Yale University Library

39002009932899

Cbril 300t

YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

THE LIBRARY ASSOCIATES

Gift of
ABEL CARY THOMAS, Y '05

METHODISM AND SLAVERY:

WITH OTHER MATTERS IN

CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH;

BEING A

REVIEW

OP THE

MANIFESTO OF THE MAJORITY,

IN REPI.Y TO

THE PROTEST OF THE MINORITY, OF THE LATE GENERAL CONFERENCE OF
THE METHODIST E. CHURCH, IN THE CASE OF BISHOP ANDREW*!

BY H. B. BASCOM, D. D.
PRESIDENT OF TRANSYLVANIA UNIVERSITY.

"The unjust Judge is the capital remover or land-marks." Lord Bacon. . '•
" There is no medium between the power of the Law and the arbitrary power of men; and the. arbitrary
power of men, in whatever form, is despotism " Baxter.
"Aa authentic kind of falsehood, that with authority belies our good name, to all nations and posterity.
 If the substantial subject be well forged out, we need not examine the sparks, which irregularly fly
from it." Sir Thomas Moore.

FRANKFORT, KY.
HODGES, TODD & PRUETT, PRINTERS.
1845.

* _ E,

0^l,300t

Entered according to an Act of Congress, in the year 1845, by the Author, in the Clerk's Office
of the District Court of the District of Kentucky.

REVIEW, &c

The more ostensible merits of the controversy, in the case of Bishop Andrew, have
received a degree of publicity, through the medium of the Press, which seems to super
cede the necessity of any great extent or minuteness of preliminary statement, in order
to approach the subject fairly and without disadvantage, in an attempt to understand it
and estimate its merits, whether as it regards the parties in controversy, or the Church
at large. All the material facts and principles, involved in the controversy, pro and
con, stand out with sufficient prominence, in the Protest of the Minority and Reply of
the Majority ; and the facts and reasonings, or rather assumptions and conclusions of
these Documents, may lie considered, as furnishing the proper issue between the parties,
and the true text of the discussion, upon which we enter. And as the subject of sepa
ration, as it regards the North and South of the Methodist Episcopal Church, turns main
ly, upon the question of slavery, not as connected with the case of Bishop Andrew, but
in its broader and more general aspects, I shall principally confine myself to the appro
priate topics, indicated by such limitation. Appeal to other matters, such as the pro
ceedings in the case of Bishop Andrew, and kindred developements, will be resorted to
by the way, as legitimate methods of proof and illustration, in relation to the facts and
principles involved in the discussion. Believing that a careful analysis of the whole
movement, on the part of the late General Conference, in the case of Bishop Andrew,
will show that the assault upon him, was but a masked battery, intended to conceal the
real point and object of attack, I shall rely less upon the extra-legal proceedings in his
case, than upon other aspects and relations, in which the subject presents itself. In the
instance of the struggle alluded to, it was obviously, on the part of the North, a contest
to settle a principle unknown to the constitution and laws of the Church, and the case of
Bishop Andrew was made the occasion and pretext, to bring the matter to trial. The
prosecution of Bishop Andrew was a moot case, the determination of which, not ac
cording to law, but in the chancery of party tactics, was to lead to the ulterior results
of additional legislative action, on the subject of slavery. The whole course of the
majority shows clearly, that they did not consider Bishop Andrew's connection with
slavery, as an offence in the judgment of law, but as something that ought to be an of
fence. They thought it fit to constitute an offence, and labored long and hard to accom
plish it. It was an extra-legal movement, to accomplish a purpose unknown to the law,
and an act, therefore, the manner of which was as unlawful as the matter. It was seen
and felt, that no statutable process could be sustained against the Bishop, and hence a
resort to expost facto legislation, and by consequence, an invasion of constitutional
right. In the case of Bishop Andrew, we have a judicial sentence, in the shape of a
declaratory judgment, based not upon law, but upon opinion over-riding law — the "sense"
of the General Conference, as to what law ought to be — as to what must become law,
before the North will cease to agitate the subject of slavery, and add to existing en
croachments, upon the rights and peace of the South. The authority of the General
Conference to enquire into the conduct of Bishop Andrew, and deal with him according
to law and rule, no one questions ; it was the undoubted right of the Conference. But

when a lawful authority, proceeds to unlawful demands or action, and by means equally
unknown to law and usage, the claim of authority, by the trespass upon right, is vitia
ted, and the procedure becomes null and void; and this we conceive to have been the case
in tho instance of Bishop Andrew. Not only was Bishop Andrew arraigned, but under
the hallucination of the absolutism of the General Conference, the law itself was ar
raigned, and apart from its arbitrament, the judgment of a majority became the only
rule of action and standard of right. We propose an examination of the subject, hav
ing for its object, a simple statement of the"reasons and facts, which compelled the South
to assume the position and take the stand they did, with regard to a separation of the
general or federal jurisdiction of the Church, in order to avoid the more serious evil of
utter division and disunion, throughout the whole Church. We may have conceived of
the case too strongly, and whether right or wrong, in our convictions, it seems proper
that our conduct and the motives by which we were actuated, should be presented in
their true light. As distinguished northern men, are as far from agreeing among them
selves, as the North and the South are, with regard to the real character of their own
action, we ought certainly to be judged, with some share of the indulgence, currently
reciprocated among the sub-divisions of the Northern party. Drs. Durbin, Peck, and
Elliott, in the Reply to the Protest, say the action in-Bishop Andrew's case, was no trial —
was not judicial in any sense — was not intended or thought of as a trial. Dr. Bond
and others, say this is all a mistake — an utter misconception of the facts. They assure
the Church and the world, that it was a trial, and exhibits all the essential elements of
judicial action. A third party make it a mere executive "regulation." The Protest,
written before the light of these contradictions had been shed upon the South, assumes,
that to charge with delinquency and institute enquiry, is a judicial process, inasmuch
as there is the implication of jurisdiction, law, responsibility, and judgment, and re
gards the procedure as extra-judicial, because the whole invoice of grievances, was un
known to existing law — designed to regulate the whole subject matter of complaint.
The Protest was presented with the full conviction, that under semblance of conformity
to the constitution and law, an unlawful use had been made of both, to accomplish
what was not contemplated^by either. The General Conference of 1836 say, irt' their
official address, in allusion to the subject in question, "every man should be presumed
to be innocent, until proved guilty, before some competent tribunal." Of what was
Bishop Andrew found guilty, and in view of what law? The only law which could
possibly be invoked with any semblance of justice, was known to protect him, and yet
party opinion triumphs over law and justice, and like the irresolute Pilate, they first
decla-e him innocent, and then, arraying the act against their own decision, they pro
ceed to scourge him. In comparing the law and the conduct of Bishop Andrew, we can
find no adequate cause for the action in his case. We believe the real cause lies deeper
and dates farther back. Why was law declined, and opinion, and Northern and foreign
popular feeling appealed to, against Bishop Andrew? Having a law on slavery, even
the non-prohibition of the act charged as an offence, rendered it lawful, apart from the
fact, that express provision of law covered the case. The Discipline expressly provides,
that where circumstances remove a case from within the province of the general
principle, no individual shall suffer from any application of the law. In Bishop An
drew's case, that which the law excepts in terms, is made the sum of his offence.
What Ihe law declines exacting, and actually dispenses with, is made the sum of duty.
We would not airaign motive, and can readily conceive how passion may be excited
into sentiment, and aversion roused into activity, leading to the most unhappy results,
while th« actors are unconscious of the real character of their own course of action or

the evils, they inflict. It did seem to us, at the time, and subsequent events have been
but too well calculated to confirm the impression, that hostility to the South was the'
moral type of the whole movement, and that it was intended to teach us that a Northern
altar must hereafter sanctify the gifts of the Church. The majority could not consider
the conduct of Bishop Andrew as morally wrong, for they not only allow, but expressly
authorize it, in the case of his scriptural Peers — the Eldership, or College of Presbyters.
They could not regard his conduct as officially wrong, for they publish to the world, that
there is neither prohibition nor requirement, connected with the office, in the shape of
law, and hence infer, that the lex non scripla of Northern prejudice, on the subject of
slavery, must be the standard of judgment, and constitute the tenure, by which Bishops
of the Methodist Episcopal Church, are hereafter to hold office.
But further): the abstract principles and favorite dogmas of abolitionism, in the Me
thodist Episcopal Church, had had their day of disturbing notoriety, and were regarded
by the South", as nearly defunct, until quickened into activity and dramatized, by the
anti-slavery party of the late General Conference. It was the conviction of the South,
that this party, dissatisfied with the conservative principles upon which they had for
merly acted, found themselves, as a body, without principles upon which they could act
as they wished, and it became necessary that they should adopt new ones. It is not
assumed, that there was any formal coalition between the Abolition and anti-slavery
parties ; it is believed that this was not the case. But there was, at the same time, a
mingling of parties for specific action — to accomplish given purposes, in which the par
ties were deeply if not equally interested. The policy and movements of the old con
servative party, while in a state of preparation for action, during the early part of the
Conference, seem to have performed the functions of a kind of Lazaretto, at which abo
litionism did brief quarantine, aud was then accredited as ancient Methodism, at least
for the time, and so far as the case of Bishop Andrew was concerned. There was at
least a spasm of harmony, during which the parties were one in aim and action. Both
united in declaring that an offence which violated no law of God or rnan, and was re
cognized by both as consistent with christian, and ministerial character. Each was
prompt in claiming for the General Conference absolute control over both the formation
and the execution of law. They acted together in asserting the claim of jurisdiction
pro salute anima, without license of law or sanction of precedent. They clung to
gether and fought for the same results, under every change of colour, until their pur
pose was accomplished. They united in requiring Bishop Andrew to do what the law
of the Church did not exact, and the laws of the State in which he resided, expressly
forbid — in other words, they agreed to punish the Bishop for doing what the law of th'e
Church allowed, and for not doing what the law of the State prohibited. We bespeak
the patience and candor of the reader. The freedom, and it may be thought boldness of
censure, in these brief preliminary statements, cannot be judged of fairly, except in con
nection with the facts and evidence, we submit, in support of their truth, and in vindi
cation of the course and policy of the South, in the premises of this unhappy, contro
versy. Intending an examination of all the principal topics in controversy between the North
and South ofthe Methodist Episcopal Church, no particular analysis, either of the Pro
test or the Reply, is deemed necessary, except as we proceed in order, to a review of the
whole ground occupied by both.
The first general topic claiming attention, is the compromise character of the general
law of slavery in the Methodidist Episcopal Church ; its assumption by the South in
their Protest, and its denial by the North, in their Rejoinder. To prevent misapprehen-

6
sion, it may be well to state here, and once for all, that the term compromise is used in
the Protest, in its most ordinary popular acceptation, in connection with legislation, to
denote a mutual agreement to adjust difficulties, in the shape of a legal arrangement
— some general rule or law, upon the grounds of mutual concession and forbearance, by
the parties legislating, acting as the authorized representatives of the more primary
parties, immediately interested. Before proceeding, however, I must ask to be in
dulged, while I offer some preliminary views and statements, with reference to the gen
eral subject, and my connection with it, without which I cannot be properly understood,
either by my friends or enemies. Involved in this controversy somewhat prominently.
by the force of circumstances, rather than any voluntary agency of my own, I am anx
ious to place it in the power of both my friends and enemies, to judge me fairly, and
beyond this, I have nothing to invoke or deprecate with regard to either. At the first
session ofthe Ohio Conference, after the division of the old Pioneer Western Confer
ence, I saw and heard, for the first time, that extraordinary man, Bishop Asbury, who,
in an elaborate address to the Conference, on the affairs of the Church, glanced at
the then recent session of the first Delegated General Conference, May, 1812, and
spoke ofthe advantages likely to result, and enlarging upon the various interests ofthe
Church, East, West, North and South, he remarked, that in all these sections tlie Meth
odists were one — every where the same people ; and added, that at one time he and his
venerable colleague, Dr. Coke, had greatly feared, that in this country, slavery in the
South, and the opposition to it in the North, would divide the Church ; but he warmly
congratulated the Conference, that the evil they had dreaded, had passed away ; that the
North and South, in the General and Annual Conferences, had, by mutual concession and
forbearance, settled down upon common ground, and had agreed to be governed by law
— the Discipline ofthe Church, in all they said or did on this dangerous and exciting
subject. " Do this," said he, in tones of commanding but affectionate authority, "and
you will save the master and slave, the bond and the free, the North and the South.''
The impression I received from listening to this address, was strengthened and render
ed indelible by a private discussion, to which I listened, during the same Conference, in
which some young preachers maintained, in opposition to Bishop Asbury, that slavery
in every shape, and all slave holders, should be banished from the Church ; and the
great and good Samuel Parker advocated the necessity of a compromise course, and de
fended the views of Bishop Asbury, in his address. Apart from my distinct recollec
tion of these facts, I kept a kind of journal record at the time, of nearly every thing
that interested me, and in view of both, I make this statement, as substantially correct.
Before this I had vaguely regarded slavery, in all its possible forms, as a foul blot upon
the Christian name, and the remarks of Bishop Asbury, and the arguments of Parker,
gave me the first distinct impression— led me to the first rational enlarged view of the
subject of slavery, in relation to the Methodist Episcopal Church, I had ever entertained,
and will remain with me to the close of life. Three years after, at the fourth session
of the Ohio Conference, Sept. 1815, I heard Bishop Asbury preach the funeral sermon
of Dr. Coke, and in enlarging upon the Apostolic zeal and extensive usefulness of the
Doctor, as an " American Methodist Bishop," he alluded !o the manner in which the
Doctor's usefulness had been "curtailed in the South," in his own phrase, by his imprudent
zeal and movements in reference to slavery. "We thought," said the Bishop, "we
could kill the monster at once, but the laws and the people were against us, and we had to
compromise the matter, or lose the South." I cannot pretend to give entire the precise
language of the Bishop, but such was the substance— the plain import of what he said ;
and connected as it was, with what I had heard him say before, I could not forget it!

especially as my admiration of the man, amounted to almost idolatrous veneration. I
was perhaps the more struck with the Bishop's remarks, as I had that year been
preacher in charge of a circuit in Virginia, where the subject had necessarily engaged
iny attention. There are those living, who know that the recollection of such incidents
would be likely to be indelible with me, from the fact, that at this Conference, but for
the stern interposition of Bishop Asbury, my unimportant career as a Methodist travel
ing preacher, would probably have terminated. Crushed by what I regarded (right or
wrong) as the unfeeling scrutiny of the Conference, I had addressed a letter of withdraw
al to the Conference, through my friend Rev. David Young, upon the reading of which,
Bishop Asbury said : "Give that poor boy to me, I'll take him and be responsible."
Bishop Asbury thus became my friend and protector, at a time when I greatly needed
both ; and let no one be surprised that I treasured up and preserved, what others, differ
ently circumstanced, may have forgotten. After traveling nearly four years in the Ohio
Conference, I was, in the autumn of 1816, transferred to the Tennessee Conference, of
which I was a member until 1821. During this whole period, a fierce controversy was
raging in that Conference, on the subject of slavery and abolition, the Abolitionists
having a decided majority. The course and practice of the majority, went to settle the
principle, that no slave holder, whatever might be the law of the State, in the case, or
his claims in other respects, should be received into the traveling connexion, and no
preacher, traveling or local, admitted to ordination, until he had first in fact emancipa
ted his slaves. The minority contended that such a course was inconsistent with, and
in violation of, the rights long secured to slave holders, in States where emancipation
was impracticable. The struggle was long and bitter, continuing from year to year,
and at the Tennessee Conference in 1819, the minority, acting under the advice of Bish
ops McKendree and George, protested against tbe course of the majority, and appealed
to the General Conference of 1820. Upon the presentation of the Protest in Confer
ence, Bishop McKendree presiding, admitted it lo record, against the declared will of
the majority, and took occasion to address the Conference at great length, on the course
ofthe majority, and the subject of slavery in general ; and as the interference of the
Conference with the subject, had excited no litde distrust and jealousy in the public
mind, Bishop McKendree requested that he might be heard by some of the most influen
tial citizens of Nashville, in which the Conference sat ; and at his request, I introduced
into the Conference the Honorable Felix Grundy and Oliver B. Hays, Esq., who listen
ed to the address of Bishop McKendree with intense interest, and declared to the Con
ference, that according to the address, the law of the Church was not, as they had been
led to suppose, in conflict with the laws of tbe State.
In this address, Bishop McKendree glanced briefly, but clearly at the whole range ofthe
legislation of the Church, on the subject of slavery, and took great pains to show that
while the Church sought to remove the evil of slavery, from within its own limits,
where it could be done consistently with the laws and welfare of society, it did not, in
any instance, abridge the rights of ministers or people, where law and the convention
al understanding and interests of society pursuant to them, rendered emancipation im
practicable. He reviewed, in a summary way, the various and often conflicting regula
tions of the Church respecting slavery, from the early days of Asbury and Coke, down
to that period, and showed that the apparent inconsistency, on the part of the Church,
was owing to alternate party ascendency, as it regarded the North and the South. His
whole address went to show, and he repeatedly affirmed it, that the question was one
that could only be managed by concession of parties, and that the existing laws of the
Church, were the result of such mutual concession, and that at the General Conference

of 1808, they had solemnly agreed to let tbe subject alone, in General Conference, and
allow the annual Conferences to regulate the matter within their own limits. He stated
he had hoped that this act of compromise, with others, and the final action in 1816,
would save the Church from any serious trouble, but he saw it would not, and declared
his purpose to propose to the next General Conference, to deprive the annual Confer
ences of the power given them in 1808, and to establish one uniform law to govern the
whole Church. Accordingly, he and Bishop George, privately advised the minority of
the Tennessee Conference, to memorialize the General Conference to that effect. Bishop
George addressed the Conference, approving the views of Bishop McKendree, and assur
ing us, he should concur with him in reporting the unauthorized proceedings of the
Tennessee Conference, and in asking the General Conference to repeal the law of 1808.
The Memorial of the minority, praying the repeal of this law, as advised by the
Bishops, together with their representations, led to a discussion in the General Confer
ence of 1820, which resulted in the repeal prayed for. In the final conflict between the
majority and minority of the Tennessee Conference, on this subject, the venerable Phil
ip Bruce took an active part, and fully and most unequivocally sustained the views of
the Bishops and the minority, and addressing the Conference, by request, as a living
witness in the principal transactions alluded to, he was even more minute and exact
than Bishop McKendree, in showing that the whole legislation of the Church had been
in the spirit and form of compromise, and that if this compromise was departed from,
Methodism must die in the South. The same view of the subject was avowed and ad
vocated by the never-to-be-forgotten Valentine Cooke, who was present, and called up
on for his opinions and testimony.
Barnabas McHenry, of whom I once heard Bishop McKendree say, if he were allow
ed to choose his successor, as senior Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church, Mc
Henry would be the man, was a member ofthe Tennessee Conference, and assumed and
argued not only the virtual compromise of the law of slavery, between the Northern
and Southern portions ofthe Church, but the absolute necessity of this or .some kindred
adjustment, to prevent division and ruin. These men were all opposed to slavery, and
had no connection with it, and yet they unyieldingly maintained the ground assumed
in the Protest, on this subject. It is proper to add, that Thomas Logan Douglas was
the only man in the minority of the Conference, who was in any way connected with
slavery. The minority numbered about twenty members of the Conference, and being
oppressed and trodden down in the struggle, referred to, they naturally turned to men of
age, wisdom and experience in the Church, for counsel and direction, and especially to
ascertain the real character and purposes of the law of slavery, and more particularly
the opinions and conventional understanding, in which it had originated; and being one
of the minority, and frequently called upon to act as one of its organs, I was necessarily
led to a somewhat extended, if not critical acquaintance, with the whole subject and
controversy. I was in the habit, for years, of consulting, whenever I could have ac
cess to them, the venerable men who had grown up with American Methodism, and
who were therefore well acquainted, not merely with the facts, but with the reasons of
legislation on this subject. From them I learned, what I believe to be the true history of
the general rule on slavery, which found its way into that summary code of morals,
known as the " General Rules" of Methodism, without the sanction of a General Con
ference, being introduced by Bishop Asbury and his council, in 1788 or '9, and first
published in the latter year, and was intended as a response of the Church to the pro
vision in the Constitution ofthe United States, then just adopted, for the abolition of
the slave trade ; the council deeming it proper, that what the Constitution looked for-

9
ward to prospectively, should beat once fixed upon as peremptorily binding upon all mem.
bers of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and hence the prohibition — " buying of men.
women, or children, (usually stolen and plundered from Africa, and brought to
this country for the purpose) with the intention to enslave them." The language of
Coke and Asbury, in their notes on the Discipline, sustains this view of the subject.
Speaking of this rule, they style it, "a small addition, which the circumstances of the
States required," evidently alluding to the recent prospective prohibition ofthe slave
trade in the Constitution of the United States.
No part of this recital, which I introduce with great reluctance, but could not omit
without subjecting my motives and conduct to misconstruction, is intended in any degree
to reflect upon the character or piety of the majority of the Tennessee Conference.
The most of the men who took part in that controversy, are now in their graves, and
so far as I know, no cause of quarrel exists between any of the survivors. I will only
add in this, connection, that as McKendree, George, Bruce, and Cooke, had frequent
interviews in council, with the minority, my recollections may have confounded, in
some instances, what they stated on these occasions, with their statements before the
Conference. That I quote their opinions correctly, I am entirely confident. Beside
my general connection with the subject, during the hotly contested struggle in the Ten
nessee Conference, I was a member of the committee which drafted the Protest, and
also of the committee which drafted the memorial to the General Conference, just allu
ded to, and hence it was tho more necessary I should acquaint myself with all the sour
ces, and avail myself of all means of information in my power, while at the same time,
I should be the more likely to recollect aud preserve the information I had obtained.
And accordingly, I have in my possession copies of the Protest and Memorial, numer
ous letters received during the contest and subsequently, bearing upon it, together with
other papers and documents, enabling me to make these statements with the perfect
knowledge that they are substantially correct, and entitled to the confidence of all con
cerned. In this way I imbibed my first and early notions of the compromise character
of the law of the Church on slavery. I am not at all careful or tenacious about words
or phrases. My object is to make it appear to the satisfaction of the candid and well
informed, that for the last thirty years, I have been taught, and taught too by the ablest
masters in our common Israel, that the whole legislation of the Church, on the subject
of slavery, but especially from 1800 to 1816, originated in mutual concession and com
promise, between men representing the Church, North and South, and therefore, that
the law of the Church is, ipso facto, a compromise, as assumed in the Protest of the Mi
nority at the late General Conference, the principles and the positions of which, it is
the object of this publication to defend. If I am in error, I have become involved in it
mpst unintentionally, and without any personal interest, by which a man of common
sense could have been influenced, during any part of the thirty three years to which
these statements refer, and all my convictions assure me, if I am in error, I have been
misled by such men as Bishops Asbury, McKendree — and George, Philip Bruce, Robert
Cloud, Barnabas McHenry, Valentine Cooke, Leroy Cole, John Littlejohn, William
Burke, Samuel Parker, William' Allgood, John McGee, Thomas L. Douglass, and many
others, equally entitled to credit, with whom I have been in intimate intercourse, and
whose opinions gave character to my own. That these men regarded the law of the
Church on slavery, as something yery different from a "simple decree" of the General
Conference, and as the result of vexed and protracted deliberation, at different times,
terminating finally, in a compromise of conflicting opinions, in the shape of a rule or
law, is a matter about which I can never doubt, because in every instance I bad the in-
2

10
formation directly from themselves, and could not have misunderstood them. By the
part I took in advocacy of the conservative grounds of the Discipline, in relation to
slavery, from 1816 to 1821, mixed up, occasionally, with other incidental matters, my
position became extremely unpleasant, and at two different times, Bishop McKendree
proposed to relieve me, by making me his travelling companion in his annual tour of
the continent. This I declined ; but in 1821, requested him to transfer me to some
other Conference, proposing to go wherever he chose to send me, and he accordingly
transferred me to the Baltimore Conference, and stationed me in Pittsburg, assigning
the state of things I have detailed, as the reason of my transfer. During the whole
period of the General Conference of 1824, I was confined by extreme illness, in Wash
ington City, and toward the close of the session, Bishop McKendree visited me, and in
a long interview with him, he glanced at the difficulties in which I had been involved
in the Tennessee Conference, adverted to the slavery question, expressed his conviction
that the subject, as further compromised in 1816, and left upon the common ground of
that arrangement, by depriving the annual Conferences of all legislative power over the
subject in 1820, would secure the peace of the Church. In proof of this, he stated,
that the subject had produced very little excitement at the General Conference then in
session, and he trusted the question was conclusively settled. I have added this last
item, because it is by several years of later date, and tended strongly to confirm all my
previous views of the opinions entertained by Bishop McKendree, on this subject. I
have also heard Bishop McKendree state, and have had the statement from others, that
at the General Conference of 1808, or perhaps 1812, a measure was brought forward,
on the subject of slavery, and would probably have carried, had he. not declared to the
Conference, that in the event of its adoption, he could not attempt lo administer the gov
ernment in the South ; when it was abandoned. It is a well known fact, also, and within
the recollection of living witnesses, that at the General Conference of 1796, when a
motion was made to exclude all persons from the Church in any way connected with
slavery, McKendree, Tolleson, and others, resisted it with the most unyielding deter
mination, on tlie ground that the act would exclude Methodism from the South. In a let
ter before me, a venerable member of that Conference, and who goes with the North on
the subject in controversy, says, "the motion was ably debated on both sides, all, I think,
agreeing that slavery is a great evil. The ground taken by Wm. McKendree and James
Tolleson, the strongest opposers of tho motion, was that by passing it, we should shut
up our access, not only to the slave holder, but also to the slave, so that we could do
them no good, soul or body, for time or eternity. Here are two evils, (it was urged by
McKendree and friends,) and we ought, (by way of compromise,) to choose the least.
The motion was lost." But more of this in other places. I have introduced at some
length, and at the hazard, perhaps, of incurring the charge of egotism, my own personal
connection with this controversy, not as argument, but to show how, as a Methodist
Preacher, every way unconnected with slavery, I was led to imbibe the doctrines and
opinions of the Protest on this subject, and I think it must be perceived by every one,
that my present position is a very natural, if not necessary consequence of what has
gone before. I repeat, however, that to place it in the power of others to do me justice,
is the only thing, so far asi am personally concerned, about which I am at all solici
tous, and in order to this, I have, perhaps, already said enough, and it may be, more
than was necessary.
It has always been understood in the South, that in all the conflicts in the Church,
respecting slavery, there has been a sufficient number in the General Conferences, ad
hering to Northern policy, to carry any measure they chose, but that in a great many

II
instances at least, they have been restrained by appeal and remonstrance, from the
South, and have compounded and compromised, as assumed in the Protest, and as we
shall proceed further to prove. Before proceeding further, however, it may be proper
to state, what the good sense of the reader could hardly fail to suggest, that in speaking
ofthe North and South in this controversy, it is intended not to speak of all persons —
the entire people North or South — but only so far as the North and South have spoken
out and acted in the premises. In so far as any portion of the people, North or South,
may be unrepresented by the avowal and action to which we allude, they are not inclu
ded in these designations ; and where it is meant to include them, the connection will
sufficiently explain. It is necessary to add, too, that I shall use the term abolition, in
the plain, obvious and general sense, in which I have always understood and used it, to
denote any interference or meddling with the question of slavery, contrary to the inten
tion, and beyond the provisions of law, civil and ecclesiastical — that is, the law of the land
and the law ofthe Church. All persons so acting, I regard as Abolitionists, and shall
so call them. On the other hand, the principles and actions of those who seek the re
moval or regulation of slavery, in strict and respectful accordance with law, as above,
I have always regarded and spoken of as conservative in character and tendency, and
shall do so in this discussion.
In an approach to additional sources of information — more stictly historical evidence
— especially the official and accredited testimony of the Church, the reader need not be
reminded, that the history ofthe controversy in question, has yet to be written. We
have little else than scattered elements — isolated materials and fragmentary notices,
scattered here and there triroughout immense masses of authorship and publication. All
is, to a great extent, without form and void, and a brief examination of the general sub
ject, is impossible. Facts and principles may be condensed, as was attempted in ihe
Protest ; but proof is challenged, and must be furnished, or the South be found at fault,
in the controversy. Our appeal is to the truth of history and the evidence of facts, and
both must be met and set aside by a more convincing array of opposing proofs, before
our cause is discredited. Any amount of criticism and disparaging remark, may be
brought to bear upon particular parts and aspects ofthe subject, without in any way af
fecting the force of the argument attempted. Had it been practicable to discuss the .
subject fully and fairly within a more limited compass, it would have been greatly pref- •
erable, not only in the way of saving the cost of no little labor and research, but also in
view of popular general impression. We found, however, that an extended induction
of facts and particulars, was indispensable, and no very obvious classification of them
practicable, without much mors time than we have been able to devote to the sub
ject. Beside, the subject is a peculiar and intractable one, and an appeal to discur
sive methods of examination appeared unavoidable, for the plain reason that but little
can be known of the real character of law, the true philosophy of legislation in any
case, without some adequate knowledge of the practical reasons and circumstances, in
which it had its birth ; and hence the course we have been compelled to adopt, and the
impossibility of any very brief or condensed view of the subject.
I have always been taught, that the compromise character of the law of the Method
ist Episcopal Church, was clearly inferable from the history of its legislation on the
subject. It has always seemed to me impossible for any one, not under the influence of
strong prepossession, to look at the ever recurring change of position, purpose and poli
cy on the part of the Church, respecting slavery and abolition — its various, and often
conflicting rules and regulations, at different times — its frequent suspension, repeal or
modification of such rules — the constant attempt to meet the exigency of circumstances

12
— its unwillingness to hazard the issue of carrying out its severer acts of legislation-
its uniform refusal, for sixty years, to close the door of the Church against slave hold
ers, and yet irresolutely attempting all the time, to make emancipation a condition of
membership afterward, when it was perhaps thought the terror of punishment, combined
with other causes, might operate to secure submission. I repeat, I have always thought
it impossible to look at the subject in these aspects, without perceiving that the Church,
in all its legislation, has felt a resort to concession and compromise, indispensable to uni-
ty and success, in connection with the North and the South. I am still more strongly
than ever ofthe same opinion, and consider the debates and action of the late General
Conference, and even the Manifesto of the Majority, in reply to the Protes.t, as addition
al proof of the assumption. If it be true, as distinctly affirmed by Drs. Durbin, Peck,
and Elliott, that the North has been conceding to the South for fifty years— if it be fur
ther true, as distinctly admitted, that the South has conceded to the North, although
not, if we choose to admit what they assume, to the same extent— yet as both parties
have felt the necessity, and acted upon the principle of concession, reciprocally claimed,
how does it happen, we have no compromise as the result of such concession, in the
legislation that followed? legislation and its judicial construction being the only form
in which the parties could concede? Can men or parties concede right and claim, in
legislative or judicial intercourse, and meet upon common ground, not the choice of
either party, except as a preferred evil, without acting upon the ground of compromise?
If this be possible, by whom has it been shown? The parties, by which we mean pro
and con, those who thought and felt differently, on the best mode of treatment and rem
edy, as it regards the evil of slavery, took into view the adverse grounds they occu
pied, and that the general interests might prevail over the lesser and conflicting ones,
they agreed to meet and act in view of average right and justice, between the adverse
claimants. The whole drift, both of the language and logic of the Protest, goes to
show, that in calling the law of slavery a compromise, we reasoned from the concrete
to the abstract, knowing as we did, if its authors could be believed, that it had its ori
gin in mutual concession and forbearance. As it originated in the necessity of trying
emergent circumstances, its compromise character was taken for granted, inasmuch as
the law itself became, of necessity, the abstraction and generalization of the conflicting
facts and interests, difficulties and concessions, connected with its original enactment,
in separate parts, at different times. Any tolerably accurate appreciation of the rela
tions of the parties, must furnish satisfactory proof to the most common discernment,
that the existing law of the Church could have originated in no other way. The legis
lation on slavery, by consent of parties, took circumstances and consequences into tha
account, and whatever may have been its form, as each party yielded in some things,
and refused to yield in others, and both finally met in the adoption of the same general
rules, the legislation in fact, was a compromise. It is admitted that the language of
tlie Protest varies from the common phraseology of the Church on the subject, and we
were led to use it, because, in our judgment, the crisis which gave it birth, rendered it
necessary that the principles involved should be more clearly defined, and better under-
derstood. Should it turn out that we have wronged the truth of history, let the proper
correction be applied. It is confidently believed, however, that the evidence we submit,
in support of the Protest, will satisfy the discerning and unprejudiced, that no novel
principle, assumption or speculation, unknown to our fathers and the American Meth
odism of the last half century, can be found in it. The very first minute, rule or regu
lation, the first act of legislation on the subject of slavery, by the infant Conference of
lay preachers, in 1780, is both in language and temper, a compromise. Great as the

13
evil is charged to be, it concedes that even traveling preachers were slave holders, and
merely requires a promise of emancipation ; and with regard to all other slave holders in
the Church, the Conference simply advises them to free their slaved. If they did not in
tend compromise, in view of the civil rights — the interests and feelings ofthe South —
why receive slave holders at all, either as members, or as local or traveling preachers?
In the instance of what is declared to be crime, by every law of Heaven, man, and na
ture, why merely exact promises, and advise, instead of requiring emancipation before
receiving them at all? If in the loose, extravagant language of the rule of 1780, slavery
is contrary to the laws of God, man, and nature — is hurtful to society, contrary to the dic
tates of conscience and pure religion, and doing to others what we would not they should
do to us, that is a criminal and ungodly practice, inhuman and unnatural withal, as most
expressly affirmed, what must be thought of tho piety and usefulness of preachers and
people, thus living in open and declared violation of the laws of God, man, nature, society,
and conscience, as well as the precepts of pure religion and social justice ? What must
be thought of law makers and Church rulers, who thus denounce practices as grossly in
iquitous and immoral, while no actual abandonment of the evil is necessary, either to>
church membership or ministerial office1 The persons and the practice are both placed
under the angry ban ofthe Church, and yet continued in connection with it, as if it was
thought necessary to baptize tbe evil, in order that the means of its extirpation might
be brought to bear the more effectually. And yet, after this unmitigated denunciation,
when, three years later, the subject next comes up, local preachers only are named, and
it is deemed best to try them another year, to see whether, after four years advising,
the result will not be different, and if not, it is gravely stated it may (and of course
may not, as it turned out) be necessary to suspend them. Why this hesitation and de
lay? Was it or not seen and felt, by the excellent men composing these early Conferences,
that they had acted prematurely, and that they could not carry out the principles and
measures they had avowed and adopted, withont ruin to the objects and mission of
Methodism in the South ? Unless this was so, why is an evil so unmitigated, so ut
terly at war with the moral order of Heaven and earth — so inconsistent with any, the
least degree of moral uprightness, borne with for a moment? And especially why are
persons involved in it, allowed to enter the Church, and even the ministry, when curse
and defilement are assumed as the inevitable consequence ! Without intended compro
mise, how can we reconcile the faith and practice of our fathers? In 1784, at the reg
ular Conference, the local preachers in Virginia, holding slaves, are allowed another
year to reflect upon the matter; that is, five years after the first warning! Does this
delay betoken compromise or not? At the called Christmas Conference of the same
year, we have a series of enactments, the tone of which is equally decided as to the mor
al wrong of slavery. These are expressly admitted to constitute a new term of mem
bership, unknown to the general rules of Mr. Wesley, and came in with the new organ
ization ofthe Church. Still, fearful of consequences, the law is suspended before it is
published, and slave holders have another year for reflection, and in Virginia, where
the Church was numerous and strong, they have two years more, extending the proba
tion in Virginia to seven years. If in this no compromise is seen, six months after we
have a further and more formal suspension of all the rules on slavery, until the next
Conference, when it is declared the rules shall be enforced. This, however, was not
done, and during twelve long years, the suspension continues, and the whole subject is
allowed to sleep, and confessedly, because ofthe great evil done in the South by its agi
tation. In 1796 we have a new code or set of rules, but obviously of the same compro
mise character with former ones, as explained by the practice of our rulers. Slave

14
holders are still admitted to ministerial order and official station, upon security given
that they will emancipate in future. The laws of the State, and the circumstances of
individual cases, are to be consulted and deferred to by presiding elders and preachers
in charge, in judging of the nature of the security required. And, as if doubtful
whether this was not too stringent, upon the remonstrances of McKendree and others,
from the South, they compromised the whole matter further, by authorizing the yearly
Conferences to make whatever regulations they judge proper, respecting the admission
of slave holders to official stations in the Church. Masters are allowed to hold slaves
for a term of years, to remunerate themselves. Preachers and people are called upon
for information and opinions on the subject, to be sent up to the next Conference, that
the preachers, instead of their hitherto imperfect knowledge, and conflicting and versa
tile opinions and purposes, may have full light upon the subject. Such are some ofthe
difficulties and details of the still incipient, unsettled compromise of the Protest. In
1800 there is still further modification and compromise. A traveling preacher is allow
ed lo hold slaves, where emancipation is not practicable, in conformity with the lawsof
the State in which he lives ; and to get at the subject more directly, without coming in
conflict with the civil authoritities, it is found necessary to interfere with the legisla
tion ofthe States in which slavery exists. The Annual Conferences are instructed to
memorialize the Southern Legislatures, and urge them to pass "general emancipation"
laws. Committees were to be appointed, too, to aid the traveling preachers in " this
blessed work." An application of this kind, to the Legislature of Georgia, gave birth,
in 1800, to the celebrated law of that State, prohibiting emancipation in any form, ex
cept by Legislative enactment. The application was deemed obtrusive and dangerous,
and the Church, in this way, has prevented the emancipation of thousands of slaves in
Georgia, as well as other Southern States, by provoking State legislation, which render
ed it entirely impracticable. While this business of petitioning Legislatures, and re
monstrating with them, was going on in 1800, it was suddenly found necessary to com
promise this matter too, or give up the South, and the plan of petitioning was abandon
ed accordingly, and atonement was offered for the indiscretion, in the shape of apologies
and explanations in behalf of the Church, especially after a Southern Grand Jury had,
upon presentment for a violation of the laws of the State, found a true bill against one
ofthe Bishops of the Church, Dr. Coke, on account of tbe actiye part he had taken, in
the movement now referred to.
In 1804, the compromise character of the law of the Church respecting slavery, be
gan to assume a more distinctive form. In view of the firm position and vehement re
presentations of Southern Preachers, McKendree, Lee, Tolleson, and others, that the
existing rules would no longer be borne with, private members are allowed to sell
slaves into perpetual slavery as the dictate of "mercy and humanity," without Church
censure, and all slave holders of the laity, in North Carolina, Georgia, South Carolina,
and Tennessee, are exempted from the operation of even the new rule, entirely. The
rules of 1796 and 1800, relating to interference with legislation, are repealed, and the
Conference goes so far as to hazard, for the first time, in its rules and regulations, the
distasteful admonition of the New Testament, that slaves should obey their masters and
consult their interests. At the next General Conference, however, the admonition was
expunged, as offensive or uncalled for, and nothing of the kind has appeared in our le
gislation, or marred our statute books since. In 1808, the compromise is still more fully
developed. Every thing relating to slave holding among private members is expunged
from the Discipline, and each annual Conference is fully authorized to make its own
regulations, relative to buying and selling slaves. That this was done upon demand

15
and remonstrance from the South, will not be denied, and how far it goes to prove the
compromise of the Protest, let men of sense determine. In 1812, the compromise, to
which the good men of 1780-3-4-5, were driven, by the force of circumstances, in the
very face of their own rules, and despite their cherished opinions and policy, receives
a still more conclusive form, in the shape of a direct concession in terms, upon the ur
gent representation of Southern men, that the laws of the States are so diverse on the
subject of slavery, that no general rule can apply, and hence a renewal of the grant of
right to the annual Conferences, to control the whole subject as they saw proper. It
was then agreed by the North and South, that the legislation of the Church must con
form to that of the States, and emancipation not be required by the Church, where it was
opposed by law and public opinion. This fair and manly adjustment of a grave Church
difficulty, I heard Bishop Asbury explain and commend, only four months after it oc
curred, as the great bond of union between the North and the South.
In 1816, we have the last of a series of kindred measures — the final act of legisla
tion, alluded to in the Protest, as completing the compromise between the North and
the South. "No slave holder, shall be eligible to any official station in our Church here
after, where the laws of the Church in which he lives, admit of emancipation, and per
mit the liberated slave to enjoy freedom." Ergo, "any slave holder, (so far as slave
ry alone is concerned,) shall be eligible to any official station in our Church, hereafter,
(and of course whether as Deacon, Elder, or Bishop,) where the laws of the State, in
which he lives, do not admit of emancipation, and the liberated slave is not permitted
to enjoy freedom." This is a plain grant of law, and as such it satisfied the South.
The South has always been satisfied with it. Nothing more has ever been asked by
the South. It is the open infraction — the gross violation of this law by the North, of
which we complain, and to which the South will not submit. Take now the law of
1800, the two regulating the entire traveling connexion and local ministry — "When
any traveling Preacher becomes an owner of a slave or slaves, by any means, he shall
forfeit his ministerial character in our Church, unless he execute, if it be practicable, a
legal emancipation of sueh slaves, conformably to tbe laws of the State, in which he
lives." Hence, "no traveling Preacher, becoming an owner of slaves, by any of the
tenures recognized by law, in slave holding States, will be subjected to a forfeiture of
his ministerial rights, if legal emancipation be impracticable, in conformity with the
law of the State, in which he lives." With this, the South is equally satisfied, and by
it we are willing to abide. We only complain of its violation by the North. And so
of the general rule; as a prohibition, — "The buying or selling of men, women, or chil
dren, with an intention to enslave them." If then, a man shall not buy or sell man,
woman, or child, with intention to deprive them of liberty, or reduce them to a sitate of
slavery, he cannot violate the general rule. And with this too the South are perfectly
satisfied. These rules fairly interpreted according to their most obvious meaning, as
by the General Conference of 1840 — interpreted as they would be in any intelligent
Court of Equity, afford all the protection we need. The construction, however, placed
upon them, the two former especially, by the last General Conference, virtually repeals
them, and it is against such nullification we protest. Believing as we have shown, and
shall further show, that the legislation of the Church on slavery, especially since 1800,
originated in concession and compromise, call it by what name you will, the South have
always relied on it as a solemn compact, based upon the good faith of the parties, and re
gard the violation of it, by the late General Conference, as inconsistent with fidelity to
the obligations of a grave public engagement.

16
Tn 1820, the only action of the General Conference respecting slavery was to take
from the Annual Conferences the authority to make their own regulations on the sub
ject ; and this action was had in view of the Memorial already alluded to, from a mi
nority of the Tennessee Conference and the representations of Bishops McKendree and
George; in connection with it. In 1824 the general law of slavery was left untouched.
So also in '28, '32, '36 '40 and '44, except, that by construction, the last General Con
ference changed it entirely, and so undermined all the securities of the South, and re
duced us to the necessity of resistance, as an act of self-preservation. As the general
rule, the course of legislation on this subject has always been a conservative, middle
one, between Northern and Southern convictions and interests. The necessity of union
was always strongly felt, and this interest prevailed, but not until either section or par
ty, North and South, had yielded highly cherished preferences, on the ground of conces
sion and forbearance. And not only is it susceptible of the clearest historical and logi
cal proof, that the law of slavery has always been a virtual compromise, but the whole
administration based upon existing law, from time to time, has been such in fact, be
cause accommodated to the ever-varying circumstances, under which it has been ap
plied. If not, why has the law, in so many instances, as we have seen, been permit
ted to remain a dead letter — a mere brutum fulmen, when it came in conflict with cir
cumstances and developments, rendering its exercise inconsistent with the more general
reasons and causes, which gave it birth? We are reminded, however, that all this is de
nied both by the writers and signers ofthe Reply, (it was the joint production of three
different writers, only one of whom signed it,) and it may not be amiss to vary the evi
dence on this subject. The Protest assumes a legal compromise, in the absence of
its forms, and the Reply quietly assures all concerned, that it is an absurd fiction, un
worthy of credit. This denial, without a word of proof, is offered as quite sufficient to
overthrow the Protest entirely. The summary endorsement of the quintuple alliance
of Northern editors, was of course superfluous. If it should be made appear, however,
that legislative compromise is by no means uncommon, but in fact of frequent occur
rence, and notoriously one of the most ordinary forms of party stipulation, it will at
least tend to prepare the way for a fairer estimate of the mass of evidence we have yet
to present, on the subject in dispute. The well known political balance of mutual
rights and interests, as secured in the Constitution of the United States, between the
North and the South, has been recognized as a compromise, since the foundation of the
government, without any direct evidence, however, of any thing resembling compro
mise, in the Constitution itself. A conventional understanding has, during this whole
term, existed between tbe North and South, to the effect, that in the admission of new
States into the confederacy, the number of free and slave States shall be equal, or as
nearly so as practicable ; and this has been invariably appealed to, as a compromise not
to be disregarded by either party, without the imputation of implied dishonor, although
no express contract exists to this effect. The evidence is found in the Constitutional
history ofthe country. When the Congress of the United States, in 1820, decided up
on a proposition from the Hon. H. Clay, that no slave State should be admitted into the
Union, North of latitude 36 30, and the North agreed to admit Missouri, and settle the
slavery question as then agitated, upon the basis of such a prospective arrangement, it
was then, and has ever since been, regarded as a compromise, reasonably and fairly
binding the South against any attempts to extend slavery beyond this line, and the
North against meddling with the question, by opposing the admission of slave States
South of it, unless they should exceed in number the free States North. However in
formal, this conventional arrangement, it has always been understood and recognized as

17
a compromise, which saved the Union of the States, both by the people of this country,
and throughout the civilized world.
Mr. Madison informs us, that a measure introduced into Congress in 1782, was car
ried through and became. a law "by compromise," and yet, in the reported proceed
ings of Congress, the evidence is not found upon the Journal. Mr. Madison also in
forms us, that in settling the question in the Congress of 1783, in what proportion
slaves should come in as a basis of representation, the question could only be settled
by compromise; and yet tbe compromise does not appear upon the face of the record.
In the Convention for the adoption of the Constitution of the United States in 1787,
there was a special conventional compromise, as Madison, Hamilton, and others, assure
us, between the North and the South, respecting commerce and Slavery — the Northern
confederates needing wliE.t it was the interest of the South to withhold, but the North
insisting, the South yielded, in view of a similar concession to them in favor of slave
ry. The evidence of the fact, however, does not appear in the Constitution, but else
where ; although it is as certain, as it is likely to become important in the history of
the country. The West India Emancipation bill is known and recognized in the de
bates of Parliament, and British history, as a compromise; and yet as a law it wears
the aspect of a simple decree, and is only known as a compromise, because it was an
adjustment of a difficult question between the West India Planters and the Imperial
Legislature, upon the ground of mutual concession. Even Magna Charta is shown by
Hallam, Godwin and others, to have been a compromise, and as such has given char
acter to British legislation ever since, although the form of this celebrated instrument
does not indicate the fact. The existing government of France is recognized by philo
sophical statesmen, as the great compromise between the absolutism of one part ofthe
nation, and the republicanism of the other ; and it is strictly true that the government
of Louis Phillippe is a compromise arrangement, although it may not appear upon the
Statute book, or in the Cabinet archives. During a period of near a century before the
American Revolution, a conventional understanding existed between the colonies of
this country and the English government, that while the latter had the right to regu
late external taxation, duties, and imposts, connected with the colonies, the undoubted
right belonged to the former, to regulate all internal taxation ; and a well defined com
promise to this effect, without any formal stipulation, had become so incorporated with
the convictions and feelings of the American people, that its violation by the British
ministry, instantly decided the colonies in favor of revolt. The question of slavery, in
British India, has long been treated by the Parliament and Press of England, as a com
promise arrangement — one party insisting on its abolition, and the other resisting it,
as subversive of British sovereignty in that quarter of the globe. The policy of the gov
ernment has always been regarded as a compromise, while mere legislation has given
the subject no such aspect. The adjustment of the great Tariff question, between the
North and the South, in 1832, is known as the Compromise act of Congress on the sub
ject, and yet, upon its face, it is a simple decree of national legislation. Speaking of
English compromise grants, the Crown, the Nobility, and the Commons being parties,
Hale says : "The concession of these Charters was in Parliamentary form."
Dr. Bangs and Bishop Emory, both style the suspended resolutions of 1820, usually
known as the Presiding Elder question, a compromise; yet no evidence of the fact ap
pears upon the face of the law, and it is evident they reasoned in the case, as we have
in the Protest, the law was a compromise because it originated, as did the law of slave
ry, in the mutual concession of antagonist parties. The proposition of the Bishops to
the late General Conference, to postpone the whole question in the case of Bishop An-
3

IS
drew until 1848, was regarded and has since been represented by both parties as a com
promise measure, without being so shaped or styled by its authors. Dr. Emory, and
subsequently the Bishops, in an official address, and more recently Dr. Elliott, repre
sent the conventional agreement of the traveling ministry, to labor where the Episco
pacy may appoint, and the people to submit without any claim of right to select their
pastors, as a compromise in the Constitution of the Church, and which cannot be viola
ted without high moral blame, but certainly without any formal stipulations to this
effect. By analogy then, the circumstances of conventional understanding and legislative
adjustment, being the same or similar, is it not with the most perfect and entire pro
priety, the Protest speaks of the compromise law of the Church, on the subject of slave
ry? Nor in doing so, was there any thing constrained or far-fetched. It is a conclu
sion so natural and necessary, in view of the premises, as furnished in the history of
the Church, that the only wonder is, that men claiming enlarged information could be
prevailed upon to risk its denial. It is urgently assumed in the Reply, that the North
has always been conceding to the South, as it regards slavery. The question arises,
have they done so, except as it was just and right? Have they sacrificed principle and
duty, by concession? If not, the just claims of the South to the concessions made, are
admitted by their own acts in the case, and the result is compromise. We have seen,
and shall have occasion further to see, that in order to the very existence of the law of
slavery in the Methodist Episcopal Church, compromise was an indispensable condi
tion. Without it the law could not have been. In a conflict of necessities, the parties
legislated upon the principle of mutual accommodation. Neither party had what they
desired, each gave up what they were anxious not to part with, but agreed to unite,
upon what they could obtain, in the adjustment, without disunion, and this social guar
anty, in the shape of public law, has been looked upon, in the South at least, as a com
promise, because concession was known to be its basis, and because, without such a re
ciprocal modification of different and opposing elements, interests, and wishes, no law
could have bound the North and South together. The Bishops in their General Confer
ence address, 1840, say, "it is impossible to frame a rule on slavery proper for our peo
ple in all the States alike," and certainly it is not less impossible to do it in the case of
the ministry. The only reasons involving conscience or principle, apply alike in either
case. And accordingly the law of the Church has always been different in its applica
tion to different States, and we are thus presented with the necessity, the reasons, and
the fact, of compromise, as assumed in the Protest. The sum of the whole legislation
on the subject, has been essentially conventional in character and bearing, and although
without any formal ratification by the parties as such, has been in fact a compromise
arrangement. Dr. Bangs says, "the several modifications of the rules on slavery, from
one General Conference to another, until the present time, all partake of a similar
character," (that of compromise,) "intending to record the opposition of the Church to the
system, and to adopt such measures to mitigate its evils, and finally, if possible, to do
it away, as wisdom and prudence should suggest." Speaking of the legislation of
1784, the Dr. says, "even this gradual process could not be carried forward, without
producing a greater evil than it was intended lo remove," and adds, that the law "was
suspended," (the Church finding it necessary to compromise,) "in favor of those more
¦.vise and prudent measures, which the Church has ever since used, and is ready to use,
for the extirpation of slavery." Even the zeal of Dr. Coke cooled in contact with the
reasons and necessity for compromise to which we allude. "On his second visit to
America, Dr. Coke was convinced he had acted indiscreetly, and he consented (when

19
pressed by the South,) to let the question of emancipation alone." "He proceeded in
such an intolerant spirit of philanthropy, that he soon provoked violent opposition."
"His mistaken zeal and the unfavorable influence his opinions and course had, on the
subject of slavery in the South, are matters of history." — Drew's Life of Coke, South-
ey's Wesley, Coke's Journal. The General Conference in their address to the British
Conference in 1840, say, "under the administration of Dr. Coke, emancipation was
urged alike in all the States, without reference to law or public opinion — the attempt
proved almost ruinous, and was soon abandoned by the Dr. himself. While therefore,
the Church has encouraged emancipation, in those States where the laws permit it, and
allow the freedman to enjoy freedom, we have refrained from conscience sake, from all
intermedling with the subject, in those States, where the laws make it criminal." Would
truth permit the last Generel Conference to make such a statement? They add, "the
question of the evil of slavery, is a very different matter, from a principle or rule of
Church discipline, to be executed contrary to and in defiance of the laws of the land."
There is perhaps no single word in the English language, so fully expressive of the
meaning of the General Conference in this statement, as the single word compromise,
if we take into the account, with the course of action indicated, the reasons which ob
viously led to it. The General Conference says, of both the ministers and members of
the Church, "with their rights as citizens of these United States, the Church disclaims
all interference." Apply this to the Southern ministry and membership, connected with
slavery, where emancipation is impracticable, and what does it expressly authorize them
to assume, on coming into the Church, or any grade of the ministry? By what means
could it be made clearer, that the General Conference pledges, that the legislation and
practical government of the Church, should be such, as not to conflict with the rights
of citizenship in any of the States. How was this pledge treated by the late General
Conference, especially in tbe case of Bishop Andrew? The General Conference of
1836 declared, "such is the diversity of habits, thoughts, manners, customs, and do
mestic relations, among the people of this vast Republic, and the diversity of the insti
tutions of this vast confederacy, that it is not to be supposed an easy task, to suit all
the incidental circumstances of our economy to the views and feelings of the vast mass
of minds interested." Is it not intended, that the facts brought into view, shall desid
erate the necessity of compromise, in order to prove its reasonableness, as it actually ex
isted in the law of the Church? Again they say, "we pray that brethren, will at least
give us the credit of having acted in good faith, not having regarded private ends or
party interest, but the best good of the whole family of American Methodists." Tha
allusion here to parties, "party interests" and "good faith," may tempt some to think, that
both the language and sentiments of the General Conference had been plagiarised into
the Protest; They add, "we assure you, we have adopted no new principle or rule of
discipline, respecting slavery, since the time of the apostolic Asbury, neither do we
mean to adopt any. There are States in which slavery exists so universally, and is so
closely interwoven with the civil institutions, that both do the laws disallow of eman
cipation, and the great body of the people, (the source of laws with us,) hold it to be trea
sonable, to set forth any thing by word or deed, tending that way." As it would be
wrong and unscriptural to enact a rule of discipline contrary to the Constitution and
laws of the State, on this subject, so also would it not be equitable or scriptural, to
confound the positions of our ministers and people, so different are they in different
States, with respect to the moral question which slavery involves." The good sense of
these passages, will command respect every where, but when we come to apply them in
the case of Bishop Andrew, we are compelled to see, that the requirement of the late

20
General Conference was both disallowed and held to be treasonable both by the laws
and people of Georgia — was contrary alike to its "Constitution and laws," if ihe last
may explain the first, and therefore, by authority of the General Conference of 1836,
not only "wrong," and "inequitable," but "unscriptural," albeit, it is in bad taste and
worse odour to invoke scripture to this effect. They say further, "we have been less
or more agitated with the perplexing question of slavery, interwoven as it is, in many
of the State Constitutions, and left to their disposal by the civil compact, which binds
us together as a nation, and thus put beyond the power of the legislation of the General
Government, as well as the control of ecclesiastical bodies, could you have perceived all
its delicate relations to the Church, to the several States, and the government of the
United States, you would have sympathized with us more tenderly." Contrast with
this language, the rash and reckless proceedings, (so we are compelled to regard them,) of
the General Conference of 1844, and who can help being struck with their irreconcila
ble dissimilarity. Here is a most "perplexing question," "interwoven" with some fif
teen "State Constitutions" — at the "disposal" of these States alone, and this too by the
stipulations of the national compact — "beyond the power of the General Government,
or the control of ecclesiastical bodies," — "delicately" connected with "the Church" —
the "several States" and the government of the United States. In 1844, however, all
is changed. The Majority place "theatres and grog-shops," side by side with slavery,
and declare them equally allied to law and government. And their organs have since
improved upon the discovery, by the addition of "drunkenness, profaneness, and the
card table" — all equally condemned by morality, yet equally protected by law! The
General Conference of 1836, by solemn resolution declared, "we wholly disclaim, anv
right, wish, or intention, to interfere, in the civil and political relation, between master
and slave, as it exists in the slaveholding States in this Union." Here the relation
between master and slave is "civil and political," and the Conference disavows anv
"right" to "intefere." Georgia was a slaveholding State — Bishop Andrew a citizen
and master, and ihe laterGeneral Conference declared, that the "civil and political" re
lation, existing between him and his slaves, must be dissolved, or he cease to be a
Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church, except in a state of suspension— that is
hung up for further punishment. Take the public faith of the Church, as pledged to
James 0. Andrew, in the resolution above, and then turn to Ihe redemption of that
pledge by the late General Conference, and tell us which is laboring under tbe greater
"impediment," and which ought to "desist," until it is removed? In the address of the
Bishops in 1836, they say, "from a calm and dispassionate survey of the whole ground,
we have come to the solemn conviction, that the only safe scriptural and "prudent way
for us, both as ministers and people to take, is wholly to abstain from this agitating sub
ject." What deference did the Majority of the late General Conference extend to this
advice? In all the General Conference olympiads of the Church, has any one been
half as much distinguished by agitation, as was the close of the last?
The Bishops state in behalf of the Annual Conferences generally—" they have no dis
position to criminate their brethren in the South, who are unavoidably connected with
slavery, or to separate from them on that account." Bishop Andrew, by the showing
of his prosecutors, was " unavoidably connected with slavery," entirely apart from his
marriage, and the assurance here given by the Bishops, and endorsed by the General
Conference, was utterly disregarded in his case. The Bishops add of the Conferences,
" they clearly perceived that the success of abolition measures would result in the di
vision ofthe Church." Did or did not the anti-slavery party so act at the late General
Conference, as to give success to '• abolition measures," and thus incur the responsibil-

21
ity of a " division of the Church?" In the same connection, the Bishops strongly in
sist on " no imposition of new terms of communion — no violation of covenant engage
ments, on the part ofthe Church." This is too much in character with the doctrines of
the Protest, not to be condemned with it. The Bishops obviously regarded the Annual
Conferences as original contracting parties, creating the Delegated General Conference
with limited rights and powers, and the law of slavery as one of congruity and comity.
to which they had mutually consented, in General Conference action, for the good ofthe
whole body — hence the law of slavery a term of communion — and " covenant engage
ments" which may be broken by the General Conference. Does the abused compro
mise of the Protest assume more than this? The Bishops remark further : " Rules
have been made, from time to time, regulating the sale, and purchase, and holding of
slaves, which, upon experience of the great difficulty of administering them, and the un
happy consequences, both to masters and servants, have been as often changed and repeal
ed. These important facts, which form prominent features of our past history, as a
Church, may very properly prepare us for that course of action in future, which may be
best calculated to preserve the peace and unity of the whole body — promote the happi
ness ofthe slave population, and advance, generally, in the slave holding community of
our own country, the humane and hallowing influence of our religion. We cannot withhold
from you, at this eventful period, the solemn conviction of our minds, that no new ec
clesiastical legislation on the subject of slavery, at this time, will have a tendency to
accomplish these most desirable objects." How far this admonition, to adhere to ex
isting " covenant engagements" — the compromise ofthe Protest, was adhered to in the
premises of this controversy — and to what extent " new legislation" was had by forced
construction of existing law, we shall have occasion to see by viewing the subject in a
variety of additional aspects. The Bishops vehemently urge the ministry, including
themselves, to employ their " whole influence to bring both slave and master to a sa
ving knowledge ofthe grace of God, and to a practical observance ofthe relative duties
of 'master and slave,' so clearly prescribed in the writings of the inspired Apostles." —
(The duties growing out of the relations of the theatre, grog shop, card table and race
ground, omitted.) "Can we," they add, "at this eventful crisis, render a better ser
vice to our country, than by laying aside all interference with relations authorized and
established by the civil laws, and applying ourselves wholly and faithfully to what
specially appertains to our high and holy calling— to teach and enforce the moral obli
gations ofthe Gospel, in application to all the duties growing out of the different rela
tions of society. If past history affords us any correct rules of judgment, there is much
cause to fear, that the influence of our sacred office, if employed in interfering with the
relation itself, and consequently, with the civil institutions of the country, will rather
tend lo prevent than to accomplish these desirable ends." How this advice, sanction
ed as it had been by the whole Church, was dishonored by the late General Conference,
no one need be told.
The British Conference, in the last charge to their West India Missionaries, before
the abolition of slavery there, explicitly declare : "Your only business is to promote
the moral and religious improvement of the slaves to whom you have access, without,
in the least degree, in public or private, interfering with their civil condition." And in
their address to the Methodist Episcopal Church in 1839, on the subject of slavery,
they say: "You are placed in circumstances of painful trial and perplexity. We en
ter with brotherly sympathy into the peculiar situation you are called to occupy." First
disclaiming any right to meddle with the civil condition of the slave, even in the West
Indies, where slavery existed without the guaranties with which it is surrounded in this

22
country ; and secondly, admitting that our position, in this respect, is a peculiarly try
ing one, and therefore calls for treatment suitable to the difficulty and issues involved.
Again, the British Wesleyans instruct their Missionaries — " on all persons, in a state
of slavery, you are diligently and explicitly to enforce the same exhortations which the
Apostle of our Lord administered to the slaves of ancient nations." There is certainly a
startling contrast between these views, and the kindred advice of our Bishops, as it re
gards the apostolic practice of inculcating upon all slaves, the Scripture duty of obedi
ence and fidelity, and the affectation of pious horror manifested at the recent General
Conference, lest the Bible should be invoked on this subject for any purpose not involv
ing the denunciation of slavery. The difference is, the first has, and the second lacks
the warrant of the Bible. At the Western Conference in Tennessee, in 1808, Bishop As
bury says: " We made a regulation on slavery ; it was, that no member of society, or
preacher, should sell or buy a slave, unjustly, inhumanly, or covetously." The conces
sion here by Biihop Asbury and the Conference, is, that in view of the existing
system of slavery, (though regarded as an evil,) ministers, as well as members of the
Church, may nevertheless both buy and sell slaves, without the charge of injustice, in
humanity, or covetousness — that is, without any charge of moral wrong. At the Vir
ginia Conference, in 1809, Bishop Asbury says : " We are defrauded of great numbers
by the pains that are taken to keep the blacks from us." Why? He adds, "their mas
ters are afraid of our principles" — that is, abolition principles. He goes on, "would not
an amelioration in the treatment and condition of slaves, have produced more good to
the poor Africans, than any attempt at their emancipation! What is the personal lib
erty ofthe African, which he may abuse, to the salvation of his soul?" Well may we
pause over these concessions of the experienced Asbury. He avows that abolition had
" defrauded" the Church of multitudes, (not only thousands, but hundreds of thousands
of slaves,) and he admits that the salvation of these unfortunate slaves had been jeop
ardized by attempts at their emancipation, which had proved as abortive, as they were
offensive and injurious. At the Southern Conference, held at Green Hills, North Caro
lina, in 1785, Dr. Coke warmly, and in reproachful language, objected to tbe character
of Rev. Jesse Lee, because he was not in favor of coercing the immediate unconditional
emancipation of all slaves owned by Methodists. This resulted in a serious personal
conflict, producing great division of feeling, and a high state of excitement in the Con
ference. The Doctor found himself in the minority, and finally apologised for his con
duct. The difficulty, however, was renewed a few days after, at a Conference in Vir
ginia, where the people became greatly excited against the Conference, on account
of their interference in matters of civil right. The author of the Life of Lee, alluding
to this conflict with Dr. Coke, remarks that Lee " anticipated what in reality was
brought to pass, a few years after, that the spirit of the (Southern) people would be
roused, by pressing the subject too closely, and that it would be the means of closing
the door effectually against future emancipation." Indeed, nothing is more evident
than that parties, as they now exist, have existed from the beginning, in the Methodist
Episcopal Church, on this subject ; and that the zeal and indiscretion of the abolition
party, during the whole term, have tended directly to check and arrest the progress of
emancipation, so that no unimportant portion of Southern slavery, is directly chargea
ble, during a period of sixty years, to such interference by a portion of the Church.
History and experience, a thousand experiments and as many failures, have demonstra
ted to the good sense of all concerned, that to meddle and denounce, can never miti
gate tbe evils of slavery, in this country. And if slavery and Methodism ought not to
co-exist, in the same fellowship, why, inthe name of any or all the virtues, has the con-

23
nection been allowed at all, whether by Wesley himself, in the early American and
West India societies, or by the Methodist Episcopal Church? Mr. Wesley made no at
tempt to exclude it — had no rule — gave no directions on the subject. He condemned
the system, but as a practical question of civil origin and regulation, refused to meddle
with it. The Methodist Episcopal Church has always waged war upon the evil, and
yet would not part with it ; that is to say, has always proclaimed slavery an evil, and
yet admitted slave holders to all the rights and privileges of lay and ministerial stand
ing. A standing antagonism has been maintained, but always in a state of wedlock.
How will the historian make appear, that it was fair and just, honest and honorable,
to admit slave holders, as they have notoriously, since 1770, both to membership and
office, with the intention of making emancipation the condition of the one and the other,
subsequently? If the first be admitted but the latter denied, then what becomes of ihe
Church's " opposition" to slavery? In what sense has slavery ¦' been treated as- an
evil?" Unless we take the ground that it was the purpose of the Church to oppose
. slavery, as one of the many forms of civil oppression, but not to treat the slave holder as
involved in moral blame, in view of the mere relation itself, how can we defend the char
acter ofthe Church? Look at the ground we have just gone over. Why this temporiz
ing hesitation — this complication of terms and conditions — these declarations of hostili
ty, followed by truce, suspension and repeal? Look at the subject as we may, the idea
and the necessity of compromise, obtrude at every step. The real difficulty, which ev
er and anon has presented itself, in the history of legislation, has always arisen out of
a conflict of opposing elements and interests. The conflict proves the existence of par
ties, and the adjustment ofthe difficulty, by legal enactment of the parties in common
council, proved the only and yet real compromise, for which we contend. Lee, in his
history of American Methodism, speaking ofthe legislation of 1784, observes : "These
rules were offensive to most of our Southern friends, and were so much opposed by
many of our private members, local preachers, and some of the traveling preachers,
that the execution of them was suspended." That is, the legislation of a majority was
suspended upon the Protest of a Southern minority. The parties were as distinctly
marked sixty years ago as now. Lee says of the Conference first legislating on the
subject of slavery in 1780 : " None of the preachers South of Baltimore were present
at the Conference." It was a Northern movement entirely — a one-sided measure — tbe
South would not submit to it, and the " Rules" soon went to the grave of the Capulets.
The action in 1780, should be carefully kept in view, as the deed of the North, distin
guished from the South, although it has been dexterously palmed upon the whole body
of primitive Methodist preachers. Lee is explicit: "On the 24th day of April, the
eighth Conference met in Baltimore, where the Northern preachers only attended." The
North had the preponderance of strength, and ruled, as now, the minority of the South.
Speaking of the Northern Conference and the Southern Conference contra-distinguished,
Lee says the Northern Conference "was allowed greater privileges than that in the
South, especially in making rules and forming regulations for the societies. Accord
ingly, when any thing was agreed to in the Virginia Conference, (South) and after
wards disapproved of inthe Baltimore Conference, (North) it was dropped. But if any
rule was fixed and determined on at the Baltimore Conference, the preachers in the
South were under the necessity of abiding by it." The North having the majority, and
controlling the South. In 1803 the Southern conferences had 165 preachers, and 56,-
000 members; while the Northern Conferences had a less numerous membership, with
218 preachers — an excess of more than 50; and a similar disproportion has always ex
isted, giving Church control to the North. It is true, in early times the North and

24
South would have been about equal in numbers and strength, had the Baltimore
ence acted with the South, where geographically and politically she properly be ongs.
That Conference, however, has always cherished affinities for the Norlh, and continues
to do so, and this fact has secured to the North the power of the Church for 65 years or
more. Contrary, therefore, to the round assertion of the Reply, the preponderance of
strength has always been in the North. Upon this misstatement of fact, andlheconse-
quent inconclusive reasoning of the Respondents, it is not necessary to enlarge. Nu
merous facts support our general position. In raising a fund, the year before our
Church organization, that is in 1793, for the support of preachers' families, the assessment
was "North Circuits £200, South Circuits £60;" showing the great disproportion in
strength and resources. At the General Conference of 1804, the Baltimore and Phila
delphia Conferences alone, furnished 67 members, nearly two thirds of the whole num
ber. Had not the Baltimore Conference represented Pennsylvania rather than Mary
land, as she always has in this respect, the North and South would have been equally
divided, with three Bishops (Englishmen) at their head. As it was, the North was de
cidedly in the ascendant. Indeed, up to the General Conference of 1812, the Baltimore
and Philadelphia Conferences furnished more than half the members of all the General
Conferences. I have often heard it stated by those who were present, that at the Christmas
Conference of 1784, there was but a small number of preachers present, and scarcely any
from the South, until toward the close, when nearly all the business had been despatch
ed. This statement is sustained by Lee's history, and especially by Bishop Asbury,
who says : " Friday 24, (December,) rode to Baltimore, where we met a few preach
ers; it was agreed to form ourselves into an Episcopal Church, with Superintendent",
Elders and Deacons ; when the Conference was seated, Dr. Coke and myself were unan
imously elected to the Superintendency ofthe Church. We were in great hasle, and did
much business in a little lime." In all this, Northern ascendancy is distinctly visible, as
the power of control has been in fact with the Northern Conferences, and the South
strictly a minority.
Bishop Asbury states, that soon after its publication, he learned that the address in
1800, of the Genera] Conference, calling on the Southern Legislatures to emancipate
the slaves of the South, had, in South Carolina, "been the occasion of producing a law,
which prohibited ministers attempting to instruct any number of blacks with the
doors shut, and authorizing a peace officer to break open the door in such case?, and
disperse or whip the offenders. Nothing could- so effectually alarm, and arm the citi
zens of South Carolina, against the Methodists, as the address of the General Confer
ence. They did indeed, (before,) give their slaves liberty to hear and join our Church,
but now it appears the poor Africans will no longer have that indulgence." Again he
says, "I lament that I have no access to the poor (slaves,) our way is strangely closed up,
at present, in consequence of ihe address." Drew, speaking of Dr. Coke and his
associates, remarks, "on account of their attacks on slavery, they were in danger of
beino' altogether hindered from prosecuting their ministry, and hence were compelled to
change their course," that is, driven to compromise. He says, "if Dr. Coke had contin
ued his direct attack upon the slave trade, (slavery is meant,) he must have abandoned
the United States." These and kindred facts, early decided the Church in favor of a
compromise course. When, at the General Conference of 1808, ihe Bishops were au
thorized to ordain colored persons, free or slaves, to the office of Deacon, it was deemed
unadvisable to publish the fact, nor was it published until nine years after. Lee says,
"most of the Preachers were opposed to its being made-public." Why this deference
to Southern opinion and feeling, unless the Church had resolved on a course of compro-

mise treatment? Dr. Bangs says, "they found it necessary to relax in their measures
against slave holders, without, however, attempting to justify the system itself." Lee
says of these early measures : " It was going too far, and calculated to irritate the
minds of our people, and not to convince them." He adds: "Long experience has
taught us, that the various rules that have been made on this subject, have not been at
tended with that success which was expected. We are well assured they never were
of any particular service to our societies." He informs us : " Dr. Coke met with much
opposition in the South, owing to his imprudent manner of preaching against slavery.
No doubt the Doctor, at the time, thought he was doing right, but afterward, when he
printed his Journal in England, he acknowledged he was wrong. in preaching publicly
against slavery in Virginia, where the practice was tolerated by law." Tbe General
Conference of 1796, apparently in doubt about what had been done, calls upon the whole
Church, to give, in any form they might prefer, their maturest thoughts on slavery; and
yet Coke and Asbury, in preparing and publishing, by request of this Conference, their
notes on the Discipline, say not one word in explanation ofthe section on slavery. The
general rule, respecting which there was no diversity of opinion, they explain, but pass
over the vexed question, which then, as now, was giving the Church so much trouble —
that is, how we are to attempt correction, without increasing the evil? Was not this
very silence a concession to the magnitude ofthe difficulty ? The probability that the
general rule was inserted by order of the Bishop's council, is strengthened by the fact
that the slavery question was allowed to slumber — was not agitated at all, from 1785 to
1796. Jn the year 1789, the date of the rule, there were eleven Conferences, all quite
small, as we learn from Lee, Bangs, and others. Noone of them could claim any thing
like conventional authority, and this fact, connected with the preceding one( renders tho
supposition above almost certain ; especially when connected with what we have before
stated, and the silence of Conference history on the subject.
Dr. Durbin says: "The Qhurch has gradually made concessions to the necessities of
the slave holding States — our fathers wisely made them, on the ground of necessity —
the Methodist Church could not have existed at all in the South, without them." An
analysis ofthe Doctor's concession, shows that the majority ofthe North conceded, up
on the just demand of the South, and that the South and Norlh, in asking and making
the concession, sought the common unity and good of the whole, and the Doctor thus
gives us, in part, the true compromise of the Protest. Dr. Bangs assumes that the
Methodist traveling ministry " pledge themselves to each other, not to violate those
conventional obligations, under which they have reciprocally bound themselves, as ar
ticles of faith, and rules of moral, religious and ministerial duty. Against these they
are not at liberty to speak, preach, or write. Without the redemption of this pledge,
there can be no peace or union." How far, and with what force this applies to our
compromise argument, and our reasoning on the subject of conventional pledges, in the
shape of legislation, will be seen at once, without remark from us. On the subject of
slavery the Dr. says, "at almost every General Conference, some enactment has been
made for the purpose of regulating slavery— of modifying or mitigating its character,
with a view ultimately, if practicable, to do it away. It is manifest, that the making
rules for the regulation of a practice, is in some sense to pronounce, that the practice
is not, in itself, considered independently of all concurring circumstances, a moral evil
in the sight of God. To legislate for a thing is to sanction it, though the manner of
holding the thing may be considered either unlawful or inexpedient." This is the true
compromise doctrine of the Church. The legislation of the Church has aimed at the
regulation of the practice in question. This implies not merely toleration, but as Dr.

26
Bangs says, some degree of "sanction." The Church has never legislated, in view of
regulating Drunkenness, Profaneness, Gambling, Theatres, and Grog-shops. Every as
pect in which the subject comes up, proves the folly of any attempt to place slavery in
the same category with these. The whole history of Methodism, disowns the classifi-
cation as absurd, and in the language of the General Conference, "unscriptural."
On the general view of the subject we have taken, hear the venerable Bishop Hedding,
whose reasoning has never been influenced by a Southern sun or Southern sympathies.
He says, "the Church has permitted her members to hold slaves, where the laws of the
land are such that they will not allow of emancipation, without subjecting the emanci
pated person to be again enslaved. The right to hold a slave, is founded on the rule
'all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them.' That
there are many such cases among our brethren of the Southern States, I firmly believe.
If I did not believe it, I could not do the duties the Church requires me to perform,
when I attend the Southern Conferences. If I had not believed it in 1824, I could not
have accepted the charge committed tome, when I was made one of the Superintendents
of the whole Church, including slaves and masters. They believe that to emancipate
their slaves, would be breaking the rule, 'do as you would be done by.' We cannot
convince them by censuring them. Other means must be used if ever they are convin
ced. But that they are wrong in principle, cannot be proved, unless you can produce a
precept of the Divine law equal to this, 'thus saith the Lord, thou shalt not own a slave.'
But this precept is not in the Bible. Will you say slavery is condemned in the parts
which compose it. This is true of the slave trade, of the system, and of all the injus
tice and cruelty inflicted on slaves, but it is not true in circumstances, where the best
possible thing a man can do for his slaves, is to hold, protect, feed, and govern them.
Will you say, 'undo every burden and let the oppressed go free;' but the people I have
described are not oppressed by their owners. If their present owners should set them
free, they would be oppressed by others. They are now held to protect them from op
pression, and to own them is the only way to protect them. The Church has never
said there could be no circumstances, in which a man could own slaves, and yet be in
nocent — nay, she has said the contrary." Since the organization of the Church in 1784,
he represents her as "teaching those who could put away their slaves, on our Lord's
rule, to do so, and also teaching those who could not thus release them, to conduct to
wards them as the Saviour directed." He says "the address of the General Conference
on slavery in 1800, was the occasion of a vast amount of injury both to them and the
work." Speaking of tbe entire history of the Methodist Societies from their first es
tablishment to the organization of the Church in 1784, the Bishop remarks, "Mr. Wes
ley and his preachers did not, at that time, believe it was a sin to hold slaves, where
the laws were such as to prevent their continuing free after being manumitted. The
language they employ clearly shows that it was their opinion that their people might
be innocent in holding slaves, where the laws did not permit emancipation on christian
principles. Mr. Wesley never said one word, that I can find, against a christian man's
holding his slave in circumstances where he could not put him away without injuring
him. And the fact of his allowing some of his preachers and members to hold slaves
in this country, for several years before our Church was organized, is sufficient evi
dence to my mind, that he saw that nothing better could be done for the slaves, circum
stanced as thoseowners were, than to hold, feed, protect, and govern them. Whilethis
state of things continued Mr. Wesley ordained a Bishop and two Elders for this coun
try, sending them over to organize his preachers and societies into an Episcopal Church,
at the same time appointing Mr. Asbury joint superintendent with Dr. Coke, when he

27
must have known, that many, both of his preachers and members in this country, held
slaves." Again, "I have been severely condemned, for expressing an unwillingness, to
put a resolution to vote, in an Annual Conference, tending to censure our brethren in
the South, for doing the same thing which Mr. Wesley allowed their fathers to do,
when in connection with him, and when, also, he possessed the full power to prevent
their donig so, or to expel them." Methodist Societies were formed in the West In
dies about the time they were in the United States, and Bishop H. remarks, "they were
under Mr. Wesley's superintendence, and from the best information I have been able to
obtain, slave owners were admitted into those Societies. Mr. Wesley believed St.
Paul permitted Philemon to be a member of the Church at Colosse, while he held Onesi-
mus a slave. That Dr. A. Clarke, Mr. Benson, Dr. Coke, and Mr. Watson also believed
that the Apostles permitted slave owners in peculiar circumstances, to bo members of the
Church of Christ, is a fact too plainly declared in their writings, to admit of a doubt.
These authors must have believed, that the Apostles knew, that the christians of their
day were under such laws or circumstances, that the only thing such of them as held
slaves could possibly do for them, according to our Lord's rule, was to hold, protect,
feed, and govern them. They all-believed that in some circumstances, men might own
slaves and yet be christians. Though the Methodist Episcopal Church always permit
ted slave owners to remain in her communion, where they could not put away their
slaves without violating the Saviour's rule, she labored hard and long, by various rules
and resolutions, and other efforts, all within the great principles above laid down, to
prepare the way for, and finally to accomplish a universal emancipation, especially in
the Church. But she found, the more she exerted herself on this subject, the more hin
drances were thrown in her way, by legal enactments, popular excitements, and by per
secution. She found that, by trying to release the bodies of the slaves, she was hindered
from using the means to save their souls, and that instead of removing their burdens,
she was made the occasion of increasing them. The Church found herself driven to
this alternative, either to cease using direct means to accomplish universal emancipa
tion, or abandon the largest portion of the Southern country." That is, the Church
was driven to compromise, as the only possible mode of duing any thing to accomplish
the object it had in view. Bishop H. says, "she determined to do all in her power, to
save both slave and master. By these" (compromise,) "measures, the Church has held
a powerful influence over thousands of both colors — she has prevented a vast amount of
injuries, which otherwise," (without such compromise,) "would have been inflicted on the
poor slaves. The civil government of that country, (the South,) is not in the hands of
the Methodists, and further, if they were so disposed, to attempt to control it on this
subject, would only hinder their great work, and bring heavier afflictions on "God's
suffering poor." Let our Lord's rule be enforced, till the rulers and the great body of
the people, of both colors, feel its influence, and then will the great Jubilee come, and
it is my opinion, it will not come before, unless it be brought about by war, blood, and
revolution. You cannot fail of perceiving, that I am on the ancient Methodist ground,
in relation to this subject — the ground trodden by Wesley, Coke, Clarke, Benson, Wat
son, Asbury, Whatcoat, Garrettson, and many other wise and holy men, who now rest
in Heaven." In review of the whole, the Bishop says of the Church, "she has chang
ed her measures," (intending compromise,) "from time to time, as the changes of circum
stances seemed to require, but never her principles." This is enough — we want no more.
This extract of manly and luminous statement and reasoning, from Bishop Hedding,
is a true and living picture of "Methodism and slavery," and well worthy the attention
of the whole Church; nor is there any thing in it, variant from the mass of opinion and

2S
evidence, we have submitted from the standard writers, the Bishops, and the General Con
ferences of the Church. It is emphatically the doctrine of the Church, the creed of
Methodism respecting slavery. It was upon the compromise principles of the Bishop's
argument, that Dr. Coke became the owner of slaves, by actual and deliberate pur
chase, as superintendent, under Wesley, of the West India missions. It was too, in
precise accordance with this general view of the subject, that the General Conference
of 1840 said, "as emancipation, under such circumstances, (that is, in States where it
is not practicable, so as to secure the enjoyment of liberty to the freed slave,) is not a
requirement of Discipline, it cannot be made a condition of eligibility to office.'' None
need be told, that contrary to this official assurance, the last General Conference did make
emancipation, under the very circumstances described, a necessary condition of such
eligibility. Again, the Conference says, "an appeal to the policy and practice of the
Church, for fifty years past, will show incontestibly, that whatever may have been the
convictions of the Church, with regard to this great evil, the nature and tendency of
the system of slavery, it has never insisted upon emancipation, in contravention of
civil authority, and it therefore appears to be a well settled and long established prin
ciple, in the polity ofthe Church, that no ecclesiastical disabilities are intended to ensue,
either to the ministers or members of the Church, in those States where the civil au
thority forbids emancipation." In relation to this grave decision of the Genera] Con
ference, who can help seeing that the General Conference of 1844, directly contradict
ed, contravened and laid it aside, while ecclesiastical disability, under the precise cir
cumstances excepted, was officially decreed. Thus proving, as charged by the Protest,
that the good faith of the General Conference of May last, is placed in a very question
able point of view, in the cases of both Harding and Bishop Andrew. The General
Conference of 1840 declares further, "that in the Discipline, we have two distinct
classes of legislative provision, in relation to slavery, the one applying to owners of
slaves, where emancipation is practicable, consistently with the safety and interest of
masters and slaves, and the other, where it is impracticable, without endangering such
safety and these interests, on the part of both. In the latter case no disability attaches
on the ground of slavery, because the disability attaching in other cases, is here remov
ed by special provision of law." Contrast this declaration with the action of the late
General Conference, and that action will be found, a direct violation of an express
guaranty by the highest authority of the Church. The same General Conference con
tinues, "may not the principles and causes, giving birth to great moral and politi
cal systems or institutions, be regarded as evil, even essentially evil, in every primary
aspect of the subject, without the implication of moral obliquity, on the part of those
involuntarily connected with such systems and institutions, and providentially involved
in their operation and consequences? May not a system of this kind, be jealously re
garded, as in itself more or less inconsistent with natural right and mora] rectitude,
without the imputation of guilt, and derelict motive, in the instance of those, who
without any choice or purpose of their own, are necessarily subjected to its influence
and sway?" And if so, in the case of slavery in the United States, what but a com
promise course can be pursued by the Church, without a direct invasion of civil and
religious rights, growing out of long established relations, consecrated by the sancti
ties of conventional adjustment in the great national compact?
About the mere term compromise, I am not disposed to contend— in fact care nothing
about it. It was used in the Protest as typing the truth of history, and so used we
yield nothing assumed in the Protest. The use of the term may not have been familiar
in the North. But that it has been in. familiar use, among well informed Methodist

29
preachers and laymen in the South, for a long term of years, I know to be the fact, and
certainly did not know, when the Protest was written, that this was not the case in the
North. I had heard it used, as I have shown, for more than thirty years, by fathers
and leaders of the Church; and not dreaming that either the term, or the fact it was
used to type, would be questioned in any quarter, it was used without consultation with
any one. To what purpose, and with what claim to historical correctness, the question
has been mooted by the Reply, and in one or more of the Northern papers of the
Church, let those concerned determine at their leisure. A Northern man who was in
the Genera] Conferences of 1796, 1800, 1804, and 1808, says, in a letter before me, "when
we met in General Conference, May 1808, and the report came from the South, what
great injury had been done to the progress of religion among the slaves and the free,
the North and South mutually agreed to compromise on that subject, and every thing
relating to the question of slavery, (as to private members,) was stricken from the Dis
cipline, and each Annual Conference authorized to form its own rules and regulations
on the subject of slavery," (in relation to the preachers.) "Why the compromise of
1808, was ever violated, or by what- influence the right of each Annual Conference was
taken away, I am not able to say. The course pursued from 1812 to 1844, comes within
your own knowledge."
Another member of all the Genera] Conferences from 1796 to 1808, says, in a letter
with reference to the legislation of 1804, and an attempt to adjust the difficulties of the
Church on the Slavery question, "we got the compromise act passed:" and, again,
"the compromise act passed at that time, I think was sufficient to satisfy every one up
on the subject, North and South." Another member of every General Conference from
1796 to 1812, and who sides with the North in this controversy, remarks, in a letter re
ceived from him, "as to the conservative rules, I have no recollection when they were
not ; for what else could we do? We had no right to make rules in opposition to the laws.
As to its being middle ground, on which the North and South met, by way of compro
mise, I always thought it ground on which we met of necessity, not choice." Still
they met there, and the fact of compromise is admitted. Another says, "surely it is
manifest that the whole course of our legislation on Slavery has been a compromise.
The constant effort, indeed, from the beginning, has been to establish and enforce the
Old England and New England doctrine and practice of abolition ; but it was ever found
to be impracticable, and while abandoned in practice, it was still contrived to keep on
record the testimony of that creed." No comment is necessary to show the value of
such proofs, as establishing the main position of the Protest on this topic. These men
speak of different compromise acts, and the Protest assumes these different acts, often
changed and modified from 1800, but especially 1804 to 1816, as constituting, in sum,
the compromise law of the Church on Slavery. The reasons of the legislation, to which
. these men allude, are distinctly recognized by the General Conference of 1840. "It
must be expected that great variety of opinions and diversity of conviction and feeling
will be found to exist in relation to slavery, and most urgently call for tbe exercise of
mutual forbearance and reciprocal good will on the part of all concerned." With opin
ions so variant, and conviction and feeling so diverse, how can men live and act togeth
er in peace and unity, unless upon. the ground of compromise?
Before dismissing the topic of compromise, we have other important views to submit
on the subject. We maintain, that the rrjoral character of slavery in the United States
connects, essentially, with its civil and political aspects and relations, and that apart
from the latter, the former cannot be justly conceived of. Every where in the Bible,
and it is brought to view directly or allusively in hundreds of instances, slavery is re-

30
garded as a civil regulation, and all ecclesiastical interference should treat it as such.
In the United States, slavery is mixed up with organic State relations, and involves ori
ginal jural rights. These relations and rights are ordained and declared by the Con
stitution creating the Government of the United States, to be both Federal and Nation
al, pertaining in part to the States confederating, and partly to the Nation, as compos
ed of the contracting parties. The rights arising out of the relations in question, as
it respects Slavery, are, by constitutional arrangement, under the protection of the fed
eral power and supreme law of the Nation, and any citizen, or association of citizens,
invading these, in any form, or so acting as to reduce their force or value, is, incontes-
tibly, guilty of a civil, and we maintain by consequence, a moral trespass. - By the com
pact of the constitution, slavery is made an integral part of the basis of Federal and
National representation, and this as much by the act of the North as the South. Against
their wishes and remonstrances, especially Virginia and Georgia, it was introduced in
to the Colonies under the high sanction of British Law. It is strictly and essentially
of jural origin in the United States, and based in the government of the country upon
the legislation of National Sovereignty. It is an accredited principle — a well known
condition of the national compact, without which it is equally well known no Union of
the States, North and South, would or could have taken place. Slavery is only provin
cial in view of geographical locality ; in all its more important aspects it is Federal and
National in its relations and bearings. Viewing the North and South, as each a collec
tion of States, they have long existed distinct historical parties on the subject of slave
ry — parties by constitutional and legislative arrangement — parties by compacts of law,
and different and opposite judicial determinations proceeding upon them : each legislating
about the negro, slave and free, not only in diverse, but antagonist directions — opposed
more or less in interest, feeling, policy and purpose ; and is it supposed that the Metho
dist Episcopal Church could diffuse her influence, and marshal her 500,000 ministers and
members on either side of the line without the existence, if not formal organization,
of parties? The conflicts in every General Conference since 1792, prove the existence
of such parties in the Church; and their separate principles have been developed and
modified, from time to time, by various forms of repeated practical application, until
they have expanded, North and South, into something like distinct systems, involving
belief and feeling, strong and tenacious, and deeply interwoven with the practical life
and social existence of the people. It has been a result as proper as it was natural and
necessary, that the Church, in each of these great national sections, has not been ar
rayed against the policy of the State, but more or less conformed to it. In the Metho
dist Church, the parties in question have always been distinguished by other character
istics than those already mentioned. The Northern division of the Church has been, to
a great extent, a movement parly, while the Southern has been stationary and conserva
tive. That the South has been most impulsive and excitable, is admitted. They have
an interest at stake, not felt in the North. But that the South has ever attempted agi
tation, or engaged in discussion or controversy on the subject of slavery, except in
self-defence, or when assailed from some quarter, will hardly be assumed by any one.
In the history of attempts at legislative change, it will be found that nearlv everypro-
positinn for new iind further interference has come from the North, while the South has
generally simply resisted. The North has proceeded from one extreme and extrava
gance to another, in the denunciation of slavery as a- wrong, an evil ; the South admit
ting and feeling it to be an evil, entailed upon them by the ancestral governments of
the country, and asking for a remedy that would not be a greater evil. Meanwile,
Southern Methodism has done, even for the freedom of the negro, a thousand fold more

31
than Northern, beside what has been done for the earthly comfort and final happiness of
the slave, as such. The Qhurch, like the Stale, has always presented dual antagonis
tic forces — different primitive types of action, North and South, on the subject of Slave
ry, and until lately, a third force or type distinct from each, but partaking moro or less
of the character of both, has come in as a bond of mediation and intercourse between
the two, and holding both in check, has given vigour and balance to the social organi
zation. But this third conservative power having coalesced with the more extreme
Northern party, not as abolitionists, it may be, but acting with them as a common
force or party against the South, the equilibrium is destroyed, and the necessity of sep
aration has been unequivocally avowed by both parties in General Conference assem
bled. It is admitted as a general rule, as it regards State relations, that the North has
ostensibly acted upon the principle and policy of concession toward the South respect
ing slavery; but this was originally for a bonus consideration — was matter of Federal
contract, without which the South would not have confederated at all. Did the North
concede to the South? So did the South to the North, which found its indemnity in South
ern concession in relation to navigation and commerce, and the provisional right of di
rect taxation, in view of the National revenue. If it be said this latter right has rare
ly been asserted, still it does not affect the argument, for the North has had greatly
more than its equivalent in other respects, especially in the preferred advantages of the
tariff arrangements of the government and country, ever since the adoption of the con
stitution, so that the North has fully realized its own price for the concessions purchas
ed by the South in regard to slavery, of which we are so often and sometimes not very
graciously reminded.
When, therefore, it is recollected that every fraction of concession we have had from
the North, is in redemption of a conventional pledge, the primary conditions of which
have been realized to the letter, by the North, the obligations of the South may appear
the less oppressive, as the North refused all concession that did not tend, directly or indi
rectly, to promote Northern interest. In view of this compromise arrangement, the
North and South are mutually bound to compliance with the stipulations specified, and
unless the North pursue a course in relation to slavery, tending to damage Southern in
terest, the South is certainly bound, in honor and good faith, to do nothing in any way
calculated to reduce the value of what was offered, as an equivalent for Northern con
cession in relation to Southern slavery. And as this matter is vitally connected with
the more cardinal bearings of the present controversy, it may be proper to examine the
subject a little more at length.
The abolition of slavery in Pennsylvania took place in 1780, and other portions of
the North were strongly inclined, from various reasons, to a similar course. The ab
olition movements of England, about this time, in connection with the excitement and
movement in Pennsylvania, and further North, operated as motives — as inducements,
with the English Methodist Preachers, recently come to this country, to agitate the
question in the infant societies they had raised, and of course controlled; and, accord
ingly, in the first year of Pennsylvania abolition, we have the first rule on Slavery
among the Methodists in Europe or America, religious zeal being quickened by the po
litical excitement and agitation of the times. A very dissimilar state of things exist
ing at the time, in the South, from that in Pennsylvania and the North generally ; the
movement was resisted there, alike by Church and State, and hence the formation of
parties in both, which have continued ever since.
Robinson on "Slavery and the Constitution," remarks, that "at the time of the Fede
ral Convention, 1787, the experience of the States South of Pennsylvania, was sucli as

32
to produce distrust of their Northern brethren, as to tbe safety of their property in
slaves." Rawle on the Constitution, referring to the same period, observes, "it was
no easy task to reconcile the local interests and discordant prepossessions of the differ
ent sections of the United States, but the business was accomplished by acts of conces
sion and mutual condescension." Mr. Madison says, "the Convention found difficul
ties not to be described. Mutual deference and concession were absolutely necessary.
Had they been inflexibly tenacious of their individual opinions, they would never have
concurred ; it was difficult, extremely difficult, to agree to any general system. With
out it, (concession as to slave property,) the Southern States never would have entered
into the Union of America." Defending the compromise of the Constitution, Gover
nor Randolph says, "the Southern States conceived their property (in slaves) to be se
cure by this arrangement." Patrick Henry, arguing the necessity of a constitutional
guaranty to bind the North, states "a decided majority of the States — of Congress — is
North— the slaves are South." Chief Justice Tighlman, of Pennsylvania, in a decision
of the Supreme Court of that State, says, "whatever may be our private opinions on the
subject of slavery, it is well known that our Southern brethren would not have consent
ed to become parties to the Constitution, unless their property in slaves had been secur
ed." Chancellor Kent, speaking of this constitutional arrangement, observes, "it was
the result of necessity, and grew out of the fact of the existence of slavery in a por
tion of our country. The evil has been of too long standing, and is too extensive
and too deep rooted to be speedily eradicated, or even to be discussed without great
judgment [and discretion." The Hon. H. Clay stated, in debate in the Senate of the
United States, "the Constitution of the United States never could have been formed up
on the principle of investing the General Government with authority to abolish the in
stitution of slavery at pleasure. It never can be continued for a single day, if the ex
ercise of such power be assumed or usurped." Speaking of tbe general subject of
slavery, as sanctioned by the Federal Constitution, the American Quarterly Review
says, "the slave holding States (alone) have the right, the power, and the capacity lo
apply the remedy."
The whole current of political and judicial opinion, in the entire history of the gov
ernment, treats the subject as originally adjusted, and only susceptible of being man
aged by compromise. The Hon. D. Webster asks, "if we begin to disturb the balance
of power, (on the subject of slavery,) where shall we stop?" Justice Shaw, of Massa
chusetts, says, "the Constitution of the United States partakes both of the nature of a
treaty and of the form of a government. Before the adoption of the Constitution, the
States were, to a certain extent, sovereign and independent, and were in a condition to
settle the terms on which they would form a more perfect union. The constitution of
the United States regards the States, to a certain extent, as sovereign and independent
communities, with full powers to make their own laws and regulate their own policy,
and fixes the terms upon which their intercourse with each other shall be conducted.
Slavery is not contrary to the law of nations. The Constitution affords effectual security
to the owners of slaves. The States have a plenary power to make all laws necessary
for the regulation of slavery, and the rights of slave owners, while the slaves remain
within their territorial limits." Every Northern man, every abolitionist even, where-
ever found, as a citizen of the United States, is a party in solemn and public treaty with
every Southern man — every slaveholder — as the other party, not to disturb the right of
property in this respect, nor in any way thwart the intended purposes of its constitution
al guaranty ; and by how far this may be done, by so far the obligations of good faith
and citizenship are not only departed from, but violated. Justice Story says, "the slave

33
holding States insisted on a representation strictly according to numbers ; the non-
slaveholding States contended for a representation according to the number of free per
sons only. The controversy was full of excitement, and was maintained with so much
obstinacy on each side, that the Convention was more than once on! the eve of dissolu
tion. At length the present system was adopted by way of compromise ; it was a ne
cessary concession to the spirit of conciliation on which the Union was founded. View
ed as a measure of compromise, it is entitled to great praise." And certainly those
who fail to act upon it, (whether in or out of the Church,) are entitled to great blame.
The Hon. Edward Everett says, "it was deemed a point of the highest policy, by the
non-slaveholding States, notwithstanding the existence of slavery in their sister States,
to enter with them into the present Union, on the basis of the constitutional compact.
That no union could have been formed on any other basis, is a fact of historical notori
ety, and it is asserted in terms by Gen. Hamilton, in the reported debates of the New
York Convention for adopting the Constitution. This compact expressly recognizes
the existence of slavery, and concedes to the States where it prevails, the most import
ant rights and privileges connected with it. Every thing that tends to disturb these re
lations, is at war with its spirit, and whatever, by direct or necessary operation is cal
culated to excite an insurrection among slaves, has been held, by highly respectable
legal authority, an offence against the peace of the Commonwealth, which may be pro
secuted as a misdemeanor at common law. Our Fathers, the Adamses, the Hancocks,
and otber eminent patriots of the Revolution, although, fresh from the battles of liber
ty, and approaching the question as essentially an open one, deemed it, nevertheless,
expedient to enter into a Union with our brothers of the slaveholding States, on the
principle of forbearance and toleration on this subject." Dr. Frost says, "it was a
compromise of conflicting interests."
Chief Justice Parker, of Massachusetts, holds the following language with regard to
the slave holding States : "They might have kept aloof from the Constitution. That
instrument was a compromise. It was a compact by which all are bound. We then
entered into an agreement that slaves should be considered as property. Slavery would
still have continued if no Constitution had been made." Chief Justice Robertson, al
luding to the adjustment of the slavery question in the Constitution of the United States,
says, "it was the subject of a sacred compromise, which it would be neither safe nor
just for either party, without the other's consent, ever to disturb." Alluding to the
same subject, the Edinburgh Review observes, "American Statesmen labored, from the
first, under two great difficulties, against which they have struggled on, by compromise
and evasion — we mean the questions arising out of slavery, &c." Chief Justice Jay
confirms the general opinion, "the Convention who formed and recommended the new
Constitution, had an arduous task to perform, especially as local interests, and, in some
measure, local prejudices were to be accommodated. Several of the States conceived
that restraints on slavery might be too rapid, to consist with their particular circum
stances, and the importance of union rendered it necessary that their wishes on that
head should, in some degree, be gratified." How they were consulted, and what ad
justment took place, we have seen. Alluding to this topic, the Rev. Mr. Freeman, of
the North, remarks, of the compromise of the Constitution, "it concerns rights of pro
perty secured by tbe Federal compact, upon which our liberties mainly depend. , It is a
part of the collection of political rights, the least invasion of any one of which would, of
course, impair the tenure by which every other is held. When the Federal compact was
formed, the entire abolition of slavery was a favorite object with many, but they knew that
this or the Union must be surrendered. They had no alternative but to leave it as they

3-i
found it existing inthe South, or fail of the great desideratum of a Union ofthe States.
The legal construction is, that the South, who hold slaves, retain the right of exclusive
regulation over them; which right the United States cannot touch." He adds, "any
measures, on our part, of a coercive nature, or calculated to disturb the domestic ar
rangements of the South, would be a violation of our political contract, and of good
faith. Whatever we do, should be so done as not to put in jeopardy the peace of the
slave holding States. It is not enough to say that the Constitution is violated by any
action endangering the slave holding portion of our country— a higher law than the
Constitution forbids this unholy interference." A judicious observer remarks, of the
gradual abolition of slavery in the United States, "in undertaking a work of this mag
nitude, compromises will be found as necessary as they were in forming the Federal
compact." An influential English Journal has recently attempted to prove, at length,
that the "only barrier to general emancipation, in the United States, is the Federal Un
ion, which defies alike humanity and reform." Testimonies to this effect might be mul
tiplied indefinitely, but it cannot be necessary.
Such, then, is the true position of the North on this question, nor can they separate
their moral from their civil relations, as paities to the Constitution: they are all, by
deliberate consent, connected with slavery, and if they get rid of it, without the consent
of the Southern States, unless these shall violate the national compact, they get rid of
truth, honor, and good character, at the same time. It is, too, a well understood prin
ciple of law and morality, in the construction of compromises, that the temper of the
parties which led to compromise, remains one of its conditions; and either party of
fending, in this respect, violates an important obligation contracted in becoming a par
ty. Let this be applied to the slavery question, and its application will be seen at
once. Legislative contracts are common in all governments, having the force, some
times, of treaty, and sometimes of compromise, and often both. That this is the char
acter of the national compact, binding every citizen, church members as well as others,
it would be worse than stupid to deny. That the result of all legislation in the Meth
odist Church, has been a standing law of forbearance, conformably to civil obligation,
has been shown with equal clearness, thus showing that the compromise of the Protest
has been the household law of the Church ever since the subsidence of the first aboli«
lion excitement, under the early English Preachers. Abstract law, involving compro
mise, can only be carried into effect by acts of kindness, and the ministry of the affec
tions, without which it is a lifeless text, unexplained by living example, and must fail
to accomplish the purposes of ils enactment. This view of the subject applies equally
to North and South, and should be well considered by both.
It has been repeatedly decided, and is a commonly received truth, both in common
law and equity jurisprudence, that a simple decree, in form of law, may be proved a
treaty compact or compromise, by showing the original relative position of Ihe parties
interested, and the obvious indications- of purpose and intention as inferable from the
external circumstances, leading to the action assumed and admitted. Law, viewed in
the light of reason, purpose, motive, should always be explained by the context ; that
is, the circumstances giving it birth. This is what the Protest meant by the reasons of
law, instead of the strange misconceptions of the Reply. In abatement of the force of
this reasoning, it has been urged, with some show of plausibility, that, mixed up with
the compromises ofthe Constitution, was the conventional understanding, that the
South should address itself to the work of emancipation, after 1808, as it had not done
before. In reply to this, three facts are especially worthy of notice. 1st, A perma
nent provision of the Constitution contemplates and authorizes a different result. 2d>

35
What is assumed, was long and tenaciously exacted as a condition of Union, and per
emptorily refused by the South, whether in whole or in part— the South refusing lo con
federate, unless the control of ihe difficulty should be left to the States directly involv
ed in it, without the right of other States to interfere in anyway. But. 3d, It is well
known that a large portion of the South were favorable to gradual emancipation, provi
ded any disposition could be made of the free black population, consistent with the
welfare of the States giving them freedom. It was early ascertained, however, that
both the old and the new free States were inexorably resolved to exclude the free black
population, as far as possible, from their limits, and throw the whole burden upon the
South, although the slave trade of the North had been the principal means of filling
the South with slavery; and this state of things imposed upon the South the necessity,
and gave them the right, of managing this most difficult question in the best way they
could, in view of the common welfare of all concerned.
On this subject, Mr. Webster remarks, "In my opinion the domestic slavery of the
Southern States is a subject within the exclusive control of the States themselves, and
this, I am sure, is the opinion of the North. Congress has no authority to interfere
in the emancipation of slaves, or in the treatment of them, in any of the States. This
was so resolved by the House of Representatives, when Congress sat in New York, in
1790, on the report of a committee consisting almost entirely of Northern members,
and I do not know an instance of the expression of a different opinion, in either house
of Congress, since. The servitude of so great a portion of the population of the South
is undoubtedly regarded at the North as a great evil, political and moral, but it is re
garded, nevertheless, as an evil=, the remedy of which lies with those Legislatures,
(Southern,) to be provided and applied according to their own sense of policy and du
ty." General Washington, in urging the adoption of the Federal Constitution, in view
of a Union of the States, says, in language which should never be forgotten, "I do
most solemnly believe that this or dissolution awaits us, and is the only alternative."
Let this language of Washington be borne in mind, in connection with the fact, that
the reasons and necessity which influenced the judgment of Washington, in 1787, have
been increasing in number and weight ever since. Must not every person of ordinary
discernment perceive that compromise is the great conservative principle of both the
political and the social system in the United States, and so far as the Church or ecclesias
tical legislation shall fail to conform to this principle of Union, the Church must be ar
rayed against the State, and hostile to its most vital interest, so far as these may be
dependant upon such Union. The subject of slavery being, as all must admit, compro
mised in the Constitution of the United States, and all citizens of alllhe States, free
and slave, being parties to the compromise, all law, and of course any possible form
of ecclesiastical law, not in harmony with this arrangement, must infringe the guaran
ty of the great national compact. If it be said the Church is a voluntary associa
tion, with fixed conditions of membership, it does not affect the reasoning, for every
such compact necessarily Subject to the higher, is, in itself unlawful, unless in confor
mity with the greater over-riding it, and to which every citizen of the United States is
a party. It is not intended to denounce the motives or conduct of those who may be
opposed to the Constitution, in this respect, provided they do not resist its control, or
seek to change it by improper means. But it is intended to say, that those who act so
as to do the one or the other, cannot be regarded as good citizens. It is meant to say,
that any attempt, by the Church, or ecclesiastical authority, to contravene civil law or in
validate civil rights, is not only without warrant from the Bible, but pours contempt upon
the word of God, and the admitted obligations ofthe christian profession. Slavery in the

36
Southern States, viewed as limited confederating sovereignties, is local and provincial;
but as it regards the Union of the States, it is Federal andNutional, by contract ofthe Con-
stitution itself; and every essay, individual or social, by Church or State, to unsettle the
compromise of that instrument, reduces the value, and endangers the perpetuity of the
Union. And that large portions of the Methodist Episcopal Church are beginning to act
nounconspicuous part iu this respect, (however unintentionally,) is a prevalent opinion in
the South, and when it is disavowed, let the grounds of this opinion be set aside by sat
isfactory evidence ; and until this is done, all denial will be mere declamation.
Unless the national pledge of the Constitution, binding every citizen of the confede
racy, is violated by the North, there is no likelihood of disturbance, or revolt by the
slaves and free negroes of the South. If disturbance and revolt should take place, it
will be upon direct or virtual invitation from the North ; and that the North may have
no reason or pretext for such a course, it greatly, imperatively, behooves the South
not to withhold from the North, any consideration, claim, or indemnity, authorized bv
the compromise of the Constitution. I would invoke the South to cherish its honor
and consult the interests of the whole Union in this respect. That general emancipa
tion, if pressed upon us by the North, would lead to revolt and conflict, admits of no
doubt. In the proportion, therefore, that individuals, political parties, or churches,
shall lend themselves to a course of action calculated to bring about such a result, and
the consequent disunion of these States, by aggression upon Southern rights, in the
same proportion will history hold them accountable for the treason. It is a grave sug
gestion, and we ask that it may be gravely considered. If the North cannot proceed
much further, without danger to the South, and the Methodist Episcopal Church, North,
shall continue to encourage aggression, after the fashion of the late General Confer
ence proceedings, and prior Methodist movements in the North, what must be consid
ered the true attitude of the Church, with regard to her pledge in the Constitution of
the United States, to say nothing of her own abused legislation on the subject? Who
will fail to perceive, that, in retreating from the evil, by a peaceful separation of juris
diction, the South aro seeking to prevent an issue to which the North are pushing us
with unrelenting purpose? We ask not the North to approve slavery. We do not ask
them to cease warring against il, so far as such war may be protected by right,
But we do ask the North to respect justice and good faith, in connection with the ori
ginal compact, and subsequent compromises, binding the North and the South together
as one great people. The fact will obtrude itself, as we proceed, upon the common
sense of every reader, that the same specific reasons, calling for a compromise adjust
ment in our political, require it in our ecclesiastical relations, North and South; and
the numerous proofs of this Review, drawn from a great variety of unrelated sources,
will show that the result has been the same with regard to both. Accordingly, in the
Methodist Episcopal Church, while the existing law, from time to time disapproved the
system of slavery, it distinctly offered the overture, that, under specified circumstances,
slave holding should not be urged in bar to any of the rights and privileges of the mem
bership or ministry, and hence the compromise, so stoutly denied by the Reply. From
the suggestive character of much of the reasoning we have introduced, the discerning
reader will have perceived that the compromise argument of the Protest may be viewed
with advantage to its evidence, in other points of light. Even the common law of so
ciety, regulating social intercourse between the North and the South, since the abolition
of slavery in the former, has been one of compromise, without which, such intercourse
must have been as unpleasant as limited and inconvenient. And how handsomely and
generously this law has been acted upon, by the Storeys, the Websters, and the Everetts,

37
and intelligent thousands in the North, (upon whom, and their like in the South, de
pend the hopes of the country,) none need be told. It is Religious Fanatics and Polit
ical Demagogues, whose vandal abuse of the law of comity, between the North and the
South, is working the ruin of our Constitutional Union. But again : all law is a con
tract, and equivalence of consideration is presumed to be the motive determining the
parties, necessarily existing under every government, to consent and submission. Dis
turb, then, one of the contracting parties in the possession and use of the equivalent,
always implied, so that expected advantage is not realized, and the result is a violation
of contract, and an impairment of right.
Let this principle be applied, in the case of the Southern Methodist slave holder, say
Harding or Bishop Andrew, with the legislation and assurances of the Church full in
view, and can the conclusion be resisted, that the Church is disposed to meddle with
rights and principles, guarantied by the stipulations of law, contrary to public assuran
ces given by the Church? Justice Story says, "any law which enlarges, abridges, or in
any manner changes the intention of the parties, (in contracts, whether of law or
otherwise,) resulting, (by fair inference,) from the stipulations in the contract, neces
sarily impairs it." He adds: "a grant made by a State to a private individual, (and of
course by a Church to a minister or member,) and accepted by him, is a contract, and
cannot be revoked by any future law." So also, "a charter granted by the State to a
company, is a contract, and equally binding to tbe State as to the grantee." Take now
the "law," the "grant," the "charter," of the Methodist Episcopal Church, pledging that
under circumstances specified, her Southern ministers and members, shall not be dis
turbed by the Church with regard to the slaves they may so hold, and compare it with
the action and avowed policy of the Majority in this contest, and what is the inference?
Apply ihe above well known principle of law and equity, to the contract character of the
legislation of the Church on slavery, which is a property as well as a moral question,
and will it not be seen, that the Protest on this subject, is but too full of truth and rea
son? We introduce, on this subject, for the purpose of proof and illustration, numer
ous analagous principles, facts, and cases, not merely to prove the doctrine of the Pro
test, but also to show, with what claim to candor and acquaintance with the subject, the
Reply opposes to it the most confident denial, and treats the whole topic, as scarcely
worthy even the sneer of superior information, with which it is dismissed. Having al
luded to the property aspect of the question, it is not unworthy of notice here, that it
would seem to have been the purpose of the Church, lo give it secular and civil, rather
than the high moral rank claimed for it, by the late General Conference, inasmuch as
the section on slavery, in the Discipline, is excluded from the moral part of it, where il
was once found, and comes in under the head of "Temporal Economy of the Methodist
Episcopal Church," ostensibly at least, treating the subject as one involving the legal
relations of property, and therefore not within the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical law.
But that the Church has claimed, and continues to claim, the authority to interfere with
the civil rights of her ministers, as it regards slave property, it is useless to deny, and
the difficulty and delicacy of such claim, must always connect with the fact, that by spe
cial compact and deliberate compromise, in the Federal Constitution, such rights are
placed beyond the reach of any kind of infringement, without an invasion of constitu
tional right. No other species of property in the nation, is in the same category. By
this time perhaps, the reader will be pretty well prepared to decide upon the force of
one of the principal positions of the Reply, that the warranted protection of the rights
of slave holders, by the constitution and laws of the United States, and the States res
pectively where slavery exists, can be no ground of argument in this discussion. It

3S
may be seen that while in some States the citizen is not, in others, as in Georgia, he is
"required" to hold slaves — that instead of simply "allowing" a citizen to do so, when
ever he becomes the owner of slaves, they throw about him legal constraint and immu
nity, at the same time.
Legislation upon the principle of mutual accommodation, has always been regarded
as a legal compromise. The Reply admits a struggle in the Church for sixty years.
No struggle of course, could exist without parties, and finally the parties meeting on
ground, not the first choice of either, the result is compromise. Unable to see by means
of the same optics, on the subject of slavery, how was it possible for the North and
South to unite and co-operate, except on the ground of compromise? The very showing
of the Fieply, furnishes the premises from which, in part at least, the conclusion ofthe
Protest is drawn. A slight examination of the Protest will show, that it was not in
tended to speak of any special statute or enactment, but of the purpose and spirit of
general law, declared by special acts at different times, and adjudications had upon
them as giving the character of a compromise to our legislation. All these, wilh their
various relations, reasons and bearings, are brought in, in aggregation, and compromise
is assumed as the result. In charging upon the Majority want of good faith, in dis
regarding this compromise, it is plain the Protest intended, and we still think most
justly, to represent the law as a declaration of trust, the object of the trust created, be
ing the protection of character and right, under well defined circumstances. But the Ma
jority proceeded to icithdraiv the protection and destroy the relief afforded by law, and in
stead of the protection and relief pledged by law, actually inflict the wrong it was the
purpose of the law to prevent. On the final legislation of the Church respecting slave
ry, Dr. Bangs says, "various enactments had been passed from one General Conference
to another, with a view to regulate the practice of slavery in the Methodist Episcopal
Church — an evil this, which it seemed impossible to control, much less to eradicate from
the ranks of our Israel. From the organization ofthe Church in 1784, slavery had
been pronounced an evil, and a variety of expedients had been resorted to for the pur
pose of lessening its deleterious tendencies, where it seemed unavoidably to exist.
Finding, however, that the evil was beyond the control of ecclesiastical law, as to its erad
ication from the Church — the General Conference so modified the section in the Dis
cipline on slavery, as to read" — as it now does. This is the faithful language of his
tory, and gives a clear idea of the compromise action of the Church, in the management
of this most impracticable difficulty. "Such may, through the force of circumstances, be
come the state of society, that great moral evils may be tolerated, where the conviction
is clear, that acts of prohibition would produce evils far more extensive and far more
to be deprecated. So damaged, or disordered, or complicate, by tho practice or misfor
tunes of a former age, may become the very texture of society, and so peculiar the re
lations, which as a people we sustain to each other, that an immediate and entire correc
tion of the evil, may be impracticable ; and that, therefore, neither individnals nor so
ciety, are bound to attempt it." — Plea for Africa. "We do indeed tenderly sympathize
with those portions of our Church and country, where the evil of slavery has been en
tailed upon them, where a great and the most virtuous part of the community, abhor
slavery and wish its extermination, as sincerely as any others ; but where the number of
slaves, their ignorance and vicious habits generally, render an immediate and univer
sal emancipation inconsistent alike with the safety and happiness of the master and
slave." — General Assembly Presbyterian Church. The remedial compromise course re
commended in these extracts, involves the principle intended to be protected by the law

S9
of exception, as distinguished from that of the general rule, in section 10th of the Dis
cipline. The argument of the Reply, is without any semblance of pertinence or force, in all
those cases coming under the provisional exception of the Discipline, that is, where
emancipation is impracticable, without an evasion or violation of law, and these were
the very cases to which the Reply was confined, by the premises of the argument. The
laws of nearly all the Southern States, forbid emancipation ; it is the civil duty oj the
citizen not to attempt it ; and in many of the States, as in Georgia, severe penalties ac
company the prohibition. Is this true of the absurd and offensive examples urged by
the Majority as analogous? Does Southern !aw forbid the voluntary discontinuance of
the theatre, the grog-shop, the card table, or race course? If not, what becomes of
the sophistry by which it is gravely attempted to overthrow the reasoning of the Pro
test? Although the slave is not a citizen proper, yet the common denunciation that he
is a mere chattel, &c, betrays alarming ignorance or want of candor. He is directly
recognized as an inhabitant, and is represented as such in the National Legislature.
He is an inhabitant in charge, under the guardianship of a citizen proper, and this civil
relation is created and protected by the supreme and municipal law of this country.
Both create an essential difference between property in slaves, and all other kinds of
property, and hence the absurdity as well as injustice of the position above. Was it
competent for a free and sovereign people, in organizing a government for themselves,
to decide that they would have among them, by allowing them to remain, a class of
human beings, introduced into the country without their agency, by subjecting them to
the kind of inhabitancy just described? If yea, then what right has a Church to med
dle with such civil arrangement? Is the right derived from their own civil relations?
We have seen, that any original right they may have had, has been surrendered by con
tract. And what is their religious right? Before any can be established, they must
first prove a right to resist civil authority, and also a right, secondly, to abolish the re
lation in question. If nay, be the answer — then the Church is in conflict with the gov
ernment, and government, rather than the civil relation established by it, becomes the
proper object of attack, and all interference with the subject is beginning to assume its
legitimate character of opposition to government and civil authority. Great declama
tory stress is laid upon the inconsistency of slavery, with the freedom and equality as
sumed in behalf of all men, in the Declaration of National Independence, and the high
character and insulted shades of the signers of that instrument, are invoked in argu
ment and declamation, against the allowableness of slavery as an element.of Ihe poli
tical organization. This Declaration was the noble deed of a noble band of patriots,
and was considered as binding the nation, because the. act of their representatives. It
should not be forgotten however, that the same and kindred conscript fathers, we're the
authors of the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution of the United State*, in
both which, they acted upon the declared principle, that the people of the confederating
States, could never become one nation, without a compromise, fixed and conclusive in
its terms, on the subject of slavery, and the whole people, North as well as South, rati
fied an arrangement to this effect. Why such frequent and flippant appeals to the De
claration, never intended as a rule of action, to the utter disparagement of the Consti
tution, ordained as the great rule of action with all concerned? The Declaration com
mits the people to general principles only, the Constitution binds them to a given course
of conduct. It is their own act, not that of their representatives merely. It is the
covenant oath and witness of their national existence, honor, and safety ; and the man
who can violate this covenant stipulation, as elsewhere explained, under cover of

40
Church relationship, creed, conscience, or party organization, is an unworthy and dan
gerous citizen of the United States. And every Church attempting to control the ques
tion of slavery, upon any other than the compromise principle guarantied, jure solemni,
by the whole people of the United States, is guilty of an attempt to unsettle a principle,
upon the adjustment of which, the original fact of confederation turned exclusively;
and such Church fo acting, must prove dangerous to the union of the United Stales.
The true doctrine of the Methodist Episcopal Church, as avowed and published up to the
last General Conference, has been, that tolerating slavery, in the membership, she has
required her ministers, in view of orders, to free themselves from slavery, if connected
with it, where it could be done consistently with the laws, and the welfare of the libe
rated slave. Beyond this the Church has not gone. We have shown this to be, in
substance, the opinion of the Bishops and of the General Conferences of 1836 and
1840, in their official addresses. Evidence to the same effect, has been brought lo bear
from a great variety of sources, all tending to present the legislation of the Church on
the subject of slavery, in its true and proper light, as based upon the principles of
conventional compromise in conformity with the civil compact between the North and
the South. We have seen at every step, that there has been real and bona fide compro
mise, although nominal baptism to this effect, may have been wanting. We regard,
too, the legislation of the Church, as we have exhibited it, not only as rational and safe,
but as much more accordant with the Scriptures, than the plans and projects to which
it stands opposed. If we survey the entire aspect, in which the whole subject is pre
sented in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments ; if we turn to the fathers of
the first four centuries of the christian era, as likely to reflect in their writings, the
decisions of Inspiration in the case; if we take the occasional notices of profane histo
ry on the subject ; it will be seen, that while the moral code of Judaism and the genius
of Christianity may stand opposed to slavery, as one of the many forms of civil oppres
sion, and inconsistent with our conceptions of natural right, and the promised regene
ration of human society, there is, nevertheless, in al] these records, a distinct recogni
tion of thejural origin of slavery, and its necessary connection with civil polity, and
we no where, in any of them, meet with the language of denunciation and overthrow,
with regard to it. There is no attempt to alter or disturb the relation, but simply to
prescribe and inculcate the duties arising out of it, and revealing the retributions con
sequent upon any and every abuse of it. Indeed the whole subject as discussed by
Christianity and managed by the primitive Church, is presented as one, not to be con
trolled or disposed of by either, except in due subordination to the civil authority, and the
regulations of law, in which it has its origin. And in this great primary fact, we see,
in principle, the true prototype ofthe conflict of laws, and consequent compromise treat
ment of the question, about which we have had occasion to say so much. Contrast
this with any true picture of modern abolition and anti-slavery, and in what do they
agree? Heaven and Hell are scarcely less resembling. The one is a quiet garden
scene, the other a stormy Pontus, "casting up mire and dirt." In connection with the
general argument of the preceding pages, it is important to call attention again to the
judgment of the General Conference of 1840. At this Conference two large committees
were appointed on slavery and abolition, one the usual standing committee, consisting of
a member from each Annual Conference, the other a special committee of nine members
of tlie body, upon the well understood controversy, known as the "Westmoreland
case." In addition to the matters referred to this latter committee, by resolution of
the Conference, the committee were respectfully requested, by all the Bishops in coun
cil, when it was ascertained that the general committee did not intend to do so, to pre-

41
sent a full and analytical view of the,whole law of the Churoh on slavery, particularly in
relation to the rights of the different grades of the ministry, as affected by slave hold
ing, so that all discordant views and discrepancies in administration might, if possible,
be conclusively adjusted and settled, by authority of the General Conference, and the
committee had this specific object in view, in making the elaborate report from which
we have already made several extracts. The report was adopted with great unanimity,
in fact without a negative voice in tho body. This report was looked to as settling the
difficulties it was intended to remove, and was fully relied upon by the South, as secu
ring all they desired in the premises. The decision of the General Conference, to
which we ask attention, is too precise and unmistakable in language and meaning, to
admit of misconstruction, without an intention to deceive. "While the general rule
i^law,) on the subject of slavery, relating to those States, whose laws admit of eman
cipation, and permit the liberated slave to enjoy freedom, should be firmly and constant.
ly enforced, the exception to the general rule, (law,) applying to those States where
emancipation, as defined above, is not practicable, should be recognized and protected,
with equal firmness and impartiality." "Therefore,
"Resolved by the several Annual Conferences in General Conference assembled, That
under the provisional exception of the general rule (Jaw,) of the Church, on the sub
ject of slavery, the simple holding of slaves, or mere ownership of slave' property, in
States or Territories where the laws do not admit of emancipation, and permit the libera
ted slave to enjoy freedom, constitutes no legal barrier lo the electipn or ordination of
ministers, to the various grades of office, known in the ministry of the Methodist
Episcopal Church, and cannot, therefore, be considered as operating any forfeiture of
right, in view of such election and ordination." Here is a solemn declaration, to the
Church and the world, explanatory of an existing law, by the supreme judicial authori
ty of the Church, gravely announcing, that simple slave boldingor ownership of sla.vesi
in States and Territories where emancipation is not practicable, and the liberated slave
not allowed to enjoy freedom, is not, in any way, a legal barrier lo election and ordina
tion, and cannot operate any forfeiture of right, on the part of any minister of any grade,
(Deacon, Elder or Bishop,) in the Methodist Episcopal Church. And yet Drs. Durbin.
Peck, and Elliott, as solemnly declare, that the Church has always let it be known that
slave holding, even under the provisional exception of the law, would, in the case of
Bishops, operate the forfeiture of right, which the General Conference stipulates, by'
formal decision, shall not take place, in the instance of any grade of ministers. And
accordingly, without any change of the law. and in the very face of the above declara
tion of right, the last General Conference did, directly and outrightly, and under the
precise circumstances specified, as rendering such action impossible, what the publicly
pledged faith of the Church had said, four years before, should not be done. Whether
this amounts to the want of good faith, assumed in the Protest, let the good sense and
upright feeling of the Church and world determine.
Let us now turn to the back ground of the picture.
It is more than two hundred years since the introduction of slavery into this country,
under the exclusive direction of the British government. The colonies had no will or
agency in bringing about this result, and it is a well known fact, that it was in contra
vention of their wishes. During this entire term, slaves have been recognized and held
as property, under all the forms of government known to the country, and the Church
should not forget, that it was the christian governments of Europe, in the 16th and
17th centuries, by which slavery, as a civil and domestic institution, was re-introduced
and re-established among civilized nations, after its nominal abolition among the W.es-
6

42
tern Gothic nations of that continent. And the christian European powers did, too,
what had never been done before; they restricted the doom of servitude to a single par
ticular race, and linked the destinies of slavery, in the system they established, with
the negro family. That it was an outrage, is felt and admitted by all. That all have
a right to seek the removal of the evil, is as readily admitted. It is, however, so in
terwoven with the very existence and life blood of a large portion of society, in this
country, that it has long been a desideratum how this can be done, without the introduc
tion of greater evils. We have seen that the people of the non-slave holding States,
have no right to attempt to control the question, in any form. Their right to appeal
and remonstrance, provided they do not resort to means calculated to agitale and excite,
and thus inflict direct injury upon the South, is not denied, it is believed, in any quar
ter. As a right of comity, it is admitted. All attempts, however, to compel or force
the South, by exciting the popular mind, trying to produce disaffection among slaves,
and so disturbing the social system, as to impair the value of conceded rights, and en.
danger the common welfare, are barred by the Constitution, and will always meet with
prompt and determined resistance from the South. But further, however it may be re
gretted, it cannot be disguised, that negro slavery now exists, connected with reputed
inferiority of race, and the incurable disability of color, and both tending, however un
reasonably or unjustly, to perpetuate the evil. Unhappily in the enslavement of the
negro, the worse than misfortune, the universal ignominy of color, adds to the hard
ship of servitude, and becomes a part of his evil destiny, even where that servitude is
exchanged for nominal freedom. In this melancholy state of things, the outrage upon
natural right, which all slavery implies, is made to derive countenance and support from
nature lierself, for it is but too true, that hitherto, all races of men in all time, have
united, however wrongfully, in decreeing to the negro a separate social condition, and
by consequence, destiny. Even when mixed up with other races, the negro has not
been allowed to mingle. And it is a very singular fact, that the English, whether in
Europe or America, have cherished the principle of exclusion, to which we allude, be
yond any other race known in history.
Slavery at one time, was general throughout the colonies and afterwards States. But
there were physical and invincible reasons in tho North, why slavery should not obtain
there, in the way and to the extent it did South. It was introduced and tried, but did
not work well. The severity of the climate, poverty of the soil, and a necessary appeal,
at an early date to manufactures and commerce as the staple pursuits of productive en
terprise, and to which slave labor was found inapplicable, all tended to expel slavery
from the North. The slave was soon found to be a bad bargain, upon the hands of the
shrewd producer. The constant influx too, of European adventurers, English, Irish,
Scotch, Dutch, Swiss, and so of the rest, filling up the North to avoid competition with
the more regular system of slave labor South, soon rendered Northern slave labor un
profitable, by the superiority and greater cheapness of free labor, so that the political
economy of the North alone, was quite sufficient to either emancipate the Northern ne-
«ro, or send him a slave to the South. It was the interest and policy of the North, to
get rid of the negro, lt was a speculation worthy of Northern sagacity. Notsowith
the South. As early as the first instance of Northern abolition, the slave question was
one of lifeand death with the South. It was then and continues to be, vitally connected
with the tenure by which life is held, and the order of society maintained. The greater
value of the slave South, had been a centripetal force gradually attracting the slave
from the North, for a long term of years, until when emancipation began, there was
found but asmallnumber tobe'gotrid off. Their saletoSoutherri purchasers, had greatly

43
thinned the North of slaves as "unprofitable servants," and prepared the way for the
emancipation of the balance. Northern humanity, which forbade the sale of the negro
within the limits of Northern States, did not forbid his transportation and sale in the
South, and to this process, the North owes a large share of its boasted freedom from
slavery. Reasons have always existed in the South, both for the introduction and
continuance of slavery, which never existed in the North, and it was as much the
interest of the North to abolish slavery, as it was of the South to retain it. It was a
business arrangement, resulting from motives of interest and policy with both, the
South having the addiiional plea of its own safety to urge in the case. The North
knew that to abolish slavery, was to banish the negro. The South knew that to abol
ish slavery, was to turn the negro loose, in countless numbers, without restraint or
control. Its abolition North presented no danger, then or in prospect; but it is admit
ted on all hands, that its abolition South, at any time, for at least sixty years past, would
have been attended with the most imminent danger. Even were the Southern States to
try the experiment of keeping in slavery the present generation, while making legal
provision for the freedom of the next, it would establish a principle, in the view of the
mass of slaves, which would give birth to an amount of impatience and irritation, en
dangering the safety of the whole South. What was safe and laudable in the North,
would have been suicidal and ruinous in the South. The inutility of slavery mingled
with and strengthened the religious convictions of the North. One of the fundamental
principles of all slavery, the interest ofthe master, was attacked in the North, and
made its appropriate impression. During all this period, however, emancipation inthe
South, without the removal of the negro, would have been, not Southern but National
madness, for it would only have disposed and prepared the two races for mutual de
struction. Any state of things, tending to disturb the existing relations between tho
races in the South, and which does not at the same time, contemplate the removal of
one, must tend to the destruction of one or both of them. Since the foundation of so
ciety, the white and black races have never co-existed, under the same government on
equal footing, and never can. If the two races, as is entirely certain, cannot mingle,
they must, as it regards equality of intercourse, wholly separate, and where the num
ber of blacks is considerable, such separation without removal is impossible, except in
a state of slavery or civil discord. The whole order of society in the United States,
must be first subverted and then re-modeled, before the negro can, by possibility, derive
and enjoy the same benefits of society with the white man. It is incontestibly true of
the whole North, from Maine to Illinois, that in the proportion tbe legal distinctions
between the white man and negro are abolished, new barriers to any thing like equality
of intercourse, are studiously thrown up by the white population, by means of which,
the negro is re-enslaved, and more hopelessly doomed, to all the disadvantages of both
caste and condition. The whole course of the North, for half a century, proclaims their
purpose and policy, not to mingle with the negro, and yet they are incessantly pursu.
ing a course, the object of which is to compel the South to mingle with them, for this the
South must do in some form, or else keep them in slavery, unless they can be removed.
The repugnance of which we speak, is invincible. Nature, not less than the habit and
the associations of ages, has established visible and indelible signs and reasons of separa
tion. If we subdue and overcome the mere fact of servitude, the evil remains, as it re
gards the actual condition and welfare of the negro, and in most instances is increased
beyond estimation. Wherever they are found, the free negroes of this country are de
prived of all the more important privileges of social humanity, and are literally suffer-
in" a debasement, in every thing except the name, worse than slavery. At every con-

44
tact with society they are repulsed and put down. Their very color renders them alien
to all aboilt them— to every other race. They have no country, and unprepared by their
previous destiny to obey the voice and submit to the dictates of law and reason, few of
them act as though they had any property in themselves. Thousands of them perish
annually for want of the protection and supply realized in a state of slavery. After
an experiment of fifty years in the North, no elevation of the negro character, no im
provement of their condition has taken place. As slavery recedes the prejudice against
the negro increases. All the non-slave holding States, and especially those where slave
ry has never existed, are intolerant even of the presence ofthe negro. Look at the im
partial humanity of Ohio and other free States, whose laws exclude not only the slave
but the "free and equal" negro, and deny him not merely the right of holding property
but even of residence. It is unlawful for any citizen of Ohio to employ a negro (/We
of course,) to do a day's work to keep hirn from starving, unless he shall have first given
security, both for maintainance and good behavior. The whole movement of the North —
the entire policy of the free Slates, has been a system of death to the negro.
In their miserable freedom, so called, they have died at the rate of two to one, in a
state of slavery. Interest or humanity may abolish abstract slavery, but the interposi
tion of omnipotence seems necessary to relieve the negro from the weight of disabili
ties beneath which he is crushed. The declaration of his freedom is a fraud in every
State of this Uni°n- B°ln prejudice and law proclaim it impossible, in the existing
stale of things. The ordinary eligibilities of citizenship are no where his. Tho white
man and the negro may not separate, as to the "bounds of habitation," but they do
not, cannot combine. They may be together, but to mingle is impossible. The dis
tinction, for example, as it relates to color alone, appears so founded in an invincible
law of nature, that in no instance, in the history of civilization, has it yielded to the
influence of circumstances. This may be all and utterly wrong ; our business is with
thefact only. Kindred reasons and arguments maybe multiplied indefinitely. Dis
proportionate, inadequate compensation for labor, is assumed as a fundamental ele
ment — one of thechief disadvantages of slavery, and it is an argument principally re
lied upon by abolitionists, of every sect and color, and yet it is susceptible of the clear
est demonstration, that the slave of the South, (in an annual estimate,) gets more than
the free negro of the North ; and, by the showing of the Northern argument, is less a
slave. Every victim of injustice is a slave, and such is the negro every where
in the North. Crushed by the indirect tyranny of law, and the intolerance of
public opinion, he is the miserable victim of all kinds of injustice and hard
ship. And what must be the sober decision of history with regard to those who
pity the negro until he becomes free, and then starve him t-i death? The mooted
question of negro rights and worth, and his title to Northern sympathy and pro
tection, are dropped the moment the negro becomes free, and appeals to the North
ern court of errors for the promised boon of equal, social and political rights.
Notwithstanding all the paraded humanity of the North on the subject, no actual abo
lition of slavery lias ever taken place in the United Slates. The proclamation to this ef
fect is an imposition upon the civilized world. The servitude of the negro, and the in
justice and hardship of his lot have merely changed their form. The legal principle of
slavery is abolished in the North, but all New England, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio,
&c, do not contain a single negro who is free, in the sense of the Declaration of Amer
ican Independence— not one. No where does the negro meet the white man— no where is
he met by him upon terms of equality. There is no civil, social, domestic, or even
religious intercommunity of enjoyment or suffering. They are deprived of tlie most

45
important rights of mankind. Both by law and public opinion they are condemned to
hereditary degradation and misery. Their liberty is a lie and a cheat. In what do they
find themselves free, except to be neglected, scorned, and trodden under foot. Preju
dice, manners and custom, turn aside and bear down the fruitless provisions of legisla
tion. There is that constituent"]}' interwoven with the popular feeling of the American
people, in relation to the unfortunate negro, which law can never efface. It is even
true, that the prejudice against the negro increases with the progress of emancipation.
Take any of the Northern States — that which nearest approaches the Utopia of mod
ern abolitionism, and notwithstanding the affranchisement of the negro in law, if a
white person marry a negro, infamy is the result. Free negroes, with very few excep
tions as to places, dare not avail themselves of the right of suffrage, even where it is
allowed. They are no where credible witnesses against white persons — (the attempt
of the late General Conference to make them such, notwithstanding.) There is not a
State in this Union where a negro is essentially an equal party in an action at law.
Where is the negro admitted as equal peer and compatriot with the white man? Where
as juror, judge, or counsellor? Is there any office of trustor honor to which he is el
igible? What school receives the two races together, without being placed under pub
lic ban? Can the negro's money procure him a seat at the Theatre or Opera, without
some signal of his inferiority offered in atonement to those who wish it to be under
stood they but tolerate his presence, albeit they have sworn him free and equal? What
hospital or poor house receives him, except apart from the privileged white sufferer,
without, it may be. half the sense or virtue of the negro? Even the Church assigns
him a distant seat and different altar. The grave itself perpetuates the distinction, by
disowning the fellowship of his dust. In life and death alike, he is proscribed and
trodden under foot as an alien and outcast, and his degradation is thus made to accom
pany him to the very gates of Heaven. And all this is true to a much greater extent
in the North than in the South. The free negro North is used — allowed to live, if he
can, and at any rate is at perfect liberty to die, but no where is he protected, encour
aged, and rewarded, in all the liberty-loving North. Paradoxical as it may seem, there
is nothing resembling sympathy and equality of moral relation between the races, ex
cept in the South, where the one, in the proportion of seven in ten, is enslaved to the
other. Here, to a great extent, the children of the two races grow up together, and,
as a general rule, cherish for each other, in greater or less degree, interest and attach
ment. Similar reasoning applies to the household circle, as it regards adults. There
is a natural sense of obligation and kindness, on tlie one hand, and of dependence and
gratitude on the other, leading to many of the kinder offices- of human intercourse,
without which the heart must be utterly desolate. I do not claim ibr the South that
this view of the subject applies to all slave holding individuals and familes. There are
but too many exceptions to the rule, and I shall not attempt to protect them from the
execration they deserve, for neglect and cruelty in relation to their abused and suffer
ing slaves. Nor do I intend to charge upon the North, or free States, that there, are
no individuals or families who treat the negro as he deserves. I speak only of the
general rule, in both cases, and am anxious to give full force, lo the exceptions, both as
it regards number and weight. Individuals and families in the South have, doubtless,
acted infamously toward their slaves, and continue to do so, as individuals and fami
lies in the North have, and continue to act, towards their hired and apprenticed ser
vants, and formerly toward their slaves also. Most cheerfully dowe bear testimony,
that individuals and associations in the North have, in many instances, acted nobly to
ward the negro, whether free or slave. What we ask, is, that the exceptions, in both
cases, may be fairly contrasted with the general rule.

46
The abolition of slavery has been extensively agitated, three several times in the
United States. The first was about the time of the formation of the Federal Govern
ment. Shortly after the adoption of the Constitution, numerous abolition petitions
reached Congress, under the administration ol Washington, praying the interposition
of the General Government. They were respectfully received and referred to an able
committee, as all such petitions should be, and the report of the committee was, that
the General Government had nothing to do with the subject — no right to interfere in any
way, as the matter belonged wholly to the slave holding Slates, without any right, on
the part of individuals, societies, churches, or the free States, even, to meddle with it.
And so the matter was disposed of, apparently to the satisfaction of all concerned, and
the excitement died away.
The next abolition era, connects with the admission of Missouri, thirty years after,
when the compromise to which we have alluded took place, and again settled the ques
tion. The third movement followed that of England, in relation to West India Slave
ry, and has continued ever since, although the movements — the emancipation proposed
here, and that which took place in the West Indies — are utterly unanalagous. Here,
the negroes are in the midst of us, locally mixed up with a great people, being to the
while population as one in three. There, they were scattered among a cluster of dis
tant islands, and were twenty to one as to number, rendering an expensive military
force indispensable to safety, in each island. Had four millions of negro slaves been
mixed up with the people of England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales, does any sane per
son suppose they would have been emancipated by the English Parliament? Or rather,
is it not certain they would not have been, unless their instant removal had been pro
vided for? It is an instance, therefore, of the most stupid injustice, to attempt to rea
son by analogy from the one to the other. Long before any appeal was heard from the
North, the voice of the South was emphatic in the denunciation of negro slavery. The
colonies of Virginia and Georgia, and even South Carolina, boldly remonstrated against
the impolicy and inhumanity of the slave trade, and its consequences, when they knew
their Sovereign was a smuggling slave merchant, dividing the spoil with a large num
ber of his own subjects, and those of other nations. The South too, has always shown
itself more ready than the North, to get rid of the negro by removal and colonization in
Africa, or elsewhere, if it be found practicable. The great mass of Southern slave
holders resist genera] emancipation, not because it is inconsistent with their interest,
viewed as a question of political economy, but because they know it to be utterly incom
patible with their safety. Upon the consequences of the immediate, indiscriminate
emancipation of the slaves of the South, or emancipation by any other than very grad
ual methods, I am not disposed to dwell. All sober minded men, however, indulge the
apprehension, that were the slaves thus let loose, they might be led to think and feel
like the negroes of St. Domingo, butchering the whole Europoan population, in grati
tude for the decree of the French Assembly of 1791, declaring them "free and equal"
to the whites. Who does not know, that every rash movement of the North endangers
the safety of the South, and compels further resort to precautionary measures of safe
ty, thus subjecting the slave to an abridgement of right and enjoyment which had never
been thought of but for tlie gratuitous obtrusion of Northern interference.
It is already perceptible, that in the West Indies, unless other systems of servitude,
the new types oj slavery already introduced, should check the tendencies of the eman
cipation act, imposed upon the Islands against their consent, the European race, yield
ing to the negro, is likely to become extinct. And should the North impose a similar
emancipation upon the South, in violation of the compromise of the Constitution,

among the immediate and necessary effects, sooner or later, the breaking up of the
American Confederation, and the destruction of the negro race in tlie South must be
numbered. • Look at the Maroons of Jamaica : ever since their freedom they have utter
ly abandoned themselves to universal idleness, with all its attendant evils and vices, ob
durately refusing to labor, under any circumstances, even to prevent starvation. Tho
bloody insurrections too, in the Island of Barbadoes, in 1816, taking into the account,
causes and consequences, is a comment to the same general effect. Improvidence and
idleness, vagrancy and crime, are the notorious fruits of emancipation in the United
States and the West Indies. Crime, in the United States, among fre,e negroes, is in
something like tenfold proportion, compared with what it is among Southern slaves,
and tbe mortality is more than double. Our criminal and medical statistics abundantly
attest these facts. A pretty extensive acquaintance with more than half the StatPs of
this Confederacy, and about an equal number, North and South, has led me to believe
that the slaves of the South are better conditioned and better satisfied than the free ne
groes of the North ; and, as a general rule, are better informed, especially on the sub
ject of their moral relations. And, also, that they are well disposed, and inclined to
virtue and morality, greatly beyond those of the North, or the free negroes of the
South. The latter too, do much better in the South than inthe North. Two reasons
have long operated accordingly, in driving free negroes from the North, where they
properly belonged, to the South. First, the repulsive inhumanity of the North, in so
treating them, that they have preferred seeking shelter in the Southern States. And,
secondly, the fact, that even the free negroes, so injurious to the Southern slave inter
est, have generally fared better in the South than in the North; and thus a large pro
portion of the freed slaves of the North, especially from 1790 to 1830, subsisted, in
fact, on Southern charity.
About three millions and a half of slaves are now part and parcel of the population
of the United States. They are here in our midst, and must be governed, and must
have support. They were originally entailed upon us, against our will and wishes, by
the mother country, during our colonial existence ; but being here, they must remain
and be controlled, unless some plan can be adopted for their removal. Remaining, how
can they be governed, except in a state of slavery? Every State in the Union is dis
posed to cast off the few who are free. Every where their presence is regarded as an
evil, if not nuisance. The South will not emancipate except upon condition of remo
val. The North will not consent to receive even a fair proportion of them, should they
become free; and what is to be done with them? Their gradual emancipation and re
moval has never been objected to by the South ; and carried out upon the principles of
the original compromise of the Constitution, never will be. We say to our common
country, free us of the danger, and ice consent lo Ihe removal of the evil.
In this view of the subject,, three questions press upon us : — our own good, in the
slave States; the good of the negro, free and slave; and the common good of the coun
try. In our deliberate judgment, those who are conducting the Northern crusade
against Southern slavery, have no eye to either, or having any such end in view, have
been infinitely unfortunate in the selection of means, and the temper displayed in the
use of them. If the clamorous censors of Southern policy are the true friends of tho
negro, why do they, in the same breath urge emancipation in the South and legislate to
exclude thenegro from the free States? Is it merely intended in this way to annoy tho
South by a violation of the plain duties of citizenship, or are they willing to be under
stood as conceding that there is no chance for the negro except in the South?

4S
In any analysis of the facts of history and experience, connected with the general
abolition movement under discussion, we are naturally led to judge of the principles
and motives of those embarked in the movement, from tlieir moral and religious char
acter and course of action in other directions and aspects. And as citizens and subjects
of Great Britain have been very actively concerned for the last twelve or fifteen years
in getting up and carrying on the great anti-slavery and abolition excitement in the
Northern States, it will be proper to devote some attention to the moral character of the
movement in both countries. In doing so, however, it is not intended, in speaking of
Great Britain, or the Northern States, to include all persons, or the entire people of
either. But as the more moderate and conservative portions of the people, in the one
and the other, have not seen proper publicly to separate from the movement parties in
question, by formal disapproval and condemnation of their course, it cannot be expect
ed that we should do more, by way of excepting them, than they have done themselves.
That the movement in this country was set on foot by foreign (British) influence, has
been so extensively avowed by the Church, that no proof of the fact can be called for.
It has been assumed in Episcopal and General Conference addresses. It has been dis
tinctly avowed, again and again, in the official papers of the Church at New York and
Cincinnati. It is elaborately declared to be the fact, by Dr. Bangs, in liis History of
the Church. It was repeatedly avowed by American speakers, in the famous meeting
of malcontents and agitators on this subject, ever since praying to be known as "the
World's Convention." The fact is notorious, and will not be denied. As the United
States preceded England in the abolition of the slave trade, and was the first of civil
ized nations in an attempt to redress the wrongs of Africa, admitting the equally noble
conduct of England in doing the same a short lime after, England can claim no credit
on this score to which we are not equally entitled. We ask attention to British policy
in other aspects connected with slavery. Look then, at tho British Government abol
ishing slavery in the West Indies, but pursuing a wholesale system incomparably
worse in her East India possessions. The British Asiatic Journal- says, "the whole of
Hindostan, with the adjacent possessions, is one magnificent plantation, peopled by
more than one hundred millions of slaves, belonging to a company of gentlemen in Eng
land, whose power is far more unlimited than that of any Southern planter over his
slaves." In the very act of West India emancipation, it is distinctly declared, (see
section 44,) that the slavery of other parts of the British Dominions was not to be in
any way affected by the act. Beside tho slavery just noticed in connection with the East
India Company, there is a well known government system of slave ownership in Mala
bar, the Islands of Ceylon, St. Helena, and other places, where the English Govern
ment is a notorious slave-factor — a regular jobber in the purchase and sale of slaves.
The system is carried on, enlarged, and perpetuated, by the purse and bayonet of the
Government. — Asiatic Journal and Parliamentary Debates. Numerous English author
ities might be cited, to show that England determined to sacrifice her West India Col
onies to bring the productions of the Ganges and Barompooter in competition with
those of the slave holding portion of the United States and the Brazils. The British
Government has formally sanctioned the entire Hindoo system of slavery. The same
sanction has been extended to the Mahomedan system, by which the Government has
become a pander to both, spread out among a hundred and fifty millions of British sub
jects in India. England has gone farther. She has, actually, by the origination of a
separate, independent slave trade, established, in India, a third system of her own, by
the activity and vigor of which, the children of Africa and others, are being annually
enslaved by thousands. An English witness, Dr. Bowering, affirms, of British subjects

49
in India, "the entire population of this vast empire are subjected to the most degrading
servitude — a deeper degradation than any produced by West Indian or American slave
ry. They are perishing by thousands and hundreds of thousands from famine, while
the store houses of the East India Company are filled' with bread, wrung from the soil
by a standing army." "Uncounted multitudes sell themselves and children into slavery
by permission of the British Government." — Parliamentary Papers, 1839. The same
authority declares, that "an external slave trade, by importation, including all the at
tendant horrors of a regular system of kidnapping, is carried on." The Duke of Wel
lington remarked lately, in the House of Lords, "slavery does exist in that country —
domestic slavery in particular, to a very considerable extent ; yet I would be careful
how I interfered with the matter. 1 would recommend your Lordships to deal lightly
in the matter if you wish to retain your sovereignty in India." McNaughton says,
"thousands are at this moment living in a state of hopeless, unauthorized bondage.
They have sanctioned ihe free importation of slaves into their territories from foreign
States." Sir Robert Peel lately made the charge, and offered the evidence, in the Na
tional Legislature, that "British Merchants are, even now, deeply and extensively en
gaged in the slave, trade." That country too, is at Ihis moment engaged in a new sys
tem of English negro slavery, by the forcible capture of negroes in Africa, compelling
them to apprentice themselves, by the insulting mockery of legal forms, for a term of
fourteen years ; and whether this be with or without nominal security as to their free
dom at the expiration of the term, it is essentially a violation of the compact of nations,
relating to the slave trade, and a species of legal, but real piracy, by no means in bad
keeping with other demonstrations of the English Government in the selection and use
of means and measures for the purposes of national aggrandisement. Finding, too,
that they cannot rely updn the labor of the free blacks, emancipation in the West In
dies has been succeeded by another experiment — the enslavement of the Hill Coolies of
India, to take the place of West India freed negroes. Both these systems of slavery
are now in operation for the benefit of the West Indies, and other tropical portions of
the Empire.
The legalized kidnapper seizes 1he hand of the poor captive on the banks of the Gam
bia, and compels his signature to a fraudulent indenture, about which he knows no
more than the monkeys chattering in the woods about him, and he goes to the West
Indies a slave, to prove tbe practicability of ample production, notwithstanding the
emancipation of his predecessor! The Coolies, a poor, swarthy, degraded caste of la
borers in India, existing in great numbers, and generally in a state of starvation and
suffering, are prevailed on to go to the West Indies, and when they reach there, as
apprenticed slaves, the negroes of the Antilles refuse all association with them, as
more degraded than themselves. In India they are oppressed beyond the means of
subsistence, and in 1838, five hundred thousand of them perished of famine in a single
district. This state of things will always be sufficient to secure emigration, and sup
ply the West Indies with slaves. No corner of the British Empire can be pointed out
in which there is not worse slavery, in some shape or other, than in the United States.
Who can help seeing that the fetters were struck from eight hundred thousand negroes,
in the West Indies, only to be fastened upon as many European sufferers, of the labor
ing classes, at home? It has been more than intimated, in numerous English publica
tions, and the Debates of Parliament, that speculations upon the reflex bearings West
India emancipation is to have upon the fate of our Southern negroes, and especially
in connection with the production of our Southern staples, rice, cotton, tobacco, and
sugar, will go far to explain the philanthropy of the West India emancipation act.
7

50
England has betrayed and avowed her policy, and explained her motives in too many
forms, to admit of doubt as to the intentions of government. That thousands of the
good people of England saw in it nothing but good will to the negro, we readily admit.
But when we see England, as we are compelled to, ruining and starving millions, by a
system of oppression inconceivably worse than the slavery of the United States, we
must be allowed to judge of motives by other tests than mere profession. How does it
happen that England is so deeply interested in the fortunes of Southern slavery in this
country, and at the same time so unfeelingly inattentive to the cry of millions of her
own suffering subjects in British India? Why so readily excited into activity by car
icature appeals in behalf of the American slave, while the living cry of her own en
slaved and starving millions does not affect her? Why are the Cabinet, at Washington,
as well as the people of the United States, favored with remonstrance and homily on
the subject of civil oppression, while an unheeded voice is heard pealing through the
diameter of the Globe, from Cuddalone, Tanjore, Madras, the Bengal Presidency, and
other parts of outraged India, asking in vain for redress? We only quote British history
when we state, that in two famines alone, occasioned solely by the forced exclusive mo
nopoly of the grain trade, immense masses of human beings — all subjects of British mili
tary despotism, equal in number to the whole negro population of the United Stales — per
ished from sheer starvation, while within reach, in the English granaries, in both in
stances, were locked up and guarded by military force, ample means of subsistence and
supply for all these murdered millions, and only and yet inexorably withheld from
motives of pelf and cupidity, in view of enhanced price! The acute and discerning
Southey says, of the great mass of the English poor, "they are deprived, in childhood,
of all instruction and enjoyment. They grow up without decency — without comfort —
without hope — without morals, and without shame. They bring forth slaves like them
selves, to tread in the same path of misery." The North British Review remarks,
"there is fair ground to question, whether, notwithstanding the existence of slavery,
with all its attendant evils, there be a larger proportional amount of ignorance, crime,
and misery, in the United Stales of North America, than is to be found in Great Bri
tain and Ireland. The abolition of slavery in America would be a far greater triumph
of principle, humanity, and courage, than was the emancipation of slaves in the Bri
tish Colonies ; its abolition there would be much more honorable. The physical con
dition and general treatment of slaves in the United States are better than they were in
our West India colonies previous to emancipation. Our countrymen, in general, have
treated the Americans unkindly and unfairly. It would have been hopeless to have ex
pected West India proprietors to have emancipated their slaves without compulsion.
We are very doubtful whether, if slavery had stood in the same relation to us it does to the
inhabitants of the Southern States of America, there be even now enough principle, hu
manity, and courage, in the community of Great Britain to have effected its abolition."
It is well known that quite recently the English Government passed an "order in coun
cil," for the transportation of one hundred thousand negroes fromAfricalo Demarara alone,
and offers a bounty upon the head of every negro brought into Sierra Leone for trans
portation to the West Indies; thus bribing the African to make a slave of his fellow.
It is true these poor creatures are called apprentices— being slaves in fact. There is
not one fifth part the amount of slavery in the United States there is in the British Em
pire. In fact, England owns more slaves, detached from the soil, (not serfs or vassals,)
than all other civilized nations put together. Allison, in his History of Europe, avows
the opinion of Ireland, that "it would be a real blessing to its inhabitants, in lieu of
the destitution of freedom, to obtain the protection of slavery." Murry, the English

51
traveler, says, of the slaves of the South, "if they could forget that they are slaves
their condition is decidedly better than the great mass of European laborers." The
London Quarterly Review, speaking of West India emancipation, says, "the results of
that experiment are extremely doubtful. Let us beware of increasing the suspicion that
we are willing to urge our example on the United States, from motives not of philan
thropy merely, but in part at least of mercantile calculation:' It has been avowed in
England, since 1840, in twenty different forms, especially in leading political journals,
that British tropical production cannot compete with American, until the American sys
tem of slavery is undermined. These journals have invoked attention to facts, so cu
rious and instructive, that we shall be excused for noticing a few. Our sources of in
formation are all English,
It has been urged that the cotton production of America, North and South, amounts
to some 800,000,000 pounds, the result of slave labor, while England is unable to reach
150,000,000 pounds, in all parts of her dominions. The annual production of Ameri
can sugar is stated, upon the same authority, to exceed that of England in the propor
tion of 10,000,000 to 4,000,000; and it isalledged that a similar disproportion obtains
with regard to all tropical products. The English press has announced that the annual pro
duct of fixed American capital, based upon, or otherwise connected with slave labor, is
about 220,000,000, while that of England , vested in the production of the staples to which
slave labor is applied, in North and South America, does not exceed 50,000,000. It is
declared, that England cannot look upon such results with indifference, and that she
must right herself by some means, among which it has been more than intimated the
subversion of the slavery system of the South was a desideratum. At one time it has
been urged upon the attention of England, that the advantage enjoyed by America, in
consequence of the large amount of slave labor, must lead to a corresponding extension
of commerce, growth of manufactures, with increased national wealth and strength.
At another, it has been pressed upon the notice of the Northern States, that it is their
interest to unite with other countries in subverting the existing system of Southern
production! And, apprehensive that the North might have sagacity enough to see,
that drying up the sources of Southern production must instantly and fatally cripple
Northern commerce and manufactures, with which those of England would be immedi
ately brought in competition, prostrating the North as effectually as the South may be
ruined, it has been attempted to show, that Northern capital and labor might accom
plish, in the South of this country, what the home argument seems to concede is not
likely to be accomplished in English Southern colonies ! We would not be invidious.
We are anxious to reason correctly on the subject ; but we cannot perceive what con
nection there is between such appeals and suggestions, and the ostensible objects of En
glish philanthropy and Northern abolition, respecting Southern slavery. Such a poli
cy, if ever adopted and acted upon, will as certainly destroy the elements of our social
strength and greatness, as that the Union of the States cannot survive it.
A member of the British Parliament declared, recently, "the greater proportion of
the people of England demand the immediate emancipation of slaves, in whatever quar
ter of the world they may be found." He should have added — "let charity begin at
home." Another member of Parliament says, "we will turn to America and requir-
emancipation." It is to be hoped he meant, after freeing the last million of their own
slaves ! In this way foreign arrogance is reading us homilies on immediate emancipa
tion, when even foreign ignorance must have known that all the emancipation we have
had, in Mexico, Chili, Buenos Ayres, Colombia, St. Domingo, and the West Indies,
was gradual, not immediate. The slaves of Mexico, so often quoted as an example of

52
immediate abolition, had to purchase their own freedom by labor, at an ad valorem esti
mate, requiring generally twelve or fourteen years labor, and in many instances much
more; so that myriads of them were only emancipated by death. It is quite unnecessary to
say, that deeply as the South may feel interested in the question of prospective emanci
pation, nothing will-be yielded to intimidation at home, or from abroad. The London
Athena?um appeals warmly and directly to the North, in favor of "the duty and policy
of instant abolition." The London Herald, a government paper, says, in anticipation
of a conflict with the United States, "are Texas and Oregon to become the principal
military stations of a power which has at its command the Lakes, the St. Lawrence,
Halifax, Bermuda, most of the West India Islands, and, above all, the terrific war-cry
of negro emancipation!" The language attributed to the Duke of Richmond, whether
true or not, as an utterance of his, must be regarded as full of interest, because in ac
cordance with so much that is known to be true on the subject to which it refers. "The
Sovereigns of Europe hive determined upon the destruction of the Government of the
United States, and have come to an understanding upon the subject, and they will event
ually succeed by subversion rather than conquest. It is (this country) a receptacle for
the bad and disaffected population of Europe ; and the European governments favor
such a course. This will create a surplus, and a majority of low population, whoare
easily excited. All the low and surplus population of the different nations of Europe
will be carried into that country. They will bring with them their principles, and, in
nine cases out of ten, adhere to their ancient and former governments, laws, manners,
customs, and religion, and will transmit them to their posterity. Discord, disunion,
anarchy, and civil war will ensue, and some popular individual will assume the gov
ernment and restore order, and the Sovereigns of Europe, the emigrants, and many of
the natives will sustain them." We leave facts to speak for themselves on this sub
ject, whether in confirmation or correction of such speculations.
The manner in which our country is almost literally belted by British possessions,
and surrounded by British influence, is known to every one. Take the range of the
British West India Islands, from West to East, include the immense territory recerrtly
acquired of the government of Central America, and by means of which they will al
ways be able to command the Ithmus of Darien, uniting North and South America —
pass thence to New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, the Canadas, New Britain,
extending nearly to the Rocky Mountains, and to complete the chain, Oregon is claim
ed, from its Northern limit to its nearest approach to the Mexican boundary. In this
vast region, a scattered population of nearly 100,000 are already subject to British
law, with an immense military post at the mouth of the Columbia, thus commanding,
not only the outlet of all our Northern Lakes, but occupying the key of the Pacific,
with a view of controlling the trade of the Sandwich Islands, Java, the Spice Islands,
China, &c. England is a friendly power, and should, by all means, be treated as such,
to the extent her conduct will allow. She is, however, a rival, and mat/ become an en
emy. And by how far she has manifested a disposition to interfere with the internal
policy of this country, especially in relation to slavery and commerce, should cerlainlv
be watched and resisted. The whole press of the country, political and religious, has
been nearly unanimous in declaring the abolition and anti-slavery movement in the
United States, to be of foreign English origin. The same has been avowed by the
British and conceded by the abolition press of the United States. Is or is not all this
sufficient, to place this country upon its guard? Grant that it is the duty, and would
be wise in the people of the United States, to attempt by fair and constitutional meth
ods, to free the country of slavery, why this foreign interference and tampering— why

53
this courting and coaxing of foreign countenance and co-operation, by the organized
anti-slavery associations of this country i What must bethought of American citizens
who ally themselves with foreign combinations to disturb and agitate the country, and
on a subject and in a way, necessarily tending to dissolve the union of the States? One
English Journal says, "the people of England will never rest until slavery is termina
ted in the United States." Another says, "slavery can only be reached through the
Federal Constitution." Such is the text ; and the comment is a constant effort in Eng
land, more or less disguised and respectful, to array the North against the South on
the subject of slavery, and then in turn the South against the North, in the matter of
her own free trade propagandism, with which the South is presumed to be in sympathy.
We would not be ill-natured, but we ask attention to the facts. Again : why a constant
effort of the English press to exagerate the disabilities and sufferings of the American
slave, while similar and in many instances, inconceiveably greater oppression and suf
fering among British subjects, are kept entirely out of sight? Should not a country so
long and inveterately in the habit of claiming prerogatives, and exercising rights, not de
rived from either God or man, which is known to have expended much more blood and
treasure, iu invading the rights of others, than in defending her own, be a little care
ful in the extension of censorship over the morals of other countries? A nation whose
annual custom it has been forages, to transport thousands into perpetual slavery, in dis
tant penal colonies, not merely for crime proper, but for offences committed only to
prevent starvation, and by which no one was injured to the amount of a shilling, such
as stealing a pheasant or shooting a hare, might afford to be a little more considerate, u.
little less officious, in meddling with the defective codes of other countries We are
willing, never reulctant, to have bared to public gaze, theabuses of American slavery;
but England ought never to do it without a faithful depiction of the atrocities she knows
to exist, by license of her own government, in different parts of the Empire. For ex
ample, when lecturing the United States on the .evils and horrors of Southern slavery,
she should enable us to judge of her impartial clemency, in connection with practices
not unlike those falsely charged upon the South of the United States ; the history and
philosophy of her transportation system ; the elements of her gigantic plan of convict
civilization; the degradation, the slavery, the exile, the hunger, the toil, the filth, the
nakedness, the exposure ; the bayonet, the hand cuff, the cat o'ninetail, the leg chain,
the gory scourge, the military guard, the blood clotted triangle, the chain-gang, the
iron hearted task master, the night watch, the blood hound, the gallows ; cast away un
wholesome food, which has circumnavigated the globe, saline petrefactions, called
meats, and old as Her Majesty at that, devoured in the wooden night box and convict
cave; British subjects sold by government as slaves to the highest bidder, and bought by
British christians; scourgers appointed bylaw; the double government cat ; government
license for fifty lashes ; labor during fifteen hours of the day, with the thermometer not un
frequently at 125! And the benignant authors of all this, our reprovers on the subject of
slavery! I should be ashamed to write the above, were it not that every phrase in the
picture, is borrowed from British law and English witnesses. With no wish to dispar
age the virtue and worth of England, a single question explains all we have in view:
Whv are the English meddling only with American slavery, without attending to their
own kindred and even worse systems of degradation and suffering, found in every divi
sion of the Empire, and provoking the remonstrances of the civilized world? Why
such care for us, and sympathy with the Southern negro, while enslaving and mal-treat-
ine the negro and other unfortunate portions of mankind elsewhere? Why. so reckless
of the fate of 40,000.000 of slaves in Russia, in connection with the Greek Church?

54
Why so unmindful of the slavery of Italy, Austria, Spain, and Portugal, found in the
bosom of the Papal Church, while laboring so disinterestedly for the purity of the Amer
ican Churches, as it regards the evil of slavery? Of a hundred millions of negroes,
found upon the bosom of our world, no three millions existing together, in any country,
can be pointed out, enjoying any thing like one half the physical and moral advantages
enjoyed by Ihe slaves of the Southern States ; and why is it so much sympathy is felt
for the few, thus circumstanced, and so little interest cherished in behalf of the remain
ing millions, at least in no better, and believed to be in a much worse condition?
Dr. Durbin, fresh fr«m the great theatre of abolition ethics, and known to be an acute
observer of men and things, says, "the truth is, that under the present working of
Brilishinstitulions, the mass of the people are slaves, and the few are masters, without
the responsibilities cf masters. The physical condition of the greater pari of the slaves in
the Southern States of America, is belter than that of millions in England and Ireland—
their moral and intellectual condition cannot be worse." Plainly, the millions of the
common mass of England and Ireland, are more truly and miserably slaves, than the
negroes of our Southern States. Now will it or not, be the "sense" of the Majority of
the late General Conference, that the Wesleyan Methodist Preachers, the Buntings, the
Newtons, the Jacksons, and Dixons, who certainly rank with the "masters" and not
with the "slaves," and who "travel at large and oversee the work" Wesley left to be
superintended by them, shall "desist" from the exercise of their, functions, as "over
seers of the Church of God," until this "impediment" is removed, and the millions of
English and Irish slaves are freed, whether they can be or not? And until they do this,
can they be regarded as any better than poor Bishop Andrew, who was made a slave
holder without his consent, by the "working" of similar "institutions?" But further,
for the consideration of our trans-Atlantic friends. It is known to them — to all, that
large portions of the children of Africa, have existed in a state of slavery for 3,000
years, and it is equally well known, that unconnected with all other races, one portion
of the negro race, since the earliest dawn of history, has been enslaved to another, and
that in greater proportion too, than to any other race. There are ten, perhaps more
than twenty negro masters in Africa, to every white one in the United States, and own
ing ten, if not twenty times as many negroes. And it is also true, that those portions
of Africa, where the slave trade with the white man is unknown, are the most inveterate
slave regions. It has been estimated, that something like nine tenths of the whole six
ty millions of Africa, are in fact slaves. The English can doubtless account for the
origin and existence of American slavery, as they are the authors of it, and are now
battening upon its gains. But how will they account for the state of things in Africa?
And why so much zeal in this direction and so little in that? In all the negro islands,
(many and populous,) of the Indian archipelago, the negro is enslaved to the negro.
Why too, are the negroes of this and every other country, St. Domingo and the other
West India Islands especially, so utterly and proverbially indifferent to the condition
of their fellow negroes in slavery? In no instance have they, as a people, made a move
for the freedom of the negro, or manifested any general solicitude ou the subject.
Does there or not, appear to be some deep and primary reason for such startling results?
Grant that England and the North can satisfactorily explain the matter, so far as they
are the authors of American slavery ; still, is there not much beside this, which needs to
be explained? Why a destiny so untoward, for every portion ofthe African race, for
now a term of at least 3,700 years? All our hopes and fears centre in the conviction,
that whether for good or evil, or it.may be a mysterious dispensation of both, the hand
of God must connect with such a destiny!

55
Similar reasoning applies to the Northern division of our own country. New Eng
land capital, combined with the acquisitive ardor and daring enterprise of her hardy
sons, gave birth to a large proportion of the whole amount of American slavery, as well
in the South as North. An almost incalculable amount of Northern capital, is at this
time invested in Southern slaves. The hundreds of Northern men, annually settling
in the Southern States and Territories, are known promptly and without hesitation, to
become slave holders ; and the Simon-pureism of Church and State — of Pilgrim and Pu
ritan — fresh from the most approved nurseries of abolition zealotry, yields to the sug
gestions of convenience and interest, in enlarging and upholding the system of Southern
slavery. Even temporary residents in the South, from the North, and belonging to
Northern Churches, become slave holders in instances not a few. Indeed very few of
the New England and Northern Clergy, taking the range of all denominations, emi
grate South, without becoming slave holders, as soon as they find themselves able. And
a great many, the owners of slaves in the South, sell ihem, there, and return North to
live, it may be, in ease and affluence, upon the "price of blood," in the parlance of anti-
slavery ethics. And in this connection, the Northern Methodist Church, and especially
the Ministry, are entitled to notice. With motive we have nothing to do, except as
general conduct must be regarded as being its only true exponent. What is had in
view, therefore, by the ceaseless increasing agitation of the slave question, must be
judged of by the character and conduct of the agitators, in other respects — particularly
in relation to vice and the vicious, in other departments of evil and classes of evil
doers. In this regard, it is pertinent and important to enquire — are they equally zealous
and as intolerant in reference to other forms of evil, as in the case of slavery? Are
they as intolerant of other forms of slavery as of negro slavery? Is it oppression they
hate and would destroy — oppression in all its forms and wherever found? Do they seek
out and relieve the enslaved and oppressed of every relation and condition — the wife,
defrauded of her rights in a state of hated servitude — the oppressed child, crushed
beneath the unfeeling brutality of parental despotism — the hired servant, wronged and
borne down by a tyranny, to which necessity subjects him — the miserable slaves of un
protected apprenticeship — the unfortunate debtor and inmate of the poor house, deprived
of unforfeited rights by the indifference and obduracy of public and popular feeling?
If such be their conduct, we are not at liberty to question their motives as anti-slavery
reformers for the benefit of the South. But by how far such is not their conduct, we
impugn their motives, as at least of very doubtful character. When th'e benefit of the
slave is sought, by cursing the slave holder, we cannot admit the plea of good motive,
and must consider hostility to the South as the real cause of the movement. Millions
in the civilized world are the victims of a legal and social despotism, incomparably
worse than Southern slavery. They are more ignorant, have less control of their per
sons and actions, have less to eat, and food of a worse quality, they are worse clothed —
they work harder and longer, in every twenty four hours, have less contentment, less
motive and emulous feeling, and in every respect, are in a state of debasement more
utterly hopeless than American slaves. And why is it, feeling and sympathy are not
manifested in their behalf, in a manner corresponding with abolition sympathy for the
Southern slave? What interest is felt or manifested for the millions in the civilized
world, now in a state of vassalage or villenage, two systems of slavery, equal at least
in evil and injury, to the system of American slavery. Not equally zealous with re
gard to other social evils, what must be the inference, as it regards their motives? And
how as it regards crime? Take the vices rife and dominant on every side of them.
Look at the commonness and insolence of impiety, stalking all about them. Blasphe-

56
my, profaneness, drunkenness, Sabbath breaking, dishonesty, lying, and defamation ;
and so of the wbtile tide of human abomination, rolling up before them ; are they equal
ly jealous and exacting, in their attempts to suppress these? And if not, what is the
inference again? Is there not a manifest inconsistency, between their clamorous ag
gressive movements, as it regards slavery, artd their want of zeal and activity in the
suppression of general popular crime, every where surrounding them? If conscience
and religious principle were the exciting causes, one human interest would not be es
poused at the manifest expense and to the great detriment of others. Why this frenzi
ed sentimentality — this delerium of opinion and feeling on the subject of slavery; com
bined with such invincible Sadducean torpor as to other and worse forms of oppression
and vice, and especially proverbial indifference to the moral and immortal wants of the
negro? Notwithstanding the thousands of free negroes within their limits, all the abo
litionism, love of the negro, hatred of slavery, all the perverted facts, distorted state
ments, declamatory defamatiqn, and in some instances honest and able appeals, connect
ed with an interminable array of newspaper and pamphlet warfare, conventions, meet
ings, lectures, agents, and importation of foreign aid — all these within the wide spread
territory of the New England, Providence, Maine, Vermont, and Hew Hampshire Con
ferences, have not brought a solitary negro into the Methodist Episcopal Church, at
least to rerpain there long enough to be reported. So say the ministers of the current
year. How, why is this? Here is the negro — the free negro in the free and happy
North. Here too are his own dear friends — his patent benefactors, laboring as above
for his good, day and night, and even the Sabbath not intermitting the struggle, and yet,
Heaven favored as he is, in the very Goshen of the moral world, with a superfluity of
blessing for himself, and the popular curse, piled mountain high upon his oppressor, the
incorrigible negro is not converted — none of them can be got intb the Church — no, not
one! Turn now to the Troy, Black river, Erie, Oneida, Michigan, Rock river, Gene
see, North Ohio, Illinois — nine Conferences ; in all these we have less than a thousand
negroes in the Church! What does it mean ; how is it to be explained? How does it
happen, that the free blacks in the non-slave holding States, have been so very limited-
ly benefitted and influenced by a ministry, so indefatigable in the abuse and denuncia
tion of slavery? Is it because the negroes have discernment enough to see, that their
wordy benefactors have really never done any thing for the good of tbe negro, soul or
body — that they do not care for the negro — that they are not the true friends of the ne
gro? Why drive a trade with the sympathies of those they find themselves able to ex
cite and agitate, but leave the poor negro to turn their abstractions and declamation, to
what account he can — that is none at all, involving good of any kind? Who of these
have volunteered to appear in the South, to instruct, console, and cheer the negro, arhid
the hardships of his lot? Addressing the very men of whom we are speaking, Bishop
Hedding says, "if you feel as much for the slaves as our Southern brethren do — if you
are willing to labor as hard and suffer as much for the benefit of the slaves, as those
brethren do, go and help them ; there is work enough there for you all." This noble and
yet blistering challenge was thrown out by the Bishop seven years ago, but no one of
these intrepid and devoted reformers of the Church, has appeared in the South for the
salvation of the negro. They remain at home, and content themselves with fiery ha
rangues and blustering paragraphs— revolutionary conventions and seditious reports,
and we need scarcely add, that such cheap displays of humanity and showy exhibitions
of feeling, costing nothing but words, can never deceive the negro or the friends of the
negro in the South. But it may not be amiss to enquire, what has been the real value
of emancipation to the negro, say in the United States and West Indies, where well un-

57
derstood experiments have been made, in due form. Ever since emancipation in St.
Domingo, the mulattoes and blacks have been in a state1 of active hdstile array against
each other. The British Foreign Quarterly says of the former, "they were ignorant,
covetous, lazy, proud, vindictive, and cruel, and almost totally destitute of moral feel
ing ;" of the latter, "they saw the doors of their cage open, and like tigers, slipped out
to rend and tear." Since their emancipation, the proportion of illegitimate births in
the Island, has been increased to three in every four. The habitual invincible worth
lessness of both races, has continued, with very little variation, ever since they obtain
ed their freedom, and may be very justly estimated by the famous Code Rurale, by which
labor was made compulsory to lessen the amount of theft, robbery, and starvation, in
this model Republic of emancipated negroes. The same Journal informs us, sustained
by other authorities, that not only in Hayti, but all the West Indies, even in Jamaica,
whenever a fire, or any calamity of the kind takes place, the emancipated negroes in
variably look on in stupid sullenness, without any attempt at assistance, and frequently
indeed, the first flash of a conflagration or heave of an earthquake, is the signal for
plunder. The production of St. Domingo, since the emancipation of the negroes, has
been reduced as 150 to 15. Thousands of sugar plantations, have been utterly aban
doned by the free negroes, because they found the Banana and other spontaneous fruits,
would keep them from starving whether they worked or not. Professor Wilson, of
Edinburg, says of England "she has forced upon the West India Islands, the monstrous
project of negro emancipation — a step which has already reduced to one half, the pro
duction of those fine colonies, and given a blow to tbe prosperity of both the negro and
European populatien, from which neither can ever recover. It soon hecame manifest
that the negroes would not work." In the Island of Cuba, from 1775 to 1827, fifty two
years, the increase of the free black population, was only 246, while that of the slave
population was 547. A similar state of things, has always been presented, in tbe
United States. Are privation and extreme suffering, favorable to rapidity of increase
in population? If not, what must be the inference?
The effects of emancipation and the condition of/ree negroes in the United States, are
matters too well known to require proof or illustration with the well informed. In
Massachusetts, only one seventy fourth part of the entire population is African, and
yet one sixth of all their convicts are negroes. In Connecticut, one thirty fourth are
negroes, furnishing one third of all the convicts. In New York, one thirty fifth, and
one fourth of the convicts in the city prisons are free negroes. In New Jersey, one
thirteenth furnishing one third of all the prisoners. In Pennsylvania, one thirty fourth
and over one third of all the convicts negroes. One fourth of the whole expense con
nected with the prison systems of the entire North, is incurred by crime committed by
one twentieth part of the population. The same is strictly true with regard to the pau
per expenditures of all the Northern States. Facts of this kind can never become so stale
as not to be startling. We glance at them for a single purpose only ; it is to show that
amid all the appliances and under the most hopeful influence, of anti-slavery philan-
throphy, the degradation of the negro continues unchanged, and may be seen in all the
innumerable forms of indolence, vice, and misery. In Virginia, where no legal barrier
prevents, in a population of 40,000 free negroes, less than 200 are found to own a sin
gle foot of land. And the same is true in about the same proportion, in all the States,
slave and free. A well informed Northern Clergyman says, "every State seems to
cherish a disposition to be free from a free black population. In all the walks of life,
in every society, upon every path which lies before others, to honor, and fame, and
glory, a moral incubus pursues and fastens upon them. There appears to exist, in the

5S
breasts of white men, in this country generally, a prejudice against the color of the
African, which nothing short of Divine power can remove. It is thought by many at
the North, that immediate emancipation would render it necessary for the whites to ex
terminate the blacks, or abandon the Southern soil."— Comer on Slavery. Dr. Fisk
boldly maintained, throughout the hottest of the abolition contest, in the East and
North, that either immediate emancipation, or emancipation at all, without removal,
would be worse than slavery, to all concerned. Dr. Phillip attempts to account for the
unmitigated aversion to the color of the African, so universally prevalent in the United
States, especially in the North, by ascribing it to the injuries, we as a people, have in
flicted on that unfortunate race. Our only concern at present is with the fact, showing
that the negro has no chance to rise or improve in this country. A Northern author,
in an admirable "Plea for Africa," declares, "the humanity of slave holders in the
Southern States, has far exceeded the feeling indulged toward the blacks in my native
New England or the Middle States. A much kindlier feeling is indulged towards the
blacks at the South than at the North." The whole current of evidence on the subject
tends to show, that the reprobate South is the only section in the United States, where
any considerable attention is paid to the wants of the negro. Of the free negroes
of New England, of Connecticut, of New Haven even, Dr. Bacon enquires, "are they
not, in the estimation of the community, and in their own consciousness, aliens and out
casts, in the midst of the people." Dr. Dana, of the North, says, "there are princi
ples of repulsion between them and us, which can never be overcome." The unfortu
nate negro may cease to acknowledge a master, but cannot deprive himself of the con
sciousness, that he belongs to a degraded class, which as a class can never rise to
equality with the white race about him. The North has inspired the negro with ex
pectations above bis condition ; duped him with hopes he can never realize, and dis
gusted him with a lot, from which he can never escape, and from which the North has
done nothing to enable him to escape.
The city of Baltimore, presents probably the largest and most intelligent mass of
free persons of color, found in the United States. A large number of them are per
sons of reading and reflection. These in an appeal to the citizens of Baltimore, and
through them to the people of the United States, say, "we reside among you and yet
are strangers — natives, yet not citizens— surrounded by the freest people and the
most republican institutions in the world, and yet enjoying none of the immunities of
freedom. Difference of color, the servitude of most of our brethren, &c. will not allow
us to mingle with you in the benefits of citizenship. As long as we remain among you,
we shall be a distinct caste — an extraneous mass of men irrecoverably excluded from
your institutions. Though we are not slaves, we are not free. We do not and never
shall participate in the enviable privileges which we constantly witness." Judge Black
ford says, "they are of no service here, (free States,) to the community or themselves.
They live in a country the favorile abode of liberty, without tne enjoyment of her
rights. To all these the black man is a stranger." "Here the features, the'complex-
ion, and every peculiarity of his person pronounce upon the ransomed slave another
doom." — C. on Slavery. "If liberated and left among the whites, they would be a
constant source of annoyance, corruption, and danger. They could never be trusted as
faithful citizens. Each would regard the other with painful suspicion and apprehen
sion. It is essential to the interests of each, that they be separated." — Dr. Miller.
"The removal of the colored population is, I think, a common object, by no means con
fined to the slave States ; the whole Union would be strengthened by it, and relieved from
a danger whose extent can scarcely be. estimated."— Chief Justice Marshall. "A polit-

59
ical evil which we have inherited— a stain to be washed from the national escutcheon."—
Gov. Vroom. "Ourselves, our children, our land, and every beloved institution of our
country, are deeply involved"— Bishop Meade. "The free black whom prejudice con
signs to a moral debasement in the North, is as deeply injured as the slave who, in the
South, is held in physical bondage. The mass of crime committed by Africans is
greater in proportion to numbers in the non-slave holding than in the slave holding
States, and as a general rule, the degree of comfort enjoyed by them is inferior. They
are destined to be forever proscribed and debased by our prejudices."— B. F.Butler.
"The breath of opinion poisons all tlieir efforts. They feel it is impossible to contend
with the whites. They call more loudly for our sympathy than their brethren in bon
dage."— Rev. Mr. Bestor.
That part of the Protest which shows the whole Church, North as well as South, to
be plainly and unavoidably connected with slavery, is not noticed by the Reply at all,
although a great portion of its reasoning turns upon this point entirely. The boast of
the North, generally, of freedom from slavery, is equally fallacious. Where are the
descendants of the thousands of slaves sold by the progenitors of Northern abolition
ists in the Southern States and West Indies? Sold and deeded by them into perpetual
captivity, how is the slave trading North to get rid of the evil? What are these aboli
tionists doing with the "price of blood" thus left them by their sainted sires? In work
ing out their freedom from slavery, what of the poor Pequod Indians enslaved by them
at home, and shipped in large numbers to the Bermudas, and there sold into intermina
ble slavery? Who owns, and is consuming the millions in the North, acquired by ac
tual, regular, and protracted merchandise, in Ihe souls and bodies of men, connected
with the slave trade between the periods of 1650 and 1845? How are the children of
a slave holding and slave trading ancestry, who have consigned thousands to perpetual
servitude, from mere motives of gain, to rid themselves of the moral relations and ef
fects of slavery? How many now engaged in spreading the evangelism of anti-slave
ry, have resided South, owned slaves, not by inheritance orin right of marriage, but by
purchase, have bought low and sold high, and returning to the North, are now living on
the proceeds of slavery, and weekly contributing, in their own patent phrase, the
"price of blood" in the diffusion of abolition abuse? Dr. Dana says, "let us not ima
gine, for a moment, that we, in this Northern clime, are exempt from that enormous
guilt connected with slavery and the slave trade which we are so ready to appropriate
to our brethren in distant States. In New England are the forges which have framed
fetters and manacles for the limbs of unoffending Africans. The iron of New Eng
land has pierced their anguished souls. In New England are found the overgrown
fortunes — the proud palaces, which have been reared up from the blood and sufferings
of these unhappy men. The guilt is strictly national — national then, let the expiation
be. Let the whole country confess its guilt." New England and foreign slave mer
chants filled the South with slaves, aided by the sanction and participation of the Bri
tish government. The oppressor's gold has enriched the North as well as the South.
The truth of history speaks in the lines of Mrs. Sigourney — "The frown of deep in
dignant blame bends not on Southern climes alone. To dark slavery's yoke severe, our
father's helped to bow the neck." If the whole matter in question be fully and fairly
examined, the North may find itself as deep in debt to the justice of God, as even the
South ; and as it regards the slave trade, infinitely more so. How many more or less
than a score of Northern vessels, with men and capital in necessary proportion, are at
this moment engaged in the slave trade between Africa and the Brazilian ports alone?
Who is ignorant of the amount of Northern capital engaged in the slave trade with the

60
Island of Cuba, after the opening of the port of Havana to foreign slave vessels, in
1789, and still further in 1791? Immense portions of the wealth of the North have
been acquired by means of slavery and the slave trade; and slavery, in the light of
means connected with the end, is now interwoven with the whole civil and social econo
my of Northern society. It cleaves to the soil, the homesteads, thechurches, the grave
yards, the colleges, the schools, thepolitical economy, and religious enterprise of the land.
The real difference between the North and the South appears to be, the one holds the
slave, and the other the price of the slave. The one has the power to obey the com
mand of God, respecting the slave, and is, of course, responsible for the use of it.
The other bartered the slave and the responsibility together, for gold, and by way of
educing good from "evil," secured a preferred equivalent for the one and the other.
The Southern portion of the Church, having any connection at all, are connected with
slavery under the high and direct sanction of law ; and how will it be made appear that
such connection is criminal, while a multiform connection with slavery is found in the
North, in direct violation of the constitution and laws of the United States, in some if
not all ofits aspects, and yet not criminal? Slaves, recognized as property, by express
provision of the supreme law of the land, are, in instances almost innumerable, decoy
ed or stolen from their owners, secreted, protected, and aided in effecting their escape,
although after being thus stolen or decoyed off, they are as really and truly slaves, and
the property of others, as though nothing of the kind had occurred. Wherever they
are found, in Northern States, they belong, by right of law, and the pledged consent of
every citizen of the United States, to those from whom they have been stolen, or in
duced to escape, and no length of residence, North, affects the title of the owner. In
this way, all engaged in this species of abolition, or in any way furthering or approving
it, have a direct connection with slaves and slavery, in open violation of law ; that is,
they take, or otherwise aid, in depriving the owner of his property, without his knowl
edge or consent, and thus, in defiance of law, connect themselves with slavery by
means of theft and robbery. We should like to know how this class of "men-steal-
ers," (such by the constitution and laws of the country,) can escape the charge of con
nection with slavery, or how they expect lo dissolve such connection ! Entailed upon
the South by means of British policy and Northern commercial enterprise, how does it
happen that the curse of slavery is to be borne by the South alone? What baptism has
washed the stains of the original lepers? By what vicarious arrangement have their
sins been fastened upon the South, as the scape-goat by which they are to be borne
away? How many Northern Methodist Preachers were ordained by Bishop Coke, du
ring his connection with slavery in the West Indies, between 1788 and 1792, and how
has the Northern Church got rid of the evil thus entailed upon them? All the superior
Councils of the Church, since 1780, have consisted, in part, of slave holders, and al
ways found in many of the Annual Conferences; slavery has been mixed up with all
the federal relations of the Church for 65 years, and how is the Church to rid itself of
this taint? The evil in the South has its warrant in the law of its production ; in
causes over which we had no control, and with the existence and operation of which,
those who now abuse us most, English and Northern abolitionists, are more intimate
ly connected than all the world beside. The North is a stockholder in the slave trade
as truly as the South, and can never cease to be one, until the gains, by means of it,
in all tbe successive accumulations of principal and interest shall, to the last cent, be
expended in efforts to remove the evil they have inflicted on this country, on Africa,
the countries of South America, the Islands of the West Indian Archipelago, and
other portious of the globe.

Gl
We have seen that slavery is, to all intents and purposes, a national arrangement.
The whole nation was originally concerned in its introduction and prevalence among
us. The whole nation consented to its legal perpetuation, by its formal recognition in
the Constitution of the United States. It could only become national, in the Union of
the States, by consent and contract of the North. All statesmen and jurists treat it
as a national concern. A Northern reviewer says, "the evil is ours ns well as theirs;
we are ready to appropriate it all to our Southern brethren, but we have no power or
right thus lo wash our hands. From the North have gone ships, and seamen, and tra
ders in human flesh, that have been polluted by the inhuman traffic, and the 'pieces of
silver' gained by them have been apportioned to the North: the North have shared
largely in the accursed spoils." Is the North ready to consecrate these gains to the
removal of the evil? Until this is done, if no longer, the North remains, of necessi
ty, connected with the evil, as they have merely exchanged the slave for his value in
the shape of other capital. Suppose too, the North were called upon, as the means of
atoning for the evils inflicted upon the nation, by the importation of intoxicating li
quors, and other demoralizing means of gain, during the last two hundred years, to
sacrifice the amount of property now connected with the slave system of the South,
say 800,000,000 of dollars, which they require the South to yield, and be thankful that
they are let off so lightly! What requirement of God or man would secure such an
alienation of property on the part of those who exact it of the South, in propitiation of
Northern displeasure, on account of the evil of slavery? If not prepared for anything
of the kind, may they not learn a lesson of forbearance toward the South, especially
as they contributed so largely toward the establishment of the property system of the
South? How will it be shown that it is either honest or honorable in the North, while
enjoying the advantages of the national compact, to demand back the price they were
once so glad to pay for it? In what sense slavery is national, and in what provincial
only, has been shown with sufficient clearness in this discussion. And as slavery,
within specified limitations, is a principle of public policy, those who assail it as an
outrage, can only do so by assailing the civil compact uniting the several States of the
confederacy. Or, turning to the provincial aspects of the question, they give their
local views and policy an extra-territorial application, contrary to, and in violation of
the federal treaty rights of American citizenship ; and in doing so, must, of necessity,
act in bad faith. We are glad to know that thousands in the North, opposed to slave
ry, are not 'disposed to disturb the South by any agitation of the subject ; and by how
far they discountenance agitation in this, or any other way, the South will accord to
them the justice and generosity to which their conduct entitles them. Nor can we-
perceive what damage or disreputation would accrue to the Scribes and Pharisees of
abolition and anti-slavery, were they to take a lesson from the conduct of this portion
of their fellow citizens, and especially from that of Christ and his Apostles on this
subject. In the application of this reasoning, Methodism is no exception to the general rule.
The impurity, the hated leprosy is spread all over the North by the constitution and
laws, and by consequence, stipulated consent and established usages of the Church.
The action of the last General Conference, if carried out, will prove but an anodyne,
not a remedy. Much else will remain to be done. Pragmatic pertinacity in excluding
slavery from the Episcopacy, say the Executive Department, while it is allowed to re
main in the General and Annual Conferences— the Legislative and Judicial Departments
of the Church, deemed by the majority of so much more importance — will always ap
pear to the impartial and well-informed, as ridiculous as it is absurd and inconsistent. *

62
Who can help being struck with the contrast between the conduct of Prophets and
Apostles, in relation to the evil of slavery, and the course pursued by the Northern
abolition and anti-slavery party or parties of the Methodist Episcopal Church? Slave
ry, perpetual hereditary slavery, existed in the Jewish, and also in the Christian Church,
and slaves and masters, under Divine direction and influence, constituted portions of
both, and in both, at different times and in various ways, God himself interposed and
legislated for the regulation of the evil — for such it seems to us it must have been re
garded, and might have been, without affecting our reasoning. All this was true and
yet no directions given — no movement authorized or indicated, towards its overthrow.
It was directly connected with, and was a part of the civil polity, in both instances.
In the one it was expressly authorized, and in the other distinctly recognized, as a civil
and domestic arrangement, giving birth to important social and moral obligations, and
while its abuses are denounced, no attempt was made to interfere with it, as a concern
of State. During the personal ministrations of Jesus Christ and his Apostles, the
whole Eastern world was full of slavery, in ils worst forms — in forms confessedly
worse than any in the United States, and comprehending, it has been estimated, one
entire half of the population of the East ; and yet inspiration is silent, except in the
specification and enforcement of the relative duties of master and slave, without one
word in condemnation of the relation out of which the duties arise. Must not St. Paul
and his associates have been familiar with the "Ergastula tola" of Juvenal — entire
work houses crowded with slaves, and dotting nearly every road side of Greece and
Rome? Were they ignorant of the fact, that slavery, even negro slavery, had existed
in the countries and colonies of Greece for ages before the christian era? Were they
strangers to the fact, that the Roman Empire was full of slavery? Had the slave mar
kets of Ihe Imperial and Provincial capitols, never attracted their attention? Did they
not know that the mines of the Empire alone, for a series of ages, occupied upon. an
average, annually, some 50,000 slaves? Were the facts attested by Seneca, Pliny, Strabo,
and others, that many Roman citizens owned whole legions of slaves, unknown to them?
And yet we have seen, and shall further see, what their example was, and how little it
resembled the conduct of which we complain? Every word on the subject from either,
vindicates the idea and the fact, that slavery is a civil relation, with which Christianity
does not meddle, and as such is not to be interfered with on the part of the Church.
From Moses to Christ, slavery, perpetual slavery for life, existed in the Church, even
in connection with the Priesthood in all its grades, and God, equal and infinite in wisdom
and goodness, specified, explained, and enforced its relations. Not only did the He
brews hold slaves, by Divine permission, but by the same warrant, they were permitted
to transmit them to their children, as hereditary property. There is no prohibition of
slavery during the Old Testament history, nor is the relation of master and slave any
where charged as a social or moral wrong. In the Jewish polity, it is not merely tole
rated, but as the prevailing custom of the early Eastern nations, which God did not see
proper to deny to the Jewish nation, it was retained and adopted as one of the institutes
of a polity, established and published by Himself, as sole legislator. And this is not
merely conceded, but currently assumed and asserted, by the whole stream both of Jew
ish and Christian commentary. Nor are Methodist commentators any exception to the
rule. It is admitted and taught by all our standard' expositors, not excepting Dr.
Coke, who in his commentary, whatever he may say elsewhere, admits that slavery by
Divine warrant, was made a part of the political constitution of the Jewish Common
wealth. Ignorance alone will deny, that slavery pervaded the whole Eastern world, at
the introduction of Christianity, and yet the legislation of the New Testament, no where

63
condems the relation or the system, but is limited to conservative regulations, designed
to prevent abuse, and inculcate duty, in relation to all connected with the system,
whether as masters or slaves. Non-resistance to the law of servitude as a civil ar
rangement, submission and fidelity on the part of slaves, are exacted as matter of
christian duty, and for the emphatic reason "that the name of God and his doctrine be
not blasphemed, "as by those, who teach the right of resistance and non-submission, in
the premises. The same duty is urged, in view of the solemn motive, that the slave
may "adorn the doctrine of God our Saviour," a part of the "doctrine of God our Sa
viour," being, that as the master owes protection, support, and kindness to the slave,
as such, so the slave owes obedience and all fidelity to the master, in his character of
master. A still more explicit reason, assigned in the New Testament, is, that such
obedience, so performed by the slave, is necessary to the Divine approval, as matter of
plain duty, growing out of the civil condition of the slave. Every critical student of
the New Testament, is well aware that there is not in it a single sentence, nor any
series of them, from which induction can logically deduce Ihe inference, that the sim
ple owning or holding of slaves, is inconsistent with the word of God, or christian
character. How is it then, that so many have become "wise above what is written,"
and are so far in advance of the revelations of infinite wisdom, on this^subject, as to
represent slavery under any circumstances, as one of those monster vices — a Giant
abomination, which (according to some,) Christianity has refused to pollute her lips
with, and has left to be destroyed by extra-scriptural efforts, or if such be not the po
sition, (according to others,) then let us have the warrant from the word of God, un
der which they presume to act. Difference of opinion and feeling on the subject, we
do not complain of — this is to be expected, but when it comes to cursing and outlawry
from the pale of all the virtues, then those who so treat us, must produce Divine war
rant for what they do, or stand exposed to the charge of arraigning the wisdom and the
word of God. By a denunciation of slavery as the sin of sins, the disciple charges the
Master with infidelity to His commission, for by a most unaccountable oversight, the
great Teacher, and the inspired expositors of his declared will, failed to intimate, that
it was a sin at all. Those we oppose in this argument, make the christian profession
a reason for dissolving the relation of master and slave, contrary to the unequivocal
teaching of the New Testament, which enjoins the duty of greater fidelity on the part
of the christian slave, because the master is a christian too, and they brethren in Christ,
and in this way our opponents deface rather than adorn the doctrine of God our Saviour.
The New Testament teaches that this doctrine is adorned, when the slave renders a
ready and cheerful obedience, in view of his relations as a slave ; modern menders of
the Divine message teach, that it is best done by disobedience, theft, robbery, running
away, or placing themselves in a position to be stolen by their benefactors. The New
Testament enjoins obedience upon the slave, from motives of honesty and uprightness,
lest the name of God and his doctrine be blasphemed ; the reformers in question, how
ever, blaspheme both the name of God and his doctrine, by inculcating directly the con
trary course of conduct. The New Testament requires that kind of obedience which
counts "the master worthy of all honor"— that is, in the relation of master. It directs
the slave not to be careful about his servitude — "care not for it," although freedom is
to be preferred, when it is offered by rightful authority. It also teaches the slave to
render service to his master "as unto Christ" — "not to steal but to show all good fidel
ity" — and finally, most solemnly requires all ministers of Jesus Christ, "to teach and
command these things,'' and assures the Church and the world, that those ministers who
fail or refuse to do it, "do not consent to wholesome words, tven tht words of the Lord

64
Jesus, but are proud knowing nothing— doting about questions and strifes of words—
whereof cometh envy, evil surmisings, perverse disputings of men of corrupt minds,
destitute of the truth, from such withdraw." Here is a picture too fearfully attractive
not to be noticed. A picture drawn by omnicient discernment, and every word of it
originally applied to the subject of slavery and abolition. We are not ignorant of the
extent to which sneer and banter have been appealed tc, to deter all concerned from any
thing like a scriptural examination of the subject. Those who resort to such a course,
doubtless perceive, that whatever warrant they may have for their conduct from other
sources, they have none from the word of God. They no doubt feel, that they are
teaching Prophets and Apostles instead of learning from them! The Church that claims
authority to excommunicate, or in any way punish or disparage the claims of a man
merely because standing in the relation of master or owner to a slave, treats the lan
guage and analogy of the Bible on this subject as obsolete, for in the Scriptures of both
the Old and the New Testament, the relation is recognized as existing in the Church,
every way and essentially distinct from that of hired or indented service, and in a way
further, showing the relation to be allowable by Divine permission. God informed his
people, under the old dispensation, that they might hold slaves either for a term of
years, or for life, as a "perpetual possession" and "inheritance" for their children.
The permission is expressly given in various forms. Under the new dispensation, He
has not only failed to say they shall not do so, but proceeding upon the fact that they
did, and the assumption that they would, He simply instructs them, how to treat their
slaves, and explains to them the kind of service they may reasonably expect from them.
The cruel, unjust, and even unkind master, should be disowned by the Church, as also
the faithless slave. The humane and considerate master and the faithful slave, have as
good a right, according to the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, to membership in the
Church of God, other things being equal, as any class of mankind whatever. The
practice of the Church for more than thirty centuries, has been in accordance with this
statement. Biblical scholars need not be told, that in the Hebrew and Greek of the
Old and New Testaments, terms denoting the slave proper, by general consent of all
commentary and criticism, and clearly beyond doubt distinguishing the slave from the
hired or any other kind of servant — thus forming two separate and well defined states
of servitude, are used several hundred times, and frequently in direct contrdst in the
same sentence, and that in both langnages, and both divisions ofthe Bible, they are
distinguished arid kept separate, by the use of different terms, without any confusion
of meaning or application. They need not be told, that in the New Testament as in
the old, the one relation is recognized as existing in the Church, as well as the other,
and that there is no prohibition of the one any more than of the other. The distinction
between ruler and subject, parent and child, husband and wfe, is not more distinctly main
tained by the use of different terms, than that between the slave proper and the hired ser
vant of the Scriptures. If this be not so, let the contrary be shown. Let it be made appear,
that the "Eved" and "Saukeer", (slave and hired servant,) of the Hebrew Scriptures 
the "Doulous" and "Mistlwlos," (store and hireling) ofthe Greek of the Septuagint and
the New Testament, with their almost innumerable compounds and formations, as well
as other kindred terms, with their compounds and derivatives, used to denote the same
contrasted relations — let it be shown, that all these, so used in several hundred places,
do not mean the opposite civil and domestic relations of slavery and freedom  of compul
sory and voluntary service. But if not, and the Bible is found teeming with such evi
dences and distinctions with regard to slavery, while the very Decalogue recognizes the
relation, and it is re-published in the sermon on the mount, let it be admitted that the

65
evil of slavery is to be judged of in view of other tests than ils condemnation in tho
Bible. Were the Bible silent on the subject, the case would be very different. Other
means of judgment would, of necessity, have to be appealed to. But the Bible is not
silent. Heaven has legislated on the subject, and beyond that legislation no man or
Church can go, without a departure from the word of God. The Methodists have
avowed the belief to Heaven and earth, that what is not taught in the Bible, cannot be
made a condition of salvation, and by consequence cannot be essential to christian
character or ministerial qualification. Let the Bible then, come in as a vvitness on this
subject, and let Its decision be conclusive of the controversy. This must have been
the design of Heaven, or the subject would not have been introduced there. We may
fight and divide, and fight after division, until weary and wasted, and it must come to
this at last. Slavery as a question of morality, can only be settled by an appeal to the
revealed will of God. Here, and on this ground, must the decisive battle be fought.
Let this then be the issue. The Divine will being revealed on the subject, in the Scrip
tures, what is it? If we misunderstand the great register of our faith, let us see our
wrong. If we lack information, enlighten us. If by fair exegetical argument, the
contrary of what we assume can be shown, we pledge ourselves to submit. But should
it appear that the Bible recognizes the jural and social relation of master and slave, as
a concern of civil government, with which the Church has no right to interfere, beyond
the inculcation of duty and the correction of abuses incident to the relation, then we
are compelled to maintain, that those who denounce the relation itself, as criminal and
inconsistent with christian character, "teach for doctrine the commandments of men,
and pervert the oracles, of God." We repeat, here is the true issue, and let it be met.
The early attempts of the Church, or portions of it, to interfere, so as to disturb the
civil and domestic relations between master and slave, are directly condemned by near
ly all the principal early and later fathers. Ignatius, Chrysostom, and Jerome especial
ly, denounce the practice as unchristian. Ignatius says, "despise not the slaves, neither
suffer them to be puffed up, but to the glory of God let them serve with greater dili
gence, that they may obtain of God a better liberty. Let them not desire that their
liberty be purchased by the Church, lest they fall under the slavery of their passions."
And accordingly it was decreed, by one of the ancient councils of the Church — "if any
teach, that by virtue of religion or christian instruction, that the slave may despise his
master, or may withhold his service, or that he shall not serve his master with good
faith and reverence, let him be anathema." Such views of the subject are not offered
to show that slavery is not an evil, but to show that it is not, (unless the relation be
abused to criminal and unworthy purposes,) evil in the sense and to the extent assum
ed by a large portion, perhaps the majority of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Where
slavery obtains, without being a civil regulation of the State, without the sanction of
public law, as was the case in Massachusetts, from its introduction until put down by
the Judiciary, our reasoning does not, and is not intended to apply. If evil be applied
to slavery in the Discipline' of the Methodist Episcopal Church, .7. the sense in which
it is applied to drunkenness, profaneness, &c, as contended by some of our General
Conference organs, then the Church has deliberately connived at vice and ungodliness,
in both the ministry and membership, for the last half century and more, and must be
looked upon as not less guilty and degraded, than she would have been, had she allow
ed her ministers and members to be drunkards, swearers, and Sabbath breakers. If
this be so, the Church has been dishonest and unprincipled, in every period of her his
tory, and those holding such an opinion, to be consistent, can only award her the curse
of Heaven, and the scorn of Christendom. The term evil, however, in tbe Discipline,
9

66
is used in no such sense. Such a construction would not only prove the Methodist
Church unworthy of confidence, but the great head of the Church general, Prophets and
Apostles, the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, the principal fathers and
writers of the Church, since the days of inspiration, would be equally included in the
condemnation ; for we have seen that all these have steadily and formally recognized
the state and relations of slavery, even perpetual hereditary slavery, and have specifi
cally legislated and given direction, not for its overthrow, but for the regulation of the
duties and obligations arising out of such state and relations. Taking the slavery of
the United States, and certainly we have proved it to be such, as a long established civil
regulation of jural origin, interwoven with all the successive forms of government; and
the very structure of society, unless it can be shown to be inconsistent with the word
of God, and so forbidden to the christian, we maintain that any authoritative inter
ference with the relation by the Church, is a usurpation of right that ought to be resist
ed. We have seen at length and undeniably, that the judgment of our chief pastors,
the Bishops, as given at different times, and fully sustained by repeated and formal de
clarations of the General Conference, directly rejects the supposition that the relation
in itself is disallowed by the word of God, and therefore sinful. All the Bishops joint
ly, Bishop Hedding, Dr. Bangs, two successive General Conferences, and other author
ities, have been adduced to show that since the early abolition of the Methodists in the
United States," this has never been the doctrine of the Church. In matters of con
science she has, &} her own official avowal, no right to legislate, except what she de
rives from thpfBlWe. — See Dr. Emory's report in 1828. Whence her right then to de
nounce as morally wrong, a civil relation, recognized and tolerated in the Jewish and
Christian Scriptures? The recent General Conference declared the slavery question to
be one of conscience, and a? the subject is discussed in the Bible, which we receive as
"the only and sufficient rule of faith and praotico," we ask for the warrant of the Ma
jority in taking the stand they have on this subject. One of two things we claim, in
the abused name of God and his word: — either furnish the warrant we call for or treat
us on this subject as we are treated by the Bible and its author. We do not mean to
say that the Bible favors slavery, or that slavery is not an evil ; what we insist upon
is, that the Bible treats it as a jural arrangement in human governments, which the
Church has no right to assail or disturb, beyond proper efforts to bring master and
slave into the fold of Christ, and urge upon both the faithful performance of their rela.
tive duties, that in this way, principle and conviction may operate their appropriate re
sults. This was God's ancient method in the Patriarchal and Jewish ages, and that of
Christ and his Apostles under the new dispensation, and we insist it will he found to
be the only efficient means for the extirpation ofthe evil. Beyond this the Bible is
neither for nor against .slavery. There is no pro-slavery — no anti-slavery in it. The
relation is recognized and its duties clearly pointed out, and at the same time all abuse
of the relation is denounced as sin and punished accordingly. Whatever the zeal and
fanaticism of modern enlightenment may decree or say, no other method of treatment
is found in the Bible or authorized by its ethics. Having in various forms brought the
subject to the notice of the Church, as requiring his interposition, why is God not per
mitted to express his own will, and explain his own law and purposes? Sacredly pledg
ed to abide by these, as found in the Scriptures, have or have not the high engagements
of the Church been broken in connection with the facts brought to notice in this Re
view? How the legislation of the Church has been treated, we have seen in exlenso.
Can further proof be needed to show that civil law has been declared, in effect, null and
void, in its assertion of the rights of citizenship? In the case of Bishop Andrew, for

67
example, his personal rights as a citizen of Georgia, are legislated away by the sum
mary process of resolution. With no law of the Church to authorize it, as themselves
admit, the Majority place the character and conscience of Bishop Andrew in the keep
ing of a party jurisdiction, ex,tra-territorial with regard to the entire South ; and this
too, although every citizen of the United States, as we have seen, is as much bound to
protect the right in question, as any other guarantied by the constitution. , Indeed, or
ganized as the States are, under the federal compact, the whole anti-slavery movement
is an aggressive interference with the civil arrangements of the country. It is a poli
tical trespass, and so far as the Church is involved, it is such ostensibly for religious
purposes, and must come under the condemnation of the late Ohio Conference, in its
denunciation of "politico-religious" movements of whatever kind, for certainly the one
before us is of this character, with all the vengeance of ampleproof and illustration.
The Protest assumes, that the constitution ofthe Methodist Episcopal Church has
been violated in the proceedings against Bishop Andrew, and it will at least be necessa
ry to show what was meant by the assumption. We reject, and always have, as absurd
and utterly untenable, the position, that the "restrictive articles" are the constitution
of the Church, in any allowable senSe. The very proposition appended to the articles,
is sufficient without any thing else, to overthrow the pretension. Very little discern
ment is necessary, to see at once, that no government is established by these articles ;
they do not pretend to establish one, and of course, of necessity, cannot be a consti
tution, for all admit that a constitution is that which establishes and constitutes a gov
ernment. That is intended, and those things especially included, without which the
government could not exist, and every one perceives that such views do not and cannot
apply to the restrictive articles. These articles do not create, nor do they constitute the
government, and therefore cannot be the constitution. They do not, nor can they be
made, even constructively, to include the fundamental principles of the government.
There are other principles of government not found in them, and to which they do not
allude, equally elementary, equally essential to the very existence of the government.
A constitution, further, means the form in which the governing power is exercised.
Such form, however, is not found in the restrictions, except in part, and as all know, to
a very limited extent. The restrictive articles are a part of the constitution of tbe
Methodist Episcopal Church, and a small part only. They were not originally inten
ded or thought of as the constitution of the Church, although undoubtedly designed to
be of constitutional force, ond such force we distinctly claim for them. They are prop
erly an amendment or addition to the constitution, adopted and engrafted upon it, long
after the Church had a constitution as truly and properly as now. Wliile, therefore,
the restrictive articles are a part of the constitution, they are not the constitution proper,
any more than 'any other important section of the Discipline. As technically under
stood and applied, in the political jurisprudence of the United States, the Methodist
Episcopal Church is without a constitution. We have a constitution, however, as cer
tainly as the United States haver resembling, it is true, the English constitution in
its origin and structure, much more than that of our own country, consisting mainly,
as does the British constitution, of declaratory acts, statutes, rules, and regulations,
together with construction, precedent, and usage, as the means of compact, union, and
action, and thus forming a body of law, which is in fact our only constitution. In a
¦ word, our only constitution is our book of statutes, rules, and regulations— the Discip
line of the Church. All these, essential either to the existence of the government or
to secure the ends of its institution, are of constitutional force and validity, and by
consequence parts of the constitution. The Itinerancy is confessedly more essential to

68
the existence and government of the Methodist Episcopal Church, than any other prin
ciple or arrangement belonging to it, and yet the restrictive articles do not allude to it,
except as it regards Bishops alone. The forms of ordination, as it relates to three or
ders or grades of the ministry, originally received from Wesley, as not only valid and
sufficient, but always regarded as essential to the very existence of ihe ministry, and
of course the Church, must be considered as a constitutional arrangement, and an un
doubted part of the constitution ; yet these are not secured in the restrictions, except by
implication perhaps, in the case of Bishops. Class meetings too, although not of Divine
obligation, connect with a vitally constitutional principle in the government, as with
these originates the ministry, and without them, with our present form of government,
we could have no ministry of any kind. The class meeting system, therefore, is a con
stitutional arrangement, beyond doubt, although not covered by the restrictive rules,
The Annual Conference system, without which the whole machinery of Methodism,
would. become extinct, will always be looked upon as a fundamental element of the very
structure of our government, and yet it is not protected by the restrictive articles. The
same is true of tbe Quarterly Meeting system, apart from which our whole executive
administration would be something entirely different from what it is, and it can, there
fore, be regarded in no other light than as a part of the constitution, and yet the restric
tions imposed upon the delegated General Conference, have no reference to this any
more than to the other great constitutional arrangements to which we have called atten
tion. The General Conference also comes in with its powers and limitations, as a
constitutional arrangement, but the restrictions upon it are no more the constitution,
than any one of the constitutional powers or arrangements we have enumerated in the
general system.
The General Conference was created and established by the Annual Conferences,
(with the consent and approval of the Episcopacy,) as the organ of their action, joint
ly and in common. Not transcending the limits of its powers, its action is, of course,
constitutional and binding; but exceeding these limits, its action is at once unconsti
tutional, not binding, and ought to be resisted. Attempting the exercise of power
not delegated, it ceases to be the organ of the Annual Conferences, is from under the
protection of the constitution, and loses .all right of controly All the powers of the
General Conference originated, pre-existed, and were exercised before the existence of
the General Conference, and are, in no primary sense, traceable , to it. Episcopacy
too, with all its present powers, had long existed and operated its functions, as now,
before General Conferences were thought of. The Episcopacy is not of General
Conference origin, in any sense. All the General Conferences, from 1792 to 1844,
could not have given it the character claimed for it, by our principal writers on the
subject. It had full and effective existence, and constitutional force and validity, be
fore the General Conference, which now assumes to have created it, had any existence
at all. It preceded even the Eldership. It was the Episcopacy and Eldership in con
junction, as a constituent body, that created the General Conference, and imposed up
on it the restrictive rules, now forming a part, and but a very small part, of the consti
tution. These are, in no sense, self-imposed restrictions, as absurdly supposed by
some. They were imposed by those giving birth and power to the delegated General
Conference, and without whose authority it could pot have been. The Episcopal office
was created, and Dr. Coke officially placed in its incumbency, by the only authority
having any right to act, before any Church existed in the United States. In the Meth
odist Episcopal Church, the Bishop was the first grade of the ministry adopted. There
was no Elder — no Deacon. The Laity had nothing to do with it. They had merely,

69
through their Lay Preachers, petitioned Mr. Wesley for Elders. and Deacons. The
Episcopacy was the first formative element or principle in the organization of the
Church. It was the primal arrangement, around which all others clustered and settled
into order and symmetry. It was by an authority antecedent and superior to the Gene
ral Conference, that the Bishop was created President, and head of that body, which he
could not be without belonging to it. His right of Headship and Presidency is not de
rived from the General Conference in any way. He is not indebted to the General Con
ference for his position there. His being there is not by concession of that body. As
the general rule, his Presidency is one of the conditions of the existence of the body.
He is there by appointment of the constitution, to preside and oversee. Even when
there, as President, he is not the officer of the Conference in the sense contended for.
It is not for them to elect whether he shall be there or not. He is the officer of the
constitution — ihe Church, and without an abuse of right — of privilege; the General
Conference cannot even object, constitutionally, much less remove him, and then only
by regular adjudication, for improper conduct, by an appeal to law and evidence. The
right of trial by committee, and of appeal, under circumstances affording full and fair
opportunity of defence, is another constitutional principle of Methodist polity, existing
prior to, and independently of, the General Conference, and applies to all ministers and
members of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and to a Bishop, (if he be a minister,)
not less than others. Nor is there anything in the discipline opposed to this. The an
swer, to question 4, section 4, is simply declaratory of the amenability of the Bishop
to the General Conference, and the right of the Conference to try and determine in the
case ; but the mods of trial is determined by the constitution, to be by committee, and as
the case comes of course before the General Conference, it is virtually an appeal. The
real difficulty is defective legislation ; no statute exists to carry out the provision of the
constitution, which expressly declares that no minister shall be deprived of trial by
committee. When a Bishop is charged or arraigned at a General Conference, not to
violate the constitution, he should be tried by a committee of his peers, and then let the
Conference decide. I know no statute requires this, and it is equally true that none
forbids it ; and as it is explicitly exacted by the constitution, trial, without the inter
vention of a committee, is a violation of that instrument, and would be equally uncon
stitutional, were it authorized by statute, for, in either case, it is doing what the con
stitution says the General Conference shall have no power to do,, in the case of any
minister, preacher, or member.
The tenure by which the Bishop holds office, before and since the adoption of the re
strictive rules, is distinctly, in the articles themselves, recognized as of constitutional
force; and any course of legislation or judical action, any declaratory act of the Gen
eral Conference, in any way tending to unsettle such tenure, placing it, for example,
under the control of a mere majority of the General Conference, instead of the consti
tution, and thus depriving the Executive Department of its intended vigor and stabil
ity, is in violation of a plain constitutional provision of the Discipline.
The Articles of Religion are, also, an important and prominent part of the constitu
tion. The 5th of these teaches, that what is not taught in the Bible, is not essential to
Christianity, in theory or practice ; any conduct, therefore, not required or forbidden in
the word of God, unless it be so required or forbidden by some other part of the con
ventional compact, existing as the constitution of the Church, cannot be made the con
dition of eligibility, either as it regards membership or office, on the part of the laity
or ministry, without the, violation, alledged in the preceding cases. No such require
ment or prohibition can be shown ih the case of Bishop Andrew, and hence the infer-

70
ence of the Protest, as to the unconstitutionality of the proceedings against him. Tha
23d article, as explained by the General Conference, expressly enforces subjection and
deference— peaceable submission to all civil authority; requires the use of all laudable
means to secure obedience to "the powers that be," and requires all to conduct as quiet
and orderly citizens and subjects. The Constitution of the United States, the Nation
al Legislature, and the highest judicial tribunals of the country, have decided that
slavery is a civil relation, created bylaw, and subject only, under federal protection, to
the control of the States in which it exists. The sain-? authority deprives, (with his
own consent, in the federal compact,) every citizen of the United States of any right
to interfere with this relation. Beside, in tho State of Georgia, the Legislature alone
has power to free a slave, and for a long term of years, has uniformly refused to do so,
on any account. The General Conference require Bishop Andrew to do what they
know could only be done by the Legislature of the State; and declare him unfit for a
Christian Bishop, for sustaining a civil relation created by law, without any agency of
his, and which he cannot dissolve, if he would. Such conduct, the Protest assumes, is
in direct conflict with the duties of citizenship, pledged in the article in question, and
is directly calculated, if not intended, to generate and cherish contempt and disaffection
for the national constitution, as well as the constitutions and laws of nearly one half
the States of the confederacy ; and thus, by how far it may prevail, preparing the way
for the disunion of the States and the overthrow of the government. The 21st article
says, "it is lawful for a minister, as for all other christians, to marry at their own dis
cretion, as ihey shall judge the same to serve best to godliness." Being the owner of
slaves already, by the avoidless operation of law, for marrying a lady possessed of
slaves, an acl allowed as above, and not elsewhere prohibited, by any law of Heaven
or earth, Bishop Andrew is directed to desist from the exorcise of his Episcopal func
tions. Was not this requirement in violation of a right secured to Bishop Andrew by
the constitution of the Church? The "general rule" on slavery is admitted, on all
hands, to be a part of the constitution since 1808. The intention of the rule was to
declare the disapproval and opposition of the church to the slave trade, and the system
of slavery as consequent upon it. This rule, by the 4th restrictive article, cannot be
revoked or changed by the General Conference. It is not only not competent for the
Conference to revoke, but they cannot alter it so as to change its character, or make it
different in its bearings and application,. Any statutory regulations, therefore, on the
subject of slavery, must, by constitutional restraint, be merely expository of the pur
pose and intention of the general rule ; for, going beyond this, would be to change it,
and would, of course, infringe the constitution. Any legislation contrary to the rule,
would be in effect to revoke it. Any coining short or transcending it, in range and ap
plication, would be, actually, in every practical sense, to change it. All the legislation
we have had then, since 1789, and especially since 1808, when the restriction was im
posed on the General Conference, can only be considered as a statutory exposition of
this rule; and every deviation from it, if any, has been an unconstitutional meddling
with the subject. The rule, too, is a "general" one, that is, applies to all — to Bish
ops even, as all will admit. Indeed, no incredulity can doubt, no ingenuity evade the
conclusion. If, then, the general rule apply to Bishops, how does it happen that the
statutory exposition of it makes an exception of them? The very supposition exposes
its own absurdity. And it follows, hence, thai the whole law of slavery must apply to
Eishons as to oiher grades of the ministry. This is the position of the Protest. Here
then is the law, and let Bishop Andrew be tried by it. If it appear that he has bought,
sold, or enslaved, man, woman, or child, let him be punished. If he be a slave holder,

71
as a citizen of Georgia, and the laws of the State admit of emancipation, and allow
the liberated slave to enjoy freedom, he is liable to arrest, and let the punishment fol
low. But should the facts negative both suppositions, as is elsewhere demonstrated,
then the law gives no right to touch hinij and to do so, is a violation of the constitution.
I maintain, therefore, that it follows, irresistibly,' that the proceedings of the late Gen
eral Conference, in Bishop Andrew's case, were a direct and gross violation of the con
stitution and laws of the Church, and that the minority had u. right to declare them
null and void. On the subject of such right, under the circumstances in proof, Chief
Justice Marshall says, "a legislative act, contrary to the constitution, is not a law. An
act of the Legislature repugnant to the constitution, is void." He adds, "this theory
is essentially attached to written constitutions, and is to be considered as one of the fun
damental principles of society;" and its application to judicial and executive acts, must
be equally apparent.
Bishop Andrew become thp owner of slaves by compulsion of law, without any will
or consent of his own, entirely apart from his marriage. That I might not be in error
on this subject, I applied, through a friend, to two distinguished Jurists of Georgia,
for the law of the State — the whole law relating to the emancipation of slaves, and
subjoin their reply:—
"Laics of Georgia in reference to the manumission of Slaves. — 1801: Section 1. —
From and after the passing of this act, it shall not be lawful for any person or persons
to manumit, or set free, any negro slave or slaves, any mulatto or mustigo, or any oth
er person or persons of color, who may be deemed slaves at the time of the passing of
this act, in any other manner or form, than by an application to the Legislature for that
purpose." 1818: Section 4. — "All and every will, testament, deed, whether by way of
trust, or otherwise, contract, agreement, or stipulation, or other instrument, in writing,
or by parol, made and executed for the purpose of effecting, or endeavoring to effect,
the manumission of any slave or slaves, either directly, by conferring, or attempting to
confer freedom on such slave or slaves, or indirectly or virtually, by allowing and se
curing, or attempting to allow and secure, to such slave or slaves, the right or privi
lege of working for his or her benefit, or themselves free from the control of the mas
ter or owner of such slave or slaves, or of enjoying the profit of his, her or their labor
or skill, shall be, and the same are hereby, declared to be null and void." The law then
proceeds to declare that any person attempting to manumit, or being in any way con
cerned in tlje attempt, shall be subject to a penalty not exceeding one thousand dollars ;
and the slaves attempted to be made free, shall be sold at public outcry.
"Georgia, Richmond county. — We, the undersigned, members of the Augusta Bar,
hereby certify that the aforegoing are true extracts from the Acts of the Legislature, now
in force, relative to the emancipation of slaves. The general policy of the Legisla
ture of Georgia, relative to passing acts of emancipation, on application of particular
individuals, is decidedly against it. We have known many instances in which it was
refused, and but two in which it was granted, under very peculiar circumstances. We
have never known an instance in which legislative emancipation was granted to a man's
slaves generally. We have also known applications refused under very strong appeals.
S J WM. W. HOLT,
CHARLES J. JENKINS.
29th July,. 1844."
This will, perhaps, place at rest the suspicion attempted to be excited by tbe Reply,
and some of the Northern Church Papers, that the laws of Georgia did not render
emancipation as impracticable as was assumed by the friends of Bishop Andrew. The
law of Maryland, as explained and attested, by the Hon. Mr. Merrick, of the United

72
States Senate, and Judge Key, placed it equally out of the power of Mr. Harding, of
the Baltimore Conference, to manumit the slaves of his wife, and yet, the majority of
the General Conference required both Bishop Andrew and Mr. Harding to do what the
municipal laws of Georgia and Maryland forbid ; that is, the Church required these
men to perform unlawful acts — required them to commit the sin and brave the penal
ties of a civil trespass to secure the favor of the Church, and actually punished both for
not doing it. If emancipation be practicable in Maryland, in the sense of the Discip
line, that is, legally, and at the same time permitting the liberated slave to enjoy free
dom in the State, why did the Representative of the Baltimore Conference, in the ap
peal case of Harding, avow, in behalf of the Conference, that they did not intend to be
governed by the laws of Maryland on the subject of slavery? And why was it avowed,
by another member of the Baltimore Delegation, that the law could be violated with
impunity, and that, therefore, it ought to be resisted? Why, too, was it so much in
sisted upon, that Harding might have freed his wife's slaves by removal from the
State? These facts would not be noticed, but for the much more important one, that
the doctrine and conduct in question were endorsed by the majority ofthe General Con
ference, and ecclesiastical law thus brought, as charged in the Protest, in direct con
flict with the laws of the land. Ecclesiastical was claimed to be above, to supersede,
and virtually abrogate civil law ; and it is but too true, that language to this effect has,
to a fearful extent, become the vulgar tongue of a large portion of Northern Metho
dism on the subject of Slavery. The position was avowed, and gloried in, that no
slave-owning citizen of Georgia, or any other State whose laws are similar, can be a
Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church, without an act constituting a penal offence
against the laws of the State to which he owes allegiance. He is required to violate
or evade civil law, as the only condition upon which he can be permitted to exercise
the functions of a Bishop. The office is declared to be incompatible with the obliga
tions of citizenship in some twelve of the Southern States. He is disfranchised, be
cause, as a citizen, he cannot do what the Church requires. In other words, the Church
assumes to have an officer who shall be exempt from the operation of the law of the
State in which he lives, or else, no citizen of that State is eligible to the office. Can
the South be expected to submit to this?
lt may be necessary lo notice, briefly, the denial of the Manifesto, that the law of
slavery applies to Bishops. The majority think the law cannot apply to Bishops, be
cause the mode of trial is not the same as in the case of other Traveling Preachers.
The same reasoning would exempt another class in like manner, as the mode of trial
is not the same in the cases of Traveling and Local Preachers ; therefore the law of
slavery cannot apply to Local Preachers, as they are not named any more than Bish
ops. With regard to the trifling salary regulation of 1836, unless the General Con.
ference regarded Bishops as Traveling Preachers proper, they violated the plain letter
of the constitution, in allowing them any salary at all. According to Doctors Durbin,
Peck and Elliott, every dollar appropriated to the Bishops, since 1808, is an open abuse
of a plain constitutional trust, .respecting the proceeds of the Book Concern and Char
tered Fund ; such allowance, as all know, being restricted to Traveling Preachers only.
But further, the customary phrase in the Discipline, "Traveling Preachers," is, every
where and uniformly used, to distinguish the itinerant from -the local ministry, and for
no other purpose. Bishops must belong to one or the other, and if to the itinerant
class, as they are no where excepted, the law of slavery must apply to them ; and if
not, as slave holding in the ministry is regulated by law, then slavery in the Episcopa
cy cannot be considered as a trespass of any kind, and the doctrine of the Protest is

fully sustained by one of the principal postulates of the Reply. Unless Bishops are
included under the phrase "Traveling Preachers," they are excluded from our pulpits,
so far as right is-concerned, by the very terms of our Deed of Settlement. It is reck
lessly affirmed in the Reply, that in the Discipline, "special provision is made in the
case of Local and Traveling Preachers." Tim statement is utterly unfounded : not
only are Local Preachers not named in the section on slavery, but they are not alluded
to at all, except by a construction which must inevitably include Bishops. If the phrase
"official station," be construed, as it certainly should, to include them, when they as
pire to ordination, &c, so, also, does it, of necessity, include Bishops. If Bishops
hold "official stations," the law of slavery must apply to them. The Reply makes the
discovery, that the section on slavery applies only to officers of the Church. , Turn now
to a Bishop : — Is he an officer of the Church, holding "official station?" and if so, as all
must see at once, the law of slavery must apply to him, and he be protectcd'by it, so far
as it may be intended to afford protection in any instance. This single admission sets
aside the denial of the Reply as absurd and self-contradictory. But again, in view of
the "special provision" of the Reply for Local Preachers, which, as we have seen, cov
ers equally the case of Bishops, with what show of fairness can the Repliers deny, as
they do, the assumption of the Protest, that we have express law, covering the case of
Bishop Andrew? What is the difference between "express law" and "special provis
ion?" The Reply explicitly admits, what elsewhere it most laboriously denies, that the
law of slavery does apply to Bishops. It urges, for example, that Bishop Andrew, by
a deed of trust, placed it out of his power to do what, by a change of the law of Georgia,
the Discipline would 'imperatively' demand, and a 'standing law' of the Church require!
Now, unless this be regarded as a full and unequivocal admission, that the law of slave
ry applies to Bishops, ond covers the case of Bishop Andrew, not only is the reasoning
absurd, but the whole passage devoid of sense; and we thus demonstrate that the ad
verse position of the Reply, overthrown by these fata! concessions, must have been re
sorted to to meet, an emergency. If the Bishops are excluded from subjection to the law
of slavery, because not named, then are they equally excluded in the instance of many
of the most important laws of the Church, as in many of its most cardinal regulations
they are not named at all. In one of their official addresses, the Bishops speak of
themselves and their work as constituting a "department of the traveling ministry."
The majority labored long and hard, at the last General Conference, to show that
slavery is a moral question — a question of conscience. Dr. Emory, in liis celebrated
report in 1823, says, that all the moral laws of Methodism apply to Bishops as truly as
to any other portion of the Church ; and yet we are told the law of slavery does not
include them. They maintained a Bishop is not a Traveling Preacher in the sense of
the Discipline, and yet, if even deposed as a Bishop, he would still be a Traveling El
der in good standing! Not belonging to any Conference in the United States or else
where, where would be his place, and what his rights, as a Traveling Preacher? What'
Conference could have claimed him? What Bishop would have dared to give him an
appointment? Or, acting upon Bishop Hamline's suggestion, would the General Con
ference have been so obliging as to exercise the rights of an Annual Conference, and
the appointing power of the Episcopacy, in addition, and so taken care that he had both
place and work as a Traveling Preacher? This whole attempt to deprive Bishops of
the protection, and yet subject them to the restraints of the law of slavery, must strike
all as extraordinary, to say the 'least of it, and we are compelled to think, that but for
the good fortune of such folly, (as it seems to us,) in having able supporters, its suc
cess would be slender indeed. In the General Conference's plan of division, adopted
10

only two days before the date of the Reply, it is said, "Ministers, local and traveling,
of every grade and office, in the Methodist Episcopal Church, may," &c. And this
form of expression all admit was intended to include Bishops, not less than other min
isters ; and proofs to tbe same effect might be multiplied to almost any extent, but it
cannot be necessary.
We are often reminded that the middle or umpire Conferences will protect the South.
We have grave reasons for believing that these Conferences, unless utterly misrepre
sented in the last General Conference, are in alliance with abolitionism, so far as may
be necessary to carry out tho purposes indicated by the action of that body on the sub
ject of slavery. On every question before that body, involving Southern interest, they
went almost en masse with the abolitionists. They supported the abolition measure to
rescind ihe law prohibiting colored testimony against white persons, where it was not
allowed in civil proceedings, and thus placed ecclesiastical, in conflict with civil right,
in all the slave holding States. The middle, or anti-slavery party, went with the abo
litionists in Harding's case. They were side by side and shoulder to shoulder against
Bishop Andrew. They acted together in the election of one of the new Bishops.
They were one in resisting the proposition of the Bishops, and the whole South, to ap
peal the case of Bishop Andrew to the Annual Conferences and the Church. They ac
ted with the abolitionists in the avowal of a principle unknown to law, and disavowed'
by a preceding General Conference, as we have proved, that connection with slavery, even
under circumstances expressly excepted by the law, disqualifies a minister for the Epis
copal office. They did all this and more. And, connected with the last item, they failed
either to say, or let it be understood, that an abolitionist could not be elected Bishop. And
yet we are called upon to confide our interests to the care of these Conferences. If they did
not intend a coalition with the abolitionists, why did they not express disapproval ofthe
almost innumerable abolition petitions, demanding that all slave holders be separated
from the Church? Why was it the South could get no report upon these petitions —
for or against the objects prayed for? The reply avows that these petitions were a
reason of action against Bishop Andrew. Why not reported on then, and new legisla
tion had? Do the majority intend to proclaim the fact, that they were governed by pe
titions and party interests, rather than law? Beside, why be governed by a few peti
tions, as to slavery in the Episcopacy, and pay no attention to the many, praying that
slavery be separated from the Church in all its parts and relations? In a word, these
and similar demonstrations satisfied the South that anti-slavery and abolition will nev
er pause until the South shall refuse submission, or be trodden under foot.
It is distinctly premised in the Reply, that anti-slavery and abolition principles and
feelings, in the North, are far in advance of law, and the petitions presented, as well as
the debates and action at the last General Conference, prove it; and being urged as the
grand reason of action, does not the Reply avow, what the Protest charges, an extra
judicial procedure, going beyond law to accomplish ulterior purposes? The petitions,
too, and the agitation, by Methodist Preachers, in which, to a great extent, they had
their origin, were in direct violation of the advice and authority of the two preceding
General Conferences, as we have shown, and the action of the last General Confer
ence dishonoring, as we have further shown, the assurances of the same body in 1836
and 1840. The South, on these accounts, was the less inclined to believe that the um
pire Conferences could be any longer relied upon, as likely to pursue a medium, com
promise course, as settled by the law of the Church. Unprotected by the pledge of
public law, upon what can we rely for the security of our rights? What is our safety,
as a minority? We can only judge the future from the past; and what hope of in-

ID

demnity is afforded by the review? The conviction is general in the South, that while
we remain a mere minority, as now, the evil is without remedy.
On all the great interests of the main question, there is no division of public opin
ion and feeling, except as individual cases usually form exceptions to general rules.
These exceptions, it is believed, are not understood North, either as it regards the po
litical or religious aspects of the question. In the pending controversy in the Meth
odist Church, small portions of the ministry and membership, in border sections South,
have manifested an ill-disguised inclination, if not purpose, so to adjust themselves to
any emergency ahead, that it will be an easy matter to find themselves, or be found,
wherever the greatest indemnity of circumstances may happen to present the only'at-
traction they are likely to yield to. Another portion, small, it is believed, have been
misled by the false issues so constantly and plausibly kept before them ; and still an
other portion is met with, whose affinities are entirely northern. From the manner in
which these several classes have reported themselves, it has been inferred North, as as
sumed here, that State policy and public popular conviction can be so controlled in Ken
tucky, Missouri, Vicginia, and Maryland, as to favor the views and movements of tbe
North on this subject. Those who affect to think so, however, have entirely miscal
culated, and we greatly fear that it will be found necessary, in these States, to resist such
a state of things, under the impulse of reasons much stronger than the abstractions of
Church casuistry. It is believed that the opinions of Southern Methodism, on the sub
ject of slavery, type pretty fairly the opinions of general society, including those who
do, and those who do not hold slaves. Southern Methodists, (with exceptions as.above,)
maintain that no abstract principle can become a rule of action without regard to cir
cumstances. Here the North and South divide on the subject of slavery. That slave
ry is an evil, is admitted on all hands. The South maintains, however, that circumstan
ces, obviously Providential, and not subject to the control of the actor or agent, so mod
ify the question that the abstnet wrong in the case ceases to be a correct principle of
iudgment, and the real morality of slavery can only be judged of correctly, in view of
circumstances which may either increase or mitigate the evil, and gives it, in fact, its
only proper moral character. By this rule we are always willing to be judged. The
reasoning of the Reply admits the majority acted without the warrant of law in Bish
op Andrew's case, and it was this defection and trespass, as indicating the general po
sition of the North, which stirred the South to resistance. The majority required not
merely what they knew to be legally impracticable, but what they knew to be contrary
to law, and a penal offence. They said, in terms which cannot be misunderstood where
the Eno-lish language is known, that Bishop Andrew, as a citizen of Georgia, must vio
late the obligations of citizenship in that State, or cease to be a Bishop of the Meth
odist Episcopal Chnrch. They required of him an act unlawful in itself, in the State of
his residence, and did it while a plain law of the Church gave public and formal assu
rance it should not be done. The Reply further, in the whole tenor of its argument,
admits that Bishop Andrew became "unacceptable" to the North, without having vio
lated any law or rule of the Church. It will certainly be admitted that a Bishop holds
office according to rule and law regulating the conduct and duties of a Bishop. If, then,
Bishop Andrew had not infringed these, which is not assumed, and yet had become un
acceptable to the North, does it not show that the requirements of the North went be
yond law, and exacted, as the condition of acceptability, what the law did not require?
It was against such injustice the South protested, and will always defend herself.
A very large proportion of the Minority of the South, in the late General Conference,
have no connection with slavery, and so far as it may depend upon themselves, never ex-

76
pect to have anv. Many of them have done much, and expect to do more, for the free
dom of the negro. They had themselves manumitted a large number of slaves, and had
been the means of securing the freedom of many others, and they are not prepared to
submit to be libelled and proscribed by those who never havi and are never likely to do
any thing for "the negro, and whose zeal seems to derive its principal pabulum from the
success of their efforts, in preventing others from doing any thing. Beside, we have
political relations, and owe civil allegiance in the States in which we reside ; and is it
to be supposed, that civil authority and public opinion, are to be controlled in the slave
holding States, by non-resident ecclesiastical rulers, or that Southern Methodists will
submit and truckle to such interference? Mitigated as is the state of slavery, savin
Maryland, Western Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri ;, seen as it is, that the Northern
division of the Church intends to regulate the rights of citizenship and property as it
regards the ministry and membership within these States, or else subject them to a dis
franchisement of Church rights ; will these States continue to wink at such interference,
combined as they know it to be, with an extensive confederate purpose, on the part of
the North, to compel the Church South to submit to their creed and pplicy on the subject
of slavery? Tolerant and good natured as these States are known to have been, those
who are thus abusing public clemency, may find before long, that they have reached a,
limit, beyond which they are not to pass, in hope of further forbearance. As the free
dom of discussion degenerates into insolence of dictation, public attention is becoming
wakeful, and its watchfulness more and more retributive. There has recently been a
most labored effort, by ministers and members of the Methodist Episcopal Church, in
Maryland, Western Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri, to make the impression North,
that as large portions of the citizens of these States have no personal connection with
slavery, they can be detached from Southern interests, and induced to ally themselves
with Northern abolition and anti-slavery. This is no doubt so, with regard to some.
The fact just named proves it. But so far as it is the purpose to induce the belief that
the great mass of non-slave holding citizens in these States, have any sympathy with
Northern interference respecting slavery, or can be induced to separate in feeling and
interest, from those holding slaves about them, our Southern men with Northern predi
lections, will find themselves sadly mistaken. This class of citizens may not approve —
may even be opposed to slavery, but knowing the rights and cherishing the interests of
the States to which they belong, they will always be found ready to resist any interfer
ence with them, come from what quarter it may. Thousands of them, ninety nine in
the hundred, who would be glad to see slavery extinct in the land, will never consent
to emancipation except upon the condition, that as rapidly as the slaves are freed, they
shall be removed from the State. Remove them with the prospect that they will do well,
and very few will object to their freedom.
Another movement on the part of the late General Conference, regarded by the South
as high-handed and dangerous, was an attempt to establish the novel doctrine, that be
fore a Methodist traveling preacher, owning slaves, is fairly entitled to the protection
of the law of exception in the Discipline, he must do all in his power to effect the free
dom of his slaves by removal lo another State or country. A very slight analysis of
the proceedings in the cases of Bishop Andrew and Harding, will show that in the ad
judication in either case, this lawless expedient, assumed (however indirectly,) the
shape of an actual requirement, for it was urged that however impracticable or unlaw
ful emancipation might be in Georgia and Maryland, the difficulty might have been
overcome by removal, and the defendants are accordingly punished for not availing them
selves of it, although the requirement is utterly without the pale of law— contrary to

77
its letter and purpose, and extra-legal in every respect in which it can be looked at.
Can Methodism exist South, when it requires Southern ministers to expatriate themselves
in order to secure the favor and protection pf the Church? How many Southern minis
ters will avail themselves of such an obliging overture, we have no means of deciding.
To the charge made in form and variously insinuated in high places at the North, that
the Southern ministry of the Methodist Episcopal Church are pro-slavery in principle
and practice, and that they promote and uphold the system from the love of it ; that in
this respect they are not Methodists according to the Discipline, and have been trying
to innovate, so as to induce the Church to depart from long established landmarks on the
subject, we oppose an explicit denial, and pronounce the charge as destitute of truth as
it is replete with injustice and outrage. The South has not moved in this matter at any
period, except in self defence, when the Church has been disposed to decree, that a civil
relation, sanctioned by the supreme authority of the nation, was incompatible with the
sanctity of Church relations. The South has uniformly acted in resistance of North
ern innovation. And especially has the South been satisfied since the last compromise
regulation of 1816, affranchising slave holding ministers as it regards all the offices of
the Church, in States where emancipation is impracticable. We have sought no
change — we wanted none. We asked for none at the late General Conference. We
are perfectly satisfied with the law as it is, and as it has been understood and interpre
ted both by the General Conference and the executive department up to 1844. We do
object, however, and we never will submit to the, construction put upon the law at the
last General Conference. The Majority of that body changed the law essentially, by
giving- it a constructive application unknown in the whole range of its administration;
and the practical effect is new legislation on the subject of slavery, in direct conflict
With existing law, as explained by the General Conference, assuming, among other
things, that no owner of slaves, under any circumstances, however providential, and
whatever the laws of the State may be, can hold or exercise the office of Bishop in the
Methodist Episcopal Church. This proposition of the Majority misrepresents the law,
and disfranchises in terms, every slave holding minister in the South, and in fact all ab
solutely, as all are liable, without any agency of their own, to become the owners of
slaves, and emancipation is no where practicable, except in two or three of the States,
contingently. This decision of the General Conference the South will not submit to,
because they cannot do so without self destruction. The South could not, without
ruin, and will not from principle, submit to the inequality of right in the ministry,
North and South, assumed and attempted to be established, both by General Conference
action and in the Reply. We merely claimed the right of equality, on the basis of
law, not as enforcable, but sjmply declared and protected, in tbe theory of government.
While affranchised in law, we were willing to leave it to the Majority to avail them
selves, at any time, of the right of franchise, as they saw proper. Enfranchisement,
however, by declaratory enactment, with the avowed purpose, as by the late General
Conference, of disfranchisement in fact, is too gross an outrage on all social equity to
be borne by the Southern ministry, andis accordingly resisted with almost perfect una
nimity. In relation to the charge brought against the Southern Methodist Ministry, that they
are the supporters and promoters of slavery, although found in the Northern General
Conference papers, we are by no means anxious, beyond the extent to which it com
pels us, to ascribe the charge to improper motives, on the part of those who make it.
We are perfectly willing to be compared with those who thus defame us, at any time.
Appealing to what we have done, and are doing for the slave, we are prepared to abide

78
the judgment of the wise and the good. To be reproached and misrepresented, by those
who have never appealed to any rational means to remove the evil of slavery, and who
seek to atone for the notorious defect, by abusing those who are doing all that can be
safely done to this effect, that is, really all that is done at all, may annoy but cannot
alarm the Southern Church. We regard ourselves as involved in a great providential
movement, connected with the destinies of the African race, here and elsewhere.
Were it in our power, without interfering with the rights of others, we would releasp
them from civil bondage ; but as it is not, and Christianity directs us not to oppose our
selves to civil authority, but instead, to submit to it, as "the ordinance of God," we
are content to do what we are allowed to, to alleviate and render tolerable, a condition
resulting from no act cf ours, but having its origin in the organic arrangements of
civil society. With these views, we shall pursue our course undeterred by any amount
of cursing or abuse from our enemies, until we shall liave fulfilled our mission, or
Providence shall indicate a different course of action. The Church South has been the
means of the emancipation of thousands of slaves. Methodist ministers alone, since
1775, have given freedom to thousands, held in their own right. Some have freed from
thirty to sixty at a time. And not only have they aimed at the good ofthe negro in
this way, but they have actually evangelized, including the dead and the living, several
hundred thousand of them during the last seventy years, beside contributing to the im
provement of their condition in other respects, vitally connected with the happiness of
time and the hopes of eternity. And but for the censorship and unkindness of tho
North, (largo portions always excepted) both to the negro and liis benefactors,
Southern Metb'-idism had achieved for the slave infinitely more than it has. Northern
uncharitableness, in the shape of bitter denunciation and arrogant interference, tends
every year to rivet the fetters and prolong the captivity of the Southern slave. Who
can estimate the incalculable, the eternal mischief resulting from the conduct of the
North, to the great and noble, the God-like cause of emancipation and colonization?
These con only exist and operate in this country, as cause and effect. They are related,
inseparable developments of the benevolent energies of a great people. The one will
not, cannot advance without the other. Together, they constitute the hope of the
country, in relation to this most exciting and important subject. Emancipation without
removal, without colonization, is but the dream of the visionary, if, indeed, visionary
ever had such a dream. The very thought is folly ; it cannot be. And nothing is moro
certain, than that the conduct of the North, respecting slavery, has arrested, almost
entirely, both emancipation and colonization. They have re-enslaved the negro of the
South. They havo rolled back and involved in darkness, tbe tide of light and life, on
its passage to Africa. In the year 1830, more negroes obtained their freedom in Ken
tucky, than have been freed during the fourteen years since, on account of Northern
interference with what did not in any way belong to them. And the same is true, and
to a much greater extent, of other portions of the South. There was a general dispo
sition to favor emancipation, upon condition of removal. But, alas, how has this fair
work of God been defaced and thrown down by the insane extravagance, the night
mare frenzy of Northern abolitionism, aided, in but too, many instances, by heads and
hands consecrated, and with the vows of God upon them, for other purposes! And is
it not indeed grievous, most afflicting, to see the old anti-slavery party falling off from
this noble work of God and man, for the weal of the negro, wherever found, and lend
ing themselves to measures and movements, which, by retarding the gradual freedom
ofthe enslaved negro and African Colonization, must of necessity give vigor and per
petuity to the curse and infamy even of the slave trade itself. The more immediate

79
evils, however, of anti-slavery agitation, connect with our civil and political rela
tions as a confederacy of free and slave States. Of these agitators, Mr. Frelinghuysen
remarks, they are "seeking lo destroy our happy Union." Chancellor Walworth says,
"they are contemplating a violation of the rights of property secured by the constitu
tion they are sworn to support, and pursuing measures which must lead to a civil war."
The lessons of experience and the warning voice of history are lost upon this class of
disturbers. What do they care, that according to a late English journal, a standing ar
my in the West Indies, the most recent example to which they can appeal, is necessary
"to stifle the seeds of revolt consequent on achieved slave emancipation." Even the
virtuous Clarkson, their own witness, is unheeded by them when he declares that, "the
extent to which voluntary emancipation, in view of colonization in Africa, had taken
place in the United States, is the most surprising exhibition of human virtue, to be met
with in the whole history of negro emancipation."
The boast of the Majority, so much relied upon in the Reply, that the Episcopacy in
the whole line of Bishops, from Coke to the present worthy Bench, has never had any
connection with slavery, until the unfortunate dereliction of Bishop Andrew, is rather
premature. The Rev. Wm. Hummet, of Charleston, South Carolina, and some time
missionary in the West Indies, on leaving the Methodist Church and setting up for him
self, as a separatist, published, in 1792, a virulent pamphlet against Dr. Coke, and
among many other charges enumerated, the most of which are clearly and ably refuted
by Dr. Coke, in his answer, he brings to view Dr. Coke's connection with slavery in the
island of St. Vincent, alledging that the Dr. had used the Caribb Mission fund, in the
purchase of a lot of negroes to work a cotton and coffee plantation, presented by the
Colonial Legislature, for the benefit of the mission. Dr. Cuke, in his reply, now before
me, printed in London 1793, in a very frank and satisfactory manner, disposes of many
of the statements and inferences of Mr. Hammet, in reference to this transaction, as
incorrect and unjust, but distinctly and in various forms admits the fact, that with money
he had collected for the Caribb Mission, and funds of his own, he had, at the urgent
solicitations of friends, purchased the slaves as charged, and had held and worked them
as such, upon the cotton division of the mission plantation. The Dr. assigns as the
principal reason of this purchase and ownership of slaves, that he could not have the
plantation worked to advantage by either free negroes or hired slaves. He says, "in
answer to the charge of my purchasing slaves, I shall give an account of the-transac-
tion, (the purchase,) with all possible candor. My friends on all sides of me urged,
that the present might be considered as an exempt case— that the gift of the land was un
doubtedly Providential— that the slaves purchased for the cultivation of it, would cer
tainly be treated by us, in the tenderest manner. These and other arguments prevailed,
and I gave directions that a sufficient supply should be procured for the cultivation of
cotton on the low land." Whatever we may think of it, the missionary zeal of Dr.
Coke made him a slave holder, by actual deliberate purchase. This the Dr. avows in
explanation of his course. He says further: "I had hardly left the Island, when my
established principles began to operate. I considered that no'exempt case could justify
the proceeding— that we are not to do evil that good may come. The wound continued
to deepen in my mind for some months, till I at last wrote from Baltimore to inform
our missionary, (Mr. Baxter,) that I could not admit of any slaves upon the estate, on
any consideration. Thus I have stated the whole business of the slaves. At the time I
acted for the best, and humanum est errare." The Dr. repudiates the charge of an
abuse of the missionary fund, by stating that out of his own private funds he paid to
the mission, an amount equivalent to the sum he had used in the purchase of the slaves,

so
and adds that he was "the only looser in a pecuniary point of view." The Dr. does not
say that he gave freedom to these slaves ; there is no allusion to any Such fact, unless
it may be inferred from the Dr*s. consciousness of wrong, and the order to remove
the slaves from the plantation. In the absence of evidence, however, I take it for grant
ed the Dr. freed them, although it would be much more satisfactory to many no doubt,
to know that he did. I introduce this historical fact, about the truth of which no one
can doubt, merely to show that the paraded assumption of the Reply, our Northern
Journals, and the North generally, that no Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Cfiurch
has ever had any connection with slavery, except Bishop Andrew, is not true, and by
consequence, that the argument and action of the Majority, based upon it, fall to the
ground, as it is incontestably certain, that the first Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal
Church was a slave holder by voluntary purchase, and not as Bishop Andrew, by the
unavoidable control of circumstances. All thathas.been said, therefore, about the law
of usage, invariable custom, &c. as excluding slavery from the Episcopacy not being
true, is of course entirely inapplicable, and were it true, would be equally so. Lord
Bacon lays it down as an incontrovertible principle of law and morals : "In all true
judgment, there is a very great difference between an usage, to prove a thing lawful, and
a non-usage to prove it unlawful." The difference is, the first may be legitimate proof,
whereas the second is always preposterous. .And yet it ranks as a principal argument
against the Protest of the South. Because it is true, in the instance of all the Presi
dents of the United States from the North, that no one has been re-elected, therefore it
is a settled principle of the government, that a Northern President can serve but for
four years — a single term. Because it is equally true, that nil the Southern Presidents
have served the double term of eight years, therefore, it is a settled principle of the
government that all Southern Presidents shall be re-electod. By the logic of our North-'
ern friends, no one can question the validity of the claim or the soundness of the de
monstration! The attempt to show that the North has conceded to the South, in the election of
Southern men as Bishops, is too absurd to require more than a brief notice. Dividing
by Conference lines, giving Baltimore to the North, with which she has always acted,
until she divided on the question now agitating the Church, we have bad but two South
ern Bishops, McKendree and. Andrew. The first three Bishops of. the Church were
foreigners — English abolitionists of the school of Sharpeand Clarkson. Bishop George
was from the Baltimore Conference, North. Roberts, Soule, Hedding, Fisk, Morris,
Waugh, Hamlinc. and Janes, were elected as Northern men. McKendree was elected
without reference to the slave question. Bishop Andrew's election, by Northern votes,
was not a concession to the South. The circumstances under which Bishop Andrew
was elected, have been utterly misrepresented. As was perfectly natural, the Southern
delegates in 1832, were anxious that one of the Bishops to be elected, should be from
the South, lt so happened, however, (without any reference to slavery,) that the only
individuals upon whom the Southern delegates could generally unite, were in fact,
slave holders, and as the Northern majority were not backward to let it be known, that
no slave holder could be elected, the Southern delegates determined to have no candi
date, and allow the majority to select the men they might prefer. They selected J. 0.
Andrew as one, knowing he was not the choice of the South, and that they were not
gratifying the Southern delegates, (except a few,) in doing so. It was the avowed pol
icy of the North, to elect a Southern man, that there might be no apparent ground of
complaint from the South, and yet to accomplish their own purposes in the exclusion of
the men preferred by the South, who happened to be the owners of slaves. The North

SI
did not elect Bishop Andrew as the candidate of the South. They knew he was not the
choice of the South, and would not be supported by a majority of the Southern delegates,
especially as the latter knew he had been fixed upon by the North for the 'express pur
pose of defeating the wishes of the South. The idea therefore, so industriously incul
cated, that Bishop Andrew and the South have violated the conditions of a private un
derstanding, in the instance of the Bishop's election, by the position they assumed at
the late General Conference, has no foundation in truth. Furthermore, Northern men
elected Bishop Andrew without consulting him — without coming to any understanding
with him or the South on the subject. Northern views and purposes were alone con
sulted. The South was not deferred to, nor cared for in the matter, beyond the fact,
well understood at the time, as a matter of policy, that the election of a Southern man
would silence the South, or compel the avowal, they wanted a slave holding Bishop!
Such are the facts, as I understood them at the time, and I believe them to be correct ;
from which it will not be difficult to see to what extent Bishop Andrew and the South
are indebted to Northern magnanimity, so plausibly set forth in the Reply, and various
other accounts we have had of Bishop Andrew's election.. No little stress has been laid
upon the fact, that some suggestions appeared in some of the Southern papers of tho
Church, to the effect, that the election of a slave holder to the Episcopacy, would go far
to quiet the apprehensions of many in the South, that a purpose existed in the North,
to proscribe the Southern ministry in this respect, so far as they might be connected
with slavery. By the law of the Church and the authoritative exposition of the law by
the General Conference, no legal barrier existed to preclude such election, and the of
fense, therefore, alledged in the Reply, the Christian Advocate and Journal, and else
where, could only mean, thatin thejudgment of some, the interest of the South might
be promoted, should the North be sufficiently just and generous, not to make an objec
tion of that which the law had explicitly declared should not operate any forfeiture of
right, in view of any of the offices of the Church. The only offense charged, was sim
ply to state the constitutional claim of eligibility — the legal qualification necessary —
not a right to be elected in fact, of which no one ever thought — but the claim of being
eligible ; nnder no legal disability, which is in itself one of the plainest and best de
fined rights known in the theory of government. And right to this effect, and so un
derstood, is as clearly secured to the Southern slave holder, who cannot legally emanci
pate his slaves, and secure to them freedom after emancipation, as any other right be
longing to the ministry, North or South. And to make the mere claim of this right an
offense, is so manifestly unjust, that in itself it furnishes a strong reason with the
South for the proposed separation. If we are to be punished for barely reminding
the North of a constitutional claim, it is really high time we had placed ourselves in a
position to resist such constructive nullification of law and right. This whole argu
ment, however, proceeds upon a shameful misstatement of facts. It is warily attempt
ed to make the impression, that the South first moved in this matter, and put forth an
unheard of, unlawful claim, whereas we have seen that the right is an undoubted one,
secured by law and asserted by the General Conference; and it is further true, that the
South was silent until after the public denial of the right by a Northern "Convention of
ministers and members of the Methodist Episcopal Church," and the purpose officially
avowed to bring the matter before the next General Conference. The subject was first
agitated in the North, and assumed there a most exciting and t&roatening aspect. This
was well known to Dr. Bond, and to both the authors and signers of the Reply, for it
had extensive publicity in the papers of the Church, before a word was heard from the
South on the subject. This novel Northern movement was regarded as so manifestly
11

82
offensive and out of character, that the Christian Advocate and Journal vindicated the
claim of the South as clear matter of right, (whether expedient to assert it or not,) and
rebuked the Northern agitators, as guilty of an obvious outrage upon Southern right and
feeling, and informing them at the same time, that they could not sustain their position
before the Church. The conduct of the South, therefore, gravely charged as an offense,
in the shape of a daring innovation, was a simple act of self defence against Northern
aggression, notoriously committed in defiance of law, and in the face of the whole
Church, and the repeated formal attempts to make a contrary impression, injurious to
the South, has rendered it necessary to direct attention, both to the misstatement of fact
ind the manifest injustice of the conclusion, founded upon it. The only force found in
the argument, recoils upon the North, as every one will perceive by barely looking at it.
As having a direct bearing upon this whole controversy, it is important to notice,
that the rights of the ministry, as affected by simple slave holding, in States where
emancipation is not practicable, having been brought by memorial from Westmoreland,
Virginia, before two General Conferences successively, those of 1836 and 1840 ; the
latter decided, that "the Discipline of the Church having provided for the ordination of
ministers thus circumstanced, the course pursued by the Baltimore Conference, (within
whose limits Westmoreland is found,) operates an abridgement of right, and therefore,
furnishes /ws< ground of complaint. It is a departure from the plain intendment of
law in the case, and a violation, not less of express compact than of social justice, to
withhold ordination for reasons which the provisions of the law plainly declare are not
to be considered as a forfeiture of right." Here the General Conference style the law
on slavery an express compact, and by various forms of proof, we have shown, that it
was a compromise as truly as a compact. But this by the way. The decision from
which we quote, adds, "attaching themselves to the Church, as citizens of Virginia,
where in the obvious sense of the Discipline, emancipation is impracticable, the holding
of slaves, or failure to emancipate them, cannot be plead in bar to the right of ordina
tion. The Church has failed to redeem the pledge of its own laws, by refusing or fail
ing to promote to office, ministers in whose case no disability attaches on the ground
of slavery. The exception in the Discipline is, therefore, strictly applicable to all min
isters and members of the Methodist Episcopal Church, holding slaves in Virginia, and
they appear clearly entitled to the benefit of the rule, made and provided in such cases."
The question thus settled by the General Conference, can be misunderstood by no one,
and yet the Baltimore Conference has continued to withhold justice from the ministry
connected with slavery in this section of Virginia, in violation both of general law and
special adjudication, by the General Conference, had upon the law. The Baltimore
Conference has fooni judicial security against arraignment for such injustice, in the
fact, that that body has so managed, as to be always able to defy proof that ordination
was withheld on account of slavery alone, and not for other reasons. How far the fair,
ihe just, and the honorable, connect with the grounds of this impunity, in resisting the
authority of the General Conference, those interested must determine for themselves.
That it is a procedure unwarranted by law, and in violation of its plain provisions, as
solemnly adjudicated upon by the General Conference, no one, it is believed, will enter
tain a doubt. The law and the General Conference have both been set aside. The
decision adds, "the petitioners, in accordance with the provisions of the Discipline,
whether said provisions be right or wrong, are entitled to remedy," and suggests in
terms, that a transfer to the Virginia Conference, is perhaps, under all the circumstan
ces, the only "conclusive remedy" for the party aggrieved. Whether the portion of
the Church in this section of Virginia, will act upon the suggestion of tha General

S3
Conference, and seek connection with tho Virginia Conference, or remain as heretofore,
in the Baltimore Conference, or seek an independent Conference existence, is a matter
about which we have nothing to say. The principle involved however, was too impor
tant to be overlooked, and having placed the matter in its proper light, as it regards law
and right, we leave it where it was left by the decision of the General Conference.
A very staid effort has been made to convince the church and world that as the only
condition of continued union, the South insists that slavery must be admitted into the
Episcopacy. The sophistry of this position can have escaped the notice of but few.
The fact is, as we have shown at large, in various ways, the last General Conference
avowed the principle, and took stand upon the ground, that no Minister of the
Methodist Episcopal Church, having connection with slavery, under any circumstan
ces, could, by constitutional right, exercise the office of Bishop; and further, that
the principle assumed, and the ground thus taken, were to constitute the only condi
tion upon which the Union between the North and the South can be perpetuated. So
far, therefore, from the South setting up a new term or condition of Union, the reverse
is true, and the innovation comes from the North ; for they proceeded to make that a
condition of Union, which, in the shape of law, and formal declaration by the General
Conference, they had assured the church and the world should not be required of any
man, in view of any of the various grades of office known in the ministry ofthe Meth
odist Episcopal Church. And the truth turns out to be, that instead of Southern in
novation, we have Northern violation of law and right, beside the dishonored pledge of
the General Conference, upon which the South relied as security against the wrong
thus inflicted. The question is not, whether Southern Methodist Preachers ought not
to concede that no slave holder shall ever exercise the functions of Bishop, rather
than divide the Church, but whether it is their duty to submit to a declared inequality of
right, contrary to laic, and knowing that such submission must forever cripple and de
grade the Church in the South, where public opinion is known to be utterly intolerant
of any such assumption. The offense of the North is a denial and abuse of right se
cured by law. The question of slavery is settled by law. Does the law disfranchise?
It does not, and until it does, the South says the Church shall not. What the South
assumes, in this respect, seems to have been admitted as well as denied by the North.
By two very important votes, the last General Conference decided that a slave holder
may be a Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church, for Bishop Andrew was declared
to be such; and this certainly amounts to a virtual declaration, that a slave holder may
be constitutionally elected to the office. Whatever would bar his election would, of
course, bar his holding office. What right, then, has the Conference to depose or pun
ish for that which constitutes no barrier to election? As the South had been profound
ly silent on the subject, why did the North set up the hue and cry about the election of
a slave holding Bishop? What would have been thought, North, had ten thousand peti
tioners from the South prayed the last General Conference not to elect a negro a Bishop?
It would not be difficult to show they had quite as good reasons for getting up petitions
to this effect, as the North had for the conduct of which we complain. The stale
charge, and contemptible as it is stale, that certain Southern Ministers favor separa
tion, because they wish to become Bishops, is only entitled to notice, because men
from whom nothing of the kind could have been expected, have risked the disreputa
tion of giving it currency. When it is recollected, however, that some men have no
means of judging others, except by tliemselves, and advert to the additional fact, that
there is equally good, and indeed much stronger reason to believe that those who ma-

I 84
lign and defame in this way, are acting exclusively with a view to their own personal
and party interests, the charge is replied to quite beyond its merits.
A similar perversion of facts is found in the charge, that the South declined the pro
position of the Bishops, to postpone the whole subject until another General Confer
ence, because they would not submit to Bishop Andrew's resignation, ad interim. This
charge is wholly untrue. No such proposition was made by the Bishops. Their pro
position was, that Bishop Andrew should, meanwhile, perform his Episcopal functions
as usual, except that he was not to have charge in the North, or where he might be ob
jected to as the owner of slaves ; and the whole South, to a man, favored the proposi
tion. The Reply treats the charge of the Protest, that Bishop Andrew was proceeded
against extra-judicially, as something quite monstrous, and yet no small portion of its
reasoning plainly admits the justice of the allegation. The most common and popular
meaning of extra-judicial, is, out of the ordinary course of judicial procedure ; and tho
Reply not only admits the proceeding in Bishop Andrew's case to be of this character,
but argues at length to prove that nothing was left the Majority, in the exigence of the
case, but to pursue such a course, and thus proves what the Protest assumes. The
Protest also charges a lawless procedure, and the Reply not only admits, but directly
assumes, that having a right to do so, the Majority, under the stress of circumstances,
deemed it necessary to act without any appeal to law, and thus clearly sustains the Pro
test in this instance also. The whole burden of the Manifesto goes to show, that
Bishop Andrew was laid aside, not for any offence against any law of the Church, but
because he had rendered himself unacceptable to the North, by marrying a lady pos
sessed of slaves, although years before, the Providence of God had made him the own
er of slaves, without his consent, and against his will, and in a State where he is im
peratively required to hold them, and even an attempt to free them, subjects him to pro
secution and punishment. See the law.
Not offending against, but being fully protected by law, Bishop Andrew could only be
unacceptable to the North so far as the law is so. The real cause of his being unac
ceptable, is found in the fact, that the rapid growth of abolition and anti-slavery, North,
has antiquated the law, and it ceases to type Methodist opinion and feeling on the sub
ject of slavery. Both are far ahead of law, and the fact is admitted by the Reply, and
urged as a reason of action. The Reply argues, that as the Episcopacy is common to
the whole Church, law or no law, slavery must be kept out of it, because the North
will not tolerate it. Th» Reply, however, forgets to argue further, that the General
Conference is as common to the whole Church, as Episcopacy, and much more so in
many respects, (and, according to the Repliers, a thousand fold more important,) and,
therefore, must be kept free from slavery too. The Majority insist that the purpose
of the constitution can only be carried out by having Bishops acceptable everywhere.
Of course they conscientiously electioneered and voted for men as Bishops, in May
last, that they believed would be acceptable to the whole Church, South as well as
North, or otherwise must have dishonored their own principles. Had Bishop Andrew
yielded to the demands of the Majority, as going beyond, and in contravention of the
law in the case, he would have rendered himself unacceptable to the whole South ; for
the North to require it, therefore, was, upon their own showing, a violation of the con
stitution. One of the false issues attempted to be made by the Reply, and some of our Northern
Church papers, is, that the North is opposed to slavery ; the South resists their hostile
demonstrations ; therefore the South is pro-slavery. This logic seems to be endorsed
as perfectly irrefutable by a large portion of tbe Northern Church, destitute, as it is,

85
of even the semblance of either reason or argument. It does not seem to be laken in
to the account at all, that the opposition of the South may relate entirely to what they
regard as the unlawful and dangerous means resorted to in order to correct the evil.
Two physicians 'meet at the bed-side of a patient ; one prescribes, and the other oppos
es the prescription; therefore the latter seeks the death of the patient. Comment is un
necessary. The Reply utterly perverts the position of the Protest with regard to "the reasons of
the law" of slavery. The Protest, assuming the general law as a compromise arrange
ment, settling the principle of action upon which the parties agreed to act, appeals to
the "reasons," or final cause of such an arrangement, to show that the practical pur
pose had in view would be essentially defeated, by making any class of ministers an
exception to its operation ; and in all that is said in the Reply, the real principle involv
ed is kept entirely out of sight, and not even glanced at.
Another specimen of the consistency of the Majority, respecting slavery, is, that
the General Conference is everything, and the Episcopacy nothing, comparatively, and
yet slavery in the General Conference, where it has been found since 1792, does rio
harm, or at least is to be tolerated, while, in the Episcopacy, it is ruinous of the
Church ! In the greater it is very well, but in the less it is not to be endured ! Bishop
Hamline's "Croton River" may be polluted with it, but if it be found in the Episcopal
Reservoir, supplied by this same river, (no matter about the other reservoirs,) woe be
tide the Church ! In one breath, or paragraph, Bishop Andrew is pure and spotless,
and the laudation of his virtues, superior fitness, and admirable qualifications, is al
most offensive to good taste ; in another, it is gravely debated whether he ought not to
be impeached for improper conduct, and he is declared to have violated an important
trust, and to be a dishonored man. The charge against Bishop Andrew was, connec
tion with slavery. The law of slavery consists of the general rule on that subject, and
the 10th section. The arraignment of the Bishop is based upon an assumed infraction,
not of either of these, but one of the restrictive articles, having no reference to the
subject, and binding only upon the triers of Bishop Andrew. Both the general rule
and the specific law regulating the subject, with regard to all our ministers, are eva
ded, and the constitution appealed to, at a point having no reference to the matter in
hand; and thus, by construction, we have ex post facto legislation, for the purpose of
making an offence of that, which was not such, by the only law applicable in the case.
In proceeding to action, they quote the constitution as law, but when held responsible
for the action had, they assure us no law was appealed, to, but the emergency met and
disposed of without reference to law ! The Reply assumes the latter, and Finley's
Preamble proves the former.
The Reply says it was prevalently believed by the Majority, that Bishoa Andrew
might have been impeached for "improper conduct," under the express provisions of the
Discipline. The only improper conduct charged, was slave holding. On this subject
we have express law, it is true, but Doctors Durbin, Peck, and Elliott, as the expoun
ders of law for the Majority, maintain that it does not apply to Bishops, and of course
the Discipline has no "express provisions" of any kind, applicable in the case. In the
absence of all law then, as the Doctors contend, where are we to look for the "express
provisions" of law on which to base an impeachment? No latitude of meaning at
tached to the phrase "improper conduct," will answer the purpose of the Repliers, for
slave holding is the only conduct in question, and this, it is alledged, the law does not
recognize as "improper" in the instance of a Bishop, as that officer is exempt from its
claims. Impeachment, therefore, was impossible, in the premises of the difficulty, ac-

S6
cording to the showing or the very men who claim no small share of credit on the
ground of forbearance, that is, for not doing what, according to their own argument,
they could not do. From the reasoning in portions of the Reply, and particularly in
some of the speeches on the same side, the alledged misconduct of Bishop Andrew
would seem to be the mere fact, that he had rendered himself, or by some means had
become unacceptable to the North. Ho could not, it is said, be a General Superinten
dent. Why not? In view of what law is he delinquent? We are told he is a
slave holder. Grant it. On this subject we have a law, and Doctors Durbin, Peck,
and Elliott, or if it be preferred, the Majority admit, as plainly as they deny, that it
includes Bishops as well as other Ministers. By this law Bishop Andrew is innocent
— he is fully protected, and notwithstanding the argument of the Reply — of Bishop Ham-
line and others, to prove that the Majority are a law to themselves, still it is obviously
felt North, as well as South, that it is necessary to invoke some other law, to prove de
linquency in view of some other standard, in order to give the right of punishment.
Since writing the preceding sentence, I have opened a letter from an old veteran of
the North, the pupil of Asbury, and the associate of Emory, to read — "I have no doubt
you have the Discipline on your side — Bond and others have expediency." Another,
from a different Northern Conference, says, "God speed you, and so say thousands
North of the line." I could quote pages to the same effect, from Northern men, not
withstanding the blustering gasconade with which it is attempted to make the impres
sion that the whole Church, North, regards the Church, South, as guilty of apostacy
from the first principles of Methodism. The Reply avows a change of Northern sen
timent, and the law remaining the same, the change avowed explains why Bishop An
drew is unacceptable North. Could this be more conclusively proved, than by the fact,
that Finley's resolution lays Bishop Andrew aside upon a prohibition of the constitu
tion, applying only to the General Conference itself, and which could only be brought
to bear upon Bishop Andrew by a manifest abuse of judicial trust. The real difficul
ty, the only cause of embarrassment, is fodnd in the relations between the Church,
North, and the Discipline, and not in the relations between Bishop Andrew and the law.
Another proof, equally strong and pertinent, is furnished by the preface to the reso
lution of Griffith and Davis, in which the present is declared to be the least favorable
period in our history for tolerating a Bishop connected with slavery. And we again
ask why? There is the law without change for a quarter of a century. Is it intended
to say the Church will not abide by it? The Bible too, is the same. Are we thus no
tified, that while no want of acceptableness connects with the Bishop's relations to the
Bible or Methodism, such want does connect with the Church? And what is> the infer
ence? Who does not perceive that the Church is in advance of both, and that both are
required to yield to the innovations of party expediency? How came it to pass, too,
that Bishop Andrew was declared, by the Majority, good enough for the office of Bish
op, but unfit to perform its duties? By what warrant of candor or consistency do they
declare his official incumbency both constitutional and expedient, while he is forbidden,
and it is inexpedient for him to do the work of a Bishop? Are we to understand, that
as Christianity and Methodism had failed to discredit the Bishop, to the satisfaction of
the Majority, it devolved upon the Church to do it? Another view of the subject con
ducts us to the same conclusion.
Methodism has always maintained, that all the high moral objects of the ministry
connect as essentially with the office of Presbyter as of Bishop. By admitting, there
fore, as Methodism always has, that slave holding may, in given circumstances, com
port with all tbe relations and duties of an Elder in the Church of God, it is admitted,

S7
when it is made an objection under the same circumstances in a Bishop, that the
Church is influenced by conduct and reasons not disapproved by Heaven, and the Church
is thus boastfully presented, as exacting of a Bishop, what it is conceded God himself
does not require of an Elder— both being in the same order of the ministry. Should
considerations in a matter so weighty as the ministerial office be allowed to control
Church action, while it is admitted the Divine conduct is in no way influenced by them?
In proof of the disposition and purpose of the Northern Division of the Church to med
dle with the question of slavery beyond all existing warrant of political or ecclesias
tical law, mark the force of the following language, in one of the principal organs of
the Majority— The Western Christian Advocate: "The Methodists have never yet ta
ken any measures to bring their views to bear upon the elections of the country, although
this is their privilege, whenever they may see fit to exercise it ; and it may be yet, if
it is not now, their duty, to exercise the elective franchise, constitutionally and legally,
against slavery and in favor of freedom." The policy thus intimated, if not threaten
ed, can only be brought to bear in one or both of two ways— in the election of Presi
dent of the United States, or in an attempt by change to destroy the compromise of the
Federal Constitution. The election of President, should the incumbent even be a thor
ough-going abolitionist, could not be brought "to bear against slavery," except by lat
eral methods, and very indirectly, and by no means with certain effect at all, and in
view of his well known intelligence, we cannot suppose that this was what the editor
had his eye upon, when he penned the monitory sentence we have just quoted. The
allusion, to have fitness, and be of any force, must have been to the fact formally avow
ed in other Northern Methodist Papers, that it is not unlikely the three hundred thou
sand votes of the Northern Methodist Episcopal Church may, from a sense of -'duty,''
and to satisfy the conscience of abolition and anti-slavery, yet be brought to bear upon
a change of the national compact "against slavery;" that is, receding from the origi
nal condition of Union, as it regards slavery, and of course dissolving the National
Confederacy, as all know this would be the result. Unless we have misunderstood this
and similar intimations, the South can hardly have been premature in deliberating upon
the necessity of separation.
The attempt in the Reply to magnify the state of dread and apprehension in the
North, as it regards a slave holding Bishop, is really surprising. How could the North
dread, what they knew they had the power of preventing, by having an actual majority
of more than two thirds in the General Conference? All tbe annual and quarterly Con
ferences — all the societies and individuals who petitioned against the election of a
slave holding Bishop, knew the whole alarm or excitement on the subject, if any, had
originated North, and that there was really, not only no danger, but no possibility of
the election of a slave holder, should Northern men be opposed to the election of one;
and the Reply maintains, in behalf of the whole North, that such opposition has al
ways been as universal as notorious in every period of the Church's history. The Re
ply must intend to maintain the legal ineligibility of a slave holder, or else that the
legal abstract right, had become a dead letter by the prevalence of Northern opinion,
adverse to law ; and in either case, no real alarm could have existed North, and we are
perfectly satisfied none did exist, and that the whole was intended for effect. The
Northern movement was merely intended to present an array of bayonets against slave
ry, in any and every shape and aspect, and at as many points as possible. Antagonism
and aggression, in view ofthe existing order of things affecting slavery, marked all the
petitions presented at the last General Conference. Tiie petitioners present no actual
personal grievances under which they labor, as creating the right of petition. The right

SS
exercised is a right of war, and the declaration accompanies its assertion, in the lan
guage of the petitions themselves. The Reply claims these petitions as a ground of
action against Bishop Andrew, he had sinned, not against the law of the Church, but
against Northern "sentiment." But why does not the Reply give us the whole truth
in the premises, so that what they report might be explained by what they suppress?
Why not frankly inform the Church, (for they knew it to be true) that a much larger
number of petitioners than that against a slave holding Bishop, demanded an absolute
separation of the Church from all slavery and slave holders, in all the forms ofthe one
and relations of the other? Why did not the Repliers tell the Church, what they well
knew, that the separation of the Episcopacy from slavery was not the thousandth part
of what was prayed for? Was it just or candid — did it comport with fair dealing not
to do so? Why were these facts separated, "the one taken and the other left?" And
why have the Northern Advocates pursued a similar course? So far as the petitions are
authority, or furnish motive for action, the Majority have declared themselves ready to
unchurch the whole slave holding portion of the South, provided it is stoutly petitioned
for. If such petitions may be a cause of action in one case, why not in another?
Does not the silence of the Reply, as to the main object of the petitions, furnish the
South with just ground of alarm as to their future safety? Why, too, did the slavery
committee, to whom all these petitions were referred, endorse the policy of such a
course, by the omission even to intimate, that there existed any difficulty in granting
all that abolition prayed for? Why such a studied ominous silence? Were they not
bound to report upon the character of these petitions? Why did they fail to do sol
Why did the committee decline letting it be known, by a full and manly report, that
these petitions could only be granted by new legislation on the subject of slavery, en
tirely subversive of existing law? Why withhold all opinion as to the real character
of the petitions, and the reasons and motives of their presentation? Why was all they
did report, against the South, who had not infringed the Discipline in any respect, and
in favor of the North, whose movements indicated a fixed determination not to submit
to it.
In one paragraph the Reply tells us, that the vigilant caution ofthe Church from the
very institution of Episcopacy, had been directed to the great object of securing its
purity, by the exclusion of slavery ; and in another it is indignantly affirmed, that the
virtuous dead, North and South, had never dreamed even that such an evil as slavery
could ever find its way into tho Episcopacy. The logic of the B.eply is, that an evil
never thought of had been vigilantly guarded against for sixty years. If the last state
ment be true, what did the caution in question amount to, and of what force is the as
sumption? If the watchful apprehension did exist, as both affirmed and denied, why
no prohibition of law, as the Reply would show? If Bishops are excepted in the ap
plication of a special statute relating exclusively to the ministry, does not their non-
inclusion by the law, upon every fair principle of judicial construction, authorize the
relation, for sustaining which, Bishop Andrew was punished? The Reply assumes, at
least by concession, that no disciplinary provision — no law of the Church covered the
case of Bishop Andrew; and it is alleged that the Conference hence treated it as >i
"practical difficulty," for the removal of which they were compelled to "provide."
The Majority thus not only admit, but avow their action to be extra-legal ; and if so,
was it not by logical necessity, extra-judicial? But to return; why all this wide
spread epidemic dismay in the North? There is no legal offence, the Majority being
judges, and as a law-abiding portion of the Church, how could they be alarmed1 Un
less they intended going beyond the provisions of law, and thus drive the South to re-

89
sistance, why feel uneasy? Moreover, if the Majority, before the emergency in ques
tion gave bitth to so many rare inventions, regarded themselves as having the un
doubted right to displace a Bishop and "give his Bishopric to another," even without
trial or enquiry, what ground was there for the foreboding apprehensions ofthe Reply?
Whether we look at the North, therefore, before or after the knowledge of Bishop An
drew's connection with slavery transpired, the assumed alarm and fidgety preparations
ofthe abolition portion of the Church, prove the existence of purpose and pre-arrange-
ment, to disturb the long settled question of slavery, beyond any thing that had pre
ceded. Such purpose has been since avowed by the proper representatives ofthe aboli
tion party, and how far seconded and sustained by the anti-slavery party, is sufficiently
shown in other parts of this Review. The Reply charges, that Bishop Andrew had
deliberately or heedlessly placed himself in direct and irreconcilable conflict with the
sentiments of a majority of the Church. In relation to this, we enquire, how far ihe
law of the Church may be presumed to reflect its sentiments? It can never be made
appear that Bishop Andrew's conduct was in conflict with the law, and if in conflict
with the sentiments of a majority of the Church, then the law is no index of the opin
ion of the Majority, and is in fact an imposition upon the credulity of the law-abiding
portion of the Church. And further, the Reply itself shows, that without either de
liberation or heedlessness, without any will or choice of his own, Bishop Andrew had
been the owner of slaves for many years before his late marriage, and in a State where
emancipation is not only unlawful, but even the attempt is rendered criminal by the
laws. Had he not married, the result in every material aspect of the subject would
have been the same. The charge, therefore, is without foundation in the facts of the
case, the Repliers themselves being witnesses.
It was most confidently affirmed in the case of Harding, that the only question was,
was it practicable for him to emancipate his slaves? All present will recollect, that in
debate this was given as the only principle upon which the true issue was to hinge.
The bare statement, however, to say nothing of the absurdities to which it leads, tor
tures and misrepresents both the spirit and language of the law. This, so far from
being the only question, was but one of three constituting the main question. 1st.
Was it at all practicable for Harding to emancipate his, or rather his wife's slaves?
2d. Could this be done conformably to the laws of the State in which he lived? And,
3d. Being in fact and legally practicable, could the liberated slaves enjoy freedom in
Maryland? Grant that an affirmative answer ought to be given to the first of these
questions, still, as such an answer cannot be given to the second and third, the majority
either of the Baltimore Conference or of the General Conference, had no more right,
by the law of the Discipline, to require the emancipation pf Harding's slaves, than they
had to run them off North, hy way of giving them their freedom, that is, had no
right at all, in virtue of the law. That they uprightly believed they had such right,
at the time of action, is cheerfully conceded in relation to both.
Another argument in Harding's case seems lo have found great favor in high places,
as it may be made, it was no doubt thought, to answer the purpose when all others fail.
It is assumed, that Harding might at least have relinquished his own right of property
in his wife's negroes, and so freed himself from slavery. Beside, that legal contingen
cies might destroy this argument altogether, it should be borne in mind that such a
quasi species of emancipation is utterly unknown to the law of Maryland, and there
fore not legal, and of course could not in any way have affected the state of servitude
in which the negroes would still be left. It must have occurred to every one too, that
such a course would not have met the requirement of the Discipline at all, for the Dis-
12

90
cipline disavows emancipation as a requirement of law, except where the liberated
slave is permitted to enjoy freedom. The argument in question, however, sophistical
as disingenuous, does not liberate the slave in fact or form, in whole or in part; free
dom, therefore, in any sense, fs out of the question, and such an act by Harding, would
have been without the sanction of civil or ecclesiastical law, and could not be approv
ed, it seems to us, by humanity or common sense. We are thus driven to the conclu
sion, that as the principal conditions of the requirement by the law of the Church,
were barred by the civil law in Maryland, both the Baltimore Conference and the Gen
eral Conference violated the letter and intention of the Discipline, in exacting emanci
pation of Harding. The recent showy and confident attempt to make appear that the
condition respecting the enjoyment of freedom by the liberated slave, does not apply to
traveling preachers, is utterly set aside and overthrown by the reasoning and construc
tion of law in the addresses, both of the Bishops and of the General Conference, in
1836 and 1840, and especially by the judicial decision of the latter in 1840, in the
Westmoreland case, and cannot be urged except in direct conflict both with Episcopal
and General Conference authority. The argument above, therefore, so far as it may
turn upon this item, remains unaffected by the attempt alluded to, and shows our con
clusion to be fairly made out. Harding was suspended contrary to the plain letter of
the law. That the same was true in the case of Bishop Andrew, we have seen at
length. The bonds imposed upon the Bishop had never existed before they were prepared for
the occasion. The Majority sought no vindication of violated law, no redress ofinjur-
ed right. The true cause of action, was the rifeness of abolition and anti-slavery opin
ion and feeling beyond the anticipation, and contrary to the provisions of law. It was
Northern violation of law which rendered the attempted degradation of Bishop An
drew expedient. The Reply labors hard to make it appear, that the Church had al
ways declared and acted upon the principle, that the Episcopacy or a Bishop could in
no event, be allowed to have connection with slavery, and yet Dr. Durbin, in debate
stated, as did others in substance, "in passing this resolution we make a clear declaration
against the connection of slavery and our Episcopacy, a declaration which we cannot
avoid making if we would, and ought not if we could — a declaration which the world
will approve." But if according to the Reply, the declaration was as old as the Church,
and well understood by every body, why this formality in re-declaring it? The fact is,
it was a declaration of claim on the part of the Majority, not only in open conflict with
law, but in utter disregard of trust and confidence created by recent official declarations
to the contrary. The whole movement shows the party was aiming at the introduction
of a new principle, and the declaration and principle being both new, it was seen that
their novelty, not less than inconsistency with existing law, would surprise and star
tle, and hence the necessity of explanation, by way of conciliating the Church, in view
of the new order of things about to be introduced. The real difficulty then, existed in
others, not in Bishop Andrew, and for the wrong of others he was called to suffer. The
Majority evidently acted upon the maxim that the law was behind the age, and that it
would not do for the, Church to be in the same category, and hence the rapid stride, the
furlong in a breath; with which they moved forward to the accomplishment of their pur
poses. It may not be amiss to enquire why the South are charged with pro-slavery,
without being charged with any specific violation of law? Is it intended to say the
law is pro-slavery? Or, if not, and we have violated the law, why is it not shown.
wherein and after what maimer. We do not so treat the North. We show in what
they have offended and departed from the law and order ofthe Church. Our char-

DI
ges are specific, and the proof accompanies them. We invoke attention and chal
lenge scrutiny, with regard to the one and the other. Are the scriptures and the law
of the Church the standard by which we are judged? If they are, those who charge
us with pro-slavery, must show wherein we have ofl'ended against tliese, and failing to
do so, no other proof is needed to show the injustice and malignity of the charge. In
a word, the wrong inflicted upon the South by the falsehood of the charge, is scarcely
a greater outrage than the defamatory manner in which it has been presented.
A specimen of Northern consistency may be found in the fact, that Bishops Soule
and Andrew are held to a most rigid responsibility for alledged disobedience to the wish
es of the General Conference, in that, the latter, at the instance of the former, consent
ed to assist his senior colleague in the labors and duties of his late Southern tour, in
doing which , he did only what the General Conference told him to do ; that is, exercise
his own judgment as to the propriety of performing any work or not. For these acts
Bishops Soule and Andrew are denounced in no measured terms, and it is more than in
timated that exemplary punishment awaits thetn at the next General Conference.
Meanwhile, Northern writers, talkers, declaimers, editors, Annual and Quarterly Con
ferences, leaders' meetings, societies, &c, are found impugning the wisdom and ar
raigning the action of the General Conference in every form of undisguised and scorn
ful rebuke, without any intimation of either responsibility or punishment, because, for
sooth, it is found practicable to hide the contempt they pour upon the General Confer
ence, ir this respect, by attempts, tadefend it in others. Why liability in the one case,
and immunity in the other? The action ofthe Conference, on the Plan of Division, de
nounced by the North, as absurd and unauthorized, was united in by every member of
the whole body, except twelve, taking the vote on the 3d resolution as the test vote of the
body. That approved by them in the prosecution of Bishop Andrew, was a strictly
party movement, on the slavery question, and solemnly protested against by every del
egate from thirteen Annual Conferences, beside being opposed by the votes of one half
the Delegation from the Baltimore Conference, two thirds of the Philadelphia Delega
tion, a majority of that from Illinois, with several others from New Jersey, New York,
Michigan, Ohio, and Rock River. Fifteen Annual Conferences condemned the action
in the case of Bishop Andrew ; the vote of one was neutralized by an equal division,
and five divided unequally. And the result is, upon this most difficult and delicate
question, the Annual Conferences confederated in the General Conference, divided six
teen to fifteen, the North having a, majority of one. It is true the Delegation from Tex
as, two in number, divided, as did that of Baltimore; but it was admitted by the Dele
gate who voted with the North, that ih doing so he did not represent any portion of the
Texas Conference. The Annual Conferences, therefore, all absolutely equal in their
rights, divided as above, and those who are now attempting to sustain the action of the
General Conference, in Bishop. Andrew's case, know that fifteen Annual Conferences
disapproved it, while the action, adopting the Plan of Separation, about which we have
so much pragmatic dissent and turbulent abuse, was not opposed by a single Annual
Conference, and by only twelve scattering votes of individuals ! And yet we are told,
respect for the General Conference, as the Representative Council of the Church, com
pels the conduct we have under notice ! The conduct of a bare, the leanest possible ma
jority, counting by Conferences, is defended with all imaginable zeal and ability, as the
voice and action of the Church, and, at the same time, the almost unanimous action of
the whole body, providing for a peaceable "division of the Church," on "constitution
al" principles, is denounced and libelled as the work of "divisionists" — the project of
a "Southern clique."

92
Since May last, sixteen Annual Conferences have officially endorsed the doctrine and
positions of the Declaration and Protest, without qualification or exception, and yet,
ever and anon, a knot or club of Northern abolitionists or anti-slavery agitators, num
bering scarcely as many individuals, are permitted, in the papers of the Church, to
ban and defame them as a "clique" of schismatic "separatists." If there be any vir
tue which can suffer such wrong, such wantonness of injury, without resentment, the
South certainly stands in need of it. Would we had the patience and meekness of the
sainted John, who, under similar treatment, was content to say, leaving the quiet max
im to explain itself, "no lie is of the truth." But to return. We wish to know, (to
restrict the general view, here taken, to a single point,) why Bishops Soule and An
drew are to be punished for supposed disobedience to a simple wish of the Majority, ex
plained by themselves, to mean anything or nothing, as Bishop Andrew might happen
to understand it, or they find it convenient to decide, while Editors and others, equally
the Agents of the Conference, are promised not only impunity, but even reward, in re
sisting an express and binding "regulation" of the General Conference, having all the
force of law? We risk the opinion, that no General Conference, having any respect
for the decencies, to say nothing of the graver sanctities of judicial procedure, will ev
er attempt to arraign Bishops Andrew and Soule for practical dissent from its. wishes,
without, at the same time, arraigning the whole corps of Editorial and other Censors,
who have been in such officious haste to inform the Church and public, that the Gene
ral Conference of 1844 had so damaged the interests of the Church, that their inter
ference, in contravention of its action, and contempt of its authority, became necessa
ry, to save the Church from ruin! We have not been unmindful of what will be re
torted here, that we of the South resisted the same authority, in the case of Bishop
Andrew. This is admitted as ostensibly true, but the reader who travels over the
ground of this discussion with us, cannot help perceiving, with the facts and evidence
before him, how utterly unresembling are the positions of the parties, and how impos
sible it is to compare them, as standing in anything like the same relation to law and
right. We resisted the disturbance, by adverse Northern opinion and action, of civil
and ecclesiastical rights and relations, established both by the law of the land and of
the Church, and the possession of which had been formally guarantied to us by both.
They resist the will of the Majority without any plea of law, or show of right, be
yond that of private judgment. They not only nullify law, shown not to be inconsis
tent with the constitution, but they destroy the Legislature itself, by the virtual, but
plain declaration, that no law of the General Conference can bind the Church without
its formal previous consent. In our case, the reasons of law override its forms. The
occasion accredits the right of resistance, and we vindicate ils assertion by the emer
gency of the circumstances under which we act, and hence the difference, both as to
the moral and the constitutional grounds of action.
In the instance of the two great points upon which the Norm and South divide, Slave
ry and Episcopacy, the Reply, in the first case, denies to Bishops the character of Trav
eling Preachers proper; and, in the second, insists they are merely such, with the ad
dition of being tenants at will, as officers of the General Conference.
The sage induction by which the Manifesto attempts to show that the Protest main
tains the General Conference to be a creature of the Episcopacy, is in keeping with its
general claim to fairness of argumentation. It is plainly the purpose of the Protest to
show, that because, according to law, we cannot have Annual Conferences, (and by con
sequence no General Conference, unless in extreme cases,) independently of the Epis-
eopacy, it does not, therefore, follow, that the General Conference is the creature of

93
the Episcopacy, although there is quite as good reason for assuming it, as there is for
assuming the Episcopacy to be a mere creature of the General Conference.
The Reply, in pressing upon our notice the uniform repugnance to slavery, in tho
high places of the Church, has signally failed in giving us the true aud proper rela
tions of "Methodism and Slavery," and exhibits a sad paucity of proof with regard to
the manifestation of the kind of repugnance so very confidently assumed. Beside the
many unmanageable facts and perplexing inferences already noticed, tending to discred
it the ultraism of the Reply in this respect, there are other items of no mean signifi
cance, which ought at least to be explained. The General Conference of 1828 selected,
with great unanipnity, a Southern slave holder as their Representative to the British
Conference. It is well known, too, that at the General Conference, in 1832, more than
forty Northern votes were given for a Southern slave holder as Bishop, and given too,
against a Southern man, proposed for the same office, who was not a slave holder.
These, and kindred facts, all go to show, that until the recent marriage of abolition
and anti-slavery, for grave family reasons, (a union of effort for particular purposes,
as elsewhere seen,) the Church has been in the habit of selecting men for office, and
appointments of trust, without reference to their connection with slavery, it being well
understood that no slavery was found in the Traveling Ministry, except under circum
stances where, according to law, no forfeiture of right could ensue. All this, howev
er, is utterly misunderstood or misrepresented by the Reply. That Jesse Lee was the
owner of slaves, when designated by Bishop Asbury for the office of Bishop, and came
within a single vote of being elected by tbe General Conference, is, I am informed, sus
ceptible of proof. It is also affirmed that he was such, when, at an earlier day, he
planted Methodism in New England. Bishop McKendree never attempted to disguise
his solicitude for the election of Thomas Logan Douglass as Bishop, although he knew
him to be an extensive slave holder, in a State where emancipation was impracticable.
Southern men, holding slaves, have, at different times, been supported for tbe Episco
pacy, by Northern votes, ever since the organization of the Church.
The manner in which the Reply repels the charge of "extra-judicial" proceedings
against Bishop Andrew, will be recollected by all. The charge is, that Bishop An
drew was proceeded against "out of the ordinary course of legal procedure," such be
ing the common and obvious meaning of the term; and the Reply, after denying the
charo-ein various forms, takes great pains to show why the Bishop could not be dealt
with according to law, and why it was necessary to meet the emergency "out of the
ordinary course of legal procedure." The gross fallacy of the pretension, that the
General Conference has the right to do anything not expressly forbidden, publishes its
own refutation the moment it is looked at. So soon as we apply it to the division of
General Conference jurisdiction, this argument of the Majority is, by themselves, de
nied as futile. While Bishop Andrew is on the tapis, the "Croton river" overflows its
banks, but the moment division comes up, it is dried in all its streams. When Episco
pacy is in the way, the General Conference has all power, even the sovereign lawlessness
claimed for it by Bishop Hamline ; but whenever it is shown that such supremacy must
give to the body claiming it, the right to divide the general jurisdiction of the Church,
we are instantly informed, as we have been in twenty different shapes, that this right
belongs not to the Traveling Ministry, but the people— the Laity. The reader, by ad
verting to our reasoning elsewhere, will perceive at once, that in theory, this is a rev
olution in the government of the Methodist Episcopal Church. It is depriving the
Traveling Ministry of rights and powers always claimed by them, and investing them
in the people, where it has always been obstinately contended they do not belong, and

94
by whom they cannot be claimed, except upon the principles of a revolutionary radi
calism. This concession of the General Conference Press, "by authority,'' for tempo
rary party purposes, may be found to contain the seeds, and furnish the type of a des
tiny not dreamed of in the philosophy of the Majority. What is conceded now, and in
this case, may be claimed hereafter, and acted upon in others. The argument is a Del
phian blade, cutting more ways than one. When we come lo apply it, the General
Conference is as much the creature of the people as a Bishop is the creature and facto
tum of that body.
The strangely doubtful— the equivoque position in which the resolution of Finley,
with the subsequent explanation, left Bishop Andrew, made in every practical sense,
the mere discretion — the will of Bishop Andrew, the sole law of determination, both
with regard to the moral character of his conduct and the propriety of exercising or de
clining to do so, the functions of his office. And yet for adopting the rule of action
prescribed by the Majority, the Bishop is to be further punished. The Bishops inform
ed the Conference, by way of asking for "official information," that in their judgment
they had "no discretion to decide" upon even the kind of relation Bishop Andrew sus
tained to the Church. The Conference tell them they are right, they have no discretion
in the case. The Conference declare all is confided to the discretion of Bishop Andrew,
and that what he may resolve upon is the law of the General Conference, "whether in
any" — he may work or let it alone, "and if any in what work" — he may choose any
work he prefers — "be employed," sees fit to occupy himself, (for no directions are given
the Bishops,) "is to be determined by his own decision and action, in relation to the pre
vious action of this Conference in his case." Should Bishop Andrew decide he is sus
pended, he may be expected to decide against taking work, although the Conference leaves
him at liberty to work, should he see proper. Should his "decision" be that the Con
ference has merely advised him, and left him to do as he may think best, still the whole
matter is left to himself, and the necessary alternative construction is, that the decision
of Bishop Andrew is the law of the General Conference. And the question now arises,
can the General Conference, with any show of right, punish Bishop Andrew for doing
what they expressly authorized him to do — that is, work or let it alone, at his own dis
cretion. Can he be punished for obeying their own law? Or rather, was not the law
such, (the Bishop's own will,) as to render disobedience impossible! And what then is
he to be punished for? A writer in the Western Advocate, who strikes but hides th
hand, informs us tbe next General Conference will let us know what he is to be punished
for. This however, can hardly be. When the manifesto was presented to the Confer
ence, it contained a very significant menace to this effect, but the Majority refused to
sanction the amenability of Bishop Andrew in this respect, as assumed by Drs. Durbin,
Peck, and Elliott, and the latter accordingly proceeded to strike it out. This was after
the report had been made and was in the possession of the Conference. Other items
too, were stricken out by Dr. Durbin, some with and some without the consent of the
committee or Conference. That this was not done, as has been alledged, to oblige the
South, is perfectly obvious, for many other things pointed out and animadverted upon
as particularly objectionable, were not stricken out, and it is plain those items only were
expungpd, which it was seen were indefensible and likely to discredit the argument and
cause of the Majority.
It can hardly be necessary to call attention to the unfair use which has been made of
the fact that Southern men, upon a motion from the North, voted to have the Reply re
corded upon the Journal and printed. The motive of Southern men in doing so, will
be perceived by all. Th Majority had ordered tkeir explanation of ths action had ia

95
Bishop Andrew's case, in the shape of an extended report by distinguished leaders of
the party, but were unwilling to assume the responsibility of adopting it. The South
challenged the Majority to accredit the report, either by its adoption or by attaching
their signatures to it. They refused to do either. Wishing to have ready access to it,
and have the Church made acquainted with it, although notoriously disapproving its
contents, several Southern men voted to record and print it, as a summary of the doc
trines and opinions of the Majority, respecting slavery and Episcopacy, which the South
believes to be alike subversive of the unity and General superintendency of the Metho
dist Episcopal Church.
The Reply insists that the readiness and unanimity with which the Blajority consent
ed to the plan of separation, is a practical refutation of the charge of the Protest, that
the Minority had been subjected to the party control of a dominant majority. Suppose
we look at later demonstrations by the North. What kind of treatment has the South
received from the great mouth piece, the government organ of the Northern party, the
Christian Advocate and Journal, to say nothing of others? We are privately assured
it is true, from different sources, that it misrepresents both Northern opinion and feel
ing, as certainly and even offensively, as all know it to have misrepresented tho Gen
eral Conference and the South ; still it speaks for the Church North, and will, no doubt,
continue lo do so. The perfect silence of book agents, book committees and the North
ern Conferences, must, of course, be understood as their endorsement of its policy and
tactics, and they are accordingly responsible, not for every thing the paper may contain,
but for its main position and obvious purpose in this controversy, as authorized to
speak/or the Church, and it requires no great discernment to see, that important results
may follow from the fact, that the original position of the Majority has been denied and
reversed, and its public solemn obligations scorned and cancelled by its official organ,
thus rendering it more imperiously necessary than before, that the Southern Conferen
ces be independent of the Northern.'beside the proof it furnishes of the original neces
sity of division. A single fact noticed elsewhere, and that can never be forgotten by
the South, speaks volumes on, this subject. Papers published under the authority of
the General Conference, have stated distinctly and repeatedly, in the gravest forms,
that the only reason why the South seeks a separate organization, is because they insist
on having a slave holding Bishop, and cannot be gratified while in union with the North.
We have shown this statement to be as notoriously false in fact, as it is injurious in
its purpose and effect. The whole history of the difficulty publishes its want of truth
not less than the malevolence of its origin, and the express language of the Genera]
Conference is falsified without disguise, by the imputation. The Conference in provi
ding for separation, avowedly acted in view of "various reasons enumerated" in the
declaration of the Southern delegates, and the only reason of our Editors is not even
one of the several alluded to, in any sense or shape whatever. The fact is, the Reply
mistook both the character and temper of the North on this whole subject, unless both
are miserably misrepresented by the official press.
Those men who believe all slave holding to be morally criminal, and are resolved to
rid the Church of all slavery in every respect, are infinitely consistent compared with
those who seem to think slavery involves very little difficulty on moral grounds, but is
most disastrously evil when it becomes mixed up with, the difficult tactics of sectional
interest and party expediency. The fact is, to be at all consistent, Methodism in all the
non-slave holding Conferences, must occupy the old common ground of the legal tolera
tion of slavery in all grades of the ministry, in States whose laws do not allow the
emancipation and subsequent freedom of the slave, or must take new ground, and ex-

96
elude it from the ministry, and by consequence, as we think, from the membership alto
gether. The Church South can admit of no distinction— no inequality of right in the
ministry, without disreputation and overthrow. Where emancipation is practicable
without evading or violating civil law, and the freed slave is allowed to enjoy freedom
in the State of his domicil, should Southern ministers fail to emancipate, let them be
punished. But where this is not the case, and wliile the law of the Church remains as
it is, we will not submit to punishment of any kind, and it need not be expected of us.
The old compromise, as we have understood it, is the only ground upon which we can
stand in the South, and by how far we credit Northern assurances and defer to South
ern opinion, it is unlikely we shall ever occupy that ground again. Under these cir
cumstances, geographical division, (as to general jurisdiction,) with the exceptions re
cognized by the General Conference plan of separation, seems to be the only pacific
remedy. For this the South, with a greatly less number of exceptions than was ex
pected, is ready ; and should the North, under the influence of counsels, adverse to the
pledge of the General Conference, refuse to fulfil its contract, the question will be left
to work out its solution in a different way, uninfluenced by Editors or correspondents,
North or South. We write and talk of union, as if it were matter of choice by the par
ties to have it by mere dint of proclamation. But where is that of which so much
is written and spoken, to so little purpose? Soberly, where is our union? "The North
saith, it is not in me, and the South, it is not in me!" Split assunder by a moral con
vulsion despite ourselves — involuntarily sundered by the throes of an earthquake—
already apart and each asking what the other cannot yield — clinging to opposing prin
ciples vital to existence, as the parties recede from each other; the question is, how
may the least evil result from what has taken place? No longer one, and finding it
impossible to agree, is there any reason why we should destroy one another, by way of
proof that wo ought not to have been separated? If the ends for which we came to
gether, can only be accomplished by separation, and this we have solemnly declared as
it regards the South, and the truth of the declaration is increased by every day's expe
rience, what must be the suggestions of both duty and interest? And what must be the
inevitable inference as lo constitutional competency to divide the general jurisdiction of
the Church, in an emergency of this kind? On what grounds is it doubted? With
what show of reason or force of argument can it be questioned?
The proposed division, so far from exciting political alarm and alienation in the South
with regard to the North, will tend directly to prevent the one and the other. Five
thousand ministers and five hundred thousand members South, tamely submitting to
Northern encroachment on the subject of slavery, would immediately and beyond doubt
endanger the union of the States, but when it is seen that the rapidly increasing thous
ands of Southern Melbodi=ts, will not submit to this, all cause of alarm in connection
with the Church, is removed at once. If while the civil condition and relations of the
South are constantly assailed by the Church North, Southern Methodists had not re
sisted, but allowed the interference to proceed from one extreme to another, the Metho
dists being largely the most numerous denomination in the South, there would have
been just reason, perhaps, to fear that the South might be driven to means of self de
fence, endangering the harmony if not union of the confederacy. Already, however,
the resistance of the Southern Church has given a tone of confidence to Southern feel
ing, greatly lessening the danger in question. It is not unlikely, from the present
signs of the times, and we accordingly predict, that the Presbyterian Church in the
South, will soon be compelled to adopt the course we have, and that these examples will
be followed by the Baptist Church, and at a later period by other Churches, in a similar

separation. If our conjectures should be verified, we entertain no doubt at all that the
effect will be eminently favorable to the interest of the National Union. Political abo
litionism has been principally sustained in the North, by religious fanatacism and for
eign interference, and the latter has been brought to bear extensively, as all know,
through the various. Churches of the United States. Should, however, the principal
Churches South, claim separate jurisdiction, as it regards this question, it will deprive
agitation at once of its principal means and appliances, and a less excited and exaspera
ted state of feeling North and South, will naturally exert an influence upon public opin
ion and sentiment, highly conservative in relation to the great interests of our common
country. The abolition influence in the United States, has been inconceivably enhanc
ed by the encouragement and countenance of England and the influx of foreigners from
every part of Europe. A late English writer on this subject says, "that England has
taken up the trade of propagandism is admitted by our rulers themselves." Another
affirms that it was for this specific object she "confiscated property to the amount of
40,000,000 sterling in the West Indies," which did not, in any sense, belong to the
government, and which having been accumulated under the full and explicit sanction of
British law, she could not deprive her subjects of without a plain violation of the rights
of property. Dr. Bangs, speaking of the Northern agitation of "slavery and aboli
tionism," says, "this spirit was powerfully excited by agents sent out from England for
the express purpose of lecturing us on the evils of slavery. These heedless and enthu
siastic lecturers, aroused a spirit of resistance to their measures and proceedings^ which
it was not easy to control. This interference of foreigners with our domestic relations,
was considered by the more judicious portion of the community, as highly reprehensi
ble and wprthy of severe rebuke and remonstrance." That an immense mass of the
American people are opposed to slavery, in principle and feeling, is not disputed, and
no where regretted or complained of in the South. But it is true at the same time, and
susceptible of the clearest historical proof, that the whole abolition and anti-slavery
movement in the United States, for the last twelve years, has been to a very great ex
tent anti-American and essentially of j or eign origin. The whole system is largely in
debted lo foreign influence, both as it regards iis projection and impulse. Nor is this
true merely in relation to the organized efforts of the anti-slavery and abolition mis
sion, as such, but the principle involved and the fact wo assume have developed them
selves and displayed their relations and affinities, in various forms of political, social,
and moral mischief. Public attention and concern have been for years attracted to tbe
evil as one of no common magnitude. Thousands who do not deem it prudent to speak
or act, feel that the curse is in our midst — that the elements of social degeneration and
national decay, are at work, with an energy and effectiveness calling loudly for the in
terposition of public virtue and political foresight. The subject is too deeply painful
and humiliating to be enlarged upon.
Look at the annual foreign accessions to our population — look at the lawless disregard
of restraint among Ihem — a levelling system of agrarianism rapidly extending in' every
direction and fearfully increasing in strength and activity. Even now they constitute
in various places, formidable castes and parties, caring for nothing but to secure thoir
own petty personal interests, and to promote the reckless aims of the unprincipled de
magogues by whom they are duped and demoralized. This class of foreigners rarely
crowd together in the South in masses sufficiently large to affect the interests of society.
The long established system of slave labor — the kinds and methods of production, and
the general habits of society, with other causes, deter them. They seek the free States
of the North, and are found there as ten to one, if not in greater disproportion, com-
13

9S
pared with the South. Foreign influence in this way, has been most unfairly brought
to bear in the North, upon the question of slavery in the South. For more than half a
century, without any knowledge of our political institutions and civil relations, the
slaves of other nations, have been the legislators of this. Legionary hordes are annually
emptied out of Europe, in the shape of ignorant, needy, and disorderly paupers, fugi
tives, and convicts, every where crowding the cities and districts of the North, officious
ly meddling with both the polity and police ofthe country, and rapidly sapping the
foundations of its noblest institutions. Placed on their arrival, in direct association
with the lowest and most depraved part of our own population, and subjected but too
generally to the drill of debased and lawless leaders, the Botany Bay of European out
casts on this side the Atlantic, is allowed 10 give character, not only to the law and ma
gistracy, but even to the manners and morals of the country. We except of course,
from the application of these remarks, and we do it with the greatest pleasure, all those
citizens of the United States from foreign countries, many and respectable, who practi
cally discourage and discountenance the growing evil of which we complain ; all others
we include as accessary to tho outrage, and inflicting irreparable injury upon the char
acter and hopes of the country.
Among the rare morceaux of the Reply claiming attention, we may notice the attempt
to make the impression that the Protest denies that Bishop Andrew was really and le
gally connected with slavery. The Protest contains no such denial — no intimation of
the kind, and the statement is negatived both by the language and reasoning in every
part of the document. The Reply also contains the unauthorized representation, that
the Protest assumes the ecclesiastical compact existing between the North and South
to have been a constitutional arrangement in form, and cannot, therefore, be altered or
revoked without the removal of constitutional restrictions. There is no such idea in
the Protest. The general law of slavery, as enacted at different times, is assumed, as
we have proved it to be, a compromise arrangement, in the shape of a common law
agreed upon by the parties, North and South, and the Protest maintains that the Ma
jority of the late General Conference, in disregarding the law, were not merely charg-
able with its violation, but also with a breach of good faith toward the South. There
is no allusion to the removal of constitutional restrictions. What the Protest meant by
charging a violation of the constitution, is fully explained and supported in another
part of this Review. So far as the constitution is directly applicable to Bishop An
drew's case, unless it can bo shown that he bought or sold with intention to "enslave,"
the constitution, as explained in the 10th section, not only protects him in his connec
tion with slavery, but must be disregarded and violated in any attempt to disturb him.
The Reply attempts to prove Bishop Andrew blame worthy, because a Bishop is "allow
ed to live where he pleases," and it seems it would have pleased the Repliers and those
they represent, had Bishop Andrew removed North, and so freed himself from slavery
by expatriation. It so happens, however, that Bishop Andrew "pleases" to live in
Georgia, where he resided at the time of his election, and the Discipline, as we have
seen, takes from the General Conference any right to disturb him in his connection
with slavery, in that State. And as a Bishop is kindly "allowed to live where he
pleases," no blame can possibly attach to Bishop Andrew for not removing North.
Among other things found in the Protest by the Reply, which happen not to be there,
is "the virtual deposition of several Bishops, by a worse than extra-judicial process."
What was there, but not seen, it would seem by the, authors of the Reply is, that Bish
ops violating the compact, the compromise law of slavery, themselves, or submitting
without proper remonstrance to its violation by others, cannot be acceptable in the

99
South, and need not appear there with such expectation. This we re-affirm in behalf
of the whole South. We have furnished in these pages, abundant proof that the only
Bishops the Church had at the time the Protest was written, were fully committed to the
compromise policy of the Church respecting slavery, and the position was taken in view
of a possible change of sentiment by some of the Bishops, but especially tbe probable
election of one or more to the office, who might be abolitionists. That is, we have no
more use for such South, than the North have for Bishop Andrew. But to declare an
abolition Bishop unacceptable in the South is a "virtual deposition," ergo, according to
Drs. Durbin, Peck, and Elliott, the declaration that Bishop Andrew was unacceptable at
the North, was his "virtual deposition," although the same Doctors stubbornly deny it in
other parts of the Reply, and maintain that it does not even amount to ecclesiastical cen
sure of any kind. An abolition Bishop declared unacceptable in the South is "virtually
deposed," but a Bishop holding slaves by the direct permission of law, may be declared
unacceptable North, without even the implication of censure!
Of a piece with the preceding, is the effort of the Reply to disparage the reasoning of
the Protest, by charging upon it the assumption, that a Bishop is only responsible for
criminal conduct. It will be quite sufficient to say that no part of the Protest author
izes any such supposition, in whole or in part, directly or remotely. It merely denies
the light of the General Conference to inflict upon a Bishop of the Church official disa
bility of any kind, without due form of trial. Of which more in its place.
The Reply very warily tries to make it appear, that the North is satisfied with the
existing law of the Church on slavery, and seeks no new legislation. That new legis
lation on the subject wascalled for in 1836, 1840, and 1844, none will deny. The call
was made at each General Conference, by several thousand petitioners, and how does
the report of the committee of 1844, comport with the declaration of the Reply? The
leport admits the call for new legislation, and does not disapprove it. It is perfectly
non-committal. Nine Annual Conferences and ten thousand petitioners ask that action
may be had and results secured contrary to the provisions of existing law, and yet the
committee say nothing in defense of law and against the attempt at change and innova
tion. Was it the purpose of the committee to authorize the inference South, that when
they thought it safe to do so, they were prepared to recommend action? Did they intend
10 invite nine additional Conferences and twenty thousand petitioners to try it again at
the next General Conference? Why did the committee recommend and the Majority
find it expedient to endorse the lawfulness of negro testimony against white persons in
Church trials, by repealing a law which had disallowed it in States and Territories
where negroes were not allowed as witnesses in civil process? Was it believed that
negro witnesses might be useful auxiliaries in managing the South? The statement of
the Reply too, is discredited by the counter avowal of some sixty vNew England.traveling
preachers, who, since the General Conference, have declared themselves in favor of new
legislation. It is true Dr. Bond and Dr. Elliott are trying to make all believe, either
that the men in question, are first rate, straight forward, trust worthy, law abiding Metho
dists, and will save the New England Conferences, "sound to the core," or that they
are but a handful of noisy ultra abolitionists and not worth minding. It dont seem to
be at all material to the argument which they shall turn out to be. It seems to be
resolved on, that they shall either keep quiet or be proved to be unworthy of notice or
confidence. What adverse influence can such men as Crandall, Porter, King, Binney,
Remington, and a hundred or two like them, bring to bear upon the slave holding por
tion of the Baltimore Conference, embracing parts of Maryland and Virginia, and the
District of Columbia? What has the Philadelphia Conference to fear, although it has

100
important slave sections in Maryland and Virginia? What harm will accrue to the
large portions of Virginia in the Pittsburg and Ohio Conferences? What is there to
alarm the Northern societies on the Southern border in Kentucky and Missouri?
We are assured that all this, working together for good, will pass off pleasantly!
There are many, and the gravest reasons, on purely conservative grounds, for a di
vision of Church jurisdiction, but none for political division, as it regards the Union
of the States. The Methodist Episcopal Church has done what the General Govern
ment of the United States has constantly avowed it had no right to do, for any purpose
whatever ; that is, has required emancipation in States where it is prohibited by law,
as the condition of Church rights and immunities. Civil government has honorably
and nobly refused to do what the Church, by ail possible means of agitation and ag
gression, is constantly attempting to accomplish. Church authority is interposed for
the disturbance of civil right. Now, while the Southern part of the Church remains
in union with the Northern, it is held responsible for such aggression and disturbance,
and by so far is distrusted and condemned by public sentiment and feeling. If the
Church, South, however, shall separate, as proposed, with a view to correct the eyil,
it will be conclusive proof that the measures of Northern agitators and divisionists are '
disapproved and resisted as they should be, and Methodism will be allowed to operate
its appropriate functions. How far the assailants of the action of the General Confer
ence, on the subject of separation, may succeed in preventing the intended result, is
now uncertain. The General Conference is pledged, by formal stipulation, to what its
Northern organs say shall never lake place, and these organs have pledged the Church,
North, to courses of action which must, of necessity, falsify the most solemn assuran
ces of the General Conference. The South has, in no form, resisted the action of the
General Conference, on the subject of slavery, more directly and unequivocally, than
have the Northern Church papers the action of that body on the subject of separation.
Tbe only difference is, we protest and resist on the ground of violated law, as we show
and prove at length, and they proceed to impugn, disparage, and denounce the Confer
ence for acting in the alledged absence of right. Both the Majority and Minority, that
is, the Conference, acted, in the matter of separation, upon the great principle, that
whenever uncontrolable circumstances require changes, as necessary to the adjustment
of the connexional interests and relations of the Church, and especially the great ob
jects of its organization, it must be constitutionally competent for the Church to make
them. This is one of those self-evident truths connected with social and moral rela
tions, about which a thousand denials can never generate a single doubt. Men may
demur and disclaim, but who can doubt the existence of right in such a case? We
have seen, that by the constitution and laws of the Methodist Episcopal Church, the
governing power belongs exclusively to the Traveling Ministry. This power is prin
cipally wielded through the medium of the General Conference, and indeed exclusively,
so far as legislative control is concerned. The separation proposed, relates entirely,
applies only, to the federal relations of the Annual Conferences, North and South, and
it was deemed competent for the General Conference, as their proper and common or
gan of action in the premises, to project and adopt a provisional plan for a division of
jurisdiction, which w^uld give to two federal representative bodies, separated by fixed
geographical lines, the power and rights, within the limits of each, respectively, now
belonging to one. This plan, "mandatory" and authoritative as it is known to be, has
been set at nought by editors and writers, North, as not binding on any one, however
stringently Bishops Soule and Andrew are bound by mere "advice." The Commission
ers of the North, too, who accepted an important official trust, which allows them no

101
discretion, have gratuitously declared their purpose not to fulfil that trust, unless what
the General Conference, expressly provides shall be a "constitutional" division of the
Church, shall turn out to be a mere "secession!" It is true Dr. Olin and others, in the
North, hold a language very different from that under notice, and vehemently and elo
quently maintain that the faith and honor of the Majority of tbe Methodist Episcopal
Church are deeply and irretrievably implicated, should they refuse or fail to redeem the
pledge of the plan of separation, mutually agreed upon by the parties. The refusal of
the North to abide by a plain contract arrangement, entered into by the only constitutional
means in the power of the Church, will of course render it necessary, should the South
hold them to the contract, that the matter be tested by other forms of trial. And if
driven to such a resort, we have full confidence we shall be able to make it appear that
we have been forced to tbe issue by a necessity created entirely by tbe wrong-doing of
the Majority. That the Northern Conferences have so violated the long established law
of the Church, both as it regards Slavery and Episcopacy, as to forfeit, in law and equi
ty, the rights and privileges of the Methodist Episcopal Church, we have no earthly
doubt. That the Southern Conferences are the true representatives and assertors of
the Law and Discipline of the dfirrch, with regard to both, and that this can be made
appear before any competent tribunal, we have as little doubt. And we deeply
regret to say, that appearances, at present, indicate that the controversy will only find
its termination upon such an issue. Should the Church, North, dishonor the pledge of
the General Conference, and refuse to divide, as per General Conference plan, and thus
attempt to make the Southern organization, should one be formed, a "mere secession,"
no remedy will be left the South but the issue above.
Among the unmanly and disreputable shifts resorted to in this controversy, is a re
cent attempt at imposition upon the credulity of the Church, by the reckless assertion,
that a simple division of General Conference, or federal jurisdiction, is an idea of re
cent origin in the South — unthought of until lately. To show the notorious and inex
cusable want of any show of truth in this statement, it is only necessary to recur to
the Southern Declaration, in which such separation is specified in terms, as the only one
thought of by the South, and to the plan of separation adopted by the Majority, every
one of whose provisions is conformed to this specific idea. It has been attempted, too,
to practice a similar deception, by announcing, that until it was found impolitic to do
so, the South, with great unanimity, were in favor of expunging every thing from the
Discipline on the subject of slavery. Beyond the extent to which a few exceptions
qualify the general rule, this charge is as false as the preceding one. The Southern
Delegations, at New York, resolved, in form, to abide by the Discipline as it was, in
any and every event. This has been the uniform purpose and avowal of the South, ever
since, with but very few exceptions. In Ihe instance of avowed opinions on the sub
ject of separation, by individuals, popular meetings, Annual and Quarterly Conferen
ces, the exceptions to the general rule have been in the proportion of about one in fif
ty. To every one in the South, who has suggested a change in the law of slavery, ten
in the North have avowed a determination to seek a change in favor of abolition,
Why have not our one-eyed watchmen seen and reported this also? Have their aboli
tion affinities become so strong that they can see, South, what does not exist, but turn
ing North, are unable to discern what could not fail to attract, had it not already be
come perfectly common?
The argument, from want of authority to divide, strikes one with surprise, after the
claim put forth by the last General Conference, arrogating to that body all power, le
gislative, judicial, and executive, claiming the right to do any and every thing they

102
saw proper, except the very few things placed in custody of the restrictive articles. It
has, moreover, always been the doctrine of the Church, right or wrong, that the sole
right to govern the Church, in all its' diversified interests, belongs to the Traveling
Ministry, to the exclusion of the Local Ministry and Laity, and the doctrine has been
twice jormally avowed by the General Conference, beside being shown by the very struc
ture of the government itself. The Traveling Ministry constitute the government.
The rights of government accrue to them exclusively, in view of all the legal provis
ions connected either with the constitution or the laws. Any rights of sovereignty,
therefore, predicable of the Church, may, as the Church has always been organized,
be rightfully exercised by the Traveling Ministry, and, since 1808, by the "Delegates
of the several Annual Conferences, in General Conference assembled." The right to
divide is an extreme right, incidental to inherent sovereignty, always belonging to
those constituting the government ; and its exercise is always lawful, when demanded
by any adequate imperative emergency. If, then, the immemorial doctrine of the
Church, that to the Traveling Ministry belongs, by conventional compart, all right to
govern and control, they alone, of course, have the right to determine the question of
division. The radical claim, recently set up, in various quarters, that the General
Conference, as the organ of the Traveling Ministry, the government proper, has no
right to divide a jurisdiction absolutely its own, as elsewhere and otherwise asserted,
without the consent of the Local Ministry and the people, or rather the assumed right
of the people to decide the question, is a claim involving a principle which has, at dif
ferent times, as we have seen, received the formal condemnation ofthe Church, through
the General Conference. Whatever may be the natural, moral, or scriptural right of
the people primarily, the doctrine of the Church is, that by consenting to be governed
by the Traveling Ministry, in the act of entering the Church, all such right was surren
dered, and cannot now be claimed, without assuming a radical, revolutionary position
in relation to the government of the Church. The only legal right of division belongs
incontestably to the General Conference. And this right, in fact and in form, has been
exercised by the General Conference, in setting off, by formal enactment and legisla
tive provision, the Methodist Episcopal Church in Canada. And to deny the right, "m
view of a precedent so perfectly plain and unambiguous, is, to say the least of it, most
absurdly inconsistent, until it be shown that the Canada separation was a "secession,"
and all who favored it "disunionists." It is, further, true, that the Canada case covers
the entire ground, and involves every principle implicated in the pending division.
Both parties, it is well known, intended to provide for a separation, without another
meeting of the General Conference. The Plan of Separation authorizes the Southern
Conferences to judge of the necessity of separation, and furnishes the highest warrant
of the Church for a separate organization, if it be deemed necessary.
The South asked that the Conferences in the slave, holding States might be set off un
der the jurisdiction of a separate General Conference, with a view to prevent the ar
ray of the North and the South against each other, at every General Conference, (as
now organized,) on the subject of slavery. A constitutional division of general juris
diction was prayed for, all other organic relations remaining the same. It was suppos
ed, that, as the General Conference possessed full power to make all regulations for
the welfare of the Church, deemed indispensable, and not inconsistent with the con
stitution, that the right of extreme necessity authorized the South to ask, and the North
to grant the separation in question, and such an arrangement was mutually agreed to
by the parties. It was not thought, by either party, that the constitution had made
provision for such a separation, but by both, that so far as necessity, in view of the

103
good of the whole Church demanded it, it could not be inconsistent with the constitu
tion, the primary design of which is to promote such good. Hence, the Conference
ordered that a "constitutional" plan of separation should be devised and reported by the
appropriate committee, which was done accordingly, and was adopted by the Confer
ence in due form. The Northern votes in favor of this plan were more than double the
number given from the South. The North, with almost absolute unanimity, declared,
that should the Southern Conferences decide in favor of it, such separation of jurisdic
tion should take place, in right of such special grant. All the sixteen Southern Con
ferences have so decided, and the numerical dissent in the Traveling Ministry has been
less than -one half per cent. The condition, therefore, upon which the Majority of the
General Conference pledged the North to a separation, having been most fully and un
equivocally realized, the North is committed to the issue without any possible chance of
honorable retreat, unless with the consent of the South. That this whole transaction,
both in its form and subject matter, has been grossly distorted and utterly misrepre
sented by General Conference organs, whether viewed on moral or legal grounds, is a
position not likely to stand in need of proof. The almost innumerable statements and
declarations, that the South proposed to "separate from the Church," was understood
to be a "secession," and to "go off as no longer any part of the Church," are not only
unjust and untrue, as it "regards the South, but a libel upon the official action of the Ma
jority of the late General Conference. The General Conference gravely and explicitly
instructed the committee of nine to "devise a constitutional plan for a mutual and
friendly division of the Church" into two great departments, North and South, in the
following words : —
"Resolved, That the committee appointed to take into consideration the communication of
the Delegates from the Southern Conferences, be instructed, provided they cannot, in their
judgment, devise a plan for the amicable adjustment of the difficulties now existing in the Church
on" the subject of slavery, to devise, if pissible, a constitutional plan for a mutual and friendly
division of the Church."
Here is our warrant. And let it be noticed — 1st. That it is proclaimed by the Gen
eral Conference, that they did not think a constitutional division impracticable. And,
2d, That, in reporting the plan, under instruction, that it should be constitutional, there
is no intimation from the committee, or others, that it was not so. If the men who
adopted the above resolution, and also sustained, hy their votes, the plan of separa
tion reported by the committee, acting under the instruction given, intended that the
separation should not be constitutional, and in pursuance of law and order, but in fact
a "secession," operating a forfeiture of Church rights, as now avowed by official
ao-ents of the Conference,' then we cannot for a moment hesitate, nor do we believe
public opinion will, in pronouncing it a deliberate fraud practised upon the South,
against the purposed mischiefs of which the South is amply protected, both by ecclesi
astical and civil law. The General Conference is, in the face of Heaven and Earth,
committed to a "constitutional" and friendly "division of the Church," mutually agreed ,
to by all the Annual Conferencesi represented in the General Conference. The South
are no more "divisionists" than the North. The true sponsors of division are the men
who voted for the resolution, and the report in question, arid they are held to the re
sponsibility involved. No- plea of oversight, with regard to the use of terms, can be
urged by the Majority, for a Southern man, fearing it might create an insuperable diffi
culty, moved to strike out the term "constitutional," which the Conference promptly
refused to do, and by retaining stressed the term, as one to which no little importance
was attached. The Majority, therefore, are pledged to the result— a constitutional di
vision of the Church, and any and every effort to the contrary, tending in any way to

10-1
prevent such a result, involves the faith and honor of the Conference. The General
Conference action, as above, binds the Church, inlaw, as well as on^the score of hon
or and good faith. It is a plain legislative contract, by the supreme legislative power,
upon which the South relied and acted, and should the North determine not to koep
faith in the premises, a new issue is formed, and the question arises, whether the decep
tion attempted to be imposed upon the South does not rightfully transfer the identity of
the Methodist Episcopal Church to the party keeping good faith in the transaction. Dr.
Elliott and others maintained, (and every man who voted for the resolution and report
above, must have thought so, or trifled strangely both with his conscience and reputation,)
that the plan of division reported by instruction could be carried into effect consistently
with the Scriptures and ihe Discipline, and of course constitutionally. The Northern
party are bound to a division, precluding all idea of "secession," if truth, horjor, and
law can bind them, and retreat is impossible, without a sacrifice which must make, them
poor indeed. In all the proceedings in the case, the one distinct intelligible idea, mis
understood by no one, was a peaceful, constitutional division or separation of the
Church. All idea of separation from the Church was distinctly disowned and repudi
ated ; and the falsehood of the charge is proved by the express language of the Gene
ral Conference, in the shape of authoritative instruction. This position, in view of
the evidence supporting it, cannot be in the least affected by a thousand denials, how
ever painfully unpleasant it may be, to see the truth of history, as found upon the jour
nals, and in the debates of the General Conference, contradicted by men, who them
selves did, what they affirm was not done at all! That the action of the General Con
ference was designed and understood to be "constitutional," is inevitable, however-that
action may have been perverted and misrepresented since. In the General Conferences
of 1836 and 1840, it was the opinion of those bodies, with but few exceptions, that it
was competent for the General Conference, as proposed by the lamented Cox, to set off
the infant Church of Liberia as an independent Methodist Episcopal Church, as had
been done before, in the case of Canada. The question of constitutional right, in all
these cases, is one and the same, and must, certainly, with the advocates of General
Conference inerrability, (if not with others,) tend to strengthen our argument. What
ever name it may suit Northern editors or writers to give the proposed Southern organ
ization, such organization is clearly and irrefutably authorized by the Genera] Confer
ence. That body agreed, by stipulations, plain and unambiguous as any requirement
or prohibition of the decalogue, should the Southern Conferences so elect, lo set them.
off and allow them lo organize a separate ecclesiastical establishment, as an accredited por
tion of the great Methodist family in the United States, into which it should be lawful
for any member, minister, or Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church to enter, with
out censure or disability of any kind. And to deny this, in the face of the evidence,
accessible to all, is worse than fatuous. It is true the plan contemplates a change of
the 6th restrictive article, in order to a division of the funds, and the consent of the
Annual Conferences, to this effect, is recommended by the General Conference, but no
such consent is made necessary by the plan to legalize the organization, should the
South find it neeessary to organize. If the three fourths vote of the Annual Confer
ences is not obtained, it only affects the fund question, without, in any way, vitiating
the general movement. Should the South see proper to organize without such security,
the risk of course is incurred by the South, as to the fund, but tbe arrangement, as a
whole, remains unaffected by the failure. The fact is, there will be no risk finally, as
several of the Northern Conferences will, at their first meeting after the formation pf
a separate Southern connexion, if they redeem the pledges they have given, vote for

105
the change of the restrictive article, and so remove the difficulty. So far, therefore, no
obstacle exists to the new organization. It is urged, however, that the rights claimed,
upon the basis of the contract, have been forfeited by the South, because Southern pa
pers, meetings, &c., have held severe language with regard to the North. This may
be true, but as equally severe language has been hold by the North against the South,
any tolerably fair examination of this matter, will satisfy any one that there has been
quite as much forfeiture of right North, as South. If this view of the subject should
ever assume the shape of a direct issue, it will not be difficult to show on which side
the line truth and facts have suffered most from distortion and misrepresentation.
Such a plea can avail nothing. The charges of the South against the Norlh are in the
Protest, and were formally preferred before the plan qf separation was agreed to. A
war of editors and writers cannot affect the legal position of parties. The plea, to
have presented even a show of reason, should have been originally urged upon tho
ground of the Protest itself. We are strongly persuaded the Northern Conferences,
generally, would be unwilling to resort to such a plea, however partizan advocates, and
perhaps a few Conferences, may be induced to turn it to what account they can.
Were the Local Ministry and membership admitted to a participation in the legisla
tion and government of the Church, by its constitution and laws, the proposed division,
without their consent, would, it is admitted, vitiate the whole procedure, but as it is, it
cannot affect either the ecclesiastical or legal, rights of the parlies. We speak of things
as they are, not as they ought to be, if any should think them not right. Not only has
the General Conference twice formally declared that all such right, as to Local Preach
ers and the people, is barred by the constitution, but these bodies themselves have glo
ried in proclaiming that they have no such right as that assumed for them in the argu
ment to which we are replying. That any, all constitutional right of the kind is denied to
any portion of the Church; except the Traveling Ministry, see report of the General Con
ference of 1824, also, Dr. Emory's Report in 1828, Dr. Bond's Appeal, and other docu
ments on the same subject, published by authority of the Church, in all which it is de
finitely assumed that the Local Ministry and Laity have barred their natural right, if
they ever had any, to all participation in the governing power of the Church, by con
ventional arrangement, and that loyalty to Methodism, the peace and good of the Church,
and especially the existence and success of the general itinerant system,r imperiously
require thatthey should not seek to disturb'an organic adjustment, so vital to <-he in
terests of all concerned. Now, however, the Northern Majority are attempting to
rouse, and excite to action, the stupendous popular force which it was then contended
would inevitably destroy the Church. Why this change? Is it principle or policy?
Is the old doctrine discarded, or is it a mere ruse, intended for temporary effect, when
the old order of things is to be re-asserted? The true question is, have the confedera
tion- Annual Conferences a right to say, by their Delegates in General Conference as
sembled, urgent reasons demanding it, that instead of a single federal jurisdiction, as
now, by means of one General Conference, they will divide this jurisdiction into two,
the one North and the other South, and let two General Conferences, with equal powers
and privileges, within their respective limits, be the organs of federal action, instead of
one, as heretofore? And, as the Local Ministry and membership have always been de
nied the ri"ht of representation, both in the Annual Conferences and the General Con
ference, we are curious to know how the Majority, without a change of organic law,
can invest them with the right to resist the action of the one and the other, upon the
question of dividing a jurisdiction from which theu have always been carefully exclu
ded' How does it happen that the concurrence of these portions of the. Church, denied
14

106
all participation in the government, by the constitution and the laws, is now necessary
to the constitutional action of bodies officially declared to be independent of them, by
conventional compact, in their right to govern the Church? Did the proposed separa
tion affect the moral laws of Methodism, or the moral relations and interests of Meth
odists, as Church members ; did it invoke any change as to faith or morals, ordinan
ces or ceremonies, did it touch the elements of christian character or fellowship, did it
propose any material change of government or discipline, the case would be different,
and the primary moral rights of the great body of the Church would stand out with
commanding appeal. But nothing of the kind is proposed. It is simply a modal change,
affecting only a single feature of government. All the moral laws and the Discipline
of the Church remain untouched. The Annual Conference system and the Episcopacy,
the Itineracy, and, in a word, the whole moral and ecclesiastical machinery of Metho
dism are to remain as before. The only change thought of by the Southern Delega
tions in the late General Conference, was a division of General Conference jurisdic
tion, leaving all else unaffected by the change. This, and this only, is specifically set
forth in the Southern "Declaration." And this, and this only, is specifically responded
to in the "constitutional" plan of division adopted by the General Conference. And
the truth of history, the irresistible evidence of facts, intelligible to the plainest un
derstanding, will not belong in making it appear, that those who, under the simulated
pretence of defending the General Conference, have represented the South as aiming at
the disruption of tbe Church, and a separation from it, either do not understand the
subject themselves, or are resolved that others shall not. They are either ignorant of
the facts in the case, or perversely misrepresent them, with intention to deceive. We
state what we know many North, as well as South, avow themselves compelled to be
lieve. How far men may rely upon their own pre-conceptions and prejudices as cor
rect, and proceed to affirm and dogmatize upon such authority, without examination, and
thus falsify the truth of history, and even the publicity of official acts and records,
without intending to do it, is a matter about which we shall not pause to speculate.
Those interested can solve the question at their leisure. Meanwhile, the evidence ac
cumulating upon the subject, may, at no distant day, form an element of history as cu
rious as it will be valuable, and a chapter certainly not moro humiliating than it will
be found irrefutable. The North arranged, approved, and adopted the plan of division,
conjunctively with the South. They had a majority of two-thirds both in the committee
and the Conference. That their honor and good-faith are pledged to carry it into effect, is
a position few, it is believed, will be prepared to question. They cannot recede with
any claim to truth or fairness. The act was a stipulation in form, and cannot be re
called. It is matter of history, and cannot be denied. The plan of separation is a
plain contract, and any attempt to evade it, by either party, would involve shameless
dishonor. The Majority are bound, if they can be bound by any pledge man can give
to man. All who attempt to frustrate and defeat the plan agreed upon, are at least, resist
ing the action of the General Conference. The opposition to the plan, ostensibly urg
ed upon the ground of constitutional difficulties, commands respect, so far as these dif
ficulties are pointed out, and assume the shape of argument, and it has been our aim,
in this discussion, to meet and dispose of such difficulties with fairness and candor.
The outcry and declamation we have had on this topic, are perhaps best answered by show
ing in how many ways those who are thus trying to excite alarm, have either so offend
ed themselves, or have witnessed the violation of the constitution and laws of the
Church, by others, without any apparent sense of obliquity or disapproval. But too
many have furnished evidence that their difSculties, in this respect, are strangely one-

107
sided, and connect with whatever contravenes their wishes. For example, the doctrine
of the Majority, as represented by the Reply, and also by Bishop Hamlineand others,
is, that it is constitutionally competent for the General Conference to do any and every
thing not forbidden by the restrictive rules, and by taking this broad position, which
they cannot deny, it is declared competent for the General Conference to authorize, as
they did, a separate Southern organization, as all know this is not denied to the Con
ference in the restrictive rules. Their own exposition, therefore, of constitutional
right, is at war with the present doctrine of the party, unless misrepresented by their
own official organs.
Among the many logical fatuities brought to view in this controversy, may be ranked
the attempt to show that the term separation, in the plan adopted by the General Con
ference, was used to denote not what it properly means, but "secession." The mean
ing of the term will be determined at once by an examination of the "declaration" of
Southern delegates — the resolution of instruction and the report of the committee of
nine, adopted as the plan of separation. In their brief and unpretending declaration,
the delegates from the Southern Conferences simply inform the General Conference "that
the continued agitation of the subject of slavery and abolition, in a portion of the
Church, the frequent action on that subject in the General Conference, and especially
the extra-judicial proceedings against Bishop Andrew, must produce a state of things
in the South, which renders a continuance of the jurisdiction of this General Confer
ence over those Conferences inconsistent with the success of the ministry in the slave
holding States." The obvious and only meaning of this language is, the Southern Con-
ferences'cannot succeed in the great objects they have in view, while controlled by the
abolition and anti-slavery majority of the North, and the reasons why they cannot, are
clearly specified. Is there any thing revolutionary or schismatic in this? Does the
declaration lack manliness or moderation of either tone or temper? Upon this declara
tion the committee was raised, and acted under the following instruction : Resolved,
That the committee be instructed, to devise, if possible, a. constitutional plan for a mu
tual and friendly division of the Church." That is, a "division of the Church" so far
as prayed for — releasing the Southern Conferences from the control of the Northern
majority, by allowing them a separate organization. Both the declaration and'the reso
lution are in strict conformity with the closing sentence of the Protest, "it is believed,
it will be found practicable to devise and adopt such measures and arrangements, pres
ent and prospective, as will secure an amicable division of the Church upon the broad
principles of right and equity." Thus showing what kind of division only was had
in view. The committee did not ask. to be released from the instruction given. They
did not intimate that they could not perforin the duty assigned them. They reported
under the binding control of the instructions received, without giving notice in any
form, that they had found it either necessary or expedient to swerve. If they did not
intend their report as a "constitutional plan for the division ofthe Church," they be
trayed a solemn official trust and deceived the Church North and South. The Majority,
when they had it perfectly in their power, refused to release them, as we have seen, from
the "constitutional" restraint ; and under these circumstances, they cite the thirteen
Southern Conferences as representing in their Declaration, "that for various reasons
enumerated, the objects and purposes of the Christian Ministry and Church organiza
tion, cannot be successfully accomplished by them, under the jurisdiction of this Gen
eral Conference as now constituted." Showing that the sole difficulty was connected
with the federal jurisdiction of the General Conference, and that a division of this so
as to place us from under the oppressive control of abolition and anti-slavery, was all

108
that we prayed for. Hence the committee say, "in the event of a separation — a con
tingency to which the declaration asks attention, as not improbable, we esteem it the
duty of this General Conference, to meet the emergency with christian kindness and
the strictest equity," So also, "should the Annual Conferences in the slave holding
States, find it necessary to unite in a distinct ecclesiastical connection, the following rule
shall be observed with regard to the Northern boundary of such connection." It is a
geographical division, in view of securing a separate and independent jurisdiction in
the South. The report decides that all Societies, Stations, and Conferences, belonging
to either side of the line of separation, shall so belong by simply "adhering by a vole of
a majority." If so to adhere South is "secession," why not North, as precisely the
same expression is used in both cases? So "adhering" they are to remain under the
unmolested pastoral care of the Church "adhered" to. Ministers on either side the line
are expressly forbidden to attempt, in any way, the formation of Churches or Societies
upon the other. "Interior charges shall in all cases, be left to the care of that Church
within whose territory they are situated." "Ministers, local and traveling, of every
grade and office in the Methodist Episcopal Church, may as they prefer remain in that
Church, or without blame, attach themselves to the Church South." Thus most clearly
showing that the Southern division was to be recognized as a Church proper, not less
than the Northern. The report calls the boundary "the line of division." It speaks
of the proposed Southern division, as "a distinct* ecclesiastical connexion" — "the Church
in the South — the Southern Church — Church South — that Church — the Southern organi
zation — the Church so formed — the Conferences South." The latter even after separa
tion, are recognized as rightful claimants for a portion of the chartered fund. The di
vision of the book concern is a transfer upon the ground of admitted claim. Now is
it possible that all this could take place among men of sense and upright purpose, if it
had been intended the South should be a "secession." We regard it as impossible.
Meanwhile we have seen that nothing has occured since, to change, alter, or nullify in
any way, the stipulations binding the parties. The general view we have taken is fully
and fairly sustained by the debates. Dr. Elliott said of the plan, that "it would insure
the purposes assigned, and would be for the best interests of the Church — was a proper
course for them to pursue in conformity with the Scriptures — all history did not furnish
an example of so large a body of christians remaining in such close and unbroken con
nection ; it was found necessary to separate ; the Churches at Antioch, Alexandria, and
Jerusalem, were as distinct as the Methodist Episcopal Church would be if the sugges
ted separation took place; to this conclusion they must eventually come; the measure
contemplated was not schism but separation for their mutual convenience and prosperi
ty." Rev. Mr. Griffith, hostile to the whole plan, urged among other things, that it
gave no choice to interior charges, "if they wished to be members of the Methodist Epis
copal Church, whether it should be the Southern or the Northern.'' Dr. Paine, Chair
man of the committee, spoke of the South as likely to find it necessary to "carry out
the provisions of this enactment" — of a Southern "convention" resolving on an "organ
ization" in accordance with the provisions of the report ; the measure had been con
cocted in the spirit of compromise and fraternal feeling, in the hope of preventing agi
tation and schism." Dr. Luckey said "he regarded the resolution, (the first,) as pro-
visionary, providing in an amicable, proper way, for such action as might hereafter be
necessary ; if the separation were necessary, it ought to be amicably and constitution
ally effected, and there was no intention of doing it otherwise. Mr. Wesley saw it
necessary to permit the connection in the United States lo separate." Dr. Bangs says
of the committee, being a member of it, "tbey were instructed by a resolution of the

109
Conference, how to act in the premises. They were to provide for separation, if they
could do so constitutionally— they had presented this report, from which the Conference
would see they had at least obeyed their instructions and had met the constitutional diffi
culty, by sending round to the Annual Conferences, that portion of the report which re
quired Wei';- concurrence, The Laws, Discipline, Government, all would be the same.
The South asked a separate Conference, adapted to the institutions of that portion of tho
country." Rev. Mr. Fillmore, another member of the committee, remarked significant.
ly, "Methodism, as the childof Providence, adjusts herself as she had always done, to
the circumstances of the case ; she proposed that if these fears (of the South,) proved
well grounded, they divide into bands, and go on spreading holiness through their res
pective territories ; the plan simply makes provision for such '^contingency." Rev.
Mr. Finley could see nothing "unconstitutional" in the plan. "The parties stood pre
cisely alike — there was a great gulf between them and he wished there was middle ground
on which both could stand. Mr. Wesley separated the American from the English
Church ; the General Conference gave the Canada Conference liberty to do just what
they now proposed to do, with the South ; we are now doing nothing more than we did
then. Bishop Hamline, also of the committee, alluding to the first resolution, which
gives character to all the rest, said, "the committee though', it could not be objected lo
on the ground of constitutionality, lie for one, would wish to have his name recorded
affirming them to be brethren, if they found they must separate. The article referred to
the Annual Conferences had not, necessarily, any connection with division as agreed by
all." Rev. Mr. Porter, one of tbe committee, said, "the time was coming when separa
tion must take place. The difficulty was greater now than it was four years ago, and
would increase." Dr. Winans, of the committee, declared^ "the only proposition was
that they (South,) might have liberty, if necessary, to organize a separate Conference,
and it was important that they should know at an early period, that they had such liber
ty." Finally, hear Drs. Durbin, Peck, and Elliott : "The proposition for a peaceful
separation, has already been met by the General Conference, by a vote which would
doubtless have been unanimous but for the belief that some entertained of the unconsti
tutionality of the measure;" thus declaring that the Genera] Conference had made. what
was regarded by nearly all, as a "constitutional" provision for the separation of North
and South, into two distinct ecclesiastical connections.
A recent perversion of the facts of history, in the Western Christian Advocate, 'is
worthy of notice in this connection. It is broadly affirmed that the committee, upon
Dr. Capers' resolutions, took the ground that no division of the Church, as to General
Conference jurisdiction, could take place constitutionally, and the inference is thence
pressed, that a constitutional separation of the Northern and Southern Conferences,
could not have been thought of in the instance of the plan finally adopted by the Con
ference. In reply, it will be proper to observe: 1st. That the plan of Dr. Capers was
that of an individual, and was brought forward by the Dr. upon his own responsibility,
without the knowledge or concurrence of the Southern Delegations. It was a proposi
tion from Dr. Capers to the North and South equally. The .committee very generally
agreed, that the subject coming up in this form, presented serious, if not insuperable
difficulty. It roust not be overlooked, that the proposition from Dr. Capers preceded
the Southern declaration, which gave a new aspect to the' whole subject. And we now
state what will be abundantly proved whenever it is necessary, that leading men of the
Majority, in and out of the committee under notice, assured Southern Delegates, in and
out of the committee, that the question of separation could not be approached by the
General Conference, safely and constitutionally, except upon a declaration of grievance

110
by the Southern Delegations, and assured us if such declaration were made, it would be
in their power to extend to us the relief prayed for, that is, that the Southern Conferen
ces might be from under the control of the Northern Majority — this being all we want
ed. Upon the basis of this assurance, a brief, informal, but explicit declaration was
presented, and the well known committee of nine appointed, and instructed to report, if
practibable, a "constitutional plan" for the "division of the Church." It was too, to
be a "mutual a.ni friendly division." The constitutional difficulty as to power and right,
was presumed to be removed by the declaration, which placed the proposed separation
on the ground of necessity, as the great objects of the ministry and Church organiza
tion could not, in the South, be carried on without it. The actual grounds of the ne
cessity being set forth in the declaration of thirteen Annual Conferences, was supposed
to change entirely, the constitutional aspects of the question, and give the committee
and Conference right and power beyond any thing presumed by either party, in the case
of Dr. Capers' resolutions, and hence the instruction given to report a "constitutional
plan." It follows, therefore: 2nd. That any attempt to infer the alledged unconstitu
tionality of the plan adopted, from the opinions of the committee respecting the plan of
Dr. Capers, is unfair and unauthorized, in view both of the logic and the facts of the
case. The grounds of action being essentially different in the two cases, the reasons
and motives influencing men of sense, could not have been the same, and accordingly
what was deemed nnSafe and impracticable in the one, was agreed to as safe and advi
sable in the other. And the whole objection being thus obviated, the preceding reason
ing remains in all its force, in favor of the constitutionality of the plan of separation
as projected and sanctioned by the Majority. Bishop Soule, speaking of Finley's resolu
tions, says, "net a doubt remained with me, that the adoption of the resolution would
result in a division of the Church." He adds, "measures were finally adopted by the
Conference, providing for a peaceful and equitable separation between the North and the
South." Dr. Olin says, "the piovis-ional plan of the General Conference was avowedly
based on an anticipated necessity expected to result from the state of public senti
ment at the South, and from the peculiar relations of the Southern Church to existing
institutions. The only wish expressed or manifested was that the two great divisions
into which our Israel hereafter must be organized, should occupy positions the most fa
vorable to the discbarge of their high obligations to the world and its Saviour." This
is a faithful report of what actually took place. - It is a statement strictly conformed to
the facts of the case, and future developements will'sustain its truth, despite a thousand
malignant editorials and other efforts vainly attempting to make it appear that the South
was to leave the Church as a secession. Every true friend of Methodism will read the
following burning sentence from the same pen, with prophetic interest: "I shall look
upon the Methodist Episcopal Church asforever dishonored — I shall look for somesignal .
mark of the Divine displeasure, if after sufficient time has elapsed, to test the insuffi
ciency of all plans of compromise, she shall decline to adjust on equitable terms, all the
questions that must arise from the separate organization." There is one other view of
this subject, to which we should call attention. Great consequence has been attached
to an argument against division, on the ground that unless the Annual Conferences, by
a three fourths vote, shall authorize the General Conference, that body has no rio-ht or
power to act at all in the premises. This argument is good for nothing, because it can
not apply, unless it can be shown, that the question of separation is covered by the res
trictive rules, and as this will not be attempted, it further follows that it was entirely
and constitutionally competent for the Annual Conferences to act as they did, through
their representatives "in, General Conference assembled." As the separation proposed

Ill
is not prohibited by the constitution nor by law, and the General Conference has full
power to make rules and regulations necessary lo t'Tu common welfare of the Church,
if that body believed separation necessary to such Welfare, (as they must have done or
w»uld not have provided for it,) the claim of constitutional right seems to be u neces
sary inference, and thus strengthens the general argument.
Moreover, this whole question as to constitutionality, is varied by the peculiar char
acter of its subject matter. Were it a question of either faith or morals, properly,
(although not included by the restrictive rules) we should be inclined to prefer (not
withstanding constitutional right) that the Annual Conferences, rather than their Dele
gates in General Conference assembled, should settle it. (A novel doctrine or practice
not inconsistent with the "Articles of Religion" or "General Rules," would be of the
kind we mean.) But such is not the character of the question. The true original is
sue between the parties is, a difference of opinion, political and religious, as to th'e law
fulness and consequent moral character of a civil relation, created and protected by the
supreme and municipal law of the country; and the -right, further, of ministers and
members of the Methodist Episcopal Church la sustain this relation, without detriment
to their 'other relations and interests, whether as citizens ox as professors of Christianity.
On this question the Nation and the Church, as the general rule, divide territorially, as
the States admit or exclude slavery. The slave States being a minority, and the same
being true of the Southern division of the Church, both originally refused to leave this
question unsettled, and to be at any time determined by the Majority, and sought pro
tection, the first by the treaty provisions of the federal constitution, and the second,
by attempts from time to time, as fully shown in these pages, to procure the enactment
by the Church, of such conservative and permanent laws, as would be most likely to
secure to the South the ends of social justice'. As therefore, it is the first and most
fundamental function of every constitution, to achieve the objects of the organization
to which it relates, and the moral unity and enlarged influence ofthe Church must rank
among these, if it be found, as no one can doubt, after the solemn attestation of six
teen Annual Conferences, that the course ofthe Majority, (being little more than one
half of the Church,) must necessarily injure and depress the Minority, we repeat,
these things being so, the right of remedy must accrue under the constitution, even
where the consent of the Majority is wanting. We introduce this argument to show,
that were the Church Norlh to adopt the malign advice of its public organs and special
agents, and attempt to drive us off as a secession, it could not do so. Not having vio
lated any law of the Church, as even our revilers admit, and not intending any change
with regard to its Faith, Morals, or Discipline, the constitution protects us and we rest
secure. In the event we are treated by the North as threatened by the conspiracy of
the Press against General Conference authority and Southern interests, beside the
means of redress left us, we shall have the proud and cheering consciousness of high
vantao-e-o-round in being chargeable with no Punic stain in retreating from the obliga
tions of a plain public engagement, or trifling with the sacrcdness of a grave, official
trust. In such a cause, and so sustained, we can afford to suffer.
The civil condition and relations of the societies in North America, are assigned by
Mr. Wesley as the ground of "separation" between the British and American Metho
dists. The same reason specifically was assigned in the instance of the Canada "sepa^
tion." In both these instances, the Church was "divided" by the highest authority in
it. If the reader will turn to the Declaration, Protest, and Debates, so often alluded
lo, he will find that a precisely similar reason is urged as the sole ground of the sepa
ration now pending in the Methodist Episcopal Church. It ii asserted, however, tha:

112
there is "no necessity of division J and it will be proper to notice by whom and upon
what grounds this is assumed. ETC the General Conference leave the question of ne
cessity to bo determined, as it ha* been by the dogmatism and impertinence of the
Press? The "Southern Conferences" were constituted the judges by express enact
ment and stipulation in the plan oqseparation. The sixteen Southern Conferences
have decided the question svith unpreSedented unanimity. Tire question has been set
tled by the tribunal to which the General Conference referred it, and of course by the
only one having any right in the premises. The "Southern Conferences" had by con
sent and contract of parties, the sole arbitrement ofthe question. Any attempt, there
fore, to control the result by Northern interference, is not merely a gratuitous rrieddling
with the subject, but a broach of good faith. Certainly when the General Conference
left the decision wholly and absolutely with the Southern Annual Conferences, and
pledged themselves to abide the result, it was not expected that, the intrusive dictation
of the Press would thwart their purposes, by appealing the case to a different tribunal,-
The defence of tho action of the Majority in their course against slavery was to be
expected, and is not excepted to on the ground of right, but the attempt as we have ex
plained at length, to defend the action of the Conference in this case, and yet impugn
and set it aside in the other, although equally bound to defend both, is such a manifest
abuse of official trust, such an outrage offered to the good sense and virtue ofthe ap
pointing power, that but for the high state of party feeling in relation to the South, '
such official malversation would not be tolerated for an hour. It is really grateful to
be able to turn from the gross injustice thus done, not less to the South than lo the
North, and attend to the rational and manly decision of Dr. Elliott : "We are persuaded
distinct organizations must exist in the nature of things, in the Methodist Episcopal
Church in the United States, and thai necessity and scripture principles will inevitably
enforce them. We believe that tho unity, purity, power, and extending influence of
Methodism, may be promoted by these means." So thought Wesley when he set off
the American societies as a distinct organization. So thought the British Connexion
in giving the Irish Conference distinct organic being: So thought the Methodist Epis
copal Church in setting off tho Canada Conference as a distinct organization. So
thought one hundred and forty seven members of the late General Conference against
twelve, in relation to the proposed Southern organization. That the right and power
to declare, by consent of parties, one portion of the Methodist Episcopal Church an
independent and separate organization, with regard to every other, have been assumed
and exercised by the General Conference, and acquiesced in by the whole Church as
constitutional, can only be doubted by those who are ignorant of the facts. No so
phistry can misconstrue the following resolution ofthe General Conference of 1828 :
"Resolved, That the compact existing between the Canada Annual Conference and the
Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States be, and hereby is dissolved, by mutual
consent." If the "compact" between one Annual Conference and the Church, ,can be
constitutionally "dissolved" by the General Conference, it can be done in relation to
any number, as tiie compact in every instance is precisely th.e same. The General
Conlerence avows the adoption of the above resolution in view of a "separate Church
establishment," which the Conference expressly acknowledges to be (in prospect) a
Methodist Episcopal Church, and the Bishops 'are requested to ordain a Bishop for the
new "Connection," so called by the Conference, and no reasoning can invalidate the
conclusion that the action of the General Conference in this case, based upon the decla
ration and request of the Canada Conference, gave birth to the "Methodist Episcopal
Church" of Upper Canada. How fully and forcibly this applies to the separation of

113
the Southern Conferences, will be seen by all. The reasons in both cases originate
entirely in a necessity created by civil relations and interests, and are therefore, essen
tially the same, so far as principle is involved. But notwithstanding all this editorial
dictation, in defiance of General Conference action and avowal, as we have shown, in
utter disregard of the facts and the evidence in the case, in perfect contempt of their
own glorified majority theory, and the men who employed them as their representatives,
by electing them to office, in defiance too of their virtual pledge to sustain the body at
whose hands they accepted office ; despite all these, if Editors could be believed, we
are to be a "secession," or else (unlike Editors) submit to whatever the majority may
choose to impose upon us. It would be no difficult task to take the leading postulates
and general reasoning of some of our Northern papers, and prove the Editors of them
to be "seceders" from the Methodist Episcopal Church, to the full extent it is possible
to believe what they offer in the shape of premises and conclusions. By every argu
ment they offer, proving us to be seceders because we resist the will of the Majority,
they publish themselves as such, inasmuch as they are doing the same thing. The
cases we know are not exactly similar, but the circumstances making them differ ars
in our favor, as elsewhere shown. We gave notice to the Majority, by formal protest,
before the action of the Conference w&s final, that we would not submit. Did our Ed
itorial Nullifiers of General Conference action, cither before or after their election,
inform the Conference that they should resist its will? Had this been so, who does not
know that no one of them could have been elected? Holding the principles they now
avow, did not honor and fair dealing require that they should do so? If they have
since changed their principles, how can they honorably continue at a post they know
they could not have occupied, had such change been known, or rather with the, views and
principles they now avow? Is there no abuse of privilege, no betrayal of trust in all
this? Beside, these men are not constitutional officers ; they are mere special Agents,
holding office temporarily, while the Southern Conferences are constitutional contract
ing parties in the organic structure of the Church, and as such, have rights which no
sensible man will think of in connection with special temporary Agents. But further:
these Agents, although unknown to the constitution, and as such, constituting no part
of the Methodist Episcopal Church, have so usurped right and magnified their official
consequence, as to declare in substance, a law ofthe General Conference null and void,
by various attempts to induce the Annual Conference and the Church not to regard it as
binding, but to treat it as a "nullity," and promising indemnity at the same time, in
the event of such resistance. Let the Bishops and General Conference give their opin
ion of such conduct: "we regard it as of unhappy tendency, that either individual mem
bers or official bodies should employ terms and pass resolutions of censure and con
demnation on their brethren, and on public officers and official bodies, over whose ac
tions they have no legitimate jurisdiction." Whatis the jurisdiction of our censors in
the case under notice? We have said, were they constitutional officers, it would be
different. As it is, they have no rights except such as they derive from those who em
ploy them. But for the authority they defy and set at nought, they would have no
right to speak at all — would not be found indeed in the places they occupy. How en
tirely different our position is we have shown. We exercised the constitutional righ t
of a Minority, and refused submission from the moment the wrong was inflicted. We
demanded reparation on the ground of law and constitutional right. When the Ma
jority said they could not recede, we then asked for a division of General Conference ju
risdiction, that in future, as a large substantive portion of the great Methodist family,
we mifbt not be re-subjected to similar treatment and difficulty ; and this was thought
15

114
so reasonable by the Blajority, they authorized us to do as we proposed. Connect, then,
the constitutional rights of the Minority with this authorization of the Majority, and
it will be seen we do not lack warrant in tbe course we have pursued.
Among the thousand difficulties interposed to deter the Southern Conferences from
action, their right to meet in Convention according to appointment, is called in ques
tion, and some no doubt, have felt the force of the objection. The right in the case
connects with the Southern Conferences as such. The legitimate right of the Conven
tion to meet and deliberate, and its authority to act conclusively in the premises, result
from the circumstances rendering it necessary, and the manner of its projection and
getting up. As means to an end it was in the contemplation of all, when tho plan of
separation was adopted. By authority, the necessity of division was to be judged of
by the Southern Conferences, not the people. The Majority did not propose to consult
the people. It was the Southern Ministry in their address to the Methodists of the
South, who first brought out the idea and adopted it as a principle of action, to confer
with the people fully and unreservedly. We knew the people had no constitutional
right to decide and determine, as such right is precluded both by our form of govern
ment, and the repeated declaration of the General Conference. Still we determined to
consult them, and not act in contravention of their wishes and interests. They have
decided the question as the action of their representatives assumed they would. Much
the greater proportion of those who dissent from the South are upon the border, and
the larger number of these do so because the disguises and misrepresentations making
up the sum of their information on the subject, have led them to think only of a "se
cession from the Church," instead of a "constitutional division of the Church," as ex
pressly resolved by the General Conference. And so soon as these perversions of truth
and fact are rightly understood, multitudes who now hesitate will hesitate no longer.
The motives and intended effect of these misstatements, are becoming more and more
intelligible every day, and the result is, individuals and societies are changing ground,
even after formal committal, and falling in where they properly belong. And it is no
disparagement of character or claim, to suggest what is morally certain to occur, both
as regards individuals and societies, that even after an appeal to the Convention against
division, its necessity will be fell and sanctioned by the remonstrants. Meanwhile, it
is to be expected, that there are in the Southern States, and especially upon the border,
anti-slavery men and abolitionists, who cannot be thought of as ever likely to coalesce
with the South, and their number may be considerable. Northerners and foreigners not
a few, with Old and New England and free State principles on the subject of slavery,
as well as others, native citizens, will dissent from the policy of a Southern organiza
tion. Nothing else could be expected. A similar state of things, we know equally
well, will be found upon the Northern side of the border, and all without affecting the
main question. When the General Conference acted on the subject, it was well knowu
and perfectly understood, that the Southern Conferences would of necessity, have to
meet in Convention before a Southern organization could possibly take place, and the
Convention will accordingly meet under the full and obvious sanction of the General
Conference. The General Conference explicitly authorized the Southern Conferences
to form a separate organization if they saw proper, and all means necessary to such a
result have of course, the official approval of the General Conference, and hence the
right and authority with wnich the Convention will meet. Beside, sixteen Southern
Conferences and about two thirds of the Northern Conferences have (the former direct
ly and the latter indirectly) given their sanction to the Convention. Whether the
Convention then shall proceed to organize a separate jurisdiction, as contemplated by

115
the General Conference or not, the holding of the Convention will be a regular Church
procedure, accredited in proper form by the highest authority of the Church, and in no
sense whatever an irregular revolutionary movement. Several of the Northern Con
ferences not voting for the change of the sixth restrictive 1 ule, at their recent sessions,
have intimated their intention to do so, should the South resolve to organize. And it is
confidently believed that not more than three or four of all the Northern Conferences,
if a single one, will finally endorse the doctrine of the Northern Commissioners for the
division of the Church funds, that we are not entitled to a pro rata share of them, un
less we consent that what the General Conference calls 'a constitutional division of the
Church," is really nothing but a "secession" from it! We shall see. The South did
not expect, did not even wish to be called Ike Methodist Episcopal Church in the Uni
ted States. They had no desire or purpose to usurp or supplant, in this respect. It
was very generally agreed among the Southern Delegates, that if allowed to separate, as
the General Conference authorized, with their just share of the Book Concern and
Chartered Fund, and holding their own Church property, they would be known as "the
Southern Methodist Episcopal Church." They were only anxious to preclude all idea
of secession from the Church, or departure of any kind from the great principles of
American Methodism. Securing this last result, we are by no means ambitious as to
title, or the name by which we are to be known. We intend to be understood, howev
er, both as it regards our principles and action. If denounced and defamed as a "se
cession," by the Church North, as we have been by Northern Church Editors and oth
ers, it will remain to be decided by other men and other methods, what has essentially
constituted the Methodist Episcopal Church since 1784, and in what the South has de
parted from it. The North will not be permitted to settle this question, any more than
the South. The party adhering to law and usage will be the true Church, whether
North or South, Majority or Minority. We cannot be unapprised of the united effort
of partizan leaders and portions of the Church, from Maine to Illinois, to produce the
conviction and spread the alarm that the South is about to become a "secession." And
among the means employed, is the rallying shout for the union of the Church by the
very men who dug its grave. Herod East, and Pilate West, the abolitionist and con
servative, have simulated the sacrifice of dislike and enmity upon this fancied altar
of their own erection, and in hope of realizing the purposes for which they "made
friends;" are likely to relish with no common zest, the "feast of charity" which is to
give to oblivion the "bitter herbs" of their former intercourse, or it may be want of it.
The South never thought of a separate organization, until it became necessary to pre
serve Methodism as it was before the innovations of the last General Conference. It
was the only remedy left us for correcting the effects of an abuse of trust by the Ma
jority, and for doing this we are subjected to the abuse and villification of exasperated
partizans. as "dividers" of the Church and "seceders" from it. Do our enemies hope
to divert attention from the true issue by a resort to such, methods of vague ad captan-
dum imputation, unsupported by the suffrage of facts or the semblance of truth? We
believe we have already submitted a sufficient amount of evidence to prepare the reader
to determine, with which party originated the necessity of division, and to whom right
fully belong the epithets "divisionists, seceders, &c," so liberally applied to us. The
Majority have earned the distinction at no common cost, and history will see that they
are not deprived of the honors they have won.
It may be well here Jo recur to a former topic : It has been urged with imposing em
phasis, that the division of jurisdiction proposed, will tend to a dissolution of tho po-
litical Union of the States, North and South. In our judgment, however, its direct

116
tendency will be to prevent it. That the controversy in the Methodist Episcopal Church
for the last twelve years, has tended to such u. result, few will doubt; and all agitation
of the question of slavery,. must, of necessity, continue to do so. If we do not sepa
rate, it is morally certain we shall have nothing but agitation on the subject. In the
event of a separation, after a brief border, and perhaps some intestine war, the fair
probability is, we shall have peace, and the business of agitation subside entirely, or
at least nearly so. The rights and feelings of the parties will reciprocally command,
and bring about a state of comity and good feeling infinitely more favorable to the sta
bility of the National Union than the existing state of things, and the exciting agita
tion consequent upon it. In any event, should the Northern abolition crusade continue
and gain strength in its political aspects, the safety of the Union must be endangered
in proportion, and no man can hide the threatened evil from his eyes. It must be seen
and looked forward to. As the friends then, and uniform supporters of the National
Union, what arc we, as Southern Methodists, called upon to do? Obviously to select
that course of policy and action which will be best calculated to repress abolition ex
citement and agitation, and so far as the Methodist Episcopal Church is concerned, if
correctly represented by the Majority in the late General Conference, and the course
thare indicated is to be persisted in, we regard separation as the only mode of doing it.
The charge insinuated against the South, in at least one, if not more of our General
Conference organs, that they are disposed to favor the views and designs of men whose
political course and purposes aim at a dissolution of the Union, and that they are pro
bably acting in concert with them, is as truthless and unfounded as it is insidious and
dishonorable. One of the grave and influential motives which determined the South toN
protest against the proceedings of the North, was to prevent an impression South, that
a Northern anti-slavery majority might trespass upon Southern rights to any extent
they felt inclined, without resistance by the Southern Ministry, and thus increase the
difficulties already existing between the free and slave holding States. It was, and con
tinues to be, the belief of the Southern Delegates, that nothing but a generous and
manly adherence to the compromise of the Federal Constitution, on the subject of
slavWry, can possibly perpetuate a union originally based upon it. And believing the
Methodist Episcopal Church in the North was infringing that compromise, by ecclesi
astical action in violation of political right, they knew existing evils in the South
would be greatly, if not hopelessly aggravated, did they allow themselves to become
unresisting parties to the encroachment complained of. And taking the same view of
both political and church parties, they were led to look upon a separation of General
Conference jurisdiction as most likely to prevent, as far as the Church was concerned,
final and incurable disunion in the one and the other. One thing is certain, unless ri
gid adherence to law and right is proof of an attempt at disunion, the South ne?ds no
vindication against the charge. And it is equally certain, that by how far infrino-e-
ment of law and right, as shown in these pages, tends to disunion in Church and State,
to the same extent are those who bring the charge against the South, guilty of it them
selves. We have seen how the compromise of the Constitution of the United States,
the great national compact, is being infringed and set aside by abolition and anti-slave
ry propagandism. We have seen how the corresponding legislation of the Church has
been superseded by the tactics of a loose and reckless expediency, and such defection
from law and right, and failure to maintain and assert the claims of relative and social
justice, will explain to men of sense and candor at whose door lies the charge of un
dermining the foundations, and invading the sanctity of the National Union. The
Bishops say, in their address, in 1840, and might have repeated it with equal truth in

117
1844, "at the last session of the General Conference the subject of slavery, and its ab
olition, was extensively discussed, and vigorous exertions made, to effect new legisla
tion upon it. We icgret that we are compelled to say, that in some of the Northern
and Eastern Conferences, in contravention of your christian and pastoral counsel, and
our best efforts to carry it into effect, the subject has been agitated in such forms, and
in such u. spirit as to disturb the peace of the Church." Would to God the Church of
our common love had learned the lesson in time, before it was too late to prevent the
calamity already upon us, that whenever the Bible ceases to be the deep, and broad, and
one foundation of our religious convictions, all is unsafe and in danger, because at the
mercy of unbridled fanatacism ! Who, then, are the true "divisionists" in this contro
versy? Will not the common sense of the Church and the world decide that those
with whom, or rather connected with whose conduct, originated the necessity of divis
ion, are the persons or party really entitled to the distinction, and exclusively account
able for the result? That it was the Northern party who took new ground upon tho
slave question, we have, as we think, clearly proved in this discussion. That .hey
took ground equally new and untenable, on the Episcopal question, we shall have oc
casion to show in the sequel. That they, and not the South, have/ departed from law
and order, we think susceptible of the clearest demonstration. That they have recent
ly manifested a most striking proclivity to change, a prurient appetence for innovation,
will scarcely admit of doubt. How far such mental and moral habitudes may be char
acteristic of the North, rather than the South, we shall not take upon ourselves to de
termine, but leave them to verify or disprove the statement of Robertson, the Histori
an, with regard to the good old stock, their ancestral types : "from the first institution
of the company of Massachusetts Bay, its members seem to have been animated with
a spirit of innovation in civil policy as well as in religion; and by the habit of reject
ing established usages in the one, they were prepared for deviating from them in the
other." Connected with the supposed tendencies in question, we have seen what has
. been the influence of interest and policy. A Northern Clergyman says, "the different
physical features and agricultural productions of the South and North have more than
the force or absence of proper moral feeling, banished slavery from the one, and per
petuated it in the other. Had New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, or even New
England, produced cotton, rice, indigo, and sugar, it is not improbable slavery would
have continued in these States, and increased its numbers here to this very hour."
Many of the first men of the North have expressed similar opinions, and proved their
sincerity by the magnanimity of their conduct.
If the Church be a unit, in the sense insisted upon in this controversy, not only one,
but indivisible, it must, of necessity, by means of such mystic unity, be connected
with slavery, in all its sections, in New York and Boston as well as Charleston and
New Orleans. If that unity, as has been contended, turns mainly upon the Traveling
Ministry, as holding and exercising the governing power of the Church, it follows, of
course, that the whole ministry, so far as it is a unit, is connected with slavery, be
cause slave holders are found both in its own ranks and throughout a large extent of
its pastoral charges. Who can forget with what revolting horror the frightened North
prayed that slavery might not be "returned and rolled back" upon them. But what
meant this devout deprecation? Had it really any meaning at all? Slavery returned —
rolled back upon the North, without adding -a solitary human being to the number of
either slavos or masters! And what makes the matter still more difficult to be under
stood, all this evil befalls the North without any change even of relation in the instance
of any one of all the thousands concerned! Plaiialy, however, Bishop Andrew musftnot

IIS
go North, and so we say too. But in all his constitutional relations, as Bishop of the
Methodist Episcopal Church, he is North as well as South. He is Bishop there, by
right, and was so declared by Northern votes in May last. His official jurisdiction,
by consent and decree of the Majority, slave holder though he be, extends to every Con
ference, District, Circuit, Station, Church, Pulpit, Fireside, and Closet. He is Bishop
of the whole North, by law and right. To say he rightfully sustains the relation, but
is not allowed to perform its duties, only makes the matter worse. The reason of the
result is not found in the fitness of things. If it be said he is merely requested not lo
perform its duties, it is still worse, for it is left to the Bishop himself to say whether
he will discharge the obligations of a trust, which law, and the vows of office require
shall be discharged with unrelaxing fidelity. The general evil complained of, is in
creased too, by another view of the subject. How many Northern men, not a few of
whom are now abolitionists and anti-slavery agitators, have been ordained by Bishop
Andrew during the last nine years, and since his connection with slavery, and have thus
become the medium through which the evil has been returned and rolled back upon the
North? What is to be done in this case? If there has been defilement, how is it to be
got rid of? What would be the effect of the re-imposition of hands by an Abolition
Bishop? Will it be tried? But again, the Majority claim Episcopal power for the
General Conference. According to the traditions of 1844, they are the ordainers and
administrators, by the Ministry ofthe Bishops, as their mere agents, removable at will,
and as such, the General Conference, North and South, are annually, and have been for
half a century, ordaining slave holders, and recognizing the scriptural lawfulness of
the evil of slavery, in all the forms and relations of church administration, and hence,
connection with slavery in another form ; and what, we ask, is to be the remedy in
this case? Has it been duly considered at the North, to what extent the entire Episco
pacy is connected with slavery, by annually ordaining, with the consent of the whole
Church, scores of slave holders, and sending them out in the name of God to preach the
Gospel, and exercise pastoral supervision in the various fields of Church enterprise?
In view of this multiform connection with slavery, what will the Church next attempt
North? The plan now seems to be, to drive off the South as a secession. But this cannot be,
as we have seen, without subverting the authority of the General Conference, and to do
this, is to destroy the existing government of the Church. We know many Northern
men who are trembling at the audacity of the experiment. They perceive the effect
must recoil upon the North. It is perceived that if they nullify the action of the last
General Conference, that of thenext may be nullified in like manner, no matter to what
it may relate ; and hence, an interminable train of evils, tending to the overthrow of
all government. If, for the good and sufficient cause we have shown, the Southern
movement in Bishop Andrew's case be regarded by the North as so extremely danger
ous, why is it, that in an attempt to correct our error, they commit a precisely similar
one, with the manifest disadvantage against themselves, of not having anything like
the same indemnifying reasons for their action.
But we are sagely told the General Conference only authorized a "friendly" separa
tion. By "mutual and friendly division," was certainly not meant, as Editors and oth
ers contend, that any manifestation of improper feeling, North or South, would vitiate
the contract, and "nullify" the official action of the General Conference, but simply
that the separation, upon fixed terms and specified conditions, was to be mutually agreed
to, and ratified by the parties respectively, without a resort to revolutionary party vio
lence. No man, asleep or awake, ever dreamed that the ordinary excitement usually

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attendant upon a'controversy involving the passions and interests of millions, could
render null and void the obligations of a plain contract, deliberately entered into by the
parties. If the parties have been out of temper, and have displayed bad passions, it is
to be regretted certainly, but cannot affect the contract between them. It was the im
possibility of living together in harmony which led to the agreement to separate, and
to urge the necessary effects of such want of harmony, in vitiation of the contract, is
too preposterous to be thought of. Even heaven requires us to "live peaceably with all
men," in view of the exception that it is impossible to do so with some.
It may be the Protest misapprehended the "sense" of the General Conference as to
the judicial or merely advisory character of the proceedings in Bishop Andrews' case.
What else could be expected when the Majority obstinately continue to disagree among
themselves, and as a party, have not yet decided what they meant. The Bishops, in
their address of the 30th May, understood the action proposed by Finley's resolution,
as an adjudication, a judicial proceeding. Both before and after it had passed, the
South understood it as having the force of a mandatory order. Take the mooted form
of expression as elsewhere and otherwise used by the same body, and what is the in
ference authorized? "Resolved, That it is 'the sense' of this Genera] Conference, that
the vote of Saturday in the case of Bishop Andrew, be understood as advisory only."
What is meant? Plainly, ordered that it is the judgment, &c. "Resolved, as the sense
of this]Conference, that Bishop Andrew's name stand in the Minutes, Hymnbook, and
Discipline as formerly" — that is, undeniably, ordered that, &c, nothing advisory about
it. ''Resolved, That it is the sense of this General Conference, that the Church now
stands, in relation to the testimony of colored persons, as it did before the General
Conference of 1840." The only and obvious meaning is, ordered. &c. Resolved,
That it is the sense of this General Conference, that paragraph, &c, stand, Sic. — that
is, ordered, not advised. "It is hereby declared to be the sense of this General Confer
ence, that J. V. Potts, be restored, &c." In all these instances, the form of expression
used in Bishop Andrew's case is mandatory, and it is not used in an advisory sense, in
any instance upon the Journals of 1840 or 1844. What then is the presumption crea
ted? Is it not in favor of the construction of the South? The Protest proceeded upon
the assumption that all application of law or its principles, is necessarily judicial in its
character, whether such in form or not, and that if conduct be censured in view of law,
by a tribunal having cognizance ofthe case, it is a judicial act. Finley's preamble
distinctly charges a violation of law, and his resolution is a judicial judgment follow
ing upon the charge. There is a formal indictment and a specific finding. Disability
in consequence, is inflicted on Bishop Andrew, and reaches him in the shape of penalty.
They gave him a parchment, declaring, that in their judgment, God had called him to
the work and office of a Bishop. They give notice in their proceedings against him,
that for specific reasons, they have seen proper to decide that he ought not to do the
work appropriate to his office, and he is, therefore, punished, a thousand denials and
disclaimers notwithstanding. If we grant, however, that the joint resolve of abolition
and anti-slavery, known as Finley's, was but advisory, it does not affect in any mate
rial sense, the reasoning of the Protest, for the character of the prosecution does not
essentially, by any means, turn upon that of the decision, and the Protest principally
discusses the general movement. If we knew the true position of the North, we would
meet it, but we do not. Dr. Bond at first took great care to show the famous resolution
advisory ; subsequently, he has obviously based his reasoning upon its mandatory force,
as any one can see and show by his editorials. The New England organ regards the
resolution as a mandamus. Dr. Elliott, in the Reply, says it was mere advice. In his

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paper, however, he demolishes the Reply, and says the resolution has all the force of
law. And a score of similar contradictions and cross opinions, from the same party,
might be pointed out if necessary. We have seen that the Reply says Bishop Andrew
was not tried — that the proceeding against him was not judicial — was not punitive;
that he was not legally suspended. Now admit that Bishop Andrew was not tried in
due form — that the proceeding against him was not judicial pursuant to law and right —
that he was not punished in any sense known to law and usage — that he was not sub
jected to legal suspension in any allowable sense ; still it does not follow that the state
ment of the Reply is true to the facts in the case. Bishop Andrew was irregularly
tried. He was informally subjected to judicial process, and judicial disability being
the result, he was, to all intents and purposes, punished. The nature of his punish
ment is defined by his Judges; he is to "desist" from the exercise of his functions,
that is, (nothing else can be made of it,) he is suspended, and the question next arises,
how far the suspension was constructively removed or modified by Mitchell's resolu
tions. When formally moved to do so, the Conference refused to declare Ihe resolution
advisory. They refused to adopt their own report, made by special order, u. prominent
feature of which was, the advisory character of the resolution. Utterly at variance
among themselves, as to what they meant then, or might afterwards find it convenient
to mean, how can it be expected that others should understand them? Refusing to say
or admit that the resolution was simple advice, when gravely called upon to explain
their meaning, did they not officially authorize the alternate construction that the sen
tence was mandatory, or that they deemed a resort to verbal equivocation necessary to
accomplish the purposes they had in view? It is contended the "dignity" of the body
would have been lowered by explanation. In what way it was asserted by failing to
express tliemselves intelligibly, even to their own party, will probably be as inobvious
to many, as the meaning of the resolution itself. What is most extraordinary, how
ever, is the fact, that the Majority are as far from agreeing among themselves now as
they were ten months ago. Asa party, they refused to explain, and so far as individ
uals have explained for them, they have affirmed and denied — said and unsaid ; their
yea has been nay and their nay yea. One man, one class of men affirmed Bishop An
drew was blameless ; without reproach, and must not be censured because he had vio
lated no law or rule of the Church. Oth?rs said he had acted in "bad faith" — "dishon
orably" — "was a dishonored man," and guilty of "gross immorality;" and yet these
very men, one and all, under the cohesive influence of party combination, voted for the
san;.? thing, and went for the same measures; voted both for Finley's resolution and
Mitchell's explanation ; soma declared the former mandatory and others advisory. One
half unite in saying, if the Bishop exercise his functions, he is responsible for disobe
dience to the express will of the Conference, the other say no, he will only be held ac
countable for not deferring to advice. Both agree in refusing to say he shall work, and
are equally united in refusing to say he shall not, and all, it seems, are unanimous in
the purpose, that whether he shall work or not, it shall amount to the same thing.
Facing the North, they all declare they cannot and will not have a slave holding Bishop,
and turning to the South, they instantly determine that they have and will have one.
They refuse to request Bishop Andrew to resign, and then turn round and blame him
for not doing what they thought it improper to request of him. They order an expla
nation of the whole affair by several of their most distinguished men, each a host in
himself, as it regards character, learning, and influence, and then refuse to adopt it.
They direct the argument and opinions of Drs. Durbin, Peck, and Elliott to be spread
upon their Journals without official sanction, and yet ostensibly as the judgment of the

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Conference. Take then, the action of the Conference upon Finley's resolution, and it
will be seen that the positions and reasoning of tlie Protest are fully sustained. And
turning to Mitchell's resolutions, giving a new aspect to the whole subject by addition
al and different action, and it will appear equally clear that Bishops Soule and Andrew
have acted in perfect conformity with the only intelligible position the Conference final
ly chose to assume, in relation to the whole affair.
Recent intimations that Mitchell's explanation is yet to be explained, seem to indicate
that the great Northern party are by no means settled as to purpose or policy, end or
means. What the result may be as it regards these, we have no means of knowing.
We know, it is true, for we have the evidence in our possession, that there is a large
amount of dissent and dissatisfaction North, in relation to the course pursued by the
official Press, but whether such dissent will ever be developed and embodied in any
available action, admits of doubt. It is not unlikely the principal, results will be con
fined to want of confidence, division, and distraction among the different sections of the
party. Editors charged with the management of the Church, the General Conference, the
Episcopacy, the Annual Conferences, and so on, as the greater includes the less, aro
certainly potent agents, and wield effective instrumentalities, and may ward off evils
which we deem inevitable. Meanwhile, it is our opinion that, however party policy
and interest may hold the great Northern mass together for a short time, (supposing
the South to organize,) yet at no distant day, the anti-slavery of the more Northern
Conferences, will drive off all connected with slavery in the Baltimore, Philadelphia,
Pittsburg, and Ohio Conferences, as well as societies "adhering" North, on the South
ern border, or failing in this, will declare themselves independent, and throw them
selves in conflict with the Conferences now connected with slavery. Were the slave
holding portions of the Conferences just named, to unite with the South, (an event not
at all likely to oecur, as will soon be shown by the Baltimore Conference,) the entire
North might remain together, but in view of the course things are now taking, continu
ed union is extremely improbable. So soon as these sections are found in a state of
actual wardship under the Northern guardians of the Church, it will be demanded- of
them to relieve the Church North of the last vestige of slavery. This demand will no
doubt, be resisted, and disunion and conflict, followed by separation, will be the result.
Without the compromise shown in these pages to have so long distinguished the rela
tions of "Methodism and Slavery," it is impossible they can live together in peace,
although hostility to the South may keep them together for the purposes of defence and
aggression as a party. The pertinence of the following language, from a Northern
source, in no way implicated in this controversy, will be appreciated by good sense every
where. The various necessities (of the Church,) are sometimes too obstinately discor
dant to be met by any general laws, and yet general laws alone can be passed. Such are
the contrarieties of views, principles, interests, and ulterior objects, that the legislation
of the General Conference is of sheer necessity, conducted on the principle and in the
spirit of compromise." The- vigorous minded author ofthe above sentence saw clearly,
that the moral and ecclesiastical cannot be separated from the political relations of slave
ry wherever it exists, under the high sanction of the civil polity of the country, and wc
have seen that it so exists in the United States. Our connection with slavery is strictly
national. It exists in the South by consent cf the North, and from the very foundations
of the government blends indissolubly with our national existence and relations. The
responsibility, whether as it regards its existence, continuance, or removal, belongs to
the nation as such, and not to the South alone. This opinion has been deliberately
16

122
avowed, ndt only by the first statesmen and jurists of the country, but virtually, as we
have seen, by Congress, and gravely and formally by nearly one half the State Legisla
tures of the Union, in connection with the objects of African Colonization, particularly
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia,
Georgia, Tennessee, Ohio, Kentucky, and Indiana, seven of them being non-slave hold
ing States. Any attempt to palm the evil upon the South as sectional, can only be the
result of ignorance or ill nature. The great act and means of our nationalization, both
as a people and as several different States in union — :the formation and adoption of the
national constitution, places this beyond dispute. So far as slavery is evil, it is the na
tion that has sinned, and the nation must make the atonement, in some form or other.
The slave States have never shown themselves unwilling to make their share of the
atonement, by safe and proper methods. Speaking of Southern emancipation and the
separation of the races, Mr. Jefferson says, "although more important to the slave
States, it is highly so to the others also, if they were serious in their arguments on the
Missouri question. The slave States too, if more interested, would also contribute more
by their gratuitous liberation, thus taking upon themselves alone, the first and heav
iest item of expense." If it be alledged that the system of Southern domestic slavery
precludes the hope that the South will so act as to sustain the high interests of civil
liberty in the United States, it will perhaps be sufficient to reply to the charge, as did
Edmund Burke to a similar charge in the British Parliament : "the people of the South
ern colonies of America, are much more strongly, and with a higher and more stubborn
spirit, attached to liberty, than those to the Northward."
We are tempted again to ask, why the South is denounced with such unsparing bit
terness for doing only what our denouncers glory in having done themselves? The
Northern organs of the General Conference, assure the Church, as quietly as though
they had right to do so, that ministers and people are under no obligation of any kind,
to be governed by the action of that body on the subject of separation, declaring the
whole to be unauthorized and not entitled to deference and submission on the part of the
Church. We have seen that with infinitely better reason for what they did, in resist
ing the prosecution of Bishop Andrew, and with constitutional and moral right to
which, the North can lay no claim, the South have done abstractly, nothing but what
the North has, and why then so much bluster and menace against us, while their own
conduct is all well enough? Does it not show at least that party and not principle is
the guiding influence?
The Reply, if we understand it, perversely supposes the Protest to assume that the
constitution and laws of the United States and of the slave-holding States respectively,
are such that these must be violated by any effort toward the emancipation of the negro.
No such idea is conveyed in any part of the Protest. Nor is the reasoning of that pa
per touched by the alternative so much stressed by the Reply, that law must require
slave holding on the one hand, or merely allow it on the other. The logic of the Pro
test is not at fault unless it can be shown that this alternative view of the subject is
correct in States where emancipation is impracticable, and this cannot be done, for the
assumption of the Reply is contrary to notorious fact. In Georgia, for" example, and
nearly all the Southern States, a citizen holding slaves is required to hold unless he
transfer his title, which transfer does not affect the legal servitude of the slave. What
is meant by the Protest in this respect, and is contended for in the argument of this Re
view is, that the law of slavery in most of the slave holding States, does not allow the
freedom of the slave and prohibits interference of any kind with the relations or rights of
the citizen holding slaves, and it is charged that contrary to its published creed and

123
pledged faith, the Church has so interfered at different times and in numerous instan
ces. If we have failed to make good the charge, the North have the disposition and
ability to make it appear, and let it be done. In disposing of several miscellaneous
items in this connection, we take great pleasure in repeating, what is felt to be but a
simple act of justice, that in speaking of the abolition and anti-slavery of England and
the North of the United States, we have, as before explained, no intention to implicate
or in any way censure the entire people found in either, but ask distinctly that the appli
cation of our strictures and reasoning may be confined to two classes, those practically
engaged in the oonduct and movements we have described : and second, those who either
approve or fail to resist them. If it is not our object to show that the good people of
England and the North of the United States, viewed as an entire people, are worse
than those of the Southern States,' but that they are no belter, and that the stupidly ab
surd boasting of abolition and anti-slavery, in behalf of tho former, can be very satis
factorily replied toby the latter, whenever it is necessary. From large portions. of
the people of England and the North, we receive nothing but outrage and insult — the
anathemas of illnature rather than the sympathies of brotherhood, and conscious we do
not deserve the treatment we receive, we have thought it but just and right to let it be
seen by whom and under what show of claim we are thus cursed and banned. On this
topic we have sustained our views almost exclusively by English and Northern wit
nesses, and these not few in number or questionable in character. We have said of
England, nothing more than what Englishmen have said — one of her distinguished sons
for example, in the North British Review, "injustice, oppression, and degradation, in
too many quarters of the globe, have been the sole fruits of British interference." We
have said of the North nothing, it is believed, which does injustice to the truth of his
tory. Of the South, in connection with the many unnecessary and wanton abuses, in the
shape of inhumanity and vice, more or less incident to the system of slavery, we have
spoken plainly and without reserve, and have only defended the South so far as we be
lieve truth and justice entitle her to defense. Truth and plain dealing have been our
object. We have no eherished ulterior aims to accomplish, beyond an attempt to ren
der the subject in controversy less difficult and intractable to those who may wish to
understand it. We have written under the full and strong conviction, that the igno
rance in which the popular mind of the nation has been kept by its teachers, respecting
the true relations of the North and South on the subject of slavery, is a stupendous
fraud upon the unsuspecting credulity of millions, and fatally tending to the over
throw of the great national brotherhood, in which they are now so happily blended.
We repeat, it is not our wish, it is no part of our purpose, -to defend individuals or the
South in regard to any of the abuses of slavery, such as cruelty of any kind to slaves,
neglect of their comfort, inattention to their wants, violation of their rights — the infa
mous practice of driving an internal tradein slaves, with its usual attendant enormities
for the purposes of gain ; these and all kindred evils, we abhor and denounce, and shall
always continue to do so, as utterly inconsistent with either religion or humanity, and
as deserving the scorn and contempt of both. The Reply most disingenuously as we
think, tries to involve the Bishops in the prosecution of Bishop Andrew. They say
the Majority had it "forced" upon them by the address of the Bishops. The Bishops,
however, made no allusion to any difficulty or disability preventing Bishop Andrew
from doing the work of a general superintendent, and in their address on Bishop An
drew's case, expressly affirm the contrary of what the Reply attempts to fix upon them.
They say in terms, that work could be given to Bishop Andrew, where he would be
cordially received, "without any infraction of a constitutional principle." The con-

124
struction of the Reply was disavowed by the Bishops before the Reply was written, and
the injustice to the Bishops is without excuse. The attempt of the Reply, endorsed
by Advocates, &c. to make it appear that to hold slaves in the Southern States stands
in the same relation to personal choice, and the virtues of good character with the pat
ronage of the theatre, grog shop, and gaming table, will prove too attractive not to en
gage the attention of the reader without further comment from us, A cipher, whether
as it regards persons or things, does not always pass for naught, and will not in this in
stance. The Church, both in law and practice, has always made the distinction and
recognized the difference it seems to be the object of the Reply to deny and confound.
The Reply urges most strenuously, that unless a Bishop shall travel throughout the
whole extent of territory embraced by all the Annual Conferences in the American con
nection, he cannot be constitutionally, a general superintendent, and it is argued that as
the North are not disposed to receive Bishop Andrew in that character, of course he
cannot be one. This whole argument is entirely fallacious for several reasons : 1st.
AVhat it requires is impossible, during the quadrennial intervals of the General Con
ference. 2d. It has not been the uniform practice of the Bishops for the last twenty
years. 3d. The disqualification of Bishop Andrew, can only be made out in view of a
demand of abolition and anti-slavery, not only extra-legal but unlawful ; not only does
no law require it, but it is contrary to law. And finally, the reicrse of what is assumed
has been repeatedly authorized by the General Conference. That of 1840 for example,
resolved that the Bishops be recommended "to make such an apportionment ofthe
work among themselves, as shall in their judgment most effectually promote the general
good." In 1832 the General Conference resolved, "it is inexpedient to require each of
our Bishops to travel throughout the whole of their extensive charge during the recess
of the General Conference," and they recommend the Episcopacy so to arrange their
general oversight in this respect, as shall best suit their own convenience. The Gen
eral Conference of 1824, resolved that "it is highly expedient for the general super
intendents to meet in council at every session of the General Conference, to form their
plan of traveling through their charge, whether in a circuit after each other, or dividing
the connection into Episcopal Departments as to them may appear proper and most con
ducive to the general good." The Bishops in May last, said, "no constitutional princi
ple would be infringed by giving Bishop Andrew work where he would be cordially re
ceived." The Reply, therefore, is entirely at fault in this matter, as the General Con
ference has, at several different times, expressly authorized what they affirm would des
troy the Episcopacy altogether! If riot "to travel at large," through all the Annual
Conferences, destroys the validity of Methodist Episcopacy, did not the late General
Conference violate one of the restrictive rules, in the quasi location of Bishop Andrew,
without finding hirn guilty of offense against some law of the Church?
It has been shown that under semblance of conformity to the provisions of a consti
tution and the forms of law, an unlawful and even fraudulent use may be made of both,
and resistance in all such, and in all analogous cases, is the only remedy left the injured
party. The South "broke the tables" but not "the law." The North broke the law and then
destroyed the tables, by proclaiming the Legislature superior to the Constitution, the res
trictive articles only excepted. The South maintain that the law of the land, as the
general rule and by fair implication, is to be regarded as a fundamental principle of ec
clesiastical law, and that any attempt by Church action, to invade or unsettle rights and
relations connected with the subject matter of the civil code, and accredited by the sov
ereignty of the National will, is as alien to Methodism as it is manifestly "unscrip-

125
tural," and if we have seemed to break the letter of the Church law, in some aspects
of the subject, it was only to maintain its spirit and purpose in others of much more
importance. The object of the attempt to make the South a "secession," is two fold. It is ex
pected to be a permanent bond of union between the abolition and old anti-slavery
parties. ' They hope to have no further cause of quarrel as during the late "Radico
abolition" war, and it also tends lo the gratification of a large amount of personal
grudge and spleen indulged in by Northern leaders, towards individuals in the South,
who have been so unfortunate as to become somewhat prominent in this controversy.
A third motive, connected with the funds of the Church, has its influence with some,
who cannot help betraying their reverence for ihe.buller, but we do not believe it applies
to the North generally, nor will we believe it, until they refuse to divide as ordered by
the General Conference, which we are quite sure the upright masses in the ministry
and membership North, will not permit their leaders to do.
The Reply bases several of its conclusions upon the fact that the action of the Ma
jority against Bishop Andrew, was called for by the abolition petitions presented to the
Conference. The reasoning of the Repliers in this respect, is directly opposed to a formal
decision ofthe General Conference of 1840, which declares that petitions relating to gen
eral interests and not involving personal grievance, are to be considered only as the
opinions and arguments of the signers, and not prayer for relief under protection of
the right of petition. We must, therefore,, understand the Majority as endorsing the
doctrines of the petitions, or else dissenting from General Conference authority.
Which was intended?
Another fallacy of the Manifesto is, it seems to connect the principal functions of
Episcopacy with the mere fact of "traveling at large," whereas the true idea of general
superintendency is, the extent and universality of the Bishop's oversight and jurisdic
tion, as it regards all the various interests of the Church "temporal and spiritual,"
aud it would have been much more consistent with the constitution and laws of the
Church, if instead of the unlawful attempt to exclude Bishop Andrew, from the North,
on account of a connection with slavery authorized by the Church, (as we have shown,)
thev had urged the duly of his oversight in that direction, to resist and subdue the inva
sion and defiance of law and order by anti-slavery extravagance. Another of the pro-
abolition heresies of the Reply is, that what is avowedly founded in grace, the will and
call of Christ, we mean the oversight and jurisdiction of a christian -Bishop, according
to the ordination service, may be forfeited or at least annulled without sin or moral
offense of any kind. What right can the Church have to remove, punish, or in any
way embarrass a man called by Christ to the "work and office" of a Bishop, when it is
not even alledged that he has sinned against any law of Christ? Whatever else it may
be, this is not Methodism.
We had long hoped and believed that the salvation of the slave would prove a salva-
tory clause in the anti-slavery creed of Northern Methodism, and so arrest the vandal
inroads of abolitionism, as to allow the "gospel free course" among the slaves of the
South. We re-advert to the subject because no urgency of appeal can equal its im
portance. By how mueh Hell is worse than the social bondage of the slave, and Hea
ven preferable to any condition the result of his liberation ; by how far eternity is more
important than time, thus infinitely does the poor negro need the gospel more than any
thinn- else, and hundreds of thousands of them are now annually receiving it at the
hands of the Southern ministry. This work, however, the North is steadily retarding
by its whole course of policy on the subject of slavery. Not satisfied with inspiring

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the slave with impatience and discontent in relation to his earthly lot, they dash from
his lips the cup of salvation, and leave him to his fate. If they "remember those that
are in bonds," it is certainly not "as bound with them." In this respect they are indeed
fearful defaulters in the cause of the negro. How very differently did the good Asbury
think and feel on this great question of life and death to the negro. Assuming the
truth of Park's Travels and similar accounts of Africa, he says, "the Africans are in a
state so wretched, that any sufferings with the gospel, would be preferred." After a
long and conscientious struggle with his early abolition principles and feelings, this
good man clung to the compromise of these pages, as the true ground to be occupied
by the Church, declaring his maxim to be, "all is right that works right — all is wrong
that works wrong."
Before dismissing this general topic, it may be proper to notice a covert intimation of
the Reply, to the effect that whatever may be the protection extended or the rights se
cured to the owner of slaves by the constitution and laws of the United States and the
States respectively, where slavery exists, it can be no ground of argument or action in
the pending struggle between the North and South. We believe, however, the intel
ligent reader will be prepared to decide, in view of the evidence submitted, that the pro
tection and security in question, are just and necessary grounds' of both argument and
action, and that the doctrine of the Majority in this respect, has been constantly disa
vowed by the Church from 1800 to 1844. The standing laws of the Church during this
entire period, have pledged the public faith of the whole body, that where emancipation
is impracticable, consistently with civil law, it shall not be required of any person or class,
as the condition of Church privileges or ecclesiastical relations. The deliberate and
undoubted violation of this pledge hy the General Conference of 1844, taught the South
ern portion of the Church, that the larger division of it North, had abandoned the legal
compromise of the Discipline upon which the South had so long and confidently reposed,
and that the future relations of the slave holding and non-slave holding Conferences,
would have to be adjusted upon a different basis. This conviction produced the Protest,
and after protracted and anxious deliberation, the parties "in General Conference
assembled," mutually agreed upon a "constitutional plan" of separation, giving to each
division distinct and independent jurisdiction.
In offering some remarks in the shape of an outline argument upon the rights and
powers of Episcopacy, and the General Conference, respectively, before we close, it is
not intended to touch the theological argument distinguishing a Bishop from a Presby
ter, nor yet to discuss the scriptural rights and claims of a Christian Bishop, but mere
ly to fix the place, and ascertain the true relations and consequent constitutional rights
of a Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church, as the chief executive officer known in
its government. The difference of opinion on this subject, between the North and the
South, the Protest and Reply, turns entirely upon the strictly ecclesiastical relations of
a Bishop in the government of the Church. About the scriptural character of a Chris
tian Bishop we may differ in opinion, but have no dispute. The incipient controversy,
likely to become as serious, in many respects, as that on slavery, hinges, in every ele
mentary sense, upon the Bishop's proper constitutional participation in the governing
power of the Church. In the theory of Methodist Church government, as found in the
Discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and variously explained and illustrated
in the history and publications of the Church, Bishops are regarded as a third order in
the ministry only, in view of their governing powers as church or ecclesiastical rulers.
They are a third order, not in the institution of the Christian Ministry, as derived from
Christ, but in the structure of the government which claims lo be divinely authorized,

127
because consistent with the doctrine and practice of the New Testament, without being
required by it, to the exclusion of other forms of government. Or still more explicit
ly, the present controversy turns upon the distribution, by the organic laws ofthe
Church, of the necessary powers and attributes of every government, between the
Episcopacy and General Conference. No question arises as to what ought to be the
distribution of power, but the inquiry is absolutely restricted to the fact of distribution,
as the government is known to have been organized and administered. It does not de
volve upon us, nor would it be at all in place, to show in what respects the govern
ment might have been more consistently or advantageously adjusted. The only ques
tion is, how has it been adjusted in point of fact? What are the constitution and laws,
and what is the evidence of practice and usage, as it regards the existing conflict of
right and claim between the Episcopacy and the General Conference? After what man-
¦ ner, by whom, and for what purposes was Episcopacy introduced and established?
How, and by whom, and with what power and rights was the General Conference or
ganized? In what relation do they stand to each other? What are the proper func
tions of each? In what defined relation, especially, does each stand to the legislative,
judicial, and executive power of the government? These and similar topics become
the true text of discussion, apart from all speculation as to how things might have been
better arranged. We offer no defence of Methodist Episcopacy. With the abstract
right or wrong of its theory we have nothing to do. Whether it have more or less
power than it ought to have, is a question not mooted at all. What is the theory, and
what the vested power and rights of the Episcopacy, by our present form of constitu
tional government, is the true and only question. It is charged in the Protest, and be
lieved in the South, that the late General Conference invaded rights originally secured
to the Episcopacy as a constitutional trust, and over which the General Conference has
no control, except in its judicial capacity, upon conviction of misconduct, and forfeit
ure of right. We have never doubted, for a moment, that the General Conference
transcended its powers in action, and avowed principles and opinions subversive of the
constitution and government nf the Church. This opinion is not confined to the South.
Many, among the old and the wise of the North, entertain it, and are not without fear
and anxiety as to the future.
In the very cursory examination we shall be able to give this subject, we shall do
little more than attempt to indicate the data and trains of reasoning, connected with the
conclusions we avow. The Majority of the late General Conference claim, in behalf of
that body, that it is thesource of Episcopal power in the Methodist Episcopal Church.
This claim will be found in the Debates, the Reply, and in all the Northern Advocates.
It has been put forth with significant minuteness in a hundred different forms. Taking
rank among the notabilities of Bishop Hamline's really able and eloquent speech, it has
continued to maintain its prominence down to the last hebdomadal effusions of the
Northern press, and some great men have gone so far as to give notice that vows are
upon them to sacrifice even life, if it be necessary, upon the altar of its defence ! We
trust, however, that such costly sacrifices will not be found necessary. Meanwhile, let
us attend to the claim itself. What has been the doctrine of the Church on the subject
for the sixty years of its existence? The testimony of Dr. Coke, the first Bishop of
the Methodist Episcopal Church, is, that "Mr. Wesley was recognized by the whole
body of American Methodists as the fountain of our Episcopal office." Dr. Emory
says, "Mr. Wesley did institute an Episcopacy for the American Methodists." The
Wesleyan Methodist Magazine says, "the Episcopacy itself was of Mr. Wesley's en-
acting." In the Minutes and Discipline of 1789, the Episcopacy of the Church is ex-

128
pressly said to be derived from Wesley "by regular order and succession." Dr. Emory
says, "if the ordination of Dr. Coke, (as Bishop,) was not an ordination proper, and
not a mere appointment to office, it was certainly a very solemn mockery — a trifling
with sacred things." Dr. Bangs sayrs, "the Methodist Episcopal Church was organized
under the direction of Mr. Wesley." Dr. Coke distinctly informs us he acted, in the
organization of the Methodist Episcopal Church, "under delegated authority from Mr.
Wesley." Mr. Wesley having ordained one, and provided, by formal commission, for
the ordination of the other, says, "I have appointed Dr. Coke and Mr. Asbury Joint
Superintendants." The Discipline speaks of "letters of Episcopal ordination" receiv
ed from Mr. AVesley, and also informs us that the Coriference of 1784, when the Church
was organized, "receive!" Coke and Asbury as their Bishops, appointed by Wesley,
"being fully satisfied of the validity of their Episcopal ordination." In the ordination
credentials of Coke and Asbury, there is no allusion to any power or right, as derived
from the American Preachers, by election. Dr. Elliott says, that "Mr. Wesley having
full power and perfect right to do so, provided for the American Methodists a plan of
Church government and Church offices." He says, Wesley was "the acknowledged
Bishop of the connection in America." He says, "we had no possible chance to obtain
an Episcopacy except from Wesley." He speaks of Wesley as the "leading agent" in
the organization of the Methodist Episcopal Church. He says the American Metho
dists appealed to him "as their Bishop or Chief Presbyter," with right to govern them.
He declares Wesley "ecclesiastically called to this Episcopal work." He maintains
that ours, "as received from Wesley, is a genuine Episcopacy." The venerable Mor
rell says, of the original institution of Methodist Episcopacy, "distinct ordination
proves a different degree of order, if Mr. Wesley's conduct is to be admitted in proof."
Coke and Asbury say Mr. Wesley consecrated the former Bishop, and directed him to .
consecrate the latter, "that our Episcopacy might descend from himself." Dr. Bangs
says, "Mr. Wesley ordained Dr. Coke to this very office," (the Episcopal,) and sent
him to America "with power to ordain others, and exercise functions which appertained
not to simple Presbyters." He says, of Methodist Episcopacy, it was of Mr. Wesley's
"own creation — the child of his choice." He adds, "Mr. Wesley certainly intended
Dr. Coke and Mr. Asbury to exercise jurisdiction over the whole Church in America."
And again, "Episcopal powers were certainly invested in them" by Mr. Wesley, and,
says the Doctor, there "was an Episcopal jurisdiction, to all intents and purposes."
Dr. Emory says, further, "Mr. Wesley established an Episcopal order of Ministers."
"Mr. Wesley intended to establish the ordination of an order of Superintendents, to
act as Bishops in fact." He affirms Mr. Wesley "did, in fact, claim and exercise Epis
copal authority" in America, and was, in fact, our first Bishop. P. P. Sandford saysj,
"Methodist Episcopacy emanated from Wesley." Dr. Phoebus says, "our orders in the
Church are from God, we received them from Christ by Wesley." Again, Dr. Bangs
says, "John Wesley, the founder of Methodist Episcopacy." He adds, "Wesley was
tbe head of the connection, and as such gave law and direction to the whole body."
Charles Wesley says of his brother, "he consecrated a Bishop and sent him to Ameri
ca." Dr. Coke says, "from Wesley I received my commission." This is the common
current language of our Church writers. All unite in tracing the Episcopal office to
Wesley as its source and fountain. How the General Conference came to be mixed up
and united wiLh the authority of Wesley, in giving birth and perpetuity to Methodist
Episcopacy, we shall see at proper length in its place, and will only remark here, that
the confusion of origin and misapprehension, as to strictly Episcopal investiture, seem
to have been occasioned by two circumstances especially : 1st, The purpose of Asbury

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not to accept ordination, as directed by Wesley, without the previous concurrence of
the American Preachers, and the fact that they did concur, both in his Case and Coke's.
And, 2d, The additional fact, that in the instance of all their coadjutors or surcessors,
it was determined that the designation should be by the body of Traveling Ministers.
From these facts, two things have been assumed as vital to Methodist Episcopacy. 1st,
That the body of American Preachers were creatively concerned in its origination ; and
2nd, That the rights and authority of the Investiture— the office, are, in every proper
sense, derived from them. Both these conclusions are not only faulty, but erroneous,
as we shall have occasion t6 see, and have been used as the premises of oiher conclu
sions equally untenable.
At present, however, let us briefly enquire after the rights and powers of the Epis
copacy, as avowed and advocated by the Church since its first organization. A brief
general glance at the subject here will be sufficient. Other necessary views of the
subject will come in elsewhere. Bishop Asbury says, "there is not, nor indeed in my
mind can there be, a perfect equality between a constant President, (Bishop,) and those
over whom he always presides." Dr. Emory says, from Stillingfleet, in relation to the
ceremony of Episcopal ordination, "the bare imposition of hands did not confer any
power, but with that ceremony they joined those words wliereby they did'confer author
ity." Dr. Bangs says, in relation to the Episcopacy of the' Methodist Church in the
United States, "the British Methodists have no visible head, but we have." Dr. Emory,
in showing Bishops to be superior to Presbyters, speaks of a Bishop as the'1 "constitu
ted organ" of the Church, for the purposes of ordination and jurisdiction. Dr. Bangs
remarks, "as to the government, the title sufficiently ascertains its distinctive character,,
it being ih fact and name Episcopal." And again, speaking of a Bishop of the Metho
dist Episcopal Church, he maintains he is "a superior minister, possessing a delegated
jurisdiction, chiefly of an executive character."' So, also, Dr. Emory, "the forms of
ordination prepared for us by Mr. Wesley, for setting apart our Superintendents and
Elders, were merely an abridgement of the forms of the Church of England, for setting
apart Bishops and Priests, clearly intending the same ecclesiastical officers in each case."
Dr. Bangs says, further, of our Bishops, that they are the "Chief Ministers" of the
Church. Also, that "at the organization of the Church, in 1784, the power of appoint
ing the Preachers was invested in the' Bishops." He also says, "we approximate near
er, in respect to the power of ordination, to the Presbyterians, while, as it respects the
power of jurisdiction, we form nearly a parallel line with the Protestant.Episcopalians."
He adds, of Bishops, "'this order of Ministers isrecognized in our Church ; to them is
committed thechief government of the Church ; they are consecrated especially for this
service." The Conference of 1784 resolved, "we will form ourselves into an Episco
pal Church, under the direction of- Superintendents, &c." Dr. Emory affirms, "Mr.
Wesley established an Episcopal order of Ministers, .and recommended to us a solemn
form for the selling apart and ordaining such an Order ; a form for the ordaining of Su
perintendents among us, in the same manner that Bishops are ordained, in the Church
of England, with the same solemnities, and- for' the same purposes — to preside over the
flock of Christ, including the Pr-esbylers." He adds, "is not an Episcopal order of
Ministers' an Episcopacy, in fact?" ' Also, "if, by Superintendents, Mr. Wesley did
not mean that order of Ministers, denominated by the Church of England, and the
Protestant Episcopal Church, Bishops, neither, by Elders, did he mean that order of
Ministers denominated by those Churches, Priests." The Doctor continues, "Dr. Coke
was set apart by Mr. Wesley to superintend and preside over the whole body of Methodist
Preachers on this continent, and to exercise all the powers usually considered Episcopal."
17

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And further, bespeaks of the "delegated jurisdiction of our Bishops." He says, "our
Bishops are an order of Ministers distinct from, and superior to, other Presbyters, in
thai exlenl of jurisdiction, and in those executive powers delegated lo them." Bishop
McKendree says, "a Bishop having pie general oversight of the temporal and spiritual
concerns of ihe Church, is, of course, authorized to attend to any and all matters,
small and great, in the execution of Discipline." The authorities and evidence thus
cited, may be regarded as general in language, and miscellaneous in bearing. This,
to some extent, is true, but at the same time, when we come to apply the language, in
each instance, and by analysis seek its meaning, we meet with nothing vague or inex
plicit, but the whole, strikingly consistent in all its parts, is found drifting in ihe same
"direction, and conveying the definite ide?. of a pervading principle of action — a substan
tive power of control, in the government of the Methodist Episcopal Church. This
guiding principle, this directing agency, may not be, in itself, or in relation to other
things, what many would have it; it may be too strong for some, too weak for others ;
fault may be found, and difficulties urged; objections may be interposed, and consequen
ces dreaded ; Scylla may be started back from on the one hand, and Charybdis on the
other; but all this has nothing to do with the question engrossing us, which is simply to
ascertain, if possible, what is the doctrine, what the avowed opinions of the Methodist
Episcopal Church on this subject? .And, in an enquiry of this kind, appeal must be had
to the constitution and laws ofthe Church, to precedent and usage, the acts of adminis
tration, the nature and fitness of things, as.well as the judgment and views of the best
accredited expounders of the polity and discipline of the Church. Neither party can set
tle the question by proclamation, or an ''order in council ;" the law and the testimony
must become the rule of judgment. We do not obtrude our own opinions. We prove
our positions by the founders, fathers and guardians of the Church. Speaking for them
selves, they tell another guise tale than that of the Protest about Methodist Episcopacy.
An Episcopacy of which Wesley is the "fountain," which he ''instituted" and "enacted,"
derived from him in "regular order and succession ;" ah Episcopal "ordination proper,
not a mere appointment to office;" Episcopal Church, "organized under the direction of
Wesley ;" joint Bishops "appointed" by Wesley; "Episcopal ordination received from
Wesley." The American Preachers "received" their Bishops, as "appointed" by Wesley;
"fully satisfied of the validity of their Episcopal ordination." Wesley "the acknowl
edged Bishop ofthe connexion." Church government and officers "provided" by Wes
ley ; no chance of an Episcopacy "except from Wesley." He "called to this Episcopal
work;" this a "genuine Episcopacy; " "descended" from Wesley; result of a. "dis
tinct ordination" by Wesley ; conferring powers not to be claimed by "simple Presby
ters ; Episcopacy of "Wesley's own creation;" a "child" of his; Wesley giving Coke
and Asbury "jurisdiction over the whole Church in America;" "investing in them
Episcopal powers;" "establishing an Episcopal order;" "Bishops in fact;" Wesley
"claiming and exercising Episcopal authority;" from Wesley "emanated" Episcopacy;
ecclesiastical "orders received from Wesley;" Wesley "the Founder of Methodist Epis
copacy ;" "head of the connexion ;" gave law and direction to the whole body ;" "con
secrated a Bishop ;" Episcopal "commission" received from Wesley. Now, if all, or
but a small part of this be true, how is Episcopacy an emanation from the General Con
ference? In what sense is the General Conference its source? With what show of
truth or fairness was the claim set up, for the first time, at the last meeting of that
body? But agcin, a Bishop "superior" to those over whom he "presides ;" "authori
ty" conferred by "ordination ;" Bishop the "head" of the Church ; the "constituted or
gan" of the Church ; Episcopacy giving "distinctive character" to the government of

131
the Church ; a "superior Minister ;" having "delegated jurisdiction." The same "ec
clesiastical officer" as Bishop in the English Establishment ; "chief Minister ;" "pow
er invested" in the Bishop ; "power of ordination and jurisdiction ;" having the "chief
government;" "to preside over the whole body" of Ministers ; with "all the powers
Usually considered Episcopal; "distinct from, and superior to Presbyters; both as to
"ordination and jurisdiction ;" having the "general oversight." It is not more cer
tainly the doctrine of the Methodist Church, that Episcopacy was exclusively derived
from Wesley, than that it is a. constitutional substantive power, and not merely ministe
rial agency in the structure and government of the Church. The language we have
quoted can be misunderstood by no one. Methodist Episcopacy, as -an institute, both in
view of its origination and perpelxdiy, is derived from Wesley, and Wesley alone, ac
cording to all the chosen witnesses of the Church. To concur with Wesley, as peti
tioners for the boon, and "receive" at his hand, was all tho American Preachers or So
cieties had to do with the matter. <
Dr. Emory, in giving the model of Methodist Episcppacy, from Stillingfleet, gives
the following quotations, and adopts them as principles of Methodist polity : "The
Church delegates to the Episcopacy'a more peculiar exercise ofthe power of jurisdic
tion." "The jurisdiction of Presbyters was restrained by mutual consent." "It be
longs to those who are appointed" (Bishops.) "By this we may understand how law
ful the exercise of an EpiScqpal power may be in the Church of God, supposing an
equality in all Church officers as to the power of order." "The Church may, in a pe
culiar, manner, single out some of its officers for the due administration of Episcopal
power." "By the great harmony of both, carrying on the affairs of the Church."
"The management of ordination and Church power, by the Presidency of the Bishop,
and the concurrence of the Presbytery." "A "twofold power belonging to Church offi
cers) a power of order and a power of jurisdiction." Stillingfleet insists that the pow
er of ordination and jurisdiction inherent in Presbyters, is, upon its delegation to the
Episcopacy "restrained (in ihe Presbyters) by ecclesiastical laws." In relation to these
and numerous other positions to the same effect, Dr. Emory remarks, emphatically, "so
say we." Bishop Asbury says, "if our titlehad hot been Methodist Episcopal Church,
and if the English translation had' not rendered Episcopoi Bishops, well contented am
I to be called Superintendent, not Bishop. They say we (Bishops and Elders) are the
same order ; then why not the same names in Greek and English? Why not Deacons
and Bishops of the same order?" The Discipline of 1789, enquires, "what is tho prop
er origin of Episcopal authority in our Church?" In the answer, election by the Con
ference is not recognized as in any Way creative of Episcopacy, or as being its source.
Bishop Hamline affirms, of Bishop Roberts, "through his peers the Holy Ghost made
him overseer. That office, (Episebpal,) he executed by the highest warrant on earth.
He shed lustre on his own ordained circle." He adds, "Episcopal prerogatives pre
scribed by the law of the Church." The ordination service in making and consecrating
a Bishop, assumes that the person ordained is called of God to the special ministry of
a Bishop, as distinguished from Elder and Deacon, for each of which orders we have a
separate ordination. Dr. Elliott says, "no change which obstructs them in the dis
charge of their duty, can be effected constitutionally by the General Conference. Dr.
Emory argues at length, and conclusively, that a resort to the solemnities of ordina
tion, in the case of mere appointment to labor, is a novelty unknown to Methodism, and
treats the supposition as absurd and ridiculous. In these quotations, the Church dele
gates power to' the Bishop ; this power no longer belongs to the Presbyters ; the Church
singles out men for the exercise of Episcopal power ; the Bishop presides, the Presby-

132
ters concur ; the latter are restricted by law — by mutual consent in the act of delega
ting power ; difference of order jn the sense before noticed, is argued from difference
of title ; authority and right are not derived- from election in any conclusive sense. The
Bishop is chosen overseer by the Holy Ghost, is accredited by the highest warrant of
earth ; bis prerogatives settled by prescription of law ; his circle is his own — an exclu
sive sphere; his ministry is special, by God's appointment; the General Confereace even,
is without power or right, (unless usurped,) to obstruct him in the discharge of duty; or
dination is a sacred consecration to office, not a mere appointment to labor, as most ab
surdly contended by the late General Conference. Can a tithe of all this claim be found
in the Protest? Does that instrument go half as far as these guides of the Church?
And beside, the Protest merely designed asserting the general doctrine ofthe Church on
the subject, and showing that it had been departed from, and was misrepresented by the
Majority. The object of the Protest was, to show that the General Conference claimed
what, by constitutional right, belonged to the Episcopacy ; and, moreover, attempted to
assert the claim by unlawful means. The Conference, for example, assumed the right
within themselves, to make and constitute Bishops ; they assumed the power of removal
because permitted by the Annual Conferences, to select the incumbent'; they claimed
that the powers invested in the Episcopacy before the General Conference existed, were
nevertheless, found only in themselves ; that they could rightfully perform all the func^
tions of Episcopacy — that they could make a Bishop to day and unmake him to-morrow,
without any infringement of right, the preposterous absurdity was avowed that they
could of right, having all power, do any thing they saw proper, not only without law
but in violation of it, excepting only the half dozen items prohibited in the Restrictive
Rules. It is not meant to say that all these positions were formally avowed by- the
Conference as such, but each was assumed in behalf of the Conference, as may be seen
by reference to the Debates, the Manifesto, and the Northern advocates of subsequent
date, and so far as we know, none of them have been disavowed by any considerable
portion of the Northern Church. Each has the ineffaceable endorsement of Bishop
Hamline, and has received the equally ineffaceable endorsement of the Majority in his
election. In a word, we have the type of a New Episcopacy. We have the effect of
additional legislation without its forms, changing the relations and rights, if not en-,
tirely subverting the old Wesleyan Episcopacy of the Church, Which is the better
theory — which should be preferred by the Church is a question not in dispute. The
charge preferred against the Majority is, that they have innovated upon the existing
system, and have done so by means unlawful and dangerous, because revolutionary in
their tendency.
Dr. Bangs says, "three forms of consecration, all separate and distinct!" Among
the grounds of Episcopal claim in his own instance, Bishop Asbury ranks "divine au
thority," "seniority in America," "ordination," by Coke and others, and the "signs of
an Apostle," (meaning the manifest approval of Heaven and the Church) showing that
although he certainly attached value to his election (by being "received" as the ap
pointee of Wesley,) yet he did not rely upon it as in itself accrediting his Episcopal
claims. Coke and Asbury inform us that the Episcopacy instituted by Wesley in the '
consecration of Coke, and the "commission" he gave him to consecrate Asbury as
Bishop, was acknowledged and received by the Conference of 1784, as "the chief Synod
of the Church." They well knew this Conference of Lay Preachers could do nothing
more than acknowledge and receive. The Methodist Episcopal Church declares her
Bishops to be "called of God, according to his word, to the work and office of a Bishop,"
and unless God and his word be mocked, all conventional "regulations" will be con-

133
formed to this great primary fact, assumed by the Church. The "directions" of Wes
ley, forming the only warrant of the American societies to become a separate organi
zation, recognized no right of election by the preachers, in view of the Episcopal of
fice. They had avowed and published their want ef right, their utter incompetency to
organize a Church without Wesley — of course they could not elect Bishops. The full
validity of our Episcopacy, as exclusively derived from Wesley, must be admitted, or
we have none. There is no Presbytery in the Methodist Episcopal Church, except as
created by its Episcopacy, and the supposition that Episcopacy was accredited by what
itself had produced, is, to say the least of it, not the theory of Methodical Episcopacy,
as set forth by all the defenders of the Chiirch, and especially in the authorities to
which we appeal in the brief argument we are now sketching. Is there any thing in
the Protest elevating the Episcopacy to half the height indicated by the positions just
cited? And how do they contrast with the newly adopted creed of the Majority, which
throws around a Bishop such an ambiguity of right claim and relation, "now high, now
low," that instead 'of his taking his place in the government as an officer of the consti
tution, with well defined rights and corresponding duties and claims, subject only to
the control of law, he is but the quadrennial agent of a General Conference Majority,
and is liable to removal or degradation, whenever they deem it expedient to exercise
the power they assume? The advocates of the new theory' will of course allege that
the Presbyters of the Methodist Episcopal Church, have at any rate, regular Presby-
terial ordination, and that since they obtained it, it has been competent for them to
create an Episcopacy upon the Stillingfleet model. This, however, will involve sev
eral difficulties.
1st. Methodist Episcopacy did not so originate, had no such origin — the truth of his
tory can never give it such a character; nor has an. Episcopacy of this kind ever been
instituted bv them. Our Episcopacy, and the plan of its perpetuation, both pre-date
the existence of Presbyters! The right and power of ordination, as they existed in
Wesley, were transferred to our Bishops, and constitutionally invested in them, before a
Presbyter existed in the Church. The constitution of the Church at the time of its or
ganization, and ever since, deprives the Presbyters of the power of ordination whiie
there is a Bishop in the Church.
2d. The order cf succession precludes the supposition, that for the reason assigned,
the Episcopacy of the Church is in the hands of the Presbytery. The organic laws of
the Church in the very provision which gave being to Presbyters, as such, restricted all
the rights of ordination to the Episcopacy, and declare that this investiture can only be
come void by the extinction of the original order of Bishops. The right of the Presby
ters to select the incumbent does not affect the argument. The Presbyters may select
a thousand to be made Bishops, but in themselves can never make one, while a solitary
incumbent of the office survives in tbe Church.
3d. Should the only alternative contingency -which can possibly give the right of
Episcopal ordination to the Presbyters ever take place, the right does not belong to
them one moment after its exercise in the consecration of a Bishop. They can in no
event, by the cbnstitution, ordain an Elder or Deacon, or more than one Bishop at a
time. The moment their consecration of a Bishop is complete, the right of ordination
ceases to exist in the Presbyters. This may not be as it should be, if any will have it
so, but we have only to do with things as they are, as we find them in the constitution
and the laws.
4th. FroTn the preceding data, iris clear, that until the existing theory of Methodist
Church polity is utterly subverted, it can never become the right of the Presbyters of

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the Church to change the character of our present Episcopacy or institute one of a dif
ferent kind.
But let us see further how others have thought and reasoned on the general subject :
Dr. Coke, speaking of the organization ofthe Church in 1784, under the direction of
himself and Asbury, as Bishops, by appointment of Wesley, says, "Mr. Wesley has de
termined the point." The Discipline informs us that Wesley "commissioned and direct
ed" Dr. Coke to set apart Mr. Asbury as Bishop.
Dr. Bangs says, "the Traveling Ministry, consisting of licensed Preachers, Deacons,
Elders, Bishops. The duties of each are prescribed and constitutional restraints limit
the power of each officer in the execution of his trust. Regular tribunals are constitu
ted, rules of judgment are laid down, and the whole process by which the supposed
delinquent is to be tried, acquitted, or condemned, is clearly defined and prescribed."
The Bishops in their address, 1844, discussing the constitutional limits of their office,
say, "the office of a Bishop is almost exclusively executive." Dr. Emory insists that to
do justice to the character pf Methodist Episcopacy, it is essential, while we claim for
it no elevation above the primary rights of the Presbytery or body of Elders, as it re
gards the original power of ordination, superiority must be claimed on the ground of
special investment, in relation both to the pov-cr of ordination and of jurisdiction, and
that this power can only heinvesled by Episcopal consecration, as constitutionally pro
vided for. Bishop Asbury, in attempting to show how the Episcopal character of Tim
othy types the true Episcopacy of the Church in modern times, distinguishes his Epis
copal ordination by St. Paul, from his Presbylerijl ordination by "laying on of the hands
of Presbytery," and transferring his reasoning to Methodist Episcopacy, it is plainly
his purpose to show, that special consecration is essential to the office, and that election
is nothing more than a mere expression of choice and endorsement of personal fitness.
That Bishops Emory and Waugh took the same view of the subject at I he date of Bish
op Soule's election, is plain from the language they held with regard to him; they say,
"just elected to the Episcopal office, not yet ordained or even an existing Bishop in,
fact." In their judgment ordination was essentially constituent of the office,. And in
this way, in seemingly unrelated but nevertheless essentially connected parts and par
cels, the evidence increases upon us at every step in ihe examination, that Episcopacy
in the organic economy of the Methodist Episcopal Church, is a constitutional principle
of government and law, and is only subject to the control of the General Conference
by regulation of law, as will further be seen in the progress of the argument.
Morrell says, "Mr. Wesley framed the constitution of our Church." "Dr. Coke had
the orders of Mr. Wesley lo ordain Superintendents." "Dr. Coke did actually ordain
three orders." Dr. Phoebus says, "our government grew up under tbe appointment of a
Superintendent by consent of preachers and people. As such our Episcopacy is con
stitutional. It cannot be altered but by the general consent of preachers and people. It
must be done by the common consent of all parties concerned." Sandford distinctly re
cognizes the "constitution" of the Church, -as recommended by Wesley and adopted by
the Conference of 1784. Morrell says, "it was written in our constitution." He tells
us Wesley's name was left off .the American Minutes, as the head ofthe American
connection, to prevent him from exercising "unconstitutional power" in the recall or
removal of Bishop Asbury. Title page of Discipline in 1786 says, "forming the con
stitution of said Church." The preface to the fifth edition of the Discipline styles that
Discipline the "constitution of our Church." Dr. Bangs speaks of the "organization,"
that is, constitution of the Church, as requiring duties and conferring privileges pecu
liar to each order and office of the ministry, and affirms "so lone as these duties are

135
performed with fidelity, the annexed privileges are freely and amply secured." In the
address of the General Conference of 1824, it is avowed "the General Rules and the
Articles of Religion form, to every member of our Church distinctively, a constitution."
In 1789,. the Discipline claims to be the "constitution of tho Church." R. Emory re
marks, "in 1808 an important change was made in the constitution of thp Church by the
establishment of a delegated General Conference." Dr. Bangs says the object had in
view by the Annual Conferences before the meeting of the General Conference in 1808,
was "to provide for a future delegated General Conference, whose powers should be
defined and limited by constitutional restrictions." These and similar testimonies go to
show a conslituiionalinvestment and distribution of rights and powers among the sever
al departments and various offices of the Church, .including especially the Episcopacy
and General Conference. They also show that the position cf Bishop Hamline and
others, assuming the Restrictive Articles to be the constitution of the Church, is utterly
unworthy of credit. The very structure of the government, and the whole history of
its administration, not less than the constantly avowed opinions of the Church since its
organization in 1784, demonstrate most conclusively, that the position is without any'
foundation in either the history or philosophy, the facts or reasons of Methodist Church
polity. We have seen 'that the governing, power in the Methodist Episcopal Church belongs
to the Traveling Ministry, and that the question at issue in this controversy is, how
and in what proportion this power is distributed among its different departments, coun
cils, and tribunals, as coming into existence and use, and being created and established
at different times. Our Chbrch organization obviously presents several departments,
more or less mixed in character as it regards their functions, but still sufficiently dis
tinct and independant of each other for the practical purposes of government. 1st.
The Episcopacy or General Superintendency. 2d. Annual Conferences. 3d. General
Conferences. 4th. The General Pastorate or Traveling Ministry in their appointed
. charges of labor and administration.
We notice the first three in the order of their introduction as elementary principles,
giving form and character to the government. All are to be regarded as great consti
tutional arrangements. Among these wo must of necessity find distributed, the Legis
lative, the Judicial, and Executive powers of the government, and the question arises,
what is the distribution? Or is it true, as has been assumed, that there is no actual
distribution, nor yet any law of distribution, and that all the functions of government-
are commingled and meshed up together, to be exercised at discretion by the several
departments and organic bodies having general control. That the distribution has not
been a careful and well settled one may be true, but thg assumption that there has been
no distribution at all, affecting the different classes 'of power, except in a few instan
ces connected with each, must, we think, be rejected by the good sense of the Church.
Many of the authorities already cited, throw material light upon this subject, and show
that a very different view of the subject has obtained among the most distinguised men
of, the Church in every period of its history. In answer to the question, "who shall
compose the General Conference?" the Discipline says expressly, "one of the General
Superintendents shall preside in the General Conference." Again, this Presidency or
Headship is a part ofthe "Plan of General Superintendency," the first duty ofthe
Bishop is "to preside in our Conferences," Annual and General. Their constitutional
oversight extends to all the ^'temporal and spiritual business ofthe Church," and of
course and especially to the General Conference, as that .body does a large share of the
business of the Church. Waiters, the first American- Methodist Preacher, says, "the

136
Bishops business is to preside in our Conferences, (Annual and General) and in-case of
an equal division on a question, he has the casting vote." Sandford says, "the Gener
al Conference is composed of Bishops who are its Presidents, &c." Dr. Elliott says,
"to preside in our Conferences, comprehends the Presidency of the General Confer
ence." Dr. Coke says to the General Conference in 1808, that he will reside in Amer
ica permanently, in his character of Bishop if the Conference, will "agree that I shall
have a full right to give my judgment in every thing in the General and Annual Con
ferences on the making oj laws, the stationing of the Preachers, sending out Mission
aries, and every thing else, which as a Bishop, belongs to my office. I want no new
condition ; I only want it to be perfectly ascertained, that I shall be authorized by you
to fulfil my office, without which, our reciprocal engagements are a perfect nullity.''
Dr. Bangs speaks of "powers ceded to the Episcopacy." Bishop McKendree says, "by
virtue of a delegated power from the General Conference," (as the organ ofthe
Church's authority and action,) "I. hold the reigns of government." Dr. Bangs says.
of Methodist Episcopacy, "this superintendency is provided for in the organization qf
the Methodist Episcopal Church.', In their Address, in 1840, the Bishops jspeak ofthe
"constitutional powers of the General Superinteridants, of their general executive admin
istration, and their official department in the Church." Dr, Emory endorses the opinion
of Stillingfleet, that the form of Church government which approaches nearest the
primitive, is the "Presidency of Bishops for life." At the General Conference of 1804.,
Dr. Bangs informs us, Coke, Asbury, and Whatcoat, acted as "Presidents of the Gen
eral Conference." Mr. Morrell assures us, that the Conference of 1787 decided that
even "Mr. Wesley had no authority to remove Mr. Asbury," after he had been consti
tuted Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States. Dr. Emory
says of Bishop George, "he regarded the duties of his place and office as specified in
the Discipline, in the light of a contract, by which he had solemnly engaged to be
bound." In 1805, Bishop Asbury gives notice to the "world" that he considered his
election by the Conference of Lay Preachers in 1784, as but one of several sources, whence
he derived his Episcopal authority. Coke and Asbury say, "Episcopacy took its rise
in Wesley." They rank it among the functions of Episcopacy, "to meliorate the se
verity of Discipline, to relieve the people under every oppression. In them (the Bish
ops) the people have a refuge, — to them they may appeal, and before them lay all their
complaints and grievances." The Discipline of 1789 asks, "how is a Bishop to be
constituted in future?"- Election a new method of selecting the incumbent. It may
strike the reader that there is in these citations no principle of coherence affording any
reason why they should appear in the same connection. It must be recollected, howev
er, that it is the simple object of these strictures to show that the Protest did not as
sume, in behalf of the Episcopacy, any thing beyond its allowed, claim's, currently
conceded in the doctrines and history of the Church. Any proofs, therefore, going to
show what these claims have been for sixty years, must be directly pertinent as well
as important. The testimonies just quoted, prove that Bishops of the Methodist Epis
copal Church are, by constitutional right, -Presidents of the Annual and General Con
ferences, and of course are members and integral parts of them, when in session, be
side having the executive oversight of all the members of both, in the intervals of their
meeting. The Discipline includes them with others, in "composing" the Body. Pres
idency and oversight are scarcely, compatible with the idea of their bejng the mere
chairmen of Conference meetings. ,The right of discussion, of expressing their opin-,
ions on all subjects, of recommendation and. remonstrance, seems to be a necessary in
ference. It is claimed by Dr. Coke as belonging to the ofice. The reins of government

137
are held by delegated power, that is, power parted with and given in trust for specified
purposes. Bishops have constitutional powers; the general executive adminisiration is
theirs; their official relations, rights, and duties, constitute a regular department; their
Presidency is for life, unless forfeited by misconduct ; the appointing power cannot re
move, except for reasons destroying the objects of the appointment ; the official relations
of a Bishop imply a contract between himself and tbe Church. Election had nothing
to do with the institution of the office, and is but an auxiliary method of perpetuating
it ; the office arose in Wesley, and comes in as a regulating power between the minis
try and people. We attempt no defence of the various forms of expression used,
or claims put forth in the passages quoted. What we may approve or disapprove
weighs nothing in the controversy. Our business is to show the true doctrine of the
Church on the subject.
Among other items regarded by the South as signs of the times with the Northern
Majority, may be noticed tbe manifest indifference and irreverence with which the
solemnities of the Episcopal ordination service have been treated. It has doubtless
been seen and felt that truth and falsehood resemble as little as the new theory of
Episcopacy and the ceremony in question. And if the former be true, the latter is
certainly a chapter of rare foolishness, and ought to be expunged, as Bishop Hamline
cautiously suggests it might be, without detriment to Methodism, as we use no such
ceremony in the appointment of Book Agents, Editors, Class Leaders, &c, all of
course (the assumption is) sustaining, as agents, the same relation to the Church! But
let us look into this matter a little. The ordination service styled the "form and man
ner of making and ordaining a Bishop," assumes that the person so ordained is called
by the Holy Ghost to the special ministry of a Bishop as distinguished from both Pres
byter and Deacon, for each of which orders we have a separate ordination service in no
way inclusive of the first office or Episcopal consecration. It is assumed that he is
called to be a Bishop, to a ministration distinguished from all others according to thp
will of Christ. It is assumed that being divinely called, he is by the act of ordination,
admitted to government in the Church of Christ. He is said to be thus admitted to a
peculiar administration. The people, the Church of God, "including the Presbyters,"
Dr. Emory adds, are said to be committed to his charge by the same act, and so of ma
ny other assumptions to the same effect. Can the man who regards a Bishop as the
mere ao-ent or officer of the General Conference, liable at any time to removal or depo
sition, at the will of the Majority, without impeachment or trial, or even cause assign
ed, be prepared for honest subscription or submission to a ceremony of consecration,
every clause of which is in irreconcilable conflict with his avowed opinions as to the
real character of the Episcopal office? How will this matter be regarded by the well
informed and pious masses of the Church, even in the North? Will they not agree
with Bishop Emory, that it is "mockery, a trifling with sacred things." Take the ac
tion of the General Conference in electing, and that of the proper officers in ordaining
a Bishop. They call him to the work and office of a Bishop in the name of God, and as
His representatives. They declare him called of Christ and gifted with the graces of
his spirit "evermore" to perform the duties and "fulfil the course" of a christian Bish
op. They recognize his official elevation as God's own appointment, and during life.
The consecration is the name of the Trinity, sanctioned and accredited by the solem
nities of the sacrament. Now if all this mean that a Bishop may be used to-day and
laid aside to-morrow, without proof (which due form of trial can alone safely test) that
the consecrated person chosen of God for the purpose, has disqualified himself for the
trust reposed in him, by a forfeiture of the divine approval; we repeat, if the ceremony
18

138
mean nothing inconsistent with such a view of the subject, then is our ordination ser
vice not only unmeaning, but so fraught with the fearful significance of being an
ungodly mockery, that the sooner it is laid aside the better. I need not remind the
readers of the Northern papers, that there are already indications by no means ob
scure, that the inconsistency between the new Episcopal theory and the ordination ser
vice, will require their early attention, unless it is found expedient to adjourn the
movement to a "more convenient season" for reform. The innovation under notice,
must prove extensively mischievous in its bearings. It subverts the foundation and
destroys the tenure of the ministerial office in the Methodist Episcopal Church entirely.
If ordination in the instance of a Bishop, mean mero appointment to labour, and may
be fairly typed by the appointment of a Class Leader or Editor, similar views will
doubtless obtain with regard to the ordination of Elder and Deacon, as there is nothing
more solemn or sanctioning in the latter than tho former, and the result will be, the
high and holy function of the Ministry, severed from the fastenings of its immemorial
sanctity, will be sacred only to the purposes of ecclesiastical sway and party domi
nation. The position we are now opposing, strikes us as the more strange and sur
prising, because we have no accredited instance in the whole history of the Church, of
ministerial ordination, except for life, upon condition of good behaviour. The rights
and privileges conferred by ordination, as Bishop Emory properly suggests, are mat
ter of "contract" between the parties, and while either party does not ojfend the laws
of the Church, the rights and privileges reciprocally involved, are perpetual. On
this ground alone, the action of the late General Conference, in the case of Bishop
Andrew, must be viewed as an outrage upon his legal and personal rights. It was,
moreover, a violation of the pledge of the Church, given in his ordination credentials,
in which the protection and support of the Church are solemnly guarantied, "so long
as his spirit, practice, and doctrine, are such as become the gospel of Jesus Christ, and
he shall submit to and maintain the Discipline and order of the Methodist Episcopal
Church in America." It is well known the Majority did not even allege offence, either
against the laws of Christ or of the Church, and yet in gross violation of this official
pledge, they withdrew the protection and support the Church had promised. Such con
duct shows that God in his word is not allowed to be the judge of sin, of right and
wrong, nor yet the Church in her laws, but that the caprice and resentments of party
opinion and feeling, are to become the rule of action and standard of ministerial and
personal worth.
The several Annual Conferences up to 1792, were always considered as separate and
independent bodies, and it was not likely, says Dr. Bangs, "that so many independent
bodies could be brought to harmonize in all things. The several Annual Conferences
were considered only as so many parts of the whole body, nothing was considered bind
ing upon all, unless it were approved by each and every of these separate Conferences."
Bishop Asbury styles the General Conference a "grand federal and responsive body."
The federal relations and reciprocity of right assumed by Bishop Asbury, were merely
riodified, not destroyed by the change, or rather addition to the constitution, giving
iirth to the delegated General Conference. It is still a federal responsive body, as
represented in the Protest, and this very fact gives the reason of the limitation of its
powers. "The General Conference consists of an equal representation from the sev
eral Annual Conferences," says Dr. Bangs. In what proportion, then, do we seek the
constitutional inherence of power in each? This will of course depend upon the fact
of distribution, already adverted to. In the General Conference certainly so far as the
constitution clothes them with power. To this extent it is always competent for that

139
body to act without control, and in forms absolutely conclusive. The constitution,
however, is the only commission under which any of the departments can rightfully act.
And what we wish to achieve, believing it to be the truth, is to show that the consti
tution intended something like an equal distribution of the powers of government among
its different departments. When once, some score of years since, acting upon our
then understanding of things, we honestly believed the Episcopacy was likely to dis
turb this balance of power, by claiming for itself more than its constitutional share,
we opposed the supposed usurpation, as now we oppose that of the General Confer
ence. We should do the same thing with regard to the Annual Conferences, or gener
al Pastorate, were they so to act as to produce a similar conviction. The doctrine for
which we contend, is simply something like a substantial co-ordination of powers among
the different departments of the government. This result secured, we ask for nothing
more. And if to secure it the reduction of Episcopal power shall be found necessary,
we shall promptly favor the reduction.
The doctrine of Bishop Hamline, which seems to be extensively endorsed in the
North, affirming General Conference prerogative to be a just law of action, without de
fining Or publishing the mode of action, we reject and resist in all its forms, as at
once dangerous and inadmissible in any government. One of its necessary conse
quences, is expost facto legislation, without even the usual disguise of legislative and
judicial construction. Take for instance, the right claimed in behalf of the General
Conference to appoint the Preachers to their pastoral charges. This right never did
belong to the General Conference, nor can it While the present constitution of the
Church exists. If the whole Book of Discipline be regarded as the constitution, in
general terms, the right is denied to the General Conference ; and if, with Bishop Ham
line, we receive the restrictive articles as the constitution, they expressly prohibit the
General Conference from any such attempt, as this right of appointment forms the
most important part of the plan of General Superintendency, which they are not al
lowed to destroy. But the logic is, the General Conference elect the Bishops, and may
therefore perform all the duties of Bishops, if they prefer it. Extend the rule a little
and see how it will work. The Annual Conferences elect the General Conference, and
therefore, if they prefer, may not only perform all its constitutional duties, but by the
same rule, get at those of the Episcopacy also. This single dogma carried into prac
tice, would immediately subvert the whole government of the Church. Witness its
effect in the action of the late General Conference, in Bishop Andrews' case, and the
consequences with which it has been attended.
The government of the Methodist Episcopal Church is certainly somewhat irregular
and anomalous in form ; still it has essentially its co-ordinate departments, especially
the Episcopacy, Annual Conferences and the General Conference, by no means excluding
the ministry in pastoral charge, apart from their Conference relations. It is an impos
sible theory to suppose a government without legislative, judicial, and executive pow
ers, and irregularly as these are distributed, they are found in the above departments.
The General Conference has limited legislative power. It has also a substantive por
tion of judicial power, having original jurisdiction in the case of Bishops, and appel
late in the instance of members of Annual Conferences. The Annual Conferences
have a large share of judicial power, retaining in their hands an important portion of
the legislative, and meanwhile exercising to a considerable extent, executive functions.
The Episcopacy is emphatically the Executive Department of the Church, or rather of the
government, with scarcely a tithe of power from the other classes. Some of the func.
tions of the General Conference appear more or less executive in character, but in no

140
sense does the General Conference possess any considerable portion of executive power.
It will be perceived at once, by the good sense of the reader, that from the mixed char-
acterof the distribution of power in the government of the Methodist Episcopal Church,
it becomes the more necessary to guard against the encroachment of one department
upon another. Such encroachment as shown at large in this Review, has given birth
to our present difficulties, and the controversy in which the Church is now so unhappi
ly involved. We have no wish to reduce the constitutional power of the General Con
ference, or increase that of the Episcopacy. We wish no function of the General Con
ference transferred to the Episcopacy. We would not add to the aggregate of Episco
pal power a single iota, were all the powers of the government within our gift. What
we except to and resist, is the hitherto unheard of claim of nearly absolute power put
forth by the Majority of the General Conference in May last. The position that "the
Bishop's term of service may be limited or undetermined at pleasure," is so utterly unsup
ported by evidence of any kind, and manifestly inconsistent with all the evidence we
have in the case, that its bare announcement furnishes its own disproof. The position
invades the constitution at every point in which it can be viewed. It is contradicted
by the whole tenor of the ordination service, without which we can have no constitu
tional Episcopacy. It is disavowed, in terms, by the official certificate of ordination.
It is without any sanction from the Discipline. It is discredited by all usage, and pos
sesses every attribute of a gross and daring innovation. And yet all these revolutiona
ry doctrines and legal absurdities, received the full practical sanction of the General
Conference. The principal asserter of them became their authoritative type and living
impersonation, by the highest marks of approval and confidence within the gift of the
Majority. The doctrine in question, therefore, is the doctrine of the Majority, and we
are thus minute, with no view of calling attention to individual character, but for the
sole purpose of showing that the party claiming to be the Methodist Episcopal Church,
par excellence, is the party by whom the constitution of the Church has been notorious
ly disregarded, and its rights in the same proportion forfeited. The General Confer
ence acts under the authority of but a limited commission, and the measure of its su
premacy is determined by the limits the constitution imposes. Its powers are in no
sense absolute, but as properly under the control of the" constitution as those of any
other department.
Dr. Coke was the father of the General Conference system, and in his circular in
1791, urging the propriety and necessity of his plan, he proposes the General Confer
ence in sum, "as a check upon every thing," that is a great regulating principle of gov
ernment, not overriding and capriciously controlling the other departments, but subject
ing their action and administration to proper revision and restraint, to be regulated by
law. As connected with the Presidency of the General Conference, Bishops have been
in the habit of giving their opinions and advice, offering resolutions, and even voting ih
the instance of a tie. The practice, however, has varied at different times, and with
different men. As lately as tbe General Conference of 1840, one Bishop offered a series
of resolutions, which were adopted by the Conference, and another gave the casting
vote on an important question, to which no exception was taken, and both these acts,
stated upon the Journals, were subsequently approved by the Conference, without dis
sent. In fact the Presidents have always been recognized as constitutional members of
the General Conference, until the new era of 1844. They are there and such by com
mission of the constitution. Bishop Asbury left the sittings of the General Conference
of 1792, and after absenting himself, wrote back to the Conference, "I am happily ex-
oused from helping to make laws by which I myself am to be governed ;" showing plain-

141
ly that he considered himself a member of the body, with' right to assist in making
laws. Coke was in the habit of introducing formal resolutions in the General Confer
ence. So was Asbury. Other Bishops have done the same. Coke and Asbury say,
"all the different orders that compose our Conferences;" showing that Bishops were
regarded as constitutional members of the Conferences in which they preside, whether
Annual or General. If Bishops are not a constitutional part of the General Conference,
why do they meet and preside by requirement of law? Why is their signature neces
sary to the validity of the Journals and the authority of official documents? Is the
Presidency of the General Conference no part of it? In every organic sense is not the
President the head of the body? Can this be true without his belonging to the body?
Bishops are ex-officio, by right of office, Presidents of the General Conference, and in
that body are constitutional representatives of the Church at large. The very constitu
tion of the General Conference includes the presence and Presidency of a Bishop. In the
Bishops' address of 1840, all the various "judicatories of the Church" are recognized
as "constitutional ;" of course the Presidency of the General and Annual Conferences
are among the constitutional arrangements alluded to. About a Bishop's right to speak
or vote, we shall not contend. We are only anxious to show his constitutional relation
as President of the body. Placed there by the constitution to preside as the end of the
appointment, whatever means may be necessary to accomplish the end, he is constitu
tionally allowed to avail himself of, as an obvious incidental right, and beyond this it is
believed no claim has ever been made. The constitution places a Bishop, having com
mon oversight of the whole Church, in the General Conference, and at its head, as the
, representative of the general departments of the government, and especially the one to
which he more appropriately belongs. Under the old General Conference regimen all
the Traveling Preachers in full connection are declared to be members by right. Were
the Bishops in full connection or not? If yea, then they were members. It is not
meant to say the President of a General Conference is a member in the sense in which
Annual Conference Delegates are, but that the constitution makes him a part of the
body in virtue of his right of general oversight, which extends to the General Confer
ence as well as other departments of the ecclesiastical system. But other views of the
subject bear upon the main question in the same way.
Coke and Asbury declare a Bishop to be "the 'chief executor of those regulations
made in the College of Presbyters," that is, the General Conference. The whole bench
of Bishops in 1844, declare the Episcopal office to be chiefly executive, and the doctrine in
fact, is coeval with the American organization. That some of the initiatory steps of exe
cutive administration are taken by the General Conference, and that in this way it may
be said to possess executive power and perforin executive acts is admitted, but that the
General Conference possesses, by vested right, the general executive power of the gov
ernment as lately assumed in its behalf, we explicitly deny, and regard the claim as an
arroo-ation of power as absurdas it is alarming, and calling for resistance on the basis
of the constitution. The further claim to all power, legislative, judicial, and execu
tive, not expressly denied them in the six restrictive articles, is so replete with usurp
ing innovation, that we cannot refrain from asking the Church, even at the North, to
look it more fully in the face, before they commit themselves lo its final approval. Act
ing upon the ground of this claim, the reforming Majority of the late General Confer
ence, might have annihilated the entire itinerant system— all the Annual and Quarterly
Conferences, together with all our missions, colleges, schools, benevolent associations,
&c. If the Church is prepared to submit to such claims, it is time she were preparing
for eventful changes, both of polity and administration. Is there any connection be-

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tween the late putting forth of these claims, and the official declaration mudo to the
General Conference by Bishops Soule, Hedding, Andrew, Waugh, and Morris, that in
several of the Northern Conferences little remains of the itinerant system except the
name? Is there evidence of an intention to consolidate the power of governmentinthe
General Conference, and by destroying the present checks and balances of the system,
place it in the power of the Majority of that body to conirol the ivhole machinery of
Church action1 Was it necessary to elaborate these claims with chiselled exactitude —
dove-tail them into each other, and reduce them to a science, in order to get at Bishop
Andrew? We lay the effect before the reader and leave him to find an adequate cause.
From 1792 to 1808, the General Conference possessed the power of the whole body
of ministers ; now it does not ; it is a Church Council with limited powers ; not "every
thing," but as Dr. Coke says, "a check upon every thing." As the claim, that the Gen
eral Conference creates the Bishop, proves to be a mere fiction, so the claim of right to
do what they please with their own, must, as far as Bishops are concerned, go to "the
moles, and the bats" with it. Let the Majority have the benefit of their own reasoning
in application to the General Conference. That body was created by the Episcopacy
and Annual Conferences, therefore the Episcopacy and Annual Conferences can destroy
it when they please! The Genera) Conference is a constitutional provision of the gov
ernment, and cannot, by right, alter or override the fundamental principles in virtue of
which it governs or perforins its functions. Holding power only in virtue of the con
stitution, and acting beyond, and independently of its provisions, they act without
right, and cease at once to be the representatives of the constitution. Hence, all such
acts are null and void. We have applied this universally received principle of consti
tutional law to the action of the late General Conference in the case of Bishop An
drew, and also in relation to a division of General Conference jurisdiction, and have
shown the constitutional right of the South to resist, in the one case, and the utter want
of it on the part of the North, in the other. That the Annual Conferences are regarded by
the Discipline, as original contracting or confederating parties, not only in the creation
of the General Conference, but in the constitutional government of the Church, is undenia
ble, from the language and provisions of the 6th restrictive article, distinctly recognizing
the power of the Annual Conferences to change the entire government of the Church,
even to the doing away of Episcopacy. To effect this, it is only necessary that the
Conferences decide upon the change, and elect their delegates to the ensuing General
Conference in view of it, and as these are the only organic bodies represented in the
General Conference, unless the delegates prove recreant to their trust, it is accomplish
ed. The fact that the General Conference elects Bishops, by no means furnishes a pri
ori presumption, as has been contended, of the dependence of Bishops upon that body.
It is a well known and common fact in the history of governments, that one branch ap
points the officers of another, essentially co-ordinate in its character. The fact in ques
tion does not authorize even a plausible inference in favor of General Conference pow
er. As the Methodist Episcopal Church was originally organized, that is, by its con
stitution, Episcopal powers never belonged to the General Conference, and if they had,
the very form of the government proves they must have been parted with by an act of
solemn transfer, and invested in the Bishops, and of course their resumption by the
General Conference is impossible, until the constitution is either changed or destroyed.
To meet this difficulty, and obviate its absurdity, the still greater absurdity is maintain
ed, that these powers inhere in the Bishops and the Conference at the same time, and
may be exercised by either, as the Conference may elect ! Can it be necessary to reply
to such an argument? And if so, for whose benefit? Can any one avoid perceiving,

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that when, by election and ordination now, as by ordination alone, originally, Bishops
become invested with Episcopal powers, the right to suspend the exercise of those pow
ers, or withdraw them, cannot accrue to their original source, unless the Bishop shall
violate the well known terms of the investment. This view of the subject has been
sustained by the action of the General Conference. It is well known that the "sus
pended resolutions" of 1820 were protested against by Bishops McKendree and Soule,
as unconstitutional, on the ground, solely, that it was taking from the Episcopacy, by
simple resolution of the General Conference, right and power invested there by the con
stitution, and thus destroying the sacredness of. vested rights, beside impairing the in
tended force and vigor of the Episcopacy, as the executive branch of the government.
The protest was sustained by the General Conferences of 1824 and 1828, as based up
on good and sufficient reasons.
The Episcopal office is a, delegation of right and power, in the shape of a high moral
trust, and unless the trust is abused by moral or official delinquency, the claim of the
Bishop to the continued possession of the right and power invested in him, cannot be
impaired except by a constitutional change of government. Whatever may be the vaga
ries and shifts of party expediency, by the constitution and laws of the Methodist Epis
copal Church, a Bishop is not removable, or liable to legal disability of any kind, ex
cept, as upon fair trial, he is found to be punishable. All the power vital to the func
tions of Episcopacy, is constitutional, and no portion of it merely ministerial. Those
who maintain that a Bishop is absolutely subject to the General Conference, must, of
necessity, maintain that the Conference possesses absolute power with regard to the
Episcopacy, but that this is not so, we prove in a hundred different forms. The fiction
by which it is attempted to discriminate between the office and the officer, may answer
for declamation, but not in argument. If all Bishops are absolutely subject to the Gen
eral Conference, the Episcopal office is absolutely under its control. The office follows
the officer. They necessarily co-exist. The one must be predicated of the other. The
relations, rights, and duties of the officer constitute the office, and the attempted dis
tinction utterly fails, as what is now claimed in relation to the incumbent, destroys the
office. Nothing essential to the Episcopacy was ever granted it by the General Conference,
and therefore, by the showing of the Majority, no material power of office can be ta
ken from Bishops, except for causes invalidating the reasons of their election and con
secration. Although properly amenable to the General Conference for both moral and
official conduct, they are, nevertheless, essentially independent, for living as christian
ministers, and performing their duty according to law, the General Conference has no
right to disturb them, any more than they have right to disturb the General Conference
in the performance of its constitutional functions ; the Annual Conferences, meanwhile,
being essentially independent of both, in their appropriate sphere of action. We have
seen the Episcopal office declared to be a trust from God, committed to the Bishop by
the hands of the Church ; and yet the Majority claim the right to annul the grant with
out any alledged unfaithfulness to God or the Church, which can be presumed to de
stroy tbe reason of the grant. The office is not a gift, but a trust proper, and the only
responsibility of the Bishop connects with the fulfilment of the trust, and the difference
of opinion, North and South, is, we contend the Bishop is responsible, according to law,
¦ they, that he is indefinitely amenable, at the discretien of a mere Majority of the Gen
eral Conference. Law is the standard of judgment for which the South contends. The
North, so far as they have made themselves intelligible, substitute opinion and passion.
Ia the Protest, and everywhere else, we have' rigidly maintained Episcopal responsibil-

144
ity to all the intents and purposes of law, and those who misrepresent us in this res
pect, will find our High Churchism in the law, and old as Methodism withal.
The General Conference is supreme in nothing essential to Methodism. The articles
of religion and standards of belief, the general rules, the Episcopacy, its plan of super
intendency, the right of trial and appeal of all ministers and members, pre-existed, are
of constitutional force, and beyond the power of the General Conference. A limitation
of its power is seen, as before, in the instance of the Episcopal office, which it did not
create, and cannot fill. Dr. Fisk was a Bishop, so far as the General Conference could
make him one, but still was not a Bishop in any allowable sense whatever. The "con
sent and imposition of hands of a Bishop," that is, the Episcopal consecration of the
constitution, was necessary to make him one.
An attempt to divest of power and right, without alledged infringement of the terms
of the primary investment, must be regarded as unjust and tyrannous in all cases where
the investment is constitutional, and during good behavior, and not merely ministerial
and tempory, where it results from the form, and not any mere act of the government.
The power to divest has been urged with great confidence, on the ground that the Bish
op is responsible to the Conference. The responsibility is admitted, but the conclusion
does not follow, beyond the extent of the judicial rights of the Conference in the case,
Coke and Asbury state, explicitly, what all know from the Discipline, that Presiding
Elders are responsible to the Annual Conferences ; but have the Annual Conferences
the power of removal, inconsequence? All know they have not. Other views of the
subject, which follow, will further expose this legal fallacy, as opposed to all just
views of the subject to which it is applied.
,When it is avowed that the Church is, by organic structure and arrangement, "un
der the direction of Bishops, Elders, and Deacons, according to the forms of ordina
tion," are we to suppose that it is competent for the Elders and Deacons to supercede
the Bishops, by stripping them of the functions of control, and so take the entire direc
tion upon themselves? When the General Conference of 1836 distinctly stated that
Bishop Roberts was "not able to do effective service," and yet expressly recognized him
as "joint Superintendent of the Methodist Episcopal Church," was it in view of office
or labor that the joint superintendency accrued? When the General Conference, in
1820, released Bishop McKendree from the responsibility of performing the duties of
General Superintendent, did he cease lo be such?
The indefinite grant of power to the General Conference to expel a Bishop for "im
proper conduct," will require a moment's notice, as important conclusions have been
deduced from an obviously false construction of the language, by those who have at
least had the means of better information. Our theorists, bent upon reforming the
Episcopal creed of the Church, insist that by "improper conduct," it is not meant to in
clude actions or conduct involving moral wrong, or in any way sinful in their nature
and tendency, but mere faults of character or conduct, such as imprudence, practical
indiscretion, &c, not implying any offence against the laws of Christ or the Church.
For such conduct merely, it is stiffly maintained a Bishop may be expelled the Church
of God, or at least ejected from his office. We reject the position entirely, as not true,
in whole or in part ; and we insist it is as untenable, in all sound reasoning, as it is
untrue in the theory of the law in the case. And, 1st, The position dishonors the
word of God. The idea that a Christian Bishop may be expelled the Church of Christ,
or degraded from office for conduct not involving moral wrono- — not in anv sense or de
gree sinful, is in direct and shameful conflict with the plainest lessons and truths of tbe
Bible. It is not only a gross, but an inexcusable offence against the language and ge-

145
nius, the whole analogy of christian doctrine and ethics, as taught in the scriptures.
2d. It is a position so strange and outre, so alien from all our conceptions of justice
and right, that it can never have the suffrage of tho good sense and sympathies, much
less the high moral convictions of our common nature. The very supposition bears
upon its face, evidence of unkindncss and cruelly. It exiles a man merely because he
is a Bishop, without the pale of those charities, whose extension to all is essential to
christian character. It exhibits the government of the Church as altogether more ex
acting than the laws and government of God, and must in the same proportion, place
its interests and reputation in jeopardy. 3d. The rule with regard to "improper con
duct," was adopted in 1781, when the Church was Organized, and no other existed from
that period until 1792, and if the construction in question be correct, during this
whole term no law of the Church authorized the expulsion of a Bishop for crime, al
though he might be expelled for the common, if not unavoidable errors of humanity.
The first rule was evidently intended as a general law for the trial of Bishops for "im
proper conduct" of any kind, from the lowest grade requiring notice, to the highest spe
cies of crime. Hence says Lee, in 1792, "we introduced a new rule for the trial of
Bishops," obviously regarding the rule of 1784 as a law for the trial of an accused
Bishop. We consider it a well settled construction, that the phrase "improper con
duct" was used in the legislation of the Church, to cover all kinds of conduct incon
sistent with christian or ministerial character, whether applied to Bishops or others.
Dr. Emory evidently understood the subject in this light. He says of Bishops, "this
superiority is accorded to them only so long as they are not judged guilty of any im
proper conduct requiring their degradation," plainly assuming that the phrase denotes
any immoral or other course of conduct requiring suspension from office, or expulsion
from the Church. Improper conduct, in the law of trial under notice, is used to denote
any kind of conduct in a Bishop, so inconsistent with the purposes of his appointment,
and the obligations of his office, as to require the official notice of the Church. Dr.
Bangs gives it as the sense and substance of the very law or rule in question, "if ac
cused, the General Conference has power to try, censure, acquit, or condemn a Bishop."
The p'Hver can only be exercised judicially, by due means of "accusation and trial."
The phrase, "improper tempers, words, or actions," found elsewhere in the Discip
line, has a perfect equivalence of meaning, and yet we know its import is so grave
and strong as to bo followed by expulsion from the Church. By turning to the old
Minutes, Lee's History, and contemporary records and journals, it will be found
that the terms divowned, dismissed, expelled, and laid aside, are used indifferently and
interchangeably to denote the same thing, severance from the Church. This will not
be disputed, and the use of these terms will help us to an understanding of tbe law
we are now examining. Dr. Bangs mentions the expulsion of ssveral preachers in
1788, "for improper conduct." In 1788 Leroy Cole was expelled for alledged "improp
er conduct." (This expulsion was unjust, as the Conference admitted at its next meet
ing, when he was restored.) The Minutes of 1793, ask who have been disowned
(expelled) for "improper conduct?" and we are informed James Bell was. In 1794
Simon Carlisle7 David Richardson, .lames Johnston, and David Valleau, were all ex
pelled for "improper conduct." A short time subsequent to the organization of the
Church, Enoch Mattson, Adam Cloud, and Thomas Chew, were expelled for "improper
conduct." In 1792 Lee informs us, a rule was introduced "for the trying of Traveling
Preachers who miarht be accused of being guilty of 'improper conduct,'" and thedefinition
of what is meant by "improper conduct," is "being guilty of some crime expressly fur-
bidden in the word of God, as an unchristian practice, sufficient, to exclude a person
19

146
from the kingdom of grace and glory." The legal use of the phrase has, beyond doubt,
covered all the forms of moral delinquency, since its first introduction into the Dis
cipline. The rule for trying a Bishop in the intervals of General Conference, adopted
eight years after the first, was obviously intended to supplement and explain the first
rule, as both defective and indefinite. Coke and Asbury explain the phrase in
the same way ; they say Ihe various means of trial to which all of us are subject, which
applied to Bishops, is without truth or meaning, unless our construction be correct, as
but one mode of trial would be left them, upon the construction we oppose. They also
clearly assume, that any charge of "improper conduct"' against a Bishop, to be follow
ed by censure or disability of any kind, can only be acted upon in due "form of trial."
As the explanatory synonym of the phrase "improper conduct," they say "tyrannical
or immoral conduct." as authorizing "severe censure" and a "change of men." "They
are conscious the Conference would neither degrade nor censure them, unless they
(Bishops) deserved it." "They are subject to be tried." "No Bishops on earth are
subject to so strict a trial." "They are as responsible as any ofthe Preachers." The
idea of judicial trial, pervades the whole comment. Finally, they speak of Bishops as
liable to be "expelled the Church" (not their office merely) on the charge of "improper
a p^u :t." From all which, it must result inevitably, not only that the construction
put i ,'on the phrase by the Majority, is an utter mis-statement of the law, and perverts
it entirely from its orignal meaning and intention ; but that all the ingenuity and arti
fice expended upon the labored attempt to show that a Bishop of the Methodist Episco
pal Church may be laid aside, divested of office, or even expelled the Church, for con
duct not involving moral delinquency of any kind, must fall to the ground, without
claim to any thing like reason or credibility. If correot in our premises and conclu
sions, the former of which will bo found in the law and history of the Church, and the
latter we think legitimate and necessary, it will be perceived at once, that the principal
warrant of the Majority in the prosecution of Bishop Andrew, is utterly destroyed.
They had no such right, discretion or warrant, as contended for, and proceeding
against him as they did, not only invaded law and right in his case, but adopted a prin
ciple of action with regard to others, placing ir manifest jeopardy, the dignity and val
ue of the Episcopal office.
It may be proper to recur to the question of amenability. About the fact that a
Bishop is amenable to the General Conference for his moral and official conduct, there
is no dispute. We contend, however, that a Bishop is not amenable so as to be in the
hands or power of the General Conference, affecting his office or the exercise of its
functions, as specified and secured in the constitution, except for conduct coming under
the judicial cognizance of that body, by license of law pursuant to the constitution.
To this extent he is strictly amenable, and should'always be held so. The amenability
we oppose, is a claim of right by the General Conference, to hold a Bishop responsible
to the judgment or opinions of that body without reference to law, inasmuch as it is the
supreme council of the Church, and its will must be law at any time. In support of this
theory, great reliance is placed upon a recent statement of the Bishops, to the effect,
that the authority of the whole executive administration proceeds from the General
Conference. If this be conceded, it does not conflict with our reasoning. Still it is
quite certain the Bishops did not mean what it is attempted to make them mean. They
knew that the original investment of power in the executive department, say Episco
pacy, was not by the General Conference or body of Preachers ; they had no such power
to part with, but inasmuch as the constitution invested in the General Conference the
right to select the incumbents of the Episcopal office, with the additional right to regu-

147
late the Episcopal charge, provided they disturbed nothing essential to Episcopacy or its
plan of superintendency, as a pre-ordinate power and department of the government,
it is entirely proper for the Bishops or any body else, to speak of the authority of the
executive administration as derived from the General Conference. Limited and under
stood as above, it is true, and doubtless best that it should be so. We would not have
it otherwise. Meanwhile, the vested right of the chief executive officers of the gov
ernment, are protected by the constitution, which merely makes the General Conference
the organ of investment without right to disturb or recall, except for improper conduct
manifestly defeating the ends of the investment, and then only in virtue of the judicial
trust committed to the Conference by the constitution. Hence in the same connection
the Bishops speak of their responsibility to the Conference as a "judicatory" and "con
stitutional tribunal." When they speak of their "superintending agency," they must
mean under the constitution and not the General Conference, in any conclusive sense.
They knew the legal subjection of the General Conference to the constitution, to be the
same as theirs, and therefore, that any claim of contrpl except such as we have speci
fied, could not bo admitted by them, without the betrayal of a constitutional trust. Hence
again, they speak of "all things being done in every official department of the Church,
in strict conformity to the constitution and the Discipline."
That the Bishops did not mean a subjection to the General Conference, the test of
which shall be the mere will of that body, apart from the constitution and laws, stands
out in intelligible relief, in the same connection from which we have quoted. They say,
"the primary objects of their official department in the Church, were to preserve, in the
most effectual manner, an Itinerant ministry — to maintian a uniformity in the government
and discipline, in every department." The kind of responsibility they readily admit, is
that for which we contend — "responsible for the discharge ofthe duties of their office,"
is their language; "the office," they add, "you have committed to us." While the
Bishops knew themselves responsible to the General Conference for their conduct, both
as individuals and officers, they knew equally well that they were not dependent for
right and prerogative, as they derived these from the constitution, independently of the
General Conference. It is certainly not very complimentary to the intelligence of the
electors, to suppose they would make men Bishops so grossly ignorant of the constitu
tion as to suppose that the rights and powers of the Episcopacy depend upon the Gen
eral Conference. Sandford, speaking of Episcopal responsibility to the General Con
ference, says, "a Bishop is responsible for his christian, moral, and official conduct."
Dr. Bangs says, "he is amenable to that body for his moral and official conduct." Dr.
Elliott says, "from tbem" (we have shown in what sense only,) "he derives his powers,
and to them is accountable for the exercise of them. Also, "He is accountable for the
proper discharge of his duties." Dr. Bangs assumes that "those who invest another with
ecclesiastical orders, on condition that he possesses certain qualifications and continues
to discharge the duties of his office, have a power and a right to divest him of it when
ever he fails to fulfil these conditions." Bishop McKendree says, "I consider myself
justly accountable, not for the system of government, but for my administration, ready
to answer for past conduct." Dr. Elliott, in vindicating a Bishop against the absurd
idea of any except legal responsibility to the General Conference, declares, "if they
had no Discipline to bear on his case, then he could not break their laws, as they did not
exist." Sandford accounts for the Bishops' amenability to the General Conference by
remarking, "it possesses judiciary powers respecting the Bishops." Bishop McKen
dree, reasoning expressly upon the responsibility of "Bishops, Elders, &c." affirms,
"the suspending power is clearly restricted to such crimes as are expressly forbidden

143
in the word of God." The Bishops have recently said of themselves, that "they are
amenable to the General Conference not only for their moral conduct and the doctrines
they teach, but also for the faithful administration of the government cf the Church,
according to the provisions of the Discipline." These and innumerable other declara
tions to the same effect, constituting the staple opinions of the Church on the subject of
Episcopal amenability to the General Conference, show, with a conclusiveness which
cannot be affected by argument or sophistry, that the new theory of the Northern school,
is in all its essential parts and tendencies, subversive of the old, and directly at war
with Ihe constitution of the Church. No man can read the arguments and avowals of
those to whom the new theory is justly patented, without perceiving that there exists,
and always must, the most invincible repugnance between the commonly received doc
trines of the Church, and the innovations it is so boldly attempted to substitute in their
place. We say substituted in their place, for the two theories cannot co-exist in
practice. Coke and Asbury remark, "if ever through improper conduct the General Conference
looses confidence, in any considerable degree, (in the Bishops,) they will upon evidence,
&c." And again, "if ever the Episcopacy evidently betrays a spirit of tyranny or par
tiality, and this can be proved before the General Conference, &c." Showing that both
of the last arguments submitted, are fully sustained by the Bishops. They understood
improper conduct to mean misconduct of any kind, such as "tyranny, partiality, im
moral conduct," and they further and distinctly let it be known, that the "evidence" and
"proof" of trial "before the General Conference, " is the only mode of testing the is
sue. We have already noticed- for another purpose, unequivocal evidence that the view
wc take of this subject is correct. "The letters of Episcopal ordination" held by the
Bishops say, "set apart, consecrated, and ordained, to the office and work of a Bishop,
so long as his spirit, practice, and doctrine are such as become the gospel of Jesus
Chriit, and he shall submit to and maintain the Discipline and order" of the Church.
A claim of right then to disturb, remove, or degrade, while the Bishop submits to law
and order, and maintains them in administration, involves the claimants in the charge
of falsehood as well as faithlesness, for in the "letters" above, they are sacredly pledg
ed to the contrary of what they claim. But these "self imposed" restrictions, remova
ble at will, are supposed fully to secure the General Conference against all legal em
barrassment. The expedient is, so says the argument of Bishop Hamline and others,
if a law be needed the General Conference can, in a moment, make it for the occasion.
And the result is, the restrictions restrict no body — nothing. The Conference has un
limited license — there is no restriction at all except as the resolves and acts of the Con
ference at different times, become the antipodes of each other, and limit by obstruction.
Let this claim be applied to the assumed legislative, judicial, and executive supremacy
of the General Conference, and in theory we have as veritable a tyranny as ever existed
on earth, and the only safety of the Church will be in the intelligence and virtue of the
men composing the body. They may not do wrong, may not oppress, but that they
have, so far as this theory of government is concerned, as good a right to do wrong as
to act otherwise, no one can doubt. Dr. Bangs says, "the acts of the General Confer
ence are tried hy the restrictive regulations, which define and limit their powers."
The Dr. certainly does not mean that they are their own triers, but that their acts are to
be 'tested by these rules, and the other departments act in accordance with the conclu
sions at which they arrive in the case. The President presiding over the deliberations
of the body, by appointment of the constitution, is there for the several purposes, as
has been seen, of general oversight— as the representative of the Church at large in its

149
various departments and interests — to preside and moderate in the sittings of the body,
and always respecting and asserting its rights, nevertheless superintend there as
elsewhere. He is not there for the direct but auxiliary purposes of legislation and ju
dicial procedure. Hence, in "judging of the acts of the body, his position is materially
different from that of the elected — the local and sectional delegates of the body, and the
reasoning which would apply to them, cannot apply to the constitutional head of the
assembly. He is in the body, with constitutional right, to further the objects of its
appointment. We have shown, in various ways, that the imposing pretence that the Church met
in 1808, to frame a constitution, can only mean, so far as the truth of history is con
cerned, that it was the purpose of the Episcopacy and Annual Conferences, as the prop
er contracting departments and parties, not to allow the project of a Delegated General
Conference to go into effect without adding to the constitution, proper restrictions and
limitations, with regard to the rights and powers they would be likely to assume.
It was the specific object of that Conventional Conference to prevent ihe preferment of
any such claim in behalf of the General Conference, as that against which we are now
protesting. The imposition of these restrictions was eminently the condition upon
which a Delegated General Conference was allowed to exist al all, and yet this body,
thus limited and restricted, claims to determine whether they will abide constitutional
restraint, as imposed by others, or not rather create constitutional prerogative as they
may stand in need of it. And to render this sliding scale of constitution and law eve
ry way facile and easy of management, it is assumed that the only restrictions upon
the General Conference are "self-imposed," and may, of course, at any time be over
ruled by prerogative! These are the miserable inventions, such the sans culoile radi
calism, for protesting against which we are denounced as reckless "divisionists," en
gaged in a crusade against the unity of the Church-, which they themselves had destroy
ed, while we were praying them to withhold their hands ! We appeal to facts. Let
the developments of this Review, and others equally important, be calmly and careful
ly weighed, and we are content to abide the issue. In every aspect in which we are
able to view this exhorbitant claim of General Conference power, we regard it as ab
surd and dangerous. There certainly must be something in the constitutional struc
ture of the government to check and counterbalance such a state of things. And, in
part, as we have shown, we believe beyond cavil, such check and resistance must be
found in the Chief Executive Officers of the Church. We do not mean power to con
trol the General Conference, except so far as to check and moderate, and keep it within
the limits of the constitution. When it is obvious, for example, that an act of the Gen
eral Conference is subversive of constitutional right, it is the plain and undeniable du
ty of the Bishops, as constitutional officers of the whole Church, to resist the wrong in
a proper manner, and not give sanction and currency to a grave constitutional abuse, by
transforming a legislative or judicial error into an executive general evil. In this
way the subject would be brought, in due form, before all the departments of the
Church, equally independent, under the constitution, and the proper correction of the
evil would, in due time, be the probable result. If Bishops are allowed to have judg
ment and conscience in the premises, how nan they act otherwise than as we suggest?
When the General Conference, in the judgment of the Episcopacy, have not only fail
ed to represent the constituent bodies electing them, but so acted as to inflict deep and
permanent injury upon them, are not the Bishops, as having the general oversight of
all, allowed to dissent, and in a proper and respectful manner appeal the case for rem
edy to other departments of the Church? It is not intended to claim that ally express

150
grant gives full and perfect right to this effect. It is not alluded to as matter of right,
except upon high moral grounds, connected with the reasons and aims of government.
The power of the suspensive veto, at least, must be found somewhere in every good gov
ernment, in eve-y government, in fact, which is not a tyranny, or liable to become one
at any moment. If practicable, we prefer that the power of check and balance should
be found in each department, with regard to the rest — any other; but if this be not
practicable, owing to the peculiar form of the government, or is wanting for any other
reason, the right will, of necessity, often accrue in extreme cases, and, from the nat
ural operation of cause and effect, to the Executive department, much more frequently
than the others. When we say of necessity, we mean, it is often necessary to accom
plish the objects of the constitution, and when this is the case, the right is inherent in
the system, whether it exist as a formal grant or not. It is well known to have been
the opinion of Bishop McKendree, that without the exercise of this power, as occasion
may demand, the executive branch of the government of ihe Methodist Episcopal Church
could not maintain its effectiveness. It will be recollected by many, that Bishop Mc
Kendree, upon a time, firmly and peremptorily refused to ordain a man elected to El
der's orders, by the New York Conference, because, as he alledged, they had infringed
the constitution in his election, and, as a constitutional officer, he refused to endorse
the proceeding. We have seen he acted upon the same principle in 1820, with regard
to the "suspended resolutions ;" and it is known, that in 1824 he had a measure brought
forward, the object of which was, to give lo the Episcopacy, subject to proper restric
tions, the right of the negative we are noticing : not with any view to lessen the final
power of the General Conference, but to protect the rights of the Episcopacy and An
nual Conferences, and secure an effective well balanced administration of the govern
ment. This view of the subject is introduced merely by the way, to bring before the
reader tho rights and powers of Episcopacy, not ou scriptural grounds, but as an ele
mentary principle of the government of the Church, and vitally connected with its ef
fective administration. Under the belief, formerly, that the claims of Episcopacy, in
the Methodist Episcopal Church, both as it regarded ordination and jurisdiction, were
prescriptively based upon divine scriptural right, we rejected the claim as destitute of
any thing like fair or reasonable warrant. When led, however, to examine the subject
in the light of a conventional arrangement, in the original organization of the Church,
and subsequent adjustment of the different parts and powers of the government, the
whole subject of necessity assumed a different aspect, and approval or disapproval turn
ed upon the subject matter of two simple questions : 1st. What are tbe rights and pow
ers conventionally secured to the Episcopacy, and by consequence constitutional, in the
government of the Methodist Episcopal Church? And, 2d. Viewing the ecclesiastical
system of the Church as a grand missionary organization, are these rights and powers
necessary to secure an effective administration of the government, and the ends pro
posed by the system? Having satisfied myself with regard to the first, and answered
the second affirmatively, I immediately adopted the general views I have since enter
tained, and with which I am involved in this controversy. Since the termination of
my connection with the former controversy, seventeen Annual Conferences, whose ad
ministration has been approved by five successive General Conferences, (of all which I
have been a member,) have extended to me official public approval, as worthy of their
confidence and that of the Church. I have proofs in my possession, that during the
whole period in question, I have had the friendship and confidence of the first men of
the Church, East, West, North, and South, always including a decided majority, if not
the entire bench of Bishops. Under these circumstances, and not to extend a notice of

151
myself, to which I am driven by gratuitous insult and injury, I must be permitted to
say to my recent villifiers through the medium of the press, that if, at whatever addi
tional expense of truth and decency, it will be any gratification to their malignity to
proceed further with their abuse, humble as I am in reputation and resource, I can af
ford to let them.
If we understand the claim of General Conference power, it is that all the power of
the government is in its hands. It is true the restrictions are admitted to throw some
difficulty in the way, but it has been seen that the removal of the difficulty is conve
niently provided for. If we do not misconceive the recent revelations on this subject,
the doctrine is, that the power of government proper is in the General Conference, un
divided with, unmodified and unmediatized by any other department of the system. It
would be an easy task to show that hundreds of postulates und assumptions, and long
trains of reasoning, of Northern origin, during the last ten or eleven months all tend
to this, and we cannot help thinking, it is our deliberate conviction, that a claim like
this, to make, execute, and judge, in relation to all law, is as preposterous a claim to
absolutism in the structure of government, as any known in history. The reason is
obvious; there is no mediatizing, qualifying power in any other branch of the govern
ment. Now whether the supposed binding force of the restrictive rules be admitted
or not, we have seen and shall have occasion further to show, that this claim of power
is subversive of the only theory of government we have, and is likely soon to result
in consequences greatly injurious, if not fatal to its usual vigor of administration.
I have had no communication with any of the Board of Bishops on the subject, but am
perfectly satisfied from my knowledge of the men and their general views, that a ma
jority of them are of the same opinion, and regard the government, in this respect, as
in a course of revolution, which mayor may not be arrested and turned aside from the
primary objects had in view, by the movers and supporters of the project. It will thus
be seen, important issues are involved beside the slavery question. The spirit of
change and innovation is abroad. Distinct spheres of authority in the Chnrch are in
conflict. Immense masses of mind and feeling are antagonizing in different directions.
The swell of the earthquake is beneath us. Under such circumstances, how, by what
organ or organs is the Church to act, in remedy of the evils already upon us? What
can a General Conference do? A General Conference brought on our misfortunes. Its
action in regard to Andrew and Harding, as the pretext for more decisive, and as we
have proved, unconstitutional and lawless movements against slavery, has destroyed the
confidence of the South. The North, under the dictation of the Press, are rapidly
placing themselves in direct hostility to the General Conference, on tho question of
separation. What then could a General Conference do? Precisely what the Baltimore
and Illinois Conferences expect them to do, re-assert the lawfulness and necessity of
the proceedings of the last General Conference, on the subject of slavery, and by new
legislation attempt to nullify Us contract with the South, as to the division of the
Church. All Delegates would be elected upon strictly party grounds, and all action
had in view of party purposes ; I mean the great objects of the parties respectively, on
the two great questions, slavery and separation. I see no power or likelihood of rem
edy, but the high moral certainty of increased evil by such an arrangement. The par
ties North and South are being so compactly formed and firmly pitted against each
other, that it is entirely probable a majority of the old Delegates would be returned,
and if not, men of the same sentiments and feelings beyond doubt, and it requires but
little discernment to see what the result would be. I have from the first, believed that
mere General Conference Agency, can avail nothing toward an adjustment of the diffi
culty.

152
At the close of the General Conference my hopes of adjustment were connected with
the Annual Conferences and the Episcopacy, but the Annual Conferences aro now com
mitted North and South; Bishop Andrew is a Rebel, and Bishop Soule a Tyrant by
proclamation, and the tone of my hopes in these directions is greatly lowered. Still,
I am individually disposed to favor any plan of adjustment likely to give us a state of
things preferable to the present. I will go in for testing or trying any measure of ad
justment or compromise, by means of General Conference, Annual Conference, or
Episcopal interposition, the only constitutional methods to which we can appeal, as the
government precludes the Local ministry and people, beyond the right of advice and re
monstrance. I will go in for any or all of these, provided it can be done without af
fecting the ultimate obligation of the contract now existing between the Northern and
Southern Conference-:, on the subject of separation, should the attempt fail. This is
certainly fair and just in regard to both parties. Let us be assured, then, upon the
basis of reliable stipulations, that such effort or efforts at compromise, shall not, in the
event of failure, affect in any way the validity of the General Conference plan of sepa
ration, by operating a forfeiture of right, or destruction or abatement of obligation in
relation to it, and I will favor compromise in any constitutional form in which it is at
all likely to succeed. If the union of the Church be the object, no man can object to
this. So far, however, as an attempt at adjustment is intended to release the North or
South from the contract in question, or may tend to place in jeopardy the interests of
that contract, I am bound in truth and honor to resist it. I repeat, however, that if
assured as above, that in the event of failure, ihe parlies Norlh and South are tofall
back upon the rights and obligations of the contract in queslion, I will wait any length of
time, will perform any labor, will do or suffer to any exlcnt, suggested by the reason or
fitness of things, to place the Church where it was on the 1st of May, 1844. Meanwhile,
committed as I am in company with the Southern Delegations in the lute General Confer
ence, and every member of the late Kentucky Conference, (save one) to principles and
issues, plain and unambiguous, found in the Declaration and Protest, the Southern Ad
dress, the provisional arrangements for ihe Louisville Convention, and the official re
corded action ofthe Kentucky Conference, and from which there is no honorable retreat,
except upon avowal of a change of opinion and conviction, upon the merits of the whole
subject, I cannot consent to any course or measure, the effect of which will be to unbind
the Norlh and disfranchise the South, in view of the obligations and rights ofthe plan of
separation. Any thing short of this I am ready to support. I know many who approve
the general course ofthe South are opposed to any conclusive action by the Convention,
fearing it will preclude the hope of future adjustment. Such persons have our respect
and sympathy. But it is worthy of grave enquiry, whether such action, to the extent of
formal organization to go into effect contingently, is not the only available method of
getting at compromise at all, unless the South are prepared to compromise by uncon
ditional submission, to exparte dictation. This last conclusion and course have, beyond
all doubt, been resolved upon by small portions of the Church in Kentucky, and else
where upon the Southern border. Whether the same indifference to the principles and
interests involved in this controversy, will mark any considerable porlion of the
Church, remains to be seen. That it is the purpose of many to call and clamor for
compromise, who merely wish the South to forfeit their rights under the contract of
separalion entered into by the parties of the last General Conference, is well known
and understood, and against ihis intrigue and such treason, it is hoped the South will
be sufficiently guarded. In a word, we would say to the North, we are ready to abide
the contract between us. in the shape of a legislative enactment of the General Con-

153
erence, or if there be any hope of compromise, we will agree to suspend the fulfilment
of its stipulations, until the trial is fairly made, and should the attempt fail, both par
ties must abide the issue of the General Conference plan of separation.
The claim of unlimited arbitrary power by the General Conference, is so offensive
to the genius of our government, we know not how to dismiss it; and convinced as wo
are that a virtual co-ordination of powers among the departments in the general ad
ministration, is essential to the stability of the government, we must ask tho attention
of the reader to some additional arguments. We have shown that by the whole
amount of the Episcopal power of the government, the claim in question is of necessi
ty reduced, as thai is incontestably proved to be an elementary power of the govern
ment, not only before the General Conference existed, but from the organization ofthe
Church, and before it had a Presbyter in it. As the General Conference did not cre
ate the Episcopal office, so it never had the power to fill it. It may select a person to
fill, and in case the Church has no Bishop, may select Presbyters to consecrate one, but
this right and power of consecration are not derived from the General Conference, but
from the power of ordination in the Presbyters, derived from their own Episcopal ordi
nation. In consecrating a Bishop, they represent not the General Conference but the
Episcopacy, the Bishop or order of Bishops, from whom they essentially derived the
right and power they now exercise. Add to this, what is in proof in the general argu
ment, that the constitutional (I do not say scriptural) validity of the consecration, turn
ing in a very materia", sense upon the prescribed form of consecration, which form is a
part of the constitution, exists, and is of binding obligation, independently of the
General Conference. This ground, too, of General Conference claim, so exultingly
relied upon, is further overthrown by the fact, that in the consecration in question, the
General Conference has no will or discretion of its own, except in the mere matter of
saying who is to be selected for the office. The constitution tells them that they "shall
elect," and that the Elders "shall ordain." It is not the Conference but the constitu
tion winch directs how the Episcopal power of ordination is to be exercised by Presby
ters, in a case of extreme necessity. The constitution is careful to show that no Epis
copal power (instead of all, according to Bishop Hamline,) belongs to the General
Conference. When our first Bishops say they are at the "mercy" of the General
Conference, and also the "little Conference" or committee of nine for the trial of
Bishops, they do not mean, as we have proved by their own declarations, that' no law
is interposed between them and the General Conference, but that the Conference, as
the tribunal to try them, could keep or break the law by a just or unjust application of
it, and hence judicially, they were fully in the power of the Conference. The old
General Conference, however, had a vague claim to power in this respect, which the
present delegated General Conference does not, possess, the amendment to the constitu
tion in 1808, expressly restricting it. The General Conference has no power over a
Bishop on the ground of prerogative, not a particle. The power they have by the
Constitution we do not object lo ; it is asserted in the Protest and admitted by the whole
South. Take the sum of Episcopal powers : — the right to preside in the General and
Annual Conferences; to fix and control the appointment of all the Traveling Preach
ers ; the exclusive right to ordain ; the power of the general executive administration,
in the intervals of the Conferences especially; to travel at large and superintend the
spiritual and temporal interests of the Church, throughout the entire connection, to
gether with the incidental rights and powers necessary to accomplish these objects.
These are all protected by tbe constitution, and without its violation the General Con
ference cannot reach them, so as to "change, alter or destroy." The only power re-
20

154
coo-nized by Bishop Hedding, in the positions quoted from him on this subject, which
can possibly affect our reasoning, is in the body of Traveling Elders, and cannot be
brought to bear upon the constitutional claims of Episcopacy, except as before shown
in this argument. The inferences from Bishop Hedding, confounds the body of Travel
ing Elders with the General Conference, as a representative council of the Church.
The constitution keeps them separate. If it be said this council represents the Elders
in question, it is sufficient to notice in reply, that it equally represents the Deacons,
and is no more a delegation from the Elders than from the Deacons, so that the one
cannot be substituted for the other in argument, without a misstatement of facts, as
well as logical confusion. The inference of power here, from the premises assumed,
is further invalidated from the fact, that the power claimed never did belong to either
the body of Traveling Elders or the General Conference, and could not therefore be
cededor investedhy either. After the institution of Episcopacy and its full investment
with all its present rights and powers, that can in any way be deemed essential, it was
conventionally agreed to deposite the right to elect Bishops, and the judicial power to
try them in case of delinquency, with the General Conference, and this is the only
controlling power the General Conference has inthe premises. The facts, of history
indeed, compel us to go farther than this ; it is not only true that our Episcopacy did
not originate with the Eldership, but it is equally true, as just seen, that it is perpetuated
by them to a very limited extent only, for 1st. The General Conference is the Repre
sentative Body of the Deacons as well as Elders, and 2d. Its power to perpetuate is
but auxiliary, being confined to mere election, which invests no right of any kind in
the person elected, beyond saying he may be invested with right and power by those
having authority to make the investment, after election by the General Conference.
Thus showing, that in every representative sense the Deacons divide the power assum
ed, with the Elders, and that in both, and after all, it is merely adjunctive to a more
substanlive power, which the constitution has bounded as a separate sphere of action.
The protest in assuming Episcopacy to be a co-ordinate branch of the government, in
tended to convey the idea usually conveyed by such phrase, that it is an independant
department, a separate sphere of executive power and action, standing in the same re
lation to the constitution that the General Conference does, that is to say, as the Epis
copacy cannot constitutionally invade in any way, the rights and powers of the Gener
al Conference, so the General Conference has no constitutional right to touch, in any
form, the vested rights of the Episcopacy. The co-ordination we assume, is not to be
judged of by any estimated equality of powers, when the different departments are sim
ply compared with each other, but in so far as they are independent of each other, in
their relation to the constitution. This is the view of the Protest, and we show it to
be the doctrine of the Church. The very language of the constitution avows it in the
3d restrictive article. When Bishop Hedding speaks of the body of Traveling Elders
having power to "reduce, limit, or transfer to other hands" Episcopal power, he is not
speaking of General Conference power, but merely of the constitutional right of the
Annual Conferences to change the form of government, and do away Episcopacy en
tirely. This however, is Annual not General Conference power, and beside, it no more
belongs to Elders than to Deacons, as we have seen. We ask attention to Ihis fact
as materially affecting the adverse argument. All the authorities urged by the Reply
to the Protest, except the misconceived opinion of Bishop Hedding, are inapplicable and
out of place, because based upon the old order of things, before the powers of the Gen
eral Conference were restricted in 1808.

155
Powers before conceded, not constitutionally, or in any accredited form, but apparent
ly by common general consent, were in 1808, expressly denied to the General Confer
ence by a constitutional limitation of the powers and rights of that body. On this ac
count, much that is said by Coke and Asbury, in their Notes on the subject of General
conference power over the Episcopacy, is now entirely inadmissible as an exposition of
law, and it is the sheerest "sophistry" to appeal to it as such. The same is true as to
the opinions of Asbury and McKendree, in 1806, as quoted by the Rev. J. Young, and
similar quotations made since in the Northern papers, from Dickins and Watters.
These concessions all date back to an order of things not in existence since 1808, and
can, therefore, have no weight whatever against the force of our general position on
this subject. All the power now found in tlie General Cnoference over the Episcopacy,
amounts to nothing more than that Bishops are legally and strictly responsible for their
conduct as Ministers and Bishops, and that it is competent for the Conference to lay
them aside, by judicial process, whenever they shall be found guilty of misconduct
either as men or officers, which obviously requires it. This power the Conference ought
to have, and it is enough to control the Episcopacy and prevent the introduction of any
serious evils into that department. We are unyieldingly opposed to any power in the
Episcopacy by which the Church can be oppressed, but we are not less opposed to any
such power in the General Conference or else where. To prevent such a result is our
only object, and we essay to do it not by proposing any thing new, but by showing that
what our positions desiderate, is already found in the government. We do not claim
as much power for the Episcopacy as belongs to the General Conference. We are con
tent that the Episcopacy shall have incomparably less power. Let that body, as the
legislature and high Court of Appeals, be "supreme" in the parlance of the Church. All
this may be so and yet our reasoning be correct. The co-ordination of the Protest, so
far from meaning the alledged "supremacy" of the Reply does not denote even an ap
proach to equality of power, and in jurisprudence is never used for such purpose. It
means simply, existing independently of other departments by the organic laws of the
government. In the same way geographical departments may, and often do, in Church
and State, exist under the same organic laws, and 'in this sense the Kentucky Confer
ence applies the term "co-ordinate," to the proposed Southern organization, and law and
public opinion will sustain the construction. Such an organization, should it take place,
will not be claimed to be the Methodist Episcopal Church, as before stated, to the exclu
sion of the Northern division, but authorized by that Church to exist under all its organic
laws without the exception or change of any one of them, it will be to all the intents
and purposes of Church unity, a "co-ordinate" division of the collection of Ministers
and people in the United States, known as the Methodist Episcopal Church. This
Church has no corporate or other unity except what arises from having the same creed,
liturgy, laws, and moral discipline, and as none of these are affected by the division pro
posed, the real unity of the Church cannot be affected by the contemplated change. The
unity contended for by those who, renouncing the authority of the Church, have thrust
themselves into the place of the General Conference, and are attempting to dogmatize
the Church into submission, is without meaning or application, beyond the mystic charm
of a mere name. Upon the principles of reasoning they adopt, there can be no union
between them and the British, Irish, and Canadian connexions of Methodists, for
these, with the same faith, liturgy, moral laws, and Discipline, are not the Methodist
Episcopal Church, and must, therefore, be aliens, by the logic brought to bear upon the
South. If the union so lustily fought for, without being defined or made intelligible,
be moral and spiritual, the mere name is nothing, but applies to all christians of what-

156
ever name. If it be the union of a multitude with the same faith, the same rites and
ceremonies, claiming to be subject to the same organic laws and moral regulations as
to life and conduct, then all the denunciations against the South, as "seceders and
schismatics," must be traced to something less sacred than truth and principle, for these
can lend no support to the injustice and outrage under which we are suffering, without
even being charged with offense against any law of the Church, and for only proposing
to do, what the highest authority of the Church has declared all who choose may do
"without blame!" Were we offenders equally with the North ; had we violated the
constitution and laws of the Church; had we dishonored its official pledges and trifled
with its most sacred stipulations; had we assailed the constitutional tenures of office,
and claimed the right of taking back what we never bestowed and never had it in our
power to bestow ; it might be different with us ; we might feel, not as now ; as it is, wc
know ourselves to be greatly wronged and deeply injured, and cannot respect as we
wish to, either the motives or the means embarked in the effort to degrade and destroy
us. But to return. It may be urged, that our view of the theory of Methodist Church
government, will bring the Episcopacy or Executive Department in conflict with the
General Conference. In our judgment, however, it is the only mode of avoiding it,
und we are perfectly satisfied that upon the plan wc oppose the two cannot co-exist in
effective action. We regard it as entirely important that the General Conference should
have all the power now properly belonging to it. We would not deprive it of a parti
cle of its present power or right. What we except to, is the late exorbitant claim of
power, (as by Bishop Hamline,) never hefore asserted in behalf of it, at least since
1808. The General Conference must possess the necessary power to hold in salutary
check any tendency of the Episcopacy to assume or usurp what does not by right of law
belong to it, and such power it certainly has at present, and we think in just and ade
quate degree. And to accomplish the same purposes of good to the Church, it is equally
necessary that in the constiiutional distribution of power, the Episcopacy should not
depend upon the will of the General Conference for right and prerogative. Hence the
constitution places these beyond the control of the General Conference. We have
shown with perhaps sufficient force and clearness, that the General Conference right of
election, has no connection with the rights and powers of Episcopacy. These were
pre-settled in the constitution, long before the existence of a General Conference or the
election of a Bishop in any proper sense, for the informal election of Asbury in 1784,
was perfectly null as to any right of election, there being neither Elders nor Deacons
in the body, except the Wesleyan "assistants" of Coke and Asbury, and a merely lay
election could certainly confer no clerical or ecclesiastical right. It was entirely proper
to consult the wishes of that body of good and sensible men, but they had just admitted
to Mr. Wesley, they had no right to elect any man to clerical orders of any kind.
Nothing is clearer than that Bishops are elected by the General Conference without de
riving any power or privilege from it. The General Conference gives nothing consti-
tuently connected with the office, and can take nothing away, except judicially. Regu
lations relating to the ways and means of Episcopal administration, not affecting the
rights of office, are made by the General Conference, with full and perfect powers, and these
reduce or increase Episcopal power in fact, according to their nature and character, but
our argument turns entirely upon things vital to Episcopacy, as a fundamental power.
The Northern argument against the claims of Episcopacy, as set forth from the fathers
and founders of the Church in this sketch, which we are compelled to collect from differ
ent sources and collate as best we can, is so entirely miscellaneous in character and
Protean in shape, we find it difficult to give suitable form and consistency to anyexami-

157
nation of it. The critical reader will find himself a little dissorted in this respect oc
casionally, but when he recollects that we are only pledged to general outline views, he
will perhaps, after discounting such real or seeming irregularity, meet with sufficient
point and concentration in the argument, as a whole, to enable him to judge of the true
merits of the question at issue.
Is it possible for any person of intelligence and candor to examine the questions' in
controversy respecting Methodist Episcopacy, without being struck with the contrast
between the new Episcopal theory and the old, as we have found it in the staple pro
ductions of the Church? In the common convictions and standard writings of the
Church for sixty years, Episcopacy has been a distinct and well defined organism, so
constitutionally interwoven with the government, as to give name and character to the
Church. According to the new theory, it is a more "ministerial executive regulation"
of the General Conference, which they can dispense with or continue at pleasure. With
"the fathers," it is the great primary principle of Church order, expanded into an ac
tual department of the government, so connected with the other departments as to se
cure energy and harmony of co-operation, and yet so independent of them in the ful
filment of its high trust, that except for crime or mal official conduct in the incumbents,
it cannot be changed from what it is, unless by a change of the constitution. The re
cent re-construction of the old theory teaches, that the General Conference may find it
necessary either to discontinue the "regulation" of having general superintendents, or
may so regulate the fact and plan of Episcopal oversight, as to have the supervision of
whatever kind the Conference may prefer. It used to be thought, that Episcopacy was
the most original elementary agency in the organic formation of the Church. The late
discovery is, that the General Conference originated both Episcopacy and Episcopal
authority. The old doctrine was, that Episcopacy pre-existed and united with the An
nual Conferences, in giving birth to the General Conference, and finally that these as
the superior authority, by imposing proper restrictions upon it, provided amply for the
security of the parties creating it, as one of the principal organs of Church action.
This error is now corrected, by its being ascertained that the General Conference is a
self constituted body, limited in right and power only by "self imposed" restraint. The
former doctrine was, that in every original sense, Episcopacy was derived from Wes
ley  that ordination by Wesley gave birth to it, and that election by the lay Conference
of 1784, was not even an incident in its institution, but a mere "receiving" of what
Wesley had provided for his societies in America. The contrary of this is now assum
ed with imposing boldness, and it is contended that Episcopacy is of conventional Con
ference origin. Former opinion admitted the conventional character of the Conference
of 1784, but was careful to discriminate, that in whatever other aspects it was conven
tional, il had no agency in the institution of Episcopacy. Now, however, it was a prin
cipal agency, for without this assumption, the subsequent agency of election would lose
the virtue claimed for it. It was prevalently understood formerly, that as the General
Conference was the last organic department erected in the construction of the present
government of the Church, it could have had no participation in producing the others
and none of their powers except by transfer. Now the claim is, it possesses all the
power of both, because the old departments conceded to the new, upon its establish
ment, that it might elect and try Bishops for "improper conduct." and say when a new
Annual Conference shall be created, although without any right or power to make a
Bishop or organize an Annual Conference. The Episcopacy being in the full vigor of
maturity, before the projection of the General Conference system, it did not occur to
the founders and authors of the economy of American Methodism, that the latter would

15S
claim paternity and jurisdiction in relation to every thing connected with the former.
That this is now done, however, few will attempt to deny. We used to think, as a
Church, that in Episcopacy was to be sought the constitutional headship of tho govern
ment. How far below this it is now attempted to reduce it, may be judged of by the
mass of evidence we submit. The Church was of opinion that from 1792 to 1808, the
General Conference had loo much power, and that it was necessary to restrict it by con
stitutional prohibitions. Now the latter claims more power than it was supposed to
possess before the reduction of its powers, when consisting of "all the Preachers in
full connection" — that is, all the Deacons and Elders in the Traveling Ministry. As
parties to the constitution, the old doctrine was thai each department is rigidly subject
to tiie regulations of law. Now it seems to be thought, that the legislative department
cannot act unlawfully, as it can in "two minutes," supply itself with law in any emer
gency. The very existence of the restrictive rules, proves clearly, that the former doc
trine was, that should the General Conference obviously violate the constitution, it is
the right and the duty of the Episcopacy and Annual Conferences, to interpose and resist.
It is now the doctrine, however, that the General Conference is the only judge ofthe
constitutionality of its own acts. The old theory, which impresses itself upon tho
very face of the constitution, laws, and administration of the Church, that the executive
power of the governmont belongs essentially to the Episcopacy and Annual Conferen
ces, is superceded by the assumption of general executive power in behalf of the Gen
eral Conference. Our fathers, as we have shown, knew no better than that the Episco
pacy and Annual Conferences derived tlieir rights and powers from the constitution, and
had all they now possess, substantially, beside much they have parted with by conces
sion, before they thought of creating a General Conference. Their sons, it seems, are
to be better taught, and all right and power of whatever kind, is to be credited to the
General Conference. The whole Church has always regarded Annual Conferences as
independent organic bodies, subject only to General Conference control as law directs.
The new theory annihilates this independence entirely, by assuming that the absolute
right of control in relation to these bodies, is in the General Conference, and that they
exist only by its permission. Instead of which, nothing is plainer, than that the Gen
eral Conference is by direct provision of the constitution, under Ihe control of the An
nual Conferences, in the last resort, and it will be seen by every one how intimately
Episcopal oversight and its executive rights and powers, are interwoven with the An
nual Conference system. Thus presenting the checks and balances to which we have
adverted. Until recently, it seemed to be well understood, that as the Church, or rather
the Episcopacy and Annual Conferences, were of mature age and possessed the whole
official authority of the Church, before they organized the General Conference, and as
they conceded none of their fundamental powers to that body, the General Conference
could have no claim to disturb them in the functional exercise of their powers and
rights. In this, however, modern enlightenment shows them to have been mistaken.
It has always been well understood, that limited legislative and judicial power, as well
as some of the powers of general administration, had been invested in the General Con
ference by the organic regulations giving it existence. It has always been admitted too,
that in matters not vitally affecting the independant functions ofthe Episcopacy and
Annual Conferences, that is, in things incidental and modal in relation to legislative,
judicial, and administrative rights, as invested by law, it is competent for the General
Conference to give and take away, and it has occasionally done both. But this view of
the subject differs materially from the one which allows the Conference to regard its
own will, at any time, as the only law of action in the case. The Church, for more than

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half a century, has published to the world, that its Episcopacy was derived from Wes
ley — that his rights and powers of ordination and superintendence were transferred to
Coke and Asbury, Bishops of his own selection and constitution, he having consecrated
the former and commissioned him to consecrate the latter, without any the most remote
allusion to any organic action by the American Preachers, in the institution of Episco
pacy. The Church having likewise published to all during this whole period, that the
only act of the lay Preachers of the day, was to "receive" the Bishops of Wesley's ap
pointment, as the superintendents of the new Church; thus proclaiming the institution
of Episcopacy to be the first creative act of the new organization. In view of these
facts, it must strike all as strange and unaccountable, how Episcopacy has become a
derivative power in relation to the General Conference. Would Dr. Coke have pre
sumed or dared to ordain Mr. Asbury upon his election by the lay Preachers of 1784,
without authority from Wesley? Would Asbury have presumed or dared to accept or
dination upon such a basis? The answer is negative in both cases. All know that
neither would have presumed so to act. And yet the now popular argument for General
Conference right, respecting Episcopacy, relies mainly upon this election for its sup
port. Failing to prove this election valid, as inevitably they must, it is irresistably
certain that the General Conference has no claim of superiority over Episcopa
cy on the ground of what is so often called "election by the Presbyters." And as
Episcopacy existed in full and effective force, valid and ample as now, with
out deriving a particle of right or power from the "College of Presbyters" as Coke
and Asbury say of the Eldership, after they had created it, under authority from Wes
ley, it shows most conclusively that General Conference election can confer nothing in
any way essential to the Episcopal office. The ordination service (itself a part ofthe
constitution) is evidence of the plainest kind, that no Episcopal right is conferred by
by mere election. The ordination certificate attests the same fact. The design of
election, which is both proper and important, is confined to the suitableness and qualifi
cations of the incumbent. We have shown that it is in no sense an investiture. It
merely authorizes his elevation to the Episcopate by ordination.,. Both the power and
form of ordination pre-date and are independent of our present Presbyterial election,
and beyond General Conference control. Against this, it proves nothing to say, no
Bishop can be made without the consent of the General Conference. This is admitted,
and we are as ready as our opponents to admit the fitness and importance of the ar
rangement. It secures the important result that Bishops are not allowed to select their
associates, and that none can be ordained except approved by a, majority (we wish it
were a two-thirds majority) of the General Conference. Still it proves nothing against
our argument for reasons before given. Suppose wo say the General Conference and
Episcopacy together, cannot make a man a Bishop without his consent1 Does this make
the will of the man in any way constitutive of the office? Test the matter in another
form; ceasing to ordain, would not our constitutional Episcopacy perish, despite u.
thousand elections? We have seen the Episcopacy and General Conference existing
in constitutional connection, as independent departments, except so far as this inde
pendence is qualified by the terms of union. They exist and act together, the one the
Head the other the Body. Each has separate duties with which the other may not in
terfere, so that essentially they are co-ordinate branches of the government, although
essentially, they exist and operate in a state of mutual inter-dependence, as do all co
ordinate branches of the government. Each constitutes a distinct organism, and has a
separate anatomy, a system of its own.

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The power of each is derived from the constitution, the nature of the general sys
tem. The distribution of power is regulated by organic law. If the Bishops offend,
there is the law to correct and punish them. The General Conference cannot, with all
its latitude of power and right in other respects, exceed the restrictions imposed upon
it, by Ihe departments which gave it being, without a breach of trust as well as violation
of right, and the remedy must be found in the counteractive forces ofthe system. The
Episcopacy has powers not derived from the General or Annual Conferences. The Gen
eral Conference has nothing but what it derived from the Annual Conferences and Epis
copacy. This is not introduced to prove Episcopacy above the General Conference, (no
part of our reasoning implies this) but merely to show thai the General Conference is
not every thing, and possessed of all power, as lately claimed by the opponents in this
argument. Were the Episcopacy and Annual Conferences acting together, disposed
to usurp power, as we believe the General Conference has lately done, the latter with
its entire power, might be overthrown in a short time. By direction of the power
creating it, and without the permission of the Annua] Conferences and Episcopacy, it
can only meet once in four years. It cannot call itself together or meet at will, and
should the executive department, embracing the Episcopacy and Annual Conferences,
refuse to execute its wishes, the government would be at an end ; and this further
proves the inter-dependence of the departments, and that the supremacy of the Gener
al Conference, to the extent contended for, is a mere fiction, and always must remain
one, under the present constitution. We prove that the Episcopacy is strictly and
properly a co-ordinate branch of the government, by showing that all the other branch
es, much less the General Conference alone, have no right or power to do it away, ex
cept by a change of the constitution. Each department, although connexional as to
the rest, is separate and independent, that is, protected against the invasions of the
other branches by the constitution. The whole of section 4th, in the Discipline, is
strictly organic law and has all the force of any part of the constitution, or else the
General Conference has no power with regard to Episcopacy of any kind, except as
usurped by gratuitous interference. The grant of power to "make rules and regula
tions"/;^ the Church, excepts in every thing important, both Episcopacy and its plan
of oversight. For this there existed the plainest and most irresistible reason. Not
only had the General Conference done nothing toward the institution of Episcopacy,
but even the Church had not. Its existence dates back before the birth of either. It
was the first grand substantive arrangement, around which all others subsequently
clustered and assumed Organic form. The whole machinery of Church administration
received life and motion from it. The primary action and continued impulse of the
whole system arc traceable to it, and as the government has always been organized,
would become defunct without it. We are compelled to think the view of the sub
ject we propose is the only one which can possibly relieve the Church from the charge
of having a most illiberal and tyrannical government, so far as its theory is concerned,
whatever may be the character of ils practical administration. We present, in our
attempt to exhibit the government as we find it, a nearly equal distribution of its pow
ers between the Episcopacy, Annual Conferences, and the General Conference, the
General Pastorate being essentially adjunctive to the two former, although for conve
nience, and in view of some purposes and functions peculiar to it, generally recogni
zed as a separate department. And among many other inferences of the utmost im
portance, we thus reach the principal one had in view in the course of our reasoning,
that a Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church is not in the power of the General
Conference, except in its judicial capacity as a court of trial, proceeding against him

161
upon a charge of improper conduct, and this for the general comprehensive reason,
that the jus proprietalis as it regards the chief constitutional officer of the Church, is
not in the General Conference, but in the several departments of the government
equally, by direction of the organic laws of the entire system. See an able and inter
esting argument on this subject, by the Rev. Dr. Latta, which has yet to be answered.
We know it will be said that such a general view of the subject as we, have taken,
amounts to "Prelacy, Popery, Puseyism," and so of the rest. With this we have
nothing to do. The charge recoils from us upon the Fathers and Founders, the Apostles
and Pillars, the Defenders and Advocates of the Church, as a true Episcopal Church,
unless it can be made appear that we misrepresent them. We show, we believe con
clusively, that we simply adhere to constitution and law, the principles and opinions
of the Church since the first day of its organization. If the system be wrong, be it
so; the arguments remain unaffected. Our only task has been to show what the system
is, and before we are abused as aiming at the projection of an Episcopal "supremacy,"
let our arguments be answered, as we have attempted to give them, in the language of
reason and sobriety, and for the purposes of rational conviction. No amount of decla
mation and assertion, unsupported by argument and evidence, no tempest of personal
abuse, no attempt at sneer and banter, can move or affect us. We must be over-
thown on the ground of argument, or remain unvanquished. This is no boast. We
mean simply, that on the subjects upon which we have written, we have offered an ex
tended series of arguments which strike us as satisfactory and conclusive, and before
any man or number of men can obtain any advantage of us, it must be shown demon
stratively, that the reasons and arguments in question, ought not to have impressed us
as they have.
Left to the undisturbed current of my own thoughts and feelings, I should not have
taken it for granted that this Review was destined to attract, in any unusual way, the
attention of those arrayed against me, in the conflict to which it relates, but already
assaulted in advance with Vandal injustice and want of truth. I have been led to sup
pose, from a pre-judgment so every way gratuitous and illiberal, that the unmanly
malevolence that could not wait to know whether it was uttering truth or falsehood,
might probably give me a notoriety upon which I should otherwise not have calculated.
I shall await and note results with care and patience, until it may become necessary to
attend to them.
A few items, more or less personal to myself, and yet intimately connected with
some of the bearings of this discussion, and I have done. I wish to say first and dis
tinctly, I have not written, dictated, or suggested a single line on the merits of the
controversy, or any particular part of it, or in relation to any person or persons con
nected with it, to which I have not attached my name. The various charges, there
fore, suggestions and insinuations, which have appeared in Northern papers, intended
to implicate me in this respect, are at least as utterly unjust as the fact that they are
false can make them.' From what motives I have been thus assailed, without having
by any act, or any part of my conduct, furnished any reason or course, or semblance
of either, for the assaults made upon me, it will not perhaps, be difficult to determine.
The men' in the principal instances, are a sufficient comment upon the motives, and
accordingly I have received numerous communications from Northern as well as
Southern sources, assuring me these attacks are well understood and properly appre
ciated, as having their origin in personal malignity and party purposes.
I first heard of Bishop Andrew's connection with slavery and the appeal of Har
din? in Baltimore, on my way to General Conference, in April last. I did not take
&' 21

162
my seat in that body until the sixth day of the session. By this time the parties
North and South were pretty well defined. The two or three first meetings of the
Southern Delegations after my arrival, I did not attend. I was anxious to learn the
true position and purposes of the parties. I was soon induced to believe, not only that
the cases of Harding and Bishop Andrew would bring on a conflict between the North
and South, but that new ground would be taken by the North, on the main question,
whenever these cases became the occasion of discussion and action. I early sought to
learn the opinions and views of men, likely to exert no little influence with what had
usually been known as the "conservative" party, and was surprised to learn, that they
were decided and active in the approval and furtherance of a course, which I was satis
fied the South could not submit to. Circumstances compelled me to believe, that the
old compromise ground of the Church, on the subject of slavery, had been or was
about to be abandoned. A large number of Conferences, and thousands of individual
petitioners North, had addressed the General Conference, remonstrating jn effect,
against the provisions, and demanding changes infringing the purposes of law. Under
these circumstances and such an aspect of things, I met the Southern Delegates, and
availed myself of an opportunity to say to them, in substance, that I had come to the
painful conclusion that it was the settled purpose and policy of the old Anti-Slavery
Conservative party, to take ground with the Abolitionists against the South, by de
clining any longer to assert and maintain the compromise law of slavery, as generally
understood by the South, and especially as explained by the preceding General Confer
ence. That so far as I had been able to understand them, they were off the compromise
of the Discipline, and likely to form new associations, injurious if not fatal to South
ern Methodism. That it would be necessary for the South to be watchful and firm as
a Minority, or they would find themselves in a position fearfully detrimental to the
interests of the Church in all the Southern Conferences. I then stated, that in view of
the petitions before the Conference, a large portion of which were new and peculiar in
their character, and other evidence not less convincing, to which my attention had been
directed, it was my opinion that a plan existed, more or less matured, the object of
which was the subversion of the slavery compromise, and the effect of which would be,
if carried out, to reduce the South to the necessity of adopting one of three courses.
1st. They must submit to the outrage regardless of Southern rights and interests ; or
2d, appealing to the only constitutional means in their power, assert those rights and
interests by remaining firmly upon the basis ofthe Discipline, and claiming the pro
tection of law ; or 3d, must go or be forced off as a secession, without any interest in
the Book Concern or other funds or property of the Church. After these remarks, I
requested to know of all present, publicly and explicitly, whether it was their purpose
to abide by the Discipline as it was on the subject of slavery, and all without a single
dissentient having so pledged themselves, I assured them I should be most glad to find
myself mistaken as to the fears and conviction I had expressed, in reference to the
plan or purpose to which I had alluded.
I carefully avoided any allusion which might in any way implicate members of the
General Conference beyond the mere fact, that I was obliged to think many of them
were pursuing a course directly calculated, whatever their motives and purposes might
be, to bring about the result I feared. And in proof and illustration of this, having
made the remark with regard to many, I stated that one who had been long looked to
and regarded as especially the friend and champion of the South, had avowed opinions
and urged a course of action in relation to both Harding and Bishop Andrew, which
would further the objects of the plan or purpose I had brought to their notice, as efiec-

163
tually as though he were the Cataline of the conspiracy. It was my intention to say
distinctly, that I believed the purpose existed North to disturb and destroy the com
promise of the Discipline, as discussed in these pages, and that the position of Dr.
Bond, as reported to me in relation lo the cases of Harding and Bishop Andrew, would
contribute directly to the accomplishment of the object. I had heard from several dif
ferent sources, that Dr. Bond had said that the action of the Baltimore Conference in
Harding's case, must, and doubtless would be sustained by the General Conference;
that Bishop Andrew had not kept faith, or had acted in bad faith in relation to those
who had elected him ; they selecting him because he was not a slaveholder, and he af
terwards becoming one, and yet holding office ; that he was a dishonored man or had
acted dishonorably ; that he must resign or be deposed, as nothing else would prevent
Northern Conferences from secession, and meet the demands of Northern public opin
ion ; that the General Conference had full power to depose or lay aside Bishop An
drew ; and that it might be done by merely striking his name from the Minutes and
Church Records ; that for such a course, the Conference had precedent in the instances
of Wesley and Coke, or at least one of them ; and that this or something equivalent
must be done, whether the South would submit to it or not. These statements, which
I give in substance and meaning, and not perhaps in the precise language and form in
which they were uttered, were reported by different persons as coming from Dr. Bond,
and induced me and many others to believe, that his intended course would as directly
and effectually tend to overthrow the compromise of the law of slavery, as the purpose
or plan believed to exist in the North. The recent public declaration, that I stated a
plan existed among Northern members ofthe General Conference, approved and encour
aged by Dr. Bond, to drive off the South as a secession, with a view to deprive them of
their equitable interest in the Buok Concern and other Church property, is as false as
any statement can be, because utterly devoid of truth. My reasoning upon the facts
stated, and in relation to the choice of evils we should probably be called to make, did, as
a matter of course, call attention to the loss of Church property, as consequent upon se
cession, should we be driven to it, and I accordingly invoked the South on this, as well
as other accounts, not to allow themselves to be provoked to such a step. I urged it
as my belief, that the law of slavery had been conspired against, and should it turn out, that
I had anticipated events, and understood movements correctly, nothing would be left the
Minority of the South, but unconditional submission, constitutional resistance by solemn
Protest, and appeal to tbe conservative powers ofthe Church, or finally, voluntary or forced
secession with forfeiture of rights as before. All this I did without disguise, and still be
lieve I was correct. The whole current of events since the hour I made the statement,
goes to show that I did not greatly, if at all, miscalculate. Individuals and parties
have acted and continue to act, as I anticipated. The plan or purpose to which I invok
ed the reluctant attention of the South, has been ever since in course of development,
and the somewhat indirect but essentially auxiliary influences, to which I made allusion,
are visibly increasing with the progress of this great Church difficulty. M.y only ob
ject in alluding to Dr. Bond as I did, was to make the impression, that whatever might
have been the hopes of the South, connected with him and other leaders of the so cal
led conservative party, that ground of safety, was, in my opinion, to be relied upon no
longer. To understand my true position, in reference to the subject matter of this ex
planation, it is necessary to enquire, 1st. was I mistaken with regard to the facts
upon which I predicated my opinion? 2d, was that opinion a fair and natural infer
ence from the facts? Beside, the mass of evidence in various forms furnished in this
Review, making it entirely certain that a purpose did exist in the North, no longer to

164
submit to the law of compromise, as explained at length by the General Conference of
1840, the full and proper proof is found in the uniform language ofthe petitions, "that
the General Conference would take measures entirely lo separate slavery from the
Church," not the Episcopacy, not the Traveling Ministry only, but the whole Church.
On presenting these innumerable petitions from nine Conferences and some ten thous
and persons, the Northern Delegates stated, without any attempt at concealment, and
with almost stereotyped uniformity, not only that the petitioners (generally) were well
known to them, were respectable, and as intelligent and pious as any in other portions
of the Church, but always and especially that they petitioned from principle and convic
tion, that it was matter of conscience and of settled purpose that they did so, and
finally, that they would "never rest until they obtained what they prayed for." The
same purpose has been avowed and published unequivocally and repeatedly in Zi
on's Herald and other papers, by large and influential portions of the Church, '
Ministers and people, including delegates of the last General Conference. The
fact of the purpose charged in my statement, has in every thing material, been
communicated to Dr. Bond, and published by him for the information of the Church and
world. So far then as this item is concerned, who can doubt as to the facts? But did
Dr. Bond avow the opinions and make the statements attributed to him? That he did I
have never doubted. They were heard and reported not by a single individual only, but
by different persons. The most, if not all of them, have been since assumed and as
serted, admitted or implied, in the editorials of his paper. The entire course and tem
per of Dr. Bond, have been in keeping with them, and the internal evidence in the case,
as well as that of witnesses, endorses the correctness of our original information. Let
the impartial reader now take the plan or purpose, which we prove existed North, not
to abide by the slavery compromise as understood by the South and affirmed by the
General Conference, and take also the position of Dr. Bond as Editor, and the former
friend and advocate of the South, and how would the opinions avowed by him be likely to
affect the purpose in question? Would or would not the opinions and views ascribed to
Dr. Bond, and known to be concurred in to a great extent, by the Conservative party
generally, be directly calculated to further the Northern purpose we have noticed, to
destroy the good old via media ofthe Church, on the subject of slavery? Wasmotthe
inference that they would, both natural and necessary? If not, we are at fault. But
if they were, then we cannot be blamed, for all will admit that the interests involved
rendered it necessary that Southern attention should be called to the subject immediate
ly. When Dr. Bond saw proper to contradict a report, which he said was in circulation
as coming from him, and the substance of which was that a plan had been formed by
Northern members of the General Conference, to force the South into secession, &c.
Dr. Smith, supposing he might allude to my remarks or statements to the Southern
Delegations, as just detailed, replied, in substance, without consulting me, that the
statement made by Dr. Bond had not been made to the Southern Delegates ; that the
two statements were essentially variant, and that it was necessary to disabuse the Con
ference of a wrong impression, by informing them of the true issue, affirming that "it
had been stated over and over again, in terms that led to the conviction, that it was the
purpose of many in the Conference to pursue measures, which must necessarily result
in a division, and that in declaring their adhesion to these measures, they had used lan
guage which justly entitled them to a disclaimer. That course they had adopted with
Bishop Andrew, and it was of Ihis he and his Southern friends justly complained."
This challenge, which implicated members of the General Conference beyond any state
ment of mine, was not met by any one. Dr. Bond said that with this positron he had

165
nothing to do ; that is, with my position, fairly stated by Dr. Smith, at a time and un
der circumstances when the evidence in the case could have been had in a few minutes,
Dr. Bond had nothing to do. Dr. Smith not only charged before the General Confer
ence all that I had before the Southern Delegates, but went further, implicating mem
bers of the body, from all allusion to whom I had carefully abstained. Why was not
the issue of Dr. Smith upon my statement met? The fact that the statement of Dr.
Smith was not challenged, was, under the circumstances, a public admission of its
truth. Was Dr. Bond under no obligation to attend to Dr. Smith's statement, which in
fact was mine, because not in accordance with his? If not, any more could I be con
sidered as under obligation to attend to Dr. Bond's, knowing, as I did, that I had never
made any statement of the kind, and especially as Dr. Bond had not charged it upon
me? Not entirely satisfied, however, with this mode of settlement, I immediately called
on Dr. Bangs and Rev. Mr. Sehon, both of whom had addressed the Conference on the
subject, and enquired of them, whether they had any allusion to me in their remarks,
and also whether they understood Dr. Bond to have? They both promptly and expli
citly assured me they had none, and that so far as they knew or believed, Dr. Bond had
none. I then went to the Rev. Jno. A. Collins, the friend and guest of Dr. Bond, and
enquired of him to the same effect, with respect to Dr. Bond, when with equal explicit-
ness he assured me he did not believe he had. I then supposed it unnecessary to pay
any further attention to the subject, and thought no more of it, until from motives and
for purposes about which I am not disposed to speculate, it re-appeared in the columns
of Dr. Bond's paper, with additional features of distortion and misrepresentation.
It was my purpose to publish early on this subject, after the General Conference. But
numerous friends, North and South, requested me to forbear, in the hope that some ac
tion might be had by the Northern Conferences, meeting in rapid succession, which
might tend to allay excitement and prepare the way for an adjustment of difficulties.
I therefore determined to remain silent until after the Kentucky Conference. A serious
indisposition from the 15th of September until the 1st of December, rendered me incapable
of the labor of preparing for publication. Meanwhile, the subject in controversy began
to assume new and more eventful aspects, in the Northern division of the Church, and
I did not wish to meet the actual party position of the North, until it was fully and fairly
taken, in action as well as argument. While, therefore, there was a prospect of addi
tional light on the subject, I was unwilling to deprive myself of the advantage of it,
by premature publication. These reasons have been satisfactory to myself, and as no
one else has any rights in the premises, I may, of course, expect them to be to others.
I promised to perform the task "at my earliest leisure," and I beg to assure all con
cerned, that on the basis of that promise, I could, for want of "leisure," have postponed
the publication to a much later period.

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