'T^LE«¥]MWEI^S2ir¥''

Gift of

STRONG VINCENT

AND

His Brigade at Gettysburg
JULY 2, 1863

OLIVER W. NORTON
Private Eighty-third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers
First Lieutenant Eighth Regiment U. S. C. Infantry
Ex-Commander Illinois Commandery
Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States
Chicago, December, 1909

STRONG VINCENT

In the numerous histories of the civil war or accounts
of the campaign and battle of Gettysburg which have ap
peared from time to time, the writer of this paper has
never seen one which did full justice to the important
part enacted by Colonel Strong Vincent and his brigade
on the extreme left of the Union Army on the afternoon
of July 2, 1863, and which, if it did not decide the victory,
contributed so much to it that but for this the battle
would have been gained by the Confederates.
Some accounts state that General Warren, observing
the importance of the position, entirely unoccupied, and
the evident intention of the Confederates to seize it, took
the responsibility of detaching Vincent's brigade from its
division and personally conducted it tO' the place where it
fought. Other accounts state that Weed's brigade was
first placed on the hill by General Warren and that Vin
cent's brigade came up later and extended the line to the
left. All accounts give great credit to Vincent's skill and
the splendid fighting of the brigade, but they all miss the
point which the writer wishes to make clear in this state
ment, which is that If Vincent had not taken upon him
self the responsibility of taking his brigade to that posi
tion without waiting to receive the order from his division
commander as soon as he knew that his corps commander
had ordered a brigade to be sent there, the arrival of his
brigade would have found the enemy in possession of the
ground, frorni which in all probability it could not have
been dislodged.
It may seem presumptuous for one who at the time of
the battle of Gettysburg was a private soldier of the Eighty-
third Pennsylvania Volunteers to question the accuracy of
accounts written by officers of high rank or historians in
civil life whose attainments have so well fitted them to
write the story of the battle, but this presumption may be
Note.— Where italics are used in these reports they do not appear in the original
but are employed by the writer to call special attention to certain statements.

pardoned perhaps when it is known that the writer is the
only living person, with the possible exception of a captain
on the staff of General Sykes, who saw and heard what
took place at the critical moment.
The writer, although a private soldier, was on detached
service at the time of the battle of Gettysburg, at the head
quarters of the Third Brigade, First Division, Fifth Army
Corps, acting as brigade bugler and bearer of the brigade
headquarters flag. His duty was when the brigade was in
the field to be always near the brigade commander, so that
staff officers or others who had business with him could
know by the flag where to find him, and to sound on the
bugle orders for the brigade, when so directed by its com
mander. The First Division, under command of General Barnes,
with the other divisions of the corps, arrived on the field
early in the morning of July 2 and was massed in rear of
the right of the line. It made some changes of position
during the day and about the middle of the afternoon, when
I>ongstreet's attack on the Third Corps became very heavy,
the Fifth Corps was moved to the left to reinforce the
Third Corps. The. First Division led the corps and the
Third Brigade under Vincent led the division. The column
was halted on the low ground in rear of the position of the
Third Corps and General Sykes with General Barnes rode
forward to select a position for the troops. Sykes and
Barnes appear to have separated before any further orders
were given to the division. While waiting for orders Vin
cent saw a captain of General Sykes' staff riding toward
him from the front. Vincent, who evidently knew the cap
tain, left the head of his brigade and rode forward to meet
him ; writer followed closely with the flag. Arriving, Vin
cent said, "Captain, what are your orders?" Without re
plying directly, the officer said, "Where is General Barnes ?"
If Vincent knew he did not answer the question, but said
with emphasis, "What are your orders? Give me your or
ders." The officer replied, "General Sykes directed me to
tell General Barnes to send one of his brigades to occupy
that hill yonder," pointing to Little Round Top. Without
a moment's hesitation Vincent replied, "I will take the re
sponsibility of taking my brigade there."

Vincent was a born soldier. Although not educated at
AVest Point, he entered the service in April, 1861, as Adju
tant of the three months' regiment that was raised at Erie,
Pa., and upon the reorganization of this regiment, which
was mustered into the service of the United States for three
years, he became its Lieutenant-Colonel and when its Colo
nel, John W. McLane, was killed at the battle of Gaines Mill,
Vincent succeeded to the command of the regiment. A Har
vard man recently admitted to the bar, he had the intellectual
qualities which fitted him to command. With his quick eye
he appreciated as well as his superior officers the importance
to our army of the immediate occupation of that command
ing position. General Barnes was not with his division;
writer had not seen him since early in the morning. If
Vincent knew where he was he also knew that if he waited
for the officer of General Sykes' staff to find him and have
the order sent through the usual channel, much valuable
time would be lost, and it might be too late. At the risk of
court martial for taking his brigade away from the division
without orders from its commander, but understanding the
order of the corps commander that some brigade of the divis
ion should be sent to that hill, he assumed the responsibility
of taking his brigade there and he did the right thing at the
right time. Returning to the brigade, he gave to Colonel
Rice, the senior regimental commander, the order to bring
on the brigade as rapidly as possible and started for the
hill, closely followed by the writer. Arriving at the foot of
the northwest slope and finding it impracticable, he skirted
the northern base of the ridge, then turned southward
along the eastern slope where the ground was less difficult
until he reached the point where the high ridge ends and
the hill falls away toward the valley, between the two Round
Tops. Riding around the large rocks which end the ridge
at this point, we came out on the small plateau where the
Sixteenth Michigan Regiment was placed in position a little
later. We sat on our horses looking out toward the
Devils Den and the country toward the Peach Orchard
where the battle was then raging fiercely, but in our immedi
ate neighborhood not a Union or Confederate soldier was
to be seen. We had been there but a few moments when a
shell exploded a few feet to our right, followed by another

about the same distance to the left. Vincent said to me,
"They are firing at the flag, go behind the rocks with it."
I obeyed and in a few moments he came and dismounting,
left his horse with me. He then went over the lower
ground on foot, selecting the position in which to place the
brigade. I think the regiments which had followed the
same route we took, arrived in the following order : Forty-
fourth New York, Sixteenth Michigan, Eighty-third Penn-
slyvania and Twentieth Maine. As the head of the column
came up, Vincent said to Colonel Rice, "Form your regi
ment here, Colonel, with the right at the foot of this rock."
Colonel Rice replied, "Colonel, in every previous battle in
which we have been engaged, the Forty- fourth and Eighty-
third have fought side by side. I wish it could be so today."
Vincent appreciated the feeling and answered, "It shall be
so, let the Sixteenth pass you." The order was sent back,
the Forty-fourth was halted until the Sixteenth had reached
its place, then under Vincent's direction the Forty-fourth,
Eighty-third and Twentieth took their respective positions
and sent out skirmish lines to the front. Up to this time
not a shot had been fired nor a Confederate soldier seen on
that part of the field, but the skirmishers of the Eighty-
third and F.orty- fourth soon met the enemy advancing in
heavy columns without skirmishers. They came on rapidly
following the retirement of our skirmishers, and arriving
within short range of our line, opened a heavy fire on the
Eighty-third and Forty-fourth. This lasted for some time,
when the enemy fell back but re-formed and with additional
troops made another assault, this time reaching far enough
to our left to involve the Twentieth Maine, but our men
could not be moved. While this was taking place, another
force, supposed to be the greater part or all of Robertson's
brigade of Texas regiments, passed to the north in the low
ground between us and the Devils Den, and having gone
beyond the line held by the Sixteenth Michigan, turned and
advanced directly up the hill to attack this flank of our line.
They came with such courage and such overwhelming num
bers that the right of the Sixteenth Michigan wavered and
broke. Colonel Welch and a large part of the right wing
of his regiment left the field, taking his colors with him.
In trying to rally these men Colonel Vincent was mortally

wounded and carried to the rear. Just at this time the One
hundred and fortieth New York "under Colonel O'Rorke
arrived on the hill on our right and charged on the exultant
enemy. O'Rorke and many of his men were killed and
"/ounded, but the enemy was driven off, our line was re
established under the direction of Colonel Rice, who as
sumed the command, and no further assaults were made on
the right of our line. Hazlett's Battery and the balance of
Weed's Brigade, which came up after the One hundred and
fortieth New York, extended the line along the crest of the
ridge from Vincent's Brigade to its base at the north and
held it until the end of the battle. The enemy continued its
assaults upon the left of our line, making repeated efforts
to turn the flank of Chamberlain's Twentieth Maine, but
failed. The account of the battle at this point has been so
fully described in the reports quoted elsewhere, that it need
not be repeated here.
When the fighting opened the writer left his horse and
flag with the horses and servants of the mounted officers
of the brigade and obtaining a musket took his place in the
nearest point of the line on the right of the Forty-fourth
New York and remained there until the fighting ceased ;
reporting then to Colonel Rice he was directed by him to
go to the hospitals in the rear to get ambulances and help to
remove our wounded. Having no shoulder straps and be
ing responsible for his brigade flag, he mounted and took
that along as his badge of authority. He came to the road
which passes east along the northern end of Little Round
Top and found that road full of ambulances of the Second,
Third and Fifth Corps and field hospitals of these corps
located in every convenient spot for more than a mile to
the east, but the ambulance officers and surgeons were so
fully occupied that he received little immediate encourage
ment, although later help was sent and our wounded as well
as those of the enemy which had fallen into our hands were
cared for as well as they could be under the circumstances.
Returning he saw Colonel Welch with a large number of
the men of the Sixteenth Michigan and the colors of that
regiment at the road-side nearly a mile in rear of the battle
field. Being much surprised to see him there, he asked
Colonel Welch where the brigade was. Welch replied that

he did not know, that they were driven off the hill and that
Colonel Vincent was in that farm house. After conversa
tion with some of the men of the Sixteenth and being satis
fied that Colonel Welch was mistaken, he entered the house
and found Colonel Vincent on a bed in a room on the first
floor. He was very pale and unable to speak, but held out
his hand to me, and taking it I expressed in some way my
sorrow at seeing him there. When I said "The boys are
still there, Colonel," his face was lighted with a smile, but
the sight was too painful to me and I hurried back to my
place on the hill.
The writer has searched the official records and other
accounts and presents herewith extracts from all the official
reports relating to this matter, with certain letters and
papers relating to the battle on Little Round Top. General
Warren is entitled to all the credit which he would claim
for himself, but he would be the first to disclaim credit for
acts he did not perform. He went to the hill by the order
of General Meade, accompanied by two Lieutenants of En
gineers and some mounted orderlies. Seeing from his po
sition near the signal station a heavy force of the enemy
very near the hill, he sent a written dispatch to General
Meade, suggesting that a division be sent there at once.
He then went to General Sykes, reported what he had seen
and urged him to send there a portion of his corps which
was then just arriving. He did not detach Vincent's
brigade nor any other brigade, but acted in accordance with
his military training by referring the matter to General
Sykes commanding the Fifth Corps, the nearest available
troops. Sykes promised the troops needed and Warren re
turned to the signal station, where he found the officer
folding his flags and preparing to leave. Warren directed
him to remain and to continue waving his flags. He ap
pears to have remained there until Vincent's brigade, which
had repulsed the first assaults, seemed likely to be over
whelmed by the additional troops which the enemy was
sending. He then descended the hill again and finding
Colonel O'Rorke's regiment, the One Hundred and fortieth
New York, bringing up the rear of Weed's brigade, the
other three regiments with General Weed in advance, hav
ing already passed to the front, Warren took the responsi-
10

bility of detaching O'Rorke's regiment and hurrying it to the
crest of the hill, where it arrived just in time to repulse the
assault of the Texas troops which had just driven back in
disorder the right of the Sixteenth Michigan.
Sykes appears to have ordered first one brigade from
the First Division to be sent there and then Weed's brigade
of the Second Division, which was following at some dis
tance in the rear, to take position on the hill also. Sykes
then went further to the rear to order up Crawford's Third
Division. On his return he found that Weed's brigade,
with the exception of O'Rorke's regiment, was moving to
the front under orders from an officer of General Sickles'
staff. He ordered it back to Round Top and Vincent's and
Weed's brigades held this position until the fighting was
over. Fisher's brigade of the Third Division came up later
to reinforce Vincent's brigade, but did not arrive in time to
take any active part in the battle.

Extract from General Hunt's paper on the Battle of
Gettysburg, in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,"
Vol. 3, page 307, in which he quotes a letter from General
G. K. Warren:
" * * * ^s soon as General Longstreet's attack
commenced, General Warren was sent by General Meade to
see to the condition of the extreme left. The duty could
not have been intrusted to better hands. Passing along the
lines he found Little Round Top, the key of the position,
unoccupied except by a signal station. The enemy at the
time lay concealed, awaiting the signal for assault, when a
shot fired in their direction caused a sudden movement on
their part, which, by the gleam of reflected sunlight from
their bayonets, revealed their long lines outflanking the
position. Fully comprehending the imminent danger, War
ren sent to General Meade for a division.
Before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Gen
eral Warren testified that he went to Little Round Top "by
General Meade's direction." In a letter dated July 13th,
1872, General Warren says :

11

GENERAL WARREN'S LETTER.
Just before the action began in earnest, on July 2nd, I
was with General Meade, near General Sickles, whose
troops seemed very badly disposed on that part of the field.
At my suggestion. General Meade sent me to the left to
examine the condition of affairs^ and I continued on till I
reached Little Round Top. There were no troops on it,
and it was used as a signal station. I saw that this was
the key of the whole position, and that our troops in the
woods in front of it could not see the ground in front of
them, so that the enemy would come upon them before
they would be aware of it. The long line of woods on the
west side of the Emmitsburg road (which road was along
a ridge) furnished an excellent place for the enemy to form
out of sight, so I requested the captain of a rifle battery just
in front of Little Round Top to fire a shot into these woods.
He did so, and as the shot went whistling through the air
the sound of it reached the enemy's troops and caused every
one to look in the direction of it. This motion revealed to
me the glistening of gun-barrels and bayonets of the
enemy's line of battle, already formed and far outflanking
the position of any of our troops ; so that the line of his
advance from his right to Little Round Top was unopposed.
I have been particular in telling this, as the discovery was
intensely thrilling to my feelings, and almost appalling. I
immediately sent a hastily written dispatch to General
Meade to send a division at least to me, and General Meade
directed the Fifth Army Corps to take position there. The
battle was already beginning to rage at the Peach Orchard,
and before a single man reached Round Top the whole line
of the enemy moved on us in splendid array, shouting in
the most confident tones. While I was still all alone with
the signal officer, the musket balls began to fly around us,
and he was about to fold up his flags and withdraw, but
remained, at my request, and kept waving them in defiance.
Seeing troops going out on the Peach Orchard road, I rode
down the hill, and fortunately met my old brigade. General
Weed, commanding it, had already passed the point, and I
took the responsibility to detach Colonel O'Rorke, the head
of whose regiment I struck, who, on hearing my few words
12

of explanation about the position, moved at once to the
hill-top. About this time First Lieutenant Charles E. Haz-
lett, of the Fifth .Artillery, with his battery of rifled cannon,
arrived. He comprehended the situation instantly and
planted a gun on the summit of the hill. He spoke to the
effect that though he could do little execution on the enemy
with his guns, he could aid in giving confidence to the in
fantry, and that his battery was of no consequence what
ever compared with holding the position. He stayed there
till he was killed. I was wounded with a musket-ball while
talking with Lieutenant Hazlett on the hill, but not seri
ously; and seeing the position saved while the whole line
to the right and front of us was yielding and melting away
under the enemy's fire and advance, I left the hill to rejoin
General Meade near the center of the field where a new
crisis was at hand."

ADDRESS OF CAPTAIN PORTER FARLEY.
140th Regiment, New York Volunteers, at Dedication
OF Regimental Monument at Gettysburg,
September 17, 1889.
"New York at Gettysburg," Vol. Ill, page 953.
extract.
* * * "jt ^as while waiting there that a printed order
was brought to Colonel O'Rorke. He read it and then
handed it to the adjutant, as they both sat mounted in
front of the regiment, and told him to read it aloud. It
was from the general in command of the army and was as
follows : circular.
"Headquarters Army of the Potomac
June 30, 1863.
"The Commanding General requests that previous to
the engagement soon expected with the enemy, corps and all
other commanding officers will address their troops, ex
plaining to them briefly the immense issues involved in this
13

struggle. The enemy are on our soil. The whole country
now looks anxiously to this army to deliver it from the
presence of the foe. Our failure to do so will leave us no
such welcome as the swelling of millions of hearts with
pride and joy at our success would give to every soldier
in the army. Homes, firesides and domestic altars are in
volved. The army has fought well heretofore. It is be
lieved that it will fight more desperately and bravely than
ever if it is addressed in fitting terms.
"Corps and other commanders are authorized to order
the instant death of any soldier who fails in his duty at this
hour.
"By command of Major General Meade,
"S. Williams, Asst. Adjt. General."
The order was explicit that all commanding officers
should address their troops ; and, though doubtless much
against his inclinations, as it was certainly contrary to his
habit, O'Rorke, for the first and last time, there addressed
a speech to his regiment. How well we all remember him
sitting there on his horse in front of the regimental colors.
His face, his form, his dress, all come up before us. His
cheeks flushed as. he spoke, but there was no hesitancy, and
he closed with the ringing words : "I call on the file closers
to do their duty, and if there is a man this day base enough
to leave his company, let him die in his tracks. Shoot him
down like a dog." The words were those of a man who in
tended to do his duty and who was equally determined that
every man under him should do his. The speech was effec
tive for its purpose, and a murmur of approval ran through
the ranks. The scene, the action, and the words were of
intense dramatic interest.
We soon changed our position, and during the greater
part of the remainder of that day we lay with the whole of
our corps upon Powers Hill, about a mile eastward from
the spot where we now stand. Throughout the day, the
boom of an occasional cannon .shot could be heard, but it
seemed far away. Late in the afternoon, however, we
could hear the artillery in lively play to our westward, but
it still seemed much more distant than it really was. The
14

battle of the day had actually opened, and we were soon
set in motion towards the high ground which we could see
to the westward, and which in fact was the very hill on
which we now stand.
The First Division of our corps had preceded us, and so
had the other brigades of our division and the other regi
ments of our brigade. It is my beHef that we were march
ing that afternoon as the rear regiment of the Second
Division. The whole of our division, therefore, was pass
ing along the road which crosses this ridge at the foot of
the northern extremity of Little Round Top; the two lead
ing brigades had become engaged in the furious battle then
raging on the further side ; our own brigade was crossing
the ridge, and we ourselves had about reached the point
where the railroad now crosses the roadway, when an inci
dent occurred which changed our line of march, and which
proved to be an important factor in the result of that day's
battle. Just at that moment our former brigadier. Gen. G. K.
Warren, Chief Engineer of the Army, with an orderly and
one or two officers, rode down towards the head of our
regiment. He came from the direction of the hill top, that
is, from this point where we now stand. His speed and
manner indicated unusual excitement. Before he reached
us he called out to O'Rorke to lead his regiment that way
up the hill. O'Rorke answered him that General Weed had
gone ahead and expected this regiment to follow him.
"Never mind that," answered Warren, "I'll take the re
sponsibility." Warren's words and manner carried convic
tion of the importance of the thing he asked. Accepting
his assurance of full justification, O'Rorke turned the head
of the regiment to the left, and following one of the officers
who had been with Warren, led it diagonally up the eastern
slope of Little Round Top. Warren rode off, evidently
bent on securing other troops. The staff officer who rode
with us, by his impatient gestures urged us to our greatest
speed. You will remember how some of the guns of Haz
lett's Battery broke through our files before we reached
the top, and the frantic efforts of the horses, lashed by the
drivers, to pull their heavy pieces up that steep acclivity.
A few seconds later the head of our regiment reached the

15

summit of the ridge ; war's wild panorama spread before
us, and we found ourselves upon the verge of battle.
It was a moment which called for leadership, and we
are here today the witnesses of the manner in which that
leadership was fulfilled. There was no time for tactical
formations. Delay was ruin. Hesitation was destruction.
Well was it for the cause he served that the man who led
our regiment that day was one prompt to decide and brave
to execute. The bullets flew in among the men the moment the lead
ing company mounted the ridge, and as not a musket was
loaded the natural impulse was to halt and load them. But
O'Rorke permitted no such delay. Springing from his
horse, he threw his reins to the sergeant major; his sword
flashed from its scabbard into the sunlight, and calling:
"This way, boys," he led the charge over the rocks, down
this hillside, till he came abreast the men of Vincent's
Brigade, who were posted in the ravine to the left. Join
ing them an irregular line was formed, such as the con
fusion of the rocks lying thereabout permitted, and the fine
grew and was extended towards the right as the successive
rearward companies came upon the scene of action. There
while some were partly sheltered by the rocks and others
stood in the open, a fierce fight went on with an enemy
among the trees and underbrush. Flushed with the excite
ment and bravely led, they pushed up close to our line.
The steadfastness and valor displayed on both sides made
the result for some minutes doubtful, but a struggle so
desperate and bloody could not be a long one. The enemy
fell back; a short lull was succeeded by another onslaught,
which was again repelled.
The story has been told in print that our colonel led
with the regimental colors in his own hands ; and that the
men followed him and with clubbed muskets beat back the
enemy. Such fictions provoke a smile, and are mentioned
only to contradict them. O'Rorke carried only his sword,
and you carried your muskets grasped by the butts and not
by the barrels. History should record the truth without
exaggeration. And this is the truth of the matter; that as
the regiment came over the ridge its muskets were empty,
and its leading companies rushed down the hill to meet the
16

enemy without firing a shot. It was only when you came
abreast the men of Vincent's Brigade near the foot of the
hill that you had time to load and return the fire which spit
a deadly fusillade from the woods before you. Those
woods seemed to swarm with the gray-coated crowd. The
enemy had almost enveloped Vincent, and had nearly seized
this vantage ground on which we stand. Vincent's men,
who for some minutes had maintained the fight, were out
numbered and outflanked. Reinforcement was never more
opportune. The arrival of the One hundred and fortieth
Regiment at that crucial moment saved Little Round Top,
and a glance at the surrounding topography carries convic
tion as to the supreme value of its possession.
While our regiment fought in the valley, the guns of
Hazlett's battery thundered from this hilltop, and its dis
charges swept the hostile lines which had forced back
Sickles' corps; so that by the time our regiments' fighting
was over, not a battalion of the enemy remained in sight
upon the opposite ridge, which had been the scene of that
afternoon's chief battle. Such, briefly told, was the strug
gle for the possession of this hilltop.
When that struggle was over, the exultation of victory
was soon chilled by the dejection which oppressed us as we
counted and realized the cost of all that had been won. Of
our regiment, 85 enlisted men and 6 officers had been
wounded. Two of these officers, Lieuts. Hugh McGraw
and Charles P. Klein, were fatally hurt. Besides these, 26
of the comrades who had marched with us that afternoon,
had fallen dead before the fire of the enemy. Grouped by
companies, a row of inanimate forms lay side by side be
neath the trees upon this eastern slope. No funeral cere
mony, and only shallow graves could be accorded them. In
the darkness of the night, silently and with bitter dejection,
each Company buried its dead.
Among the slain was one whose loss lay heavy on the
heart of every one of us. Your thoughts anticipate his
name. The artist's hand has reproduced his features, and
his effigy upon this cenotaph now calmly gazes upon us, and
for years to come shall remain the testimony to all who
come this way, of the admiration and the love which this
regiment accorded him. O'Rorke was among the dead.

17

Shot through the neck, he had fallen without a groan, and
we may hope without a pang. The supreme effort of his
life was consummated by a death heroic in its surroundings
and undisturbed by pain.
The spot on which he died is a most fitting place, and
this circle of his comrades the most fitting presence in
which to utter that tribute to his memory, which by grace
of character, by natural talent, and by studious culture, he
so truly deserves. To me he was as an elder brother be
loved; and though since that time Death has struck near
and hard upon my heart, he had never before struck so
near as that July afternoon, when I looked down upon the
placid features of O'Rorke's dead face and felt that he had
gone from me forever. Twenty-six years have passed, and
time has tempered the grief which his death brought into
our hearts ; but we shall always cherish his memory with a
loving regard and admiration, which only a noble nature
could inspire. We have known many men since the day
he died. Let each of us recall the list of those whose quali
ties have most attracted his regard. Has there been one
among them who possessed combined, the grace of form
and carriage, the modesty, the purity and honesty of char
acter, the amiable temper, the intellectual force, the com
manding influence over others, the knightly accomplishments
of his profession, and above all, the proved courage of Col.
Pat O'Rorke, who here died at the head of his regiment?
For myself I must say that I have never known one whose
personality was so symmetrically developed, one so free
from blemish, one who so well exemplified the ideal soldier
and man.
"He was a very perfect, gentle knight." This cenotaph
is a memorial of all our comrades who died in this great
battle ; but by the united wish of all of us who survived, it
bears the face and name of the man whom we all most de
lighted to honor. * * * "

18

REPORT OF GEN. GEORGE SYKES,
Commanding Fifth Army Corps,
dated July 31, 1863.
"Rebellion Records," Series 1, Vol. 27, page 592.
EXTRACTS.
* * * A rocky ridge, commanding almost an entire
view of the plateau held by our army, was on our extreme
left. Between it and the position occupied by Birney's di
vision. Third Corps, was a narrow gorge filled with im
mense bowlders and flanked on either side by dense woods.
It afforded excellent cover and an excellent approach for
the enemy, both of which he promptly made use of. The
rocky ridge commanded and controlled this gorge. In ex
amining it and the ground adjacent, previous to posting my
troops, I found a battery at its outer edge, and without ade
quate support. I galloped to General Birney, whose troops
were nearest, explained to him the necessity of protecting
the guns, and suggested that he should close his division
on the battery, and hold the edge of woods on its right. I
promised to fill the gap he opened, which I did with Sweit-
zer's and Tilton's brigades, of my First Division, posting
them myself.
In the meantime, Vincent's brigade, of this division, had
seized the rocky height, closely followed by Weed's brigade.
Second Division. These troops were posted under the
direction of General Warren, Chief Engineer of this army.
After closing the interval made by Birney with the brigades
of General Barnes, I rode rapidly to the Taneytown pike
to bring up the remaining troops of the corps, and on my
return with them found the greater part of Weed's brigade
moving away from the height where it had been stationed,
and where its presence was vital. I dispatched a staff of
ficer to know of the General why he had vacated the
ground assigned him. His reply was, "By order of Gen
eral Sickles." I at once directed him to re-occupy it, which
was done at the double-quick step. Hardly had he reached
it before the enemy came on in tremendous force. Vin
cent's brigade and O'Rorke's regiment (Weed's brigade)
were and had been sorely pressed. Both these heroic com-

19

manders had fallen ; but Weed again in position, Hazlett
working his guns superbly, and the timely arrival of Ayres'
brigades of regulars, who were at once ordered to attack,
stemmed the tide, and rolled away the foe in our front.
^ ^ ;f^
Night closed the fight. The key of the battle-field was
in our possession intact. Vincent, Weed and Hazlett,
chiefs lamented throughout the corps and army, sealed with
their lives the spot intrusted to their keeping, and on which
so much depended. * * *
REPORT OF GEN. JAMES BARNES.
Commanding First Division, Fifth Army Corps,
Beverly Ford, Va., August 24, 1863.
"Rebellion Records," Series 1, Vol. 27, page 599.
extract.
I have the honor to submit the following report of the
operations of the First Division of the Fifth Corps, from
June 28 to July 9, including the battle of Gettysburg and
the movements of the command during the few days previ
ous and subsequent thereto in conformity with instruc
tions from headquarters: * '¦' *
Between 4 and 5 o'clock in the afternoon, orders were
received from General Sykes to move toward the left and
to the front. The column was immediately formed, and
moved rapidly up by the Taneytown road to the ground
assigned to the division. General Sykes and myself, pre
ceding the advance of the column upon the ground upon
which it was to take position, reconnoitered the field, and
the position to be held by the command was determined
upon by him.
Soon after, the head of the column entered upon the
field. At the same time General Warren, of the staff of
General Meade, came up, riding rapidly from the left, and,
pointing out the position of the elevation known as the
Round Top, not far off and toward the left, urged the im
portance of assistance in that direction. General Sykes
yielded to his urgent request, and / immediately directed
20

Colonel Vincent, commanding the Third Brigade, to pro
ceed to that point with his brigade. Colonel Vincent moved
with great promptness to the post assigned to him. The
brigade consisted of the Sixteenth Michigan, the Forty-
fourth New York, the Eighty-third Pennsylvania, and the
Twentieth Maine Regiments.
The Second Brigade, commanded by Colonel Sweitzer,
arrived next upon the ground. This brigade consisted of
the Fourth Michigan, the Sixty-second Pennsylvania, the
Ninth Massachusetts and the Thirty-second Massachusetts.
The Ninth Massachusetts, however, was absent, being upon
the special duty for which it had been detailed in the morn
ing. Upon receiving his instructions. Colonel Sweitzer
placed his command promptly in position.
The First Brigade, under command of Colonel Tilton,
arrived next. This brigade was composed of the Eighteenth
Massachusetts, the Twenty-second Massachusetts, the One
hundred and eighteenth Pennsylvania, and the First Mich
igan Regiments. The position assigned to it was on the
right of the ground occupied by the Second Brigade, and
was immediately placed by Colonel Tilton, in conformity
with the instructions given to him. The division thus in
position constituted the right of the Fifth Corps, and its
place in line was on the left of the ground assigned to the
Third Corps. The line was on the edge of a thick wood,
the ground to the front being cleared of timber, but inter
spersed with rocks and some straggling trees. As the two
brigades entered the wood, they passed over a line of
troops, understood to be a portion of a brigade of the
Third Corps ; they were lying down upon the ground.
Upon the right of our position an open space, apparently
unprotected, extended to some distance. Upon calling the
attention of General Sykes to it, he remarked, referring to
the part of the Third Corps over which we had passed, and
then lying down in our rear, that those troops were to be
removed. The remaining portion of the Third Corps was
understood to be at some distance to the right, and much in
advance of what seemed to be their natural and true posi
tion. This unguarded space was watched with great anx
iety. There was little time, however, for deliberation.
General Sykes, called by his duty to the left of the line,
21

went toward that portion of his command. The attack of
the enemy commenced almost immediately along my front.
It was very severe, but was gallantly withstood.
After some time, during which the firing was very
heavy, the enemy showed himself in great force on our
right flank. He had penetrated through the unguarded
space there, and commenced pouring in a destructive fire
from the advantageous position he had gained, and without
changing my front there were no means of checking his
advance toward my rear. Colonel Tilton, commanding the
First Brigade, which was on the right, was immediately
directed to change his front to the right, and the order was
at once executed, deliberately, yet promptly, and in good
order. Colonel Sweitzer, commanding the Second Brigade,
on the left of the First, was immediately notified of the
change upon his right, and directed to fall back in good
order, and to take up a new position a short distance in his
rear, for the purpose of co-operating in opposing this heavy
attack upon the flank. This brigade, consisting at that time
of only three regiments, numbering in all, officers and men,
1,010, was placed promptly and in good order as directed.
The First Brigade numbered in all, officers and men, 654.
Affairs being in this position, General Caldwell, com
manding a brigade of the Second Corps, came up in great
haste, and stated to me that his brigade, then in the woods
a short distance to the left, was driving the enemy in his
front, and urgently requested assistance. I immediately di
rected Colonel Sweitzer to go to his relief. He moved his
brigade forward in line, to the front and left, his men giving
cheers as they advanced across an open field to the edge of
the wood; but the progress of the enemy upon our flank
still continued, and this brigade was compelled again to
change its front to repel his advance, and soon found itself
in close conflict with him. The Fourth Michigan and
Sixty-second Pennsylvania were in actual contact with him.
Colonel Jeffords, commanding the Fourth Michigan, was
thrust through with a bayonet while gallantly attempting to
rescue his colors from the grasp of the enemy.
Finding himself unable to compete with numbers far
superior to his own, and that the enemy was gaining ground
in the rear. Colonel Sweitzer directed his command to re-

22

tire slowly, but orderly, halting and firing as they retired,
and took position on elevated ground a short distance to
his rear and succeeded in preventing the enemy from mak
ing any further progress in that direction.
In the meantime the movements of the First Brigade,
under similar circumstances, corresponded with those of the
Second. This brigade, small in numbers, fired and retired
in good order, and succeeded in reaching the ground on the
opposite side of the open field toward the left, and there
halted. The darkness put an end to the conflict, and the
enemy was foiled in his effort to get in the rear of the
command. The Ninth Massachusetts shortly afterward re
joined the Second Brigade, having been relieved from the
duty upon which it had been detailed early in the morning.
In this position the two brigades remained during the night.
On the following day, the First Brigade was directed
to relieve the Third Brigade at Little Round Top, where it
also had succeeded in maintaining the position assigned to it,
as will appear in the sequel.
I cannot speak in terms too commendatory of the bear
ing of the officers and men of these two brigades during the
progress of this conflict. Skillfully directed by the two
brigade commanders, they obeyed with cool intrepidity
every order issued to them, under the most trying circum
stances, and long resisted superior numbers with firmness.
Partly surrounded by the enemy, they succeeded in prevent
ing the left of the line from being taken in reverse, resisting
an attack not exceeded, I am sure, in violence in any contest
hitherto occurring. The exposure of their flank, arising
from whatever cause, placed them in a most dangerous
position and their heroic conduct alone saved the command
at least, if not the entire left of the army, from disaster.
The statement of the casualties of the contest is sufficient
evidence of their gallant resistance, and it is alike due to
those who have survived and to the memory of the gallant
dead that this record should be made of their valor and
devotion. The Third Brigade, as above related, was detached
from the division upon its arrival upon the ground, and was
consequently removed from my immediate oversight. The
record of its service, however, drawn principally from the

23

report of its commander, belongs to this record of the
service of the division.
Colonel Vincent, commanding the brigade, upon being
detached, as above mentioned, proceeded promptly to the
position assigned to him. It was upon an elevated and
rocky hill known as Little Round Top. It was situated at
some distance to our left, and near the extreme left of the
line of battle. Its defense was of the utmost importance.
When the brigade was placed in position, the Twentieth
Maine occupied the left of the line, the Sixteenth Michigan
the right, the Eighty-third Pennsylvania and the Forty-
fourth New York the center. The Third Division of the
Fifth Corps was posted on the right of the brigade. The
enemy had concentrated a heavy force in front of the line,
and began a fierce attack immediately after the troops were
in position. Repeated charges were made upon the center
of the brigade, but the line was unbroken. A vigorous at
tack upon the right caused a temporary wavering there, but
the One hundred and fortieth New York coming promptly
to its support, it was re-established at once.
It was at this time that Colonel Vincent, commanding
the brigade, while rallying this part of his command, fell,
mortally wounded. He was a gallant officer, beloved and
respected by his command and by all who knew him. His
death is a serious loss to the army and the country.
Upon the removal of Colonel Vincent from the field, the
command of the brigade devolved upon Colonel Rice, of
the Forty-fourth New York Volunteers. The enemy, as
stated, having in vain attempted to break the right of the
brigade, renewed his attack upon the center and left. The
Twentieth Maine, Colonel Chamberlain commanding, was
posted on the left. It consisted of 380 men and officers.
While the enemy in front was making a fierce attack, a
brigade was observed in the rear of their lines moving by
its right flank and passing through a slight ravine on our
left, with the evident purpose of gaining a position on the
left flank of this regiment.
Colonel Chamberlain at once threw back his left wing,
and extended his right wing by intervals toward the left, in
order to avoid diminishing the extent of his front. The
brigade of the enemy alluded to reaching a proper position,

24

attacked him furiously on the left flank, advancing within
10 paces and rapidly firing. They were first checked and
then repulsed by the left wing of the regiment, thrown back
for that purpose.
A second, third, and fourth time the enemy renewed
their attempt to break this line, and each time were they
successfully repelled by that handful of men. Four times
that little interval of 10 paces was the scene of a desperate
conflict. The ground was strewed with dead and wounded
men of both sides, promiscuously mingled. Their ammuni
tion was exhausted ; they replenished it from the cartridge
boxes of the men lying around them, whether friends or
foes, but even this resource soon failed them ; the enemy in
greatly superior numbers pressed hard ; men and officers
began to look to the rear for safety, but the gallant com
mander of the regiment ordered the bayonets to be fixed,
and, at the command "Forward" that wearied and worn
body of men rushed onward with a shout. The enemy fell
back. Pressing on, and wheeling to the right in open in
tervals, the left wing came again in line with the right wing,
and then the whole regiment, deployed at intervals of 5
paces, followed up the advantage they had gained. The
enemy threw down their arms and surrendered in large
numbers; the others fled rapidly from the contest; 368
prisoners, including 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant colonel, and a
dozen other officers of lesser rank were sent to the rear ; 50
of their dead lay upon the field, and large numbers of their
wounded; 30 of this gallant regiment were killed, over 100
were wounded, but not one was taken a prisoner, and none
were missing.
It was now nearly dark. A portion of the enemy ap
peared to have occupied the summit of the rocky hill to
the left. The men of this brave regiment, exhausted by
their labors, had thrown themselves upon the ground, and
many of them sunk at once in sleep. Colonel Rice, now in
command of the brigade, directed Colonel Chamberlain to
drive the enemy from this height. The order was at once
given. Roused again to action, and advancing with fixed
bayonets and without firing, lest the smallness _ of their
numbers might be suspected, they rushed up the hill.

25

Twenty-five more prisoners, including some staff officers,
were added to the number previously taken, with a loss to
the regiment of 1 officer mortally wounded and 1 man
taken prisoner by the enemy. It was ascertained that these
troops occupying the hill had been sent from Hood's divis
ion, which was then massed a few hundred yards distant,
and that their object was to reconnoiter the position as a
preliminary to taking possession of the height.
In addition to the prisoners above mentioned as taken
by this regiment, 300 stand of arms were also captured by
them. It is due to this regiment and to its commander
that their service should be thus recorded in some detail.
Upon receiving a re-enforcement of five regiments of
the Third Division, under command of Colonel Fisher,
Colonel Rice detached two of them to the aid of Colonel
Chamberlain, in order to maintain the position he had
gained, and he was thus enabled to hold it, and the enemy,
having been repelled upon every point of his attack, and
night coming on, withdrew from the conflict.
Colonel Rice directed the Forty-fourth New York and
the Eighty-third Pennsylvania to move to the front and
gather up the wounded, who, including those of the enemy
who had been left upon the field, were carefully brought
in. The total results of the service of this brigade are
stated by Colonel Rice to be 500 prisoners captured, in
cluding 2 colonels and 15 other commissioned officers, and
1,000 stand of arms. The brigade numbered about 1,000
men. * * *
A tribute is due to the memory of Colonel Vincent, who
fell, mortally wounded, early in the engagement. He lin
gered a few days after the engagement. His promotion as
a brigadier-general was sent to him at once as an apprecia
tion of his services by the Government, but it reached him
too late for his own recognition. He expired soon after its
receipt. (July 7, 1863. O. W. N.) * * *
Being disabled for further actual command of the divis
ion, the opportune arrival of General Griffin enabled me to
relinquish it to him, and the division moved toward Middle-
town, where it arrived on July g. * * *

26

REPORT OF COL. WILLIAM S. TILTON,
Commanding First Bbigade, First Div., Fifth A. C.
Middletown, Md., July 9, 1863.
"Rebellion Records," Series 1, A^ol. 27, page 607.
EXTRACT.
* * * At 4:30 p. m., on July 2, the brigade, under
my command, advanced to the front, and was placed, by
order of General Barnes, in order of battle in a piece of
woods at the south of Mr. Rose's house. The Second
Brigade was on our left, but there being no infantry upon
our right, I made a crotchet by refusing the right wing of
my right battalion (One Hundred and Eighteenth Pennsyl
vania Volunteers, Colonel Gwyn). * * *
No sooner was the line formed than the foe attacked
our front. The onslaught was terrible and my losses
heavy, so much so that I was somewhat doubtful if our line
could withstand it. This fact I communicated to the gen
eral commanding division, zvho ordered me to fall back in
good order if unable to hold the position; but my men be
haved nobly, and twice repulsed the assailants. My colo
nels wished to advance. Being anxious about my right,
however, I reconnoitred in person, and discovered the
enemy in large force coming from the direction of Rose's
house, with the evident design of outflanking me. I imme
diately retired and took up a new position (in two lines),
at the left and rear of a battery which had been posted about
300 yards to my right and rear. The battery soon com
menced to retreat, firing, followed by the rebels, who were
now again upon my right flank. To avoid this flank move
ment, I retired, firing, a short distance in the timber, and
then moved across an open field, took up a new position
upon the right of the Second Division, and reported to Gen
eral Sykes.
* "* * On the 3rd we reheved the Third Brigade,
on duty, holding the rocky hill upon the extreme left.
On the 4th, I advanced the brigade to the edge of the
woods in our front and sent out a strong line of skirmishers
to feel the enemy. The report of this reconnaissance has
been made by order directly to Major-General Sykes.
27

REPORT OF COL. JACOB B. SWEITZER,
Commanding Second Brigade, First Div., Fifth A. C.
July 31, 1863.
"Rebellion Records," Series 1, Vol. 1, page 610.
extract.
* * * When we moved off from the orchard, the
Third Brigade, being on the left of the division, moved
first, the Second and First Brigades following in the in
verted order.
The Second Brigade was placed in position in a wood
fronting an open field, the woods bordering two sides of the
field, the side in which we were and also that extending at
right angles from our left toward the enemy, and in the
last mentioned wood the First Brigade was posted, connect
ing with our left. Having formed the three regiments of
this brigade in line of battle (the Ninth Massachusetts
being still absent on picket duty) in their regular order from
right to left, and finding this formation threw the Thirty-
second Massachusetts, which was on our left, into an ex
posed position beyond the woods in low, cleared ground, I
directed Colonel Prescott to change his front to the rear,
so as to give him the benefit of the elevated ground and the
cover of the woods, which movement he executed.
We had not remained long in this position before an at
tack commenced by the enemy in front of the First Brigade
and Thirty-second Massachusetts. As there was no appear
ance of the enemy in front of the line formed by the Sixty-
second Pennsylvania and Fourth Michigan, I directed them
to change front to the left, and form lines in rear of the
Thirty-second Massachusetts, to strengthen that position.
During the execution of this order, the attack continued;
the firing was very severe, and we lost many brave officers
and men. Here fell Major Lowry, second to none in all
the attributes of a soldier and a gentleman.
When the attack commenced, word ivas sent by General
Barnes that when we retired zve should fall back under
cover of the woods. This order was communicated to
Colonel Prescott, whose regiment was then under the hot-

28

test fire. Understanding it to be a peremptory order to re
tire then, he replied, "I don't want to retire ; I am not ready
to retire; I can hold this place," and he made good his as
sertion. Being informed that he misunderstood the order,
which was only intended to inform him how to retire when
it became necessary, he was satisfied, and he and his com
mand held their ground manfully.
Some time after that, word was sent that the First
Brigade was retiring, and General Barnes sent me word to
fall back also, which I did in perfect good order, the regi
ments retaining their alignments and halting and firing as
they came back. Having arrived at the road leading along
the rear of the wheat-field, the brigade was formed in line
in the woods in the rear of the road and parallel to it, the
right resting on the corner of the woods toward the front.
We had not remained here more than, say, fifteen minutes,
when a general officer I had never seen before rode up to
me, and said his command was driving the enemy in the
woods in front of the wheat-field; that he needed the sup
port of a brigade, and desired to know if I would give him
mine. I referred him to General Barnes, and said I would
obey his directions with pleasure. He spoke to the general,
who was not far off. General Barnes came and stated to
me what had been said to him by General Caldwell (this I
learned wp"-- the officer who had lately spoken to me), and
asL^a me if I would take the brigade in. I told him I would
if he wished me to do so. He said he did. The command
was then called to attention. General Barnes got out in
front of them, and made a few patriotic remarks, to which
they responded with a cheer, and we started off across the
wheat-field in a line parallel to the road, our right flank
resting on the woods. We advanced to the stone fence be
yond the wheat-field next to the woods, and took position
behind it to support, as we supposed, our friends in the
woods in front. The Fourth Michigan, being on the right
of the brigade, extended beyond the stone fence, and was,
consequently, most exposed.
We had scarcely got to this position before I noticed
regiments retiring from the woods on our right, which I
supposed were relieved by others who had taken their
places, and would protect us in that direction. I observed
29

also that there was considerable firing diagonally toward
our rear from these woods, which I then thought were shots
from our troops aimed over us at the enemy in the woods
beyond and falling short. They were, however, much too fre
quent to be pleasant, and my color bearer, Ed. Martin, re
marked, "Colonel, I'll be  if I don't think we are
faced the wrong way; the rebs are up there in the woods
behind us, on the right."
About this time, too, word was brought me from the
Fourth Michigan and Sixty-second Pennsylvania that the
enemy were getting into our rear in the woods on the right.
I directed those regiments to change front, to face in that
direction and meet them, which they did, the firing in the
meanwhile being rapid and severe. I at the same time dis
patched Lieutenant Seitz, aide-de-camp, to communicate to
General Barnes our situation. He reached the point where
he had last seen General Barnes. He zvas not there. Lieu
tenant Seitz found the enemy had reached that point, and
he came near falling into their hands himself; his horse
was killed, and he made his way back to me on foot;
reported that General Barnes was not to be found; that the
enemy was in the woods on our right as far back as where
we had started from, and along the road in rear of the
wheat-field. Finding that we were surrounded — that our enemy was
under cover, while we were in the open field exposed to
their fire — I directed the command to fall back. This was
done in order, the command halting and firing as it retired.
The Fourth Michigan and Sixty-second Pennsylvania had
become mixed up with the enemy, and many hand-to-hand
conflicts occurred. * * *
Finding, as we retired in the direction from which we
advanced, that the fire of the enemy grew more severe on
our right, I took a diagonal direction toward the corner of
the wheat-field on our left and rear. We crossed the stone
fence on this side of the field, and retired to the rear of
the battery on the elevation beyond, where the command
halted. We had lost heavily in our passage across the field.
The Fourth Michigan and Sixty-second Pennsylvania had
been surrounded, and a large proportion of those regiments

30

were missing, either killed, wounded, or prisoners. What
remained of the command formed in the rear of the bat
tery, and we were shortly afterward joined by the Ninth
Massachusetts, which had been absent all day on detached
duty. It IS difficult to conceive of a more trying situation than
that in wbich three regiments of this command had lately
found themsleves, and from which they had just effected
their escape; in fact, I have since understood that one of
General Barnes' aids remarked to him shortly after we had
advanced, when it was discovered the enemy was behind
us on the flank, that he might bid good-bye to the Second
Brigade. I was also informed by General Barnes that,
learning soon after we had advanced, the situation on our
right, he had dispatched an orderly to me with the informa
tion and a verbal order to withdraw, but the orderly never
reached me.
Every officer and man in the command, so far as I am
informed, did his whole duty. All stood their ground and
fought unflinchingly until they were ordered by me to re
tire, and in falling back behaved with coolness and delib
eration. We lost many of our best officers and men.
I subjoin a field report of the regiments engaged on the
morning of July 2, and also a report of the same regiments
on July 4. A nominal and tabular report of casualties in
the command has already been forwarded.
About dark on the evening of the 2nd, the acting assis
tant adjutant-general of the First Brigade came to me and
inquired for General Barnes ; said he was directed by Gen
eral Sykes to tell him to have the Second Brigade form on
the right of the First in the position they then were. As
General Barnes was not present, I receiveed the order, and
put the Second Brigade in the position indicated, where we
remained until the evening of the 5th, when the division ad
vanced toward Emmitsburg.

31

REPORT OF COLONEL JAMES C. RICE,
Commanding Third Brigade, First Div., Fifth A. C.
AT Battle of Gettysburg, with
Reports of Regimental Commanders.
"Rebellion Records," Series 1, Vol. 27, page 616.
July 31, 1863.
In compliance with orders from division headquarters,
I have the honor to report the operations of this brigade
during the battle near Gettysburg on the 2nd and 3rd inst.
The brigade, under the command of the late Colonel
Vincent, was detached from the division and ordered into
position at about 4 p. m. of the 2nd instant, on the extreme
left of our line of battle. The Twentieth Maine occupied
the extreme left of the brigade line, the Sixteenth Michigan
the extreme right, connecting with the Third Division, under
General Crawford, while the Eighty-third Pennsylvania and
Forty-fourth New York occupied the center. The mus
kets taken into action by the brigade numbered about 1,000.
The ground occupied by the brigade in line of battle
was nearly that of a quarter circle, composed mostly of high
rocks and cliffs in the center and becoming more wooded
and less rugged as you approached to the left. The right
was thrown forward somewhat to the front of the ledge
of rocks, and was much more exposed than other parts of
the line. A comparatively smooth ravine extended along
the entire front, perhaps 50 yards from our line, while on
the left and beyond a high and jagged mountain rises,
called Round Top hill. That the disposition of the forces
and the nature of the ground may be better understood by
the general commanding, I send with this report a diagram
of the same.
The brigade had scarcely formed in line of battle and
pushed forward its skirmishers when a division of the
enemy's forces, under General Hood, made a desperate
attack along the entire line of the brigade. He approached
in three columns, with no skirmishers in advance. The
object of the enemy was evident. If he could gain the
vantage ground occupied by this brigade, the left flank of
32

our line must give way, opening to him a vast field for suc
cessful operations m the rear of our entire army.
To effect this object the enemy made every effort
Massing two or three brigades of his force, he tried for an
hour in vain to break the lines of the Forty-fourth New
York and Eighty-third Pennsylvania, charging again and
again within a few yards of these unflinching troops. At
every charge he was repulsed with terrible slaughter. De
spairing of success at this point, he made a desperate attack
upon the extreme right of the brigade, forcing back a part
of the Sixteenth Michigan. This regiment was broken,
and, through some misunderstanding of orders, explained
in the official report of the commanding officer, it was
thrown into confusion ; but being immediately supported by
the One Hundred and Fortieth New York Volunteers, the
line became again firm and unbroken.
It was at this point of time that Colonel Vincent, com
manding the brigade, fell mortally wounded. Of the char
acter of this gallant and accomplished officer I will speak
before I close this report.
The enemy again attacked the center with great vigor,
and the extreme left with desperation. Passing one brigade
of his forces by the right flank in three columns, he pushed
through the ravine toward the left of our brigade, came
immediately to a "front," and charged upon the Twentieth
Maine. Now occurred the most critical time of the action.
For above half an hour the struggle was desperate. At
length the enemy pressed so strongly upon the left flank of
Colonel Chamberlain's regiment that he wisely determined
to change the order of battle, and commanded his left wing
to fall back at right angles to his right. Lie then ordered
a charge and repulsed the enemy at every point.
On assuming the command of the brigade during this
attack upon the center and left, I at once passed along the
line, and notified the officers and men of my own regiment
that I was about to take command of the brigade and that
they must hold their position to the last. I did this that no
panic might arise. I then notified all the commanders of
the regiments in person, and assured them of my determina
tion to hold the line to the last. Colonel Chamberlain and
other officers immediately informed me that their commands

33

were out of ammunition. I had at this time neither an aide
nor an orderly even to bear a message. (See P. S.) The
enemy was still pressing heavily upon the line. I immediately
pressed into service every ofircer and man in the rear not
engaged in the action, whether known or unknown, and
made them pledge their honor that they would deliver in
person every order that I should send by them. I sent four
of them, one after another, with orders for ammunition.
The ammunition came promptly, was distributed at once,
and the fight went on.
The enemy was now attempting to take possession of
Round Top hill, a commanding position overlooking our
left. It was evident no time was to be lost, and I sent at
once other officers, whom I pressed into my service, with
messages to the general commanding the corps, asking
for re-enforcements to support the brigade. The messages
were promptly delivered, and five regiments were at once
sent to my support from the Third Division, General Craw
ford, under command of Colonel Fisher.
Having, with the aid of this officer, properly disposed
of three regiments of this force, I ordered Colonel Cham
berlain, of the Twentieth Maine, to advance and take pos
session of the mountain. This order was promptly and
gallantly executed by this brave and accomplished officer,
who rapidly drove the enemy over the mountain, capturing
many prisoners. Colonel Fisher at once ordered two regi
ments of his command to support Colonel Chamberlain,
and the hill remained permanently in our possession.
The forces of the enemy beingnow repulsed on our left
and front, I ordered a detachment from the Forty-fourth
New York Volunteers and the Eighty-third Pennsylvania
to push forward and secure all the fruits of this hard-
earned victory.
It was now 8 o'clock in the evening, and before 9 o'clock
we had entire possession of the enemy's ground, had gath
ered up and brought in all of our own wounded and those
of the enemy, and had taken and sent to the rear over 500
prisoners, including 2 colonels and 15 commissioned offi
cers, together with over 1,000 stand of arms belonging to
the enemy.

34

The following morning the prisoners of the brigade
buried all of our own dead and a large number of those of
the enemy.
The fearful loss of the enemy during this struggle may
be estimated from the fact that over 50 of his dead were
counted in front of the Twentieth Maine Regiment, and his
loss was nearly in that proportion along our entire line.
Although this brigade has been engaged in nearly all of
the great battles of the Army of the Potomac, and has
always greatly distinguished itself for gallant behavior, yet
in none has it fought so desperately or achieved for itself
such imperishable honors as in this severe conflict of the
2nd instant.
A nominal and tabular list of the casualties of this brig
ade has already been forwarded to the major-general com-
•manding, but it is fitting again to mention the names of the
brave and faithful officers of the command who fell in this
desperate struggle. Of the Forty-fourth New York Vol
unteers, Capt. L. S. Larrabee and Lieutenants Dunham and
Thomas ; of the Twentieth Maine, Lieutenant Kendall, and
of the Sixteenth Michigan, Lieutenants Browne, Jewett, and
Borden were killed. •
The brigade was relieved during the forenoon of the 3d
instant by the First Brigade, and ordered to the center of
the line, where it remained in reserve the balance of the
day, exposed to a severe cannonading, but with no loss,
from the security of its position.
The colonel commanding would commend to the favor
able notice of the general commanding the following-named
officers, for their gallant conduct in battle on the 2d instant:
Colonel Chamberlain and Adjutant Chamberlain, of the
Twentieth Maine; Lieutenant-Colonel Conner and Major
Knox, of the Forty- fourth New York Volunteers; Captain
Woodward and Adjutant Gifford, of the Eighty-third
Pennsylvania, and Captain Elliott and Adjutant Jacklin, of
the Sixteenth Michigan.
Especially would I call the attention of the general com
manding to the distinguished services rendered by Colonel
Chamberlain throughout the entire struggle.
To the loss sustained by this command in the death of
Colonel Vincent I can refer in no more appropriate lan-

35

guage than that used in the general order announcing it to
this brigade, a copy of which I herewith annex.
P. S. In justice to the officers composing the staff, it
gives me satisfaction to state, in explanation of my report,
that at the time I took command. Captain (Eugene A.)
Nash, inspector-general of the brigade, was, in obedience
to orders received from Colonel Vincent, at the front watch
ing the movements of the enemy, to report the same if he
should attempt a flank movement; that Captain (John M.)
Clark, assistant adjutant-general, in obedience to orders,
was absent for ammunition, and that Captain (Amos M.)
Judson, by orders, was absent for re-enforcements. Dur
ing the night these officers rendered me the greatest service
and I desire to commend each of them to the most favorable
notice of the commanding general for their gallant conduct
both under Colonel Vincent's command as well as my own.
(Inclosure.) General Orders No. 5,
Hdqrs. 3d Brigade, 1st Div., 5th Corps,
July 12, 1863.
The colonel commanding hereby announces to the brig
ade the death of Brig.-Gen. Strong Vincent. He died near
Gettysburg, Pa., July 7, 1863, from the effects- of a wound
received on the 2d instant, and within sight of that field
which his bravery had so greatly assisted to win. A day
hallowed with all the glory of success is thus sombered by
the sorrow of our loss. Wreaths of victory give way to
chaplets of mourning, hearts exultant to feelings of grief.
A soldier, a scholar, a friend, has fallen. For his country,
struggling for its life, he willingly gave his own. Grateful
for his services, the State which proudly claims him as her
own will give him an honored grave and a costly monu
ment, but he ever will remain buried in our hearts, and our
love for his memory will outlast the stone which shall bear
the inscription of his bravery, his virtues, and his patri
otism. While we deplore his death, and remember with sorrow
our loss, let us emulate the example of his fidelity and pa
triotism, feeling that he lives but in vain who lives not for
his God and his country. 36

REPORT OF COL. JOSHUA L. CHAMBERLAIN,
Twentieth M.mne Inf.\ntry.
Field Near Emmitsburg, July 6, 1863.
In cornpliance with the request of the colonel command
ing the brigade, I have the honor to submit a somewhat de
tailed report of the operations of the Twentieth Regiment
Maine Volunteers in the battle of Gettysburg, on the 2d and
3rd instant.
Having acted as the advance guard, made necessary by
the proximity of the enemy's cavalry, on the march of the
day before, my command on reaching Hanover, Pa., just
before sunset on that day, were much worn, and lost no
time in getting ready for an expected bivouac. Rations
were scarcely issued, and the men about preparing supper,
when rumors that the enemy had been encountered that
day near Gettysburg absorbed every other interest, and very
soon orders came to march forthwith to Gettysburg.
My men moved out with a promptitude and spirit ex
traordinary, the cheers and welcome they received on the
road adding to their enthusiasm. After an hour or two of
sleep by the roadside just before daybreak, we reached the
heights southeasterly of Gettysburg at about 7 a. m. July 2.
Massed at first with the rest of the division on the right
of the road, we were moved several times farther toward
the left. Although expecting every moment to be put into
action and held strictly in line of battle, yet the men were
able to take some rest and make the most of their rations.
Somewhere near 4 p. m. a sharp cannonade, at some
distance to our left and front, was the signal for a sudden
and rapid movement of our whole division in the direction
of this firing, which grew warmer as we approached.
Passing an open field in the hollow ground in which some
of our batteries were going into position, our brigade
reached the skirt of a piece of woods, in the farther edge
of which there was a heavy musketry fire, and when about
to go forward into line we received from Colonel Mncent,
commanding the brigade, orders to move to the left at the
double-quick, when we took a farm road crossing Plum
Run in order to gain a rugged mountain spur called Granite
Spur, or Little Round Top. 37

The enemy's artillery got range of our column as we
were climbing the spur, and the crashing of the shells
among the rocks and the tree tops made us move lively
along the crest. One or two shells burst in our ranks.
Passing to the southern slope of Little Round Top, Colonel
Vincent indicated to me the ground my regiment was to
occupy, informing me that this was the extreme left of our
general line, and that a desperate attack was expected in
order to turn that position, concluding by telling me I was
to "hold that ground at all hazards." This was the last
word I heard from him.
In order to commence by making my right firm, I formed
my regiment on the right into line, giving such direction to
the line as should best secure the advantage of the rough,
rocky, and stragglingly wooded ground.
The line faced generally toward a more conspicuous
eminence southwest of ours, which is known as Sugar Loaf,
or Round Top. Between this and my position intervened
a smooth and thinly wooded hollow. My line formed, I
immediately detached Company B, Captain Morrill com
manding, to extend from my left flank across this hollow
as a line of skirmishers, with directions to act as occasion
might dictate, to prevent a surprise on my exposed flank
and rear.
The artillery fire on our position had meanwhile been
constant and heavy, but my formation was scarcely com
plete when the artillery was replaced by a vigorous infantry
assault upon the center of our brigade to my right, but it
very soon involved the right of my regiment and gradually
extended along my entire front. The action was quite
sharp and at close quarters.
In the midst of this an officer from my center informed
me that some important movement of the enemy was going
on in his front, beyond that of the line with which we were
engaged. Mounting a large rock, I was able to see a con
siderable body of the enemy moving by the flank in rear of
their line engaged, and passing from the direction of the
foot of Great Round Top through the valley toward the
front of my left. The close engagement not allowing any
change of front, I immediately stretched my regiment to the
left, by taking intervals by the left flank, and at the same
38

time "refusing" my left wing, so that it was nearly at right
angles with my right, thus occupying about twice the extent
of our ordinary front, some of the companies being brought
into single rank when the nature of the ground gave suffi
cient strength or shelter. My officers and men understood
my wishes so well that this movement was executed under
fire, the right wing keeping up fire, without giving the
enemy any occasion to seize or even to suspect their ad
vantage. But we were not a moment too soon ; the enemy's
flanking column having gained their desired direction, burst
upon my left, where they evidently had expected an un
guarded flank, with great demonstration.
We opened a brisk fire at close range, which was so
sudden and effective that they soon fell back among the
rocks and low trees in the valley, only to burst forth again
with a shout, and rapidly advanced, firing as they came.
They pushed up to within a dozen yards of us before the
terrible effectiveness of our fire compelled them to break and
take shelter.
They renewed the assault on our whole front, and for
an hour the fighting was severe. Squads of the enemy
broke through our line in several places, and the fight was
literally hand to hand. The edge of the fight rolled back
ward and forward like a wave. The dead and wounded
were now in our front and then in our rear. Forced from
our position, we desperately recovered it, and pushed the
enemy down to the foot of the slope. The intervals of the
struggle were seized to remove our wounded (and those of
the enemy also), to gather ammunition from the cartridge-
boxes of disabled friend or foe on the field, and even Co
secure better muskets than the Enfields, which we found
did not stand service well. Rude shelters v/ere thrown up
of the loose rocks that covered the ground.
Captain Woodward, commanding the Eighty-third Penn
sylvania Volunteers, on my right, gallantly maintaining his
fight, judiciously and with hearty co-operation made his
movements conform to my necessities, so that my right was
at no time exposed to a flank attack.
The enemy seemed to have gathered all their energies
for their final assault. We had gotten our thin line into as
good a shape as possible, when a strong force emerged from
39

the scrub wood in the valley, as well as I could judge, in
two lines in echelon by the right, and, opening a heavy fire,
the first line came on as if they meant to sweep everything
before them. We opened on them as well as we could with
our scanty ammunition snatched from the field.
It did not seem possible to withstand another shock like
this now coming on. Our loss had been severe. One-half
of my left wing had fallen and a third of my regiment lay
just behind us, dead or badly wounded. At this moment my
anxiety was increased by a. great roar of musketry in my
rear, on the farther or northerly slope of Little Round Top,
apparently on the flank of the regular brigade, which was
in support of Hazlett's battery on the crest behind us. The
bullets from this attack struck into my left rear, and I
feared that the enemy might have nearly surrounded the
Little Round Top, and only a desperate chance was left for
us. My ammunition was soon exhausted. My men were
firing their last shot and getting ready to "club" their
muskets. It was imperative to strike before we were struck by
this overwhelming force in a hand-to-hand fight, which we
could not probably have withstood or survived. At that
crisis, I ordered the bayonet. The word was enough. It
ran like fire along the line, from man to man, and rose into
a shout, with which they sprang forward upon the enemy,
now not 30 yards away. The effect was surprising ; many
of the enemy's first line threw down their arms and sur
rendered. An officer fired his pistol at my head with one
hand, while he handed me his sword with the other. Hold
ing fast by our right, and swinging forward our left, we
made an extended "right wheel," before which the enemy's
second line broke, and fell back, fighting from tree to tree,
many being captured, until we had swept the valley and
cleared the front of nearly our entire brigade.
Meantime, Captain Morrill with his skirmishers (sent
out from my left flank), with some dozen or fifteen of the
U. S. Sharpshooters who had put themselves under his
direction, fell upon the enemy as they were breaking, and
by his demonstrations, as well as his well-directed fire,
added much to the effect of the charge.

40

Having thus cleared the valley and driven the enemy
up the western slope of the Great Round Top, not wishing
to press so far out as to hazard the ground I was to hold
by leaving it exposed to a sudden rush of the enemy, I suc
ceeded (although with some effort to stop my men, who
declared they were "on the road to Richmond") in getting
the regiment into good order and resuming our original
position. Four hundred prisoners, including two field and several
line officers, were sent to the rear. These were mainly from
the Fifteenth and Forty-seventh Alabama Regiments, with
some of the Fourth and Fifth Texas. One hundred and
fifty of the enemy were found killed and wounded in our
front. At dusk. Colonel Rice informed me of the fall of Colonel
Vincent, which had devolved the command of the brigade
on him, and that Colonel Fisher had come up with a brigade
to our support. These troops were massed in our rear.
It was the understanding, as Colonel Rice informed me, that
Colonel Fisher's brigade was to advance and seize the west
ern slope of Great Round Top, where the enemy had
shortly before been driven. But, after considerable delay,
this intention for some reason was not carried into exe
cution. We were apprehensive that if the enemy were allowed
to strengthen himself in that position, he would have a great
advantage in renewing the attack on us at daylight or be
fore. Colonel Rice then directed me to make the movement
to seize that crest.
It was now 9 p. m. Without waiting to get ammunition,
but trusting in part to the very circumstance of not expos
ing our movement or our small f ront iy -firing, and with
bayonets fixed, the little handful of 200 men pressed up
the mountain side in very extend&d-oi-dervas the steep and
jagged surface of the ground compelled. We heard squads
of the enemy falling back before us, and, when near the
crest, we met a scattering and uncertain fire, which caused
us the great loss of the gallant Lieutenant Linscott, who
fell, mortally wounded. In the silent advance in the dark
ness we laid hold of 25 prisoners, among them a staff officer
of General (E. M.) Law, commanding the brigade imme-
41

diately opposed to us during the fight. Reaching the crest,
and reconnoitering the ground, I placed the men in a strong
position among the rocks, and informed Colonel Rice, re
questing also ammunition and some support to our right,
which was very near the enemy, their movements and words
even being now distinctly heard by us.
Some confusion soon after resulted from the attempt of
some regiment of Colonel Fisher's brigade to come to our
support. They had found a wood road up the mountain,
which brought them on my right flank, and also in proxim
ity to the enemy, massed a little below. Hearing their ap
proach, and thinking a movement from that quarter could
only be from the enemy, I made disposition to receive them
as such. In the confusion which attended the attempt to
form them in support of my right, the enemy opened a
brisk fire, which disconcerted my efforts to form them and
disheartened the supports themselves, so that I saw no more
of them that night.
Feeling somewhat insecure in this isolated position, I
sent in for the Eighty-third Pennsylvania, which came
speedily, followed by the Forty-fourth New York, and, hav
ing seen these well posted, I sent a strong picket to the
front, with instructions to report to me every half hour
during the night, and allowed the rest of my men to sleep
on their arms.
At some time about midnight, two regiments of Colonel
Fisher's brigade came up the mountain beyond my left, and
took position near the summit ; but as the enemy did not
threaten from that direction, I made no effort to connect
with them. - - ~~
We went into the fight with 386, all told — 358 guns.
Every pioneer and musician whio could carry a musket went
into the ranks. Even the sick and footsore, who could- not
keep up in the march, came up as soon as they could find
their regiments, and took their places in line of battle, while
it was battle, indeed. Some prisoners I had under guard,
under sentence of court-martial, I was obliged to put into
the fight, and they bore their part well, for which I shall
recommend a commutation of their sentence.
The loss, so far as I can ascertain it, is 136 — 30 of whom
were killed, and among the wounded are many mortally.
42

Captain Billings, Lieutenant Kendall, and Lieutenant
Linscott are officers whose loss we deeply mourn, efficient
soldiers and pure and high-minded men.
In such an engagement there were many incidents of
heroism and noble character which should have place even
in an official report ; but, under present circumstances, I am
unable to do justice to them. I will say of that regiment
that the resolution, courage, and heroic fortitude which en
abled us to withstand so formidable an attack have happily
led to so conspicuous a result, that they may safely trust
to history to record their merits.
About noon on the 3d of July, we were withdrawn, and
formed on the right of the brigade, in the front edge of a
piece of woods near the left center of our main line of bat
tle, where we were held in readiness to support our troops,
then receiving the severe attack of the afternoon of that day.
On the 4th, we made a reconnaissance to the front, to
ascertain the movements of the enemy, but finding that they
had retired, at least beyond Willoughby's Run, we returned
to Little Round Top, where we buried our dead in the place
where we had laid them during the fight, marking each
grave by a head-board made of ammunition boxes, with
each soldier's name cut upon it. We also buried 50 of the
enemy's dead, in front of our position of July 2. We then
looked after our wounded, whom I had taken the responsi
bility of putting into the houses of citizens in the vicinity of
Little Round Top, and, on the morning of the 5th, took up
our march on the Emmitsburg road.
REPORT OF LIEUT.-COL. NORA'AL E. WELCH,
Sixteenth Michigan Infantry.
Near Emmittsburg, Md., July 6, 1863.
In reply to circular of jiis date from brigade headquar
ters, as to'thc part this re^'iment sustained in the action of
July 2 and 3, I have the honor to report:
The regiment, under my command, lay with the Third
Brigade, Fir^^t Division, Fifth Corps, closed in mass, near
and in rear of Getty.-br.rg, to the left of the main road,
during most of the day. The brigade was commanded by
43

Col. Strong Vincent, Eighty-third Regiment, Pennsylvania
Volunteers. About 4 p. m. we moved rapidly to the extreme left of
our line of battle, and went into position on the left of the
brigade, at that time circling the crest of a high, rocky hill.
After deploying two of my largest companies as skirmish
ers — Brady's Sharpshooters from the left, and Company
A from the right — I was ordered at double-quick to the
right of the brigade, and to take my position on the right of
the Forty-fourth New York. Before this could be accom
plished, however, we were under a heavy fire of the enemy's
infantry. We succeeded, however, in securing our places
after some loss.
We remained in this position nearly half an hour, when
some one (supposed to be General Weed or Alajor-General
Sykes ) called from the extreme crest of the hill to fall back
nearer the top, where a much less exposed line could be
taken up. This order was not obeyed, except by single indi
viduals. From some misconstruction of orders, and en
tirely unwarrantable assumption of authority. Lieutenant
Kydd ordered the colors back. None left with them, how
ever, but three of the color-guard. They followed the brig
ade colors to where Colonel Vincent, after being wounded,
had been carried, where they remained all night, joining the
regiment in the morning with 45 men, who had left the field
during and after the fight. All the remainder of the regi
ment retained their position until relieved.
The two companies sent out as skirmishers numbered
about 50. The number of muskets taken in line was about
150; the number killed and wounded 59 — 21 killed. Sev
eral wounded have since died.
On the 3d, we took up a new line farther to the right,
at the left of the brigade, and remained on our arms for
twenty- four hours.
Captain Elliott and Adjutant Jacklin behaved with their
usual gallantry. Captain Partridge, Lieutenants Borgman
(wounded). Woodruff, Forsyth, Cameron (wounded, with
arm amputated). Swart, Graham, Salter, and Captain
Chandler, behaved nobly and handled their men with cool
ness and valor. Lieutenants Browne, Company E, Jewett,
Company K, and Borden, Company F, died, bravely defend-
44

mg the flag they had sworn to support and that they loved
in their hearts, and emulating the bravest. I had no truer
or purer officers, and their loss cannot be replaced.
REPORT OF LIEUT-COL. FREEMAN CONNER,
Forty-Fourth New York Infantry.
July 6, 1863.
I have the honor to submit the following report of the
action taken by this regiment in the engagement of July 2 :
About 4 p. m. our regiment. Col. J. C. Rice command
ing, was placed in position on Round Top Hill, with the
Eighty-third Pennsylvania on our left and the Sixteenth
Michigan on our right. Company B was immediately
thrown out as skirmishers. When they had advanced about
200 yards they met the enemy advancing in three lines of
battle. Orders were immediately given by Capt. L. S. Larrabee,
commanding the company, to fall back upon the battalion.
It was while executing this order that that faithful and
brave officer was shot through the body and instantly killed,
being the first officer that this regiment had ever had killed
in battle. The enemy continued to advance until the first line came
within about 40 yards of our line. Upon their first appear
ance we opened a heavy fire upon them, which was con
tinued until they were compelled to retreat. After they
had disappeared in our immediate front, we turned our fire
upon those who had advanced in the hollow to our right,
and continued it until we were out of ammunition.
After we had been engaged about one hour. Colonel
Vincent, commanding brigade, was wounded, and the com
mand fell upon Col. J. C. Rice, and the command of the
regiment upon myself.
We remained in our position until the next morning
about 8 a. m., when we were relieved by Colonel Hayes,
Eighteenth Massachusetts. We were then moved to the
right about three-eighths of a mile, and formed in line of
battle, the Sixteenth Michigan on our left and the Twentieth
Maine on our .right. 45

I regret to add that in addition to Captain Larrabee,
whose death I have already noted, the officers are called
upon to mourn the loss of First Lieutenant Eugene L. Dun
ham, Company D, a brave and efficient officer, who was in
stantly killed during the heavy firing from the enemy in our
front. Capt. William R. Bourne, Company K ; Capt. Ben
nett Munger, Company C; Adjt. George B. Herendeen;
First Lieut. Charles H. Zeilman, commanding Company F,
and Second Lieut. Benjamin N. Thomas, Company K, were
wounded, the latter, it is feared, mortally.
It affords me great pleasure to be able to state that both
officers and men behaved with the greatest coolness and
bravery, not a single case of cowardice having come to
my ear.
REPORT OF CAPT. ORPHEUS S. WOODWARD,
Eighty-Third Pennsylvania Infantry.
Near Emmitsburg, Md., July 6, 1863.
In compliance with orders from headquarters Third
Brigade, First Division, Fifth Corps, I have the honor to
report the following as the operations of my command dur
ing the battle of the 2d, 3d, 4th and 5th instant.
On the morning of the 2d instant, moved to the front.
At about 2 :30 p. m. was ordered into position on our ex
treme left, the Forty-fourth New York on my right, the
Twentieth Maine on my left. At 3:15 p. m. the enemy ad
vanced and engaged my skirmishers, pressing on in force,
with bayonets fixed. They soon drove in my skirmishers
and engaged my regiment, posted behind rocks and stones
hastily thrown up for defense. The contest continued lively
until nearly 6 p. m., when the enemy fell back. I instantly
threw forward a strong line of skirmishers, who captured
between 50 and 60 prisoners and 200 stand of arms.
My men and officers acted splendidly. Where all did
so well, I cannot discriminate.
My loss amounted to 10 killed and 45 wounded.
At 1 :30 a. m. on the 3d, moved to the support of the
Twentieth Maine, which had succeeded in taking a high hill

46

a little to the left of my former position. Remained here
until 10 a. ni., when, being relieved by a regiment of the
Pennsylvania Reserves, rejoined my brigade, massed in the
woods, just at the right of General Sykes' headquarters.
Here I remained until 12 m., the 4th, when the brigade was
thrown forward on a reconnaissance. We moved out, and
occupied the position occupied by the enemy the previous
day ; threw forward skirmishers, but found no opposing
force within 2 miles. I deem it but proper to state that but
for the prompt and skillful disposition made by Colonel
A'incent of the troops under his command (the Third Brig
ade), the enemy would have succeeded in turning our left.
I regret to state that Colonel \'incent was severely
wounded. My command (his regiment) esteemed him
highly as a gentleman, scholar, and soldier, and bitterly
avenged his injury.

REPORT OF GEN. ROMEYN B. AYRES,
Commanding Second Division, Fifth Army' Corps,
July 28, 1863.
"Rebellion Records," Series 1, Vol. 27, page 634.
extract.
* * * In the afternoon, the enemy's attack on the
left of our position being developed, the division, preceded
by the First Division, was marched to the support of our
troops engaged, the Third Brigade being placed in position
on the general line of battle upon a rocky hill (usually
called Round Top hill) of great importance, facing the Em
mitsburg and Gettysburg pike. This brigade was ordered
to hold this hill, which duty it performed well and effectu
ally. * * *

47

REPORT OF COL. KENNER GARRARD,
Commanding Third Brigade, Second Div., Fifth A. C.
AT Battle of Gettysburg
After Death of General Weed.
"Rebellion Records," Series 1, Vol. 27, Part 1, page 651.
extract.
* * * At this point the leading regiment, under the
direction of General Warren, chief engineer Army of the
Potomac, was led to the left, up on what is known as Round
Top ridge. Hazlett's Battery ascended the ridge immedi
ately in rear of this regiment (the One hundred and forti
eth New York Volunteers, Col. P. H. O'Rorke command
ing), and went into battery on the summit. The One hun
dred and fortieth was formed in line, and was immediately
closely engaged with the enemy at short musket range on
the left slope of the ridge.
A portion of the First Division, Fifth Army Corps (Vin
cent's Brigade. O. W. N.), was engaged to the left of the
ridge, and this regiment and Hazlett's Battery were brought
up to assist the First Division in repelling a heavy assault
of the enemy, with the evident design of gaining this ridge.
Colonel O'Rorke was mortally wounded at the head of his
regiment while leading it into action.
The other regiments. One hundred and forty-sixth
New York Volunteers and the Ninety-first and One hun
dred and fifty-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, were led to
the right and front some distance, and formed in line in a
narrow valley to support a portion of the Third Corps and
Watson's Battery, then severely pressed by the enemy. Be
fore becoming engaged, however, orders were received for
these regiments to return at double-quick to Round Top
ridge, and secure and hold that position. The Ninety-first
was posted on the left of the battery, connecting with the
One hundred and fortieth. The One hundred and forty-
sixth and One hundred and fifty-fifth were posted on the
right, extending from the battery on the summit, along the
crest of the ridge, to the gorge on the right.
* * * When the brigade and Hazlett's Battery seized
the ridge, it was done under a heavy musketry fire, and was

entirely. unoccupied, excepting by a part of the First Divi
sion (Third Brigade under Vincent. O. W. N.), on the ex
treme left, and I am gratified to report to the general com
manding the division that the order to secure and hold the
ridge -a^as faithfully e.recuted.
COMMENTS ON OFFICIAL REPORTS.
In reports marked "extract," portions in relation to pre
liminary movements and in some cases recommendations of
officers for good conduct and matters purely formal are
oniitted, but all which relates directly to the subject of
this paper is given as reported by the several officers.
General Sykes
States that he posted Sweitzer's and Tilton's brigades
of the First Division himself. He says that "In the mean
time, Vincent's brigade, of this division, had seized the
rocky height, closely followed by Weed's brigade. Second
Division. These troops were posted under the direction of
General Warren, Chief Engineer of this army." If by
"these troops" General Sykes means to include Vincent's
brigade, it appears to be an error. There seems to be no
reference to Warren in any of the reports of Vincent's
brigade and no evidence that Warren at any time went far
ther to the south than the ground occupied by the One hun
dred and fortieth New York of Weed's brigade.
The statement that Weed's brigade had been taken away
from its position on the hill by order of General Sickles and
ordered by General Sykes to return and reoccupy that posi
tion is not confirmed by the report of Colonel Garrard, who
assumed command when General Weed fell, and made the
report for the brigade after the battle. He must have been
present and could hardly have failed to notice this change
of position. It seems more probable that General Sykes
had ordered the brigade to the hill before he went to the
rear to bring up the Third Division and finding on his re
turn that General Weed with all his regiments except the
One hundred and fortieth New York were marching to the
front by order of General Sickles, ordered them back to the
position which he had previously assigned to them.
49

General Barnes.
This officer's report was not made until August 24,
nearly two months after the battle and then only after the
receipt of positive instructions to make his report. It is a
long document, composed largely of verbatim copies of the
reports of his subordinate officers. It seems evident from
the reports of his brigade commanders that they received
very little assistance from him during the battle. General
Sykes says that he personally posted the First and Second
Brigades. The Third Brigade was removed from his im
mediate command and asked and received no advice or
assistance from the Division commander. Barnes says that
he was with General Sykes when General Warren applied
to the latter for troops to occupy Round Top, that Sykes
yielded to Warren's urgent request and that he (Barnes)
immediately directed Colonel Vincent, commanding the
Third Brigade, to proceed to that point with his brigade.
In view of the writer's certain knowledge of the conversa
tion between Colonel Vincent and the officer of General
Sykes' staff and the enquiry of that officer for the where
abouts of General Barnes, the only plausible explanation of
Barnes' statement is that General Sykes' aide found Barnes
after leaving Vincent and Barnes sent the order after Vin
cent and his brigade had gone.
Some important discrepancies are found between Gen
eral Barnes' report of the orders given and movements
made by the First and Second brigades and reports of these
movements made by the brigade commanders, some of
which will be specified in comments on the Brigade Re
ports. Reading between the lines, it appears that Barnes'
action as division commander was not efficient and did not
inspire great confidence in him in the minds of any of his
brigade commanders. Orders which h£ claims to have
given in regard to some of the movements of the brigades-
are reported by Colonel Tilton and Colonel Sweitzer to have
been made under their own initiative and when they finally
reached their last position they reported directly to the-
Corps commander. General Barnes says that "Being dis
abled for further actual command of the division, the op
portune arrival of General Griffin enabled me to relinquish
60

it to him, and the division moved toward Aliddletown,
w^here it arrived July 8." He does not say what caused
his disability. The only reference to him which writer has
been able to find in the official reports, is that in 1864 he
was relieved from duty on court martial and assigned to
the command of a prisoners' camp at Point Lookout.
Colonel Tilton
After describing the position taken by his brigade and
the attack on his front, states that "General Barnes ordered
me to fall back in good order if unable to hold the position."
He makes no mention of an order from General Ijarnes to
change his front to repel the attack on his flank. Finding
that the enemy was in great force on his right and rear, he
made several changes of position apparently without orders
from General Barnes, and at last, after crossing an open
field, took up a new position upon the right of the Second
Division, and reported to General Sykes.
Colonel Sweitzer,
After detailing the various movements of his brigade,
some by the direction of General Barnes and others by his
own orders, in extricating his men from their perilous posi
tion, he adds these significant words : "About dark on the
evening of the 2nd, the Acting Assistant Adjutant General
of the First Brigade came to me and enquired for General
Barnes; said he was directed by General Sykes to tell him
to have the Second Brigade form on the right of the First,
in the position they then were. As General Barnes was
not present, I received the order, and put the Second
Brigade in the position indicated, where we remained until
the evening of the 5th, when the division advanced toward
Emmitsburg." From this it would appear that at the close
of the battle on the second day General Barnes was not
present or in communication with any of the brigades of his
division. From his conduct as reported by the command
ers of the First and Second brigades, the reader may judge
what would have been the result if Mncent had waited for
an order from him before moving his brigade to Little
Round Top.

51

Colonel Rice.
As his report and those of his regimental commanders
show so clearly the importance of the part taken by this
brigade in securing the victory as Gettysburg, they are given
in full. It will be noticed that neither Colonel Rice nor any
of the regimental commanders make any reference to Gen
eral Warren having conducted them to this position or
taken any part in posting the brigade. The report of Colo
nel Chamberlain graphically describes the fighting of his
splendid regiment. The promotion of Colonel Rice to be
Brigadier-General and his transfer to another corps, left
Colonel Chamberlain in command of this famous brigade
and with his Twentieth Maine, the Eighty-third Pennsyl
vania, and other regiments which had been added to the
command later in the war. Chamberlain commanded the
force which received the formal surrender of Lee's army
at Appomattox. The brief reports of Lieutenant -Colonel
Conner of the Forty-fourth New York and Captain Wood
ward of the Eighty-third Pennsylvania, are scarcely ade
quate to measure the splendid fighting of these regiments.
The report of Lieutenant -Colonel Welch of the Sixteenth
Michigan contains some statements which are not confirmed
either by the brigade commander or the commanders of the
other regiments. He says, "About 4 p. m. we moved
rapidly to the extreme left of our line of battle, and went
into position on the left of the brigade, at that time circling
the crest of a high, rocky hill. After deploying two of my
largest companies as skirmishers — Brady's Sharpshooters
from the left, and Company A from the right — I was or
dered at double-quick to the right of the brigade, and to
take my position on the right of the Forty-fourth New
York. Before this could be accomplished, we were under
a heavy fire of the enemy's infantry. We succeeded, how
ever, in securing our places after some loss." This state
ment does not appear to be in accordance with the facts.
When the brigade neared the position assigned to it, march
ing in column of fours, the Forty-fourth New York headed
the column, followed by the Sixteenth Michigan, the
Eighty-third Pennsylvania next, the Twentieth Maine bring
ing up the rear. At the request of Colonel Rice that the
52

Forty-fourth New York and Eighty-third Pennsylvania
might fight side by side, as they had in all previous engage
ments, Colonel Vincent assented, and directed the Six
teenth to pass the Forty-fourth. This may have been done
at the double-quick, but no skirmishers were thrown out at
that time by the Sixteenth Michigan and probably at no
time during the battle, as the ground in their front was
open to the foot of the hill. As soon as the Sixteenth
Michigan was in place the other regiments followed, taking
position on the left in the following order: Forty-fourth
New York, Eighty-third Pennsylvania and Twentieth
Maine on the left. The brigade was all in position before a
soldier of the enemy had been seen. The skirmishers
thrown out by the Eighty-third and Forty-fourth advanced
some distance before a shot was fired by either side. The
Sixteenth Michigan was fully in place and at least two
heavy assaults had been repulsed by the other regiments
before the Sixteenth Michigan had received a shot from
the direction of its front. After the attacks by the five
Alabama regiments had been repulsed from our center, the
Texas regiments of Robertson's brigade passed north on
the left of Law to a point some distance beyond the Six
teenth Michigan, then advanced in heavy force against that
regiment. Its right wing fell back in disorder, while the
left held fast. The Texans were within our lines for a few
moments, when the timely arrival of the One hundred and
fortieth New York and their charge down the slope, caused
the enemy to retire, and our line was re-established. In
his attempt to stop the retreat of Welch's men, Colonel
Vincent was mortally wounded. Welch further states,
"We remained in this position nearly half an hour, when
some one (supposed to be General Weed or Major-General
Sykes) called from the extreme crest of the hill to fall back
nearer the top, where a much less exposed line could be
taken up. This order was not obeyed, except by single in
dividuals. From some misconstruction of orders, and en
tirely unwarrantable assumption of authority. Lieutenant
Kydd ordered the colors back. None left with them, how
ever, but three of the color-guard. They followed the
brigade colors to where Colonel A/'incent, after being
wounded, had been carried, where they remained all night.

63

joining the regiment in the morning, with 45 men, who had
left the field during and after the fight. All the remainder
of the regiment retained their position until relieved." This
is a remarkable statement evidently made to account for the
unsoldierly conduct of the portion of the Sixteenth Mich
igan and its commanding officer. It is certain that neither
General Sykes nor General Weed was ' near that position
at that time. He makes no mention of the presence of the
One hundred and fortieth New York with Colonel O'Rorke
at its head, which charged down the hill and repulsed the
enemy which had driven back the right of Welch's regi
ment. It is certain that Welch with his 45 men did not fol
low the brigade colors at that time to the house where Vin
cent was carried, because the brigade colors did not leave
the hill until the fighting was all over, when the writer, who
carried those colors, was sent to the rear by Colonel Rice to
get assistance for our wounded. It is certain that Colonel
Welch told the writer near the farm house where Vincent
lay, that the brigade had been driven off the hill and he
did not know where it was. It is probable that Welch with
a part of his regiment sought safety in the rear of the ridge,
and went with his men nearly a mile from the scene of
the fight of his brigade and remained until morning.
It is significant that in his report Colonel Rice com
mended for their gallant conduct Colonel Chamberlain and
Adjutant Chamberlain of the Twentieth Alaine, Lieutenant-
Colonel Conner and Major Knox of the Forty-fourth New
York, Captain Woodward, commanding Eighty-third Penn
sylvania, and Adjutant Gifford of that regiment, but in the
Sixteenth Michigan mentions only Captain Elliott and Ad
jutant Jacklin, omitting any reference to Lieutenant-Colo
nel Welch.
Colonel Rice in his kindness of heart seems to have ac
cepted the statement made by Colonel Welch in his report,
but could not commend his conduct. Possibly as he was
engaged with his own regiment at the time this break oc
curred he had no personal knowledge of the facts. Welch
continued in command of the regiment and in subsequent
battles acted well.
Colonel Vincent gave up his life here, but his brigade,
with the assistance of the One hundred and fortieth New

54

York led by the gallant Colonel O'Rorke, maintained its
position until the end.
In 1901 the writer sent substantially the same state
ment, in regard to A^incent's conduct at Gettysburg, to each
of the officers named below, and received letters in reply
with permission to publish them, from which the following
extracts are made :

p-ROM MAJOR-GENERAL DANIEL BUTTERFIELD.
Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg.
Hotel Royal Palm, Miami, Florida, February 19, 1901.
No man who lived and fought in the battle of Gettys
burg did more for his country than Vincent. I knew the
whole matter from beginning to end. He was a magnificent
soldier, a gentleman of high education and great ability.
General Tremain brought messages to General Meade
and to me from the field, describing the exigency and great
need for the immediate occupation of Round Top, and
authority was given him to send the troops there. In my
judgment there was not another command on the field
which could have been more effective in the matter of time
and rapidity of movement in getting to the spot in time to
have saved the day, owing to its wonderful efficiency, drill
and discipline under Vincent, who had been trained and
educated with it.
FROM DANIEL E. SICKLES, MAJ.-GEN., U. S. V.
Commanding Third Army Corps at Gettysburg.
New York, November 21, 1901.
Colonel Vincent's part in the operations of that day, on
the left of the Union lines, was distinguished by excellent
judgment, prompt movements and signal gallantry, for
which he was promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General,
before his death, on the 7th of the month. My own com
mand, the Third Army Corps, was engaged in the immediate
vicinity, and I had, therefore, an opportunity of observing

65

Vincent's fight and can speak of it from personal knowl
edge. There is no doubt that the repulse of Lee's assault
on our left flank, on the 2d of July, '63, saved the Union
army from defeat at Gettysburg. This was accomplished
by the Third and Fifth Corps and Caldwell's division of the
Second Corps. I have always regarded General Vincent's
co-operation as worthy of all praise.
FROM JOSHUA L. CHAAIBERLAIN,
Brevet Major-General, U. S. V.
Colonel Commanding 20th Maine Volunteers
AT Gettysburg.
Portland, Alaine, November 18, 1901.
Col. A'incent's conduct in taking his brigade to Little
Round Top and placing it in position, and in throwing his
great personal energy and determination into the fight there,
are personally well known to me. I regard the timely occu
pation of that position, which was at that stage of the battle
the key of the Union defense, as due to the energy and skill
of Colonel Vincent.
FROM HENRY E. TREMAIN,
Brevet Brigadier General, U. S. V.
New York, November 23, 1901.
Upon reading the foregoing, I recall many reasons be
sides your own valuable testimony for believing that the
account is correct, and that too much recognition cannot be
given by this country to the skill and heroism of General
Vincent's supreme effort and sacrifice.
FROM GENERAL ELLIS SPEAR.
Major 20th Maine A'olunteers at Gettysburg.
Washington, D. C, November 23rd, 1901.
I have read carefully the foregoing statement in regard
to General Vincent's services at Gettysburg. As to the
greater part of the statement, I know of my own knowl
edge that it is strictly accurate. What happened on the
56

Position of Eighty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers on Little Round Top, Gettysburg.

3 9002 00993 0067