatures on the army of reserve had circulated
in Milan, as well as hr Vienna and London. They represented
it as a crew of old men and boys, armed with bludgeons, mounted
on asses, and having two blunderbusses for artillery. While
derision, harmless enough, it is true, was thus poured forth upon
the French Republic, the unfortunate Italians were the victims of
the most cruel oppression. £A11 the men in Lombardy most dis
tinguished by fortune and talents were in prison or in exile,
especially if they had taken any part in the affairs of the Cisal
pine republic. It was remarkable enough that persecution had
pressed less heavily upon the hot-headed patriots, upon those
who corresponded with the French Jacobins, than upon the
moderate men, whose example might be more contagious for
the people."! Excepting some very few creatures of the Aus
trian government, and some nobles belonging to the oligarchic
party, all were sighing for the return of the French. But they
durst scarcely hope for their return, especially when they saw
the baron de Melas so far advanced into Liguria, so near taking
Genoa and passing the Var, and the First Consul so occupied,
at least apparently, with the dangers of invasion, which threat
ened France upon her frontiers'" of the Rhine. A report was
even circulated among the people, that the general Bonaparte,
so well known in Italy, had died in Egypt,; that, a modern
Pharaoh, he had been engulfed by the Red Sea; and that he
whose name was then figuring in Paris was one of his brothers.
It is easy to conceive the surprise of the Italians, when, all
,at once, they were told that a French army had appeared at
Ivrea, that it was even debouching beyond that town, that it
was in march for the Tessino ; lastly, that it had crossed that
river. Let the reader figure to himself the agitation which pre
vailed in Milan, the affirmations, the contradictions, which
succeeded each other for forty-eight hours; lastly, the joy which
burst forth when the intelligence was confirmed by the appear
ance of general Bonaparte himself, marching with his staff at
the head of the advanced-guard. On the 2nd of June (13th

220 history of the [June 1800.
Prairial), the entire population, thronging to meet the French
army, recognised the illustrious general, whom they had so often
seen within their walls, welcomed him with transports of en
thusiasm, and received him as a saviour come down from
heaven. The sentiments of the Italians, always so strong, so
demonstrative, had broken forth with such force, because so
many circumstances had never before concurred to render the
joy of the people sudden and profound. The French general,
on entering Milan, hastened to throw open the prisons, and to
restore the government of the country to the friends of France.
He gave a provisional administration to the Cisalpine republic,
and composed this administration of the most respected men.
Adhering, however, in Italy, to the system which he followed
in France, he would not permit either violence or reaction ; and,
in replacing power in the hands of the Italians of his party, he
did not allow them to exercise it against their countrymen of
the opposite party.
After these first attentions paid to the affairs of the Milanese,
he hastened to push his columns in all directions, to the lakes,
to the Adda, to the Po, so as to spread the insurrection for the
advantage of the French, to seize the enemy's magazines, to
cut off his communications, and to bar all retreat against him.
Thus far every thing had gone on most prosperously, for Lannes,
directed upon Pavia, had entered that city on the 1st of June,
and taken immense magazines. That general had found at Pavia
the Austrian hospitals, considerable stores of corn, forage, am
munition, arms, above all 300 pieces of cannon, half of them
field-pieces. He had procured there several bridge-equipages,
which the companies of French pontonniers, who had come
without materiel, were about to employ on the Po. Chabran's
division, left before the fort of Bard, had taken it on the 1st of
June, and found there eighteen pieces of cannon. General
Chabran, after putting a garrison into it, as well as into Ivrea,
proceeded to occupy the course of the Po, from the Dora Bal-
tea to the Sesia. Lannes occupied from that point to Pavia.
The corps of general Bethencourt, which had come from the
Simplon, was posted before Arona, towards the point of Lake
Maggiore. The Italian legion was dispatched, by Brescia, after
the Austrians, who were retiring in the utmost haste. At the
same time, Duhesme's and Loison's divisions were crossing the
Adda, and proceeding to Lodi, Crema, and Pizzighittone. Ge
neral Wukassowich, who no longer pretended to guard the
Adda, retired behind the Mincio, under the guns of Mantua.
Nothing now impeded the march of general Moncey, except
ing the difficulty of finding subsistence in the sterile valleys of
Upper Switzerland. His first columns were just appearing,
but it was necessary to wait a few days longer for the others,
and this was the greatest inconvenience of the situation, for it
behoved the First Consul to make haste, if he would not see

June 1800.] consulate and the empire. 221
Genoa fall into the hands of the Austrians. General Bona
parte was now certain of uniting all his columns, with the ex
ception of one — that was general Thurreau 's, which was en
trenched at the debouche of Mont Cenis, without being able to
advance. For the rest, our army was strongly seated in the heart
of the Milanese, having its retreat secured by Mont Cenis, the
St. Bernard, the Simplon, and the St. Gothard, holding the Adda,
the Tessino, the Po, living upon the magazines of the Austrians,
cutting them off from all the routes, and capable of fighting a
decisive battle with them, after which they would have no other
resource, if they were beaten, but to lay down their arms. The
surrender of Genoa, if it were to take place, would be an unfor
tunate circumstance — unfortunate in the first place, for the
brave army which was defending it, unfortunate also because
the Austrian besieging corps would not fail to reinforce general
Melas, and would thus render the great battle that was to ter
minate the campaign more difficult. But, if general Bonaparte
gained the victory, Genoa and Italy would be reconquered at
one blow. He made, nevertheless, an especial point of saving
Genoa; but he could not hope for the junction of Moncey's
corps before the 5th or 6th of June, and he could not flatter
himself that Genoa would hold out till then.
The baron de Melas, whom the last news had completely en
lightened, and who saw his adversary, after entering Milan, giving
the hand to all the columns in succession as they descended the
Alps, now comprehended the vast plan projected against him.
To add to his misfortune, he had received intelligence of the
reverses of M. de Kray and his retreat upon Ulm. Abandon
ing, at length, the system of half-measures, he issued imperative
orders to general Elsnitz to relinquish the bridge of the Var,
and to general Ott to raise the siege of Genoa, and both of them
to unite at Alexandria. This was just what general Bonaparte
had hoped for the salvation of Genoa. But that noble and un
fortunate army of Liguria was doomed to pay to the very last
with its blood, with its sufferings, and finally with a mortifying
surrender, for the triumphs of the army of reserve.
To the very last, Massena maintained a noble countenance.
" Before he will surrender," said the soldiers, " he will make
us eat his very boots." The butchers' meat being consumed,
they ate horse-flesh, and, when that too failed them, they
fed upon the most loathsome animals. The wretched bread
made of oats and beans was consumed also. Ever since the
23rd of May (3rd Prairial), Massena had been collecting starch,
linseed, and the cacao deposited in the warehouses of Genoa,
and with these he had caused a bread to be made, which the sol
diers could scarcely swallow, and which very few of them were
able to digest. Almost all of them went to crowd the hospitals.
The populace, having no other food but herb soup, experienced
all the pangs of hunger. The streets were strewed with wretches

222 history of the [June 1800.
expiring from inanition, emaciated women exposing to public
charity the infants whom they could no longer support. Another
sight alarmed the city and the army : it was that of the numer
ous prisoners whom Massena had taken, and to whom he had
no food to give. He would not release them on parole, since he
had s'een those who had been thus liberated appear again in the
enemy's ranks. He had, therefore, proposed to general Ott,
and afterwards to admiral Keith, that they should furnish the
provisions requisite for their daily consumption, giving his
word of honour that nothing should be abstracted for the gar
rison. The word of such a man deserved to be depended on.
But such was the inveteracy, that the enemy resolved to impose
upon Massena the charge of feeding the prisoners, even though
they should have to suffer the most cruel privations. The
hostile generals had, therefore, the barbarity to doom their
soldiers to the severest pangs of hunger, in order to aggravate
the dearth in Genoa by leaving there some thousand mouths
more to feed. Massena supplied the prisoners with the herb
soup which he dealt out to the inhabitants. This was not nu
tritious enough for robust men, accustomed to abundance in
the rich plains of Italy : they were always on the point of re
volting, and, to cure them of all thoughts of that, he caused them
to be confined in old hulls of ships, which were moored in the
middle of the port, and on which a numerous artillery, constantly
pointed, was ready to pour destruction. So frightful was the
howling raised by these unfortunate men, that it harrowed the
feehngs of a population already so deeply affected by its own
sufferings. The number of our soldiers diminished daily : they were seen
expiring in the streets, and so debilitated were they that it had
been found expedient to permit them to sit down while mount
ing guard. The dispirited Genoese had ceased to do the duty of
the national guard, fearing lest they should be compromised
when, by and by, the Austrians should bring back the oligarchic
party. From time to time, vague rumours announced that the
despair of the inhabitants was about to burst forth ; and, to
prevent the explosion, battalions, with loaded cannon, occupied
the principal places.
Massena awed the people and the army by his impassible
bearing. The respect inspired by that hero, eating the same exe
crable bread as the soldiers, living with them under the enemy's
fire, and submitting not only to their physical sufferings, but to
all the duties and anxieties of commander, with unshaken firm
ness, the respect which he inspired kept all quiet ; he exercised,
amidst desolated Genoa, the ascendency of a superior spirit.
A feeling of hope, nevertheless, still supported the besieged.
Several of the general's aides-de-camp, after bold efforts, had
passed through the blockading force, and brought some inteUi
gence. Colonels Reille, Franceschi, Ortigoni, had passed, and

June 1800.] consulate and the empire. 223
had learned, at one time, that the First Consul was setting out,
at another, that he was crossing the Alps. One of them, Fran-
ceschi, had left him descending the St. Bernard. But since
the 20th of May no tidings of him had been received. Ten or
twelve days passed in this situation appeared ages ; and the
officers asked themselves, with despair, how it could happen
that, in ten days, general Bonaparte had not traversed the
space which separates the Alps from the Apennines. " We
know him well enough," said they, " to be certain that by this
time he is either conqueror or conquered ; if he does not arrive,
he must have succumbed in this rash enterprise.' Had he been
able to debouch in Italy, he would already have grappled the
Austrian general, and dragged him from the walls of Genoa."
Others alleged, that general Bonaparte had considered the
army of Liguria as a corps sacrificed to a great operation ; that he
had but one thing in view, that was, to detain baron de Melas on
the Apennines, and, that object attained, he no longer concerned
himself about raising the blockade of Genoa, but was marching
to execute some mightier plan. " Well !" added the Genoese,
and even our own soldiers, " we have been sacrificed to the
glory of France ; but, now the end is attained, is it intended
that we should perish to the last man? If it were in fight,
with arms in our hands, well and good ! but of famine, of
disease — 'tis impossible ! It is high time to surrender." Several
soldiers, in their despair, proceeded so far as to break their
muskets. At the same time, a plot of some men, irritated by
suffering, was discovered. Massena addressed to them an ad
mirable proclamation, in which he reminded them of the duties
of the soldier, which consist as much in enduring privations
and hardships as in braving dangers ; he pointed out to them
the example of their officers, living upon the same food, and
daily exposing themselves, at their head, to death or wounds.
He told them that the First Consul was advancing with an
army to deliver them ; that, by capitulating to-day, they should
lose in a moment the result of two months' efforts and devoted
ness. " A few days, perbaps a few hours longer," said he,
" and you will be delivered, after having rendered eminent
services to your country."
Accordingly, at every report, every sound towards the
horizon, they imagined that they heard the cannon of general
Bonaparte, and eagerly thronged to look out. One day, they
persuaded themselves that cannon were firing at the Bocchetta ;
a mad joy burst forth on all sides ; Massena himself repaired to
the ramparts. Vain illusion ! It was the sound of a thunder
storm in the gorges of the Apennines. Again they sunk into
the deepest dejection.
At length, on the 4th of June, there would be left but two ounces
of that horrid bread, made of starch and cacao, to each man per
day. ' The surrender of the place could be no longer deferred ;

224 history OF the [June 1800.
our unfortunate soldiers could not be reduced to such straits
as to devour one another, and there was an inevitable term to
resistance in the material impossibility to support life. Besides,
the army was conscious that it had done all that could be ex
pected of its courage. It felt thoroughly convinced that it no
longer covered the Thermopylae of France, but that it was
made subservient to a manoeuvre, which, at the moment, must
have succeeded or miscarried. It began, in particular, to be
lieve that the First Consul was more solicitous to extend his
combinations than to afford it succour. Massena shared this
feeling, without avowing it ; but he did not consider his task
as completely accomplished till he had reached the last possible
term of resistance. When the two miserable ounces of bread
left to be dealt out to each man were consumed, he must
surrender. He made up his mind to it, at least, with deep
chagrin. General Ott had sent a flag of truce, for the Austrians were
as much pressed to bring the affair to a conclusion as the
French. That general had, in fact, the most positive orders to
raise the siege of Genoa, and to fall back upon Alexandria.
The offers of the enemy, say some historians, ought to have
enlightened Massena. No doubt, he knew that if he stood out
one or two days longer, he might, perhaps, be relieved ; but he
could not wait. " Give me," said he to the Genoese, " two
days' provisions, one day's only, and I shall save you from the
Austrian yoke ; I shall save my army from the mortification of
surrender." At length, on the 3rd of June, Massena was obliged to nego
tiate. The Austrians talked of capitulation ; he rejected the
idea in such a manner, that they refrained from recurring to it.
He insisted that the army should retire freely, with arms and
baggage, with colours flying, and at liberty to serve and fight as
soon as it should have passed the lines of the besiegers ; " if
not," said he to the Austrian officers, sent with the flag of
truce, " I will sally from Genoa, arms in hand. With 8000
famished soldiers, I will appear before your camp, and I will
fight till I force my way through." They agreed to allow the
garrison to depart, but required that he himself should remain
prisoner, because they were afraid lest, with such a commander,
the garrison, proceeding from Genoa to Savona, might join
Suchet's troops, and attempt some formidable enterprise in the
rear of baron de Melas. To allay the indignation of Massena,
they avowed the motive, so honourable to him, of this con
dition. He would not hear of it. They then insisted that the
garrison should retire by sea, that it might not have time to
join Suchet's corps. To all these propositions he returned his
usual answer, that he would cut his way through. At length,
they consented to let 8000 men depart by land, in other words,
all those who could still support the weight of their arms. The

June 1800.] consulate and the empire. 225
convalescents were to be successively embarked, and conveyed
to the head-quarters of general Suchet. There would be left
behind 4000 sick, whom the Austrians engaged to victual, to
take care of, and to restore afterwards to the French army.
General Miollis was to be left in command of them. Massena
made stipulations in favour of the Genoese ; he required, as an
express condition, that none of them should be molested for
opinions manifested during our occupation, that persons and
property should be rigidly respected. M. de Corvette, an emi
nent Genoese, afterwards minister in France, had been admitted
to these conferences, that he might be able to attest the efforts
made in behalf of his countrymen. Massena wished, moreover,
that they should be permitted to retain the form of govern
ment which they then had, and for which they were indebted
to the French Revolution. On this point the Austrian generals
refused to enter into any engagement. " Well, then," said
Massena, " do as you please ; but I declare to you that, before
the fortnight's end, I will be back again in Genoa" — a prophetic
declaration, to which M. de St. Julien made this noble and
delicate reply : " You will find in this place, general, men whom
you have taught how to defend it."
The definitive conference was held on the morning of the
4th of June, in a chapel at the bridge of Cornigliano. The
article, stipulating that part of the army should be allowed to
retire by land, gave rise to a last difficulty. But, Massena
leaving the Austrian generals no other alternative than to con
sent to what he desired, or to expect a desperate battle on the
morrow, they yielded the point. It was stipulated that- this
convention of evacuation, from which the word capitulation
was carefully banished, should be concluded that same evening.
The enemy's officers, we may add, filled with admiration for the
French general, paid him all possible attention and marks of
respect. Evening having arrived, he still hesitated to sign, even then
hoping that he might be delivered. At length, when it was im
possible to delay any longer without breaking his word, he affixed
his signature. On the following day, our troops marched out,
with general Gazan at their head, and found rations at the ad
vanced posts. Massena himself embarked, that he might reach
the head-quarters of Suchet the more expeditiously. He left the
port in a vessel carrying the tricoloured flag, and under the guns
of the English squadron.
Thus ended that memorable siege, during which the French
army had signalized itself by such eminent virtues and such
eminent services. It had made more prisoners, and slain more
enemies, than it numbered soldiers. With 15,000 men, it had
taken or put hors de combat more than 18,000 Austrians. It
had, above all, destroyed the confidence of the Austrian army,
by compelling it to make incessant and extraordinary efforts.
VOL. I. Q

226 history of the [June 1800;
But would the reader like to know at what cost this brave
garrison of Genoa had held out so long ? Out of 15,000 com
batants, it had lost 3000 in fight ; 4000 others were wounded,
more or less severely ; 8000 only were fit to rejoin the active
army. Soult, the second in command, had fallen into the hands
of the enemy, after having had his leg broken. Out of three
generals of division, one, Marbot, died of epidemic disease;
another, Gazan, was dangerously wounded.^" Out of six generals
of brigade, four were wounded, Gardanne, Petitot, Fressinet, and
d'Arnaud. Out of twelve adjutant-generals, six were wounded,
one taken, one killed. Two officers of the staff were killed,
seven taken, fourteen wounded. Eleven colonels, out of
seventeen, were put hors de combat, or made prisoners. Three-
fourths of the officers had met with the like fate. Thus we
see that it was by setting an example of devotedness that the
leaders of this brave army supported it amidst such cruel trials.
In a word, it proved itself worthy of those who commanded it,
and never did the French soldier display more fortitude and
heroism. Honour, then, to the unfortunate bravery, which, by
its unbounded steadfastness, contributed to the triumphs of
that fortunate bravery, the exploits of which it is now our pro
vince to record !
WThile, urged to raise the siege of Genoa, general Ott was
granting to Massena the honourable conditions which we have
just specified, general Elsnitz, recalled by the orders of the
baron de Melas, abandoned the bridge of the Var. The attacks
of the Austrians upon that bridge had been delayed, because
their heavy artillery, conveyed by sea, had been long in coming.
Various attempts had been successively made on the 22nd and
the 27th of May; the last, in particular, was a real effort of
despair, on the part of general Elsnitz, who was determined not
to spare any exertion before he withdrew. These attacks were
gallantly repulsed. General Elsnitz, convinced that there was
no chance of success, then thought of recrossing the mountains.
Suchet, forming a prompt and just conception of the intentions
of the Austrian general, laid his plans so as to prevent him
from executing his retreat in security. He clearly perceived
that, by continuing to manoeuvre by his left along the moun
tains, he should place the Austrians in a perilous situation, and
should probably be enabled to take from them some detached
corps. Now, outside the line of the Var, which had stayed the
invasion, runs in a parallel direction the line of the Roya, the
source of which is situated at the Col de Tende itself. If the
French, proceeding beyond the Var, were to reach the sources
of the Roya before the Austrians, they would oblige their ad
versaries to move along the crests of the Apennines, in quest of a
pass through them. This correct conception of general Suchet,
executed with vigour, was crowned with complete success. He
began by dislodging general Gorupp from Ronciglione, continued

June 1800.] consulate and the empire. 227
to march briskly by his left, on the shaken right of the Austrians,
took successively the Col de Rauss, which affords a pass from
the valley of the Var into that of the Roya, and the famous
camp of Mille Fourches, and, master of the Col de Tende, he
found himself, on the 1st of June, upon the line of retreat of
general Elsnitz. General Gorupp, thrown in disorder on the
Upper Roya, had still time to gain the Col de Tende, but left
many dead and prisoners by the way. General Elsnitz, with the
rest of his army, had no other course but to follow the maritime
slope, as far as Oneglia, and to return by Pieve and St. Jacques
into the valley of the Tanaro. He had to cross tremendous
mountains, with soldiers already demoralized by this species of
flight, and having at his heels a foe, who passed with joy from
the defensive to the offensive. For five whole days, the Aus
trians were pursued without intermission, experiencing continual
checks ; and, at length, on the 6th of June, general Elsnitz, on
his arrival at Ormea, numbered not so many as 10,000 men.
On the 7tb, he was at Ceva. General Gorupp had retired upon
Coni, with a weak division. The loss sustained by the Austrian
corps, since leaving the Var, was estimated at 10,000 men.
General Suchet, so long separated from Massena, found him
again, in proceeding along the coast, in the environs of Savona.
The 12,000 French who had come from the Var, united with
the 8000 from Genoa, composed a corps of 20,000 men, advan
tageously placed for falling upon the rear of M. de Melas. But
Massena had received, in landing, a very dangerous wound,
which prevented him from mounting on horseback ; the 8000
men whom he was leading were emaciated with fatigue ; and, it
must be confessed, all the defenders of Genoa harboured in their
breasts a secret irritation against the First Consul, who was
known to be triumphing at Milan, while the army of Liguria
was reduced to the' necessity of capitulating. Massena was
unwilling that general Suchet should run the risk of a descent
into Italy, while in ignorance of the movements about to be
made beyond the Alps by the two generals opposed to each
other. The baron de Melas, rejoined by all his lieutenants,
Haddick, Kaim, Elsnitz, and Ott, might be at the head of a for
midable force, fall upon Suchet, and crush him before he went
to meet general Bonaparte. Massena permitted his lieutenant,
Suchet, to cross the Apennines, to post himself in advance of
Acqui, and ordered him to remain in that position, observing,
harassing the Austrian army, and hanging over its head like the
sword of Damocles. We shall see presently what further
services the army of Liguria rendered by its mere presence on
the summit of the Apennines.
Massena thought that this brave army, in terminating by a
threatening movement the memorable defence of Genoa, had
done enough for the triumph of the First Consul, and that it
could not do more without imprudence : this great captain was
Q2

228 history of the [June 1800.
right. He turned over the Austrians, exhausted, reduced by
above one third, to general Bonaparte. Of the 70,000 men
who had crossed the Apennines, there returned not more than
40,000, including the detachment brought back by M. de Melas
to Turin. The 50,000 left in Lombardy were also much re
duced, and, moreover, widely dispersed. Generals Haddick
and Kaim, who guarded, the one the valley of Aosta, the other
the valley of Susa, had sustained very considerable losses.
General Wukassowich, thrown beyond the Mincio, and sepa
rated from his commander-in-chief by the French army which
descended from the St. Bernard, was paralysed for the rest of
the campaign. A corps of some thousand men had ventured
into Tuscany. By immediately uniting generals Elsnitz and
Ott, who were returning from the banks of the Var and from
Genoa, with generals Haddick and Kaim, who were coming
from the valleys of Aosta and Susa, M. de Melas might still
form a mass of about 75,000 men. But it was requisite that he
should leave garrisons in the fortresses of Piedmont and Li
guria, such as Genoa, Savona, Gavi, Acqui, Coni, Turin, Alex
andria, and Tortona; so that there would not be left him more
than fifty and some odd thousand soldiers to place in line on a
day of battle, supposing that he did not sacrifice too great a
number to the guarding of the fortresses, and that the junction
of his generals was effected without accident.
The situation of the Austrian generalissimo was, therefore,
extremely critical, even after the reduction of Genoa. It was
critical, not only on account of the dispersion and the diminution
of his forces, but also on account of the route to be pursued, in
order to get out of the cramped inclosure of Piedmont, in which
general Bonaparte had confined him. He would be obliged,
in fact, to recross the Po before the face of the French, and to
regain, through Lombardy, which they occupied, the high road
to Tyrol and to the Friule. The difficulty would be immense in
presence of an adversary, who excelled, particularly in war, in
the art of great movements.
M. de Melas had remained master of the upper Po, from its
source to Valenza. It would be easy for him to cross that river
at Turin, Chivasso, Casale, or Valenza, no matter which ; but
if he crossed at one of these points, he would fall upon the
Tessino, which general Bonaparte occupied, and upon Milan,
the centre of all the French forces. He had, therefore, but
little chance of escape in that quarter. Still he would have this
course left — to appuy on his right, to proceed towards the lower
part of the Po, that is, march to Piacenza or Cremona, in order
to gain the high road to Mantua. If he pursued this plan,
Piacenza would become for both adversaries the capital point
to occupy. For M. de Melas, it would be almost the only way
to escape the Caudine Forks ; for general Bonaparte, it would
be the means of reaping the reward of his audacious march

June 1800.] consulate and the empire. 229
across the Alps. If, in fact, the latter suffered the Austrians to
escape, though he should have delivered Piedmont, this would
be but a meagre result, in comparison with the perils which he
had braved ; he should even incur some ridicule in the eyes of
Europe, attentive to this campaign ; for his manoeuvre, the in
tention of which was now manifest, would be baffled. Piacenza
was, consequently, the key of Piedmont ; it was indispensable,
as 'well to him who wanted to get out of it, as for him who
wished to shut up his adversary there.
From these considerations M. de Melas fixed upon two points
for the concentration of his troops : Alexandria, for the troops
which were in Upper Piedmont ; Piacenza, for those which were
about Genoa. He ordered generals Haddick and Kaim to
march from Turin, by Asti, upon Alexandria ; general Elsnitz,
who had returned from the banks of the Var, to proceed
thither by Ceva and Cherasco. These three corps, once united,
were to move from Alexandria to Piacenza. He enjoined gene
ral Ott, returning from Genoa, to descend direct, by the Boc
chetta and Tortona, upon Piacenza. A corps of infantry,
relieved from all the incumbrances of an army, had orders to
proceed thither still more directly by the route of Bobbio, which
runs along the valley of the Trebbia. Lastly, general Oreilly,
who was already around Alexandria with a strong detachment
of cavalry, received instructions not to await the concentration
of the troops from Upper Piedmont, but proceed to Piacenza at
the utmost speed of his horses., The little corps hazarded in
Tuscany likewise received instructions to repair thither, through
the duchy of Parma, and by the road of Fiorenzuola. Thus,
while the principal part of the Austrian army was concentrating
itself upon Alexandria, for the purpose of thence marching to
Piacenza, the corps nearest to Piacenza itself had orders to
march thither in a direct line and instantaneously.
But it was doubtful whether it would be possible to anticipate
general Bonaparte in so important an object. He had lost at
Milan five or six days in waiting for the corps coming from the
St. Gothard — most Valuable time, since Genoa had fallen in that
interval. But now that general Moncey, with the troops de
tached from Germany, had crossed the St. Gothard, he was
not going to lose another minute. Placed on the route of the
couriers despatched from Vienna to M. de Melas atTurin, and sent
back by M. de Melas from Turin to Vienna, he was now ini
tiated in all the plans of the imperial government. He had read,
for example, the singular despatches, in which M. de Thugut,
cheering up the Austrian general, recommended to him to be
easy, and not suffer himself to be diverted from his object by
the fable of the army of reserve; to possess himself as speedily
as possible of Genoa and of the line of the Var, that he might
be able to spare a detachment to reinforce the army of marshal
de Kray, driven back upon Ulm. He had read also the des-

230 history of the [June 1800.
patches of M. de Melas, at first full of confidence, and very
soon of anxiety and uneasiness. This satisfaction, however, was
somewhat disturbed on the 8th of June, when he learned from
this same correspondence that Massena had been obliged to
surrender Genoa on the 4th. This intelligence, it is true, mad.d'e
no change in his plan for the campaign ; for, having determined d.
to get upon the rear of the enemy, in order to envelop him, and
to oblige him to lay down his arms, if he succeeded, Italy and
the city of Genoa would be reconquered at one blow. The
really serious inconvenience resulting from the reduction of
Genoa was, that he should have on his hands the disposable
troops of general Ott. But the intercepted despatch brought
consolation with it; for this despatch said that Massena's sol
diers were not prisoners of war. If, therefore, on the one hand,
a more considerable Austrian force was about to descend from
the Apennines ; on the other, French troops, which he could
not reckon upon at first, were to descend from the Apennines,
at the heels of the Austrian troops.
The First Consul, now that Genoa had opened its gates, was
in less hurry to meet M. de Melas. But it was most urgent
for him to occupy the line of the Po, from Pavia to Piacenza
and Cremona ; and he made dispositions quite as active as those
of M. de Melas, to possess himself of such important points,
and especially of Piacenza. While he was occupied at Milan in
collecting the troops which had come from the different points
of the Alps, he marched the troops which had come with him
by the St- Bernard upon the Po. Lannes had already taken
possession of Pavia with Watrin's division. This general was
directed to cross the Po a little below its junction with the
Tessino ; that is to say, at Belgiojoso. Murat, with Boudet's
and Monnier's divisions, had orders to cross it at Piacenza;
Duhesme, with Loison's division, at Cremona.
On the 6th of June, Lannes, having collected at Pavia, in the
Tessino, all the disposable craft, took them into the Po, and, on
arriving between Belgiojoso and San Cipriano, set about cross
ing. General Watrin, who was placed under his command,
crossed the river with a detachment. No sooner had he reached
the right bank, than he was attacked by the troops which had
come from Valenza and Alexandria, and were hastening to Pia
cenza. He was in danger of being thrown into the river ; but
general Watrin stood firm, till the boats going and returning
had brought him reinforcements, and he was finally left master of
the ground. The remainder of Watrin's division, led by Lannes,
then passed over, and took a position a little farther on, threaten
ing the high road from Alexandria to Piacenza.
The same day Murat arrived before Piacenza. The Austrian
commissariat was established in that town, with some hundreds
of men to guard the stores. On the approach of the danger, the
Austrian officer ordered cannon to be planted at the tete du pont of

June 1800.] consulate and the empire. 231
Piacenza, situated on the left bank of the Po, and endeavoured
to defend himself there, till the corps, which were advancing on
all sides, should have come to his aid. The advanced guard of
Monnier's division, conceiving that it was approaching an un
defended position, was received with a tremendous discharge
of grape-shot, and could make no impression on it by attacking
in front. It was therefore determined to wait till next day to
make a regular attack.
On the following day, the 7th, general Oreilly, who had re
ceived orders from M. de Melas to ride with all speed to Pia
cenza, arrived there with his cavalry. The other Austrian corps,
that which was ascending from Parma by Fiorenzuola, that
which was descending with general Gottesheim by Bobbio, and
that coming with general Ott by Tortona, had not yet arrived.
General Oreilly alone, with his squadrons, could scarcely be
equal to the defence of Piacenza. The few hundred men, who
had attempted to resist at the tete du pont, had lost one-fourth
of their number. In this situation the Austrian commandant
ordered all the artillery to be taken away, and the bridge of
Piacenza, formed of boats, to be cut ; and when general Boudet
hastened up to repair the check of the preceding day, he found
the tete du pont evacuated, and the bridge itself destroyed. But
part of the boats employed in its construction were still left.
Murat took possession of them, and caused Monnier's brigade
to be conveyed to the other side of the Po by successive trips,
a little lower down, at Nocetto. This brigade fell upon Pia
cenza, and penetrated into it, after a very warm contest. Gene
ral Oreilly hastily fell back, that he might be in time to save
the park of artillery coming from Alexandria, and which would
be in danger of falling into the hands of the French, if it ap
peared before Piacenza. He retreated, in fact, with such expe
dition as to prevent that park from falling into the hands either
of Murat or of Lannes. He had to make more than one charge
of cavalry against the advanced troops of Lannes, which had
crossed the Po at Belgiojoso; but he disengaged himself, and had
time to issue counter- orders to the park, which shut itself up in
Tortona. While general Oreilly, passing almost scathless through
our advanced posts, was returning to Alexandria, the advanced
guard of the infantry of general Gottesheim, which had de
scended along the Trebbia, by Bobbio, appeared before Pia
cenza. It was Klebeck's regiment, which had thus come upon
Boudet's entire division, and got cut to pieces. This unfortu
nate regiment, assailed by superior forces, lost a great number
of prisoners, and fell back in disorder upon Gottesheim's prin
cipal corps, which it preceded. General Gottesheim, alarmed
at this rencontre, reascended in all haste the slope of the Apen
nines to return across the mountains to Tortona and Alexan
dria, which caused him to lose his way, and wander about for
several successive days. Lastly, the regiment returning from

232 history of the. [June 1800.
Tuscany, by the route of Parma and Fiorenzuola, arrived the
same day before the suburbs of Piacenza. The consequence
was a fresh rout of that detached corps, which, falling unawares
into the midst of an enemy's army, was thrown back in disorder
upon the Parma road. Thus, out of the four corps marching
upon Piacenza, three — the least important, it is true — had been
overthrown and fled, leaving prisoners behind them. The fourth
and most considerable, that of general Ott, having a longer cir
cuit to make, was still behind, and was soon to fall in with
Lannes, in advance of Belgiojoso. From this moment the French
were masters of the Po, and had in their possession the two
principal passages, that of Belgiojoso, near Pavia, and that of
Piacenza itself. They soon occupied a third ; for, on the fol
lowing day, general Duhesme, at the head of Loison's division,
took Cremona from a detachment which general Wukassowich
had left in that city when he retired. He took there a great
quantity of materiel and 2000 prisoners.
General Bonaparte directed all these operations from Milan.
He had sent Berthier to the bank of the Po, and, day by day,
frequently hour by hour, prescribed, in an incessant correspond
ence, the movements that were to be executed.
Though, by possessing himself of the Po from Pavia to Pia
cenza, he was master of the line of retreat which M. de Melas
might be expected to attempt to follow, yet other points claimed
consideration : for what rendered the route of Piacenza the real line
of retreat for the Austrians was the presence of the French behind
the Tessino and about Milan. The French, in fact, in this posi
tion closed the passage which the Austrians would have had it
in their power to open by crossing the Po between Turin and
Valenza; but if now, for the purpose of going to meet M. de
Melas, the French were to cross the Po between Pavia and Pia
cenza, and thus to abandon Milan and to weaken the Tessino,
they might again hold out to M. de Melas a temptation to cross,
either at Turin, or at Casale, or at Valenza, to harass our un
covered rear, enter the city of Milan itself, and to serve us nearly
as we had served him in descending from the Alps.
Neither was it impossible that M. de Melas, sacrificing part
of his baggage and of his heavy artillery, wliich, besides, he
could leave in the fortresses of Piedmont, might retire upon
Genoa, then, ascending again by Tortona and Novi,asfar as the
Bocchetta, and there striking into the valley of the Trebbia,
might contrive to reach the Po, below Piacenza, in the environs
of Cremona or Parma, and succeed in gaining Mantua and the
Austrian States by this out-of-the-way route. This march across
Liguria and along the back of the Apennines, the same that had
recently been prescribed to general Gottesheim, was the least
probable, for it presented great difficulties, and would occasion
the sacrifice of part of the materiel; but it was strictly possible,
and it was necessary to provide against it as well as the others.

June 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 233
The whole attention of general Bonaparte was now engrossed in
securing himself against these various contingencies; and history
furnishes perhaps no example of combinations so skilful, so pro
foundly conceived, as those which he devised on this decisive
occasion. He had this triple problem to solve : to close by a barrier of
iron the principal route, that leading direct from Alexandria to
Piacenza ; to occupy, in such a manner as to be able to hasten
thither in case of need, that which, passing along the Upper Po,
fell upon the Tessino ; lastly, to retain the faculty of descending
timely upon the Lower Po, if the Austrians, seeking to fly
along the back of the Apennines, should attempt to cross the
river below Piacenza, towards Cremona or Parma. General
Bonaparte, incessantly poring over the map of Italy to find a
post which fulfilled these three conditions, made a choice worthy
of being for ever admired.
If we examine the course of the chain of the Apennines, we
shall see that, in consequence of the curve which it forms to
embrace the Gulf of Genoa, it runs northward, and throws out
branches which approach very closely to the Po, from the posi
tion of la Stradella to the environs of Piacenza. In all this part
of Piedmont and the duchy of Parma, the foot of the heights
advances so near to the river as to leave but a very narrow space
for the high road to Piacenza. An army posted in advance of
la Stradella, at the entrance of a sort of defile several leagues in
length, its left upon the heights, its centre upon the road, its
right along the Po and the marshy grounds that border it, is
difficult to dislodge. It must be added that the route is studded
with hamlets and villages, built of stone, and very capable of
resisting cannon. Against the imperial army, which was strong
in cavalry and artillery, this position, therefore, independently
of its natural advantages, possessed the property of annulling
those two arms.
It had, moreover, other most peculiar advantages. It is very
near this position that the tributary streams on the other side of
the Po, most important to occupy, such as the Tessino and/the
Adda, effect their junction. Thus the Tessino falls into the Po,
a little below Pavia and above Belgiojoso, nearly opposite tola
Stradella, at the distance of two leagues at most. The Adda,
running beyond and for a greater distance before it unites with
the Po, discharges itself into that river between Piacenza and
Cremona. The reader will at once comprehend that, placed at
la Stradella, and master of the bridges of Belgiojoso, of Pia
cenza, and of Cremona, general Bonaparte would be in posses
sion of the most decisive points ; for he would bar the principal
road, that from Alexandria to Piacenza, and he would have it
in his power, at the same time, by a long march, to hasten to
the Tessino, or to redescend the Po to Cremona, and to fly to-

234 history OF the [June 1800.
wards the Adda, which covered his rear against the corps of
Wukassowich. It was in this species of net, formed by the Apennines, the Po,
the Tessino, and the Adda, that he distributed his forces. He
resolved first to proceed to la Stradella himself, with the 30,000
best soldiers of his army, Watrin's, Chambarlhac's, Gardanne's,
Boudet's, and Monnier's divisions, placed under Murat, Victor,
and Lannes, in the position that we have described, the left to
the mountains, the centre upon the high road, the right along
the Po. Chabran's division, which had come by the Little St.
Bernard, and had at first been directed to occupy Ivrea, was
afterwards sent on to Vercelli, with orders to fall back upon
the Tessino, in case of the enemy's approach. Lapoype's divi
sion, which descended the St. Gothard, was posted on the Tessino
itself, in the environs of Pavia. These were from 9000 to
10,000 men, who were to fall back upon one another, to dispute
the passage of the Tessino to the last extremity, and to give
general Bonaparte time to hasten in one day to their assistance.
The detachment of the Simplon, guarded, under general Bethen-
court, towards Arona, the route of the St. Gothard, the retreat
of the French army in case of disaster. Gilly's division was to
guard Milan : this was rendered necessary by the presence of an
Austrian garrison in the citadel of that city. There were three
or four thousand more men destined for this two-fold purpose.
Lastly, Lorges' division, which had come from Germany, had
orders to establish itself at Lodi on the Adda. Loison's division,
which formed part of the army of reserve, was commissioned,
under the command of general Duhesme, to defend Piacenza
and Cremona. This was another force of 10,000 or 11,000 men
employed on these two last points.
Such was the distribution of the fifty odd thousand soldiers
whom general Bonaparte had at his disposal at the moment;
32,000 were at the central point of la Stradella, from 9,000 to
10,000 on the Tessino, 3000 or 4000 at Milan and Arona,
lastly, from 10,000 to 11,000 on the lower course of the Po and
of the Adda, all placed in such a manner as to support one another
reciprocally with extreme promptness. In fact, on receiving
notice from the Tessino, general Bonaparte could in a day fly to
the succour of the 10,000 French who guarded it. On notice
from the Lower Po, he could, in the same space of time, descend
upon Piacenza and Cremona, while general Loison, defending the
passage of the river, would give him time to hasten up. All and
each of them, on their part, could march upon la Stradella and
reinforce general Bonaparte in as short a time as it would take
him to reach them.
General Bonaparte seemed here to deviate from his usual
principle, that of concentrating his forces on the eve of a great
battle. If such a concentration passes for a master-piece of art
when it is effected seasonably, at the moment of a decisive ac-

June 1800.] consulate and the empire. 235
tion, and in the case of two adversaries anxious to measure their
strength, totally different tactics should be employed when one of
the two is attempting to escape, and the art consists in seizing
before fighting him ! Such was the case here. ' It was requisite,
in fact, that general Bonaparte should spread a net around the
Austrian army, and that this net should be strong enough to
detain it ; for, if there had been on the Tessino or the Lower
Po nothing but advanced guards, proper at most for giving notice,
not for barring the road against an enemy, the aim would have
been totally missed. There were needed at all the points posts
capable at once of giving warning and of keeping the Austrians
in check, whilst a principal mass was retained at the centre ready
to hasten to any quarter with decisive means. It was impossible,
then, to combine with more profound art the employment of his
forces, and to modify more skilfully the application of his own
principles, than general Bonaparte did on this occasion. It is
in their manner of applying, according to circumstances, a true
but general principle, that we recognise superior men of action.
This plan once decided upon, general Bonaparte gave his
orders accordingly. Lannes, with Watrin's division, had been
despatched to la Stradella by Pavia and Belgiojoso. It was of
importance that Chambarlhac's, Gardanne's, Monnier's, and
Boudet's divisions should carry to him the succour of their
forces, before the Austrian corps — which, repulsed from Pia
cenza, might join general Ott's force towards Tortona, — should
have time to press him. This was what general Bonaparte had
foreseen with his prodigious sagacity. Being unable to leave
Milan till the 8th and to reach la Stradella before the 9th, he
despatched the following instructions to Berthier, Lannes, and
Murat — Concentrate yourselves, said he, at la Stradella. On
the 8th, or the 9th at latest, you will have upon your hands
15,000 or 18,000 Austrians, coming from Genoa. Go, meet
them, rout them. There will be so many the fewer Austrians to
fight, on the day of the decisive battle which awaits us with the
whole army of M. de Melas. — Having given these orders, he set
out on the 8th from Milan to cross the Po in person' and to be
the next day at la Stradella.
It was impossible to divine more accurately the movements of
the enemy. We said just now that three Austrian detachments
had appeared uselessly before Piacenza; that the detachment
which had arrived from Tuscany by Fiorenzuola had been driven
back ; that the detachment of general Gottesheim, who had
descended with infantry by the valley of the Trebbia, had been
thrown back into that valley ; lastly, that general Oreilly, has
tening from Alexandria with cavalry, had been forced to return
towards Tortona. But general Ott, on his part, marching by
the road from Genoa to Tortona, arrived at la Stradella on the
morning of the 9th of June, as general Bonaparte had foreseen.
He brought along before him generals Gottesheim and Oreilly,

236 history of the [June 1800.
whom he had met retreating, and determined to make a vigorous
effort upon Piacenza, not imagining that nearly the whole French
army could be posted en echelon in the defile of la Stradella.
Including the troops that had just rejoined him, he had 17,000
or 18,000 men. Lannes could not collect, on the morning of
the 9th, more than 7000 or 8000 : but, in consequence of the
repeated warnings of the commander-in-chief, from 5000 to 6000
more were to rejoin him in the course of the day. The field of
battle was that which we have described. Lannes presented
himself — his left on the heights of the Apennines, the centre on
the chauss'ee towards the hamlet of Casteggio, the right on the
plain of the Po. He had been wrong in proceeding a little too
far in advance of la Stradella, towards Casteggio and Monte-
bello, just where the road ceases to form a defile, owing to the
extent of the plain. But the French, full of confidence, though
inferior in number, were capable of the greatest efforts of de
votedness, especially under a leader like Lannes, who possessed
in the highest degree the art of inducing them to follow him
anywhere. Lannes, directing'witb vigour Watrin's division upon Casteggio,
beat back the advanced posts of Oreilly. His plan consisted
in making himself master of the hamlet of Casteggio, lying
before him on the road, either by attacking it in front, or by
turning it by the plain of the Po, on the one hand, by the ac
clivities of the Apennines, on the other. The numerous artillery
of the Austrians, established on the road, swept the ground in
all directions. Two battalions of the 6th light strove to take
this murderous artillery, by turning it by the right; while the
3rd battalion of the 6th and the whole 40th endeavoured to
gain the neighbouring hills, situated on the left, and the rest of
Watrin's division marched upon Casteggio itself, where the
centre of the enemy was. An obstinate combat ensued at
all these points. The French had wellnigh carried the at
tacked positions, when general Gottesheim, hastening up with
his infantry to support Oreilly, overthrew the battalions which
had climbed the heights. Lannes, under a tremendous fire,
supported his troops, and prevented them from yielding to
numbers. They were, nevertheless, ready to succumb, when
Chambarlhac's division, forming part of general Victor's corps,
arrived. General Rivaud, at the head of the 43rd, climbed the
heights afresh, rallied the French battalions which had been re
pulsed from them, and, after incredible efforts, finally maintained
himself there. At the centre, that is, on the high road, the 96th
came to the assistance of general Watrin in his attack on the
hamlet of Casteggio; and the 24tb, extending itself to the right
in the plain, endeavoured to turn the left of the enemy, in order
to silence the fire of his artillery. During this combined effort
on the wings, the brave Watrin had to sustain a furious combat
in Casteggio ; he lost and retook the hamlet several times. But

June 1800.] consulate and the empire. 237
Lannes, present everywhere, gave the decisive impulsion. By
his orders, general Rivaud, on the left, having remained master
of the heights and crossed them, descended on the rear of Cas
teggio ; the troops, sent into the plain on the right, turned the
hotly contested hamlet; both marched to Montebello, while,
general Watrin, making a last effort on the enemy's centre,
broke through it, and at length proceeded to beyond Casteggio.
The Austrians, finding themselves at this moment repulsed in
all quarters, fled to Montebello, leaving in our hands a con
siderable number of prisoners.
The action had lasted from eleven in the forenoon till eight in
the evening. It was the Austrians who had blockaded Genoa,
trained by Massena to the most furious fights, that were here,
in the plains of Piedmont, struggling with desperation to force
their way through. They were supported by a numerous artillery,
and they had displayed more than ordinary bravery. The First
Consul arrived at the very moment when the battle, the place
and the day of which he had so correctly foreseen, was just
finished. He found Lannes covered with blood, but intoxicated
with joy, and the troops enchanted with their success. They
felt, as he has since said, that they had behaved well. The
conscripts had proved themselves worthy to vie with the veteran
soldiers. We had taken 4000 prisoners, wounded or killed
nearly 3000 men. The victory had been difficult for us to gain,
since 12,000 combatants, at most, had been opposed to 18,000.
Such was the battle of Montebello, which gave to Lannes and
his family the title that distinguishes it among the French
families of the present time — a glorious title, which his de
scendants ought to be proud to bear !
This first rencontre was a promising beginning, but it inti
mated to M. de Melas the difficulty he would have in forcing
his way. General Ott, with a force diminished by 7000 men, re
tired in consternation upon Alexandria. The courage of the
French army was raised to the highest degree of hardihood.
The First Consul lost no time in collecting his divisions, and
in strongly occupying that road from Alexandria to Piacenza,
which, in all probability, M.de Melas would follow. Lannes
having advanced too far, the First Consul fell back a little to
the very point which is called la Stradella, because the defile,
narrowed in this place by the approximation of the heights and
the river, renders the position more secure.
The 10th and 11th of June were passed in observing the move
ments of the Austrians, in concentrating the army, in giving it a
little rest after its rapid marches, in organising the artillery in
the best possible manner ; for, till now, not more than forty field-
pieces could be brought together at this point.
On the 11th, one of the most distinguished generals ot that
period, Desaix, who, perhaps, equalled Moreau, Massena,
Kleber, Lannes, in military talents, but who surpassed them all

238 history of the [June 1800.
in the rare perfections of his character, arrived at head
quarters. He had just returned from Eajypt, where Kleber had
committed political faults, which we shall soon have the chagrin
to record, which Desaix strove in vain to prevent, and, to escape
the painful sight of which, he had fled to Europe. These faults,
however, had afterwards been gloriously retrieved. Desaix,
stopped near the coast of France, had been treated by the
English in the most shameful manner. He loved the First
Consul with a sort of passion ; and the First Consul, touched by
tbe affection of such a noble heart, requited it by the warmest
friendship that he ever felt in his life. They passed a whole
night together, in relating to each other what had happened in
Egypt and in France, and the First Consul immediately gave
him the command of Monnier's and Boudet's united divisions.
On the following day, June 12th, general Bonaparte, surprised
at seeing nothing of the Austrians, could not help feeling some
apprehensions. Astonished that, in such a situation, M. de
Melas should hesitate, lose time, and suffer all the outlets to be
closed around him, measuring his adversary too closely by his
own standard, he said that M. de Melas could not have wasted
such precious hours, and that he must have escaped, either by
ascending towards Genoa, or by crossing the Upper Po, with
the intention of forcing the Tessino. Tired of waiting, he left, in
the afternoon of the 12th, his position of la Stradella, and ad
vanced, followed by the whole army, to the height of Tortona.
He gave orders for the blockade of that fortress, and established
his head-quarters at Voghera. On the morning of the 13th, he
crossed the Scrivia, and debouched in the immense plain ex
tending between the Scrivia and the Bormida, which, at the
present day, has no other name but the plain of Marengo. It
was the very same which, several months before, his imagination
marked out for the theatre of a great battle with M. de Melas.
At this place, the Po flows at a distance from the Apennines.
The intervening country is intersected by the Bormida and the
Tanaro, whose currents have become less rapid, and uniting
near Alexandria, afterwards discharge themselves into the bed
of the Po. The road skirting the foot of the Apennines to
Tortona separates from it opposite to that place, turns off to the
right, passes the Scrivia, and debouches in a vast plain. It
runs across it to a first village called San Giuliano, proceeds to
a second called Marengo, at length crosses the Bormida, and
leads to the celebrated fortress of Alexandria, " If the enemy
meant to follow the high road from Piacenza to Mantua, it is
here that he would wait for me," said general Bonaparte to
himself; " here his numerous artillery, his fine cavalry, would
have great advantages, and he would fight with all his united
means." Having made this reflection, general Bonaparte, in
order to confirm himself in his conjectures, ordered the country
to be scoured by light cavalry, which did not fall in with a single

June 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 239
Austrian outpost. Towards evening, he sent forward general
Victor's corps, composed of Gardanne's and Chambarlhac's
divisions, to Marengo. At this point we encountered a detach
ment, that of Oreilly, which defended for a moment the village
of Marengo, then .abandoned it, and recrossed the Bormida. A
reconnaissance, not made with due care, even afforded room to
suppose that the enemy had no bridge upon the Bormida.
From all these signs, general Bonaparte ceased to doubt that
M. de Melas had, as he expressed it, given him the slip. He would
not have abandoned the plain, and particularly the village of Ma
rengo, which forms the entrance to it, if he had meant to cross
it, to fight a battle, and to conquer the route from Alexandria to
Piacenza. Misled by this most just reflection, general Bona
parte left general Victor, with his two divisions, at Marengo ;
he placed Lannes en echelon in the plain with Watrin's division,
and galloped off for his head-quarters at Voghera, to get intelli
gence from general Moncey, stationed on the Tessino, from
general Duhesme, stationed on the Lower Po, and thus ascertain
what had become of M. de Melas. Officers of the staff, starting
from all points, were directed to meet him at his head-quarters.
But the Scrivia was overflowed, and very fortunately he was
obliged to stop at Torre di Garofolo. Accounts from the Tessino
and the Po, dated that very day, intimated that all was perfectly
quiet. M. de Melas had attempted nothing in that quarter.
What could have become of him ? . . . . General Bonaparte
conceived that he had marched back upon Genoa, by Novi, with
the intention of passing into the valley of the Trebbia, and again
falling upon Cremona. It seemed, in fact, that, as he was not
at Alexandria, as he was not on march for the Tessino, he could
not have taken any other course. It might also be conjectured
that, following the example of Wurmser at Mantua, he had
gone and shut himself up in Genoa, where, supplied by the
English, having a garrison of 50,000 men,- he would have the
means of protracting the war. These ideas had taken such
strong hold of the mind of the First Consul, that he directed
Desaix to march upon Rivalta and Novi with Boudet's single
division. It was, in fact, through Novi that M. de Melas would
have to pass, in going from Alexandria to Genoa.
However, from a lucky presentiment, he kept Monnier's divi
sion, and the second of Desaix's divisions, at head-quarters, and
he provided as far as possible for all contingencies, by leaving
Victor at Marengo with two divisions, Lannes with one in the
plain, Murat at his sides with all the cavalry. If we consider
the general distribution of the French forces at this moment,
spread partly on the Tessino, partly on the Lower Po and the
Adda, partly on the route to Genoa, we shall be struck with
their dispersion. This was the necessary consequence of the
general situation and of the circumstances of the day.
The night of the 13th, which preceded one of the most glorious

240 history of the [June 1800.
days in history, general Bonaparte passed at the village of Torre
di Garofolo, and fell asleep, expecting to receive tidings on the
morrow. Meanwhile, confusion reigned in Alexandria. The Austrian
army was in despair. A council of war had just been held, and
none of the resolutions which the French general was afraid of
had];been adopted. There had indeed been some talk of retiring
by the Upper Po and the Tessino, or shutting themselves up in
Genoa, but the Austrian generals, like brave men, as they were,
had preferred following the suggestions of honour. After all,
^=aid they, we have been fighting for these eighteen months, like
good soldiers ; we had reconquered Italy ; we were in march for
the frontiers of France ; our government urged us forward ; it
was but yesterday that it gave such" orders : it behoved it to
apprise us of the danger which threatened our rear. If any
blame attaches to our situation, to the government that blame
belongs. All the means proposed for avoiding an engagement with
the French army are complicated, difficult, hazardous; there is
but one simple and honourable course, it is to break through.
To-morrow we must open a way for ourselves at the price of our
blood. If we succeed, we will regain, after a victory, the road to
Piacenza and Mantua ; if not, after we have done our duty, the
responsibility for our disaster will fall upon others, not upon
ourselves. The First Consul could notcomprehend how so much time could
be thrown away in deliberating in such an emergency. But there
was none who equalled the promptness of his determinations, and
M. de Melas was in a position sufficiently desperate to cause
the cruel perplexities which delayed his definitive resolution to
be forgiven. In deciding to give battle, the Austrian general
behaved like a soldier full of honour ; but he might be reproached
for having left 25,000 men in the fortresses of Coni, Turin, Tor
tona, Genoa, Acqui, Gavi, and Alexandria, especially after the
loss which Ott had sustained at Montebello. With 25,000 men
in the fortresses, 3000 in Tuscany, 12,000 between Mantua and
Venice, he had left 40,000 men at most to bring upon the field
of battle, where the issue of the war was to be decided. To this
number had dwindled that fine army 120,000 strong, which, at
the commencement of the campaign, was to force the southern
frontiers of France ! 40,000 had perished, 40,000 were scattered,
40,000 were about to fight, in order to escape the Caudine Forks;
but among these last were a powerful cavalry and 200 pieces of
cannon. It was decided that, on the following day, the whole army
should debouch by the bridges of the Bormida, for there were
two, covered by one and the same tete du pont, notwithstanding
the false intelligence given to general Bonaparte ; that general
Ott, at the head of 10,000 men, half cavalry, half infantry, should
debouch from the Bormida, and, turning to the left, proceed to-

June 1800.] consulate and the empire. 241
wards a village called Castel Ceriolo ; that generals Haddick
and Kaim, at the head of the main body of the army, about
20,000 men, should carry the village of Marengo, which forms
the entrance to the plain ; and that general Oreilly, with 5000
or 6000 soldiers, should turn to the right and ascend the Bor
mida. A powerful artillery was to support this movement. A
considerable detachment, particularly strong in cavalry, was
left in the rear of Alexandria, on the Acqui road, to observe
Suchet's troops, of whose arrival vague accounts had been re
ceived. We have described that vast plain, traversed throughout its
whole extent by the high road from Alexandria to Piacenza, and
inclosed between the Scrivia and the Bormida. The French,
marching from Piacenza *and the Scrivia, came first to San
Giuliano, then, three-quarters of a league further, to Marengo,
which was very near the Bormida, and formed the principal
debouche that the Austrian army had to gain possession of, in
order to get out of Alexandria. Between San Giuliano and
Marengo ran, in a straight line, the road that was about to be
disputed, and on either side extended a plain covered with corn
fields and vineyards. Below Marengo, and on the right of the
French, on the left of the Austrians, was Castel Ceriolo, a large
hamlet, through which general Ott would have to pass, in order
to turn the corps of general Victor stationed in Marengo. Upon
Marengo, then, the principal attack of the Austrians was to be
directed, since that village commanded the entrance to the plain.
At daybreak, the Austrian army crossed the two bridges of
the Bormida. But its movement was slow, owing to its' having
but a single tete de pont to debouch by. Oreilly passed first,
and fell in with Gardanne's division, which general Victor, after
he had occupied Marengo, had sent forward. This division
consisted of only the 101st and the 44th demi-brigades. Oreilly,
supported by a numerous artillery, and having twice the force,
obliged it to fall back and to seek shelter in Marengo. For
tunately he did not follow it into the place, but waited until the
centre, under general Haddick, was able to support him. The
tardiness of the march through the defile formed by the bridges
caused the Austrians to lose two or three hours. At length,
generals Haddick and Kaim deployed in the rear of Oreilly,
and general Ott crossed the same bridges, to proceed to Castel
Ceriolo. General Victor instantly united his two divisions to
defend Marengo, and sent word to the First Consul,' that the
whole Austrian army was advancing, with the evident intention
of giving battle.
A defence peculiar to the ground served most seasonably to
second the intrepidity of our soldiers. In advance of Marengo,
between the Austrians and the French, was a deep and muddy
rivulet, called the Fontanone. It ran between Marengo and the
Bormida, and emptied itself, a little lower down, into the Bor-
VOL. I. K

242 history of the [June 1800.
mida. Victor placed towards his right, that is, in the village of
Marengo, the 101st and 44th demi-brigades, under general
Gardanne ; to the left of the village, the 24th, the 43rd, and the
96th, under general Chambarlhac ; a little further back, general
Kellermann, with the20th, 2nd, and oth cavalry, and a squadron
of the 12th. The rest of the 12th was sent to the Upper Bor
mida, to observe the distant movements of the enemy.
General Haddick advanced towards the rivulet, protected by
twenty-five pieces of artillery, which played upon the French.
He threw himself bravely into the bed of the Fontanone, at the
head of Bellegarde's division. General Rivaud, instantly leaving
the shelter of the village, with the 44th and the 101st, opened a
point-blank fire upon the Austrians, who were endeavouring to
debouch. A most obstinate conflict etisued along the Fontanone.
Haddick made repeated attempts ; but Rivaud,* keeping his
ground under the»batteries of the Austrians, stopped Haddick's
corps by a fire of musketry within short range, and drove it back
in disorder to the other side of the rivulet. The unfortunate
general Haddick received a wound, which afterwards proved mor
tal, and his soldiers retired. M. de Melas then ordered general
Kaim's troops to advance, and directed Oreilly to ascend the bank
of the Bormida to a place called La Stortigliona, with the design of
charging our left with Pilati's cavalry. But at this moment general ¦¦'
Kellermann was on horseback, at the head of his division of ca
valry, observing the movements of the enemy's squadrons; and
Lannes, who had lain, the preceding night, to the right of Victor,
in the plain, had just placed himself in line between Marengo
and Castel Ceriolo. The Austrians, then, made a second effort.
Gardanne's and Chambarlhac's divisions, drawn up in a semi
circle, around the semicircular bed of the Fontanone, were placed
in such a manner as to pour a converging fire upon the point of
attack. Their musketry spread havoc among the troops of
general Kaim. Meanwhile, general Pilati, ascending higher,
had succeeded in crossing the Fontanone, at the head of 2000
horse. The gaHant Kellermann, who on this day added greatly
to the glory he had acquired on the field of Valmy, clashed
upon Pilati's squadrons, as soon as they attempted to debouch,
slaughtering, and hurling them into the muddy bed of that little
stream, which art could not have formed better for covering the
position of the French.
At this moment, though our army, taken by surprise, had no
more than the two corps of Victor and Lannes in line, that is to
say, 15,000 or 16,000 men to resist 36,000, still, owing to the
fault committed by the Austrians on the preceding day/ in neg
lecting to occupy Marengo, a fault, however, which had been
productive of advantages to them, inasmuch as it had led general
Bonaparte into error, our army had time to wait the arrival of
* Olivier Rivaud.

June 1800.] consulate and the empire. 243
its commander, and of the reserves remaining behind, or sent by
the route of Novi.
Such was the state of things, when M. de Melas determined
to make a desperate effort to save the honour and the liberty of
his army, and, gallantly seconded by his soldiers, all veterans,
whose victories in the preceding campaign had heightened their
courage, M. de Melas made another attack on the French line.
General Ott, who had taken a good deal of time in filing off,
began to be in a condition to act on the left of the Austrians.
He manoeuvred with a view to turn us, passed through Castel
Ceriolo, and fell upon Lannes, who, placed beside Victor, be
tween Marengo and Castel Ceriolo, formed the right of our line.
While general Ott's corps occupied the attention of Lannes, the
corps of Oreilly, Haddick, and Kaim, having united, were di
rected anew upon the Fontanone, in front of Marengo. A for
midable artillery supported all their movements. Lattermann's
grenadiers entered the brook, crossed it, and gained the other
bank. Chambarlhac's division, posted on the left of Marengo,
and on the flanks of the Austrian grenadiers, kept up a destruc
tive fire upon them. A battalion of these grenadiers, nevertheless,
contrived to maintain its ground beyond the Fontanone. M. de
Melas redoubled the cannonade on Chambarlhac's division, which
was not covered by the houses of the village, like that which de
fended Marengo itself. Meanwhile the Austrian pioneers hastily
constructed a bridge on trestles. The gallant Rivaud, at the
head of the 44th, issuing from the village of Marengo, and march
ing up to the assailants, in spite of the grape-shot, was on the
point of driving them into the Fontanone, when tremendous dis
charges of artillery stopped the 44th, exhausted by this obstinate
struggle, and Rivaud himself was wounded. Availing themselves
of this advantage, Lattermann's grenadiers advanced en masse, and
penetrated into Marengo. Rivaud, covered with blood, placed
himself once more at the head of the 44th, made a vigorous
charge on these grenadiers, and drove them out of Marengo ;
but received, as soon as he lost the shelter of the houses, by a
fearful fire of artillery, he could not force them to recross the
brook, which had hitherto so well protected our army. Weakened
by loss of blood", and scarcely able to support himself, this brave
officer was obliged to submit to be carried off the field of battle.
The Austrian grenadiers therefore retained possession of the
position which they had just carried. At the same instant, Cham
barlhac's division, which, as we have said, was not protected by
any shelter, but completely exposed to the grape-shot, was well
nigh mowed down. General Oreilly repulsed the 96th, which
formed our extreme left, and then began to act on the offen
sive. Towards the right, Lannes, who, having at first the
single corps of general Kaim only to deal with, had been on the
point of driving it into the bed of the Fontanone, perceived that
he was all at once turned by general Ott, debouching from
r2

244 history of the [June 1800.
Castel Ceriolo with a large body of cavalry. Champeaux's bri
gade of cavalry, drawn up in rear of Lannes' corps, as was Kel
lermann in rear of Victor's, made, but in vain, several brilliant
charges. The unfortunate Champeaux received a mortal wound.
Our army, severely pressed on both wings, separated from Ma
rengo, the point to which it had at first so strongly clung,
and, having no longer any support, ran the risk of being forced
back into the plain in the rear, where it could make no stand
against two hundred pieces of cannon and an immense cavalry.
It was ten o'clock in the morning. The carnage had been
frightful. A considerable mass of wounded encumbered the
road between Marengo and San Giuliano. Already part of Vic
tor's troops, overwhelmed by numbers, were retiring in disorder,
crying that all was lost. All must have been lost, in fact, with
out a reinforcement of troops, which were not exhausted, and,
more especially, without a great captain, capable of regaining
the victory wrested from us.
General Bonaparte, on receiving intelligence that the Austrian
army, which he so feared might escape him, had, on the con
trary, taken his army by surprise, in that very plain of Marengo,
so deserted on the preceding day, hastened from Torre di Garo-
falo, congratulating himself on the lucky inundation of the
Scrivia, which had prevented him from passing the night at
Voghera. He brought with him the consular guard, a body not
very numerous, but of incomparable valour, and which became
subsequently the imperial guard ; he brought Monnier's divi
sion, composed of three excellent demi-brigades ; he was fol
lowed at a little distance by a reserve of two regiments of
cavalry; and he further sent orders to Desaix to march with
the utmost expedition for San Giuliano.
The First Consul, at the head of these reserves, proceeded at
a gallop to the field of battle. He found Lannes attacked on
the right by the infantry and cavalry of general Ott, and endea
vouring, nevertheless, to support himself on the left around
Marengo. Gardanne was defending himself in the hedges of
that village, the object of such a furious struggle; and, on the
other side, Chambarlhac's division was dispersing under the
heavy discharges of the Austrian artillery. A glance sufficed
for his military eye to perceive what was fitting to be done in
order to retrieve the day. His mutilated left was absolutely
routed ; but his right, which was only threatened, still main
tained its ground; it was that, therefore, which ought to be re
inforced. By keeping a firm' hold of Castel Ceriolo he should
have a point of support amidst that extensive plain ; he should
be able to make a pivot of his strengthened wing, and bring his
beaten wing into the rear, where it would be out of the reach of
the enemy. If he should lose by this movement the high road
from Marengo to San Giuliano, the evil would be reparable ; for,
behind his new position, there would be another roady leading

June 1800.] consulate and the empire. 245.
to Sate, and from Sale to the banks of the Po. His line of
retreat to Pavia would thus be still secured. Placed, moreover,
on the right of the plain, he would be on the flank of the Aus
trians, who would take the high road from Marengo to San
Giuliano, if they meant to follow up the victory.
Having made these reflections with the rapidity of lightning,
general Bonaparte put instantly into execution the resolution
which he had j ust conceived. He sent forward into the plain,
to the right of Lannes, the 800 grenadiers of the consular guard,
ordering them to stop the Austrian cavalry till the arrival of
Monnier's three demi-brigades. These brave fellows, formed in
square, received with admirable coolness the charges of the
Lobkowitz dragoons, and stood unbroken by the repeated assaults
of a multitude of horse. A little on their right, general Bona
parte ordered two of Monnier's demi-brigades, which arrived at
the moment, to proceed towards Castel Ceriolo. These two
demi-brigades, headed by general Carra St. Cyr, marched forward,
and, sometimes drawn up in square to stop the cavalry, some
times in columns of attack to charge the infantry, they at length
recovered the lost ground, and lodged themselves in the hedges
and gardens of Castel Ceriolo. At the same moment, general
Bonaparte, at the head of the 72nd, lent his support to the left
under Lannes, while Dupont, the chief of the staff, went to rally
in the rear the wrecks of Victor's corps, pursued by Oreilly's
horse, but protected by Murat with the reserve of cavalry. The
presence of the First Consul, the sight of the bear-skin caps of
his horse-guard, infused fresh spirit into the troops. The battle
recommenced with new fury. The brave Watrin, of Lannes'
corps, with the 6th of the line and the 22nd, drove Kaim's soldiers
into the Fontanone at the point of the bayonet. Lannes, firing the
40th and the 28th with his own heroic spirit, pushed both of
them upon the Austrians. The battle raged fiercely over the
whole of the immense plain. Gardanne strove to reconquer
Marengo ; Lannes endeavoured to make himself master of the
rivulet, which, at first, had so usefully covered our troops; the
grenadiers of the consular guard, still in square, like a living
citadel amidst that field of battle, filled the gap between Lannes
and the columns of Carra St. Cyr, which had entered the first
houses of Castel Ceriolo. But baron de Melas, with the courage
of despair, bringing up his united masses upon Marengo, de
bouched at last from the village, and drove back the exhausted
soldiers of Gardanne, who, in vain, took advantage of all ob
stacles. Oreilly continued to overwhelm with grape-shot the
division of Chambarlhac, which was still left exposed to the fire
of an immense artillery.
It was impossible for the French to keep their ground; they
were obliged to give way. General Bonaparte ordered them to
fall back by degrees, at the same time keeping up a firm couii-

246 history OF the [June 1800.
tenance. But, while his left, deprived of Marengo, and thence
forward without support, retreated rapidly to San Giuliano,
where it might find shelter, he continued to hold the right of
the plain, and drew away from it slowly, thanks to the point of
Castel Ceriolo, thanks to the energy of the consular guard, and
thanks above all to Lannes, who made unparalleled efforts.
Provided only he holds his position on the right, the First Consul
still retains a line of retreat by Sale towards the banks of the
Po ; and, if Desaix, sent the preceding day upon Novi, should
come up in time, he may still reconquer the field of battle and
bring back victoiy to his side.
It was at this moment that Lannes and his four demi-brigades
made efforts worthy of the admiration of posterity. The enemy,
who had debouched en masse from Marengo into the plain,
poured forth a shower of balls and grape-shot from eighty pieces
of cannon. Lannes, at the head of his four demi-brigades, was
two hours in retiring three quarters of a league. When the
enemy approached and became too pressing, he halted and
charged with the bayonet. Though his artillery was dismounted,
a few light pieces, drawn by the best horses, and manoeuvred
with equal skill and boldness, were brought up, and assisted by
their fire the demi-brigades that were too much cramped, and
dared to place themselves in battery against the formidable
Austrian artillery. The consular guard, which could not be
broken by charges of cavalry, was now attacked with cannon.
The enemy strove to batter it in breach, like a wall, and then
charged it with Frimont's horse. It sustained considerable loss,
and fell back, but unbroken. Carra St. Cyr fell back also,
and abandoned Castel Ceriolo, still retaining, however, a last
support in the vineyards in rear of that village. We, neverthe
less, remained masters of the road from Castel Ceriolo to Sale\
On all sides, the plain exhibited a vast scene of carnage, where
the roar of explosions mingled with that of the artillery ; for
Lannes blew up the ammunition-waggons, which he could not
carry off.
Half the day was spent. M. de Melas fancied himself sure of
the victory, which he had so dearly purchased. This old warrior,
who, for courage,at least, proved himself worthy of his adversary
on that memorable day, returned to Alexandria, worn out with
fatigue. He left the command to M. de Zach, the chief of his
staff, and sent off couriers to all Europe, to proclaim his victory
and the defeat of general Bonaparte at Marengo. This chief of
the staff, invested with the command, then formed the bulk of
the Austrian army into marching column, on the high road from
Marengo to San Giuliano. He put at the head two regiments
of infantry, and then the column of Lattermann's grenadiers,
followed by the baggage train. He placed general Oreilly on
the left, and generals Kaim and Haddick on the right, and en-

June 1800.] consulate and the empire. 247
deavoured to gain in this order that high road to Piacenza, the
object of so many efforts, and the salvation of the Austrian
army. It was now three o'clock. If no new circumstance intervened,
the battle might be considered as lost by the French, unless they
could, on the morrow, with the troops shifted from the Tessino
and the Adda, to the Po, retrieve the misfortune of the day.
Desaix, however, with Boudet's whole division, had not yet come
up: would he arrive in time ? On this circumstance depended
the issue of the battle. The aides-de-camp of the First Consul
had been galloping in quest of him ever since morning. But,
. long before they reached him, Desaix, on the first cannon-shot
fired in the plain of Marengo, had instantly wheeled about.
Hearing this distant report, he had concluded that the enemy,
whom he had been sent in search of to Novi, on the Genoa road,
was at Marengo itself. He had immediately despatched Savary,
with a few hundred horse, to Novi, to see what was going for
ward, and had waited with his division, listening intently to the
cannon of the Austrians and the French, which never ceased
thundering'in the direction of the Bormida. From Savarv having
discovered no trace of the enemy in the environs of Novi, Desaix
was confirmed in his happy conjecture, and, without further
delay, marched for Marengo, sending before him several aides-
de-camp to apprise the First Consul that he was coming. He
had marched the whole day, and, at three o'clock, his heads of
columns at length appeared at the entrance into the plain, in
the vicinity of San Giuliano. He himself, preceding them at a
gallop, rode up to the First Consul. Happy inspiration of a
lieutenant equally intelligent and attached ! happy fortune of
youth ! If, fifteen years later, the First Consul, now so well
seconded by his generals, had found a Desaix on the field of
Waterloo, he vyould have preserved the empire, and France her
preponderant position among the powers of Europe.
The presence of Desaix changed the aspect of things. He
was surrounded ; he was made acquainted with the occurrences
of the day. The generals formed a circle about him and the
First Consul, and discussed with warmth the critical position of
the army. Most of them advised retreat. The First Consul
was not of this opinion, and he earnestly pressed Desaix for his.
Desaix, surveying the devastated field of battle, then drawing
out his watch and looking at the hour, replied to general Bona
parte in these simple and noble terms : "Yes, the battle is lost;
but it is only three o'clock ; there is time enough to gain ano
ther." General Bonaparte, delighted with the opinion of Desaix,
prepared to avail himself of the succour brought him by that
general, and of the advantages ensured to him by the position
taken ever since morning. He was, in fact, in the plain, on the
right, while the enemy was on the left, in marching column, on
the high road, advancing towards San Giuliano. Desaix, ar-

248 HISTORY OF the [June 1800.
riving from San Giuliano, with 6000 fresh troops, and facing the
Austrians, might stop them short, while the bulk of the rallied
army should fall upon their flank. Orders were forthwith issued
in accordance with this plan.
The three demi-brigades of Desaix were formed in advance
of San Giuliano, a little to the right of the high road ; the 30th
deployed in line ; the 9th and 59th in close columns on the
wings of the former. A slight undulation of the ground con
cealed them from the enemy. On their left were the rallied
and somewhat recovered wrecks of Chambarlhac's and Gar
danne's troops under general Victor ; on their right, in the
plain, Lannes, whose retreating movement was suspended, then
the consular guard, then Carra St. Cyr, who had kept as near
as possible to Castel Ceriolo. The army then formed a long
oblique line from San Giuliano to Castel Ceriolo, and between
Desaix and Lannes, and a little in rear, was placed Keller-
mann's cavalry in the interval. A battery of twelve pieces, the
sole remnant of the whole artillery of the army, was spread upon
the front of the corps of Desaix.
These dispositions made, the First Consul rode through the
ranks of his soldiers, and addressed the different corps. "My
friends," said he, " we have fallen back far enough : recollect that,
I am accustomed to lie on the field of battle." Having reani
mated the troops, who, inspirited by the arrival of the reserves,
burned with impatience to resume the fight, he gave the signal
for attack. A charge was beaten along the whole line.
The Austrians, in order of march rather than in order of battle,
were proceeding along the high road. The column under the
command of M. de Zach came first. A little in rear, came the
centre, half deployed in the plain, and making front to Lannes.
General Marmont all at once unmasked twelve pieces of
cannon. A thick shower of grape-shot fell upon the head of the
surprised Austrian column, which expected no further re
sistance ; for the enemy believed that the French were decidedly
retreating. Scarcely had it recovered from this sudden shock,
when Desaix set the 9th light in motion. " Go and inform the
First Consul," said he to Savary, his aide-de-camp, " that I
am charging, and that I am in want of cavalry to support me."
Desaix, on horseback, led on this demi-brigade. He ascended
with it the slight rise of the ground which hid it from the view
of the Austrians, and abruptly revealed himself to them by a
fire of musketry discharged within a few paces of them. The
Austrians returned it, and Desaix fell, pierced by a ball in the
chest. " Conceal my death," said he, to general Boudet,
his chief of division ; " it might dishearten the troops."
Useless precaution of that hero ! His fall had been observed,
and his soldiers, like those of Turenne, insisted, with loud
shouts, on avenging their leader. The 9th light, which on that
day earned the title of incomparable, which it bore till the ter-

June 1800.] consulate and the empire. 249
mination of our wars — the 9th light, having poured forth its
fire, formed in column, and fell upon the dense mass of the
Austrians. At sight of it, the first two regiments which opened
the march, taken by surprise, fell back in disorder on the second
line, and disappeared in its ranks. The column of Lattermann's
grenadiers was then alone at the head, and received this shock
like crack troops. It stood firm. The conflict extended on
both sides of the high road. The 9th light was supported on
the right by Victor's rallied troops, on the left by the 30th and
59th demi-brigades of Boudet's division, which had followed
the movement. Lattermann's grenadiers were defending them
selves with difficulty, when an unforeseen storm suddenly burst
over their heads. General Kellermann, who, on the application
of Desaix, had received orders to charge, set off at a gallop, and,
passing between Lannes and Desaix, placed part of his squadrons
en potence, to make head against the Austrian cavalry, which he
saw before him ; then, with the rest, he fell upon the flank of
the column of the grenadiers, already attacked in front by
Boudet's infantry. This charge, executed with extraordinary
vigour, cut the column in two. Kellermann's dragoons
slaughtered to the right and to the left, till, pressed on all
sides, the unfortunate grenadiers laid down their arms. Two
thousand of them surrendered. At their head, general Zach
himself was obliged to deliver his sword. The Austrians were
thus deprived of their commander during the conclusion of the
battle; for M. de Melas, as we have seen, thinking himself sure
of the victory, had retired to Alexandria. Kellermann did not
stop there ; dashing upon the Lichtenstein dragoons, he put
them to flight. The latter fell back upon the centre of the
Austrians, which was deploying in the plain, in face of Lannes,
and threw it into some disorder. Lannes then advanced, and
attacked the shaken centre of the Austrians with vigour ; while
the grenadiers of the consular guard and Carra St. Cyr again
moved towards Castel Ceriolo, from which they were not far
distant. Along the whole line from San Giuliano to Castel
Ceriolo, the French had resumed the offensive ; they marched
forward, intoxicated with joy and enthusiasm, on perceiving
victory returning to them. Surprise and discouragement had
passed to the side of the Austrians.
Admirable determination of character, which persists, and,
by persisting, brings back Fortune ! From San Giuliano to
Castel Ceriolo, that oblique line of the French advanced at the
charge-step, driving back the Austrians, utterly astonished at
having a new battle to fight. Carra St. Cyr had soon retaken
the village of Castel Ceriolo, and general Ott, who had at first
advanced -beyond that village, fearful of being overpowered,
thought of falling back, lest he should have his communi
cation cut of. A panic was communicated to the cavalry;
it fled at full speed, shouting, "To the bridges !" All, then,

250 history of the [June 1800.
strove who should first reach those bridges of the Bormida.
General Ott, recrossing at Castel Ceriolo with Vogelsang's
troops, was obliged to force his way through the French. He
succeeded, and regained in haste the banks of the Bormida, to
which all hurried with furious precipitation.
Generals Kaim and Haddick strove in vain to keep their
ground in the centre; Lannes did not allow them the means of
doing so ; he drove them into Marengo, and prepared to push
them into the Fontanone, and, from the Fontanone, into the
Bormida. But Weidenfeld's grenadiers made head for a mo
ment, to give Oreilly, who had advanced as far as Cassina
Grossa, time to come back. The Austrian cavalry, on its part,
attempted several charges to stop the progress of the French.
But it was repelled by the horse grenadiers of the consular
guard, led by Bessieres and young Beauharnais. Lannes and
Victor, with their united corps, at last fell upon Marengo, and
threw Oreilly's as well as Weidenfeld's grenadiers into disorder.
The confusion on the bridges of the Bormida increased every
moment. Foot, horse, artillery, were crowded together there
in disorder. The bridges being insufficient for all, many threw
themselves into the Bormida, for the purpose of fording it. An
artillery-driver attempted to cross with his gun. He succeeded,
and the whole of the artillery would then have followed his
example, but part of the carriages stuck fast in the bed of the
river. The French hotly pursuing them, took men, horses,
cannon, and baggage. The unfortunate baron de Melas, who,
two hours before, had left his army victorious, had hastened to
the spot on hearing of this disaster, and could not believe his
eyes. He was a prey to vexation and despair. Such was the
sanguinary battle of Marengo, which, as we shall presently see,
had an immense influence on the destinies of France and of the
world; it gave, in fact, at the moment, peace to the Republic,
and, a little later, the Empire to the First Consul. It was
cruelly disputed, and it was worth the disputing ; for never was
the issue of a battle more serious for both adversaries. M. de
Melas fought to avoid a humiliating capitulation ; general Bo
naparte staked on that day his whole fortune. The losses,
considering the number of the combatants, were immense, and
out of all the usual proportions. The Austrians lost about 8000
men, in killed and wounded, and more than 4000 prisoners.
Their staff was cruelly decimated. General Haddick was killed ;
generals Vogelsang, Lattermann, Bellegarde, Lamarsaille, and
Gottesheim were wounded ; and with them a great number of
officers. Thus they lost, in men hors de combat or taken, one-
third of their army, if it was from 36,000 to 40,000 strong, as
it is generally said to have been. As for the French, they had
6000 killed or wounded, and about 1000 of them were taken
prisoners, which again exhibits a loss of one-fourth, out of
28,000 soldiers present at the battle. Their staff suffered as

June 1800.] consulate and the empire. 251
severely as the Austrian staff. Generals Mainony, Rivaud,
Malher, Cham peaux, were wounded, the last mortally. The
greatest loss was that of Desaix. France had not sustained one
more to be regretted during a ten years1 warfare. In the esti
mation of the First Consul, this loss was great enough to diminish
the joy that he felt for the victory. His secretary, M. de
Bourrienne, hastening to congratulate him on this miraculous
triumph, said to him, "What a glorious day!" "Yes," re
plied the First Consul, " it would have been glorious indeed,
could I but have embraced Desaix this evening on the field of
battle. I was going," added he, " to make him minister of
war; I would have made him a prince, if I could." The con
queror of Marengo had as yet no notion that he should, at no
distant day, have it in his power to bestow crowns on those vvho
served him. The body of the unfortunate Desaix was lying
near San^Giuliano, amidst that vast field of carnage. His aide-
de-camp, Savary, who had been long attached to him, sought
out his body from among the dead, and, recognising it by his
profusion of hair, had it removed, and wrapped in an hussar
cloak ; then placing it on his horse, he conveyed it to the head
quarters at* Torre di Garofalo.
Though the plain of Marengo was drenched with French
blood, joy pervaded the army. Soldiers and generals felt the
merit of their conduct, and appreciated the immense importance
of a victory gained on the rear of the enemy. The Austrians, on
the contrary, were in consternation ; they knew that they were
enveloped, and had no alternative but to submit to the law of
the conqueror. Baron de Melas, who, on this day, had two
horses killed under him, and who, in spite of his great age, had
behaved as well as the youngest and most valiant soldier in his
army could have done — baron de Melas was overwhelmed with
the profoundest grief. He had returned to Alexandria, to rest
himself a little, in the belief that he was the victor. Now he
saw his army half destroyed, seeking flight by every outlet,
abandoning its artillery to the French, or leaving it swamped in
the marshes of the Bormida. To complete the misfortune,
Zach, the chief of his staff, who enjoyed his entire confidence,
was at this moment a prisoner with the French. In vain he
turned his eyes from one of his generals to another ; none of
them would give an opinion, but all cursed the cabinet of
Vienna, which had kept them under such fatal illusions, and
thus plunged them into an abyss. It was 'imperative, however,
to come to "some determination, but what? .... To fight, in
order to clear themselves a way ? They had just tried that plan,
but not succeeded. To retire upon Genoa, or to cross the
Upper Po, for the purpose of forcing the Tessino? These
courses, difficult before the battle, were impracticable since it
had been fought and lost. General Suchet was a few leagues
in rear with the army of Liguria, towards Acqui ; general Bo-

252 history of the [June 1800,
naparte was in advance of Alexandria, with the victorious army
of reserve. They were on the point of effecting their junction,
and cutting off the road to Genoa. General Moncey, who,
with the detachments which had come from Germany, was
guarding the Tessino, might be succoured by general Bona
parte in as short a time as it would take to march to him. Thus
there was no chance of escape on any side, and they were com
pelled to adopt the cruel idea of capitulating ; happy if, in
abandoning Italy, they could save the liberty of the Austrian
army, and if they could obtain from the generosity of the con
queror the concession that those unfortunate troops should not
be made prisoners of war. In consequence, it was resolved that
a flag of truce should be sent to general Bonaparte, for the
purpose of entering into negotiations. Prince Lichtenstein was
selected to repair, next morning, June 15th (26th Prairial), to the
French head-quarters.
The First Consul, on his part, had many reasons for treating.
His principal aim was attained, for Italy was delivered by a
single battle. After the victory which he had just won, and
which enabled him completely to hem in the Austrians, he was
certain to obtain the evacuation of Italy; he might even, in
strictness, require the vanquished to lay down their arms, and
to surrender themselves prisoners. But, by wounding the
honour of those brave men, he might, perhaps, urge them to an
act of despair. It would be spilling useless blood, and, above
all, it would be losing time. Having been absent from Paris
for above a month, he was sensible hpw important it was that
he should return as speedily as possible. We had a prisoner,
who was capable of being a most useful medium of communi
cation. This was general Zach. To him the First Consul
opened his mind ; he expressed, in his presence, his sincere
desire to make peace, his disposition to spare the imperial army,
and to grant it honourable terms. The Austrian flag of truce
having meanwhile arrived, he manifested before that envoy the
same sentiments that he had expressed to M. de Zach, and
charged both of them to return with Berthier to M. de Melas,
to settle the bases of a capitulation. According to his custom
in all cases of this kind, he declared irrevocably the conditions
already fixed in his own mind, adding that no parleying would
induce him to modify them. Thus he refrained from insisting
that the army of the Austrians should be declared prisoners of
war; he was willing fo allow it to pass with the honours of war;
but he required that all the fortresses of Liguria, Piedmont,
Lombardy, and the Legations, should be immediately given up
to France, and that the Austrians should evacuate all Italy./ as
far as the Mincio. The negotiators set out forthwith for the
Austrian head-quarters.
The conditions which they brought, though rigorous, were
natural, one might even say generous. One only was mortify-

June 1800.] consulate and the empire. 253
ing, almost humiliating ; this was the surrender of Genoa, after
such effusion of blood, and after an occupation of a few days
only ; but evidently the conqueror could not waive this point.
M. de Melas, nevertheless, sent his principal negotiator to the
First Consul, to make some remonstrances against the proposed
armistice. " Sir," said the First Consul, with warmth, " my
conditions are irrevocable. It was not yesterday that I began
my military life ; your position is as well known to me as to
yourselves. You are in Alexandria, incumbered with dead,
wounded, sick, destitute of provisions ; you have lost the best
troops of your army, and are surrounded on all sides. There is
nothing that I might not require, but I respect the gray hair of
your general, and the valour of your troops, and I require
nothing more than is imperatively demanded by the present
situation of affairs. Return to Alexandria ; do what you will,
you shall have no other conditions."
The convention was signed at Alexandria on that same day,
the 15th, according to the bases proposed by general Bonaparte.
It was agreed, in the first place, that there should be a sus
pension of arms in Italy, till the receipt of an answer from
Vienna. If the convention was confirmed, the Austrians were
to be at liberty to retire with the honours of war behind the line
of the Mincio. They engaged, in retiring, to deliver up to the
French all the fortresses which they occupied. The citadels of
Tortona, Alexandria, Milan, Arona, and Piacenza, were to be
delivered up between the 16th and the 20th of June (27th
Prairial, and 1st Messidor) ; the citadels of Ceva, Savona, the
fortresses of Coni and Genoa, between the 16th and the 24th of
June; and the fort of Urbino on the 26th. The Austrian army
was to be divided into three columns, which were to retire one
after another, as fast as the fortresses were delivered up. The
immense stores of provisions, accumulated by M. de Melas in
Italy, were divided equally ; the artillery of the Italian foundries
was assigned to the French army, the artillery of the Austrian
foundries to the imperial army. The Imperialists, after they had
evacuated Lombardy, as far as the Mincio, were to confine them
selves behind the following line : — the - Mincio, the Fossa
Maestra, the left bank of the Po, from Borgo Forte to the mouth
of the river in the Adriatic. Peschiera and Mantua were left
to the Austrian army. It was stipulated, without any expla
nation, that the detachment of that army, then in Tuscany,
should continue to occupy that province. Concerning the States
of the Pope and the king of Naples, no mention could be made
in this capitulation, because those princes had nothing to do
with events passing in Upper Italy. If this convention was
not ratified by the emperor, ten days' notice of the resumption
of hostilities was to be given. In the meantime, no detach
ment was to be sent off to Germany by either party.
Such was the substance of the celebrated convention of Alex-

254 history of the [June 1800.
andria, that in one day gained for France the restitution of
Upper Italy, which involved the restitution of the whole ot Italy.
M. de Melas has since been censured much, and much too
severely, for this campaign and this convention. We ought to
be just towards misfortune, especially when it is redeemed by
conduct Ml of honour. M. de Melas was deceived, respecting
the existence of the army of reserve, by the cabinet of Vienna,
which was incessantly feeding him with the most mischievous
illusions. When once undeceived, he may he censured for not
having collected his troops either soon enough, or completely
enough, and for having left too many men in the fortresses. It
was, in fact, not behind the walls of those places, but on the
field of battle of Marengo, that they ought to have been de
fended. Admitting this fault, it must be acknowledged that
M. de Melas conducted himself as brave men do, when they are
surrounded ; he strove to cut his way through, sword in hand.
The attempt was most gallantly made, and he was vanquished.
From that time there was but one thing possible for him to do,
and that was, to save the liberty of his army, for Italy was
irrecoverably lost to him. He could not obtain more than he
did obtain ; he might even, had the conqueror so willed it, have
been subjected to further humiliations. And the conqueror
himself did well not to require more, since, had he determined
to humble these brave men, he would have incurred the risk of
driving them to desperate extremities, and of losing valuable
time, his presence in Paris being at that moment indispensable.
Let us, then, pity M. de Melas, and admire, without reserve,
the conduct of the victor, who owed the prodigious results of
this campaign/ not to chance/but to the most profound and the
most marvellously executed combinations
Some detractors of general Bonaparte have pretended to at
tribute to general Kellermann the victory of Marengo and all
the results which that memorable battle brought in its train.
Why then, if general Bonaparte must be stripped of this glory,
not ascribe it to that noble victim of the happiest inspiration, to
that Desaix, who, anticipating the orders of his chief, sacrificed
his life, but won the day? Or why not ascribe it to that intrepid
defender of Genoa, who, by detaining the Austrians on the
Apennines, gave general Bonaparte time to descend from the
Alps, and delivered them up to him almost half destroyed?
According to some people, generals Kellermann, Desaix, and
Massena, would be the real conquerors of Marengo, — all, except
ing general Bonaparte. qSut, in this world, the voice of nations
has always decreed glory, and the voice of nations has proclaimed
conqueror him, who discovered, with the glance of o-enius, the
use that might be made of the High Alps, for debouching on
the rear of the Austrians, who deceived their vigilance for three
successive months, who created an army which did not exist,
who caused its formation to be disbelieved by all Europe who

June 1800.] consulate and the empire. 255
crossed the St. Bernard without beaten road, appeared unex
pectedly in the midst of Italy; confounded with astonish
ment, surrounded his unfortunate adversary with marvellous
art, and fought with him a decisive battle, lost in the morn
ing, regained in the evening, and sure to have been regained,
if not on that day, yet on the next : for, besides Desaix's 6000
men, 10,000 hastening up from the Tessino, and 10,000 posted
on the Lower Po, would have furnished infallible means for
destroying the hostile army. Let us suppose, in fact, the Aus
trians, victorious on the 14th of June, entering the defile of La
Stradella, finding at Piacenza generals Duhesme and Loison,
with 10,000 men, ready to dispute with them the passage of the
Po, and at their heels general Bonaparte, reinforced by generals
Desaix and Moncey; what would the Austrians have done in
that dangerous place, stopped by a well-defended river, and
pursued by an army superior in number? They would have
succumbed more disastrously than in the plains of the Bormida.
I The real conqueror of Marengo was, therefore, he who chained
Fortune by his combinations, profound, admirable, unequalled
in the history of great captains.
For the rest, he was ably served by his lieutenants, and there
is no need to sacrifice any glory for the purpose of building up
his. Massena, by an heroic defence of Genoa, — Desaix, by the
most happy determination, — Lannes, by incomparable firmness
in the plain of Marengo, — Kellermann, by a splendid charge , of
cavalry, — all aided him in his triumph. He rewarded them all
in the most signal manner ; and, as for Desaix, he evinced for
his death the noblest sorrow. The First Consul decreed mag
nificent honours to the man who had rendered France so im
portant a service ; he even adopted his military family and
placed about his own person his two aides-de-camp, who were
thrown out of employment by the death of their general : these
were colonels Rapp and Savary. -:
Before he left the field of battle of Marengo, the First Consul
resolved to write another letter to the emperor of Germany.
Though the first had elicited only an indirect answer, ad
dressed by M. de Thugut to M. de Talleyrand, he conceived
that in the hour of victory he might condescend to renew his
rejected overtures. At this moment, he was most ardently
desirous of peace : he felt that, to give peace to France' abroad,
as he had pacified it at home, was his real vocation, and that
the accomplishment of this task would legitimatise his nascent
authority, much more than new victories could possibly do.
Susceptible, moreover, of the strongest impressions, he had
been most deeply touched on beholding that plain of Marengo,
on which lay a fourth of two armies : under the influence of these
sentiments/ he wrote a singular letter to the emperor. "It is on
the field of battle," said he, " amidst the sufferings of a mul
titude of wounded, and surrounded by 15,000 dead, that I

256 history of the [June 1800.
beseech your Majesty to listen to the voice of humanity, and
not to permit two brave nations to slaughter each other for
interests which are foreign to both. It is for me to urge your
Majesty; since I am nearer than you to the theatre of war,
your heart cannot be so strongly impressed as mine."
The letter was long. The First Consul discussed in it, with
the eloquence peculiar to himself, and in language which was
not that of diplomacy, the motives which France and Austria
could still have for continuing armed against one another. " Is it
for religion that you are fighting?" said he. " In this case, make
war upon the Russians and the English, who are the enemies of
your faith, and be not their ally. Is it to check the progress of
revolutionary principles ? But the war has propagated them
over half the continent, by extending the conquests of France,
and it cannot but propagate them still farther. Is it for the
balance of power in Europe ? But the English threaten that
balance more than we do ; for they are become the masters and
the tyrants of commerce, and nobody can now match them;
whereas Europe will always be able to control France, if she
were seriously to threaten the independence of nations. — [A
proposition unfortunately but too well founded, as a war of
fifteen years has but too fully proved I] Is it," added the warrior
diplomatist, "is it for the integrity of the Germanic empire!
But your Majesty has yourself given up to us Mayence and the
German States on the left bank of the Rhine. Besides, the
Empire is earnestly entreating you to give it peace. Is it,
lastly, for the interests of the house of Austria ? Nothing is
more natural : but let us carry out the treaty of Campo Formio,
which secures to your Majesty large indemnities in compensa
tion of the provinces lost in the Netherlands, and ensures them
to you in that quarter where you had rather obtain them, that
is, in Italy. Let your Majesty send negotiators whithersoever
you please, and we will add to the treaty of Campo Formio sti
pulations capable of satisfying you relative to the existence of
the secondary States, which the French Republic is charged
with having shaken." The First Consul here alluded to Holland,
Switzerland, Piedmont, the Roman States, Tuscany, and Na
ples, which the Directory had revolutionised. " On these con
ditions," he added, "peace is made; let us extend the armistice
to both armies, and enter into immediate negotiations."
M. de St. Julien, one of the generals who possessed the con
fidence of the emperor, was to be the bearer of this letter and
of the convention of Alexandria to Vienna.
Some days afterwards, his first impressions having somewhat
worn off, the First Consul felt that species of regret which he
often experienced, when he happened to write an important
paper from the first impulse, and without consulting cooler
minds than his own. In apprising the Consuls of the step he
had taken, he said, "I have despatched a courier to the emperor

June 1800.] consulate and the empire. 257
with a letter which the minister of foreign affairs will commu
nicate to you. You will find it rather original; but it was
written on the field of battle. JJ { June 22nd.)
Having taken leave of his army, he set out for Milan on the
morning of the 17th of June (28th Prairial) three days after
the victory of Marengo. He was awaited there with keen im
patience. He arrived about dark. The population, forewarned,
thronged the streets to see him pass. They raised shouts of
joy, and threw flowers into his carriage. The city was illumi
nated with that brUliancy which the Italians alone understand
the art of displaying on such occasions. The Lombards, who
had just borne for ten or twelve months the Austrian yoke,
rendered more galling by the war and the violence of circum
stances, trembled for fear of being replaced under their insup
portable authority. During the various phases of this short
campaign, in which the most contrary reports reached them,
they had experienced the most painful anxiety, and they were
transported with joy to see tlieir deliverance at last ensured.
General Bonaparte ordered the re-establishment of the Cisalpine
Republic to be immediately proclaimed, and hastened to intro
duce some order into the affairs of Italy, the aspect of which
was completely changed by his recent victory.
We have already observed that the war, undertaken by the
formidable coalition of the Russians, the English, and the
Austrians, to re-establish in their dominions the princes over
thrown by the alleged encroachments of the Directory, had not
replaced any of them. The king of Piedmont was at Rome,
and the grand-duke of Tuscany in Austria ; the Pope had died
at Valence, and his provinces were invaded by the Neapolitans.
The royal family of Naples, entirely devoted to the English,
was alone in its dominions. The queen of Naples, Sir John
Acton, and lord Nelson, .permitted, if they did not order, abo
minable cruelties. The victory of the French Republic was
destined to change all this : humanity was as much interested
in the matter as policy.
The First Consul instituted a provisional government in
Milan, till the Cisalpine could be reorganised, and definitive
frontiers assigned to it, which would not be possible before
peace. He did not conceive that he was obliged to pay more
regard to the king of Piedmont than Austria had shown for him,
and therefore he was in no hurry to re-establish him in his
dominions. He appointed, instead,, a provisional government,
and nominated general Jourdan commissioner to this govern
ment, with the direction of which he was charged. The First
Consul had long wished to employ, and to withdraw from his
enemies, this wise and honest man, not at ali fitted to be the
head of the anarchists in France. Piedmont, therefore, was
held in reserve, with the intention of disposing of it at the peace,
either for the profit of the French Republic, or as a pledge of
VOL. I. S

258 history of the [June 1800.
reconciliation with Europe, when reconstituting her secondary
States, destroyed under the Directory. Tuscany was to continue
occupied by an Austrian corps. The First Consul caused it to
be watched, ready to lay hands on it if the English should land,
or if more men should be raised against France. As for Naples,
he said nothing, he did nothing, waiting to see the effect of his
victory on the spirit of that court. The queen of Naples, in
affright, was already preparing to set out for Vienna, to solicit
the support of Austria, and, more especially, that of Russia.
There remained the court of Rome : here temporal interests
were bound up with the most important spiritual interests.
Pius VI., as we have seen, had recently died in France, the
prisoner of the Directory. The First Consul, true to his policy,
had caused funeral honours to be paid to him. A conclave had
assembled at Venice, and had, with great difficulty, obtained
permission from the Austrian cabinet to appoint a successor to
the deceased Pope. Thirty-five cardinals attended this conclave.
A prelate was secretary : this was monsignor Consalvi, a Roman
priest, young, ambitious, remarkable for the pliancy, the pene
tration, the agreeable qualities of his mind, and who has since
been mixed up with the most important affairs of the time. The
conclave, as usual in all elections, political or religious, was
divided. Twenty-two of its members sided with cardinal Braschi,
nephew of the late Pope, and supported the pretensions of car
dinal Bellisomi, bishop of Cesena. Those who were unwilling
to perpetuate at Rome the all-powerful influence of the Braschi
family, joined cardinal Antonelli, who was in favour of cardinal
Mattei, who signed the treaty of Tolentino. But they gave
him only thirteen votes. For several months this silent but
obstinate contest had been going on. Neither of the two com
petitors had as yet gained any votes from the other. At length
the learned cardinal Gerdil, who had figured in the controversies
of the last century, was thought of. This new candidate was a
native of Savoy, and had become, since the victories of the
Republic, a subject of France. Austria exercised her right of
exclusion against him.' To put an end to the matter, two mem
bers of the conclave deserted cardinal Mattei, and promised to
support cardinal Bellisomi, which ensured him twenty-four
votes, that is, two-thirds, the number rigorously required by the
laws of the Church to render an election valid. But, as the
assembly was held in the dominions of Austria, it was thought
proper first to submit to her this nomination, in order to obtain
her tacit assent. The court of Vienna had the discourtesy to let
more than a month elapse before returning an answer. The
susceptibility of the princes of the Church was wounded ; at
the same time the plans of all parties were upset, and the elec
tion of cardinal Bellisomi became impossible. This moment of
disorder and fatigue the able secretary of the conclave, the
prelate Consalvi, had been waiting for, to start a fresh candidate,

June 1800.] consulate and the empire. 259
the object of his long and secret meditations. Addressing him
self to each party in that language which was most likely to
touch it, he demonstrated to one the inconveniences of the pre
ponderance of the Braschi; to another the little reliance that
could be placed on Austria, or the other Christian courts ; then,
appealing to the old Roman interest, so profound, so sagacious^
he unfolded to their astonished eyes, a prospect absolutely new
to them all. " It is from France," said he to them, "that we
have suffered persecution for these ten years past. Well, it is
from France that we may, perhaps, derive future support and con
solation. France, ever since the days of Charlemagne, has always
been the most useful, the least irksome of protectors. A young and
very extraordinary man, of whom it is still very difficult to form
a judgment, now rules that country, and, depend upon it, he
will very soon have reconquered Italy. [The battle of Marengo
had not then been fought.] Recollect that he protected the
priests in 1797s and that he has, quite recently, paid funeral
honours to Pius VI. Singular expressions which he has been
heard to use, on the subject of religion and of the court of Rome,
have been repeated to us by witnesses worthy of credit. Do
not neglect the support which you may derive from that quar
ter. Let us make a final choice that cannot be considered as an
hostility to France ; that may even, up to a certain point, be
agreeable to her; and we shall, perhaps, do a thing more service
able to the Church, than applying for candidates to all the Ca
tholic courts in Europe."
This was certainly a flash from that genius of the court of
Rome, which afterwards blazed forth at the commencement of
the present century. Monsignor Consalvi then put forward
the. name of cardinal Chiaramonti, bishop of Imola. It was
impossible to make a choice more consonant with the end which
he had in view. Cardinal Chiaramonti, a native of Cesena,
aged fifty-eight years, related to Pius VI., elevated by him to
the Roman purple, had long been universally esteemed for his
understanding, his learning, and his amiable character. With
these attractive qualities he united great firmness ; and he had
been seen at an earlier period struggling with a victorious forti
tude against the annoyances of his Order, that of St. Benedict,
and the persecutions of the Holy Office. His most recent and!
most celebrated act was a homily written in quality of bishop of
Imola, when his diocese had been united with the Cisalpine
Republic. He had then spoken of the French Revolution with
a moderation which had charmed the conqueror of Italy, and
scandalised the fanatics of the old order of things. Respected,
nevertheless, by every body, he pleased the Braschi party, was
not disliked by the contrary party, suited all the cardinals, weary
of the length of the conclave, and was deemed a happy choice
by those who hoped much from the good-will of France in
future. The unexpected adhesion of an illustrious personage
S 2

260 history OF the [June 1800?
decided his election, which, in fact, met with no real difficulty
but in his personal reluctance to accept, such an honour. This
adhesion was that of cardinal Maury. This celebrated champion
of the ancient French monarchy had retired to the court of
Rome, where he lived, rewarded by a cardinal's hat for his
struggles with Barnave and Mirabeau. He was an emigrant,
but an emigrant endowed with a remarkable mind, extraordinary
sense, and cherishing with secret satisfaction the idea of attach
ing himself again to the government of France, since glory re
deemed the novelty of that government. He could dispose of
six votes, and gave them to cardinal Chiaramonti, who was
elected Pope nearly at the moment of the arrival of general
Bonaparte at Milan, after crossing the St. Bernard.
The new Pontiff was at Venice, having been unable to obtain
from the court of Vienna permission to be crowned at St. Marks,
or from the court of Naples the restitution of Rome. However,
having set out almost suddenly to proceed to Ancona, he nego
tiated in that city the evacuation of the States of the Church,
and his own return to the capital of the Christian world. France,
which had become friendly towards the Holy See, had it in her
power to afford him very timely support in this precarious posi
tion, and the singular foresight of Monsignor Consalvi might
receive its fulfilment in a manner which was altogether unex
pected. This meeting of cardinal Chiaramonti and the First
Consul, the one raised to the pontifical throne, the other to the
republican dictatorship, nearly at the same time, was not one of
the least extraordinary or the least fertile in consequences of
the events of the present century.
Young Bonaparte, in 1796, the submissive general of the.
Directory, unable as yet to dare every thing, and not as yet
pretending to school the French Revolution, had maintained
the Pope by the treaty of Tolentino, and had taken from him
nothing but the Legations for the purpose of annexing them to
the Cisalpine Republic. Having now become First Consul,
having it in his power to do what he thought fit, determined to
rectify many of the things which the French Revolution had
accomplished, he could not hesitate as to his conduct towards
the recently elected Pope. No sooner had he returned to Milan
than he had an interview with cardinal Martiniana, bishop of
Vercelli, a friend of Pius VII.'s, declared to him that he was
resolved to live on good terms with the Holy See, to reconcile
the French Revolution with the Church, even to support the
latter against her enemies, if the new Pope showed himself
reasonable, and thoroughly comprehended the then situation of
France and of the world. This intimation, dropped into the
ear of the aged cardinal, was not destined to be lost, and was
soon to produce abundant fruit. The bishop of Vercelli des
patched to Rome his own nephew, count Alciati, to open a
negotiation.

June 1800.] consulate and the empire. 261
To this overture general Bonaparte added an act which was
still bolder, and in which he durst not have indulged in Paris ;
but he was delighted to make the news of it travel from a dis
tance into France, as a token of his future intentions. The
Italians had made preparations for a solemn Te Deum in the
ancient cathedral of Milan. He determined to.be present at
the ceremony, and, on the 18th of June (29th Prairial), he
wrote these words to the Consuls : " To-day, in spite >of all that
our Paris atheists may say, 1 am going in great state to the Te
Deum which is to be sung in the cathedral of Milan." (Archives
of the State Paper Office.)
After he had thus turned his mind to the general affairs of
Italy, he made some indispensable arrangements for the distri
bution of the army in the conquered country, and for its sub
sistence and reorganisation. Massena had just joined him.
The ill-humour of the defender of Genoa was dispelled by the
flattering reception which the First Consul gave him, and he
was appointed to the command of the army of Italy, to which
he was so well entitled. This army was composed of the corps
which had defended Genoa, of that which had defended the Var,
of the troops which had crossed the St. Bernard, and of those
under general Moncey, which had come from Germany. These
together formed an imposing mass of 80,000 tried men. The
First Consul quartered them in the rich plains of the Po, to
give them rest after their fatigues, and to indemnify them for
their privations by the abundance which they would there
enjoy. With his accustomed foresight, the First Consul ordered the
forts and citadels which closed the passes between France and
Italy to be blown up. In consequence, the demolition of the
forts of Arona, Bard, and Seravalle, and of the citadels of Ceva
and Ivrea, was prescribed and executed. He fixed the extent
of the contributions, which were to serve for the subsistence of
the army, and the mode in which they were to be levied : des
patched the consular guard himself, calculating the days' marches
in such a manner that it should arrive in Paris in time for the
festival of the 14th of July,* which, according to his intentions,
was to be celebrated with great pomp. He took the trouble
while yet at Milan, to regulate the details of that fete. " It is
necessary," he writes, " to study to make the solemnity of the
14th of July a brilliant one, and not to let it ape the rejoicings
which have hitherto taken place. Chariot-races might be very
well in Greece, where they fought in chariots. They are out of
place and unmeaning in France." (Milan, June 22nd. State
Paper Office.) He forbade triumphal arches to be erected for
him, observing, that he wished for no other triumphal arch than
the public satisfaction.

* The anniversary of the storming of the Bastille in 1789.

262 history OF the [June 1800.
If the First Consul, notwithstanding the urgent interests that
called for his presence at Paris, did tarry ten days at Milan, it
was that he might thoroughly assure himself of the punctual
execution of the convention of Alexandria. He mistrusted
Austrian honesty, and even imagined that he perceived some
delay in the delivery of certain places. He immediately stormed
against the weakness of Berthier, and ordered the second and
third columns of the army of M. de Melas to be detained. The
first had already set out. There was reason for some fears
respecting Genoa, in particular, which the Austrians might
easily be tempted to deliver up to the English, before the French
had time to take possession of it. In fact, the prince of Ho
henzollern, either of his own accord, or instigated by the English,
refused at this moment to give up to Massena's troops a place
which the Austrians had found it so difficult to take. M. de
Melas, when informed of these demurs, enjoined his lieutenant,
in the most honourable manner, to fulfil the convention of
Alexandria, threatening, if he resisted, to give him up to the
consequences liable to be brought upon him by such an act of
perfidy. The injunction of M. de Melas was obeyed, and Genoa
was delivered to the French on the 24th of June, amidst the
rejoicings of the Ligurian patriots, freed in so few days from the
presence of the Austrians and the domination of the oligarchy.
Thus was fulfilled the spirited declaration of Massena, " I swear
to you that I will be back again in Genoa before a fortnight is
over !"
All this being done, the First Consul set out from Milan on
the 24th of June, with Duroc, his favourite aide-de-camp,
Bessieres, commandant of the consular guard, M. de Bourrienne
his secretary, and Savary, one of the two officers whom he had
attached to las person in memory of Desaix. He stopped a
few hours at Turin, to give orders for works at the citadel,
crossed Mont Cenis, and entered Lyons under triumphal arches,
amidst the population/ amazed at the prodigies which had been
just accomplished. The Lyonnais, who were equally smitten
with his glory and his policy, beset the h6tel des Celestins, where
he had alighted, and absolutely insisted on seeing him. He
was obliged to show himself. Unanimous acclamations burst
forth at sight of him. He was so earnestly solicited to lay the
first stone of the Place Bellecour, the rebuilding of which was
about to be commenced, that he could not help complying. He
passed a day at Lyons, amidst the concourse of all the inha
bitants of the environs. Having addressed the Lyonnais in
terms which delighted them, relative to the speedy re-establish
ment of peace, order, and commerce, he set out for Paris. The
inhabitants of the country thronged together at every place
through which he passed. This man, so kindly treated by For
tune, keenly- enjoyed his glory, and yet, conversing incessantly
by the way with his travelling companions, he made this grand

June 1800.] consulate and the empire. 263
remark, which so finely expresses his insatiable thirst of renown,
"Yes," said he, " in less than two years I have conquered Cairo,
Milan, Paris : and yet, were I to die to-morrow, I should not
have half a page in a Universal History." He arrived in the
night between the 2nd and 3rd of July at Paris.
His return was necessary, for, having been away from the
capital nearly two months, his absence, especially at the mo
ment of the false news of Marengo, had given rise to some
intrigues. It was even beheved for a moment that he was either
dead or vanquished, and ambitious persons had set themselves
to work. Some thought of Carnot, others of M. de La Fayette,
who had been released from Olmiitz,. through the kindness of
the First Consul, and returned to France. They werefor making
Carnot or M. de La Fayette president of the Republic. M. de
La Fayette had no hand in these intrigues ; no more had Carnot.
But Joseph and Lucien Bonaparte conceived, and most unjustly,
a mistrust of the latter, which they infused also into their bro
ther. Hence that unlucky resolution, which the First Consul
executed a little later, to take the portfolio of war from Carnot.
Some even imagined that they could perceive in Messrs. de
Talleyrand and Fouche, who hated one another, a tendency to
be reconciled, no doubt for the purpose of concerting their
schemes, and profiting together by recent events. On this
occasion not the slightest symptom of stir was visible on the
part of M. Sieyes, the man best entitled to lead the country, in
case general Bonaparte should have disappeared from the scene.
But he was the only one who showed so much reserve. All
.this, however, had scarcely time to betray itself, so speedily
were the bad tidings superseded by good. But what had passed
was greatly exaggerated in the relation, and the First Consul
conceived against certain persons a resentment, which he had
the good sense to conceal, and even to forget entirely, in regard
to all those who had been mentioned to him, one only excepted,
the illustrious Carnot. The First Consul,, moreover, wholly
engrossed by joy at his successes, was desirous that, at this
moment, not the slightest cloud should arise to overshadow the
pubhc felicity. He gave a gracious reception to all, and was
himself welcomed with transport, especially by those who had
reason to reproach themselves. The populace of Paris, on hear
ing of his return, collected under the windows of the Tuileries,
and thronged, during the whole day, the courts and the garden
of the palace. The First Consul was several times obliged to
show himself to the crowd. At night, the city of Paris was
spontaneously illuminated. People were eager to celebrate a
miraculous victory, the certain presage of an ardently desired
peace. This day so deeply touched him "who was the object of
this homage that, twenty years afterwards, in loneliness, in exile,
a prisoner amidst the solitude of the Atlantic Ocean, he men-

264 history of the [June 1800.
tioned it among his recollections as one of the happiest of his
life. On the following day, the bodies of the State waited upon
him, and set the first example of those congratulations, the irk
some spectacle of which we have since seen so often repeated,
and in every reign. This spectacle was then new, and there
was an adequate motive for it. There appeared successively at
the Tuileries, the Senate, the Legislative Body, the Tribunate,
the chief tribunals, the Prefecture of the Seine, the civil and
military authorities, the directors of the Bank of France, lastly,
the Institute, and the scientific societies. These great bodies
hastened to compliment the conqueror of Marengo, and ad
dressed him in such language as kings were formerly addressed,
as they have since been addressed in. But it must be admitted
that this language, though uniformly that of praise, was dictated
by a sincere enthusiasm. In factjjjie aspect of things changed
in a few months ; security succeeding deep alarm ; an unparal
leled victory replacing France at the head of the powers of
Europe ; the certainty of a speedy peace putting an end to the
anxieties of a general war ; in short, prosperity already showing
itself on all sides. How could such great results, so speedily
realized, fail to transport the nationT>The president of. the
<6enate concluded his address, which trray convey an idea of all
the others, in these terms : —
" We take pleasure in acknowledging that to you the country
*©wes its salvation ; that to you the Republic will owe its con
solidation, and the people a prosperity, which you have in one
day made to succeed ten years of the most stormy of revolu
tions." While these things were passing in Italy and in France, Mo
reau, on the banks of the Danube, continued his glorious cam
paign against M. de Kray. We left him manoeuvring about
Ulm, to oblige the Austrians to quit that stronghold. He had
posted himself between the Iller and the Lech, supporting his
left and his right on those two rivers, turning his face to the
Danube, his back to the city of Augsburg, ready to receive M.
de Kray, if he chose to fight, and meanwhile barring the road to
the Alps, which was the essential feature of the general plan,
If the successes of Moreau had not been either prompt or
decisive, they had been steady and sufficient to allow the First
Consul to accomplish in Italy what he purposed to do there.
But the moment was come when the general of the army of the
Rhine, emboldened by time and by the success of the army of
reserve, was resolved on trying a serious manoeuvre, to dislodge
M. de Kray from the position of Ulm. Now that, though he
knew nothing about the battle of Marengo, he had heard, how
ever, of the successful passage of the Alps, Moreau, no longer
fearful of uncovering the mountains, had full liberty in his

June 1800.] consulate and the empire. 265
movements. Of the different manoeuvres possible for effecting
the fall of the position of Ulm, he preferred that which con
sisted in crossing the Danube below that place, and forcing M.
de Kray to decamp, by threatening to cut off his line of retreat.
This manoeuvre was, in fact, the best ; for that which consisted
in pushing straight on by Munich for Vienna/1 was too bold
for the character of Moreau, and perhaps premature, in the
general state of affairs. That which would have consisted in
crossing above and quite close to Ulm, and storming the Aus
trian camp, was hazardous, like every attack by main force.
But to cross below Ulm, and/ by threatening/to cut off M. de
Kray's line of retreat/to oblige him to retire and secure it, was
at once the most pruoent and the safest manoeuvre.
From the 15 th to the 18th of June, Moreau set himself in
motion to execute his new resolution. The organization of his
army, as we have said, had been somewhat changed in conse
quence of the departure of generals St. Cyr and St. Suzanne.
Lecourbe still formed the right, and Moreau the centre, at the
head of the corps of reserve. The corps of St. Cyr, transferred
to general Grenier, formed the left. The corps of St. Suzanne,
reduced to the proportions of a strong division, and given to the
daring Richepanse, was to perform the office of a corps of
flankers, which, at this moment, was employed in observing Ulm,
while the rest of the army was manoeuvring below it.
There had been some fighting about Ulm, in particular on the
5th of June, when two French divisions had made head against
40,000 Austrians. This was an expedient of M. de Kray's to
keep us before Ulm, by giving us plenty of occupation. On
the 18th of June, Richepanse was in sight of Ulm; Grenier,
with the left, at Guntzburg ; the centre, composed of the corps
of reserve, at Burgau ; Lecourbe, with the right, extended to
Dillingen. The enemy had cut all the bridges from Ulm to
Donauwerth. But a reconnaissance made by Lecourbe had
decided Moreau to choose the points of Blindheim and Grem-
heim for crossing the Danube, because at these two points the
bridges were imperfectly cut, and might easily be repaired.
Lecourbe was charged with this perilous operation. To facili
tate it for him, he was reinforced by general Boyer with five
battalions, and by the whole reserve of cavalry, under the com
mand of general d'Hautpoul. The centre, under the general-in-
chief, moved even from Burgau to Aislingen, to be at hand to
support the passage. Grenier, with the left, had orders to
make an attempt on his side to attract the attention of the
enemy. On the morning of the 19th of June, Lecourbe had posted
his troops between the villages of Blindheim and Gremheim,
the bridges of which were but half destroyed, and he took care
to shelter himself behind some clumps of trees. He had no
bridge equipage, in fact, nothing but a quantity of planks., He

266 history of the [June 1800.
made up by daring courage for the want of every thing else.
General Gudin directed, under Lecourbe, this attempt to cross.
Some pieces of artillery were planted on the bank of the Danube,
to keep off the enemy; at the same time, the adjutant Quenot
bravely swam off, for the purpose of seizing two large craft,
which were lying on the other side. This courageous officer
brought them away under a shower of balls, and returned with
only a slight wound on the foot. The best swimmers in the
divisions were then selected ; they deposited their clothes and
their arms in the two barks, and plunged into the water under
the enemy's fire. On reacning the otheV bank, without even
taking time to put on their clothes, they seized their arms,
dashed upon some companies of Austrians who guarded that
part of the river, dispersed them, and took from them two pieces
of cannon with the ammunition waggons. This done, our men
hastened to the bridges, the props of which were still standing;
they worked away on both banks and made use of ladders and
planks, to re-establish some sort of communication. Some
French artillerymen availed themselves of it to cross to the
other side of the Danube, and turned against the enemy the
two pieces of cannon which had been taken from him. We
were soon masters of both banks ; and the bridges were suffi
ciently repaired to afford passage to the greater part of the
troops. The infantry and cavalry began to debouch. It was
to be expected that numerous Austrian reinforcements would
promptly ascend from Donauwerth, and others descend from
all the upper positions, Gundelfingen, Guntzburg, and Ulm.
Lecourbe, who had repaired himself to the spot, caused such
infantry as he could spare, and some troops of horse, to be placed
in the village of Schwenningen, which was on the road to Do
nauwerth. This was an important point ; for it was that way
by which the Austrians ascending the Danube must come.
Accordingly, it was not long before 4000 infantry, 500 horse,
and six pieces of cannon, made their appearance, and attacked
the village, which in less than two hours was several times lost
and retaken. The numerical superiority of the Austrians, how
ever, and their obstinate determination to recover an important
position, had wellnigh triumphed over our troops, and obliged
them to abandon the village, when Lecourbe received a season
able reinforcement of two squadrons of carabineers. He united
with them a few troops of the 8th hussars, which he had at
hand, and pushed them upon the enemy's infantry, extended
over the spacious plain to the banks of the Danube. This
charge was executed with such vigour and promptness that the
Austrians were driven back, and left us their artillery, 2000
prisoners, and 300 horses. Two battalions of Wurtembergers,
. endeavouring to keep their ground by forming into squares,
were broken like the others. After this brilliant action, fought
by Puthod's brigades, Lecourbe had nothing more to fear from

June 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 267
the quarter of the Lower Danube. But that was not the side
from which the greatest danger was likely to come. The bulk
of the Austrians being posted above, that is to say at Dillingen,
Gundelfingen, and Ulm, it was necessary to turn towards that
side, to face the enemy who was about to descend from it.
Luckily, Montrichard's and Gudin's divisions and d'Hautpoul's
reserve had crossed by the repaired bridges of Gremheim and
Blindheim, and bordered the celebrated plain of Hochstett,
rendered sadly famous for us in the time of Louis XIV. (13th
of August, 1704). The enemy, having hastened from the nearest
points to Dillingen, at some distance from Hochstett, was, drawn
up near the Danube, the infantry on our left, along the marshes
of the river, and behind some clumps of trees ; the cavalry in
very strong force on our right. They thus presented themselves
in good order, awaiting the reinforcements which were coming,
and retiring slowly, to draw nearer to those reinforcements.
The 37th demi-brigade and a squadron of the 9th hussars fol
lowed step by step the retrograde movement of the Austrians.
Lecourbe, having rid himself by the action at Schwenningen
of any enemy that could come from the Lower Danube, had ar
rived at a gallop, at the head of the 2nd regiment of carabineers,
the cuirassiers, the 6th and 9th cavalry, and lastly the 9th
hussars. This was nearly the whole of general d'Hautpoul's
reserve of cavalry. They were on level ground, and separated
from the enemy by a streamlet, the Egge, on which was a vil
lage, that of Schrezheim. Lecourbe, at the head of the cuiras
siers, galloped through the village, formed them on debouching,
and pushed them upon the Austrian cavalry, which, surprised
' by this vigorous and sudden charge, fell back in disorder, leaving
uncovered the 9000 infantry, whom it was destined to protect.
These foot-soldiers, thus abandoned, would have thrown them
selves into the ditches which furrow the banks of the Danube
about Dillingen ; but the cuirassiers, judiciously commanded,
cut the column, and separated 1800 men, who became our pri
soners. This was the second successful action that day, gained in part
by the cavalry, and it was not the last. Lecourbe placed him
self on the Egge, waiting for the rest of his reserves, which
were to arrive by the bridge of Dillingen, which had fallen into
our hands. But M. de Kray's cavalry hastened up with all
possible expedition, outstripping the infantry, and formed in
two great lines in the plain behind Lauingen. This was an
opportunity for our cavalry to profit by the ardour which the
successes of the morning had excited, and to measure them
selves in the plain with the numerous and brilliant squadrons
of the Austrian army. Lecourbe, having ordered his infantry
to occupy Lauingen, united all the cavalry of his divisions
with d'Hautpoul's, and deployed it in the plain, offering to the

268 history of the [June 1800.
enemy a species of combat which was likely to tempt him, on
account of the number and the quality of his horse. The first
Austrian line charged ours at full speed, with a regularity and a
steadiness natural to highly trained cavalry. It drove back, in
fact, the 2nd regiment of carabineers, which had behaved with
such intrepidity in the morning, and some squadrons of hussars,
which had charged with it. Our cuirassiers then advanced,
rallied the carabineers and the hussars, who faced about on
seeing themselves supported, and all together dashed with vigour
upon the Austrian squadrons, which they drove back in their
turn. At this sight, the second line of the enemy's cavalry
advanced, and, having the advantage of impulsion over our
troopers, who had become separated in the charge, obliged them
to fall back precipitately. But the 9th was in reserve. Ma
noeuvring with skill and boldness, it took the Austrian cavalry
in flank, surprised, threw it into confusion, and secured to our
victorious squadrons the plain of Hochstett.
The losses in killed, wounded and prisoners could not be very
considerable, for it is only encounters of cavalry with infantry
that are very serious. But we remained in possession of the
plain, and our cavalry had just assumed a real superiority over
that of the Austrians, which it never had before. All our arms
had from this moment a decided ascendency over those of the
enemy. It was eight o'clock, and, in the long days of June,
there was still time left for the Imperialists to dispute with us
the left bank of the Danube, so gloriously conquered in the
morning. Eight thousand infantry advanced, in fact, to the
assistance of the corps already beaten, and they were followed
by a numerous artillery. Moreau came up, meanwhile, at the
head of all his reserves. A new and more obstinate battle en
sued. The French infantry, in its turn, attacked the Austrian
infantry, under a fire of balls and grape-shot. The soldiers of
M. de Kray, who fought for an important point, the preserva
tion of the position of Ulm, displayed extreme vigour. Moreau
was several times personally engaged in the thick of the fray ;
but his infantry, supported by the cavalry, which had returned
to the charge, finally remained victorious about eleven at night.
At the same moment, the 37th demi-brigade entered Gundel-
fingen, and then all the positions in the plain were in our hands.
We had crossed the Danube, taken 5000 prisoners, twenty
pieces of cannon, 1200 horses, 300 carriages, and the consider
able magazines of Donauwerth. The fighting had lasted eighteen
successive hours. This operation, .which changed the melan
choly recollections of Hochstett into recollections of glory, was,
next to Marengo, the most brilliant operation of the campaign.
It was equally honourable to Lecourbe and to Moreau. The
latter had slowly warmed into boldness ; but at length, stimu
lated by the examples set in Italy, he had displayed tactics of a

June 1800.] consulate and the empire. 269
higher order, and he had just plucked a laurel from that tree,
from which the First Consul had gathered such glorious wreaths.
Happy and noble rivalry, had it never extended any further !
After so bold and so decided a manoeuvre, on the part of his
adversary, M. de Kray could no longer remain at Ulm, without
being cut off from his communication with Vienna. To march
direct upon the French, for the purpose of giving them battle,
would be too hazardous, with soldiers whose courage had been
again rudely shaken by the last engagements. He hastened,
therefore, to decamp that same night. He sent off before him
the park, consisting of nearly a thousand carriages, and followed
next day, with the main body of the army, by the Nordlingen
road. He marched in dreadful .weather, and on roads which
were in a shocking state from the rain. Such was, nevertheless,
the rapidity of his retreat, that in twenty-four hours he reached
Neresheim. To cheer his dispirited troops, he put in circu
lation a report that a suspension of arms had just been signed
in Italy, that it was to be extended to Germany, and that peace
could not fail to follow. This intelligence diffused joy among
his soldiers, and imparted a degree of energy. They arrived at
Nordlingen. Moreau had been apprised too late of the departure of the
enemy. Richepanse was not able to perceive the evacuation of
Ulm till the last detachments were retiring, and he immediately
communicated the intelligence to the commander-in-chief. But
the Austrians had meanwhile gained the start, and, the bad
weather, which prevailed for two days, prevented the French
from overtaking them by a forced march. Moreau, neverthe
less, arrived at Nordlingen on the 23rd of June, in the evening,
closely pressing the rear-guard of M. de Kray, who continued
to retreat. Finding that, owing to the badness of the roads, he
should not gain sufficiently upon the Austrian army to overtake
it, and that he might be drawn oh in a fruitless pursuit to un
known distances, Moreau resolved to halt, and to choose a
position adapted to the present state of things. M. de Kray,
concealing the joyful tidings of the victory of Marengo, which
were not yet known in the French camp, sent him word, how
ever, of the suspension of arms concluded in Italy, and proposed
the like for Germany. Moreau, suspecting from this that im
portant events had taken place beyond the Alps, and not doubting
that they were propitious, and expecting every moment to re
ceive a courier to inform him of them, would not conclude any
thing before he was acquainted with the particulars, and, above
all^ before he had conquered better cantonments for his troops.
He resolved to recross the Danube, to charge Richepanse with
the investment of the two principal places situated on that
river, Ulm and Ingolstadt, to proceed with the bulk of his
army beyond the Lech, to occupy Augsburg and Munich, and
•thus to "secure part of Bavaria to draw provisions from, and,

270 history of the [July 1800.
lastly, to make himself master of the bridges over the Isar and
of all the roads leading to the Inn.
Moreau accordingly recrossed the Danube and the Lech* at
Donauwerth and Rhain, and marched his different corps, by
Pottmess and Pfaffenhofen, to the banks of the Isar. He oc
cupied, on that river, the points of Landshut, Moosburg, and
Freisingen ; and detached Decaen to Munich, which the latter
entered, as in triumph, on the 28th of June. While he was
executing this movement, the two armies met for the last time,
falling in with each other unexpectedly, and being thus involved
in an aimless combat. It was at Neuburg, on the right bank
of the Danube, while both were marching for the Isar. A
French division, having separated too far from the rest of the
army, had to sustain a long and obstinate action, in which it
finally triumphed, after suffering a most severe loss, that of the
brave Latour d'Auvergne. This illustrious soldier, honoured
by general Bonaparte with the title of First Grenadier of
France, was slain by the thrust of a lance, which pierced his
heart. The army shed tears upon his grave, and did not leave
the field of battle till they had raised a monument over his
grave. On the 3rd of July (14th Messidor), Moreau was in the
heart of Bavaria, blockading Ulm and Ingolstadt on the Danube,
and occupying Landshut, Moosburg, Freisingen, and Munich
on the Isar. It was now high time to think of the Tyrol, and
to wrest from prince Reuss the strong positions which he held
along the mountains, at the sources of the Iller, the Lech, and
the Isar — positions by means of which he could always annoy
the French. He was not dangerous, it is true, but his presence
obliged us to detach a considerable force, as he was an object
which our right wing could never lose sight of. To this end,
general Molitor was reinforced, and furnished with means for
attacking the Grisons and the Tyrol. The positions of Fussen,
Reitti, Immenstadt, and Feldkirch, were successively taken,
in a prompt and brilliant manner, and our establishment on the
Isar was thus perfectly consolidated.
M. de Kray had recrossed the Isar, and moved beyond the
Inn, occupying the camp of Ampfing, in advance of that river,
and the tetes de pont of Wasserburg and Muhldorf. It was now
the middle of July (the end of Messidor). The French go
vernment had authorised general Moreau to act for what he
might consider the best, and to lay aside his arms whenever he
should judge fit. He thought, and very reasonably, that it was
not right for him to be left fighting alone. The rest enjoyed
by the troops in Italy was envied them by their fellow-soldiers
in Germany ; besides, the army of the Rhine, stationed between
the Isar and the Inn, had a much more advanced position than
the army of Italy, and thus had one of its flanks uncovered.
Though a stipulation of the convention of Alexandria forbade

July 1800.] consulate and the empire. 271
the French, as well as the Austrians, to send detachments to
Germany, it was possible that this stipulation might not be
punctually observed, and that the army of the Rhine might
soon have an unexpected increase of enemies upon its hands.
Moreau, who had received several proposals from M. de Kray,
resolved at length to listen to them, and, on the 15th of July
(26th Messidor), he consented to sign, at Parsdorf, a place
situated in advance of Munich, a suspension of arms nearly
to the same purport as that of Italy.
The two armies were to retire each behind a line of demarca
tion, which, commencing at Balzers, in the Grisons, skirted the
Tyrol, ran between the Isar and the Inn, at an equal distance
from both rivers, and then to the Danube at Wilshofen, as
cended that river to the mouth of the Altmuhl, and followed
the Altmuhl, the Rednitz, and the Mayn, to Mayence. The
fortresses of Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt continued
blockaded, but they were to receive, every fortnight, a quantity
of provisions, proportionate to the strength of their garrisons.
The two armies had to give twelve days' notice, in case of the
renewal of hostilities. The French army would thus draw its
provisions from Franconia, Swabia, and a great part of Ba
varia. Our soldiers, posted on the Mincio, on one side of the
Alps, on the Isar, on the other side, were about to receive com
pensation, in the rich plains- of Italy and Germany, for their
toils and their privations. These brave fellows had earned it
by the noblest exploits that had yet signalised the arms of
France. The army of the Rhine, though it had not shed so
bright a lustre as the army of Italy, had, nevertheless, distin
guished itself by a campaign conducted with equal judgment
and vigour. The last great event of this campaign, the passage
of the Danube at Hochstett, might rank with the most glorious
feats of our military annals. Public opinion, which, in 1799,
was not favourable to Moreau, had become almost partial for
him in 1800. Next to the name of general Bonaparte, at a
great distance, it is true, but yet at such a distance, that the
distinction was still flattering, was incessantly placed the name
of general Moreau ; and, as public opinion is ever fickle, the
fame of the latter eclipsed, this year, that of the conqueror of
Zurich, by whom it had been eclipsed in the preceding year.
The tidings of the brilliant successes of the army of the
Rhine crowned the satisfaction produced by the extraordinary
successes of the army of Italy, and changed into certainty the
hopes of peace that filled all minds. There was joy in every
heart. The public funds, denominated the Five per Cents.,
which sold at thirteen francs before the 18th of Brumaire, had
risen to forty. A decree of the Consuls announced to the
stock-holders that the dividends for the first six months of the
year IX., and which fell due on the 22nd September, 1800,
should be paid entirely in cash : happy inteUigence, such as had

272 the consulate and the empire. [July 1800
not for a long time been given to the unfortunate creditors of
the State ! All these benefits were attributed to the armies, to
the generals who had led them to victory, but principally to
young Bonaparte, who had shown that he could both govern and
fight in a very superior manner. Hence the fete of the 14th of
July, one of the two republican solemnities retained by the
Constitution, was celebrated with great pomp. Preparations
were made for a magnificent ceremony at the Invalides. Mehul,
the musician, had composed some appropriate pieces, and the
first singers of Italy, which began at this time to be stripped
both of its masterpieces of art and of its artists, were brought
to Paris to execute them. After the performance of these
pieces under the dome of the Invalides, the First Consul, ac
companied by a numerous staff, repaired to the Champ de Mars,
to review the consular guard. It arrived that very morning,
covered with dust, and in tatters, having been on march ever
since the day after the battle of Marengo, that it might be
punctual at the rendezvous appointed by the First Consul for
the 14th of July. It brought to the Invalides the colours taken
during the last campaign, to be placed in the general repository
of our trophies. The crowd which bordered both sides of the
Champ de Mars rushed forward to gain a closer view of the
heroes of Marengo. The public intoxication was carried to
such a length as wellnigh to produce accidents. The First
Consul was long pent up amidst this scene of popular confusion.
He returned to the Tuileries, surrounded by the multitude, who
crowded about him. The whole day was devoted to public
rejoicings. A few days afterwards, on the 21st of July (2nd Thermidor),
it was announced that count de St. Julien, an officer in the
confidence of the emperor of Germany, was on his way to
Paris ; that he was the bearer of the ratification of the convention
of Alexandria, and charged to confer with the First Consul on
the conditions of the approaching peace. No doubt was any
longer entertained of the conclusion of that so ardently desired
peace, which was to put an end to the second coalition. France,
it may be said, had never seen such happy days.

END OF VOL. I.

C. WHITING, BEAUFORT HOUSE, 8TKAND.

^ A - //\ u <-< i> >' t'c Jc c~cl it* y t '**/ c *

haixdan-.R&Tiry Colbum , \£Ab.

®1je onlp authorise!) @l)iffon.
HISTORY OF THE
CONSULATE AM) THE EMPIRE
OF
FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.
FORMING A SEQUEL TO
" THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION."

M. A. THIERS,
LATE PRIME MINISTER OF FRANCE,
MEMBER OF THE FRENCH ACADEMY, AND OF THE INSTITUTE,
&C. &C. &C.
TRANSLATED BT
D. FORBES CAMPBELL, Esq.
WITH THE SANCTION AND APPROVAL OF THE AUTHOR.

vol. n.

LONDON:
HENRY COLBURN, GREAT MARLBOROUGH-STREET,
SOLD ALSO BY
CHAPMAN AND HALL, STRAND.
1845.

C. WHITING, BEAUFORT HOUSE, STRAND.

CONTENTS

OF
THE SECOND VOLUME.

BOOK V.
HELIOPOLIS.

PAGE
State of Egypt after the Departure of General Bonaparte — Profound Grief
of the Army: its Desire to return to France — Kleber excites, instead of re
pressing, that Feeling — His Report on the State of the Colony — This
Report, destined for the Directory, is received by the First Consul — False
hoods with which it is filled — Great Resources of the Colony, and Facility
of securing it to France — Kleber, influenced by the feeling which he had
encouraged, is induced to treat with the Turks and the English — Culpable
Convention of El-Arisch, stipulating the Evacuation of Egypt — Refusal
of the English to execute that Convention : they calculate upon obliging
the French Army to lay down its Arms — Noble Indignation of Kleber —
Rupture of the Armistice and Battle of HeEopolis — Dispersion of the
Turks — Kteber pursues, them to the Frontiers of Syria — The Vizir's Camp
taken — New Distribution of the Army in Lower Egypt — Return of Kleber
to Cairo, to reduce that City, which had risen in his Rear — His skilful
Temporizing — Having collected his Means, he attacks and retakes Cairo —
General Submission — Alliance with Murad Bey — Kleber, who thought it
impossible to keep Egypt when subdued, re-conquers it in thirty-five Days
from the Turkish Forces and the revolted Egyptians — His Faults glori
ously repaired — Emotion of the Mussulman Populations on learning that
Egypt is in the Hands of the Infidels— A Fanatic travels from Palestine to
Cairo to assassinate Kleber— Lamentable Death of the latter, and its Con
sequences for the Colony-Present Tranquillity— Kleber and Desaix both
killed on the same Day — Characters and Lives of those two Warriors^  3

IV CONTENTS.
BOOK VI.
ARMISTICE.
PAGE
Vast Preparations for succouring the Army in Egypt — Arrival of M. de St.
Julien at Paris — Impatience of the French Cabinet to treat with him —
Notwithstanding the insufficiency of M. de St. Julien's Powers, Talleyrand
induces him to sign preliminary Articles of Peace — M. de St. Julien signs
and sets out with Duroc for Vienna — State of Prussia and Russia — Clever
Expedient of .the First Consul in regard to the Emperor Paul— He sends
back to him six thousand Prisoners without Ransom, and offers him the
Island of Malta— Enthusiasm of Paul I. for General Bonaparte, and Mis
sion of M. de Sprengporten to Paris — New League of the Neutral Powers
— The four great Questions of Maritime Law — Reconciliation with the Holy
See — The Court of Spain, and its Intimacy with the First Consul — Sketch
of the internal State of that Court — General Berthier sent to Madrid — This
Representative of the First Consul negotiates a Treaty with Charles IV.
by which Tuscany would fall to the House of Parma, and Louisiana to France
— Erection of the Kingdom of Etruria — France reinstates herself in the
Favour of the European Powers — Arrival of M. de St. Julien at Vienna —
Astonishment of Ms Court when apprised of the Preliminary Articles
signed without Powers — Embarrassment of the Cabinet of Vienna, which
had engaged not to treat without England— Disavowal of M. de St. Julien
— Attempt at a joint Negotiation, comprehending England and Austria —
For the Admission of England into the Negotiation, the First Consul re
quires a Naval Armistice, which would enable him to succour Egypt —
England refuses, not to treat, but to grant the proposed Armistice — The
First Consul then insists on a direct and immediate Negotiation with
Austria, or the Resumption of Hostilities — Manner in which he has pro
fited by the Suspension of Arms to put the French Armies on a formidable
Footing — Alarm of the Austrians, and cession of the Fortresses of Philips-
burg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt, to obtain a Prolongation of the Continental
Armistice — Convention of Hohenlinden, granting a fresh Suspension of
Arms for forty-five Days— Appointment of M. de Cobentzel as Envoy to
the Congress of Lung ville— Festival of the 1 st of Vendemiaire— Removal of
Turenne's remains to the Invalides— The First Consul devotes the Leisure
left him by the Interruption of Hostilities in attending to the internal
Administration— Success of his Financial Measures— Prosperity of the
Bank of France— Payment of the Stockholders in Cash— Repair of the
Roads— Return of the Priests— Difficulties respecting the Celebration of
Sunday and Decadi— New Measures in regard to the Emigrants— Posture of
Parties— Their Dispositions towards the First Consul— The Revolutionists
and the Royalists— Policy of the Government towards them— Conflicting
Influences about the First Consul— Parts acted by Messrs. Fouchu, de
Talleyrand, and Cambaceres— The Bonaparte Family— Letters of Louis

CONTENTS. V
PAGE
XVIH. to the First Consul and Answer to that Prince— Plot of Ceracchi
and Arena— Public Sensation created by the Discovery of this Plot— Impru
dent Friends of the First Consul wish to make a Handle of it to raise him
too soon to the Supreme Power— Pamphlet written in that Spirit by M. de
Fontanes — Necessity for disavowing that Pamphlet — Lucien Bonaparte
removed from the Ministry of the Interior and sent to Spain  43

BOOK VII.
HOHENLINDEN.
Peace with the United States and with the Barbary Regencies — Meeting
of the Congress of Luneville — M. de Cobentzel declines a separate Nego
tiation, and insists at least on the presence of an Enghsh Plenipotentiary,
to mask the real Negotiation between Austria and France— The First
Consul, with a view to hasten the Conclusion, orders the Renewal of Hos
tilities — Plan of the Winter Campaign — Moreau is directed to cross the
Inn, and to march for Vienna — Macdonald, with a second Army of Reserve,
has Orders to pass from the Grisons into the Tyrol — Brune, with eighty
thousand Men, is destined to force the Adige and the Mincio — Planof the
young Archduke John, appointed Generalissimo of the Austrian Armies —
His Plan for turning Moreau miscarries through defective Execution —
He halts by the way, and purposes to attack Moreau in the Forest of Ho
henlinden — Admirable Manoeuvre of Moreau's executed in a superior
Manner by Richepanse — Memorable Battle of Hohenlinden — Important
Results of that Battle — Passage of the Inn, the Salza, the Traun, and the
Enns — Armistice of Steyer — Austria promises to sign the Peace imme
diately — Operations in the Alps and in Italy — Macdonald crosses the
Splugen, despite the Perils and Hardships of Winter — His Arrival in the
Italian Tyrol — Dispositions of Brune for crossing the Mincio at two
Points— Defect in those Dispositions — General Dupont attempts a first
Passage at Pozzolo, and draws upon himself alone the Main Body of the
Austrian Army — The Mincio is forced after a useless Effusion of Blood
— Passage of the Mincio and the Adige — Fortunate Escape of General
Laudon in consequence of a Falsehood — The Austrians, being beaten,
propose an Armistice in Italy — Signature of that Armistice at Treviso — Re
newal of Negotiations at Luneville — The Principle of a separate Peace
admitted by M. de Cobentzel— The First Consul requires Austria to pay
the Expenses of this second Campaign, and imposes harder Conditions
than in M. de St. Julien's Preliminaries — He fixes, as his Ultimatum, the
Boundary of the Rhine in Germany, the Boundary of the Adige in Italy —
Courageous Resistance of M de Cobentzel — This Resistance, though
honourable, causes Austria to lose valuable Time— While the Negotiations
are pending at Luneville, the Emperor Paul, to whom the First Consul
has ceded the Island of Malta, claims it from the English, who refuse it —
.Rage of Paul I.— He invites the King of Sweden to St. Petersburg, and

.^ CONTENTS.
renews the League of 1780-Declaration of tne Neutrals-Rupture of all
the Northern Powers with. Great Britain-The First Consul avails himself
of it to force harder Terms upon Austria— He insists, not only upon the
Boundary of the Adige, but also on the Expulsion of all the Princes of the
House of Austria from Italy— The Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke
. of Modena are to be removed to Germany— M. de Cobentzel at length
gives way, and, with Joseph Bonaparte, signs the celebrated Peace of Lune
ville, on the 9th of February, 1801— France obtains for the second Time
^ the Boundary of the Rhine, throughout its whole Length, and is left al
most Mistress of Italy— Austria is thrust back beyond the Adige— The
Cisalpine Republic is to include the Milanese, Mantua, the Duchy of
Modena, and the Legations— Tuscany destined for the House of Parma,
with the Title of Kingdom of Etruria— The Principle of the Secularisations
laid down for Germany— Important Results obtained by the First Consul
in the course of Fifteen Months  121

BOOK VIII.
THE INFERNAL MACHINE.
Plots against the Life of the First Consul — Carbon, St. Rejant, and Limoe-
lan, three Agents of Georges, form a plan for destroying the First Consul
by the Explosion of a Barrel of Gunpowder — Choice of the Rue St. Ni-
caise, and of the 3rd Nivose for the Execution of this Crime— The First
Consul saved by the Dexterity of his Coachman— Sensation produced— The
Crime attributed to the Revolutionists, and to the Indulgence shown them
by Fouche, the Minister— Animosity of the new ¦ Courtiers against that
Minister— His Silence and Coolness— He discovers Part of the Truth and
makes it known ; but Measures are nevertheless taken against the Revo
lutionists—Irritation of the First Consul— Project of an arbitrary Mea
sure—Deliberation on this Subject in the Council of State— After long
Discussions, a Resolution is adopted for transporting a certain Number of
Revolutionists without Trial— Some Resistance, but very faint, made to
this arbitrary Act— Discussion whether- it shall take place by a Law, or by
a spontaneous Measure of the Government, referred only to the Senate,
for the sake of Constitutionality— The latter Course adopted— Transporta-
who ?!Creed against one hundred and thirty alleged Terrorists— Fouche,
w 10 ew them to be innocent of the Attempt of the 3rd Nivose, consents,
tZa T8' ^2^ MeaSWre which Proscribes them-Discovery of the
-U^tCon^eIf rhaIMach™-E*ecutionofCarbon and St. R^ant
— unjust Condemnation of TV™;  -r , » j.
TearLX-FreshManife^Jr:; r ^ ' ™' ^-^^ « **
-Financial Statement ot wl^aT ^^ ^ *&*»*
^.-BudgetoftheYearrX-DelIeanS /? the Ws VX, VH, and
-**- * the Tribunal -^tSSJE^

CONTENTS. Vll
PAGE
this Plan of Finance— Sentiments of the First Consul— Continuation of his
administrative Labours— Roads— Canal of St. Quentin— Bridges over the
Seine— Works at the Simplon— The Monks of the Great St. Bernard
established at the Simplon and at Mont Cenis  169

BOOK IX.
NEUTRAL POWERS.
Sequel of the Negotiations with the Powers of Europe — Treaty with the
Court of Naples — Exclusion of the English from the Ports of the Two
Sicilies, and Engagement entered into by the Neapolitan Government to
receive a French Division at Otranto — Spain pledges herself to coerce the
Portuguese, to put an end to the Enghsh Trade on the Coasts of Portugal —
Vast naval Projects of the First Consul, for combining the Naval Forces of
Spain, Holland, and France, to enable them to act in Concert — Means con
templated to assist Egypt — Admiral Gauteaume, at the Head of a Division,
leaves Brest during a Gale of Wind, and proceeds to the Straits of Gibraltar
on his Way to the Mouth of the Nile — General Coalition of all the Mari
time Nations against England — Preparations of the Neutral Powers in the
Baltic —Warlike Ardour of Paul I. — Distress in England — She is visited by
a frightful Famine — Her Financial and Commercial Position before, and
since the War — Her Income and Expenditure both doubled — Unpopula
rity of Mr. Pitt — His Differences with George HI., and Retirement from
Office — The Addington Administration — England, in spite of her Embar
rassments, faces the Storm, and despatches Admirals Nelson and Parker to
the Baltic, to break up the Confederacy of the Neutral Powers — Plan con
ceived by Nelson and Parker— They determine upon forcing the Passage
of the Sound— The Swedish Coast being badly defended, the EngUsh Fleet
passes the Sound almost without Difficulty, and appears before Copen
hagen—Nelson's views are to Attack the Danes, before proceeding to the
Baltic — Description of the Position of Copenhagen, and Measures adopted
to Defend this Important Maritime Position— Nelson executes a Bold Ma
noeuvre, and succeeds in Anchoring in the King's Channel, Broadside on to
the Danish Fleet — Bloody Engagement— Gallantry of the Danes, and
Danger of Nelson — He sends a Flag of Truce to the Crown Prince of Den
mark, and thereby obtains the Advantage of a Victory — Suspension of
Hostilities for Fourteen Weeks, during which the Death of Paul I. becomes
known — Events which have taken place in Russia — Exasperation of the
Russian Nobility against the Emperor Paul, and their Resolution to get
rid of this Prince by any Means, even by Crime— Count Pahlen — His Cha
racter and Projects— His Conduct towards the Grand Duke Alexander—
The Scheme of a forced Abdication made to conceal their Project of As
sassination — Frightful Scene at the Palace (Michael) on the Night of the
23rd of March— Tragical Death of Paul I, — Accession of Alexander — The

viii CONTENTS. PAGE
Confederacy of the Neutral Powers dissolved by the Death of the Emperor
Paul— Virtual Armistice in the Baltic — The First Consul endeavours, by
offering Hanover to Prussia, to retain her in the League of the Neutrals —
England satisfied with having broken up this Confederacy by the Battle of
Copenhagen; and with being rid of Paul I., seeks to Improve the Oppor
tunity offered, by treating with France, and redeeming the Errors of Mr.
Pitt — The Addington Administration Proposes Peace to the First Consul,
through the Medium of M. Otto — This Proposal accepted, and Opening
of Negotiations between France and England at London — Peace becomes
general, both by Sea and Land— Progress of France since the I8th Bru
maire  203

BOOK V.

HELIOPOLIS.
State of Egypt after the Departure of General Bonaparte— Profound Grief
of the Army : its Desire to return to France — Kleber excites, instead of re
pressing, that Feeling— His Report on the State of the Colony— This
Report, destined for the Directory, is received by the First Consul — False
hoods with which it is filled — Great Resources of the Colony, and Facility
of securing it to France — Kleber, influenced by the Feeling which he had
encouraged, is induced to treat with the Turks and the English — Culpable
Convention of El Arisch, stipulating the Evacuation of Egypt — Refusal
of the English to execute that Convention : they calculate upon obliging
the French Army to lay down its Arms — Noble Indignation of Kleber—
Rupture of the Armistice and Battle of Heliopolis — Dispersion of the
Turks — Kleber pursues them to the Frontiers of Syria — The Vizir's Camp
taken — New Distribution of the Army in Lower Egypt — Return of Kleber
to Cairo, to reduce that City, which had risen in his Rear — His skilful
Temporizing — Having collected his Means, he attacks and retakes Cairo —
General Submission — Alliance with Murad Bey — Kleber, who thought it
impossible to keep Egypt when subdued, re-conquers it in thirty-five Days
from the Turkish Forces and the revolted Egyptians — His Faults glori
ously repaired — Emotion of the Mussulman Populations on learning that
Egypt is in the Hands of the Infidels — A Fanatic travels from Palestine to
Cairo to assassinate Kleber — Lamentable Death of the latter, and its Con
sequences for the Colony — Present Tranquillity — Kleber and Desaix both
killed on the same Day — Characters and Lives of those two Warriors.

VOL. II.

JOglFIIIlo

L^don.HeaaxyCoIburii.1845.

HISTOKY OF
THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE
OE
FRANC E
UNDER
NAPOLEON.

BOOK V.

HELIOPOLIS.

In August, 1799, general Bonaparte, being decided by news
from Europe to leave Egypt suddenly, ordered admiral Gan
teaume to send out of the harbour of Alexandria the frigates
La Muiron and La Carrere, the only ships left after the de
struction of the fleet, and to cast anchor in the little roadstead of
the Marabout. It was there, about two leagues westward of Alex
andria, that he purposed to embark. He took with him generals
Berthier, Lannes, Murat, Andreossy, Marmont, and the two
men of science to whom he was more attached than to any of
the others belonging to the expedition, Monge and Berthollet.
On the 22nd of August (5th Fructidor, year VII.), he pro
ceeded to the Marabout, and precipitately embarked, in constant
apprehension lest the English squadron should make its ap
pearance. The horses on which the party rode thither, being
left upon the beach, galloped back to Alexandria. The sight
of these horses, completely saddled, but without riders, excited
a sort of alarm ; it was supposed that some accident had befallen
some of the officers of the garrison, and a detachment of cavalry
was despatched from the entrenched camp. Presently, a Turkish
b2

4 HISTORY OF THE [Aug. 1799.
groom, who had been present at the embarkation, explained
what had happened, and Menou, who alone had been initiated
into the secret, made known in Alexandria the departure of
general Bonaparte, and the appointment which he had made of
general Kleber to succeed him. The latter had an appointment
to meet him at Rosetta, on the 23rd of August, but general
Bonaparte was so hurried to embark, that he had gone the day
before. Besides, in imposing upon Kleber the heavy burden of
the command, he was better pleased to leave him an absolute
order, which admitted, of neither objection nor refusal.
This intelligence caused a painful surprise throughout the army.
At first, it was discredited ; general Dugua, commandant of Ro
setta, had it contradicted, not believing it himself, and fearful of
the bad effect which it was likely to produce. However, it was
not possible to doubt long, and Kleber was officially proclaimed
the successor of general Bonaparte. Officers and soldiers were
in consternation. It had needed the ascendency exercised over
them by the conqueror of Italy to draw them after him into
distant and unknown countries, and it had needed all his as
cendency to keep them there. Regret for home is a passion,
which becomes violent, when the distance and the novelty of
places, and fears founded on the uncertainty of return, concur to
irritate it. In Egypt, this passion frequently burst forth in
murmurs, sometimes in suicide. But the presence of the com
mander-in-chief, his language, his incessant activity, dispelled
these gloomy vapours. Well knowing how to occupy himself,
and how to occupy others, he captivated their minds to the
highest point, and either dissipated around him, or prevented the
generation of, those irksome feelings to which he was altogether
a stranger. The men often said to themselves that they should
never see France again, that they should never recross the Me
diterranean, especially now that the fleet had been destroyed at
Aboukir; but- general Bonaparte was there; with him they
could go anywhere, find their way back to their country, or
make a new country for themselves. With his departure, the
aspect of things was totally changed. The intelligence of it
came, therefore, like a thunderbolt. The most opprobrious
epithets were applied to this departure. They did not consider
that irresistible impulse of patriotism and ambition, which, on
the news of the disasters of the Republic, had urged him to re
turn to France. They perceived only the forlorn state in which
he left the unfortunate army, which had felt sufficient confidence
in his genius to follow him. They said to themselves that he
must then have convinced himself of the imprudence of that
enterprise, of the impossibility of its success, since he had run
away, and relinquished to others what seemed to him thence
forward impracticable. But to sneak off alone, leaving beyond
sea those whom he had thus compromised, was cruelty, nay,
cowardice, said some traducers ; for he always had some, and

Aug. 1799.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 5
very near to his person, even in the most brilliant epochs of his
career. Kleber was not fond of general Bonaparte, and endured his
ascendency with a sort of impatience. If he restrained himself
in his presence, he indulged elsewhere in unbecoming ex
pressions. A grumbler and whimsical man, Kleber had ardently
desired to accompany the expedition to Egypt, that he might
get out of that state of disgrace in which he had been left to
live under the Directory ; and he was now sorry that he had
quitted the banks of the Rhine for the banks of the Nile. With
a weakness unworthy of his character, he allowed that feeling to
betray itself. This man, so great in danger, gave way to it as much
as the meanest of his soldiers could have done. ' The chief com
mand did not counterbalance the necessity of remaining in Egypt,*
for he was not fond of commanding. Encouraging the discon
tent against general Bonaparte, he committed the fault, which
would deserve to be called criminal, had it not been repaired
by heroic actions, of contributing himself to produce in the
army an impression which soon became general. After his ex
ample, every body began to say, that they could not stay any
longer in Egypt, and must absolutely return to France at all
hazards. Other feelings mingled with this passion for return,
to subvert the spirit of the army, and to produce in it the most
mischievous dispositions.
An old rivalry then divided, and long continued to divide,
the officers who had belonged to the armies of the Rhine and
of Italy. They were jealous of one another, each class pre
tending to carry on war in a different and a superior manner ;
and, though this rivalry was repressed by the presence of
general Bonaparte, it was the principal cause of the diversity of
their opinions. All who had come from the armies of the Rhine
showed but little partiality for the expedition to Egypt ; on the
other hand, the officers originally attached to the army of Italy,
though sorry to be so far distant from France, were favourable
to that expedition, because it was the work of the general-in-
chief. After his departure, all restraint was thrown off. Kleber's
partisans rallied tumultuously around him ; they loudly repeated
with him what, it is true, began to be the conviction of every
one, that the conquest of Egypt was a mad undertaking, which
ought to be abandoned as soon as possible. This opinion,
however, found dissentients ; some generals, such as Lanusse,
Menou, Davout, Desaix in particular, dared to express other
sentiments. The army was thenceforward split into two parties ;
the one was called the colonist, the other the anti-colonist
party. Unluckily, Desaix was absent. He was completing the
conquest of Upper Egypt, where he was fighting brilliant bat
tles, and governing with admirable wisdom. His influence,
therefore, could not be opposed at that moment to Kleber's.
To crown the misfortune, he was not to remain in Egypt.

6 HISTORY OF THE [Sept. 1799.
General Bonaparte, wishing to have him about his person, had
committed the fault of not appointing him commander-in-chief,
and had left orders for him to return very soon to Europe.
Desaix, whose name was universally cherished and respected in
the army, whose administrative talents equalled his military
talents, would have governed the colony most ably, and would
have avoided all those weaknesses to which Kleber gave way,
at least for a moment.
Kleber, however, was the most popular of the generals among
the soldiery. His name was hailed by them with entire confi
dence, and somewhat cheered them for the loss of the illustrious
commander who had just left them. The first impression once
past, their minds, though they had not recovered their wonted
tone, acquired more calmness and justice. Other language was
used : they said to themselves that, after all, it behoved general
Bonaparte to fly to the succour of France when in danger ; and
that, the army once established in Egypt, the best thing he
could do for it was to go to Paris, to represent strongly its situ
ation and its wants, and to claim that assistance which he alone
could extort from their supine rulers at home.
Kleber returned to Cairo, assumed the command with a sort
of ostentation, and took possession of the fine Arabian mansion
which his predecessor had occupied in the Ezbekyeh Place.
He displayed a certain pomp, not so much to gratify his own
taste, as to make an impression on the Orientals, and resolved
to cause his authority to be felt, by exercising it with vigour.
But it was not long before the solicitudes of the chief command,
which were insupportable to him, the new dangers with which
the Turks and the English threatened Egypt, and the grief of
exile, which was general, filled his soul with the most gloomy
discouragement. A report of the state of the colony having
been made to him, by his order, he addressed to the Directory a
despatch full of errors, and accompanied it with a report of
Poussielgue's, administrator of the finances — a report in which
things were represented in the most false, and especially the
most inculpatory light, in regard to general Bonaparte.
In this despatch and report, dated the 26th of September
(4th Vendemiaire, year VIII.), general Kleber, and Poussielgue,
the administrator, stated that the army, diminished by one half,
was at this moment reduced to about 15,000 men ; that it was
nearly naked, which in that climate was extremely dangerous
on account of the difference of temperature between day and
night; that they were in want of cannon, muskets, projectiles,
powder, all which things it was difficult to replace, because cast
iron, lead, timber for building, and materials for making gun
powder, were not to be had in Egypt ; that there was a consider
able deficit in the finances, for the sum of 4,000,000 (of francs)
was due to the soldiers for pay, and 7,000,000 or 8,000,000 to
the contractors for various supplies; that the resource of levying

Sept. 1799.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 7
contributions was already exhausted, the country being ready
to rise, if new ones were imposed ; that, the inundation having
been scanty this year, and the crops being thus likely to prove
deficient, the Egyptians would be alike destitute of the means
and the will to pay the tax ; that dangers of all kinds threatened
the colony ; that the two old chiefs of the Mamelukes, Murad
Bey and Ibrahim Bey, still maintained their ground, the one in
Upper Egypt, the other in Lower Egypt ; that Djezzar, the
celebrated pasha of Acre, was about to send to the Turkish
army a reinforcement of 20,000 excellent soldiers, the former
defenders of St. Jean' d'Acre against the French ; that the
grand-vizir himself, having set out from Constantinople, was
already in the environs of Damascus, with a powerful army ;
that the Russians and the English were to join a regular force
to the irregular forces of the Turks ; that, in this extremity,
they had but one resource left, namely, to treat with the Porte ;
and that, general Bonaparte having set the example, and given
express authority in .the instructions left for his successor, an
attempt was about to be made to negotiate with the grand-
vizir a mixed domination, by means of which the Porte should
occupy the open country of Egypt, and levy the miri or land-
tax, while France should occupy the towns and the forts, and
levy the revenue of the customs. Kleber added, that the com
mander-in-chief had seen the crisis approaching, and this was
the real motive for his precipitate departure. M. Poussielgue
concluded his report with a calumny : general Bonaparte, when
he left Egypt, had, he said, carried away two millions. To com
plete this picture, it should be known that general Bonaparte had
heaped favours on M. Poussielgue.
Such were the despatches sent to the Directory by Kleber and ¦f
M. Poussielgue. General Bonaparte was there treated as a
man who is supposed to be ruined, and to whom one need not
show indulgence. It was believed, in fact, that he was exposed
to the two-fold danger of being taken by the English, or severely
condemned by the Directory for having quitted his army. What
would have been the embarrassment of the writers of those
despatches, had they known that they would be opened and
read by the man who was the object of so many calumnies, and
who had now become the absolute head of the government !
Kleber, too careless to ascertain himself the real state of
things, not even taking the pains to examine whether the state
ments which he was sending agreed with his own assertions, —
Kleber did not think that he was advancing falsehoods; he
transmitted, through negligence and ill-humour, the hearsays
which passion had multiplied around him to such a degree as to
give them a kind of public notoriety. These despatches were
entrusted to a cousin of Barras's, the Director, and accompanied
by a multitude of letters, in which the officers of the army gave
vent to a despair as unfounded as it was imprudent. This

8 HISTORY OF THE [Sept. 1799.
cousin of Barras's was taken by the English; he hastily threw
overboard the packet of despatches of which he was the bearer;
but this packet floated, was perceived, picked up, and sent to
the British cabinet. We shall soon see what was the result of
these mischievous communications, which thus fell into the
hands of the English, and were made public to all Europe.
Kleber and M. Poussielgue, however, had sent duplicates of
their despatches to Paris. These duplicates, transmitted by a
different channel, reached France, and were delivered to the
First Consul.
What truth was there in this picture, drawn by morbid
imaginations ? Of this we shall soon be enabled to judge with
certainty by the events themselves ; but, meanwhile, we must
rectify the false assertions just laid before the reader.
The army, according to Kleber, was reduced to 15,000 men;
yet the returns sent to the Directory made them amount to
28,500. When, two years later, it was brought back to France,
it still numbered in its ranks 22,000 soldiers, and, in these two
years, it had fought several great battles and innumerable actions.
In 1798 there had left France, in various convoys, 34,000 men :
4000 were landed at Malta; 30,000, therefore, arrived at Alexan
dria. Subsequently, 3000 sailors, wrecks of the crews of the
fleet destroyed at Aboukir, reinforced the army, and again
raised it to .33,000 men. In 1798 and 1799, it had lost from
4000 to 5000 soldiers; it was, therefore, reduced to about
28,000, of whom 22,000, at least, were fit for duty.
Egypt is a healthy country, where wounds heal with extreme
rapidity : there were, this year, few sick, and no plague. Egypt
was full of Christians, Greeks, Syrians, or Copts, applying to be
enlisted into our ranks, and capable of furnishing excellent re
cruits, to the number of 15,000 or 20,000. The Blacks of Darfur,
bought and made free, added so many as 500 good soldiers to
one of our demi-brigades alone. Egypt, moreover, was sub
dued. The peasants who cultivate it, accustomed to obey under
all masters, never thought of lifting a musket. With the ex
ception of a few insurrections in the towns, there was nothing
to be feared but from undisciplined Turks, coming from a dis
tance, or English mercenaries, transported with great trouble
by sea. Against such enemies the French army was more
than a match, if it were commanded, not with genius, but
merely with ordinary judgment.
Kleber alleged in his despatches that the soldiers were naked;
but general Bonaparte had left cloth for clothing them, and, a
month after the transmission of this despatch, they were en
tirely new clothed. At any rate, Egypt abounded in cotton
stuffs ; it furnished all Africa with them. It could not be diffi
cult to procure these stuffs by purchase, or by demanding them
in part of the taxes. As for provisions, Egypt is the granary of
the countries destitute of corn. Wheat, rice, beef, mutton,

Sept. 1799.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 9
poultry, sugar, coffee, were then ten times as cheap there as in
Europe. So low were the prices of necessaries, that the army,
though its finances were not the most flourishing, was able to
pay for all that it consumed. Kleber asserted that it was in
want of arms ; and there were left 1 1 ,000 swords, 15,000 mus
kets, 1400 or 1500 pieces of cannon, 180 of which were field-
pieces. Alexandria, which, according to him, was stripped of
artillery ever since the siege of St. Jean d'Acre, contained more
than 300 pieces of cannon in battery. As for ammunition,
there remained 3,000,000 cartridges for infantry, 27,000 gun-
cartridges made up, and resources for making more; for there
were still in the magazines 200,000 projectiles, and 1,100,000
pounds (500 tons) of powder. The subsequent events demon
strated the truth of these allegations, since the army continued
to fight two years longer, and left the English considerable stores.
What, in fact, could have become, in so short a time, of the
immense materiel carefully accumulated by general Bonaparte on.
board the fleet which conveyed the army to Egypt ?
In regard to the finances, Kleber's report was equally false.
The soldiers were paid up. It is true that nothing had yet been
decided respecting the financial system best adapted for pro
visioning the army, without draining the country; but the
resources existed, and, by levying merely the taxes already
imposed, the troops might live in abundance. There was due
upon the imposts of the year sufficient to provide for all the
current expenses ; that is to say, above 16,000,000f. There was,
consequently, no need to drive the population to insurrection
by the imposition of new taxes. The financial documents
subsequently made public proved that Egypt was capable of fur
nishing 25,000,000f. per year, and that with ease. At this rate it
paid but half the amount wrung from it, with a thousand vexa
tions, by the numerous tyrants who oppressed it by the name
of Mamelukes. According to the price of things in Egypt, the
army could be subsisted for 18,000,000f or 20,000,000f. As
for the chests, so far was general Bonaparte from having ex
hausted them that, at his departure, he had not even taken the
whole of his pay.
As for the dangers with which the colony was threatened, the
truth was this: Murad Bey, disheartened, was a fugitive in
Upper Egypt with a few Mamelukes. Ibrahim Bey, who, under
the government of the Mamelukes, shared the sovereignty with
him, was then in Lower Egypt, towards the frontiers of Syria.
He had not 400 horse, much less some thousands. Djezzar
Pasha was shut up in St. Jean d Acre. So far from preparing
a reinforcement of 30,000 men for the army of the grand-vizir,
he viewed, on the contrary, with high displeasure, the approach
of a fresh Turkish army, now especially that his Pashalik was
delivered from the French. As for the grand- vizir, he was not
yet across the Taurus. The English had their troops at Mahon,

10 HISTORY OF THE [Sept. 1799.
and were thinking at this moment of employing them in Tus
cany, at Naples, or on the coast of France. As for a Russian
expedition, that was a mere fable. The Russians never had
any idea of taking so long a voyage, for the purpose of furthering
the policy of England in the East.
The inhabitants were not so disposed to insurrection as was re
presented. By humouring the sheiks, who are the priests and the
lawyers of the Arabs, as general Bonaparte had prescribed, their
attachment might soon be gained. We had already begun to
make ourselves a party among them. We had, moreover, on
our side the Copts, the Greeks, the Syrians, who, being all
Christians, behaved towards us as. friends, and as useful auxi
liaries. Thus nothing imminent from that quarter was to be
apprehended. No doubt, if the French experienced disasters,
the Egyptians, with the fickleness of conquered nations, would
do as the Italians themselves had recently done, they would
join the conqueror of one day against the conqueror of the pre
ceding day. Still they appreciated the difference between the
sway of the Mamelukes, who fleeced them, and never came but
sword in hand, and that of the French, who respected property,
and rarely struck off their heads.
Kleber, then, had indulged in dangerous exaggerations, the
melancholy results of hatred, ennui, and exile. At his side,
general Menou, viewing every thing under the most favourable
colours, beheved the French to be invincible in Egypt, and
regarded the expedition as the commencement of a near and
momentous revolution in the commerce of the world. Men
never can sufficiently divest themselves of their personal im
pressions in forming opinions of this kind. Kleber and Menou
were both honest, upright men ; but one wanted to leave Egypt,
the other to stay in it: the clearest, and the most authentic
returns, conveyed to them totally contrary significations — misery
and ruin to one, abundance and success to the other.
At any rate, be the situation what it might, Kleber and his
party rendered themselves seriously culpable in thinking of
evacuation, for they had no right to do so. It is true that gene
ral Bonaparte, in his instructions replete with wisdom, exa
mining all possible cases, had foreseen the very case in which
the army might be obliged to evacuate Egypt. " I am going
to France," said he, "either as a private man or as a pubhc
man ; I will get succours sent to you. But if by next spring
(he was writing in August, 1799) you have received no succours,
no instructions; if the plague has carried off more than 1500
men, independently of losses by war; if a considerable force,
which you should be incapable of resisting, presses you hard,
negotiate with the vizir; consent even, if it must be so, to an
evacuation, subject to one condition, that of referring to the
French government, and meanwhile continue to occupy. You
will thus have gained time, and it is impossible that, during the

Nov. 1799.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 11
interval, you should not have received succours." The instruc
tions were very sound ; but the case foreseen was far from being
realised. In the first place, it would have been requisite to wait
till the spring of 1800; it would have been requisite that, at this
period, no succours, no orders, should have arrived in Egypt;
it would have been requisite that the army should have lost part
of its effective force by the plague; and, lastly, that it should
be pressed by superior forces : now, nothing of this sort had
happened, or did happen. A negotiation opened without these
conditions was a real transgression.
In September, 1799 (Vendemiaire, year VIIL), Desaix, hav
ing completed the conquest and subjugation of Upper Egypt,
had left two moveable columns for the pursuit of Murad Bey,
to whom he had offered peace on condition of his becoming a
vassal of France. He had then returned to Cairo by order of
Kleber, who wished to make use of his name in those luckless
negotiations into which he was about to enter. During these
proceedings, the army of the grand-vizir, so long announced,
was slowly advancing. Sir Sidney Smith, who convoyed with his
squadron the Turkish troops destined to be transported by sea,
had just arrived off Damietta with 8000 Janissaries. On the
1st of November, 1799 (10th Brumaire, year VIIL), the landing
of the first division, of 4000 Janissaries, was effected, towards
the Bogazof Damietta, that is, at the entrance of that branch of
the Nile which runs past this town. General Verdier, who had
only 1000 men at Damietta, marched out with these troops, and
proceeded beyond the fort of Lesbeh, to a narrow tongue of
land, on the shore of which the Turks had disembarked, and,
without giving time for the other 4000 Janissaries to arrive,
attacked the 4000 who had already landed. In spite of the fire
of the English artillery, advantageously placed upon an old
tower, he beat them, drowned or put to the sword 3000, and
took the rest prisoners. The landing craft, at this sight, returned
to their ships, and did not land the remainder of the Turkish
troops. The French had only twenty-two men killed and 100
wounded. On the first; tidings of this disembarkation, Kleber had de
spatched Desaix with a column of 3000 men ; but the. latter,
uselessly sent to Damietta, had found the victory won, and the
French filled with unbounded confidence. This brilliant
achievement ought to have served to encourage Kleber : unfor
tunately he was swayed at once by his own chagrin and by that
of the army. He had before influenced the troops, who in
their turn hurried him into the fatal resolution of an immediate
evacuation. General Bonaparte became the theme of fresh
invectives. That rash young man, it was' said, who had ex
posed the French army to perils, and exposed himself to other
perils in braving the seas and the English cruisers in order to

12 HISTORY OF THE [Nov. 1799.
return to France, that rash young man could not have escaped
the dangers of the passage. The wise generals trained in the
school of the Rhine ought to relinquish a mad scheme, and to
carry back to Europe brave soldiers, indispensable to the Re
public, now threatened in all quarters.
In this disposition of mind, Kleber had sent to the vizir,
who had entered Syria, one of his officers to make new overtures
of peace. General Bonaparte, with a view to embroil the vizir
with the English, had previously entertained the idea of setting
on foot negotiations, which, on his part, were nothing more than
a feint. His overtures had been received with great distrust and
pride. Kleber's met with a more favourable reception, through
the influence of Sir Sidney Smith, who was preparing to play a
prominent part in the affairs of Egypt.
This officer of the English navy had largely contributed to
prevent the success of the siege of St. Jean d'Acre ; he was
proud of it, and had devised a ruse de guerre, according to the
expression of the English agents, which consisted in taking
advantage of a momentary weakness to wrest from the French
their valuable conquest. Accordingly, as all the intercepted
letters of our officers clearly showed their impatient desire to
return to France, Sir Sidney Smith wished to induce the army
to negotiate and to sign a capitulation, and, before the French
government had time to give or to refuse its ratification, to ship
it off immediately and to throw it upon the coast of Europe.
With this view, he had disposed the grand-vizir to listen to
the overtures of Kleber. As for himself, studying to load the
French officers with civilities, he permitted the news from Eu
rope to reach them, taking care however that only such intelli
gence should pass as was anterior to the 18th of Brumaire.
Kleber, on his part, despatched a negotiator to Sir Sidney Smith,
for as the English were masters of the sea, he wished to induce
them to take part in the negotiation, so that the return to
France might be rendered possible. Sir Sidney lent a willing
ear to this message, and manifested a disposition to enter into
arrangements, adding, moreover, that, by virtue of a treaty of the
5th of January, 1799, negotiated by himself, there existed a
triple alliance between Russia, England, and the Porte ; that
those powers had bound themselves to do every thing jointly;
that, in consequence, no arrangement with the Porte could be
valid and carried into execution, if it was not concurred in by
the agents of all the three courts. In his communications, Sir
Sidney Smith assumed the title of " Minister plenipotentiary of
his Britannic Majesty to the Ottoman Porte, commanding his
squadron in the waters of the Levant."
Sir Sidney Smith' here attributed to himself a title which he
had had, but which he had ceased to hold since the arrival of
Lord Elgin as ambassador at Constantinople; and, in reality,

Dec. 1799.] consulate and the empire. 13
he had at this moment no other power than what a military
commander always has — that of signing conventions of war,
suspensions of arms, &c.
Kleber, without closer examination, without knowing whether
he was treating with agents sufficiently accredited, entered blindly
into that perilous track into which he was hurried by a senti
ment common to the whole army, and which would have ended
in ignominy, if, fortunately for him, Heaven had not endowed
him with an heroic soul, which could not fail to retrieve itself
with glory, as soon as he should discover the extent of his
fault. He entered, then, into negotiation, and offered to Sir
Sidney Smith, as well as to the vizir, who had advanced as far
as Gaza in Syria, to appoint officers furnished with full powers
to treat. Disliking to receive the Turks in his camp, and un
willing, on the other hand, to risk his officers amidst the undis
ciplined army of the grand-vizir, he resolved to propose Sir
Sidney Smith's ship Le Tigre for the place of the conferences.
Sir Sidney, who was cruizing with two ships only — which,
be it observed by the way, sufficiently proved the possibility for
France to communicate with Egypt — Sir Sidney had at this
moment but one ; the other, the Theseus, was under repair at
Cyprus. Boisterous weather frequently obliging him to stand off
the coast, his communications with the land were neither regular
nor prompt. It took some time to obtain his assent. At length,
his answer arrived : it intimated that he should appear suc
cessively off Alexandria and Damietta, to take on board the
officers whom Kleber should send to him.
Kleber appointed Desaix and Poussielgue, the administrator,
the same who had so clumsily slandered general Bonaparte, and
whom the Egyptians, in their Arabic relations, have designated
Sultan Kleber's vizir. Poussielgue was an advocate for evacua
tion, Desaix just the reverse. The latter had made the utmost
exertions to withstand the torrent, to raise the spirits of his
companions in arms, and he had undertaken the negotiation
commenced by Kleber, solely in the hope of protracting it, and
gaining time for the arrival of succours and instructions from
France. Kleber, in order to excuse himself to Desaix, told him
that it was general Bonaparte who first began to parley with the
Turks ; that, moreover, he had himself provided for, and au
thorised beforehand, a treaty of evacuation, in case of imminent
danger. Desaix, misinformed, still hoped that the first ship
which should arrive from France would clear up these obscuri
ties and perhaps change the deplorable dispositions of the staff
of the army. He set out with M. Poussielgue, and, unable to
join Sir Sidney Smith off Alexandria, he found him before
Damietta, and went on board Le Tigre, on the 22nd of Decem
ber, 1799 (1st Niv6se, year VIIL). It was just at this moment
that general Bonaparte was invested with the supreme power in
France.

14 HISTORY OF THE [Dec. 1799.
^Sir Sidney Smith, delighted to have on board such a pleni
potentiary as Desaix, gave him a most flattering reception, and
strove by all the means of persuasion to bring him into the idea
of evacuating Egypt.
Desaix was perfectly competent to defend himself, and stood
out for the conditions which his principal had instructed
him to demand. These conditions, wliich were inadmissible by
the English commodore, were particularly convenient to Desaix,
who wished to gain time ; on the part of Kleber they were
extremely ill-advised, for their extravagance rendered any agree
ment impossible. But Kleber sought in that very extravagance
an excuse for his fault. He demanded, for instance, that the
army, retiring with the honours of war, with arms and baggage,
should be allowed to land at any point of the continent that he
might be pleased to select, in order to afford the Republic the
aid of its presence, wherever it might be deemed most service
able. He demanded that the Porte should restore to us im
mediately the Venetian islands, which had become French pro
perty by the treaty of Campo-Formio, that is to say, Corfu,
Zante, Cephalonia, &c, and were occupied at the moment by
Turco-Russian garrisons ; that these islands, and above all,
Malta, a much more important one, should be given up to
France ; that the possession of them should be guaranteed tp
her by the persons signing the treaty of evacuation ; that the
French army, on retiring, should have a right to reinforce and
revictual the garrisons ; lastly, that the treaty which united the
Porte, Russia, and England, should be instantly annulled, and
the triple alliance of the East dissolved.
These conditions were unreasonable, it must be confessed :
not that they were an exorbitant equivalent for what was given
up in giving up Egypt, but because they were not feasible.
Sir Sidney made Kleber sensible of this. Officers treating for
a mere suspension of arms could not include other topics of such
vast extent in their negotiation. Zante, Cephalonia, Corfu, were
occupied by Turkish and Russian troops ; it was requisite,
therefore, to refer not only to Constantinople but also to
Petersburg. Malta was held under the king of Naples as lord
paramount : it could not be disposed of without the consent
of that prince, who had always refused to cede it to France.
To laud French troops in the island at that moment, would
be in a manner deciding the question. There would be found
there cruizers or garrisons of all the coalesced powers, who
would not retire upon an order from Sir Sidney Smith or
the grand-vizir. Besides, England would never consent to a
condition ensuring Malta to France. To land a French army
on a point of the continent, where it might derange the com
binations of the war by its unexpected appearance, would be a
step too bold for a mere commodore to think of taking. Lastly,
to demahd the abolition of the triple alliance was requiring Sir

Dec. 1799.] consulate and the empire. 15
Sidney Smith to undo by himself alone, on board his ship, a
treaty ratified by three great powers, and which had acquired
great importance for the East. Supposing that all these stipu
lations should be accepted by all the courts whose consent was
requisite, it would be necessary to send to Naples, to London,
to St. Petersburg, to Constantinople : of course this would no
longer be a military convention of evacuation, like that which
was signed at Marengo, and capable of being executed at the
very instant. If it were referred to London, it must consequently
be referred to Paris also, which Kleber had no wish to do. All
this evidently far surpassed the bounds of a military capitulation.
Sir Sidney Smith had no difficulty to make the French nego
tiators feel the force of these reasons. But it was urgently
necessary to settle two points immediately — the departure of the
wounded, and of the scientific men attached to the expedition, for
whom Desaix solicited safe-conducts, and secondly, a suspension
of arms ; for the army of the grand-vizir, though marching slowly,
would soon be in presence of the French. It had actually
arrived before the fort of El Arisch, the first French post on the
frontiers of Syria, and had summoned it to surrender. Kleber,
apprised of this circumstance, had written to Desaix and ordered
him to require, as an indispensable condition of these confer
ences, that the Turkish army should halt on the frontier.
The first point, that relating to the departure of the wounded,
and the men of science, rested with Sir Sidney Smith. He
assented to it with great cheerfulness and courtesy.. As for the
armistice, Sir Sidney declared that he would willingly propose
it, but he could not answer for obtaining it ; for the Turkish
army was composed of fanatic and barbarous hordes, and it was
a difficult thing to make regular conventions with it, and still
more so to ensure their execution. To remove this difficulty,
he resolved to go to the camp of the grand-vizir, which was in
the environs of Gaza. The negotiations, in fact, had been going
on for a fortnight on board Le Tigre, while floating at the plea
sure of the winds off the coasts of Syria and Egypt : the parties
had said all that they had to say, and the negotiation could not
be continued to any useful purpose but with the grand-vizir.
Sir Sidney Smith, therefore, proposed to repair thither, to
arrange there a suspension of arms, and to prepare for the arrival
of the French negotiators, if he thoughtthat he could ensure them
safety and respect. This proposal was accepted. Sir Sidney,
availing himself of a favourable moment, pushed off in a boat
which landed him on the coast, after incurring some dangers,
and ordered the captain of Le Tigre to meet him in the port of
Jaffa, where Poussielgue and Desaix were, to be put ashore, if
the conferences were to be transferred to the camp of the grand-
vizir. At the moment when the English commodore reached the
camp, a horrible event had occurred at El Arisch. The Turkish

16 history of the [Dec. 1799.
•
army, composed, for the smaller part, of Janissaries, and for the
greater part, of Asiatic militia, whom the Mussulman laws place
at the disposal of the sultan, presented a confused and undis
ciplined mass, extremely formidable to all who wore the Euro
pean dress. It had been raised in the name of the Prophet ;
for the Turks were told that this was the last effort that would
be required to drive the Infidels out of Egypt ; that the re
doubtable Sultan of Fire, Bonaparte, had left them ; that they
were weakened and disheartened ; that they must be conquered
if the Turks merely showed themselves ; that all Egypt was
ready to rise against their domination. These and other things,
repeated everywhere, had collected around the grand- vizir an
army of 70,000 or 80,000 fanatic Mussulmans. The Turks were
joined by the Mamelukes. Ibrahim Bey, who had some time
before retired to Syria, and Murad Bey, who had descended by
a long circuit from the cataracts to the environs of Suez, had
become the auxiliaries of their former adversaries. The Eng
lish had made for this army a sort of field-artillery, drawn by
mules. The Bedouin Arabs, in the hope of soon plundering
the vanquished, whichever they might be, had placed 15,000
camels at the disposal of the grand-vizir, to assist him to cross
the desert which separates Egypt and Palestine. The Turkish
generalissimo had in his semi-barbarous staff some English
officers, and some of those culpable emigrants, who had taught
Djezzar Pasha how to defend St. Jean dAcre. We shall now
see what those wretched fugitives became the cause of.
The fort of El Arisch, before which the Turks were at this
moment, was, according to the declaration of general Bonaparte,
one of the two keys of Egypt : Alexandria was the other. Ac
cording to him too, an army arriving by sea could not land in
great number anywhere but on the beach of Alexandria. An
army advancing by land, and having to cross the desert of Syria,
would be obliged to pass by El Arisch, to get water at the wells
situated at that place. He had therefore ordered important works!},
to be constructed about Alexandria and the fort of El Arisch to
be put into a state of defence. A body of 300 men, supplied
with provisions and ammunition, kept garrison there, and it was
commanded by a courageous officer named Cazals. The Turkish
advanced guard having reached El Arisch, colonel Douglas, an
English officer in the service of Turkey, summoned Cazals, the com
mandant, to surrender. A disguised French emigrant was the bearer
of the summons. A parley ensued, and the soldiers were told
that the evacuation of Egypt was imminent ; that it was already
announced as resolved upon ; that it would soon be inevitable ;
and that it was cruel to wish to oblige them to defend themselves.
The culpable sentiments which the officers had too much en
couraged in the army, then burst forth. The soldiers in garrison
at El Arisch, vehemently longing, like their comrades, to leave
Egypt, -declared to the commandant that they would not fight,

Dec. 1799.] consulate and the empire. 17
and that he must make up his mind to surrender the fort. The
gallant Cazals indignantly called them together, addressed them
in the noblest language, told them that if there were cowards
among them, they might leave the garrison and go to the camp
of the Turks, that he gave them full liberty to do so, but that
he would resist unto death with those Frenchmen who continued
faithful to their duty. These words revived for a moment the
feeling of honour in the hearts of the soldiers. The summons
was rejected, and the attack commenced. The Turks were not
capable of carrying a position that was ever so little defended.
The batteries of the fort silenced all their artillery. Directed
hy English and emigrant officers, they nevertheless pushed their
trenches to the salient angle of a bastion. The commandant
ordered a few grenadiers to make a sortie, for the purpose of
driving the Turks from the first branch of the trench. Captain
Ferray, who was appointed to head the party, was followed by
three grenadiers only. Finding himself abandoned, he returned
to the fort. Meanwhile, the mutineers had struck the colours,
but a sergeant of grenadiers had hoisted them again. A struggle
ensued. During this contest, the recreants who insisted on
surrendering, threw ropes to the Turks ; these ferocious ene
mies, once hoisted up into the fort, rushed, sword in hand,
upon the dastardly beings who had given them admission into
the fort, and slaughtered a great part of them. The others, brought
back to reason, joined the rest of the garrison, defended them
selves with desperate courage, and were most of them cut in
pieces. Some, in small number, obtained quarter, thanks to
colonel Douglas, and owed their lives to the interference of that
humane, gallant, and distinguished officer.
Thus fell the fort of El Arisch. This was a first effect of the
deplorable disposition prevailing in the army, the first fruit
reaped by the leaders from their own faults.
It was now the 30th of December (9th Nivose) : the letter
written by Sir Sidney Smith to the grand-vizir, to propose to
him a suspension of arms, had not reached him in time to pre
vent the melancholy catastrophe at El Arisch. Sir Sidney
Smith was a man of generous feelings. This barbarous mas- '
sacre of a French garrison horrified him, and, above all, it made
him fearful of the rupture of the negotiations. He lost no time
in sending explanations to Kleber, both in his own name and
in that of the grand-vizir, and he added the formal assurance
that all hostility should cease during the negotiations.
At the sight of these hordes, which rather resembled a mi
gration of savage tribes than an army going to battle, fighting
among themselves at night over provisions or the possession of
a well, Sir Sidney Smith felt alarmed for the safety, of the
French plenipotentiaries. He insisted that the tents destined
for their reception should he pitched in the very quarter of the
grand-vizir and the reis-effendi, who were both present with the
VOL. II. C

18 history of the [Jan. 1800.
army; and that a guard of picked men should be stationed about
these tents ; he had his own placed near them ; and, lastly, he
provided a detachment of English seamen, to secure from all
violence both himself and the French officers committed to his
honour. Having taken these precautions, he sent to Jaffa, to
fetch Messrs. Poussielgue and Desaix to the place where the
conferences were to be held.
Kleber, when informed of the massacre of El Arisch, did not
manifest as much indignation as he ought to have done ; he was
aware that, if he was too warm upon that subject, all the nego
tiations might be broken off. He was more urgent than ever
for a suspension of arms ; and, at the same time, by way of
precaution, and to be nearer to the theatre of the conferences, he
left Cairo, and transferred his head-quarters to Salahieh, on the
very border of the desert, two days' march from El Arisch.
In the mean time, Desaix and Poussielgue, detained by con
trary winds, had not been able to land at Gaza till the 11th of
January (21st Nivose), and to reach El Arisch before the 13th.
The conferences commenced as soon as they arrived, and the
indignation of Desaix had wellnigh broken off the negotiations.
The Turks, ignorant and barbarous, interpreting in their way
the conduct of the French, attributed their disposition to treat,
not to an immoderate desire to return to France, but to fear of
fighting. They required, therefore, that the army should sur
render themselves prisoners of war. Desaix was for putting an
end at once to all kind of communication, but Sir Sidney inter
posed, prevailed on both parties to moderate their terms, and
proposed honourable conditions, if there could be such for a re
solution of this nature. It was no longer possible to put for
ward the original conditions of Kleber. Of this he was himself
convinced, from the letters which had been written to him from
on board Le Tigre, and he said no more about the Venetian
Islands, Malta, and the revictualling of those islands. To give
a colour, nevertheless, to his capitulation, he still adhered to one
point — that the Porte should withdraw from the triple alliance.
This point, strictly considered, was susceptible of being nego
tiated at El Arisch, since the grand- vizir and the reis-effendi
were at hand ; but it could scarcely be demanded of the English
negotiator, whose intervention, however, was indispensable.
This condition, therefore, was set aside, like the others. It was
a vain artifice, which Kleber and his advisers employed towards
themselves, to conceal from their own eyes the indignity of their
conduct. The pure and simple evacuation, and its conditions, soon be
came the sole subject of negotiation. After long discussions,
it was agreed that all hostility should cease for three months ;
that those three months should be employed by the vizir in
collecting, in the ports of Rosetta, Aboukir, and Alexandria, the
vessels requisite for the conveyance of our army ; by general

Jan. 1800.] consulate and the empire. 19
Kleber in evacuating the Upper Nile, Cairo, and the contiguous
provinces, and in concentrating his troops about the points of
embarkation; that the French should depart with arms and
baggage, that is to say, with the honours of war ; that they
should take with them such military stores as they had need of,
and leave the rest ; that, from the day of the signature, they
should cease to impose contributions, and should abandon to
the Porte such as were still due ; but that, in return, the French
army should receive 3000 purses, equivalent at that time to
3,000,000 francs, and representing the sum necessary for its
subsistence during the evacuation and the passage. The forts
of Katieh, Salahieh, and Belbeis, forming the frontier of Egypt
towards the desert of Syria, were to be given up ten days after
the ratification ; Cairo forty days after. It was agreed that the
ratification should be given within eight days by general Kleber
alone, and without any reference to the French government.
Lastly, Sir Sidney engaged, in his own name, and in the name
of the Russian commissioner, to furnish the army with pass
ports, to prevent molestation from English cruizers.
The French commissioners here committed an error in form,
which was of serious consequence. The signature of Sir
Sidney Smith was indispensable, for, without that signature, the
sea continued closed to them. They ought to have required Sir
Sidney Smith, since he was the negotiator of that convention,
to sign it. The mystery of his powers would then have been
eleared up. It would then have transpired that the English
commodore, though he formerly held powers to treat with the
Porte, had none at this moment, Lord Elgin having arrived as
minister at Constantinople ; that he had no special instructions
for the present case ; that he merely had very strong pre
sumptions to hope that his conduct would be approved in
London. The French plenipotentiaries, not conversant with
diplomatic usages, supposed that Sir Sidney Smith, offering
passports, was qualified to give, them, and that these passports
would be valid.
The terms of the convention being arranged, there was nothing
more to be done but to sign it. The noble heart of Desaix
revolted from what he was obliged. to do. Before he placed
his name at the foot of such a paper, he sent for Savary, his
aide-de-camp, directed him to proceed to the head-quarter3 at
Salahieh, where Kleber was, to communicate to him the draft
of the convention, and to declare that he would not sign it, till
he had received from him a formal order to that effect. Savary
came, repaired to Salahieh, and delivered to Kleber the message
with which he was charged. Kleber, who had a vague feeling
of his fault, determined, in order to cover it, to assemble
a council of war, to which all the generals of the army were
summoned. The council met on the 21st of January, 1800 (1st Pluviose,
c 2

20 HISTORY OF THE [Jan. 1800.
year VIIL). The minutes of it still exist. It is painful to see
brave men, who had spilt their blood, who were going to spill it
again for their country, heap up wretched falsehoods to co
lour a criminal weakness. This example ought to serve for a
lesson to military officers ; it ought to teach them that it is not
sufficient to be firm in battle, and that the courage to brave
balls and bullets is the least of the virtues imposed by their
noble profession. In this council of war, great stress was laid
on the intelligence which had then reached Egypt, that the
great combined French and Spanish fleet had sailed out of the
Mediterranean into the ocean ; whence it was concluded that all
hope of succour from France was at an end. In proof of this, it
was argued that five months had elapsed since the departure of
general Bonaparte — five months, during which no despatch had
arrived. An argument was made of the discouragement of the
army, which the very persons who used it had themselves con
tributed to produce. They adverted to what had recently hap
pened at Rosetta and Alexandria, where the garrisons had
behaved like that of El Arisch, threatening to revolt, if they
were not immediately taken back to Europe. They alleged that
the active army was reduced to 8000 men ; they exaggerated,
beyond measure, the force of the Turkish army ; they talked of
a pretended Russian expedition that was about to join the
grand-vizir — an expedition which had no existence but in the
heated imaginations of those who were desirous to forsake
Egypt at any rate. They asserted, as a positive fact, the im
possibility of resistance — an assertion which was so soon to be
contradicted, in an heroic manner, by the very persons who so
stoutly maintained it. Lastly, to keep as closely as possible
within the instructions of general Bonaparte, they brought for
ward some cases of plague, extremely doubtful, and, for the
rest, absolutely unknown in the army.
Notwithstanding all that was said, however, the partisans of
the evacuation were far from, adhering to the instructions
left by general Bonaparte. He had laid down as conditions : —
1. That no succours, no orders, should have arrived by the
spring of 1800. 2. That the plague should have carried off
1500 men, besides the losses from war. 3. That the danger
should be so great as to render all resistance impossible : and,
these circumstances being realised, he had recommended to his
successor to gain time in negotiating, and not to consent to the
evacuation, but on condition of its ratification by France. Now,
it was still only January, 1800 ; there was no plague, no pressing
danger ; and yet an immediate evacuation was the point to be
decided, and without any reference to France,
A man who has exhibited in war something superior to
courage, that is to say character, general Davout, since marshal
and prince of Eckmuhl, was the only one who durst withstand
this culpable impulsion. He was not afraid to oppose Kleber,

Jan. 1800.] consulate and the empire. 21
to whose ascendency all the rest bowed, and combated with
energy the proposed capitulation. But he was not listened to;
and, from a mischievous complaisance, he consented to sign the
resolution of the council of war, by suffering an entry to be
made in the minutes that it had been adopted unanimously.
Davout, nevertheless, took Savary aside, and charged him to
assure Desaix that if he chose to break off the negotiation he
would find support in the army. Savary returned to the camp
at El Arisch, and communicated to Desaix what had passed, and
the message which Davout had desired him to deliver. Desaix,
finding Davout's name subscribed to the deliberations, replied
with warmth to Savary, " Whom then would you have me trust,
when the very man who disapproves the convention dares not
make his signature, agree with his opinion ? He would have
me disobey, and yet dares not maintain to the end the senti
ments which he has expressed!" Desaix, though deeply grieved,
yet, on seeing the torrent, gave way to it himself, and affixed
his signature on the 28th of January, to that unlucky conven
tion, afterwards celebrated by the title of the convention of El
Arisch (8th Pluviose).
When the thing was done, people began to be sensible of its
importance. Desaix, on his return to the camp, spoke of it
with grief, and did not conceal his deep mortification at having
been selected for such a mission, and forced to fulfil it by an
order from the general-in-chief. Davout, Menou, and some
others, launched out into bitter invectives : dissensions broke
forth on all sides in the camp at Salahieh.
Meanwhile, preparations were making for departure : the
great majority of the army were overjoyed at the prospect of
leaving these distant lands, and soon beholding France again.
Sir Sidney Smith had returned to his ship. The vizir advanced
and took possession, consecutively, of the entrenched positions
of Katieh, Salahieh, and Belbeis, which Kleber, in haste to
execute the convention, faithfully delivered up to him. Kleber
returned to Cairo, to make his preparations for departure, to
call in the troops that were guarding Upper Egypt, to concen
trate his army, and then to direct it upon Alexandria and Ro-
setta, at the time stipulated for embarkation.
While these events were occurring in Egypt — baneful con
sequences of a sentiment which the chiefs of the army had
fanned instead of stifling — other events, natural consequences
of the same causes, were taking place in Europe. In fact,
the letters and despatches, sent in duplicate, had, as we
have seen, arrived at the same time in London and Paris. The
accusatory despatch directed against general Bonaparte, and
addressed to the Directory, had been delivered to general Bona
parte himself, who had become the head of the government.
He was shocked at so many weaknesses and falsehoods ; but he
was sensible how much the army needed Kleber ; he appreciated

22 history of the [Jan. 1800.
the great qualities of that general, and, not conceiving that his
discouragement could proceed to such a length as to induce him
to give up Egypt, he took no notice of his own grievances. He
hastened, therefore, to despatch from France instructions and
an intimation of the great succours which he was preparing to
send. The British government, on its part, having received a dupli
cate of Kleber's despatches, and a great number of letters writ
ten by our officers to their families, caused them all to be pub
lished, with a view to exhibit to Europe the situation of the
French in Egypt, and to embroil generals Kleber and Bona
parte. It was a perfectly natural calculation on the part of an
hostile power. At the same time, the English cabinet had re
ceived advice of the overtures made by general Kleber to the
grand-vizir and to Sir Sidney Smith. Believing that the French
army was reduced to the last extremity, it lost no time in send
ing off an express order not to grant any capitulation, unless
they surrendered themselves prisoners of war. Mr. Dundas
even made use, in his place in parliament, of odious expressions.
"An example," said he, " must be made of that army, which,
in a time of profound peace, has dared to invade the dominions
of one of our allies : the interests of mankind require that it
should be destroyed."
This language was barbarous ; it displays the violence of the
passions which then filled the hearts of the two nations. The
English cabinet had taken literally the exaggerations of Kleber
and of our officers ; it considered the French as reduced to
submit to any conditions that might be imposed upon them ;
and, not foreseeing what was passing, it had the imprudence to
give positive orders to Lord Keith, the admiral commanding
in the Mediterranean, not to sign any capitulation but on the
express condition that the French troops should become pri
soners of war.
These orders, despatched from London on the 17th of De
cember, reached admiral Keith in the island of Minorca in the
first days of January, 1800 ; and, on the 8th of the same month,
that admiral hastened to forward to Sir Sidney Smith the in
structions which he had just received from his government. It
took time, especially at that season, to cross the Mediterranean.
The communications of Lord Keith did not reach Sir Sidney
Smith before the 20th of February. The latter was deeply
chagrined. He had acted without precise instructions from his
government, reckoning upon it that his acts would be approved.
He thus found himself in a false position with the French, for
they might, with apparent reason, accuse him of breach of faith.
Better acquainted, besides, with the real state of things, he was
well aware that- Kleber would never consent to surrender him
self prisoner of war ; and he saw the convention of El Arisch,
so adroitly wrung from the weakness of a moment, wholly set

Feb. 1800.] CONSULATE AND the empire. 23
aside. He lost no time in writing to K16ber, to express his
mortification, to apprise him honestly of what was passing, to
advise him to suspend immediately the delivery of the Egyptian
fortresses to the grand-vizir, and to conjure him to wait for
fresh orders from "England before he took any definitive resolu
tion. Unfortunately, when these advices from Sir Sidney arrived at
Cairo, the French army had already executed in part the treaty
of El Arisch. It had delivered up to the Turks all the positions
on the right bank of the Nile, Katieh, Salahieh, Belbeis, and
some of the positions of theDelta, particularly the town of
Damietta and the fort of Lesbeh. The troops were already on
march for Alexandria, with their baggage and stores. The
division of Upper Egypt had put the Turks in possession of
the Upper Nile, and was falling back upon Cairo, for the pur
pose of rejoining the rest of the army towards the sea. Desaix,
availing himself of the order which he had received to return to
France, and disliking to have any hand in the details of that
ignominious retreat, had set out with Davout, who, for his part,
could not stay any longer with Kleber. Kleber, forgetting his
bickerings with Davout, was anxious to retain him, and had
offered him the rank of general of division, which he had au
thority to confer as governor of Egypt. Davout refused it,
saying that he should not like his promotion to bear the date
of such a deplorable event. But, when Desaix and, Davout
were embarking, M. de Latour Maubourg, arriving from France,
with the despatches of the First Consul, met them on the beach,
informed them of the revolution of the 18th of Brumaire, and
of the elevation of general Bonaparte to the supreme power.
Thus Kleber, at the moment when he had just given up the
fortified positions, learned that the convention of El Arisch
would not be executed, and received the intelligence, not less
momentous to him, of the establishment ofythe consular govern
ment. But there had been sufficient weakness for a great character :
an ignominious offer was now about to recall Kleber to himself,
and to make him what he really was — a hero. He was obliged
either to surrender himself prisoner, or to defend himself in a
much worse situation than that which he had declared to be
untenable in the council of war at Salahieh ; he was obliged
either to submit to dishonour, or to engage in a desperate strug
gle. Kleber did not hesitate, and we shall see that, notwith
standing his much worse situation, he contrived to do what a
few days before he judged to be impossible, and thus gave the
noblest of contradictions to himself.
Kleber instantly countermanded all the orders previously
given to the army. He brought back from Lower Egypt to
Cairo part of the troops that had already descended the Nile ;
he ordered his stores to be sent up again : he urged the division

24 history of the [March 1800.
of Upper Egypt to make haste to rejoin him, and gave notice
to the grand-vizir to suspend his march towards Cairo, other
wise he should immediately commence hostilities. The grand-
vizir replied that the convention of El Arisch was signed ; that
it must be executed ; that, in consequence, he should advance
towards the capital. At the same instant, an officer sent from
Minorca with a letter from Lord Keith to Kleber, arrived at
the head-quarters. Among other expressions, that letter con
tained the following : " I have received positive orders from his
Britannic Majesty, not to consent to any capitulation with the
army under your command, unless the troops lay down their
arms, surrender themselves prisoners of war, and give up all
the ships in the harbour of Alexandria."
Kleber, fired with indignation, caused Lord Keith's letter to
be inserted in the order of the day, adding to it these few words :
" Soldiers, to such insults, there is no other answer than vic
tory. Prepare for action."
This noble language found an echo in every breast. The situa
tion was greatly changed since the 28th of January, the day on
which the convention of El Arisch was signed. The French then
held all the fortified positions in Egypt; they ruled the Egyptians,
who were quiet and submissive; the grand-vizir was on the
other side of the desert. Now, on the contrary, the most im
portant posts were given up ; they had possession of the plain
only; the population was everywhere awake; the inhabitants of
Cairo, excited by the presence of the grand-vizir, who was at
the distance of five hours', march, was waiting only for the first
signal to rise. The dismal picture drawn in the council of war,
in which the convention of El Arisch was discussed, — thai}
picture, then false, was now strictly true. The French army
was about to fight in the plain which borders the Nile, having
in front the vizir, with 80,000 men, and on its rear the
300,000 inhabitants of Cairo ready to revolt ; and it was without
fear ! Glorious reparation of a great fault ! '
Agents of Sir Sidney Smith's had hastened up, to interpose
between the French and the Turks, and to make fresh pro
posals of accommodation. Letters, they said, had just been
written to London ; when the convention of El Arisch was
known there, it would be ratified to a certainty ; in this situa
tion, it would be right to suspend hostilities, and wait. To
this the grand-vizir and Kleber consented, but on conditions
that were irreconcileable. The grand-vizir insisted that Cairo
should be given up to him : Kleber, on the contrary, that the
vizir should fall back to the frontier. In this state of things,
fighting was the only resource.
On the 20th of March, 1800 (29th Vent6se, year VIIL),
before daybreak, the French army marched from Cairo, and
deployed in the rich plains which border the Nile, having the river
on the left, the desert on the right, and in front, but at a dis-

March 1800.] consulate and the empire. 25
tance, the ruins of ancient Heliopolis. Night, almost luminous
in this climate, facilitated the manoeuvres, but without rendering
them distinct to the enemy. The army formed itself into four
squares; two on the left, under general Reynier, two on the
right, under general Friant. They were each composed of two
demi-brigades of infantry, drawn up in several lines. At the
angles and outside were companies of grenadiers, with their
backs to the squares, serving to reinforce them during the march
and in charges of cavalry, and separating from them to attack
defended positions when the enemy attempted to make a stand.
At the centre of the line of battle, that is to say, between the
two squares on the left, and the two squares on the right, the
cavalry was disposed in a deep mass, having light artillery on
its wings. At some distance in the rear, and on the left, a fifth
square, smaller than the others, was destined to act as a re
serve. The number of the troops that Kleber had collected in
this plain of Heliopolis might be estimated at somewhat less
than 10,000' men. They were firm and tranquil.
Day began to dawn. Kleber, who, since he had been commander-
in-chief, had displayed a sort of magnificence, in order to make an
impression on the Egyptians, was dressed in a rich uniform.
Mounted on a horse of great height, he exhibited to the soldiers
that noble countenance which they so much loved to behold,
and the manly beauty of which filled them with confidence.
" My friends," said he, as he rode through their ranks, " you
possess in Egypt no more than the ground under your feet. If
you recoil but a single step, you are undone !" His presence
and his words were everywhere hailed with the greatest en
thusiasm ; and, as soon as it was quite light, he gave orders for
marching forward.
As yet, only part of the army of the grand-vizir was in sight.
In that plain of the Nile which extended before us, appeared
the village of El Matarieh, which the Turks had entrenched.
Here was an advanced-guard of from 5000 to 6000 Janissaries,
very good soldiers, escorted by some thousand horse. A little
beyond, another body appeared to harbour a design to glide be
tween the river and our left wing, for the purpose of raising
Cairo in our rear. In front, and at a much greater distance,
the ruins of ancient Heliopolis, a wood of palm-trees, and* con
siderable undulations of the ground, hid the bulk of the Turkish
army from the view of our soldiers. The total number of all
these forces, including the principal body, the corps placed at
El- Matarieh, and the detachment on march to penetrate into
the city of Cairo, might be computed at 70,000 or 80,000 men.
Kleber first ordered a squadron of mounted guides to charge
the detachment manoeuvring on our left, for the purpose of in
troducing itself into Cairo. The guides dashed off at a gallop
upon this confused mass. The Turks, who never feared cavalry,
received and returned the shock. They completely enveloped

26 HISTORY OF the [March 1800.
our horse, which was in danger of being cut to pieces, when
Kleber sent to their relief the 22nd regiment of chasseurs and
the 14th of dragoons, who, charging the dense mass by
wliich the guides were, in a manner, surrounded, used their
swords so well as to disperse and put them to flight. The Turks
then retired out of sight.
This done, Kleber hastened to attack the entrenched village
of El Matarieh, before the main body of the enemy's army had
time to come up. This duty he assigned to general Reynier,
with the two squares on the left ; and he himself, with the two
squares on the right, wheeling about, posted himself between
El Matarieh and Heliopolis, to prevent the Turkish army from
coming to the assistance of the attacked position.
Reynier, having reached the village of El Matarieh, detached
the companies of grenadiers which lined the angles of the
squares, and ordered them to charge the. village. These com
panies advanced, forming two small columns. The brave
Janissaries would not wait for them to come up, but went to
meet them. Our grenadiers, receiving them firmly, poured '
upon them, when close to the muzzles of their pieces, a dis
charge of musketry, which struck down a great number, and
then charged with fixed bayonets. While the first column was
attacking the Janissaries in front, the second took them in
flank, and completed their dispersion. The two columns
united then fell upon El Matarieh, amidst a shower of balls.
They rushed with the bayonet on the Turks, who resisted, and,
after a great carnage, made themselves masters of the position.
The Turks fled into the plain ; and, joining those whom the
guides, chasseurs, and dragoons, had just before dispersed, ran
in disorder towards Cairo, with Nassif-Pasha, the lieutenant of
the grand-vizir, at their head.
The village of El Matarieh, full of spoils in the Oriental
fashion, presented an ample booty to our soldiers. But they
did not stop there ; both generals and soldiers were aware how
important it was not to be surprised, in the midst of a village,
by the mass of the Turkish troops. The army, resuming by
degrees the same order as in the morning, advanced into the
plain, still formed into several squares, with the cavalry in the
middle. It passed the ruins of Heliopolis, and perceived beyond
them a cloud of dust rising on the horizon, and rapidly ad
vancing towards us. On the left .appeared the village of
Seriaqous ; on the right, amidst a wood of palms, the village of
El Merg, situated on the margin of a small lake, called the Lake
of the Pilgrims. A slight elevation of ground ran from one to
the other of these villages. All at once, this moving cloud of
dust stood still, and was presently dispersed by a breeze, leaving
the Turkish army exposed to view ; it formed a long, floating
line from Seriaqous to El Merg. Placed on the elevation just
mentioned, it somewhat overlooked the ground upon which our

March 1800.] consulate and the empire. 27
troops were deployed. Kleber then gave orders to advance.
Reynier, with the two squares on the left, marched towards
Seriaqous ; Friant, with the two squares on the right, moved
upon El Merg. The enemy had sprinkled a considerable number
of tirailleurs in advance of the palm-trees which surround El
Merg. But a fight of tirailleurs could scarcely be successful
against such soldiers as ours. Friant sent a few companies of light
infantry, which soon obliged these detached Turks to rejoin the
confused mass of their army. The grand- vizir was there, in the
midst of a group of horsemen, whose bright armour glistened in
the sun. Our howitzer fire soon dispersed this group. The enemy
brought forward his artillery, with the intention of replying ;
but his shot, ill-directed, passed over the heads of our soldiers.
His pieces were soon dismounted by ours, and put hors de
combat. The thousand colours of the Turkish army were then
seen waving, and part of its squadrons rushed out of the
village of El Merg upon the squares of Friant's division.
The deep fissures in the ground, the ordinary effect of a
hot sun upon a soil long inundated, fortunately checked the
impetuosity of the horses. General Friant, suffering these
Turkish horse to advance nearly to the muzzles of the guns,
gave orders for a sudden discharge of grape-shot, which swept
them down by hundreds. They retired in confusion.
This was but the prelude to a general attack. The Turkish
army was visibly preparing for it. Our squares waited with
firmness, two on the right, two on the left, the cavalry in the
centre, facing both before and behind, and covered by two lines
of artillery. At a signal given by the grand-vizir, the entire
mass of the Turkish cavalry set itself in motion, rushed upon
our squares, spread itself upon their wings, turned them, and
soon surrounded the four fronts of our order of battle. The
French infantry, unmoved by the shouts, the bustle, the tumult
of the Turkish cavalry, remained calm, with bayonet presented,
keeping up a continued and well-directed fire. In vain these
thousand groups of horse whirled round it : they fell under the
grape-shot and the balls, rarely coming up to its bayonets, ex
pired at its feet, or turned about and fled, never to show them
selves again.
After a long and frightful confusion, the sky, darkened by
smoke and dust, suddenly became clear ; the sun burst forth,
and our victorious troops beheld before them a mass of men
and horses, dead or dying ; and, at a distance, as far as the eye
could reach, bands of fugitives running away in alb directions.
The main body of the Turks wasjxtising, in fact, towards El
Kangah, where they had encamped the preceding night, on the
road to Lower Egypt. A few groups only went to rejoin those
parties which, under Nassif-Pasha, lieutenant of the grand-vizir,
had in the morning directed their steps towards Cairo.
Kleber resolved not to allow the enemy any rest. Our

28 history OF THE [March 1800.
squares, preserving their order of battle, crossed the plain at a
rapid pace, and, passing Seriaqous and El Merg, advanced to
El Kangah. We arrived there at night. The enemy, finding
himself closely pressed, again fled in disorder, leaving to our
army the provisions and baggage, of which we stood in great
need. Thus, in that plain of Heliopolis, 10,000 soldiers, by supe
riority in discipline and quiet courage, dispersed 70,000 or
80,000 foes. But, to obtain a more beneficial result than that
of a few thousand killed, wounded, and stretched in the dust, it
would be necessary to pursue the Turks, to drive them into the
desert, and to cause them to perish there by hunger, thirst, and
the sword of the Arabs. The French army was exhausted with
fatigue. Kleber allowed it a little rest, and gave orders for the
pursuit on the following day.
We had scarcely 200 or 300 wounded or dead, for in
this species of combat, troops in a square, which preserve
themselves unbroken, sustain but. little loss. Kleber, at this
moment, hearing cannon towards Cairo, had no doubt that the
corps which had turned his left had gone to second the revolt
of that city. Nassif-Pasha, the vizir's lieutenant, and Ibrahim Bey,
one of the two Mameluke chiefs, had actually entered it with
2000 Mamelukes, 8000 or 10,000 Turkish horse, and some
revolted villagers of the environs, in all about 20,000 men.
Kleber had left scarcely 2000 in that great capital, distributed
in the citadel and the forts. He ordered general Lagrange to
set out in the middle of that same night, with four battalions,
and go to their relief. He enjoined all the commandants of
troops left at Cairo to take strong positions, to keep in com
munication with one another, but not to attempt any decisive
attack before his return. He was apprehensive of some false
manoeuvre on their part, which might uselessly endanger the
lives of the soldiers, every day more and more precious, now
that they were absolutely doomed to remain in Egypt.
During the whole time that the battle had lasted, the second
Mameluke chief, Murad Bey, who had formerly shared with
Ibrahim Bey the rule over Egypt, who was distinguished from
his colleague by brilliant valour, chivalrous generosity, and great
intelligence, had remained on the wings of the Turkish army,
motionless, at the head of 600 superb horse. When the battle
was over, he had plunged into the desert and disappeared. It
was in consequence of a promise given to Kleber that he had
thus acted. Murad Bey, who had recently arrived at the vizir's
head-quarters, had felt the old jealousy which so long divided
the Turks and the Mamelukes spring up again within him. He
was aware that the Turks were anxious to recover Egypt, notto
restore it to the Mamelukes, but to possess it themselves. He,
therefore, thought to conciliate the French, under the idea of
allying himself with them, if they were victorious, or of sue-

March 1800.] consulate and the empire. 29
ceeding them if they were vanquished. Acting, however, with
circumspection, he refrained from the manifestation of his sen
timents till hostilities were definitively resumed, and had pro-
raised Kleber to declare for him after the first battle. That
battle was fought ; it was glorious for the French ; and his
sympathy for them could not fail to be greatly augmented by it.
There was reason to hope that, in a few days, we should have
him for our professed ally.
In the middle of the very night which followed the battle,
after allowing the troops a few hours' rest, K16ber ordered the
drums to beat to arms, and marched for Belbeis, determined
not to give any respite to the Turks. He arrived there very
early in the day. This was the 21st of March (30th Vent6se).
The vizir, in his rapid flight, was already beyond Belbeis. He
had left in the fort and town a corps of infantry, and in the plain
a thousand horse. On the approach of our troops these horse
fled. The Turks were driven out of the town ; they were shut
up in the fort, where, after exchanging a few cannon-shot, want
of water and fear induced them to surrender. So great was the
fanaticism of these Turkish troops, that some men chose rather
to be slaughtered than to give up their arms. Meanwhile, the
cavalry of general Leclerc, scouring the plain, seized a long
caravan of camels proceeding towards Cairo, and laden with the
baggage of Nassif-Pasha and Ibrahim Bey. This capture re
vealed more completely to Kleber the real design of the Turks,
which consisted in exciting not only the capital but all the large
towns in Egypt to rise against the French. Apprised of this
design, and finding that the Turkish army made no stand any
where, he detached general Friant with five battalions for Cairo,
to support the four battalions sent in the night from El Kangah,
under the orders of general Lagrange.
Next day, March 22nd (1st Germinal), he set out for Salahieh.
General Reynier preceded him at the head of the left division :
he himself followed with the guides^and the 7th hussars. Lastly
came general Belliard, with his brigade, the rest of Friant's
division. During the march, a message was received from the
grand-vizir, who desired to negotiate. The only answer re
turned was a refusal. Not far from Karaim, half-way to Sala
hieh, a violent canonade was heard ; soon afterwards Reynier's
division was seen formed in square and engaged with a multitude
of horse. Kleber sent word to Belliard to hasten his march,
and he himself, with the cavalry, proceeded with the utmost
expedition towards Reynier's square. But at this sight the
Turks, who were attacking Reynier's division, liking better to
have to do with the French cavalry than with the infantry, fell
upon the guides and the 7th hussars, whom Kl6ber was bringing
with him. Their charge was so sudden that the light artillery
had not time to place itself in battery. The drivers were
slaughtered on their guns. Kleber, with the guides and the

30 history of the [March 1800.
hussars, was for a moment in the greatest danger, especially as
the inhabitants of Karaim, thinking that it was all over with
such a handful of French, had hastened to the spot with pitch
forks and scythes to finish them. But Reynier immediately
sent the 14th dragoons, which extricated Kleber in time. Bel
liard, who had pushed on at a great rate, came up soon afterwards
with his infantry, and cut in pieces some hundred men.
Kleber, anxious to reach Salahieh, hastened his march, defer
ring till his return the punishment of Karaim. The heat of the
day was oppressive ; the wind blew from the desert, and along
with a scorching air was inhaled a fine, penetrating dust. Men
and horses were exhausted with fatigue. At length, about
nightfall, they arrived at Salahieh. They were now on the very
frontier of Egypt, at the entrance of the desert of Syria, and
Kleber expected to have on the morrow a final engagement with
the grand-vizir. But, on the morning of the next day, March
23rd (2nd Germinal), the inhabitants of Salahieh came to meet
him, and informed him that the vizir was continuing his flight
in the greatest disorder. Kleber hastened forward, and with
his own eyes beheld this sight, which proved how much he had
exaggerated to himself the danger of Turkish armies.
The grand-vizir, taking with him 500 of his best horse, had
penetrated with some baggage into the desert. The rest of his
army was fleeing in all directions ; one part was running towards
the Delta; a second begged upon its knees for quarter; a third,
seeking an asylum in the desert, was slaughtered by the Arabs.
These last, after convoying the Turkish army, had remained on
the frontier, knowing that one party or the other must be van
quished, and that, of course, there would be booty to pick up.
Their conclusion was correct; for, finding the Turkish army
completely demoralised and incapable of defending itself even .
against them, they murdered the fugitives for the purpose of
plundering them. Just at the moment when Kleber arrived,
they had borne down to the deserted camp of the vizir, and
pounced upon it like a flock of birds of prey. At the sight of
our army, they flew away on their swift horses, leaving abundant
spoils to our soldiers. Here, in the intrenched space of a
square league, they found an infinite multitude of tents, horses,
cannon, and a great quantity of saddles and harness of all sorts,
40,000 horse-shoes, a profusion of provisions and of rich ap
parel, boxes already broken open by the Arabs, but still full of
perfumes of aloes, silk stuffs, in short of all those articles that
compose the dazzling and barbarous luxury of oriental armies.
Along with twelve litters of wood, carved and gilt, there was a
carriage hung on springs after the European fashion, of English
manufacture ; and pieces of cannon were found with the motto
Honi soit qui mal y pense; a certain evidence of the very active
intervention of the English in this war.
Our soldiers, who had brought nothing with them, found, in

March 1800.] consulate and the empire. 31
the Turkish camp, provisions, ammunition, a rich booty, and
objects the singularity of which made them laugh, as they were
always disposed to do after a brief moment of dejection. Strange
power of the mind over man ! Now, victorious, they had no
wish to leave Egypt, and no longer considered themselves
doomed to perish in distant exile !
When Kleber had ascertained with his own eyes that the
Turkish army had disappeared, he resolved to return and re
duce the towns of Lower Egypt, and Cairo in particular, to
their duty. He made the following dispositions : — generals
Rampon and Lanusse were ordered to scour the Delta ; Rampon
was to march to the important town of Damietta, which was in
the hands of the Turks, and to retake it. Lanusse was to keep
in communication with Rampon, to sweep the Delta from
Damietta to Alexandria, and to reduce successively the revolted
villages. Belliard had the general commission to support these
different operations, and the special commission to second
Rampon in his attack on Damietta, and to retake himself the
fort of Lesbeh, which commands one of the mouths of the Nile.
Kleber, moreover, left Reynier at Salahieh, to prevent the rem
nants of the Turkish army, which had fled into the desert of
Syria, from coming back. The latter was to remain in obser
vation on the frontier, till the Arabs had completed the dis
persion of the Turks, and then return to Cairo- Lastly,
Kleber himself -set out on the next day, March 24th (3rd
Germinal), with the 88th demi-brigade, two companies of
grenadiers, the 7th hussars, and the 3rd and 14th dragoons.
He arrived at Cairo on the 27th of March. Important events
had occurred there since his departure. The population of that
great city, which numbered nearly 300,000 inhabitants, fickle,
inflammable, inclined to change, like all multitudes, had followed
the suggestions of Turkish emissaries, and fallen upon the
French the moment they heard the cannon at Heliopolis.
Pouring forth outside the walls during the battle ; and seeing
Nassif-Pasha and Ibrahim Bey, with some thousand horse and
Janissaries, they supposed them to be conquerors. Taking
good care not to undeceive the inhabitants, the Turks affirmed,
on the contrary, that the grand-vizir had gained a complete
victory, and that the French were exterminated. At these
tidings, 50,000 men had risen in Cairo, at Boulaq, and at
Gyzeh. Armed with swords, pikes, and old muskets, they
purposed to slaughter the French left among them. But 2000
men, entrenched in the citadel and in the forts which com
manded the city, supplied with provisions and ammunition,
opposed a resistance difficult to overcome. Having almost all
of them fallen back in time, they had managed to shut them
selves up in the fortified places. Some, however, had been in
great danger ; it was those who, to the number of 200 only,
mounted guard at the head-quarters. This noble edifice, for-

32 HISTORY OF the [April 1800.
merly occupied by general Bonaparte, and since by Kleber and
the principal administrations, stood at one of the extremities of
the city, overlooking on one side the square of Ezbekyeh, the
finest in Cairo ; on the other, gardens stretching to the Nile.
The Turks and the insurgent populace intended to storm this
house, and to slaughter the 200 French by whom it was oc
cupied. This would have been the more easy for them, since
general Verdier, who guarded the citadel, placed at the other
extremity of Cairo, could not come to their assistance. But the
brave soldiers who were in the head-quarters managed, some
times by a well-supported fire, sometimes by daring sorties, to
keep the ferocious multitude at bay, and to give general Lagrange
time to arrive. He had been detached, as we have seen, the
very night after the battle, with four battalions. He arrived at
noon the next day, entered by the gardens, and rendered the
head-quarters thenceforth impregnable.
The Turks, seeing no means of overcoming the resistance of
the French, reeked their revenge on such unfortunate Christians
as were in their power. They began by slaughtering part of
the inhabitants of the European quarter ; they killed several
merchants, plundered their houses, and carried off their wives
and daughters. They then went in search of those Arabs who
were accused of living on good terms with the French, and of
drinking wine with them. They put them to death ; and
murder and plunder went hand in hand, as usual. They im
paled an Arab, who had been chief of the Janissaries under the
French, and who was charged with the police of Cairo ; and
they treated in the same manner one who had been secretary to
the Divan instituted by general Bonaparte. Thence they pro
ceeded to the quarter of the Copts. These, as every one
knows, are descended from the ancient inhabitants of Egypt,
and have adhered to Christianity, in spite of all the Mussulman
dominations that have succeeded one another in their country.
They possessed great wealth, arising from the collection of the
taxes, which the Mamelukes had delegated to them. The in
tention was, to punish in them, friends of the French, and more
especially to plunder their houses. Very fortunately for these
Copts, their quarters formed the left side of Ezbekyeh square,
contiguous to our head-quarters. Their chief was, moreover,
rich and brave; he defended himself well, and succeeded in
saving them.
Amid these horrors, Nassif-Pasha and Ibrahim ,Bey were
ashamed of themselves for what they did, or suffered to be
done. They saw that wealth wasted which would belong to
them, if they remained in possession of Egypt. But they
winked at all that was done by a populace of which they were
no longer masters, and thought, besides, by these massacres, to
keep up their animosity against the French.
During these transactions arrived general Friant, detached

April 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 33
from Belbeis, and lastly Kleber him self. Both entered through
the gardens behind our head-quarters. Though conqueror of the
grand-vizir's army, Kleber had a serious difficulty to surmount,
nothing less than to subdue an immense city, peopled by
300,000 inhabitants, partly in a state of revolt, occupied by
20,000 Turks, and built in the Oriental style, that is to say, having
narrow streets, divided into piles of masonry, which were real
fortresses. These edifices receiving light from within, and, ex
hibiting without nothing but lofty walls, had terraces instead of
roofs, from which the insurgents poured a downward and
destructive fire.. Add to this, that the Turks were masters of
the whole city, excepting the citadel and the square of Ezbekyeh.
As for the latter, they had blockaded it in a manner, by closing
the streets that ran into it with embattled walls.
The French had but two modes of attack ; either to keep up
a destructive fire of bombs and howitzers from the citadel, till
the city was reduced, or to debouch by the square of Ezbekyeh,
overthrowing all the barriers erected at the head of the streets,
and taking all the quarters by assault, one by one. The first
method was liable to cause the destruction of a great city, the
capital of the country, which the French needed for the supply
of necessaries ; the second exposed them to the risk of losing
ten times as many men as ten battles like that of Heliopolis
would have cost them.
In this case, Kleber showed as much prudence as he had
just shown energy in the field. He resolved to gain time, and to
let the insurrection wear itself out. He had sent almost the
whole of his materiel to Lower Egypt, under the idea that he
should very soon embark. He enjoined Reynier, as soon as the
army of the vizir had entirely crossed the desert, and as soon as
Damietta and Lesbeh were retaken, to ascend the Nile with his
whole division and the stores necessary for Cairo. Meanwhile,
he caused all the outlets, by which the city could communicate
with the surrounding country, to be blockaded. Though the
insurgents had procured provisions by plundering the houses of
the Egyptians, in general amply supplied with them, though
they had cast balls, and even founded cannon, they could not
possibly help suffering very soon from dearth. Nor could they
fail at length to be undeceived respecting the general state of
things in Egypt, and to learn that the French were everywhere
victorious, and the vizir's army dispersed ; moreover, they were
likely to fall out ere long, for their interests were totally oppo
site. Nassif Pasha's Turks, Ibrahim Bey's Mamelukes, and the
Arab population of Cairo, could not agree together long. For
all these reasons, Kleber thought it advisable to temporise and
to negotiate.
While he was gaining time, he completed his treaty of
alliance with Murad Bey, through the agency of the wife of that
Mameluke prince, a person universally respected, endowed
VOL. II. D

34 HISTORY OF THE [April 1800.
with beauty, and even with a superior understanding. He
granted to him the province of Said, under the supremacy of
France, on condition of paying a tribute equivalent to a con
siderable part of the imposts'" of that province. Murad Bey
engaged, moreover, to fight for the French ; and the French
engaged, if they should ever quit the country, to facilitate for
him the occupation of Egypt. Murad Bey, as we shall see
by-and-by, faithfully adhered to the treaty which he had just
signed, and began by driving from Upper Egypt a Turkish corps
which had occupied it.
By means of Murad Bey and the sheiks who were secret
friends of France, Kleber then opened negotiations with the
Turks who had entered Cairo. Nassif Pasha and Ibrahim Bey
began, in fact, to be afraid of being shut up in the city by the
French, and treated after the Turkish fashion. They knew,
besides, that the grand-vizir's army was completely dispersed.
In consequence, they cheerfully assented to conferences, and
agreed to a capitulation, by the terms of which they were to be
allowed to retire safe and sound. But, at the moment when
this capitulation was about to be concluded, the insurgents of
Cairo, finding themselves abandoned to the vengeance of the
French, were seized with consternation and rage, caused the
conferences to be broken off, threatened to despatch all those
who showed any determination to desert them, and even gave
money to the Turks to induce them to fight. An attack by main
force was, therefore, indispensable for completing the reduction
of the city.
Lower Egypt having returned to its duty, Reynier had as
cended with his corps and a convoy of military stores. He
assisted in investing that part of the outworks of Cairo, which
stretch from north to east, that is to say, from fort Camin to
the citadel; general Friant encamped towards the west, in the
gardens behind our head-quarters, between the city and the Nile;
Leclerc's cavalry was posted between Reynier's and Friant's divi
sions, scouring the country; general Verdier occupied the south.
On the 3rd and 4th of April (13th and 14th Germinal) a de
tachment of general Friant's commenced the first attack. Its
chief object was to clear Ezbekyeh square, which was our prin
cipal debouche. A beginning was made with the Copt quarter,
which formed the left of it. The troops penetrated with the
greatest intrepidity into the streets which crossed this quarter
in all directions ; while several detachments blew up the
houses all round Ezbekyeh square, for the purpose of opening
avenues to the interior of the city. Meanwhile, the citadel
threw a few bombs to intimidate the population. These attacks
were successful, and made us masters of the heads of the streets
terminating in Ezbekyeh square. In the following days, an
eminence situated near fort Sulkouskoi, which the Turks had
entrenched, and which commanded the Copt quarter, was taken.

April 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 35
Every preparation was thus made for a general and simultaneous
attack. Before he made this attack, Kleber summoned the in
surgents for the last time : they refused to listen to the sum
mons. Still making a particular point of sparing the city, which,
it is true, was not implicated in the horrors committed by a
few fanatics, he resolved to speak to the eye by means of a ter
rible example. He gave orders for attacking Boulaq, a detached
suburb of Cairo, on the banks of the Nile.
On the 15th of April (25th Germinal) Friant's division sur
rounded Boulaq, and poured upon that devoted suburb a
shower of bombs and howitzers. Favoured by this fire, the
soldiers rushed to the assault, but met with an obstinate resist
ance from the inhabitants and the Turks. Every street, every
house, became the theatre of a desperate conflict. Kleber or
dered this horrible carnage to be suspended for a moment^ to
offer pardon to the revolters : that pardon was rejected. The
attack was then resumed : the fire spread from house to house,
and Boulaq, in flames, experienced the two-fold horror of a con
flagration and an assault. Meanwhile, the chiefs of the popu
lation having thrown themselves at the feet of the conqueror,
Kleber put a stop to the effusion of blood, and saved the rem
nant of the hapless suburb. It was the quarter which contained
the warehouses of the merchants ; in these were found an im
mense quantity of goods, which were preserved from the flames
for the use of the army.
This horrible sight was witnessed by the whole population of
Cairo. Taking advantage of the effect which it was likely to pro
duce, Kleber ordered the capital itself to be attacked. A house
adjoining to the head-quarters had been undermined; fire was
applied to the mine, and Turks and insurgents were blown up
together. This was the signal for the attack. Friant's and
Belliard's troops debouched by all the outlets from Ezbekyeh
square, while general Reynier entered at the north and east
gates, while Verdier, from the elevated citadel, showered bombs
upon the city. The fight was obstinate. Reynier's troops pene
trated through the Bab-el-Charyeh gate, situated at the extremity
of the great canal, and, driving before them Ibrahim Bey and
Nassif Pasha, who defended it, at length cooped up both of
them between the 9th demi-brigade, which, having entered at
the opposite point, nad driven back all they encountered in their
victorious course. The two French corps joined, after making
a frightful carnage. Night separated the combatants. Several
thousand Turks, Mamelukes, and insurgents, had fallen; four
hundred houses were in flames.
This was the last effort at resistance. The inhabitants, who
had long detained the Turks, now began to conjure them most
earnestly to quit Cairo, and thus leave them at liberty to negotiate
with the French. Kleber, who was averse to these sanguinary
scenes, and who was anxious to spare his soldiers, wished for
D 2

36 HISTORY OF THE [April 1800.
nothing better than to treat. The envoys of Murad Bey served
him for agents. The treaty was soon concluded. Nassif Pasha
and Ibrahim Bey were to retire to Syria, escorted by a detach
ment of the French army. The only terms granted them were,
that their lives should be spared. They set out from Cairo on
the 25th of April (5th Floreal), leaving to the mercy of the
French the wretches whom they had urged into revolt.
Thus terminated that sanguinary struggle, which had com
menced with the battle of Heliopolis on the 20th of March, and
which ended on the 25th of April with the departure of the last
lieutenants of the vizir, after thirty-five days' fighting, between
20,000 French, on one side, and, on the other, the whole force of
the Ottoman empire, seconded by the revolt of the Egyptian
towns. Great faults had occasioned this insurrection, and pro
voked this horrible effusion of blood. If, in fact, the French
had not made preparations for departing, the Egyptians would
never have dared to rise. The contest would have been limited
to a brilliant but by no means dangerous battle between our
squares of infantry and the Turkish cavalry. But, a commence
ment of evacuation, having produced a popular explosion in seve
ral towns, it was necessary to retake them by assault, which was
more destructive than a battle. Let us forget Kleber's faults
in admiration of his glorious and energetic conduct ! He had
imagined that he could not defend Egypt, when subjugated and
peaceful, against the Turks ; and he had now conquered it in
thirty-five days, in spite of Turks and of the insurgent Egyptians,
with equal energy, prudence, and humanity.
In the Delta, all the towns had returned to a state of com
plete submission. Murad Bey had driven from Upper Egypt
the Turkish detachment of Dervish Pasha. The vanquished
everywhere trembled before the conqueror, and expected a
terrible chastisement. The inhabitants of Cairo in particular,
who had committed revolting cruelties upon the Arabs attached
to the French, and upon the Christians of all nations, were filled
with consternation. Kleber, who was humane and wise, took
good care not to repay cruelties with cruelties. He knew that
conquest, odious to all nations, never becomes tolerable in the
estimation of those on whom it falls, but at the price of a good
government, and cannot render itself legitimate in the eyes of
enlightened nations unless by the accomplishment of great de
signs. He hastened, therefore, to use his victory with modera
tion. The Egyptians were persuaded that they should be treated
harshly : they conceived that the loss of fife and property would
atone for the crime of those who had risen in revolt. Kleber
called them together, assumed at first a stern look, but after
wards pardoned them, merely imposing a contribution on the
insurgent villages.
Cairo paid 10,000,000 fcs., a burden far from onerous for so
large a city. The inhabitants considered themselves as most lucky

May 1800.] consulate and the empire. 37
to get off so easily. Eight millions more were imposed upon
the rebel towns of Lower Egypt.
This sum sufficed for the immediate discharge of the arrears
of pay, and furnished funds for procuring the provisions needed
by the army, for supplying all the wants of the wounded, and for
completing the fortifications that were begun. It was a precious
resource, till the system of the impositions should be improved
and carried into execution. Another resource, equally unex
pected, presented itself at this moment. Seventy Turkish ves
sels had just entered the Egyptian ports, to carry away the
French army. The late hostilities justified our detaining them.
They were laden with goods, which were sold for the benefit of
the chest of the army. Owing to these various resources, an
abundant provision was made for all the services, without any
requisition in kind. The army found itself in plenty, and the
Egyptians, who had not hoped to be let off so easily, submitted
with perfect resignation. The army, proud of its victories,
confident in its strength, knowing that general Bonaparte
was at the head of the government, ceased to doubt that it
would soon receive reinforcements. Kleber had in the plain
of Heliopolis made the noblest amends for his momentary
faults. He assembled the administrators of the army, the persons
best acquainted with the country, and turned his attention to
the organisation of the finances of the colony. He restored the
collection of the direct contributions to the Copts, to whom it
had formerly been entrusted ; he imposed some new customs'
duties and taxes on articles of consumption. The total of the
revenues was to amount to 25,000,000 fcs., and this was suffi
cient for all the wants of the army, which did not exceed
eighteen or twenty millions. He admitted into the ranks of
our demi-brigades, Copts, Syrians, and even Blacks, bought in
Darfur, and whom some of the subalterns, beginning to speak
the Janguage of the country, undertook to drill. These new
soldiers placed in the regiments, fought there as stoutly as the
French with whom they had the honour to serve. Kleber gave
orders for the completion of the forts constructing around Cairo,
and set men to work at those of Lesbeh, Damietta, Burlos, and
Rosetta, situated on the sea coast. He pressed forward the works
of Alexandria, and imparted fresh activity to the scientific re
searches of the Institute of Egypt. From the cataracts to the
mouths of the Nile, everything assumed the aspect of a solid and
durable establishment. Two months afterwards, the caravans of
Syria, Arabia, and Darfur, began to appear again at Cairo. The
hospitable welcome which they received ensured their return.
If Kleber had lived, Egypt would have remained in our pos
session, at least till the time of our great disasters. But a
deplorable event snatched away that general, in the midst of
his exploits and of his judicious government.

38 history of the [June 1800.
It is always more or less dangerous to give a deep shock to
the ruling principles of human nature. All Islamism had
been moved by the presence of the French in Egypt. The
children of Mahomet had felt somewhat of that enthusiasm
which of old inflamed them against the crusaders. Cries of a
holy war were raised, as in the twelfth century ; and there were
fanatic Mussulmans who vowed to achieve thf sacred fight, which
consists in slaying an infidel. In Egypt, where people saw the
French closely, where they appreciated their humanity, where
they could compare them with the soldiers of the Porte,
especially with the Mamelukes — in Egypt, where they wit
nessed their respect for the Prophet (a respect enjoined by
general Bonaparte), less aversion for them was entertained;
and, when they afterwards left the country, the fanaticism had
considerably abated. Indeed, during the late insurrection,
there had even been perceived, in some places, real signs of at
tachment to our soldiers, to such a degree, that the Enghsh
agents were surprised at it. But, throughout the rest of the
East, the attention of all was engrossed by one subject, and that
was the invasion by Infidels of an extensive Mussulman country.
A young man, a native of Aleppo, named Suleiman, who
was a prey to extravagant fanaticism, who had performed the
pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, who had studied at the
mosque El Azhar, the most celebrated and the wealthiest in
Cairo, that where the Koran and the Turkish law are taught,
who, finally, purposed to obtain admission into the body of the
doctors of the faith, chanced to be wandering in Palestine, when
the wrecks of the vizir's army passed through the country. He
witnessed the sufferings, the despair, of his co-religionists,
which violently affected his morbid imagination. The aga of
the Janissaries, who had chanced to see him, inflamed his fana
ticism still more by his own suggestions. This young man
offered to assassinate "the Sultan of the French," general
Kleber. Furnished with a dromedary and a sum of money, he
repaired to Gaza, crossed the desert, proceeded to Cairo, and shut
himself up for several weeks in the great mosque, into which
students and poor travellers were admitted, at the cost of that
pious foundation. The rich mosques are in the East what
convents formerly were in Europe; there are found prayer,
religious instruction, and hospitality. The young fanatic inti
mated his design to the four principal sheiks of the mosque,
who were at the head of the department of instruction. They
were alarmed at his resolution, and at the consequences to
which it was likely to lead; they told him that it would not
succeed, and that it would bring great disasters upon Egypt ;
but still they refrained from apprising the French authorities.
When this wretched man was sufficiently confirmed in his
resolution, he armed himself with a dagger, followed Kleber for
several days, but, finding no opportunity to approach him, he

June 1800.] consulate and the empire. 39
resolved to penetrate into the garden of the head-quarters, and
to hide himself there in an abandoned cistern. On the 14th of
June he appeared before Kleber, who was walking with Protain,
the architect of the army, and showing him what repairs would
require to be done in the house, to obliterate the traces of the
bombs and balls. Suleiman approached him, as if to beg alms,
and, while Kleber was preparing to listen to him, he rushed
upon him, and plunged his dagger several times into his breast.
Kleber fell, under the violence of this attack. Protain, having
a stick in his hand, fell upon the assassin, struck him violently
on the head, but was thrown down in his turn by a stab with
the dagger. At the cries of the two victims, the soldiers ran
to the spot, raised their expiring general, sought and seized the
murderer, whom they found skulking behind a heap of rubbish.,
A few minutes after this tragic scene Kleber expired. The
army shed bitter tears' over him. The Arabs themselves, who
had admired his clemency after their revolt, united their regrets
to those of our soldiers. A military commission assembled im
mediately to try the assassin, who confessed every thing. He
was condemned, according to the laws of the country, and im
paled. The four sheiks to whom he had communicated his
intention were beheaded. These bloody sacrifices were deemed
necessary for the safety of the chiefs of the army. Vain pre
caution ! With Kleber, the army had lost a general, and the
colony a founder, for whom none of the officers left in Egypt
was qualified to make amends. With Kleber Egypt was lost
for France. Menou, who succeeded him by right of seniority,
was a warm partisan of the expedition ; but, notwithstanding
his zeal, he was very far beneath such a task. One man alone
could have equalled Kleber, nay, surpassed him, in the govern
ment of Egypt ; this was he, who, three months before, em
barked in the harbour of Alexandria for Italy, and who fell at
Marengo, on the same day, nearly at the same moment that
Kleber was murdered at Cairo ; this was Desaix. Both died
on the 14th of June, 1800, for the accomplishment of the vast
designs of general Bonaparte. How singular the destiny of
these two men, constantly placed side by side during life, undi
vided in death, yet withal so different in every quality whether
of mind or body !
Kleber was the handsomest man in. the army. His lofty
stature, his noble countenance, expressing all the pride of his
soul, his valour at once intrepid and cool, his quick and Solid
intelligence, rendered him a most formidable commander on
the field of battle. His mind was brilliant, original, but un
cultivated. He read incessantly and exclusively Plutarch and
Quintus Curtius ; there he sought the food of great souls, the
history of the heroes of antiquity. He was capricious, indocile,
and a grumbler. It was said of him, that he liked not either to
command or to obey ; and this was true. He obeyed under

40 history of the [June 1800.
general Bonaparte, but not without murmuring ; he sometimes
commanded, but in the name of another, under general Jourdan,
for example, assuming the command by a sort of inspiration
amidst the battle, exercising it like a superior captain, and, after
the victory, resuming his character of lieutenant, which he pre
ferred to any other. Kleber was licentious in his manners and
language, but upright, disinterested, as men were in those days,
for the conquest of the world had not yet corrupted their dis
positions. Desaix was the reverse in almost every respect. Simple,
bashful, nay, somewhat awkward, his face hid by a profusion
of hair, he had not the look of a soldier. But, heroic in action,
kind to the soldiers, modest with his" comrades, generous to the
vanquished, he was adored by the army and by the people con
quered by our arms. His solid and eminently cultivated mind,
his intelligence in war, his application to his duties, and his dis
interestedness, made him an accomplished model of all the
military virtues ; and, while Kleber, indocile, refractory, could
not endure any superior authority, Desaix was obedient, as
though he had not known how to command. Under a rough
exterior/ he concealed a soul ardent and susceptible of enthu
siasm. / Though trained in the severe school of the army of the
Rhine, he was a warm admirer of the campaigns in Italy, and
was desirous of inspecting with his own eyes the fields of battle
of Castiglione, Arcole, and Rivoli. While visiting those places,
the theatres of immortal glory, he accidentally fell in with the
commander-in-chief of the army of Italy, who conceived a
strong attachment for him. What an honourable homage was
the friendship of such a man ! General Bonaparte was deeply
touched by it. He esteemed Kleber for his high military
qualities, but considered none as equal to Desaix either in talents
or character. Besides, he had an affection for him ; surrounded
by companions in arms, who had not yet forgiven his elevation,
though feigning an obsequious submission to him, he appreciated
the more Desaix's pure disinterested devotedness, founded on
deep admiration. At the same time, keeping to himself the secret
of his preferences, affecting ignorance of Kleber's faults, he
treated him and Desaix both alike, and was desirous, as we
shall see, to unite in the same honours two men whom Fortune
had united in one and the same fate.
For the rest, all continued quiet in Egypt after Kleber's
death. General Menou, on assuming the command, lost no
time in despatching the ship Osiris from Alexandria, to carry
to France tidings of the then flourishing state of the colony, and
of the deplorable end of its second founder.

July 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 41

BOOK VI.

ARMISTICE.
Vast Preparations for succouring the Army in Egypt — Arrival of M. de St.
Julien at Paris — Impatience of the French Cabinet to treat with him —
Notwithstanding the insufficiency of M. de St. Julien's Powers, Talleyrand
induces him to sign preliminary Articles of Peace — M. de St. Julien signs
and sets out with Duroc for Vienna — State of Prussia and Russia — Clever
Expedient of the First Consul in regard to the Emperor Paul — He sends
back to him six thousand Prisoners without Ransom, and offers him the
Island of Malta — Enthusiasm of Paul I. for General Bonaparte, and Mis
sion of M. de Sprengporten to Paris — New League of the Neutral Powers
— The four great Questions of Maritime Law — Reconciliation with the Holy
See — The Court of Spain, and its Intimacy with the First Consul — Sketch
of the internal State of that Court — General Berthier sent to Madrid — This
Representative of the First Consul negotiates a. Treaty with Charles IV.
by which Tuscany would fall to the House of Parma, and Louisiana to France
— Erection of the Kingdom of Etruria — France reinstates herself in the
Favour of the European Powers — Arrival of M. de St. Julien at Vienna —
Astonishment of his Court when apprised of the Preliminary Articles
signed without Powers — Embarrassment of the Cabinet of Vienna, which
had engaged not to treat without England — Disavowal of M. de St. Julien
— Attempt at a joint Negotiation, comprehending England and Austria —
For the Admission of England into the Negotiation, the First Consul re
quires a Naval Armistice, which would enable him to succour Egypt —
England refuses, not to treat, but to grant the proposed Armistice — The
First Consul then insists on a direct and immediate Negotiation with
Austria, or the Resumption of Hostilities — Manner in which he has pro
fited by the Suspension of Arms to put the French Armies on a formidable
Footing — Alarm of the Austrians, and cession of the Fortresses of Philips-
burg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt, to obtain a Prolongation of the Continental
Armistice — Convention of Hohenlinden, granting a fresh Suspension of
Arms for forty-five Days — Appointment of M. de Cobentzel as Envoy to
the Congress of Luneville — Festival of the 1st of Vendemiaire — Removal
of Turenne's remains to the Invalides — The First Consul devotes the Leisure
left him by the Interruption of Hostilities in attending to the internal
Administration — Success of his Financial Measures — Prosperity of the
Bank of France — Payment of the Stockholders in Cash — Repair of the
Roads — Return of the Priests — Difficulties respecting the Celebration of
Sunday and Decadi — NewMeasures in regard to the Emigrants — Posture of
Parties — Their Dispositions towards the First Consul — The Revolutionists
and the Royalists — Policy of the Government towards them — conflicting
Influences about the First Consul — Parts acted by Messrs. Fouche, de
Talleyrand, and Cambaceres — The Bonaparte Family — Letters of Louis
XVIII. to the First Consul and Answer to that Prince — Plot of Ceracchi
and Arena — Public Sensation created by the Discovery of this Plot — Impru
dent Friends of the First Consul wish to make a Handle of it to raise him
too soon to the supreme Power — Pamphlet written in that Spirit by M. de
Fontanes — Necessity for disavowing that Pamphlet — Lucien Bonaparte
removed from the Ministry of the Interior and sent to Spain.

( 43 )

BOOK VI.

ARMISTICE.

While the Osiris was conveying to Europe the tidings of
what had happened on the banks of the Nile, orders totally
contrary to those before given were despatched from the ports
of England. The observations of Sir Sidney Smith had been
well received in London. The government had been fearful of
disavowing an English officer, who had come forward as invested
with its powers ; it had above all discovered the falsehood of the
intercepted despatches, and formed a more correct estimate of
the difficulty of wresting Egypt from the French army. It had,
therefore, ratified the convention of El Arisch, and instructed
lord Keith to cause it to be executed. But it was too late, as
we have seem the convention was at that moment torn, sword
in hand; and the French, having recovered possession of Egypt,
were no longer disposed to abandon the country. The English
ministers were destined to experience bitter regret for the levity
of their conduct and violent attacks in parliament.
The First Consul, on his part, was rejoiced by the intelligence
of the consolidation of his conquest. Unfortunately, the news
of Kleber's death reached him almost at the same moment as
the news of his exploits. His grief was intense and sincere.
He rarely dissembled, and only when obliged to do so by a duty
or by an important interest, but always with effort, because the
vivacity of his temper rendered dissimulation difficult. But in
the narrow circle of his family and his counsellors, he used no
disguise; he manifested his affections, his antipathies, with
extreme vehemence. It! was among these intimates that he
betrayed the profound sorrow which he felt for the death of
Kleber. In him, he regretted not a friend, as in Desaix ; he
regretted a great general, an able chief, more capable than any
other to ensure the establishment of the French in Egypt — an
establishment which he regarded as his most glorious work, but
which definitive success alone could convert from a brilliant
attempt into a great and solid enterprise.
Time, that like a river sweeps along with it all that falls into
its rapid current, Time has engulfed the odious falsehoods then
invented by the hatred of parties. There is one of them,

44 HISTORY OF the [July 1800.
however, which it may be instructive to mention here, though
long since consigned to profound oblivion. The royalist agents
reported, and English newspapers repeated, that Desaix and
Kleber, having given umbrage to the First Consul, were
assassinated by his orders, the one at Marengo, the other at
Cairo. There were miserable and silly fools enough to believe
it, and now people are almost ashamed to recollect such imputa
tions. Those who fabricate these infamous calumnies ought
sometimes to place themselves in presence of posterity. They
would blush at the refutation which time has in store for them.
The First Consul had already given pressing orders to the
fleets at Brest and Rochefort, to prepare to set sail for the Medi
terranean. Though our finances were in a much better state,
still, being obliged to make great efforts on land, the First
Consul could not accomplish all that our navy required. He
neglected nothing, however, to put the great Brest fleet in a
condition to put to sea. He solicited the court of Spain to send
the necessary orders to admirals Gravina and Mazzaredo, com
manding the Spanish division, to concur in the movements of
the French division. The squadrons of the two nations, blocked
up in Brest for a year past, when united, would form a force of
forty ships of the line. The First Consu] proposed that, taking
advantage of the sailing of this immense naval force, the French
ships disposable at L'Orient, Rochefort, and Toulon, and the
Spanish ships disposable at Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthagena, should
join the combined fleet, to increase its strength. These different
movements were to be directed in such a manner as to deceive
the English, to throw them into great perplexity, and mean
while, admiral Ganteaume, taking with him the quickest sailers,
was to slip away and to carry to Egypt 6000 picked troops,
numerous workmen, and an immense materiel.
Spain willingly assented to this combination, which would at
least have the advantage of bringing back into the Mediter
ranean, and consequently into her ports, the squadron of admiral
Gravina, uselessly shut up in the harbour of Brest. She saw no
other objection to this plan but the bad condition of her fleets
and their wretched equipment. The First Consul did his best
to remove this objection, and the ships of the two nations were
soon provided with the more necessary stores. In the mean time,
he was anxious that the army in Egypt should receive intelligence
from him every five or six days. He gave orders that, from all
the ports of the Mediterranean, Spain and Italy included, there
should sail brigs, avisoes, mere merchantmen, carrying balls,
bombs, lead, powder, muskets, swords, wood for cartwrights' work,
medicines, Jesuits' bark, corn, wine, in short all that the army in
Egypt was likely to need. He ordered, moreover, that each of
these small vessels should take out a number of workmen, masons
or smiths, some gunners, and some picked cavalry- soldiers.
He directed them to charter vessels at Carthagena, Barcelona,

July 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 45
Port Vendre, Marseilles, Toulon, Antibes, Savona, Genoa, Bastia,
St. Florent, &c. He even bargained with merchants of Algiers
to send to Egypt cargoes of wine, of which the army was desti
tute. By his command/ a company of actors was formed, the
requisites for a theatre were provided, and the whole was to be
sent to Alexandria. The best Paris newspapers were subscribed
for, in order to be forwarded to the principal officers of the
army, that they might be made acquainted with what was
passing in Europe. In short, nothing was neglected that could
serve to keep up the courage of the exiled soldiers, and to place
them in constant communication with the mother-country.*
Of course several of these vessels were liable to be taken, but
the greater number had a chance of arriving, and did actually
arrive, for the extensive coast of the Delta could not be strictly
guarded. The same success did not attend the attempts made
to revictual Malta, which the English kept closely blockaded.
They made an especial point of reducing this second Gibraltar;
they knew that the blockade must in the long run produce here a
certain effect; for Malta is a rock, which cannot be supplied but
by sea, whereas Egypt is a vast kingdom, which feeds both itself
and its neighbours. They stedfastly persevered, therefore, in'
investing the place and in inflicting upon it the horrors of
famine. The brave general Vaubois, having at his disposal a
garrison of 4000 men, was not afraid of their attacks; but he
saw the provisions destined for the subsistence of his soldiers
hourly diminishing, and unfortunately did not receive from the
ports of Corsica sufficient resources to supply the place of those
that were every day consumed.
The First Consul also turned his earnest attention to the
selection of a chief capable of commanding the army in Egypt.
The loss of Kleber was distressing, especially in consideration
of those who might be called to succeed him. Had Desaix
remained in Egypt, the misfortune would have been easily
repaired. But Desaix had returned; Desaix was dead. Those
who were left were not competent for such a command. Reynier
was a good officer, brought up in the school of the army of
the Rhine, skilful, experienced, but cold, irresolute, without
ascendency over the troops. Menou was well informed, per
sonally brave, an enthusiast in favour of the expedition, but
incapable of directing an army, and covered with ridicule because
he had married a Turkish woman and turned Mahometan himself.
He took the name of Abdallah Menou, which was a subject of
mirth for the soldiers, and greatly abated the respect with which
a commander-in-chief needs to be surrounded. General Lanusse,
brave, intelligent, full of an ardour, which he understood the art
of communicating to others, appeared to the First Consul to
* All these particulars are extracted from the voluminous correspondence
of the First Consul with the department of war and of the marine.

46 HISTORY OF the [July 1800.
deserve the preference, though he was deficient in prudence.
But general Menou had assumed the command by right of
seniority. It was difficult to ensure the arrival of an order in
Egypt; the English might intercept that order; and, without
communicating it literally, they might excite a suspicion of its
purport, in such a manner as to render the command uncertain,
to produce dissension among the generals, and to distract the
colony. He therefore left things in the same state, and con
firmed Menou in the charge, not conceiving him to be so utterly
incapable as he really was.
JrWe must now return to Europe, to see what was passing on
this theatre of the great events of the world. The letter
addressed from Marengo itself to the emperor of Germany
reached him along with the news of the lost battle. The court
of Vienna was then aware of the faults which it had committed,
in rejecting the offers of the First Consul at the beginning of
winter, in persisting to consider France as exhausted and in
capable of continuing the war, in refusing to believe the existence
of the army of reserve, and in blindly pushing M. de Melas into
the gorges of the Apennines. The credit of M. de Thugut was con
siderably diminished, for tohim alone were imputed all the errors
of want of conduct and foresight. However, to these faults,
already so serious, was added another not less important, that of
forming a closer alliance than ever with the English, under the
impression of the disaster of Marengo. Till now, the cabinet of
Vienna had declined their subsidies, but it thought it right to
procure immediately the means of repairing the losses of this
campaign, either to place itself in a condition to treat more
advantageously with France, or to be able to engage in a fresh
struggle with her, if her pretensions were too exorbitant. It
accepted, therefore, two millions and a half sterling (62,000,000
francs). In return for this subsidy, it engaged not to make
peace with France before the month of February following,
unless the peace were common to England and Austria. This
treaty was signed on the 20th of June, the very day on which
the news of the events in Italy reached Vienna. Austria, there
fore, bound herself to the fortunes of England for seven months
longer; but she hoped to pass the summer in negotiations, and
to get on till winter before hostilities could be recommenced.
For the rest, the imperial cabinet had made up its mind to
peace; it merely wished to negotiate jointly with England, and
especially not to make too great sacrifices in Italy. On this
condition, it desired nothing better than to conclude peace.
The emperor sent as bearer of his answer to the letter of the
First Consul, the same officer who had brought that letter,
namely, M. de St. Julien, in whom he reposed great confidence.
The answer on this occasion was direct and personally addressed
to general Bonaparte. It contained the ratification of the double
armistice, signed in Germany and in Italy, and an invitation to

July 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 47
explain himself confidentially and with perfect frankness re
specting the bases of the future negotiation. M. de St. Julien
was specially charged to sound ,the First Consul on the con
ditions of peace, and on his part to say sufficient concerning
the intentions of the emperor to induce the French cabinet to
disclose its own. The letter of which M. de St. Julien was
the bearer, full of flattering and pacific protestations, contained
a passage in which the object of his mission was clearly specified.
" I am writing to my generals," said his imperial majesty, " to
confirm the two armistices, and to settle the details of them.
I have, moreover, sent to you the count de St. Julien, major-
general in my army : he is charged with my instructions, and to
point out to you how essential it is not to enter into public
negotiations, likely to excite prematurely in so many nations
hopes perhaps illusory, till it is ascertained, at least in a general
manner, if the bases that you mean to propose for peace are
such as to afford a prospect of obtaining that desirable end.
" Vienna, July 5th, 1800."
The emperor hinted, towards the conclusion of this letter, at
the engagements which bound him to England, and which made
him desirous of a peace common to all the belligerent powers.
M. de St. Julien arrived in Paris on the 21st of July (2nd
Thermidor, year VIIL), and was cordially received. He was
the first envoy from the emperor who had been seen for a long
time in France. He was welcomed as the representative of a
great sovereign and a messenger of peace. We have already
shown how earnestly the First Consul desired to put an end to
the war. Nobody contested with him the glory of battles ; he
now aspired to one of a different kind, less brilliant but more
novel, and at this time more profitable to his authority, that of
giving peace to France and Europe. In his ardent soul desires
were passions. He then sought peace as we have since seen
him seek war. M. de Talleyrand desired it as much ; for he
was already fond of assuming the part of moderator about the
First Consul. It was an excellent part to play, especially at a
later period ; but to urge the First Consul to peace at this time
was adding one impatience to another, and endangering the
result by too great precipitation.
On the very day after his arrival, the 22nd of July (3rd
Thermidor), M. de St. Julien was invited to a conference with
the minister for foreign affairs. They conversed on the subject
of their reciprocal desire to terminate the war, and the best way
of accomplishing it. M. de St. Julien listened to all that was
said to him concerning the conditions on which peace might be
concluded, and hinted on his part at all that the emperor wished.
M. de Talleyrand concluded too hastily that M. de St. Julien had
secret and sufficient instructions for treating, and proposed that
they should not confine themselves to a mere conversation, but

48 HISTORY OF the [July 1800.
draw up jointly preliminary articles of peace. M. de St. Julien,
who was not authorised to take such an important step, for the
engagements of Austria towards England were in absolute op
position to it, M. de St. Julien objected that he had no power to
conclude a treaty. M. de Talleyrand replied, that the emperor's
letter completely authorised him, and that, if he would agree to
some preliminary articles and sign them, with the proviso of their
ulterior ratification, the French cabinet, on the mere letter of the
emperor, would consider him as sufficiently accredited. M. de
St. Julien, a soldier by profession, and devoid of experience in
diplomatic usages, had the simplicity to avow to M. de Talley
rand his embarrassment and his ignorance of forms, and to ask
him what he would do in his place. " I would sign," answered
M. de Talleyrand. " Well then, be it so," rejoined M. de St.
Julien, " I will sign the preliminary articles, which shall not be
held valid till they have received the ratification of my sove
reign." " Most assuredly," replied M. de Talleyrand, " no
engagements between nations are valid but such as have been
ratified." This singular manner of communicating their powers to each
other is specified at length in the minutes still existing of
that negotiation. They are dated the 23rd, 24th, 27th, and
28th of July (4th, 5th, 8th, and 9th Thermidor, year VIIL).
All the important points to be arranged between the two nations
were discussed. The treaty of Campo Formio was adopted as
the basis, with the exception of some modifications. Thus the
emperor abandoned to the Republic the boundary of the Rhine,
from the point where that river leaves the Swiss territory to
that where it enters the Batavian territory. In regard to that
article M. de St. Julien demanded and obtained a change in the
wording. He wished the expression, " The Emperor assents to
the line of the Rhine," to be altered as follows : " The Emperor
does not oppose the retaining of the boundary of the Rhine by
the French Republic." This mode of expression was adopted
in answer to the reproaches of the Germanic body, which had
accused the emperor of giving up to France the territory of the
confederation. It was agreed that France should not retain any
of the fortified positions which operated upon the right bank
(Kehl, Cassel, Ehrenbreitstein), that their works should be
razed, but that, in return, Germany should not throw up any
entrenchment, either of earth or masonry, within three leagues
of the river.
So much for the boundary between France and Germany.
The fimits between Austria and Italy yet remained to be settled.
Ihe fifth secret article of Campo Formio had stipulated that
Austria should receive in Germany an indemnitv for certain
lordships which she had given up on the left bank of the Rhine,
independently of the Netherlands, which she had long before
sacrificed to France. The bishopric of Salzburg was to com-

July 1800.] consulate and the empire. 49
pose that indemnity. The emperor would have liked better to
be indemnified in Italy, for the acquisitions which he made in
Germany, especially;- in the ecclesiastical principalities, were
scarcely new acquisitions, the court of Vienna already possessing
in those principalities an influence and privileges nearly equiva
lent to a direct sovereignty. On the contrary,, the acquisitions
which he obtained in Italy had the advantage of giving him
territory, which he did not yet possess in any degree, and es
pecially' of extending his frontier and his influence in a country
which had been the constant object of the ambition of his
family. From these same motives it was natural that France
should be better pleased to see Austria aggrandise herself in
Germany than in Italy. This latter point, however, was con
ceded. The treaty of Campo Formio threw Austria back upon
the Adige, and attributed to the Cisalpine Republic the Mincio
and the celebrated fortress of Mantua. The ambition of Aus
tria this time was to obtain the Mincio, Mantua, and the Lega
tions into the bargain, which was exorbitant. The First Consul
went so far as to grant her the Mincio and Mantua, but he would
not cede the Legations at any rate. The utmost he would
consent to was to give them to the grand-duke of Tuscany, on
condition that, in return, Tuscany should be transferred to the
grand-duke of Parma, and the duchy of Parma to the Cisalpine.
The grand-duke of Parma would have gained considerably by
this exchange, which was a satisfaction granted to Spain, with
what views we shall show by-and-by. .
M. de St. Julien replied that, on this latter point, his sove
reign was not prepared to adopt a definitive resolution ; that
these removals of sovereign houses from one country to an
other were by no means conformable with his policy ; that of
course this was a point which must be afterwards adjusted. To
evade the difficulty, the negotiators merely said, in the prelimi
nary articles, that Austria should receive in Italy the territorial
indemnities previously granted to her in Germany.
The Austrian officer, thus metamorphosed into plenipoten
tiary, expressed in the name of his sovereign a warm interest
for the independence of Switzerland, but scarcely any for that
of Piedmont, and appeared to insinuate that France might pay
herself in Piedmont for what she ceded to the house of Austria
in Lombardy.
The parties, therefore, stopped short at very general condi
tions ; the boundary of the Rhine for France, with the demo
lition of Kehl, Cassel, and Ehrenbreitstein; particular indemnities
for Austria, taken from Italy instead of Germany; which sig
nified that Austria would not be confined within the limit of
the Adige. But, it must be confessed, not only was it vain to
treat with a plenipotentiary without powers, but something still
more vain was it to consider as articles of peace articles, the
only contestable point in which, the only one for which the
VOL. II. E

50 HISTORY OF THE [July 1800.
emperor went to war, the boundary of Austria and Italy, was
not even resolved in a general manner : for, as to the boundary
of the Rhine, no one had seriously thought of disputing that
with us, for a long time past.
To the preceding articles were added some accessory arrange
ments: it was agreed, for example, that a congress should be
held immediately; that, during this congress, hostilities should
be suspended, the levies en masse making in Tuscany disbanded,
and the English landings, with which Italy was threatened,
deferred. M. de St. Julien, urged beyond all reasonable bounds by the
desire to play an important part, had from time to time scruples
respecting the strange and bold step which he had ventured to
take. To make him easy upon the matter, M. de Talleyrand
promised, on his word of honour, that these preliminary articles
should remain secret, and that they should not be considered as
having any value whatever till after their ratification by the
emperor. |On the 28th of July, 1800 (9th Thermidor, year
VIIL), these famous preliminaries were signed at the hotel of
foreign affairs, to the great joy of M. de Talleyrand, who,
finding M. de St. Julien so prepared upon every question,
seriously believed that he had secret instructions to treat. This,
however, was not the case, and, if M. de St. Julien was so well
informed, it was only because they wished at Vienna to enable
him to provoke and to receive the confidential communications
of the First Consul relative to the conditions of the future
peace. The French minister had not been able to penetrate
that circumstance; and, from the desire to sign an act resembling
a treaty, he had committed a serious errorTy
The First Consul, paying no attentionta the forms observed
by the two negotiators, and trusting on that point entirely to M.
de Talleyrand, thought for his part of nothing but making Austria
explain her views, in order to ascertain whether she wished
for peace, and to force it from her by a new campaign, if she
appeared not to desire it. But, for this purpose, it would have
been better to have summoned her to explain herself within a
given time than to enter into an illusory and puerile negotiation,
in consequence of which the dignity of the two nations was
likely to be compromised, and their reconciliation to be rendered
more difficult.
M. de St. Julien thought it best not to wait in Paris for the
emperor's answer, as he was solicited to do; he wished himself
to carry the preliminaries to Vienna, no doubt with a view to
explain to his master the motives of his extraordinary conduct.
He left Paris on the 30th of July (11th Thermidor), accom
panied by Duroc, whom the First Consul sent to Austria, as he
had previously sent him to Prussia, to observe the court there
closely, and to give it an advantageous opinion of the modera
tion and policy of the new government. Duroc, as we have

July 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 51
elsewhere remarked, was well suited for missions of this kind
from his sound sense and elegant manners. The First Consul
had, moreover, given him written instructions, in which he had
provided with minute attention for every contingency. In the
first place, when any circumstance led to a presumption of the
intentions of Austria in regard to the preliminaries, Duroc was
instantly to send off a courier to Paris. It was recommended to
him until the ratification to keep an absolute silence, and to
appear totally ignorant of the intentions of the First Consul.
If the ratification was granted,, he was authorised to declare, in
a positive manner, that peace might be signed in twenty-four
hours, if there was a sincere desire for it. He was to let it be
understood, in one way or another, that, provided Austria would
be content with the Mincio, the Fossa Maestra, and the Po,
which was the fine marked out by the convention of Alexandria;
and provided, moreover, that she agreed to the removal of the
duke of Parma to Tuscany, and of the duke of Tuscany to the
Legations, there was no obstacle to an immediate conclusion.
These instructions even contained rules respecting the language
to be held on all the subjects that might arise in conversation.
Duroc was forbidden to join in any sneers against Russia and
Prussia, which were then disliked at Vienna, because they had
withdrawn from the coalition. He was enjoined to maintain a
great reserve respecting the emperor Paul, whose character was a
theme for raillery in every court : he was to speak highly of the
king of Prussia, to visit the grand-duke of Tuscany, to show none
of those passions which the Revolution had excited, either in one
way or in another. Royalists and Jacobins were all to be
spoken of as though they were not less ancient in France than
the Guelfs and the Ghibellines in Italy. He was particularly
enjoined not to manifest any antipathy towards emigrants,
excepting those, indeed, who had borne arms against the
Republic. He was ordered to assert on all occasions that, of
all the countries of Europe, France was most attached to its
government, because of all countries it was that which had
afforded the government occasion to do the most good. Lastly,
he was to represent the First Consul as having no prejudices,
neither those of other times nor those of the present day, and
as being indifferent to the attacks of the English press, for he
did not understand English.
Duroc set out with M. de St. Julien, and though the secret
of the preliminaries was kept, still the numerous conferences of
the emperor's envoy with M. de Talleyrand had been remarked
by every body, and people said aloud that he was the bearer of
conditions of peace.
Our prodigious successes in Italy and Germany had naturally
exercised a considerable influence, not upon Austria alone, but
upon all the courts of Europe, whether friendly or hostile.
On the news of the battle of Marengo, Prussia, still neutral
e2

52 HISTORY OF the [July 1800.
upon system, but kindly disposed towards us according to
events, Prussia had expressed warm admiration to the First
Consul, and from that moment had not said a single word which
could give rise to a doubt respecting the attribution to France
of the entire line of the Rhine. The only point now to be
studied, according to her, was to be just in the partition of the
indemnities due to all those who lost territories on the left bank
of the Rhine, and discreet in settling the general limits of the
great States. She even added that it was right to be firm
towards Austria, and to curb her insatiable ambition. Such
was the language which she held every day to our ambassador
in Berlin.
M. d'Haugwitz, and king Frederick William in particular,
whose kindness was sincere, informed general Beurnonville from
day to day of the rapid progress which the First Consul was
making in the esteem of Paul I. As we have already seen,
that fickle and enthusiastic prince, had for some months been
passing from a chivalrous animosity against the French Revolu
tion to an unbounded admiration of the man who was now the
representative of that revolution. He had conceived an absolute
hatred for Austria and England. Though from this change a
first result of great importance had been obtained, namely, the
motionless attitude of the Russians on the Vistula, still the
First Consul aspired to something more. He wished to enter
into direct communication with the emperor Paul, and suspected
Prussia of prolonging that equivocal state, that she might be the
sole agent in our relations with the most powerful of the courts
of the North.
He devised a method, which was crowned with complete suc
cess. There were still in France six or seven thousand Russians
taken last year, and who could not be exchanged, because Russia
had no prisoners to release in return. The First Consul had
proposed to England and to Austria, which held in their hands
a certain number of our soldiers and seamen, to exchange these
Russians for a like number of French. Both of them assuredly
owed Russia such a courtesy, for these Russians had incurred
captivity solely by serving the purposes of English and Aus
trian policy. The proposal was nevertheless rejected.*. The
First Consul immediately conceived the happy idea of restoring
unconditionally to Paul I. the prisoners in our handso. This
was an act of dexterous generosity, and not very burdensdme to
France, which could do nothing with these prisoners, since they
could not procure her Frenchmen in exchange. The First
Consul accompanied this act with the attentions most likely to
touch the susceptible heart of the emperor Paul. He caused
these Russians to be armed and clothed in the uniform of their
sovereign: he even gave up their officers, their colours, and their
arms. He then wrote a letter to count de Panin, minister of
foreign affairs at St. Petersburg, informing him that, Austria and

July 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 53
England having refused to procure their liberty for- the soldiers
of the czar, who had become prisoners while serving the cause
of those powers, the First Consul would not detain those brave
men indefinitely, and that he sent them back to the empero^:
unconditionally ; that this was on his part a testimony of contf
sideration for the Russian army, an army which the French had
learned to know and to esteem on fields of battle. I
This letter was sent by way of Hamburg. It was trans
mitted by M. de Bourgoing, our minister in Denmark, to M.
de Muraview, minister of Russia at Hamburg. But such was
the fear excited by Paul I. in his agents, that M. de Muraview
refused to receive this letter, not daring to disobey the anterior
orders of his cabinet, which forbade him all communication
with the representatives of France. M. de Muraview merely
reported to his court what had passed, and made it acquainted
with the existence and contents of the letter, of which he had
refused to take charge. Upon this, the First Consul made an
other, and still more efficacious advance towards the Russian
monarch. ("Seeing that Malta could not hold out long, and that
this island, strictly blockaded, would be obliged, by want of pro
visions, to surrender to the English, he conceived the idea of
giving it to Paul. It is well known that this prince, an enthu
siast on the subject of the ancient orders of chivalry, and that of
Malta in particular, had caused himself to be elected grand
master of St. John of Jerusalem, that he was resolved to re
establish that religious and chivalric institution, and that he
frequently held at St. Petersburg chapters of the Order, for the
purpose of conferring its decoration on the princes and great
personages of Europe. It was impossible to take a more direct
course to his heart than by offering him the island that was the
seat of the Order^of which he had made himself the head. The
thing was ably cdnceived in all its bearings. Either the English,
who were on the point of taking it, would consent to restore it,
and then it would be out of their hands ; or they would refuse,
and Paul I. was capable enough to declare war against them on
that account^ This time, M. de Sergijeff, a Russian officer, and
one of the^-prisoners detained in France, was directed to proceed
to Petersburg, as the bearer of the two letters relative to the
prisoners and the island of Malta.
When these different communications reached St. Petersburg,
they produced their inevitable effect. Paul was deeply touched,
and thenceforth indulged, without reserve, in the highest ad
miration of the First Consul. He immediately selected an old
Finland officer, M. de Sprengporten, formerly a Swedish sub
ject, a most respectable man, very well disposed towards
France, and in high favour at the court of Russia. He ap
pointed him governor of the island of Malta, ordered him to
put himself at the head of the 6000 Russian prisoners in France,
and to go with this force perfectly organised, and to take pos-

54 HISTORY OF THE [July 1800.
session of the island of Malta, which would be delivered up to
him by the French. He ordered him to proceed to Paris, and
to thank the First Consul publicly. To this demonstration Paul
added a much more effective step ; he enjoined M. de Krudener,
his minister in Berlin, who had been charged, some months
before, to renew the connexion between Russia and Prussia, to
enter into direct communication with general Beurnonville, our
ambassador, and furnished him with the necessary powers for
negotiating a treaty of peace with France.
M. d'Haugwitz, who thought, perhaps, that the reconciliation
was proceeding too rapidly, for Prussia would lose her cha
racter of mediating agenty the moment the cabinets of Paris
and St. Petersburg were in direct communication — M. d'Haug
witz contrived to be the ostensible agent of this reconciliation.
Hitherto M. de Krudener and M. de Beurnonville had met in
Berlin, in the houses of the ministers of the different courts,
without speaking. One day, M. d'Haugwitz invited them both
to dinner ; after dinner, he brought them face to face, then left
them tete-a-tetc in his own garden, to give them opportunity for
complete explanation. M. de Krudener expressed his regret
to M. de Beurnonville, that it had not been in his power before
to seek the society of the French legation ; he excused the
refusal given at Hamburg to receive the First Consul's letter,
by the existence of anterior orders ; and, lastly, he entered into
a very long explanation respecting the new dispositions of his
sovereign. He informed him of the mission of M. de Spreng
porten to Paris, and avowed the especial satisfaction which
Paul I. had felt at the restitution of the prisoners, and the offer
to restore Malta to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. At
length, from all these subjects he passed to the most serious,
namely, the conditions of peace. Russia and France had
nothing to quarrel about. They had not gone to war for any
interest of territory or commerce, but for a dissimilarity in the
form of their government. As far as concerned themselves
directly, they had, therefore, but to write one article, to the effect
that peace was re-established between the two powers. This
circumstance alone showed how unreasonable the war had been.
But the war had brought with it alliances, and Paul, who
prided himself on strict fidelity to his engagements, desired
only'one thing, that his allies should be treated indulgently.
They were four in number : — Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Piedmont,
and Naples. He demanded, on behalf of the four, the integrity
of their dominions. Nothing could be more easy, if an explana
tory clause were merely introduced to the effect, that this con
dition should be considered as fulfilled, if those princes obtained
an indemnity for the provinces which the French Republic should
take from them. The point was thus understood and admitted
by M. de Krudener. In fact, the secularisation of the eccle
siastical States of Germany, and their proportionate partition

July 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 55
among the lay princes who had lost the whole or part of their
dominions, in consequence of the cession of the left bank of
the Rhine to France, was a thing long agreed upon by every
body. It had even been admitted at the congress of Rastadt,
under the Directory. An arrangement was equally easy for
the Italian princes, allies of Paul I. Piedmont was to lose
Nice and Savoy ; it might be indemnified in Italy, if Austrian
ambition were curbed in that country, and not suffered to ex
tend itself too far there. On this point, Paul I., greatly
irritated against the cabinet of Vienna, said, like Prussia, that
Austria must be kept down, and nothing granted her but what
could not be refused. As for the kingdom of Naples, France
had nothing to take from it, but she had odious proceedings to
punish, outrages to avenge. Still the First Consul was willing
to pardon, on one condition, of a nature to be particularly
pleasing to Paul L, who wras not less hostile to the English
than to the Austrians, namely, that the cabinet of Naples should
atone for its faults by a formal rupture with Great Britain. On
all these points the parties were nearly agreed. , They could not
fail to become still more so every day, from the natural course
of events, and from the impetuous character of Paul I., who
from a state of dissatisfaction with his former allies, was about
to pass, without transition, to a state of open war.
The reconciliation of France with Russia was, therefore,
nearly accomplished, and even public ; for the departure of M.
de Sprengporten for Paris had just been officially announced.
Paul I., the furious enemy of France, thus became her friend,
her ally, against all the powers of the old coalition. The glory
and the profound address of the First Consul had wrought this
extraordinary change. A fortuitous and important circumstance
was about to render it still more complete ;<sinis was the quarrel
of the neutral powers, exasperated by the violences of England
upon the seas/) It seems as if every thing concurred to favour
the designs ofthe First Consul, and one is tempted to admire,
at this moment, his good fortune as much as his genius.
, On viewing the course of events in this lower world, one would
almost say, that Fortune loves to smile on youth, for she seconds,
in a wonderful manner, the early years of great men. Let us not,
however, like the ancient poets, make her blind and capricious ;
if she so often favours the youth of great men, as she did that
of Hannibal, of Caesar, of Napoleon, it is because they have not
yet abused her favours. General Bonaparte was fortunate,
then, because he had deserved to be so; because he was in
the right against all the' world ; at home, against party strife ;
abroad, against the powers of Europe. At home, he aimed
only at order and justice ; abroad, at peace, but an advan
tageous and glorious peace, such as he has a right to desire who
has not been the aggressor, but who has been victorious
through his superior ability. Thus Europe sought anxiously

56 HISTORY OF the [July 1800.
to be reconciled to France, represented by a great man, so
just and so powerful. And if this great man had met with
auspicious circumstances, there was not one which he had not
brought about himself, or by which he had not skilfully pro
fited. It was but yesterday that one of his lieutenants, anti-
pating his orders, had hastened, at the report of the cannon,
to gain for him the victory of Marengo ; but what had he not
done to pave the way to that victory? Now, a prince, struck
with insanity on one of the first thrones in the world, afforded
an easy prey to his diplomatic ability ; but with what masterly
condescension had he not contrived to flatter that monarch!
England, by her conduct on the seas, was soon going to recon
cile all the maritime powers with France; but we shall see
what art he had employed to soothe them, and to leave to
England the part of violence. Fortune, that capricious mistress
of great men, is not, then, so capricious as people are pleased
to represent her. All is not caprice when she smiles upon
them, caprice when she abandons them, and, in her alleged
infidelities, the fault is, in general, not on her side. But let us
speak a language more true, more worthy of so grave a subject:
Fortune, that pagan name given to the power which governs
all things here below, is Providence, befriending genius when
walking in the path of rectitude, that is, in the ways marked
out by infinite wisdom.
The fortunate circumstance which was destined definitively to
rally the powers of the North around the politics of the First
Consul, and to procure for him auxiliaries upon the element on
which he had most need of them, that is, on the seas, was this : —
The English had just committed new violences against neutrals.
They could not suffer the Russians, the Danes, the Swedes, the
Americans, to frequent quietly all the ports of the world, and
to lend their flags to the commerce of France and Spain. They
had already violated the independence of the neutral flag, espe
cially in regard to America, and it was because the Americans
had not sufficiently defended it that the Directory showed its
anger, by subjecting them to treatment almost as rigorous as
that which they experienced from the English. General Bona
parte had repaired this fault by annulling the harshest of the
regulations enforced by the Directory ; by instituting the tri
bunal of prizes, charged to administer better justice to captured
vessels ; by paying homage, in the person of Washington, to
all America; lastly, by inviting negotiators to Paris, for the
purpose of renewing relations of amity and commerce with her.
It was precisely at this moment that England, as if irritated by
the ill success of her policy, seemed to become more oppressive
towards neutrals. Odious acts had already been committed by
her upon the seas ; but the last exceeded all the bounds, not
only of justice, but of the most ordinary prudence.
This is not the place for entering into all the details of that

July 1800.] consulate and the empire. 57
important dispute; suffice it to specify its principal points. The
neutrals alleged that the war, which certain great -nations
thought fit to wage with one another, ought not, in any way,
to cramp their own trade, nay, that they had a right to pick up
that commerce of which the belligerent powers voluntarily de
prived themselves. In consequence, they claimed the right of
frequenting freely all the ports of the world, of. navigating even
between the ports of the belligerent nations ; of going, for in
stance, from France and Spain to England, from England to Spain
and France, and, what was more disputable, of going from the
colonies to the mother-countries, of going from Mexico to Spain,
for the purpose of carrying thither the precious metals, which,
but for their intervention, could never have reached Europe.
They maintained that " the flag covers the merchandise," which
means, that the flag of a power, not implicated in the war, covered
from every kind of search the merchandise transported in their
vessels; that, on board them, French merchandise could not
be seized by the English, nor English merchandise by the
French ; as a Frenchman, for instance, would have been invio
lable on the quays of Copenhagen and St. Petersburg for the
British power ; in short, that the vessel of a neutral nation was
as sacred as the very quays of its capital.
The neutrals consented to only one exception. They ad
mitted that they ought not to "carry goods specially used in war,
for it was contrary to the very idea of neutrality that they
should supply one of the belligerent nations with arms against
the other. But they sought to limit this interdiction solely to
articles fabricated for war, such as muskets, cannon, powder,
projectiles, materials for accoutrements of every kind, &c. ; and
as for provisions, they would not consider any provisions inter
dicted but such as were prepared for the use of armies, such
as biscuit, for example.
If they admitted one exception as to the nature of trans
portable merchandise, they admitted another as to the places to
he entered, but on condition that it should be accurately defined.
This second exception was relative to the ports bona fide block
aded, and guarded by a naval force capable of laying siege to
them, or of reducing them by famine, by means of blockade. In
such a case they admitted that to run into a blockaded port was
thwarting one of the two nations in the use of its right, by
preventing it from taking the places of its enemy by attack or
by famine ; that it was consequently affording succour to one of
the two against the other. But they insisted that the blockade
should be preceded by formal declarations, that the blockade
should be bona, fide, executed by such a force that there would
be imminent danger in violating it; and they did not admit that,
by a mere declaration of blockade, either party could interdict
at pleasure, by means of a pure fiction, the entry into such or
such a port, nay, frequently the entire extent of certain coasts.

58 HISTORY OF THE [July 1800.
Lastly, as it was necessary to ascertain whether a vessel really
belonged to the nation whose flag she hoisted, whether or not she
carried merchandise called contraband of war, the neutrals con
sented to be searched, but required that this search should be
made with certain courtesies to be agreed upon and punctually
observed. Above all, they considered it as an essential rule
that search should not take place if merchant-vessels were con
voyed by a ship of war. The military or royal flag, according
to them, ought to enjoy the privilege of being believed on its
word, when it affirmed, upon the honour of its nation, that the
vessels under convoy were, in the first place, of its nation, and,
in the next, that they had on board no interdicted articles. If
it were otherwise, said they, a mere brig, when cruizing, might
stop a convoy and with that convoy a fleet of war, perhaps an
admiral. Who knows even? a privateer might stop either M.
de Suffren or lord Nelson.
Thus the doctrines maintained by the neutrals may be reduced
to four principal points.
The flag covers the merchandise, that is to say, no search
shall be made after an enemy's goods on board -a neutral vessel,
foreign to the belligerent nations.
No merchandise is interdicted but contraband of war. This
contraband is confined solely to articles made for the use of the
armies. Corn, for instance, and naval stores, are not included.
Access cannot be interdicted to any port, unless it is bona
fide blockaded.
Lastly, no vessel under convoy can be searched.
Such were the principles maintained by France, Prussia,
Denmark, Sweden, Russia, and America, that is to say, by an
immense majority of nations: principles, founded on respect for
the rights of others, but pertinaciously contested by England.
She insisted, in fact, that, on these conditions, the commerce
of her enemies would be carried on without obstacle by means
of the neutrals (which, be it observed by the way, was not cor
rect, for that commerce could not be continued by means of
neutrals, without relinquishing to them the greater part of the
profits, and causing the nation obliged to have recourse to them
to sustain an enormous loss); she insisted then on seizing
French and Spanish merchandise on board whatever vessel it
might be. She maintained that certain commodities, without be
ing fabricated, such as corn and naval stores, were real succours
carried to a nation in time of war. She alleged that a declara
tion of blockade was sufficient, without the presence of a naval
force, to interdict the entry of certain ports or coasts; and
lastly, that neutrals, upon pretext of being under convoy, could
not escape the search of the belligerent powers.
V If the reader wishes to know what was at the bottom of the
important interest concealed under these sophistries of the public
writers of England, here it is. England was bent on preventing

July 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 59
the precious metals of Mexico, the principal source of the opulence
of Spain, from being brought to the Spaniards; to the French
sugar and coffee, which they, cannot dispense with ; to both the
timber, hemp, and iron of the North, necessary for their navy.
She would fain have it in her power to starve them, in case of
a deficient harvest, as she had done in 1793, for instance;
she sought a pretext for closing the ports of entire countries,
without having recourse to a bona fide blockade; lastly, she
purposed, by dint of searches, annoyances, and obstacles of
every kind, to ruin the commerce of all nation's, so that war,
which, for commercial nations is a state of distress, should
become for her merchants, what it actually was, a time of
monopoly and of extraordinary prosperity. With regard to the
Americans, she had an intention still more unjust, namely, to rob
them of their seamen upon pretext that they were English,]a con
fusion easy to make, owing to the similarity of the languages.
In 1780, during the American war, Catherine the Great had
formed the league of the neutrals to resist these pretensions.
The First Consul, taking advantage of the nascent friendship of
Paul, of the , increasing irritation of the neutrals, and of the
unparalleled violences of the English, made the utmost efforts
to form a similar one in 1800.
At this moment, the dispute presented itself under one form
only, that of the right of search. The Danes and the Swedes,
to escape the vexations of the English cruizers, had devised the
expedient of sailing in numerous convoys, escorted by frigates
bearing the royal flag. It must be added that they never
tarnished the honour of their flag, and took good care not to
escort, false Danes or false Swedes, or to cover contraband of
war, as it was called. They studied only how to escape
vexations which had become intolerable. But the English,
viewing this as a mere subterfuge to elude a difficulty and con
tinue the commerce of neutrals, persisted in exercising the right
of search, even in regard to vessels under convoy.
In the preceding year, two Swedish frigates, the Troya and
the Halla Fersen, escorting Swedish merchantmen, had been
stopped by the English squadrons and obliged to submit to the
search of the convoy under their care. The king of Sweden
had sent the captains of the two frigates before a court-martial
for not defending them. This example had for a moment
checked the English, who were apprehensive lest they should
provoke a rupture with the northern powers. They had in con
sequence shown a httle more lenience to Swedish vessels. But
two recent instances had revived the difficulty, and driven
Sweden and Denmark to the last degree of exasperation.
In the winter of 1799 — 1800, the Danish frigate the Haufersen,
captain Vandockum, who was convoying a fleet of merchantmen
in the Mediterranean, was stopped by the squadron of admiral
Keith; she attempted to resist, was fired upon, and carried into

60 HISTORY OF the [July 1800.
Gibraltar. A most violent dispute ensued on this subject
between the English cabinet and the Danish cabinet, and it was
still going on, when, in the month of July, the Danish frigate,
the Freya, escorting a convoy of her nation was met in the
Channel by an English squadron. The latter insisted on exer
cising the right of search; captain Krabe, commander of the
Freya, nobly resisted the summons of the English admiral, and
refused to suffer the convoy to be searched. Force was
employed with uncalled for violence ; captain Krabe defended
himself; his ship was riddled, and he was obliged to surrender
to the superior force of the enemy, for he had but a single
frigate to oppose to six men of war. The Freya was carried
into the Downs.
This occurrence was soon followed by another, of a different
nature, but more odious and more serious. Two Spanish
frigates were lying at anchor at the entrance of the road of
Barcelona. The English formed a plan for taking them. Here
was no question about the right of neutrals, but the perpetra
tion of a piece of downright knavery, for the purpose of entering
an enemy's port with impunity, without being recognised. They
perceived in these roads a Swedish galliot, the Hoffnung, and
resolved to make use of her for accomplishing the piratical act
which they meditated. They manned their boats, boarded the
galliot, clapped a pistol to the breast of the Swedish captain,
and obliged him to sail quietly towards the Spanish frigates,
which, having no mistrust of the Swedish flag, since it was
neutral, suffered her to come alongside. The English imme
diately rushed on board, surprised the two frigates, which had
few hands on board, took possession of them and left the
harbour of Barcelona with their unworthily acquired prey.
This event produced an extraordinary sensation in Europe,
and incensed all the maritime nations, whose rights the English
were no longer satisfied with violating, but whose flag they
outraged, by making it, unknown to itself, subservient to acts
of the most infamous piracy. Spain was already at war with
Great Britain; she could do nothing more; but she had re
course to Sweden, whose flag had been usurped, to denounce
this odious fact, more offensive to Sweden than even to Spain.
Nothing more was requisite to embitter the quarrel between
England and the neutrals. At this moment especially, the
moderation which the First Consul had manifested towards them
was of such a nature as to render British violence more glaring.
Sweden demanded reparations : Denmark had already demanded
them. Behind these two courts was Russia, which, ever since
the league of 1780, regarded herself as a copartner with the
powers of the Baltic in all questions that interested their mari
time rights.
On the part of Denmark, M. de Bernstorff kept up a brisk
controversy with the cabinet of London, by means of notes

Aug. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 61
which France published, and which do equal honour to the
minister who wrote them, and to the nation which gave them
its signature, and which had soon to support them with its
arms. "A mere gun-boat," said the English, "carrying the
flag of a neutral, is to have a right then to convoy the trade
of the world, and to withdraw from our vigilance the commerce
of our enemies, which may be carried on as easily in time of war
as in time of peace !" " A whole squadron," replied M. de
Bernstorff, "would be obliged then to obey the summons of
the most paltry cruizer, to stop at her requisition, to suffer the
convoy which it is escorting to be examined before its face !
The word of an admiral, making a declaration upon the honour
of his nation is not to weigh against the doubt of the captain of
a privateer, who is to have a right to verify the declaration by
a search ! One of these hypotheses is more inadmissible than
the other."
To support its doctrines by means of terror, the English
cabinet, which had just sent lord Whitworth to Copenhagen,
despatched after him a squadron of sixteen sail, which was
cruizing at this moment at the entrance of the Sound. The
presence of this squadron produced a strong sensation among
all the powers of the Baltic : it alarmed not only Denmark,
against which it was directed, but also Sweden, Russia, and
Prussia herself, whose commerce was likewise interested in the
free navigation of the seas. The four powers which signed the
old armed neutrality of 1780 commenced a negotiation, with the
avowed purpose of forming a new league against the maritime
tyranny of the English. The cabinet of London, which was,
nevertheless, afraid of such an event, insisted warmly at Copen
hagen on settling the dispute ; but, so far from offering indem
nities, it had the singular presumption to demand them. It pur
posed, by frightening Denmark, to withdraw her from the league
before it was formed. Unfortunately, Denmark had been taken
by surprise ; the Sound was not in a state of defence ; Copen
hagen was not secured from a bombardment. In this state of
things, she was obliged to give way for the moment, with a view
to gain the winter season, during which ice would defend the Bal
tic, and give all the neutrals time to make their preparations for
resistance. On the 29th of August (11th Fructidor, year VIII.)
Denmark was obliged to sign a convention, in which the question
of the law of nations was adjourned, and the last misunder
standing only, winch had arisen on the subject-of the Freya, was
adjusted. The Freya was to be repaired in the English dock
yards and restored ; but, for the moment at least, the Danish
government ceased to furnish convoys for merchantmen.
This convention had settled nothing. The storm, so far from
being dispersed, soon gathered again, for the four northern
courts were extremely incensed. The king of Sweden, whose
honour was not yet satisfied, prepared for a journey to St. Peters-

62 HISTORY OF THE [Aug. 1800.
burg, to renew the ancient league of neutrality ; and Paul I.,
who was not fond of middle terms, took at the outset a most
energetic step. Being informed of the dispute with Denmark, and
of the presence of a British fleet at the entrance of the Sound,
he sequestrated all property belonging to the English, as a
security for the injury that might be done to Russian com
merce. This measure was to be continued till the intentions of
the British government were completely elucidated.
In the northern courts, therefore, every thing tended to favour
the designs of the First Consul. Events served him according
to his wish. Things went on equally well in the south of Eu
rope, that is in Spain. Here one of the first monarchies of
the globe was seen sinking into dissolution, to the great detri
ment of the balance of Europe, and to the great grief of a
generous nation, indignant at the part which it was made to act
in the world. The First Consul, whose indefatigable mind em
braced all objects at once, had already directed the efforts of his
policy towards Spain, and sought to derive as much advantage
for the common cause as he could from that degenerate court.
We should not draw the melancholy picture that follows, if
it were not true, in the first place, and if it were not necessary,
in the next, for understanding the great events of the period.
The king, the queen of Spain, and the prince of Peace,
had engaged for many years the attention of Europe, and ex
hibited a spectacle extremely dangerous for royalty, at that time
already so much lowered in the estimation of nations. One
would have said that the illustrious house of Bourbon was des
tined at the close of this century to lose their crowns in France,
in Naples, and in Spain : for, in these three kingdoms, three
sovereigns of imbecile weakness, exposed their sceptres to the
derision and the contempt of the world, by leaving them in the
hands of three queens, either giddy, violent, or dissolute.
The Bourbons of France, whether by their own fault, whe
ther through misfortune, were swallowed up by the French
Revolution ; by dint of foolishly provoking it, those of Naples
had been driven a first time from their capital ; those of Spain,
before they let their sceptre drop into the hands of the crowned
soldier whom that Revolution had produced, deemed it expedient
to pay their court to him. They had already allied themselves
with France in the time of the Convention ; they could not but
connect themselves with her much more cheerfully now that
the Revolution, instead of a sanguinary anarchy, exhibited to
them a great man, disposed to protect them if they followed his
advice. Happy had it been for these princes, if they had fol
lowed the advice, at that time excellent, of this great man !
Happy for himself had he done no more than give it them !
The king of Spain was an honest man, not harsh and blunt
hke Louis XVI., more agreeable in person, but less informed,
and surpassing him in weakness. He rose very early, not to

Aug. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 63
attend to his royal duties, but to hear masses, and then go
down to his workshops, where, surrounded by turners, smiths,
and armourers, and stript ojfhis clothes like them, he wrought
in their company at all sorts of work. Though very fond of the
chase, he liked still better to manufacture arms. From his shops
he went to his stables, to assist in dressing his horses, and in
dulged in the most incredible familiarities with his grooms.
After spending the first half of the day in this manner, he took
a solitary repast, to which neither the queen nor even his chil
dren were admitted, and devoted the rest of the day to the chase;
Several hundred horses and servants were set in motion for this
daily pleasure, which was his predominant passion. After riding
hke a young man, he would return to his palace, give a quarter
of an hour to his children, half an hour to the signature of the
papers submitted to him by the queen and his ministers, sit down
to play with some of the nobles of his court, sometimes take a
nap with them, till the hour for his last meal, which was fol
lowed immediately by his retirement to bed, always at one and
the same fixed time. Such was his life, without a single variation
throughout the year, unless during Passion Week, which was
devoted entirely to religious exercises. In other respects, an
honest man, faithful to his Word, mild, humane, religious, of ex
emplary chastity though not cohabiting with his wife, ever since
his physicians had, by her direction, ordered him to abstain
from it ; he had no other share in the scandals of his court, in
the faults of his government, than in suffering them to be com
mitted, without perceiving them, without believing them, during
the course of a long reign.
By his side, the queen, sister of the duke of Parma, a pupil
of Condillac's, who wrote for her and her brother some excellent
works of instruction, led a totally different life, and would do
very little honour to the celebrated philosophic tutor of her
youth, if philosophers could in general answer for their disciples.
She was nearly fifty years old, and had still certain vestiges of
beauty, which she strove to perpetuate with infinite pains.
Going to mass every day, like the king, she employed in cor
responding with a great number of persons, and particularly
with the prince of Peace, those hours which Charles IV.
spent in his workshops and his stables. In this corre
spondence she communicated to the prince of Peace the affairs
of court and State, and received from him a report of all
the puerilities and scandal of Madrid. She finished her morning
by giving one hour to her children, and one to the duties of
government. Not a paper, not an appointment, not a pardon,
went for the royal signature, before it was submitted to her.
The minister who should have ventured upon such an infraction
of the conditions of her favour would have been instantly dis
missed. She dined alone, like the king, in the middle of the
day; the rest of the afternoon was devoted to receptions, in which

64 HISTORY OF THE [Aug- 1800.
she acquitted herself very gracefully, and to the prince of Peace,
on whom she bestowed several hours of her time every day.
The reader is aware that the prince of Peace was no longer
minister, at the period of which we are treating. M. d'Urquijo,
whom we shall presently introduce, had succeeded him; but that
prince was nevertheless the first authority in the kingdom. This
singular personage, ignorant, fickle, of no capacity, but of hand
some exterior, as it is necessary to be in order to succeed in a
corrupt court, the arrogant ruler of queen Louisa, had reigned
for twenty years over her vacant and frivolous soul. Weary of
his high favour, he shared it cheerfully with obscure favourites,
indulged in a thousand debaucheries, which he recounted to his
crowned slave, whom he delighted to mortify by his stories,
nay, even maltreated her, it is said, in the grossest manner:
and yet he retained an absolute empire over that princess, who
was incapable of resisting him, who could not be happy unless
she saw him every day. After she had long committed the
government to him, with the official title of first minister, she
gave it up as much to him still, though he no longer had that
title ; for nothing was done in Spain but according to his plea
sure. He disposed of all the resources of the State; and he
had at home enormous sums in cash, while the treasury, reduced
to the greatest straits, made shift with a discredited paper-money,
depressed to half its nominal value. The nation was almost
habituated to this spectacle; it manifested indignation only
when some new and extraordinary scandal made the blood
mount into the faces of the brave Spaniards, whose heroic
resistance soon afterwards proved that they were worthy of a
different government. At the moment when Europe rang with
the great events occurring on the Po and the Danube, the court
of Spain was the theatre of an unheard-of scandal, which had well
nigh exhausted the patience of the nation. The prince of
Peace proceeding from one excess to another, had finished by
marrying a relation of the royal family. A child was born from
this union. The king and queen, resolving themselves to stand
sponsors for the new-born infant, had the ceremony performed
with all the etiquette customary at the baptism of Infants of
Spain. The highest nobles of the court were obliged to perform
the same duty that would have been required of them if the
child had been the offspring of royalty. On this infant in
long-clothes had been conferred the great orders of the crown
and magnificent presents. The grand-inquisitor had officiated
at the religious ceremony. This time, it is true, indignation had
risen to the highest pitch, and every Spaniard had considered
himself as personally insulted by this odious proceeding.
Tilings had come to such a pass that the Spanish ministers
opened their minds upon the subject to the foreign ambassadors,
and particularly to the ambassador of France, to whom they
usually had recourse in most of their embarrassments, and who

Aug. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 65
received from their own lips the shocking particulars which we
are here relating.
Amidst these scandalous proceedings, the king alone, kept
under continual espionage by his wife, neither knew nor sus
pected what was passing. Neither the outcry of his subjects,
nor the occasional revolt of some of the grandees of Spain, indig
nant at the degradation that was required of them, nor the inex
plicable assiduities of the prince of Peace, could open his eyes.
This poor good-natured king even used sometimes to make this
singular remark, which embarrassed all present who were doomed
to hear it: " My brother of Naples is a blockhead, who suffers
himself to be ruled by his wife." It should be added that the
prince of the Asturias, since Ferdinand VII., brought up at a
distance from the court and with incredible harshness, detested
the favourite, whose criminal influence he was aware of, and
that his just hatred for the favourite was at last converted in his
mind into an involuntary hatred for his father and mother.
What a spectacle, at the conclusion of the eighteenth and the
beginning of the nineteenth century, when the throne of France
had recently sunk with a crash, and when a young warrior,
simple, austere, indefatigable, full of genius, had just raised
himself upon its ruins ! How long could the Spanish monarchy
withstand the dangerous effect of this contrast !
Amidst these disorders, the house of Spain was at times
overtaken by confused presentiments, and began to feel some
apprehensions of a revolution. The ancient attachment of the
Spaniards to royalty and to religion served, it is true, to cheer
it ; but it was afraid that Revolution would come by the way of
the Pyrenees, and therefore sought to dispel the danger by
implicit deference towards the French Republic. The incredible
violence of the English cabinet, the passionate outbursts of
Paul I. against that house, on the formation of the second
coalition, had thrown it completely into our arms. It regarded
this as advantageous, nay, honourable, since general Bonaparte
had ennobled, by his presence in the seat of power, all the
relations of the cabinets with the government of the Republic.
The good king Charles IV. had conceived, though at a dis
tance, a sort of friendship for the First Consul. This feeling
became stronger every day, and it is painful to think how this
singular attachment was destined to terminate, without treachery
on the part of France, but by an inconceivable concatenation
of circumstances. " What a great man is general Bonaparte !"
Charles IV. was incessantly saying. The queen said so too,
but more coldly, because the prince of Peace, disposed
sometimes to censure what the court of Spain did since he was
no longer minister, seemed to blame the partiality that was
shown to the government of France. Meanwhile the First
Consul, informed by M. Alquier, our ambassador, a man of
superior understanding and sagacity, that he must absolutely
VOL. II. P ,

66 HISTORY OF THE [A.Ug. 1800.
secure at Madrid the good-will of the prince of Peace, the First
Consul had sent to that favourite some magnificent arms, made
at the manufactory of Versailles. This attention on the part of
the greatest personage in Europe had touched the vanity of
the prince of Peace. Some attentions of our ambassador had
completely won him, and thenceforward the whole court of
Spain seemed to give itself up to us without reserve.
From d'Urquijo, the minister, alone was a slight resistance
experienced. He was a man of eccentric character, naturally
an enemy to the prince of Peace, whom he had succeeded^
and liking general Bonaparte not much better. M. d'Urquijo,
of plebeian extraction, and endowed with some energy, having
drawn upon himself the enmity of the clergy and of the court
through some insignificant reforms which he had attempted, inr
clined, in an astonishing manner for a Spaniard of that time,
towards revolutionaryideas. Ho was connected with many French
demagogues, and participated to a certain point in their aversion
for the First Consul. He had the merit of desiring to reform
the most crying abuses, of striving, for instance, to diminish the
revenues of the clergy and the jurisdiction of the agents of the
court of Rome. To these measures he was striving to obtain his
Holiness' assent ; and in making this attempt he had exposed
himself to serious dangers. Having, in fact, the prince of
Peace against him, he must be undone, if the Romish influence
were to unite with the domestic influence in the palace to
overthrow him. Touched with some attentions paid him by
M. Alquier, witnessing, moreover, the partiality of the king and
queen, M. d'Urquijo at length began, in his turn, to admire
general Bonaparte, whom it was not only natural, but at that
time quite the fashion, to admire.
The partiality of the king soon became unbounded. Having
seen the arms sent to the prince of Peace, he conceived and
expressed a wish to have some of the same sort. Some mag
nificent specimens were manufactured forthwith, and he re
ceived them with real joy. The queen also wished for dresses,
and Madame Bonaparte, who was celebrated for her taste, sent
all the most exquisite and elegant productions of that kind in
Paris. Charles IV, generous as a Gastilian, unwilling to be
behindhand, took care to make a right royal return. Knowing
that horses would be acceptable to the First Consul, he stripped
the studs of Aranjuez, Medina Cceli, and Altamira, of their
handsomest inmates, to find first six, then twelve, then sixteen
horses, the finest in the Peninsula. One cannot tell where he
would have stopped, had he not been checked in his ardour.
He took two months to select them himself, and nobody could
have performed the task better, for he was a consummate
judge. He appointed, moreover, a numerous train to accom
pany them to France, chose his best grooms for this mission,
clothed them in magnificent liveries, and imposed but one con-

Aug. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE, 67
dition on all this parade, namely, that, while travelling in
France, his grooms should attend mass every Sunday. A
promise was given that his desire should be complied with, and
his joy at making a handsome present to the First Consul was
then unalloyed. Though fond of France, this excellent prince
had a notion that it was impossible for a man to live in that
country many days, without wholly forsaking the religion of his
forefathers. The eclat of these demonstrations suited well the views of
the First Consul. It gratified him ; he thought it useful to
show to Europe, and even to France, the successors of Charles
V., the descendants of Louis XIV., taking honour to them
selves from their personal relations with him. But he sought
more solid advantages in his diplomatic relations, and aimed at
a more important object.
The king and queen of Spain were passionately fond of one
of their children, the Infanta Maria Louisa, wife of the here
ditary prince of Parma. The queen, sister, as we have said, of
the reigning duke of Parma, had united her daughter to her
nephew, and concentrated upon this couple her fondest affec
tions ; for she was most ardently attached to the house from
which she sprang. She meditated an aggrandisement for that
house in Italy, and, as Italy was at the disposal of the conqueror
of Marengo, it was on him that she rested all her hopes of ob
taining the accomplishment of her wishes. The First Consul,
apprised of those wishes, took care not to neglect this way of
arriving at his ends ; and he despatched to Madrid his faithful
Berthier, in order to profit by the circumstance that presented
itself. This was the first subject of his attention on his return
from Marengo. If he had sent one of his aides-de-camp to
Berlin and to Vienna, he resolved to do more for the court of
Spain ; he resolved to send thither the man who had the largest
share in his glory ; for Berthier was then the Parmenio of the
modern Alexander.
It was at the very moment when the First Consul was nego
tiating the preliminaries of peace with M. de St. Julien, when
he was seducing the inflammable heart of Paul I., and fomenting
in the North the quarrel of the neutral powers ; it was at this
moment that he despatched general Berthier in all haste to
Madrid. He set out towards the end of August (beginning of
Fruetidor)> without official title, but with the certainty of pro
ducing a great effect by his mere presence, and with secret
powers for treating on the most important subjects.
His journey embraced several objects ; the 'first was, to visit
the principal sea-ports of the Peninsula, to ascertain their state
and their resources, and, money in hand, to urge expeditions
for Malta and for Egypt. Berthier quickly performed this
task, and then hastened to Madrid to fulfil the more important
mission with which he was charged. The First Consul was
F 2

68 HISTORY OF THE [-A-Ug. 1800.
quite willing to grant an increase of territory to the house of
Parma ; he was even disposed to add to this aggrandisement a
new title, that of king, which would have crowned the wishes of
the queen ; but he required to be paid for these concessions in
two ways : firstly, by the restitution of Louisiana to France ;
secondly, by a threatening injunction to the court of Portugal,
for the purpose of deciding it to make peace with the Republic
and to break with England.
The motives of the First Consul for requiring such conditions
were these : — Since Kleber's death, he began to be uneasy
about the preservation of Egypt, and he shared with all his
contemporaries the ambition of distant possessions. The
rivalry between France and England, which, for a century past,
had fought solely for the East and West Indies, had inflamed
to the highest degree' the passion for possessing colonies. In
case of Egypt being wrested from us, the First Consul wished to
achieve something for the colonial greatness of France. He cast
his eye over the map of the world, and beheld a magnificent pro
vince, situated between Mexico and the United States, formerly
belonging to France, ceded, in a time of abasement, by Louis
XV., to Charles III., seriously threatened by the English and
the Americans, so long as it should be in the impotent hands
of the Spaniards, of little value to the latter, who possessed
half the American continent, but of great value to the French,
who had no possession in that part of America, and capable of
being made productive, when the activity of the latter should
be specially concentrated on its territory: this province was
Louisiana. If Egypt, lost to us, could no longer furnish us with
a compensation for St. Domingo, the First Consul hoped to
find it in Louisiana.
He demanded it formally, therefore, of Spain, as the price of
an acquisition in Italy. He required, in addition, that part of the
Spanish fleet blocked up in the roads of Brest should be given
to him. As for Portugal, he wished to take advantage of the
geographical position of Spain in regard to that country, and of
the ties of consanguinity which united the two reigning houses
of the Peninsula, to detach it from the alliance with England.
The prince of Brazil, regent of Portugal, was, in fact, son-in-law
of the king and queen of Spain. The Court of Madrid, therefore,
possessed not only the power of neighbourhood, but also family
influence, and it was a fit occasion for employing this two-fold
medium for driving the English from this part of the Continent.
The Enghsh, once excluded from Portugal, when the coasts of
Prussia, Denmark, Russia, and Sweden were about to be closed
against them, when Naples, doomed to submit to the will of
France, was going to receive orders to forbid them her ports —
the English would soon be excluded from the whole of the
Continent. Such were the proposals which Berthier was ordered to

Aug. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 69
carry to Madrid. He was cordially received by the king, the
queen, the prince of Peace, and by all the grandees of Spain,
curious to see the man, whose name always figured beside that
of general Bonaparte in the military bulletins of these times.
The conditions of France appeared hard, yet no serious re
sistance could be made to them. D'Urquijo, the minister, alone,
fearing the effect which this cession might produce upon the
Spaniards, showed rather more opposition than the court.
Reasons incontestably good were adduced to make him easy.
He was told that it would take a large extent of territory on the
yet uninhabited banks of the Mississippi, to form an equivalent
for the smallest possessions in Italy ; that the Spaniards needed,
in the Gulf of Mexico, allies such as the French against the
English and the Americans ; that, if Louisiana was of great
value to. France, stripped of all her colonial possessions, it was
of scarcely any to Spain, already so rich in the New World ;
that an increase of influence in Italy would be worth more to
Spain than a distant territory, situated in a region where she
had more land than she could work and defend ; that it was an
ancient French possession, wrung from the weakness of Louis
XV., and which Charles III. himself, with that upright spirit
which was known to all the world, had for a moment refused, so
convinced was he that it was not his due. These reasons were
excellent, and assuredly, under these circumstances, Spain
was not asked to give more than she received. But what
decided M. d'Urquijo more than all the best arguments, was
the fear of offending France, and thwarting a combination to
which his court was attached with a sort of passion.
An eventual treaty was agreed upon. By this treaty, the
First Consul promised to obtain for the duke of Parma an in
crease of dominions in Italy of about 1,200,000 souls ; to
ensure to him, moreover, the title of king, and the acknow
ledgment of this new rank by all the sovereigns of Europe, at
the general peace. As soon as part of these conditions were
fulfilled, Spain, in return, was to cede back to France Loui
siana, with the same extent of territory which that province had
when it was ceded by Louis XV. to Charles III., and to give,
moreover, six ships of the line, rigged, armed, ready to receive
their crews. This treaty, signed by Berthier at Madrid, filled
the queen with joy, and raised the infatuation of the court of
Spain for the First Consul to the highest pitch.
The last condition, which had for its object to force Portugal
to break with England, was easy, for it was as accordant with
the interests of Spain as with those of France. Spain, in fact,
was equally interested with France in weakening the power of
England, and above all in excluding her from the Continent.
In this the First Consul did no more than rouse her from her
unpardonable apathy, and urge her to make use of an influence
which she ought long since to have employed. He went still

70 HISTORY OF THE [Aug. 1800.
further in his plans relative to this point : he proposed to Charles
IV., if the court of Lisbon should not comply immediately with
the injunction given it, to pass the frontiers of Portugal with
an army, to seize one or two provinces, and to keep them as
pledges, for the purpose of afterwards obliging England to re
store the Spanish colonies which she had taken, in order to save
the dominions of her ally. For his part, if Charles IV. did not
conceive himself strong enough to undertake this enterprise,
he offered him the assistance of a French army. That kind-
hearted king did not ask for so much. The prince of Brazil
was his son-in-law; he had no wish, therefore, to take provinces
from him, even though they were only to serve as pledges for
the restitution of Spanish provinces. But he addressed to him
the most pressing exhortations, and even added threats of war,
if his advice was not attended to. The court of Lisbon pro
mised to send a negotiator immediately to Madrid, to confer
with the ambassador of France.
Berthier returned to Paris loaded with the favours of the
court of Spain, and could assure the First Consul that he had
friends entirely devoted to him in Madrid. The magnificent
horses sent by Charles IV. arrived nearly about the same time,
and were presented to the First Consul in the Place du Carrousel,
at one of those great reviews, in which he delighted to show to
the Parisians and to foreigners the soldiers who had conquered
Europe. An immense concourse of curious persons came to
see those beautiful animals and those grooms in splendid live
ries, which reminded the spectator of the pageantries of ancient
monarchy, and bore evidence to the respect, the extraordinary
attentions, of the oldest courts of Europe for the new head
of the French Republic.
At this moment, three American negotiators, Messrs. Oliver
Ellsworth, Richardson Davie, and Van-Murray, sent to recon
cile France and the United States, arrived in Paris. That
republic, swayed by interest much more than gratitude, above
all, governed at that time by the policy of the federalist party,
had drawn closer to Great Britain during the late war, and had
been wanting not only to France but likewise to herself in desert
ing the principles of the maritime neutrality. Forgetful of
the treaty of alliance of 1778, to which she owed her existence, a
treaty which bound her not to grant to others commercial advan
tages which were not at the same time extended to the French,
she had conceded extraordinary and exclusive advantages to
Great Britain. Giving up the principle that " the flag covers
the goods," she had admitted that an enemy's property may be
searched for on board a neutral bottom, and seized if its origin were
ascertained. This conduct was alike impolitic and dishonour
able. The Directory, naturally much irritated, had had recourse
to the system of reprisals, declaring that France would treat
neutrals as they suffered England to treat them. Proceeding

Aug. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 71
from one harsh step to another, it had come to a state of almost
declared war with America, but without actual hostilities.
Such was the state of things which the First Consul had it
much at heart to put an end to. We have seen what honours
he paid to Washington, with the two-fold intention of producing
an effect both at home and abroad : he appointed three pleni
potentiaries, his brother Joseph Bonaparte, and the two coun
cillors of state Fleurieu and Roederer, to arrange matters with
the American plenipotentiaries, and earnestly pressed the con
clusion of the negotiation, in order to give England very soon a
new adversary, by placing another power on the list of those
who would engage to cause the true principles of maritime neu
trality to be observed. The first obstacle to a reconciliation
was the article by which the United States promised to France
a share in the commercial advantages granted by her to all nations.
This obligation not to concede any thing to others without con
ceding as much to us, occasioned the Americans great embarrass
ment. Their negotiators manifested no disposition to yield on
this point, but appeared ready to acknowledge and to defend
the rights of neutrals, and to re-establish, in their stipulations
with France, the principles which they had abandoned in treat
ing with England. The First Consul, who was much more tena
cious of the principles of the maritime neutrality than of the
commercial advantages of the treaty of 1778, which had become
illusory in practice, the First Consul directed his brother to waive
the point, and to conclude an arrangement with the American
envoys, provided there could be obtained from them a complete
and formal recognition of the principles of the law of nations
which it was important to enforce. This difficulty removed, the
parties soon agreed about, all the rest, and at this moment a treaty
of reconciliation was preparing to be signed with the United States.
Another reconciliation, of much greater importance still, that
of the Republic with the Holy See, began to produce its fruit. The
new Pope, elected in the vague hope of an accommodation with
France, had beheld this hope, to which he owed his elevation,
realised. General Bonaparte, as we have related, returning
from Marengo, had transmitted some overtures to Pius VII.
through cardinal Martiniana, bishop of Vercelli, assuring him
that he had no intention to re-establish the Roman and Parthe-
nopean Republics,, instituted by the Directory. He had cer
tainly enough to do in Italy, with the Cisalpine Republic to
constitute, to direct, and to defend against the. policy and the
interests of all Europe. General Bonaparte required in return
that the new pontiff should lend the aid of his spiritual autho
rity in re-establishing peace and concord in France. The Pope
joyfully received count Alciati, nephew of cardinal Martiniana,
who was charged to carry the overtures of the First Consul ; he
sent him back immediately to Vercelli, to declare, in his name,
that, though disposed to co-operate with the First Consul,

72 HISTORY OF '^H]C4> [Aug. 1800.
in effecting an object so important and so dear to the Church,
still he wished first to be made acquainted in a somewhat more
precise manner with the views of the French cabinet. The cardi
nal, in consequence, wrote from Vercelli to Paris, to communi
cate the dispositions and the wishes of the new Pope. The First
Consul, in reply, asked for a negotiator, with whom he could enter
into direct explanation, and the Pope immediately appointed
Monsignor Spina, bishop of Corinth, nuncio of the Holy See at
Florence. This envoy, having first repaired to Vercelli, resolved
to set out for France, at the urgent solicitation of the First
Consul, who, by bringing this negotiation under his own eye,
thought to make the more sure of its success. On the part of
the First Consul, it was a ticklish step to bring to Paris a
representative of the Holy See, especially in the state of the
public mind, which was not yet prepared for a sight of this
kind. It was agreed that Monsignor Spina should not have
any official title, and that he should profess himself to be
bishop of Corinth, charged to treat with the French government
on the affairs of the Roman government.
During these negotiations, so actively and so ably conducted
with all the powers, M. de St. Julien, who had signed and was
the bearer of the preliminaries of peace, had proceeded for
Vienna, accompanied by Duroc. Aware of thecimprudence of
his conduct, he had not concealed from M. de Talleyrand that he
was not sure he should be able to take Duroc on to Vienna. The
illusion of the minister would not allow him to give heed to this
difficulty ; and it was agreed that M. de St. Julien and Duroc
should take the head-quarters of M. de Kray, established at
Alt-OZttingen, near the Inn, in their way, to obtain from that
general passports permitting Duroc to enter Austria. They
reached the head-quarters on the 4th of August, 1800 (16th
Thermidor, year VIIL), but Duroc was detained, and not suf
fered to pass the limit fixed by the armistice. This was a first
and by no means favourable sign of the reception which the
preliminaries were likely to meet with. M. de St. Julien then
set off alone for Vienna, telling Duroc that he would apply for
passports for him and send them to the head-quarters if he ob
tained them. M. de St. Julien then sought audience of the em
peror, and delivered to him the articles which he had signed in
Paris, on condition of ratification and secrecy. The emperor was
greatly surprised and dissatisfied at the extraordinary latitude
which M. de St. Julien had given to his instructions. It was
not precisely the conditions contained in the preliminary articles
which displeased him : it was the fear of being compromised with
England, which had just assisted him with her money, and was
extremely suspicious. He was prepared, it is true, to go so far
as to communicate part of his intentions, for the purpose of dis
covering those of the First Consul ; but he would not at any
price have signed any document whatever, for that would infer

Aug. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 73
a negotiation opened without the participation of the British cabi
net. Therefore, in spite of the danger of provoking a storm on the
part of France, the imperial cabinet resolved to disavow M. de St.
Julien. That officer was publicly very ill treated, and sent into a
sort of exile in one of the remote provinces of the empire. The
preliminaries were considered as null, having been signed, though
provisionally, by an agent without character and without powers.
Duroc received no passports, and, after waiting till the 13th of
August (25th Thermidor), he was obliged to return to Paris.
All this, independently of the delay in the conclusion of
peace which it- created, was very disagreeable to say to the First
Consul; and Austria had reason to fear the effect of such a.
communication on his irritable character. It was very possible
that he might leave Paris immediately, put himself at the head
of the armies of the Republic, and march upon Vienna. The
court of Austria resolved therefore, while disavowing the pre
liminaries, not to make a rupture of that disavowal, and to propose
to the French government the immediate opening of a congress.
Lord Minto, representative of the British cabinet at Vienna,
consented to suffer Austria to negotiate, but on condition that
England should be a party to the negotiation. It was agreed
with him to propose diplomatic conferences in which England
and Austria should alike take part. In consequence, M. de
Thugut wrote to M. de Talleyrand, under date of the 11th of
August (23d Thermidor), that, though disavowing the impru
dent conduct of M. de St. Julien, the emperor was nevertheless
earnestly desirous of peace; that he, therefore, proposed the
immediate opening of a congress, in France itself, at Schelestadt,
or Luneville, whichever the French government pleased ; that
Great Britain was ready to send a plenipotentiary; and that, if
the First Consul assented to this, a general peace might soon
be restored to the world. The whole was clothed in the
language most likely to soothe the impetuous disposition of
him who then governed France,
When the First Consul received these tidings, he was highly
irritated. He was offended, in the first place, at the disavowal
of the officer who had treated with him, and in the next, he
saw with mortification that peace was deferred. He perceived,
above all, in the presence of England at the negotiation, a cause
of interminable delays ; for there was much more difficulty in
concluding a maritime than a continental peace. On the spur of
the moment, and under the influence of a first impression, he was
for raising an outcry, denouncing Austria as having violated
her faith, and commencing hostilities forthwith. M. de Talley
rand, sensible that he had himself done wrong in treating
with a plenipotentiary without powers, endeavoured to pacify
the First Consul. The matter was submitted to the Council of
State. This great body, which is now nothing more than an
administrative tribunal, was then a real council of government.

74 HISTORY OF THE [Aug. 1800.
The minister laid before it a detailed report. " The First
Consul," said he in his report, " has thought fit to convoke an
extraordinary meeting of the Council of State, and, trusting to
its discretion as well as to its wisdom, he has charged me to
communicate to it the most minute details of the negotiation
which has taken place with the court of Vienna." Having
unfolded that negotiation, as one might have done before a
council of ministers, M. de Talleyrand acknowledged that the
Austrian plenipotentiary had no powers ; that, in negotiating
with him, the possibility of a disavowal ought to have been
foreseen; that, in consequence, there was no establishing a
polemique d'apparat on this subject; and that a violent outbreak
ought to be avoided. But, referring to the example of the
negotiations for the peace of Westphalia, which had long pre
ceded the signature of the treaty of Minister, and during which
the parties continued to negotiate and fight, he proposed that
the opening of a congress should be agreed to, and at the same
time that hostilities should be recommenced.
This was, in fact, the wisest course that could be pursued.
It was expedient to treat, since the hostile powers had made
France an offer to do so, but also to profit by the state of our
armies, quite ready to take the field afresh, and that of the
Austrian armies not yet recovered from their defeats, to force
Austria to negotiate in earnest, and to separate herself from
Great Britain.
There was, however, one thing which might be tried that
had also its advantages; and the First Consul discovered it
with his usual sagacity. England proposed a joint negotiation.
In admitting her to a congress, there was the danger of intro
ducing a contracting party in no hurry to conclude, and the danger,
more especially, of clogging the continental peace with all the
difficulties of the maritime peace : time would, therefore, elapse
in negotiations either insincere or rendered more difficult ; the
season for fighting would be suffered to pass away, and thus the
Austrian armies would gain a respite which they greatly needed.
These were serious inconveniences. But a compensation might
be found for them all ; it was this : since England desired to be
admitted to the negotiation, to admit her, but on one condition,
that of concluding a naval armistice also. If England assented
to this, the benefits of the naval armistice would far surpass
the inconveniences of the continental armistice ; for our fleets,
navigating wherever they pleased, would be enabled to provision
Malta and to carry soldiers and materiel to Egypt. For such an
advantage, the First Consul would gladly have run the risk of
an extra campaign on the Continent. A naval armistice was
no doubt something quite new, quite unusual, in the law of
nations ; but it was fair that the Anglo-Austrian alhance should
pay in some manner for the sacrifice which we. made on our
part in suspending the march of our legions for Vienna.

Aug. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 75
We had residing in London a discreet and skilful negotiator,
M. Otto, who was there for the purpose of treating of matters
relative to the prisoners of war. He had even been chosen by
our cabinet, with a view to make use of him on the first
occasion, either to make or to listen to overtures. He was
instructed specially to address himself to the British cabinet,
and plumply propose the question of a naval armistice. In this
mode of proceeding the First Consul found the advantage of
getting on faster, and of negotiating his business directly, which
he always liked to do better than to employ agents. On the
24th of August (6th Fructidor, year VIIL), instructions con
formable with this new plan of negotiation were sent to
M. Otto. On the same day, the communications from Vienna
were answered in a very harsh tone. In this answer, the refusal
to admit the preliminaries was attributed to the subsidiary
treaty signed on the 20th of June last; the French government
disdainfully deplored the dependence in which the emperor was
placed in regard to England; it assented to a congress at
Luneville, but added,, that they must nevertheless fight while
negotiating, because, in proposing a joint negotiation, Austria
had not taken the precaution to provide, as a natural condition,
for a suspension of arms by land and sea. This was one way of
inducing Austrian diplomacy itself to make an effort in London
for obtaining a naval armistice.
Negotiations were opened in London between M. Otto
and captain George, the head of the Transport Office. They
lasted during the whole month of September. M. Otto pro
posed, on the part of France, that hostilities should be
suspended by land and sea; that all the vessels both of com
merce and war of the belligerent nations should be allowed to
sail freely; that the ports belonging to France, or occupied by
her armies, such as Malta and Alexandria, should be assimilated
to the fortresses of Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt, in Ger
many, which, though blockaded by our armies, were never
theless to receive provisions and supplies. M. Otto, treating
frankly, admitted that France would derive great advantages
from this arrangement; but he added, that she ought to have very
great advantages, to compensate her for the concession which
she made, in suffering the summer to pass away without com
pleting the destruction of the Austrian forces.
The sacrifice required of England in this demand was one
which nothing was capable of wringing from her. It would, in
fact, be. permitting the revictualling of Malta and Egypt, and
thus perhaps ensuring for ever those two possessions to France;
it would also be permitting the grand combined French and
Spanish fleet to leave Brest, to sail into the Mediterranean, and
to take a position there/ which would render it afresh master of
that sea for a longer 6r a shorter time. England, therefore,
could not assent to such a proposal. Still the danger of Austria

76 HISTORY OF THE [Sept. 1800.
touched her deeply ; she had an important interest in not suffering
her to be crushed; for, if Austria were crushed, general Bonaparte,
having the full command of his means, would be able to attempt
some formidable enterprise against the British islands. In con
sequence, she deemed it expedient to make sacrifices to an
interest of this kind ; and, while crying out against the strange
ness of a naval armistice, she presented a counter-project, dated
the 7th of September, 1800 (20th Fructidor, year VIIL). To
begin with, she assented to Luneville as the place of the con
gress, and appointed Mr. Thomas Grenville, brother of the
minister for foreign affairs, to treat for the general peace. She
next proposed the following system respecting the naval
armistice. All hostilities were to be suspended by land and
sea : the suspension of arms was to extend not only to the three
belligerent parties, Austria, England, and France, but to their
allies. This arrangement was designed to deliver Portugal from
the threatening remonstrances of Spain. The maritime places
which were blockaded, such as Malta and Alexandria, were to
be assimilated to the places in Germany and to be provisioned
every fortnight in proportion to the consumption which had
taken place during the interval of time elapsed. The ships of
the fine lying at Brest and other ports were not to be at liberty
to change their station during the armistice.
This counter-project was, on the part of England, rather a
testimony of good-will towards Austria than an. actual con
cession on the important point of the negotiation. Malta might,
no doubt, gain something. by being provisioned for a few months;
but Egypt needed no provisions. It was soldiers, muskets,
cannon, that it wanted, and not corn, which it had to spare to all
the world.
France, however, by yielding on some points, might still find
in the naval armistice advantages sufficiently great to induce its
acceptance, even with modifications.
On the 21st of September (the 4th complementary day of the
year VIIL), the First Consul made a proposal, which was the
last. He consented that ships of the line should not be allowed
to change their station, which condemned the combined squa
dron of Spain and France to remain blocked up in Brest; he
required that Malta should be revictualled every fifteen days, at
the rate of 10,000 rations per day : he consented that Egypt
should continue blockaded; but he required that six frigates
should have liberty to leave Toulon, to sail to Alexandria, and
to return without being searched by the British cruisers.
His intention here was clear enough, and he was right not to
disguise an interest, which every one would have guessed at first
sight. He meant to arm these six frigates en flute, to load them
with men and munitions of war, and to send them to Egypt.
He hoped that they might be made to carry 4000 soldiers, a
great quantity of muskets, swords, bombs, balls, &c. He had,

Sept. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 77
therefore, sacrificed every thing, to confine himself to his mairi
object, the revictualling of Malta and the recruiting of the army
in Egypt.But the difficulty, what effort soever might be made on both
sides to diminish it, remained at bottom the same. The object
was to preserve Malta and Egypt for France, two points upon
which England would not give way. Thus there were no means
of coming to an understanding. The negotiation was relin
quished, on the refusal in London to admit the last plan for a
naval armistice.
Before these parleys were definitively broken off, the First
Consul, by way of courtesy, made a final proposal to England.
He offered to renounce all armistice, and, nevertheless, to treat
with her, but in a separate negotiation from that which was
about to commence with Austria.
It was now September, 1 800. Several months had been spent
in sterile negotiations since the victories of Marengo and Hoch
stett, and the First Consul would not waste any more time
without acting.
Austria, when threatened, had replied that she could not force
England to sign a naval armistice ; that she offered, for her own
part, to negotiate immediately ; that she had appointed M. de
Lherbach to repair to Luneville ; that he was about to proceed
thither forthwith ; that Mr. Thomas Grenville was waiting, on
his part, for passports; that they could, therefore, negotiate
without delay ; but that it was not necessary to resume hosti
lities during the negotiations, and to spill more torrents of
human blood. The First Consul, who perceived the secret in
tention of protracting till winter should arrive, determined, at
length, on resuming hostilities, and had issued his orders ac
cordingly. He had employed to good purpose the two months
which had elapsed, and put a finishing hand to the organisation
of the armies. His new arrangements in respect to them were
as follows : —
Moreau, as we have said, had been obliged to send general
St. Suzanne upon the Rhine with some detachments, for the
purpose of uniting the garrisons of Mayence and Strasburgj and
making head against the partisans raised by baron d'Albini in
the heart of Germany. The army of Moreau was in conse
quence weakened, and, at the same time, the force so collected
was insufficient to cover his rear. The First Consul, to ward off
all danger in that quarter, had hastened to complete the Bata
vian army, placed under the command of Augereau. He had
formed it of 8000 Dutch and 12,000 French, drawn from the
troops which guarded Holland and the departments of the
North. These troops, the most worn down by the preceding
campaigns, reinvigorated since by rest, reinforced by recruits,
now constituted excellent corps. Augereau had marched to
Frankfort, where he awed by his presence the Mayence levies of

78 HISTORY OF THE [Sept. 1800.
baron d'Albini and the Austrian detachments left in the envi
rons. This precaution taken, the corps of St. Suzanne reor
ganised, nearly 18,000 strong, had returned to the Danube, and
again formed the left wing of Moreau. His return raised the
active army of the Rhine to more than 100,000 men.
When the army of reserve had thrown itself into Italy, it had
been obliged to leave behind part of the corps destined to com
pose it, and for the complete formation of which there had not
been time to wait. Instead of an effective force of 60,000 men,
as was intended, it had numbered only forty and some odd thou
sand. The First Consul had formed with these corps left behind
a second army of reserve, 15,000 strong, given the command of it
to Macdonald, and posted it in the Grisons, facing the Tyrol,
which had permitted Moreau to draw him to his right wing,
commanded, as the reader is aware, by Lecourbe, and to unite,
in case of need, under his hand, the entire mass of his army,
if he should have to force the barrier of the Inn.
The army of Italy, on its part, established on the banks of
the Mincio by the convention of Alexandria, relieved also bythe
presence of Macdonald from all concern about Switzerland and
the Tyrol, had been enabled to draw its wings closer to its main
body, and to concentrate itself in such a manner that it could
enter into action at any moment. Composed of the troops which
had crossed the St. Bernard, of those which had been drawn
from Germany by the St. Gothard, lastly, of the troops of
Liguria, which had defended Genoa and the Var, rested and
recruited, it presented a total mass of about 120,000 men,
80,000 of whom were assembled on the Mincio; Massena had
at first been appointed commander-in-chief, and he was, in fact,
the only one capable of commanding it well. Unfortunately,
mischievous dissensions had arisen between the commissariat of
the army and the Italian governments. The army, though sta
tioned amidst fertile Italy, and in possession of the rich magazines
left by the Austrians, had nevertheless not enjoyed all the plenty
to which it was entitled by its long privations. It was alleged
that the commissariat officers had sold part of these maga
zines. The governments of Piedmont and the Cisalpine,
moreover, complained that they were drained by war contribu
tions, and refused to pay them. Amidst this confusion, heavy
charges were preferred against the French administration ; and
m these complaints general Massena himself was included. The
clamour soon became so vehement, that the First Consul thought
himself obliged to recall Massena, and to appoint general Brune
in his stead. Brune, with abundance of intelligence and cou
rage, was but an indifferent general, and a still more indifferent
politician. He was one of the most zealous leaders of the de
magogue party, which, however, did not prevent him from being
devotedly attached to the First Consul, who was thereby much
gratified. Not having had it in his power to assign him an

Sept. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 79
active command during the spring campaign, the First Con
sul determined to give him one during the autumn campaign.
His victory in Holland caused him to rank high in public esti
mation; but the recall of Massena was a misfortune for the
army, and for the First Consul himself. Massena, soured, was
about to become, in spite of himself, a subject of hope for a
multitude of intriguers, who at this moment were again stirring.
The First Consul was aware of this, but he would not suffer
irregularities anywhere, and one cannot blame him for it.
To these four armies the First Consul had added a fifth
assemblage of troops around Amiens. He had detached from
the demi-brigades left in the interior the skeletons of the com
panies of grenadiers, recruited them with fine men, and formed
out of them a superb corps of 9000 or 10,000 picked soldiers,
whom he intended to dispatch in haste to the coast, if the En
glish should effect a landing on any part of it, or into Italy, to
perform the duty which Augereau was performing in Germany,
that of covering the wings and the rear of the principal army.
Murat was appointed its commander-in-chief.
All this had been accomplished, as far as related to the re
cruiting, by means of the levy ordered by the Legislative Body,
and, with reference to expense, by means of the financial re
sources recently created. These different corps were now in
want of nothing; they were well fed, well armed; they had
horses, and a complete materiel.
The First Consul was naturally impatient to avail himself of
such means to wring peace from Austria before winter. He,
therefore, ordered Moreau and Brune to repair to their head
quarters, and to make preparations for recommencing hostilities-
He directed Moreau to give the Austrian general the notice sti
pulated by the armistice, and not to allow any prolongation of
the suspension of arms, unless on one condition, that the em
peror should relinquish to the French the three fortresses actually
blockaded, Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt. On this condi
tion he consented to grant a further respite of five or six weeks.
These fortresses, in fact, were worth the sacrifice. Once in
possession of them, the French would obtain an excellent base
of operation on the Danube; they would be reinforced by
the corps which were blockading them ; they would, moreover,
have time left to push one wing of the army of Italy upon Tus
cany and the kingdom of Naples, countries in which levies en
masse were being raised at the instigation of Austria, and with
the money of England. Such were the orders despatched to the
head-quarters of Moreau.
The emperor of Germany, on his part, making good use of
the time, had employed with the greatest activity the subsidies
furnished by England. He hastened the new levies ordered in
Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary, Styria, and Carinthia. Wickham,
the Enghsh minister, had established a sort of offices in several

80 HISTORY OF THE [Sept. 1800.
towns of Germany, for bribing soldiers to fight for the coalition.
By means of a fresh subsidy, the Bavarian and Wurtemberg
corps had been considerably augmented. Independently of the
sums paid to Austria, English recruiting officers had taken into
the direct pay of their government two regiments, composed of
boatmen plying on the rivers of Germany, and destined to faci
litate the passage of them. Ten thousand peasants, hired for
the purpose, threw up, under the direction of Austrian engi
neers, formidable entrenchments along the whole line of the
Inn, from the Tyrol to the junction of that river with the Da
nube. All was bustle from Vienna to Munich. The staff of
the Austrian army had been totally changed. M. de Kray,
notwithstanding his experience and his vigour on 'the field of
battle, had shared the disgrace of M. de Melas. The archduke
Ferdinand himself, who served under him, had been removed.
The archduke John, a young prince of highly cultivated mind
and very brave, but without experience in war, his head full of
theories, his imagination struck by the manoeuvres of general
Bonaparte, and anxious to imitate him at any rate, had been
called to the supreme command of the imperial armies. This
was one of those novelties, which people are fond of trying
in desperate circumstances. The emperor had repaired in
person to the army, to review it, and to excite the spirit of
the soldiers by his presence.
He passed several days with the army, accompanied by M. de
Lherbach, the negotiator appointed to proceed to Luneville, and
by the young archduke John. Having seen every thing, ex
amined every thing, in company with his advisers, he ascer
tained that nothing was ready, that the army was not yet
sufficiently recruited, either in point of materiel or courage, for
the immediate recommencement of hostilities. M. de Lherbach
was, therefore, commissioned to repair to Moreau's head
quarters, to learn whether a prolongation of the armistice for a
few days could not be obtained from the French government.
M. de Lherbach was informed by Moreau of the conditions
fixed by the First Consul for a new suspension of arms. He
consented reluctantly to these conditions, and, on the 20th of
September (the 3rd complementary day of the year VIIL), he
concluded a new prolongation of the armistice with general
Lahorie, in the village of Hohenlinden, which was destined so
soon to become celebrated. The fortresses of Philipsburg,
Ulm, and Ingolstadt were to be delivered up to the French
army, to be disposed of as it should think fit. In return, the
armistice was prolonged for forty-five days, reckoning from the
21st of September, including fifteen days' notice of the resump
tion of hostilities, if they were once more to recommence.
The emperor returned to Vienna, dissatisfied with the visit
which be had been induced to pay to the army, for that visit
had been productive of no other result than the surrender to

Sept. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 81
the French of the three strongest fortresses in the Empire.
That prince was overwhelmed with chagrin. His subjects
shared his sentiments, and accused M. de Thugut of being a
complete tool of England. Queen Caroline of Naples had just
arrived with admiral Nelson and lady Hamilton, to support
the war party in Vienna ; but the public clamour was vehement.
M. Thugut was reproached for egregious faults, such as the re
fusal, at the commencement of winter, to listen to the pacific
proposals of the First Consul, the vicious direction of the
military operations, his obstinacy in not admitting the existence
of the army of reserve, even when it was crossing the St. Ber
nard, the concentration of the principal forces of the Empire in
Liguria, with a view to please the English, who flattered them
selves that they should gain possession of Toulon ; lastly, the
engagement entered into with the British government not to
treat without it ; an engagement signed on the 20th of June, at
a moment when he ought, on the contrary, to have preserved
his freedom of action. These reproaches were, in great part,
well founded; but, whether founded or not, they had the
sanction of events ; for nothing had succeeded with M. de
Thugut, and nations judge only from results. M. de Thugut
was, therefore, obliged to yield to circumstances, and retired,
still retaining, however, considerable influence over the Austrian
cabinet. M. de Lherbach was appointed to succeed him, and,
as envoy to the congress of Luneville, instead of M. de
Lherbach, was selected a well-known diplomatist, M. Louis
Cobentzel, who was personally acceptable to general Bonaparte,
and who had negotiated with him the treaty of Campo-Formio.
Hopes were entertained that M. de Cobentzel would prove a
fitter person than any other for establishing amicable relations
with the French government, and that, placed at Luneville, at
some distance from Paris, he would occasionally visit that
capital, to have direct communication with the First Consul.
The delivery to the French army of the three fortresses off
Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philipsburg, took place most seasonably
for the celebration of the fete of the "1st Vendemiaire. It
could not fail to revive the hopes of peace, by furnishing evi
dence of the extremity to which Austria was reduced. This
fete, one of the two which tha Constitution had retained,
was destined to celebrate the anniversary of the foundation of
the Republic. The First Consul determined that it should not
be less pompous than that of the 4th of July, so opportunely
heightened by the presentation to the Invalides of the colours
taken in the last campaign ; he resolved that it should be dis
tinguished by a character as patriotic, but more serious, from all
those which had been given during the course of the Revolu
tion, and, above all, that it should be' exempt from the ridicule
attached to the imitation of ancient customs in modern times.
Religion, it must be confessed, leaves a great void in the

82 HISTORY OF THE [Sept. 1800.
solemnities of rations, when it is excluded from them. Public
games, theatrical representations, and fires, illumining the night
with'their brightness, may occupy, during several hours, the mul
titude assembled to rejoice at any joyful occurrence, but cannot
fill up an entire day. In all ages, nations have been disposed to
celebrate their victories at the foot of their altars, and they have
converted their public ceremonies into an act of thanksgiving to
the Deity. But altars France then had none. Those which had
been erected to the goddess of Reason, during the reign of Terror,
those which the Theophilanthropists innocently strewed with
flowers, during the licentious system of the Directory, were
covered with a ridicule never to be effaced ; for, in regard to
altars, none are respectable but those which are ancient. Now,
the old Catholic altar of France had not yet been restored.
Nothing, consequently, was left but ceremonies in some sort
academic, beneath the dome of the Invalides ; elegant discourses,
such as M. de Fontanes could deliver; or patriotic airs, such
as a Mehul or a Lesueur could compose. The First Consul,
sensible of all this, sought, therefore, to supply the place of the
religious feature by a profoundly moral feature.
The homage to Washington, the presentation of the colours
taken at Marengo, had already supplied materials for the two
fetes celebrated during his consulship; he contrived to find,
in a great reparative act, the subject matter of the fete of the
1st of Vendemiaire, year IX. (23rd September, 1800.)
At the time of the violation of the tombs at St. Denis, the
body of Turenne had been found in perfect preservation.
Amidst the excesses of the populace, an involuntary feeling of
respect had saved these remains from the general profanation.
Deposited at first in the Jardin des Plantes, they had afterwards
been consigned to the care of M. Alexandre Lenoir, a man,
whose pious zeal, worthy of being recorded in history, had
preserved for us a multitude of ancient monuments, which he
had collected in the museum of the Petits Augustins. There
lay these remains of Turenne, exposed to the curiosity, rather
than to the respect, of 'visiters. The First Consul conceived the
idea of depositing the relics of this great man beneath the dome
of the Invalides, and under the guard of our country's veterans.
S'o glorify an illustrious general and a servant of the ancient mo-
archy, was reconciling the glories of Louis XIV. with those of
the Republic ; it was re-establishing respect for the past, without
offending the present ; it was, in short, the whole policy of the
First Consul, under the noblest and the most touching form.
This removal was to take place on the last complementary day of
the year VIII. (22nd of September), and, on the following day,
the first stone of the monument to Kleber and Desaix was to
be laid. Thus, at the moment, when our earth, in obedience to
the laws wliich govern its motions, was completing one great
century, and giving birth to another, (no less famous in its turn,

Sept. 1800,] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 83
if it prove one day worthy of its commencement), at this mo
ment, the First Consul resolved to pay a joint homage to the-i
hero of past times and to the twin heroes of the present timeJ
To render these two ceremonies the more striking, he imitated l
in some points what had been practised at the Federation of J
1790, and desired all the departments to send to him repre
sentatives, who, by their presence, should give to. these fetes
not merely a Parisian, but a national character. The depart
ments cordially responded to this appeal, and chose distinguished
citizens, whom curiosity, a desire to see, with thj&r own eyes,
disorder succeeded by tranquillity, the miseries of anarchy by
prosperity, and the desire especially to approach and to converse
with a great man, drew in great numbers to Paris.
On the fifth complementary day, in the year VIII. (Sep
tember 22nd), the public authorities repaired to the museum of
the Petits Augustins, to fetch the car on which was laid the
body of Turenne. On this car, drawn by {four white horses,
was placed the sword of the hero of the monarchy, preserved in
the family of Bouillon, and lent to the government for that
noble ceremony. Four old generals, mutilated in the service of
the Republic, held the slips of the car ; it was preceded by
a pie-balled horse, like one which Turenne frequently rode,
harnessed as horses were in his time, led by a Black, and offer
ing an accurate representation of some scenes from the age
to which this homage was paid. Around the car marched the
invalids, followed by some of those fine troops which had just
returned from the banks of the Po and of the Danube. This
extraordinary and noble procession passed through Paris,
amidst an immense concourse, and proceeded to the Invalides,
where the First Consul awaited it, surrounded by the envoys of
the departments, both those of the old France of Louis XIV.,
and those of new France ; these latter representing Belgium
and Luxemburg, the Rhenish provinces, Savoy, and the county
of Nice. The precious relique borne by this train was placed
under the dome. Carnot, minister of war, delivered a simple
and suitable address, and, while music of a solemn kind, pealed
through the vaulted edifice, the body of Turenne was deposited
beneath the monument where it now reposes and where it was
soon to be rejoined by his companion in glory, the illustrious
and virtuous Vauban ; where he was destined to be joined one
day by the author of the great things which we are here relating;
where he will certainly remain, surrounded by this august com
pany, throughout the ages which Heaven may reserve for France.
If, in times like ours, when faith is quenched, any thing can
supply its place and equal, perhaps, the pomp of religion, it is
such spectacles.
On the -evening of that day, a gratuitous representation of
the Tartuffe and the Cid was given to the people of the capital,
with a view to afford them an amusement less coarse than usual.
G2

84 HISTORY OF THE [Sept. 1800.
The First Consul attended the performance. His presence,
his intention, instinctively guessed by that impressible and in
telligent populace, all concurred to maintain, in that tumultuous
assemblage, perfect decorum, a very unusual thing at gratuitous
representations. The silence was interrupted only by cries, a
thousand times repeated, of " Vive la Republique ! Vive le general
Bonaparte I"
On the following day, the First Consul, accompanied, as on
the preceding, by the public authorities and the envoys of the
departments, repaired to the Place des Victoires. There was to
be raised a monument in the Egyptian style, destined to receive
the mortal remains of Kleber and Desaix, who, according to
the intention of the First Consul, were to rest side by side.
He laid the first stone, and then proceeded on horseback to the
Invalides. There the minister of the interior, who was his
brother Lucien, delivered a speech on the state of the Republic,
which made a strong impression. Certain passages were highly
applauded, among others, the following, relative to the present
age and the age of Louis XIV.: " One might say, that at this
moment those two great ages have met to express mutual ad
miration over that august tomb." The speaker, while pro
nouncing these words, pointed to the tomb of Turenne. He was
answered by unanimous applause, proving that all hearts, with
out derogating from the present, were willing to take again from
the past what deserved reviving. And, that the spectacle might
be complete, that the ordinary illusions of human nature might
have their share in these scenes, otherwise so noble, the orator
further exclaimed : " Happy the generation which sees a revo
lution begun under monarchy terminate in a republic !"
During this ceremony, the First Consul had received a tele
graphic despatch, announcing the armistice of Hohenlinden and
the cession of the three fortresses of Philipsburg, Ulm, and
Ingolstadt. He sent his brother Lucien a note, which was read
to those present, and greeted with greater applause than the
academic harangue of the minister of the interior. Notwith
standing the respect due to the place, shouts of " Vive Bonaparte!
Vive la Republique!" shook the vaults of the noble edifice. An
immediate publication of the news in Paris produced a more
profound satisfaction than all the rejoicings destined for the
amusement of the multitude. People were not afraid of war;
they were full of confidence in the genius of the First Consul
and in the courage of the French armies, if it must be con
tinued : but, after so many battles, after so many troubles, they
wished to enjoy in peace the glory acquired and the prosperity
that was beginning to dawn.
That prosperity was, indeed, making rapid advances. If the
mere presence of general Bonaparte had sufficed, on the 18th of
Brumaire, to soothe, to cheer men's minds, to revive their
hopes, the case *n»?t be verv different now. when the successes

Sept.T800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 85
of our armies, the eager advances made by Europe towards us,
the prospect of a speedy and a glorious peace, and lastly, tran
quillity everywhere restored, had realised the hopes conceived
in a first moment of confidence.
These hopes had, in fact, become realities, and it may be said
that, in the ten months past, from November, 1799, to Septem
ber, 1800, the face of France was changed. The public funds,
the vulgar but true index to the state of public opinion, had
risen from twelve francs (the real price at which five per cent.
stock was sold the day before the 18th of Brumaire) to forty
francs. They promised to reach fifty.
The stockholders had just received a half-year's dividend in
cash, a thing which had not occurred since the commence
ment of our Revolution. This financial phenomenon had pro
duced a great effect, and it appeared to be not one of the least
of the victories of the First Consul. How had he been able to
accomplish this prodigy ? This was an enigma which the mass
of the public explained by that extraordinary power, which he
was already said to possess, of doing whatever he pleased.
But there is no miracle in this world: there is no other cause
for real successes but sound sense seconded by a strong will.
Such too was the sole cause of the happy results obtained by
the administration of the First Consul. He had, "in the first
place, applied a remedy to the real evil, which consisted in the
delays in the collection of the taxes : he had, with this viewT*
instituted a special agency for the preparation of the assessments^"
formerly left too complaisantly to the communes. This special
agency, stimulated by the prefects, another creation of the con
sular government, had made out the assessments in arrear of
the year VII. and the year VIII. and finished those for the
year IX., the year just entered upon (September, 1800, to
September, 1801). Thus, for the first time since the Re
volution, the assessments of the current year were about to be
put into a train of collection, from the very first clay of that
year. The receivers-general, having the revenue paid to them
punctually, were thus enabled to discharge punctually the
monthly bills which they had accepted, and had, in fact,
always paid them at the end of every month. We have already
said that, to guarantee the solidity of these bills, the Treasury
had required of the receivers a security in cash, which security,
deposited in the Sinking Fund, was to serve to retire such bills
as might be protested. Out of the 20,000,000 composing the
total amount of the securities, not more than 1,000,000 had
been required for the payment of dishonoured bills. Hence
they had obtained immediately a character equal to that of the
best commercial paper. At first, they could not be discounted
below three-fourths per cent, per month, that is, nine per cent.
per annum; now, persons were willing to discount them at eight,
and even at seven. This was a very moderate rate, especially

86 HISTORY OF THE [Sept. 1800.
in comparison with that which the government had hitherto
been obliged to pay.' Now, as the direct contributions in a
total budget of 500,000,000 amounted to about 300,000,000,
the Treasury had, from the first day of that year's account, had
in its hands the 300,000,000 in assets easy to be realised.
Instead of receiving nothing, or nearly nothing, as formerly,
and receiving but tardily the little that was paid in, it had, from
the very 1st of Vendemiaire, the greater part of the public
revenue at its disposal. Such had been the result of the pre
paration of the assessments in proper time, and of that system
of bills of exchange drawn, by the name of obligations, on the
chests of the receivers-general : by depriving the latter of the pre
text of delay in their receipts, the government had been enabled!
to impose upon them the condition of paying on a fixed day.
The year VIII. which had just closed (September, 1799, to
September, 1800), had not been so easily provided for as the
year IX. promised to be. It had been necessary to withdraw
all the papers previously issued, bons d'arrerage, bons de requisi
tion, delegations, &c. These papers had been withdrawn either
by the discharge of anterior contributions, or by means of
certain arrangements entered into with the holders. The reve
nue of the year VIII. had consequently been diminished) by
so much, and there had resulted a deficit on that year's
account. But, the victories of our armies having carried them
into the enemy's country, the Treasury was immediately re
lieved from the burden of their subsistence; and, with some
national domains, which began to fetch advantageous prices, the
deficit of that year might afterwards be covered. No more
bons d'arrerage had been issued, for the stockholders were in
future to be paid in cash ; no more bons de requisition, for the
armies were supported either by the French treasury, or by some
foreign treasury; lastly, no more delegations, for, as we have
elsewhere related, the First Consul had adopted an invariable
system in regard to persons having claims upon the State : he
either gave them nothing or cash ; and in cash he already gave
them more than the preceding governments. Every week he
held a council of finances : at this council he required a state
ment of the resources, and another of the wants, of each
ministerial department, to be laid before him, selecting the most
urgent of those wants, and dividing among them the resources
which were sure to come in, but nothing more. With this
regularity, this firmness of conduct, there was no further neces
sity for issuing paper; and, throwing no fictitious stock into
circulation, the government had ceased to have any to redeem.
The receipts of the Treasury, during the year IX., were there
fore sure to be in specie.
The pubhc dividends had been paid by the Bank of France.
This Bank had existed for only six months, and it was already
able to issue notes to a considerable amount, which were taken

Sept. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 87
by the public as readily as cash. The wants of trade and
the conduct of the government towards the new establishment,
had occasioned this rapid success. The way in which the thing
was done was this. Out of the securities in cash, a million, at
most, had been sufficient to support the credit of the obligations.
The rest . had been left unemployed ; and, strong as was the
temptation to employ the 18,000,000 or 19,000,000 remaining
to satisfy wants, all of which were urgent, the government had
not hesitated to impose upon itself the severest privations, in
order to devote 5,000,000 to the purchase of Bank shares, the
amount of which it had paid immediately. It had not stopped
there, but had deposited with it in account current the surplus
of the disposable funds. An account current is composed of
sums which are paid in on condition that they can be drawn out
at pleasure, according to the wants of each day. Having all at
once such resources at its disposal, the Bank had lost no time
in discounting, in issuing notes, which, always paid in money, if
the holders so desired, had acquired in a few months the
value of cash. All this may now appear ordinary enough ; for we
see this phenomenon in every small town operating in the easiest
manner, and a great number of banks prospering from the very
day of their foundation. But, at that time, after so many bank
ruptcies, after the aversion which the assignats had excited for,
paper, it was a sort of commercial prodigy, wrought by a go
vernment, which, of all sentiments, particularly inspired tha
of confidence.
The Treasury then resolved to entrust the Bank with various
services advantageous for itself and for the State, especially that
of paying the rentes. It did this by means of a perfectly simple
process. The acceptances of the receivers-general were as good
as bills of exchange. The Treasury, therefore, offered the Bank
these bills to the amount of about 20,000,000 for discount ; an
operation highly advantageous to it, for discount was at six or
seven per cent, and an operation perfectly safe, as these accep
tances had acquired an unexceptionable character. The Bank
then undertook the payment of six months dividend to the stock
holders, who received from it either cash or notes, at their option.
Thus, in a few months, the government had, by submitting
to privations, already raised itself a powerful instrument, which,
for an aid of 10,000,000 or 12,000,000 that it had received for
the moment, could now render it services to the amount of
hundreds of millions.
Financial prosperity, therefore, revived on all sides. The
only sensible depression amidst the general well-being was the
depression of landed property. In the height of our troubles,
the proprietors of land or of houses had enjoyed the advantage
of paying no taxes, owing to the delay in making out the assess
ments, or in paying next to nothing, thanks to the assignats.
It was now otherwise. They were now obliged to pay,first. the

1

88 HISTORY OF THE [Sept. 1800.
arrears, next the current assessments, and the whole in cash.
For small proprietors, the burden was heavy. Allowance had
at first been made for 5,000,000 of non-available assets in the
budget, with the intention of exempting the tax-payers who were
too hardly pressed ; it was found necessary to devote to the same
object a much larger sum. It was a kind of profit and loss
account opened with the tax-payers, by the operation of which
the past was forgiven them, in order that punctual payment of
the present might be obtained. Landed property alone cannot
support in a State all the public burdens. These must partly be
met by excise, and other duties on articles of consumption. The
Revolution, by abolishing the taxes on liquors, on salt, and on
other articles, had closed one of the two necessary sources of the
public wealth. Time had not yet opened it again. This was one
of the glories destined at a later period for the restorer of order
and of society in France. But he had first a great many pre
judices to overcome. By establishing octrois at the gates of
towns to provide for the wants of the hospitals, he had made
a first useful experiment, and which accustomed people to the
resumption of a measure, sooner or later indispensable.
Though landed property was for a moment heavily burdened,
a general feeling of ease was, nevertheless, diffused among all
classes. In all parts people felt themselves regenerated, and
they found within them courage for speculation and exertion.
But there was much more to be done in that convulsed
society, to restore every thing, not to a perfect state, such as
one might aspire to in time, but merely to a state that was en
durable. We have just seen what required to be done for the
finances : there was another service quite as important and quite
as much disorganised as that of the finances, namely, that of the
n-oads. They had become almost impassable. As every body
knows, not a few years' but a few months' neglect is sufficient
to change into a quagmire the artificial strata which men make
upon the earth, for the transport of heavy loads. Now, it was
nearly ten years, since the roads in France were left almost with
out repairs. Under the old government, their repair was pro
vided for by corvees, and since the Revolution by means of a sum
which figured in the general budget, but had not been paid
more punctually than the sums destined for other services. The
Directory, seeing how things stood, had been led to the idea of
a special resource, which could not be misapplied, and which
could never ran short : and, to attain this end, it had established
a toll for keeping up the roads and erected gates for collecting
it. This toll had been farmed to the contractors for the roads
themselves, who, negligently superintended, defrauded both in
the collection of the toll and in the application of the produce
of it. Besides, it was insufficient. It yielded at most 13,000,000
or 14,000,000 per annum, and 30,000,000 would have been
required. In the three years VI., VII., and VIII. no more

Sept. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 89
than 32,000,000 had been expended on the roads, and it would
have required at least 100,000,000 to remedy the ravages which
time had made, and to provide for their annual repair.
The First Consul, adjourning the adoption of a complete
system, had recourse to the simplest expedient, that of apply
ing the general funds of the State to the succour of this im
portant service. He continued the toll, the mode of levying
it, and its application, confining himself to a stricter superin
tendence, and gave immediately 12,000,000 upon the year IX.,
a considerable sum for that time. This sum was to serve for
the repair of the principal high roads running from the centre
to the extremities of the Republic, from Paris to Lille, from
Paris to Strasburg, from Paris to Marseilles, from Paris to Bor
deaux, and from Paris to Brest. He proposed to lay out after
wards on other roads a similar amount to what he had thus de
voted to them, to augment this grant in proportion to the improved
circumstances of the Treasury, at the same time continuing the
toll, till the roads of France were restored to the state in which
those of every civilised country ought to be.
The canals of St. Quentin and the Ourcq commenced towards
the end of the old government, exhibited everywhere the ap
pearance of ditches half filled up, of hills half cut through, of
ruins, in short, rather than works of art. He immediately sent
engineers to survey them, went thither himself, and ordered de
finitive plans, with the intention of signalising by works of great'
pubhc utility the first moments of the speedily expected peace. (
It was not merely the wretched state of the roads which ren
dered them unfit for travelling, but also the robbers by whom
they were infested in a great number of provinces. The Chou
ans, and the Vendeans, unemployed ever since the termination of
N the civil war, and having contracted habits of life incompatible
with peace, pursued the trade of plunder on the high roads of
Bretagne, Normandy, and the environs of Paris. Refractory
persons running away from the conscription, and some soldiers
of the army of Liguria, impelled by .privations to desert, were
committing the like depredations on the roads of the centre and
of the south. Georges Cadoudal, who had returned from Eng
land with plenty of money, and was now concealed in the Mor-
bihan, secretly directed this new chouannerie. Numerous move
able columns, accompanied by military commissions, were
requisite to suppress thig^dTsoroer. The First Consul had
already formed some ot these columns, but he had not sufficient
troops. While the Directory had kept too many troops at
home, he had kept too few. But he said to himself, most
justly, that, when he had beaten the enemies abroad, he should
soon put down those at home. " Have patience," he replied to
those who spoke to him in alarm about this kind of disorder ;
" give me a month or two ; by that time I shall have conquered
peace, and then I will do speedy and complete justice upon

90 HISTORY OF THE [Sept.. 1800.
those highwaymen." Thus, in every point of view, peace was
then the indispensable condition of well-being. Meanwhile, how
ever, he applied-himself to remedy the most urgent disorders.
>We have already related that he had consented to substitute
for the oath formerly required of priests a mere promise of obe
dience to the laws, which could not offend their consciences in
any way. They had immediately availed themselves of this in
great numbers, and the clerical functions were at once disputed
by the constitutional priests, who had taken the oath to the civil
constitution of the clergy, the nonjuring priests, who had given
only a promise of obedience to the laws, and, lastly, those who
had neither taken the oath nor given the promise. The priests
belonging to the first two classes were competitors with one
another for obtaining the churches, which were granted to them
with more or less facility, according to the extremely variable
humour of the local authorities. Those who had refused any sort
of declaration, performed the ceremonies of religion clandestinely
in private houses, and were held by many stanch Catholics to be
its only true ministers. Lastly, to add to the confusion, there
were the Theophilanthropists, who also made use of the Catholic
churches, and on certain days deposited flowers on those altars,
at which the priests had been saying mass. These ridiculous sec
taries held festivals in honour of all the virtues, of courage, tem
perance, charity, &c. On All Saints' day, for example, they
celebrated a festival in honour of ancestors. In the eye of
strict Catholics this was a profanation of the religious edifices ;
and sound sense and the respect due to the dominant creeds
commanded that it should be done away with.
For putting an end to this chaos, an agreement with the Holy
See was requisite ; an agreement by means of which those who
had taken the oath, those who had given the promise, and those
who had refused both, might be reconciled together. But Mon
signor Spina, envoy of the Holy See, had but just arrived at
Paris, and, surprised to find himself there, kept out of every
body's sight. The subject to be discussed was as delicate for
him as for the government. The First Consul, discerning with
extraordinary tact the characters of men and the employment
for which they were fitted, had opposed to this wily Italian the
person most capable of coping with him, namely, the Abbe
Bernier, who, after having long directed La Vendee, had at
length reconciled it with the government. He had brought him
to Paris, attached him to himself by the most honourable of all
ties, the desire to contribute to the public welfare, and to share
the honour of doing so. To the Abbe Bernier to re-establish a
good understanding between France and the Romish Church
was like continuing and completing the pacification of La Ven
dee. The interviews with Monsignor Spina had but just begun,
and the government could not promise itself an immediate result.
It was of importance to come to as speedy an arrangement of

Sept. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 91
religious affairs as possible ; for peace with the Holy See was
not less desirable for the quiet of people's minds than peace
with the great powers of Europe. But, meanwhile, there was
a multitude of irregularities, either mischievous or singular,
against which the First Consul strove to provide in the best
possible manner by consular ordinances. He had already, by'
his ordinance of the 7th Nivose,. year VIII. (28th of December,
1799), forbidden the local authorities, frequently favourable to
the priests, to thwart them in the exercise of their religion. Hav
ing charge of the religious edifices, as we have elsewhere observed,
they would frequently not allow the priests the use of them on
Sundays, but only on Decadis, alleging that the Decadi was the
only holiday recognised by the laws of the Republic. The or
dinance referred to above. had provided for this difficulty, by
enjoining the local authorities to give up the edifices for public
worship to the priests on the days indicated by each persua
sion. But this ordinance had not smoothed all the difficulties
relative to Sundays and Decadis. On this point the laws and
manners were at variance, a variance which it is necessary to j
explain, in order to convey an idea of the state of French society ',
at that period.
The Revolution, in its passionate fondness for uniformity and
symmetry, had not confined itself to the introduction of unifor
mity into all measures of length, superfices, and weight, and to the
reduction of them to natural and immutable unities, such as a
fraction of the meridian, or the specific gravity of distilled water;
it had aimed at introducing the same regularity into the measure
of time. It had therefore divided the year into) twelve equal
months, of thirty days each, completing it by the ingenious in
vention of five complementary days. It had divided the months.
into three decades, or w:eeks.of ten days each, reduced in this
manner the days of rest to three per month, and substituted for
the four Sundays of the Gregorian calendar the three decadis of
the republican calendar. Most assuredly, in all mathematical
points of view, this latter calendar was far better than the old one ;
but it offended religious ideas ; it was not that of the generality of
mankind, that of history ; it could not overcome inveterate habits.
The metrical system, after forty years' efforts and legislative
restrictions, and notwithstanding its incontestable commercial
advantages, has scarcely yet been definitively adopted : how
then could there be any hope of supporting the republican ca
lendar against a custom of twenty centuries, against universal
usage, against the power of religion 7 When we reform, we
must be content to reform for the purpose of applying a remedy
to real sufferings, of re-establishing justice where it is wanting
but to reform for the pleasure of the eye or of the mind, for th
purpose of putting a straight line where there is none, is re
quiring too much of human nature. You may form at pleeT
sure the habits of a child ; you cannot remould those of al

92 HISTORY OF THE [Oct. 1800.
grown man. It is the same with nations : you cannot alter
the habits of a people after an existence of fifteen centuries.
Accordingly, Sunday was again observed in all quarters. In
certain towns, the shops were closed on Sundays, in others on
Decadis ; frequently in the same town, in the same street, the
contrast existed, and exhibited the spectacle of a mischievous
conflict of ideas and manners. For the rest, Sunday would
have prevailed everywhere, but for the intervention of certain
authorities. The First Consul, by a new ordinance of the 7th
Thermidor, year VIII. (July 26th, 1800), decided that every
one should be at liberty to keep holiday when he pleased, to
adopt for a day of rest the day most conformable with his tastes
or his religious opinions ; and that the public officers, bound to
adhere to the legal calendar, should alone be obliged to choose
the Decadi for the suspension of their labours. This was en
suring the triumph of Sunday.
The First Consul acted judiciously in encouraging the return
to an ancient and general habit, most judiciously, if he designed
*\re-establishing the Catholic religion, as he really did design, and
with good reason, to do.
The emigrants again engaged his attention. We have already
adverted to their eagerness to return ever since the very first
days of the Consulate : this eagerness had kept increasing, on
observing what repose France enjoyed, in what security all the
inhabitants of its territory lived. But, desirous as the govern
ment was to put an end to the proscription launched against them,
it was yet necessary, while putting down one disorder, and pro
scription is one, to avoid falling into another, for a precipitate
reaction is a disorder too, and of the most serious nature. These
returned emigrants found on their estates either old denouncers,
who had contributed to persecute them, or purchasers who had
obtained possession of their property with paper : to both these
classes they were disquieting enemies, or at least troublesome
neighbours; and they were not discreet enough not to abuse
the clemency shown to them by the government.
They availed themselves with alacrity of the law passed a few
months before, which declared that the list of the emigrants was
closed. Those who had been omitted in this list lost no time
in profiting by the clause respecting them. As they could no
longer be inscribed but by the authority of the ordinary tribu
nals, which constituted but an inconsiderable danger for them,
they lived in quiet, and had almost all returned. Those who
had been entered in the list, and whom the law referred to the
administrative authorities to claim their erasure, took advantage
of the spirit of the times to get their names erased. They ap
plied, in the first instance, for surveillances, that is, as we have
already explained, the faculty of returning for a time under the
superintendence of the political police; they then obtained, from
friends, or from complaisant persons, false certificates, attesting

Oct. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 93
that they had not quitted France during the reign of Terror;
that they had only kept concealed to save themselves from the
scaffold ; and in this manner they obtained their erasure with
incredible facility. The list drawn up formerly by the local
authorities, with the recklessness of persecution, comprehended
145,000 persons, and formed nine volumes. Now, names
were erased with as much recklessness as they had before
been inscribed, and the emigrants were reinstated by thousands
in all their rights. Some, whose properties had not yet been
sold, applied to the members of the government to get the
sequestration taken off; they solicited, according to custom, the
men whom they abused the day before, whom they would again
abuse on the morrow, and frequently madame Bonaparte herself,
who had formerly been connected with the French noblesse, in
consequence of the rank which she held in society. If the
emigrants, whose estates were not sold, recovered them at the
price of abject solicitations followed by ingratitude, there was
no great mischief in that ; but those whose property had been
alienated went into the provinces, addressed themselves to the
new proprietors, and often, by dint of threats, importunities, or
religious suggestions at the pillow of the dying, recovered their
family possessions at a low price, by means not much more credit
able than those by which they had been despoiled of them.
The tumult was at this, moment so general as to attract the
attention of the First Consul. He wished to redress the wrongs
done by the Revolution, but above all he wished to avoid
alarming any of the interests which it had created, and which had
become legitimate with time. In consequence, he thought it
right to adopt a measure, which was only part of what he did at a
later period, but which introduced some order into that chaos of
claims, of precipitate returns, and of dangerous attempts. After
mature deliberation in the Council of State, the following
ordinance was issued on the 20th of October, 1800 (28th Ven
demiaire, year IX.).
In the first place, all those previously erased, no matter by
what authority, or with what negligence the proceedings in re
gard to them had been conducted, were validly withdrawn from
the list of emigrants. Certain collective inscriptions, under
the designation of children or heirs of emigrants, were consi
dered as not having taken place. Women, under the authority
of husbands when they quitted France, minors under the age of
sixteen years, priests who left the country in obedience to the
laws of banishment, persons comprehended under the head of day-
labourers, workmen, artisans, or domestic servants; the absent,
whose absence was anterior to the Revolution, the Knights of
Malta, residing in Malta during our troubles, were all definitively
erased. The names of the victims who had perished on the,
scaffold were also withdrawn from the list : this was a reparation
due to their. families and to humanity. These modifications

94 HISTORY OF THE [Oct. 1800.
made, those were kept upon the list without exception who had
borne arms against France, those who held offices in the civil
or military household of the exiled princes, those who had
received rank or title from foreign governments, without the
authorisation of the French government. The minister of jus
tice was to appoint nine commissioners, the minister of police
a like number; to these eighteen commissioners the First
Consul was to add nine councillors of State; these twenty-seven
persons collectively were charged to make out the new list of
emigrants upon the bases indicated. The emigrants definitively
erased were obliged to make a promise of fidelity to the Consti
tution, if they wished to remain in the country, or to obtain the
removal of the sequestration from their unsold property. They
were condemned to remain under the surveillance of the political
police till a year after the conclusion of a general peace. This
precaution was designed for the protection of the purchasers of
national domains. As for the emigrants definitively kept upon
•the list, nothing could for the present be enacted relative to
them : what concerned them was deferred to a later period.
Under existing circumstances, this ordinance comprehended
all that could most reasonably be done ; it retrenched from the
proscription list the great mass of the inscribed ; it reduced that
fist to a small number of the declared enemies of the Revolution,
and postponed the decision of the fate of all such to a future
period. Thus, when the Republic should be definitively victorious
over Europe, universally recognised, solidly established, when
the firm determination of the First Consul to protect the pur
chasers of national domains should have sufficiently dispelled
their alarms, the government would probably be able to com
plete that act of clemency, and at length recall all the proscribed,
even those who had been traitors to France. For the moment
it went no further than to cut several embarrassing questions
and to put an end to many intrigues.
We see what difficulties of all kinds that government had to
surmount, to restore order in a subverted society, to be clement
and just towards the one, without alarming or being unjust
towards others. But toilsome as were its labours, they found
their reward in the plaudits, it may be said, of the entire
country. In the first days which succeeded the 18th Bru
maire, people had thrown themselves into the arms of general
Bonaparte, because they sought force, whatever it might be ;
and because, from the acts of the young general in Italy,
they hoped that this force would be enlisted into the service of
sound sense and justice. A single doubt was then felt, and some
what diminished the eagerness to give themselves up to him.
Will he keep his place longer than the governments which pre
ceded him ? Will he understand how to govern so well as he
did how to fight ? Will he put an end to the troubles, the per
secutions ? Will he be of such or such a party ? The eleven

Oct. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 95
or twelve past months had effectually dispelled these doubts.
His power was gaining strength from hour to hour ; since Ma
rengo, especially, France and Europe bowed under his ascen
dency. As for his political talents, there was but one voice on
that subject among those who approached him ; he was, at
least, as great a statesman as he was a commander. As for the
tendency of his government, that was as evident as his genius.
He was of that moderate party which deprecated persecution of
every kind, which, disposed to annul some of the things" which
•the Revolution had done, was not for annulling all, but, on the
contrary, was determined to uphold its principal results. These
doubts removed, people rallied around him with the eagerness
of joy and gratitude.
In all parties there are two sets.of persons ; the one numerous,
and honest, whom a man may bring over to himself by, realising
the wishes of the country ; the Other, small in number, stubborn
and factious, which, far from contenting, you deeply mortify by
realising those wishes, because you deprive it of its grievances.
With the exception of this latter class, all the parties were
satisfied, and lent freely tlieir support to the First Consul, or
resigned themselves, at least, to his government, if their cause
was irreconcileable with his, as the royalists, for example. The
patriots of '89, and ten years before these comprised 'nearly all
France, the patriots of '89, at first hurried on by enthusiasm to
wards the Revolution, soon borne back at the sight of the bloody
scaffold, now disposed to think that they had been mistaken on
almost every thing, conceived that they had at length found, under
the consular government, all that was possible to be realised in
their wishes. ^Tbe abolition of the feudal system, civil equality,
a certain intervention of the country in its affairs, no great deal
of liberty, but much order, the triumphant position of France in
Europe — all this, very different, it is true, from what they had
at first wished for, but now sufficient in their estimation, all this
seemed ensured to their^ M. de la Fayette, who, in many re
spects, resembled tho*Se men, excepting that he was less con
vinced — M. de la Fayet$, released from the dungeons of
Olmiitz, through an act of the First Consul's, proved, by his
perfectly disinterested assiduities towards him, the esteem
which he felt for his government and the adhesion of those
who entertained sentiments like his own. As for the more
ardent revolutionists, who, without being attached to the Re
volution from participation in its condemnable excesses, ad
hered to it from conviction and from sentiment — these were
pleased with the First Consul for being the reverse of the Bour
bons and ensuring their definitive exclusion. The purchasers
of national domains, though looking black at times, on account
of his indulgence towards the emigrants, had no doubt of his
resolution to uphold the inviolability of the new properties, and
clung to him as to an invincible sword, that secured them from

96 HISTORY OF THE [Oct. 1800.
the only real danger with which they were threatened, the
triumph of the Bourbons and the emigrants by means of the
arms of Europe.
As for that timid and well-disposed portion of the royalist party,
which sought, above all, to be relieved from all further dread of
the scaffold, exile, or confiscation, which, for the first time for ten
years past, began not to have them before its eyes, it was
almost happy, for, with it, to have nothing to fear was almost
happiness." All that the First Consul did not yet grant, it
finally anticipated from him, if I may so express myself. To
see the people in their workshops, the tradesmen at their
counters, the nobility in the government, the priests at the
altar, the Bourbons in the Tuileries, and general Bonaparte at
their side, in the highest station imaginable for a subject, would
have been to these royalists perfection. Of these things there
were three or four, which already they clearly discerned in the
acts and plans of the First Consul. As for the last, that of
seeing the Bourbons again in the Tuileries, they were disposed,
in their good-natured credulity, to expect it of him, as one of
the miracles of his astounding genius ; and, if the difficulty of
believing that a man would thus give up to others a crown
which he held in his hand staggered those possessed of some
perspicacity, their resolution was soon taken. "Lethimmake him
self king," said they, "butlet him save us,for monarchy alone can
save us !" A great man, in default of a legitimate prince, seemed
acceptable to them ; but a king they must have at any rate.
Thus, by ensuring to the patriots of '89 civil equality ; to the
purchasers of the national domains, to the stanchest patriots,
the exclusion of the Bourbons ; to the moderate royalists per
sonal safety, the re-establishment of religion ; to all, order,
justice, national greatness, he had won the honest and disin
terested mass of all the parties.
There was still, what there always is, the implacable portion
of these parties, that which Time never changes but by con
signing it to the grave. Those who compose it are, in general,
the most conscientious, or the most guilty of men, and these
are always last upon the breach.
The men who, in the course of the Revolution, had imbrued
their hands in blood, or signalised themselves by excesses
which it was impossible to forget; others who, though they had
nothing wherewith to reproach themselves, had been hurried
into demagogue turbulence by the violence of their character or
the turn of their mind; the furious Mountaineers, the few
survivors of the famous Commune, the old Jacobins and Cor
deliers, were irritated in proportion to the success of the new
government. They called the First Consul a tyrant, who
meant to effect a complete counter-revolution in France, to
abolish liberty, to bring back the emigrants, the priests, and
even the Bourbons, to make himself their base servant. Others,

Oct. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 97
less blinded by anger, said that he designed to make himself
tyrant for his own aggrandisement, to stifle liberty for his own
advantage. He was a Caesar who ought to fall under the dagger
of a Brutus. They talked of daggers, but did nothing but talk
of them; for the energy of these men, greatly exhausted by ten
years' excesses, began to turn into violence of language. We
shall soon see, in fact, that it was not in their ranks that resolute
assassins were likely to be found. The police was incessantly
at their heels, penetrating into their clandestine meetings, watch
ing them with incessant attention. There were some who
wanted nothing but bread Ci^e First Consul, by the advice of
Fouche, the minister, cheerfully supplied them with it, or, if
they were fit for any thing, he did better, he gave them employ
ment. They then became, according to the account of the others,
nothing but wretches sold to the tyrant. If even there were
any, who, from sheer fatigue, became a little more calm, as was
at this time the case with some notorious personages, such as
Santerre, and several others, they were immediately branded
with the appellation of hirelings. According to the custom of
parties, these incorrigible demagogues sought, among the real
or supposed discontented men of the day, the imaginary hero
who was to realise their dreams. It is not known from what
indications Moreau had appeared to them to be jealous of the
. First Consul ; it was, probably, because he had acquired suffi
cient glory to be the second personage in the State. They had
instantly extolled him to the skies. But Moreau had just ar
rived in Paris ; the First Consul had given him a mpst flattering
reception, made him a present of a pair of pistols, enriched
with precious stones, and inscribed with the names of his
victories : he was now nothing but a lackey. Brune, the dema
gogue, at first dear to their hearts, had, by his intelligence, at
tracted the attention of the First Consul, obtained his confi
dence, and been appointed to .the command of the army of
Italy ; he, too, was a lackey. Massena, on the contrary, de
prived rather abruptly of the command of that army, was dis
satisfied, and could scarcely contain himself; he was immediately
declared the future saviour of the Republic, and ought to put
himself at the head of the real patriots. Such was the case
with Carnot, whom they called a royalist of the 18th of Fruc
tidor, whose proscription they then demanded and obtained, and
who, being now deprived of the portfolio of war, again became,
in their estimation, a great- citizen; such was the case with
Lannes, who, it is true, was attached to the First Consul, but
was a decided republican, and at times used extremely violent
language relative to the return of the priests and of the emi
grants ; such was the case with M. Sieyes himself— with M.
Sieyes, odious at first to the republicans for having been the
principal accomplice of the 18th of Brumaire, then the butt of
their raillery, on account of the disappointment with which the
VOL. II. H

98 HISTORY OF THE [Oct. 1800.
First Consul had repaid his services, and by this time almost
a favourite with them, because, dissatisfied with being a cipher,
he showed what he had shown to all the governments — a cold
and disapproving mien. Carnot, Lannes, Sieyes, were to join
Massena to set up the Republic again on the first occasion.
Lastly, what will strikingly illustrate the silly credulity of the
expiring parties, the minister Fouche, one of the two principal
advisers of the First Consul, and who had no object to gain —
the minister Fouche, because he was well acquainted with these
patriots, not afraid of them, and occasionally afforded them
relief, knowing that it was rather tongues which needed silencing,
than hands disarming — the minister Fouche was to join Mas
sena, Carnot, Lannes, and Sieyes, to overthrow the tyrant, and
save the liberties which were menaced.
The royalist faction had, like the revolutionary faction, its
implacable sectaries, equally credulous reasoners, but more for
midable conspirators. These were the great nobles of Versailles,
who had returned, or were about to return, intriguers charged
with the sorry affairs of the Bourbons, going to and fro between
France and foreign countries, to frame childish plots, or to earn
a little money ; lastly, desperadoes, devoted soldiers of Georges,
ready for any crimes.
The first, great nobles, accustomed to talk much, attacked
by words only the First Consul, his family, and his government.
They lived in Paris nearly like foreigners to the country, scarcely
deigning to notice what was passing there, sometimes soliciting
their erasure from the list of emigrants, or the removal of the
sequestration from their unsold property. For this purpose
they frequented Madame Bonaparte's, at least such of them as
had been acquainted with her when she was the wife of M. de
Beauharnais. They went in the morning, never in the evening,
were received in the entresol of the Tuileries, which she had fitted
up for her private apartments, warm solicitors while there, ex
cusing themselves as soon as they had left for having gone
thither, and attributing that step to a strong desire to oblige
unfortunate friends. Madame Bonaparte foolishly found plea
sure in the society of these equivocal visiters; and her husband,
though frequently annoyed by them, nevertheless endured them
out of complaisance to his wife, perhaps, too, from a desire to
know every thing, and to have communications with all parties.
There were few of these solicitors who were not under obliga
tions to the government, either on their own account, or on
account of relations ; but the freedom of their language was not
for this reason at all diminished. All that was done for them
was, in their estimation, no more than their due : they had been
robbed of their possessions, and, if they were restored to them,
this was but a duty, an act of repentance, for which they owed
no gratitude to any one. They jeered at every thing and at
every body, even at the embarrassment of Madame Bonaparte,

Oct. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 9d
who, if she was proud to be the wife of the first man of the age,
seemed almost ashamed of being the wife of the chief of the go
vernment, and who was at once too kind and too weak to crush
them with the legitimate pride which she ought to have felt.
They jeered, we said, at every body, excepting, however, the
First Consul, whom they thought a great general, but a middling
politician, without consistency in his ideas, favouring the Jacobins
one day, the royalists the next, having no will but in war,
because war was his profession, and there too, inferior to Moreau,
in more than one respect. It is true, he had obtained splendid
successes ; that those gentlemen admitted ; thus far every thing
had prospered with him, but how long would that last ? Europe,
indeed, was now incapable of resisting him; but, though con
queror abroad, would he overcome all the difficulties with which
he was surrounded at home ? The finances seemed to improve,
but paper, which had been the ephemeral expedient of all the
revolutionary governments, was also the expedient of his.
Nothing was to be seen but bills of the receivers-general, notes
of the Bank of France, &c. Would not this new paper end
as paper had always ended? The government at this time
did make some sort of shift, because the armies were maintained
by the conquered countries; but at the peace, when they should
return to their own territory, how were they to be provided for ?
Landed property was grievously burdened, and before long those
subject to the taxes neither could nor would pay them. People
talked, it was true, of the satisfaction of certain classes, of priests
and emigrants, who were well treated by the present government;
but that government recalled the emigrants without restoring
their property to them. They were enemies whom it brought
from abroad into the country, and who were in consequence the
more dangerous. It recalled the priests, but without giving
them back their altars. To concede every thing by halves in this
way, was to confer an obligation one day on people who would
not thank you for it the next. Bonaparte, as these royalists
called him, for they never deigned to give him his proper title,
Bonaparte knew not how to do any thing but in an incomplete
manner. He had permitted Sunday to be kept, but he had not
dared to abolish the Decadi, and France, left to herself, had
returned universally to Sunday. This was not the only an
cient custom to which she would return, as soon as an example
was set or liberty given. Bonaparte, by re-establishing, now
this, then that, was himself commencing a counter-revolution,
which would soon hurry him further than he meant to go.
Since he was about reviving so much of the past, would he go the
length of restoring the monarchy, and even of restoring it for
himself, by making himself king or emperor? — if so, he would
only render the counter-revolution more certain, by undertaking
to effect it with his own hands. On this restored throne there
would very soon be wanted those princes who alone were worthy
H 2

100 HISTORY OF THE [Oct. 1800.
to fill it; and, in re-establishing the institution, he would have
re-established it for the Bourbons.*
It frequently happens that hatred guesses right, because it
takes delight in imputing faults, than which nothing is more predi
cate of human conduct. Only, in its restless impatience, it
outstrips time. These 'shallow tattlers knew not how near
they came to the truth ; neither did they know that, before
their predictions were accomplished, it was decreed that the
world should be convulsed for fifteen years, it was decreed that
the man of whom they thus spoke should have achieved
sublime things, committed prodigious faults, and that, ere the
catastrophe arrived, they should have time to belie them
selves, to abjure their cause, to forsake the only legitimate princes
in their estimation, to serve this ephemeral master, to serve and
to adore him ; they knew not that, if France should one day
return to the feet of the Bourbons, she would approach them as
if thrown by the tempest to the foot of a time-honoured tree, but
thrown thither only for a moment.
In a lower sphere conspired otherwise than by words the
intriguers in the service of the Bourbons, and lower still, but
more dangerously, the agents of Georges, with their hands full
of money supplied by England. Georges, ever since his return
from London, was in the Morbihan, concealing himself from
observation, acting the part of a man who retires in resignation
to some rural retreat, but implacable in reality, having sworn in
his heart, having sworn to the Bourbons, to perish or to destroy
the First Consul. To attack in open fight the grenadiers of the
consular guard would be hopeless ; still there were among the
Chouans arms quite ready to have recourse to the last expedient
of vanquished parties, that is to assassination. Among them
might be found a band ready for any thing, for the blackest
crimes as well as the rashest attempts. Georges, still undecided
as to the moment and the place which ought to be chosen, kept
them to their purpose, communicating with them through trusty
persons, giving up to them the high roads for their subsistence,
or part of the money received in profusion from the British
cabinet. The First Consul, satisfied with the homage of France, with
the unanimous adhesion of the sincere and disinterested men of
every party, gave himself little concern about the language of
the one class, or the plots of the other. Wholly engrossed by
business, he thought little of the empty talk of the idle, though
* This picture of the emigrants of those days is not drawn from imagina
tion. The language -which 1 attribute to them is literally extracted from the
voluminous correspondence addressed to Louis XVIII., and brought by that
prince to France. Left, during the Hundred Days, at the Tuileries, and subse
quently deposited in the archives of the Foreign Office, it furnishes singular
evidence of the illusions and of the passions of that time. Some of these
ietters are very witty, and all very curious.

Oct. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 101
he was far from being insensible to it; but, for the time being, he
was too much absorbed by his task to pay much attention to such
language. He thought very little more of the plots directed
against his person ; he considered them as one of those dangers,
which he braved every day on the field of battle with the indiffer
ence of fatalism. For the rest, he deceived himself respecting the
nature of his danger. Having, on the 18th of Brumaire, wrested
the supreme power from the revolutionary party, and having
it at the moment for his principal enemy, he threw the blame of
all that happened on this party, and seemed to be irritated
against it alone. The royalists, at least at that time, were in his
eyes but a persecuted party, which it was right to screen from
oppression. He was well aware that there were villains among
them; but he had contracted the habit, from living with moderate
men, of anticipating violence from the revolutionists alone. One
of his advisers, however, strove to correct this error of his
judgment: it was M. Fouche, the minister of the police.
In this government, conducted almost by one man, all the
ministers had been cast into the shade, with the exception of two,
Messrs. Fouche and de Talleyrand. They alone were, at times,
faintly discernible through the halo of glory which encircled
general Bonaparte, and the dazzling effulgence of which threw all
around him into comparative obscurity. General Berthier had
just succeeded Carnot in the department of war, because he was
more supple, more resigned to the modest part of comprehending
and rendering the ideas of his chief, which he did with a clear
ness and a precision truly admirable. It was no slight merit to
be the worthy chief of. the staff to the greatest captain of the
age, and perhaps of all ages. But Berthier, beside the First
Consul, could not have any importance as director of the military
operations. The navy, at the moment, attracted very little
attention. The finances required only the firm and persevering,
but unobtrusive application of certain principles of order, laid
down once for all. The police, on the contrary, was of great im
portance, on account of the vast authority with which the go
vernment was armed ; and, as well as the police, the foreign affairs,
on account of the relations to be re-established with the whole
world. As for the police, the First Consul needed a man who
was acquainted with the parties and with the individuals of
whom the parties were composed: this was the cause of the
influence acquired by Fouche, the minister. In regard to the
foreign affairs, though no person better qualified than the First
Consul could be presented to Europe, there needed every moment
an agent more mildj more patient than he: and this was the
cause of the influence acquired by M. de Talleyrand. Messrs.
Fouche" and de Talleyrand shared, therefore, the only portion of
political credit which the ministers then enjoyed.
The police was not at that period what fortunately it has since be
come, a mere surveillance, without power, charged solely with warn-

102 HISTORY OF THE [Oct. 1800.
ingand giving information to justice. It was an immense arbitrary
authority deposited in the hands of a single man. The minister of
the police could exile these as revolutionists, could recall those as
emigrants, fix for all the place of their residence, continue or re
move the sequestration from the property of returned emigrants,
restore or take away his church from a priest, suppress or repri
mand a journal which had displeased him ; lastly, point out any
person to the mistrust or the favourof a government, which then had
an extraordinary number of places to give away, and which soon
had the wealth of Europe to distribute among its creatures. The
minister of the police, on whom the institutions of the time con
ferred such attributions, though placed under the supreme and
vigilant authority of the First Consul, yet possessed a formidable
power over the whole nation.
M. Fouche charged to exercise this power, formerly an Orato-
rian and a Conventionalist, was an intelligent and a crafty person
age, neither good nor wicked, well acquainted with men, espe
cially the bad, and despising them ; employing the funds of the
police in supporting the agents of troubles as much as in watching
them ; always ready to procure bread or a place for every person
weary of political agitations ; thus making friends for the govern
ment, and more especially for himself; creating for himself obliged
dependents, far superior to credulous and deceitful spies, who
never failed to inform him of every thing that it was his interest
to know ; having persons under obligations to him in all the
parties, even among the royalists, whom he knew how to ma
nage, and to repress at the right time ; always forewarned, never
overrating danger, nor exaggerating it to his master; clearly
distinguishing an imprudent man from one really to be feared,
knowing when to caution the one, to proceed against the other;
in short, managing the police better than it ever was managed,
for it consists in disarming animosities as much as in repressing
them ; a superior minister, if he had had elevated intentions, if
his indulgence had sprung from any other principle than an in
difference to good and evil, if his activity had proceeded from any
other motive than a passion for interfering in every thing, which
rendered him irksome and suspicious to the First Consul, and
frequently gave him the appearance of a vulgar intriguer. For
the rest, his intelligent but ignoble countenance, was a faithful
mirror of the qualities and vices of his soul.
The First Consul, chary of his confidence, never granted it
freely, especially to men for whom he had no esteem. He made
use of M. Fouche, and at the same time distrusted him. Hence
he sometimes sought to dispense with or to control him, by giving
money to de Bourrienne, his secretary, to Murat, the commandant
of Paris, but especially to Savary, his aide-de-camp, in order to
compose, in this way several contradictory polices. But M.
Fouche always contrived to convict these bastard polices of
awkwardness and puerility, proved himself alone to be well in-

Oct. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 103
formed, and, while frequently crossing the First Consul, neverthe
less made his peace with him by that manner of treating men in
which was mingled neither love nor hate, but an incessant appli
cation to wean them, one by one, from an agitated and fac
tious existence.
M. Fouche, half faithful to the revolutionary party, took
pleasure in showing indulgence to his old friends, and dared, in
reference to them, to contradict the First Consul. Well knowing
their moral situation, appreciating, more especially, the villains
of royalism, he was incessantly repeating that the danger, if there
were any, was from the royalists much more than from the revo
lutionists, and that they should soon have occasion to perceive
this. He had even the merit, but not for a long time, of insisting
that it would be well not to forsake the Revolution and its ideas
quite so much. Hearing already the flatterers of the day assert,
that it was necessary to proceed more rapidly in reaction, to dis
regard the prejudices of the Revolution, and to return to something
that should resemble monarchy, minus the Bourbons, he dared
to censure, if not the aim, at least the imprudence with which
certain persons pursued that track. While admitting the justice
of his opinions, given with good sense, but without frankness and
without dignity, the First Consul was struck, but not pleased,
with them. He acknowledged the services of this personage,
but had no esteem for him.
M. de Talleyrand performed a totally contrary part; he had
neither affection for M. Fouche nor resemblance to him. They
had both been formerly priests, the one having belonged to the
superior, the other to the inferior clergy, and yet they had no
thing in common, but their having both taken advantage of the
Revolution to cast aside, the former the prelate's robes, the latter
the humble gown of the Oratorian professor. How strange, it
must be confessed, and how characteristic of that deeply, con
vulsed society, was the spectacle presented by this government,
composed of a soldier and two priests, who had abjured their pro
fession, and, though thus composed, having none the less splen
dour, grandeur, and influence in the world.
M. de Talleyrand descended from a family of the noblest line
age, destined by his birth for the army, doomed to the priest
hood by an accident, which deprived him of the use of one foot,
having no liking for this imposed profession, successively bishop ,
courtier, revolutionist, and emigrant, then afterwards minister for
foreign affairs under the Directory, M. de Talleyrand had retained
something of all these different states; there was to be found in
him a touch of the bishop, of the man of quality, and of the re
volutionist. Having no firmly fixed opinion, but only a naturaTA
moderation, which was opposed to every species of exaggeration ;
capable of entering at once into the feelings of those whom he
wished to please, either from liking or from interest ; speaking jh i
unique language peculiar to that society which had Voltaire

104 HISTORY OF THE [C Oct. 1800,
for instructor; full of smart, poignant repartees, which rerfbitrary
him as formidable as he was attractive; by turns caressirfjter of
disdainful, demonstrative or impenetrable ; careless, dignifiie as
lame without loss of gracefulness, in short, one of the most ex
traordinary personages, and such a one as a revolution alone
can produce, he was the most seducing of negotiators, but at the
same time incapable of directing, as head, the affairs of a great
State; for every leader should possess a resolute will, settled
views, and application, and he had none of these. His will was
confined to pleasing, his views consisted in the opinions of the
moment, his application was next to nothing. In a word, he
was an accomplished ambassador, but not a directing minister:
be it understood, however, that this expression is to be taken in
its most elevated acceptation. For the rest, he held no other post
under the consular government. The First Consul, who allowed
no person the right to give an opinion on the affairs of war and
of diplomacy, merely employed him to negotiate with the fo
reign ministers, on basis previously prescribed, and this M. de
(Talleyrand did with an art that will never be surpassed. He
possessed, however, a moral merit, that of being^foKd^fpeaxe
under a master who was fond of war, and of showing that he was
so. Endowed with exquisite taste, uniting with it unerring tact,
and even a useful indolence, he was able to render real ser
vices, by simply opposing to the First Consul's exuberance of lan
guage, pen, and action, his sobriety, his perfect moderation, and
fti^ very propensity to do nothing. But he made little impres
sion on that imperious master, from whom he extorted no re
spect either by genius or by conviction. Thus he had no more
empire than M. Fouche, nay, even less, though quite as much
employed, and more agreeable.
Then again, M. de Talleyrand said just the contrary to what
M. Fouche said. Attached to the ancient riqime, minus the
persons and the ridiculous prejudices of other times, he recom
mended the re-establishment of the monarchy as soon as pos
sible, or an equivalent for it, by availing of the glory of the
First Consul in lieu of blood-royal, adding that, if we wished
to have a speedy and a durable peace with Europe, we ought to
make haste to resemble other states. And, while bis colleague,
Fouche, in the name of the Revolution advised that we should
not go too fast, M. de Talleyrand, in the name of Europe, ad
vised that we should not go so' low.
The First Consul prized the plain good sense of M. Fouche,
relished the graces of M. de Talleyrand, but absolutely believed
neither the one nor the other on any subject, and, as for his
confidence, had given that, given it wholly and entirely, but not
to either of those two men — to his colleague Cambaceres. The
latter, with an understanding far from brilliant, had extraor
dinary good sense, and an unbounded attachment to the First
Consul. Having trembled for ten years of his life under pro-

'U Jet. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 105
scribers of all sorts, he loved, with a kind of affection, the
powerful master, who at length procured him the faculty of
breathing at his ease. He loved his power, his genius, his
person, from which he had not received, and hoped never to
receive, any thing but favours. Acquainted with the weak
nesses of men, even of the greatest, he counselled the First Con
sul, as one ought to counsel when one wishes to be attended to,
with perfect sincerity, with extreme discretion, never for the pur
pose of showing off his own wisdom, but always to be serviceable
to a government which he loved as dearly as himself, always
approving of all its acts in public, Whatever they might be, and
never disapproving of them but in private, in an absolute tete-a-
tete with the First Consul; keeping silence when there was no
good to be done, and when censure could be but a vain pleasure
of finding fault ; sure to speak his mind, and with a courage
highly meritorious in a man so extremely timid, when he was in
time to prevent a blunder, or influence the general conduct of
affairs. And, as if a character which is incessantly under self-
restraint must needs be betrayed into some weakness, the consul
Cambaceres exhibited a puerile vanity with his inferiors, lived
with some subaltern courtiers, who paid him fulsome homage,
walked every day in the Palais Royal, in a ridiculously magni
ficent dress, and sought, in the gratification of a gourmandise
that has become proverbial, pleasures which were suited to his
vulgar but prudent soul. Of what consequence, however, are
a few foibles, redeemed by superior reason !
The First Consul cheerfully forgave these foibles in his col
league, and made much of him. He appreciated that superior
good sense, which never wished to shine but to be useful, and
which threw a tempered and true light upon every thing. He
appreciated, above all, the sincerity of his attachment, laughed
at his weaknesses, but always with delicacy, and paid him the
very high compliment of confiding every thing to him alone, of
never being concerned but about his judgment. Hence, he was
susceptible of no influence but his — an influence scarcely sus
pected-, and on that account very great.
The consul Cambaceres was qualified more especially to
temper his vehemence in regard to persons, and his precipitation in
regard to things. Amidst this conflict of two opposite tendencies,
one urging to a precipitate reaction, the other, on the contrary,
combating that reaction, M. Cambaceres, inflexible when the
maintenance of order was in question, was, in every thing else,
always a decided advocate for not going too fast. He did not
oppose the end to which things were visibly tending, for he kept
incessantly repeating, "Let them in due time decree as much
power as they please to the First Consul, well and good, but
not too soon." He wished especially that reality should always
be preferred to appearance, real power to that which was but os
tentation. A First Consul, possessing the power to do all that

106 HISTORY OF THE [Oct. 1800.
he pleased for the welfare of the State, seemed to him far su
perior to a crowned prince, cramped in his action. To act, and
to keep out of sight, above all, never to act too quickly, consti
tuted the whole of his wisdom. This most certainly is not
genius, but it is prudence; and, for founding a great State,
both are requisite.
M. Cambaceres was useful to the First Consul in another way,
besides advising him with superior judgment — that of govern
ing the Senate. That body, as we have said, was of immense
importance, owing to the patronage vested in it. In the first
moments, it had been relinquished, in some measure, to M.
Sieyes, as a compensation for the executive power, vested
wholly in general Bonaparte. M. Sieyes was at first content to
abdicate, but, living on his estate of Crosne, began to feel some
what vexed at his nullity; for there never was abdication without
regret. Had he possessed firmness and consistency, he might
have wrested the Senate from the First Consul, who would
then have had no resource left but a coup d'etat. But M.
Cambaceres, without noise, without ostentation, insinuating
himself by degrees with that body, occupied the ground, which
the peevish negligence of M. Sieyes abandoned to him. People
knew that it was through him they could come at the First
Consul, the source of all favour, and to him they accordingly
addressed themselves. Of this he availed himself with infinite
and always concealed ait, to repress or to regain opponents.
But this was done with such discretion, that nobody thought to
complain of it^At a time when repose had become true wisdom,
when repose was even necessary for reviving one day a taste
for liberty, we dare not censure, we dare not give the name of
corrupter to the man who, on the one hand, tempered the
master imposed by events, and, on the other, checked the im
prudences of an opposition without aim, unseasonable, and po
litically unwisffn
As for the^Consul Lebrun, general Bonaparte treated him
with respect, even with affection, but as a person meddling but
little with public affairs, the administration excepted. To him
he consigned the superintendence over the details of the finances,
and charged him to keep him acquainted with the proceedings
and the sentiments of the royalists, by whom this third consul
was frequently surrounded. He had thus an ear and an eye
among them, but only from the mere interest of curiosity as to
what might be hatching in that quarter.
To convey an accurate idea of the circle surrounding the First
Consul, we must say a word concerning his family. He had
four brothers, Joseph, Lucien, Louis, and Jerome. The two
latter we shall notice in due time. Joseph and Lucien only
were then of any importance. Joseph, the eldest of all, had
married the daughter of a wealthy and respectable merchant of
Marseilles. He was mild, tolerably acute, agreeable in per-

Oct. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 107
son, and caused his brother less vexation than any of the
others. It was for him that the First Consul reserved the
honour of negotiating the peace of the Republic with the States
of the old and the new world. He had charged him to con
clude the treaty which had been signed with America, and had
just appointed him plenipotentiary to Luneville, thus seeking to
assign to him a part which should be popular in France.
Lucien, at present minister of the interior, was a clever man,
but of an unequal mind, restless, ungovernable, and, though pos
sessing talent, not having sufficient to make amends for what he
Wanted in point of good sense. Both flattered the propensity of
the First Consul to raise himself to the supreme power ; and
this was but natural. The genius of the First Consul, like his
glory, were things personal to himself; one quality only could be
transmissible to his family, that was the princely quality, if he
should one day assume it, in preference to that of first magis
trate of the Republic. His brothers were among those who
asserted, with least reserve, that the present form of govern
ment was but one of transition, devised to lull revolutionary
prejudices ; but that he ought to make up his mind, and that, if
he wished to found something truly stable, it was indispensably
necessary to introduce greater concentration, unity, and dura
bility. The drift of all this was very evident. The First
Consul, as every one knows, had no children, which greatly
embarrassed those who already dreamt of the transformation of
the Republic into a monarchy. It was, in fact, an inconsistency to
pretend to be desirous of insuring the regular and natural trans
mission of the supreme power in the family of a man who had
no heirs. Thus though, hereafter, this default of heirs might be
a personal advantage for the brothers of the First Consul, it was
now an argument against their projects, and they frequently re
proached Madame Bonaparte for a misfortune, o.f which, they
said, she was the cause. Having quarrelled with her, from sheer
jealousy of her influence, they had not spared her in conversa
tion with her husband, and persecuted her with their remarks,
incessantly and loudly repeating that it was absolutely necessary
for the First Consul to have a wife who should bring him chil
dren, that this was not a private but a public consideration, and
that a resolution on this point was indispensable, in order to
insure the future welfare of France. They caused these cruel
sentiments, pregnant with the most sinister consequences for her,
to be repeated by all lips. The wife of the First Consul, appa
rently so fortunate, was, therefore, at this moment very far
from happy.
Josephine Bonaparte, who had been married first to the count
de Beauharnais, then to the young general who had saved the Con
vention on the 13th Vendemiaire, and now shared with him a
place which began to resemble a throne, was a Creole by birth,
and had all the graces, all the defects, usual in women who are

108 HISTORY OF THE [Oct. 1800.
so born. Kind-hearted, profuse, and frivolous, not a beauty,
but perfectly elegant, and endowed with infinite fascination, she
could please much more than women who were superior to her
in understanding and personal charms. The levity of her con
duct, depicted to her husband in the most unfavourable colours
when he returned from Egypt, filled him with anger. He had
thoughts of separating himself from a wife whom, right or wrong,
he believed to be culpable. She wept a long time at his feet ; her
two children, Hortense and Eugene Beauharnais, both very
dear to general Bonaparte, wept too ; he was overcome, and
yielded to a conjugal tenderness, which, for many years, was
with him paramount to policy. He forgot the real or alleged
faults of Josephine ; he loved her still, but not as in the early
period of their union. The unbounded extravagance, the vexa
tious imprudences, in which she daily indulged, frequently ex
cited in her husband gusts of impatience which he could not
repress ; but he forgave her with the kindness which prosperity
inspires, and could not long be angry with a woman, who had
shared the first moments of his nascent greatness, and who,
from the day of their union, seemed to have brought Fortune
along with her.
• JMadame Bonaparte was altogether a woman of the ancien re
gime, devout, superstitious, nay, a royalist, detesting what she
called the Jacobins, who hated her in return ; seeking only the
society of the ancient nobility, who, returning in throngs, as we
have said, used to visit her in the morning. They had known
her the wife of an honourable man, pretty high in rank and
in military standing, the unfortunate Beauharnais, who died on
the revolutionary scaffold ; they found her the wife of a parvenu,
but of a parvenu more powerful than any prince in Europe ;
they did not hesitate to go and solicit favours, while affecting to
look down upon her. She was eager to make them partakers of
her power, and to render them services. She even took pains to
excite in them a sort of illusion which they were fond of indulg
ing, that, in reality, general Bonaparte was only waiting for a fa
vourable occasion to recall the Bourbons, and to restore the
inheritance which belonged to them. And, singularly enough,
this illusion which she delighted to instil into them, she would
almost fain have shared herself; for she would rather have seen
her husband a subject of the Bourbons, but a subject the pro
tector of his kings, surrounded by the homage of the ancient
French aristocracy, than crowned monarch by the hand of the
nation. She was a very faint-hearted woman. Though giddy,
she loved that man who covered her with glory, and loved him
the more since she was less beloved by him. Not conceiving it
possible that he could set his daring foot on the steps of the
throne, without falling immediately beneath the dagger of re
publicans or royalists, she foresaw her children, her husband, and
herself, overwhelmed in one general ruin. But, supposing that

.Oct. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 109
he ascended safe and sound to that usurped throne, another fear
harrowed her heart — it would not be her lot to share his eleva
tion. If general Bonaparte should some day be made king or
emperor, it would evidently be under the pretext of giving a
stable government to France, by rendering it hereditary; and
unfortunately her physicians left her no hope of ever having
more children. She recollected on this subject the extraordinary
prediction of a woman, a sort of Pythoness then in vogue,*
who had told her: "You will occupy the first place in the"
world, but only for a short time." She had already heard the
brothers of the First Consul pronounce the fatal word, divorce.
The victim of grandeur, whom, to judge of her lot from the
external splendour by which she was surrounded, the queens of
Europe might have envied, was a prey to corroding care.
Each advance of fortune added apparently to her happiness, but
really augmented her distress ; and if she did escape from her
keen anxieties, it was by a levity of character which saved her long
and intense thought. The attachment of general Bonaparte for
her, his gusts of passion, when he gave way to them, repaired the
next moment by demonstrations of the greatest kindness, served
also to cheer her. Hurried away, moreover, like all the people
of that time, by a stupifying whirlwind, she reckoned upon the
god of revolutions, upon chance; and, after painful agitations,
she returned to the enjoyment of her fortune. She strove,
meanwhile, to divert her husband from his ideas of an exagge
rated greatness, ventured even to talk to him of the Bourbons,
at the risk of raising storms ; and, in spite of her partialities,
which ought to have led her to prefer M. de Talleyrand to M.
Fouche, she had taken a liking to the latter, because, thorough
Jacobin as he was, she said, he dared tell the truth to the First
Consul ; and to tell the truth to the First Consul was, in her
estimation, to advise him to uphold the Republic, but to increase
at the same time his consular power. Messrs. de Talleyrand
and Fouche, thinking to strengthen themselves by penetrating
into the family of the First Consul, introduced themselves into
it by flattering each as each liked to be flattered. M. de Tal
leyrand strove to please the brothers, by saying that it was
necessary to devise for the First Consul a different position from
that which the Constitution conferred on him. M. Fouche,
endeavoured to please Madame Bonaparte by saying, that to
hurry things would be the height of imprudence, and endanger
the loss of all. This method of insinuating themselves into his
family, and exciting disharmony by their interference, was ex
cessively displeasing to the First Consul. This feeling he often
manifested ; and when he had any communication to make to his

* Mademoiselle Le Normand, the celebrated fortune-teller, whom some
readers may have visited at her residence, No. 5, Rue de Tournon, Paris.
She published, in 1820, Memoires Historiques et Secretes de I' Imperatrice Jose
phine, in two volumes, containing very interesting particulars of her distin
guished patroness, and died in 1844— Translator.

110 HISTORY OF THE [Oct. 1800.
relations, he employed his colleague Cambaceres, who, with his
accustomed prudence, listened to every thing, but said no more
than he was directed to say, and acquitted himself of this kind
of commission with equal delicacy and precision.
A very strange circumstance occurred to impart a present and
positive feature to all these internal agitations. The prince, who
was afterwards Loais XVIII., then an exile, ventured upon a
singular and indiscreet step. Many royalists, to account for and
excuse their return towards the new government, affected to
believe, or really did believe, that general Bonaparte meant to
recall the Bourbons. These men, who had not read, or knew not
how to read, the history of the English revolution, and to appre
ciate the terrible lessons with which it abounds, all at once disco
vered in it an analogy which flattered their hopes ; it was the
recall of the Stuarts by general Monck. They'said nothing about
Cromwell, who, however, acted a part great enough not to be
forgotten. The unfounded rumour had at length gained currency,
and reached Louis XVIII. This prince, endowed with tact and a
good understanding, had committed the blunder of writing to
general Bonaparte himself, and had transmitted to him several
letters which he thought seasonable, but which were not, and
which proved only one thing — the ordinary illusions of the
emigrants. The first of the letters was as follows : —
" February 20th, 1800.
" Men such as you, sir, whatever their apparent conduct may
be, never excite uneasiness. You have accepted an eminent post,
and I am glad you have done so. You know better than any one
else how much strength and power are required to secure the
happiness of a great nation. Save France from its own frenzy,
and you will have fulfilled the first wish of my heart; restore her
king to her and future generations will bless your memory. Your
services will alway be found too valuable to the state/ to admit
of my discharging in full, and as I could wish, the debt of my
ancestors and my own, by the bestowal of important posts.
"Louis."
The First Consul was extremely surprised on receiving this
letter, and was for some time undecided whether he ought to reply.
It had been transmitted to him by the consul Lebrun, who had
received it himself from the Abbe" Montesquiou. The First
Consul, engrossed by a multiplicity of business, on entering upon
the government, had suffered some time to elapse without an
swering it. The prince, impatient as an emigrant, wrote a second
letter, stamped still more with the credulity of his party, still
more derogatory to his dignity. It was in these terms :—
"You must long have been aware, general, of the esteem in
which I hold you. If you doubt whether I am susceptible of
gratitude, mark your own nlarv • £•=• *y>o+ «f "~»- *¦-: — j<- a - 'or

Oct. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. Ill
my principles, they are those of the French character. I am
clement by disposition. I shall be so from reason also.
"No, the victor of Lodi, of Castiglione, and of Arco.a, the con
queror of Italy and of Egypt, can never prefer a vain celebrity to
true glory. You are, nevertheless, losing valuable time : we can
insure the repose of France ; I say toe, because I need Bonaparte
for this purpose, and he could not accomplish it without me.
" General, Europe observes you, glory awaits you, and I am
impatient to restore peace to my people. "Louis."
This time the First Consul thought that he could not help
answering. At bottom he had never had any. doubt as to the
course which he ought to pursue towards the deposed princes.
Ambition apart, he considered the recall of the Bourbons as im
practicable and fatal. It was from conviction that he repelled
them, earnestly as he might otherwise desire to be master of
France. His wife had been made acquainted with the incident, so
had his secretary ; and, though he did them not the honour to admit
them to such deliberations, he gave them his motives. His wife had
thrown herself at his feet to implore him to leave at least some
hope for the Bourbons ; he repulsed her angrily, and addressing
his secretary, " You do not know those people," said he ; " if I
were to give them back their throne, they would fancy that they had
recovered it by the grace of God. They would soon be surrounded
and hurried away by the emigrants ; they would overturn, in pre
tending to remodel, every thing, even what cannot be remodelled.
What would become of the numerous interests created since '89 ?
What would become of the purchasers of national domains, and
of the leaders of the army, and of all those who have embarked
their lives and fortunes in the Revolution? After men, what would
become of things ? What would become of the principles for which
we have fought so hard ? All this would perish, but not perish
without a struggle; the conflict would be tremendous; thousands
of men would perish. No, never will I take so fatal a resolution."
He was right. Setting aside all personal interest, he acted judi
ciously. His dictatorship, which retarded the establishment of
public liberty in France, a liberty, however, extremely difficult
to establish at that time, his dictatorship completed the triumph
of the French Revolution, which Waterloo itself, after a lapse of
fifteen years, could no longer destroy.
As might be expected, his answer was in unison with his sen
timents, and did not hold out more hopes than he meant to give.
It is only from the very words of the letter that one can judge
of the grandeur of expression with which he replied to the im
prudent overture of the exiled prince : —
" Paris, the 20th Fructidor, year VIII. (7 Sept. 1800.)
" I have received your letter, sir, and thank you for the obliging
expressions which it contains regarding myself.

112 HISTORY OF THE [Oct. 1800.
"You should renounce all hope of returning to France, you
could not do so but over the corses of half a million Frenchmen.
" Sacrifice your individual interest to the repose and happiness
of France ; history will give you credit for it.
" I am not insensible to the misfortunes of your family ; I will
contribute with pleasure to the ease and the tranquillity of your
retirement. " Bonaparte."
Some portion of this got abroad, and the personal designs of
the First Consul became, in consequence, the more evident.
It is full-often the attempts of parties to stifle an infant power,
that accelerate its growth, and encourage it to dare all that it
meditates. An attempt more ridiculous than criminal of the re
publicans against the First Consul, hastened a demonstration quite
as ridiculous, on the part of the men who purposed to hurry for
ward his elevation : both came to nothing.
The patriot declaimers, more noisy and far less formidable than
the agents of the Bourbons, met frequently at the house of a man
formerly employed by the Committee of Public Welfare, now out
of office. His name was Demerville; he talked a great deal,
hawked about the pamphlets against the government, and was
scarcely capable of doing more. His house was the resort of
Arena, the Corsican, one of the members of the Five Hundred,
who had escaped by a window on the 18th Brumaire; ofTopino
Lebrun, a painter of some talent, pupil of David, participating in
the revolutionary extravagance of the artists of that time ; and
of many Italian refugees, who were exasperated against general
Bonaparte, because he protected the pope and did not re-establish
the Roman Republic. The principal and the most violent of these
latter was a sculptor named Ceracchi. These hot-brained men
used to meetatDemerville's, and made use of language the most
absurd. It was requisite, they said, to put a finishing hand to
the business ; they had plenty of people on their side; "Massena,
Carnot, Lannes, Sieyes, nay, Fouche himself. There was nothing
to do but to strike the tyrant, and all the genuine republicans
would speak out; all would unite to raise up the expiring Re
public again. But it was necessary to find a Brutus to Strike
the new Caesar. Nobody came forward. A soldier out of em
ploy, named Harrel, leading a life of idleness and penury with
these declaimers, indigent and discontented like them, appeared
to them the man of action whom they needed. They made pro
posals to him which alarmed him exceedingly. In his agitation,
he communicated the matter toa commissary of war, with whom
he was somewhat intimate, and who advised him to report all he
knew to the government. This Harrel went to M. de Bourrienne,
secretary to the First Consul, and general Lannes, commandant
of the consular guard. The First Consul, apprised by them,
directed the police to give Harrel money and orders to consent
to all that his accomplices should propose to him. These miser
able conspirators conceived that thev had found in him the very

Oct. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 113
man for executing their purpose ; but they thought that one was
not sufficient. Harrel offered to bring some others. They agreed
to it, and Harrel brought to them some spies of M. Fouche's.
After they had fallen into this snare, they thought of procuring
daggers to arm Harrel and his companions. This task they took
upon themselves, and brought daggers purchased by Topino
Lebrun. At length, they chose the place for despatching the
First Consul, and this was the Opera, then called the Theatre of
the Arts. They fixed the moment, and that was the 10th of Oc
tober (18th Vendemiaire, year IX.), on which day the First
Consul was to attend the first representation of a new opera.
The police, being forewarned, had taken its precautions. The
First Consul went to the Opera House followed by Lannes, who,
watching over him with the most anxious attention, had doubled
the guard, and placed the bravest of his grenadiers around his
box. The would-be assassins actually came at the time agreed
upon, but not all, and not armed. Topino Lebrun was not there,
neither was Demerville ; Arena and Ceracchi alone appeared.
Ceracchi approached nearer to the First Consul's box than the
others, but he had no dagger. The only bold fellows on the
spot, and armed, were the conspirators sent by the police to the
theatre of crime. Ceracchi and Arena were apprehended, as were
successively all the others, but most of them either at home or in
the houses where they had sought refuge.
This affair produced a great sensation; it was not deserving
of it. Assuredly the police,, which ignorant men, not conversant
with such matters, in general charge with. fabricating itself such
plots as it discovers, the police had not invented this, but it must
be admitted, that it had. taken too great a part in it. The con
spirators wished, without the least doubt, the death of the First
Consul, but they were incapable of striking him with their own
hands ; and, by furnishing them with what was most difficult to
be found, pretended perpetrators, they had been led further into
the crime than they would have ventured had they been left to
themselves. If all this were to have terminated in a severe
but only temporary punishment, such as ought to be inflicted on
madmen, well and good ! but to put them to death on such
grounds is more than it is right to do, even when the object is
to protect a precious life. But at that time of day people were
not so nice ; proceedings were immediately instituted, and these
were destined to lead the unhappy wretches to the scaffold.
This attempt excited a general alarm. Hitherto there had
been seen during the Revolution only what were then called
journees, or attacks by armed bands; but people now felt secured
from such assaults by the military power of the government.
They had not yet thought of assassination, or of the possibility
of the First Consul being struck unawares, in spite of the
guard of grenadiers which surrounded him. The attempt of
Ceracchi, the ridiculous part of which was not known, was a
VOL. g . I

114 HISTORY OF THE [Oct. 1800.
kind of forewarning which terrified all classes. A dread of
finding themselves plunged back into chaos seized every body, and
generated a sort of enthusiasm in favour of the First Consul. The
populace crowded round the Tuileries. The Tribunate, the only
one of the assemblies of the State assembled at that moment,
since it met every fortnight in the interval between the sessions,
repaired thither in a body. All the public authorities followed
this example. Great numbers of addresses were sent to the
First Consul. They may all be summed up in these words of
the municipal body of Paris :
" General," it said, " we beg in the name of our fellow-
citizens, to express the deep indignation which they have felt at
the news of the attempt meditated against your person. So
many interests are involved with your existence, that the plots
which have threatened it must necessarily be a subject of public
grief, as the vigilance which has preserved it will be a subject of
national gratitude and joy.
" That Providence, which in the year VIII. brought you back
from Egypt, which at Marengo seemed to protect you from all
dangers, which, lastly, on the 18th Vendemiaire, year IX., has
just saved you from the fury of assassins, is, permit us to say
so, the Providence of France much more than yours. It has
not willed that a year so brilliant, so full of glorious events,
destined to occupy so large a space in the recollection of men,
Bhould terminate all at once in a detestable crime. May the
enemies of France cease to seek your destruction and ours!
May they submit to that destiny, which, more mighty than all
plots, will ensure your preservation and that of the Republic!
.... We say nothing to you about the guilty ; justice lays
claim to them."
These addresses, all cast in the same mould, repeated to the
First Consul that he had no right to exercise clemency, that his
life belonged to the Republic, and ought to be defended like the
public welfare, of which it was the pledge. It must be added
that these manifestations were sincere. Every one thought
himself in danger along with the First Consul. Every one but
the factious wished for his preservation. The royalists believed
that, if he were to die, they should be sent back to the scaffold
or into exile; the revolutionists imagined that they beheld
counter-revolution triumphant through the arms of foreigners.
The First Consul took particular and remarkable pains to
diminish the estimate that was formed of the danger to which he
had been exposed. He would not have it believed that his life
depended on the first comer; and he conceived this to be equally
necessary for his safety and for his dignity. In conversing with
the authorities deputed to congratulate him, he told them all
that the danger, about which they were so much alarmed, had
not been serious : he explained to them how, surrounded by the
officers of the consular guard and a piquet of his grenadiers, he

Oct. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 115
was completely secure against the seven or eight wretches who
purposed to attack him. He was convinced much more than his
words could lead people to suppose of the danger with which his
his life was threatened ; but he thought it useful to exhibit him
self to all imaginations surrounded by the grenadiers of Marengo,
and inaccessible amidst them to the weapons of assassins.
More serious plots than this, about which so much fuss was
made, and framed by other hands, were preparing in the dark.
Under the influence of a vague presentiment, people said to one
another, that these attempts would be repeated. Hence the parr
tisans of the First Consul took occasion to insist that something
more stable was requisite than an ephemeral power resting on the
head of a single man, to which the stab of an assassin's dagger
might at any time put an end. The brothers of the First Consul,
Messrs. Roederer, Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely, de Talleyrand,
de Fontanes, and many others, held these ideas, some from con
viction, others to please the master, all, as it is usually the case,
from a mixture of sincere and interested motives. This led to the
appearance of a very singular, and very remarkable, anonymous
pamphlet, said to have been written by Lucien Bonaparte, but
which, from the extraordinary elegance of the language, from
the classic knowledge of history, ought to have been attributed
to its real author, who was M. de Fontanes. This pamphlet
excited so strong a sensation as to deserve mention here. It
marks one of the steps taken by general Bonaparte in the career
of supreme power. Its title was, " ParallUe entre Cesar, Crom
well, Monch, et Bonaparte." The author first compared general
Bonaparte with Cromwell, and found in him no resemblance to
that leading personage of the English Revolution. Cromwell,
as he said, was a fanatic, a sanguinary leader of a faction, the
murderer of his king, victor only in the civil war, conqueror of a
few cities or counties of England, in short, a barbarian who had
ravaged the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, a clever
villain, but no hero. The counterpart to Cromwell in the French
Revolution would be Robespierre, if Robespierre had possessed
courage, and if, France having nothing to subdue but La Vendee,
he had been the conqueror of it. General Bonaparte, on the
contrary, having no hand in the evils of the Revolution, had
compensated by immense glory for crimes which were not his. He
had abolished the barbarous festival instituted in honour of
regicide ; he was putting an end to the horrors of the revolu
tionary fanaticism ; he honoured the arts and sciences, established
schools, opened the temple of the arts. He had not carried
on civil war ; he had conquered not cities but kingdoms. As for
Monck, what had that unsteady mind, that deserter from all parties,
who did not know whither he was steering, who wrecked the
vessel of the Revolution upon monarchy, as he might have wrecked
it on the Republic, what had this sorry personage in common with
general Bonaparte, who possessed a mind so firm, and knew so
12

116 HISTORY OF THE [Oct. 1800.
clearly what he purposed ! The title of duke of Albemarle might
be enough to satisfy the vulgar vanity of general Monck, " but is
it to be supposed that the truncheon of marshal, or the sword of
constable, would suffice for the man before whom the universe stands
aghast? .... Does not every one know that there are certain
destinies which call to the loftiest station? .... And besides,
were Bonaparte ever to imitate Monck, is it not evident that
France would be again plunged into the horrors of a new revo
lution? The tempests, instead of being allayed, would spring
up again on all sides."
After rejecting these comparisons, the author found in the whole
range of history no counterpart to general Bonaparte but Caesar.
He discovers in him the same military greatness, the same poli
tical greatness, but he discovers also one point of dissimilarity.
Caesar, at the head of the Roman demagogues, had oppressed the
party of the honest citizens, and destroyed the Republic ; general
Bonaparte, on the contrary, had raised in France the party of the
honest citizens and put down that of the wicked.
All this was true : the task undertaken thus far by general
Bonaparte was much more moral than that of Caesar.
After all these comparisons, it was necessary to draw a conclu
sion. Happy the Republic, exclaimed the author, if Bonaparte
were immortal! "¦ But where," he added, " where are his heirs?
where are the institutions capable of upholding his benefits and
perpetuating his genius ! The destiny of 30,000,000 of human
beings hangs on the life of a single man ! Fellow countrymen,
what would become of you, if at this moment a funeral wail were
to announce that this man had ceased to live !"
The author next examined the different chances that might turn
up at the death of general Bonaparte. Would the nation return
under the yoke of an assembly ? but the remembrance of the Con
vention was there to exclude such a supposition from every mind.
Would it throw itself into the arms of a military government ?
but where was the equal of general Bonaparte ? The Republic,
no doubt, possessed great generals, but which of them so far
eclipsed all the rest as to extinguish all rivalry, and to prevent
the armies from slaughtering one another, in behalf of their
particular chief? .... In default of the government of assemblies,
in default of the government of Praetorians, would the country
have recourse to the legitimate dynasty, which was on the fron
tiers, stretching out its arms to France? .... But this would be
counter-revolution, and the return of Charles II. and James II. to
England, and the blood which flowed at their appearance, were
examples sufficient to enlighten nations ; and, were more recent
examples needed, the late return of the queen of Naples and her
imbecile husband to their unfortunate kingdom was a lesson
written in characters of blood. Frenchmen, you are sleeping on
the brink of an abyss! Such were the concluding words of this
singular composition.

Oct. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 117
All that it contained, excepting the flatteries of language, was
true; but those truths were very premature, to judge from the
impression which they produced. Lucien, minister of the inte
rior, employed the means at his disposal for circulating this pam
phlet over all France. He filled Paris and the provinces with it,
taking care to conceal its origin. The publication produced a great
effect. In reality itsaid only what every body thought, but itrequired
of France an avowal which a very legitimate pride did not yet
permit her to make. . Eight years before, the French had abolished
a royalty of fourteen centuries, and, were they to come so soon
and confess, at the feet of a general of thirty, that they were
wrong, and beseech him to revive that royalty in his person !
They were willing enough to invest him with a power equal to
that of kings, but it was necessary at least to save appearances,
were it merely for the sake of the national dignity. True, this
young warrior had already gained admirable victories, and already
restored, to some extent, security throughout the country, but he
had scarcely commenced the reconciliation of parties, the reor
ganisation of France, the compilation of its laws, and above all
he had notyet given peace to the world. There were then many
titles yet left for him to acquire, but which he was sure of soon
concentrating on his glorious head.
The impression was general and painful. The prefects re
ported from all quarters that the pamphlet produced a mischievous
effect; that it supplied the demagogue faction with some justifi
cation ; that Caesars called forth Brutuses ; that the publication
was imprudent and to be regretted. In Paris the impression was
the same. In the Council of State the disapprobation was not
concealed. The First Consul, whether he had been concerned
in the pamphlet, or whether he had been compromised without his
knowledge by impatient and unskilful friends, deemed it incum
bent on him to disavow it, especially in the eyes of the revolu
tionary party. He sent for M. Fouche, and asked him publicly how
he could suffer such publications to be circulated. " I know the
author," replied the minister. " If you know him you ought to have
sent him to Vincennes." " I could not send him to Vincennes,"
rejoined M. Fouche, "for it is your own brother." At these words
general Bonaparte complained bitterly of that brother, who had
already compromised him oftener than once. A feeling of dis
pleasure with Lucien Bonaparte was the consequence. One day,
the latter not being punctual at the council of the ministers,
which was frequently the case, and many complaints being pre
ferred against his administration, the First Consul expressed
strong dissatisfaction, and seemed disposed to dismiss him imme
diately. But Cambaceres advised him not to proceed so harshly,
and not to take the portfolio of the interior from Lucien, without
giving him a suitable compensation. The First Consul complied.
M. Cambaceres contrived the embassy to Spain, and was directed
to offer it to Lucien. He had no difficulty in persuading him to

118 HISTORY OF THE [Oct. 1800.
accept it. Lucien set off, and before long the imprudent pam
phlet ceased to be thought of.
Thus a first attempt at assassination against the First Consul
had provoked in his favour a first attempt at elevation : but the
one was as mad as the other was awkward. It was requisite that
general Bonaparte should purchase by fresh services an augmen
tation of authority, which nobody yet defined with precision, but
which all foresaw confusedly in the future, and to which he or his
friends already aspired in an open manner. At all events his
fortune was soon to furnish him, in services rendered, in dangers
encountered, with immense claims, which France would no longer
resist.

Oct. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 119
BOOK VII.

HOHENLINDEN.
Peace with the United States and with the Barbary Regencies — Meeting
of the Congress of Luneville — M. de Cobentzel declines a Separate Nego
tiation, and insists at least on the Presence of an English Plenipotentiary,
to mask the real Negotiation between Austria and France — The First
Consul, with a view to hasten the Conclusion, orders the Renewal of Hos-
tilites — Plan of the Winter Campaign — Moreau is directed to cross the
Inn, and to march for Vienna — Macdonald, with a second Army of Reserve,
has Orders to pass from the Grisons into the Tyrol — Brune, with eighty
thousand Men, is destined to force the Adige and the Mincio — Plan of the
young Archduke John, appointed Generalissimo of the Austrian Armies —
His Plan for turning Moreau miscarries through jdefective Execution —
He halts by the way, and purposes to attack Moreau in the Forest of Ho
henlinden — Admirable Manoeuvre of Moreau's executed in a superior
Manner by Richepanse — Memorable Battle of Hohenlinden — Important
Results of that Battle-i-Passage of the Inn, the Salza, the Traun, and the
Enns — Armistice of Steyer — Austria promises to sign the Peace imme
diately — Operations in the Alps and in Italy — Macdonald crosses the
Splugen, despite the Perils and Hardships of Winter — His Arrival in
the Italian Tyrol — Dispositions of Brune for crossing the Mincio at two
Points — Defect in those Dispositions — General Dupont attempts a first
Passage at Pozzolo, and draws upon himself alone the Main Body of the
Austrian Army — The Mincio is forced after a useless Effusion of Blood
— Passage of the Mincio and the Adige- — Fortunate Escape of General
Laudon in consequence of a Falsehood — The Austrians, being beaten,
propose an Armistice in Italy — Signature of that Armistice at Treviso — Re
newal of the Negotiations at Luneville — The Principle of a separate Peace
admitted by M. de Cobentzel — The First Consul requires Austria to pay
the Expenses of this second Campaign, and imposes harder Conditions
than in M. de St. Julien's Preliminaries — He fixes, as his Ultimatum, the
Boundary of the Rhine in Germany, the Boundary of the Adige in Italy —
Courageous Resistance of M. de Cobentzel — This Resistance, though
honourable, causes Austria to lose valuable Time — While the Negotiations
are pending at Luneville, the Emperor Paul, to whom the First Consul
has ceded the Island of Malta, claims it from the English, who refuse it —
Rage of Paul I. — He invites the King of Sweden to St. Petersburg, and
renews the League of 1780 — Declaration of the Neutrals — Rupture of all
the Northern Powers with Great Britain — The First Consul avails himself
of it to force harder Terms upon Austria — He insists, not only up©a-±he
Boundary of the Adige, but also on the Expulsion of all the Princes of the
House of Austria from Italy — The Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke
of Modena are to be removed to Germany — M. de Cobentzel at length
gives way, and, with Joseph Bonaparte, signs the celebrated Peace of Lune
ville, on the 9th of February, 1801 — France obtains for the second Time
the Boundary of the Rhine, throughout its whole Length, and is left al
most Mistress of Italy — Austria is thrust back beyond the Adige — The
Cisalpine Republic is to include the Milanese, Mantua, the Duchy of
Modena, and the Legations — Tuscany destined for the House of Parma,
with the Title of Kingdom of Etruria— The Principle of the Secularisations
laid down for Germany — Important Results obtained by the First Consul
in the course of fifteen Months.

( 121 )

BOOK VII.
HOHENLINDEN.
Joseph Bonaparte had just signed at Morfontaine, with
Messrs. Ellsworth, Davie, and Van-Murray, the treaty which
re-established peace between France and the United States. It
was the first treaty concluded by the consular government. It
was natural that the reconciliation of France with the different
powers of the globe should begin with that Republic, to which
she had, in a measure, given birth. The First Consul had
allowed the difficulties relative to the treaty of alliance of the
6th of February, 1778, to be adjourned; but, on the other
hand, he had required the adjournment of the claims of the
Americans relative to captured vessels. He judged, and very
justly, that, at the moment, he ought to be satisfied with the
acknowledgment of the rights of neutrals. This was giving
to France one ally more, and to England one enemy more upon
the seas ; it was a new leaven added to the maritime quarrel,
which was arising in the North, and which became from day to
day more serious. In consequence, the principal articles of the
law of neutrals, such, at least, as they are laid down by France
and all the maritime States, were inserted integrally in the new
treaty. These articles were the same to which we have already ad
verted. 1. The flag covers the merchandise — consequently, the neutral
can carry the goods of any enemy, without being searched.
2. There is no exception from this rule, unless for contraband
of war, and that contraband does not extend to alimentary sub
stances, or to naval stores, timber, pitch, hemp, but solely to
manufactured arms and munitions of war, such as " powder,
saltpetre, petards, matches, balls, bullets, bombs, grenades,
carcasses, pikes, halberts, swords, sword-belts, or accoutrements,
pistols, scabbards, cavalry-saddles, harness, cannon, mortars with
their carriages, and generally all arms, munitions of war, and im
plements for the use of troops."
3. Neutral bottoms can sail from any port to any port ; there
is no exception to their freedom of navigating, unless in regard

122 HISTORY OF THE [Oct. 1800.
to ports bona fide blockaded; and only those ports are bona fide
blockaded which are guarded by such a force that there is serious
danger in attempting to break the blockade.
4. The neutral is bound to submit to search, for the purpose of
ascertaining her real character; but the visiting vessel must keep
at the distance of cannon-shot, and send only a boat and three
men to board her; and, if the neutral is convoyed by a vessel of
war, no search can take place, the presence of the admiralty flag
being a sufficient guarantee against every species of fraud.
The treaty contained other stipulations of detail, but these
four principal clauses, which truly constitute the law of neu
trals, were an important victory; for the Americans, in adopting
them, were obliged to insist on the application of them to their
vessels on the part of the English, or forced to go to war with
them. The signature of this treaty was celebrated with eclat at Mor-
fontaine, a beautiful seat, which Joseph, who was richer than
his brothers, in consequence of his marriage, had some time
before purchased. The First Consul went thither, accompanied
by a numerous and brilliant party. Elegant decorations, set
up in the mansion and the gardens, everywhere exhibited
France and America united. Toasts suited to the occasion
were drunk. The First Consul proposed the following : " To
the manes of the French and the Americans who died on the
field of battle for the independence of the New World." Lebrun
proposed, " The union of America with the Northern powers,
to enforce respect for the liberty of the seas." Cambaceres
gave for the third, " The Successor of Washington."
The French government waited with impatience for the arrival
of M. de Cobentzel at Luneville, to learn whether his court was
disposed to conclude peace. The First Consul, if he was not
satisfied with the progress of the negotiations, was determined to
renew hostilities, let the season be ever so far advanced. Since
he had crossed the St. Bernard, he reckoned obstacles as
nothing, and thought that men could fight just as well in snow
or on ice, as on ground covered with verdure or with crops.
Austria, on the contrary, wished to gain time, because she was
pledged to England not to make any separate peace before the
month of February ensuing, that is, February, 1801 (Pluvi6se,
year IX.). Extremely apprehensive of the renewal of hostilities,
she had just applied for a third prolongation of the armistice.
The First Consul had peremptorily refused it, on the ground
that M. de Cobentzel had not yet arrived at Luneville. He
was resolved not to concede this point, till the Austrian pleni
potentiary should be on the very spot fixed for the negotiation.
At length, on the 24th of October, 1800, M. de Cobentzel
arrived at Luneville. He was received on the frontiers and
along the whole route with salutes of cannon, and with
extraordinary demonstrations of respect. General Clarke had

Nov. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 123
been appointed governor of Luneville, to do the honours of the
place to the members of the Congress ; and, that he might be
able to discharge that duty in a suitable manner, a sum of
money and some crack regiments had been placed at his disposal.
Joseph, on his part, had repaired thither, accompanied by M. de
Lafor&t, for secretary. No sooner had M. de Cobentzel ar
rived, than the First Consul, anxious to learn himself the dispo
sitions of the Austrian negotiator, sent him an invitation to
come and pass a few days in Paris* M. de Cobentzel durst not
refuse, and proceeded to Paris with great deference. He reached
it on the 29th of October. A new prolongation of the armistice
for twenty days was at once granted him. The First Consul then
conversed with him on the peace, and the conditions upon which
it might be concluded. M. de Cobentzel's replies were not very
satisfactory on the question of a separate negotiation, and, as to
the conditions, he put forward pretensions that were totally out
of place. Austria had views in regard to Italy which it was im
possible to satisfy, and she expected, if the indemnities promised
in. Italy by the treaty of Campo-Formio were granted to her in
Germany only, she expected that exorbitant concessions of
territory should be made to her either in Bavaria, or in the
Palatinate, or in Swabia. The First Consul gave way to some
sallies of passion. This he had done before in the negotiations
of Campo-Formio, with this same M. de Cobentzel ; but, with
increasing age and power, he controlled himself even less than
he had formerly done. M. de Cobentzel complained bitterly,
saying that 'he had never been treated in that manner, either by
Catherine, or by Frederick, or by the emperor Paul himself.
In consequence, he desired to return to Luneville, and the First
Consul suffered him to depart, imagining that it would be better
to negotiate foot by foot with him, through the medium of
Joseph. The latter, mild, calm, and tolerably intelligent, was
fitter than his brother for this operation of patience.
M. de Cobentzel and Joseph Bonaparte, having met at Lu
neville, exchanged their full powers on the 9th of November
(18th Brumaire). Joseph had orders to put to him the three
, following questions: — 1. Had he authority to treat? 2. Was
he authorised to treat separately from England 1 3. Was he to
treat for the emperor, in the name of the house of Austria alone,
or in the name of the whole Germanic empire ?
The powers being exchanged, and found to be valid, for
which purpose they were most minutely scrutinised, on account
of the misadventure of M. de St. Julien, they entered into ex
planations concerning the extent of those powers. M. de Co
bentzel declared, without hesitation, that he could not treat
* Napoleon said, at St. Helena, that M. de Cobentzel was desirous to
come to Paris in order to gain time. His memory deceived him. The
diplomatic correspondence proves1 what I advance.

124 HISTORY OF THE [Nov. 1800.
without the presence of an English plenipotentiary at the con
gress. As to the question, whether he was to treat for the
house of Austria alone, or for the whole Empire, he said that he
must refer to Vienna for fresh instructions.
These answers were transmitted to Paris. The First Consul
immediately directed M. de Cobentzel to be informed that hosti
lities should be renewed at the expiration of the armistice, that
is to say in the last days of November ; that, nevertheless, the
congress need not break up; that while the hostilities continued
they might negotiate; but that the French armies would not
stop in their march till the Austrian plenipotentiary had con
sented to treat without England.
During these transactions the First Consul had taken a pre
caution, which had become indispensable, in regard to Tuscany.
The Austrian general, Sommariva, had remained there with a few
hundred men, agreeably to the convention of Alexandria, but he
continued to raise levies en masse with English money, At the
same moment intelligence was received of a landing at Leghorn of
those same English troops, which had so long been on their way
from Mahon to Ferrol, from Ferrol to Cadiz. The Neapolitans,
on their part, were advancing towards Rome, and the Austrians,
spreading themselves in the Legations beyond the limits marked
out by the armistice, were thus endeavouring to extend a hand to
the Tuscan insurrection. The First Consul, seeing that, while
the Austrians were seeking to gain time, they were preparing
to place the French army between two fires, directed general
Dupont to march upon Tuscany, and Murat, commanding the
camp at Amiens, to proceed immediately to Italy. He had
several times warned the Austrians what he meant to do, unless
they suspended the movements of troops begun in Tuscany ;
and, perceiving that they paid no attention to these intimations,
he had actually given orders accordingly. General Dupont, with
Pino's, Mather's, and Carra St. Cyr's brigades, rapidly crossed
the Apennines, and occupied Florence ; while general Clement
marched from Lucca to Leghorn. No resistance was anywhere
experienced. Meanwhile, the insurgents assembled in the town
of Arezzo, which had already distinguished itself against the
French, at the time of Macdonald's retreat in 1799. They were
obliged to take it by assault, and to punish it. This was done
less severely, perhaps, than it had deserved for its conduct to
wards our soldiers. All Tuscany was thenceforward submissive.
The Neapolitans were stopped in their march, and the English
driven from the soil of Italy, at the very moment when they
were about to enter Leghorn. Two davs afterwards, they
landed 12,000 men.
¦ The armies were in motion on all sides, from the banks of the
Mayntothe coast of the Adriatic, from Frankfort to Bologna.
Notice of hostilities had, moreover, been given. Austria, in
alarm, made a last attempt, through the medium of M. de

Nov. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 125
Cobentzel — an attempt which proved her desire to bring
matters to a conclusion, but also the embarrassment resulting
from her unfortunate engagements with England. M. de Co
bentzel, therefore, addressed himself to Joseph Bonaparte, and,
assuming a tone of confidence, asked him several times if the
discretion of the French government might be depended upon.
Made easy on this point by Joseph, he showed him a letter, in
which the emperor, expressing the same fears that he himself
had just expressed, relative to the danger of an indiscretion,
but, relying upon his knowledge of men and things, authorised
him to make the following overture. Austria consented, at
length, to detach herself from England, and to treat separately,
on two conditions, on which she must insist in the most absolute
manner; firstly, inviolable secrecy till the 1st of February,
1801, the period at which her engagements with England ter
minated, with a formal promise, if the negotiation should mis
carry, to give up all the papers written on both sides ; secondly,
the admission of an English plenipotentiary to Luneville, to
mask the real negotiation by his presence. On these two con
ditions, Austria consented to treat immediately, and desired a
fresh prolongation of the armistice.
The proximity of Paris admitted of an immediate answer.
The First Consul would not, at any rate, admit an English
negotiator to Luneville. He consented, however, to suspend
hostilities again, on condition of a peace signed secretly, if that
suited Austria, but signed within forty-eight hours. The con
ditions of this peace were already settled, in a great measure,
by the discussion on the preliminaries. They were the follow
ing : — The Rhine as boundary of the French Republic in Ger
many ; the Mincio for the boundary of Austria in Italy, instead
of the Adige, which she had in 1797, but with the cession of
Mantua to the Cisalpine ; the Milanese, the Valteline, Parma,
and Modena to the Cisalpine ; Tuscany to the duke of Parma ;
the Legations to the duke of Tuscany ; lastly, as general condi
tions, the independence of Piedmont, Switzerland, and Genoa.
These were the groundwork of the St. Julien preliminaries, with
a single difference, the relinquishment [of Mantua to the Cisal
pine, to punish Austria for the refusal of her ratification. But
the First Consul required that the treaty should be signed in
forty-eight hours, otherwise he threatened immediate war, and
with redoubled vigour. In case of acceptance, he bound himself
absolute secrecy till the 1st of February, and to a new suspension
of hostilities.
Austria was not disposed either to proceed so expeditiously,
or to assent to such sacrifices in Italy. Deceiving herself
respecting the conditions which she was able to obtain, she
rejected the French proposal. Hostilities were, therefore, re
newed immediately. M. de Cobentzel and Joseph remained
at Luneville, waiting, before they made new communications

126 HISTORY OF THE [Nov. 1800.
to one another, for the events that were about to take place at
once on the Danube, on the Inn, on the High Alps, and on
the Adige.
The renewal of hostilities had been announced for the 28th of
November (7th Frimaire, year IX.). Every thing was ready
for this winter campaign, one of the most celebrated, and one of
the most decisive in our annals.
The First Consul had disposed five armies on the vast theatre
of this war. His intention was to direct them from Paris, with
out putting himself personally at their head. Still he had not
renounced the idea of going to Germany or Italy, and assuming
the direct command of one of them, if an unforeseen reverse,
or any other cause, should render his presence necessary. His
equipages were at Dijon, quite ready to start for the point to
which he might be obliged to repair.
These five armies were those of Augereau on the Mayn, of
Moreau on the Inn, of Macdonald in the Grisons, of Brune on
the Mincio, and of Murat on march for Italy, with the grenadiers
of Amiens. Augereau had under his command 8000 Dutch,
12,000 French, in all 20,000 men; Moreau 130,000, of whom
110,000 belonged to the active army. The army of this latter
had been raised to this considerable force by recruiting, by
the return of sick and wounded, and by the junction of St. Su
zanne's corps. The delivery of Philipsburg, Ulm, and In
golstadt, had, moreover, permitted Moreau to concentrate all
his troops between the Isar and the Inn. Macdonald had at
his disposal 15,000 men in the Grisons. Brune in Italy was at
the head of 125,000 soldiers, 80,000 of whom were on the
Mincio, 12,000 in Lombardy, Piedmont, and Liguria ; 8000 in
Tuscany; and 25,000 in the hospitals. Murat's corps formed a
force of 10,000 grenadiers. This constituted a total of 300,000
combatants. If we add to this number 40,000 men in Egypt
and in the colonies, 60,000 in the interior and on the coasts, we
shall find that, since the administration of the First Consul, the
Republic numbered nearly 400,000 soldiers under arms. The
300,000 posted on the theatre of war, 250,000 of whom were
effective, and capable of acting immediately, were provided
with every thing, thanks to the united resources of the Treasury,
and the contributions levied in the countries occupied. The
cavalry was well mounted, especially that in Germany- The
parks of artillery were large, and in admirable condition.
Moreau possessed 200 pieces of cannon, Brune 180. We were,
therefore, much better prepared than in spring, and our armies
had unbounded confidence in themselves.
Enlightened but rigid judges have asked why the First
Consul, instead of dividing the whole of his active forces into
five corps, had not, according to his own principle, formed two
great masses, one of 170,000 men under Moreau, marching for
Vienna through Bavaria ; the other of 130,000 under Brune,

Nov. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 127
crossing the Mincio, the Adige, and the Alps, and threatening
Vienna by the Friule. This was, indeed, the plan which he
adopted in 1805, but the exposition of facts will enable the
reader to comprehend his motives, and prove with what a pro
found knowledge of men and things he understood how to vary
the application of the great principles of war according to
circumstances. Our two principal armies, that of Moreau and that of Brune,
were posted on the two sides of the Alps, nearly on the same
meridian, the first along the Inn, the second along the Mincio.
Moreau was to force the line of the Inn, Brune that of the
Mincio. These two armies were at least equal in numerical
force, immensely superior in moral force, to those which were
opposed to them. Between the two lay the chain of the Alps,
forming in this part what is called the Tyrol. The Austrians
had the corps of general IDer in German Tyrol, and that of
general Davidovich in Italian Tyrol. General Macdonald, with
the 15,000 men placed under his command, and designated the
second army of reserve, was to occupy those two corps, and to
attract all their attention, by leaving them uncertain respecting
the point of attack which he should choose ; for, placed in the
Grisons, he had the option of throwing himself directly into
German Tyrol, or by the Splugen into Italian Tyrol. The
title borne by his army, and the doubts circulated respecting its
force, could not but excite apprehensions of some other extra
ordinary stroke, and it was there to profit by the dread which
the passage of the St. Bernard had produced. People had not
given sufficient credit to the first army of reserve ; they were
ready to give too much to the second. Moreau and Brune,
thenceforth relieved from all uneasiness about the side next to
the Alps, could, without being alarmed for their flanks, push
forward with the whole of their forces.
Augereau's little army was destined to watch the levies en
masse of Franconia and Swabia, supported by the Austrian
corps of Simbschen. It covered, therefore, the left and the rear
of Moreau. Lastly, Murat, with 10,000 grenadiers and a
powerful artillery, was to perform precisely the same part, in
regard to Brune, as Augereau was about to perform in regard
to Moreau. He was to cover the right and the rear of Brune,
against the insurgents of central Italy, the Neapolitans, and the
English, &c.
These prudential precautions are such as it is right to take,
when you are confined within the conditions of ordinary war
fare. Now, the First Consul was necessarily confined within
them, when he had for executers of his plans two such generals
as Brune and Moreau. Moreau, the best of the two, and one
of the best in Europe, was, nevertheless, not the man to do
what the First Consul, after he became emperor, himself did in
1805, when, collecting a considerable force on the Danube, and

128 HISTORY OF THE [Nov. 1800.
leaving a smaller force in Italy, he swept onwards like a torrent
upon Vienna, regardless either about his flanks or his rear, and
placing his safety in the overwhelming vigour of the strokes
which he dealt to the principal enemy. But Moreau, but
Brune, were not men to act thus. It was, therefore, necessary
that, in directing them, he should keep within the conditions of
methodical warfare ; it was necessary to guard their flanks and
their rear, to secure them against whatever might happen around
them ; for neither was capable of controlling accidents by the
grandeur and vigour of his resolutions. For this reason it was
that Macdonald was placed in the Tyrol, Augereau in Franconia,
Murat in central Italy.
These dispositions did not admit of improvement, unless
the state of affairs at home had allowed the First Consul to
assume, in person, the command of one of the armies ; but
every body agreed that at this moment he ought not to leave
the centre of the government. His absence, during the short
campaign of Marengo, had been attended with inconveniences
serious enough to prevent him from incurring them again,
without absolute necessity.
The dispositions of the Austrians were, in all respects, inferior
to ours. Their armies, nearly equal in number to the French
forces, were not a match for them in any other respect. They
had not yet recovered from their recent defeats. The archduke
John commanded in Germany, marshal Bellegarde in Italy.
Simbschen's corps, destined to form the nucleus of the levies in
Swabia and Franconia, appuyed itself on general Klenau. The
latter commanded an intermediate corps, placed a cheval on the
Danube, connecting itself, on the right, with Simbschen's corps,
on the left with the principal army of the archduke. Generals
Simbschen and Klenau had, between them, 24,000 men, exclu
sively of the partisan troops raised in Germany. General
Klenau was destined to follow the movements of general St.
Suzanne, to approach the archduke if St. Suzanne approached
Moreau, to join Simbschen's corps if St. Suzanne should join
the httle army of Augereau.
The archduke John had with him 80,000 men, of whom
60,000 were Austrians, in advance of the Inn, and 20,000 Wur-
tembergers or Bavarians, behind the entrenchments of that river.
General Iller commanded 20,000 men in the Tyrol, besides
10,000 Tyrolese. Marshal Bellegarde, in Italy, was at the head
of 80,000 soldiers, well established behind the Mincio. Lastly,
10,000 Austrians, detached towards Ancona and La Romagna,
were to second the Neapolitans and the English, in case these
latter should make an attempt upon central or southern Italy.
They formed, therefore, a principal force of 224,000 men, which,
with the Mayencers, the Tyrolese, the Neapolitans, the Tuscans,
and the English, might amount to about 300,000. The First
Consul, in causing the Tuscans to be disarmed, in closing

Nov. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 129
Leghorn against the English, in repressing the Neapolitans,
had taken very useful and proper precautions for preventing the
augmentation of the hostile forces.
By a sort of mutual resolution, both the belligerent parties
prepared to settle the quarrel in Germany, between the Isar and
the Inn. The operations commenced on the 28th of November
(7th Frimaire), in severe weather, produced by a very cold
rain in Swabia, and intense frost in the Alps. While Augereau,
advancing by. Frankfort, Aschaffenburg, Wurtzburg, and Nu
remberg, fought a brilliant action at Burg-Eberach, separated
the Mayence levies from Simbschen's corps, and crippled the
latter for the rest of the campaign ; while Macdonald, after oc
cupying the Austrians for a considerable time towards the
sources of the Inn, was preparing, in spite of the season, to cross
the great chain of the Alps, with the intention of boldly throwing
himself into Italian Tyrol, and facilitating for Brune the attack
of the line of the Mincio ; Moreau, with the principal mass of
his forces, advanced, between the Isar and the Inn, to a field of
battle which he had long studied, seeking a decisive engage- *
ment with the great Austrian army.
It is necessary to give an accurate idea of the ground on which
the French and the Austrians were about to meet, upon one of
the most important occasions of our long wars. We have else
where described the basin of the Danube, watered by that
great river and a series of tributaries, which, descending rapidly
from the Alps, come in succession to swell the mass of its
waters. These tributaries, we observed, are lines which an
Austrian army, intending to cover Vienna, ought to defend, and
which a French army, purposing to march on that capital, must
force. In the summer campaign, Moreau, as it will be recol
lected, after penetrating from the valley of the Rhine into that
of the Danube, and crossing the Iller, the Lech, the Isar, had
halted between the Isar and the Inn. He was master of the
course of the Isar, all the principal points of which he occupied;
first Munich, then Freising, Moosburg, Landshut, &c. He had
advanced beyond that river, and was facing the Inn, occupied
in force by the Austrians.
The Isar and the Inn, both issuing from the Alps, run to
gether towards the Danube, separated by an almost invariable
distance of between ten and twelve leagues. Proceeding at first
in a northward direction, the Isar to Munich, the Inn to Was-
serburg, they both turn off towards the east, till they fall into'
the Danube; the Isar at Deggendorf, the Inn at Passau. We
were masters of the Isar, and jt was requisite that we should
force the Inn ; but the Inn, broad, deep, defended at its outlet
from the mountains by the fort of Kufstein, and in the lower
part of its course by the fortress of Braunau, covered between
these two points by a vast number of intrenchments, the Inn
was a difficult barrier to pass. If Moreau attempted to force it
VOL. II. K

130 HISTORY OF THE [Nov. 1800.
in the upper part of its course, between Kufstein, Rosenheim,
and Wasserburg, he would meet with almost insurmountable
local difficulties ; he would, moreover, have the army of Tyrol
on his right flank. If he determined on forcing it in the lower
part of its course, between Braunau and Passau, near the point
where it falls into the Danube, he would have to run the risk of
a lengthened march upon the left, through a difficult, wooded,
marshy country, exposing his flank to the Austrian army, which,
advancing by Miihldorf and Braunau, might throw itself upon
the right wing of the French army. These two inconveniences
were judged extremely serious. Ifthe Austrians, taking care to
guard themselves properly, and to observe with vigilance all the
passes of the Inn, confined themselves to the defensive, Moreau
might encounter almost invincible obstacles. But such was not
their design. The offensive was resolved upon in the Austrian
staff. The young archduke John, with his head full of new
theories invented by the Germans, and emulous also to imitate
something of the great movements of general Bonaparte, devised
a very extensive plan, which was not badly conceived either,
in the opinion of competent judges. Unluckily this plan was
inapplicable, because it was not based on the accurate appre
ciation of present circumstances. As far as it has come to our
knowledge, it was as follows : —
Moreau was established on the ground which separates the
Isar from the Inn. Between Munich and Wasserburg this
ground forms an elevated plain, covered with a thick forest, sub
sides as it approaches the Danube, and, as it sinks, is rent into
numerous ravines, continues wooded in some parts, becomes
swampy in others, and, in short, is very difficult of access on
every side. Moreau was in possession of this plateau, of the
forest which covers it, and of the roads that intersect it. From
Munich, where he had his head-quarters, two roads lead to the
Inn ; the one running direct through Ebersburg to Wasserburg,
the other in an oblique direction to the left, and passing through
Hohenlinden, Haag, Ampfing, and Miihldorf. Both crossed the
gloomy forest of pines, which covers that elevated tract. It was
in this formidable retreat, formed by a hilly and wooded country,
approachable by two roads, both of which were held by Moreau,
that an assailing force must needs encounter him. The other
roads consisted of only very narrow paths, destined solely for the
conveyance of timber, and impassable for the heavy waggon-train
of an army.
The young archduke projected a great manoeuvre. He pur
posed not to attack Moreau's position in front, but to turn it, in
debouching by the bridges of Miihldorf, Neu-Oetting, and Brau
nau. Leaving about 20,000 men, Bavarians, Wurtembergers,
and Conde's emigrants, to dispute the Inn, he intended to assume
the offensive with 60,000 Austrians, and to march on the left of
Moreau, through that half woody, half swampy country, which

Nov. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 131
extends between the Inn and the Isar, near the points where they
fall into the Danube. If the young archduke proceeded rapidly
through the difficult country by Eggenfelden, Neumarkt, and
Wilsburg, and arrived in time at Landshut on the Isar, he would <
be able to ascend the Isar on our rear, to Freising, cross it at
that place, and thence continue his march upon a chain of
heights which begins at Dachau, and commands the plain of
Munich. Occupying this point, he would dangerously threaten
Moreau's line of retreat, and oblige him to evacuate the country
between the Inn and the Isar, and to pass through Munich with
the utmost haste, in order to take a retrograde position on the
Lech. But, to insure the success of such a manoeuvre, one must
have correctly calculated all the means of execution, and, after
engaging in it, great firmness was requisite for encountering its
perilous chances ; for there was an almost impassable country to
traverse, in horrible weather, and at the same time incessantly
skirting an enemy, who was not prompt and daring, it is true,
•but intelligent, firm, and not easily disconcerted.
The troops of both nations were in motion on the 26th and
27th of November (5th and 6th Frimaire), to commence hosti
lities on the 28th (7th Frimaire). The Austrian general Klenau,
stationed on the Danube to support Simbschen against the little
army of Augereau, had attracted the attention of general St.
Suzanne, commanding Moreau's fourth corps. Being thus both
of them removed to a considerable distance from the principal
theatre of events, they were on the Danube; general St. Suzanne
towards Ingolstadt, general Klenau towards Ratisbon.
Moreau had moved his left wing, 26,000 strong, and under the
command of general Grenier, along the high road from Munich
to Miihldorf, by Hohenlinden, Haag, and Ampfing, thus making
it occupy the slopes of that species of plateau which extends
between the two rivers. His centre, which he commanded in
person, and which amounted to about 34,000 men,* occupied
the direct road from Munich to Wasserburg by Ebersberg. The
right wing under Lecourbe, of about 26,000 men, was posted
along the upper Inn, in the environs of Rosenheim : a division
of it observed the Tyrol. Moreau had consequently at hand only
his left and his centre, nearly 60,000 men. He had set his army
in motion to make a strong reconnoissance from Rosenheim to
Miihldorf, and to force the enemy to disclose his intentions.
Moreau, unable to anticipate, like general Bonaparte, the de
signs of his adversary, still less to dictate them, as the latter
did, by taking the initiative with a high hand, — Moreau was
obliged to grope about to discover what he could neither divine
nor pre-induce. But he advanced prudently, and if he was

* The centre consisted of 30,000 men ; but the Polish division of Knia-
cewitz, which had rejoined general Decaen, and the artillery reserve, must
have augmented it to about 34,000 or 35,000 men.
K.2

132 HISTORY OF THE [Nov. 1800.
surprised, he repaired expeditiously, and with great calmness,
the mischief of the surprise.
The 29th and 30th of November (8th and 9th Frimaire) were
spent by the French army in reconnoitring the line of the Inn ;
by the Austrian army in crossing that line and traversing the low
tract between the Inn, the Danube, and the Isar. Moreau forced
the Austrian advanced posts to fall back, moved his right under
Lecourbe to Rosenheim, his centre, under his own immediate
command, to Wasserburg, his left, under Grenier, to the heights
of Ampfing. These heights command, but at a great distance,
the banks of the Inn. The left of the French army was in some
danger ; for, following the course of the Inn to Miihldorf, it was fif
teen leagues from Munich, while the rest of the army was only ten.
Moreau had, in consequence, taken care that it should be sup
ported by a division of the centre, that which general Grandjean
commanded. But it was a fault to advance in this manner in three
corps, so far separated from one another, in place of marching on
the Inn en masse, and presenting himself before a single debouche,*
while he made false demonstrations at several points. This fault
had wellnigh been productive of serious consequences.
The Austrian army had passed, at Braunau, Neu-Oetting
Miihldorf, and crossed the low tract which has been already
mentioned. Part of the archduke's troops, recently arrived, had
scarcely had time to rest themselves. They were marching labo
riously in that region, sometimes wooded, sometimes intersected
by small rivers, the Wils, the Rott, the lsen, which descend
from the plateau occupied by the French army. The narrow
paths, which is was necessary to follow, were broken up ;
and it was with the utmost difficulty that the heavy park
of waggons could move along them. The young archduke
and his advisers, who had not foreseen any of these circum
stances, were alarmed at the undertaking, now that it was
begun. Our left wing, advanced nearly to Ampfing and Miihl
dorf, gave them uneasiness, and made them apprehensive lest they
should be cut off from the Inn. They designed to turn Moreau,
and now they were fearful that they should themselves be turned
instead. This danger should have been foreseen, and a new base
of operations prepared on the Danube, between Ratisbon and
Passau, in case they should be separated from the Inn. But
nothing of this kind was done. In every bold operation it is
necessary to provide, in the first place, for difficulties of execution,
and, in the next, after commencing the execution, to persevere
with firmness in what one has planned, for it is very rarely the case
that we do not incur ourselves the dangers in which we would
involve our adversary. The Austrian staff, from the very outset,
was astonished, terrified, at what it had projected, and suddenly
changed its plan. Instead of persisting in gaining the Isar, for
the purpose of ascending on our rear, it stopped short, and re
solved to turn down upon our left, and to give battle immediately.

Dec. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 133
This was meeting the difficulty in front, and undiminished ; for
it became necessary, in ascending the bed of the rivers, to climb
the elevated ground which we occupied, and then penetrate into
the forest, in which we had been for a long time established. The
enemy might at first have an advantage over our left wing, which
was somewhat endangered, but, this success obtained, he would
find our army concentrated in an absolute labyrinth, all the out
lets of which it knew and occupied.
. Accordingly, on the 1st of December (10th Frimaire, year
IX.), the archduke John moved the greater part of his army
upon our left by three roads at once ; the valley of the lsen, the
highroad from Miihldorf to Ampfing, lastly, the bridge of Krai-
burg on the Inn. The valley of the lsen, commencing on the
flanks of the woody plateau, already described, permitted the
greatly lengthened position of our left to be turned. A corps of
15,000 men ascended it. Another corps marched direct for the
high road from Miihldorf, which, after ascending the heights of
Ampfing, leads through the forest to Hohenlinden and Munich.
Lastly, a detachment, crossing the Inn at Kraiburg, and passing
through Aschau, took in flank our left wing, which had unluckily
ventured as far as Ampfing. Forty thousand men were going
in a moment to fall upon 26,000.
These 26,000 men, commanded by general Grenier, had
to sustain a severe and unequal contest. Ney, who defended
the heights of Ampfing, displayed that incomparable energy
which distinguished him in war. He performed prodi
gies of valour, and contrived to retire without serious loss.
Threatened by the corps which had passed the Inn at Kraiburg
and penetrated into the defile of Aschau, he was fortunately ex
tricated by Grandjean's division, which Moreau, as we have said,
had detached from his centre to support his left. Legrand's
division, which was in the valley of the lsen, ascended that
valley in retrograding upon Dorfen. Moreau, seeing the supe
riority of the Austrians, had the good sense not to persist, and
effected his retreat in the best order.
It is obvious from these first movements that Moreau had
not been able to penetrate the designs of the enemy, and that,
in advancing upon all the debouches of the Inn at once, instead
of making an attack upon a single point, he had compromised
his left. The extraordinary valour of his troops, and the vigour
of his lieutenants, who, in execution, were accomplished generals,
had made amends for all.
But this was only an insignificant beginning. Moreau had
abandoned the outskirts of his position, and retired to the centre
of the extensive forest of Hohenlinden. It would be requisite
to force him in this formidable retreat. His coolness and vigour
were here about to be pitted against the inexperience of the arch
duke, flushed by a first success.
We have already said that two roads ran through the forest: one

134 HISTORY OF THE [Dec. 1800.
on the right, descending directly to the Inn, by Ebersberg and
Wasserburg ; the other, on the left, which passes through Ho
henlinden, Mattenboett, Haag, Ampfing, and joins the Inn at
Miihldorf, is rather longer. It was along this latter road that
the Austrians were proceeding en masse, some following the de
file which it forms through the forest, others laboriously ascend
ing the beds of the small rivers which gave access to the flank
of our position. Moreau immediately formed a judgment, and a
sound one, of this situation, and conceived an idea from which
he derived great results : it was to allow the Austrians, already
engaged with his left, to penetrate into the forest, and then,
when they should be pretty far advanced in it, to transfer his
centre from the Ebersberg road to the Hohenlinden road, to
surprise them in that dangerous place, and to destroy them
there. He made his dispositions accordingly.
The road on the left, or the Hohenlinden road, adopted by
the Austrians, after leaving the banks of the Inn and ascending
the heights of Ampfing, passed over hills, alternately wooded
and naked, as far as Mattenboett, then through a thick wood
from Mattenboett to Hohenlinden, forming there a long defile.
bordered by lofty pine-trees. At Hohenlinden itself the forest
suddenly ceased. A small plain, free from wood, studded with
several hamlets, extended to the right and left of the road; in the
middle were the village of Hohenlinden and the post-house. Not
only the principal column of the Austrian army, marching in the
defile of the forest, but also the detachments ascending the river
lsen, for the purpose of debouching by different outlets on the
left of our position, would necessarily have to pass this spot.
In this httle plain of Hohenlinden, Moreau deployed his left
wing under Grenier, Grandjean's division having been pre
viously detached from the centre, with all the reserves of artillery
and cavalry.
On the right of the road and village of Hohenlinden he
posted Grandjean's division, commanded on this day by general
Grouchy ; on the left, Ney's division ; still further to the left,
on the skirt of the wood, and at the head of the roads by which
the Austrian columns ascending the valley of the lsen would
arrive, Legrand's and Bastoul's divisions, both drawn up in ad
vance of the villages of Preisendorf and Harthofen. The re
serves of cavalry and artillery were in rear of these four divisions
of infantry, deployed in the middle of the plain. The centre,
reduced to Richepanse's and Decaen's two divisions, was at some
leagues' distance, on the right-hand road, in the environs of
Ebersberg. Moreau sent to those two divisions an order, some
what vaguely expressed, but positive, to throw themselves from
the right-hand into the left-hand road, to get into the latter in
the environs of Mattenboett, and there surprise the Austrian
army entangled in the forest. This order was neither precise, nor
clear, nor circumstantial, as well conceived and well expressed or-

Dec. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 135
ders ought to be, and those of general Bonaparte, for instance,
invariably were. He neither indicated the route to be pursued, nor
provided against any accidents which might bccur ; he left every
thing that was to be done to the intelligence of generals Decaen
and Richepanse. They, however, might well be trusted to make
up for all that the commander-in-chief omitted to say. Moreau,
moreover, directed Lecourbe, who formed his right towards the
Tyrol, and. general St. Suzanne, who formed his left towards
the Danube, to draw near in haste to the spot on which the de
cisive event of the campaign was about to take place. But one
was fifteen leagues off, at least, the other twenty-five, and they
were consequently out of reach. It was not thus that general
Bonaparte acted on the eve of great battles : on these occasions
he did not leave half his forces at such distances. But, to bring
up all the parts of which a numerous army is composed in time
to the point where the fortunes of war are decided, there is re
quired a superior foresight, which the greatest men alone possess,
and without which it is still possible to be an excellent general.
Moreau was about to fight nearly 70,000 Austrians with fewer
than 60,000 French ; this number was more than sufficient, with
the soldiers of whom our legions were then composed.
The archduke John, ignorant of all this, was intoxicated with
his success on the 1st of December (10th Frimaire). He was
young, and he had seen that formidable army of the Rhine,
which for many years the Austrian generals had not possessed
the skill to stop, falling back before him. He rested on the 2nd
of December, which gave Moreau time to make the dispositions
which we have just detailed ; and he prepared every thing for
passing through the extensive forest of Hohenlinden on the 3rd
of December (12th Frimaire). This general, rather raw in his
profession, imagined that the French army could not make the
least resistance to him in the route which he was about to pur
sue. He conceived at most that he should fall in with it in
advance of Munich.
He divided his army into four corps. The principal, that of
the centre, composed of the reserve, the Hungarian grenadiers,
Bavarians, the greater part of the cavalry, the baggage, and a hun
dred pieces of cannon, was to follow the high road from Miihl
dorf to Hohenlinden, to traverse the defile which it forms through
the forest, and then debouch in the little plain of Hohenlinden.
General Riesch, who had crossed the Inn at Kraiburg, on the
1st of December, with about twelve thousand men, was to
flank the centre, and to debouch in the open ground at Ho
henlinden, on the left of the Austrians, on the right of the French.
At the other extremity of this field of battle, the corps of Bail-
let-Latour and Kienmayer, which had entered the valley of the
lsen, were to continue to ascend it, and to debouch at some dis
tance from one another, the first by lsen upon Kronacker and
Preisendorf, the second by Lendorf upon Harthofen ; both in

136 HISTORY OF THE [Dec. 1800.
the unwooded plain of Hohenlinden. They had orders not to
lose time, to leave even their artillery behind, the corps of the
centre taking a great quantity along with it by the principal
road, and to carry with them no more baggage than was neces
sary for making soup for the soldiers. •
Thus these four corps of the Austrian army, marching at a
considerable distance from each other, in that thick forest, one
only, that of the centre, on a high road, with causeway, the three
others by paths exclusively destined for the carriage of timber,
were to meet in the open space extending between Hohenlinden
and Harthofen, exposed to the risk of not arriving together, and
of encountering, by the way, many unforeseen adventures. The
Bavarians having rejoined the Austrians, the archduke's army
amounted, at this moment, to 70,000 men.
On the morning of the 3rd of December, the French were
deployed between Hohenlinden and Harthofen. Moreau, on
horseback before daybreak, was at the head of his staff, and, a
little farther off, Richepanse and Decaen were executing the
movement which they were directed to make from the Ebers
berg road to that of Hohenlinden.
The four Austrian corps, on their part, advanced simultane
ously, each as fast as it could, sensible of the value of time in a
season when there is so little daylight either for marching or for
fighting. A thick fall of snow darkened the air, and rendered
the nearest objects indistinguishable. The archduke John, at
the head of the centre, had penetrated into the defile of the
forest from Mattenboett to Hohenlinden, and had almost cleared
it long before general Riesch, on his left, and generals Baillet-
Latour and Kienmayer on his right, could reach the field of
battle, embarrassed as they were in those horrible roads. The
young prince at length appeared on the margin of the wood
facing Grandjean's and Ney's divisions, both drawn up in order
of battle, in advance of the village of Hohenlinden. The 108th
demi-brigade, of Grandjean's division, was deployed, having on
its wings the 46th and the 57th, formed in close column. The
4th hussars and the 6th of the line supported it in the rear. A
very brisk cannonade was opened on both sides. The Aus
trians attacked the 108th, which made a firm resistance. Eight
battalions of Hungarian grenadiers were ordered to file through
the wood, in order to turn it on its right. On seeing this,
generals Grandjean and Grouchy hastened, with the 46th, to
the assistance of the 108th, which was shaken, and began to
lose ground. They penetrated into the wood, and commenced,
among the pine-trees, a desperate struggle, almost man to man,
with the Hungarian grenadiers. A battalion of the 57th, pushing
still deeper into it, turned the Hungarians, and obliged them to
seek refuge in the recesses of the forest. Thus Grandjean's
division remained victorious, and prevented the Austrian co
lumn from deploying in the plain of Hohenlinden.

Dec. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 137
After a few moments' rest, the archduke John made a new
attack on Hohenlinden, and on Grandjean's division. This
second attack was repulsed like the first. At this moment, the
Austrian troops of Baillet Latour began to be perceived towards
Kronacker, making their appearance on our left, at the margin
of the wood, ready to debouch into the plain of Hohenlinden.
The snow, having ceased falling for a few minutes, allowed
them to be easily discerned. But they were not yet in a state
to act, and, besides, Bastoul's and Legrand's divisions were pre
paring to receive them. All at once, a kind of agitation, a
wavering, was perceptible in the Austrian troops of the centre,
which had not yet been able to get out of the defile of the
forest. Something extraordinary seemed to be taking place on
their rear. Moreau, with a sagacity which does honour to his
military intuition, remarked this circumstance, and said to Ney,
" Now is the moment to charge ; Richepanse and Decaen must
be upon the rear of the Austrians." He immediately ordered
Ney's and Grandjean's divisions, which were on the right and
left of Hohenlinden, to form into columns of attack, to charge the
Austrians drawn up on the margin of the forest, and to drive
them back into that long defile in which they had till then been
shut up. Ney charged them in front ; Grouchy, with Grand
jean's division, took them in flank, and both drove them im
petuously into that gorge, where they wer'e crowded together
pell-mell, along with their artillery and cavalry.
At this very instant, the events which Moreau had foreseen
and prepared were taking place at the other extremity of the
defile, at Mattenboett. Richepanse and Decaen, in obedience
to the orders which they had received t from him, had struck
off from the Ebersberg road into that of Hohenlinden.
Richepanse, who was the nearest to Mattenboett, had started,
without waiting for Decaen, and daringly penetrated into that
tract of thickets and ravines which separates the two roads,
marching while the fight was going on at Hohenlinden, and
making incredible efforts to drag with him, over that inundated
ground, six pieces of small calibre. He had already passed,
without accident, the village of St. Christoph, when the corps
of general Riesch, destined to flank the centre of the Austrians,
arrived there ; but he had proceeded onward from St. Christoph
with a single brigade, leaving the second, Drouet's, engaged with
the enemy. Richepanse, reckoning upon Decaen to extricate
Drouet's brigade, had marched, without losing a moment, for
Mattenboett; for his military instinct told him that there was
the decisive point. Though he had left but two demi-brigades
of infantry, the 8th and the 48th, a single regiment of cavalry,
the 1st chasseurs, and six pieces of cannon, with about 6000
men, he had continued his march, dragging his artillery by hand,
almost always through the quagmire. On reaching Mattenboett,
at the other extremity of the defile of the forest, the head of which

138 HISTORY OF THE [Dec. 1800.
we have just said that Ney was attacking, he fell in with a body of
Austrian cuirassiers, dismounted, with their horses' bridles over
their arms ; he fell upon them, and made them prisoners. Then
deploying on the small open spot which surrounds Mattenboett,
he placed the 8th on the right, the 48th on the left, and pushed
the 1st chasseurs on eight squadrons of cavalry, which, on
seeing him, had formed to charge him. The 1st chasseurs,
after a vigorous charge, was repulsed, and fell back behind the
8th demi-brigade. The latter, crossing bayonets, stopped the
career of the Austrian cavalry. At this moment, Richepanse's
position became critical. Having left behind his second brigade
to make head against Riesch's corps, surrounded himself on all
sides, he thought that he ought not to give the Austrians time
to perceive his weakness. Committing to general Walther,
with the 8th demi-brigade and the 1st chasseurs, the duty of
keeping in check the enemy's rear-guard, which was preparing
to fight, he himself, with the 48th alone, fell to the left, and
took the bold resolution to fall upon the Austrian rear in the
defile of the forest. Hazardous as was this resolution, it was
not less sensible than vigorous ; for the archduke's column, en
tangled in this defile, must have before it the main body of the
French army, and, by dashing furiously upon its rear, it was
probable that he should produce great disorder in it, and obtain
important results. 'Richepanse immediately formed the 48th
into columns, and, marching sword in hand amidst his grena
diers, penetrated into the forest, sustained, without flinching, a
violent discharge of grape-shot, then fell in with two Hungarian
battalions, which hastened up to bar his passage. Richepanse
would have inspirited his brave soldiers with words and gestures,
but they had no need of them. " Those fellows are our pri
soners," cried they, " let us charge !" They charged accordingly,
and completely routed the Hungarian battalions. Presently,
they came to masses of baggage, artillery, infantry, accumulated
pell-mell at this spot. Richepanse struck inexpressible terror
into this multitude, and threw it into frightful disorder. At the
same moment, he heard confused shouts at the other extremity
of this defile. On advancing, these shouts, becoming more
distinct, revealed the presence of our troops. It was Ney,
who, marching from Hohenlinden, had penetrated by the head
of the defile, and pushed before him the Austrian column, which
Richepanse was driving the other way, by attacking it in rear.
Ney and Richepanse met, recognised one another, and em
braced, intoxicated with joy on seeing so glorious a result.
Their troops rushed, on all sides, upon the Austrians, who
sought shelter by flight in the woods, or begged quarter of
the conqueror. They took thousands of prisoners, the
whole of the artillery, and the baggage. Richepanse, leaving
Ney to secure these trophies, returned to Mattenboett, where
general Walther had remained with a demi-brigade and a single

Dec. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 139
regiment of cavalry. He found this brave general, struck by a
ball, borne away in the arms of his soldiers, but bis countenance
beaming with joy, and compensated for his sufferings by the
satisfaction of having contributed to a decisive manoeuvre.
Richepanse extricated his troops, and returned to St. Christoph,
where he had left Drouet's brigade alone engaged with Riesch's
corps. But all his anticipations were verified on that auspicious
day. General Decaen had arrived in time, extricated Drouet's
brigade, and repulsed Riesch's corps, after taking from it a great
number of prisoners.
It was by this time midday. The centre of the Austrian
army had been enveloped and entirely routed. The left, under
general Riesch, arriving too late to stop Richepanse, attacked
and driven towards the Inn by Decaen, was in full retreat, after
sustaining considerable losses. With such results at the centre
and on the left of the Austrians, the issue of the battle could no
longer be doubtful.
During these events, Bastoul's and Legrand's divisions, posted
on the left of the clear ground about Hohenlinden, had had upon
their hands the infantry of generals Baillet-Latour, and Kien
mayer. These divisions had been hard pressed, for they were
inferior by one- half to the enemy ; they had, moreover, the dis
advantage of ground ; for the head of the wooded ravines, by
which the Austrians debouched into the little plain of Hohen
linden, being rather higher than that open plain, enabled them to
pour a downward fire upon it. But generals Bastoul and Le
grand, under the command of general Grenier, seconded by the
courage of their brave soldiers, made a vigorous stand. Luckily,
too, d'Hautpoul's cavalry was there to support them, as well as
Ney's second brigade, the latter general having entered the defile
with one only.
The two French divisions, at first overwhelmed by numbers,
had lost a little ground. Quitting the margin of the wood, they
had fallen back into the plain, but with extraordinary steadiness
and displaying to the enemy an heroic firmness. Two demi-
brigades of Legrand's division, the 51st and the 42nd, thrown
back towards Harthofen, had to oppose Kienmayer's infantry,
besides a division of cavalry attached to that corps. Sometimes
keeping up a well-sustained fire upon the infantry, at others cross
ing bayonets against the cavalry, they opposed an invincible re
sistance to all attacks. But, at this moment, Grenier, being
apprised of the success obtained at the centre, formed Legrand's
division into columns, caused it to be supported by charges of
d'Hautpoul's cavalry, and drove back Kienmayer's corps to the
skirt of the wood. General Bonnet, on his side, with a brigade
of Bastoul's division, charged the Austrians, and overthrew
them in the valley from which they, had endeavoured to issue.
Meanwhile, the grenadiers of Iola's brigade, Ney's second,
rushed upon Baillet-Latour, and repulsed him. The impulsion

140 HISTORY OF THE [Dec. 1800.
of victory communicated to these brave troops, redoubled their
ardour and their strength. They finally drove back the two corps
of Baillet-Latour, and Kienmayer, the one towards the lsen, the
other towards Lendorf, in that low and difficult tract from which
they had in vain attempted to debouch, in order to gain posses
sion of the plateau of Hohenlinden.
Moreau returned at this moment from the heart of the forest
with a detachment of Grandjean's division, to bring relief to his
left, which was so briskly attacked. But there, as at all the other
points, he found his soldiers victorious, transported with joy,
congratulating their general on such a glorious triumph. That
triumph was indeed glorious. The Austrian army had greater
difficulty to get out of those thickets than it had to penetrate into
them. There were seen everywhere straggling corps, which,
not knowing whither to flee, fell into the hands of our victorious
troops, and laid down their arms. It was five o'clock, and dark
ness shrouded the field of battle. The French had killed or
wounded 7000 or 8000 of the enemy, made 12,000 prisoners,
taken 300 waggons, and eighty-seven pieces of cannon, results very
uncommon in war. Thus in one day the Austrian army had lost
nearly 20,000 soldiers, almost all its artillery, its baggage, and,
what was of still greater importance, its whole moral courage.
This battle is the most brilliant of all that Moreau ever fought,
and certainly one of the greatest in the present century, which
has beheld such extraordinary conflicts. It has been wrongfully
asserted that there was another conqueror of Marengo than
general Bonaparte, and that this was general Kellermann. With
much greater reason it might be alleged that there was another
conqueror of Hohenlinden than general Moreau, namely, general
Richepanse, for he executed, upon a rather vague order, a most
brilliant manoeuvre. But, though less unjust, this assertion would
still be unjust. Let us leave to every man the merit of his deeds,
and not imitate those paltry efforts of envy, which is on all occa
sions bent on discovering a different conqueror from the real one.
Moreau, in advancing along the Inn from Kufstein to Miihl
dorf, without having chosen a precise point of attack, without
having concentrated all his forces upon that point, to make
nothing but mere demonstrations, — Moreau had in this manner
exposed his left in the battle of the 1st of December. Still this
could prove but a momentary advantage to the enemy ; and, in
retiring into the recesses of the labyrinth of Hohenlinden, in
drawing the Austrians thither, in bringing down opportunely
his centre upon his left, from Ebersberg to Mattenboett, he had
executed one of the most successful manoeuvres known in the
history of modern warfare. It has been alleged that Riche
panse marched without orders,* that is incorrect ; an order was

* So Napoleon erroneously asserted at St. Helena. The written orders
exist, and have been printed in the Memorial of the war.

Dec. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 141
given to him, as we have related, but it was too general, not
sufficiently detailed. None of the circumstances that might
have happened had been provided against. Moreau had merely
directed Richepanse and Decaen to strike off from Ebersberg
for St. Christoph, without specifying the route, without pro
viding against either the presence of Riesch's corps, or any of the
possible and even probable accidents, amidst that forest full of
enemies ; and, with an officer less vigorous than Richepanse,
he might have reaped a disaster instead of a triumph. But
fortune always has some share in military successes. All that
can be said is, that in this case it was very great, nay, greater
than usual.
Moreau has been censured because, while fighting with six
divisions out of twelve, he left three under general St. Suzanne
on the Danube, three under general Lecourbe on the Upper
Inn, and thus exposed his left, under general Grenier, to the
hazard of fighting in the proportion of one against two. This
reproach is certainly more weighty and more deserved ; but let
us not tarnish so glorious a triumph, and let us add, in order to
be just, that there are flaws in the finest works of men, that in
the most splendid victories there are faults, — faults which fortune
repairs, and which must be admitted as an ordinary accompani
ment of great military exploits.
After this important victory, the conqueror would have done
well to pursue the Austrian army briskly, to march for Vienna,
to demolish, by pushing forward, the defences of the Tyrol, to
necessitate in this manner a retrograde movement in the whole
line of the Austrians from Bavaria to Italy; for the retreat of the
troops from the Inn would occasion that of the troops from the
Tyrol, and the retreat of these latter would render the abandon
ment of the Mincio inevitable. But to obtain all these results
it would have been necessary to have forced the Inn, then the
Salza, which falls into the Inn, and forms a second line to cross
after the first. At the moment, all this might have been accom
plished from the impulsion given to our army by the victory of
Hohenliden. Moreau, as soon as he had allowed some rest to his troops,
moved his left and part of his centre into the Miihldorf road,
threatening at once the bridges of Kraiburg, Miihldorf, and Brau
nau, to persuade the enemy that he intended to cross the Inn in
its lower course. But, meanwhile, Lecourbe, who a few months
before had so gloriously passed the Danube at the battle of
Hochstett, was directed to cross the Inn, with the right, near
Rosenheim. This general had discovered a spot called Neubeurn;
where the right bank, which we occupied, commanded the left
bank, occupied by the enemy, and where the artillery might be
advantageously employed to protect the passage. This point was
therefore chosen. Several days were unfortunately lost in col
lecting the necessary materiel, ahd it was not till the morning of

142 history of the [Dec. 1800.
the 9th of December, six days after the great battle of Hohen
linden, that Lecourbe was enabled to act.
Moreau had suddenly resumed his position on the Upper Inn.
The three divisions of the centre had been despatched from
Wasserburg to Aibling, at a little distance from Rosenheim,
ready to assist Lecourbe. The left had succeeded them in their
positions, and general Collaud, with two divisions of St. Suzanne's
corps, had been pushed forward from the Isar to Erding.
On the morning of the 9th of December (18th Frimaire) Le
courbe commenced the operations for the passage beforeNeubeurn.
Montrichard's division was to cross the Inn first. General Lemaire
placed on the heights of the right bank a battery of twenty-eight
pieces of cannon, and swept off everything that appeared on the
left bank. On this part of the Inn there was nothing but Conde's
corps, and this was too weak to oppose any serious resistance.
While all the enemy's detachments were kept at a respectable
distance by a continued fire of artillery, the pontonniers threw
themselves into boats, accompanied by some battalions of elite,
destined to protect their operations. In two hours and a half a
bridge was completed, and Montrichard's division could begin to
debouch. It advanced upon the Austrians, who retreated, and
descended the right bank of the Inn till they were opposite to
Rosenheim. They took a strong position at Stephans Kirchen.
During this movement the divisions of the centre, [stationed
before Rosenheim itself, exerted themselves to prevent the
Austrians from destroying completely the bridge of that town.
Having been unsucessful, they ascended the Inn and crossed at
Neubeurn, for the purpose of seconding Lecourbe. Conde's
corps, reinforced by some succours, appuyed itself, on the one
hand, upon the destroyed bridge of Rosenheim, on the other
upon the small lake of Chiemsee. Lecourbe sent a detach
ment to turn this lake, which obliged the enemy to retire,
after a resistance that was not very bloody. The Inn was
thus crossed, and that formidable obstacle, which it was
alleged could not fail to stop the French army, was surmounted.
Thus Lecourbe had gathered a fresh laurel in the winter cam
paign. The march was not slackened. Next day, a bridge was
thrown before Rosenheim for the passage of the rest of the centre.
Grenier, with the left, crossed the Inn over the bridges of Wasser
burg and Miihldorf, which the enemy had abandoned without
destroying them.
It was expedient to lose no time in driving the Austrians to
the banks of the Salza, which runs behind the Inn and falls into
that river, a httle above Braunau. The Salza is like a second
arm of the Inn itself. If you would cross the Inn near the
mountains, you are obUged to cross it twice, as it were ; whereas,
in passing it in the environs of Braunau, after its junction with
the Salza, there is but one passage to perform. But then the
volume of its waters is doubled, and the difficulty of crossing

Dec. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 143
by main force is proportionably increased. This reason, and
a desire to surprise the enemy, who did not expect to see the
French attempt the passage above Rosenheim, had decided the
choice of Moreau.
Lecourbe, supported by the divisions of the centre, advanced
rapidly, in spite of all the difficulties presented by that hilly
country, interspersed with woods, rivers, and lakes, — a country
difficult in any season, but still more so in the middle of Decem
ber. The Austrian army, though shaken by so many reverses, still
kept the field. The sentiment of honour, awakened by the danger
of the capital, caused it still to make noble efforts to stop us.
The Austrian cavalry covered the retreat, and vigorously charged
the French corps, which advanced too rashly. The enemy
crossed the Alz, which conveys the water of the Chiemsee to the
Inn; they passed Fraunstein, and at length arrived near the
Salza, not far frpm Salzburg.
There, before Salzburg itself, was still left a strong position
to occupy. The archduke John thought that he might there
concentrate his troops, hoping to procure for them some success,
which would raise their courage, and somewhat slacken the
daring pursuit of the French. Accordingly, he did concentrate
them there on the 13th of December (22nd Frimaire).
The town of Salzburg is seated on the Salza. In advance of
that river runs another small stream, the Saal, which descends
from the neighbouring mountains, and falls into the Salza below
Salzburg. The ground between the two is level, marshy, co
vered with clumps of trees, everywhere difficult of access. Here
the archduke John took a position, with his right to the Salza,
his left to the mountains, his front covered by the Saal. His
artillery swept this level tract. His cavalry, drawn up on the
naked and solid parts of the ground, was ready to charge the
French corps which should dare to take the offensive. His in
fantry was solidly appuyed upon the town of Salzburg.
On the morning of the 14th, Lecourbe, impelled by his ar
dour, forded the Saal, sustained several charges of cavalry on
the strand bordering the river, and bore them bravely ; but pre
sently, the thick fog which covered the plain clearing off, he
perceived, in advance of Salzburg, a formidable line of cavalry,
artillery, and infantry. It was the whole Austrian army. In
presence of this danger he behaved with great steadiness, but
suffered some loss.
Fortunately Decaen's division at this moment crossed the
Salza towards Laufen, in an almost miraculous manner. On
the preceding day, the advanced guard of this division, find
ing the bridge of Laufen destroyed, had explored the banks
of the Salza, everywhere covered by the enemy's tirailleurs,
in search of a passage. It had. perceived a boat lying on
the opposite shore. At this sight, three chasseurs of the
14th swam across to the other side> in spite of the most

144 HISTORY OF the [Dec. 1800.
intense cold, and a current still more rapid than that of the Inn.
After fighting hand to hand with several Austrian tirailleurs,
they had taken and brought across the boat. Some hundred
French availed themselves of it for crossing successively to the
opposite bank, occupied a village quite close to the destroyed
bridge of Laufen, and barricaded themselves there in such a
manner that a small number of them sufficed to defend it. The
others had rushed upon the Austrian artillery, taken it, seized
all the craft on the right bank of the Salza, and thus furnished
the division remaining on the left bank with the means of cross
ing. On the morning of the following day, the 14th, Decaen's
whole division having crossed, and ascending to Salzburg, came
up at the very moment when Lecourbe was engaged single-
handed with the whole Austrian army. It could not have ar
rived more opportunely. The archduke, apprised of the passage
of the French and of their march upon Salzburg, hastily de
camped, and thus Lecourbe was extricated from the serious
danger to which chance and his ardour had exposed him.
All the defences of the Inn and the Salza were thus overcome.
From that moment there was no obstacle to cover the Austrian
army, or to give it courage to resist the French army. In Tyrol,
it is true, there were left 25,000 men, who might have annoyed
our rear, but it is not when you are victorious, and demoralisa
tion has seized your enemy, that you need fear bold attempts.
Moreau, having left St. Suzanne's corps behind, to invest Brau
nau, and to occupy the tract of country between the Inn and
the Isar, — Moreau, emboldened by the success attending every
step he took, marched towards the Traun and the Ens, which
were now incapable of stopping him. Richepanse formed the
advanced guard, supported by Grouchy and Decaen. The re
treat of the Austrians was effected in disorder. The French
picked up every moment men, carriages, or cannon. Richepanse
fought brilliant actions at Frankenmarkt, at Vbklabriick, and at
Schwanstadt. Incessantly engaged with the Austrian cavalry,
he took so many as 1200 horse at a time. On the 20th of De
cember (29th Frimaire) the French had crossed the Traun, and
were marching for Steyer, with the intention of crossing the Ens
at that place.
The young archduke John, whom such a series of disasters had
completely disheartened, had just been superseded by the arch
duke Charles, who was at length recalled from disgrace, to have a
task assigned to him, now impossible to be performed — that of
saving the Austrian army. He beheld with grief on his arrival
the spectacle exhibited by those soldiers of the empire, who, after
they had nobly resisted the French, desired that they might no
longer be sacrificed to a fatal and universally reprobated policy.
He sent M. de Meerfeld to Moreau, to propose an armistice.
Moreau agreed to grant forty-eight hours, on condition that
within this time he would return from Vienna, furnished with

Dec. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 145
the emperor's powers ; but he stipulated, at the same time, that
the French army should meanwhile have the faculty of advancing
to the Ens.
On the 21st, he crossed the Ens at Steyer. His advanced
posts appeared on the Ips and the Erlaf. He was at the gates
of Vienna ; he might feel tempted to enter it, and to appropriate
to himself the glory which no French general had yet had, of
penetrating into the capital of the empire. But the moderate
spirit of Moreau was not fond of pushing fortune to extremities.
The archduke Charles gave him his word that if hostilities were
suspended, Austria would treat immediately for peace, on the
conditions which France had always insisted upon, especially
that of a separate negotiation. Moreau, full of a just esteem
for that prince, showed a disposition to believe him.
Several of his lieutenants urged him to march to Vienna. —
" It will be better," he replied, " to secure peace .... I hear
nothing of Macdonald and Brune ; I know not whether the one
has succeeded in penetrating into the Tyrol, whether the other
has been able to cross the Mincio. Augereau is at a great dis
tance from me, in a critical situation. I might perhaps drive
the Austrians to despair, were I to persist in humbling them.
We had better halt and be content with peace, for it is for that
alone that we are fighting."
These were wise and praiseworthy sentiments. On the 25th
of December (4th Nivose, year IX.), he consented, therefore,
to sign, at Steyer,, a new suspension of arms, the conditions of
which were the following :— rThere was to be a cessation of hos
tilities in Germany, between the Austrian armies and the French
armies, commanded by Moreau and Augereau. Generals Brune
and Macdonald were to be invited to sign a similar armistice for
the armies of the Grisons and of Italy. The whole valley of
the Danube, including the Tyrol, was given up to the French,
besides the fortresses of Braunau and Wurtzburg, the forts of
Scharnitz, Kufstein, &c. The Austrian magazines were placed
at our disposal. No detachment of troops could be sent to
Italy, in case a suspension of arms should not be agreed to by
the generals commanding in that country. This stipulation was
obligatory on both armies.
Moreau was satisfied with these conditions, calculating, with
reason, upon peace, and preferring it to more signal, but more
hazardous triumphs. A brilliant glory surrounded his name,
for his winter campaign surpassed that of the spring. After
crossing the Rhine in that first spring campaign, and driving the
Austrians to the Danube, while the First Consul was crossing
the Alps ; after having then dislodged them from their camp at
Ulm by the battle of Hochstett, and pushed them back to the Inn,
he had taken breath during the summer, and, resuming his march
in winter, during the most intense cold, he had overwhelmed
them at Hohenlinden, driven them from the Inn to the Salza,
VOL. II. L

146 history of the [Dec. 1800.
from the Salza to the Traun and the Ens, pushing them, in dis
order, to the very gates of Vienna. At last, halting a few leagues
from the capital, he granted them time for signing peace. In
his conduct there had been irresolution, dilatoriness, in short,
faults which severe judges have since keenly censured, as if to
revenge, on the memory of Moreau, the injustices committed
upon the memory of Napoleon ; but there was an unbroken
series of successes, obtained by prudence and firmness. We
ought to respect all glories, and not destroy one to avenge
another. Moreau had proved himself capable of commanding
100,000 men with prudence and vigour; no man, excepting
Napoleon, has manoeuvred such a force so well, in the present
century ; and, although the place of the conqueror of Hohen-
Unden be at an immense distance from that of the conqueror of
Rivoli, of Marengo, and of Austerlitz, that place is, nevertheless,
glorious, and would have remained glorious, if criminal mis
conduct, the fatal effects of jealousy, had not subsequently sullied
a life till then noble and pure.
The armistice in Germany happened seasonably for extri
cating the Gallo-Batavian army, commanded by Augereau, from
its hazardous position. The Austrian general, Klenau, who had
always remained at a great distance from the archduke John,
had suddenly formed a junction with Simbschen, and, by this
union of forces, had brought Augereau into danger. But the
latter had bravely defended the Rednitz, and maintained his
ground till the conclusion of hostilities. The retreat of the
Austrians into Bohemia relieved him from embarrassment, and
the armistice covered, him from the dangers of a position too
destitute of support, since Moreau was at the gates of Vienna.
During these events in Germany, hostilities continued in the
Alps and in Italy. The First Consul, seeing, from the com
mencement of the campaign, that Moreau could dispense with
the assistance of the army in the Grisons, had ordered Mac
donald to cross the Splugen, to throw himself from the great
chain of the Alps into the Valteline, and from the Valteline into
Italian Tyrol, then to proceed to Trent, and. thus turn the line
of the Mincio, and, by this manoeuvre, put an end to the re
sistance of the Austrians in the plains of Italy. No objection,
founded on the height of the Splugen or the inclemency of the
season, could shake the First Consul. He had invariably re
phed that, wherever two men could set their feet, an army had
the means of passing, and that the Alps were easier to cross in
frost than when the snow was melting, the season in which he
had himself crossed the St. Bernard. This was the argument
of an absolute spirit, which is determined to attain its end at
any rate whatever. The event proved that, in the mountains,
winter is attended with dangers at least equal to those of
spring, and that, moreover, it dooms men to the most frightful
hardships.

Dec. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 147
General Macdonald prepared to obey, and he did it with all
the energy of his character. After leaving Morlot's division in
the Grisons, to guard the debouches which communicate be
tween the Grisons and the Engadine (the upper valley of the
Inn), he approached the Splugen. For some time past, the
division of Baraguay d'Hilliers was in the Upper Valteline,
threatening the Engadine from the Italian side; while Morlot
threatened it from the side next to the Grisons. With the bulk
of his army, about 12,000 men, Macdonald commenced his
movement, and climbed the first acclivities of the Splugen.
The passage of that lofty mountain, narrow and winding during
an ascent of several leagues, was attended with the greatest
dangers, especially at that season, when frequent tempests
covered the roads with enormous drifts of snow and ice. The
artillery and ammunition had been placed on sledges, and the
soldiers were laden with biscuit and cartridges. The first
column, composed of cavalry and artillery, began the passage in
fine weather,, but it was all at once assailed by a tremendous
tempest. An avalanche precipitated one half of a squadron of
dragoons into the abyss, and struck terror into the soldiers.
They, nevertheless, kept up their courage. In three days, the
storm having ceased, a fresh attempt was made to cross this
formidable mountain. It was encumbered with snow. Oxen
were driven before the troops, to trample the snow, into which
they sank up to the belly ; then labourers beat it down hard ;
the infantry, in passing, rendered it quite solid ; lastly, sappers
widened the passes, when too narrow by cutting the ice with
hatchets. Tliese exertions were requisite to render the road
passable for cavalry and artillery. The first days of December
were thus spent in effecting the passage of the first three columns.
The soldiers endured these horrible sufferings with admirable
fortitude, living upon biscuit and a small quantity of brandy.
The fourth and last column had at last nearly reached the summit
of the mountain, when a fresh storm once more closed the
passage, entirely dispersed the 104th demi-brigade, and buried
about 100 men. General Macdonald was there. He rallied
his soldiers, cheered them under dangers and hardships, caused
the road, barred by blocks of frozen snow, to be again opened,
and at length debouched with all the rest of his corps into the
Valteline. This truly extraordinary enterprise had carried the greater
part of the army of the Grisons across the great chain, and to
the very threshold of the Italian Tyrol. General Macdonald, as
he had been ordered, sought, as soon as he had passed the
Splugen, to concert with Brune before proceeding to the sources
of the Mincio and the Adige, and thus demohshing the whole
defensive line of the Austrians, which extended from the Alps
to]the Adriatic.
Brune would not deprive himself of a whole division to assist
L2

148 HISTORY OF THE [Dec. 1800.
Macdonald, but he consented to detach Lecchi's Italian division,
which was to ascend from the valley of the Chiesa to the
Rocca d'Anfo. Macdonald, therefore, resolved to ascend the
Valteline, and to attack Mont Tonal, which commands the pass
into the Tyrol and the valley of the Adige. But here, though
the height was inferior to that of the Splugen, the ice was as
deeply drifted ; and besides, general Wukassowich had covered
the principal approaches to Mont Tonal with intrenchments.
On the 22nd and 23rd of December, general Vandamme made
an attack at the head of a corps of grenadiers, and renewed it
several times with heroic courage. Those brave fellows made
incredible but useless efforts. Several times, marching upon
the ice, and exposed to a most destructive fire, they advanced
to the very palisades of the intrenchment, and endeavoured to
pull them up, but, the ground being frozen, they were foiled in
the attempt. It was useless to persist further ; it was, there
fore, resolved, to pass into the valley of the Oglio, to descend it
to Pisogno, and then proceed into the valley of the Chiesa.
The intention in this was to cross the mountains in a less
elevated region, and by passes not so well defended. Mac
donald, having descended to Pisogno, crossed the Cols which
separated him from the valley of the Chiesa, formed his junction
with Lecchi's brigade towards the Rocca d'Anfo, and found
himself beyond the obstacles which parted him from the Italian
Tyrol and the Adige. He was enabled to reach Trent, before
general Wukassowich had effected his retreat from the heights
of Mont Tonal, and to take a position between the Austrians
who defended the sources of the rivers amidst the Alps and
the Austrians who defended the lower part of their courses in
the plains of Italy.
Brune, before he attempted to force the Mincio, had waited
till Macdonald had made sufficient progress for the attacks to be
nearly simultaneous in the mountains and in the plain. Out of
125,000 spread over Italy, he had, as we have observed, 100,000
effective men, tried soldiers, and recruited after their privations,
an artillery admirably organised by general Marmont, and an
excellent cavalry. Nearly 20,000 men guarded Lombardy,
Piedmont, Liguria, and Tuscany. A weak brigade, commanded
by general Petitot, observed the Austrian troops, which, setting
out from Ferrara, threatened Bologna. The national guard of
the latter city was ready, besides, to defend itself against the
Austrians. The Neapolitans were again passing through the
Roman States on their march to Tuscany; but Murat, with the
10,000 men from the camp of Amiens, was gone to meet them.
Brune, after providing for the guard of the different parts of
Italy, had about 70,000 men to direct upon the Mincio. General
Bonaparte, who was perfectly acquainted with this theatre of
operations, had recommended to him carefully to concentrate his
troops as much as possible in Upper Italy; to take no heed what

Dec. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 149
the Austrians might attempt towards the banks of the Po, in
the Legations, or even in Tuscany ; to remain steadily, as he had
himself formerly done, at the debouches of the Alps ; and he was
incessantly repeating that, when the Austrians should be beaten
between the Mincio and the Adige, that is to say, on the line by
which they enter Italy, all those who had passed the Po and
penetrated into central Italy would be in so much the greater
danger. The Austrians did actually seem disposed to come out of
Ferrara and to threaten Bologna; but general Petitot found
means to repress them, and the national guard of Bologna dis
played on its part the firmest attitude.
Brune, straightways conforming to the instructions which he
had received, advanced to the Mincio, between the 20th and 24th
of December (29th Frimaire to 3rd Nivose), took the positions
which the Austrians had occupied in advance of that river, and
made his dispositions for passing it on the morning of the 25th.
General Delmas commanded his advanced-guard, general
Moncey his left, general Dupont his right, and General Michaud
his reserve. Besides the cavalry and artillery distributed in the
divisions, he had a considerable reserve of both.
¦ In recording the first campaigns of general Bonaparte,* we
have already described this theatre as the scene of so many
memorable events; we must, nevertheless, portray in a few
words the configuration of the country. The mass of the waters
of the Tyrol, is discharged by the Adige into the Adriatic ; hence
the Adige forms a line of great strength. But, before you reach
the line of the Adige, you come to one of minor importance,
namely that of the Mincio. The waters of several valleys lateral
to that of the Tyrol, at first accumulated in the Lake of Garda,
afterwards pour themselves into the Mincio, tarry some time
at Mantua, around which they form an inundation, and at last
fall into the Po. There was, consequently, a double line to cross,
first that of the Mincio, then that of the Adige, the latter being
far the more considerable and the stronger of the two. It was
requisite to cross both, and if this were done promptly enough
to give a hand to Macdonald, who was marching by the Rocca
d'Anfo and Trent to the Upper Adige, it would be possible to
separate the Austrian army defending the Tyrol from the Aus
trian army defending the Mincio, and to take the former.
The line of the Mincio, seven or eight leagues long at most,
appuying on the Lake of Garda on the one hand and Mantua on
the other, bristling with artillery, and defended by 70,000
Austrians, under the command of the count de Bellegarde, was
not easy to force. The enemy had at Borghetto andVallegio a
well intrenched bridge, which enabled him to act on both banks.
The river was not fordable at this season ; and the mass of its
* In the History of the French Revolution,

150 HISTORY OF THE [Dec. 1800.
waters had been further increased by closing all the canals which
are supplied by it.
Brune, after collecting his columns, conceived the singular
idea of crossing the Mincio at two points at once, atPozzolo and
at Mozzembano. Between these two points the river formed a
bend, the convexity of which was turned towards our troops ;
moreover, the right bank, which we occupied, commanded the
left bank occupied by the Austrians, so that at Mozzembano, as
well as at Pozzolo, we could open a converging fire from higher
batteries upon the enemy's bank, and thus cover the operation of
a passage. But at both points the Austrians were found firmly
seated behind the Mincio, covered with solid intrenchments,
appuyed either on Mantua or on Peschiera. The advantages and
the inconveniences of the passage were, therefore, nearly alike at
Pozzolo and at Mozzembano. But what ought to have decided
Brune to prefer one of the two points, no matter which, while
he might have made a false demonstration on the other, was
that between these two points there was a tete de pont, then oc
cupied by the enemy. The Austrians, therefore, could debouch
by this tete de pont, and throw themselves on one of the two
operations with a view to interrupt it. It follows that only one
should have been attempted, and that with the whole of the forces.
Brune, nevertheless, persisted in his double plan, apparently
to divide the enemy's attention, and on the 25th of December
made all necessary dispositions for a double passage. But diffi
culties which supervened in regard to carriage, difficulties ex
tremely great at this season, prevented every thing from being
ready at Mozzembano, the point at which Brune himself was with
the greater part of his troops, and the operation was deferred
till the next day. It would seem that, in this case, the second
passage ought to have been countermanded ; but Brune, having
always considered the attempt near Pozzolo as a mere diversion,
thought that the diversion would produce its effect with the
greater certainty, if it preceded the principal operation by twenty-
four hours.
Dupont, who commanded at Pozzolo, was an officer full of
ardour : he advanced, on the morning of the 25th, to the bank of
the Mincio, crowned with artillery the heights of Molino della
Volta, which commanded the opposite bank, threw a bridge in a
very short time, and, favoured by a thick fog, succeeded in pass
ing Wattrin's division to the right bank. Meanwhile, Brune
continued motionless with the left and the reserves, at Mozzem
bano. General Suchet, placed between the two with the centre,
masked the Austrian bridge of Borghetto. General Dupont,
then, was on the left bank with a single corps, in presence of the
whole Austrian army. It was easy to foresee the result. The
count de Bellegarde, without loss of time, directed the mass of
his forces upon Pozzolo. General Dupont sent to apprise his
neighbour, Suchet, and the commander-in-chief, of the success

Dec. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 151
of the passage, and of the danger to which that success ex
posed him. General Suchet, like a brave and faithful comrade,
hastened to the assistance of Dupont's division ; but, on quitting
Borghetto, he sent to beg Brune to provide for the guard of that
debouche, which he left uncovered by his movement towards
Pozzolo. Brune, instead of hurrying with all his forces to the
point where a lucky accident had opened the passage of the
Mincio to his army, Brune, still engrossed by his operation of
the following day upon Mozzembano, never quitted his position.
He approved the movement of general Suchet, at the same time
recommending to him not to compromise himself on the other
side of the river, and merely sent Boudet's division to mask the
bridge of Borghetto.
But general Dupont, eager to follow up his success, was
absolutely engaged. He had crossed the Mincio, taken Pozzolo,
which is situated on the left bank, and carried successively
Wattrin's and Monnier's divisions across the river. One of his
wings was appuyed on Pozzolo, the other on the Mincio, under
the protection of the elevated batteries of the right bank.
The Austrians marched with all their reinforcements upon
that position. They were preceded by a great number of pieces
of cannon. Fortunately, our artillery, placed at Molino della
Volta, and firing from one bank to the other, protected our
soldiers by the superiority of its fire. The Austrians fell
furiously upon Wattrin's and Monnier's divisions. The 6th light,
the 28th, and the 40th of the line, were wellnigh overwhelmed,
but they resisted, with admirable intrepidity, all the joint assaults
of the Austrian infantry and cavalry. Monnier's division, how
ever, surprised in Pozzolo by a column of grenadiers, was dis
lodged. At this moment, Dupont's corps, separated from its
principal point d'appui, was on the point of being thrown into
the Mincio. But general Suchet, arriving on the other bank,
with Gazan's division, and perceiving from the heights of
Molino della Volta the serious danger of his brother commander,
engaged with 10,000 men against 30,000, hastened to send him
reinforcements. Restrained, at the same time, by the orders of
Brune, he durst not send him the whole of Gazan's division,
and threw Clauzel's brigade only to the other side of the river.
This brigade was insufficient; and Dupont must have suc
cumbed notwithstanding these succours, when the rest of
Gazan's division, crowning the opposite bank, from which the
Austrians could be reached with grape-shot and even by
musketry, poured on them a murderous fire, and thus stopped
them short. Dupont's troops, being supported, resumed the
offensive, and made the Austrians fall back. General Suchet,
seeing that the danger increased every moment, resolved to
send Gazan's whole division to the other bank. The important
point of Pozzolo was thenceforward most fiercely disputed.
That village was six times taken and retaken. At nine o'clock

152 HISTORY OF THE [Dec. 1800.
at night, the combatants were still fighting by moonlight and in
a severe frost. The French finally remained masters of the left
bank, but they had lost the elite of four divisions. The Austrians
had left 6000 dead or wounded on the field of battle, the French
nearly as many. But for the arrival of general Suchet, our left
wing would have been destroyed ; and, as it was, he durst not
engage completely, his hands being tied by the orders of the
commander-in-chief. If M. de Bellegarde had directed his whole
forces upon that point, or if he had debouched from the bridge
of Borghetto, while Brune was immovable at Mozzembano, he
might have inflicted a disaster on the centre and on the right of
the French army.
Fortunately, he did nothing of the kind. The Mincio was
thus crossed at one point. Brune persisted in his plan of
passing the next day, the 26th of December, towards Mozzem
bano, thus exposing himself anew to the risks of an operation
by main force. He covered the heights of Mozzembano with
forty pieces of cannon, and, favoured by the fogs of the season,
succeeded in throwing a bridge. The Austrians, fatigued with
the preceding day, doubting the intention of a second passage,
made less resistance than the day before, and suffered the
neighbouring positions of Sallionzo and Vallegio to be taken
from them.
The whole army debouched in this manner beyond the Mincio,
and was enabled to march, with all its divisions united, for the
second line, that of the Adige. The tete de pont of Borghetto
must have fallen, as a matter of course, from the offensive
movement of our columns. A fresh blunder was committed in
sacrificing several hundred of our brave soldiers for the conquest
of a point which was not tenable. Twelve hundred Austrians
were made prisoners there.
The French were victorious, but at the cost of valuable blood,
which generals Bonaparte and Moreau would not have failed to
spare the army. Lecourbe passed the rivers of Germany in a
different manner. Brune, having forced the Mincio, advanced
towards the Adige, which he ought to have crossed immediately.
He was not ready to effect the passage till the 31st of December
(10th Nivose). On the 1st of January, general Delmas, with
the advanced-guard, crossed the river without accident at Busso-
lengo, above Verona. General Moncey, with the left, was to
ascend to Trent, while the rest of the army descended again to
envelop Verona.
Count de Bellegarde was at this moment in imminent danger.
Part of the troops of the Tyrol, under general Laudon, had re
tired before Macdonald, and fallen back upon Trent. General
Moncey, with his corps, was marching thither also, in reascend-
ing the Adige. General Laudon, hemmed in between Macdo-
nald's corps and Moncey's, must succumb, unless he bad time
to escape into the valley of the Brenta, which, running beyond

Dec. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 153
the Adige, terminates, after numerous windings, at Bassano.
Brune, if he suddenly crossed the Adige, and vigorously pushed
count de Bellegarde beyond Verona, to Bassano itself, might
anticipate at this latter point the corps of the Tyrol, and take it
entire by closing the debouche of the Brenta.
An act not the most honourable of general Laudon's, and the
tardiness of general Brune, extenuated, it is true, by the season,
extricated the Tyrol corps from all these perils.
Macdonald had actually reached Trent, while Moncey's corps
was proceeding thither, on its side. General Laudon, hemmed
in between these two corps, had recourse to a falsehood. He
assured general Moncey that an armistice had just been signed
in Germany, and that this armistice extended to both armies,
which was false ; for the convention signed at Steyer by Moreau
applied only to the armies operating upon the Danube. General
Moncey, from a nice sense of honour, credited the statement of
general Laudon, and opened to him the passes leading to the
Brenta; so that he was enabled to rejoin the count de Belle
garde in the environs of Bassano.
But the disasters in Germany were known. The Austrian
army, beaten in Italy, pressed by an army of 90,000 men, since
the junction of Macdonald's and Brune's troops, could hold out
no longer. An armistice was proposed to Brune, who hastened
to accept it, and signed it on the 16th of .January at Treviso.
Brune, impatient to settle matters, demanded no more than the
line of the Adige, with the fortresses of Ferrara, Peschiera, and
Portolegnago. He never thought of requiring, the cession of
Mantua. Yet he had received specific orders not to halt till
he had entered Isonzo, and made himself master of Mantua.
That place was the only one which was worth the trouble ; for
all the others must have fallen as a matter of course. It was
of especial importance to occupy it, that there might be a
ground for demanding, at the congress of Luneville, its cession
to the Cisalpine Republic.
While these events were occurring in Upper Italy, the Neapo
litans penetrated into Tuscany. The count de Damas, who com
manded a corps of 16,000 men, 8000 of whom were Neapolitans,
had advanced to Sienna. General Miollis, obliged to guard
all the posts of Tuscany, had not more than 3500 disposable
men, mostly Italians. He marched, nevertheless, to meet the
Neapolitans. The brave soldiers of Pino's division rushed upon
the advanced-guard of the count de Damas, overthrew it, forced
an entrance into Sienna, and put to the sword a considerable
number of the insurgents. The count de Damas was obliged
to fall back. Besides, Murat was advancing with his grenadiers,.
to wring from him the signature of a third armistice.
Thus the campaign was finished everywhere, and peace in
sured. In every quarter our operations had been successful.
Moreau's army, flanked by that of Augereau, had penetrated to

154 HISTORY OF THE [Jan. 1801.
the very gates of Vienna ; Brune's, seconded by that of Mac
donald, had passed the Mincio and the Adige, and advanced to
Treviso. Though it had not entirely thrown the Austrians to
the other side of the Alps, it had dispossessed them of sufficient
territory to furnish the French negotiator at Luneville with power
ful arguments against the pretensions of Austria in Italy. Murat
was about to complete the submission of the court of Naples.
On receiving intelligence of the battle of Hohenlinden, the
First Consul, who was said to be jealous of Moreau, was filled
with sincere joy.* This victory lost none of its value in his
estimation because it was achieved by a rival. He deemed
himself so superior to all his companions in arms in military
glory and in political influence, that he felt no jealousy of any
of them. Wholly devoted to the task of pacifying and re
organising France, he derived warm satisfaction from every
event which contributed to facilitate his task, even when such
events added to the fame of those men, who were destined
afterwards to be set up for rivals to him.
What displeased him in this campaign was the useless effu
sion of French blood at Pozzolo, and especially the grievous
fault of not demanding Mantua. He refused to ratify the con
vention of Treviso, and declared that he would give orders for
the renewal of hostilities, if the fortress of Mantua were not im
mediately delivered to the French army.
All the while, Joseph Bonaparte and M. de Cobentzel,
were at Luneville, awaiting the events occurring on the Danube
and the Adige. It is a singular situation, that of two nego
tiators, treating while hostilities are going on, witnesses, as it
were, of the duel between two great nations, expecting every
instant the news not of the death, but of the exhaustion of the
one or the other. On this occasion, M. de Cobentzel displayed
an energy of character, which may be held up as an example to
men who are called to serve their country in disastrous circum
stances. He did not suffer himself to be disconcerted by the
defeat of the Austrians at Hohenlinden, or by the passage of
the Inn, the Salza, the Traun, &c. To all these events he
rephed, with imperturbable composure, that all this was certainly
unfortunate, but that the archduke Charles had recovered from
his mortifications ; that he had arrived at the head of the extra
ordinary levies of Bohemia and Hungary ; that he had brought
to the assistance of the capital 25,000 Bohemians and 75,000
Hungarians ; that, in advancing farther, the French would meet
with a resistance which they did not expect. At the same time,
he persisted in all the pretensions of Austria, particularly in that
of not treating without an English plenipotentiary, who would

* M. de Bournenne says that " he leaped for joy ;" and this biographer is
not to be suspected, for, though he owed every thing to Napoleon, he seems
not to have recollected this in his Memoirs.

Jan. 1801.] consulate and the empire. 155
at least mask by his presence the real negotiations which might
take place between the two legations. Sometimes he went so
far as to say, that he would retire to Frankfort, and thus put
an end to the hopes of peace, which the First Consul needed for
lulling people's minds. At this threat, the First Consul, who
never shuffled when any one tried to intimidate him, sent word
to M. de Cobentzel, that if he left Luneville, all chance of an
accommodation would be totally lost, and that the war should
be pushed to the utmost extremity, even to the entire destruc
tion of the Austrian monarchy.
Amidst this diplomatic struggle, M. de Cobentzel received
intelligence of the armistice of Steyer, the emperor's order to
treat on any terms, and, in particular, urgent injunctions to
obtain an extension to Italy of the armistice already agreed
on for Germany ; for there would be nothing gained, if, after
stopping one of the two French armies which were marching for
Vienna, the other should be suffered to reach that capital by
the Friule and Carinthia. In consequence, M. de Cobentzel
declared, on the 31st of December, that he was ready to treat
without the concurrence of England, that he consented to sign
preliminaries of peace, or1 a definitive treaty, whichever the
French government pleased; but that, before he definitively
committed himself by separating from England, he desired
that an armistice common to Italy and Germany should be
signed, and that some explanation respecting the conditions
of peace should be entered into, at least in a general manner.
For his part, he proposed these conditions : the Oglio, for the
boundary of Austria in Italy, together with the Legations ; and
at the same time, the reinstatement of the dukes of Modena and
Tuscany in their former dominions.
These conditions were unreasonable. The First Consul would
not have admitted them even before the successes of the winter
campaign, and still less after them.
The reader has not forgotten the preliminaries signed by the
count de St. Julien. The treaty of Campo-Formio was there
adopted for basis, with this difference, that certain indemnities
promised to Austria for various petty territories should be
granted in Italy, instead of Germany. We have already men
tioned the drift of this alteration ; the treaty of Campo-Formio
assigned the Adige for the boundary between the Cisalpine
Republic and Austria; by promising Austria indemnities in Italy,
she was led to hope for the Mincio, for example, instead of the
Adige, as a boundary, but the Mincio at most, and never the
territory of the Legations, which the First Consul intended to
dispose of otherwise.
The ideas of the First Consul were thenceforth fixed. He
determined that Austria should pay the expenses of the winter
campaign ; he determined that she should have the Adige, and
nothing more, and that she should receive no indemnity, either

156 history of the [Jan. 1801.
in Germany or Italy, for the small territories ceded on the left
bank of the Rhine. As for the Legations, he meant to reserve
them, and to make them subservient to various combinations.
Hitherto they had belonged to the Cisalpine Republic. His
design was either to leave them to it, or to devote them to the
aggrandisement of the house of Parma, promised, by treaty, to
the court of Spain. In this latter case, he should give Parma
to the Cisalpine, Tuscany to the house of Parma, which would
be a considerable aggrandisement, and the Legations to the
grand-duke of Tuscany. As for the duke of Modena, Austria
had promised, by the treaty of Campo-Formio, to indemnify him
for the loss of his duchy by means of the Brisgau. It was,
therefore, for her to fulfil her engagements towards that prince.
The First Consul wished for something else, that was tho
roughly understood but very difficult to make Austria agree to.
He wished not to be obliged, as after the peace of Campo-
Formio, to bold a congress with the princes of the Empire, to
obtain from each individually the formal cession of the right
bank of the Rhine to France. He recollected the congress of
Rastadt, which terminated in the murder of our plenipoten
tiaries ; he recollected the trouble it had, been to treat with each
prince separately, and to agree with all those who had lost
territories upon a system of indemnities that would satisfy
them. In consequence, he required that the emperor should
sign, as head of the house of Austria, for what related to his
house, and, as emperor, for what related to the Empire. In
short, he wanted to have, in a single stroke, an acknowledg
ment of our conquests, both on the part of Austria and on the
part of the Germanic confederation.
He, therefore, ordered his brother Joseph to notify to M. de
Cobentzel the following conditions, as definitively fixed : — The
left bank of the Rhine to France ; the boundary of the Adige
for Austria and the Cisalpine, without relinquishing the Le
gations ; the Legations to the duke of Tuscany ; Tuscany to
the duke of Parma ; Parma to the Cisalpine ; the Brisgau to
the duke of Modena; lastly, peace to be signed by the emperor,
both for himself and for the Empire. As for the armistice in
Italy, he was willing to grant it, on condition of the immediate
delivery of the fortress of Mantua to the French army.
As the First Consul was acquainted with the Austrian manner
of negotiating, and particularly that of M. de Cobentzel, he
wished to cut short a great many difficulties, a great many op
positions, a great many threats of a feigned desperation ; and
he devised a new way of signifying his ultimatum. The Legis
lative Body had just assembled ; it was proposed to it on the 2nd
of January (12th Nivose), to declare that the four armies com
manded by generals Moreau, Brune, Macdonald, and Augereau,
were entitled to their country's thanks. A message, added to
this proposal, announced that M. de Cobentzel had at length

Jan. 1801.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 157
engaged to treat without the concurrence of England, and that
the definitive condition of peace was the Rhine for France, and
the Adige for the Cisalpine Republic. The message added that,
in case these conditions were not accepted, the French would
march on Prague, on Vienna, and on Venice, and there enforce
them. This communication was hailed with transport in Paris, but
excited a strong emotion at Luneville. M. de Cobentzel raised
great outcries against the hardness of these conditions, and par
ticularly against their form. He complained bitterly that
France seemed to be making the treaty by herself, without
having to negotiate with any body. He, nevertheless, continued
firm, and declared that Austria could not give way on all the
points, that she would rather fall with arms in her hand than
accede to such conditions. M. de Cobentzel consented, how
ever, to fall back from the Oglio to the Chiesa, which runs
between the Oglio and the Mincio, on condition of having
Peschiera, Mantua, and Ferrara, without obligation to demolish
those fortresses. He consented to indemnify the duke of
Modena with the Brisgau ; but he insisted on the restitution of
the dominions of the duke of Tuscany. He spoke of formal
guarantees to be given for the independence of Piedmont,
Switzerland, the Holy See, Naples, &c. As for peace with the
Empire, he declared that the emperor was about to demand
powers of the Germanic Diet, but that this sovereign would
never take it upon him to treat for it without being authorised.
He insisted further on the signature of an armistice in Italy,
declaring that, as for Mantua, if Austria were to deliver that
fortress to the French army, she would put all Italy at once into
the hands of the French, and deprive herself of all means of
resistance, if hostilities should be renewed. Adding caresses to
firmness, M. de Cobentzel endeavoured to touch Joseph, by
talking to him of the favourable dispositions of the emperor
towards France, and particularly towards the First Consul, in
sinuating even that Austria might probably ally herself with the
French Republic, and that such an alliance would be very ser
viceable against the secret but real ill-will of the northern courts.
Joseph, who was extremely mild, could not help being affected,
to a certain degree, by the complaints, the threats, and the
caresses of M. de Cobentzel. The First Consul roused his
energy by numerous despatches. " You are forbidden," he
wrote to him, " to admit of any discussion on the principle laid
down in the ultimatum : the Rhine and the Adige. Stick to
those two conditions as irrevocable. Hostilities shall not cease
in Italy till Mantua is given up. If they begin again, the
thalweg of the Adige shall be carried back to the Julian Alps,
and Austria shall be excluded from Italy. If Austria," added
the First Consul, " should talk of her friendship and her alliance,
reply that those who have just shown themselves so attached

158 HISTORY OF THE [Jan. 1801.
to the English alliance cannot care about ours. Assume, in
negotiating, the attitude of general Moreau, and force M. de
Cobentzel to play the part of the archduke John."
At length, after a further resistance of several days, intelli
gence more and more alarming every moment arriving from
the banks of the Mincio — it must not be forgotten that hos
tilities continued in Lombardy longer than in Germany — M. de
Cobentzel consented, on the 15th of January, 1801 (25th Ni
vose), that the Adige should be adopted for the boundary of the
possessions of Austria in Italy. He ceased to mention the duke
of Modena, but renewed the formal demand of the reinstate
ment of the duke of Tuscany in his dominions. He consented
further to declare that the peace of the Empire should be signed
at Luneville, but after the emperor should have obtained powers
from the Germanic Diet. In the same protocol, this plenipo
tentiary again claimed an armistice for Italy, but without assent
ing to the condition which France attached to it — the immediate
delivery of Mantua to our troops. His fear was, that after
giving up this point cTappui, France would impose harder con
ditions ; and, alarming as the resumption of hostilities appeared
to him, he would not yet part with this pledge.
This persevering firmness in defending his country in so
difficult a situation was natural, and honourable, but at last it
became imprudent, and led to consequences which M. de
Cobentzel had not foreseen.
The occurrences in the North contributed as much as the
victories of our armies to augment the pretensions of the First
Consul. He had hitherto sought anxiously for peace with
Austria, in the first place, to have peace, and, in the next, to
secure himself against one of those changes of humour so
frequent in the emperor Paul. For some months past, it is
true, that prince had shown a keen resentment' against Austria
and England ; but a manoeuvre of the Austrian or English
cabinet might bring back the czar to the coalition, and then
France would again have all Europe upon her hands. It was
this apprehension which had induced the First Consul to brave
the inconveniences of a winter campaign, in order to crush
Austria while she was deprived of the support of the forces
of the Continent. The turn which events had recently taken
in the North having relieved him from all fear on this head, he
had become at once more patient and more exacting. Paul, in
fact, had formally broken with his late allies, and thrown him
self completely into the arms of France, with that warmth which
he showed in all his actions. Strongly disposed to this line of
conduct by the effect produced upon his mind by the victory
of Marengo, by the restitution of the Russian prisoners, by the
offer of the island of Malta, lastly, by the adroit and delicate
flatteries of the First Consul, he had been definitively decided
by a recent event. It will be recollected that the First Consul,

Jan. 1801.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 159
despairing of saving Malta, strictly blockaded by the English,
had conceived the happy idea of offering that island to Paul I.;
that this prince had received that offer with transport; that he
had commissioned M. de Sprengporten to go to Paris, to thank
the head of the French government, to receive the Russian
prisoners, and to conduct them to Malta, to form its garrison.
But, in the mean time, general Vaubois, reduced to the last
extremity, had been compelled to surrender the island to the
English. This event, which, under any other circumstances,
must have mortified the First Consul, grieved him but little.
" I have lost Malta," said he, " but I have put an apple ot
discord into the hands of my enemies." Paul hastened to claim
from England the seat of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem ;
but the British cabinet, instead of giving it up, replied by a
flat refusal. Paul was enraged beyond measure. He laid an
embargo on the English shipping, caused so many as three
hundred of their vessels at once to be seized in the ports of
Russia, and even ordered such as endeavoured to escape to be
sunk. This circumstance, added to the quarrel of the neutrals
noticed above, could not fail to produce a war. The czar put
himself at the head of this quarrel, calling to his aid Sweden,
Denmark, and even Prussia, and proposing to them to renew
the league of maritime neutrality of l780. He invited the king
of Sweden to repair to St. Petersburg, to confer with him on
this important subject. Gustavus went thither, and was mag
nificently entertained. Paul, full of the mania with which
he was possessed, held at St. Petersburg a grand chapter of
Malta, admitted as knights the king of Sweden and all the per
sonages who accompanied him, and conferred most lavishly the
honours of the Order. But he did something more serious —
he immediately renewed the league of 1780. On the 26th of
December, a declaration was signed by the ministers of Russia,
Sweden, and Denmark, by which those three maritime powers
engaged to maintain, even by arms, the principles of the law of
neutrals. They specified all these principles in their declara
tion, without omitting one of those which we have mentioned,
and which France had just induced America to recognise.
They bound themselves, moreover, to unite their forces, and to
direct them in common against any power whatever that should
violate the rights which they alleged to belong to them. Den
mark, though extremely zealous for the interests of the neutrals,
would have been glad not to proceed so fast; but the ice
defended her for three months, and she hoped that, before her
waters were navigable, England would have given way, or at
least that the preparations of the neutrals of the Baltic would
be sufficient- to prevent the British fleet from appearing before
the Sound, as it had done in the month of August last.
Prussia too, which would rather have negotiated than proceeded
with such promptness, was hurried along like Sweden and Den-

160 HISTORY OF THE [Jan. 1801.
mark, and gave her adhesion two days afterwards to the declara
tion of St. Petersburg.
These were important events, and insured to 1 ranee the
alliance of the whole North of Europe against England; but
these were not all the diplomatic successes of the First Consul.
The emperor Paul had proposed to Prussia to concur with
France in what was passing at Luneville, and to agree to three
of the bases of the general peace. Now, the tenour of the com
munications* of these two powers to our government, entirely
coincided with those principles on which France had most
insisted at Luneville. .. pv
Prussia and Russia conceded the left bank of the Rhine,
without dispute, to the French Republic; but they demanded
an indemnity for the princes who lost portions of territory, but
solely for the hereditary princes, and by means of the secu
larisation of the Ecclesiastical States. This was precisely the
principle which Austria repudiated, and which France proposed.
Russia and Prussia demanded the independence of Holland, of
Switzerland, of Piedmont, and of Naples, which, at the moment,
was in no way contrary to the designs of the First Consul.
The emperor Paul interfered in behalf of Naples and Pied
mont, solely on account of the treaty of alliance concluded
with those States in 1798, when it had been necessary to involve
them in the second coalition war; but he meant to protect
Naples only on condition that this court should break with
England. As for Piedmont, he claimed but a slight indemnity
foi-°the cession of Savoy to France. He thought it right, and
Prussia with him, that France should curb the ambition of
Austria in Italy, and confine her within the boundary of the
Adige. Paul became at last so ardent, that he proposed to the
First Consul to form a close alliance with him against England,
and to engage not to make peace with her until the restitution
of Malta to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. This was
more than was desired by the First Consul, who was shy of
such absolute engagements. Paul, wishing appearances to cor
respond with the real state of things, opened, instead of the
clandestine communications between M. de Krudener and
general Beurnonville in Berlin, a public negotiation in Paris
itself. He accordingly appointed M. de Kalitscheff as pleni
potentiary to treat ostensibly with the French cabinet. M. de
Kalitscheff received orders to repair immediately to France.
This negotiator was the bearer of a letter addressed to the First
Consul, and, moreover, written by the emperor Paul with his
own hand. We already had M. de Sprengporten in Paris ; we
were now about to have M. de Kalitscheff: it was not possible
to desire a more signal reconciliation of Russia with France-
* Letter of the King of Prussia of the 14th of January, communicated by
M. de Lucchesini.

Jan. 1801.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 161
Thus the face of things was changed in Europe, in the North
as well as in the South. In the North, the maritime powers, at
open war with England, sought to join with us against her, by
absolute engagements. In the South, Spain was bound to us
by the closest ties : she threatened Portugal, to compel her to
break with Great Britain. Lastly, Austria, worsted in Germany
and Italy, left by all the powers at ourmercy, had nothing but
the daring obstinacy of her negotiator at Luneville to defend her.
r. These, events, the fruits of the ability of the First Consul, fol
lowed each other in rapid succession in the first days of January.
Prussia and Russia, in fact, manifested their desire for the
peace of the Continent ; and Paul, with his own hand, apprised
the First Consul of the mission of M. de Kalitscheff, at the
very moment when M. de Cobentzel, giving way as to the
boundary of the Adige, but obstinately standing out in regard
to all the rest, refused the delivery of Mantua, as the price of
an armistice in Italy.
The First Consul immediately wished to retard the progress
of the negotiation at Luneville. He directed instructions to be
given to Joseph, and wrote to him,* prescribing a new line of
conduct to our legation. In a state of crisis, such as Europe
was in at that time, he thought it inexpedient to be in a hurry.
It was possible, in fact, that too much might have been ceded,
or something stipulated, which might have run counter to the
views of the northern courts. Anticipating besides, that M. de
Kalitscheff would arrive in a few days, he wished to see him,
before he concluded definitively. Instructions were therefore
transmitted to Joseph, to temporise for at least ten days, before
he signed, and to require conditions still more stringent than
the preceding.
Austria had consented to confine herself within the Adige.
The construction which the First Consul now sought to put upon
this was, that the duke of Tuscany was not to remain in Italy,
but should receive, like the duke of Modena, an indemnity in
" Germany. His ultimate object was not to leave a single Austrian
prince in Italy. To leave the duke of Tuscany in Tuscany, was,
in his views, equivalent to giving Leghorn to the English ; to
remove him to the Legations, was granting Austria a footing
beyond the Po. In consequence, he adopted the idea, of trans
ferring Tuscany to the house of Parma, as he had stipulated at
Madrid; thereby converting Leghorn into a Spanish arsenal;
and of thenceforth including the whole valley of the Po in the
Cisalpine Republic; for, according to this plan, it would com
prehend the Milanese, the Mantuan, Plaisance, Parma, Modena,
and the Legations. Piedmont, at the entrance of that valley,
would in future be but a vassal of France. Austria, limited
by the Adige, would be thrown to one extremity of Italy;
* Letter dated 1st Pluviose (21st January).— (State Paper Office.)
VOL. II. M

162 HISTORY OF THE [Jan. 1801.
Rome and Naples confined to the other extremity; France,
with Tuscany and .the Cisalpine for her advanced ports, would
control and sway that superb country. Joseph Bonaparte was
therefore directed by his new instructions to require that the
duke of Tuscany should, like the duke of Modena, be removed
into Germany; that the scheme for the secularisation of the
ecclesiastical States, should be realised to indemnify the here
ditary German princes, as well as the Italian princes, dispossessed
by France; that the peace with the Empire should be signed at
the same time as the peace with Austria, without even waiting
for the sanction of the Diet ; that nothing should be stipulated
respecting Naples, Rome, and Piedmont, because France, though
willing to preserve those States, desired first to arrange with
them the conditions of their preservation ; lastly, that Mantua
should be delivered up to the French army, under threat of
immediate renewal of hostilities.
Nothing is more usual, when a negotiation is still pending,
when a treaty is not signed, nothing is more common than to
modify the proposed conditions. The French cabinet, there
fore, was quite justified in departing from its first conditions ;
but it must be confessed that, in this case, the alterations were
abrupt and extensive.
M. de Cobentzel, by waiting too long, by demanding too
much, by being wilfully blind to his real position, had lost the
favourable moment. According to his custom, he complained
bitterly, and threatened France with the desperation of Austria.
He was, nevertheless, pressed to obtain the armistice for Italy,
and made up his mind to concede Mantua ; but he feared lest,
after he had given up this bulwark, he should be at the mercy of
France, and that fresh demands should be brought forward. In
this frame of mind, he showed himself mistrustful and captious,
and would not relinquish Mantua till at the last extremity. At
length, on the 26th of January (6th Pluviose), he signed the sur
render of that fortress to the French army, to obtain an armistice
in Italy and a prolongation of the armistice in Germany. The
negotiators immediately dispatched couriers from Luneville to
the Adige, to prevent an effusion of blood, which was imminent.
Warm discussions ensued at the conferences, which were held
at Luneville, on the following days. M. de Cobentzel said that
he had been promised the re-establishment of the grand-duke, on
the very day, that he had consented to the boundary of the Adige.
Joseph rephed, that this was true, but that the re-establishment
of this prince, was to be granted in Germany ; that every state
availed itself of its present situation to treat more advantageously':
that France, in acting thus, adopted the very principles expressed
by M. de Thugut, in his letters of the preceding winter; that,
moreover, the grand-duke, whose case was under discussion,
would be in Tuscany, cut off from Austria and unsupported;
that, in the Legations, on the contrary, he would be too well

Jan. 1801.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 163
placed, as he would serve for a link between Austria, Rome,
and Naples, that is to say, between the enemies of France, an
arrangement to which France would never consent. The idea
of placing him, either in Tuscany, or in the Legations should,
therefore, be relinquished.
After vehement controversies, M. de Cobentzel seemed at
last to consent that the indemnities for the grand-duke should
be taken in Germany ; but he would not admit the absolute
principle of the secularisation of the ecclesiastical States. The
ecclesiastical States were devoted to Austria, especially the
three archbishop-electors of Treves, Cologne, and Mayence,
whereas the hereditary princes, on the contrary, were often
opposed to her interest in the Germanic Diet. Austria assented
to the secularisations, understood in this way, that the small
ecclesiastical States should serve to indemnify not only the
hereditary princes of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Orange, but the
great ecclesiastical princes, such as the archbishops of Treves,
Cologne, and Mayence; for then her influence in Germany would
have been in part maintained. Joseph Bonaparte had orders
to make an obstinate opposition to this proposal. He was to
admit the principle of secularisations solely for the benefit of
the hereditary princes. Lastly, M. de Cobentzel would not
sign the peace for the. Empire, without powers from the Diet.
This refusal proceeded, according to him, from a reluctance to
violate forms ; but in reality from an unwillingness to render
too evident the part usually played by Austria in regard to the
members of the Germanic body, a part which consisted in com
promising them with France, whenever it was to the interest of
Austria to do so, and afterwards deserting them, when the war
had been disastrous. In 1797, she had delivered Mayence to
the French, a proceeding most severely censured by all Ger
many ; and now, to sign for the Empire, without powers from
the Diet, seemed to M. de Cobentzel a new and very grievous
act, to add to all the anterior acts with which the German
princes reproached their sovereign. To these reasons Joseph
Bonaparte replied, that it was easy to perceive the real motive
of Austria ; that she was afraid of committing herself with the
Germanic body, but that it was not for France to heed such
considerations ; that, as to form, there was a precedent in the
peace of Baden, signed by the emperor in 1714, without powers
from the Diet; that, besides, the emperor was now only
asked to sanction what the representatives of the Empire had
already assented to at Rastadt, that is to say, the cession of the
left bank of the Rhine to France ; and that his refusal would be
a sorry service rendered to Germany, for the French armies
would continue in the territories occupied by them, till peace
was concluded with the Empire ; whereas, if the peace were
common to all the German princes, the evacuation would im
mediately follow the ratifications.
M 2

164 HISTORY OF THE [Feb. 1801.
These discussions lasted several days. M. de Cobentzel was,
nevertheless, anxious to conclude. The French negotiator, on
his side, though at first desirous to defer the signature of the
treaty for a few days, being now apprised that M. de Kalitscheff
would not arrive in Paris so soon as he was at first expected,
saw no further advantage in temporising: he too was desirous
to bring matters to a close. Orders had, in fact, been given to
the two plenipotentiaries to come to an agreement ; and, to
decide M. de Cobentzel, Joseph Bonaparte had been authorised
to make one of those concessions, which, at the last moment,
serve for a pretext to an exhausted negotiator for yielding with
honour. The thalweg* of the Rhine was the limit assigned to
France and Germany; consequently Dusseldorf, Ehrenbreit
stein, Philipsburg, Kehl, Old Breisach, situated on the right
bank, though attached to the left bank by many ties, were to be
left to the Germanic Confederation. But Cassel, a suburb of
Mayence, on the right bank, was a subject of dispute, for that
suburb could scarcely be separated from the city itself. Joseph
w:as authorised to cede Cassel, but on condition that it should
be dismantled. Mayence would thus cease to be longer a for
tified tete de pont, affording a passage at all times to the right
bank of the Rhine.
The last conference was held on the 9th of February, 1801
(20th Pluviose, year IX.). As it usually happens, the nego
tiators were never nearer to a rupture than when they were on
the point of agreeing definitively. M. de Cobentzel warmly in
sisted on the maintenance of the grand- duke of Tuscany in
Italy; on the indemnity destined for the German princes, an
indemnity which he wished to extend to the ecclesiastical
princes of the first order; lastly, on the inconvenience of sign
ing for the Germanic body, without having powers from the
Diet. An article relative to the debts of Belgium also gave
ise to great difficulties. On all these accounts he at last de
clared that he durst not conclude without referring to Vienna.
Joseph thereupon replied that his government enjoined him to
declare the negotiations at an end, unless they brought them to
a termination before they broke up ; he added that in the event
of another campaign Austria would be thrown back beyond the
Julian Alps. At length he ceded Cassel, besides all the fortified
positions on the right bank, but on condition that France should
demolish before she evacuated them, and that they should never
be reconstructed.
Upon this concession M. de Cobentzel yielded, and the treaty
was signed on the 9th of February, 1801, at half-past five in
the evening, to the great joy of Joseph, to the great grief of
M. de Cobentzel, who, however, had nothing to reproach himself -
with ; for, if he had endangered the interests of his court, it was
because he had persisted in defending them too warmly.
* The middle of the stream.— Translator.

Feb. 1801.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 165
Such was the celebrated treaty of Luneville, which terminated
(the war of the second coalition, and for the second time con
ceded to France the left bank of the Rhine, with a commanding
situation in Italy. The principal clauses were as follows.
The thalweg of the Rhine, from its exit out of the Helvetic
territory to its entry into the Batavian territory, formed the
boundary of France and Germany. Dusseldorf, Ehrenbreitstein,
Cassel, Kehl, Philipsburg, Old Breisach, situated on the right
bank, were left to Germany, but were first to be dismantled.
The hereditary princes who suffered losses on the left bank were
to be indemnified. No mention was made of the ecclesiastical
princes or of the mode of fixing the indemnities ; but it was
perfectly understood that the whole or part of the ecclesiastical
territories were to serve for the indemnities.
The emperor, at Luneville as at Campo-Formio, ceded the
Belgic provinces to France, as well as the small territories
which he possessed on the left bank, such as the county of
Falkenstein, and the Frickthal, which lay wedged in between
Zurzach and Basle. He gave up, moreover, the Milanese to the
Cisalpine. For these he obtained no other indemnity than the
Venetian States as far as the Adige, which had been previously
insured to him by the treaty of Campo-Formio. He lost the
archbishopric of Salzburg, which had been promised him by a
secret article of the same treaty. His house was, besides, de
prived of Tuscany, which was ceded to the house of Parma.
An indemnity in Germany was promised to the duke of Tus
cany. The promise of the Breisgau was still held out to the
duke of Modena.
The territorial distribution of Italy was thus settled on a much
more advantageous basis for France than at the time of the treaty
of Campo-Formio. Austria continued to have the Adige for her
boundary ; but Tuscany was taken from her house and given to
a house dependent on France ; the English were excluded from
Leghorn; the whole valley of the Po, from the Sesia and the
Tanaro to the Adriatic, belonged to the Cisalpine Republic, a
dependent daughter of the French Republic; lastly, Piedmont,
eonfined to the sources of the Po, was dependent on us. Thus,
masters of Tuscany and the Cisalpine, we occupied all central
Italy, and prevented Austria from giving a hand to Piedmont,
the Holy See, and Naples.
By the first coalition, Austria had lost Belgium and Lom
bardy, besides Modena for her family. By the second, she
lost the bishopric of Salzburg for herself, and Tuscany for her
house, which placed her in a position somewhat inferior in
Germany, but very inferior in Italy. This was certainly not
too much for all the bloodshed, for all the efforts imposed
upon France.
The principle of the secularisations was not explicitly but
implicitly laid down, since it was promised to indemnify the

166 HISTORY OF THE [Feb. 180Jgj
hereditary princes without alluding to the ecclesiastical princes.
Evidently the indemnity could not be demanded of any but the
ecclesiastical princes themselves.
The peace was declared common to the Batavian, Helvetic,
Cisalpine, and Ligurian Republics. Their independence was
guaranteed: nothing was said concerning Naples, Piedmont,
or the Holy See. These States were dependent on the plea
sure of France, which, for the rest, was tied in regard to Pied
mont and Naples, by the interest which the emperor Paul took
in behalf of those two courts, and in regard to the Holy See, by
the religious plans of the First Consul.
The First Consul, however, as we have seen, had not thought
fit to explain himself to any one relative to Piedmont. Dis
pleased with the king of Sardinia, who gave up his ports to the
Enghsh, he was desirous of keeping himself at liberty in regard
to a territory situated so, near to France and of such high
importance to her.
The emperor signed the peace for himself as sovereign of the
Austrian States, and for the whole Germanic body as emperor
of Germany. France promised secretly to use her influence
with Prussia to dispose her to approve this mode of proceeding
of the emperor's. The ratifications were to be exchanged in
thirty days by Austria and by France. The French armies
were not to evacuate Germany till the ratifications had been
exchanged at Luneville, but were to have evacuated it entirely
a month after that exchange.
Here, as at Campo-Formio, the liberation of all persons con
fined for political offences was stipulated. It was agreed that
the Italians, shut up in the prisons of Austria, particularly Mos-
cati and Caprara, should be released. The First Consul had not
ceased to insist on this act of humanity ever since the opening
of the congress.
General Bonaparte had attained the supreme power on the
9th of November, 1799 (18th Brumaire, year VIII.) ; it was now
the 9th of February, 1801 (20th Pluvi6se, year IX.); conse
quently just fifteen months had elapsed, and France, partly
reorganised at home, completely victorious abroad, was already
at peace with the Continent, and in alliance with the North and
the South of Europe against England. Spain was preparing to
march against Portugal ; the queen of Naples had thrown her
self at our feet ; the court of Rome was negotiating in Paris the
arrangement of religious affairs.
General Bellavene, appointed to carry the treaty, left Lune
ville in the evening of the 9th of February, and arrived as an
extraordinary courier in Paris. The treaty which he brought
was immediately inserted entire in the Moniteur. Paris was
suddenly illuminated; vehement and general joy burst forth on
all sides; and thanks without number were given to the First
Consul for this happy result of his victories and his policy.

Dec. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 167

BOOK VIII.

INFERNAL MACHINE.
Plots against the Life of the First Consul — Carbon., St. Rejant, and Limoe-
lan, three Agents of Georges, form a Plan for destroying the First Consul
by the Explosion of a Barrel of Gunpowder— Choice of the Rue St. Ni-
caise, and of the 3rd Nivose for the Execution of this Crime — The First
Consul saved by the Dexterity of his Coachman — Sensation produced — The
Crime attributed to the Revolutionists, and to the Indulgence shown them
by Fouche', the Minister — Animosity of the new Courtiers against that
Minister — His Silence and Coolness — He discovers Part of the Truth and
makes it known ; but Measures are nevertheless taken against the Revo
lutionists — Irritation of the First Consul — Project of an arbitrary Mea
sure — Deliberation on this Subject in the Council of State — After long
Discussions, a Resolution is adopted for transporting a certain Number of
Revolutionists without Trial — Some Resistance, but very faint, made to
this arbitrary Act — Discussion whether it shall take place by a Law, or by
a spontaneous Measure of the Government, referred only to the Senate,
for the sake of Constitutionality — The latter Course adopted — Transporta
tion decreed against one hundred and thirty alleged Terrorists — Fouche,
who knew them to be innocent of the Attempt of the 3rd Nivose, consents,
nevertheless, to the Measure which proscribes them — Discovery of the
real Authors of the Infernal Machine — Execution of Carbon and St. Rejant
— Unjust Condemnation of Topino Lebrun, Arena, &c. — Session of the
Year IX. — Fresh Manifestations of Opposition in the Tribunate — Institu
tion of Special Tribunals for the Suppression of Robbery on the Highroads
¦ — Financial Statement of Ways and Means for the Years VI., VII., and
VIIL— Budget of the Year IX.— Definitive Adjustment of the Public Debt
— Rejection by the Tribunate, and Adoption by the Legislative Body, of
this Plan of Finance— Sentiments of the First Consul — Continuation of his
administrative Labours — Roads — Canal of St. Quentin — Bridges over the
Seine — Works at the Simplon — The Monks of the Great St. Bernard es
tablished at the Simplon and at Mont Cenis.

( 169 )

BOOK VIIL
INFERNAL MACHINE.
While the external position of France was daily becoming
more brilliant, while Germany and Austria were treating for peace,
while the northern powers were leaguingwith us to resist the mari
time pretensions of England, while Portugal and Naples were
closing their ports against her, and while, in short, every thing
was succeeding to the wish of a victorious and moderate govern
ment, her internal situation exhibited a spectacle, at times
frightful, of the last convulsions of expiring parties. We have
already seen, in spite of the prompt re-organisation of the
government, robbery infesting the high roads, and factions, in
despair, attempting the assassination of the First Consul. These
were the inevitable consequences of our past disunion. The men
whom civil war had trained to crime, and who could no longer
resign themselves to a peaceable and honest life, sought employ
ment on the highways. The broken-down factions, despairing
of overpowering the consular guard, attempted to destroy, by
atrocious means, the invincible author of their defeat.
Robbery had increased on the approach of winter. It was
impossible to travel the roads without running the risk of being
plundered or murdered. The departments of Normandy, Anjou,
Maine, Bretagne, and Poitou, were, as formerly, the theatres of
these depredations. But the evil had spread. Several departments
of the centre and the South, as those of the Tarn, laLozere, the
Aveyron, the Upper Garonne, l'Herault, the Gard, the Ardeche,
the Drome, Vaucluse, the Bouches du Rhone, the Upper and
Lower Alps, the Var, had been infested in their turn. In these
departments the bands of robbers had been recruited by the
assassins of the South, who, upon pretext of chastising Jacobins,
murdered, for the purpose of robbingj the purchasers of national
domains; by young men who would not submit to the conscrip
tion ; and by some soldiers whom want had driven from the army
of Liguria, during the cruel winter of 1799 and 1800. These
wretched men, having once entered upon this criminal life, had
taken a liking to it; and nothing but the force of arms and the
severity of the laws could now divert them from those courses.
They stopped the public conveyances; they kidnapped from

170 HISTORY OF the [Dec. 1800.
their homes the purchasers of national domains, and frequently
opulent landed proprietors also, carried them into the woods, as
they did the senator Clement de Ris, for example, whom they
detained for twenty days, inflicted horrible tortures on their
victims, sometimes burning their feet, till they had paid consi
derable sums for their ransom. They plundered more especially
the pubhc chests, and even seized the funds of the State at the
houses of the collectors, upon pretext of making war upon the
government. Vagabonds who, in these times of trouble, had left
their homes to follow a wandering life, served them for scouts,
by assuming the character of beggars in the towns. These
wretches, picking up all sorts of information while engaged in
begging, intimated to the robbers, their accomplices, what car
riages to stop and what houses to plunder.
Small bodies of troops had been required to repress these
bands. When any of them were taken, justice could not take
its course, for the witnesses durst not give evidence, and the
juries were afraid to convict. Extraordinary measures are
always to be regretted, not so much on account of the severities
attendant on them, as the shock which they give to the constitu
tion of a country, especially when that constitution is new.
But, in this case, measures of that kind were indispensable ; for
ordinary justice, after it had been tried, was found to be powerless.
A bill (prqjet de hi) had been prepared for instituting special
tribunals for the suppression of highway robbery. This bill,
presented to the Legislative Body, which was then sitting, was
violently attacked by the opposition. The First Consul, exempt
from those scruples of legality which are felt only in times of quiet,
and which, even when they happen to be petty or narrow, are at
least a happy sigh of respect for the authority of the law, the
First Consul had not hesitated to have recourse to martial law
till the plan under discussion should be adopted. As it was
necessary to employ bodies of troops to suppress these bands of
robbers, the gendarmerie not being strong enough to cope with
them, he thought that this situation might be assimilated to a
state of real war, which authorised the application of the laws
peculiar to the state of war. He formed several small corps,
which scoured the infested departments, and were accompanied
by military commissions. All the robbers taken in arms were
tried within forty-eight hours and shot.
The horror excited by these villains was so great and so
general, that nobody durst raise a doubt as to the regularity
or the justice of these executions. Meanwhile, villains of
another stamp were meditating the destruction of the consular
government by different and still more atrocious means. While
Demerville, Ceracchi, and Arena, were undergoing judicial exa
mination, their adherents of the revolutionary party continued to
form a thousand schemes, the one more insane than the other.
They had planned the assassination of the First Consul in his

Dec. 1800.] consulate and the empire. 171
box at the Opera, and had scarcely dared, as we have seen, to
grasp their daggers. Now, they were dreaming of something
else. One day they proposed to excite a disturbance at the
breaking up of one of the theatres, and to dispatch the First
Consul amidst the tumult ; on another, to seize him on his way
to Malmaison, and to murder him after they had carried him
off. Like genuine declaimers at clubs, they talked of these
schemes everywhere and aloud, so that the police was informed
from hour to hour of each of their plans. But, while they
talked incessantly, not one of them was bold enough to act.
M. Fouche feared them but little, and yet watched them with
continual attention. However, among their numerous devices,
there was one more formidable than the rest, and which had
roused the particular vigilance of the police. One Chevalier,
a workman employed in the manufactories of arms established
in Paris under the Convention, had been found at work upon
a frightful machine. It was a barrel filled with powder
and langrage to which was adjusted a musket-barrel with
a trigger. This machine was evidently destined to blow
up the First Consul. The inventor was apprehended and
thrown into prison. This new contrivance made some noise,
and contributed greatly to keep all eyes fixed on those wha
were called Jacobins and Terrorists. Their reputation of '93
caused them to be more feared than they deserved to be. The
First Consul, as we have already said, participated in the error
of the public respecting them ; and, having continually to do
with the revolutionary party, sometimes with honest men of
that party dissatisfied with too rapid a re-action, sometimes.
with villains planning crimes which they no longer had the
energy to commit, he laid the blame of every thing upon the
Revolutionists, was angry with none but them, talked of punish
ing them alone. M. Fouche persisted, but to no purpose, in
directing his attention to the Royalists. It would have required
strong facts to change the opinion of the First Consul and that
of the public on this subject. Unfortunately, atrocious facts.
were in course of preparation.
Georges, having returned from London to the Morbihan, was,
full of money, thanks to the English, and secretly directed the
plunderers of the diligences. He had sent some of his cut
throats to Paris, for the purpose of murdering the First Consul.
Among them were two men, named Limo'elan and St. Rejant, both
practised in the horrors of the civil war, and the latter formerly
a naval officer, having some knowledge of gunnery. To these
two he added a third, called Carbon, a subordinate person, the
worthy tool of those great criminals. Arriving in Paris one after
another, towards the end of November (first days of Frimaire),
they sought the surest means of killing the First Consul, and
made more than one trial with air-guns in the neighbourhood of
Paris. Fouche, the minister, apprised of their presence and of

172 history of the [Dec. 1800.
their errand, had them closely watched. But, owing to the
inefficiency of two agents employed to follow these men, he had
lost sight of them. While the police was making every exertion
to discover traces of them, these villains had buried themselves
in profound obscurity. Without declaiming, like the Jacobins,
or communicating their secret to any one, they prepared for an
atrocious deed, which has been equalled but once, and in our own
times. pDhevalier's machine had suggested to them the idea of
--destroying the First Consul by means of a barrel of powder
charged with langrage. They resolved to put this barrel into a
small cart, and to place it in one of the narrow streets which
then led to the Carrousel, and through which the First Consul
very frequently passed in his carriage. They bought a horse and
a cart, and hired a cart-house, passing themselves off for foreign
traders. St. Rejant, who, as we have just said, was a naval
officer and artillerist, made the necessary experiments, went
several times to the Carrousel, to see the First Consul's carriage
leave the Tuileries, to calculate how long it took to reach the
neighbouring streets, and to arrange every thing in such a manner
that the barrel should explode at the right time. These three
men chose, for the accomplishment of their plan a day when the
First Consul was to go to the Opera to hear Haydn's oratorio of
" The Creation," which was to be performed for the first time. It
was the 3rd Nivose (December 24th, 1800). They selected for
the theatre of the crime the Rue St. Nicaise, which ran from the
Carrousel to the Rue de Richelieu, and through which the First
Consul was in the habit of passing very often. Several succes
sive windings in this street must necessarily slacken the progress
of the most expert driver. The day having arrived, Carbon,
St. Rejant, and Limoelan, drove their cart to the Rue St. Nicaise,
and then separated. While St. Rejant was to set fire to the
barrel of powder, the two others were to place themselves within
sight of the Tuileries, and to come and give him notice the
moment they saw the First Consul's carriage make its appearance.
St. Rejant had the barbarity to get a girl of fifteen to hold the
horse harnessed to this horrible machine. For his part, he kept
himself in readiness to set fire to it.
At this very moment, the First Consul, fatigued with business,
was hesitating about going to the Opera, but he suffered himself
to be persuaded by the earnest solicitations of those about him,
and set out from the Tuileries at a quarter past eight o'clock.
He was accompanied by generals Lannes, Berthier, and Lau-
riston, and escorted by a detachment of mounted grenadiers.
Most fortunately these grenadiers followed, instead of preced
ing, the carriage. It arrived in the narrow part of the Rue
St. Nicaise, without having been announced either by the detach
ment or by the accomplices. The latter never came to apprise
St. Rejant. Fear had prevented their doing so, or perhaps they
had not recognised the First Consul's carriage. St. Rejant himself

Dec. 1800.] consulate and the empire. 173
did not perceive it till it was a little past the machine. He' was
violently jostled by one of the horse-guards, but, not disconcerted,
he set fire, and instantly took to flight. The First Consul's coach
man, who was a capital whip, and usually drove his master with
extreme rapidity, had had time to pass one of the turnings of the
street, when the explosion was suddenly heard. The shock was
tremendous: the carriage was nearly overturned; all the win
dows were broken, and the fronts of the neighbouring houses
were shattered by the discharge. One of the horse-grenadiers
was slightly wounded, and all the surrounding streets were in
stantly strewed with a great number of persons dead or dying.
The First Consul and those who accompanied him, at first con
ceived that they had been fired at with grape ; they stopped for
a moment, soon learned the real state of the case, and pursued
their way. The First Consul insisted on going to the Opera. He
appeared calm, unmoved, amidst the extraordinary agitation that
prevailed in all parts of the house. It was reported that, in
order to despatch him, banditti had blown up a whole quarter
of Paris.
He staid but a few moments at the Opera, and returned im
mediately to the Tuileries, where, on the report of the attempt,
an immense concourse had collected. His anger, which he had
before repressed, then burst forth. "It is the Jacobins, the
Terrorists," he exclaimed ; " it is those wretches in permanent
revolt, in battailhn carre against every government, it is the
cut-throats of the 2nd and 3rd of September, the ringleaders of
the 31st of May, the conspirators of Prairial ; it is those villains
who, to assassinate me, have not scrupled to sacrifice thousands
of lives. I will do signal justice upon them." There was
no need for an impulsion from so high a quarter to inflame the
public opinion against the Revolutionists. Their exaggerated
reputation, and their attempts -for two or three months pastjf
were such as to cause every possible crime to be attributed to
them. In that saloon, thronged more especially by those who
were anxious that their attachment should be remarked, there
was soon but one cry against the Terrorists, as they were called.
The numerous enemies of M. Fouche hastened to profit by the
occasion, and to launch forth into invectives against him. His
police, said they, sees nothing, allows any thing to be done; it
shows a criminal indulgence towards the revolutionary party.
This is owing to M. Fouche's fellow-feeling for his old accom
plices. The life of the First Consul would no longer be safe in
his hands. In a moment the animosity against that minister
was at its height; that very evening it was asserted that he had
been dismissed. As for M. Fouche, retiring into a corner
of the saloon of the Tuileries, with a few persons who did not
share the general excitement, he listened to the accusations pre
ferred against him with the utmost composure. His air of incre
dulity inflamed still more the anger of his enemies. Still he

174 history of the [Dec. 1800.
would not disclose what he knew, for fear of marring the success of
the researches that were on foot. But, recollecting the agents of
Georges, dogged for some time by the police, and afterwards lost
sight of, he did not hesitate in his own mind to impute the crime
to them. Certain members of the Council of State would have
addressed some observations to the First Consul, and expressed
their doubts as to the real authors of the attempt in the Rue
St. Nicaise: he flew- into a violent passion. " I am not to be
bamboozled," he exclaimed. " This is no attempt of Chouans or
emigrants, or ci-devant nobles and priests. I know the authors;
I shall be sure to get at them, and to inflict on them an exem
plary punishment." While uttering these words, his speech was
vehement, his gesture threatening. His flatterers applauded and
excited that anger which should have been soothed, not inflamed,
after the horrible events which had just agitated all around.
On the following day, the same scenes were repeated. Ac
cording to a custom recently introduced, the Senate, the Legis
lative Body, the Tribunate, the Council of State, the judges,
the administrative authorities, the staffs, waited upon the First
Consul, to express their grief and indignation, sentiments
sincerely and universally felt. Never, indeed, had such a thing
been seen. The Revolution had familiarised men's minds with
the cruelties of dominant factions, but not yet with the dark
plots of vanquished parties. People were filled with surprise and
dismay: they dreaded the repetition of these atrocious attempts,
and asked each other in consternation what would become of
France, if the man, who alone curbed these wretches were to be
cut off. All the bodies of the State, admitted into the Tuileries,
expressed ardent attachment to the hero-pacificator, who had
promised to restore, and who was actually restoring, peace to the
world. The terms of these addresses were common-place, but the
sentiment which pervaded them all was not less genuine than
profound. The First Consul replied to the municipal council:
" I have been touched by the proofs of affection which the people
of Paris have shown me on this occasion. I deserve them, because
the only aim of my thoughts, of my actions, is to augment the
prosperity and the glory of France. While those banditti confined
themselves to direct attacks upon me, I could leave to the laws
the task of punishing them ; but, since they have just endangered
part of the population of the capital by a crime unexampled in
history, the punishment shall be equally speedy and terrible.
Assure the people of Paris, in my name, that that handful of
villains, whose crimes have gone far to dishonour liberty, shall
soon be deprived of the power to do mischief."
Every one applauded these words of vengeance, for there was
not a person but, for his own part, made use of similar expres
sions. Men of reflection anticipated with pain that the enraged
lion might, perhaps, overleap the barrier of the laws ; but the
multitude called for punishment. In Paris, the agitation was

Dec. 1800.] consulate and the empire. 175
extreme. The Royalists threw the guilt on the Revolutionists,
and the Revolutionists on the Royalists. Both were equally sin
cere, for the crime remained a profound secret to all but its
authors. Every one descanted on the subject, and, according to
his inchnation to condemn one party rather than another, found
reasons equally plausible for accusing the Royalists or the Revo
lutionists. The enemies of the Revolution, both old and new,
said that the .Terrorists alone could have devised so atrocious
a scheme, and adduced, as a conclusive proof of their opinion,
the machine of Chevalier, the gunsmith, recently discovered.
Sagacious persons, on the contrary, who had stedfastly clung
to the Revolution, asked why those highway robbers, those
Chauffeurs, who committed so many crimes, who daily dis
played an unparalleled refinement in cruelty, and who, in parti
cular, had just carried off the senator Clement de Ris, why
these men might not be the authors of the horrible explosion in
the Rue St. Nicaise as well as the so-called Terrorists. It should
moreover be borne in mind that persons of sedate minds could
scarcely obtain a hearing at that moment, so deeply was public
opinion agitated, and so strong was the tendency to condemn
the revolutionary party. But, will it be believed ? amidst the
conflict of diverse imputations, there were men of both parties
inconsiderate or perverse enough to hold a totally different
language. Certain factious Royalists longed for the destruction
of the First Consul at any rate, and adopting the general opinion
wliich attributed the crime to the Terrorists, admired the atro
cious energy, the profound secrecy, which had been required
for the commission of such a deed. The Revolutionists, on the
contrary, seemed almost to claim the merit for their party;
and there were among them braggarts of crime, who had the
culpable folly of being almost proud of the execrable act that
was imputed to them. It is only in times of civil war that we
meet with such levity and such unprincipled language, among
men who would themselves be incapable of perpetrating the
deeds which they dare to approve.
We may further add, that all who talked of this event were
totally wrong. The minister Fouche alone suspected who were
the real culprits.
While he was engaged in searching after them, every body
was asking what was to be done to prevent future attempts of
the same kind. People were, at that time, so accustomed to
violent measures, that they thought it almost natural to seize
the men known to have been formerly Terrorists, and to treat
them as they had treated their victims in '93. The two sec
tions of the Council of State, to whose province this subject
more particularly belonged, the sections of legislation and of
the interior, assembled two days after the event, on the 26th
of December (5th Nivose), to inquire which of the various plans
proposed was most admissible. As the bill (projet de hi) to
institute special tribunals was then under discussion, it was

176 history of the [Dec. 1800.
suggested that two clauses should be added to it. The first
instituting a military commission for the trial of crimes com
mitted against the members of the government ; the second
investing the First Consul with authority to remove from Paris
men whose presence in the capital should be deemed dangerous,
and to punish them with transportation, if they should attempt
to disregard such first exile.
After the preliminary investigation of this subject in the two
sections of legislation and of the interior, the whole Council of
State met under the presidency of the First Consul. M.
Portalis reported what had passed in the morning in the two
sections, and submitted their propositions to the Council. The
First Consul, out of temper, thought these propositions de
fective. A mere change of jurisdiction appeared to him totally
inadequate to the circumstances. He was for apprehending the
Jacobins en masse, shooting those who should be convicted of
having had a hand in the crime, and transporting the others.
But it was his wish to accomplish this by means of an extra
ordinary measure, in order to be more sure of the result. " The
proceedings of a special tribunal," said he, " will be slow, and
not reach the real criminals. Our business now is not to frame
a system of judicial metaphysics. Metaphysical minds have
ruined every thing in France for the last ten years. We must
judge of the situation like statesmen, and apply a remedy to it
like resolute men. What is the evil that annoys us ? There
are in France 10,000 scoundrels, spread over the whole country,
who have persecuted all the honest people, and who are
steeped in blood. All are not guilty in the same degree, far
from it. Many are still open to repentance, and are not incor
rigible criminals ; but, while they see the head-quarters esta
blished in Paris, and the chiefs concocting plots with impunity,
they retain hope, and keep up their spirits. Strike the chiefs
boldly, and the soldiers will disperse. They will return to those
occupations from which they were driven by a violent revolution ;
they will forget that stormy passage in their lives, and again
become peaceable citizens. Honest men, who are now in con
stant fear, will take courage, and attach themselves to a govern
ment which has known how to protect them. There is no middle
course ; either we must pardon all, like Augustus, or vengeance,
prompt, terrible, and proportionate to the crime must overtake
them. As many of the guilty must be sacrificed as there have
been victims. Fifteen or twenty of these villains must be shot,
and 200 of them transported. By these means we shall rid the
Republic of agitators who convulse it ; we shall clear it of such
sanguinary scum." .... At each successive sentence, the First
Consul became more and more animated ; and, nettled at the
disapprobation even which he perceived in certain countenances,
" I am," he exclaimed, "I am so convinced of the necessity
and justice of a strong measure, to purify, and, at the same
time, to quiet France, that I am readv to constitute nsvself sols

Dec. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 177
judge, to have the culprits brought before me, to examine them,
to try them, and to order sentence of condemnation to be exe
cuted. All France will applaud me, for it is not my own person
that I here seek to avenge. My fortune, which has preserved
me so often on the field of battle, will continue to preserve me.
I think not of myself ; I think of social order, which it is my
mission to re-establish, and of the national honour, which it is
my duty to purge from an abominable stain."
This scene petrified part of the Council of State with surprise
and terror. Some members, sympathising with the sincere, but
intemperate feelings of the First Consul, applauded his speech.
A very decided majority discerned, with regret, in his words, the
language which the Revolutionists had themselves held, when
they proscribed thousands of victims. They, too, had said that
the aristocrats endangered the Republic, that it was necessary to
get rid of them by the most speedy and by the surest means, and
that the public safety was worth a few sacrifices. The difference,
to be sure, was great ; for, instead of a bloodthirsty rabble, who,
in their blind fury, at length took each other for aristocrats, and
slaughtered one another, here was a man of genius, proceeding,
with consistency and vigour, towards a noble aim, that of setting
convulsed society to rights. Unfortunately, he endeavoured to
succeed, not by the slow observance of rules, but by prompt
and extraordinary means, like those which had been employed
to overturn it. His good sense, his generous heart, and the
horror of shedding blood, then prevalent, were guarantees against
sanguinary executions ; but, with the exception of actual, blood
shed, he was disposed to resort to every severity towards those
who were then denominated Jacobins and Terrorists.
Objections were raised in the Council of State, timidly, it is
true, for the indignation universally excited by the crime of the
Rue St. Nicaise, checked the courage of those, who would fain
have made some resistance to arbitrary proceedings. However,
one individual, who was not afraid to oppose the First Consul,
and who did so bluntly, and in a straightforward way, ad
miral Truguet, seeing that the intention was to strike the Re
volutionists en masse, raised doubts respecting the real authors
of the crime. " Government," said he, " is desirous to get rid
of the villains who disturb the Republic ; well and good ; but
there are villains of more than one kind. The returned emigrants
threaten the purchasers of the national domains ; the Chouans
infest the high roads ; there-instated priests inflame the passions
of the people in the South ; the public mind is poisoned by
pamphlets"  This last expression of admiral Truguet had
reference to the famous pamphlet of M. de Fontanes, to which
we have before adverted. At these words, the First Consul,
stung to the quick, and, advancing directly to the speaker,
asked, " What pamphlets do you allude to ?" " Pamphlets that
are publicly circulated," replied admiral Truguet. " Specify
VOL. II. N

178 HISTORY OF the [Dec. 1800.
them," rejoined the First Consul. " You know them as well
as I do," retorted this courageous man, who thus dared defy
such indignation.
A scene like this had never yet been witnessed within the
walls of the Council of State. The circumstances produced an
outburst of the impetuous temper of the man who then held
in his hands the destinies of France. He thereupon gave vent
to his passion, and displayed all the eloquence of wrath. " Do
people take us for children?" he exclaimed. "Do they think
to hurry us away with these declamations against the emigrants,
the Chouans, the priests ? Because there are still some partial
attempts in La Vendee, are we to be required, as formerly, to
declare the country in dangeT ? . . . . Has France ever been in
a more brilliant situation, have the finances ever been in a better
state, the armies more victorious, has. general peace ever been
nearer at hand ? If the Chouans commit crimes, I will have
them shot. But must I begin again by proscribing on account
of the appellations of nobles, priests, or royalists ? Must I send
into exile ten thousand old men, who only desire to live peace
ably, while paying respect to the established laws ? Have you
not seen poor ecclesiastics put to death in Bretagne, at the insti
gation of Georges himself, because he saw that they were gra
dually becoming reconciled to the government ? Must I again
proscribe on account of rank or title ? Must I strike some be
cause they are priests, others because they were formerly nobles ?
Do you not know, gentlemen, members of the Council, that,
with the exception of two or three, you are all reputed Royalists ?
You, citizen Defermon, are you not taken for a partisan of the
Bourbons ? Must I send citizen Portalis to Sinnamary, citizen
Devaisne to Madagascar, and then constitute myself a council a
la Babceuf? No, citizen Truguet, I am not to be deceived : we
have none who threaten our quiet but the Septembrisers. They
would not spare even you ; in vain you might tell them, that you
had defended them to-day in the Council of State ; they would
sacrifice both you and me, as well as all your colleagues."
There was only one word to be said in reply to this vehement
apostrophe, that it was not right to proscribe any person for a
mere title, neither one party because they were styled Royalists,
nor another party because they were Revolutionists. The First
Consul had no sooner uttered his concluding words, than he rose
abruptly, and put an end to the sitting.
Cambaceres, the consul, always calm, possessed infinite skill
in obtaining by gentleness, what his imperious colleague would
fain extort by the sole power of his will. He assembled the two
sections on the following day at his residence ; he endeavoured,
in a few words, to excuse the warmth of the First Consul, affirm
ing, what was true, that he had no dislike to contradiction, when
it was free from acrimony and personality ; and he endeavoured
to reconcile their minds to the idea of some extraordinary mea-

Dec. 1800.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 179
sure. This was not worthy of his accustomed moderation ; but,
though in the habit of giving prudent advice to the First Consul,
he gave way when he saw that he was absolutely resolved, and
especially when the point in discussion, related to the curbing of
the Terrorists. M. Portalis, who had the merit of being averse
to proscribe any one, though he had been proscribed himself,
adhered to the plan of the two sections, proposing to add two
clauses, to the law instituting the special tribunals. Cambaceres,
however, insisted, and obtained a majority in favour of the
adoption of an extraordinary measure, upon the understanding
that it should be discussed afresh before the united sections.
In this sort of meeting with closed doors, words again ran very
high. M. Roederer inveighed vehemently against the Jacobins,
imputed their crimes to the indulgence of M. Fouche, and went
so far as to move that the Council of State should join in an
address, praying for the dismissal of that minister.
M. Cambaceres repressed all these ebullitions of zeal, and
convoked the sections at the apartments of general Bonaparte,
in whose presence was held a sort of privy council, composed
of the Consuls, the two sections of the Interior and Legislation,
and the ministers of Foreign affairs, of the Interior, and of Justice.
So strong were the prejudices against M. Fouche, that he was
not even summoned to these conferences.
The proposal of an extraordinary measure, was again pre
sented and discussed at great length. Several sittings of this
same privy council were held before the members could agree.
At length, it was resolved that a general measure should be
adopted against those who were called the Terrorists. But a
serious question yet remained to be settled ; that was the form
of that measure. The point to be decided was, whether that
measure should be carried into execution by a spontaneous act
of the government, or by means of a law. The First Consul, ge
nerally so bold, was in favour of a law. He was averse to
compromise the great bodies of the State on this occasion, and
this he declared openly. " The Consuls are irresponsible," said
he, " but the ministers are not so, and any of them who sign
such a resolution may some day be called to account. Not a
single individual must be compromised ; the Legislative Body
must share in the responsibility of the proposed measure. The
Consuls themselves," he added, "know not what may happen.
As for myself, while I live, I am not afraid that any one will
dare to call me to account for my actions. But I may be killed,
and then I cannot answer for the safety of my two colleagues.
It would be your turn to govern," said he, laughing, to the
second consul, Cambaceres, " and you are not very firm in the
stirrups. It will be better to have a law for the present, as well
as for the future."
A singular scene was passing at this moment. They who
Were averse to the measure, wished that it might be adopted,
N2

180 HISTORY OF THE [Dec. 1800.
not by means of a law, but through a spontaneous resolu
tion of the government. They were desirous to throw upon
the government the entire responsibility, without perceiving
that they were thus suffering it to acquire the mischievous habit
of acting alone, and on its arbitrary authority. It was said, in
support of this opinion, that the law would not pass, that
opinions began to be divided respecting the real authors of the
crime, that the Legislative Body would recoil from a proscrip
tion-list, and that the government would run the risk of incur
ring a most signal defeat. Messrs. Roederer and Regnault de
St. Jean d'Angely expressed themselves to this effect. To the
latter the First Consul made this reply : " Since the Tribunate
has rejected one or two laws, you are panic-struck. There are,
it is true, some Jacobins in the Legislative Body, but not above
ten or twelve at most. They frighten the others, who know that,
but for me, but for the 18th of Brumaire, they would have been
massacred. These latter will stand by me on this occasion; the
law will pass."
The advocates of the other course persisted in their senti
ments, and M. de Talleyrand, siding with those who were afraid
of the bill being thrown out, suggested an argument most likely
to make an impression on the First Consul, namely, that abroad
the measure would have a more salutary effect. " Foreigners,"
he said, "would recognise in it the act of a government that
dared, and was able to defend itself against the anarchists." The
First Consul yielded to this argument, but he devised a middle
course, which was adopted : this was, to refer it to the Senate,
that this body might examine whether the act was, or was not,
an infringement of the Constitution. The reader will, no doubt,
recollect that, according to the Constitution of the year VIIL,
the Senate did not vote the laws, but was empowered to rescind
them, if it deemed them contrary to the Constitution. It had
not the same power with regard to the measures of the govern
ment. The suggestion of the First Consul was therefore ap
proved, and M. Fouche was directed to make out a list of the
principal Terrorists, with a view to their being transported to
the deserts of the New World. The two sections of the Council
of State were charged to draw up a declaration of the reasons
for this act. The First Consul was to sign the decree, and the
Senate to declare whether it was, or was not, contrary to the
Constitution. This measure against the Terrorists, illegal and arbitrary in
itself, had not even the justice which an arbitrary act may some
times carry with it, when it punishes those who are really guilty ;
for the Terrorists were not the authors of the crime. By this
time, the truth began to be suspected. Fouche, the minister, and
Dubois, prefect of police, had been incessantly engaged in the
most active search, and this search had not been fruitless. The
violence of the explosion had destroyed almost all the instru-

Jan. 1801.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 181
ments of the crime. The girl, whom St. Rejant had employed
to hold the horse, had been blown to pieces ; nothing was left
of the unfortunate creature, but her legs and feet. The iron
tires of the cart-wheels had been thrown to a great distance.
Fragments of the articles employed in the commission of the
crime, and which were likely to lead to the discovery of the
authors,, had been found, at a great distance apart, in every direc
tion. There were also left some remains of the cart, and the
horse. These remains were collected, a description of them was
drawn up, and made public through the newspapers, and all the
horse-dealers in Paris were invited to inspect them. By a lucky
chance, the original owner of the horse at once identified him, and
gave the name of the seedsman to whom he had sold him. This
seedsman, being summoned, declared with the utmost frankness,
all that he knew about the matter. He had sold the horse to two
men, who represented themselves as foreign traders. He had had
two or three interviews with them, and described them very
minutely. A man who kept carriages for hire, and who had let
for a few days the cart-house, in which the cart was deposited,
made also a very circumstantial deposition. He described the
same persons, and furnished particulars perfectly corresponding
with those which had been received from the seedsman. The
cooper who had sold the barrel, and who had put on the iron
hoops, gave information agreeing entirely/with the preceding
accounts. All these depositions perfectly tallied as to the stature,
features, dress, and appearance of the suspected individuals.
When all these witnesses had been heard, recourse was had to a
decisive proof. Upwards of two hundred Revolutionists, appre
hended on this occasion, were taken from prison and brought
before them. These examinations lasted during the 1st, 2nd, 3rd,
and 4th of January (11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th Niydse), and led
to the conviction that not one of the Revolutionists was con
cerned in the crime, as not one was recognised. And no doubt
could be entertained of the veracity of the witnesses who fur
nished these descriptions, for almost all of them had come for
ward spontaneously to give evidence, and manifested great zeal
in seconding the efforts of the police. Thus, it was proved almost
to a certainty that the Revolutionists were innocent. The fact,
however, could not be perfectly established, unless by the dis
covery of the real authors. But an important circumstance,
pointed to the agents of Georges, who had been sent upwards of
a month before to Paris, and who had always been considered
by M. Fouche as really the guilty parties. Though all trace of
them had been lost, yet, down to the 3rd Nivdse they had been
seen, sometimes in one place, sometimes in another, though the
police had not been able to apprehend them. But, since the 3rd
Niv6se, they had entirely disappeared, so that one would almost
have thought that they had concealed themselves under ground.
This disappearance, so sudden and so complete, ever since the day

182 HISTORY OF THE [Jan. 1801.
of the crime, was a striking circumstance. Add to this, that one of
the descriptions given by all the witnesses, corresponded in every
point to that of Carbon. M. Fouche, more convinced than
ever by all these indications, that the real authors were the
Chouans, lost no time in dispatching an emissary to watch
Georges' motions, and to obtain information relative to Carbon,
St. Rejant, and Limo'elan. In the mean time he had collected
sufficient evidence to shake the conviction of many, and even
that of the First Consul, who, nevertheless, would not relinquish
his first opinion but upon the production of actual proof.
Such was the state of the proceedings on the 4th of January
(14th Nivose), the day on which the act that condemned so many
men under the designation of Terrorists, was definitively decreed*
The Council of State had successively come to an agreement
upon all the points; it had never thought seriously of a tribunal
which should try in a summary manner, and sentence the Terror
ists to be shot ; it had always stopped short at the idea of trans
porting a certain number of them ; and, after many discussions, it
was agreed that they should be transported, by virtue of an act
of the Consuls, submitted to the approbation of the Senate. The
affair having been arranged with the principal members of the
Council and the Senate, the rest could be nothing but an empty
formality. M. Fouche, who, without knowing the whole truth, was never
theless acquainted with it in part, and buffeted on all sides,
had the weakness to lend himself to a measure, directed, it is
true, against men stained with blood, but not the authors of the
crime, which it was intended to punish at the moment. Of all
those who participated in this act of proscription, he was there
fore the most inexcusable ; but he was attacked in all quarters;
he was accused of complaisance towards the Revolutionists; and
he had not the courage to resist. He himself drew up the re
port for the Council of State, on which the decree of the Con:
suis was founded.
In this report, presented to the Council of State on the 1st of
* I have compared the dates of all the documents in the case with the
dates of the measures passed against the revolutionary party, and the result
is, that between the 1 1th and the 14th Nivose, (the 1st and the 4th of Janu
ary) only one thing was known, namely, that the personal examinations of the
so-called Terrorists, had not led to the identification of any one of them. Con
sequently, there were strong reasons for believing that the revolutionary party,
was not concerned in the crime of the Rue St. Nicaise ; but this was not posi
tively ascertained till much later, that is to say, till the 28th Nivose (18th of
January), the day of the apprehension, and complete identification of Carbon
by the sellers of the horse, cart, and barrel. The act against the Revolutionists
is dated the 14th Nivose (4th of January) : it is not true, therefore, as it has
been sometimes asserted, that the proscription took place in spite of a perfect
knowledge of the real authors of the crime, and that the government punished
the Revolutionists, knowing them to be innocent. The procedure was at all
events highly arbitrary ; but it is our duty to state the facts as they occurred,
without exaggeration or extenuation.

Jan. 1801.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 183
January, 1801 (11th Niv6se), a class of men was denounced,
who for ten years had steeped themselves in crime of every kind;
who had shed the blood of the prisoners in the Abbaye, invaded
and outraged the Convention, threatened the Directory, and
who now, driven to despair, had recourse to the dagger, to strike
the Republic in the person of the First Consul. " All these
men," it was said, " have not taken up the dagger, but all are
universally known to be capable of pointing it, and1 of using it."
It was added that the protective forms of justice were not made
for them ; it was therefore proposed to seize, and to transport
them from the territory of the Republic.
The examination of the report gave rise to the question,
whether the Jacobins ought not to be denounced in it as the
contrivers of the 3rd Nivose. The First Consul took great pains
to oppose this. " We believe so," said he, " but we do not know
it;" — (he began, in fact, to be shaken in his conviction) — " they
are transported for the deeds of the 2nd of September, of the
31st of May, of the days of Prairial, for Baboeuf's conspiracy,
for all that they have done, for all that they might yet do."
A list of 130 persons doomed to transportation was annexed to
this report. The government did not confine itself to transporting
them ; but, what was perhaps more cruel, there was added to the
names of several of them the appellation Septembriser, without any
other ground for thus stigmatising them than public notoriety.
The Council of State manifested a visible repugnance on
hearing these 130 names; for it might be said that it was called
upon to draw up a proscription list. Thibaudeau, the councillor,
said that such a list could not be prepared by the Council.
"I am not so silly," replied the First Consul, angrily, "as to
make you pass sentence upon individuals ; I merely submit to
you the principle of the measure." The principle was approved,
but not without some dissentient votes.
The question was then proposed, whether the measure should
be an act of state police, on the part of the government, or a
law passed in the accustomed forms. This point had been pre
viously arranged : the resolutions already secretly adopted were
confirmed, and it was decided that the measure should be a
spontaneous act of the government, but referred to the Senate,
which should pronounce upon the question of constitutionality.
On the 4th of January (14th Nivose,) the First Consul, having
had the definitive list prepared, drew up a decree, by which he
banished from the territory of the Republic the persons included
in that list, and without hesitation affixed his signature..
On the 5th of January (15th Niv6se), the assembled Senate,
proceeding a step further than the decision of the Council of
State, declared that the resolution of the First Consul was a
measure essential to the preservation of the Constitution.
These unfortunate persons were collected on the following
day, and despatched to Nantes to be shipped and transported to

184 HISTORY OF THE [Jan. 180L
distant countries. There were among them some deputies of
the Convention, several members of the old Commune, all that
remained of the murderers of September, and the notorious
Rossignol, who had been general of the revolutionary army.
Assuredly these men, at least most of them, deserved no sym
pathy ; but all the forms of justice were violated in regard to
them, and that which proves the danger of the violation of those
sacred forms is, that many of the denunciations made by the
police were disputed, and with a strong appearance of truth.
It required some moral courage at the moment, to intercede
on behalf of these proscripts; still there were some who, on the
recommendation of bold men, were properly erased from the list
of proscription, and spared at Nantes from the fatal embarkation.
That an individual should be able to obtain, or fail in obtaining,
the favour of a government, according as he can command,
or is unable to command, an influential recommendation, is a
point to which I shall not advert ; but that his exclusion from
a proscription list should depend upon the accidental circum
stance, whether he can or cannot find a courageous influential
friend to interfere on his behalf, must shock every feeling of
justice, and prove that when forms are violated, society is exposed
to all the horrors of arbitrary rule. And yet this period was-
resplendent with glory; it was distinguished by a love of order,
by an antipathy to blood. But the nation was emerging from
the revolutionary chaos ; it had no respect for rules ; it found.
them inconvenient and insupportable. If ever this arbitrary act
were canvassed, a single word was sufficient to justify it. Those
wretches, it was said, were steeped in blood, they would wallow
in it again, if they were allowed free scope ; they are treated much
better than they had treated their victims. And, certainly, if this
act had many previous precedents at anterior epochs, in regard
to the violation of forms, it was marked by two peculiar distinct
features from the past: punishment fell mostly upon villains,
and their blood was not shed. A miserable excuse, we admit,.
but which we must nevertheless urge in extenuation, to show
that the year 1800 had nothing in common with the year '93.
While these unfortunate persons were on the road to Nantes,
it was with the greatest difficulty that they were saved from the
fury of the populace in all the towns through which they passed-,
so strongly was public feeling expressed against them. Under
the dominion of this feeling, something still more deplorable
occurred; this was the condemnation of Ceracchi, Arena, Demer
ville, and Topino Lebrun. It will be recollected that in the pre
ceding October (Vendemiaire), these hot-headed men had entered
into a plot for the assassination of the First Consul at the Opera..
But none of them had had the courage, nor perhaps even any
decided intention, to assist in the execution of the plot. The po
lice agents, sent in as spies amongst them, and to whom they gave
daggers, urged them on to a degree of guilt, which before, perhaps,

Jan. 1801.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 185
they had not contemplated But, at any rate, they did not make
their appearance at the place fixed for the execution of their plot;
and Ceracchi, the only one apprehended in the Opera-house,
was not even armed with one of the daggers which had been
distributed amongst them. They were declaimers, who certainly
wished for the destruction of the First Consul, but would never
have dared to consummate it. They were tried on the 9th of
January (19th Niv6se), at the very moment when the events just
related were occurring. Their counsel, aware of the fatal influence
exercised upon the minds of the jury by the catastrophe of the
3rd Nivose, strove in vain to weaken it. That influence was
irresistible upon the jury, which, of all tribunals, is that
most swayed by public opinion, and which has the advantages
and the inconveniences of that bias. Sentence of death was
passed on four of these wretched men: these were Ceracchi,
Arena, Demerville, and Topino Lebrun. The latter deserved
some sympathy, and became a striking example of the cruel
mutability of fortune during revolutions. This young Topino
Lebrun was a painter of some talent, and a pupil of David.
Participating in the extravagant ideas of the artists of the time,
he had been a juryman at the revolutionary tribunal, but had
there shown himself far more merciful than his colleagues. He
brought forward the advocate Chaveau Lagarde, the respectable
defender of the victims of that time, who in vain gave evidence
in favour of his humanity. Extraordinary change of fortune i
the former juryman of the revolutionary tribunal, now accused
in his turn, calls to his assistance the former defender of the
victims of that sanguinary tribunal ! But this assistance, gene
rously afforded, could not save him. The whole four, condemned
on the 9th of January (19th Niv6se), were, after an unavailing
appeal to the court of Cassation, executed on the 31st of the
same month of January.
Meanwhile, the horrible mystery of the infernal machine was
being gradually brought to light. M. Fouche had set agents to
work about Georges, to make inquiries concerning Carbon, what
had become of him, and where he lived. He had learned through
this channel that Carbon had sisters residing in Paris, and he had
also discovered their abode. The police searched it, and found
a barrel of powder. They obtained, moreover, from Carbon's
youngest sister, the address of the new lodging in which he had
secreted himself. He was residing with very respectable persons,
the demoiselles de Cice, sisters of M . de Cice, formerly archbishop
of Bordeaux, and minister of justice. These ladie's, taking him
for a returned emigrant, whose passport was not in order, had
procured him an asylum amongst a number of females, formerly
nuns, who lived together in a remote quarter of Paris. These
innocent women, who every day returned thanks to Heaven for
, the preservation of the First Consul, as they would have given
themselves up for lost if he had fallen, had afforded a retreat,

186 HISTORY OF the [Jan. 1801.
unconsciously, to one of his assassins. The police repaired
thither on the 18th of January (28th Nivose), and apprehended
Carbon, together with all the persons who had admitted him
into the house. He was confronted the same day with the
witnesses previously examined, and fully identified At first, he
denied every thing, but at length confessed his participation in
the crime, but an innocent participation, according to his account,
for he asserted that he was not aware of the purpose for which
the cart and the barrel were intended. He denounced Limoelan
and St. Rejant. Limoelan had had time to make his escape to a
foreign country, but St. Rejant, thrown down by the explosion,
and half dead for some minutes, had only time and strength to
change his lodging. An agent of Georges employed to attend
on him, and who had been left at liberty, in hopes by tracking
him to find St. Rejant, served to indicate his abode. On proceed
ing thither, the police found that he was still very ill from the
effects of his wounds. He was soon confronted, identified, and
convicted upon abundance of evidence, which left no room for
doubt. Under his bed was found a letter to Georges, in which he
related, with some ambiguity, the principal circumstances of the
crime, and justified himself to his chief for his miscarriage. Car
bon and St. Rejant were sent to the criminal tribunal, which soon
sentenced these execrable assassins to the death they deserved.
When all these particulars were published, the obstinate ac
cusers of the revolutionary party, and the complaisant defenders
of the royalist party, were alike surprised and confounded. The
enemies of M. Fouche, also were disconcerted. The soundness of
his judgment was acknowledged, and he was re-established in the
favour of the First Consul. But he had furnished a weapon of
which his enemies, with justice, took advantage. Since he was so
sure of his point, said they, why did he suffer the Revolutionists
to be proscribed? He deserved, indeed, this keen reproach,
The First Consul, who was unconcerned about violated forms,
and cared for nothing but the results obtained, manifested no
regret. He thought that what was done, was well done in every
respect ; that he was rid of what he called " the staff of the
Jacobins," and that the 3rd Niv6se proved merely one thing —
the necessity of watching the Royalists, as well as the Terrorists,
"Fouche's opinion," said he, "was, after all, the only correct
one; he is right : we must keep an eye on the returned emigrants,
the Chouans, and all the members of that party."
This event greatly diminished the sympathy which had been
felt for the Royalists, who had been complaisantly called the
victims of terror; and likewise greatly diminished the animosity
against the Revolutionists. M. Fouche had gained in credit, but
not in esteem.
_ The painful feelings created by the employment of the machine,
since named infernal, were soon dispelled by the joy produced
by the peace of Luneville. All days are not auspicious even

Jan. 1801.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 187
under the most prosperous governments. That of the Consulate
had the unexampled advantage, that, if sad impressions took
possession of the public mind one moment, they were dissipated
the next, by some grand, new, unforeseen result. Occasional
brief but mournful scenes, in which the First Consul was con
spicuous as the saviour of France, which each faction was striving
to undo, and these scenes followed by victories, treaties, and
acts of reparation, which healed deep wounds, or restored public
prosperity — such was the spectacle which was then incessantly
exhibited. General Bonaparte always emerged from them
greater, dearer to France, more clearly destined for the supreme
power. The second session of the Legislative Body had commenced.
It was engaged, at this moment, in the discussion and adoption
of several laws, the principal of which — that of the special
tribunals — was of no real importance, after what had just been
done. But the opposition in the Tribunate opposed these laws
against the government ; this was sufficient to induce the latter
to persevere in them. The first of them related to the archives
of the. Republic. It had become necessary, since the abolition
of the ancient provinces had given up to neglect a great number
of old title deeds and documents, still either very useful, or very
curious, to decide in what place these and other ancient records,
such as laws, treaties, &c, should be deposited. This was a
measure of order, devoid of all political bearing. The Tri
bunate voted against the law, and having, as usual, sent its three
orators to the Legislative Body, obtained its rejection by a great
majority. The Legislative Body, although strongly attached to
the government, was, like assemblies thus devoted, sometimes
jealous of showing its independence in measures of detail ; and
it could certainly do this without danger, in the discussion of a
law, the object of which was to determine in what place, or
places, certain ancient records and papers should be deposited.
The two assemblies had under their consideration, at the
moment, a law more important than the preceding, but equally
foreign to politics. It related to Justices of peace, whose number
had been found too great. Six thousand having been appointed
at the time of their first institution, they had not answered the
purpose for which they were created. In many districts, men
capable of duly performing such functions were not to be found.
They had failed in another point. It had been resolved to assign
to them the judicial police ; they had performed this duty very
indifferently, and besides, the paternal and benevolent character
of their jurisdiction had been, in a certain degree, impaired by it.
The new plan of the government proposed two modifications
relative to the Justices of peace : in the first place, their reduction
from 6000 to 2600; and, in the next, the transfer of the judicial
police to other magistrates. The project was a reasonable one,
and presented with excellent intentions; but it met with violent

188 HISTORY OF THE [Feb. 1801.
opposition in the Tribunate. Several members spoke against it,
especially M. Benjamin Constant. It was, nevertheless, carried
in the Tribunate by 59 votes against 32 ; and in tlje Legislative
Body by 218 against 41.
Another law, more calculated to produce discussion, and of
an entirely political nature, was presented at this period : this
was the law which had for its object the institution of special
tribunals. But this had lost its chief utility since the First
Consul had appointed military commissions, to accompany the
moveable columns employed in the suppression of robbery ; and
especially since he had not hesitated to proscribe arbitrarily
such Revolutionists as were deemed dangerous. These military
commissions had already produced salutary effects. The judges
in military uniform, who composed them, were not afraid of the
accused: they encouraged the witnesses who were to give evi
dence, and frequently these witnesses were the very soldiers who
had seized the banditti, and surprised them with arms in their
hands. Prompt and vigorous justice, following the very active
employment of force, had singularly contributed to re-establish
safety on the roads. The deadly conflicts which had ensued
with the escorts placed on the imperiales of the diligences soon
intimidated the robbers. Attacks became less frequent ; and
security began again to prevail, thanks to the vigour of the
government and of the tribunal, thanks also to the conclusion
of the winter. The proposed law, therefore, was introduced
when the evil was already abated ; but it was beneficial, inasmuch
as it imparted regularity to the military tribunals established on
the high roads, and applied to highway robbery a permanent
and perfectly legal measure of punishment. The projected
organisation was this: —
The special tribunals were to be composed of three ordinary
judges, all of them members of the criminal tribunal, of three
military officers, with two assessors, the latter chosen by the go-
yernm ent, and duly qualified, by their standing at the bar, to act as
judges. Thus the military members could not have a majority.
The government was empowered to establish these tribunals in
those departments where they might be thought useful. They
were authorised to take cognizance of all crimes committed by
armed bands on the high roads and in the country, of all outrages
against the purchasers of national domains, and lastly, of murders
attempted with premeditation against the heads of the govern
ment. This last clause comprehended such crimes as the infernal
machine, the plot of Ceracchi, Arena, &c. The court of Cassation
was empowered to decide in every case of disputed jurisdiction,
all other business before the court being suspended. This insti
tution was to be abolished, as a matter of right, two years after
the general peace.
These tribunals were obnoxious to every objection which can
attach to exceptional justice. But there was this to be urged in

Feb. 1801.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 189
their favour, that never had society, convulsed to the very centre,
required more prompt and more extraordinary measures for
tranquillising it. Under the pretext of an adherence to the
Constitution, recourse was had to that article of it, which per
mitted the Legislative Body to suspend its provisions in the
departments where that might be deemed necessary. The case
of extraordinary jurisdictions, was evidently comprehended in
this clause ; as the suspension of the Constitution necessarily
led to the immediate establishment of martial law. Moreover,
the discussion was altogether superfluous in a country, and at a
time when 130 persons had just been proscribed without trial,
and military commissions had been established in several de
partments, without eliciting the slightest murmur from public
opinion. It must even be confessed that, as compared with
these acts, the proposed law was a return to constitutional go
vernment. But it was vehemently, acrimoniously attacked by
the usual opponents, Messrs. Daunou, Constant, Ginguene, and
others. In the Tribunate it passed by a majority of only 49
votes to 41. In the Legislative Body, the majority was much
greater, for the bill obtained 192 votes against 88. But a mi
nority of eighty-eight votes exceeded the usual strength of the
minority in that assembly, wholly devoted to the government.
This great number of dissentient votes was attributed to a speech
of M. Francais, of Nantes, who addressed language perhaps a
little too intemperate to the Legislative Body. " M. Francais,
of Nantes, has done right," said the First Consul to his col
leagues, Cambaceres and Lebrun, who seemed to disapprove
that speech ; " it is better to have fewer votes, and to show
that we feel ^insults and are determined not to put up with
them." The First Consul made use of still stronger language to a
deputation of the Senate, which presented to him a resolution
of that body. He expressed himself in the boldest manner,
and on several occasions he plainly declared, that, if he was too
much annoyed, that if people would endeavour to prevent him
from restoring peace and order to France, he would rely upon
the opinion which the country had of him, and govern by
consular ordinances. His ascendency increased every moment
with success, his boldness with his ascendency, and he was no
longer at the pains of dissembling the extent of his designs.
He met with still stronger opposition on the questions of
finance, which were the last discussed during this session.
This was, nevertheless, the most meritorious work of the
government, and more particularly owing to the personal in
tervention of the First Consul.
We have several times explained the means employed to
insure the collection, and the regular payment into the Treasury,
of the revenues of the State. These means had been com
pletely successful. In the year VIII, (1799—1800), there had

190 HISTORY OF THE [Feb. 1801.
been received 518,000,000,* which equalled the amount of the
taxes for a whole year ; for, in the budget, the expenditure and
the receipts did not at that period exceed 500,000,000. Of these
518,000,000, a sum of 172,000,000 belonged to years V, VI.,
and VII., and 346,000,000 to the year VIII. Some items
were still owing for those four years ; it was necessary that
they should be completely liquidated, in order that the year IX.
(1800 — 1801), which was the current year, might at length pro
ceed with perfect regularity. The income of the year IX. was sure
to be adequate to the expenses, as the taxes would produce from
500,000,000 to 520,000,000 ; and this was sufficient to cover
the expenses of the peace establishment. A system of annual
accounts, distinguishing the income and expenditure for each
twelve months had been introduced, and thenceforth the receipts
of the year IX. were to be exclusively applied to the expenses
of the year IX., and the receipts of the year X. to the expenses
of the year X., and so on ; provision was thus made for the
future. But for the past, that is to say, for the years V, VI.,
VII., and VIIL, there was a deficit to be made good. To
this purpose, the daily receipts derived from the arrears of the
contributions of those respective years were appropriated. But
these arrears, which were chiefly owing by the landed proprietors,
reduced them to a state of great depression. At the meetingof the
councils-general of the departments, a meeting then held for the
first time, eighty-seven councils-general out of 106 complained
of the excessive burden of the direct contributions. Govern
ment, therefore, had no alternative, as we have before observed,
but to remit a part of the outstanding arrears, if it persevered
in requiring in future, the punctual payment of the whole tax.
A law was proposed to authorise the local administrations to
relieve the tax -payers who were too heavily assessed. This bill
passed without opposition. But this would occasion a con
siderable deficiency appertaining to the years V., VI., VII., and
VIII. This deficiency was estimated for the three years V.,
VI., VII., at 90,000,000, and for the year VIIL, separately, at
30,000,000. The year VIII. (1799— 1800) was kept distinct
from the years V., VI., and VII., because the year VIII. be
longed to the Consulate.
It was necessary to decide how these deficits were to be met.
There were national domains still undisposed of, to the extent
of about 400,000,000 ; and it was here that the sound sense of
the First Consul, exercised the happiest influence on our finan
cial system, and caused the best possible employment to be
made of the public resources.
As the national domains were not always marketable, their
value had repeatedly been received in anticipation, by means of
a government paper, which had been issued under different
denominations, and which was receivable in payment of these
* These figures express francs, twenty-five of which are equivalent to ll.
sterling — Translator.

Feb. 1801.} CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 191
domains. Since the extinction of the assignats, this kind of
paper was known by the name of rescriptions. In the course of
the year VIIL, some of these rescriptions had been negotiated
at less ruinous rates than before, but still at too great a sacri
fice, to render it prudent to have recourse to them. These
notes were negotiated at a loss from the very first day they
were issued, soon fell into discredit, then passed into the hands
of speculators, who, in this manner purchased the national do
mains for next to nothing. In this way a valuable resource had
been wasted, to the great detriment of the State, and to the great.
advantage of stockjobbers. The remaining 400,000,000, if they
could be saved from the disorder, by which so many other mil
lions had been swallowed up, to this day, would soon acquire,
with time and peace, a three or fourfold value. The First Con
sul was resolved not to squander them in the same way that
several thousand millions had already been thrown away.
Immediate funds were nevertheless required. The First
Consul endeavoured to obtain them by the emission of rentes*
(stock), which, since his accession, had already advanced con
siderably in value. They had risen from the price of ten and
twelve, to that of twenty-five and thirty after Marengo, and
above that of fifty, since the peace of Luneville ; it was asserted
that they would rule as high as sixty at the general peace. At
this rate, the government could begin to negotiate them, as
there M'as less loss in selling rentes, than national domains. The
First Consul, unwilling to open a loan, proposed to pay with
rentes, certain creditors of the State, and to appropriate to the
Sinking Fund an equivalent sum in landed property, which that
Fund would sell by and by, slowly and at its full value, so as
to compensate in this manner for the augmentation about to
be made to the public debt. Such was the principle of the laws
of finance proposed this year.
The debts yet unpaid for the last three years of the Directory,
V., VI., and VII., passed for bad debts. They were the rem
nant of the disgraceful contracts, to the amount of 600,000,000,
made under the Directory. Upon commencing a new system,
the governmentjresolved to respect these debts, notwithstanding
their origin, and their nature. They amounted to a sum of about
90,000,000, but, almost the whole being in the hands of specu
lators, they were at a discount of seventy-five per cent, in the
market. It was proposed to pay them off by means of a stock
bearing interest at the rate of three per cent. The total of these
debts amounting to 90,000,000, it would require, at three per
cent., 2,700,000 francs to meet the dividends. This stock, at
the current price of the public funds, (say 30 to 33|), repre
sented a real value of 27,000,000 or 30,000,000 and could
* " Rente" signifies the annual dividend payable on stock : thus, 250 five
per cent '-.rentes" (perpetual annuity of 250 francs) represents 5000 francs
capital stock.— Translator.

192 HISTORY OF THE [Feb. 1801.
not fail to represent one of 40,000,000 at least, in the eight or
ten months which must elapse before the operation was com
pleted. The debts intended to be paid, being at a discount of
seventy-five per cent., and the capital of 90,000,000, of which
they were composed, being thus reduced in reality to 22,000,000
or 23,000,000, much more would be paid for them than
they were worth, if government granted a rente of 2,700,000
francs for them, since that rente, sold immediately, would have
produced 27,000,000 or 30,000,000, and soon was likely to
produce 40,000,000.
The debts of the year VIII. to be still liquidated, were of a
totally different nature. They were contracted for services per
formed during the first year of the consular government, when
order already prevailed in the administration. These services,
rendered at a time when the distress was still great, had, it is
true, been paid for at a very high rate ; but it would have been
derogatory to the honour of the consular government not to have
faithfully kept these engagements, which were recently contracted,
which had not been classed, like those of the Directory, among
discredited paper, nor negotiated as such, and to have treated
them in the same manner as those which belonged to the years
V., VI., and VII. Government, therefore, did not hesitate to
pay in full, and at its nominal value, the excess of the expendi
ture of the year VIII. It was now estimated at 60,000,000,
but the receipt of arrears of the contributions of the year VIII.
would reduce it to 30,000,000. It was resolved, to pay a por
tion of it, 20,000,000, with a stock bearing interest at five per
cent., which made 1,000,000 interest. We shall explain pre
sently, in what way the balance of 10,000,000 was provided for.
The income of the year IX. (1800 — 1801) seemed likely to
meet the expenses, on the nearly certain hypothesis of a speedy
termination of the war; for the continental peace concluded
at Luneville must soon lead to a maritime peace. The budget
was not at that time voted a year in advance ; it was voted in
the same year, while the expenses were being incurred. The
budget of the year IX., for instance, was presented and dis
cussed in Ventose, year IX., that is to say, the.budget of 1801
in March, 1801. The expenditure and the receipts of this year
were estimated at the moment at 415,000,000 (exclusively of
the expenses of collection and various local services, which may
be taken at 100,000,000 more, so that 415,000,000 must be
taken at 5 1 5,000,000) . But the estimate of 4 1 5,000,000 for the
expenditure and the receipts fell short of the truth, for then,
as now, the real charges always exceeded the estimates. We
shall even show, by and by, that the sum of 415,000,000, was
increased to 500,000,000. Fortunately, the produce of the taxes
exceeded the sum estimated, as well as the expenditure. This
excess on both sides was certainly calculated upon ; but fearing,
erroneously by-the-bye, that the surplus receipts would not cover

Feb. 1801.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 193
the excess of the expenditure, government determined to secure
a supplementary resource. Ten millions yet remained to be pro
vided for, as we have just said, to complete the payments of the
year VIIL; it was supposed that 20,000,000 would be required
for the balance of the year IX.; thus 30,000,000 would have to
be raised in two years. It was resolved to have recourse to a
sale of national domains to that extent only. The sale of fifteen
millions' worth of these domains might be effected with advan
tage and without confusion, in the course of each year. By
placing this business in the hands of the commissioners of the
Sinking Fund, who had already performed this duty with
great ability, the government was sure to dispose of this portion
of the domains of the State on advantageous terms. In this
manner the previous accounts would be liquidated, and the
present balanced. There was but one more operation requisite
to render the organisation of the finances of the State complete,
and that was, the definitive regulation of the public debt.
The moment was come, in fact, for fixing its amount, for
adjusting the resources of the Sinking Fund to the amount
of the entire capital of the debt, and for applying to this object
the 400,000,000 of national domains, which were still at the
disposal of the State.
The public debt was just as it had been left by the bank
ruptcy declared by the Directory, but attributable to the Con
vention and the Constituent Assembly. One-third of this debt
had been placed upon the Great Book : it was this portion
which was called, in the language of the time, the Consolidated
Third. Interest at five per cent, had been allowed on this
third, saved from the bankruptcy. The amount of it inscribed
in the Great Book was 37,000,000 (interest and not capital).
A very considerable sum had still to be inscribed. Two- thirds
had been mobilised, another expression of the time, that is to
say, struck out of the Great Book, and declared receivable in
payment of the national domains, so that, in point of fact, they
were clearly assignats. A subsequent law had completed their
depreciation, by restricting them to a single purpose, that of
being received in payment exclusively for the buildings, and
not for the lands or the woods, constituting part of the national
possessions. It was necessary to put an end to this state of things, and for
that purpose to carry to the Great Book the remainder of the
Consolidated Third, which the preceding government had deferred
inscribing, that it might be dispensed from paying interest
upon it. Justice and regularity in the finances demanded that
an end should be put to this state of things. It was proposed
to enter in the Great Book Consolidated Third to the extent of
1,500,000, but to bear interest only from the commencement
of the year XII. This part of the debt, though the enjoyment
of the income from it was postponed for two years, yet acquired
VOL. II. O

194 history of the [March 1801.
immediately, from the mere circumstance of the inscription, a
value nearly equal to the portions already inscribed ; and a
very high value was moreover conferred on all that remained
of the Consolidated Third by this earnest of punctuality. There
was a considerable amount left uninscribed, either in Consolidated
Thirds, properly so called, or in debts of the emigrants, which
the State had taken upon itself, in confiscating their property,
or in debts of Belgium, which had been a condition of the
conquest. Lastly, there were the mobilised two-thirds, now
extremely depreciated, and which it was but just to afford the
holders the means of realising. An offer was made to convert
them into Consolidated Thirds, funded at the rate of five francs
stock for one hundred francs nominal capital. It was probable
that the holders would eagerly accept this offer. It was pro
posed to create for this purpose, 1,000,000 of rentes, and if this
first trial succeeded, it was anticipated that the entire value of
the mobilised two-thirds would be soon absorbed. A fixed period
was also appointed, after which the two-third bonds, should no
longer be receivable in payment of the national domains. At
the expiration of this term, the domains purchased and not paid
for were to revert unconditionally to the State.
It was calculated that the addition of the sum of 20,000,000
of rentes to the 37,000,000 of Consolidated Third already in
scribed in the Great Book, would suffice to meet the balance of
Consolidated Third still uninscribed, the mobilised two-thirds, the
conversion of which was contemplated, and lastly, the debts of
the emigrants and of Belgium. The national debt would accord
ingly comprise 57,000,000 perpetual rentes. In addition to that
permanent charge there existed, however, 20,000,000 of life
annuities, 19,000,000 of civil and religious pensions (the latter
paid to the clergy who had been dispossessed of their pro
perty), and lastly, 30,000,000 of military pensions; thus, in
all, 69,000,000 of terminable annuities, of which about 3,000,000
would annually fall in. There was reason, therefore, to hope,
that in a few years, as the annuitants, pensioners, and others
died off, the saving under the head of life annuities would com
pensate for the successive augmentations which the perpetual
debt would receive in consequence of new inscriptions in the
Great Book. Consequently, the entire annual charge for
interest on both branches of the debt, supposing provision to
be made for all old claims, could not possibly exceed the sum
of 100,000,000, about one-half of which consisted of perpetual
rentes, and the other of terminable rentes. Our financial position
then was this : a debt bearing 100,000,000 annual interest, and
a budget exhibiting a total expenditure (interest on the debt
included) of 500,000,000, with a clear net revenue of a like
amount, after deduction of 100,000,000 for the costs of col
lection. This position was certainly far superior to that of
England, which had an annual debt of nearly 500,000,000,

March 1801.] consulate and the empire. 195
with a revenue of 1,000,000,000 or 1,100,000,000. Add to this
that France still had left the resource of the indirect contri
butions, that is to say, taxes on liquors, tobacco, salt, &c, not
yet re-established, and which were destined to furnish at a
future period an immense revenue.
The First Consul was desirous of augmenting the resources
of the Sinking Fund in proportion to the increase of the debt.
He had decided upon the creation of rentes to the amount of
2,700,000 francs to wipe off the deficit of the years V., VI., and
VII., of 1,000,000 for the deficit of the year VIIL, and of
several more millions for the inscription of the balance of the
Consolidated Third, and for the conversion of the mobilised two-
thirds, &c. He caused a capital of 90,000,000 in national
domains, saleable at discretion, and applicable to the redemption
of rentes to be assigned to the Sinking Fund. At the suggestion
of the First Consul, there was moreover transferred to the Com
missioners a rente of 5,400,000 francs belonging to the fund for
public instruction: we shall presently see how this sum was
made good. • *»
By this arrangement, the national domains were preserved
from being frittered away ; for the Commissioners of the Sinking
Fund, disposing of them slowly, and at seasonable times, or
keeping them, if it suited them, thus avoided the deplorable
dilapidations which had formerly taken place. To secure the
remainder with a greater degree of certainty, the First Consul
resolved to apply a considerable portion of them to various
other branches of service, in which he took great interest, such
as public instruction and the maintenance of the invalids. Public
instruction appeared to him the most important service of the
State, that, in particular, for which an enlightened government
like his, having a new society to found, ought to lose no time in
providing. As for the invalids, that is to say, wounded soldiers,
they formed, as it were, his family ; they were the props of his
power, the instruments of his glory : all his attention was due to
them ; he owed them at least some instalment of the thousand
millions formerly promised by the Republic to the defenders of
the country.
.. The First Consul did not like to see these important services
dependent on the budget, on its fluctuations and contingencies.
In consequence, he caused 120,000,000 worth of national
domains to be allotted to public instruction, and 40,000,000
to the support of the Hospitals for the Invalids. Here was
sufficient amply to endow the noble institution which he intended
one day to devote to the education of the French youth, and
wherewithal to endow also several similar hospitals upon the
same footing as that which owes its origin to Louis XIV. Whe
ther these assignments were or were not afterwards respected,
it was for the moment 160,000,000 rescued from the improvident
sales of public lands, and an annual relief for the budget. Thus
02

196 HISTORY OF the [March 1801.
of the 400,000,000 worth of national domains left, 10,000,000
were granted towards the expenditure of the year VIIL,
20,000,000 for that of the year IX., 90,000,000 to the Sinking
Fund, 120,000,000 to public instruction, 40,000,000 to the
invalids. These formed a total sum of 280,000,000 out of
400,000,000, for which a useful employment was immediately
found, without having recourse to the system of public sales.
Out of this sum of 280,000,000, 10,000,000 only for the year
VIIL, and 20,000,000 for the year IX., were to be disposed of
in the course of two }-ears, which would not be attended with
any inconvenience ; the 90,000,000 assigned to the Sinking Fund
were to be sold, but very slowly, when the Fund should be in
absolute want of money, perhaps not at all. The 120,000,000
for public instruction, the 40,000,000 for the Invalids, were
never to be offered for sale. Out of the total of 400,000,000,
there would remain 120,000,000 disposable and unappropriated.
In reality, only 30,000,000 out of the 400,000,000 were to be
sold ; the rest remained in trust for different branches of the
services, or as a disposable reserve, with a certainty of soon
increasing at least double or treble in value for the advantage
of the State.
To sum up : the government availed itself of the revival of
credit to substitute the expedient of the creation of rentes to
that of the alienation of the national domains ; it discharged by
a very small portion of these domains, and by a creation of rentes,
the deficiencies left unpaid in the years V., VI., VII., and VIIL,
it completed the liquidation of the floating public debt, and
insured the payment of the interest in a certain and regular
manner. After having thus regulated old accounts, saved the
remnant of the domains of the State, and fixed the amount of
the debt, there would be an annual interest of 100,000,000, an
ample Sinking Fund ; and finally, a budget, with an equal
income and expenditure of 500,000,000, exclusive of the costs
of collection, or of 600,000,000 including those costs.
Such a distribution of the public property, conceived with
not less equity than sound sense, ought to have met with
general approbation. A violent opposition was nevertheless
raised in the Tribunate. The 415,000,000 demanded for the
current year, the year IX., were granted without difficulty; but
the opposition complained that the budget was not voted a year
in advance; an unfair reproach, for nothing was at that time
arranged for such a mode of proceeding. It was not yet practised
in England, and it was even a disputed point among financiers.
The same opposition members complained of the regulation of
the arrears being an act of bankruptcy towards the creditors
of the years V., VI., and VII., whose debts were to be con
solidated at three per cent, only, instead of five, as was the case
with those of the year VIIL They found fault with the regulation
of the debt for depriving the holders of the Consolidated Third

March 1801.] consulate and the empire. 197
of the interest of their stock for two years, since that interest
was to commence only with the year XII. For these two com
plaints there was very little foundation ; for, as we have seen,
the creditors of the years V., VI., and VII., in obtaining a per
manent rente of three per cent., received more than their debts
were worth ; and as for the portion of the Consolidated Third,
the inscription of which was resolved upon, a great service was
rendered to the holders by the mere circumstance of that in
scription. If, in fact, that inscription had been deferred a'year
or two longer, as had been done by the preceding government,
the holders would have been deprived, not only of the interest,
but of the benefit of the definitive consolidation. To resume
the process of that consolidation so long deferred, was of itself
to place them in a much better position.
The Tribunate grew warm upon these trivial objections ; paid
no regard to the answers that were addressed to it; and
rejected the plan of finance by a majority of fifty-six votes to
thirty, in the sitting of the 19th of March (28th Ventose).
Some cries of "Vive la Republique!" were even raised in the
tribunes, a circumstance which had not happened for a long
time, and revived the remembrance of the tumultuous days of
the Convention. On the motion of Messrs. Riouffe and Chau-
velin, the president caused the tribunes to be cleared.
Two days later, on the 21st of March (30th Ventose), the
last day of the session of the year IX., the Legislative Body
heard the discussion of the bill. Three tribunes were to
attack, and three Councillors of State to defend it. M. Ben
jamin Constant was one of the three tribunes. He urged in
a brilliant manner, the objections raised against the plan of
the government. The Legislative Body, nevertheless, voted
its adoption by a majority of 227 to 58. The First Consul
ought to have been satisfied. But he knew not, neither did
those about him know, that we ought to do good without being
surprised, without being ruffled, by the injustice with which we
are frequently repaid. And what man ever had so much glory
as the First Consul, to compensate him for these attacks, so fri
volous, so indiscreet ! Besides, notwithstanding these attacks,
the arrangements were excellent on the part of the government.
The majority in the Legislative Body was five-sixths at least ;
and in the Tribunate, the vote of which decided nothing, it was
two-thirds. There was nothing to be astonished at, little to
cause alarm in such inconsiderable minorities. But, although
the object of universal admiration, the man who then go
verned France could not endure the petty censures passed
upon his administration. The time for a real representative
government had not yet arrived : the opposition had not its
principles, or its manners any more than the government itself.
That which will completely portray the oppositionists of the Tri
bunate is, that the odious procedure against the Revolutionists

198 history OF the [March 1801.
did not elicit from them a single observation. They took
advantage of the circumstance, of the act not having been
referred to the Legislature, to remain silent on the subject. They
declaimed on things that were of little importance or unob
jectionable, and winked at the unpardonable infringement of all
the rules of justice. Such, in almost all times, is the conduct
of men, and of parties.
After all, the barren agitation of a few systematic opposi
tionists, mistaking the general movement of minds, and the
exigencies of the time, produced little sensation. The public was
wholly engrossed by the spectacle of the immense efforts, which
had achieved victory and a continental peace for France, and
which were soon to procure for her a maritime peace also.
As we have observed several times, the First Consul, amidst
his military and political occupations, never ceased to give his
attention to roads, canals, bridges, to manufactures, and to
commerce. We have already described the wretched state of the roads,
and the means employed by the First Consul, to supply the in
sufficiency of the produce of the tolls. He had given orders for
a thorough inquiry into this subject, but, as is mostly the case,
the difficulty consisted much more in the want of money, than
in the choice of a good system. He proceeded direct to the
point, and in the budget of the year IX. he appropriated fresh
sums out of the general funds of the treasury, for prosecuting
the extraordinary repairs already begun. Canals were also the
subject of conversation. Men's minds, disgusted with political
agitations, gladly turned towards every thing that concerned
industry and commerce. The canal now known by the name of
the canal of St. Quentin, connecting the navigation of the Seine,
and of the Oise, with that of the Somme and the Scheld, that is
to say, connecting Belgium with France, had been abandoned.
It had been found impossible to agree upon the mode of exe
cuting the cutting, which was to afford a passage, from the valley
of the Oise, into those of the Somme and the Scheld. The en
gineers were divided in opinion. The First Consul went thither
himself, heard what each had to say, decided the question, and
decided it well. The cutting was determined upon, and continued
in the best direction, the identical one which has succeeded. The
population of St. Quentin received him with transport, and no
sooner had he returned to Paris, than the inhabitants of the
Seine Inferieure sent a deputation, to solicit him to grant them
in their turn forty-eight hours of his time. He promised a speedy
visit to Normandy. At his instigation, the erection of three
new bridges in Paris over the Seine was decided upon, and
entrusted to companies : these were, that fronting the Jardin
des Plantes, and called the bridge of Austerlitz; that which
unites the isle of the City, 'with the isle St. Louis; lastly, that
which connects the Louvre with the palace of the Institute. He

March 1801.J CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 199
directed his attention at the same time, to the road of the
Simplon, the first project of his youth — a project ever dearest to
his heart, most worthy to rank, in future, beside the exploits of
Rivoli and Marengo. It will be recollected, that the First
Consul, as soon as he had founded the Cisalpine Republic, was
desirous to connect it with France by a road, which, running from
Lyons or Dijon, passing through Geneva, traversing the Valais,
descending to the Lago Maggiore and Milan, should enable
an army of 50,000 men with 100 pieces of cannon to debouch
at any time, in the heart of Upper Italy. For want of such a
road, he had been obliged to cross the St. Bernard. Now that
the Cisalpine Republic had been reconstituted at the congress
of Luneville, it was more than ever expedient, to form a great
military communication between Lombardy and France. The
First Consul had immediately issued orders for the necessary
works. General Turreau, whom we have seen descending
the Little St. Bernard, with the legions of conscripts, while
general Bonaparte was descending the Great St. Bernard with
his seasoned troops, received orders to fix his head-quarters at
Domo d'Ossola, at the very foot of the Simplon. This general
was to protect the workmen, and his soldiers were to assist in
the completion of the undertaking.
To this magnificent work the First Consul resolved to add
another, in commemoration of the passage of theAlps. The monks
of the Great St. Bernard had rendered important services to the
French army. Supplied with some money, they had during
ten days, supported the strength of our soldiers with food and
wine. The First Consul retained a deeply grateful recollection
of those services. He resolved upon the establishment of two
similar hospices, one on Mount Cenis, the other on the Simplon,
both auxiliary to the convent of the Great St. Bernard. They
were each to contain fifteen monks, and>to receive from the
Cisalpine Republic, a considerable endowment in lands. That
Republic could refuse nothing to its founder. But as that
founder liked prompt execution in all things, he had the works
necessary for the first establishment performed at the expense
of France, that these useful undertakings might experience no
delay. Thus magnificent roads and institutions founded with
a beneficence truly noble, were to attest to future ages, the pas
sage of the Alps by the modern Hannibal.
Concurrently with these grand and beneficent views, a subject
of another kind engaged his attention, which was no less useful
to the nation ; that is the compilation of the Civil Code. The
task of digesting this code, the First Consul had confided to se
veral eminent lawyers, Messrs. Portalis, Tronchet, and Bigot de
Preameneu. Their labours were concluded, and the result had
been communicated to the Court of Cassation, as well as to the
twenty-nine tribunals of appeal, since called Royal courts. The
opinions of the whole of the magistracy were thus collected, and

200 HISTORY OF the [March 1801.
the work was now about to be submitted to the Council of State,
and gravely discussed under the presidency of the First Consul.
It was proposed, that it should then be presented to the Legis
lative Body in the course of the ensuing session, that of the
year X.
Ever ready to undertake great works, and at the same time
to reward their authors munificently, the First Consul had just
used his influence to raise M. Tronchet to the Senate. By this
means, he conferred a distinction upon an eminent juriconsult,
one of the compilers of the Civil Code, and, what was not a
matter of indifference to him in a political point of view, the
courageous defender of Louis XVI.
All things, therefore, were being organised at the same time,
with the harmony which a comprehensive mind is capable of
introducing into its works, with the rapidity which a resolute
energy, an authority already punctually obeyed, is capable of
imparting to them. The genius which accomplished these things
was without doubt extraordinary ; but, it must be confessed,
the situation was as extraordinary as the genius. General Bona
parte had France and Europe to move, and victory for a lever ;
he had to digest all the codes of the French nation, but then
at the same time all ranks were disposed to submit to his laws
with implicit obedience; he had roads, canals, bridges to con
struct, and the necessary resources for these objects, at his un
disputed disposal ; he had even nations ready to furnish him
with their treasures, the Italians, for example, who cheerfully
contributed to the expense of opening the Simplon, and to the
endowment of the Hospices raised on the summits of the Alps.
Providence dees nothing by halves. For every mighty task, she
furnishes a great genius, and to every great genius, she assigns
a mighty task.

March 1801.] consulate and the empire. 201

BOOK IX.

NEUTRAL POWERS.
Sequel of the Negotiations with the Powers of Europe— Treaty with the
Court of Naples — Exclusion of the English from the Ports of the Two
Sicilies, and Engagement entered into by the Neapolitan Government to
receive a French Division at Otranto— Spain pledges herself to coerce the
Portuguese, to put an end to tlie English Trade on the Coasts of Portugal —
Vast naval Projects of the First Consul, for combining the Naval Forces of
Spain, Holland, and France, to enable them to act in Concert — Means con
templated to assist Egypt — Admiral Ganteaume, at the Head of a Division,
leaves Brest during a Gale of Wind, and proceeds to the Straits of Gibraltar
on his Way to the Mouth of the Nile — General Coalition of all the Mari
time Nations against England — Preparations of the Neutral Powers in the
Baltic — Warlike Ardour of Paul I.— Distress in England — She is visited by
a frightful Famine — Her Financial and Commercial Position before, and
since the War — Her Income and Expenditure both doubled — Unpopularity
of Mr. Pitt — His Differences with George III., and Retirement from
Office — The Addington Administration—England, in spite of her Embar
rassments, faces the Storm, and despatches Admirals Nelson and Parker to
the Baltic, to break up the Confederacy of the Neutral Powers — Plan
conceived by Nelson and Parker — They determine upon forcing the Passage
of the Sound — The Swedish Coast being badly defended, the English Fleet
passes the Sound almost without Difficulty, and appears before Copen
hagen — Nelson's views are to attack the Danes, before proceeding to the
Baltic — Description of the Position of Copenhagen, and Measures adopted
to defend this important Maritime Position — Nelson executes a bold Ma
noeuvre, and succeeds in anchoring in the King's Channel, Broadside on to
the Danish Fleet — Bloody Engagement — Gallantry of the Danes, and
Danger of Nelson — He sends a Flag of Truce to the Crown Prince of Den
mark, and thereby obtains the Advantage of a Victory— Suspension of
Hostilities for fourteen Weeks, during which the Death of Paul I. becomes
known — Events which have taken place in Russia — Exasperation of the
Russian Nobility against the Emperor Paul, and their Resolution to get
ridof this Prince by any Means, even by Crime — Count Pahlen — His Cha
racter and Projects — His Conduct towards the Grand Duke Alexander —
The Scheme of a forced Abdication made to conceal their Project of As
sassination— Frightful Scene at the Palace (Michael) on the Night of the
23rd of March— Tragical Death of Paul I. — Accession of Alexander — The
Confederacy of the Neutral Powers dissolved by the Death of the Emperor
Paul— Virtual Armistice in the Baltic— The First Consul endeavours, by-;
offering Hanover to Prussia, to retain her in the League of the Neutrals — '
England satisfied with having broken up this Confederacy by the Battle of
Copenhagen, and with being rid of Paul I., seeks to improve the Oppor
tunity offered, by treating with France, and redeeming the Errors of Mr.1
Pitt — The Addington Administration proposes Peace to the First Consul,
through the Medium of Mr. Otto— This Proposal accepted, and Openingj
of Negotiations between France and England at London— Peace becomes
general, both by Sea and Land— Progress of France since the 18tH
Brumaire. -d
de).

( 203 )

BOOK IX.
NEUTRAL POWERS.
Peace between the Emperor and the Empire having been con
cluded at Luneville in February, 1801, the First Consul was
impatient to secure the results of his policy. These were to con
clude a peace with those continental States which had not yet
been reconciled to the Republic, and to compel them to close
their ports against England ; to direct against the latter the com
bined strength of the neutral powers, and, in conjunction with
them, to strike some decisive blow against the British trade and
territory ; and by this combination of means attain a maritime
peace, without which the peace of the continent would be incom
plete. Every thing proclaimed that these happy results could
not be long delayed.
The Germanic diet had ratified the signature affixed by the
emperor to the treaty of Luneville. There were no grounds for
supposing that there would be any demur, as Austria possessed
the power of influencing the Ecclesiastical States, the only dis
sidents opposed to the treaty. With respect to the secular
princes, as they were to be indemnified for their losses, from the
territories proposed to be secularised they had a strong interest
in accelerating the acceptance of the conditions stipulated be
tween Austria and France. They were, moreover, under the
influence of Prussia, which power France had induced to view fa
vourably the proceedings at Luneville. Besides all this, every one
was anxious for peace, and was ready to contribute to promote
it, even by sacrifices. Prussia alone, in ratifying the signature of
the Emperor, which he had granted without the authority of the
Diet, appeared desirous to qualify her consent, in such a form as
rather to assume the semblance of toleration, than that of appro
bation, thereby reserving for the future the rights of the Empire.
But this proposition of Prussia, which at the same time that it
ratified the treaty, implied an indirect censure on the Emperor,
was not supported by the majority. The treaty was ratified un
conditionally in its original form, by a conclusum of the 9th of
March, 1801 (18th Ventose, year IX.). The ratifications were
exchanged at Paris on the 16th of March (25th Ventdse).

204 history OF the [March 1801.
There only remained to settle a plan of indemnifications, which
was to be the subject of ulterior negotiations.
Peace was thus concluded with the greater part of Europe. It
was, indeed, not yet signed with Russia, but we were, as will
soon appear, engaged with her, and with the northern courts, in
one great maritime coalition. There were at the same moment,
two Russian ministers at Paris. M. de Sprengporten, on the
subject of the prisoners, M. de Kalitscheff for the adjustment of
general affairs. The latter had just arrived in the early part of
March (middle of Ventose).
There still remained the courts of Naples and Portugal to
coerce, in order to close the entire continent completely against
England. Murat was advancing towards Southern Italy with a chosen
body of troops, which had been drawn from the camp at Amiens.
Reinforced by several detachments supplied from the army of
general Brune, he had proceeded as far as Foligno, with a view
to compel the court of Naples to yield to the will of France. Had
it not been for the interest evinced by the emperor of Russia in
favour of this* court, the First Consul would probably at once
have granted to the house of Parma the kingdom of the Two Sici
lies, with the view of depriving a hostile family of this fine terri
tory. But the disposition manifested by the emperor Paul,
would not allow him to carry this idea into effect. He was
desirous, moreover, to conciliate general opinion throughout
Europe, and for this reason it was expedient to avoid, as much
as possible, the overthrowing of the ancient kingdoms. He was
then willing to grant peace to the court of Naples, on the con
dition that she should come to a rupture with England. But
to influence her to take this step was in the highest degree diffi
cult of accomplishment. Murat advanced to the frontiers of the
kingdom, taking care to avoid Rome, and lavishing upon the
Pope the greatest demonstration of respect. The court of
Naples no longer resisted, but signed an armistice which con
tained a stipulation agreeable to the wishes of the First Consul,
for the exclusion of the English from the ports of the Two Sici
lies. Nevertheless, the armistice was only for the short term
of thirty days; at the expiration of which,' a definitive treaty of
peace was to be signed.
The marquis de Gallo, one of the negotiators at Campo-
Formio, who boasted of his intimacy with the First Consul, and
of having as much influence over him, as M. de Cobentzel, had
repaired to Paris. Confiding on these personal recommenda
tions, he flattered himself that, under the protection of the
Russian embassy, and at the instances of Austria, he should
obtain the conditions desired by the court of Naples, which
were confined to a simple neutrality. These pretensions were
ridiculous, inasmuch as this court, which had given the signal

March 1801.] consulate and the empire. 205
for the second coalition, which had waged against us an obstinate
war,_ which had, in short, treated the French with great in
dignity, could not expect, now that we held her at our discretion,
to escape upon the condition of a plain and simple separation
from England. The least we could do, was to compel her,
either willingly or by force, to act as hostilely against England,
as she had done against France.
M. de Gallo having betrayed considerable self-sufficiency at
Paris, having even appeared to depend more than was becoming
upon the Russian embassy, a prompt termination was put to his
negotiation. M. de Talleyrand notified to him, that a French
plenipotentiary had set out for Florence, that the negotiation
was consequently transferred to that city, and that, moreover,
he could not treat with a negotiator who had not the power to
consent to the sole condition deemed indispensable, namely,
the expulsion of the English from the ports of the Two Sicilies —
a condition which the emperor Paul had as much at heart as the
First Consul himself. Consequently, M. de Gallo found it
necessary to quit Paris without delay. We had, in fact, just
despatched to Florence M. Alquier, who had been recalled from
Madrid, at the period when Lucien Bonaparte was sent to Spain.
M. Alquier was invested with full instructions and powers to
negotiate. This plenipotentiary repaired to Florence with the utmost
haste, and found there Chevalier Micheroux, the same minister
who signed the armistice with Murat, who had just received
full powers from his court. The negotiations, transferred to that
city, and carried on under the bayonets of the French army, no
.longer experienced the same difficulties as at Paris. A treaty
of peace was signed on the 18th of March, 1801 (27th Ventose,
year IX.). The conditions may be pronounced moderate, if the
, situation of the court of Naples be compared with that of the
French Republic. We permitted that branch of the house of
Bourbons to retain the whole of its dominions, which were pre
served to them in their full integrity. We only exacted an in
significant portion of territory which it possessed in the island
of Elba. This was Porto Longone, and the surrounding dis
trict. The island of Elba, at that time, belonged partly to Tus
cany, and partly to the Two Sicilies. The intention of the French
Consul was to annex it entirely to France. An historian of
these treaties has loudly inveighed against this alleged act of
spoliation, as if it were not plainly the natural right of the
victor. With the exception of this insignificant sacrifice, the
court of Naples lost nothing. She bound herself to close her
ports against the English, and to furnish France with three
frigates, to be delivered over, ready armed, at Ancona. The
First Consul destined these for Egypt; but the most important
article of the treaty was secret. It stipulated that the Neapo
litan government should receive a division of 12,000 to 15,000
a

206 history of the [March 1801.
French troops in the Gulf of Tarentum, and should victual them
during the whole term of their occupying that station. The
real intention of the French Consul, without any reservation,
was to transport them to that spot, with a view to succour
Egypt. At that station they would be half way on the route
to Alexandria ; a last article required the restitution of all the
objects of art, which had been selected at Rome, by the French,
which were all packed up in cases, when the Neapolitan army
penetrated into the Papal States in 1799, and which the court
of Naples had seized, and appropriated to itself. An indemnity
of 500,000 francs was granted to the French who had been pil
laged or harassed by the marauding bands of Neapolitans.
Such were the terms of the treaty of Florence, which must
be viewed as an act of clemency, when the previous conduct of
the court of Naples is taken into consideration ; but which was
perfectly in accordance with the intentions of the First Consul,
who was aiming exclusively at procuring the ports of the conti
nent to be closed against England, and at securing advantageous
positions, to enable him to keep up communications with
Egypt. Nothing was yet agreed upon with the Pope, whose plenipo
tentiary was still negotiating at Paris, upon the most importantof
all, the religious question. He was dissatisfied with the king of
Piedmont, who had yielded up Sardinia to the English, and also
with the Piedmontese, who had manifested dispositions but
httle friendly towards our troops. He was desirous, therefore,
of freeing himself from any engagement respecting that im
portant part of Italy.
Let us now turn to Spain and Portugal. Every thing
proceeded favourably in that quarter. The court of Spain,
delighted with the stipulations agreed upon at Luneville, which
secured Tuscany to the young Infant of Parma, with the title
of king, appeared every day more and more devoted to the
First Consul, and to his views. An unexpected event, the fall
of M. d'Urquijo, far from injuring our relations, had only
served to strengthen them. This was not at first anticipated,
as M. d'Urquijo was in Spain a sort of revolutionist, from
whom a greater degree of favour was expected towards France,
than from any other individual. But the result proved this to
be a misapprehension. M. d'Urquijo had been at the head of
affairs but a short time. Desirous of correcting certain abuses,
he had induced his royal master, king Charles IV., to send
an autograph letter to the Pope, recommending a series of
propositions for the reform of the Spanish clergy. The "Pope,
alarmed at perceiving a reforming spirit arising in Spain, ap
pealed to the old duke of Parma, brother to the queen, com
plaining of M. d'Urquijo, whom he stigmatised as a bad
Catholic. This was sufficient to ruin M. d'Urquijo in the
mind of the king. The prince of Peace, an avowed enemy of

March 1801.] consulate and the empire. 207
M. d'Urquijo, availed himself of the opportunity, and struck
the last blow during a royal progress. Through these com
bined influences, M. d'Urquijo was stripped of power, and
treated with an unexampled degree of harshness and severity.
He was seized in his own house, and banished from Madrid,
like a criminal of state. M. de Cevallos, a relative and creature
of the prince of Peace, was appointed his successor. This
prince thus again became, from that moment, the real prime
minister of the court of Spain. As he had sometimes shown
some sort of opposition to an intimate alliance with France,
probably in order to have an opportunity of thus throwing
blame upon the Spanish ministry, it was feared that this
change of ministers might be prejudicial to the designs of the
First Consul. But Lucien Bonaparte, recently arrived at
Madrid, forming at once a correct opinion of the actual state
of things, neglected M. de Cevallos, a powerless subordinate,
and put himself in direct relations with the prince of Peace.
He gave this prince to understand, that it was he who was
considered at Paris as in reality prime minister of Charles IV.,
that to him would be ascribed all the difficulties which French
pohcy might encounter in Spain, and that upon his own con
duct would depend, whether we should regard him as a friend,
or as an enemy. The prince of Peace, who had provoked
numberless animosities, and, above all, that of the heir-pre
sumptive, deeply irritated with the state of oppression in which
he was condemned to live, and conscious that his ruin was
inevitable if the king and queen chanced to die, regarded the
friendship of the Bonapartes as most precious, and promptly
preferred their alhance to their hostility.
From that moment, business was conducted between the
prince of Peace and Lucien directly. M. d'Urquijo, finding
himself too weak to bring this question of Portugal to a
solution, had from time to time postponed any positive ex
planation on the subject. He had made France a thousand
promises, unattended by any substantial results. The prince
of Peace admitted in his interviews with Lucien, that up to
that time they had not been inclined to act, that M. d'Urquijo
' had cajoled France with fine words ; but he declared that he
was ready, as far as regarded himself, to concert measures with
the First Consul to act effectually against Portugal, provided
they could come to an understanding upon certain points. He
demanded first, the co-operation of a French division of
25,000 men, as Spain had it not in her power to raise a larger
force than 20,000, to such a point of depression had that
splendid monarchy been reduced. As the presence of a French
force might alarm the king and queen, it would be necessary,
therefore, in order to reassure them both, that this force should
be placed under the command of a Spanish general. This

208 history OF the [March 1801.
general was to be the prince of Peace himself. Finally, the
provinces of Portugal, of which they were to take possession,
were to remain as security in the hands of the king of Spain
until a general peace : in the meantime, the ports of Portugal
should be closed against England.
These proposals were accepted by the First Consul with the
greatest eagerness, and returned in order to receive the sanc
tion of king Charles IV. This prince, governed by his queen,
who, in her turn, was under the influence of the prince of
Peace, consented to the war against his son-in-law, on con
dition that the latter should not be deprived of any portion of
his territories ; that he should be forced only to break with the
Enghsh, and to enter into an alliance with France and Spain.
These views did not coincide with those of the prince of Peace,
who was desirous, it was alleged at Madrid, to secure for him
self a principality in Portugal. However this may be, he was
obliged to submit, and he received accordingly the rank of
generalissimo. A summons was sent to the court of Lisbon, to
come to an explanation within a fortnight, and to make election
between England and Spain, the latter supported by France.
In the meantime, the preparations for war were commenced
on both sides of the Pyrenees. The prince of Peace, now
created generalissimo of the Spanish and French troops, carried
off even the king's own guards, to enable him to complete his
army. He amused the court with reviews, with warlike spec
tacles, and indulged in the wildest dreams of military glory.
The First Consul, on his part, hastened to direct towards Spain
a portion of the troops which were returning to France. He
formed a division of 25,000 men, well armed and equipped.
General Leclerc was appointed to the command of the advanced-
guard. General Gouvion St. Cyr, whom he justly regarded
as one of the most able generals of the time, was appointed to
the command of the entire army, in order to compensate for
the utter incapacity of the prince generalissimo.
It was arranged that these troops, set in motion in the
month of March, should be ready to enter Spain in the course
of the ensuing month of April.
The whole of Europe thus co-operated to aid our designs.
Under the influence of the First Consul, the States of the south
closed their ports against England, and the Northern States
entered into an armed league against her. Under these circum
stances, this power was under the necessity of having troops
everywhere ; in the Mediterranean in order to blockade Egypt ;
in the straits of Gibraltar, to check the movements of the French
fleets passing from one sea to the other; upon the coast of Por
tugal, to succour their threatened ally; before Rochfort and
Brest, in order to blockade the great French and Spanish
squadron which was ready to set sail : in the north to keep

March 1801.] consulate and the empire. 209
nowfrs1.1^1!!1'361' ^^ and Prevent the ™inS of the neutral
authorit'v t J WGre also. ne<*ssary in India to maintain their
authority and conquests in that quarter.
™<LT^T ^°nSS1^a,s desir°us of seizing this peculiar mo-
Z&W11811 forces' reiuired m a11 places at the
XmS ' r strenSth necessarily widely scattered, to
attempt some great expedition. The principal object he had in
view, that which he the most cherished, was to succour Egypt.
He owed a great duty to the army led bevond the sea, and sub
sequently abandoned by him, in order to' return to the assist
ance ot France. He also considered the colony founded on the
banks of the Nile as the most glorious of his works. It was of
importance to prove to the world, that in transporting 36,000
men to the East, he had not yielded to the inspirations of a
young and ardent imagination, but had attempted a serious en
terprise, susceptible of being brought to a successful conclusion.
We have seen the endeavours made to negotiate a naval armis
tice, the object of which was to permit six frigates to enter into
the port of Alexandria. This armistice, it will be recollected,
had not been concluded. Not having sufficient financial re
sources for the equipment of armaments by sea and land, the
Iirst Consul had not yet been able to undertake the vast ope
ration which he had in contemplation to succour Egypt. But
now, relieved from the continental contest, being able to direct
all his resources towards naval warfare, having almost entirely the
coasts of Europe at his disposal, he meditated, in order to pre
serve Egypt, projects as extensive, and as bold as those which
he had executed to achieve its conquest. The winter season
contributed to the success of his plans, by rendering the pre
sence of the English cruisers on the coasts quite impossible.
In the meantime, vessels of every description, trading vessels,
and ships of war from the smallest despatch-boat up to frigates,
sailed from the various ports of Holland, France, Spain, Italy,
and even from the coast of Barbary, carrying to Egypt with
news from France, provisions, European goods, wines, and mu
nitions of war. Some of these vessels were captured, but the
greater part reached Alexandria, and not a week elapsed without
news from the government at home being received at Cairo, to
gether with signal proofs of the interest which it took in the colony.
The First Consul also prepared a fleet adapted for the inland
navigation of Egypt. He had executed a model of a seventy-
four gun ship, which would combine great strength with the
advantage of being able to navigate the shallow channels of
Alexandria without discharging her guns.* Orders were given
to build a certain number after this model.
Whilst he bestowed all this sedulous care to sustain the spi
rits of the army of Egypt, transmitting to it frequently news, with
* Letter dated 1st Nivose, year IX. — (State Paper Office.)
VOL. II. P

210 history OF the [March 1801.
partial relief, the First Consul was, at the same time, preparing
a vast expedition in order to convey thither, by one mighty
effort, a powerful reinforcement of troops and materials of war.
The armies returned to the soil of France were about to add a
pressure on our finances ; but, on the other hand, they supplied
the government with great means to disquiet, perhaps to strike
a blow at England. Thirty thousand men remained in the
Cisalpine; 10,000 in Piedmont; 6000 in Switzerland; 15,000
were proceeding to the gulf of Tarentum ; 25,000 were direct
ing their march towards Portugal ; 25,000 were stationed in
Holland: thus 111,000 men were to be supported by foreign
powers. The remainder were about to be thrown on the
French treasury, but nevertheless entirely at the disposal of the
First Consul. A camp was forming in Holland; another in
French Flanders ; a third at Brest ; a fourth was already col
lected in the Gironde, either destined for Portugal, or to fur
nish troops for embarcation at Rochefort. The corps returning
from Italy assembled between Marseilles and Toulon. The
division of 15,000 men appointed to the station in the gulf of
Tarentum, was to occupy Otranto, in virtue of a secret article
of the treaty of Naples, to cover the surrounding roadsteads by
numerous batteries, to prepare a place of anchorage, where a
fleet might approach and embark a division of 10,000 to 12,000
men in order to transport them to Egypt. Admiral Villeneuve
had already set out to give the necessary orders on the spot for
such embarcation.
The naval forces of Holland, France, and Spain, with some
remains of the Italian navy, stationed near these several assem
blages of troops, gave England reason to apprehend descents
contemplated upon different points at the same time ; upon
Ireland, upon Portugal, upon Egypt, or upon the East Indies,
The First Consul had concerted measures with Spain and
Holland, relating to the employment of their respective navies.
By collecting the wrecks of the ancient Dutch navy, five ships
of-the-line and a few frigates might be armed. Thirty vessels were
lying at Brest, fifteen French, and as many Spanish, which had
been detained two years in that harbour. The First Consul
had made the following arrangements with Spain. Five Dutch
ships combined with five French vessels, and five of the Spanish
vessels lying at Brest, were to be despatched to Brazil, in
order to protect that fine kingdom, and to prevent England
from indemnifying herself for the enterprise set on foot against
Portugal, by seizing on the Portuguese colonies. Twenty Spa
nish and French ships, according to the convention, were to
remain at Brest, to be ready at any moment to throw an army
into Ireland. A French division was preparing under admiral
Gauteaume, in the same port of Brest, destined, it was said, for
St. Domingo, there to re-estabhsh the French and Spanish
authority. Another French division was being equipped at

March 1801.] CONSULATE AND the empire. 211
Rochefort, and a Spanish division of five vessels at Ferrol, for
the purpose of carrying troops to the West India Islands, and
recovering Trinidad, for instance, or Martinique. Spain, by the
treaty which secured Tuscany to her in exchange for Louisi
ana, had engaged to furnish France with six vessels fully
equipped, placed in the harbour of Cadiz, and to employ the
resources of that ancient arsenal to reorganise a portion of the
forces which she formerly possessed at that station.
The First Consul, in forming these arrangements, did not
communicate to the Spanish government his real intentions, as
he feared the indiscretion of that cabinet. He was desirous to
send a portion of the combined fleets to Brazil, and to the West
India Islands, to accomplish the avowed designs, and to attract
thither the English fleets; but at Brest his paramount object
was the expedition under Gauteaume, ostensibly destined for
St. Domingo, but intended in reality for Egypt. He gave
orders for the selection of seven of the fastest sailing ships of
the squadron, with two frigates and a brig ; and these vessels
were to transport 5000 men to effect a landing, with an ample
supply of warlike stores of all kinds, timber, iron, medicines,
and a selection of European commodities most wanted in Egypt.
The First Consul gave orders to reland the cargoes of those
vessels which were already in a very advanced state of loading,
and to reload them in conformity with the fresh arrangements
which he had determined upon. He was anxious, in short,
that each vessel should contain a complete assortment of every
individual article prepared for the colony, and not an entire
cargo of one single description of articles ; so that in the case
of one of the vessels being captured, the expedition would not
be totally deficient of the precise article which the captured
vessel might contain. This arrangement being contrary to the
usage of the navy, rendered the stowage of these vessels more
difficult, but the absolute will of the First Consul overcame all
these obstacles. His aide-de-camp, Lauriston, was at Brest,
seconding the written instructions of which he was the bearer
by the influence of his presence, and by his urgent endeavours
to expedite their departure. The expedition from Rochefort,
ostensibly announced for the West India Islands, was also
destined for Egypt. Its equipment was proceeding as rapidly
as possible. The aide-de-camp Savary urged its departure, and
drew thither a body of troops detached from the army of Por
tugal. The division of 25,000 men, which was about to pass
the Pyrenees, being assembled in the Gironde, furnished con
venient means for disguising the real object of the Rochefort
expedition. Without exciting the least suspicion, a few bat
talions had been borrowed from this force with the intention
of embarking them in this squadron. The expedition was to
be confided to admiral Bruix, perhaps the most distinguished
naval commander whom France at that time possessed. This
P2

212 history OF the [March 180L
admiral united to a superior understanding, seldom found
amongst either civil or military men, a perfect knowledge of
naval affairs, and had distinguished himself by his successful
and well-known cruise of 1799 in the Mediterranean. When,
at the last moment, general Bonaparte should disclose his secret
to the cabinet at Madrid, admiral Bruix was to proceed to
Ferrol, and, reinforced by the squadron lying at that place, re
pair to Cadiz, there to be joined by the division furnished by
Spain,"and then proceed onwards to Otranto, embark the troops
collected at that point, and from thence set sail for Egypt. This
division at Cadiz, furnished by Spain, was composed of six fine
vessels which were being prepared in the greatest haste. Admi
ral Dumanoir had just set out post to Cadiz, in order to urge on
their equipment. Bodies of sailors were proceeding by land
towards this port. Small vessels, filled with seamen, were
sent also at the same time, and these men, when transferred,
helped to complete the crews of the vessels of war.
These numerous expeditions would inevitably attract the
attention of England to all points at once, divide her forces,
cause her infinite confusion, and some of them taking advantage
of this confusion would be almost certain to reach Egypt-
Desirous of availing himself of the bad season, which rendered
the enemy's cruising off Brest both difficult and interrupted,
the First Consul intended to make admiral Gauteaume sail
before spring. His orders to this effect were very precise ; but
it was not easy for him to inspire his naval commanders with
the same spirit that animated the generals of his land forces.
Admiral Gauteaume had seemed to him bold and successful, as
it was he who had brought him almost miraculously from Alex
andria to Frejus. But in this opinion he was mistaken. This
officer, an experienced seaman, perfectly acquainted with the
navigation of the Levant, of undaunted bravery, was, nevertheless,
of irresolute character, and incapable of sustaining the burden of a
heavy responsibility. The expedition was ready for sea : several
families of workmen were embarked, under the impression instil
led into them, that they were bound to St. Domingo, but still they
hesitated to put to sea. Savary, armed with the orders of the First
Consul, overcame all the obstacles which presented themselves,
and compelled Gauteaume to set sail. The enemy's cruisers
descried them, and made signals to the blockading squadron that
the French fleet was leaving the port, so that Gauteaume was
under the necessity of returning to the anchorage in the outer
road of Bertheaume. He then feigned to re-enter the inner
roads, in order to induce the English to believe that his only
object was to exercise his crews by performing these evolutions.
At last, on the 23d of January (3rd Pluvi6se), the enemy's
cruisers being dispersed by a dreadful gale of wind, he set sail,
and, in spite of the greatest dangers, happily succeeded in getting
out of the port of Brest, and proceeded towards the straits of

March 1801.] consulate and the empire. 213
Gibraltar. The success of Gauteaume's enterprise was the more
desirable, as the famous expedition consisting of 15,000 or
18,000 English, destined one day for Ferrol, and another day
for Cadiz, or it might be the south of France, was at that
moment on its way to Egypt. It was lying in the road of
Macri, opposite the island of Rhodes, waiting the season for
landing, and the completion of the preparations of the Turks.
Orders were issued to the journals of the capital to make no
mention of the naval movements which might be remarked in
the ports of France, unless the intelligence was derived from the
Moniteur* Before we trace the operations of our squadrons in the south,
we must revert to the north, and see what was passing between
England and the neutral powers.
Great Britain was, at this moment, menaced by an accu
mulation of the greatest dangers. War had at length broken
out between that government and the Baltic powers. The de
claration of the neutrals, similar to that issued in 1780, being
only a simple declaration of their rights, England might still have
dissembled with them without construing this declaration, which
was directed in a general manner to all the belligerent parties, as
addressed especially to herself, and might have endeavoured, for
the moment, to avoid any collision, by taking care to respect the
Danish, Swedish, Prussian, and Russian flags. England had, in
fact, much greater interest in maintaining peace with the northern
powers of Europe, than in harassing the commerce of the smaller
maritime powers trading with France. Moreover, her imme
diate want of foreign corn rendered even the freedom of the
neutrals temporarily expedient. Strictly considered, she was
only justified in making reprisals against Russia ; inasmuch, as
amongst all the members of the neutral league, the emperor Paul
was the only one who had added to the declaration, the hostile
act of an embargo on her vessels. Besides, the question of
Malta was much more the motive of this measure, than were
any of the contested points concerning maritime rights. _
But England, in her pride, had met a simple exposition of
principles by an act of violence, and had placed under embargo
all the Russian, Swedish, and Danish vessels. She had only
excepted from these rigorous proceedings the commerce of
Prussia, towards which power she showed more moderation, in
the hopes of detaching her from the confederacy, and moreover,
because Hanover was at her mercy.  ^ 
* The following is a curious letter on this subject :—
" The First Consul to the Minister of General Police.
" Have the goodness, Citizen Minister, to address a short circular to the
•editors of the fourteen journals, forbidding the insertion of any article cal
culated to afford the enemy the slightest clue to the different movements
which are taking place in our squadrons, unless the intelligence be derived
from the official journal.
" Paris, 1st Ventose, year IX."— (State Paper Office.)

214 HISTORY OF the [March 1801.
England, then, was actuaUy at war at the same time with France
and Spain, her ancient enemies, and with the courts of Russia,
Sweden, and Prussia, her ancient allies ; she had been abandoned
by Austria, since the peace of Luneville, and by the court of
Naples since the treaty of Florence. Portugal, her last foothold
on the continent, was about to be wrested from her. Her situation
was precisely similar to that in which France was placed in 1793.
She was reduced to struggle alone against all Europe, exposed,
however, it is true, to fewer dangers than France, and entitled to
less merit for being able to defend herself, inasmuch as her insular
position protected her from the peril of an invasion. But to
render the parallel of their respective positions more remarkable
and complete; England was a prey to a frightful famine. The
people were in want of food of primary necessity. This state
of things was entirely brought about by the obstinacy of Mr.
Pitt, and by the genius of general Bonaparte. Mr. Pitt having
refused to treat before Marengo, and general Bonaparte having
disarmed one portion of Europe by his victories, and turned the
other against England by means of his policy, were both in
contestably the authors of this prodigious change of fortune.
The position of England was unquestionably most alarming,
and we must acknowledge that at this critical juncture she did
not give way to despondency. The harvest of the preceding
year having been less by one-third than an average crop, all the
preceding stock on hand had been consumed. The harvest of
the year 1800 having again been deficient by one-fourth, the pre
sent scarcity had followed. This scarcity was doubly aggravated
by the general war, and especially by the war with the maritime
powers, since the supplies of grain were usually derived from the
Baltic. If, therefore, the bad harvest was the primary cause
of the famine, it is true that the war greatly tended to aggravate
the calamity. Had it only raised the price of grain, by inter
posing impediments in the way of the Baltic trade, even then
its influence upon the general distress must have been truly
disastrous. The revenue presented this year the most alarming
deficit. The income tax, customs, and excise gave apprehensions
that there would be a deficiency in the revenue of 3,000,000/. to
4,000,000/. sterling. The expenditure of the year was enormous.
To meet this it became necessary to borrow 25,000,000/. to
26,000,000?. sterling. The total expenses of the year for the three
kingdoms (Ireland having just become united by the act of union),
including the interest of the debt created by Mr. Pitt, were esti
mated at 69,000,000/ sterling, an enormous amount at any time,
but the more so in 1800, as at that period the revenue had not
been augmented to that considerable amount to which a subse
quent interval of forty years has raised it in England and in all
the countries of Europe. France, as we have stated, had only
to support a burden of 600,000,000 francs (24,000,000/. sterling).
The exact total of the English debt was, as usually, stoutly dis-

March 1801.] consulate and the empire. 215
£1;^ in tS1S only the statement of the government,* it
^^Sl^^^4^USS^4lHte^aS- To%neettheinter-
a sum of PO S/nrl^6 ^^ fUnd' there WaS re1uired annua%
n Z ? ,?' 14\000/. sterling, without taking into account the debt
ot Ireland, or the loans guaranteed to the emperor of Germany.
JE™ 7+t aCCUS?d -°f having increased the debt on account of
the war ol the revolution, more than 300,000,000/. sterling. On
the showing of the government the increase was 298,000,000/.
# But we must say that England presented a most surprising
improvement m every branch, and that her riches had aug
mented in the same proportion as her burdens. Besides the
conquest of India, consummated by the destruction of Tippoo
baib ; besides the conquest of a portion of the French, Spanish,
and Dutch colonies, to which was just added the acquisition of
the island of Malta, England had monopolised the commerce of
the whole world. According to the official returns, the imports
which had been in 1781, towards the close of the American war,
12,724,000/. sterling, and which, in 1792, at the breaking out of
the war of the Revolution, were 19,659,000/. sterling, increased,
in 1799, to 29,945,000/. The exports of English manufactured
goods, which, in 1 781, were 7,633,000/., in 1 792 were 24,905,000/.,
and rose, in 1799, to 33,991,000/. Thus her foreign trade had
tripled since the termination of the American war, and had
nearly doubled since the war of the Revolution. In 1788, the
English trade employed 13,827 vessels,. and 107,925 seamen;
at now, in 1801, employed 18,877 vessels, and 143,661 seamen.
The excise and customs had risen from 7,320,000/. to 15,587,000/.
The Sinking Fund, which was, in 1784, 1,000,000/., had also
increased, in 1800, to 5,500,000/.
The resources of the British empire had, then, all doubled or
trebled during the preceding twenty years ; and, if the pressure
at the moment was great, there existed enormous wealth to meet .
it England, it is true, was incumbered by a debt of more
than 480,000,000/, with an annual charge of 20,000,000/., to
meet the accruing interest ; she had to meet, this year, an ex
penditure of 68,000,000/., and to raise, by loan, 24,000,000/., to
meet her exigencies. All this was enormous, no doubt, if we,
moreover, consider the value of money at the time ; but England
possessed resources within herself, proportionate to these de
mands. Although not a continental power, she had an army of
1 93,000 regular troops,l 09,000 militia and fencibles, making a total
.of 302,000 men. She possessed 814 vessels of war, of all sizes,.
either in course of building or repairing, advance ships, or in
commission at sea. In this number were included 100 ships of
the line, and 200 frigates, under sail, in all quarters of the world ;
twenty ships of the line, and forty frigates in reserve, ready for
* These amounts are taken from the budget presented to Parliament in
June 1801, by Mr. Addington, successor to Mr. Pitt.

216 HISTORY OF the [March 1801.
sea. Her effective force then could not be estimated at less than
120 line-of-battle ships, and 250 frigates, manned by 120,000
seamen. In addition to this stupendous force, England pos
sessed a number of naval officers of great merit, and, at their
head, a renowned seaman in the person of Nelson, He was an
eccentric, violent man, not fit to be entrusted with authority, in
cases where diplomatic services were combined with his duties as
a naval commander ; and he had but recently given a proof of
this at Naples, by allowing his name to be tarnished by the in
trigues of women, during the bloody executions ordered by the
Neapohtan government ; but in the midst of danger he was a
hero ; and he displayed as much genius as courage ; his country
was justly proud of his glory.
England and France have filled the present age with the fame
of their formidable rival exploits. The period at which we have
now arrived in this recital is one of the most remarkable during
the struggle which they maintained against each other. They
both had waged war during eight years. France, with financial
resources far less vast, but perhaps more solid, inasmuch as
they were founded upon a territorial revenue, with a population
nearly double, with all the enthusiasm which a good cause in
spires, had successfully resisted all Europe, had extended her
territory to the Rhine, and to the Alps, had acquired the do
minion over Italy, and a decisive influence on the continent.
England, with the profits arising from the commerce of the
whole world, with a powerful navy, had acquired a preponder
ance on the ocean, equal to that which France had acquired on
land. England, by subsidising the European powers, had in
cited them against her rival, had urged them to fight, even to
their destruction. But whilst she exposed them to be crushed
in her service, at the same time she seized upon the colonies of
all nations, oppressed the powers which remained neutral, taking
revenge, for the success of France on land, by an oppressive
tyranny on the ocean ; and, although victorious upon this ele
ment, she could not prevent France from creating a magnificent
maritime station in Egypt, threatening even the British do
minions in the East Indies.
A strange revulsion of public opinion, as we have said else
where, resulted from this concatenation of events. France,
admirably governed, appeared, in the eyes of the world, humane,
wise, tranquil, evincing moderation in her victories — a combi
nation of meritorious qualities as rare as they are admirable.
Whilst the various cabinets were becoming reconciled to her,
they perceived at once how they had all, till then, been the
dupes of England's policy. Austria had been urged on to
fight for the cause of England, as if she were struggling for
her own existence. For this same England the Germanic
empire had been dismembered. The powers of the north,
with Russia at their head, discovered, at length, that unde*

March 1801.] consulate and the empire. 217
pretext of prosecuting a moral purpose, and contending against
the French revolution, they had only contributed to procure for
England the commerce of the whole universe. Thus the whole
world at this moment turned against the mistress of the seas.
Paul I. had given the signal with" the accustomed impetuosity of
his character. Sweden imitated his example without hesitation.
Denmark and Prussia followed in the same steps, although with
a less degree of resolution. Austria conquered, and now reco
vered from her delusions, digested her spleen in silence, and, for
the moment, at least, gave signs of resisting, for a long period to
come, the baneful influence of the British subsidies.
England reaped the fruits of the policy she had pursued ; she
had doubled her colonies, her commerce, her revenue, her navy;
but she had also doubled her debt, her expenditure, her burdens,
her enemies, and she presented a spectacle of immense wealth,
with all the frightful misery attending a people dying from
hunger. France, Spain, Russia, Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden,
were leagued against her. France, Spain, and Holland united,
possessed eighty ships, fully equipped, and were capable of arm
ing a greater number. Sweden had twenty-eight, Russia thirty-
five, Denmark twenty-three, making a total together of 166
ships of the line — a force superior to that of the British navy.
But England, on her side, enjoyed one great advantage, in having
to contend with a coalition ; moreover, her armaments surpassed,
in effectiveness, those of the coalition. The French and Danish
vessels were the only ones which could cope with theirs ; and
these found it difficult, when fighting in large squadrons, as the
manoeuvres of the English navy excelled all others in the world.
Nevertheless, the danger was becoming imminent, for, if the
struggle were prolonged, general Bonaparte was capable of under
taking some formidable expedition, and, if he succeeded in
crossing the English channel with an invading army, England
was lost.
The long-continued good fortune of Mr. Pitt, like that of M.
de Thugut, was now on the wane, before the rising star of
young general Bonaparte. Mr. Pitt had enjoyed the most bril
liant destiny of his time, after that of the Great Frederick; he
was only forty-three years of age, and had already held the reins
of power, during seventeen years, a power almost absolute in a
free country. But his fortune was declining with years, and
that of general Bonaparte, on the contrary, was rising — it was
just dawning. The fortunes of men succeed each other in the
history of the world, like beings in the universe, they have their
youth, their decrepitude, and their death. The incomparably
more brilliant fortune of general Bonaparte was also destined
one day to decline, but meanwhile it was reserved for it to
witness the fall of the greatest statesman England ever had,
sinking beneath its bright ascendant.
Great Britain seemed menaced by a sort of internal convulsion.

218 history of the [March 1801.
The people, suffering from a frightful scarcity, were rising in
different parts of the kingdom, pillaging the magnificent country
seats of the English aristocracy, and in the cities, plundering the
bakers' shops and the provision warehouses. There were in
London in 1801, as in Paris in 1792, misguided friends of the
people, who incited proceedings against the alleged engrossers,
and, in fact, insisted upon a measure which differed only in
name from a maximum in the price of bread. Nevertheless,
neither the government, nor the parliament appeared in the
least degree disposed to yield to these senseless demands. The
masses reproached Mr. Pitt with being the cause of all their
present distresses, they alleged it was he, who, by loading the
country with taxes, by doubling the debt, had raised the prices of
articles of primary necessity to an exorbitant degree ; that it was
he, who, in persisting in prosecuting a mad war, in refusing to
treat with France, had ended by turning all the maritime nations
against England, and by depriving the English people of a sup
ply of foreign grain from the Baltic, now become indispensable.
The opposition, seeing for the first time for seventeen years, Mr.
Pitf s power shaken, redoubled their energy. Mr. Fox, who had so
long absented himself from parliament, again resumed his seat.
Sheridan, Tierney, lords Grey and Holland, renewed their
attacks, and (that which rarely happens in excited parties of an
opposition) on this occasion, when contending with their politi
cal adversaries, they had right on their side. Mr. Pitt, in spite
of his accustomed self-possession, had little in fact to urge in
reply, when the question was asked, why he had not treated
with France when the First Consul proposed peace before the
battle of Marengo ? Why, and that recently before Hohenlinden,
why had he not consented, if not to a naval armistice which
might have given the French a chance of maintaining them
selves in Egypt, at least to the separate negotiation which they
had proposed ? Why had he so untowardly let slip the opportu
nity of securing the evacuation of Egypt, by refusing to ratify
the convention of El Arisch? Why had he not temporised
with the neutral powers in order to gain time with them ? Why
had he not imitated lord North, who, in 1780, avoided answer
ing a manifesto of maritime powers, by a declaration of war ?
Why had he thus drawn all Europe in array against England on
account of doubtful questions of the law of nations upon which
all countries entertained conflicting opinions, and which at the
moment did not materially affect the interests of England >
Why, with the view of preventing France from obtaining
for her dock-yards, timber, iron, and hemp, which were not
sufficient to recruit its navy, why had he exposed England to be
wholly deprived of foreign corn ? Why, in short, had an Eng
hsh army been uselessly transported from Mahon to Ferrol, and
from Ferrol to Cadiz, without any practical result ? The opposi
tion, contrasting the management of the affairs of England with

March 1801.] consulate and the empire. 219
that of the affairs of France, inquired of Mr. Pitt, with bitter
irony, what he had to say of this young Bonaparte, of this rash
youth, who, according to the ministerial language, was only
doomed to enjoy a brief existence like his predecessors, so
ephemeral that it did not entitle him to be treated with 1
Mr. Pitt had great difficulty in maintaining his ground against
Fox, Sheridan, and Tierney, lords Grey and Holland, when in
the face of all England, he was pressed by these urgent ques
tions, but became alarmed at the number of his enemies, and
disconcerted at the clamour of a famished people, in vain de
manding bread.
Mr. Pitt made but a feeble defence to all these reproaches.
He constantly repeated his favourite argument, that if he had
not made war, the English constitution would have perished ;
and he cited as examples, Venice, Naples, Piedmont, Switzer
land, Holland, and the Ecclesiastical States of Germany, as if it
could be believed that what had occurred to some third-rate
Itahan, or German powers, must necessarily have happened to
powerful England, and to her liberal constitution. He replied, and
on this occasion with more truth, that if France had greatly
increased her territory by land, England had equally aug
mented her power by sea; that her navy was crowned with
glory, that if her debts and her taxes had doubled, her riches-
had also doubled, and that all circumstances considered,
England was more powerful at that moment, than before
the war. All this could not be disputed. Mr. Pitt added,.
moreover, that as the First Consul appeared to be more perma
nently established in authority, they were about to treat with
him. But on the question of neutral rights he remained in
flexible. " If England," said he, " subscribed to the doctrines-
laid down by the neutral powers, a small armed sloop would
suffice to convoy the trade of the whole world. England would
be precluded from taking any steps against the trade of her
enemies, and she could no longer prevent Spain from receiving
the precious metals of the New World, nor France from obtain
ing the naval munitions of war supplied by the North. We
must," he exclaimed, " envelop ourselves in our own flag, and
proudly find our grave in the deep, rather than admit the validity
of such principles in the maritime code of nations."
Two sessions of parliament succeeded each other without any
interval of repose. In November, 1800, the last meeting took
place of what was called the Parliament of England and Scot
land; in January, 1801, the united parliament of the three
kingdoms assembled for the first time in virtue of the act which
united Ireland with Great Britain. During these two sessions
the most vehement discussions had been carried on without in
termission. Mr. Pitt was visibly weakened, not as respected
his numerical majority in the parliament, but as regarded^his
popular influence, and moral power out of doors. Every one

220 history of the [March 1801.
felt that in persisting in making war against France, he had
overshot the mark, and had missed, on the eve of Marengo
as on that of Hohenlinden, the favourable opportunity of treating
advantageously. To miss an opportunity is for a statesman, as
well as for a military man, an irreparable misfortune. The
moment for making peace once past, fortune turned against Mr.
Pitt. He felt himself, and the people perceived that he was
vanquished by the talents of young general Bonaparte.
We must, however, do him, and also England, the justice to
acknowledge, that the measures adopted during this frightful
scarcity, were marked by great moderation. The proposal of a
maximum was rejected. They went no further than to grant
considerable bounties upon the importation of corn, to prohibit
the use of grain in the distilleries, and to discontinue all paro
chial relief in money, lest it might raise the price of bread, afford
ing, however, that relief in food such as salted provisions, vege
tables, &c. A royal proclamation was addressed to all classes
in easy circumstances, and who had it in their power to vary
their diet, urging them to use the utmost economy in the con
sumption of bread in their respective families. In addition to
this they despatched numerous fleets to obtain rice in the East
Indies, corn in America, and in the Mediterranean. They even
endeavoured to procure it from France, by a contraband trade
on the coast of Brittany and La Vendee.
Nevertheless, in the midst of this distress, which was borne
with great fortitude, Mr. Pitt did not neglect the prosecution of
the war, and he had made every arrangement for a bold expedi
tion into the Baltic as soon as the season would permit. He was
desirous to aim a blow first at Denmark and then at Sweden, and
proceed even to the extremity of the gulf of Finland, with a view
of menacing Russia. But it is not known even in his own
country, whether he seriously wished to continue at the head of
affairs in England. Two questions were constantly agitated by
him in the cabinet, one of which, most inopportune at such a
moment, led to his retirement. It has been seen, that after
strenuous exertions made in the preceding year, he had obtained
what is called the act of union with Ireland, that is to say the
union of the parliaments of England, Scotland, and Ireland into
one imperial legislature. This measure had appeared like a sort
of party victory, especially in the face of the reiterated attempts
of the French Republic to stir up an insurrection in Ireland. But
they had only succeeded in stripping Ireland of her indepen
dence, by giving the Catholics a formal pledge that emancipation
should be granted to them. The Catholics were told, that they
never would obtain their enfranchisement, from the prejudices of
the Irish parliament, which was undoubtedly true ; but it appears
that promises were actually made, amounting to a positive pledge,
which must be^considered as a serious political error, if it be true'
that Mr. Pitt was bound, by the tenor of these engagements, to

March 1801.] consulate and the empire. 221
grant emancipation, or to retire. It was a pledge at that time
impossible of performance. Be this as it may, in the month of
February, 1801, at the opening of the first united parliament,
vii' £t ai • the consent of George III. to an emancipation
bill. The king, a staunch Protestant, conceived this to be an in
fringement of his coronation oath, and obstinately refused it.
Mr. Pitt made another request, which was a most reasonable one :
namely, not to consider the occupation of Hanover, by Prussia, as
an act of hostility, but to keep on terms with that power, in order
to preserve at least one friendly relation on the continent. The
sacrifice was too great for a prince of the house of Hanover.
The dispute between the king and the minister grew warm, and
on the 8th of February, 1801, Mr. Pitt, together with the majo
rity of his colleagues, Messrs. Dundas and Windham, lord
Grenville, and others, tendered their resignation. This resigna
tion, after an administration of seventeen years, under circum
stances so extraordinary, caused the greatest sensation. The
people could not view it as arising out of natural circumstances,
but ascribed secret motives to Mr. Pitt ; and an opinion at that
time took possession of the public mind, which historians have
zealously perpetuated ever since, that Mr. Pitt, perceiving the
necessity of a temporary peace, consented to stand aloof during a
few months, in order to allow this peace to be brought about by
others, rather than by himself, and then afterwards to return to the
helm of affairs, when the political exigency of the moment should
have been provided for. Such are the motives which the mul
titude generally ascribe to public men, and which ill-informed
writers repeat as they have heard them. Mr. Pitt neither fore
saw the peace of Amiens, nor its short duration,* nor did he
conceive, moreover, that peace was incompatible with his con
tinuance in the ministry, as he had consented to the famed nego
tiations at Lille in 1797, and even recently he had selected Mr.
Thomas Grenville to represent England at Luneville. But Mr.
Pitt had gone to great lengths with the Catholics ; he had com
mitted a blunder, of which public men are often guilty, that of
sacrificing the interest of the future, to secure the advantages of
the moment. Having promised too much, he felt all the em
barrassment of not fulfilling those promises, and that in a critical
state of parties, when a small accession of strength to his adver
saries would -suffice to overwhelm him. It is true that subse
quently, he denied positively, that he had ever given any distinct
pledge respecting Catholic emancipation, and this denial was in
deed wanting to defend him from such a charge of imprudence.
Whatever opinion may be entertained on this point, there never
* I am indebted for the above details to several cotemporaries of Mr. Pitt,
who were on the most intimate terms with him ; who were engaged in the
ministerial negotiations of that period, and who fill, even at the present day,
some of the highest offices in England.

222 history of the [March 1801.
was a period when the dangers of any country justified to the
same degree, or even required, the postponement of solemn en
gagements, for in 1801, England was a prey to a famine within,
while abroad, she was at war with the whole of Europe. Never
theless, Mr. Pitt withdrew from office, and his retirement can
only be regarded as the weakness of a superior mind. It is evi
dent that, everywhere surrounded byfearful embarrassments, Mr.
Pitt was not sorry to be relieved from his situation, under the
honourable pretext of an inviolable fidelity to his own engage
ments. He sent in his resignation to the great grief of the king,
to the great dissatisfaction of the ministerial party, and to the
great apprehension of all England, which viewed with alarming
anxiety, a set of new and inexperienced men seize the helm of
affairs at this critical juncture. Mr. Pitt caused himself to be
succeeded by Mr. Addington, who was his creature, and had
for many years past held the speakership of the House of
Commons. Lord Hawkesbury, afterwards lord Liverpool,
succeeded Mr. Grenville at the Foreign office. They were mo
derate, prudent men, but of second-rate ability, both friends
of Mr. Pitt and for some time followed his advice. This it was
which contributed, more than any other cause, to give currency
to the report that the retirement of Mr. Pitt was ostensible
rather than real.
The feeble intellect of George III. was unequal to bear the
violence of the political crisis. He was seized with a fresh at
tack of insanity, and during a month was incapable of fulfilling
the functions of royalty. Mr. Pitt had sent in his resignation.
Mr. Addington and lord Hawkesbury were the ministers ap
pointed to succeed him, but had not yet received the seals of
office. Mr. Pitt, although he had ceased to be minister, was
still, in fact, king of England, during this crisis of nearly a
month's duration, and was so by the consent of the whole nation.
Explanations took place upon the subject in the House of Com
mons. They were of a very delicate nature; they were de
manded by Mr. Sheridan, and given in noble, statesmanlike
language by Mr. Pitt. The various motions, usually made in
the English parliament, upon the state of the country, were post
poned, and it perhaps occurred to some distrustful minds that
Mr. Pitt prolonged, without reluctance, the sort of royal autho
rity which he enjoyed. He trusted it would be believed, to use
his own language at the time, that in the event of ministers being
no longer able to receive the commands of his Majesty from his
own mouth, they would propose measures to which it was unne
cessary to allude more distinctly, but which they should not de
lay for one single day. They found themselves placed by their
duty in an unprecedented situation, which they should not wish,
on any account, to prolong one instant more than strict necessity
required. Mr. Sheridan replied to this, by expressing the ut
most confidence, that neither Mr. Pitt, nor any other minister

March 1801.] consulate and the empire. 223
would ever presume to take advantage of the unhappy condition
of the king's health, to prolong, for one moment, a power equal
to that of the sovereign himself.
The most delicate reserve was observed. The word which
characterised the real condition of the king, that of madness,
did not escape the lips of any one ; and the nation waited with
anxiety, but with perfect composure, the issue of this extra
ordinary crisis. During this period, Mr. Pitt induced subsidies to
be voted, which no one opposed ; the Enghsh fleets were got
ready for sea, and admirals Parker and Nelson left Yarmouth
with forty-seven sail, and proceeded towards the Baltic.
In the middle of March, the king's health was restored. Mr.
Pitt transferred the reins of government to Mr. Addington, and
lord Hawkesbury. The new ministers, when giving explana
tions, as usual, on assuming office, did not omit to state, from
their seats in parliament, that they entertained the highest sen
timents of esteem for their predecessors ; that they considered
the course of policy they had adopted as highly salutary,
and that it had, in fact, saved England ; they consequently de
clared, that they should be guided by the same principles, and
follow in the same steps. " Why, then, have you come into
power ?" asked Messrs. Sheridan, Grey, and Fox. " If you
mean to pursue the same line of policy as your predecessors,
the ministers who have retired were much more capable than
yourselves, of carrying on the affairs of the kingdom."
Impartial men, members of parliament, censured Mr. Pitt for
having relinquished the government of the nation, at such a
critical moment, and for retiring without valid and sufficient
reasons. Even the opposition was so far in the wrong, as to
reproach him with retiring at the expense of the king's popu
larity, by giving out, that the king refused to grant emancipation,
which measure was generally acceptable to the country. This
reproach was both unreasonable, and at variance with true con
stitutional principles. Mr. Pitt, in resigning, was under the
necessity of publicly stating the reasons for his withdrawal from
office ; and if the king did really refuse his sanction to an eman
cipation bill, Mr. Pitt had a perfect right to proclaim it. He
made it known, however, in language eminently suitable to the
occasion. But it plainly appeared, that this refusal was rather a
pretext, than a real motive, and that Mr. Pitt yielded to a state
of things, with which he was unequal to contend. The lustre of
his staf faded before one that was now rising, and which was
destined to diffuse a far brighter splendour than his own. Al
though he afterwards appeared at the head of affairs, and ac
tually died in office, the expiration of his political existence
may be dated at this period. Mr. Pitt, after having continued
seventeen years in power, left his country loaded at once with
increased riches and increased debt, with greater burdens, and
with greater resources. He was an accomplished orator, if

224 history of the [March 1801.
viewed as an organ of the government ; an able and powerful
leader, but with little enlightened views as a statesman. He
had committed grievous errors, and was ever warped by all
the prejudices of his countrymen. No Englishman ever enter
tained a more deadly hatred towards France ; but we must
guard against being unjust towrards him on this account, and
evince our impartiality, by honouring patriotism, even when
engaged in a contest with our own.
Although Mr. Addington and lord Hawkesbury were not to
be compared, in talent, to Mr. Pitt, the impulse had been given,
and the vessel of the state was borne onwards, for a time, by
the momentum imparted to it by the fallen minister. The subsi
dies had been asked and voted ; the English fleets were launched
towards the Baltic, in order to settle the question of the rights
of neutrals; and an army, transported on board the fleet of
admiral Keith, was on its way to the East, in order to dispute
the possession of Egypt with the French.
Admiral Parker, an old experienced officer, whose judgment
could be relied upon in critical emergencies, commanded the
Baltic fleet. Nelson was next in command, ready to act when
ever battle was necessary ; the latter, in fact, was only qua
lified to fight, but nature had endowed him with a happy in
stinct for warfare, and he reasoned ably upon subjects con
nected with his profession. He proposed, that without waiting
for the second division of the English fleet, they should pass the
Sound, proceed direct to Copenhagen, and there, by some act
of vigour, detach Denmark from the coalition ; then afterwards
repair to the Baltic, throw themselves into the midst of the
combined fleets, prevent their junction, and thus, from that
time, dictate terms at discretion. This plan was well conceived,
for it was now the month of March, the northern waters were
still covered with ice, and this alone was sufficient to prevent
the fleets of the neutrals from effecting their junction; which,
indeed, Nelson had good reason to fear, as it must greatly have
endangered the British squadron.
This squadron, consisting of seventeen ships of the line, and
thirty frigates, or smaller vessels, appeared on the 30th of March,
in the Cattegat. The Cattegat is the first gulf formed by the
northern extremity of Denmark, when it approaches the oppo
site coast of Sweden.
The neutral powers were proceeding with extreme activity in
their preparations. The emperor Paul, animated by his accus
tomed ardour, had'urged and incited on Sweden, Denmark, and
Prussia, and threatened with his enmity, those who did not mani
fest the same zeal as himself. Denmark and Prussia would have
preferred negotiatingin the first instance ; but the menaces of Paul,
and the stern, but no ways menacing admonitions of the First
Consul, accompanied with a formal promise of assistance from
France, had prevailed with these two cabinets. Denmark, be-

March 1801.] consulate and the empire. 225
sides, seeing the English respond to a simple declaration of
principles, by a declaration of war, did not consider herself at
liberty to recede, and accordingly took energetic measures to
repel the enemy. Prussia, perplexed in the extreme bythe
intimidation of Russia on the one side, and France on the other,
having ceased any longer to play the part of mediatrix, now that
Paul I. and the First Consul were upon amicable terms ; instead
of taking the lead as before, was now reduced to the position of
an obsequious follower, and from that time could rely upon their
friendly dispositions alone, for a share of the Germanic indem
nities advantageous to her interests, and was therefore anxious
to please those powers by her consistent firmness. She accord
ingly declared against England, and replied to her overtures by
protestations of fidelity to the cause of the neutrals. She pro
hibited the English from entering any of the northern ports
situated between Holland and Denmark"; she closed the mouths
•of the Ems, the Weser, and the Elbe, and stationed troops, and
raised batteries at the principal points of the entrances to these
rivers. To crown all, she marched a body of troops, and took
possession of Hanover. This proceeding was of all the rest, the
most serious and decisive. The First Consul requited it by the
warmest proofs of his satisfaction, and by the most positive
pledge to her of an advantageous participation in the Germanic
indemnities. Denmark, on her part, took possession of Hamburg and Lu-
beck; the small port of Cuxhaven, which belonged to Hamburg,
and which was the only place to which the English could have
access, had been already occupied by Prussia. Thus, then, the
English were left nothing but the sea and their vessels. They
had not a place where they could cast an anchor. They now
had the task to procure by force a readmittance for their ships
into the continental ports.
It is necessary, in order to reach the Baltic from the Cattegat,
to'pass through the celebrated straits of the Sound. These straits
are formed by the contiguity of the coasts of Denmark and Sweden.
Between Elsinore and Hessingborg it is about three miles in
width. The guns placed on the batteries of the two opposite
banks, can just reach a vessel passing in the middle of the
channel, but without being able to do much damage to a fleet of
ships. Nevertheless, as the channel is deeper on the Swedish side,
ships of war of a large size are obliged to approach nearer to this
coast, and by fortifying it with batteries the passage could have
been rendered more difficult to the English. But the Swedish
coast had at that time no batteries, and, indeed, had never had
any at any previous period; in fact it has no port which merchant
vessels could be tempted to frequent. There is no other port in
the Sound, except that of Elsinore, belonging to Denmark, and
on this account batteries have been erected for the defence of the
Danish coast only, with scarcely any on the Swedish side. On
VOL. II. Q

226 history OF the [March 1801.
the Danish side stands the fortress of Kronenberg, regularly forti
fied. For these reasons the usage has originated of paying to
the Danes, and not to the Swedes, the dues levied in the Sound.
In such a state of things, it would have been requisite to con
struct works on the coast of Sweden, of which they were defi
cient. King Gustavus Adolphus, who, next to Paul, was the
most violent of the members of the league, had consulted the
czar on the subject, when he was at St. Petersburg, on his recent
visit, but they were aware of the impossibility of executing the
least work during the present winter season, when the soil, indu
rated by the frost, would resist the pickaxe and the spade, to such
a degree as to render any labour upon it wholly impracticable.
Gustavus Adolphus had also just had an interview with the crown
prince of Denmark, at that time regent of the kingdom, the same
who died some years ago, in 1841, after a long and glorious reign.
They conferred together upon this subject, and the Crown Prince,
from private reasons by which Denmark was influenced, did not
seem to attach much importance to the fortifying of the Swedish
coast* The Sound then was but feebly defended on the Swedish
side. There was only an old battery of eight pieces of cannon, con
structed along time ago upon the most salient point of the shore.
Although this neglect has been greatly blamed since, it is certain
that the Sound, even if it had been strongly fortified on both sides,
would not have presented any serious dangers to the English, as
the width of the channel being about three miles, vessels passing
in the midst of the straits, would be at a distance of a mile and
a half from the batteries, and would therefore, being almost out
of the range of their guns, escape with only perhaps some da
mage to their sails and rigging.
There is also another approach to the Baltic besides that of the
Sound, which is formed by the two arms of the sea which sepa
rate, the one the Island of Zealand from the Island of Funen,
the other the Island of Funen from the coast of Jutland, passages
well known by the names of the Great and Little Belt. The
English would be but little inclined to sail by this passage, in
which they would be exposed to the fire of more than one Danish
fort ; but still more to the shoals, which rendered the navigation ex
tremely dangerous for ships of the line; they were, therefore, most
likely to decide upon going through the passage of the Sound.
The Danes concentrated all their defences, not exactly at the
* Very erroneous assertions have been made on this subject. I have had
recourse to the highest and most authentic authorities. The archives of
France, Sweden, and Denmark, contain the proofs of what I here advance.
Those who have written to the contrary, Napoleon amongst others, have
only repeated the allegations made at the time. The second passage of the
Sound, which took place in 1807, at a period when Sweden was at war with
Denmark, and viewed with pleasure the triumph of the English, has contri
buted to confirm the idea, that the Swedes had acted perfidiously. But on
the first occasion, that is, in 1801, Sweden acted with perfect good faith; she
was anxious for the general success, and would have done every thing in her
power to secure it.

March 1801.] consulate and the empire. 227
Sound, but lower down, in the channel which forms the continu
ation of the Sound, that is to say before Copenhagen. The two
coasts of Denmark and of Sweden, after having approximated to
each other at the Sound, now stretch out to an extent varying
in width from three to twelve leagues, forming a strait about
twenty leagues in length, abounding with reefs and shoals,
through which a vessel can only navigate, by steering through
the narrow channels, carefully ascertaining the depth of water by
incessant soundings. The city of Copenhagen is situated on the
most important of these channels, about twenty leagues from the
Sound, in a direction towards the south. It was at this spot
that the Danes had made immense preparations, waiting for the
approach of the enemy. The post which they occupied did not
exactly close the entrance to the Baltic, as we shall presently
explain, but it compelled the English to risk an attack on
a well-defended position, strongly fortified beforehand. The
Crown Prince had taken prompt and numerous preliminary mea
sures for defence. He had stationed before Copenhagen a
number of vessels, cut down so as to form formidable floating
batteries, and he had armed besides ten line-of-battle ships, which
were only waiting for seamen from Norway to complete their
crews. It is well known that the Danish navy is the best in the
whole North.
Sweden and Russia, on their parts, had also made preparations
for resistance. Sweden had placed troops on the coasts from
Gottenburg to the Sound, and fortified Carlscrona, in the Baltic,
as well as all the other accessible points on that coast. King
Gustavus Adolphus was urging on admiral Cronstedt to complete
the equipment of the Swedish fleet. This fleet already consisted
of seven ships of the line, and two frigates, ready to set sail, the
moment the sea was disencumbered of the winter ice. The Rus
sians had twelve ships of the line all ready at Revel, and which,
like the Swedish vessels, were only detained by the ice. The
coalitionists had not accomplished, doubtless, all that would
have been possible, if they had had at their head an energetic
government, like France at that period, but, by assembling, in
time, the seven Swedish, the twelve Russian, and ten Danish ships
before Copenhagen, there would have been formed a fleet of thirty
ships of the line, and of from ten to twelve frigates, stationed in
a formidable position, where the English could not have come
to an engagement without danger, and still less could have
passed by and disregarded. To have passed it, without attacking
it, in order to embark in any enterprise in the Baltic, would have
been to incur the danger of leaving an imposing force in their rear,.
capable of closing up the sole outlet of this sea, and of pre
venting their egress therefrom, in case of reverses. But to collect
together these naval divisions, in proper time, required a celerity
of movements of which these three neutral governments were
hardly capable. They used every dispatch, doubtless, but relying

228 history of the [March 1801.
too much upon the continuance of severe weather, they had not
commenced their preparations sufficiently early, and the energetic
promptitude of the English greatly surpassed theirs.
On the 21st of March, an English frigate touched at Elsi
nore, bringing Mr. Vansittart, who was commissioned to make a
last application to the Danish government. Mr. Vansittart de
livered to Mr. Drummond, the English Charge d'Aflaires, the
ultimatum of the British cabinet. The terms of this ultimatum
required the Danes to withdraw from the naval confederacy of
the Neutral Powers; to open their ports to the English; and
adhere to the provisional arrangement of the preceding August,
by virtue of which/ they had engaged no longer to convoy their
merchant vessels. The Crown Prince of Denmark promptly
refused to entertain the idea of such a defection, and replied that
Denmark, and her allies, had not made a declaration of war, and
that they had confined themselves to the publication of their prin
ciples of maritime law: that the English were the aggressors, as
they had retaliated to a mere assertion of a dogma in the law of na
tions, by an embargo; that Denmark would not commence hostili
ties, but she would energetically repel force by force. The gallant
people of Copenhagen nobly seconded, by their steady alle
giance, the prince who represented them with so much dignity.
The whole population took up arms; and, at the call of their
noble leader, formed themselves into corps of militia and volun
teers. Eight hundred students rushed to arms; every one who
could handle a pickaxe assisted the engineers in completing the
defensive works: redoubts were thrown up in every direction.
Mr. Drummond and Mr. Vansittart abruptly left Copenhagen,
threatening this unhappy city with all the thunders of England.
On the 24th, they rejoined the admirals of the fleet, who from
that moment, began to arrange their plan for immediate hostilities.
Nelson and the commander-in-chief, Parker, held a council of
war, on board the fleet. The plan of operation was discussed.
Some proposed to pass by way of the Sound, and others by way
of the Great Belt. Nelson maintained that it was of little con
sequence by which strait the fleet should pass, only that not an
hour should be lost in getting into the Baltic, and bearing up to
Copenhagen, in order to prevent the junction of the coalitionists.
Once in the Baltic, a part of the English fleet should be directed
against Copenhagen, to strike a blow against the Danes, and a
part against Sweden and Russia, to destroy the northern fleets.
They had twenty sail of the line, twenty-five or thirty frigates,
and vessels of all descriptions. He would undertake with twelve
ships, to destroy all the Swedish and Russian fleets; the re
mainder must attack and bombard Copenhagen. As to which
of the passages they should navigate, Nelson preferred braving
some of the cannon-shot to which they might be exposed in
passing the Sound, to encountering the dangerous shoals of the
Great and Little Belt.

March 1801.] consulate and the empire. 229
Admiral Parker, less enterprising, made an attempt, by the
Great Belt, on the 26th of March. Several light vessels of the
flotilla having grounded, the commander-in-chief recalled the
squadron, and determined to force the Sound. Early on the
morning of the 30th of March, they commenced this arduous
passage. At the time, it blew a topsail breeze from the north
west, favourable for navigating this strait, which runs in a direc
tion from north-west to south-east, as far as Elsinore, after
which it continues almost due north and south. The squadron,
favoured by the wind, advanced boldly, at an equal distance
from the two opposite shores. Nelson led the van, Parker took
the command of the centre, and admiral Graves brought up the
rear. The line-of-battle ships formed a single column in the
middle of the channel. On each side a flotilla of gun and bomb
vessels approached nearer to the coast of Denmark and Sweden,
in order to engage the enemy's batteries at a shorter range. As
soon as this squadron came in sight of Elsinore, the fortress of
Kronenberg immediately opened a fire upon them. One hundred
pieces of heavy cannon, vomitted forth a volley of shells and red-
hot balls. But the English admiral, perceiving that the fire on
the Swedish side did little or no execution, as the old battery
of eight guns scarcely fired, immediately approached nearer to
that side of the coast, and passed the straits amidst the jeers of
the English sailors at the Danes, whose shells and balls fell 600
yards short of the enemy's ships. The flotilla of bomb and gun
vessels, which had approached quite close to the Danish coast,
poured forth, and received, an immense quantity of shells, but
little bloodshed ensued, as four men only were wounded on the
side of the Danes, two of whom were severely wounded, and two
died. In Elsinore, only one house suffered from the fire of the
English, and that was, singularly enough, the house of the Eng
lish consul.
The whole fleet anchored, towards noon, in the middle of the
gulf, off the island of Huen.
The gulf, as we have just said, runs from north to south, for
the distance of about twenty leagues, varying in width, as the
shores advance or recede, from three to twelve leagues, and has
only a few channels that are navigable. At about twenty leagues
towards the south, stands Copenhagen, situated on the west side
of the gulf, on the coast of Denmark, at a small elevation above
the level of the sea, and forming a slightly inclined plane, from
which a cannon-ball would just skim over the surface of the sea.
The gulf is very wide at this spot, and divided by the low island
of Saltholm, into two navigable channels : the one called the
passage of Malmo, runs along the Swedish coast, and is scarcely
accessible for large vessels : the other, called Drogden, skirts
along the coast of Denmark, and is generally preferred by navi
gators. The latter is again divided by a sand bank, which is called
the Middle Ground, into two passages ; one called the King's

230 history of the [March 1801.
Channel, forms the entrance to Copenhagen: the other, called the
Dutch Channel, runs on the outer side of the Middle Ground. The
Danes had taken up a position in the King's Channel, leaving
the other open to the English, having in view rather the defence
of Copenhagen, than to prevent the enemy entering into the Baltic.
But it was very certain that Parker and Nelson would not ven
ture into the Baltic, without first destroying the defences of
Copenhagen, together with the maritime forces, that the neutrals
might have assembled there.
The means of defence, on the side of the Danes, consisted of
land batteries, constructed on the right and left of the harbour,
and of a line of razeed vessels, or floating batteries, moored in
the middle of the King's Channel, the whole length of Copen
hagen, with the view of keeping the enemy's fire at a distance.
Commencing at the northern position, "was a battery called the
Three Crowns, constructed of stone work, almost completely
closed at the gorge, commanding even the entrance to the port,
and connecting its fire with the citadel of Copenhagen. It was
fortified with seventy pieces of cannon of the largest calibre.
Four ships of the line, of which two were under sail, and two
at anchor, besides a frigate under way, completely blocked up
the entrance to the stream which led to the port. In proceeding
from this fort, that is, the Three Crowns, towards the south,
twenty hulks of large ships, armed with guns, and strongly
moored, filled up the passage of the King's Channel, and was
thus connected with the batteries on land, placed on the island of
Amak. Thus the line of defence of the Danes was supported on
the left, by the Three Crowns battery, and on the right, by the
island of Amak; its length occupying, and completely blocking
up, the middle of the passage of the King's Channel. The works
of the Three Crowns could not be forced, defended as they were
by seventy yawning cannon mouths; and also by five vessels, three
of which were under sail. The line of defence, consisting of the
rafts and stationary hulks, on the contrary, was of too great
length, not sufficiently close, and incapable of manoeuvring; and,
owing to the object they had in view, of obstructing the middle of
the passage, was placed too much in advance of the point of sup
port on the right, that is to say, the fixed batteries on the island of
Amak. This island is but a continuation of the coast on which
Copenhagen is seated. The line of floating batteries could, there
fore, be attacked on the right. If it had been formed of a division
of vessels, under sail, capable of shifting their position, or even if
it had been more concentrated, more strongly supported on the
bank, the English would not have come out of this attack
altogether safe and sound. But the Danes set great value upon
their naval squadron, which they had not the means of re
placing, if it was destroyed ; and not having, besides, received
all the seamen from Norway, to man it completely, they kept/
it protected in the inner basin of the harbour, thinking that old

April 1801.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 231
unserviceable vessels were sufficient to answer the purpose of
floating batteries against the English fleet.
Their bravest seamen, commanded by intrepid officers, worked
the guns, mounted on these old hulks which were strongly moored
and chained together.
The English having arrived off Copenhagen, long before the
junction of all the neutral maritime powers at this point, might
have passed to the eastward of the Middle Ground, disregarding
the Danes stationed in the King's Channel, and have proceeded by
the before-mentioned Dutch Channel into the Baltic. They might;
have accomplished this beyond the reach of the guns of Copen
hagen ; but they would have left in their rear an imposing force,
capable of cutting off their retreat, in case any untoward event
should force them back weakened, and in want of shelter,
through the passage of the Sound. It was better to take ad
vantage of the isolated position of the Danes, and, by striking a
decisive blow, detach them from the confederacy, and, after
having, by this means, seized the keys of the Baltic, proceed, with
all expedition, against the Swedes and the Russians. This plan
was, at the same time, bold and prudent ; and it received that
which rarely occurred — the concurrent approbation of both
Parker and Nelson.
The entire days of the 31st of March, and 1st of April were
occupied, in examining the Danish line, in sounding the channel,
and in concerting the plan of attack. Nelson and Parker, ac
companied by the oldest officers of the fleet, with the chief
officer of engineers, reconnoitred, in person, in the midst of the
ice, the position of the enemy, being sometimes within reach of
the enemy's shot. Nelson maintained that, with ten ships, he
would undertake to attack, and break the right line of the Danes.
His plan was to proceed down the whole length of the Middle
Ground, by passing through the Dutch Channel, doubling round
the farther extremity, and reascending by way of the King's
Channel, and then take his station, ship against ship, about a
cable's length from the enemy. He arranged, moreover, that a
division of the fleet, under a brave officer, Captain Riou, should
attack the land battery of the Three Crowns, and, after having
silenced their guns, disembark 1000 men, and take it by storm.
The commander-in-chief, admiral Parker, with the remainder
of the fleet under him, was not to engage in this bold ma
noeuvre ; it was agreed that he should remain in the rear, to can
nonade the citadel, and cover the disabled vessels as they retired
from the action.
This manoeuvre, as daring as that of Aboukir, could only suc
ceed through great ability and good fortune. Admiral Parker
gave his assent to it, on condition that it should not be carried
too far, if the difficulties should be found insurmountable ; and
placed at Nelson's disposal twelve ships, instead of ten, for which
he had applied. On the evening of the 1st of April, Nelson

232 HISTORY OF THE [April 1801.
dropped through the Dutch Channel, and came to an anchor,
considerably below Copenhagen, at a place on the island of
Amak, called Draco. In order to get into the King's Channel,
and traverse its entire length, a totally different wind was-
wanting to that which had brought him down the Dutch
Channel. The next morning, the wind having opportunely
shifted from its direction on the night before, he ascended the
King's Channel, steering his fleet between the Danish line and
the shoals of the Middle Ground. The whole channel had been
sounded, but, notwithstanding this precaution, three ships struck
on the Middle Ground, and Nelson took up his position with
the remaining nine only. He was not disheartened, but anchored
broadside on, within half a cable's length of the Danish line, a
distance which must render the effect of the cannonading most
terrific. The want of the three vessels aground was greatly felt,
more particularly for the attack of the Three Crowns battery,
which thus was obliged to be attempted by frigates.
At ten o'clock in the morning, the whole English squadron-
had taken up its position, and received and poured forth a fright
ful volley of artillery. A division of bomb and gun-ships,
drawing but little water, was placed upon the shoal of the
Middle Ground, and discharged their shells upon Copenhagen,
over the masts of the two squadrons. The fire from the
Danish batteries, consisting of 800 guns, inflicted considerable.
damage on the English. The officers in command of the rafts
displayed great intrepidity, and their gunners exhibited the most
heroic courage. The commander of the Provesten, in particular,.
vvho occupied the extremity of the line towards the south, con
ducted himself with the most distinguished gallantry. Nelson,.
perceiving the importance of at once depriving the Danish line
of the support which it received from the batteries of the island
of Amak, directed four vessels against the Provesten alone. M.
de Lassen, captain of the Provesten, defended himself until he
had lost 500 out of his 600 gunners; he then threw himself
into the sea, with the 100 remaining, and swam on shore from
his vessel, which he left in flames. He thus had the glory of.
not striking his flag. Nelson then directed all his efforts
against the other rafts and floating batteries, and succeeded in
silencing several. In the mean time, at the other end of the
line, Captain Riou suffered severely, Three English vessels-
being fast on the Middle Ground, he had only frigates to oppose
to the Three Crown batteries, and he was exposed to a frightful,
and destructive fire from their guns, without any hope of
silencing them, or of being able to take them by storm. Parker,
perceiving the resistance of the Danes, and fearing that the
English ships, too much injured in their rigging, would be ex
posed to be run aground, gave orders to discontinue action. Nelsort
perceiving this signal thrown out at admiral Parker's mast-head,
gave way to a noble expression of indignation. He had lost th&

April 1801.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 233
use of one eye, and, taking up the glass, and placing it to his
blind eye, he said, sarcastically, " I really don't see Parker's
signal for leaving off action," and he kept his signal for closer
battle still flying. This was a noble act of imprudence, and
was followed, as it often happens to audacious boldness, by a
successful result.
The floating batteries of the Danes, not being able to move,
or seek shelter under the land batteries, were exposed to a
most destructive fire. The Danebrog blew up with a terrific
explosion ; several others were disabled, and drifted from their
moorings, after having suffered an enormous loss of men. But
the English, on the other side, did not suffer less severely, and
were placed in the greatest peril. Nelson, in endeavouring to
take possession of the Danish vessels which had struck, received,
as he neared the batteries on the island of Amak, a deadly dis
charge from their guns. At this moment, three or four of his
vessels were so completely shattered, as to be almost unma
nageable; and, on the side of the Three Crown batteries, Captain
Riou, compelled to draw off his vessels to a distance, was cut
in two by a chain-shot. Nelson, almost beaten, was not discon
certed, and conceived the idea of sending a flag of truce to the
prince of Denmark, who was present, on one of the batteries, at
this horrible scene. He told him that, if he did not stop the
firing, which prevented him taking possession of his prizes,
which, by right, belonged to him, since they had struck their
flags, he should be obliged to blow them up, with all their
crews ; that the English were the brothers of the Danes, that
both had fought sufficiently to attest their valour, and ought to
avoid the further effusion of blood.
The prince, moved by this appalling spectacle, fearing also for
the city of Copenhagen, now deprived of the protection of the
floating batteries, gave orders for the firing to cease. This was-
a mistake, for a few moments longer.-'and Nelson's fleet, almost
disabled, would have been obliged to retire half destroyed. A
sort of negotiation ensued, and Nelson took advantage of it to
quit his place of anchorage. Whilst he was in the act of retiring,
three of his vessels, considerably damaged, being no longer
manageable, struck on the Middle Ground. If, at this moment,
the fire had still continued, these three vessels must have been lost.
The next day, Nelson and Parker, after great efforts, got afloat
the three vessels which bad grounded, and opened a negotiation
with the Danes for the purpose of obtaining a suspension of hos
tilities They stood as much in need of this as the Danes, as-
thev had 1200 men killed and wounded, and the havoc in six of
their vessels was horrible. The loss of the Danes was not much
greater, but they had relied too much upon the line of their float-
fne batteries, and now that these batteries were destroyed, the
lower part of the city, which is open to the sea, was exposed to a
bombardment. They were also apprehensive for their vessels of

234 HISTORY OF THE [April 1801.
war, which, half equipped, immovable, and locked in the basin,
might have been set fire to, and totally consumed. This appre
hension was to them most alarming. They, in fact, clung to their
squadron, as to their very maritime existence: and this squadron,
once destroyed, they were not in a position to replace it. At this
instant, under the momentary irritation of suffering and danger,
they complained of their allies, without reflecting upon the diffi
culties which had prevented them from repairing to the walls of
Copenhagen. The contrary winds, the ice; and the shortness of
time, had detained the Swedes and the Russians, without any
blame being fairly attributable to them. It is true, that had they
arrived with their twenty ships and joined the Danish fleet in the
straits, where the engagement took place, Nelson would have
failed in his daring enterprise, and the cause of the maritime
neutral confederacy would have triumphed on that day. But
there had not been time for any of them to get ready, and the
promptitude of the English changed the fortune of the war.
Admiral Parker, who was greatly alarmed at the temerity of Nel
son, during the battle of the second, formed now a correct opinion
of the position of the Danes, and knew how to derive every ad
vantage from the battle which had been fought. He required the
Danes to withdraw from the confederacy of the neutral powers,
to open their ports to the English, and to receive, moreover, an
English force, under the pretence of protecting them against the
resentment of their allies. Nelson had the courage to land on
the third of April to carry these proposals to the Crown Prince.
He went in a boat to Copenhagen, heard the murmurs of this
brave people, who were filled with indignation at seeing him, but
found the Crown Prince inflexible. This Prince, more alarmed,
the evening before, than the actual danger of Copenhagen justi
fied, would not, nevertheless, consent to the ignominious defec
tion proposed to him. He replied, that he would sooner be buried
in the ashes of his city than betray the common cause. Nelson
returned on board the flag-ship without having obtained any con
cession. During this interval, the Danes, seeing themselves exposed to
the dangers of a second conflict, set to work, and added new de
fences to those which before existed. They rendered the battery
of the Three Crowns more formidable, covered the island of Amak
with guns, as well as the lower part of the city. They transported
their vessels of war, the paramount objects of their solicitude,
into the innermost basins of the harbour, the farthest from the
sea, carefully covering them with dung and blindage, so as to
protect them against fire ; and were at length reassured, when
they perceived the hesitation of the English, who did not evince
much eagerness to renew this terrific struggle. The whole of
the available population lent their aid ; one part was placed
under arms, and the other part employed in preparing the means
for extinguishing the conflagration. At length, after waiting five

April 1801.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 235
days, Nelson returned to Copenhagen, notwithstanding the
threatening aspect of the preparations of the Danes. The discus
sion was animated, and he took upon himself to make concessions,
which Admiral Parker had not authorised. He agreed upon an
armistice which amounted virtually to a statu quo. The Danes
did not withdraw from the confederacy, but all hostilities were
suspended between them and the English for fourteen weeks ; at
the expiration of which period, they were to return to the same
position as on the day on which this suspension of hostilities was
signed. The terms of the armistice embraced only the Danish
islands and Jutland, but not Holstein, so that hostilities might be
continued in the Elbe, and that from that time the English were
prohibited the navigation of that river. The English were to
keep at a cannon-shot distance from all the Danish ports and
vessels, with the exception of the King's Channel, which they
were free to navigate, in order to reach the Baltic. They were
forbidden, consequently, to establish themselves upon any
points of the Danish territory, and they were only allowed to put
into any port for the purpose of refreshment, or to take in a
supply of provisions.
These terms were all Nelson could obtain, and they were, we
must confess, all that his victory entitled him to demand. But,
as he was on the point of leaving Copenhagen, a very untoward
report obtained currency, and the Crown Prince, who had been
influenced thereby to enter into negotiations, succeeded in keep
ing the knowledge of it from him. The report was in truth, at
the moment, that Paul I. had just died suddenly. Nelson left
the place, without being aware of this intelligence, which would
doubtless have greatly increased his pretensions. The armistice
was immediately ratified by Admiral Parker. The Crown Prince
also intimated to the Swedes, that it was useless to expose
themselves unavailingly to the attacks of the English, which they
would be unequal to resist. This advice was not uncalled for, in
asmuch as, after great efforts, Gustavus Adolphus had succeeded
in getting his fleet ready to sail. He had in the earnestness of
his zeal, dismissed one rear-admiral the service, and sent another
admiral before a court-martial, in order to punish them for an
alleged dilatoriness, which could not justly belaid to their charge.
All these efforts were however superfluous. Paul I., in fact,
had breathed his last, at St. Petersburg, on the night between the
23rd and 24th of March. This event put an end much more
effectually, than the incomplete victory of Nelson, to the mari
time confederacy of the northern powers. Paul I. had been the
chief promoter of that confederacy; he had applied all the impetu
ous energy of his character to secure its success, and assuredly
he would have exerted himself to the utmost to repair the disaster,
in other respects pretty equally shared, of the battle of Copen
hagen. He would have sent his land forces to Denmark, de
spatched the whole of the neutral fleet to the Sound, and probably

236 HISTORY OF THE [April 1801.
have made the English rue their barbarous enterprise against the
capital of the Danes. But this prince had driven the patience of
his subjects to the last extremity, and he had just been put to
death, a wretched victim of a tragical revolution at the palace.
Paul I. was of a lively disposition, but all his opinions were
carried to the extreme, and as usual, with persons of his tempe
rament, capable of good or evil actions, according to the tem
porary impulse of his weak, excitable, ill-regulated mind. If
the temper of private individuals so constituted is fatal, it be
comes still more so in the case of princes, especially when they
are invested with absolute power. With them it often borders
on madness, assuming sometimes even symptoms of a sanguinary
character. Thus, at St. Petersburg, every man trembled for his
own fate; even the favourites of Paul, who were treated with
the greatest kindness, were not certain but that the favour they
at present enjoyed might terminate in an exile to Siberia.
This prince, both sensitive and chivalrous, felt a lively sympathy
for the victims of the French Revolution, and a vehement hatred
against the Revolution itself. Thus, whereas the able Cathe
rine had wisely, during her reign, confined herself to exciting all
Europe against France, without setting a single soldier in motion,
Paul, on his accession to the throne, had sent Suwarrow with
100,000 Russians into Italy. In the warmth of his zeal, he had
interdicted, from his dominions every article which came from
France, books, fashions, and dress. This more than sufficed to
give umbrage to the Russian nobility, who, like the whole of the
aristocracy of Europe, delighted in reviling France, but never
theless with the reservation, of enjoying her wit, her manners,
and her highly advanced civilisation. They found this anti-
revolutionary zeal intolerable, when carried to such an excess.
In a short time, however, Paul was seen to change these
opinions and go to the very opposite extreme, conceiving a
great hatred for his allies, and receiving his enemies into favour,
crowding his apartments with the portrait of general Bona
parte, drinking publicly to his health, and carrying the contrast
so far as actually to declare war against Great Britain. This
step rendered him not only irksome, but actually odious to the
Russian nobility, for he not only interfered with their tastes, but
injuriously affected their material interests.
The vast extent of his dominions, occupying almost the whole
of the northern part of Europe, abounding in grain, timber,
hemp, and ores, requires the aid of foreign merchants, who seek
these indigenous commodities, and give in exchange, either
money, or manufactured goods. The English in their trade with
Russia, supply her, in return for the raw produce of her soil,
with the articles manufactured by their own labour, and thus-
the Russian farmers are enabled to pay to their landlords the
rents of their land. The English then engross the most important
branches of trade with St. Petersburg, and this is the tie by

April 1801.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 237
which, in some measure, the policy of Russia is fettered to
English interests, and that rivalry, which sooner or later must
inevitably break out between these two great co-partners in the
possession of Asia, is modified.
The Russian aristocracy was accordingly highly exasperated
with the newly adopted policy of Paul. If they had blamed, in
this prince, an excess of hatred against France, they found still
greater fault with an excess of affection towards her, especially
when this surprising attachment was carried to such an extent, as
to adopt steps ruinous to the interests of the landed proprietors.
Besides this obnoxious interference with their tastes and their
interests, Paul was still further guilty of cruelties, to which,
however, he was not naturally addicted, being rather of a good,
than of a mischievous disposition. He had sent a multitude of
unhappy wretches to Siberia ; afterwards, affected by their
sufferings, he recalled them, but without re-instating them in
their property. These unfortunate creatures filled all St. Peters^
burg with their complaints, and with their lamentable misery.
Annoyed by these spectacles, he exiled them a second time.
Becoming every day more and more distrustful, in proportion as
the hatred of his subjects became more apparent to him, he
threatened the lives of every one around him. He conceived
sinister designs against his ministers, sometimes against his wife
and children, and this prince, who was all but mad, assumed
habitually the behaviour of a tyrant. He surrounded the palace
Michael, which was his usual residence, like a fortress, with
bastions and ditches. One would have said, that he seemed to
anticipate a sudden attack. At night, he even barricadoed the
door which separated his apartments from those of the empress,
and thus unwittingly predisposed every thing for his tragical end.
Such a state of things could not long continue, and must in
evitably terminate in some deed of violence, similar to that which,
more than once, had been witnessed in this empire, where, it is
true, rapid advances have been made towards civilisation, but
where actual barbarism was the point of starting. The idea of
getting rid of the unhappy Paul, by the accustomed means, that
is to say, by a revolution at the palace, there where the palace
is the nation, suggested itself to every mind. Let us set a proper
value upon the advantages of institutions. At another extre
mity of Europe, upon one of the greatest thrones of the universe,
sat a prince afflicted also with insanity, a headstrong, but pious
and good prince, George III. This king, occasionally deprived
of his reason, during whole months, had just experienced a
relapse of his malady, at one of the most critical moments for
England. Nevertheless, the business of the nation proceeded in
the most regular and ordinary course. The constitution provid
ing the king with ministers, who conduct the government on his
behalf, this aberration of the royal mind did not, in any way, pre
judice the affairs of the nation. Mr. Pitt held the government
for George III., precisely as he had held it during seventeen.

238 HISTORY OF THE [April 1801.
years ; the thought of an atrocious crime never entered into the
imagination of any one ! At St. Petersburg, on the contrary, the
spectacle of an insane prince on the throne, gave rise to the most
sinister projects.
There was at that time, at the court of Russia, one of those
men, dreaded by all, who never shrink from the perpetration of
any audacious deed. In a regular government, such men may
rise, perhaps, to the station of eminently good citizens, but in a
despotic government, they become criminals, if crime is, in certain
cases, one of the expedients not actually sanctioned by the go
vernment, but incidental to its administration. Crime must be
condemned in every country where it prevails, but we must con
demn still more the institutions by which it is engendered.
Count Pahlen had served in the Russian army with distinc
tion. He possessed a commanding person, and concealed be
neath the rough, and sometimes familiar manner of a soldier, a
deep and acute mind. He was endowed, moreover, with sin
gular audacity, and an imperturbable presence of mind. As go
vernor of St. Petersburg, intrusted with the police of the empire,
and initiated, thanks to the confidence of his master, into all
the great affairs of State, he was, in point of fact, though not
by office, the principal personage in the Russian government.
His political opinions respecting the public policy of the country,
were very decided. The crusade against the French revolution,
seemed to him as unreasonable, as the new-born zeal against
England was intemperate. A prudent reserve, a neutrality
skilfully maintained, in the midst of the formidable contest be
tween France and England, appeared to him the only advan
tageous policy which Russia could pursue. Entertaining neither
English nor French views, but being wholly Russian in his
opinions, he was also a Russian in his manners, and a Russian
such as existed in the days of Peter the Great. Being persuaded
that every thing was hastening towards ruin, unless the reign of
Paul were curtailed, having even conceived some alarm for him
self personally, from certain indications of dissatisfaction which
had escaped the emperor, he boldly formed his resolution, and
communicated it confidentially to count Panim, vice-chancellor,
who was at the head of foreign affairs. They both were of opinion,
that it was necessary to terminate this state of things, which had
become as alarming for the empire, as for individual safety.
Count Pahlen took upon himself the execution of the terrible
project upon which they had resolved. * The heir to the throne
* The following details are the most authentic that can be procured con
cerning the death of Paul I. This is the source from which they are derived.
The court of Prussia, greatly shocked at the news of the death of Paul I.,
was still more highly indignant at the unparalleled effrontery with which
some of the accomplices in the crime dared to boast of it at Berlin. The
court obtained, through various channels, and principally from a well-informed
person, some curious details, which were collected in a minute, and trans
mitted to the First Consul. These are the particulars which M. Bignon, at
that time secretary of our embassy to the court of Prussia, was enabled to

April 1801.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 239
was the grand duke Alexander, of whose reign we have been
contemporaries — a young prince, who gave every promise of
superior qualities, and who appeared at that time, what he did
not prove subsequently, easy to be led. He it was whom count
Pahlen desired to raise to the throne, by some catastrophe
brought about suddenly, without disturbance or confusion. It
was indispensably necessary to come to some understanding with
the heir, the grand duke, to have his concurrence, in order to
avoid, after the deed was perpetrated, being treated like a vulgar
assassin, who is sacrificed, whilst, at the same time, advantage
is taken of his crime. It was embarrassing to him, to break
the matter to this prince, who, governed by amiable feelings,
was incapable of lending his countenance to an attempt against
the life of his father. Count Pahlen, without disclosing his
whole mind, without revealing any distinct project, discussed with
the grand duke the affairs of state, and, at each successive extra
vagance of Paul, endangering the empire, communicated the
fact to him, then remained silent, without deducing any conse
quences therefrom. Alexander, in receiving these communica
tions, cast down his eyes, and also remained silent. These mute
but expressive, scenes were of frequent occurrence. At length,
it was requisite to come to some clearer explanation. Count
Pahlen, at last, gave this young prince to understand that such
a state of things could not be prolonged, without bringing ruin
to the empire ; and, taking care to avoid the mention of a crime,
to which Alexander would not have listened, he insinuated to him
that it was necessary to depose Paul, to provide for him a quiet
retreat, but, at all hazards, to wrest from his hands the helm of
power, and prevent him from driving the vessel of state to utter
destruction. Alexander shed a flood of tears, disclaimed any wish to dis
pute the throne with his father, but yielded, by degrees, before
procure, and which he has introduced into his work. But the most private
circumstances still remained unknown, when a singular accident placed France
in possession of the only account, worthy of credit, concerning the death of
Paul I., which perhaps is in existence. A French emigrant, who had passed
his life in the service of Russia, and who had acquired some military renown,
became the friend of count Pahlen and general Benningsen. Being at the
country-seat of count Pahlen, he obtained, from their own lips, a circum
stantial detail of every thing which took place in St. Petersburg, on the tragical
night between the 23rd and 24th of March. As the emigrant was very
careful in taking notes of every thing he saw and heard, he immediately com
mitted to paper an account of the particulars given by these principal actors,
and inserted it in the valuable memoirs he has left behind him. These
manuscript memoirs are now the property of France. They correct numerous
inaccurate or vamie statements, and, moreover, do not compromise more than
they were previously, the names already involved in this dark event. They
furnish, however, more precise and probable details, instead of the false and
exaggerated accounts already known. After comparing this report, emanating
from a quarter perfectly well-informed, with the details furnished by the
court of Prussia, we have drawn up the historical recital which follows, and
which seems to us the only one truly worthy of credit, perhaps the only
complete one which posterity will ever obtain of this tragical catastrophe.

240 HISTORY OF THE [April 1801.
fresh proofs of the danger to which Paul exposed the affairs
of the country, and even the imperial family itself. Paul, in
fact, dissatisfied with the supineness of Prussia, in the affairs of
the neutral league, even talked of marching 80,000 men upon
Berlin. Besides this, in the delirium of his arrogant pride, he
wished the First Consul to take him as his adviser in all things,
and that this powerful personage should not make peace with
Germany, nor with the cabinets of Piedmont, Rome, Naples, or
the Porte, excepting upon terms laid down by Russia ; so that
it was soon greatly to be feared that he would not remain long
on amicable terms with France, whose policy he had so warmly
espoused. To these suggestions count Pahlen added the ex
pression of his uneasiness concerning the safety of the royal
family, of whom Paul, it was said, began to harbour suspicions.
Alexander acquiesced at length; but, at the same time, ex
acted from count Pahlen the most solemn oath, that no attempt
should be made against the life of his father; count Pahlen
swore to every thing desired by this inexperienced youth, who
imagined that a sceptre could be wrested from the grasp of an
emperor, without depriving him of life.
The requisite actors in the scene yet remained to be provided,
as count Pahlen, in conceiving this scheme, deemed it beneath
him, to take any personal share in its execution. He fixed upon
them accordingly, but decided upon only intrusting them, sooner
or later, with the part they were destined to perform, according
as they, by degrees, acquired his confidence. The brothers
Soubow, upstarts raised by the favour of Catherine, were chosen
as the chief instruments of the plot. Count Pahlen only re
vealed it to them at a late period. Plato Soubow, the favourite
of Catherine, supple, restless, was worthy of figuring conspicu
ously in the revolution of a palace. His brother Nicholas, re
markable only for great personal strength, was well qualified to
play a subordinate part; Valerien Soubow, a brave and honour
able soldier, a friend of the grand duke Alexander, deserved,
from his merit, to have been excluded from the plot. They
had a sister, intimately connected with all the English faction
— a friend of lord Whitworth, the English ambassador —
who inflamed them with zeal for the British policy. Count
Pahlen engaged many other accomplices, and brought them
to St. Petersburg, under various pretences, but still without
disclosing any thing to them. There was one other indi
vidual whom he had summoned to St. Petersburg, upon whose
co-operation he knew he could rely, as well as upon his for
midable courage; this was the famous general Benningsen, a
Hanoverian, in the service of Russia, the first officer in the
Russian service at that time, and who, at a later period, in 1807,
had [the honour to check, in Poland, the victorious march of
Napoleon, and whose hands, worthy, indeed, of wielding a
sword, should never have been sullied by a poniard.
Benningsen had retired into the country, dreading the effects

April 1801.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 241
of Paul's anger, which he had incurred ; count Pahlen withdrew
him from his retreat, initiated him into the plot, but proposed
nothing further to him, if general Benningsen can be credited
than the project of deposing the emperor. Benningsen pledged
his word, and kept it with an appalling courage.
They resolved to fix upon some day for the execution of their
project, when the regiment of Semenouiki, wholly devoted to
the grand duke Alexander, should be on duty at the palace
Michael. They were obliged to wait. But time pressed, for
Paul's malady made rapid progress, became every day more
alarming, and placed the interests of the empire, as well as the
safety of his attendants, in greater jeopardy. One day Paul laid
hold of the imperturbable Pahlen, by the arm, and addressed him
in these singular terms: — "Were you at St.Petersburg in 1762?"
(It was in that year that the emperor, the father of Paul, was
assassinated, to transfer the throne to the Great Catherine.)
" Yes," answered count Pahlen, quite coolly, " I was." " What
part did you take in the event of that time 1" " That of a
subaltern cavalry officer in the ranks of his regiment. I was a
witness of, but not an actor in, that catastrophe." " Well,"
continued Paul casting a look of distrust, and of accusation at
his minister, " They want to re-enact to-day the revolution of
1762." " I am aware of it," replied count Pahlen, without
betraying the least emotion. " I know all the plot ; I am a
party to it." "What !" exclaimed Paul, "are you one of the
conspirators 1" " Yes ! but to be better apprised of it, and that
I may be in a position, more effectually to watch over your
safety." The calmness of this formidable conspirator quite set
all Paul's conjectures at defiance, and disarmed his suspicions
respecting him; but he still continued discomposed and excited.
An event of almost public interest, if such a term may be
employed with reference to such a crime, concurred to hasten
their proceeding. Paul ordered a despatch to be written, on the
23rd of March, to M. de Krudener, his minister at Berlin, enjoin
ing him to declare to the court of Prussia, that if she did
not promptly act against England, he wduld order an army
of 80,000 men, to march upon the Prussian frontiers. Count
Pahlen desirous, without saying too much, to induce M. de
Krudener to attach no importance to this declaration, added, in
his own handwriting, the following postscript : — " His Imperial
Majesty is labouring under indisposition to-day ; tlie consequences
may prove serious." *
The 23rd of March was fixed upon for the execution of the
plot; count Pahlen, under colour of giving a dinner party,
assembled at his house the Soubows, Benningsen, and several
general officers, upon whom he thought he could rely. Wines
of all kinds were served with profusion. Pahlen and Benningsen
* This despatch was shown to the French Ambassador, General Beurnon
ville, who instantly forwarded these particulars to his government.
VOL. II. R

242 HISTORY OF THE [April 1801.
did not drink any. When dinner was over, they unfolded to the
conspirators, the project for which they were assembled. The
most part were now, for the first time, made acquainted with this
terrible plot. They were not told that they would be required
to assassinate Paul, as almost every one would have shrunk
with dismay, from the perpetration of such a crime. They were
told, that they must proceed to the palace, and compel him to
abdicate, that thus they would deliver the empire from an
imminent danger, and that they would save a multitude of inno
cent lives, at present threatened by the sanguinary madness of
Paul. At last, in order to succeed in persuading them, it was
affirmed that the grand duke Alexander himself, convinced of
the necessity of saving the empire, was acquainted with the
project, and approved it. Then these men, already excited with
wine, no longer demurred, and, for the most part, with only
three or four exceptions, set out under the impression, that they
were going to depose a mad emperor, and not to shed the blood
of an unfortunate master.
The night appearing sufficiently advanced, the conspirators,
to the number of about sixty, sallied forth, divided into two
bands. Count Pahlen took one under his direction, general
Benningsen, the command of the other; both officers, dressed in
their full uniform, and wearing their sashes and orders, marched
forward, sword in hand. The palace Michael was constructed
and guarded like a fortress ; but the bridges were lowered, and
the gates thrown open to the chiefs of the conspirators. Ben-
ningsen's party marched first, and proceeded direct towards the
emperor's apartments. Count Pahlen remained behind, with his
reserved body of conspirators. This man, who had organised
the conspiracy, disdained to assist personally in its execution.
He was only there to provide for any unexpected emergencies.
Benningsen penetrated into the apartment of the sleeping mo
narch. Two heyduks were on duty as his body-guard. These
brave and faithful attendants attempted to defend their sovereign.
One was struck down by a blow from a sabre, the other took
flight, crying out for help — cries utterly unavailing in a palace,
the guards of which are almost all accomplices in the plot ! A
valet, who slept in a room adjoining that of the emperor, ran to
the scene; they compelled him, by force, to open the door of his
master's chamber. The unhappy Paul might have found a
refuge in the apartments of the empress ; but, in his distrustful
suspicions, he had taken the precaution, every night, to barricade
the door which led to them. All escape being cut off, he flung
himself to the bottom of the bed, and concealed himself behind
the folds of a screen. Plato Soubow ran to the imperial bed,
and, finding it empty, cried out, in alarm, " The emperor has
escaped ; we are lost !" But, at the same instant, Benningsen
caught sight of the prince, rushed towards him, sword in hand,
and presented to him the act of abdication. " You have ceased
to reign !" he exclaimed to him ; " the grand duke Alexander

April 1801.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 243
is now emperor. I summon you, in his name, to resign the
empire, and to sign this act of abdication. On this condition
alone I answer for your life." Plato Soubow repeated the same
summons. The emperor, confused and lost in dismay, demanded
of therrywhat he had done to deserve such treatment. " For
years past you have never ceased to persecute us," retorted the
half-intoxicated assassins. They then pressed upon the unhappy
Paul, who struggled hard, expostulated, and implored them in
vain. At this moment a noise was heard ; it was the footsteps
of some of the conspirators who had remained behind ; but the
assassins, believing that some one was coming to the assistance
of the emperor, fled in disorder. Benningsen alone, inflexibly
resolute, remained in the presence of the monarch, and, advancing
towards him, with his sword pointed at his breast, prevented
him stirring from the spot. The conspirators having recognised
each other, re-entered the chamber, the theatre of their crime.
They again hemmed in the unfortunate monarch, in order to force
him to subscribe his abdication. The emperor for an instant
tried to defend himself. In the scuffle, the lamp which gave
light to the frightful scene, was overturned and extinguished ;
Benningsen ran to procure another, and, on his return, disco
vered Paul expiring under the blows of two assassins ; one had
broken in his skull with the pummel of his sword, whilst the
other was strangling him with his sash.
Whilst this scene was enacting, count Pahlen bad remained
outside, with the second band of conspirators. When he was
told that all was over, he ordered the body of the emperor to be
laid out on the bed, and placed a guard of thirty men at the door
of the apartment, with orders not to admit any one, even the
members of the imperial family. He then repaired to the grand
duke, to announce to him the terrible occurrence of the night.
The grand duke, in a state of violent agitation, demanded of
him when he approached, what had become of his father? The
silence of count Pahlen, soon dissipated the fatal illusions he had
cherished, in imagining that an act of abdication was only con
templated. The grief of the young prince was profound; it
continued to be, we are told, the secret remorse of his life, as he
was naturally of a good and generous nature. He threw himself
upon a chair, and burst into tears ; would listen no longer to any
thing, but loaded Pahlen with bitter reproaches, which the latter
received with an imperturbable composure.
Plato Soubow went in quest of the grand duke Constantine,
who was wholly ignorant of what was going on, but who has
been unjustly accused of having been implicated in this bloody
catastrophe. He came to the spot trembling, believing that all
his family were to be sacrificed, found his brother overwhelmed
with despair, and then learnt every thing which had taken place.
Count Pahlen had desired a lady of the palace, who was very
intimate with the empress, to acquaint her with the fact of her

244 HISTORY OF THE [April 1801.
tragical widowhood. This princess rushed in haste towards her
husband's apartments, and attempted to reach his death-bed ; but
the guards kept her back. Having for an instant recovered
from her first paroxysm of grief, she felt, together with the
emotions of sorrow, the rising impulses of ambition awaken in
her breast. She thought of the Great Catherine, and wished
to reign. She despatched several persons to Alexander, who
was about to be proclaimed, telling him that the throne be
longed of right to her, and that it was she, and not he, who
ought to be proclaimed as successor. This was a new embar
rassment ; this was increased anguish for the already lacerated
heart of the son, who, about to ascend the steps of the throne,
had to pass between the corpse of a murdered father, and an
agonised mother, in tears, franticly demanding, by turns, her
husband, or the sceptre. The night was consumed while these
appalling and tragical events were passing; the day approached;
it was necessary to leave no time for reflection ; it was of im
portance that the death of Paul and the accession of his suc
cessor should be proclaimed at the same time. Count Pahlen
approached the young prince ; " You have wept sufficiently as a
child," said he ; "come now and reign." He tore him from this
house of mourning, and, followed by Benningsen, hastened to
present him to the troops.
The first regiment they met was that of Preobrajesnky. As
it was entirely devoted to Paul I., their reception was very
cold. But the others, who were attached to the grand duke,
and who, besides, were under the influence of count Pahlen, who
possessed considerable ascendancy over the army, did not hesitate
to cry " Long live Alexander." The example was followed, and
soon the young emperor was proclaimed, and placed in possession
of the throne. He returned, and took up his residence with his
wife, the empress Elizabeth, at the Winter palace.
St. Petersburg was filled with consternation at the news of this
bloody catastrophe. The impression it created, proved that the
manners of the empire had undergone a change, and that since
1762, Russian manners had become modified by the influence of
European civilisation. It may be said to the honour of Russia,
that if she had already progressed since 1762, she has equally
advanced since 1800. The Russians exhibited on that occasion,
feelings which did them honour. They feared Paul I. and his
insanity, more than they hated him, as he was not of a san
guinary character. The horrible circumstances of his death were
immediately known, and inspired the deepest commiseration.
His body lay in state according to usage, but infinite precautions
were used to disguise his wounds. Military gloves concealed the
mutilation of his hands. A large hat completely covered his
head. His face was disfigured~by contusions, but it was given
out, that he had died of apoplexy.
This barbarous event produced an extraordinary effect through-

April 1801.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 245
out Europe. The news spread like lightning to Vienna, Berlin,
London, and Paris. It caused the deepest horror and consterna
tion. Some years previously, Paris had terrified all Europe by
shedding royal blood ; but at present, Paris exhibited a spectacle
of order, humanity, and tranquillity; it was now the ancient
monarchies, which in their turn scandalised the whole civilised
world. A year before, the Neapolitan sovereign had imbrued his
hands in the blood of his subjects; now a revolution in the palace,
bathed the imperial throne of Russia in blood.
Thus, in this agitated age, every country in succession furnished
melancholy examples, and supplied deplorable subjects of animad
version to its enemies ! Truly, if nations wish to revile each
other, their several histories furnish ample materials for mutual
recrimination ; but let us avoid recurring to these sad remi
niscences for such a purpose. If we relate these horrible de
tails,' it is because truth is the first duty of the historian ; it is
because truth is the most useful, the most powerful of lessons, the
most effectual in averting the recurrence of similar scenes ; and
thus, without offending any nation, let us say again, that the
institutions are more to be blamed than the people ; and that if,
at St. Petersburg, an emperor was murdered in order to bring
about a change of policy ; at London, on the contrary, without
any sanguinary crisis, a peace policy followed a war policy, by
the mere substitution of Mr. Addington in the place of Mr. Pitt.
The particulars of this catastrophe soon became public, through
the indiscretion of the assassins themselves. At Berlin especially,
where the court was closely connected with that of St. Petersburg,
the details of the crime spread with singular rapidity. The sister
of the Soubows had taken refuge in that city, and had manifested,
it was said, certain symptoms of uneasiness and anxiety, like one
who awaits some great event. It so happened that her son was
the very officer appointed to announce to Prussia the accession
of Alexander. This young man, with all the indiscretion of his
age, partially divulged the particulars of the assassination, and
thus occasioned at Potsdam a scandal which gave great offence
to the young and virtuous king of Prussia. The court made this
young manTeel the impropriety of his conduct; but hence arose
a foul calumny. This sister of the Soubows was on terms of in
timate friendship with the English ambassador, Lord Whitworth,
who figured afterwards at Paris, and played there a very conspi
cuous part. The death of the emperor Paul was so highly advan
tageous to the English, it occurred so opportunely to complete
the doubtful victory of Copenhagen, that the vulgar throughout
Europe, readily ascribed the perpetration of this crime to British
policy. The intimacy of the English ambassador, with a family
so deeply implicated in the assassination of Paul, furnished strong
plausible surmises, confirmatory of the calumny, together with
fresh arguments for those who can never perceive that events
may originate in general and natural causes.

246 HISTORY OF the [April 1801.
Nevertheless, none of these conjectures were founded in truth.
Lord Whitworth was an honourable man, incapable of partici
pating in such a plot. The cabinet by which he was accredited,
had committed numerous unpardonable acts during many pre
vious years, and, soon after, was guilty of others still more difficult
to justify, but it was as much taken by surprise as the rest of
Europe by the death of the Czar. And yet, the First Consul
himself, notwithstanding the unquestionable impartiality of his
judgment, could not help entertaining some suspicions, and he
gave rise to still more, by the terms in which the death of the
emperor Paul was announced in the Moniteur. " It is for history,"
says this official journal, " to develop the mystery which surrounds
this tragical death, and to declare which cabinet in the world was
the most deeply interested in bringing about such a catastrophe."
This event delivered England from a relentless enemy, and
deprived the First Consul of a powerful ally, but one that latterly
was becoming embarrassing, and almost as dangerous as he was
serviceable. It is certain that the deceased emperor, in the fulness
of his arrogance, believing that the First Consul could no longer
refuse him any thing in return for his alliance, had required con
ditions with regard to Italy, Germany, and Egypt, which France
could never have conceded, and these demands must have inter
posed great obstacles to the re-establishment of peace, a desire
for which was now becoming general throughout Europe. The
First Consul selected his favourite aide-de-camp, Duroc, who had
been previously sent to Berlin and to Vienna, and despatched
him to Russia. He ordered him to repair to St. Petersburg, with
an autograph letter, to congratulate the new emperor on his acces
sion, and to bring to bear all the powers of flattery and persuasion
of a great man, in order to instil, if possible, into his mind, sound
ideas concerning the relations between France and Russia.
Duroc set out instantly with orders to proceed by way of Berlin.
He was to visit Prussia for the second time, collect more correct
information respecting the recent events which had occurred in the
North, and thus reach St. Petersburg better acquainted with the
men and the facts with which he would there have to deal.
England was delighted, as well she might be, with receiving
at the same time the news of the victory of Copenhagen, and the
death of the formidable adversary, who had originated the league
of the neutral powers against her. The valour of the British
hero, the gallant Nelson, was exalted to the skies, and that with
a most natural and legitimate enthusiasm, for nations do well, in
the first ecstacies of their joy, to celebrate, and even exaggerate
their triumphs. Nevertheless, the first transports of enthusiasm
being over, when the nation became more calm, the victory of Co
penhagen was more correctly appreciated. The passage of the
Sound had been, it was said, not very difficult to force ; the attack
on Copenhagen in a narrow strait, where the English ships could
not manoeuvre without great peril, was an adventurous, bold act,

April 1801.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 247
worthy of the victor at Aboukir. But the English fleet had been
seriously disabled, and if it had not been for the too great eager
ness of the Crown Prince of Denmark to listen to Nelson's flag of
truce, the day would probably have been lost. The victory had been
very close upon a defeat, and moreover, the results obtained were
quite unimportant, since the English had only extorted from the
Danes a simple armistice, at the expiration of which the struggle
must be renewed. If the emperor Paul had not died, this naval
enterprise which the English must have prosecuted, in the
midst of an inclosed sea, in which they could not put into any
port, and the outlet, from which might be shut against them, must
have had many terrible dangerous chances against its success.
But the blow struck so opportunely against the power which com
manded the entrance to the Baltic, that is to say, the Danes, was
decisive ; Paul was no longer there to take up the gauntlet, and
to continue the contest. This is an additional proof, illustrating
the numberless others with which history abounds, that there are
in this world many propitious chances in favour of boldness, espe
cially when its efforts are seconded by sufficiently commanding
ability. The English immediately proceeded to take advantage of this
fortunate change of sovereigns, by relaxing the rigour of the
principles they had laid down respecting the maritime law of
nations, so as to arrive at some honourable adjustment with
Russia, and, after Russia, with all the remaining powers. They
were well aware of the kind and amiable character of the young
prince who had ascended the throne of Russia, as at that period it
was pronounced to be rather bordering on weakness ; and, besides,
they flattered themselves with having regained considerable in
fluence at St. Petersburg. They sent Lord St. Helens to that
capital, with the necessary powers to effect, an arrangement. M.
de Woronzoff, ambassador of Russia to the court of George III.,
wholly wedded to the cause of British policy, having even incurred
the sequestration of his property on account of his not having
quitted London, his accustomed place of residence, received an
invitation to appear there in his official capacity, which he forth
with accepted. The vessels belonging to the neutral powers, de
tained in the English ports were released. Nelson, by order of
his government, continued inactive in the Baltic, and was in
structed to intimate to the courts of the north, that he should re
frain from any act of hostility, unless they determined to put
their fleets to sea, in which case he should engage with them ;
but if, on the contrary, these fleets should remain in their respec
tive ports, and not attempt to make the long threatened junction
with the Danish squadron, he should abstain from any hostile act
against the coasts of Denmark, of Sweden, and of Russia ; that he
should allow free passage to all the merchant vessels, and the re
lations between the countries should be upon the same footing as
before the rupture.
The blow struck against Copenhagen had unfortunately pro-

248 HISTORY OF THE [April 1801.
duced its effect. The minor neutral powers, such as the Danes
and the Swedes, although deeply irritated on tlieir own account
against England, had only been forced into the league by the
menacing influence of Paul I. Prussia, who regarded her mari
time interests as quite secondary compared with her other national
interests, and who strongly inclined towards peace, had only en
gaged in the dispute, when urged on by the twofold influence of
Paul I. and the First Consul : she, accordingly, felt overjoyed on
finding herself extricated from such an embarrassment. She was,
like the rest, eagerly disposed to co-operate in the re-establish
ment of commercial relations.
In a short time the trading vessels of all nations, English,
Swedish, Danish, and Russian, reappeared in the Baltic : and trade
and navigation resumed their accustomed activity. Nelson al
lowed them to pass unmolested, and received in return, along the
northern coasts, the refreshments of which he stood in need. This
virtual armistice was, therefore, generally acceded to. The Rus
sian cabinet, directed by count Pahlen, without yielding unbe
comingly to British influence, showed a disposition to terminate
the maritime dispute, by such an adj ustment as would secure, up
to a certain point, the rights of the neutrals. It intimated that
they would receive Lord St. Helens. Already it had authorised
the return of M. de Woronzoff to London, whither M. de Ber-
nestoff also repaired, as the representative of Denmark.
The First Consul, who had ably contrived and elaborated
this formidable coalition against Great Britain, a coalition
founded moreover upon the interests of all the maritime nations,
viewed with regret its dissolution, occasioned as it was by the
weakness of the confederates. He tried to make them ashamed
of the promptitude with which they receded ; but each excused
his conduct by the example of his neighbour. Denmark, justly
proud of the bloody engagement of Copenhagen, declared that
she had done her part, and that it was the duty of the others to
perform theirs. Sweden expressed herself ready to fight; but,
she added, that as the Danish, Prussian, and, above all, the Rus
sian flags, were freely traversing the seas, she could not see why
her subjects alone should be debarred from the benefits of trade.
Prussia excused her inaction, by the change which had happened
at St. Petersburg, but, at the same time, reiterated to France, the
warmest assurances of steadfast constancy. She declared that a
just estimate would be formed of her perseverance in the cause,
when the proper time arrived for concluding an arrangement, and
the articles of the maritime law of nations should be definitively
settled. Russia affected not to neglect the rights of the neutrals,
but avowedly confined her endeavours to the accomplishment of
one thing only, which was the cessation of hostilities commenced
upon insufficient grounds.
The First Consul, who was desirous of retarding an accom
modation between Prussia and England as long as possible, con
ceived a very ingenious expedient to prolong the dispute. He had

April 1801.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 249
offered Malta to Paul, and he now tendered Hanover to Prussia.
We have seen that Prussia had occupied that province, so dear to
the heart of George III., by way of reprisals for the violent acts
which the English government had committed against the neutral
flags. Prussia had lent herself with considerable hesitation to this
act of aggression, but the secret longing which she has always
felt for the possession of that province, the most desirable for her,
that which would most conveniently enlarge and round off the fron
tiers of her territory, prompted her to seize upon it, notwithstand
ing her anxiety for peace and repose. Other motives also had in
fluenced her. She had, besides, an indemnity to claim in Germany,
as she was amongst the number of the secular princes, who were to
be indemnified for their losses on the left bank of the Rhine, by
the secularisation of the ecclesiastical states. These claims were
very large, and in the hope that the First Consul would favour
them, she was anxious to propitiate him, by taking possession of
Hanover. General Bonaparte declared at once, that if she
wished to keep Hanover, and indemnify herself thereby, although
this indemnity was of ten times greater value than the amount
to which she was entitled, he would willingly consent, without
giving way to any jealousy at this great augmentation, conceded
to a power whose territory was conterminous with France. This
proposal at once delighted, and disturbed the young monarch.
The offer was a seductive one, but the chief stumbling block was,
the resentment of England Nevertheless, without accepting the
proposal in a definitive manner, the cabinet of Berlin replied, that
the king Frederick William was fully sensible of the friendly dis
positions of the First Consul, that he had come to no resolution
yet, that it was better to defer the consideration of this territorial
question till the negotiations for a general peace throughout Eu
rope; and he added, that grounding his conduct upon the present
state of things, which was an armistice tacitly acquiesced in,
rather than formally stipulated, he should continue to keep
possession of Hanover.
The First Consul did not require more, beintr content with having
thereby involved the courts of London and Berlin in a question
of the most complicated solution, and placed in the hands of a
power which was devoted to him, a precious pledge, which could
be most advantageously used in the negotiations with England.
The period of these negotiations at length approached. Eng
land had seized with avidity, the opportunity of relaxing the
rigour of her maritime principles, with a view of quelling the
danger which threatened her in the north ; she was now anxious
to terminate this state of things, and to conclude peace, not only
with the neutrals, but with a power still more formidable than
they; with France, which during the last ten years had con
vulsed all Europe, and which -began to threaten the British soil
with serious dangers. At one period, thanks to the obstinacy
of Mr. Pitt, and the talents of general Bonaparte, she found
VOL. II. s

250 HISTORY OF THE [April 1801.
herself alone, contending against all the world ; having extricated
herself from this position by a successful act of temerity, by a
fortuitous stroke of good fortune, she was averse to again incur
similar dangers, through a repetition of similar errors. England,
moreover, could now treat with honour, and it was expedient,
after having lost so many good opportunities, not to miss the one
which now presented itself. Why, reasoned the people of Eng
land, why prolong the war? We have taken all the colonies
worth having: France, at the same time, has vanquished all the
allies, to which we have been attached; she has aggrandised
herself at their expense, and has become the most formidable
power in the universe. Every day added to the struggle renders it
more serious, especially through her successive conquest of all the
European coasts and harbours. She has reduced Holland and
Naples, and at the present moment is marching against Portugal.
We must not render her more powerful, by pertinaciously persist
ing in the prosecution of the war. Ifit was for the maintenance of
the most salutary principles that we contended some years past;
if it was for social order menaced by the French revolution ; that
is now no longer the case, since France affords the brightest
example of order and of wisdom. Can we think to re-establish
the Bourbons? There, indeed, was Mr. Pitt's grand error, his
mistaken policy: and if his great influence, his great talents
are lost to us, we must secure the only advantage we can from
his retirement, that is to say, we must relinquish that unremit
ting, malignant spirit of hatred, which dictated the most im
prudent and gross personalities between him and general Bona
parte. All sensible, reflecting men in England were in favour of peace.
This feeling had the powerful support of the King and the people.
The pious and obstinate King of England, who refused the eman
cipation of the Catholics to Mr. Pitt, out of fidelity to the Protes
tant cause, did not the less rejoice at the restoration of Catholicism
in France, a re-establishment, which was expected soon to take
place. He viewed in that, the triumph of religious principles, and
was content. He had a great aversion to the French revolution, and
although general Bonaparte had thwarted and seriously counter
acted the policy of England, he was greatly pleased with him.
for the reaction against that revolution, and for reinstating true
social principles in public opinion. France, which possesses in
such an eminent degree the power of communicating to other
nations the feelings she herself experiences, being now calmed
down, brought back to sound notions, King George III. regarded
the blessings of social order as preserved"to mankind. If with
Mr. Pitt the war had been one of national ambition, as respected
George III. it had been a war of principle. General Bonaparte
might, therefore, consider him as*a friend, but a friend of a very
different stamp from Paul I. Having recovered from the attack
which had obscured his reason during several months, he was

April 1801.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 251
now decidedly inclined to peace, and pressed his ministers to
conclude it. The English people, fond of novelty, looked upon
a peace with the French as the greatest of novelties ; for they
had slaughtered each other, during the last ten years, in every
quarter of the world ; ascribing also the prevailing scarcity to
the sanguinary struggle which desolated both land and sea, they
called loudly for a reconciliation with France. Moreover, the
new prime minister, Mr. Addington, unfit to aspire to the same
glory as Mr. Pitt, to whom he was greatly inferior in talents,
in celebrity, and in general administrative capacity, had but
one plain intelligible object in view, which was to make peace.
He accordingly desired to bring it about, and Mr. Pitt, still
powerful in parliament, counselled him to this step, as the most
expedient. The events in the north, far from swelling the pride
of England, disposed her, on the contrary, to seize a very con
venient and very honourable opportunity of negotiating. The
new minister had determined upon this on the day he assumed
office ; and he was only confirmed in his resolution, when the
intelligence reached him of what had taken place at Copen
hagen, and at St. Petersburg. Going still further, he decided
upon making a direct overture to the First Consul, which would
correspond with the initiative taken by the latter towards Eng- -
land upon his accession to power.
Lord Hawkesbury, who presided over the Foreign Office in
Mr. Addington's administration, sent for M. Otto. This gentle
man transacted in London, as we have already seen, the diploma
tic business relative to the prisoners, and had been six months
before intrusted with the duties connected with the naval armis
tice. He was, therefore, the natural medium of fresh communi
cations, which were about to take place between the two govern
ments. Lord Hawkesbury informed M. Otto, that the King had
confided to him a most agreeable task, the knowledge of which
would no doubt cause as much pleasure in France as in England,
and this was, to propose peace. He said, that His Majesty was
even ready to send a plenipotentiary to Paris, if it were so desired,
or to any other city more agreeable to the French Consul. Lord
Hawkesbury added, that the conditions which it was his intention
to propose were perfectly honourable to both countries, and as a
proof of the sincerity of this reconciliation, he declared, that from
that day, every design directed against the present government of
France, should be discountenanced by the British cabinet. He ex
pected a full reciprocity on the part of the French Republic.
This was disavowing the antecedent policy of Mr. Pitt, who
had always pretended to aim at the re-establishment of the Bour
bons, and who bad unremittingly fomented the attempts of the
emigrants and the Vendeans by English gold. The negotiations
could not have been opened in a more dignified mariner. Lord
Hawkesbury, however, required a prompt reply.
The First Consul, who at that time only aimed at keeping faith-

252 HISTORY OF THE CONSULATE, &C [April 1801.
fully the pledge made to France, to procure for the country peace
and tranquillity, was delighted with this solution of the question,
which he had, in fact, obtained by his successes, and by the wis
dom of his policy. He accepted the overtures of England with as
much eagerness as she had shown in proposing them. Neverthe
less, a negotiation of formality appeared to him tedious, and not
sufficiently efficacious. The remembrance of that of Lord Malmes
bury, in 1797, which was but an empty demonstration on the part
of Mr. Pitt, had left an unpleasant impression on his mind. He
thought that, if they were really sincere at London, as indeed
they appeared really to be, it was quite sufficient to confer directly
with the Foreign Office, and there discuss, with frankness and
candour, the conditions of peace. He considered these easy of ar
rangement, if a reconciliation were sincerely intended. " For," said
he, " England has taken the Indies, and we have taken Egypt ; if
we mutually agree, each to preserve these rich conquests, the
rest is but of little importance. Of what importance are, in fact,
a few islands in the West Indies, or elsewhere, which England
keeps from us, or our allies, compared with the vast conquests we
have made ? Can she refuse to restore them, when Hanover is in
our hands, when Portugal will soon be so, and weoffer to evacuate
these kingdoms in return for a few islands in America ? Peace
is therefore easy to be brought about;" so ran his dispatch to M.
Otto, "if the English desire it. I empower you to treat, but
directly only with lord Hawkesbury."
Full powers were sent to M. Otto with a recommendation not
to make any thing public, to write as little as possible, to nego
tiate verbally, and only to exchange written notes upon the
most important questions. It was impossible to keep such a
negotiation an absolute secret; but the First Consul enjoined M.
Otto to require and, on bis part, to observe the greatest discretion,
relative to those questions which must necessarily on both sides
be raised and discussed.
Lord Hawkesbury, in the name of the King of England, con
sented to this mode of proceeding, and it was agreed that the con
ferences should commence at once at London, between him and
M. Otto. They did really open, in the early part of April, 1801
(middle of Germinal, year IX.).
From thel8th Brumaire, year VIII. (9th of November, 1799), to
the month of Germinal, year IX. (April, 1801), eighteen months
had elapsed, and France, at peace with the continent, engaged in a
frank and sincere negotiation with England, was about to obtain,
for the first time for ten years, a general peace on land, and at sea.
The condition of this general peace, admitted by all the contract
ing parties, was the preservation of our brilliant conquests.

END OF VOL. II.

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