STRATEGY OF
THE RUSSO.
JAPANESE WAR

BREVET-PvfAJOR

rnn ' n

YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF THE
RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
GIVEN AT THE
INDIAN STAFF COLLEGE AND AT ALDERSHOT

LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY

OF THE

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

BY
BREVET-LIEUT.-COL. W. D. BIRD, d.s.o.
(Late Professor Indian Staff College)

LONDON
HUGH REES, Ltd.
119, PALL MALL, S.W.
19II
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

DS5\ \ 3 I \

CONTENTS

I.
II.
III.
IV.

VI.

Geographical and Political Factors .
Events leading up to the War — Organization of
THE Armies .......
Strategical Considerations 
Narrative op the Land Operations up to the
Battle op Liao Yang 
Narrative of the Events Preceding the Battles
op the Sha Ho and Mukden ....
Lessons op the War 

PAGE 1

10
19
27
6888

APPENDICES
Details of Organization op Troops .... 95
Approximate Distribution and Strength op Troops at
Various Pbbiods,  98

JXRl\JUO J. IUX\±\.

fU(3 ,

MAPS {in pocket)

1.

General Map of

Southern Manchuria.

2.

Plan op Positions at end of April, 1904.

3.

») )

28th Mat.

4.

it 3

15th June.

5.

JJ J

30th June.
6.
JJ J
31st July.
7.
JJ J
25th August.
8.
JJ J
end op Battle op Liao Yang.
9.
3J J
early in October.
10.
JJ )
END op Sha Ho Battle.
11.
JJ J
New Year, 1 905.
12.
JJ )
20th February.
NOTE
Books Consulted
British and German Official Accounts.
"The Russian Army and the Japanese War," by General
Kuropatkin.
"Lectures on the Russo-Japanese War," published by the
Rouskii Invalid.
LECtURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

TjlVEEY campaign possesses special features distinguishing
-^ it from others, and perhaps even rendering comparison
with them difficult. These differences are conditioned by
topography, fertility, and climate, by national characteristics,
by relative strength and efficiency, by resources and arma
ment, and by the character of the rival leaders.
Some acquaintance with these factors is therefore required
before a just appreciation can be made of the significance
of the strategical operations during the Kusso-Japanese
struggle in Manchuria.
The first factor to be considered is the geography of the
seat of the war.
The soldier regards geography from a somewhat different
standpoint to that adopted by the civilian.
To the civilian the term geography means information as
to the physical features of a country, as to its resources,
climate, railways, rivers, harbours, cities, inhabitants, ex
ports, imports, policy, etc., which will be valuable ia a
commercial, political, or even social sense. The soldier,
however, looks on all countries as possible theatres of war,
and though he may and does seek for information similar
to that required by the civilian, he enquires how the various
physical, meteorological, commercial, human, and political
factors would affect the progress of a campaign carried out
in the country the geography of which he is studying.
One of the first, if not the very first consideration, when
B

2 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
regarding geography from a military point of view, is there
fore the communications of a potential theatre of war.
Speaking generally, the direction taken by roads is deter
mined by the trend of the mountain ranges, which to a
certain extent condition the flow of the water rained on to
their sides, the river mouths as a rule also affording the
best havens.
Eoads usually follow the line of the least resistance —
that is the water channels — but lateral communications
between river valleys cross the intervening ranges of moun
tains or hills at their lowest points.
Hence, to discover the general direction of roads, it is
first of all necessary to obtain a clear idea of the coast-line,
mountains, and rivers of an area.
Coast. The coast-line of Manchuria and Korea from Shan-hai-
kuan eastwards, extends for 2300 miles, of which 1700
belong to Korea. [Map 1.] Though in this long stretch
there are many indentations, there are but few good har
bours, excepting in the south of Korea. Elsewhere the coast
is of a shelving character, with flat mud shore sloping
gradually for miles out to sea, and hardly covered with
water even at high tide.
On the shores of the Pe-chi-li gulf, the difference between
high and low tide is sometimes as much as twenty-five feet,
but along the southern and eastern coast of Korea it does
not usually amount to more than eight feet, and at Port
Arthur and Dalny is ten or twelve feet.
Commencing from the west the first port of interest is
Ying-kou (Newchuang), on the Liao river. Vessels drawing
about seventeen feet can cross the bar at the mouth of the
Liao, and can lie in the stream, which is five hundred yards
or more wide, though the fair-way is much less. Ying-kou
possesses wharves, lighters, etc., capable of dealing with a
fair trade, but is ice-bound during five months in each year.
Following the coast-line of the Liao-tung peninsula lying
between Ying-kou and the Yalu, the next important arm
of the sea is found in Fu-chou bay, where shelter may be

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 3
obtained, though at some distance from the shore, by vessels
of moderate size.
A more favourable anchorage is Hu-lu-shun Bay, seven
teen miles southwards, but this place is without facilities
for landing.
To the south of Hu-lu-shun lies Society Bay, with the
Port Adams inlet, the latter being eighteen miles long and
open to vessels of the size of an average tramp steamer.
The shore of the inlet is however shelving, and there are
few if any landing facilities.
Chin-chou Bay gives little or no shelter. Louisa and
Pigeon Bays afford protection to small steamers, from all
but westerly winds. Port Arthur is ice-free, land-locked,
and of considerable extent, but has little deep water,
Th6 entrance is about five hundred to six hundred yards
wide, but the fair-way available for large vessels is not much
more than one hundred yards. The deep water lies in con
tinuation of the harbour mouth. There are docks, with
accommodation for cruisers and smaller craft, and fairly
good workshops. The harbour bottom is of stiff clay, with
rock outcrop, which makes dredging difficult. The town and
harbour were protected by a complete system of works.
Thirty miles north of Port Arthur is Ta-lien-wan Bay, six
miles long and six miles wide. To the south of this bay lies
Dalny, an ice-free port, with docks, and harbour available
for ships drawing thirty feet of water. Next come Yen-
tai, Hou-tu-shih, and Pi-tsu-wo, also ice-free, but giving
shelter only from west and south-west, and with shoal fore
shore for several miles. Ta-ku-shan resembles Pi-tsu-wo, but
is ice-bound for several months in the year. The mouth of
the Yalu is navigable by small steam vessels, but further
south the Che-chen river affords a good anchorage, though
Chin-am-pho, twenty miles up the estuary of the Tai-tong
river, is a better port. The river at Chin-am-pho is a mile
wide, and is said to be deep, but the foreshore shelves for
half a mile, and the harbour is in winter ice-bound.
Chem-ul-po, on the Han river, is the port of Seoul. It

4 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF
is accessible to all nhi-p" thrmighout t>.^ year, though the
anchorage is a mile from shore. In January and February
the harbour is partially frozen, making discharge of cargo
difficult. Fu-_san, to the south of Korea, is a fair harbour protected
by an island. Gen-san, on the east of Korea, is a good
port, usually ice-free in winter, but is shut ofif from the rest
of the country by steep mountains.
Vladivostock, in the Amur river province, possesses docks,
and a harbour with two entrances. It is fortified, but is so
far ice-bound for five months in each year, that navi
gation is only rendered possible by continual use of ice
breakers.
Mountains. The mountains of Manchuria are in character rugged
hills, whose lower portions are sometimes covered with
plantations of scrub oak or hazel, at other places are
cultivated in rough terraces, or again fall in open stony
slopes; the summits often consist of bare masses of rock,
affording positions accessible in only one or two places.
The hillsides, where not cleared for cultivation, are of
soft soil, freely sprinkled and in some places almost covered
with slabs of rock, and between the stones there grow in
many localities a profusion of creepers and wild flowers.
The mountain area lies east and south of a line drawn
roughly from Hsiung-yao-cheng to Fu-shun.
The hills, which are volcanic m origin, trend in a general
north-easterly and south-westerly direction, and consist of a
number of ranges lying roughly parallel to one another.
These are separated by fairly level valleys, from one or two
miles to four hundred yards wide, each boasting a stream,
which rambles over a stony and shallow, though relatively
wide bed.
The principal range of hills is the Feng-shui-ling, with
their southern continuation the Hsiung-yao-shan. The
former rear themselves to a total of about 5000 feet above
sea-level, or 2000-3000 feet above their valleys ; the latter
are not more than 2000-3000 feet above the sea.

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 5
In these hills rise the Tai-tzu Ho^ and its tributaries, which
flow westwards, the Ai Ho and its tributaries flowing south
tef join the Yalu ; also the Ta-yang Ho running southwards to
Ta-ku-shan, and the Fu-chou Ho in the Liao-tung peninsula.
West of the mountain area lies a great plain, extending Plain.
for one hundred and fifty miles or more westwards to the
Mongolian hills. This plain, consisting of rich alluvial soil
brought down by the great rivers Liao, Hun, and Tai-tzu, is
highly cultivated, and supports a dense population.
The division between plain and mountain is in most
localities distinctly marked, still in the area between Kai-
ping and Liao-Yang at distances of about twenty or thirty
miles, long somewhat serrated ridges run westwards on to
the level ground, but usually end rather abruptly near the
line followed by the railway.
In the district between Liao-Yang and Mukden, the
dividing line between plain and hill is still less clear, a
series of isolated hills, or groups of little hills, extending for
ten or fifteen miles west of the upland area, but as in the
more southerly district, ceasing at or near the line of railway.
The principal rivers watering the mountain and plain are Rivers.
the liao, the Hun and Tai-tzu. The Liao, rising in the
Mongolian hills flows at first in a north-easterly direction
for three hundred miles. Then bending south-east it con
tinues in this course until, after passing the Manchurian
boundary, it is turned southwards by a spur of the central
Manchurian hills, and travels for three hundred miles, across
the plain to which it gives its name, into the gulf of Pe-chi-li
near Ying-kou. The Liao, twenty or thirty miles above
Ying-kou, receives on its left bank the Hun and Tai-tzu
rivers, which meet a few miles above this point. The
general characteristic of all these rivers is that they flow
on rather than below the plain, in broad relatively shallow
beds, and between banks raised by the silt they bring down.
In the rainy season they are therefore liable to burst their
'"Ho" is the Chinese word for river, "Shan" for mountain, and
"Ling" for pass.

6 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF
banks, and some ten years ago eight days' continuous rain
flooded the whole Liao plain for nearly three weeks.
Steamers drawing seventeen feet of water can, as has
been noted, navigate the Liao to Ying-kou, thirteen miles
from its mouth. Large junks can sail up the river for some
fifty miles, small junks ascend to Hsin-min-tnn.
The Hun and Tai-tzu are navigable well above Mukden
and Liao-Yang, and considerable timber trade by means of
rafts of logs cut in the higher reaches, is done on both
rivers. The Hun, south of Mukden, is three hundred to four
hundred yards wide, and the Liao is of similar width at
Liao-Yang. When in flood both rivers apparently rise five
or six feet, and are not easy to navigate owing to the rapidity
of the current. From November to March they are covered
with ice sufficiently thick to carry guns.
The tributaries of the Hun and Tai-tzu flow six or
eight feet below the level of the fields in the plain, but
their banks are sloping and grass or willow grown rather
than precipitous, and the depth of water is not in spring
more than one or two feet.
The Yalu rises about midway across the northern boun
dary of Korea, and after flowing south-west for three
hundred miles empties its waters into the sea. In the upper
reaches a wild region of mountain and forest is traversed,
but some sixty miles from the mouth the southern bank is
cultivated, though on the northern it is still enclosed by
rocky hills and bluffs. The river is navigable by jimks for
about fifty miles, and small steamers can cross the bar at its
mouth. At An-tung, it is over three-quarters of a mile wide.
The remaining mountain streams possess characteristics
similar to the Fu-chou river. This flows over a stony bed,
along a sandy valley from half a mile to two or three
miles wide. The bottom of the stream is not more than
two feet below the level of the valley, and its depth in
spring is such that the water rarely rises to the level of the
banks.

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 7
The Chinese cart, drawn by three or four mules, is the Roads and
transport of Manchuria, hence almost every valley boasts a Ch"iate.
cart track, and the passes traversable by wheel transport
possess roads which though not good are at worst practicable.
No road in Manchuria is metalled, and the great Imperial
and Mandarin roads differ from the others only in that they
are two or three times as wide, and if possible more full of
ruts. *
In many places the roads and tracks have sunk below the i
level of the surrounding country. This is partly due to
wear, but mainly to the fact that the Chinese farmer is
accustomed annually to remove the road surface, which
is used as field dressing.
The roads become so heavy after rain, that carts habitu
ally sink up to their axles in mud, and on these occa
sions the carter often seeks firmer soil by a small detour
into the neighbouring ploughed fields. To prevent this the
farmer digs at right angles to and close to the edge of the
road, a series of little trenches about eighteen inches deep
and wide and six or eight feet long.
In Manchuria rain usually falls in July, August, and
September, coming as do the Monsoon rains in India, in
bursts of from three to eight days, separated by bright
intervals. During and immediately after rain cart traffic
practically ceases, but as the soil is friable and dries quickly,
the roads can be used again after two or three days' sunshine.
In October the roads freeze and remain hard, but rough
and full of ruts, until March, when the scanty snow that
has covered them during winter thaws by day. In April,
the thaw regularly sets in but the relatively hot sun soon
dries the roads, and keeps them so until the break of the
Monsoon rains.
The climate is temperate to hot in summer, but is, at
times, very cold in winter. The snowfall is light, but when
a northerly wind blows, as happens two or three times a
week, the thermometer by day falls to and below zero,
whilst the nights are always bitterly cold.

8 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF
The principal, that is the most used roads, are the Im
perial road from Pekin to the Yalu, and thence to Seoul.
This road, which is some thirty to forty feet wide, runs, in
Manchuria, from Hsin-min-tun to Mukden, a distance of
40 miles, thence to Liao-Yang, 40 miles. From this place it
plunges south-eastwards into the mountains, and after
crossing the Mo-tien-ling pass, about 3500 feet above the
sea, and the main Feng-shui-ling range near Lien-shan-
kuan, runs by Feng-huang-cheng to An^tung, 180 miles
from Liao-Yang. In Korea it passes by Ping- Yang to
Seoul, 140 miles from An-tung.
The coast road from the Yalu to Port Arthur, via Ta-ku-
shan, 230 miles. The road from Port Arthur to Kirin, via
Kai-ping, Hai-cheng 230 miles, and Mukden 310 miles
from Port Arthur.
Railways. Three important railways existed. An extension of
the Trans-Siberian line, known as the C_hinese Eastern
railway, running from near Chita to Vladivostock, for 200
miles in Eussian, and for 950 miles in Chinese territory.
At Sungari, not far from Harbin, and 600 miles from
the Siberian border, the Port Arthur branch left the main
line, reaching Dalny in 600 miles, and Port Arthur in 615
miles. Both main line and branch were single, and of five-
foot gauge, the rails being single-headed, with flat base, and
weigliing 62 lb. the yard ; the ballast and sleepers were of
but moderate quality. The sidings and crossing places were
about ten miles apart, and the fuel burnt was wood, except
in Southern Manchuria, where coal was used. On the Port
Arthur branch were some thirty bridges of about 80 yards
length, those at Liao-Yang and Mukden being more than
600 yards long, whilst the longest, that at Sungari,
measured about 800 yards. At Kai-ping and near Te-
li-ssu were bridges of some 300 yards span. Apparently
the maximum carrying capacity developed was about twelve
pairs of trains per day.
The Imperial Chinese railway from Pekin to Ying-kou,
with a branch to Hsin-min-tun, which might perhaps

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 9
have been used by the Japanese to move troops against the
Eussian right. This was a single line, of British standard
gauge. Telegraph lines existed along the railways, and cables Telegraphs
connected Fu-san with Japan, and Port Arthur with Chifu. cables.
The Liao valley is a great grain-producing area, beans and Resources.
millet being principally raised. The millet, which grows to
a height of ten feet, provides the Chinaman with most of the
necessaries of life. The grain is used as food for man and
beast, and for distillation of spirits, whilst the stalks are
chopped up as fodder, or are employed to thatch houses,
fence gardens, or even as firewood. Few domestic animals
are bred, except pigs, but Mongolia produces quantities of
sheep, cattle, and small horses, which are readily obtained
from Hsin-min-tun.
The mountainous region produces little millet, but grows
quantities of timber, and coarse silk is raised from silk
worms which feed on the underwood.
Coal of fair quality exists near many of the big towns,
the principal centres being Fu-shun, Yen-tai; Pen-hsi-hu.
The Chinese towns are all of one pattern, square built. Towns and
and surrounded by a crenelated wall twenty to thirty feet
high, and at top eight to ten feet wide. These walls are
pierced by numerous pagoda-roofed gates. Within are
unmetalled streets of tile-roofed shanties and shops, all one
story high, and in the case of the larger towns suburbs of
mud houses have grown up outside the city walls.
In the plain the villages consist of groups of thatched home
steads, with walls of mud or of sun-dried bricks plastered
with mud, which when frozen axe bullet proof. Each house
stands in a garden surrounded by a more or less thick and
well-built wall, or by a fence of plaited millet stalks. In
the hills houses and walls are of roughly shaped stones,
sometimes cemented, and the roofs are of thatch, slate,
or tile.

II
Events rflHE War between Eussia and Japan may be traced, as
loading up to _|_ ^^^ j^^g^. modern wars, to intense conflict of in-
the war. •'
terest between the two powers.
In past centuries, and at intervals of about a hundred
years, the Japanese had made incursions into Korea and
Manchuria, and after successes more or less important, and
occupation more or less prolonged, had been driven back to
their islands by the Chinese. Korea and Manchuria were
therefore the historical lines of Japanese expansion.
The Eussians first appeared in the Far East in 1860,
when the Amur province and Vladivostock were ceded to
the Tsar by China. At this time Japan was governed
under a feudal system, the country, though nominally ruled
by the emperor, being really under the power of the nobles,
called Daimios, and their armed Samurai retainers. In 1868,
the nation, after a severe struggle, overthrew the Daimios.
In 1875, the Eussians occupied Saghalien, an event which,
combined with the seizure of the Amur province, caused
Japan to become alarmed for her independence.
The Japanese noting that the European strength lay in
armament and organisation, now decided to avoid the fate
of the Amur province and Saghalien, by organising the
country, government, army and navy, on Etiropean prin
ciples. Japanese were therefore sent to Europe to assimilate
Western ideas, and European teachers were freely imported
into Japan.
1890. The combined result of this policy and of these events
was such an increase in the material prosperity and popula
tion, that Japan felt, about 1890, the need for expansion.
10

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 11
At the same time it was feared that Korea, Japan's his
torical outlet on the mainland, inhabited by a physically
fine, but in spirit decadent race, and ruled under the nerve
less suzerainty of China, might fall into the hands of
Eussia. Japan therefore decided either to occupy Korea, or
to render herself paramount in the peninsula.
With this object a quarrel was picked with China in 1894, 1894.
the Chinese fleet was defeated off the Yalu, the passage of
the river was forced, and Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei were
taken. China thereupon concluded a peace on 30th April, 1895, 1895.
under which Korea was declared independent, the Kuan-
tung peninsula, that is, the area between Chin-chou and
Port Arthur, was leased to Japan, and a large indemnity
promised. Eussia, France, and Germany, now brought diplomatic
pressure to bear on Japan, causing her, much to the disgust
of the nation, to relinquish her conquests. In 1891 Russia
had begun the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway,
with the object of linking up her possessions in the Far
East more closely with her European territory, and if
circumstances were favourable, of wresting a further piece
of country from China's feeble grasp. By 1895 the railway
had nearly reached Lake Baikal.
It was at that time a cardinal item of Eussian policy
that the possession of an ice-free port on the open sea
was essential to the national welfare, and this seems to
have been turned to account by a group of leading men in
Eussia to induce the Government to take up the project
of obtaining a harbour in Southern Manchuria. Japan,
meanwhile, seeing in Russia's various manoeuvres a direct
threat to Japanese independence, commenced, in 1895, de
liberately to prepare herself, both morally, physically, and
politically, for a life and death struggle with her powerful
competitor. The Government therefore began to familiarise
the nation with the idea of war with Eussia, and of self-
sacrifice for the national welfare, and at the same time

12 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF
further improved the condition of the armed forces, and
looked round for allies.
1896. In 1896, Eussia made another move in the game, when
she obtained permission from China to run the Chinese
Eastern railway direct from Chita to Vladivostock, instead
of along the left bank of the Amur. In 1898 she went
further, leasing from China Port Arthur, together with the
southern portion of the Liao-tung peninsula. At the same
time the construction of a branch railway from near Har
bin was begun, which by 1900 had reached Port Arthur,
though the line was but roughly laid, and was unballasted.
1900. jji 19QQ ^Ijq ia,te Dowager Empress of China, much
impressed by the South African disasters of England, the
power at that time most feared in Pekin, determined to
try and rid China of foreigners, and with this object
fomented the so-called Boxer rising.
Eussia at once seized the opportunity to occupy Man
churia for the purpose of protecting her railway, but later,
in response to diplomatic representations, promised the
powers to evacuate the Mukden province in October 1902,
Kirin in the spring of 1903, and Tsi-tsi-har, north-west of
Kirin, in the autumn of the same year.
Whilst these events were taking place, and the Japanese
were perfecting their forces, the statesmen of Japan had in
1902. 1902 concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with
Great Britain, under which it was agreed that if either
nation were attacked by two powers the other should come
to the aid of her ally.
Japan also entered into friendly relations with the
United States, thus practically securing herself against the
intervention of other nations in the forthcoming struggle
with Eussia.
In October 1902, Eussia evacuated part of south-west
Manchuria, but failed to carry out her promise in respect to
the remainder of the province.
1903. At the beginning of 1903, General Kuropatkin, the
Eussian War Minister, made a tour of inspection in the Far

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 13
East, and as a result a viceroyalty was created which would
bring the various provinces, commands, and garrisons, under
the central authority of Admiral Alexiev, who was nomi
nated Viceroy.
Incensed at Eussia's breach of faith regarding the
evacuation of Manchuria, and alarmed by the creation of
a viceroyalty, which it was feared was but the prelude to
an increase in Eussian activity in the Far East, Japan in
July 1903 began to negotiate for the redemption of the
pledge to leave Manchuria. These negotiations ended in
war in February 1904.
Though Japan was not perhaps quite ready for war in
1903, her preparations were so far advanced that hostilities
could be commenced whenever diplomacy decided that the
favourable moment had arrived. '
Eussia on the other hand was by no means so well pre
pared. The Trans-Siberiaji and Chinese Eastern railways,
excepting the section round Lake Baikal, had indeed been
roughly completed, the fortifications of Port Arthur had
been strengthened, and the port of Dalny created.
The railways however were not yet capable of heavy
traffic, and the forces in the Far East were numerically
weak. The bulk of these had not even been organised
into corps, there were but few cavalry or technical troops,
guns were not plentiful, nor for the most part of the newest
models, and lastly the troops were scattered throughout
the territory in small garrisons. Moreover the diplomatic
sitnation in Europe was not so favourable that Eussia could
afford to despatoh to the Far East a tithe of her land forces.
Whether, from a military point of view, Japan should
have declared war earlier, before for instance the railway
to Port Arthur was completed, is for consideration.
If the moment was uupropitious in 1900, when the rail
way had reached Port Arthur, she might in 1902 after the
conclusion of the alliance with England, have argued that
Eussia's preparations were likely to be proportionally less
complete than her own, and pressure could have been put

14 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF
on Russia, in October 1902, to carry out the promised
evacuation of Mukden.
Possibly however the political atmosphere was less
favourable in 1902 than was the case a year later.
Again it would seem that Japan would have been better
advised to have declared war after the Manchurian and
Korean ports were ice-free, than at the time she selected.
True such policy might have added to the Port Arthur
squadron four large cruisers from Vladivostock ; but Russia
would not have been allowed two months in which to collect
troops before the first blow was struck on land, and Japan
might, in these circumstances, have overrun Southern Man
churia, and captured Port Arthur, before Russian regiments
had begun to arrive in any numbers.
It was however probably Russia's threat to increase her
Far Eastern squadron, which caused Japan to precipitate
matters and commence war in winter.
Russian Possessed of almost boundless resources in men, and with
a navy twice as large as that of Japan, it would at first
sight appear that Russia must inevitably have crushed her
opponent. But complete accord between policy and organisation for
war, as shown in the peace distribution of troops and in
their power rapidly to mobilise when required, is as neces
sary to success as are great resources, otherwise defeat may
be experienced before the resources can be developed, and
Russia both in a military and political sense was not ready
for the conflict even in 1903-4.
Encouraged by the success of an aggressive policy against
other nations, Russia had apparently come to regard such
procedure as infallible, but its inherent weakness became too
soon apparent when attempted against a rival ready to
fight for her rights.
The Russian forces in the Far East were inadequate to
support her policy and secure her interests. The navy on
paper was equal to that of the Japanese, but paper equality
is not sufficient to command success in war, and the ships

resources.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 15
which might have turned the balance were in Europe,
many months' sail distant, and it might perhaps be im
politic to move them to the Far East.
Similarly the Russian land forces were many thousand
miles from the main army, and this space could be crossed
only in ships or by a single line of railway, ill laid, and
moreover incomplete in the stretch round Lake Baikal.
In other words Russia did not possess the power of
rapidly concentrating her forces in the localities where the
contest would be decided, and her navy and army were
therefore liable to defeat in detail.
In 1904, Russia controlled in round numbers a total of Russian
some 4,500,000 trained soldiers, of whom 3,500,000 .belonged Organisation
to the active army and reserve, 345,000 were Coss^ks, and
685,000 National Guard.
The period of military service was from the 21st-43rd
year, of which eighteen years were spent in the active army
and reserve, and the remainder in the National Guard.
The colour service was for four or five years, and thirteen
years were passed in the reserve, during which period two
trainings of six weeks were carried out.
The Cossacks, Finns, and the Christians of the Caucasus,
served under special regulations, whilst Mahomedans were
obliged to pay a sum of money in lieu of military service,
but might volunteer to serve if they so desired.
The field troops comprised the units of the active army
brought up to war strength by reserves, and certain so-
called reserve units, the cadres of which were maintained in
peace, and filled up with reservists on mobilisation.
In time of war dep6t units were also formed of reservists
and soldiers not physically fit or not required on mobilisation.
For garrison duty there were special fortress and local
troops. The National Guard was primarily designated for home
defence, but was liable to furnish drafts for the field troops.
At the commencement of the war, there were, in Europe
and the Caucasus, twenty-five active army and reserve

16 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
corps, in Russian Turkestan two corps, in Eastern Siberia
two corps, and in the remainder of the empire a number of
unallotted units. (Appendix I.)
Russian | The Russian army was neither well trained nor well
training. / g(jm>a,ted. It is said that even officers who had passed the
staff college rarely studied their profession after the com
pletion of their course, and that the regimental officers
were ignorant of the theory of war.
The practical training also left much to be desired. The
men were little practised in shooting, but were taught to
rely on mass attacks and the bayonet to gain victory. Out
post and reconnaissance duties were neglected, and indi
vidual initiative discouraged.
All ranks were moreover steeped in the plausible fallacy
of the advantages inherent in the occupation of defensive
positions, and attached undue importance to the value of
ground, and to a defensive attitude ; yet, in actual practice,
folds and features of ground were rarely utilised to the best
advantage. Generals immersed themselves in details, and interfered
unduly in the instruction of troops and companies, to the
detriment of the training, and to the limitation of their
own power to handle large forces, grasp important situa
tions, or deal with great issues. But serious as were the
above faults they might have been partially overcome
during the campaign had all ranks been inspired with the
sentiment of patriotism and unselfish devotion to duty.
This was far from being the case. Even the officers
openly expressed their indifference to the war, and the rank
and file, though they fought well, and endured hardship
with praiseworthy patience, went to the front unwillingly.
Japanese Very different was the attitude of the Japanese army.
""y Here every man was convinced that his utmost efforts
were demanded to save the country from destruction, and
the wonderful constancy of the Japanese soldiers was a
more important factor in the national success than was
even the bold generalship of the higher leaders.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 17
In Japan every male between the ages of seventeen and
forty was, in 1904, liable to serve in either army or navy,
but military service did not, as a rule, begin until the
twentieth year.
The army was organised as follows: — Japanese
Active army, service three years — 180,000 men. gamsa i
On working furlough for four years and four months—
200,000 men.
Reserve army (or Kobi), in which men served for five
years, with an organisation separate from that of the active
army— 200,000.
Conscript reserve, obligation for seven years and four
months, or for one year and four months — trained men
50,000, untrained men 250,000.
National army of all men who had passed out of the
other classes, and were less than forty years old — 220,000,
of whom about half had received training. (Appendix II.)
Of Japan's resources in shipping it is sufficient to note
that her merchant navy had a tonnage of 650,000 and pos
sessed between 200 and 300 steamers.
Japan was in a measure beholden to Europe for the train- Japanese
ing of her arinies, for many Japanese officers„liad_been and ''*'°'°S-
still are attached for ihstriictioh to certain European armies.
It was however to the German army that the majority were
sent, and the German model was therefore generally copied
in both training,~strategy, and tactics, though it is perhaps
doubtfur whether the Japanese peace training attained a
Feally high standard.
The Japanese adopted the enveloping form of offensive
war, but attacked with vigour at all points.
Their infantry, at the beginning of the campaign, ad
vanced to the attack in relatively dense lines of skirmishers,
whose movements were covered by both rifle and artillery
fire. The infantry pressed on, in the usual manner, as close -
as possible to the enemy's line, and then either made whilst
daylight lasted a series of assaults, prepared by rapid but
somewhat wild rifle fire, and covered by storms of shrapnel

18 THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE
delivered from rather long range ; or more often attempted
to win the position by night attack.
Though possessed of great tenacity of purpose, the Japan
ese appear to be slow thinkers and without the capacity
of quickly adapting their minds and methods to circum
stances. Plans once adopted were therefore carried out to
the letter rather than in the spirit in which they had been
conceived, and as a result it may fairly be said that the
subordinate generals and regimental leaders did not direct
their men with any particular intelhgence, and that the
latter did not fight much with their heads. The higher
commanders were as a rule rather prodigal of their men's
lives, and the soldiers, responding gallantly to the orders
and example of their officers, often by their doggedness
repaired mistakes due to excessive rigidity in tactics and
generalship. The cavalry was not well organised. Eegiments were for
the most part with divisions instead of being brigaded, and
their employment was on a par with their organisation.
Military value Striking a balance between the forces actually or poten
tially available on both sides, and having due regard to
their military value, it may be concluded that the Japanese
possessed over the Eussians certain advantages of patriotism
and training, and that larger numbers could in the first
instance be placed in the field. Whether Eussia would be
able to redress the balance would depend on the rapidity
with which Japan struck decisive blows.

Ill

AN empire exists only on sufferance which does not
m\. possess the power of free and well-developed inter
communication between its parts.
Two main lines of communication were available between Command
Eussia and her Far-Eastern possessions, the Trans-Siberian °^ *^^ ^^*"
railway and the sea. Though possessing in the aggregate
sufficient naval and military resources to ensure the defeat
of Japan, Eussia's double responsibilities in Europe and in
the Far East had involved division of force, the bulk of the
army and half the navy being stationed in Europe.
Of the two lines by which force could be concentrated in
the Far East, the railway alone was not in this crisis
adequate to meet Eussian requirements in the matter of
transport. Sufficient force to ensure success could therefore
only be transported to and maintained in the Far East if
Eussia also possessed the power of free movement by sea.
So long as she retained command of the sea, Japan, even
if overwhelmed on land, could securely have retired to
some Torres Vedras, and there awaited a favourable oppor
tunity again to take the offensive. And even if Eussia
succeeded in driving the Japanese from the mainland, her
conquest would have been of little value until she obtained
the power to utilise the ports won in land battles.
Command of the sea, then, was vital to Eussia.
Japan is an island empire, and though to some extent self-
contained was not independent of seaborne commerce. The
loss of power to control her maritime communications
would moreover have put an end to her dreams of expan
sion, and would have exposed her to the danger of invasion.
Without naval supremacy Japan's armies could not easily
19

20 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF
have reached the continent of Asia. Had they however
after indecisive naval actions ventured on invasion of
Manchuria, and had they been so far successful on land as
to have driven the Russians to Lake Baikal before the
question of supremacy at sea was finally settled, their
eventual ruin would have been certain if the link binding
the land forces with their island home was severed ; for no
large army could have been maintained in Manchuria with
command of the sea irrevocably lost.
Apparently, then, naval supremacy, that is the power to
control maritime communications, was for both sides the
decisive factor, and each should have strained every nerve
to attain this end, relegating other necessary operations to
strictly subordinate positions.
Had Russia been able to concentrate her whole fleet in
Far Eastern waters, Japan's position would have been one
of great difficulty, but Russia had been obliged to divide
her navy into two portions, and at the decisive point
possessed no numerical superiority over her opponent.
Japan was therefore given an opportunity of beating the
Russian navy in detail.
If the Russian Eastern detachment chose to meet the
Japanese fleet in fair fight, so much the better for Japan,
whose fleet was the more efficient. But if the Eastern
detachment should elect to await in its harbours the arrival
of the European squadron, it would be Japan's duty
to take these naval bases and in this manner deprive the
Russian fleets of bases of operation, and ensure the capture
or destruction of all shipping lying in them.
Of the two miUtary harbours, Port Arthur and Vladi
vostock, the former was most valuable, being free of ice in
the winter. Whatever the relative merits of the two places
Port Arthur was however of greatest importance to the
Japanese, being at the commencement of hostilities the
base of the larger portion of the Russian fleet (four large
cruisers only were in Vladivostock) and after the naval
surprise of 8th February its asylum.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 21
It wduld seem then that the primary objective of the Japanese
Japanese being to obtain the control of the maritime com
munications between Japan, Manchuria, and Korea, through
the destruction of the Russian squadron based on Port
Arthur, plans should have been made to secure the early
capture of the fortress, since it was possible that the
squadron would not quit the shelter of the harbour.
The occupation of Korea was also of importance, whence
indirect protection could be afforded to the force detailed to
besiege Port Arthur, for no Russian force moving into the
Liao-tung peninsula could afford to neglect a Japanese army
placed on or near the Yalu. The possession of Korea was
from an economic point of view necessary to Japan, it
would be a valuable asset when negotiations for peace were
commenced, and until Dalny was taken no satisfactory
harbours for landing troops existed except in Korea.
With command of the sea, Japan, if beaten in Manchuria
or at Port Arthur, could perhaps maintain herself suffi
ciently long in the mountains of Korea to render Eussia
weary of the struggle.
Even without command of the sea, if the naval actions
were indecisive, Japan, by using the islands in the Tsushima
strait, might maintain a force in Korea, and might even,
though this would be unlikely, prosecute the siege of Port
Arthur from this base.
It is therefore thought that as was done Korea should
as soon as possible have been occupied by the Japanese.
The capture of a fortress can be attained either by main
force, or by starvation, the method employed being contin
gent on the necessity for the early reduction of the place.
No fortress can survive for long the defeat of the field
forces of the nation, hence if the field armies are destroyed
the capitulation of the national fortresses is only a matter
of time.
Thus there were open to Japan two methods for the re
duction of the Far Eastern naval bases of the Eussian fleet.
They could either be besieged, assaulted, and so captured.

-r

22 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
every effort being directed to the achievement of this result,
and only sufficient troops diverted against the Russian
armies to prevent their interfering with the besiegers; or
one or both fortresses could be blockaded, whilst every man
not required for this purpose marched against the Russian
army. The choice of alternatives hinged no doubt upon the
issue of the first naval actions, but if, as was the case,
these proved indecisive, it is believed that the former would
have been the correct course, more especially in view of the
possibility of the despatch of Russian naval reinforcements
from Europe.
i* at whichever policy Japan elected to pursue, her utmost
endeavours should have been devoted to one or other
method of obtaining possession of the Russian naval bases.
There should have been no halting between two opinions,
such policy tends to failure, and at the decisive point it is
impossible to be too strong.
Japan's primary objective on land may have been the
capture of Port Arthur, the field armies being intended to
act as a covering force, though adopting active measures
so as to rob the Russian army of the initiative. Possibly
she undervalued the resisting power of Port Arthur, and
the carrying capacity of the Trans-Siberian railway, and
hoped to achieve the early capture of the fortress, and then
victory over such forces as Russia might have deployed.
Perhaps her army was in the circumstances deemed
sufficiently strong to attain both objects. Again, the
Japanese may have thought that in spite of the necessity
for taking Port Arthur, the Russian troops in Manchuria
must be attacked and beaten before the arrival of reinforce
ments from Europe rendered them formidable in numbers.
Whatever her reasons Japan in effect pursued a double
objective, undertaking the simultaneous reduction of Port
Arthur and the destruction of the Russian field armies.
In the event therefore she possessed decisive preponderance
of force neither in front of Port Arthur, nor in the field.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 23
It may safely be claimed that the capture of Port Arthur
was delayed for many months owing to the initial weakness
of the besieging army.
On the other hand it is believed that had two or three
extra divisions been detailed to besiege Port Arthur, this
place would have fallen by assault after a few weeks' siege,
and long before the Russians could have made really serious
efforts for its relief, or could have assembled a sufficiently
large army in Manchuria to give them the advantage in the
subsequent campaign.
As to the field operations there is little doubt that but
for the determination of the Japanese infantry, and the
resolution of the higher commanders, the respite gained by
Russia through the resistance of Port Arthur might well
have proved fatal to Japan. Neither at Liao-Yang, nor at
the Sha-Ho, did the Japanese possess sufficient force to gain
decisive victories, and the cause of their weakness was the
large number of troops that had been absorbed in the siege
of Port Arthur.
The resistance offered by this fortress made these battles
indecisive, and gave Russia time in which to collect so
many troops that even after its fall the Japanese failed to
gain a decisive victory at Mukden.
The plan actually adopted by Japan was an enveloping Japanese plan.
advance of three armies from widely different directions —
the Yalu, Ta-ku-shan, and Dalny — on Liao-Yang, whilst a
fourth army besieged Port Arthur.
Converging operations though they menace the enemy's
communications involve risk of defeat in detail even when,
as in this case, the enemy's armies are not credited with a
high standard of mobility. A convergent advance was
however doubtless forced on Japan by the mountainous and
inhospitable character of Southern Manchuria, where, owing
to the absence of roads and local resources, some dispersion of
force would have been necessary for purposes of supply, un
less arrangements could have been made to forward supplies
by sea to the armies as they advanced up the Liao Tung

24 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
peninsula, or for rapidly utilising the Port Arthur
railway as it fell into her hands. Had the supply of the
requirements of the whole field force from the few ports in
the Liao Tung peninsula been practicable, which seems
doubtful, or had steps been taken quickly to repair and
provide rolling stock for this railway, the three field armies
might have been deployed in the peninsula, and within
easy supporting distance of one another. Under such
dispositions the armies could however only have moved
directly against those of the Russians, and their deployment
would have been slow.
Having adopted a plan of convergent operations from
separate bases, Japan's object should have been to exercise
such simultaneous and vigorous pressure from all directions
as to prevent concentration of hostile force against any one
of her separated armies. At the same time every effort
should have been made to attain tactical contact as soon as
possible, by rapid but well-regulated advance on a common
objective.
Russian Russia's objects were naturally to a great extent the con
verse of those of the Japanese.
Japan wished for rapid and early success, whilst not only
was time required by Russia for the collection of her
scattered forces, but she must at all costs maintain posses
sion of her naval bases.
Conversely if attacked by the Japanese the fortresses
would gain time for the development of resources.
Whilst fortifying and provisioning Port Arthur and
Vladivostock for lengthy sieges, Russia might therefore
have prepared to manoeuvre with the troops not required to
garrison these places, so as to draw the Japanese armies on
themselves and away from the fortresses. At the same
time pending the collection of an army adequate to under
take the offensive, the Japanese, as opportunity offered,
might have been harassed and exhausted by minor engage
ments, and attacked in detail if opportunities occurred.
Whether the Russian Eastern squadron should have

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 25
fought a decisive action with the Japanese, or awaited the
arrival of the reinforcements, is a difficult question to
answer. The solution of the problem depended on the probable
date when naval reinforcements from Europe might be
expected. If likely to be long delayed the natural inclina
tion would be to risk all in a decisive naval action, rather
than lose moral and efficiency by remaining in port until
forced to bolt out to avoid destruction at the hands of the
enemy's land forces ; or worse still passively await capture
or annihilation.
Before the outbreak of war the strength of the Russian
land forces in Manchuria appears to have been goyerned
by the belief expressed by Admiral Witgeft, that having
regard to the relative strength of the two fleets the possi
bility of a Eussian reverse was a contingency not worth
consideration. So sure indeed were the Eussians of naval
victory that the Eastern squadron was divided into two
portions; four large cruisers being stationed at Vladivos
tock whence, on declaration of war, they were to harry
the coastline of Japan whilst the remainder dealt with the
Japanese fleet.
The Eussian military general staff had nevertheless after Russian plan.
a careful survey of the situation come to the conclusion
that should Japan obtain control of the maritime commu
nications in the Far East, she would, during the first period
of the war, be in a position to employ on the mainland
numbers considerably larger than those at the disposal of
the Eussians, for the strength of the Japanese permanent
and territorial armies, with the depot troops required for
their maintenance, was computed at 400,000 men.
It was supposed that the Japanese could take the field
with ten or eleven divisions which might be. employed
either to occupy and secure Korea, where attack by the
Russians would be awaited, or for offensive operations in
Manchuria against Port Arthur, and in the Ussuri province
against Vladivostock.

26 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
In the first contingency Russia could only passively
await the arrival of reinforcements in such numbers as
would enable her to take the offensive. In the second
it was proposed to adopt the Fabian policy of avoiding
decisive action until sufficient force had been assembled to
permit of offensive operations with reasonable prospects of
success. All troops not required for the defence of Port
Arthur and Vladivostock, for the security of the railway,
and for the maintenance of order, should therefore be con
centrated in the area Mukden — Liao-Yang — Hsiu-yen, and
whilst operating so as to delay the Japanese advance to the
greatest possible extent, should gradually fall back on
Harbin. In the circumstances, which are not dissimilar to those
that confronted the British in South Africa in 1899, the
Russian plan was probably as satisfactory as any that could
have been devised.
In practice, owing to the political difficulties attending
the adoption of a frank policy of abandonment of territory,
serious obstacles must be faced in executing such projects,
whilst to harass and delay the enemy, and at the same
time avoid decisive action, is the very reverse of simple,
unless in possession of such superior mobility as the Boers
held over the British.

w

IV

HEN initiating in the autumn of 1903 the diplomatic Japanese
, . , _ „ 1. J • T calculations.
pressure which finally resulted in war, Japan, prac

tically secure through the British alliance from the in
terference of third parties, seems to have calculated that
her navy was capable of beating the divided portions of
the Russian fleet in detail, and that her army could cope
successfully with any force that Russia could maintain in
the Far East.
The confidence of the Japanese in their navy was fully
justified. The unwise distribution of the Japanese land
forces ; the resistance offered by Port Arthur ; the slowness
of the Japanese military deployment and subsequent opera
tions; the quantities of supplies obtained by Russia from
Manchuria and Mongolia; and the unexpectedly efficient
working of the Trans-Siberian railway, enabling Russia
to place in the field a larger force than had been contem
plated, all combined to upset Japan's other calculations.
Japan was therefore obliged not only to augment her active
army, but so to modify her recruiting laws as to enable
greater masses of men to be placed in the field.
Trusting however in her power to beat Russia, Japan February
continued to press for Eussian evacuation of Manchuria,
untU, on 6th February, 1904, negotiations were broken off,
and diplomatic relations with Eussia severed. (Appendix III.)
On the same day the Japanese navy sailed to attack the
Eussian squadron at Port Arthur, a few ships being detached
to destroy a couple of small Russian cruisers lying at Chem-
ul-po, and to convoy a force of 2500 men destined to occupy
Seoul, the capital of Korea. 27

28 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
By 3 a.m. on 9th the Japanese troops had landed with
out hindrance from the Russians, and the bulk were railed
at once to Seoul. The next day the Russian ships were
sunk when issuing from the harbour.
Meanwhile Admiral Togo had surprised the Russian
squadron lying outside Port Arthur, and had torpedoed
three of the largest ships.
Whilst these events were taking place mobilisation orders
had been issued in Japan at 2 p.m. on 6th February to
the Guard, 2nd and 12th divisions, and to the fortresses of
Tsushima and Hakodadi.
The Japanese had originally intended to secure possession
of Southern Korea at any rate, by landing the 12th division
at Fu-san and moving it by march route eighteen stages to
Seoul; and had already made arrangements for supply along
the road.
After the first naval success it was however determined
to use Chem-ul-po as the port of disembarkation.
In February the mouth of the Yalu, Ta-ku-shan, and
Ying-kou are all ice-bound, and do not become clear of ice
until the middle of March, so that the Japanese could not
at that time have taken advantage of their temporary
command of the sea by landing troops at those places.
Had they been able to do so, and had command of the
sea been maintained, their lines of communication on land
would have been shortened; but a large force would have
been exposed to attack in strength whilst landing at Ying-
kou, whilst a small force would have been isolated as well
as exposed. Moreover transports sailing to Ying-kou must
have passed close to Port Arthur.
On 14th February the 12th division railed to Nagasaki,
where it embarked in six groups of transports, of which the
first sailed at noon on 15th. By 22nd, the whole division
had landed at Chem-ul-po, and a detachment had occupied
Ping-Yang. Simultaneously two regiments of the 4th division and
two of the 2nd division were despatched to Chem-ul-po,

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 29
and garrisons placed in Fu-san, Ma-sam-po, and Gen-san. . March.
Mobilisation had meanwhile proceeded in Japan, and by
4th March the Guard and 2nd divisions had concentrated
at Hiroshima ready to embark under the command of
General Kuroki.
Early in March a detachment of the 12th division occupied
Chin-am-pho, the port of Ping- Yang. On 10th March this
ha ibour v/as reported clear of ice, and was therefore
selected as the port of disembarkation for the Guard and
2nd divisions.
These troops were all on shore by 29th, the 12th division
was well to the north of Ping- Yang, and An-ju had been
occupied. Information now reached General Kuroki that with the
exception of 1500 to 2000 Russian cavalry no hostile troops
were south of the Yalu.
The Japanese therefore pushed forward parties north
wards both to bridge the rivers Che-chen and Tai-ing, to
form supply depots, and to reconnoitre roads.
The result of this reconnaissance, which might with
advantage have been taken in hand before the commence
ment I hostilities, was that all roads were found to be bad,
and tiio coast road alone was reported fit for the movement
of a large force. The whole country was moreover stated
to be destitute of supplies.
In these circumstances it is for consideration whether
Kuroki would not have been better advised to have
marched only the 12th division towards the Yalu, sending
the Guard and 2nd divisions northwards by ship at any rate
to Yu-sa-pho and Ri-ka-ho, thus following the precedent of
the Vimeiro campaign.
This course would have been less fatiguing and not
accompanied by greater risk than marching, as was done,
by detachments along one bad road, and valuable time
would have been saved.
Probably, however, shipping was not available for the
purpose.

30 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
April On 1st April, sufficient supplies having been collected at
An-ju, Kuroki pushed on a force under General Asada to
cover the establishment of depots of supplies at Yu-sa-pho
and Ri-ka-ho. The Russians fell back without offering
serious resistance, and by 4th Asada's cavalry had occupied
Wi-jn. The 12th and Guard divisions which were lying respec
tively a few miles north and south of An-ju marched
northwards on 7th, throwing out towards Yong-pyong a
weak flank guard, which was to halt there until the main
body had passed An-ju, and then march to Chyang-Syong.
The 2nd division which had been south of An-ju moved
forward only on 11th.
The main body of Asada's force reached Wi-ju on 8th
April, to find that the enemy had withdrawn to the right
bank of the Ya-lu, and on 21st the army had concentrated
near Wi-ju, whilst the flank detachment stood at Chyang-
Syong. During these operations, the 1st and 3rd divisions had
on 1st April concentrated at Hiroshima, whilst the 4th
division had mobilised and was standing at Osaka, and an
artillery brigade of 108 guns was also ready to take the
field. In April these divisions had been quietly embarked
in a fleet of about eighty transports, which sailed without
escort to Chin-am-pho as they were ready.
By the end of April the three divisions had concentrated
at Chin-am-pho under General Oku.
Meanwhile war had been formally declared on 10th
February, and the Czar had issued a ukase ordering the
mobilisation of the troops in the Siberian military district,
and in the districts of Perm, Viatka, and Kazan.
Between 9th and 12th February, most of the powers
including China published declarations of neutrality.
Japan and Korea entered into an agreement on 23rd
February, under which Japan, in exchange for the right to
use certain places in Korea for military purposes, guaranteed
the integrity of the country.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 31
Admiral Makarov was given command of the Eussian
Far Eastern Squadron on 16th February, and on the same
day the Viceroy transferred his headquarters from Port
Arthur to Mukden.
On 29th February General Kuropatkin was appointed
commander-in-chief in Manchuria, and General Linevitch
in the Ussuri district, but both were under the orders of.
Admiral Alexiev, the Viceroy.
The Japanese had meanwhile made several abortive
attempts to confine the Russian fleet in Port Arthur by
sinking merchant vessels across the mouth of the harbour.
On 12th April, when cruising outside Port Arthur, the
battleship FetropavlovsJc, with Makarov on board, was sunk
by floating mines, and another battleship injured.
At the end of April the Russians are said to have believed
that the Japanese intended to destroy the Russian Eastern
squadron, capturing its place of refuge, Port Arthur, if the
Russians would not leave the harbour to fight a decisive
naval battle on the high seas. At the same time the field
armies were to advance to Harbin so as to isolate Vladivos
tock and the Pri-Amur province from the rest of the Empire.
One of the advantages inherent in command of the sea is
that the enemy is kept in ignorance of the plans of the
power possessing naval supremacy until they are actually in
execution. During this period of uncertainty two alterna
tives were open to the Russians. They could place adequate
garrisons in the fortresses, make arrangements to watch
Korea and the coastline of Manchuria, and keep the remainder
of their forces in hand, abandoning all attempts to safeguard
territory or to interfere with the operations of the Japanese
until the situation had become clear ; or after placing garri
sons in the fortresses, they could dispose the rest of the
troops so as to attempt to secure Manchuria against invasion.
Detachments of sufficient strength to embarrass the opera
tions of the enemy would under this arrangement be posted
on the most probable lines of invasion, a central force being
held in reserve to operate as required.

32 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
It was the opinion of Kuropatkin that the military
operations of the Russians at the beginning of the war
must be conducted with great circumspection in order to
prevent the destruction of the forces in detail.
Whilst holding fast to the two naval bases, the Russians
must therefore above all things avoid the temptation to
defend localities and positions possessing merely a local
and ephemeral importance; and in order to obviate the
equally serious risk of being forced to attempt the relief
of Port Arthur with inadequate forces, should it be besieged,
he proposed to strengthen the garrison at the expense of the
field army.
Owing apparently to the opposition of the Viceroy Alexiev,
who was averse to the policy of locking up a large propor
tion of the available troops in the fortresses, and at this
juncture possessed a great but quite unwarrantable con
tempt for the military prowess of the Japanese, this proposal
was not carried into effect.
Disregarding to a great extent the lines of the plans out
lined by General Kuropatkin and the General Staff, the
Russians in the end chose to disseminate their forces, their
dispositions being calculated to secure Port Arthur and
Vladivostock ; to delay if not to check a Japanese advance
from Korea, 19,000 men being placed near An-tung ; and to
hinder the operations of a force attempting to land at
Ying-kou, 17,000 mep being at that place and at Ta-chih-
chiao. The coastline was watched so as to ensure the
receipt of early warning of any intention to disembark at
or near Ta-ku-shan or on the eastern shores of the Liao-
tung peninsula; and a central force of 35,000 was retained
at Liao-Yang and Mukden, whence it could be moved by rail
to Ying-kou or into the Liao-tung peninsula to the relief of
Port Arthur, but could not easily support the detachment
on the Ya-lu (Appendix IV, Map 2.)
There are always grave political objections to the execu
tion of a policy of bold abandonment of territory, but the
detachment of such large forces as those placed on the Ya-lu

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 33
and at Ying-kou possessed serious military drawbacks. Not
only were these dispositions contrary to the principle of
concentration of effort, but such large detachments too often
become compromised in the execution of their difficult task
of delaying the enemy, and even if they escape disaster,
their continuous and unavoidable retirement reacts un
favourably on the moral of the troops.
Again taking into consideration its position and climate,
it may now after the event be urged that a smaller garrison
would have sufficed for Vladivostock, though it is to be
remembered that had the Japanese captured the fortress and
subsequently advanced along the railway as far as Harbin,
the Russians would have been forced to withdraw their field
forces from Southern Manchuria.
Perhaps then it would have been better had the Russians
whilst strongly garrisoning Port Arthur, and detailing a
smaller force to Vladivostock, contented themselves with the
despatch to such localities as the Ya-lu, Ta-ku-shan, and
Pi-tzu-wo, of weaker but more mobile bodies of troops which
while too weak to attempt decisive action could neverthe
less have obtained information, and at the same time have
considerably hampered the movements of the Japanese.
The main body of the army might have been retained in
some central positions such as Hai-cheng or Kai-ping whilst
every effort was made to render it mobile.
From the dispositions of the Japanese armies at the end
of April (Appendix IV, Map 2) it may be inferred that the
intention had been in the first instance to secure and occupy
Korea, then either to advance so far across the Ya-lu as to
be in a position to menace the lines of communication of
any Russian forces operating in the Liao-tung peninsula;.
or to transfer the bulk of the 1st army to a position directly
covering the siege operations against Port Arthur. At the
same time it may be supposed that the troops at Chin-am-pho
were intended to assist Kuroki in his earlier operations, and
when these had been completed to isolate Port Arthur and
to secure the troops conducting the siege from interference.

34 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
Exactly how much was known by the Japanese as to the
strength and dispositions of the Russians, it is not at present
possible to state with accuracy.
The Japanese were credited with a good system of intelli
gence, whilst the Russians had been at little pains either to
conceal their dispositions or the numbers of troops detailed
to proceed from Europe to the Far East.
It may perhaps be assumed then that the Japanese were
aware that on the Ya-lu were some 20,000 of the enemy ;
that the upper course of this river and the coastline as far
as Ta-ku-shan were being watched by cavalry; that Port
Arthur possessed a garrison of from 20,000-30,000 men,
detachments from which were fortifying Nan Shan on the
isthmus of Chin-chou, and were guarding the coastKne of
the Kuan-tung peninsula; that near Ying-kou was a con
siderable force; that there were numbers of troops near
Liao Yang, say 20,000-30,000 men; and that the railway
line from Harbin to Port Arthur was well protected.
At this juncture the Russians had in their favour all the
prestige of their conquest of half Asia, and of more than a
century of practically unchecked victory by Europeans over
Asiatics. It would consequently have been of the first
importance for the Japanese commanders to establish in the
minds of their men, by an early and important success, a feel
ing of equality with if not of superiority over Europeans.
Kuroki, who was in touch with the Russians, should
therefore have proceeded with such caution as to avoid
the risk of even a minor reverse, but should have been
prepared to strike boldly if an opportunity was offered
of gaining victory.
The Russians had placed themselves behind a broad and
unfordable river, and it is an established fact that rivers
influence military operations mainly in that they delay
the movements of the attacker, and during the passage
afford the defender an opportunity of engaging the attack
ing troops in detail. On the other hand, when the defender
has abandoned, as had the Russians, one bank of the river.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 35
it is certain that to be in a position to take advantage of
the opportunities afforded by a river line, the defending
force must be mobile, and the communications along the
river bank must be well developed.
Kuroki may be given credit for the knowledge that he
possessed a numerical superiority over the enemy of between
13,000-15,000 sabres and bayonets, also that the communi
cations on the Russian bank of the Ya-lu were but moderately
efficient. There should consequently have been but little
doubt as to the power of the Japanese to gain the passage
without affording the enemy an opportunity of beating
them in detail.
The direct attack of a defended river line is so difficult
that it is rarely attempted. The passage is therefore
usually gained by other measures; for instance, when the
enemy's force is scattered, by such methods as feinting in
several directions to mislead him, whilst the main body is
thrown over at some favourable point. If the hostile troops
are concentrated in one locality, the whole attacking force
can avoid or turn their position, or it may be turned by a
detachment whilst the remainder contain the enemy and
then cross imder cover of the detachment. Again the
main body can turn the position whilst the enemy is con
tained by a detachment.
The Russian troops though disseminated in a tactical,
being concentrated in a strategical sense in the neighbour
hood of An-tung, one of the last alternatives could have
been adopted by Kuroki.
Movement of troops on a large scale round the Russian
right was probably out of the question owing to the isnpos-
sibility of procuring shipping, there would therefore have
remained the altci/Ktl i vo of crossing the Ya-lu above Wi-ju.
To have passed the whole of his force over the river above
Wi-ju would have been attended by least risk, no serious
fighting was likely to take place, but the difficulties of
supply might have been grave, and the movements of the
Japanese must have been slow. If two divisions had been

36 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
sent over the Ya-lu whilst one was left to contain the
Russians, this division would have been secure from counter
attack owing to the presence of the river. In the absence
of good roads the operations of the Japanese turning force
would however have been so tardy as to have given the
Russians ample time to escape, so that whilst the crossing
would have been accomplished, the enemy would probably
have been able to avoid defeat. Under the method of
turning the position with a detachment whilst the main
body held fast the opponents, the detachment would have
been liable to defeat unless the operations were conducted
with energy. Some risk however must always be run
in war, and under this alternative the Russians, in the hope
of defeating the detachment, might be drawn into battle
with the whole Japanese force, when a Japanese victory
would be probable. In the circumstances it may be con
cluded, then, that this last alternative would have been
most advantageous to the Japanese.
It is said that in the first instance Kuroki had in
tended to gain the passage of the Ya-lu by sending the
12th division across the river in the neighbourhood of
Chyang-syong, whence it could menace the communica
tions of the Russian detachment by advancing on Ai-yang-
cheng. When this plan had been made the Japanese commander
received an intimation that his army was not to leave the
vicinity of the Ya-lu until the force under General Oku,
which was destined to land in the Liao-tung peninsula, had
begun its advance on Liao Yang. This it was estimated
would be towards the middle of June.
Unwilling to risk separation from one of his divisions
for so long a period as one month in face of an unbeaten
enemy, Kuroki now resolved to pass all three divisions
over simultaneously and on a wide frontage, but lack
of bridging material caused the abandonment of this
project. Finally it was decided that the 12th division should cross

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 37
above Wi-ju and cover the others who would pass over
near that town, when all would simultaneously attack.
The operation was carried out with success on 1st May. May.
The next question is what should have been Kuroki's
procedure after the battle of the Ya-lu. Actually he had
been directed to advance to a point half-way between
An-tung and Feng-huang-cheng, intrench, and wait until
the 2nd army was ready to advance up the Liao-tung
peninsula. His object was now presumably so to manoeuvre as to
distract the attention of the Russians from the operations
of Oku, without incurring undue risk to the 1st army.
No danger would have been incurred had the Japanese
remained at An-tung, for it was unlikely that the Russians
in force would have ventured so far south to attack them.
By staying at An-tung Kuroki would not however have
contained any large number of Russians, who would there
fore have been free to operate against Oku.
It would seem, then, that Kuroki should have made a
forward movement so as to impose on the enemy, advancing
perhaps as far as Feng-huang-cheng. At the same time a
bridgehead on which he could fall back might have been
made at An-tung.
Kuroki did advance, but not until 10th May, supply
difficulties and the necessity for tapping an area where
transport could be obtained — little transport was available
at An-tung — being strong motives for the forward move
ment, as well as the desire indirectly to assist the dis
embarkation of another Japanese force at Ta-ku-shan.
On 3rd May, probably to cover the sailing of the trans
ports of the army under General Oku, the Japanese again
attempted to block up the mouth of the harbour of Port
Arthur. On the same day, guarded by a few gun and torpedo
boats, and preceded by a naval landing party, the first
group of sixteen vessels, containing the 3rd division, was
able to sail for the selected landing-place Hou-tu-shih, a few

38 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
miles south of Pi-tzu-wo, where the Japanese force which
captured Port Arthur had disembarked in 1894. Hou-tu-
shih though reputed to possess superior accommodation to
Pi-tzu-wo was by no means an ideal port. The foreshore was
shallow, muddy, and of considerable extent, piers and quays
were non-existent, and the place was exposed to easterly
winds, though somewhat sheltered by the Elliot islands.
On the other hand the distance from Port Arthur (fifty to
sixty miles), the nearest point where the Russians were in
force, was sufficient to reduce to small proportions the risk
of serious opposition to the landing operations ; and trans
ports coming from Japan need not pass close to the Russian
warships, as would have been the case had a landing been
effected on the west coast of the Liao-tung peninsula.
On 4th May the ships sighted Hou-tu-shih, where a few
Cossacks were observed. The weather was however too
rough to render landing practicable, so the Japanese seem
to have sailed to the Elliot islands where a shallow haven,
protected by a boom against a Russian torpedo-boat attack,
had been selected as night anchorage for the vessels.
It was hoped that even if the enemy's torpedo boats
damaged the transports when at anchor the passengers
could easily be saved in the shallow water, whilst the
cargoes would without much difficulty be salvaged.
On 5th the disembarkation commenced, the naval cover
ing party being first put ashore, then a battalion, then more
infantry and some cavalry. Pi-tzu-wo was now occupied,
the few Eussians in the place retiring northwards ; a de
tachment too was despatched to Pu-lan-tien to cut the
railway, but was content merely to skirmish with the small
Eussian garrison.
By 16th May, though the field hospitals and supply and
ammunition columns had not landed. General Oku was able
to march the 3rd division towards Chin-chou, whilst the
1st and part of the 4th division had taken up a position at
Pu-lan-tien, and along the Ta-sha river, facing northwards.
Between 15th and 23rd May the 5th division and the

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 39
1st cavalry brigade arrived from Japan, and the trains of
the 1st, 3rd, and 4th divisions were landed, together with
half of an artillery brigade. Meanwhile to prevent the
despatch of a force from the north to attack General Oku's
troops whilst engaged in the work of disembarkation, a
na,val demonstration was made in the neighbourhood of
Kai-ping. General Oku issued orders, on 21st, for the 1st, 3rd, and
4th divisions to advance to Chin-chou, where a force esti
mated' at about 10,000 Eussians was known to be holding
a strongly fortified position. The 5th division, with detach
ments of the 3rd and 4th divisions, and the 1st cavalry
brigade, was meanwhile to hold the line Pu-lan-tien and
the Ta-sha river.
On 26th Chin-chou was captured, and on the same day
some 16,000 Eussians were driven from Nan-shan.
The 11th division disembarked at Yen-tai between 20th
and 31st May.
By 29th Dalny, Ta-lien-wan, and Nan-kuan-ling were
occupied. The 1st and 11th divisions were now, with some Kobi
brigades which were coming to the front, constituted into
a 3rd army, under General Nogi, for the siege of Port
Arthur. The 3rd, 4th, and 5th divisions, with the 1st cavalry
brigade, and the 1st artillery brigade, were at the same
time grouped into the 2nd army under General Oku.
For several days the troops at Pu-lan-tien had been
skirmishing with some Eussian horsemen supported by
artillery, and as these were thought, by the Japanese, to be
possibly the advanced guard of a larger force, the 3rd and
4th divisions and the half artillery brigade were moved to
Pu-lan-tien on 2nd and 3rd June.
On 19th May the 10th division, forming the nucleus
of the 4th Japanese army, had begun to disembark at
Ta-ku-shan, under General Kawamura.
Kuroki on 10th May advanced the main body of the

40 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF
1st army to Feng-huang-cheng, detaching on 28th a brigade
of the 12th division to Ai-yang-cheng.
Some inference as to the general intentions of the
Japanese could now have been made by the Eussians from
the dispositions of the Japanese forces (Map 3), the landing
of troops at Ta-ku-shan showing that active measures were
to be taken against the Eussian army, whilst from the
arrangement of the forces the operations were almost bound
to take the form of a concentric advance.
Since the three Japanese armies would be liable to defeat
in detail until they arrived within tactical supporting dis
tance of one another, it might also be inferred that the
forward movement would be prosecuted with energy.
It has been remarked (page 23) that the strategical
deployment of the Japanese field forces was probably
conditioned to a great extent by the limitations imposed
by the topography of Southern Manchuria on the concen
tration of large numbers in any one locality.
It is now for consideration whether the Japanese deploy
ment in the form of two strong wings with a connecting
force in the centre, was the most suitable that could in the
circumstances have been made. If it may be assumed that
one of the principal objects of Japanese strategy was to
safeguard from interference the force besieging Port Arthur,
it is evident that the largest numbers possible should have
been so disposed as to be able to offer direct opposition
to Eussian attempts to relieve the place. The Japanese
would therefore have been faced with the problem as to
the largest numbers that could be maintained on the roads
leading up the Liao-tung peninsula.
Even if it may be taken for granted that troops could
to some extent have been supplied from the coast, it is
difficult to see how a larger force than that actually allotted
to the 2nd army could have been maintained in this area,
and this force may be taken to represent the maximum
that could successfully have operated in Liao-tung.
The next question is whether the remainder, or at any

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 41
rate the major portion of the remainder of the field
armies, should not have been concentrated on the roads
leading from Ta-ku-shan via Hsiu-yen, where the troops
would have been well placed to support or be supported
by the 2nd army.
Whether such large numbers could have been maintained
on this line of advance is doubtful, but apart from this
the size of the force detailed to operate from Ta-ku-shan
would depend on the decision to use or neglect the routes
leading from the Ya-lu.
The direction followed by these roads was such as to
enable an army using them not only to menace the com
munications of all Eussian forces lying south of Liao Yang,
but to bring it directly on to the flank of a Eussian force
offering battle at this city. At the same' time the commu
nications of all Eussian troops operating eastwards from
Liao Yang would be open to attack from the direction of
Ta-ku-shan and Port Arthur.
On the other hand until the Japanese armies had ad
vanced inland some distance, the troops moving from the
Ya-lu would be isolated, and exposed, before the other armies
could intervene, to the risk of disaster at the hands of the
main force of the Eussians, who owing to this fact and
to the menacing position occupied by the Japanese right
wing might be tempted to attack it.
It would seem then that if any troops were placed on
the roads leading from the Ya-lu the advantages would be
greatest and the risks not unduly great if the force was
large. A strong centre, and if necessary a weak right, composed
of troops who could not be maintained in the centre,
would constitute a less hazardous arrangement. The
centre and left would be able more effectively to support
one another, whilst the weak right, though perhaps tempt
ing to attack, would probably be ignored by the enemy,
and if attacked and beaten its defeat would not exercise
a vital influence on the operations of the remainder.

42 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF
Against these dispositions it may however be argued that
the troops in the centre and on the left would not be well
placed to achieve decisive results from a successful action
near Liao Yang, and it may therefore be concluded that
little fault can be found with the deployment of the
Japanese field armies, for the undoubted advantages out
weighed the possible dangers of their formation.
It has been suggested that, under the original Japanese
plan of campaign, the 1st army was intended to move
on Hai-cheng, and not towards Liao Yang, and that the
primary object of the Japanese leaders was to concentrate
their own forces rather than to envelop the Russians. The
direction actually taken by Kuroki's army is ascribed to
the infiuence of topography, and to the fact that the only
practicable roads from the Yalu to the Liao converged on
Liao Yang.
In 1895, the army which crossed the Yalu did march on
Hai-cheng. It appears, then, that if the Japanese had
desired Kuroki's army to move on Hai-cheng, sufficient
roads would have been available for the purpose. It is
probable, therefore, that the Japanese deliberately moved
the 1st army by the more northerly routes, with the
object both of preventing Russian operations towards Porl;
Arthur, and of keeping the 1st army in a position f:|:om
which it could envelop the Russian left in any locality
south of Mukden. No doubt it was calculated that the
Russians could not quickly overwhelm Kuroki in the hilly
country lying south-east of Liao Yang, and that the
attraction of Port Arthur, and the presence of the other
two armies, would tend to lessen the probability of such
a counter-stroke. Possibly the Japanese hoped, after the
rapid capture of Port Arthur, to apply to the Russians
the enveloping tactics attempted at Mukden, the 3rd army
forming the left wing, the 1st standing in a more favourable
position than was their right on that occasion.
After the battle of the Yalu, the Russians, engrossed, as
was the case throughout the campaign, in contemplation

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 43
of their own dangers and difficulties and not those of their
enemy, became, owing to the movement of a Japanese
detachment towards Sai-ma-chi, seriously alarmed for the
security of their line of communication in the area north
of Liao Yang. Troops under Rennenkamf, amounting to
a Cossack brigade, 2500 infantry, and two horse batteries,
were therefore pushed to Sai-ma-chi, and at the same time
two or three battalions from Liao Yang began to fortify the
passes near Lien-shan-kuan. Another Cossack brigade,
under Mischenko, was also sent to watch the coastline
near Ta-ku-shan.
Madridov, who was still on the upper Yalu, made on
10th May a raid into Korea against the Japanese line
of communications, attacking An-ju, but was easily beaten
off by its garrison of less than a hundred men.
During the remainder of May no incident of importance
occurred except a few Russian reconnaissances from Sai-
ma-chL The security of Port Arthur had however caused anxiety
to the Viceroy, whose somewhat sanguine estimate of its
powers of resistance had so far changed to one of despond
ency that on 25th April he issued general instructions to
Kuropatldn that when the fortress was attacked, the field
army must advance to its support rapidly and with energy.
On 19th May these instructions assumed a definite form,
Kuropatkin being directed to take active measures for the
relief of pressure against Port Arthur, either by attacking
Kuroki, or whilst Containing Kuroki by marching against
the force under Oku which had landed near Pi-tzu-wo.
Two days later a further suggestion was made that whilst
leaving a screen of troops on the Feng-shui-ling and a
reserve at Hai-cheng, the remainder of the field force
should attack General Oku. Kuropatkin spent some time
in consideration of instructions so foreign to his own views,
hoping perhaps that the chapter of accidents might come
to his assistance in the shape of a Japanese reverse at
Nan-shan.

44 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
On 27th May, the day following the defeat of the Russians
at Nan-shan, he however seems to have given way, for he
informed Alexiev that offensive operations would be under
taken against the force under Oku.
The augmentation of the Russian army had, meanwhile,
been proceeding, and towards the end of May the field forces
had reached the respectable total of about 100,000 bayonets
and sabres (Appendix V, and Map 3).
At this juncture the strength of the Japanese force under
Kuroki was estimated to be three divisions and three Kobi
brigades; the 2nd army to comprise three divisions, whilst
a large force was believed to be in the neighbourhood of
Ta-ku-shan ; the grand total amounting to perhaps between
80,000-100,000 fighting men.
The main question to be decided before commencing any
operation q| war on a large scale is whether the results are
likely to be decisive ; if not the venture will rarely be worth
undertaking. The attempt may even prove disastrous, for
if a leader plays for lower stakes when the enemy is aiming
at decision, he stands to win pence and to lose pounds.
Risk there must be in all ventures, but it is safe to say
that where gain will be greatest risk will be least, for
this situation implies that the blow is to be struck at
some point vital to the enemy, and as such blow must be
parried, the enemy will be obliged to conform to the opera
tions of the attacker.
Kuropatkin's first consideration should therefore have
been, which, if either alternative, would lead to decisive
results. From this point of view he made a correct selection in
decidiag to attack General Oku, for though the defeat of
General Kuroki might have delayed the Japanese operations,
their plan of campaign would not have been ruined. More
over to have reached the 1st army at all would have been
a slow and difficult business, having regard to the moun
tainous nature of the country lying south-east of Liao Yang,
and to the deficiency of transport under which the Russians

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 45
were labouring. Effective counter attack by the 2nd army
which would force the Russians to abandon their plans and
conform to the movements of the enemy was therefore to
be feared; and lastly, the Russian army possessed neither
the special training nor armament required for mountain
warfare. By crushing Oku the Russians would not only in all
probability have paved the way for the destruction of the
larger portion of the Japanese army, but would have re
opened the road to Port Arthur, and perhaps saved the
Russian fleet. Besides an advance by Kuroki would owing
to the nature of the country be so slow that before a serious
menace could be offered to the Russian communications
Oku might have been beaten.
Having determined to strike at Oku, the next point for
decision should have been in what force the operation was
to be undertaken.
Here again it should only have been necessary to follow
one of the great principles of war^nd to strike with every
available man, cutting down necessary detachments to the
lowest possible limits. The difficulty in war is however
to determine what is the lowest margin of safety, and
Kuropatkin was set no easy task to decide how many men
would be required to deal with Kuroki and Kawamura,
and how many to secure his line of communication against
Japanese forces which might be landed at Ying-kou, or even
at Shan-hai-kuan.
Lastly, assuming that the Russian general decided to
march southwards with the bulk of his troops, he must
weigh the all-important questions of transport, Supply,
time, and space, to discover whether his plan was really
capable of execution.
It is an axiom that continuous pressure on the enemy is
the very soul of the convergent system of strategy, which
depends greatly for its success on the maintenance of simul
taneous pressure on the enemy from the various directions
in which the army is moving.

46 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
It was to be expected, then, that the combined forward
movement of the Japanese armies would be vigorously
prosecuted, and that if any army were attacked the others
would at once advance against the Russians to relieve it.
It is therefore clear that, as in all operations of war, the
probability of success would be greatly increased if the
Japanese were kept in ignorance of the Russian projects
up to the moment of decisive attack on Oku.
The adoption of a defensive attitude towards the 1st army
and the force at Ta-ku-shan, while an attack was made on
Oku, would however have given the Japanese an indication
as to the Russian plan. Whilst troops were marching against
the 2nd army Kuroki and Kawamura must therefore be led
to believe that they were also about to be attacked. Finally,
a simultaneous offensive must be undertaken against the
three armies, though only pressed home against Oku, and
the garrison of Port Arthur must sally against the investing
forces. Oku too must not be permitted to discover that the
decisive blow was about to fall on his army lest he should
fall back on Nan-shan, whilst the others moved forward
against the Russian communications.
Keller who had superseded Zasulitch, and Rennenkamf,
had between them in the neighbourhood of Lien-shan-kuan
and Sai-ma-chi some 25,000 sabres and bayonets, opposed
to Kuroki's detachment, thought to number about 50,000 ;
and Mischenko at Hsiu-yen could muster about 7000 sabres
and bayonets against Kawamura's force, which might consist
of one or more divisions. Having regard to the nature of
the country in which the operations were to be conducted,
Keller and Mischenko should therefore have been able to
contain the 1st army and 10th division, whilst a decisive
blow was struck at Oku.
If a brigade, i.e. 5000-6000 men, were left at Ying-kou,
where it was perhaps still possible that the Japanese might
attempt to land a force with the object of surrounding and
cutting off aU Russian troops operating against Oku, and a

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 47
force at Kai-ping, to secure this place against a naval raid,
the remaining troops, less depots, and small garrisons of,
say, half a brigade, in all, at Liao Yang and Mukden, would
have numbered some 60,000 sabres and bayonets.
With these Kuropatkin could have moved against Oku,
whose army was estimated at three divisions, or some 36,000
sabres and rifles.
Possibly, had he displayed energy, Kuropatkin might,
with the help of the railway, have collected this force at
Wa-fang-tien in a fortnight, that is during the first week in
June, when Oku would probably have been in the neigh
bourhood of Pu-lan-tien, if not farther north.
It is thought, then, that had he acted in whole-hearted
fashion, Kuropatkin might towards the beginning of June
have taken the offensive with fair prospects of success.
But the Russian general, perhaps with the object of hazard
ing as few troops as possible, especially after a demonstration
made by a Japanese squadron in the neighbourhood of Kai-
ping on 7th and 8th June, was content to adopt a half-
measure, and even this was not carried out until after ten
days' further delay.
On 5th June part of the 1st Siberian Corps was railed June.
to Te-li-ssu, on 7th a memorandum was addressed to
General Stackelberg, to whom had been confided the com
mand of the force. In this he was directed to advance
southwards with the 1st Siberian corps and other troops, so
as to create a diversion in favour of Port Arthur, by draw
ing against his detachment as large a Japanese force as
possible, but was warned that he was not to become
entangled in a decisive action against superior forces.
Kuropatkin however immediately countermanded the
movements of a portion of the troops, owing to a display
of activity by the 10th Japanese division, and it was not
until 12th June that Stackelberg was allowed to issue the
orders necessary to complete the concentration of his force.
Eventually, some 27,000 bayonets, and 2000 to 3000 sabres,
were massed at or near Te-li-ssu.

48 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
The Russian cavalry had meanwhile retired on Te-li-ssu
when the 2nd army moved to Pu-lan-tien, but had again
advanced to Wa-fang-tien on receiving from Stackelberg
a reinforcement of two battalions.
Early in Tune the Japanese heard, both from local spies,
and from their intelligence service in Europe, that the
Russians were about to attack Oku.
Their armies were standing on an extended frontage, and
not one of the three was sufficiently strong to cope success
fully and unassisted with the largest force the Russians could
move against them. The configuration of the theatre of
war and the disposition of the armies however gave them,
as lias been pointed out, this advantage, that if either flank
was threatened the remainder by direct advance could
menace the line of communication of the troops with which
the Russians assumed the offensive. The reply of the
Japanese to the impending attack on Oku should therefore
have been an immediate offensive by the forces under
Kuroki and Kawamura.
Whether Oku should have retired, halted, or advanced, is
the next question. Had he fallen back before the enemy,
or remained stationary, a large body of Russians would have
been inveigled far into the Liao-tung peninsula, and an
opportunity afforded to Kuroki and Kawamura to interpose
between it and the rest of the Russian army.
In war it is however never possible to rely on informa
tion, nor safe to count even on probabilities, and though
every indication pointed to the likelihood of an attack on
Oku, these rumours and movements might have been only
a ruse to distract attention from other operations which
would have been facilitated by the inactivity of the 2nd
army. Besides the object of the Japanese was to concen
trate, not separate their armies, and above all the initiative
must not be allowed to pass to the enemy. It is thought,
then, that a simultaneous advance should at once have been
undertaken by the three armies, which would have assured
the possession of the initiative.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 49
This, subject to the limitations imposed by difficulties of
maintenance, was apparently the intention of the Japanese
General Headquarters.
On 2nd June Kawamura was ordered to hold himself in
readiness to advance towards Kai-ping and menace the
flank of any Russian troops in this neighbourhood, whether
^or not his division had completed its disembarkation. At
the same time Kuroki was ordered to send to Kawamura
a force under General Asada of one brigade, two squadrons,
and two batteries, with which Kawamura wisely decided
to deal a blow against Mischenko before attempting to
move on Kai-ping.
Asada left Feng-huang-cheng on 6th June, and on 8 th
he combined with part of the 10th division in a successful
attack on Hsiu-yen, which temporarily disposed of Mis
chenko. As the Russian operations now seemed to be
hanging fire, in point of fact Kuropatkin, as has been
narrated, had countermanded the movement of part of the
force designated to advance against Oku, Japanese General
Headquarters issued orders postponing the projected move
ment on Kai-ping. Kawamura therefore halted and in
trenched, and on the news of this development Kuropatkin
allowed Stackelberg to continue his concentration on
Te-li-ssu. On 12th, Oku being ready to move from Pu-lan-tien with
three divisions and the cavalry, Kawamura was directed to
proceed towards Kai-ping, as soon as he could do so, leav
ing Asada to protect his right and watch Hsi-mu-cheng.
Orders were also issued for a forward movement by the
1st army, but owing to supply difficulties Kuroki was only
able to push forward some detachments, whose operations
combined with news of the westward march of Asada's
brigade caused Keller to fear an attack on his right. He
therefore began to mass troops on this flank, and to push
reconnaissances southward.
Meanwhile Oku had commenced his march from Pu-lan-
tien, and by 13th, the 3rd and 5th divisions were, with the
E

50 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
artillery brigade, at Wa-fang-tien, the 4th division near
Fu-chou, and the cavalry brigade on the right flank. The
6th division, though part had disembarked, was not yet
ready to advance.
Even the threat of an offensive had therefore, though
they probably did not know it, already proved advantageous
to the Russians, for the Japanese had been obliged to push
forward any troops that were in position to move, and as
matters stood either Kawamura or Oku could have been
attacked without risk of intervention by Kuroki (Appendix
VI, Map 4).
On 15th June the Japanese defeated the Russians at
Te-li-ssu, driving in their right, but did not follow up the
success with any vigour — in fact there was practically no
pursuit — and Stackelberg's detachment was able to fall
back quietly on Kai-ping, covered by a cavalry force under
Samsonov. Kuropatkin now hastened all available troops southwards,
even withdrawing a brigade from Keller's detachment to
strengthen the force south of Liao Yang, and a defensive
position was selected and fortified in the vicinity of
Ta-shih-chiao. At the same time Keller was ordered to make a demon
stration against Feng-huang-cheng, reported to be occupied
by the 2nd and Guard divisions, an operation which, whilst
it might certainly have caused anxiety to the Japanese as
to the safety of the 1st army, would have produced results
exactly contrary to what apparently were desired had the
2nd and 4th armies been directed to advance and relieve
pressure against Kuroki.
Having mustered eight battalions Keller advanced in
two columns and reached a point ten miles from Feng-
huang-cheng unopposed. He then retired, and on arriving
at Lien-shan-quan, on 18th June, received orders to remain
on the defensive.
No sooner had Keller withdrawn, than Rennenkamf
attacked Ai-yang-cheng, reported to be held by the 12th

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 51
division, but drew off without discovering the strength of
the enemy's force.
The two Russian generals seem to have acted indepen
dently, thereby reducing the chances of success.
The Russian fleet now showed signs of activity, putting
to sea on 23rd June, but was driven back into the harbour
by the Japanese. On 26th June the 3rd army captured
a ridge known as Ken-shan, about ten miles' from Port
Arthur, subsequently repulsing several attempts to retake
the position.
At about this time the 3rd army was reinforced by the
9th division and 4th Kobi brigade, and an artillery brigade.
The victory of Te-li-ssu having for the moment placed
the initiative in the hands of the Japanese, they were able
to pause to complete their arrangements for a sustained
advance. It was at flrst proposed that Kawamura should attack
the passes near South Feng-shui-ling on 26th June, by
which date it was computed that the 2nd army would have
reached Kai-ping.
On 24th June Kawamura, in common with the other
Japanese commanders, was however notified that as the
Russian fleet was still in condition to put to sea and render
sea transport of supplies precarious, the combined advance
on Liao Yang must be delayed untU after the end of the
rainy season, that is until September. Thus the Japanese
had already begun to feel the drag on their operations
of the fortress of Port Arthur, which was sheltering the
Russian fleet, and proposed to abandon the initiative, a
step likely to be fraught with serious consequences in
view of the dispersion of their forces.
By this development Kawamura was placed in an un
enviable dilemma, for his detachment lay isolated and
exposed close to the passes over a main range held by a
hostile force which he was aware had been recently re
inforced, but over whose operations he could exercise no
surveillance.

52 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
In these circumstances there were open to him three
alternatives: advance, inaction, retreat.
Inaction which would leave his force in its disadvan
tageous situation, with the prospect of future operations
against a more strongly fortified and garrisoned position,
may at once be discarded.
Retreat was undesirable from both moral and tactical
points of view, for the men would be discouraged, the
division would abandon territory already conquered, and
though the difficulties of supply might be reduced the
power to intervene effectively on behalf of the other armies
would practically be abandoned.
There would have remained the policy of attack, and in
favour of this it might have been argued that no better
opportunity of capturing the passes was likely to occur.
Moreover, though the maintenance of the force might
present difficulties, and some risk would be run of counter
attack, the troops would at any rate be well placed, when
holding the passes, both to resist attack and to screen their
own strength and movements, whilst observing those of the
enemy. Finally they would be in the most favourable
situation to assist the other armies in case of need, and to
co-operate when the time came for a general forward move
ment. Kawamura decided, and it is thought rightly, to attack,
and by 27th had taken the Sov 't Feng-shui-ling. The
Japanese then halted and began to intrench.
On 22nd June Kuroki had been informed by the Japanese
General Headquarters that as a concentric advance on Liao
Yang would shortly take place, a depot of supplies was to
be pushed forward to Tung-yuen-pu, under guard of a
detachment. Judging that such policy would be too
hazardous Kuroki resolved to move his whole army for
ward, and the troops were actually on the march when
the order of 24th postponing the movement on Liao Yang
came to hand.
The Japanese are not quick to adapt themselves to

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 53
changed conditions, and Kuroki was probably aware that
Kawamura intended to occupy the Feng-shui-ling. He
therefore determined to continue his operations, seizin}^'
the Mo-tien-ling and neighbouring passes with the object,
though drawing nearer to the enemy's masses, of limiting
the Russian power of manoeuvre, and of obtaining in
formation. The army moved in three columns, owing to the
mountainous nature of the district, the Guards marching on
Erh-chia-pu-tsz, the 2nd division on Lien-shan-kuan, and
12th division by Sai-ma-chi. Before this advance Keller
and Rennenkamf fell back, so that, by 27th, the Guard and
2nd divisions were holding the Mo-tien-ling and neighbour
ing passes, and the 12th division a pass twelve miles west
of Sai-ma-chi called Pa-li-ling.
Having obtained possession of the roads over the
Mo-tien-ling area Kuroki relapsed into inactivity, due in
part to heavy rain, which quite disorganised his arrange
ments for supply.
At this juncture the information available to the Russians
caused them to credit the 1st army with a strength of only
three Kobi brigades at Mo-tien-ling, whilst the 12th division
was believed to be at Sai-ma-chL
On the other hand, the bold movements of Kawamura
and the presence of Asada's detachment with this force led
to the belief that it consisted of no fewer nan four divisions
under the command of KurokL
Kuropatkin, fearing that the Japanese meditated an
advance from the South Feng-shui-ling against Hai-cheng,
therefore at once swept up all available troops to oppose
them, collecting near Hsi-mu-cheng a composite force of no
fewer than 30,000 sabres and bayonets, from units of the
2nd division 4th corps, from the 5th East Siberian, and
3l8t and 35th divisions, and from various Cossack regi
ments. As the Japanese made no further movement
forwards the troops from the 31st division were however
soon afterwards sent back to Hai-cheng, and now the Russian
commander-in-chief, thinking apparently that Keller's

54 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
detachment had been dangerously weakened, returned two
regiments to him (Appendix VII, Map 5).
Early in July Kawamura was notified that the advance
of the 2nd army was about to be renewed, and this in
formation seems to have been accompanied by a suggestion
that the 10th division should march westwards so as to
co-operate in the movement.
Confronted as he was by so large a force of Russians,
Kawamura judged that such operations would be hazardous,
for he feared that on hearing of his departure the Russians
might at once advance and attack Asada's brigade. He
therefore contented himself with the despatch of two weak
detachments towards Kai-ping, to establish touch with the
forces under Oku.
On 12th July the 10th Kobi Brigade, which had begun to
arrive at Ta-ku-shan as early as 24th June, reached Hsiu-yen
to reinforce Kawamura's detachment, and on 16th General
Nodzu took over command of the troops, now constituted
the 4th army.
Rumours of these movements having reached Kuropatkin,
he seems to have resolved to clear up the situation by
means of an attack on Mo-tien-ling by Keller's detachment,
which had been augmented by the 1st brigade, 9th division,
recently arrived from Europe, and by three battalions from
Rennenkamf, in all about 8000 bayonets. Rennenkamf had
at the same time received the 2nd brigade of the 9th division,
eight battalions strong, as reinforcement.
The information desired by Kuropatkin could, broadly
speaking, be attained either by cunning or by force ; that
is by such expedients as secret-service agents and special
patrols, or by reconnaissance in force, or attack on one or
all of the Japanese armies.
It is a maxim that no military operation on a large scale
should be undertaken unless the results are likely to be
decisive, and it cannot be urged that the results of a recon
naissance in force promised to be decisive to the Russians,
except in an unfavourable sense, that is to say the recon-

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 55
noitring force might be opposed by overwhelming numbers
of the enemy and suffer disastrous defeat.
If secret-service agents, officers' patrols, and minor recon
naissances had, as was apparently the case, been tried
without success, the only remaining alternative would have
been attack on one or all of the enemy's armies on a grand
scale, though to have made such attack when in ignorance
of the enemy's dispositions would have been a hazardous
venture. It would however have been attended by some
prospects of advantage, whereas none were to be expected
from a reconnaissance in force.
Attack in force on the passes at and near Mo-tien-ling
might have ended in disaster should the Japanese really
have proved to be holding them with no more than three
brigades, for the troops at South Feng-shui-ling might, by a
rapid advance, succeed in interposing between the Eussians
and Liao Yang.
Advance in strength against the 2nd army would have
been too perilous, for it was far away, and the weak detach-
• ments which could have been left to hold off Kuroki and
Kawamura might well have found that they had neither
strength nor space to manoeuvre necessary for this purpose.
A third alternative would have been attack on the forces
holding the South Feng-shui-ling, estimated,' as has been
pointed out, at about 45,000 men.
For this there would have been available the 30,000
troops already in this neighbourhood, the bulk of the 10th
corps, which reached Liao Yang during the early portion of
July, and could not be less than 20,000 strong, besides some
15,000-20,000 men at Ta-shih-chiao and Hai-cheng — that is
about 65,000 men.
To contain Oku there would have remained quite 30,000
in position at Kai-ping, whilst Keller and Eennenkamf
would still have disposed of nearly 20,000, wherewith to
hold off the 1st army, believed to number about 25,000.
Against this project it may be urged that victory, if
gained, though important, might not have been decisive;

66 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF
whilst if success was not rapidly attained, the Eussians
might — though of this there could have been no great likeli
hood — be enveloped by the advance of the Japanese wings.
Again, both here and at Mo-tien-ling the Eussians would
have been operating in mountainous districts, for which
their organization and armament was ill adapted.
Actually a reconnaissance in force was made when Keller,
on 17th July, attacked the Japanese positions at and near
Mo-tien-ling with about eighteen battalions, drawing off
when the positions were found to be held in strength.
The result of this reconnaissance was to cause the Eussians
to revise their opinions as to the dispositions of the
Japanese armies, and it seems now to have been more
correctly believed that Kuroki, at Mo-tien-ling and Sai-ma-
chi, disposed of at least three divisions and some Kobi,
supported by two Kobi brigades at Feng-huang-cheng and
Kuan-tien-cheng. Nodzu, owing to the movements of his
reconnoitring detachments, was thought to have two
divisions and one Kobi brigade at South Feng-shui-ling,
and one division at Hsin-kai-ling. Oku was credited with
four divisions.
Kuroki temporarily resumed the offensive on 19th July,
the 12th division driving a Eussian force, of some 7000
men, with twenty-four guns, from Chiao-tao. This success
established direct communication between the 2nd and
12th divisions, and secured the right of the Mo-tien-ling
position. From Chiao-tao a road led to Mukden, via Pen-hsi-hu, so
that the reverse gave Kuropatkin fresh cause of anxiety for
the security of his communications.
Against the total estimated strength of the Japanese of
160,000 bayonets and sabres, for the strength of the
divisions seems to have been greatly exaggerated — the
actual numbers were about 100,000 (Appendix VIII,
Map 6) — Kuropatkin could at this juncture oppose about
140,000 sabres and rifles. To the Eussian commander,
before whose eyes difficulties appear to have bulked un-

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 57
duly large, the concentration of superior numbers against
one of the three Japanese armies whilst the others were
contained and misled by activity and menaces, seemed
however an insoluble problem ; and he has left it on record
that whilst sufficient men were not available to permit of
successful attack on one of the hostile groups without risk
of defeat by the others, the rainy weather had so seriously
damaged the roads as to preclude the rapid movements
necessary for victorious action on interior lines. Such
arguments are not heard from the lips of great leaders like
Napoleon, who are aware that no advantage can be gained
without hazard, and that the difficulties of the enemy are at
least as serious as their own.
In spite of his pessimistic views, Kuropatkin seems after
Chiao-tao to have felt that some action ought to be taken,
and as the leading troops of 17th corps had begun to arrive
at Liao Yang, he decided to drive back Kuroki, and thus
clear the Russian communications.
The Russian commander-in-chief, who, on the news of
Te-li-ssu, had at once hurried southwards, now directed the
bulk of the 10th corps to march, on, 23rd July, to An-ping,
and himself moved eastwards to supervise the operation.
These continued movements must have dislocated
the arrangements of his staff, and the presence of the
Russian commander in localities where detachments of his
army had suffered reverses was likely not to improve, but
to prejudice his grasp of the general situation, by leading
him to attach undue importance to local incidents.
It has been urged' on behalf of Kuropatkin that he mis
trusted the capacity of his subordinate generals. If so his
methods would tend to aggravate rather than to mend
matters, and all his time and energies were required to
arrange for the organization, and even training of his army.
Many regiments possessed newly raised battalions; the
East Siberian brigades had recently been expanded into
divisions, and were full of drafts of men who had never seen
a magazine rifle ; and the transport train was not efficient.

58 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
Moreover, the Russian armies were distributed in a series of
independent detachments, without cohesion, or knowledge
of one another's movements. Not even the force opposing
Kuroki was under one commander.
Meanwhile Oku had reached Hsiung-yao-cheng on 21st
June, and on 9th July occupied Kai-ping, the Russians
retiring after a short resistance.
On 22nd July the Asada detachment was returned to the
1st army under instructions from General Headquarters,
which had left Japan on 6th July and were now at Kai-
ping. This redistribution was made apparently as a pre
liminary to the concentric forward movement by the 2nd
and 4th armies which was about to be renewed, the fears as
to [the power of the Russian fleet to take effective action
having doubtless been found to be exaggerated. The
Japanese appear to have been aware that the Russians
had received considerable reinforcements, that about two
corps were holding an intrenched position at Ta-shih-
chiao, and that a large force was standing at Hai-cheng
behind them. To prevent attack in force on Oku, as soon
as his army assumed the offensive, they were therefore
probably anxious that simultaneous pressure should be
exerted by Nodzu, who was believed now to be opposed
by a division, and possessed sufficient force to deal with it ;
and that Kuroki, who was somewhat in advance of the
other two, should both be credited with the receipt of
reinforcements, which would cause the Russians to hesitate
to despatch troops against Oku, and should be in sufficient
strength to hold his own if attacked.
On 23rd July, Oku began his march against Ta-shih-chiao,
and on the next day attacked the 1st and 4th Siberian
corps at that place, who fell back after an indecisive action.
The position of Ta-shih-chiao, on one of the spurs flung
westward into the Liao plain from the Feng-shui-ling group
of mountains, had been strongly intrenched, so it is curious
that the Russians, having accepted battle, offered so half
hearted a resistance, for they fought merely a rear-guard

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 59
action. A possible explanation is that until the 1st army
had been dealt with Kuropatkin did not wish his southern
detachment to accept battle, but at the same time did not
care to yield Ying-kou without a struggle. Zarubaiev had
therefore been ordered not to commit his troops to close
action, and fell back when news was received that the -Ith
army was advancing on Hsi-mu-cheng, As a result the
Japanese gained the prestige of a victory, and the Russians
sacrificed lives to no purpose.
On 25th, the 2nd army occupied Ying-kou.
On 28th, communication was opened between the 2nd and
4th armies, and the 5th division was placed under the
orders of General Nodzu. The 4th army had on 24th
moved slowly towards Hsi-mu-cheng and was now eight or
ten miles south of that city.
Whilst these events were taking place in the area south
of Liao Yang, Kuropatkin on 23rd had inspected the 10th
corps during its march from Liao Yang towards An-ping,
but finding the regiments devoid of pack transport, and
aware that the 17th corps, the bulk of which was at Liao
Yang, was in the same predicament, decided that an
immediate offensive was out of the question, especially as
the information as to the enemy's strength and dispositions
was by no means reliable.
On receiving news of the defeat at Ta-shih-chiao the
Eussian commander returned to Liao Yang, leaving the
eastern forces without a leader, though General Sluchevski,
commanding the 10th corps, is said to have received instruc
tions that if, as was now expected, Kuroki advanced on Muk
den he was to be attacked at all costs ; should the Japanese
move on Liao Yang they were to be resisted to the last.
If the Eussians were afraid of the 1st army, Kuroki was
not less anxious as to the intentions of Kuropatkin, the
news of whose arrival at An-ping, accompanied by a con
siderable number of troops, was received about 24th July.
The Japanese commander however approached the
problem in a spirit of greater enterprise and resolution, and

60 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
of the three alternatives before him, retreat, which would
perhaps have drawn the Russians further into the
mountains, but might have demoralised his own troops and
limited their power of co-operating with the other armies ;
inactivity, which would have left the initiative to the
Russians ; and attack, which was calculated to disturb the
enemy, to upset his plans, and in this manner indirectly to
assist the 2nd and 4th armies ; he wisely determined to
attack. Calling up five Kobi battalions from his line of com
munication, he delivered an attack on 31st July, against the
10th corps at Yu-shu-ling and Pien-ling, and against
Keller's detachment at Ta-wan. After severe fighting the
Russians fell back under cover of darkness, practically
unpursued, and took up positions on the hills east of
An-ping. On 31st July, no doubt with a view to co-operating with
Kuroki, the 4th army advanced on Hsi-mu-cheng, and after
another indecisive action, the Russians drew off on 1st
August towards Hai-cheng. The action of the Russians
may have been influenced by news of the victory of 1st
army. Oku had also advanced on 1st, and meeting with
little resistance, occupied Hai-cheng two days later, the
Eussians having fallen back to another strongly intrenched
position at An-shan-chan.
The result of these operations was to bring the 2nd and
4th armies into close contact with one another, but the left
of the 1st army was still separated by some forty miles, cf
rough mountain and steep-sided valley from the right of
tJic 4th army. The 1st army was also in point of distance
a good deal nearer to Liao Yang than were the other
armies, though, having regard to the nature of the country,
there was not perhaps, in point of time, much difference in
the distance of the three from the Chinese city.
The general disposition of the Japanese and the advanced
position of the 1st army had however practically committed
the Japanese to a converging attack on Liao Yang, for

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 61
whereas it might have formed a mobile wing of the Japan
ese forces, these could now manoeuvre only with difficulty
and risk. (Appendix IX, Map 7.)
Had not Oyama's hand for example been forced by the
Eussian advance against the 1st army, and had this army
been held back on the line Chiao-tao to Mo-tien-ling, the
2nd and 4th armies might have been used to hold fast the
Eussians at An-shan-chan, whilst the 1st was employed to
envelop their left.
The reasons given by General Kuropatkin for the with
drawal of his army to the positions in the neighbourhood of
An-shan-chan, Lang-tzu-shan, and An-ping, are that the
enemy possessed numerical superiority ; better organization
and equipment ; youth, inurement to heat, and to movement
over hills ; higher military spirit, and more skilful leader
ship. With such pessimistic views as to the efficiency of his
troops it is no wonder that the Eussian commander was in
grave doubt whether to await the onslaught of the Japanese
at liao Yang, or to retire as some of his generals desired '
north of the Tai-tzu.
Had it not been for the defeat of the Eussian fleet outside
Port Arthur on lOth^August, which was followed by such
alarmist reports as to the defensibiUty of the fortress that
the Viceroy Alexiev urged that some effort must again be
made to assist the garrison, even if nothing more was done
than a demonstration against Hai-cheng, it is possible that
the Eussians might have withdrawn across the Tai-tzu.
But these circumstances combined with the fact that the
5th Siberian corps originally designated for Vladivostock
was now being sent to Liao Yang, inclined Kuropatkin to
await events in the positions then held by his army.
During August the Japanese operations were again
suspended. Though heavy rains had disorganized the supply
arrangements, this lull is probably ascribable to hopes that
the result of the first assault delivered on Port Arthur
between the 19th and 24th August, would set free the
3rd army for the decisive battle now imminent,

62 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF
Meanwhile the Eussians lay inactive in their advanced
positions south and east of Liao Yang, Kuropatkin, whilst
awaiting the arrival of reinforcements, being content to
leave the initiative in the hands of the enemy, whose
advance would be opposed if it was judged that the
Eussians had received sufficient accession of strength to
render success probable.
It is a maxim of war that decisive success cannot be
gained by an army that does not at some juncture assume
the offensive, and in these circumstances if Kuropatkin
decided to await the attack of the Japanese instead of
attacking them, it should have been with the intention of
assuming the offensive on the first opportunity.
The topography of the neighbourhood of Liao Yang was
not unfavourable to the adoption of an attitude of expect
ancy, for the Tai-tzu is as a rule fordable in but few locali
ties at this season of the year, and the Eussians possessing six
or seven bridges at Liao Yang secured by a bridgehead of forts
and by an outer circle of intrenchments, as well as one or
more bridges at a point some eight miles above this city, had
ample means of crossing the river at will with more rapidity
and in greater security than could the Japanese.
Had the Eussians then chosen to await attack behind the
Tai-tzu the Japanese would have been obliged either to
undertake direct and costly operations against the bridge
head, with the eventual prospect of meeting a counter-attack
when exhausted by their efforts to capture the forts. Or a
portion of the army might have made a direct attack on the
bridgehead whilst the remainder passed over the river in
some other locality and moved against the flank and
communications of its defenders; the Eussians however,
possessing means of more rapid passage, could then mass the
bulk of their army on either bank, and attack bne of the
divided portions of the Japanese forces.
Or again, if the Japanese attempted to pass the whole of
their army over the Tai-tzu either above or below Liao Yang,
the Eussians, who could concentrate more rapidly on either

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 63
bank, could attack in superior numbers the front or rear of
the Japanese army whilst it was astride the stream.
It may here be remarked that had Kuropatkin spent even
a few weeks of the period which had elapsed since the
commencement of hostilities in building bridges and making
bridgeheads on the lower reaches of the Tai-tzu river, from
which he could have issued against the Japanese left, the
operations of the Japanese would probably have assumed a
different character.
Though in theory the temporary defensive possessed con
siderable attractions, in practice it was, judging from past
history, at least probable, so difficult is it to husband reserves
and to make the most of opportunities for their employment,
that the Russians might not reap the advantages of the
situation were the initiative left to the enemy, and being
again obliged to conform to his movements, might be unable
to attack him at their pleasure.
Besides even the temporary defensive possesses moral
drawbacks, for it is a confession, however grudging, of in
feriority. Even admitting the supposed numerical and moral superi
ority of the Japanese, and their advantages in the matter
of equipment and leadership, the situation of the three
armies, lying on the arc of a semicircle, of which the
Russians formed the chord, and with a considerable gap
between their right and centre, was such as to present con
siderable prospects of decisive victory for the Russians after
the successful adoption of the offensive so ardently advocated
by Alexiev.
The 1st army most nearly menaced the Russian line of
communication and for this reason its defeat would have
been advantageous. In case of failure irretrievable disaster
was not probable, for the troops detailed to hold fast the
2nd and 4th armies should, with the help of the forts and
intrenchments at Liao Yang, have been able to keep them
off until the remainder of the Russians were safely across
the Tai-tzu.

64 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
Leaving 60,000 sabres and bayonets to contain Oku and
Nodzu, whose armies were thought to comprise 150 batta
lions, or from 100,000-120,000 men, Kuropatkin could have
attacked Kuroki's force with about 80,000-90,000 sabres
and bayonets, which would have given him a small numeri
cal superiority on the estimated strength of the 1st army,
65,000-70,000 men. Actually the Russian preponderance
over the Japanese would in this quarter have been as
about 2-1. (Appendix IX, Map 7.)
On the other hand, owing to the organization, transport,
armament, and training of the Russians, operations on a
large scale in the mountains presented serious difficulties,
and their dispositions were such the attack must to a great
extent have been direct rather than enveloping, for only
about 15,000 bayonets from Liao Yang, besides troopsfrom
Mukden, were available to movement in any given direction.
These might have been used to envelop the left of the 1st
army, separating it from the others, an operation which, if
successful, would have involved the retreat of the 1st and
of the other armies, but not their ruin without further
victorious actions. Or the troops from Liao Yang, etc.,
could Ifave been sent against the right of the 1st army from
the direction of Pen-hsi-hu, where local success could per^
haps have been most easily attained, but the immediate
result might only have been to force the three Japanese
armies into one straight line, though Kuroki's line of
communication to the Ya-lu would probably have been
severed. Against Oku and Nodzu, the Russian commander-in-
chief could, after detailing about 50,000 sabres and bayonets
to engage Kuroki, oppose between 90,000-100,000 sabres
and bayonets, to their estimated total of 100,000-120,000
and actual strength of nearly 85,000.
Successful attack on the 4th army would no doubt have
caused a general retirement by the Japanese, but further
operations would have been necessary to consummate the
success, and the principal fighting would have taken place

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 65
in a hilly region, where the rapid success essential to final
victory, or even to escape envelopment by the Japanese
wings,, was unlikely to be attained.
The 2nd army however not only directly covered the
main lines of supply of the Japanese forces to Ying-kou and
Dalny, but also the siege of Port Arthur. It was standing in
a flat district more suitable to the Eussian tactics and arma
ment than was the mountainous area south-east and east of
Liao Yang, and the railway could be used to facilitate
Eussian concentration in this direction. If then this army
could have been routed, the Japanese forces would probably
never have recovered from the blow, even if they did not
absolutely perish from the consequences.
It; seems then that an offensive against the army of Oku
offered the greatest advantages.
In the event of failure there was certainly the risk of
envelopment by the 1st Japanese army, but the 3rd Siberian
and the 10th corps should, with the help of the detach
ment lying north of the Tai-tzu near Pen-hsi-hu, have been
amply sufficient to guard against this contingency, pending
the result of the operations against the troops of Oku and
Nodzu. In any case a general should have regard to the advan
tages rather than to the dangers of a venture, and to what
may be gained rather than to what is at hazard.
Viewing the question from this standpoint, it must be
concluded that of all the alternatives before Kuropatkin,
most was to be gained by success against the Japanese left,
and that he might therefore have taken the risks incidental
to this operation and concentrated every available man
against the army of Oku, reducing the detachments required
to contain the remaiuder of the enemy's forces to the lowest
possible limits. Kuropatkin however continued to wait
on the movements of his opponent.
The news of the failure of the assault on Port Arthur
placed Oyama in a difficult position. All prospect of
fighting a decisive battle with the advantage of numbers

66 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF
in his favour had vanished, and though his units had
received large drafts and were up to or over their establish
ments, he found himself, with his forces still unconcen-
trated, opposed by an enemy believed at the moment to
possess preponderance of numbers to the extent of some
20,000 bayonets and sabres, and likely in the near future to
receive considerable reinforcements.
Of the three alternatives open to the Japanese, retire
ment would in a moral and political sense have been
disastrous, the soldiers would have been discouraged, ground
gained at great cost of life would have been abandoned, and
external loans on which the continuance of the struggle
largely depended would have ceased.
To have remained inactive, especially after a reverse,
would have disheartened the troops, and would have left
the initiative to the enemy, who could have attacked at his
leisure, and when in overwhelming strength and in the full
flush of confidence.
Even with troops who have experienced an unbroken
series of successes a direct attack on intrenched positions
held by an enemy superior in numbers is a hazardous
venture. In war a commander is however usually con
fronted by choice of evils, and in such circumstances the
safest plan is to adopt the course most likely to lead to
decisive results, unless exceptionally cogent reasons can be
urged in favour of less conclusive action.
In this case the Japanese plans had been seriously com
promised by what is thought to have been initial disregard
of the principle of concentration of effort. There was how
ever only one practicable way out of the difficulty, and that
was to continue to press the Eussians in the hope that
superior fighting power and bolder generalship would be
crowned by victory.
This alternative was chosen by Oyama. As before, the
1st army was first committed to action, with the object,
it is said, of causing the Eussians to evacuate the An-
shan-chan position. The Japanese, who as has been shown

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 67
were already committed to a converging attack, as a result
lost all power of manoeuvre, except with such troops as
could, at considerable risk, be withdrawn from the battle
frontage. In the event they were however victorious, principally
because Oyama established and maintained moral superiority
over Kuropatkin, who was forced to conform to the move
ments of the Japanese, abandoning his own plans. (Map 8.)
His plan appears to have been to hold the positions at
An-shan-chan, and south and east of An-ping, sufficiently
long to oblige the enemy to show his hand and force.
Having accomplished this, the army was to retire on the
forts and intrenchments that had been made round Liao
Yang, then, pivoting on this bridgehead, it was to manoeuvre
on both banks of the Tai-tzu. If the enemy divided his
forces and placed them astride the river, the Russians would
fall in superior numbers on one or other fraction.
The plan though cautious might if successfully executed
have given the Russians a great victory. On the other
hand success could be attained only after somewhat com
plicated manoeuvres, and it is an axiom that to retain,
during an action, the control of troops sufficient for an
effective counter-attack is as difficult as to judge correctly
the moment most opportune for the offensive. Moreover
the troops holding the advanced positions were liable to
defeat in detail, and if not beaten must at any rate have
been subjected to the demoralising infiuence of another
retirement.

V

September. TITHETHER the operations subsequent to the battle
»* of Liao Yang do not more properly belong to the
domain of tactics is doubtful, but the very magnitude of
the frontages was such that the movements of the armies
may perhaps still be treated under the heading of strategy.
After their defeat at Liao Yang the Russians, having
destroyed or seriously damaged the bridges over the Tai-
tzu, retired northwards with stolid deliberation, unpursued
by the Japanese, the main body reaching the neighbourhood
of Mukden on fith September.
Kuropatkin's first impulse seems to have been to evacuate
Mukden, and retreat to Tieh-ling, a town about forty miles
north of the Manchu capital, where on an offshoot from the
Manchurian mountains is a position suitable for defensive
tactics. But circumstances soon caused the Russian commander
to change his mind. In the first place the Japanese
pursuit ceased. Then political pressure to discontinue
the retirement appears to have been brought to bear on
him from Russia, through the Viceroy Alexiev. Again
the Russians were much dependent for meat supply on
Hsin-min-tun, and were naturally unwilling to abandon to
the enemy Mukden, a town lying in a rich grain-growing
district, and of considerable political importance.
It was therefore decided to halt at Mukden, and the army
was quartered in this neighbourhood, as follows : —
Of the cavalry, Grekov's Orenburg Cossack division kept
touch with the Japanese along the Sha and Shi-li rivers ;
Mischenko, with the Trans-Baikal and Ural Cossack
68

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 69
brigades, stood eastwards, as far as the Fu-shun to Pen-
hsi-hu road; and the cavalry division imder Samsonov
watched the country east of Fu-shun. Besides these, there
were the customary detachments wide to both flanks.
The 10th and 17th corps, with the 2nd and 4th Siberian
corps, remained south of the Hun river, and were
employed in constructing a semicircle of forts, round a
radius from Hun-ho-pu to Yan-su-chian-tzu, to act as
bridgeheads to the bridges carrying the railway and Im
perial or Mandarin road.
The 1st Siberian corps proceeded to Fu-ling, six miles
east of Mukden, the 3rd to Fu-shun, twenty miles further
east. The two then began to intrench the line of the Hun
from Mukden to Fu-shun, constructing works on both banks
of the river, and roads from Mukden to the localities occu
pied by the various corps. The 1st corps now arriving
from Europe, had its headquarters at Pu-ho, fifteen miles
north of Mukden. Of the 5th Siberian corps which had
been broken up during the battle of Liao Yang, the bulk
was sent under General Dembovski into the area between
Mukden and Hsin-min-tun, the remainder being attached
to the 3rd corps.
Soon after Liao Yang the Czar, believing that the defeat
of the Russians had perhaps in part been due to the fact
that the Eussian army was too large a command for one
individual, decided to form two armies in Manchuria, under
Admiral Alexiev as commander-in-chief, one to be com
manded by Kuropatkin, the other by General Grippenberg,
at that time commanding the Vilna army corps.
This appointment may have turned Kuropatkin's thoughts
to projects for retrieving his reputation, and the fact that a
squadron from the Baltic was about to sail for the Far East
rendered another effort to relieve pressure on Port Arthur,
or at least to prevent the despatch of reinforcements from
the field armies to the 3rd army, almost a necessity.
The Russian army had moreover received such accession
of numbers that the prospects of victory no longer appeared

70 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
unpromising; for besides the 1st corps there had arrived
from Europe Q.F. guns in substitution for those of older
pattern up to that time in use by the Siberian corps, and
the 6th Siberian corps was well on its way to the seat of war.
Lastly Kuropatkin, consequent perhaps on his experience
at Liao Yang, deemed that the position at Mukden, astride
a great river, in front of a large city, and with its left
thrown back by a bend of the river towards the Russian
line of communication, was unfavourable for battle.
Before attempting to attack the Japanese, Kuropatkin,
taught by his difficulties at Liao Yang, proceeded to delegate
his authority, and to decentralise command, by organizing
his forces into three groups or armies. Of these, the Eastern
detachment, lying east of Mukden, was composed of the
1st, 2nd, and 3rd Siberian corps, with General Samsonov's
Cossack division, all under General Stackelberg. The
Western detachment of the 10th, 17th corps, and portions
of the 5th Siberian corps under General Dembovski, with
General Grekov's Cossack division, was under General
Bilderling. A central force consisting of the 1st corps, the
4th Siberian corps, the 6th Siberian corps, when it came up,
and Mischenko's Cossack division, was under the commander-
in-chief. In addition, the usual strong mixed forces watched
both flanks, showing that the moral superiority rested with
Oyama, and that Kuropatkin was concerned rather with the
possible movements of the enemy than with his own, and
with the parrying rather than the delivery of blows. (Map 9.)
Attention was also given to mapping, for the Russians
knew little of the area round Mukden, but apparently not
much was accomplished, for Stackelberg's detachment is
said to have possessed but few maps when orders were
received for the advance against the Japanese.
Whilst the Russians were thus engaged, the Japanese,
exhausted by their efforts at Liao Yang, had halted, the 1st
array on the line Hei-yin-tai to Lo-ta-tai, the 2nd and 4th
armies south of the Tai-tzu, and west and east of Liao Yang.
About 14th September, Marshal Oyama seems to have

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 71
decided to undertake further offensive operations in a
month's time, by which date, no doubt, drafts to make good
the losses of Liao Yang would have arrived, as well as the
8th division.
Accordingly instructions were issued to this effect, and
each army was allotted the district in which to advance,
probably with the object of enabling the commanders to set
about the collection of topographical and other information.
The troops were at the same time warned that in future
frontal attacks, when unaccompanied by enveloping move
ments, were to be avoided as far as possible. This last
provision exactly coincided with tactical instructions pro
mulgated by the Eussians about the same time.
To the 1st army was assigned the Ta-lien-kou to Pu-tsao-
yai road, and the district eastwards as far as Pen-hsi-hu. The
4th army was to use the roads on either side of the railway,
and the 2nd army the roads westward as far as the right
bank of the Hun. The reserve, of Kobi brigades, was to
march west of the railway, and behind the right of the 2nd
army. It was not until 10th September, after the bridges over
the Tai-tzu at Liao Yang had been repaired, that the
2nd army began to cross the river and to intrench itself
on the line Shan-tai-tzu to Ta-pa-tai-tzu.
At about the same time the 4th army took up the line
Nan-tai to La-ni-pu.
The bulk of the 1st army now stood between La-ni-pu
and the Yentai coal mines. Umezawa's detachment was
however about fifteen miles to the east, at Pien-nu-lu-pu,
where it had been posted partly for the purpose of recon
noitring the district allotted to the 1st army, partly because
this village lies in an important valley centre, whence roads
lead to Pen-hsi-hu, and thence to Chiao-tao and the Ya-lu.
Both commanders were contemplating offensive opera
tions, and each therefore wanted information as to the
enemy's dispositions.
Though the cavalry covering the Eussian front made it

72 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
difficult for the Japanese patrols to penetrate the line of
the enemy's advanced posts, the Japanese General Head
quarters obtained from other sources fairly accurate in
formation of the Russian dispositions ; and after all cavalry
more often than not can only confirm, or show to be false,
news obtained from other sources. It was known that the
whole Eussian front and flanks were covered by cavalry;
that the 5th Siberian corps was reported west of Mukden,
the 10th and 17th corps round or close to the city, the
1st and 2nd Siberian corps east of Mukden; but the
3rd Siberian corps was not located. News was also re
ceived that works were being constructed north of the
Sha Ho, and east of Mukden, and that the 1st European
and 6th Siberian corps had reached the front.
War cannot be made without some hazard, and the
object of a commander should be so to plan his operations
that if successful the greatest advantages will be gained,
irrespective of the consequences of possible failure. Each
blow should therefore be so aimed and delivered that the
enemy will be forced directly to parry it, and to conform
to the movements of the attacker, abandoning his own
projects. This will be the case when the envelopment of
the adversary or the security of his line of communication
is in question.
The plan or its execution will however be at fault
should the situation develop in such a manner that the
enemy can by counter-attack throw the whole of the
attacking army on the defensive, or can force the attacker
to fall back for the purpose of securing his own line of
supply. It has been said " that rivers and mountains, like other
complications in the art of war, afford additional oppor
tunities to skill and talent, and additional embarrassments
to incapacity " ; and, indeed, the part played in these
operations by the great Hun river, and the mountains
north of Pen-hsi-hu, fully exemplify the truth of this
statement.

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 73
The Hun certainly complicated the problem presented
to Oyama, for he could not, without placing his army
astride so serious an obstacle, carry out a converging move
ment against the Eussians, nor could he, without consider
able risk of interruption of his own line of supply, attempt
to turn or envelop their right flank. On the other hand,
the Hun would present equal difficulties to Eussian attack
from this direction, and would therefore protect the
Japanese left. Equally the presence of the mountains,
where movement and operations are always slow, would
have been prejudicial to turning movements from or against
the Japanese right.
Had there been available means of rapidly transporting
his army west of the Hun, the Japanese commander-in-
chief might perhaps have been tempted to try and surprise
the enemy by moving the whole, or at any rate the greater
part of his forces over the Tai-tzu and Hun, near Hsiao-
pei-ho. Marching between the Hun and Liao rivers he
could then have attacked the Eussian right, thus turning
the fortifications south and east of Mukden and at the
same time using the Hun as a line of supply.
Under this plan some risk must have been run in
uncovering even temporarily the main line of supply
from Ying-kou and Dalny, and the army would have been
liable to defeat in detail during the passage of the river.
On the other hand, food and munitions could have been
brought by junk up the Liao and Hun, and a few field
works at Liao Yang should have sufficed to protect the
line of communication until Japanese pressure on the
Eussian communications had obliged the latter to abandon
any enterprises that might have been undertaken south of
Mukden. If unable to adopt so bold a course, Oyama, trusting to
the protection afforded to his left by the Hun, might have
repeated the tactics of Liao Yang, advancing directly on
Mukden with the 2nd army, and moving the 1st and 4th
armies in echelon behind the 2nd, through the hills

74 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF
towards Fu-shun. Here they could probably with ease
have forced the passage of the Hun, but supply in the
hilly country might have presented difficulties, and of
the topography of this district but little was known. The
advance through the mountains would moreover neces
sarily have been so slow and precarious as to have exposed
the 2nd army to defeat before the remainder could inter
vene ; and a Eussian success or even a serious attack against
the 2nd army would probably have constituted so grave a
menace to the security of the Japanese communications as
inevitably to have caused the abandonment of enveloping
operations by the right.
Or Oyama could have imitated the strategy of Lee in 1862,
and detached Kuroki to move round the Eussian left whilst
the rest attacked or remained fronting the Eussians. In
this case also defeat in detail was a contingency to be
reckoned with.
Again, a less ambitious, though probably not less hazard
ous alternative, could be adopted, and direct advance under
taken in the direction of Mukden and Fu-shun.
The situation of the two armies, now fronting each other,
in a plain enclosed by a great river system on the one hand,
and tracts of rugged mountains on the other, and both
standing astride their lines of communication, however
imposed either a bold turning movement, or an equally
dangerous, though to outward appearance less risky frontal
advance against the Eussians. The last course would
moreover be the least likely to lead to decisive results.
The alternatives presented to the Eussian commander-in-
chief much resembled those placed before Oyama.
About the middle of September, the information available
to Kuropatkin inclined him to believe that the Japanese
armies numbered 160,000-170,000 men, that is to say about
40,000 more than actually were present. It was thought
that two Japanese divisions, with Kobi behind them, were
between Nan-tai and Shan-tai-tzu, that four divisions with
some brigades of Kobi were immediately north of Liao

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 75
Yang, two divisions near the Yen-tai coal mines, and two
divisions and some Kobi between Pien-nu-lu-pu and Pen-
hsi-hu, It was known moreover that all the Japanese troops
were intrenched.
Several courses were open to the Eussian leader. He
could utilise the Hun as a line from which to manoeuvre,
constructing bridges, and building bridgeheads at, say,
Chan-tan, Hun-ho-pu south of Mukden, and at Fu-shun,
and keeping his army, with the exception of his cavalry,
north of the river. But this plan would be unenterprising,
and therefore a confession of weakness and inferiority.
Whilst fortifying Hun-ho-pu to secure his communica
tions, and covering his front with cavalry, who would be
especially active in the hilly country, he could march the
bulk of his army down the right bank of the Hun, and
cross the river south of Chan-tan and Hei-kou-tai. This
project would involve the passage of the Hun, a broad river,
in somewhat close proximity to the Japanese left, and
though the blow would fall near the Japstnese main line
of communications, to reach them would involve the passage
of the Tai-tzu in a locality where the river is not less than
300 yards wide.
Again the Eussian general could move his army south
wards, astride the Hun, attacking the Japanese in front
with one portion, and when their attention was fully
engaged, throwing the remainder across the river on to
their left flank. In this case there would be risk of
defeat in detail, for the enemy might envelop the troops
east of the Hun Ho, or might even make a counter-attack
towards Fu-shun. If the Japanese however advanced on
Fu-shun, their movements in the hills, especially if opposed,
would be slow, and the blow would be somewhat wide of
the mark.
Or the Eussians, advancing from Mukden and Fu-shun,
might try to envelop the Japanese right in the mountainous
region of Pen-hsi-hu, whilst closely engaging their front ;
having defeated the right little physical difficulty would

76 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
be experienced in crossing the Tai-tzu, and advancing
against the Japanese communications. In order that the
enveloping movement might come as a surprise to the
enemy, it should take place after his front had been
attacked. Objections to this project would be that the
mountainous districts were but imperfectly known; that
the Russian armament was not well suited to mountain
warfare, for only three or four mountain batteries were
available ; that supply would be difficult ; that movements
in mountainous country are always slow, but are particu
larly so when opposed; that the left must move further
and over more difficult ground than the right and centre,
and that the synchronising of the operations might therefore
pjove difficult; that the Japanese main line of communi
cation was many miles distant, and that therefore to sever
it would be difficult ; that there would be risk of defeat in
detail, for the enemy, whilst containing with a detachment
the Russian left which must advance through a moun
tainous district where decisive success could not rapidly be
attained, might attack in strength their centre and envelop
their right; and lastly, unless the Japanese conformed to
movements of the Russians the advantages of the situation
would lie with the Japanese, who by attack on the Russian
right could offer a more serious menace to the Russian com
munications, than would even Russian success at Pen-hsi-hu
to those of their own army. In such eventuality persistence
in this plan would demand uncommon firmness of character.
The Russians might also advance in three converging
masses with the object of enveloping the enemy, though,
having regard to the fighting power of the Japanese, a
numerical preponderance which the Russians did not
possess would be necessary to ensure victory. Or they
might move in double echelon from their centre, holding
back both wings so as to meet and counter the enveloping
tactics practised by the Japanese. Such policy would lead
to a desperate frontal battle, without much prospect of
decisive victory.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 77
Lastly, an attack might be delivered on the Japanese
right, with the object of drawing the Japanese reserves
in an easterly direction. This accomplished, the Russian
right and centre, which would have been withheld from
close action, might attack with success.
To this plan it may be objected that the main operation,
though directed against the troops covering the principal
Japanese line of supply, would be merely a frontal attack,
and therefore more likely to be costly than decisive. Since
moreover the Japanese right covered no vital point or
important line of communication, it was unlikely to be
reinforced at the expense of the centre. The Japanese
might also consider that an advance against the Russian
right would afford more effective relief to their own right
than the direct despatch of reinforcements to this flank,
more especially as the Russian communications lay behind
their right flank.
Though Kuropatkin was of opinion that his army was
still numerically too weak to undertake the offensive with
any considerable prospect of success, he decided that active
measures were preferable to awaiting attack in the un
favourable positions at Mukden.
The following tasks were therefore confided to the three
portions of his army. The force under Bilderling was to
make a demonstration against the main force of the
enemy, moving along the railway. The troops under
Stackelberg were at the same time to envelop and attack
the enemy's right. The central force was to march behind
and in the interval between the others, as a reserve, and if
the Japanese were found to be concentrating towards their
right the reserve was to co-operate with Bilderling in an
attack on the centre of the enemy's line.
In criticising the Russian dispositions (Appendix X,
and Map 9) it may be remarked that Kuropatkin would
perhaps have been better advised had he, instead of placing
his reserve behind the centre in position directly to rein
force a wing, either posted two corps along the Sha Ho to

78 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
the east of the railway, and three corps in the interval
between the railway and the Hun ; or if space for so many
men was not available to the west of the line, had he added
one corps to his left wing and placed two corps along the
Sha Ho to the east, and two corps with Dembovski's detach
ment to the west of the railway. The three groups could
then have come into action simultaneously, or successively,
as desired, whilst the corps west of the railway could have
outflanked the enemy's left. At the same time such of his
17,000 cavalry as were not required for local protection
might, since the Japanese cavalry was not numerically
formidable, have been formed into two masses of say 7000
and 10,000, the larger to operate against the Japanese
right, the smaller against their left wing.
The flank detachments might also have been very much
reduced in strength so as to enable effort to be concentrated
at the decisive point, the field of battle.
The dispositions of the Japanese army may be criticised
in the sense that they were perhaps better adapted for a
defensive battle for the possession of Liao Yang, than for
the offensive movement which Oyama is said to have con
templated, long marches to either flank being necessary
before the troops could reach positions from which to com
mence an enveloping movement,
Oyama seems to have received early intimation of the
enemy's projects. On 28th September, the actual date on
which Kuropatkin issued his general plan — with only a
reservation that the time for action was to be notified
later — the Japanese commander-in-chief informed his army
leaders that the Russians might at any moment move in
force against Pien-nu-lu-pu, and that arrangements must
therefore be made against this contingency.
October. Again, on 2nd October, a Russian army order was pub
lished and copied in the Press, announcing that the time
had come for the Russian army to take the offensive and
drive the enemy southwards.
This may have been regarded by the Japanese as a ruse,

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 79
for in spite of the warning they were in some degree sur
prised by Kuropatkin's adoption of the offensive.
As happened throughout the war, the Russian operations,
conceived in a half-hearted doubtful spirit, were executed
in so slow and hesitating a fashion that the Japanese, by a
vigorous offensive, were able to deprive the enemy of his
initial advantage, and Kuropatkin, finding his communica
tions menaced by some successes on the part of the Japanese
left and left centre, was content to abandon his projects and
to conform to those of the enemy.
After severe fighting the armies halted, exhausted and
facing one another, on the banks of the Sha river, where
they settled down, in close contact, to await — the Russians
the arrival of reinforcements, before again undertaking the
offensive, the Japanese the release of their 3rd army by Ihe
capture of Port Arthur, (Map 10.)
The Viceroy Alexiev was recalled soon after the Sha Ho
battle, leaving Kuropatkin free to direct operations, and to
continue the work of organizing the army.
For some months the Russians devoted themselves to November
reorganization, and to the absorption of reinforcements. T^ ^^\
o _ ' _ r December
Both sides also busily intrenched, and whilst bickering was
frequent, the fighting rarely assumed serious proportions,
notwithstanding that the troops were in places not fifty
yards apart.
The fall of Port Arthur on 1st January having practically January,
extinguished Russia's chances of obtaining command of the
sea, the Russian field army became the primary objective of
the Japanese. (Appendix XI and Map 11.)
The Russians having now completed the organization of
their army, and being in sufficient numbers to warrant
hope of successful attack before troops set free by the
fall of Port Arthur could reach the enemy, Kuropatkin
consulted his army commanders as to the desirability
of an immediate offensive. It was however decided
that no forward movement should take place until the
whole of the 16th corps was available — ^part had already

80 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF
reached the front, and the rest would arrive in a fort
night. Two great obstacles stood in the way of active measures —
the shortness of the days and the coldness of the time of year.
In spite of the rigorous climate Kuropatkin decided to
attack the Japanese, hoping perhaps that the Eussians,
inured to cold, would support the inevitable hardships
better than the enemy.
Before taking the offensive, the Eussian leader, either
with the object of discovering if any troops from Port
Arthur had reached the armies, or to alarm the enemy as
to his communications, and to delay, by destroying the
railway, the movement of Nogi's army, sent round the
Japanese left a force of about fifty squadrons, with half
a dozen batteries, and a few infantry. This detachment
was under Mischenko, who had orders to destroy the depots
at Ying-kou, and to blow up railway bridges in the area
between Ta-shih-chiao and Kai-ping,
The raid ended on 11th January, and was so far success
ful that the Eussians appear to have learnt that no troops
of the 3rd army had reached Liao Yang.
At this juncture the Eussian general staff credited the
Japanese armies lying north of Liao Yang with a total of
about 200,000 rifies, 7000 sabres, and 600 guns; the 3rd
army was believed to number about 70,000 rifles and 150
guns. (Appendix XI, Map 11.)
Kuropatkin, who could now dispose of some 300,000 rifles
and sabres and 1200 guns, therefore resolved on an offensive,
and in accordance with the unanimous opinion of his army
commanders decided to envelop the Japanese left. The
army of Grippenberg was to be employed for this purpose,
and if its operations were attended by any measure of
success the other armies were to attack the Japanese
positions. Should the Japanese reply by a counter-attack
on the Russian left the operations against the Japanese left
were to be prosecuted with greater energy.
Not content with indicating the broad outlines of his

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 81
plan, the Russian commander-in-chief, like other leaders
upon whom responsibility has weighed too heavily, plunged
into a maze of minutiae, and overwhelmed his army com
manders with orders and instructions as to details in regard
to the most elementary of their duties. He thus distracted
his own attention and those of his subordinates from con
templation of essentials", and one and all lost grasp of the
situation. There seems no doubt that having regard to the frontage
occupied by the two armies, the estimated numerical super
iority of the Russians, some 100,000 men, and the strength
of the Russian front line, behind which manoeuvre should
not have been difficult, Kuropatkin possessed the power to
deal a serious blow on either flank. This the Japanese
would find difficulty in parrying, unless troops were with
drawn from the first line, in which case there would be risk
of the front being broken.
The left flank of the Japanese was most inviting ; here
the country was not so difficult as were the eastward hills,
the distance to be traversed by the Russians would be less
than would be required to turn the enemy's right, and the
Japanese left was nearer their main line of communication.
If, then, the left were broken, the enemy's line of supply
would be in serious danger, whilst Russian troops could be
massed in this locality without prejudice to the direct pro
tection afforded to their own line of communication.
On the other hand, the Japanese reserves were thought
to be standing near Yen-tai station, and therefore well
placed to reinforce the left.
Kuropatkin's plan was however not such as would secure
victory from an enterprising opponent, for the Russian
commander was apparently unwilling to commit his left
and centre to close action until success had been gained
elsewhere, lest the enemy should deliver a counter-attack
and drive the Russians back over their works. Nor would
he weaken his line in order to free troops for an attack in
the greatest possible force against the enemy's left,
G

82 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
The moiil superiority in fact itill rested with Oyama,
and Kuropatkin seems to have been afraid to venturea
decisive blow. Even his preliminary measures were not
above criticism.
Forewarned is forearmed, and a primary condition of
success in war is therefore that the enemy shall be misled,
and that the blow when delivered shall come as a surprise.
The Russians however neglected this rule, for from
13th January onwards the Russian right began to show
unusual activity, a balloon usually raised at Sha-ho-pu
moving westwards, whilst on 17th and 18th cavalry occu
pied Ssu-fang-tai, west of Chan-tan,
It may of course be said that these manoeuvres might
have been a ruse to draw the enemy's attention westwards ;
and this fact constitutes one of the great disadvantages of the
defensive, in that the defender can rarely be certain whether
the enemy's movements are a stratagem, or the prelude to
an attack.
The Japanese however possessed other information of the
Russian intentions, for on the night of 24th January, six
Russian soldiers who surrendered to the Japanese in
different portions of the frontage held by the armies — and
such desertions were unfortunately frequent, especially
amongst the Jews in the Czar's service — all reported that
an attack would be made on 25th against the Japanese left.
In spite of this the Japanese were somewhat taken aback
when on 25th the enemy attacked in force the village of
Hei-kou-tai. The Russians were however driven back after
three days' hard fighting.
As at the Sha Ho, the Russians lost their initial advan
tage through the undue deliberation of their movements,
and no serious operations took place against the Japanese
front to prevent reinforcement of the threatened point.
The Japanese contented themselves with beating off the
attack, probably because they were unwilling to become
involved in a decisive battle before the arrival of the
3rd army.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 83
In the interval between the battle of Hei-kou-tai and February.
that of Mukden no stirring events occurred, but as a
result of Hei-kou-tai both sides increased their fortified
frontage, the Japanese continuing to hold Hei-kou-tai and
the neighbouring villages in force, whilst the Russians
threw up intrenchments west of Chan-tan.
In other respects the Russians do not seem to have
greatly altered their dispositions, though on account of
Japanese raids, and of reports as to the presence of a force
of Japanese in Mongolia, a brigade of the 41st division,
the Don Cossack division, and some 15,000 men of drafts
were detailed to reinforce the troops guarding the railway
line. At the same time rumours of the landing of a large
body of Japanese in Northern Korea induced Kuropatkin
further to disseminate his troops, six battalions and a
number of reservists being despatched to Vladivostock.
The arrival of the 3rd army, and the completion of
Kawamura's 5th army, caused considerable changes to
be made in the arrangement of the Japanese troops.
(Appendix XII, and Map 12,)
The annual thaw was now imminent, which would melt the
icebound rivers, and render the roads almost impracticable
for traffic, and the fields difficult even for the operations of
infantry. It was therefore to be presumed that in spite
of the cold one or both commanders would assume the
offensive, more especially since the Japanese, now that
the 3rd army had arrived, could not for some time at
any rate expect further reinforcements.
Immediately after the action at Hei-kou-tai Kuropatkin
had resolved again to take the offensive. Uncertainty as
to the direction in which the Japanese would deploy the
3rd army, and doubt whether it would not be best to await
the arrival of large reinforcements amounting to some
70,000 men now on their way from Europe, caused him
for a time to suspend active measures. On 21st February
the Russian commander-in-chief however reverted to lue
bolder policy.

84 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
The experience of the Sha Ho battle had taught the
Russians the local resisting power inherent in mountain
positions, and whilst railways had been run to various
portions of the Russian frontage, thus facilitating supply,
none had been laid far into the mountains south of Fu-
shun. The feeding of a large force in this locality would
therefore have demanded quantities of transport, which
could probably only be procured with difficulty. Moreover
to have turned the Japanese right would have required a
long detour, for Kawamura's army was some distance east
of Pen-hsi-hu ; and success, if attained, would probably
have been local rather than decisive, for the enemy's main
line of communication lay many miles from the 5th army.
Attack on the right was also apparently expected by the
enemy, or it was his intention to operate so as to envelop
the Russian left, for according to Kuropatkin's information
the bulk of the 3rd army had been sent to Kawamura.
Again the armament of the Russian army, possessing as
it did but few mountain guns, was not well suited to hill
warfare; and lastly if he moved a number of troops east
wards, Kuropatkin would weaken the force covering his
own communications, and render himself liable to success
ful counter-attack west of Mukden.
Conversely, the position of the Russian reserves, the
alignment of the auxiliary railways, the armament of
the Russians, their preponderance in cavalry, and the
level nature of the country, would facilitate operations
against the Japanese left. By adopting this plan, Kuro
patkin would be retaining the bulk of his army near
Mukden and his line of communication ; it might reason
ably be hoped that Kawamura's advance through the
mountains could be sufficiently retarded to enable decisive
success to be gained against the Japanese left; and above
all victory if gained would be decisive.
On the other hand the Japanese reserves were thought
to be near their left flank.
Adhering to the plan adopted before the action of Hei-

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 85
kou-tai, Kuropatkin decided to attack the Japanese left,
but without attempting envelopment, the intention being
apparently to crush the enemy's left by weight of numbers,
about four corps being used for this purpose, whilst of the
remainder the bulk were to await the result of the first
encounters before attacking the armies of Kuroki and
Nodzu, the reserve being employed according to circum
stances. This plan may be characterised as a half-measure, and it
would have been wiser to have withdrawn certainly one,
probably better still two corps, from the strongly fortified
frontage, and to have placed a mass of five or six corps,
including the reserve, west of the Hun, covered by 10,000
or 15,000 cavalry. The enemy's right and front might
then have been attacked, and when these had been closely
engaged, the stroke might have been launched agaiast their
left. On 24th February, the very day before the attack
should have commenced, the Russian commander-in-chief
found a fresh excuse for hesitation and again suspended
operations. He had, it appears, heard that the Japanese were aware
of his projects, that by withdrawing troops from their
centre they had massed 125,000 men and 340 guns on
their left, and behind these had large reserves at Hsiao-
pei-ho. Moreover a strong attack by the 5 th army on the
Russian left had been reported.
Instead of at once seizing the initiative so as to disturb
the enemy's plans, and either attacking the Japanese centre
in force, or withdrawing troops from his own front to
counter the expected blow, Kuropatkin despatched a staff
officer to confer on the situation with the commander of
the 2nd army, who in a subsequent conversation on the
telephone was given discretion by the commander-in-chief
whether to attack or to await developments.
Naturally General Kaulbaurs, on whom such responsi
bility should never have been thrust, chose the second

86 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
alternative, and again the Eussian army surrendered the
initiative. The Japanese had already adopted a formation calculated
both to meet envelopment by the enemy, or should he
remain on the defensive, to facilitate the envelopment
of his forces ; the 3rd army being placed behind the left,
the 5th behind the right flank. They had moreover
decided to assume the offensive on 20th February, their
plan apparently stopping short at nothing less than the
envelopment of the Eussians, the 5th army operating
against the enemy's left, the 3rd army against his right.
In order however to deceive the enemy as to their in
tentions, and to induce him to send his reserves eastwards,
thus facilitating the deployment of the 3rd army, Kawa
mura was to move first.
This stratagem succeeded, and to it the Japanese were
a good deal beholden for their victory.
Events nevertheless proved that the Japanese plan was
rather beyond the capacity of their forces. In these
circumstances, it would probably have been better to have
reduced the strength of Kawamura's army, and added
these troops, as well as the general reserve, which was re
tained behind the centre far into the battle, to the 3rd army.
This army would then have comprised about five divisions,
and its operations would probably have been decisive.
By withdrawing cavalry from the divisions of the 2nd
and 4th armies, where but little scope existed for mounted
action, a larger mass might also have been placed on the
left, with advantage to the Japanese operations.
The battle of Mukden closed the long series of active
operations in Manchuria on a great scale, and though for
many months the war on land dragged on with skirmishes
and minor affrays, both Eussians and Japanese more or
less tacitly agreed to await the final contest for superiority
at sea which ended in the destruction of the Eussian fleet
at the battle of Tsu-shima on 27th and 28th May, 1905.
On 8th June President Eoosevelt suggested to the Eussian

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 87
and Japanese Governments that a conference should be
called to consider the possibility of a satisfactory agree
ment. The proposal met with approval, the confer
ence assembled on 9th August, and on 5th September,
1905, the treaty of peace was signed, and subsequently
ratified.

VI

THE strategical lessons of the Eusso-Japanese war are
those which throughout history have clamoured for
recognition, but have seldom been thoroughly appreciated.
Often governments have courted disaster by living in the
present, by disregarding future possibilities, and by pur
suing, regardless of consequences, policies likely to end in
disaster. The Eussian government, hypnotised by the vastness of
her empire, and encouraged by the respect for her actions
displayed by certain European ministries, embarked thought
lessly on an ill-considered policy of expansion. This brought
her face to face with an apparently weak but determined
foe, whose very existence was threatened by Eussian preten
sions. Eussia's policy in this particular outstripped her strategy,
that is her forces were not so disposed as to secure her
interests should their pursuit lead to conflict with Japan,
As a result, the great northern power paid the usual
penalty for unpreparedness, bad organization, and unsound
distribution of force. She lost the initiative, was obliged to
conform to the operations of the enemy, and to push into
the front line, as they arrived in the theatre of war, a
heterogeneous collection of units who were without cohesion.
As always happens in such circumstances, councils were
divided, plans hastily arranged, and as hastily abandoned,
or when carried out were spoilt by hesitation. Generals
had confidence neither in themselves, in one another, nor in
their men, and the troops, sharing this feeling, mistrusted
their leaders.

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 89
Fighting as they were in the midst of a semi-hostile
population, and dependent for maintenance to a great
extent on their siagle line of railway to Europe, the
Eussians were also, from the first, forced to make large
detachments to guard their communications, as to the
security of which they were naturally sensitive. Similarly
a large garrison was locked up to secure Vladivostock
against enterprises rendered possible by the Japanese
acquisition of command of the local sea communications.
Eussia was therefore obliged to accept defeat from a
weaker nation, who through careful preparation and sound
organization — which go far to ensure success in war — and
with the help of judicious alliances, was able to beat a more
powerful rival.
Neither wealth, resources, numbers of population, nor
even armed force, are therefore decisive factors in war.
More important than these are foresighl;, preparation, and
organization. Eussia's policy of expansion was not national, it was
rather the policy of a few ambitious men. The support of
the nation, an important item in war, was therefore lacking,
and the soldiers went to the front unwillingly or even
under compulsion.
Consequently, though the Russians fought well, they
fought without enthusiasm, and their generals could not
rely on this factor. The Japanese people on the other hand
entered heart and soul into the contest, inspiring their
soldiers to noble deeds.
The influence of the almost unbroken series of defeats
and victories which fell to the lot of the combatants is
shown in their general attitude and moral during battle.
The Russian soldiers who became accustomed to the idea
of falling back when things began to go ill, were in the end
too ready to retire when the enemy's flre became severe.
The Japanese having discovered by experience that victories
are gained by men who will not admit that they are beaten,
won many a flght through sheer doggedness and obstinacy.

90 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
because the soldiers felt that if only they could hold on the
enemy would certainly give way.
The difficulty of remedying errors in initial deployment
is clearly shown by the course of the campaign. The Rus
sians never overcame the original drawback of their local
weakness; the Japanese laboured throughout under the
disadvantage inherent in the false strategy of pursuing a
double objective, when not in possession of great pre
ponderance of force.
The Japanese plan was faulty in that effort was not
concentrated against the most important objective, whilst
the projects were somewhat beyond the capacity of the
national resources.
The power of resistance possessed by the Russian troops
quartered in Manchuria was moreover perhaps esteemed too
lightly, whilst the capacity of the Trans-Siberian railway
was also undervalued.
Nor was war declared at the most favourable moment,
from a military and meteorological point of view.
Want of foresight too was displayed in not suffi
ciently discounting the influence of the climatic and
topographical conditions in Manchuria, which undoubtedly
delayed the Japanese operations to the advantage of the
Russians. Still, vigorous execution enabled the nation to achieve a
considerable success; the movements of the armies were
successfully co-ordinated in such a manner as to afford one
another support; and the menace of the 1st army to the
Russian line of communication produced the expected
effect. The whole course of the operations in fact again shows
that it is not so much ability to plan as resolution to carry
through, i.bi'. is required to make successful war; though,
naturally, a good plan well executed is the ideal to be
attained. Command of the sea also proved a valuable asset to
Japan, in forcing Russia to guard strongly the fortress of

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 91
Vladivostock, and in causing her generals to disseminate the
troops in Manchuria.
The value and importance of the initiative is another
lesson of the war.
He who is obliged to follow the enemy's lead ceases to be
a free agent, a fact which adversely affects his judgment,
rendering him weak and vacillating.
The initiative does not belong in perpetuity to the
assailant, to him who first attacks, for the defender by an
early counter-stroke may reverse the positions.
Circumstances will not always permit a belligerent to
attack first, but it is to be remembered that the longer the
initiative is left to the opponent, the greater become his
chances of success.
The strong and weak points of enveloping strategy stand
out clearly. There is no magic calculated to ensure success
in enveloping strategy, that is in converging movements on
several lines of operation. Far from it this form of war is
the most hazardous, and the general who adopts exterior
lines, deliberately or of necessity separates his forces,
affording the opponent the desired opportunity of beating
them in detail.
Converging movements favour envelopment, and envelop
ment if successful is decisive, a fact which tempts com
manders to run great risks for its attainment.
War would be fairly easy were the game played even
blindfold on a chessboard; with no factors of weather or
topography to disturb calculations ; with men of wood not
delicate human beings with which to make moves; and
with accurate knowledge of the enemy's dispositions.
It is the presence of these disturbing elements that
makes war so difficult an art ; for even in countries with
settled climates the influence of weather on the health
of the men or on the mobility of the army, may at any
moment prejudice the best-laid plans.
A more variable factor even than weather is human
nature, and if a wide margin must be allowed for the

92 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF
effect of climate, a wider is required to discount human
eccentricities. If ignorance of the enemy's position and movements be
added to the plot, it is clear that no plan of operations
not simple and elastic has great chance of success.
Kuropatkin's wavering attitude may have and probably
did influence that of his subordinate generals, but it cannot
be said that they executed his plans with the spirit he had
the right to expect. Yet generous co-operation is one of
the foundations of success in war.
It is not, at present, easy to say how much or how little
either commander was influenced by political pressure, and
to what extent the course to be pursued was dictated from
localities far from the seat of war.
The general policy to be followed in war rests with the
National Government, but interference in the details of the
conduct of a campaign cannot but lead to disaster, as history
has shown time and again.
Though formalism spells ruin, men unless carefully
schooled against this fault, often vainly seek to solve by
rule the difficulties and dilemmas of war. This tendency
to act according to rule rather than principle was ob
servable on both sides, with results that were often un
fortunate. Training for war is an important part of peace prepara
tion, but is perhaps the most difficult portion of what may
be called peace strategy. This is due to the innate con
servatism of human nature which prompts officers and men
to dislike the trouble of changing methods in which they
have been trained, and which may in the past have stood
the test of war ; to the fact that it is not possible in peace
to pronounce definitely on the infiuence that will be exercised
by improvements in armament ; and to the unwillingness of
governments and nations to pay the heavy premiums
required to ensure efficiency.
The Russians certainly, the Japanese in some degree,
were consequently found behind modern requirements in

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 93
their training, and both paid for their fault by useless
sacrifice of life.
A lesson of this war is that if a sound plan vigorously
executed is the foundation, good information is the keystone
of military success. An efficient service of intelligence
cannot be improvised, it must be manned by those whose
minds have been trained in these matters. Of this the
Japanese were aware, and though in some respects their
topographical information was faulty, their intelligence
service in Europe, combined with a local system of spies,
who were assisted by the friendly Chinese population,
appears usually to have afforded early and accurate news
of the enemy's dispositions and intentions.
The Russian intelligence department is said to have been
ill organized ; and it is even stated that few if any officers
at Russian headquarters were able to read the Japanese
writing, and that documents which fell into their hands
could not therefore be deciphered.
In contrast too to the silence of the Japanese press, the
Russian newspapers published details of the mobilisation
of troops, and the despatch of reinforcements, which laid
bare to the enemy the strength of the opposing army.
Lastly, the great difficulty of war is demonstrated by the
failure of the Russian leader in this campaign,
Kuropatkin was an able officer as judged by ordinary
standards. To those who knew him he appeared a clever
man, well versed in the theory of the art of war. He was
reckoned resolute, he possessed much of that war experience
which is rated so high, and had distinguished himself on
service. He seemed therefore to possess the qualifications required
in a general. Yet he failed. The weight of responsibility
was too great for him, and in reality he lacked the character
to carry through his plans, and to dominate the wills of his
subordinates and of his opponent.
Character may be an inborn quality, as is strength of
arm, or swiftness of foot, but character can be formed and

94 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
developed, and " to teach taste is inevitably to form charac
ter." The soldier then who strives unceasingly to improve
his knowledge and judgment, who faces difficulties boldly,
and whose actions are guided by the principle that
"nothing has been done whilst anything remains undone,
and that to fail is better than not to attempt," will have
made a great stride towards the formation of a character fit
to take command, should fortune so shape the career.

APPENDIX I
RUSSIAN ORGANIZATION
A Normal Army Corps consisted of —
Two infantry divisions, one cavalry division, corps engineers,
and administrative services.
An Infantry Division included —
Two brigades, each of two, four-battalion regiments, each
battalion including at most from 800-900 rifles; one
artillery brigade of six or eight batteries, each of eight
guns ; and an engineer company.
A cavalry division comprised two brigades, each of two, six-
squadron regiments, with two, six-gun horse batteries. Total :
3000-3500 sabres or lances, and 12 guns.
Total strength of an army corps was at highest about 28,000
rifles, 3400 sabres, 124 guns.
Of the corps that took part La the war, the following, which
belonged to the active European army, were approximately of the
above strength : 1st, 4th, 10th, 16th, 17th.
The 5th and 6th Siberian Corps were composed of European
reserve units, and at best numbered 28,000 rifles and 96 guns.
The 4th Siberian Corps was made up of Siberian reserve units,
and possessed at most 28,000 rifles and 64 guns.
The 2nd Siberian Corps included East Siberian troops and
reserve units, strength at highest 27,000 rifles and 80 guns.
The 1st and 3rd Siberian Corps were formed in Eastern Siberia
before the war, and numbered about 22,000 rifles and 64 guns.
None of the Siberian corps had special corps cavalry, but
Cossack divisions, and smaller units, were attached to them as
required. Armament. — That of the artillery was of a heterogeneous nature.
About one-third of the field batteries possessed a modern 3 in. Q.F,
gun, with shield, firing a practically smokeless powder, and throwing
a shrapnel up to 6000 yards with time fuse, and 7000 yards with
96

96 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
percussion fuse. The remainder of the field guns were principally
muzzle-loading weapons, of 3 '42 calibre. There were a few
mountain guns, and a proportion of heavy artillery and howitzers.
The cavalry carried sword, a rifle similar to that of the infantry,
sometimes a bayonet, and the front rank had also usually a lance.
Of rifle ammunition, 45 rounds were on the man, and 24 rounds
in the regimental transport.
The infantry weapon was a "299 charger-loading rifle, each
charger holding five cartridges. The rifle was sighted to 3000
yards, and weighed nine pounds. Each man nominally carried 120
rounds in his pouches, bandolier, and kit bag, and there were 66
rounds per rifle in the regimental carts. Actually 200-300 rounds
were taken by the men into action.
Equipment and Rations. — ^Each infantryman had usually on
his person biscuit and salt for two and a half days, and carried a
great coat and a portion of a shelter tent, and eighty men per
company were equipped with spades. The total weight carried
by the infantry soldier, including clothing, was 70 pounds.
Of reserve rations, there were in Vladivostock and district at
the beginning of the war, three months' supplies; in the Port
Arthur command, twelve months' food ; and eight months' in the
Siberian military district.
Enqinbkes. — Pontoon units had from 300-400 yards of bridg
ing material, and many engineer companies possessed a hght field
park. The European companies had forty miles of cable and wire, and
there were four East Siberian telegraph companies, each with six
teen mUes of wire. There were also, in the army, three telegraph
companies with Marconi wireless equipment, for maintenance of
communication between the commander-in-chief and army com
manders. Machine Guns. — Several divisions had four-gun machine-gun
companies. Mounted Scouts. — Most divisions possessed companies of
mounted scouts.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 97
APPENDIX II
JAPANESE ORGANIZATION
The army was organized on a territorial system. There were
thirteen districts, each furnishing one division, and one Kobi
brigade. Four new divisions, and Kobi brigades, were raised in 1904.
A division included two brigades, each of two, three-battalion
regunents, the battalion numbering some 950 rifles; one cavalry
regiment ; six, six-gun batteries ; one battalion of engineers, with a
bridging train ; one telegraph company ; five ammunition columns ;
four supply columns ; six field hospitals.
Total estabHshment : 11,400 rifles, 600 sabres, 36 guns, 750
engineers, 5500 others.
The 5th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th divisions had mountain
guns only ; the 7th division had only four batteries, two being of
field and two of mountain guns ; the remainder possessed field
guns. A Kobi brigade consisted of two, two-battalion regiments, and
numbered 3500 rifles.
A mixed Kobi brigade was composed of one infantry brigade of
two, two-battalion regiments ; three batteries ; and one company
of engineers. Total : 5000 rifles, ? sabres, 18 guns, 280 engineers.
An artillery brigade consisted of three regiments, each of six,
six-gun batteries.
A cavalry brigade comprised two regiments, of four squadrons
each. Armament. — The field and mountain guns were of the same
calibre — 2-95 inches. Both fired a practically smokeless powder,
and the field gun ranged to about 5000 yards. After the Sha Ho
battle, the field guns were provided with shields.
There were batteries of 4-72 howitzers, and heavy guns of
various kinds.
The artillery carried both shrapnel, and high explosive shell.
The cavalry were armed with a sword, and with a carbine
sighted to 1500 yards. 90 roimds of ammunition were carried
by each man.
H

98 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
The infantry possessed a rifle of -256 calibre, sighted to 2200
yards, weighing about eight and a half pounds, and loaded by
means of a charger carrying five cartridges.
Of ammunition, 200 rounds were supposed to be on the man,
and 60 rounds on the ammunition mules.
Rations, etc — Each man had, on his person, two days' rations ;
and two-thirds of the men carried an intrenching tool strapped to
the knapsack. The total weight of arms and equipment was about
57 pounds, or 65 pounds including clothes.
Engineers. — The bridging sections possessed 153 yards of
bridge, and a telegraph section had 35 miles of air line and
cable. Machine Guns. — In 1904-5 each division was given fourteen
Hotchkiss guns. These were organized into two six-gun batteries,
and one two-gun section.

APPENDIX III
TABLES SHOWING THE APPROXIMATE
DISPOSITIONS AND NUMBERS OF THE ARMIES
COMBATANT TROOPS, LESS ARTILLERYMEN
Japanese

BEGINNING OF FEBRUARY, 1904,
Guard, Guard Kobi brigade
1st division, 1st Kobi brigade .
2nd division, 2nd Kobi brigade .
3rd division, 3rd Kobi brigade .
4th division, 4th Kobi brigade .
5th division, 5th Kobi brigade .
6th division, 6th Kobi brigade .
7th division, 7th Kobi brigade .
8th division, 8th Kobi brigade .

Tokio.Tokio. Sendai.Nagoya. Osaka.
Ujina. Kumatoto.
Hokkaido.Hirosaki.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 99
Japanese (continued)
9th division, 9th Kobi brigade . , Kanazawa,
10th division, 10th Kobi brigade . Hijemi,
11th division, 11th Kobi brigade , Marugame,
12th division, 12th Kobi brigade . Kokura.
Two cavalry brigades.
Two artillery brigades.
Depot troops.
Grand total : 245,000 rifles, 12,500 sabres, 804 guns, 12,750
engineers, Russians
Vladivosfoek (Ussuri) district
BEGINNING OF FEBRUARY, 1904,
1st, 2nd, 5th, 6th, 8th East Siberian rifle brigades,
2nd brigade of the 31st division,
2nd brigade of the 35th division.
Two regiments of cavaby.
One engineer battalion.

Fourteen batteries

Fortress troops.

Railway troops.
Rifles.
Sabres.
Guns.
Field troops
. 36,000
1,500
112
Fortress troops .
. 4,500
—
—
Railway troops .
. 3,500
—
—
Total .
. 44,000
1,500
112
Ktian-tung peninsula
3rd, 4th, and 7th East Siberian rifle brigades (less two regiments).
5th East Siberian rifle regiment.
One Cossack regiment.
2\ engineer battalions.
Five batteries.
Fortress troops.
Rifles.
Sabres.
Guns.
Field troops
. 17,000
700
40
Fortress troops .
. 2,500
—
—
Total .
. 19,500
700
40
100 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
Russians (continued)
Southern Manchuria
9th East Siberian rifle brigade.
Three infantry regiments.
Seventeen squadrons.
Two batteries.
Railway troops.

Field troops
Railway troops .
Total

Rifles.
. 14,000 7,500
. 21,500

Sabres, 2,000 2,000

Guns. 12 12

In the Trans-Baikal district
Rifles. Guns.
3,000 32

Grand total.
Field troops
Fortress troops .
Railway troops . ;
Frontier guards .
Total .

Rifles.
. 70,000 7,000
. 11,000
. 13,500
. 101,600

Sabres. 4,200 8,000
12,200

Field Guns.
196
48
244

APPENDIX IV
Japanese
South of Wi-ju, and Oh'yang-syong
END OF APRIL.
1st army, General Baron Kuroki.

Guard division.

2nd division.
12th division.
Rifles.
Sabres.
Guns.
Engineers.
Total .
. 33,500
1,000
126
800
THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 101
Japanese (continued)
Chiriram-p'ho
Under General Oku, in transports.
1st division.
3rd division.
4th division.
Half an artillery brigade.

Rifles. Sabres. Guns.

Engineers.

Total . . 33,500 1,000 162

800

Grand total , 67,000 2,000 288

1,600

Russians,

Towards Shan-hai-kuan

END OF APRIL,

Rifles. Sabres.

General Kossagovski. 1,400 250
Neighhourhood of Liao-Yang, Mukden,
etc.
5th East Siberian rifle division.
1st Siberian infantry division.
One brigade 10th corps.
One brigade 17th corps.
Detached units.
Trans-Baikal Cossack division.
Twelve squadrons Cossacks.
Six companies engineers.
Rifles, Sabres. Guns,
Total , . 31,500 4,300 124
Near Ta-shih-chiao and Ying-kou
Isfc and 9th East Siberian rifle divisions.
Six squadrons dragoons.
One battalion engineers, Te-li-ssu, und Pu-lan-tien
One brigade, five squadrons, and one horse battery.
Rifles, Sabres. Guns.
Total . . 17,000 700 70
102 LECTURES ON THE STEATEGY OF
Russians (continued)
Near An-tung, some cavalry toitiards Ta-ku-shan
Lieutenant-General Zasulitch.
3rd and 6th East Siberian divisions,
Mischenko's Cossacks. Rifles, Sabres. Guns.
Total . , 16,600 3,000 78
East of Kuanrtien-cheng
Colonel Madridov.
Two squadrons and two companies of mounted scouts.

Po/rt Arthur, and neighbourhood

4th East Siberian rifle division,
7th East Siberian rifle division.
Two companies engineers.
Three battalions fortress troops.
One squadron. Rifles, Sabres.
Total, 27,000 120

Fortress
Field Guns, Guns. Engineers.
66 518 450

'Vladivostock and district

2nd East Siberian rifle division,
8th East Siberian rifle division,
Ussuri cavalry brigade.
Fortress troops. Rifles.
Total . . 14,500

Sabres. 1,000

Field Guns.
12

Rifles.
Field troops . 66,400
In fortresses . 41,500
Railway and
Frontier troops 24,500
Grand total

Field Fortress Guns
Sabres. Guns, at Port Arthur.
8,500 272 —
1,120 78 —
8,000 48 —

132,400 17,620

398

518

THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE

103

APPENDIX V
Japanese
Feng-huang-cheng, and Ai-yang-cheng
28th may
1st army. General Baron Kuroki.
Guard division.
2nd division.
12th division. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.
Total . . 30,000 1,000 128 2,000

Nan-shan, Pu-lan-tien, Ta-sha river, and Yen-tai
2nd army, General Baron Oku.
1st division.
3rd division.
4th division.
5th division.
11th division, disembarking at Yen-tai.
1st cavalry brigade.
An artillery brigade (less one regiment).
Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.
Total . . 56,000 3,200 234 4,000

Ta-ku-sh
Nucleus of the 4th army.
10th division. Rifles.
Total . . 11,000

tan Sabres. 400

Guns. 36

Engineers. 300

Grand total . 96,000

4,600

398

6,300

Russians
Towards Shan-hai-kuan

28th may.
General Kossogovski.

Rifles. 1,400

Sabres. 250

104 LECTUEES ON THE STRATEGY OF
Russians (continued)
Liao-Yang and MuMen
5th East Siberian rifle division.
2nd brigade 31st division, 10th corps.
2nd brigade 35tli division, 17th corps.
Portions of 2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions.
Various Cossack and artillery units. Rifles. Sabres. Guns,
Total , , . 37,000 4,000 118
Ying-kou, Kai-ping, Hai-cheng, and neighbourhood
Lieutenant-General Stackelberg.
1st East Siberian rifle division.
9th East Siberian rifle division.
Part of 2nd Siberian reserve division.
South of Wa-fang-tien

Major-General Samsonov's cavalry.

Rifles.

Sabres.

Guns.

Total . . . 27,500

2,800

100

Lien-shan-kuan, Erh-chia-pu-tzu, Ta-wan, Lang-tzu-shan.
Lieutenant-General Count Keller.
3rd East Siberian rifle division.
6 th East Siberian rifle division.
Part of 2nd Siberian reserve division.
One Cossack regiment and horse battery.
Rifles. Sabres. Guns.
21,000 600 76
Sai-ma-chi
Major-General Rennenkamf. Rifles. Sabres. Guns.
2,100 3,000 14
East of Sai-ma-chi
Lieutenant-Colonel Madridov. Rifles and Sabres.
700

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 105
Rdssians (contintied)
Hsivr-yen, Hsi-mu-eheng, and neighbourhood
Major-General Mischenko. Rifles. Sabres. Guns.
4,000 3,000 6
Port Arthur and Nan-shan
Lieutenant-General Stoessel. Field Fortress
Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Guns.
27,000 120 66 518

'Vladivostock
Lieutenant-General Linevitch. Rifles. Sabres. Field Guns.
22,000 3,600 64

Field troops
In fortresses
Railway and
frontier guards

Rifles. Sabres.
93,500 13,850
49,000 3,720
34,300 8,000

Field Fortress Guns
Guns, at Port Arthur.
300 —
130 —
48 —

Grand total 176,800 25,570 478

518

APPENDIX VI
Japanese
Feng-htumg-cheng and Ai-yang-cheng
15th JUNE
1st army. General Baron Kuroki.
Guard division (less Asada brigade).
2nd division.
12th division. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.
Total . . 25,000 1,000 116 2,500

106 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
Japanese (continued)
North of Ta-kurshan and at Hsiu-yen
Nucleus of 4th army. General Kawamura.
10th division.
Asada brigade of Guards.

Rifles.

Sabres.

Guns.

Engineers.

Total . . 16,500

400

48

800

Te-li

¦ssu

2nd army. General Baron Oku.

3rd division.
4th division.
5th division.
1st cavalry brigade.
Artillery brigade.
Rifles.
Sabres.
Guns.
Engineers.
30,000
2,000
216
2,400
6th division (landing).
Rifles.
Sabres.
Guns.
Engineers.
11,400
430
36
830
Advancing on
Port Arthur
3rd army, General Baron Nogi.
1st division.
11th division.
Rifles.
Sabres.
Guns.
Engineers.
Total . . 23,000
430
73
1,600
Grand total . 105,900
4,260
488
8,130
Russians
Liao-Yang, and Mukden
15th JUNE
2nd brigade, 31st division.
1st Siberian division.
5th East Siberian rifle division.
Cossack and artillery units. Rifles.
Total . . 26,000
Sabres.
2,500
Guns. 48
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

107

Russians (continued)
Ta-shih-chiao, Hai-cheng, Hsi-mu-cheng, and Ying-kou
Bulk of 4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve
divisions).
Cossack units. Rifles. Sabres. Guns.
Total . 17,000 3,500 40
Towards Shan-hai-kuan
General Kossogovski.
Total

Rifles.1,500

Sabres. 250

Guns. 8

-Feng-shui-ling ra^nge
Lieutenant-General Count Keller.
3rd East Siberian rifle division.
6th East Siberian rifle division.
One Cossack regiment.

Rifles.
Total . . 18,000

Sabres. 350

Guns. 68

Near Sai-ma-chi
Major-General Rennenkamf. Rifles.
Total . . 3,500

Sabres. 2,200

Guns. 22

Hsing-chi'ng
Lieutenant-Colonel Madridov. Rifles.
Total . . 700

Sabres. 1,000

Guns. 2

South Feng-shui-ling, and neighbourhood
Major-General Mischenko.
Part of the 4th Siberian corps.
Cossacks, and horse guns.

Rifles.

Sabres.

Guns.

Total ....

10,500

2,000

24

Te-li-.

ssu

Lieutenant-General Stackelberg.

1st East Siberian rifle division.
9th East Siberian rifle division.
2nd brigade 35th division.
Cossack units.
Rifles.
Sabres.
Guns.
Total .
27,000
2,200
90
108 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
Russians (continued)
Port Arthur
Lieutenant-General Stoessel.
Garrison, naval detachments, and town guard. Field Fortress
Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Guns.
Total . . 32,000 120 66 458

Vladivostock

Lieutenant-General Linevitch

..

Rifles.
Sabres.
Guns.
Total .
. 22,000
3,600
64
Field
Fortress
Rifles.
Sabres.
Guns.
Guns.
Field troops
. 104,200
14,000
302
—
In fortresses.
etc. 54,000
3,720
130
—
Railway, etc.,
guards
. 34,300
8,000
48
—
Grand total . 192,500 25,720
480
458
APPENDIX VII
Japanese
Mo-tien-ling, and Pa-li-ling
30th JUNE
1st army, General Baron Kuroki.
Guard division (less Asada brigade).
2nd division.
12th division. Rifles. Sabres,
Total. . 25,000 1,000
Guns. Engineers.
116 2,500
THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 109
Japanese (continued)
South Feng-shui-ling
Nucleus of 4th army, General Kawamura.
10th division,
Asada brigade of Guards,
10th Kobi brigade at Ta-ku-shan. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.
Total. . 21,000 600 48 1,000

Hsiung-yao-cheng

2nd army, General Baron Oku.

3rd division.

4th division.

5th division.
6th division.
1st cavalry brigade.
An artillery brigade.
Rifles. Sabres.
Guns. Engineers.
Total. . 41,000 2,400
252 3,200
Ken-shan
3rd army. General Baron Nogi.
1st division.
11th division.
1st Kobi brigade.
Naval brigade.
Rifles. Sabres.
Guns. Engineers.
Total , , 28,000 450
72 1,600
Grand total 115,000 4,450
488 8,300
Russians
Liao-Yang, and Mukden
30th JUNE
Various detachments.
Rifles, Sabres.
Guns.
8,000 1,500
14
Harbin, and Kirin
Garrisons,
Rifles. Sabres.
Guns.
3,000 400
8
110 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF
Russians (continued)
Towards Shan-hai-kuan
General Kossogovski. Rifles, Sabres, Guns.
1,500 250 8

Chiao-tao, and Pa-li-ling

Major-General Rennenkamf.

Rifles. Sabres.

Guns.

3,500 2,200

26

West of Mo-tien-ling
Lieutenant-General Count Keller,
Portions of the 3rd and 6th East Siberian rifle divisions
Cossacks, Rifles, Sabres, Guns,
Total , , 8,500 600 24
On route to join Keller, two regiments, etc.
Rifles. Guns.
4,500 24

Hsing-ching

Lieutenant-Colonel Madridov,

Rifles.
Sabres.
Guns.
700
1,000
2
lang-chi, and south (
3/ Hsi-mu-t
iheng
Major-General Mischenko.
One brigade of 4th Siberian corps.
2nd brigade 35th division.
Part of 31st division.
Cossacks and horse guns.
Bayonets,
Sabres.
Guns,
Total , , 16,000
1,800
72
Hsi-mvrche'ng
Lieutenant-General Zasulitch,
Portions of 5th East Siberian rifle division,
Cossacks, and horse guns. Rifles. Sabres. Guns,
Total . . 10,500 1,500 46
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 111
Russians (continued)
South of Kai-ping
Major-General Samsonov,

Sabres.

Guns.

3,000

12

Kai-ping, and Ying-kou

Lieutenant-General Stackelberg.

1st East Siberian rifle division.

9th East Siberian rifle division.

Detachments,
Cossacks and horse guns.
Rifles. Sabres,
Guns.
Total , , 29,000 750
50
Hai-cheng, and Ta-shih-chiao
Lieutenant-General Zarubaiev,
Portions of 4th Siberian and other corps.
Cossacks. Rifles. Sabres. Guns.
Total . . 20,000 800 40
Field
Fortress
Rifles.
Sabres.
Guns.
Guns.
Field troops . 105,200
13,800
326
458
In fortresses, etc. 54,000
4,120
130
Railway and frontier
guards . . 34,300
8,000
48
193,500 25,920 504 458
APPENDIX VIII
Japanese
Attacking the Russian positions at Yu-shu-ling, Pien-ling, and
Ta-wan
31st JULY
1st army. General Baron Kuroki.
Guard division.
2nd division.
12th division.
Umezawa brigade.
Rifles.
Sabres.
Guns.
Engineers,
Total .
36,000
1,000
114
2,000
112 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF

Japanese (continued)
South of Hsi-mu-cheng
4th army, General Count Nodzu.

5th division.

10th division.

10th Kobi brigade.
Detachment of 3rd division.
Rifles.
Sabres.
Guns.
Engineers.
Total . . 26,000
850
84
2,000
Ta-shih-chiao, and south of Hai-cheng
2nd army. General Baron Oku.
3rd division.
4th division,
5th division,
1st cavalry brigade.
Artillery brigade.
Total
Rifies.
33,000
Sabres. 2,400
Guns. Engineers.
216 2,400
Besieging Port Arthur
3rd army. General Baron Nogi.
1st division.
9th division.
11th division.
1st and 4 th Kobi brigades.
Naval brigade.
Siege train. Rifles.
Total . . 45,000
Sabres. Guns.
450 220
Engineers. 1,600
Grand total . 140,000
4,700 634
8,000
Russians
Near Kou-
31sT JULY Rifles. 1,500
¦pang-tzu Sabres. Guns.
250 8
Liao-Yang, Mukden, Kirin, Harbin
Garrison and drafts. Rifles. Sabres. Guns.
25,500 2,100 24
THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 113
Russians (continued)
An-ping, Yu-shu-li'ng, and Pien-ling
Lieutenant-General Sluchevski.
10th corps (9th and part of 31st division).
North of Yurshu-ling
General Luibavin's detachment.
Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade. Rifles. Sabres. Guns
Total . . 20,000 3,500 98

Ta-wan, in Lan ¦valley

Lieutenant-General Count Keller.

3rd East Siberian rifle division.

6th East Siberian rifle division.
Rifles. Sabrea.
Guns.
Total .
. 17,000 300
68
Pen-hsi-hu
Colonel Grulev.
Rifles. Sabres.
Guns.
3,500 500
6
East of Pen-hsi-hu
Lieutenant-Colonel Madridov's and other detachments.
Rifles. Sabres. Guns.
1,500 1,000 2
Hai-cheng
Lieutenant-General Stackelberg.
1st Siberian corps (1st and 9th East Siberian rifle divisions).
Lieutenant-General Zarubaiev.
4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions).
Siberian Cossack division. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.
Total . . 34,500 3,000 100 350
Hsi-murcheng
Lieut.-General Zasulitch.
5th East Siberian division.
2nd and 3rd Siberian infantry divisions.
31st division.
Mischenko's cavalry.
Rifles. Sabres.
Guns.
Total . 25,500 4,000
86
114 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
Russians (continued)

Field

Fortress

Rifles.
Sabres.
Guns.
Guns.
Field troops
129,000
14,650
392
458
In fortresses, etc. ,
, 54,000
4,000
130
—
On railways, etc. ,
, 34,300
8,000
48
—
217,300 26,650 570 458
APPENDIX IX
Japanese
Ea4 of the ridge dividing the lower portions of the Lan and
Tang rivers
25th AUGUST
1st army, General Baron Kuroki.
Guard division.
2nd division.
12 th division.
Umezawa brigade.
A Kobi regiment.
Rifles.
Sabres.
Guns. Engineers.
Total .
. 45,000
1,500
120 3,000
Shan-in-tzai, and towards Hai-cheng
4th army. General Count Nodzu,
5th division.
10th division.
10th Kobi brigade. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.
Total . . 33,000 1,000 72 1,700
Between Hai-cheng and An-shan-chan.
2nd army, General Baron Oku.
3rd division.
4th division.
6th division.
11th Kobi brigade.
Artfllery brigade.
1st cavalry brigade. Rifies. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.
Total . . . 47,000 2,500 278 2,800
Total field force . 125,000 5,000 470 7,500
THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 115
Japanese (continued)
Besieging Pm-t Arthur
3rd army. General Baron Nogi. Field Siege
Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Guns. Engineers.
40,000 450 180 220 3,000
Grand total 165,000 5,450 650 220 10,500
Russians
Towards Ta-wan, on Liao R.
25th AUGUST
General Kossogovski. Rifles. Sabres. Guns.
2,500 1000 4
Ohing-Jw-cTieng, Upper Tai-tzu, and Hsing-ching
Colonel Madridov. Rifles. Sabres. Guns.
1,500 120 2
Mukden, Kirin, Harbin
5th Siberian corps, and part of 1st corps.
Rifles. Sabres. Guns.
20,000 350 48
Tai-tzu R., Kung-shan-ling, An-ping, Lang-tzu-shan, etc.
General Bilderling.
10th European corps (9th and 31st divisions, General Sluchevski).
3rd Siberian corps (3rd and 6th East Siberian rifle divisions,
General Ivanov).
17th European corps (3rd and 35th divisions. General Bilderhng).
2nd cavalry brigade (General Luibavin).
Rifles. Sabres. Guns.
Total . . 60,000 5,200 260

116 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
Russians (continued)
An-shan-chan, and ¦neighbourhood
I Lieutenant-General Stackelberg.
1st Siberian corps (1st and 9th East Siberian rifle divisions)
Lieutenant-General Zasulitch.
5th East Siberian rifle division.
Lieutenant-General Zarubaiev.
^ / 4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions).
•^. \ Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade.
Ural Cossack brigade.
Siberian Cossack division.
General Grekov's cavalry.
Two mixed detachments maintained communication with
V Bilderling's force. Rifles. Sabres. Guns.
Total. . 50,000 8,000 160

Liao-Yang and neighbourhood

Rifles. Sabres. Guns.

Total .
. 15,000 350 80
Rifles. Sabres. Field Guns.
Fortress and
Naval Guns.
Field troops
. 149,000 15,020 554
586
Fortresses, etc.
. 47,500 4,000 130
—
Railway, etc.
. 34,300 8,000 48
—
230,800 27,020 732 586
APPENDIX X
Japanese
South of Yen-tai coal mines, Pien-mi-lu-pu, etc.
BEGINNING OF OCTOBER.
1st army, General Baron Kuroki.
Guards division.
2nd division.
12th division.
Umezawa's brigade.
29 th Kobi regiment
2nd cavalry brigade. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers
Total . . 40,000 2,500 120 2,000
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 117
Japanese (continued)
La-ni-pu to Nan-tai, but bulk still south of the Tai-tzu
4th army, General Count Nodzu.
5fch division.
10th division. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.
 Total . . 20,000 400 72 1,400
Nan-tai to Shan-tai-tzu, but some troops still south of the Tai-tzu
2nd army, General Baron Oku.
3rd division.
4th division.
6th division.
1st cavalry brigade.

Rifles.

Sabres.

Guns. ]

Engineers.

Total . . 30,000

2,500

114

2,000

General reserve. ^^"¦'^ ^<^o-

Yang

3rd Kobi brigade.

5th Kobi brigade.
10th Kobi brigade.
11th Kobi brigade.
One artillery brigade.
Other artillery units.
Rifles.
Sabres.
Guns.
Engineers.
Total . . 25,000
—
228
—
Total field force 115,000
5,400
534
5,400
Besieging Port Arthur
3rd army, General Baron Nogi
Field
Siege
Rifles. Sabres,
Guns.
Guns.
Engineers.
Total. . 45,000 450
180
220
3,500
Grand total. 160,000 5,850
714
220
8,900
Russians
Advancing on and between the Fu-shun to Wei-ning-ying, and
the Furling to Pien-nu-lu-pu roads
BEGINNING OF OCTOBER.
Eastern force.
Lieutenant-General Stackelberg.
1st Siberian corps (1st and 9th East Siberian rifle divisions).
2nd Siberian corps (5th East Siberian rifle division, and part
of 54th division).
3rd Siberian corps (3rd and 6th East Siberian rifle divisions).
General Samsonov's Sib Cossack division.
118 LECTURES ON THE STEATEGY OF
Russians (continued)
Moving on Hsiao-chia-ho-tzu
General Eennenkamf 's detachment (13 battalions, 16 squad
rons, 30 guns). Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.
Total . . 60,000 6,000 200 1,500

Guarding left flank as far as Sai-ma-chi and
Hsing-ching road
Colonel Madridov. Rifles. Sabres. Guns.
1,000 400 2

Guarding ri
General Kossogovski

ght flank as far as Liao river
Rifles. Sabres. Guns.
. 5,000 1,000 16

Advancing southwards astride the railway
Western force.
General Bilderling.
10th army corps (9th and 31st divisions).
17th army corps (3rd and 35th divisions).
General Grekov's Ural and Orenburg Cossack division.
West of the Hun Ho
General Dembovski's detachment (12 battalions, 16 squadrons,
32 guns, 2 battalions engineers).
Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.
Total . . 50,000 7,500 222 2,000
South of Mukden
General reserve.
4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions).
Isfc corps (22nd and 37fch divisions).
6th Siberian corps (55th and 72nd divisions).
In touch ivith enemy
Mischenko's Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade (11 squadrons,
8 guns). Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.
Total . . 55,000 2,000 304 1,500

Field

Fortress and

Rifles.
Sabres.
Guns.
Naval Guns.
Field troops .
171,000
16,900
744
546
Fortresses, etc.
45,000
4,000
130
—
Railways, etc. .
34,000
8,000
48
—
250,000 28,900 922 546
THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 119

APPENDIX XI
(See Map 11)
Japanese
From south of Hua-ling to Tang-kow
15th JANUARY, 1905.
1st army, General Baron Kuroki.
Guard division.
2nd division.
12th division.
Umezawa brigade.
Two Kobi brigades.
Artillery. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.
Total . . 48,000 1,200 180 3,000
Pu-tsao-yai to Putilov hill
4th army. General Count Nodzu.
10th division.
Two or three Kobi brigades.
Artillery. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.
Total . . 25,000 600 96 450
Ku-chia-tzu to west of Ta-tai
Cavalry to Hei-kou-tai
2nd army, General Baron Oku.
3rd division.
4th division.
6th division.
Isfc cavalry division.
Arfcillery. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.
Total . . 33,000 2,400 204 2,400

120 LECTUEES ON THE STEATEGY OF
Japanese (continued)
East of Pen-hsi-hu
2nd cavalry brigade. Sabres. Guns.
1,500 6
Near Yen-tai station, and at Lang-tung-kou
General reserve.
5th division.
8th division.
Four or five Kobi brigades. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.
Total . . . 40,000 800 108 850

Total field force . 146,000

6,500 594

6,700

At or moving from .

Poi-t Arthur

3rd army. General Baron Nogi.

1st division.

7th division.
9th division.
11th division.
1st and 4th Kobi brigades.
Naval brigade.
Siege train. Rifles. Sabres.
Field Siege
Guns. Guns.
Engineers.
Total . . 48,000 450
216 235
4,000
Grand total . 194,000 6,950
810 235
10,700
Russians.
South-east of Mukden
15th JANUARY, 1905.
1st army, General Linevitch.
1st corps (22nd and 37th divisions).
2nd Siberian corps (5fch Easfc Siberian division, and 1st Siberian
division).
3rd Siberian corps (3rd East Siberian division, and part of 78th
division),
4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions).
THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE 121
Russians (continued)
Thirty miles east of Pen-hsi-hu
General Alexiev's detachment.
Portions of 6th East Siberian, and of 71st divisions.
Part of Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade.
Rifles. Sabres, Guns, Engineers.
Total . , 95,000 6,000 320 2,500
Hsi^ng-ching
Colonel Madridov's force. Rifles. Sabres. Guns.
 700 600 4 
Connecting Alexiev, arid Madridov
General Maslov's detachment. Rifles. Sabres. Guns.
3,000 200 2
West of Putilov hill, to Chirtai-tzu
3rd Army, General Kaulbaurs.
6th Siberian corps (55th division and Orenburg Cossacks).
17th corps (3rd and 35th divisions).
5th Siberian corps (54th and 61sfc divisions).
Rifles. Sabres, Guns, Engineers,
Total , , 65,000 2,000 400 2,000
Sanrchia-tzu, to Chan-tan
2nd army, General Grippenberg.
1st Siberian corps (1st and 9th East Siberian divisions).
8th corps (14th and 15th divisions).
10th corps (9fch and 31st divisions).
Rifle corps (three rifle brigades).
Mischenko's Cossacks.
Western detachment, between the Hun and Liao rivers, 8
battaUons, 21 squads, 20 guns.
Rifles, Sabres. Guns, Engineers.
Total , . 95,000 9,000 374 2,000
Hun-ho-pu, and Tao-shan-tun
General reserve.
Portions of 16th corps, and of 6th Siberian corps.
Heavy and other artillery. Rifles. Sabres. Guns.
Total . . 15,000 200 106

122 LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF
Russians (continued) Field
Rifles, Sabres. Guns.
Field troops . 273,700 18,000 1,206
Fortresses, etc. . 15,000 3,000 80
Railways, etc. . 25,000 8,000 48
313,700 29,000 1,334
APPENDIX XII

Japanese

(Map 12)

Between Wei-tzu-yu, and Pao-tzu-yen

20th FEBRUARY, 1905

5th army, General Kawamura.
11th division.
Three or four Kobi brigades.
Rifles. Sabres. Guns.
Engineers.
Total , , 25,000 600 72
2,000
From Hua-ling, to south of Feng-chia-pu
Isfc army, General Baron Kuroki.
Guard division.
2nd division.
12fch division.
Umezawa brigade.
5th Kobi brigade.
Artillery, etc. Eifleg_ Sabres. Guns. Engineers.
Total , , 43,000 1,200 180 3,000
South of Feng-chia-pu, to Ldng-sJien-pu
4th army, General Count Nodzu.
6th division.
10th division.
Two or three Kobi brigades.
Artillery. Rifles. Sabres.
Guns.
Engineers.
Total . . 35,000 850
142
1,700
Ling-shen-pu, to Hei-kou-tai
2nd army. General Baron Oku.
4th division.
5th division.
8th division.
Two Kobi brigades.
Artillery. Rifles. Sabres.
Guna.
Engineers.
Total . . 42,000 1,000
204
3,000
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 123
Japanese (continued)
Yang-chia-wan, Huang-ni-wa, and Hsiao-pei-ho
3rd army, General Baron Nogi.
1st division.
7th division.
9th division.
Artillery. gjggg^ Sabres. Guns, Engineers.
Total . . 35,000 1,200 270 1,400
San-chia-pao, to Shan-ko-yu-shu
1st cavalry brigade.
2nd cavalry brigade.

Total , . , .

Sabres. Guns,
3,000 12

Shi-li-ho, and Yen-tai station
General reserve.

3rd division.

Three or four Kobi brigades. Rifles.
Total . . 25,000
Sabres, Guns,
350 42
Engineers. 400
Grand total . 205,000
8,200 922
11,500
Russians
South-east of Mukden
20th FEBRUARY, 1905.
1st army, General Linevitch.
1st army corps (22nd and 37th divisions).
2nd Siberian corps (5th East Siberian division and 1st Siberian
division).
3rd Siberian corps (3rd East Siberian division and part of 71st
division).
4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian divisions).
General Baumgarten's detachment connecting with General
Alexiev. Ching-ho-cheng
General Alexiev's detachment of part of 6th East Siberian and
of 71st division, with a portion of Trans-Baikal Cossack
brigade. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.
Total . . 95,000 6,000 360 2,500
Hsing-ching neighbourhood
Colonel Madridov's force. Rifles. Sabres. Guns.
700 600 4
124 THE EUSSO-JAPANESE WAE
Russians (continued)
Connecting Alexiev, and Madridov
General Maslov's detachment. Rifles. Sabres. Guns.
3,000 200 2
South of Mukden
3rd army. General Bilderling.
5th corps (54th and 61st divisions).
6th Siberian corps (55th division and Orenburg Cossacks).
17th corps (3rd and 35th divisions).
Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.
Total. . 60,000 2,000 250 2,000
South-west of Mukden
2nd army, General Kaulbaurs.
1st Siberian corps (1st, 9th, and part of 6th Easfc Siberian
divisions).
8th corps (14th and 75th divisions).
10th corps (9th and 31st divisions).
Rifle corps (three rifle brigades).
Between the Hun and Liao rivers
Rennenkamf's western defcachment.
Kossagovski's detachment. Rifles. Sabres. Guns. Engineers.
Total . . 90,000 8,000 494 2,500
South of Mukden, and behind the right of 1st army
General reserve.
16th corps (25th and part of 41st divisions).
72nd division of 6th Siberian corps.
One infantry and one Cossack regiment.
Rifles. Sabres. Guns.
Total . . 35,000 1,200 120

Rifles.

Sabres. Field Guns.

Field troops

. 283,700

18,000 1,230

Fortresses, etc.

. 20,000

3,000 80

Railways, etc.

. 40,000

10,000 48

343,700

31,000 1,358

WILLIAM BRENDON AND SON, LTD,
PRINTERS, PLYMOUTH

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