.^\a:\-^*^^ Yale Uiiivetsi'v '.-¦' '¦' Caiif^l 7J^ c!jt?'/^p/>/J L^^orna -S '^^6^. A HISTORY OF Political Parties IN THE UNITED STATES IN THREE VOLUMES. VOLUME I. BY J. P. GORDY, Ph. D.. Professor of Pedagogy in Ohio University, Athens, Ohio, and Author of "Lessons in Psychology''' ATHENS, OHIO, OHIO PUBLISHING CO.. 1895. Entered, According to Act of Congress, in the Year 1895, By J. P. GORDY. In the Office of the Librarian ol Congress, at Washington. PREFACE. THIS book is written, primarily, for the teacher who has not had the advantage of a higher education. Believing, as the author does, that the history of the United States is second in importance to no subject taught in the public school, it has seemed to him desir able that books should be put within the reach of public school teachers, the study of which would enable them to teach the subject intelligently. Until normal school training is required of American teachers, a considerable part of their training must be obtained through private study. To help them to prepare themselves to teach United States History is the primary object of this book. The author has aimed to treat his subject in such a way that the thoughtful reader, without much previous knowledge of it, could get some insight into the causes that have determined the political history of the country. For this reason, everything that is merely episodical in its nature, such as Burr's expedition against New Or leans, has been omitted. The author has wished to keep the attention of the reader concentrated on those phases of history which it is important for American citizens to know iu order that they may perform their duties as American citizens intelligently. He has hoped also that the book might commend itself to some of that large class of Americans — business (.3) 4 PREFACE. men as well as professional men — who are beginning to realize that the present has its roots in the past, and that there is no way to understand the present except by studying the past. ¦With the hope that here and there the book might find a reader who would wish to examine for himself the grounds of its statements, the author has sought to give enough references to enable such readers to satisfy themselves. Of his aim in another particular, he may, perhaps, be permitted to speak : That the book contains mistakes of fact as well as of inference, will doubtless be found to be true ; but he confidently believes that it is free from mistakes that are due to any bias in favor of any individ ual or of any party. Of the authorities he has consulted and to whom he is under obligations, he wishes to make special mention of Alexander Johnston's articles in Lalor's Cyclopedia, and of Henry Adams' History of the United States. Ohio University, Athens, Ohio, fune H, 1896. CONTENTS. PAGE. CHAPTER I. ¦Without a Government 9 CHAPTER II. The Revolution of 1787 22 CHAPTER III. Some Characteristics of the New Constitution 36 CHAPTER IV. The Antifederal Party 53 CHAPTER V. Alexander Hamilton 63 CHAPTER VI. A Forgotten Democrat 74 CHAPTER VII. The Federalist Financial Policy 91 CHAPTER VIII. Thomas Jefferson 104 CHAPTER IX. JefFersonian Republicans Ill (5) 6 CONTENTS. CHAPTER X. The French Revolution 122 CHAPTER XI. The French Revolution in American Politics 141 CHAPTER XII. Relations with England 169 CHAPTER XIII. Jay's Treaty •• 185 CHAPTER XIV. The "Whiskey Insurrection 198 CHAPTER XV. Monroe iu France 212 CHAPTER XVI. The Extra Session of 1797 228 CHAPTER XVII. The X., Y. and Z. Mission 240 CHAPTER XVIII. A Province of France or an Independent Nation — Which? 254 CHAPTER XIX. The Alien and Sedition Laws 266 CHAPTER XX. The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions 281 CHAPTER XXI. The Downfall of the Federalist Party 295 CONTENTS. 7 CHAPTER XXII. The Revolution of 1800 317 CHAPTER XXIII, Jefferson as a States Rights Republican and Jeffer son as a Democrat 334 CHAPTER XXIV. Gallatin's Financial Policy 342 CHAPTER XXV. Jefferson's First Message 351 CHAPTER XXVI. Northern Democrats and Southern Republicans 361 CHAPTER XXVII. The Purchase of Louisiana 373 CHAPTER XXVIII. The Northern Confederacy 386 CHAPTER XXIX. West Florida 396 CHAPTER XXX. Conquering Without War 414 CHAPTER XXXI. The Berlin Decree and the Attack on the Chesa peake 431 CHAPTER XXXII. The Orders in Council and the Milan Decree 448 8 CONTENTS. CHAPTER XXXIII. The Embargo 460 CHAPTER XXXIV. The Effect of the Embargo on Napoleon, Great Britain and New England 473 CHAPTER XXXV. Submission or War ? 489 CHAPTER XXXVI. Submission 499 THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES. CHAPTER I. WITHOUT A GOVERNMENT. 1 PROPOSE to write an outline of the history of political parties in the United States. I wish to de scribe the great currents of thought and action in our political life, and the forces that have de termined their direction. I wish to describe ^og°^® °* ^^^ the forces that have made the Mississippis and Ohios and Missouris in our history, leaving to larger books the detailed and microscopic study of the little streams which have resulted from comparatively unimportant causes. From such a point of view, we may say that the history of political parties in this country begins with the Federalists. 10 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES The first question to ask of every political party is, What is it trying to do? What public want does it seek to satisfy? What motive influences the ^iiticai°' men that belong to it to associate together parties. . in a political organization? Let us put this question to the Federalist party; let us ask what it was organized to do.* To this question it is possible to give a definite answer. From the adoption of the Articles of Confed eration in 1781 to the organization of the government under our present constitution in 1789, we were -without a government. "Without a government! Did not Con gress meet every year and pass laws, and levy taxes, and send ministers to foreign countries, and seek to make treaties with them? " Yes, it did all this and much more. But a body may pass laws, and levy taxes, What consti- , , , . .^, ^ , . tutes a and make treaties without being a govern- government? ment. If you wish to determine whether an organization resMy constitutes a government, you can apply a simple, and at the same time, an infallible test. Ask what happens in case any one on whom its so-called laws operate, or upon whom its taxes are le-vied, refuses to obey the law, or to pay the tax. If the body that passed the law or levied the tax, can do nothing about it, if it can only remonstrate, it can pass all the laws and levy all the taxes it likes. It is not a government. A law that I can obey or not, is not a law ; a tax that I may *See Political Science Quarterly, 'Vol, 'VI., page 593. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 11 pay or not, is not a tax. The one is a suggestion or a piece of advice, and the other a request for the payment of money. It was Madison who said " A sanction is es sential to the idea of law, as coercion is to that of government." And Washington, in a circular letter which he addressed to the governors and presidents of the states in 1783, declared that one of the things which was essential to the very existence of the United States as an independent power, was that there must be an in dissoluble union of all the states under a single federal government, which must have power to enforce its decrees; since without such power it would be a gover?iment ottly in name. I say, therefore, that the Congress of the Confedera tion was not a government. No one paid any attention to its so-called laws unless he chose; every one did as he pleased about paying its taxes. The states '^ Character of on whom these requests, or requisitions, as o^^tfe""^^^^^ they were called, for money were made, '^°if^'ieratiou. had indeed solemnly agreed to pay them, when they assented to the Articles ot Confederation. But since these requisitions were nothing but requests, the states could break their promises and disregard them.* The result was that of $6,000,000 called for by Congress from 1782 to 1786 only $1,000,000 had been paid at the end of March, 1787. *Madison characterized the requisitions of Congress as mere calls for voluntary contributions. 12 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. It will require a vigorous effort of the imagination to enable us to realize the terrible condition of a nation which has no national government. More than anything else, it reminds me of a mind, a soul, an intelligence, a thinking, feeling, conscious, personality. Condition of a , . - , . , . , , , , , , nation without which here m this world should somehow a government. get detached from its body without losing any of the desires natural to it in its ordinary state. Think of such an intelligence, unable to communicate with its friends, unable to gratify its desire for knowledge, unable to see the beauties of the world of nature and of art, and deprived even of the poor boon of giving expres sion to its despair and you will be able to form some idea of the condition of a nation without any national govern ment. Fitly did Hamilton say: "A nation without a national government, is an awful spectacle." Unlike the disembodied intelligence of which I have spoken, the nation had indeed an organ through which it could express its wishes, but none through which it could execute them. It had to sit with its hands folded and see the states violate its solemn treaties, and bring upon it the contempt of the civilized world. And when the state refused to pay the taxes which the government asked for in order to pay the interest on the money which had been lent us in our struggle for independence, it was powerless to compel them. What is the explanation of this fact ? Why was it that the men of the Revolution went to the trouble of HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 13 creating an organization with every attribute of a govern ment, except the all-essential one of power Why were the to execute its will? The answer is simple: conf°eae°iaoa The people did not look upon themselves as a '"1°p'«'*' nation; they had not attained to national self -consciousness. The people of each state, looking upon their state as their country, regarded every government but the state gov ernment as foreign. Another of th« things which Wash ington in the circular letter of which I have already spoken, declared was essential to the very existence of the United States as a nation, was a willingness on the part of the people to sacrifice some of their local interests to the common good, a feeling that they were fellow citi zens of a common country. But the people of the va rious states were not willing to do this; they did not re gard one another as citizens of a common country. The love of the union which seventy-five years later had be come a passion that men were willing to die for, hardly existed then. One of the truest patriots of New England spoke on the floor of the Massachusetts House of Depu ties of the Congress of the United States as a foreign government.* Accordingly, the men of the Revolution wished to make it impossible for Congress to imitate the example of England and play the tyrant. But if you * At one time the delegates to Congress from Massachusetts were ordered to write to the Governor as often as once a fort night, and at another a committee of the legislature was ap pointed to correspond with the delegates, who were expected to be minute in their accounts of what was done. 14 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. wish to make an abuse of power impossible, you must grant no power to be abused. This is why the United States, from 1781 to 1789 tried to govern with a govern ment that had no power to govern. The result was that by 1787 it had become clear to all thoughtful men that the nation was confronted with these alternatives; it must either give itself a real government or sink into anarchy; it must take the risk of arming its so called government with power, or sink, in the language of Washington, into wretched and contemptible fragments of empire. To create a real government was the work that called the Federalist party into existence. We do not need to be told by history that before our forefathers determined to make fundamental changes in their government, they tried to modify the Articles of Confederation so as to make it possible to get along with them. The conservatism of men of Anglo-Saxon blood, their distrust of untried experiments in matters of gov ernment would be sure to find expression in attempts to modify the existing system, hopelessly and irretrievablj' bad as it was, before radical changes were resolved on. We could also anticipate, in a rough and general way, the sort of modifications they attempted to make. The de fect in the system that made it a glaring impossibilitj' for it to live, was its failure to provide any means for rais ing money. The nation owed money; it could provide none to pay it. It had necessary current expenses; it could provide no means of meeting them. Naturally, there- HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 15 fore an attempt was made to patch up the existing sys tem in such a way as to make it possible to raise money. In 1781, before the Articles of Confederation had been ratified by all of the states. Congress passed a resolution recommending to the several states the indispensable ne cessity of vesting in Congress a power to levy a duty of five per cent ou imports, the money to be used in paying the debts incurred in the Revolution, and the power to cease when these debts were paid. tSes'of'con- Attempts to amend the A tides of Coi But since the Articles of Confederation were "=1°''''"°" framed on the theorj' that the states were independent and sovereign, and that their confederation was a sort of league or treaty into which each of them had voluntarily entered, no new article could be added without the con sent of all of the states. To add a new article, was, on the prevailing theory, to modify the treaty, and we can not modify a treaty without the consent of all the parties to it. When, therefore, Rhode Island refused to consent to the article, the scheme failed. In 1783, a new proposition was submitted to the states. They were asked to give Congress the power to levy a duty of five per cent on imposts for twenty-five years, the money to be used in paying the interest— not theprincipal — on the Revolutionary debt as it became due. Congress hoped that in twenty-five years they could sell western land enough to pay theprincipal, and they asked the states to provide "supplementary funds" to meet cur rent expenses. 16 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. By February, 1786, nine of the states had consented to the proposed article in such terms that Congress could act on it at once as soon as the other four consented. At the urgent request of Congress, three of the remaining four consented to it during the course of the year, but as the fourth. New York, qualified her consent with im practicable conditions, this plan also failed. The refusal of New York to grant the impost de cided the fate of the Confederacy. A government that cannot pay its debts, that cannot borrow money, that cannot provide for its current expenses, will not long keep up the farce of pretending to be a government, but whether even this would have sufficed to make the states abandon the wretched Confederation, it is impossible to say. The refusal of Rhode Island to assent to the article proposed in 1781, and of New York to the one proposed in 1783, with the reluctant consent of the other states, were only symptoms of a state of society more closely bordering on anarchy than any other this country has ever seen. Deluded as men are ever prone to be by names, many people imagined that with liberty secured, all the evils from which they suffered would vanish. Paper money P?''!y,'i'?"^f^ Ignorant of the fact that the excellence of a lUil't 16u to It, government consists largely in the means it provides that frugality and industry shall receive their due reward, there was a strong party in most of the states that looked to the government for measures to do away HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 17 with the necessity for these virtues. In spite of their exper ience with the paper money of 1779,when flour had sold for a dollar a pound and a hat for fifty dollars, this party in sisted that the state should make a lot of money and wipe out its debts at once. How absurd, they said, to toil till the bones are weary and the muscles ache when the state can so easily add to the wealth of the country by the manufacture of paper money. When we know that in seven states this party carried the day, and that in four others it was a strong minority, we can more clearly understand why the states paid so little attention to the requisitions of Congress, anfl why they were so reluctant to authorize the five per cent duty. For the great majoriy of the men who suffered from this paper money mania were deluded because they wished to be. They had been greatly impoverished by the Revolution. Their property had been seized by both armies and their commerce almost destroyed by the fleets of Great Britain. But the close of the war found them with very absurd ideas as to the immediate financial future of the country. Many of them supposed that Europe was about to inundate the country and thus raise the price of lands wonderfully. Deluded by these hopes and relying on the supposed value of the government securities which they possessed, and on their calculations as to the value of the produce of their soil when all restrictions were removed from trade, they went heavily in debt,and soon became hopelessly involved.* "See Marshall's Life of Washington, vol. V, 87-9. 18 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. The same causes that led to the paper money mania produced other effects of a kindred character. Where ever the debtor party was in power, laws were passed affording facilities for the payment of debts Laws passed hy ,. , . -, . , . . paper money or Suspending their collection, and remitting taxes, as well as for the manufacture of paper money. The result was a lack of confidence in the government which almost paralyzed business. So little confidence was felt in the government of the various states that in many of them owners of public securities had to lose from fifty to seventy-five per cent. So great was the fear that laws would be passed releasing men from the obligation to pay their debts, that in some states the notes of those whose ability to pay was undoubted, could not be negotiated except at a discount of from thirty to fifty per cent. In New Hampshire the influence of the debtor class induced the legislature in 1785 to pass a law making every sort of property a legal tender at an appraised value. But this only increased the distress. Credit could not be had when debts were to be paid in such a medium of exchange. This led to the calling of a convention which urged the government to issue Insurrection in . NewHamp- paper money. While the legislature was considering this request, a body of armed insurgents assembled at the seat of government and demanded immediate compliance with the request of the convention. "When General Sullivan, the president. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 19 undertook to expose the absurdity of their demands, he was interrupted with loud clamors for "paper money," "an equal distribution of property," "the annihilation of debts," and "a. release of taxes." The insurrection was suppressed without difiiculty, but it was significant of the tendency towards anarchy. But it was the conduct of the debtor class in Massa chusetts which more than everything else awoke the country to a realization of its condition. The burden of debt was particularly heavy shays' rebellion. in that state. At a time when business was almost at a standstill, it is estimated that there was an aggregate equivalent of a tax of more than $50 on every man, woman and child in the state. Enraged at the lawyers and judges who were fattening on their distress, the debtor class, in 1786, surrounded the court house in seven different counties, and in a number of instances prevented the courts from sitting. In December of that year, under the leadership of Daniel Shays, they had an army of fifteen hundred men in the field, and had it not been that Bowdoin, an energetic, statesmanlike man, was governor of the state, the insurrection might have terminated disastrously. But what gives it its special importance in history is that it made thoughtful men everywhere realize the ab surdity of looking any longer to the Confederation for any of the functions of government. When Action of con gress with ref- the news of the insurrection reached erence to shays' rehelliou. Congress in the fall of 1786, and when the 20 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. danger that the turbulent elements of society in New England might unite their forces and threaten the whole country, stared them in the face, they could do nothing but request the states to raise a body of troops. And as though this was not a sufficiently emphatic confession of their utter impotence, they did not even dare to say what the troops were to be used for, but pretended that they were wanted to protect western settlers against the Indians! That vote proclaimed the nothingness of Congress in terms that no one could misunderstand. With no power to execute laws, with no power to enforce the observ ance of treaties, with no power to collect taxes, with no means of paying its debts or providing for its current expenses, with no power to raise troops, with no power to use them when raised to protect a state from insurrec tion, it became clear that the experiment of the Confed eration had failed; it became clear that if we expect a government to discharge the functions of government, we must give it power to govern. When this became clear, a party was organized to give the country a govern ment. But the first thing to be done was to give it a constitution which would make a government possible. QUESTIONS.* 1. 'William G. Sumner (in his Life of Alexander Hamilton) says : "The Union was, from the start, at war with the turbulent, *Many of the questions on this aud subsequent chapters are not answered in the book. The student is, however, strongly urged to seek the answers to them because of the light they throw on the subject of it. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 21 anarchistic elements which the Revolution had set loose ;" ex plain and illustrate. 2. He says also : "The growth from a point at which some states united, up to the point at which there was a United States, constitutes the history of the Union ;" explain and illustrate. 3. The Connecticut act of 1776, in which the charter of that state was established as a constitution, contained the following statement: "This republic is, and shall forever remain, a free and independent state;" what does it show? 4 The constitution of Massachusetts, adopted in 1780, con tains the following article : "The people of this commonwealth have the sole and exclusive right of governing themselves as a free, sovereign and independent state ;" what does it show? 5. The constitution of South Carolina, adopted in 1778, contained the following article : " That the style of this country be hereafter the state of South Carolina;" what does it show? 6. A large number of the public men of the Revolutionary period, Washington among them, used the word " country,'' in speaking of their state ; what does it show ? 7. The text asserts that the Articles of Confederation were framed on the theory that the states were independent and sover eign ; were they really sovereign ? What constitutes the sover eignty of a people ? Is Canada sovereign? Switzerland? 8. What work was the Federalist party organized to do ? 9. Was the Congress of the confederation a government ? 10. What was meant by "requisition ? " 11. What is meant by "national self-consciousness ?" 12. What changes were proposed in the Articles of Confed eration, and why were they not adopted ? 13. What did the debtor classes in the several states attempt to do and why ? 14. What did Congress do when they heard of the rebellion in Massachusetts ? 22 HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. CHAPTER II. THE REVOLUTION OF 1787. IT WOULD be interesting, if it were possible, to trace from the start the steps that led to the calling of the Federal Convention. John Fiske thinks it grew out of a scheme of Washington's for connecting the east and the west by means of inland navigation. It is certain that no man in the country realized more clearly than Washington the importance of union. He knew that the war had been needlessly prolonged because there had been no central govern- Washington'sthtVast andweli "^^'^t Strong enough to call out the re- together, sources of the country ; and when the war was over he was far from thinking that the dangers that had threatened the country from its impotent govern ment were at an end. "Itis clearly my opinion," he wrote to Hamilton in 1783, " unless Congress have powers competent to all general purposes, that the disasters we have encountered, the expense we have incurred, and the blood we have spilt, will avail us nothing." He knew that the great obstacle in the way of conferring com petent powers on Congress was the feeling that it was a foreign government. It seemed to him, therefore, a mat ter of the first importance to bind the east and the west together by inland navigation. Make the various parts HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 23 of the country manifestly. one in interest was his thought; bind them together in an organic commercial whole, and they will soon seem to themselves one politically ; the senti ment of union will soon be developed. At a time when the south and west were in a ferment about the free navi gation of the Mississippi, he wrote: "I may be singular in my ideas, but they are these : That to open a door to, and make easy the way for those settlers to the westward, * * before we make any stir about the navigation of the Mississippi, and before our settlements are far advanced towards that river, would be our true line of policy." In consequence of his efforts, a company was organized in 1785 for extending the navigation of the Potomac and James rivers, and he was made president of it. But when John Fiske asserts that this led to the meeting of commissioners from Maryland and 'Virginia in 1785, he goes beyond the evidence. Washington's pub lished correspondence makes no mention of the visit of the commissioners, nor has any evidence been brought forward to show a direct connection between his scheme for binding the east and the west in a ° The steps that commercial whole, and the meeting, which na^pous conven- was the first link in the chain of events, that led directly to the constitution of the United States. Perhaps I,odge's assertion: "It (Washington's canal scheme) helped among other things to bring Maryland and "Virginia together," is as far as we shall ever be able to go. But whatever brought them together, their meeting was 24 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. the first step towards the constitution of the United States, The commissioners from those states met to form a compact between "Virginia and Maryland for the regula tion of the trade upon the Potomac and Pocomoke rivers, and the Chesapeake Bay. A compact was agreed upon to be submitted to the legislatures of their respective states. In the course of their discussions, the commission ers saw that it was desirable for the two states to have a uniform system in all that pertained to currency, duties, and commercial matters in general. They accord ingly recommended that each year two commissioners should be appointed to report upon the details of a system for the next year. The legislature of Maryland approved of the compact made by their commissioners. In considering the pro posed commercial commission, they saw that it was de sirable for Delaware and Pennsylvania to agree with Maryland and 'Virginia on a uniform commercial system. In their report to "Virginia, therefore, they recommended that Delaware and Pennsylvania be invited to send com missioners to the conference. And would it not be well, continued the Maryland report, to invite commissioners from all the thirteen states to attend the conference? James Madison was a member of the "Virginia legis lature, and the report from Maryland gave him an oppor tunity that he was eager to improve. He realized vividly the need of a stronger central government and had al- HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 25 ready prepared a motion recommending a convention of the thirteen states. It had been laid on the table. But when the report from Maryland was presented, it was taken from the table and passed. The resolution was passed January 21, 1786. It pro vided that commissioners from "Virginia should meet such commissioners as might by appointed by the other states "to take into consideration the trade of the United States; to examine the relative situation and trade of the said states, to consider how far a uniform system in their com mercial regulations may be necessary to their common interest and their permanent harmony ; and to report to the several states such an act relative to this great object, as when unanmiously ratified by them, will enable the United States in congress assembled effectually to provide for the same." The commissioners appointed by "Virginia in the circular letter which they sent to the several states pro posed that the convention should be held in Annapolis in September, 1786. It is doubtful whether anything would have come of the proposal, had not New York de feated the scheme to give Congress the power to levy an impost of five per cent for twenty-five years. The ac tion of New York certainly had one important result: the representation of New York at the con vention. When the legislature of that state rejected the revenue system, Alexander Hamilton and his friends ex erted themselves to the utmost to secure the appoint- 26 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. ment of commissioners from New York. They suc ceeded, and Hamilton himself was appointed as one of them. The convention met at Annapolis in September, 1786. As only five states were represented it did not venture to transact any business. Before adjourning, however, on motion of Hamilton, the con- What did the . , , ,i .. ,. ^ Annapolis Con- vention votcd to recommcud the states to vention do? send delegates to a constitutional conven tion to be held in Philadelphia on the second Monday of the following May, "to take into consideration the situa tion of the United States ; to devise such further pro visions as shall appear to them necessary to render the constitution of the Federal government adequate to the exigencies of the union ; and to report such an act for that purpose to the United States in Congress assembled as when agreed to by them, and afterwards confirmed by the legislature of every state will effectually provide for the same." The Articles of Confederation were supposed to be framed in harmony with the prevailing opinion that the states were independent and sovereign ; that the con federacy was only a league of friendship ; and that when the states entered into it they lost none of the sov ereignty and independence which, as they supposed, be longed to them before 1781, and which fiThe Artioiesoi belongs to all independent nations. In enu- Confederation. meratmg the defects of the Confederacy, HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 27 Madison said that the federal system was in fact "nothing more than a treaty of amity, of commerce, and of alli ance between independent and sovereign states." Never theless, the Articles of Confederation differed from an ordinary treaty in two particulars : first, they provided for a congress which was really nothing more than a "council of advisers ;" and second, they contained an agreement to ¦ the effect that each state would faithfully execute its recommendations. Since the Articles of Confederation were supposed to be a league or treaty of friendship between independent states or nations, they provided that the consent of all the states was necessary to their amendment. They provided, also, that the proposed amendment should be recom mended by Congress. But the motion offered by Hamilton and passed by the Annapolis convention, as we have seen, proposed that amendments to the Articles of Confederation should be recommended by a federal convention. Through the influence of Hamilton in New York, and Bowdoin in Mas sachusetts, this difficulty was to some extent obviated. The delegates in Congress from New York and Massa chusetts moved that that body recommend the conven tion. Congress voted that it was expedient that on the second Monday of May, 1787, a convention of delegates appointed by the states, should be held in Philadelphia "for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation." 28 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. Any changes in the Articles of Confederation which could fairly be called a revision of them had to leave two of its provisions untouched: first, that each Two fundamen tal ieatures of state should have one vote and no state more the Articles of Confederation. ^^^^ ^^^. secoud, that those changes should receive the assent of every state before going into effect for any of them. To make a constitution providing that some states should have more power in the govern ment than others, would strike at the fundamental principle of the confederacy — that the states were inde pendent and sovereign, and, as such, on a footing of per fect equality. To make a constitution providing that it should go into effect when adopted by any number less than the whole would be to assume that all of the people of the thirteen states could be controlled by a part; that in some respects, at least they constituted o?te people, and that the opinion that they were thirteen peoples was false. But when the Convention met it was evident, from the beginning, that all of the states would not adopt any con stitution it might make. Rhode Island had sent no dele gate, and even on the supposition that all the other states wv ^-^.v. could be induced to adopt it, which was Why did the con- ^ dSegardThelr" very Unlikely, there was every reason to suppose that Rhode Island, pursuing the selfish narrow policy that had directed her course since the close of the Revolution, would reject it. Moreover, the people of the large states felt the injustice of allow- HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 29 ing the small states to have as much power in the gov ernment as they had. To give to Rhode Island as much power as to Massachusetts, and to Delaware as much as to "Virginia, seemed absurd. Added to all this was the fact that the statesmen of the Convention saw that the radical difficulty with the government of the Confederation was that it dealt with states, not with indi viduals. It had no direct relations with individuals. It could reach them only through the roundabout and un certain way of the state legislatures. If it wanted money it had to ask the states to tax their citizens; if it wanted troops it had to ask the states to raise them. On the principle of the Confederation there was no way of rem edying this. On this principle, as we have so often seen, the states were supposed to be independent and sovereign. But no state that claimed to be sovereign could permit an outside or foreign government to come within its territory and control its inhabitants, without admitting that its sovereignty was nothing more than a shadow. These various reasons determined the ablest men in the Convention to disregard the Articles of Confederation from the start. They determined to make a constitution providing for a government, first, that acted directly on the people of the various states ; second, that gave to the states power in proportion to wealth or Revolutionary population, or both; and third, that should action ot the r sr ' Convention. be organized as soon as\ the constitution 30 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. had been adopted by some number less than the entire thirteen. This was nothing less than to propose a revo lution, radical and fundamental. The states that adopted the constitution the}' proposed to make were to abandon their claim to independence and sovereignty; were to permit an outside power to enter their territories and compel their inhabitants to do its will ; were to give up their claim to equality in the general government ; and the states that refused to adopt it, provided it had been adopted by the number agreed on by the Convention, were, without their consent, to have the so-called gov ernment under which they lived, the government of the Confederation, destroyed. To propose this, I repeat, was to propose not merely a radical and fundamental change in the government of the states; it waff to propose a revolution, a change not in accordance with the consti tution. If the Convention had frst resolved " that any mere revision of the Articles of Confederation would fail to meet the case, that a government must be provided for having direct relations with the people of the states, and that the necessities of the situation left no alterna tive but to say that a constitution providing for such a government should go into effect when it had been adopted by some number less than the whole of the states" — if the Convention had first resolved on this, and then applied in a legal way to their masters, the people of the various states, for authority to make such a con stitution, and if this authority had been granted, their HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 31 action in framing such a constitution would have been constitutional, as that of the states would have been in adopting it. However profound the change in the gov ernment the constitution they proposed to make might provide for, it would not have been a revolution, because, in the case supposed, it would have been a change in accordance with the constitution. The Congress of the Confederation had a right to recommend the legislatures of the various states to authorize their delegates to make such a constitution, and their legislatures had a right to authorize it. If Congress had so recommended and the states had so authorized, the convention would then have acted in accordance with the Articles of Con federation in transforming the character of the govern ment. Sent to Philadelphia though they had been for " the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation," they would have acted in an entirely legal way in disregarding their original instructions, be cause, in the case supposed, they had asked for new instructions and got them. But when, without such instructions, they disre garded the Articles of Confederation, their action was revolutionary, and every state that adopted the constitu tion, sanctioned their action and became a party to it. Every such state said that the theory of the Confedera tion, that the states were independent and sovereign, was false. For, according to the new constitution, the states were not equal. In the house of representatives 32 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. the states were to be represented in proportion to their population, and in voting for president, their power was to be in nearly the same ratio. The government called into being by the new constitution did not, like the Con gress of the Confederation, stop at the sacred boundary lines of the states. It boldly crossed the Rubicon ; it entered the territory of the states and was declared by the constitution within certain limits, and for certain purposes, the supreme authority there. Most decisive of all, every state that voted for the constitution declared that, in a matter of fundamental importance, a certain majority — nine was the number agreed upon by the con vention — could act for the whole. Nine states, said the constitution, and every state, that voted for it, said the same thing, could destroy the government of the entire thirteen. If, in a matter of such moment, a certain majority could act for the whole, why not in any matter ? Before the adoption of the constitution the states might put on the airs of sovereignty without making them selves ridiculous. But when they adopted it they tacitly confessed that the crowns of which they had boasted were but the creations of ambitious dreams, for they themselves had acknowledged the supremacy of the real sovereign.* Many members of the Convention knew very well that their action was revolutionary. Patterson, of New *See Burgess' Political Science, vol. 1, chapter II, pp. 98-108. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 33 Jersey, said, " We ought to keep to our lim its or we shall be charged with usurpation, ^*eeo"°'^'^ * * * We have no power to go beyond the federal scheme. A confederacy supposes sovereignty in the members composing it, and sovereignty supposes equality. If we are to be considered as a nation, all state distinc tions must be abolished, the whole must be thrown into hotchpot, and when an equal division is made there may be equality of representation." He urged that if the con federacy was radically wrong, it was the duty of the mem bers of the Convention to return to their states and obtain larger powers instead of assuming them without warrant. The friends of the constitution acknowledged in substance the truth of his contention. Gouverneur Morris declared that the Convention was unknown to the confederacy. In tones that must have grated upon the advocate of state sovereignty, he declared that the one people of the United States were the supreme authority, and that in case of an appeal to them, the federal compact might be altered by a majority of its citizens, precisely as the constitution of a particular state may be by a majority of its citizens. Randolph said, "When the salvation of the republic is at stake it would be treason to our trust not to propose what we find necessary." And Wilson said : "We must, in this case, go to the original powers of society. The house on fire must be extinguished ^j^^on^ °* without a scrupulous regard to ordinary rights." That was the situation in a nutshell. The 34 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. kouse was on fire, but to say that to extinguish it the Convention must go to the original powers of society was to say that the people of the thirteen states consti tuted one American people, not merely geographically, but politically, and that this was the sovereign whose word was law, and whose dispensing power was absolute. QUESTIONS. 1. In the ratification of the constitution by the 'Virginia convention in 1788, this sentence occurs: "That the powers granted under this constitution being derived from the people of the United States may be resumed by them whenever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression." In what sense was the phrase "people of the United States" evidently used ? Explain the significance of its use in such a sense. 2. In the Pennsylvania convention in 1787, James Wilson said : " My position is, that in this country the supreme, absolute and uncontrollable power resides in the people at large; that they have vested certain proportions of this power in tbe slate governments ; but that the fee simple continues, resides and re mains with the body of the people." What did he mean by the "people at large?" State accurately the relation between the "people at large,'' aud, first, the general government, and, second, the state governments ? 3. Why did Washington wish to connect the East and the West by means of canals ? 4. State the steps that led to the calling of the Annapolis convention. 5. What did the Annapolis convention do ? 0. How did the Articles of Confederation provide for their own amendment? 7. What characteristics of the confederation had to remain in any system which could be called a revision of its articles ? 8. What led the Convention to disregard them ? 9. What constitutes a revolution ? 10. Was the Federal Convention a revolutionary body ? State your reasons for your answer. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 35 11. Did they assume to be sent to Philadelphia by the Ameri can people to make a constitution ? 12. How might they have made their action constitutional ? 18. Were Patterson and Wilson both right in their conten tions ? 14. Explain the apparent contradiction ? 15. How does the constitution provide for its own amend ment ? What does that show as to the nature of the American government ? 16. If Rhode Island and North Carolina had not adopted the constitution would the general government have had the right to compel them to do it ? 17. Burgess says that the Philadelphia Convention " really exercised constituent powers when it framed an entirely new con stitution, designated the bodies who should ratify it, and fixed the majority necessary for ratification." What does he mean by "constituent powers ?" Is his statement correct ? 86 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIEa CHAPTER III. SOMB CHARACTERISTICS OF THB NEW CONSTITUTIOK. I UT WHILE the members of the Convention were B' divided on the question as to whether they should frame a constitution that they had no legal right to make, Anti-demo- there was one question on which they were llesSi'thilon- a unit. If there was a man in the Convention who did not believe that *. democracy was an impossible form of government, he was discreetly silent. On this point, men like Madison, who, excepting Jefferson, had more to do with organiz ing the Republican (Democratic) party than any other man, and Elbridge Gerry, Democratic vice-president in Madison's second term, and Dickinson, afterwards a prominent Republican (Democrat) in Delaware, and George Mason, whose devotion to state sovereigntj' was so strong that he would not sign the constitution and opposed it in the Virginia convention with all liis might, were in perfect accord with Alexander Hamilton, from whom they afterwards came to differ as widely as the poles.* Said Elbridge Gerry: " The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy." Said George Mason : "We have been too democratic." Said Edmund Ran dolph: "Every one admits that the evils under which *It is scarcely necessary to say that the present Democratic party was originally called Republican. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 37 the United States labor have their origip in the turbu lence and follies of democracy." And Madison, in words that ought to be treasured in the memory of every American voter : " In future times, a great majority of the people will not only be without landed, but any other sort of property. These will either com bine under the influence of their common situation, in which case the rights of property and public liberty will not be secure in their hands — or, what is more probable, they will become the tools of opulence and ambition; in which case there will be equal danger on another side." Said Roger Sherman: "The people should have as little to do as may be about the government. They want information and are constantly liable to be misled." Said General Pinckney: "An election of either branch by the people, scattered as they are in many states, is totally impracticable. I differ from gentlemen who think that a choice by the people would be a better guard against bad measures, than by the legislatures. A majority of the people in South Carolina were notoriously for paper money, as a legal tender ; the legislature had refused to make it a legal tender. The reason was that the latter had some sense of char acter, and were restrained by that consideration." So undemocratic was the Convention that there were many who opposed the election of the house of repre sentatives by the people. Elbridge Gerry was emphatic in his opposition. "The people do not want virtue," said he, " but are the dupes of pretended patriots." 3J HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. The government, therefore, which the conventioa wished to provide for was a republic, not a representa tive democracy. They wished to provide for a govern ment in which the power ofthe people would be exhausted in choosing some of the men who were to administer it and who were to execute its laws. They wished to have a government "that should rest on the solid foundation of the people." But the idea that the people should elect all of the officers of the government, repre sentatives, senators, executive, members of the Supreme Court, still more, that the officers of the government should be guided by anything but the constitution and their own judgment, was entirely foreign to the Conven tion. In 1789, when the constitution had gone into effect, and the qaestion of amendments to it was being discussed, one was offered asserting an express right in the people to instruct their repr,esentatives. It is safe to say that such a proposition would have found no favor in the Convention. We shall see more clearly the real uature of the government, which the Convention intended to create, if we look at the constitution in the light of proposals strongly advocated by some of its members. Some of them wanted the power of the people limited to the election of the members of the state legislatures ; the state legislatures to choose members of the lower house of Congress ; the lower house, the senate, and the two houses, the executive. So universal was the distrust of HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 39 a democracy that the wish to refine popular appoint ments by successive filtrations,* was unanimous, the only difference arising as to the extent to which this processs of filtration should be carried. We know that in fact the constitution did limit the direct power of the people to the election of merabers of the house of rep resentatives and presidential electors, although through what we may call the democratization of the government, they now practically elect the President, and exert an in creasingly strong influence over the election of senators. The first outline of the present constitution was in troduced by Edmund Randolph, governor of Virginia, though Madison was its chief author. The Virginia plan, as it was called, provided for a gov ernment with a legislative body of two J^n.^'''^*^^ houses in both of which the people were to be directly represented. Instead of giving each state one vote and no state more than one, the Virginia plan did not recognize the states. Each state was to be repre sented in both houses in proportion to its wealth or pop ulation. As it made states powerful in proportion to their wealth or population, the delegates from the larger states favored it, while those from the small states opposed it. Patterson, of New Jersey, proposed a plan more ac ceptable to the small states. His plan proposed a mere modification of the Articles of Confederation. Congress *This remark was made by Madison. 40 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. was to consist ol one body as under theAr- The New Jer- ticles, and each state was to have a single sey plan. vote. It provided for an executive council to be chosen by Congress, and for a federal judiciary. It also proposed to give Congress the power to regulate foreign and domestic commerce, to levy duties on im ports, and internal taxes, in the form of a stamp act. But the radical defect of this plan was identical with that of the confederation. Congress would still deal with states and not with individuals. It might pass laws for the reg ulation of commerce ; it might levy duties upon imports and impose internal taxes ; it might make treaties with foreign countries ; but the states could do as they pleased about executing its laws or collecting its taxes, or requir ing their citizens to observe its treaties. A government according to Patterson's plan would still be a " govern ment by supplication." But while the delegates from the small states could not controvert this, they in turn planted themselves on a fact which was equally undeniable; thatthe Objection to ... the Virginia Virginia plan was revolutionary, and that it put the small states at the mercy of the large states. Patterson said that "there was no more rea son that a great individual state, contributing much, should have more votes than a small one, contributing little, than that a rich individual citizen should have more votes than an indigent one. Give the large states an influence in proportion to their magnitude, and what will HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 41 be the consequence? Their ambition will be propor tionally increased, and the small states will have every thing to fear. Let the large states unite if they please, but let them remember that they have no authority to compel the others to unite. Shall I submit the welfare of New Jersey with five votes in a council where Virginia has sixteen ? I will never consent to the proposed plan. I will not only oppose it here, but on my return home will do everything in my power to defeat it there. Neither my state nor myself will ever submit to such tyranny." James Wilson, of Pennsylvania, asked in reply why 180,000 men in one part of the country should have as much power in the national legislature as 750,000 in an other part? "The gentleman from New Jersey is candid. I will be equally candid, the Virginia plan. I will never confederate on his principles." Neither side would yield ; the Convention seemed on the verge of dissolution. At last the delegates from Con necticut suggested a compromise. Let the national legislature consist of two houses, oS^to^e. they said. Let each state have a single vote in one, and let them be represented in proportion to their population in the other. This compromise was bitterly opposed by the delegates from the large states. The question was really decided by the votes of Elbridge Gerry and Caleb Strong, of Massachusetts. By dividing the vote of that state, there were five in favor of the com- 42 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. promise, and four against it.* Their reasons for their votes are instructive. "We are neither the same nation, nor different nations," said Gerry. "We ought not, therefore, to pursue the one or the other of these ideas too closely. If the Convention did not agree upon a compromise a secession would take place and some foreign sword would do the work." And Strong : "It is agreed on all hands that Congress are nearly at an end. If no accommodation takes place the Union must soon be dissolved." To prevent a dissolution of the Union, Strong and Gerry prevented the vote of one large state, Massachusetts, from being cast against the compromise which gave all the states the same amount of power in one of the houses of Congress. This was the first great compromise of the constitu tion : that which made the states equal in power in the senate. The next provided that five slaves should be counted as three persons in determining the number of representatives to which a state was entitled. Here again it was the "logic of facts," not the logic of principle that decided the question. Gouverneur Morris' speech was unanswerable. "Slavery is a nefarious institution," he said. "It is the curse of heaven on the states where it prevails. Upon what principle is it that slaves shall be computed in the representation? Are they men? * Rhode Island sent no delegates to the Convention ; those from New Hampshire had not yet arrived ; and those from New York were absent. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 43 Then make them citizens and let them vote. Are they property? Why, then, is ri^orsTavery.'"'" no other property included? The admis. sion of slaves into the representation, when fairly ex plained, comes to this, that the inhabitant of Georgia and South Carolina who goes to the coast of Africa, and, in defiance of the most sacred laws of humanity, tears away his fellow creatures from their dearest connections and damns them to the most cruel bondage, shall have more votes in a government instituted for protection of the rights of mankind than the citizen of Pennsylvania or New Jersey, who views with a laudable horror so nefar ious a practice. He would sooner submit himself to a tax for paying for all the negroes of the United States, than saddle posterity with such a constitution." That was the logic of principle. But the task set the Convention was not to make an ideal constitution for ideal people, but to make a con stitution for the people of the thirteen states. Nor was their task to make an ^e convlnt'on" ideal constitution for the thirteen states, but to make one which they would accept. To make a good constitution which they would not accept, was to leave them without any, and that meant anarchy. That was "the logic of facts," and it was that to which Rutledge, of South Carolina, gave expression when in discussing the third compromise he said : " Religion and humanity had nothing to do with this question. Interest alone is 44 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. the governing principle with nations. The true question at present is, whether the Southern states shall or shall not be parties to the Union." That was 2ave^^^°° the question, when provisions concerning slavery were under con.sideration. The logic of principle was unanswerable, but the logic of facts is always decisive with practical men when practical questions are under consideration. The Convention therefore agreed that five slaves should count as three citizens in determining the number of representatives to which a state was entitled. This was a compromise Jjetween the North and the South, but the third compromise, which forbade Con gress to prohibit the slave trade for twenty years, was a compromise between the New England commercial states and North and South Carolina and Georgia. The New England states wished Congress to have power to pass navigation acts by a simple majority. They had realized Compromise the ruiuous results of allowing the states to between com mercial states have power to regulate commerce. But the and three south- " ernmost states. Southern States were unwilling that Con gress should have power to pass navigation acts by a simple majority. They were afraid that the commercial states would get control of their carrying trade, and charge exorbitant freights on their rice, indigo and tobacco. Three of them, however, were determined not to relinquish the slave trade. Rutledge said: "If the Convention thinks that North Carolina, South Carolina HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. 45 and Georgia, will ever agree to the plan, unless their right to import slaves be untouched, the expectation is vain. The people of those states will never be such fools as to give up so important an interest." The New England states, accordingly, made a concession to the three southernmost states, without which it is reason,ably cer tain the constitution would never have been adopted, and they, in turn, made a concession to the commercial states. They agreed that Congress should have power to regulate commerce by a simple majority, and the com mercial states agreed that the slave trade should not be prohibited for twenty years. James Bryce calls attention to the fact that there are several remarkable omissions in the constitution. It contains no specific grant of power to the national gov ernment to coerce a rebellious state. Nothing is said as to the right of a state to secede, nothing as to the doc trine of state sovereignty. These omissions are signifi cant. The Convention framed a constitution by the adoption of which thirteen peoples, imagining themselves independent and sovereign, really acknowl- compromise between edged themselves to be but parts of a nationalism and state single political whole. But they did it sovereignty. unconsciously. They continued to think of themselves as sovereigns who had not abdicated their thrones, but who permitted an agent to exercise some of their func tions for them. If the constitution had contained a definite statement of the actual fact ; if it had said that 46 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. to adopt it was to acknowledge the sovereignty of the one American people, no part of which could sever its connections from the rest without the consent of the whole, it would probably have been rejected by every state in the union. These omissions we may call a fourth compromise, the compromise between state sov ereignty and nationalism. Without these compromises, as we have so often seen, the constitution would not have been adopted. But it is important to note that all of them except the first — that gave all the states the same power in the D ti uzin" S^^^t^ — proved to be denationalizing forces. o^these'^^ ° The adoption of the constitution gave to compro es. ^.^^ United States a government, substi tuted for the powerless jabbering Congress of the Con federation, a government with power to enforce its laws and compel its citizens to observe its treaties. It gave to the unity of the American people, which under the Confederation had been a mere idea, an objective exist ence among the institutions of the world. It came into contact with every citizen in the land, and tended to make him feel that the American government was his government, tended to make the idea of patriotism reach beyond .the boundaries of the state, and give it a reall}' national significance. But these compromises tended to perpetuate that feeling of separateness and isolatipn, that state selfishness or state patriotism, the prevalence of which made the period between 1783 and 1787 a danger- HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 47 ously critical period in American history. Separately, these compromises would have been comparatively harm less. But working together, they seriously threatened the existence of the union in 1820, 1833, and in 1850, while in 1861 they plunged the country into one of the most terrible civil wars known to history. That civil war was the price which the American people paid for their lack of national patriotism in 1787. With national patriotism enough to have had at heart the highest ulti mate good of the whole American people, the Convention would have framed, and the states would have adopted, a constitution without these compromises. But the actual alternatives were a constitution with these denationalizing elements or anarchy. The work which national patriotism might have done peacefully and with out loss, in 1787, was done at a terrible cost in the civil war. The constitution which was intended to be the great national charter of a free people is no longer dis figured by clauses recognizing slavery. The three* slavery clauses were blotted out of it by the blood of the men who fell in that terrible struggle. It is still silent as to secession and state sovereignty. But in the lurid light of the civil war, that silence is no longer misinter preted. All men now admit that practically if not theo retically — we think practically and theoretically — when the people of the thirteen states adopted the constitution *The third was the clause which provided for a fugitiva slave law. 48 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. of 1787, they acknowledged the unity and sovereignty of the one American people. The radical defect of the Confederation was its ina bility to execute its laws. The attention of the Conven tion was, therefore, early directed to some means ot Proposal to remedviug this. The Virginia plan, as in- give Congress ./ o <=. j. SS'onstuutlonai troduced by Randolph, proposed to give to states. ^ Congress the power to veto all unconstitu tional laws passed by the states, and all laws conflicting with treaties made in accordance with it, and to compel by force any state to do its duty as defined in the consti tution. The power to veto unconstitutional laws was at first agreed to by the Convention without dissent. Indeed, even this did not go far enough to satisfy some of its members. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney moved that the national legislature should have authority to negative all laws passed by the states which they should judge to be improper. Radical as this motion was, it was seconded by Madison, and advocated by some of the ablest men in the Convention. It received however, the votes of but three states, Virginia, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. But upon maturer reflection, the Convention decided that the states could be kept from violating the constitu tion and treaties and laws of the United States by means less offensive to the people. They decided to incorporate in the constitution aclause providing that the constitution and the laws and treaties made in accordance with it. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 49 should be " the supreme law of the land," and that the judges in every state should be bound thereby, "anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." The substance of this clause was introduced by Pat terson, in the plan which was intended to leave the princi ple of the confederation untouched. And no wonder, for it was substantially a repetition of the "promise" made by the states in the Articles of Confederation, to "abide by the determinations of the United States in Congress assem bled." Under the government of the Confederation, this promise had been of no value for the Confederation had no power to compel the states to keep it. But the crea tion of a national executive and judiciary made this clause in the constitution mean exactly what it said. The con stitution provided that the judicial powers should extend to all cases in law and equity arising under it, or the laws and treaties made in accordance with it. When, therefore, Congress or the legislature of a state passes a law which any one considers as encroaching upon his rights as guaranteed by the constitution, he can refuse to obey it on the ground that it is unconstitutional. The case so arising comes before the federal courts, and if they in the last resort declare the act unconstitutional, it is null and void so far as the particular case before them is concerned. There is nothing in the constitution to prevent the continued enforcement of the nullified law in all other 50 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. cases that are not brought before the federal courts. But the decisions of the Supreme Court are so universally re spected that they have "the force of a general rule," and no executive attempts to enforce a law in any case in which they have been pronounced unconstitutional.* Americans who are familiar with no constitutional system but their own, are apt to look upon Burgess on Su- the'united'* °' ^^^^ ^ ^ matter of course, but Burgess has states. shown us that this is far from being the case. "In England, France and Germany," he tells us, "such an effect is scarcely thought of. We have seen however, that the supreme court of England, France and Germany might deal with a particular case just as the Supreme Court of the United States deals with it, and that the legislatures of these respective States have only about the same powers of coercion over those courts that the Congress of the United States possesses. What, then, is it which causes this all important generalization to be made immediately and unconditionally from a spe cial decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, when such a generalization is scarcely dreamed of any where else?" " We must go back of statutes and cpnstitution for the explanation. Back of these, however, there lies nothing in the domain of political science but public opinion." It is, then, the feeling ofthe American people that law must rest upon reason and justice, that the constitution is a *See Burgess' Science and Constitutional law, vol. II, p. 327. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 51 more reliable statement of the principles of reason and justice, than mere legislative acts, and that the judiciary is a more trustworthy interpreter of those principles than the legislature — it is this feeling which has given such authority to the interpretation of the constitution by the Supreme Court. This feeling "has been awakened and developed by the fact that the political education of the people has been directed by the jurists rather than the warriors or the priests ; and it is the reflex influence of this education that upholds and sustains, in the United States, the aristocracy of the robe. I do not hesitate to call the governmental system of the United States the aristocracy of the robe ; and I do not hesitate to pro nounce this the truest aristocracy for the purposes of government which the world has yet produced."* QUESTIONS. 1 . What is the diflference between a republic and a repre sentative democracy? Which did the Convention aim to provide for? 2. How do you account for the pronounced anti-democratic tendencies of men like James Madison and Elbridge Gerry ? 3. Specify the various features of the constitution which show that it provides for a republic rather than a representative democracy. 4. Our governmental system is in fact much more demo cratic than the framers of the constitution intended it to be. State the reasons. 5. Contrast the 'Virginia and New Jersey plans. 6. What was the Connecticut compromise ? * Burgess' Political Science and Constitutional Law, vol. II, 52 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 7. Did the constitution, as Gouverneur Morris asserted, put a premium on slavery? 8. What was the compromise between the commercial states, and North and South Carolina, aud Georgia ? 9. State the three slavery clauses in the constitution. 10. Did the fugitive slave clause in the constitution author ize the capture of fugitive slaves, prior to the passage of a fugitive slave law ? 11. When was the first fugitive slave law passed ? 12. What was the compromise between state sovereignty and nationalism ? 13. Which ofthe compromises proved to be denationalizing forces, and why ? 14 What effect did the civil war have on the compromises of the constitution ? 1.5. How did the Convention at first propose to prevent the states from passing unconstitutional laws ? 16. 'What provision did they finally make to prevent it ? 17. 'What does Burgess mean when he calls the aristocracy of the robe the governmental system ofthe United States? HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. 53 CHAPTER IV. THE ANTIFEDERAL PARTY. THE Convention finished its work in September. The constitution was published in the newspapers of Philadelphia about the middle of the month, and then the contest between the Federalists and the Antifederal- ists began. The programme of the Antifederalists was purely negative. Like the Irishman, who said he was "ag^n the government, '' when he was asked as he landed Programme in New York what political party he be- oi the ^ -^ Antifederalists. longed to, they were opposed to the consti tution, and that was the only plank in their platform. We must be careful not to confuse them with the Republicans or Democrats who began to exist as a party about 1791. The questions at issue between the two parties in 1791 were entirely different from the single question which divided the Federalists and Antifederal ists in 1787. Shall the constitution be adopted? That was the one question at issue between the Federalists and the Antifederalists in 1787. But the questions that divided the Federalists and and KeputSL. Republicans in the administrations of Washington and Adams related to matters of finance and foreign affairs, and the proper interpretation of the 64 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. constitution. Indeed, two eminent men, Jefferson and Madison, were Federalists in 1787 and Republicans in 1791. They were Federalists when to be a Federalist meant to believe in the adoption of the constitution ; they were Republicans when to be a Federalist meant to believe in Hamilton's financial policy, and in an in terpretation of the constitution which tended, they be lieved, to the undue centralization of the government. We may divide the Antifederalists into three great classes. The first class was composed 'of men of the type of Patrick Henry, Luther Martin, George Mason, and Rawlin Lowndes. Feeling intensely that IStifeaCTlffcts ' ^^^^^ ^^^^^ '^^^ ^^^^^ country, and governed rather by feeling than by intellect, these men could not endure the thought that their state should submit to a government external, and therefore foreign to them. "What gave the Convention the right to say we the people, instead of we the states?" asked Patrick Henry. Seeing in the confederation a form of government in which the states were independent and sovereign, in which they submitted to no compulsion, they forgot its terrible defects, and lauded it as the most perfect govern ment in the world. Jefferson, who be it remembered, was Those who not an Antifederalist, said that to compare feared the con- SvlrtiS-ow t^^ *^^ government of the confederation with ments.^°^*™ the governments of the countries on the con tinent of Europe was like comparing heaven with hell. Jefferson was in France when he said that. His mind was HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 55 haunted by the thought of the suffering peasants of France, doomed by despotism to a life of unrequited toil. His countrymen were free; and to be free seemed to him in the presence of the victims of French despotism, the perfection of political blessedness. He forgot, and so did Antifederalists like Patrick Henry, that liberty pro tected by law is the only liberty possible to men ; that liberty unprotected by law is nothing but anarchy, and that anarchy inevitably results in tyranny. Antifederalists of this class objected to the constitution because they were afraid the government it provided for would abuse its powers. But the history of the confeder ation had shown that the only way to make an abuse of power impossible is to grant no power to be abused. The second class opposed the constitution primarily because of pecuniary considerations. I have already spoken of the paper money epidemic that spread over the country. That delusion, as we have seen, bade fair to take the country by storm in 1786. It captured the legislatures of seven states outright, and in- Those who op- ° posed the cou- trenched itself in such strong minorities in pecuni°ary'"^ four others, as to leave those who were able '¦^***''°'*- to think straight in mortal terror of the results of the next election. Now every advocate of paper money in the country was opposed to the constitution, because it forbade any state to make anything but gold and silver a legal tender for the payment of debt. There was another class who had pecuniary reasons for opposing the constitution. When the Revolutionary 56 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. war broke out, large sums of money, especially in the South, were due to British subjects. Under the govern ment of the confederation, no power outside of the state could compel the payment of them, whatever treaties might be made. But the new constitution as we know provided that itself, and laws and treaties made in ac cordance with it, should be the supreme law of the land. And the treaty made with Great Britian at the close of the Revolution, provided for the payment of the debts due to English citizens. The debtor classes in general tended instinctively to oppose the constitution. We have seen that under the government ofthe Confederation, whenever they got con trol of the state, they passed laws remitting taxes, afford- •ing facilities for the payment of debts, or suspending their collection, as well as for the manufacture of paper money. The party that opposed them, that insisted on the payment of debts, public and private, always wished to strengthen the powers of the central government while debtor classes as invariably opposed it. Oliver Ellsworth, of Connecticut, said in the Con vention, "The prevailing wish of the people of the Eastern (New England) states is to get rid of the public debt, and the idea of strengthening the national government carries with it that of strengthen ing the public debt." Before the constitution was framed, therefore, the material was ready for the organiza tion of the two parties — the one to secure and the other to prevent its adoption. It was not this or that pro- HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 57 vision in it which especially aroused the antagonism of the majority of those that opposed it. Its fundamental vice in their eyes was that it intended to create a govern ment — that it intended to put an end to that license of the confederation which was so rapidly degenerating into anarchy. There was a third class, small in number, but very influential, whose primary motive in opposing the consti tution was ambition. Demagogues like George Clinton, of New York, with no end in view but the advancement of their own personal interests, opposed the '^ > x-jT Those who constitution, because like Csesar they pre- ttoolfgh imbi- ferred to be first in their own state, to being *'°"' second in any other government. Anything, therefore, that tended to diminish the importance of their state,* tended to diminish the importance of the theatre upon which they hoped to act a conspicuous part. These various classes made the Antifederalists a very formidable party. For a considerable time, the friends of the constitution were in grave doubt whether its enemies would not succeed in preventing its adoption in Massachusetts, New York, Virginia, Rhode Island, and North Carolina. That they failed to do it is probably due to the effect produced by Shays' insurrection. That event, as we have seen, created a profound impression on the people of the entire country. It gave them an un pleasant feeling of insecurity. Like the flash of lightning that enables the belated traveler to see that he is walking 58 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. on the brink of a precipice, it burned into the minds of thoughtful men the fact that they were on the very verge of anarchy. But notwithstanding this, Massachusetts, which had been the theatre of the insurrec- ^^emon ^'^^^'^ tion, and which had suffered terribly frots the inability of the confederation to regulate commerce, ratified the constitution by a majority of only nineteen out of a total of three hundred and fifty-five votes. Small as the majority was, it was obtained onlj- through the exercise of great tact on the part of the Federalists. The convention was induced to ratify it only when it was agreed to accompany their The constitu- ._ . , , . j- tion in Massa- ratification by urgent recommendations ot chusetts. amendments by means of which the liber ties of the people could be more effectually secured. In New York, the constitution was ratified only through the exertion of the transcendent abilities of Alexander Hamilton. When the convention met, he found himself the leader of a minority of nineteen against a majority of forty-five. "Two-thirds of In New York, the Convention, and four-sevenths of the people are against us," he wrote. But he was, indeed, as Jefferson afterwards termed him, "the Colossus of the Federalists." He did not approve of the constitution. He rightly said that in the federal Conven tion no man's ideas were more remote from the plan than his own were known to be. But believing that the alternatives were anarchy and convulsion on the one HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. 59 hand, and a chance of good on the other, believing moreover that the fate of republican government for all time was at stake, he advocated its adoption with all the energy of which his ardent nature was capable. "With an eloquence," says John Fiske, "scarcely equaled before or since until Webster's voice was heard," Hamilton argued week after week until at last the leader of the Antifeder alists, Melancthon Smith, declared that he was convinced of the merits of the constitution, and that he intended to vote for it. When the decisive vote was taken, there was a majority of three for the constitution out of a total of fifty-seven. Small as the majority was, the Federalists had to pay a dangerously high price for it. They were obliged to recommend that a circular letter be sent to all the states recommending another Federal convention to consider amendments to the constitution. In Virginia, the result seemed more doubtful than it had done in any other state except New York. The abilities of the two parties in the convention were about equal. If, on the one side there were James Madison, Edmund Randolph, John Marshall and George Wythe; on the other, there were in Virginia. Richard .Henry Lee, William Grayson, George Mason, and most formidable of all, the great orator of the Revolution , Patrick Henry. The Federalists however, had the aid of the overshadowing influence of Washington. That probably decided the result. On the final vote, out of a total of one hundred and sixty-eight 60 HISTOR,Y OF POLITICAL PARTIES. votes, the constitution received a majority of ten. A change of ten votes in Massachusetts, two in New York, and six in Virginia would have prevented the adoption of the constitution in each of those states. What the final outcome would have been in such an event it is impossible even to conjecture. This much at least, it seems safe to say : Had any one of those states rejected the constitution, it would almost certainly have been rejected by more than four states. In North Carolina, the constitution was rejected by a large majority, and in Rhode Island no convention was called to consider it. When the constitution was adopted by eleven states, the Antifederalists attempted to get another Federal convention called in harmony with the recommend ation of the convention in New York. If there had been systematic, concerted action in this The Antif ederal- adoption'oftte direction, it seems impossible to doubt that constitution. ^^^^ ^^^^j^ ^^^^ Succeeded. The power ful minorities in Massachusetts, New York and Virginia, to say nothing of other states, combined with the ma jorities in Rhode Island and North Carolina, could cer tainly have effected this. But the antagonism of the party to national ideas, the emphasis which it laid upon the idea of the state as the country of its citizens, seems to have been an obstacle in the way of concerted action between the leaders of the party in different states. Indeed, to have admitted the necessity of such con- HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 61 certed action, would have been to admit a community, if not an identity, of interests, which was inconsistent with their fundamental principle. For how could it be necessary for the Antifederalists in the various states to act as one party, to pursue a common end, unless they had identical interests? And how could they have identical interests, if the name America had only a geo graphical significance ? When, in 1789, the attempt to secure another Federal convention failed, the Antifederalists ceased to exist as a party. That large numbers of them remained hostile to the new government is altogether probable. But their leaders seem for the most part to have taken the patri otic stand announced by Patrick Henry in the Virginia constitution : " If I shall be in the minority," he said, " I shall have those painful sensations which arise from a conviction of being overpowered in a good cause. Yet I will be a peaceable citizen. My head, my hand, my heart shall be free to retrieve the loss of liberty and remove the defects of the system in a constitutional way. I wish not to go to violence, but will wait with hopes that the spirit which predominated in the Revolution is not yet gone, nor the cause of those who are attached to the Revolution yet lost. I shall, therefore, patiently wait in expectation of seeing this government so changed as to be compatible with the safety, liberty and happiness of the people." It is pleasant to be able to say that in a few years Patrick Henry came to see that the cause of 62 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. those whb were attached to the Revolution was not lost when the constitution was adopted; that it was not neces sary to change the constitution in order to have a gov ernment compatible with the safety, liberty and happiness of the people. QUESTIONS. 1. 'What was the progi-amme ofthe Antifederalists ? 2. Why should not the Republicans be confused with them? 3. Enumerate the three classes of which they were com posed. 4. Contrast the character of the leading Antifederalists in Virginia with those in the northern states. 5. How do you account for it ? 6. Give an account of the struggle over the constitution in Massachusetts, New York and 'Virginia. 7. By what majorities was it carried in those states ? 8. There were three other states in which the Antifederal ists were a strong party. Name them. 9. In what section of the country were the Antifederalists stronger ? HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. 63 CHAPTER V. ALEXANDER HAMILTON. WITH the adoption of the constitution the first chap ter in the history of the Federalists closed. But the men who fought its first battle did not, like the Anti- federalists, lay down their arms when the Classes of which the. Federal par- victory was won. They had, indeed, con- ^hen the'const^ sisted of very different classes, and they adopted."^ had been influenced by very different motives. Among them were the commercial class, chiefly from New Eng land, who wished to have the constitution adopted be cause it proposed to create a government with power to regulate commerce, and because it prohibited the states from making anything but gold and silver a legal tender for the payment of debts. There were also the creditor classes, who had seen with dismay the tendencies of the states to repudiate all debts, public and private, and who hoped that a government with power to collect taxes would pay its debts, and check the repudiating propensi ties of the states. There were the planters of the South who looked to the new system to put an end to the finan cial depression, from which they, in common with all the owners of property in the country, had suffered. There was also a class deserving of special mention, because of the influence which they exerted on the future of the 64 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. party, the class who had been most reluctant to separate from Great Britain — some of them, perhaps, had never been willing that the country should declare itself inde pendent, but had pretended to be in order to save their estates from confiscation — the class who were ardent admirers of the British form of government, and who had most distrust of a government which derived its powers from the people.* Last but not least in impor tance, there was the small class whose hatred of anarchy made them, like Hamilton, regard a nation without a na tional government, as an awful spectacle ; the class whose national patriotism made them want a home, so to speak, for their feeling of nationality. These were the compo nents of the Federal party when it won its first victory. *"The Federal Convention was the work of the commercial people in the seaport towns, of the planters of the slave-holding states, of the officers of the revolutionary army, and the property holders everywhere. And these parties could never have been strong enough of themselves to procure the general adoption of the instrument which they matured, had it not been that the open insurrection in Massachusetts, and the assemblages threat ening to shut up the courts of justice in other states, had thrown the intermediate body of quiet citizens of every shade of opinion, in panic all on their side. It was under the effect of this panic that the delegates had been elected, and that they acted. * * Among the Federalists * * * were to be found a large body of the patriots of the revolution, aud a great number of the substan tial citizens along the line of the seaboard towns and populous regions. * * * But these could never have succeeded in effect ing the establishment of the constitution had they not received the active and steady co-operation of all that was left in America of attachment to the mother country, as well as of the moneyed interest, which ever turns to strong government, as surely as the needle to the pole." John Adams' Works, vol. I, pp. 441--443. Callender expressed the same opinion as to the influence of Shay's rebellion when he said that the constitution "was crammed down the gullet of America '' HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 65 Could they stand side by side when its next battle was fought? The second great question which the Federalists at tempted to answer was, "Shall the financial policy recom mended by Alexander Hamilton be adopted?" Before this question came before the country, the Federalists had indeed accomplished work of great importance under the new constitution. They had organized the government, having provided for a Secretary of State, of War, of the Treasury, and for an Attorney-General.* They had pro vided temporarily for the pressing needs of the treasurj' by imposing a duty on imports. They had put through Congress twelve amendments, ten of which became in corporated into the constitution. Most im portant of all, they had passed a Judiciary Judiciary Act. Act, one section of which provided that in all cases where the powers of the general government were called in question and the decision was unfavorable to them, an appeal might be taken from the courts of the state to those of the United States, thus making the courts of the general government the ultimate judge of its powers, and depriving the states of all power of effec tive resistance. But though the discussion of these measures, and the votes upon their passage showed wide differences of opinion, there was not that organized opposition to them *These offices were filled by Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, Henry Knox and Edmund Randolph, respectively. 66 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. which was necessary to make them party questions ; the opponents of them had not organized themselves into a party for the accomplishment of definite ends. When it is said that they were passed by the Federalists, no more is meant than that the majorities in favor of them were composed for the most part of those who had been elected to Congress as friends of the constitution. For until Hamilton submitted his financial policy to Second period in . the history of Cougress a dead issue was the only test of the Federalists. ° Federalism. Up to that time to be a Fed eralist meant to prefer the constitution to the Articles of Confederation. But when men had made up their minds as to this financial policy. Federalism acquired a new meaning; it meant to be a believer in this financial policy. And the significant thing to note is that some of the men who led in the opposition to Federalism in the second period of its history had been ardent Federalists before. Why was this ? Why was it that those who had agreed when the question was as to the adoption of the constitu tion were unable to agree when the question was as to the adoption of this financial policy? Why was it that they not only disagreed, but, as we shall see, so radically, that each party felt that the other was an enemy to the coun try ? To understand this, we must make some attempt to understand the greatest political genius which this country has so far produced, Alexander Hamilton. The life of this remarkable man reads almost like a HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 67 romance. Intellectually, we may almost say that he never had a boyhood. At Hl^t™''sUJe seventeen, we find him writing anonymous pamphlets of such ability that they were attributed to the most eminent men in New York ; at twenty-three, in the midst of the occupations and diversions of the camp, he found time to write a profound letter on the financial affairs of the Confederacy ; at twenty-five he traced with .such accuracy the defects of the miserable government of the Confederation that scarcely anything remained to be added, and sketched an outline of a constitution bear ing a remarkable resemblance to the one adopted seven years later; at twenty-six, a member of Congress; at thirty, ofthe Federal Convention ; at thirty-two, Secretarj' of the Treasury-, and from then until his untimely death at the early age of fortj'-seven, the life and soul of the Federal party. I know of no way in which one can get a more vivid idea of his wonderful ability than to see how constantl)^ Washington turned to him for advice, not merely while it was his ofiicial dut}', as Secretary of the Treasury, to give it, but when he had ceased to be a member of the cabinet. Scarcely any sub- upon^wTshtog- ject of importance presented itself to *"''• Washington after Hamilton had left his cabinet that he did not call upon Hamilton. Would Hamilton give him his opinion of Jay's treaty ? Would he suggest the sub jects he thought the President should treat of in his 68 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. speech to the two Houses of Congress? Would he ex amine the draft of the President's farewell address and submit such changes and additions as seemed to him desirable? — are samples of the requests which this re markable judge of men was constantly making of Hamil ton. The two men indeed were almost perfectly fitted to work together. Each supplemented the defects of the other. Washington's mind worked slowly, but his con clusions once reached were remarkable for their sound ness. Hamilton, on the other hand, was marvelously quick, but his judgment was in danger of being carried away by the ardor of his temperament. Washington was by no means remarkable for originality. His great power was displayed not in originating new ideas and expedients, but in determining their value when originated by others. Hamilton, with the possible exception of his great antago nist, Thomas Jefferson, was the most original political gen ius, the most fertile in ideas and expedients, the country has produced. In their temperaments, also, as well as in their intellectual character, the two men were almost perfectly adapted to work together successfully. Upon a temper less firm than Washington's, Hamilton's ardor might have exercised undue influence; but upon the self-poised character of Washington, it spent its force as vainly as the waves of the Mediterranean upon the rocks of Gibraltar. This young man of thirty went to the Federal Con vention with sharply defined and positive opinions, not HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 69 merely as to the disease from which the country was suffering, but as to the appro- demcKsracy."' priate remedy. He believed that the dis ease was democracy, and that the organs through which it had diffused its poison into the life of the nation were the state governments. To restore the patient to health he believed heroic treatment was necessary. Any treat ment that did not remove the cause of the disease, that did not apply the knife to democracy, would, he believed, result in ultimate failure. In a great speech six hours long, he urged the Con vention to frame a constitution completely subordinating the government of the states to the general government. The constitution that he ^ cEnventiiS. proposed, provided for an aristocratic re public, by requiring a certain amount of real property as a qualification for voting for President and Senators. The President and Senators were to hold office during good behavior. The state governments were to be sub ordinated to the general government by vesting in the President the appointment of the governors of the states and by giving to them the power of absolute veto in all state legislation. The Convention did not approve of his plan, but his ardent temperament made it impossible for him not to hope that his ideas might, to some ex- his opinion as to the influence of tent, be finally embodied in the new sys- construction and ' ¦' precedent upon tem. "You have made a good constitu- ^^^ constitution. 70 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. tion," remarked one of Gouveneur Morris' friends to him after the adjournment of the Convention. "That," re plied Morris, "depends- on how it is construed." No one realized that more clearly than Hamilton. He knew that as, on the one hand, powers actually conferred may be come obsolete through disuse, so the liberal construction of its powers might give to them a scope greater than those who framed it intended. In his speech in the Con vention he said whatever the powers conferred on the general government, "if it preserves itself, it must swal low up the state governments, otherwise it would be swallowed up by them." After the constitution had been adopted, he wrote a brief paper in which he said : "The object of a good administration should be to acquire for the Federal government more consistency than the con stitution seems to promise for so great a country. It may then triumph altogether over the state governments , and reduce ihem, to an entire subordination, dividing the large states into simpler districts. The organs of the general government may also acquire additional strength." * These opinions, frankly avowed in the Conven tion and doubtless freely repeated in private conversa tion, had an important influence on American history. Up to the time of the adoption of the constitution, James Madison, of Virginia, had worked side by side with Ham- * Italics are mine. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 71 ilton in the cause of good government. During those miserable years of the Confed- Mam^° """^ eration they had co-operated in the effort to promote every measure that held out any hope of con ferring adequate powers upon Congress. Together they had worked to secure the Federal Convention, and when it met, although they differed widely in their ideas of gov ernment, they had co-operated in securing a constitution which proposed to substitute a real government for the powerless Congress of the Confederation. Together, as sisted by. Jay, after the Convention adjourned, they wrote the Federalist, that remarkable series of essays explain ing and advocating the constitution, still used in some of our colleges as a text-book. But shortly after Hamilton became Secretary of the Treasury, he and Madison be gan to pursue different paths. When Hamilton out lined his financial policy, Madison, then in the House of Representatives, began to oppose it, and before two years had passed away, Hamilton's measures met with little opposition more pronounced and emphatic than they re ceived from his old political and personal friend. When Madison was an old man he explained the reason. "I deserted Colonel Hamilton," he said, "or rather he de serted me ; in a word, the divergence be- . Madison's expla- tween us took place from his wishing to nation of theu- divergence. administration, or rather more properly to administer the government into what he thought it ought to be; while, on my part, I endeavored to make it con- 72 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. form to the constitution as understood by the Conven tion that produced and recommended it, and particularly by the State conventions that adopted it." As to the original cause of the divergence, Madison was probably right, at least, to some extent — ^but to understand the ex tent of it, especially to understand the bitterness with which the two men came to regard each other, to un derstand why Hamilton in the latter part of 1791 came to believe "that Mr. Madison, co-operating with Mr. Jeffer son, is at the head of a faction decidedly hostile to me and my administration ; and actuated by views, in my judgment, subversive of the principles of good govern ment, and dangerous to the union, peace and happiness of the country,"* Madison's explanation is insufficient. Perhaps some light may be thrown on this subject by a study of the diary of a forgotten senator from Pennsylva nia, written the first two years of Washington's first ad ministration. QXIESTIONS. 1. State the various elements of which the Federalist party was composed. 2. Were the southern planters as solidly Federalists as the property owners of the country in general ? 3. What light does the Virginia convention throw on this question ? 4. Do you see any explanation of the fact that the admirers of the British constitution were universally Federalists ? 5. Why is it important to remember that they were ? 6. What was the Judiciary Act of 1789, and in what did its importance consist? * Hamilton's letter to Carrington in 1792. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 73 7. What did Hamilton think of democracy ? S. What kind of a constitution did he propose in the Con vention? 9. How did he think the constitution might be changed, practically, without amendment ? 10. Has it, in fact, been so changed? 11. What officer in the American government exercises most influence on the course of legislation ? 12. Is it the constitution, or usage and precedent that gives him that power ? 13. How did Madison explain his divergence from Ham ilton ? 14. If you thiuk Madison was truthful — as everyone does — would you accept his statement on this point as entirely conclu sive? Give your reasons for your answer. 15. What two periods in the history of the Federalist party have so far been spoken of*? 74 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. CHAPTER VI. A FORGOTTEN DEMOCRAT. TO UNDERSTAND how men like Madison, who had been conspicuous for their Federalism when to be a Federalist meant to believe in the adoption of the consti tution, came to co-operate in the organiza- The influence . _ , _ , , . of environment tiou of a party opposed to Federalism, when upon Madison. to be a Federalist meant to be in favor of Hamilton'^ financial policy, we must try to understand their environment. For Madison would never have op posed the measures of Hamilton so systematically and persistently as he did after 1791, had it not been for the nature of the influences brought to bear upon him. The men with whom he walked and talked, who wrote letters to him and to whom he wrote in reply, who visited him and whom he visited, the men above all upon whose ap proval he was obliged to depend for promotion, gave a certain set to his mind, a certain direction to his attention. They predisposed him to see all the difficulties on one side of the various questions that arose in their full force, and to minify those on the other. They put him on the alert for every attempt to enlarge the scope of the pow ers conferred upon the general government by construc tion; for every attempt to "administration" the govern ment from what it was intended to be to a government HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 75 with larger powers. To understand, therefore, the nature ofthe influences exerted upon him, it is desirable to under stand these men — to realize as clearly as we can, their atti tude towards political questions — what they hoped and what they feared from the government. This is the more worth while because, in the first place, the influences they exerted upon Madison were ex erted also upon a man of greater force — Thomas Jeffer son, a man whose temperament and cast of ^^y important mind would probably have decided him to Mad?«fn^s'eSvi- . . ronments? oppose the measures of Hamilton inde pendently of such influences, although it is quite impos sible to imagine him the leader of a forlorn hope. In the second place, when we understand these influences, we shall see the material that was already for organiza tion into an anti-Hamiltonian party. To this end, I pro pose to cite numerous quotations from the diary of William Maclay, Senator from Pennsylvania from 1789 to 1791. This diary was written with no thought of publi cation. Every line of it contains intrinsic evidence of being the expression of the author's sincere opinions. These opinions do indeed represent only one of the two phases then dominant in the political thinking of Vir ginia ; her antagonism to a strong central government, her jealousy of every assumption of federal power. The peculiar opinions known as Virginia Republicanism, opinions with which we shall hereafter become ac quainted, found no expression in Maclay's diary. But 76 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES these opinions, as we shall see, chiefly diverged from the Democracy of which Senator Maclay was Democracy and . , Vttginia Kepub- SO vigorous au exponent, so long as it was licanism. not in power, in matters of foreign policy. So far as domestic affairs were concerned, the Democracy of Maclay and the Republicanism of Virginia were in substantial agreement as long as they were an opposition party merely. When the one party of which they were the component elements got possession of the gov ernment, the question had then to be settled, as we shall see, as to which of the two was to determine its policy ; whether the government was to be administered in har mony with the ideas of Democracy, or whether it should follow the path marked out by Virginia Republicanism. One further preliminary remark is necessary : I shall cite quotations from his diary, ranging over the entire two years of his senatorial service. I shall therefore, depart from a chronological order, stating his opinions on matters which we have not yet reached in the course of our story in order that the nature of the influences that were hostile to the policy of the new government may be presented in a single view. April 25, 1789, he records Vice President John Adams as saying, "Gentlemen, I do not Adam^on titles, kuow whether the framers of the con stitution had in view the two kings of Sparta or the two consuls of Rome when they framed one to have all the power while he held it, the other to do nothing." HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 77 April 30: "The Senate returned to their chamber after service, found and took up the address.* Our Vice- President called it his Most Gracious Speech. I looked all around the Senate. * * * i must speak or no body would. "Mr. President, we have lately had a hard struggle against kingly authority. The minds of men are still heated ; everything related to that species of government is still odious to the people. The words pre fixed to the President's speech are the same that are usually placed before the speech of his Britannic Majesty. I consider them improper." May 5 : "Title selected for our President was 'Elective Majesty.' " May 7 : "There are three ways," said our Vice President, "in which the President may communicate with us ; one is personally. If he comes here we must have a seat for him. In Eng land it is called a throne." May 14 : "Through all this base business (about titles) I have endeavored to mark the conduct of General Washington. I have no clue that will lead me fairly to any just conclusions as to his sentiments." June 5 : " Levees may be extremely useful in old countries where men of great fortunes are collected, as they may keep the idle from ^^^i^^""'^ being much worse employed, but here I think they are hurtful. * * * Indeed, from these *He refers to the address of the President at the opening of the two houses of Congress. Instead of sending a message to Congress at the opening of that body, the first two presidents de livered an address. 78 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. small beginnings I fear we shall follow, nor cease till we have reached the summit of court etiquette, and all the frivolities, fopperies and expenses practiced in European governments. I grieve to think how many individuals are aiming at these objects with unceasing diligence."* June 14 : " My mind revolts in many instances against the constitution of the U. S. I am afraid it will turn out *The account given of Washington's levees by Sullivan, in his Familiar Letters, enables us to understand why Democrats like Maclay did not take kindly to them. "Washington devoted one hour," says Sullivan, "every other Tuesday, from three to four, to these visits. He understood himself to be visited as President of the United States, and not on his own account. He was not to be seen by anybody and everybody, but required that everyone who came should be introduced by his secretary, or by some gentle man who knew himself. * * * At three o'clock or at any time within a quarter of an hour afterwards, the visitor was conducted to the reception room from which all seats had been removed for the time. On entering, he saw the tall, manly figure of Washing ton clad in black velvet; his hair in full dress, powdered and gathered behind in a large silk bag ; yellow gloves on his hands, holding a cocked hat with a cockade in it, and the edges adorned with a black feather about an inch deep. He wore knee and shoe buckles, and a long sword, with a finely wrought and polished steel belt which opened at the left hip ; the coat worn over the sword so that the belt and the part below the folds of the coat be hind were in view. The scabbard was white polished leather. He stood always in front of the fireplace with his face towards the door of entrance. The visitor was conducted to him, and he re quired to have the name so distinctly pronounced that he could hear it. * * * He received his visitor with a dignified bow, while his hands were so disposed as to indicate that his salutation was not to be accompanied with shaking hands. This ceremony never occurred in these visits even with his most near friends, that no distinction might be made. As visitors came in they formed a circle around the room. At a quarter past three the door was closed. He then began on the right and spoke to each, calling him by name and exchanging a few words. When he had completed his circuit, he resumed his first position. The visitors approached him in succession, bowed and retired. By four o'clock this ceremony was over." Long after the death of Washington, Jefferson wrote, "I was ever persuaded that a belief that we must at length end in some- HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 79 the vilest of all traps that ever were set to ensnare the freedom of an unsuspecting people. Trea- r . TT • 1 Treaty provis- ties passed by the executive of the United ions of the con stitution. States are to be the law of the land. To cloak the executive with legislative authority is setting aside our modern and much boasted distribution of power into legislation, judicial, and executive. It contradicts all the modern theory of government and in practice must be tyranny." June 16: "Grayson (of Virginia) made a speech on the Judiciary Bill.* "The matter predicted by Mr. Henry (Patrick) is now coming to pass ; consolidation is the object of the new government and the first attempt will be to destroy the Senate, as they are the representatives of the state legislatures.'' Judiciary act. June 17 : "I opposed this bill from the be ginning. It certainly is a vile law system, calculated for expense and with a design to draw by degrees all law business into the Federal courts. The constitution is meant to swallow all the state constitutions by degrees, and thus to swallow by degrees all the state judiciaries. Of all the members of the House, the conduct of Patterson has surprised me most. He has been character- thing like a British constitution, had some weight in his adoption of the ceremonies of levees, birthdays, pompous meetings with Congress, and other forms of the same character, calculated to prepare us gradually for a change which he believed possible, and to let it come on, with as little shock as might be to the public mind." *See page 65. 80 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. ized to me as a staunch Republican man and gentiine Whig. Yet he has in every Republican question deserted us and in some instances betrayed us." (Note the use of the word "Republican" as a party epithet.) Sept. 18 : "By this and yesterday's papers France seems travailing in the birth of freedom. God give her a happy delivery. Royalty and nobility and the vile pag eantry by which a few of the human race lord it over and tread on the necks of their fellow-mortals seem likely to be demolished with their kindred Bastile which is said to be laid in ashes. Ye Gods ! with what in- FrenchRevoiu- (jig^atiou do I think of the late attempts of some creatures among us to revive this vile machinery ! O Adams, Adame, what a wretch art thou !" Jan. 12, 1790: "I made an unsuccessful motion when it was proposed, that the whole Senate should wait on the President with answer to the speech.* First, I wished for delay that we might see the conduct adopted by the House of Representatives. I thought it likely they would do the business by committee. I wished to imitate them. I, as a Republican, was, however, opposed to the whole trick of echoing speeches." Jan. 14: "It is evident from the President's speech that he wishes everything to fall into the British mode of business. I have directed the proper officers to lay before *He refers to a custom in the first three administrations of framing au answer to the president's speech on opening the two houses of congress. Each house made its own answer. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 81 you, etc. The compliments for him and business for them. He is but a man, but really a good one, and we can have nothing to fear from him ; but much from the precedent he may establish." "The extraordinary rise of certificates (of the public debt) has been remarked for some time past. This could not be accounted for neither in Philadelphia nor elsewhere. But the report from the oi^certmcliteL"^ treasury explained it all. Hamilton recom mends indiscriminate funding and in the style of a British minister, has sent down his bill.* 'Tis said that a com mittee of speculators could not have framed it more for their advantage. It has occasioned many serious faces. I feel so struck of an heap, I can make no remark on the matter." (These certificates had depreciated to 20, 16, 12 and even 7 cents on the dollar.) Jan. 15: "The business of yesterday will, I think damn the character of Hamilton as a minister forever. It appears that a system of speculation for the engrossing of certificates has been carrying on for some time. Whispers of this kipd come '^^^1^^^'^°^ from every quarter. Dr. Elmer told me that Mr. Morrisf (Robert) must be deep in it, for his partner, Mr. Constable of this place, had one contract for more than $40,000 worth. There is no room to doubt that a connection is spread all over the continent in this *Seepage 91. tHe was a Senator from Pennsylvania. 6 82 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. villainous business. The Speaker gives me this day his opinions that Mr. Fitzsimmons was concerned in the business. Hawkins, of North Carolina, cCTtaicat'es" '° ^^^^ ^^ ^^ came up he passed two expresses with very large sums of money on their way to North Carolina for purposes of speculation in cer tificates. Wadsworth has sent two small vessels for the southern states on the same errand. I really fear the members of Congress are deeper in this business than any others. Nobody doubts but all connection originated from the treasury."* March 22: "I went with Mr. Wynkoop to visit Mr. Carroll of Carrollton; we got on the subject of the state of Carolina having z«j/r7^(:/^a? their representatives. Could any hint have gone from here, said he, to set them Instruction of . senators by state on this measure? This question raised the legislature. following train of ideas in tny mind: Fitz simmons is gone to prevent a similar measure in Penn sylvania, and I am suspected of having given hints to set such a measure going. Perhaps something of this kind may be alleged against me with justice. The doc trine, of instruction may certainly be carried so far as to be in effect the tribunitial veto of the Romans, and reduce us to the state of a Polish diet. But it is introduced. Perhaps the best way is for all the states to use it, and the general evil, if it really should be one, will call for a remedy. But here is a subject worthy of inquiry. Is it *This suspicion was entirely unfounded. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 83 to be expected that a federal law passed directly against the sense of a whole state will ever be executed in that state? If the answer is in the negative, it is clearly better to give the state an early legislative negative than finally let her use a practical one which would go to the dissolution of the union." March 30 : "The bill for the military establishment took up the rest of the day and was finally »T», • 1 ... Tendencies of committed to seven members. This bill the new govern ment. seems laying the foundation of a standing army." April 15 : "Infatuated people that we are ! The first thing done under our new government was the cre ation of a vast number of offices and officers. A treas ury detailed into as many branches as interest could frame. A Secretary of War with a host of clerks, and above all a Secretary of State, and all these men labor in their separate vocations. Hence, we must have a mass of national debt to employ the treasury; an army for fear the department of war would need employment. Foreign engagements, too, must be attended to keep up the consequence of that Secretary. The next cry will be for an admiralty. Give Knox his army and he will soon have a war on hand; indeed, I am clearly of the opinion that he is aiming at this even now, and that, few as the troops that he now has under his direction, he will have a war in less than six months with the southern Indians." ^Entirely unprovoked by the IndiaiiS, of course!) •84 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. April 26: "We did not continue in our seats for more than three-quarters of an hour till King moved an adjournment. Modesty by degrees begins to leave. We used to stay in the Senate till about two o'clock whether we did anything or not, by way of seMt^e^°'*^^ keeping ftp the appearance of business. But even this we seem to be getting over." (Members of congress were paid five dollars per day. and thrifty Senator Maclay thought they ought to put in full time so as to earn their money. The same criticism was general in Virginia, as one of Washington's correspond ents assured him.) April 27: "Langdon, of New Hampshire, wants to make the assumption of state debts the condition of re moving Congress. He avowed in the most unequivocal manner that consolidation of the different governments was his object in the matter." May 1: "The assumption of state debts would have completed the pretext for seizing every resource of gov ernment and subject of taxation in the union, so that even the civil lists of the respective governments would have to depend on the federal treasury." May 5: "Baron Steuben is supported in a demand of near six hundred guineas a year. In fact, to over whelm us with debt is the endeavor of every creature in office, for fear, as there is likely to be no war, that if there should be no debt to be provided for, there would be no business for the general government with all this HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 85 train of officers. The sooner no business, the better." May 6 : "I joined the committee on the bill for the salaries of ministers, plenipotentiaries, charge d' affairs, etc. I bore my most pointed testimony ..,.,.,- , ,, ,_ Maclay on min- agamst this kind of gentry ; declared I isters to foreign countries. wished no political connection with any other country. Our commercial intercourse could be well regulated by consuls who would cost us nothing." December 14: "If there is treason in the wish I re- retract it, but would to God this same General Washing ton were in heaven ! We would not then have him brought forward as the constant cover to every uncon stitutional aud unrepublican act." December 31: "A system is daily developing itself which must gradually undermine and finally de stroy our so much boasted equality, liberty and repub licanism — high wages, ample compensa- Extravagance sf tions, great salaries to every person con- the new govem- nected with the government of the United States. The desired effect is already produced ; the frugal and parsimonious appointments of the indi vidual states are held in contempt. Men of pride, ambi tion, talents, all press forward to exhibit their abilities on the theatre of the general government — Grade first. Second grade — To create and multiply officers and ap pointments under the general government by every possi ble means in the diplomacy, judiciary and military. This 86 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. is called giving the President a respectable ^trona"e*' patrqnage — which I take to mean no more and no less than that the President should always have a number of lucrative places in his gift to reward those members of Congress who may promote his views, or support his measures, more especially if by such conduct they should forfeit the esteem of their con stituents. We talk of corruption in Great Britain. I pi ay we may not have occasion for complaints of a sim ilar nature here. Respicefinem as to the third." Jan. 27, 1791 : "When the matter of no discrimina tion was carried in Congress, in the first session, I could hardly suppress the thought that some S|?and*°^ persons wished to destroy the confidence between us and France, and bring us back to the fleshpots of British dependence." Feb. 1 : "This day I had much to say against the report of a committee, which went to declare war against the Algerines. It is not a suspicion that the designs of the court are to have a fleet and army. Madayon n\-, -r -,¦ . r -, r- . . .. war wun Al- The Indian war is forced forward to i ustify giers. _ •' -^ our having a standing army, and eleven unfortunate men, now in slavery in Algiers, are the pre text for fitting out a fleet to go to war with them. 'While fourteen of those captives were alive, the barbarians asked |85,000 for them ; but it is urged we should ex pend $600,000, rather than redeem these unhappy men." (It seemed poor economy to Senator Maclay to spend HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 87 $500,000 in compelling the Algerines to give up the American citizens, rather than pay $35,000 as a ransom !) "I vociferated against the measure and I suppose offended my colleagues. This thing of a fleet has been working among the members all the session." Feb. 11 : "The obnoxious clause in the Excise Bill was the putting it in the power of the President to form districts by cutting up the states, so as to pay no respect for their boundaries. King (Rufus) de clared " we had no right to pay any more Excise. attention to the state boundaries than to the boundaries of the Cham of Tartary." Annihilation of the state governments is undoubtedly the object of these people. The late conduct of the state legislatures has provoked them beyond bounds. With these two en gines, an army and a navy, and the collateral aid derived from a host of revenue officers, farewell freedom in America !" In almost every important particular, these extracts indicate the attitude of the Republican party organized in 1791 and 1792 by Jefferson and Madison in opposition to the party of Hamilton. A morbid dislike of titles and presidential levees and speeches and f^e^en'Mac^ of everything that savored in the remotest a^^he'creed . * , ot the Repuh- degree of monarchy ; a morbid distrust of ucan party. the general government, a disposition to consider all its acts not from the point of view of their expediency, but of their capacity to enhance its power and importance, to 88 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. consider its very moderate and modest military establish ment as evidence of an intention to create a standing army, its Indian and Algerine wars as waged not to de fend America against the outrages of savages and and pirates, but in order to fasten a permanent debt on the country and supply the means of corrupting Con gress ; an intense dislike of a navy as a natural foe to liberty ; a disposition to regard France as representing liberty, and England, tyranny ; above all, a disposition to regard the general government as a foreign government, and, therefore, to consider anything that looked like an encroachment on its part upon the state governments, as an attack upon libertj', — all these were eminently char acteristic of the Republican party, and were probably characteristic of the majority of the American people in 1790 and 1791. The attitude of Senator Maclay towards Hamilton's financial policy was also characteristic of the Republi can party. Not a line did the good senator write in Ground of ob- Commendation of the fact that Hamilton's jection to Hamilton's policy at least restored the credit of the financialpolicy, country. That feature of it was entirely concealed by two facts : (1) That it might be used as a means of corrupting members of Congress, and (2) that it had an undoubted tendency to strengthen the gen eral government. Better a thousand times he seems to to say, that the debt of the government should not be paid, that it should not keep faith with its creditors. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 89 than that it should furnish the means of corrupting Congress, and of increasing the power of the central government. In three other particulars these extracts are worthy of careful note. They show that the independence and sovereignty of the state still seemed a living fact to their author. He could scarcely conceive that a federal law "passed directly against the sense of a whole state could ever be executed in that state." They show also that though he disliked the general government exceedingly, he acquiesced in it as necessary, and aimed only to con fine its action within such limits as to prevent it from encroaching upon the states. Finally, they show that if he and those who thought with him had a morbid fear of the general government, that Hamilton was not the only Federalist who had a morbid distrust and dislike of the governments of the states. Indeed, the spring of all the bitterness and intensity of party passion that soon set the American people beside itself, was this : Each party regarded as the paramount and supreme necessity what the other regarded with morbid distrust and fear. Ex perience has shown that neither the state nor the general governments, as their powers are determined by the con stitution, are to be regarded with distrust and suspicion. But the Americans of 1790 had no experience to guide them. QUESTIONS. 1. How does one's environment influence his opinions.' 2. 'Why is it especially important to understand Madison ? 90 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 3. What was the difference between Northern Democracy and 'Virginia Republicanism ? 4. Why, in your opinion did Maclay find Adams' opinions on titles offensive ? 5. Why do you think he objected to Washington's levees ? 6. How did Jefferson explain Washington's ceremony ? 7. Why did Maclay object to the treaty clauses of the Con sti tutiou? 8. Do you know any attempt made by the Republicans in Washington's second administration in harmony with this objec tion? 9. What was the Judiciary act and why did he object to it? 10. Why did he object to Washington's speeches and the answers made by the two houses of Congress ? 11. What were the certificates of which he spoke and what was the extent of their depreciation ? 12. Why was he in favor of instructing Senators ? 13. What did he think of the new government ? 14. What did he think of sending ministers to foreign countries? Of the extravagance of the government? Of the excise ? Of war with Algiers ? 15. What was his opinion of state sovereignty ? HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 91 CHAPTER Vll. THE FEDERALIST FINANCIAL POLICY. THE LOVE of justice, stability and order was the leading trait in the political character of Alexander Hamilton. It was this that led him to wish to subject the government of the states to the Federal government : The experience of the confederation, he Leading trait in thought, had proved that they could not be Hamilton's char- trusted to do justice, to promote stability, and to preserve order. In many of the states, during the period ofthe confederation, the owners of state debts had to lose from ten to seventeen shillings in the pound because the state government refused to enact laws which would insure justice to the holders of their securities. The same trait led him to desire an aristocratic repub lic. He thought none but property holders could be trusted to do justice to the rights of property. The objects of his financial policy were clearly stated in his first report upon the public credit, submit ted to Congress in January, 1795, the re port which Senator Maclay said would anlnciaTpoiicy. damn his character as a Secretary forever. He says: "To justify and preserve the confidence of the most enlightened friends of good government; to pro mote the increasing respectability of the American name; 92 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. to answer the calls of justice; to restore landed property to its due value; to furnish new resources both to agri culture and commerce ; to cement more closely the union of the states; to add to their security against foreign attacks; to establish public order on the basis of an upright and lib eral policy; — these are the great and invaluable ends to be secured by a proper and adequate provision at the present period for the support of the public credit." The clauses which I have italicized state the leading objects which he had in view. Men as fair as Madi son undoubtedly believed that he had another ob ject more fundamental than any of them — the administra tion of the government from what the Convention ' in tended it to be, to what he wished it to be. But I find no convincing evidence that this is so. Alarming as Hamilton's interpretation of the constitution seemed to tl?S^tation°of Jefferson and Madison, the student of his- and thedeSsions tory must remember that in almost every of the Supreme . . , , . . . , Court. important particular his interpretation has been borne out by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. That Hamilton was intent upon vindi cating for the general government every power conferred upon it by the constitution is certainly true, but no more than that can be safely asserted. The quotations made from him on a preceding page may indeed seem to con tradict this.* But what he thought desirable is not to be taken as evidence of what he actually attempted to do. * See page 70. HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. 93 Sumner truly says : "The contest with anarchy and repu diation was the great work which went to the making of the nation at the end of the last century, and Hamilton was one of tbe leading heroes in it." One of the means which he employed was the in troduction of a policy which arrayed on the side of gov ernment and stability, and order, a large part Hamilton's flnan- of the wealth ofthe country. We know how the tendency to anarchy. feeble was the sense of public honor at that time ; we know that there was a strong paper money party in most of the states; that the states would neither pro vide for their own debts nor those of the Confederation; that many of them passed laws providing for the stay of legal proceedings for the collection of debts and for the suspension of taxes. We have seen a powerful rebellion break out in Massachusetts whose object was the en thronement of anarchy. The question which confronted the new government was. Could this disintegrating, re pudiating, anarchistic spirit be successfully encountered? It had to answer that question successfully in order to live, and to help it to do it was the great object of Hamil ton's financial policy. He felt that if he could array the wealth and the intelligence of the country upon the side of the government; if he could concentrate the interest and the energies of the influential classes upon a single object, focus them upon a single point, the victory would be sure. 94 HISTORY OK POLITICAL PARTIES. To this end, he recommended (1) the payment of the foreign debt in full ; (2) the payment of the domestic debt in full, interest and principal to those who held the certificates of debt, whether original holders Sc^^enda- or uot ; (3) the assumption of the debts of tions. . , T. 1 i- the states, incurred during the Revolution ary war ; (4) an excise on distilled spirits ; (5) the in corporation of a national bank ; (6) a protective tariff.* There were no differences of opinion in Congress as to what should be done about the foreign debt. All agreed that it must be paid in full. The action of the various state legislatures during the period of the Con federation does indeed plainly show that they were ready enough to find excuses for not paying it if they could. The unanimity, therefore, with which the proposition to pay it was agreed to by Congress rather indicates the difficulty of finding plausible reasons for evading these ob ligations than the existence of a strong public opinion in favor of meeting them. But when the second question arose — as to the pay ment of the domestic debt in full to those who held the certificates of debt — there were plausible reasons enough for opposing it. The men who held them were not for the most part those to whom they had been * The first three recommendations were made in the report .submitted in January, 1790; the fourth and fifth were made about the close of the year ; the sixth about a year after the fourth and fifth. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 95 originally given. The original holders were old soldiers and men who had fur- and against dis crimination, nished the armies of the Revolution with supplies for carrying on the war. They had sold them to their present holders at a terrible discount, sometimes as low as one-sixth of their face value. Why should the government give them more? Because it had agreed to do it, replied the friends of Hamilton, because not to do it would be a breach of contract. The government had promised to pay the original holders of the certificates, or those to whom they might be assigned, their face value, and on the strength of that promise, speculators had taken the risk of their being paid, and bought them. Moreover, no one could say, they argued, that the specu lators had not paid all they were worth at the time they bought them. Before the constitution was adopted, above all before there was any plan to revise the Articles of Confederation, the risk that these certificates would never be paid at all, either in whole or in part, was cer tainly very great. These considerations carried the day. The bill to provide for the payment in full of the owners of the certificates of debt passed both Houses by a large majority. The debate showed that Madison was beginning to diverge from Hamilton. He had no sympathy with the repudiating spirit of the Confederation. The proposi tion, therefore, to scale down the public debt, received no support from him. His proposition was to pay the 96 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. holders of the public debts what they had SStton.'''^ P™P- paid for them, in case they had bought them, and pay the balance of the principal to the original holder. But this would fail to accomplish the object which many of those who opposed Hamilton's recommendation had at heart, the wiping out ofa consider able part of the principal of the public debt. It accord ingly received the vote of but thirteen members of the House, and of those thirteen it is a significant fact that nine were from Virginia.* No sooner was this bill disposed of than a bill was in troduced providing for the assumption of those debts of the states incurred during the Revolutionary war. Hamilton had recommended this in his report on the ground of justice and expediency. The debts in- Hamilton's ob- mendfn?as°sump- curred by the States, he said, were really *'''°' incurred in defense of the whole country and it was, therefore, but just that the nation should bear the burden. Moreover it would be better for the nation to pay them, because in that way conflicting systems of taxation between the state and the general government would be avoided. The constitution required that the taxes imposed by the general government should be uni form throughout the country. But if the revolutionary *Fisher Ames' remarks about Madison in a letter to a friend about this time, are suggestive : " He (Madison) is not a little of a Virginian, and thinks that state the land of promise; but is afraid of their state politics and of his popularity there more than, I think, he should be. He is our first man." HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 97 debt of the states were to be paid by them, one state would tax one set of articles and another another set. It would therefore be difficult, if not impossible, for the govern ment to select such objects of taxation as to avoid con flicting with the systems of taxation adopted by some of the states. He had another reason, which had great weight with him, that he did not mention in his re port. He knew that the assumption of the debts of the states would weaken the influence of the states and in crease that of the general government; that it would transfer the interests of the creditors of the states, from the states to the United States. But though he did not mention this, his opponents were perfectly well aware of it. We remember that Maclay said that assumption would complete the pretext for seizing every resource of government, so that even the civil lists would have to depend on the federal treas ury. Such remarks were not confined to the privacy of diaries. Stone, of Maryland, said that the law would effect the consolidation of the government. The other side was not equally frank. But in their letters to each other. Federalists avowed their opinions. George Cabot, for ex ample, a leading Massachusetts Federalist, said that the powers which must be exercised by the states in provid ing for their own state debts were such as belonged to a supreme government only, and could not be intrusted to subordinate ones. He declared that he had settled it as an irrefragable truth that the national government could 98 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. not go on without assuming them. The one side said that the existence of the state governments depended on defeating assumption; the other that the existence of thenationalgovernment dependeduponcarrjdngit. There was a bitter fight. Sedgwick, of Massachusetts, solemnly warned the House ofthe dangerous consequences to be ap prehended in his state from a failure to pass the law. The condition of Massachusetts certainly would have been deplorable in the extreme, if the bill had failed to pass. We have seen that Sha5''s insurrection was oc casioned by the mountain of debts and taxes which was crushing the people of the state. But before the adoption of the constitution, the legislature of the state had im posed a tariff on imported articles, and these contributed materially to lesson the burden of taxation. But the adoption of the constitution deprived it of that resource and made it almost impossible for the state to pay its debts. At last, owing to a bargain between Hamilton and Jefferson, the measure became a law. There had been a determined struggle in Congress over the location of the capital of the Bargain between ,^ Hamilton and United States. The members of Congress Jefferson. ° from the eastern and middle states wanted it in a northern city, and as they were in a majority, Germantown, at one time came very near being selected. But the southern members were bitterly opposed to this. Again threats of secession were hinted. Lee, of Virginia, declared that he "was averse to sound alarms or HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 99 introduce terror into the House, but if they were well founded he thought it his duty," and Jackson, of Georgia, said that "this will blow the coals of sedition and injure the union." The southern members were anxious to have the capital located on the Potomac. It occurred to Hamilton to use their wish as a means for getting votes for assumption. He himself had not a particle of state or sectional attachment. When he saw his measure in danger, he asked Jefferson to give it his influence, and agreed, in case it was done to use his influence with some northern members to induce them to vote for a southern location of the capital. The bargain was made. Jefferson induced two Virginia members to vote for assumption and Hamilton persuaded a few northern men to vote for a southern capital. Congress, therefore, voted to locate the national capital on the Potomac and to assume state debts to the amount of $21,000,000. Madison was one of the steady and persistent opponents of assumption. The action of Maryland, Virginia and North Caro lina with reference to assumption is suggestive. In Maryland, a resolution that it was dangerous to the state governments was defeated only by the vote ofthe Speaker of the House. The Assembly of Virginia denounced it as repugnant to the constitution of the United States, giving to it the exercise of a power not granted to the general government, "and intended to concentrate and perpetuate a large moneyed interest, which would pro duce a prostration of agriculture at the feet of commerce. 100 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. or a change in the present form of the Federal govern ment, fatal to the existence of American liberty." North Carolina also denounced it violently. The passage of this bill made more taxes necessary. The taxes imposed by Congress had provided for the ex isting needs and obligations of the government. Where was the money to come from? In answer to this ques tion, Hamilton sent in a new report, recommending an excise on distilled spirits. Here again, Hamilton had political as well as financial objects in view. He not only wished to raise necessary taxes, but to do it in such a way as to strengthen the general government and vin dicate for it the powers conferred upon it by ihe constitu tion. He wished to break down the idea of state sov ereignty. He knew that the tax would meet with strong opposition. Many of the states did indeed impose ex cises on various articles, and no one made any objection to it. But in the minds of the people of that time, there was an enormous difference between an excise laid by the state and one laid by the United States. An excise laid by the state was like any other tax. It was imposed by the people upon themselves. But an excise imposed by the general government was a tax imposed by a for eign government. The general government was not their government, and although the constitution gave it the right to impose excises, it was none the less an inva sion of the sovereignty of the states. Jefferson voiced the sentiment of a large part of the American people HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. 101 when he said: "The excise law is an infernal one. The first error was to admit it by the constitution, the sec ond, to act on that admission." But Hamilton was in the zenith of his power and influence, and in spite of all opposition the measure became a law. The day after Hamilton submitted his report recom mending an excise, he sent another recommending the incorporation of a national bank. It is not neces sary for us to go into details as to the proposed measure. Suffice it to say that as in all the preceding Hamilton rec- cases he had political as well as financial ommends a na tional bank. objects in view. He wished to have an in stitution from which the government could borrow money in times of emergency, which would facilitate exchanges between different parts of the country, and which would increase the amount of money in circula tion. These were some of his financial objects. But he also wished to array upon the side of the government all the wealthy men whose pecuniary interest in the bank would give them a pecuniary interest in supporting the government. Most of all, he wished to vindicate for the government what he conceived to be the implied powers of the constitution. Henry Clay once said that precedents are the habits of nations. Hamilton was well aware of this. He wished the young nation to form the habit of employing any means to reach an end which the constitution authorized it to reach, whether those means were specifically authorized or not, provided they were not 102 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. prohibited. Though the bill was strongly opposed, first in the House of Representatives by Madison, and after wards in the cabinet by Jefferson and Randolph, it be came a law. We remember that in the Federal Convention Ham ilton made an elaborate argument for a constitution pro- Ariding for an aristocratic republic and a central govern ment, to which the governments of the states were to be Hamuton's completely subordinated. It is interesting speech in the , , . . <¦ • j Convention to note the relations between these ideas and his flnan cial pouoy. ajj^ liis financial policy. The payment of the domestic debts to those who held certificates of debt, the assumption of state debts, the incorporation of the national bank, did not make the government an aristo cratic republic. But they did give to many of the wealthy and intelligent men of the country a direct pe cuniary interest in the support of the government. The law imposing an excise on whisky did not subordinate the state governments to the general government. But it gave to thoughtful men a striking object lesson of the power of the new government. It •made them realize that the new government had power to collect taxes as well as levy them, and that the claim of state sovereignty was but the boast of a child who had not measured himself with the world. The implied powers vindicated for the government by Hamilton in the incor poration of the national bank did not subordinate the governments of the states to that of the United States. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 103 But the incorporation of the national bank did show that the powers of the general government were capable of indefinite expansion. When we realize how enormously the powers of the general government have in fact been increased, through the doctrine of implied powers,* we have no reason to be surprised that the opponents of Hamilton regarded the doctrine as tending to put the powers of the states at the mercy of the general gov ernment. QUESTIONS. 1. 'What was the leading trait in Hamilton's character ? 2. What were the objects of his financial policy? 3. What, according to Professor Sumner, was the great work that went to the making of the nation at the end of the last century ? 4. What were the various measures of Hamilton's financial policy ? 5. Why, in your opinion, did Madison favor discrimina tion? 6. What political object had Hamilton in recommending assumption, and why was it so violently opposed? 7. By what means was the measure finally carried ? 8. It is often said that Madison's opposition to Hamilton was due to Jefferson's influence ; does this chapter throw any light ou that, and if so, what? 9. 'What was Hamilton's object in recommending a national bank ? An excise ? 10. State the relation between Hamilton's financial policy and his speech in the Convention ? ¦"'See Woodrow Wilson's Congressional Government, pp. 21-22. 104 HISTORY" OF POLITICAL PARTIES. CHAPTER VIII. THOMAS JEFFERSON. ALTHOUGH Washington's cabinet consisted of but four men, no other cabinet in American history has contained so large a number of men of the first order of ability ; for Hamilton was not the only remarkable man in it. The Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, was also a political genius, and, like Hamilton, he impressed his in dividuality so powerfully upon the institutions of the country that his personality is a question of the first im portance to the student of our history. It would be difficult to find two men more perfectly devoted to what they conceived the welfare Contrast be tween Hamilton of the country, and at the same time more and Jefferson. unlike than Hamilton and Jefferson. The leading trait of Hamilton, we have seen, was his love of justice, stability and order; the leading trait of Jefferson was his love of liberty and his belief in its practicability to a greater extent and on a larger scale than the world had ever seen. The one thought the supreme need of society was a government strong enough to do justice and preserve order; the other regarded liberty, and a govern ment too weak to interfere with it, as the supreme politi cal good. The one regarded anarchy as the greatest enemy of society; the other saw in tyranny its greatest foe. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 105 Hamilton was also devoted to liberty. But he thought it impossible unless it was under the protection of a strong government. Jefferson was also a friend to stability, but he believed that the intelligent self-interest of men was a sufficient guarantee of it. The one thought it better to risk the tyranny of a strong central government than to put order and stability in jeopardy. The other would risk the anarchical tendencies of a weak central govern ment rather than endanger liberty. Almost every act of Jefferson's public life may be traced, more or less directly, to his love of influence of ,., •_. , .,, . , .... . . .-T r Jefferson's love liberty. His buls in the Virginia House of of liberty upon his poUtical Burgesses to abolish the laws of entail and career. primogeniture, and to provide for the gradual emancipa tion of slaves ; his efforts in Congress to have slaverj' prohibited in all the territories of the United States, an ticipating by seventy years the platform upon which the present Republican party first stood, had their origin in this characteristic. As soon, therefore, as Jefferson under stood the trend of Hamilton's financial policy, when he saw how it tended to strengthen the central govern ment, it was impossible for him not to oppose it. He did indeed, as we have seen, lend his influence to the passage of one of its measures, but that Why he gave was because he did not understand its ten- his influence lor assumption. dencies. When he arrived in March, 1790, at the seat of government, and entered upon the duties of his office, the laws providing for the payment of the 106 HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. foreign and domestic debts had already passed, and Con gress was angrily debating the bill for assumption. He heard on all sides threats of dissolution, and rightly came to the conclusion that the Union was in danger. So while he was of the opinion, as he said, "that Congress should always prefer letting the states raise money in their own way," when it could be done, yet in that instance he saw " the necessity of yielding to the cries of the creditors in certain parts of the country for the sake of union," and "to save us from the greatest of all calamities, the total ex tinction of our credit in Europe." Accordingly, he con sented to use his influence for assumption in consideration of the location of the capital on the Potomac. But when he came to see the trend of Hamilton's financial policy, he regretted his act as he never did any other in his political career. By the time the whole country began to see the outlines of Hamilton's policy, it provoked the antagonism of a well organized political party, and Jefferson was its leader. But before stating its creed, it is desirable to summarize the arguments presented by Hamilton and Jefferson, the one for, the other against, the constitutionality of the bill providing for a national bank. When the bill was before the House of Representa tives, Madison made a strong speech in opposition to it His opinion of OU the grouud that it was unconstitutional. the constitution- auty ol the bill Impressed by these arguments, when the to incorporate o > a bank. bill was Submitted to him, Washington HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 107 called on Jefferson and Hamilton for their written opinions. Jefferson's opinion began as follows: " I con sider the foundation of the constitution as laid on this ground, that all powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states or to the people. To take a single step beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress, is to take posses sion of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition." He then attempted to show that the power to incor porate a bank was not one of the powers conferred upon Congress by the constitution, because (1) it was not one of the specially enumerated powers. The constitution gives Congress the power to impose taxes, borrow money, regulate commerce, declare war, etc., but does not say that it can incorporate a bank. Hence, (2) if the power was conferred at all, it must be capable of being deduced by a fair method of interpretation from one or the other of the two general clauses in the section enumerating the powers of Congress. But it cannot be inferred from the first, which authorizes Congress "to levy taxes to provide for the general welfare of the United States," because "the le-vying of taxes is the power, and the general welfare the purpose for which the power is to be exercised. They are not to levy taxes ad libitum for any purpose they please; but only to pay the debts or provide for the wel fare of the Union. In like manner, they are not to do 108 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. anything they please to provide for the general welfare, but only to levy taxes for that purpose." Nor can it be inferred from the second general clause, which provides that Congress shall have power to "make all laws which shall be necessary and proper " for carrying into effect the enumerated powers, because they can all be carried into execution without a bank. But if they can, a bank is not necessary, and consequently not authorized by this clause. In brief, Jefferson interpreted this clause as if it had been written as follows: And Congress shall have power to pass all laws which shall be absolutely and indispensably necessary for carrying into effect the foregoing powers. Hamilton's argument was based on the principle that power to do a thing implies power to use appropriate means. To say that Congess had power to ^Irdon?" * achieve certain ends and yet was prohibited from using the fittest means unless they were absolutely necessary, or had been specifically granted, he regarded as an absurdity. From his point of view, to prove the constitutionality of the bill providing for a bank, no more was necessary than to show that a bank would be useful in borrowing money or collecting taxes. If it was a convenient means of executing any of the powers conferred upon Congress, and had not been prohibited by the constitution, it was constitutional. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 109 It should be carefully noted that Hamilton's opinion was not based on the "necessary and proper " clause. If the constitution had contained no such clause, the con stitutionality of the bill, he contended, would have been just as clear and undoubted. The principle that govern ments, like all other human agents, can only do things by employing appropriate means was too self evident to make it necessary for the constitution to say so, and that was the entire meaning of the "necessary and proper" clause. But since the clause is there, it can only receive its true interpretation in the light of this self evident principle. Hamilton's reasoning convinced Washington and the bill became a law. The opinions of Hamilton and Jefferson were in per fect harmony with their political characters. Jefferson wished to have a weak central government 1 •/- 1 ¦ • 1 1 . • ¦> Influence of and if the constitution had been interpreted doctrine of im- pUed powers. in harmony with his "opinion" he would have had it. Hamilton wished to have a strong central government, and to the practical acceptance of his "opinion," it is due that the government of the United States exercises such large powers. If one wishes to realize the great part that has been played in Ameri can history by Hamilton's doctrine of implied powers, he has only to bear in mind that our acquisitions of foreign territory, our laws for internal improvement and our tariff legislation receive their only defense from that doctrine. Hamilton contended that it was necessary to 110 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. the very existence of the national government that Jefferson's interpretation should be exploded. How far he was right, we shall see more clearly hereafter. But one thing is already clear : If Jefferson's "opinion" had been made the rule of Congressional action, the American government with which we are acquainted would never have existed. QUESTIONS. 1. Draw a contrast between Hamilton and Jefferson. 2. Trace the influence of Jefferson's love of liberty upon his political career. 3. Do you see any relation between Jefferson's love of liberty and the embargo legislation of his second presidential term ? 4. Why did he use his influence for assumption ? 5. State in detail his opinion as to the constitutionality of the national bank. 6. What are the two general clauses of the constitution ? 7. State Hamilton's opinion as to the constitutionalty of the national bank. 8. What do you understand to be the doctrine of the im plied powers of the constitution ? 9. State in as much detail as you can the influence it has exerted upon the course of American history. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. Ill CHAPTER IX. JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICANS. PRECEDING chapters have enabled us to see that with the passage of the law providing for the in corporation of the bank, the Federalists had answered three great questions : (1) Should the country have a real government ? (2) Should Hamilton's financial policy be adopted? (3) Should the constitution be so inter preted as to enlarge the powers of the general govern ment. We are now in a position to see that there was no necessary inconsistency in being a Federalist, when the Federalists were working for the adoption of the con stitution, and in not being a Federalist when they were trying to effect the adoption of Hamilton's inconsistent? financial policy, and advocating his doctrine of implied powers. One of Madison's biog raphers thinks that Madison was guilty of great incon sistency because he was a Federalist in 1789, and a Republican in 1791. "There had been no change of political principles," says Mr. Gay, "neither in the party he had left or the party he had joined; but each was striving with all its might to adapt the old doctrine to the altered condition of affairs under the new union. The change was wholly in Mr. Madison. That which 112 HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. had been white to him was now black ; that which had been black was as the driven snow." * This is an unjust and inaccurate statement of the case. The party he left was advocating the adoption of the constitution when he was a member of it. When he began to oppose it, it was advocating such an interpreta tion of the constitution as would enlarge the powers of the general government to an extent dangerous, in his opinion, to the liberties of the country. A man could surely believe in the adoption of the constitution, and at the same time believe that Hamilton's interpretation of it was incorrect. Nor is it more true to say that there was no change in the party that Madison joined. The party that Madi son "joined" had no existence until it was organized by himself and Jefferson. It was the single aim of the Antifederalists to prevent the adoption of the constitution. But not a line in the private correspondence of the leaders of the Republican party, to say nothing of their speeches, is in evidence to show that they had any aim but to pre serve the general government in "all its constitutional vigor" and to "support the state governments in all their rights. "t The Federalists called their opponents Antifederalists, and Federalist historians have done the same thing. But we know nothing of Madison that justifies us in believing that he would not have exerted himself as vigorously to *Life of Madison, American Statesman Series, page 191. t Jefferson's first inaugural address. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 113 preserve the constitution in 1792 as he- did to have it adopted in 1787. There was indeed a change in him, but it was a change growing out of, and dependent upon, cir cumstances. In 1787, he had a vivid sense of the dangers of anarchy. It was natural, therefore, that he should con centrate his thoughts on means of preventing it. In 1792, he had a vivid sense of the dangers of an undue centraliza tion of power. It was equally natural that he should con centrate his thoughts on means of preventing it. As his fear of anarchy grew out of his experience of the Confed eration, so likewise his fear of undue centralization grew out of his knowledge of Hamilton and his opinion of the tendency of his financial system. It is indeed true that those who had been Antifeder alists generally became members of the new Some Antiled- Republican party. Those who had been erausts became RepubUcans. Antifederalists for pecuniary reasons, because they wished to have paper money, or to avoid the payment of debts, instinctively opposed Hamil ton's financial policy. The vital nerve of that policy was the principle that the nation must fulfil its contracts in order that justice might be done and its credit pre served. But this class of Antifederalists consisted of men whose sympathy with the debtor classes made them disre gard the importance of the public credit. Those Antifederalists, also, who opposed the con stitution because they believed it would prove dangerous to the liberties of the country, naturally joined the 114 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. Republican party. A man whose devotion to liberty made him prefer the powerless Confederation to the new constitution would naturally prefer the constitution as Jefferson understood it, to the constitution as Hamilton understood it. But while many Federalists became Republicans, many Antifederalists became Federalists. But others be- ,^, _, , , . . -, -on i eame Federal- The Federalists, m 17o9, as we have seen, ists. consisted of two elements ; a national ele ment, who felt that they were Americans, first of all and who wished their country to have such a government as would enable her to take her place among the nations of the world ; and a commercial element, who wished to have a government strong enough to make and execute laws which would enable them to do business profitably. Hamilton's financial policy made a strong appeal to this element. The men with money enough to speculate in government certificates, to buy state securities and bank stock, had the the greatest pecuniary interest in Hamil ton's policj', and they constituted the commercial class. This explains why it was that many who were Antifeder alists before the adoption of the constitution afterwards became Federalists. They belonged to what we may call the commercial wing of the Federalists. They cared little or nothing about the nation as such. But when they found that a strong central government could pass laws which would enable them to make money, they were in favor of it. Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 115 Hampshire and New York were strongholds of Antifed- eralism. But when they found what a good thing the government was from a business point of view they be came Federalists. We are now in a position to understand an important fact in American history. From the very Were the Anti- organization of the Republican party, the federausts a sectional party 1 two great political parties were chiefly sec tional. The Antifederalists were not a sectional party. Of the six states in which it was strongest, four, Mas sachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire and New York were in the north, and two, Virginia and North Carolina, were in the south. But the Republican party was a southern party, and the Federalist party, after the adop tion of the constitution, was a northern party. Topsy's remark, " sich good times and me not in 'em," suggests the explanation. Hamilton's financial policy made good times for the commercial Federalists who were chiefly in the North, but the planters of the South had no such direct and immediate pecuniary interest in it, and, there fore, they opposed it. This throws light on another important fact. The Republican minorities in the northern states „ . ^ Umon of north- and the Republican majorities in the south- and?o™hern'^ ern states were composed of widely different classes. The lawyers, the clergy, almost all of the wealth and culture and intellect of the North were in the Feder alist party. But in the South precisely the reverse was 116 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. true. The small Democratic farmers of the North and the aristocratic planters of the South combined against the Federalists under the leadership of Hamilton. Now, this union of northern Democrats and southern aristocrats was not the result of common ideas as to the proper ob ject and scope and methods of government. The one tie that united them was pecuniary interest. Both classes were in debt, neither class derived more than an indirect benefit from Hamilton's financial policy, while each felt the pressure of a system that insisted with such emphasis on the payment of debts. "A common reluctance to pay, a common dread of taxation, a common envy of the more fortunate moneyed class, whose position had been so pal pably improved by the funding of the public debt— though little more so, in reality, than the position of everybody else — made both farmers and planters" join in clamors against Hamilton's system.* While such considerations enable us to understand the general grouping of political parties at Federalist opin ion ol the Re- the close of Washington s first admmistra- publicans. tion, there is one fact that they do not en tirely account for, and that is the passion with which the party warfare was waged. Each party looked upon the other as deadly enemies to the best interests of humanity; each felt that upon the success of its principles depended the welfare of the race. The Republicans, in the opinion of the Federalists, were only Antifederalists with a more *Hildreth, IV., p. 350. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 117 respectable name. Unable to prevent the adoption of the constitution, they were trying to destroy it by opposing the measures without which it could not endure, or, if that was impossible, to construe it in such a way as to deprive it of all value. They hated the constitution, the Federalists believed, because they hated government. Government made them paj' their debts, compelled them to pay taxes to carry out its contracts, restrained them from the license of anarchy. In contending against the Republicans, the Federalists felt that they were fighting with anarchists for justice and law and order, and the very existence of organized society. But if the Federalists regarded the Republicans as anarchists, the Republicans in turn regarded . Republican their opponents as monarchists. We re- opinion of the Federalists. member what Senator Maclay thought of the efforts of John Adams to give the President what he regarded as proper titles ; he regarded them as attempts to revive royalty and nobility and the vile pageantry by which a few of the human race had lorded it over and trodden upon the necks of their fellow mortals. If we substitute for Maclay a large part of the American people, and for John Adams the Federalists, we can easily see how the Republican party came to exist, and why it hated its op ponents with such intensity. They were on the hunt for monarchists and they found them everywhere. In Wash ington's levees and in the speeches which he addressed to Congress, they saw forms and ceremonies which were in- 118 HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. tended to familiarize the people with the idea of mon archy. In Hamilton's funding system they perceived an intention to perpetuate the public debt that means might always be at hand for corrupting members of Congress, and transforming the government into a monarchy with "kings, lords and commons." When it was proposed (in 1792) to put on one side of the gold and silver coins a representation of the head of the President of the United States, they thought it would be received as a stamp of royalty. In the doctrine of implied powers, they read a determination to encroach upon, or explain away the limited powers of the constitution in order to make it a stepping stone to monarchy. When the Federalist Sedgwick (in 1794) urged an increase in our military force at a time when there was imminent danger of war with Eng land, Madison was sure that Hamilton was his prompter, and that one of his objects was that of "turning every contingency into a resource for accumulating force in the government." When after three years of patient endurance of the lawless resistance to the collection of the excise in western Pennsylvania, the government at last in 1794 sent fifteen thousand men to crush the Whisky Rebellion, Jefferson said " that it answered the favorite purpose of strengthening government, and increasing the public debt." When Wayne gained his decisive victory over the Indians in 1794, after St. Clair's terrible defeat, the Republicans would not unite in congratula tions upon it because they believed that the war was un- HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 119 necessary, that it had been waged to increase the national debt and strengthen the government. When the admin- istation in 1793 refused to perinit Genet to rush the country headlong into war with England, Republicans were sure that it was because they sympathized with monarchial England, in her war with Republican France. When John Adams, on occasion of the yellow fever in Philadelphia, suggested that Congress authorize the President to postpone the meeting of Congress, should circumstances make it desirable, Madison looked upon it as an attempt to get the prerogative for proroguing the legislature. When the Federalists in 1798 voted a pro visional army in consequence of the publication of the X. Y. Z. dispatches, Madison said that it was a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home was to be charged to provisions against danger, real or pretended, from abroad. Firm in the belief that the underlying aim of the Federalists was to accumulate as much power as pos sible in the general government, the first question which the Republicans asked themselves when their opponents proposed any measure was not — Is it wise? Is it expe dient ? But, can it be used as a precedent for extending the powers of the government? In 1792, Fisher Ames, a Massachusetts Federalist, then a member of the House of Representatives, said : "We have near twenty anti- dragons watching the tree of liberty and who consider every strong measure and almost every ordinary one as an attempt to rob it of its fair fruit. We hear inces- 120 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. santly from the old foes of the constitution—This is un constitutional, and that is, and indeed what is not ? I scarce know a point which has not produced this cry, not excepting a motion for adjourning." Believing that the Federalists were bent on introducing monarchy, the Republicans opposed these measures, step by step, and point by point with the passionate energy of men who felt that they were making the last stand for the liberties of the human race. The Federalists, realizing that such opposition, if successful, could have but one outcome, the utter overthrow of all effective government, natur ally supposed that to be its aim. And so the fight went on ; each side supposing themselves to be the champions •of the constitution, and that their antagonists meant to overthrow it. The longer it continued, the bitterer it became until men in the two parties who had been old personal friends ceased to speak to each other. If the two sides could only have got together, one cannot help thinking, if each could have made the other understand his position, the cause of good government would have been a great gainer. QtnesTiONs. 1. Whatthree great questions had the Federalists answered by the close of Washington's first administration? 2. Contrast the object of the Federalist in 1789 with their object in 1791. 3. 'What, classes of Antifederalists became Republicans and what Federalists ? 4. Explain the sectional character of the Federalist and Republican parties. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 121 5. What, in the opinion of the Federalists, was the object of the Republicans ? 6. 'What, in the opinion of the Republicans, was the object of the Federalists ? 7. To what extent was either of them right? 122 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. CHAPTER X. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. WHILE the struggle between the Federalists and Republicans was going on in this country, the champions of power and the champions of freedom were engaged in a life-and-death struggle in France. For years the finances of the French govern- The convoca- •, , , . . -, , ¦ • tion of the meut had been m a wretched condition. states-General. The long and unnecessary wars of the monarchy, the extravagance of the court and nobility had imposed upon the common people a burden that they were unable to bear. They had to pay the greater part of the taxes, but when they had been taxed to their utmost capacity, the government found itself without the means of indulging in its customary extravagance. What was to be done ? Finance minister after finance minister had been able to point to but one way out of the difficulty — increased taxation of the privileged classes, the nobles and priests. But these classes obstinately and stupidly refused to help the State out of the difficulty, created to a great extent by their own extravagance. In consequence of the emergency, it was finallj^ de cided to call a meeting of the States-General — represen tatives of the three great orders iu France — nobles priests and commons. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 123 The news that there was to be a meeting of the States-General sounded in the ears of the common peo ple like the voice of hope to the dying. Under the reign of Louis XV they had seen justice bought and sold as though it were an ordinary article of com merce. They had seen the money coined oppression of out of their very life blood, squandered in presents to the profligate and abandoned, and paid in absurdly high salaries to civil and military officials, who made no pretense of performing the duties of their offi ces. It is said that Louis XV probably spent more money on his pleasures than was spent during his reign in any department of state. They saw, says Alison, "the most important operations of agriculture" fettered or pre vented by the game laws and the restrictions intended for their support. Game of the most destructive kind, such as wild boars and herds of deer were permitted to go at large through spacious districts without any en closures to protect the crops. Numerous edicts existed which prohibited hoeing and weeding lest the young partridges should be disturbed; mowing hay lest the eggs should be destroyed ; taking away the stubble lest the birds should be deprived of shelter. They had to "grind their corn at the landlord's mill, press their grapes at his press, bake their bread in his oven," and then pay what he asked for the privilege. In some provinces they had not even the right to use hand mills without paying for it, and the nobles had the power to sell to the 124 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES wretched peasants the right of bruising buckwheat and barley between two stones. This robbery under the guise of law was made all the harder to bear through the insupportable insolence and arrogance ofthe robbers. "It was quite usual," we are told, "for the young noblesse of that day to run down the canaille of the streets, and to insult the wives of the burgeoise to their husbands' faces." About the mid dle of the eighteenth century, a grand seigneur thought it a great grievance that Louis XV should have rebuked him for indulging in the amusement of shooting peasants. But the twenty-five millions of the French commons " who counted as nothing in France," and who looked forward with such hopefulness to the meeting of the States-General, were themselves divided by a chasm al most as wide as that which separated the nobles from them. An aristocracy of riches and culture had gradu ally grown up, composed of professional and business men, and although it was the most intelligent and en lightened part of the State, it was thoroughly imbued with the aristocratic spirit of the nobles, and regarded the toiling multitudes below it with the utmost contempt. Roughly speaking, then, we may say that the French people prior to the Revolution was composed of which \he three elements; the first composed of til- were composed lers of the soil whose food in some dis- prior to the revolution. tricts was chiefly grass and the barks of trees, and who hated with inexpressible intensity the HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. 125 rapacious, grasping, grinding, tyrannical nobles who doomed them to such a life — and the artisans and work men of the cities, supplied with the bare necessaries of life and loathing the aristocratic commoners who em ployed them as the cause of all their wretchedness; the second, of aristocratic commoners consisting of professional and business men, despising the people below them, and hating the arrogant and insolent nobles, who assumed to be above them; and the third of nobles, clerical and lay, the great majority of whom were infa mous, or would have been at any other time, for their dissoluteness and profligacy and extravagance. In May, 1789, the States-General met at Versailles. When they met the last time, more than one hundred and seventy years before, the three bodies struggles be tween the com- of which it was composed — nobles, priests mons and the '¦ other two and commoners — had voted separately so orders. that any two had a veto on the proceedings of the other. But France had been taught by Rousseau that all men are equal; and the commoners, who outnumbered the other two bodies, refused to transact any business un less the nobles and priests would meet with them and vote as one body. When these obstinately and persist ently refused, the commoners declared themselves the Na tional Assembly of France, and as such proceeded to make a constitution. When the nobles and priests saw that they could not prevent the action of the commoners, they joined that 126 HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. body after it had assumed to be the repre- Deciarationa of seutatives of the people. Before the as- rights of man. ^ ^ sembly began to make a constitution, they made a declaration of the rights of man. They de clared among other things that all men are born free and equal ; that sovereignty resides in the nation ; that the natural rights of man can be limited only in such a way as to secure the same rights to others ; that all men are entitled to religious freedom, and the freedom of speech and the press; that no one can be deprived of property save when necessity demands it, and then only in a legal way, and upon condition that he receives just compensation previously determined. It followed up this declaration with the abolition of such institutions as were inconsistent with it. Nobility, peerage, hereditary distinctions of orders — wut^*e°to.°' °°' every institution which was out of har mony with the doctrine of the liberty and equality of the rights of man, was swept away. It framed a constitution providing for a single chamber with supreme legislative authoritj^ and a limited monarch with only a suspensive veto. If the Revolution could have stopped here, if the French monarch could have summoned the magnanimity conditions es- ^o take the position of a constitutional cess^of th^"° king, if the French nobles, disregarding Revolution. ,,,. , ,.. - . ,, the habits and traditions of centuries, could liave acquiesced in the abolition of institutions which HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. 127 had permitted them to fatten on the blood of the people; if the monarchs and nobles of neighboring States could have seen the destructive work of the French National Assembly without any fear for their own institutions; if the French common people with the bitter hatred en gendered by centuries of cruel oppression in their hearts, and with their utter ignorance of government, could have been reasonable in their demands and ex pectations, the terrible convulsion which carried fire and sword all over Europe, and which threatened our own government with destruction, would never have taken place. But the co-operation of these various causes brought about a new revolution. The Revolution of 1789 was the work of the intelligent middle classes — who were chieflj' represented in the commons mJ-d^ of the States-General and who were the soundest part of the French State ; and the constitution, framed by the National Assembly, put the power of the State chiefly in their hands. The Revolution of 1791-3 was the work of the ignorant multitude, and if one wishes to see what sort of a government a really popular govern ment may sometimes be, he will do well to study with great care this later French Revolution. Of the various agencies upon whose conduct the per manency and success of the first revolution depended, the French king, the French nobles, the kings and nobles of foreign countries, the EoS™ xvi.°' French common people, it was more nearly 128 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. possible for Louis XVI of France to act the part re quired by the situation than for any ofthe others. If his power to see what the best interests of France required, and his ability to act upon his perceptions had been equal to his desire to serve his people, little would have been wanting which he could have done to insure the perma nence of the Revolution of 1789. But feeble in intellect and weak in will he could not act the part assigned to him by destiny as the condition of preventing the most terrible Revolution known to history. He could not free himself from the traditions of his Bourbon ancestors, and he could not follow out any consistent line of policy. The result was that a crisis which imperatively demanded boldness and firmness and energy, found only vacilla tion and hesitation and weakness. But it was the conduct of the French nobles, and the nobles and monarchs of foreign countries, notably those of Prussia and Austria, that contributed tria and Prussia most powerfully to the Overthrow of the against France. Revolution of 1789. The monarchies and aristocracies of Europe were naturally alarmed at its prin ciples. If its principles were true and right, they them selves were an anachronism with no right to be. And in every court in Europe there were plenty of French nobles to stimulate their fears and urge the necessity of restoring Louis XVI to the position as absolute monarch from which he had been deposed by the constitution of 1789. The sovereigns of Austria and Prussia met in August, HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 129 1791, at Pilnitz. and agreed upon a plan for a coalition against France, solemnly protesting that on the fate of Louis XVI depended the fate of the monarchies of Europe. At the same time, an army of French nobles, who had been emigrating from France in a steady stream since the summer of 1789, collected on the banks of the Rhine. It was impossible for Louis, who had in vain at tempted to escape from the country of which he was the nominal ruler, not to sympathize with the . . . Manifesto ofthe purpose of Austria and Prussia. It was im- Duke of Bmns- ^ ^ wick. possible for him to make no effort directly or indirectly to assist in achieving that purpose. It was also impossible for the French people, passionately and fiercely jealous of their newly found liberties, not to sus pect his intriguing with them even more than he did. Accordingly, when the armies of Prussia and Austria drove the demoralized and undisciplined troops of France out of Belgium and invaded France ; when their commander, the Duke of Brunswick, issued a manifesto commanding Paris instantly to submit to its King, if it would avoid being "razed to the earth," declaring that the Legislative Assembly, the National Guards, and the municipal author ities would be held answerable for whatever occurred, the people of Paris became delirious with passion. Their enemy, the enemy of the rights of man, was on the soil of France, and within the city their treach erous king still sat in the palace of the Tuil- leries. In the war which they felt to be the war 130 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. of kings against France, they believed that their king was on the side of kings against his own country. The king was deposed; the prisons of the city were filled with multitudes suspected of being unfriendly to liberty; and the will of the Parisian mob became more and more the only law for the government of France. As the Austrian and Prussian armies approached September nearer and nearer, the passions of the mob Q13iSS3iCr6. became more and more uncontrollable. On the 10th of September they tore open the prisons of the city and began a work of butchery, nor did they stop till they had murdered eleven hundred men. The National Convention which was summoned when the king was deposed, proclaimed France a re public, and declared its hostility to any people which should permit itself to be ruled by a king, France pro- , . i ¦ . . , , ., . _ claimed a re- or should maintain an order of nobility. It public. also offered assistance to any people that would arise against its despots. It brought Louis XVI before it, condemned him to death, and in less than a month and a half from the beginning of his trial, " the descendant of a hundred kings" was guillotined near the broken statue of one of his own ancestors. By this act, the Convention threw down the gauntlet at the feet of every monarch of Europe, and before the end ofthe year, the "war of armed opinions" began — on the one side, England and Spain, and Portugal and Austria, and HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 131 Prussia and Russia, representing authority — on the other, France, representing the prin- ^^J^'*''' ^^ ciples of the Revolution, "a new religion" for which hundreds of thousands of Frenchmen were willing to die. At this juncture. Genet, the minister of the " terrible republic " to the United States landed at Charleston, and the question had then to be decided whether France, in the war of the people against kings, was to be joined by her old ally, or whether she was to stand the onset of all Europe unaided. 'When the king was deposed, and the republic de clared in consequence of the invasion of France and the manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick, the revolutionists realized that one of the foes with which the new order of things was likely to have to contend, was Wealthy citzens the wealthy inhabitants of Paris. Robes- pfe^re^^i.rop'Jfsi- pierre accordingly appeared before the ^.s- ^^^^'''^^^ ssembly on August 17 and demanded the passage of two laws: one authorizing the municipality to arrest whom soever they pleased as a suspect; the other, establishing a revolutionary tribunal in Paris, for the special purpose of trying those whom the municipality should arrest. This idea, that the wealthier classes in France could be kept from open resistance to the Revolution only by es tablishing a system of terror, had begun to bear fruit when Genet arrived in the United States in the spring of 1793. 132 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. It had indeed borne fruit in the September massacre of which I have already spoken. A word from the revo lutionary leaders would probably have stopped that butchery. But they believed that it was better that eleven hundred men should be murdered in prison — es pecially when they were guilty of the crime of opposi tion to the Revolution — than that France should be con vulsed in a civil war, at the same time that she was en compassed on all sides with foreign enemies. But it was not till the fifth of September 1793, that, in the terrible language of Bar^re, "terror was decreed to be the order of the day." The revolutionary tribu nal which Robespierre had demanded in August, 1792, had indeed been some months in existence. Terror decreed ., ^ the order of the and many persons, guilty of no crime but day. of Opposition to the Revolution, and of military failure, had been doomed by it to the guillotine. But in September, the guillotine was set to work, not to punish offenses of any kind, political or military, but in order to frighten into acquiescence those who were opposed to the course of the Revolution. From the first of April, when this tribunal was organized, until "terror became the order of the day," in the following September, sixty-six persons were guillotined. But when the system of terror was established, the activity of the guillotine was quick ened. On September 22, the revolutionary tribunal was divided into four sections so that it could try more prisoners, and on October 29, on motion of Robespierre, HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 133 the Presidents were authorized to stop any trial after it had continued three days and ask the jury if they had made up their minds. These two changes increased the activity of the guillotine wonderfully. In October, fifty, in November, fifty-eight, in December, sixty-nine, in Jan uary, seventy-one, in February, seventy-three, in March, one hundred and twenty-seven, in April, two hundred and fifty-seven, in May, three hundred and fifty-eight, in the first nine days of June, one hundred and twenty-two, were sacrificed as victims to the system of terror. On June 10, 1794, a decree was passed depriving prisoners on trial of counsel, and in other ways making it possible for the revolutionary tribunal to work more rapidly. Between June 10, and July 27, when Robespierre was overthrown, only seven weeks, thirteen hundred and seventy-six persons were sent to the guillotine ! The machinery which furnished this terrible tribunal with material was simple. Paris was divided into sections in each of which was a revolutionary committee, "puri fied," to use the significant phrase of the period, from time to time of all but the most radical revolutionists. These committees employed three means of "maintaining the terror" in their sec- ^^13'^"°'''° tions; guarantee cards, denunciations and the law of the suspects. The guarantee cards were issued by the revolutionary committees and contained a full history of the person to whom they were issued, especially since 1789. Any one who heard a citizen 134 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. make a remark unfriendly to the Revolution, or sus pected him of being unfriendly to it, could go to the nearest revolutionary committee and denounce him. The denounced person was generally sent to prison, while the denouncer received a further protection in that the revolutionary committee wrote on his guarantee card that he was a good citizen, in this way offering him in ducements to denounce as many persons as possible. Finally, the law of the suspects made any one of noble birth, or who had held office before 1789 ; any one who had been in any way connected, whether by relation or service, with the nobles who had emigrated from France in consequence of the Revolution ; any one who could not show that he had made some sacrifice to the cause of the Revolution ; in a word, any one who might be sup posed for any reason to be discontented with the new order of things, — liable at any moment to be sum moned before a revolutionary committee and sent to prison. Arrests made by these committees were at once re ported to a committee of the Convention called the Com mittee of General Security, which had Committee of general se- charge of the police of the whole country. It could order the arrest of any individual in France, and have him brought to Paris. It had con trol of the prisons of Paris and selected those who were to be tried by the revolutionary tribunal, and ex ecuted those whom it sentenced to death. This selection HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 135 of victims was at first made with great care, and those only were chosen who had made themselves prominent by their opposition to the Revolution. But when the system of terror was established, the selection of victims became a matter of accident and caprice, the primary object being to appease the terrible hunger of the guillo tine with a certain number of victims each day. Friends of prisoners often saved the lives of those in whom they were interested by bribing the clerks of the Committee of General Security to keep the names of their friends where they would not be likely to attract the attention of the public accuser. The unfortunate victims brought before the tribunal were generally sentenced to death, although in the early days of the terror they seem to have had a fair trial. But after the de cree of June 10, their trials were mere mockeries. Upon a hint from the judge, the jury declared itself convinced and immediately brought in a verdict of guilty. While Paris was in this way terrorized into ac quiescence in the course of the Revolution the same means were employed to prevent opposition to it throughout the provinces of France. By a SlTSYnif^ °° decree of April 30, 1793, deputies on mission from the Convention to the provinces — there were then eighty-two of them — were granted unlimited power to do whatever seemed to them calculated to promote the public good. At the end of June, their number was greatly increased, and when the system of terror had 136 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. become established in Paris, they were specifically authorized to imprison any one at will, and have them tried for their lives by the ordinary courts, or by revolu tionary tribunals organized after the pattern of the ter rible tribunal of Paris, according as seemed to them desirable. But, not only the lives, but the property of the people of the provinces over which they ruled with such an iron hand were absolutely at their disposal. They could confiscate it to the service of the State, and appeals from their decisions were always rejected. They were to secure acquiescence in the course ofthe Revolution; with out bloodshed, if possible, but to secure it at any rate, cost what it might. This pale abstraction had a terrible illustration at Lyons. The revolutionary commission of that city had not sent to the guillotine more than five victims daily be tween the 9th of November and the 4th of prOTtaoes. *^^ December. This did not make "terror the order of the day," to an extent satisfactory to the deputies on mission there. On December 4, sixty individuals were shot in a single batch, and the next day two hundred and eight more met the same fate. Guillo tining and fusillading, as such shooting was called, con tinued throughout the first half of December, and on December 21, Lyons was reported "peaceful," and puri fied of those who were opposed to the Revolution ! At Marseilles and Bordeaux and most of all at Nantes, simi lar tragedies were enacted. The province of La Vendee, HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 137 in which Nantes is situated, received terrible punish ment for daring to rebel against the Revolution. An army was ordered in January, 1794, to march up and down the district and arrest suspects, and burn all the villages on their route. For two or three months these "infernal columns," moved up and down the district leav ing a trail of blood and ashes to mark their path. At Nantes the ingenuity of the deputy, in whose hands lay the lives and the property of the people of the city, was taxed to the utmost to devise means of ridding the world of those who had been guilty of the terrible crime of op posing the Revolution. The guillotine worked fast, but it was unable to make any appreciable difference in the number of those who crowded the prisons of the city. It was necessary to resort to new methods — those who had revolted against the Revolution, or who were sus pected of having done so, were taken outside of the city and shot in batches. It is estimated that eighteen hun dred perished in this way. The accidental drowning of ninety priests on November 16 who had been confined in an old hulk on the Loire, through the overcrowding of the prisons, suggested to Carrier, to whom belongs the infamous reputation of having been responsible for the despotism at Nantes, another way of striking terror into those who dared to oppose the course of the Revolu tion. In the next few weeks it is estimated that at least seventeen hundred and seventy-seven persons were drowned in the Loire. Most of them were drowned in 138 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. the hulks of old vessels, which were sunk after they were filled with these unfortunate wretches ; but, as if for the sake of variety. Carrier had some of them bound hand and foot and thrown into the river. These deputies on mission were the agents of the Great Committee of Public Safety, a com- pSbite Safety^, mittee of the Convention which was abso lute master of France during the Reign of Terror. The revolutionary committees of Paris, the Committee of General Security, the deputies on mission were all but so many means which the Committee of Public Safety employed to compel France to do its will and acquiesce unhesitatingly in the course of the Revolution. This committee recalled Carrier because of his atrocities. But it did not disapprove of his objects, nor of his methods in a general way. It was not the character of his methods but their details to which they objected. It was not that he had killed hundreds but that he had killed thousands, and these in an unneces sarily brutal way. It was one great object of Robes pierre when he became a member of the Great Com mittee to make it absolute master of France. The dep uties on mission were nominally deputies of the Con vention, but really as we have seen, agents of the Great Committee. The Committee of General Security was the agent through which they kept Paris in awe and was one of the means through which they maintained the Terror throughout France. During the period of the HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 139 Terror it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the lives and property of every man in France lay absolutely at the mercy of the Great Committee, and the means by which it wielded this despotism was terror. France submitted to it because the great majority of French men realized that only a government which wielded the entire resources of the country could cope with the enemies which surrounded her on every side.* So much it has seemed necessary to say that the influ ence of the French Revolution in American politics may be more clearly understood. QUESTIONS. 1. What did the States-General represent? 2. When were they convoked and for what purpose ? 3. Give some details that illustrate the oppression of the peasantry. 4. State and describe the three classes iuto which the French people were divided in 1789. 5. Describe the struggle that took place in the States- General and state its results. 6. Contrast the action of the States-General with that of the Federal Convention. 7. Mention some characteristics of the constitution adopted in 1789. 8. In what did the French Revolution of 1789 consist? 9. Why is it called a revolution ? 10. Explain the various causes that led to the Revolution of 1791. 11. Why is it called a revolution ? 12.' Why did Austria and Prussia enter into an alliance against France ? *This theory is ably advocated by H. Morse Stephens, to whose volumes on the French Revolution I am greatly indebted. 140 HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. 13. 'What was the manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick and to what result did it lead ? 14. What body was summoned to rule France when the King was deposed ? 15. How do you account for its conduct in offering to as sist any people in Europe that wished to recover their liberties ? 16. In what did it result, and why ? 17. How did Robespierre purpose to make the wealthier classes in Paris acquiesce in the course of the Revolution ? 18. Explain the phrase "Terror was decreed to be the order of the day." 19. What was the Revolutionary Tribunal and how was its activity increased in September 22, and October 29? 20. What caused the men to be thrown into prison who were brought before this tribunal ? 21. Describe the relation between the Revolutionary Com mittees and the Committee of General Security, aud the Commit tee of Public Safety. 22. Who were the deputies on mission ? 23. What power did they have during the period of the terror and how did they use it ? 24. 'Why did Frenchmen submit to the despotism of the Committee of Public Safety ? HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 141 CHAPTER XI. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS. YOU remember how keen was the sympathy of good Senator Maclay with France. France is struggling to be free. * * * Qod grant that she may be success ful. And you remember the issue which , . , Maclay on seemed to him at stake m the strug- the French Revolution. gle. "Royalty, nobility, and the vile pag eantry by which a few of the human race lorded it over their fellow mortals seems likely to be demolished with their kindred Bastile." With such a conception of the issue, it is easy to see how men of different temperaments in this country would regard it. Men of Hamiltonian temper, in whom the love of stability and order was the pre dominant passion, who regarded anarchy Hamilton. as the most dangerous enemy of society and who wished to have a strong central government to prevent it, would be sure to see in the French Rev olution an illustration of the natural tendency of democracies. Hamilton said to Edmund Randolph in the fall of 1793 : "Sir, if all the people in America were now assembled and were to call on me to say whether I am a friend to the French Revolution, I would declare that I hold it in abhorrence." As Lodge puts it: "He 142 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. beheld in France the embodiment of the two forces hate ful to him above all others, anarchy and tyranny. He believed the French Revolution to be little less than a crusade against religion, property, organized society and the ordered liberty which he prized more than life itself, while in the foe of France, he saw a kindred people, a strongly governed State, and the sternly temperate free dom in whose principles he had been nurtured."* But men of the temperament of Jefferson would be too sure to see it in an entirely different light. The man who said of the wretched government of the Confedera tion that to compare it with the govern- jefterson. meuts on the continent of Europe, was like comparing heaven with hell, would be sure to concentrate his attention on one great fact, it was a struggle between institutions in which the tyranny and oppressions of centuries had intrenched themselves and the right of self government, the right which he believed to be essential to the progress of the human race. "God send," he wrote in 1792, "that all the nations who join in attacking the liberties of France, may end in the attain ment of their own." And in speaking of the September massacre, he wrote : "In the struggle which was neces sary many guilty persons fell without the form of a trial, and with them, some innocent. These I deplore as much as anybody, and shall deplore some of them to the day of my death. But I deplore them as I should have done *Studies in American History, p. 182. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 143 had they fallen in battle. It was necessary to use the arm of the people, a machine not so blind as balls and bombs, but blind to a certain degree. * * * The liberty of the whole earth was depending on the issue of the contest, and was ever such a prize won with so little innocent blood? My own affections have been deeply wounded by some of the martyrs to this cause, but rather than it should have failed, I would have seen half the earth desolated; were there but an Adam and Eve left in every country, and left free, it would be better than it is now." And Gallatin writing to an intimate friend Feb ruary 1, 1794, when the Reign of Terror was at its height, said : " France at present offers a spectacle un heard of at any other period. Enthusiasm there pro duces an energy equally terrible and sublime. All those virtues which depend upon social or fam ily affections, all those amiable weaknesses, Gauatin. which our natural feelings teach us to love or respect, have disappeared before the stronger, the only, at present, powerful passion, the amor patries. I must confess my soul is not enough steeled, not sometimes to shrink at the dreadful executions which have restored at least apparent internal tranquility to that republic. Yet, upon the whole, as long as the combined despots press upon every frontier and employ every engine to destroy and distress the interior parts, I think they, and they alone, are answerable for every 144 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. act of severity or injustice, for every excess, nay, for every crime which either of the contending parties in France may have committed." The pecuniary interests of the followers of Hamil ton and Jefferson tended to strengthen the sympathies Pecuniary in- ^^ ^he oue party with England, of the pubuclniand' Other with France. We have seen that the financial policy of Hamilton was most profitable to the commercial class, and that therefore they were Federalists. But the same class had the strongest reason for wishing to preserve peace with Eng- gland. War with England meant the destruction of their commerce. But the south, where as we have seen, the Republican party was strongest, hoped for positive pecuniary benefits from war with England. Many men in that section, as we know, had owed large sums of money to England since the outbreak of the Revolu tion, and they knew that war would postpone the pay ment of them, even if its chances did not enable them to escape the necessity of paying them altogether. If we keep these two facts in mind, that the tempera- mefat of the followers of Jefferson inclined them to sym- influenceof pathize with France rather than England, OT AmeriSan^ and that their pecuniary interests tended in poUtics. ... , ., , the same direction, while the temperament of the followers of Hamilton led them to sjonpathize with England and their pecuniary interests tended the same way, we shall be in a position to understand one of HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 145 the great currents of American history for the next eight years, if not indeed, for the next twenty-two. For the next eight years our foreign relations were the burning question in American politics, and for the fol lowing fourteen, they were one of the questions in re ference to which party lines were drawn. Throughout this entire period, the attitude of the two political parties was chiefly determined by the causes we are consider ing. From 1793 till 1815, the Federalists on the whole sympathized with England because of their tempera ment and their pecuniary interests ; from 1793 till 1800, the Republicans favored France for similar reasons. From the latter period till 1815, we cannot characterize the attitude of the Republicans towards France in the same definite and unqualified way. But we shall find reasons for believing that it was at least indirectly due to the causes that were in operation in 1793. Of course, gratitude to the French because of their assistance to us in the Revolutionary war, and hatred to England were additional weights, inclining the people all oyer the country more or less strongly to France, ac cording to their temperament. These considerations will give us some idea of the crisis which the country entered when the French min ister, Edmond Genet, landed at Charleston in April, 1793. Although only twenty-eight g^^^^f^"^"' years old, he had already succeeded in revolutionizing Geneva and annexing it to the French 146 HISTORY QF POLITICAL PARTIES. republic. To accomplish a similar object in the case of the United States, to make it completely subservient to the interests of France, was the real object of his mission. Nor did he undertake it for the mere purpose of ag grandizing France. He was an incarnation of one phase of the French Revolution, and with all the feivor of his French nature he believed that the cause of France was the cause of the human race. He, himself, said that he loved his country passionately; that he adored the cause of liberty ; that he was ready to sacrifice his life for it ; and that it appeared inconceivable to him that all the enemies of tyranny, that all virtuous men did not march with France to the combat. To love liberty seemed to him to love France ; to be devoted to France was to be devoted to liberty, to espouse the cause of France, was to espouse the cause of humanity. The instructions which he received from his govern,- ment when he was sent to this country as minister, throw a flood of light on his diplomatic Genet's instruc- i • i i i_ n tions. career, a career which has been well characterized as the most jemarkable in all the annals of diplomacy. If the conduct of the American government was " timid and wavering," he was charged " to take such steps as will appear to him the exigencies may require, to serve the cause of liberty and the free dom of the people," "in expectation that the American government will finally determine to make common cause with us. "'^ The meaning of this sentence is clear. He * Italics are mine. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 147 was to take such steps as the circumstances rendered necessary in order that the American government might determine to make common cause with France. But what did he propose to do to induce a " timid and wavering" government to make common cause with her? If we study this question in the light of his career in this country, the answer becomes clear ; if he found the government timid, he intended to enlist the American people so strongly on the side of France as to compel it to take sides with her, or be overthrown. Another paragraph in his instructions is also sug gestive. He was instructed that it was the wish of France that a new treaty might be made with the United States, upon a basis more " liberal and more fraternal than that of 1778." But as the timidity of cer tain members of the Federal government might make that difficult, he was instructed to "draw every advantage which the provisions of the subsisting treaty secure to the republic, until a new treaty compact has more clearly and fully defined and enlarged them." He was therefore " expressly enjoined to make himself thoroughly master of the sense of the treaty of 1778, and to be watchful in the execution of the articles which are favorable to the commerce and navigation of the French republic." This, then, was his task : Eventually to negotiate a treaty with this country more liberal than that of 1778, a treaty which would commit the United States to making common cause with Genets task. France; immediately to draw every advantage 148 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. which the provisions of the treaty of 1778 could be made to secure to the French republic, and he intended to compel the government, if he found it unwilling, first, to submit to his interpretation of the treaty, and later to make such a treaty as France desired, by enlist ing the sympathies of the people so strongly on the side of France, that it would have to choose between complying with his wishes and destruction. In the year 1778, the United States made two treaties with France, a treaty of alliance and a treaty of com merce. The treaty of alliance was by its Treaties of 1778. terms "eventual and defensive." Its "es sential and direct end" was stated to be the maintenance of the liberty, sovereignty and inde pendence of the United States." These articles and the general scope of the treaty make it evident that, with the exception of the eleventh article, the intention was to limit the treaty to the war for independence which the United States were then waging. But by the terms of that article, the United States "guaranteed from the present time (1778) and forever, " "the possessions ofthe crown of France in America." The treaty of comraerce was, by its terms, to be per petual. By its nineteenth section, it provided for free en trance to prizes made by either party into the ports of the other, but cruisers belonging to an enemy were not to be permitted to remain in the ports of the other ; by the twenty-fourth section, that the privateers of a nation at HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 149 enmity with either of the contracting parties should not be permitted to fit their ships, or sell their prizes in the ports of the other; aud by its thirty-first, that each of the con tracting parties was to have the liberty of having consuls in the ports of the other. These were the articles which Genet was in effect instructed to construe in the sense most favorable to France, and in order to induce or com pel a " timid and wavering government " to consent to his interpretation, he was to array the American people on the side of France. From the beginning of his career in this country Genet made two facts clear ; first, that his business here was primarily with the American people; and second, that he did not intend to confine oharieston. his efforts in behalf of "liberty, fraternity and equality" to even the most liberal interpretation of the treaties of 1778. Instead of landing at Philadelphia, the seat of government, he landed at Charleston April 8 and proceeded to Philadelphia by land. He knew that France was most popular in the South, and he wished at the start to give the government a vivid impression of the depth of the people's sympathyfor France. Without waiting for the formality of presentation, he began at once to conduct himself not like a foreign minister, but like a sovereign in his own empire. The treaty of commerce provided that France could have consuls in the ports of the United States. With that as a warrant (?) Genet commanded each French consul in the United States to 150 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. act as a court of admiralty to try and to condemn any prizes that French cruisers might bring to port. The treaty provided that privateers of an enemy of France should not be permitted to fit out prizes in the ports of the United States, or bring them there. Genet construed that as a permission to France to do it. He immediately bought two swift sailing vessels, equipped them as privateers, manned them with Americans, and sent them out to capture British merchantmen. The frigate in which he came from France, L' Ambuscade, captured a British vessel, "The Grange," in American waters on her way to Philadelphia. The inscriptions on her masts showed that he meant to employ every means to excite the American people to the French fever heat of enthu siasm. On her foremast was inscribed, "Enemies of equality, change or tremble;" on her main mast, "Free people, you see in us brothers and friends ; " on her miz- zen mast, "We are armed to support the rights of men." The colors of England were reversed and the flag of France was flying, as if in triumph above them. Genet's journey to Philadelphia was one long ova tion. At every town Republicans poured out in hun dreds, shouting themselves hoarse as they PMiiSSphfa'" escorted him to the best hotels and enter tained him with civic feasts. As he neared Philadelphia men on fast horses were stationed along the road to give the city timely information of his approach. Whenhereached Gray's Ferry,thousands of Philadelphians HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 151 took possession of him and carried him in triumph to the town. The next day he received addresses from the German and French Republicans and from many citizens in Philadelphia, and the day after he was presented to Washington as the minister from the French republic to the United States. His reception by Washington was in marked contrast with his reception by the people. But to understand the attitude of Washington, we must follow the deliberations of the government from the time the news of the war between France and England reached the United States until Genet's arrival in Philadelphia. As soon as the news of the declaration of war by France against England reached the United States, (April 15, 1793), Washington hastened from Mount Ver non to Philadelphia and sent to the members of his cab inet a series of questions prepared by Ham ilton upon which their opinions were to be sions"'' given at a cabinet meeting the next day. Should a proclamation be issued for the purpose of pre venting interferences of the citizens of the United States in the war between France and Great Britain? Should it contain a declaration of neutrality? Should a minis ter from the Republic of France be received? If re ceived, should it be absolutely or with qualification? Were the United States obliged by good faith to consider the treaties heretofore made with France as applying to the present situation of the parties? Might they re nounce them or consider them suspended till the gov- 152 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. ernment of France should be established? Suppose the treaties binding, what was the effect of the guarantee clause? Did it apply to a defensive war only, or to an offensive as well as a defensive war? Was the war in which France waS engaged an offensive or a defensive war? Did any article of either of the treaties prevent British ships of war, other than privateers, from coming into the ports of the United States? The cabinet unanimously agreed that a proclama tion of neutrality should be issued; that Genet should be received; and that it was not expedient to call a special session of Congress. But Hamilton and Knox held that Genet should be received with an express reserve of the question as to whether the treaties should be suspended. Jefferson, with whom Randolph inclined to agree, thought the treaties as binding with the repub lic, as they had been with the monarchy. Hamilton also contended that in case the treaties were considered bind ing, the guarantee clauses did not apply to an offensive war such as France was then waging against England, while Jefferson declined to give an opinion on the ground that it was not then necessary to decide that question. The proclamation as issued declared the disposition of the United States to pursue a friendly and impartial conduct toward all the belligerent powers, ofneuteauty'! as required alike by duty and interest. It exhorted and warned the citizens of the United States to avoid all acts which might in any man- HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 153 ner tend to contravene such a disposition ; and declared that the government would not only not interfere to pro- feet any citizen, who might expose himself to punish ment under the law of nations bj' aiding or abetting any of the belligerents, but that it would cause all such acts to be prosecuted in the courts of the United States, so far as they came within their cognizance. x\t a cabinet meeting called to consider the privateer ing commissions issued bj' Genet, and the prizes con demned by French consuls, it was unanimously decided that they were not authorized either by the treaties be tween France and the United States, or bj' the laws of nations, and were, therefore, void. It was also agreed that "The Grange," the vessel captured b}' "L'Ambuscade" within American waters should be restored. But the cabinet was unable to agree when the question arose as to what should be done with the privateers fitted out by Genet. Hamilton contended that as these captures were violations ofthe proclamation of neutrality that had been issued, the vessels taken should be restored to their own ers ; otherwise the United States would become a party to the injury inflicted on Great Britian. Jefferson argued, that if the captures were illegal — whether they were or not he declined to sa}'^ — it was for the courts to say so, and in case they were, to order a restoration of the property. 'When Genet presented his credentials, \^'^ashing- ton spoke to him of the friendship of the United States 154 HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. Genet's presen- for France. But not a word did he say tation to Wash- ,.,_>,_ . „,. ington; his con- about the French Revolution. With a struction ofthe treaty. mind disposed to go direct to facts and not to stop with a formula, it was becoming more and more a question with Washington whether wholesale butchery by the guillotine and the propagandism of an archy by the bayonet, even when done in the name of liberty, fraternity and equality, were, after all, so much preferable to the old despotism of France. Genet was very indignant, but what offended him most of all was that certain medallions of "Capet" ( Louis XVI ) and his family were in the President's parlor. He protested vehemently against the proclamation of neutrality, and the decision of the cabinet on the subject of privateers. He argued that the provision of the treaty that France might bring her prizes into American ports, implied that France might control such prizes and dispose of them ; and that the clause in the treaty forbidding either party to allow the enemies of the other to fit out privateers in the ports of the other, must be understood as implying a mutual right in the parties themselves to fit out pri vateers in each other's ports. Nor did he confine himself to protests. Persisting in the policy upon which he entered at Charleston, foreign minister though he was, he continued to act on his, own interpretation of the treaty in de- Hispractioalde-fiance ol the fiance of the expressed wishes of the government, government. The government was, in- HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. 155 deed, "timid and wavering" to the last degree from his point of view. But he believed that he could compel the government to accede to his wishes by the force of public opinion, and he lost no opportunity to arouse it. When he was told that two American citizens, Henfield and Singleterry by name, who had enlisted in one of the privateers which he had fitted out at Charleston were ar rested in accordance with a decision of the cabinet, he replied with a burst of indignation. "The crime laid to their charge," he said (June 1), "the crime which my mind cannot conceive and which my pen almost refuses to state, is the serving of France, and the defending with her children the common and glorious cause of liberty." When he was told (June 8) that the granting of military commissions within the United States by any foreign authority, especially to American citizens, was illegal, he declared that the right had been given by the treaty of 1778. He dared to tell the President of He lectures the United States, through his Secretary of Jag^cSSfftuyon" State, thatin taking upon himself the de- °'i'^""««- cision of such a question he was exceeding his powers. "As long as the states in Congress assembled," he said, "shall not have determined that this solemn engagement should be not performed, no one has a right to shackle our operations." He did, however graciously add that he had shown some deference to the American government. "I have instructed the consuls," he said, "not to grant titles to Americans commissioning privateers except to 156 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. such captains as shall obligate themselves under oath and security to respect the territory of the United States and the political opinions of the President, until the rep resentatives of the sovereign" — he meant the represent atives of the people in Congress — "shall have confirmed or rejected them." He said that every obstruction by the government of the United States to the arming of French vessels was an attempt on the "rights of man," and a violation of the system of neutrality. "For if our merchant vessels are not allowed to arm themselves when the French alone are resisting the league of all the tyrants against the liberty of the people, they will be exposed to inevitable ruin in going out of the ports of the United States, which is certainly not the intention of ttie people of America. Their fraternal voice has re sounded from every quarter around me and their accents are not equivocal — they are pure as the hearts of those by whom they are expressed." Here is a plain intimation of the nature of the ques tion at issue between Genet and the American govern ment. Should the legally constituted au- Beai question 7 - , i at issue. thorities of the country decide the attitude which the United States were to take towards France and England, or was the minister of a foreign nation at the head of a French faction to decide it for them ? Should the President of the United States keep the oath he had solemnly taken, should he execute the laws and treaties as he under %tood them, or was a foreigner to defy HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. 157 the government ajid act on his own inierpretationsf That was the question which Genet was trying to answer, and that was what he had in mind when he contrasted the commands of Washington with the intention of the peo ple of America. And when he said that the accent of their fraternal voice, which had resounded from every quarter, was not equivocal, he intended to insinuate that France would accomplish in the United States what she had done in every other neutral or friendly country in which her revolutionary envoys had enjoyed freedom of speech, overthrow the constituted authorities in favor of the "principles of the revolution." With any other man as President, he would in all probability have succeeded. It is more than doubtful if any other man could have kept his ground when such a tornado of French enthusiasm was sweeping over the country. As it was, the issue seemed for a considerable time in doubt. When the cabinet was debating what could be done to restrict Genet to his legitimate func tions, the most prominent citizens of Philadelphia, includ ing the governor of Pennsylvania, were attending civic feasts given in his honor, each plunging a knife into the head of a pig to indicate their approbation of the fate that had overtaken the unfortunate King of France. The Republican papers quite generally took sides with Genet. In July, 1793, the National Gazette, edited by Freneau, a clerk employed by Jefferson in the department of state, upheld him, as RepubUcan '¦ ^ press. we shall see, in the most flagrant act of defi- 158 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. ance of which he was guilty. The General Advertiser, another Republican paper published at Philadelphia, said: "It is no longer possible to doubt that the inteu- tion of the executive of the United States is to look upon the treat}'^ of amity and commerce, which exists between France and America, as a nullity, and that they are pre pared to join the league of kings against France." That put the matter before the American people precisely as Genet wished to have it. He wished to create the im pression that the government must bend to his wishes, or be regarded by its citizens as joining the league of kings against France. The tone of the Republican papers of Philadelphia was followed by those of New York and Boston, and indeed by the Republican press generally. But the supporters of Genet did not confine their attempts to break down their government in the interest of a foreign power, to newspaper articles. Within two weeks after his arrival in Philadelphia (May &Sties."° ^^)> ^ "Democratic Society" was formed in that city in imitation ofthe famous Jacobin Club of Paris, and before the summer was half gone there were Democratic societies in nearly every state in the Union. In a circular sent out by the parent society in July, the fate of America was declared to depend on the fate of France. If the league of kings succeeded in murdering liberty in France, they -would not long permit it to survive in America. Indeed, the enthusiasm created by the republic of HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 159 France seemed to deprive a large part of the people of the power of sober judgment. As McMaster puts it, "both men and women seemed for the time to have put away their wits and gone mad ^^j^'^" ^"' with republican enthusiasm. Their dress, their speech, their daily conduct, were all regulated on strict Republicau principles. There must be a flaming liberty cap in every house ; there must be a cockade in every hat ; there must be no more use of the old titles. Sir, &nd Mr., Dr. and Rev. It is time, exclaimed one of those ardent Republicans, it is time the use of these di abolical terms ceased. They are offensive to Republican ears. We cannot open a letter but we are addressed as Dear Sir. We cannot go into the courts but we hear "his Worship, the Mayor," or "his Honor, the Judge." We cannot attend the Legislature, to see what the servants of the people, are about, but we hear on every side, "his Excellency, the Governor," or "his Excellency, the Presi dent," or "the Honorable Gentleman who spoke last." Let us stop this, go to France for a Republican lesson, put aside the absurd epithets of Mr. and Sir, and use the "social and soul-warming term citizen." At New York, a newspaper editor made haste to beg his friends to address him henceforth as citizen, and not as Mr., which was a short form of "Master." At Boston every man was soon calling his neighbor Citizen and his wife Citess. The word appeared scrawled on the letters dropped at the post-ofiice; it stood at the head of memorials or 160 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. addresses sent up to the Governor, and before the names of public characters mentioned in the Gazette. It was used in the notices of deaths and marriages. Tradesmen put it on their bills. It fell from the lips of judges as they sat on the bench."* But there was one immovable obstacle in the path of Genet and his supporters, and that was Washington. Realizing that his popularity was a tower of strength to the government, some ofthe Republican papers attempted to break it down. They said that he was wasUi^ton ^^^'^ debauching the country, that he was seeking a crown, that he was hypocritically passing himself off as an honest man. One of them went so far as to publish a pasquinade called the funeral of Washington, in which he was represented as placed upon a guillotine in parody of Louis XVI, of France. Nor did they cry in the wilderness. It is said that there were ten thousand men in Philadelphia threatening day after day to drag him out of his house, and make him resign or declare for France. It is easy to understand the effect of all this upon such a temperament as Genet's. It emboldened him to persist in the line of policy marked out for him by his government, and made him confident that Eflect on Genet, he would succeed iu the end. The envoys of revolutionary France had usually suc- *Vol. II, pages 91-2. This curious freak was the rage when Genet came to the country. It shows what plastic material lay ready to his hand. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 161 ceeded in making her friendship as dangerous as her enmity to any government to which they were sent. His support in the United States made him believe that the result here would eventually be the same — that he would be able either to convert the government to the principles of the revolution, or overthrow it. Accordingly he acted, in the language of Jefferson,* "as co-sovereign of the territory, armed vessels, levied men, gave commissions of war independently" of the government and in direct opposition to its orders and efforts. When it forbade its citizens to arm and engage in the war, he undertook to arm and engage them. When it forbade vessels to be fitted in the ports of the United States for cruising on nations with whom the United States were at peace, he commissioned them to fit and cruise. The "Citizen Genet" and "Sans Culottes," having been fitted out at Charleston ( though without permission ofthe President, yet before it was forbidden), the Presi dent only required them to leave our ports, and did not interfere with their prizes. Instead, however, of their quitting our ports, the "Sans Culottes" remained and the "Citizen Genet" went out only to cruise on our coast, and defy the authority of the government by returning into port again with her prizes. Though in a letter early in June the final determination of the President was com municated, that no future armaments in American ports * Letter to Gouverneur Morris, minister to France, i Bgtt«t 16, 1793, asking his recalL 162 HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. should be permitted, privateers were afterwards equipped and commissioned in Charleston, Savannah, Boston, and an attempt was made to equip one in New York. But perhaps his most flagrant defiance of the gov ernment occurred in the case of the " Little Sarah." The " Little Sarah " was an English vessel, which Little Sarah. was Captured by the French frigate "L' Am buscade" and sent into Philadelphia. There, under the very eyes of the Federal government. Genet undertook to equip her as a privateer and send her to cruise against British vessels. Washington was then at Mount Vernon. Hamilton suspected what Genet was doing, and reported his suspicions to the cabinet. The cabinet ordered an investigation, and when the facts were discovered. Governor Mifflin was called on to interfere. He sent Dallas, his secretary of state, to beg Genet to de tain the vessel, to avoid the necessity of resorting to force. Genet fell into a passion and threatened to appeal from the President to the people, the real sovereign, as he said, in this country. Jefferson also went to him and besought him to avoid the necessity of an appeal to force. Again he indulged in violent language, refused to promise any thing, b'ut at length condescended to say that though the vessel intended to drop down the river, it was not with the intention of sailing. Upon this hint, Jefferson sug gested that Governor Mifflin dismiss his militia, and as soon as it was done, the vessel was sent to sea, in defiance HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 163 of the government, to cruise against the vessels of Great Britain. The National Gazette, edited be it remembered by one of Jefferson's clerks, openly defended Genet in this act of defiance. He had acted "too honestly," it said; "he was too accommodating lor the sake of the peace of the United States." The interference with National Ga zette supports the Little Sarah was the result of "-a Brit- him in his defi ance of the ish construction of the treaty with France, government. at the hazard of involving us in a contest with our ally." "The militia of Philadelphia seem to be made the tools of design and dishonor." — Governor Mifflin had ordered out one hundred and twenty men for the purpose of taking possession of the vessel, when Genet so peremp torily refused to promise Dallas that the vessel should not sail. — "They were to hold her in possession for Britons, contrary to treaty; and to give mortification and insult to our allies. Will they submit to be the instruments of revenge for Britons? Have they forgotten the circum stances of the late Revolution? Let it not be said of them that they were the tools of ministerial policy, to harass and distress the saviors of our country. The minister of France will, I hope, act with firmness and with spirit. The people are his friends or the friends of France. She will have nothing to apprehend, for as yet the people are the sovereign of the United States. Too much complacency is an injury done his cause, for as every advantage is already taken of France, not by the 164 HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. people, further condescension must lead to further abuses. If one of the leading features of our government is pusillanimity, when the British Lion shows his teeth, let France and her minister act as become the dignity and justice of their cause and the honor and faith of America." * While he was thus setting the government at defi ance, he continued to lecture the President of the United States on his constitutional duties. In a letter written about the middle of June, he told the President that he ought not to have taken it upon himself to quests Genet's decide whether certain payments to France recall, should be advanced or not, but that it was his duty to consult Congress. About a week later he told him that Congress ought already to have been occupied with questions which he had been too hasty in deciding. September 18, he said the President had no right to de cide questions which the constitution expressly reserved to Congress. » Jefferson's Anas record. May 23, '93, a conversation between himself and Washington respecting this paper: "He (Wash ington) adverted to a piece in Freneau's paper of yesterday ; he said he despised all their attacks on him personally, but that there never had been an act of the government, not meaning in the executive line only, but iu any line, which that paper had not abused. * * * He was evidently sore and warm, and I take his intention to be, that I should interpose in some way with Freneau, perhaps withdraw his appointment of translating clerk to my office. But I will not do it. His paper has saved our con stitution, which was galloping fast into monarchy, and has been checked by no means so powerful as that paper." HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES, 165 The affair of the " Little Sarah " undoubtedly con tributed materially to bringing matters to a climax. His threat to appeal to the people against Washington, helped to bring the more sober part of the people to their senses. The popularity which made his mission a dangerous menace to American institutions, began to wane. Moreover, it precipitated a determination which would doubtless have been reached sooner or later, to ask the French Government to recall him. This was resolved on early in August, and about the middle of the month, Jefferson wrote to Gouverneur Morris, giving an account of Genet's performances and asking his recall.* A copy of the letter was also sent to Genet. But this letter by no means terminated the enter prises of this energetic and hot-headed Frenchman. He repeated his lectures as to the constitutional duties of the President — said that it was for the representatives of the American people, and not for a single . . , . He appeals to man to exhibit accusations against him, the people. and declared that he was about to have printed all his correspondence with Jefferson, his instruc tions and those of his consuls, " in order that the Amer ican people whose esteem is dearer to me than life, may judge if I have been worthy or not of the fraternal re ception which it deigned to give me." He carried out his threat ; he published his correspondence ; he made his appeal to the people. *See page 161. 166 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. The results of his appeal were not encouraging. Nevertheless he continued to act as "co-sovereign" of the country. In the latter part of the year, he planned a hostile expedition against the Floridas from South Carolina and Georgia, and one against New Orleans from Kentucky. Early in 1794, Washington'decided to hold no further intercourse with him, but about this time, the news of his recall was received. As Congress was not in session until his career was nearly over, the two parties had no opportunity to put them selves on record with reference to him in an official way, until public opinion had veered around to the support of Washington and the policy of neutrality. But that the masses of the Republicans sympathized with him was a notorious fact. Though leaders like Jefferson and Madison felt obliged to repudiate him, they never failed to distinguish' between France and her minister. In a letter to Madison in August, 1793, Jefferson laid down what he conceived to be the proper policy of the Repub licans : "I believe it will be true wisdom in the Repub lican party to approve unequivocally of a state of neu trality ; to abandon Genet entirely, with expressions of strong friendship and adherence to his nation, and con fidence that he has acted against their sense. In this way, we shall keep the people on our side by keeping ourselves in the right." When Congress met, this advice was followed out to the letter. The Republican majority in the House approved of the proclamation and HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 167 disapproved of Genet, though without any warmth. It was not the fault of the Republicans, that in the fourth year of its existence, the government was not broken down by a hot-headed enthusiast in behalf of a govern ment, which must be pronounced the most absolute des potism of modern times. QUESTIONS. 1. What did Hamilton think of the French Revolution and why ? 2. What did Jefferson say about the September massacre, and Gallatin about the Reign of Terror? Account for their opinions. 3. How did the pecuniary interest of the Federalists and Republicans affect their opinions ? 4. Describe the influence of foreign relations upon Amer ican politics from 1783 until 1815. 5. Describe the character of Genet. 6. What did his instructions direct him to do, and how did he propose to do it ? 7. Describe the treaties of 1778 between France and the United States. 8. Show how Genet interpreted them. 9. What questions did Washington submit to his cabinet when the news of the war between France and England reached the United States, and by whom were they prepared ? 10. What differences of opinion appeared in the cabinet ? 1 1. What proclamation did Washington issue .'' Had he a constitutional right to issue it ? 12. Describe Genet's treatment of Washington. 13. What was the real question at issue between Genet and the government ? 14. 'What prevented Genet from succeeding ? 15. Describe the attitude of the Republican press. 16. 'What were the Democratic societies and for what were they organized ? 168 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 17. Describe the republican craze that swept over the country. 18. Explain the attempts that were made to break down the popularity of Washington. 19. Describe the case of the "Little Sarah." 20. Did Genet make his threatened appeal to the people ? If so, how, and what was the result ? 21. If Genet had succeeded in his efforts, what effect would this success have had upon the government ? 22. In a message to Congress in December, 1793, Washing ton said that Genet's performances had "tended to involve us in war abroad and in discord and anarchy at home. " Explain. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 169 CHAPTER XII. RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND. THE close of the • Revolutionary War left Great Britain and her former colonies in a state of mu tual irritability, which unfortunately, the circumstances of the time presented abundant opportuni ties to increase. According to the colonial ^i™/stlm°°^°°' system then practiced by every country in Europe, the mother country compelled her colonies to trade with her. They looked to her for protection, and she in turn, compelled them to give her the profits of their trade. The colonial system of England naturally resulted in changing profoundly the commercial relations of the United States to that country after the close of the war. While the United States were colonies, they Commercial re- enjoyed unrestricted trade with other Eng- EnSaniTafter lish colonies, but when they became inde- ^ ev u i n. pendent, England at once, and naturally, from her point of view, began to impose restrictions upon their trade, where she did not prohibit it altogether. To the people of this country this seemed a piece of pure vindictiveness. Failing to place themselves at the point of view of England, they regarded what was really a quite modified form of her colonial system — modified because of inex- 170 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. orable circumstances in favor of the United States, as a wanton infliction of injury. Opportunities for misunderstanding on the part of England were also not wanting. In the treaty of peace at the close of the Revolution, the United States agreed to recommend the states to repeal the laws confiscating the estates of tories. Though it was well Breaches of the understood at the time that Congress had only recommendatory power, England chose to forget it. And while Congress kept faith with Eng land by recommending action in harmony with the treaty, England chose to regard the failure of the states to comply with the recommendation as a breach of it. Accordingly, she still kept possession of the northwest posts, and persistently refused to make compensation for the negroes carried away at the close of the war. Not only did she keep possession of the posts; she exercised severeignty over the immediately surrounding territory and on numerous occasions, indicated a disposition to retain them permanently. This was sufficiently irritating. But it was made much more so by the fact that she was suspected of using opportunities which she possessed by violating her treaty to stir up the Indians against us. Whether she did or not, and if so, to what tom^^ ^°* '''^ extent, are matters into which we need not here inquire. Taking human nature as we find it, it would have been natural for her agents to do it, and, in any case, inevitable, for the people of this HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 171 country to suspect them of doing it. Further, Americans suspected her of inducing Portugal to make a treaty with Algiers that let her pirates out of the Mediter ranean, and permitted them to capture defenseless Amer ican vessels in the Atlantic by the score. Such in general were the relations between this country and England when the French Revolution put every monarchy in Europe to the necessity of defending itself against the new theory ofthe Rights of Man, backed by the soldiers of France. To the monarchs of Europe the French seemed outlaws. What respectable and con servative people in this country today think of anar chists, the conservative people of Europe thought of the French. But the people of this country were notorious sympathizers with France. The attitude of England toward France, therefore, naturally increased the irrita tion of this country towards England ; the attitude of the United States toward France, naturally increased the irritability of England toward this country. These various causes put the two countries in such a position with reference to each other, as would have made it difficult under any circumstances, to avoid a col lision. But this difficulty was increased 111 il r , ,1 , TA 1 1 Treaty between immeasurably by the fact that England, Kussia and Eng- land in 1793. and the other countries at war with France, took an attitude towards her, to which the United States could not consent without, in effect, joining them in the war against France. Regarding the French Revolution 172 HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. as anarchy, and the French as outlaws against the human race, England and Russia made a treaty in 1793 in which they in effect agreed to ignore all the rules and usages of international law, in their warfare against them, and to compel other nations, to do the same. Accord ingly, they began to put in practice a system that was in tended to starve out the French, and compel them to sub mit. During the summer of 1793, England made six treaties with different nations, stipulating that the con tracting parties should stop all provisions going to France. In June of that year, England gave instruc tions to her ships of war to stop all neutral vessels laden with flour, corn, or meal bound to the ports of France, and send them into British ports. The provisions were to be purchased by the government, and ^sfon°order ^^^ ships released when they had given security not to go to any country not in amity with Great Britain. Whether the United States would have been bound to submit to such regulations, if they had taken the English view of the French Revolution, is a question into which we need not now inquire. The government of Denmark made an able argument against the English- Russian system, on the supposition that the view on which it was based was correct. But with the American view of the French Revolution there was but one thing to be done: Protest against the English provision order, and in the last resort, make the protest effective by some sort of forcible appeal to the self-interest of England. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 173 Before this difficulty was adjusted, England added to the grievances of which this country complained, by what the United States regarded as a new invasion of their rights. In time of peace, France enforced the colonial system as vigorously as any country in Europe. But when she was engaged in war with England, she was obliged to open the ports of her colonies to the com merce of all the world. England's supremacy at sea would have made the enforcement of the system a pos itive contribution to her own resources. Moreover, it would have prevented her colonies from buying what they needed, and would have deprived them of a market for their surplus produce. Accordingly, when she was engaged in war with England, France abandoned for the time her colonial system, since the fleets of England made it impossible for her colonies to trade with her. In 1756, England began to put in practice a prin ciple which was thereafter known as the Rule of the War of 1756 — that trade which was unlawful in peace was unlawful in war. Regarding the temporary aban donment of her colonial system on the part of France as an attempt to protect herself against the British fleet, England determined not to ^J^i^g' *^^ ^^"^ submit to it. She declared that a trade that was illegal in time of peace was illegal in time of war, and that vessels were liable to confiscation that en gaged in it. On the top of the provision order then, of June, 1793, in November of that year England 174 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. issued an order in council based on the Rule of the War of 1756, prohibiting all neutral trade with French col onies which was not legal in time of peace. As if all this were not enough, England was actively engaged in searching American ships for British seamen. It would have been an outrage on the Amer- Impressment of . , . , , . American sea- lean flag to which this couutry could men. scarcely have submitted without compro mising the national dignity, if this search had been so con ducted, as to make it manifest that the impressment of British seamen was the only object. But as a matter of fact, American seamen were often impressed on the pre text that they were of English birth, and under such cir cumstances as to justify Americans in believing that the government of England did not disapprove of it. It is interesting to compare the attitude of this country towards England and Prance respectively, in 1793. Genet was endeavoring to compel the United States to permit him to carry out a policy, submission to which would have been equivalent to our taking part in the war against England. England entered upon a policy which, if submitted to by the United States, would have been equivalent to our taking part in the war against France. We have seen how the government dealt with France ; how did it deal with England ? I have said that with the American view of the French Revolution, there was but one thing to do about the British provision order of June — protest and, in the HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 175 last resort, make the protest effective by some sort of forc ible appeal to the self-interest of England. The phrase, "some sort of forcible appeal to the self-interest of Eng land," may seem a clumsy and weak circumlocution for the simple and strong word "war." But it is not so. If we are careful to distinguish the wishes and threats of many Republicans, from the policy of the Republican leaders, we shall understand that war with any nation was no part of the Republican programme. Undoubtedly there were many Republicans who talked, and a consider able number who wished, a war with England. Butit v/as the dread of centralization, the attachment of a large ma jority of the people to the states, and the fear that the general government would absorb them, that called the Republican party into existence. Anything, therefore, that tended to increase the power of the central govern ment would be sure to provoke their opposition. But war inevitably has that tendency. War creates debts, and debts, the Republicans believed, make it pos sible to corrupt a government. War makes navies desirable, and, as we shall see, the EepuhUoan dread of war. Republicans believed that navies are fraught with dangers to liberty. Worse than all, a nation en gaged in war may find it necessary to employ all its re sources, regardless of constitutional limitations, or be beaten. For these reasons. Republican leaders like Jef ferson, Madison and Gallatin, had no thought of war. In a celebrated report on commerce submitted to 176 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. Congress in December, 1793, Jefferson intimated what he conceived to be the true foreign policy of the country. Ostensibly, the report with its recommen- Jefterson's suh- ,.,,., . , stitute lor war. datious dealt With commercial matters only. If any nation imposed high duties upon American products, or prohibited them altogether, or per mitted their importation only in American vessels, Jef ferson recommended that we treat them in the same way. He believed that Great Britain could be compelled to re move her burdensome restrictions upon American com merce, by having the same burdens imposed upon her own. But he was far from thinking that his panacea for commercial ills was good for nothing else. In scores of letters, before and after this time, he stated that in the power to regulate commerce, the government possessed the means of righting its wrongs without resorting to -war. In March, 1793, he wrote to Madison : "The idea seems to gain credit that the naval powers combining against France, will prohibit supplies, even of provisions, to that country. Should this be formally notified, I suppose that Congress would be called, because it is a justifiable cause of war, and as the executive cannot decide the question of war on the affirmative side, neither ought it to do so on the negative side, by preventing the compe tent body from deliberating on the question. But I should hope that war would not be their choice. / think it will furnish us a happy opportunity of setting another pre cious example to the world, by showing that nations m,ay be HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 177 brought to do justice by appeals to their interests as well as by appeals to arms. I should hope that Congress, instead of a declaration of war, would instantly exclude from our ports all the manufactures, produce, vessels and subjects of the nations com-mitting this aggression, during the contin uance of this aggression, and till full satisfaction is made for it."* In a letter to his daughter, written six days after his report was submitted to Congress, he predicted the Republican policy : "Our affairs with England and Spain have a turbid appearance," he said. "The letting loose the Algerines on us which has been contrived by England, has produced a peculiar irritation. / think Con gress will indenmify tliemselves by high duties on all ar ticles of British importation." '\ Early in January, Madison offered a series of resolu tions in the House of Representatives, propo.sing restric tions on British commerce in harmony with Jefferson's recommendation. The first merciai resolu tions. resolution, asserting the general principle of retaliation, was carried by a vote of fifty-one to forty- six. Before the rest of them came to a vote they were superseded by the passage (March 26) of a joint resolu tion laying an embargo on ships in American ports. April 7, the Republican theory of foreign relation was at last set forth without any ambiguity in a motion to discontinue all commercial intercourse with Great Britain * Works, vol. Ill, page 519. Italics are mine. tltalics are mine. 178 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. after November 1, until she should surrender the western posts, and compensate American citizens for the losses inflicted by her anti-neutral attacks upon their commerce. In the long debate upon these various propositions, four facts are worthy of special note : (1) that although it was the commerce of New England that especially suf fered at the hands of England, the representatives of that section almost to a man opposed the measures that were ostensibly proposed primarily for its protection; (2) that the representatives of the South, which had very little com merce, were almost as unanimously in favor of them; (3) that the policy of the Federalists was to adjust the difficulties between the two countries by negotiation if possible, but, in the meantime, to make preparations for war ; (4) that the Republicans not only disagreed with the Federalists as to the method of ultimate decision, and as to the pre paration that should be made for war, but also as to the policy of negotiation. As to the first and second points, it would not be cor rect to say that the opposing interests of the two sections were the direct and immediate cause of the differences between Federalists and Republicans. Men like Madison did not favor commercial restrictions, because it was the commerce of New England instead of that of Virginia which would be hampered by them. It is indeed true, that if Virginia had been a commercial state, if the busi ness of large numbers of her people would have suffered heavily through commercial restrictions, the attitude of HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 179 Jefferson and Madison towards the policy would probably have been different. In all their reflections upon the sub ject, there would have stood in the foreground of their thoughts, the fact of this inevitable loss to their constitu ents, and they would have been compelled thereby to scrutinize more closely the arguments by which they convinced themselves, that this loss would eventually be made good. Their contention was that the political in terests of the country would be promoted by close com mercial relations with France, rather than with England. But even upright men can more easily convince them selves that it is the duty of strangers to make pecuniary sacrifices for what they consider to be the good of the countrj^ than that it is the duty of themselves or their friends. Of course, the greater readiness of the Federalists to go to war was in part due to the fact that they were not so frightened by the thought of a strong ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ central government. Hamilton's enemies, read^*to"goto indeed, repeatedly charged him with desir ing to bring on a war for the sake of strengthening the government. That charge is groundless. He was too much of a statesman not to see how disadvantageous, if not disastrous, a war would be to the young nation. But we may be sure that its tendency to strengthen the gov ernment was no part of his reasons for objecting to it. He knew, as did all other intelligent Americans, that war would lay a heavy burden on the new government, that 180 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. it would disarrange its finances, interrupt its prosperity, and that when there was so little national patriotism it might seriously endanger its stability. But he believed there were worse things than war, and one of them was submission to insults that would deaden the feeling of national honor. The attitude of the Republicans towards negotiation with England was probably due, to a considerable extent, to their fear that a negotiation might RepuhUoan atti- , _ , . . _ , , tude towards succeed. In their entire confidence that negotiation. they could compel respect for the rights of the United States by commercial restrictions, they did not wish to hamper the country by a treaty. The best treaty the country could obtain, they felt sure, would not be favorable, and some of its provisions, they feared, would make it impossible for the country to use its most powerful weapon. There was, also, a sentimental reason which had great influence with the masses of the party, and was not without influence upon its leaders. France, their old friend, was fighting for liberty ; England, their old enemy, was fighting for despotism ; to make a treaty with England was to make a treaty with the enemy of France and of liberty. The extent to which the " revolutionary madness " of France had infected the people of this country was clearly shown by the influence of purely sentimental considerations on the debate. As Tracy said, " this dis cussion" — on Madison's resolutions — " has assumed an ap- HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 181 pearance which must be surprising to a stranger and painful to ourselves. The Congress of the United States is seen deliberating, not upon the welfare of our own citizens, but upon the relative circumstances of two European nations, and this deliberation has not for its object the relative benefit of their markets to us, but which form of government is best and most like our own, which people feel the greatest affection for us, and what measures we can adopt which will best humble one and exalt the other." But Washington was unmoved by such considera tions. Aiming only at the welfare of the country, he paid no heed to the clamor itogfand."' of parties and of partisans. He decided to make a trial of negotiations before making the perilous appeal to arms. In April, 1794, he nominated John Jay, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, as envoy extraor dinary to England. The Senate confirmed the nomination, and Jay went to England for the special purpose of at tempting to settle the difficulties between the two coun tries by negotiation. The Republicans persisted in pushing their policy of commercial restrictions. The bill to prohibit all inter course with Great Britain, passed the House, but was de feated in the Senate by the casting vote of John Adams. This action of the Senate called forth a letter from Jefferson, which showed the democratic drift of Republican sentiment: " This ^l^f^" ""^ "^^ body " (the Senate), he wrote to Madison, 182 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. " was intended as a check on the will of the represen tatives, when too hasty. They are not only that, but completely on the will of the people also, and, in my opinion, are heaping coals of fire not only on their persons but on their body as a branch of the legislature. * * * It seems that the opinion is fairly launched into the public that they should be placed under the con trol of a more frequent recurrence to the will oftheir con- stitutents. This seems requisite to complete the experi ment whether they do more harm than good." It was in this session that the beginnings of the United States navy were made. The ques- Begmnings of a ^^^^ ^^^ whether to fit out a squadron and send it to the Mediterranean to keep the Algerine pirates from preying on our commerce, or whether money should be appropriated to buy a peace. It was finally decided, January 2, to do both, to purchase a peace and provide a naval force. The first Committee of Ways and Means ever appointed by the House of Representatives, was appointed to consider the waj'^s and means for supporting the naval force which they might recommend as desirable. Such questions had before this been referred to the Secretary of the Treasury. This committee recommended the building of four frigates. The bill as passed provided for six. But the opposition suc ceeded in adding a clause to the effect that proceedings should be suspended in case of a peace with Algiers, for the purpose of which a million dollars was appropriated. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 183 The grounds of the Republican opposition to the creation of a naval force were clearlj' stated by William Branch Giles, of Virginia. The policy of creatinga navy "involved a complete derelic- po^tion"'to''it.^ tion of the policy of discharging the prin cipal of the public debt." " To increase her navy and de crease her debt" "exceeded the ability of any nation." "It was the most expensive of all the means of defense, and the tyranny of governments consists of the expensiveness of their machinery." " The system of governing by debts he conceived, the most refined system of tyranny." " There is no device which facilitates the sj'Stem of ex pense and debts so much as anavy,and he declared that he should value his liberty at a lower price than he now did if this policy should obtain." This was orthodox Re publican doctrine; whether it was in harmony with the best interests of the country, the history of the war of 1812 will show. Perhaps the most important act of this session was the neutrality or foreign enlistment Act, which was passed June 5, 1794, to furnish a me^t acf."^^* basis upon which the judiciary could act in preventing the citizens of the United States from violat ing neutrality. It is gratifying to American pride to know, that though it was the first act of the kind that was ever passed, it has since been imitated in the legis lation of most European States. 184 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIER. QUESTIONS. 1. Describe the colonial systems of Europe one hundred years ago. 2. What effect did the independence of the United States have upon their commercial relations with England ? 3. What were the difficulties between the two countries in 1793? 4. What did Russia and England agree to do in a treaty made' in 1793? 5. What was the English provision order ? 6. What would submission to it have been equivalent to ? 7. 'Why did France relax her colonial system when she was engaged in war with England ? 8. What was the rule of the war of 1756 ? 9. Was it just from the European point of view ? 10. What order in council did England issue in November, 1793? 11. What was the Republican substitute for war? 12. Whydid they object to war? 13. "What did Jefferson recommend in his report on com merce ? 14. What were Madison's resolutions ? 15. What were the noteworthy features in the debate upon them? 16. For what purpose did the Federalists recommend a navy ? 17. Why did the Republicans oppose it ? ' 18. What was the foreign enlistment Act? HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 185 CHAPTER XIII, JAY'S TREATY. THE PRECEDING chapter has told of the injuries inflicted upon the United States by England in detaining ships laden with provisions for France, and in enforcing the rule of the war of 1756. In addition to these, the United States justly SlSn."""''^ complained of the British doctrine of block ade, which England had been enforcing against this coun try since the outbreak of the war with France. The same day the famous provision order was issued (June 8, 1793), English ships of war and privateers were com manded to capture a ship anywhere on the high seas whose papers showed that she was on the way to a port declared to be blockaded, provided the declaration of the blockade was known in the country from which she sailed before the time of her departure. To obtain redress for these grievances, to prevent their recurrence in the future, to adjust the points of difference growing out of the treaty of peace, were the primary objects of Jay's mission. If he was successful in these, he was to en deavor to negotiate a commercial treaty, but no treaty was to be made which was not consistent with our obli gations to France. He reached England in June, 1794, and succeeded 186 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. in negotiating a treaty in November. Of the various American claims, the treaty satisfied but The treaty. one. The Northwcstcm posts were to be surrendered on or before June 1, 1796, but no compensation was to be made for their previous de tention. Three comrai-ssions were provided for: one, to settle the Northeast boundary; another, to fix the amount of debts due to British citizens which the ob struction of justice had made it impossible to collect, and which were to be paid by the United States; a third, to determine the amount due from Great Britian to citi zens of the United States, for illegal captures and confis cations. But Jay was unable to induce Lord Grenville, the English negotiator, to agree that provisions should in no case be regarded as contraband of war. On the contrary, the treaty clearly implied that provisions might in some cases be contraband, but provided that when they were taken as such they should be paid for. Nor was he able to secure an abandonment of the rule of the war of 1756, or of the so-called right of impressment. It must be acknowledged that there were serious difficulties in the way of yielding the right to impress British sailors when they were found on Impressment. board of American ships. England owed her greatness to her supremacy on the sea. But if British sailors could evade the duty of serving on British vessels of war by engaging in American vessels, HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 187 it seemed to English statesmen that that supremacy was seriously endangered. They were willing to admit that in exercising the right of impressing British seamen, in- jurj- had sometimes been inflicted, in that American born sailors had been mistaken for British citizens. But they contended that an abuse of the right was no sufficient reason for abandoning it, least of all when England was engaged in a war in which it was of the utmost import ance for her to have command of all her resources. There was indeed, in one point, a fundamental difference between the American and the British view. England contended that a man had no right to renounce his al legiance — that a man who was once a citizen could never become an alien, while the United States contended that a man born in any country, could by process of naturalization, become a citizen of the United States. In exercising the so-called right of impressment, then, England might claim the services of a British-born sailor who was a citizen of the United States in accord ance with their laws. But whatever the abstract merits of the question, England would not renounce the right of searching American vessels for British sailors, nor would she acknowledge the principle that the goods of an enemy are safe on the vessels of a neutral. The treaty provided that Americans should not ac cept commissions from the enemies of England against England, nor English from the enemies of America against America, and that citizens of either country, ac- 188 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. cepting such commissions were to be regarded as pirates. It also provided that privateers of an enemy of either England or America should not be allowed to arm their ships, or sell their prizes in the ports of the other, but that ships of war of each of the contracting parties should be hospitably received in the ports of the other, and permitted to sell their prizes there. But it provided that none of its articles should be construed contrary to previous treaties of either party with other nations. The best argument that has ever been made for the treaty was made by Jay when he transmitted it to the department of state. There "was no reason Meets of the ^^ believe or conjecture," he said, "that one more favorable to us was attainable." A treaty which implied that provisions might sometimes be contraband of war, which secured no compensation for the negroes carried away at the close of the war, or indemnity for injuries suffered through the wrongful detention of the northwestern posts, which tacitly admitted the right of search, and of impressment, and the right to prevent any trade with the colonies of a nation engaged in war, which that nation did not allow in time of peace, might be preferable to war, but it would be difficult to defend it on any other grounds. Bad as these features of the treaty were, they were by no means the worst in the eyes of the Republicans. In every disputed point, it rendered the French interpretation of the treaties between France and the United States im- HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. 189 possible to this government. Genet had said that these treaties gave France the right to fit out privateers, and sell prizes in American ports; this treaty forbade it. Genet had claimed the right to give American citizens commissions against England; this treaty said that Americans accepting such commissions, were to be re garded as pirates. Worst of all, the treaties between France and the United States provided that the goods of an enemy on board the vessels of a friend were safe, while Jay's treaty made the goods of an enemy on board the vessel of a friend, liable to capture. In other words, at the time when France, in the opinion of the Republi cans, was fighting with the whole of Europe, in behalf of liberty and the right of self-government, France — who had assisted us generously in our struggle for inde pendence and had voluntarily bound herself not to cap ture the goods of an enemy when found on board Amer ican vessels — this treaty gave England the right to cap ture French goods on American vessels. Jay reached New York in the latter part of May and from that time till July 2, when the treaty was published in the democratic " Aurora," of Philadelphia, the eagerness of the country to learn its Opposition to it. contents was intense. A large number of the people would have condemned a good treaty, but when they found that a treaty had been made which seemed, to their prejudiced eyes, to yield everything to England, a mighty wave of indignation swept over the 190 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. country. From Boston to Savannah meetings were held and resolutions were passed, urging the President not to sign it. Hamilton was stoned at a public meeting while attempting to defend it. Jay was repeatedly burned in effigy, and one society regretted that there was no guillo tine in this country for his benefit. In Philadelphia, a copy of the treaty was burned before the British minis ter's house ; in Charleston, after a meeting at which the treaty had been denounced, the flag of Great Britian was dragged through the streets, and burned before the house of the British consul. But Washington, the "unparalleled executive," was still President. And having decided that the choice lay between that treaty, bad as he thought it, and war, he de cided to sign it, in spite of the fact that England had repeated her provision order, and was thus again treating provisions as contraband of war. Having already re ceived the votes of twenty Senators, a bare constitutional majority, he signed it and promulgated it as the law of the land. But it had a dangerous gauntlet to run before it was definitely settled that it was to be the law of the land. Pursuing the same course they had taken Republican press attacks Wash- when Genet was trying to drive the goveru- ington .• o o ment into submission to the will of France, the Republican papers denounced Washington more bit terly than ever. The "Aurora" charged him with vio lating the constitution, declared that Louis XVI had never HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 191 dared to heap such insults upon his subjects as Wash ington had upon the American people, by making a disgraceful treaty with a nation whom they despised. One writer declared that he had overdrawn his salary ; another, that he had gone back to private life at the close of the war because the government offered no position that could satisfy his ambition ; that his life of seclusion, his levees, his returning no visits, his state and his cere mony, his unrepublican habits, in a word, gave the lie to his oath to defend the constitution, the object of which was to provide a Republican form of government. All this was preliminary to a determined and persist ent effort on the part of the House of Representatives to defeat the treaty, which had already been House of Rep- proclaimed as the law of the land. In a resentatives and the treaty. letter to Rutledge, after denouncing it as an execrable thing, Jefferson said : " I trust the popular branch of the legislature will disapprove of it, and thus rid us of this infamous act, which is really nothing more than a treaty of alliance between England and the Anglo- men of this country, against the legislature and the peo ple." The Republicans had a double motive in wishing the House of Representatives to rid the people of it; they not only wished to defeat what Jefferson called the alliance between England and the Anglomen, but also to extend the power of the House of Representatives. They felt that the great danger to Republican institutions in this country lay in the Executive. With this idea they 192 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. wished to enlarge the power of the House of Represent atives, " the popular branch of the legislature," as much as possible. Under the influence of these two mo tives, they entered upon what proved to be one of the fiercest struggles in which the two parties ever engaged. The fight began (March 2, 1796), with a resolution offered by Edward Livingston, of New York, calling on the President for Jay's in.structions and all ^esoMon"^ the correspondence and documents relating to the treaty, excepting such as any exist ing negotiation might make it improper to disclose. In the debate upon this resolution, Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania, arose to a position of real leadership in the Republican party. In a speech of great abilitj', he set forth the Republican theory of the f^e'ech'^ treaty clauses of the constitution with a clearness and force that left nothing to be desired. Jefferson declared that it was worthy of inser tion in the Federalist as the only rational commentary upon that part of the constitution. Gallatin contended that a treaty made by the President, by and with the ad vice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, is inchoate, that it does not become the law of the land until it re ceives the sanction of the House of Representatives. "To construe the constitution consistently, we must at tend to all the sections of it. To interpret particular clauses of it by themselves, invites absurdities. By one section, it is declared that a treaty is the supreme law of HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 193 the land, that it operates as a law; yet it is to be made by the President and Senate only. Here will be an appar ent contradiction; for the constitution declares that the legislative power shall be vested in the three branches. By this construction there would appear to be two dis tinct legislatures." "If still it is insisted that treaties are the supreme law of the land, the constitution and laws are also; and, it may be asked, which shall have the preference? Shall a treaty repeal a law or a law a treaty? Neither of these can be done. A law cannot repeal a treaty because a treaty is made with the concur rence of another party — a foreign nation — that has no participation in framing the law." "A treaty made by the President and Senate cannot repeal a law, because the House of Representatives have a participation in making- the law. It is a sound maxim in government, that it re quires the same power to repeal a law that enacted it. If so, it follows that laws and treaties are not of the same nature" — that treaties are not laws and do not have the force of laws until they have received the sanction of both Houses of Congress. "Gentlemen had dwelt much on the clause of the constitution which declares that the constitution, laws and treaties made in accordance with it, are the supreme law ofthe land. But they had neglected to read the whole of the clause, and had thereby missed its obvious meaning. The intention was not to compare the constitution, laws, and treaties with each other, but with the constitution and laws of the particular states; to de- 13 194 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. clare whether the constitution, laws and treaties of the general government — or the laws and constitution of the states, are supreme, in case of clashing powers." Living ston's resolution was carried by a large majority. Washing ton declined to give the papers on the ground that the power of making treaties is vested exclusively in the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and that it was the duty of the House of Repre sentatives to make all necessary provisions for carrying them into effect. A few days later (April 7), the House passed a resolution by a vote of fifty-seven to thirty-five declaring that it claimed no agency in making treaties, but that it claimed the right to deliberate upon the ex pediency of carrying into effect a treaty which contained regulations on the subjects which the constitution had committed to their care. All this was preliminary skirmishing. The fight began in earnest (April 15), when the Federalists offered a resolution declaring that provision ought to be made for carrying the treaty into effect. It was speech. ""^^ in this debate that Fisher Ames made the great speech of his life. So feeble that he was hardly able to stand, he disregarded the advice of his physician, and determined to make an effort in behalf of what he regarded 4b the salvation of his country. He declared that the question which the house was de bating was, " Shall we break the treaty, shall we vio late a solemn engagement into which the nation has en- HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 195 tered? With solemn emphasis he urged that a govern ment wantonly refusing to fulfill its engagements, cor rupts its citizens. "Will the laws continue to prevail in the hearts of the people, when the respect that gives them efficacy is withdrawn from the legislators. To weaken government and to corrupt morals are effects of a breach of public faith not to be prevented." But it was when he portrayed the horrors that would be sure to fol low a rejection of the treaty, that he moved his audience to tears. To reject the treaty was to reject the forts, and to reject the forts, was to involve the frontiers in all the horrors of an Indian war. " We light the savage fires, we bind the victims. This day, we undertake to render account to the widows and orphans, whom our decision will make — to the wretches that will be roasted at the stake." But war with the Indians was not the only or the worst result which seemed to Fisher Ames an inevitable result of rejecting the treaty. War with England, anarchy and confusion at home, would be, he believed, its inevitable results. " Even the minutes I have spent in expostulat ing," he said, in closing, " have their value, because they protract the crisis, and the short period in which alone we may resolve to escape it. Yet I have, perhaps, as little personal interest in the event as anyone here. There is, I believe, no member who will not think his chance to be a witness of the consequences greater than mine. If, however, the vote should pass to reject, and a spirit should rise, as it will, with the public disorders to 196 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. make confusion worse confounded, even I, slender ' and almost broken as my hold on life is, may outlive the government and constitution of my country." When he sat down, there was scarcely a dry eye in the House. John Adams sat weeping in the gaUery and ejaculating, " My God ! how great he is." His speech, backed by the letters and petitions, which were pouring into the House, decided the question, and the reso lution to carry the treaty into effect passed by a vote of fifty-one to forty-eight. Appropriations were made in this session of Con- gresss for carrying into effect treaties made with Spain and Algiers in 1795. The treaty with Spain was negoti ated by Thomas Pinckney. It provided for Treaties with . . . ^, ,,.... ,, Spain and a free navigation of the Mississippi to both xxi^ieira- parties throughout its entire extent. It also gave to the Americans a right of deposit at New Orleans for three years, at the end of which time, the right was either to be continued at the same place or at some other convenient point on the bank of the river. By the treaty with Algiers, the United States agreed to pay $763,000, besides a yearly tribute in slaves of the nominal value of $24,000, in consideration of the release of the American captives and of peace for the future. The impatience of the Dey of Algiers at not receiving his money soon enough, seemed to make it desirable to pacify him with the promise of a frigate, which made the treaty cost another hundred thousand dollars. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 197 QUESTIONS. 1. State the object of Jay's Mission. 2. Mention the important points of the treaty and point out its defects. 3. State the British defense of impressment. 4. Describe the opposition to the treaty. 5. Why did the Republicans wish the House of Represent atives to refuse appropriations to the treaty ? 6. Why was the Senate more obnoxious to the Republi cans than to the Federalists ? 7. What was Livingston's resolution ? 8. State Gallatin's view of the relation of the House of Representatives to treaties. 9. Upon what point did Fisher Ames lay most stress ? 10. What were the important provisions of the treaties with Spain and Algiers ? 11. Why was the right to navigate the Mississippi such an important matter to the people of the West and South ? 198 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. CHAPTER XVI. THE WHISKY INSURRECTION. WK HAVE seen that Hamilton's financial policy aimed to increase the stability and strengthen the authority of the Union, as well as restore its credit and provide it with a revenue. With these ends in view, as we have seen, he recommended an excise on distilled spirits as a means of providing the extra revenue ren dered necessary by the assumption of state debts. Of all forms of taxation, probably none was then so unpopular among English and Americans as an excise. Dr. Johnson's famous definition, "a hateful tax, levied upon commodities, and adjudged not by the Prejudice . , . agamst an ex- common judges of property, but by wretches hired by those to whom excise is paid," well described the general feeling of the people in this country as well as in England. The Continental Con gress in its address of 1774 to the people of Canada, laid special stress on the fact that in being subject to Eng land, they were subjected " to the imposition of excises, the horror of all free states." In addition to this an excise laid on the people of the states by the general government seemed like a tax imposed by a foreign government. The Congress of the Confederation, as we know, had no power to lay taxes on HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. 199 the people, and this power was withheld from it because the states regarded it as a foreign government. When Congress humbly requested the legislatures of the states to tax their citizens, its attitude, cap in hand, in the presence of its masters, was one which the immense ma jority of the people thought entirely proper. The new constitution had provided for a radical change in this re lation. It authorized the government which it created — not to go to the states as a beggar and ask for money — but as a monarch with power to compel obedience to his commands. It could indeed exercise this power only as directed by representatives whom the people had chosen. The power behind the throne was the whole American people. They were the real sovereign, and the general government was but the organ through which they acted, the agent that gave expression to their will. But in the nature of the case it was impossible for this change in their constitution to produce any immediate change in the feelings of the people. The new consti tution said that it, and laws and treaties made in accord ance with it, should be the supreme law of Ettect of adop tion of the con- the land, but so in substance said the old. stitution on the leehngs of the The Articles of Confederation declared that p^°p1'=- every state shouldabide by the decision of theUnitedStates in Congress assembled, in reference to all the questions sub mitted to them by the Confederation. But in spite of this declaration, the sovereign states had disregarded the de cisions of Congress whenever they pleased. What was 200 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. to prevent their doing the same under the new govern ment ? There were, to be sure, in the new government an executive and a judiciary which had been wanting in the old. But was anyone foolish enough to suppose that this executive would dare enforce a law against the wishes of a sovereign and independent state? Senator Maclay, we remember, thought the very idea preposter ous, and there is little doubt that in this, as in many other respects, he correctly represented the feelings of a large majority of the people. For what means could it employ? It had no standing army, and men of their way of thinking meant to take good care that it did not get one. And was it reasonable to suppose that militia would march against their fellow citizens and compel them to obey an unpopular, and, from their point of view, unjust law? The power of the executive depended en tirely on the will of the people, and what reason was there to suppose that the people would go to the aid of the executive against themselves ? To put an end to such ideas, to make every man in the United States understand that the new government had power to compel obedience to its laws, to make them feel that the laws of the general govern- Hamilton's , . . r i • ohject. ment were not mere pieces of advice, sug gestions to do this and not to do that,but com mands that must be obeyed, was Hamilton's great politi cal object in recommending an excise. Until this ques tion was settled, he knew that the question as to whether HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 201 there was or was not a government was still undecided. He knew that the existence of a House of Representa tives, Senate, President, Supreme Court, and all the gov ernmental machinery that might be devised, did not of themselves prove that the new Constitution had created a government. Had it power to compel obedience to its laws ? That was the question, upon the answer to which depended the decision as to whether the new constitution was merely a revised edition ofthe Articles of Confedera tion, or whether it had created a real government for the American State. Hamilton knew that this transcendently important question must be decided sometime, and it seemed to him highly desirable that the decision should be reached as soon as possible. In a long letter to Washington, Jeffer son objected to the excise as " committing the authority of the government in parts where resistance is most probable and coercion least practicable." Hamilton in reply* admitted that this objection had some weight. " It must be confessed," he continued, " that a hazard of this nature has been run ; but if there were motives suf ficiently cogent for it, it has been wisely run." After stating his financial reasons, he added this important paragraph: " Other reasons co-operated in the minds of some able men to render an excise at an early period de- * Washington did not send Jefferson's letter, but stated its various points in order, and forwarded them to Hamilton as ex pressions of opinion in Virginia upon the policy of the govern ment, and asked him to reply to them. 202 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. sirable. They thought it well to lay hold of so valuable a resource of revenue before it was generally preoccu pied by the state governments. They supposed it not amiss that the authority of the national government should be visible in some branch of internal revenue, lest a total non-exercise of it should beget an impression that it was never to be exercised, and next, that it ought not to be exercised. It was supposed, too, that a thing of the kind could not be introduced with a greater pros pect of easy success than at a period when the govern ment enjoyed the advantage of first impressions, when state factions to resist its authority, were not yet matured, when so much aid was to be derived from the popular ity and firmness of the actual Chief Magistrate.* With these ends in view, he caused a bill laying an excise on distilled spirits to be introduced in Congress in 1790. It was defeated, but a bill with substantially the same provisions, passed about the middle of the next year. The law created widespread dissatisfaction, especially in Virginia, North Carolina and Pennsylvania. In the western counties of all these states, beyond or among the AUeghanies, it seemed to the people not merely an inva sion of their rights, but a tyrannical impo- Dissatisfaction . . with the ex- sitiou. They were three hundred miles or cise. more from the sea with very few roads and these bad. They had to convert their grain into whisky, * Hamilton's Works, vol. IV, page 256. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 203 since it was impossible to carry so bulky an article as corn so great a distance on such bad roads with profit. Whisky was the money of the community as there was a great scarcity of coin. Nevertheless, little open resistance was made to the law in Virginia and North Carolina. But in Pennsylvania, under the leadership of some able men, one of whom was Albert Gallatin, the enemies of the law de termined to attempt to prevent its enforce- ^If^^l^ ment. They were urged to do this by the National Gazette, a Republican paper edited, it will be remembered by Freneau, a clerk employed by Jefferson in the department of state. At a meeting at Pittsburg in August, 1792, they declared that they would treat as enemies all persons who accepted an office for the col lection of the tax. September sixth, they gave a practical illustration of their meaning by tarring and feathering a revenue officer. Congress had passed an act in May preceding, giving the President power to use militia in executing the laws ofthe Union and suppressing insurrections. Hamilton told the President when he gave him an account of the Pittsburg meeting that he thought the time had come to employ the power which that law had put into his hands. "If this is not done the spirit of disobedience will naturally extend, and the authority of the government will be prostrated." Late in September, the President accordingly issued a proclamation stating that the oppo- 204 HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. sition to laws passed in accordance with an express pro vision of the constitution was "dangerous to the very being of government," exhorting all persons to desist from unlawful combinations, and charging magistrates to bring infractors of law to justice. He also ordered Randolph, the Attorney-General, to prosecute those who had been concerned in the Pittsburg meeting, but it was found that they had committed no offense for which they could be indicted. Throughout the year 1793, the policy of intimidation agreed upon at the Pittsburg meeting was followed and a number of men were tarred and feathered. But the Whisky Insurrection, so called, really began in July, 1794. One ground of objection to the law was that a person accused under it had to go to Philadelphia, a distance of several hundred miles, in order to be tried. Congress passed an act June 5, 1704, re- rewfonh'^^s. moving this grievance, by providing that offenders against the internal revenue law might be tried by state courts. But before this law could be taken advantage of, the United States marshal received some fifty writs to serve on persons in western Pennsylvania, summoning the defendants to Philadelphia. When, in company with the inspector of the district. General Neville, he undertook to serve them in Alle ghany county, the cry was raised, "the Federal sheriff is taking away people to Philadelphia," and he was fired upon by a body of armed men. They captured the HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 205 marshal and would not release him until he had promised to serve no more writs west of the AUeghanies. The inspector fled for his life down the Ohio river, and went thence by a circuitous route to Philadelphia. In two days (July 15-17), the execution of the law was stopped. A mass meeting was called at Braddock's field August 1, at which some 7,000 men were present, and preparations began to be made to array the whole force of the insur gent counties against the United States. The question had then to be answered : Was the constitution of the United States a revised edition of the Articles of Con federation ; could its laws be defied at pleasure, or had it called a real government into existence? Washington called for the opinion of his cabinet as to the course proper to be pursued in the crisis. The opinion of the Secretary of State, Edmund T%iii- r .. ¦ -r- . Randolph's opin- Randolph, is profoundly significant. "A ion as to caumg out the militia. calm survey of the situation of the United States," he said, "banishes every idea of calling the mili tia into immediate action." A radical and universal dis satisfaction with the excise existed in the western coun ties of Pennsylvania, and a number of adjacent counties in that state and in Virginia were infected with it. If the attempt were made to enforce the law, these elements might be joined by the disaffected classes generally. Now, Governor Miffiin, of Pennsylvania, having declared his opinion that the available militia of the state would be unequal to the task of suppressing the insurrection. 206 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. who could tell whether the militia of other states would serve ? The insurgents might call in the aid of the Brit ish, with a British war and the dissolution of the Union as the result. The parties in the country were highly inflamed, and "one character alone could keep them in awe ; and if the sword be drawn it will be difficult to restrain them." From the point of view of a generation that thinks as little of openly resisting the laws of the United States as it does the laws of nature, this "opinion" of Grounds for it. Randolph's seems absurd. But that respect for law in this country which makes it irre sistible, had a beginning. It did not exist in the period of the Confederation. How was Randolph to know that in five short years it had so far developed that it could be relied on as a means of coercing rebellious citizens? Nor was he the only prominent man who doubted whether the militia could be relied on. When Governor Mifflin was requested to call out the militia of the state, he declined to do it. He believed that such a step would result in strengthening the revolt, as he doubted whether the mili tia of the state would "pay a passive obedience to the mandates of the government." And when Washington issued a requisition on the Governors of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland and Virginia for 13,000 men,* Mifflin felt so doubtful of the result that he traveled over the state and employed his great eloquence to secure the *The number was afterwards raised to 15,000. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 207 quota of Pennsylvania. If, in spite of the exertions of Mifflin, it be said that in his case and that of Randolph the wish was father to the thought, since they were both Republicans, that certainly will not be said of Hamilton. And yet he said in a letter written to Sedgwick in 1799 : " In the expedition against the western insurgents, I trembled every moment lest a greater part of the militia should take it into their heads to return home rather than go forward."* The truth is that there was probably not an intelligent man in the country who was not, more or less, doubtful as to the result. They had seen the utter contempt which the people had shown for the laws of the Congress of the Confedera tion ; they had seen the government of the French mon archy crumble to pieces, because the French soldiers would not obey orders when they were commanded to attack insurgents. How was any one to know that the result would not be the same in the United States? It is certainly true that Hamilton had more hope of a favor able result than Randolph. But the difference between him and Randolph lay rather in his clear perception of the truth that not to suppress the insurrection was to re turn to the anarchy of the Confederation. A suppres sion of the rebellion or anarchy ; these as he plainly saw, were the alternatives. The suppression of the insurrec tion with such a popular executive as Washington he *J. C. Hamilton, History of the Republic of the United States, vol. VII, p. 278. 208 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. doubtless regarded as probable. But whether probable or not he knew that anarchy was the absolutely certain result of a failure to do it. Agreeing with his great con temporary in France, Mirabeau, that the great end of government was the maintenance of order, he saw that however great the risk, it must be made since everything depended on it. The question at issue, as he himself said, plainly was, "Shall the majority govern or be gov erned? Shall the nation rule or be ruled? Shall the general will prevail or the will of a faction? Shall there be government or no government?"* He, therefore, urged that the militia should be called out and that the force should be so imposing, if attain able, as " to frighten from opposition, save the effusion of blood of citizens, and secure the object to ?^S°°'^ be accomplished." Washington followed Hamilton's advice; fifteen thousand men were called out and their appearance crushed the insur rection without the necessity of fighting a single battle. But two men were killed and those in personal conflict with the soldiers, for which the latter received punishment. The Whisky Insurrection marks an important epoch in the history of the United States. In 1787, the Fed eral Convention framed a constitution providing for an organization to be called a government. Epochal charae- -n-mr, . ¦ ii ¦< ter of Whisky In 178y, this so-callcd government was Insurrection. created. But the question as to whether it * Hamilton's Works, IV, 16. A series of essays addressed to the people of the United States. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 209 was in fact what it claimed to be was not settled until the short-lived Whisky Insurrection was suppressed. Then it became clear that the laws of the government were not mere pieces of advice but commands that must be obeyed. Alexander Johnson calls attention to the contrast between the debates in Congress before and after the Whisky Insurrection. "Before 1794," he says, "there is in many of the speakers almost an affectation of vol untary obedience to Federal laws, and of monition to others not to provoke resistance. After this year, this characteristic disappears almost entirely, and the debates have no longer the background of possible club law."* QUESTIONS. 1. In his life of Madison, Rivest quotes Hamilton as say ing at a cabinet meeting, "A government can never be said to be established until some signal display has manifested its power of military coercion. " Was Hamilton right ? 2. Washington wrote a letter to Henry Lee, commander of the forces against the Whisky Insurrection, containing the following paragraph : "No citizen of the United States can ever be engaged in a service more important to his country. It is nothing less than to consolidate and to preserve the blessings of that revolution, which at much expense of blood and treasure, constituted us a free and independent nation." Explain and justify this strong language. 3. Conway, in his life of Edmund Randolph, page 243 says : "When insurrection flamed out on the Ohio, the British party attributed it to the seditious influences of the societies *Lalor's Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy and United States History, vol. Ill, page 1111. tVol. Ill, 452. 210 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. (Democratic,) the French party to machinations of the English. " Account for such conflicting explanations. 4. In a letter to Madison written December 28, 1794,* Jef ferson said: " 1 expected to have some justification of arming one part of society against another; of declaring a civil war be fore the meeting of that body which has the sole right of declar ing war ; of being so patient at the kicks and scoffs of our ene mies, and rising at a feather against our friends ; of adding a million to the public debt and deriding us with recommenda tions to pay it if we can.'' Account for Jefferson's dissatisfaction with the conduct of the administration in suppressing the Whisky Insurrection, and discuss the italicized clauses. 5. Henry Adams (in his Life of Gallatin, page 175) says "The Hamiltonian doctrine was that the United States should be a strong government, ready and able to maintain its dignity abroad and its authority at home by arms ; Mr. Gallatin main tained that its dignity would protect itself if its resources were carefully used for self development, while its domestic authority should rest only on consent. " Discuss the clause in italics ; can authority rest on consent ? 6. Contrast the conduct of the government with refer ence to Shays' Insurrection and the Whisky Insurrection. What does the contrast show ? 7. Describe the prejudice of English and Americans against an excise. 8. Contrast the attitude of the Congress of the Confeder ation with that of the government created by the constitution towards the people of the states ? 9. Why did they not appreciate the change ? 10. 'What was Hamilton's object in recommending an ex cise? 11. 'When did the Whisky Insurrection begin and under what circumstances ? 12, What was Randolph's opinion as to the propriety of calling out the militia? 13. State the facts upon which his opinion was based. 14. 'What was Hamilton's opinion and why r »Works, vol. IV, pages 110-113. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 211 15. He is accused by his enemies of having purposely in cited the Whisky Rebellion; suppose the charge true, do you think he was justified in doing it ? 16. What do you think would have been the consequence if a man of indecision, like Buchanan, had been President in 1794? 17. In what respect does the 'Whisky Insurrection consti tute au epoch in the history of the United States? 212 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. CHAPTER XV. MONROE IN FRANCE. JOSEPH FAUCHET, who succeeded Genet as minister from France to this country, comported himself with comparative propriety. He did, indeed, take sharp issue with the United States in its interpreta tion of the treaty of 1778. But it is diffi- frea^Hf^iws"^ cult not to bclieve that in this instance France had a good case. The 19th article of that treaty said that no shelter should be given in the ports of the United States or France "to such ships as shall have made prizes of the subjects, people, or prop erty of either of the parties." The United States con strued the clause as though it read, "To such ships as shall bring in their prizes." Fauchet insisted on con struing it literally, and also urged that " capturing ves sels " meant the whole fleet, and not the particular ves sels that had made the capture. But Adet, who succeeded Fauchet, in the summer of 1795, did not conduct himself with so much moderation. In a letter written shortly after his arrival PiokerVnB"^'*° in this couutry (September 28, 1795), he complained bitterly that the United States did not take effective measures to prevent England from seizing American vessels laden with provisions for the HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 213 ports of France. He quoted to Timothy Pickering, who had succeeded Edmund Randolph, as Secretary of State, the following passage in a letter from Jefferson to Pinck ney, September 7, 1793 : "This act, too, tends directly to withdraw us from the state of peace in which we are wishing to remain. It is an essential character of neu trality to furnish no aids (not stipulated by treaty) to one party which we are not equally ready to furnish to the other. If we permit corn to be sent to Great Britain and her friends, we are equally bound to permit it to France. To restrain it would be a partiality which might lead to war with France. And between restrain ing it ourselves, and permitting her enemies to restrain it unrightfully is no difference. She would consider this as a mere pretext of which she would not be the dupe and on what honorable ground could we otherwise ex plain it ? Thus we should see ourselves plunged by this unauthorized act of Great Britain, into a war with which we meddle not and which we wish to avoid, if justice to all parties and from all parties will enable us to avoid it." And then he ventured to characterize the conduct of the United States in the following language : " It cannot, therefore, be doubted that the French Re public has a right to complain if the American govern ment suffers the English to interrupt the commercial re lations which exist between her and theUnitedStates; if, by a perfidious condescension, it permitted the English to violate a right, which it ought to defend for its honor 214 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. and its interest ; if, under the cloak of neutrality, it pre sented to England a poignard to cut the throat of its faith ful ally; if, in fine, participating in the tyrannical and homicidal rage of Great Britain, it concurred to plunge the French people into the horrors of famine." But notwitstanding the insolent tone of this letter, he had profited by Genet's experience. He had learned Attempts to in- ttat he could not drive the American gov- Mentiai'eieo-^^" ernment out of the path it wished to pur- tion. , sue, and that the people could not be alienated from the government they had chosen. He, therefore, resolved to employ different measures to reach the same end. He resolved to take a hand in the presi dential election. His plan was to frighten the people with the danger of a war with France, and then tell them that the way to avert it was to elect Jefferson president. Ac cordingly, he wrote letter after letter to the American Secretary of State, and sent at the same time a copy to be published in the Democratic Aurora. In the space of three weeks, four of his articles appeared in that paper, the manifest object of which was to influence the presidential election. The first reported a decree of the French government to the effect that France would treat the ships of neutrals in precisely the same way in which they permitted themselves to be treated by Eng land. In other words, if the Americans permitted England to search, capture, and confiscate their ships, France would also search, capture, and confiscate their HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 215 ships. The fourth, after speaking of his government as "terrible to its enemies but generous to its alUes," de manded the fulfillment of the treaty to which the United States owed their existence as a nation, and closed with praising the sentiments of Jefferson. In the meantime, Monroe was perpetrating a series of diplomatic feats in France almost as remarkable as those of which Genet had been guilty in this country, although of quite a different character. He had gone to France as minister in 1794 ?®°?" °' ?°!'''- o erneur Morris. to take the place of Gouverneur Morris, who had not been satisfactory to the French revolutionists because of his evident lack of sympathy with their ex cesses. To Gouverneur Morris, deeds had seemed of more importance than words, and the cloak of "Liberty, Fraternity and Equality" which the French Revolution had thrown around its odious and blood-thirsty despotism had not to his mind changed its character. But Monroe was of a different temperament. He was an extreme sympathizer with France. He had opposed Jay's mis sion, and he went to France, as his whole career there shows, not so much to repre- Monroe'sobject. sent the United States in that country, as to promote what seemed to him the cause of the people against the "conspiracy of kings;" and to promote the cause of the people was, in his view, to bring the United States and France into the closest possible relations. In speaking of Genet, Hildreth says, he was filled with "an 216 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. enthusiasm aggravated to the highest pitch by the union of the kings and aristocracies of Europe against the French Republic, and potent enough to drive even wise men into madness." Whoever wishes to understand that sentence should study Monroe's career in France. He had been authorized by his instructions to declare the sincere wishes of the President and the people for the success of the French Revolution, and was told that while he went to France to strengthen our His address to . , , the National friendship With that country, he was not to Convention. betray the dignity of the United States, or show the most remote mark of undue complaisance. Shortly after his arrival in Paris, he wrote a letter to the French National Convention, requesting them to fix the day and prescribe the mode by which he should be acknowledged as the representative "oftheir ally and sister Republic." Two days later, he presented a florid address in the hall of the National Convention. Forgetting as Randolph wrote him, in reply to the letter in which he gave an account of this, the neutrality of the United States, the jealousy of allied powers, the sound reasons England had for suspecting the American people of breaches of faith in favor of the French, the desirability of doing nothing to excite unnecessary suspicion, he opened his heart as though private affections and opinions were the only points to be considered. He told the gov ernment of the most absolute despotism of modern times, a despotism as absolute as any known to history, that it HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 217 was similar to the government of the United States, that both cherished the same principles and rested on the same basis — the equal and inalienable rights of man. And he had the hardihood to say to the government whose hands were reeking with the blood of the citizens of France, that "the wisdom and firmness of her councils unite equally in securing the happiest results." As soon as Monroe was publicly recognized, he found himself beset by Americans, hoping through him to re ceive compensation for injuries which they had suffered at the hands of the French Republic. Some of them had been injured bj' the em- ances at the hands of France. bargo at Bordeaux, by which a hundred American vessels had been detained for more than a year. Some had claims upon the Republic for supplies sold to the Government of San Domingo. Some had brought in cargoes for sale and had been detained upon one pre text or another; and others had received injuries not merely in violation of the general principles of interna tional law, but of specific articles of the treaties of 1778. In a letter addressed to the Committee of Public Safety September 3, 1794, he urged the case of the last class on a ground that at least must be conceded to be unique. Misunderstanding his instructions in a remarkable way, he said "that he was not instructed to complain of or re quest the repeal of the decree authorizing a violation of the articles ofthe treaty which secured the Monroe's letter 1 ... J- . J J to the Commit- mutual right of carrying enemy goods and tee of PubUc Safety. enemy passengers. On the contrary, I 218 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. well know that if upon consideration, after the experi ment made, you should be of the opinion that it produces any solid benefit to the Republic, the American Republic and my countrymen in general will not only bear it with patience but with pleasure." But. true to his idea that the great object of his mission was to advance the cause of the "rights of man," he endeavored to convince them that it would be more beneficial to France to repeal the decrees, as though that were the only matter of interest to the United States. Called on by a committee of the French government to learn whether funds could be ob tained from the United States for carrying on the war against the enemies of France, he replied that he had no authority to answer that question. But he was sure that if it was in the power of the United States such aid would be rendered. And then he plainly stated his opinion that such aid would be the more certainly given, if France would guarantee to make no peace with Eng land or Spain, as long as the complaints of the United States against them had not been settled. In a letter to the Department of State, he said that the partiality of France for the United States was so great that if France could decide whether the United States should go to war with England, "they would leave us to act in that respect according to our wishes. And I am likewise persuaded, if we embark iu the war, they will see us through it. I have some hope, if we do not, and especially if we aid them, in the article of money, that they will support as HISTORY OP Political parties. 219 far as they are able our demands upon Spain and Eng land." His instructions had authorized him to say that the motives of Jay's mission were to obtain "compensa tion for our plundered property and restitution of the posts," and also to declare that Jay was "positively forbid den to weaken the engagements between America and France." With this as authority, he ventured to assure the French government that Jay's mission "was strictly limited to demanding reparation for injuries." But when he learned that Jay had actually negotiated a treaty, he felt obliged to give the French Committee of Public Safety the information (December 27), and promised to give them a copy of the treaty as soon as he got posses sion of it. Six weeks later (February 12, 1795), he wrote that if the United States could keep the confidence of the French Republic unimpaired, "by accurate penetra tion" he was confident that there was "no service within its power that the French Republic would not render to us." Before they heard of Jay's treaty the indications of this disposition were extremely strong; "for at that time I had reason to believe that it contemplated to take un der its care and provide for our protection against Al giers; for the expulsion of the British from the western posts, and the establishment of our right with Spain to the free navigation of the Mississippi, to be executed in the mode we should prefer, and upon terms perfectly easy to us, terms in short, which sought only the aid of our own credit to obtain from our bank an inconsiderable sum to 220 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. be laid out in the purchase of provisions within our own country, and to be reimbursed, if possible, by themselves. But by that intelligence this disposition was checked. I am still inclined to believe that if the arrangement with England, or the negotiation 'with Spain, should fail, it is possible to accomplish the whole through the means of this Government."Shortly after signing the treaty, ¦ Jay had written to Monroe promising to communicate its principal points. Monroe sent a confidential person to Jay to obtain such information of the treaty as Jay might see fit to give, t^°™mmui?ate s™^^ ^^ '^^^ °f the greatest consequence, thlcom^ttee SO Monroe wrote, to remove all doubts on of Public /- ^ T-v 1 y-\ Safety. the part of the French Government as to its contents. "It is necessary, however, to observe that as nothing will satisfy this government but a copy of the instrument itself and which, as our ally, it thinks itself entitled to, it will be useless for me to make it any new communication short of that." Jay's reply, February 5, 1795, presents an admirable light in which to study the career of Monroe. "You must be sensible that the United States have an unquestionable right to make any pacific arrangements with other powers, which mutual convenience may dictate, provided these arrangements do not contradict or oppugn their prior engagements with other States. Whether this adjustment was con sistent with our treaty with France, struck me as being the only question which could demand or receive the HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 221 consideration of that republic, and I thought it due to the friendship subsisting between the two countries, that the French Government Srol"^'' '° should have without delay the most perfect satisfaction on that head." He then stated that he had already given what he had hoped would be satisfactory information on that point, and then quoted the clause in the treaty, which provided that nothing in it should be construed contrary to existing engagements with other sovereigns or States. "Considering that events favorable to our country could not fail to give you pleasure" — was he intentionally sarcastic? — "I did intend to communi cate to you concisely some of the raost interesting par ticulars of this treaty, but in the most perfect confidence, as that instrument has not yet been ratified, nor received the ultimate forms necessary to give it validity. As further questions respecting parts of it may yet arise, and give occasion to further discussions and negotiations, BO that if finally concluded at all it may then be different from what it now is, the impropriety of making it public at present is palpable and obvious. * * * jt does not belong to ministers who negotiate treaties to publish them even when perfected, much less treaties not yet completed, and remaining open to alteration or rejection. Such acts belong exclusively to the governments who form them. I cannot but flatter myself that the French government is too enlightend and reasonable to expect that any consideration ought to induce me to overleap 222 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. the bounds of my authority, or be negligent of the re spect which is due to the United States. That respect, and my obligation to observe it, will not permit me to give without the permission of this government a copy of the instrument in question to any person, or for any purpose; and by no means for the purpose of being submitted to the consideration and judgment of the councils of a foreign government, however friendly." But what seemed "palpable and obvious" to Jay, was not obvious to Monroe; expectations which Jay thought the French government too enlightened and reasonable to entertain, were entertained by Monroe. For he had "gained such an insight into their councils" "as to be sat isfied" that all our great material objections so far as they were connected with this republic were more easily to be removed by a frank and liberal deportment, than a cool and reserved one." Nor did he "see any condescension in such a line of conduct," "On the contrary betweeti na tions allied as we are, I deem it the most magnanimous as well as the soundest policy," When at last he finally re ceived a slight sketch of the treaty he at once submitted it to the Committee of Public Safety. Writing to the Department of State September 10, 1795 — he had received no letter from Randolph since May 31, and therefore did not know that Jay's treaty had already been ratified- —he was still of the opinion that a " timely and suitable at tempt" could engage the aid of France "in support of our claims upon England," ''upon fair and honorable HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 223 terms." Nor did he see any objections to such an ar rangement." If we were at war with England, none would be urged by any one — if then, remaining at peace, another country is willing to give us the fortunes of its arms, in support of our claims against a common enemy, ought we to decline an arrangement which would be adopted in war, especially when it is considered that peace is the lot we prefer, and that our success depends upon its suc cess ? But can we accomplish what we wish by the for tunes of France, by any kind of negotiation we can set on foot, without any effort of our own ; and if such effort is made, of what kind must it be? To this I can give no answer, other than by referring you to my former letters on that head. But to secure success by embarking this government with full zeal in our behalf, 1 ••, • • -r-v 1 1 • ¦¦,, i Monroe pro- and striking terror into England, it will be poses the inva- sion of Canada. necessary to lay hold of her property within the United States, take the posts, and even invade Canada. This would not only secure to us completely our claims upon Britain and especially, if we likewise cut up her trade by privateers; but, by making a decisive and powerful diversion in favor of France, promote, and very essentially, a general peace." From this letter, it is again evident that Monroe did not regard himself as a minister bound to consider the interests of his own country alone. He argued in favor of strong measures against England because, among other reasons, it would create a "decisive and powerful diversion in favor of France." 224 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. But when at last Monroe received a letter from Timothy Pickering, December 1, informing him that the treaty had been ratified by the Senate, and signed by the President, and instructing him as to the defense of it, which he was to make to the French Gov- Ezplanation of , , . , . Monroe's career ernment, he was placed m an embarrassing in France. position. Filled with the enthusiasm for "liberty, fraternity, and equality," which was "potent enough to drive even wise men into madness," it had been impossible for him to take any but the French view of the relations between the United States and England, or to interpret his instructions from any but that point of view. From such a point of view, he had honestly believed that the object of Jay's mission was to demand satisfaction for injuries. With his passionate wish for France's success, with his intense feeling that she and the United States alone represented the cause of liberty against kings, he had naturally taken the government of France into his entire confidence, and done all that he could do to prepare her to fight the battles of the United States which he was sure would have to be fought by some one. His instructions had reminded him to keep steadily in view the fact that he was to maintain the self- respect of his own government. But were not France and the United States the two republics ofthe world, each founded on the doctrine of the inalienable rights of man? For one of these to accept favors of the othei was no more to do violence to its self respect from Monroe's HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 22o point of view, than it is for a sister to accept favors from her brother. They were allies not merely by treaty, but in spirit, each engaged in a holy crusade for liberty. It was in such a spirit that Monroe had entered upon his mission, and attempted to do its work. But when he was confronted with the fact that to demand reparation for injuries was not the sole object of Jay's mission, when he was informed that a treatj- had been made, and when he learned that it had been ratified by the Senate, and signed by the President, when he realized that he had been unwittingly deceiving the French Govern ment, and unintentionally misrepresenting the object of Jay's mission, it was impossible for him to see that the source of it all lay in his own enthusiasm, in his inability to take a cold, judicial, impartial view of his instructions, and of the relations between the United States and Eng land on the one hand, and the United States and France on the other. He believed that his own government had willfully deceived him in order that he in turn might de ceive France. He accordingly refused to obey his in structions ; with the case of the United States before him, he refused to state it until the middle of February, 1796, and then only because the French minister of Foreign Affairs informed him that since the ratification of Jay's treaty, the Directory regarded the alliance between France and the United States as at an end, and that Adet was about to be recalled, and that a special minister J5 226 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. was about to be sent to the United States to make this announcement. Then at last Monroe apparently began to realize that he was, in truth, the minister of the United States. He defended Jay's treaty, and replied to all the charges brought against the United States by the French Gov ernment. But his zeal was too tardy to satisfy his own government, especially when it had been preceded by such an inabilitj^ to reall}' separate the interests of France from those of his own country. Washington ac cordingly decided to recall him, and in September, 1796, Charles C. Pinckney was appointed in his stead. Per haps the sharpest criticism on his career in France ever made is found in a paragraph in Washington's Farewell Address given to the American people the very month in which he recalled Monroe. "Coustantlj- keeping in view that 'tis folly in one nation to look for dis- Washington'sdress^^^ '^^' interested favors from another, that it must paj' with a portion of its independence for whatever it maj' accept under that character ; that by such acceptance, it maj' place itself in the condition of having given equivalents for nominal favors, and yet with being reproached with ingratitude for not giving more, there can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation. 'Tis all illusion which experience must cure, which a just pride ought to discard." HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 227 QUESTIONS. 1. How did France interpret the nineteenth article of the treaty of 1778 ? 2. How did Adet attempt to influence the presidential elec tion? 3. Why was Gouverneur Morris recalled from France? 4. What seems to have been Monroe's object ? 5. Describe his address in the hall of the French National Convention. 6. What did he say to the French government about its in fraction of the treaty with the United States ? 7. What did he endeavor to persuade the United States to do with reference to the war between France and England ? 8. How did he purpose to secure protection against Algiers and getjjossession ofthe western posts? 9. Why did he wish to communicate Jay's treaty to the French government ? 10. Draw a paral'el between Jay and Monroe. 11. Account for his conduct in France. 12. Why did he refuse to state the American view of Jay's treaty ? 13. When was he recalled, and why? 14. What seems to have been Washington's opinion of him? 15. Shortly after Monroe's recall, Gallatin wrote to his wife as foUcws : "The time they chose to recall Monroe, was when from his correspondence they had reason to believe he had suc ceeded in allajdng the resentment ofthe French. Then, thinking they had nothing to fear from France, and that they had used Monroe so as to obtain every service that he could render, they recalled him with the double view of giving to another person the merit of terminating the differences and throwing upon him the blame, if any, that existed before." Discuss and explain. 228 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. CHAPTER XVI. THE EXTRA SESSION OF 1797. In the presidential election of 1796, Jefferson re ceived sixty-eight and John Adams seventy-one votes. Adams was therefore elected President, and Jefferson Vice-president. When Adams was inaugurated in March, 1797, our relations with France were in a Ptockne^'"''*"'* ^^^ critical condition. The conduct of the Republicans in the United States and of Monroe in France, had borne their natural fruits. Charles C. Pinckney reached Paris as Monroe's succes sor in December, 1796. The day after his arrival (Decem ber 9) he and Monroe waited upon De La Croix, the French minister of foreign affairs, Pinckney presenting his credentials and Monroe his letters of recall. These the minister promised to submit to the French Directory, and to send Pinckney and his secretary "letters of hos pitality," without which, according to the laws of France, no stranger could remain in Paris. A few days later (December 12) De La Croix notified Monroe that the Director}' would not receive another minister from the United Stales until the grievances of which France com plained were redressed. "But this breach," he added, in the style of Genet, "did not oppose the continuance of af fection between the French Republic and the American HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 229 people^, which is grounded on former good offices' and reciprocal interests, an affection which you have taken pleasure in cultivating by all the means in yoiir power." Pinckney at once wrote to De La Croix inquiring if it was the wish of the Directory that he should leave France immediately, or whether he should remain till he heard from the United States. De La Croix replied verbally, through Pinckney's private secretary, that, since the recall of Monroe, the Directory acknowledged no American minister. As to his going or staying the Directory would decide. February 3, 1797, he was finally notified that he was rendering himself liable to arrest by having stayed in Paris nearly two months in violation of the law forbidding strangers to staj' there without "letters of hospitality." Pinckney at once asked for his pass port and left for Holland. When Monroe presented his letters of recall (Decem ber 20), to the Directory, he again declared that the prin ciples of the French Revolution were the same as those of the American Revolution. He assured the Directory that it was with the most "heartfelt satis- r ¦ 1 1 1 , 1 1 • 111 Monroe's fare- laction that he beheld victory and the dawn weii speech to the Directory. of prosperity upon the point of realizing under the auspices of a wise and excellent constitution, all the great objects for which in council and in the field they had so long and so nobly contended." The President ofthe Directory replied as follows: "By presenting this '¦ Italics are mine. 230 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. day to the Executive Directory your letters of recall, you offer a very strange spectacle to Europe. France, rich in her freedom, surrounded by the train of her victories, and strong in the esteem of her allies, will not stoop to calculate the consequences of the condescension of the American government to the wishes of its ancient ty rants. The French Republic expects, however, that the successors of Columbus, Raleigh and Penn, always proud of their liberty, will never forget that they owe it to France. They will weigh in their wisdom the magnani mous friendship of the French people, with the crafty caresses of perfidious men, who meditate to bring them again under a foreign j'oke. Assure the good people of America, Mr. Minister, that, like them, we adore liberty; that they will always possess our esteem, and find in the French people that Republican generosity, which knows how to grant peace as well as to cause its sovereignty to be respected. As for you, Mr. Minister Plenipotentiary, you have combated for principles. You have known the true interest of your country. Depart with our re gret." Adams differed from the leading members of his cab inet as to the course that should be pursued "when Pinck ney was insultingly driven from France. Hamilton urges envoy shSuid be Timothy Pickering and Oliver Wolcott, Secretaries of State and of the Treasury, respectively, thought that the United States had done enough ; that to yield to the demands of France was to HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 231 surrender national independence. Fortunately, Hamilton agreed with Adams in thinking that a special envoy should be sent to France. The decision of the French Directory not to receive another American minister until the grievances of which France complained were re dressed, could not mean, Hamilton argued, that they would not receive a special envoy. Moreover, if they did refuse to receive him, it would be well to have sent him since the people would thereby be convinced that the government had done all that it could to make peace with France. By such arguments, Hamilton succeeded in breaking down the opposition of Pickering and Wolcott. Congress assembled in special session on May 13, ac cording to the President's proclamation. In his opening speech the President called special attention to the insidious attempts of the President to^c^ngrest^"*' of the French Directorj^, in his farewell speech to Monroe, to separate the American people from their government. " Such attempts," he said, " ought to . be repelled with a decision which shall convince France and the world that we are not a degraded people, humili ated under a colonial spirit of fear and sense of inferiority, fitted to be the miserable instruments of foreign influ ence, and regardless of national honor, character and in terest." At the same time, he declared his intention to send a new mission to France, since neither the honor nor the interest of the country forbade them to repeat their advances. But he urged Congress to create a navy 232 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. and to fortify the harbors of the United States, and to pass laws authorizing merchant vessels to arm in their defense. The attitude of the Republicans towards France, as appeared in the debate on the President's speech, bore a curious likeness to that of the Federalists Opinions of Nicholas con- towards England. George Cabot, a leading trasted. ^^^ representative Federalist,wrote to Oliver Wolcott on April 13, 1797, as follows : " He ( Liancourt, a Frenchman travelling in this country) said the power of England was at an end. I rejoined, that all the civil ized world would have cause to mourn if this should be true, for they would the?i be obliged to fight agaitist France or to give up their independence." In the debate on the Presi dent's speech, Nicholas, a zealous Republican from Vir ginia, after declaring that the insult to Pinckney was not so great after all, .said : " It might, perhaps, be the opin ion of some, that he was improperly influenced b)- party zeal in favor of the French. * "'¦ * But wliere was the proof of the charge ? On his first coming into this House, the French were embroiled with all their neigh bors, who were endeavoring to tear them to pieces. Know ing what had been the situation of this countrj' when en gaged in a similar cause, he was aiixious for their suc cess. And was there not reason for this anxiety, when a nation contending for the right of self-government was thus attacked ? Especially since it was well known that if the powers engaged against France had been successful, this country would have been their next object ? Had they HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 2:53 not the strongest proof in the declaration of one df the British colonial governors, that it was the intention of England to declare war against America in case of the successful termination of the war agaiuist France?" He concluded his speech by declaring that iu ratifying Jay's treat}- the United States had abandoned the position of neutrality, and given France just cau.se for complaining. The same contrast appeared in connection with the subject of impressment, the Federalists minifying, and the Republicans exaggerating, the extent to which Ameri can citizens suffered by it. Butthegreat speechof the session was madeby Robert Goodloe Harper, a leading Federalist from South Carolina. He declared that the real Harper's^pee'ck. ground of the dissatisfaction of France with Jay's treaty was not this or that article of the treaty, but the treaty itself — the fact that the United States had made any treaty with England. She was angry because it had defeated her plan of drawing America into the war, and the whole object of her present policy was to compel the United States to renounce it. She hoped to succeed because she believed that the people of this country were weak, pusillanimous, too much devoted to gain to regard the honor of their country, too distrustful of their government to defend it, too much exasperated with England to consent to that co-operation which must necessarily grow out of resistance to France, She had seen them submit with patience to the insults and out- 234 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. rages of three successive ministers, for the very least of which she would have sent the minister of any nation out of the country, if not to the guillotine. The conduct of members of the House had confirmed her in the erroneous opinion that there was a party in the very bosom of the government devoted to her interests. What could France infer from the conduct of Republi cans in the House, but that they were a party devoted to her views, when she saw them constantly opposing meas ures on the ground that they would be hurtful or dis pleasing to her ; constantly supporting those plans which she was desirous of seeing supported ? With such facts before her, what could she conclude but that though they were unable to shape the policy of the government, thej^ would be ready and able so to clog its operations as to prevent it from employing vigorous measures against her ? She no doubt did believe that she had nothing to do but press hard on the government in order to lay it, bound hand and foot, at the feet of the party friendly to her, by means of which she might then govern the country. Misunderstanding the exultation of Americans over her victories, and their sorrow for her defeats, she saw in them nothing but proofs of a slavish devotion to herself, which would make them incapable of asserting their own rights, if it had to be done at the risk of her displeasure. She did not know, nor could she be made to understand, that it was the cause of liberty in which she was thought to be struggling, that inspired this en- HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 235 thusiasm, and that if she abandoned the principles she professed, these generous well wishers would be found among the firmest of her opposers. Supposing resent ment against England to be far more deeply rooted and more universal than it really was, she relied on it as a certain means of preventing any union of interests and operations between the United States and England, how ever recommended by policy, or required by necessity. In these delusions she was confirmed, not only by the conduct of persons in this country, but it was to be feared by the behavior of some of our own citizens in her own country, who had forgotten the trust reposed in them, and the situation in which they were placed, and had al lowed themselves to pursue a course of conduct cal culated to confirm France in all her unfounded and injurious opinions respecting this countr}-. Supposing, therefore, that the people of this country were unwilling to oppose her, and the government unable, that they would prefer f>eace with submission to the risk of war ; that a strong party devoted to her would hang on the govern ment, and impede all its measures of reaction ; and, if by her aggression, Americans should find themselves in a position where they would have to choose between war with England and war with her, that their hatred of England would make them prefer the former, she had resolved on the measures she was then pursuing, the object of which was to make them renounce the treaty with England and enter into a quarrel with her, — "in 236 HISTORY OF POIylTICAL PARTIES. fine, to effect by force and aggressions, that which she had attempted in vain by four years of intriguing and insidious policy." Such being her objects, could she be induced to re nounce them by trifling concessions of this, that, or the other article of a treaty? To suppose that she could was a delusion which rendered gentlemen blind to the herculean strides of her ambition, "which aimed atnothing less than the establishment of a universal empire or uni versal influence, and had fixed upon this country as one of the instruments for accomplishing her plan." This remarkably accurate description of the policy of the French government apparently exerted no in fluence on the opposition. An answer echoing the sentiments of the President's speech was carried only by a small majority. During the extra session of Congress, acts were passed prohibiting the fitting out of privateers against nations with whom the United States were Acts of the . • i -t- r 1 TT ¦ 1 extra session. at peace, or agaiust citizens of the United States ; forbidding the exportation of arms and encouraging their importation ; appropriating $115,000 for the further fortification of American harbors; apportioning to the states 80,000 militia to be ready to march at a moment's warning ; and authorizing the com pletion and equipment of the three new frigates, the "United States," "Constitution," and "Constellation." The Republicans opposed most of these measures. Be- HISTQRY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 237 sides their oppositon to all measures that looked toward war, they were opposed to all measures that tended to increase the expenditures of the government because of their habit of considering every measure, not from the point of view of expediency, but from the point of view of its capacity to be used as a precedent in undermining the liberties of the people. This characteristic was strikingly shown in a persist ent and bitter attempt in the regular session of Congress to defeat appropriations to support Ameri- Debate ra ap- . . , ^ T, ,. propriations lor can ministers at the courts of Berlin and ministers to Prussia and Portugal. One would naturally suppose Portugal. that the primary question would have been whether the usefulness of ministers at those courts was likely to justify the expense. That question was, of course, raised by the opposition, but it was not considered on its merits. Nicholas, who opposed the appropriation with all his might, " thought it neces,sary to take a view ofthis subject not only from the increase of expense, but from a variety of other considerations. He conceived it to be a duty they owed to themselves and their constituents, as well to secure liberty, as to perpetuate the constitution it self, that the President, who had the power of making appointments, should be kept from extending the power beyond what the nature and wants of the government absolutely requii>ed." But the attitude of the Federalists was equally strained and unnatural. They also could not consider the question on its merits, but connected it 238 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES in their minds with questions of transcendent importance because of its possible influence as a precedent. In the same debate, the Federalist, Harper, said : " It is my firm and most deliberate opinion that the amendment now under consideration to refuse appropriations for the ministers to Portugal and Prussia, and the principle to which it belongs, lead directly to the introduction of anarchy and revolution in the country, and if not steadily opposed must sooner or later produce that effect. " From such different points of view, it was natural for the Republicans to underestimate the need of increased taxes, and the Federalists to overestimate it. The one party was willing to run the risk of embarrassing the government in the interests of liberty ; the other, of im posing unnecessary burdens on the people in the in terests of order and good government. But in spite of the opposition of the Republicans, laws were passed in creasing the duty on imported salt, and imposing stamp duties. All schemes of internal taxation, as we have seen, were especially obnoxious to the Republicans. They did violence to the very strong feeling of state patriotism which was especially characteristic of this party. The feeling that the state was the country of its citizens, made all schemes of internal taxation by the federal government seem like taxation by a foreign power. Accordingly, they succeeded in postponing the operation of the new stamp act till January, 1798, and afterwards till the following June. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 239 Before the close of the special session, John Mar shall, Elbridge Gerry and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney were appointed envoys extraordinary to France. QUESTIONS. 1. Why, in your opinion, did France reject Pinckney? 2. Contrast the tone of Monroe's farewell speech with the treatment Pinckney received. How do you account for it ? 3. Speaking of Monroe, Washington said: "There is abundant evidence of his being a mere tool in the hands of the French government, cajoled and led away always by unmeaning assurances of friendship." Do you think he was right ? 4. What was there in the speech of the President of the Directory lo Monroe that indicated that France Still meant to pursue the policy that Genet had undertaken to carry out in the United States? 5. Were Hamilton and Adams on friendly terms ? 6. Why did Hamilton urge a special mission to France ? 7. Contrast the opinions of Cabot and Nicholas. 8. What did Harper try to prove ? Was he right ? Mention the facts that seem to you to support or overthrow his opinion. 9. 'What did Senator Maclay say in his diary in harmony with the position taken by the Republicans as to appropriations for ministers to Prussia and Portugal ? 240 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PAETIES. CHAPTER XVII. THE X., Y. AND Z. MISSION.* THE selection of the envoys had been a matter of great interest ever since it was decided to make another effort to preserve peace with France. The prob lem that the President had to solve was not merely to find men whose characters and abilities fitted them for the difficult and delicate work which was to be done, but to find such men in whom the two parties had confidence. This was a difficult task. So general and decided was the partiality of the public men of the time, either for England or France, that it wa.s almost impossible to find a man who was acceptable to one party, in whom the other had confidence. But the President's selection was fairly satisfactory to both parties. John Marshall and C. C. Pinckney were both moderate Federalists, and Elbridge Gerry was a moderate Republican. Jefferson wrote to him that his nomination "gave me certain assurance that there would be a preponderance in the mission, sincerely teftoGen-y^' disposed to be at peace with the Frencli government and nation." Such a state ment from such a man would seem to be conclusive proof *So called because the letters X. Y. and Z. were substituted for the names of the unofficial agents of Talleyrand in the report t ransmitted to Congress. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 241 that the President had selected envoys, a majority of whom had no undue partiality for England. They met in Paris October, 1797, and at once noti fied Talleyrand, the French minister of Foreign Affairs, oftheir arrival and requested him to appoint a day for an interview. He replied that he was occupied with a re port upon American affairs which was to be submitted to the Directory, and that he could not grant an interview until it was finished. A few days later The Directory (Oct. 18), an unofficial agent from Talley- anH^oln t?"^ rand, M. Hottinguer (designated as X. in ^^°°^' the dispatches transmitted to Congress), told them that the Directory were exceedingly irritated at some pas sages in the President's speech, and that these passages would have to be softened before the envoys could be received. But this was not all. So outraged were the Directory in behalf of France that a bribe of $240,- 000 for themselves, and a considerable loan to France was necessary to soothe their wounded feelings. A few days later, two more unofficial agents, M. Bellamy and M. Hau- teval appeared. Bellamy read the President's speech and enlarged upon the resentment it had occasioned, and upon the "satisfaction" that was an indispensable preliminary, as he said, to any negotiation. "But I will not disguise from you," he continued, "that this satisfaction being made, the essential part of the treaty remains to be ad justed ; you must pay money, you must pay a great deal of money." 242 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. Hottinguer told them that since , the peace with the emperor of Austria, the Directory had taken a higher and more decided tone with respect to the France resolves .,..,.,_ , . to have no ueu- United States and all other neutral nations trals. than before ; that they had resolved to have no neutrals — that nations who did not aid them should be treated as enemies. He enlarged on the power and vio lence of France, and urged the danger of the United States. The envoys answered that all Americans depre cated a war with France; but that their then situation was more ruinous than a war; that their commerce was plun dered unprotected, but that if war was declared, America would seek the means of protection. Hottinguer returned to the subject of money. Said he," Gentlemen, you do not speak to the point. It is money ; it is expected that you will offer money." The Americans replied that they had spoken to that point very explicitly ; they had given their answer. "No," said he, "you have not; what is your answer?" "It is 'No, no, not a sixpence.' " Hottinguer said that nothing could be done in France without money ; that one of the members of the Directory was in the pay of the privateers; that Ham burg and other European states had been compelled to buy a peace, and that it would be for the interest of the United States to do so. He enlarged again on the danger of a breach with France, on her irresistible power. The envoys replied that no nation esteemed her power more highly than the United States, or wished more ardently HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 243 to be at peace with her. But there was one object still dearer to the Americans than the friendship of France, and that was their national independence. America had taken a neutral position; she had a right to take it. No nation had a right to force her out of it. To lend money to a belligerent power abounding in all the requisites of war but money, was to relinquish her neutrality and take part in the war. To lend this money under the lash and coercion of France was to relinquish the to lend money . under coercion government of herself and submit to a for- a reUnauish- ment of inde- eign government imposed upon her by pendence. force. She would at least make one vigorous struggle be fore she thus surrendered her independence. A day or two later (October 30), Bellamy (designated Y in the dispatches), called the attention of the envoys to the situation of the United States, and to the force that France was capable of bringing to bear upon them. He warned the Americans that the fate of Venice might befall the United States. "You may believe," he said, " that in ex posing to your countrymen the unreasonableness ofthe de mands of this Government, that they will unite in re senting them. You are mistaken. You ought to know that the diplomatic skill of France, and the means she possesses in America, are sufficient to enable her with the French party in America, to throw the blame which will attend the rupture of of^R^^nce*. ^ these negotiations on the Federalists, as you term yourselves, but on the British party, as France 244 HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. terms you, and you may rest assured this will be done." The envoys replied with equal freedom. They said that the United States had given the most unequivocal proof of their friendship for France when almost the whole of Europe — Austria, Germany, Prussia, Russia, Spain, Sar dinia, Holland and Britain — was leagued against her. But what was the conduct of France? "Wherever our property can be found she seizes and takes it from us; unprovoked, she determines to treat us as enemies and our making no resistance produces no diminution of hostility against us. She abuses and insults our govern ment, endeavors to weaken it in the estimation of the people, recalls her own ministers, refuses to receive ours, and when extraordinary means are taken to make ex planations, * * * the envoys who bear them are not received. They are not permitted to utter the amicable wishes of their country, but in the haughty style of a master, they are told that unless they will pay a sum to which their resources scarcely extend, they may expect the vengeance of France, and, like Venice, be erased from the list of nations." Two days later (November 1), the envoys decided to hold no more indirect intercourse with the government. On the eleventh of the month, they wrote to Talleyrand reminding him of his promise to make known the deci sion of the Directory as soon as he had submitted his re- The envoys re- port OU American affairs. Ten days later solve to hold . ' no more indirect having received no answer, thev sent intercourse with ' -' Taueyrand. Pinckney's private secretary, Major Rut- HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 245 ledge to inquire of Talleyrand whether he had submitted the letter to the Directory, and whether they might ex pect an answer. Talleyrand replied that he had sub mitted the letter, and that he would give the envoys no tice, when the Directory had instructed him as to the course he was to pursue. In the meantime, Hottinguer and Bellamy made repeated efforts to draw the envoys into further discussions. They, however, persisted in their resolution. But when Gerry, who had met Talley rand in the United States, and to whom that minister had shown some civilities, said in the presence of Bel lamy that he should like to wait on Talleyrand for the purpose of inviting him to dine, Bellamy at once pro posed to accompany him. He improved his opportunity by again urging the importance of giving the bribe to the Directory and making the loan to France. He said that if nothing could be done by the envoys, arrange ments would at once be made to ravage the coasts of the United States. Gerry replied that France might ravage their coasts but that she could never subdue them. When they reached Talleyrand's office, Gerry remarked that Bellamy had just stated certain proposition as com ing from Talleyrand. The latter replied that the informa tion given by Bellamy was correct, and that he himself would state it in writing. He at once made a memorandum, stating the form of the proposed loan, but after he had shown it to Gerry, he burned it. The "fee usual in diplomatic transactions," he did not mention, doubtless from motives of delicacv. 246 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. The envoys finally (Dec. 19), decided to prepare a letter to Talleyrand, discussing the differences between the two countries, precisely as though they had been ac credited. The letter was written by Marshall, and every line of it bears the stamp of the great intel- Letter of the , , •.. <• i i envoys to lect and strong personalty of the man who TaUeyrand. o r j afterwards became famous as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. In a clear, cold, but ab solutely conclusive way, he stated the case of the United States. He stated that on the 9th of May, 1793, before the British provision order, the National Convention passed a decree, one paragraph of which was as follows : '¦ The French ships of war and privateers may stop and bring into the ports of the Republic, such neutral ves sels as are loaded, in whole or in part, with provisions be longing to neutrals and destined for enemy's ports, or with merchandise belonging to enemies ; " that a large number of American vessels were detained for a long time at Bordeaux without any motive for their de tention being assigned; that on July 2, 1796, the Direct ory had decreed "that all neutral or allied powers shall without delay be notified that the flag of the French re public will treat neutral vessels, either as to confiscation, searches or captures, in the same manner as they shall suffer the English to treat them;" that on March 2, 1797, considering Jay's treaty as making concessions to England, which, by the treaty of 1778, France was en titled to, it proceeded to modify that treaty by declaring HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. 247 that enemy's goods in American vessels, were liable to confiscation, and that merchandise, not sufficiently proved to be neutral, was also liable to confiscation ; and by sub jecting to punishment as a pirate any American seaman found on the ships of the enemies of France, whether he was there by his own consent, or whether he was forced to be there through menace or actual violence; that this decree also exacted papers from Americans which the treaties between the two nations had been sup posed to render unnecessary, and which, accordingly, their vessels could not be supposed to possess. How at variance many of these decrees were with the laws of nations, to say nothing of the laws of humanity ; how inconsistent with the treaties between the United States and France ; how ruinous to the interests of the United States, this paper showed with a conclusiveness that made a fair reply impossible, but, at the same time, with a dignity and good temper that would seem to com pel a manifestation of those qualities in return. Before this letter was sent, the French made a new attack upon the commerce of neutrals, an attack more violent and outrageous than any of its predecessors. It forbade the entrance into any port of France of any ves sel, which at any previous part of her voyage had touched at any English port, or the port of any colony of England, and declared that all vessels were liable to confiscation that had on board any merchandise, which was the produce of England or her colonies, no matter to whom it belonged. 248 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. After waiting in vain for nearly a month for a reply to their letter, the envoys decided to ask for a joint inter view with Talleyrand. He granted the request. During the course of the interview, he insisted on Interview of with "rauey- ^ ^°^^ ^^ ^^ indispensable condition of ad justing the difficulties between the two countries. Marshall replied that a loan to France would be inconsistent with the neutrality which the United States had struggled so hard to maintain. If America were actually in league with France, all that could be ex pected of her would be to furnish money. To furnish money, therefore, would be, in fact, to make war. Tal leyrand insisted that the loan might be made secretly. But Marshall replied that under the American form of government, such a thing was out of the question. Talleyrand finally decided to reply to the letter of the Americans. With a case to defend that was indefen sible, he substituted assertion for fact, and insult for ar gument. He declared that it was an in- TaUeyrand's re- ..11. 1 1 . .,.,..„ ply to the letter Contestable truth that the United States of the envoys. were the first aggressors, that the griev ances of which they complained were necessary con sequences of wrongs, which the United States had in flicted on France. He insinuated that the courts to which matters interesting to France had been referred, had been subject to a "secret influence;" and de clared that deception had been practiced on France in reference to the mission of Jay, who had been HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 249 sent to London solely, as it was then said, "to negotiate arrangements relative to the depredations" upon American commerce by Great Britain. He asserted that in the treaty negotiated by Jay the United States had made to England "concessions the most unheard of; the most incompatible with the interests of the United States; the most derogatory to the alliance which existed be tween the said states and the French republic," and that the latter was, therefore, perfectly free, in order to avoid the inconveniencies of the treaty, to avail itself of the pre servative means with which the laws of nature, the law of nations and prior treaties, furnished it. In the face of the fact that after one American minister had been driven from France, the United States had sent three envoys ex traordinary, and that these had waited six months, knocking in vain at the door of the Republic for admis sion, subjected meanwhile to propositions insulting to themselves and dishonorable to their country, Talley rand had the audacity to declare that the United States had omitted nothing to prolong the misunderstanding. As though that were not audacious enough, he dared to add that it was probably for that reason that it was thought proper to send to France as envoys "persons whose opinions and connections" were "too well known to hope from them dispositions sincerely conciliatory." " It is painful," he continued, " to be obliged to make a contrast between this conduct and that which was pursued, un der similar circumstances, towards the cabinet of St. 250 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. James. An eagerness was then felt to send to London ministers well known for sentiments corresponding with the objects of their mission. The republic, it would seem, might have expected a like deference." But he did not show the boundlessness of his impudence and au dacity until he said that the Directory was disposed to treat with that one of the three, whose opinions were pre sumed to be more impartial. The interest of the reply made by the envoys, tempts one to quote from it extensively, but we have room but for three short extracts. In reply to Talleyrand's insinu ation that the courts of the United States were corrupt, they said: "The undersigned regret, Citi- voys?' °' *^^ '^"" ^^^ Minister, that your researches concern ing the United States have not extended to their courts. You would have perceived and admired their purity. You would have perceived that America may repose herself securely on the integrity of her judges, and your justice would have spared the insinuations con cerning them which closed that part of your letter." Replying to his charge that the English sympathies of two of them unfitted them to be ministers to France, they said: "The opinions and relations ofthe undersigned are purely American, unmixed with any particle of for eign tint. If they possess a quality on which they pride themselves, it is an attachment to the happiness and wel fare of their country ; if they could, at will, select the means of manifesting that attachment, it would be by ef- HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 251 fecting a real and sincere accommodation between France and the United States on principles promoting the in terests of both, and consistent with the independence of the latter. All who love liberty must admit that it does not exist in a nation which cannot exercise the right of maintaining neutrality. If opinions and relations such as these, are incompatible with ' dispositions sincerely conciliatory,' then indeed has the Federal government chosen unfit instruments for the expression of its pacific disposition." In reply to Talleyrand's proposal to treat with Gerry, to the exclusion of the other two, they said : " The result of a deliberation on this point is that no one of the undersigned is authorized to take upon himself a negotiation, evidently intrusted by the tenor of their powers and instructions to the whole ; nor are there any two of them who can propose to withdraw themselves from the task committed to them by their government while there remains a possibility of performing it." Disregarding this paragraph, the very day the letter was presented, Talleyrand wrote a note to Gerry, whose object was to bow Pinckney and Marshall out of the French Republic. " I suppose, sir," he said, " that Messrs. Pinckney and Marshall have thought Marshall and it useful and proper in consequence of the Piuckney dis- intimations given in the end of my note, and the obstacles which their known opinions inter posed to the desired reconciliation, to quit the territory of the Republic. On this supposition, I have the honor to 252 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. point out to you to the fifth or seventh of this decade to resume our reciprocal communications." Gerry weakly consented to remain, although he insisted that he had no power to treat independently of his colleagues ; that he could only confer informally and communicate the results to the United States. He afterwards excused himself for remaining on the ground that Talleyrand had repeatedly threatened that his leaving Paris would be the signal for an immediate declaration of war by France against the United States. But Gerry's consenting to remain did not relieve the country of repeated insults in the persons of his two col leagues. Notwithstanding Talleyrand's desire to have Marshall leave, he was unable to obtain a passport and safe conduct until he had been subjected to repeated in dignities. And it was only with great difficulty that Pinckney could get permission to stay for a few months with a sick daughter, in the south of France. QUESTIONS. 1. Why was the selection of envoys for the French mis sion a matter of so much difficulty ? 2, Explain the name by which the mission is generally known. 3. Give some account ofthe men appointed as envoj'S. 4. Do you know what the passages in the President's speech were that gave offense to the Directory ? 5. What demands were made of the envoys as a condition of their reception ? 6. What sort of insult does one country give to another when the former refuses to receive the ministers of the latter ? HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 253 7. What was the origin of the patriotic cry iu America: " Millions for defense but not a cent for tribute ? " 8. The envoys said that to lend money to a belligerent power was to relinquish neutrality. Were they right ? 9. Also, that to do it under compulsion was to relinquish their sovereignty. Was that true ? 10. Talleyrand's agents threatened the United States with the fate of "Venice ; what was the fate of Venice ? 11. What light does this mission throw on tbe speech of Robert Goodloe Harper, of which an account has been given in a preceding chapter. 254 HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. CHAPTER XVIII. A PROVINCE OF FRANCE OR AN INDEPENDENT NATION WHICH ? IT IS essential to a clear understanding of the history of political parties in this country for the next few years, to obtain a vivid realization of the nature and extent of the insults and outrages, to which the United States were subjected at the hands of France. We have seen how one French minister defied the government, and attempted to compel it to take part with France in her Conduct of war with England; how another, profiting of the'uSited^'^^ SO far by the experience of his predecessors states and treat- , .1 ... ,- 1 . . ment ol Ameri- as to realize the impossibility of driving can ministers in France. ^]jg government out of the path of neutrality, so far forgot the proprieties of his office, and the respect due to the constituted authorities, as to publish article after article in a Republican paper with the object of in fluencing the presidential election. We have seen how one minister of the United States was insultingly driven from France, and how this country, in spite of the asser tion by the French government that France would never receive another minister till the grievances of which she complained were redressed, sent three envoys extraor dinary for the purpose of settling, if possible, in an am icable way, the difficulties between the two countries. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 255 We have seen these envoys patiently waiting, hat in hand, at the door of the French republic, knocking in vain for admission ; we have seen them in their intense anxiety to preserve peace, ignore these insults and, contrary to diplomatic usage, write a letter to the government that had refused to receive them — as a man bent on peace, might go to the house of his enemy and, after wait ing in vain for him to open the door, go to the window and shout through it in mild and conciliatory language, the message of peace he had come to bring; we have seen the dignified and convincing, and yet passionless way in which they stated the case of the United States, and the false and insulting reply made by the French minister of foreign affairs; we have seen the envoys, still bent on preserving peace between the two countries, ig noring his insults, and declaring in repl}' that they were ready to do anything not inconsistent with the interests and the independence of the United States, in order to restore cordial relations between the two countries, that unless the United States could do as they pleased about maintaining a position of neutrality, they were not inde pendent, and that for France to demand them to give up their neutrality as a condition of peace, was in effect to say that the only terms upon which she would be at peace with them, was that they shouldrenounce their sovereignty and independence and become a province of France; we have seen Tallyrand bowing the two Federalist envoys out of the republic and yet subjecting one of them to 256 HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. insulting indignities before giving him the passport with out which he could not leave France, and giving the other with manifest reluctance permission to remain a few months in France with a sick daughter — all this we have seen, but it by no means completes the list of insults and outrages to which the United States were subjected at the hands of France. But before attempting, not to complete the hst, but to make it less incomplete, at the risk of unneoessary repetition, we must again call attention to the nature of the question which was at issue between the two countries, and had been since Genet landed at Charles- quesUonIt*Sue. ^n in the Spring of 1793. That question was essentially this : Should the United States rule themselves, or should they be ruled by France? Was there, on this side of the Atlantic, an independent and sovereign American State, or was there in effect, a province of France, amusing itself in child-like fashion— withthe forms and airs of sovereignty? For several months, as we have seen, Genet, acting on the theory that the United States was a province of France, conducted him self as "co-sovereign " of the country. The government determined one way, and he, the representative of France, not only determined another, but acted on his determina tion. The government said that the United States were and wished to be neutral in the war between England and France; he, in effect, said that they were not neutral, and employed to some extent the resources of the country. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES, 267 — and plainly hoped to be able to euiploy them all event ually — on the theory that they were not. When the French agent was overthrown through the . . Explanation of popularity and firmness of Washington, the conduct of '^ ^ o ) (Jenet and Adet. France by no means abandoned the pur pose of bending the United States to her will, of making the country in effect a French province. Genet's experience only made her realize the necessity of resorting to other methods. As she could not array the people against their government, the easiest way of accomplishing her designs seemed to be to exert her influence to put the government in the hands of men, whom she supposed herself able to control. This was why Adet openly at tempted to win votes for Jefferson in the presidential election of 1796. But when Jefferson was beaten, and the government was continued in the hands of what France chose to con sider the British party, she determined to Policy of France resort to more violent methods to gain her alter the defeat of Jefferson. ends. Adet had attempted to convince the people through the columns of the Aurora that they must elect Jefferson if they would avoid war with France. After the defeat of Jefferson the policy of the French was to make the government believe that it must choose between war with France, and submission to the will of France. France felt confident that the American people, to use an expression afterwards made famous by Josiah Quincy, could not be kicked into war with her. If she 258 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. could convince the government that its choice was nar rowed between an impossibility, and submission to her will, she felt sure of accomplishing her purpose. This is why one American minister was driven from France; why the three envoys were kept waiting for admission six months in the ante-room of the French republic, and why two of them, supposed to be less manageable than the third, were finally dismissed. But, as the letter of the envoys to Talleyrand has already shown, France by no means relied on the means employed by her ministers in the United Explanation of the anti-neutral States, and OU the pressure she was able to decree ol 1793. -^ bring upon the government through her treatment of American ministers in France, for the at tainment of her ends. The first decree mentioned in the letter of the envoys, the decree passed, be it remembered, in May, 1793, before the British provision order — order ing French ships of war and privateers to bring into the ports of the republic, neutral ships, laden with merchan dise belonging to enemies, or with provisions bound for the ports of enemies, was probably no part of the system, afterwards developed, to compel the United States to do the will of France. In the then situation of the French republic, engaged in a desperate struggle with nearly the whole of Europe, that decree was doubtless regarded by the French National Convention, which then governed France, as a desperate measure rendered justifiable and necessary, by the desperate position of France. A govern- HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 259 ment which had already fabricated all the machinery of the Terror, which a few months later declared "terror to be the order ofthe day," which in defiance of the laws and usages of all civilized countries condemned thousands of its citizens to the guillotine, that there might be no op position to the course of the Revolution, would naturally not hamper itself in its dealings with neutrals, by treaties and principles of international law. As the lives and property of her citizens seemed to France trifles not worth considering in comparison with the maintenance of the Revolution, it is easy to see that she would not shackle her limbs with treaties and cobwebbed principles of international law in her desperate struggle to introduce a new era into the history of the world — the era of "lib erty, fraternity and equality." But when the next decree mentioned by the letter of the envoys was passed, the decree of July, 1796, the issue of the struggle between France and the rest of continental Europe was hardly a ^dec^'eeof matter of doubt. The sublime energy of France had already made it clear that the question was not, whether continental Europe would conquer France, but, whether France would conquer continental Europe. The decree of 1796, therefore, was in no sense a desper ate measure of a desperate people. It was aimed directly at the United States, and like the decree of March, 1797, it was a part of the system whose object was to compel the United States, in spite of the treaty they had made 260 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. with England, to take a position of helpless dependence on France. , In accordance with the last decree, numerous captures were made of American vessels. The French tribunals, whose duty it was in the first instance to determine the legality of these prizes, were composed of men many of whom had a pecuniary interest in the privateers which had brought in the prizes, and who were, therefore, in terested in condemning them. If an appeal was taken to a higher court, the law officer of the government was authorized to refer the whole matter to the minister of justice, that the opinion of the government might be taken ; and he decided the case, not in accordance with treaty provisions, or principles of international law, but with the policy of the government at the time. In other words, the more the French government wished to make the United States feel the danger of a war with France, the more certain was the decision that the American ves sel had been justly captured, and was the prize of her captor. But, as if to throw a net around American vessels so unfortunate as to cross the path of French privateers and .ships of war that would permit none to escape, this de cree authorized French ships of war and privateers to capture all vessels not having a role d' equipage, that is, articles, containing a list of the' crew, signed by them selves, and countersigned by some public officer, or a na tional sea letter, as a proof of the nationality of the ves- HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 261 sel. This practically put ever}- American vessel at the mercy of French privateers and ships of war. No such thing as a role d' equipage was required by American law, and no American vessel was provided with it. Nor had France thought of insisting upon it in the case of American vessels until it became a part of her policy to bend the United States to her will. The requirement of a national sea letter as the proof of the nationality of ves sels was a direct violation of the treaty between France and the United States. That treaty specified the form of passport, which was to serve as a proof in time of war, of the nationality of the vessels of the two countries. But the French justified their requirement of a sea letter on the ground that Jay's treaty had abrogated the treaty be tween France and the United States, and, therefore, made its specification of a passport for the vessels of the two countries a nullity. The clause of the decree, provid ing for punishment as pirates of any Americans found on board British vessels, whether they had been forcibly im pressed or not, was an outrage upon which comment is unnecessary. But it is worthy of remark that the Re publican papers which had found no language strong enough in which to characterize the British practice of impressment, had not a word to say against the French decree which so far surpassed it in atrocity. Joel Bar low, an American then in Paris, who was in hearty sym pathy with the policy which France was pursuing to wards his own country, wrote to his brother-in-law in the 262 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. United States, of this decree, as follows: "It was in tended to be little short of a declaration of war." "The government here was determined to fleece Barlow's letter, you to a sufficient degree, to bring you to your feeling in the only nerve in which your sensibility lay, which was your pecuniary interest." But what was probably merely a matter of opinion with Barlow, became a certainty when the consul-general of the United States complained of the condemnation of two American vessels on the ground that they had no roles (T equipage. To this complaint. Merlin, the French minis ter of justice, who was also a speculator in privateers, re plied: "Let your government return to a sense of what is due to itself and its true friends, become ment. ® ^ "^ ®" just and grateful, and let it break the in comprehensible treaty which it has con cluded with our most implacable enemies, and then the French republic will cease to take advantage of this treaty, which favors England at its expense, and no ap peals will then, I can assure you, be made to any tribu nal against injustice." But the most outrageous attack made by the French government upon American commerce was not njentioned Decree of 1798. by the euvoys in their letter to Talleyrand, since it was not passed until after the letter was written. In utter disregard, not only of the treaties between the United States and France, but the principles of interna tional law, this decree (Jan. 18, 1798) forbade any vessel. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 263 which at any part of her voyage, had touched at an English port, or of any of her colonies, to enter a French port, and declared that any vessel which had on board merchandise which was the produce of England or her colonies, no matter who was the owner of it, was liable to confiscation. From the point of view of an American of the present day, who looks upon his country , 1 , Talleyrand's as the most powerful m the world, the opinion of the '^ United States. interpretation here given of the conduct of France may seem difficult to believe. But in considering the matter two things must be constantly borne in mind. The first is that the United States had but just entered the great family of nations and were by no means re garded as a first-class power. Talleyrand, who was a refugee in America in the period ofthe Terror in France. told the Directory on his return, so Pinckney was in formed, that the United States were of no more conse quence than Genoa, and needed to be treated with no greater ceremony. The second point was clearly stated by Hamilton, " There are," he said " currents in human affairs, when events, at other times little less than miraculous, are to be considered as natural and simple." That France, from 1793 to 1800, should think of reducing the United States to a position of helpless dependence upon her was the most natural thing in the world. A country which in 1793 was at war with all Europe, and which by 1795 had 264 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. compelled all of her enemies except Austria and England to make peace with her, would find it hard to believe that the "enemies of liberty, fraternity and equality" in the United States would be able to oppose her will. QUESTIONS. I. What was the nature of the question at issue between the United States and France from 1793 to 1800 ? 2. Compare the word " State " as used in this chapter with the same word in a quotation made from Burgess on page 50, and state its meaning? 3. Give the names of the men who were ministers from France to the United States from 1793 to 1800, and give an account of their conduct. 4. Contrast the letter written by Lord Sackville-West in 1888 with the letters published by Adet in the Aurora in 1796, and the conduct of the government with reference to the former with its conduct with reference to the latter. 5. How do you explain the difference ? 6. Give the substance of the various decrees issued by France relating to the United States from 1793 to 1798, and explain their object. 7. Compare the decree of January, 1798, with the famous Berlin decree afterwards issued by Napoleon in 1806. 8. What was Talleyrand's opinion of the United States in 1798? 9. Account for it. 10. A member of the French council of five hundred in 1797 made a speech in which he said : " It is not Pinckney whom they (the government) repulse. It is the government of which he is the minister and the organ. And what have we been doing? Our agents at St. Domingo announce to the minister of marine, that having no other financial resources, and knowing the un friendly dispositions of the Americans, they had, to avoid perish ing, armed privateers; that already eighty-seven corsairs were at sea ; and that for three months the administration had subsisted, and iiidi\iduals had been enriched by the product oftheir prizes. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES; 265 That the revolting conduct of the Americans and the indirect evidence of the intentions of the government, made it their duty to order reprisals. Corsairs against a friendly nation! Re prisals! When we are the assailants! Reprisals towards a naiicm whichhas -not taken one of our vessels! Wealth acquired by the confiscation of the vessels of a people with whom treaties unite us ; from whom no declaration of war separates us. What is the pretext ? The treaty with Great Britain ! Are we then the sovereigns of the world? Are our allies only our subjects, who cannot forin treaties at their willf " Explain and comment upon the italicized passages. 266 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. CHAPTER XIX. THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS. ABOUT the middle of March (March 19), the Presi dent sent to Congress a message informing them of the conclusion he had reached from a careful considera tion of the contents of the dispatches from President's mes sage to Con- our envoys in France, which had been re cess. '' ceived about two weeks before. He told Congress that although nothing had been left undone which honorably could have been done, he saw no reason to expect that the envoys could accomplish the objects of their mission on terms compatible with the honor and essential interests of the United States; and that nothing further could be attempted without abandoning the prin ciples for which the country had uniformly contended, and which lay at the basis of its national sovereignty. He therefore urged them to adopt measures for the pro tection of our commerce and citizens ; " for the defense of any exposed portions of our territory; for replenishing our arsenals, establishing foundries and military manufactories, and to provide such efficient revenue, as will be necessary to defray extraordinary ex penses, and supply the deficiencies which may be occa-- sioned by depredations on our commerce." He also in formed them that he had cancelled the instructions to collectors not to permit private armed vessels to sail. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 267 The effect of this message upon the Republicans was natural. Filled with the belief that the Federalists were bent on every pretext for accumulating . , , . Jefferson's opin- power in the government, they were not in- ion of the mes sage. clined to take the word of John Adams for the necessity of these warlike preparations and heavy expenditures. In a letter to Madison, Jefferson declared that the President's " insane message " was identical with war, and that he could see nothing in favor of it " result ing from views either of interest or honor strong enough to impose even on the weakest mind." The only explana tion he was able to give of " so extraordinary a degree of impetuosity " was by supposing it to be due either to the desire to establish a monarchy, or to effect the separation of the states. He thought that Congress should pass a law prohibiting the sailing of private armed vessels as the President had withdrawn his prohibition, and then adjourn, since to do nothing and to gain time was every thing. The Republicau members of Congress sympathized with Jefferson, and the effect of their conduct upon the Federalists was equally natural. Firm in the conviction that the Republicans were only Antifederalists in dis guise, that their desire and aim was to break down the constitution, the Federalists thought that it was the policy of their opponents to keep the country unarmed, and thus compel the government to accept such terms as France might choose to impose. Utterly failing to com- 268 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. prehend the point of view of their opponents, the Feder alists believed that the Republicans were ready to sub ject the country to any degree of humiliation that might result either in overthrowing the constitution or in humbling the administration so as to destroy its prestige in the eyes of the people. Nor was this opinion confined to a few extremists like Robert Goodloe Harper and Harrison Gray Otis. In a letter to Lafayette, written the latter part of 1798, Washington wrote : "A party exists in the United States formed by a combina- Washington's . . ... .. opinion ol the tion of causes, which opposes the govern- Repuhlloans. , . ¦, ¦ j ment in all its measures, and is determined, as all its conduct evinces, by clogging its wheels, indi rectly to change the nature of it, and subvert the con stitution." Immediately after the receipt of the President's mes sage the House passed a bill making appropriations for the equipment of the three national frigates Debate upon ,.,.,,, ,., Spriggs' resoiu- which had been authorized at the late ses- tions. sion. A few days later (March 27), the policy of the opposition was developed in three resolu tions offered by Spriggs, of Maryland. The first de clared that it was not expedient for the United States to resort to war against the French republic; the second, that the arming of merchant vessels ought to be restricted; the third, that adequate provision ought to be made for the protection of our seacoast and for the internal defense of the country. The HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 269 House at once entered upon a heated debate of these resolutions. But before the debate was over the Federalists gave an unanswerable reply to one of the arguments of their opponents. Gallatin had said : " There was one circumstance very unaccountable in tlAs business. The President informed the House that he had received certain papers and .says, I have considered these papers ; I have deliberated upon them; I have not sent them to you, but require you to act on them. I call upon you to take energetic measures, ^p^'i^c™'^ and request that you will provide sufficient revenue — the House has thus been obliged to take up the subject in the dark," To this insinuation the Feder alists replied (March 30), by moving that the President be requested to communicate to the House the dispatches that had been received from the envoys to the French republic. The motion was iedCTaiists.^ carried; the dispatches were made public, and their contents overwhelmed the opposition with as tonishment and filled the immense majority of the American people with indignation. The Aurora and some other opposition papers did indeed argue that it was better to pay the bribe the Directory had demanded than run the risk of war. The country had purchased peace of the Indians and Algiers, why not . -, T. .. r 1 - Republican and purchase it of France? But all of the m- independent ¦*¦ press dependent papers, among them some that had leaned strongly towards the Republicans, at once 270 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. became earnest advocates of the policy of the President. From all parts of the country addresses came in showers commending his attitude, and making him feel for the first and only time in his life that he was a really popu lar man. * The effect of this torrent of popular indignation was quickly manifest in Congress. Spriggs' resolutions were abandoned; a, bill for the procuring of additional armed vessels was passed; a naval depart- hy^con^e^i^*'^ ment was created, and the President was authorized at any time within three years in the event of a declaration of war against the United States or actual invasion of their territory by a foreign power, or imminent danger of such invasion, to enlist ten thousand men to serve for a term not exceeding three years. While many members of the opposition bent before the storm, a few of them going over to the Federalists, some of them declining to vote, some of them going home, their leaders — Jefferson, in his private correspond ence, and Gallatin and Nicholas and Livingston in the House — steadily opposed every measure that looked to wards war. Utterly unable to appreciate their motives, the Federalists determined to crush an opposition, which was aimed, they believed, at the very life of the nation. They passed an Alien Law, which empowered the Presi dent of the United States to send out of the country any HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 271 alien whom he regarded as a suspicious person. Believing that the French had Alien Law. emissaries in the countrj', who were trying to create divisions among American citizens, fearing that the fate that had overtaken Venice and Switzerland and Rome (whose governments had been overthrown bj- agents of the French), would befall this country unless vigorous measures were taken to prevent it, the Federal ists stained the statute books of American history with the outrageous law, that put the right of aliens to reside in this country at the mercy of the President of the United States. All that he, had to say was, "I regard you as a suspicious person, leave the coiintry," and the alien so addressed must do it, or submit to fine and imprisonment. It was to no purpose that the Federalists were told by Gallatin, that since the Whisky Insurrection nothing had bqen seen but a cheerful sub mission to the laws; that an attachment to the constitu tion and a sense of the happiness enjoyed under it were universal. The heated minds of the excited Federalists were haunted by images of plots and conspiracies to overset the government, and, in order to save the gov ernment, it seemed to them essential that the plotters and conspirators should be brought within the reach of the law. In the form in which the Alien bill passed the Senate it was still more tyrannical. The Senate bill pro vided that any alien, who returned after having been 272 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. banished from this country, should be liable to imprison ment and hard labor for life. Gallatin called the methods of the Federalists a sys tem of alarm "which day after day brings forth motions calculated to spread fears of imaginary dangers; which one day produces an Alien bill; in the next. The object ol . ... the Federalist attempts to introduce an unconstitutional system. Sedition bill, and finally, wants military as sociations of one part of the people in order to suppress a supposed disaffection of the rest of the community." The Federalist system at this time certainly was a sys tem of alarm. But it was invented because they were themselves so thoroughly alarmed that they regarded it as necessary to the salvation of the country, not, as Gal latin believed, for mere party purposes, in order to strengthen the Executive. But in order to save the country, it was not enough, they thought, to provide for its defense against alien em issaries who might be found within it. In the crisis of extraordinary difficulty and danger which, in their opinion, the country had reached, it was Th^Sedition necessary to put into the hands of the gov ernment a weapon with which it might de fend itself against its own seditious citizens. Accord ingly, they passed the famous, or rather the infamous. Sedition Law. In order to understand the spirit of which that law was the expression, it is desirable to study not merely the form which it received at its passage, but HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. 273 the form in which it was introduced. . As originally in troduced, the first section declared that the people of France were enemies of the United States, and that ad herence to them, giving them aid and comfort, was pun ishable with death. The fourth provided that any per son who, by writing, printing, publishing or speaking, should attempt to justify the hostile conduct ofthe French, or to defame and weaken the government of the United States by any declaration or expressions, which tended to induce a belief that the government or any of its officers were influenced by motives hostile to the constitution, or to the liberties or happiness of the people, might be punished by a fine or imprisonment. But the fanaticism of the Federalists, intense as it was, had not reached such a point of madness as to per mit them to pass the bill in that form. Fortunately there was still enough hostility to tyranny among them, enough of devotion to individual liberty to cause them to strike out the first and fourth sections altogether. Hamilton, whom no one would accuse of undue devotion to indi vidual liberty, objected to the bill as soon as he saw it in print. "Let us not establish tyranny," he said; "energy is a very different thing from violence. If we make no false step we shall be essentially united, but if we push things to extremes we shall then give to faction body and solidity." But it is a fact of great interest to note that there were twelve men in the Senate, who voted for the bill with i8 274 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. the fourth section as above described, while only six voted against it, and that it was defeated in the House by the casting vote of the Speaker. Had the bill become a law in that form, it would not only have been possible for the Federalists to entirely silence the Republican press, but the intentional vagueness of its language . would have made it possible for them to treat as crimes every form of opposition to their measures. If it was a crime to say or write that the Federalists were influenced by motives hostile to the constitution, that their aim was by interpretation and precedent to make it provide for a stronger government than the men who framed it in tended, it was a crime to say what almost every Repub lican believed with passionate intensity. It is instruc tive to note that when Livingston declared that the prin ciple ofthe Alien bill "would have disgraced the age of Gothic barbarity," the Federalist, Otis, declared that this very remark was "evidence of seditious disposition." And if this speech had been delivered anywhere but on the floor of Congress, it would have been a crime in ac cordance with the bill as it passed the Senate, and would have passed the House had the vote of the Speaker been cast in its favor. As the bill finally became a law, it certainly went far enough towards establishing a tyranny. The first section made it a high misdemeanor, punishable by fine, not exceeding $5,000, and imprisonment from six months to five years, "for any persons unlawfully to combine and HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 275 conspire together with intent to oppose any measures of the government of the United States, directed by proper authority, or to impede the operation of any law of the United States, or to intimidate or prevent any person hold ing office under the government ofthe United States from executing his trust," or, with similar purpose, "to com mit, advise, or attempt to procure any insurrection, riot, unlawful assembly or combination." The second section provided for a fine of not more than $2,000, and imprisonment for not more than two years, of any one who printed or published any false, scandalous and malicious writings against the government of the United States, or either house of Congress, or the President, with intent to defame them, or to bring them into contempt or disrepute, or to excite against them the hatred of the good people of the United States, or to stir up sedition, or with intent to excite any unlaw ful combination for opposing or resisting any law of the United States, or any lawful act of the President, or to excite generally to oppose or resist any such law or act, or to aid, abet or encourage any hostile designs of any foreign nation against the United States. To these two sections, two more were added, on motion of the Federal ist, James Asheton Bayard, of Delaware. These provided that the truth of the matter stated might be given in evi dence as a good defense. It has been said that there was great provocation for the passage of the act — that the falsehood, calumny and 276 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. shameful abuse in which editors indulged with a freedom which it is almost impossible to conceive the Sedition for any oue who has not waded through the Law. party filth of the time — go far towards justi fying it. But to this the conclusive reply is that the coarseness and virulence and indecency of party war fare were by no means monopolized by the Republican press. And no intelligent student of history supposes that the intention of the Sedition Law was to impose any restraint upon Federalist editors. No ; it was not coarse ness and abuse and indecent attacks as such, that the Federalists objected to, but to coarseness and abuse when they were the objects of them. And it was one chief purpose of the Sedition Law to prevent attacks upon the authors of it. The object of the law is clearly shown by the char acter of the prosecutions that were based upon it. Among the offenses for which Lyon, Republican Prosecutions un- -,_.,. . .,., der the Sedition member of the House of Representatives Law. from Vermont, was punished, was his asser tion that " every consideration of the public welfare was swallowed up in a continual grasp for power (by the Presi dent), and unbounded thirst for ridiculous pomp, foolish adulation and selfish avarice." Thomas Cooper was fined $400 and imprisoned six months for saying that in 1797 the President was " hardly in the infancy of political.mistake.'' Then, he went on — the President had not said that a Re publican government might mean anything; had not HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 277 signed the Alien and Sedition Laws ; had not saddled a standing army and a permanent navy upon the country ; had not brought its credit so low as to borrow money at eight per cent., etc. Frothingham was fined and impris oned for accusing Hamilton of attempting to buy the Aurora in order to suppress it in the interests of the Fed eralists. In truth, these measures were eminently characteristic of the Federalists. The Federalists believed that they and they alone had at heart the best interests of the country. They believed that their opponents were a French party, not merely admirers, but devoted to the interests, of France; they believed that the Republicans made a mere pretense of devotion to republicanism, that they might with better hopes of success, carry on their war against the constitution in the interests of France and anarchy. The Alien and Sedition Laws were the direct results of these beliefs. Believing that they were on the verge of a war with France, a war forced upon them by France because they would not permit the country to take a position of helpless and absolute dependence upon her, it seemed to them but the simple dictate of self-preservation to give the government the power to protect itself against the emissaries which they were certain the great Propogand- ist of Anarchy was sending among them. Believing also that the Republicans were a French party, and that they would repeat the attempt they had made in the case of the Whisky Insurrection, only on a larger scale, on the 278 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. first opportunity, it seemed to the Federalists essential that the government should have the power to nip such attempts in the bud; that it should not be obliged to wait for sedition to organize its forces before it could strike it down. To prevent the anarchy that would result from the successful efforts of hostile aliens and seditious citi zens, the Federalists laid violent hands on the constitu- Federahsts'opin-tion, and showed their lack of sympathy ment'by°ttfe"' with the American attempt at self-govern- people. ment. It has been well said that they had got out of humor with the "new rage for calling in the sovereign people, and playing government as it were, in the street," and the Federalists were out of humor with the people because they believed that government by the people would result in anarchy. But these laws were characteristic of the Federalists, not only in what they aimed to accomplish directly, by Division ol meaus of them, but in what they opinion as to . . jurisdiction of hoped to accomplish indirectly. We have United States r r j courts. geen ^j^at ^;]^q Federalists resolved to en large the powers of the central government by construc tion and precedent. In 1798 it was a question in dispute between Federalists and Republicans as to the crimes over which the Federal courts had constitutional jurisdic tion. The Republicans contended that the Federal courts had jurisdiction over those crimes only, which were expressly enumerated in the constitution — treason, counterfeiting United States coin or securities, piracies HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 279 and offenses against the laws of nations. The Federalists, on the contrary, claimed that offenses which are crimes, not because they are violations of any law which has been enacted — statute law — but are crimes because they are violations of laws, based on custom — common law — also come under the jurisdiction of the Federal courts. In 1798 libel was still a common law offense. From the point of view of the Republicans, therefore, the Sedition Law was a dangerous precedent, since it brought within the jurisdiction of the Federal court offenses, which, in their opinion, the constitution had left exclusively under the jurisdiction of the courts of the states. In the closing weeks of the session, a number of important laws were passed in contemplation of hostili ties, if not of war, with France. Our merchant vessels were authorized to arm and forcibly repel the assaults of the French (June 25) ; appropriations were made for distributing arms among the states (July 6) ; the treaties between France and the United States were declared uo longer binding on the United States (July 7) ; and the President was authorized to issue letters of marque and re prisal against France (July 9). To meet the extraordi nary expenses thus incurred, a direct tax of $2,000,000 was laid and the President was authorized to borrow $2,000,000 in anticipation of it, and $5,000,000 more. QUESTIONS. 1. Account for Jefferson's opinion of the President's message. 280 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 2. Why do you suppose he thought its object was either to establish a monarchy, or effect a separation of the states ? 3. What was Washington's opinion of the Republicans ? 4. What were Spriggs' resolutions ? 5. What position was taken by the Republican press when the dispatches were published ? 6. Whatwas the difference between paying a tribute to the Algerines and giving a bribe to Prance ? 7, What was the Alien Law ? 8. In what form did it pass the Senate ? 9. What were the provisions of the Sedition Law ? 10. What did the first and fourth sections of the bill, as origi nally introduced, provide ? 11. What votes were cast for the bill in the form in which it was introduced ? 12. Could the Republicans have made any opposition whatever to Federalist measures, which the Federalists might not honestly have characterized as due to motives hostile to the constitution, if the bill had passed in that form ? 13. What evidence does the Sedition Law give that the Fed eralists feared a popular uprising in behalf of France? 14. In what way were the Alien and Sedition Laws character istic of the Federalists ? 15. What differences of opinion existed between Federalists and Republicans as to the jurisdiction of the Federal courts? 16. What is the difference between statute and common law? HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 281 CHAPTER XX. THE KENTUCKY AND VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS. MANY years after the passage of the Alien and Se dition Laws, Jefferson said that he believed them as palpably unconstitutional, as if Congress had passed a law 'requiring every one to bow down and worship a golden calf. He was equally clear as to their object ; he considered them as merely "an experiment . . Jefferson on the on the American mmd to see how far it AUen and sedi tion laws. will bear an avowed violation of the Consti tution. If this goes down, we shall immediately see at tempted another act of Congress, declaring that the Pres ident shall continue in office during life, reserving to another occasion the transfer of the succession to his heirs, and the establishment of the Senate for life." We are told by one author (McMaster, vol. I, page 419), that the fact that Jefferson ever wrote such folly, is of itself enough to deprive him of every possible claim to statesmanship. Whether Jefferson was or was not a statesman is a question which we are not obliged to dis cuss. But if no one could be a statesman in 1798 with out having a tolerably correct estimate of the aims of his political opponents, then there were no statesmen at that time. If Jefferson, and Madison, and Gallatin cannot be considered statesmen because they thought the Federal- 282 HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. ists wished to destroy the constitution in the inter ests of monarchy, Washington, and Hamilton, and Fisher Ames cannot be considered statesmen because they thought the Republicans wished to destroy the con stitution in the interests of anarchy. In truth, it was a time of such political madness that clear, temperate, sober, steady thinking was almost impossible. That this was quite as true of the Federalists as of the Republicans, this story has abundantly shown. If further proof iS de sired, it is found in the fact that, with the exception of John Marshall, every leading Federalist, Washington in cluded, entirely approved of the Alien and Sedition laws. Indeed, Fisher Ames questioned the soundness of John Marshall's Federalism because he did not approve of them. With such opinions of the Alien and Sedition Laws, it was natural for Jefferson and those who agreed with him to take steps to prevent the carrying out of what they regarded as the the Federalist programme. Accord ingly, in the autumn of 1798, he and Wilson C. Nicholas and George Nicholas, of Kentucky, discussed the question as to what it was best to do. Jefferson expressed an earnest wish that Kentucky should unite with Virginia in protesting against the constitutionality of the two odious laws. George Nicholas at once offered to introduce resolutions protesting against them, if Jefferson would frame them. Jefferson agreed to do it, but exacted from his friends a pledge that they would never reveal the fact that he was the author of the resolutions. He wrote HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 283 them, and with some modification they were passed by the Kentucky legislature almost unanimously. Later in the year Madison wrote a series of resolutions of the same character which were passed by the legislature of Virginia. The resolutions of Madison were not so extreme as those written by Jefferson, and for that reason it seems desirable to consider them first. The following is the important paragraph of the Virginia resolutions : "This Assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare that it views the powers of the Federal government as result ing from the compact to which the states are parties, as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instru ment constituting that compact, as no further valid than they are authorized by the grants enumer ated in that compact; and that in case of a Jo:^^ ^^^°^'^' deliberate, palpable and dangerous exercise of other powers, not granted by the said compact, the States, who are the parties thereto, have the right and are in duty bound to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits the authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to them." The significance of the entire paragraph depends upon the meaning given to the word " interpose." Did Madison mean that each individual state had a right to interpose in the sense that, as a sovereign power, it could declare null and void ^^^om^"""' within its boundaries, every law that it re- 284 HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. garded as a deliberate, palpable and dangerous exer cise of powers not granted to the general gov ernment by the constitution? If so, his theory was nothing but nullification, with its ugly features a little disguised by the generality and vagueness of the language in which it was expressed. But he himself has told us emphatically that that was not his meaning. In 1831, when the question of nullification was being hotly discussed, Calhoun tried to commend it by showing, or seeking to show, that it was taught by the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions. Madison protested. He said that Virginia did not contend that a single state had the con stitutional right to forcibly prevent the execution of a law of the United States. The state inter- ^itionoht^^^' position for which Virginia contended, he urged, was that provided for by the consti tution. The constitution provided for the calling of a convention either by congress or by two-thirds of the states. The decision of such a convention, representing as it would have done the sovereign American people, the power that made the constitution and could unmake it, would have been final as to the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition laws when ratified by the legislature of three-fourths of the states as provided for in the con stitution. That, said Madison, was what the Virginia res olutions meant by " interpose." To doubt Madison's interpretation would by no means be an impeachment of his veracity. Any one HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 285 who has given any attention to the nature of memory will have no difficulty in understanding that Madison might have been mistaken as to the meaning and object of the resolutions, which he himself had written more than thirty years before. But there is nothing in the resolutions which is inconsistent with his interpretation. The interpretation contended for is claimed for the "states.*" The singular term is never used. The reso lutions did indeed affirm that the constitution is a com pact between separate and sovereign states. If this doctrine were true, the constitution would be a sort of treaty, and a state would be justified in renouncing its obli gations when the Constitution was infringed by any other. But though the right of secession could be based on such a view of the constitution, the right of nullification could not. To say that a state had a right, under certain circumstances, to set aside a treaty, was one thing; to say that it had a right, while it professed to be bound by the *But Madison's interpretation is difficult to reconcile with a passage in a letter which he wrote to Jefferson in 1798. "Have you ever considered thoroughly," he says, "the distinction be tween the power of the State and that of the legislature on questions relating to the federal pact? On the supposition that the former is clearly the ultimate judge of infractions, it does not follow that the latter is the legitimate organ, especially as a con vention was the organ by which the compact was made. This was a reason of great weight for using general expressions, that would leave to other states a choice of all the modes possible for concurringinthe substance, and would shield theGeneral Assembly (of Virginia) against the charge of usurpations in the very act of protesting against the usurpations of Congress." 286 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. treaty to oppose the authority created by it, was quite another. The nine resolutions drawn by Jefferson were more radical and unequivocal. The first declared that the constitution was a compact ; "that to this compact each state acceded as a state, and is an integral party, its co- states forming as to itself, the other party; that the gov ernment created by this compact was not made the exclusive or final judge of the powers dele- The first of the J o r Mt£'as''d?awn g^tcd to itsclf, siuce that would have made by Jefferson. j^^ discretion, and not the constitution, the measure of its powers; but that as in all other cases of compact among parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress." Here the meaning is too plain to allow any legerde main of interpretation to put it out of sight; the consti tution is a compact; each state acceded to it as an integral party; and each party, that is, each state, has a right to decide when the compact has been broken, and what shall be done when it has been. But the meaning of the resolution is not only clear but the process by which some of its most important conclusions were reached, is equally clear. Jefferson concluded that the general government which was created bythe constitution, was not made the exclusive or final judge of its powers. But' what led him to such an all-important conclusion? Not the study of the constitution. This champion of strict HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 287 construction based his belief that each state had an equal right with the general government to judge when the con stitution had been violated, and what redress it should de mand under such circumstances, upon a consideration of the consequences of supposing that the decision of the general government as to the extent of its powers, was final — "that would have made its discretion, and not the constitution, the measure of its powers." The second resolution asserts that the Federalist doctrine that the courts of the general government had jurisdiction over common-law crimes violates the amend ment to the constitution that declares that " the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the The second. states are reserved to the States or to the people respectively," and that the Sedition Law, which was based upon it, is unconstitutional. The third asserts that since no power over the free dom of religion, freedom of speech, or freedom of the press was delegated to the United States by the constitu tion, nor prohibited by it to the states, the Sedition Law, "which does abridge the freedom of the press is not law, but is altogether void. The third, and of no force." The fourth declares that since no power over alien friends has been delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, the Alien Law "which assumes The fourth. powers over alien friends not delegated by 288 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. the constitution, is not law, but is altogether void and of no force." The fifth asserts that to remove aliens is equivalent to a prohibition of their immigration, and is, therefore, a violation of the clause in the constitution The fifth. which declares that the migration or im portation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by Congress prior to the year 1808. The sixth declares that the imprisonment of a per son on his failure to obey the simple order of the Presi dent to leave the country, is contrary to that amendment of the constitution that provides that " no Thesuth. person shall be deprived of liberty with out due process of law ; " that the same act which undertakes to " authorize the President to remove a person out of the United States who is under the pro tection of the law, on his mere suspicion, without accu sation, without jury, without public trial, without con frontation of the witnesses against him, without having witnesses in his favor, without defense, without counsel," is contrary to the amendment of the constitution which provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right of public trial by an impartial jury, to be informed ofthe nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory processes for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense ; HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. 289 that the same act in transferring the power of judging from the courts.to the President, violates that article of the constitution that provides that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in courts, and that this transfer of judicial power is to " that magistrate of the general government who already possesses all the execu tive, and a negative in all legislative powers." The eighth recommends that a committee of confer ence and correspondence be appointed, and asserts that " this commonwealth " ( it will be borne in mind that these resolutions were written on the supposition that they would be passed ^'^ ./ X- The eighth, by the legislature of Kentucky), " is de termined, as it doubts not its co-states are, to sub^ mit to undelegated, and, consequently unlimited powers, in no man, or body of men. on earth; that in cases of an abuse of the delegated powers, the members of the general government, being chosen by the people, a change by the people would be the constitutional remedy ; but where powers are assumed, which have not been dele gated, a nullification of the act is the rightful remedy ; that every state has a natural right in cases not within the compact, to nullify of their own authority all assump tions of power by others within their limits." The ninth authorizes the committee of conference and correspondence to communicate with any one who may be appointed for such a purpose by any one or more of the states. 19 290 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. An analysis of these resolutions, written again be it said, on the supposition that their author was the mouth piece of .the legislature of Kentucky, shows that they consist of three parts ; the first lays down ^soiSto^.*''^ the proposition that since the constitution is a compact between the states to which each state acceded as an integral party, each state has a right to judge ( 1 ) when the constitution has been vio lated, ( 2 ) what sort of redress the nature of its violation calls for. In the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh, Kentucky as a party to the compact, decides that several specified clauses of the constitution have been violated by the Alien and Sedition Laws. In the eighth, the redress is specified, which different infractions of the constitution call for. In case of an abuse of dele gated powers, a change in the members of the govern ment is the rightful remedy. But in case of an assump tion of powers not delegated, the very case which had actually arisen according to the resolutions, a nullifica tion of the act by the sovereign states is the constitu tional remedy. If this analysis is correct, to contend that the same interpretation should be given to the resolutions drawn by Jefferson, that Madison gave to those drawn by him self, is impossible. As plainly as language can say it, Jefferson says that each state has a right to judge when the constitution has been violated and what redress shall be had; that — supposing himself to be the mouthpiece of HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 291 Kentucky — the constitution has been violated in various particulars ; and that for such violations nullification by individual states is the rightful remedy. To assert as Alexander Johnston does, that the Jeffersonian doctrine* "seems to have been" that there were but two parties to the "compact," 'Restates and Johnston's tnter- pretations. the federal government, is to do violence to the specific and carefully chosen language of Jeffer son. It is, indeed true as Johnston asserts, that the state sovereignty doctrine of Jefferson was formulated as a shield of protection for the individual, while in the hands of Calhoun it was to be a "shield of protection for a section and for slavery." But I deny that this distinction is "vital." If a state is sovereign for one purpose, it is a contradiction to say that it is not sovereign for any purpose whatever. If it can, in the exercise of its sovereignty, set aside one law, it can set aside any. If it can set aside unconstitutional laws like the Alien and Sedition Laws in the interests of the in dividual, it can for the sake of slavery (or could) set aside constitutional laws. It cannot be sovereign when the setting aside of unconstitutional laws is in question, without being sovereign when the setting aside of con stitutional laws is in question. It cannot have sover eign power to do right without having sovereign power to do wrong. ^Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy and United States History; article on Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. 292 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. The best defense to make of Jefferson, as the author of the Kentucky resolutions, is not to contend that they do not mean what they say. The truth is, that when Jefferson wrote them, he believed that liberty was being driven to its last stronghold. He believed that the Federalists were bent on carrying out a programme, which unless arrested at the beginning, would drive the states into revolution and blood, and furnish the enemies of humanity with a new pretext for calumnies against Re publican government. Failing to realize that the only barrier that can be erected against such schemes must be found in devotion to liberty, he himself forged in the very resolutions that were written to defend it, the most effective weapon that has been used in the last hundred years against Republican government. The civil war, which was the logical outcome of the doctrine of the Kentucky resolutions, was a tremendous struggle to de termine whether "governraent of the people and by the people" can endure. But it is unjust to Jefferson to say that the. doctrine of these resolutions was his abiding sober thought as to the proper remedy for violations of the consti tution. He stated his abiding thought on the matter in a letter written a few years before his death to Justice Johnson: "The ultimate arbiter," he said, "is the people of the union, assembled by their deputies in con vention, at the call of Congress, or of two-thirds of the HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 298 states. Let them decide to which they mean to give an authority claimed by two of their organs." QUESTIONS, 1. What did McMaster say about Jefferson as a states man and how would you reply to it/ 2. Why, in your opinion, was Fisher Ames disposed to re gard approval of the Alien and Sedition Law as a test of the soundness of one's Federalism? 3. Who was Fisher Ames ? Do you recall any speech of his? ' 4. Why did Jefferson wish to conceal his authorship of the Kentucky resolutions ? Do you recall any other instance in his history when he seemed unwilling that the public should know his relation to important measures ? 5. Give the substance of the most important paragraph in the Virginia resolutions ? 6. How did Madison explain the meaning of "interpose ?" 7. Can you reject his explanation without impeaching his veracity ? 8. Reconcile his explanation with the paragraph quoted in the letter to Jefferson. 9. What follows from the opinion that the constitution is a compact ? 10. What is the difference between nullification and seces sion? 11. Could a state be supposed to have the right of seces sion without the right of nullification ? 12. State the substance of the first of the Kentucky reso lutions as drawn by Jeffersoni? 13. Point out carefully the nature of the reasoning by which its conclusions were reached. 14. Jefferson objected that to make the general government the final judge of its powers, was to make its discretion the measure of its powers ; did not his theory make the discretion oj the states the measure of its powers? 294 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 15. If the doctrine of this resolution were true and were acted on as such, what would be the difference between the con stitution and the Articles of Confederation ? 16. What is Alexander Johnston's interpretation of this paragraph ? 17. What do you think of his interpretation ? 18. What seems to have been the abiding thought of Jeffer son on this subject i 19. What do you think of the reasoning of the second, third fourth, fifth and sixth resolutions f HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 295 CHAPTER XXI. DOWNFALL OF THE FEDERALIST PARTY. OUR STORY has already told of the tornado of indig nation that swept over the country on the publica tion of the X., Y. and Z. dispatches, and of the energetic measures passed by Congress in June and July, 1798. The news seems to have taken Talleyrand and the F'rench government completely by surprise. That a "backwoods nation" of 5,000,000 people would dare to throw down the gauntlet at the feet of the conquerors Effect upon . ., ... France of the of continental Europe was a possibility energetic meas ures ol the upon which they had not reckoned. The "J^^^^ states. Directory at once changed their attitude. They assured Gerry that they were eager to preserve peace between the two republics. They no longer demanded satisfaction for the language of Adams' message. They declared that they did not wish the United States to break Jay's treaty; they issued circulars forbidding the further cap ture of American vessels; they released American seamen, and, in August, declared in a semi-official way, their readiness to receive a new American minister, provided his political opinions were acceptable. In his message to Congress in December, Adams asserted that the "pretension" on the part of the French to prescribe the qualifications which a minister of ^e 296 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. United States should possess was inadmissible, and de clared that to send another minister "without more deter minate assurances that he would be received nominated to was au act of humiliation to which the France. United States ought not to submit." But he gave it as "his deliberate and solemn opinion, that whether we negotiate with her or not, vigorous prepara- rations for war will be alike indispensable." Long before this, however, Talleyrand had given the most "determi nate assurances" that an American minister would be received. In his message in June, we remember, Adams had said that he "would never send another minister to France without assurance that he would be received as the representative of a great, powerful, and independent republic." Accordingly, on September 28, 1798, Talley rand caused the resident American minister at the Hague, William Vans Murray, to be assured that "whatever pleni potentiary the government of the United States might send to France, in order to terminate the existing difficul ties between the two countries, he would undoubtedl5' be received with the respect due to the representative of a free, independent and powerful nation." Adams took hira at his word. Without even hinting his intention to his cabinet, to say nothing of asking their advice, on February 18, 1799, he nominated Murray as minister to France. This precipitate action, which was undoubtedly the occasion of the downfall of the Federal partj-, grew out HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 297 of the relations between John Adams and the Hamiltonian Federalists. Hamilton and Adams began their respective careers under the constitution, the one as Secretary of the Treasury, the other as Vice-president, with a lack of confidence in each other. Hamilton suspected Adams of being unfriendly to Washington. He believed that Adams had been among the number in Congress, who, at one period in the Revolution, had been willingto supersede Washington and appoint HanSton"* Gates in his stead. Though this feeling was so far overcome as to induce him to prefer the election of Adams as Vice-president, it left a sediment behind in the form of a distrust of him, and an unwillingness to see him elected by a very large majorit}-. He accordingly used his influence to diminish the nuraber of votes for Adams. Adams heard of this and was naturally inclined to complain that he appeared before the world as the choice of a minority of the electors, when but for the influence of Hamilton he would have received a decided majority. As Vice-President during Washington's two administra tions, Adams had repeatedly given the casting vote in favor of measures that had originated with Hamilton. Nevertheless, the relations between the two men were never cordial. It was impossible that they should be. Their tempers and characters were such that they were sure to come into antagonism. Hamilton's ardor, ability, self-assertiveness, and devotion to the public good cora- 298 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. bined with a remarkable capacity to impress himself upon men, had made him, by the close of Washington's second term, the real leader of the Federal party. When Jefferson was an old man. Van Buren visited him at his home at Monticello. In the course of their numerous conversations about political parties, Van Buren observed that in speaking of the Federalists, Jefferson always spoke of Hamilton. Instead of saying the Federalists did this and that, he always said Hamilton did this and that, attributing to him the authorship of their entire policy. Van Buren asked him the reason. Jefferson smiled and said that the Republicans never had any doubt that the policy of their opponents was directed by Hamilton. The researches of history have fully con firmed Jefferson's opinions. Every important measure of the Federalists during Washington's two administra tions bore the stamp of Hamilton's personality. Wash ington himself, as we have seen, constantly looked to him for advice. The members of Washington's cabinet who were appointed after its first members resigned, owed their elevation largely to his influence, and habitu- all)"^ relied on him for advice and suggestions. The nat ural inclination of weaker men to lean on a strong man, impelled them in the critical and difficult positions in which they often found themselves, to turn to a man who always had time to think out a clear and definite policy for every emergency, and support it by powerful reasons. In this wav, Hamilton exerted almost as much HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 29y influence on the policy of Washington's administration after he left the cabinet, as he did while he was a member of it. John Adams had many of the characteristics of Hamilton. He was as ardent, as self assertive, as much devoted to the public good, as little capable of being guided by the will of another, as Hamilton. Like Ham ilton he was quick in his decisions, fertile in resources, and of untiring industry. But o?Adams!^*"'** unlike Hamilton, he was not remarkable for the power of impressing himself upon men. Moreover, there were positive reasons why the members of his cab inet were at least indifferent to him, if not more than that, from the beginning. They were in perfect sym pathy with Hamilton, and that was Hamilton's attitude. In the election that resulted in making Adams President, Hamilton used his influence to make Thomas Pinckney President,instead of Adams. As the constitution then stood, two men were voted for by each presidential elec tor, as President. The one who received the highest number of votes became President, and the one the next highest, Vice-president. Hamilton had urged all the New England electors to vote for Pinckney as well as for Adams, because he knew that some of the electors in the Southern states would vote for Pinckney who would not vote for Adams, since the former was a southern man, and, in this way, Pinckney would be elected Presi dent over Adams. 300 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. This came to the knowledge of Adams and made him very indignant. It would be impossible in so short a space, to draw one side of his Adams' vanity, character more clearly than he himself did in a paragraph of a letter which he wrote on this occasion. "But to see such a character as Jefferson," he wrote March 30, 1797, to Henry Knox, "and much more such an unknown being as Pinckney, brought over my head, and trampling on the bellies of hundreds of other men infinitely his superiors in talents, services and reputation, filled me with apprehensions for the safety of us all. It demonstrated to me that if the project succeeded, our constitution could not have lasted four years. We should have been set afloat and landed, the Lord knows where. That must be a sordid people indeed, a people destitute of a sense of honor, equity and character, that could submit to be governed, and see hundreds of its most meritorious public men governed by a Pinckney, under an elective government." For a man who took himself so seriously as to use such lan guage as this in speaking of Pinckney and Jefferson, to get along without frictidn with his cabinet, would have been difficult if they had agreed with him on questions of public policy. But they did not. Their opinions differed widely from his in matters of fundamental im portance. Moreover, because of the precedents estab lished in Washington's two administrations, they did not look upon their office in the light in which it is univer- HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 301 sally regarded now. They regarded themselves, not as advisers of the President, who were in duty bound 1o defer to his decisions, however contrary to opinions enter- , . . . tained by mem- their judgment it might be, but as hav- bers of thecal i- •> ° & ) net of their ing a share of executive power. Timothy posiMo"" Pickering showed this very clearly in a letter to Hamilton written in 1798. " Internal politics and our exterior re lations," he said, "maybe deeply affected by the char acter and principles of the President and Secretary of State." Now this opinion which Pickering, as stern and unbending a man as Andrew Jackson, entertained of his office, an opinion which was shared by his colleagues, was sure to lead them into collision with Adams. For they differed from him almost as radically as he himself did from Jefferson. He was one of the few public men of his time who was absolutely without foreign bias. When he was presented to George III, of England, in 1785, he said to that monarch, " I must avow to your majesty that I have no attachment save to my own country." The old Revolutionary .spirit was strong within him in 1797. He wrote to his wife, "I would not have my son go as far as Mr. Jay, and af- Adams' opinion •^ ° ¦" ¦' of France and firm the friendly disposition of that country Sed^wSh (England) to this. I know better. I know party. their jealousy, envy, hatred and revenge co\rered under pretended contempt." But he cared just as little for France. Not deluded by names, he had early seen that the French Revolution had nothing in common with the 302 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. Revolution in his own country. In a letter to his wife in 1798, he said that if he thought of nature as Franklin did, he should regard her as " a kind of French Republic, cun ning and terrible, but cruel as the grave, and as unjust as the 'Tempter and Tormentor.'" The preceding year he said, " I should dread his kindness (John Bull's) as much as French severity, but will be the dupe of neither." But a large number of leading Federalists by no means ex tended their dislike to England and France in the same impartial and even-handed way. We remember what Cabot thought of the war that England was waging with France. He thought that it was in behalf of the civilized world, and that if she failed, the rest of the world would have to fight or give up their independence. And this was about the view of the two leading members of Adams' cabinet, Timothy Pickering and Oliver Wol cott. Under such circumstances to expect harmony be- t\veen Adamsandhis cabinet wasto expectthe impossible. It was after Congress adjourned in July, 1798, that the first collision between Adams and his cabinet oc- washington ap- curred. As President of the United States, pointed com- • « •, , ,11- mander-in-chief it was Adauis duty to appoint the officers of the provi- ^ sional army. gf ^j^g provisional army which Congress had provided in the closing days of its session. As to who should be put at the head of it, there was little occasion for the exercise of discretion — the whole country instinctively turned towards Washington. De ferring to this universal wish apparently, rather HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES, 303 than to any strong desire of his own, Adams ap pointed Washington to the position of Lieutenant-Gen eral and Commander-in-chief of the Army, and the Sen ate unanimously confirmed him. When Washington accepted the nomination he was perfectly well aware of the relations between Adams and Hamilton, He knew, moreover, that it was Hamilton's wish to be second to him in command, and that it was the judgment of a large number of influen- Conditions un- ential Federalists that his abilities entitled S?^"^i?i^i',^ ''°- cepts the ap- him to the position. John Jay and Timothy P°i°*™«"'- Pickering had strongly urged the desirabilit}' of giving Hamilton this appointment. In this estimate of Hamil ton, Washington himself concurred. He accordingly ac cepted the appointment ds Commander-in-chief under two conditions: (1) That the chief line and staff officers should be such as he confided in ; and (2) that he should not be called into the field until the situation of the country made it indispensable. Adams at once submitted Washington's letter of ac ceptance to Congress, and also a list which had been ar ranged by Washington, naming Hamilton, C. C. Pinck ney and Knox as Major-Generals, and in that order. As soon as the extra session was over, the President hastened to his home in Quincy. Hardly had he ar rived there, when he found that the question as to who was to be second in command was still in dispute. The 304 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. friends of Hamilton were claiming the posi- Dispute over the precedence of ^Jqjj for him OU the ground that his name the Major- '^ Generals. ^^^^^ g^.^^ ^^ ^^^ jj^^ ^f Major-Gcuerals. But many of the New England papers urged that the po sition belonged to Knox because of the higher rank he had held in the Revolutionary war. Adams, as a New Englander, who liked Knox, a New England man, and strongly disliked Hamilton, preferred to give the posi tion to Knox. But the friends of Hamilton in and out of the Cabinet were determined to prevent this if pos sible. McHenry, Secretary of War, sent lettei-s to Adams, which had been drafted by Hamilton himself, the objects of which were to reconcile Knox to a subor dinate position, and induce Adams to announce that the order was to be Hamilton, Pinckney, and Knox. These letters made Adams angry. "There has been too much intrigue in this business," he said, "with General Wash ington and me." He ordered that the commissions ofthe three Major-Generals should be made out in such a way as to i3ut Knox first, Pinckney second, and Hamilton third. But this called out a letter from Washington in which he stated that he should regard such an arrangement as a violation of the condition upon which he had accepted his appointment, and threatened to resign. To this letter Adams jnelded with as much grace as he could, and ap pointed Hamilton second in command. The effect of this successful attempt to thwart the wishes of Adams, and compel him as President to do HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 305 what he did not wish to do, was not only to embitter him more strongly than ever against Ham- Effect oi mak- •1 •-,• •-, -I r .. ing Hamilton ilton and plant in his mmd seeds of dis- second in com mand above trust towards his Cabinet, but also to disin- Adams. cline him to a policy which might result in the aggrand izement of his personal enemy. That Adams was too much of a statesman not to have pushed the preparations for war with the utmost vigor, if war had seemed to him probable, cannot be questioned. But the successful at tempt to force him to make Hamilton second in com mand, certainly tended to cause him to minify, rather than magnify, the probability of war. "One thing I know," he wrote to McHenry in October, "that regi ments are costly everywhere, and more so in this coun try than any other under the sun. If this nation sees a great army to maintain without an enemy to fight, there may arise an enthusiasm that seems little to be fore seen. At present, there is no more prospect of seeing a French army here than in heaven." But these were by no means the chief considerations that led Adams away from the warlike designs of the Hamiltonian Federalists. Although he was a Federalist, he stood at least half way between Ham- . Adams did not ilton and Jefferson. "The crisis," which beheveinthe *' cnsis." continually haunted the mind of Hamilton, and his followers, a crisis in which the ignorant masses would attempt to inaugurate a French Revolution in this country, never troubled him. The difference between 306 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. the two men in this respect is well illustrated by their attitude towards the Alien Law. Adams approved of it, but in his hands it was a dead letter ; he sent ho alien out of the country. Hamilton, on the contrary, declared that the majority of them ought to be sent away. Since Adams apprehended no crisis he did not feel the need of strengthening the government. Although Hamilton was too much of a statesmen not to see that war was an evil which it was incumbent on the country to avoid, if it could be done with honor, there is no reason to doubt that war had to his mind compensating ad vantages; it would result in strengthening the government and in so calling out the military resources of the country as to make a revolution impossible. We have seen that at the adoption of the constitution, Hamilton's distrust of popular government had made him doubtful of the stability of the government which it had called into existence. And though the issue of the Whisky Insur rection might have taught him that respect for its au thority was general, the terrible convulsions in France had more than neutralized the lessons of the Whisky Insurrection; they had seemed to him an awful and never-to-be-forgotten object lesson of the folly of expect ing anything but injustice and practical anarchy from a government by the people. The desirability of setting this point in a clear and strong light makes it useful, perhaps, to tion.^ nsurreo- ^^j^ attention for a moment to an insignifi cant insurrection, which broke out in PlISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 307 Pennsylvania in 1799. In the preceding year, it will be remembered. Congress levied a direct tax. One of the things on which it was to be levied was houses, arranged in certain classes, and one of the means pre scribed for making the classification was a measurement of the windows. Opposition to it in certain counties in Pennsylvania culminated in a riot, and when thirty rioters were arrested, they were rescued by a man named Fries at the head of fifty armed horsemen. For this offense Fries was tried and condemned to death, and when he was pardoned by Adams, it seemed to Hamilton and to many leading Federalists that Adams had been guilty of a grdssHmd culpable breach of trust. They were constantly judging of tendencies in this countrj"- by the analogies furnished by France. They believed that Fries' insurrection was only a sign of the anarchical tendencies of democracy, and that the only way the un ruly giant could be kept from overturning the State was by being kept down by the strong hand of authority. When, therefore, Adams, whose brain was not affected by the intoxication of Anti-French fanaticism, pardoned Fries, it seemed to many of the leading Federalists almost a treasonable breach of trust. It was this fever of Anti-French fanaticism in the Hamiltonian Federalists that caused their divergence from Adams on the question of which men- Enghshsym- tion has already been made. In 1798, as ^^'^iito^an''^ we have seen, the only power in Europe ^^'^^'^'^'^'s- 308 HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. that opposed France was England. England theretore had corae to seera to the followers of Hamilton the champion of law, order, religion, and everything that was good. They forgot her anti-neutral orders in council, her impressment of American seamen, her selfish colonial policy, or reraerabered them only to apologize for them. The oue fact that entirely filled the field of their con sciousness was that England alone had not succumbed before the Great Propagandist of Anarchy. Precisely as the Republicans had opposed the mission of Jay in 1794, because, from their point of view, negotiation with England was negotiation with the enemy of liberty, with the coalition of kings against the people, so in 1798 there were many leading Federalists to whom negotiation with France seeraed like negotiating with the Incarnate Prin ciple of Evil against the charapion of law, order and re ligion. And with the sarae propriety with which the Republicans in 1793 might be characterized as a French faction, many leading Federalists in 1798 might be characterized as an English faction. The Hamil tonian Federalists believed that the one question which France asked when she was on the point of making a treaty was not whether its stipulations, if observed by her, would promote her ends, but whether agreeing to observe thera would do so. Correctly believing that the one purpose which had influenced France in all her inter course with this country was the overthrow of the gov ernraent, they thought that to gain time and restore her HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 309 injured credit in the United States, she would agree to any treaty that seemed likely to promote her ends. Moreover, they believed that after one American minister had been driven out of France and the three special envoys still more grossly insulted, the time had come for the United States to stand on their honor. If diplomatic intercourse was to be resumed between the two countries, it was for France to take the initia tive. It was not enough for her to indicate in a lordly way her readiness to receive an American minister — to say, in effect that if the United States should send a min ister he should not be subjected to threats of interference from the police, or refused recognition except on insult ing' and dishonorable conditions. She herself should send a minister to this country to close the breach which she had opened. If she refused, if she persisted in her attitude of hostility, if war resulted, it would decrease the probability of a revolution in this country and cure the people of their almost fatal partiality for France. So reasoned the Hamiltonian Federalists. When, therefore, the President sent a message to the Senate nominating Vans Murray as minister Effect of the . . . French mission to France, their indignation was boundless, on the Hamu- tonian Federal- Pi ckcriug wrote to Hamilton, "we have ^*^- all been shocked and grieved at the nomination of a min ister to negotiate with France. I beg you to believe that it is wholly his (the President's) own act, without any par ticipation or communication with any of us." And 310 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. Sedgewick, also to Hamilton: "Had the foulest heart and the ablest head in the world been permitted to select the most erabarrassing and ruinous measure, perhaps it would have been precisely the one which has been adopted. In the dileraraa to which we are reduced, whether we approve or reject the nomination, evils only, certain, great, but in extent incalculable, present them selves." These statements, strong as they are, did but voice the indignation of the Hamiltonian wing of the party. By processes which it would take a psychologist to unravel, they had come to feel that Adaras had no po litical right to defy their will. Regarding themselves as leaders of the party, they felt that they had a right to de fine its policy, and that the, in a sense, accidental fact, that Adams was President, gave him no right to change it. But no clearer light can be found in which to view the effect of Adams' French mission upon the Hamil tonian Federalists, and thereby to study their political character, than two letters written by George Cabot to Hamilton. "Cabot," says Henry Adams, tcfHaoSitra!^'^ "was considered the wisest head in his party, to whose rebuke even Hamilton was forced to bow." A special significance, therefore, may justly be attached to his opinions. "For myself," he says in a letter written in August, 1800, " I often declare that the mission to France, though impolitic, unjustifi able, dangerous and inconsistent; the expulsion of able, upright and faithful officers * * * though a ruinous HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. 311 precedent ; the pardon of Fries though a sacrifice of the safety as well as dignity of the state, * * * that all these would not induce me to oppose the President's re-election, if I did not view them as evidence, explained and confirmed by other evidence, that he has abandoned the system he was chosen to maintain, and that he is likely to introduce its opposite, with all its pernicious consequences, as fast as he can, and as far as his influence will go." But what was the system which Adams was chosen to maintain and which Cabot found evidence that he had abandoned? That appears from another letter written by the same to the sarae. In this letter, Cabot was speaking of the pamphlet which Hara ilton had just written about Adaras and of which men tion will be made later. "They (certain Federalists) expected you would have analyzed him so effectually as to prove that he is and must be but little attached to the support of the public credit and the rights of property ; in a word, that war with England, privateering , and paper m-oney, with all their baneful appendages and con sequences, are viewed by him, not as evils to be depre cated, but resources to be preferred to that stable condi tion aimed at by the Washington systera which he hates, and which he has been constrained by circumstances to support." Here we have what we may call a full length portrait of the Hamiltonian Federalists in 1798, 1799 and 1800, in outline at least. Adaras thought it better to waive the point of honor and take Talleyrand at his 312 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. word, and send another mission to France ; he thought that he might safely follow the example of Washington in dealing with the leaders of the Whisky Insurrection, and pardon Fries ; he decided to demand the resignation of members of his cabinet who had endeavored persist ently to thwart his policy rather than assist in carrying it out, and, therefore, he had abandoned the Washington system ; therefore, he was no longer attached to the sup port ofthe public credit and the rights of property ; there fore, he regarded war with England, privateering, and paper money, not as evils to be deprecated, but as re sources to be preferred to the system of Washington ! Anyone who wishes to get a vivid realization of the con dition of things that caused an attempt to preserve peace to result in the downfall of the party to which the Presi dent who made it belonged, should make a careful study ofthis " therefore." The temper of mind which made a bridge from such facts to such a conclusion, was totally unfit to be trusted with the administration of the govern ment. It was bound to play the part of a Don Quixote. That Adams refused to play such a part, that his vision was too clear and his judgment too free from the preju dices of the time to make him regard windmills as seri ous menaces upon the government, is the reason that the Hamiltonian Federalists attacked him, and that he, and the great party to which he belonged, were beaten in 1800. We have seen that in February, 1799, Adams startled HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 313 the country by nominating Vans Murray as envoy to France. Further reflection enabled him to see that Mur ray was not a sufficiently important person to be in trusted with such an important mission alone. Accord ingly, before the Senate acted on his nomination, he nominated three persons. Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth, Patrick Henry, and Vans Murray, to be joint commis sioners to France. Henry declining. Governor Davie, of North Carolina, was appointed in his stead. The details of the story, how the friends of Hamil ton in and out of the cabinet, undertook to thwart the President, how in their fondness for Quixotic enterprises, they tried to prevent John Adams, of all the men in the world, from doing what he conceived to be his duty, need not detain us here. As some oftheir reasons for delaying the departure of the coraraissioners had some ground, Adams did not order the commissioners to sail until Octo ber. But on the morning of October 1 6, without consulting his cabinet, he ordered that their instructions should be put in final shape, and that a frigate should be got in readiness to take them not later than Noveraber 1. They sailed on November 5. That this mission to France inflicted a fatal wound on the Federalist party, proved, as we have seen, that it was time for it to die. It had been a great party, and it had done a noble work. It F^a^aUsts.* found the country without a government ; it created one. It converted the lifeless letter of the con- 314 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. Stitution into a living systera of government. It "touched the dead corpse of public credit and it sprang into life." It kept the country in the straight and narrow path of neutrality when to depart from it would have been fatal to the young government. But its work was done. With little faith in the possibility of Republican governraent to begin with, that faith had grown less and less until its leaders had come to think that the one hope of realizing it lay in war with France. An idea so un-American, so utterly out of harraony with the spirit of American in stitutions, made the party that entertained it unfit to be longer trusted with the destinies of the young republic. Fortunately for the country the official leader of the party was a strong man. When our minister had been driven from France he did not allow a sense of na tional dignity to prevent him from sending three special envoys there. When these in turn had been insulted, he did not permit fear of France to cause him to forget what was due the country. The man who had defied England in 1775, was ready to defy the conquerors of continental Europe in 1798. But to refuse to send a minister after France had so emphatically declared her wish to receive one, to go to war for a mere point of etiquette, was not consistent with his ideas of the public interests. But when he sent the mission,he split the party into two ir reconcilable factions, and made his own reelection im possible. His action, as we have seen, subjected him co the HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 315 fiercest and most vindictive criticisms from the leaders of the party. Hamilton wrote a pamphlet ^ ¦' f- 1- Judgmentof hls- criticizing him in terms that fairly ex- Adams^French posed him to punishment under the ¦™^^'°°- Sedition Law. But his own verdict upon his conduct is the verdict of history. In a letter to James Lloyd, written in 1808, he said : " I will defend ray raission to France as long as I have an eye to direct ray hand, or a finger to hold my pen. They were the most disinterested and meritorious actions of my life. I reflect upon them with so much satisfaction that I desire no other inscrip tion over my gravestone than, ' Here lies John Adams, who took upon himself the responsibility of peace with France in the year 1800.' " QUESTIONS. 1. Enumerate the measures passed by Congress in reference to France in June and July, 1798. 2. What effect did they produce upon the French govern ment? 3. Whom did Adams nominate as a minister to France in February, 1799, and under what circumstances ? 4, What was the attitude of Adams to Washington during the Revolutionary war ? 5. Can you account for it ? 6. What did the Republicans think of Hamilton's relation to the policy of the Federalists ? 7. Compare Hamilton and Adams. 8. What opinion did the members of Adams' cabinet enter tain of their offices ? 9. How did they come to have such an opinion ? 10. Compare Adams' opinion of England with that of some other leading Federalists. 316 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 11. To what position was Washington appointed and on what condition did he accept the appointment ? 12. What was it that tended to disincline Adams towards war with France ? 13. What was the " crisis " in which the Hamiltonian Feder alists believed ? 14. How do you account for their belief? 15. What was Fries' Insurrection, and why did some Feder alists attach so much importance to it ? 16. Compare the attitude of many Federalists towards the French mission iu 1799, with the attitude of the Republicans to wards Jay's mission in 1794. 17. Do you think there was as much reason for the French mission as there was for the mission of Jay ? 18. If Adams had refused to send ministers to France and war had resulted, do you think the war of 1812 would have been fought ? 19. Do you think a war with France in 1799 would have been as unpopular in the South as the war of 1812 was in New Eng land ? 20. What influence do you think a successful war with France would have had upon the history of poUtical parties in this country ? 21. Who was Cabot? 22. Analyze at length his two letters to Hamilton ? 23. His second letter speaks of the opinion of "certain Fed eralists ; " show that the opinion was really his own. 24. What do these letters show as to the temper of the Ham iltonian Federalists ? 25. Why was such a temper unfit to be trusted with the gov ernment? 26. Summarize the work of the Federalist party. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 317 CHAPTER XXII. THE REVOLUTION OF 1800. OUR story has already told of the warlike measures passed in 1798, and of their effect upon the French government. In accordance with the law authorizing the President to give instructions to the commanders of public armed vessels to with'Knclf'^ capture any armed French vessel, the United States frigate, the Constellation, captured a French frigate, L'Insurgente (February, 1799), after a three hours' pursuit and a fight in which the French frig ate lost twenty killed and forty-six wounded, while the Americans had but one man killed and three wounded. About a year later, the sarae frigate gained a decided victory over the French frigate La Vengeance. During the summer also, a number of French privateers had been taken by American cruisers. ' These victories undoubtedly increased the desire of the French government to restore friendly relations with the United States. When the envoys reached Paris (March, 1800), they were warmly received, and without delay they entered upon negotiations. But a difficulty immediately appeared which threat ened to break up the negotiation. The American en voys were instructed to insist upon the renunciation of 318 HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. the old treaties, and also upon an indem- wUhsSSoe^ nity for spoliations upon American com merce. These, they were instructed, were to be parts of any treaty that was to be negotiated with France, that could not be dispensed with. But the French commissioners were unwilling either to relin quish the treaties of 1778, or to pay indemnities. At last (Augu.st, 1800), the French offered this alternative: The old treaties with provisions for mutual indemnities, or a new treaty without indemnities. The peremptory character of the instructions of the American envoys made it impossible for them to accept either of these offers. The situation in which they found themselves obliged them either to abandon the negotiation or make a temporary arrangement, which would enable the United States to leave the position of hostility it had taken towards France, and which the American government might approve or reject as they saw fit. In October a convention was agreed upon, leaving the question as to the binding force of the old treaties — which meanwhile were to be inoperative — convention^* and indemnities, to future negotiation ; providing for the mutual restoration of all captured property, French or American, not already condemned by either party; and for the mutual pay ments of debts, whether they were owed by either of the governments or by individuals. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES, 319 When the convention was subraitted to the Senate, the Federalist Senators who had been opposed to the mission refused to ratify the article referring the binding force of the treaties and indemnities to future negotiations. Adams ratified the convention as it had been altered, although he preferred it, as he informed the Senate, in its original form. When it was subraitted to Napoleon, who was then at the head of the French government, he added a pro viso to the effect that the expunging of the article relat ing to future negotiations should be understood as an abandonment of the claims of both sides, thus making the convention the equivalent of a new treaty without indemnities. In this form, it was finally ratified by the United States. To free itself from the embarrassraents of the treaties of 1778, the American government gave up its just claims to indemnity for French spoliations on American commerce. If the object of this story were to delineate the characters of the public men of the country rather than to follow the fortunes of its political parties, it would be necessary at this point to give a detailed account of the quarrels between Adams and his cabinet, and seek to measure out the proper portion of praise and blame. We should have to tell how Pickering, Wolcott and McHenry kept their positions under a President, whose plans and policy they were trying to defeat. We should have to tell how they imparted the knowledge, which 320 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. they possessed as the President's confidential advisers, to Alexander Hamilton, thai the latter might use it in his bitter attack upon the former. There is one point, however, of a semi-personal nature that we cannot avoid discussing: How far was the overthrow of the Federalists due to Adams' lack of Was Hamilton tact, and how far to Hamilton's imperious- or Adiims more ., _ , . responsible lor ness? In discussiug this question, two the downfall of ° ^ the Federalists? facts must be borne in mind: (1) It was Adams and not Hamilton upon whora the people had imposed the duty of determining the foreign policy of the government. Neither Hamilton nor his followers had a right to complain that Adams resisted the influ ence of the Hamiltonian Federalists ; that he had a policy of his own, unless it was clear that his policy was un wise, that it did not tend to promote the well-being of the country. But (2) the testimony of history is un equivocal to the effect that Adams' objects were patriotic and his means wisely chosen. It is indeed, true, that he did a wise thing in an exceedingly unwise way. But when one is commenting on the lack of tact shown by Adams in deciding upon the French mission without consulting his cabinet, the question naturally arises whether he showed less tact in carrying out a wise policy than Hamilton did in attempting to force an unwise one upon him. If there is any doubt as to this, there can be none whatever as to the judgment displayed by Hamil ton in making a bitter personal attack upon Adams. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 321 With all of Adams' vanities and faults — and he had plenty of both — no admirer of Hamilton will venture to assert that any act of Adams' adrainistration was as ill- judged and unwise as that attack of Hamilton's. It is true, that the pamphlet, whose main object was to show the unfitness of Adams to be President, concluded with a recommendation to the Federal electors to vote for him. But that only showed the folly of writing it. It is also true that it was only intended for distribution among a few confidential friends. But how could Hamilton be sure that the thing would not happen which did happen — that the Republicans would not get possession of it and spread it broadcast over the country? No, the ser vices which Hamilton rendered the country from 1789 to 1797 were of the highest order — greater perhaps than were rendered by any other man, not excepting Wash ington. But in 1798, the "crisis" in which he believed that the friends of order and stability, of government and law, would have to defend themselves against anar chists, seemed so imminent, that the supreme duty of the hour appeared to him to be to take measures to avert it, and the surest way to avert it, to make war on France. Like Fisher Ames, he believed that peace in gen eral was a good thing, not peace with France. To be at peace with France was to be at peace with the enemy of all government. The opposition of the Hamiltonian Federalists prob ably defeated Adams. As he lacked only eight votes of 322 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. receiving as many as Jefferson and Burr, it seems safe to assume that, had it not been for the hostility of Hamilton and his friends, he would have been re-elected. But the election did not decide who was to be Pres ident, As we know, the constitution then required that two men should be voted for, for President, and the one receiving the highest number of votes became President, and the one the next highest number. Vice-president. As both Jefferson and Aaron Burr had the same number of votes, the House of Representatives had to choose between them. The House of Representatives was then under the control of the Federalists. That party, therefore, found Federalists itself iu a Strange situation, the situation between Burr* of having the duty to decide which one of and Jefferson. . two hated antagonists should be President, for, by the constitution, the vote for President cast by the House of Representatives had to be cast by states for one or the other of the two candidates who had received the highest number of votes. It has been one object of this story to show that the leaders of the Federalists looked upon their antagonists as opponents of all government, as fanatical doctrinaires, ready, in spite of the experience of the Confederation, to try the absurd experiment of undertaking to govern without a government ; as wicked enemies of the public credit, and ready, like the French revolutionists, to cut all the bonds that held society together; as friends of HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES, 323 France and enemies of England because the one repre sented anarchy, and the other government in the great contest going on in Europe. If this is clear, it will be easy to see the temptation to which their opportunity subjected the Federalists, Should they elect Jefferson, whom they regarded as the very life and 1 r -I ¦ ¦ • -.-> 1 1- 1 Federalists' soul of doctrinaire anti-Federalism and hatred of Jef ferson. anarchic, French-revolution Jacobinism ? It is hardly too much to say that the Republican House of Representatives in 1865 would scarcely have loathed the idea of making Jefferson Davis President of the United States more intensely, than did the Federalist House in 1800, the idea of making Thomas Jefferson President. Should they disregard the constitution? Should they prevent an election of either Jefferson or Burr, and com pel a new election by the people, in the hope that in the chances of politics they might have better luck at the next election, and in the certainty that the government in the meantime would be administered by a man of their own party? To do that was to make war upon the very principle that had called the Federalist party into ex istence, the principle of deference to legally constituted authorities, of respect for government. Should they elect Aaron Burr, the unprincipled demagogue, the man whose one purpose in life was to promote the interests of Aaron Burr ? These were the alternatives between which they had to choose, and when we understand the situation, we 324 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. shall not wonder that they hesitated between them. We shall not be surprised to learn that there were Fed eralists who believed that the gravity of the emergency justified and demanded heroic treatment — treatment no less heroic than that of setting aside the constitution for the sake of what they believed to be the principle of the constitution — cutting off a limb to save a life — prevent ing an election, that the government might not pass into the hands of men who would use their opportunity, as the Federalists believed, to destroy the constitution. We shall wonder still less that many leading Federalists deliberately concluded that even Aaron Burr, bad and unprincipled as he was known to be, was to be preferred as President, to a man who embodied, as they believed, all that was bad in politics. As soon as it was known that the election was to devolve upon the House of Representatives, the Feder alist newspapers began to discuss this al- FederaUsts' . . , opinion of temativc; either to prevent a constitu- Burr, ^ tional election by balloting without a choice till the 4th of March, or to elect Burr. In the event of the former, it was proposed to pass a law niak- • ing the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or the Secretary of State, President pro tem. But this wild measure, as Gouverneur Morris called it, was given up before the middle of December, and then they began to think seriously of taking up Burr. They believed him to be "arabitious, selfish, profli- HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. 325 gate;" they thought his ambition the worst kind, they believed that his "selfishness excluded all social af fections," and that his "profligacy defied all decency and was unrestrained by any moral sentiments," They re garded him as a bankrupt both in character and property, but they feared "as rauch from the sincerity of Jefferson, as from Burr's lack of character." They thought that Jefferson was an enemy of the measures that had given the country all it possessed of national character,- pros perity, and respectability; that he was a "sincere and en thusiastic Democrat," persevering in the pursuit of his object," but unscrupulous as to the means of attaining it; that he was devoted to the views of those men in his state whose unceasing purpose it had been and was, as they said, "to reduce in practice the administration ofthe government to the /rzwczjJ'/.fj of the old Confederation ; " that he was "servilely devoted to one foreign nation, under any forra of government, and pursuing any system of measures however hostile to this country, and unrelent ingly hostile to another nation," and these the two na tions with which the closeness of our relations made it most important to preserve an exact neutrality.* With such an opinion of the two men, they thought it best to support Burr, especially since they hoped in this way to detach him from his party, or at least to sow the seeds of dissension between its northern and southern wings. * See letter of Sedgewick to Hamilton, Hamilton's Works, VI, p. 511. 326 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. But there was one man in the party, who held a de cidedly different opinion, and that man was Hamilton. The madness that had deprived him of his judgment in his quarrel with Adams had left him, and Hamilton uses . his inHuence for he was agaiu the clcar-hcaded statesman Jefferson. ready to subordinate every private consid eration to the public good. He and Burr were nominal friends while Jefferson was his bitter, personal enemy. But believing that the country would be safer with Jeffer son as President than with Burr, he wrote letter after letter to his friends in the House of Representatives en treating them to vote for Jefferson. To Bayard, of Dela ware, he wrote, "For Heaven's sake, my dear sir, exert yourself to the utmost to save our country from so great a calamity;" to Sedgwick, "I beg of you, as you love your country, your friends, and yourself, to reconsider dispassionately the opinion you have expressed in favor of Burr." In another letter to Bayard, "If the party shall, by supporting Mr. Burr as President, adopt him for their official chief, I shall be obliged to consider myself an isolated man. It will be impossible for me to recon cile with my notions of honor or of policy, the continu ing to be of a party which will have disgraced itself and the country." He exerted himself particularly with Bay ard, who, as the single representative of Delaware, could cast the vote of the state for Jefferson, which, with the votes that Jefferson was sure to receive from Republican states, would make him President. HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. 327 But when the balloting began (Feb. 11), it seeraed that the efforts of Harailton had been ex- ,-, . »-. , , . Bayard decides erted to no purpose. The six Federalist the election of Jefferson. States, New Harapshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Delaware and South Carolina voted for Burr; Vermont and Maryland cast no vote since half of the representatives of each state were Federalists and they voted for Burr; aud the other eight states voted for Jefferson. The balloting continued for a week with no change in the result. But Bayard, impressed by the arguments of Hamilton, at last declared in a caucus of the Federalists, that he had decided to vote for Jefferson. "You can not well imagine," he afterwards wrote to Hamilton, "the clamor and vehement invective to which I was subjected for several days. We had several cau cuses. All acknowledged that nothing but desperate measures reraained, which several were disposed to adopt, and but few were willing openly to disapprove. We broke up each tirae in confusion and discord, and the raanner of the last ballot was arranged but a few minutes before the ballot was given." On this ballot — the 36th — the Federalists from Vermont, Maryland and Delaware put in blanks, so that the Republicans of the two former cast the votes of their state. This gave Jefferson the votes of ten states and made him President, while Burr became Vice-President, according to the constitution. With the election of Jefferson, the sceptre passed 328 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. from the Federalist party never to return. It has been customary to attribute its downfall to the Alien and Sedi tion laws, to divisions among the Federalists themselves, and to the direct taxes rendered necessary by the prepara tions for the war with France. But, as Hildreth says, these measures only contributed to determine the precise moment of the event, which, under any circumstances, could not have been long deferred. It is by no means clear that the Federalists were a majority of the people at the time of the adoption of the Federalists Constitution. If they were, it was due to probably in a ...,., ¦¦ j i_ mmonty during the pauic IU which many raen had been the period of their supremacy, thrown by the imraiueut danger of anarchy. But when the two ' parties became organized under the constitution, when the Anti-federalists were succeeded by the Republicans, it is clear that the latter were, and con tinued to be, in the majority. At no time from 1793 on, excepting the brief period when the X, Y and Z indigna tion made the Federalists a really popular party, were the Federalists in the majority in the House of Repre sentatives. Washington was a Federalist. But his elec tion as President had no party significance. Adams owed his election to the fact that party discipline had not been perfected. Two Republican electors, one in Vir ginia, and the other in North Carolina, voted for Adams. Had those two votes been given to Jefferson, he would have been elected. . Nor is it difficult to see why the Federalists were in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 329 a minority. If it is true, as Hildreth says, that they "represented the experience, the prudence, the practical wisdom, the discipline, the fife^iact"°° °' conservative reason" of the country, it is also true that they represented its conservative prejudices. The party that passed the Alien and Sedition laws, that wanted an army in 1798, not only because of the proba bility of a war with France, but because of the supposed probability of insurrection and rebellion at home; the party whose leaders regarded acts of John Adams of which history emphatically approves as evidence of a ruin ous change of system on his part, that preferred the election of Burr to the election of Jefferson, had a funda raental weakness somewhere. What that weakness was this story has tried to make clear. It was excessive distrust of a popular form of government, an altogether unfounded fear that there were elements in this country similar to those in France which, if not kept down by the strong arm of the law, would produce a French Revolution in this country. It was this distrust of the people, this fear of anarchy, that lay back of the Alien and Sedition Laws, of the quarrels between the Federalists, and of their readiness to incur unnecessary expenses in raising armies and equipping navies. But it is more important to note that it was this dis trust of the people that made the people distrust it ; that made it inevitable that the people should consequences ^^ of Federalist hurl It from power sooner or later. The distrust of pop ular govern- continued supremacy in a Republican gov- ™*°*- 330 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. ernment of a party that does not thoroughly believe in Republican government is an impossibility. This dis belief in Republican government is bound to show itself in laws that alienate and exasperate its friends. In truth, the Federalists were trying to swim against the irresistible tide of destiny. The character, education, mode of life and environment of the masses of the Araerican people, inevitably made them believe what the Federalist leaders did not believe, that society has a capacity to govern it self. As Henry Adams puts it. Federalism was but a half-way house between the European past and the American future, and in 1800 the American future had come. It should be carefully noted that the Federalist dis trust of democracy was entirely natural. In what chap ter of history had Jefferson and Gallatin read that demo cracy tends to promote the well-being of man ? Where had it ever been found consistent with order and respect for law?* The horrible excesses of the French Revolution seemed to be but a new confirmation of the truth apparently taught by all history — that a govern ment by the people is a government by the worst classes of society. And this was the profound conviction of the Federalist leaders. " Our country," wrote Fisher Ames in 1803, " is too big for union, too sordid for patriotism, too democratic for liberty. What is to become of it he who raade it best knows. Its vice will govern it by prac- »Cf. Henry Adams, Vol. I, p. 75. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 331 ticing upon its follies. This is ordained for democracies." George Cabot wrote in 1804, "We are Democratic alto gether and I hold democracy in its natural operation to be the government of the worst." Nor was this opinion confined to the private correspondence of the Federalists. Dennie's Portfolio, a Federalist paper, contained a paragraph in 1803, which was reprinted, Henry Adams tells us, by Federalist newspapers all over the country. "A democracy," it said, "is scarcely tolerable at any period of national history. * * * It is on its trial here, and the issue will be civil war, desolation and an archy." But these croakers were not in harmony with the American people. When Jefferson wrote in 1800, " I have sworn upon the altar of God, eternal enmity against every form of tyranny over the mind of man," he did but voice the sentiment of the great majority of his country men. To a stimulus to exertion such as was never before applied to any people, the Americans responded with an energy that developed a consciousness of power which gave the lie to all the dogmas of the past. When the Federalists said that democracy was the government ofthe worst, they were but preachers of a creed which in 1800 was already outworn in America. Many years afterwards Jefferson said that the elec tion of 1800 was as real a revolution as was the revolu tion of 1776. He was right. But he was mistaken as to the nature of the revolution, fg^"^"""""* He believed that it was a revolution in 332 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. which power passed from a party that wished to establish a monarchy to one that was opposed to a monarchy. But it is doubtful if there was a single man of any note in the Federalist party who had any such wish. There were doubtless some who would have preferred that form of government, if the temper of the American people had made it expedient to try it. But they knew that the American people would not submit to a monarchy. The contrast, therefore, between the Federalists and the Republicans was not that between monarchists and those who were opposed to monarchy, but between those who did not heartily believe, and those who did, in the suc cess of the American experiment. In 1801, for the first time in the history of the country, the party in power did intensely and enthusiastically sympathize in what we have come to call American ideas. The followers of Jef ferson were profound^ convinced of the truth of the theory on which the American Constitution is based — that raan is capable of self-governraent. That is why their accession to power was an event of such iraportance in the history of the world. QUESTIONS. 1. What warlike measures were passed in June aud July, 1798 ? ¦' 2. What effect did they have upon the French govern ment? 3. What was the outcome of the naval confiicts between France and the United States ? 4. Were the United States and France at war with each other ? HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 333 5. What converts a state of hostility iuto a state of war ? 6. Is au act of Congress always necessary to make a state of war? 7, What instructions were given to the envoys to France? 8, What convention was agreed upon, and why? 9. In what form was it finally ratified by both countries ? 10. Do you think that the Americans who sustained losses be cause of French spoliations, had a just claim on their own govern ment after the ratification of that convention ? 11. Was Hamilton or Adams more responsible for the down fall of the Federalists ? 12. Explain why it was that the Federalists had to vote for Jefferson or Burr? 13. State at length the Federalist opinion of Jefferson and of Burr. 14. Why did the Federalists decide to support Burr ? 15. Why did Hamilton use his influence in behalf of Jef ferson ? 16. How was it that Bayard was able to decide the election of Jefferson ? 17. Show that the Federalists were probably in a minority during the greater part of the twelve years that they were in power. 18. The text says that they represented the conservative prejudices of the country. Explain. 1 9. Show that a party that distrusts the people must be over thrown in a popular government sooner or later. 20. Iu what did the so-called revolution of 1800 consist ? 21. Contrast the meaning of "revolution" iu the above sen tence with its meaning in the chapter entitled " The revolution of 1787." 334 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. CHAPTER XXIII. JEFFERSON AS A STATES-RIGHTS REPUBLICAN AND JEF FERSON AS A DEMOCRAT. THE man who took the oath of office as President of the United States in 1801, believed that his admin istration was to introduce a new era in the history of the world. For the first time, as he believed, men were to see a government for the sake of the gov- Sr°'^ °^ erned. When government was devoted to such a purpose he believed that its custom ary incidents, armies, navies, national debts, banking systems, internal taxes, wars — could be entirely dispensed with. The confident optimism and serene disregard of the teachings of the past which were so characteristic of Araericans found their perfect expression in Jefferson, and in the selfishness of the governing classes Jefferson saw a satisfactory explanation ofthe miseries of mankind. It never occurred to him that his administration should signalize itself merely by its rigid and consistent adherence to a strict construction of the constitution. As Harailton hoped to increase the powers conferred upon the government by the constitution through construction, so Jefferson, consciously or unconsciously, aimed to de crease them by disuse. The changes which Jefferson hoped in this way to HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 335 make in the constitution related both to foreign and do mestic matters. Regarding the state gov- Jefferson's the- ., ,. ,-.,.., . ory of the prop- ernments as the guardians of the liberties er work of the Federal govern- of the people, he thought the general gov- "'*"'• ernment should exercise none of the powers conferred upon it by the constitution, the exercise of which tended to increase its powers at the expense of those of the states. He did, indeed, use language which implied that he thought that the constitution had intended to confine the general government to foreign affairs, leaving all mat ters of domestic concern to the states. In an important letter to Gideon Granger in 1800, he said : "The true theory ofour constitution is surely the wisest and best, that the states are independent as to everything within themselves, and united as to everything respecting for eign nations. Let the general government be reduced to foreign concerns only, and let our affairs be disentangled from those of all other nations, except as to coraraerce, which the merchants will manage the better, the more they are left free to manage for themselves, and our gen eral government may be reduced to a very simple organ ization and a very inexpensive one — a few plain duties to be performed by a few servants." Twenty-one years later, in 1821, he repeated the same idea, although in not quite so unqualified a form : "The people to whom all authority belongs have divided the powers of government into two distinct departraents, the leading^ characters of * Italics are mine. 336 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. which are foreign and domestic ; and they have appointed for each a distinct set of functionaries. These they have made co-ordinate, checking and balancing each other, like the three cardinal departments in the individual states — each equally supreme as to the powers delegated to itself, and neither authorized ultimately to decide what belongs to itself or to its copartner in governraent. As independ ent, in fact, as different nations, a spirit of forbearance and comproraise, therefore, and not of encroachraent and usurpation is the healing balm of such a constitution." Three years later, in 1824, he expressed the same opin ion : "The Federal is in truth our foreign government, which department alone is taken from the sovereignty of the separate states." But Jefferson was not in the habit of expressing him self with scientific accuracy, and the evidence makes it clear that he did not mean what an accurate writer would have meant by such language. For he expressed the same idea in 1787 in speaking of the sort of constitution he thought the country ought to have, although in the same letter he expressed his disapproval of the constitu tion. " My own general idea was," he wrote in 1787, "that the states should severally preserve their sovereignty in whatever concerns themselves alone, and that what ever may concern another state or any foreign nation, should be made a part of the Federal sovereignty." It is clear, therefore, that in saying that the general government was the foreign, and the state governments HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 337 the domestic, branch of our governmental system, he was not expounding his theory of what the framers of the con stitution intended them to be. His purpose was to state his idea of what they ought to be, and of what, by prece dent and construction, they could be made to be. The quotation already made from him about the time of the Whisky Insurrection is a further confirmation of this con clusion. He said, it will be remembered, that the excise tax was an infernal one ; that the first error was to ad mit it by the constitution; the second, to act ou that admission. In other words, that the framers of the con stitution had made the mistake of conferring upon the general government the power of laying an excise was no reason why those who administered the general gov ernment should use the power conferred upon it. For, as Jefferson believed, the laying of such a tax was the exercise of a power that tended to aggrandize the general government at the expense of the states. If now we seek to mark off in a general waj^ the field into which Jefferson thought the general govern ment ought not to enter, whether the constitution gave it the right so to do or not, the quotations already made from him combined with a passage in his inaugural ad dress, enable us to do it. Except to encourage commerce and agriculture, and diffuse information — these exceptions were made in his inaugural — the general government should undertake no domestic functions : these should be left to the states. 338 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. With the above trifling exceptions, the whole func tion of the general government was confined to the man agement and control of our foreign affairs. Jefferson's theory of for- "Let the general government be reduced oems." j.^ foreign concerns," he had written to Granger. But what was his theory of foreign concerns ? His private correspondence contains the answer to this question. In a letter to Thomas Paine, written a few days after his inauguration, he said : " Determined as we are to -avoid, if possible, wasting the energies of our people in war and destruction, we shall avoid implicating our selves with the powers of Europe, even in support of principles which we mean to pursue. We believe we can enforce these principles as to ourselves by peaceable means, now that we are likely to have our public counsels detached from foreign views." But how were we to enforce our principles by peaceable means ? A letter to a Dr. Logan written a few days later, contained the answer : "Our commerce is so valuable to them," he wrote, "that they will be glad to purchase it when the only price we ask is to do us justice. I believe we have in our hands the means of peaceable coercion; and that the raoment they see our government so united as that we can make use of it, they will, for their own interest, be disposed to do us justice." * This, then, was the Republican theory of " foreign concerns." If other nations insulted us, if they made in- *See page 176. HISTORY OF POLITICAlv PARTIES, 339 vasions upon our rights, Congress should impose restric tions upon their commerce or prohibit it altogether, until they ceased to insult us, and made suitable provisions for indemnity. In a word, instead of a barbarous and brutal appeal to arms, Jefferson proposed to substitute commer cial restrictions as a means of bringing offending nations to their senses. The readers of this history are familiar with the reasons that led Jefferson to these opinions. Jefferson hated arraies, navies, banking systems, internal taxes, wars, because he loved liberty, and he loved liberty because he thought he saw in over-government the root of most of the ills that afflict mankind. It had been one of his cardinal objections to Harailton that his funding and banking system had furnished the means of corrupting Congress, and he believed that the armies and navies that the Federalists were so eager to have had a double object in view : (1) To fasten a permanent debt upon the government, and thus perpet uate the raeans of corrupting Congress ; and (2) to have ready at hand a force which the Federalists might em ploy in putting down all opposition to their measures. The same reason led him to believe that the general gov ernment ought not to impose internal taxes, and that it ought to confine itself to foreign "concerns." He was a States Rights Republican — and he was a States Rights Republican not only because he was inclined like most of the Americans of his time to look upon the state as 340 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. the country of its citizens, but also because he thought the liberties of the people would be less endangered, their interests better promoted by the states, than by the general government. He was opposed to war not only because of its waste of life and money, but because of its hostility to liberty. War would lead to armies and navies and a national debt and banking systems; war would make it necessary for the general government to exercise doubtful constitutional powers. War would tend to centralize and monarchize the government, and so assimilate this country to the rest of the countries of the world. Jefferson was a States Rights Republican because he was a philanthropist and a Democrat, and his theory of commercial restrictions had the same origin. In other words, his philanthropy and Democracy Two questions , r r ¦ which Jefferson were deeper and more fundamental than ms had to answer. States Rights Republicanism. There were therefore, two questions which Jefferson had to answer before he could prove that his Republicanism and his Democracy could dwell together in peace: (1.) Could the general government, in confining its domestic func tions to the promotion of commerce and agriculture and the diffusion of knowledge, do all the things that the in terests of the people demanded? Might it not find itself in a position in which it would have to choose between a a sacrifice of the theories of Republicanism, and a sacrifice of the imperative interests of the people? (2.) Could for- HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 341 eign nations be forced to respect our rights by commercial restrictions? Would commercial restrictions serve as an effective substitute for war? If his theory failed to an swer both of these questions, it would prove itself a mere dream like Plato's Republic or More's Utopia. Tha historj' of his two administrations will show what suc cess it had in answering them. QUESTIONS. 1. What is the difference between States Rights Republi canism and Democracy ? 2. The text says that Jefferson's Democracy was deeper than his Republicanism ; explain. 3. What was Jefferson's theory of the proper work of the government ? 4. Compare the quotation made in the text from the letter written in 1821, with the Kentucky resolutions. 5. Do you think that Jefferson hoped to change the con stitution, and, if so, how? 6. Compare him with Hamilton in this respect. 7. What was his theory of foreign "concerns? " 8. In what memorable instance in Washington's adminis tration did the Republicans seek to put this theory into practice ? 9. Show that Jefferson's opinions were rooted in his love of liberty. 10. State clearly the two questions which Jefferson had to answer before he could prove that his theories of government were practicable. 11. In 1802 Hamilton wrote to Rufus King as follows: " The prospects of our country are not brilliant. The mass is far from sound. At headquarters a most visionary theory presides. No army, no navy, no active commerce ; national defense not by arms but by embargoes, prohibitions of trade, etc. ; as little government as possible within ; these are the pernicious dreams which as far and as fast as possible will be attempted to be realized." How far was Hamilton right in his estimate of Jeffer son's theories? 342 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. CHAPTER XXIV. GALLATIN'S FINANCIAL POLICY. A FEW days before his inauguration, Jefferson wrote a letter, in which he said that he hoped that the body of the nation, even that part which French excesses forced over to the Federal side, would join the Republicans, leaving only those who were pure monarchists, and who would be too few to form a sect. This hope exerted an important influence upou his policy during the eight years of his two administrations. Extreme partisans on both sides were dissatisfied with his inaugural. No wonder ; for one of its objects seemed to be to prove that there was no difference be tween thera. " Let us unite with one heart Jefferson's in augural ad- and one mmd, he had said ; " let us restore dress. to social intercourse that harmony and af fection, without which liberty and even life itself are but dreary things. And let us refiect, that having ban ished from our land that religious intolerance under which mankind so long bled and suffered, we have yet gained little, if we countenance a political intolerance as despotic, as wicked, and capable of as bitter and bloody persecutions. During the throes and convulsions of the ancient world, during the agonizing spasras of infuriated man, seeking through blood and slaughter his long lost HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 343 liberty, it was not wonderful that the agitation of the billows should reach even this distant and peaceful shore ; that this should be more felt and feared by some and less by others ; that this should divide opinions as to measures of safety. But every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle. We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists." Jefferson knew very well that this kind of talk was not what the extreme partisans of his own party expected. About the end of March he wrote, " I am sensible how far I should fall short of effecting all the reformation which reason would suggest and experi ence approve, were I free to do whatever I thought best ; but when we reflect how difficult it is to move or inflect the great machine of society, how irapossible to advance the notions of a whole people suddenly to ideal right, we see the wisdom of Solon's remark, that no more good must be attempted than the nation can bear, and all will be chiefly to reform the waste of public money, and thus drive away the vultures who prey upon it, and im prove some little on old routines." Whatever the motive of Jefferson's conduct, whether his conduct was due to the mere desire to gain popular ity, or to the patriotic wish to bring over the great mass of the Federalists to what he conceived to be the right side, or whether, as is most probable, to a How farJeffer- son attempted raixture of both, it prevented him from at- p°^"t*ce the tempting to give immediate effect to the isoo. "revolution of 1800," save in improving "some little on old 344 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. routines," and in reforming the "waste of the public ' money." Asfar back as the time of Senator Macla}', as we know. Republicans had condemned the levees and speeches of Washington as savoring of monarchy, and our diplomatic establishment as unnecessarily expensive. To do away with the levees, therefore, to communicate with Con gress by message, to reduce the diplomatic establish ment, was, in the eyes of Jefferson, an " improvement on old routines " which would not antagonize the " Republi can Federalists," whom he hoped to win over to his party. And he knew very well that any reform in the waste of public money would be popular with the great majority of the American people, no matter which party they belonged to. Accordingly, his great Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin, was allowed to give complete expression to the " revolution of 18Q0," so far as it could be done in the inanagement of the finances. Republicans had constantly charged that Harailton and the Federalists regarded a national debt as a national blessing ; Gallatin and the Republicans, on the contrary. Comparison regarded a national debt as a pillar of cor- iiton and Ga™" ruption. Both Hamilton and Gallatin had latin. political as well as financial ends in view, Hamilton's political aim was to tie the rich and in fluential all over the country to the support of the general government by pecuniary interest. The political aim of Gallatin was to free the limbs of the young re public from every weight that tended to prevent them HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. 345 from developing into the symmetry and proportion of an ideal state. Hamilton, with too low an estimate of human nature, thought the only way raen could be induced to ser%'e the State was by making it their pecuniary interest to do so ; Gallatin, with too high an estimate of human nature, thought that one of . the chief dangers of the State lay in warping men's natural desires to serve it by appeals to their pecuniary interests. Regarding a national debt as a pillar of corruption, Gallatin based his financial systera on the principle that the expenditures of the government must Details of Gal- be SO related to its income as to enable it to latin's ananciai system. pa5' the national debt in as short a time as possible, without imposing too heavy a bur den on the people iu the shape of taxes, and without having recourse to taxes that the general government ought not to lay. He estimated that the government could apply $7,300,000 a year to the payment of its debts, and he calculated that the whole of it, interest and prin cipal, would be paid in sixteen years, if this sura yearly were devoted to that purpose. Proposing that this sum should be applied by law to this object, it remained to decide what further expenses should be indulged in, and how the revenue should be raised. The net receipts frora customs, lands and postage he calculated at $9,950,000 for the year. In addition to this, the internal taxes laid by the Federalists amounted in all to $650,000, which made an incorae of $10,600,000, 346 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. or $3,300,000 more than the sum to be devoted to the payment of the debt. But internal taxes, as we know, were not in harmony with Republican theories. Gallatin, therefore, proposed to sacrifice the revenue obtained from this source, leaving but $2,650,000 for the entire expen,ses of the government. Of this sum he proposed that $930,000 should be devoted to the support of the array and $670,000 to the support of the navj^ When Henry Dearborn and Robert Sraith, Secre taries of War and the Navy, respectively, accepted this scheme with unimportant modifications, and Congress embodied it in laws, it becarae clear that Jefferson's theory of government was actually to be put in practice. That theory was, as we know, that the general government was the foreign branch of our governmental systera, its only domestic functions consisting in the promotion of agriculture and commerce, and the diffusion of informa tion ; and that its management of " foreign concerns " should proceed on the theory that nations could be com pelled to respect our rights by commercial restrictions. Evidently, a government whose entire domestic expenses, excepting the postoffice, were estimated at $750,000 — $1,900,000 was the sum finally agreed on for the armb and navy — including the cost of the collection and dis bursement of the revenues, could scarcely be said to at tempt the discharge of any domestic functions. And a government whose arm}' and navy were to be supported HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 347 by $1,900,000 a year, at a time when all signs pointed to a speedy renewal of the terrible convulsions in Europe, when Spain still owned the Mississippi river and the Floridas; when Napoleon was suspected of having bought Louisiana ; when English ships were impressing Ameri can seaman by the score, — evidently did not expect to cause its rights to be respected by force.* Evidently, also, the two questions, which, as we saw in the last chap ter, Jeffersonian Republicanism had to answer before it could prove itself a practical systera of governraent, were in a fair way of being brought to a speedy test. If Napoleon had bought Louisiana, if the people of the West had to get his consent before taking their commerce through the mouth of the Mississippi, an embroilment with France was almost sure to follow. Europe would then have a chance to learn whether the young republic beyond the Atlantic would be able to avoid the terrible scourge of war by having recourse to peaceable coercion, and whether a govern ment could exist whose domestic functions consisted in promoting agriculture and commerce, and diffusing in formation. To a temper less sanguine than Jefferson's, it would have seemed a bad omen that before the first half year of his administration had expired, he found a war on his hands which his theories were powerless to deal with. Following the custom of Europe, the United States had 'See Henry Adams, Vol. I, p. 2-11. 348 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. paid in the preceding ten years raore than two million dollars in the form of what amounted to tribute to the four pirate states, Morocco, Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. About two months and a half after Jefferson's inaugura tion, the Pacha of Tripoli demanded more than he had agreed to accept in a treaty negotiated in oh. 1796, and, when his demand was refused, declared war. Thus, without any responsi bility of his own, Jefferson found himself obliged to use the much decried little navy created by the Federalists in defending the commerce of the country against a power upon whom peaceable coercion could not be brought to bear. But he did not fail to improve the opportunity to emphasize his strict construction theories. He sent a small squadron of frigates into the Mediterranean with orders to protect American commerce, but not to go beyond the line o£ defense, since Congress alone could declare war. A fight between an American frigate and a Tripolitan cruiser furnishes a somewhat curious illus tration of the difference between " defending American comraerce," and waging war. The Araerican captured her eneray, killed twenty of her men aud wounded thirty more. But after completely dismantling the captured vessel, cutting away her masts and throwing her guns overboard, she was dismissed with the survivors of her crew as Congress had not declared war ! Such consolation as Jefferson could get out of such adherence to his theories was open to him. But a less HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 349 confident man would have asked himself whether other nations than the Barbary pirates, upon whom his theory of foreign concerns could not be brought to bear, might not insult the United States, and Tphether in any case his theory could be relied on with perfect certainty. For this theory of foreign " concerns " was the keystone of the arch of Jeffersonian Republicanism. If that failed armies, navies, internal taxes, banking S)stems, liberal constructions of the constitution, — the whole troop of Federalist heresies and corruptions which the Republi cans had never tired of denouncing, would be the inevitable result. If this theory could not stand the test of trial, the foundation principle of Gallatin's finan cial system — that the national debt, being a pillar of cor ruption, the expenses of the government must be so ar ranged as to permit its speedy payment — was gone, and the denunciations which Republicans had poured upon Hamilton because a national debt had not seemed to him the worst of national calamities, would be proved to ha\e had no grounds. In truth, the issue between Hamilton and Gallatin, Federalism and Jeffersonian Republicanism, in one of its phases might have been narrowed down to this : Might not a nation as well as an individual have to choose debt as the least of all possible evils ? Had the world advanced so far towards the millenium that a nation could work out its political salvation — devote it self in the most intelligent way to the advancement of the highest interests of its citizens — without going in 350 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. debt ? The history of the next three administrations will give us the answer to this question. QUESTIONS. 1. Jefferson drew a contrast between the Republican and monarchical Federalists. What did he mean ? 2. What was one of the leading objects of Jefferson's in augural ? 3. To what extent did Jefferson attempt to give expression to the principles of the revolution of 1800, and why ? 4. Compare the objects of Hamilton and Gallatin in their financial systems. 5. Show how the details of Gallatin's financial system were related to the political objects which he had in view, 6. Henry Adams says : "Gallatin's economies turned on the question whether the national debt or the risk of foreign aggres sion were most dangerous to America." Is he right? 7. Why did Gallatin propose to dispense with the internal taxes ? 8. What amount of money did Gallatin propose to devote to the domestic functions of the government? 9. What was the Republican theory of the domestic func tions of the government ? 10. What sum did Gallatin propose to devote to the army and navy ? II. What was the Republican theory of foreign "concerns ?" 12. What was Jefferson's theory of the relation between the United States and Tripoli, when Tripoli declared war against this country ? 13. Discuss the practical outcome of his theory. 14. Could Tripoli be at war with the United States without the United States being at war with Tripoli ? 15. What is the meaning of the clause in the constitution which says that Congress shall declare war ? 16. What was the keystone of the arch of Jeffersonian Re publicanism, and why? HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. 351 CHAPTER XXV. JEFFERSON'S FIRST MESSAGE. IN Stating his reasons, iu a letter addressed to the President of the Senate, for substituting a message for the speech with which the first two Presidents had opened Congress, Jefferson showed his j^„^^^^^.^ ^^^. desire to conciliate the moderate Federal- Sg'^a mSsage j.j . for a speech, and ists. He did not wish to exasperate the for recommend ing internal friends of Washington and Adams by say- *^^®*'- ing that in making speeches to Congress they had been imitating the king of England, and paving the way for the introduction of monarchy into this country. Ignoring the real reason, he said that he had had principal regard to the convenience of the legislature, to the economy of their time, and so on. The same characteristic appeared repeatedl}' in the message itself. The Republicans were opposed on principle, as we know, to internal taxes. But when Jefferson recommended their repeal, he did it on grounds which neither of his predecessors would have hesitated to take, provided they had agreed with him as to the facts. "Weighing all probabilities of expense," he said, "as well as of income, there is reason able ground of confidence that we may now safely dis pense with all internal taxes, and that the remain ing sources of revenue will be sufficient to provide for 352 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. the support of government," and to pay the interest and principal of the public debt within a shorter period than had been expected. Washington and Adams would have been unwilling to recommend internal taxes if they had thought them unnecessary. In the paragraph immediately following, Jefferson showed his hand most clearly. "These views," he said, "of reducing our burdens are formed in the expectation that a sensible and at the same tirae a salutary reduc tion may take place in our habitual expenditures. Ft)r this purpose, those of the civil government, the army and the navy, will need revisal. When we consider that this government is charged with the external and mutual relations only of these states; that the states themselves have principal care of our persons, our property and our reputation, constituting the great field of human concerns, we raay well doubt whether our organization is not too complicated, too expensive; whether offices and officers have not been multiplied unnecessarily, and sometimes injuriously to the ser\'ice they were meant to promote." In other words, there had been an un necessary multiplication of offices, because of the erron eous Federalist theory of the functions of the general government. Supposing that the general government had domestic functions to perform, that it had more than foreign "concerns" to attend to, that the state governments were not the domestic branch of our governmental system, the Federalists had multiplied HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES, SoS offices to undertake work with which the general govern ment had nothing to do. But he did not state what was, to his own mind, the strongest argument against it. He did not object to the Federalist theory of government because it endangered liberty, and tended toward mon archy, but because it was unnecessarily expensive, "Among these (officials) who are dependent on executive discretion, I have begun the reduction of what was deemed unnecessary. The expenses of diplomatic agency have been con,siderably diminished," After suggesting that Congress should pass in review the offices that had been established by law, he continued: "Considering the general tendency to multiply offices and dependencies, and to increase expense to the ultimate term of burden which the citizen can bear, it behooves us to avail our selves of eveiy occasion which presents itself for taking off the surcharge ; that it never raay be seen here, that after leaving to labor the smallest portion of its earnings on which it can subsist, govenimeut shall itself consume the whole residue of what il was instituted to guard." Of course, such talk was popular, and no one knew it better than Jefferson. But if lack of economy had been his sole ground of objection to Federalist administrations, he would have had a poor case against them. The current expenses of the government in 1800, including the expenses of the quasi war with France, were only about $7,000,000 ; and the average an nual expenditures for the preceding ten years, including 354 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. payments on account of the public debt, had been about $9,000,000. In truth, it was not so much the extrava gance, as the tendency of Federalist measures, to which Jefferson objected. To restrict the power of the govern ment, not to reduce taxes, was his supreme purpose.* But in order to get the consent of moderate Federalists to restricting the power which their party had exercised, he tried to convince them that it had been guilty of unnecessary taxation. The sarae characteristics appeared in his reraarks on the judiciary system. " The judiciary sys- Jefterson on the Judiciary tem of the United States," he said, "and system, ' especially that portion of it recently erected, will of course present itself to the contemplation of Congress ; and that they may be able to judge of the proportion which the institution bears to the business it has to perform, I have caused to be procured from the several states, and now lay before Congress, an exact statement of all the causes decided since the first estab lishment of the courts, and of those which were depend ing when additional courts and judges were brought to their aid." The least objectionable thing about the judiciary system frora the point of view of the Re- Repuhllcan theory of the publicans was its expeusiveuess. If they Judiciary. were right, it was radically wrong — wrong *See Henry Adams' History of the United States, Vol. I, p. 243, HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 355 not here and there, and in details, but fundamentally. The very conception of the Supreme Court, as it ap peared in the constitution, was at war with the Republi can theory. In Jefferson's own language, it was un- elected by, and independent of, the nation. In 1800, the people declared that they disapproved of the administra tion of John Adams. But the constitution gave him the power of appointing a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court — ^John Marshall — who interpreted it in accordance with Federalist ideas for thirty-four years after the Federal ists had been overthrown. From the Republican point of view, a constitution which permitted such things did not so much provide for governraent of the people by the people, as for government of the people by rulers whora the people had chosen. Between such a ' constitution, and a constitution which invested the power of appointment in a hereditary ruler, there was of course a difference ; but, from the Republican point of view, this difference was not essential. The constitution permitted a Chief Justice, who had been appointed by a President elected by one generation, to interpret it for another — for a generation that emphatically disapproved of the President and of the man whom he had appointed. What difference did it raake to the people for whora John Marshall interpreted ^he constitution whether the power to whom he owed his appointment was a hereditary ruler, or a President elected by another generation of people? What difference did it make to the people in 1801, that the power to whom he owed his appointment 3f>6 HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. was a man chosen by themselves, since they had come to disapprove of their own judgment in 1796? When they changed their minds, could they not give expression to it ? Were they to be bound indefinitely by their own mistakes, to be compelled to follow their less enlight ened rather than their more enlightened decision ? To say that they were, was to use the lan guage of the constitution of the United States, but not of the theory of Republicanism. The only way, therefore, from the Republican point of view, to reform the Supreme Court, was to reforra it out of existence, as it was then constituted. To leave the Supreme Court as the constitution left it, and attempt to meet the difficulty by passing a law providing foi such an in crease in the number of judges as would make the majority Republican ; or to impeach enough of them so that those appointed in their stead would make it Re publican, would not solve the problem. Any solution of the problem which left the Supreme Court free to interpret the constitution, as it liked, whether the people ap proved of its interpretation or not, was unrepublican. There was indeed but one Republican solution. Amend the constitution so as to provide for the removal of judges by the President on address of both Houses of Congress. Such an amendraent would put the govern ment in all three departraents under the direct control of the people, and that was what Republicanism demanded. That not a hint of this appeared in Jefferson's message HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES, 357 makes one wonder whether he was not trying to effect a revolution which none but the initiated would suspect of being revolutionary. Nor can his silence on this point be explained by the supposition that he did not realize the danger. His private correspondence shows that he realized it vividly. At the very time that he was asking Congress to con sider whether the judiciary system was not unnecessarily expensive, he was writing to his friends about its hostility to Republicanism. "They (the Federalists) have re tired into the judiciary as into a stronghold," he wrote to John Dickinson in December, 1801. " There the re mains of Federalism are to be preserved, and fed from the treasury, and from that battery all the works of Re publicanism are to be beaten down and erased." Eighteen years later, he declared that this prediction was being fulfilled. "The nation declared its will" (in 1800), he wrote to Judge Roane in 1819, " by dismissing functionaries of one principle and electing those of another, in the two branches, executive and legislative, submitted to their election. That, therefore, has con tinued the reprobated system, and although new matter has been occasionally incorporated into the old, yet the leaven of the old raass seems to assimilate to itself the Qg-y^r * * and we find the judiciary on everj' occasion, still driving us into consolidation." But he neglected to say that when he ruled his party with an absoluteness never surpassed by any President of the United States 358 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. except Andrew Jackson, no word of recommendation escaped his lips to change the constitution so as to make it possible to give expression in all departraents of the governraent to the " revolution of 1800." If it be said that his silence in 1800, was due to the obvious fact that his party was not then strong enough to carry an amendment to the constitution, that explanation fails to account for his silence concerning the Judiciary Act of 1789. Not even the Alien and Sedition laws .struck a raore powerful blow at the theory of Republi canism than did that law. It provided, as we know, that in cases before the state courts where the powers of the general governraent were involved, and the decision had been unfavorable to them, an appeal might be taken to the Supreme Court. But that raade the state judiciaries subordinate to the Federal judiciary, made the Federal government the final judge " of the extent of the powers delegated to itself." And yet Jefferson left on the statute books of the United States this law, when a word from him would have erased it, which, from his point of view, made " the discretion" of the general government, and not " the constitution, the measure of its powers." To have spoken that word would indeed have been to raise a tempest of indignation such as few Presidents have ever encountered. But, as the sequel will show, Jeffer son was a man of courage. And if the difference between Federalism and Republicanism was as vital as he insisted, if the hopes of the world depended on realizing the Re- HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 359 publican ideal, would it not have been wiser to encounter the storm rather than permit the continuance of a law which was gnawing away at the vitals of Republicanism, in the very hour of its apparent triumph ? * Whatever the cause of his silence, that silence was one of the great forces of American history. That he was sin cere in his Republicanism, that it was the ruling passion of his life, ought not to be questioned to-day by any competent student of history. Indeed, it is probable that it was precisely because of his devotion to the people that he was guilty of such apparent inconsistencies. To put as much power as possible in the hands of the people, was the great aim of his public life. If he had been the radical doctrinaire, the fanatical visionary, his opponents thought him, he would have risked everything to secure his complete ideal. But, as he was a statesman, it seemed to him wiser to take some steps toward the realization of his ideal than to go in the contrary direction because he could not reach his goal. In speaking of the portion of the judiciary system recently erected, he referred to a law passed by the Fed eralists in 1801 ( February 13), Before its passage the judiciary system consisted of oi'iMh'^^ ¦*^'" one Supreme Court with six judges, and of fifteen District Courts, each having a single judge. The United States was divided into three circuits. The judges of the Supreme Court held two terms a year at "Cf. Henry Adams, I, 254-261. 360 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. Washington, and twice a year made the tour of their cir cuits. The law of 1801 provided for one Supreme Court of five judges, when the first vacancy occurred ; six Cir cuit Courts, each having three judges, excepting one cir cuit which was to have but one ; and twenty-three Dis trict Courts, each with a single judge as before. The in creased expense caused by the new law amounted to about thirty thousand dollars a year. To save this expense was the point to which Jefferson called attention as the reason for repealing it. QUESTIONS. 1. What reason did Jefferson assign for substituting a mes sage for the speeches which his predecessors had delivered to Congress ? What was the true reason ? 2. What reason did he assign for recommending the repeal of internal taxes ? What was the true reason ? 3. Jefferson said that the general government was charged with the external and mutual relations only of the state. What did he mean ? 4. What was his strongest objection to the Federalist theory of government ? 5. Why did he not state it? 6. What objection did Jefferson make to the judiciary system in his message ? What in his private correspondence ? 7. Why did he not state his whole thoughts in his mes sage? 8. Show that the judiciary system of the United States is not in harmony with Democracy. 9. How would it have to be reformed to make it so ? 10. What was the Judiciary Act of 1789, and in what way was it inconsistent with the opinions of Jefferson ? 11. Why did uot Jefferson recommend its repeal ? 12. What was the Judiciary Act which was passed in 1801 ? HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. ,')(U CHAPTER XXVI. NORTHERN DEMOCRATS AND SOUTHERN REPUBLICANS. THE Congress which met in December, 1801, passed three important laws : One, providing for an annual appropriation of $7,300,000 to be devoted to the payment of the public debt; another, repealing the internal taxes: a third, repealing the Judiciary Act, passed in the last raonth of Adams' administration. Three important The first two it is unnecessary to say, were a part of Gallatin's financial policy. That policy, as we know, aimed to accomplish political objects which might jusdy be said to be revolutionary in their character. But as the message of the President had recoramended these measures on financial grounds only, it was on these grounds only that they were advocated by his followers in Congress. Measures which were a part of a sys tem which was intended to give the United States a unique place in the history of the *world, and Jefferson's administration a unique place in the history of the United States, were defended on the sole ground of their ex pediency from a financial point of view. It is probable, indeed, that a majority of the raen who voted for thera were influenced by nothing but financial considerations. As Jefferson was both a States Rights Republican and a Democrat, his party was composed of States Rights Re publicans and Democrats. 362 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. But while Jefferson united both characters in himself, many of his followers, particularly in the north, were Democrats without being Republicans. His followers in the north agreed with him in his estimate of the politi cal capacity of the people, in desiring to abolish all property qualifications for voting, and in opposing all Followers of aristocratic ceremonies, but they did not Jefferson, States . , , . Rights Bepuhii- agree With him m regarding banking sys- cans and Demo- ^ *''^*^' ' terns and national debts as tending towards monarch)', or in thinking that the general governraent was the foreign branch of our governraental system. They were opposed to the Federalists because the Feder alists were aristocratic and conservative; they were follow ers of Jefferson because he was democratic and progressive, because he wished to put as rauch power as possible iu the hands of the people, but not because thej' were in sympathy with, or even understood his peculiar ideas as to the functions of the national and state governments. A perception of this fact undoubtedly had something to do with the reticence of Jefferson and those of his fol lowers who were in his confidence, as to the ultimate scope of his measures. He and they felt that the strongest, if not indeed the only recommendation of Gallatin's financial policy to many of Jefferson's followers, was that it proposed to pay the debt quickly and at the same time tax the people lightly. The same influence made itself felt in the debate on Effect of em- to sorae extent, at least, the effect of the upol^Nl^Eng"-"^ erabargo, especially upon the Federalists of '^°'^' New England. Many of thera felt that they were not only justified in evading the embargo laws, but that it was a crime not to evade them, if they could. And this feeling was shared to a great extent by men of all parties in New England. In a speech delivered in the * See Pickering's letter to Governor Sullivan in 1808, New England Federalism, Fisher Ames' Works, and Annals of Con gress, 1808-1809, especially speeches of Bayard, Pickering, Gardenier, Hillhouse and Josiah Quincy. 486 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. Senate in February, 1809, Bayard said, " We all know that the opposition to the erabargo in the Eastern States is not the opposition of a political party or of a few dis contented raen, but the resistance of the people to a measure which they feel as oppressive and regard as ruinous."* When, therefore, the Enforcing Act was passed, all New England was soon echoing and re-echo ing with protests and threats of resistance. An extract from the proceedings of the town of Augusta, in Maine, will give a fair idea of the resolutions passed by a hundred New England towns and cities. " The awful crisis has arrived when it becomes necessary for the friends of our independence to make a firm and decided stand — when it becomes all important to throw aside minor considera tions, and unite for the coramon good ; and when a sense of coraraon danger draws us together to meet the approaching storm. With submission almost amounting to criminal apathy, we have suffered privations and restrictions never before expected of, or endured by, a free people. Now that even the means of subsistence is at hazard, and the sacred asylum of our dwellings is no longer held inviolable — silence would be a crime, and resistance would becorae a virtue of the first raagni- tude."t When the bill for enforcing the embargo was before the Senate, Hillhouse, of Connecticut, said, " In my mind the present crisis excites the most serious * Annals of Congress, 1808-1809, 403. t Olive Branch, 148. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 487 apprehensions. A storm seems to be gathering which portends not a tempest on the ocean, but domestic con vulsions. However painful the task, a sense of duty calls upon me to raise my voice, and use my utmost exertions to prevent the passage of this bill. I feel ray self bound in conscience to declare, lest the blood of those who should fall in the execution of this measure may lie on my head, that I consider this to be an Act which directs a mortal blow at the liberties of my country, an act containing unconstitutional provisions to which the people are not bound to submit, and to which, in ray opinion, they will not subrait." * This, then, was what Jefferson saw in the closing weeks of his adrainistration as a result of his policy of peace : Napoleon approving it, England defying it, and New England on the verge of rebellion. He had raeant it to work a revolution in the foreign policy of the country ; he found it in danger of working a revolution in the governraent, and the overthrow of the union. QUESTIONS. 1. What was the Bayonne Decree ? 2. How did the Federalists and Republicans differ -with respect to it, and why ? 3. What is your opinion of it ? 4. Account for Napoleon's approval of the embargo. 5. What effect did the Spanish uprising have on Napoleon's continental system ? ¦* Annals of Congress, 1808-1809, 298. 488 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 6. What offer did Pinkney make to the British Government through Canning ? 7. What was Canning's reply ? 8. What reply did Pinkney make ? 9. What did Pinkney mean when he said that the offer of the United States, if accepted by England, would place the United States in the position with relation to France, that England in sisted she ought to take ? 10. What classes in England were benefited, and what in jured by the embargo ? II. Which were the more influential? 12. Describe the attitude of the Federalists towards the foreign policy of the administration and state how far you think it was justifiable. 13. What was the "Enforcing Act?" 14. What effect did it have on New England ? 15. Do you think New England should have submitted to it? 16. What did Hillhouse mean by "my country?" HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 489 CHAPTER XXXV. SUBMISSION OR WAR? AFTER the rejection of Monroe's treaty, Monroe was inclined to sulk in his tent. He felt that the Admin istration had set him an impossible task, and rejected his treaty without due con- eie1;tion! sideration because he had gone contrary to his instructions. Monroe's attitude inclined most of the Republicans who were dissatisfied with the Administra tion, and especially those who disliked Madison — who was known to be Jefferson's candidate — to make Monroe their candidate for the presidency. It seemed likely for a time that the unpopularity of the embargo would lead to the defeat of Madison if the Federalists and Anti-ad ministration Republicans could combine on a single can didate. But as Madison was selected by the Republican caucus, party discipline prevailed, and he was elected by 122 out of a total of 176 electoral votes. George Clinton was elected Vice-President. Before the result of the election was officially known, Jefferson practically threw down the reins Jeflerson of ffovernraent. When Congress met on and tne ° embargo. November 7, 1808, he acknowledged in his message that his "candid and liberal experiment" — offering to England and Napoleon to suspend the erabargo 490 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. on certain conditions — "had failed." He said that it must "rest with the wisdora of Congress to decide on the course best adapted" to the existing state of things. Gal latin, whora Madison intended to make his Secretary of State, urged Jefferson to recoraraend sorae positive course. But in vain. It was evident that the erabargo could not be continued much longer, and Jefferson could not recommend its repeal. The theory of commercial restric tions as a means of coercion had been the dream of his life — his one great piece of constructive statesmanship. In all of his hopes for playing a great part in history in advancing the interests of the world, this theory had been an important element. He had hoped to be the philosophic statesraan, the humanitarian ruler, whose destiny it was to prove to the world that the brutalities and barbarisras of war could be dispensed with. And now to adrait that his life-long dream was, after all, only a dream ! To admit that in spite of his efforts to save them from it, the American people must travel over the same road that had proved so fatal to the happiness and liberties of the race. To sign the death warrant of his favorite child— the offspring of all his philanthropic hopes! It was too much, and apparently the one great hope that animated him in the closing months of his administration was to be spared the humiliation of signing a repeal of the embargo. He could not bring himself to admit that his policy of peace had failed. "If we go to war now," he said, "I fear we may renounce HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 491 forever the hope of seeing an end of our national debt. If we can keep at peace eight years longer, our income, liberated from debt, will be adequate to any war, without new taxes or loans, and our position and increasing strength will put us hors d' insulte from any nation." "If we can keep at peace" — but how was that possible? How were the United States to remain at peace when the two greatest powers in the world insisted on making war upon them? Jefferson refused to say. In December, 1808, he said : "I have thought it right to take no part in proposing measures, the execution of which will devolve on my successor. I am therefore chiefly an unmeddling listener to what others say." As he would formulate no plan that looked beyond the close of his administration, Madison ^oi^?'^^ and Gallatin were obliged to take the responsibility. Their plan was to continue the embargo till June 1, pass a total Non-intercourse Act against both France and England, providing for a sus pension of it in favor of the one which might revoke her anti-neutral decrees, and, in the event of failing to secure such revocation, a special session of Congress, and a declaration of war against both powers. The Non- intercourse Act would remove England's "grievances" by placing her on an equality with France. England had coraplained of the Non-importation Act which had gone into effect in 1807, and of the proclamation issued by the President on account of the "Chesapeake" affair 492 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. as unjustly discriminating against her in favor of Napoleon. With these complaints removed, Madison and Gallatin believed that England would revoke her orders when she saw that war was the alternative and that the "obstinate Emperor" would persist in his course so that war would take place with Napoleon, with Eng land as an ally. To prepare Congress for such a policy, Gallatin wrote a report which may be regarded report.^ ^ as iu a seusc the message of the incoming Administration. The report was presented Noveraber 22 by G. W. Campbell, who was chairman of the committee to whom had been referred that part of the President's message which related to foreign affairs. It airaed to show that there was ''no other alternative, but abject and degrading subraission; war with both nations; or a continuance and enforce ment of the embargo. * >i= * War with one of the belligerents only, would be submission to the edicts and will of the other ; and a repeal in whole or in part of the embargo must necessarily be war or submission. * * * A partial repeal raust, frora the situation of Europe, necessarily be actual submission to one of the aggressors and war with the other." As the measure finally decided on was partial re peal, it is important to consider the arguments by which Gallatin sought to prove beforehand that it was equiva lent to submission. "It is said that the adoption of that HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 493 proposition"-— to repeal the erabargo except as to France and her allies, and England — "would restore our com raerce with the native powers of Asia and Africa, and with Spain, Portugal, Sweden and Russia." Assuming it to be true, the effect of it "would be to open an indi rect trade with Great Britian which, through St, Barthol oraew and Havana, Lisbon, Cadiz, or Gottenburg, would receive, at prices reduced by glutted markets aud for want of competition, all the provisions, raw materials for her manufactures, and other articles, which she may want. * * * A measure which would supply exclusively one of the belligerents would be war with the other." To supply Great Britain exclusively "can only be defended on the ground that France is the only aggressor, and that, having no just reason to complain of England, it is our duty to submit to her." That supposition being inadmissible, the painful alternatives were the continu ance of the erabargo, and a war with both Powers. But a permanent embargo would "not properly be resistance; it would be withdrawing from the contest, and abandoning our indisputable right freely to navigate the ocean." The alternatives therefore, the report inti mated, were not a permanent embargo, war or sub mission, but, a repeal of the embargo in the near future, war or submission. The chief reason for hesitation, since the choice ultimatel}^ lay between submission and war, was the necessity, if war were resorted to, of making 494 HISTORY OP POLITICAL PARTIES. it at the same time against the two most powerful na tions in the world. The report concluded with recoramending three res olutions. The first declared that the United States could not, without a sacrifice of their independence, submit to the edicts of Great Britain and France ; the second, that it was expedient to exclude frora the ports of the United States all the ships and goods of those Powers that vio lated the neutral rights of the United States ; the third, that the country should at once be put in a more com plete state of defense.* The debate upon these resolutions continued nearly twenty days, and whatever it may have left Debate upon it. in doubt. One thing was clear; there was no war party in the country. Josiah Quincy, a bitter Massachusetts Federalist, in his first speech did in deed seera to lean to war. "The path of duty," he said, "is as distinct as the milky way. * * It is the path of ac tive preparation — of dignified energy. It consists in taking the nature of things as the measure of the rights of your citizens, not the orders and decrees of iraperious foreigners. Give what protection you can. Take no counsel of fear. Your strength will increase with the trial, and prove greater than you are now aware. But I shall be told that this may lead to war. I ask, Are we now at peace? Certainly not, unless retiring from insult be peace — unless shrinking under the lash be peace. * Annals of Congress, 1808-1809, 514-521. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 495 The surest way to prevent war is, not to fear it. The idea that nothing on earth is so dreadful as war, is incul cated too studiously among us. Di.sgrace is worse. Abandonment of essential rights is worse." But this warlike talk was not serious. Quincy believed, as Hil dreth afterwards did, "that the two bugbears of abject sub mission on the one side, and on the other, war at the same time, with both France and England," had been "theatrically brought in, from opposite directions, to frighten Congress and the people into acquiescence in the embargo."* Quincy wanted no war, at least with England. His "path of duty" was a means of getting rid of the erabargo. The Federalist theory being that the difficulties of the United States with England grew out of the partiality of the Adrainistration for France, the Federalists wanted an abandonraent of the embargo sys tem, "root and branch." "Repeal the embargo and Non- iraportation Acts," they said; "rescind the proclaraa tion," resist the French edicts, which first raade war on our rights, and the difficulties with England would van ish, the Orders in Council would be withdrawn.f But while the Federalists advocated what Gallatin called "abject and degrading submission," not a voice on the Republican side was raised in behalf of war. Ad mitting the reasoning of the Report, that the choice lay between war, embargo, and submission, they urged the * Hildreth, VI, 98. t Barent Gardenier, Annals of Congress, 1808-1809, 851. 496 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. continuance of the embargo, although the Report had shown that a permanent embargo was submission. The truth must be told; the Representatives of the American people in 1808 were afraid to declare war! The Ameri can people had been made to act the part of cowards so long that they had begun to think that the play repre sented the reality. As Troup, of Georgia, said, they had become so familiar with outrages that they ceased to be moved by them. "Two years ago you were willing to go to war to limit the right of search; you would have gone to war to prohibit the practice of impressraent; you would have gone to war to overthrow the lawless systera of blockade ; you would have gone to war for the colonial trade; for the attack on the Chesapeake; two years ago you would have gone to war for the Orders in Council; and now that all these outrages, and more than these have accu mulated on your head, until you are bowed down to the earth, you are content to beg a little coraraerce of Eng land!" But in the sarae speech, Troup hiraself showed how lacking he was in all proper sense of the dignity and honor of the nation. "The people of this country," he said, "want peace as long as they can preserve it with honor. And do you think, sir, we are ready to plunge headlong into a ruinous war, naked and unarmed, to gratify a few bankrupt coraraercial speculators?" * Bent to the earth, as Troup said the nation was, by the load of British outrages, he could yet talk about the preserva- -* Annals of Congress, 1808-1809, 604-606. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 497 tion of peace with honor ! And the noteworthy fact is that his remark struck nobody as ridiculous. No one interrupted hira amidst shouts of derisive laughter, to ask how a nation could talk about honor, which for three years had allowed itself to be insulted and outraged, and at last treated as a province with no rights save such as England and France might deign to grant. At the close of the long debate, the three resolu tions were carried. By a vote of one hundred and eight een to two the House of Representatives said that the United States could not submit to the edicts of Great Britain and France without a sacrifice of their independ ence. But the debate which preceded the vote showed how little the vote meant. The Federalists believed that the embargo could be repealed, and no resistance offered to England without subraission. The Republicans be lieved that to repeal the embargo without declaring war was submission, and while the opposition to the erabargo in New England was making it more and more evident that embargo could not be enforced much longer, they were unwilling to declare war. Evidently Gallatin was right when he said "A raajority will not adhere to the erabargo rauch longer, and if war be not speedily deter rained on, subraission will ensue," * QUESTIONS. 1. Why was Jefferson so reluctant to abandon the embargo ? 2. What was the policy of Madison and Gallatin ? » Gallatin to Nicholson, Dec. 29, 1808: Adams' Gallatin, 384. 3> 498 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 3. Do you think it was wise ? 4. The text calls Campbell's report the first message of the incoming administration. Why ? 5, The report argued that the alternatives were abject and degrading submission, war with both France and England, and a continuance of the embargo ; do you admit it ? 6, Is submission of necessity "abject and degrading? " 7. Quincy argued that since the nation felt itself unable to fight both its aggressors at the same time, it might, without com promising its honor or its dignity, declare war against one of them — ignoring the other ; do you agree with him ? 8. If the United States had adopted Quincy's policy, which nation do you think it should have fought; France or England? 9. The report argued that a measure which would supply exclusively one of the belligerents would be war with the other ; do you think so ? 10. What were the three resolutions recommended by the report ? 11. For what purpose was it written ? 12. What was Quincy's theory of it ? 13. What did the debate on it show ? 14. What do you think of Troup's speech ? HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 499 CHAPTER XXXVI. SUBMISSION. WHILE Madison and Gallatin were attempting to bring Congress to the point of repealing the embargo in favor of war, they were endeavoring to work on England through Erskine. They told Erskine that the alternatives open to the United States were em bargo and war; that the people of the country were be ginning to regard the embargo as too passive; and that America must be driven to endeavor to maintain her rights against the two greatest powers in the world, un less one of them should revoke her anti-neutral decrees. In that case, the United States would side with that one against the other, provided the other persisted in her war upon the commerce of the United States.* Madison hoped through Erskine to induce England to revoke her decrees when she saw that it would result in a war between the United States and Napoleon. Before the vote on the resolutions recomraended by Campbell's report had been taken, Gallatin presented his annual report on the finances (December 10, 1808). It amounted to a recommenda- ^uafr^ort"' tion of war. He told Congress that even in case of war against both England and France, no in- ¦*Erskine to Canning, December 4, 1808. 500 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. ternal taxes were contemplated.* Internal taxes, as we know, had always been bitterly oppo.sed by the Repub licans. Gallatin told them that they need not hesitate to declare war through fear of internal taxes. He said that loans should be principally relied on and that the revenue derived from duties on imports would be amply sufficient, during long intervals of peace, not only to de fray current expenses, but to pay the debts contracted in war. In accordance with the policy of the incoming Ad ministration, Smilie offered (January 7) in the House of Representatives a resolution declaring that a committee should be appointed to take into consideration the pro priety of providing by law for an early meet- Extra session, ing of the next Congress. It was distinctly understood that the extra session was con templated for the purpose of declaring war. In the de bate on the bill providing for the extra session on the fourth Monday in May, J. G. Jackson, Madison's brother- in-law, said: "I think, by passing this bill, we give the nation a pledge that it shall be the ne plus ultra, which shall give to foreign nations time to revise their conduct towards us, and will give them tirae to consider whether or not they will have war with us."t If the Federalists had believed this, if through earnest conferences between the raerabers of the Admin- »Annals of Congress, 1808-1809, 1765. tAnnals of Congress, 1808-1809,1095. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 501 istration and the leaders of the Federalists, partisanship could have been subordinated to patriotisra, if they could have been convinctd of the sincere desire of the Admin istration to isolate the enemies of the United States so that the country might have but one enemy to fight, and that enemy Napoleon — the United States would have been spared a great hurailiation, and a still greater danger. But they did not believe it. They believed that if war was declared against France and England, the war against France would be raerely nominal, since France had no territory that we could attack without encountering the fleets of England. Many of them believed that the Ad ministration had no idea of declaring war under any cir cumstances, that the proposed extra session for the pur pose of declaring war was a mere trick to deceive the people, as Quincy declared in a speech as remarkable for its ability as it was for its bitterness. Quincy told the House that it had been deceived when it passed the erabargo laws, that coercion was its real object, and not precaution, as was pretended. He said that the proposed extra session had a similar object — that it was not intended that Quincy's speech. Congress should declare war under certain contingencies — that was a mere pretence; its real object was to delude the people into submitting to the embargo a little longer, that if the people would bear it, "this embargo will be continued, not only until next May, but until next September, yes, sir, to next May twelve 502 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. months;" "that it was intended to persevere in the measure until it effect, if possible, the proposed object." He declared that "it was never intended by Adrainistra tion to do anything else effectual for the support of our maritime rights. Sir, I am sick, sick to loathing, of this eternal clamor of war, war, war, which has been kept up incessantly on this floor, now for more than two years. Sir, if I can help it, the old women of this country shall not be frightened in this way any longer. I have been a long time a close observer of what has been said and done by the majority of this House, and for one, I am satisfied that no insult, however gross, offered to us by either France or Great Britain, could force this raajority into the declaration of war. To use a strong but cora mon expression, it could not be kicked into such a dec laration by either nation." If the majority meant war they would have prepared for it. What preparation had they made? They had built one hundred and seventy gun boats; they had in requisition one hundred thousand militia. "You talk of going to war against Great Britain with, I believe, only one frigate and five sloops of war in coraraission! And yet you have not the resolution to meet the expense of the paltry little navy which is rotting in the Potomac. * * * You go to war with all the revenue to be derived from commerce annihilated, and possessing no other resource than loans or direct or other internal taxes ! You ! A party that rose into power by declaiming against direct taxes and loans"! * «Annals of Congress, 1808-1809, 1111-1114. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 503 The sting of Quincy's taunts lay in their truth. After all the insults of England and France, the House could still vapor about the preservation of peace with honor ! The next day (January 20), the bill for an extra session passed by a vote of eighty to twenty-six. On the surface it looked as if the policy of Madison and Gallatin would be carried out to the letter. Their resolutions (recommended in Campbell's Report and in tended to commit the House to erabargo or war) had been passed by an overwhelraing raajority ; Erskine was writ ing dispatch after dispatch to prove to his government that if they did not revoke their Orders in Council, the United States would declare war against them in June. But Madison and Gallatin coraraitted one fatal blunder. For some reason, perhaps because they regarded it as derogatory to the dignity of the government not to en force the embargo laws as long as they reraained laws, perhaps because they wished to drive the people into preferring war through the very odiousness of the alter native, perhaps because they yielded to the spell of Jef ferson's influence, who permitted himself to hope that if the erabargo was rigorously enforced, England would be corapelled to revoke her decrees — they urged the En forcing Act of which a preceding chapter has given some account and which became a law January 9. The discontent in New England at once rose to the point of danger to the Union. A few radi cals like Pickering, Otis, Gore and Hillhouse New^Engiand!" were ready to resort to extrerae measures 504 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. before. The passage of the Enforcing Act made their attitude infections. When the legislature of Massachu setts met, a committee of the Senate to whom had been referred the numerous petitions relating to the embargo, at once (February 1) recomraended a law to protect the people of the state against the " unreasonable, arbitrary and unconstitutional searches in their dwelling houses," authorized by the Enforcing Act. Such a law would have been equivalent to nullification. When Secretary Dear born wrote (February 4) to Governor Trumbull, of Connecticut requesting him to select railitia officers to aid the collectors in enforcing the erabargo, Trumbull flatly refused. " Conceiving as I do," he said, " and, be lieving it to be the opinion of the great mass of citizens in this State that the late law of Congress for a more rig orous enforcement of the embargo is unconstitutional in many of its provisions, * * * my mind has been led to a serious and decided determination to refuse corapli ance with your request, and to have no agency an the ap pointraents which the President has been pleased to refer to me." With New England in such a teraper, many Republicans began to think that the alternative was not embargo or war, but an immediate and unconditional re peal of the embargo, or a dissolution of the Union. All the laws required to carry out the policy of Mad ison had been passed except one. January 30, Wilson Cary Nicholas offered a resolution which olution*^ '^^^" contained the substance of the law yet to be passed if that policy was to pre- HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 605 vail. Upon the fate of that resolution depended the questions as to whether the United States would submit or go to war. The resolution was as follows: "Resolved, As' the opinion of this House, that the United States ought not to delay beyond day of to resume, maintain and defend the navigation of the high seas; and that provision ought to be made by law for repealing on the day of the several erabargo laws, and for authorizing at the same time, letters of marque and re prisal against Great Britain and France, provided on that day their Orders or Edicts violating the lawful commerce and neutral rights of the United States shall be in force, or against either of those nations having in force such Orders or Edicts." The resolution having been divided, Nicholas moved to fill the blank with the words "the first day of June." The debate began upon Debate on it. this motion that on June 1, the embargo laws should be repealed. Frora the beginning of the de bate it was evident that the majority realized that the danger of rebellion in New England made it necessary that the embargo should cease and that the alternative was not embargo or war, but war or subraission. With an earnestness that was pathetic, David R. Williams, of South Carolina, begged the representatives of New Eng land to remember that they had a country. " You have driven us from the embargo. The excitements in the East render it necessary that we should enforce the em- 506 PIISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. bargo with the bayonet or repeal it. I will repeal it — and I could weep over it more than over a lost child. If you do not resist you are no longer a nation — you dare not call yourself so — you are the merest vassals conceiv able. * * * If avarice has so seized on our hearts as to take away wholly the love of country (and assuredly it has if we submit), for God's sake let me entreat gentlemen to make the best terms they can for us — to procure for us the miserable boon that the tax on us may be collected here, without corapelling us to go to Britain to pay it."* To which Cook, of Massachusetts, replied that "we raust take things as they are." "The South say embargo or war ; and the North and East say, no embargo, no war. * * * I lament that this difference exists ; yet as it does exist, we must take things as they are and legislate ac- cordingly."t He was right. Representative after repre sentative from the North and East urged a repeal of the embargo without war ; representative after representative from the South begged that if the embargo must be re pealed that a declaration of war be made — but in vain. As one speaker put it, the embargo had so long been in terposed between the people and British depredations they had lost their war spirit. On February 1, the House in Coraraittee of the Whole, by seventy-three votes against forty, rejected Nicholas' raotion to repeal the erabargo June 1, and the next day voted that the erabargo should * Annals of Congress, 1808-1809, 1238. tAnnals of Congress, 1808-1809, 1249. HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 507 cease on the 4th of March. Four days later, the second half of Nicholas' resolution was voted on. By a vote of fifty-seven to thirty nine, the same House which less than two months before had declared that the United States could not submit to the decrees of Great Britain and France without a sacri fice of their honor and independence, declared that they would not authorize letters of marque and reprisal, even if the decrees of Great Britain and France continued in force. That vote meant submission. The Non-inter course Bill, introduced a few days later and passed the latter part of February, was only a thin veil to disguise from the Araerican people the fact that their representa tives had not courage enough to declare war. David R. Williams, whose passionate and patriotic protests against submission ought to rescue his narae frora oblivion, called the conduct of the House "conteraptlble cowardice." It seeras at first sight paradoxical that the section of country that suffered raost from England's piracies upon our commerce should have been least disposed to resent them. But the paradox disappears Effect of embar- when we learn that freights were so England an^tiie South. high that merchants could lose ten per cent by capture and still make money. Further, all the trade which the United States carried on with the colo nies of Spain and France was due to the war between France and England. No matter how rauch England interfered with the trade between the United States and 508 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. the colonies of her enemies, so long as she permitted any, the United States had more than they raight expect to have upon the return of peace. This was one of the reasons why the erabargo was so much more unpopular in New England than it was in the South. Another reason was the instantaneousness and direct ness of its action upon the shipping, and dependent inter ests of New England. The sailors, draymen, shipwrights and sea-captains who were suddenly thrown out of em ployment, the venders of pitch, tar, hemp, bacon and salt fish who found theraselves with a greatly reduced market for their commodities, the ship-owners, who were deprived of their profits, knew the cause of their losses beyond a doubt. But the action of the embargo upon the planters of the South was neither instantaneous nor direct. The embargo made no change in their occupations. They planted and tended their cotton, rice, indigo and tobacco as in preceding years. And if, when autumn came, they found a reduced market for their produce, they were able to be in doubt as to the cause. The enforcement of the Berlin Decree, and the more rigorous Orders in Council had intervened since the last autumn, and who could tell how much influence they would have had, if there had been no embargo, in reducing the price of their produce.* ^Nevertheless, the South suffered more from the embargo than New England. There was no market for tobacco at any price, and wheat fell from two dqllars to seventy-five cents a HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 509 The Non-intercourse Act closed the ports of the United States to all public and private ships of France and England; forbade all importations frora England and France; and repealed the em- tatlr?o°iSie Act. bargo, except as to Great Britian and France and their dependencies. It also authorized the President to suspend the law by proclaraation and renew the trade with France or England in case either of these countries ceased to violate the rights of the United States, while it was to continue in force against the nation that persisted in enforcing its anti-neutral edicts. How much, or rather how little, it meant, the British minister saw clearly. He wrote to his Government that England would derive great advantage from it, as, with her comraand of the ocean, .she could procure, through neutrals, any of the produce of the United States, besides the immense quantity which would be carried directly to Great Britain under various pretenses, while France could obtain but little, and that at great expense and risk. Jefferson signed the bill March 1. Ten days later, he mounted his horse to ride through snow and sleet to Monticello, never again to appear on the scene where he bushel. "Yankee" ingenuity enabled the New Euglanders to ward off, to some extent, the blow of the embargo, but it fell upon the South with crushing force. Virginia was driven to the verge of bankruptcy. Jefferson himself was almost ruined by the measure with which he had tried to maintain the honor of the country. 510 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. had wielded such imperial influence for The two great j^'erlon's'ad- *^^ preceding eight years. Looking over ministration. .-t •. - . .li ^ .l these years, it is easy to see the two great mistakes of his two administrations. The first was in allowing the desire to gain West Florida, through the in fluence of Napoleon to cause him not to resent the in sults of Spain and the defiance of France. If he had yielded to the impulse which impelled him so strongly in the summer of 1805 to declare war on France and Spain, the overwhelming disaster of his second adminis tration would never have been encountered. There would have been no English attacks upon our commerce, no embargo, and also, no war of 1812, no Plartford Con vention. The mistakes, as well as the evils of men, live after them, and in the dangers and humiliations of the second war for independence, as the war of 1812 has been rightly called, the country was, in part, reaping the harvest which sprung from Jefferson's unfortunate policy with respect to West Florida. His second mistake, it hardly need be said, was his recommendation of an em bargo, without limit as to tirae, especially when it was done under circumstances that made it possible for his enemies to believe that he was in league with Napoleon, against Great Britain and New England. The complete and disastrous failure of the erabargo settled the fate of Jeffersonian Republicanism. The dream of peace upon which its theory of foreign con cerns was based was proved to be only a dream. The HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 511 brutal and barbarous weapons which Republicans had hoped to be able to dispense with, could not yet be thrown aside, if nations would protect themselves against insults. But 'when the day comes, as come it will, when war shall be a thing of history, it will be one of Jeffer son's clairas to recollection that he anticipated that day, that he strove by peaceable means to defend the rights of his country. But after all, it is as a Democrat, not a States-Rights Republican, as a raan who was devoted to the interests of the people and who believed in their capacity, that Jefferson lives, and will live in history. In spite of all his mistakes, it was fitly said of him in one of the stormy debates of January, 1809, that 'his acts ought to have induced all his former enemies to say "he has dis appointed our expectations, and proved hiraself the sup porter of that Declaration of Independence which was given to the world frora his pen." ' QUESTIONS. 1. What was Madison's policy ? 2. What influence did Madison seek to exert on Canning through Erskine ? 3. What did Gallatin seek to show in his annual report? 4. What was the object of the extra session ? 5. Why did Madison wish to put off the declaration of war? 6. What ground had Quincy for saying that Congress was deceived when it passed the embargo? 7. What did he think was the object of the extra session ? 8. What warranted him in saying that the nation could not be kicked into a war? 512 HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 9. The text says Madison and Gallatin committed one fatal blunder ; what was it, and why did they commit it ? 10. What produced the discontent in New England? II. What was Nicholas' resolution and for what purpose was it offered? 12. What are letters of marque and reprisal? 13. Discuss the speeches of David R. Williams and Cook. 14. Describe the effect of. the embargo upon New England and the South. 15. What was the Non-intercourse Act? 16. What were the two great mistakes of Jefferson's two ad ministrations ? 17. What rank do you think will be finally awarded him by History ? 18. State at length the principles of Jeffersonian Republi canism, and tell how much was left of them at the close of Jeffer son's secoud administration. I, ,>,'!'< I^HM' ;.i-'-m' (ir i||l(j )'ll)'i|'-*l .s^>1