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I.
YALE
UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

THE

ADMINISTRATION

EVE OF THE REBELLION:

pistorg of Jfour ffars kfore i\t Mm.

BY JAMES BUCHANAN,
EX-FBESIS£iri OF IHE TTKITED STATES OF AMSBIOA.

LONDON:
SAMPSON LOW, SON, & MARSTON,
CFnglig^, ametlcnn. anD Colonial JSoofeadUtg anl) ^ubllgjcvs,
59, LUDGATE HILL.
1865.

^\:>b'\,^'\{

PEEFAOE

The following historical narrative of the events preceding
the late rebeUion was prepared soon after its outbreak, sub
stantiaUy in the present form. It may be asked, "Why, then, was
it not pubhshed at an earUer period ? The answer is, that the
publication was delayed to avoid the possible imputation, un
just as this would have been, that any portion of it was in
tended to embarrass Mr. Lincoln's administration in the -dgor-
ous prosecution of pending hostiUties. The author deemed it
far better to suffer temporary injustice than to expose himself
to such a charge. He never doubted the successful event of
the '^ar, even during its most gloomy periods. Having dra'wn
his first breath soon after the adoption of the Federal Constitu
tion and the Union 'which it established, and having been an
eye-'witness of the blessed effects of these, iu securing liberty
and prosperity at home, and in presenting an example to the
oppressed of other lands, he felt an abiding con'viction that the
American people -would never suffer the Great Charter of their
rights to be destroyed. To the Constitution, as interpreted by
its framers, he has ever been devoted, believing that the specific

jy PREFACE.
powers which it confers on the Federal Govemment, notwith
standing the experience of the last dreary years, are sufficient
for almost every possible emergency, whether in peace or in
war. He, therefore, claims the merit— if merit it be simply to
do one's duty— that whilst in the exercise of Executive func
tions, he never violated any of its provisions.
It may be observed that no extensive and formidable rebel
Uon of an inteUigent people against an established Govemment
has ever arisen vdthout a long train of previous and subsidiary
causes. A principal object of the author, therefore, is to pre
sent to the reader a historical sketch of the antecedents ending
in the late rebellion. In performing this task, the eye naturally
fixes itself, as the starting point, upon the existence of domestic
slavery in the South, recognized and protected as this was by
the Constitution of the United States. We shall not inquire
whether its patriotic and enlightened framers acted with -wise
foresight in yielding their sanction to an institution which is in
itself a great social evil, though they considered this was neces
sary to avoid the still greater calamity of dissolving the Con
vention without the formation of our Federal Union.
The narrative will prove that the original and conspiring
causes of all our future troubles are to be found in the long,
active, and persistent hostility of the Northern Abolitionists,
both in and out of Congress, against Southern slavery, until the
final triumph of their cause in the election of President Lin
coln ; and on the other hand, the corresponding antagonism and
violence with which the advocates of slavery resisted these ef
forts, and vindicated its preservation and extension up till the
period of secession. So excited were the parties, that had they

PEEFACE. V
intended to furnish material to inflame the passions of the one
against the other, they could not have more effectually suc
ceeded than they did by their mutual criminations and recrimi
nations. The struggle continued without intermission for more
than the quarter of a century, except within the brief interval
between the passage of the Compromise measures of 1850 and
the repeal of the Missouri Compromise in 1854, during which
the hostile feelings of the parties were greatly allayed, and
hopes were entertained that the strife might finally subside.
These peaceful prospects, it will appear, were soon blasted by
the repeal of this Compromise, and the struggle was then re
newed with more bitterness than ever until the final catastro
phe. Many grievous errors were committed by both parties
from the beginning, but the most fatal of them all was the se
cession of the cotton States.
The authorities cited "in the work will show that Mr. Bu
chanan never failed, upon all suitable occasions, to warn his
countrymen of the approaching danger, and to ad'vise them of
the proper means to avert it. Both before and after he became
President he was an earnest advocate of compromise between
the parties to save the Union, but Congress disregarded his rec
ommendations. Even after he had, in his messages, exposed
the dangerous condition of public affairs, and when it had be
come morally certain that all his efforts to avoid the civil war
would be frustrated by agencies far beyond his control, they
persistently refused to pass any measures enabling him or his
successor to execute the laws against armed resistance, or to
defend the country against approaching rebellion.
The book concludes by a notice of the successful domestic

VI PEEFACE.
and foreign policy of the administration. In the portion of it
concerning our relations 'with the Mexican Eepublic, a history
of the origin and nature of " the Monroe doctrine " is appro
priately included.
It has been the author's intention, in the foUo'wing pages, to
verify every statement of fact by a documentary or other au
thentic reference, and thus save the reader, as far as may be
possible, from reliance on individual memory. From the use
of private correspondence he has resolutely abstained.
'Wbeatlamd, September, 1865.

OONTEI^ITS.

CHAPTER L
PAGE
The rise and progress of Anti-Slavery agitation — The Higher Law — Anti-Sla
very Societies — Their formation and proceedings — Their efifeot destructive
of State Emancipation — The case in Virginia — Employment of the Post OfBce
to circulate incendiary publications and pictures among the slaves^Meesage
of General Jackson to prohibit this by law — His recommendation defeated —
The Pulpit, the Press, and other agencies— Abolition Petitions — The rise of
an extreme Southern Pro-Slavery party — The Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, and
the case of Prigg vs. Pennsylvania, and its pernicious effects — The South
threaten Secession — The course of Mr. Buchanan as Senator — The Wilmot
Proviso and its consequences — The Union in serious danger at the meeting
of Congress in December, 1849, ....... 9

CHAPTER n.
Meeting of Congress iu December, 1849 — The five Acts constituting the Com
promise of September, 1850 — Effect of the Compromise in allaying excitement
— ^Whig and Democratic Platforms indorse it — ^President Pierce's happy ref
erence to it in his Message of December, 1853 — The repeal of the Missouri
Compromise reopens the slavery agitation — Its passage in March, 1820, and
character — ^Its recognition by Congress in 1845, on the Annexation of Texas —
The history of its repeal — This repeal gives rise to the Kansas troubles —
Their nature and history — The Lecompton Constitution and proceedings of
Congress upon it — The Republican party greatly strengthened — D^iision of
the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case — Repudiated by the Republican
party and by the Douglas Democracy — Sustained by the old Democracy — The
Kansas and Nebraska Act — The policy and practice of Congress toward the
^Territories— Abuse of President Buchanan for not adhering to the Cincinnati
Platform without foundation, . . . . . . .21

viii CONTENTS.
CHAPTER ni. FAOB
Senator Seward— The "Irrepressible Conflict"— Helper's "Impending Crisis"—
The John Brown Raid— The nature of Fanaticism— The Democratic National
Convention at Charleston — Its proceedings and adjournment to Baltimore —
Reassembling at Baltimore and proceedings there — Its breaking up and di
vision into the Douglas and the Breckinridge Conventions — Proceedings of
each — Review of the whole and the effect on the South, . . .57
CHAPTER IV.
The heresy of Secession — Originated in New England — Maintained by Josiah
Quincy and the Hartford Convention, by Mr. Rawle and Mr. John Quincy
Adams, but opposed by the South — Southern Secession dates from South Car
olina Nullification — Its character and history — The Compromise Tariff of 1833
— The Nullifiers agitate for Secession — Mr. Calhoun— Mr. Cobb against it —
Warnings of the Democratic party — They are treated with contempt — Seces
sion encouraged by the Republicans — The Cotton States led to believe they
would be allowed to depart in peace — President Buchanan warned them
against this delusion, . . . . . . . .8$
CHAPTER V.
General Scott's "Views," and the encouragement they afforded to the cotton
States to secede — Their publication by him in the "National Intelligencer" —
His recommendation in favor of four distinct Confederacies —His recommen
dation to reenforce nine of the Southern forts, and the inadequacy of the
troops — The reason of this inadequacy— The whole army required on the fron
tiers — The refusal of Congress to increase it — Our fortifications necessarily
left without sufiBcient garrisons for want of troops — The President's duty to
refrain from any hostile act against the cotton States, and smooth the way to
a compromise — The rights of those States in no danger from Mr. Lincoln's
election — Their true policy was to cling to the Union, . . . .99

CHAPTER "VI
Mr. Lincoln's election to the Presidency — Its danger to the Union — Warnings of
the President and his trying position — His policy in the emergency, and the
reasons for it — His supreme object the preservation of the Union — Meeting of
Congress, and the hostility of the two parties toward each other  The wrongs
of the South — ^Howrash and causeless would be rebellion in the cotton States
— The right of secession discussed and denied in the Message— The President's
position defined — Question of the power to coerce a State — Distinction be
tween the power to wage war against a State, and the power to execute the
laws against individuals— Views of Senator (now President) Johnson, of Ten
nessee—President Buchanan's solemn appeal in favor of the Union  His es
trangement from the secession leaders— Cessation of all friendly intercourse
between him and them, . . .... 108

CONTENTS. IX
CELiPTER 'Vn. PAOB
Refusal of Congress to act either with a view to conciliation or defence — The Sen
ate Committee of Thirteen and its proceedings — Mr. Crittenden submits his
Compromise to the Committee — Its nature — The Committee unable to agree —
Testimony of Messrs. Douglas and Toombs that the Crittenden Compromise
would have arrested secession in the cotton States — Mr. Crittenden proposes
to refer his amendment to the people of the several States by an act of ordi
nary legislation — His remarks in its favor — Proceedings thereon — Expression
of public opinion in its favor — President Buchanan recommends it — Recom
mendation disregarded and proposition defeated by the Clark amendment —
Observations thereon — Peace Convention proposed by Virginia — Its meeting
and proceedings— Amendment to the Constitution reported by Mr. Guthrie,
chairman of the committee — Its modification on motion of Mr. Franklin, and
final adoption by the Convention — Virginia and North Carolina vote with
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont against it
— Its rejection by the United States Senate — The House of Representatives
refuse even to receive it — Every Republican member in both branches of Con
gress opposed to it, ........ 134
CHAPTER Vm.
Congress passes no measures to enable the President to execute the laws or de
fend the Government — They decline to revive the authority of the Federal
Judiciary in South Carolina, suspended by the resignation of all the judicial
officers — They refuse authority to call forth the militia or accept volunteers,
to suppress insurrections against the United States, and it was never proposed
to grant an appropriation for this purpose — The Senate declines throughout
the entire session to act upon the nomination of a Collector of the Port of
Charleston — Congress refuses to grant to the President the authority long
since expired, which had been granted to General Jackson for the collection
of the revenue — The 36th Congress expires, leaving the law just as they found
it — General observations, ........ 153
CHAPTER rX.
The forts in Charleston harbor— Conduct toward them and the reasons for it —
To guard against surprise reenforcements ready — Instructions to Major An
derson — Interview with South Carolina members — General Scott again recom
mends the garrisoning of all the forts — Reasons against it — The compromise
measures still depending — Want of troops — Observations on General Scott's
report to President Lincoln — His letter to Secretary Seward, and the man
ner in which it, with the report, was brought to light and published — Mr. Bu
chanan's reply to the report — General Scott's statement of the interview
with President Buchanan on 15th December, and observations thereupon —
The example of General Jackson in 1833, and why it was inapplicable, . 162
CHAPTER X.
South Carolina adopts an ordinance of secession, and appoints Commissioners to
treat with the General Government— Their arrival in Washington- Major An-

CONTENTS.

derson's removal from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter — The President's inter
view with the Commissioners, who demand a surrender of all the forts — Hi a
answer to this demand — Their insolent reply, and its return to them — Its pre
sentation to the Senate by Mr. Davis — Secretary Floyd requested to resign —
He resigns and becomes a secessionist — Fort Sumter threatened — The Brooh-
lyn ordered to carry reenforcements to the fort — The Star of the West substi
tuted at General Scott's instance — She is fired upon — Major Anderson de
mands of Governor Pickens a disavowal of the act — The Governor demands
the surrender of the fort — The Major proposes to refer the question to Wash
ington — The Governor accepts — The truce — Colonel Hayne and Lieutenant
Hall arrive in Washington on the 13th January — Letter from Governor Pickens
not delivered to the President until the 31st January — The answer to it —
Colonel Hayne' s insulting reply — It is returned to him — Virginia sends Mr.
Tyler to the President with a view to avoid hostilities — His arrival in Wash
ington and his proposals— Message of the President, .... 180
CHAPTER £1.
Fort Sumter again — An expedition prepared to relieve it — The expedition aban
doned on account of a despatch from Major Anderson — Mr. Holt's letter to
President Lincoln— Fort Pickens in Florida — ^Its danger from the rebels —
The Brooklyn ordered to its relief — The means by which it was saved from
capture approved by General Scott and Messrs. Holt and Toucey, with the
rest of the Cabinet — Refutation of the charge that arms had been stolen — ^Re
port of the Committee on MiUtary Affairs and other documentary evidence 
The Southern and Southwestern States received less than their quota of
arms — The Pittsburg cannon — General Scott's unfounded claim to the credit
of preventing their shipment to the South — Removal of old muskets — Their
value— Opinion of Mr. Holt in regard to the manner in which President Bu
chanan conducted the administration, ...... 209
CHAPTER Xn.
The reduction of the expenses of the Government under Mr. Buchanan's admin
istration — The expedition to Utah — The Covode Committee, . . . 231
CHAPTER Xm.
The successful foreign policy of the administration with Spain, Great Britain
China, and Paraguay — Condition of the Mexican Republic; and the recom
mendations to Congress thereupon not regarded, and the effect  The treaty
with Mexico not ratified by the Senate, and the consequences  The origin
history, and nature of the " Monroe Doctrine," . . , .258

MR. BUCHANAN'S ADMINISTRATION.

CHAPTEE I.
The rise and progress of Anti-Slavery agitation — The Higher Law — Anti-Slavery
Societies — Their formation and proceedings — Their effect destructive of State
Emancipation — The case in Virginia — Employment of the Post Office to circulate
incendiary publications and pictures among the slaves — Message of General Jack
son to prohibit this by law — His recommendation defeated — The Pulpit, the Press,
and other agencies — ^Abolition Petitions — The rise of an extreme Southern Pro-
Slavery party — The Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, and the case of Prigg «s. Penn
sylvania, and its pernicious effects — The South threaten Secession — The course
of Mr. Buchanan as Senator — The Wilmot Proviso and its consequences — The
Union in serious danger at the meeting of Congress in December, 1849.
That the Constitution does not confer upon Congress power
to interfere -with slavery in the States, has been admitted by all
parties and confirmed by all judicial decisions ever since the ori
gin of the Federal Government. This doctrine was emphatically
recognized by the House of Representatives in the days of
Washington, during the first session of the first Congress,* and
has never since been seriously called in question. Hence, it be
came necessary for the abolitionists, in order to famish a pretext
for their assaults on Southern slavery, to appeal to a law higher
than the Constitution.
Slavery, according to them, was a grievous sin against God,
and therefore no human Constitution could rightfully shield it
from destruction. It was sinful to live in a political confed
eracy which tolerated slavery in any of the States composing it ;
and if this could not be eradicated, it would become a sacred
* Annala of Congress, vol. ii., p. 1474, Sept. 1, 1789-'90.

10 ME. Buchanan's administeation
duty for the free States to separate from their guilty associates.
This doctrine of the higher law was preached from the pulpits
and disseminated in numerous publications throughout New
England. At the first, it was regarded with contempt as the
work of misguided fanatics. Ere long, however, it enlisted nu
merous and enthusiastic partisans. These were animated with
indomitable zeal in a cause they deemed so holy. They consti
tuted the movement party, and went ahead ; because, whether
from timidity or secret sympathy, the conservative masses failed.
in the beginning to resist its progress in an active and deter
mined spirit.
The anti-slavery party in its career never stopped to reflect
that slavery was a domestic institution, exclusively under the
control of the sovereign States where it existed ; and therefore,
if sinful in itself, it was certainly not the sin of the people of
New England. With equal justice might conscience have im
pelled citizens of Massachusetts to agitate for the suppression
of slavery in Brazil as in South Carolina. In both cases they
were destitute of all rightful power over the subject.
The Constitution having granted to Congress no power over
slavery in the States, the abolitionists were obliged to resort to
indirect means outside of the Constitution to accomplish their
object. The most powerful of these was anti-slavery agitation :
agitation for the double purpose of increasing the number of
their partisans at home, and of exciting a spirit of discontent and
resistance among the slaves of the South. This agitation, was
conducted by numerous antf-slavery societies scattered over the
North. It was a new and important feature of their organiza
tion that women were admitted as members. Sensitive and en
thusiastic in their nature against wrong, and believing slavery to
be a mortal sin, they soon became public speakers, in spite of the
injunctions of an inspired apostle; and their harangues were
quite as violent and extreme as those of their fathers, husbands,
and brothers. Their influence as mothers was thus secured and
directed to the education of the rising generation in anti-slavery
principles. Never was an organization planned and conducted
with greater skUl and foresight for the eventual accomplishment
of its object.

on the eve of THE EEBELLION. 11
The New England Anti-Slavery Society was organized in
Boston on January 30th, 1832 ; that of New York in October,
1833 ; and the National Society wasorganized in Philadelphia
in December, 1833. Affiliated societies ' soon became numer
ous. After the formation of the New England society the agitation
against Southern slavery proceeded with redoubled vigor, and
this under the auspices of British emissaries. One of the first
and most pernicious effects of these proceedings was to arrest
the natural progress of emancipation under legitimate State
authority. When this agitation commenced, the subject of such emanci
pation was freely discussed in the South, and especially in the
grain-growing border States, and had enlisted numerous and
powerful advocates. In these States the institution had become
unprofitable. According to the witty and eccentric Virginian, Mr.
Handolph, if the slave did not soon run away from the master,
the master would rim away from the slave. Besides, at this
period nobody loved slavery for its o-wn sake.
Yirgiuia, whose example has always exercised great influence
on her sister States, was, in 1832, on the verge of emancipation.*
The current was then running strong in its favor throughout the
State. Many of the leading men, both the principal newspapers,
and probably a majority of the people sustained the policy
and justice of emancipation. Numerous petitions in its favor
were presented to the General Assembly. Mr. Jefferson Kau-
dolph, a worthy grandson of President Jefferson, and a delegate
from one of the largest slaveholding counties of the common
wealth (Albemarle), brought forward a bill in the House to ac
complish the object. This was fully and freely discussed, and
was advocated by many prominent members. Not a voice
was raised throughout the debate in favor of slavery. Mr. Ran
dolph, finding the Legislature not quite prepared for so deci
sive a measure, did not press it to a final vote ; but yet the House
resolved, by a majority of 65 to 58, "that they were profoundly
sensible of the great evils arising from the condition of the color
ed population of the commonwealth, and were induced by policy
* Letter of Geo. W. Randolph to Nahum Capen, of 18th AprU, 1851.

12 ME. Buchanan's administeation
as well as humanity to attempt the immediate removal of the free
negroes ; but that further action for the removal of the slaves
should await a more definite development of public opinion."
Mr. Randolph's course was approved by his constituents, and
at the next election he was returned by them as a member of the
House of Delegates, on this very question. Unfortunately, at
this moment the anti-slavery agitation in New England began
to assume an alarming aspect for the peace and security of the
Southern people. In consequence, they denounced it as a foreign
and dangerous interference with rights which the Constitution
had left exclusively under their own control. An immediate and
powerful reaction against emancipation by State authority was
the [result, and this good cause, to which so many able and
patriotic Southern men had been devoted, was sacrificed.
Mr. Randolph himself, a short time thereafter, expressed a
confident belief to the author, that but for this interference, the
General Assembly would, at no distant day, have passed a law
for gradual emancipation. He added, so great had been the re
vulsion of public sentiment in Yirginia, that no member of that
body would now dare to propose such a measure.
The abolitionists became bolder and bolder as they advanced.
They did not hesitate to pervert the Post Office Department of
the Govemment to the advancement of their cause. Through
its agency, at an early period, they scattered throughout
the slaveholding States pamphlets, newspapers, and pictorial
representations of an incendiary character, calculated to arouse
the savage passions of the slaves to ser-rile insurrection. So
alarming had these efforts become to the domestic peace of the
South, that General Jackson recommended they should be pro
hibited by law, under severe penalties. He said, in his annual
message of 2d December, 1835 : " Imust also invite your attention
to the painful excitement produced in the South by attempts to
circulate, through the mails, inflammatory appeals addressed to
the passions of the slaves, in prints, and in various sorts of pub
lications, calculated to stimulate them to insurrection and to pro
duce all the horrors of a servile war." * And he also commended to
the special attention of Congress "the propriety of passing such a
* 2 Statesman's Manual, 1018.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 13
law as will prohibit, under severe penalties, the circulation in the
Southern States, through the mails, of incendiary publications in
tended to instigate the slaves to insurrection." *
A bill for this purpose was reported to the Senate, but after a
long and animated debate, it was negatived, on the 8th of June,
1836, by a vote of 19 to 25.t It is worthy of remark, that even
at this early period not a single Senator from New England,
whether political friend or opponent of General Jackson, voted
in favor of the measure he had so emphatically recommended.
All the Senators from that portion of the Union, under the lead
of Messrs. Webster and Da-vis, of Massachusetts, denied to Con
gress the Constitutional power of passing any law to prevent the
abolitionists from using our o'wn mails to circulate incendiary
documents throughout the slaveholding States, even though
these were manifestly intended to promote servile insurrection
and civil war within their limits. The power and duty of Con
gress to pass the bill were earnestly urged by Mr. Buchanan,
then a Senator from Pennsylvania, in opposition to the objections
of Mr. Webster.
This anti-slavery agitation in New England was prosecuted by
other and different agencies. The pulpit, the press. State Le
gislatures, State and county conventions, anti-slavery societies,
and abolition lectures were all employed for this purpose.
Prominent among them were what were called, in the lan
guage of the day, abolition petitions.
Throughout the session of 1835-6, and for several succeeding
sessions, these petitions incessantly poured in to Congress. They
prayed for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia,
and in the forts, magazines, arsenals, and dockyards of the United
States 'within the slaveholding States. They also protested
against the admission of any new slaveholding State into the
Union, and some of them went even so far as to petition for a
dissolution of the Union itself.
These petitions were signed by hundreds of thousands of men,
women, and children. In them slavery was denounced as a na
tional sin and a national disgrace. Every epithet was employed
• 2 Statesman's Manual, p. 1019.
t Senate Journal, June 2, 1836, pp. 399, 400, and Con. Globe of June 8, 1836.

14: ME. Buchanan's ADMnnsTEATiON
calculated to arouse the indignation of the Southern people. The
time of Congress was wasted in -violent debates on the subject of
slavery. In these it would be difficult to determine which of the
opposing parties was guilty of the greatest excess. Whilst the
South threatened disunion unless the agitation should cease, the
North treated such threats with derision and defiance. It be
came manifest to every reflecting man that two geographical
parties, the one embracing the people north and the other those
south of Mason and Dixon's line, were in rapid process of for
mation — an event so much dreaded by the Father of his
Country. It is easy to imagine the effect of this agitation upon the proud,
sensitive, and excitable people of the South. One extreme natu
raUy begets another. Among the latter there sprung up a party
as fanatical in advocating slavery as were the abolitionists of the
North in denouncing it. At the first, and for a long time, this
party was small in numbers, and found it difficult to excite the
masses to support its extreme views. These Southern fanatics,
instead of admitting slavery to be au e-vil in itself, pronounced
it to be a great good. Instead of admitting that it had been re
luctantly recognized by the Constitution as an overruling poli
tical necessity, they extolled it as the surest support of freedom
among the white race. If the fanatics of the North denounced
slavery as e-vil and only evil, and that continually, the fanatics
of the South upheld it as fraught with blessings to the slave as
well as to his master. Far different was the estimation in which
it was held by Southern patriots and statesmen both before and
for many years after the adoption of the Constitution. These
looked forward hopefully to the day when, -with safety both to
the white and black race, it might be abolished by the people
of the slaveholding States themselves, who alone possessed the
power. The late President, as a Senator of the United States, from
December, 1834, until March, 1845, lost no opportunity of warn
ing his countrymen of the danger to the Union from a persist
ence in this anti-slavery agitation, and of beseeching them to
suffer the people of the South to manage their domestic affairs
in their own way. All they desired, to employ their oft-repeat-

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 15
ed language, was " to be let alone." With a prophetic -nsion, at
SO early a period as the 9th March, 1836, he employed the fol
lowing language in^the Senate : " Sir," said Mr. B., " this ques
tion of domestic slavery is the weak point in our institutions.
Tariffs may be raised almost to prohibition, and then they may
be reduced so as to yield no adequate protection to the manufac
turer; our Union is sufficiently strong to endure the shock.
Fierce political storms may arise — the moral elements of the
country may be convulsed by the struggles of ambitious men for
the highest honors of the Govemment — the sunshine does not
more certainly succeed the storm, than that all will again be
peace. Touch this question of slavery seriously — ^let it once be
made manifest to the people of the South that they cannot live
with us, except in a state of continual apprehension and alarm
for their wives and their children, for all that is near and dear to
them upon the earth — and the Union is from that moment dis
solved. It does not then become a question of expediency, but
of self-preservation. It is a question brought home to the fire
side, to the domestic circle of every white man in the Southern
States. This day, this dark and gloomy day for the Republic,
will, I most devoutly trust and believe, never arrive. Although,
in Pennsylvania, we are all opposed to slavery in the abstract,
yet we will never "violate the Constitutional compact which we
have made with our sister States. Their rights will be held
sacred by us. Under the Constitution it is their own question,
and there let it remain." *
A new source of anti-slavery agitation was about this time
opened against the execution of the old Fugitive Slave Law, x^assed
in February, 1T93.
This was greatly increased by the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States, at the January term, 1842, in the case
of Prigg vs. the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, f It is true,
the opinion of the Court, delivered by Mr. Justice Story,
explicitly affirmed the Constitutional right of the master
to recover his fugitive slave in any State to which he had fled.
It even went so far as to clothe the master himself " with full
* tjales and Seaton'a Regiker of Debates, vol. xii., part 1, 1835-6, p. 781.
t 16 Peters, 539.

16 ME. Buchanan's administeation
authority, in every State of the Union, to seize and recapture
his slave, wherever he can do it without a breach of the peace
or any illegal violence." After these strong affirmations it be
comes necessary to state the reason why this decision became the
occasion of increased anti-slavery agitation.
The act of 1793 * authorized and required State judges and
magistrates, in common with judges of the United States, to
carry its provisions into effect. At the date of its passage no
doubt was entertained of the power of Congress to direct this
duty to be performed by appropriate State authorities. From
the small number of Federal judges in each State, and their dis
tance from each other, the masters, in almost every instance, re
sorted to the magistrate of the " county, city, or town corporate,"
where the slave had been arrested. Before him the necessary proof
was made, and, upon being satisfied, he granted a certificate to the
master, which was a sufficient warrant under the law " for re
moving the said fugitive from labor to the State or Territory
from which he or she fled." These State magistrates were fa
miliar to the people of the respective localities, and their duties
were performed in a satisfactory manner, and with but little
complaint or commotion. This continued to be the practice
until the opinion of the Court in the case of Prigg was pro
nounced. In this it was decided that State magistrates were
not bound to perform these duties ; and the question whether
they would do so or not, was left entirely to their own discre
tion. It was thus rendered competent for State Legislatures to pro
hibit their own functionaries from aiding in the execution of the
Fugitive Slave Act.
Then commenced a furious agitation against the execution
of this so-called " sinftd and inhuman " law. State magistrates
were prevailed upon by the abolitionists to refuse their agency in
carrying it into effect. The Legislatures of several States, in
conformity with this decision, passed laws prohibiting these
magistrates and other State officials from assisting in its execu
tion. The use of the State jails was denied for the safe-keep
ing of the fugitives. Personal Liberty Bills were passed, inter-
* 1 U. S. L. 802.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 17
posing insurmountable obstacles to the recovery of slaves. Every
m«ans which ingenuity could devise was put in operation to
render the law a dead letter. Indeed, the excitement against it
rose so high that the life and liberty of the master who pursued
his fugitive slave into a free State were placed in imminent peril.
For this he was often imprisoned, and, in some instances,
murdered. The Fugitive Slave Law, although passed under the admin
istration of Washington for the purpose of carrying into effect a
plain, clear, and mandatory provision of the Constitution, was
set at naught. And this was done in the face of a well-kno'wn
historical fact, that without such a provision the Constitution it
self never could have existed. Without this law the slaveholder
would have had no remedy to enforce his Constitutional right.
There would have been uo security for his property. If the
slave, by simply escaping across a State line, could make him
self free, the guarantees of the Constitution in favor of the mas
ter would be effectually abolished. These very guarantees were
rendered practically of little or no avail, by the decision of the
Court in the case of Prigg vs. Pennsylvania, declaring that the
Congress of 1793 had violated the Constitution by requiring
State magistrates to aid in executing the law.
We have no disposition to dispute the binding force of this
decision, although made by a bare majority against the opinion
of Chief- Justice Taney and three other judges. It was never
theless pronounced by the Constitutional tribunal in the last re
sort, and therefore challenges the obedience, if not the approval,
of every law-abiding citizen.
Mr. Justice Story himself seems to have clearly and compla
cently foreseen the injurious consequences to the rights of the
slaveholder which would result from his decision. In his
biography, written by his son (vol. ii., p. 392), it is stated : " But
in establishing, contrary to the opinion of four of the judges, that
the extradition of fugitive slaves is exclusively withui the juris
diction of the Federal Govemment, and that the State Legisla
tures are prohibited from interfering, even to assist in giving
effect to the clause in the Constitution on this subject ; he (Judge
Story) considered that a great point had been gained for liberty;

18 ME. Buchanan's administeation
so great a point, indeed, that, on his return from Washington, he
repeatedly and earnestly spoke of it to his family and his inti
mate friends as being ' a triumph of^freedom.' "
Again (page 394) : "Nor were these views contradicted by
subsequent experience. From the day of the decision of Prigg
vs, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the act of 1793 was," says
his biographer, " a dead letter in the free States."
The slaveholders, thus deprived of their rights, began to
threaten secession from the Union. They contended that, the
people of the Northern States having violated the Constitution
in a fundamental pro-vision necessary to their peace and safety,
they of the South, according to the settled rules governing the
construction of all contracts, whether between States or individ
uals, had a right to rescind it altogether.
In 1846, in the midst of the agitation against the Fugitive
Slave Law, came that on the Wilmot Provipo. This asserted it
to be the right and duty of Congress to prohibit the people of the
Southern States from emigrating with their slave property to the
common territory of the United States, which might be acquired
by the war with Mexico. Thus was raised anew the question in
regard to slavery in the territories, which has since proved so
fatal. In May, 1846, the existence of war with Mexico, by the act
of that Republic, was recognized by Congress, and measures were
adopted for its prosecution.*
On the 4th of August, 1846, near the close of the 'session,f
President Polk, desirous of restoring peace as speedily as pos
sible, and of adjusting the boundaries between the two Republics
in a satisfactory manner, asked Congress for a small contingent
appropriation, to be applied to this purpose, which it might or
might not become necessary to employ before their next meet
ing. Accordingly, on the 8th of August a bill was presented to
the House granting the President §2,000,000.
To this bill Mr. Wilmot offered his proviso as an amend
ment. X The proviso declared " That, as an express and funda
mental condition to the acquisition of any territory from the
* Act of 13th May, 1846 ; 9 U. S. S. at Large, p. 9. t 3 Statesman's Manual, 1610.
t Con. Globe, 1845-'6, p. 1217.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 19
Republic of Mexico by the United States, by 'virtue of any treaty
which may be negotiated between them, and to the use by the
Executive of the moneys herein appropriated, neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude shall ever exist in any part of said terri
tory, except for crime, whereof the party shall first be duly con
victed." Had this proviso been never so proper in itself, it was both
out of time and out of place. Out of time, because, whether any
treaty could be made acquiring territory from Mexico, was fu-
tm-e and contingent ; and in fact that of Guadalupe Hidalgo,
under which we acquired Upper California and New Mexico,
was not concluded imtil almost eighteen months thereafter. *
But Mr. Wilmot was so eager to introduce this new subject
for anti-slavery agitation, that he could not await the regular
course of events.
The proviso was also out of place in an appropriation bill
confined to a single important object, because it was calculated
to defeat, as it actually did defeat, the appropriation. It was a
firebrand recklessly and prematurely cast among the free and
slave States, at a moment when a foreign war was raging, in
which all were gallantly fighting, side by side, to conquer an
honorable peace. This was the moment selected, long in ad
vance, to announce to the people of the slaveholding States
that if we should acquire any new territory by our common
blood and treasure, they should forever be prohibited from en
tering any portion of it with by far the most valuable part of
their property.
The introduction of this proviso instantly caused the flames
of fanaticism to burn with more intense ardor, both North and
South, than they had ever done before. How wise is the Di'vine
maxim, that " sufficient unto the day is the e-vil thereof" !
The new territory afterwards acqidred from Mexico, being
outside of the ancient province of Louisiana, was not embraced
by the Missouri Compromise. The late President, then Secre
tary of State, strongly urged the extension of the line of 36° 30'
through this territory to the Pacific Ocean, as the best mode of
adjustment. He believed that its division by this ancient line,
• Treaty, Feb. 2, 1848 ; 9 U. S. Statutes at Large, 923.

20 ME. Buchanan's administeation
to which we had been long accustomed, would be more just in
itself, and more accept§,ble to the people, both North and South,
than any new plan which could be devised.*
This proposal was defeated by the Wilmot Proviso. That
ill-starred measure continued to be forced upon the considera
tion of Congress, as well as of State Legislatures, session after ses
sion, in various forms. Whilst Northern Legislatures were pass
ing resolutions instructing their Senators and requesting their
Representatives to vote for the Wilmot Proviso, Southern Le
gislatures and conventions were passing resolutions pledging
themselves to measures of resistance.
The interposition of the proviso, in season and out of season,
and the violent and protracted debates to which it gave rise, de
feated the establishment of territorial governments in California
and New Mexico throughout the whole of the thirtieth Con
gress (1847-'8 and 1848-9). Meanwhile it placed the two sections
of the Union in hostile array against each other. The people of
the one, instead of regarding those of the other as brethren, were
converted into deadly enemies. At the meeting of the thirty-
first Congress (December, 1849) serious apprehensions were every
where entertained, among the most enlightened and purest pa
triots, for the safety of the Union. The necessity was admitted
by all that measures should be adopted to ward off the impend
ing danger. • Letter to Berks County, Aug. 25, 1847.

OK THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. # 21

CHAPTER II.
Meeting of Congress in I^feember, 1849— The five Acts constituting the Compromise
of September, 1850 — Effect of tfie Compromise in allaying excitement— Whig and
Democratic Platforms indorse it — President Pierce's happy reference to it in his
Message of December, 1853^The repeal of the Missouri Compromise reopens the
slavery agitation — Its passage in March, 1820, and character — Its recognition by
Congress in 1845, on the Annexation of Texas — The history of its repeal — This
repeal gives rise to the Kansas troubles — Their nature and history — The Lecomp
ton Constitution and proceedings of Congress upon it — The Republican party
greatly strengthened— JOecision of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case —
Repudiated by the Republican party and by the Douglas Democracy — Sustained
by the old Democracy — The Kansas and Nebraska Act — The policy and practice
of Congress toward the Territories — Abuse of President Buchanan for not adher
ing to the Cincinnati Platform without foundation.
The thirty-first Congress assembled on the first Monday of
December, 1849, and they happily succeeded in averting the
present danger by the adoption of one of those wise com
promises which had previously proved so beneficent to the
country. The first ray of light to penetrate the gloom emanated from
the great and powerful State of Pennsylvania. Her House of
Representatives refused to consider instructing resolutions iu
favor of the Wilmot Proviso. Soon thereafter, on the 4th of
February, 1850, the House of Representatives at Washington,
by a vote of 105 to 75, laid resolutions favoring this proviso
upon the table.* The way was now opened for compromising
all the existing questions in regard to slavery.
The bold, eloquent, and patriotic Clay, who, thirty years be
fore, had contributed ^o much to the passage of the Mis-
* Con. Globe, 1840-'50, p. 276.

22 ME. Buchanan's administeation •
souri Compromise, was designated by the voice of the country
as the leader in effecting this new Compromise. He did not,
in his old age, shrink from the task. In this he was power
fully aided by several of our wisest and most conservative
statesmen. The necessary legislation for this purpose was accomplished
in September, 1850, by the passage of five distinct acts of Con
gress. These were : 1. " An Act to amend and supplementary
to" the old Fugitive Slave Law of the 12th of February, 1793.*
This pro-vided for the appointment of as many Commissioners
by the Courts of the United States as the public convenience
might require to supply the place of the State magistrates who
had, as heretofore explained, been forbidden to carry into effect
the mandate of the Constitution for the restoration of fugi
tive slaves. The chief object was to make the Federal Gov
emment independent of State assistance in the execution of the
law. 2. An Act for the admission of California, as a free State,
into the Union, embracing its entire territory, as well that south
as north of the Missouri Compromise line.f
3 and 4. Acts for establishing Territorial Governments in
New Mexico and Utah, under which both these Territories were
to be admitted as States into the Union, " with or without
slavery as their respective Constitutions might provide." X From
abundant but wise caution, the first of these Acts declared, in
conformity with the Constitution, that " no citizen of the United
States shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property in said
Territory, except by the judgment of his peers and the laws of
the land." These two Acts, in addition to the old Missouri
Compromise, embraced all our remaining Territories, whether
derived from Mexico or France. They terminated the agitation
on the Wilmot Proviso, by depri-ving it of any territory on
which it could operate.
The Act estabhshing the Territory of New Mexico pro
vided also for annexing to it all that portion of Texas lying
» 9 U. S. Laws, 462, Sept. 18. t Ibid., 452, Sept. 9.
X Ibid. 446 and 453, Sept. 9.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 23
north of 36° 30' ; thus -withdrawing it from the jurisdiction of a
slave State.
5. An Act was passed to abolish the domestic slave trade
within the District of Columbia.'*
These five Acts constituted the famous Compromise of Sep
tember, 1850. At the first, this Compromise was condemned
both by extreme abolitionists at the North and by extreme se
cessionists in the South. By the abolitionists, because it tol
erated slavery in New Mexico, and pro'vided for the due ex
ecution of the Fugitive Slave Law ; and by the secessionists,
because it admitted the great State of California as a free State
into the Union, and this notwithstanding a considerable part of
it lies south of the Missouri line. Nevertheless, it gradually
made its way to public favor, and was hailed by the conservative
masses, both North and South, as a wise and judicious arrange
ment. So far had it enlisted the general approval, that in June,
1852, the National Conventions of both the Democratic and
Whig parties bestowed upon it their approbation, and expressed
their determination to maintain it. They both resolved, to em
ploy the language of the Democratic platform, that they would
" resist all attempts at renewing, in Congress or out of it, the
slavery agitation, under whatever shape or color the attempt
may be made."t
On this subject the Whig platform is specific and emphatic.
Its eighth and last resolution is as follows •,'X
" That the series of Acts of the thirty-second Congress, the
Act known as the Fugitive Slave Law included, are received
and acquiesced in by the Whig party of the United States as a
settlement in principle and substance of the dangerous and ex
citing questions which they embrace ; and, so far as they are con
cerned, we will maintain them and insist upon their strict en
forcement, until tinfe and experience shall demonstrate the ne.
cessity of further legislation to guard against the evasion of the
laws orf the one hand, and the abuse of their powers on the other
— not impairing their present efficiency ; and we deprecate all
further agitation of the question thus settled, as dangerous to
» 9 U. S. Laws, 467, Sept. 20. t Greeley's PoUtical Text Book, 1860, p. 20.
X Ibid. p. 19.

24 me. Buchanan's administeation
our peace, and will discountenance all efforts to continue or re
new such agitation, whenever, wherever, or however the attempt
may be made ; and we will maintain the system as essential to
the nationality of the Whig party and the integrity of the
Union." When Congress assembled, after the election of President
Pierce, on the first Monday of December, 1853, although the
abolition fanatics had not ceased to agitate, crimination and re
crimination between the sectional parties had greatly subsided,
and a comparative political calm everywhere prevailed. Pres
ident Pierce, in his annual message, felicitously referred to the
" sense of repose and security to the public mind throughout the
Confederacy," and pledged himself " that this repose should suf
fer no shock during his official term," if he had the power to
avert it.
The Compromise of 1850 ought never to have been disturbed
by Congress. After long years of agitation and alarm, the coun
try, under its influence, had enjoyed a season of comparative re
pose, inspii'ing the people with bright hopes for the future.
But how short-lived and delusive was this calm ! The very
Congress which had commenced so auspiciously, by repealing
the Missouri Compromise before the end of its first session, re
opened the floodgates of sectional strife, which, it was fondly
imagined, had been closed forever. This has ever since gone on
increasing in violence and malignity, until it has involved the
country in the greatest and most sanguinary civil war recorded in
history. And here it is necessary, for a correct understanding of the
subject, to refer to the origin, the nature, and the repeal of this
celebrated Compromise.
It was passed on the 6th of March, 1820, after a long and
¦violent struggle in Congress between the ffiends and the oppo
nents of what was then called the Missouri restriction.* This
proposed to require from Missouri, as a condition prec^ent to
her admission as a State, that she should "ordain and establish
that there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude "
therein, except as a punishment for crime.
3 U. S. Laws, 545.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 25
Under the Compromise as finally effected, whilst the restric-
tionists were obliged to submit to the existence of slavery in
Missouri, they obtained, on their part, a guarantee for perpetual
freedom throughout the vast remaining territory north of the
parallel of 36° 30', which had been acquired from France under
the Louisiana Treaty.* These were the equivalents reciprocally
granted and accepted by the opposing parties.
This guarantee is to be found in the 8th section of the Act
authorizing the people of the then Missouri Territory to form a
Constitution and State Government, preparatory to admission as
a State into the Union. f It is embraced in the following lan
guage : " That in all that territory ceded by France to the
United States, under the name of Louisiana, which lies north of
36° 30' north latitude, not included within the limits of the
State [Missouri] contemplated by this Act, slavery and involun
tary servitude, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes,
whereof the parties shall have been duly convicted, shall be, and
is hereby, forever prohibited. Provided always : That any per-~l
son escaping into the same, from whom labor or service is law- /
fiiUy claimed in any State or Territory of the United States, |
such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed and conveyed to the'
person claiming his or her labor or service as aforesaid." "
The Missouri Compromise finally passed Congress by large
majorities. On a test question in the Senate on the 2d March,
1820, the vote in its favor was 27 against 15 ; and in the House,
on the same day, it was 134 against 42. Its wisdom and policy
were recognized by Congress, a quarter of a century afterwards,
in March, 1845, when Texas, being a slave State, was annexed
to the Union. Acting on the presumption that several new
States might be formed out of her territory, one of the express
conditions of her annexation was, that in such of these States as
might lie north of the Missouri Compromise line, slavery shall be
prohibited.:]: The Missouri Compromise had remained inviolate for more
than thirty-four years before its repeal. It was a covenant of
peace between the free and the slaveholding States. Its authors
* For its history, vide Appendix to Con. Globe, 1st session 33d Congress, p. 226.
+ 3 U. S. Laws, 545. J 5 U. S. Laws, 797.

26 me. Buchanan's administeation
were the wise and conservative statesmen of a former generation.
Although it had not silenced anti-slavery discussion in other
forms, yet it soon tranquillized the excitement which for some
months pre'vious to its passage had con-vulsed the country in re
gard to slavery in the Territories. It is true that the power of a
future Congress to repeal any of the Acts of its predecessors, un
der which no private rights had been vested, cannot be denied ;
, still the Missouri Compromise, being in the nature of a solemn
compact between confiicting parties, whose object was to ward
off great dangers from the Union, ought never to have been
repealed by Congress.
The question of its constitutionality ought to have been left
to the decision of the Supreme Court, without any legislative
intervention. Had this been done, and the Court had decided it
to be a violation of the Constitution, in a case arising before
them in the regular course of judicial proceedings, the decision
would have passed off in comparative silence, and produced no
dangerous excitement among the people.
Let us briefly sketch the history of this repeal, which was the
immediate cause of our present troubles.
Senator Douglas, on the 4th January, 1854, reported a bill
from the Committee on Territories, to establish a Territorial
Government in Nebraska.* This bill was silent in regard to the
Missouri Compromise. It was nearly in the usual form, and
would have doubtless passed, with but little, if any, opposition.
Before it was reached in order, the Whig Senator Dixon, of
Kentucky, on the 16th January, gave notice that when it should
come before the Senate, he would move to add to it a section
repeahng the Missouri Compromise, not only in regard to Ne
braska, but all other Territories of the United States.f A few
days thereafter, on the 23d January, the Committee on Terri
tories, through Mr. Douglas, their chairman, offered a substitute
for the original biU. X This, after dividing Nebraska into two
Tenitories, the one stiU bearing that name, and the other the
nam,e of Kansas, proceeded to annul the Missouri Compromise
in regard to these and all our other Territories. With this
* Con. Globe, 1853-'4, p. 115. t Ibid, p. 175. t Ibid n. 222.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 27
Mr. Dixon expressed himself " perfectly satisfied." * Such is
the origin of what has since been familiarly called " the Kansas
and Nebraska Bill."
On the question of repeal, a long and angry debate arose iu
both Houses of Congress. This consumed a large portion of the
session, and exasperated the* contending parties to a degree never
before witnessed. The opponents of the bill openly and vio
lently predicted imminent danger to the peace of the Union
from its passage, whilst its advocates treated any such danger
¦with proud and indignant disdain.
The bill finally passed both Houses on the 25th, and was
approved by President Pierce on the 30th May, 1854.
It was ominous of e"nl that every Southern Senator present,
whether Whig or Democrat, without regard to past political
distinctions, voted for the repeal, with the exception of Mr. Bell,
of Tennessee, and Mr. Clayton, of Delaware, who voted against
it; and that every Northern Democratic Senator present,
uniting with the South, also voted for the repeal, with the excep
tion of Messrs. Allen and James, of Rhode Island, and Mr.
Walker, of Wisconsin, who voted against it.f
The repeal was accomplished in the foUo'wing manner: The
14th section of this bill, whilst extending the laws of the United
States ov^r Kansas and Nebraska, excepts therefrom " the 8th
section of the Act preparatory to the admission of Missouri into
the Union, approved March sisth, eighteen hundred and twenty,
which, being inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention
by Congress with slavery in the States aud Territories, as recog
nized by the legislation of 1850, commonly called the Compro
mise measures, is hereby declared inoperative and void ; it being
the true intent and meaning of this Act not to legislate slavery
into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to
leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their
domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Con
stitution of the United States."
It is impossible to conceive how it could be inferred that the
Compromise of 1850, ou the question of slavery in the territories,
would be inconsistent -with the long previous Missouri Compromise
» P. 239. t Con. Globe, 1853-'4, p. 1321.

28 ME. Buchanan's administeation
of 1820 ; because each applied to distinct and separate portions
of our territorial domain. Whilst the Missouri Compromise was
confined to the territory acquired from France under the
Louisiana purchase, that of 1850 provided only for the new ter
ritory long afterwards acquired from Mexico under the treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo. The Compromise measures of 1850 contain
no words to repeal or invalidate the Missouri Compromise. On
the contrary, they expressly recognize it, as we have already
seen, in the Act providing for^the cession of a jportionof Texas to
New Mexico.
After a careful review of the history of the anti-slavery party,
from its origin, the candid inquirer must admit that up tiU this
period it had acted on the aggressive against the South. From*
the beginning it had kept the citizens of the slaveholding States
in constant irritation, as well as serious apprehension for their
domestic peace and security. They were the assailed party, and
had been far more sinned against than sinning. It is true, they
had denounced their assailants with extreme rancor and many
threats ; but had done nothing more. In sustaining the repeal
of the Missouri Compromise, however, the Senators and Repre
sentatives of the Southern States became the aggressors them
selves, and thereby placed the country in an alarming and dan
gerous condition from which it has never since been rescued.
-'' The repeal of the Missouri Compromise having entirely re
moved the interdict against slavery in all our territories north of
36° 30', the struggle immediately commenced in Kansas between
the anti-slavery and pro-slavery parties. On this theatre the
-extreme men of both sections were brought into mortal conflict.
Each party hurried emigrants to the Territory ; — the one intent
upon making it a free, the other, though in violation of the laws
of climate, upon making it a slave State. The one strenuously
contended that slavery, under the Constitution, was local in its
character and conflned to the States where it existed ; and
therefore, if an emigrant passed into the ' Territory with his
slaves, these became instantly free. The other maintained, with
equal zeal, that slaves were recognized as property by the Con
stitution, and consequently their masters had a right to take
them to Kansas and hold them there, under its guarantees, like

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 29
any other property. Besides, the South insisted that without
this right the equality of the States within their common ter
ritory was destroyed, and they would be degraded from the rank
of equals to that of inferiors.
It was not long until a fierce and 'vindictive war arose in
Kansas between the opposing parties. In this, scenes of blood
shed and rapine were enacted by both parties, disgraceful to the
American character. It is not our purpose to recapitulate these
sad events.
Wliilst the pro-slavery party in the Territory sustained the
Government in all its branches which had been established over
it by Congress, the anti-slavery party repudiated it. They
contended that frauds and violence had been committed in the
election of members to the Territorial Legislature sufficient to
render its enactments a nullity. For this reason they had held
a Convention at Topeka, had framed a State Constitution, had
elected their o'wn Governor and Legislature to take the place
of those in the actual administration of the Territorial Govern
ment, and had applied to Congress for admission into the Union.
Such were the first bitter fruits of repealing the Missouri in
terdict against slavery north of 36° 30', and thus opening the
Territory of Kansas to the admission of slaves.
It cannot be doubted that fi-auds and violence had been com
mitted in this election ; but whether sufficient to render it a
nullity was a question for Congress to decide. After a long and
violent struggle. Congress had decided this question by finally
rejecting the application for the admission of Kansas as a State
into the Union under the Topeka Constitution, and by recog
nizing the authority of the Territorial Government.
Such was the condition of Kansas when Mr. Buchanan
entered upon the duties of the Presidential office. All these
proceedings had taken place during the session of Congress
(1856-'7) which terminated immediately before his inauguration.
It will be admitted that he possessed no power to go behind the
action of Congress and adjudge it to be null and void. In fact,
he had no alternative but to sustain the Territorial Government.
A new era was now commencing with the accession of Presi
dent Buchanan, and he indulged the hope that the anti-slavery

30 ME. Buchanan's administeation
party would abandon their hostihty to the Temtorial Gov
emment and obey the laws. In this he was encouraged by the
fact, that the Supreme Court had just decided that slavery
existed in Kansas under the Constitution of the Utiited States,
and consequently the people of that Territory could only relieve
themselves from it by electing anti-slavery delegates to the
approaching Lecompton Convention, in sufficient number to
frame a free State Constitution preparatory to admission into the
Union. They could no longer expect ever to be admitted as a
State under the Topeka Constitution. The thirty-fourth Con
gress had just expired, having recognized the legal existence of
the Territorial Legislature in a variety of forms wbich need not
be enumerated.* The Delegate elected under a Territorial law
to the House of Representatives had been admitted to his seat,
and had completed his term of service on the day previous to
Mr. Buchanan's inauguration.
In this reasonable hope the President was destined to disap
pointment. The anti-slavery party, dm-ing a period of ten
months, from the 4th of March, 1857, until the first Monday of
January, 1858, continued to defy the Territorial Government
and to cling to their Topeka organization. The first symptom
of yielding was not until the latter day, when a large portion
of them voted for State officials and a member of Congress un
der the Lecompton Constitution. Meanwhile, although actual
war was suspended between the parties, yet the peace was only
maintained by the agency of United States troops. " The op
posing parties still stood in hostile array against each other,
and any accident might have relighted the flames of civil war.
Besides, at this critical moment, Kansas was left without a Gov
ernor, by the resignation of Governor Geary."']-
Soon after the inauguration an occasion offered to Mr.
Buchanan to define the policy he intended to pursue in relation
to Kansas. This was in answer to a memorial presented to him
by forty-three distinguished citizens of Connecticut, a number
of them being eminent di'vines. The following we extract from
his letter dated at Washington, August 15, 1857 :
* Message to Congress transmitting the Constitution of Kansas.
t Message of December, 1857, p. 18.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 31
" When I entered upon the duties of the Presidential office,
on the fourth of March last, what was the condition of Kansas ?
This Territory had been organized under the Act of Congress
of 30th May, 1854, and the government in all its branches was
in full operation. A governor, secretary of the Territory, chief
justice, two associate justices, a marshal, and district attorney
had been appointed by my predecessor, by and 'with the advice
and consent of the Senate, and were aU engaged in discharging
their respective duties. A code of laws had been enacted by
the Territorial Legislature ; and the judiciary were employed in
expounding and carrying these laws into effect. It is quite true
that a controversy had previously arisen respecting the validity
of the election of members of the Temtorial Legislature and of
the laws passed by them ; but at the time I entered upon my
official duties Congress had recognized this Legislature in differ
ent forms and by different enactments. The delegate elected
to the House of Representatives, under a Territorial law, had
just completed his term of service on the day previous to my
inauguration. In fact, I found the government of Kansas as
well estabhshed as that of any other Territory. Under these
circumstances, what was my duty ? Was it not to sustain this
govemment ? to protect it from the 'violence of lawless men, who
were determined either to rule or ruin ? to prevent it from being
overturned by force? in the language of the Constitution, to
' take care that the laws be faithfully . executed ' ? It was for
this purpose, and this alone, that I ordered a military force to
Kansas to act as a posse comitatus in aiding the civil magistrate
to carry the laws into execution. The condition of the Territory
at the time, which I need not portray, rendered this precaution
absolutely necessary. In this state of affairs, would I not have
been justly condemned had I left the marshal and other officers
of a like character impotent to execute the process and judgments
of courts of justice established by Congress, or by the Territorial
Legislature under its express authority, and thus have suffered
the govemment itself to become an object of contempt in the
eyes of the people? And yet this is what you designate as
forcing ' the people of Kansas to obey laws not their own, nor
of the United States ;' and for doing which you have denounced
3

32 ME. Buchanan's administration
me as having violated my solemn oath. I ask, what else could
I have done, or ought I to have done ? Would you have desired
that I should abandon the Territorial govemment, sanctioned as
it had been by Congress, to illegal violence, and thus renew the
scenes of ci'vil war and bloodshed which every patriot in the
country had deplored ? This would, indeed, have been to vio
late my oath of office, and to fix a damning blot on the charac
ter of my administration.
" I most cheerfully admit that the necessity for sending a mil
itary force to Kansas to aid in the execution of the civil law,
refiects no credit upon the character of our country. But let
the blame fall upon the heads of the gbilty. Whence did this
necessity arise ? A portion of the people of Kansas, unwilling
to trust to the ballot-box — the certain American remedy for
' the redress of all grievances — undertook to create an indepen
dent government for themselves. Had this attempt proved suc
cessful, it would of course have subverted the existing govem
ment, prescribed and recognized by Congress, and substituted a
revolutionary government in its stead. This was a usurpation
of the same character as it would be for a portion of the people
of Connecticut to undertake to establish a separate government
¦within its chartered limits for the purpose of redressing any
grievance, real or imaginary, of which they might have com
plained against the legitimate State government. Such a prin
ciple, if carried into execution, would destroy all lawful author
ity and produce universal anarchy."
And again : " I thank you for the assurances that you ¦will
' not refrain from the prayer that Almighty God ¦wiU make my
administration an example of justice and beneficence.' You
can greatly aid me in arriving at this blessed consummation, by
exerting your infiuence in allaying the existing sectional excite
ment on the subject of slavery, which has been productive of
much evil and no good, aud which, if it could succeed in attain
ing its object, would ruin the slave as well as his master. This
would be a work of genuine philanthropy. Every day of my
life I feel how inadequate I am to perform the duties of my
high station without the continued support of Divine Prov
idence yet, placing my tmst in Him and in Him alone, I enter-

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 33
tain a good hope that He will enable me to do equal justice to
aU portions of the Union, and thus render me an humble instru
ment in restoring peace and harmony among the people of the
several States."
This answer, at the time, appeared to give general satisfac
tion. Soom after the 4th of March, 1857, Mr. Robert J. Walker
was appointed Govemor, and Mr. Frederick P. Stanton Secre
tary of the Territory of Kansas. The great object in 'view was
to prevail upon the Anti-Slavery party to unite with their oppo
nents in framing a State Constitution for Kansas, leaving the
question to be decided at the ballot-box whether it should enter
the Union as a free or as a slave State. Accordingly the Gov
ernor was instructed to take care that the election for delegates
to the convention should be held and conducted with perfect
fairness to both parties, so that the genuine voice of the people
might be truly heard and obeyed. This duty he performed 'with
fidelity and ability, but unfortunately 'without success.
The laws which had been passed by the Territorial Legisla
ture providing for this election are liable to no just exception.
The President, speaking on this subject in his message of 2d of
February, 1858, transmitting the Kansas Constitution to Con
gress, employs the following language : — " It is impossible that
any people could have proceeded with more regularity in the
formation of a ctostitution than the people of Kansas have done.
It was necessary, first, to ascertain whether it was the desire of
the people to be relieved from their territorial dependence and
establish a State govemment. For this purpose the Territorial
Legislature, in 1855, passed a law ' for taking the sense of the
people of this Territory upon the expediency of calhng a con
vention to form a State constitution ' at the general election to
be held in October, 1856. The ' sense of the people ' was ac
cordingly taken, and they decided in favor of a convention. It
is true that at this election the enemies of the territorial gov
emment did not vote, because they were then engaged at Topeka,
without the slightest pretext of lawful authority, in framing a
constitution of their own for the purpose of subverting the ter
ritorial govemment.

34 ME. Buchanan's administeation
" In pursuance of this decision of the people in favor of a
convention, the Territorial Legislature, on the 27th day of Feb-
raary, 1857, passed an act for the election of delegates on the
third Monday of June, 1857, to frame a State constitution.
This law is as fair in its pro-visions as any that ever passed a
legislative body for a similar purpose. The right of suffrage at
this election is clearly and justly defined. ' Every hond fide in
habitant of the Territory of Kansas ' on the third Monday of
June, the day of the election, who was a citizen of the United
States, above the age of twenty-one, and had resided therein for
three months pre'vious to that date, was entitled to vote. In
order to avoid all interference from neighboring States or Terri
tories with the freedom and fairness of the election, provision
was made for the registry of the qualified voters ; and in pur
suance thereof nine thousand two hundred and fifty-one voters
were registered."
The great object was to convince these 9,251 quahfied electors
that they ought to vote in the choice of delegates to the conven
tion, and. thus terminate the controversy by the will of the
majority. The Governor urged them to exercise their right of sufirage ;
but in vain. In his Inaugural Address of the 27th of May, 1857,
he informed them that, "Under our practice, the prehminary
act of framing a State constitution is uniformly performed
through the instrumentality of a convention of delegates chosen
by the people themselves. That convention is now about to be
elected by you under the call of the Territorial Legislature,
created and stiU recognized by the authority of Congress, and
clothed by it, in the comprehensive language of the organic law,
¦with full power to make such an enactment. The Territorial
Legislature, then, in assembling this convention, were fully sus
tained by the Act of Congress, and the authority of the conven
tion is distinctly recognized in my instructions from the Presi
dent of the United States." The Governor proceeded to warn
them, clearly and distinctly, what would be the consequences,
if they should not participate in the election. " The people of
Kansas, then," he says, " are invited by the highest authority
kuo'wn to the Constitution, to participate, freely and fairly, in

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 35
the election of delegates to frame a Constitution and State Gov
emment. The law has performed its entire appropriate function
when it extends to the people the right of suffrage, but cannot
compel the performance of that duty. Throughout our whole
Union, however, and wherever free government prevails, those
who abstain from the exercise of the right of suffrage authorize
those who do vote to act for them in that contingency ; and the
absentees are as much bound, under the law and Constitution,
where ihere is no fraud or violence, by the act of the majority
of those who do vote, as if all had participated in the election.
Otherwise, as voting must be voluntary, self-government would
be impracticable, and monarchy or despotism would remain as
the only alternative."
" This was the propitious moment," said the President,
" for settling all difficulties in Kansas. This was the time for
abandoning the revolutionary Topeka organization, and for the
enemies of the existing govemment to conform to the laws, and
to unite with its friends in framing a State Constitution. But
this they reftised to do, and the consequences of their refusal to
submit to lawful authority and vote at the election of dele
gates may yet prove to be of a most deplorable character.
Would that the respect for the laws bf the land which so emi
nently distinguished the men of the past generation could be
ye-vived ! It is a disregard and violation of law which have for
years kept the Territory of Kansas in a state of almost open re
bellion against its government. It is the same spirit which has
produced actual rebellion in Utah. Our only safety consists in
obedience and conformity to law. Should a general spirit
against its enforcement prevail, this will prove fatal to us as a
nation. We acknowledge no master but the law ; and should
we cut loose from its restraints, and every one do what seemeth
good in his own eyes, our case will indeed be hopeless.
" The enemies of the territorial govemment determined stiU
to resist the authority of Congress. They refused to vote for
delegates to the convention, not because, from circumstances
which I need not detail, there was an omission to register the
comparatively few voters who were inbabitants of certain coun
ties of Kansas in the early spring of 1857, but because they had

36 ME.
predetermined, at all hazards, to adhere to their revolutionary
organization, and defeat the estabhshment of any other consti
tution than that which they had framed at Topeka. The elec
tion was, therefore, suffered to pass by default ; but of this result
the quahfied electors who refused to vote can never justly com
plain." A large majority, therefore, of Pro-Slavery delegates were
elected members of the convention.
" From this review, it is manifest that the Lecompton Con
vention, notwithstanding the refusal of the Anti-Slavery party to
vote, was legally constituted and was invested with power to
frame a constitution."
It has been urged that these proceedings were in 'violation
of the sacred principle of popular sovereignty. " But in what
manner," said the President, "is popular sovereignty to be
exercised in this country, if not through the instrumentality of
established law? In certain small repubUcs of ancient times
the people did assemble in primary meetings, passed laws, and
directed pubhc affairs. In our country this is manifestly impos
sible. Popular sovereignty can be exercised here only through
the ballot-box ; and if the people wiU refuse to exercise it in this
manner, as they have done in Kansas at the election of dele
gates, it is not for them to complain that their rights have been
violated." Throughout the intervening period, and for some time there
after, Kansas was in a dreadful condition. To illustrate this,
we shall transcribe several paragraphs from the President's
Message.* He says, that " A great delusion seems to pervade
the pubhc mind in relation to the condition of parties in Kansas.
This arises from the difficulty of inducing the American people
to realize the fact that any portion of them should be in a state
of rebelhon against the Government under which they Hve.
When we speak of the affairs of Kansas, we are apt to refer
merely to the existence of two violent political parties in tliat
Territory, divided on the question of slavery, just as we speak
of such parties in the States. This presents no adequate idea of
• Page 1.

ON THE EVE OP THE EEBELLION. 87
the true state of the case. The dividing line there is not be
tween two political parties, both acknowledging the lawful ex
istence of the government, but between those who are loyal to
this govemment, and those who have endeavored to destroy its
existence by force and by usurpation — between those who sustain
and those who have done all in their power to overthrow the
territorial govemment established by Congress. This govem
ment they would long since have subverted, had it not been
protected from their assaults by the troops of the United States.
Such has been the condition of affairs since my inauguration.
Ever since that period a large portion of the people of Kansas
have been in a state of rebelhon against the govemment, with
a military leader at their head of a most turbulent and danger
ous character. They have never acknowledged, but have con
stantly renounced and defied the government to which they owe
allegiance, and have been all the time in a state of resistance
against its authority. They have all the time been endeavoring
to subvert it, and to estabhsh a revolutionary government, under
the so-called Topeka Constitution, in its stead. Even at this
very moment the Topeka Legislature is in session. Whoever
has read the correspondence of Governor Walker with the State
Department, recently communicated to the Senate, will be con-
'vinced that this picture is not overdrawn. He always protested
against the withdrawal of any portion of the mihtary force of
the United States from the Territory, deeming its presence
absolutely necessary for the preservation of the regular govem
ment and the execution of the laws. In his very first despatch
to the Secretary of State, dated June 2, 1857, he says : ' The
most alarming movement, however, proceeds from the assem
bling on the 9th of June o^ the so-called Topeka Legislature,
¦with a view to the enactment of an entire code of laws. Of
course it will be my endeavor to prevent such a result, as it
would lead to ine^vitable and disastrous colhsion, and, in fact,
renew the civil war in Kansas.' This was ¦with difficulty pre
vented by the efforts of Governor Walker ; but soon thereafter,
on the 14th of July, we find him requesting General Hamey to
furnish him a regiment of dragoons to proceed to the city of
La-wrence, and this for the reason that he had received authentic

38 ME. Buchanan's administeation
intelligence, verified by his own actual observation, that a dan
gerous rebelhon had occurred, ' involving an open defiance of
the laws and the estabhshment of an insurgent government in
that city.'
" In the Governor's despatch of July 15, he informs the
Secretary of State ' that this movement at Lawrence was the
beginning of a plan, originating in that city, to organize insur
rection throughout the Territory ; ' and especially in all towns,
cities, or counties where the Repubhcan party have a majority.
Lawrence is the hot-bed of all the abolition movements in this
Territory. It is the town established by the abohtion societies of
the east ; and whilst there are respectable people there, it is filled
by a considerable number of mercenaries who are paid by abolition
societies to perpetuate and diffuse agitation throughout Kansas,
and prevent a peaceful settlement of this question. Halving
failed in inducing their own so-called Topeke State Legislature
to organize this insurrection, Lawrence has commenced it her
self, and, if not arrested, the rebellion wdl extend throughout
the Territory.'
" And again : ' In order to send this communication imme
diately by mail, I must close by assuring you that the spirit of
rebellion pervades the great mass of the Repubhcan party of this
Territory, instigated, as I entertain no doubt they are, by east
ern societies, having in view results most disastrous to the Gov
ernment and to the Union ; and that the continued presence
of General Harney here is indispensable, as originally stipulated
by me, with a large body of dragoons and several batteries.'
" On the 20th July, 1857, General Lane, under the authority
of the Topeka Convention, undertook, as Governor Walker in
forms us, ' to organize the whole so-called free State party into
volunteers, and to take the names of all who refuse enrolment.
The professed object is to protect the polls, at the election in
August, of the new insurgent Topeka State Legislature. The
object of taking the names of all who refuse enrolment is to ter
rify the free State conservatives into submission. This is proved
by recent atrocities committed on such men byTopekaites. The
speedy location of large bodies of regular troops here, with two
batteries, is necessary. The Lawrence insurgents await the

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 39
development of this new revolutionary military organization,'
etc., etc.
"In the Governor's despatch of July 27th, he says that
' General Lane and his staff everywhere deny the authority of
the territorial laws, and counsel a total disregard of these enact
ments.' " Without making further quotations of a similar character
from other despatches of Governor Walker, it appears by a refer
ence to Mr. Stanton's communication to General Cass, of the
9th of December last, that the ' important step of calling the
[Territorial] Legislature together was taken after I [he] had be
come satisfied that the election ordered by the Convention ou
the 21st instant [December] could not be conducted without col
lision and bloodshed.' So intense was the disloyal feeling
among the enemies of the government established by Congress,
that an election which afforded them an opportunity, if in the
majority, of making Kansas a free State, according to their own
professed desire, could not be conducted without collision and
bloodshed !
" The truth is, that, up till the present moment, the enemies
of the existing govemment still adhere to their Topeka revolu
tionary constitution and government. The very first paragraph
of the message of Governor Robinson, dated on the 7th of De
cember, to the Topeka Legislature, now assembled at Lawrence,
contains an open defiance of the Constitution and laws of the
United States. The Governor says : ' The Convention which
framed the constitution at Topeka originated with the people
of Kansas Territory. They have adopted and ratified the same
twice by a direct vote, and also indirectly through two elections
of State officers and members of the State Legislature. Yet it
has pleased the administration to regard the whole proceeding
as revolutionary.' " The Topeka govemment, adhered to with such treasonable
pertinacity, is a govemment in direct opposition to the existing
government prescribed and recognized by Congress. *.It is a
usurpation of the same character as it would be for a portion of
the people of any State of the Union to undertake to establish a
separate govemment, within its limits, for the purpose of re-

40 ME.
dressing any grievance, real or imaginary, of which they might
complain against the legitimate State Govemment. Such a
principle, if carried into execution, would destroy all lawful
authority and produce universal anarchy.
" From this statement of facts, the reason becomes palpable
why the enemies of the government autborized by Congress
have refused to vote for delegates to the Kansas Constitutional
Convention, and, also, afterwards on the question of slavery
submitted by it to the people. It is because they have ever re
fused to sanction or recognize any other constitution than that
framed at Topeka."
The Convention, thus lawfully constituted, met for the sec
ond time on the 4th of September, and proceeded to frame a
constitution, and finally adjourned on the 7th day of Novem
ber, 1857.* A large majority of its members, in consequence
of the refusal of the Anti-Slavery electors to vote for delegates,
were in favor of establishing slavery. The Convention having
refused to submit the whole constitution to the people, in oppo
sition to the desire of the President, determined finally to sub
mit to them only the all-important question whether slavery
should or should not exist in the new State. This they were
required to do under the true construction of the Kansas and
Nebraska Act, and without this the constitution would have
encountered his decided opposition. It was not, however, until
the last moment, and this after an angry and excited debate, that
the Convention, by a majority of only three, determined to sub
mit this question to a popular vote. Acting on the authority
of former precedents, and considering that all other parts of
the constitution had been finally adopted, they therefore sub
mitted the question of slavery alone to the people, at an election
to be held on the 21st December, 1857. For this purpose they
provided that, before the constitution adopted by the Convention
" shall be sent to Congress asking for admission into the Union
as a State," an election shall be held to decide this question,
at which all the white male inhabitants of the Territory should
be entitled to vote. They were to vote by ballot ; and " the bal-
* Senate Documents, 1857-'58, vol. vii., No. 21.

ON THE EVE OP THE EEBELLION. 41
lots cast at said election shall be indorsed ' Constitution with
Slavery,' and ' Constitution with no Slavery.' "
" Here, again," says the President, " a fair opportunity was
presented to the adherents of the Topeka Constitution, if they
were the majority, to decide this exciting question ' in their o-wn
way,' aud thus restore peace to the distracted Territory ; but they
again refused to exercise their right of popular sovereignty, and
again suffered the election to pass by default." In consequence,
the result, according to the report of J. Calhoun, the President
of the Convention, was 6,226 votes in favor of slavery, and but
569 against it.
The constitution thus adopted had provided for holding an
election on the first Monday of January, 1858, for " a Govemor,
Lieutenant-Govemor, Secretary of State, State Treasurer, and
members of the Legislature, aud also a member of Congress."
The election was peaceably conducted under the instructions
of the President. A better spirit now prevailed among the op
ponents of the Lecompton Constitution, and they no longer re
frained from voting. A large majority of them, by a strange
but happy inconsistency, recognized its existence by voting un
der its provisions.*
This election was warmly contested by the two political
parties in Kansas, and a greater vote was polled than at any
previous election. A large majority of the members of the
Legislature elect belonged to that party which had previously
refused to vote. The Anti-Slavery party were thus placed in
the ascendant, and the political power of the State was in their
hands. The President hailed this evidence of returning reason as an
auspicious event. It had been his constant effort from the begin
ning to induce the Anti-Slavery party to vote. Now that this
had been accomplished, he knew that all revolutionary troubles
in Kansas would speedily terminate. A resort to the ballot
box, instead of force, was the most effectual means of restoring
peace and tranquillity.
It was after all these events had transpired, that the Presi-
* Message Dec. 6, 1858.

42dent, ou the 30th January, 1858, received the Lecompton Con
stitution, -with a request from the President of the Convention
that it might be submitted to the consideration of Congress.
This was done by the message of the 2d February, 1858, from
which we have already made several extracts. In this the
President recommended the admission of Kansas as a State under
the Lecompton Constitution. He says : " The people of Kansas
have, then, ' in their own way,' and in strict accordance with the
organic act, framed a constitution and State Govemment ; have
submitted the all-important question of slavery to the people,
and have elected a govemor, a member to represent them in
Congress, members of the State Legislature, and other State
officers. They now ask admission into the Union under this
constitution, which is repubhcan in its form. It is for Congress
to decide whether they will admit or reject the State which has
thus been created. For my own part, I am decidedly in favor
of its admission, and thus terminating the Kansas question.
This 'will carry out the great principle of non-intervention recog
nized and sanctioned by the organic act, which declares in ex
press language in favor of ' non-intervention by Congress 'with
slavery in the States or Territories,' lea-ving ' the people thereof
perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions
in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United
States.' In this manner, by localizing the question of slavery
and confining it to the people whom it immediately concerned,
every patriot anxiously expected that this question would be
banished from the halls of Congress, where it has always ex
erted a baneftil influence throughout the whole country."
" If Congress, for the sake of those men who refused to vote
for delegates to the convention when they might have excluded
slavery from the constitution, and who afterwards refused to
vote on the 21st December last, when they might, as they claim,
have stricken slavery from the constitution, should now reject
the State because slavery remains in the constitution, it is man
ifest that the agitation on this dangerous subject will be renewed
in a more alarming form than it has ever yet assumed."
" As a question of expediency, after the right [of admission]
has. been maintained, it may be wise to reflect upon the benefits

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 43
to Kansas and to the whole country which would result from its
immediate admission into the Union, as well as the disasters
which may follow its rejection. Domestic peace will be the"
happy consequence of its admission, and that fine Territory,
which has hitherto been torn by dissensions, will rapidly in
crease in population and wealth, and speedily realize the bless
ings and the comforts which follow in the train of agricultural
and mechanical industry. The people will then be sovereign,
and can regulate their O'wn affairs in their own way. If a ma
jority of them desire to abolish domestic slavery within the State,
there is no other possible mode by which this can be effected so
speedily as by prompt admission. The will of the majority is
supreme and irresistible when expressed in an orderly and law
ful manner. They can make and unmake constitutions at
pleasure. It would be absurd to say that they can impose
fetters upon their o'wn power which they cannot afterwards
remove. If they could do this, they might tie their own hands
for a hundred as well as for ten years. These are fundamental
principles of American freedom, and are recognized, I believe,
in some form or other, by every State constitution ; and if Con
gress, in the act of admission, should think proper to recognize
them, I can perceive no objection to such a course. This has
been done emphatically in the constitution of Kansas. It de
clares in the bill of rights that ' aU political power is inherent
in the people, and all free governments are founded on their au
thority and instituted for their benefit, and therefore they have
at all times an inalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform,
or abolish their form of government iu such manner as they
may think proper.' The great State of New York is at this
moment governed under a Qonstitution framed and established in
direct opposition to the' mode prescribed by the previous consti
tution. If, therefore, the provision changing the Kansas consti
tution after the year one thousand eight hundred and sixty-four,
could by possibility be construed into a prohibition to make
such a change previous to that period, this prohibition would
be wholly unavailing. The Legislature already elected may, at
its very first session, submit the question to a vote of the people
whether they will or wiU not have a convention to amend their

44 ME. Buchanan's administeation
constitution, and adopt all necessary means for giving effect to
the popular will."
" Every patriot in the country had indulged the hope that
the Kansas and Nebraska Act would put a final end to the
slavery agitation, at least in Congress, which had for more than
twenty years convulsed the country and endangered the Union.
This act involved great and fundamental principles, and if
fairly carried into effect will settle the question. Should the
agitation be again revived, should the people of the sister States
be again estranged from each other with more than their former
bitterness, this will arise from a cause, so far as the interests of
Kansas are concerned, more trifiing and insignificant than has
ever stirred the elements of a great people into commotion. To
the people of Kansas, the only practical difference between ad
mission or rejection depends simply upon the fact whether they
can themselves more speedily change the present constitution if
it does not accord with the will of the majority, or frame a sec
ond constitution to be submitted to Congress hereafter. Even
if this were a question of mere expediency, and not of right, the
small difference of time, one way or the other, is of not the least
importance, when contrasted with the evils which must neces
sarily result to the whole country from a revival of the slavery
agitation. " In considering this question, it should never be forgotten
that, in proportion to its insignificance, let the decision be what
it may, so far as it may affect the few thousand inhabitants of
Kansas who have from the beginning resisted the constitution
and the laws, for this very reason the rejection of the constitu
tion will be so much the more keenly- felt by the people of four
teen of the States of this Union, where slavery is recognized
under the Constitution of the United States.
" Again : The speedy admission of Kansas into the Union
would restore peace and quiet to the whole country. Already
the affairs of this Territory have engrossed an undue proportion
of public attention. They have sadly affected the friendly rela
tions of the people of the States with each other, and alarmed
the fears of patriots for the safety of the Union. Kansas once
admitted into the Union, the excitement becomes locahzed, and

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 45
¦will soon die away for want of outside ahment. Then every
difficulty will be settled at the ballot box."
" I have thus performed my duty on this important question,
under a deep sense of responsibility to God and my country. My
public life will terminate within a brief period ; and I have no
other object of earthly ambition than to leave my country in
a peaceful and prosperous condition, and to live in the affections
and respect of my countrymen. The dark and ominous clouds
which now appear to be impending over the Union, I conscien
tiously believe may be dissipated with honor to every portion of
it by the admission of Kansas during the present session of Con
gress; whereas, if she should be rejected, I greatly fear these
clouds will become darker and more ominous than any which
have ever yet threatened the Constitution and the Union."
This Message gave rise to a long, exciting, and occasionally
violent debate in both Houses of Congress, between the Anti-
Slavery members and their opponents, which lasted for nearly
three months. In the course of it slavery was denounced in
every form which could exasperate the Southern people and
render it odious to the people of the North ; whilst, on the other
hand, many of the speeches of Southern members displayed
characteristic violence. Thus two sessions of Congress in suc
cession had been in a great degree occupied with the same in
flammatory topics, in discussing the affairs of Kansas.
The debate was finally concluded by the passage of the
" Act for the admission of the State of Kansas into the Union,"
of the 4th May, 1858.* This act, which had been reported by
a Committee of Conference of both Houses, was passed in the
Senate by a vote of 31 to 22, and in the House by a vote of 112
to lOS.f This was strictly a party vote in both Houses, with
the exception of Mr. Douglas, in the Senate, who voted with the
minority, and a few so-called Anti-Lecompton Democrats who
voted with the minority in the House. This act explicitly
recognizes t"he validity of the proceedings in Kansas which had
given birth to the Lecompton Constitution. The preamble re
cites that — • 11 U. S. Laws, p. 269.
t Con. Globe, 1857-'8, pp. 1899 and 1905.

46 ME. Buchanan's administeation
" WJiereas, The people of the Territory of Kansas did, by
a Convention of Delegates assembled at Lecompton, on the
seventh day of November, one thousand eight hundred and
fifty-seven, for that purpose, form for themselves a Constitution
and State Government, which Constitution is republican," etc. ;
and it then proceeds to enact, " That the State of Kansas be,
and is hereby, admitted into the Union on an equal footing 'with
the original States in all respects whatever, but upon this fun
damental condition precedent," etc.
The necessity for this condition precedent arose from the fact
that the ordinance of the Convention accompanying the consti
tution, claimed for the State a cession of the public lands
more than six times the quantity which had been granted to
other States when entering the Union.* The estimated amount
was more than twenty-three million five hundred thousand
acres. To such an exaction Congress could not yield. In heu
of this ordinance, therefore, they proposed to submit to a vote
of the people of Kansas a proposition reducing the number of
acres to be ceded, to that which had been granted to other
States. Should this proposition be accepted by the people,
then the fact was to be announced by the proclamation of the
President ; and " thereafter, and without any further proceedings
on the part of Congress, the admission of the State of Kansas
into the Union, upon an equal footing 'with the original States in
aU respects whatever, shall be complete and absolute."
Such was the condition precedent, which was never ftdfiUed,
because the people by their votes on the 2d of August, 1858,
rejected the proposition of Congress, and therefore Kansas was
not admitted into the Union under the Lecompton Constitution.
Not'withstanding this, the recognition by Congress of the regu
larity of the proceedings in forming the Lecompton Constitution
did much good, at least for a season. It diverted the attention
of the people from fighting to voting, a most salutary change.
The President, in referring to this subject in his next annual
Message of December 6, 1858, uses the following language :
" When we compare the condition of the country at the present
* Con. Globe, 1857-8, p. 1766.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 47
day with what it was one year ago, at the meeting of Congress,
we have much reason for gratitude to that Almighty Providence
which has never failed to interpose for our rehef at the most
critical periods of our history. One year ago the sectional strife
between the North aud the South on the dangerous subject of
slavery had again become so intense as to threaten the peace
and perpetuity of the confederacy. The apphcation for the ad
mission of Kansas as a State into the Union fostered this un
happy agitation, and brought the whole subject once more before
Congress. It was the desire of every patriot that such measures
of legislation might be adopted as would remove the excitement
from the States and confine it to the Territory where it legiti
mately belonged. Much has been done, I am happy to say, to
wards the accomplishment of this object during the last session
of Congress. " The Supreme Court of the United States had pre'viously de
cided that all American citizens have an equal right to take into
the Territories whatever is held as property under the laws of
any of the States, and to hold such property there under the
guardianship of the Federal Constitution, so long as the territo
rial condition shall remain. This is now a well-established posi
tion, and the proceedings of the last session were alone wanting
to give it practical effect.
" The principle has been recognized, in some form or other, by
an almost unanimous vote of both Houses of Congress, that a
Territory has a right to come into the Union either as a free or
a slave State, according to the will of a majority of its people.
The just equality of all the States has thus been vindicated, and
a fruitful source of dangerous dissension among them has been
removed. " While such has been the beneficial tendency of your legisla
tive proceedings outside of Kansas, their influence has nowhere
been so happy as 'within that Territory itself. Left to manage
and control its O'wn affairs in its own way, without the pressure
of external influence, the revolutionary Topeka organization,
and all resistance to the territorial govemment established by
Congress, have been finally abandoned. As a natural conse
quence, that fine Territory now appears to be tranquil and pros-
4

48 ME. Buchanan's admtnibteation
perous, and is attracting increasing thousands of immigrants to
make it their happy home.
" The past unfortunate experience of Kansas has enforced the
lesson, so often already taught, that resistance to lawful author
ity, under our form of government, cannot fail in the end to
prove disastrous to its authors."
It is unnecessary to pursue this subject further than to state
that Kansas was finally admitted into the Union on the 29th
January, 1861.
The series of events already enumerated had greatly
strengthened and extended the Anti-Slavery party. It soon
drew within its vortex all other pohtical organizations in the free
States, except that of the old Democratic party, and consoh-
dated them under the name of the Republican party. This
thenceforward became purely sectional, and was confined to
the States north of Mason and Dixon's line.
The Kansas and Nebraska Act had referred all constitutional
questions respecting slavery in the Territories, to the Supreme
Court of the United States. It accordingly furnished the neces
sary facihties for bringing cases " invol'ving title to slaves," or
the " question of personal freedom," before that tribunal.
At the period of Mr. Buchanan's inauguration a case was
pending before that Com-t (Dred Scott v, Sandford, 19 Howard's
Reports, p. 393) involving all the contested questions in regard
to slavery. This, at the time, presented to him a cheerful but
delusive prospect. He confidently expected that the decision
of the Court would settle all these questions and eventually re
store harmony among the States. Accordingly, in his Inau
gural Address, he had declared that to this decision, whatever it
might be, he should, in common with all good citizens, cheer
fully submit. This was his imperative duty. Our free form of
government must soon be destroyed, should the Executive set
up his judgment against that of the coordinate judicial branch,
on a question clearly within its constitutional jurisdiction.
Two days after the inauguration, on the 6th March, 1857,
the Supreme Court pronounced its judgment. This was deliv
ered bj Chief Justice Taney, and embraced all the points in con-
trover* f. It estabhshes the following propositions :

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 49
1. Congress has power to acquire territory, "to be held by
the United States until it is in a suitable condition to become a
State upon an equal footing with the other States."
2. This territory is " acquired by the General Government,
as the representative and trustee of the people of the United
States, and it must therefore be held in that character for their
common and equal benefit ; for it was the people of the several
States, acting through their agent and representative, the Fed
eral Govemment, who in fact acquired the territory in question,
and the Government holds it for their common use, until it shall
be associated with the other States as a member of the con
federacy." 3. Until that time should arrive, it was the duty of Congress
to estabhsh a government over the Territory, " best suited
for the protection and security of the citizens of the United
States, and other inhabitants who might be authorized to take
up their abode there."
4. But " the territory being a part of the United States,
the Govemment and the citizen both enter it under the authority
of the Constitution, with their respective rights defined and
marked out ; and the Federal Govemment can exercise no power -i
over his person or property beyond what that instrument con
fers, nor lawfully deny any right which it has reserved."
5. The Federal Government possesses no power to violate ¦<-^
the rights of property -within such Territory, because these " are '
united with the rights of persons, and placed on the same ground f
by the fifth amendment to the Constitution, which provides that
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." " And the powers over persons and property
of which we speak, are not only not granted to Congress, but
are in express terms denied, and they are forbidden to exercise
them. And this prohibition is not confined to the States, but
the words are general, and extend to the whqle Territory over
which the Constitution gives it power to legislate, including
those portions of it remaining under Territorial Government, as
well as that covered by States. It is a total absence of power
everywhere within the dominion of the United States, and places
the citizens of a Territory, as far as these rights are concerned.

50 ME. Buchanan's administeation
on the same footing with citizens of the States, and guards them
as firmly and plainly against any inroads which the General
Government might attempt, under the plea of implied or inci
dental powers. And if Congress itself cannot do this — ^if it is
beyond the powers conferred on the Federal Government — ^it
will be admitted, we presume, that it could not authorize a ter
ritorial Govemment to exercise them. It could confer no power
on any local Govemment, estabhshed by its authority, to violate
the pro'visions of the Constitution."
6. " It seems, however, to be supposed, that there is a differ
ence between property in a slave and other property, and that
different rules may be applied to it in expounding the Constitu
tion of the United States." " Now, as we have already said in
an earlier part of this opinion, ou a different point, the right of
property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the
Constitution. The right to traffic in it, like an ordinary article
of merchandise and property, was guaranteed to the citizens of
the United States, in every State that might desire it, for twenty
years. And the Govemment in express terms is pledged to
protect it in all future time, if the slave escapes from his owner.
This is done in plain words — too plain to be misunderstood.
And no word can be found in the Constitution which gives Con
gress a greater power over slave property, or which entitles
property of that kind to less protection than property of any
other description. The onlypower conferred is the power coupled
with the duty of guarding and protecting the owner in his
rights." " Upon these considerations it is the opinion of the Court
that the Act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from hold
ing and owning property of this kind in the territory of the
United States north of the line therein mentioned [the Missouri
Compromise line], is not warranted by the Constitution, and is
therefore void."
This decision, so fuU and explicit, established the right of the
master to take his slaves into the Territories and hold them
there in despite of all conflicting Cougressional or Territorial
legislation, until the Territories should be prepared to assume
the position of States.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 51
It might have been expected that this decision would have
superseded all opposing pohtical platforms, aud ended the con
troversy in regard to slavery in the Territories. This expecta
tion, notwithstanding, soon proved to be a delusion. Instead
of yielding it obedience, its correctness and binding effect were
instantly resisted by the Republican party. They denounced
and repudiated it in every possible form from the first moment,
and continued to maintain, in opposition to its express terms,
that it was not only the right but the duty of Congress to abolish
slavery in all the Territories. This became a cardinal principle
in the Chicago platform on which Mr. Lincoln was nominated
and elected, and to which his Inaugural proves he had deter
mined to adhere. The agitation continued for years, just as
though the Supreme Court had never decided the question, until
at length Congress passed an Act, on the 19th June, 1862,* de
claring that from and after its passage, " there shall be neither
slavery nor involimtary servitude in any of the Territories of the
United States now existing, or which may at any time hereafter
be formed or acquired by the United States, otherwise than in
punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been didy
convicted." This Act stands upon the Statute Book in direct conflict
with the Constitution as expounded by the Supreme Coordinate
Judicial Tribunal, and is therefore, according to the theory of
our Government, a mere nullity.
On the other hand, a large and respectable portion of the old -
Democratic party of the North, best known as the Douglas
Democracy, equally disregarded the decision of the Supreme
Court. For some years before it was pronounced, this party, whilst
admitting that the Constitution authorizes the migration of
slaves from the States into the Territories, had maintained that
after their arrival it was competent for the Territorial Legisla
ture to impafr or destroy the rights of the master. They claimed
this power by -virtue of a supposed inherent attribute of popular
sovereignty alleged to belong to the first settlers of a Territory,
just as it exists in the people of one of the States. This doctrine
* Pamph. Laws, 1861-'62, p. 432.

52 ME.
was appropriately, though not in good taste, called " squatter
sovereignty." It involved, at least in appearance, an extension
of popular rights, and was therefore well calculated to enhst pub
lic sympathy in its favor. It was presented and enforced by its
advocates in such captivating colors, that before the date of the
decision it had secured many enthusiastic adherents in the North,
whilst it was utterly repudiated in the South. The Douglas
Democracy contended that this their favorite theory had been
recognized in May, 1854, by the Kansas and Nebraska Act, de
claring it to be " the true intent and meaning of this Act not to
legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it
therefrom; but to leave the people thereof free to form and
regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject
only to the Constitution of the United States."
They ought to have reflected that even if this provision had
in plain language conferred upon the first settlers the power to
abolish slavery, still, according to its very terms, it was " subject
to the Constitution of the United States," and like aU other laws
it would be void if in confiict with this Constitution. What
tribunal was to decide this question ? Certainly the Supreme
Court. Indeed the law itself had, in express terms, recognized
this, by prescribing the appropriate method of bringing the
question before that Court. After the Court, therefore, in March,
1857, had decided the question against their ideas of Territorial
sovereignty, they ought to have yielded. They ought to have
acquiesced in the doctrine that property, including that in slaves,
as well in the Territories as in the States, is placed under the
protection of the Constitution, and that neither a Territorial
Legislature nor Congress possesses the power to impair or de
stroy it.
This decision ought surely to have ended the question ; but
not so. Instead of this, the Douglas Democracy disregarded the
decision altogether. They treated it as though it had never
been made, and still continued to agitate without intermission,
and with powerful effect, until the very day of President Lin
coln's election. Absolute non-interference with slavery in the
Territories, ou the part of any human power outside of them,
was their watchword ; thus lea-ving the people thereof en-

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. . 53
tirely free to regulate or destroy it according to their o-wn dis
cretion. On the other hand, the old Democracy, true to its ancient
and time-honored principles in support of law and order, at once
yielded a willing obedience to the decision of the Supreme Court.
Whatever differences of opinion previously existed among them
iu regard to the correctness of the decision, at once disappeared.
Without being the advocates of domestic slavery, they held them
selves bound by the compromises made and recorded in the
Constitution by its illustrious authors, and sustained the decision
from an imperious sense of pubhc duty. It did not require the
authority of the Supreme Court to con-vince a large majority of
them that a Territorial Legislature had not power to deprive a
citizen of his property which was denied both to a State Legisla
ture and to Congress. This extreme power of sovereignty in the
latter cases they knew could only be conferred by an amend
ment to the State or Federal Constitution.
The Douglas Democracy still placed their principal relianse,
as they had done before the decision, on the language of the
Kansas and Nebraska Act. The difference between them and
the old Democracy related to the point of time intended by the
act, when the people of the Territories were recognized to pos
sess the power " to form and regulate their domestic institutions
in their o-wn way." Was this at any time they pleased after
the arrival of the first settlers, or not until the people should
assemble in convention to form a State government, when, in
the language of the act, they were to be admitted into the
Union " with or without slavery, as their constitution may pre
scribe at the time of their admission " ? According to the con
struction of the Douglas Democracy, the act recognized their
right to abolish slavery at any period of the Territorial exist
ence ; but according to the construction of the old Democracy,
there was no recognition of this right, until the period when
they should meet in convention to form a State constitution ;
and such was in accordance with the decision of the Supreme
Court. If the Douglas construction of the act be correct, it is mor
ally certain that the Southem Senators aiid Representatives who

54
were warm advocates of its passage, could not possibly have so
understood it. If they had, they would then have voluntarily
voted away the rights of their own constituents. Indeed, such a
construction of the act would be more destructive to the interests
of the slaveholder, than the Republican doctrine of Congressional
exclusion. Better, far better for him to submit the question to
Congress, where he could be deliberately heard by his representar
tives, than to be deprived of his slaves, after he had gone to the
trouble aud expense of transporting them to a Territory, by a
hasty enactment of a Territorial Legislature elected annually
and freed from all constitutional restraints. Such a construc
tion of the Kansas and Nebraska Act would be in direct opposi
tion to the policy and practice of the Government from its origin.
The men who framed and built up our institutions, so far from
regarding the Territories to be sovereign, treated them as mere
-wards of the Federal Government. Congress, as a faithful and
kind guardian, watched over their infancy and promoted their
gro'wth and prosperity until they attained their majority. During
the period of their pupilage the persons and property of the
inhabitants were protected by the Constitution and laws of the
United States. When the population had so far increased as to
render this expedient. Congress gave them a Territorial Gov
emment. But in conferring upon the settlers the privilege to
elect members to the popular branch of the Territorial Legisla
ture, they took care to reserve the appointment of the Govemor
and the members of the Council to the President and Senate.
Moreover, they expressly pro'vided, in the language of the com
promise measures of 1850, " that all the laws passed by the
Legislative Assembly and Governor shall be submitted to the
Congress of the United States, and if disapproved, shall be null
and of no effect." This limitation on their powers was intended
to restrain them from enacting laws in conffict with the Consti
tution, the laws, or the established policy of the United States.
It produced the happiest effect. The cases are rare, indeed, in
which Congress found it necessary to exercise this disapproving
power. It was not then foreseen that any political party would
arise in this country, claiming the right for the majority of the
first settlers of a Territory, under the plea of popular sovereignty.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 55
to confiscate the property of the minority. When the popula
tion in the Territories had reached a sufficient number. Congress
admitted them as States into the Union under constitutions
framed by themselves, " with or -without slavery," according to
their own discretion.
Long experience had abundantly sanctioned the wisdom of
this policy. Under its benign infiuence many powerful and
prosperous States have been admitted into the Union. No
serious difficulties had ever occurred until the attempt was made
to abolish it under the construction in favor of " squatter sov
ereignty " given to the Kansas and Nebraska Act.
The Southern people, who had expected that after the deci
sion of the Supreme Court their equal rights iu the Territories
would be respected by the Northern Democracy, were deeply
mortified and disappointed to find that a large portion of this
party still persevered in assailing these rights. This exasperated
them, and placed in the hands of Southei-n disunion agitators a
powerful weapon against the Union.
President Buchanan, ever since the commencement of his
administration, has been persistently denounced, especially by
the Douglas Democracy, for sustaining the law as pronounced
by the highest judicial authority of the country. He has been
charged with pro-ving faithless to the Cincinnati platform, which
he accepted and on which he was elected. To prove this would
be impossible, because it is altogetber silent in regard to the
power of a Territorial Legislature over the question of slavery.
Nay, more ; whilst affirming, in general terms, the provisions of
the Kansas aud Nebraska Act, it specifically designates a future
time when slavery may be rightfully abohshed, not by the Terri
torial Legislatm-e, but by the people. This is when, " acting
through the legally and fairly expressed will of a majority of
actual residents, and whenever the number of their inhabitants
justifies it, [they assemble] to form a constitution with or with
out domestic slavery, and be admitted into the Union upon terms
of perfect equality with the other States." Before this period
1 the Cincinnati platform is silent on the subject. The power is
claimed by its advocates as a mere inference from the general
language of the Kansas and Nebraska- Act. But even if the

56 ME.
right of a Territorial Legislature to abolish slavery had been
aflSrmed in express terms by the Cincinnati Convention, which
was the President bound to obey ? — a political platform, or the
Constitution as expounded afterwards by the Supreme Court ?
the decree of a nominating convention, or the supreme law of
the land ? He could not hesitate in the choice under his oath
faithfully and to the best of his ability " to preserve, protect,
and defend the Constitution of the United States." Sad must
be the condition of any country where an appeal can be taken
from judicial decisions to excited popular elections ! Under
our free govemment all citizens are equal before the law. The
law and the law alone is their master. When this is disre
garded and defied by excited and exasperated popular majori
ties, anarchy and confusion must be the inevitable consequence.
Public and private rights are sacrificed to the madness of the
hour. The Government itself becomes helpless for their protec
tion, and to avoid such e'vils history has taught us that the peo
ple 'will at last seek refuge in the arms of despotism. Let all
free governments in future times profit by our example. Let
them take warning that the late disastrous civil war, unjustifia
ble as it was, would most probably never have existed had not
the American people disobeyed and resisted the Constitution of
their country as expounded by the tribunal which they them
selves had created for this express purpose.
The great Democratic party might have maintained its as
cendency and saved the Union, had it not been thus hopelessly
di'vided at this critical period. Encouraged and emboldened
by its irreconcilable di'visions, the Abohtion or Republican party
no longer confined itself to au opposition to slavery in the Ter
ritories. It soon extended its agitation to the suppression of
slavery within the States. At the first it sought to save ap
pearances, but the veil was too transparent to conceal its pur
poses.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 57

CHAPTER III.
Senator Seward — The "Irrepressible Conflict" — Helper's " Impending Crisis " — The
John Brown Raid — The nature cf Fanaticism — The Democratic National Conven
tion at Charleston — Its proceedings and adjournment to Baltimore — Reassem
bling at Baltimore and proceedings there — Its breaking up and division into the
Douglas and the Breckinridge Conventions — Proceedings of each — Review of the
whole and the effect on the South.
Senatoe Sewaed, of New York, was at this period the
acknowledged head and leader of tfie Republican party. In
deed, his utterances had become its oracles. He was much more
of a pohtician than a statesman. Without strong convictions,
he understood the art of preparing in his closet, and uttering
before the public, antithetical sentences well calculated both to
inflame the ardor of his anti-slavery friends and to exasperate
his pro-slavery opponents. If he was not the author of the
" irrepressible conflict," he appropriated it to himself and con
verted it into a party oracle. He thus aroused passions, proba
bly without so intending, which it was beyond his power after
wards to control. He raised a storm which, like others of whom
we read in history, he wanted both the courage and the power
to quell. We quote the following extract from his famous speech at
Rochester on the 25th of October, 1858 : * " Free labor and
slave labor, these antagonistic systems, are continually coming
into close contact, and collision results. Shall I teU you what
this collision means ? They who think it is accidental, unneces
sary, the work of interested or fanatical agitators, and therefore
ephemeral, mistake the case altogether. It is an irrej^ressible
* Helper's Compendium, p. 142.

58 ME. Buchanan's administeation
conflAct between opposing and enduring forces, and it means that
the United States must and will, sooner or later, become either
entirely a slaveholding nation or entirely a free-labor nation.
Either the cotton and rice fields of South Carolina aud the
sugar plantations of Louisiana 'will ultimately be tilled by free
labor, and Charleston and New Orleans become marts for legit
imate merchandise alone, or else the rye fields and wheat fields
of Massachusetts and New York must again be surrendered by
their farmers to slave culture and to the production of slaves,
and Boston and New York become once more markets for trade
in the bodies and souls of men."
However impossible that Massachusetts and New York
should ever again become slaveholding States, and again engage
in the African slave trade, yet such was the temper of the times
that this absurd idea produced serious apprehensions in the
North. It gave rise to still more serious apprehensions in the
South. There they believ£d or affected to believe that the peo
ple of the North, in order to avoid the dreaded alternative of
having slavery restored among themselves, and having their
rye fields and wheat fields cultivated by slave labor, would put
forth all their efforts to cut up slavery by the roots in the South-
em States. These reckless fancies of Senator Seward made the
deeper impression upon the public mind, both North and South,
because it was then generally believed that he would be the
candidate of the Republican party at the next Presidential elec
tion. In accordance with the -views expressed by Senator
Seward, Hinton Helper's " Impending Crisis " soon afterwards
appeared, a book well calculated to alarm the southern people.
This was ushered into the world by the following warm com
mendation from Mr. Seward himself: * " I have read the ' Im
pending Crisis of the South ' with great attention. It seems to
m.e a work of great merit, rich yet accurate in statistical infor
mation, and logical in analysis."
On the 9th of March, 1859, a Repubhcan committee in New
York, consisting of Horace Greeley, Thurlow Weed, and others,
issued a circular warmly commending* the book, and proposing
to publish one himdred thousand copies of a compendium of it
• Fowler's Sectional Controversy, p. 205.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 69
at a cheap rate for gratuitous circulation. In order to raise
subscriptions for the purpose, they obtained the recommendation
of this plan by sixty-eight Republican members of Congress,
with Schuyler Colfax at their head. It is in the following
terms : * " We the undersigned, members of the House of Rep
resentatives of the National Congress, do cordially indorse the
opinion and approve the enterprise set forth in the foregoing
circular." The author of the book is by birth a North Caroliuian,
though of doubtful personal character, but his labors have since
been recognized and rewarded by his appointment as Consul of
the United States at Buenos Ayres.
Published under such auspices, the " Impending Crisis " l»e-
came at once an authoritative exposition of the principles of the
Republican party. The original, as well as a compendium, were
circulated by hundreds of thousands. North, South, East, and
West. No book could be better calculated for the purpose of
intensifying the mutual hatred between the North and the South.
This book, in the first place, proposes to abolish slavery in the
slaveholding States by exciting a revolution among those called
" the poor whites," against their rich slaveholding neighbors.
To accomphsh this purpose, every appeal which perverse inge
nuity and passionate malignity could suggest, was employed to
excite jealousy and hatred between these two classes. The cry
of the poor against the rich, the resort of demagogues in all
ages, was echoed and reechoed. The plan urged upon the non-
slaveholding citizens of the South 'was — f
1st. " Thorough organization and independent political ac
tion on the part of the non-slaveholding whites of the South."
2d. "Ineligibility of pro-slavery slaveholders. Never another
vote to any one who advocates the retention aud perpetuation
of human slavery."
3d. "No cooperation with pro-slavery pohticians — no fel
lowship with them in religion — no affiliation with them in so
ciety." 4tb. " No patrouage to pro-slavery merchants — ^no guestship
• Con. Globe, 1859-60, p. 16. t Compendium, p. 76.

60 me. Buchanan's administeation
in slave-waiting hotels — no fees to pro-slavery lawyers — no em
ployment of pro-slavery physicians — no audience to pro-slavery
parsons." 6th. " No more hiring of slaves by non-slaveholders."
6th. " Abrupt discontinuance of subscription to pro-slavery
newspapers." 7th. " The greatest possible encouragement to free white
labor." " This, then," says Mr. Helper, " is the outhne of our scheme
for the abolition of slavery in the Southem States. Let it be
acted upon with due promptitude, and as certain as truth ia
mightier than error, fifteen years will not elapse before every
foot of territory, from the mouth of the Delaware to the em-
boguing of the Rio Grande, will glitter with the jewels of free
dom. Some time diiring this year, next, or the year foUo'wing,
.let there be a general convention of non-slaveholders from every
slave State in the Union, to deliberate on the momentous is
sues now pending." * Not confining himself even within these
hmits, Mr. Helper proceeds to still greater extremities, and
exclaims : " But, sirs, slaveholders, chevaliers, and lords of
the lash, we are uu'wilhng to allow you to cheat the negroes
out of all the rights and claims to which, as human beings,
they are most sacredly entitled. Not alone for ourself as an
individual, but for others also, particularly for five or six mil
hons of southem non-slaveholding whites, whom your iniqui
tous Statism has debarred from almost all the mental and mate
rial comforts of life, do we speak, when we say, you must sooner
or later emancipate your slaves, and pay each aud every one of
them at least sixty dollars cash in hand. By doing this you
will be restoring to them their natural rights, and remunerating
them at the rate of less than twenty-six cents per annum for the
long and cheerless period of their servitude from the 20th of
August, 1620, when, on James River, in Yirginia, they became
the unhappy slaves of heartless tyrants. Moreover, by doing
this you -will be performing but a simple act of justice to the
non-slaveholding whites, upon whom the system of slavery has
» Pages 89, 90.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 61
weighed scarcely less hea^dly than upon the negroes themselves.
You will, also, be applying a saving balm to your o-wn outraged
hearts and consciences, and your children — yourselves in fact —
freed from the accursed stain of slavery, -will become respecta
ble, useful, and honorable members of society."
He then taunts and defies the slaveholders in this manner :
" And now, sirs, we have thus laid down om* ultimatum. What
are you going to do about it ? Something dreadful of course !
Perhaps you -will dissolve the Union again. Do it, if you dare 1
Our motto, and we would have you to understand it, is, ' The
dholition of slavery and the perpetuation of the America/n
Union.'' If, by any means, you do succeed in your treasonable
attempts to take the South out of the Union to-day, we will
bring her back to-morrow ; if she goes away -with you, she will
return without you.
" Do not mistake the meaning of the last clause of the last
sentence. We could elucidate it so thoroughly that uo intelh
gent person could fail to comprehend it ; but, for reasons which
^may hereafter appear, we forego the task.
" Henceforth there are other interests to be consulted in the
South, aside from the interests of negroes and slaveholders. A
profound sense of duty incites us to make the greatest possible
efforts for the abolition of slavery ; an equally profound sense
of duty calls for a continuation of those efforts until the very
last foe to freedom shall have been utterly vanquished. To the
summons of the righteous monitor within, we shall endeavor to
prove faithful ; no opportunity for inflicting a mortal wound in
the side of slavery shall be permitted to pass us unimproved.
^' Thus, terror engenderers gf the South, have we fully and
frankly defined our position ; we have no modifications to pro
pose, no compromises to offer, nothing to retract. Frown, sirs,
fret, foam, prepare your weapons, threat, strike, shoot, stab,
bring on civil war, dissolve the Union, nay, annihilate the solar
system if you will — do all this, more, less, better, worse, any
thing — do what you will, sirs, you can neither fod nor intimi
date us ; our purpose is as firmly fixed as the eternal pillars of
heaven ; we have determined to abolish slavery, and so help us
God, abohsb it we will ! Take this to bed with you to-night,

62 ME. Buchanan's administeation
sirs, and think about it, dream over it, and let us know how
you feel to-morrow morning."
Such are specimens from the book indorsed and commended
by the acknowledged leader of the Repubhcan party, after hav
ing read it " with great attention," and by sixty-eight prominent
Republican members of Congress ! In the midst of the excite
ment produced by this book, both North and South, occurred the
raid of John Brown into Virginia. This was undertaken for
the avowed purpose of producing a servile insurrection among
the slaves, and aiding them by military force in rising against
their masters.
John Brown was a man violent, lawless, and fanatical.
Amid the troubles in Kansas he had distinguished himself, both
by word and by deed, for boldness and cruelty. His ruling
passion was to become the instrument of abolishing slavery, by
the strong hand, throughout the slaveholding States. With
him, this amoimted almost to insanity. Notwithstanding all
this, he was so secret iu his purposes that he had scarcely any
confidants. This appears in a striking manner from the testi
mony taken before the Senate Committee.* Several abohtiou-
ists had contributed money to him in aid of the anti-slavery
cause generally, but he had not communicated to them for what
particular purpose this was to be employed. He had long med
itated an irruption into Virginia, to excite and to aid a rising
of the slaves against their masters, and for this he had prepared.
He had purchased two hundred Sharp's carbines, two hundred
revolver pistols, and about one thousand pikes, with which to
arm the slaves. These arms he had collected and deposited in
the vicinity of Harper's Ferry., When the plot was ripe* for
execution, a little before midnight on Sunday evening, the 16th
of October, 1859, he, with sixteen white and five negro confed
erates, rushed across the Potomac to Harper's Ferry, and there
seized the armory, arsenal, and rifie factory belonging to the
United States. When the inhabitants awoke in the morning
they found, greatly to their terror and surprise, that these places,
with the town itself, were all iu possession of John Bro^vm's
force. It would be a waste of time to detail the history of this
* Reports of Senate Committee, 1st Session 36th Congress, No. 278, vol. ii.

ON THE EVE OP THE EEBELLION. 63
raid. Suffice it to say that on Tuesday morning, 18th, the .
whole band, with the exception of two who had escaped, were
either killed or captured. Among the latter was John Brown
himself, badly wounded. In the mean time, however, his party
had murdered five individuals, four of them unarmed citizens,
and had wounded nine others. It is proper to observe that
John Brown, after all his efforts, received no support from the
slaves in the neighborhood. The news of this attack on Har
per's Ferry spread rapidly over the country. All were at first
ignorant of the strength of the force, and pubhc rumor had
greatly exaggerated it. The President immediately sent a de
tachment of marines to the spot, by which John Brown and his
party were captured in the engine house, where they had fied
for shelter and defence. Large numbers of volunteers from
Virginia and Maryland had also hastened to the scene of action.
John Brown and several of his party were afterwards tried be
fore the appropriate judicial authorities of Virginia, and were
convicted and executed.
In the already excited condition of public feeling through
out the South, this raid of John Brown made a deeper impres
sion on the southem mind against the Union than all former
events. Considered merely as the isolated act of a desperate
fanatic, it would have had no lasting effect. It was the enthu
siastic and permanent approbation of the object of his expedi
tion by the abolitionists of the North, which spread alarm and
apprehension throughout the South. We are told by Fowler
in his " Sectional Controversy," that on the day of Brown's
execution bells were tolled in many places, cannon fired, and
prayers offered up for him as if he were a martyr ; he was placed
in the same category ¦with Paul and Silas, for whom prayers
were made by the C&urch, and churches were draped in mourn
ing. Nor were these honors to his memory a mere transient
burst of feehng. The Repubhcan party have ever since hon
ored him as a saint or a martyr in a cause which they deemed
so holy. According to them, " whilst his body moulders in the
dust his spirit is stiU marching on " in the van to accomplish
his bloody purposes. Even blasphemy, which it would be im
proper to repeat, has been employed to consecrate his memory.
5

64 ME. Buchanan's administeation
Fanaticism never stops to reason. Driven by honest impulse,
it rushes on to its object without regard to interposing obsta
cles. Acting on the principle avowed in the Declaration of
Independence, " that all men are created equal," and believing
slavery to be einful, it would not hesitate to pass from its O'wn
State into other States, and to emancipate their slaves by force
of arms. We do not stop to inquire whether slavery is sinful.
We may observe, however, that under the old and new dispensar
tions, slaves were held both by Jews and Christians, and rules were
prescribed for their humane treatment. In the present state of
civilization, we are free to admit that slavery is a great political
and social e'vil. If left to the wise ordinances of a superintending
Pro'vidence, which never acts rashly, it would have been grad
ually extinguished in our country, peacefully and without blood
shed, as has already been done throughout nearly the whole of
Christendom. It is true that other countries enjoyed facilities
for emancipation which "we do not possess. In them the slaves
were of the same color and race with the rest of the commu
nity, and in becoming freemen they soon mingled with the gen
eral mass on equal terms with their former masters.
But even admitting slavery to be a sin, have tbe adherents of
John Brown never reflected that the attempt by one people to
pass beyond their o'wn jurisdiction, and to extirpate by force of
arms whatever they may deem sinful among another people,
would involve the nations of the earth in perpetual hostilities ?
We Christians are thoroughly convinced that Mahomet was a
false prophet ; shall we, therefore, make war upon the Turkish em
pire to destroy Islamism ? If we would preserve the peace of the
world and avoid much greater evils than we desire to destroy,
we must act upon the wise principles of international law, and
leave each people to decide domestic questions for themselves.
Their sins are not our sins. We must intrust their punishment
and reformation to their own authorities, and to the Supreme
Governor of nations. This spirit of interference with what we
may choose to consider the domestic evils of other nations, has
in former periods covered the earth with blood. Even since the
advent of Christianity, until a comparatively late period, Cath-
ohcs and Protestants, acting on this false principle; have, with

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 65
equal sincerity, made war against each other, to put down dog
mas of faith which they mutually believed to be sinful and dan
gerous to the soul's salvation, and this in the name of Him who
descended from heaven to establish a kingdom of peace and
charity on earth. Spain waged a reckless war against the poor
Indians of Mexico, to root out the sin of idolatry from their
midst and compel them to embrace the Christian faith ; and
whoever shall read the life of Cortes must admit that he acted
with perfect sincerity, and was intent on their souls' salvation.
Mahometans, believing Christianity to be sinful, have, in a sim
ilar spirit, made war on Christian nations to propagate their
O'wn faith.
We might flU volumes with like examples from history.
These days of darkness and delusion, of doing evil that good
might come, have, it is to be hoped, passed away for ever under
the pure light of the Gospel. If all these acts were great -wrongs
in the intercourse between independent nations, if they violated
the benign principles of Christianity, how much greater would
the wrong have been had one portion of the sovereign States
of a confederate union made war against the remainder to extir
pate from them the sin of slavery ] And this more especially
when their common constitution, in its very terms, recognizes
slavery, restores the runaway slave to his master, and even
makes the institution a basis for the exercise of the elective
franchise. With hke reason might the State of Maine, whilst
the delusion of the Maine liquor law prevailed, have made war
on her sister States to enforce its observance upon their people,
because drunkenness is a grievous sin in the belief of all Chris
tians. In justiflcation of this, she might have alleged that the
intemperance tolerated among her neighbors, and not her o'wn
spirit to intermeddle with their concerns, was the cause of
the war, just as it has been asserted that slavery in the South
ern States was the cause of the late war. We may believe
and indeed know that the people of the North, however much
they may have extolled the conduct of John Brown, would
never in practice have carried out his teachings and his exam
ple ; but justice requires that we should make a fair allowance
for the apprehensions of the Southern people, who necessarily

66 ME. Buchanan's administeation
¦viewed the whole scene from an opposite standpoint. Under
these circumstances it is no wonder that the South should have
entertained fearful apprehensions for their peace and safety, in
the event that the Abohtion party should succeed in obtaining
the reins of the government, an event soon thereafter rendered
morally certain by the breaking up of the Charleston Demo
cratic Convention. To the history of the sad event we now
proceed. It is certain that before the meeting of the Convention, the
Democratic party of the North had become seriously divided
between the old and the Douglas Democracy, and that the lat
ter at least was strongly tinctured 'with an anti-slavery spirit.
The Convention assembled at Charleston on the 23d of
April, 1860, to nominate candidates for the offices of President
and Vice-President. It was composed of delegates from aU the
thirty-three States of the Union, and each State was entitled to
as many votes as it had Senators and Representatives in Con
gress. The whole number of votes was, therefore, 303 ; and
under the two-thirds rule which it adopted, after the example
of former Conventions, 202 votes were required to make a nom
ination.* The Convention elected Hon. Caleb Cushing, of
Massachusetts, its President.
This Convention had no sooner assembled than a radical
difference of opinion was exhibited among its members in regard
to the status of slavery in the Territories, The old Democratic
portion, invoking the Dred Scott decision, held that slave prop
erty, under the Constitution, was entitled to the same protec
tion therein with any other property ; whilst the Douglas dele
gates, in opposition to this decision, maintained the power of a
Territorial Legislature to impair or destroy this property in its
discretion. On the day after the Convention assembled (24th
April), a committee was appointed, consisting of a delegate
from each State, selected by the respective State delegations, to
report resolutions as a platform for the party ; and on the same
day it was resolved unanimously " that this Convention wUl not
proceed to ballot for a candidate for the Presidency until the
platform shall have been adopted." On the 27th of April the
Committee on Resolutions made majority and minority reports.f
Report of Proceedings, p. 11. f 5th day, p. 45.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 67
After a long, able, and eloquent discussion oil the respective
merits of the two reports, they were both, on motion of Mr.
Bigler, of Pennsylvania, re-committed to the Committee on
Resolutions,* with a view, if possible, to promote harmony ; but
this proved to be impracticable. On the sixth day of the Con
vention (Saturday, April 28th), f at an evening session, Mr.
Avery, of North Carolina, and Mr. Samuels, of Iowa, from the
majority and minority of the committee, again made opposite
and confficting reports on the question of slavery in the Terri
tories. On this question the committee had divided from the
beginning, the one portion embracing the fifteen members from
the slaveholding States, with those from California and Oregon,
and the other consisting of the members from all the free States
east of the Rocky Mountains. On all other questions both
reports substantially agreed, and therefore in regard to them no
special notice is required.
The following is the report of the majority made on this
subject by Mr. Avery, of North Carolina, the chairman of the
committee : " ResoJ/oed, That the platform adopted by the Dem
ocratic party at Cincinnati be affirmed with the following ex
planatory resolutions : 1st. That the Government of a Terri
tory, organized by au act of Congress, is provisional aud tempo
rary, and during its existence all citizens of the United States
have an equal right to settle with their property in the Terri
tory, without their rights, either of person or property, being
destroyed or impaired by Congressional or Territorial legislation.
2d. That it is the duty of the Federal Govemment, in aU its
departments, to protect, when necessary, the rights of persons
and property in the Territories, and wherever else its constitu
tional authority extends. 3d. That when the settlers in a Ter
ritory ha'ving an adequate population form a State Constitution,
the right of sovereignty commences, and being consummated
by admission into the Union, they stand on an equal footing
with the people of other States, and the State thus organized
ought to be admitted into the Federal Union whether its consti
tution prohibits or recognizes the institution of slavery." It
* Page 89. t Pages 92, 93.

68'will be perceived that these resolutions are in exact conformity
with the decision of the Supreme Court.
The following is the report of the minority, made by Mr.
Samuels, of Iowa. After re-affirming the Cincinnati platform
by the first resolution, it proceeds : " Inasmuch as differences
of opinion exist in the Democratic party, as to the nature and
extent of the powers of a Territorial Legislature, and as to the
powers and duties of Congress, under the Constitution of the
United States, over the institution of slavery 'within the Terri
tories, Resolved, That the Democratic party will abide by the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States up'on ques
tions of constitutional law."
It must strike the reader that this resolution does not meet
the question, but is vague and evasive. It entirely ignores the
fact that all these " questions of constitutional law " had been
already decided by the Supreme Court, and that in regard to
them no differences of opinion could exist among those who
were willing to recognize its authority. It leaves the rights of
the master over slave property in the Territories as an open
question, and places them at the mercy of a majority in Terri
torial Legislatures, until some future decision should be made,
not on this specific question, but generally " on questions of
, constitutional law." In fact, it treats the decision as though it
had never been made. It is proper to observe that we have
included the member of the committee from Massachusetts (Mr.
Butler) among the sixteen votes in favor of the minority report,
because, although he made a separate report of his own, this was
confined to a simple recommendation of the Cincinnati platform
and nothing more. The opposing reports from the Northern
and the Southern members of the committee were thus distinctly
placed before the Convention. It was soon manifest that should
the minority report prevail, the Convention must be broken into
fragments. After some preliminary remarks, Mr. Samuels moved the
adoption of the minority report as a substitute for that of the
majority.* This gave rise to an earnest and excited debate.
The difference between the parties was radical and irreconcUa-
" Page 97.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 69
ble. The South insisted that the Cincinnati platform, whose
true construction in regard to slavery in the Territories had al
ways been denied by a portion of the Democratic party, should
be explained and settled by an express recognition of the prin
ciples decided by the Supreme Court. The North, on the other
hand, refused to recognize this decision, and still maintained the
power to be inherent in the people of a Territory to deal with the
question of slavery according to their own discretion. The vote
was then taken, and the minority report was substituted for that
of the majority by a vote of one hundred and sixty-five to one
himdred and thirty-eight.* The delegates from the six New Eng
land States, as well as from New York, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota, fourteen free States,
cast their entire vote in favor of the minority report. New Jersey
and Pennsylvania alone among the free States east of the
Rocky Mountains refused to vote as States, but their delegates
voted as individuals. Had all the States voted as units, without
regard to the respective minorities in each ; or, on the other hand,
had the delegates from all the States voted as individuals, in either
case the majority report would have been s^tained, and the
Democratic party might have been saved. It was the want of
imiformity in the mode of voting that produced the disastrous
result. The means employed to attain this end were skilfully
devised by the minority of the Pennsylvania delegation in fa
vor of nominating Mr. Douglas.f The entire delegation had,
strangely enough, placed this power in their hands, by selecting
two of their number, Messrs. Cessna and Wright, to represent
the whole on the two most important committees of the Con
vention — that of organization and that of resolutions. These
gentlemen, by adroitness and parhamentary tact, succeeded iu
abrogating the former practice of casting the vote of the State
as a unit, and in reducing it almost to a cipher. In this man
ner, whilst New York indorsed with her entire thirty-five votes
the pecuhar views of Mr. Douglas, notwithstanding there was
in her delegation a majority of only five votes in their favor on
the question of Territorial sovereignty,:}: the effective strength
of Pennsylvania recognizing the judgment of the Supreme
* Page 112. 7th day, April 30. t Page 21. X Mr. Bartlett, p. 249.

70 ME. Buchanan's administeation
Court was reduced to three votes, this being the majority of fif
teen on the one side over twelve on the other.
The question next in order before the Convention was upon
the adoption of the second resolution of the minority of the
committee, which had been substituted for the report of the
majority. On this question Georgia, Louisiana, Alabama, Ar
kansas, Texas, Florida, and Mississippi refused to vote.* In
deed, it soon appeared that on the question of the final adoption
of this second vague and general resolution, which in fact
amounted to nothing, it had scarcely any friends of either party
in the Convention. The Douglas party, abandoning their own
offspring, and preferring to it the Cincinnati -platform, pure and
simple, 'without explanation or addition, voted against it.f On
the other hand, the old Democracy could not vote for it with
out admitting that the Supreme Court had not already placed
the right over slave property in the Territories on the same
footing with all other property, and therefore they also voted
against it. In consequence the resolution was negatived by a
vote of only twenty-one in its favor to two hundred and thirty-
eight. X Had th» seven Southern States just mentioned voted,
the negatives would have amounted to two hundred and eighty-
two, or more than thirteen to one. Thus both the majority and
the minority resolutions on the Territorial question were re
jected, and nothing remained before the Convention except the
Cincinnati platform.
At this stage of the proceedings § (April 30th), the States
of Louisiana, Alabama, South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida,
Texas, and Arkansas, having assigned their reasons for the act,
withdrew in succession from the Convention. || After these
seven States had retired, the delegation from Virginia made a
noble effort to restore harmony. T[ Mr. Russell, their chairman,
addressed the Convention in a solemn and impressive manner.
He portrayed the alarming nature of the crisis. He expressed
his fears that we were on the eve of a revolution, and if this
Convention should prove a failure it would be the last National
Convention of any party which would ever assemble in the
• Page 116. + Ibid. X Ibid. § Pp. 118-125.
I Pp. 126, 127. IT 80th April, 7th day, p. 126.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 71
United States. " Virginia," said he, " stands in the midst of
ber sister States, in garments red with the blood of her children
slain in the first outbreak of the ' irrepressible conflict.' But,
sir, not when her children fell at midnight beneath the weapon
of the assassin, was her heart penetrated with so profound a
grief as that which will wring it when she is obliged to choose
between a separate destiny with the South, and her common
destiny with the entire Republic."
Mr. Russell was not then prepared to answer, in behalf of
his delegation, whether the events of the day [the defeat of the
majority report, and the withdrawal of the seven States] were
sufficient to justify her in taking the irrevocable step in ques
tion. In order, therefore, that they might have time to delib
erate, and if they thought proper make an effort to restore har
mony in the Convention, he expressed a desire that it might
adjourn and afford them an opportunity for consultation.* The
Convention accordingly adjourned until the next day, Tuesday,
May 1st ; and immediately after its reassembling the delegation
from Georgia, making the eighth State, also withdrew.f
In the mean time the Virginia delegation had consulted
among themselves, and had conferred with the delegations of
the other Southern States which still remained in the Conven
tion, as to the best mode of restoring harmony.:]; In conse
quence Mr. Howard, of Tennessee, stated to the Convention
that " he had a proposition to present in behalf of the delega
tion from Tennessee, whenever, under parliamentary rules, it
would be proper to present it." In this Tennessee was joined
by Kentucky and Virginia, " the three great middle States
which stand as a breakwater against fanaticism on one side and
disunion on the other. He should propose the following reso
lution, whenever it would be in order : ' Resolved, That the
citizens of the United States have an equal right to settle 'with
their property in the Territories of the United States ; and that,
under the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States,
which we recognize as the correct exposition of the Constitution
of the United States, neither the rights of person nor property
• Page 128, 8th day. t Ibid. X Page 136.

72 ME. Buchanan's administeation
can be destroyed or impaired by Congressional or Territorial
legislation.' " *
" Mr. Russell, as chairman of the delegation from Virginia,
rose to express the sentiments entertained by the delegation from
that State, and the position they occupy this morning in - this
Convention. They came here for the double purpose of defend
ing the rights of the South, which are involved in the great issues
of the day, and of maintaining the integrity of the American
Union. Tbe events of yesterday had especially left him a deh
cate task to perform. Events had occurred which their constit
uency never contemplated when they were sent here. They de
sired that the Democratic party should remain complete, what
ever might be done in this Convention. With these general
views, the Virginia delegation had entered into consultation
among themselves, and had conferred with their sister Southem
States remaining in the Convention. They believed that the
resolution just read by the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr.
Howard] presented a reasonable basis of settlement among all
parties. North and South, affirming, as it did, the doctrine of
the decision of the Supreme Court, and going no further."
On a subsequent day (May 3d), Mr. Russell informed the
Convention that this resolution had, " he beheved, received the
approbation of all the delegations from the Southem States
which remained in the Convention, and also received the appro
bation of the delegation from New York. He was informed
there was strengthe nough to pass it when in order." f Of this
there could have been no doubt, with the vote of New York in
its favor. Had it been adopted, what an auspicious event this
would have been both for the Democratic party aud the coun
try! Mr. Howard, however, in vain attempted to obtain a vote
on his resolution. When he moved to take it up on the evening
of the day it had beeu oft'ered, he was met by cries of " Not in
order," " Not in order." X The manifest purpose was to postpone
its consideration until the hour should arrive which had been
fixed by a previous order of the Convention, in opposition to its
first order on the same subject, for the balloting to commence
* Page 136. + Page 152. X Page 138.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 73
for a Presidential candidate, when it woidd be too late. This
the friends of Mr. Douglas accomplished, and no vote was ever
taken upon it either at Charleston or Baltimore.
Before the balloting commenced Mr. Howard succeeded, in
the face of strong opposition, with the aid of the thirty-fivo
votes from New York, in obtaining a vote of the Convention
in affirmance of the two-thirds mle. On his motion they re
solved, by 141 to 112 votes,* " that the President of the Con
vention be and he is hereby directed not to declare any person
nominated for the office of President or Vice-President, unless
he shall have received a number of votes equal to two-thirds of
the votes of all the electoral colleges." It was well known at
the time that this resolution rendered the regular nomination
of Mr. Douglas impossible.
The balloting then commenced (Tuesday evening. May 1st),
ou the eighth day of the session.f Necessary to a nomination,
under the two-thirds rule, 202 votes. On the first ballot Mr.
Douglas received 145^ votes ; Mr. Hunter, of Virginia, 42 ; Mr.
Guthrie, of Kentucky, 35^ ; Mr. Johnson, of Tennessee, 12 ;
Mr. Dickinson, of New York, 7 ; Mr. Lane, of Oregon, 6 ; Mr.
Toucey, of Connecticut, 2J ; Mr. Davis, of Mississippi, 1^, and
Mr. Pearce, of Maryland, 1 vote.
The voting continued until 3d May, during which there
were iifty-four additional ballotings. Mr. Douglas never rose
to more than 162J, and ended at 151^ votes, 202 votes being
necessary to a nomination. Of these votes, at least 110 were
given by delegates from States which, judging from their ante
cedents, could not .give him or any Democratic candidate a sin
gle electoral vote.
This statement proves the wisdom and foresight of those who
adopted the two-thirds rule. Until 1824 nominations had been
made by Congressional caucus. In these none participated ex
cept Senators from Democratic States, and Representatives from
Democratic Congressional districts. The simple majority rule
governed in these caucuses, because it was morally certain that, '
composed as they were, no candidate could be selected against
the will of the Democratic States on whom his election de-
* Page 141. + Pages 141-152.

74

ME.

pended. But when a change was made to National Conven
tions, it was at once perceived that if a mere majority could
nominate, then the delegates from Anti-Democratic States might
be mainly instrumental in nominating a candidate for whom
they could not give a single electoral vote. Whilst it would
have been harsh aud inexpedient to exclude these States from
the Convention altogether, it would have been unjust to confer
on them a controlling power over the nomination. To com
promise this difficulty, the two-thirds rule was adopted. Under
its operation it would be almost impossible that a candidate
could be selected, without the votes of a simple majority of del
egates from the Democratic States.
It had now become manifest that it was impossible to make
a uomination at Charleston. The friends of Mr. Douglas ad
hered to him and would vote for him and him alone, whilst his
opponents, apprehending the effect of his principles should he
be elected President, were equally determined to vote against
his nomination.In the hope that some compromise might yet be effected to
save the Democratic party, the Convention, on the motion of
Mr. Russell, of Virginia, resolved to adjourn to meet at Balti
more on Monday, the 18th June ; * and it was " respectfully rec
ommended to the Democratic party of the several States, to
make pro'vision for supplying all vacancies in their respective
delegations to this Convention when it shall assemble."
The Convention re-assembled at Baltimore on the 18th June,
1860,f according to its adjournment, and Mr. Cushing, the Pres
ident, took the chair. It was greatly to be desired that the
Southern delegates who had withdra'wn at Charleston might
resume their seats at Baltimore, and thus restore the Conven
tion to its original integrity. In that event high hopes were
still entertained that both parties might harmonize in selecting
some eminent Democratic statesman, not obnoxious to either as
a candidate, and thus save the Democracy of the Union from
certain defeat. Every discerning citizen foresaw that without
such a re-union the Democratic party would continue to be
hopelessly divided, and the Republican candidates must inevi
tably be elected. * Pages 15&-154, 10th day, May 3d. + Page 165.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 75
Immediately after the reorganization of the Convention,
Mr. Howard, of Tennessee, offered a resolution, " that the Pres
ident of this Convention direct the sergeant-at-arms to issue
tickets of admission to the delegates of the Convention, as orig
inally constituted and organized at Charleston." Thus the vi
tally important question was distinctly presented. It soon,
however, became manifest that no such resolution could prevail.
In the absence of the delegates who had -withdrawn at Charles
ton, the friends of Mr. Douglas constituted a controlling major
ity. At the threshold they resisted the admission of the orig
inal delegates, and contended that by withdrawing they had
irrevocably resigned their seats. In support of this position,
they relied upon the language of the resolution adjourning the
Convention to Baltimore, which, as we have seen, " recom
mended to the Democratic party of the several States to make
pro-vision for supplying all vacancies in their respective delegar
tions to this Convention, when it shall reassemble." On the
other hand, the advocates of their readmission contended that
a simple withdrawal of the delegates was not a final renuncia
tion of their seats, but they were still entitled to reoccupy them,
whenever, in their judgment, this course would be best calculated
to restore the harmony and promote the success of the Demo
cratic party ; that the Convention had. no right to interpose be
tween them and the Democracy of their respective States ; that
being directly responsible to this Democracy, it alone could ac
cept their resignation ; that no such resignation had ever been
made, and their authority therefore continued in full force, aud
this, too, with the approbation of their constituents.
In the mean time, after the adjournment from Charleston
to Baltimore, the friends of Mr. Douglas, in several of these
States, had proceeded to elect delegates to take the place of
those who had -withdrawn from the Convention, but not in any
instance, it is believed, according to the rules and usages of the
Democratic party. Indeed, it was manifest at the time, and
has since beeu clearly proved by the event, that these delegates
represented but a small minority of the party in their respective
States. These new delegates, nevertheless, appeared and de
manded seats.

76 After a long and ardent debate, the Convention adopted a
resolution, offered by Mr. Church, of New York, and modified on
motion of Mr. Gilmore, of Pennsylvania, as a substitute for
that of Mr. Howard, to refer " the credentials of all persons
claiming seats in this Convention, made vacant by the secession
of delegates at Charleston, to the Committee on Credentials."
They thus prejudged the question, by deciding that the seats of
these delegates had been made and were still vacant. The
Committee on Credentials had been originally composed of one
delegate from each of the thirty-three States, but the number
was now reduced to twenty-five, in consequence of the ex
clusion of eight of its members from the States of Georgia,
Alabama, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, Louisiana, Arkan
sas, and Florida. The committee, therefore, now stood 16 to
9 in favor of the nomination of Mr. Douglas, instead of 17 to
16 against it, according to its original organization.*
The committee, through their chairman, Mr. Ejum, of Mis
souri, made their report on the 2l6t June, and Govemor Ste
vens, of Oregon, at the same time presented a minority report,
signed by himself and eight other members.
It is unnecessary to give in detail these conflicting reports.
It is sufficient to state that whilst the report of the majority
maintained that the delegates, by withdrawing at Charleston,
had resigned their seats, and these were still vacant ; that of the
minority, on the contrary, asserted the right of these delegates
to resume their seats in the Convention, by virtue of their orig
inal appointment.
Iu some respects the majority report presented a strange
aspect. Whilst it recommended the admission of all the new
delegates from the States of Alabama and Louisiana, to the
exclusion of the 'old, it divided Georgia equally between the
conflicting parties, allowing one half to each, thus rendering the
vote of the State a mere nullity. This anomaly was, however,
afterwards corrected by a vote of the Convention. Indeed, the
new delegates voluntarily withdrew their claim to seats.
On the next day (June 22),t the important decision was
made between the confficting reports. Mr. Stevens moved to
• Pages 187-191. t Page 203.

ON THE EVE OP THE EEBELLION. 77
substitute the minority report for that of the majority, and his
motion was rejected by a vote of 100^ to 150. Of course no
vote was given from any of the excluded States, except one half
vote from each of the parties in Arkansas.
The resolutions of the majority, except the ninth, relating
to the Georgia delegation, were then adopted in succession.
Among other motions of similar character, a motion had been
made by a delegate in tbe majority to reconsider the vote by
which the Convention had adopted the minority report, as a
substitute for that of the majority, and to lay his own motion
on the table. This is a common mode resorted to, according to
parhamentary tactics, of defeating every hope of a reconsider
ation of the pending question, and rendering the first decision
final.* Mr. Cessna, always on the, alert, with this view called for a
vote on laying the motion to reconsider on the table. Should
this be negatived, then the question of reconsideration would be
open. The President stated the question to be first " on laying
on the table the motion to reconsider the vote by which the Con
vention refused to amend the majority report of the Committee
on Credentials by substituting the report of the minority." On
this question New York, for the first time since the meeting at
Baltimore, voted with the minority and changed it into a ma
jority. " When New York was called," says the report of the
proceedings, " and responded thirty-five votes " (in the negative),
" the response was greeted with loud cheers and applause." f
The result of the vote was 113|- to 138| — " so the Convention
refused to lay on the table the motion to reconsider the minor
ity report" The Convention then adjourned until the evening,
on motion of Mr. Cochrane, of New York, amidst great excite
ment and confusion.
This vote of New York, appearing to indicate a purpose to
harmonize the party by admitting the original delegates from
the eight absent States, was not altogether unexpected. Although
voting as a unit, it was known that her delegation were greatly
divided among themselves. The exact strength of the minority
was afterwards stated by Mr. Bartlett, one of its members, in
• Page 209. t Page 210.

78 ME.
the Breckinridge Convention.* He said : " Upon all questions
and especially upon the adoption of the majority report on cre
dentials, in which we had a long contest, the line was strictly
drawn, and there were thirty on one side and forty on the other."
This was equal to fifteen votes to twenty.
The position of New York casting an undivided vote of
thirty-five, with Dean Richmond at their head, had been a con
trolling power from the commencement. Her responsibihty
was great in proportion. Had she cast her weight into the scale
at Charleston in favor of the majority report on the resolutions
and in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court, this,
as we have already seen, would have prevailed by a vote of 173
to 130. Such a result might probably have terminated the
controversy between the North and the South.
After the retirement of the Southem delegations at Charles
ton, the delegation from New York had appeared to be willing
to change their course and adopt the compromise platform pro
posed by Virginia, Tennessee, and Kentucky, with the approba
tion of the other border States still in the Convention. This
was in fact nothing more than an affirmance of the decision of
the Supreme Court. In advocating it, Mr. Russell, of Virginia,
whose abihty and spirit of conciliation had been displayed
throughout, stated his belief, as we have seen, that it had " re
ceived the approbation of the delegation from New York ; " and
this statement was not contradicted. This would have secured
its adoption. The means by which a vote upon the question
was defeated at Charleston by the commencement of the ballot
ing have already been presented. Strong expectations were,
therefore, now entertained that after the New York delegation
had recorded their vote against a motion which would have
killed the minority report beyond hope of revival, they would
now follow this up by taking the next step in advance and voting
for its reconsideration and adoption.-f On the evening of the
very same day, however, they reversed their course and voted
against its reconsideration. They were then cheered by the
opposite party from that which had cheered them in the morn
ing. Thus the action of the Convention in favor of the majority
report became final and conclusive.^
• Page 249. t Page 211. X Page 211.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 79
Mr. Cessna, of Pennsylvania, always eager, at once moved
"that the Convention do now proceed to nominate candidates'
for President and Vice-President of the United States." These
proceedings immediately produced the disastrous effects which
must have been foreseen by all.*
Mr. Russell rose and stated, " It has become my duty now,
by direction of a large majority of the delegation from Virginia,
respectfully to inforpa you and this body, that it is not consist
ent with their convictions of duty to participate longer in its
deKberations."t Mr. Leader next stated " that it became his duty, as one of
the delegates from North Carohna, to say that a very large
majority of the delegation from that State were compelled to re
tire permanently from this Convention, on account, as he con
ceived, of the unjust course that had been pursued toward some
of their fellow-citizens of the South. The South had heretofore
relied upon the Northern Democracy to give them the rights
which were justly due them ; but the vote to-day had satisfied
the majority of the North Caroluia delegation that these rights
were now refused them, and this being the case, they could no
longer remain in the Convention."
Then followed in succession the withdrawal of the delegations
from Tennessee,:]: Kentucky,§ Maryland,! Cahfornia,T[ Oregon,**
and Arkansas.ft The Convention now adjourned at half-past
ten o'clock until the next morning at ten.
Soon after the assembhng of the Convention^:]: the President,
Mr. Cushing, whilst tendering his thanks to its members for
their candid and honorable support in the performance of his
duties, stated that notwithstanding the retirement of the delega
tions of several of the States at Charleston, in his sohcitude to
maintain the harmony and union of the Democratic party, he had
continued in his post of labor. " To that end and in that sense,"
said he, " I had the honor to meet you, gentlemen, here at Balti
more. But circumstances have since transpired which compel
me to pause. The delegations of a majority of the States have,
either in whole or in part, in one form or another, ceased to par-
* Page 212. + Page 213. X Page 213. § Page 213. 1 Page 214.
If Pages 215-217. ** Page 217. ft Page 225. Jt Sixth day, June 23d, page 225.
6

80
ticipate in the deliberations of the Convention. * * * In
the present circumstances, I deem it a duty of self-respect, and I
deem it still more a duty to this Convention, as at present or
ganized, * * * to resign my seat as President of this Con
vention, in order to take my place on the fioor as a member of
the delegation from Massachusetts. * * * I deem this above
all a duty which I owe to the members of this Convention, as to
whom no longer would my action represent the will of a majority
of the Convention." *
" Governor Tod, of Ohio, one of the Vice-Presidents, then
took the vacant chair, and was greeted 'with hearty and long-
continued cheers and applause from members of the Convention."
" Mr. Butler, of Massachusetts, now announced that a portion
of the Massachusetts delegation desired to retire, but was inter
rupted by cries of ' No,' ' No,' ' Call the roll.' The indefatigar
ble Mr. Cessna called for the original question, to wit, that the
Convention now proceed to a nomination for President and Vice-
President." " The President here ordered the Secretary to caU the States.
Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont were called, and they
gave an unbroken vote for Stephen A. Douglas. When Mas
sachusetts was called, Mr. Butler rose and said he had a respect
ful paper in his hand which he would desire the President to
have read. A scene of great confusion thereupon ensued, cries
of ' I object ' being heard upon all sides." Mr. Butler, not to be
baffled, contended for his right at Jbis stage to make remarks
pertinent to the matter, and cited in his support the practice of
the Conventions at Baltimore in 1848 and 1862, aud at Cincin
nati in 1856. He finally prevailed, and was permitted to pro
ceed. He then said he " would now withdraw from the Conven
tion, upon the ground that there had been a withdrawal, in whole
or in part, of a majority of the States ; and further, which was a
matter more personal to himself, he could not sit in a Conven
tion where the African slave trade, which was piracy according
to the laws of his country, was openly advocated."
Mr. Butler then retired, followed by General Cushing and
four others of the Massachusetts delegation.
* Page 226.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 81
The balloting now proceeded. Mr. Douglas received 173J
votes*; Mr. Guthrie 9 ; Mr. Breckinridge 6^ ; Mr. Bocock and
Mr. Seymour each 1 ; and Mr. Dickinson and Mr. Wise each
half a vote. On the next and last ballot Mr. Douglas received
181^ votes, eight of those in the minority having changed their
votes in his fa'vor.
To account for this number, it is proper to state that a few
delegates from five of the eight States which had withdrawn still
remained in the Convention. On the last ballot Mr. Douglas
received all of their votes, to wit: 3 of the 15 votes of Virginia,
1 of the 10 votes of North Carolina, 1^ of the 3 votes of Ar
kansas, 3 of the 12 votes of Tennessee, 3 of the 12 votes of
Kentucky, aud 2J of the 8 votes of Maryland, making in the
aggregate 14 votes. To this number may be added the 9 votes
of the new delegates from Alabama and the 6 from Louisiana,
who had been admitted to the exclusion of the original '^cle-
gates. If these 29 votes from Southern States be deducted
from the 181J votes nominating Mr. Douglas, that number would
be reduced to 152f".
These proceedings had now rendered it clear that Mr. Doug
las could not, as he did not, receive one electoral vote from any
of the sixteen Democratic States of Delaware, Maryland, Vir
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Lou
isiana, Mississippi, Texas, Florida, Tennessee, Kentucky, Arkan
sas, Cahfomia, and Oregon. He owed his nomination almost
exclusively to States which could not give him a single electoral
vote. What was still more ominous of evil, the division was
sectional between the free and the slaveholding States, between
the North and the South. It might have been supposed that
these disastrous circumstances, foreboding such dangers both to
the Democratic party aud the Union, would have caused his
friends to pause, and at the last moment consent to some means
of conciliation. But they rushed on to complete their work,
regardless of consequences. The two-thirds rule interposed no
obstacle in their course, although it had been expressly adopted
and readopted by this Convention, and the very case had now
occurred — the nomination by nearly all the Anti-Democratic
States — against which its original authors, with -wise foresight.

82
intended to guard. Mr. Douglas was accordingly declared to
be the regular nominee of the Democratic party of the Union,*
upon the motion of Mr. Church, of New York, when, accord
ing to the report of the proceedings, " The whole body rose to
its feet, hats were waved in the air, and many tossed aloft ;
shouts, screams, and yells, and every boisterous mode of express
ing approbation and unanimity, were resorted to."
Senator Fitzpatrick, of Alabama, was then unanimously
nominated as the candidate for Vice-President ; aud the Conven
tion adjourned siTie die on the 23d June, the sixth and last
day of its session.f On the same day, but after the adjourn
ment, Mr. Fitzpatrick declined the nomination, and it was
immediately conferred on Mr. Herschel V. Johnson, of Geor
gia, by the Executive Committee. Thus ended the Douglas
Convention. But another Convention assembled at Baltimore ou the
same 23d June,:]: styling itself also, and -with as httle reason,
the " National Democratic Convention." It was composed
chiefly of the delegates who had just withdra'wn from the Doug
las Convention, and the original delegates from Alabama and
Louisiana. One of their first acts was to abrogate the two-
thirds rule, as had been done by the Douglas Convention.
Both acted under the same necessity, because the preservation
of this rule would have prevented a nomination by either.
This consideration, instead of causing both to desist and appeal
to the people of the States to appoint a new Convention for the
salvation of the Democratic party, was totally disregarded.
Mr. Cushing was elected and took the chair as President.
In his opening address he said : " Gentlemen of the Conven
tion, we assemble here, delegates to the National Democratic
Convention [applause], duly accredited thereto from more than
twenty States of the Union [applause], for the purpose of nomi
nating candidates of the Democratic party for the offices of
President and Vice-President of the United States, for the pur
pose of annoimcing the principles of the party, and for the pur
pose of continuing and reestablishing that party upon the firm
foundations of the Constitution, the Union, and the coequal
rights of the several States." §
• Pages 231-236. f Page 239. X Page 241. § Page 243.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 83
Mr. Avery, of North Carolina, wHo had reported the major
ity resolutions at Charleston, now reported the same from the
committee of this body, and they "were adopted unanimously,
amid great applause."
The Convention then proceeded to select their candidates.
Mr. Loring, on behalf of the delegates from Massachusetts, who
with Mr. Butler had retired from the Douglas Convention,
nominated John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, which Mr.
Dent, representing the Pennsylvania delegation present, "most
heartily seconded." Mr. Ward, from the Alabama delegation,
nominated R. M. T. Hunter, of Virginia ; Mr. Ewing, from
that of Tennessee, nominated Mr. Dickinson, of New York ;
aud Mr. Stevens, from Oregon, nominated General Joseph Lane.
Eventually all these names were withdra'wn except that of Mr.
Breckinridge, and he received the nomination by a unanimous
vote. The whole number of votes cast in his favor from twenty
States was 103^. The vote of Mr. Douglas was considerably
greater, but Mr. Breckinridge received a large majority over
him from States known to be Democratic.
General Lane was unanimously nominated as the candidate
for Vice-President. Thus terminated the Breckinridge Conven
tion. The 23d of June, 1860, was a dark and gloomy day both
for the Democratic party and the Union. It foreboded nothing
but evU. There could be no pretence that either candidate had
been nominated according t5 the established rules of the party.
Every individual Democrat was, therefore, left at liberty to
choose between them. In many localities, especially North,
their respective partisans became more ¦violent against each
other than against the common foe. No reasonable hope could
remain for the election of Mr. Douglas or Mr. Breckinridge.
It was morally certain that Mr. Lincoln would be the next Pres
ident, and this added greatly to his strength. The result was,
that of the 303 electoral votes, Mr. Douglas received but 12 *
(3 from New Jersey, and 9 from Missouri), and Mr. Breckin
ridge only 72 (3 from Delaware, 8 from Maryland, 10 from
North Carolina, 8 from South Carolina, 10 from Georgia, 6
* Congressional Globe, I860-' 61, page 894.

84 ME. Buchanan's administeation
from Louisiana, 7 from Mississippi, 9 from Alabama, 4 from
Arkansas, 3 from Florida, and 4 from Texas). Virginia, North
Carolina, and Tennessee cast their 39 votes for John BeU, of
Tennessee, of the self-styled Constitutional Union party.
In re'viewing the whole, it is clear that the original cause of
the disaster was the persistent refusal of the friends of Mr.
Douglas to recognize the constitutional rights of the slavehold
ing States in the Territories, established by the Supreme Court.
These rights the Southem States could not yield after the de
cision, without a sense of self-degradation, and voluntary aban
donment of their equahty 'with their sister States, as members
of the Union. But were they justified, for this cause, in seced
ing from the Convention, and pursuing a course so extreme ?
Far from it. Had they remained at tbe post of duty, like Vir
ginia and the other border States, it would have beeu impossi
ble that a candidate so obnoxious to them, on account of his
principles, could have been nominated. The final result would
probably then have been the nomination of some compromise
candidate, which would have preserved the unity and strength
of the Democratic organization. Indeed, the withdrawal of
these States, under the circumstances, has afforded plausible
ground for the behef of many, that this was done with a view to
prepare the way for a dissolution of the Union. Although,
from the votes and speeches of their delegates, there do not
seem to be sufficient grounds for so harsh a judgment, yet it
cannot be denied that the act was rash, unwise, and unfortunate.
An entire new generation had now come upon the stage in
the South, in the midst of the anti-slavery agitation. The
former generation, which had enjoyed the blessings of peace and
security under the Constitution and the Union, had passed away.
That now existing had gro'wn up and been educated amid
assaults upon their rights, and attacks from the North upon the
domestic institution inherited from their fathers. Their post-
offices had been perverted for the circulation of incendiary pic
tures and pubhcations intended to excite the slaves to servile
insurrection. In the North, the press. State Legislatures, anti-
slavery societies, abolition lecturers, and above all the Christian
pulpit, had been persistently employed in denouncing slavery as

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 85
a sin, and rendering slaveholders odious. Numerous abolition
petitions had been presented to Congress, from session to session,
portraying slavery as a grievous sin against God and man. The
Fugitive Slave Law enacted by the first Congress, as well as
that of 1850, for the security of their property, had been nulli
fied by the Personal Liberty Acts of Northern Legislatures, and
by the organized assistance afforded by abohtionists for the es
cape of their slaves. Wilmot provisos had been interposed to
defeat their constitutional rights in the common Territories, aud
even after these rights had been affirmed by the Supreme Court,
its decision had been set at naught not only by the Republican
but by the Douglas party. " The irrepressible conflict " of Sen
ator Seward, and the Helper book, both portending the aboh
tion of slavery in the States, had beeu circulated broadcast
among the people. And finally the desperate fanatic, John
Bro'wn, inflamed by these teachings, had invaded Virginia, and
murdered a number of her peaceful citizens, for the avowed
purpose of exciting a servile insurrection ; and although he had
expiated his crimes on the gallows, his memory was consecrated
by the abolitionists, as though he had been a saintly martyr.
In the midst of these perils the South had looked with hope
to the action of the Democratic National Convention at Charles
ton, but in this they had been sadly disappointed. This series
of events had inflamed the Southern mind with intense hostility
against the North, and enabled the disunion agitators to prepare
it for the final catastrophe.
It was not until after the breaking up of the Democratic
party at Charleston and Baltimore, that the masses, even in the
cotton States, always excepting South Carolina, could be induced
to think seriously of seceding from the Union. The border
States, with Virginia in the front rank, although much dissatis
fied with the course of events at the North, still remained true
to the Federal Govemment.

86

CHAPTER IV.
The heresy of Secession — Originated in New England — Maintained by Josiah Quincy
and the Hartford Convention, by Mr. Rawle and Mr. John Quincy Adams, but
opposed by the South — Southern Secession dates from South Carohna Nullifica
tion — Its character and history — The Compromise Tariflf of 1833 — The Nullifiers
agitate for Secession — Mr. Calhoun — Mr. Cobb against it — Warnings of the Dem
ocratic party — They are treated with contempt — Secession encouraged by the
Republicans — The Cotton States led to believe they would be allowed to depart
in peace — ^President Buchanan warned them against this delusion.
The alleged right of secession, or the right of one or more
States to withdraw from the Union, is not a plant of Southem
origin. On the contrary, it first sprung up in the North. At
an early period after the formation of the Constitution, many
influential indi'viduals of New England became dissatisfied with
the union between the Northern and Southem States, and were
anxious to dissolve it. " This design," according to Mr. John
Quincy Adams, " had been formed in the winter of 1803-'4, im
mediately after and as a consequence of the acquisition of
Louisiana." * This he disclosed to Mr. Jefferson, in the year
1809. About the same time, to the confidential friends of Mr.
Jefferson he " urged that a continuance of the embargo mucu
longer would certainly be met by forcible resistance, supported
by the Legislature and probably by the judiciary of the State
[Massachusetts]. That to quell that resistance, if force should
be resorted to by the Government, it would produce a civil war ;
and that, in that event, he had no doubt the leaders of the party
would secure the cooperation with them of Great Britain. That
their object was, and had been for several years, a dissolution of
* Letter of Dec. 80, 1828, in reply to Harrison Grey Otis and others. Appendix
to RandaU's Life of Jefferson, vol. iii., p. 635. Vide also vol. iii., p. 295.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 87
the Union, and the establishment of a separate Confederation,
he knew from unequivocal evidence, although not provable in a
court of law ; and that in case of a civil war, the aid of Great
Britain to effect that purpose would be assuredly resorted to, as
it would be indispensably necessary to the design."
Afterwards, in 1828, whilst President of the United States,
he reaffirmed the statement made to Mr. Jefferson, and said :
" That project, I repeat, had gone to the length of fixing upon a
military leader for its execution ; and although the circumstances
of the times never admitted of its execution, nor even of its
full de-s'elopment, I had yet no doubt in 1808 and 1809, and
have no doubt at this time, that it is the key of all the great
movements of these leaders of the Federal party iu New Eng
land, from that time forward till its final catastrophe in the
Hartford Convention." It is but fair to observe that these state
ments were denied by the parties implicated, but were still ad
hered to and again reaffirmed by Mr. Adams.
In this connection we may cite the speech dehvered by Mr.
Josiah Quincy, a" leading and influential Representative from
Massachusetts, on the 14th January, 1811.* In this he boldly
avows and defends both the right and the duty of States to
separate from the Union, should Congress pass the bill then
pending before them, " to enable the people of the Territory of
Orleans to form a Constitution and State Govemment, and for
the admission of such State [Louisiana] into the Union on an
equal footing with the original States."
He alleges " that the principle of this bill materially affects
the liberties and rights of the whole people of the United States.
To me it appears that it would justify a revolution in this coun
try, and that in no great length of time may produce it." He
then proceeds to declare as follo'^s : " If this bill passes, it is
my deliberate opinion that it is 'virtually a dissolution of the
Union ; that it will free the States from their moral obhgatiou,
and, as it will be the right of all, so it 'will be the duty of some,
definitely to prepare for a separation, amicably if they can, 'vio
lently if they must." Upon being called to order for the utter-
* Gales & Seaton's Annals of Congress, 1810-11, 3d session, p. 524.

88 ME.
ance of this sentiment, he repeated it and committed it to 'writing
'with his own hand.
The ¦violation of the Constitution mvolved in this bill was,
according to Mr. Quincy, the admission into the Union of a
State composed of foreign territory, which had been outside of
the limits of the United States when the Constitution was
adopted. This, he contended, would result in a serious diminu
tion of the power and influence in the Federal Government, to
which Massachusetts and the other old States were justly entitled.
It is curious to observe that he justified a dissolution of the
Union by the very same fallacy afterwards employed* by the
Southern secessionists, in applying to our Government a rule of
construction applicable to mere private contracts. " Is there,"
said he, " a moral principle of public law better settled, or more
conformable to the plainest suggestions of reason, than that the
¦violation of a contract by one of the parties may be considered
as exempting the other from its obligations ? " *
Thirty-five members united with Mr. Quincy in voting
against this bill, but it passed the House by a vote of 77 to 36.
We shall not refer specially to the proceedings of the Hart
ford Convention, which assembled in December, 1814, during
the existence of our last war with Great Britain. We may ob
serve generally, that this body manifested their purpose to dis
solve the Union, should Congresstfefuse to redress the grievances
of which they complained. The peace, however, ¦with Great
Britain, terminated their action, and consigned them to lasting
and well merited reproach. During this entue period the
Southern people opposed and denounced all threats and efforts
to dissolve the Union as treasonable, and during the war as giv
ing " aid and comfort " to the enemy.
The right of secession found advocates afterwards in men of
distinguished abilities and unquestioned patriotism. In 1825 it
was maintained by Mr. William Rawle, of Philadelphia, an
eminent and universally respected lawyer, in the 23d chapter
of his " View of the Constitution of the United States." In
speaking of him his biographer says, that " in 1791 he was ap
pointed District Attorney of the United States, by the Father
* Gales & Seaton's Annals of Congress, 1810-11, 3d session, p. 577.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION.

of his country ; " and " the situation of Attorney General was
more than once tendered to him by Washington, but as often
declined," for domestic reasons.* But to quote a still higher
authority, that of Mr. John Quincy Adams. This learned
and profound statesman, in 1839, admitted the right of the peo
ple of a State to secede from the Union, whilst deprecating its
exercise. We copy entire the three paragraphs relating to this
subject from his " Discourse dehvered before the New York
Historical Society,"! on the fiftieth anniversary of General
Washington's Inauguration as President of the United States :
" Iu the calm hours of self-possession, the right of a State to
nullify an act of Congress, is too absurd for argument, and too
odious for discussion. The right of a State to secede from the
Union, is equally disowned by tbe principles of the Declaration
of Independence. Nations acknowledge no judge between them
upon earth, and their Governments, from necessity, must in their
intercourse with each other decide when the failure of one party
to a contract to perform its obligations, absolves the other from
the reciprocal fulfilment of his own. But this last of earthly
powers is not necessary to the freedom or independence of States,
connected together by the immediate action of the people of
whom they consist. To the people alone is there reserved, as
well the dissolving, as the constituent power, and that power
can be exercised by them only under tbe tie of conscience, bind
ing them to the retributive justice of Heaven.
" With these qualifications, we may'admit the same right as
vested in the people of every State in the Union, with reference
to the General Government, which was exercised by the people
of the United Colonies, with reference to the supreme head of
the British empire, of which they formed a part; and under
these limitations have the people of each State in the Union a
right to secede from the confederated Union itself
"Thus stands the RIGHT. But the indissoluble link of
union between the people of the several States of this confed
erated nation is, after ali, not in the right .^ but in the heart. If the
day should ever come (may Heaven avert it) when the affections
of the people of these States shall be ahenated from each other ;
* Brown's Forum, p. 505. + Pages 68, 69.

90 ME. Buchanan's administeation
when the fraternal spirit shall give way to cold indifference, or
collision of interest shall fester into hatred, the bands of pohtical
association will not long hold together parties no longer attracted
by the magnetism of conciliated interests and kindly sympathies ;
and far better will it be for the people of the disunited States
to part in friendship from each other, than to be held together
by constraint. Then will be the time for reverting to the prece
dents which occurred at the formation and adoption of the Con
stitution, to form again a more perfect union, by dissolving that
which could no longer bind, and to leave the separated parts to
be reunited by the law of pohtical gravitation to the centre."
These high authorities in the North made no impression on
the Southern people. Southem secession was the bitter fruit of
South Carolina nullification.
Nullification did not spring from the slavery question. It
originated exclusively from hostility to a protective tariff.
In the behef of the people of South Carohna, the tariff laws
afforded extravagant and unconstitutional protection to domes
tic manufactures, greatly to their injury. They were convinced
that the high import duties exacted from them enhanced un
justly the price of the articles they consumed, and at the same
time depreciated the value of the cotton and other articles which
they produced and exported ; and that all their losses were so
many forced contributions to enrich Northern manufacturers at
their expense.
In this belief the people of the State were nearly unanimous;
but they were almost equally divided as to whether nullification
was an appropriate and constitutional remedy. Nullification
assumes that each State has the rightful power to absolve itself
from obedience to any particular law of Congress which it may
deem oppressive, and to resist its execution by force ; and yet in
regard to all other laws to remain a constituent member of the
Union. Thus in each State, though still under the same Gen
eral Government, a different code might be in force, varying
with every degree of latitude. This would produce " confusion
worse confounded." Even secession can be sustained by much
more plausible arguments than such a paradox.
Mr. John C. Calhoun was the acknowledged leader of the

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 91
Nullification party. As a member of the House of Representa
tives he had borne a conspicuous part in the declaration and
prosecution of the war of 1812 against Great Britain. He
had been Secretary of War during nearly the whole eight years
of Mr. Monroe's Presidency, and had displayed great adminis
trative abihty in organizing and conducting his Department.
He was elected in 1824, and afterwards reelected in 1828, Vice-
President of the United States, and still held this high office.
He possessed eminent reasoning powers, but, in the opinion of
many, was deficient in sound practical judgment. He was terse
and astute in argument ; but his views were not sufficiently broad
and expanded to embrace at the same time all the great inter
ests of the country, and to measure them according to their rela
tive importance. It was his nature to concentrate all his powers
on a single subject ; and this, for the time being, almost to the ex
clusion of all others. Although not eloquent in debate, he was
rapid, earnest, and persuasive. His powers of conversation were
of the highest order ; and it was his delight to exert them iu
making proselytes, especially of the young and promising. It
is but just to add that bis private life was a model of purity.
Under his auspices, the State Convention of South Carolina,
in November, 1832, passed the well-known Nullification Ordi
nance. By this they declared that all the tariff acts then in
force had been passed in violation of the Constitution of the
United States ; aud that they were " null, void, and no law, nor
binding upon this State, its officers or citizens." They also
ordained that should the Federal Govemment attempt to carry
these acts into effect within the limits of South Carolina, " the
people of this State will thenceforth hold themselves absolved
from all further obligation to maintain or preserve their political
connection with the people of the other States, aud will forth
with proceed to organize a separate Government, and to do all
other acts and things which sovereign and independent States
of right do." *
This declaration was the germ of Southem secession. It
asserted the right and the duty of South Carolina to secede
from the Union and establish an independent Govemment,
* Con. Debates, vol. ix., Part 2d, Appendix, pp. 162, 163.

92 ME.
whenever the Federal Govemment should attempt to execute
the tariff laws within its limits.
At this period a large and influential minority, almost amount
ing to a majority of the people of South Carolina, were opposed
to nullification. This party embraced the Federal judges, and
the collectors and other revenue officers at the different ports.
They did not believe nulhfication to be either a rightful, or
constitutional remedy for grievances, which notwithstanding
they felt keenly in common with their fellow-citizens. So hos
tile did the parties become toward each other in the progress of
the conflict, that there was imminent danger they might resort
to civil war. The minority stood ready to aid the Govemment
in enforcing the tariff laws against the nulliflers.
The Convention, in their address to the people of the United
States,* proposed terms of compromise, with which should Con
gress comply. South Carolina would lepeal the nullifying ordi
nance. Professing their ¦wiUingness " to make a large offering to
preserve the Union," f and distinctly declaring that it was a con
cession on their part, they proposed to consent to a tariff im
posing the same rate of duty on the protected as on the unpro
tected articles, " provided that no more revenue be raised than
is necessary to meet the demands of the Government for con
stitutional purposes, and pro-vided, also, that a duty substan
tially uniform be imposed upon all foreign imports." Thus their
ultimatum was a uniform ad valorem horizontal tariff for reve
nue alone, without any discriminations whatever in favor of
domestic manufactures.
At this crisis Mr. Calhoun resigned the office of Vice-Presi
dent, and on the 12th December, 1832, took his seat in the Sen
ate as one of the Senators from South Carolina, for the purpose
of advocating the measures he had advised. Strange to say.
South Carolina substantially succeeded in accomphshing her
object by the passage of the " Compromise Act " of 2d March,
1833.:]: Under it. Congress pro-vided for a gradual reduction of
existing duties on all foreign articles competing in the home
market with our domestic manufactures, until they should finally
* Con. Debates, vol. ix., Part 2d, Appendix, p. 168.
t Page 172. X U. S. Statutes at Large, p. 629.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 93
•
sink, on the 30th June, 1842, to a uniform rate of 20 per cent.
ad valorem, from and after which period this reduced duty only
should be collected. Mr. Calhoun supported the bill and voted
for its passage. South Carolina accepted the concession, and
repealed the ordinance of nuUiflcation.
Mr. Calhouu, notwithstanding this success, was never able
to indoctrinate the Southern people outside of his own State
with the heresy of nullification. It soon became odious to the
whole country, and has since passed into universal disrepute.
But not so with its twin sister secession.
Whilst these proceedings were pending. General Jackson was
ready and willing to enforce the laws against South Carolina,
should they be resisted, with all the means in his power. These
were, however, inadequate for the occasion. New legislation
was required to enable him to act with vigor and success. For
this he applied to Congress in an elaborate message of the 16th
January, 1833.* This was not granted until the passage of the
" Compromise Act " had rendered such legislation unnecessary.
In fact, this act and " the Force Bill," as it was then called, con
ferring on him the necessary powers, were approved by General
Jackson on the same day (2d March, 1833). Such was, at this
crisis, the jealousy of executive power in Congress, that the only
effective enactments of this bill were to expire, by their o'wn
limitation, at the end of the next session of Congress (June,
1834). Here it may be proper to observe, that Congress re
fused to revive them throughout the entire session of 1860-61,
and to confer upon President Buchanan the same powers for the
collection of the revenue which they had, but only for this brief
period, conferred on President Jackson.
The majority in South Carolina, encouraged by success in
bringing Congress to terms on the tariff question, and smarting
under tbe reproach of nullification, soon threw aside all reserve
and rushed from this heresy into that of secession. In this they
were not long after joined by the minority which had resisted
nullification. The formidable aspect assumed by anti-slavery at
the North consolidated the union between the nulhfiers and the
anti-nuUifiers. Then followed the exchange of violent and 'vir-
• Congressional Debates, vol. ix., part 2d, Appendix, p. 145.

94 ME. Buchanan's administeation
ulent denunciations between the slavery and anti-slavery fac
tions. North and South, each furnishing combustibles to the
other, as though they had been in alliance to destroy the Union.
Although the people of South Carohna had thus become al
most unanimous in their hostility to the Union, they were nev
ertheless divided into two parties, denominated " Disunionists"
and " Cooperationists." Both were equally resolved on seces
sion ; they differed merely as to the point of time for making
the movement. Whilst the former advocated immediate action
by the State alone, the latter were in favor of awaiting the coop
eration of one or more of the other slaveholding States.
The time-honored and Union-loving Whig and Democratic
parties no longer existed in South Carolina. They had passed
away amid the din of disunion. Mr. Calhoun, from the termi
nation of nullification until the day of his death (31st March,
1850), made the 'wrongs and dangers of the South his almost
constant theme. These he much exaggerated. In his last
great speech to the Senate,* on the 4th March, 1850, a few days
before his death, which, from physical weakness, was read J)y
Mr. Mason, the Senator from Virginia, he painted these ¦wrongs
in glowing colors, and predicted that if they were not speedily
redressed disunion must inevitably follow. He asked the North
" to do justice, by conceding to the South an equal right in
the acquired [Mexican] territory, and to do her duty by caus
ing the stipulations in regard to fugitive slaves to be faith
fully fulfilled ; to cease the agitation of the slave question," and
to provide for such au amendment to the Constitution as would
restore to the South the means of self-protection. It is worthy
of remark, that, extreme as he was, he never, on any occasion,
asked for a repeal of the Missouri Compromise.
Although the earnest and impassioned appeals of Mr. Cal
houn made a deep impression on the people of the Southern
States, yet outside of South Carohna these failed to convince
the masses that they ought to resort to extreme measures.
Whilst satisfied they were suffering grievous ¦wrongs from the
Abolitionists, they were yet wilhng to abide by the coinpromise
measures of 1850, and to seek redress by constitutional efforts
* Con. Globe, 1849-'50, p. 451.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 95
¦within tbe Union. Such, it is our confident belief, continued to
be the genuine sentiments of a very large majority of their peo
ple even in the cotton States for a number of years after the
death of Mr. Calhoun. Still complaining, yet still hoping, they
could not be persuaded to adopt rash measures, by all the zeal
and eloquence of pro-slavery demagogues with which they were
infested. The friends of the Union calculated much upon the persist
ent opposition to South Carolina doctrines so long maintained
by Georgia. Indeed Mr. Cobb, in his canvass for Governor,
had made an able and powerful argument before the people of
that State against the right of secession ; aud this was a prin
cipal reason for his selection for a seat in the Cabinet of Mr.
Buchanan. Without the cooperation of this great and influen
tial State a successful movement toward disunion would have
been impracticable.
It was not until after the breaking up of the Charleston and
Baltimore Conventions, as we have before observed, that the
people of the cotton States, having lost all hopes of security
and redress within the Union, began seriously to determine to go
out of it. By this time they had become thoroughly indoctri
nated with a belief in the right of secession ; and they began to
think earnestly of putting it into practice.
Throughout the Presidential canvass, the cotton States
openly declared their purpose to secede should Mr. Lincoln be
elected. In this they were now unfortunately in earnest. In
ominous contrast with their former blustering, they now assumed
a quiet and determined tone. No sound judging man, unless
blinded by prejudice, could doubt their fixed resolution, unless
the Republican party should concede their equal rights within
the Territories ; should cease to assail slavery in the States ;
should repeal the personal liberty laws of Northern Legislatures,
and should fairly carry into execution the Fugitive Slave Laws.
Besides, they felt confident of their power. Their territory was
larger and contained a greater population than that of the thir
teen original States which had estabhshed their independence
against the forces of the British Empire. They, also, hoped to
bring the border slaveholding States, which still remained trae
7

96
to the Union, into their alhance. They knew that if invaded,
the Northern armies, in order to reach them, must march
through these States, which they hoped would deny a right of
passage to the invaders.
The Democratic party, justly appreciating the danger, every
where throughout the canvass warned their coimtrymen of its
approach. The Republican party, on the other hand, treated
these warnings as mere electioneering expedients, and in deris
ion ridiculed the Democrats as " Union savers." They confi
dently predicted that the threats of the cotton States would end
in smoke,' as they had ended heretofore ; that they woidd not
dare to secede ; but even if they should, they could within a
brief period be reduced to obedience by the overwhelming phys
ical power of the North.
With strange inconsistencj', however, immediately after Mr.
Lincoln's election much was said and written by Republicans in
the North calculated to delude the cotton States into the behef
that they might leave the Union without serious opposition.
The New York " Tribune," deservedly their leading and most
influential journal, giving tone to its party everywhere, contrib
uted much to encourage this delusion. It was doubtless actu
ated by hostility to a continued union with slaveholding States.
Acting in the spirit of the quotation already made from the ora
tion of John Quincy Adams before the New York Historical
Society, it on the 9th of November, but three days after Mr.
Lincoln's election, announced such sentiments as the folio-wine :
" If the cotton States shall become satisfied that they can do
better out of the Union than in it, we insist on letting them go
in peace. The right to secede may he a revolutionary one, but
it exists neveetheless. •» * * We must ever resist the
right of any State to remain in the Union and nulhfy or defy the
laws thereof. To ¦wtthdeaw feom the Union is quite anothee
matter; and whenever a considerable section of our Union
shall deliberately resolve to go out, 'we shall resist all coee-
cive measures' designed to keep it in. We hope never to live
in a Republic whereof one section is pinned to another by bay
onets." And again on the 17th December, three days before the

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 97
secession of South Carohna : " If it [the Declaration of Inde
pendence] justifies the secession from the British Empire of three
millions of colonists in 1776, we do not see why it would not
justify the secession offwe millions of Southrons from the Fed
eral Union in 1861. If we are mistaken on this point, wby
does not some one attempt to show wherein and why ? For our
own part, while we deny the right of slaveholders to hold
slaves against the ¦will of the latter, we cannot see how twenty
millions of people cam rightfully hold ten, or evenfuve, in a de
tested Union with them hy military force, * * * Jf
seven or eight contiguous States shall present themselves authen
tically at Washington, saying, ' We hate the Federal Union ; we
Jiave withdrawn from it ; we give you the choice between
acquiescing in our secession and arranging amicably all inci
dental questions on the one hand and attempting to subdue us
on the other,' we could not stand up for coercion, for suhjugor
tion, for we do not thinh it woidd he just. We hold the right
of self-government even lohen invoiced in hehalf pf those who
deny it to other's. So much for the question of principle."
In this course the " Tribune " persisted from the date of
Mr. Lincoln's election until after his inauguration, employing
such remarks as the following : " Any attempt to compel them
by force to remain would be contrary to the principles enuncia
ted in the immortal Declaration of Independence, contrary to
the fundamental ideas ou which human liberty is based."
Even after the cotton States had formed their confederacy,
and adopted a provisional Constitution at Montgomery, on the
23d February, 1861, it gave them encouragement to proceed in
the following language : " We have repeatedly said, and we once
more insist, that the great principle embodied by Jefferson in
the Declaration of American Independence, that Governments
derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, is
sound and just ; am.d that if the Sla/ve States, the Cotton States,
or the Oulf States only, choose to form an independent natioji,
THEY HAVE A CLEAE MOEAL EIGHT TO DO SO. Whenever it shall
he clear that the great hody of Southern people have hecome con
clusively alienated from the Union, and anxious to escape from
it WE WILL DO OUE BEST TO FOEWAKD THEIE ¦VIEWS."

98 In a similar spirit, leading Repubhcans everywhere scorn
fully exclaimed, " Let them go ; " " We can do better without
them ; " " Let the Union sHde," and other language of the same
import. In addition to all these considerations, the persistent refusal
of Congress, from the first until the last hour of the session of
1860-61, to take a single step in preparing for armed resistance
to the execution of the laws, served to confirm the cotton States
in the opinion that they might " depart in peace."
The people of the cotton States, unfortimately for themselves,
were also infatuated with the behef, until the very last moment,
that in case they should secede they would be sustained by a
large portion if not the whole Democratic party of the North.
They vainly imagined that this party, which had maintained
their constitutional rights whilst the^ remained in the Union,
would sustain them in rebellion after they* had gone out of it.
In this delusion they were also greatly encouraged by sympa
thy and support from influential and widely circulated Anti-
Repubhcan journals in the North, and especially in the city of
New York.
It was in vain, therefore, that the late President warned
them, as he often did, against this delusion. It was in vain he
assured them that the first cannon fired against either Fort
Moultrie or Fort Sumter would arouse the indignant spirit of the
North — would heal ^11 political di-visions amongst the Northern
people, and would unite them as one man in support of a war
rendered inevitable by such an act of rebellion.

ON THE EVE OP THE EEBELLION. 99

CHAPTER V.
General Scott's "Views," and the encouragement they afforded to the cotton States
to secede — Their publication by him in the "National Intelligencer" — His recom
mendation in favor of four distinct Confederacies —His recommendation to reSn-
force nine of the Southern forts, and the inadequacy of the troops^The reason
of this inadequacy — The whole army required on the frontiers — The refusal of
Congress to increase it — Our fortifications necessarily left without sufficient gar
risons for want of troops — The President's duty to refrain from any hostile act
against the cotton States, and smooth the way to a compromise — The rights of
those States in no danger from Mr. Lincoln's election — Their true policy was to
cling to the Union.
Such, since the period of Mr. Lincoln's election, having been
the condition of the Southern States, the " Views " of General
Scott, addressed before that event to the Secretary of War, on
the 29th and 30th October, 1860, were calculated to do much
injury in misleading the South. From the strange inconsisten
cies they involve, it would be difficult to estimate whether they
did most harm in encouraging or in provoking secession. So
far as they recommended a military movement, this, in order to
secure success, should have been kept secret until the hour
had arrived for carrying it into execution. The substance of
them, however, soon reached the Southern people. Neither the
headquarters of the army at New York, nor afterwards in
Washington, were a very secure depository for the " Views,"
even had it been the author's intention to regard them as confi
dential. That such was not the case may be well inferred from
their very nature. Not confined to the recommendation of a
military movement, by far the larger portion of them consists
of a political disquisition on the existing dangers to the Union ;
on the horrors of civil war and the best means of averting so
great a calamity ; and also on the course which their author had

100 ME. Buchanan's administeation
resolved to pursue, as a citizen, in the approaching Presidential
election. These were themes entirely foreign to a mihtary re
port, and equally foreign from the official duties of the Com
manding General. Furthermore, the " Views " were pubhshed
to the world by the General himself, on the 18th January, 1861,
in the " National Intelligencer," am,d this withofut ihe consent or
even previous Jcnowledge of the President. This was done at a
critical moment in our history, when the cotton States were
seceding one after the other. The reason assigned by him for
this strange violation of official confidence toward the President,
was the necessity for the correction of misapprehensions which
had got abroad, " both in the public prints and in pubhc speeches,"
in relation to the " Views."
The General commenced his " Views " by stating that, " To
save time the right of secession may be conceded, and instantly
balanced by the con-elative right on the part of the Federal
Government against an interior State or States to reestablish
by force, if necessary, its former continuity of territory." He
subsequently explains and quahfies the meaning of this pbrase
by saying : "It 'will be seen that the ' Views ' only apply to a
case of secession that makes a gaj) in the present Union. The
falling off (say) of Texas, or of all the Atlantic States, from the
Potomac South [the very case which has since occurred], was
not within the scope of General Scott's provisional remedies."
As if apprehending that by possibility it might be inferred he
intended to employ force for any other purpose than to open
the way through this gap to a State beyond, still in the Union,
he disclaims any such construction, and says : " The foregoing
'views eschew the idea of invading a seceded State." This dis
claimer is as strong as any language he could employ for the
purpose. To sustain the hmited right to open the way through the
gap, he cites, not the Constitution of the United States, but the
last chapter of Paley's " Moral and Political Philosophy," which,
however, contains no allusion to the subject.
The General paints the horrors of civil war in the most
gloomy colors, and then proposes his alternative for avoiding
them. He exclaims : " But break this glorious Union by what-

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 101
ever line or lines that pohtical madness may contrive, and there
would be no hope of reuniting the fragments except by the
laceration and despotism of the sword. To effect such result the
intestine wars of our Mexican neighbors would, in comparison
with ours, sink into mere child's play.
" A smaller evil " (in the General's opinion) " would be to
allow the fragments of the great Republic to form themselves
into new Confederacies, probably fom-."
Not satisfied with this general proposition, he proceeds not
only to discuss and to delineate the proper boundaries for these
new Confederacies, but even to designate capitals for the three
on this side of the Rocky Mountains. We quote his own lan
guage as follows : — " All the lines of demarcation between the
new unions cannot be accurately dra'wn in advance, but many
of them approximately may. Thus, looking to natural bounda
ries and commercial affinities, some of the following frontiers,
after many waverings and confficts, might perhaps become ac
knowledged and fixed :
" 1. The Potomac River and the Chesapeake Bay to the
Atlantic. 2. From Maryland along the crest of the Alleghany
(perhaps the Blue Ridge) range of mountains to some point on
the coast of Florida. 3. The line from, say the head of the
Potomac to the West or Northwest, which it will be most diffi
cult to settle. 4. The crest of the Rocky Mountains."
" The Southeast Confederacy would, in all human probabihty,
in less than five years after the rupture, find itself bounded by
the first and second lines indicated above, the Atlantic and the
Gulf of Mexico, with its capital at say Columbia, South Caro
lina. The country between the second, third, and fourth of
those lines would, beyond a doubt, in about the same time con
stitute another Confederacy, with its capital at probably Alton
or Quincy, Illinois. The boundaries of the Pacific Union are
the most definite of all, and the remaining States would consti
tute the Northeast Confederacy, with its capital at Albany. ' It,
at the first thought, will be considered strange that seven slave-
holding States and part of Virginia and Florida should be placed
(above) in a new Confederacy with Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, etc.
IBut when the overwhelming weight of the great Northwest is

102 me. Buchanan's administeation
taken in connection with the laws of trade, contiguity of terri
tory, and' the comparative indifference to free soil doctrines on
the part of Western Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mis
souri, it is evident that but little if any coercion, beyond moral
force, would be needed to embrace them ; and I have omitted
the temptation of the unwasted public lands which would fall
entire to this Confederacy — an appanage (well husbanded) suffi
cient for many generations. As to Missouri, Arkansas, and
Mississippi, they would not stand out a month. Louisiana
would coalesce without much solicitation, and Alabama with
West Florida would be conquered the first 'winter from the ab
solute need of Pensacola for a naval depot."
According to this arrangement of General Scott, all that
would be left for " the Northeast Confederacy " would be the
New England and Middle States ; and our present proud Capi
tol at Washington, hallowed by so many patriotic associations,
would be removed to Albany.*
It is easy to imagine with what power these " Views," pre
sented so early as October, 1860, may have been employed by
the disunion leaders of the cotton States to cou'vince the jieople
that tbey might depart in peace. Proceeding from the Com
manding General of the army, a citizen and a soldier so eminent,
and eschewing as they did the idea of invading a seceded State,
as well as favoring the substitution of new Confederacies for the
old Union, what danger could they apprehend in the formation
of a Southern Confederacy ?
This portion of the " Views," being purely political and pros
pective, and having no connection with military operations, was
out of time and out of place in a report from the Commanding
General of the Army to the Secretary of War. So, also, the
expression of his personal preferences among the candidates then
before the people for the office of President. " From a sense
of propriety as a soldier," says the General, " I have taken no
part in the pending canvass, and, as always heretofore, mean to
* It is worthy of special remark that General Scott in his autobiography recently
published, vol. ii., p. 609, entirely omits to copy this part of his views on which wo
have been commenting; so also his supplementary views of the next day, though
together they constitute but one whole. He merely copies that which relates to gai^
risoning the Southern forts.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 103
stay away from the polls. My sympathies, however, are with
the Bell and Everett ticket."
After all these prehminaries, we now proceed to a different
side of the picture presented by the General.
In the same " Views " (the 29th October, 1860), be says that,
" From a Icnowledge of our Southern population it is my solemn
conviction that there is some danger of an early act of rashness
preliminary to secession, viz., the seizure of some or all of the
following posts : — Forts Jackson and St. Philip, in the Missis
sippi, below New Orleans, both without garrisons ; Fort Morgan,
below Mobile, without a garrison ; Forts Pickens and M'Rea,
Pensacola harbor, with an insufficient garrison for one ; Fort
Pulaski, below Savannah, without a garrison ; Forts Moultrie
and Sumter, Charleston harbor, the former with an insufficient
garrison, and the latter without any ; and Fort Monroe, Hamp
ton Roads, without a sufficient garrison. In my opinion all
these works should be immediately so garrisoned as to make any
attempt to take any one of them by surprise or coup de main
ridiculous." It was his duty, as commanding general, to accompany this
recommendation with a practicable plan for garrisoning these
forts, stating the number of troops necessary for the purpose;
the points from which they could be drawn, and the manner in
which he proposed to conduct th-e enterprise. Finding this to
be impossible, from the total inadequacy of the force within the
President's power to accomplish a military operation so exten
sive, instead of furnishing such a plan he absolves himself from
the task by simply stating in his supplemental views of the next
day (30th October) that " There is one (regular) company at
Boston, one here (at the Narrows), one at Pittsburg, one at
Augusta, Ga., and one at Baton Rouge — in all five companies,
only, within reach, to garrison or reenforce the forts mentioned
in the ' Views.' "
Five companies only, four hundred men, to garrison nine
fiyrtifhcations scattered over six highly excited Southern States.
This was all the force " within reach " so as to make any attempt
to take any one of them hy surprise or coup de main ridicii-
lous.

104 ME. Buchanan's administeation
He even disparages the strength of this small force by apply
ing to if the diminutive adverb " only,"" or, in other words,
merely, barely. It wiU not be pretended that the President
had any power, under the laws, to add to this force by caUing
forth the inilitia, or accepting the services of volunteers to gar
rison these fortifications. And the small regular army were be
yond reach on our remote frontiers. Indeed, the whole Ameri
can army, numbering at that time not more than sixteen thousand
effective men, would have been scarcely sufficient. To have at
tempted to distribute these five companies among the eight forts
in the cotton States, and Fortress Monroe, in Virginia, would
have been a confession of weakness, instead of an exhibition of
imposing and overpowering strength. It could have had no
effect in preventing secession, but must have done much to pro
voke it. It "will be recollected that these "views, the substance
of which soon reached the Southern States, were written before
Mr. Lincoln's election, and at a time when none of the cotton
States had made the first movement toward secession. Even
South Carolina was then performing all her relative duties,
though most reluctantly, to the Govemment, whilst the border
States, with Virginia in the first rank, were still faithful and
true to the Union.
Under these circumstances, surely General Scott ought not
to have informed them in adyance that the reason why he had
recommended this expedition was because, from his knowledge
of them, he apprehended they might be guilty of an early act
of rashness in seizing these forts before secession. This would
necessarily provoke the passions of the Southem people. Vir
ginia was deeply wounded at the imputation against her loyalty
from a native though long estranged son.
Whilst one portion of the "Views," as we have already
seen, might be employed by disunion demagogues in con"vincing
the people of the cotton States that they might secede without
serious opposition from the North, another portion of them was
calculated to excite their indignation and drive them to extrem
ities. From tKe impracticable natm-e of the " Views," and their
strange and inconsistent character, the President dismissed them
from his mind without further consideration.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 105
It is proper to inform the reader why General Scott had five
companies only within reach for the proposed service. This
was because nearly the whole of our small army was on the
remote frontiers, where it had been continually employed for
years in protecting the inhabitants and the emigrants on their
way to the far west, against the attacks of hostile Indians. At
no former period had its services been more necessary than
throughout the year 1860, from the great number of these In
dians continually threatening or waging war on om- distant set
tlements. To employ the language of Mr. Benjamin Stanton,
of Ohio, iu his report of the 18th February, 1861, from the
military committee to the House of Representatives : " The
regular army numbers only 18,000 men, when recruited to its
maximum strength ; and the whole of this force is required
upon an extended frontier, for the protection of the border set
tlements against Indian depredations." Indeed, the whole of it
had proved insufficient for this purpose. This is estabhshed by
the reports of General Scott himself to the War Department.
In these he urges the necessity of raising more troops, in a
striking and convincing light. In that of 20th November,
1857,* after portraying the intolerable hardships and sufferings
of the army engaged in this service, he says : " To mitigate
these evils, and to enable us to give a reasonable security to our
people on Indian frontiers, measuring thousands of miles, I
respectfully suggest an augmentation of at least one regiment
of horse (dragoons, cavalry, or riflemen) and at least three regi
ments of foot (infantry or riflemen). This augmentation would
not more than furnish the reenforcements now greatly needed
in Florida, Texas, New Mexico, California, Oregon, Washington
Territory, Kansas, Nebraska, and Minnesota, leaving not a com
pany for Utah."
Again, General Scott, in his report of November 13, 1858,
says : f " This want of troops to give reasonable security to our
citizens in distant settlements, including emigrants on the plains,
can scarcely be too strongly stated ; but I will only add, that as
often as we have been obliged to withdraw troops from one fron-
* 3 Senate Documents, 1857-58, p. 48.
t Senate Executive Documents, 1858-59, vol. ii., part 3, p. 761.

106 ME. BUCHAITAn's ADMINISTEATION
tier in order to reenforce another, the weakened points have
been instantly attacked or threatened with formidable invasion."
The President, feeling the force of such appeals, and urged
by the earnest entreaties of the suflering people on the frontiers,
recommended to Congress, through the War Department, to
raise five additional regiments.* This, like aU other recommen
dations to place the country in a proper state of defence, was
disregarded. From what has been stated it is manifest that it
was impossible to garrison the numerous forts of the United
States with regular troops. This will account for the destitute
condition of the nine forts enumerated by General Scott, as well
as of all the rest.
Wben our system of fortifications was planned and carried
into execution, it was never contemplated to pro"vide garrisons
for them in time of peace. Tliis would have required a large
standing army, against which the American people have ever
evinced a -wise and wholesome jealousy. Every great repub-
hc, from the days of Csesar to Cromwell, and from Cromwell
to Bonaparte, has been destroyed by armies composed of free
citizens, who had been converted by military discipline into
veteran soldiers. Our fortifications, therefore, when completed,
were generally left in the custody of a sergeant and a few sol
diers. No fear was entertained that they would ever be seized
by the States for whose defence against a foreign enemy they
had been erected.
Under these circumstances it became the plain duty of the
President, destitute as he was of military force, not only to
refrain from any act which might provoke or encourage the
cotton States into secession, but to smooth the way for such a
Congressional compromise as had in times past happily averted
danger from the Union. There was good reason to hope this
might still be accomplished. The people of the slaveholding
States must have kno-wn there could be no danger of an actual
invasion of their constitutional rights over slave property from
any hostile action of Mr. Lincoln's administration. For the
protection of these, they could rely both on the judicial and the
legislative branches of the Government. The Supreme Court
¦* Senate Documents, 1857-58, vol. iii., p. 4.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 107
bad already decided the Territorial question in their favor, and
it was also ascertained that there would be a majority in both
Houses of the first Congress of Mr. Lincoln's term, sufficient to
prevent any legislation to their injury. Thus protected, it would
be madness for them to rush into secession. '
Besides, they were often warned and must have known that
by their separation from the free States, these very rights over
slave property, of which they were so jealous, would be in greater
jeopardy than they had ever been under the Government of the
Union. Theirs would then be the only Government in Chris
tendom which had not abohshed or was not in progress to
abohsb slavery. There would be a strong pressure from abroad
against this institution. To resist this effectually would require
the power and moral infiuence of the Government of the whole
United States. They ought, also, to have foreseen, that if their
secession should end in civil war, whatever might be the event,
slavery would receive a blow from which it could never recover.
The true policy, even in regard to the safety of their dopiestic
institution, was to cling to the Union.

108 ME.

CHAPTER VI.
Mr. Lincoln's election to the Presidency — Its danger to the Union — ^Warnings of the
President and his trying position — His policy in the emergency, and the reasons
for it — His supreme object the preservation of the Union — Meeting of Congress,
and the hostUity of the two parties toward each other — The wrongs of the South —
How rash and causeless would be rebellion in the Cotton States — The right of se
cession discussed and denied in the Message — The President's position defined —
Question of the powei: to coerce a State — Distinction between the power to wage
war against a State, and the power to execute the laws against individuals — Views
of Senator (now President) Johnson, of Tennessee — President Buchanan's solemn
appeal in favor of the Union — His estrangement from the secession leaders — Ces
sation of all friendly intercourse between him and them.
On the 6th November, 1860, Abraham Lincoln was elected
President of the United States, and immediately thereafter the
Legislature of South Carolina passed an Act for the call of a
Convention to carry the State out of the Union, calculating that
by this precipitate violence she might force the other cotton
States to follow in her lead.
Every discerning citizen must now have foreseen serious dan
ger to the Union from Mr. Lincoln's election. After a struggle
of many years, this had accomplished the triumph of the anti-
slavery over the slaveholding States, and established two geo
graphical parties, inflamed with malignant hatred against each
other, in despite of the warning voice of Washington. It at
once became manifest that the apprehensions of civil war, aris
ing from this event, had proved as disastrous to the business of
the country as if the struggle had actually commenced. Al
though the harvests of the year had been abimdant, and com
merce and manufactures had"liever been more prosperous, terror
and alarm everywhere prevailed. In the midst of all the ele
ments of prosperity, every material interest was at once greatly

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 109
depressed. With a sound currency in abundance, the price of
all public securities fell in the market. The credit of the Fed
eral Government, which had before stood so high, was unable
to resist the shock. The small necessary loans to meet the
previous appropriations of Congress, could not be obtained
except at ruinous rates.
Throughout more than a quarter of a century the late Pres
ident, on every fitting occasion, had solemnly warned his coun
trymen of the approaching danger, unless the agitation in the
North against slavery in the South should cease. Instead of
this, it still continued to increase, year after year, with brief
intervals only, until it has become at length the unhappy, though
unjustifiable cause, perhaps the criminal pretext, for the seces
sion of eleven slaveholding States from the Confederacy.
The President had less than four months to complete his
term of office. The Democratic party, to which he owed his
election, had been defeated, and the triumphant party had pur
sued his administration from the beginning with a virulence
uncommon even in our history. His every act had been mis
represented and condemned, and he knew that whatever course
he might pursue, he was destined to encounter their bitter hos
tility. No public man was ever placed in a more trying and
responsible position. Indeed, it was impossible for him to act
with honest independence, without giving offence both to the
anti-slavery and secession parties, because both had been clearly
in the wrong. In view of his position, and after mature reflec
tion, he adopted a system of policy to which ever afterward,
during the brief remnant of his term, he inflexibly adhered.
This he announced and explained in the annual message to
Congress of the 3d December, 1860, and in the special message
thereafter of the 8th January, 1861.
The Cabinet was then composed of Lewis Cass, of Michi
gan, Secretary of State ; Howell Cobb, of Georgia, Secretary
of the Treasury ; John B. Floyd, of Virginia, Secretary af
War ; Isaac Toucey, of Connecticut, Secretary of the Na-vy ;
Jacob Thompson, of Mississippi, Secretary of the Interior ; Jo
seph Holt, of Kentucky, Postmaster-General, in the place of

110 ME. Buchanan's administeation
Aaron V. Bro'wn, of Tennessee, deceased ; and Jeremiah S,
Black, of Pennsylvania, Attorney-General.
The annual message throughout, before it was communicated
to Congress, had been warmly approved by every member of
the Cabinet, except so much of it as denied the right of seces
sion, and maintained the duty of defending the public property
and collecting the revenue in South Carolina, to which Messrs.
Cobb and Thompson objected. These having now become prac
tical questions of -vital importance, both felt it would be impos
sible to remain in tbe Cabinet whilst holding opinions upon
them in opposition to the known and settled convictions of the
President. They accordingly resigned after the meeting of
Congress, remaining in office for a brief period, to enable them
to bring up and close the ordinary business of their respective
departments, and thus clear the way for their successors.
At this critical moment, and but nine days after Congress
had assembled. General Cass, on the 12th December, 1860, re
signed the office of Secretary of State, notwithstanding the
message had, but a few days before, elicited from him strong
expressions of approbation. Of this resignation and the circum
stances preceding and following it, we forbear to speak, not
doubting it proceeded at the moment from a sense of duty.
Attorney-General Black was, in consequence, appointed Secre
tary of State, and the vacancy thereby created was fllled by the
appointment of Edwin M. Stanton as Attorney-General.
Philip F. Thomas, formerly Governor of Maryland, and
then Commissioner of Patents, was appointed Secretary of the
Treasury, in place of Mr. Cobb, who had resigned on the 8th
December, but he did not long continue in office, having also
resigned on the llth January, 1861. The reason he assigned
was a difference of opinion from the President and a majority
of the Cabinet in regard to the measures which had been adopted
against South Carolina, and the purpose of the President to
enforce the collection of the customs at the port of Charleston.
Immediately thereafter, the President tendered the appoint
ment of Secretary of the Treasury to General John A. Dix, of
New York, whicH was, much to his satisfaction, promptly ac
cepted.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. Ill
The Interior Department remained vacant after the retire
ment of Mr. Thompson, but its duties were ably and faithfully
performed by Moses Kelly, the chief clerk, until the close of the
administration. Upon Mr. Holt's transfer, late in December,
1860, from the Post Office to the War Department, the first As
sistant Postmaster-General, Horatio King, of Maine, continued
for some time to perform the duties of the Department iu a
highly satisfactory manner, when he was appointed Postmaster-
General. After these changes the Cabinet consisted of Messrs.
Black, Dix, Holt, Toucey, Stanton, aud King, who all remained
in office until the end of Mr. Buchanan's term.
The President had earnestly desired that his Cabinet might
remain together until the close of the administration. He felt
sensibly the necessary withdrawal of some of its members, after
all had been so long united in bonds of mutual confidence and
friendship. The President's policy was, first and above all, to propose
and urge the adoption of such a fair and honorable compro
mise as might prove satisfactory to all the States, both North
and South, on the question of slavery in the Territories, the im
mediate and principal source of danger to the Union ; and should
he fail to accomplish this object in regard to the seven cotton
States, which there was too much cause to apprehend, then to
employ all legitimate means to preserve and strengthen the
eight remaining slave or border States in their undoubted loy
alty. These States, he knew, iu case of need, might prove in
strumental , in bringing back their erring sisters to a sense of
duty. To preserve the Union was the President's supreme object,
and he considered it doubtful whether it could survive the shock
of ci'vil war. He was well aware that our wisest statesmen had
often warned their countrymen, in the most solemn terms, that
our institutions could not be preserved by force, and could only
endure whilst concord of feeling, and a proper respect by one
section for the rights of another, should be maintained. Mr.
Madison in this spirit had observed, in tbe Federal Convention,*
* June 8, 1787. Sup. to ElUot's Debates, vol. v., p. 171.
8

112 ME. Buchanan's administeation
that " Any Government for the United States, formed upon the
supposed practicability of using force against the unconstitutional
proceedings of the States, would prove as visionary and faUacious;
as the Govemment of [the old] Congress." And General Jack
son, a high authority, especially on such a subject, had declared
in his Farewell Address* (3d March, 1837), that " the Constitu
tion cannot be maintained, nor the Union preserved, in opposi
tion to public feeling, by the mere exertion of the coercive
powers confided to the General Govemment. The foundations
must be laid in the affections of the people ; in the security it
gives to life, liberty, character, and property, in every quarter
of the country ; and in the fraternal attachments which the citi
zens of the several States bear to one another, as members of
one political family, mutually contributing to promote the hap
piness of each other. Hence [in evident reference to the slavery
agitation in the North] the citizens of every State should
studiously avoid every thing calculated to wound tbe sensibility
or off'end the just pride of the people of other States ; and they
should frown upon any proceedings within their own borders
hkely to disturb the tranquillity of their pohtical brethren in
other portions of the Union."
The President, whilst admitting that Mr. Madison and Gen
eral Jackson may have erred in these opinions, was convinced
that should a rebellion break out witliin the seven cotton States,
this coidd not be overcome without a long and bloody war.
From the character of our people and the history of our race,
it was evident that such a war, on both sides, would be earned
to desperate extremities. These seven States composed a con
tiguous territory of greater extent than the whole thirteen orig
inal States, and contained more than five milhons of people.
To vanquish them would require a very large army and an im
mense sacrifice of kindred blood. No person acquainted with
history could be blind to the danger to which our free institu
tions would be exposed from such an army. History had taught
us that every great Republic had fallen a victim to military
power. Besides, it was morally certain that should civil war
actually commence, most if not all of the border States, though
* 2 statesman's Manual, 951.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 113
still adhering to the Union, would eventually be drawn into the
confiict. To prosecute civil war would require an expenditure
of hundreds of millions of dollars. This would entail an enor
mous debt on ourselves and our posterity, the interest on which
could only be paid by oppressive taxation. The President knew
that, in the mean time, many of the great commercial, manufac
turing, artisan, and laboring classes would be exposed to abso
lute ruin. It was therefore his supreme desire to employ all
the constitutional means in his power to avert these impending
calamities. In the midst of these portentous circumstances, both present
and prospective. Congress met on the first Monday of December,
1860, and the President on the next day transmitted to them
his annual message. The opposing parties, instead of presenting
the peaceful aspect becoming the Representatives of a great Con
federacy assembled to promote the various interests of their con
stituents, breathed nothing but mutual defiance. There was no
longer any social or friendly intercourse between the Pro-Slavery
and Anti- Slavery members. South Carolina had called a Con
vention for the avowed purpose of adopting a secession ordi
nance ; and the other cotton States were preparing to follow her
example. Such was the situation at the meeting of Congress, and it
was most unfortunate that but few individuals in the Northern
States justly appreciated the extent and magnitude of the dan
ger. These facts stared every unprejudiced observer in the face.
The danger was upon us, and how to remove it was a question
for enlightened aud patriotic statesmanship. The stake involved
was no less than the peace and perpetuity of the Union. The
evil could not be averted by any argument, however conclusive,
against the right of a State peacefully to secede from the Union.
This dangerous heresy had taken thorough possession of the
Southern mind, and the seven cotton States were acting and
preparing to act iu accordance with it. There was but one
mode of arresting their headlong career, and this was promptly
to recognize their rights over slave property in the Territo
ries, as they existed under the decision of the Supreme Court.
If the North should refuse to do this and reject any compro-

114 ME. Buchanan's administeation
mise, the secession of the cotton States woxdd be inevitable.
Apart from the factitious importance with which party spirit
had invested the question, it was little more in point of fact than
a mere abstraction. The recognition of the decision of the Su
preme Court on the part of Congress, would not have added a
single slave or a single slave State to the number already exist
ing. The natural and irreversible laws of climate would prove
an insurmountable banier against the admission of any of our
Territories as a slave State into the Union.
The President, therefore, in his annual message of 3d Decem
ber, 1860, appealed to Congress to institute an amendment to the
Constitution recognizing the rights of the Southern States in re
gard to slavery in the Territories. But before we proceed to
give the history and the fate of this recommendation, it is neces
sary to revert to previous portions of the message, in which he
endeavored to hold the balance fairly between the North and the
South. And first in respect to the -wrongs which the South had suf
fered, he says : " The long-continued and intemperate interfer
ence of the Northern people 'with the question of slavery in the
Southem States, has at length produced its natural effects. The
different sections of the Union are now arrayed against each
other, and the time has arrived, so much dreaded by the Father
of his Country, when hostile geographical parties have been
formed. " I have long foreseen, and often forewarned my country
men of the now impending danger. This does not proceed
solely from the claim on the part of Congress or the Temtorial
Legislatures to exclude slavery from the Territories, nor from
the efforts of different States to defeat the execution of the
fugitive slave law.
" All or any of these evils might have beeu endured by the
South, without danger to the Union (as others have been), in the
hope that time and reflection might apply the remedy. The im
mediate pern arises, not so much from these causes, as from the fact
that the incessant and ¦violent agitation of the slavery question
throughout the North, for the last quarter of a century, has at
length produced its mahgn influence on the slaves, and inspired

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 115
them with vague notions of freedom. Hence a sense of security
no longer exists around the family altar. This feeling of peace
at home has given place to apprehensions of servile insurrections.
Many a matron throughout the South retires at night in dread
of what may befall herself and her children before the morning.
Should this apprehension of domestic danger, whether real or
imaginary, extend and intensify itself until it shall pervade the
masses of the Southem people, then disunion will become inevi
table. Self-preservation is the first law of nature, and has been
implanted in the heart of man by his Creator for the wisest pur
pose; and no political union, however fraught with blessings
and benefits in all other respects, can long continue, if the neces
sary consequence be to render the homes and the firesides of
nearly half the parties to it habitually and hopelessly insecure.
Sooner or later the bonds of such a Union must be severed. It
is my conviction that this fatal period has not yet arrived ; and
my prayer to God is, that he would preserve the Constitution
and the Union throughout all generations.
" But let us take warning in time and remove the cause of
danger. It cannot be denied that for five and twenty years the
agitation at the North against slavery has been incessant. In
1835, pictorial handbills and infiammatory appeals were circu
lated extensively throughout the South, of a character to excite
the passions of the slaves, and, in the language of General Jack
son, ' to stimulate them to insurrection and produce aU the
horrors of a servile war.'
" This agitation has ever since been continued by the pubhc
press, by the proceedings of State and County Conventions, and
\>j abolition sermons and lectures. The time of Congress has
been occupied in violent speeches on this never-ending subject ;
and appeals, in pamphlet and other forms, indorsed by distiu-
guished names, have been sent forth from this central point and
spread broadcast over the Union.
" How easy would it be for the American people to settle the
slavery question forever, and to restore peace and harmony to
this distracted country ! They, and they alone, can do it. All
that is necessary to accomphsh the object, and all for which the
slave States have ever contended, is to be let alone and permit-

116 ME. Buchanan's administeation
ted to manage their domestic institutions in their own way.
As sovereign States, they and they alone are responsible before
God and the world for the slavery existing among them. For
this the people of the North are not more responsible, and have
no more right to interfere, than with similar institutions in Rus
sia or in Brazil. Upon their good sense and patriotic forbear
ance, I confess, I still greatly rely. Without their aid it is be
yond the power of any President, no matter what may be his
own political proclivities, to restore peace and harmony among
the States. Wisely limited and restrained as is his power under
our Constitution and laws, he alone can accomplish but little
for good or for evil on such a momentous question."
The President then proceeded to show how rash and cause
less would be the action of the cotton States, should they rise
in revolutionary resistance against the Federal Govemment, at
a time when their rights were in no real danger, either from the
election or administration of Mr. Lincoln. He says : " And
this brings me to observe, that the election of any one of our
fellow-citizens to the office of President does not of itself afford
just cause for dissolving the Union. This is more especially
true if his election has been effected by a mere plurality and
not a majority of the people, and has resulted from transient
and temporary causes, which may probably never again occur.
In order to justify a resort to revolutionary resistance, the Fed
eral Government must be guilty of ' a dehberate, palpable, and
dangerous exercise ' of powers not granted by the Constitution.
The late Presidential election, however, has been held in strict
conformity with its express prpvisions. How, then, can the
result justify a revolution to destroy this very Constitution ?
Reason, justice, a regard for the Constitution, all require that
we shall wait for some overt aud dangerous act on the part of
the President elect, before resorting to such a remedy. It is
said, however, that the antecedents of the President elect have
been sufficient to justify the fears of the South that he -will at
tempt to invade their constitutional rights. But are such appre
hensions of contingent danger in the future sufficient to justify
the immediate destruction of the noblest system of govemment
ever de'vised by mortals ? From the very nature of his office.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 117
and its high responsibilities, he must necessarily be conserva
tive. The stern duty of administering the vast and complicated
concerns of this Government, affords in itself a guarantee that
be will not attempt any violation of a clear constitutional
right. " After all, he is no more than the chief executive officer of
the Government. His province is not to make but to execute
the laws, and it is a remarkable fact in our history that, not
'withstanding the repeated efforts of the Anti-Slavery party, no
single act has ever passed Congress, unless we may possibly ex
cept the Missouri Compromise, impairing in the slightest degree
the rights of the South to their property in slaves. And it
may also be observed, judging from present indications, that no
probability exists of the passage of such an act by a majority
of both Houses, either in the present or the next Congress.
Surely, under these circumstances, we ought to be restrained
from present action by the precept of Him who spake as man
never spoke, that ' sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof
The day of evil may never come unless we shall rashly bring it
upon ourselves.
" It is alleged as one cause for immediate secession, that the
Southem States are denied equal rights with the other States in
the common Territories. But by what authority are these de
nied? Not by Congress, which has never passed, and I believe
never will pass, any act to exclude slavery from these Territories.
And certainly not by the Supreme Court, which has solemnly
decided that slaves are property, and like all other property
their owners have a right to take them into the common Ter
ritories and hold them there imder the protection of the Consti
tution. " So far, then, as Congress is concerned, the objection is not
to any thing they have already done, but to what they may do
hereafter. It will surely be admitted that this apprehension of
future danger is no good reason for an immediate dissolution of
the Union. It is true that the Territorial Legislature of Kansas,
on the 23d February, 1860, passed in great haste an act over the
veto of the governor, declaring that slavery ' is and shall be for
ever prohibited in this Territory.' Such an act, however, plainly

118 ME. Buchanan's administeation
'violating the rights of property secured by the Constitution, will
surely be declared void by the judiciary, whenever it shall be
presented in a legal form.
" Only three days after my inauguration the Supreme Court
of the United States solemnly adjudged that this power did not
exist in a Territorial Legislature. Yet such has been the factious
temper of the times that the correctness of this decision has been
extensively impugned before the people, and the question has
given rise to angry pohtical conflicts throughout the country.
Those who have appealed from this judgment of our highest
constitutional tribunal to popular assembhes, would, if they
could, invest a Territorial Legislature with power to annul the
sacred rights of property. This power Congress is expressly
forbidden by the Federal Constitution to exercise. Every State
Legislature in the Union is forbidden by its own Constitution to
exercise it. It cannot be exercised in any State except by the
people in their highest sovereign capacity when framing or
amending their State Constitution. In like manner it can only
be exercised by the people of a Territory, represented in a con
vention of delegates for the purpose of framing a constitution
preparatory to admission as a State into the Union. Then,
and not until then, are they invested with power to decide the
question whether slavery shall or shall not exist within their
limits. This is an act of sovereign authority and not of subor
dinate territorial legislation. Were it otherwise, then indeed
would the equality of the States in the Territories be destroyed,
and the rights of property in slaves would depend not upon the
guarantees of the Constitution, but upon the shifting majorities
of an irresponsible Territorial Legislature. Such a doctrine, from
, its intrinsic unsoundness, cannot long influence any considera
ble portion of our people, much less can it afford a good reason
for a dissolution of the Union.
"The most palpable violations of constitutional duty which
have yet been committed consist in the acts of different State
Legislatures to defeat the execution of the fugitive slave law. It
ought to be remembered, however, that for these acts neither
Congress nor any President can justly be held responsible.
Having been passed in violation of the Federal Constitution,

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 119
they are therefore null and void. All the courts, both State and
national, before whom the question has arisen, have, from the
beginning, declared the fugitive slave law to be constitutional.
The single exception is that of a State court in Wisconsin ; and
this has not only been reversed by the proper appellate tribunal,
but has met with such universal reprobation, that there can be
no danger from it as a precedent. The validity of this law has
beeu established over and over again by the Supreme Court of
the United States with perfect unanimity. It is founded upon
an express provision of the Constitution, requiring that fugitive
slaves who escape from service in one State to another shall be
' delivered up ' to their masters. Without this provision it is a
well-known historical fact that the Constitution itself could never
have beeu adopted by the Convention. In one form or other
under the acts of 1793 and 1850, both being substantially the
same, the fugitive slave law has been the law of the land from
the days of Washington until the present moment. Here, then,
a clear case is presented, in which it will be the duty of the next
President, as it has been my o'wn, to act with 'vigor in executing
this supreme law against the conflicting enactments of State
Legislatures. Should he fail in the performance of this high
duty, he will then have manifested a disregard of the Constitu
tion and laws, to the great injury of the people of nearly one-
half of tl^e States of the Union. But are we to presume in
advance that be wiU thus violate his duty ? This would be at
war with every principle of justice aud of Christian charity.
Let us wait for the overt act. The fugitive slave law has been
carried into execution iu every contested case since the com
mencement of the present administration ; though often, it is to
be regretted, with great loss and inconvenience to the master,
and with considerable expense to the Govemment. Let us
trust that the State Legislatures will repeal their unconstitu
tional and obnoxious enactments. Unless this shall be done
without unnecessary delay, it is impossible for any human power
to save the Union.
" The Southem States, standing on the basis of the Constitu
tion, have a right to demand this act of justice from the States
of the North. Should it be refused, then the Constitution, to

120
which all the States are parties, will have been wilfully -violated
by one portion of them in a provision essential to the domestic
security and happiness of the remainder. In that event, the
injured States, after having first used all peaceful and constitu
tional means to obtain redress, would be justified in revolution
ary resistance to the Government of the Union."
Having thus disposed of the question of revolutionary re
sistance, the message proceeds to discuss the right of peaceful
secession from the Union claimed by the Southem States in
their sovereign character. It proceeds :
" I have purposely confined my remarks to revolutionary re
sistance, because it has been claimed vsdthin the last few years
that any State, whenever this shall be its sovereign will and
pleasure, may secede from the Union in accordance with the
Constitution, and without any violation of the constitutional
rights of the other members of the Confederacy. That as each
became parties to the Union by the vote of its own people
asseihbled in convention, so any one of them may retire from
the Union in a similar manner by the vote of such a conven
tion. " In order to justify secession as a constitutional remedy, it
must be on the principle that the Federal Government is a mere
voluntary association of States, to be dissolved at pleasure by
any one of the contracting parties. If this be so, the Confed
eracy is a rope of sand, to be penetrated and dissolved by the
first adverse wave of public opinion in any of the States. In
this manner our thirty-three States may resolve themselves into
as many petty, jarring, and hostile republics, each one retiring
from the Union without responsibility whenever any sudden ex
citement might impel them to such a coui-se. By this process
a Union might be entirely broken into fragments iu a few weeks,
which cost our forefathers many years of toil, privation, and
blood to establish.
" Such a principle is wholly inconsistent with the history as
well as the character of the Federal Constitution. After it was
framed with the greatest deliberation and care, it was submitted
to conventions of the people of the several States for ratification.
Its provisions were discussed at length in these -bodies, com-

ON THE EVE OP THE EEBELLION. 121
posed of the first men of the country. Its opponents contended
that it conferred powers upon the Federal Government danger-
pus to the rights of the States, whilst its advocates maintained
that, under a fair construction of the instrument, there was no
foundation for such apprehensions. In that mighty struggle
between the first intellects of this or any other country, it never
occurred to any individual, either among its opponents or advo
cates, to assert or even to intimate that their efibrts were all vain
labor, because tbe moment that any State felt herself aggrieved
she might secede from the Union. What a crusliing argument
would this have proved against those who dreaded that the rights
of the States would be endangered by tlie Constitution. The
truth is, that it was not until some years after the origin of the
Federal Government that such a proposition was first advanced.
It was afterwards met and refuted by the conclusive arguments of
General Jackson, who, in his message of the 16th January, 1833,
transmitting the nullifying ordinance of South Carolina to Con
gress, employs the following language : ' The right of the peo
ple of a single State to absolve themselves at will and without
the consent of the other States from their most solemn obhga-
tions, and hazard the liberty and happiness of the millions com
posing this Union, cannot be acknowledged. Such authority
is believed to be utterly repugnant both to the principles upon
which the General Govemment is constituted, and to the objects
which it was expressly formed to attain.'
" It is not pretended that any clause in the Constitution
gives countenance to such a theory. It is altogether founded
upon inference, not from any language contained in the instru
ment itself, but from the sovereign character of the several
States by which it was ratified. But is it beyond the power of
a State, like an individual, to yield a portion of its sovereign
rights to secure the remainder ? In the language of Mr. Madi
son, who has been called the father of the Constitution, ' It was
formed by the States — that is, by the people in each of the
States acting in their highest sovereign capacity, and formed
consequently by the same authority which formed the State
constitutions.' ' Nor is tbe Government of the United States,
created by the Constitution, less a Govemment, in tho strict

122 ME, Buchanan's administeation
sense of the term, within the sphere of its powers, than the
govemments created by the constitutions of the States are
within their several spheres. It is, like them, organized into
legislative, executive, and judiciary departments. It operates,
hke them, directly on persons aud things ; and, like them, it
has at command a physical force for executing the powers com
mitted to it.'
" It was intended to be perpetual, and not to. be annulled at
the pleasm'e of any one of the contracting parties. The old
Articles of Confederation were entitled ' Articles of ^ Confedera
tion and Perpetual Union between the States ; ' and by the thir
teenth article it is expressly declared that ' the articles of this
confederation shall be iu'violably observed by every State, and
the Union shall be perpetual.' The preamble to the Constitu
tion of the United States, ha-ving express reference to the Arti
cles of Confederation, recites that it was established ' in order to
form a more perfect union.' And yet it is contended that this
' more perfect union ' does not include the essential attribute of
perpetuity. " But that the Union was designed to be perjjetual, appears
conclusively from the nature and extent of the powers conferred
by the Constitution on the Federal Govemment. These powers
embrace the very highest attributes of national sovereignty.
They place both the sword and the purse under its control.
Congress has power to make war and to make peace ; to raise
and support armies and navies, and to conclude treaties with
foreign govemments. It is invested vrith the power to coin
money, and to regulate the value thereof, and to regulate com
merce -with foreign nations and among the several State?. It is
not necessary to enumerate the other high powers which have
been conferred upon the Federal Govemment. In order to
carry the enumerated powers into effect. Congress possesses the
exclusive right to lay and collect duties on imports, and, in com
mon with the States, to lay and collect all other taxes.
" But the Constitution has not only conferred these high
powers upon Congress, but it has adopted effectual means to
restrain the States from interfering with their exercise. For
that purpose it has in strong prohibitory language expressly de-

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 123
clared that ' no State shall enter into any treaty, alliance,
or confederation ; grant letters of marque and reprisal ; coin
money ; emit bills of credit ; make any thing but gold and sil
ver coin a tender in payment of debts ; pass any bill of attain
der, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obhgatiou of con
tracts.' Moreover, ' without the consent of Congress no State
shall lay any imposts or duties on any imports or exports, ex
cept what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspec
tion laws,' and if they exceed this amount, the excess shall be
long to the United States. And ' no State shall, without the
consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops or
ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or com
pact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in
war, unless actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will
not admit of delay.'
" In order still further to secure the uninterrupted exercise
of these high powers against State interposition, it is provided
' that this Constitution and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or
which shall be made under the authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme law of the land ; and the judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or
laws of any State to the contrary not-withstanding.'
" The solemn sanction of religion has been superadded to
the obligations of official duty, and all Senators and Represent
atives of the United States, all members of State Legislatures,
and all executive aijd judicial officers, ' both, of the United
States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath or affir
mation to support this Constitution.'
" In order to carry into effect these powers, the Constitution
has established a perfect Government in all its forms, legislative,
executive, and judicial ; and this Government to the extent of
its powers acts directly upon the individual citizens of every
State, and executes its o'wn decrees by the agency of its o-wn
officers. In this respect it differs entirely from the Government
under the old confederation, which was confined to making
requisitions on tbe States in their sovereign character. This left
it in the discretion of each whether to obey or to refuse, and

124 ME. Buchanan's administeation
they often declined to comply with such requisitions. It thus
became necessary, for the purpose of removing this barrier, and
' in order to form a more perfect union,' to establish a Govem
ment which could act directly upon the people and execute its
own laws without the intermediate agency of the States. This
has been accomplished by the Constitution of the United States.
In short, the Government created by the Constitution, and de
riving its authority frgm the sovereign people of each of the
several States, has precisely the same right to exercise its power
over the people of all these States in the enumerated cases, that
each one of them possesses over subjects not delegated to the
United States, but ' reserved to the States respectively or to the
people.' " To the extent of the delegated powers the Constitution of
the United States is as much a part of the constitution of each
State, and is as binding upon its people, as though it had been
textually inserted therein.
" This Govemment, therefore, is a great and powerful Gov
emment, invested with all the attributes of sovereignty over the
special subjects to which its authority extends. Its framers
never intended to implant in its bosom the seeds of its own
destruction, nor were they at its creation guilty of the absurdity
of providing for its own dissolution. It was not intended by its
framers to be the baseless fabric of a vision, which, at the touch
of the enchanter, would vanish into thin air, but a substantial
and mighty fabric, capable of resisting the slow decay of time,
and of defying the storms of ages. Indeed, well may the jeal
ous patriots of that day have indulged fears that a Govemment
of such high powers might violate the reserved rights of the
States, and wisely did they adopt the rule of a strict construc
tion of these powers to prevent the danger. But they did not
fear, nor had they any reason to imagine that the Constitution
would ever be so interpreted as to enable any State by her own
act, and without the consent of her sister States, to discharge
her people from all or any of their federal obligations.
" It may be asked, then, are the people of the States -with
out redress against the tyranny and oppression of the Federal
Government ? By no means. The right of resistance on the

ON THE EVE OP THE EEBELLION. 125
part of tbe governed against the oppression of their govern
ments cannot be denied. It exists independently of all consti
tutions, and has been exercised at all periods of the world's his
tory. Under it, old governments have been destroyed and new
ones have taken their place. It is embodied in strong and ex
press language in our own Declaration of Independence. But the
distinction must ever be observed that this is revolution against
an established Government, and not a voluntary secession from
it by virtue of an inherent constitutional right. In short, let
us look the danger fairly in the face ; secession is neither more
nor less than revolution. It may or it may not be a justifiable
revolution ; but still it is revolution."
The President having thus attempted to demonstrate that
the Constitution affords no warrant for secession, but that this
was inconsistent both with its letter and spirit, then defines his
own position. He says :
"What, in the mean time, is the responsibility and true posi
tion of the Executive ? He is bound by solemn oath, before
God and the country, ' to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed,' and from this obligation he cannot be absolved by
any human power. But what if the performance of this duty,
in whole or in part, has been rendered impracticable by events
over which he could have exercised no control ? Such, at the
present moment, is the case throughout the State of South Car
olina, so far as the laws of the United States to secure the ad
ministration of justice by means of the Federal judiciary are
concerned. All the Federal officers within its limits, through
whose agency alone these laws can be carried into execution,
have already resigned. We no longer have a district judge, a
district attorney, or a marshal iu South Carolina. In fact, the
whole machinery of the Federal Government necessary for the
distribution of remedial justice among the people has been
demolished, and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to re
place it.
" The only acts of Congress on the statute book bearing
upon this subject are those of the 28th February, 1795, and 3d
March, 1807. These authorize the President, after he shall
have ascertained that the marshal, with his posse comitatus, is

126
unable to execute ci^vil or criminal process in any particular
case, to call forth the mihtia and employ the army and na-vy to
aid him in performing this service, having first by proclamation
commanded the insurgents ' to disperse and retire peaceably to
their respective abodes within a hmited time.' This duty can
not by possibility be performed in a State where no judicial
authority exists to issue process, and where there is no marshal
to execute it, and where, even if there were such an officer, the
entire population would constitute one solid combination to
resist him.
" The bare enumeration of these provisions proves how inad
equate they are without further legislation to overcome a united
opposition in a single State, not to speak of other States who
may place themselves in a similar attitude. Congress alone has
power to decide whether the present laws can or cannot be
amended so as to carry out more effectually the objects of the
Constitution. " The same insuperable obstacles do not lie in the way of
executing the laws for the coUection of the customs. The reve
nue still continues to be collected, as heretofore, at the custom
house in Charleston, and should the collector unfortunately re
sign, a successor may be appointed to perform this duty.
" Then, in regard to the property of the United States in
South Carolina. This has been purchased for a fair equivalent,
' by the consent of the Legislature of the State,' ' for the erec
tion of forts, magazines, arsenals,' &c., and over these the au
thority ' to exercise exclusive legislation ' has been expressly
granted by the Constitution to Congress. It is not believed
that any attempt will be made to expel the United States from
this property by force ; but if iu this I should prove to be mis
taken, the officer in command of the forts has received orders
to act strictly on the defensive. In such a contingency the re
sponsibility for consequences would rightfully rest upon the
heads of the assailants.
" Apart from the execution of the laws, so far as this may be
practicable, the Executive has no authority to decide what shall
be the relations between the Federal Government and South
Caroluia. He has been invested with no such discretion. He

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 127
possesses no power to change the relations heretofore existing
between them, much less to acknowledge the independence of
that State. This would be to invest a mere executive officer
with the power of recognizing the dissolution of the Confeder
acy among our thirty-three sovereign States. It bears no resem
blance to the recognition of a foreign de facto Government, in
volving no such responsibihty. Any attempt to do this would,
on his part, be a naked act of usurpation. It is, therefore, my
duty to submit to Congress the whole question in all its bear
ings." Then follows the opinion expressed in the message, that the
Constitution has conferred no power on the Federal Govem
ment to coerce a State to remain in the Union. The foUo-wing
is the language : " The question fairly stated is, ' Has the Con
stitution delegated to CongreSs the power to coerce a State into
submission which is attempting to -withdraw, or has actually
¦withdrawn from the Confederacy % ' If answered in the affirma
tive, it must be on the principle that the power has been con
ferred upon Congress to make war against a State.
" After much serious reflection, I have arrived at the conclu
sion that no such power has been delegated to Congress or to
any other department of the Federal Govemment. It is mani
fest, upon an inspection of the Constitution, that this is not
among the specific and enumerated powers granted to Congress ;
and it is equally apparent that its exercise is not ' necessary and
proper for carrying into execution ' any one of these powers.
So far from this power having been delegated to Congress, it
was expressly refused by the Convention which framed the Con
stitution. " It appears from the proceedings of that body that on the
31st May, 1787, the clause ' cmthorizing am, exertion of the force
of ihe ivhole against a delinquent State ' came up for considera
tion. Mr. Madison opposed it in a brief but powerful speech,
from which I shall extract but a single sentence. He observed :
' The use of force against a State would look more like a decla
ration of war than an infliction of punishment, and would proba
bly be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all
pre-vious compacts by which it might be bound.' Upon bis mo-

128 ME. Buchanan's administeation
tion the clause was unanimously postponed, and was never, I
believe, again presented. Soon afterwards, on the 8th June,
1787, when incidentally adverting to the subject, he said : ' Any
government for the United States, formed ou the supposed prac
ticability of using force against the unconstitutional proceedings
of the States, would prove as -visionary and fallacious as the gov
ernment of Congress,' evidently meaning the then existing Con
gress of the old confederation."
The Republican party have severely but unjustly criticized
this portion of the message, simply because they have not chosen
to take the distinction between the power to make war against
a State in its sovereign character, and the undoubted power to
enforce the laws of Congress directly against individual citizens
thereof within its limits. It was chiefly to establish this very
distinction that the Federal Constitution was framed. The
Govemment of the old Confederation could act only by requisi
tions on the different States, and these, as we have seen, obeyed
or disobeyed according to their own discretion. In case of dis
obedience, there was uo resort but to actual force against them,
which would at once have destroyed the Confederacy. To re
move the necessity for such a dangerous alternative, the present
Constitution, passing over the Governments of the States, con
ferred upon the Government of the United States the power to
execute its own laws directly against their people. Thus all
danger of collision between the Federal and State authorities
was removed, and the indissoluble nature of the Federal Union
established. The Republican party have, notwithstanding, con
strued the message to mean a denial by the President of the
power to enforce the laws against the citizens of a State after
secession, and even after actual rebellion. The whole tenor, not
only of this message, but of the special message of the 8th Jan
uary, 1861, contradicts aud disproves this construction. Indeed,
in the clause of the first, immediately preceding that relied
upon, and whilst South Carolina was rapidly rushing to seces
sion, he expressed his determination to execute the revenue laws
whenever these should be resisted, and to defend the public
property against all assaults. And in the special message, after
South Carolina and other States had seceded, he reiterated this

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. , 129
declaration, maintaining both his right aud his duty to employ
militai-y force for this purpose. Having proved secession to be
a mere nullity, he considered the States which had seceded to
be still within the Union, and their people equally bound as
they had been before to obey the laws.
The Disunionists, unlike the Repubhcans, placed the correct
construction upon both messages, and therefore denounced them
in severe terms.
The President was gratified to observe that Senator Johnson,
of Tennessee, a few days after the date of the first message,
placed this subject in its true light, and thereby exposed him
self to similar denunciations. In his speech of 18th December,
1860 ("Congressional Globe," p. 119), he says: "I do not be
lieve the Federal Govemment has the power to coerce a State,
for by the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United
States it is expressly provided that you cannot even put one of
the States of this Confederacy before one of the courts of the
country as a party. As a State, the Federal Government has no
power to coerce it ; but it is a member of the compact to which
it agreed in common -with the other States, and this Government
has the right to pass laws, and to enforce those laws upon indi-
-viduals within the limits of each State. Wliile the one propo
sition is clear, the other is equally so. This Government can,
by the Constitution of the country, and by the laws enacted in
conformity with the Constitution, operate upon individuals, and
has the right and the power, not to coerce a State, but to enforce
and execute the law upon individuals within the limits of a
State." Sound doctrine, and in confonnity with that of the framers of
the Constitution ! Any other might, according to Mr. Madison,
have been construed by the States iu rebellion as a dissolution
of their connection with the other States, and recognized them
as independent belligerents on equal terms with the United
States. Happily our civil war was undertaken and prosecuted in
self-defence, not to coerce a State, but to enforce the execution
of the laws within the States against individuals, and to suppress
an unjust rebellion raised by a conspiracy among them against
the Government of the United States.

130 ME. Buchanan's administeation
After an impartial re-view of all the circumstances, and a
careful consideration of the danger of the crisis, the President
determined to recommend to Congress to initiate such amend
ments to the Constitution as would recognize and place be
yond dispute the rights of the Southem people, as these had
been expounded by the Supreme Court. Whilst acknowledging
that the cotton States were without justifiable cause for their
threatened attempts to break up the Union, either by peaceful
secession, as they claimed the right to do, or by forcible rebel
lion, he could not deny that they had suffered serious wrongs
through many years from the Northern abolition party. To
deny them such a security would be at war with the noblest feel
ings of patriotism, and inconsistent with the friendly sentiments
which ought ever to be cherished between the people of sister
States. We ought first to do our duty toward the cotton States ;
and if thereafter they should persist in attempting to dissolve
the Union, they would expose themselves to universal condemna
tion. We should first " cast the beam out of our o-wn eye," and
then we might see clearly how to deal with our brothers' faults.
Besides, such a course would have confirmed the loyalty of the
border slaveholding States. And above all, we were bound to
make this concession, the strong to the weak, when the object
was to restore the fraternal feelings which had presided at the
formation of the Constitution, to reestabhsh the ancient harmony
between the States, and to prevent civil war. Neither the
Chicago platform, nor any other political platform, ought to have
stood in the way of such a heahng measure. The President,
therefore, appealed to Congress to propose and recommend'" to
the legislatures of the several States the remedy for existing
evUs which the Constitution has itself provided for its own pres
ervation. This has been tried at different critical periods of our
history, and always with eminent success. It is to be found in
the fifth article providing for its o-wn amendment. Under this
article amendments have been proposed by two-thirds of both
houses of Congress, and have been ' ratified by the legislatures
of three-fourths of the several States,' and have consequently be
come parts of the Constitution. To this process the country is
indebted for the clause prohibiting Congress from passing any

ON THE E-VE OF THE EEBELLION. 131,
law respecting an .establishment of religion, or abridging the
freedom of speech or of the press, or of the right of petition. To
this we are, also, indebted for the Bill of Rights, which secures
the people against any abuse of power by the Federal Gov
ernment. Such were the apprehensions justly entertained by
the friends of State rights at that period as to have rendered it
extremely doubtful whether the Constitution could have long
survived without those amendments.
" Again, the Constitution was amended by the same process,
after the election of President Jefferson by the House of Rep
resentatives, in February, 1803. This amendment was rendered
necessary to prevent a recurrence of the dangers which had
seriously threatened the existence of the Govemment during the
pendency of that election. The article for its own amendment
was intended to secure the amicable adjustment of confiicting
constitutional questions like the present, which might arise be
tween the Govemments of the States and that of the United
States. This appears from contemporaneous history." * * *
" The explanatory amendment might be confined to the final
settlement of the true construction of the Constitution on three
special points :
" 1. An express recognition of the right of property in slaves
in the States where it now exists or may hereafter exist.
" 2. The duty of protecting this right in all the common
Territories throughout their Territorial existence, and until they
shall be admitted as States into the Union, with or without
slavery, as their constitutiens may prescribe.
" 3. A like recognition of the right of the master to have
his slave, who has escaped from one State to another, restored
and ' dehvered up ' to him, and of the validity of the fugitive
slave law enacted for this purpose, together with a declaration
that all State laws impairing or defeating this right are viola
tions of the Constitution, and are consequently null and void.
It may be objected that this construction of the Constitution has
already beeu settled by the Supreme Court of the United States,
and what more ought to be required ? The answer is, that a
very large proportion of the people of the United States still
contest the correctness of this decision, and never will cease

132 ME.
from agitation and admit its binding force until clearly estab-
lished by the people of the several States in their sovereign
character. Such au explanatory amendment would, it is be
heved, forever terminate the existing dissensions, and restore
peace and harmony among the States.
" It ought not to be doubted that such au appeal to the arbit
rament established by the Constitution itself, would be received
with favor by all the States of the Confederacy. In any event,
it ought to be tried in a spirit of conciliation before any of these
States shall separate themselves from the Union."
The President accompanied his recommendations by a sol-
emu appeal in favor of the Union. He says :
" But may I be permitted solemnly to invoke my country
men to pause and deliberate, before they determine to destroy
this, the grandest temple which has ever been dedicated to
human freedom since the world began. It has been consecrated
by the blood of our fathers, by the glories of the past, and by
the hopes of the future. The Union has already made us the
most prosperous, and ere long will, if preserved, render us the
most powerful nation on the face of the earth. In every foreign
region of the globe the title of American citizen is held in the
highest respect, and when pronounced in a foreign land it causes
the hearts of our countrymen to swell with honest pride. Surely
when we reach the brink of the yawning abyss, we shall recoil
with horror from the last fatal plunge.
" By such a dread catastrophe, the hopes of the friends of
freedom throughout the world would be destroyed, and a long
night of leaden despotism would enshroud the nations. Our
example for more than eighty years would not only be lost, but
it would be quoted as a conclusive proof that man is unfit for
self-government. " It is not every wrong — ^nay, it is not every grievous wrong
— which can justify a resort to such a fearful alternative. This
ought to be the last desperate remedy of a despairing peo
ple, after every constitutional means of conciliation had been
exhausted. We should refiect that, under this free Govem
ment, there is an incessant ebb and flow in public opinion. The
slavery question, like every thing human, will have its day. I

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 133
firmly beheve that it has reached and passed the culminating
point. But if, in the midst of the existing excitement, the Union
shall perish, the evil may then become irreparable."
This message proved unsatisfactory both to the Repubhcan
party and to the Pro-Slavery party in the cotton States. The
leaders of this latter party in Congress, and especially Mr. Jef
ferson Da-vis, objected to it because of its earnest argument
against secession, and the determination expressed to collect the
revenue in the ports of South Carolina, by means of a naval
force, and to defend the public property. From this moment
they ahenated themselves from the President. Soon thereafter,
when he. refused to withdraw Major Anderson from Fort Sum
ter, on the demand of the self-styled South Carolina Commis
sioners, the separation became complete. For more than two
months before the close of the session all friendly intercourse
between them and the President, whether of a political or social
character, had ceased.

134 ME. Buchanan's administeation

CHAPTER VII.
Refusal of Congress to act either with a view to conciUation or defence — The Senate
Committee of Thirteen and its proceedings — Mr. Crittenden submits his Compro
mise to the Committee — Its nature — The Committee unable to agree — Testimony of
Messrs. Douglas and Toombs that the Crittenden Compromise would have arrested
secession in the Cotton States — Mr. Crittenden proposes to refer his amendment
to the people of the several States by an act of ordinary legislation — His remarks
in its favor — ^Proceedings thereon — Expression of public opinion in its favor — Pres
ident Buchanan recommends it — Recommendation disregarded and proposition
defeated by the Clark amendment — Observations thereon — Peace Convention pro
posed by Virginia — Its meeting and proceedings — Amendment to the Constitution
reported by Mr. Guthrie, chairman of the committee — Its modification on motion
of Mr. Franklin, and final adoption by the Convention — Virginia and North Caro
lina vote with Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont
against it — Its rejection by the United States Senate — The House of Representa
tives refuse even to receive it — Every Republican member in both branches of
Congress opposed to it.
In this perilous condition of the country it would scarcely
be believed, were it not demonstrated by the record, that Con
gress deliberately refused, throughout the entire session, to pass
any act or resolution either to preserve the Union by peaceful
measures, or to furnish the President or his successor with a
military force to repel any attack which might be made by the
cotton States. It neither did the one thing nor the other. It
neither presented the ohve branch nor the sword. All history
proves that inaction in such an emergency is the worst possible
pohcy, and can never stay the tide of revolution. On the con
trary, it affords the strongest encouragement to rebellion. The
sequel ¦will prove the correctness of these opinions.
Then, first, as to the action of Congress on the President's
recommendation to adopt amendments to the Constitution.
Soon after its meeting, on the motion of Senator Powell, of
Kentucky, " so much of the President's Message as relates to
the present agitated and distracted condition of the country,
and the grievances between the slaveholding and the non-slave
holding States," * was referred to a special committee, consist
* Senate's Report of Committees, 2d session, 36th Congress, 1860- 61, No. 288

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 135
ing of thirteen members. This committee was composed of the
most distinguished and influential Senators. They were true
representatives of the political parties to which they respec
tively belonged. It consisted of five Republicans : Messrs.
Seward, Collamer, Wade, Doolittle, aud Grimes ; five from slave-
holding States : Messrs. Powell, Hunter, Crittenden, Toombs,
and Davis ; and three Northern Democrats : Messrs. Douglas,
Bigler, and Bright. The latter three were intended to act as
mediators between the extreme parties on the committee.
No legislative body, in the history of nations, had ever
created a committee upon whose action more important conse
quences depended. Beyond question, they had it in their power
justly and honorably to preserve the peace of the country and
the integrity of the Union.
The committee first met on the 21st December, 1860, and,
preliminary to any other proceeding, they " resolved that no
proposition shall be reported as adopted, unless sustained by a
majority of each of the classes of the committee ; Senators of
the Republican party to constitute one class, and Senators of the
other parties to constitute the other class." This resolution was
passed, because any report they might make to the Senate would
be in vain unless sanctioned, by at least a majority of the five
Republican Senators. On the next day (the 22d), Mr. Critten
den submitted to the committee " A Joint Resolution " (the same
which he had two days before presented to the Senate), " pro
posing certain amendments to the Constitution of the United
States," now known as the Crittenden Compromise. This was
truly a compromise of confficting claims, because it proposed
that the South should surrender their adjudged right to take
slaves into all our Territories, provided the North would recog
nize this right in the Territories south of the old Missouri Com
promise line. This amendment offered terms to the North far
less favorable to the South than their existing rights under the
decision of the Supreme Court.
The Constitution, as expounded by this decision, opens all
the Territories, both North and South, as the common property
of the States, to the introduction and protection of slave prop
erty. Mr. Crittenden's amendment proposed to restrict this gen-

136 ME. Buchanan's administeation
eral right and confine it to the Territories south of the latitude
of 36° 30'. It prohibited slavery forever from all Territories,
" now held or hereafter acquired," north of this line, whilst
south of it slavery was " recognized as existing, and shall not
be interfered with by Congress, but shall be protected as property
by all the departments of the Territorial Govemment during
its continuance ; and when any Territory north or south of said
Hne, within such boundaries as Congress may prescribe, shall
contain the jjopulation requisite for a member of Congress, it
shall be admitted into the Union with or without slavery, as
the Constitution of such new State may provide." *
This amendment yielded every thing to the North, except
a mere abstraction. It gave, in point of fact, all the vast
territories of the United States to perpetual freedom, with the
single exception of New Mexico. And in regard to this, it is
scarcely necessary to state to any person in the least degree ac
quainted with geography, that New Mexico could never practi
cally become a slaveholding State. As to the Indian Territory
south of 36° 30', it belongs not to the United States, but is
secured to the Indians by solemn treaties, founded upon fuU and
indeed ample equivalents.
At the first it was confidently expected that this amendment
would be yielded by the North as a peace offering to the South.
It was in substance and in fact neither more nor less than an
offer to restore the Missouri Compromise, agaiust the repeal of
which the Republican party in Congress, in 1854, had so justly
struggled. It was hailed by the people throughout the coimtry
as the rainbow upon the cloud, promising peace and perpetuity
to the Union. Indeed, who could fail to believe that when the
alternative was presented to the Senators and Representatives
of the Northern States, either to yield to their brethren in the
South the barren abstraction of caiTying their slaves into New
Mexico, or to expose the country to the imminent peril of ci^ril
war, they would choose the side of peace and union ? The
period for action was still propitious. It will be recollected that
Mr. Crittenden's amendment was submitted before any of our
forts had been seized, before any of the cotton States, except
* Senate Report of the Proceedings of the Committee, Dec. 31, 1860.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 137
South Carolina, had seceded, and before any of the Conventions
which had been called in the remaining six of these States had
assembled. Under such circumstances it would have been true
wisdom to seize the propitious moment before it fied forever,
and even yield, if need be, a trifiing concession to patriotic
policy, if not to abstract justice, rather than expose the country
to a great impending calamity. And how small the concession
required even from a sincere anti-slavery Republican ! In the
language of Mr. Crittenden : " The sacrifice to be made for its
preservation [that of the Union] is comparatively worthless.
Peace and harmony and union in a great nation were never pur
chased at so cheap a rate as we now have it in our power to do.
It is a scruple only, a scruple of as little value as a barleycorn,
that stands between us and peace and reconciliation and union ;
and we stand here pausing and hesitating about that httle atom
which is to be sacrificed." *
Notwithstanding these powerful arguments iu favor of the
Crittenden Compromise, it was rejected by the Committee of
Thirteen, every one of its five Republican members, together with
Messrs. Davis and Toombs, from the cotton States, having voted
against it. Indeed, not one of all the Republicans in the Senate,
at any period or in any form, voted in its favor, doubtless for the
reason that it tolerated slavery within New Mexico, in opposi
tion to the Chicago platform. This they held paramount to
every other consideration.
The committee, having failed to arrive at a satisfactory con
clusion, reported their disagreement to the Senate on the 31st
December, 1860, in a resolution declaring that they had " not
been able to agree upon any general plan of adjustment." f
Thus ou the last day of the year 1860 vanished the reasonable
prospect'that any of the seven cotton States would voluntarily
remain in the Union. Soon thereafter the Conventions of Florida
on the 7th January, Mississippi the 9th, Alabama the llth,
Georgia the 19th, Louisiana the 25th, aud Texas the 5th Febru
ary, adopted ordinances of secession by overwhelming majorities.
Several of these States, after the evil example of South Carolina,
' Con. Globe, 3d Jan., 1861, p. 237.
t Senate Report of Committee, 1860-61, No. 288.

138 me. Buchanan's administeation
proceeded to seize the public property 'within their limits ; and
the authorities of Louisiana, even before her ordinance of seces
sion, more outrageous than the rest, robbed the Branch Mint
and Sub-Treasury at New Orleans of a large amount of money.
But was Mr. Crittenden correct in beheving, notwithstanding
the adverse vote of Messrs. Davis and Toombs in the committee,
that the adoption of his amendment would have arrested seces
sion in the cotton States ? There is good reason to believe that
be was, with tbe exception of South Carohna ; and she could
not long have remained in a state of isolation. On this question
we have the published testimony of two members of the Com
mittee of Thirteen, which has never since been contradicted.
Mr. Douglas, in his speech of the 3d January, 1861, but three
days after the report of the committee and ¦within the hearing
of all its members, said : " If you of the Repubhcan side are
not willing to accept this [a proposition for adjustment made by
himself] nor the proposition of the Senator from Kentucky
'(Mr. Crittenden), pray teU us what you are 'willing to do. I
address the inqufry to the Republicans alone, for the reason that
in the Committee of Thirteen, a few days ago, every member from
the South, including those from the cotton States (Messrs.
Toombs and Davis), expressed their readiness to accept the
proposition of my venerable friend from Kentucky (Mr. Critten
den), as a final settlement of the controversy, if tendered and
sustained by the Republican members. Hence the sole respon
sibility of our disagreement, and the only difficulty in the way
of an amicable adjustment, is with the Republican party." *
And Mr. Douglas, afterwards, on the 2d of March, 1861, re
affirmed his former statement. In replying to Senator Pugh
(of Ohio), he said : " The Senator has said that if the Crittenden
proposition could have been passed early in the session, it would
have saved all the States except South Carolina. I firmly
believe it would. While the Crittenden proposition was not in
accordance with my cherished 'views, I avowed my readiness
aud eagerness to accept it, in order to save the Union, if we
could unite upon it. No man has labored harder than I have to
get it passed. I can confirm the Senator's declaration that Sen-
* Appendix to Con. Globe, 1860-'61, p. 41.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 139
ator Da-vis himself, when on the Committee of Thirteen, was
ready, at all times, to compromise on the Crittenden proposition.
I wiU go further and say that Mr.' Toombs was also ready to do
so." *
Besides, on the 7th January, 1861, Mr. Toombs, only twelve
days before his State seceded, said : " But although I insist
upon this perfect equality in the Territories, when it was pro
posed, as I understand the Senator from Kentucky now proposes,'
that the line of 36° 30' shall be extended, acknowledging and
protecting our property on the south side of that line, for the
sake of peace, permanent peace, I said to the Committee of
Thirteen, and I say here, that with other satisfactory provisions,
I would accept it," etc., etc.f
Mr. Crittenden did not despair of ultimate success, notwith
standing his defeat before the Committee of Thirteen. After
this, indeed, he could no longer expect to carry his compromise
as an amendment to the Constitution by the necessary two-thirds
vote of Congress. It was, therefore, postponed by the Senate on
his own motion. :j; As a substitute for it he submitted to the
Senate, on the 3d January, 1861, a joint resolution (S. No. 64),
which might be passed by a bare majority of both Houses. This
was to refer his rejected amendment, by an ordinary Act of Con
gress, to a direct vote of the people of the several States. This
he prefaced by some striking remarks. He said : " The times
on which we have faUen, sir, are of a very extraordinary charac
ter ; full of danger to the peace of the country, and even to the
union of the country. Its extraordinary character seems to
require of us all efforts, ordinary and extraordinary, for the pur
pose of averting the danger which now so threateningly hangs
over us. The measure which I am about to propose, sir, is of
that extraordinary character ; and I shall be at a loss for a justi
fication and excuse for it, if it cannot be found in the perilous
condition of pubUc affairs, and in that great law, the safety of
the people."
He then proceeded to offer his resolution in the following
language : " Whereas the Union is in danger, and, owing to the
* Con. Globe, 1860-'61, p. 1391. t Ibid., p. 270.
X Ibid., p. 237.

140 me. Buchanan's administeation
unhappy divisions existing in Congress, it would be difficult, if
not impossible, for that body tO' concur in both its branches by
the requisite majority, so as to enable it either to adopt such
measures of legislation, or to recommend to the States such
amendments to the Constitution, as are deemed necessary and
proper to avert that danger ; and whereas in so great an emer
gency the opinion and judgment of the people ought to be heard,
and would be the best and surest guide to their Representatives :
Therefore, Resolved, That provision ought to be made by law
without delay for taking the sense of the people and submitting
to their vote the following resolution [the same as in his former
amendment], as the basis for the final and permanent settlement
of those disputes that now disturb the peace of the country and
threaten the existence of the Union."
It was supposed that this resolution would conciliate the
support of some at least, if not all, of the Republican Senators.
By referring the questions in dispute to the legitimate fountain
of aU political power, it would reheve them from previous com
mittals to the Chicago platform. Besides, it was beheved that
they would not assume the responsibihty of denying to the
people of their own States the opportunity of expressing an
opinion at the ballot-box on questions involving no less a stake
than the peace and safety of the Union. Nevertheless, it wUl
appear from the sequel, that not a single Republican Senator
ever voted for the resolution. Had Congress thought proper to
refer the Crittenden Compromise to the people of the several
States, no person who observed the current of public opinion at
the time, can fail to believe that outside of South Carohna it
would have received their approbation. Memorials in its favor
poured into Congress from all portions of the North, even from
New England.* One of these presented to the Senate was
from " the Mayor and members of the Board of Aldermen and
the Common Council of the city of Boston, and over 22,000
citizens of the State of Massachusetts, praying the adoption of
the compromise measures proposed by Mr. Crittenden." f It
may be proper here to observe that the resolution of Mr. Crit-
* Index to Senate Journal, pp. 494, 495, and 496.
+ Senate Journal, I860-' 61, p. 218.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 141
tenden did not provide in detail for holding elections by which
" the sense of the people " could be ascertained. To supply this
omission. Senator Bigler, of Pennsylvania, the able, indefatiga
ble, and devoted friend of the measure, on the 14th January,
1861, brought in " A bill to provide for taking the sense of the
people of the United States on certain proposed amendments to
the Constitution of the United States ; " but never was he able,
notwithstanding his persevering efforts, to induce the Senate
even to consider this bill.
President Buchanan, in the mean time, and from the begin
ning, exerted all his constitutional influence in favor of these
measures. In his special message to Congress of the 8th Jan
uary, 1861, after depicting the deplorable consequences which
had already resulted to the country from the bare apprehension
of civil war and the dissolution of tbe Union, he says : " Let
the question be transferred from political assemblies to the bal
lot-box, and the people themselves would speedily redress the
serious grievances which the South have suffered. But, in
Heaven's name, let the trial be made before we plunge into
armed conffict upon the mere assumption that there is no other
alternative. Time is a great conservative power. Let us pause
at this momentous point, and afford the people, both North and
South, an opportunity for refiection. Would that South Caro
lina had been con-vinced of this truth before her precipitate
action ! I, therefore, appeal through you to the people of the
country, to declare in their might that the Union must and
shaU be preserved by all constitutional means. I most earnestly
recommend that you devote yourselves exclusively to the ques
tion how this can be accomplished in peace. All other ques
tions, when compared with this, sink into insignificance. The
present is no time for palliatives ; action, prompt action is re
quired. A delay in Congress to prescribe or to recommend a
distinct and practical proposition for concihation, may drive us
to a point from which it wiU be almost impossible to recede.
" A common ground on which conciliation and harmony can
be produced is surely not unattainable. The proposition to
compromise by letting the North have exclusive control of the
territory above a certain Une, and to give Southem institutions

142 ME. Buchanan's administeation
protection below that line, ought to receive universal approba
tion. In itself, indeed, it may not be entirely satisfactory, but
when the alternative is between a reasonable concession on both
sides and a dissolution of the Union, it is an imputation on the
patriotism of Congress to assert that its members 'wUl hesitate
for a moment."
This earnest recommendation was totally disregarded. It
would be a useless labor to recapitulate aU the proceedings in
the Senate upon the proposition of Mr. Crittenden to refer his
amendment to a vote of the people. On the 14th January,
1861, he made an unsuccessful attempt to have it considered,
but it was postponed until the day following.* On this day it
was again postponed by the vote of every Republican Senator
present, in order to make way for the Pacific Railroad bill.f On
the third attempt (January 16), he succeeded, but by a majority
of a single vote, in bringing his resolution before the body.
Every Republican Senator present voted against its considera
tion. A direct vote upon the resolution, so earnestly desired by
the country, now seemed inevitable. The parhamentary tactics
of the Repubhcan party, however, defeated this object. Mr.
Clark, a Republican Senator from New Hampshire, moved to
strike out the entire preamble and resolution of Mr. Crittenden,
and in lieu thereof insert as a substitute a preamble and resolu
tion of a directly opposite character, and in accordance with the
Chicago platform. This motion prevailed by a vote of 25 to 23,
every Republican Senator present having voted in its favor.:]:
Thus Mr. Crittenden's proposition to refer the question to tbe
people was buried under the Clark amendment. This contin
ued to be its position for more than six weeks, until the day
before the final adjom-nment of Congress, 2d March, when it
was far too late for final action even had there been a majority
in its favor. This superincumbent weight was then removed,
and the proposition itself was defeated by a vote of 19 in the
affirmative against 20 in the negative.§ Thus the Republican
party accomplished their object, and thus terminated every rea-
* Con. Globe, 1860-'61, . 361-363. + Ibid., p. 381.
X Ibid., p. 409. § Ibid., p. 1405.

ON THE EVE OP THE EEBELLION. 143
sonable hope of any compromise between the North and the
South. It is proper for future reference that the names of those Sen
ators who constituted the majority ou this momentous ques
tion, should be placed upon rex;ord. Every vote given from the
six New England States was in opposition to Mr. Crittenden's
resolution. These consisted of Mr. Clark, of New Hampshire;
Messrs. Sumner and Wilson, of Massachusetts ; Mr. Anthony,
of Rhode Island ; Messrs. Dixon and Foster, of Connecticut ;
Mr. Foot, of Vermont ; and Mr. Fessendeu, of Maine. The
remaining twelve votes, in order to make up the 20, were given
by Messrs. Bingham and Wade, of Ohio ; Mr. Trumbull, of
lUinois ; Messrs. Bingham and Chandler, of Michigan ; Messrs.
Grimes and Harlan, of Iowa ; Messrs. Doolittle and Durkee,
of Wisconsin ; Mr. Wilkinson, of Minnesota ; Mr. King, of New
York ; and Mr. Ten Eyck, of New Jersey. It is also worthy of
observation, that neither Mr. Hale, of New Hampshire, Mr.
Simmons, of Rhode Island, Mr. Collamer, of Vermont, Mr.
Seward, of New York, nor Mr. Cameron, of Pennsylvania,
voted on the question, although it appears from the joumal
that all these gentlemen were present in the Senate on the
day of the vote. It would be vain to conjecture the reasons
why these five Senators refrained from voting on an occasion so
important. It will be recoUected -that a direct vote of the Senate on the
Crittenden resolution was defeated by the adoption of the Clark
amendment, at so early a period of the session as the 16th Jan
uary, when there was still time for action. This amendment
prevailed only in consequence of the refusal of six secession
Senators to vote against it. They thus played into the hands
of the RepubUcan Senators, and rendered them a most accepta
ble service. These were Messrs. Benjamin and ShdeU, of Lou
isiana ; Mr. Iverson, of Georgia ; Messrs. Hemphill and Wigfall,
of Texas ; and Mr. Johnson, of Arkansas. Had these gentle
men voted 'with their brethren from the border slaveholding
States and the other Democratic Senators, the Clark amend
ment woidd have been defeated, and the Senate would then have
been brought to a direct vote on the Crittenden resolution.
10

144 ME. Buchanan's administeation
Had this been effected and the Crittenden resolution adopted
by the Senate, as it might have been by the votes of the recu
sant Senators, this would have awakened the people of the coun
try to their true condition, and might have aroused them into
action in sufficient time before the close of the session to avert
the impending danger. As it was, they remained in a state of
suspense, and stUl continued to hope imtil the very day before
the termination of Congress, when all hope was finaUy extin
guished. Such conduct on the part of these six Senators can
not be too severely censured. They thus deserted the Demo
cratic Senators from the border slaveholding and other States,
at tbe hour of their utmost need. It is but a poor excuse for
their defection to say, as they did, that the Repubhcan Senators,
whose votes were necessary to any effectual compromise, had
steadily repudiated the Crittenden propositions in every form,
and for this reason they were already on the eve of abandoning
their seats in the Senate.
Whilst the lovers of peace were almost despairing for the
fate of the Crittenden amendment, their hope of its final tri
umph was revived by the interposition of Virginia.* The Gen
eral Assembly of that Commonwealth, on the 19th January,
1861, adopted resolutions expressing " the dehberate opinion "
" that unless the unhappy controversy which now divides the
States of the Confederacy shaU be satisfactorily adjusted, a
permanent dissolution of the Union is inevitable." For the
purpose of averting " so dire a calamity," they extended au invi
tation "to aU such States, whether slaveholding or non-slave
holding, as are willing to unite with Virginia in an earnest
effort to adjust the present unhappy controversies, in the spirit
in which the Constitution was originaUy framed," to appoint
Commissioners for this purpose, to meet on the 4th February,
1861, at the City of Washington. The resolutions expressed a
favorable opinion of the Crittenden Compromise, with some
modifications, and the belief that " it would be accepted as a
satisfactory adjustment by the people of this Commonwealth."
Such was the origin of the Peace Convention. The best hopes
of the country were now fixed on the border slave States, in-
« Con. Globe, i860-' 61, p. 601.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 145
eluding North Carohna and Tennessee. These great aud pow
erful commonwealths stUl remained faithful to the Union. They
had hitherto stood aloof from secession, and bad manifested an
earnest desire not only to remain in the Union themselves, but
to exert their powerful influence to bring back the seceding sis
ters. Virginia had ever ranked as chief among the Southem
States, and had exercised great influence over their counsels.
She had now taken the lead iu the grand design to save the
Union, and it became the duty of the President to render her
all the aid in his power in a cause so holy. Every reflecting
man foresaw that if the present movement of Virginia should
fail to impress upon Congress and the country the necessity for
adopting a peaceful compromise, like that proposed by Mr. Crit
tenden, there was imminent danger that aU the border slave
States would follow the cotton States, which had already adopted
ordinances of secession, and unite with them in an attempt to
break up the Union. Indeed, as has been already seen, the
Virginia Legislature had declared that, in case of faUure, such
a dissolution was " inevitable."
The Peace Convention met on the 4th February.* It was com
posed of one hundred and thirty-three commissioners, represent
ing twenty-one States. A bare inspection of the list will con
vince all inquirers of the great respectability and just influence
of its members. Among them there were many venerable and
distinguished citizens from the border States, earnestly intent
upon restoring and saving the Union. Their great object was
to prevail upon their associates from the North to unite with
them in such recommendations to Congress as would prevent
their own States fr6m seceding, and enable them to bring back
the cotton States which had already seceded. It will be recol
lected that on the 4th February, when the Peace Convention
assembled, six of the cotton States, South Carolina, Alabama,
Mississippi, Georgia, Louisiana, and Florida, had already adopted
ordinances of secession ; and that but four days thereafter (8th
February) deputies from these States had adopted and published
at Montgomery, Alabama, a Pro'visioual Constitution for the so-
called Confederate States. The Union was then crumbling to
* Con. Globe, I860-' 61, p. 125 _

146 ME. Buchanan's administeation
pieces. .One month only of the session of Congress remained.
Within this brief period it was necessary that the Convention
should recommend amendments to the Constitution in sufficient
time to enable both Houses to act upon them before their final
adjournment. It was also essential to success that these amend
ments should be sustained by a decided majority of the commis
sioners both from the Northern and the border States. It was,
however, soon discovered that the same malign infiuence which
had caused every Repubhcan member of Congress to oppose the
Crittenden Compromise, would probably defeat the patriotic
purpose for which the Convention had assembled.
Ou Wednesday, the 6th February, a resolution was adopted,*
on motion of Mr. Guthrie, of Kentucky, to refer tbe resolutions
of the General Assembly of Virginia, and aU other kindred sub
jects, to a committee to consist of one commissioner from each
State, to be selected by the respective State delegations ; and
to prevent delay they were instructed to report on or before
the Friday following (the 8th), " what they may deem right,
necessary, and proper to restore harmony and preserve the
Union." This committee, instead of reporting on the day appointed,
did not report until Friday, the 15th February,f and thus a pre
cious week was lost. The reason for this delay shaU be expressed
in the language of Mr. Reverdy Johnson, a member of the com
mittee and a commissioner from Maryland. In bis letter of 13th
May, 1863, to the editors of the " Joumal of Commerce," in an
swer to aUegatious made by Mr, David D. Field, who had also
been a member of the committee from New York, he says :
" In the committee to whom the whole subject was referred, and
at whose head was placed Mr. Guthrie, of Kentucky, and of
which Mr. Field was a member, efforts to this end [reasonable
guarantees to the South on the subject of slavery] were made
again and again, but in vain. And what was finaUy agreed
upon and reported, met with the sanction of but a bare majority
of the committee, Mr. Field not being of that majority. The
discussions in every meeting of the committee were earnest, and
a part of the Southem members (I was of the number) im-
* Official Journal of the Convention, pp. 9 and 10. t Ibid., p. 21.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 147
plored their Northern brethren to agree to something tHat ther'e
was any reason to believe would be satisfactory to the South. I
saw then that unanimity could alone render the propositions of
the committee effective. I also saw, and as the result has proved,
that no satisfactory adjustment attained, an attempt at least
would be made to sever the Union." (The cotton States
had already attempted to sever it so far as this was iu their
power.) The amendments reported by a majority of the committee,
through Mr. Guthrie, their chairman, were substantiaUy the
same with the Crittenden Compromise ; but on motion of Mr.
Johnson, of Maryland, the general terms of the first and by far
the most important section were restricted to the present Teni
tories of the United States.* On motion of Mr. FraukUn, of
Pennsylvania, this section was further amended, but not mate
rially changed, by the adoption of the substitute offered by him.
Nearly in this form it was afterwards adopted by the Conven-
tion.f The following is a copy : " In all the present territory
of the United States north of the parallel of thirty-six degrees and
thirty minutes of north latitude, involuntary ser-vitude, except
in punishment of crime, is prohibited. In all the present terri
tory south of that line, the status of persons held to iu voluntary
service or labor, as it now exists, shaU not be changed ; nor shaU
any law be passed by Congress or the Territorial Legislature to
hinder or prevent the taking of such persons from any of the
States of this Union to said territory, nor to impair the rights
arising from said relation ; but the same shall be subject to judi
cial cognizance in the Federal courts, according to the course of
the common laAV. When any Territory north or south of said
line, within such boundary as Congress may prescribe, shall con
tain a population equal to that required for a member of Con
gress, it shall, if its form of govemment be republican, be ad
mitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original
States, with or without involuntary servitude, as the Constitution
of such State may provide."
Mr. Baldwin, of Connecticut, and Mr. Seddon, of Virginia,
on opposite extremes, made minority reports, which they pro-
* Official Journal, p. 43. + Ibid., p. 70.

148 ME. Buchanan's administeation
posed t» substitute for that of the majority. Mr. Baldwin's
report was a recommendation " to the several States to unite
with Kentucky in her application to Congress to call a Con
vention for proposing amendments to the Constitution of the
United States, to be submitted to the Legislatures of the several
States, or to Conventions therein, for ratification, as the one or
the other mode of ratification may be proposed by Congress, in
accordance -with the provisions in the fifth article of the Consti
tution." *
Of the two modes prescribed by the Constitution for its own
amendment, this was the least ehgible at the existing crisis, be
cause by far the most dilatory. Instead of calUng upon Con
gress, then in session and which could act immediately, to pro
pose specific amendments to the Legislatures of the several States,
it adopted the circuitous mode of requesting these Legislatures,
in the first instance, to apply to Congress to caU a Convention.
Even should two-thirds of them respond in the affirmative to this
request, the process would necessarily occasion a delay of years
in attaining the object, when days were aU-important. This
would entirely defeat the patriotic purpose of the Peace Con
vention. It was called to obtain, if possible, a direct vote of
two-thirds of both Houses before the end of the session in favor
of such amendments as it might recommend. Could such a vote
be obtained, it was confidently expected by the friends of the
Union that its moral influence would, for the present, satisfy the
border States ; would arrest the tide beginning to rise among
their people in favor of secession, and might enable them to
exercise an effective influence in reclaiming the States which
had already seceded. Affairs were then so urgent that long be
fore the State Legislatures could possibly ask Congress to caU a
Convention as required by Mr. Baldwin's proposition, the cause
of the Union might be hopeless. It was, therefore, rejected.
This proposition of Mr. Baldwin, evasive and dUatory as it
was, nevertheless received the votes of eight of the twenty-one
Sfates.f These consisted of the whole of the New England
States, except Rhode Island, and o^ Illinois, Iowa, and New
York, all being free States. This was an e-vil omen.
* Official Journal pp. 24 and 25. t Ibid., p. 63.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 149
The first amendment reported by Mr. Seddon differed from
that of the majority inasmuch as it embraced not only the pres
ent but all future Territories.* This was rejected.f His sec
ond amendment, which, however, was never voted upon by the
Convention, went so far as distinctly to recognize the right of
secession. It cannot be denied that there was in the Convention an ex
treme Southem rights element, headed by Mr. Seddon. This
manifested itself throughout its proceedings. These show how
naturally extremes meet. On more than one important occa
sion, we find the vote of Virginia and North Carolina, though
given in each case by a bare majority of their commissioners,
side by side with the vote of Massachusetts and Vermont. It
would be too tedious to trace the proceedings of the Convention
from the report of the committee made by Mr. Guthrie until
its final adjournment. It is sufficient to say that more than
ten days were consumed in discussion and in voting upon va
rious propositions offered by individual commissioners.' The
final vote was not reached until Tuesday, the 26th February,
when it was taken on the first and vitally important section, as
amended.:]: This section, on which all the rest depended, was negatived
by a vote of eight States to eleven. Those which voted in its
favor were Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. And those in the
negative were Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachu
setts, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, New Hampshire,
Vermont, and Virginia. It is but justice to say that Messrs.
Ruffin and Morehead, of North Carohna, and Messrs. Rives and
Summers, of Virginia, two of the five commissioners from each
of these States, declared their dissent from the vote of their
respective States. So, also, did Messrs. Bronson, Coming,
Dodge, Wool, and Granger, five of the eleven New York com
missioners, dissent from the vote of their State. On the other
hand, Messrs. Meredith and Wilmot, two of the seven commis
sioners from Pennsylvania, dissented from the majority iu voting
in favor of the section. Thus would the Convention have ter-
* Off. Journal, pp. 26, 27, and 28. t Ibid., p. 28. X Ibid., p. 70.

150 ME. Buchanan's administeation
minated but for the interposition of Illinois. Immediately after
tbe section had been negatived, the commissioners from that
State made a motion to reconsider the vote, and this prevailed.
The Convention afterwards adjourned until the next morning.
When they reassembled (February 27), tbe first section was
adopted, but only by a majority of nine to eight States, nine being
less than a majority of the States represented. This change was
effected by a change of the vote of IlUnois from the negative to
the affirmative, by Missouri withholding her vote, and by a tie
in the New York commissioners, on account of the absence of
one of thefr number, rendering it impossible for the State to
vote. Still Vfrginia and North Carolina, in the one extreme,
and Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshfre, and
Vermont, in the other, persisted in voting in the negative. From
the nature of this vote, it was manifestly impossible that two-
thfrds of both Houses of Congress should act favorably on the
amendment, even if the delay had not already rendered such
action impracticable before the close of the session.
It would be useless to refer to the voting on the remaining
sections of the amendment, which were carried by small major
ities.* The Convention, on the same day, through Mr. Tyler,
their President, communicated to the Senate and House of Rep
resentatives the amendment they had adopted, embracing aU the
sections, with a request that it might be submitted by Congress,
under the Constitution, to the several State Legislatures. In
the Senate this was immediately referred to a select committee,
on motion of Mr. Crittenden. The committee, on the next
day (28th Feb.), f reported a joint resolution (No. 70) proposing
it as an amendment to the Constitution, but he was never able
to bring the Senate to a direct vote upon it.:}: Failing in this,
he made a motion to substitute the amendment of the Peace
Convention for his own.§ This he prefaced by declaring that
he looked upon the result of the deliberations of that body
" as affording the best opportunity for a general concurrence
among the States, and among the people." He, 'therefore,
" had determined to take it in preference to his own proposi-
* Senate Journal, pp. 332, 333. t Ibid., p. 337. X Ibid., p. 384.
§ Con. Globe, I860-' 61, p. 1404.

•; ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. I5l
tion, and had so stated to many of the members of the Con
vention." He further said that he had " examined the proposi
tions offered by that Convention ; tbey contain, in my judg
ment, every material provision that is contained in the resolu
tion called the Crittenden Resolution." He also had adopted
this course " out of deference to that great body of men selected
on the resolution of Virginia, and invited by Virginia herself
The body having met, and being composed of such men, and a
majority of that Convention concurring in these resolutions, I
think they come to us with a sanction entithng them to consid
eration." Mr. Crittenden's reasons failed to convince the Sen
ate, and his motion was rejected by a large majority (28 to 7).*
Then next in succession came the memorable vote on Mr. Crit
tenden's O'wn resolution, and it was in its turn defeated, as we
have already stated, by a majority of 20 against 19.
We cannot take leave of this venerable patriot, who so wisely
appreciated the existing danger, without paying a just tribute
to the 'vigor and perseverance of his repeated efforts to ward off
from his country the direful calamity of disunion and civil war.
Well did he merit the almost unanimous vote of the Virginia
Convention, on the llth March, tendering him the thanks of the
people of Virginia for " his recent able, zealous, and patriotic
efforts in the Senate of the United States, to bring about a just
and honorable adjustment of our national difficulties." f This
vote, we may remark, was far from being complimentary to the
conduct of a majority of their own commissioners (Messrs. Ty
ler, Brockenbrough, and Seddon) in the Peace Convention.
In tbe House of Representatives, the amendment proposed
by tbe Convention was treated with still less respect than it had
been by the Senate.:]: The Speaker was refused leave even to
present it.§ Every effort made for this purpose was successfully
resisted by leading Republican members. The consequence is
that a copy of it does not even appear in the Joumal.
Although the amendment was somewhat less favorable to
the South, and ought, therefore, to have been more acceptable
to the North than the Crittenden amendment, yet Uke this it
* Senate Journal, p. 386. t National Intelligencer, March 14, 1861.
X Con. Globe, pp. 1331, 1332, 1333. § House Journal, pp. 446, 448, 449.

152 ME. buchahan's administeation
encountered the opposition of every Repubhcan member in both
Houses of Congress. Nevertheless, it presented a basis of com
promise which, had it been conceded by the North, might and
probably would have been accepted by the people of the border
States, in preference to tbe fearful alternative of their secession
from tbe Union.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 153

CHAPTER VIII.
Congress passes no measures to enable the President to execute the laws or defend the
Government — They decline to revive the authority of the Federal Judiciary in
South Carolina, suspended by the resignation of all the judicial officers — They
refuse authority to call forth the militia or accept volunteers, to suppress insur
rections against the United States, and it was never proposed to grant an appro
priation for this purpose — The Senate declines throughout the entire session to act
upon the nomination of a Collector of the Port of Charleston — Congress refuses to
grant to the President the authority long since expired, which had been granted
to General Jackson for the collection of the revenue — The 36th Congress expires,
leaving the law just as they found it — General observations.
We have already seen that Congress, throughout the entire
session, refused to adopt any measures of compromise to prevent
civil war, or to retain first the cotton or afterwards the border
States within the Union. Failing to do this, and whilst wit
nessing the secession of one after another of the cotton States,
the withdrawal of their Senators aud Representatives, and the
formation of their Confederacy, it was the imperative duty
of Congress to furnish the President or his successor the
means of repelling force by force, should this become necessary
to preserve the Union. They, nevertheless, refused to perform
this duty with as much pertinacity as they had manifested in
repudiating all measures of compromise.
1. At the meeting of Congress a Federal Judiciary had
ceased to exist in South Carolina. The District Judge, the Dis
trict Attomey, and the United States Marshal had resigned
their offices. These ministers of justice had all*deserted thefr
posts before the act of secession, and tbe laws of the United
States could no longer be enforced through their agency. We
have already seen that the President, iu his message, caUed the

154 ME. Buchanan's administeation
attention of Congress to this subject, but no attempt was made
in either House to pro'vide a remedy for the evil.
2. Congress positively refused to pass a law conferring on
the President authority to call forth the militia, or accept the
services of volunteers, to suppress insurrections which might
occur in any State against the Govemment of the United States.
It may appear strange that this power had not long since been
vested in the Executive. The Act of February 28, 1795,* the
only law applicable to the subject, pro'vides alone for caUing
forth the mihtia to suppress insurrections against State Govem
ments, without making any similar provision for suppressing
insurrections against the Govemment of the United States. If
any thing were required beyond a mere inspection of the act to
render this clear, it may be found in the opinion of Attorney-
General Black, of the 20th November, 1860. Indeed it is a plain
casus omissus. This palpable omission, which ought to have
been instantly supplied, was suffered to continue until after the
end of Mr. Buchanan's administration, when on the*29th July,
1861, Congress confeiTed this necessary power on the President.^
The framers of the Act of 1795 either did not anticipate an
insurrection within any State against the Federal Govemment,
or if they did, they purposely abstained from providing for it.
Even in regard to insurrections against a State Govemment, so
jealous were they of any interference on the part of the Federal
Government with the rights of the States, that they withheld
from Congress the power to protect any State " against domes
tic violence," except " ou the application of the Legislature, or
of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened)."
Under the Act of 1795, therefore, the President is precluded
from acting even upon his own personal and absolute knowledge
of the existence of such an insurrection. Before he can caU
forth the militia for its suppression, he must first be appUed to
for this purpose by the appropriate State authorities, in the
manner prescribed by the Constitution. It was the duty of
Congress, immediately after their meeting, to supply this defect
in our laws, and to confer an absolute authority on the Presi
dent to call forth the mUitia, and accept the services of volun-
» 1 Stat, at Large, p. 424. t 12 U. S. Stat, at Large, p. 281.

ON THE EVE OP THE EEBELLION. 155
teers, to suppress insurrections against the United States, when
ever or wherever they might occur. This was a precautionary
measure which, independently of existing dangers, ought long
since to have formed a part of our permanent legislation. But
no attempt was ever made in Congress to adopt it until after
the President's special message of the 8th January, 1861, aud
then the attempt entirely faded. Meanwhile the aspect of pub
Uc affafrs had become more and more threatening. Mr. Crit
tenden's amendment had been defeated before the Committee
of Thfrteen, on the last day of December ; and it was also highly
probable that his proposition before the Senate to refer it to a
vote of the people of the States, would share the same fate.
South Carolina and Florida had afready seceded, and the other
cotton States had called Conventions for the purpose of seceding.
Nay, more, several of them had already seized the forts, maga
zines, and arsenals within their limits. StUl all this failed to
produce any effect upon Congress. It was at this crisis the
President sent his special message to Congress (8th January,
1861), by which he endeavored to impress them with the neces
sity for immediate action. He concealed nothing from them.
Whilst still cUnging to the fading hope that they might yet pro
vide for a peaceful adjustment of our difficulties, and strongly
recommending this course, he says : " Even now the danger is
, upon us. In several of the States which have not yet seceded,
the forts, arsenals, and magazines of the United States have
been seized. This is by far the most serious step which has
been taken since the commencement of the troubles. •» * *
The seizure of this property, from all appearances, has been
purely aggressive, and not in resistance to any attempt to coerce
a State or States to remain in the Union." He also stated the
well-known fact that our smaU army was on the remote fron
tiers, aud was scarcely sufficient to guard the inhabitants against
Indian incursions, and consequently our forts were without suffi
cient garrisons.
Under these circumstances he appeals to Congress in the fol
lowing language : " But the dangerous and hostile attitude of
the States toward each other has already far transcended and cast
in the shade the ordinary executive duties afready provided for

156 ME. Buchanan's admintsteation
by law, and has assumed such vast and alarming proportions as
to place the subject entirely above and beyond executive controL
The fact cannot be disguised that we are in the midst of a great
revolution. In aU its various bearings, therefore, I commend
the question to Congress, as the only human tribunal, under
Providence, possessing the power to meet the existing emergency.
To them exclusively belongs the power to declare war, or to
authorize the employment of military force in aU cases contem
plated by the Constitution ; and they alone possess the pawer to
remove grievances which might lead to war, and to secure peace
and union to this distracted country. On them, aud on them
alone, rests the responsibihty."
Congress might, had they thought proper, have regarded the
forcible seizure of these forts and other property, including that
of the Branch Mint at New Orleans with aU the treasure it con
tained, as the commencement of an aggressive war. Beyond
question the cotton States had now committed acts of open hos
tUity against the Federal Govemment. They had always con
tended that secession was a peaceful constitutional remedy, and
that Congress had no power to make war against a sovereign
State for the purpose of coercuig her to remain in the Union.
They could no longer shelter themselves imder this plea. They
had by their 'violent action entfrely changed the position they
had assumed ; and instead of peacefuUy awaiting the decision
of Congress on the question of coercion, they had themselves be
come the coercionists and assailants. This question had, there
fore, passed away. No person has ever doubted the right or the
duty of Congress to pass laws enabling the President to defend
the Union against armed rebellion. Congress, however, stiU
shrunk from the responsibUity of passing any such laws. This
might have been commendable had it proceeded from a sincere
desfre not to interpose obstacles to a compromise intended to pre
vent the effusion of fraternal blood and restore the Union. StUl
in any event the time had arrived when it was thefr duty to
make at the least contingent provisions for the prosecution of the
war, should this be rendered inevitable. This had become the
more necessary as Congress would soon expire, and the new Con
gress could not be convened for a considerable period after the

ON THE EVE OP THE EEBELLION. 157
old one had ceased to exist, because a large portion of the Rep
resentatives had not theu been elected. These reasons, however,
produced no effect.
The President's special message * was referred, two days after
its date (10th January), by the House of Representatives to a
special committee, of which Mr. Howard, of Michigan, was
chairman. Nothing was heard from this committee for the
space of twenty days. Tbey then, on the 30th January, through
Mr. John H. Reynolds, of New York, one of its members, re
ported a bill t enabling tbe President to caU forth the militia or to
accept the services of volunteers for the purpose of protecting
the forts, magazines, arsenals, and other property of the United
States ; and to " recover possession " of such of these as " has
been or may hereafter be unlawfully seized or taken possession
of by any combination of persons whatever." Had this bill be
come a law, it would have been the duty of the President at
once to raise a volunteer or mihtia force to recapture the forts
which had been afready seized. But Congress was not then
prepared to assmne such a responsibility. Mr. Reynolds accord
ingly withdrew his bill from the consideration of the House ou
the very day it was reported. On his own motion it was recom
mitted, and thus kiUed as soon as it saw the light. It was never
beard of more.
Theu, after another pause of nineteen days, and only a fort
night before the close of the session, the Committee on Mihtary
Affafrs, through Mr. Stanton, of Ohio, thefr chairman, on tbe
18th February reported another bUl § on the subject, but of a
more Umited character than that which had been withdrawn. It
is remarkable that it contains no provision touching the recovery
of the forts and other property which had been afready seized by
the delinquent States. It did no more than provide that the
powers already possessed by the President, imder the Act of
1795, to employ the mihtia in suppressing insurrections against
a State Govemment, should be " extended to the case of insur
rections against the authority of tbe United States," with the
additional authority to " accept the services of such volunteers
* Con. Globe, p. 316. t Ibid., p. 645, bills of H. R., No. 698.
§ Ibid., p. 1001, bill 1003, H. R.

158 me. Buchanan's administeation
as may ofl'er thefr services for the purpose mentioned." Thus
all hostile action for the recovery of the forts afready seized was
excluded from the bill. It is difficult to conceive what reasona
ble objection could be made to this biU, except that it did not
go far enough and embrace the forts afready seized ; and more
especially as when it was reported we may recoUect that the
Confederate Congress had already been ten days iu session at
Montgomery, Alabama, and had adopted a Provisional Consti
tution. Notwithstanding aU this, the House refused to act upon
it. The bill was discussed on several occasions until Tuesday,
26th February. On that day a motion was made by Mr. Cor-
win, of Ohio, to postpone its consideration until Thursday, the
28th February.* Mr. Stanton, the reporter of the bill, resisted
this motion, stating that such a postponement would be fatal to
it. " It will," said he, " be impossible after that to have it
passed by the Senate " (before tbe 4th March). He, therefore,
demanded the ayes and noes ; aud notwithstanding his warning,
Mr. Corwin's motion prevaUed by a vote of 100 to 74, and thus
the bUl was defeated.
It may be proper to observe that Mr. Corwin, whose motion
killed the bill, was a confidential friend of the President elect,
then present in Washington, and was soon thereafter appointed
minister to Mexico.
But even had Congress passed this bUl, it would have proved
whoUy inefficient for want of an appropriation to carry it into
effect. The Treasury was empty; but had it been ftdl, the
President could not have dra-wn from it any, even the most
triffing sum, without a previous appropriation by law. The
union of the purse -with the sword, iu the hands of the Execu
tive, is wholly inconsistent with the idea of a free govemment.
The power of the legislative branch to withhold money from
the Executive, and thus restrain him fi-om dangerous projects
of his own, is a necessary safeguard of hberty. This exists
in every govemment pretending to be free. Hence our Con
stitution has declared that " no money shall be drawn from the
Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law."
It is, therefore, apparent that even if this bill had become a
* Con. Globe, 1232.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 159
law, it could not have been carried into effect by the President
-without a direct violation of the Constitution. Notwithstand
ing these insuperable obstacles, no member of either House,
throughout the entire session, ever even proposed to raise or appro
priate a single dollar fbr the defence of the Govemment against
armed rebellion. Congress not only refused to grant the President
the authority and force necessary to suppress insurrections against
the United States ; but the Senate, by refusing to confirm his
nomination of a collector of the customs for the port of Charles
ton, effectually tied his hands and rendered it impossible for him
to collect the revenue within that port. In his annual message
he had expressed the opinion that " the same insuperable obsta
cles do not lie in the way of executing the [existing] laws for the
collection of customs on the seaboard of South Carohna as had
been interposed to prevent the administration of justice under
the Federal authority within the interior of that State." At all
events he had determined to make the effort with the naval
force under his command. He trusted that this might be accom
plished without collision ; but if resisted, then the force neces
sary to attain the object must be applied. Accordingly, whilst
informing Congress " that the revenue stiU continues to be col
lected as heretofore at the custom house in Charleston," he says
that " should the collector unfortunately resign, a successor may
be appointed to perform this duty." The collector (William F.
Colcock) continued faithftdly to perform his duties until some
days after the State had seceded, when at the end of December
he resigned. Tlie President, immediately afterwards, on the 2d
January, nominated to the Senate, as his successor, Mr. Peter
Mclntire, of Pennsylvania, a gentleman well quaUfied for the
office. The selection could not have been made from South
Carolina, because no citizen of that State would have accepted
the appointment. The Senate, throughout their entire session,
never acted upon the nomination of Mr. Mclntire ; and without
a collector of customs duly appointed, it was rendered impossi
ble for the President, under any law in existence, to coUect the
revenue. But even if the Senate had confirmed Mr. Mclntire's nomi
nation, it is extremely doubtful whether the President could
11

160
lawfully have coUected the revenue against the forcible resist
ance of the State, unless Congress had conferred additional
powers upon him. For this purpose Mr. Bingham, of Ohio, on
the 3d January, 1861,* the day after Mr. Mclntire's nomina
tion to the Senate, reported a bill from the Judiciary Commit
tee, further to provide for the collection of duties on imports.
This bill embraced substantially the same pro-visions, long since
expired, contained in the Act of 2d March, 1833, commonly
called " the Force Bill," to enable General Jackson to collect
the revenue outside of Charleston, " either upon land or on
board any vessel." Mr. Bingham's bill was permitted to slum
ber on the files of the House until the 2d March, the last day
but one before Congress expired,f when he moved for a suspen
sion of the rules, to enable the House to take it up and consider
it, but his motion proved unsuccessful. Indeed, the motion was
not made until so late an hour of the session that even if it had
prevailed, the bill could not have passed both Houses before the
final adjournment. Thus the President was left both 'without
a collector of customs, and most probably without any law
which a collector could have carried into effect, had such an
officer existed. Mr. Bingham's bill shared the fate of all other
legislative measures, of whatever character, intended either to
prevent or to confront the existing danger. From the persist
ent refusal to pass any act enabUng either the outgoing or the
incoming administration to meet the contingency of civil war,
it may fairly be inferred that the friends of Mr. Lincoln, in and
out of Congress, believed he would be able to settle the existing
difficulties with the cotton States in a peaceful manner, and
that he might be embarrassed by any legislation contemplating
the necessity of a resort to hostile measures.
The 36th Congress expired on the 3d March, 1861, leaving
the law just as they had found it. They made no pro-vision
whatever for the suppression of threatened rebellion, but delib
erately refused to grant either men or money for this purpose.
It was this violation of duty which compelled President Lin
coln to issue a proclamation convening the new Congress, in
special session, immediately after the attack on Fort Smuter.
* Con. Globe, p. 236, bills H. R., No. 910. t H. Journal, p. 465

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 161
Urgent and dangerous emergencies may have arisen, or may
hereafter arise in the history of our country, rendering delay
disastrous, such as the bombardment of Fort Sumter by the
Confederate Govemment, which would for the moment justify
the President in violating the Constitution, by raising a military
force without the authority of law, but this only during a recess
of Congress. Such extreme cases are a law unto themselves.
They must rest upon the principle that it is a lesser e'vil to
usurp, imtil Congress can be assembled, a power withheld from
the Executive, than to suffer the Union to be endangered, either
by traitors at home or enemies from abroad. In all such cases,
however, it is the President's duty to present to Congress, imme
diately after their next meeting, the causes which impeUed him
thus to act, and ask for their approbation ; just as, ou a like
occasion, a British minister would ask Parliament for a bill of
indemnity. It would be difficult, however, to conceive of an
emergency so extreme as to justify or even excuse a President
for thus transcending his constitutional powers whUst Congress,
to whom he could make an immediate appeal, was in session.
Certainly no such case existed during the administration of the
late President. On the contrary, not only was Congress actually
in session, but bills were long pending before it for extending
his authority in calling forth the militia, for enabling him to
accept the services of volunteers, and for the employment of the
navy, if necessary, outside of ports of entry for the collection
of the revenue, all of which were eventually rejected. Under
these circumstances, had the President attempted, of his own
mere will, to exercise these high powers, whilst Congress were
at the very time deliberating whether to grant them to him or
not, he would have made himself justly liable to impeachment.
This would have been for the Executive to set at defiance both
the Constitution and the legislative branch of the Govemment.

162 ME. Buchanan's administeation

CHAPTER IX.
The forts in Charleston harbor — Conduct toward them and the reasons for it — To
guard against surprise reenforcements ready — Instmctions to Major Anderson —
Interview with South Carolina members— General Scott again recommends the
garrisoning of all the forts — Reasons against it — The compromise measures still
depending — Want of troops — Observations on General Scott's report to Pres
ident Lincoln — His letter to Secretary Seward, and the manner in which it, with
the report, was brought to light and published — Mr. Buchanan's reply to the re
port — General Scott' s statement of the interview with President Buchanan on
15th December, and observations thereupon — The example of General Jackson in
1833, and why it was inapplicable.
It is now necessary to recur to the condition of the forts and
other public property of the United States 'within South Caro
lina, at the date of the President's annual message, on the 3d
December, 1860. In regard to that property the message says :
" This has been purchased for a fair equivalent, by the consent
of the Legislature of the State, for the ' erection of forts, maga
zines, arsenals,' and over these the authority ' to exercise exclu
sive legislation ' has been expressly granted by the Constitution
to Congress. It is not believed that any attempt will be made
to expel the United States from this property by force, but if in
this I should prove to be mistaken, the officer in command of
the forts has received orders to act strictly on the defensive. In
such a contingency the responsibility for consequences would
rightfully rest upon the heads of the assailants." Thus if war
must come, the President had determined to fix the whole re
sponsibility for its commencement on South Carolina. In order
to estimate correctly the wisdom of this defensive pohcy, it is
necessary to revert to the condition of the country on the 3d
December, 1860, when it was announced. At this period we

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 163
may divide the Southem States into three classes, holding opin
ions variant from each other.
1. There was South Carolina, wbich had been the avowed
and persistent advocate of disunion for more than a quarter of
a century. She had already called a Convention for the pur
pose of seceding from the Union. Her leading secessionists
were ever on the alert to seize upon any action of the Federal
Govemment which they might wrest to the purpose of alienat
ing the other slaveholding States from thefr attachment to the
Union, and enlisting them in her cause.
2. The second class was composed of the six other cotton
States. The people of these, although highly excited against
the abolitionists, were still unwilling to leave the Union. They
would have been content, notwithstanding the efforts of seces
sion demagogues, with a simple recognition of their adjudged
rights to take slaves into the Territories,. and hold them there
like other property, until, a territorial convention, assembled to
frame a State constitution, should decide the question. To this
decision, whatever it might be, they professed their willingness to
submit. Indeed, as has already been seen from the statements
of Messrs. Douglas and Toombs in the Senate, they would have
consented to abandon their rights in all the Territories north of
36° 30', leaving what should remain to them little more than a
name. 3. The third class consisted of the border slaveholding States,
with Virginia at the head. A large majority . of thefr people,
although believing in the right of peaceful secession, had resisted
all the efforts of the extreme men in their midst, and were still
devoted to the Union. Of this there could be no better proof
than the result of the election held in Virginia, February 4,
1861, for the choice of delegates to her State Convention, even
after the cotton States had all seceded.* This showed that a
very large majority of the delegates elected were in favor of
remaining in the Union.
Under these circumstances, it is easy to imagine what would
have been the effect on the other Southem States of sending a
feeble force of United States troops to Fort Moultrie at this criti-
* Appleton's Annual Cyclopoedia for 1861, p. 730.

164 ME. Buchanan's administeation
cal conjuncture. Had collision been the consequence, and blood
been shed immediately before the meeting of Congress, the
other cotton States, from their well-kno'wn affinities, would have
rushed to the support of South CaroUna. She would thus have
accomplished her long-sought object. Indeed, it was the current
report of the day that her leading disunionists had declared the
spUUng of a little blood would be necessary to secure the coop
eration of other Southern States. Besides, in the President's
opinion, there was no necessity, at the time, for any reenforce-
ment to secure the forts in the harbor of Charleston. He was
convinced that while the' other slaveholding States were ready
and 'wiUing to compromise with the North, South Carohna would
not dare to attack Fort Moultrie. This conviction did not
spring from any confidence in her spfrit of forbearance ; it
arose from a certain knowledge that such an outrage would be
condemned not only by the border but by the cotton States. It
would estrange and separate them from her, at the very moment
she was most solicitous to conciliate them. Whoever was in
Washington at the time cannot fail to recollect the denunciations
in advance of leading Southern men against such an unprovoked
attack. The pubUc property stood within her limits — three
forts, a custom house, an arsenal, and a post office, covered by
the flag of the country. From these she knew she had nothing
to fear unless she should first make the attack. Such an out
rage as the seizure of a fort of the United States by any State
had never before been imagined. There must be a fearful sus
pense between the conception and the commission of such an
act. It was the supreme object of the President to promote, by all
the means in his power, such a fair and honorable adjustment be
tween the North and the South as would save the country from
the scourge of civil war. It was, therefore, his evident policy to
isolate South Carolina, as far as possible, from the other South
ern States ; and for this purpose to refrain from afty act which
might enable her to enlist them in her cause. If, after aU, she
should attack Fort Moultrie, this act would have met their uni
versal condemnation. Besides, nothing short -of such an attack
could have united the people of the North iu suppressing her re
volt. They were then far from being prepared for civil war.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 165
On the contrary, they were intent on a peaceful solution of our
difficulties, and would have censured any act of the administra
tion which might have defeated this purpose and precipitated
them into hostilities. The true policy was that expressed by
President Lincoln to the seceded cotton States in his inaugural
months afterward, in which he informs them, " You can have no
conflict without being yourselves the aggressors." Although the
President believed (and this with good cause, as the event has
shown), that under the existing circumstances, South Carolina
would not attack any of the forts in the harbor of Charleston
whilst he suffered thefr status guo to remain ; yet in this it was
possible he might be mistaken. To guard against surprise after
the secession of the State, 'W'hich was then imminent, he had pre
pared an expedition as powerful as his limited means would
afford, to send reenforcements to Major Anderson, at the first
moment of danger. For this purpose the Secretary of the Navy
had stationed the Brooklyn, a powerful war steamer, then com
pletely ready for sea, in Hampton Roads, to take on board for
Charleston three hundred disciplined troops, 'with provisions and
munitions of war, from the neighboring garrison of Fortress
Monroe. Having thus pro'vided for the reenforcement of the forts, in
case of need, the Secretary of War despatched Assistant Adju
tant-General Buell to Major Anderson, at Fort Moultrie, with
instructions how he should act in his present position. These
were, communicated to him on the llth December, 1860.
Whilst they instructed the Major to avoid every act of aggres
sion, they directed him, in case of an attack upon, or an attempt
to take possession of, any of the three forts under his command,
to defend them to the last extremity. Furthermore, he was
authorized, as a precautionary measure, should he believe his
force insufficient for the defence of all three, to remove it at his
discretion from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter, whenever he
should have tangible evidence of a design, on the part of South
Carolina, to proceed to a hostUe act. We say to Fort Sumter,
because the third fort. Castle Pinckney, was wholly indefensi
ble. From the important bearing of these instructions upon
subsequent events, they are entitled to textual insertion. They

166 ME. Buchanan's administeation
are as foUows : * " You are aware of the great anxiety of the
Secretary of War, that a coUieion of the troops with the people
of the State shall be avoided, and of his studied determination
to pursue a course 'with reference to the military force and forts
in this harbor, which shall guard against such a collision. He
has, therefore, carefully abstained from increasing the force at
this point, or taking any measures which might add to the pres
ent excited state of the public mind, or which would throw any
doubt on the confldence he feels that South CaroUna wiU not
attempt by violence to obtain possession of the public works or
interfere with thefr occupancy. But as the counsel and acts of
rash and impulsive persons may possibly disappoint these expec
tations of the Government, he deems it proper that you shall be
prepared with instructions to meet so unhappy a contingency. He
has, therefore, dfrected me verbally to give you such instructions.
You are carefuUy to avoid every act which would needlessly
tend to provoke aggression, and for that reason you are not,
'without e'vident and imminent necessity, to take up any position
which could be construed into the assumption of a hostile atti
tude, but you are to hold possession of the forts in this harbor,
aud if attacked you are to defend yourself to the last extremity.
The smallness of your force 'will not permit you, perhaps, to
occupy more than one of the three forts, but an attack on or
attempt to take possession of either one of them wiU be regarded
as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command into
either of them which you may deem most proper to increase its
power of resistance. You are also authorized to take simUar
defensive steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design
to proceed to a hostile act." *
The President having observed that Major BueU, in reducing
to 'writing at Fort Moultrie the instructions he had verbally re
ceived, required Major Anderson, in case of attack, to defend
himself to the last extremity, immediately caused the Secretary
of War to modify this instruction. This extreme was not re-
qufred by any principle of miUtary honor or by any rule of
war. It was sufficient for him to defend himself until no reason
able hope should remain of saving the fort. The instructions
• Ex. Doc, H. R., vol. vi., No. 26, p. 10.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 167
were accordingly so modified, with the approbation of General
Scott. The President ha'ving determined not to disturb the status quo
at Charleston, as long as our troops should continue to be hospi
tably treated by the inhabitants, and remain in unmolested pos
session of the forts, was gratified to learn, a short time thereafter,
that South Carolina was equally intent on preserving the peace.
On the 8th December, 1860, four of the Representatives in
Congress frpm that State sought an interview, and held a con
versation with him concerning the best means of avoiding a
hostile collision between the parties. In order to guard against
any misapprehension on either side, he suggested that they had
best reduce thefr verbal communication to writing, and bring it
to him in that form. Accordingly, on the 10th December, they
delivered to him a note, dated on the previous day, and signed
by five members, in which they say : " In compliance with
our statement to you yesterday, we now express to you our
strong convictions that neither the constituted authorities, nor
any body of the people of the State of South Carolina, will
either attack or molest the United States forts in the harbor of
Charleston, previously to the action of the Convention ; and we
hope and believe not until an offer has been made, through an
accredited representative, to negotiate for an amicable arrange
ment of all matters between the State and the Federal Govem
ment, provided that no reenforcements be sent into these forts,
and their relative military status shall remain as at present." *
Both in this and in their previous conversation, they declared
that in making this statement, they were acting solely on their
own responsibihty, and expressly disclaimed any authority to
bind their State. They, nevertheless, expressed the confident
belief that they would be sustained both by the State authori
ties and by the Convention, after it should assemble. Although
the President considered this declaration as nothing more than
the act of five highly respectable members of the House from
South Carolina, yet he welcomed it as a happy omen, that by
means of their influence coUision might be prevented, and time
afforded to all parties for refiection and for a peaceable adjust-
* Ex. Doc, H. R., vol. vi., No. 96, p. 9, &c.

168
ment. Frdm abundant caution, however, he objected to the
word " provided " in thefr statement, lest, if he should accept it
without remark, this might possibly be construed into an agree
ment on his part not to reenforce the forts. Such an agreement,
he informed them, he would never make. It would be impossi
ble for him, from the nature of his official responsibility, thus to
tie his own hands and restrain his own freedom of action. StiU,
they might have observed from his message, that he had no
present design, under existing circumstances, to change the con
dition of the forts at Charleston. He must, not-withstanding,
be left entirely free to exercise his ovra discretion, according to
exigencies as they might arise. They replied that nothing was
further from their intention than such a construction of this
word ; they did not so understand it, and he should not so con
sider it.
It was at this moment, on the 15th December, 1860, after
the President's policy had been fixed aud announced in his an
nual message ; after the " Brooklyn " had been made ready to go
to the rehef of Major Anderson in case of need ; after he had
received instructions in accordance with this pohcy ; after the
President's pacific interview with the South Carolina members,
and before any action had yet been taken on the first Critten
den Compromise, that General Scott deemed it proper to renew
his former recommendation to garrison the nine Southern forti
fications. This appears from his report to President Lincoln,
of the 30th March, 1861, entitled " Southem Forts ; a Sum
mary," &c., of which we shall often hereafter have occasion to
speak. It is scarcely a lack of charity to infer that General
Scott knew at the time when he made this recommendation
(on the 15th December) that it must be rejected. The Presi
dent could not have complied with it, the position of affairs still
remaining unchanged, without at once reversing his entfre pol
icy, and without a degree of inconsistency amounting almost to
self-stultification. The Senators from the cotton States and
from Virginia, where these forts are situated, were still occupied
with their brother Senators in devising measures of peace aud
conciliation. For this patriotic purpose the Committee of Thir
teen were about to be appointed, and they remained in session

ON THE EVE OP THE EEBELLION. 169
until the last day of the month. Meanwhile all the Southem
Senators in Congress professed their willingness to adopt the Crit
tenden Compromise, so much and so justly lauded afterwards by
General Scott himself. If at this moment, whilst they were en
gaged in peaceful consultation with Senators from the North, the
President had despatched military expeditions to these nine forts,
it was easy to foresee what would be the disastrous effect, not
only in the cotton, but in aU the border States. Its first effect
would have been to dissolve the existing conferences for a peace
able adjustment.
This, the General's second recommendation, was wholly un
expected. He had remained silent for more than six weeks from
the date of his supplemental " Views," con-vinced, as the President
inferred, that he had abandoned the idea of garrisoning all these
forts with " the five companies only " -within his reach. Had
the President never so earnestly desired to reenforce the nine
forts in question, at this time, it would have been little short of
madness to undertake the task, with the smaU force at his com
mand. Without authority to call forth the militia or accept the
services of volunteers for the purpose, this whole force now con
sisted of six hundred recruits, obtained by the General since the
date of his " Views," in addition to the five regular companies.
Our army was still out of reach on the remote frontiers, and
could not be withdrawn, during midwinter, in time for this mili
tary operation. Indeed, the General had never suggested such a
withdrawal. He knew that had this been possible, the inhab
itants on our distant frontiers would have beeu immediately ex
posed to the tomahawk and scalping knife of the Indians. Our
weak condition in regard to troops within reach is demonstrated
by the insignificant number of these he was able to collect in
Washington on the 4th March following. This was to resist an
attempt which he apprehended would be made by an armed
force to prevent the inauguration of President Lincoln and to
seize the public property. The General was so firmly convinced
of the reality of this plot, that nothing could shake his faith. It
was in vain that a committee of the House of Representatives,
after hearing the General himself, and after full investigation, had
reported that his apprehensions were unfounded.* Besides, the
* February 14, 1861. House Reports of Committees, vol. ii.. No. 79.

170
President, relying on his o-wn sources of information, had never
entertained any similar apprehensions. The stake, notwith
standing, was so vast and the General so urgent, that he granted
him permission to bring to Washington aU the troops he could
muster to resist au imaginary but dreaded enemy. The whole
number of these, including even the sappers aud miners whom
he had withdrawn from West Point, amounted to no more than
six hundred and fifty-three, rank and ffle. These troops, with a
portion of the district mUitia, the General had posted in differ
ent parts of the city, and had stationed sentinels on the tops of
the highest houses and other eminences, so that aU was ready to
attack the enemy at the first moment of thefr appearance ; but
never did an inauguration pass more peacefully and quietly. It
is due to President Lincoln to state, that throughout his long
progress in the same carriage with the late President, both on
the way to the Capitol and the return from it, he was far from
evincing the shghtest apprehension of danger.
Had the President attempted to distribute the General's
thousand men, as he proposed, among the numerous forts in the
cotton States, as well as Fortress Monroe, their absurd inade
quacy to the object would have exhibited weakness instead of
strength. It would have provoked instead of preventing coUi
sion. It would have precipitated a civU war with the cotton
States without the slightest preparation on the part of Congress,
and would at once have destroyed the then prevaUing hopes of
compromise. Worse than all, it would have exasperated Vfrginia
and the other border States, then so intent on remaining in the
Union, and might have driven them at once into hostile action.
And now it becomes our painful duty to examine the report
of General Scott to President Lincoln of 30th March, 1861.
This was first published at the General's instance, eighteen
months after its date, in the " Natioual Intelligencer " of the
21st October, 1862, It cannot be denied that the report through
out is an indiscriminate censure of President Buchanan's conduct
in dealing with the Southern forts. It evidently proceeded from
a defective memory prejudiced by a strong bias. It rests mainly
on vague and confused recollections of private conversations
alleged to have been held with the President several months

ON THE EVE OP THE EEBELLION. 171
before its date. These having occurred between the commander-
in-chief and the commanding General of the army, on important
military questions, pertaining to their respective official duties,
were, in their nature, strictly confidential. Were this otherwise,
it would destroy that freedom and unreserve which ought to
characterize such consultations^ and instead thereof, the parties
would be ever on their guard in the interchange of ojjinions, often
greatly to the prejudice of the pubhc interest. Had the General
resolved to violate a confidence as sacred as that between the Pres
ident and a member of bis Cabinet, such is the treachery of the
best human memory, he ought, at the least, to have submitted
his statements to Mr. Buchanan before he had embodied them
iu his report. Had he done this, we venture to say from the
sequel that most of them would have never seen the light*
When President Buchanan retired from office, he had reason
to beheve he had parted from the General on terms mutually
amicable. Although in former years their friendly intercourse
had been for a season interrupted, yet he believed all this had
been forgotten. A suspicion never entered his mind that the
General held in reserve a quiver of arrows to assail his public
character upon his retirement from office.
* This report does not allege that it had been made in conse
quence of a call from President Lincoln. From its face it ap
pears to have been a pure volunteer offering on the part of the
General. It deals with the past and not with the future. It is
remarkable that it does not contain a word of advice to President
Lincoln, such as might have been expected from the command
ing General, as to the manner of recovering the forts which
before its date had been already seized by the Confederates. On
the contrary, it reveals the strange fact that the General, so late
as the 12th March, and after the so-called Confederate Govem
ment of the cottpu States was in full operation at Montgomery,
had advised President Lincoln to evacuate Fort Sumter, and this
in direct opposition to what had been tb^ well-known and oft-
expressed determination of Mr. Buchanan. We need scarcely
remark that President Lincoln acted wisely in disregarding this
counsel. It was founded on an alleged military necessity. Had
the fort been actually invested by a hostile force so superior as

172 ME. Buchanan's administeation
to render resistance hopeless, this would have justified a capitu
lation in order to save a useless sacrifice of hfe. Its voluntary
abandonment, however, to the Confederacy, would have gone
far toward a recognition of thefr independence.
The General, in this report, would have President Lincoln
beheve, on the authority of a Richmond newspaper, that " had
Scott been able to have got these forts in the condition he desfred
them to be, the Southem Confederacy would not now exist."
Strange hallucination ! In plain English, that South Carolina,
which throughout an entire generation had determined on dis
union, and had actuaUy passed an ordinance of secession to carry
this purpose into effect, and the remaining six powerful cotton
States ready to follow her evil example, unless thefr adjudged
rights should be recognized by Congress, and which together
have since sent into the field such numerous and powerftd
armies, would at once have been terrified into submission by the
distribution of four hundred troops in October, or one thousand
iu December, among thefr numerous fortifications !
Very different must have been his opinion on the 3d March
following, when he penned his famous letter to Secretary Seward.
In this he exclaims : " Conquer the seceded [cotton] States
by invading armies. No doubt this might be done in two 6t
three years by a young and able general — a Wolfe, a Dessaix, a
Hoche, with three hundred thousand disciplined men, estimating
a third for garrisons, and the loss of a yet greater number by
skirmishes, sieges, battles and Southem fevers. The destruction
of life and property on the other side would be fiightful, however
perfect the moral discipUne of the invaders. The conquest
completed, at that enormous waste of human life to the North
and the Northwest, with at least $250,000,000 added thereto,
and cui hono f Fifteen devastated provinces ! not to be brought
into harmony with their conquerors, but to be held for genera
tions by heavy garrisons, at an expense quadruple the net duties
or taxes it would be possible to extort from them, foUowed by a
protector or an emperor." In view of these fearful forebodings,
we are not surprised that he should have despafred of the
Union, and been wilhng to say to the cotton States, " Wayward
sisters, depart in peace." Nor that he should have fallen back

ON THE EVE OP THE EEBELLION. 173
on his opinion expressed in the "Views" (29th October, 1860),
that " a smaller evil [than such a ci'vil war] would be to allow
the fragments of the great RepubUc to form themselves into new
Confederacies." The General, however, in the same letter to Secretary
Seward, presents his alternative for all these evils. He advises
Mr. Lincoln's administration " to throw off the old and assume
a new designation — the Union party ; adopt the conciliatory
measures proposed by Mr. Crittenden, or tbe Peace Convention,
and my life upon it, we shall have no new case of secession, but,
on the contrary, an early return of many if not all of the States
which have already broken off from the Union. Without some
equally benign measure, the remaining slaveholding States will
probably join the Montgomery Confederacy in less than sixty
days, when this city, being included in a foreign country, would
require a permanent garrison of at least thfrty-five thousand
troops." His advice to adopt the Crittenden Compromise would
have beeu excellent had it been given to his Republican friends
in Congress in the previous December, before any State had
seceded, and before any fort had been seized, instead of then
recommending to President Buchanan to despatch small bands
of United States soldiers to each of the forts. This recommen
dation, had it been followed at the time, would at once have
defeated this very Crittenden Compromise, so much desired, and
served only to provoke the cotton States into secession. It
would have been the stone of Cadmus cast among the armed
men sprung from the dragon's teeth, and the signal for imme
diate fratricidal war and mutual destruction. The advice to
President Lincoln was out of season, after both the Crittenden
Compromise and the measures proposed by the Peace Conven
tion had been finaUy rejected by Congress, and whilst the Con
federacy of the cotton States was in active existence.
Before we proceed to analyze in further detail the General's
report, it is curious to note the reason for its pubhcation. This
was a consequence of the publication of his letter to Secretary
Seward, which was in its very nature confidential. At this
period, in October, 1862, when the rebelhon had assumed a for
midable aspect, and when his sinister predictions appeared to

174 ME. Buchanan's administeation
be in the course of fulfilment, he read the original draft, in his
own handwriting, to a friend. This gentleman, whilst extolling
the far-seeing sagacity and the prophetic spirit it displayed,
begged for tbe draft as an invaluable keepsake. This appeal
to the General proved frresistible. The manuscript was dehv
ered to the friend, who soon thereafter read it, amid great ap
plause, at a pubUc meeting iu the city of New York, and whilst
a highly excited political canvass was depending for the office of
Governor. The letter thus pubUshed, implying a direct censure
on President Lincoln for not having followed the advice it had
given, created no little astonishment, because of the prevalent
belief at the time, that the General was under many obligations
to the administration for liberal and indulgent treatment in the
face of discomfiture and defeat. The letter having thus been
first published by his friend, it was soon thereafter repubUshed
in the " National Intelligencer," of the 21st October, 1862, un
der the General's O'wn authority, and in addition, a copy of his
report to President Lincoln. Why he thus connected these two
documents, so distinct and even opposite in character, it would
be difficult to decide. It has been conjectured he may have
thought that the censure of Mr. Buchanan in the report might
prove an antidote to that against Mr. Lincoln in the Seward
letter. Whatever may have caused the publication of this re
port, Mr. Buchanan has cause to rejoice that it was brought to
hght during his lifetime. It might, otherwise, have slumbered
on the secret files of the Executive Department until after his
death, and then been revealed to posterity as authentic history.
And here it is proper to mention, that a few days after the pub
Ucation of the report, Mr. Buchanan replied to it in a letter
pubhshed in the " National JnteUigencer," of the 1st Novem
ber, 1862. This gave rise to a correspondence between himself
and General Scott, which, on both sides, was formally addressed
to the editors of that journal, and was published by them in
successive numbers. This continued throughout the autumn.
It might at first be supposed that the errors in the report had
beeu sufficiently exposed in the course of this correspond
ence ; but in the present historical sketch of President Bu
chanan's conduct, it is impossible to pass over the strictures

ON THE EVE OP THE EEBELLION. 175
made upon it by General Scott. The two are inseparably joined
together. The General, in his report, prefaces the statement of his con
versation with President Buchanan, by saying, that on the 13th
December he had " personally urged upon the Secretary of War
the same ' views ' [those of the previous October], -viz., strong
garrisons in the Southern forts ; those of Charleston and Pensa
cola harbors at once ; those on Mobile Bay and the Mississippi
below New Orleans, next, &c., &c. I again pointed out the
organized companies, and the [600] recruits at the principal
depots available for the purpose. The Secretary did not concur
in my views." This, indeed, he could not have done so early
as the 13th December, without placing himself iu direct opposi
tion to tbe well-defined policy of the President. An interview
was, therefore, appointed for the 15tb December, between the
President and the General. " By appointment," says the Gen
eral, " the Secretary accompanied me to the President, Decem
ber 15th, wben the same topics, secessionism, &c., were again
pretty fully discussed." He does not furnish the President's
answer to the proposition to send strong garrisons to the South
em forts. This must unquestionably have referred to the topics
of which his mind was then full, -viz., the promising aspect of
compromise at the moment ; the certain effect of such a meas
ure in defeating it ; the inadequacy of the force at command
for so extended au operation ; and tbe policy wbich had been
laid down in his annual message. Not a word of all this. But
the General's memory seems to have improved with the lapse
of years and the progress of the rebellion. In his report to
President Lincoln, he speaks of but one conversation with Pres
ident Buchanan, that of the 15th December, whilst in his letter
of the 8th November, 1862, to the " National InteUigencer," a
portion of the correspondence to which we have referred, he
aUeges he had, on the 28th and 30th of the same December,
repeated the recommendation to garrison all the Southern forts.
In this statement, if material, it would be easy to prove he was
mistaken. Indeed, President Buchanan has in his possession a
note from the General himself, dated on Sunday, 30th Decem
ber, stating that by indisposition he was confined to the house
12

176 ME. Buchanan's administeation
on that day, and could not therefore caU upon him. Of this
hereafter. ^
According to the report, he merely mentions in general terms
the recruits he had obtained for the expedition, without aUot-
ting them among the several forts. According to the letter, he
informed President Buchanan that the number of recruits at
New York and Carlisle barracks was about six hundred, "be
sides the five companies of regulars near at hand, making about
one thousand men." And he also stated how he woidd distrib
ute them among the several forts. In this distribution he left
only " about two hundred men for the twin forts of Moultrie
and Sumter, Charleston harbor." He also declared in this let
ter, that " he considered the force quite adequate to tbe occa
sion." But, as if rendered conscious of its inadequacy by the
logic of events, he alleges that President Buchanan " might
have called forth volunteers to garrison these forts, ¦without any
special legislation," and this, too, " ¦with the full approbation of
every loyal man in the Union." That is, that on the 15th De
cember, 1860, before any State had seceded, he might ¦without
law have usurped this authority, when the law-making power
was actually iu session and had made no movement to grant it,
and when all were intent, not on war, but on measures of com
promise. In this letter he charges the Secretary of War, "¦with
or without the President's approbation," ¦with " ha-ving nearly
denuded our whole eastern seaboard of troops." In doing this,
he must surely have forgotten that he himself had eloquently
urged that all the force on the frontiers was not sufficient for the
protection of our di||;ant feUow-citizens, and had therefore advo
cated the raising of an additional force by Congress for this
very purpose.
It would seem from the report that the President confined
his observations at their interview exclusively to the reenforce
ment of the forts in Charleston harbor, for which General Scott,
according to his own statement, in the letter to the " National
Intelhgencer," could spare but two hundred tnen, the remaining
eight hundred being required for the other fortifications. Tbe
President having expressed the opinion, according to the report,
" that there was at the moment no danger of an early secession

ON THE EVE OP THE EEBELLION. 177
beyond South Carolina," he proceeded to state, " in reply to my
[General Scott's] arguments for immediately reenforcing Fort
Moultrie, and sending a garrison to Fort Sumter," that " the
time has not arrived for doing so ; that he should wait the action
of the Convention, of South CaroUna, in the expectation that a
commission would be appointed and sent to negotiate with him
and Congress, respecting tbe secession of the State and the prop
erty of the United States held within its limits ; and that if Con
gress should decide against the secession, then he would send a
reenforcement, and telegraph the commanding officer (Major
Anderson) of Fort Moultrie to hold the forts (Moultrie and
Sumter) against attack."
Now it is probable that in the course of this conversation,
the President may have referred to the rumor then current, that
the South Carolina Convention intended to send commissioners
to Washington to treat -with the Government, but it is quite
impossible he could have stated that the reenforcement of the
forts should await the result of thefr mission. Why? Because
the Brooklyn had been for some time ready to proceed to
Fort Moultrie, dependent on no other contingency than that
of its attack or danger of attack. Least of all was it possible
the President could have said that if Congress should decide
against secession, he would then telegraph to Major Anderson
" to hold the forts (Moultrie and Sumter) against attack," when
instructions of a similar but stronger character had already been
sent aud deUvered to him, and were of record in the War De
partment. It is strange that the President should, according to
the General, have made any future action in regard to these
forts dependent upon his own decision, or that of Congress, on
the question of secession, when he had iu his annual message, but
a few days before, condemned the doctrine as unconstitutional,
and he well knew it would be equally condemned by Congress.
It is curious to note a trait of the fault-finding temper of the
General in this conversation. In it he makes the Secretary of
War observe, " -with animation," " We have a vessel of war (the
Brooklyn) held in readiness at Norfolk, and he would then send
three hundred men in her from Fort Monroe to Charleston ; "
but the General objected to this arrangement, saying in answer,

178 ME. Buchanan's administeation
" that so many men could not be withdra-wn from that garrison,
but could be taken from New York," &c., &c. In this report
to President Lincoln the General exultingly declares, " that if
the Secretary's three hundred men had then (on the 15th De
cember), or some time later, been sent to Ferts Moultrie and
Sumter, both would now have been in the possession of the
United States," &c. And again, " It would have been easy to re
enforce this fort (Sumter) do-wn to about the 12th February." In
making these declarations, he must surely have forgotten not
only his o-wn objection to sending these very " three hundred
men " from Fortress Monroe, but also the fate of the Star of
the West, in the early part of January, -with his recruits from
New York, which had been substituted under his advice aud
direction for the Brooklyn.
The reader must have observed that we speak argumenta-
tively and doubtingly of the General's statement of this conver
sation. We do this simply because President Buchanan, al
though a party to it, has no recollection whatever of its particu
lars. The reason doubtless is, that, beheving General Scott to
have been aware before the interview that the President woiUd
not ¦violate his announced policy by sending one thousand men
to all the Southern forts, or two hundred to those in Charleston
harbor, he must have considered this renewed recommendation
rather a matter of form, springing from a motive which he ¦will
not attempt to conjecture, than any thing more serious. But
whatever may have been the cause of his want of memory, the
fact is certainly true. He sincerely wishes it were otherwise.
We may observe generally in regard to this report, that the
attempt, at the end of more than three months, filled with the
most important and stirring events, to write out charges against
President Buchanan, must almost necessarily do him injustice.
Fairly to accomplish such a task, the writer ought to have tested
his own recollection by a reference to dates and official documents
within his reach. Not having done this, the report is confused
throughout, sometimes blending in the same sentence occur
rences of distinct date and opposite nature. When these come
to be unravelled, it will appear in the sequel that they are often
contradicted by official and other unimpeachable testimony.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 179
And here it is due to General Scott to mention, that on the
evening of their interview (15th December), he addressed a note
to President Buchanan, reminding him that General Jackson,
during the period of South Carolina nullification, had sent reen
forcements to Fort Moultrie to prevent its seizure by the nulli
fiers and to enforce the collection of the revenue. This example
was doubtless suggested for imitation. But the times had greatly
changed during more than a quarter of a century which had
since elapsed. In 1833 South Carolina stood alone. She had
then the sympathy of no other Southem State. Her nullifica
tion was condemned by them all. Even her own people were
almost equally divided on the question. But instead of this, in
December, 1860, they were unanimous, and the other cotton
States were preparing to follow her into secession, should their
rights in tbe Territories be denied by Congress. Besides, the
President had already declared his purpose to collect the reve
nue by the employment of vessels of war stationed outside of the
port of Charleston, whenever its collection at the custom house
should be resisted. He hoped thereby to avoid actual collision ;
but, whether or not, he had resolved at evei-y hazard to coUect
the revenue. Such was the state of affairs on the 15th Decem
ber, 1860. Meanwhile the forts and all other public property
were unmolested, and Major Anderson and his troops continued
to be supplied and treated in the kindest maimer.

180 ME. Buchanan's administeation

CHAPTER X.
South Carolina adopts an ordinance of secession, and appoints Commissioners to
treat with the General Government — Their arrival in Washington — Major Ander
son's removal from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter — The President's interview with
the Commissioners, who demand a surrender of all the forts — His answer to this
demand — Their insolent reply, and its return to them — Its presentation to the Sen
ate by Mr. Davis — Secretary Floyd requested to resign — He resigns and becomes
a secessionist — Fort Sumter threatened — The Broohlyn, ordered to carry reen
forcements to the fort — The Star of tJie West substituted at General Scott's in
stance — She is fired upon — ^Major Anderson demands of Governor Pickens a
disavowal of the act — The Governor demands the surrender of the fort — The
Major proposes to refer the question to Washington — The Governor accepts — Colo
nel Hayne and Lieutenant Hall arrive in Washington on the 13th January — The
truce — Letter from Governor Pickens not delivered to the President until the 31st
January — The aaswer to it — Colonel Hayne's insulting reply — It is returned to
him — ^Virginia sends Mr. Tyler to the President with a view to avoid hostilities —
His arrival in Washington and his proposals — ^Message of the President.
On the 20th December, 1860, the South Carolina Convention
adopted an ordinance of secession, and on the 22d appointed
three of their most distinguished citizens to proceed forth-with
to Washington to treat with the Govemment of the United
States concerning the relations between the parties. These
were Robert W. Barnwell, James H. Adams, and James L. Orr.
They arrived in Washington on Wednesday, the 26th Decem
ber. Ou the next morning they received inteUigence by tele
graph that Major Anderson had, on Christmas night, secretly
dismantled Fort Moultrie ; had spiked his cannon, had burnt
his gun-can-iages, and had removed with his troops to Fort
Sumter, as if from an impending attack. This information they
sent to the President. He received it with astonishment and
regret. With astonishment, because he had beUeved Major
Anderson to be in secmity at Fort Moultrie; and this more

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 181
especiaUy whilst the commissioners appointed but three days
before were ou their way to Washington. With regret, because
this movement would probably impel the other cotton aud
border States into active sympathy -with South Carohna, and
thereby defeat the measures of compromise stUl before the Com
mittee of Thfrteen of the Senate, from which he l^d hoped to
confine secession to that Statfe alone. The President never
doubted for a moment that Major Anderson believed before the
movement that he bad "the tangible evidence " of an impending
attack requfred by bis instructions. Still it was difficult to im
agine that South Carolina would be guilty of the base perfidy
of attacking any of these forts during the pendency of her mis
sion to Washington, for the avowed purpose of preserving the
peace aud preventing collision. Such treacherous conduct would
have been considered infamous among all her sister States. She
has always strenuously denied that such was her intention.
In this state of suspense the President determined to await
official information from Major Anderson himself. After its
receipt, should he be convinced upon fuU examination that the
Major, on a false alarm, had violated his instructions, he might
then think seriously of restoring for the present the former status
quo of the forts. This, however, was soon after knovra to be
impossible, in consequence of the -violent conduct of South Car
olina in seizing all the other forts and pubhc property in the
harbor and city of Charleston.
It was under these circumstances that the President, on
Friday, the 28th December, held his first and only interview
with the commissioners from South Carolina. He determined
to Usten with patience to what they had to communicate, taking
as Uttle part himself in the conversation as civUity would per
mit. On their introduction he stated that he could recognize
them only as private gentlemen and not as commissioners from
a sovereign State ; that it was to Congress, and to Congress
alone, they must appeal. He, nevertheless, expressed his willing
ness to communicate to that body, as the only competent tribunal,
any propositions tbey might have to offer. They then proceeded,
e-vidently under much excitement, to state their grievances
arising out of the removal of Major Anderson to Fort Sumter,

182 ME.
and declared that for these they must obtain redress preliminary
to entering upon the negotiation with which they had been in
trusted ; that it was impossible for them to make any proposi
tion until this removal should be satisfactorily explained ; and
they even insisted upon the immediate ¦withdrawal of the Major
and his troops, not only from Fort Sumter, but from the harbor
of Charleston, as a sine qua non' to any negotiation.
In their letter to the President of the next day, they repeat
this demand, saying : * " And, in conclusion, we would urge upon
you the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of
Charleston. Under present circumstances they are a standing
menace which renders negotiation impossible, and, as our recent
experience shows, threatens to bring to a bloody issue questions
which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment."
This demand, accompanied by an immistakable threat of attack
ing Major Anderson if not yielded, was of the most extravagant
character. To comply with it, tbe commissioners must have
known, would be impossible. Had they simply requested that
Major Anderson might be restored to his former position at Fort
Moultrie, upon a guarantee from the State that neither it nor the
otber forts or public property should be molested ; this, at the
moment, might have been worthy of serious consideration.
But to abandon aU these forts to South CaroUna, on the demand
of commissioners claiming to represent her as an independent
State, would have been a recognition, on the part of the Execu
tive, of her right to secede from the Union. This was not to be
thought of for a moment.
The President replied to the letter of the commissioners
on Monday, 31st December. In the mean time information
had reached him that the State authorities, without waiting
to hear from Washington, had, on the day after Major Ander
son's removal, seized Fort Moultrie, Castle Pinckney, the cus
tom house, and post office, and over them all had raised the Pal
metto fiag ; and moreover, that every officer of the customs,
collector, naval officer, surveyor, appraisers, together with the
postmaster, had resigned thefr appointments ; and that on Sun
day, the 30th December, they had captured from Major Hum-
» Ex. Doc, H. R., vol. vi., No. 26, p. 6.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 183
phreys, the officer in charge, the arsenal of the United States,
containing public property estimated to be worth half a million
of dollars. The Govemment was thus expelled from all its
property except Fort Sumter, and uo Federal officers, whether
civU or military, remained in the city or harbor of Charleston.
The secession leaders in Congress attempted to justify these vio
lent proceedings of South Carolina as acts of self-defence, on the
assumption that Major Anderson had afready commenced hos
tilities. It is certain that their tone instantly changed after his
removal ; and they urged its secrecy, the hour of the night when
it was made, the destruction of his gun-carriages, and other at
tendant incidents, to inflame the passions of thefr followers. It
was under these circumstances that the President was called
upon to reply to the letter of the South Carolina commissioners,
demanding the immediate withdrawal of the troops of the United
States from the harbor of Charleston. In this reply he peremp
torily rejected the demand in firm but courteous terms, and de
clared his purpose to defend Fort Sumter by all the means in his
power against hostile attacks, from whatever quarter they might
proceed. ( Vide his letter of the 31st December, 1860, Ex. Doc.
No. 26, H. R., 36th Congress, 2d Session, accompanying Presi
dent's message of 8th January, 1861.^ To this the commissioners
sent their answer, dated on the 2d January, 1861. This was so
violent, unfounded, and disrespectful, and so regardless of what
is due to any individual whom the people have honored with the
office of President, that the reading of it iu the Cabinet excited
indignation among all the membei's. With their unanimous
approbation it was immediately, on the day of its date, returned
to the commissioners with the foUowing indorsement: "This
paper, just presented to the President, is of such a character that
he declines to receive it." Surely no negotiation was ever con
ducted in such a manner, unless, indeed, it had been the prede
termined purpose of the negotiators to produce an open and im
mediate rupture.
It may be asked, why did the President, at his interview with
the South Carolina commissioners, on the 28th December, offer
to lay the propositions they bad to make before Congress, when
he must have been morally certain they would not meet a favor-

184 ME. Buchanan's administeation
able response ? This was to gain time for passion to subside,
and for reason to resume her sway ; to bring the whole subject
before the representatives of the people in such a manner as to
cause them to express an authoritative opinion on secession, and
the other dangerous questions then before the country, and
adopt such measures for their peaceable adjustment as might
possibly reclaim even South Carolina herself ; but whether or
not, might prevent the other cotton States from foUowing her
evil and rash example.
The insulting letter of the commissioners, which had been
returned to them, was notwithstanding presented to the Senate
by Mr. Jefferson Davis, immediately after the reading of the
President's special message of the 8th January ; and such was
the temper of that body at the time, that it was received and
read, and entered upon thefr joumal. Mr. Da^vis, not content
-with this success, followed it up by a severe and unjust attack
against the President, and his example was followed by several
of his adherents. From this time forward, as has been afready
stated, all social and political intercourse ceased between the
disunion Senators and the President.
It is worth notice, that whUst this letter of the commission
ers was pubUshed at length in the " Congressional Globe,"
among the proceedings of the Senate, thefr previous letter to
the President of the 28th December, and his answer thereto of
the 31st, were never published in this so-eaUed official regis
ter, although copies of both had accompanied his special mes
sage. By this means the offensive letter was scattered broad
cast over the country, whilst the letter of the President, to
which this professed to be an answer, was buried in one of the
numerous and long after published volumes of executive docu
ments. It is proper to advert to the aUegation of the commissioners,
in thefr letter of the 28th December, that the removal of Major
Anderson to Fort Sumter was made in -violation of pledges
given by tbe President. They also say that " since our arrival
an officer of the United States, acting, as we are assured, not
only without but against your orders, has dismantled one fort
and occupied another, thus altering to a most important extent

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 185
the condition of affairs under which we came." As to the al
leged pledge, we have afready shown that no such thing existed.
It has never been pretended that it rests upon any pretext ex
cept the note of the 9th December, delivered to the President
by the South Carolina members of Congress, and what occurred
on that occasion. All this has been afready stated. But if ad
ditional evidence were wanting to refute the assertion of a
pledge, this might be found in the statement pubUshed after
wards in Charleston by two of their number (Messrs. Miles and
Keitt),* who, in giving an account of this interview, do not
pretend or even intimate that any thing passed even in their
opinion on either side in the nature of a pledge. By what offi
cer, then, was the assurance given to tbe commissioners since
their arrival in Washington, that Major Anderson had acted
not only without but agaiust the President's order ? It was
none other than the Secretary of War himself, notwithstanding
it was in obedience to his o-wn instructions but a few days before
that the removal was made from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter.
This appears from the letter of Major Anderson to the War
Department of the 27th December, the day after his removal,
which unfortunately did not arrive in Washington until some
days after its date. In this he says : " I -wUl add that many
things con-viuced me that the authorities of the State designed
to proceed to a hostUe act " (against Fort Moultrie), the very
contingency on which the Secretary had not only authorized
but directed the Major to remove his troops to Fort Sumter,
should he deem this a position of greater security. These in
structions were in a certain sense peculiarly his o-wu. They
were prepared and transmitted to Major Anderson by himself.
Throughout they do not mention the name of the President,
though in the main they expressed his views.
We can refer to a probable cause for this strange conduct on
the part of the Secretary. This was, that three days before the
South Carolina commissioners reached Washington, the Presi
dent had communicated to him (23d December), through a dis
tinguished friend and kinsman of his own, a request that he
should resign his office, with a statement of the reason why this
* Appleton's "American Annual Cyclopasdia" for 1861, p. 703.

186
was made. When he heard this request he displayed much
feeling, but said he would comply with the President's wishes.
It is proper to state the reason for this request. On the night
before it was made (22d December), the fact was first made
knovra to the President that 870 State bonds for $1,000 each,
held in trust by the Govemment for different Indian tribes, had
been purloined from the Interior Department by Godard BaUey,
the clerk in charge of them, and had been delivered to WiUiam
H. RusseU, a member of the firm of " Russell, Majors & Wad-
dell." Upon examination, it was discovered that this clerk, in
Ueu of the bonds abstracted, had from time to time received bUls
of corresponding amount from Russell, drawn by the firm on
John B. Floyd, Secretary of War, and by him accepted and
indorsed, and this without any la^wftU authority. In conse
quence there was found in the safe where the Indian bonds had
been kept, a number of these accepted bills, exactly equal in
amount to $870,000. These acceptances were thfrteen in num
ber, commencing on the 13th September, 1860, and had been
received by Mr. BaUey, according to his own statement, " as
collateral security for the return of the bonds," and as such had
been placed by him in the safe. It is remarkable that the last
of them, dated on the 13th December, 1860, for $135,000, had
been drawn for the precise sum necessary to make the aggregate
amount of the whole number of bUls exactly equal to that of
the abstracted bonds.
And here it is due to Secretaiy Thompson to state, though
a digression, that on Monday morning, the 24th December, at
his own instance, the House of Representatives appointed a
committee " to investigate and report upon the subject," of
which Hon. Mr. Morris, of Illinois, a rancorous opponent of the
administration, was the chafrman. After a full investigation,
the committee made their report on the 12th February, 1861.*
In this they state : " They deem it but justice to add that they
have discovered nothing to involve the late Secretary, Hon.
Jacob Thompson, in the slightest degree in the fraud, and nothing
to indicate that he had any comphcity in the transaction, or that
he had any knowledge of it until the time of the disclosure by
• Report of Committee, H. R., 1860-'61, vol. ii., No. 78, p. 8.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 187
Godard Bailey." It is to be regretted, for the sake of public
justice, that all the circumstances connected ¦with the abstraction
of these bonds had not been subjected to a judicial investigation.
This was rendered impossible by the action of the committee
itself, in examining John B. Floyd and Wilham H. Russell as
witnesses. For this reason they were relieved from all criminal
responsibility by the Act of Congress of the 24th January, 1857,*
of the existence of which the committee seem to have been igno
rant. This act provides that no person examined as a witness
before a committee of either House of Congress, " shall be held
to answer criminally in any court of justice for any fact or act "
" touching which he shall have testified." In this manner both
Mr. Floyd and Mr. Russell escaped without trial.
To return from our digression. Secretary Floyd's apparent
complicity with this fraudulent transaction covered him with
suspicion, and, whether this were well or ill foimded, rendered it
impossible, in the opinion of the President, that he should re
main in tbe Cabinet ; and hence the request that he should re
sign. What effect this request may have produced in suddenly
converting him from ha-ving been until then an avowed and con
sistent opponent of secession to one of its most strenuous sup
porters, may be readily inferred. Certain it is, that immediately
after the arrival of the South Carolina commissioners, he became
the intimate associate of leading secession Senators, who had
just before been in the habit of openly condemning his official
conduct. On the evening of the day after the arrival of these commis
sioners he boldly assumed his new position, and became the only
-witness to a pledge which his own instructions of a few da,ys
before prove could never have existed. On that evening, in the
face of all these facts, he read to the President, in Cabinet couu-
cU, in a discourteous and excited tone, hitherto unknown, a paper
declaring that " it is evident now, from the action of the com
mander at Fort Moultrie, that the solemn pledges of this Gov
emment have been violated by Major Anderson," and that " one
• 11 Laws U. S., p. 155.

188
remedy only is left, and that is to withdraw the garrison from
the harbor of Charleston altogether." This e-vidently foreshad
owed the demand made by the commissioners on the foUo-wing
day (28th December), of which we have afready treated. This
proposition the President heard with astonishment. As he had
stated in his reply to them of the 31st December : " Such an
idea was never thought of by me. No aUusion had ever been
made to it in any communication between myself and any human
being." The Secretary, on the 29th December, sent to tbe President
the resignation of his office. By this he offered to discharge its
duties until his successor should be appointed. It was instantly
accepted without reference to this offer, and Postmaster General
Holt was transferred to the War Department.
The President had not made the personal acquaintance of
Mr. Floyd before his appointment. Though never in Congress,
he had been, like his father, Govemor of Vfrginia. Mi*. Bu
chanan had been favorably impressed by tbe fact that he had
refused to accept a recommendation from the Electoral CoUege
of Virginia for a seat in the Cabinet, assigning as a reason that
the President, in making selections for this high and confiden
tial office, ought to be left free and untrammeUed to the exer
cise of his o-wn judgment.
The removal of Major Anderson to Fort Sumter, and the
seizure by South Carohna of aU the remaining pubUc property
at Charleston, altogether changed the aspect of affairs from what
it had been at the date of the interview between General Scott
and the President. Fort Sumter was now threatened -with an
immediate attack. The time had arrived for despatching the
Brooklyn on her destined expedition for its rehef At this crisis
General Scott, being too unweU to caU in person, addressed a
note to the President, on Sunday, the 30th December, asking
his permission to send, without reference to the War Depart
ment, and otherwise as secretly as possible, two hundred and
fifty recruits from New York harbor to reenforce Fort Sumter,
together with some extra muskets or rifles, ammunition and sub-
'sistence stores, expressing tbe hope " that a sloop-of-war and

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 189
cutter may be ordered for the same purpose as early as to-mor-
rot/" (31st December).
The President immediately decided to order reenforcements ;
but he preferred to send them by the Brooklyn, which had re
mained in readiness for this service. He thought that a pow
erful war steamer -with discipUned troops on board would prove
more effective than a sloop-of-war and cutter with raw recruits.
Accordingly on the next morning (Monday) he instructed the Sec
retaries of War and the Navy to despatch the Brooklyn to Fort
Sumter. On the evening of this day the General called to con
gratulate him on the fact that the Secretaries had afready issued
appropriate orders to the respective army and navy officers, and
stated that these were then in his own pocket.
In contradiction to this prompt action, it is difficult to im
agine how the General could have asserted, in his report to
President Lincoln, that " the South Carolina commissioners had
afready been many days in Washington, and no movement of
defence [on the part of the United States] had been permitted."
In regard to the " many days' " delay : — These commissioners ar
rived in Washington on the 26th December ; the General sent his
request to the President on Sunday, the 30th ; and on Monday
morning he himself received the necessary orders for the depart
ure of the expedition. General Scott, notwithstanding this
prompt response to his request, proceeds still further, and charges
the President with ha-ving " refused to allow any attempt to be
made " to reenforce Fort Sumter, " because he was holding ne
gotiations -with the South Carolina commissioners," although
this aUeged refusal occurred at the very time (31st December)
when he himself had in his own hands the order for the Brook
lyn to proceed immediately to Fort Sumter. Nay, more : " After
wards," says the General, " Secretary Holt and myself endeav
ored, in vain, to obtain a sbip-of-war for the purpose, and were
finally obUged to employ tbe passenger steamer Star of the West."
After this statement, will it be credited that the Star of the West
was employed in place of the Brooklyn at the pressing instance
of General Scott himself? And yet such is the fact. The Presi
dent yielded to this unfortunate change -with great reluctance,

190 ME. Buchanan's administeation
and solely in deference to the opinion of the commanding Gen
eral on a question of mUitary strategy. What a failure and
confusion of memory the report to President Lincoln exhibits !
At the interview ¦with President Buchanan on the evening
of the 31st December, the General seemed cordially to approve
the matured plan of sending reenforcements by the Brooklyn.
Why, then, the change in his opinion ? At this interview the
President informed him he had sent a letter but a few hours be
fore to the South CaroUna commissioners, in answer to a com
munication from them, and this letter would doubtless speedily
terminate their mission ; — that although he had refused to recog
nize them in an official character, yet it might be considered
improper to transmit the orders then in his possession to the
Brooklyn until they had an opportunity of making a reply, and
that the delay for this purpose could not, in his opinion, exceed
forty-eight hours. In this suggestion the General promptly con
curred, observing that it was gentlemanly and proper. He,
therefore, retained the orders to await- the reply. On the morn
ing of the 2d January the President received and returned the
insolent communication of the South Carolina commissioners
¦without an answer, and thus every obstacle was removed from
the immediate transmission of the orders. In the mean time,
however, the General had unluckily become convinced, after
advising with an individual beUeved to possess much knowledge
and practical experience in naval affafrs, that the better plan to
secure both secrecy and success would be to send to Fort Sumter
a fast side-wheel mercantile steamer from New York ¦with the
two hundred and fifty recruits.
Such was the cause of the change, according to the undoubted
information communicated to the President at the time by the
Secretaries of War and the Navy. For this reason alone was
the Star of the West substituted for the service instead of the
Brooklyn. The change of programme caused a brief delay ; but
the Star of ihe West, with recruits on board, left New York for
Charleston on the afternoon of the 5th January. On the even
ing of the same day, however, on which this ill-fated steamer
went to sea, General Scott despatched a telegram to his son-in-

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 191
law. Colonel Scott, of the United States army, then at New
York, to countermand her departure ; but this did not reach him
until after she had left the harbor.
The cause of this countermand proves how much wiser it
would have beeu to employ the Brooklyn in the first instance on
this important ser-rice. This shall be stated iu the language of
Secretary Holt in his letter of the 5th March, 1861, in reply to
certain allegations which had been made and published * by Mr.
Thompson, the late Secretary of the Interior. In this he. says :
" The countermand spoken of (by Mr. Thompson) was not more
cordially sanctioned by the President than it was by General
Scott and myself; not because of any dissent from the order on
the part of the President, but because of a letter received that day
from Major Anderson, stating, in effect, that he regarded him
self secure in his position ; and yet more from intelligence which
late on Saturday evening (5th January, 1861) reached the De
partment, that a heavy battery had been erected among the sand
hills, at the entrance to Charleston harbor, which would prob
ably destroy any unarmed vessel (and such was the Sta/r of the
West) which might attempt to make its way to Fort Suibter.
This important information satisfied the Government that there
was no present necessity for sending reenforcements, and that
when sent they should go not in a vessel of commerce, but of
war. Hence the countermand was despatched by telegraph to
New York; but the vessel had sailed a short time before it
reached the officer (Colonel Scott) to whom it was addressed."
General Scott, as well as the Secretaries of War and the
Na-vy, convinced of the blunder which had been committed in
substituting the Star of the West for the Brooklyn, proceeded to
provide, as far as might be possible, against anticipated disaster.
For this purpose the Secretary (jf the Navy, on the 7th January,
despatched an order to the commander of the Brooklyn (Farra-
gut), and General Scott simultaneously forwarded to him a
despatch to be delivered to the U. S. officer in command of
the recruits on the Star of the West. By this the commander
of the recruits was informed that Captain Farragut had been in-
* " National Intelligencer," 5th March, 1861
lo i

192 ME. BUCHANAN'S ADMINISTEATION
stmcted -to afford him " aid and succor in case your [his] ship be
shattered or injured ; second, to convey this order of recall, in
case you cannot land at Fort Sumter, to Fort Monroe, Hampton
Roads, there to await further orders." In a postscript he was
farther directed " to land his troops at Fort Monroe and dis
charge the ship." The sequel wUl show that these precautions
were useless.
The Star of the West, under the command of Captain
McGowan, proceeded on her ill-starred voyage, amid anxious
apprehensions for the fate of the recruits and mariners on board.
She arrived in Charleston harbor on the 9th of January, the flag
of the United States fiying at her mast-head ; and whilst en
deavoring to approach Fort Sumter, was fired upon by order of
Governor Pickens. She then immediately changed her course
and returned to New York. Fortunately no hves were lost, nor
was the vessel materiaUy injured. This statement of facts proves
incontestably that the President, so far from refusing, was not
only willing but anxious, within the briefest period, to reenforce
Fort Sumter.
On the very day and immediately after this outrage on the
StoJT of the West, Major Anderson sent a flag to Governor
Pickens, informing him of the reason why he had not opened fire
from Fort Sumter on the batteries which had attacked the Star
of the West. This was because he presumed the act had been
unauthorized. He demanded its disavowal, and if this were not
sent in a reasonable time he would consider it war, and fire on
any vessel that attempted to leave the harbor. Had he adhered
to his purpose, the ci'vil war would then have commenced. This
demand of Major Anderson, so worthy of an American officer,
was totally disregarded by the Govemor. Instead of disavow
ing the act or apologizing for tt, he had the audacity, but two
days after the outrage, to send the Hon. A. G. Magrath and
General D. F. Jamison, whom he styled as " both members of
the Executive Council and of the highest position in the State,"
to Major Anderson, for the purpose of persuading him to surreu-
der the fort. In the letter which they bore from the Govemor,
dated on the llth January, they were instructed to present to

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 193
Major Anderson " considerations of the gravest public character,
and of the deepest interest to all who deprecate the improper
waste of life, to induce the delivery of Fort Sumter to the consti
tuted authorities of the State of South Carohna, with a pledge
ou its part to account for such public property as may be in
your charge."
This Major Anderson appears to have regarded, not merely
as an effort to persuade him voluntarily to suiTender the fort,
but as an absolute demand for its surrender. In either case,
however, his instructions, already quoted, prescribed his line of
duty. Under these he ought to have peremptorily informed the
emissaries of the Governor that he would not surrender, but
would defend the fort against attack by all the means in his
power. In this course he would not only have obeyed his in
structions, but have acted in accordance with the explicit deter
mination of the President, announced but eleven days before
(31st December) to the South Carolina commissioners. But
Major Anderson, notwithstanding these considerations, as well
as his own declared purpose but two days before to consider the
attack on the Star of the West as war, and to act accordingly,
unless it should be explained and disavowed, now proposed to
Governor Pickens to refer the question of surrender to Washing
ton. In his answer of the same date to the Governor's menacing
request, whilst stating that he could not comply with it, and
deeply regretting that the Governor should have made a demand
of him with which he could not comply, he presents the follow
ing alternative : " Should your Excellency deem fit, prior to a
resort to arms, to refer this matter to Washington, it would afford
me the sincerest pleasure to depute one of my officers to accom
pany any messenger you may deem proper to be the bearer of
your demand." This proposition was promptly accepted by the
Governor, and in pursuance thereof he sent on his part Hon. I.
W. Hayne, Attorney-General of South CaroUna, to Washington ;
whilst Major Anderson sent as his deputy Lieutenant J. Nor
man Hall, of tbe first artiUery, theu under his command in the
fort. These gentlemen immediately set out for Washington,
and arrived together on the evening of the 13th January, 1861.

1J4 ME. Buchanan's administeation
Thus, greatly to the surprise of the President, had a truce
or suspension of arms been concluded between Major Anderson
and Governor Pickens, to continue, from its very nature, until he
should again decide against the surrender of Fort Sumter. This
was what the writers on public law denominate " a partial truce
under which hostiUties are suspended only in certain places, as
between a town and the army besieging it." * Until this deci
sion should be made by the President, Major Anderson had thus
placed it out of his o'wn power to ask for reenforcements, and
equally out of the power of the Govemment to send them 'with
out a violation of the public faith pledged by him as the com
mandant of the fort. In the face of these facts, the President
saw with astonishment that General Scott, in his report to Pres
ident Lincoln, had stated that the expedition under Captain
Ward, of three or four smaU steamers, " had been kept back,"
not in consequence of this truce between Major Anderson and
Governor Pickens, " but by something like a truce or armistice
concluded here [in Washington], embracing Charleston and
Pensacola harbors, agreed upon between the late President and
certain principal seceders of South CaroUna, Florida, Louisiana,
&c., and this truce lasted to the end of the administration."
From the confused and inaccurate memory of the General,
events altogether distinct in their nature are so blended in his
report to President Lincoln, that it is difficult to disentangle
them. Such is eminently the case in mixing up the facts rela
tive to Charleston and Pensacola in the same sentences. In
order to render each clear, we shall first treat of Charleston and
afterwards of Pensacola.
The expedition of the Star of the West had scarcely re
turned to New York, when the news of the truce between Major
Anderson and Govemor Pickens reached Washington (13th
January). Between the two events it was physically impossi
ble to prei^are and send a second expedition, and this could not
be done afterwards until the truce should expire, without a vio
lation of public faith. It did not last, as the General asserts,
" to the end of the administration," but expfred by its own lim-
* Vattel's Law of Nations, p. 404.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 195
itation on the 5th February, the day when Secretary Holt finally
aud peremptorily announced to the South Carolina commis
sioner that the President would not under any circumstances
surrender Fort Sumter. It is possible that, un^er the laws of
war, the President might have annulled this truce after due no
tice to Governor Pickens. This, however, would have cast a
serious reflection on Major Anderson for having concluded it,
who, beyond question, had acted from the purest and most pa
triotic motives. Neither General Scott nor any other person,
so far as is known, ever proposed to violate it. Indeed, from
his peculiar temper of mind and military training, he would
have been the last man to make such a proposition ; and yet, in
his report to President Lincoln, he does not make the most dis
tant allusion to the fact, well known to him, that such a truce
had ever been concluded. Had he done this, he would at once
have afforded conclusive evidence against sending reenforce
ments until it should expire. On the contrary, instead of the
actual truce, " something like a truce," according to his state
ment, was made, not in Charleston, but in Washington, and not
between the actual parties to it, but " between the late President
and certain principal seceders of South Carolina." Nothing
more unfounded and unjust could have been attributed to Pres
ident Buchanan.
Major Anderson may probably have committed an error in
not promptly rejecting the demand, as he understood it, of Gov
ernor Pickens for the surrender of Fort Sumter, instead of refer
ring it to Washington. If the fort were to be attacked, which
was then, extremely doubtful, this was the propitious moment
for a successful resistance. The Governor, though never so will
ing, was not in a condition to make the assault. He requfred
time for preparation. On the other hand. Major Anderson was
then confident in his power to repel it. This is shown by his
letters to the War Department of the 31st December and 6th
January. From these it appears that he not only felt safe in
his position, but confident that he could command the harbor
of Charleston, and hold the fort in opposition to any force which
might be brought against him. Such was, also, tbe oft-expressed

196 ME. Buchanan's administeation
conviction at Washington of Lieutenant Hall, whom he had
selected as his deputy, as well as that of Lieutenant Theodore
Talbot, likewise of the 1st artillery, who had left Fort Sumter
on the 9th January, 1861, as a bearer of despatches. Still, had
Govemor Pickens attacked the fort, this would have been the
commencement of civil war between the United States and
South Carolina. This every patriot desired to avoid as long as
a reasonable hope should remain of preserving peace. And
then such a hope did extensively prevail, founded upon the ex
pectation that the Crittenden Compromise, or some equaUy
heaUng measure, might be eventually adopted by Congress.
How far this consideration may account for Major Anderson's
forbearance when the Star of the West was fired upon, and
for his proposal two days thereafter to refer the question of the
surrender of the fort to Washington, we can only conjecture. If
this were the cause, his motive deserves high commendation.
Colonel Hayne, the commissioner from South Carolina, as
already stated, arrived in Washington on the 13th January.
He bore with him a letter from Govemor Pickens addressed to
the President. On the next morning he caUed upon the Presi
dent and stated that he would deUver this letter in person on
the day following. The President, however, admonished by his
recent experience -with the former commissioners, declined to
hold any conversation with him on the subject of his mission,
and requested that all communications between them might be
in -writing. To this he assented. Although the President had
no actual knowledge of the contents of tbe Govemor's letter,
he could not doubt it contained a demand for the surrender of
the fort. Such a demand he was at all times prepared peremp
torily to reject. This Colonel Hayne must have kno-wn, be
cause the President had but a fortnight before informed his pre
decessors this was impossible, and had never been thought of by
him in any possible contingency. The President confidently
expected that the letter would be transmitted to him on the day
after the interview, when his refusal to surrender the fort would
at once terminate the truce, and leave both parties free to act
upon their own responsibility. Colonel Hayne, however, did

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 197
not transmit this letter to tho President on the 15tli January,
according to his promise, but withheld it untU the 31st of that
month. The reason for this vexatious delay will constitute a
curious portion of our narrative, and deserves to be mentioned
in some detail. ( Vide the President's message of 8th Febru
ary, 1861, with the accompanying documents, Ex. Doc, H. R.,
vol. ix.. No. 61.)
The Senators from the cotton States yet in Congress ap
peared, strangely enough, to suppose that through their infiuence
the President might agree not to send reenforcements to Fort
Sumter, provided Govemor Pickens would stipiUate not to at
tack it. By such an agreement they proposed to preserve the
peace. But first of all it was necessary for them to prevail upon
Colonel Hayne not to transmit the letter to the President on
the day appointed, because they well knew that the demand
which it contained would meet his prompt and decided refusal.
This would render the conclusion of such an agreement impos
sible. In furtherance of thefr plan, nine of these Senators, with
Jefferson Davis at their head, addressed a note to Colonel Hayne,
on the 15th January, requesting him to defer the delivery of the
letter. They proposed that he should withhold it until they
could ascertain from the President whether he would agree not
to send reenforcements, pro-vided Govemor Pickens would en
gage not to attack the fort. They informed the Colonel that
should the President prove willing in the first place to enter into
such an arrangement, they would then strongly recommend that
he should not deUver the letter he had in charge for the present,
but send to South Carolina for authority from Govemor Pick
ens to become a party thereto. Colonel Hayne, in his answer
to these Senators of the 17th January, informed them that he
had not been clothed with power to make the arrangement sug
gested, but pro-vided they could get assurances vrith which they
were entirely satisfied that no reenforcements would be sent to
Fort Sumter, he would withhold the letter with which he had
been charged, refer their communication to the authorities of
South Carohna, and await further instructions.

198 ME. Buchanan's administeation.
On the 19th January this correspondence between the Sena
tors and Colonel Hayne was submitted to the President, accom
panied by a note from three of their number, requesting him to
take the subject into consideration. His answer to this note
was delayed no longer than was necessary to prepare it in proper
form. On the 22d January it was communicated to these Sen
ators in a letter from the Secretary of War. This contained an
express refusal to enter into the proposed agreement. Mr. Holt
says : " I am happy to observe that, in your letter to Colonel
Hayne, you express the opinion that it is ' especially due from
South Carolina to our States, to say nothing of other slavehold
ing States, that she should, so far as she can consistently -with
her honor, avoid initiating hostilities between her and the United
States or any other power.' To initiate such hostihties against
Fort Sumter would, beyond question, be an act of war against
the United States. In regard to the proposition of Colonel
Hayne, ' that no reenforcements wUl be sent to Fort Sumter in
the interval, and that public peace wiU not be disturbed by
any act of hostility toward South Carolina,' it is impossible for
me to give you any such assurances. The President has no au
thority to enter into such an agreement or understanding. As
an executive officer, he is simply bound to protect the pubhc
property so far as this may be practicable ; and it would be a
manifest violation of his duty to place himself imder engage
ments that he would not perform this duty, either for an indefi
nite or limited period. At the present moment it is not deemed
necessary to reenforce Major Anderson, because he makes no
such request and feels quite secure in his position. Should his
safety, however, require reenforcements, every effort -will be
made to supply them."
It was beheved by the President that this peremptory refusal
to enter into the proposed agreement, woiUd have caused Colo
nel Hayne immediately to present the letter he had in charge
and thus terminate his mission, thereby releasing both parties
from the obligations of the truce. In this expectation the Pres
ident was disappointed. The secession Senators again inter
posed, and advised Colonel Hayne still longer to withhold the
letter from the President, and await further instructions from

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 199
Charleston. In his answer of 24tli January to their note con
taining this advice, he informs them that although the letter
from the Secretary of War " was far from being satisfactory,"
yet in compliance with their request he " would withhold the
communication with which he was at present charged, and refer
the whole matter to the authorities of South Carolina, and
would await their reply." On the 30th this reply was received,
and on the next day Colonel Hayne transmitted to ftie Presi
dent the letter of Govemor Pickens demanding the surrender
of the fort, with a long communication from himself This let
ter is dated " Headquarters, Charleston, January 12, 1861," and
is as follows :
" SiE : At the time of the separation of the State of South
Carolina from the United States, Fort Sumter was, and stiU is,
in the possession of troops-of the United States, under the com
mand of Major Anderson. I regard that possession as not con
sistent with the dignity or safety of the State of South Caro
Una, and have this day [it was the day previous] addressed
to Major Anderson a communication to obtain from him the
possession of that fort by the authorities of this State. The
reply of Major Anderson informs me that he has no authority
to do what I required, but he desfres a reference of the demand
to the President of the United States. Under tbe circum
stances now existing, and which need no comment by me, I
have determined to send to you Hon. I. W. Hayne, the Attor
ney-General of the State of South Carolina, and have instructed
him to demand the delivery of Fort Sumter, in the harbor of
Charleston, to the constituted authorities of the State of South
Carolina. The demand I have made of Major Anderson, and
which I now make of you, is suggested by my earnest desfre to
avoid the bloodshed which a persistence in your attempt to re
tain possession of that fort will cause, and which will be una
vailing to secure to you that possession, but induce a calamity
most deeply to be deplored. If consequences so unhappy shaU
ensue, I will secure for this State, in the demand which I now
make, the satisfaction of ha-ving exliausted every attempt to
avoid it.
" In relation to the pubhc property of the United States

200 ME.
within Fort Sumter, the Hon. I. W. Hayne, who will hand you
this communication, is authorized to give you the pledge of the
State that the valuation of such property wUl be accounted for
by this State, upon the adjustment of its relations -with the
United States, of which it was a part."
On the 6th February, the Secretary of War, on behalf of
the President, replied to this demand, as well as to the letter of
Colonel Hayne accompanying it. Our narrative would be in
complete without this admirable and conclusive reply. It is as
follows : "War Dbpaetmeht, February 6, 1861.*
" Sir : The President of the United States has received your
letter of the 31st ultimo, and has charged me with the duty of
replying thereto.
" In the communication addressed to the President by Gov
ernor Pickens, under date of the 12th January, and which ac
companies yours now before me, his Excellency says : ' I have
determined to send to you the Hon. I. W. Hayne, the Attorney-
General of the State of South Carolina, and have instructed
him to demand the surrender of Fort Sumter, in the harbor
of Charleston, to the constituted authorities of the State of
South Carolina. The demand I have made of Major Ander
son, and which I now make of you, is suggested because of my
earnest desire to avoid the bloodshed which a persistence in your
attempt to retain the possession of that fort will cause, and
which wiU be unavailing to secure to you that possession, but
induce a calamity most deeply to be deplored.' The character
of the demand thus authorized to be made appears (under the
influence, I presume, of the correspondence with the Senators
to which you refer) to have been modified by subsequent in
structions of his Excellency, dated the 26th, and received by
yourself on the 30th January, in which he says : ' If it be so
that Fort Sumter is held as property, then, as property, the
rights, whatever they may be, of the United States, can be as
certained, and for the satisfaction of these rights the pledge of
the State of South Carolina you are authorized to give.' Tbe
full scope and precise purport of your instructions, as thus modi-
* H. E. Ex. Doc, 1860-'61, vol. ix., Doc, No 61.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 201
fied, you have expressed in the following words : ' I do not come
as a military man to demand the surrender of a fortress, but as the
legal officer of the State — its attorney-general — to claim for the
State the exercise of its undoubted right of eminent domain,
and to pledge the State to make good all injury to tbe rights of
property which arise from the exercise of the claim.' And lest
this explicit language should not sufficiently define your posi
tion, you add : ' The proposition now is that her [South Caro
lina's] law officer should, under authority of the Govemor and
his council, distinctly pledge the faith of South Carolina to
make such compensation, in regard to Fort Sumter and its ap
purtenances and contents, to the full extent of the money value
of the property of the United States, delivered over to the
authorities of South Carolina by your command.' You then
adopt his Excellency's train of thought upon the subject, so far
as to suggest that the possession of Fort Sumter by the United
States, ' if continued long enough, must lead to collision,' and
that ' an attack upon it would scarcely improve it as property,
whatever the result ; and if captured, it would no longer be the
subject of account.'
" The proposal, then, now presented to the President, is simply
an offer on the part of South Carolina to buy Fort Sumter and
contents as property of the United States, sustained by a decla
ration, in effect, that if she is not permitted to make the purchase
she will seize the fort by force of arms. As the initiation of a
negotiation for the transfer of property between friendly gov
ernments, this proposal impresses the President as having as
sumed a most unusual form. He has, however, investigated the
claim on which it professes to be based, apart from the declara
tion that accompanies it. And it may be here remarked, that
much stress has been laid upon the employment of the words
' property ' and ' public property ' by the President in his sev
eral messages. These are the most comprehensive terms which
can be used in such a connection, and surely, when referring to
a fort or any other public establishment, they embrace the entire
and undivided interest of the Government therein.
" The title of the United States to Fort Sumter is complete
and incontestable. Were its interest in this property purely

202
proprietary, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, it might
probably be subjected to the exercise of the right of eminent do
main ; but it has also political relations to it of a much higher
and more imposing character than those of mere proprietorship.
It has absolute jurisdiction over the fort and the soil on which it
stands. This jurisdiction consists in the authority to ' exercise
exclusive legislation ' over the property referred to, and is there
fore clearly incompatible with the claim of eminent domain now
insisted upon by South Carolina. This authority was not de
rived from any questionable revolutionary source, but from the
peacefid cession of South Carolina herself, acting through her
legislature, under a provision of the Constitution of the United
States. South Carohna can no more assert the right of eminent
domain over Fort Sumter than Maryland can assert it over the
District of Columbia. The poUtical and proprietary rights of
the United States in either case rest upon precisely the same
ground. " The President, however, is reheved from the necessity of
further pursuing this inqufry by the fact that, whatever may be
the claim of South Carohna to this fort, he has no constitutional
power to cede or surrender it. The property of the United
States has been acqufred by force of pubhc law, and can only be
disposed of under the same solemn sanctions. The President, as
the head of the executive branch of the govemment only, can no
more sell and transfer Fort Sumter to South CaroUna than he
can sell and convey the Capitol of the United States to Mary
land or to any other State or individual seeking to possess it.
His Excellency the Governor is too famiUar with the Constitu
tion of the United States, and -with the limitations upon the
powers of the Chief Magistrate of the government it has estab
lished, not to appreciate at once the soundness of this legal prop
osition. The question of reenforcing Fort Sumter is so fuUy
disposed of in my letter to Senator Slidell and others, under date
of the 22d of January, a copy of which accompanies this, that its
discussion wiU not now be renewed. I then said : ' At the present
moment it is not deemed necessary to reenforce Major Anderson,
because he makes no such request. Should his safety, however,
require reenforcements, every effort will be made to supply

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 203
them.' I can add nothing to the explicitness of this language,
which still applies to the existing status.
" The right to send forward reenforcements when, in the
judgment of the President, the safety of the garrison requires
them, rests on the same unquestionable foundation as tbe right
to occupy the fortress itself. In the letter of Senator Davis and
others to ¦yourself, under date of the 15th ultimo, they say : ' We
therefore think it especiaUy due from South Carolina to our States
— to say nothing of other slaveholding States — that she should,
as far as she can consistently with her honor, avoid initiating hos
tihties between her and the United States or any other power ; '
and you now yourself give to the President the gratifying as
surance that ' South Carohna has every disposition to preserve
the public peace ; ' and since he is himself sincerely animated by
the same desire, it would seem that this common and patriotic
object must be of certain attainment. It is difficult, however,
to reconcile with this assurance the declaration on your part that
' it is a consideration of her [South Carolina's] own dignity as a
sovereign, and the safety of her people, which prompts her to
demand that this property should not longer be used as a mili
tary post by a government she no longer acknowledges,' and the
thought you so constantly present, that this occupation must
lead to a collision of arms and the prevalence of civil war.
Fort Sumter is in itself a military post, and nothing else ; and
it would seem that not so much the fact as the purpose of its use
should give to it a hostile or friendly character. This fortress is
now held by the Government of the United States for the same
objects for which it has been held from the completion of its
construction. These are national and defensive ; and were a
pubhc enemy now to attempt the capture of Charleston or the
destruction of the commerce of its harbor, the whole force of the
batteries of this fortress would be at once exerted for their pro
tection. How the presence of a small garrison, actuated by such
a spirit as this, can compromise the dignity or honor of South
CaroUna, or become a source of frritation to her people, tbe
President is at a loss to understand. The attitude of that garri
son, as has been often declared, is neither menacing, nor defiant,
nor unfriendly. It is acting under orders to stand strictly on the

204 ME. Buchanan's administeation
defensive ; and the govemment and people of South Carolina
must weU know that they can never receive aught but shelter
from its guns, unless, in the absence of all provocation, they
should assault it and seek its destruction. The intent -with
which this fortress is held by the President is truthfully stated
by Senator Davis and others in their letter to yourself of the 15th.
January, in which they say : ' It is not held with any hostUe or
unfriendly purpose toward your State, but merely as property
of the United States, which the President deems it his duty to
protect and preserve.'
" If the announcement so repeatedly made of the President's
pacific purposes in continuing the occupation of Fort Sumter
untU the question shall have been settled by competent authority,
has failed to impress the government of South Carolina, the for
bearing conduct of his administration for the last few months
should be received as conclusive evidence of his sincerity. And
if this forbearance, in view of the cfrcumstances which have so
severely tried it, be not accepted as a satisfactory pledge of the
peaceful policy of this administration toward South Carohna,
then it may be safely affirmed that neither language nor conduct
can possibly furnish one. If, with all the multiphed proofs
which exist of the President's anxiety for peace, and of the ear
nestness with which he has pursued it, the authorities of that
State shall assault Fort Sumter, and perU the hves of the hand
ful of brave and loyal men shut up ¦within its waUs, and thus
plunge our common country into the horrors of civil war, then
upon them and those they represent must rest the responsibihty.
" Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"J. Holt,
" Secretary of War,
"Hon. I. W. 'B.^irm, Attorney-General of the State of South Carolina.
" P. S. — The President has not, as you have been informed,
received a copy of the letter to yourself from the Senators, com
municating that of Mr. Holt of the 22d January."
This letter of Mr. Holt, though ffi'm and decided in charac
ter, is courteous and respectful, both in tone and in terms. It

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 205
reviews the subject in an able and comprehensive manner, ex
plaining and justifying the conduct of the President. Unlike
the letters to which it is a response, it contains no menace. In
conclusion it does no more than fix the responsibility of com
mencing a civil war on tbe authorities of South Carolina, should
they assault Fort Sumter and imperil the lives of the brave and
loyal men shut up within its walls. It does not contain a word
or an expression calculated to afford just cause of offence ; yet
its statements and its arguments must have cut Colonel Hayne
to the quick. To reply to them successfully was impossible.
He, therefore, had no resort but to get angry. Following in the
footsteps of his predecessors, on the 8th February he addressed an
insulting answer not to Secretary Holt, as usage and common
civility required, but dfrectly to the President. He then sud-
' denly left Washington, leaving his missile behind him to be de
livered after his departure. From his conduct he evidently an
ticipated its fate. His letter was returned to him on the same
day, directed to Charleston, with the following indorsement :
" The character of this letter is such that it cannot be received.
Col. Hayne having left the city before it was sent to the Presi
dent, it is returned to him by the first mail." What has be
come of it we do not know. No copy was retained, nor have
we ever heard of it since.
What effect this letter of Mr. Holt may have produced upon
the truculent Governor of South Carolina we shall not attempt
to decide. Certain it is, from whatever cause, no attack was
made upon Fort Sumter until six weeks after the close of Mr.
Buchanan's administration. The fort remained unmolested un
til South Carolina had been for some time a member of tbe Con
federate States. It was reserved for Mr. Jefferson Davis, their
President, to issue the order for its bombardment, and thus
formally to commence the civil war. This he did with a fuU
consciousness that such would be the fatal effect ; because in the
letter from him and other Southern Senators to Col. Hayne,
of the 15th January, both he and they had warned Govemor
Pickens that an attack upon the fort would be " the instituting
hostilities between her [South Carolina] and the United States."
Thus ended the second mission from South CaroUna to the

206 ME. Buchanan's administeation
President, and thus was he relieved from the truce concluded by
Major Anderson. But in the mean time, before the termination
of this truce, the action of the General Assembly of Vfrginia,
instituting the Peace Convention, bad interposed an insur
mountable obstacle to the reenforcement of Fort Sumter, un
less attacked or in immediate danger of attack, without entfrely
defeating this beneficent measure. Among their other proceed
ings they had passed a resolution "that ex-President John
Tyler is hereby appointed by the concurrent vote of each branch
of the General Assembly, a commissioner to the President of the
United States ; and Judge John Robertson is hereby appointed
by a hke vote, a commissioner to the State of South Carolina
and the other States that have seceded or shall secede, with in
structions respectfuUy to request the President of the United
States and the authorities of such States to agree to abstain,
pending the proceedings contemplated by the action of the Gen
eral Assembly, from any and aU acts calculated to produce a
colhsion of arms between the States and the Govemment of the
United States."
Mr. Tyler arrived in Washington on the 23d January, a
fortnight before the departure of Col. Hayne, bearing -with him
a copy of the Virginia resolutions. These he presented to the
President on the foUo-wing day, assuring him that whUst the
people of Vfrginia were almost universally incUned to peace and
reconstruction, yet any efforts on her part to reconstruct or
preserve the Union " depended for their success on her being
permitted to conduct them undisturbed by outside coUision."
This resolution, it will be observed, requested the President,
and not Congress, to enter into the proposed agreement. Mr.
Tyler, therefore, urged the President to become a party to it.
This he refused, stating, according to Mr. Tyler's report to the
Governor of Virginia, " that he had in no manner changed his
views as presented in his annual message ; that he could give no
pledges ; that it was his duty to enforce the laws, and the whole
power rested with Congress." He promised, notwithstanding,
that he would present the subject to that body. This was due
both to its intrinsic importance and to the State of Virginia,
which had manifested so strong a desire to restore and preserve
the Union.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 207
The President, accordingly, in his message of the 28th Jan
uary, submitting the Virginia resolutions to Congress, observed
in regard to this one, that " however strong may be my desfre
to enter into such an agreement, I am convinced that I do not
possess the power. Congress, and Congress alone, under the
war-making power, can exercise the discretion of agreeing to
abstain ' from any and all acts calculated to produce a coUision
of arms ' between this and any other Government. It would,
therefore, be a usurpation for the Executive to attempt to re
strain their hands by an agreement in regard to matters over
which he has no constitutional control. If he were thus to act,
they might pass laws which he should be bound to obey, though
in conffict with his agreement. Under existing circumstances,
my present actual power is confined within narrow limits. It
is my duty at all times to defend and protect the pubUc prop
erty within the seceding States, so far as this may be practica
ble, and especially to employ aU constitutional means to protect
the property of the United States, and to preserve tbe pubhc
peace at this the seat of the Federal Govemment. If the se
ceding States abstain ' from any and all acts calculated to pro
duce a colUsion of arms,' then the danger so much to be depre
cated will no longer exist. Defence, and not aggression, has
been the policy of the administration from the beginning. But
whilst I can enter into no engagement such as that proposed, I
cordially commend to Congress, with much confidence that it
will meet thefr approbation, to abstain from passing any law
calculated to produce a coUision of arms pending the proceed
ings contemplated by the action of the General Assembly of
Virginia. I am one of those who wUl never despair of the Re
pubUc. I yet cherish the belief that the American people will
perpetuate the union of the States on some terms just and hon
orable for all sections of the country. I trust that the media
tion of Vfrginia may be the destined means, under Providence,
of accomphshing this inestimable benefit. Glorious as are the
memories of her past history, such an achievement, both in re
lation to her own fame and tbe welfare of the whole country,
would surpass them all."
This noble and patriotic effort of Virginia met no favor from
14

208 ME. Buchanan's administeation
Congress. Neither House referred these resolutions of her Gen
eral Assembly to a Qommittee, or even treated them with the
common courtesy of ordering them to be printed. In the Sen
ate no motion was made to refer them, and the question to print
them with the accompanying message was debated from time
to time until the 21st February,* when the Peace Convention
had nearly completed its labors, and after this no further notice
seems to have been taken of the subject. In the House the
motion to refer and print the Virginia resolutions, made by Mr.
Stanton, of Ohio, on the day they were received , was never
afterwards noticed.f This mortifying neglect on the part of the
Representatives of the States and of the people, made a deep
and unfortunate impression on the citizens of Vfrginia.
* Con. Globe, pp. 590, 636. t H. J., p. 236. Con. Globe, p. 601.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 209

CHAPTER XI.
Fort Sumter again — An expedition prepared to relieve it — The expedition abandoned
on account of a despatch from Major Anderson — Mr. Holt's letter to President
Lincoln^Fort Pickens in Florida — Its danger from the rebels — The Brooklyn
ordered to its relief — The means by wliich it was saved from capture approved by
General Scott and Messrs. Holt and Toucey, with the rest of the Cabinet — Refu
tation of the charge that arms had been stolen — Report of the Committee on Mil
itary Affairs and other documentary evidence — The Southern and Southwestern
States received less than their quota of arms — The Pittsburg cannon — General
Scott's unfounded claim to the credit of preventing their shipment to the South-
Removal of old muskets — Their value — Opinion of Mr. Holt in regard to the man
ner iu which President Buchanan conducted the administration.
It is now necessary to return to Fort Sumter, This was the
point on which the anxious attention of the American people
was then fixed. It was not known until some days after the
termination of the truce, on the 6th February, that Governor
Pickens bad determined to respect the appeal from the General
Assembly of Virginia, and refrain from attacking the fort dur
ing the session of the Peace Convention. It, therefore, became
the duty of the administration in the mean time to be prepared,
to the extent of the means at command, promptly to send suc
cor to Major Anderson should he so request, or in the absence
of such request, should they ascertain from any other quarter
that the fort was in danger. From the tenor of the Major's
despatches to the War Department, no doubt was entertained
that he could hold out, in case of need, untU the arrival of re
enforcements. In this state of affairs, on the very day (30th
January) on which the President received the demand for the
surrender of tbe fort, he requested the Secretaries of War aud the
Navy, accompanied by General Scott, to meet him for tbe pur
pose of devising the best practicable means of instantly reen-

210 ME. Buchanan's administeation
forcing Major Anderson, should this be required. After several
consultations an expedition for this purpose was quietly prepared
at New York, under the direction of Secretary Toucey, for the
relief of Fort Sumter, the command of which was intrusted to
his intimate friend, the late lamented Commander Ward of the
na'vy. This gaUant officer had been authorized to select his
own officers and men, who were to rendezvous on board of the
receiving-ship, of which he was then in command. The expedi
tion consisted of a few small steamers, and it was arranged that
on receiving a telegraphic despatch from the Secretary, when
ever the emergency might require, he should in the course of the
foUo'wing night set sail for Charleston, entering the harbor in
the night, and anchoring if possible under the guns of Fort
Sumter. It is due to the memory of this brave officer to state that he
had sought the enterprise with the greatest enthusiasm, and was
wilhng to sacrifice his life in the accompUshment of the object,
should such be his fate, saying to Secretary Toucey this would
be the best inheritance he could leave to his 'wife and children.
According to General Scott's version of this affafr in his
report to President Lincoln : " At this time, when this [the truce
on the 6th February] had passed away. Secretaries Holt and
Toucey, Captain Ward of the na'vy, and myself, 'with the knowl
edge of the President [Buchanan], settled upon the employment
under the captain (who was eager for the expedition) of three
or four small steamers belonging to the coast survey." But this
expedition was kept back, according to the General ; . and for
what reason? Not because the Peace Convention remained
still in session, and the President would not break it up by
sending reenforcements to Fort Sumter whilst the authorities
of South Carolina continued to respect the appeal of the Gen
eral Assembly of Virginia to avoid colhsion, and whilst Major
Anderson at the point of danger had asked no reenforcements.
The General, passing over these the true causes for the delay
in issuing the order to Commander Ward to set sail, declares this
was kept back " by something hke a truce or armistice made here
[in Washington] between President Buchanan and the principal
seceders of South CaroUna," etc., etc., the existence of which has

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 211
never been pretended by any person except himself. It soon
appeared that General Scott, as well as the President and Secre
taries of War and the Na'vy, had been laboring under a great
misapprehension in supposing, from the information received
from Major Anderson, that this small expedition, under Com
mander Ward, might be able to reUeve Fort Sumter. How in
adequate this would have proved to accomplish the object, was
soon afterwards demonstrated by a letter, with enclosures, from
Major Anderson to the Secretary of War. This was read by
Mr. Holt, greatly to his own surprise and that of every other
member of the Cabinet, on the morning of the 4th March, at
the moment when the Thirty-sixth Congress and Mr. Buchanan's
administration were about to expire. In this the Major declares
that he would not be willing to risk his reputation on an attempt
to throw reenforcements into Charleston harbor with a force
of less than twenty thousand good and well- disciplined men.
Commander Ward's expedition, consisting of only a few small
vessels, borrowed from the Treasury Department and the Coast
Survey, with but two or three hundred men on board, was ne
cessarily abandoned. On the next day (5th March) the Secre
tary of War transmitted Major Anderson's letter, with its enclos
ures, to President Lincoln. This he accompanied by a letter
from himself reviewing the correspondence between the War
Department and Major Anderson from the date of his removal
to Fort Sumter. The foUowing is a copy, which we submit
without comment : "War Dbpaetmekt, March 5th, 1861.
" SiE : I have the honor to submit for your consideration
several letters with enclosures received on yesterday from Major
Anderson and Captain Foster, of the Corps of Engineers, which
are of a most important and unexpected character. Why they
were unexpected will appear from the following brief statement :
" After transferring his forces to Fort Sumter, be (Major
Anderson) addressed a letter to this Department, imder date of
the 31st December, 1860, in wbich he says : ' Thank God, we
are now where the Govemment may send us additional troops
at its leisure. To be sure the uncivil and imcourteous action of

212 ME. Buchanan's administeation
the Governor [of South Carohna], in preventing us from pur
chasing any thing in the city, wiU annoy and inconvenience us
somewhat ; still we are safe.' And after referring to some defi
ciency in his stores, in the articles of soap and candles, he adds :
* Still we can cheerfully put up -with the inconvenience of doing
without them for the satisfaction we feel in the knowledge that
we can command this harbor as long as our Government wishes
to keep it' And again, on the 6th January, be wrote : ' My
position -will, should there be no treachery among the workmen
whom we are compelled to retain for the present, enable me to
hold this fort against amy force which cam, he hrcmght against
me ; and it would enable me, in the event of war, to annoy the
South Carolinians by preventing them from throwing in supplies
into thefr new posts, except by the aid of the Wash Channel
through Stone River.'
" Before the receipt of this communication, the Govemment,
being without information as to his condition, had despatched
the Star of the West with troops and suppUes for Fort Sumter ;
but the vessel having been fired on from a battery at the en
trance to the harbor, returned without having reached her des
tination. " On the 16th January, 1861, in replying to Major Anderson's
letters of the 31st December and of 6th January, I said : ' Your
late despatches, as weU as the very inteUigent statements of
Lieutenant Talbot, have relieved the Govemment of the appre
hensions previously entertained for your safety. In consequence
it is not its purpose at present to reenforce you. The attempt
to do so would no doubt be attended by a collision of arms and
the effusion of blood — a national calamity, which the President
is most anxious to avoid. You will, therefore, report frequently
your condition, and the character and activity of the preparations,
if any, which may be being made for an attack upon the fort, or
for obstructing the Government in any endeavors it may make
to strengthen your command. Should your despatches be of a
nature too important to be intrusted to the mails, you will con
vey them by special messenger. Whenever, in your judgment,
additional supplies or reenforcements are necessary for your
safety or for a successftil defence of the fort, you wUl at once

ON THE EVE OP THE EEBELLION. 213
oommunicate the fact to this Department, and a prompt and
-vigorous effort -wiU be made to forward them.'
" Since the date of this letter Major Anderson has regularly
and frequently reported the progress of the batteries being con
structed around him, and which looked either to the defence of the
harbor, or to an attack on his own position ; but he has not sug
gested that these works compromised his safety, nor has he made
any request that additional supplies or reenforcements should be
sent to him. On the contrary, on the 30th January, 1861, in a
letter to this Department, he uses this emphatic language : ' I do
hope tbat no attempt will be made by our friends to throw sup
plies in ; their doing so would do more harm than good.'
" On the 5th February, when referring to the batteries, etc.,
constructed in his vicinity, he said : ' Even in their present con
dition, they will make it impossible for any hostile force, other
than a large and well-appointed one, to enter this harbor, and
the chances are that it will then be at a great sacrifice of life ; '
and in a postscript he adds : ' Of course in speaking of forcing an
entrance, I do not refer to the Uttle stratagem of a small party
slipping in,' This suggestion of a stratagem was well considered
in connection with all the information that could be obtained
bearing upon it ; and in consequence of 'the vigilance and num
ber of the guard-boats in and outside of the harbor, it was re
jected as impracticable.
" In view of these very distinct declarations, and of the earnest
desire to avoid a colhsion as long as possible, it was deemed en
tirely safe to adhere to the line of policy indicated iu my letter
of the 16th January, which has been already quoted. In that
Major Anderson had been requested to report ' at once,' ' when
ever, in his judgment, additional supplies or reenforcements
were necessary for his safety or for a successful defence of the
fort.' So long, therefore, as he remained silent upon this point,
the Government felt that there was no ground for apprehension.
Still, as the necessity for action might arise at any moment, an
expedition has been quietly prepared and is ready to sail from
New York on a few hours' notice for transporting troops and
supplies to Fort Sumter. This step was taken under the super
vision of General Scott, who arranged its details, and who re-

214 ME. Buchanan's administeation
garded the reenforcements thus pro-vided for as sufficient for tbe
occasion. Tbe expedition, however, is not upon a scale ap
proaching the seemingly extravagant estimates of Major Ander
son and Captain Foster, now offered for the first time, and for
the disclosures of which the Government was whoUy unprepared.
" The declaration now made by the Major that he would not
be- willing to risk his reputation on an attempt to throw reen
forcements into Charleston harbor, and with a view of holding
possession of the same, with a force of less than twenty thousand
good and well-discipUned men, takes the Department by surprise,
as his pre-vious correspondence contained no such intimation.
" I have the honor to be,
" Very respectfully,
" Your obedient servant, "J.Holt.
"To THE PeESIDENT."
Having pointed out the course pursued by President Bu
chanan in regard to Fort Sumter, we must now return to Fort
Pickens, in Florida. This feeble State was the last from which
a revolutionary outbreak could have reasonably been expected.
Its numbers had not entitled it to admission into the Union, and
a large amount of blood and treasure had been expended by the
Govemment of the United States for the protection and defence
of its inhabitants against the Seminole Indians. Nevertheless,
weak as the State was, its troops, under the command of Colo
nel WiUiam H. Chase, formerly of the corps of engineers of the
United States army, suddenly rose in rebellion, attacked the
troops of the United States, and expeUed them from Pensacola
and the adjacent navy yard. Lieutenant Slemmer, of the artil
lery, and his brave little command, consisting of between sev
enty and eighty men, were thus forced to take refuge in Fort
Pickens, where they were in imminent danger of being cap
tured every moment by a gi-eatly superior force.
From the interruption of regular communications with
Washington, Secretary Holt did not receive information of these
events until some days after their occurrence, and then only
through a private channel. Reenforcements were despatched

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 215
to Fort Pickens without a moment's unnecessary delay. The
Brooklyn, after being superseded by the Sta/r of the West, had
fortunately remained at her old station, ready for any exigency.
She immediately took on board a company of United States
troops from Fortress Monroe, under the command of Captain
Vogdes, of the artiUery, and with provisions and military stores
left Hampton Roads on the 24th January for Fort Pickens.
The Secretary of the Navy had, with prudent precaution, with
drawn from foreign stations all the vessels of war which could
possibly be spared with any regard to the protection of our for
eign commerce, and had thus rendered the home squadron unu
sually large. Several of the vessels of which it was composed
were at the time in the ¦vicinity of Fort Pickens. These, united
¦with the Brooklyn, were deemed sufficient fOr its defence. " The
fleet," saj'S the Secretary, "could. have thro^wn six hundred men
into the fort (seamen and marines), without including the com
pany from Fortress Monroe." *
Four days after the Brooklyn had left Fortress Monroe, Sen
ators Slidell, Hunter, and Bigler received a telegraphic despatch.
from Senator Mallory, of Florida, dated at Pensacola on the
28th January, with an urgent request that they would lay it
before the President. This despatch expressed an ardent desire
to preserve the peace, as well as the most positive assurance
from himself and Colonel Chase, that no attack would be
made on the fort if its present status should be suffered to re
main. The President carefully considered this proposal. The
Brooklyn might not arrive in time for tbe preservation of this
important fort, and for the relief of Lieutenant Slemmer. Be
sides, a collision at that point between the opposing forces would
prove fatal to the Peace Convention so earnestly urged by Vir
ginia, and then about to assemble. But, on the other hand, the
fort was greatly in need of provisions, and these must at every
hazard be supplied. Mr. MaUory and Colonel Chase must be
distinctly informed that our fleet in the ¦vicinity would be al
ways on the alert and ready to act at a moment's warning, not
only in case tbe fort should be attacked, but whenever the offi-
* His testimony before the Hale Committee and the Court-Martial on Captain
Armstrong. Report No. 37, pp. 58, 234.

216 ME. Buchanan's administeation
cers in command should observe preparations for such an attack.
No precaution must be omitted on thefr part necessary to hold
the fort.
The conclusion at which the President arrived, with the
approbation of every member of his Cabinet, ¦will be seen in the
joint order dated on the 29th January, immediately transmitted
by telegraph from Secretaries Toucey and Holt to the com
manders of the Macedonian and Rrookh/n, and " otber naval
officers in command," and " to Lieutenant A. J. Slemmer, 1st
artillery, commanding Fort Pickens, Pensacola, Florida." The
following is a copy : " In consequence of the assurances received
from Mr. MaUory in a telegram of yesterday to Messrs. Slidell,
Hunter, and Bigler, ¦with a request it should be laid before the
President, that Fort Pickens would not be assaulted, and an
offer of such assurance to the same effect from Colonel Chase,
for the purpose of avoiding a hostUe colUsion, upon receiving
satisfactory assurances from Mr. Mallory and Colonel Chase that
Fort Pickens wiU not be attacked, you are instructed not to
land the company on board the Brooklyn unless said fort shaU
be attacked, or preparations shall be made for its attack. The
provisions necessary for the supply of the fort you 'wiU land-
The Brooklyn and the other vessels of war on the station 'wUl
remain, and you will exercise the utmost 'vigUance and be pre
pared at a moment's warning to land the company at Fort Pick
ens, and you and they will instantly repel any attack on the
fort. The President yesterday sent a special message to Con
gress communicating the Virginia resolutions of compronuse.
The commissioners of different States are to meet here on Mon
day, the 4th February, and it is important that during their
session a collision of arms should be avoided, unless an attack
should be made, or there should be preparations for such an at
tack. In either event the BrooTdyn and the other vessels, vrill
act promptly. Your right, and that of the other officers in com
mand at Pensacola, freely to communicate by special messenger
[with the Government], and its right in the same manner to
communicate with yourself and them, will remain intact, as the
basis on which the present instruction is given."
On the arrival of this order at Pensacola the satisfactory

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 217
assurances which it required were given by Mr. Mallory and
Colonel Chase to our naval and military commanders, and the
result proved most fortunate. The Brooklyn had a long pas
sage. Although she left Fortress Monroe on tbe 24th January,
she did not arrive at Pensacola until the 6th February. In the
mean time Fort Pickens, with Lieutenant Slemmer (whose con
duct deserves high commendation) and his command, were, by
'virtue of this order, supplied 'with provisions and placed in per
fect security, until an adequate force had arrived to defend it
against any attack. The 'fort has ever since been in our pos
session. General Scott, in his report to President Lincoln, speaks of
this arrangement in the hostile spirit toward President Buchanan
which pervades the whole document. He condemns it 'without
quaUflcation. He alleges " that the Brooklyn, 'with Captain
Vogdes' company alone, left the Chesapeake for Fort Pickens
about January the 22d, and on the 29th President Buchanan,
having entered into a quMsi armistice "with certain leading se
ceders at Pensacola and elsewhere, caused Secretaries Holt and
Toucey to instruct, in a joint note, tbe commanders of the war ves
sels off Pensacola, and Lieutenant Slemmer, commanding Fort
Pickens, to commit no act of hostility, and not to land Captain
Vogdes' company unless the fort should be attacked." He washes
his hands of all knowledge of the transaction by declaring, " That
joint note I never saw, but suppose the armistice was consequent
upon the meeting of the Peace Convention at Washington, and
was understood to terminate with it."
WUl it be believed that General Scott himself had expressly
approved this joint order before it was issued, which he presents
to President Lincoln in such odious colors ? President Buchanan
had a distinct recollection that either the Secretary of War or
of tbe Navy, or both, had at the time informed him of this fact.
StiU he would have hesitated to place himself before the pubUc
on an important question of veracity in dfrect opposition to a
report to his successor by the Commanding General of the army.
He was relieved from this embarrassment by finding among his
papers a note from Secretary Holt to himself, dated on the 29th
January, the day on which the joint order was issued. From

218 ME. Buchanan's administration
this the fbllowing is an extract : " I have the satisfaction of say
ing that on submitting the paper to General Scott he expressed
himself entirely satisfied with it, saying that there could be no
objection to the arrangement in a military point of view or
otherwise." How does General Scott, in November, 1862, at
tempt to escape from this dilemma? Whilst acknowledging
that few persons are as little liable as Mr. Holt to make a mis
statement, either by accident or design, he yet states that he has
not the slightest recollection of any interview with him on the
subject.* He proceeds to say that he does indeed remember
that Mr. Holt, about this time, approached his bedside when be
was suffering from an access of pain ; leaving it to be inferred,
though he does not directly say so, that this might account for
his want of attention ; and then he slides off, as is his wont, to
another subject. But his subterfuge wiU not avail him. The
testimony of Mr. Holt is conclusive that he not only expressed
his satisfaction 'with the order, but expressly declared that
there could be no objection to it in a mihtary or any other point
of 'view. It is impossible that Mr. Holt, on the very day of the
interview, and without any conceivable motive, should have
made a false report to the President of what had just occurred
between himself and the General. Strange forgetfulness !
General Scott, also, in his report to President Lincoln, com
ments severely on the delay of the order for reenforcements to
Fort Taylor, Key West, and Fort Jefferson, Tortugas Island,
notwithstanding this had been issued so early as the 4th Jan
uary, and though these reenforcements had arrived in sufficient
time to render both forts perfectly secure. This the General
admits ; and there the matter ought to have ended. But not
so. It was necessary to eUcit fi-om this simple transaction
reasons for magnifying his own ser'vices and censuring President
Buchanan. According to the report, he had experienced great
difficulty in obtaining permission from the President to send
these reenforcements ; " and this," says he, " was only effected
by the aid of Secretary Holt, a strong and loyal man." He
then launches forth into the fearful consequences which might
* General Scott's rejoinder to ex-President Buchilnan, "National Intelhgencer,'
Nov. 12, 1862.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 219
have followed but for his own vigilance and foresight. He even
goes so far as to say that with the possession of these forts, " the
rebels might have purchased an early recognition."
In opposition to these fanciful speculations, what is the sim
ple statement of the fact ? The administration were well aware
of the importance of these forts to the commerce of tbe Gulf
of Mexico. General Scott asked the attention of Secretary
Floyd, then about to leave office, to the reenforcement of them
by a note of the 28th December. Not recei-ring any response,
he addressed a note on the 30th to the President on the same
subject. The rupture with the first South CaroUna commission
ers occurred on the 2d January, and the time had then arrived
when the President, acting on his established poUcy, deemed it
necessary to send reenforcements not only to Fort Sumter, but
also to Forts Taylor and Jefferson, and these were accordingly
despatched to the two latter on the 4th January. The same
course precisely would have been pursued had General Scott
remained at his headquarters in New York.
But the most remarkable instance of General Scott's want
of memory remains to be exposed. This is not contained in
his report to President Lincoln, but is to be found in his let
ter of the 8th November, 1862, to the " National Intelligen
cer," ia reply to that of ex-President Buchanan. Unable to
controvert any of the material facts stated in this letter, the
General deemed it wise to escape from his awkward position
by repeating and indorsing the accusation against Secretary
Floyd, in regard to what has been caUed " the stolen arms,"
although this had been condemned as unfounded more than
eighteen months before, by the report of the Committee on
Military Affairs of the House of Representatives. This was that
the Secretary, in order to furnish aid to the approaching re
belhon, had fraudulently sent public arms to the South for the
use of the insurgents. This charge chimed in admirably -with
public prejudice at the moment. Although the committee, after
full investigation, had so long before as January, 1861, proved
it to be unfounded, yet it has continued, notwithstanding, to be
repeated and extensively credited up till the present moment.
Numerous respectable citizens still believe tbat the Confederate

220 ME. Buchanan's administeation
States have been fighting us 'with cannon, rifles, and muskets
thus treacherously placed in thefr possession. This delusion
presents a striking iUustration of the extent to which pubhc
prejudice may credit a falsehood not only without foundation,
but against the clearest official eridence. Although the late
President has not been implicated as an accessory to the alleged
fraud, yet he has been charged -with a want of vigilance in not
detecting and defeating it.
The pretext on which General Scott seized to introduce this
new subject of controversy at so late a period, is far-fetched and
awkward. Mr. Buchanan, whilst repelling the charge in the
General's report to President Lincoln, that he had acted under
the infiuence of Secretary Floyd in refusing to garrison tbe
Southern fortifications, declares that "aU my Cabinet must
bear me witness that I was the President myself, responsible for
all the acts of the administration ; and certain it is that during
the last six months pre'rious to the 29th December, 1860, the
day on which he resigned his office, after my request, he exer
cised less influence in the administration than any other mem
ber of the Cabinet." * Whereupon the General, in order to
weaken the force and impair the credibility of this declaration,
makes the foUowing insidious and sarcastic remarks: "Now,
notwithstanding this broad assumption of responsibility, I should
be sorry to believe that Mr. Buchanan specially consented to
the removal, by Secretary Floyd, of 115,000 extra muskets and
rifles, with all their implements and ammunition, from North-
em repositories to Southern arsenals, so that on the breaking
out of the maturing rebelUon, they might be found without cost,
except to the United States, in the most convenient positions
for distribution among tbe insurgents. So, too, of the one him
dred and twenty or one hundred and forty pieces of heavy
artillery, which the same Secretary ordered from Pittsburg to
Ship Island, in Lake Borgne, and Galveston, Texas, for forts
not yet erected. Accidentally learning, early in March, that
under this posthumous order the shipment of these guns had
commenced, I commimicated the fact to Secretary Holt (acting
for Secretary Cameron) just in time to defeat the robbery."
* Letter to "National Intelligencer," 28th Oct., 1862.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 221
Whilst writing this paragraph it would seem impossible that
the General had ever read the report of the Committee on
Military Affairs, and equaUy impossible that he, as Command
ing General of the army, should have been ignorant of this
important document, so essentially connected with his official
duties. But to proceed to the report of the committee, which effect
ually disproves the General's assertions. At the commence
ment of the session of 1860-61, public rumor gave birth to this
charge. It very justly and properly attracted the attention of
the House of Representatives, and from its nature demanded a
rigorous investigation. Accordingly, on the motion of Mr.
Stanton, of Ohio, the chairman of the Committee on Military
Affairs, the House adopted a resolution instructing the commit
tee " to inqufre and report to the House to whom and at what
price the pubUc arms, distributed since the 1st January, 1 860,
had been disposed of," etc., etc. The investigation was deemed
Df such paramount importance that the House authorized the
committee not only to send for persons and papers, but also to
report at any time in preference to all other business. From
the nature of the charge it could not be difficult for the commit
ter to establish 'either its truth or its falsehood. Arms could
not be removed from one armory or arsenal to another by Sec
retary Floyd, without the knowledge and active participation
of the officers and attaches of the Ordnance Bureau. At its
head was Colonel Craig, an officer as loyal aud faitbful as any
who belonged to the army. It was through his agency alone
that the arms could have been removed, and it is certain that
had he kuo'wn or suspected treachery on the part of the Secre
tary, he would instantly have communicated this to the Presi
dent, in order that it might be defeated.
The committee made their first report to the House on the
9th January, 1861.* With this they presented two tables (Nos.
2 and 3), communicated to them by Mr. Holt, then the Secre
tary of War, from the Ordnance Bureau, exhibiting " the num
ber and description of arms distributed since 1st January, 1860,
to the States and Territories, and at what price." Whoever
* " Congressional Globe," p. 294. House Journal, p. 156.

222 ME. Buchanan's administeation
shall examine table No. 2 'will discover that the Southem and
Southwestern States received much less in the aggregate instead
of more than the quota of arms to which they were justly enti
tled under the law for arming the mihtia. Indeed, it is a re
markable fact that neither Arkansas, Delaware, Kentucky, Loui
siana, North Carohna, nor Texas received any portion of these
arms, though they were army muskets of the very best quality.
This arose simply from their own neglect, because the quota to
which they were entitled would have been delivered to each of
them on a simple apphcation to the Ordnance Bureau. The
whole number of muskets distributed among all the States, North
and South, was just 8,423. Of these the Southern and South
western States received only 2,091, or less than one-fourth.
Again, the whole number of long range rifles of the army calibre
distributed among all the States in the year 1860, was 1,728. Of
these, six of the Southem and Southwestern States, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Vfrginia
received in the aggregate 758, and the remainder of these States
did not receive any.
Thus it appears that the aggregate of rifles and muskets
distributed in 1860 was 10,151, of which the Southem and
Southwestern States received 2,849, or between one-third and
one-fourth of the whole number. Such being the state of the
facts, well might Mr. Stanton have observed in making this
report, much to his credit for candor and fairness, that " there
are a good deal of rumors, and speculations, and misappre
hension as to the true state of facts in regard to this mat
ter." * The report of the committee and the opinion expressed
by its chairman before the House, it might have been sup
posed, would satisfy General Scott that none of these muskets
or rifles had been purloined by Secretary Floyd. But not so.
The ex-President had stated in his letter to the " National In
telligencer," of November 7th, 1862, that " the Southern States
received in 1860 less instead of more than the quota of arms to
which they were entitled by law." This statement was founded
on the report of the committee, which had now been brought
fully to bis notice. He, notwithstanding, still persisted in his
* "Congressional Globe," 1860-61, p. 294.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 223
error, and in his letter to the " National Intelligencer " of the
2d December, 1862, he says : " This is most strange contrasted
with information given to me last year, and a telegram just re
ceived from Washington and a high 'officer, not of the Ordnance
Department, in these words and figures : ' Rhode Island, Dela
ware, and Texas had, not drawn at the end of eighteen sixty
(1860) thefr annual quotas of arms for tbat year, and Massachu
setts, Tennessee, anal Kentucky only in part. Virginia, South
Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Kansas were by the order of the Secretary of War supplied
with their quotas for eighteen sixty-one (1861) in advance, and
Pennsylvania and Maryland in part.' " It is in vain that the
General attempts to set up an anonymous telegram against the
report of tjie committee. From what source did he derive the
information given to him last year ? And who was the author
of the telegram ? He does not say in either case. Surely be
fore he gave this telegram to the world, under the sanction of
his own name, he ought to have ascertained from the Ordnance
Bureau whether it was true or false. This he might easily and
'speedily have done, had he been careful to present an authentic
statement. There is a mysterious vagueness about this telegram,
calculated if not intended to deceive the casual reader into the
beUef that a great number of these arms had been distributed
among the enumerated States, embracing thefr quotas not only
for 1860 but for 1861. From it no person could imagine that
these eight States in the aggregate had received fewer muskets
and rifles than would be required to arm two full regiments.
The next subject investigated by the committee was, had
Secretary Floyd sent any cannon to the Southem States ? This
was a most important inquiry. Our columbiads and 32-pound-
ers were at the time considered equal, if not superior, to any
cannon in the world. It was easy to ascertain whether he had
treacherously, or otherwise, sent any of these formidable weap
ons to the South. Had he done this, it would have been impos
sible to conceal the faot and escape detection. Tbe size and
ponderous weight of these cannon rendered it impracticable to
remove them from the North to the South without the knowl
edge of many outside persons, in addition to those connected
15

224 ME. Buchanan's administeation
with the Ordnance Bureau. The committee reported tjn this
subject on the 18th February, 1861. There was no evidence
before them that any of these cannon had actually been trans
mitted to tbe South. Indeed, this was not even pretended.
From their report, however, it does appear that Secretary Floyd
had attempted to do this on one occasion a very short time be
fore he left the department, but that he had failed in this at
tempt in consequence of a countermand of his order issued by
Mr. Holt, his successor in the War Department.
It requires but a few words to explain the whole transaction.
Secretary Floyd, on the 20th December, 1860, 'without the knowl
edge of the President, ordered Captain (now Colonel) Maynadier,
of the Ordnance Bureau, to cause the guns necessary for the
armament of the forts on Ship Island and at Galveston to be
sent to those places. This order was given verbajly and not in
the usual form. It was not recorded, and the forts were far
from being prepared to receive thefr armaments. The whole
number of guns requfred for both forts, according to the state
ment of the Engineer Department to Captain Maynadier, was
one hundred and thirteen columbiads and eleven 32-pounders.
When, late in December, 1860, these were about to be shipped
at Pittsburg for their destination on the steamer Silver Wa^e,
a committee of gentlemen from that city first brought the facts
to the notice of President Buchanan. The consequence was,
that, in the language of the report of the committee : " Before
the order of the late Secretary of War [Floyd] had been fully
executed by the actual shipment of said guns from Pittsburg, it
was countermanded by the present Secretary." This prompt
proceeding elicited a vote of thanks, on the 4th January, 1861,
from tbe Select and Common Councils of that city, " to the
President, the Attorney-General [Black], and the acting Secre
tary of War [Holt]."
It is of this transaction, so clearly explained by the commit
tee in February, 1861, that General Scott, so 'long after as the
8th November, 1862, speaks in the language which we again
quote : " Accidentally learning, early in March, that under this
posthumous order [of Secretary Floyd] the shipment of these
guns had commenced, I communicated the fact to Secretary

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 225
Holt (acting for Secretary Cameron) just in time to defeat the
robbery." This statement is plain and explicit. The period
of the General's alleged communication to Secretary Holt is
precisely fixed. It was in March, after the close of Mr. Bu
chanan's administration, and whilst Mr. Holt was acting for
Secretary Cameron, who had not yet taken possession of the
department. This was just in time to prevent the '¦'¦ posthu
mous " order of Secretary Floyd from being carried into execu
tion. Why does the General italicize the word '¦'¦posthumous" %
Perhaps he did not understand its signification. If this word
has any meaning as appUcable to the subject, it is that Mr. Floyd
had issued the order to Captain Maynadier after his office had
expfred. Be this as it may, the object is palpable. It was to
show that Mr. Buchanan had suffered his administration to ter
minate leaving the " posthumous " order of Governor Floyd in
fuU force until after Mr. Lincoln's accession, and that it would
even then have been carried into execution but for the General's
lucky interposition.
The General, in his letter to the " National Intelligencer "
of 2d December, 1862, attempts to excuse this deplorable want
of memory to the prejudice of Mr. Buchanan. Whilst acknowl
edging his error in having said that the countermand of Mr.
Floyd's .order was in March, instead of early in the prerious
January, he insists that this was an immaterial mistake, and
still actually claims the credit of having prevented the shipment
of the cannon. " An immaterial mistake ! " Why, time was
of the very essence of the charge against Mr. Buchanan. It
was the alleged delay from January till March in countermand
ing the order, which afforded any pretext for an assault on his
administration. After his glaring mistake had been exposed,
simple justice, not to speak of magnanimity, would have re
quired that he should retract his error in a very different spirit
and manner from that which he has employed.
It is due to Colonel Maynadier to give his own explanation
for having obeyed the order of Secretary Floyd. In his letter
to tbe Potter Committee of tbe House of Representatives, dated
3d February, 1862», he says : " In truth it never entered my
mind at this time (20th December, 1860), that there could be

226 ME. Buchanan's administeation
any improper motive or object in the order, for on the question
of union and secession Mr. Floyd was then regarded through
out the country as a strong advocate of the Union and opponent
of secession. He had recently published, over his own signa
ture, in a Richmond paper, a letter on this subject, which gained
him high credit at the North for his boldness in rebuking the
pernicious views of many in his o'wn State."
The committee, then, in the third place, extended back thefr
inqufry into the circumstances under which Secretary Floyd
had a year before, in December, 1859, ordered the removal of
one-fifth of the old percussion and fiint-lock muskets from the
Springfield armory, where they bad accumulated in inconven
ient numbers, to five Southem arsenals. The committee, after
examining Colonel Craig, Captain Maynadier, and other wit
nesses, merely reported to the House the testimony they had
taken, 'without in the sUghtest degree impUcating the conduct
of Secretary Floyd. Indeed, this testimony is wholly inconsist
ent with the existence of any improper motive on his part. He
issued the order to Colonel Craig (December 29th, 1859) almost
a year before Mr. Lincoln's election, several months before his
nomination at Chicago, and before the Democratic party had
destroyed its prospects of success by breaking up the Charleston
Convention. Besides, Secretary Floyd was at the time, as he
had always been, an open and avowed opponent of secession.
Indeed, long afterwards, when the question had assumed a more
serious aspect, we are informed, as afready stated by Captain
Maynadier, that he had in a Richmond paper boldly rebuked
the advocates of this pernicious doctrine. The order and all the
proceedings under it were duly recorded. The arms were not
to be removed in haste, but " from time to time as may be most
suitable for economy and transportation," and they were to be
distributed among the arsenals, " in proportion to their respec
tive means of proper storage." All was openly transacted, and
the order was carried into execution by tbe Ordnance Bureau
according to the usual course of administration, 'without any
reference to the President.
The United States had on hand 499,554, say 500,000 of these
muskets. They were in every respect inferior to the new rifle

ON THE EVE OP THE EEBELLION. 227
muskets, with which the army had for some years been sup
plied. They were of the old calibre of j%% of an inch, which
had been changed in 1855 to that of ^\ in the new rifled mus
kets. It was 105,000 of these arms that Secretary Floyd or
dered to be sent to the five Southern arsenals ; " 65,000 of them
were percussion muskets of the caUbre of 3%^, and 40,000 of this
calibre altered to percussion." By the same order 10,000 of the
old percussion rifies of the calibre of -^^ were removed to these
arsenals. These constitute the 115,000 extra muskets and rifles,
'with aU thefr implements and ammunition, which, according to
General Scott's aUegation nearly three years thereafter, had
been sent to the South to furnish arms to the future insurgents.
We might suppose from this description, embracing " ammuni
tion," powder and ball, though nowhere to be found except in
his own imagination, that the secessionists were just ready to
commence the civil war. His sagacity, long after the fact, puts
to shame the dulness of the Military Committee. Whilst obliged
to admit tbat the whole proceeding was officially recorded, he
covers it with an afr of suspicion by asserting that the transac
tion was " very quietly conducted." And yet Jj was openly
conducted according to the prescribed forms, and must have
been known at the time to a large number of persons, including
the General himself, outside either of the War Department, the
Springfield armory, or the Southern arsenals. In truth, there
was not then the least motive for concealment, even had this
been possible.
The General pronounces these muskets and rifles to have
been of an " extra " quality. It may, therefore, be proper to
state from the testimony what was their true character.
In 1857 proceedings had been instituted by the War Depart
ment, under the act of 3d March, 1825, " to authorize the sale
of unserviceable ordnance, arms, and mihtary stores."* The
inspecting officers under the act condemned 190,000 of the old
muskets, " as unsuitable for the pubhc service," and recom
mended that they be sold. In the spring of 1859, 50,000 of
them were offered at pubhc sale. " The bids received," says
Colonel Craig, "were very unsatisfactory, ranging from 10^
• 4 Stat, at Large, 127.

228 ME. Buchanan's administeation
cents to $2.00, except one bid for a small lot for $3.50. In sub
mitting them to the Secretary I recommended that none of them
be accepted at less than $2.00." An effort was then made to
dispose of them at private sale for the fixed price of $2.50. So
low was the estimate in which they were held, that this price
could not be obtained, except for 31,610 of them in parcels. It
is a curious fact, that although the State of Louisiana had pur
chased 5,000 of them at $2.50, she refused to take more than
2,500. On the 5th July, 1859, Mr. H. G. Fant purchased a
large lot of them at $2.50 each, payable in ninety days ; but in
the mean time he thought better of it, and like tbe State of Lou
isiana failed to comply 'with his contract. And Mr. Belnap,
whose bid at $2.15 for 100,000 of them intended for the Sar
dinian Govemment had been accepted by the Secretary, under
the impression it was $2.50, refused to take them at this price
after the mistake had been corrected. Colonel Craig, in speak
ing of these muskets generaUy, both those which had and had
not been condemned, testified that " It is certainly advisable to
get rid of that kind of arms whenever we have a sufficient num
ber of others to supply their places, and to have aU our smaU
arms of one caUbre. The new gun is rifled. A great many of
those guns [flint-locks], altered to percussion, are not strong
enough to rifle, and therefore they are an inferior gun. They
are of a different caUbre from those now manufactured by the
Govemment." Had the cotton States at the time determined upon rebellion,
what an opportunity they lost of supplying themselves with
these condemned " extra muskets and rifles " of General Scott !
In opposition to the strictures of General Scott upon Mr.
Buchanan's administration, it may be pardonable to state the
estimate in which it was held by Mr. Holt, the Secretary of
War. No man Uving had better opportunities than himself of
forming a just judgment of its conduct, especiaUy in regard to
military matters. Besides, in respect to these, he had been in
constant official communication with General Scott from the
first of January, 1861, until the inauguration of President Lin
coln. He had preriously been Postmaster-General from the
decease of his predecessor. Governor Bro-wn, in March, 1859,

ON THE EVE OP THE EEBELLION. 229
until the last day of December, 1860, when he was appointed
Secretary of War, at this period the most important and respon
sible position in the Cabinet, In this he continued until the
end of the administration. In his customary letter of resigna
tion addressed to Mr. Buchanan, immediately before the advent
of the new administration, and now on file in the State Depart
ment, he did not confine himself to the usual routine in such
cases, but has voluntarily added an expression of his opinion of
the administration of which he had been so long a member.
He says tbat — '
" In thus terminating our official relations, I avail myself of
the occasion to express to you my heartfelt gratitude for the
confidence -with which, in this and other high positions, you
have honoo'ed me, and for the firm and generous support which
you have constantly extended to me, amid the arduous and per
plexing duties which I have been called to perform. In the full
conviction that your labors -will yet be crowned by the glory
that belongs to an enlightened statesmanship and to an unsul
lied patriotism, and with sincerest wishes for your personal hap
piness, I remain most truly "Your friend, "J. Holt."
It is fair to observe that the policy of President Lincoln
toward the seven cotton States which had seceded before his in
auguration, was, in the main, as conservative and forbearing as
that of Mr. Buchanan. No fault can be justly found with his
inaugural address, except that portion of it derogating from
the authority of decisions of the Supreme Court. This was
doubtless intended to shield the resolution of the Chicago plat
form, prohibiting slavery in Territories, from the Dred Scott
decision. It cannot be denied that this had at the time an un
happy influence upon the border States, because it impaired the
hope of any future compromise of this vital question.
President Lincoln specifies and illustrates the character of
his inaugural in his subsequent message to Congress of the 4th
July, 1861. He says : " The pohcy chosen looked to the exhaus
tion i)f all peaceable measures, before a resort to any stronger

230 ME.
ones. It sought to hold the pubhc places and property, not
afready wrested from the Govemment, and to collect the reve
nue, relying for the rest on time, discussion, and the ballot-box.
It promised a continuance of the mails at Govemment expense
to the very people -who were resisting tbe Govemment, and it
gave repeated pledges against any disturbance to any of the
people or any of their rights. Of all that a President might
constitutionally and justifiably do in such a case, every thing
was forborne -without which it was possible to keep the Govem
ment on foot."
The policy thus announced, whilst like that of Mr. Buchanan,
was of a still more forbearing character. Nay, more ; the ad
ministration of Mr. Lincoln dehberated, and at one time, it is
believed, had resolved, on the adrice of General Scott, to with
draw the troops under Major Anderson from the harbor of
Charleston, although this had been repeatedly and peremptorily
refused by the preceding administration. If sound poUcy had
not enjoined this forbearing course, it would have been dictated
by necessity, because Congress had adjourned after haring de
liberately refused to provide either men or means for a defensive,
much less an aggressive movement.
The policy thus announced by Mr. Lincoln, under the cfr
cumstances, was the true policy. It was the only policy which
coidd present a reasonable hope of preserring and confirming
the border States in their aUegiance to the Govemment. It
was the only policy which could by possibUity enable these
States to bring back the seceded cotton States into the Union.
It was the only policy which could cordially unite the Northern
people in the suppression of rebeUion, should they be compeUed
to resist force by force for the preservation of the Constitution
and the Union. It was, however, rendered impossible to pursue
this conservative policy any longer after the Govemment of the
Confederate cotton States, on the 13th April, 1861, had com
menced the civil war by the bombardment and capture of Fort
Sumter. Its wisdom has been vindicated by the unanimous and
enthusiastic uprising of the Northern people, without distinc
tion of party, to suppress the rebelhon which had thus beeu
inaugurated.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 231

CHAPTER XII.
The reduction of the expenses of the Government under Mr. Buchanan's administra
tion — The expedition to Utah — The Covode Committee.
The rancorous and persistent opposition to Mr. Buchanan's
administration throughout its whole term, did not divert it fi-om
devoting its efforts to promote the various and important inter
ests intrusted to its charge. Both its domestic and foreign pol
icy proved eminently successful. This appears from tbe records
of the country. We deem it necessary to refer only to a few of
the most important particulars.
The administration succeeded by rigid economy in greatly
reducing the expenditures of the Govemment. To this task
Mr. Buchanan had pledged himself in his inaugural. It was
no easy work. An overfiowing treasury had produced habits
of prodigality which it was difficult to correct. Over the con
tingent expenses of Congress, which had become far more ex
travagant than those of any other branch of the Government,
the President could exercise no control. For these the two
Houses were exclusively responsible, and they had so far tran
scended all reasonable limits, that their expenses, though in their
nature they ought to have been purely incidental, had far ex
ceeded the whole of the regular appropriation for their pay and
mileage. Such was the extent of tbe abuse, that in the two
fiscal years ending respectively on the 30th June, 1858 and
1859, whilst the regular pay and mileage of the members were
less than $2,350,000, these contingencies amounted to more
than three millions and a half In the fiscal year ending on the
30th June, 1860, they were somewhat reduced, but stiU ex
ceeded $1,000,000.

232 ME. Buchanan's administeation
Notwithstanding this extravagance and the large outlay un
avoidably incurred for the expedition to Utah, the President
succeeded in graduaUy diminishing the annual expenditures
until they were reduced to the sum of $55,402,465.46. We do
not mention the cost of the expedition to Paraguay, because,
through the careful management of the Secretary of the Navy,
this amounted to very little more than the ordinary appropria
tion for the naval serrice. This aggregate embraces all the ex
penses of the Government, legislative, executive, and judicial,
for the year ending 30th June, 1860, but not the interest on the
pubhc debt. If this, which was $3,177,314, be added, the whole
would amount to $58,579,779.46. K to this we should make a
Uberal addition for appropriations recommended by the War
and Navy Departments, as necessary for the defence of the
country, but which were rejected by Congress, we shaU be able
to appreciate justly the correctness of the President's declara
tion in his annual message of December, 1860, " that the sum
of $61,000,000, or, at the most, $62,000,000, is amply sufficient
to administer the Govemment and to pay the interest on the
pubhc debt, unless contingent events should hereafter ren
der extraordinary expenditures necessary." These statements,
though made in the message, were never controverted by any
member of either House in this hostile Congress. The expen
diture was reduced to a much lower figure than the friends of
the administration deemed possible. The result was the fruit
of rigid economy and strict accountabihty. All pubUc con
tracts, except in a very few cases where this was impracticable,
were awarded, after advertisement, to the lowest bidder. And
yet, in the face of all these facts, the administration of Mr. Bu
chanan has been charged with extravagance.
UTAH.
In addition to the troubles in Kansas, President Buchanan,
at an early period of his administration, was confronted by an
open resistance to the execution of the laws in the Territory of
Utah. All the officers of the United States, judicial and exec
utive, except two Indian agents, had found it necessary for their

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 233
personal safety to escape from the Territory. There no longer
remained in it any Govemment, except the Mormon despotism
of Brigham Young. This being the condition of affairs, the
President had no alternative but to adopt rigorous measures for
restoring the supremacy of the Constitution and the laws. For
this purpose he appointed a new Govemor (Cumming) and
otber Federal officers, to take the place of Govemor Young and
of those who had been compelled to leave the Territory. To
have sent these officers to Utah without a military force to pro
tect them whilst performing their duties, would have only in
vited further aggression. He therefore ordered that a detach
ment of the army should accompany them to act as a posse com.
itatus, when required by the ciril authority for the execution
of the laws.
There was much reason to believe that Govemor Young had
long desired and intended to render himself independent. " He
knows [says the President, in his annual message of December,
1857] that the continuance of his despotic power depends upon
the exclusion of aU settlers from the Territory, except those who
wUl acknowledge his divine mission and implicitly obey his
-will ; and that an enlightened public opinion would soon pros
trate institutions at war with the laws both of God and man.
He has, therefore, for several years, in order to maintain his
independence, been industriously employed in collecting and
fabricating arms and munitions of war, and in disciplining the
Mormons for military service. As Superintendent of Indian
Affairs, he has had an opportunity of tampering with the Indian
tribes, and exciting their hostile feelings against the United
States. This, according to our information, he has accomphshed
in regard to some of these tribes, while others have remained
true to thefr allegiance, and have communicated his intrigues to
our Indian agents."
" At the date of the President's instructions to Govenor Cum
ming, a hope was indulged tbat no necessity might exist for em
ploying the military in restoring and maintaining the authority
of the law, but this hope has now vanished. Governor Young
bas, by proclamation, declared his determination to maintain
bis power by force, and has already committed acts of hostihty

234 against the United States. Unless he should retrace bis steps,
the Territory of Utah wiU be in a state of open rebellion. He
has committed these acts of hostihty, notwithstanding Major
Van VUet, an officer of the army, sent to Utah by the Com
manding General to purchase provisions for the troops, had
given him the strongest assurances of the peaceful intentions
of the Government, and that the troops would only be employed
as a posse comitatus when called on by the ciril authority to aid
in the execution of the laws."
He not only refused to sell, or permit the Mormons to sell,
any prorisions for the subsistence of the troops, but he informed
Major Van Vliet that he had laid in a store of prorisions for
three years, which in case of necessity he would conceal " and
then take to the mountains, and bid defiance to aU the powers
of the Government."
The message proceeds to state that " a great part of all this
may be idle boasting ; but yet no -wise govemment wUl lightly
estimate the efforts which may be inspired by such frenzied
fanaticism as exists among the Mormons in Utah. This is the
first rebellion which has existed in our Territories ; and human
ity itself requires that we should put it down in such a manner
that it shall be the last. To trifle with it would be to encourage
it and to render it formidable."
It was not until the 29th of June, 1857, that the General in
Chief (Scott) was enabled to issue orders, from his headquar
ters at New York, to Brigadier General Harney, for the conduct
of the expedition.* (And here it may be proper to observe that
Col. A. S. Johnston, of the 2d United States cavafry, was soon
after substituted in the command for General Hamey. This
was done on the earnest request of Govemor Walker, who
beheved that Harney's services in Kansas were indispensable.)
The season was now so far advanced, and Utah was so dis
tant, that doubts were entertained whether the expedition ought
not to be delayed until the next spring. But the necessity for
a prompt movement to put do-wn the resistance of Brigham
Young to the execution of the laws, and to prevent the conse
quences of leaving him in undisturbed possession of supreme
* Senate Documents, 1857-58, vol. iii., p. 21.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 235
power for another year, were most fortunately sufficient to
overcome these doubts. General Scott in his orders refers
to these difficulties, and makes them tbe occasion of prescrib
ing to tbe commander the great care and diligence h%
ought to employ. He says : " The lateness of the season, the
dispersed condition of the troops, and the smallness of the num
bers available, have seemed to present elements of difficulty, if
not hazard, in this expedition. But it is believed that these
may be compensated by imusual care in its outfit and great pru
dence in its conduct. All disposable recruits have been
reserved for it. So well is the nature of this service appreci
ated, and so deeply are the honor and interests of the United
States involved in its success, that I am authorized to say the
Government will hesitate at no expense requisite to complete
the efficiency of your Uttle army, and to insure health and com
fort to it, as far as attainable."
The happy result of this expedition we shall present in the
language of the annual message of the 6tb of December, 1858, as
follows : " The present condition of the Territory of Utah,
when contrasted with what it was one year ago, is a subject for
congratulation. It was then in a state of open rebelUon, and
cost what it might, the character of the Government required
that this rebeUion should be suppressed, and the Mormons com
pelled to yield obedience to the Constitution and the laws.
In order to accomphsh this object, as I informed you in my last
annual message, I appointed a new Govemor instead of Brig
ham Young, and other Federal officers to take the place of
those who, consulting their personal safety, had found it neces
sary to ¦withdraw from tbe Territory. To protect these ciril
officers, and to aid them as a posse comitatus in the execution
of tbe laws in case of need, I ordered a detachment of the army
to accompany them to Utah. The necessity for adopting these
measures is now demonstrated.
" On the 15th of September, 1857, Governor Young issued his
proclamation, in the style of an independent sovereign, announc
ing his purpose to resist by force of arms the entry of the United
States troops into our own Territory of Utah. By this he re
quired all the forces in tbe Territory ' to hold themselves in

236 ME. Buchanan's administeation
readiness to march at a moment's notice to repel any and aU
such invasion,' and estabUshed martial law from its date through
out the Territory. These proved to be no idle threats. Forts
Bridger and Supply were vacated and burnt down by the Mor
mons, to deprive our troops of a shelter after thefr long and
fatiguing march. Orders were issued by Daniel H. Wells,
styling himself ' Lieutenant-General, Nauvoo Legion,' to stam
pede the animals of the United States troops on thefr march, to
set fire to their trains, to burn the grass and the whole country
before them and on thefr fianks, to keep them from sleeping by
night surprises, and to blockade the road by feUing trees and
destroying the fords of rivers, etc., etc., etc.
" These orders were promptly and effectuaUy obeyed. On
the 4th of October, 1857, the Mormons captured and burned,
on Green River, three of our supply trains, consisting of seventy-
five wagons loaded ¦with prorisions and tents for the army, and
carried away several hundred animals. This diminished the
supply of provisions so materially that General Johnston was
obliged to reduce the ration, and even with this precaution
there was only sufficient left to subsist tbe troops until the first
of June. " Our Uttle army behaved admirably in thefr encampment at
Fort Bridger under these trying privations. In the midst of the
mountains, in a dreary, unsettled, and inhospitable region, more
than a thousand miles from home, they passed the severe and
inclement winter without a murmur. They looked forward
with confidence for reUef from thefr country in due season, and
in this they were not disappointed.
" The Secretary of War employed all his energies to forward
them the necessary supphes, and to muster and send such a
miUtary force to Utah as would render resistance on the part
of the Mormons hopeless, and thus terminate the war without
the effusion of blood. In his efforts he was efficiently sustained
by Congress. They granted appropriations sufficient to cover
the deficiency thus necessarily created, and also provided for
raising two regiments of volunteers ' for tbe purpose of quelhng
disturbances in the Territory of Utah, for the protection of sup
ply and emigrant trains, and the suppression of Indian hostiU-

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 237
ties OU the frontiers.' * Happily, there was no occasion to caU
these regiments into serrice. If there had been, I should have
felt serious embarrassment in selecting them, so great was the
number of our brave and patriotic citizens anxious to serve
their oountry in this distant and apparently dangerous expedi
tion. Thus it has ever been, and thus may it ever be !
" The wisdom and economy of sending sufficient reenforce
ments to Utah are established not only by the event, but in the
opinion of those who, from their position and opportunities, are
the most capable of forming a correct judgment. General John
ston, the commander of the forces, in addressing the Secretary
of War from Fort Bridger, under date of October 18th, 1857,
expresses the opinion that ' unless a large force is sent here,
from the nature of the country, a protracted war on their [the
Mormons'] part is inevitable.' This he considered necessary, to
terminate the war 'speedily and more economically than if
attempted by insufficient means.'
" In tbe mean time it was my anxious desire that the Mor
mons should yield obedience to the Constitution and the laws,
without rendering it necessary to resort to military force. To
aid in accomplishing this object, I deemed it advisable, in April
last, to despatch two distinguished citizens of tbe United States,
Messrs. Powell and McCuUoch, to Utah. They bore with them
a ptoclamation addressed by myself to the inhabitants of Utah,
dated on the 6tb day of that month, warning them of their true
condition, and how hopeless it was on their part to persist in
rebellion against the United States, and offering all those who
should submit to the laws a full pardon for their past seditions
and treasons. At tbe same time I assured those who should
persist in rebeUion against the United States that they must ex
pect no further lenity, but look to be rigorously dealt with,
according to their deserts. The instructions to these agents, as
well as a copy of the proclamation and their reports, are here
with submitted. It will be seen by their report of the 3d of
July last, tbat they have fully confirmed the opinion expressed
b-7 General Johnston in tbe prerious October as to the necessity
of sending reenforcements to Utah. In this they state tbat they
* Act of 7th April, 1858, 11 Laws, p. 262.

238 ME. Buchanan's administeation
' are firmly impressed with the behef tbat the presence of tbe
army here, and the large additional force that had been ordered
to this Territory, were the chief inducements that caused the
Mormons to abandon the idea of resisting the authority of the
United States. A less decisive policy would probably have
resulted in a long, bloody, and expensive war.' These gentle
men conducted themselves to my entire satisfaction, and ren
dered useful serrices in executing the humane intentions of
tbe Govemment.
" It also affords me great satisfaction to state that Govemor
Cumming has performed his duty in an able and concUiatory
manner, and with the happiest effect. I cannot, in this connec
tion, refrain from mentioning the valuable services of Colonel
Thomas L. Kane, who, from motives of pure benevolence, and
without any official character or pecuniary compensation, ris-
ited Utah during the last inclement winter for the purpose of
contributing to the pacification of the Territory.
" I am happy to inform you that the Govemor and otber
civil officers of Utah are now performing thefr appropriate func
tions without resistance. The authority of the Constitution and
the laws has been fully restored, and peace prevails throughout
the Territory. A portion of the troops sent to Utah are now
encamped in Cedar Valley, forty-four mUes southwest of Salt
Lake City, and the remainder have been ordered to Oregon to
suppress Indian hostUities.
" The march of the army to Salt Lake City, through the
Indian Territory, has bad a powerful effect in restraining the
hostUe feelings against the United States which existed among
the Indians in that region, and in securing emigrants to tbe far
west against their depredations. This wiU also be the means of
estabUshing miUtary posts and promoting settlements along the
route. " I recommend that the benefits of our land laws and pre
emption system be extended to the people of Utah, by the estab
lishment of a land office in that Territory."
Nearly eight years after these events had passed into history,
Mr. Buchanan was no little surprised to discover that General

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 239
Scott, in his autobiography, published in 1864,* asserts that he
had protested against the Utah expedition, and that it was set
on foot by Secretary Floyd, " to open a wide field for frauds and
peculation." He does not even intimate that the expedition
had been ordered by the President. The censure is cast upon
Floyd, and upon Floyd alone. The President had, as a matter
of course, left the miUtary details of the movement to the Sec
retary of War and the Commanding General of the Army.
From a reference to the instmctions from the General to Gen
eral Harney, the President could not have infeiTcd the exist
ence of any such protest. On the contrary. General Scott
explicitly states the fact that they had been " prepared in con
cert with the War Department, aud sanctioned by its au
thority wherever required." In these instructions General
Scott, so far from intimating that he had protested against the
expedition, states that " the community, and in part the civil
Govemment of Utah Territory, are in a state of substantial re
bellion against the laws and authority of the United States. A
new civil Govemor is about to be designated, and to be charged
with the establishment and maintenance of law and order.
Your able and energetic aid, -with that of the troops to be placed
under your command, is relied upon to secure the success of his
mission." And the Gene^;al, as we have already seen, expresses
the belief that the honor and interest of the United States were
deeply involved in the result. Most certainly Mr. Buchanan,
until he read the autobiography, never learned that General
Scott had protested against the Utah expedition.
THE COVODE COMMITTEE.
We have already more than once referred to the violent and
persistent opposition manifested in Congress to President Bu
chanan's administration throughout its whole term. This was
displayed in a signal manner by the creation and proceedings of
the notorious Covode Committee, during the session immediately
preceding the Presidential election. It was instituted, beyond
doubt, to render the existing Democratic administration odious
* Vol. ii., p. 504.
16

240 ME. Buchanan's administeation
in the eyes of the people, and thereby to promote tbe election
of any Republican candidate who might be nominated. The
manner in which this committee was raised, by stifling debate,
plainly augured the character of its future action.
On the 5th March, 1860, Mr. John Covode, a Representa
tive fi'om Pennsylvania, moved to suspend the rules of the
House so as to enable him to introduce the resolutions creating
his committee.* The Speaker decided that this motion was
not debatable. Several members endeavored to discuss the
character of the resolutions, but they were soon called to order
and silenced. Before Mr. Underwood was stopped he had got
so far as to say : " I rise to a point of order. It is, that it is not
in order, in this House, for any member to propose an investi
gation upon vague, loose, and indefinite charges, but it is his
duty to state the grounds distinctly upon which he predicates
his inquiry. If the gentleman who offered these resolutions
wUl state to the House, upon his responsibility as a member,
that he knows, or has been informed and beUeves, that offers'
have been made to bribe, as insinuated in that resolution, no
body will object. But I do object to charges against any officer
of the Govemment by insinuation." Mr. Covode was silent to
this appeal, but Mr. Bingham came to his rehef by objecting to
the debate as " all out of order."
Mr. Winslow afterwards (amidst loud and continued cries
of "Order") said: "I feel some hesitation about my vote.
These resolutions are very vague and indefinite, large in thefr
terms, and framed like a French indictment, covering a deal of
ground and abounding in a multitude of general charges. I
have perfect confidence in the integrity of the President and his
Cabinet. Let any specific charge be brought against him or
them, and I will cheerfully yield the fullest investigation, and
accord the promptest action. I will do nothing to hinder but
every thing to facilitate it. I cannot, however, vote for a com
mittee on these sweeping charges." Mr. John Cochrane, of
New York, had also got so far as to say : " Because no charges
have been made on which an investigation can be founded,"
when " Mr. Grow and others called the gentleman to order."
* House Journal, p. 450; " Congressional Globe,'' pp. 997, 998.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 241
The motion to suspend the rules was passed, and the resolu
tions were then before the House for consideration and discus
sion, when Mr. Covode instantly rose before any other member
could obtain the fioor, and called for the previous question on
the adoption of the resolutions, which if sustained would cut
off all amendment and debate.
Mr. NoELL. " I desfre to offer an amendment, and ask that
it may be read for information."
Mr. Covode. " I cannot yield for that purpose."
Mr. NoELL. " I ask to have the amendment read for infor-
¦ mation." Mr. Bingham. " I object."
" The previous question was seconded and the main question
ordered to be put, and under the operation thereof the resolu
tions were adopted."
On the 9th March, 1860, Mr. Speaker Pennington appointed
Mr. Covode of Pennsylvania, Mr. OUn of New York, Mr.
Winslow of North Carolina, Mr. Train of Massachusetts, and
Mr. James C. Robinson of Illinois, members of the committee.*
The Covode Committee was thus ushered into existence in om
inous silence, its authors having predetermined not to utter a
word themselves, nor to suffer its opponents to utter a word, on
the occasion of its birth. The President could not remain si
lent in the face of these high-handed and unexampled proceed
ings. He felt it to be his imperative duty to protest against
them as a dangerous invasion by the House of the rights and
powers of the Presidential office under the Constitution of the
United States. Accordingly he transmitted to the House, on
the 28th March, 1860, tbe following message : f
" To THE HonsE OP Representatives :
" After a delay which has afforded me ample time for refiec
tion, and after much and careful deliberation, I find myself con
strained by an imperious sense of duty, as a coordinate branch
of the Federal Govemment, to protest against the first two
clauses of the first resolution, adopted by the House of Repre
sentatives on the 5th instant, and published in tbe " Congres-
* House Joumal, p. 484. + Ibid., p. 618.

242 ME. Buchanan's administeation
sidnal Globe " on the succeeding day. These clauses are in the
foUowing words : ' Resolved, That a committee of five members
be appointed by the Speaker, for the purpose, 1st, of investi
gating whether the President of the United States, or any other
officer of the Government, has, by money, patronage, or other
improper means, sought to influence the action of Congress, or
any committee thereof, for or against the passage of any law
appertaining to the rights of any State or Territory ; and 2d,
also to inquire into and investigate whether any officer or offi
cers of the Govemment have, by combination or otherwise, pre
vented or defeated, or attempted to prevent or defeat, the execu
tion of any law or laws now upon the statute book, and whether
the President has failed or refused to compel the execution of
any law thereof
" I confine myself exclusively to these two branches of the
resolution, because the portions of it which follow relate to al
leged abuses in post-offices, na-vy-yards, pubhc buUdings, and
other public works of the United States. In such cases inqui
ries are highly proper in themselves, and belong equaUy to the
Senate and the House as incident to thefr legislative duties, and
being necessary to enable them to discover and to provide the
appropriate legislative remedies for any abuses which may be
ascertained. Although the terms of the latter portion of the
resolution are extremely vague and general, yet my sole purpose
in adverting to them at present is to mark the broad line of dis
tinction between the accusatory and the remedial clauses of this
resolution. The House of Representatives possess no power
under the Constitution over the ffrst or accusatory portion of the
resolution, except as an impeaching body ; whUst over the last,
in common with the Senate, thefr authority as a legislative body
is fully and cheerfully admitted.
" It is solely in reference to the first or impeaching power
that I propose to make a few observations. Except in this sin
gle case, the Constitution has invested the House of Representa
tives with no power, no jurisdiction, no supremacy whatever
over the President. In all other respects he is quite as inde
pendent of them as they are of him. As a co6rdinate branch
of tbe Government he is their equal. Indeed, he is the only

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 243
direct representative on earth of tbe people of all and each of
tbe sovereign States. To them, and to them alone, is he respon
sible whilst acting within the sphere of his constitutional duty;
and not in any manner to the House of Representatives. The
people have thought proper to invest him with the most honor
able, responsible, and dignified office in the world, and the indi
vidual, however unworthy, now holding this exalted position,
will take care, so far as in him lies, that their rights and prerog
atives shall never be violated in his person, but shall pass to his
successors unimpafred by the adoption of a dangerous prece
dent. He will defend them to the last extremity against any
unconstitutional attempt, come from what quarter it may, to
abridge the constitutional rights of the Executive, and render
him subserrient to any human power except themselves.
" The people have not confined the President to the exercise
of executive duties. They have also conferred upon him a large
measure of legislative discretion. No bill can become a law
without his approval, as representing the people of the United
States, unless it shall pass after his veto by a majority of two-
thirds of both Houses. In his legislative capacity he might, iu
common with the Senate and tbe House, institute an inquiry to
ascertain any facts which ought to influence his judgment in
approving or vetoing any bill. This participation in the per
formance of legislative duties between the coordinate branches
of tbe Government ought to inspire the conduct of all of them,
in their relations toward each other, with mutual forbearance
and respect. At least each has a right to demand justice from
the other. The cause of complaint is, that the constitutional
rights and immunities of the Executive have been violated in
the person of the President.
" The trial of an impeachment of the President before tbe
Senate on charged preferred and prosecuted against him by the
House of Representatives, would be an imposing spectacle for
the world. In the result, not only his removal from the Presi
dential office would be involved, but, what is of infinitely greater
importance to himself, his character, both in the eyes of tbe
present and of future generations, might possibly be tarnished.
The disgrace cast upon him would in some degree be refiected

244 ME. Buchanan's administeation
upon the character of the American people who elected him.
Hence the precautions adopted by the Constitution to secure a
fafr trial. On such a trial it declares that ' the Chief Justice
shall preside.' This was doubtless because the framers of the
Constitution believed it to be possible that the Vice-President
might be biassed by the fact that ' in case of the removal of the
President from office ' ' the same shaU devolve on the Vice-Pres
ident.' " The preUminary proceedings in the House ih the ease of
charges which may involve impeachment, have been well and
wisely settled by long practice upon principles of equal justice
both to the accused and to the people. The precedent estab
lished in the case of Judge Peck, of Missouri, in 1831, after a
careful reriew of all former precedents, will, I venture to pre
dict, stand the test of time. In that case, Luke Edward Law
less, the accuser, presented a petition to the House, in which he
set forth minutely and specificaUy his causes of complaint. He
prayed ' that the conduct and proceedings in this behalf of said
Judge Peck may be inqufred into by your honorable body, and
such decision made thereon as to your ¦wisdom and justice shaU
seem proper.' This petition Was referred to the Judiciary Com
mittee ; such has ever been deemed the appropriate committee
to make similar investigations. It is a standing committee, sup
posed to be appointed without reference to any special case, and
at all times is presumed to be composed of the most eminent
lawyers in the House from different portions of the Union,
whose acquaintance with judicial proceedings, and whose habits
of investigation, qualify them pecuUarly for the task. No tri
bunal, from their position and character, could in the nature of
things be more impartial. In the case of Judge Peck the wit
nesses were selected by the committee itself, with a riew to
ascertain the truth of the charge. They were cross-examined
by him, and every thing was conducted in such a manner as to
afford him no reasonable cause of complaint. In view of this
precedent, and, what is of far greater importance, in riew of the
Constitution and the principles of etemal justice, in what man
ner has the President of tbe United States been treated by the
House of Representatives ? Mr. John Covode, a representative

ON the eve of the EEBELLION. 245
from Pennsylvania, is the accuser of the President. Instead of
following the wise precedents of former times, and especially
that in the case of Judge Peck, and referring the accusation to
the Committee on the Judiciary, the House have made my ac
cuser one of my judges.
" To make the accuser the judge is a riolation of the princi
ples of universal justice, and is condemned by the practice of all
cirilized nations. Every freeman must revolt at such a specta
cle. I am to appear before Mr. Covode, either personally or by
a substitute, to cross-examine the witnesses which he may pro
duce before himself to sustain his own accusations against me,
and perhaps even this poor boon may be denied to the President.
" And what is the nature of the investigation which his reso
lution proposes to institute ? It is as vague and general as the
English language affords words in which to make it. The com
mittee is to inqufre, not into any specific charge or charges, but
whether the President has, 'by money, patronage, or other
improper means, sought to infiuence,' not the action of any
individual member or members of Congress, but ' the action ' of
the entire body ' of Congress ' itself, ' or any committee thereof
The President might have had some gUmmering of the nature
of the offence to be investigated, had his accuser pointed to the
act or acts of Congress which he sought to pass or to defeat by
the employment of ' money, patronage, or other imjiroper means.'
But the accusation is boimded by no such hmits. It extends to
the whole circle of legislation ; to interference ' for or against
the passage of any law appertaining to the rights of any State
or Territory.' And what law does not appertain to the rights
of some State or Territory ? And what law or laws has the
President faded to execute? These might easily have been
pointed out had any such existed.
" Had Mr. Lawless asked an inquiry to be made by the
House whether Judge Peck, in general terms, had not violated
his judicial duties, without the specification of any particular
act, I do not believe there w^uld have been a single vote in that
body in favor of the inquiry. Since the time of the Star Cham
ber and of general warrants, there has been no such proceeding
in England.

246 ME.
" The House of Representatives, the high impeaching power
of the country, ¦without consenting to hear a word of explana
tion, have indorsed this accusation against the President, and
made it thefr own act. They even refused to permit a member
to inquire of the President's accuser what were the specific
charges against him. Thus, in this preliminary accusation of
' high crimes and misdemeanors ' against a coordinate branch of
the Govemment, under the impeaching power, the House refused
to hear a single suggestion even in regard to the correct mode
of proceeding, but, ¦without a moment's delay, passed the accu
satory resolutions under the pressure of the prerious question.
In the institution of a prosecution for any offence against the
most humble eitizen — and I claim for myself no greater rights
than he enjoys — the Constitution of the United States, and of
the several States, requfre that he shall be informed, in the very
beginning, of tbe nature and cause of the accusation against
him, in order to enable him to prepare for his defence. There
are other principles which I might enumerate, not less sacred,
presenting an impenetrable shield to protect every citizen falsely
charged with a criminal offence. These have been riolated in
the prosecution instituted by the House of Representatives
against the executive branch of the Government. ShaU the
President alone be deprived of the protection of these great
principles, which prevail in every land where a ray of liberty
penetrates the gloom of despotism ? Shall the Executive alone
be deprived of rights which all his fellow-citizens enjoy ? The
whole proceeding against him justifies the fears of those -wise
and great men who, before tbe Constitution was adopted by the
States, apprehended that the tendency of the Govemment was
to the aggrandizement of the legislative at the expense of the
executive and judicial departments.
" I again declare, emphaticaUy, that I make this protest for
no reason personal to myself ; and I do it with perfect respect
for the House of Representatives, in which I had the honor of
serring as a member for five successive terms. I have lived
long in this goodly land, and have enjoyed all the offices and
honors which my country could bestow. Amid all the political
storms through which I have passed, tbe present is the first

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 247
attempt which has ever been made, to my knowledge, to assail
my personal or official integrity ; and this as the time is
approaching when I shall voluntarily retire from the serrice of
my country. I feel proudly conscious that there is no public
act of my life which will not bear the strictest scrutiny. I defy
all investigation. Nothing but the basest perjury can sully my
good name. I do not fear even this, because I cherish an hum
ble confidence that the Gracious Being who has hitherto
defended and protected me against the shafts of falsehood and
malice will not desert me now, when I have become ' old and
gray-headed.' I can declare, before God and my country, that
no human being (with an exception scarcely worthy of notice) has,
at any period of my life, dared to approach me with a corrupt
or dishonorable proposition ; and, until recent developments, it
had never entered into my imagination that any person, even in
the storm of exasperated political excitement, would charge me,
in the most remote degree, with haring made such a proposi
tion to any human being. I may now, however, exclaim, in
the language of complaint employed by my first aud greatest
predecessor, that I have been abused ' in such exaggerated and
indecent terms as could scarcely be applied to a Nero, to a
notorious defaulter, or even to a common pickpocket.'
"I do, therefore, for the reasons stated, and in the name of
the people of the several States, solemnly protest against these
proceedings of the House of Representatives, because they are
in violation of the rights of the coordinate executive branch
of the Government, and subversive of its constitutional inde
pendence ; because they are calculated to foster a band of inter
ested parasites and informers, ever ready, for their own advan
tage, to swear before ex parte committees to pretended private
conversations between the President and themselves, incapable,
from their nature, of being disproved, thus furnishing material
for harassing him, degrading him in tbe eyes of the country,
and eventually, should he be a weak or a timid man, rendering
him subservient to improper influences, in order to avoid such
persecutions and annoyances ; because they tend to destroy that
harmonious action for the common good which ought to be
maintained, and which I sincerely desfre to cherish between

248 ME.
coordinate branches of the Government; and, finaUy, because,
if unresisted, they would estabUsh a precedent dangerous and
embarrassing to all my successors, to whatever political party
they might be attached. " James Buchanan.
" Washington, March 28tt, 1860. "
The principles maintained in this message found no favor
with the majority in the House. It was referred to the Com
mittee on the Judiciary, of which Mr. Hickman, of Pennsylvania,
was chairman.* On the 9th of April, 1861, he reported resolu
tions from the majority'of the committee in opposition to its
doctrines, whilst these were sustained by the minority. The
majority resolutions were adopted by the House on the 8th of
June following.-!-
Meanwhile the Covode Committee continued to pursue its
secret inquisitorial examinations until the 16th of June, 1860,
when Mr. Train, one of its members, and not Mr. Covode the
chairman, made a report from the majority, accompanied by the
mass of all sorts of testimony which it had collected.:]; The
views of the minority were presented, by Mr. Winslow of North
Carolina, now no more — a man possessing every estimable
quaUty both of head and of heart, and one who had enjoyed the
highest honors which his own State coidd confer.
The committee, though it had been engaged for three
months with vindictive zeal and perseverance in hunting up all
sorts of testimony against the President and members of bis
Cabinet, yet finally shrunk from tbe responsibility of reporting
a single resolution accusing or censuring any one of them. In
the boundless field it had explored, it failed to discover a single
point on which it could venture to rest any such resolution.
This surely was a triumphant result for the President.
We refrain from now portraying the proceedings of the com
mittee in their true light, because this has already been suffi
ciently done by tbe message of the President to the House of the
28th June, 1860, of which we insert a copy from the Journal. §
* House Journal, pp. 622, 699. t Ibid., p. 1014.
X Ibid., p. 1114. § Ibid., p. 1218.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 249
" To THE House or Representatives :
" In my message to the House of Representatives of the
28th March last, I solemnly protested against the creation of a
committee, at the head of which was placed my accuser, for the
purpose of investigating whether the President had ' by money,
patronage, or other improper means, sought to infiuence the
action of Congress, or any committee thereof, for or against the
passage of any law appertafhing to the rights of any State or
Territory.' I protested against this because it was destitute of
any specification ; because it referred to no particular act to
enable the President to prepare for his defence ; because it de
prived him of the constitutional guards which, in common with
every citizen of the United States, he possesses for his protec
tion ; and because it assailed his constitutional independence as a
coordinate branch of the Government. There is an enlightened
justice, as weU as a beautiful symmetry, in every part of the
Constitution. This is conspicuously manifested in regard to
impeachments. The House of Representatives possesses ' tbe
sole power of impeachment ; ' the Senate ' the sole power to try
all impeachments ; ' and the impeachable offences are ' treason,
bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors.' The practice
of the House, from the earliest times, had been in accordance
with its own dignity, the rights of the accused, and the demands
of justice. At the commencement of each judicial investiga
tion which might lead to an impeachment, specific charges were
always preferred ; the accused had an opportunity of cross-
examining the witnesses, and he was placed in full possession of
the precise nature of the offence which he had to meet. An
impartial and elevated standing committee was charged with
this investigation, upon which no member inspired with the an
cient sense of honor and justice would have served, had he ever
expressed an opinion against the accused. Until the present
occasion it was never deemed proper to transform the accuser
into tbe judge, and to confer upon him the selection of his own
committee. " The charges made against me, in vague and general terms,
were of such a false and atrocious character that I did not en
tertain a moment's apprehension for the result. They were ab-

250 ME. Buchanan's administeation
horrent to every principle instilled into me from my youth, and
every practice of my life, and I did not believe it possible that
the man existed who would so basely perjure himself as to swear
to the truth of any such accusations. In this conriction I am
informed I have not been mistaken. In my former protest,
therefore, I truly and emphatically declared that it was made
for no reason personal to myself, but because tbe proceedings of
the House were in violation of the rights of the coordinate ex
ecutive branch of the Govemment, subversive of its constitu
tional independence, and, if unresisted, would estabUsh a pre
cedent dangerous and*embarrassing to aU my successors. Not
'withstanding aU this, if the committee had not transcended the
authority conferred upon it by the resolution of the House of
Representatives, broad and general as this was, I should have
remained sUent upon the subject. What I now charge is, that
they have acted as tho ughthey possessed unlimited power, and,
without any warrant whatever in the resolution under which
they were appointed, have pursued a course not merely at war
with the constitutional rights of the Executive, but tending to
degrade the presidential office itself to such a degree as fo ren
der it unworthy of the acceptance of any man of honor or prin
ciple. " The resolution of the House, so far as it is accusatory of
the President, is confined to an inquiry whether he had used
corrupt or improper means to infiuence the action of Congress
or any of its committees on legislative measures pending before
them. Nothing more, nothing less. I have not learned through
the newspapers, or in any other mode, that the committee have
touched the other accusatory branch of 'the resolution, charging
the President with a riolation of duty in faUing to execute some
law or laws. This branch of the resolution is therefore out of
the question. By what authority, then, have the committee
undertaken to investigate the course of the President in regard
to the Convention which framed the Lecompton Constitution ?
By what authority have they undertaken to pry into our foreign
relations, for the purpose of assailing him on account of the in
structions given by the Secretary of State to our Minister in
Mexico, relative to the Tehuantepec route ? By what authority

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 251
have they inquired into the causes of removal from office, and
this from tbe parties themselves removed, with a view to preju
dice his character, notwithstanding this power of removal be
longs exclusively to the President imder the Constitution, was
so decided by the first Congress in the year 1789, and has ac
cordingly ever since been exercised ? Thexe is in the resolution
no pretext of authority for the committee to investigate tbe
question of the printing of the post-office blanks, nor is it to be
supposed that the House, if asked, would have granted such an
authority, because this question had been preriously committed
to two other committees — one in the Senate and the other in the
House. Notwithstanding this absolute want of power, the com
mittee rushed into this investigation in advance of all other
subjects. " The committee proceeded for months, from March 22d,
1860, to examine ex parte, and without any notice to myself,
into every subject which could possibly affect my character.
Interested and vindictive witnesses were summoned and exam
ined before them ; and tbe first and only information of thefr
testimony which, in almost every instance, I received, was ob
tained from the publication of such portions of it as could inju
riously affect myself, in the New York journals. It mattered
not that these statements were, so far as I have learned, dis
proved by the most respectable witnesses who happened to be
on the spot. The telegraph was sUent respecting these contra
dictions. It was a secret committee in regard to the testimony
in my defence, but it was pubUc in regard to all the testimony
which could by possibility refiect on my character. The poison
was left to produce its effect upon the pubUc mind, whilst the
antidote was carefully -withheld.
" In their examinations the committee violated the most
sacred and honorable confidences existing among men. Private
correspondence, which a truly honorable man would never even
entertain a distant thought of divulging, was dragged to light.
Different persons in official and confidential relations with my
self, and with whom it was supposed I might have held conver
sations, the revelation of wbich would do me injury, were exam
ined. Even members of the Senate and members of my own

252
Cabinet, both my constitutional advisers, were called upon to
testify, for the purpose of discovering something, if possible, to
my discredit.
" The distribution of the patronage of the Government is
by far the most disagreeable duty of the President. Applicants
are so numerous, and their apphcations are pressed with such
eagerness by thefr friends both in and out of Congress, that the
selection of one for any desirable office gives offence to many.
Disappointed applicants, removed officers, and those who for
any cause, real or imaginary, had become hostile to the admin
istration, presented themselves, or were inrited by a summons
to appear before the committee. These are the most dangerous
¦witnesses. Even with the best intentions, they are so influenced
by prejudice and disappointment, that they almost ineritably
discolor truth. They swear to their own version of private con
versations with the President without the possibiUty of contra
diction. His lips are sealed and he is left at their mercy. He
cannot, as a coordinate branch of the Govemment, appear before
a committee of investigation to contradict the oaths of such
¦witnesses. Every coward knows that he can employ insulting
language against the President with impunity, and every false
or prejudiced witness can attempt to swear away his character
before such a committee without the fear of contradiction.
" Thus for months, whilst doing my best at one end of the
avenue to perform my high and responsible duties to the coun
try, has' there been a committed of the House of Representatives
in session at the other end of the avenue, spreading a drag-net,
without the shadow of authority from the House, over the whole
Union, to catch any disappointed man wiUing to malign my
character, and all this in secret conclave. The Uon's mouth at
Venice, into which secret denunciations were dropped, is an apt
iUustration of the Covode Committee. The Star Chamber,
tyrannical and odious as it was, never proceeded in such a man
ner. For centuries there has been nothing like it in any ciril
ized country, except the revolutionary tribunal of France, in the
days of Robespierre. Now, I undertake to state and to prove
that should the proceedings of the committee be sanctioned by
the House, and become a precedent for future times, the balance

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 253
of the Constitution wUl be entirely upset, and there will no long
er remain the three coordinate and independent branches of
tbe Government — ^legislative, executive, and judicial. The
worst fears of the patriots and statesmen who framed the Con
stitution in regard to the usurpations of the legislative on the
executive and judicial branches will then be realized. In the
language of Mr. Madison, speaking on this very subject, in the
forty-eighth number of the ' Federalist : ' 'In a representative
republic, where tbe executive magistracy is carefully limited
both in the extent and duration of its power, and where the
legislative power is exercised by an assembly which is inspired,
by a supposed influence over the people, with an intrepid confi
dence in its own strength, which is sufficiently numerous to feel
all the passions which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous
as to be incapable of pursuing the objects bf its passions by
means which reason prescribes, it is against the enterprising
ambition of this department that the people ought to indulge
all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions.' And in
the expressive and pointed language of Mr. Jefferson, when
speaking of the tendency of the legislative branch of Govern
ment to usurp the rights of the weaker branches : ' The concen
trating these in the same hands is precisely the definition of des
potic government. It wUl be no alleriation that these powers
will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a single
one. One hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be
as oppressive as one. Let those who doubt it turn their eyes on
the Republic of Venice. As little will it avail us that they are
chosen by ourselves. An elective despotism was not the gov
ernment we fought for, but one which should not only be
founded on free principles, but in which the powers of govem
ment should be so divided and balanced among several bodies
of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal Umits
without being effectually checked and controlled by the others.'
" Should the proceedings of tbe Covode Committee become
a precedent, both the letter and spirit of the Constitution will
be violated. One of the three massive columns on wbich the
whole superstructure rests will be broken do'wn. Instead of tbe
executive being a coordinate, it will become a subordinate

254 ME. Buchanan's adsiinisteation
branch of the Govemment. The presidential office 'will be
dragged into the dust. The House of Representatives will
then have rendered the Executive almost necessarUy subserrient
to its wishes, instead of being independent. How is it possible
that two powers in the State can be coordinate and independent
of each other, if the one claims and exercises the power to
reprove and to censure all the official acts and all the private
conversations of the other, and this upon ex parte testimony
before a secret inquisitorial committee — ^in short, to assume a
general censorship over the others ? The idea is as absurd in
public as it would be in private Ufe. Should the President
attempt to assert and maintain his own independence, future
Covode Committees may dragoon him into submission by
collecting the hosts of disappointed office-hunters, removed offi
cers, and those who desire to live upon the public treasury,
which must follow in the wake of eveiy administration, and
they, in secret conclave, 'wiU swear away his reputation. Under
such circumstances, he must be 'a very bold man should he not
surrender at discretion and consent to exercise his authority ac
cording to the 'wiU of those invested with this terrific power.
The sovereign people of, the several States have elected him to
the highest and most honorable office in the world. He is
their only direct representative in the Government. By their
Constitution they have made him commander-in-chief oi thefr
army and navy. He represents them in thefr intercourse with
foreign nations. Clothed with their dignity and authority, he ,
occupies a proud position before all nations, civilized and sav
age. With the consent of the Senate, hfe appoints all the im
portant cffficers of the Government. He exercises the veto
power, and to that extent controls the legislation of Congress.
For the performance of these high duties he is responsible to
the people of the several States, and not in any degree to the
Llouse of Representatives.
" Shall he surrender these high powers, conferred upon him
as the representative of the American people, for their benefit, to
the House, to be exercised under their overshadowing infiuence
and control ? Shall he alone of all the citizens of the United
States be denied a fair trial ? Shall he alone not be ' informed

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 255
of the nature and cause of the accusation ' against him ? Shall
he alone not ' be confronted with the witnesses ' against him ?
Shall the House of Representatives, usurping the powers of the
Senate, proceed to try the President, through the agency of a
secret committee of the body where it is impossible he can
make any defence, and then, without affording him an oppor
tunity of being heard, pronounce a judgment of censure against
him ? The very same rule might be applied, for the very same
reason, to every judge of every court of tbe United States.
From what part of the Constitution is this terrible secret inquisi
torial power derived? No such express power exists. From
which of the enumerated powers can it be inferred? It is
true the House cannot pronounce the formal judgment against
him of ' removal from office,' but they can, by their judgment
of censure, asperse his reputation, and thus, to the extent of
thefr influence, render the office contemptible. An example is
at hand of the reckless manner in which this power of censure
can be employed in high party times. The House, on a recent
occasion, have attempted to degrade the President by adopting
the resolution of Mr. John Sherman, declaring that he, in con
junction with the Secretary of the Navy, ' by receiving and con
sidering the party relations of bidders for contracts, and the
effect of awarding contracts upon pending elections, have set an
example dangerous to the public safety, and deserring the re
proof of this House.'
" It will scarcely be credited that the sole pretext for this
vote of censure was the simple fact that in disposing of the
numerous letters of every imaginable character which I daily
receive, I had, in the usual course of business, referred a letter
from Colonel Patterson, of Philadelphia, in relation to a con
tract, to the attention of tbe Secretary of the Navy, the head of
the appropriate department, without expressing or intimating
any opinion whatever on the subject ; and to make the matter,
if possible, still plainer, the Secretary had informed the com
mittee that ' the President Md not in any mamner interfere in
this case, nor has he in any other case of contract since I ha/ve
heen in the depa/rtnunt.' The absence of all proof to sustain
this attempt to degrade the President, whilst it manifests the
17

256 ME. Buchanan's administeation
venom of tbe shaft aimed at him, has destroyed the vigor of
the bow.
" To return, after this digression. Should the House, by the
institution of Covode committees, votes of censure, and other
derices to harass the President, reduce him to subservience to
thefr will, and render him their creature, then the well-balanced
Government which our fathers framed wiU be annihilated. This
conffict has already been commenced in earnest by the House
against the Executive. A bad precedent rarely if ever dies.
It ¦will, I fear, be pursued in the time of my successors, no mat
ter what may be their pohtical character. Should secret com
mittees be appointed with unlimited authority to range over all
the words and actions, and, if possible, the very thoughts of the
President, with a riew to discover something in his past life
prejudicial to his character, from parasites and informers, this
would be an ordeal which scarcely any mere man since the fall
could endure. It would be to subject him to a reign of terror
from which the stoutest and purest heart might shrink. I have
passed triumphantly through this ordeal. My rindication is
complete. The committee have reported no resolution looking
to an impeachment against me ; no resolution of censure ; not
even a resolution pointing out any abuses in any of the execu
tive departments of the Government to be corrected by legis
lation. This is the highest commendation which could be be
stowed on the heads of these departments. The sovereign peo
ple of the States ¦wiU, however, I trust, save my successors, who
ever they may be, from any such ordeal. They are frank, bold,
and honest. They detest delators and informers. I therefore,
in the name and as the representative of this great people, and
standing upon the ramparts of the Constitution which they
' have ordained and established,' do solemnly protest against
these unprecedented and unconstitutional proceedings.
" There was still another committee raised by the House on
the 6th March last, on motion of Mr. Hoard, to wbich I had
not the slightest objection. The resolution creating it was con
fined to specific charges, which I have ever since been ready and
willing to meet. I have at all times invited and defied fair in
vestigation upon constitutional principles. I have received

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 267
no notice tbat this committee have ever proceeded to the inves
tigation. " Why should the House of Representatives desire to en
croach on the other departments of the Govemment ? Their
rightful powers are ample for every legitimate purpose. They
are the impeaching body. In their legislative capacity it is
their most wise and wholesome prerogative to institute rigid
examinations into the manner in whicb all departments of the
Government are conducted, with a riew to reform abuses, to
promote economy, and to improve every branch of administra
tion. Should they find reason to believe, in the course of their
examinations, that any grave offence had been committed by
the President or any officer of the Government, rendering it
proper, in their judgment, to resort to impeachment, their course
would be plain. They would then transfer the question from
their legislative to their accusatory jurisdiction, and take care
that in all the preliminary judicial proceedings, preparatory to
the vote of articles of impeachment, the accused should enjoy
the benefit of cross-examining the witnesses, and all the other
safeguards with which the Constitution surrounds every Ameri
can citizen.
" If, in a legislative investigation, it should appear that the
public interest requfred the removal of any officer of the Gov
emment, no President has ever existed who, after giving him a
fafr hearing, would hesitate to apply the remedy. This I take
to be the ancient and weU-established practice. An adherence
to it will best promote the harmony and the dignity of the in
tercourse between the coordinate branches of the Government,
and render us all more respectable both in the eyes of our own
countrymen and of foreign nations.
"James Buchanan.
" Washington, June 22, 1860."
On the reading of this message it was, on motion of Mr.
Benjamin Stanton, of Ohio, referred to a select committee, con
sisting of himself, Mr. Curry, Mr. Charles F. Adams, Mr. Sedg
wick, and Mr. Pryor, which was instructed to report to the
House at the next session. No report was ever made. Thus
ended the Covode Committee.

258 ME. Buchanan's administeation

CHAPTER XIII.
The successful foreign policy of the administration with Spain, Great Britain, China,
and Paraguay — Condition of the Mexican RepubUc ; and the recommendations to
Congress thereupon not regarded, and the efiFect — The origin, history, and nature
of the "Monroe Doctrine" — The treaty with Mexico not ratified by the Senate,
and the consequences.
The administration of Mr. Buchanan, in conducting our
foreign affafrs, met with great and uncommon success.
SPAIN.
Our relations with Spain were in a very unsatisfactory con
dition on his accession to power. Our flag had been insulted,
and numerous injuries had been inflicted on the persons and
property of American citizens by Spanish officials acting un
der the dfrect control of the Captain General of Cuba. These
gave rise to many but unavailing reclamations for redress and
indemnity against the Spanish Government. Our successive
ministers at Madrid had for years ably presented and enforced
these claims, but all without effect. Their efforts were contin
ually baffled on different pretexts. There was a class of these
claims caUed the " Cuban claims," of a nature so plainly just
that they could not be gainsayed. In these more than one hun
dred of our citizens were dfrectly interested. In 1844 duties
had been illegally exacted from thefr vessels at different custom
houses in Cuba, and they appealed to thefr Government to have
these duties refunded. Their amount could be easUy ascertained
by the Cuban officials themselves, who were in possession of aU
the necessary documents. The vaUdity of these claims was

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 259
eventually recognized by Spain, but not untU after a delay of
ten years. The amount due was flxed, according to her o-wn
statement, with whicb the claimants were satisfied, at the sum
of $128,635.54. Just at the moment when the claimants were
expecting to receive this amount without further delay, the
Spanish Government proposed to pay, not the whole, but only
one-thfrd of it, and this provided we should accept it in fiiU
satisfaction of the entire claim. They added that this offer was
made, not in strict justice, but as a special favor.
Under these cfrcumstances, the time had arrived when tbe
President deemed it his duty to employ strong and rigorous
remonstrances to bring all our claims against Spain to a satis
factory conclusion. In this he succeeded in a manner gratify
ing to himself, and it is believed to all the claimants, but unfortu
nately not to the Senate of the United States. A convention
was concluded at Madrid on the 6th March, 1860, estabhshing
a joint commission for the final adjudication and payment of aU
the claims of the respective parties. By this the vahdity and
amount of the Cuban claims were expressly admitted, and their
speedy payment was placed beyond question. The con-vention
was transmitted to the Senate for thefr constitutional action on
tbe 3d May, 1860, but on the 27th June they determined, greatly
to the surprise of the President, and the disappointment of tbe
claimants, that they would " not advise and consent " to its rat
ification. The reason for this decision, because made in executive ses
sion, cannot be positively known. This, as stated and believed
at the time, was because the convention had authorizQd the Span
ish Government to present its Amistad claim, like any other
claim, before the Board of Commissioners for decision. This
claim, it will be recoUected, was for the payment to the Spanish
owners of the value of certain slaves, for wbich the Spanish
Government held the United States to be responsible under the
treaty with Spain of the 27th October, 1795. Such was tbe
eridence in its favor, that three Presidents of the United States
had recommended to Congress to make an appropriation for its
payment, and a bill for tbis purpose had passed the Senate.
The validity of the claim, it is proper to observe, was not rec-

260 ME. BUCHANAN' S ADMINISTEATION
ognized by tbe convention. In this respect it was placed on
tbe same footing with all the other claims of the parties, 'with
tbe exception of the Cuban claims. All tbe Spanish Govem
ment obtained for it was simply a hearing before the Board, and
this could not be denied with any show of impartiaUty. Be
sides, it is quite certain that no convention could have been
concluded without such a provision.
It was most probably the extreme riews of the Senate at the
time against slavery, and their reluctance to recognize it even so
far as to permit a foreign claimant, although under the sanction
of a treaty, to raise a question before the Board which might
involve its existence, that caused the rejection of the conven
tion. Under the impulse of such sentiments, the claims of our
fellow-citizens have been postponed if not finaUy defeated. In
deed, tbe Cuban claimants, learning that the objections in the
Senate arose from the Amistad claim, made a formal offer to
remove the difficulty by deducting its amount from the sum due
to them, but this of course could not be accepted.
GEEAT BEITAIN.
With Great Britain our relations were in a most unsatisfac
tory condition at the commencement of Mr. Buchanan's admin
istration. Two irritating and dangerous questions were pend
ing between them, either of which might at any moment have
involved them in war. The first arose out of her claim to a
protectorate over the Mosquito Coast, and her establishment of
a colonial govemment over the Bay Islands, which territories
belonged respectively to the feeble Central American Repubhcs
of Nicaragua and Honduras. These acts of usurpation on the
part of the British Govemment were in direct riolation of the
Monroe doctrine, which has been so 'wisely and strenuously
maintained by our Government ever since it was announced.
It was beUeved that the Clayton and Bulwer treaty, concluded
in April, 1850, under the administration of General Taylor,
had settled these questions in favor of tbe United States, and
that Great Britain would withdraw from the territories of
Nicaragua and Honduras. But not so. She stiU persisted in

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 261
holding them. She even contended tbat tbe treaty only pro
hibited her from making future acquisitions in Central America,
and by inference admitted the right to hold all her then ex
isting possessions. The true construction of this treaty was the
subject of a prolonged correspondence between Mr. Buchanan
while Minister in London and the British Government. This
produced no effect at tbe time. After be became President,
however, the question was amicably and honorably settled, under
his advice and approbation, by treaties between Great Britain
and the two Central American States, in accordance 'with our
construction of the Clayton and Bulwer treaty.
Great Britain, both before and after the war of 1812, had
persistently claimed the right of search. Her exercise of this
right in the spring of 1858 had nearly involved the two coun
tries iu war. The American people have ever been peculiarly
sensitive against any attempt, from whatever power, to invade
the freedom of the seas. This their whole history attests from
the days of the Revolution. The question was now brought to
dfrect issue by the British Govemment, from which there could
be no escape. At this period she despatched a number of
small armed vessels, which had been employed in the Crimean
war, to the coast of Cuba and the Gulf of Mexico, with instruc
tions to search American merchantmen whom they might sus
pect as slave-traders. These waters are traversed by a large
portion of our navigation, and their free and uninterrupted use
is essential to the security of our coastwise trade between the
different States. This was all placed at the mercy of the junior
officers in command of these small vessels. They proceeded at
once to execute their orders. They forcibly boarded and
searched numerous American vessels, and this often, as might
have been expected, in a mde and offensive manner. Day
after day reports of these violent proceedings succeeded each
other, and produced general indignation throughout the coun
try. The call of the people 'was loud for immediate redress.
The President remonstrated to tbe British Govemment against
these deliberate violations of our national sovereignty, but judg
ing from the experience of the past, this would have proved
unavailing. It had become necessary to resist force by force.

262
Without awaiting the action of Congress, he assunled this respon
sibihty, which he thought the exigency demanded and would
justify. He accordingly ordered every ship of war 'within reach to
the Gulf, with instructions from the Secretary of the Na'vy " to
protect all vessels of the United States on the high seas from
search or detention by the vessels of war of any other nation."
This decisive measure received the unqualified and enthusiastic
approbation of the American people, and the Senate, though
somewhat tardily, approved it by ap unanimous vote.* Had an
attempt been afterwards made to search any of our vessels, tbis
would have been resisted by force; a collision between tbe
armed vessels of the two powers, acting under the authority of
each, would have occurred, and this would have been the com
mencement of hostiUties.
But fortunately no colUsion took place. The British Gov
emment became sensible they were in the wrong, and at once
recalled the orders under which thefr commanders had acted.
They did far more. They abandoned thefr claim to the right of
search, for which they had so long contended, and recognized
the vaUdity of the principle of international law in favor of the
freedom of the seas, always maintained by our own Govemment.
Thus have vessels of the United States been forever secured
from risitation and search by British cruisers, in time of peace,
under any circumstances whatever.
In this satisfactory manner was the long controversy be
tween the two Governments finally settled. We deem it proper
here to insert an extract from the annual report of the Secre
tary of the Na'vy (Mr. Toucey), to the President, of tbe 6th De
cember, 1858,f in which he states the action of his Department
in carrying into effect the instructions of the President. The
Secretary says : " The force sent into the neighborhood of Cuba
to resist the exercise of the right of search by British cruisers,
consisted of the steam frigates Wabash and Colorado ; the sloops
of war Macedonian, Constellation, Jamestown, Saratoga, and
Plymouth ; tbe steamers Water Witch, Arctic, Fulton, and De
spatch, and the brig Dolphin comprising the Mediterranean
squadron under Flag Officer Lavallette, the home squadron
* Congressional Globe, p. 3061. t Senate Documents, vol. iv., p. 3.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 263
under Flag Officer Mcintosh, and such other vessels as were
sent out specially for the purpose. They were all deemed ef
fective for the object for wbich they were sent, because in the
execution of their mission no one of them would have hesitated
to resist a ship of the largest class. They were instructed to
protect all vessels of the United States against the exercise of
the right of search on the high seas, in time of peace, by the
armed vessels of any other power. These instructions have
been often repeated, and are now regarded as standing instmc
tions to the navy of the United States wherever employed.
They put the deck of an American vessel on the same footing
'with American soil, the invasion of which under foreign author
ity is to be as strenuously resisted in the one case as in the other.
They regard such invasion as in the highest degree offensive to
the United States, incompatible with their sovereignty and with
the freedom of the seas, and to be met and resisted by the whole
power of the country. It was your policy promptly and deci
sively to embrace the opportunity to bring this question of right,
upon wbich we had gone through one war and half a century
of negotiation, to final issue, by placing all other nations in a
posture where they must either fight for it or abandon it. The
result has proved the wisdom of the measure."
CHINA.
The same success attended our negotiations with China.*
The treaty of July, 1844, with that empire, had provided for
its own revision and amendment at the expiration of twelve
years from its date, should experience render this necessary.
Changes in its provisions had now become indispensable for the
security and extension of our commerce. Besides, our mer
chants had just claims against the Chinese Government, for inju
ries sustained in riolation of the treaty. To effect these changes,
and to obtain indemnity for these injuries, the Hon. WilUam B.
Reed was sent as Minister to China. His position proved to be
one of great delicacy. England and France were engaged in
war against China, and urged the United States to become a
* Message, 8th December, 1857, p. 14.

264 ME. Buchanan's administeation
party to it. Tbey alleged that it had been undertaken to ac
complish objects in which we had a common interest 'with them
selves. This was the fact ; but the President did not beheve
that our grievances, although serious, would justify a resort to
hostilities. Whilst Mr. Reed was, therefore, directed to pre
serve a strict neutrality between tbe belligerents, he was in
structed to cooperate cordially with the Ministers of England
and France in all peaceful measures to secure by treaty those
just concessions to comrderce which the cirilized nations of the
world had a right to expect from China. The Russian Govem
ment, also, pursued the same line of poUcy.
The difficulty, then, was to obtain for our country, whilst
remaining at peace, the same commercial advantages which
England and France might acqufre by war. This task our Min
ister performed with tact, abiUty, and success, by the conclusion
of the treaty of Tientsin of the 18th June, 1858, and the two
supplemental conventions of Shanghae of the 8th November
following.* These have placed our commercial relations with
China on the same Satisfactory footing with those of England
and France, and have resulted in the actual payment of the ftdl
amount of all the just claims of our citizens, leaving a surplus
to the credit of the Treasury. This object has been accom
plished, whilst our friendly relations with the Chinese Govern
ment were never for a moment interrupted, but on the contrary
have been greatly strengthened.
PAEAGUAT.
The hostile attitude of the Govemment of Paraguay toward
the United States early commanded the attention of the Presi
dent. Tbat Government had, upon frivolous and even insulting
pretexts, refused to ratify the treaty of friendship, commerce,
and narigation, concluded with it on the 4th March, 1853, as
amended by the Senate, though this only in mere matters of
form.f It had seized and appropriated the property of Ameri
can citizens residing in Paraguay, in a riolent and arbitrary
* Pamphlet Laws, 1861-'62, p. 177, appendix.
+ Senate Documents, 1867-58, vol. ii., p. 35, etc., etc.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 265
manner ; and finally, by order of President Lopez, it had fired
upon the United States steamer Water Witch (1st February
1855), under Commander Thomas J. Page of the navy, and
killed the saUor at the helm, whilst she was peacefully employed
in surveying the Parana river, to ascertain its fitness for steam
narigation. The honor, as well as the interest of the country,
demanded satisfaction.
The President brought the subject to the notice of Congress
in his first annual message (8tb December, 1857). In this he
informed them that he would make a demand for redress on the
Government of Paraguay, in a firm but conciUatory manner,
but at the same time observed, that " this will the more prob
ably be granted, if the Executive shall have authority to use
other means in the event of a refusal. This is accordingly rec
ommended." Congress responded favorably to this recommen
dation. On the 2d June, 1858,* they passed a joint resolution
authorizing the President " to adopt such measures, and use
such force as, in his judgment, may be necessary and advisable,
in the event of a refusal of just satisfaction by the Govemment
of Paraguay," " in connection with tbe attack on the United
States steamer Water Witch, and with other matters referred to
in the annual message." f They also made an appropriation
to defray the expenses of a commissioner to Paraguay, shoidd
he deem it proper to appoint one, " for tbe adjustment of diffi
culties " with that Republic.
Paraguay is situated far in the interior of South America,
and its capital, the city of Asuncion, on the left bank of the
river Paraguay, is more than a thousand miles from the mouth
of the La Plata.
The stern policy of Dr. Francia, formerly the Dictator of
Paraguay, had been to exclude all the rest of the world from
bis dominions, and in this he had succeeded by tbe most severe
and arbitrary measures. His successor. President Lopez, found
it necessary, in some degree, to relax this jealous pohcy ; but,
animated by the same spirit, he imposed harsh restrictions in his
intercourse with foreigners. Protected by his remote and se
cluded position, he but little apprehended that a navy from our
* U. S. Stat, at Large, vol. xi., p. 370. t Ibid., p. 319.

266 ME. Buchanan's administeation
far distant country could ascend the La Plata, the Parana, and
the Paraguay, and reach his capital. This was doubtless the
reason why he had ventured to place us at defiance. Under
these cfrcumstances the President deemed it adrisable to send
'with our commissioner to Paraguay, Hon. James B. Bowlin, a na
val force sufficient to exact justice should negotiation fail.* This
consisted of nineteen armed vessels, great and small, carrying two
hundred guns and twenty-five hundred sailors and marines, all
under the command of the veteran and gaUant Shubrick. Soon
after the arrival of the expedition at Montevideo, Commis
sioner Bowlin and Commodore Shubrick proceeded (30th De
cember, 1858) to ascend the rivers to Asuncien in the steamer
Fulton, accompanied by the Water Witch. Meanwhile the re
maining vessels rendezvoused in the Parana, near Rosario, a
position from which they could act promptly, in case of need.
The commissioner arrived at Asuncion on the 25th Janu
ary, 1859, and left it on the 10th February. Within this brief
period he had ably and successfuUy accomplished aU the objects
of his mission. In addition to ample apologies, he obtained
from President Lopez the payment of $10,000 for the family of
the seaman (Chaney) who had been kiUed in the attack on the
Water Witch, and also concluded satisfactory treaties of indem
nity and of navigation and commerce 'with the Paraguayan
Government.t Thus the President was enabled to announce
to Congress, in his annual message (December, 1859), that
" all our difficulties with Paraguay had been satisfactorily ad
justed." Even in this brief summary it would be unjust to 'withhold
from Secretary Toucey a commendation for the economy and
efficiency he displayed in fitting out this expedition. | It is a
remarkable fact in our history, that its entire expenses were de
frayed out of the ordinary appropriations for the naval service.
Not a dollar was appropriated by Congress for tbis purpose,
unless we may except the sum of $289,000 for the purchase of
seven small steamers of light draft, worth more than thefr cost,
» Message 19th Dec, 1859.
t United States Pamphlet Laws, 1859-60, p. 119, appendix.
X Report of Sec. Toucey, 2d Dec, 1859; Sen. Doc. 1859-60, vol. iii., p. 1137.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 267
and whicb were afterwards usefully employed in the ordinary
naval service.*
It may be remarked that tbe President, in his message
already referred to, justly observes, " that tbe appearance of
so large a force, fitted out in such a prompt manner, in the far
distant waters of the La Plata, and the admirable conduct of
the officers and men employed in it, have bad a happy effect
in favor of our country throughout all that remote portion of
the world." \
THE MEXICAN EEPUBLIC AND THE MONEOE DOCTEINE.
The relations of the United States with Mexico .on the
accession of Mr. Buchanan to the Presidency in March, 1857,
were of an unfriendly and almost hostile character. That Re
public had been in a state of constant revolution ever since it
achieved its independence from Spain. The various constitu
tions adopted from time to time had been set at naught almost
as soon as proclaimed ; and one miUtary leader after another,
in rapid succession, had usurped the government. This fine
country, blessed 'with a benign climate, a fertUe soil, and vast
mineral resources, was reduced by civil war and brigandage to
a condition of almost hopeless anarchy. Meanwhile, our trea
ties with the Republic were incessantly riolated. Our citizens
were imprisoned, expelled from the country, and in some instan
ces murdered. Thefr vessels, merchandise, and otber property
were seized and confiscated. While the central Government
at the capital were acting in tbis manner, such was the general
lawlessness prevailing, tbat different parties claiming and exer
cising local authority in several districts were committing simi
lar outrages on our citizens. Our treaties had become a dead
letter, and our commerce with the Repubhc was almost entfrely
destroyed. The claims of American citizens filed in the State
Department, for which they asked the interposition of their own
Govemment ¦with that of Mexico to obtain redress and indem
nity, exceeded $10,000,000. Although this amount may have
* Letter of Sec. Toucey, May 11, 1860, to Committee on Naval Expenditures, vol.
vi., No. 86 Miscellaneous Doc. of H. B.

268 ME. Buchanan's administeation
been exaggerated by the claimants, still their actual losses must
have been very large.*
In all these cases as they occurred our successive^ninisters
demanded redress; but thefr demands were only followed by
new injuries. Their testimony was uniform and emphatic in
reference to the only remedy which in thefr judgments would
prove effectual. " Nothing but a manifestation of the power
of the Govemment of the United States," wrote Mr. John For
syth, our Minister in 1856, "and of its purpose to punish these
wrongs, wiU avail. I assure you t^at the universal belief here
is, that there is nothing to be apprehended from the Government
of the United States, and that local Mexican officials can com
mit these outrages upon American citizens with absolute im
punity." In the year 1857 a favorable change occurred in the affairs
of the Republic, inspiring better hopes for the future. A con
stituent Congress, elected by the people of the different States
for this purpose, had framed and adopted a repubUcan Consti
tution. It adjourned on the 17th February, 1857, haring pro
vided for a popular election to be held in July for a President
and members of Congress. At this election General Comonfort
was chosen President almost without opposition. His term of
office was to commence on the 1st of December, 1857, and to
continue for four years. In case his office should become vacant,
the Constitution had prorided that the Chief Justice of Mexico,
then General Juarez, should become President, until the end of
the term. On the 1st December, 1857, General Comonfort
appeared before the Congress then in session, took the oath to
support the Constitution, and was duly inaugurated.
But the hopes thus inspired for the establishment of a regu
lar constitutional Government soon proved delusive. Presi
dent Comonfort, within one brief month, was driven from the
capital and the Republic by a military rebeUion headed by
General Zuloaga ; and General Juarez consequently became the
constitutional President of Mexico until the 1st day of Decem
ber, 1861. General Zuloaga instantly assumed the name of
* List of Claims, Sepate Executive Documents, p. 18, 2d session 35th Congress,
President's Message.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 269
President with indefinite powers; and the entire diplomatic
corps, including the minister from the United States, made haste
to recognize the authority of the usurper without awaiting in
structions from their respective Governments. But Zuloaga
was speedily expelled from power. Having encountered the
resistance of the people in many parts of the Republic, and a
large portion of the army in the capital having " pronounced "
against him, he was in turn compelled to relinquish the Presi
dency. The field was now cleared for the elevation of General
Miramon. He had from the beginning been the favorite of tbe
so-called " Church party," and was ready to become their will
ing instrument in maintaining the vast estates and prerogatives
of the Church, and in suppressing the Liberal Constitution. An
assembly of his partisans, called together without even the sem
blance of authority, elected him President ; but he warily
refused to accept the office at their hands. He then resorted to
another but scarcely more plausible expedient to place himself
in power. This was to identify himself with General Zuloaga,
who bad just been deposed, and to bring him again upon the
stage as President.- Zuloaga accordingly reappeared in this
character; but his only act was to appoint Miramon " President
Substitute," when he again retired. It is under this title tbat
Miramon has since exercised military authority in the city
of Mexico, expecting by this stratagem to appropriate to himself
tbe recognition of tbe foreign ministers which had been granted
to Zuloaga. He succeeded. The ministers continued their
relations with him as " President Substitute " in the same man
ner as if Zuloaga had still remained in power. It was by this
farce, for it deserves no better name, that Miramon succeeded
in grasping the Presidency. The idea that the chief of a nation
at his own discretion may transfer to whomsoever he may please
the trust of goveming delegated to him for the benefit of the
people, is too absurd to receive a moment's countenance. But
when we reflect that Zuloaga, from whom Miramon derived bis
title, was himself a military usurper, having expelled the consti
tutional President (Comonfort) from office, it would have been
a lasting disgrace to the Mexican people had they tamely sub
mitted to the yoke. To such an imputation a large majority

270 ME. Buchanan's administration
proved themselves not to be justly exposed. Although, on
former occasions, a seizure of tbe capital and the usurpation of
power by a military chieftain had been generaUy followed, at
least for a brief season, by an acquiescence of tbe Mexican peo
ple, yet they now rose boldly and independently to defend their
rights. President Juarez, after having Ijeen driven from the city of
Mexico by Zuloaga, proceeded to form a constitutional Govem
ment at Guanajuato. From thence he removed to Vera Cruz,
where he put his administration in successful operation. The
people in many portions of the Republic rallied in its support
and flew to arms. A ciril war thus began between the friends
of the Constitution and the partisans of Miramon. In this con
flict it was not possible for the American people to remain in
different spectators. They naturally favored the cause of Pres
ident Juarez, and expressed ardent 'wishes for his success.
Meanwhile Mr. Forsyth, the American Minister, still continued
at the city of Mexico in the discharge of his official duties
until June, 1858, when he suspended his diplomatic relations
vrith the Mframon Govemment, until he should ascertain the
decision of the President. Its outrages toward American citi
zens and its personal indignities toward himself, ¦without hope
of amendment or redress, rendered his condition no longer
tolerable. Our relations, bad as they had been under former
govemments, had now become still worse under that of Mfra
mon. President Buchanan approved the step which Mr. For
syth had taken. He was consequently directed to demand his
passports, to deposit the archives of the legation with Mr. Black,
our consul at the city of Mexico, and to proceed to Vera Cruz,
where an armed steamer would be in readiness to convey him
self and family to the Unted States.*
Thus was all diplomatic intercourse finally terminated 'with
the Government of Miramon ; whilst none had been organ
ized with that of Juarez. The President entertained some
hope that tbis rupture of diplomatic relations might cause
Miramon to reflect seriously on the danger of war with the
* Letter of General Cass to Mr. Forsyth, July 15th, 1858. Senate Documents,
1858-59, vol. i., p. 48.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. " 271
United States, and might at least arrest future outrages on
our citizens. Instead of this, however, he persisted in his
course of violence against tbe few American citizens who had
the courage to remain under his power. The President in his
message of December, 1859,* informs Congress that " murders
of a stUl more atrocious character have been committed in the
very heart of Mexico, under the authority of Mframon's Gov
ernment, during tbe present year. Some of these were worthy
only of a barbarous age, and if tbey had not been clearly proven,
would have seemed impossible in a country which claims to be
civiUzed." And in that of December^ 1860, he says : " To cap
the cUmax, after the battle of Tacubaya, in April, 1859, General
Marquez ordered three citizens of the United States, two of
them physicians, to be seized in tbe hospital at that place, taken
out and shot, without crime, and without trial. This was done,
notwithstanding our unfortunate countrymen were at the mo
ment engaged in the holy cause of affording relief to the soldiers
of both parties who had been wounded in the battle, without
making any distinction between them."
" Little less shocking was the recent fate of Ormond Chase,
who was shot in Topic on the 7th August by order of the same
Mexican general, not only without a trial, but without any con
jecture by his friends of the cause of his arrest." He was rep
resented to have been a young man of good character and in
telligence, who had made numerous friends in Topic, and his
unexpected execution shocked the whole community. " Other
outrages," the President states, " might be enumerated ; but these
are sufficient to iUustrate the wretched state of the country and
the unprotected condition of the persons and property of our
citizens in Mexico."
" The wrongs wbich we have suffered from Mexico are
before the world, and must deeply impress every American citi
zen. A Govemment which is either unable or unwilling to
redress such ¦wrongs, is derelict to its highest duties."
Meanwhile the civil war between tbe parties was conducted
with various success; but the scale preponderated in favor
of tbe Constitutional cause. Ere long the Govemment of
* House Journal, p. 207.
18

272 ME. Buchanan's administeation
Juarez extended its authority and was acknowledged in aU
the important ports and throughout the sea-coasts and ex
ternal territory of the Republic ; whilst the power of Mira
mon was confined to the city of Mexico and the surround
ing States.
The final triumph of Juarez became so probable, that Presi
dent Buchanan deemed it his duty to inquire and ascertain
whether, according to our constant usage in such cases, he
might not recognize the Constitutional Govemment. For the
purpose of obtaining reliable information on this point, he sent
a confidential agent to Mexico to examine and report tbe act'ual
condition and prospects of the belligerents. In consequence of
his report, as weU as of intelligence from other sources, he felt
justified in appointing a new minister to the Mexican Repub
Uc. For this office Mr. Robert M. McLane, a distinguished
citizen of Maryland, was selected. He proceeded on his mission
on the 8th March, 1859, invested " with discretionary authority
to recognize the Government of President Juarez, if on his arri
val in Mexico he should find it entitled to such recognition, ac
cording to the established practice of the United States." In con
sequence, on the 7th of April Mr. McLane recognized the Con
stitutional Govemment by presenting his credentials to Presi
dent Juarez, having no hesitation, as he said, " in pronouncing
the Government of Juarez to be the only existing Govemment
of the Republic." He was cordially received by the authorities
at Vera Cruz, who have ever since manifested the most friendly
disposition toward the United States.
Unhapily, however, the Constitutional Government, though
supported by a large majority both of the people and of tbe
several Mexican States, had not been able to expel Miramon
from the capital. In the opinion of the President, it had now
become the imperative duty of Congress to act without further
delay, and to enforce redress from the Government of Mframon
for the wrongs it had committed in riolation of the faith of
treaties against citizens of the United States.
Toward no other Government would we have manifested so
long and so patient a forbearance. This arose from our warm
sympathies for a neighboring Republic. The territory under

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 273
the sway of Miramon around the capital was not accessible to
our forces without passing through the States under the juris
diction of the Constitutional Govemment. But this from tbe
beginning had always manifested the warmest desire to cultivate
the most friendly relations with our country. No doubt was
therefore entertained that it would cheerfully grant us the right of
passage. Moreover, it well knew that the expulsion of Miramon
would result in the triumph of the Constitutional Government
and its establishment over the whole territory of Mexico.
What was, also, deemed of great importance by the President,
this would remove from us the danger of a foreign war in sup
port of the Monroe doctrine against any European nation which
might be tempted, by the distracted condition of the Republic,
to interfere forcibly in its internal affairs under the pretext of
restoring peace and order.
Such is the outline of the President's policy. Had it been
sanctioned by Congress, it is beyond question that we should
not at this day witness the transformation of the Republic into
a monarchy. Accordingly, in his message to Congress of the 19th of
December, 1859, he says : " We may in vain apply to the Con
stitutional Govemment at Vera Cruz, although it is well dis
posed to do us justice, for adequate redress. Whilst its
authority is acknowledged in all the important ports and
throughout the sea-coasts of the Republic, its power does not
extend to the city of Mexico and the States in its vicinity,
where nearly aU the recent outrages have been committed on
American citizens. We must penetrate into the interior before
we can reach the offenders, and this can only be done by pass
ing through the territory in the occupation of the Constitu
tional Government. The most acceptable and least difficult
mode of accomplishing the object will be to act in concert with
that Govemment. Their consent and their aid might, I
believe, be obtained ; but if not, our obligation to protect our
own citizens in their just rights secured by treaty would not be
tbe less imperatife. For these reasons I recommend to Con
gress to pass a law authorizing the President, under such con
ditions as tbey may deem expedient, to employ a sufficient

274 ME. Buchanan's administeation
military force to enter Mexico for the purpose of obtaining
indemnity for the past and security for the future. I purposely
. refrain from any suggestion as to whether this force shall con
sist of regular troops or volunteers, or both. This question
may be most appropriately left to the decision of Congress.
I would merely observe that, should volunteers be selected,
such a force could be easily raised in this country among those
who sympathize with the sufferings of our unfortunate fellow-
citizens in Mexico, and with the unhappy condition of that
RepubUc. Such an accession to the forces of the Constitutional
Government would enable it soon to reach the city of Mexico,
and extend its power over the whole Republic. In tbat event,
there is no reason to doubt that the just claims of our citizens
would be satisfied, and adequate redress obtained for the inju
ries infficted upon them. The Constitutional Govemment have
ever erinced a strong desire to do justice, and this might be
secured in advance by a preliminary treaty.
" It may be said that these measures will, at least indfrectly,
be inconsistent with our ¦wise and settled policy not to interfere
in the domestic concerns of foreign nations. But does not the
present case fairly constitute an exception? An adjoining
republic is in a state of anarchy and confusion from which she
has proved wholly unable to extricate herself. She is entfrely
destitute of the power to maintain peace upon her borders, or to
prevent the incursions of banditti into our territory. In her
fate and in her fortune — in her power to establish and main
tain a; settled govemment — we have a far deeper interest,
socially, commercially, and poUtically, than any other nation.
She is now a wreck upon the ocean, drifting about as she is
impelled by different factions. As a good neighbor, shaU we
not extend to her a helping hand to save her ? If we do not, it
would not he surprising should some other nation undertake ihe
task, and thus force us to interfere at last, under circumstances
of increased difficulty, for the maintenance of our established
policy'' These recommendations of tbe President Were wholly disre
garded by Congress during the session of 1859-1860. Indeed,
they were not even noticed in any of its proceedings. The

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 275
members of both parties were too exclusively occupied in dis
cussing the slavery question, and in giving their attention to the
approaching Presidential election, to devote any portion of thefr
time to the important Mexican question.
Tbe President again brought the subject before Congress in
his next annual message of December, 1860 ; but with no
better effect. In recurring to his recommendations at the pre
vious session for the employment of a military force, and the
consequences wbich had already resulted and would afterwards
follow from the neglect with which it had been treated, he
observes : " No other alternative was left, except the entire
abandonment of our fellow-citizens who had gone to Mexico
under the faith of treaties, to the systematic injustice, cruelty,
and oppression of Miramon's Govemment. Besides, it is almost
certain that the simple authority to employ this force would of
itself have accompUshed all our objects, without striking a sin
gle blow. The Constitutional Government would, then, ere this
have been estabUshed at the city of Mexico, and would have
been ready and ¦willing, to the extent of its ability, to do us
justice. " In addition, cmd I deem this a most important consider
ation, European Governments would have heen deprived of all
pretext to interfere in the territorial and domestic concerns
of Mexico. We should thus have heen relieved from the obliga
tion of resisting, even by force, should this hecome necessa/ry,
any attempt hy these Governments to deprive our neighboring
Republic of portions of her territory, a duty from which we
could not shrink without abandoning the traditional and
established policy of the Amefi'ican people"
He adds : " I am happy to observe that, firmly relying upon
the justice and good faith of these Govemments, there is no
present danger that such a contingency will happen."
This was inserted in the message, because Mr. McLane at
the time had received informal though only verbal assurances
to tbis effect in his intercourse with European diplomatists in
Mexico. And indeed there was no danger of foreign interfer
ence so'long as the question of a miUtary expedition to Mexico
had not been decided by Congress.

276 ME. Buchanan's administeation
The President did not apprehend interference in Mexico
from any European sovereign except the Emperor of the
French. It was his known policy to seek new colonies for
France ; and his minister exercised great influence over Mfra
mon. Besides, he had previously directed his attention in a
special manner to Central America. The President, therefore,
watched his proceedings ¦with constant vigilance, under the
conriction that should he attempt to colonize the whole or any
portion of Mexico, this would almost necessarily involve the
United States in a war with France in vindication of the Mon
roe doctrine.
the OEIGIN, HISTOEY, and NATURE OF " THE MONEOE DOCTEINE."
The allied powers of Europe had triumphed over Napoleon^
and had restored the elder branch of the Bourbons, in the per
son of Louis XVIH., to the throne of France. Emboldened
by this success, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, in 1815, formed
the Holy Alhance. To this France, and nearly aU the other
continental powers, soon afterwards acceded. Great Britain,
however, stood aloof and refused to become a party to it. Tbe
object of the allies was to abolish liberal Governments on the
continent of Europe, and to maintain the dirine right of
sovereigns to rule according to their own discretion — in short,
to roU back the tide of progress toward free institutions, and to
restore the old despotisms as they had existed before the French
Revolution. Accordingly France was deputed to destroy, by
force of arms, the liberal Government of the Cortes in Spain,
and to restore the implacable and bigoted Ferdinand VII. to
absolute power. In 1823 a French army, commanded by the
Duke d'Angouleme, invaded Spain, and in a single campaign
accomplished these objects.
In the year before the date of this expedition, the Govem
ment of the United States had formally acknowledged the in
dependence of the different southern RepubUcs, formerly Span
ish colonies ; and an appropriation of one hundred thousand
dollars had been made (May 4, 1822)* by Congress to defray
• 8 United States Statutes, 678.

ON THE E'VE OF THE EEBELLION. 277
the expense of missions to these " independent nations on the
American continent."
Whilst the French invasion was in successful progress, the
British Government became satisfied that the allies, after crush
ing tbe Spanish liberals, intended to employ their arms in assist
ing Ferdinand VII. to resubjugate what they termed his rebel-
Uous colonies on this side of the Atlantic. To such an enter
prise Great Britain was strenuously opposed, and she resolved
to resist it. If successful, tbis would prove to be a severe blow
to her trade in that quarter of the world — an interest to which
she has ever been sensitively alive.
To avert the impending danger Mr. Canning, then the
British Minister for Foreign Affairs, in August, 1823, proposed
to Mr. Hush, the American Minister in London, that the two
Governments should immediately unite in publishing " a joint
declaration before Europe," manifesting their opposition to the
policy and purposes of tbe alliance in regard to this continent.
This expressed the opinion that the recovery of the colonies by
Spain was hopeless; that their recognition as independent
States was one of time and circumstances ; that the two powers
were not disposed, however, to interpose obstacles in the way to
any arrangements by amicable negotiations between the colonies
and Spain ; but that whilst they aimed at the acquisition of no
portion of these colonies for themselves, they would not see
the transfer of any of them to a third power with indifference.
Mr. Canning also observed that in his opinion such a joint dec
laration by Great Britain and the United States would alone
prove sufficient to prevent the allies from any forcible intel--
ference against tbe former Spanish colonies. For these reasons
he earnestly urged Mr. Rush to become a party to it on behalf
of bis Government. Although Mr. Rush had no dfrect instmc
tions to warrant him in such an act, and this he had communi
cated to Mr. Canning, yet he wisely agreed to assume the re
sponsibility, but upon one express condition. This was, that the
British Govemment should first acknowledge the independence
of the new American Repubhcs, as the United States had al
ready done. ' Mr. Canning, though resolved on defeating the
projects of the aUiance against these Repubhcs, was not pre-

278
pared at the time to take this decisive step, and therefore the
joint declaration was never made.
Mr. Rush, in his despatch of September 19, 1823, to Mr. John
Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State,* communicated to him
a lucid statement of these negotiations, 'with explanatory docu
ments. After these had been considered by President Monroe,
he sent them, 'with his own riews on tbe subject, to Mr. Jeffer
son, and asked his adrice as to the course wbich ought to be
pursued by the Government to ward off the threatened danger.
Mr. Jefferson's answer is dated at Monticello, on the 24th
October, 1823. It is earnest, enthusiastic, a,nd eloquent,
displaying in old age the statesmanhke sagacity and ardent
patriotism of the author of the Declaration of Independence.
It foreshadows and recommends the " Monroe Doctrine-" to the
fuUest extent. From its importance we quote it entire from
RandaU's Life of Jefferson, vol. Ui., p. 491. Mr. Jefferson says :
" The question presented by the letters you have sent me is the
most momentous which has ever been offered to my contem
plation since that of independence. Tbat made us a nation ;
this sets our compass and points the course which we are to
steer through the ocean of time opening on us ; and never
could we embark on it under circumstances more auspicious.
Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle
ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer
Europe to intermeddle ¦with cis-Atlantic affairs. America,
North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of
Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should, therefore, have a
system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe.
While the last is laboring to become the domicile of despotism,
our endeavor should surely be to make our hemisphere that of
freedom. One nation, most of all, could disturb us in this
pursuit ; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it.
By acceding to her proposition, we detach her from the band
of despots, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free gov
emment, and eniancipate a continent at one stroke, which might
otherwise linger long in doubt and difficulty. Great Britain is
tbe nation which can do us the most barm of any one, or aU on
* Rush's "Residence at the Court of London," p. 429.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 279
earth ; and with her on our side, we need not fear the whole
world. With ber, then, we should most sedulously cherish a
cordial friendship ; and nothing would tend more to knit our
affections than to be fighting once more, side by side, in the
same cause. Not that I would purchase even her amity at the
price of taking part in her wars. But the war in wbich the
present proposition might engage us, should that be its conse
quence, is not her war, but ours. Its object is to introduce and
establish the American system of keeping out of our land aU
foreign powers, of never permitting those of Europe to inter
meddle with the affairs of our nations. It is to maintain our
own principle, not to depart from it ; and if, to facilitate this,
we can effect a dirision in the body of tbe European powers,
aud draw over to our side its most powerful member, surely
we should do it. But I am clearly of Mr. Canning's opinion,
that it wiU prevent instead of provoking war. With Great
Britain withdrawn from their scale and shifted into that of our
two continents, all Europe combined would not undertake such
a war. For how would they propose to get at either enemy
without superior fleets? Nor is the occasion to be slighted
which this proposition offers, of declaring our protest against
tbe atrocious riolations of the rights of nations, by the inter
ference of any one in the internal affairs of another, so flagi
tiously begun by Bonaparte, and now continued by tbe equally
lawless alliance calling itself holy.
" But we have first to ask ourselves a question : Do we wish
to acquire to our own confederacy any one or more of the
Spanish provinces ? I candidly confess that I have ever looked
on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be
made to our system of States. The control which, with Florida
point, tbis island would give us over the Gulf of Mexico, and
the countries and isthmus bordering on it, as well as all those
whose waters flow into it, would fill up the measure of our
political well-being. Yet as I am sensible that this can never
be obtained, even ¦with her own consent, but by war ; and its
independence, which is our second interest (and especially its
independence of England), can be secured without it, I have no
hesitation in abandoning my first wish to future chances, and

280 ME. Buchanan's administeation
accepting its independence, with peace and the fiiiendship of
England, rather than its association at the expense of war and
her enmity.
" I could honestly, therefore, join in tbe declaration proposed,
that we aim not at the acquisition of any of those possessions, that
we will not stand in the way of any amicable airangement be
tween them and the mother country ; but tbat we wUl oppose,
with all our means, the forcible interposition of any other
power, as auxiliary, stipendiary, or under -any other form or
pretext, and most especially their transfer to any power by
conquest, cession, or acquisition in any other way. I should
think it, therefore, adrisable that the Executive should encour
age the British Govemment to a continuance in the dispositions
expressed in these letters, by an assurance of his concurrence
with them as far as his authority goes ; and that, as it may lead
to war, the declaration of which requfres an act of Congress,
the case shaU be laid before them for consideration, at thefr first
meeting, and under the reasonable aspect in which it is seen by
himself. " I have been so long weaned from poUtical subjects, and have
so long ceased to take any interest in them, that I am sensible I
am not quaUfied to offer opinions on them worthy of- any at
tention. But the question now proposed involves consequences
so lasting, and effects so decisive of our future destinies, as to
rekindle all the interest I have heretofore felt on such occasions,
and to induce me to the hazard of opinions which wiU prove
only my 'wish to contribute still my nnte toward any thing
which may be useful to our country. And praying you to
accept it at only what it is worth, I add the assurance of my
constant and affectionate friendship and respect."
President Monroe, thus fortified by the support of Mr.
Jefferson, proceeded to announce, in his seventh annual message
to Congress, of December 2, 1823, the now celebrated " Monroe
Doctrine." This is summed up in his assertion, " as a principle
in which the rights and interests of the United States are in
volved, that the American continents, by the free and inde
pendent condition they have assumed and maintained, are

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 281
henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future coloniza
tion by any European powers."
The word " henceforth " is employed because Great Britain
and France, at the date of the message, not to speak of the Por
tuguese Empire of Brazil, possessed colonies on this continent,
and these are exempted from its terms. It applies to the future
and not to the past. This is more specifically stated afterwards
in the declaration, that " with the existing colonies or depend
encies of any European power we have not interfered and shaU
not interfere."
The reader has perceived that the recommendations of Mr.
Jefterson went beyond the " joint declaration " which had been
proposed by Mr. Canning. This was confined to the Spanish
American colonies, but the Monroe doctrine extends the protec
tion of the United States to every other portion of the conti
nent. In a subsequent portion of the message Mr. Monroe pro
ceeds to discuss and condemn, in a clear and able manner, the
projects of the alliance against the southern Republics, and to
warn them of the consequences. In this, however, he never
loses sight of the more comprehensive doctrine he had first an
nounced against European colonization in any portion of Ameri
ca, employing such language as the following : " We owe it there
fore to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between
the United States and those [European] powers, to declare that
we should consider any attempt on thefr part to extend thefr
system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our
peace and safety." And again, after stating that our estabUshed
policy was not to interfere in the internal concerns of any Eu
ropean power, to consider the Government de facto as the le
gitimate Govemment, and to cultivate friendly relations with
it, he says : " But in regard to these continents circumstances
are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible
that the aUied powers should extend their political system to any
portion of either continent without endangering our peace and
happiness, nor can any one believe tbat our southern brethren,
if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is

282 ME. Buchanan's administeation^
equaUy impossible, therefore, that we should behold such inter
position, in any form, with indifference."
Such is the Monroe doctrine. It is in opposition to fu
ture European colonization on any part of the American con
tinent ; it is in opposition to tbe introduction of European des
potic or monarchical institutions in any part of the American
continent ; and is in opposition to any attempt of European sov
ereigns to subjugate the North American RepubUc of Mexico,
or any of tbe South American Republics. In regard to those
Republics, he emphatically says : " But 'with the Govemments
who have declared their independence and maintained it, and
whose independence we have, on great consideration and on
just principles, acknowleged we could not view any interposi
tion for the' purpose of oppressing them, or controUing in any
other manner thefr destiny, by any European power, in any
other light ^han as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposi
tion toward the United States." It was eminently wise that
the United States^ the most ancient and by far the most pow
erful Republic on this continent, should have interposed such a
shield to defend their weaker sisters against the assaults of Eu
ropean despotism.
" When IJresident Monroe's message arrived in London [we
are informed by Mr. Rush],* the whole document excited great
attention. It was upon all tongues ; the press was fuU of it ;
the Spanish American deputies were overjoyed ; Spanish Amer
ican securities rose in the stock market, and the safety of the
new States from aU European coercion was considered as no
longer doubtful." The allies soon after abandoned their hostile
purposes against the new Republics, and their independence was
secured. That portion of the message for the protection of the new
RepubUcs, being in accordance 'with tbe avowed pohcy of Great
Britain, was received with favor by the British Government ;
but not so the portion of it against future European coloniza
tion. This encountered their decided opposition.f " The Mon
roe doctrine," nevertheless, soon became a canon of political
faith for the American people, and they placed it side by side
* Rush, p. 458. t Ibid., pp. 458, 471.

ON THE EVE OF THE EEBELLION. 283
with their hostility to tbe impressment of American seamen,
and to the search of American vessels on the high seas.
The authors and friends of the Monroe doctrine entertained
no doubt of its wisdom and policy. With the established inde
pendence of the Republic of Mexico and the Republics south
of it, there arose two distinct and opposing forms of govemment
on the opposite sides of the Atlantic ; the one repubUcan, the
other monarchical ; tbe one devoted to free institutions, the
other to despotic rule. The nations of Europe having deter
mined to resist any change in their monarchical forms, it was
but just and reasonable that those of America in self-protec
tion should equally resist all attempts from the otber side
of the Atlantic to change their free institutions. To repeat
the language of Mr. Jefferson, " America, North *1and South,
has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and pe
culiarly her own ; she should, therefore, have a -system of
her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While
the last is laboring to become tbe domicile of despotism, our
endeavor should surely be to make our hemisphere that of
freedom." Govemments so radically opposed in principle could
not be intermingled in adjoining territories without dangerous
disputes and coUisions. The contrast between them would be a
perennial source of jealousy. Each would necessarily endeavor
to propagate its o'wn principles among the neighboring people
of the other. In the interests of peace and friendship between
tbe European monarchies and the American RepubUcs, a wise
foresight would forbid the former from establishing colonies
within the territories or in the 'ricinity of the latter. Should
tbe United States interpose forcibly to establish republican in
stitutions on any part of the European continent, it is certain
that all its sovereigns would combine to resist such an inter
ference as dangerous to their monarchical system. Shall we,
then, abandoning the Monroe doctrine, patientfy suffer any of
these sovereigns to extend thefr dominion, equally dangerous to
our free forms of government, on this side of the Atlantic ?
No human sagacity could, twenty years ago, have foreseen the
day when a foreign potentate, not even confining himself to the
planting of colonies on American soil, should by invasion and

284 ME. Buchanan's administeation
force of arms convert the whole RepubUc of Mexico into a Eu
ropean monarchy. The idea, if suggested at that time, would
have been treated as absurd, more especially when we refiect
that this is the richest and most populous of the RepubUcs which
more than fifty years ago had been saved from European dom
ination by our Govemment, and that its territories extend for a
thousand miles along our own frontiers.
During the administration of President Polk, it became ne
cessary that he should reaffirm the Monroe doctrine, in view of
the designs of Great Britain to establish a protectorate over the
Mosquito coast in the Republics of Nicaragua and Honduras.
This he did, in decided terms, in his first annual message to
Congress (2d December, 1845.) *
Great Britain, as we have already seen, through the inter
position of the Govemment of the United States, eventuaUy
withdrew from the Mosquito protectorate, as well as from the
colony of the Bay Islands, which she had afterwards estabUshed
on the coast of Honduras. At the close of Mr. Buchanan's
administration no European colony existed on the American
continent, except such as had been estabUshed before the Mon
roe doctrine was announced, or bad been formed out of territory
then belonging to a European power.
The President, having faUed in obtaining authority from
Congress to employ a mihtary force in Mexico, as a last resort
adopted the policy of concluding a treaty with the Constitu
tional Govemment. By this means he thought something
might be accomplished, both to satisfy the long deferred claims
of American citizens, and to prevent foreign interference with
the internal govemment of Mexico. Accordingly Mr. McLane,
on the 14th day of December, 1859, signed a " Treaty of Tran
sits and Commerce " with the Mexican RepubUc, and also a
" Convention to enforce treaty stipulations, and to maintain
order and security in the Territory of the Republics of Mexico
and the United States." These treaties secured peculiar and
highly valuable advantages to our trade and commerce, espe
cially in articles tbe production of our agriculture and manu-
* 3 statesman's Manual, p. 1458.

ON THE EVE OP THE EEBELLION. 285
factures. They also guaranteed to us tbe secure possession and
enjoyment of the Tehuantepec route, and of several other
transit routes for our commerce, free from duty, across the ter
ritories of the Republic, on its way to California, and our other
possessions on the Northwest coast, as well as to the independ
ent Republics on the Pacific and to Eastern Asia.
In consideration of these advantages, " and in compensation
for the revenue surrendered by Mexico on the goods and mer
chandise transported free of duty through the territory of that
Republic, the Govemment of the United States agreed to pay
to the Government of Mexico the sum of four millions of dol
lars." Of this sum two millions were to be paid immediately
to Mexico, and the remaining two millions were to be retained
by our Govemment " for the payment of the claims of citizens
of the United States against tbe Government of the Republic
of Mexico for injuries already inflicted, and which may be
proven to be just according to the law and usage of nations and
the principles of equity." It was beUeved tbat these stipula
tions, whilst providing two millions toward the payment of the
claims of our citizens, would enable President Juarez 'vrith
the remaining two millions to expel the usurping Govemment
of Miramon from the capital, and place the Constitutional
Government in possession of the whole territory of the Repub
lic. This, we need not say, would have greatly promoted the
interests of the United States. Besides, what was vastly im
portant, these treaties, by vesting in the United States territorial
and commercial rights which we would be bound to defend,
might for this reason have prevented any European Government
from attempting to acqufre dominion over the territories of Mex
ico and thus the Monroe doctrine would probably have re
mained inviolate. With this view Mr. McLane was seriously
impressed. In his despatch of December 14tb, 1859, to the
Secretary of State, communicating the treaties, he expresses the
apprehension tbat should they not be ratified, further anarchy
would prevail m Mexico until it should be terminated by dfrect
interference from some otber quarter.
On the 4th January, 1860, the President submitted to the
Senate the treaty and the convention with a riew to their rattfi-

286 ME. Buchanan's administeation
cation, together with the despateh of Mr. McLane. These, on
the same day, were referred to the Committee on Foreign Rela
tions. "Whether any or what other proceedings were had in
relation to them we are unable to state, the injunction of secresy
haring never been removed by tbe Senate. Mr. McLane, who
was then in Washington, had a conference with tbe committee,
and received the impression that comparative unanimity existed
in favor of the principal prorisions of the treaty ; but in regard
to the convention the contingency of its possible abuse was
referred to as constituting an objection to its ratification. Cer
tain it is that neither the one nor the other was ever approved
by tbe Senate, and consequently both became a dead letter.
The RepubUc of Mexico was thus left to its fate, and has since
become an empfre under the dominion of a scion of the House
of Hapsburg, protected by the Emperor of the French. The
righteous claims of American citizens have therefore been indef
initely postponed.

APPEI^DIX.

GENERAL SCOTT'S "VIE'WS" OF THE 29th AND 30th OF OOTO-
BEE, 1860, PUBLISHED BY HIS AUTHORITY IN THE "NA
TIONAL INTELLIGENCER" OF THE 18th OF JANUARY, 1861.

Vieics suggested by the imminent danger {October 29, 1860) of a
disruption of the TTnion by the Secession of one or more of the
Southem States.

To save time the right of secession may be conceded, and instantly
balanced by the correlative right, on the part of the Federal Govem
ment, against an interior State or States, to reestablish by force, if ne
cessary, its former continuity of territory — Paley's Moral and Political
Philosophy, last chapter.
But break this glorious Union by whatever line or lines that politi
cal madness may contrive, and there would be no hope of reuniting
the fragments except by the laceration and despotism of the sword.
To effect such result the intestine wars of our Mexican neighbors
would, in comparison with ours, sink into mere child's play.
A smaller evil would be to allow the fragments of the . great Ee
public to form themselves into new Confederacies, probably four.
All the lines of demarcation between the new Unions cannot be
accurately drawn in advance, but many of them approximately may.
Thus, looking to natural boundaries and commercial aiSnities, some
of the following frontiers, after many waverings aud conflicts, might
perhaps become acknowledged and fixed :
1. The Potomac Eiver and the Chesapeake Bay to the Atlantic.
2. From Maryland, along the crest of the Alleghany (perhaps the
19

288 APPENDIX.
Blue Ridge) range of mountains, to some point on the coast of Florida.
3. The Une from say the head of the Potomac to the west or north
west, which it win be most difficult to settle. 4. The crest of the
Rocky Mountains.
The Southeast Confederacy would, in aU human probability, in
less than five years after the rupture, find itself bounded by the first
and second lines indicated above, the Atlantic, and the Gulf of Mex
ico, with its capital at say Columbia, South Carolina. The country
between the second, third, and fourth of those lines would, beyond a
doubt, in about the same time, constitute another Confederacy, with
its capital at probably Alton or Quincy, Illinois. The boundaries of
the Pacific Union are the most definite of all, and the remaining States
would constitute the Northeast Confederacy, with its capital at Albany.
It, at the first thought, will be considered strange that seven slave-
holding States and parts of Virginia and Florida should be placed
(above) in a new Confederacy with Ohio, Indiana, mtuois, etc. But
when the overwhelming weight of the great Northwest is taken in
connection with the laws of trade, contiguity of territory, and the
comparative indifference to free soil doctrines on the part of Western
Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri, it is evident that but
little if any coercion, beyond moral force, would be needed to embrace
them ; and I have omitted the temptation of the unwasted public lands
which would fall entire to this Confederacy — an apanage (well hus
banded) sufiicient for many generations. As to Missouri, Arkansas,
and Mississippi, they would not stand out a month. Louisiana would
coalesce without much soKcitation, and Alabama, with West Florida,
would be conquered the first winter from the absolute need of Pensa
cola for a naval depot.
If I might presume to address the South, and particularly dear
Virginia — ^being " native here and to the manor born'' — I would af
fectionately ask. Will not your slaves be less secure and their labor less
profitable under the new order of things than under the old ? Could
you employ profitably two hundred slaves in all Nebraska, or five
hundred in all New Mexico ? The right, then, to take them thither
would be a barren right. And is it not wise to
" Rather bear the ills we have
Than fly to others that we know not of?"
The Declaration of Independence proclaims and consecrates the
same maxim : " Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long
established should not be changed for light and transient causes."

APPENDIX. 289
And Paley, too, lays down as a fundamental maxim of statesmanship,
" never to pursue national honor a.s distinct from national interest j"
but adds : " This rule acknowledges that it is often necessary to assert
the honor of a nation for the sake of its interests."
The excitement that threatens secession is caused by the near
prospect of a Republican's election to the Presidency. From a sense
of propriety, as a soldier, I have taken no part in the pending canvass,
and, as always heretofore, mean to stay away from the polls. My
sympathies, however, are with the Bell and Everett ticket. With Mr.
Lincoln I have had no communication whatever, direct or indirect,
and have no recollection of ever having seen his person ; but cannot
believe any unconstitutional violence, or breach of law, is to be appre
hended from his administration of the Federal Government.
From a knowledge of our Southern population it is my solemn
conriction that there is some danger of an early act of rashness pre
liminary to secession, viz., the seizure of some or all of the following
posts : Forts Jackson and St. Philip, in the Mississippi, below New
Orleans, both without garrisons ; Fort Morgan, below Mobile, with
out a garrison ; Forts Pickens and McRee, Pensacola harbor, with an
insuflicieut garrison for one ; Fort Pulaski, below Savannah, without
a garrison ; Forts Moultrie and Sumter, Charleston harbor, the former
with an insufficient garrison, and the latter without any ; and Fort
Monroe, Hampton Roads, without a sufficient garrison. In my opinion
aU these works should be immediately so garrisoned as to make any
attempt to take any one of them, by surprise or coup de main, ridicu
lous. With the army faithful to its allegiance, and the navy probably
equaUy so, and with a Federal Executive, for the next twelve months,
of firmness and moderation, which the country has a right to expect
— moderation being an element of power not less than firmness — there
is good reason to hope that the danger of secession maybe made to
pass away without one conflict of arms, one execution, or one arrest
fbr treason.
In the mean time it is suggested that exports should remain as
free as at present ; aU duties, however, on imports, coUected (outside
of the cities*) as such receipts would be needed for the national debt,
invaUd pensions, &c., and only articles contraband of war be refused
* In forts or on board ships-of-war. The great aim and object of this plan was to
gain time  say eight or ten months — to await expected measures of conciliation on
the part of the North, and the subsidence of angry feelings in the opposite quarter.

290 APPENDIX.
admittance. But even this refusal would be unnecessary, as the fore
going views eschew the idea of invading a seceded State.
WiNFiELD Scott.
Octo1>er 29<A, 1860.
Lieut.-General Scott's respects to the Secretary of War to say —
That a copy of his " Views, &c." was despatched to the President
yesterday, in great haste ; but the copy intended for the Secretary,
better transcribed (herewith), was not in time for the mail. Gen
eral Scott would be happy if the latter could be substituted for the
former. It wiU be seen that the " Views " only apply to a case of secession
that makes a gap in the present Union. The faUing off (say) of
Texas, or of all the Atlantic States, from the Potomac south, was not
within the scoj>e of General Scott's provisional remedies.
It is his opinion that instructions should be given, at once, to the
commanders of the Barancas, Forts Moultrie and Monroe, to be on
their guard against surprises and coups de main. As to regular
approaches nothing can be said or done, at this time, without vol
unteers. There is one (regular) company at Boston, one here (at the
Narrows), one at Pittsburg, one at Augusta, Ga., and one at Baton
Rouge — in all five companies only, within reach, to garrison or reen
force the forts mentioned in the " Views."
General Scott is aU solicitude for the safety of the Union. He is,
however, not without hope that aU dangers and difficulties wiU pass
away without learing a scar or painful recollection behind.
The Secretary's most obedient servant, WiNFiELD Scott.
Octoher ZOth, 1860.

APPENDIX. 291

MESSAGE OF THE PEESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, OF
THE Sth OF JANUARY, 1861.

January 9, 1861. — Read and referred, with instructions, to a Select
Committee of five, and ordered to be printed.

To the Senate and Souse of Hepresentatives :
At the opening of your present session I caUed your attention to
the dangers which threatened the existence of the Union. I expressed
my opinion freely concerning the original causes of those dangers, and
recommended such measures as I believed would have the effect of
tranquillizing the country and saring it from the peril in which it had
been needlessly and most unfortunately involved. Those opinions and
recommendations I do not propose now to repeat. My own conric-
tions upon the whole subject remain unchanged.
The fact that a great calamity was impending over the nation was
even at that time acknowledged by every inteUigent citizen. It had
already made itself felt throughout the length and breadth of the land.
The necessary consequences of the alarm thus produced were most
deplorable. The imports fell off with a rapidity never known before,
except in time of war, in the history of our foreign commerce ; the
Treasury was unexpectedly left without the means which it had rea
sonably counted upon to meet the public engagements^; trade was
paralyzed ; manufactures were stopped ; the best public securities
suddenly sunk in the market ; every species of property depreciated
more or less ; and thousands of poor men, who depended upon their
daily labor for their daily bread, were tumed out of employment.
I deeply regret that I am not able to give you any information
upon the state of the Union which is more satisfactory than what I was
then obliged to communicate. On the contrary, matters are stUl worse
at present than they then were. "When Congress met, a strong hope
pervaded the whole public mind that some amicable adjustment of the
subject would speedily be made by the representatives of the States
and of the people, which might restore peace between the conflicting

292 APPENDIX.
sections of the country. That hope has been diminished by every hour
of delay ; and as the prospect of a bloodless settlement fades away,
the public distress becomes more and more aggravated. As eridence
of this, it is only necessary to say that the treasury notes authorized
by the act of 17th December last were advertised, according to the
law, and that no responsible bidder offered to take any considerable
sum at par at a lower rate of interest than twelve per cent. From
these facts it appears that, in a government organized Uke ours, do
mestic strife, or even a well-grounded fear of civU hostUities, is more
destructive to our public and private interests than the most formidable
foreign war.
In my annual message I expressed the conriction, which I have
long dehberately held, and which recent reflection has only tended to
deepen and confirm, that no State has a right by its own act to secede
from the Union, or throw off its Federal obUgations at pleasure. I
also declared my opinion to be that, even if that right existed and
should be exercised by any State of the confederacy, the executive de
partment of this govemment had no authority under the Constitution
to recognize its vaUdity by acknowledging the independence of such
State. This left me no alternative, as the chief executive officer under
the Constitution of the United States, but to collect the pubUc revenues
and to protect the public property so far as this might be practicable
under existing laws. This is still my purpose. My province is to
execute, and not to make the laws. It belongs to Congress, exclu
sively, to repeal, to modify, or to enlarge their provisions, to meet exi
gencies as they may occur. I possess no dispensing power.
I certainly had no right to make aggressive war upon any State,
and I am perfectly satisfied that the Constitution has wisely withheld
that power even from Congress. But the right and the duty to use
military force defensively against those who resist the Federal officers
in the execution of their legal functions, and against those who assail
the property of the Federal government, is clear and undeniable.
But the dangerous and hostUe attitude of the States toward each
other has already far transcended and cast in the shade the ordinary
executive duties afready provided for by law, and has assumed such
vast and alarming proportions as to place the subject entirely above
and beyond executive control. The fact cannot be disguised that we
are in the midst of a great revolution. In aU its various bearings,
therefore, I commend the question to Congress, as the only human
tribunal, under Proridence, possessing the power to meet the existing

APPENDIX. 293
emergency. To them, exclusively, belongs the power to declare war,
or to authorize the employment of mUitary force in all cases contem
plated by the Constitution ; and they alone possess the power to re
move grievances which might lead to war, and to secure peace and
union to this distracted country. On them, and on them alone, rests
the responsibiUty.
The Union is a sacred trust left by our revolutionary fathers to
thefr descendants ; and never did any other people inherit so rich a
legacy. It has rendered us prosperous in peace and triumphant in
war. The National flag has floated in glory over every sea. Under
its shadow American citizens have found protection and respect in aU
lands beneath the sun. If we descend to considerations of purely
material interest, when, in the history of all time, has a confederacy
been bound together by such strong ties of mutual interest ? Each
portion of it is dependent on all, and all upon each portion, for pros
perity and domestic security. Free trade throughout the whole supplies
the wants of one portion from the productions of another, and scatters
wealth everywhere. The great planting and farming States requfre
the aid of the commercial and navigating States to send their produc^-
tions to domestic and foreign miarkets, and to furnish the naval power
to render thefr transportation secure against all hostile attacks.
Should the Union perish in the midst of the present excitement,
we have afready had a sad foretaste of the universal suffering which
would result from its destruction. The calamity would be severe in
every portion of the Union, and would be quite as great, to say the
least, in the Southem as in the Northern States. The greatest aggra
vation of the evil, and that which would place us in the most unfavor
able light both before the world and posterity, is, as I am firmly con
vinced, that the secession movement has been chiefly based upon a
misapprehension at the South of the sentiments of the majority in
several of the Northern States. Let the question be transferred from
poUtical assemblies to the baUot-box, and the people themselves would
speedUy redress the serious grievances which the South have suffered.
But, in Heaven's name, let the trial be made before we plunge into
armed conflict upon the mere assumption that there is no other alter
native. Time is a great conservative power. Let us pause at this
momentous point and afford the people, both North and South, an
opportunity for reflection. Would that South Carolina had been con
vinced of this truth before her precipitate action ! ¦ I, therefore, appeal
through you to the people of the country to declare in thefr might that

294: APPENDIX.
the Union must and shaU be preserved by all constitutional means. I
most earnestly recommend that you devote yourselves exclusively to
the question how this can be accomplished in peace. AU other
questions, when compared with this, sink into insignificance. The
present is no time for paUiatives ; action, prompt action, is reqnfred.
A delay in Congress to prescribe or to recommend a distinct and
practical proposition for concUiation may drive us to a point from
which it wUl be almost impossible to recede.
A common ground on which concUiation and harmony can be pro
duced is surely not unattainable. The proposition to compromise by
letting the North have exclusive control of the territojy above a
certain line, and to give Southem institutions protection below that
line, ought to receive universal approbation. In itself, indeed, it may
not be entfrely satisfactory ; but when the alternative is between a
reasonable concession on both sides and a destruction of the Union, it
is an imputation upon the patriotism of Congress to assert that its
members wUl hesitate for a moment.
Even now the danger is upon us. In several of the States which
have not yet seceded, the forts, arsenals, and magazines of the United
States have been seized. This is by far the most serious step which has
been taken since the commencement of the troubles. This pubUc
property has long been left without garrisons and troops for its protec
tion, because no person doubted its security under the flag of the
country in any State of the Union. Besides, our small army has
scarcely been sufficient to guard our remote frontiers against Indian
incursions. The seizure of this property, from aU appearances, has
been purely aggressive, and not in resistance to any attempt to coerce a
State or States to remain in the Union.
At the beginning of these unhappy troubles I determined that no
act of mine should increase the excitement in either section of the
country. If the political conflict were to end in a civil war, it was my
determined purpose not to commence it, nor even to furnish an excuse
for it by an act of this govemment. My opinion remains unchanged,
that justice as well as sound poUcy requfres us stUl to seek a peaceful
solution of the questions at issue between the North and the South.
Entertaining this conviction, I refrained even from sending reenforce
ments to Major Anderson, who commanded the forts in Charleston
harbor, untU an absolute necessity for doing so should make itself ap
parent, lest it might unjustly be regarded as a menace of mUitary coer
cion, and thus furnish, if not a provocation, a pretext for an outbreak on

APPENDIX. 295
the part of South CaroUna. No necessity for these reenforcements
seemed to exist. I vsras assured by distinguished and upright gentlemen
of South Carolina* that no attack upon Major Anderson was intended,
but that, on the contrary, it was the desfre of the State authorities, as
much as it was my own, to avoid the fatal consequences which must
eventually follow a mUitary colUsion.
And here I deem it proper to submit, for your information, copies
of a communication, dated December 28, 1860, addressed to me by
R. "W. BarnweU, J. H. Adams, and J. L. Orr, " Commissioners" from
South Carolina, with the accompanying documents, and copies of my
answer thereto, dated December 31.
In further explanation of Major Anderson's removal from Fort
Moultrie to Fort Sumter, it is proper to state that, after my answer to
the South Carolina " Commissioners," the War Department received
a letter from that gaUant officer, dated December 27, 1860, the day
after this movement, from which the following is an extract :
" I will add, as my opinion, that many things convinced me that
the authorities of the State designed to proceed to a hostile act" [evi
dently referring to the orders dated December 11, of the late Secretary
of War]. " Under this impression, I could not hesitate that it was
my solemn duty to move my command from a fort which we could
not probably have held longer than forty-eight or sixty hours to this
one, where my power of resistance is increased to a very great degree."
It will be recollected that the concluding part of these orders was in
the foUowing terms : " The smallness of your force wUl not permit
you, perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts ; but an at
tack on, or attempt to take possession of either one of them, wiU be
regarded as an act of hostiUty, and you may then put your command
into either of them which you may deem most proper to increase its
power of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar defen
sive steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed
to a hostile act."
It is said that serious apprehensions are, to some extent, entertained,
in which I do not share, that the peace of this District may be dis
turbed before the 4th of March next. In any event, it will be my
duty to preserve it, and this duty shaU be performed.
In conclusion, it may be permitted to me to remark that I have
often warned my countrymen of the dangers which now surround us.
* Messrs McQueen, Miles, Bonham, Boyce, and Keitt, members of the House of
Kepresentatives from South Carolina, on the Sth of December, 1860.

296 APPENDIX.
This may be the last time I shall refer to the subject officiaUy. I feel
that my duty has been faithfuUy, though it may be imperfectly, per
formed ; and whatever the result may be, I shaU carry to my grave
the consciousness that I at least meant well for my country.
James Buchanan.
Washington City, Jan. 8, 1861.

THE END.