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MEMOIKS OF
FRIEDRICH FERDINAND
COUNT VON BEUST
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INTRODUCTION
CONTAINING PERSONAL REMINISCENCES OF COUNT BEUST'S
CAREER AS PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRIA AND AUSTRIAN
AMBASSADOR IN LONDON
BY
BARON HENRY DE WORMS, M.P.

TWO VOLUMES

VOL. I
WITH PORTRAIT

REMINGTON & CO., PUBLISHERS
HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN

1887
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

[An Alphabetical Index to this Work will ba found at end of
Second Volume.]

CONTENTS

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gxttvobuctioxt

MY FIRST INTERVIEW WITH BEUST AT SALZBURG.  SOLFERINO, SADOWA,
AND SEDAN.  THE ' STATE WASHERWOMAN.'  BEUST'S VIEWS AS TO
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND ENGLAND. — A PROTESTANT
MINISTER GOVERNING CATHOLICS.  FREEDOM ESTABLISHED IN
AUSTRIA BY A FOREIGNER.  TORY DEMOCRACY BORN AT VIENNA.
 ABOLITION OF THE CONCORDAT.  BEUST THREATENED WITH
THE FATE OF HUSS.  MEDICAL RELATIONS WITH THE CLERICALS.
— • BEUST'S ROOM ON THE ' BALLPLATZ.'  MUSIC IN THE
INTERVALS OF BUSINESS.  RELATIONS WITH THE EMPEROR.  BEUST
ON BISMARCK.  A BLOODLESS REVOLUTION.  THE DUALIST SYSTEM.
— FEUDAL LADIES AT A FANCY FAIR.  ' BEUST'S AIDE-DE-CAMP.'
 BEUST AND BEACONSFIELD.  ADVENTURE AT A MASKED BALL: 
MY BOOK ON THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE.  BEUST ON THE
IRISH HOME RULE SCHEME.  MY INTERVIEW WITH THE DUC DE
GRAMONT.  THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.  BEUST AS AMBASSADOR IN
LONDON AND PARIS.— HIS LETTERS TO ME.  LAST INTERVIEWS. i

AUTHOR'S PREFACE . . . lxxxix

iv CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
1809-1830
BIRTH AND YOUTH.  THE BATTLE OP LEIPZIG.  THE FRENCH OCCUPA
TION OF SAXONY.  KING FREDERICK AUGUSTUS.  THE UNIVERSITY
OF GOTTINGEN. — MY INTENTION OF BECOMING PROFESSOR, AND
MY ENTRY INTO THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE.  THE UNGRATEFUL
SON OF THE REVOLUTION .... I
CHAPTER II
1830-1838
THE JULY REVOLUTION. — THE ATTITUDE OF EUROPE. — PRINCE
METTERNICH. — MY SERVICES IN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
— MY FIRST MISSION AT BERLIN . . . 1 4
CHAPTER III
1838-1848
PARIS. — MUNICH. — LONDON ..... 30
CHAPTER IV
1848
THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION AND THE YEAR 1848.  MY FIRST BUT
IMPERFECT APPOINTMENT AS MINISTER.  1 BECOME ENVOY AT
BERLIN .-,.... 43
CHAPTER V
1849
RESIGNATION OF THE SAXON MINISTRY  MY SECOND APPOINTMENT
AS MINISTER ...... eg
CHAPTER VI
1849
THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTION AND THE MAY INSURRECTION . 63
CHAPTER VII.
1849
AFTER THE INSURRECTION.  WHAT IS REACTION . . 7,
CHAPTER VIII
1849
THE ALLIANCE OF THE THREE KINGS.  THE FIRST DIFFERENCES WITH
BERLIN.— THE PILLNITZ INTERVIEW.  MY FIRST TRIP TO VIENNA 87

CONTENTS v
CHAPTER IX
1850
OLMUTZ . . • ... 93
CHAPTER X
1851
THE DRESDEN CONFERENCES.  THE BUNDESTAG.  TRIP TO LONDON
AND FRANKFORT.  BISMARCK . . . . 103
CHAPTER XI
1851-1859
PRUSSIA AT THE BUNDESTAG . . . . 113
CHAPTER XII
1852
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS AT DRESDEN . . .123
CHAPTER XIII
1853-1854
MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR AND OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.  DEATH OF
KING FREDERICK AUGUSTUS AND ACCESSION OF KING JOHN.  THE
CRIMEAN WAR ...... 126
CHAPTER XIV
1854-1856
CONTINUATION OF THE CRIMEAN WAR.  AN EXPLANATION.  AUSTRIA
ON THE VERGE OF WAR.  THE SECRET DESPATCH OF JANUARY. 
GASTEIN AND COUNT BUOL.— -MY FIRST MEETING WITH NAPOLEON
III.  MY CORRESPONDENCE WITH COUNT NESSELRODE.  MISSION OF
BARON SEEBACH TO ST PETERSBURG.  THE PEACE OF PARIS. I 36
CHAPTER XV
1856-1858
YEARS OF POLITICAL TRANQUILLITY.  FESTIVITIES AT COURT, IN DIPLO
MATIC CIRCLES, AND AT MY HOUSE.  ILLUSTRIOUS VISITORS AT,
DRESDEN.  ILLNESS OF FREDERICK WILLIAM IV.  DEATH OF THE
MINISTER ZSCHINSKI.  RESTORATION OF THE ALBRECHTSBURG. —
MOURNING IN THE ROYAL FAMILY . . . 1, 4 9

vi CONTENTS
CHAPTER XVI
1859
THE ITALIAN WAR.  MY MISSIONS TO BERLIN, MUNICH, KARLSRUHE,
PARIS, LONDON, AND FRANKFORT. . . .154
CHAPTER XVII
1859
CONTINUATION OF THE ITALIAN WAR.  THE SAXON CHAMBERS. 
PRINCE GORTSCHAKOFF. — VISIT TO VIENNA. — THE WURZBURG
CONFERENCE . . . . . . I93
CHAPTER XVIII
1860-1861
THE ' NATIONAL VEREIN.' — MY PROJECT OF REFORM OF THE CONFEDERA
TION. — ITALY AGAIN. . . . . .196
CHAPTER XIX
1862
MEETING WITH BISMARCK IN PARIS.  HIS APPOINTMENT TO THE
MINISTRY.  HIS CORRESPONDENCE WITH ME. . . 204
CHAPTER XX
1863
THE SECOND POLISH INSURRECTION  1 AT BERLIN, BISMARCK AT
DRESDEN . . . . .2l8
CHAPTER XXI
1863
THE CONGRESS OF PRINCES AT FRANKFORT . . . 225
CHAPTER XXII
1863-1864
DEATH OF THE KING OF DENMARK.  THE SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN
QUESTION IN THE DIET AND IN THE CHAMBERS.  THE LONDON
CONFERENCE . . . 2,,
CHAPTER XXIII
1863-1864
THE WAR BETWEEN GERMANY AND DENMARK.  THE LONDON CON
FERENCE . . . . ¦ . 23Q

CONTENTS vii
CHAPTER XXIV
1864
THE LONDON CONFERENCE . . . .245
CHAPTER XXV
1864
THE LONDON CONFERENCE . . . . .258
CHAPTER XXVI
1864-1865
PEACE BETWEEN GERMANY AND DENMARK.  THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE
FEDERAL TROOPS.  CONTRADICTORY POLICY OF THE GREAT
POWERS.  THE TREATY OF GASTEIN AND MY VISIT TO VIENNA. —
AN HISTORICAL DESPATCH .... 266
CHAPTER XXVII
1866
THE LAST SIX MONTHS OF THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION . 277
CHAPTER XXVIII
1866
RETROSPECT ON THE COMMENCEMENT OF A NEW ERA . 281
CHAPTER XXIX
1866
THE PRECURSORS OF THE WAR . . . .287
CHAPTER XXX
1866
DECLARATION OF WAR, AND COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES . 294
CHAPTER XXXI
THE HOPEFUL DAYS OF PRAGUE AND THE SORROWFUL DAYS OF VIENNA
 THE WAR ENDS AND MY CAREER AT DRESDEN WITH IT. 305

viii CONTENTS
CHAPTER XXXII
1866
MY NOMINATION AS AN AUSTRIAN MINISTER.  RECAPITULATION OF
EVENTS AT VIENNA.  MY PARIS MISSION.  THE PRELIMINARIES OF
NIKOLSBURG.  THE FORGETFULNESS OF EXILE . . 312
CHAPTER XXXIII
1866
INCOGNITO MINISTER AT GASTEIN.  FIRST RECEPTION BY THE EMPEROR
AT ISCHL.  LETTER FROM THE KING.  VOYAGE TO SWITZERLAND
AND ON THE RHINE.  VISIT AT PRAGUE.  CARDINAL PRINCE
SCHWARZENBERG AND COUNT BELCREDI.  THE THREE BROTHERS
THUN.  ARRIVAL AT THE BALLPLATZ.  ADDRESS TO THE
OFFICIALS ...... 329
CHAPTER XXXIV
1866
RETROSPECT ...... 342
CHAPTER XXXV
THE LAST MONTHS OF 1866
THE MINISTRY AND THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS.  THE ANTI-PRUSSIAN
FEELING PREVALENT IN VIENNA ... 348
CHAPTER XXXVI
1866
THE EMPEROR.  COUNT BELCREDI.  AUSTRIAN POLICY IN GERMANY. 
ITALY AND THE EAST . . . 357
CHAPTER XXXVII
1866
Austria's problems in the east. — my programme in the first red
book.  my despatch of the 1st of january 1867.  revision
of the treaty of paris.  evacuation of the citadel of
belgrade . . . . . -3^5
CHAPTER XXXVIII
1866
LIBERAL OR REACTIONARY?  ENLIGHTENED DESPOTISM.  COMPROMISE
WITH HUNGARY . , . . . ,yQ
APPENDIX  37g

INTRODUCTION

MY FIRST INTERVIEW WITH BEUST AT SALZBURG.  SOLFERINO, SADOWA,
AND SEDAN.  THE ' STATE WASHERWOMAN.'  BEUST'S VIEWS AS TO
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND ENGLAND.  A PROTESTANT
MINISTER GOVERNING CATHOLICS.  FREEDOM ESTABLISHED IN
AUSTRIA BY A FOREIGNER.  TORY DEMOCRACY BORN AT VIENNA.
 ABOLITION OF THE CONCORDAT.  BEUST THREATENED WITH
THE FATE OF HUSS.  MEDICAL RELATIONS WITH THE CLERICALS.
 BEUST'S ROOM ON THE ' BALLPLATZ.'  MUSIC IN THE
INTERVALS OF BUSINESS.  RELATIONS WITH THE EMPEROR.  BEUST
ON BISMARCK.  A BLOODLESS REVOLUTION.  THE DUALIST SYSTEM.
 FEUDAL LADIES AT A FANCY FAIR.  ' BEUST'S AIDE-DE-CAMP.'
— BEUST AND BEACONSFIELD. — ADVENTURE AT A MASKED BALL. 
MY BOOK ON THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE.  BEUST ON THE
IRISH HOME RULE SCHEME.  MY INTERVIEW WITH THE DUC DE
GRAMONT.  THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.  BEUST AS AMBASSADOR IN
LONDON AND PARIS.  HIS LETTERS TO ME.  LAST INTERVIEWS.

I have edited the English translation of the Memoirs
of the late Count Beust in accordance with his desire,
conveyed to me some years before his death. The
present edition differs in some respects from the
German one, published by Messrs Cotta, of Stuttgart.
vol, i a

ii INTRODUCTION
Those portions of the Memoirs which are only of
interest to a German reader have, with the author's
concurrence, been omitted ; notes have been added
when necessary to elucidate the text, and extracts
are given from letters hitherto unpublished, which
will be found among these prefatory reminiscences
of my departed friend.
My acquaintance with Count Beust dates from
the month of August 1867. At that time the
now historical interview between the late Emperor
Napoleon III and the Emperor Francis Joseph had
been arranged, with the object of patching up the
friendly relations which had been impaired by the
position taken up by France in the war of 1866, and
especially with regard to the unfortunate Emperor
Maximilian of Mexico. Although the line adopted
by France in 1866 was different from that which
she assumed in 1859 in the conflict between Italy
and Austria, in which she participated, still those
who have studied carefully the course of political
events, find no difficulty in coming to the conclusion
that had the Emperor Napoleon not allied himself to
Italy in 1859, with the result achieved at Magenta
and Solferino of crippling Austria by depriving her
of a very large portion of her Italian dominions, the
events of seven years later would probably never have
occurred. What Solferino was to Sadowa, Sadowa
was to Sedan.
On the 17th of August, 1867, I arrived at

SOLFERINO, SADOWA, AND SEDAN iii
Salzburg. It was the day preceding that fixed for
the entry of the Emperor Napoleon and the Empress
Eugenie. The picturesque capital of Upper Austria
was en fete. Flags streamed from every building ;
the peasants, in their gayest attire, had come from
their mountain homes to see, if not to welcome, the
lineal descendant of one who had occupied their
territory under other conditions. The Hotel de
l'Europe was the head-quarters of the Corps
Diplomatique — gay uniforms and star-bespangled
breasts were to be seen in every corridor, and the
uninitiated observer might, from the general appear
ance presented by the town and its buildings, have
wondered whether the quiet little town was to
be made the starting-place of a military expedition,
or of another historical congress.
Having for some time taken a strong interest in
Austrian politics — more especially with regard to
their relations to the Eastern question and the
interests of England, I had been in correspondence
with Hofrath von Hofmann, one of the Aulic
councillors of the Austrian Foreign Office — a man of
the world and a diplomat of the old school, with a
thorough knowledge of men as well as of general
politics. I had just arrived at the Salzburg railway
station when I perceived M. Hofmann, busily engaged
with the station authorities about the great event of
the next day. He greeted me in the most cordial
manner, and told me that many of my letters to him

iv INTRODUCTION
on Eastern affairs had been shown to the Austrian
Prime Minister, who, having heard that I was
coming to Salzburg, had requested him to introduce
me to him : he added that Count, then Baron Beust,
was occupying a suite of apartments in the castle of
Salzburg, and that he would receive me at three
o'clock in the afternoon. Accordingly at that hour I
proceeded to the famous old Schloss, and was ushered
into one of those uncomfortable, albeit picturesque
rooms, which were renovated and refurnished at the
time of Maria Theresa — awakening recollections of
the reign of that great Empress, when Austria was
despotically ruled by the first of her Imperial Chan
cellors, Prince Kaunitz. After a few moments'
leisure, in which I had time to examine the faded
glories of the past, in the shape of some monumental
and peculiarly uncomfortable furniture, the door
opened, and Baron Beust came in. I had imagined a
tall commanding figure, dressed in all the severe
simplicity befitting the high position of constitutional
Minister of the Austrian empire, with his button-hole
adorned with a multi-coloured rosette, indicating
many distinctions conferred upon him by appreciative
or obsequious States. The picture my imagination
had drawn was not accurate. The genial statesman,
who saluted me in excellent English, was dressed
in a summer suit of the lightest hue, without the
slightest outward evidence of his high office. Rather
small in stature, slim but erect in carriage, his

THE 'STATE WASHERWOMAN' v
clearly cut, sharply moulded features and frank blue
eye created at once in my mind the impression that
although the greater part of his life had been passed
in the tortuous paths of diplomacy, candour was as
much a leading trait in his character as were sagacity
and wisdom, the qualities which had led him and
entitled him to his present dignities. The shape of the
head, the extraordinary sharpness of the features, the
high forehead, finely cut nose, small chiselled mouth
and slightly projecting chin, vividly reminded me of
the lineaments of Pitt, as represented in his statue
at the entrance to Westminster Hall. The resem
blance which I then detected was, if I may say so,
carried still further by the bold and original policy
which he inaugurated in Austria, and in which I have
often thought he emulated the example of one of the
greatest of England's Ministers. He bade me to be
seated, and said that as he knew I was conversant
with the German tongue, he preferred speaking in
that language, although, as I have before stated, he
was a perfect master of English. The first observa
tion he made to me shewed that which I afterwards
discovered in many years of close and intimate
acquaintance with him — that he had an irrepressible
vein of humour, or rather of good-natured satire,
which cheered his friends and in no small degree dis
concerted his political foes. Speaking of the invita
tion which he had received from the Emperor Francis
Joseph to leave Dresden and take the highest post of

vi INTRODUCTION
the State in Austria, he said, 'I highly appreciate
the great honour the Emperor has done me in asking
me, who am not an Austrian, to become his Prime
Minister at this great and critical period of Austria's
history ; ' and his eye twinkled, and his face lighted up
with a smile well remembered by those who knew him,
when he added : ' It is a post of great difficulty and
great responsibility ; but the incident reminds me
irresistibly of an anecdote which I believe was told of
Voltaire, who, among the many functions that he
exercised at the Court of Frederick the Great, used to
rewrite and correct the bad verses which that austere
and would-be literate monarch used to perpetrate in
his hours of ease. It so happened that at the Court
of Frederick the Great there were some, if not many,
who believed more in the monarch's knowledge of
strategy than in his capacity as a poet, and who
suspected the great Frenchman of having materially
assisted in the composition of the royal verse. One
day a courtier who was bolder than the rest ventured
to question Voltaire on the point, and his reply was :
'Mon Dieu ! il me donne son linge sale a laver.' 'That,
said Baron Beust, ' is very much my position at the
present moment. I am called in as a sort of State
washerwoman to endeavour to purify, if I can, the
accumulation of centuries of foul linen which is taint
ing the atmosphere of the Austrian State.' He went
on to say that he had read with pleasure some
remarks of mine on the connection which I conceived

BEUST'S VIEWS AS TO AUSTRIA AND ENGLAND vii
must necessarily exist between Austria and that great
and vexed problem of European politics, the Eastern
question. ' There are few Englishmen,' he observed,
' who recognise the great importance of a friendly under
standing between Austria and England. Of course, at
the time of the First Napoleon, England's Ministers
were anxious to keep up an Austrian alliance — not
because they conceived there was any identity of
interest between the two Powers, for at that time
the Eastern question did not exist, and Russia was
also Austria's ally — but because they looked upon
Austria as the possessor of large battalions whose
physical strength was an element of power, if not
an absolute necessity, in the coalition against the
Great Napoleon. As years rolled on, and the Con
gress of Vienna introduced a new epoch in history,
the friendly policy of Metternich was forgotten
among the English politicians led by Mr Gladstone
after his conversion from Toryism to Radicalism. He
declaimed against Austria as holding Italy by the
sword, and made her responsible for the atrocities
of the Neapolitan dungeons, with which, as a matter
of fact, she had nothing to do. As to the main
tenance of her power in Italy, other nations —
including England herself — have always had to repress
by very stringent measures, as in India, the attempts
of conquered populations to free themselves from
the yoke of their conquerors.'
'In 1853, when the first clouds began to over-

viii INTRODUCTION
shadow the East, and the demands of Nicholas
became every day more imperious and more difficult
of fulfilment, Austria, had she then not entertained a
cordial feeling towards England — which that country,
through what I believe was a political mistake, did
not reciprocate — might no doubt have turned the scale
against England in a manner most disastrous to her
and her allies. Austria had all the more reason for
doing this, because one of those allies was an Italian
potentate. If she had really entertained inimical
feeling towards Victor Emmanuel, she could have
thrown in her lot with Russia, and it is impossible
to foresee what might have been the result, in view
of the terribly defective condition of British army
organisation, the hollow alliance of France, and the
undisciplined auxiliaries England had in the
Turkish army and the mercenary troops attached to
it. Austria's army of observation on the Pruth
did as much to destroy the power of Russia as
the victories of Alma and Inkerman. That Russia
has never forgiven Austria's conduct in this war,
events have shown, and may in the not distant
future still further prove.'
' My object,' continued Baron Beust, ' and I have
no hesitation in saying it frankly to one who takes
an interest in Eastern affairs, is to promote as
far as possible a permanently good understanding
between great Britain and Austria. At present
I have the greatest difficulties to contend with.

PROTESTANT MINISTER GO VERNING CATHOLICS ix
I am at the inception of my task, and before I can
deal with foreign alliances and external complications,
I have to initiate reforms in the internal condition
of Austria of the gravest and most sweeping kind.
In this task I have to bear in mind that I am a
Protestant Minister ruling over Catholics, and
that any action of mine taken purely from political
and in no way from religious motives, is certain to be
construed by the clerical and the feudal party
in Austria as directed against the supremacy of the
Holy See. Austria has suffered, and is still suffering,
from an influence which though perhaps necessary
in the days of Charles the Fifth, can have no raison
d'etre under Francis Joseph. Her greatest dangers
are those of divided nationality. First and foremost
is the individuality of Hungary, which, as an element
in the government of the empire, is of capital
importance.' ' Among the many obstacles,' continued Baron
Beust, ' which I have had to contend with in the task
I have undertaken is that of religion. The other is
the fact that the feudal aristocracy of Austria resent
what they consider the intrusion of a foreigner as the
first Minister of the Crown. Austria has had to learn
a bitter lesson. She believed that through the circum
stance that she includes in her population a very large
German-speaking element she could claim not only
the sympathy of her German neighbour, but absolute
immunity from hostile intervention. The events of

x INTRODUCTION
the last few years have shown how futile was this
view. I should not have accepted my present position
had I not received the assurance that I should be
allowed to make sweeping reforms. Germany's one
aspiration is to become united under a single ruler,
and all nations which have nerved themselves to
the great struggle of national independence have
done so less by the dictation of the Government
than by the evident and progressive will of the
people. If Austria had been alive to the fact that a
purely despotic form of Government, with feudal
Ministers as puppets to give it a spurious flavour of
constitutionalism, must necessarily have alienated from
her all German national feeling, it is probable that
the German sympathies which were common to the
two countries would have prevented the possibility of
recent events and would have brought about perhaps
a permanent union between Austria and Germany.
As it is, the reactionary policy of successive Austrian
Ministers has given the Prussian Government — and
more especially the German people — too good a
right to believe that there is nothing in common
between them and Austria but their language.
Rechberg, Esterhazy, Mensdorff, and Belcredi
can never be believed to be the pioneers of pro
gressive liberty, for they are influenced on the one side
by the innate prejudices of a hereditary aristocracy,
and on the other by a bigoted subservience to the
dictates of Rome. I do not know whether you have

TORY DEMOCRACY BORN AT VIENNA xi
heard a saying which always comes to my mind when I
have to listen to the views of statesmen of this class.
It was, I believe, Windischgratz who said ' Der Mensch
fangt erst beim Baron an ' (a man only begins to be
a man when he is a Baron). Is it to be wondered at
that such an opinion, circulated throughout Germany,
with its higher standard of free education, should evoke
the deepest antipathy, and that Ministers like Count
Bismarck, anxious to promote the unity of the German
people, should not hesitate to prove their claim to
superiority by trying conclusions with Austria ?
Those who seek for an explanation of the late war may
find it in such medieval prejudices. I do not excuse
the action of Prussia ; but you will readily see
that those who are fighting at once the battle of
nationality and of political union can have but little
in common with those who, though speaking the same
language as themselves, are fettered by social, political,
and religious exclusiveness. Sadowa was a bitter
lesson to Austria ; but if the result of the disasters of
the late campaign is to be, as it will be my endeavour
to make it, the means of her regeneration, and the
removal of the abuses which have existed for centuries
— if it is to be the means of conferring on the people
that true constitutional Government which has made
England what it is — great good will have resulted from
what at first appeared to be overpowering evil. To do
this, however, I shall have to strike at the root of
many institutions which are sapping the vitality of the

xii INTRODUCTION
empire and, if continued, will destroy its life. I never
will be a party to a purely despotic Government of
which I should be only the mouthpiece. The con
stitution which his Majesty has granted on my
recommendation will prove to be a real one in fact
as well as in name. Austria must be bound by no
other obligations than those which she owes to her
own sovereign and her people. Religion must be
maintained in its spiritual and not in its temporal
aspect. The Ministry of his Majesty must contain
those who are in touch with the people, because they
are of the people — ' Das Ministerium muss vom Volk
geschaffen sein weil es vom Volk ist ' — and in such a
Ministry will be found the elements of strength and of
unity which are essential to' the maintenance ' of the
dynasty and to the prevention of such disasters as
those which we have witnessed in the late war.'

II

Time went so rapidly in this conversation that the
Baron's dinner hour of five o'clock had long passed,
and we were still talking. The clock struck six before
I left the Castle to return to my hotel. But I was
so impressed with the broad and statesmanlike views
which Baron Beust had expressed, that I at once
noted down that which I now here reproduce. As
will have been gathered from what he said to me, the
Baron foreshadowed the policy which he afterwards

ABOLITION OF THE CONCORDAT xiii
carried out with such conspicuous success. It was my
privilege to be in Vienna when the first Biir ger -
ministerium (Bourgeois Ministry) was formed, and
Austria, for the first time, in discarding the old
traditions and prejudices of the Spanish Court, ad
mitted into the Councils of her empire distinguished
citizens of the State who were endowed with other
and more substantial qualifications than those derived
from the mere accident of birth or privilege. One
might almost say that the place where Tory demo
cracy was born was not London but Vienna, and that
its first prominent exponent was Baron Beust.
With most of the members of the Biirgermini-
sterium I was personally acquainted. First and fore
most among them was Dr Giskra, the Minister of the
Interior — a very distinguished barrister whose en
lightened views, backed up by such eminent colleagues
as Drs Herbst, Berger and Plener, had immense
weight in the Reichrath, and accomplished that which
Beust contemplated when he undertook the reins of
office, namely, the destruction of the old feudal system
of government and the substitution in its place of one
more in accordance with our own Parliamentary prac
tice. Previously to the appointment of the Biirger-
ministerium Baron Beust's action had already been so
fertile in results that the Emperor had, on the 23rd of
June 1867, raised him to the highest post of dignity
in the empire, by conferring on him a position which
had previously been occupied by only two Austrian

xiv INTRODUCTION
statesmen — Prince Kaunitz and Prince Metternich —
namely, that of Reichskanzler (Imperial Chancellor).
This was the more remarkable inasmuch as it was
no secret that one of the great reforms which he
contemplated was the abolition of the Concordat. I
was in Vienna at the time that this great change took
place, and those who, like myself, had an intimate
knowledge of the enormous power of the clerico-
feudal party in the State, and of its ramifications
throughout the whole of the exclusive Austrian
society, were amazed to see a Protestant and a Saxon
able to overcome the prejudices of the Court and the
powerful machinations of the clergy, and to carry to
a triumphant issue so vital a change. Shortly before
he accomplished this I was with him in his room in
the Ministry on the Ballplatz — the same room as
had been successively occupied by the two previous
Austrian Chancellors, who probably would have
declared, had they been alive, that the repeal of the
Concordat meant finis Austria. As was his wont,
he paced up and down the spacious apartment while
he talked. He told me that the time had come
when what he considered as one of the crowning
efforts of his policy was to be accomplished. After
showing me many of the voluminous despatches,
afterwards embodied in the Austrian Red Book, from
the Papal Nuncio at Vienna, he said that he knew
well that from the moment when he should achieve
the objects of his policy, his enemies would multiply

BEUST'S ROOM ON THE BALLPLATZ xv
in untold numbers. He felt, as he spoke, that he
was risking all, and that those who wished his down
fall would endeavour to make it appear both to the
Emperor and to his immediate surroundings that his
act was dictated by hatred of the Catholic Church,
and was the embodiment of the Lutheran principles
in which he had been brought up. His words to me
were : ' meine Feinde werden mich als einen Apostel
Luther's beschreiben, und mochten mich zum Schicksal
Huss verdammen,' (my enemies will describe me as an
apostle of Luther, and would like to condemn me to
the fate of Huss) ; ' but,' he added, ' I have taken the
responsibility and I accept the obloquy and dangers of
my position.' These were at that time very consider
able, for he was overwhelmed with threatening letters,
which, however, he always disregarded and destroyed.
On the 25th of May 1868, the laws were promulgated
which abolished the Concordat ; and immediately
after Beust received at the hands of the people of
Vienna a perfect ovation. Crowds assembled on the
Ballplatz and cheered him lustily, and the Emperor
was greeted everywhere with the acclamations of the
people, especially on the Burgplatz and Josefplatz,
which were thronged with an enthusiastic multitude.
Addresses poured in upon Beust from every part
of the country, for it was felt that by the act
which he had accomplished, despite the most
strenuous opposition, and in disregard of all personal
insults and danger, he had saved the best interests of

xvi INTRODUCTION
the State. With reference to this I may relate an
amusing anecdote of the late statesman, which was
typical of the keen sense of humour to which I
have before alluded. The Count, through the
fatigues and anxieties of office, was for some days
rather indisposed, and had to call in the services of
a trained nurse. Such functions were, in the case of
male patients, generally fulfilled at Vienna by a monk
of the order of the Barmherzige Bruder. I called
to see him in the morning, and noticed one of these
monks in his room. I asked him how he was, and
received the following characteristic reply : — ' Physisch
bin ich wohler, moralisch bin ich betriibt ' (physically
I am better, morally I am depressed). I asked
why? He answered: — 'Ich weiss nicht was die
Feudalen jetzt sagen werden zu meinen intimen bezieh-
ungen zu den Klerikalen ' (I do not know what the
feudal party will now say of my intimate relations
with the church.)

Ill

Owing to the illness of one of my children I
passed much of the years 1869-70 in Vienna, and
my relations with Count Beust were of the
most intimate and cordial description. Every
day I spent several hours in his company ; he
even kindly offered me a high post in the Austrian
Foreign Office, which would have enabled me to

MUSIC IN THE INTERVALS OF BUSINESS xvii
participate officially in the policy into which I had
the honour of being initiated from its origin, and in
regard to which he was good enough to say I had
been of some use to him. I was, of course, unable
to accept his flattering offer, which would practically
have compelled me to abandon my English nationality,
and have prevented me from taking that active part
in the politics of my own country to which I aspired.
Those mornings which I passed on the Ballplatz be
long to the most interesting recollections of my life.
The Count was passionately fond of dogs, and the
room which was, or should have been, exclusively
reserved for the reception of diplomatists was
generally occupied by a number of those faithful and
perhaps more trustworthy animals. I remember
one in particular — a huge black Newfoundland, pre
sented to him by an admirer in Stuttgart. He
was called Nero, but as far as I know he possessed
none of the obnoxious qualities of his namesake.
Conscious, perhaps, of his imperial appellation,
he did not, like other dogs, occupy an unob
trusive position under the table, but invariably sat
on it ; and he and Beust's faithful Saxon servant,
whose duty it was to prevent the incursions of un-
wished-for visitors, formed the outer guard of the
Minister's sanctum. The second room beyond this
was tenanted by Beust's private secretary, Vraniczani,
and beyond this was his own room, which, if
there be any truth in the saying that, un beau
vol. i b

xviii INTRODUCTION
desordre est un effet de Fart, certainly showed the
Count to be an artist as well as a statesman. A
large desk was on the right hand side of the room,
littered with papers, books, despatches, boxes, and
billets-doux. A little table on the left was devoted to
the Count's simple lunch, which usually consisted of
a plain cutlet and a glass of beer. Further on was
that which the Count prized next in estimation to
his despatch boxes and his work — an open piano
with the MSS. scores of various charming composi
tions of his own. Often in the midst of the perusal
of an important despatch, or the consideration of a
speech the delivery of which might affect the councils
of Europe and agitate its bourses, the Count would
stop in his peregrinations round the room, and sit
down at the piano. His explanation of this was — ' Es
gibt so viel storendes in der Politik das wir probieren
werden ein bisschen Harmonie hineinzubringen,'
(there is so much discord in politics that I will try to
introduce a little harmony) ; and then, after rattling
off a waltz or striking up a polka, he would resume his
dictation at the point where he left off, apparently
refreshed by the exhilarating music which he had
produced. He was extremely careful and accurate
with regard to all his speeches, weighing and re-
weighing every word, reading them through, and
learning them by heart. His memory was extra
ordinary, and it has often occurred to me to hear
from his own lips a speech which he was afterwards

BEUST ON BISMARCK

to deliver in the Reichsrath, when he repeated it
almost word for word.

IV

The apartments in the Ballplatz were on a portion
of the old Bastei ; and the garden upon which the
windows of his room opened led to the private
entrance of the Burg, used by the Emperor and the
Imperial family. Scarcely a day passed when I was
with him that he was not summoned to a private
audience of the Emperor. The relations between
Count Beust and the Emperor were, as he has often
told me, most friendly. It seems strange that a
monarch who had been brought up almost entirely
under the influence of those who represented the old
regime in Austria, should have been able at once not
alone to recognise the necessity of a truly constitu
tional government, but freely to adopt that intimate
intercourse with his leading Minister which obtains in
England, where by long tradition as well as constitu
tional usage, the Premier is for the time being the
actual, if not the titular, head of the State. Beust
often spoke to me on this subject. He told me that
when he undertook his post after the events of 1866,
his great anxiety was lest he should have difficulty in
impressing a monarch reared in the reactionary school
of Austrian politics, with those broader views which
in his opinion were the only ones that could save

xx INTRODUCTION
Austria from internal revolution and possible disrup
tion. Some short time after my first interview
with him at Salzburg, and on the first occasion
when I visited him in Vienna, he spoke to me at con
siderable length on this matter, and it will be interest
ing here to reproduce a part of that conversation from
the notes which I took at the time. ' The dangers
which Austria has to face,' he said, ' are of a twofold
nature. The first is presented by the tendency of her
liberal-minded German population to gravitate to
wards that larger portion of the German-speaking
people now represented by Prussia, Saxony, what was
Hanover, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria; the second is
the diversity of language and race in the empire. Of
Austria's large Slav population, the Poles have a
natural craving for independence after having enjoyed
and heroically fought for it for centuries ; while the
other nationalities are likely at a moment of dangerous
crisis to develop pro-Russian tendencies. Everyone
who has studied the German problem — which assumed
an acute form in 1866, when I was Minister in Saxony
— must feel that, setting aside the question of rivalry
with France, which sooner or later will be decided at the
point of the sword, it resolves itself simply into the
question of political supremacy. The Germans, that
is the majority of them, have been and are still anxious
not to perpetuate the state of things typified by the
German empire as constituted by Charles the Fifth.
Bismarck's object is, so far as I know it, to consolidate

BEUST ON BISMARCK xxi
Germany under one head, probably that of King
William as Emperor. Germany has changed im
mensely in sentiment and policy since I was at
Frankfort as Saxon Minister to the German Bund.
The condition of affairs which then existed can never
recur ; and the action of Prussia in the Schleswig-
Holstein question was the first practical demonstra
tion of the underlying principle of Bismarck's policy,
which means Germany for the Germans.
' The events of last year are but a further develop
ment of this idea. The incorporation of Hanover
affords the most striking example of the resolution
with which any attempt at resistance will be met,
and of the consequences of such resistance, and I have
no doubt that, but for the difference of religion,
Bavaria might have paid the same penalty, had not
Bismarck been convinced that it would be an evil and
a danger for Prussia if he endeavoured suddenly to
amalgamate a very large Catholic population under
Protestant rule. It is possible, I might almost say
probable, that if the constitutional problem had been
tried earlier in Austria — say for instance after the
disastrous campaign of 1859 — a bond of sympathy
might have been established between Austria and
Germany which not only would have rendered active
antagonism impossible, but might have united the
Court of Berlin with that of Vienna in a pacific
endeavour to accomplish that which has now been
rudely attempted by force. Germany, with her free

xxii INTRODUCTION
aspirations and her highly cultured people, felt that
the existence of a vast contiguous empire with a large
population of German-speaking subjects ruled by
Ministers like Esterhazy and Belcredi, representing a
policy in which the autocratic views of Philip of
Spain were blended with a military regime and
governed by the veto of the Vatican, was not only an
anachronism in this age of progress, but a source of
constant peril. It is to this conviction, deep-seated
in the mind of Bismarck, quite as much as to the
wish of an imperious and ambitious Minister to place
his country in the position of supremacy to which he
conceived it entitled, that we have to seek, and may
find, the causes which culminated in the disaster of
Sadowa. My object and aim in accepting the
immense responsibility which rests upon me is
not, as Bismarck would have the world believe,
to act in antagonism to those German sentiments
in which I have been born and bred, and which
during the years when I was Minister at Dresden
I have faithfully endeavoured to carry out, but to
find a modus vivendi between the German-speaking
populations and their governments ; and without
granting the supremacy to either, to maintain the
position of both.
'And now to the second danger I have above
mentioned, which presents a far more difficult pro
blem. So long as Austria was a purely despotic
State, and the Emperor ruled over it as an absolute

A BLOODLESS REVOLUTION xxiii
monarch — Emperor in Vienna, King in Hungary and
Bohemia, Ducal Prince in the other provinces of his
vast empire — the local councils had a merely nominal
existence, and the governors were there but to
register the sovereign's Imperial will and to enforce
it by arms if the necessity should arise. The revolu
tionary wave of 1848 swept over his territories as it
did over those of other potentates ; laws and decrees
which the ignorance and apathy of his people had
tolerated, if not approved, in the days of Maria
Theresa and the monarchs who succeeded her, raised
for the first time among the masses of the population
objections and antipathies which generated the firm
resolve in their minds to sweep the whole system
away. The German element, then as now, took the
initiative ; but the feeble constitutional measures
which were the outcome of popular strife and much
bloodshed dwindled down year by year until but a
semblance of constitutionalism remained. The com
fortable and good-natured Austrian (' behaglicher und
gemiithlicher Osterreicher ' ) soon forgot what had
happened, and occupied himself more with his creature
comforts and his dramatic performances than with the
development of his constitutional liberties. And—
which will show the difficulty of the position— the
various nationalities of the empire preferred their
servile condition to a state of things which on the very
principle of Constitutional government would place all
the component parts of the monarchy on an equality,

xxiv INTRODUCTION
and cause their representatives to meet in a common
parliament on an equal footing. Now my object is
to carry out a bloodless revolution ('eine blutlose
Revolution muss ich hervorbringen ') — to show the
various elements of this great empire that it is to the
benefit of each of them to act in harmony with its
neighbour, and that no Constitution can permanently
exist unless every portion of the State is represented
by it. But to this I have made one exception.
Hungary is an ancient monarchy, more ancient as
such than Austria proper. The kingdom of St
Stephen has a pedigree of centuries ; and its consti
tutional principle was asserted in the earliest times.
Its race and language are entirely different from those
of the other peoples which constitute the monarchy ;
its territorial area is larger than theirs ; its population,
though less by six millions than that of the remainder
of the empire, is much larger than that of any of the
nationalities composing it. Its people are powerful,
brave, united— and, notwithstanding 1848, loyal; for
we must not forget that the terrible events of that
year in Hungary were to a great extent caused by a
system of military despotism, carried out by Windisch
gratz and Haynau, which aroused the just indignation
of men of such widely different views and position as
Batthyany and Kossuth, and united them in an effort
perhaps less directed against the Hapsburg dynasty
than against the generals who, under a boy Emperor,
were usurping and abusing the functions of Govern-

THE DUALISTIC SYSTEM xxv
ment. In the scheme which I have developed I have
endeavoured to give Hungary not a new position with
regard to the Austrian empire, but to secure her in the
one which she has occupied. The Emperor of Austria
is King of Hungary ; my idea was that he should
revive in his person the Constitution of which he and
his ancestors have been the heads. The leading
principles of my plan are, not the creation of a new
kingdom and a new Constitution, but the resuscitation
(' Auf erstehung ') of an old monarchy and an old
Constitution ; not the separation of one part of the
empire from the other, but the drawing together of
the two component parts by the recognition of their
joint positions, the maintenance of their mutual obliga
tions, their community in questions affecting the
entire empire, and their proportional pecuniary respon
sibility for the liabilities of the whole State. It is no
plan of separation that I have carried out ; on the
contrary, it is one of closer union, not by the creation
of a new power, but by the recognition of an old one.
This cannot be too often repeated, for I know that
there are many people who maintain that I have
divided the empire.
' I may be asked why I do not apply the same
system to Bohemia. The conditions are absolutely
different. The rank of King of Bohemia held by the
Emperor of Austria has always been rather a titular
than a real one ; other sovereigns have held it, and it
was more an ornament than a power to the Austrian

xxvi INTRODUCTION
crown. Besides, if I were to advocate a separate
kingdom for Bohemia, I could only do so by limiting
it to the portion of the country which is inhabited by
the Slavs, namely, about one-half of the population.
But would it be possible to create a Slav monarchy
which should rule over an equal population of
Germans, the latter representing in a far .higher
degree the intelligence and manufacturing industry of
the whole of Bohemia ? There is no parallel between
the two cases.'
These words are especially remarkable because
they fully explain the policy which changed the
Austrian into the Austro-Hungarian empire. I
shall have occasion to refer to them again in connection
with the question which is now of all-engrossing
importance to Englishmen — that of Home Rule.

V

In proportion as the enlightened views and broad
statesmanship of Count Beust gradually permeated
the almost impenetrable barrier of the exclusive
Austrian society, the latent prejudices and bigotry
of the feudal nobility began to assume a more mili
tant and active shape. On the occasion of a great
fancy fair held for the benefit of the poor of Vienna,
at which the stalls were occupied by ladies of the
aristocracy, the long pent-up hatred— for I can de
scribe it by no other term — found free vent from the

' BEUST'S AIDE-DE-CA MP ' xxvii
lips of those who with characteristic narrow-minded
ness believed that the salvation of the country,
spiritual as well as temporal, was imperilled by the
advent of a heretical and foreign Prime Minister.
It is vividly in my recollection how two of the
leaders of Austrian society, knowing the intimate
relations which existed between the Austrian Chan
cellor and myself, took the opportunity which pre
sented itself of using me as what the Italians aptly
term a sfoga, for letting off the pent-up steam of
their indignation. I was purchasing some trifle of
them, when, forgetting the true principles of that
Christian charity which they professed to promote,
they launched out into the bitterest invectives against
the statesman who had been called in by their
sovereign to save the monarch}". ' How,' asked one
of them, ' can a Protestant hope to do any good in
our Catholic country ? What right has he to abolish
the Concordat, that bond of union which enables the
Holy Father to extend his benign influence and have
a guiding hand in our affairs ? ' She even hinted that
the reputed influence that I, another heretic, exer
cised, was an equally baleful and unjustifiable one —
adding : ' Man nennt sie doch den adlatus des Beust '
(for they call you Beust's aide-de-camp). I answered
that I could lay no claim to such a distinguished
position, even did I aspire to it ; but that no
one but a bigot, in his wildest attacks upon the
Chancellor, could dare to say that, as Protestant

xxviii INTRODUCTION
Prime Minister, he had wished or attempted to
interfere in the free exercise by all the subjects ofthe
realm of the creed they professed. For two reasons
he had adopted the policy which she condemned :
the first was that the guiding principle of government
was to leave a sovereign unfettered by obligations
dependent on the will of any foreign potentate,
temporal or spiritual, and to recognise only those
which, if a despotic monarch, he owed directly to
his people, if a constitutional one, to their represen
tatives. The days of the pilgrimage to Canossa were
over ; and a regenerated Austria would never tolerate
their return. The second reason was that the system
of education in Austria required widening ; and how
ever essential to the well-being of the people was
religious instruction, it was imperative that that
instruction should not be made a bar to the progress
of general education among the masses. To this she
rejoined : ' Beust is revolutionising our country ; he
is destroying our institutions, and the result will be
ruin to us all.' I answered that I happened to be in
Vienna as a boy when it was proposed to pull down
the Bastei and make Vienna a modern city. ' The
Bastei, built up by the citizens of Vienna to protect
themselves against the forces of the Turks, were held
at that time to be as essential to the well-being of
the town and its citizens as are the mediaeval insti
tutions which you now seek to uphold. They have
been swept away ; you have your new town, your

BEUST AND BEACONSFIELD xxix
splendid buildings, all the improvements of sanitation
and civilisation, and as a result a healthier, larger,
and more contented industrial population. As with
the Bastei, which were ramparts against barbarism,
so with mediseval laws and compacts which you and
those who think with you would seek to perpetuate.
The miserable hovels, haunts of crime and disease,
which empested Vienna before their demolition, may
be compared with the obstruction offered by a pre
judiced and privileged class to the efforts of a wise and
reforming Minister. The grand buildings have been
respected, and they and the long pedigree of their
traditions remain as. lasting monuments. The useful
institutions of the State are also preserved by wise
statesmanship ; the useless and crumbling ones have
been swept away ; and so it will be with those who
attempt to stem the torrent of just and equitable
public opinion.'
I cannot say that these observations found favour
with either of the ladies referred to. Although I
frequently met them at parties given in the house of
the Chancellor whom they had reviled, our relations
were never of a very cordial nature ; and I cannot help
remembering, in connection with these two leaders
of society and many others, that similar attacks were
made in English society, in the clubs, and in the House
of Commons, upon another Minister, almost on similar
grounds. Not indeed that he was called upon to
sweep away abuses such as existed in Austria in 1866 ;

xxx INTRODUCTION
but that he — not belonging to the privileged few,
having neither the claims of birth nor wealth to give
him, as is often the case, a position secured by those
attributes alone — the son of a Jew, himself brought up
until his twelfth year in the creed of his fathers —
succeeded by the sheer force of his indomitable will
and masterly intelligence in twice attaining the proud
position of Prime Minister of this country, strong in
the admiration and friendship of his sovereign and the
attachment of the people.
Count Beust had the highest admiration for Lord
Beaconsfield ; he had known him many years, was
very intimate with him at the time when he was
Saxon Minister in London, and renewed his acquaint
ance with him when he came here as representative of
the Bund at the London Conference in 1863. My
first introduction to Lord Beaconsfield, then Mr
Disraeli, took place through a letter which Count
Beust gave me at the end of 1867, and the immediate
result of which was that I contested the borough of
Sandwich in 1868.

VI

Beust was extremely fond of society, and was
known as an admirable causeur and raconteur. Like all
great men, he had his petty vanities, one of the most
prominent of which was that he was proud of his
small feet. On one occasion he made a bet with

ADVENTURE AT A MASKED BALL xxxi
one of the leading ladies of the Court that he could
wear her shoe. He won the bet, whereupon the lady,
with great wit and presence of mind, observed ' Es
ist merkwiirdig das ein so grosser Minister auf so
kleinen Fuss lebt' (It is singular that so great a
Minister should live on so small a footing). He
entertained largely at the Ballplatz, and on one
occasion the principal drawing-room was converted
into a theatre, and tableaux were given on three
successive evenings, in which all the celebrated
Viennese beauties took part, the tableaux themselves
being designed by the principal artists of the capital.
The fite was for a charitable object for which I
believe over 100,000 florins was realised. But it was
not only at home that the Count indulged in the
pleasures of society. He was a constant attendant
at the Burg and Opera, and was extremely fond of
going to masked balls and hearing from enterprising
masks opinions and news which he probably would
never have learned from any other source. During
the Fasching (Carnival) in Vienna one or two masked
balls are given in a ball-room in a portion of the Burg
(they are in 'no way connected with Court festivities)
called the Catherinensaal. These balls are known by
the name of Catherinen Redoutes ; the company is
extremely select, and the highest ladies of society, in
domino and mask, do not, or at least did not at that
time, hesitate to go there. The following anecdote,
related to me by the Count himself, illustrates the

xxxii INTRODUCTION
jovial tone of Viennese society at that period. Beust
went to one of these Catherinen Redoutes accompanied
by a young man who was a great personal friend.
His companion informed him that he had just quitted
the family circle, and that although he had urged his
wife to accompany him, she unfortunately was unable
to do so as she was suffering from indisposition.
They entered the brilliantly-lighted hall, and in a few
moments they were accosted by two dominos deeply
masked and dressed exactly alike in black. One
proceeded to enter into a political badinage with the
Count, the other into a less serious and possibly more
agreeable conversation with his companion. They
walked for a considerable time about the ball-room,
both enchanted with their unknown and unrecognis
able partners. Whether the diplomatist's conversation
was confined exclusively to politics he never told me :
but it was clear from what he overheard . that his
friend's was not, and that he was for the moment
oblivious of the suffering helpmate he had left at home.
In fact, it would appear that he allowed his imagina
tion to get the better of his reason and his discretion,
for he vowed eternal love to the masked fair one,
and taking a flower from his button-hole, handed it
to her at her request with the assurance that she
would treasure it as a souvenir, only to be restored
to him when next they met. 'Alas,' said Beust,
with an ironical smile, 'that meeting was all too
soon, and not so pleasant as the amorous swain had

BOOK ON THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE xxxiii
anticipated.' The two dominos disappeared in the
crowd ; the Count and his companion lingered yet
awhile in the ball-room, and then returned leisurely
home. The next morning his friend came down to
breakfast, somewhat ashamed of the incident of the
previous evening. In a few moments his wife
appeared, and with anything but a gracious smile
handed him the flower which he had presented to her
at the ball. The Count went on to say that he was
equal to the occasion, and stoutly maintained that he
had recognised her as the masked domino — which
statement was received with a scepticism worthy
of the superior acuteness of the sex.
Count Beust was very fond of horse-exercise, and
his white horse was well known in Vienna as ' Beust's
Schimmel.' He rode every day in the Prater, and
when he came to England the old Arab steed was
almost as familiar in London as it was in Vienna.
He was much attached to it, and rode it on the
memorable occasion when the Emperor Francis Joseph
was crowned King of Hungary at Pesth. He took it
with him to Paris when he was appointed Ambassador
to the Court of the Tuileries, where it died of old age.
VII
During my stay in Vienna I carefully watched
the course of political events from the period of Count
Beust's accession to offioe after the Austro-Prussian
vol. i c

xxxiv INTRODUCTION
war, and noted the extraordinary changes which had
taken place in the empire. It then occurred to me
that a work which should accurately describe the
progress of constitutionalism in Austria, the political
aspirations of its various nationalities, the creation of
that dual system which resuscitated the ancient
Hungarian constitution and gave to the Emperor of
Austria the potential as well as the titular appellation
of King of Hungary, and the circumstances of the
abolition of the Concordat, might be of interest and
instruction to the reading public in England, whose
ideas about Austria were mainly derived from the
passionate diatribes of English politicians, never
weary of inveighing against her policy in Italy and
the supposed oppression of the Hungarians. I com
municated my idea to Count Beust, who welcomed it,
and assured me that he would most willingly place at
my disposal any material I should think fit to use in
order that my work might not merely represent the
ideas which I might personally have conceived with
regard to events in Austria, but also be an accurate
history of what had taken place from 1866 to the
period of its publication. To facilitate the object I
had in view, and to ensure the quiet necessary for so
arduous a task, he kindly placed at my disposal a
room in a portion of the Foreign Office situated in the
Herren Gasse, and gave me access to all the State
papers and records bearing on the subject. The
book was published in London at the beginning of

BOOK ON THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE xxxv
1870, under the title of 'the Austro-Hungarian
Empire and the Policy of Count Beust.' The first
edition appeared under the nom de plume of 'An
Englishman.' Personally, I did not attach any im
portance to the work, except as an accurate record of
facts, and I therefore omitted to reserve to myself the
usual author's rights. I had reason to regret this,
inasmuch as two unauthorised translations appeared
soon after, one in Paris and the other at Leipzig.
Six years later, at the time of the Russo-Turkish War,
the book having been often quoted to show Austria's
relations to the Eastern Question, I published a
second edition of it in my own name, and added a
chapter on the aspect of that question with regard to
the War. It may be interesting here to note that
although this work was written in Vienna, and a vast
amount of official information was supplied to me by
Count Beust, he never saw it until it was actually
published. The reason which he gave — and which
I have no doubt was absolutely sincere — was that he
wished to feel that no remarks or suggestions of his
had in the smallest degree biassed what he desired to
be an impartial history.
In this connection I may not perhaps be con
sidered as overstepping the task which I have under
taken if I compare the following statement made
by Mr Gladstone on the 8th April 1886, on the second
reading of the Government of Ireland Bill, with the
condition of affairs in the Austrian empire which

xxxvi INTRODUCTION
induced Count Beust to propound his dualistic
policy. Mr Gladstone then said : —
'I take another case — the case of Austria and
Hungary. In Austria and Hungary there is a
complete duality of power. I will not enter upon
the general condition of the Austrian empire, or
upon the other divisions and diversities which it
includes, but I will take simply this case. At
Vienna sits the Parliament of the Austrian mon
archy; at Buda-Pesth sits the Parliament of the
Hungarian Crown ; and that is the state of things
which was established, I think, twenty years ago.
I ask all those who hear me whether there is
one among them who doubts ? Whether or not
the condition of Austria be at this moment
perfectly solid, secure and harmonious, after the
enormous difficulties she has had to confront on account
of the boundless diversity of race ; whether or not that
condition be perfectly normal in every minute par
ticular, this, at least, cannot be questioned, that it
is a position of solidity and safety compared with the
time when Hungary made war on her — war which
she was unable to quell when she owed the cohesion
of the body politic to the interference of Russian
arms ; or in the interval that followed, when there
existed a perfect legislative union, and the supreme
Imperial Council was in Vienna. What again was
the case of Austria, where the seat of the empire in
the Archduchy was associated not with the majority

BEUST ON THE IRISH HOME RULE SCHEME xxxvii
but with the minority of the population, and where
she had to face Hungary with numbers far greater
than her own ? Even there, while having to admit
what was infinitely more complex and more dangerou's
than even prejudice can suppose to be that which I
am about to suppose, it is not to be denied that great
relative good and relative success had been attained.'
At the very beginning of this quotation it will be
seen that Mr Gladstone shrunk from facing the
difference between the position of affairs in Austria,
which led to the re-establishment of the Hungarian
Constitution, and that which exists in England and
Ireland. His statement that in Austria and Hungary
there is complete duality of power is also incorrect, as
by the system of delegations or joint diet, which I
shall subsequently explain, continuous solidarity in the
affairs of the empire is maintained. He goes on to
say that he ' will not enter upon the general condition
of the Austrian empire or upon the other divisions
and diversities which it includes ; ' but in those
divisions and diversities we' must find the causes of
the establishment ofthe dual system, and it is obviously
illogical for Mr Gladstone to attempt to draw similar
conclusions from distinctly different premises.
Mr Gladstone says ' at Vienna sits the Parliament
of the Austrian Monarchy; at Buda-Pesth sits the
Parliament of the Hungarian Crown,' implying, if not
actually stating, that there is no link between those
institutions, that each is absolutely independent of the

xxxviii INTRODUCTION
other and free from every trammel in connection with
the general empire. The very words 'Austro-
Hungarian empire,' by which the Austrian empire
was to be known officially, after the dual system was
inaugurated, go far to prove the fallacy of such an
assumption. But there is one absolute dissimilarity
between Mr Gladstone's scheme of Home Rule in
Ireland and that of Qount Beust. Of this dissimil
arity I can only conclude that Mr Gladstone was not
aware. The proposed Irish Parliament was to have no
voice in questions of peace or war, of the army
or the navy, or of foreign affairs. Such matters
were to be left exclusively to the Imperial
Parliament. Equally excluded were international
treaties, customs dues, indirect taxes, and ques
tions of currency. Now what is the case in
Austria- Hungary ? Under the title of ' affairs in
common' are defined the direction of the foreign
policy of the empire, together with its diplomatic
representation abroad, and a joint army under the
supreme command of the Emperor. Both parts of
the empire have to contribute proportionately to the
cost of the Ministry of foreign affairs and of the army.
All international treaties are subject to the sanction
of both legislatures. All affairs requiring equal con
sideration, such as the customs dues, indirect taxes,
and the currency, are also to be regulated by treaties
subject to the approval of both moieties of the realm.

BEUST ON THE IRISH HOME RULE SCHEME xxxix
In order to regulate the proper constitutional
management of the affairs 'in common' the institu
tion of the ' Delegations ' was introduced. Each
legislative assembly elects a Delegation consisting of
sixty members, forty of whom are elected by each of
the lower houses, and twenty by each of the upper
houses. These Delegations assemble alternately at
Vienna and Pesth for the purpose of confidentially
discussing the bills or propositions of the Govern
ment, and of communicating to each other the
resolutions come to thereon, exchanging views on
points of difference, and, in case no agreement is
arrived at, proceeding to a division without a debate.
The concordant resolutions of both delegations are
sanctioned by the monarch as ' common laws,' the
execution of which is entrusted to the Ministries of
both countries. Finally, the joint Austro-Hungarian
Ministers are responsible to the Delegations which
also vote the budget. Where, I repeat, is the
analogy which Mr Gladstone sought to establish ?
The two parliaments of Vienna and Pesth are abso
lutely co-ordinate, for in matters relating to peace or
war and other important points which I have before
enumerated, neither can act without the other ; and
this inability to take separate action — involving as it
does the necessity of entire accord between the two
legislatures in matters affecting the general interests
of the empire— affords the best possible guarantee
against a separatist policy, which as such certainly

xl INTRODUCTION
does not exist in the Home Rule scheme of Mr
Gladstone. Mr Gladstone asks whether the position of Austria
is not one of solidity, of safety compared with the time
when Hungary made war on her? Nobody would
hesitate to answer in the affirmative. At that time
the revolution of 1848 was raging, and the whole of
Europe was more or less dangerously convulsed. But
the dual system was not introduced as a result of that
revolution. It was not introduced until nineteen
years afterwards, under circumstances to which I have
already alluded in detail ; and here I may quote the
words of Count Beust himself in two letters which he
wrote to me from Altenberg in the spring and summer
of 1886, after the introduction of Mr Gladstone's bill.
In these letters he says : —
' Independently of the demerits and dangers of Mr
Gladstone's Home Rule scheme, he has to my mind
little or no excuse for introducing it, and the parallel
he draws between it and the dual system I inaugurated
is utterly fallacious. Agrarian agitation is the plea
which he uses for giving the Irish people a separate
parliament. I believe that the agrarian system in
Ireland has for centuries been a bad one, and the land
legislation of 1881 — -whatever people may think of it
from a moral point of view — will unquestionably
bring about good results. But how these results are
to be beneficially increased by giving Ireland a
separate parliament and handing over its government

BEUST ON THE IRISH HOME RULE SCHEME xii
to the avowed enemies of England, I cannot see, for
one of its first acts would be to pass laws^ virtually
decrees of expulsion — against the landlords, to banish
capital from the land, and materially to aggravate
the general condition of the peasantry. As an old
statesman I should consider that the establishment of
an Irish Parliament, raising, as it unquestionably would,
aspirations on the part of the people to free themselves
from the English yoke, and increasing the power of
political agitators, is fraught with the gravest danger
to England. I cannot understand Mr Gladstone
quoting Austria-Hungary as an example, for, inde
pendently of the great dissimilarity between the two
systems, Mr Gladstone forgets the condition of
Austria when the Hungarian Parliament was estab
lished. Austria had been beaten after a short
but most disastrous war ; Prussia had forbid
den her any further interference in German affairs ;
the country was almost in a state of latent revolu
tion ; and an outbreak in Hungary, promoted by
foreign agents and foreign gold, with Klapka doing
Count Bismarck's bidding, was in the highest degree
probable, and would, had it occurred, have led to
almost overwhelming disaster. Knowing this, I felt
bound to advise the Emperor to accede to the views
of the De"ak party, securing the solidarity of the
empire by the guarantees afforded through the systems
of delegations and joint budget. Mr Gladstone cannot
urge upon your House of Commons the same reasons

xiii INTRODUCTION
for granting Home Rule to Ireland. England has
not been, and I trust never will be, beaten as Austria
had been beaten. No foreign foe has been dictating
terms at the gates of London. No revolution is latent;
and, a point also worthy of consideration, the popula
tion of Ireland is only about five millions, including
those Protestants who are against the Home Rule
scheme, as compared with what I should think was
the wish of the great majority of the thirty millions
composing the population of Great Britain ; whereas
the area of Hungary is greater than that of Austria
proper, and its population is nearly one-half of the
total population ofthe empire.'
The incidents connected with the establishment of
the dual system in Hungary present, indeed, such
peculiar features of interest at the present time that
it may not be out of place to recapitulate the circum
stances which led to an arrangement not in the least
degree intended to separate the two great portions of
the empire, but on the contrary to consolidate their
union. The view urged by Mr Gladstone and his
Irish supporters that the dual system in Austria-
Hungary affords a parallel and a precedent for the
establishment of a statutory parliament in Dublin can
be shown to be utterly fallacious from the conditions
which led to the establishment of that system, and from
the views entertained by its author on the subject.

BEUST ON THE IRISH HOME RULE SCHEME xliii
VIII
When Count Beust was called to the head of
affairs on the 30th of October 1866, Austria had just
emerged from a fearful conflict. She had been hope
lessly defeated. Bohemia was converted into one
vast battlefield, and, had they so wished, there is little
doubt that the Prussian troops might have occupied
Vienna. As a result, the German element in Austria
was excluded absolutely from any voice in the affairs
of the mother country. The feeling among the
German population of Austria was bitter in the
extreme ; and in view of this and of the dissensions
which existed among the other nationalities, Count
Beust felt that unless some resolute effort were made
to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Germans
by means of a real constitutional government, and at
the same time to meet the views of the Ddak party in
Hungary, the dismemberment of the empire would
inevitably result.
Thus it will be seen that the very origin of the
Dualistic system was fundamentally different from that
of the Home Rule scheme of Mr Gladstone. More
over, Counts Belcredi and Esterhazy wished to
exclude parliamentary government and to return to
absolutism. To have adopted such a line of policy
would have been to accentuate and increase the
dissatisfaction of the all-powerful German element, to
force them into active opposition, to cause them to

xliv INTRODUCTION
gravitate to Germany, to give undue preponderance
to the enormous Slav population of the empire, and
last, but not least, to strengthen the hands of the
Deak party in Hungary in a struggle for complete
independence. In a word, it became necessary for
Count Beust to face this problem : either to restore
to Hungary a position which she had in some degree
formerly enjoyed, or else to add to the great dangers
of internal disruption in Austria proper at a moment
when she was enfeebled by a most disastrous war,
threatening revolution in Hungary, with the possible
and not improbable consequence of further dangerous
external complications.
It is evident that there is no analogy between this
position and Mr Gladstone's demand for Home Rule
in Ireland. The dual system of Count Beust had for
its object the unification and consolidation of the
empire at a moment when, as the outcome of a war,
the most powerful component parts of the monarchy
both claimed constitutional independence almost as a
sine qua non of continued allegiance. It must be
remembered that in Austria constitutionalism was
more a form than a reality, and at that period a return
to absolute Government would, as I have before
pointed out, have meant nothing short of destruction.
In 1866 Austria ceased to be a German Power ;
and so wise a diplomatist as Count Beust could
not fail to see that internal dissensions coming on
the top of ruinous defeat, might lead to the creation

BEUST ON THE IRISH HOME RULE SCHEME xiv
of a vast German empire, drawing into itself the
German speaking portions of Austria, and even the
Austrian capital. The surest mode of bringing
about such a result would have been to ignore
the wishes of Deak and Andrassy, and to allow the
spark of dissension in Hungary to be fanned by them
and those who thought with them, into a flame which
would have been artificially increased and fed by the
money and influence of another power. It was known
that Prussia's object was to bring about a catastrophe
which should transfer the Austrian capital from
Vienna to Pesth, as the chief city of a new eastern
empire. This was notoriously the policy of Count
Bismarck, not because he loved Austria less, but be
cause he loved Germany more ; indeed he afterwards
expressed it in the words — ' Oesterreich muss sich nach
Osten verlegen' (Austria must move eastward.)
Count Beust wisely sought, by introducing the
dual system, and by making Count Andrassy Presi
dent of the Hungarian Ministry, to avert the dis
memberment of the empire whose destinies he had
been called by the Emperor to control. Where again
is the parallel between such a state of things and the
necessity for a Parliament on College Green ? With
regard to the latter, we have the oft-repeated assur
ance of those chosen to represent and speak for
Ireland that it is the thin end of the wedge which it
is hoped will permanently cleave the two countries.
As to the former, I have shewn by facts that the dual

xlTi INTRODUCTION
system in Austria-Hungary was conceived and
carried out by Count Beust for the purpose of pre
venting disunion.
Again, Count Beust's views with regard to Deak's
dualistic scheme had the full support of the great
majority of the German party in Austria. The
leaders of the party held what is now an historical
meeting in Aussee, accepted the dual principle, and
pledged themselves to do all in their power to promote
it. This further shows how different the circum
stances under which the dualistic scheme was intro
duced were from those under which Mr Gladstone
proposed his Home Rule scheme. It must be remem
bered that the German party in Austria represents
the most highly educated and intelligent portion
of the population, as well as the preponderating
element in trade and commercial industry. At that
time the Hungarian population was, in round numbers,
about fifteen millions, while that of the rest of the
empire was between nineteen and twenty millions.
The total population of the empire, estimated at
that time at about 34,650,000, embraced 10,600,000
Slavs in the North- Western and South- Western
portions of the empire, whose Slavophile tendencies
were rather antagonistic than generally favourable
to a progressive policy, and 2,200,000 Poles. The
balance was made up of Ruthenians; Roumanians
in the Bukovina, North-Eastern Hungary and
Transylvania ; Italians in Dalmatia and Goritz ;

BEUST ON THE IRISH HOME RULE SCHEME xlvii
and other nationalities, most of whom were not
very loyal to the dynasty. Count Beust thus felt
himself supported in his policy by the consciousness
that it had the approval of a very large proportion of
the population of Austria, having the greatest regard
for its interests and its union.
In a subsequent letter to me from Altenberg he
wrote :
' The separation of Ireland from England would,
in my opinion, inevitably take place some years
after the institution of the Home Rule Parliament.
Reading the history of the time when Grattan's
Parliament existed, every politician must be struck
by the fact that, so far from its having promoted a
loyal spirit in Ireland and one friendly to England,
the reverse was the case ; and that often sympathy
was expressed with, and active support tendered to
the French. What happened then would certainly
happen again now ; and the peril is in my
mind immensely increased by the sympathy and
support which the agitators in Ireland receive from
America. With regard to Hungary, one great
guarantee against her separation from the empire
was to be found in the fact that she was surrounded
by Slav States, and that her separate existence as a
kingdom is impossible. Once separated from Austria,
she would be absorbed. Ireland, on the contrary, as
an island separated geographically from England,
could indulge in the wild dream of an independent

xlviii INTRODUCTION
existence ; but, should the dream become a reality,
it would necessitate an enormous increase in the
naval and military power of England to prevent
Ireland, through foreign machinations, from be
coming a source of the gravest danger to the
sister country. Again : her claims to a separate
parliament have no analogy whatever to those of
Hungary. The latter country has her separate
history, a constitution which had been despotically
abolished, her own language — not, as in Ireland, con
fined to a few outlying districts, and with no literature,
but the language of the educated as well as of the
illiterate, of the courts of law, of poets and his
torians. Moreover, and this is a point of great differ
ence between the two countries, Hungary was never
represented in any Austrian Parliament. How there
fore, can Mr Gladstone use my dualistic system as a
precedent for his scheme of Home Rule? In Hungary
there was a unanimous demand, without distinction
of class or religion, for a restitution of the ancient
privileges of the country, which in no way re
sembled, so far as I can make out, those possessed
by Ireland when there was an Irish Parliament.
The Imperial Parliament of England may, and as a
student of history I should say has, made grave
mistakes in the Government of Ireland, for which
both parties in the State may be held responsible ;
but I do not believe that Ireland would obtain more
justice from an Irish Parliament, especially as the

BEUST ON THE IRISH HOME RULE SCHEME xlix
present agitation proves that the founders of the
National League would then become the rulers of the
country. As a lover of England and her free institu
tions, I sincerely hope that an Irish Parliament may
never be established.'
This was written but a few months before his
death ; and knowing as I do how conscientiously he
studied English politics, reading the debates in the
Times daily, and following every move on the political
chess-board, his views must, I am sure, possess great
weight with all who have the true interests of England
at heart. No sincerer admirer of England and of the
English, of their equal laws and model constitution,
could be found among the statesmen of Europe ; and
his long residence among us gives hi1? opinions a
special claim to consideration.

IX

Count Beust, notwithstanding the very arduous
labours of the day, found time to go a great deal into
society in Vienna, and had a remarkable faculty for
shaking off the cares of office in light and agreeable
conversation. The British embassy was perhaps the
house where he was the most constant guest, especially
at the time when Lord Bloomfield was our Ambas
sador. The hospitable mansion in the Herren Gasse,
for so many years the home of the English represen
tatives at the Court of Vienna, will be remembered
vol. i d

1 INTRODUCTION
by all those who, like myself, received invitations from
the late Lord Bloomfield and his accomplished wife.
I often met Count Beust there, either at small dinners
or at official receptions ; and I recollect that on one
occasion when nearly all the Corps Diplomatique
were assembled, the Count said to me that he was
always delighted to meet Lord Bloomfield, because his
cheery welcome counteracted the diplomatic reserve
which his high representative position imposed upon
him. He added : ' Bloomfield's Gesicht ist frei und
offen, aber der Graf S  hat wass ich nennen wiirde
ein falsches gemuthliches Blick ' (Bloomfield has a
frank open face, but Count S  has an expression
which I should call one of sham good nature). The
high personage to whom he referred was very
accurately described by these words. Singularly
astute, and entrusted with the representation of
a very great country, his endeavour seemed to be,
by a stereotyped smile, to conceal the importance and
gravity of the subject upon which he was called to
negotiate. He only wanted a periwig and diamond
snuff box to complete the picture of a diplomatist of
the old school. On one occasion, when he was dining
with Count Beust, and he and others were discussing
the good and bad elements which go to make up a
typical diplomatist, Count Beust wittily remarked :
'Mon Dieu, Monsieur le Comte, la diplomatie est
l'art de mentir facilement et impunement,' an aphorism
in which the distinguished Ambassador who had

THE AUSTRIAN FOREIGN OFFICE li
partaken of his hospitality heartily agreed. I may
mention that one of the Count's most intimate friends
was Mr (now Baron) Ludwig von Oppenheimer.
His friendship with him dated from his Saxon days,
as young Oppenheimer was a native of Leipzig, and
the Count had known him from his boyhood. He
came to Vienna after 1866, became a naturalised
Austrian subject, and was elected a member of the
Reichsrath for one of the electoral divisions of
Bohemia, in which he possessed a large estate.
The Count had a very high opinion of the young
Saxon, whom he sent during the Franco-German war
with confidential despatches to Prince Bismarck
at Versailles ; and he has since attained a high
position in the Austrian parliament, Among the
officials of the Austrian Foreign Office no one had
such influence with Count Beust as Hofrath von
Hofmann, to whom I have before alluded, nor was the
confidence of the Count in any way misplaced. Baron
Hofmann was in every respect a remarkable man. A
scholar and a most accomplished linguist, he had, which
was still more valuable in the office which he held, a
singular power of anticipating public opinion. He
felt the pulse, so to speak, of the people, correctly
diagnosed their sentiments, and advised his chief as to
the best remedies to be prescribed for the political
maladies of the State. He was the head of the
Press Bureau, and Under Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs. At that time, as now, there

Iii INTRODUCTION
existed in Austria a censorship of the press, which
was carried, out by what was called a Press Bureau.
To us in England such a condition of things is strange
and repugnant. We trust, and rightly, to the voice of
public opinion to prevent the liberty of the press from
degenerating into license, and find in our laAv of libel
ample protection against any publication of slanderous
and malicious reports. In Austria, however, where
the constitutional system is comparatively new, and
where national party strife and reactionary bigotry
expose the constitutional system to incessant attacks,
there may be some excuse for the existence of
a censorship. In the days of Count Beust this
was exercised with extreme caution. The other
members of the Press Bureau were Baron Teschen-
berg and Hofraths Weil and Orges.. Copies of
the newspapers in Vienna were supplied to these
functionaries at the moment of distribution, and if any
article appeared which was in their opinion maliciously
injurious to the government or disloyal to the
Emperor, the editor immediately received notice not
to proceed with the delivery of the paper, which had
to be destroyed, and another copy of the journal was
then printed with the incriminated article omitted.
There is also an official organ in Vienna, the Wiener
Zeitung, a sort of London Gazette with leading
articles. Of the members of the Press Bureau as it then
existed, there are none now alive ; the last, Baron

THE AUSTRIAN FOREIGN OFFICE Iiii
Teschenberg, rose to a high position in the diplo
matic service, and died comparatively young a year
or two since. One of the most remarkable and
well known of the officials in the Austrian Foreign
Office at the time I am speaking was Hofrath von
Ascher. Herr von Ascher was the head of the
Cipher Department of the office, and, probably from
passing his life in ciphering and deciphering de
spatches, he had acquired the sphinx-like look and
manner which distinguished him. Extremely tall,
very thin, with singularly high shoulders, a clean
shaven face, and straight brown hair, suspiciously
like a wig, — a person seeing him for the first time
would be puzzled to know whether he was the lead
ing comedian at the Burg Theatre or a diplo
matist from the Ballplatz. He certainly looked
much more like the former than the latter when I
used to see him nearly every morning entering Count
Beust's room with a huge green portfolio under his
arm which, after making two or three kangaroo-like
bows, he proceeded to open. He then put on a pair
of gigantic spectacles, and began to read to the Count
in a stentorian but monotonous voice the various
despatches which he had unravelled. This done, he
retired without saying another word, after repeating
the series of remarkable obeisances with which he had
entered. I was once in Gastein with Count Beust
for the water-cure, and Ascher was also there in his
official capacity. One day the Count and myself

liv INTRODUCTION
were walking along the promenade in front of the
beautiful water-fall. It had been raining heavily — as
it generally does at Gastein — and the roads were
muddy and slippery. M. Ascher was coming towards
us, and greeting the Count wTith the series of ex
traordinary contortions which he meant to be bows,
he slipped and fell at full length in the mud. Beust,
after expressing the hope that he had not hurt
himself, said ' Zum Gluck sind sie noch nicht
Minister ; wenn sie es waren, so wiirden Sie es viel
schwerer finden sich von einem Fall zu erheben' (luckily
you are not yet a Minister ; if you were, you would
find it much more difficult to rise after a fall).
Ascher, though covered with mud, and somewhat
bruised, could not help smiling at this sally, and
did not attempt to repeat the performance which
had led to his discomfiture.
With the exception of Prince Bismarck, Count
Beust was probably the possessor of more foreign
decorations than any other diplomatist. He was
also Chancellor of the Order of Maria Theresa, an
exceptional dignity conferred upon him by the
Emperor about the time when he authorised
him to quarter the Imperial Eagle in his coat of
arms. The Chancellorship of the Order of Maria
Theresa did not entitle him to wear the insignia of
the Order, which are never given for civil service,
but only as a reward for exceptional gallantry or
successful strategy before the enemy. The Orders

THE AUSTRIAN FOREIGN OFFICE lv
of which he was most proud were the Grand Cross of
the Austrian Order of St Stephen, the Collar of the
Annunziata — the highest Italian decoration — and the
Grand Cross of the Black Eagle of Prussia. He could
not receive the Austrian Order of the Golden Fleece,
as that can only be worn by Catholics. In connec
tion with the many stars conferred upon him by
European and Eastern Powers, the following anecdote
may be interesting. I was with him one day in
Vienna when he asked me to unlock a large drawer
in which the cases containing the stars and crosses
were tossed about in hopeless confusion. ' The
Minister of  has asked for an audience to-day,'
he said, ' and I wish you would kindly get me out
the Grand Cross of the Order of the country he
represents, as I learn from his letter that his visit
is an official one.' After looking in vain for the order
he mentioned, I told him it was not there. He
was much annoyed at this, and immediately dis
patched his secretary to the jeweller Roth, whose
well-known shop on the Kohlmarkt is the counterpart
of that of Grdtly in the Palais Royal, with instructions
to buy the decoration in question, and bring it back
at once. This was done, and the Count having put
it on, waited for the Foreign Minister. In due course
the latter appeared, carrying in his hand a piece
of parchment and a case. Beust, being extremely
short-sighted, took no notice of this, but engaged him
in conversation and endeavoured to elicit from him the

Ivi INTRODUCTION
object of his visit. The Minister, Baron * * *, seemed
greatly embarrassed, and Beust, thinking that perhaps
he had. some important diplomatic secret which he
might feel a difficulty in communicating before me,
told him that he could speak without reserve.
Whereupon the discomfited diplomatist, whose eyes
had been constantly rivetted upon the star with which
Beust's coat was adorned, stammered out that he
had been commanded by his Royal master to confer
on Count Beust the Grand Cross of the * * *; that he
held in his hand the insignia and the diploma, but
that as his Excellency was, as he observed, already
the possessor of the Order, his mission, so far as the
investiture was concerned, was at an end. Beust's
face at this denouement was a study. I made vain
attempts to conceal my mirth, and the plenipotentiary
looked grave and sad. I was anxious to see how the
Count would get out of the dilemma, but he was quite
equal to the trying occasion. ' Excellenz,' he said,
' werden diesen Irrthum meinerseits leicht verzeihen :
so viele Grossmachte haben mich mit Ihren hohen
Orden beehrt, dass ich mir nicht denken konnte dass
ich dieselbe Ehre von Seiner Majestat nicht besass.'
(Your Excellency will, I am sure, readily excuse my
error. So many great Powers have honoured me with
their decorations that I could not believe that I did
not already possess one from his Majesty your
sovereign). The answer was adroit, for although the
Minister represented a kingdom, he could in no way

FEUDAL EXCLUSIVENESS lvii
be considered as the emissary of a first-class power.
The compliment pleased and mollified him; the Count
took off the purchased order and put the other in its
place, and the incident was considered, in diplomatic
language, as non avenu.

At his receptions Count Beust discarded the anti
quated restrictions as to rank, religion, and parentage,
which not only existed in the Austrian Court as rem
nants of mediaeval prejudice and bigotry, but were
generally imitated by the Austrian aristocracy in
their own palaces. Although of an old noble Saxon
family, Beust ignored class distinctions, and he often
used to animadvert in the strongest terms on what
he considered not only a social absurdity but an
actual danger to the State. He adopted the view of
Lord Beaconsfield, so well expressed in ' Sibyl,' and
strove to bridge over the chasm which separates class
from class, and bring them into closer harmony as
citizens of the same country. Speaking of the exclu
siveness of the feudal aristocracy, Beust once said
to me : ' Unsere Osterreichische feudal- Aristokratie
fiirchtet den Kontakt mit der aussern Welt, und hiitet
sich davon wie man eine Leiche von der aussern Luft
hiitet ; Sie fiirchtet wahrscheinlich zu verfallen. Wenn
Sie zu schwach ist mit den aussern Welt zu leben,
muss Sie, sowie alles in der Natur, zu grunde gehen

lviii INTRODUCTION
(our Austrian feudal aristocracy fears the contact of
the outer world, and protects itself from it as one
protects a corpse fronl the outside air. Probably it
fears to fall to pieces. If it is too weak to live with
the outside world, it must perish, like everything in
nature). No truer words than these were ever
uttered. In England, where the Constitutional
principle is the growth of centuries, where education
is spreading year by year its beneficent influence
among the masses of the people, and where the legis
lature is truly representative, such a state of things
would be impossible, for anyone attempting to bring
it about would be in an impotent minority. In
Austria, however, until Count Beust entered office,
popular representation was a farce, and the Upper
Chamber was not, as with us, recruited from the ranks
of illustrious and deserving citizens. His efforts,
therefore, were not only directed to breaking down a
foolish barrier which maintained ignorance and super
stition by preventing their admixture and dilution
with industry and intelligence, but it brought
about a genuine Constitutional system, such as had
never before existed in Austria. As -with class, so
with religion. There was but little cordiality between
Catholics and Protestants ; and anti-semitism —
though seldom actively aggressive — was always latent
and ready to break out on the slightest provocation.
At Count Beust's dinners and receptions, nobles and
bourgeois, Catholics, Protestants, and Jews were

BEUST ON THE JEWS lix
received on an equal footing; and I greatly value
the encouraging and approving letter I received from
my old friend apropos a resolution which I moved
in the House of Commons denouncing the action of
Russia with regard to the atrocities committed on her
Jewish subjects, and urging Mr Gladstone's Govern
ment to protest against them in the name of Chris
tianity, civilisation and humanity. ' Everyone,' wrote
the Count, ' will sympathise with you in your efforts to
help your suffering people in Russia. No Govern
ment ought to disregard such an appeal to the best
instincts of man. No Government can dare to with
hold an expression of sympathy with the sufferer or
of condemnation of the oppressor. You know my
detestation of religious persecution in every form, and
I may tell you that of which you may not be aware —
that my aversion to anti-semitism, even when it
assumed a form far less cruel and atrocious than that
to which you call the attention of the British House
of Commons, is not of recent date, but was a lead
ing feature of my policy when I was Minister
at Dresden many years ago. I then introduced
laws having for their purpose the removal of Jewish
disabilities, and during the whole time I was Prime
Minister in Austria it was constantly my endeavour
to prove that I recognised no differences on the ground
of religion, but that socially, and as far as I could
politically and officially, I was prepared to recognise
merit whether I found it in a Jew or in a Christian.'

lx INTRODUCTION
This was strictly accurate, for Beust felt that the
same tolerance on which he relied and which he claimed
for himself as a Protestant Minister in a Catholic
country should be extended by him to those who
differed from him in creed.

XI

In 1869 disquieting rumours as to the relations
between France and Germany were perpetually
agitating the councils and exchanges of Europe. It
was felt that the rivalry between the Teuton and the
Gaul must at no distant period culminate in a
struggle in which the supremacy of one or the other
must be decided by arms. Count Beust was keenly
alive to this, and long before the incident of the
proposed accession of a Hohenzollern to the throne of
Spain on the 3rd of July 1870 which led, ten days
afterwards, to the insult offered to France at Ems and
the con-sequent disastrous war, I had had many conver
sations with him on the strained relations between the
two countries, and gathered from him his views as to
possible complications. I am betraying no secret
when I say that the impression which he always
conveyed to me was that should the hour of active
strife arrive, his policy as the directing spirit of
Austria would be to prevent, if possible, that
power from taking sides in the struggle. Austria, in
his opinion, had only commenced her regeneration.

BEUST ON FRANCE AND GERMANY lxi
She had to cultivate the arts of peace, with their
consequent development of industry and prosperity.
She had to strengthen the bonds of her dis
cordant nationalities. She had to remember that
the policy of a nation, as of an individual, ought
not to be one of revenge. Above all she had
to bear in mind that her empire, notwithstanding
the events of 1866, was by education, civilization,
and also in a great degree by population, a
German one ; and that to engage her German
subjects as the allies of France against the other
German States would not only reproduce in all
its unnatural conditions the terrible strife of 1866,
but would in the event of failure mean their
separation from the Austro-Hungarian Empire,
and bring about its disruption and ruin. Beust
was a German and a patriot, and had the same
honest regard for his adopted country as if it
had been that of his birth. He firmly believed,
and events showed the sagacity of his reason
ing, that when the conflict came, Germany would
be united against a common foe ; and that no con
siderations of differences of religion or antipathy
to Prussia, its King, or its Prime Minister, could
prevent the German speaking people from uniting
in a solid phalanx against France. If the views
which he entertained, and which his correspondence
with the French ambassador at Vienna proves him
to have expressed, had been accepted by the advisers

lxii INTRODUCTION
of Napoleon III, the war of 1870 might not have
happened, and the terrible catastrophe of Sedan
would have been averted. The French Ambassador,
the Due de Gramont, was one of the most remarkable
figures in Austrian society. Strikingly handsome,
of imposing and majestic stature, he was an ornament
to every salon. He was in truth a preux chevalier,
and his one fault was that he was too optimistic
in his views, and too readily believed in that which he
wished to be true. I knew him well, was often
his guest at the French embassy on the Lob-
kowitzplatz, and continually met him at the Foreign
office and in the houses of mutual friends. He
was summoned from his post as French Ambassador
at Vienna to fill the more onerous one of Minister of
Foreign Affairs in Paris about the time when the ten
sion between France and Germany was becoming
dangerously acute. He left Vienna, and returned
there after a short stay in Paris to receive from the
Emperor the grand cross of St Stephen in diamonds,
and to take leave of his colleagues and many friends
in the Austrian capital before finally quitting it.
I was present at a party at the Ballplatz given
in his honour, and there he conversed with me
on the clouds which appeared to be gathering over
France and Germany, and asked me what I believed
to be Count Beust's views with regard to the probable
action of Bavaria in the event of hostilities breaking
out. I felt that I was not justified in expressing an

MY INTERVIEW WITH THE DUG DE GRAMONT lxiii
opinion without first consulting the Count, and as I
knew that I was to meet him at the house of a
mutual friend, Baron T  the following day, I told
him that I would resume the conversation when next
we met. I saw Count Beust in the morning, told
him what the Duke had said to me, and asked him
for his views. He said : ' France will make a terrible
mistake if she enters upon a war with Germany under
the impression that the Catholicism of Bavaria will in
duce her to alienate herself from the rest of Germany.
She must remember that the war will not be one
between Prussia and France, but between Germany
and France. The hatred between the two countries is
intense. Germany has an old score to wipe out. The
moment war is declared the cry will go forth for the
united Fatherland, with Alsace and Lorraine as a prize.
If M. de Gramont believes that the weak and crazy
King of Bavaria, through dislike of Bismarck, has
yet strength enough to make the Bavarians hold aloof
from Germany in the struggle because their religion is
the same as that of France, he is in error. If he has
been told so he has been misled, wilfully perhaps, but
certainly misled. Should M. de Gramont, under the
influence of such an impression, urge a war policy, he
will be guilty of a grave fault, the magnitude of which
he will only discover when it is too late.' In the
evening of that day I met the French Foreign
Minister at dinner, and in a tSte-d-tete in the smoking
room I conveyed to him word for word what Count

lxiv INTRODUCTION
Beust had told me. He was sceptical as well as
optimistic. He had been persuaded that in the
event of a Franco-Prussian war Catholic France
could look upon Catholic Bavaria as an ally, and he
paid no attention to Count Beust's friendly warnings.
He saw the enormous advantage of an alliance
which would have strengthened France by the
accession of the big batallions and sturdy troops of
Bavaria, and which would weaken Prussia by the
presence of an enemy in the midst of her natural allies.
We parted, and I never saw him again until a short
time before his death, when our conversation, and the
sanguinary events which so soon succeeded it, were
not referred to. But I am convinced that this high
minded Frenchman, too straightforward to suspect
any evil motive, sincerely believed those who told
him to rely on the Bavarian alliance, and was only
undeceived when it was too late.
The author of ' The Present Position of European
Politics ' in the Fortnightly Review for January
1887, says that ' the Austrian Alliance with France
in 1870 lured Napoleon III to his destruction,'
and speaks of autograph letters on this subject from
the Emperor of Austria and the King of Italy
which he believes are in the hands of the Empress
Eugenie. I do not know what ground he has for
making these statements. As shown above, I was
in Vienna just before the war broke out, and what
I have related will I think demonstrate that there was

MY INTERVIEW WITH THE DUC DE GRAMONT lxv
not the remotest intention on the part of the Austrian
Chancellor to promise the alliance of Austria to
France. The following extract from a letter addressed
to me by Count Beust from Altenberg on the 18th
January 1873 will be of interest in this connection :
' After all, I am rather satisfied at the result of
this miserable dispute. Gramont has rendered me a
service, for he has given me an opportunity of proving
the falsity of the report that Austria had promised
France her alliance. At the same time what he did
was very wrong and very stupid ; wrong, because even
if he had succeeded in his contention, he would only
have proved that I was France's best friend, and was
only prevented by circumstances from giving her
armed support ; stupid, for he confesses that in spite
of all my so-called promises, no alliance was actually
concluded. The whole affair may be resumed in the
following words : "De deux choses l'une : ou le Due
de Gramont en 1870 a 6t6 dupe- — alors le Due de
Gramont en 1873 est ridicule ; ou le Due de Gramont
en 1870 ne l'a pas etc" — alors le Due de Gramont en
1873 estodieux."'
I may add without indiscretion that in a conversa
tion I had with the Emperor Napoleon at Beaulieu
House, Cowes, in the year 1872, in which he discussed
very openly the question of alliances before the Franco-
German war, he said that the Due de Gramont's
representations had given him the impression that
he could count on the alliance of Bavaria, but not on
vol. i e

lxvi INTRODUCTION
that of Austria. He did Count Beust the justice to
add that he (the Emperor) had never been led by the
Count to believe that France would have the alliance of
Austria. With regard to the Due de Gramont, the
Emperor's words were : ' M. de Gramont a cru ce que
lui adit M. le Comte Bray ' (the Bavarian Minister at
Vienna) ' a 1? egard d'une alliance Bavaroise en cas
d'une guerre Franco -Prussienne.' XII
Some day, when the real reasons which dictated
the policy of France before the Franco-German
War are published, I think it will be found that far
from France having, as is alleged in the article to
which I have referred, been the dupe of Austria,
the war would probably never have taken
place if the advice of Austria, given through
her Prime Minister, had been followed. Just as
the participation of France in the Crimean War
was urged upon Napoleon III in order to con
solidate, by an appeal to the French love of military
glory, the new born second Napoleonic empire, so
the war with Prussia was recommended by Mare'chal
Leboeuf and other dangerous advisers for the purpose
of rejuvenating that empire by a new bath of blood.
In dynastic rather than in national considerations
must be sought the real reason for the war of 1870.
The mob that shouted 'a, Berlin' were assumed to

THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR lxvii
couple with these words the cry of ' Vive 1' Empereur,'
in homage to the monarch whose victorious arms
were to lead them to that goal of their desires.
Republican, Legitimist and Orleanist were to be
artificially united in a bond of hatred to the Prussian,
and in a longing again to see the French flag, under
another Napoleon, wave on the Brandenburger Thor.
So precarious was the position of the Emperor at that
time, owing far less to his own fault than to the sins
of his advisers, that even this brief day-dream of
triumph was welcomed as a respite from the inevitable
catastrophe. The empire was doomed, and, like a
hapless creature in the condemned cell, clung to the
chances of any appeal which might possibly prolong
its existence. This was the true cause of the war of
1870. The representations made by the Due de
Gramont of a possible Bavarian Alliance may perhaps
have expedited the fatal resolution by encouraging false
hopesand leading the Emperor to believe in his probable
success. But these false hopes were only an incident,
and can in no way be considered as the cause of the
war. France had, I believe, made up her mind for the
conflict, with or without allies. No doubt there are
many who imagine that Austria tendered France her
active assistance, and they base this idea on the
assumption that Count Beust was anxious to give
Austria an opportunity of avenging and wiping out
the calamitous defeats of 1866. Knowing him well,
I can say positively that nothing was further from his

lxviii INTRODUCTION
thoughts, for he was essentially German in his
political views. But even assuming, for argument's
sake, the existence of a baser motive of which he was
utterly incapable — namely, a desire for revenge — such
a policy would have been suicidal, and entirely at
variance with the system which he inaugurated when
he assumed the reins of Government in 1866. That
system, as I have already explained, was based upon
the development of the power of the German element
in Austria and the restoration, if possible, of the bond
of union between the German Austrians and the rest
of Germany which had been destroyed in the Austro-
German War. There would have been no sympathy
in Austria with the idea of a Franco-Austrian alliance,
and I am inclined to believe that if such an alliance had
been attempted, the German populations of Bohemia,
Moravia and Upper and Lower Austria, might not
improbably have taken very active and dangerous
measures with the view of co-operating with their
German brethren against what they would have
deemed the common foe. In such a case the alliance
would have existed only in name, for Austria would
have had to quell internal rebellions instead of
actively participating in the war, and Sedan might
have had as disastrous an effect upon Austria as it
had upon France. Austria's Prime Minister was too
experienced and too patriotic a statesman to have
attempted so insane a policy.

BEUST'S COUNTRY HOUSE lxix

XIII

Count Beust possessed a very charming property,
about an hour's distance by rail from Vienna, called
Altenberg. It stood on the left bank of the Danube
in a delightful park, surrounded by high and beauti
fully wooded hills. The house was a large and
comfortable one, of castellated shape, exquisitely
furnished with many artistic objects, and full of
the souvenirs of a long and eventful life. Here he
used to retire for a few days whenever circumstances
allowed him to do so. On such occasions he would
invite some of his most intimate friends ; and those
who have been there will never forget the cheery
parties where, in the midst of his family circle,
with his two sons, Counts Adolph and Henry,
the veteran Statesman would cast off the cares of
office and relate anecdotes of various Courts and
personal reminiscences of sovereigns, interspersing
his talk with many a lively epigram and quotation.
As in Vienna, numbers of pet dogs, and even cats,
roamed about the house in absolute ease and famili
arity ; and nearly every room had its cage of birds, for,
like all kind and humane men, Beust was devotedly
fond of animals. On the first floor was a sunny
little room, his private study. It was here that
he wrote the greater part of the Memoirs which
I am now presenting to the public in their

Ixx INTRODUCTION
English form, and here he repeated to me the
often expressed wish that I should undertake the
task upon which I have now ventured. He had for
years been engaged in noting down the points of
interest in his life, and I was the custodian of the
bulky manuscript until a short time before he left
the post of Ambassador in Paris, and finally retired
from public affairs, when for the first time he found
leisure to examine and edit his Memoirs with a view
to their publication. He was an excellent husband
and affectionate father, and here I may say that both
his sons have devoted themselves to the service of
the State — the eldest, Count Adolph, being now, I
believe, Secretary to the Legation at St Petersburg,
and the youngest, Count Henry, occupying a high
position in the Austrian Civil Service.
XIV
It is needless here to recapitulate the circum
stances which led to Count Beust being relieved of his
functions as Imperial Chancellor and Minister of
Foreign Affairs, and to his being appointed Ambas
sador at the Court of St James's. Intrigue had
long been rife against him —
' With fame in just proportion envy grows ' —
and he had much to contend with, for Austrian
bigotry and feudal aristocratic prejudice had been

BEUST AS AMBASSADOR IN LONDON lxxi
scotched but not killed. If, however, there was any
post which could compensate him for the loss of the
elevated position he had held, it was his appoint
ment as Ambassador in England, for whose people
he had such sympathy and affection, and whose
Constitution he had endeavoured to imitate in
Austria. I saw him in Vienna shortly after the
change had been decided on, and what he felt most
was the tone of many of the principal Hungarian
journals, which, in their delight at the prospect of
having a Hungarian, in the person of Count Andrassy,
at the head of affairs, forgot the enormous debt of
gratitude they owed to his predecessor. He told
me how a Hungarian lady had called upon him,
and after animadverting in the strongest terms
on the ingratitude of her countrymen, put the matter
in a homely and very forcible phrase ' Der Ochs
vergisst dass es ein Kalb gewesen ist ' (the ox forgets
that it was once a calf). Considering tbe immense
development of Hungary since Beust's advent to office,
the simile was a most appropriate one.
On the 21st December 1871, he was appointed
Ambassador in London, and took up his residence
at 18 Belgrave Square. From the first moment
of his arrival he was overwhelmed with visitors,
and he once remarked to me that if he had lost an
old home he had found a new one. In decorating
his new house he was naturally anxious to adorn
the principal room with the portraits of the

lxxii INTRODUCTION
Emperor and Empress of Austria. For some reason
or another there was considerable delay in their being
sent to him. A mutual friend in Vienna was charged
with this commission, and when the portraits at last
arrived, the Count addressed him the following
characteristic letter, of which he gave me a copy, and
which I here reproduce :—
18 Belgrave Square.
Mon cher ami, — Mille remerciments de votre
aimable lettre et de toutes les peines que vous vous
6tes donnees pour ces augustes portraits, qui paraissent
avoir eu tant de difficulte" a se rapprocher de moi.
Je vous remercie encore de votre bonne auntie" pour
Adolphe, qui est pour moi un si grand sujet de con
tentement. Je serais en effet bien heureux de le
revoir. Vous voila done content et heureux au
milieu des contents et heureux, et le premier des
devoues. J'aime assez votre ddsarmement des haines.
Quand on s'est fait arracher une dent on ne se plaint
plus, et lorsqu 'un voisin incommode a demdnag^, on
le laisse tranquille. C'est ordinairement ainsi que les
choses se passent dans ce monde.
Ajoutons que le voisin d^place" n'a rien de mieux a
faire que de faire en sorte qu'on lui parle le moins
possible de son ancienne maison, et qu'il se case le
mieux possible dans la nouvelle.
C'est ce que je me suis applique" a faire, et je crois
avec succes. Ma maison est tres bien montee : j'ai un
excellent cuisinier, mes diners sont vantds comme
bons et comme gais, on m'ecrase de politesse dans le

BEUST AS AMBASSADOR IN LONDON lxxiii
monde, et chaque fois que je parle a un ' public
dinner ' je suis recu comme je l'dtais a Vienne dans
les premieres annees.
Ces braves gens persistent a s'imaginer que c'est
moi qui ai jete les bases du nouvel ordre de choses en
Autriche et que j'ai fait le gros de I'ouvrage. Bref,
j'ai beaucoup d'amis nouveaux : peut-etre ne vaudront-
ils pas mieux que les anciens, mais au moins cela
vous change. II est probable que je serai encore
fautif dans les appreciations, mais ici cela ne fera
pas grand mal. En revanche, je vois deja, poindre les
envieux ; ceux-la je ne pourrai pas les empecher
d'arriver, et il est bien possible qu'un beau matin ils
me cassent encore le cou. Mais alors il sera temps
de se rappeler que I'annee 1809, qui, non contente de
la bataille de Wagram, a joue" a 1' Autriche le mauvais
tour de me faire naitre, est bien loin, et qu'il est
temps d'en finir une fois avec la vie publique et de
rentrer pour tout de bon dans la vie privde, dont ces
bons Autrichiens, je leur rends cette justice, m'ont
appris a apprdcier les avantages.
Adieu, cher ami, votre bien devoue Beust.
There is some degree of bitterness and sarcasm
in this letter, especially where he writes of being
received in London as he was in Vienna in the
first few years of his stay there. But he soon became,
so to speak, acclimatised, and it is astonishing with
what facility and rapidity he accustomed himself
to our English views and institutions. He was
continually invited to public dinners, and although he

lxxiv INTRODUCTION
complained much of the fare, seemed to enjoy
proposing or responding to a toast. He took the
chair at many of the dinners of the leading charities
in London, more especially the German Hospital,
the Society of Foreigners in Distress, and the
Hungarian Society. On these occasions he always
spoke in English with great ease, and in a style
far superior to the generality of those post-prandial
orations that it is the ill-fortune of most public
men to have to make or hear. Hospitable in the
extreme, his parties and dinners were renowned in
London society, and his ball to the Prince and
Princess of Wales was admittedly one of the most
successful ever given. I remember the mass of letters
which poured in applying for invitations. The Count
handed them to me with the request that I should
advise him as to the expediency of sending the
desired card or not, and added : ' I never knew how
popular I was in London till now. I wonder whether
my popularity will be as great after the ball.' Two
other most charming fetes wiiich I can recall were the
dinners and subsequent receptions he gave in honour
ofthe Crown Prince Rudolph of Austria and the Crown
Prince and Princess of Germany. These fetes were not
brilliant in the ordinary acceptation of the word, as be
ing almost exclusively composed of what is termed the
upper ten thousand ; for he followed in London
the same principle which he observed in Vienna,
and did not make mere birth or rank the passport to

CORRESPONDENCE lxxv
his salon. In the gatherings of which I speak
the republic of letters was largely represented ; art,
science, the drama, politics and the learned professions
all found their place, and the brilliant crowd wa.s,
as it should be in the house of an enlightened
statesman, composed of the notabilities of every
class and profession.

XV

In London Count Beust's greatest amusement was
to have a quiet evening at home. After a very frugal
dinner, he would light the mildest of cigars and work
either at diplomatic despatches or correspondence
until about half-past twelve, when he usually retired
to his bed-room. The following is a typical letter of
his, selected from a number written in the same
style : — 18 Belgrave Square,
December 13, 1872.
Deak Worms, — Do you remember the Latin
proverb of our youth : ' Plenus venter non studet
libenter?' This is to say that I think it would be
best for us to meet to-morrow, Thursday, at 6 o'clock
precisely — we want two hours for business, and after
wards we will try to make a good dinner. For once
I will smoke before ten. Most truly yours, Beust.
On such occasions his custom was to discuss a

lxxvi INTRODUCTION
subject for a considerable time, and then to
ask me either to write down the result in English
or to make a precis of it in German, which he
would afterwards elaborate. His handwriting, like
that of other great statesmen, was very difficult to
read, and I have letters in my possession which would
baffle many experts in the art of deciphering. I have
alluded to the fact that he was extremely short
sighted. As a curious illustration of this, I may
mention that on one occasion, at a large party in a
well-known house in London, I happened to be on the
stairs a few steps behind him, and to my surprise he
began, without any apparent reason, to bow and make
polite gestures to some person whom I could not see,
apparently with the object of inducing him to pass
first. This continued until I joined the Count on the
landing, when I found him in front of a large look
ing glass. He was evidently under the impression
that he was standing at an open doorway and grace
fully making way for someone who wished to enter.
Luckily I was in time to explain the situation to him.
He was much amused and struck with the intelligence
of the Shah, as the following extract from one of his
letters to me shows : — 18 Belgrave Square,
June 28, 1873.
' People are quite mad here with the Shah. The
poor man is prevented from utilising his stay, as he is
constantly on the stage. He is evidently a clever

CORRESPONDENCE Ixxvii
fellow, and he behaved admirably. He was very
gracious to me, but a lady told me that at the State
Ball he asked her if I was a Scotchman, as I had no
stockings on. She then explained^to him that flesh-
coloured stockings were the fashion. We laughed
much at this story.'
Some little time after the'above incident, when
making a call in London, the lady of the house
showed him the Shah's autograph, which was even
more illegible than his own. Beust replied ' Qu'est
ce qu'on peut attendre d'un Shah ' (chat) ' qu'un
griffonage ? ' He paid a short visit to Austria in
1874, and, as this extract from a letter to me will
show, no longer found the charm in the Kaiserstadt
which so fascinated him in former years : Altenberg,
December 2, 1874.
' My impression as to Vienna may be stated in a
few words : everybody is satisfied with himself and
dissatisfied with the rest. 1 regret deeply your
absence from London. Mais -la sante" avant tout, car
elle est la base de la bonne humeur, qui est le seul
moyen de se moquer des hommes et d'endurer les
choses.'

XVI
Count Beust was keenly alive to the fact that a
political leader of men, though he must first win their

Ixxviii INTRODUCTION
confidence through their appreciation of his talent and
power, can only keep it by establishing a close bond of
sympathy with them by personal intercourse, social
relations, and a just recognition of their abilities. He
once observed, in connection with our English party life,
that Lord Beaconsfield's power over the Conservative
party from 1874 to 1880 was due as much to this know
ledge of the men "composing it and their relative value
to the party as a whole, as to his own great attributes
as a parliamentary leader. ' The fall of a government,'
he added, 'is oftener brought about by disaffection
among the members of a political party than by
the force of a parliamentary opposition.' There are
few students of politics who have been engaged
actively in public life who would dispute this
assertion. Continuing his conversation, he said,
' I think there ought to be free communication
between the leader and his followers. When I was
Minister in Vienna I always encouraged this. I
never allowed difficulties or grievances to filter
through official channels before they reached me ; but
the moment I knew of their existence, I invited those
who, rightly or wrongly, felt themselves aggrieved to
come to me and discuss matters freely and without
reserve, for I considered that there was much truth
in the old French adage " II vaut mieux avoir a, faire
au bon Dieu qu'avec ses Saints ; " and in nine cases
out of ten the qualities of the intermediaries are
anything but saint-like.' Friendly as Count Beust

CORRESPONDENCE lxxix
always was to every member of his party and to those
who worked under him in the great department of
State of which he was the head, he was a decided
enemy of officialism, and allowed no interference
on the part of the permanent officials, ' whose
first function (he said) was to carry out instructions,
and who ought on no account to confound executive
administration with questions of policy ' — a very whole
some rule which might with advantage to the State
be followed elsewhere than in Austria.
In 1875-76 Count Beust's work was very heavy
indeed. The dangers of the Eastern question were
daily becoming more serious, and a constant inter
change of despatches between the Cabinets of
Vienna and St James's taxed his energies and
time to the utmost. With the Andrassy Note he
was more especially concerned, and I am violating
no secret when I say that he attached but little
importance to it, and did not believe that it would
have any beneficial results. Although he con
scientiously represented the views of his Government
to our Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lord Derby, he
personally did not share them. The real object, in
a few words, of the Andrassy Note was to obtain a
proper recognition by the Porte of the rights of its
Christian subjects, and to guarantee that the necessary
reforms with regard to them should be executed,
and their property and dives duly protected. The
assent of the great powers to the Note (it having

lxxx INTRODUCTION
been already accepted by the Porte) was to form
an international guarantee that they would insist
on these reforms, and the Porte was to be pledged
to carry them out. From the Note itself it would
seem doubtful whether Count Andrassy's faith in
its probable success was very strong. The following
are the concluding paragraphs of the document
addressed to Count Beust for communication to
Lord Derby : —
' Sans doute que par ce moyen les Chretiens
n'obtiendraient pas la forme de garantie qu'ils
semblent r^clamer en ce moment, mais ils trouveraient
une sdcurite relative dans le fait m3me que les reibrmes
octroye"es seraient reconnues indispensables par les
Puissances, et que la Porte aurait pris envers l'Europe
1'engagement de les mettre a execution.
' Telle est la ferme conviction sortie d'un ^change
d'idees prealable entre les Cabinets d'Autriche-
Hongrie, de Russie, et d'Allemagne.
' Votre Excellence est charge"e de porter ce point
de vue a, la connaissance du Cabinet de St James,
et d'obtenir son concours a l'ceuvre de paix dont tous
nos efforts tendent a assurer le succes.
' Si, comme je l'espere, les vues du Gouvernement
Anglais se rencontrent avec les n6tres, nous lui
proposerions par egard pour la dignite et l'indepen-
dence de la Porte de ne point addresser a celle-ci
nos conseils dans une note collective, mais de nous
borner a, inviter nos R^presentants a Constantinople a
agir conjointement et d'une maniere identique aupres

CORRESPONDENCE lxxxi
du Gouvernement du Sultan dans le sens que nous
venons de developper.
' Vous voudrez bien, M. le Comte, donner lecture
de la presente depeche au Ministre des Affaires
Etrangeres, et lui en laisser copie ; et je vous serais
reconnaisant de me faire connaltre aussit6t que possible
l'impression qu'elle aura faite sur son Excellence.
' Recevez, etc'
I spent a portion of the winter of 1876 in Egypt,
and while there I received a letter from Count Beust
of which the following is an extract : —
18 Belgrave Square,
February 1876.
' Dear Worms, — I was most happy to receive your
kind letter from the land of the Pharaohs, and I
should be still happier if I could join you under a
beautiful sky instead of living miserably here in the
fogs  This winter was for me an anxious one,
in consequence of the famous Andrassy Note never
arriving. I was prevented from going abroad at
Christmas  Then I got a severe cold with a
bad cough, and Weber condemned me to remain at
home and not to receive anybody. So I spent about
a fortnight in my dog's company. At last came the
despatch, and I was obliged to run after Derby at
Knowsley and to spend three weeks here in making
the greatest exertions in order to overcome the
reluctance of the English Government to join the
other Powers. I succeeded at last, and everybody com
plimented me here on the victory. But from Vienna
vol. i /

lxxxii INTRODUCTION
not a word of thanks. I have done my duty — sapienti
sat. I have supported energetically a policy which I
do not quite understand ; this was my duty. But
how often and how deeply I am sighing for independ
ence you may easily imagine. I leave on Sunday for
the Continent, and shall be here again about the 20th
of March. I shall go first to Altenberg, and after
wards to Saxony. If you send letters to Vienna they
will easily reach me. Ever yours, Beust.'

The immediate sequel to these interviews was
Lord Derby's despatch to Sir Henry Elliot, our
Ambassador at Vienna, of the 25th January 1876.
In it he says — speaking of the Andrassy Note — ' the
proposals of that Note do not conflict with the 9th
article of the Treaty of Paris. They are in the nature
of suggestions or recommendations for adoption by
the Porte in its endeavours to put an end to the
insurrection, and do not involve any interference in
the relations between the Sultan and his subjects, nor
in the internal administration of the Empire 
What appears to her Majesty's Government to be
essential is that the Porte should act promptly and
vigorously in the execution of the reforms, and that
the officers appointed to execute them should be
men of energy and determination, who will not be
deterred by local apathy or prejudices .... and
who will do their utmost to restore a feeling of
security to the Christian population. Unless such

CORRESPONDENCE lxxxiii
a feeling can be produced, no effectual pacification
of the insurgent districts can reasonably be expected.'
Count Beust's view of the Andrassy Note may be
briefly summed up thus — that while recognising the
necessity of obtaining from Turkey the international
pledge that she would do all that was required of her
to ameliorate the condition of her Christian subjects,
he did not believe that it would have the effect either
of staying the spread of the insurrection, or of pre
venting a dangerous struggle between Russia and the
Porte which he foresaw must inevitably ensue.
That his views were correct, subsequent events con
clusively proved. What he thought of the Austrian
occupation of Bosnia is described in the following
pithy sentences from a letter which he sent me from
Altenberg: — Altenberg, August 25, 1878.
' On the 19th I go to Gastein to meet "my friend
Bismarck." You know from the newspapers all the
details of our Bosnian occupation. Au fait, il y a
plus de preoccupation que d'occupation. '
XVII
There was but one feeling in London society —
that of general regret — when it was known that he
was to leave the Court of St James's and go as
Ambassador to Paris. This was in the year 1878.
He had long known that there were intrigues going

lxxxiv INTRODUCTION
on for the purpose of ousting him from his new home
in England, and what pained him most was that he
had the best reason to believe that those who were
plotting against him were the very persons to whom,
when Prime Minister in Austria and Ambassador in
London, he had shewn the greatest kindness. Writ
ing to me from Altenberg on October 1, 1878, he
said : —
' I always advocated a close alliance with
England, and conveyed to Vienna the expressions of
the readiness of the British government to come to
an understanding, but was continually hampered by
instructions which expressly prevented a formal agree
ment. I clearly stated that England would preserve
peace if she could do so with honour, but that the
Cabinet was very decided to go to war if necessary,
and had the means to make it. I always got the
answer that this seemed doubtful. At the bottom
of all this there is an intrigue. I was warned in July,
and did not pay any attention to the hint, . . . All
was secretly arranged during the Congress and con
cealed, so that I first heard of it from the newspapers.
It was decided at once that I should have Paris,
which some years- ago I wished for, while now I
should have preferred London.'
The Count's brilliant qualities and world-wide
reputation soon obtained for him in Paris a position
socially as high as that which he enjoyed in London.
The salons of the Rue Lascases were thronged, as in

LAST INTERVIEWS lxxxv
London, with representatives of the best that society
could give in wealth, rank, and education, but he still
regretted England. Writing to me from Paris on the
28th January, 1879, he says: — 'All the charms of
Paris do not prevent me from regretting very sin
cerely my sweet old England.'

XVIII
Count Beust left Paris and gave up his embassy
there in 1882. There is no truth in the rumours
which were then circulated that the very cordial
relations which existed between him and French
politicians of all parties had given offence to Prince
Bismarck, and that representations had been made in
Vienna which led to his recall. I am inclined to
believe that his enemies propagated these reports for
the express purpose of their being commented on at
Berlin and finding their way to Vienna. Mere social
gatherings at the Austrian embassy, at which among
others Madame Adam and many other distinguished
literary and political personages wTere present, were
represented as hot beds of intrigue at which anti-
German views were matured. Conscious of doing no
wrong, and weary of misrepresentation, the Count pre
ferred relinquishing his high post, and retiring into
that position of peaceful ease for which he had so
long pined, and which was at last to give him the

lxxxvi INTRODUCTION
opportunity of chronicling his eventful life. He came
to London in June 1884, and remained some days
visiting old friends and reviving, as he said, pleasant
reminiscences. On this occasion he occupied rooms
at the Burlington Hotel. His visit was quite
unexpected ; he was in Paris, and the longing to see
London was so strong that he could not resist it. I
met him on his arrival, and was greatly shocked at
his changed appearance ; his eyes, formerly so bright,
were dull, his cheery smile had left him, and his face was
drawn and greatly aged. He saw that I noticed the
sad alteration, and the old merry look lighted up his
countenance for a moment as he said : ' Meine Feinde
konnen jetzt zufrieden sein. Was viele Jahre Arbeit
im Staats Dienste und grosse Verantwortlichkeit
nicht verderben konnte, haben sie endlich mit Liigen
und Intriguen unterminirt. Meine gesundheit ist
weg. Ich kann mit Wahrheit Sagen : " Der Mohr
hat seine Arbeit gethan, der Mohr kann gehen." ' (My
enemies may be satisfied now. That which years of
hard work in the service of the State and grave
responsibility could not destroy, they have at last by
lies and intrigues succeeded in undermining. My
health is broken. I can say with truth : ' The Moor
has done his work ; the Moor can go.') I shall never
forget the painful impression his words made on me,
for I knew what truth there was in them, and how
ingratitude and calumny had sorely wounded a most
upright and sensitive man. As I looked upon his

LAST INTERVIEWS lxxxvi
intellectual pale features, I thought of the lines in
Metastasio :
' Del buon maestro il venerato aspetto
Riconosco la guancia scolorita
Del lungo studio.'
He had several severe attacks of giddiness during
his short stay in London, and I advised him to return
home without delay. This was the last time I ever
saw him. I remained in constant correspondence with
him until within a few days of his death, which was
most sudden and unexpected, although his health had
long been failing. His end occurred in a manner very
similar to that of the late Lord Iddesleigh ; he was
sitting in his chair when he was seized with a fainting
fit, and died almost immediately of syncope of the
heart. My task is accomplished. I have endeavoured
to fulfil the wish my departed friend so often expressed
to me — to give to his many English admirers the
Memoirs of his life in their own language. I have
added my own personal experiences, because I felt not
merely that I was doing that which he would have
approved, but that I was completing with materials
which were in my possession alone the record of a life
of historical as well as personal interest. It is an
accurate chronicle, derived from letters and notes as
well as from personal recollections. It is necessarily
abridged, as the events and correspondence of twenty
years could not be condensed into an introduction, but

lxxxviii INTRODUCTION
would form a volume of themselves. Moreover, he
who attempts to write contemporary history enters
upon a most delicate and difficult task, and I have
had to omit much that may some day be written when
statesmen and others now living are no more. Count
Beust's character is best described in three words
taken from the letter the Emperor of Austria
wrote to him when rewarding him for his great
services : ' Treu und unerschrocken ' — ' True and
fearless.' HENRY DE WORMS.

London, March 1887.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

The events which I narrate in this work reach back
to the years of my early youth and childhood,
although the thoughts they suggest are the fruit of
maturer days. It was originally by no means my
intention to write a History of the greater part of
the Century in the form of an autobiography. This
daring thought only occurred to me when I Set
myself the task of writing what are commonly called
' Memoirs,' although other names may occasionally
be chosen for the same thing.
There may be Memoirs that after their appear
ance were held to be more full of interest and
importance than mine ; but I do not think that the
world has ever occupied itself so much about Memoirs
before their publication, as it has with these volumes.

xc PREFACE
' You are writing your Memoirs, are you not ? '
' When may we hope to see them in print ? ' These
and similar questions have been constantly addressed
to me for years. To them and to the demands of
newspapers and reviews for extracts, I had to reply
that it was my irrevocable decision to let the whole
work appear at once, as any other course would give
me more annoyance than gratification. Notwith
standing this, several newspapers, without any evil
intention, not only announced the immediate publica
tion of the Memoirs, which was not then contem
plated, but gave details of their probable contents,
stamping them in advance with a character which
they did not possess, that of sensational revelations.
There was no better means of putting an end to these
repeated questionings and rumours, than to proclaim
at every opportunity that the Memoirs were to be
an historical work in several volumes, extending far
beyond the period during which I held office. Thus
the belief in the immediate appearance and in the
more frivolous than serious character of the Memoirs
was dissipated ; and I was as good as my word.
Thus much in explanation of the length of the
work. With regard to its contents, I can only hope
that they are not inferior to the design, and that
' non multa sed multum ' may justly be said of them.
I am prepared for objections of various kinds ;
they will at least assure me of the attention that is
bestowed on my undertaking. I am conscious of

PREFACE xci
having throughout spoken only the strictest truth,
of having expressed my convictions, and of having,
where individuals were concerned, written without
prejudice or malice. Should I be convicted of mis
takes, I shall make it my duty to proceed to their
rectification. If such should be discovered, they are
not the result of carelessness, but of forgetfulness ;
though, as my friends know, I have a singularly
retentive memory, and it has remained faithful to me
even to old age.
It will be said that if I have treated of others
in an objective spirit, my account of myself is
too subjective, in other words, too much tinged
with self-praise. My answer is that I have narrated
my thoughts and actions. It is for the reader to
judge whether what I thought or did was worthy of
praise or not. To accuse myself would have been a
work of supererogation ; my adversaries have com
pletely relieved me from such a task.
Frederick Schlegel said that 'the historian is a
prophet who looks back.' If we take this saying liter
ally, it is unmeaning ; for he who foretells the future has
nothing in common with him who chronicles the past.
Yet Schlegel's words have a profound significance.
As the voice of the prophet is a rousing and warning
voice, so would be the voice of the historian if he
received more attention than has usually fallen to the
lot of prophets.
I would add a few words in elucidation of two not

xcii PREFACE
unimportant questions which have often been con
sidered with regard to Memoirs — the expediency
and the time of their publication. It will not
escape a close observer of the events of our
memorable century, that t-he golden rule, accord
ing to which he who bears the burthen should
also have the advantage ('cujus onera ejusdemque
commoda ' ) is rapidly falling into desuetude, in spite
of the vaunted principle of equality. I will give one
instance of what I mean. In the good old times a
statesman who had been at the head of affairs could
live unmolested after his resignation, being protected
by the censorship. But the censorship has been
supplanted by freedom of the press. Now it would
be reasonable to suppose that after losing his pro
tection, he would enjoy the advantage of self-defence,
especially when his official conduct suffers from
misrepresentation, for which the materials are
furnished, I do not say by his successors, but by
their satellites. If a retired statesman must not
speak of what is commonly called an official secret,
why should those be allowed to do so who only know
it by hearsay, and whose narratives in the public
press give rise to judgments calculated to injure not
only those concerned, but even the authority of
Government itself? Not long ago it happened that
after the death of Count Lonyay, a Vienna paper
stated that the withdrawal of the Bohemian Funda
mental Articles in 1871 was not, as hitherto believed,

PREFACE xciii
owing to me, but to him ; and a Pesth paper
magnified this assertion by declaring that I had
actually been in secret understanding with Count
Hohenwart, and had thus been playing a double
game. I neither asked nor expected the official press
to take up my defence ; but I was very far from
supposing that it would assume a hostile attitude
towards me. This, however, actually happened. I
had an interview with the editor of the Vienna paper,
in consequence of which he inserted a retractation of
the misleading article. Now I am quite insensible to
hostile criticism, but not to the distortion of facts.
In consequence of this retractation, a bitter attack
was made upon me by the chief organ of the Govern
ment (the Press department of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs was not involved), in which I was
reminded in very uncivil language of the importance
of official secrecy, and it was insinuated that I had
myself written the article in question. I must by the
way remark that the ' official secrecy ' in this case was
an incident in the Ministerial Council which was not
unknown at the time. One of those present spoke,
contrary to the general expectation, against the Fun
damental Articles, and made a joke on the subject at
which the solemn assembly laughed heartily.
The above remarks should not be construed as
preparatory to so called 'revelations.' I know how
to respect and keep real official secrets ; and my own
secrets belong to myself. I hope the reader will do

xciv PREFACE
me the justice of admitting that I have not revealed
anything that could injure government or country,
and that I have written nothing that could com
promise anyone.
I bow to those who, in order to fulfil the demands
of discretion, carry self-denial so far as to preserve
absolute silence ; but I cannot applaud their conduct,
for it is not only one's own reputation as a statesman
that is concerned, but also the authority of Govern
ment, which is impaired when the past is imperfectly
represented. In regard to the question of the time of publica
tion I was never in doubt, as I was always of opinion
that the dignified and considerate exterior of posthu
mous Memoirs implies nothing but hidden cowardice.
I was obliged by the reasons explained above to give
my reminiscences a wider scope than was originally
intended, and this, with two dangerous and tedious
illnesses, compelled me to delay the publication. But
I adhered to my resolution of issuing the work as soon
as it was finished.* I of course knew that every year
would take away from its interest ; but this was not
the deciding motive. To publish such a work during

* These Memoirs were sent to press by the Author himself in the spring of 1880.
The third part, comprising the period during which he was Ambassador in London
and Paris, was not at the time completed, but the Author frequently stated that it
would be finished so as to allow the whole work to be issued, at the latest, early
in 1887. Unfortunately, frequent attacks of illness prevented him from carrying out
his design, and death soon took the pen for ever from his hand. Thus the Memoirs
are not absolutely complete, but they include all essentials, especially the two great
epochs of the late Count Beust's life when he was Prime Minister, first in Saxony,
and afterwards in Austria.

PREFACE xcv
one's lifetime involves many unpleasantnesses and
difficulties, which are compensated, however, by the
consciousness of being able to defend what one has
written. It is natural that the Memoirs of one who
is dead should receive a milder judgment than those
of one who is living, but I think that a book which
has to bear the brunt of criticism requires more
literary qualities than one that lays claim to indulg
ence. I ask the reviewers to look upon these words
not as provocative, but as submissive.

ffizmoxiB oi
Jfritbrtch Jf-erbinatib Count bon §znBt

PART 1—1809-1866
 -TffiJ  ¦
CHAPTER I
1809-1830
BIRTH AND YOUTH.  THE BATTLE OF LEIPZIG.  THE FRENCH OCCUPA
TION OF SAXONY.  KING FREDERICK AUGUSTUS.  THE UNIVERSITY
OF GOTTINGEN.  MY INTENTION OF BECOMING PROFESSOR, AND
MY ENTRY INTO THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE.  THE UNGRATEFUL
SON OF THE REVOLUTION.
With what period of my life shall I begin these
reminiscences ?
I asked myself this question more than once
before I could arrive at a decided answer. The most
important period, not only to myself, but to others,
was the five years during which I had the honour
of being Chancellor of the Austrian Empire ; I there-
VOL. I A

2 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
fore dedicated my attention and my pen to those
years as soon as I had leisure to do so. By degrees,
however, I came to the conclusion that the preceding
and longer period during which I held office in
Saxony offered, notwithstanding its more restricted
scene of action, an equally abundant harvest of in
structive lessons and interesting facts, especially as
it was not unconnected with the course of events
in Austria before my accession to power. But as,
from this point of view, my Dresden Ministry may
be regarded as preparatory to my Vienna Ministry,
so my life up to my tenure of office was not without
influence on my subsequent career. I further con
sidered that the fifty-one years of my training for
statesmanship supplied me with recollections of more
than personal interest. Certain circumstances having
forced me, as stated in the Preface to this work, to
give my reminiscences a wider scope, I was led by
the above train of thought to begin with a date
which would really be the beginning of my life —
namely, with that of my entrance into the world.
Before I speak of the day on which I first
saw the light, I must be allowed to say some words
about the family to which I belong, especially
as some curious circumstances are connected with
it. I have never made a favourite study of gene
alogy in general or of family-history in particular,
but he whose lot it is to be much before the world,
is never in want of biographers, and by them my
attention has been drawn to some remarkable facts.
One of these is that the very ancient family of Beust
comes from the Mark of Brandenburg, where its

BIRTH AND YOUTH 3
ancestral seat, Btiste, is said to have been in the
vicinity of Schonhausen.*
My great-grandfather was a Danish Minister and
was raised to the rank of Baron. His younger
brother, a Chamberlain of the Palatinate, received in
Vienna the dignity of a Count of the Empire, and
it was mentioned in the diploma that several of his
ancestors had rendered signal service to the House
of Hapsburg. Four of them had fallen in the
battle of Miihldorf in 1322 while fighting on the
Austrian side ; another had served with distinction
under Montecuculi ; and yet another had taken part
in the relief of Vienna in 1683. Thus my relations
with Prussia and with the Austrian service found a
connection with the remotest past. The great-
grandson of Baron Beust the Danish Minister, had
to show himself very ungrateful to the Crown of
Denmark, as I was appointed in the London Con
ference of 1864 to assume an attitude of decided
hostility towards that country.
On the day of my birth something extraordinary
happened to me — I was drunk ! It came about in this
way. I always had the bad habit of keeping people
waiting for me. I did so even on that day, and when
at last I made my appearance, my father was beside
himself with joy, and gave my nurse a dozen bottles
of the oldest Rhenish wine of the year 1683. She
was a Wendish woman, unable to understand a
syllable of German, and thinking that the wine was for
a bath, she poured it into a basin and bathed me in it.
The Slavs in Austria have attributed a saying to
* Schonhausen is the seat of the Bismarck family.

4 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
me that I never uttered : viz. — ' that they should be
pushed to the wall ; ' * but this would only have been
a retribution for the injury inflicted upon me by my
Slavonic nurse on the first day of my life. I have
heard it asserted that I owe ray good temper to that
immersion in old Rhenish wine. But it is certain
that the physical effect was extremely injurious. Not
only did a sleep of twenty-four hours give rise to
grave fears for my life, but I remained in such a state
of morbid excitement as to refuse all solid food for
the first few years. This irritability, which I only
mastered by degrees, gave me the reputation, as I
afterwards heard, of being an unbearable child. To
this very day I remember the terror of my parents
when my brothers and I, who was then several years of
age, were weighed, and my weight was found to be only
eighteen pounds. I have never in my life been stout,
and have always been considered delicate,t and yet I
have seen all but two or three of my school-fellows
descend into their graves, some many years ago, while
I have attained the age of seventy-seven with
undiminished vivacity of mind and body, although it
cannot be said that I led a life of easy-going comfort.
This result has been brought about chiefly by
adhering to my maxim of observing moderation in
all things, a rule which I have also borne in mind in
politics.
* The origin of this saying was as follows :— The late Minister and Governor of
Galicia, Count Goluchowski, always spoke to me in French. It was chiefly owing to
his exertions that after I became President of the Ministry in 1867, the Galician
Diet unconditionally elected for the Reichsrath. I then said to him : ' Si cela se
fait, les Slaves sont mis au pied du rnur,' a very different expression from that above
quoted. t Even in the year 1845 a Life Insurance Company made difficulties in granting
me a policy. I have since paid it forty annual premiums.

THE BATTLE OF LEIPZIG 5
Perhaps the effects of that Bacchanalian bath
would have ended more seriously, had not my parents
left Dresden, soon after my birth, to pass the summer
and winter at Zopen, a country seat near Leipzig
belonging to my father. Here my mother (daughter
of the Minister von Carlowitz) who was a distin
guished woman of great attainments, presided over
the education of her children with a tutor, an excellent
man, a candidate in theology of the name of Sturz.
His sister was the wife of General von Langenau,
who left the service of Saxony for that of Austria in
1813. To this change of residence I owe my ever-
vivid recollection of an event of world-wide and
historical celebrity ; the battle of Leipzig. I was
then in my fifth year.
The battle lasted from the 16th to the 18th
of October. The days of the week are engraved upon
my memory. On Saturday the 16th, Prince Schwar
zenberg opened a cannonade close to our house, by
which all the panes of glass on the side nearest to the
guns were shattered into fragments. I soon grew re
conciled to the battle, as we were told that we were to
have no lessons during its progress. On the following
day, Sunday, I was playing in the yard, when
suddenly two officers appeared on horseback. My
parents, who were at church with my brothers, were
summoned in the greatest haste. The officers were
Russians, and they came for worse things than merely
to quarter themselves upon us. All the animals that
were in the stables — horses, cows, and sheep — were
dragged away. I can still see the maids crying as the
soldiers were leading off the finest of the cows. The

6 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
yard was full of armed men ; we had been taken to an
attic, from which we could distinctly see the Bashkirs
shooting with arrows at our windows. On the third
and decisive day, the 18th of October, I remember
that a Prussian officer entered and embraced my
father with the words : ' The King has come over.'
The Saxon troops had gone over to the Allies, too
late for the King, too soon for themselves.
In connection with this incident I attach a few
historical facts that I learned at a more advanced
age. The change of sides above referred to during
the battle has been justly condemned from a military
point of view, but this condemnation was only
expressed later on : if we except the French
historians, the mistake was less apparent to con
temporary writers. I ventured to say ' too soon '
because the fate impending over, Saxony remained
the same whether the Army were disarmed after the
battle or joined the hostile forces. That other effects
might result, or that the cause of the King could yet
be saved, was the mistaken idea of those who con
ducted the troops to the Allies. To this we must
add the feeling of the country, which was bitterly
opposed to the French. The people, otherwise
undemonstrative in those days, showed this feeling so
openly even before the lost battle, that the Queen
said to Napoleon on her arrival at Leipzig : ' Vous
nous avez fait perdre ce que nous avions de plus
precieux, I'amour de nos sujets.' It has been main
tained that Saxony was very French in her
sympathies during the Napoleonic regime, but this
is not true, nor was it the case even during Napoleon's

THE FRENCH OCCUPATION OF SAXONY 7
highest prosperity. There was indeed a French
faction, as always happens in such times, but not only
in the ranks of the people and of the bourgeoisie, but
also in those of the aristocracy, there was a dislike for
the existing state of things. This dislike was fostered
by the coarse and insolent manners of Napoleon. My
Grandmother Carlowitz, who had spent half her life
at Court, told me many stories on this subject : for
instance, how Napoleon behaved at a banquet in the
palace during his stay at Dresden in 1807. He had
the greatest aversion to losing much time at dinner ;
and though he was seated next to the Queen, he
turned round after the third course to the principal
chamberlain, who was standing behind him, and said :
' Faites servir les glaces.' When ladies were presented
to him, he addressed to them the stereotyped question :
' Avez-vous des enfants ? des garcons ? faites-en des
soldats ; des filles ? donnez-les a de braves militaires.'
My Grandmother also had anecdotes to tell of a
later period, when there was no longer an Emperor
Napoleon, but a King Louis XVIII : how she was
compelled at Court to play cards with Fouchd, and
how she seemed to perceive the stains of blood on his
fingers. In the present day, when so much is said
about Republican blunders, partly with justice and
partly with exaggeration, it is not uninteresting to
remember that Louis XVIII sent to the Court of
Dresden a man as Ambassador who had voted for the
death of Louis XVI, whose mother was a Saxon
Princess. This certainly did not show much delicacy
of feeling on his Majesty's part.
For a time the connection with France may have

8 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
been agreeable to the Army, which found in the
French Marshals greater politeness than was dis
played by their sovereign. In the years 1809 and 1812
the Saxon troops had the advantage of fighting with
distinction by the side of a victorious army, which had
by no means been their lot at Jena. Nevertheless,
they were not impervious to the current of
German patriotism, as the resignation of Thielmann
and Langenau proved ; and when the year 1813
arrived, this current naturally acquired greater
strength, as the lengthened residence of the King
at Prague, and the then expected union with Austria,
opened the prospect of a different kind of political
action from that which was ultimately adopted,
and which has perhaps never been adequately
judged. One of our Zopen neighbours was Count Senfft-
Pilsach, who during the first years of the Empire
was Saxon Ambassador in Paris, and subsequently
Cabinet-Minister of Saxony. When the events of
1813 took place, he was decidedly in favour of the
alliance with Austria, and had accompanied the
King to Prague after Napoleon's victory at
Lutzen. The King returned to Dresden, but Senfft
sent in his resignation, and was later on Ambassador
at Turin and the Hague, and finally at Munich,
in the Austrian service. I met him there after 1840
when I was Saxon Charge d' Affaires in that city.
My mother had been an intimate friend of his late
wife, and it was natural that we often spoke of old
times. When I was once warmly defending the
opinion that the King was wrong in letting himself

KING FREDERICK A UGUSTUS 9
be persuaded to return to Dresden, Senfft retorted :
' Do not judge the King too severely. If the battle
of Kulm had been lost, negotiations for peace might
have ensued the next day ; and the battle might
easily have been lost had it not been for Vandamme's
well-known mistake, and the less known circumstance
that Napoleon was attacked by spasm of the bladder
after the battle of Dresden, and was unable to speak
for hours.' The importance of these words of Senfft is
enhanced by a passage in the memorandum of General
von Gersdorff on the course of events in the year
1813, which will be mentioned later on. Napoleon
had given orders after the battle of Dresden that a
strong column should follow Vandamme to Nollen-
dorf, but had suddenly reversed this order by directing
the column's march in the direction of Grossenhain.
Much later, indeed only recently, it came to my
knowledge that Senfft had left some Memoirs.
They were published at Leipzig in 1863 by Veit &
Co., and they show that the judgment passed on
the unhappy King Frederick Augustus was far too
severe. From Senfft's narrative — and he was a
staunch partizan of Austria — it appears that the
Cabinet of Vienna prevented the King from breaking
too precipitately with Napoleon, that it wished him
to pursue a procrastinating policy, and that finally
his overtures to Russia and Prussia were not only
ineffectual, but were absolutely disregarded. All this
might have led the King, placed as he was in the
most difficult position, to believe that his fate and that
of his country were sealed, and that he had more to

io MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
expect from France if she were victorious, than from
the Allies. It is certain that he was not influenced
by such a consideration, but that his affection for his
people, which he had proved during a reign of more
than fifty years, made the thought intolerable to
him that Napoleon might carry out his threat of
treating Saxony as a conquered country.
Heinrich von Treitschke observes, in the recently
issued third volume of his German History, that the
King returned to Dresden of his own accord, so that
one might believe that he hastened to do so out of
obsequiousness towards Napoleon. He quotes as his
authority a memorandum which General von Gersdorff,
who preceded the King on that occasion, drew up on
the events' of 1813, in order to place it before the
consulting Ministers at the Congress of Vienna. I
know that memorandum. The quotation is correct,
but, like all quotations, its true meaning can only be
perceived when it is read in connection with what
precedes and follows. The memorandum, which con
tains much of historical value, agrees remarkably with
the conclusions to be drawn from Senfft's Memoirs.
The King, who had on the one hand the prospect of
seeing his country occupied and treated as an enemy,
and on the otherjio guarantee that the victorious Allies
would help him to regain it, recognised that under such
circumstances his proper place was where Providence
had destined him to be : in the midst of his subjects.
The hope he entertained of being able to serve the
cause of Germany as well as his own, when the war
should be over, was, though somewhat optimistic, not
utterly devoid of foundation. Dignity and a proper

THE UNIVERSITY OF GOTTINGEN n
consideration of his interests required his action to
appear as though it were voluntary, and General von'
Gersdorff was accordingly instructed at once to con
tradict any intimation that the King had yielded to a
threat. Such are the circumstances detailed in the
General's memorandum.
I must now return to the years when the events
we are discussing took place, and when I was still a
child. In the year 1819 Zopen was sold, and we
returned to Dresden, where my eldest brother, who
was studying at the Military Academy for the
Artillery, died suddenly. In the year 1822 I entered
the Kreuzschule, and left it in 1826 at the head of
my class. My second brother, who had meanwhile
studied at the Academy of Mines at Freiberg, had to
go to the University of Gottingen, as it had eminent
professors in the branches of study in which he was
engaged, and I went there with him at a somewhat
early age, having only just completed my seventeenth
year. The celebrated Georgia Augusta was then
in its zenith; it had 1500 students, of whom 800 were
foreigners, that is, non-Hanoverians. I attended
Hugo's lectures on Roman Law, Eichhorn's on
German Law, Heeren's on History, Bouterweck's on
Logic, Sartorius' and Saalfeld's on Politics, and
Blumenbach's on Natural History. During the year
I was at Gottingen I worked hard. I attended six
lectures a day, and made copious notes. That year
had a decisive influence on my political views. The
connection of Hanover with England, slight though
it was politically, developed among the students
English ideas and modes of thought, and in this

12 MEMOIRS OF COJJNT BEUST
sense I can truly say that I have been a consistent
liberal from my youth upwards. From Gottingen I
went to the University of Leipzig. My life there
during the first year differed somewhat from my life
at Gottingen; I spent more time in fencing-rooms
and beer-houses than in attending lectures, which led
one of my fellow students (I was enrolled among the
Saxons), to remark that 'Beust was becoming a
regular good fellow,' thereby implying that I had been
irregular before. But the third year made up for
lost time. My brother and myself studied hard all
day. The tutor came at 6 A.M., and from that hour
until 10 p.m. only two hours were allowed for luncheon
and exercise. After that year we both passed our
law examination in the first class.
The year spent at Gottingen, and above all the
brilliant lectures of Sartorius on politics, gave me
the thought of taking up the diplomatic career, and
I proceeded to Dresden with this object. But there
I encountered great difficulties. The then all-power
ful Minister, Count Einsiedel, was ' not favourably
disposed towards me ; and in my discouragement I
determined to adopt a very different profession. I
liked the society of Leipzig and disliked that of
Dresden. I therefore decided to return to the former
city, and become a Professor at the University, in
which post I may truly say that my extraordinary
memory would have been of great value. But my
plans were foiled by the July Revolution, which
brought about the disturbances . in Saxony and the
Minister's dismissal ; and shortly after I entered his
department as a probationer.

THE UNGRATEFUL SON OF THE REVOLUTION 13
Thus the July Revolution gave me access to the
civil service, while the February Revolution paved my
way to the Cabinet. When the times of reaction
arrived (what they really meant in Saxony I shall
explain further on), someone remarked that it could
be said of me, as of Napoleon the First, that I was
'the ungrateful son ofthe Revolution.'

CHAPTER II
1830-1838
THE JULY REVOLUTION.  THE ATTITUDE OF EUROPE.  PRINCE
METTERNICH.  MY SERVICES IN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
 MY FIRST MISSION AT BERLIN.
In one of the last chapters of the second part of my
Memoirs, which treats of the session of the Austrian
Delegation of 1870, I have praised the deputy Dr
Kuranda for having had the courage to remind his
party, at a time when everyone indulged in the cheap
pleasure of attacking fallen France, how much the
German nation and German progress owed to the
French events of the years 1789, 1830, and 1848.
Thus my own particular fatherland, Saxony, would
have had to wait many a long year for the blessings
of the constitution of 1831, had there not been a
revolution in Paris in 1830.
' What have I done to the people ? Have I not
left everything as it was?' exclaimed the kind-hearted

THE JULY REVOLUTION 15
and philanthropic King Anthony of Saxony, when
the tidings reached Pillnitz of the disturbances that
took place in September at Leipzig and Dresden.
Saxony had until then clung timorously to the old
traditions, but the complete change effected in the
views of her people by the French revolution was
universal. Even aristocratic circles were not closed
ao-ainst it, although the contest between the old and
the new was there most apparent, while in the
communal guard, in which I had risen to the rank
of officer, the supporters and the opponents of the
new order of things discussed the questions of
the day without passion. I had already become
familiar at Gottingen with liberal ideas, much to
the indignation of my aristocratic friends. With
some of my university colleagues — one of whom was
throughout my life my truest friend, Dr von Weber,
who died not long ago as Director of Archives and
Privy Councillor — I founded a debating society, and
I remember an amusing episode that occurred at
the time. The plan of a constitution, which had been
placed before the old ' Landstande ' for their accept
ance, had appeared, and it was natural that we should
discuss it. But in our zeal we went so far as to
consider the plan not only not liberal enough, but
absolutely pernicious, and a protest was at once
drawn up for presentation to the very liberal Prime
Minister. I, who was then employed in an office of
the still existing Cabinet, was entrusted with the
duty of presenting this document. We were all at
the' commencement of our official career, and I
retained sufficient presence of mind to recognise the

1 6 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
unseemliness of the proceeding, for which reason I
did not hesitate to cast the formidable document
into the fire. I soon discovered in the members of
my society an anxiety which they were little able to
conceal, and which found vent in timid questions as
to whether any answer had been received from the
Cabinet, to which I replied by confessing what I had
done, knowing well what a relief it would be to them
to know it.
At the age of twenty-one we are more open to
emotions than at the age of thirty-nine, and to that
fact I chiefly attribute the different effect produced
on me by the Revolution of July and that of February.
But even apart from this consideration, it was owing
to circumstances that the former possessed a prestige
which was wanting to the latter in spite of its more
momentous consequences. If Charles X had had
thirty thousand instead of three thousand soldiers in
Paris, it cannot be doubted that he would have been
victorious, and so-called public opinion would have
become reconciled to him, as it was later on to Louis
Napoleon after the successful Coup d' Etat. But he
was defeated, and defeated after an abortive and
brutal violation of the constitution, and his victors
had fought with enthusiasm against his tyranny.
How totally different was the state of affairs in 1848 !
What had Louis Philippe done ? Nothing, except
that he had retained the services of a Minister who
had become unpopular, but who was supported by a
majority in the Chambers, and that he had lost his
head and not known how to give orders in a riot that
was the first during his reign. A republican 'par

THE ATTITUDE OF EUROPE 17
excellence,' a ' republicain de la veille,' Emanuel
Arago, told me when he was my colleague in Berlin
in 1848, that early on the 24th of February he and
his political friends had no suspicion that the pro
clamation of the Republic was imminent ; but that
when he saw on the Place de la Concorde what was
going on, how the generals were without orders,
and how everything was in utter confusion, he and
his friends proceeded to the Palais Bourbon and
forced their way into the Chamber of Deputies. I
know that behind this almost burlesque ' mise en
scene,' ending with the departure of Monarchy in a
cab, a far deeper movement was being enacted, which
was more of European than of French origin, but
which presented for that reason a different appear
ance from that of the July Revolution. I shall return
to this subject when treating of the year 1848, and
I shall throw some light on the attitude at that
time of Europe, and especially of Austria.
I will here add some remarks on the measures
taken by the great Cabinets, and their then unques
tioned leader Prince Metternich, against the July
Revolution. I need hardly say that these remarks
were written in more advanced years, and not when
I was a young man of twenty-one.
I became more nearly acquainted with Prince
Metternich only during the last years of his life, at
which time his son was Ambassador at Dresden, and
I preserve the most agreeable and grateful recollec
tions of our intercourse ; he could not have spoken
more confidentially with Talleyrand, Hardenberg,
and Nesselrode than he did with me. Thus I am
vol. 1 b

1 8 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
conscious of being quite free from any personal pre
judice, although my conviction leads me to criticise his
policy somewhat sharply. In doing this I must not
let myself be deterred by the remembrance of the
truly great nature that showed itself in the whole
appearance of the illustrious chancellor, as well as in
his treatment of men and things.
With regard to the reported saying of Metter
nich : ' II est possible que j'ai gouverne" quelquefois
l'Europe, mais je n'ai jamais gouverne l'Autriche' —
I do not know whether it is rightly attributed to him..
I have frequently read it ; that it would have been
sincere, I do not doubt, because that which is com
monly called the Metternich system did not in any
respect agree with his humane, perhaps too humane,
because optimistic views.* But I recognise in that
saying the confession of a great sin of omission. It
is inconceivable how a man who could say with
justice that he sometimes governed Europe, could
thus either take so little part in the' internal policy
of his country or else not be able to exercise decisive
influence over it — he who held a dominant position
on the Continent, and who could not have overlooked
how close was the connection between his influence
abroad and the credit of his administration at home.
But I do not lay stress on this. I confine
myself exclusively to Metternich's action in Europe,
and it is there that I recognise his mistakes — mis
takes which I condemn, not as an advocate of a
different system, but from his own point of view.
* In 1853, a year before his death, the Prince said to me in Dresden : 'Look at
the people of Gotha, good, well-meaning people, but bankrupt.' To which I
answered in my loudest voice, his deafness having greatly increased : ' Yes, they are
bankrupt indeed, but they have credit.'

PRINCE METTERNICH 19
How often has it been said in modern times that
Austria is the empire of improbabilities ! At the
proper place, in the second part of my Memoirs,.
I have pointed out that those who most frequently
quote that saying, are least justified in making it
a reproach. Another saying has often impressed
itself upon me. In many periods of the history of
Austria one might call it ' the country of contradic
tions.' Thus we find in the Metternich era constant
suspicion and calm indifference flourishing side by
side. The July Revolution was not unforeseen. In
the weeks preceding it I was at the Bohemian
watering-places when various diplomatists happened
to be there, and they often spoke of the impending
conflict. The French Minister at Dresden belonged
to one of the greatest and oldest families of his
country, and was an intimate friend of the Prince de
Polignac. In consequence of what he heard at
Dresden, he thought himself bound to warn his
Government repeatedly against the expected violation
ofthe Charte. Polignac suffered him to do so for a
time, but at last warned him that he was in danger of
injuring his career. The Minister took the hint, and
as soon as the Ordonnances were issued, he wrote a
congratulatory despatch. This document fell into the
hands of the provisional Government, and then his
career indeed came to an end. If Dresden was aware
of what was impending, Vienna must have been still
more so, and must have been convinced of the truth
that the success of the revolution would grievously
injure the existing system, which depended on the

20 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
principle of legitimacy. Nothing would have been
more advisable than a timely understanding with
the other great Cabinets, and nothing would have
been easier, considering the close and intimate
relations in which they then stood to each other.
But no ! that same Olympian repose was preserved
which later on inspired the reply to Radetzky when
he asked for reinforcements : ' L'ltalie est un mot
geographique.' In the fifth chapter of Metternich's posthumous
papers are to be found the despatches which he
addressed to the Emperor from Konigswart after the
outbreak of the July Revolution. We learn from
these documents, as well as from preceding letters,
that Metternich was prepared for the Coup d'Etat,
and was not against it, but that he had doubts as to
the vigour and capacity of those who were to
carry it out. I therefore feel only the more justified
in venturing to say what I have said about the in
activity and carelessness then prevailing. Nor does
my opinion lose in force from the following words in
one of the despatches :
' I have just received the enclosed paper from
France. Its contents show that revolution in its
worst form is victorious in Paris. This fact demon
strates two truths ; firstly, that the Ministry was
mistaken in its choice of means ; secondly, that I
was in the right when drawing the attention of the
Cabinets for more than two years to the threatening
aspect of affairs. Unfortunately my voice was lost
in the desert.'
If we find it difficult to conceive how the voice of

PRINCE METTERNICH 21
Prince Metternich could have been ' lost in the
desert ' in those days, we are met on the other hand
by the question as to what the object of that warn
ing was to have been. It could hardly have been
a joint remonstrance in Paris, because it was not
the undertaking then contemplated in that city, but
its possibly unsuccessful execution, that roused
the Chancellor's apprehension. Nor could eventual
measures of self-defence have been discussed. The
only precaution likely to be successful was not
taken — I mean the timely understanding of the
Cabinets as to a common and therefore impressive
attitude in case ' revolution in its worst form ' should
break out with its consequent new order of things ;
and as this eventuality had been foreseen two years
previously by Prince Metternich, as he himself said,
there was full time for taking the requisite measures.
I made a stay in Paris shortly after the July Re
volution, and later on, in the years 1838 to 1841, I
was Secretary of Legation there ; and I there
fore had many opportunities of acquainting myself
with what took place before and after that event.
The attitude of the Diplomatic Corps was not passive,
but vacillating (which was far worse) ; and it had a
decisive influence on the course of events. Among
those who were then Ambassadors, several were fully
conscious of the importance of the moment, but were
prevented from action by the universal want of instruc
tions, to which was added the remarkable circumstance
that the representative of the very sovereign who was
most opposed from the beginning to the monarchy
of Louis Philippe, and who continued so until its

22 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
fall, was the least inclined to take any measures,
though the initiative fell upon him as the 'Doyen'
of the diplomatic body.
There was no telegraphic communication in those
days, but special couriers would have sufficed to
bring about such unanimity in the representations
of the Ambassadors that it would have forced the
Duke of Orleans to reflect. Before the days of
July, an initiative taken by Austria in this sense
would have received the consent and applause of all
the other powers except England. But Louis
Philippe has in many respects not been placed
historically in the proper light. The reproach
levelled at him by the Royalists that he conspired
against Charles X, who had been his benefactor
in spite of the memory of Philippe Egalite", is devoid
of truth; but it is true that he could have prevented
the dethronement of the elder line, if he had declared
firmly and at the right moment to the leaders of the
movement, many of whom were intimate with him,
that he would not accept the crown if it were taken
from Charles X. It is well known that at first
it was difficult to persuade him to take over the
Lieutenance Generale, and to accept the election.
Although he was not wanting in personal courage,
as he proved in the very serious insurrection of June
1832, still he was not a man to expose himself to
unnecessary danger, and the certainty that he would
find Europe more than averse to him as King, whereas
he would enjoy the confidence of all the Powers
as Regent, would not have been without effect.
A war undertaken by France to enforce the Tecogni-

PRINCE METTERNICH 23
tion of the new Government would not have been
probable, and would certainly have been by no means
formidable, considering the vast superiority of the
opposed forces.
On the other hand, it was wise of Metternich to
agree with Berlin in resisting the plan of armed
intervention in favour of the dethroned Bourbons,
which was demanded in other quarters, as in the
most favourable case not much could have been
expected from a Restoration carried out for the third
time at the point of the bayonet. But what was
neither intelligible nor excusable was the neglect to
take advantage of an incident which would have
warranted the interference of the Powers without
aggression, and which would have made France the
attacking party if war had ensued. The Belgian
Revolution, which then broke out, extended to Luxem
burg, a portion of the territory of the Germanic Con
federation. In that case immediate intervention
would have been justifiable, and the Powers could
have occupied not only the Grand-Duchy, but also
Belgium, then an integral portion of the Kingdom of
the Netherlands. Nobody will be inclined to main
tain that a measure which would have been supported
not merely by Austria, Prussia, and the Confederation,
but also by Russia, would have been likely to meet
with the resistance of France. Perhaps it will be
objected that I have forgotten the Polish Insurrection.
By no means. That event took place two months
later ; and if the above step had been taken, the
Russian Armv would have been in the Kingdom
of Poland before the insurrection was ready to break

24 21EM0IRS OF COUNT BEUST
out. It is doubtful what turn the affairs of France
herself would have taken ; but it is certain that the
prestige of the system which had been so deeply
undermined by the July Revolution would have
assumed a very different form from that wliich it
really acquired. I repeat that I do not feel myself
called upon to defend that system. From a certain
point of view, indeed, every system may be justified,
and may claim approval, but only when its execution
is consistent and energetic.
I now return to the years when I was still in my
twenties. Next to diplomacy I had also studied Internal
Administration, and became ' Assessor ' in the ' Landes-
direktion.' At the same time I was ' Koniglicher
Kammerjunker,' and in consequence connected with
the Court. This multiplicity of offices procured me
my first mission, of which I shall give some details,
as they recall the memory of the old Court life of the
last century. In the year 1833, the then Prince co-
Regent, afterwards King Frederick Augustus,
married Princess Maria of Bavaria, twin-sister of the
Archduchess Sophia. This event had to be preceded
by a solemn proposal of marriage, and I was
appointed to accompany the high Court official who
was entrusted with the mission. In these times it
will scarcely be believed when I say that we took five
days to go in a special post-chaise with four horses
from Dresden to Munich. My esteemed chief, who
travelled in a dress-coat and silk hat, obliging me to
do the same, held every morning a sort of reception
at which I alone was present, and he insisted on

MY SERVICES IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 35
dinner and supper being served with due slowness and
ceremony. On the first day we just managed to
arrive at Zwickau, on the second at Bayreuth, on the
third at Ratisbon, on the fourth at Landshut, and on
the fifth at Munich. One day at Munich I came
home late and overslept myself the next morning.
When I awoke, I saw my chief before me in his
dressing-gown, taking two steps backwards and say
ing : ' Most serene and most gracious king ' — thus
using me as a sort of dummy before which he re
hearsed his speech. Of this estimable man, who was
the very incarnation of etiquette, but who showed me
much kindness, I preserve a pleasing recollection, and
when I had made my mark as a Minister, I did not
disturb his conviction that the foundation of my
fortune was laid in that Munich mission. Another
reminiscence of Dresden Court life here occurs to me.
In the first years after 1830 even at Court old things
had somewhat yielded to new ; and among other
innovations, guests were allowed to appear at the
Court balls in trousers. After the marriage above
referred to, severer rules were enforced, and knee-
breeches were revived. On this subject I once said
in the presence of the Court Chamberlain, who was
otherwise my friend : ' What a good time that was
when we were allowed to appear at Court in
trousers ! ' He flew at me in a towering passion, and
said : ' Trousers ! I gave you credit for greater
attachment to the Royal Family ! '
Towards the close of that same year 1833, I
undertook a long journey through Switzerland,
France, and England, and early in 1836 I entered on

26 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
my duties as Secretary of Legation at Berlin, where
I remained two years. I hope to prove later on
that the accusation of hostility to Prussia which has
been so persistently made against me, is most unjust ;
and it would be difficult to show that it arose from
my residence in Berlin, for the social intercourse
I there enjoyed was most agreeable, and I may say
that I was regretted when I left. My lucky star
decreed that in these two years of a very uneventful
time, the visit to Berlin of the Dukes of Orleans
and Nemours took place, a visit that only passed
off favourably owing to the authoritative interference
of Frederick William III with his family and society.
How many things have changed in that comparatively
short time of thirty years! When I think of 1836
and 1866 ! The King of Prussia fully armed for war,
allied against Austria with the last King of Sardinia,
who placed himself as King of Italy on the thrones of
his exiled fellow sovereigns ! And then to reflect on
1836! In those days Berlin was, almost more than
Vienna, the home of the strictest legitimacy. Some
French families were to be found there, of very pro
nounced legitimist views, and on friendly terms with
the Court and the Aristocracy. The results of the
Belgian Revolution, too, were naturally felt at Berlin
more keenly than elsewhere, the Queen of the Nether
lands being a sister of Frederick William III,
one of his daughters being married to Prince
Frederick, and one of his sons to Princess Marianne
of the Netherlands. Among the embassies in Berlin
none were more the centre of everything that

MY SERVICES IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 27
was legitimist and absolute than that of King
Charles Albert of Sardinia. The envoys of Don
Carlos, were often to be seen at the Sardinian embassy,
and the following occurrence is very characteristic
of the regime of Turin at that time. A Count
Villette, a young man of high culture and progressive
ideas, was then Secretary of Legation to the
embassy. He was appointed Charge d'Affaires
during a prolonged leave of absence of his chief, and
sent frequent despatches to Turin. These despatches
were not read by the Foreign Minister, but the
envoy on his return hastened to inform his
Government of the dangerous and subversive views
of the Secretary. The result was that the latter
wTas recalled and dismissed. The great crime of
Count Villette consisted in the fact that he had
interested himself in the nature and advantages
of the Prusso-German Zollverein, and had even
hinted at the advisability of a similar institution for
Italy. When the Princess Elizabeth of Saxony
married the Duke of Genoa in 1850, I enquired after
my old friend Villette of the gentlemen who
accompanied the Duke to Dresden. The answer
was : ' He is in Parliament, and is a member of
the extreme Right.'
And war with Austria ! Who could have ventured,
I do not say to speak, but even to think of such an
eventuality ! In those days Vienna did not take hints
from Berlin ; but nothing took place in Berlin with
out the knowledge and approval of Prince Metternich,
and nobody dreamt of finding in that circumstance
anything derogatory to Prussia.

28 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
The visit of the French Princes to the Prussian
capital makes me revert to the theme, discussed
above, of the attitude of the Cabinets towards the
Revolution of July. Considering the circumstances
which I have just described as existing in Berlin,
that visit was a bold move, but successful, thanks to
the firmness of the King, and thanks also, as justice
compels me to admit, to the discreet and winning
manners of the Princes themselves. This good result
was in no slight measure brought about by the high
position the French Ambassador, M. Bresson, had
acquired in the favour of Prince Wittgenstein, who
was the King's most intimate friend and his constant
partner at whist. But as everywhere else, and even
more at Berlin than in other places, French and
Belgian diplomacy laboured under the disadvantage
of the interdict of Europe, secretly but effectively
carried out. As the attitude of the Courts and
Cabinets of Europe before and during the July
Revolution, was lamentably weak : so after that event
it was neither wise nor dignified. Instead of the
sword which the Powers neither drew nor wished to
draw, they were lavish of their needle-points. The
blocus matrimonial which was set up against the new
French Monarchy was not the only barrier erected,
and it merely provoked two results : firstly, the
Alliance of the Western Powers, which, as England
had honestly accepted the new state of things in
France, was inevitable, and which became incon
venient for the interests of the so-called Northern
Powers, especially in Belgium, Spain and Portugal ;
and secondly, the February Revolution, which became

MY FIRST MISSION AT BERLIN 29
even more inconvenient, and which nothing prepared
so effectually as the inadequate position with regard
to foreign Powers of the new French Monarchy. It
may indeed be safely asserted that the alarms and
injuries caused by the Second Empire (to Austria
notably) may be traced to the same source ; for they
resulted from the lesson which the aspiring Emperor
of the French had learnt from the history of the
patient King of the French.

CHAPTER III
1838-1848
PARIS.  MUNICH.  LONDON.
At the beginning ofthe year 1838 I was moved from
Berlin to Paris, where I remained until 1841.
In those days there were no railways to Paris ; and
railways have changed Paris very much to its disad
vantage. There were only a limited number of
strangers, who were chiefly of the distinguished class,
whereas now there are shoals of visitors from the
provinces and from other countries. In that good old
time there were spacious seats in the theatres ; and in
the restaurants each person had his table to himself.
If the difference between past and present is very
apparent to the ordinary tourist, it is yet more
so to him who seeks society in the French capital.
It contains now as then eminent men, and amiable
and witty women, but manners are changed, and what
gave Parisian life its great charm — the salons and

PARIS 31
little dinners — has disappeared. English customs have
been introduced everywhere. Very late dinners, which
make it difficult to go to the theatre ; the fashion of
returning from the country so late that one has to do
without society when one most wants it ; residence in
town during the hot months, when one is half stifled
in the over-crowded and brilliantly lighted rooms (in
England they at least open the windows, which are kept
rigorously closed in Paris); great dinners of at least
twenty-four people ; and crowded ' at homes.' In old
times the French families seldom received more than
six or eight people at dinner, so that all could join in
the conversation. The salon was not then, as now, a
reception where visitors come and go in rapid
succession. At the more celebrated salons, the
entrance to which required more than a mere intro
duction, the restricted circle met regularly under the
auspices of a lady gifted with the necessary accom
plishments ; and, as at small dinners, with general
conversation, au coin du feu. Elderly ladies who no
longer went into the world held their receptions every
evening in the so-called avant soiree, and one was
certain to find at some of these receptions a person of
prominent position. Thus Mold was to be met at the
Comtesse Castellane's, Pasquier at the Comtesse
Boigne's, Guizot at the Princess Lieven's. Such
circles are no longer to be found. That Paris remains
nevertheless the most agreeable residence in the world,
that one feels keen regret at leaving it, I know
from experience. But it may be imagined what an
excellent school for refined manners and mental im
provement the Paris of those days was.

32 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
At the time when I was Secretary of Legation,
it was still the custom for the Secretary to have free
quarters in the Minister's house. When there
were personal differences, this arrangement had its
disadvantages, and it has gradually fallen into
desuetude. I had the good fortune to be on the best
terms with my two chiefs and their families, and can
only speak with gratitude of their kindness. In Berlin
it was General von Minckwitz, who had formerly been
my superior as Minister of Foreign Affairs ; in
Paris, Privy Councellor Baron Konneritz : they both
had very good positions in society, which could not be
otherwise than useful to me. The latter especially
was a great favourite after a long residence in the
French capital. I did not then foresee that his
youngest son, a boy a few years old, would one day
be my son-in-law and an excellent Minister of Finance.
In other respects, too, I had, as the French say,
de la chance. I was twice Charge d'Affaires in
Paris, and though it could not be said that there
were any negotiations between France and Saxony,
my position brought me into direct communication
with two Ministers whose names are historical — •
Marshal Soult and Guizot. I have some recollection
of the time when the latter was in office. He took
the place of Thiers in 1840, after Louis Philippe, in
view of the united attitude of the Great Powers
against France, had used the saying uttered later on
by Gambetta — ¦' soumettre ou demettre ' — in the manner
of Marshal MacMahon, applying the ' soumettre ' to
himself and the 'demettre' to his Minister. At the
time when the song ' They shall not have the free

PARIS

33

German Rhine' was written, Thiers opened an
unsuccessful Chauvinistic campaign against Germany.
Some think the starting-point of this campaign,
namely, his policy in the Egyptian Question, was a
mistaken one ; but this- is by no means certain. It
was the obvious policy of Russia to maintain Turkey
in such a position that she should be in want of pro
tection ; but whether those who, like the Cabinets in
London and Vienna, wished to see Turkey full of
vitality and energy, would not have done better to let
things take their course and suffer Mehemet Ali to
make himself master of Constantinople, is an open
question. The political excitement then prevalent in Paris
was great ; the French felt keenly the humiliation
they had brought upon themselves, and Guizot, after
accepting the Presidency of the Council, did not lie
on a bed of roses. I remember having heard it said
more than once : II en a pour trois semaines. But
the three weeks became seven years. How often that
saying recurred to me later on, when I took charge of
the Ministry in the excited times of 1849, and was told
that it would only last a fortnight, whereas it lasted,
not seven years as with Guizot, but seventeen years.
The events which at that time took place in
France were in every respect extraordinary.
Because Egyptians and Turks were fighting in Asia,
Paris had to be fortified ; and without awaiting the
votes of the Chamber, Thiers had the audacity to cut
down the trees in the Bois de Boulogne, so dear to
the Parisians. It was almost more extraordinary
that when the warlike Minister had resigned and the
VOL I. C

34 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
pacific Minister had entered office, the latter carried on
the fortifications more vigorously than ever, demanding
and receiving large concessions from the Chambers for
the purpose of surrounding Paris with a number of
forts, to which a circular wall, an ' enceinte continue,'
had to be added, that it might not appear to the people
that Paris was to be bombarded during a riot.
Guizot, a man of the strictest integrity in private
matters, had laxer principles when the means of
government were in question. I was present when
these sarcastic words escaped him : ' Aujourd'hui nous
avons gagne cinq convictions.' I met him twice
afterwards, first in 1848 after his flight to London,
when he wrongly predicted that the Assemblee
Nationale, then about to be elected, would be com
posed of the dregs of all anarchical elements ; and
secondly in Paris in 1873, shortly before his death.
I met the Comte de Paris in his house, and my
appearance made the Comte exclaim : ' Here are two
Protestants who were formerly the Prime Ministers
of two great Catholic countries.'
Some other remarkable events occurred during my
stay in Paris. I witnessed the great riot in the
month of May 1839, and was within an inch of being
shot. ' Do not meddle with what is not your business,'
is a wise saying, which I utterly forgot, allowing
myself to be led by my curiosity into the midst of the
troops and the rioters. I was present at the trial
which was held in consequence of the riot before the
Chambre des Pairs. I saw Barbes and Blanqui at the
bar — that very bar at which Napoleon III appeared
the following year after the Boulogne incident.

PARIS 35
At the end of 1841, I received my first indepen
dent post as Charge d' Affaires at Munich.
I cannot conclude these reminiscences of Paris
without mentioning the Court. Even the adversaries
of the Orleans family must own that its members
have personally much that is sympathetic and
attractive, and have never omitted to do graceful
and pleasing things. Thus, although I then occupied
a subordinate position, I was invited before my
departure to dine with the Royal Family at St
Cloud. The King was quite a bourgeois on such
occasions, and carved himself, a task to which he was
not equal, so that it could perhaps be said of him
' qu'il savait mieux trancher les difficultes que les
viandes.' His awkwardness caused an accident to
befall me, wliich was fortunately not attended with
any bad consequences. A dish of ham was handed
to me, and I took a slice to which another slice
was hanging. It fell on the dress of the Queen,
next to whom I was seated, but her Majesty did not
notice it. I did not lose my presence of mind, and
the moment the Queen was looking another way, I
made a bold move and seized the slice of ham and
put it in my coat pocket. Memorable to me were
the last words that Queen Marie Amelie uttered
when I told her how sorry I was to leave Paris :
' You will see that you will end your career in Paris,'
a prophecy that has been fulfilled.
In Munich more had to be done than merely to
observe and to take an interest in the affairs of the
country. A great deal of trouble was given me
especially by railway matters. The treaty about

36 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
the Nlirnberg-Leipzig line was already concluded,
but its execution at first met with great difficulties
in the Bavarian Chamber. Later on there were
negotiations about the construction of the Bamberg-
Aschaffenburg line, in which Saxony took great
interest, in opposition to the Niirnberg- Wurzburg
line, which was carried out in later years. My
Munich residence was coeval with the latter years of
the reign of Louis I, who, in spite of his oddities, was
a sovereign of marked mental power and decided
energy. The Lola Montez episode occurred soon
after my departure from the Bavarian capital. With
out her, King Louis would not have been forced to
abdicate, and if he had remained on the throne in
1848, it is scarcely to be doubted that he, the German
Prince ' par excellence,' would have been chosen
Emperor at Frankfort, and I am certain that he
would not have refused the Imperial crown. A
transient but highly interesting period would thus
have been added to the annals of the nineteenth
century. During my stay at Munich the regime of the
clericals was paramount, and had a representative in
the Minister Abel, who had no rival in the Chamber
so far as eloquence was concerned. Viale Prela was
the Papal Nuncio. He afterwards became a Cardinal
and Nuncio at Vienna, and negotiated the Austrian
Concordat with Cardinal Rauscher.
I was on the most friendly terms with Cardinal
Viale Prela, and was vividly reminded of him in
Paris by Cardinal Czacki. My predecessor,
following the example of his Prussian colleague,

MUNICH 37
had perhaps meddled too much with the affairs of the
Bavarian Protestants, and by so doing instead of
benefiting them, only made them feel the ill-temper
which was meant for their protectors. I was of
opinion that I should do better to abstain from such
intervention, unless I should be directed to intervene
by my Government, which was not the case. That
this attitude disposed Herr Abel favourably towards
me was of use to my Government in the railway
question, and the friendship of the Nuncio was
valuable to me personally. I married at Munich the
daughter of the late General Baron von Jordan, who
was a Protestant, but whose children were brought up
in the religion of their mother, a Countess Sandizell, a
Catholic. My bride was a Catholic, and in those days
no priest could be found to solemnize a marriage be
tween a Catholic and a Protestant unless a promise were
given that the children should be brought up in the
Church of Rome. This concession I refused to grant ;
but I pointed out that the ceremony in the Protestant
Church would suffice, as the Catholic Church consid
ered a Protestant marriage as a sacrament, which was
proved by the fact that a Catholic could not marry a
divorced Protestant. I owe it to my illustrious and
reverend patron that my wife's relatives, with few
exceptions, yielded to this view, and that I had as
witnesses in the Protestant Church, two Protestants
and forty Catholics. Twenty years later I had to
assist in destroying the work* which the Cardinal had
looked upon as the crowning glory of his life, though
he himself did not live to see my ingratitude.
* The Concordat.

38 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
In 1846 I was appointed Resident Minister in
London. England is the country where I passed the
greatest part of my career as a diplomatist ; two years
as Saxon Resident Minister, seven as Austrian
Ambassador, and during various intermediate periods
as Plenipotentiary of the Germanic Confederation,
and on other shorter missions. I can truly say that
I have always looked upon England as my second
home. Whenever I visit my friends in England
(a pleasure I cannot deny myself), my heart rejoices
at the sight of Dover. Others have doubtless had a
similar experience. Whether it be the magnificent
hospitality that one finds in England, or the loyal
attachment one meets with, there is a homely feeling
about the country which attracts the visitor in spite
of the dreary monotony of English life . and the
lack of amusement.
At the time of my first London mission, two
eminent characters were still living : the Duke of
Wellington and Sir Robert Peel. As formerly in
Paris, so now in London, I had the good fortune to be
present at interesting events. The chief of these was
Sir Robert Peel's victory on the Repeal of the Corn
Laws, and his defeat on the Irish Coercion Bill which
occurred shortly afterwards. When his former sup
porters brought about this defeat by their union with
the Whigs, thus avenging themselves for his having
carried the Corn Laws Bill by a similar coalition, he
made an eloquent speech, in which he consoled himself
for his defeat by the thought that the poor would
bless him when they ate their bread. He might have
said the same of the gourmets, for the duties on wine

LONDON 39
were lowered at the same time ; and this, I may add,
had the curious effect of reducing the consumption of
wine in England. Not unjustly was it then charged
against Peel, and the charge has since been revived,
that he could have realised his philanthropic views
equally well if he had left it to the Liberal Ministry
to introduce and carry the Corn Laws Bill, as it was
the Liberal vote which enabled it to be passed when
he voted for it with his sixty followers, the so-called
Peelites. In resolving to attach his name to the
measure he caused a split in his party, which has
never since been obliterated. From that moment
there were no longer any Tories or Whigs, but Con
servatives and Liberals. In both quarters oppor
tunism has taken the place of old party traditions.
Soon after my appointment a treaty had for the
first time to be negotiated between Saxony and
England for the protection of literary copyright,
in connection with one concluded by Prussia with
special consideration for the Leipzig book-market.
Another negotiation with which I was entrusted
immediately after related to the postage between
England and Saxony. The cost of a letter-
between the two countries, which is now twenty
pfennigs, was then one shilling (ten silber
groschen), and of that sum the Saxon Post Office
received one quarter (two-and-a-half silbergroschen).
The English Post Office wished to reduce the rate ;
Saxony offered no objection, provided the two-and a-
half silbergroschen continued to be paid. It required
a vast deal of time and trouble before a compromise
was effected.

40 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
At that time I obtained an insight into a move
ment, not emanating from the lower but from the
upper circles, which was' a forerunner of the
agitation for German Unity of 1848. In this
movement the chief participators were Baron
Stockmar, the well-known author of the ' Life of the
Prince Consort ' ; my Prussian colleague, the not
less frequently mentioned Chevalier de Bunsen ; and
finally the Queen's stepbrother, Prince Leiningen,
who was in 1848 the first ' Reichs-Minister-Presi-
dent ' ; and all these grouped themselves round
Prince Albert. Their views were decidedly
favourable to Prussia, and decidedly hostile to
Austria. I have always found the governments of
the petty German States and the heads of the
mediatised families most strongly in favour of
German unity under Prussian supremacy. I do not
maintain, as I have heard others maintain, that the
motive of these aspirations was the lowering of the
position of the German Central States, and especially
of the Kingdoms, and their equalisation with the
minor territories of the Confederation ; but it is
certain that this consideration contributed to make
the parties concerned favourable to a new formation
of Germany. I do not hesitate to include in my reminiscences
slight events that may amuse my reader. I have
sometimes been reproached with writing too much,
and I hope that it will not be ascribed to self praise
when I say that wherever I was accredited, I
occupied myself not only with political questions, but
also with internal administration ; and that I wrote

LONDON 41
circumstantial reports on these subjects. Once I
wrote a lengthy document on English schools, and
two of my colleagues, who had read it at my house,
asked permission to take copies of it. After a time
they confessed that they had received highly
laudatory despatches from home, whereas I had
received no acknowledgment from Dresden. I had
then a Swedish colleague, a most agreeable com
panion, but who could not be accused, like myself, of
excessive love of writing. He was very fond of
looking at my despatches, and occasionally of using
them. When the Schleswig-Holstein movement
broke out simultaneously with the February Revolu
tion, I of course treated this movement entirely from
the German point of view, whereas it is well known
that Sweden espoused the cause of Denmark. One
morning my colleague came to me in the greatest
excitement : ' You have got me into a fine fix ! I
have just received a letter from my Minister to ask
me if I have gone mad ! '
I will here add a singular coincidence which
occurred in London at the end of 1847. Prince
Louis Napoleon took refuge in England after his
flight from Ham about the same time as I arrived in
London. He had great difficulty in gaining access
to aristocratic circles. A new club, the Coventry
Club, was founded in 1847, in the same house in
Piccadilly which is now occupied by the St James'
Club. It was founded for the purpose of receiving
foreigners, and especially members of the diplomatic
Corps, as paying members — other clubs, like the
Travellers' and the Athenaeum, receiving foreigners

42 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
as visitors only. Prince Louis Napoleon was a
candidate for election to the Coventry Club ; the
French Charge d' Affaires did his best to prevent the
Prince's admission, and he was blackballed by three
votes. A year, later, almost to the very day, he
received six million votes.

CHAPTER IV
1848
THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION AND THE YEAR 1848.  MY FIRST BUT
IMPERFECT APPOINTMENT AS MINISTER.  1 BECOME ENVOY AT
BERLIN.
In one of the preceding chapters I have, while
explaining the difference between the Revolution of
July and that of February, expressed the opinion that
the first was of purely French, and the latter far more
of European, origin. It would indeed otherwise have
been difficult to understand how a King, whose rule
was always strictly constitutional (whatever may be
said against Guizot's system), could have been
dethroned because the police had forbidden some
banquets in favour of electoral reform. As to the
oft-repeated explanation of internal corruption, it is
ridiculous to maintain that such a revolution could
have been brought about merely because there were
some scandalous trials, and a man of noble birth had
murdered his wife. The true date of its commence-

44 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
ment is not 1848 but 1847. In that year the feeble
ness of the great Governments became apparent to
the European party of agitation, and from that
nioment the first trivial cause (such as the Parisian
conflict really was) sufficed for the outbreak. The
bankruptcy ofthe Metternich system took place neither
at Vienna in the days of March, nor in Paris, but in
Switzerland in the previous year. This is not the
proper moment to enter into details about the Swiss
Constitution, a question which was then very pro
minent. It is my conviction that Austria and France
were right in principle when, relying on Treaties, they
regarded the guarantee of neutrality as conditional on
the maintenance of the Constitution of the Cantons ;
though it must be admitted that the Cabinet of Vienna
had placed itself above treaties by the annexation of
the Free State of Cracow.
That period was the much-extolled era of
' principles ' ; it might more justly be called ' the era
of contradictions.' After the occurrences in Galicia,
I will not too severely reproach the Austrian Govern
ment for the Cracow Agreement, but it had to be
remembered when Austria demanded respect of
Treaties from the Swiss, a demand which she was
finally obliged to relinquish, not with the firmness
of volition, but with the resignation of submission.
The course of events has proved how mistaken was
her judgment of the political side of the question,
which was the only practical one, when she considered
the abolition of the old Cantonal Constitution as the
starting point of revolutionary movements. After
the February Revolution broke out, there were many

THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 45
disturbances in Germany and Italy ; but Switzerland
remained the most quiet of countries. Worse, how
ever, than this error of appreciation were Austria's
errors in action. When both France and Austria
had encouraged by every possible means the resist
ance of the Cantons of the Sonderbund (this was
done, independently of the language of the Govern
ments, especially through the zeal of their agents,
who belonged to the clerical party), the threat of
armed intervention, on which the Sonderbund party
had the right to rely, ended in the powers merely
allowing things to take their course. Vienna ex
plained this conduct by saying that there was no
certainty of French co-operation. Paris had, in a
reversed sense, the same excuse, although the French
entertained the liveliest sympathy for the Sonder
bund. ' It is impossible that we can allow so
iniquitous, odious and brutal an act to be accom
plished,' said to me the old Due de Broglie, then
French Ambassador in London.
I by no means overlook the influential part played
by the Spanish Marriages and the rancour of Lord
Palmerston, but here we distinctly see the weakness
of a system that can be disturbed by such accidents.
The recognition by the Revolutionary Party of
the weakness of the European Powers had the
natural consequence that the February Revolution
operated everywhere like an explosive.
If we read German histories, as for instance the
well-written and attractive ' Thirty Years of German
History' by Biedermann, we are led to believe that
the German rising of 1848 was of purely German

46 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
origin and a purely German act. But had Louis
Philippe preserved his old energy of mind, which was
not the case (as I was able to convince myself during
a visit I paid him at Claremont shortly after his
exile), and if his two sons in the Army and Navy,
d'Aumale and de Joinville, had been in Paris at the
time, the February Revolution would only have been
another riot, and Thiers would probably have returned
to office. That in this case the German movement
would have succeeded in convening a Parliament
and a National Assembly was hardly probable, con
sidering the description Biedermann gives of the
feeling at Berlin during and after the session of the
united Landtag. The movement in Hungary and
Italy, as in Germany, began in 1847, and originated
in the above-mentioned notorious fiasco of the great
Cabinets ; after an energetic repression of the Parisian
insurrection, it would indeed not have dwindled away,
but would have proceeded more leisurely, though less
progressively. I will here refute in advance the
possible inference that I am personally averse to the
present development of Germany. I am wanting
neither in admiration of what has been performed,
nor in a sense of the defects of former times; but
this will not deter me from calling things by their
right names, and from opposing unjust depreciation
and condemnation of the past.
In Saxony, where the insurrection broke out early
in March, it was perhaps less surprising than else
where. A few years before, disturbances had taken
place at Leipzig, which were followed by armed inter
vention of not unquestionable necessity, but of very

MY FIRST APPOINTMENT AS MINISTER 47
questionable opportuneness. Victims had fallen, and
Robert Blum appeared for the first time as a popular
orator. The traces of those days were not obliterated
when the French catastrophe occurred. From Leipzig
arose the agitation for the dismissal of the Ministry,
whose members were not only honourable men, but
each eminent in his branch, and of high authority.
Their policy could not be called absolutely illiberal ;
it was only stationary. But new men were wanted
for new policies.
It was in the middle of March that I received a
letter from my superior, Minister von Zeschau, in
which he asked me to come to Dresden without delay,
as the King was going to entrust me with the Depart
ment of Foreign Affairs. The Ministers had considered
it their duty to send in their resignations, and King
Frederick Augustus accepted them with a heavy
heart. The new Ministry was a radical one, such as
then existed in all the German States. Two pro
minent members of the Second Chamber, Braun, a
lawyer, and Georgi, a manufacturer, wrere appointed
Ministers of Justice and Finance respectively ; and
von der Pfordten, then Professor of Roman Law and
Rector of the University of Leipzig, was appointed
Minister of the Interior. The King wished to place
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in experienced hands,
to which the others agreed. I immediately made
preparations for my departure, and in the confusion
I was robbed of the few Orders I then possessed and
of my dress coats, which, in those revolutionary days,
made me quite fitted for my new position. I did not
let myself be detained by a storm that lengthened the

48 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
passage from Dover to Ostend by three hours ; I
travelled night and day ; and on my arrival in
Dresden, I was received by an official of the ' Minis-
terratskanzlei,' with whom I was personally acquainted.
He came, however, not to welcome me as his chief,
but with a request that I should not show myself in
the town.
While I was on my way, the events of the 18th of
March had taken place in Berlin. This completely
changed the situation ; the Ministry required, instead
of myself, a popular man of tried radical opinions ;
and thus Pfordten exchanged the Ministry of the
Interior for that of Public Worship and Instruction
in connection with that of Foreign Affairs. Stadtrath
Oberlander of Zwickau, who was appointed Minister
of the Interior, was a thoroughly honest and far from
fanatical Democrat ; but he was weak, and entirely in
the hands of the extreme party. It was chiefly owing
to him that in the course of a year a whole network
of ultra-Democratic Clubs was spread over the
country. These clubs, the so-called ' Vaterlands-
vereine,' furnished the contingent for the Insurrection
of May 1849. Had the first arrangement been pre
served — had I been nominated Minister in 1848, and
had Oberlander not been admitted into the Cabinet —
affairs would have assumed a different aspect. The
Insurrection of May would probably not have taken
place, and affairs in Saxony would have developed
themselves as in Hanover under Bennigsen and Stiive.
Pfordten, who was at heart a Conservative, would
have found support in me, and he would have carried
Braun and Georgi with him. The public mind in

/ BECOME ENVOY AT BERLIN 49
Saxony, and not only in reactionary circles, was of
opinion, after the Insurrection of May, that things
had happened for the best, and that a thorough over
hauling was essential. Much was to be said for this
view, but it was lamentable that the revolution was
not only accompanied by bloodshed, but by the ruin of
many families, through the direct or indirect participa
tion of officials, schoolmasters, and even clergymen,
who had been misled into taking part in it.
I return to the days of March 1848. There was
a feeling in Dresden that I was entitled to some sort
of compensation for my precipitate and useless
journey, and a vacancy which had just occurred in
the Berlin Embassy seemed to afford an opportunity
of doing this. But I was not sent there until May,
and meanwhile I returned to London for a short
time. As the Government did not wish to give up
the English Embassy, nor to appoint anyone else to
it, I remained still accredited to that post ; and,
alluding to my double appointment at London and
Berlin, Lord Palmerston gave me the name of ' the
Colossus of Rhodes.'
I shall never forget my impressions when I
returned to London. After I had heard of nothing
day by day and week by week but national uprisings,
marching with the times, rupture with the past,
sovereignty of the people, etc., I found everything in
London precisely as I had left it, and the season
progressing in all the wonted splendours of
aristocratic luxury.
The Queen was then at Osborne, in the Isle of
Wight, and I received an invitation to go there for
vol. 1 D

50 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
two days. Prince Albert, who was at that time
more favourable to me than later on, when I became
too strong a champion of the Minor States of
Germany to suit his views, was highly interested in
my narrative of my Dresden journey and of all I had
seen in Germany. This interest is easily explained
by what I have said in the preceding chapter on the
Prince's activity in German affairs. His Royal
Highness showed me in confidence a paper he had
drawn up on the best form to be given to
the Germanic Confederation. His views nearly
agreed with the constitution voted later on at
Frankfort, but still more with the ' Drei-Kbnigs-
Verfassung ' or ' Fursten-Collegium ' of Berlin.
Although I refrained from saying anything on the
Imperial question, I did not alienate the sympathies
of my illustrious host, and I was afterwards informed,
on the best authority, that the Prince had sug
gested at Frankfort my nomination as German
Ambassador in London, in case Bunsen, as he
hoped, should be appointed Minister of Foreign
Affairs at Berlin.
I returned to Saxony vid Frankfort, where I
wished to see the new aspect of affairs. The sittings
had shortly before commenced in the Paulskirche.
The Bundestag was still in existence, though its com
position had been modified in accordance with the
wants of the time. The Prussian Minister to the
Bundestag was an old colleague of mine at Gottingen,
Count Usedom, who has often been named since, and
who was again Minister when the Bundestag was
revived. In spite of our differences in politics, I

/ BECOME ENVOY AT BERLIN 51
must give him the praise of always having been
impartial in his judgment. He remarked with truth
when he met me again in London after 1870 : ' I
have repeatedly said in Berlin whenever your name
was mentioned : " You always forget one thing, the
man has no venom."' This was certainly true, as all
who know me can testify. It is a pity that in the
very place where he uttered these words, people were
frequently of a contrary opinion, and would have
preferred to apply to me the saying : ' Morte la bete,
mort le venin.'
The Saxon envoy to the Bundestag was, to
my surprise, the Burgomaster of a small town in the
Voigtland, who had suddenly been invested with the
dignity of a Councillor of Legation, and who had been
very quarrelsome as a Deputy. A year afterwards
he became member of the Provisional Government of
the May Insurrection, after the suppression of which
he escaped. When at Frankfort, I always stayed at the Hotel
de Russie : and as I was going out the morning after
my arrival, the well-known porter advanced towards
me, not bowing as usual, but with his hat on. ' Do
you want to go to the National Assembly ? ' he asked
in a condescending tone. ' They are going to vote
to-day whether there will be a Monarchy or a
Republic. But I think you had better put on the
National cockade. I will give you one.'
There was no vote as to Monarchy or Republic,
but the man's advice was good, for without a cockade
I should have attracted unpleasant notice, and in
the gallery I perceived several well-known, highly

52 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
reactionary 'ci-devants' adorned with most conspicuous
specimens of this Republican emblem.
This was the only time that I was present at a
sitting in the Paulskirche. There was nothing like
an interesting debate, as at that time no member was
allowed to speak for more than ten minutes.
I was strongly impressed by the appearance of
Heinrich von Gagern, the President of the Assembly.
I have seen many Presidents of Chambers in the
performance of their functions, but none, not even
Gambetta, made so favourable an impression upon
me as von Gagern. In those days he seemed
destined to have a great future before him. If any
body had then foretold that we should meet again, I
as Chancellor of the Austrian Empire, he as envoy
of the Grand Duchy of Hesse ! He was only to
be praised for knowing how to adapt himself to this
insignificant position without betraying a recollection
of his former importance. Still, he preserved certain
habits from the days of his presidency. If he applied
to me for information, he always did so in set ques
tions. After a short stay at Dresden, I repaired to my
new post at Berlin, where I remained until I entered
the Ministry in the beginning of 1849.
Impressed as I had been by the contrast which I
found between the state of England and that of the
continent, I was much more struck by the contrast
between the Berlin of 1848 and the Berlin of previous
years. Greater still, and almost overpowering, is the
gulf that divides the Berlin of 1848 from the Berlin
of 1871.

/ BECOME ENVOY AT BERLIN 53
Imagine my feelings when I, who remembered the
Berlin of Frederick William III, saw for the first
time after leaving my hotel, in front of the Palace of
the Prince of Prussia, not indeed the inscription
' National Property,' but a member of the ' Civic
Guard,' without uniform, acting as sentinel. At the
corners of all the streets there were democratic
placards, more or less of a revolutionary nature, and
the more moderate ones scrawled over with epitaphs
such as ' Reactionary Blackguard.' Boys were selling
pamphlets, which were not only politically insolent,
but often very indecent.
At night the streets were filled by itinerant
meetings and inquisitive loungers. Soon after my
arrival, my new French colleague, the first
envoy of the Republic, came to Berlin. It was
Emanuel Arago, son of the celebrated Arago.
Nine years earlier I had heard him plead before the
Cour des Pairs in defence of Armand Barbes, the
chief instigator ofthe revolt of May. He had printed
on his cards : ' Arago, Re"pre"sentant du Peuple,
Ministre de France.' It was a clever step of
Lamartine's to send to Berlin the son of a man who
had been for many years an intimate friend of
Alexander von Humboldt, which circumstance pro
cured him a benevolent, almost a brilliant reception
from Frederick William IV. I saw a great deal of
him at Berlin, and I met him again in Paris when he
was Ambassador at Berne. He sent in his resignation
immediately after the election of Prince Louis
Napoleon as President.
Arago had ordered apartments in the Hotel de

54 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
Rome, Unter den Linden, and his arrival was expected
in the evening by a large crowd desirous of welcoming
him. I happened just then to be walking past the
house with Count Heinrich Pourtales, who was in
the artillery, and we were speaking French, which
language always came easiest to Pourtales, who was
a native of Neufchatel. Arago had just arrived, and
a man in the crowd said to me : ' Now he will be
received by a deputation, and somebody must address
him who speaks the language. You speak French,
go up.' I was required to welcome the representa
tive of the French Republic in the name of the
people of Berlin ! How quickly I disappeared may
be easily imagined.
But more serious things occurred.
The Prussian National Assembly held its sittings
in the Academy of Music, and it happened one day
that Deputies were insulted and attacked on leaving
the building. This also happened to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs. When military, or at least police,
protection, . was demanded for the Deputies, some of
them objected. The well known Dr Jacobi was of
opinion that a friendly remonstrance would suffice.
A then equally well known 'Assessor' said these
insults were a gratifying symptom of public interest,
and I still hear the words : ' It would be a pity if it
were otherwise.' In such circumstances alone could
an event be explained, the possibility of which would
scarcely be believed nowadays. The Arsenal was
plundered, not by a riotous crowd, but as a sort of
' Intermezzo ' by way of amusement. I stood some
hundred yards off, when a shabbily-dressed man came

• / BECOME ENVOY AT BERLIN 55
up to me with the words : ' Would you like to have a
cartridge ? '
Several of my colleagues had taken up their abode
at Potsdam, where the King and Queen were residing,
and I was thinking all night whether I had not better
follow their example. But the following days went
off as if nothing had happened. It cannot be said that
the ' mad year ' was not sometimes entertaining. The
summer went off in Berlin quite agreeably.
The Ministers (who were changed almost every
month) were to be found in the Cafe" Royal or at
Jagor's, where affairs could be discussed during
dinner ; then one went to the ' Zelten,' where there
was a popular meeting, and where one could hear
plenty of nonsense, and on coming home after dark
there was almost daily an innocent little riot. It
must be confessed that a certain moral anarchy made
its appearance in a mild form. This showed the real
hollowness of the movement. The observations that
I was enabled to make in Berlin in this respect, were
not lost upon me when I advised resistance before the
May insurrection broke out.
In those days of discouragement the hopes, not
only of the so-called Reactionists, but of all who loved
peace and order, were directed to Austria. The
tidings of Radetzky's successes were devoured as if
they had been Prussian victories, and his entry into
Milan was received more joyously than the taking of
the Dannewirke. Wrangel entered Berlin, without
drawing his sword or meeting with resistance, after
Windischgratz had become master of Vienna. Ac
cordingly, the Cabinet of Berlin soon came to an

56 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
understanding with that of Vienna on the German
question ; but this result was obtained less in the
spirit of adhesion than of exclusion.
One of my most remarkable recollections is con
nected with the last days of 1848, when I first met
Prince Bismarck. I was acquainted with Herr von
Savigny, who was afterwards envoy at Dresden.
His house was close to my residence in the Wilhelm-
strasse. One morning, when I went to see him,
he said : ' I have a visitor in the house, Herr von
Bismarck, of whose doings in the Landtag you must
have heard.' Immediately afterwards Bismarck
entered in his dressing-gown, smoking a long pipe.
Our conversation turned- upon the news which had
just been received that Robert Blum had been shot.
I expressed the opinion that from an Austrian point
of view this was a political mistake. I still hold that
opinion at the present moment. It happened in
this way : — Prince Windischgratz, of whom Blum's
companions would gladly have made a second Tilly,
and with whom I became more acquainted by fre
quently meeting him at Gastein, was a strict soldier,
but a humane man. He told me himself that it was
' not his intention to have Blum executed, but that he
was obliged to apply at Olmiitz for orders. As he was
very imperfectly acquainted with Blum's and Frobel's
antecedents, enquiries were made of a person who
chanced to be present, and who was conversant with
German affairs, and especially with those of Saxony.
This person said that Blum was very dangerous,
and Frobel not at all so ; whereupon orders were
issued to carry out the sentence on Blum, and to let

/ BECOME ENVOY AT BERLIN 57
Frobel escape. This step was probably also prompted
by the idea that an example must be made — the old
Austrian practice, which I have repeatedly censured
elsewhere, of taking on one's self the odium of choos
ing a scapegoat. Whether Blum was guilty (which
he certainly would have been regarded by a Court-
martial), was politically of slight consequence to
Austria ; but it was only the more important as
regards the further course of events at Frankfort.
After having left, an Archduke in that city as
Viceroy, and the Austrian Deputies in the German
Parliament, it was necessary to consider, quite inde
pendently of the doubtful question of immunity,
what the counter-effect would be on a portion of the
National Assembly.* It is not free from doubt
whether, had that incident not taken place, the voting
on the Imperial question would have been the same ;
and it should not be forgotten that King Frederick
William IV rejected the Imperial Crown because it
was offered by those who had no right to dispose of
it, notwithstanding which he held that the offer gave
him a claim to the crown. This idea of a claim has
since that time never been relinquished.
When I expressed the opinion that Blum's execu
tion was politically a mistake, Bismarck at once
interrupted me with the words : ' You are quite
wrong : if I have an enemy in my power, I must
destroy him.' I have remembered this saying more
than once.
* It may be objected that the shooting of Triitzschler did not injure Prussia
much. To this my answer is that Blum was shot in 1848, and Triitzschler in 1849
when the period of reaction was in full swing, and when there was no longer a.
National Assembly.

CHAPTER V
1849
RESIGNATION OF THE SAXON MINISTRY  MY SECOND APPOINTMENT
AS MINISTER.
Meanwhile in Saxony the March Ministry was, to
use a trivial expression, played out. A new electoral
law, framed on the broadest democratic basis, brought
together, with the active aid of the 'Vaterlands-
vereine,' a Landtag wThieh was called, not by a Govern
ment paper or a reactionist, but by the masses of
the people, ' the senseless Landtag.' From the very
beginning of the session the Ministry was forced to
recognize that it could no longer remain in power,
and the question of the publication of the ' Frank
fort Fundamental Rights of the German People '
offered a welcome opportunity for a decent resig
nation. The King's position now became extremely diffi
cult and serious. A dissolution, with the hope of a

RESIGNATION OF THE SAXON MINISTRY 59
different result of the elections, was not to be thought
of, while the King naturally hesitated to nominate
a Ministry from among the chief members of the
existing Landtag ; not only his ordinary counsellors,
but even ex-Ministers, were against such a measure.
Consequently, a so-called Ministry of officials was
decided upon. Dr Held was appointed Minister of
Justice and President of the Cabinet,' Herr von
Ehrenstein Minister of Finance, and Colonel Raben-
horst Minister of War. I was appointed Minister
of Foreign Affairs.
After all that I have said, I need scarcely remark
that in those days an appointment as Minister was far
from attractive.- In truth, it cost me no slight self-
denial to accept office. I relinquished a post which
only afforded me interesting occupation and agreeable
social intercourse, for in those days there were no
quarrels with Berlin, and I was well-known there
from my former residence. On the other hand, there
was a prospect of the abolition of the Embassies to
Foreign States — though not to German ones, and
least of all of that at Berlin. But by accepting the
portfolio, I should be placed before the alternative
either of returning in a short time, with the discredit
of a lamentable fiasco, to my former post, or else —
if my position became firmer and I were con
demned to a longer, though not permanent tenure of
office — of appointing some other person to my
Berlin post. Considering the fact that my nomina
tion as Minister was then regarded only as a
question of time, many people had warned me not to
accept it, saying that I would thereby compromise

60 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
my future without the certainty of being useful to my
king and country.
But if I had not accepted, the King would have
been compelled to appoint the very men who consti
tuted the Revolutionary Government of May, or else
their partisans. ' I would gladly have spared you,'
he said to me ; ' but I did not know how to escape
my difficulties in any other way.' After this I
accepted without hesitation.
King Frederick Augustus was a sovereign of noble
mind and lofty sentiments. Like all the princes
of his family, he was opposed to measures merely
aiming at popularity and to all demonstrations in that
sense, and yet the country recognised in him, long
before he assumed the reins of Government as co-
Regent, a friend of liberal views in accordance with the
spirit of the time. After the outbreak of the move
ment of 1830, he could only prevent his being
proclaimed king by stating decisively that if such a
step were taken, he would leave his country, never to
return. I was more than once a witness of his
enthusiastic reception in the ranks of the Communal
Guard. He was long looked upon with suspicion at
Vienna, Berlin, and especially at St Petersburg.
In later years his views became more moderate, and
he assumed a 'correct' attitude, which was then
regarded as a proof of ability. But he never became
a reactionist. He had a taste for everything
conducive to mental progress, and his favourite
amusement was the study of botany. Like his
successor, he never forgot that, although himself
a Catholic, he was the ruler of a Protestant country.

MY SECOND APPOINTMENT AS MINISTER 61
The opera of the ' Huguenots ' was allowed to appear
at Dresden without objection, while at Munich the
title had to be altered to ' the Anglicans ' and ' the
Puritans,' which almost gave rise to a protest on the
part of the British Minister. The Court was
present at the first performance from the beginning to
the end, and I was struck by the almost devotional
attitude in which the King listened to the melody
of ' Eine feste Burg ist unser Gott.'
During the five years when I served him as
Minister, that is, until his death, I not only enjoyed
his full confidence, but I also gained his affection
more than others.
It was no merit on my part not to abuse my
position ; but it was really a very independent one.
King Frederick Augustus was in a high degree a
man of sentiment ; his bitter experiences after the
May Insurrection depressed him for the remainder of
his days. He thought he had closed his account with
life ; and although the last years of his reign turned
out to be more prosperous than many previous ones,
they found him less sympathetic than formerly. The
examination of his body after death showed that had
he not died suddenly from the effects of a fall, he
might have been struck down by a serious mental
disease. It was not difficult for me to make a sacrifice for
so noble a master ; but I am of opinion that the
country benefited, not because it had me as a Minister,
but because, if the Ministerial combination to which I
belonged had not come about, events would have
assumed a much more unfavourable shape. I shall

62 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
refer to this in my next chapter. My nomination
was a pledge of support from the upper spheres, and
without this pledge the other Ministers would
scarcely have accepted office.

CHAPTER VI
1849
THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTION AND THE MAY INSURRECTION.
The Frankfort Parliament had meanwhile passed the
National Constitution with the King of Prussia as
Emperor, and I need not mention that it was accepted
by the Saxon Chambers without difficulty. But
voices were not wanting to protest against this solution
of the Imperial question ; it was especially one of the
Triumvirs of the Provisional Revolutionary Govern
ment of May, Tschirner, who declared himself against
the exclusion of Austria. In the second Chamber
the reporter of Committees was Dr Schaffrath, him
self a member of the National Assembly, a fervent
champion of the Left even before 1848, and in later
times, with more moderate views, President of the
Second Chamber. The words with which he opened
his speech — ' Finis Saxonise ' — made a deep impression
upon me ; and I reminded people of them when the

64 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
' National-Verein ' was bearing its first fruits after the
Italian Campaign, so disastrous to Austria. It is
incredible how the terms ' Parlamentarismus,' ' Klein-
staaterei,' and ' un-German views,' were then abused,
as they are still.
I must here allude to that which I said in a
previous chapter ; that it is quite false to credit me
with an aversion to the present political organisation
of Germany. I am as far from entertaining such a
sentiment as from the belief that former circumstances
may return. More than once I have said that the
events of 1866 and 1870 are to be compared to
volcanic eruptions. Where the fragments of earth
fall, there they lie. But that does not prevent the
necessity of judging the past without passion. If a
man, who was- neither a reactionist nor an adherent
of the Minor States, but precisely the reverse of both,
called that national constitution, in the solemn tones
of a funeral oration, ' the end of Saxony,' how could
any reflecting person wonder that he whom the King
of Saxony had summoned to guide the State in stormy
times, did not precipitate its burial, but did his best
as a conscientious Minister to save what he could for
his country — which had been no mean member of the
Germanic Confederation — while not opposing that
German Unity which was looming in the future? I
may be accused of much, but certainly not of one
thing : I have never been one of those who shirk
difficulties and choose the easiest path. I could not
entertain the audacious thought that the voice of
Saxony would be of decisive influence ; but considering
the exclusion of Austria on the one hand, and the

THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTION 65
rejection of the Imperial Crown by the King of
Prussia on the other, I held the demand for the recog
nition of the National Constitution to be inopportune
and premature. Nor was I shaken in this view
either by the recognition of other German States,
or by the signs of a more serious movement in my
own. The point of view from which I looked on German
affairs, and to which I firmly adhered until the
decisive year 1866, I expressed more than once in the
Chamber during the debates. Thus I " said in the
Landtag of 1849 to 1850: 'Monarchy can bear the
greatest restrictions in internal affairs, but not in
foreign affairs without the deepest injury.' In the
Landtag of 1861 I spoke as follows :
' It is now not a question of timid anxiety as to
the continued existence of the various Governments ;
it is still less a question of dislike on principle of a
preponderating Power in Germany. Yon will find all
the Governments of the larger German States con
vinced that States of their importance can exist
and flourish if they subordinate themselves to a
Confederation in which they, have a share in pro
portion to their greatness ; but that subordination
to a more powerful State, to which they would
have to render implicit obedience, would very
seriously diminish their prospect of further existence,
and that their incorporation into one State would be
inevitable.' I derive sincere pleasure from the fact that my
beloved Saxony has passed through the transfor
mation without suffering in a marked degree from
vol. 1 E

66 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
the results I anticipated. This was made possible
by the happy chance of individual influence, to
say nothing of the circumstance that the consti
tution of the present German Empire assigned to
the separate States a far more acceptable position
than the Constitution of Frankfort. The moderate
and kind manner in which the Emperor exercises his
power, on the one hand — the eminent position of the
King of Saxony as a German General on the other —
contributed powerfully to maintain the old relations
between sovereign and people. The wisdom of
Prince Bismarck may also claim its share in this
treatment of new circumstances. I do not doubt that
he was inspired by noble and unselfish motives ; but
he has too deep a knowledge of men and things not to
be aware that one of the elements that most con
tributed to urge on German Unity, was the
democratic, if not the republican, which started with
the idea that it is more difficult to get rid of many
royal houses than of one. If Prince Bismarck is
solicitous to preserve the vitality of the separate
States, this solicitude will be as valuable to the safety
and the future of Germany as the pacific alliances
which he has concluded.
But I must return to the days of May 1849.
Although I had strong reasons for declaring myself
against a precipitate acceptance of the National
Constitution, it may be asserted that Saxony's
recognition would not have brought it into force, and
I might thereby have avoided rebellion, bloodshed,
and Prussian assistance. This, however, was certainly
not the case. Instead of an insurrection lasting only

THE MAY INSURRECTION 67
six days, Saxony would have had, like Baden, a
revolution lasting for weeks ; and would have ex
perienced, like Baden, the mortification of seeing
her Army dissolved.
The May Insurrection was not a rising of the
worthy citizens of Dresden against the authorities,
but an outburst which had long been instigated and
prepared by foreign revolutionists — Bakunin for
instance. The refusal to recognise the national con
stitution made the bomb burst before its time ; which
was a blessing, not only for Saxony, but for all
Germany. Prussia would have been equal to the
task, but after much greater efforts and sacrifices ;
for a rising in the centre of Germany, which would
probably have spread, would not have been put down
so easily as the Revolution in Baden. The Saxon
troops behaved during the conflicts of May so
admirably that their conduct is above all praise ; but
we must not expect impossibilities even from the best,
nor. must we demand inflexible resistance when we
ourselves are yielding. On the 4th of May, when
the King and his Ministers left Dresden, several
regrettable occurrences took place, and I cannot for
get a scene I witnessed in the evening in the
'Blockhaus.' An officer of recognised merit, the son
of a high official, entered with the words : ' I report
myself as a deserter.' He was ordered to go to the
barracks, and to wait for what would follow. An
hour afterwards he shot himself.
Even in Berlin people shared my opinion as above
stated, and when I repaired to the Prussian capital
immediately after the insurrection, I was received

68 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
not as one who had been saved, but as one who had
saved others.
In the refusal to acknowledge the National Con
stitution, I was only supported by the Minister of
War. The three other Ministers sent in their resig
nations, but the King decided on accepting my view.
Then the task devolved upon me of finding other
Ministers. It was not an easy one, for though I
applied to many persons, nearly all answered in the
negative. More than one who refused, repented his
refusal bitterly at a later period. Only one man gave
me a decided answer, and the King could not have
made a better choice even in quiet times. This was
Dr Zschinski, a man deeply versed in the law, and
firm and honest in action. To facilitate his acceptance,
I made a sacrifice which, as I found in later years, was
not slight. I gave up to him the Presidency of the
Cabinet which should have been mine. But Ave
continued excellent friends, in spite of occasional
differences, until his death in 1858.
The days of May began on Thursday, the third of
the month, a date I shall never forget. I left my
house in the morning, not to return to it until the
ninth. The Ministers passed the day and night in
the Royal Palace, where the offices of the Ministerial
Council were situated, and where the King's firmness
was sorely tried by a succession of deputations, during
which time the barricades were in course of erection,
and the shot that had been fired from the Arsenal on
the attacking crowd raised excitement to the highest
pitch. While driving with the Minister of War along the

THE MA Y INSURRECTION 69
right bank of the Elbe from Pirna to Dresden, we
met, not far from Link's Baths, a carriage in which
were Herr von Carlowitz and a Prussian officer, who,
I think, was Herr von Bonin, the same who was at
the head of the forces in Saxony in 1866. They
brought a notification from Berlin to the effect
that the Prussian Government had decided on inter
vening not merely with a detachment, but with im
posing forces, which could not be brought together in
less than eight days. I requested Herr von Carlowitz
to return to Berlin at once, and to represent urgently
that if the promised assistance were delayed, it would
come too late, while even the smallest display of
Prussian forces would discourage the rebels, as it would
be evident that more troops would follow. That
Prussia yielded to these representations is only owing
to the personal intervention of King Frederick
William, who, against the advice of the Minister of
War, General Stockhausen, ordered three battalions
of the Emperor Alexander's Grenadiers to be sent to
our assistance.
I well remember what happened on Friday the
4th, the first day of the riots, in the ' Blockhaus.'*
These were the most trying moments of my life.
Incessant reports were coming from the Altstadt as
to the extension of the rebellion and the approach of
armed rebels from the country. There were very few
and unreliable tidings of the expected arrival of the
troops from the outlying districts, and utter un
certainty as to the appearance of the Prussian troops.
* For non-Saxon readers I remark that the Blockhaus is a Government
building near the old bridge, and not, as might be supposed from the name, a sort
of fortification.

o MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
Moreover there were doubts as to the trustworthiness
of our own forces, and fears that lasting inactivity
would produce demoralization. In a sort of council
of war the leading officers declared that it would be
unadvisable to open hostilities ; and the resolution
was formed, though fortunately only as a preliminary,
of withdrawing the troops from the city, and not
bringing them back until they had reinforcements.
I was given a military paletot and a cap of the
cavalry regiment of the guard, and it was arranged
that I should leave the city with the troops on horse
back. If the grave responsibility that weighed upon
me is considered, it will not excite surprise that I
said to the ex-minister von Ehrenstein, wdien he came
to the Blockhaus : ' I do not wish to fall into the
hands of the frantic rabble; if a bullet kills me, I
shall think myself fortunate.' The night was far
advanced when Rabenhorst and I sought shelter in the
hotels situated in the Meissner-Gasse. They were
shut, and remained so in spite of repeated ringing.
We returned to the Blockhaus, where some straw
was strewn on the floor to afford us beds. It was the
second night we had passed in our clothes, and there
was scarcely a possibility of sleep.
The next day, Saturday, began and ended more
favourably than the preceding days. Various troops
had arrived early in the morning from the country,
and on the urgent advice of the officers, who
pledged themselves for the good conduct of the men,
the Minister of War decided to give orders for the
attack. The conduct of the troops fully justified the
officers' good opinion. A part of the barricades was

THE MA Y INSURRECTION ^ i
stormed, which was no easy task, as they had not been
erected by ordinary rebels, but under the direction of
a skilful architect. At the same time we received
the news that the battalions of the Emperor
Alexander's Grenadiers had left Berlin. They
arrived at six o'clock in the evening.
I will here vary my narrative by recording an
amusing incident which took place that evening in
the Blockhaus. We were told that a man who would
not give his name, and who looked rather suspicious,
wished to speak to us on urgent matters. Geheime
Kriegsrath von Abendroth advised us to be cautious,
although the man announced that he came from
Konigstein. We allowed him to enter. Rabenhorst
took a loaded pistol, and handed me another. The
man entered with his hand in his coat pocket, and he
crept along towards us like the assassin in Schiller's
ballad : ' Die Burgschaffc.' Rabenhorst cried out in a
voice of thunder : ' If you come a step nearer, I will
shoot you ! ' whereupon the unfortunate creature
sank down in abject terror, exclaiming : ' If you
do not trust me, gentlemen, at least give me a
bootjack ! ' He had really been sent from Konigstein,
and the despatch he brought was concealed in his
boot. The next morning was full of anxiety. The old
opera house was burnt down, and we saw the huge
column of fire from the Blockhaus. It may be
imagined what I felt at seeing my native town in
flames. Fortunately the conflagration did not spread,
which was partly to be attributed to the rain that

72 . MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
fell. The weather had become bad, and I still see
the Alexander Grenadiers crossing the bridge —
splendid men, gigantic in stature, and each of them
with his trousers turned up, remembering, like true
soldiers, to take care of their uniforms even in the face
of death.

CHAPTER VII.
1849
AFTER THE INSURRECTION.  WHAT IS REACTION
On the 9th of May the Insurrection came to an
end. The fighting in the streets had lasted four days.
On the fifth we saw the white flag hoisted on the
' Kreuzzthurm.' The recollection of this signal of peace reminds me
of a little trick I played on the Weimar Minister von
Watzdorf, who had come to Dresden as Imperial
Commissary. We were sitting at a window of the
Blockhaus, and I knew that the white flag would soon
appear ; but I did not impart this knowledge to
Watzdorf, who had been for years in the service of
Saxony and was an old friend of mine. He went on
with his Frankfort tirades and remonstrances, until I
at last requested him to look at the Kreuzzthurm,
where the white flag was then flying. The author
of ' Thirty years of German History,' to whom I

74 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
referred in a previous chapter, describes my conduct
on this occasion as ' haughty and scornful,' qualities
which my bitterest enemy had failed to detect in me.
I will leave it undecided whether the Frankfort
Imperial Commissaries could say the same of them
selves. Herr von Watzdorf was highly esteemed by
Prince and people as Minister, and he was a man of
great simplicity and courtesy ; but as soon as he had
donned the Frankfort toga, from the folds of which
destruction and salvation were dispensed, he was meta
morphosed into another being. He had come to
Dresden even before the Insurrection, to persuade
the King to accept the Imperial Constitution, and I
had had enough of the way in which he played the
part of a proconsul, so that I could not resist the
temptation of giving myself at the right moment the
little satisfaction of disconcerting for a moment my
stern judge and tormentor.
On the previous day I had been informed by a
deserter that the rebel leaders were on the point of
seeking safety in flight ; and I was told the road they
would take, obviously with the object of inducing me
to prevent their escape. I made no use of this in-
formatio:i. Of the three members of the so-called
' Provisory,' but more correctly ' derisory,' Govern
ment, two escaped, Tzschirner and Todt ; the third,
Heubner, who was more misled than misleading, was
taken prisoner, not in the vicinity of Dresden, but at
Chemnitz, at the same time as the Russian Bakunin.
Heubner was a District Magistrate, Todt a Privy
Councillor. Thus the service of the State was not
unrepresented in the rebellion, and that of the

AFTER THE INSURRECTION 75
Court also furnished its contingent. The Court
Architect, who bore an illustrious name, superin
tended the erection of the barricades ; and among
the active supporters of the Provisional Govern
ment were to be found the Court band master
and the Court concert master. The two former
escaped, the latter was arrested. That it was
owing to the visions of an over-excited imagination
that the composer of ' Rienzi ' appeared in the
character of a Tribune of the People, was the opinion
of his Dresden friends, and for the honour of his
name I will believe them, as this view makes it possible
to judge less severely his flagrant ingratitude to the
King. My well-known aversion to Wagner's music
(an aversion that only applies to his later, not to his
earlier productions), has been unjustly ascribed to the
events of 1849. I know how to discriminate between
the cause and the individual, and in this case he had
no reason to complain of me. Wagner, who had been
sentenced to death in his absence, had, in the first
years afterhis flight, taken refuge in Switzerland and
France, and had received an invitation to proceed to
Weimar. The Saxon Government had as much the
right to demand his extradition as the other German
Governments the duty of complying with the demand ;
and I did not hesitate to exercise this right. Some
years later, in consequence of a request from the
Tichatschek family (the celebrated tenor Tichatschek
was the founder of Wagner's celebrity), who were inti
mate with Wagner's first wife, an excellent woman, I
applied to the King for an amnesty- for him, and he
was thus enabled to come to Dresden. He paid me

76 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
a visit of thanks, and that was the only time I had an
interview with him. I received him with these words :
' I am glad that I have been able to do something
agreeable to you, Herr Wagner ; and I am sure that
in return you will not do something disagreeable to
me ; I must therefore request you not to make any
demonstrations.' ' I do not understand,' he replied.
' But surely,' I continued, ' you remember what
occurred in 1849?' 'Oh, that was merely an un
fortunate misunderstanding.' ' A misunderstanding ?
Do you mean to say that you are not aware of the
fact that the Saxon Government is in possession of a
paper, written by your own hand, in which you boast
of having taken part in the attempt to burn the
Prince's Palace, an outrage which happily was not
attended with serious consequences ? '
I do not know whether he composed on this
occasion the song : ' Frisch, Feuer, Flamme, frohlich
und furchtbar.'
For another representative of Court Music, who
had also been condemned to death, the concert-
master Rbckel, I was able to do more, by procuring
his liberation after a long imprisonment. King John
adhered firmly to the principle that nobody should
be pardoned without presenting a petition for
mercy. Rockel, whose sentence had been commuted
to penal servitude for life, was the only one who
did not comply with this condition, and his
resistance became a source of real embarrassment.
At length I succeeded in obtaining his libera
tion from the King even without a petition. I
ventured to say that his resistance had something

AFTER THE INSURRECTION 77
of antique grandeur about it, ' and,' I added, ' where
is the Reactionist who would endure twelve years'
imprisonment without praying for mercy ? ' The
King laughed and yielded. Rockel regained his
liberty, but rewarded me with the most odious
ingratitude. Soon after his release, he published a
pamphlet on the Waldheim prison, which he repre
sented as the scene of barbarous cruelties, and pictured
me as a tyrant more ruthless than Dionysius of
Syracuse. Heubner, who had meanwhile obtained an
appointment in a private company, and who deserves
the character of an honest and truthful man, told
me that Rockel's statements were partly incorrect
and partly exaggerated. I think I myself am too
well known for anybody to believe that I could
take a pleasure in aggravating the sufferings of
prisoners. I indeed became aware, though too late,
of the fact that the director of the prison was incapa
citated by illness during the latter part of his tenure
of office, and that some irregularities had occurred in
consequence. I once paid a visit to the Waldheim
Prison ; I had the room opened in which Rockel was
confined. It resembled anything rather than a
dungeon. I found Rockel neither picking oakum
nor twisting cigar leaves, but writing at a desk. On
perceiving me, he made a stiff ceremonious bow, and
then, turning his back upon me, went on with his
writing without taking any further notice of my
presence. There was nothing to prevent him from
taking the opportunity of making complaints if he had
had any to make. But the Spartan defiance which pre
vented him from sending in a petition, may often have

78 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
prompted him to disobedience and resistance, resulting
in proportionate severities on the part of his gaolers.
Although he showed himself ungrateful, I am glad
not to be obliged to say the same of his gifted
daughter, who was destined to have a brilliant career
at the Court Theatre at Weimar, and subsequently at
the ' Burgtheater ' in Vienna. After 1870, the
Vienna Tagblatt published a series of autobio
graphies of the members of the ' Burgtheater ; ' and
I was not only pleased, but touched, to see with what
warmth Frau Mathes, nde Rockel, mentions that the
liberation of her father was owing entirely to me.
Rockel himself came to Vienna when I was Minister,
and warmly apologised to me. But he could not
obliterate the consequences of his pamphlet. How
often and with what comments have I heard the word
' Waldheim,' and myself denounced as the most
barbarous of gaolers ! Compared to me, Sir Hudson
Lowe was an entertaining companion.
The history of the prisoners of May has led me
far beyond the year 1849, to which I must now
return. But that history belongs to the great
chapter ofthe 'Reaction.'
It is remarkable how certain current phrases have
been and still are abused. I will show further
on how this has distorted facts. The word ' reaction '
is used in a very loose sense. This year — 1884 —
some Austrian noblemen who have votes in the
Hungarian Upper Chamber went to Pesth to vote
against the Mixed Marriage Bill. This is called re
action. I myself regret the step for two reasons, first,
because it promotes the Anti-Semitic movement, which

WHAT IS REACTION? 79
I oppose, as I consider it unjust in its origin and
pernicious in its consequences ; and secondly, because
it impedes the system of dualism, and for obvious
reasons I desire the stability of that system. But
what is reaction ? It is the counter effect of action,
and can therefore only be opposition to an already
existing state of things. If mixed marriages were
already legal in Hungary, and a Cziraki-Apponyi
Ministry were to propose their abolition, that would
be reaction ; but this word cannot be applied to the
opponents of something not yet introduced. In
England no one would think of stamping as reaction
ists the members of the Upper House who voted
against the Reform Bill, the Corn Laws Bill, and the
abolition of the Irish Church. In that country, indeed,
less is said and more is understood of liberty than here.
By reaction is generally understood a species of
conspiracy which at first proceeds in secret and then
in open opposition to progress and Liberalism.* This
view is not wholly without foundation, but it is
extremely one-sided. In most cases, reaction is only
the natural consequence of action, like the ebb and
flow of the tide. The higher the flow the more
extensive the ebb, and it cannot be arrested by com
manding the sea to go thus far and no farther.
How much has been said and written on the
subject of reaction in Saxony, even up to the present
* Equally unfounded is the assertion that the ' Reaction ' is hostile to the
Bourgeoisie and the Tiers Etat, as the representatives of the intelligence of a
country. I have every respect for the Bourgeoisie and the Tiers Etat, which no
doubt furnish the largest contingent of intelligence: but as if is not the lot of all
to belong to those classes, it is hard to deny intelligence to the other ones. Bismarck
and Moltke, each in his branch, represent the highest development of the German
mind, but neither would claim or admit that he should be considered as belonging
to the Tiers Etat.

80 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
time ! I remember that an article in the Pester
Lloyd on my resignation praised the ' Saxon Re
actionist ' for having known how to become in Austria
the founder of an era of freedom. But to no country
would my simile of the ebb and flow of the tide be
more applicable than to Saxony. When everything
went to wrack and ruin as in Saxony, when disorder
culminated in riots in the capital which were led by
Government officials, and which were further sup
ported by clergymen and schoolmasters, it could
scarcely be expected that a reconciliation should take
place as if nothing had happened. No conscientious
witness of events will maintain that a rabid and
persecuting reaction supervened. I, for my^ part,
remember nothing of the so-called ' weeding-out ' of
objectionable individuals. If we read the articles in
the Kreuz-Zeitung of that period, we shall find more
than one complaint of the 'laxity' of the Saxon Govern
ment. Thus I was bitterly reproached in the Chambers,
but not till the year 1861, for having introduced 'lists
of the conduct of officials.' All I had done was to
order the local administrations to draw up from time
to time tables showing the formation of the Town
Councils, and giving details of the personal and
political antecedents of the members. This had no
other object than to afford information to the Ministry
which would be of use when nominations were sent up
for confirmation, and it had for me the particular
advantage of making me ' au fait ' when I was visiting
the various towns. The measure was of small
importance, however, to the Government, and it was
abolished directly it was objected to.

WHAT IS REACTION? 81
That errors may have been committed — that the
awkwardness of some officials may have caused excep
tional and unintended hardship — I will not deny.
But were the gentlemen who exercised power in 1848
so very considerate towards men and things ? And
was it not more difficult to give up that which had
been possessed for scores of years, than that which had
been possessed for only one year ?
I have spoken of the blundering of some officials.
In that category we must include the ' Black Book,'
issued after 1850. A member of the ' Polizei-Direk-
tion,' who thought his abilities were not appreciated,
justified the prejudice entertained against him by
drawing up an alphabetical list of all politically in
criminated persons. I dispelled his illusions when he
appeared before me in full uniform, and presented
his precious work to me in the hope of being
substantially rewarded ; but the poor fellow had
gone to the expense of printing several hundred
copies, and it was an act of charity to take them
from him ; and as they were in existence, it was
thought just as well to send them to the various
Police Offices, according to the principle ' superflua
non nocent.' No orders were issued to watch the
actions of the individuals designated. In fact, nobody
was injured by the work except its author. This
system of surveillance, as useless as it was vexa
tious, was abolished the moment it came to my
knowledge. On the other hand, after I had taken the post of
Minister of the Interior in 1852, and had placed in
the following year the Dresden Police under the
VOL. i v

82 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
control of the State (it had hitherto been under that
of the town), I endeavoured to protect the police in
the exercise of their duties, which are neither light
nor grateful. When it is remarked that the London
policeman, though unarmed, is civilly treated by
everyone, the answer is usually given that it is owing
to the Englishman's innate respect for the law. But
the law plays the chief part in this matter, for it
acquits the policeman if in self-defence he kills those
who attack him, and threatens his assailants with
penalties extending even to penal servitude. If the
guardians of public safety were to enjoy similar
protection on the Continent, the public would respect
the law more than it does at present.
After the May insurrection I never forgot that
the unintentional, but not less responsible, originators
of it could not be punished, as it was only the
lamentable connivance of the Ministry of March
towards the good-natured, but incapable Oberlander,
which had for a whole year literally educated the
otherwise so pacific and orderly populace to rebellion.
It will scarcely be believed, but it is positively true,
that for this reason I thought the idea of an amnesty,
under given circumstances, eminently rational. I
had to take into consideration the views of the
Ministers of War and Justice, and I recognised
the objections to such a step, but I was always
disturbed by that connection between cause and
effect. To complete the chapter on the Saxon Reaction,
then in its zenith (after 1860 it was no longer
spoken of, and I once actually had to defend myself

WHAT IS REACTION? 83
against a reproach addressed to my Government
from Berlin that we were becoming too Liberal),
I must not omit to mention what I did when
presiding over the Ministry of Public Worship
and Instruction. This department had its own
President up to 1848, and after 1852; Pfordten
undertook it in 1848 in conjunction with the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, and I did the same after the
May insurrection.
Nobody will blame me for having undertaken above
all to banish the pernicious influence of politics from
the Church and the schools. A new School Law
made supervision more stringent, while at the same
time it introduced a much desired and highly
necessary increase of the lowest rate of salary. With
regard to the Church, although educated by my pious
mother in an orthodox spirit, I have always been
averse to cant, and inclined to free religious views.
I was and am of opinion that as, on the one hand,
nobody ought to be forced to believe in religion or to
practise it, so on the other those who value the
Church and religion have the right of demanding
that their religious views and customs shall not be
fettered. We see these ideas thoroughly carried out
in England. I often travelled on the Brighton line,
and remarked little printed papers at all the stations.
Being short-sighted, I fancied they were time-tables.
On looking at them closely, I found them to be
leaflets, circulated by religious societies, containing
the Ten Commandments and the Lord's Prayer.
This may be considered mere fanaticism, but if the
same were done in the neighbourhood of Berlin or

84 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
Vienna, the leaflets would in a short time be scribbled
over with profane jokes. Such a thing never happens
in England. I was of opinion that if the Government is called
upon to influence the Church by the choice of clergy
men, it is bound to consider those who believe rather
than those who can no longer be said to do so. But
I must openly confess, although I am a Protestant
myself, that the Protestants are far more inclined to
be intolerant than the Catholics. The Catholics lay
more stress on religious practices and less on the
forms of belief. The Protestants are either aggres
sive or exclusive. In the vicinity of Dresden, at
Tharandt, there is a celebrated Foresters' Academy,
which is also visited by foreigners. At the time
when I assumed the direction of the Ministry of
Public Worship, there had just been a change of
clergymen. The former clergyman had been some
what remiss in the performance of his duties ; and as
neither the professors nor the pupils of the Academy
were religiously inclined, scarcely anybody went to
church. I was recommended to appoint a clergyman
who had been for some time in the French part of
Switzerland, but whose views were orthodox. He
proved so excellent a preacher, that the peasantry
of the surrounding districts flocked to his church ;
but being a strict churchman, all those people who had
long given up going to church attended his services
not to listen to his sermons, but only to denounce him
for his obnoxious views.
Much fault was found with the appointment of
Harless as Chief Court Preacher in the place of

WHAT IS REACTION? 85
Ammon, who was as popular as he was learned. I
had known Harless in Munich, where he defended the
cause of the Protestants with great boldness in the
Chamber against the Abel Ministry ; and it was
through my intervention that he was, like Pfordten,
called to Leipzig. After filling the office of Chief
Court Preacher at Dresden for some years, he was
summoned back to Bavaria by King Max II, in
the capacity of President of the Chief Consistory,
and the Bavarian Protestants were not at all im
peded in the exercise of their religious duties by his
nomination. Can there be a better illustration of the difference
between Catholics and Protestants in the question of
tolerance than the Anti-Semitic agitation, with
Stocker on the one side and Haynald on the
other ?
An amusing episode will not be out of place
here :
In the years 1845 to 1849, Ronge had introduced
' German Catholicism ' into Saxony, but there were
also so-called 'free congregations.' I was Minister of
Public Worship, and a visitor was announced to me :
' The Elder of the Landeskirchen-Vorstand.' I ex
pected to see a venerable old man in long robes,
when a most elegantly-dressed gentleman entered with
the words : ' Your Excellency does not remember me ?
I am the tailor M. In the year 1840 all foreign
workmen were to have been banished from Paris, but
through your intercession I remained at Chevreuil's,
and I shall be ever grateful to you for your kindness.'
' I am very glad,' I replied, ' but how do you come to

86 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
occupy your present position ? ' 'I really do not
know ; but ifit leads me into expense, I shall resign.'
'You would do well.'
More than once after that interview I received
successful works, not of a theological kind, from the
skilful hands of the ' Elder of the Landeskirchen-
Vor stand.'

CHAPTER VIII
1849
THE ALLIANCE OF THE THREE KINGS.  THE FIRST DIFFERENCES WITH
BERLIN.  THE PILLNITZ INTERVIEW. — MY FIRST TRIP TO VIENNA.
During the period — seventeen years — when I was
Minister in Dresden, I myself wrote all my political
papers and despatches. In Vienna I only wrote some
of them. It would have been unjust to the excellent
assistants I found there, had I not made use of their
talents ; and during the first few years when I had to
attend as much (if not more) to internal as to foreign
affairs, I should not have had the time. As a rule,
I preferred dictating to writing myself ; this afforded
the double advantage of diminishing the task of the
copyist and of accelerating my own, for I found that
one makes fewer or shorter pauses when in the presence
of a secretary who is waiting for the next word.*
* My excellent secretary at Dresden, Zschille, for whom I obtained the Cross
of Honour, was one of the few persons who could always read my handwriting. My
old friend Weber used to say : ' Beust has three handwritings ; the first only Zschille
can read, the second only himself can read, and the third even himself cannot read.'

88 MEMOIRS OP COUNT BEUST
The cause of the failure of the Frankfort Constitu
tion and of the fruitlessness of the National Assembly
was not that Vienna had produced a Windischgratz
and a Jellacic, and Berlin a Brandenburg and a
Wrangel ; nor was it to be found in the opposition of
parties, and still less in a hostile attitude of Govern
ments. The true cause was that the National
Assembly was unconscious of the necessity recognised
in constitutional States, and above all in England, of
an executive power which must not only carry out
but direct the resolutions of Parliament. It there
fore preferred to seek support in the principle of
the sovereignty of the people, and only tolerated
a Central Power that w7ould blindly execute its
decrees. In this respect it resembled, in its progress
and in its end, the French National Convention,
fortunately minus the guillotine.
On the invitation of the Prussian Government,
negotiations took place at Berlin, soon after the
May insurrection, on the subject of a Constitu
tion which should be a modification of the Frankfort
scheme. With the exception of General von
Radowitz, who had special instructions, no other
Prussian Plenipotentiary took part in these negotia
tions. The Austrian Ambassador, Baron Prokesch,
was present only on the first day, and on the second
he withdrew when the scheme of a Confederation
of States exclusive of Austria was brought forward.
The Bavarian Ambassador, Count Lerchenfeld, being
totally without instructions, did not make any declara
tion at all. More energy was shown by the
Hanoverian Plenipotentiaries, the Minister Dr Stiive

THE ALLIANCE OF THE THREE KINGS 89
and Herr von Wangenheim. I was accompanied
by the Minister Behr, who, however, remained
perfectly passive.
General von Radowitz was a prominent personage.
It is well-known that he possessed extensive knowledge
and vast reading, which procured him high favour
with Frederick William IV. When the most striking
characters of the Frankfort Parliament were repre
sented in a comic illustration which could not be called
altogether a caricature, Radowitz appeared as a
Capuchin monk with a sword in his girdle. A
pugnacious monk and a pugnacious warrior, such
were the types really suggested by him. It is
curious that he, a Catholic, had a Catholic Secretary
from the Rhine provinces to help him to complete the
plan for the exclusion of Austria from the Germanic
Confederation, for this could not have been altered by
the Austro-German Alliance which even then was
already in contemplation. It has been said that
Austria's peculiar organisation made her participation
in the proposed constitution impossible. To this it
might be answered that if the Confederation had
hitherto possessed a member of the highest impor
tance to whom the suggested scheme was not suited,
the first question to be considered should have been
the means of adapting the Constitution to that
member. Up to that time everybody had thought that
constitutions were made for countries, not countries for
constitutions. It would have been worth while to
make the attempt ; and even an honest, though futile,
attempt, would have given more life to the scheme
than the obstinate determination to push the scheme

90 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
with or without allies. But on that question any
words would have been wasted. Intercourse with
General von Radowitz was not always of the easiest,
but I was fully compensated for the trouble he then
gave me thirty years later by his son, of whom I
have the most agreeable recollections when he was
for a time my colleague in Paris.
A no less interesting acquaintance was the first
Hanoverian Plenipotentiary, Dr Stiive, who had
been prominent in the opposition when Burgomaster
of Osnabriick, and was one of the few Ministers
of March who survived the year 1848. It was re
markable how quickly he fitted himself into new cir
cumstances. King Ernest Augustus was heard to
say : ' This little Stiive is a famous fellow.' And
Stiive said : ' I expected to encounter an obstinate
tyrant, and I found a most amiable and sympathetic
old gentleman.' When I dined in the summer of
1849 at Hanover with the King, I saw Stiive not
merely in court dress, but in knee-breeches. I thought
to myself : ' If my old Hofmarschall could have seen
that, how reconciled he would have become to modern
times, and what a high opinion he would have formed
of the loyalty of the Hanoverians ! '
Stiive did not yield to Radowitz in vigour of
thought or expression. But his mind was evidently
influenced by two considerations : fear of the Re
action made him take strong measures, while on the
other hand he was sometimes softened by thoughts of
the ' amiable old gentleman.'
An interview at Pillnitz, very unlike that of 1792,
although the heads of the same families were present,

THE PILLNITZ INTERVIEW 91
took place about this time. The Emperor Francis
Joseph and King Frederick William IV were the
guests of Frederick Augustus. This personal inter
course could only have been beneficial, but it remained
without result, and I doubt whether the conversations
which took place dealt with anything more than
generalities. I saw the Emperor on that occasion for
the first time ; he was nineteen years of age, and
exactly as represented in his life-size portrait in the
waiting-room of the 'Ball-Platz.' He was distin
guished by military precision and yet elegance of
manner, combined with much gravity and firmness.
Soon afterwards I saw, also for the first time, the
Emperor's Premier in Vienna. Prince Schwarzenberg
would have been, even without the events that made
him so prominent a figure, striking by his appearance
alone, which showed the grand seigneur in unaffected
simplicity as contrasted with the parvenu. His energy
and his ability have never been questioned.
I may say that Prince Schwarzenberg took a fancy
to me from the first moment he saw me, and he con
tinued my firm friend until his death. The more
difficult will it be for me to appear as his accuser in
one of the following chapters, which, as an impartial
historian, I shall be compelled to do.
Prince Schwarzenberg had the greatest contempt
for the human race, but he had not a profound know
ledge of human nature, and this deficiency explains
and excuses much that he did and much that he left
undone. In Schwarzenberg's Ministry were Schmerling,
Bach, and Leo Thun — a remarkable combination

92 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
if we consider what happened later on. It did not
last long, for Schmerling, with whom I then became
acquainted for the first time, and who remained my
sincere and constant friend in spite of Dualism, re
signed soon afterwards. But, peculiar as that com
bination may appear at the present day, Schwarzenberg
might have done much with it, if, instead of advising
the withdrawal of the Constitution of the 4th of
March 1849, he had undertaken its amelioration. At
that time the situation was such that the Hungarians
would have been obliged to yield to circumstances,
and I believe that Schmerling is not mistaken in
maintaining to this day that they would have
come. He and Bach were the very men to carry
out a revision of the Constitution in the most con
servative sense ; and Thun, who was not yet the
Minister of the Concordat, would not have refused to
lend a helping hand. That the contrary came to pass
was very welcome to Austria's enemies at Berlin and
Turin. A dangerous weapon was thereby placed in
their hands — that of compromise.

CHAPTER IX
1850

OLMUTZ

It is to me a difficult task to throw a shadow, or
rather a mourning veil, over the memory of a man
who always distinguished me with his confidence, who
did great things in the service of Austria, and to
whom Austria owes her high position in Europe —
gained after many a hard struggle — and her greater
stability in internal affairs. But even the most
remarkable men have their weak moments and their
days of error, and at Olmiitz the moment was very
weak and the error very great.
In those days of November 1850 — (the month of
November has played a great part in my career : in
November I entered office in Austria, in November I
resigned, in November I became Ambassador in
London, in November I left that city) — in those days
of November 1850 I received a visit one morning from

94 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
my doctor, who addressed me with the following words :
' How ill you look ! Have you got the jaundice ? '
' Possibly,' I replied. I had just received the news
of the Olmiitz Convention.* ' I feel,' I added, ' like
one who loses a game of whist by the bad play of his
partner.' That I nevertheless knew how to control
my feelings, is proved by the speech I made on the
subject in the Upper Saxon Chamber.
What was the military situation at that time ? In
Bohemia there were three completely armed Austrian
Corps d' Armee, accustomed to victory ; eighty
thousand Bavarians, too, were in the field, and thirty
thousand Saxons commanded the Elbe as far as
Torgau ; while in Prussia nothing was ready. I
received the confirmation of this last fact from no less
a person than the present Emperor of Germany, then
Prince of Prussia, when I paid him a visit in
1851 at Berlin. ' They might have come,' he said, ' as
far as Berlin, but how would they have got out ? '
Respect prevented me from answering that when
once in, it is easy to go out, but not easy to be driven
out. How often did I hear, even after the battle of
Sedan, Frenchmen who came to Vienna exclaim, ' Pas
un ne sortira ! '
I can repeat the Emperor William's saying
without contradiction, thanks to Dr Busch's book
* Disturbances having arisen in Hesse-Cassel owing to the Elector having
endeavoured to raise taxes without the consent of the Chamber, he applied to
Austria for assistance. The Frankfort diet approved the application, and Austrian
and Bavarian troops were sent into the country. Prussia, on the other hand,
supported the malcontents, and occupied Cassel, the capital, with her army before
the allied troops arrived. Her resolution, however, failed her at the last moment ;
her Foreign Minister, Radowitz resigned, and his successor, Manteuffel, arranged a
meeting with Prince Schwarzenberg, the Austrian Minister, at Olmiitz, where
convention was signed in which Prussia virtually yielded all Austria's demands.

OLMUTZ 95
' Unser Reichskanzler,' a work which, though un
favourable to me, I have found useful on more than
one occasion. Dr Busch quotes the following passage
from a speech delivered by Prince Bismarck in the
German Diet on the 24th of January 1882 : —
' The gentlemen in Parliament understood political
possibilities in Europe so little that they did not per
ceive that in order to obtain German unity, the first
essential requisite was a strong Prussian Army, and
the second the approval of the King of Prussia.
Instead of this the King was opposed to the utmost
in his endeavour to make his Army strong enough not
only to establish but to represent German Unity, and
we would, if Parliament had had its own way, have
had to put up with that military organisation which
made the bravest of soldiers — for such was the
Minister of War at the time of the Convention
of Olmiitz — declare to me when I announced myself
to him as Deputy and Officer of the Landwehr:
"It is quite impossible for us to go to war ; we cannot
prevent the Austrians from occupying Berlin." '
I myself alluded in the most considerate manner
to that episode in the Austrian Reichsrath in 1868,
when the Land Defence Bill was being debated. My
-words were as follows : —
' Much has been said — and can we wonder at it ? —
about the unfortunate and disastrous wars in which
we have been involved ; but I ask, where are the
ambitious diplomatists who caused them ? Where
has there been any restless activity of warlike
Ministers ? I look back on the twenty years that
have passed since the dissolution of the old Austria of

96 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
Metternich, and I find one statesman with whom
I was in close contact. He was totally devoid of
personal ambition, although he had a bold and
enterprising spirit. And what did this statesman do
at Olmiitz ? I will not revert to the contents of that
Convention, which has been considered with equal
injustice, as a humiliation in Prussia and as a success
in Austria. But I am certain that if at that time
circumstances had been reversed, if Prussia had been
armed and Austria defenceless, the Austrian Minister
would scarcely have received an invitation to come to
Breslau, and that he would have brought back some
thing very different from the preliminaries for the
continuation of the old Federal connection.'
Outside Parliament I threw reserve aside, and said
openly : ' Olmiitz was not a Prussian humiliation, but
an Austrian weakness.'
' Avilir la Prusse d'abord et la demolir ensuite ' is
a saying that has been attributed to Prince Schwar
zenberg. I am convinced that he never uttered it, as
Olmiitz itself proved most emphatically ; but I am
also convinced that he did not recognise what the
occasion required. ' Ni avilir, ni demolir, mais contenir '
— that was the problem, a problem requiring con
siderate, but firm and vigilant treatment, and especially
the employment of the right moment, which was com
pletely neglected at Olmiitz.
Thus, according to the confession of the Emperor
and Chancellor of Germany, Prussia could not have
prevented the occupation of Berlin. And in this
commanding position Austria concludes a convention
with her defenceless opponent, by which the latter

OLMUTZ 97
retracts none of the things which threatened the
former and her Allies, only leaving Austria the honour
of protecting the King of Denmark and the Elector of
Hesse ! Everything else was left to chance. Free
conferences without a programme, without previous
stipulations ! According to the tradition which I
have blamed in other parts of this work, of placing
appearances higher than realities, Austria thought
she had gained a great point when Berlin gave up the
union proposed by Radowitz ; she did not think of
securing guarantees that that union should not be
revived ten or twenty years later in another form.
This self-complacency could not be better supported in
Berlin than by the strong expression of a feeling of
humiliation, which was easily appeased, as the Prussian
sense of honour has always been of a peculiar kind,
and very different from that of other countries.
Meanwhile, Austria was not the gainer. It is in
telligible that monuments should be erected in Ger
many, and especially in Prussia, to Bismarck, but
Prussia also owes a statue to a less celebrated, though
equally useful statesman — Baron von Manteuffel — for
having gone to Olmiitz and brought back with him a
cheap olive branch.
I well remember what was said to us from Vienna :
'We must facilitate the task of the new Prussian
Ministry, which shows us such good-will.' I can only
here repeat the remark I made in a former chapter,
that Prince Schwarzenberg despised men but did
not know them. Had he known them, he would have
thought of the words that Schiller put into the mouth
of Tell's wife, when he relates to her how he had sent
VOL. i a

98 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
his attendants after Gessler who had lost his way in
the mountains : ' Thou'lt rue that deed !
He'll ne'er forgive thy having seen his weakness.'
Prince Schwarzenberg certainly did not expect grati
tude, for he despised mankind too much ; but he as
little expected that those to whom he had been
merciful should revenge themselves upon him. In
the next chapter I shall have occasion to show how
this revenge began to work in the following year,
not in the heart of Frederick William IV, but in
the deeds of one who was destined to become a great
power in the world. Herr von Manteuffel also did
not then lose the opportunity of playing generous
Austria a trick with the Hanoverian Treaty, which
was concluded the same year.
This conflict was only the last link in the chain.
For two years the tendency to thrust Austria from
Germany had been manifesting itself. Nothing had
been done to prevent the offer to Prussia of the
Imperial Crown at Frankfort ; it was rejected in the
concrete, not in the abstract — not because its accept
ance would have entailed a rupture with Austria, but
because Prussia did not consider that those who
offered it were authorised to do so, though she looked
upon the offer as giving her a claim. Then came
Bunsen's January despatch, and finally, Radowitz's
scheme of union — the Federal State. On the other
hand, guarantees had to be demanded for the future.
Was it difficult to do so ? By no means ; Prussia
herself afforded the pretext. Radowitz declared that
there was no room for Austria in the Federal State.

OLMUTZ 99
If this had been the case, and if Prussia had wished
to continue the Federal connection with Austria, the
logical conclusion would have been that no scheme
incompatible with the German Confederation should
have been entertained, and that that Confederation
should have continued and been sanctioned afresh.
There were pens enough in Vienna that could have
placed things in an amiable and inoffensive light, but
the agreement should have been clear and unequivocal.
Yes, but the feeling in Germany and the honour
of Prussia? Either one thing or the other. If a
country wants peace, knowing that it has not the
power to prevent the enemy from occupying its
capital, it is not in a position to consider such things.
Prince Schwarzenberg said to me when he arrived
at Dresden : ' You would have preferred our coming
to blows; so should I.' Perhaps it would have been
better if war had broken out then. It would at least
have been shorter than the war of 1866.
If Prussia had been defeated, which would certainly
have been the case according to the above quoted
Prussian authorities, she would not have been deprived
of a single village. The Emperor Nicholas, then at
Warsaw, would have taken care of that. But for
twenty or thirty years we should have heard no more
of the Federal State with a single head.*
I beg the reader not to forget that I am an
Austrian, and that I write as such. And let it not
be believed that a cry of joy would have been raised
* On this occasion I will not leave one thing unsaid. Neither in 1850 nor in
1866 was a special Treaty concluded between Austria and Saxony, whether for the
purpose of re-acquisition of lost territory, or with any other object. Saxony stood
entirely on the basis of the German Confederation.

ioo MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
by the Governments hostile to Prussia. This hostility
to Prussia was more an idea than a reality. In the
speech which I made shortly before the war of 1866
in the Second Saxon Chamber, I said : — ' Prussian
notions of friendship and enmity are somewhat
peculiar. If it were not almost profane, I should be
inclined to say that as in religion everything against
Divine Law is godless, so in our great neighbouring
State whoever does anything not quite to its liking
is at once called Prussia's enemy.' Only in this sense
was there sometimes, though reluctantly, ' hostility to
Prussia ' in Munich and Stuttgart, as in Dresden and
Hanover. To a revival of hearty and confidential relations
between Prussia and Austria, all these Governments
without exception would most gladly have contributed.
It is remarkable how history sometimes repeats
itself in a contrary sense. It is known how opposed
Count Mensdorf was to the war of 1866. In 1850 the
Minister of Foreign Affairs recognises the advantages
of war and abstains from it, in 1866 the Minister of
Foreign Affairs recognises its disadvantages and
declares it! A hollow peace was concluded in 1850,
after everything had been done to excite the zeal of
the Confederate States. When the news of the
dismissal of Herr von Radowitz reached Dresden, I
at once caused a suspension of the mobilisation, partly
not to increase unnecessarily the burthens of the
country, and partly with the object of facilitating the
surrender of Prussia. Vienna was extremely annoyed
at this measure, and urged a continuance of the mobili
sation. Yet soon afterwards it was notified that as the

OLMUTZ io i
Prussians were leaving Cassel, the mobilisation could
be stopped and its expense put down as a dead
loss ! That Saxony chose to forget this was proved
by her prompt appearance in the field in 1866 ; but
Bavaria remembered it, as no one knew better than I,
and as was proved by her conduct in that year.
I have a two-fold explanation and excuse for
Prince Schwarzenberg's mistake.
In the first place, he had to consider the youth of
his Imperial Master ; for although, as he often
assured me, he knew that the Emperor's appreciation
of political questions was in advance of his years, he
could not forget how serious is the responsibility of
the adviser of a youthful sovereign. In such a
position a conscientious man may listen to the voices
of timid counsellors, though he himself may be far
from timid by nature ; and such voices were probably
not wanting. We may further excuse him by saying
that he could not fully appreciate the true scope of
the question involved (a question that should have
been decided when Austria was strongest) — namely,
whether Austria was to continue a member of the
German Confederation. He could not do this,
because, as must in justice be confessed, very few at
that time were able to perceive the importance of the
crisis. In the question of the exclusion of Austria
from Germany, which no alliance can palliate, was
involved not only the place of honour secured to the
Emperor by Divine and human right as the heir of
a long line of German Emperors — not only a Con
federation of States which gave considerable strength
to Austria's position as a great power, and which

102 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
protected the most important of her extensive
frontiers against attack — but also the natural, certain,
and pacific solution of a problem which is now the
cause of grave anxiety : I mean the maintenance of
the privileged position of the German as opposed to
the non -German subjects of the Emperor. In the
second part of my Memoirs I have treated of this
question in the proper place. Whatever the Germans
may allege about their superior culture, the foundation
of the Empire by German deeds, and so on, produces
no impression whatever on the Slavs. But if Austria
had retained her prominent position in Germany, the
Slavs could not have closed their eyes and ears to
the claims of the German Austrians to hold the first
place in the monarchy.
As I have said, one can understand, though one
must regret all this. When Benedek thought it
better not to accept the battle of Koniggratz, he
wanted to retreat with his army to Olmiitz. But the
merciless logic of history had long ago decreed that
the road from Olmiitz must lead to Koniggratz.

CHAPTER X
1851
THE DRESDEN CONFERENCES.  THE BUNDESTAG.  TRIP TO LONDON
AND FRANKFORT.  BISMARCK.
It was a solemn and not unimpressive ceremony when
Prince Schwarzenberg opened the Ministerial Con
ferences in the Briihl Palace at Dresden, and I was
able to answer the Prince's speech in sincere confi
dence with the words : ' It appears to me a Provi
dential sign of reconciliation that the town which still
shows traces of those evil days when enthusiasm for
German Unity seemed only to let loose the elements
of destruction, should be the meeting-place of men
called to banish those elements, and to restore peace
and concord to the Fatherland.' Begun in this
promising way, the Conferences ended with a mutual
rendezvous at Frankfort.*
* The object of the ' Dresden Conferences ' was to arrive at a settlement of the
Constitution of the Germanic Confederation. No decision was arrived at, as Austria
and Prussia could not agree on the subject.

104 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
Prince Schwarzenberg and Baron Manteuffel were
present only occasionally ; the former had a deputy
who gave more satisfaction to himself than to others,
and the latter had the good fortune to leave
behind him a representative than whom Prussia
could not have desired a better.
If Prince Schwarzenberg had had more knowledge
of mankind, he would not have made the choice he
did. Count Buol had been for a time envoy at
Stuttgart, but for a still longer time he was out of
Germany, chiefly in Russia ; and he was so little
acquainted with German affairs that at a banquet of
the Dresden Archery Society he drank to the health
' of the town of Dresden, which had ever been loyal to
its dynasty ' — the very town which scarcely a year
before had been in full rebellion ! When in the
month of April of the following year, the Ministers
of the Central States were assembled at Darmstadt
for a Customs' Conference, the alarming news
arrived of the death of Prince Schwarzenberg.
Count Thun, the presiding Ambassador, brought us
the tidings, mentioning at the same time Count Buol
as the Prince's probable successor. When this name
was pronounced, there was a universal exclamation
of surprise and discouragement. Nevertheless this
judgment was premature. I soon afterwards had to
go to Vienna about the Customs question, and I was
agreeably surprised to find the Minister, whom I had
seen so weak, possessed of no slight power of
argument. But unfortunately the saying of old
Prince Metternich came perfectly true: 'Count Buol,'
he said, 'is a knife with a sharp point, but with no

THE DRESDEN CONFERENCES 105
edge.' How well that saying characterises the
Count's career as a Minister ! The policy of Austria
nearly everywhere pricked, but did not cut ; and the
consequence was that much anger was aroused, and
few advantages were gained. But perhaps it was
that very incisiveness of style that led Prince
Schwarzenberg to make so unsuitable a choice for
the Dresden Conferences.
It was here especially that Prussia opposed him
with a man who by imperceptible degrees made
himself master of the situation. Count Alvensleben,
formerly Minister of Finance, had hitherto been more
known for his acrimony than for anything else, and
this soon put an end to his career as a Minister
of Frederick William IV. It was he, however,
that, with incredible subtlety and pliancy, gained
the upper hand, and liberated Prussia from a
project which would have conferred a privileged and
influential position on the four Kingdoms, and which
Prussia* herself had laid before the Conference jointly
with Austria. It was further owing to his decom
posing influence, which was neither perceived nor
disturbed by his Austrian colleague, that many not
unimportant paper. > on general administration which
were handed over to Frankfort were pigeon-holed there
under the heading of ' valuable materials.'
I remember that before this was done I handed to
my neighbour, Herr von Biilow, Minister for Danish-
Holstein to the Bundestag, a paper ending with the
words : ' The august Governments are requested to
act accordingly.' I struck out the word ' act,'
observing : ' This is the result of the Conferences.'

io6 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
I must here say a few words about Herr von
Biilow. Of his undoubted mental power I need not
speak, for had he not possessed it, Prince Bismarck
would never, as German Chancellor, have appointed
him to an eminent and influential post. His charming
manners and powerful intellect are among my most
pleasing recollections. It was remarkable how he
changed sides. In the days of the Dresden Con
ferences, Herr von Biilow was not only a strong
reactionist, but a decided enemy of Prussia. And
this man ends his career as a confidant of Prince
Bismarck ! Still more remarkable was the inter
mediate stage, in which he proceeded to Berlin as
Minister of Mecklenburg. Not of Mecklenburg-
Schwerin, which was always at the beck and call
of Berlin, but of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, which always
looked more to Vienna, and where there was little
sympathy for the new formation of Germany. Any
thing else could scarcely have been expected, as the
Grand-Duchess Dowager was born a Princess of
Hesse, and the Grand-Duchess Regnant was a
Princess of Hanover. Prince Bismarck knows how
to find ' his people,' and enquires but little into the
origin of his materials so long as the stuff is good.
I did not meet Herr von Biilow again after the
Dresden Conferences until 1879, at Gastein. Un
fortunately, he wTas taken ill there, and, I believe, died
soon afterwards.
Another acquaintance which I owTe to the Dresden
Conferences, and which developed into a lasting and
warm friendship, was that of the Grand Ducal Hessian
Minister Baron von Dalwigk. We remained closely

THE DRESDEN CONFERENCES 107
intimate without a single difference or estrangement,
and I was able to count upon him in every phase of
German affairs. Dalwigk, like myself, was persecuted
as an ' enemy of Prussia,' and with equal injustice,
although his inclination to Austria was more decided
than mine. The time of the Crimean War was, I
may say, the only one during which I found it difficult
to agree with him on all points. Even less than of
hatred of Prussia could he be accused of ' Rheinbiin-
delei.'* The Hessian Government was very subservient
to Napoleon III, like other German Governments,
which merely followed in that the example of greater
Powers; but in the year 1859 I never saw anybody
more hostile to France, and more in favour of war,
that Dalwigk. Of his ability in internal adminis
tration I heard even his political opponents speak
with respect. But as I was quite Saxon, so was he
quite Hessian.
I cannot conclude my reminiscences of the Dresden
Conferences without mentioning two noteworthy inci
dents connected with them.
As soon as we received the intelligence that the
Conferences were to be held at Dresden, I suggested to
King Frederick Augustus that he should give the
Austrian and Prussian Ministers a residence in the
Royal Palace. The King agreed, and Prince Schwar
zenberg and Baron von Manteuffel were quartered
in the ' Prinzenpalais,' which adjoins the Castle. I
do not wonder that this gave some offence at Munich ;
and to this day I give Pfordten credit for not having
* ' Rhenish Oonfederationism ' — in allusion to the formation by the smaller
German States in 1806 of the Confederation of the Rhine, under the protection of
Napoleon, against Austria and Prussia.

108 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
resented it. But the more important part of the
affair consists in my having thus manifested my
partiality for a scheme which I, the so-called enemy
of Prussia, endeavoured in vain to bring about in 1861
and 1863, viz., the alternate presidency of Austria
and Prussia in the Confederation, thereby making
them virtually equal.
The other incident to which I refer was the fol
lowing : There was at Dresden a Professor of the
Painters' Academy, who at that time was very old.
In former days he had produced excellent works ; but
he gradually deteriorated, until at last he could
find no purchasers for his pictures. He took it into
his head to paint a large historical picture of the
Conference, but there were two difficulties in the way.
In the first place it was not certain whether the King
would buy the painting when finished ; and secondly,
Prince Schwarzenberg had never sat to a painter in his
life, as it bored him, and he was not inclined to do so
now, having no wish to be immortalised on canvas.
What did our Professor do ? He persuaded the King
that Prince Schwarzenberg was interested in the
picture ; and he convinced Prince Schwarzenberg that
the King wished to have it. In extenuation of his
conduct I must add that the painter himself fully
believed what he said, his vanity not allowing him to
doubt it for a moment. Prince Schwarzenberg told
us that the painter wanted to use him as a Wouver-
man's horse, because of his white uniform. On one side
of the picture was Prince Schwarzenberg talking to
Pfordten, on the other Baron von Manteuffel seated at
a table across which I was handing a document to him.

TRIP TO LONDON AND FRANKFORT 109
One day I went to the painter to give him a sitting,
and I found that 1 was represented close against the
table and overshadowed by a huge figure, under which
I almost disappeared. ' Who is that ? ' I asked. ' Oh,
that is the Mecklenburg Minister, it is absolutely
necessary to put him here.' ' Why ? ' ' Because he
has a red uniform, which introduces a good bit of
colour.' 'But don't you see that if I get up I shall
hit Mecklenburg on the head ? I do not wish to do
that ; the whole thing looks as if they meant to pre
vent me from presenting my document.' The Pro
fessor, however, would have been disconsolate without
the red uniform. ' Very well,' I said. ' Leave the
depressed position, it agrees with my depressed
spirits ! '
Soon after the conclusion of the Conference, I
went to London, where the first great International
Exhibition, the creation of Prince Albert, had just
been opened. After leaving London in 1848, 1 had
not been recalled nor had a successor been appointed,
so that I formally remained in the position described
by Lord Palmerston as that of the ' Colossus of
Rhodes.' The delivery of the note by which I was
recalled was the cause of my first interview with
Prince Albert, in whose favour I had not risen, thanks
to Bunsen's intrigues. I saw the Prince for the last
time in 1859, just before the Italian War, and he was
then more favourable to me and to Austria.
On my way home I stopped a day at Frankfort.
At the house of Count Friedrich Thun, the presiding
envoy at the Confederation and my still inti
mate friend, I had my second meeting with Herr

no MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
von Bismarck. He was not yet Minister, but only
a ' Geheimer Legationsrath,' under the orders of
General von Rochow, whom he was soon to succeed.
Although at that time nobody dreamed of his future
greatness, the words he then uttered made a deep
impression upon me, and I have often remembered
one of his sayings during the Kulturkampf. The
Thun family is related to the family of Count
Westspal, which has some estates in Bohemia, and
more in Westphalia. The conversation turned on
a member of the latter family who was fervently
religious, and Bismarck observed that ' such firm
Catholics are the King's best subjects.'
I now come to the theme of ' Prussia at the
Bundestag.' I have not invented this phrase — it
stands before me as the title of three portly volumes
issued by Poschinger.
Prince Bismarck occupies so prominent a place,
not only in the destiny of nations, but also in my
humble career, that I shall more than once have
occasion to occupy myself with him and with his
actions. I say in all sincerity that it is against my
will that on the first occasion on which I mention him
in my Memoirs, I am compelled to write against him ;
for one of the ' fables convenues,' of which there are
so many in the present day, is my ' rivalry ' with
Bismarck, which, as I prove in the second part of
this work, never entered my mind ; another is my
' hostility ' towards him. I was his opponent, not
in principle, not constantly, and least of all personally ;
but only when his actions threatened the interests
placed under my care. I found him personally

BISMARCK 1 1 1
sympathetic, and our mutual relations could, at
times, not have been better. In a letter written
by him to me in 1871, and which obtained a great
deal of publicity,* he says ; ' I always respected
in Your Excellency my most unbiassed and amiable
opponent.' It is not for me to judge whether I was
amiable, though I am conscious of desiring to be so ;
but that I was unbiassed I can safely aver ; and I
hope that the reader will find the historian as un
biassed as Prince Bismarck once found the Minister
and the Imperial Chancellor.
It may be asked how it was that this ' rivalry '
and ' hostility ' were not only invented but firmly
believed. It is always difficult to prove how such
rumours arise, but I know where this rumour arose :
in no other quarter than in Berlin and Germany.
One of those angels blowing trumpets, such as are
seen in pictures of the Day of Judgment, who are
sent out from time to time by Prince Bismarck to
appal every miscreant who dares to rebel against his
omnipotence, or whom he unjustly suspects of intend
ing to rebel, is the anonymous author of a book that
appeared recently under the title of ' Twelve Years of
German Policy.' I will not reveal who he is, but I
will only hint that I have been told that his name is
as long as his title. It is stated in that work among
other things that Prince Bismarck once said in a
confidential circle that in estimating the qualities of
* As proved by the following verses of the Berlin Comic Paper, the ' Kladdera-
datsch ' :— ' He praises Count Beust as an unbiassed foe
And as the most amiable man he doth know :
Since both at Gastein for their feud made amends,
We see that the Prince is not spoilt by his friends. '

112 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
his enemies, he first deducts their vanity ; but that
when he did so with me, nothing remained. No one
can claim to have a full knowledge of himself, and I
must therefore leave that reproach unrefuted ; but if I
really possess that weakness, to whom is it due ? To
Prince Bismarck himself and his attendant spirits.
So long as I was Minister simultaneously with
Bismarck, first in Saxony, and then in Austria, and
even when I was Ambassador in London and Paris,
nothing could happen in Germany that was un
pleasant to Prussia without a clamour being raised in
the German papers about 'Beust's intrigues.' Thus,
after the political world of London and Paris had
discovered by personal acquaintance that I had some
ability, English and French journalists took it into
their heads that I was a most dangerous enemy, and
the only one whom Bismarck dreaded. Under such
circumstances vanity would be excusable. But what
I never understood was that in the quarters where
these insinuations originated it was not understood
that there is only one cure for vanity — total silence.
Now we come to Prussia at the Bundestag.

CHAPTER XI
1851-1859
PRUSSIA AT THE BUNDESTAG
In a former chapter I mentioned that at the time
when I was Saxon Minister in London, the Due de
Broglie, father of the present Duke, was my colleague
as French Ambassador. At that time, towards the
end of 1847, Lamartine's ' Histoire des Girondins ' had
just appeared, a book which as thoroughly prepared
the Revolution of February as if Lamartine had
intended to avenge himself with it for the malicious
pun made by Louis Philippe at his expense. He
was a native of Macon, the celebrated wine district of
Burgundy ; and Louis Philippe used to call him ' le
vain (vin) de Macon,' the vain man of Macon.
When somebody said, ' After all, it is a bad book,' the
Due de Broglie retorted : ' No ; it is not a bad book,
but it is a bad action.'
VOL. i h

n4 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
I am inclined to say the same of Poschinger's
' Preussen am Bundestage.'
Far from calling it a bad book, I was grateful for
its appearance, in spite of its attacks* on me, and this
for two reasons. In the first place I discovered in it
the confirmation of the view I had long entertained
of the original and permanent tendency of Prince
Bismarck's German policy, which was, under pretence
of defending Prussia, strongly aggressive towards
Austria. In pursuing this policy he did nothing more
and nothing worse than others before him, with this
difference, that he carried it out with more ability and
success than his predecessors. But, in the interest of
historical truth, it should not be said that Austria was
the attacking party. On the other hand, I can only
welcome a precedent which must be of general applica
tion. Prince Bismarck's condemnation of La Marmora's
' Piii de luce ' falls to the ground after the appearance
of a publication which appeared either by his order or
with his consent.
I therefore do not write with any personal feeling
when I recall the above words of the Due de Broglie.
I do not quote them to characterise Poschinger's book
as a whole, however great may be the temptation to
find an analogy between a work that, like Lamartine's,
strives to excite ill-will as to the future, and one that,
like Poschinger's, endeavours to poison the reader's
mind as to the past.

* I leave those of a personal nature unnoticed. But to show the spirit of the
book, I must allude to a statement made under the date of January 1856, that in the
previous year I had applied in vain for the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour,
that very Grand Cross which I had received three years previously. Of course the
heading is : 'Beust's Application for a French Order.'

PRUSSIA AT THE BUNDESTAG 115
I use the expression, a ' bad action,' not in the
sense that the action was criminal, but that it was
ungenerous to publish the frequent attacks, far
exceeding the just limits of dispassionate criticism,
made by Bismarck when Prussian envoy at the
Bundestag on some of his colleagues, especially the
Austrian envoy who was President. These attacks
are now placed before the public as a spicy dish,
in spite of the obviously defenceless position of the
persons attacked.
Baron Prokesch, Thun's successor, is constantly
accused of untruthfulness from the moment he
entered on the duties of his office, and a whole chapter
is filled with the alleged irregularities of the Presid
ing envoy and the subservience to Austria of the
envoys of Saxony and Wiirtemberg (12th February,
8th March, 30th May, 1853). Later on (23rd March,
1855) occurs the serious complaint that Prokesch
made statements about the debates in the Bundestag
to the foreign representatives, and in particular to
those of France and England.
With regard to the footing on which Prokesch
stood with Bismarck, both may have had a good deal
to complain of each other. As Prince Bismarck told
me in 1862 at the time of his short Parisian Embassy,
during a little dinner at a restaurant, that it was a
blessing to him to pass some years with 'good-
natured ' Gortschakoff after all that he had suffered
in Frankfort from Prokesch, so Prokesch assured me,
when I visited him at Frankfort in October 1855 at
the time of his appointment as Austrian Minister at
Constantinople, that the prospect of negotiating with

116 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
the wise Ali instead of with Bismarck seemed to him
like an Oriental vision of the blessed.
However we may judge Prokesch, nobody can
deny that he was gifted with originality and brilliant
wit, and if his Frankfort despatches were published
they would find a grateful public.
When Poschinger's book was issued, Prince
Bismarck knew quite well that neither Dresden nor
Stuttgart (Munich had been wisely spared) would
presume to publish the reports of their envoys
in order to refute his assertions, and that Vienna
would not consider it opportune to make public the
despatches of the Austrian Presiding envoy at
the Bundestag.
If I see an opponent before me tied hand and foot,
I do not give him a blow in the face. I cannot there
fore regard the proceeding as praiseworthy.
Perhaps it may be retorted that the persons
attacked are no longer living. But they have left
sons and other relatives to whom their memory is
dear, and there are Governments which preserve the
recollection and the honour of the past in spite of the
change of persons and systems.
If I leave this, which I may call the social aspect
of Bismarck's despatches of that date, and turn to
their political significance, this is to be found, as I
have already hinted, in the very obvious and persist
ent tendency of representing Austria as menacing
Prussia. Bismarck may have thought it well to
impress this view on Frederick William IV, who
preserved a lingering attachment to Austria in
spite of Bunsen and Radowitz. Bismarck always

PRUSSIA AT THE BUNDESTAG 117
pursued his object of loosening the old Confederation,
and of cutting off all communication between Germany,
or at least the North of Germany, and Austria, thus
bringing it in close connection with Prussia. Those
who know as well as I do what took place between
Vienna and the German Central States in the time
between 1851 and 1856, and who are versed in the
instructions given by Austria for the Frankfort
sittings of the Bundestag, can hardly fail to be
a,mused on reading the description ofthe Macchiavellian
intrigues of the Cabinet of Vienna at the very time
when the Governments of the Central States were as
often, if not oftener, at variance with Vienna as with
Berlin. During the Crimean War Bismarck himself
admits that they were always opposed to Austria.
Wherever he turned, he heard complaints of the
incapacity of Count Buol. But Poschinger speaks
of Austrian 'intimidation' (March 1855). If I look
back on my three Austrian envoys at Dresden :
the excellent, business-like, precise, but always
courteous and considerate Count Kuefstein — my
friend Metternich — and the gentle and cautious
Baron Werner — I ask myself whether I have lost my
memory, for I cannot for the life of me recollect
airy Austrian 'intimidation.' And yet some such
effect must have been produced, as Bismarck mentions
a ' vacillation of the Central States,' of which we
never heard anything.
Oh, those wicked Central States and their
Ministers, the despicable ' Rheinbiindler ! '* Because
Pfordten and I went to the Paris Exhibition and
* See note on p. 107.

118 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
were received on that occasion by the Emperor, Herr
von Bismarck was quite convinced that we were
reporting to foreign Powers ' that the Confederation
could not resist a real external danger ' (26th April
1856). But when later on Count Bismarck proceeded
to Biarritz to have an interview with Napoleon III,
the affairs of Germany were of course not in question.
In the pursuit of his idea of the proposed revival
of the Rhenish Confederation, which was really
a hallucination, but which did not prevent him
from proposing to Prussia a separate alliance with
France (15th April, 1856), he makes a remark
in one of his reports (26th April, 1856) to which
we may justly take exception : ' The Emperor
Napoleon seems to have . received with polite reserve
the acte de commission of Count Buol — the desire of
Austria to have the honour of being the first State
of the Rhenish Confederation, if only Prussia could
be thereby degraded to the second or even third place
in the Confederation.' But a thorough refutation is
called for of the view, which he develops at great
length, that if France had threatened Germany, the
German Princes would rather have joined France than
have sacrificed their independence by remaining in the
Austro-Prussian camp. In 1840, when the attitude
of France was especially warlike, all the German
Governments rose as one man against her ; and in
1859 (I do not speak of Prussia, but of the ' untrust
worthy Central States') all were ready to proceed
against France. I am certain that if Prussia had
been attacked, the attitude of the German Princes
would have been the same.

PRUSSIA AT THE BUNDESTAG 119
But in truth it is neither generous nor wise to
harp upon the Rhenish Confederation. How did it
originate ? Did the Princes of the Rhenish Union
rush into the arms of the French Conqueror ? After
the battle of Ulm the rulers of southern Germany had
no choice. Nor had the Elector of Saxony, after he
had joined his troops to those of Prussia at Jena, where
they were defeated together, and after the Prussian
fortresses had fallen — although not under the command
of Princes of the Rhenish Union — and there was no
longer a Prussia to ally one's self with. Moreover,
the then King of Saxony refused to take Napoleon's
offer of Silesia — perhaps unwisely, for he would pro
bably have obtained more in the end if he had had
more to give up.
An attentive reader of Bismarck's Frankfort
reports will look in vain for any serious attempt on his
part to come to an understanding with his Austrian
'colleagues. On the contrary, on the 7th April 1852
he rejected a proposal made by Count Thun with
the view of establishing complete equality between-
the two States as regards their position in Germany.
Nor is it sufficiently understood that it was against
her interest and her wish that Austria consented to
the exclusion of her non -German possessions from the
Confederation. We find everywhere that difficulties
were raised by the secret hostility which depre
ciated the advantages of the Austrian Alliance,
and refused to recognize Austria's right to freedom
of action and to the choice of an alliance with
another power. On the 26th April 1856, Bismarck
even asserted that war with Austria was inevitable

120 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
because it would be useful, as ' according to the policy
of Vienna, Germany is too narrow for us both, and
Austria is the only State to which we can lose or from
which we can gain.' This was said eleven years
before the event. Men are apt to predict what they
desire. Prince Bismarck may now boast of his fore
sight ; he may also boast of having directed the
events he predicted the way he wished them to occur,
though it was the merest chance that they turned out
as they did.
I always try to find excuses for those whom I
condemn. I have done this in the case of Prince
Schwarzenberg's great sins of omission, and I will
endeavour to do the same in that of Prince Bismarck's
small sins of commission.
I shall throw light in a following chapter, on the
fact — ' infandum, regina, jubes renovare dolorem ' —
that in Austria people always rated appearance higher
than reality. I do not know where Bismarck got his
information about Austria's attempts to bully the
other States of the Confederation ; but I have had
better opportunities of observation than others in this
matter, and I can safely assert that the Central States
never felt the effects of the aggressiveness and tyranny
thus ascribed to her. It is true that those States
and the members of the Assembly at Frankfort were
sometimes offended at her assumption of superiority.
She had an idea, as false as it was injurious, that her
Presidency over the Assembly entitled her to preside
over the Bund, and that this was an inviolable
attribute of the Imperial Court. This idea prompted
the demand of Count Buol, mentioned in the report

PRUSSIA AT THE BUNDESTAG 121
ofthe 14th February 1856, that when he was passing
through Frankfort the envoys at the Bundestag
should pay him the first visit. Prokesch and Rech
berg held the same view, and carried it out with equal
obstinacy and with equally injurious effects. The
last Austrian Presiding envoy, Baron Kiibeck,
abandoned this absurd pretension, but it was then too
late. It has often been asserted, but falsely, that under
Prince Schwarzenberg Austria abandoned her old
traditional policy towards Prussia, and that instead
of maintaining her former attitude, based on the
equality of the two powers, she began to play a
domineering part derogatory to Prussia. On the
contrary, if anything of this kind ever happened it
was before 1848, and especially in the period between
1830 and 1840, when Prussia was in the habit of
taking Prince Metternich's opinion on every occa
sion, a practice not forced upon her by Austria, but
perfectly spontaneous. That was the time when
Herr von Bismarck's predecessors in Frankfort were
accustomed to look up to Count Miinch as their
chief. From that date we can trace a certain dictatorial
tone in the communications of Vienna — a tone which
I often deplored, and which was expressed only too
pointedly by the elegant and incisive style of Baron
Biegeleben. Austria made the mistake of arrogating
to herself a show of power which she did not really
possess, while the other Confederate States wrongly
looked upon a mere fault of manner as indicating a
dangerous assumption of authority.

122 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
Another excuse for the harsh and generally
unfounded charges in Bismarck's reports may be
found in the circumstance that it is a peculiarity of
the Prussian character to be very sharp sighted in
perceiving the misdeeds of other.s and very blind to
one's own.
In 1878 I visited the Paris Exhibition. King
George of Hanover had died there shortly before, and
I was told the following anecdote : A Secretary of
the Austrian Embassy, meeting a Secretary of the
German Embassy who was his friend, happened to
remark that the King's death would make a deep
impression on the Emperor William. ' Oh ! ' was the
reply, ' I am certain that the Emperor has forgiven
him ! ' These words so staggered the Austrian that he
could only say : ' I beg your pardon.'

CHAPTER XII
1852
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS AT DRESDEN
I must now relate my interview with the Emperor
Nicholas during his short visit to Dresden in 1852.
I had never seen him before, but had heard a great
deal about him.
How quickly men and events are forgotten in our
kaleidoscopic age ! Thirty years have barely elapsed
since the death of Nicholas, and yet it seems as though
he had lived and reigned in the last century. Next
to Napoleon I, there was no sovereign who was so
much adored, feared, and hated as the Emperor
Nicholas. The resources of power which he had at
his command were not to be compared in the remotest
degree with those of the present Emperor of Germany;
yet the influence on European politics of the latter
was far less than that possessed for twenty
years by the Emperor Nicholas. During my Berlin

i24 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
mission I saw that he was regarded in the Prussian
capital and at most of the German Courts as a
superior being. At Vienna the necessity of his
friendship was a fundamental maxim ; even England
owned that he had a right to claim a certain
superiority ; and the country that had most reason to
complain of him, France, did her utmost to keep
him in good humour. All this came under my
personal observation in all the German capitals except
Vienna, and it will be easily understood, therefore,
with what interest I looked forward to a meeting
with the man who at that time held so prominent a
place among the European sovereigns.
The Emperor Nicholas arrived at Dresden in the
evening from Vienna, and continued his journey to
Warsaw the following day, after visiting King
Frederick Augustus in his Weinsberg villa, on which
occasion I first saw him.
The Emperor was staying at the Russian Embassy,
and I was shown into his study. I had heard enough
of his bearing and appearance to know that his
manners were anything but those of a savage despot ;
but the easy and dignified amiability with which he
received me went far beyond my expectations. With
a few complimentary words he invited me to sit down,
and he only dismissed me after half-an-hour's conver
sation, during which we talked on various subjects
relating to many countries besides Saxony. I may
say that I scarcely remember ever having seen a more
attractive figure than the Emperor Nicholas, with
his large, blue, clear, and penetrating eye.
He spoke of his visit to Vienna, and of his friend-

THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS AT DRESDEN 125
ship for the Emperor Francis Joseph, whom he called
more than once 'ce cher Empereur.' His opinion of
Frederick William IV was less favourable. ' Voyez-
vous, avec mon beau-frere de Prusse je ne parle plus
politique, avec ses idees il est tellement au-dessus de
moi que je me fais 1' effet d'un imbecile a cote" de lui.'
I cannot forget our conversation on the burning
question of the day. ' Louis Napoleon,' said Nicholas,
' s'est fait President, il se fera Empereur. Bien, nous
le reconnaltrons, mais comme dynastie, jamais ! ' I
ventured to differ from him. I observed that it
appeared to me that it was contrary to the monarchical
principle to admit that anybody had a right to have
himself proclaimed Emperor. It was better, I thought,
that he who did so should be able to show a dynastic
origin, as wTas the case with Louis Napoleon, and the
designation of 'Napoleon III' therefore appeared to
me preferable to that of 'Louis Napoleon.'
The Emperor was not to be convinced. If I had
been able to convert him to my views how differently
things would have turned out ! There would have
been no question about calling him ' mon bon frere,'
and no Crimean War.
I have advised Russia on two occasions, first on
the subject of Napoleon III, and afterwards on that
of the Black Sea. I was not listened to, still less was
I thanked for my advice.

CHAPTER XIII
1853-1854
MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR AND OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.  DEATH OF
KING FREDERICK AUGUSTUS AND ACCESSION OF KING JOHN.  THE
CRIMEAN WAR.
Nothing was farther removed from my wishes and
thoughts than to undertake the department of the
Interior instead of that of Public Worship and In
struction ; but after this change had been brought
about by the resignation of my colleague Friesen, a
resignation I did not at all desire, it became of decided
value to me. As head of the two departments which
were politically most important, I became, though not
the premier, the leading Minister in the Cabinet. In
Saxony the Minister of the Interior was at the same
time Minister of Police, Commerce, and Agriculture.
I had indeed begun my career by serving in the inter
nal Administration, but I had afterwards lived for
thirteen years abroad. That my nomination as head

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 127
of so extensive a department was attended with no
disadvantage is to be attributed to my good fortune
in being supported by most capable officials. To this
moment I have not ceased to think with gratitude of
the four heads of departments, Kohlschiitter, Weinlig,
Korner, and von Zahn, and this reminiscence is made
more gratifying by the certainty that they never had
cause to complain of me, but always placed entire
confidence in my guidance. Indeed, throughout my
career I always succeeded in gaining the affections of
my subordinates. That in later years, in spite of the
complete change of circumstances, many of them came
to see me whenever I visited Dresden, was as honour
able to them as it was gratifying to me.
The year 1854 became momentous to Saxony by
the sudden death of King Frederick Augustus and
the accession of King John.
It is well-known that Frederick Augustus met
with a fatal accident during one of his favourite tours
in the Tyrolese Alps ; and the tragedy, or rather the
fatality of his end consisted in the fact that he, so
fearless and experienced as a mountaineer, was killed
by a fall from his carriage. I was at that time at
Munich, where there was an Industrial Exhibition,
and had taken leave of the King at Possenhofen,
whence he proceeded to the Tyrol. I cannot describe
the shock I felt when two days afterwards, early in
the morning, I was called from my bed by the
dreadful news. I hurried to Dresden. The journey
was most trying, independently of its sad associations,
as the cholera had just broken out at Munich and the
trains were all filled to overflowing. In a former

m '»

128 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
chapter I have mentioned my personal relations with
King Frederick Augustus, and I therefore need not
say how deeply and keenly I felt the blow.
The coffin arrived with the remains soon after my
return to Dresden. King John and his two sons
followed on foot from the station to the Catholic
Church, where the body was placed on a bier to be
interred in the family vault on the following day. In
my capacity of Kammerherr I demanded the honour
pf being allowed to watch the body during the night.
From the first King John bestowed upon me that
confidence and favour which I enjoyed without inter
ruption until my resignation. As Crown Prince he
used to take part in all the sittings of the Cabinet
when the King presided, and on these occasions, as
well as in his capacity of member of the First
Chamber, in whose debates he took an active part, he
had the opportunity of becoming acquainted with me.
The position in which I stood towards him could not
be more suitably described than in the letter he
addressed to me on my resignation in 1866, which
will be found in its proper place in these Memoirs.
That King John was a man of eminent scientific
attainments, and even of profound learning, is well
known. King Frederick William IV used to call
him ' my brother-in-law the Professor.' But few
knew as I did the rare modesty that was united to
such wealth of intellect. He had paid slight attention
to foreign affairs before his accession, and this may
account for the authority he gave me in such matters.
But even in home affairs, although he had a thorough
knowledge of the law, and was immeasurably my

j i

ACCESSION OF KING JOHN 129
superior in that respect, he never made me feel his
superiority. It is almost incredible, but no less true (my former
colleague Friesen mentions it in his Memoirs), that
the accession of such a sovereign, who seemed of all
men the most fitted for the crown, and who was
deservedly popular during his reign, was regarded
in the country with a certain degree of alarm — a
feeling for which a possible explanation may be found
in a peculiarity of the Saxon character.
There are two words that cannot be spoken in the
presence of a Saxon without his becoming violently
excited : ' Jew ' and ' Jesuit.' Within a comparatively
recent period the Jews were forbidden to enter certain
Saxon towns, especially those of the mountain districts.
It was, I suppose, thought impossible for a Jew to pass
a lump of ore without putting it in his pocket ! The
Jesuits, too, were looked upon as bugbears and ogres.
When the Constitution was established with the con
currence ofthe old Diets in 1831, the latter demanded
the insertion of a special provision forbidding the
introduction of Jesuits, although at that time there
was no monastic order in the country except the two
harmless nunneries in the Lausitz.
During the whole course of his reign King John
never exposed himself to the reproach of religious
intolerance. He never interfered with the affairs of
the Protestant Church; and with regard to the
affairs of his own Church he showed such reserve that
I was once obliged to take its part against him. But
as a Prince he had never concealed his Catholic faith.
It was without his interference or even knowledge (for
vol. 1 1

i3o MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
what was done was not through the instrumentality of
the Cabinet, but through Ministers of State entrusted
with religious affairs) that the Government assumed
a defensive attitude against ' German Catholicism ' in
the years subsequent to 1840, — that very 'German
Catholicism,' the hollowness of which became apparent
later on, but which at that time had enthusiastic
adherents. Public opinion in Saxony then believed
that the Jesuits were at the back of the Government,
and this was the cause of the disturbances at
Leipzig in 1845, which were partly directed against
the Prince. A mistaken notion was thus spread that
the Prince was intolerant in religious matters ; and
this was even believed in Court circles, where Pro
testant intolerance was not unrepresented. And yet
it was well known that he had confided the education
of his eldest son, Prince (now King) Albert, to a
Protestant, who was even a zealous partizan of his
Church. The cry of the ' Jesuit ' is in certain cir
cumstances raised as frequently as that ofthe 'Rhein
biindler.'* At the time of the accession of King John many
important questions had to be dealt with. In internal
affairs, the reorganisation of the judicial and adminis
trative authorities, and in foreign affairs the attitude
of the Germanic Confederation with regard to the
Crimean War, claimed full attention.
With regard to the latter point I must here refer
to the part of my Memoirs which comprises the
period of my tenure of office in Austria, and was com
pleted before I began to write the earlier part. I
* See note on p. 107.

THE CRIMEAN WAR 13.
there discuss in detail the policy of Austria during
the Crimean War, which throws considerable light on
the doings of the German Confederation and its various
members at that period.
I have already questioned the historical founda
tion of the saying attributed to Prince Schwarzen
berg : ' Avilir la Prusse d'abord et la demolir
ensuite.' I do not know whether he spoke the other
words attributed to him : ' Nous etonnerons le monde
par notre ingratitude ' ; but I have less reason to
doubt it. The realisation of the idea as carried out
after his death, did not show that Austria's ingrati
tude was of much use to her ; and the saying
attributed to Prince Schwarzenberg gave Prince
Gortschakoff an opportunity, when, much to Austria's
chagrin, the new Kingdom of Italy was recognized,
of wittily remarking : ' Nous etonnerons le monde par
notre reconnaissance.'
I fully believe that Prince Schwarzenberg thought
that the service performed by Russia in Hungary,
which was as beneficial to her as the help afforded to
the Saxons was to Prussia, should not in any way
have hampered Austria in the independent pursuit of
her interests. But practically he would have con
ducted affairs in another manner than his successor,
to whom Metternich's saying of the knife that pricks
without cutting proved only too applicable. Prince
Schwarzenberg was a man of action, and if he had
lived, Austria would, as soon as the Pruth had been
crossed in 1853, have occupied Little Wallachia, and
would have declared herself ready to withdraw her
troops so soon as Russia should do likewise. This

132 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
might at first have been felt at St Petersburg as
an unexpected blow; but lasting resentment would
have been much less probable than after making
Austria's late friend and ally drink the bitter cup
gradually to the dregs. War would scarcely have
been declared ; and even if it had broken out, it
would have produced less division and coldness in the
end than a display of military power which, though
inactive itself, paralyzed the arm of Austria's
neighbour while she was engaged in war with others.
This it is that prevented me from approving Buol's
policy ; for I was sufficiently acquainted with the
state of affairs at Vienna to know that the opposition
to Russia would be confined within the limits of
certain considerations, and would therefore not
advance beyond half measures.
The campaign, though bloodless, was not without
its victims. It is said that nearly 50,000 men died in
the hospitals ; and the national debt was increased by
500,000,000 florins. It is well known how France and
England thanked Austria and Italy for services
without which Sebastopol would perhaps never have
been taken. And Austria was patient enough to
suffer Sardinia to join her troops to those of the
Western Powers, with the transparent design of
obtaining at the Paris Congress a hearing for her
grievances against Austria and the position of the
sixth of the Great Powers ! The Austrian policy of
those days appears to me almost incredible. If
anything could make one judge it leniently, it would
be the fact that the Vienna newspapers were full of
enthusiasm in its praise. Zang in the Presse,

THE CRIMEAN WAR 133
Varrens in the Lloyd, and Kuranda, for whom I had
so much esteem, in the Ostdeutsche Post, all joined
in the chorus and looked down contemptuously on
Prussia and the Confederation. How often later on,
when the Vienna press was full of dreary articles
about the Concordat, the weakness of Reaction, and
so on, did I remember how in those days they loved to
talk of the ' majestic power ' of Austria !
Instead of the policy that has been condemned by
events, Austria could easily have obtained a guarantee
for her Italian possessions from Prussia and the Con
federation, if she had chosen to keep clear of the half
alliance with the Western Powers, and to arrange
with Prussia and the Confederation for mutual but de
cided neutrality. The Prussian envoy at the Bundestag
was far from thinking of such an arrangement, but
Frederick William IV entertained the idea very
seriously. I was able to convince myself of this more
than others, as King John was in correspondence with
his royal brother-in-law in Berlin, and showed me his
letters, the perusal of which gave me much enjoyment,
so clever and witty were they. In those days,
Dresden and Berlin were on the best of terms, and
the King's views were not crossed by Herr von
Manteuffel. That the King only now displayed this
partiality to Austria is to be ascribed to the fact that
Radowitz was no longer living, and that Bunsen was
already politically dead.
The Central States, whether they gravitated
towards the idea of a Rhenish Confederation or to the
Western Powers, looked at things more or less from the
same point of view as we did in Saxony. Thus there

134 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
was soon complete harmony when the Ministers met
in Conference at Bamberg. Bavaria was represented
by Pfordten, Saxony by me, Wiirtemberg by Neurath,
Hanover by Lenthe, Electoral Hesse by Mayer, the
Grand Duchy of Hesse by Dalwigk, and Nassau by
Wittgenstein. I was entrusted with the composition
of a note to be addressed to the Governments of
Prussia and Austria, the immediate subject of which
was the invitation we had received from both Govern
ments to join the vague Austro-Prussian Treaty of
April ; but the Note was also intended to express the
unanimous views of the various Governments on the
pending question.
Berlin was at first inclined to look with contempt
on the Bamberg Assembly and its Note, but it was
soon perceived that it contained an offer of support
which would be very acceptable to Prussia, and a few
months later Pfordten and I were welcome guests at
Berlin. If Vienna received the Note in a cool, though
not unfriendly, manner, it aroused in England, on the
contrary, the greatest anger, and Lord Clarendon, the
Foreign Secretary, thought it well to give vent to his
feelings in a despatch that was sent only to Dresden,
not to the other Governments represented at Bamberg.
I lost no time in rebutting this attack, which I
considered an unjustifiable interference in the internal
affairs of the German Confederation, by a despatch
to the Saxon Ambassador in London.*
This despatch was received with joy by my
Bamberg colleagues; but it was not well received
by the German press, owing to the sympathy which
* See Appendix (A).

THE CRIMEAN WAR 135
at that time prevailed for the Western Powers.
Prince Gortschakoff, then Ambassador at Vienna,
abundantly praised what he called a ' chef d'ceuvre de
fine ironie,' not dreaming that I would give him a
second edition of it five years later when he attempted
to dictate to the German Governments how they
should behave during the Italian War.
The opinion of the Prussian Ambassador at the
Bundestag, Herr von Bismarck, on this subject is
not without interest. In the supplementary fourth
volume of Poschinger's 'Preussen am Bundestag,'
there is a letter from Herr von Bismarck to the
Minister von Manteuffel, in which he says : ' Have
you read Beust's London despatch ? It is very
well written, and would be still better if Saxony were
stronger.' Passing over the touch of malice in these
words, one perceives in them the utter lack of appre
ciation of what the Confederation should and could
have been. The Note was not the answer of the
Saxon Government as such, but the rejection of the
unwarrantable interference of a Foreign State in the
affairs of the Confederation, which the Minister of
' little Saxony ' was bound to express, as the
Foreign Government in question had addressed itself
exclusively to him. Whether Saxony was large or
small was of no consequence. But the more reason
have I to value the circumstance that my despatch
had the honour of being printed in the fourth volume
of Poschinger's work, although Saxony has not in
creased in size since it was written.

CHAPTER XIV
1854-1856
CONTINUATION OP THE CRIMEAN WAR.  AN EXPLANATION.  AUSTRIA
ON THE VERGE OF WAR.  THE SECRET DESPATCH OF JANUARY. —
GASTEIN AND COUNT BUOL.  MY FIRST MEETING WITH NAPOLEON
III.  MY CORRESPONDENCE WITH COUNT NESSELRODE.  MISSION OF
BARON SEEBACH TO ST. PETERSBURG.  THE PEACE OF PARIS.
It is not my task to narrate the various episodes of
the Crimean War, which are still deeply impressed on
the minds of my contemporaries. But it may be of
interest to know the circumstances which gave me
opportunities of close observation, sometimes even of
influential action, and of insight into many less known
things. In the last respect what follows is not with
out value.
It is well known that the Turkish Declaration of
War and the appearance of the Western Powers on
the scene of hostilities took place after St Petersburg
had rejected the compromise formulated by the
Conference of Vienna, which was intended to open

CONTINUATION OF THE CRIMEAN WAR 137
an honourable retreat for Russia. The Emperor
Nicholas has been most severely reproached for this
rejection, but in reality he was not to blame. In a
former chapter I have mentioned my personal relations
with the Russian Imperial Chancellor, Count Nessel
rode. After his resignation, which closely followed
the Peace of Paris, he came again to Dresden, and we
frequently spoke of the past. He once told me that
the Emperor Nicholas was inclined to accept the
Vienna proposals, and that he (Nesselrode) had pre
vented him from doing so, as he considered them
derogatory to the imperial dignity. I do not think
that this revelation can injure the memory of that
statesman, for whom I had the highest esteem,
and who served two Emperors, Alexander I and
Nicholas, with signal merit. But as on the one hand
I do not limit my judgments, which I hope are always
impartial and accurate, so on the other I gladly seize
every opportunity of refuting unjust charges against
others. On the whole, public opinion has been unduly
prejudiced against the Emperor Nicholas. Whether
the present condition of Russia is the consequence
of his system of Government, or whether it is not
rather a proof that that system was necessary, is an
open question ; but it must not be forgotten, especially
in Austria, that he was a decided enemy of all
Panslavistic aspirations — which can unfortunately not
be said of his successor. He did not close his eyes to
the fact that a State governed by an absolute ruler
could not possibly encourage revolutionary agitation in
other countries without sowing its seeds in his own.
Alma and Inkerman had been fought ; Sebastopol

138 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
was still in the first stage of a siege which lasted a year.
It was at this time that the convention of December
between Austria and the Western Powers, which was
soon followed by the secret Austrian despatch of
January to the German Central States, was concluded.
Unfortunately it did not remain secret, for we find
it minutely discussed in the report of the Prussian
Ambassador at the Bundestag, Herr von Bismarck-
Schonhausen. It is sad to remember that Austria,
whose strongest weapon against Prussia's policy of ex
clusion was the rigid maintenance of the constitution of
the Bund, frequently violated it herself. That despatch
of the 14th of January 1855, signified a two-fold
departure from the constitution : first, because it
called upon certain German Governments to join in
an act of war contrary to their duties as members of
the Confederation ; and secondly, because they were
offered rewards for so doing at the expense of other
members of the Confederation. Austria would
scarcely have been inclined to cede to Bavaria a
portion of the Tyrol, or to Saxony a portion of
Bohemia, while neither Bavaria nor Saxony could
have been in a position to profit by the acquisition
of territory in Bessarabia or in Poland ; thus com
pensation would have had to be found in Germany
herself. I cannot sufficiently repeat that Austria
never rated at its true value the considerate feeling
entertained towards her by Frederick William IV,
and it was owing to that feeling that Prussia did
not derive greater advantage from the Viennese
despatch above referred to. The impression pro
duced by it in Government circles was lastino-.

AUSTRIA ON THE VERGE OF WAR 139
but unfortunately did not prevent Austria from
combining with Prussia some years later in the
Schleswig-Holstein affair, thereby again disre
garding the constitution of the Bund, and sealing
the doom of that body and her own.
It is worth mentioning that no German Govern
ment gave a detailed answer to the January despatch.
In Dresden the Austrian offers were decidedly but
politely rejected.
I endeavoured in the preceding chapter to prove
that Austria's best policy would have been to oppose
Russia by occupying the Daunbian Principalities
before the interference of the Western Powers ; or,
this step not having been taken, to pursue a policy of
neutrality jointly with Prussia and the Confederation.
This might easily have been done, considering the
views of Frederick William IV, without any arrange
ment with the Western Powers. Such a policy
would naturally and incontestably have given Austria
the leading part. Nor would it have excluded the
possibility of intervention if necessary. But it would
only have been of use, if it had been entered upon at
the right moment, and not after Austria had during a
whole year gradually departed from it and had daily
come nearer to the verge of war. If Austria had then
decided to take part in the war, its action would have
been more intelligible, and the January despatch
shows that such a decision was seriously contem-
platedf It is not uninteresting to read Bismarck's
despatches of that period. He had in view the
eventuality of an Austro-Russian War, and the
possibility of a Prusso-Russian Alliance. Of this

i4° MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
last scheme I say nothing ; but I do not think that
a constitutional appeal from Austria to the Confed
eration would have remained without effect.
Among the most marked characteristics of the
Emperor Francis Joseph is a never-failing unselfish
ness. I have on more than one occasion had proofs
of this both while I was Minister in Austria and
previously. That the Emperor refrained from using
his influence in a warlike sense during the Eastern
crisis, proves his great conscientiousness, for it can
scarcely be doubted that had he followed his personal
inclinations, Austria would undoubtedly have made
war. It was a great temptation for a young man
who was a thorough soldier, and who commanded an
efficient and victorious army.
The question of Austria taking part in the war
was soon after postponed, and it would only have be
come acute if Sebastopol had held out longer. Late
enough, in September 1855, Sebastopol was taken, and,
as chance would have it, it was through me that
Count Buol first got the news. The Minister of
Foreign Affairs had taken a holiday with his
colleague, Baron Bach, in the mountains, and had
given orders that no despatches should be forwarded
to him. We met in the evening in the little market-
town of Golling. I came from Gastein, and had read
there in the Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung the
news of the fall of Sebastopol. My intention was to
start early next morning, but Count Buol surprised
me at six o'clock with a protracted visit, which clearly
showed me once more the Austrian point of view. I
remember two remarkable statements which he made

MY FIRST MEETING WITH NAPOLEON III 141
during that interview. The first was that Austria
was already the possessor of the Danubian Princi
palities (she had them indeed in her possession, but
she had soon to give them up) ; the second was that
Austria would never wage war against France.
Soon after that meeting (it was in October 1855)
I went to Paris to see the first Paris Exhibition.
Minister von der Pfordten followed my example, and
we met there without previous appointment. At
St Cloud we had audiences ofthe Emperor Napoleon,
and were frequently invited to dinner.
I had seen the Emperor eight years before, as the
fugitive prisoner of Ham, under very different circum
stances in London. I remarked in a former chapter
that he was blackballed by three votes in an English
club in 1847, and that a year afterwards he received
six million votes. On this occasion also I was struck
by the contrast between the past and the present ;
my mind reverted to the evening when I saw Prince
Louis Napoleon at the house of the Duke of Beaufort
making fruitless attempts to be introduced to a Royal
Princess. The Emperor was in uniform, a costume
which never suited him, as he was very broad and his
legs were very short. Many disadvantages of his
personal appearance were compensated by his pleasing
voice, which always attracted me in later years, and
for the last time during his English exile after 1870.
After dinner at St Cloud I had a lengthy interview
with him while we were walking together up and
down the billiard room. On my way to Paris I had
stayed a few days at Frankfort, and had had an
interview with Baron Brunnow, Russian Ambassador

142 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
to the Bundestag. Brunnow, of whom I shall have
further occasion to speak, was Russian Ambassador in
London until the Crimean War, and he returned to
his post when peace was restored. I had known him
there when I was the Saxon Minister. He told me
that he had been instructed to the effect that his
Government would gladly make peace, but that
it would not pay a war indemnity or relinquish
territory. I was authorised to make use of this
statement, and the Emperor Napoleon assured me that
neither an indemnity nor cession of territory would
be demanded if Russia would concede the neutrality
of the Black Sea. As soon as I was back in Dresden,
I wrote a long letter to Count Nesselrode and urged
him to proceed in accordance with the French views.
I pointed out that Russia could give way with regard
to the Black Sea, as it was a demand so utterly
untenable that it would die a natural death, it being
against the nature of things to forbid an empire of
eighty million inhabitants to have ships of war in its
own waters. ' I am positive,' I added, ' that ten or
twelve years will not elapse before someone demands
the abolition of that article.' I did this myself.
Twelve years later, as Austrian Minister, I suggested
that the provisions of the Treaty of Paris relative to
the Black Sea should be abolished ; only as a compen
sation, it is true, and without conceding to Russia the
right of withdrawing from it of her own will.
The draft of my letter cannot unfortunately be
found in the Dresden Archives. But Nesselrode's
reply is still in existence, together with a letter written
by me to the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, Baron

CORRESPONDENCE WITH COUNT NESSELRODE 143
Budberg, and a second letter to Count Nesselrode.*
It will be seen that the reply, though detailed and
polite, declined to entertain my suggestion. Mean
while Vienna hit upon the idea, to my mind as
pernicious to Austria as to Russia, of proposing a
cession of territory in Bessarabia. Had this cession
been limited to the west bank of the Danube, the
plan might have been justified ; but this was not the
case, as it was a question of substituting an unnatural
frontier for the natural one formed by the river Pruth.
Nothing tended more seriously to aggravate the
bitterness and hostility of Russia than this proposal,
which Russia knew was not demanded by France or
England, and to which she had finally to yield.
An attentive perusal of Count Nesselrode's reply
to my letter will show how far Russia was from
desiring peace even after the fall of Sebastopol.
That she decided at last to accept the preliminaries of
peace as arranged by Paris, London, and Vienna, is
owing in no slight degree to the efforts of ' little
Saxony.' At the express desire of Napoleon III,
Baron Seebach, then Saxon Ambassador in Paris, and
son-in-law of Count Nesselrode, was sent to St
Petersburg to use his influence with the latter.
It was generally acknowledged in those days that
his mission was a decided success. With it, my share
in the negotiations resulting from the Crimean War
came to an end. That the negotiators of the Peace of
Paris soared to a height which I could not attain,
caused me no regret. That peace will be regarded in
the annals of diplomacy as a masterly example of how
* See Appendix (B).

144 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
to reverse the effects of a war and obtain in the future
the very opposite of what a Treaty is intended to secure.
One of the most active promoters of the Treaty,
the French Ambassador in Vienna, Baron Bourqueney,
visited me on his return to the Austrian capital, and
expressed his satisfaction in the following curious
remark: 'Quand vous lisez ce Traite, vous vous
demandez, quel est le vaincu, quel est le vainqueur ? '
He was quite right. Whoever reads the Treaty
of Paris without a knowledge of the events that
preceded it, can only arrive at the conclusion that
Russia was as victorious as the Western Powers, and
that Turkey had repulsed the Russian attack of her
own accord and without assistance. This may be
praised as generosity, but from a political point of
view it was a great blunder. After omitting to secure
from Turkey, in return for the help given her, reforms
alleviating the lot of the Christians under Turkish
rule — instead of being satisfied with the mere gracious
promise of the Sultan in this respect — the signatory
Powers should at least have taken steps to secure the
execution of their benevolent intentions. But the
very peculiarity of this Treaty consisted in the fact
that all parties acknowledged the maintenance of the
Ottoman Empire as an European necessity, and
guaranteed its territory (France, England, and
Austria even doing so in special treaties) ; but that
at the same time they all agreed not to interfere with
the internal administration of that empire. The inevit
able consequence was that when one of the signatory
Powers threatened the existence of Turkey in 1877,
the others did nothing, or rather could do nothing,-

i i

THE PEACE OF PARIS 145
for its defence. The conduct of Turkey herself pre
vented their intervention : she had not kept her
promises to her Christian subjects, and she had
suspended the payment of the interest on her
European loans. It would have been otherwise if
the Powers had adopted the suggestion I made as
Austrian Minister in 1867 for the revision of the
Treaty of Paris in the sense of a European control
over Turkey. The second part of my Memoirs enters
more into detail on this subject.
If I have a neighbour, and I am anxious that his
property should not fall into other hands, I may
pledge myself to defend him ; but in that case it
would be monstrous that I should be denied the right
of examining his affairs, and that he should be free to
manage exactly as he liked. This, however, was the
result of the notorious Ninth Article of the Treaty of
Paris. It was a result that nobody expected, and
that everybody could have foreseen. All the
Powers except Russia observed the Ninth Article
conscientiously, while Russia, who had a thousand
means of evading it, pursued her intrigues with even
less difficulty than before.

vol. 1

CHAPTER XV
1856-1858
YEARS OF POLITICAL TRANQUILLITY.  FESTIVITIES AT COURT, IN DIPLO
MATIC CIRCLES, AND AT MY HOUSE.  ILLUSTRIOUS VISITORS AT
DRESDEN.  ILLNESS OF FREDERICK WILLIAM IV.  DEATH OF THE
MINISTER ZSCHINSKI.  RESTORATION OF THE ALBRECHTSBURG. —
MOURNING IN THE ROYAL FAMILY.
The only good effect produced by the Peace of Paris,
as by all other European Treaties of Peace, was that
condition of mind which the French term ' la ddtente.'
This refreshing pause, which, alas ! was not of long
duration, made itself felt in German affairs by
producing a cooler political temperature. The calm
surface was somewhat ruffled by the Neufchatel
conflict, but this was only a transient disturbance.
Society at Dresden was at that time very brilliant.
A number of foreign families of the highest position
had come to the Saxon Capital, and the Diplomatic
Corps had acquired two members whose birth, educa
tion, and fortune made them perfect representatives of

FESTIVITIES AT COURT 147
great Courts — Count Heinrich Redern, the envoy of
Russia, and Prince Richard Metternich, the repre
sentative of Austria. Splendid balls were given at
Court on the occasion of the marriage, at the close
of 1856, of two of the King's daughters: Princess
Margaret to the Archduke Carl Ludwig, and Princess
Anne to the Hereditary Grand Duke of Tuscany.
These balls were followed by others at my house, at
Prince Metternich's, and at the residence of Prince
Corsini, the envoy extraordinary of Tuscany. The
latter made a deep impression upon me. A
' grand seigneur ' from head to foot, he was the very
ideal of an envoy. The ball he gave in the rooms
of the ' Harmonie-Gesellschaft' was magnificent,
but the bill was extravagant. He paid it at once,
saying ' Mon cher, vous^m'avez royalement e"corche" ;
je vous fais cadeau de cette e"pingle.' And thereupon
he gave the man a valuable scarf-pin. Prince Corsini
was a man of delightful manners, and I must not
forget to mention that he was one of the few who
remained faithful to the Grand-Duke in 1859.
In those days of political' repose and animated
social life I will not be considered frivolous for
thinking that the time was suited for giving a fancy
ball. I succeeded in getting together three hundred
people in fancy costumes — no slight achievement for a
town of the size of Dresden. My particular object in
giving this fete was that money should circulate. It
was completely attained, and the people were grateful
to me for it. King John said when I asked him for
the honour of his presence : ' I suppose I must appear
as Augustus III,' an allusion to Count Briihl, to

148 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
whom I do not think I deserved to be compared. Of
course the King, as well as the Crown Prince,
appeared in uniform. Prince George made a
great sensation by representing the Czar in the
principal scene, ' Peter the Great at Saardam.' The
last scene was a French Mission at Constantinople
in the time of Louis XV. I was the Ambassador,
Princess Metternich the Ambassadress, and the
Sultan was represented by Count Edmund Zichy, a
personage well-known to my Austrian readers. He
was then in the prime of his manly beauty ; his fair
beard showed no streaks of silver, and his family
diamonds looked magnificent with the old Turkish
costume. In a speech which I addressed to the
Sultan, I was guilty of making some bold allusions
to the Peace of Paris, and the King said to the
French Ambassador : ' Demain je m'attendrai a une
note.' But the latter, Baron Rouen, a sincere and
valued friend of mine, took my pleasantries in good
part, and certainly did not report to his Government
the following words which I remember using in my
address to the Sultan : ' Nous garantissons l'ind^-
pendance de la Porte, afin de pouvoir un jour vous y
mettre.' In that same year, 1857, Dresden had many
illustrious visitors. The Emperor Alexander came
there from Weimar accompanied by Prince Gort
schakoff. The Emperor Francis Joseph also came
from Weimar, where he had met the Czar, and he
witnessed the manoeuvres of the Saxon troops, which
formed the ninth Corps d'Armde of the Confederation
in conjunction with those of the Electorate of Hesse

ILLNESS OF FREDERICK WILLIAM IV 149
and the Duchy of Nassau — a circumstance that also
brought the Elector of Hesse and the Duke of
Nassau to the manoeuvres. Shortly before, Frederick
William IV paid his last visit to Pillnitz. He became
ill after his return to Berlin, and never recovered.
I now return to the book of Dr Busch, which I
value for its quotations ; but this time with less
gratitude. ' Our Chancellor ' makes the following
statement about the Congress of Sovereigns at
Frankfort and the Baden interview between King
William and the King of Saxony, who had proceeded
to Baden at the desire of the assembled Princes :
' The King of Saxony, a man of great talents, and
much esteemed by King William, endeavoured with
the assistance of Herr von Beust so zealously and
persistently to induce the King to go to Frankfort,
that much anxiety was caused by the effect this
produced on the nerves of King William, who was
then in a very delicate state. Herr von Bismarck is
said to have warmly reproached the Saxon Minister-
President on this subject, to have reminded him
under what circumstances Frederick William IV
returned from his last visit to Dresden with the
seeds of the illness which afterwards proved fatal,
and to have earnestly urged him to spare the King
and consider his health.'
I remember once having read that in former times,
when the Italian cuisine left more to be desired
than it does now, it sometimes happened that snakes
were served at table instead of eels (but without
deceiving the guests) under the name of ' Anguilla
del bosco.' Here, too, we are served with ' a snake in

IS© MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
the grass.' The passage I have quoted necessarily
implies that Frederick William IV was ill and nervous
during his last visit at Dresden, like his successor at
Baden. Now the visit at Dresden, which was limited
to a dinner at Pillnitz, took place at a time when there
was not the slightest discussion going on between
Dresden and Berlin. I myself was not present at all,
being on leave at Lindau : and the relations between
the two royal brothers-in-law were so cordial, and so
remote from any cause of quarrel, that any agitation
injurious to health could not have arisen. As little
could the dinner at Pillnitz have sown the seeds of
the mortal illness which developed itself soon after
in the form of insanity. If anything injured Frederick
William, it was the rapid journey to Vienna which
he made immediately after taking the waters at
Marienbad — a most imprudent proceeding that caused
him a serious indisposition when he arrived at
Pillnitz. The remaining part of Herr Busch's account of the
Baden interview I shall elucidate when I come to the
year 1863. He takes refuge behind the expression:
' said to have.' A conscientious historian does not
deal with what persons are said to have done, but
with what they really did. In another passage he
mentions the saying recorded by Temme in his
' Reminiscences ' as having been uttered by Bismarck
in the Landtag of 1850 about his fellow Deputies:
' They are too stupid.' He says he asked the
Prince as to the truth of the story, and that he
was told in reply that it was quite unfounded. It
would have been worth while to make a similar

ILLNESS OF FREDERICK WILLIAM IV 151
enquiry in this case ; the reply would have been the
same. I have but little to record of the year 1858. In
Saxony, according to the Constitution, the Landtag
met every three years, and not annually as before ;
but owing to the length of the session and the meet
ing of extraordinary Landtags, the interval between
the sessions was not much more than a year. The
Landtag of 1858 was very quiet, but that of 1861
showed the influence of the Italian War and of the
' National- Verein.' In the Landtag of 1858 the
Government obtained from the Chambers a concession
of particular value to the Royal House. There was
a question of erecting new buildings for the celebrated
factory of Meissen porcelain which had hitherto been
located in the Albrechtsburg, and the removal of
which was essential for the proper restoration of that
ancient castle. I allude to this because it gives me
the opportunity of mentioning an occurrence which
throws some light on the King's political opinions.
On the day when I had to speak in the Chamber, I
was attacked with a troublesome cough ; and in order
to get rid of it as quickly as possible, I took some
brandy before beginning my speech. This had at
once the desired effect ; I was enabled to speak for a
considerable period, and I carried the demand of the
Government against the motion of the Committee
which proposed to grant a smaller sum. Some hours
later, however, my cough became so much worse that I
was confined to my bed in my villa at Laubegast, which
was almost opposite to Pillnitz. The King visited
me, and spoke with satisfaction of the issue of the

152 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
debate, adding that a condition had been imposed that
no Catholic religious services should be held in the
Castle, and that he would agree to this for the
sake of religious peace. I protested against his yield
ing to so unreasonable a demand. ' Your Majesty,' I
said, ' cannot possibly submit to be deprived of a right
which all your subjects enjoy so long as they comply
with legal regulations.' And that was the sovereign
who was decried as a ' Jesuit ' !
As I continued to be unwell, I proceeded to
Gastein, which again proved its beneficial qualities.
I there met the Archduke John, whom I had last
seen in 1832, when he presided over the table d'
hote of the old ' Straubinger Hiitte.' Soon after my
return to Dresden, my colleague Zschinski died. Hisv
portfolio of Justice was transferred by the King to
the Minister of Finance, Behr, with a diploma of
nobility. The Finances were entrusted to the late
Minister of the Interior, Baron von Friesen, to whose
appointment, on being asked my opinion, I heartily
agreed. In the meantime the Royal Family had suffered
a heavy loss, which was destined not to be the only
one. The Archduchess Margaret died in the flower
of her youth at Monza, and on leaving Gastein I was
present at the sad but deeply impressive ceremony
of her interment in the vault of the Church of the
Capuchins in Vienna. The following year witnessed
the death of the Hereditary Grand Duchess of Tus
cany, who was married almost at the same time as
her Austrian sister; then that of the Princess Sidonie;
and finally that of her youngest sister, the Princess

MOURNING IN THE ROYAL FAMILY 153
Sophia, who was married to the Duke Charles
Theodore of Bavaria. I could not but admire the
King's religious resignation and undiminished atten
tion to his royal duties, in the midst of the inex
pressible grief he felt at the loss of so many who were
dear to him.

CHAPTER XVI
1859
THE ITALLAN WAR.  MY MISSIONS TO BERLIN, MUNICH, KARLSRUHE,
PARIS, LONDON, AND FRANKFORT.
The inevitable fruits of the Treaty of Paris,* which
turned that which should have resulted from the
Crimean War — the improvement of the internal
condition of Turkey and the inviolability of the
Ottoman Empire — into the exact reverse, only reached
full maturity in 1877, but it did not require nearly so
long a period to show Austria what had been attained
by Count Buol's Eastern policy. A deeply-wounded
and now watchful Russia, a pampered and now insolent
Piedmont, a flattered and now dangerous France, a
half-gained and now hesitating England, a neglected
and now aspiring Prussia ; such was the constellation
in the Austrian sky two years after the Peace of
Paris.
* Mr Gladstone one day said to me : ' The Crimean War was a great mistake.'
' Not in the least,' I replied, 'but the Treaty of Paris was a great blunder.'

THE ITALIAN WAR

i55

Meanwhile the Concordat had been concluded.
Count Buol was indeed less responsible for it than
anyone else ; but it was a bad card in his game, as it
placed a dangerous weapon in the hands of Austria's
enemies in Italy and Germany.
And yet the game would not have been such a
very bad one — I am speaking of politics, not of
military affairs — had there not been lamentable sins
of commission and omission.
Not having a full knowledge of the negotiations
carried on at Vienna, I do not wish to pass a precipi
tate judgment on the history of the events preceding
the Italian War. It is my private conviction that if
Vienna had been at the proper time more energetic
and decided, she could have come to an arrangement
with Turin as well as with Paris, and to a timely
agreement with Prussia and the German Confedera
tion. But she preferred a sulking policy, as useless
to her as it was welcome to her enemies, and she
looked upon the assistance of the Confederation as a
matter of course. The attitude of Cavour at the
Congress of Paris had been a sufficient warning to
its Austrian members ; and how much Vienna was
alarmed even in 1857, is proved by the following
circumstance : In that year King John paid a visit to
his daughter, the Duchess of Genoa, at Stresa on the
Lago Maggiore, and I followed him, having urgent
affairs to transact. Cavour, with whom I had corre
sponded on business without knowing him personally,
wished to speak to me, and indirectly proposed a
rendezvous at Arona. I thought it wise to sound
Vienna first, and the reply expressed such horror at

156 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
the idea that I thought it more prudent to decline
the interview. Thus was I deprived of what would
have been a most interesting reminiscence.
Useless and yet ominous bickerings between
France and Austria continued until after the
celebrated New Year's reception at the Tuileries. I
have never understood how that event could have
been glossed over. The position of Austria in 1866
after the battle of Koniggratz was certainly less
powerful than her position in 1859 before the battle
of Solferino ; but if an Ambassador serving under me
had been subjected to such an insult he would not
have stayed another day at his post.* Of course he
would not have been entirely withdrawn, only called
away on leave. None of the neutral Powers could
have looked upon such a proceeding as an aggression ;
but it would certainly have strengthened the feeling
prevalent in Germany in favour of Austria and against
Napoleon III as the disturber of peace. Those who
care to take the trouble of convincing themselves that
such a feeling existed, may find it expressed in almost
all the German papers of that period.
As I have already said, so far as the history of the
events preceding the Italian War is concerned, I can
only speak of my own impressions at the time, and I
am willing to be corrected if I am in error. The sins of
commission and omission to which I have referred,
however, are undoubted historical facts.
As in the Crimean, so also in the Italian War, I
* Everyone will now perceive that Europe unnecessarily bore much from
Napoleon UT that she had been compelled to bear from Napoleon I. Thus no
notice was taken of the words spoken by the Emperor after the Italian War to the
Diplomatic Corps : ' L'Europe a ete injuste envers moi.1

MY MISSIONS TO BERLIN, ETC. 157
was less remote from events than my German col
leagues ; and if I cannot boast of my efforts having
been attended with success, it will at least be acknow
ledged that I stood up boldly for Austria, in accordance
with the will of my royal master and the current of
public opinion in Germany, which however did not
survive the battle of Solferino. The reader can
convince himself of what I say by my reports from
Paris, London, and Frankfort, written in April 1859.
Copies of them were given me without reserve in
1871 by my successor in Dresden, Baron Friesen,*
and I think they are not without interest.
Early in 1859 the King's second son, Prince George
of Saxony, was engaged to be married to Princess
Maria of Portugal. The marriage was to take place
at Lisbon in the spring, but it was to be preceded by
an official courtship.
The King, wishing to give me an interesting
holiday, confided this mission to me. It was origin
ally intended that I should embark with the Prince
(who had been staying at Florence), at Leghorn, and
travel through the South of Spain to the Portuguese
capital. The approaching crisis having altered my
plans, I preferred passing through Paris and then
going by sea ; and I did not hesitate any longer when
a Congress of the Powers was proposed. I never
dreamt that Austria could decline the Congress, or,
which amounted to the same thing, frustrate it by
requiring that Piedmont should disarm without
addressing a similar demand to the other powers.
* The private reports, being practically a continuation of the narrative, are placed
at the end of this chapter. An official despatch from Dresden of this period is
included with other historical documents in the Appendix (C )

158 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
That was a sin of commission. The programme ex
pressly stipulated that existing possession of territory
should be maintained. But the excitement in Italy
was so great that neither Victor Emmanuel nor
Cavour had it in his power to prevent an explosion.
In that case Europe, and not Austria only, would
have had to intervene against the Revolution. All
that Vienna would have had to contribute was the
garrisons in the Papal States. And it was to this
that Austria preferred war.
Before going to Paris, I went, in pursuance of
the King's directions, to Berlin, where I saw the
Prince of Prussia for the first time after his appoint
ment as Regent. It was at the beginning of the new
era, and although that era was not at all favour
able to Austria, and could not have been so in any
respect, my general impressions of the situation were
satisfactory. The Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmar-
ingen, then President of the Council of Ministers,
declared, in the most decided manner, that there was
no intention of burthening the country with untimely
preparations for war, but that Austria would not be
abandoned. In a letter written by the Prince in reply
to the King of Saxony's congratulations on the mar
riage of the hereditary Prince, and of which I have a
copy in my possession, he says: 'I was much interested
in becoming more closely acquainted with Herr von
Beust. We agreed in almost all our views, wishes and
hopes, and if there have been some slight differences of
opinion between us, they did not apply to the modes
of action, but to the moment of action.' The Prince
Regent said that so long as it was only a question of

MY MISSIONS TO BERLIN, ETC. 159
attacking Sardinia, Prussia would have no occasion to
interfere ; but that things would assume a different
aspect if France were to take part in the contest. He
further remarked that Prussia had hitherto had no
occasion to complain of France ; he did not say this,
however, as if he meant for that reason to refuse
the assistance of Prussia to Austria, but gave me to
understand that it would be given in any case. Count
Schleinitz, who looked at me significantly when I met
him in the corridors of the royal palace, though
amiable as ever, spoke with much more reserve about
the matter.
The death of my mother-in-law at Munich was
the cause of my going first to that city, instead of
proceeding straight to Paris. King Maximilian
granted me a lengthy audience. He did not,
much to my surprise, show himself very enthusiastic
for the Austrian cause ; and he asked me to do
my best to prevent ' that stupid war.' About this
time Pfordten, owing to internal complications, had
resigned, and his successor had not yet entered on
his duties, the consequences of which was an inaction
very injurious to Austria. In all but Court circles
Munich was dominated by an unbounded hatred of
the French.* In Stuttgart I took my old friend,
Minister Baron Hiigel, into my compartment in the
train, and at Karlsruhe I had a conference with him,
with Dalwigk, who had come from Frankfort, and
* I saw after my arrival in Paris an old Munich friend, Count (afterwards Duke),
von Tascher, who had attained the highest honours in his character of Frenchman
and relative to the Imperial Family, but had still remained a thorough Bavarian.
'We Bavarians,' he said tome, 'will not bear anything from the cursed French,
neither will we French bear anything from the infernal Bavarians.'

160 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
with the Baden Minister, Baron Meysenbug. When
in later years I read and heard so much of Dalwigk's
' Rheinbiindelei,' * my mind always reverted to that
conference, in which my usuaUy prudent Darmstadt
colleague preached a crusade against the French with
extraordinary warmth and confidence of success. He
foresaw only one difficulty : who should have Alsace.
It was while this conference was going on that we
received news from Vienna that an ultimatum had
been sent to Turin. That was the second sin of
commission. France now had the satisfaction of
finding Sardinia the threatened instead of the threat
ening party, and Prussia that of finding Austria in
a position of attack instead of in one of defence.
And nevertheless — it is scarcely credible, yet I
remember it as if it were yesterday — I found on
arriving in Paris the next day that the temper of
that city was far from being cheerful or confident.
The pubhc was still under the impression that the
Emperor's policy after Orsini's attempt had placed the
country before the alternative of a dangerous war or
a disgraceful retreat. The lower classes understood
the question very imperfectly. A person who had
been present at the Lyons railway station at the
departure of some troops whose friends came to bid
them farewell and to make them presents of wine and
eatables, told me that the soldiers in the train
exclaimed: 'Allons donner une bonne raclee a tous ces
Italiens.' I am not saying too much when I assert that I
began to regret this audience, which had been arranged
* See note on page 107.

MY MISSIONS TO BERLIN, ETC. 161
for me by the Saxon Ambassador at the Tuileries :
not because of the difficulty of the task before me,
but because it is not pleasant to visit a house where
your host will probably not be in a good humour.
When I returned to my hotel, I immediately sent
off a detailed account of the audience ; and I think
that document will interest my readers as much as
the correspondence from London, Berlin and Frankfort.
The originals are in the Dresden Archives. As I
have already mentioned, my successor had copies
made of them, placing them without reserve at my
disposal during the short stay I made at Dresden in
1871 after my resignation. I have of course not
changed a word in them.
I indulge in the hope that my impartial reader
will draw three conclusions from this correspondence :
first, that I gave advice to Vienna which was
rejected, as on previous and later occasions, although
subsequent events proved it to be good ; secondly,
that I zealously endeavoured to obtain for Austria
the assistance of Prussia and of the Confederation,
without ignoring the consideration due to Prussia ;
and thirdly, that that consideration was unfortunately
not as scrupulously observed by Vienna as it should
have been. It is true, indeed, and several passages
in the correspondence prove it, that the attitude of
Prussia towards the Italian War was never very
friendly for Austria or the Confederation ; but the
surprise prepared for Prussia by the ultimatum,
which was totally unexpected at Berlin after the
explanations of the Archduke Albrecht and Prince
Windischgratz, was as little calculated t© gain the
VOL. I L

1 62 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
favour of Prussia as the language of the Viennese
despatches. I beg the reader to remember what I
said as to Bismarck's reports from the Bundestag.
His charge of Austria's illegal oppression of the
German States was unfounded ; but what was true,
and caused her immense damage, was the domineering
tone of her despatches. The same was the case
before the Italian War. She considered it Germany's
evident duty — a duty the fulfilment of which did not
demand her thanks — to follow her standard. On my
way to London I visited King Leopold I at Laeken,
and our conversation turned on this subject. ' Yes,'
he said, 'it is always so : Leopold and Sobieski.'*
Of course after the war broke out, there was no
further question of Lisbon.! I gave up the idea of
continuing my journey to London, chiefly in con
sequence of an interview I had with Lord Cowley,
then Ambassador in Paris, who dissuaded me from it ;
but when I returned to Frankfort I found there a letter
from the King, instructing me to consider whether I
should go to London or not after all. I talked the
matter over with Count Rechberg, then Presiding
Ambassador at the Bundestag, and by his advice I
proceeded to London.
I have a few words to add to the details given in
my reports on that visit, which will be found at the
end of this chapter.
I saw Prince Albert for the last time, and found
him, although opposed to the policy of the Cabinet of
Vienna, far more on the side of Austria than on that
* An allusion to the ingratitude which the Emperor Leopold showed to Sobieski
after the liberation of Vienna.
t See page 157.

MY MISSIONS TO BERLIN, ETC. 163
of France. The same may be said of the Duke of
Coburg, who was then in London. My audience of
the Queen gave me the opportunity of making an
interesting acquaintance. It was that of Marshal
Pelissier, Due de Malakoff, who had come to present
his letter of recall as Ambassador, and whom I met in
the anteroom at the Palace. He was a true soldier,
and his ignorance of the ways of a Court was
very amusing. Queen Victoria likes fresh air, a
circumstance sometimes very trying to the ladies who
have to appear in low dresses at the drawing-rooms
held in the month of March. When Marshal Pelissier
was dining one day with the Queen, next to whom he
was seated, he saw the windows open, and thinking of
the rheumatism he had contracted in several cam
paigns, he said to the attendants : ' Fermez les
fen^tres ! ' The Queen laughed, and repeated the
order in English. Even later on, when I was
Ambassador in London, similar stories were current
of his independent ways. The Queen excused the
roughness of the old soldier, and I saw tears in his
eyes when he came out from his farewell audience.
Of course our conversation turned on the war that
had broken out. He said : ' Voyez-vous, je n'aime
pas la domination Tudesque,' — to which I replied,
' Comme nous n'aimons pas la domination Gauloise.'
Lord Derby, father of the present Earl, was then
First Lord of the Treasury ; and Lord Malmesbury
was Foreign Secretary. I found both very reluctant
to make any decided statement of policy, and Lord
Derby called the fatal ultimatum a 'criminal enter
prise.' One day, after dining with the Queen, Lord

1 64 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
Malmesbury agreeably surprised me by saying that
the time had come for a corps of observation to be
posted on the Rhine. I thanked him for his remark,
which I at once took down and lost no time in com
municating to the Prussian Ambassador. Count
Bernstorff was an old friend of mine — I afterwards
became his colleague in London — and he was entirely
on the side of Austria, and hostile to Italy. Thus
my communication to him was very natural, and it
was certainly not his intention that his report of
it to Berlin should result in orders being sent to
Sir Alexander Malet, the English envoy, on my
arrival at Frankfort, to give a denial to Lord
Malmesbury 's words in case they should be reported.
The Prussian Ambassador in Paris, Pourtales, to
whom I had said nothing about my interview with
the Emperor Napoleon, was also instructed to explain
away what I had said.
This reminds me of an amusing incident. When
I was Secretary of Legation in Paris, there were
several old Ambassadors in the French Capital who
had been there during the Consulate, the Empire, the
Restoration, and the July monarchy. One of them,
the Ambassador of the German Free Towns, had
managed to retain his post, in spite of his age and
deafness, until the second Republic and the second
Empire. I saw him in 1859. I spoke to him of my
interview with the Emperor, and urged upon him,
in the most eloquent terms I could use, the advis
ability of the German envoys in Paris speaking out
firmly and fearlessly. He listened attentively and
seemed to understand ; but when I had concluded, he

CORRESPONDENCE 165
said : ' The Emperor will not hurt us, if we keep
quiet.' Letters to the Saxon Minister, Herr von Konneritz,
at Vienna.
(translation from the German)
Dresden, 8th April 1859.
Private
******* I cannot conceal from you that my task in Berlin
has not been made easier by the recent explanations
and letters of the Cabinet of Vienna, and I think
their utility in the interest of Austria very doubtful.
I had not expected that the idea of the Congress
would be immediately entertained, and from the first
I was prepared for very precise reservations. But I
ask whether it was advisable at once so categorically
to demand the disarmament of Sardinia, however
justifiable such a demand may be from the point of view
of law and convenience ? I ask above all : what is
the material injury done by the actual state of
Sardinia ? what could be the material advantage of
her disarming ? According to trustworthy intel
ligence everything is ready at Turin, and Cavour is
already applying to Paris for money ; why, therefore,
not let the bankruptcy become complete ? If the
Sardinians are forced to attack, nothing could be more
agreeable to Austria. And if Sardinia disarms, can
Austria save a florin on her preparations ? No.
There is only one explanation of this demand : —
Austria wishes to avoid a Congress. That is intelli
gible, but Austria is playing a dangerous game.
Public opinion in Germany, even if it should bear
the test, is worth a good deal, but not everything,
and I think Austria should do her utmost to avoid

166 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
beginning the war in a state of isolation. Our new
English Ambassador, Paget, a man of very moderate
and correct judgment, said to me yesterday : ' Si
1' Autriche insiste, elle est perdue.' That is a very
strong expression, but even if large deductions are
made from it, a great deal still remains. One thing
must be taken into consideration. What is to be done
with the Sardinian gang ? After the Congress, the
Lombards, Neapolitans, etc., can either be amnestied
or punished, or shipped off safely to America. But
noiv f And to keep the Sardinian gang within bounds
regular troops are necessary, But if it be urged that
Austria cannot trust the Congress or the Powers who
will be represented in it unless they begin by disarm
ing Sardinia, it may, from a purely practical point of
view, be objected that if a footing of peace is restored,
there will be no further work for the Congress to do.
Compare the Dresden Conferences.
It appears to me that the Austrian demand would
have far more effect if Austria were to declare that
her attitude at the Congress would depend on the
fulfilment of her legitimate wishes. Thus she would
assert her position without placing the other Powers
in the dilemma which annoys them so much.
Prince Metternich showed me yesterday a despatch
to Herr von Koller at Berlin ; it is very well written,
but will cause great anger to the Prussian Cabinet ; his
witticism about ' ill-humour ' will be strongly resented,
and I fear the same will be the result of his lesson on
political decorum.
Pray communicate these my private views to
Count von Buol as soon as possible, that he may not
believe that I acquired them in Berlin. (Signed) Beust.

CORRESPONDENCE 167
Private Dresden, Wth April 1859.
I returned late last night from Berlin, where I
went through a great deal in a short time. I write
only a few lines in haste to say that I came away very
satisfied. Since nine o'clock I have been for two hours with
the Prince of Hohenzollern, then at twelve with
Schleinitz, and at two I was received by the Regent.
When I entered the audience chamber, the two others
came out.
The Prince's expressions were very gratifying. I
will not ascribe any merit to myself, but I must say
that I have at least not done any harm. You may
assure them at Vienna that the disposition is now
favourable, but it would be advisable to spare the
feelings of Europe in their despatches. I have tried
to bring the feeling at Berlin into harmony with the
position of the Bund, laying full stress on the fact
that all the German Governments, including the
Bavarian, recognise their policy, duty and existence
in the Bund alone ; and that therefore, without being
untrue to themselves, they cannot do otherwise than
insist upon a definite attitude of the Bund in crises of
this kind ; that, therefore, there was no question of
domineering over Prussia by a majority, but only a
desire to maintain the Bund, Prussia having only to
take the initiative in order to avoid every appearance
of the pressure of ' formalism ' — as people now say at
Berlin. The previous disarmament of Piedmont is con
sidered impossible, but Prussia is very much in favour
of the universal disarmament which was recently again
proposed by Austria.
After my conversation, Budberg received the

168 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
intelligence that Russia had proposed a Congress a
quatre. England is ostensibly much displeased with Austria,
but a favourable impression has been produced towards
her in the English Cabinet by the discovery of
Russia's great activity. Yours truly
(Signed) Beust.
Letter from Baron Beust describing his interview
with the Emperor Napoleon III before the
Italian War. Samedi, le 23 Avril 1849,
&3h
Je sors a l'instant de l'audience de l'Empereur, qui
a dure" juste une heure. M'dtant rendu aux Tuileries
en uniforme, je fus recu par l'Empereur dans Son
cabinet de travail. II se trouvait assis en redingote
a Son bureau, et commenga par me faire des excuses
de ne pas avoir mis d'uniforme, croyant qu'il s'agissait
d'une visite sans cdr^monie.
Sa Majeste" me dit ensuite : ' Au reste vous venez
en ennemi — pas personellement je l'espere.' —
L'Empereur m'ayant fait asseoir, engagea aussit6t la
conversation en abordant la question du jour ; et apres
avoir manifesto un vif regret de la tournure qu'avaient
pris les affaires pendant les derniers jours, II se mit a
me parler de I'Allemagne, et me lanca, tout en conser-
vant un ton d'exquise politesse dont du reste II ne
s'est pas departi un seul instant pendant toute la
conversation, la phrase que voici : ' II me semble,
permettez-moi de vous le dire, que les gouvernements
Allemands de second ordre se present dans tout ceci a
un r61e de dupe. J'ai ete" a meme de prendre con-
naissance de plusieurs pieces assez curieuses emanant
de personnes qui se trouvent en rapports intimes avec
les re"dacteurs de la Gazette d' Augsbourg et d'autres

CORRESPONDENCE 169
journaux AUemands ; il y ^tait dit en toutes lettres qu'on
ne poussait a ce mouvement que dans 1'espoir et meme
la certitude d'en finir cette fois avec les Souverainetds
Allemandes.' — 'Puisque Votre Majesty' — rejDondis-
je a mon tour — ' m'a si nettement dit Sa pensee, je
ne crains pas de Lui parler avec une entiere franchise,
et je crois m§me remplir un devoir envers Elle en y
mettant le moins de reserve possible.' Sur un signe
affirmatif de l'Empereur, je Lui donnai les expli
cations suivantes : ' Nous ne nous faisons aucune
illusion sur les mauvais elements qui entrent dans le
mouvement gendral des esprits en Allemagne, et il ne
faut pas s'^tonner que dans cette crise ils jouent leur
r61e comme ils le font chaque fois qu'il y a chance
d'exercer une pression quelconque sur les gouverne
ments. Mais ce serait tomber dans une grave erreur
que de chercher dans ces elements l'origine et la
principale explication du courant actuel de l'opinion
publique en Allemagne. Je Vous donne une grande
preuve de sincerity en commencant par dire que
l'Autriche en general n'a pas en Allemagne des
sympathies bien vives. Elles sont tres-prononcdes
dans les populations catholiques du midi, mais
dans le reste de 1' Allemagne, et surtout dans la
population protestante, les tendances politiques
et religieuses se trouvent plutdt aux prises avec le
gouvernement Autrichien. II n'en est que plus digne
de remarque que dans cette question Italienne
I'Allemagne a vu disparaitre pour la premiere fois
depuis longtemps toute scission et division de partis
devant la conscience d'une solidarity d'intdrSt entre
1' Allemagne et l'Autriche. Cette conviction a jete"
de si profondes racines que meme la question du
Concordat, qui dtait cependant faite pour operer une
puissante diversion, s'est trouvee completement

1 70 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
etouffea II est vrai de dire que cette solidarity
d'intdrSt ne date pas d'hier. Elle a ete" solennelle-
ment reconnue par les gouvernements en 1840 et au
debut de la guerre d'Orient. Mais ce qui alors ne se
faisait jour que dans le cercle retreci des regions
officielles, a ete compris cette fois-ci par les popula
tions. En Allemagne on ne reve pas des conquetes,
mais on tient a conserver ce qu'on a. Or il ne s agit
pas de donner la Lombardie a, l'Autriche, mais de se
rendre compte de 1'importance que l'Etat de possession
de l'Autriche en Italie a pour I'Allemagne au point
de vue militaire, politique et commercial. Et ceci on
l'a cornpietement compris. Malgre". cela il y aurait
lieu de s'dtonner de l'extreime passion que les AUe
mands, ordinairement si calmes, apportent dans cette
appreciation, et puisque j'ai promis a Votre Majeste"
une entiere franchise, je Lui en donnerai encore
l'explication. Eh bien, Sire, ne cherchez la cause de
cet entrain passionne que dans l'antipathie dont Votre
gouvernement est l'objet depuis que cette question
Italienne a surgi a l'horizon ; il Vous arrive ce qui est
arrive a l'Empereur Nicolas : on Vous considere et on
Vous juge comme ayant trouble" la se"curite" publique.
Ce sentiment etait trds-vif en Allemagne alors qu'il
ne s'agissait que d'une attaque contre 1'Empire
Ottoman. Jugez ce que cela doit dtre lorsqu'il s'agit
d'une menace dirigee contre un etat de la confedera
tion ; a c6te" des esprits turbulents il y a la grande
masse qui ne regie ses pensdes politiques que sur les
interets qui la touchent. Tous ces gens-la se disent
avec raison qu'une question Italienne tant qu'elle se
traiterait entre l'Autriche et les etats de la Peninsule
ne pourrait jamais 6tre de nature a compromettre le
repos de l'Europe. Ils se disent encore avec raison
que c'est l'inte>6t que la France y met de son cote et

CORRESPONDENCE 171
l'appui qu'elle pr6ta a un gouvernement Italien qui
s'est identifie avec la revolution qui est cause de la
perturbation generale. Des ce moment, Sire, tous les
partis ont du se tourner contre le gouvernement
imperial. Le parti conservateur, qui l'avait accepte
avec reconnaissance lorsque Vous aviez terrasse la
revolution, se trouve forcement sur le m6me plan que
le parti democratique, qui ne Vous l'a jamais pardonne.
Tout ceci doit prouver a, Votre Majeste que ceux qui
Lui paraissent des agitateurs, peuvent bien etre des
organes passionnes et excentriques du mouvement
actuel, mais qu'ils n'en sont nuUement les auteurs.'
L'Empereur paraissait ecouter ces explications avec
un calme parfait et, je puis le dire, y preter une
attention soutenue. II n'entreprit nuUement de les
refuter, et arriva par une brusque transition a l'article
de facte final du congres de Vienne, qui desinteresse
les Etats de la confederation dans les guerres qu'entre-
prendraient pour leur compte les deux grandes
puissances Allemandes. Cette observation me fournit
matiere a exposer a l'Empereur le vrai caractere de
la confederation, qui etait en effet nuUement agressif
et purement defensif, mais qui avait ete toujours et
surtout pendant la guerre d'Orient compris et
applique par les gouvernements dans la conception
la plus large. Je fis remarquer que pendant la guerre
d'Orient la confederation s'etait arrfitee dans l'appui
prete a l'Autriche du moment qu'il s'etait agi de
prendre part a une agression.
Cette fois-ci il n'y avait aucun doute — au contraire
— aussi bien pour les cabinets que pour les peuples
AUemands, qu'il n'etait pas question pour l'Autriche
de se lancer dans une guerre degression qu'elle avait
a soutenir, mais une guerre de defense.
' Vous connaissez les AUemands, Sire ; ils sont lent

172 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
a se fixer, mais une fois qu'ils se sont arrdtes a une idee
ils ne l'abandonnent pas facilement ; et aujourd'hui une
apparence m6me d'agression de la part de l'Autriche
ne changera rien a leur jugement.'
L'Empereur me dit alors : ' Mais on fera une
chose tres-simple, on s'engagera a respecter les
frontieres de la confederation.' — ¦' Permettez, Sire, de
Vous repondre que la confederation ne pourrait
jamais accepter un engagement que je dois supposer
lui 6tre offert a des conditions onereuses. Si les
frontieres etaient attaquees elle devrait les defendre, et
il est impossible que la France puisse calculer d'avance
jusqu'ou la guerre doit s'etendre et jusqu'oil elle
ne doit pas.' — ' Ainsi, Vous croyez une neutralite
impossible ? ' — ' Je le crois et le dis tres sincere-
ment. Nous ne desirons nuUement la guerre,
nous la croyons desastreuse pour tout le monde,
et les gouvernements sauront apporter toute la
moderation possible dans leurs actes. Ce qui se fait
aujourd'hui a la Diete n'a rien de provoquant ; les
mesures qu'on y prend sont prevues par les lois
fondamentales, mais si la guerre edate et qu'elle
s'engage entre la France et l'Autriche, il parait
impossible que 1'AUemagne n'y soit enveloppee. Je
suis le dernier a, suivre aveuglement le courant de
l'opinion publique ; j'ai montre a ce sujet assez d'inde-
pendance, mais nous devons compter avec le mouve
ment national; et lorsque ce mouvement, bien contraire-
ment aux tendances subversives qu'il a montre jusqu'ici,
ne demande que le soutien du premier Etat de la
confederation contre les dangers dont il est menace,
il y aurait folie a vouloir l'etouffer.' — L'Empereur
passa alors a la question Italienne elle-m6me, en
repetant plus ou moins les arguments de la brochure
Laguerroniere sur la necessite de regler les

CORRESPONDENCE 173
affaires de l'ltalie. II est inutile de rapporter cette
partie de notre entretien, oh de part et d'autre il n'y
avait qu'un echange de redites. Je ne saurais toute-
fois passer sous silence que l'Empereur deguisait assez
mal la pensee secrete de mettre fin a la domination
Autrichienne en Italie, qui ne pourrait 6tre soutenue
qu'avec 100,000 hommes en temps de paix, et con-
stituait un etat de choses insoutenable. Revenant
alors a la charge, l'Empereur me dit : ' II n'y a done
aucun moyen d'amadouer 1'AUemagne ? ' — ' Franche-
ment, Sire, je n'en vois pas d'autre que de la
desinteresser de la guerre qui est sur le point de
s'enflammer. ' — ' Mais savez-vous que l'attitude de
I'Allemagne commence a devenir inquietante pour
l'Europe, on ne peut plus faire un pas ni s'interesser a
une question quelconque sans la trouver sur son
chemin. D'un c6te vous menacez le Danemarc, et de
l'autre l'Autriche etend ses bras jusqu'a Naples ; et la,
encore vous 6tes avec elle.' — ' Permettez, Sire, '
dis-je en souriant, ' que je n'accepte pas cette position
brillante que Vous faites a, I'Allemagne. Le Holstein
est un pays AUemand, et la Diete doit ecouter ses
plaintes comme ceUes detous les autres pays AUemands.
Elle y a mis une moderation que je ne desapprouve
pas, mais qu'une grande partie de I'Allemagne lui
reproche. Quant a, Naples je peux Vous dire ceci :
si l'Autriche avait pese de tout le poids de ses
influences Italiennes sur ce pays-la,, elle aurait peut-
etre bien fait, mais je vous certifie qu'en Allemagne
personne n'y aurait vu un motif pour la confederation
de s'y associer.' Je dois ajouter que le long pre-
ambule dont l'Empereur faisait preceder cette derniere
sortie ne permettait pas de supposer de Sa part
une simple plaisanterie. L'Empereur me parla encore
beaucoup des questions d'actualite. II m'apprit le

i74 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
fait assez curieux qu'a I'heure qu'il est la sommation
n'etait pas encore arrivee a Turin. Je fus frappe de
l'extreme moderation que l'Empereur apporta dans
Son jugement sur la conduite de l'Autriche dans cette
derniere circonstance, et l'air presque indifferent dont
II parlait des protestations qu'elle avait provoquees.
Sa Majeste s'attacha seulement a, relever les embarras
que l'Autriche venait de creer au ministere Britannique,
qui etait reste dans I'ignorance la plus parfaite de
ce qu'on avait medite a Vienne. Je me permis
d'exprimer sous ce dernier rapport des doutes que
j'avais lieu de croire tres-fondes, car il me parait
au moins tres-certain qu'a, la suite de la mission de
Lord Cowley le ministere Anglais devait connaitre
assez la position avancee du gouvernement Autrichien
pour mesurer 1'etendue des moyens qui etaient
necessaires pour empecher une resolution precipitee,
et que l'Empereur fut assez juste pour reconnaitre
sans que j'y eusse fait allusion, que les discours des
ministres Anglais avaient ete faits pour encourager
l'Autriche a entrer dans la voie oil elle venait de
s'engager. En general, je dois relever comme un fait
curieux que, somme toute, l'Empereur eut presque
plus de blame pour les oscillations de l'Angleterre, que
pour les actes du gouvernement Autrichien pendant
cette derniere phase.
L'Empereur, avant de me congedier, s'informa avec
beaucoup d'interet de la sante du Roi, et m'exprima
de nouveau toute la part qu'il avait prise a, la dou-
loureuse perte eprouvee par la famille Royale. II me
serra enfin cordialement la main en me disant qu'il
esperait me revoir, et non en ennemi.

CORRESPONDENCE 175
Letters to His Excellency the Minister of State.
Herr von Falkenstein, in Dresden.
(translation from the German).
Private. Paris, 2ith April 1859.
Your Excellency's obliging despatch of the 19th
inst. was handed to me the day before yesterday
in the evening, and I beg to thank you for it.
You will meanwhile have become acquainted
with my report from Munich to his Majesty the
King, and have received a private letter from
Karlsruhe. I had a long audience of the Emperor yesterday.
It was arranged by Herr von Seebach before tele
graphic orders arrived. This could not have been
easily avoided, and I have every reason to believe
that it will not be quite useless.
I enclose a narrative which I drew up immediately
after the audience, and for every word of which I can
vouch. It was so far of importance that the Council
of Ministers, which was assembled in the adjoining
room, had to wait half-an-hour for the Emperor,
which circumstance, in the present pressure of
business, proves how much he occupies himself with
the affairs of Germany. It is surely well that I
rejected most decidedly, both to the Emperor and to
Count Walewski, the proposal of neutrality. I have
done so again to the latter to-day, and laid great
stress on the necessity of considering the Bund.
Count Walewski tried to persuade me by saying
that considerations of humanity made it desirable that
the war should be as short as possible, and that this
would alone be done by Germany remaining neutral.
My reply was very simple. ' De deux choses l'une :
ou vous avez des revers — alors vous ne voudrez

176 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
pas terminer la guerre ; ou les Autrichiens en essuient
— alors l'Autriche aura recours a. la confederation.
Ainsi, de toutes manieres, l'attente de I'Allemagne
n'abregera pas la guerre.' As matters stand it is
scarcely to be hoped that the war can be avoided.
But England wiU try to prevent an engagement until
the last moment, and she will redouble her efforts
if the neutrality of Germany cannot be counted upon.
It is that which takes me over to England for a day.
I intend to be in Dresden again on Friday.
That the latest step of the Cabinet of Vienna has
brought it into a false position, and has given the
Emperor Napoleon a host of advocates for war, is,
alas ! only too evident. It is incomprehensible how
this bold decision could have been so unskilfully
carried out as to give the French so much opportunity
of appearing at the right moment on the scene of
war. The most favourable explanation, given by
Lord Cowley in his partiality to Austria, is that she
wishes to end the unequal game between herself and
France, and to place France under the necessity of
risking similar pecuniary losses to her own.
The remaining news of the day I leave to the
royal Ambassador. (Signed) Beust.
P. S. As I have just been informed by telegram
from London that none of the Ministers are in town
at present, I give up my idea of going there, and
return to-morrow evening to Frankfort, where I shaU
make a short stay, arriving at Dresden on Thursday.
Private. London, 5th May, 1859.
I begin by relating a few circumstances which
have given my journey to London, undertaken by
command of his Majesty, a longer duration than

CORRESPONDENCE 177
could originally have been expected. The absence of
a direct railway between Frankfort and Cologne, a
violent storm which prevented the boat from leaving
Calais, and a bad passage, prevented my arriving here
before Sunday the 1st inst.
In the absence of the Saxon Minister here, I
applied directly and by letter to Lord Malmesbury to
obtain an interview with him and an audience of the
Queen. I was invited to the Foreign Office the next
day ; but Lord Malmesbury was detained at Windsor,
and not being able to keep his appointment, was
obliged to postpone the rendezvous until Tuesday.
The Prince Consort happened to be away from
Windsor, and returned only on Tuesday evening.
Yesterday, Wednesday, the Court came to town, and
the Prince Consort received me immediately after his
arrival ; and to-day her Majesty the Queen has
fixed my audience for three o'clock, immediately
after the Due de Malakoff, and has honoured me
with an invitation to dinner. Thus I could not at the
earliest leave before to-morrow, Friday. But as the
telegraphic despatch that reached me last night says
that my return is no longer specially pressing, I
thought it right to accept an invitation from the
Prussian Ambassador for to-morrow, as I shall
thereby have the opportunity of meeting several
remarkable characters. I shall, therefore begin my
homeward journey the day after to-morrow, Saturday,
and shall first proceed to Frankfort according to orders.
The telegraphic despatch I received at Frankfort
left it to my own judgment whether to undertake the
journey to London or not, and I had serious doubts as
to the possibility of success, especially of such a
success as would compensate me for the great personal
inconvenience which would be caused to me just now
vol. i m

178 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
by my absence from Dresden. Still, I decided on
following his Majesty's suggestion, chiefly because
I thought that I perceived therein his conviction
of the special importance of this place, where we
have at present no representative, and also because
direct acquaintance with English affairs may be of
great use for the further consideration of the actual
political position of Germany. My task of observing
and acting in the interest of our cause was indeed
made much more difficult by existing circumstances :
in the former respect by the election's, which are
depopulating the London drawing-rooms and drawing
public attention away from the questions most
important to us ; in the latter, by the still very
unfavourable turn public opinion has taken towards
Austria, and by the precarious position of the Govern
ment, which makes it avoid every appearance of
abandoning the strictest neutrality. Under these
circumstances I must be thankful that Lord Malmes
bury granted me two protracted interviews, one with
him alone, and the other with Lord Derby as a
witness. This latter arrangement, which only wanted
the presence of a secretary to be complete, is a further
proof of the great precaution with which these
questions are now treated here, although I do not
deny that it also proves the' interest taken by the
Cabinet in my communications.
It did not require much trouble to ascertain the
state of public opinion on the Italian question. The
first violent outbreak of anti- Austrian feeling which
Lord Derby tried to surpass by stigmatising the action
of Austria with the incredible appellation of ' a crime,'
has been followed by a somewhat calmer attitude, and
the deep rooted distrust of France fairly holds the
balance against the enthusiasm for the liberation of

CORRESPONDENCE 179
Italy. But even in the most favourably disposed
circles this balance of opinion results merely in a
disposition to abstain from all intervention — in other
words, to maintain the strictest neutrality. There
can be no doubt that Austria has committed grievous
errors in her late aggressive policy, and that the idea
of her being a disturber of peace, which was so cleverly
spread in Paris, gave the first impulse to the change
of public opinion in England. But this first impression
would long ago have yielded to a juster view in the
dispassionate and reasonable English mind, had not
the cause of displeasure had an earlier and more
profound origin. I have always expressed the opinion
that the Austrian Cabinet should have the patience to
go through the stage of a Congress ; and I was so
deeply impressed by the great mistake of adopting a
different view that I thought it out of the question,
and therefore supposed I could safely remain absent
from Dresden until the middle of May. People here
have always clearly perceived, on the one hand, that
France and Sardinia desire to make conquests at the
expense of Austria, and on the other, that the insecure
condition of the Italian States is due to that Power.
In the former respect Austria finds as much sympathy
here as she does antipathy in the latter. Had
Austria accepted the Congress without reserva
tion, she would have put a stop to all Franco-
Sardinian schemes of spoliation ; and the then
remaining question of reforms in the Italian States
would have presented so many difficulties, that Vienna
might have run the risk of allowing the Congress to
debate upon it and finally to separate without arriving
at a decision, while revolution was preparing in Italy,
to be followed by universal repression. Instead of
this, Austria has taken on herself the responsibility of

180 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
destroying all hopes of pacific reform, and has exposed
the maintenance of the existing territorial distribution
to the chances of war ; and it is natural that the less
England is disposed to help her in the former point, the
less will she be inclined to support her in the latter.
Lord Malmesbury was therefore perfectly right
when he declared to me that England would observe
the strictest neutrality, and that no Minister who
wished to act otherwise could remain a day in office.
I was quite prepared for such a declaration ; and it
would have been utterly useless to attempt to speak
to an English Minister about the possibilities of the
future, or to attempt to prove to him the utility of
timely opposition to France. I had to accept the
position, and to use all my efforts to prevent England.
from putting pressure on Berlin to oppose a more
decided attitude on the part of Germany, in order that
Prussia might not be opposed, or rather that she
should be encouraged, in assuming with the other
German Governments a firmer position towards
France. I may flatter myself that my efforts with
this object were not made in vain. I struck a
responsive chord in urging that if the object is to
make the war as short as possible, German interven
tion would be the best, and German neutrality the
worst, means of attaining this object. My arguments
were as follows : — -
If Germany limits herself merely to maintaining
her troops at great expense on a war footing, without
assuming a definite position — a course which public
opinion in Germany would not long tolerate — Austria
would practically derive no support from her. Germany
would neither be able to restrain France nor to exer
cise pressure on Austria when the time for concluding
peace should arrive. In this way Germany would

CORRESPONDENCE 181
play an ambiguous and not very creditable part, so
long as her armaments are declared to be only for the
protection of the territory of the Bund. But her
attitude would be at once honourable, bold, and
favourable to England's pacific views, if Prussia and
the Confederation made an imposing display of
troops on the Rhine. The forces of France would
then be divided, and she would be disabled from
continuing the war ; while means would be afforded
of inducing Austria to accept an honourable peace, for
that Power cannot remain indifferent as to whether
she will enjoy so considerable a support for long or not.
It was perhaps not quite unnecessary that I was
able on this occasion to enlighten the great ignorance
of the English Ministers as to the affairs of the
German Confederation. It was repeatedly asked what
France had done that was menacing to Germany?
Whereupon I explained the 47 th Article of the
Agreement of Vienna, which is totally unknown
here, and the action of Germany during the Crimean
War, which was here considered insufficient. At that
time they went so far as to hold that an attack on
Austrian troops would have been an attack on Ger
many, though nobody dreamed of invading Austrian
territory ; while now the enemies of Austria openly
avow their intention of despoiling her of a province.
The military importance which the possession of
Lombardy by Austria has for Germany seemed to be
equally unknown to Lord Malmesbury.
I am satisfied with the final results of the inter
view, as Lord Derby and Lord Malmesbury both
gave me a decided assurance that if Prussia should
make up her mind to join the Confederation in an
imposing military display on the Rhine, England
would not dissuade or prevent her. This assurance

1S2 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
acquires more significance from the fact that Lord
Malmesbury told me of Prussia's desire to neutralise
the Baltic and the North Sea, adding that England
would endeavour to act in accordance with it ; and that
I made him clearly understand that this plan would not
in any way be affected by Prussia acting as I proposed.
An important question is : Will the present Min
istry remain in office ? Opinions differ greatly. No
one doubts that the elections will raise the number
of the supporters of the Ministry from 275 to about
300, which will just enable it to exist if the 354
members of the Opposition do not unite against it.
Many people think, however, that this will be the
case, being fully persuaded that when the new Parlia
ment meets, a vote of confidence will be unavoidable,
and that the fraction of the Radicals which is in
favour of a war with France will not vote with the
rest of the House. If a change of Ministry takes
place, things will certainly be bad for us, as it is to be
feared that Lord Palmerston and Lord Wodehouse
will decidedly take the part of Italy ; whereas Lord
Clarendon, whose accession to power is, unfortunately,
scarcely probable, would be far more decided in his
support of Austria than Lord Malmesbury. But on
the whole the principle of neutrality will predominate ;
and therefore it would be all the more important if
Prussia and the Bund were to take up without delay
the position I indicate, so that the new Ministry
should find it an accomplished fact. I have not
hesitated to communicate the result of my interview
to Count Bernstorff, but I humbly submit that it
might be well for his Majesty to mention it to his
Royal Highness the Prince Regent.
I must here mention that his Highness the
Duke of Saxe-Coburg, who received me last Monday

CORRESPONDENCE 183
at Windsor, after having exhausted the usual stock
of complaints of Austria and her policy, nevertheless
expressed himself very much in accordance with our
views. This, however, seems to have made, as I
shall show further on, but little impression on his
brother, the Prince Consort. The Duke told me that
he would propose to Berlin that Prussia should cross
the Rhine as soon as the French enter Austrian
territory. Of course I did not dissuade him from this
intention, and I think it excellent that such a proposal
should emanate from him ; but I regret that the
Duke communicated his project at the same time to
Lord Malmesbury, on whom I found it produced a
very unfavourable effect ; and I think it was very
fortunate that I came at the right moment to prevent
an English remonstrance at Berlin. I have succeeded
in so doing by placing the whole idea more in the
light of a matter under consideration than of a
formulated decision. The latter would seem to me
very difficult, Austria having provoked the war by
occupying Sardinian territory ; and a decision of the
Bund could hardly be arrived at in the midst of a war
during which French soldiers might appear on
Austrian territory. But I made it plain that if
Austria were beaten and a part of Lombardy were in
the hands of the enemy, the German Confederation
would have to decide the question whether it should
assist Austria to regain her possessions or not ; and
that I did not have the slightest doubt that it would
decide this question in the affirmative.
I reserve further communications, especially those
concerning my interview with the Prince Consort, for
a later report which I shall send off when I am on my
way to Dresden. (Signed) Beust.

1 84 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
Private London, 7th May 1859.
I hope your Excellency will receive a report which
I sent off yesterday to the address of the editor
Hartmann. I also hope that you have received
through the agency of the Hanoverian Ministry a
telegraphic despatch yesterday morning.
To complete the latter, I must mention the follow
ing particulars: — Lord Malmesbury, in whose com
pany I dined on Thursday with the Queen, reverted
of his own accord to the subject of our interviews, and
ended by saying quite openly that after the Due de
Malakoff had been called away to take command of
the troops at Nancy, the time had come for Germany
to place a strong corps of observation on the Rhine,
and that it will be well to do so at the right moment.
I noted down this declaration, which so far exceeded
my expectations, and I did not omit to communicate
it the next morning to Count Bernstorff, at the same
time requesting him to ask Lord Malmesbury to
confirm it, which his Lordship did. Whether Count
Bernstorff will report the declaration in an urgent
despatch to Berlin, as I wished him to do, remains to
be seen. He is personally inclined to share our views ;
but perhaps for that very reason he may be less
inclined to oppose the view taken at Berlin ; and,
indeed, I have been informed that he was not quite
pleased at my making so much progress with Lord
Malmesbury in so short a time. The Count's great
devotion to his duty, however, is a guarantee that he
will not omit to forward Lord Malmesbury's declara
tion. I have since had an opportunity of repeating
to Mr Disraeli the explanations detailed in my last
report, and they found in him a very favourable
listener, which I cannot say of Lord Palmerston.

CORRESPONDENCE 185
This is, indeed, not surprising, as Lord Clarendon
assured me through a third person that he quite
agreed with my views. As I have already mentioned,
a great deal depends on the new Ministry finding
Germany in a more decided attitude, and there can be
no surer means of cooling the ardour of England's
sympathies for Italy than to shift the scene of war,
and substitute for the Italian question a Franco-
German one. This will be the only way to accustom
the English public to the thought of the possibility of
a war with France.
As I have already stated, I had the honour of
being received at a special audience by her Majesty,
and of being subsequently invited to dinner. I also
thought it well to appear at to-day's Drawing Room.
I had a most gracious reception by the Queen.
The Ministers seem more sanguine to-day as to
their position, but there is much doubt everywhere
else on the subject. (Signed) Beust.
Private
Frankfort-on-the-Main, 10th May 1859.
As I telegraphed to your Excellency, I left
London on Saturday evening, after having attended
the Drawing Room. The little annoyances that have
harassed me throughout this journey repeated them
selves on my way home. A stupid conductor at
Ghent showed me into the slow train instead of the
express, and I consequently arrived so late at Cologne
that it was only with the greatest difficulty that I
reached Frankfort yesterday afternoon. Yesterday
evening I had detailed conferences with Count
Rechberg and Baron von der Pfordten. They
showed so great a divergence of opinion as regards
the principal points of discussion that I am obliged

1 86 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
to continue the conference to-day. I do not give up
the hope of arriving at a complete understanding.
Herr von der Pfordten has received instructions, as
your Excellency may be aware, to move in the
Confederate Assembly that the 47th Article of
the Vienna Agreement should be reconsidered.
This preliminary step is certainly excellent, if it is
made with the decided intention of coming to a
decision which would give the war armaments of the
Bund a clearly-defined object. The statements of
Herr von der Pfordten to Count Rechberg and my
self were not satisfactory, as they conveyed the
belief that Prussia would act at the right moment,
and that all that was wanted was to give her a slight
stimulus to take the initiative. I have every reason
to think that Herr von der Pfordten does not express
his personal opinion in making these statements, and
that he has received orders to make them from his
superiors. Our conference of to-day, will, I hope,
make this clear.
For my part I cannot deny that all the occurrences
of the last month have filled me with the greatest
distrust of the ideas prevalent at Berlin. I refer
not only to the manifestations which followed the
Austrian summons, but especially to the attitude of
the Prussian Minister in London towards his German
colleagues, from which it was obvious how unwelcome
to Berlin were the assurances given me by Lord
Malmesbury. I have even cause to fear, in conse
quence of an interview I had with Count Bernstorff
shortly before my departure, that in response to my
suggestion that pressure should be exercised at
Berlin in a sense favourable to Austria, the Prussian
Cabinet has been working in London in an opposite
sense with regard to the other German Governments.

CORRESPONDENCE 187
Everything must assuredly be done to facilitate
Prussia's co-operation with the other States ; but any
considerable prolongation of the present state of things
seems to me in the highest degree dangerous. Events
on the battlefield may rapidly assume a most disastrous
form for Austria ; and, taking the most favourable
view, if Prussia were then to come quickly to her
assistance, she would make Austria her debtor and us
her powerless tools, and the debt might have to be
paid at our expense later on. Should, on the contrary,
Prussia be able to pursue her present course so far as
to bring about a peace disadvantageous for Austria,
Prussia would have to make demands in Paris and St
Petersburg, and perhaps also in London, that would
at last have to be satisfied also at the expense of
the German Governments. If, on the other hand,
the German Governments, by united and energetic
action, could either force Prussia to act, or, in the
worst case, make a display of forces on the Rhine with
Austria alone, they would certainly risk much ; but if
successful, they have much to gain. They would have
led Germany into the war ; public opinion would
support them ; and, if it came to the worst, they
would fall on the field of honour. I am therefore of
opinion that the Bavarian proposal is a good one ; it
would prepare for the measures that must be taken,
and would give the various States sufficient time to
complete the military preparations that must precede
the occupation of the Rhine by a Confederate Army.
When that moment arrives, all parties must demand
of Prussia that she should propose at Frankfort that
such measures should be taken as the circumstances
may require — for something more could then be con
sidered than merely posting a corps of observation —
and if Prussia refuses to comply with this demand,

/

1 88 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
the majority would have to make its decision at once
under the 47th Article, and telegraphic orders would
have to be issued for the Confederate troops to be set
in motion. If I can come to a preliminary agreement
in this sense, subject to his Majesty's approval, I will
try to complete it in Hanover. An interview with
Count Platen would be especially important, as unity
of action towards Prussia is now above all of the
highest moment, and it appears therefore to be
absolutely necessary to concede to Bavaria at least a
formal leadership, which, as a rule, Hanover would not
be likely to agree to. I leave this early to-morrow
morning, arriving at Hanover in the evening. Pro
bably a royal invitation to dinner will detain me all
the following day at Hanover ; but I intend to travel
all night, so that I may arrive on Friday morning at
nine o'clock at Dresden.
In completion of my London reports, I have to
mention an interview with the Prince Consort, the
report of which I could not entrust to the Prussian
post. This interview gave me a deep insight into
the Prince's thoughts, and an insight which gives rise
to sad meditations. He went so far as to say that he
was convinced that it would be a real blessing for
Germany if Austria were to become so weakened as
to be no longer a support to the minor German
States, and if a new organization of Germany could
expel her altogether ; that he considered the possession
of Lombardy a trouble and a burthen, and not at all
an advantage. I think it will be superfluous to
mention further details of our conversation, or to
touch on the question of the nature of the Prince's
influence on the English Ministry, or, what is still
more pernicious, on Berlin. I wish I could believe
that the rumours mentioned in the papers of

CORRESPONDENCE 189
Orleanistic influences at the Court of St James's, and
of King Leopold's intrigues, might have induced the
Prince to express himself towards me in an anti-
Austrian sense ; but his expressions were so violent
as to betray a deeply-rooted hatred of Austria, far
surpassing his great and unconcealed aversion to the
Emperor Napoleon. Nor did the Prince conceal
from me that his silent, but always restless, ambition
prompts him to use all his efforts to promote the plan
of making the King of Prussia Emperor of Germany,
which he was the first to reveal to me early in 1848,
before the February Revolution. Far from rejoicing
at the patriotic conduct of the German Governments,
and the excellent national spirit of their subjects, he
harped on the imperfections of the Federal Constitu
tion, and depreciated everything that is now being
done, constantly laying stress on the fact that Germany
has no sovereign to represent her abroad and take
the command of her armies. I did not shirk the
labour of enlightening the Prince on the present state
of Germany, which has changed so completely in the
last eleven years ; but I had no prospect of success.
Nevertheless, his Royal Highness seemed rather
taken aback by what I said about public opinion in
Southern Germany and in Saxony, and about the possi
bility of the remainder of Germany acting against
Prussia in the present crisis.
If, as Herr von Usedom's statements here lead
one to infer, Berlin intends to wait and see whether
the present English Ministry will remain in office or
not, this is either a complete misconception of the
situation, or a calculation to avoid assisting Austria.
If a Liberal Ministry comes in and finds Germany
in her present condition, its first step will be a decided
protest against any action ; but if it finds the army of

190 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
observation already posted on the Rhine, it will accept
it as a 'fait accompli.' Public opinion will always be
the basis of English policy, and it can only be gained
for Germany's support of Austria if Germany, wholly
or in part, advances with the force of a national
movement, thereby depriving the war of the character
of a struggle for the liberation of Italy, and giving
it that of self-defence against the domination of
Napoleon. This is the ground on which England is
to be won, and the sooner Germany enters on it, the
sooner must England cease her hesitation.
When I went yesterday to Count Rechberg, I
was very much surprised to hear from him that, in
opposition to the assurances given me by Lord
Malmesbury, the English Minister, Sir Alexander
Malet, had read him a despatch according to which
the English Cabinet denies that the German Con
federation has any right to interfere in the Italian
War, and declines in advance any protection of German
commerce should Germany take any aggressive steps
in the matter. In consequence of that communication
I proceeded this morning to Sir Alexander Malet'S,
and had the satisfaction of hearing from him that the
despatch in question was sent off on the 2nd of May,
before my first interview with Lord Malmesbury.
Sir Alexander, who is very well inclined towards us,
was highly delighted with the results of my London
mission, and accepted them without reserve.
(Signed) Beust.
Private
Frankfort-on-the-Main, 10th May 1859.
9 p.m.
My conjecture as to the real origin of the views
expressed yesterday by Herr von der Pfordten was
completely confirmed to-day by his frank statements

CORRESPONDENCE 191
to me on the subject. He at the same time gave me
clearly to understand how agreeable it would be to
him if I were to enable him to report that Saxony
was in favour of a more energetic policy. I accord
ingly pointed out to him the course which I would
recommend to his Majesty the King, and he finally
declared himself ready to advocate it at Munich.
*******
I should here mention that Sir Alexander Malet
said to me in the strictest confidence that Herr von
Usedom had told him and Count Fenelon that
Prussia was only arming to keep the other German
States in check. He further informed me that
Baron Schleinitz had told Lord Bloomfield that she
intended to occupy Saxony and Hanover. It is
possible that this was merely said in order to inspire
fear, but it clearly proves the spirit animating the
Berlin Cabinet.
The bearer of my two reports of to-day will
remain long enough in Dresden to be able to take
after my return the decision of his Majesty the
King to the Royal Minister to the Bundestag.
(Signed) Beust.
Letter to the Saxon Minister, Herr von Konneritz,
at Vienna.
Private Dresden, 15th May 1859.
I avail myself of the journey of Prince Metter
nich to Vienna to send your Excellency copies of
four reports relating to my mission to London, which
I sent, some from that city, some from Frankfort.
They are merely intended for your information, and
I beg of you not to reveal any part of their contents.

192 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
I also forwarded a detailed account of my interview
(which lasted an hour) with the Emperor Napoleon,
but I do not send a copy of it, in order to be able to
say with truth that it has not been communicated.
Count Rechberg and Prince Metternich know all
these reports.
The sincerity of my declarations in Paris has had
the good effect of producing manifestations in Berlin
which have warned the other German Governments,
with redoubled emphasis, that they must follow an
independent and united course of action.
In England, where unfortunately the Ministry is
in a very shaky condition, the language hitherto
officially used will not be abandoned ; but, as I have
reason to hope, in consequence of my interviews with
Lord Malmesbury, the British representatives will be
instructed to express themselves less sharply against
the proceedings of Germany.
# * * * * * *
His Majesty received the day before yesterday
the Aide de Camp of his Royal Highness the Prince
Regent, General von Alvensleben, and replied to his
representations against the proceedings in the Bund
that if General Willisen should succeed in making an
agreement, his Majesty would be greatly pleased,
and certainly would not interfere with it, but that he
would support Austria should she demand further
assistance from the Bund. According to the most
recent information from Berlin, Herr von Schleinitz,
who is regarded as the principal representative of
neutrality, in contradistinction to the Regent, has
assumed a less rigid attitude. (Signed) Beust.

CHAPTER XVII
1859
CONTINUATION OF THE ITALIAN WAR.  THE SAXON CHAMBERS. 
PRINCE GORTSCHAKOFF.  VISIT TO VIENNA.  THE WURZBURG
CONFERENCE
Soon after my return, the Saxon Chambers as
sembled in an extraordinary session. It would be
almost impossible now to form a conception of the
friendliness to Austria which was then expressed in
the newspapers and at public meetings. It not only
showed itself in the First Chamber, which was natural
enough, but also in the Second Chamber ; and I cannot
forget how its President commented in the strongest
terms on the ' civilizing mission ' of the Emperor
Napoleon. My own speech was considered almost
too cold. I have never been able to obtain a
sufficient explanation of why Austria did not apply
at once to the Bund when French troops had entered
her territory, especially as in those days there was so
much talk at Vienna of posting forces on the Rhine.
vol. i N

194 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
One of the reasons given is that Prussia had to be
considered. But, as I have shown elsewhere, it would
have been better not to have neglected that considera
tion before the war began. The Austrian Cabinet
was not perhaps sufficiently aware of the feeling at
Berlin, but it could not have been so ill informed as
to imagine that Prussia would immediately take the
initiative. If she had applied to the Bund, the
majority of the Federal States would undoubtedly have
voted in favour of assisting her, and I do not think
that under the then existing circumstances, anybody
would have deemed it possible that Prussia should
actively interfere. Yet we are told that those were
the days of the ' miserable Bundestag,' ' the deplorable
system of the Minor States,' which the Vienna papers
were constantly making the subject of their ridicule.
The events of the war and the conclusion of peace
lie beyond the range of these volumes ; but I cannot
help alluding here to a despatch in which I sent a
rejoinder to a note from Prince Gortschakoff, making
some dictatorial remarks to the German Governments
on the nature of the German Confederation, and
alleging that it was the duty of the Confederate
States to observe a passive attitude. From many
quarters I received cordial thanks for my despatch,
but not from Vienna.
That I did not take this much to heart, is proved
by my visit to Vienna in September. To this very
day I vividly remember what a painful feeling over
came me when I heard from my room in the hotel
'Erzherzog Karl' a regimental band playing the
Radetzky March, which reminded me of happier days.

THE WURZBURG CONFERENCE 195
I held frequent conferences with Count Rechberg,
who had meanwhile become the head of the Ministry,
and endeavoured to convince him that a close agreement
of the Central States would be far more useful to
Austria than isolated intercourse with the various
Courts and Governments. Unfortunately Vienna
was never inclined to take this view for long ; and the
independent voice of Hanover, untrammelled by the
decisions of conferences, had more weight than the
united action of the other Central States. This
resulted finally in events which were neither agreeable
to Austria nor to Hanover.
On the whole, however, the attitude of the
Imperial Cabinet may be said to have been favourable
to the conference of the Central States that met
shortly afterwards at Wurzburg for the consideration
of various questions, some of which were still pending
at the Federal Assembly, and others about to be
introduced there.

CHAPTER XVIII
1860-1861
THE ' NATIONALVEREIN.'  MY PROJECT OF REFORM OF THE CONFEDERA
TION.  ITALY AGAIN.
The year 1860 reminds me of the 'Nationalverein.'
In treating of this subject I do not feel altogether
sure, and I look for a judgment that may be more
impartial. In the tenth volume of Brockhaus
' Encyclopaedia,' published in 1867, I find on page 610
the following paragraph : —
" ' Nationalverein " (German). The patriotic move
ment in Germany during the Italian War in 1859
gave occasion for the foundation of this patriotic
association, which, after various preliminary con
ferences at Eisenach and Hanover, formally consti
tuted itself at a meeting at Frankfort-on-the-Main on
the 15th and 16th of September.'
To say nothing of its acknowledged merit, the
Brockhaus 'Encyclopaedia' has never had the evil

THE ' NA TIONAL VEREIN ' 197
reputation of being reactionary, particularist, and
anti-Prussian. And yet no more bitter satire could
have been written on the Nationalverein than the
above paragraph. The patriotic movement in
Germany during the Italian War (or rather after that
war, for it was very short, and there was no such
movement during the war), was spontaneous and
enthusiastic, as I have said in former chapters, and as
cannot be doubted without ignoring every expression
of public opinion in the year 1859 ; and its object was
intervention in favour of Austria and opposition to
French aggression. But the result of the movement
was that no one came to the assistance of Austria,
and that Germany remained an inactive spectator
whilst her ' hereditary enemy ' was depriving Austria
of one of her fairest provinces. Now it was to be
expected that the movement would at least give
Austria time, if not active assistance, to strengthen
her shattered power, as she was part of Germany.
But this would have been a great mistake. The very
first step taken by this patriotic association, was to
revive the plan of excluding Austria from Germany,
which had necessarily been abandoned since 1850.
Just as the National movement before March 1848
had acquired its full strength after Louis Philippe had
lost his head during a riot, the movement of 1859
first arose after Austria had lost several battles in
Italy. It was Austria's misfortunes that gave rise to
those meetings and preliminary consultations whose
object was her exclusion from Germany, and which
were held after, and not during, the Italian War.
It was natural that the German Governments

198 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
should have assumed a cold and repellent attitude
towards this movement. In the first years of the
Bismarck regime this could be said even of Prussia,
and I myself do not deny that I was strongly opposed
to it. But I do not remember ever having, in con
nection with it, punished or reprimanded the officials
under my orders ; indeed, I do not believe that any
of them would have joined the movement.
Soon after the foundation of the Nationalverein,
I proposed a scheme for the reform of the Confedera
tion which was directly in opposition to the Verein's
aspirations, though my opposition was in no way
prompted by rivalry or hostility. I had indeed to
thank the Nationalverein for the fact that the
Landtag which met at the end of 1860 began for
the first time to remind one of the Parliamentary
purgatory of 1849, though fortunately without per
manent effects. At this Landtag a peasant Deputy
introduced a motion calling upon the Government to
take steps for the revival of a German Central Power
with popular representation. The Chamber was not yet
prepared for such a proposal, and four months passed
before the Committee appointed to consider the
motion presented its report. This gave me the
opportunity, a rare one in those days, of enlivening
the debates with a joke. I propounded the riddle :
' If a motion to establish a German Central Power
takes four months before it is discussed in the
Chamber, how long will it take to establish that
Central Power ? ' As events proved, it took exactly
ten years, but in those days that period would have
been considered too short. After promising attention

MY PROJECT OF REFORM 199
to the motion, with certain reservations, I set to work
immediately at the close of the Landtag in 1861, and
first submitted my draft at Vienna, where I was
staying for a few days on my way to Gastein.
As the draft was made at a time when there was
no pressure, either internal or external, on the Govern
ments, it was conceived in a spirit of moderate and
prudent reform. On the other hand, the character
of a Confederation of States had to be maintained, as
the establishment of a predominance of ' Confederate
I State ' would, in the view of its projectors, involve the
' exclusion of Austria. The practical result which I
| had in my mind was to make the machinery of the
Confederation work more rapidly, and to introduce a
mode of procedure more calculated to rouse public
interest than the Assembly which sat during the
whole year in the Eschenheimer Gasse at Frankfort,
and was regarded by the nation with complete indiffer
ence. I accordingly proposed to leave at Frankfort only
the members of the Federal Administration, and to fix
biennial meetings of the Bundestag, each for a period
of one month, on the 1st of May in a Southern town
(Ratisbon), and on the 1st of November in a Northern
town (Hamburg), with the proviso that a repre
sentative Assembly of delegates from the German
Parliaments might be convoked from time to time,
Austria presiding when the Assembly met at
Ratisbon, and Prussia when it met at Hamburg. My
hope that this scheme would have the effect of bring
ing the Confederation more into touch with public
opinion cannot be regarded as too sanguine. The
Representative Assembly would soon have become

200 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
permanent, developing its powers and the number of J
its members. With full right could I thus reply, in 1
a despatch addressed to the Saxon envoy, Baron von
Konneritz, to the objections made to my plan by
the Cabinet of Vienna : ' Our proposal of holding
periodical Bundestags may appear unpractical, but we
doubt whether Vienna would answer in the negative
if we asked whether, after the beginning of the
Italian War in 1859, the same lamentable result of
the conferences of the Military Committee of the
Confederation at Frankfort could have been possible
if the Bundestag had met on the 1st of May 1859 at
Ratisbon, together with the representative Assembly
which we propose. Those who remember the state
of affairs and of public opinion in those days would
not hesitate to say that such a Bundestag could not
possibly have separated without passing a resolution
for the active intervention of the Confederation. In
such a Bundestag, Prussia could not have avoided the
question at issue, while in the Committee discussions
and negotiations were protracted until the favourable
moment had gone, and the favourable tendency had
disappeared.' I unfortunately found at Vienna, I cannot say
no appreciation, but no decision. As I said above, I
first presented my draft to the Austrian Government.
The Emperor, by whom I had the honour of being)
received in an audience, expressed himself favourably I
towards it, and approved of the proposal of Austria
and Prussia presiding in turn over the Confederation.
Count Rechberg was more reserved, though he did
not give an adverse opinion. But as ill-luck would

MY PROJECT OF REFORM 201
have it, the Ministerialrath Baron Biegeleben, re
porter on German affairs, was ill at the time, and the
Foreign Office had to wait for his opinion until he
recovered. It was decidedly hostile. He expressed
his view in several despatches with characteristic
incisiveness ; but I think I could easily have refuted
him by word of mouth. Strong opposition, nay,
almost indignation, was raised by the idea of an
alternate Presidency. ' Could one imagine/ it was
asked, ' the United States of America with two
Presidents ? ' This was the mistake, which I have
pointed out elsewhere, of confusing the Presidency of
the Federal Assembly with that of the Confederation,
and of comparing Washington with Buol-Schauen-
stein, or Lincoln with Kiibeck. But the sharing
with another — not the resignation — of a purely
honorary right was regarded as an impossible sacrifice.
Here again we see appearances preferred to reality.
Considering how large even at that time the
party still was which desired nothing more than
parity with Austria and the cessation of the supposed,
though not actual, encroachments of that Power, it
cannot be denied that by making the slight sacrifice
I proposed, Austria would have lost little and gained
much. I am far from maintaining that the assent of the
Prussian Cabinet was to be reckoned upon, but
Austria's refusal made it easier for Prussia to do the
same. Count Bernstorff's reply, while abounding in
compliments on the ' latest work of the eminent
statesman whose action in German questions always
received the attention of the Berlin Government,'

202 ME 'MO IRS OF COUNT BEUST
and on ' the ingenious scheme, framed with a
thorough appreciation of the various and deviating
wishes and tendencies of the Confederate States,'
revealed, although with cautious circumlocution, the
Prussian plan, which was no other than Federal
Union under Prussian supremacy.
In drawing up my scheme I had no other intention
than to stimulate the consideration of the question in
a concrete form, and I made this clearly understood.
My object would perhaps have been attained, had
not the Cabinet of Vienna, instead of allowing my
draft the honour of a quiet decease, sounded an
unnecessary and useless alarm by making the
Prussian reply, which was addressed to Dresden and
not to Vienna, the occasion of a protest sent to
Berlin by Austria, and, at her suggestion, also in
identic notes by Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Hanover, and
the Grand Duchy of Hesse. That the Saxon
Government joined, though unwillingly, in this step,
was of course taken in very bad part by Berlin ; but
it was inevitable in view of the political relations of
the Central States.
I cannot take leave of the year 1860 without
recording a not uninteresting episode which was
closely connected with the events in Italy. At the
moment when the Sardinian troops were preparing
to invade the Papal States and to support the
Unionist movement, Count Seebach, the Saxon
envoy, who was on leave, suddenly came to me
on a secret mission from the Emperor Napoleon, who
took this means of hinting at Vienna, through me,
that if Austria wished to oppose the invasion of the

ITALY AGAIN 203
Papal territories, he, the Emperor, would not intervene,
provided no change were made as to the cession of
Lombardy. Napoleon III was very fond of making
these disclosures through indirect channels. He
did not observe his constitutional oath very strictly,
but he was almost always to be depended upon in
negotiations, and Vienna might have obtained guaran
tees. It might have been a great opportunity, for
the Article of the Treaty of Zurich relative to the
States belonging to the younger branches of the
House of Hapsburg was still in full force, and in the
Venetian Provinces affairs were assuming a different
aspect. I received for conveying the message a
polite letter of thanks, which, however, did not enter
into details. Indirectly, I heard the remark : ' Any
how it cannot last,' — a repetition of what was said in
Vienna after the July Revolution.

CHAPTER XIX
1862
MEETING WITH BISMARCK IN PARIS.  HIS APPOINTMENT TO THE
MINISTRY.  HIS CORRESPONDENCE WITH ME.
The state of affairs in Saxony made it possible for me
to take a trip to London to see the second Inter
national Exhibition. I returned home via, Paris,
where I had my first lengthy interview with Prince
Bismarck, who had just before been Prussian Am
bassador to the Court of the Tuileries. The Saxon
envoy gave us a merry dinner at the ' Petit Moulin
Rouge,' which was followed the next day by an
interview, during which we went into minute details,
and which must have produced a certain under
standing between us, although our views on German
affairs did not always coincide. This is proved by a
letter Bismarck wrote to me three months afterwards,
immediately after his appointment to the Prussian
Ministry, which I now reproduce.

CORRESPONDENCE 205
Berlin, 10i!/i October 1862.
Hochwohlgeborner Freiherr —
The recollection of our confidential conversations
in Paris has inspired me with the desire, on assuming
my present position, of maintaining my personal
relations with your Excellency through an intercourse
by letter not fettered by official forms. The pressure
of unusual business has hitherto prevented me from
carrying out this design. The official positions we
occupy in adjoining States, and the success with which
you have raised the importance of your own State
throughout Germany, make me fulfil an official duty,
while I at the same time gratify my personal wish, to
enter into direct and confidential communication with
your Excellency. I should be most grateful to learn
that your inclination meets mine in this respect.
Considering your knowledge of men and affairs,
I need not assure you that I stand quite aloof from
all adventurous plans that have been attributed to
me by political novices, and by opponents in the
press. The untruthful, distorted, and disconnected
reports of supposed sayings of mine, by which people
have endeavoured to bring my judgment into dis
credit, must have been appreciated by you with a full
knowledge of the real facts. I do not feel called upon
to force Prussia into the channels of Sardinian policy,
and if anyone in my position had any such feeling,
he would have no basis upon which he could reduce
his theory to practice.
With regard to the endeavours of France, I do
not think that I am opposed in principle to your
Excellency as to the objects attainable by German
reforms. Only so long as the particular interests of the
various States of Germany do not coincide with their
common interests in such a manner as to make their

206 ME 210 IRS OF COUNT BEUST
solidarity appear safe against all dangers, do I claim
the same freedom of action for Prussia in foreign
affairs as Austria notoriously exercises. In acting
thus, I entertain no preconceived opinion in any
respect ; I only find it necessary to object to the
prejudice that Prussia is more exposed to foreign
attacks, and therefore more in want of foreign or
German assistance, than any other State.
As to internal affairs, my most urgent duty is to
preserve and to strengthen the power of the Crown
against the increasing influence of the representative
Chamber and the Parliamentary officials. I consider
that this task can be accomplished without departing
from the positive injunctions of the Constitution. I
shall endeavour to spare as much as possible the feelings
of sticklers for constitutional forms, and to return as
soon as possible to constitutional courses — always bear
ing in mind, however, that our constitutional oath places
' fidelity to the King ' first. Being fully convinced
of your agreement with these views, I should be very
thankful if you would give me your impressions on
events in Prussia, and any good advice that may be
suggested to you by your experience in similar
circumstances. The results achieved at Munich in the question of
the Treaty of Commerce are more favourable than I
expected ; as an adherent of the Zollverein, this
pleases me the more, because I am convinced that we
can pursue no other policy than to adhere to the
Treaty. At the end of the week I purpose to go to Paris
to present my letters of recall, and to arrange my
removal. At this moment I am living at a hotel.
Perhaps the King will proceed at the same time to
the London Exhibition.

CORRESPONDENCE 207
I beg of you to receive the assurance that I am
your Excellency's sincerely devoted (Signed) Bismarck.
The future will decide whether these Memoirs will
ever reach the eyes ofthe German Chancellor. If so,
I hope he will not be displeased at my indiscretion in
publishing the above letter. It is an inestimable
autograph, for it proves that from the first moment of
his accession to power the objects of his policy were
clear to him. If it seems somewhat strange in these
days to read that he did not feel called upon to force
Prussia into the channels of Sardinian policy, and
that anyone in his position who would feel so called
upon would not have any basis upon which he could
reduce his theory to practice,- this assertion must not
be regarded as wanting in sincerity. It was equally
not his intention to persecute the ' fervent Catholics,'
the ' best subjects of the King,' or to go in disguise to
Canossa, to say nothing of the fact that Berlin always
had two measures for Italian and Prusso-German
annexations, declaring the latter to be just and the
former unjust. Notwithstanding this, the Sardinian
triumphs were not to be despised, for without them
General Govone would not have gone to Berlin in
1866. I now give my reply : Dresden, 31st October 1862.
Your Excellency's much esteemed communication
ofthe 15th inst., which I received on the 20th, would
have been answered without delay, had I not inferred
from its contents that an immediate reply would not

208 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
have found your Excellency at Berlin. In the expec
tation of your early return to that city, I do not
hesitate to express my sincerest thanks to your
Excellency for the proofs of gratifying confidence you
have given me, which I thoroughly value and esteem ;
indeed, it is not only an agreeable duty, but a true
satisfaction for me to do so. Although I know how
far behind the great questions with which your
Excellency has to deal is my modest sphere of action,
you will not find me the less zealous in responding to
your confidence, and in making our communications as
fruitful as possible for our mutual interests.
That this result, owing to the variety of questions
involved, would be more fully attained by a personal
interview, must be as apparent to your Excellency as
to me ; and I do not doubt that his Majesty, my
most gracious Master, will give me the necessary
leave, should your Excellency consider an interview
opportune. Meanwhile I will not omit to express my sincerest
confidence in your Excellency's character and dis
tinguished ability, nor to add the assurance that,
however valuable were the explanations you gave me,
it was really not necessary to reassure me with
regard to certain suppositions which I had never
adopted. My wish for a protracted interview with
your Excellency is connected especially with the
question of the French Treaty of Commerce men
tioned at the conclusion of your letter. We have
given our decided support to the Prussian Govern
ment in this question, and desire to continue to do so,
although there are serious objections to many clauses
of the Treaty ; but we do not agree with the course
Prussia is pursuing with regard to the opposition of the
South German States, although we must presuppose

CORRESPONDENCE 209
that both Governments are united in the wish to pre
serve the Zollverein. I have not concealed my
views on this point from Herr von Savigny, though
I have taken care that this difference between us
should not transpire in the newspapers. Receive, etc.
(Signed) Beust.
Some months later there was another correspond
ence, not directly with Herr von Bismarck, but with
Herr von Savigny, who received instructions from him.
Savigny had formerly been Secretary of Legation at
Dresden, where he was fulfilling a mission in 1849 at
the time of the May Insurrection. I saw a great
deal of him when I was envoy at Berlin, and when
treating of the year 1848, I mentioned that it was in
his house that I first met Herr von Bismarck. He
was Prussian envoy at Dresden from 1859 to 1863.
He was then removed to Brussels, but stopped on his
way at Berlin. It was then that the following
correspondence took place : — €
Berlin, 27th February 1853.
Mt dear Friend, — Herr von Bismarck desires
very much to see you and to speak to you. It is by
his special directions that I write this to you to-day,
and I recommend you particularly, in view of the
correspondence that passed between you and him last
autumn, to comply with his wish. Herr von Bismarck
would come to you at Dresden if the present condition
of our Parliamentary debates would allow him to do
so ; but, as matters stand, he thinks he can beg of you
to have the kindness to come here, and as soon as
possible, if your own affairs permit.
Such are my directions, which I have great
vol. 1 o

210 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
pleasure in executing, and now I will add a few
remarks which they suggest to me.
I had been long expecting with certainty that the
time would come when a desire would be expressed to
you from Berlin for a practical understanding ; you
know yourself how thoroughly my wishes pointed in
that direction.
The questions which in my view should now be
discussed, are questions of general policy, chiefly
relating, however, to the policy of our Confederation.
Not only because of your rare insight into these
questions, but also because of the position of Saxony,
it has become desirable to consult you on the present
state of affairs. In a word, you can do much good
at the present moment, and therefore I beg of you to
come. There is much readiness to receive practical
ideas, and the good old saying : ' We must strike the
iron while it is hot,' seems to me in this case especially
applicable. It is to be hoped that Vienna will
subsequently be grateful to you for your assistance in
preparing an agreement. If you should want, now or
later on, an ostensible explanation of your appearance
at Berlin, the question of commercial policy will
afford you one.
Herr von Bismarck, with whom I spent last
evening- at the Palace, intended at first to entrust
Count Rantzau with this invitation, and the Count
was to have proceeded to Dresden to-day ; but he
preferred charging me with the task, as my successor
is not yet fully acquainted with the circumstances,
nor with the previous correspondence. I add this in
order that you may know that Count Rantzau will
not be surprised when he hears that you are coming
to Berlin. The position of our Ministry is not shaken, in

CORRESPONDENCE 211
spite of the persistent rumours and statements to the
contrary ; indeed, I may say it has become stronger
owing to the events of the last few days. Even the
Liberal Party {i.e., Auerswald, Patow, Vincke, etc.,)
holds the permanence of the Ministry to be essential.
You can convince yourself of all this on the spot.
If you come within the next few days you will find
me still here.
I send this letter through one of my servants,
who will come back here to-morrow at 3 a.m. I beg
of you if possible to let him bring me word whether
you are coming, and at what time we may expect you.
Meanwhile a hearty farewell from your devoted
(Signed) Savigny.
To the Royal Prussian Envoy, Herr von Savigny,
Berlin. Dresden, 1st March 1863.
My dear Friend, — As my hasty lines of yester
day have already informed you, it was not possible
for me to answer your esteemed letter of the day be
fore yesterday in time for your servant's return. I
no longer delay my reply, having spoken to his
Majesty the King on the subject.
I need not assure you that I feel highly honoured
by the confidence shown me, and you know that I
always preferred oral to written communications when
agreements had to be made. I am therefore quite
ready to accept an invitation to Berlin, and to take
part with sincere willingness in an agreement, so far
as one may be possible.
According to the general indications given in your
letter, which agree in essentials with the conclusions
I had formed on the state of affairs, this consulta
tion would turn, not on a question pending between

212 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
Prussia and Saxony — for at present there is no such
question — but on the affairs of Germany in general and
of the Confederation in particular. But if the Royal
Prussian Government thinks itself justified in expect
ing a favourable result from a direct discussion of
these questions with the Saxon Government, that is,
with me as its representative, this expectation obvi
ously depends on the supposition that I shall be able
to obtain from the other German Governments,
especially from the Imperial Austrian Government,
and from the Governments of the Central States, due
consideration of such points of agreement as may
present themselves. In this view it is obviously
necessary that my position with those Governments,
and the favour which they have frequently bestowed
upon me, should not be weakened. Frequent experi
ence makes me not only fear, but foresee with cer
tainty, that my appearance at Berlin, the moment it
gives rise to suspicion and rumours, will be talked of
and turned to account in such a manner as would be
decidedly disadvantageous to the object we pursue.
In order to avoid such a result, it will be sufficient,
but also absolutely necessary, to let the plain truth
appear. I must therefore take the liberty, my dear
friend, of requesting you to ask for the explicit
sanction of the Minister President, Herr von Bis
marck, to a communication being sent to our Embassy
on or before my departure, acquainting it with the fact
that I am coming to Berlin at the invitation of the
Minister President to confer with him. I leave it to
Herr von Bismarck's wisdom to decide whether this
communication shall or shall not be accompanied with
a statement of any particular subject as the theme of
our discussion.
You yourself, my dear friend, have ,a far too

CORRESPONDENCE 213
profound and impartial judgment on all circumstances
for me not to feel assured that you fully understand
my point of view, and that you will perceive in it
another instance of that frankness and plain dealing
which you have often praised in me.
I beg of you to be so kind as to show this letter
to Herr von Bismarck, and to inform me of his answer
as soon as possible. I am very sorry to gather from
your note that there is little probability of my seeing
you in Berlin. I should have been delighted to have
had the opportunity of replying personally to all your
kind expressions, and of telling you how often I think
of you. Your devoted friend (Signed) Beust.
Berlin, 5th March 1863.
My dear Friend,— I have informed Herr von
Bismarck of the subject of our correspondence ; and as
I was able to tell him that. I again admired on this
occasion the chivalry of your sentiments and views,
his wish of entering into closer relations with you ha?:
become even more urgent. Meanwhile he is alarmed
at the idea of giving those explanations of the cause
of your appearance in Berlin which you justly deem
necessary, though they might only be given by word
of mouth. Similar explanations which had been
demanded by Count Thun, produced effects too last
ing and unpleasant not to have left a great distaste
here for any strong accentuation of the initiative of
this or that person. At the same time Herr von
Bismarck thoroughly and sincerely appreciates the
motives that impose upon you, my dear friend, certain
precautions at the present moment. But, considering
the impression it would make on our King if he w7ere
obliged to say to him : ' My Saxon colleague cannot
confer with me confidentially, unless he declares to
other Courts that it is at my express desire,' he thinks

214 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
that at the present moment he must give up the
realisation of the confidential rapprochement he so
much desired.
He hopes that there will soon be an opportunity
for a meeting, and he relies on finding in that case the
same friendly readiness in yourself. Perhaps you will
be able to find an opportunity that may bring you
both together without preliminaries. You know, at
least, how things stand, because I have enlightened
you on my own responsibility as to what may under
present circumstances best be attained. I hope events
may not advance more quickly than we both wish, so
that you may have time to give your valuable and
tried advice in those quarters where there is already
so much willingness to receive it.
How strained must our position in Germany be, if
this meeting between two men, so rich in the gifts of
heart and intellect, requires so much prudence and
foresight only because they are German Ministers and
neighbours ! And yet, for my own part, I can blame
neither of them because he cannot do some things
and cannot omit others. If it were not for the un
bounded liberty of the press our actions would be
freer. You will easily understand that it is necessary at
Berlin to consider most carefully every impression
made on his Majesty. There are circumstances that
make his nerves particularly sensitive.
I will not conclude this letter without giving a
little political news, but I do so in confidence to my
old and valued friend.
The Ministry stands firmly in the King's favour.
It remained firm though assailed both from without
and from within. London and Paris are divided on
the Polish question. There has been much depression

CORRESPONDENCE 215
in the latter city since it was found that the insurgents
were being supported from London. The attitude of
the Cabinet of Vienna has been most correct, as we
all acknowledge here.
Now, farewell, and pity your faithful friend, who,
in spite of all his good will, has not been able to
strengthen the bonds of union entrusted to his care.
Yours, (Signed) Savigny.
To his Excellency Herr von Savigny, at Berlin.
Dresden, 6th March 1863.
I cannot let you leave Berlin without thanking
you for your last kind letter. It is indeed better
that the journey should not take place, considering
the views with which you have acquainted me ; but I
must sincerely confess to you that I cannot under
stand how, holding these views, your esteemed chief
could think of proposing a meeting with me, and
above all a journey to Berlin. For even if I had
been able, as I have already done at your wish, to
dispense with an explanation calculated to prevent
misapprehensions, Herr von Bismarck must have
perceived that it would be impossible for me to avoid
enquiries, especially from the envoys here, and that I
could not put a padlock on my lips like Papageno in
the 'Magic Flute.' But as man is not a creature
devoid of will, following only vague desires and
instincts, and I must therefore have set my body in
motion either by my own impulse or by that of others,
I should, if debarred from disclosing the Prussian
initiative, have been obliged to tell an untruth, and
such an untruth as might have exposed me, under the
circumstances, to the most unpleasant comments.
This was of course by no means Herr von Bismarck's
intention, and I can therefore only regret that you

216 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
should have been put to so much unnecessary trouble.
As you justly observe, our position is very strained,
indeed distorted. But, believe me, one gets on best
by stating things plainly as they are and as they came
about. I quite understand that there should be a
disinclination to enter into discussions as to who took
the initiative, if it were a question of a rendezvous
between the Ministers of large States like Prussia
and Austria. But what on earth can it signify to a
Prussian Minister if it becomes known that he has
summoned the Minister of little Saxony to Berlin ?
' Let him understand it who can,' as Wallestein says.
You will do me the justice of owning that I have not
only acted with straightforwardness, but with extreme
consideration, as the former would not have for
bidden me to do at once what I asked consent to
my doing.
Your tidings are very welcome ; and they perhaps
show that the object of the intended meeting may be
considered partly attained. I need not say that I
shall be always ready and eager to come to such a
meeting. Yours truly, (Signed) Beust.
This correspondence requires a few remarks. I
submitted to the King all my diplomatic despatches,
and also my private letters when they contained
political allusions. The King read my letter to Herr
von Savigny, and expressed his approval of it. Every
body will understand my caution in that critical time.
In the interval between the dates of his two letters,
Herr von Savigny came to Dresden, in order to
induce me personally to go to Berlin; and on that
occasion he gave me to understand, though very
covertly, that it was tho wish of Herr von Bismarck

' CORRESPONDENCE 217
that I should enter the Prussian Ministry. Though
his meaning was clear to me, I could only see in this
suggestion a further motive for caution, and I did not
say a word on the subject to the King. But I
mentioned it in the strictest confidence to my oldest
and most faithful friend, Privy Councillor von Weber,
and we both agreed that if I should be unequivocally
asked to enter the Berlin Cabinet, I should place the
decision entirely in the King's hands. Such a request
was never made, however, in spite of the rumours and
assertions to the contrary. Thus it remains doubtful
whether Savigny said more than he was authorised to
say, or whether he said what he himself desired. I
must also mention a statement which he made at a
later period. My colleague Friesen, after the pre
liminaries of Nikolsburg, returned to Berlin, where
Savigny was empowered to carry on the negotiations
with Saxony, and subsequently came to Vienna.
Here he told me among other things the following
remark made to him by Savigny : ' Why,' asked
Friesen, ' is Beust so much hated by Bismarck ?
I am not aware that he has ever made himself
personally disagreeable to him.' ' I will give you the
reason,' Savigny replied with the unction so character
istic of him : ' unrequited affection ! '

CHAPTER XX
1863
THE SECOND POLISH INSURRECTION  1 AT BERLIN, BISMARCK AT
DRESDEN.
At this period of Bismarck's debut on the political
stage and of the feud in Germany about commercial
policy, the second Polish insurrection broke out,
with a result more favourable to Prussia than to
Austria. In one of Savigny's letters quoted in the
previous chapter, there is the following passage :
' London and Paris are divided on the Polish question.
There is much depression in Paris, as it is found that
the insurgents are supported from London. The
attitude of the Cabinet of Vienna has been most
correct.' ' Correct ! that is a word sublime,
In its right place and proper time.'
The Saxon Government, like the other German
Cabinets, received overtures from the Western

THE SECOND POLISH INSURRECTION 219
Powers ; but it declined, in a despatch of the 3rd of
May 1863, to entertain the proposal of a joint inter
vention at St Petersburg, pointing out that Saxony,
as a member of the German Confederation, could not
independently support a diplomatic proceeding with
regard to a foreign State, without acting in opposition
to its Federal duty, and that, on the other hand, it
could not forget that it stood in the position of an
ally of one of the Powers who were taking part in
the joint intervention at St Petersburg, and that that
Power, Austria, had not considered it desirable to
demand Saxony's co-operation. We find this loyalty
to the Confederation expressed with equal precision
in King John's reply to an invitation from the
Emperor Napoleon to take part in a Congress.
The following words occur in the King's reply :
' Si les cabinets de l'Europe veulent preter leur con-
cours a accomplir cette tache ardue, si I'Allemagne,
surtout ses deux grandes puissances en tete, s'y
associe, je m'estimerai heureux d'y contribuer dans la
modeste mesure de mes moyens et de prouver a, votre
Majeste combien les princes d' Allemagne, fidelement
attaches a, leurs devoirs federaux mais exempts de
tout esprit de prejuge ou de prevention, ont a, cceur
de resserrer les liens d'amitie et de bonne intelligence
avec leurs voisins et de maintenir les mutuels rapports
sur le base solide d'une confiance reciproque.'
That was assuredly ' correct,' and correct in the
proper place. A country of the extent of Saxony,
although it was then perfectly independent, can, in
such cases, only take into consideration its interna
tional duties and the limits of its strength. The

220 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
Government of a great Power has other matters to
consider also.
What Austria did during the Polish insurrection
was neither sufficient for her mission nor serviceable
to her interests.
I was in almost uninterrupted communication with
the Saxon envoy at Vienna, Baron von Konneritz ;
and our correspondence took the form rather of
private letters than of despatches. I wrote to him
early in 1863 as follows: 'Would that a decided
attitude were now assumed either on one side or the
other ! It seems to me that there are two courses
open to Austria ; that which I should choose would
be to say to St Petersburg : " We are both Powers
that took part in the partition of Poland, and I am
ready to participate with you in restoring order."
At the same time sufficient guarantees could be de
manded against so barbarous a system of suppression
as that of Mouravieff. Meanwhile it would be
necessary to come forward in Germany with an ample
Federal Reform. If Austria thinks she cannot come
to so direct and unreserved an agreement with
Russia, then let her pursue the other course with
equal decision, namely, union with the Western
Powers in the restoration of an independent Poland.'
As to the first course, we must bear in mind the
political situation at that time. The Polish cause
excited much less sympathy throughout Germany in
1863 than in 1831. In the latter year the Polish
refugees were admired and honoured both in Germany
and in France as so many Kosciuszkos, while their
reception in 1863 was certainly not so enthusiastic.

THE SECOND POLISH INSURRECTION 221
This, however, did not deter me from giving Prince
Gortschakoff a firm refusal (as I have stated in the
second part of this work) when he peremptorily called
upon me to expel the Poles who had come to Saxony.
On the other hand, one must remember what
Bismarck was at that time. The game, played with
such brilliant success, of misleading the world by
telling it sincerely in advance what he intended doing,
was then only in its first stage, when the great and
small States all took him for a restless spirit, possibly
dangerous, but unlikely to remain long in power. By
the general public, with the exception of the Ultra-
Conservatives, he was not only underrated, but also
thoroughly detested. That was the time when, as he
said to me during one of our conversations at
Salzburg, 'people spat on the ground when he passed.'
A decided action on the part of Austria in either of
the directions I have indicated would, if it had been
entered upon at the right time, scarcely have been
impeded by Prussia.
I have not hesitated to admit that I should have
chosen the first of the courses above indicated. It
possessed the advantage of a sincere and lasting recon
ciliation with Russia,* and the displeasure of the
Western Powers would perhaps have been less pro
nounced had Austria's attitude been negative through
out, than it proved itself to be when she stopped after
going with them half-way.
* There was no reason to suppose that St Petersburg would have rejected such
an offer. There were moments of great despondency in the Russian capital.
' Vous allez voir que nous perdrons la Pologne, ' were the words that escaped the
Russian envoy at Dresden, and Prince Gortschakoff owed his brilliant career and his
popularity to the pertinacity with which he maintained almost alone a policy of
resistance.

222 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
But if Austria was loath to take the part of
Russia so decidedly, it would have been better had
she closely allied herself with the Western Powers :
her true policy was either a sincere and lasting
friendship with Russia, or the thorough and per
manent weakening of that Power.
What was said by Savigny about France and
England disagreeing because it had been discovered
in Paris that the London Cabinet was supporting the
insurgents was not in accordance with the facts. The
truth is that Napoleon gave way because he heard
that Austria would not let herself be influenced, and
that his reserved attitude reminded the London
Cabinet of the experiences of the Crimean War.
Napoleon III had made very positive and extensive
proposals at Vienna, as usual not officially, but in a
memorandum entrusted to Prince Metternich.
I have said that there were only two courses that
could be of advantage to Austria — either a sincere and
lasting friendship with Russia, or the thorough and
permanent weakening of that Power. Neither one
course nor the other was pursued. Instead of greater
friendship, there were new disagreements, partly owing
to the part Austria took at first in the platonic pres
sure exercised by the Western Powers, and partly to
Austria's humane treatment of the Polish refugees, as
contrasted with . the more than ' correct ' measures
of the Prussian Government on the Polish frontier ;
and, far from being weakened, Russia's position after
the insurrection was stronger than ever. Thus Russia
owed a debt of gratitude to Prussia, to be paid at the
expense of Austria, to whom Russia was more

I AT BERLIN, BISMARCK AT DRESDEN 223
indebted for the rejection of Napoleon's proposals
than to the Cabinet of Berlin ; while Austria's relations
with the Western Powers grew colder, and she was
obliged to keep up a state of siege in Galicia.
This was Bismarck's first step in the ' advance
against Austria,' which he had already foreshadowed
in his Frankfort Reports. It was not to be the last.
But I must return to the beginning of my official
relations with the present Chancellor of the German
Empire. ' Unrequited affection ' did not prevent my
going to Berlin some months later. The chief object
of our conference was the French Treaty, with regard
to which we strove to facilitate the return and the
retreat of the South German Governments. Our
interviews also extended to other questions, and
passed off satisfactorily. My reception was very
polite and even cordial. I remember our walking one
evening near the Wallner Theatre, and pursuing our
conversation. We heard peals of laughter issuing
from the building, and Bismarck said : ' They are
making bad jokes about us.' Farces were then being
performed at Berlin in which I appeared as , one of
the characters, and I expressed a wish to see myself
represented on the stage by the actor Helmerding, a
wish that was not gratified.*
Some weeks afterwards Herr von Bismarck re-
* When I was Ambassador in London, Mr Gladstone, who was then in office,
was caricatured with his colleague, Mr Lowe, in a piece called ' The Happy Land,' at
the Court Theatre. This annoyed the Premier, and the piece was taken off. When
I was Austrian Chancellor, the Director of Police announced to me one morning that
I was being caricatured on the stage in a similar manner at a little suburban theatre,
and asked me what was to be done. ' Secure a box,' said I, ' that I may amuse my
friends ! ' The box was taken, and my friends and I went to the theatre ; but when
the performance reached the point where I was to enter, my representative did not
appear. The actors had perceived me in the house, and omitted the scene. Nor was
it again introduced at the further performances of the play.

22.1 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
[
turned my visit at Dresden before following his royal
master, via Leipzig, to Gastein. We parted on the
best of terms. Unfortunately our relations were
destined to be disturbed before long by accidental
circumstances for which I was in no way to blame. I
will give the details in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XXI
1863
THE CONGRESS OF PRINCES AT FRANKFORT.
Shortly after the interchange of visits with Bismarck,
the German Princes were invited by the Emperor of
Austria to take part in a Congress at Frankfort, i
This was a complete surprise for Dresden, neither more I
nor less so than for other towns, and I had no idea that
it was coming. The omniscient newspapers, however,
were of a different opinion. This would not have
been of any importance in itself. It was only unwel
come inasmuch as it was not personally convenient for
me, as will be seen by what follows, to be considered
the originator of the Vienna work of reform. What
was still more inconvenient was that Herr von
Bismarck must have been made suspicious by the very
obvious thought that I had concealed something from
him of which I was, if not the originator, at least the
VOL. I p

226 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
accessory. 1 shall revert to the subject of confidence
later on.
I pass over the details of the interviews at Gastein
between the Emperor Francis Joseph and King
William, which were not known to me at the time, or
of the subsequent invitation to Frankfort, especially
as they have since been made known more or less
fully. I repeat that at Dresden the invitation was
quite unexpected, and I wrote to our envoy at Vienna :
' A very dangerous game ; but as it must be played,
we shall take part in it.' We did not then know
the Austrian plan. We were fully convinced that
all the Confederate Princes would accept the Imperial
invitation. With silent sorrow, and yet with a swelling heart,
do I look back as an Austrian on those brilliant
Frankfort days, not because I recall to my mind the
sumptuous processions, the banquet in the ' Romer,'
and the splendid fireworks, but because they show me
vividly how great and important was Austria's posi
tion in Germany only a few years before her with
drawal. That all the sovereigns came at the
Emperor's summons, in spite of the at first doubtful
and then decided refusal of the King of Prussia — that
even those obeyed the call who had hitherto sided
almost exclusively with Prussia, like the Grand
Dukes of Baden, Oldenburg and Mecklenburg
Schwerin — was an unequivocal proof of unfailing
deference towards the old Imperial Dynasty and its
illustrious head ; and this tradition gained in strength
after the assembled Princes had had the opportunity
of convincing themselves of the dignified and business-

THE CONGRESS OF PRINCES AT FRANKFORT 227
like conduct of their deliberations. Public opinion in
Germany, too, hailed the Austrian initiative with
enthusiasm, and looked with confidence on the hoist
ing of the black, red, and yellow flag.
I cannot forgive the Deputy Dr Jacques, a man
whom in other respects I greatly esteem, for say
ing at the diet of jurists at Cassel : ' Formerly
Germany and Austria were united by a mariage de
convenance, while now the union of Germany and
Prussia is a true love-match.' However this saying
may apply to the present, it fails to give an accurate
view of the past. It was because, and not in spite of,
the idea of the Frankfort Congress having emanated
from Austria, that it met with so much sympathy.
Notwithstanding the aversion to Metternich's system
before 1848, and to the clerical reaction after 1848, the
Austrians were welcomed from the far South to the
extreme North of Germany, and this traditional and
ineradicable affection had visibly increased in strength
after Schmerling took office. Had he accompanied
the Emperor, he might have been of great use, con
sidering his previous residence at Frankfort. But he
was not the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and it was
the custom in Vienna to include the affairs of the
German Confederation in that category. I have
stated elsewhere how useful it would have been in
former times, had there been a Minister for German
affairs with a separate department, like that of the
Court Chancellor for Hungary.
The silent opposition of Prussia, which soon
manifested itself in the result of the elections, was the i
chief cause of Austria's failure. But Austria did '

228 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
not lose anything by her failure or by the frustration
of the plan of reform. The Frankfort episode should
have been regarded and treated merely as a recon
naissance. From this point of view it was not
unsatisfactory, and all that was wanted was to come
forward at the next opportunity not with proposals
of reform, but with a manifestation that would stir
the German nation to the heart. The kindness of
fortune afforded this opportunity within a few months ;
yet Austria turned her back on the confederates who
had obeyed her call — placing themselves on the
' correct ' Federal footing which happened on this
occasion to be popular — and gave her hand to Prussia,
who had treated her invitation with contempt, in
order to support her in an 'incorrect' proceeding
against the Federal majority on a question of Federal
Law in which Austria only had an interest in so
far, and no farther, as she was a member of the
Confederation. Before coming to the last stages of the Princes'
Congress at Frankfort, I must not forget an episode
that occurred at its commencement : the journey of
King John to Baden-Baden, which he undertook,
as is well-known, at the request of the assembled
Princes. I had the honour of accompanying his
Majesty. It was my task to interview the Prussian
Minister President, Herr von Bismarck. We arrived
in the afternoon. I looked for Herr von Bismarck
at the ' Stephanienbad,' where Napoleon was staying
in 1860. He was out, but soon returned. Dr Busch
has made statements in his ' Reichskanzler ' about our
interview which are pure inventions. It wras late,

THE CONGRESS OF PRINCES AT FRANKFORT 229
and Bismarck asked me to stay for dinner, an in
vitation which I gladly accepted. His first words
were : ' You come to drag us down to perdition ; you
will not succeed.' ' I do not understand you,' I
rejoined. ' If your King goes to Frankfort to
morrow, appears in the Assembly, and greets the
Princes with hearty words, saying that he is ready to
take part in their deliberations, but that as he had gone
through two severe courses of medical treatment, he
must request them to excuse him for a while, and
will return some weeks later, the Congress will leave
Frankfort on the following day.' To which Bismarck
replied : ' What you say is probable, very probable,
but not certain.' When I began a further attempt
to persuade him with the words : ' Hitherto you have
given me your confidence,' he interrupted me, saying :
' I have lost all confidence since you made your speech
at Leipzig.'* Is it not truly remarkable that the
founder of the German empire should have withdrawn
his confidence from me because I spoke of Germany
and German Unity at a public meeting ? As it is his
habit to assume a jesting tone even when he is most
annoyed, he added : ' In this way you only mislead
your friends. You had no truer friend in Prussia
than General Manteuffel. On reading your speech,
he was taken ill, and had to keep his bed for twenty-
four hours, during which he exclaimed incessantly :
"How mistaken one can be in such a man !" ' Of his
royal master, who, according to Busch, was laid up
by the worry caused him by King John and myself,
he only said : ' The King became very sulky at the
* At a festival held in 1863 by the Gymnastic Societies of Germany.

230 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
prospect of a visit from your master. He says : " If
they had only sent me my son-in-law, I should have
rated him soundly ; but they actually send me the
venerable King of Saxony ! " '
The composition of the King's reply, in which he
refused to accept the invitation signed by all the
Princes, must have given a great deal of trouble, for
Herr von Bismarck did not bring it to me till late
at night. A special train soon took us back to
Frankfort. It was towards the close of the debates and the
final drafting of the amended scheme, that the King
informed me that the Emperor desired a private con
ference with the Kings, the Elector, and the Grand
Duke of Hesse, with the co-operation ofthe Ministers;
and he told me to be in readiness to give my opinion
as to what should be done. ' My opinion,' I said,
' has long been formed. Prussia opposes the decisions
of the Princes. To proceed without Prussia I con
sider as impossible as it would be incompatible with
the Federal Constitution. It is, therefore, essential
to come to an understanding with Prussia, who will
probably maintain her present point of view. But
she will find it far more difficult to do so when the
constitutional scheme drawn up by the Congress has
been accepted by the representative Assemblies of
the various States. Thus it is advisable that the
Diets of those countries whose sovereigns have signed
the scheme, should be convened for the purpose of
electing delegates to proceed to a meeting to be held
in some town of Central Germany, Niirnberg, for in
stance, where the constitutional scheme should be

THE CONGRESS OF PRINCES AT FRANKFORT 231
either accepted or rejected without discussion. Now
it has never happened that such a meeting has dis
solved itself ; it is therefore more than probable that
the majority will be in favour ofthe scheme.*
King John was pleased with my suggestion, but
when I saw him again his Majesty informed me that
the Emperor, who had been with him during the in
terval, desired me not to develop my idea in too
sharp and decided a manner, out of consideration for
the King of Bavaria, whose nervous excitement had
risen to such a height that it was necessary not to
ruffle him in any way. I consequently preferred to
remain totally silent during the sitting ; but after
the Emperor had repeatedly requested the Ministers
to speak, as I happened to be their doyen owing to
the accidental absence of the Bavarian Minister, I
was compeUed to state my opinion. I did so, however,
in such guarded language, bearing in mind the
Emperor's previous injunction, that far from convinc
ing my hearers, I am certain that I did not even
make myself intelligible to them.
When the Congress was drawing to a close, an
incident occurred which might easily have been turned
to its advantage. A declaration had arrived from the
Danish Government which was absolutely insulting
to the Confederation. I hastened to draw attention
to it, and to express the opinion that the Emperor
should propose to the Council of Princes a suitable
rejoinder to the provocation which had been received.
Such a proposal would certainly have been accepted,
* Dr Moritz, then envoy of Bremen, says in his Reminiscences that I communi
cated this idea to him.

232 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
and would have made a favourable impression on
public opinion. I spoke on the subject with Count
Rechberg, who was not averse to the idea, but
declared that it was essential to come first of all to an
agreement with Prussia — that very Prussia whose co
operation had been dispensed with before and during
the Congress. However, we agreed that when the
Congress was over, a motion should be brought
forward at the first sitting of the Bundestag. Thurs
day was the usual day for the Diet to hold its debates ;
the sovereigns had left Frankfort on the previous
day. I went to the Palace of Prince Thurn and
Taxis, and was there informed that the sitting had
been postponed.

CHAPTER XXII
1863-1864
DEATH OF THE KING OF DENMARK.  THE SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN
QUESTION IN THE DIET AND IN THE CHAMBERS.  THE LONDON
CONFERENCE.
One of the most important periods of my life and of
my political activity was included in the second half
of 1863 and the first half of 1864. I allude to my
intervention in the affair of the Elbe Duchies and my
participation in the London Conference. My appoint
ment as the representative of the German Confedera
tion in a European Assembly was not only a high
distinction, but it acquired historical importance from
the fact that it was the only time since the formation
of the Confederation, fifty years previously, that that
body had ever had a representative. Some ill-
conditioned wit remarked that the Confederation died
from the effects of that extraordinary effort ; it
certainly did not survive it long.

234 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
I can assert with truth that the honour I then
received was by no means expected by me, although
one might have supposed so in view of the fact that
my almost unanimous election was very popular, a
result which had been brought about by the firm
attitude I assumed in my speeches, and above all in
my correspondence with the English Cabinet. But
all this had taken place at a time when I never
dreamed that the Confederation would take part
in a European Conference, much less that I should
be appointed its plenipotentiary. I do not doubt that
my Schleswig-Holstein popularity decided more than
one German Government to vote for my appointment
to the London Conference. That Herr von Bismarck
favoured it, may be explained simply by the expecta.
tion he had that I would act with vigour — which he
desired, as he hoped thereby to escape from the Treaty
of London of 1852. Count Rechberg gave me his vote
perhaps for an opposite reason, as he had always
maintained that it would be neither right nor safe for
the Confederation to attack that Treaty, and he
hoped to find in a German Minister a certain amount
of consideration for the desires of the Cabinet of
Vienna. This would agree with a story then in
vogue, whether founded or unfounded, I do not
know. Count Rechberg is reported to have said in
confidential circles that he preferred me to Pfordten,
because I was more vain, more pliant, and therefore
more easily seduced. At the Conference I certainly
did not justify that view.
It would be far beyond my task, and it would be
an unnecessary trial of my reader's patience if I were

1 1

THE SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN QUESTION 235
to give a full account of the course taken by the
Schleswig-Holstein question during the twenty years
preceding the London Conference.
In the years immediately preceding that event,
frequent and serious complaints on the part of
Germany were met by harsh rejoinders on the part
of Denmark. In the previous chapter I mentioned
that I endeavoured, before the conclusion of the
Frankfort Congress, to give it the credit of having
inflicted a rebuff on Danish arrogance. Though my
efforts were unsuccessful, the Frankfort episode had
the advantage of precipitating the action of the Federal
Assembly in the Schleswig-Holstein question, which
may also have been partly hastened by the desire
of the Governments to make the public forget the
negative result of the Congress of Princes. Within
a few months they decided to call upon Hanover and
Saxony to intervene by force of arms in Holstein on
behalf of the Confederation. Frederick VII, King of
Denmark, died shortly afterwards, and from that
moment the task of the Confederation assumed a
different aspect. A Federal execution could only
be imagined as directed against a sovereign and a
Government recognised by the Confederation as
legitimate. But as soon as there was a doubt on the
latter point, the Confederation should no longer have
spoken of ' execution,' because that term involved
an indirect acknowledgment of him who was then
in power, i.e., the King of Denmark. The 'execution '
was followed by the ' occupation ' until the question
of law was decided. It was imperative that this
should be done within the shortest possible time,

236 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
so as to settle the question whether the Duke of
Holstein, a country which undoubtedly belonged to
the Confederation, also had claims on Schleswig. An
affirmative reply would have obliged the Confederation
to take possession of the country even by force of
arms if necessary.
This was the view adopted by the Saxon Govern
ment, which adhered to it throughout. In this respect
Saxony was in agreement with the majority of the
Central and Minor States ; but she took the initiative
in the matter, for she moved and carried in the Federal
Assembly the rejection of the credentials of the Danish
envoy and his removal.
Quite different was the view taken by the two
great German Powers. Their decision was influenced
by the fact that they had signed the London Pro
test of 1852, whereby the succession of the Danish
monarchy, including Schleswig-Holstein, was settled
on Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Gliicks-
burg in consequence of the renunciation of the
Hessian branch of the family. But this protocol
merely carried out an agreement made several years
previously at Warsaw, which was preceded by
negotiations with the Danish Government, resulting
in various by no means unimportant concessions on
the part of the latter. The Duke of Augustenburg,
on the other hand, had renounced his claim to a
pecuniary compensation, but this renunciation could
hot affect the. rights of his son. The London agree
ment had never been submitted to the German
Confederation, and had therefore not been ratified
by that body.

THE LONDON CONFERENCE 237
It must be acknowledged that the position of the
two German Powers was not quite clear ; but no one
can justly maintain that it debarred them from
allowing events to take a constitutional course.
Neither Austria nor Prussia would have found her
European position injured if she had allowed the
Confederation to exercise its right as the party most
nearly concerned in the matter. The accession of
Christian IX to the throne of Denmark, which had
been settled by Treaty, would not have been inter
fered with even though his rule over Schleswig-
Holstein had been questioned. The Confederation was
not bound to consider the London Protocol, and it was
the duty of Austria and Prussia, as Federal Powers, to
protect its legal rights and to enforce its decisions.
This duty was the more imperative, as the question at
issue concerned the liberation of a German country
from foreign rule, and as public opinion in the whole
of Germany, including Austria, was favourable to
the claims of the Augustenburg family, and to the
German Confederation which supported them.
Whether the failure of the signatory Powers of
1852 to obtain the sanction of the Confederation
had been intentional or not, they had to bear the
consequences of their omission. Such were the
views maintained by me at that time against the
two great Cabinets.
I now come to the momentous decision ofthe 14th
of January. Austria and Prussia moved that the
Danish Government should be called upon to alter its
constitution, and should be threatened, in the event
of non-compliance, with the occupation of Schleswig.

238 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
The rejection of their motion was followed by a
declaration by the two States that they would occupy
Schleswig in their capacity of European Powers, and
soon afterwards by the Danish War.

CHAPTER XXIII
1863-1864
THE WAR BETWEEN GERMANY AND DENMARK.  THE LONDON
CONFERENCE.
The Danish War will be an incomprehensible incident
in the history of Austria ; less so in that of Prussia.
For both powers it was a sort of self-contradiction.
Though members of the German Confederation, they
had altered, in their capacity of European Powers,
a dynastic succession affecting the interests of the
Confederation, without its consent, and in favour of a
Prince who had no right to it. This Prince ascended
the throne, and then these same powers, in their
capacity of European Powers, waged war upon him,
depriving him and the monarchy, which the alteration
of the succession had been intended to preserve in its
integrity, of two districts, and taking possession them
selves of those districts, after having recently declared
iu their capacity of European Powers, at a European

240 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
Conference, that the legitimate ruler of the districts in
question was a prince supported by the majority of
the German Federal States.
Much as I regret doing so, I must speak strongly
on this matter. There is something peculiarly
offensive to the public sense of justice when two great
States attack a small one with forces twenty times as
large as those of their antagonist. On this subject I
was obliged to listen to much that was unpleasant in
Paris and London. It cannot be objected that the same
would have happened on an even larger scale if the
entire Confederation had resorted to arms, which
would indeed have been the case had there been no
other means of obtaining Schleswig for the Duke of
Holstein. The distinction is obvious. If the strong
have to defend a right against the weak, the weakness
of the offender cannot be urged as a reason against
using force if necessary. This was the position of the
Confederation, not of Austria or Prussia. Even the
Berlin papers made the pertinent remark that Russia,
France, or England would have had the same right to
call the King of Denmark to account, and to wage
war upon him.
And yet it was a hazardous enterprise that might
have brought the Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna into
fearful straits had it not been successful. Had wiser
counsels prevailed at Copenhagen, Denmark would
have evacuated Schleswig with a solemn protest, but
without drawing the sword. This would have been
no disgrace, considering the immense superiority
of the enemy. The Austro-Prussian troops would
have occupied Schleswig, and the then inevitable

THE WAR BETWEEN GERMANY AND DENMARK 241
intervention of Russia, France and England would have
produced negotiations, the result of which would have
been in the most favourable case that Denmark would
have conceded the demand relative to the Constitu
tion. Schleswig would then have had to be evacuated,
and Austria and Prussia would have been obliged, as
European Powers, to prevent the occupation of
Schleswig in favour of the Prince who had been
recognised by the Confederation as the legitimate
Duke of Holstein. This, in view of the public feeling
of Germany at that time, would have produced a
dangerous crisis. The danger was overcome, thanks
to the good fortune that always attended Bismarck,
and also to a conspicuous quality of that remarkable
man which is exactly described by the English word
'unscrupulousness.' It is well known, and I shall
mention the circumstance again in a future chapter,
that the Saxon troops which were entrusted with the
duty of carrying out the decision of the Bund were
driven from Holstein without ceremony after the con
clusion of the Peace of Vienna. In the following
year, 1865, I met Bismarck at Gastein. He spoke of
this incident not without regret, but added in a
quotation from Schiller —
1 It is the curse of evil deeds
That they must ever evil deeds beget.'
' And,' he continued, ' had you and your friends not
opposed our motion, your troops would have been
the first in the field, and would have taken part
in the battle of Diippel.' ' You are forgetting,'
I rejoined, 'what might have happened had the
Danes refused to fight.' 'I had taken precautions
vol. 1 o

242 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
against that,' was Bismarck's answer. ' I made the
Cabinet of Copenhagen believe that England had
threatened us with active intervention, if hostilities
should be opened, although, as a matter of fact,
England did nothing of the kind.' ' Well,' I said,
' that is certainly more than the Confederation would
have done ! '
All this did not prevent the Prussian, as well as
the Austrian, Army from performing brilliant feats of
arms. But such a contradictory and objectionable
undertaking could only be explained in one way, and
it was not difficult to discover what was Prussia's
interest in the affair. When, shortly after 1860, my
friend Savigny was envoy at Dresden, long before
the question of the Danish Succession was mooted, he
was constantly talking to me of Schleswig-Holstein,
and as he wore his heart on his sleeve, as the saying
goes, he more than once let fall the words : ' You
must understand that the Elbe Duchies will have to
become part of Prussia.' It was an old idea, but it
was not realized until it was taken up by Bismarck's
genius and energy.
But what interest had Austria in the affair?
However much she may have been inspired by
friendly feelings towards Prussia as her colleague in
the Confederation, she had no interest in the exten
sion of Prussian territory, and as little in creating a
new province for herself beyond the Elbe and the
Eider. And meanwhile she allowed a splendid oppor
tunity to escape her.
It was almost a miracle. Public opinion in Ger
many grew enthusiastic on a question of legitimacy

THE LONDON CONFERENCE 243
and of the formation of a new Middle State. The
former is in accord with Austrian traditions ; the
latter with Austrian interests. But things of far
greater moment were involved. The time had arrived
for Austria to take the lead in a question as to which
all the German Governments and representative
assemblies were agreed — at Vienna as at Berlin, at
Munich and Dresden as at Stuttgart, Hanover and
Karlsruhe — a question, in short, as to which even the
whole press of Germany was almost unanimous. But
Prussia? Well, either Prussia would have joined
Austria, thereby making success easier, more certain,
and not less honourable ; or she would have offered
resistance, either passive or active. The former, which
would certainly not have been in accordance with the
previous policy of the master of Prussia's destinies,
could only have added to the credit of an active inter
vention on the part of Austria ; and as to the latter,
I may ask all those who still recollect the state of
Germany in those days, would such resistance have
been possible ? would it have been permitted by the
Prussians themselves ? I remember, indeed, that
something was said of threats ; but it is one thing to
threaten, another to act ; and although Prussia's
military power was even then not inconsiderable,
Prince Bismarck has shown on more than one occasion
that he understands that a policy which pursues
national objects cannot attain its end by force of arms
alone. But the London Protocol? I think I have fully
shown in what way the two principal German Powers
carried out that Protocol. If it could have been

244 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
treated so cavalierly by a single power, Austria could
have discarded it with equal or even greater ease on
the ground of her Federal duties. I know (as will be
seen in the second part of this work) from a conversa
tion between Count Rechberg and myself in the
Austrian Reichsrath, that a laudable regard for the
maintenance of the peace of Europe, and a desire to
avoid the intervention of foreign Powers, were the
leading motives of Austria at that period ; but if
France, England and Russia did not intervene in a
war undertaken in defiance of German public opinion,
they would have been still less inclined to do so had
the attack on Denmark been made with the enthu
siastic approval of all Germany.
After the German Powers had been standing for
some time with drawn swords at an equal distance
from Europe and from the Confederation, the moment
came when the want of a mutual understanding was
felt. This was the origin of the London Conference.
The Confederation was invited to take part in it, and
to send a representative. I was chosen to fill that
post by all the votes of the Federal States but three,
one of which was, the Saxon vote that had been given
to Pfordten.

CHAPTER XXIV
1864
THE LONDON CONFERENCE.
I caused some displeasure to the members of the
Conference by obliging them to await my arrival for
several days. After the first sitting, which took
place without me, they had to adjourn until I made
my appearance. Much annoyance was expressed at
Berlin. ' Bismarck is beside himself with rage,'
wrote Count Hohenthal, the Saxon envoy. But
my delay was excusable. I had neither brought
about nor expected my election. As the head of two
departments, I could not leave at a moment's notice
to be absent for weeks or perhaps for months. They
were particularly angry at my not taking the shortest
way to London, and stopping at Frankfort. But I
had to go there to get my credentials. My instruc
tions did not delay me.
I met several Ministers at Frankfort : Hiigel of

246 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
Wurtemberg, Roggenbach of Baden, and Dalwigk of
Darmstadt ; and at our meeting we discussed the
question whether an official should be attached to the
mission. I had a secretary* in my suite, and I
thought he would be sufficient ; but in consequence of
the above suggestion, I proposed that an official
occupying a high position, but not in the service of
Saxony, should accompany me, and I selected the
Hessian Legationsrath Hofmann, who was recom
mended to me by Dalwigk, and proceeded with me to
London. He has been much spoken of since, and he
soon rose to the highest posts, not only in the service
of Hesse, but also in that of the German empire.
The recommendation of my friend Dalwigk was,
therefore, not to be despised ; and I regret that
Hofmann, for whom I had a great personal liking,
and whose abilities I thoroughly appreciated, could
not find a suitable field for his talents in London. In
the Conference he, of course, did not take part ; I
myself drew up the reports to the Federal Assembly,
and when there was occasion for direct communica
tions with the English Government, I either carried
them on myself, or entrusted them to the Saxon
envoy, Count Vitzthum, whose long residence in
London particularly qualified him for the task.
Thus Hofmann had scarcely anything to do but to
answer the endless letters and telegrams that reached
me from all parts of Germany, and above all from
Schleswig-Holstein. As usual, the polite Saxon.
thought it Unseemly to leave them unanswered.
• My excellent private secretary, Fischer, who was my faithful companion two
years later at Prague and Vienna.

THE LONDON CONFERENCE 247
Some of them, however, like the two following tele
grams, clearly did not require an answer. One was :
' Long live Beust ! Down with Russell ! Tell him so ' ;
the other : ' Do not forget that you represent the most
cultivated of nations.' I could not help admiring the
skill with which Hofmann varied the terms of his
replies. Not until the end of the Conference was
there an opportunity of giving him a more important
occupation, namely, the drawing up of the final report
on the whole of the proceedings of the Conference.
He did the work admirably, but I was so pleased with
it on reading it over hastily for the first time, that I
unfortunately omitted carefully to examine the word
ing of each phrase, and one in particular escaped me
which was very provoking and denunciatory towards
Prussia and Austria. Soon after my return to
Dresden, the Prussian envoy, Herr von Schulenburg,
handed me a note from his Government speaking in
appreciative terms of my action at the Conference,
and adding that Prussia would gladly have offered me
an outward recognition of my efforts if the unfortunate
phrase in my report had not rendered it impossible
for her to do so. Seven years later, when I was an
Austrian Minister, I received the order of the Black
Eagle, so that I could console myself for the delay ;
but it is odd to think of the eminent position attained
at Berlin by the very man who was the cause of the
reprimand thus administered to me.
I was made to feel England's displeasure even
before I had entered the Conference. Soon after my
arrival I received an invitation to a soiree at Lady
Palmerston's. Her husband was then Premier, and

248 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
lived at Cambridge House, in Piccadilly. Mr, after
wards Sir Charles, Murray was on leave in London ;
and when he perceived me at the door of the first
room, he told Lord Palmerston of my arrival. Lord
Palmerston shook hands with me, but instead of
addressing me, continued his conversation with one of
the guests. Only two years previously he had
received me in the most cordial manner. I was not
disconcerted by his rudeness, for I at once remarked
to some members of the Diplomatic Corps with whom
I was acquainted, and who happened to be present, in
the most cheerful tone, and loud enough for him to
hear : 'Quel dommage qu'il n'y ait pas ici un journaliste
AUemand ; comme cela ferait mon affaire ! ' I never
entered his house after that evening, nor did I meet
him again, but I heard him once more in Parliament,
and could not help admiring the strength of his voice,
and the clearness and fluency with which he spoke,
though he was then more than eighty years of age.
It is scarcely possible to form a conception at the
present time of the bitter feeling which then animated
all classes in England, high and low, against Germany.
If a copy of Punch of the year 1864 were substi
tuted by accident for one of the present year, the
reader would rub his eyes with amazement, for he
would see Punch standing between two men in
uniform, the one on the left with his head bound up,
the other on the right asking pardon on his knees.
The former was the King of Denmark, the latter the
King of Prussia. And, strange to say, this bitter
feeling was aggravated by an element that usually
soothes and reconciles : womanly influence. A year

THE LONDON CONFERENCE 249
before, the Prince of Wales had married the daughter
of Christian IX, and his young bride had won all
hearts from the first moment. It happened more
than once that I passed Marlborough House in the
afternoon on my way from the Travellers' Club to the
Grosvenor Hotel. It was the hour when the Princess
usually took her drive, and although ' time is money,'
thousands of people were assembled there daily, wait
ing to see her Royal Highness. This spontaneous
popularity has never waned ; the Princess Alexandra
enjoys it now as much as ever.
I said above that even in the highest circles the
feeling against Germany was extremely unfriendly.
I was especially made to feel this by the family of
the Duke of Cambridge. At an earlier period, when
I was Saxon Minister-President, and at a later period,
when I was Austrian Ambassador, I stood high in
the favour of the Duchess of Cambridge, for whom I
had the sincerest esteem ; but during the Danish
Conference I was treated as a stranger to her and to
her family. My position with regard to the Queen,
however, was very different. Lord Clarendon, who
was in the Cabinet, but not as Foreign Minister, re
ceived me with extreme coldness, perhaps in remem
brance of the lesson I had given him ten years
previously, although I had seen a good deal of him a
year before at Frankfort during the Congress of
Princes. During the Conference he came to the
rescue of Lord John Russell, who was almost totally
ignorant of the French language. I begged him to
inform me whether I could have an interview with
the Queen. Although three years had elapsed sjn

250 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
the death of Prince Albert, her Majesty lived in the
deepest retirement, and never appeared at the Draw
ing-rooms, a practice which she did not resume until
after 1870. Lord Clarendon said he would apply to
the Queen, but with a tone which clearly meant :
'You will have to wait a long time.' The Queen
was then staying at Osborne, in the Isle of Wight.
When I again saw Lord Clarendon, who had mean
while been there, he was like another being, most
amiable and polite. The Queen said at once that she
would gladly see me, as I was an old friend, and that
she would send me an invitation to Osborne. No
sooner had the Court Circular announced that I had
been staying two days at Osborne, than I received
countless invitations from the highest society. The
free-born Englishman was always a greater courtier
than the enslaved Russian. But I will not be un
grateful, nor will I forget that even then I experienced
the hospitality of England, although I did not enjoy
it to its fullest extent until later, when I was no
longer under a political cloud. I gladly and vividly
remember my stay in those days at the charming
estate of Strawberry Hill, near Twickenham, and the
amiability of its mistress, Lady Waldegrave.
My visit to Osborne was not only an honour and
a pleasure, but I do not think I am saying too much
when I add that it greatly assisted the cause of which
I was the representative. The Queen, as was then
her habit, was not present at dinner, but she appeared
after it with her daughters, the Princesses Helena
and Louise. I had a long conversation with her
Majesty, and it was resumed next day in the garden.

THE LONDON CONFERENCE 251
The Schleswig-Holstein question was the sole topic.
The Queen was thoroughly versed in it ; the question
was, in the truest sense of the word, a legacy of Prince
Albert. Consequently my task was not difficult, but
I can say that I performed it skilfully. I maintained,
with all the eloquence of conviction, that all Germany
would rise as one man if an armed intervention of
France or England (which at that time seemed im
minent) were to take place ; and I have been assured
on very trustworthy authority that in this case the
Queen followed the example of her grandfather,
George III, who in the early part of his reign refused
to be fettered by constitutional trammels and fre
quently carried his point by a personal decision. I do
not ascribe any merit to myself ; but I can claim a
recognition of the fact that, realising the duty incum
bent on me, I considered not only the private interests
of Saxony, but the general interests of Germany. It
would have suited the purpose of Saxony far better
had France and England intervened, for such a step
would have involved the action of the Confederation,
thus preventing the one-sided decision about the
Duchies which paved the way for 1866; and the
Saxon troops would then have had the honour of being
first in the field, instead of the humiliation which they
had to endure after the Peace of Vienna.
Before describing the course of the Conference as
concisely as possible, I will draw a picture of its
members, which may perhaps be more interesting to
my readers than the Conference itself.
The President deserves the first place. It is
peculiar to England that changes of Ministry are

252 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
caused there not by personal but by party considera
tions. In other countries it sometimes happens that
men who are not diplomatists are appointed Ministers
of Foreign Affairs ; of this striking examples are
to be found in Thiers and Guizot in France, and
Manteuffel in Prussia. But what never happens
elsewhere is that the Foreign Minister gives up
his department on grounds unconnected with foreign
policy to a colleague, taking the department ofthe latter
in exchange. This was the case with Palmerston and
Russell, who were alternately Premiers and Secretaries
of State for Foreign Affairs. Both were undoubtedly
statesmen of the highest capacity ; but whoever knew
them will be of opinion that the one was just suited
for Foreign Affairs, while the other was qualified for
everything but Foreign Affairs. By his easy and
attractive and yet very dignified manners, by his
knowledge of foreign countries and languages, by
his keen sympathy with the national currents which
influence the intercourse of England with other
Powers, Palmerston was the very ideal of a Foreign
Minister. Russell, to whom England owes the
Reform Bill and very necessary educational reforms,
was remarkable as an orator and a writer, but was
quite destitute of the qualities which were so con
spicuous in Palmerston. He never had much success
in Foreign Affairs, either in the question of Poland,
in that of Schleswig-Holstein, or in that of the
American Civil War. He was Foreign Secretary
when the Conference met, and thus was called upon
to preside over it, but he had an assistant, whether
at his desire or not I cannot say, in Lord Clarendon,

THE LONDON CONFERENCE 253
a thorough diplomatist. This was very necessary,
for Lord John Russell — whose three nephews, the
Duke of Bedford, the late Lord Ampthill, and Lord
Arthur Russell, spoke French like Frenchmen and
German like Germans — was so ignorant of French,
a language essential to diplomacy, that he could only
express himself in it with the greatest difficulty.
Under these circumstances, Lord Clarendon was
the real President ; but the consideration which he
was obliged to show to Lord John Russell, and which
he showed with his usual dexterity, had the result
of making the conduct of the deliberations rather
weak — a circumstance which could not fail to injure
the Conference itself.
When I look back on past times, I sometimes feel
as if I had attained the age of Methusalah, so many
of my colleagues have preceded me to the grave. Of
my Dresden Ministry, which lasted seventeen years, I
am the sole survivor : of my Viennese colleagues, ten
have departed this life,* and of the members of the
London Conference, perhaps only the Danes are still
living. If I speak of the people I met, I shall bear in
mind the saying ' de mortuis nil nisi bene ' which I
shall cordially respect, in regard to all of them but one
— of whom, however, I shall not say anything evil.
I shall first mention the German members. They
were old and valued friends. Count Apponyi, of
-whom I shall speak more later on, I had known
for thirty years. The Prussian Ambassador, Count
Bernstorff, was also an old friend, and so were his
* Majlath, Wiillerstorff, John Larisch, Becke, Lonyay, Giskra, Berger, Brestel,
Tschabuschnigg, to say nothing of the Hungarian Ministers.

254 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
secretary, Herr von Balan, and Baron Biegeleben. A
leading part was played by Count Bernstorff, whose
colleague I was destined to become later on as
Austrian Ambassador in London, after having been so
before as Secretary of Legation in Paris and Charge
d' Affaires at Munich. Count Bernstorff, whose abilities
were underrated in Prussia, as I have frequently had
occasion to observe, developed at the Conference a
thorough knowledge of the historical side of the
question, to the study of which he was led more than
others by the double circumstance of his family
connection with Denmark and of his property in the
Duchy of Lauenburg.
I found a new and remarkably agreeable acquaint
ance in the French Ambassador, Prince de Latour d'
Auvergne. His advocacy of Denmark was, like his
opposition to Germany, somewhat mild. I saw a
good deal of him outside the Conference, and we
soon became excellent friends. I welcomed with
joy some years later his appointment as French
Ambassador to the Court of Vienna at the commence
ment of the Franco-German War, and yet I owe to
this friendship many trying hours. In contrast to
the Due de Gramont and the Marquis de Casaux,
who replaced him as Charge d' Affaires, he thoroughly
understood the political situation, his conduct
showing much discretion; and for that reason I
own that I was good-natured enough to yield to his
request 'to put in a good word for Paris.' War had
then already been declared. I shall say more about
this in the second volume.
I conclude with a very important personage, the

THE LONDON CONFERENCE 255
Russian Ambassador. Count Brunnow's appearance
was most striking and characteristic. He, too, was
an old acquaintance, having been Ambassador in
London when I was the Saxon Resident Minister
there. He occupied that post uninterruptedly, with
the exception of the two years of the Crimean War,
until his retirement from the service in 1875.
It was once said of a person now no more, who held
very high appointments, that he was ' une incapacite
meconnue.' This could not be applied to Brunnow,
but he might have been described as ' une capacite
trop connue et trop vantee.' He was looked upon in
London for a long time as a sort of diplomatic oracle.
Nevertheless he did not prove himself equal to his
task at the most momentous crisis of his career, the
period immediately preceding the Crimean War ; for
it was owing to his reports that the Cabinet of St
Petersburg would not seriously believe that England
really meant to go to war, and that there would
be a Franco-English Alliance. Accordingly, when
Brunnow was appointed envoy at Darmstadt during
the war, the difference between the populations of
London and Darmstadt was not greater than that
between the favour he enjoyed before the war and the
disgrace into which he fell after it. At the Congress
of Paris, however, he did Russia good service as
second plenipotentiary. In a former chapter I
mentioned that the Treaty of Paris was far more
advantageous to the vanquished than to the victor ;
and if this result was partly to be ascribed to the
second Russian plenipotentiary, it was owing to the
talent which made his fortune at St Petersburg — a

256 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
remarkable ability in drawing up clever despatches.
France wished to be considerate to Russia, and
Brunnow's suggestions were listened to with favour.
At the London Conference, too, he owed his excep
tional position to the talent above referred to.
He was, next to the Danes themselves, the most
ardent champion of the cause of Denmark, and
therefore my most decided opponent. This was
chiefly caused by the circumstance that he had not
only signed the London Protocol of 1852, but
had been its chief originator. He was, moreover,
personally inclined to make himself agreeable at
Court. When I was Ambassador in London he gave
a remarkable proof of this, by concealing the death of
his wife for three days, in order that the funeral,
which he succeeded in postponing by keeping the body
in ice, should not cast a gloom over the reception in
London of the Duchess of Edinburgh. Had he during
the Conference been as thoroughly acquainted with
the views of the Queen as I was, his behaviour would
have been different. But he only thought of the
rising sun of Marlborough House. He was, above
all things, a consummate master of diplomatic reserve,
although he was fond of easy and unrestrained
conversation. I will give two examples of this.
When the news of the betrothal of the Duke of
Edinburgh to the Grand Duchess Marie was becoming
generally known, I asked him if I could report it as a
fact. ' For you, my dear colleague,' was his answer,
' I have no secrets ; but in family affairs my principle
is silence.' His successor, Count Schouvaloff, when
on his way to London, visited him at Darmstadt,

THE LONDON CONFERENCE 257
whither he had retired, and said to him : ' We are
old friends, and I appeal to your experience. You
know all about England ; Lord Derby is in power :
pray tell me what sort of a man he is ? ' ' Lord
Derby,' was the answer, ' has two hundred thousand
a year.' ' Indeed ? ' said Schouvaloff; ' I am glad for
his sake, but that does not interest me so much as to
know how best to deal with him.' 'Well, with your
acuteness, you will surely know how to deal with a
man who has two hundred thousand a year.' ' More
than that,' added Schouvaloff, when relating that
conversation to me, ' I could not get out of him.'

vol. 1 R

CHAPTER XXV
1864
THE LONDON CONFERENCE.
If it was something novel and strange for the German
Confederation to send a representative to a European
Conference, the position of that representative to
wards the other members of the Conference was
equally so. He was both more restricted and more
free than his colleagues ; restricted by the rigidity of
his instructions, free by the indemnity which he was
assured beforehand for any infringement of them. I
made full use of this privilege ; knowing the views of
the majority at Frankfort, I spoke and acted not only
as the representative of the Federal Assembly, but
also as that of the public opinion of Germany. In
fact, Frankfort ratified every step I took on my own
responsibility ; and I believe I should not have been
disowned had I demanded a portion of Jutland as well
as Schleswig.

THE LONDON CONFERENCE 259
My instructions were as follows —
1st. To act on the basis of the Federal Constitu
tion and the decisions of the Confederation, acknow
ledging the rights and maintaining the interests of
the German Confederation and the Duchies of
Holstein, Lauenburg and Schleswig, and especially
demanding the greatest possible independence for the
latter Duchy.
2nd. To prevent as much as possible, after a
previous understanding with the Austrian and
Prussian plenipotentiaries, any disagreement on im
portant subjects between the German representatives
at the Conference.
I obeyed the first instruction by demanding and
obtaining the greatest possible independence for
Schleswig, in the form of absolute separation. The
second instruction I always kept in view ; but it
was much more difficult to follow, as the disagree
ment between the representatives of the two great
German Powers was not less evident than that
between them and me.
My credentials make a magnificent ornament for
my study, where they are to be seen in a splendid
frame. They are as follows : ' The Sovereign Princes
and the Free Towns of Germany, in consequence of
the acceptance by the Confederation of the invitation
issued by the _ Government of Great Britain and
Ireland to take part in the Conference meeting in
London for the purpose of restoring peace to the
North of Europe, have appointed as their plenipo
tentiary the Royal Saxon Minister of State, Baron
von Beust.'

260 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
History, which in these days is so often super
ficial, has been biassed and therefore unjust to the
London Conference. That Conference was described
as useless and barren of results, but only after
Alsen had been taken and the Peace of Vienna had
been ratified; and yet the only place where this
description could have been used with justice was
Copenhagen, and perhaps St Petersburg. As for
London and Paris, the English Government was
very angry at the result of the Conference, while
the French was very eager for a solution more
satisfactory to Napoleon than to Germany; but
both were really satisfied at having got out of the
complication. Nothing but the greatest ignorance
and ingratitude could have prompted the statement
made in Germany that the Conference had been
unsuccessful. It could not have resulted more favour
ably for Germany than it did. Those who formed
that hasty judgment, forgot above all that if the
Conference could have come to a unanimous decision,
such a decision, considering the notorious views of the
neutral Powers, could only have been taken at the cost
of the rights and claims of Germany. That this
was avoided was a distinct advantage, though it
was not very difficult to do so, as the protest of the
German representatives would have been sufficient for
the purpose. But more was attained by the virtual
abolition of the much-talked of London Protocol
of 1852, thereby putting an end to possible negotiation
between Denmark and the Duchies, and at the same
time to any danger of European intervention in the
war. I can maintain without self-praise that this

THE LONDON CONFERENCE 261
result was chiefly to be ascribed to me. I mentioned
above that the disagreement, which had been feared
and foreseen in my instructions, was as evident between
the representatives of the two German Powers as that
between them and me. This was very natural, consider
ing the antagonistic tendencies of Vienna and Berlin.
It might perhaps have been said of Prince Bismarck
and Count Rechberg that they were ' two hearts and
one pulse,' but not that they were ' two minds and one
thought.' Vienna desired to maintain the London
Protocol, Berlin wished to get rid of it. As Count
Apponyi had, out of regard for his Prussian colleague,
to limit his attitude as representative of Austria to one
of passive observation, so Count Bernstorff owed it to
his Austrian colleague not to act without a certain de
gree of reserve. This alone could explain that when I
came forward with the declaration, made at my own risk
and responsibility, that the German Confederation
would never consent to the Duchies being again placed
under the dominion of Denmark, Count Apponyi
exclaimed almost in a fright : ' Mais je ne sais pas si
M. le Pienipotentiaire de la Confederation est autorise
a dire cela ' — to which I replied : ' Je n'ai pas, en effet,
une autorisation spedale, mais je suis certain de ne
pas 6tre desavoue.' ' Eh bien,' said Lord Clarendon,
'j'aime mieux cela, au moins c'est clair, et un acte de
bonne foi.'
From that moment it became obvious that there
was no need to disguise one's opinions, and accord
ingly Austria, Prussia and the Confederation declared
to the Conference that they recognised Duke
Frederick as the lawful successor to the throne of the

262 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
Duchies. That this could have been done without
a protest from the neutral Powers, was the most
brilliant result of the Conference. Unfortunately,
the opportunity was not turned to account, which is a
matter to be lamented by all who would have wished
to avoid the fratricidal war of 1866.
Immediately after we had issued that declaration,
I went to Count Apponyi, and implored him to
represent at Vienna the necessity of bringing about
at once a Federal decision to the effect that Duke
Frederick should be acknowledged and placed in
possession by the Confederation. However unwel
come this step would have been to Prussia, she could
not have prevented it if it were taken while the
enthusiasm with which the declaration was received
in Germany was still at its height. I did not over
look the fact that the Duchies could not be surren
dered to Duke Frederick until after the conclusion of
peace ; but that which had been done could not after
so solemn a manifestation be sufficient. The Federal
Assembly was in possession of Pfordten's report,
recommending the recognition of Duke Frederick,
and that recommendation had only to be carried out.
The Duke once invested with power, it would have
been of little consequence in what position he might
be compelled to stand towards Prussia ; the essential
thing was that there would have been no double
dominion, no Treaty of Gastein, and no Austro-
Prussian War.
In spite of all difficulties, the Conference was on
the way to an understanding in the second part of its
deliberations. After the neutral Powers, that is

THE LONDON CONFERENCE 263
France and England, whose non-intervention was of
the highest importance, had, either explicitly or
tacitly, reconciled themselves to the separation of the
Duchies, England was anxious to preserve the integ
rity of Denmark to some extent by a settlement of
the frontier, while France laid more stress on a
plebiscite. The rectification of the frontier was
treated rather as a partition. Denmark was called
upon to give up North Schleswig as far as the Schlei
(Sweden proposed even the Eider), with securities
against the erection of fortifications. Count Bern
storff was decidedly in favour of a moderate conces
sion ; and as he did not hesitate to maintain this
opinion in Berlin, we may gather how little he trusted
the attitude of England, after having been for so
many years Ambassador in London. I did not
oppose his views ; but I took the liberty of advising
my two co-plenipotentiaries not to enter on a diplo
matic negotiation on this question, as this would only
bring twofold odium on those concerned in it. The
neutral Powers would accuse them of harsh inflexi
bility, while the German people would condemn them
for being unnecessarily conciliatory. The only way
of justifying the concession would have been to
represent it as leaving to Denmark a population that
was proved not to be German, and to have no desire
of becoming so. To do this the only means was a
plebiscite, which I considered very practicable, if it
were arranged by zones of several miles in extent, and
if the votes were taken from North to South, the line
being drawn where the majority ceased to vote for
Denmark. The district that would have had to be

264 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
surrendered would have been very small. But on
this subject I had reckoned without my host. Vienna
became wildly excited on hearing my plan. The
Government wrote to Count Apponyi to ask whether
I had lost my head, and whether I had forgotten the
Venetian Provinces. The Austrian plenipotentiaries
declared themselves in the Conference against a
plebiscite, while Count Bernstorff was in favour of
it. Austria, in her indignation, overlooked the fact
that what was to take place in Schleswig was
precisely the reverse of what had occurred in Italy.
There the people were asked if they would rather
have a new than their old master, and as the former
was already in possession, the question was decided
without difficulty. Here the people were to be asked
if they would prefer to stay with their old master — a
question which certainly had no revolutionary
character. The Conference closed after some very animated
debates, as a Black Forest clock sometimes stops
suddenly after ticking more loudly than usual.
On leaving London I had one more recollection
that might serve as an instance of that mutability of
human things which is so strikingly evident in the
present age. The day before my departure there
was a ball at Strawberry Hill. Lord Clarendon said
to me on leaving : ' Eh bien, je ne vous en veux pas,
vous ne pouviez faire autrement ; mais je ne veux plus
jamais rien avoir a faire avec cet homme sans foi ni
loi qui s'appelle M. de Bismarck, ni avec celui qui est
son negre, M. de Rechberg.' Two years later, when
I was Austrian Minister, and Count Apponyi was in

THE LONDON CONFERENCE 265
Vienna, I begged of him, when occasion offered, to
remind Lord Clarendon of that saying. Count
Apponyi wrote that Lord Clarendon did not re
member it ; but it is possible that he himself did not
remember to deliver my message.
I will only say a few words in justification of my
two visits to Paris, whicii were considered great
crimes, especially in Vienna. The first took place at
Whitsuntide, when the Conference did not sit. The
interviews that I had with the Emperor Napoleon
and M. Drouyn de Lhuys exercised decided influence
on the instructions of the French Ambassador in
London. That I returned to Germany via Paris
was caused by accidental circumstances, quite remote
from politics. My stay in Paris would not have de
layed my arrival at Frankfort by one hour, had I not
received, on arriving at the Saxon Ambassador's, an
invitation to go to Fontainebleau. This delayed my
return by one day. At Fontainebleau I had not only
the opportunity of seeing the Emperor and Drouyn
de Lhuys, but also the Austrian and Prussian Am
bassadors, Prince Metternich and Count Goltz ; and
at the moment when war had just broken out again,
it must have been of interest to both to be informed
by an eye-witness as to what was being done in
London. But having gone twice to Paris, I was
naturally accused of a leaning towards France.

CHAPTER XXVI
1864-1865
PEACE BETWEEN GERMANY AND DENMARK.  THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE
FEDERAL TROOPS.  CONTRADICTORY POLICY OF THE GREAT
POWERS.  THE TREATY OF GASTEIN AND MY VISIT TO VIENNA. —
AN HISTORICAL DESPATCH.
It was the perfidy of fate, such as sometimes shows
itself in the life of an individual as in that of a nation,
that decreed that Germany, who had done most for
the liberation of the Duchies, and whose represen
tative had been sent by her Confederation to defend
their cause at a European Conference, should be
the first victim of their liberation when it was
accomplished. ' Infandum, regina, jubes renovare
dolorem,' I could exclaim with iEneas when I think
of the proceedings at Rendsburg. I will make my
reminiscences of the close of that ever memorable
year 1864 as concise as possible, which is always
advisable when one subsides from an active to a
passive part.

PEACE BETWEEN GERMANY AND DENMARK 267
When the London Conference was over, hostilities
were immediately resumed, without the German
Powers being under the necessity of paying the
slightest regard to the neutral Powers — a result which
had been brought about by the Conference, as may be
seen from the preceding chapters. The fate of Denmark
was soon settled by her submission. An armistice and
peace followed each other in rapid succession.
Austria and Prussia neither desired to undertake
a war of conquest nor to make Denmark suffer for
what she had done to them. The little kingdom
was invaded in order to compel it to yield to the
just demands of the German Confederation. To use
a legal phrase, the Powers did not act as the man
datories of the Confederation, but as its ' negotiorum
gestores.' The Confederation, which had taken
part in the London Conference, and was still occupy
ing Holstein by virtue of the decision of the two
Powers, had not only legally, but also logically the
right to have a voice in the conclusion of peace ;
especially as after the German Powers had proclaimed
the separation of the Duchies from Denmark under
the rule of the Duke of Augustenburg, and had taken
part in the sanction of that measure by the Confedera
tion, they could not appropriate the ceded territory
for their own benefit, which according to their own
statement belonged, not to him who ceded it, but
to another. None of the German Governments
ignored the respect due to the Confederation in the
negotiations on that subject ;* and there was therefore
* Some votes, indeed, especially those of Saxony and Bavaria, called forth angry
despatches from Berlin to Dresden and Munich.

268 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
the less reason to forget the respect due by Austria
and Prussia to the Confederation and its members,
above all to those whose Governments had taken
up a military position in Holstein by order of the
Confederation. The very reverse, however, happened.
Austria, indeed, was passive, but Prussia was
perniciously active. It could not have been over
looked by Prussia, where military discipline and
order was the first consideration, that the Saxon
General commanding at Rendsburg was bound
to obey the orders of the Confederation, and those
orders alone. If this was not overlooked, it was not
considered wTorth notice, otherwise the King of
Prussia could not have commanded Prince Frederick
Charles to make himself master of Rendsburg and
to occupy it with six thousand men, for such were
the terms of the notice sent by the Prince to the
commander of the Federal troops. The conflicts
between the Prussian and Hanoverian and Saxon
troops, which were much exaggerated, and were mainly
caused by the incessant provocations to which the
Federal troops were exposed, constituted a very
weak motive for so improper a proceeding. I do
not blame General von Hake for not having used
force ; but I am certain that if he had done so,
he could not have been made responsible. It could
not fail to be agreeable to the Saxon Government
that the Federal Assembly approved the course
he had taken, and that an exculpatory statement
was at the same time made by Prussia.
But it may be easily understood that extreme
bitterness rankled in millions of hearts, and that

THE WITHDRA WAL OF THE FEDERAL TROOPS 269
collisions were unavoidable. This state of things
induced the Saxon Government, after the Confeder
ation had ordered the withdrawal of the Saxon troops,
not to bring them home direct through Prussian
territory, but by rail through Hanover, Hesse, and
Bavaria. My biographer, Dr Ebeling, who thinks
it necessary to counterbalance his praises by an
occasional sharp reprimand, says that I regretted
having taken that measure. Why should I have
regretted it, as scarcely anybody blamed me for it ?
Certain papers may have pretended to see in it a
studied insult offered to Prussia ; but the Govern
ment of Berlin was far from looking upon it in that
light, especially as it had urged Dresden to expedite
the return of the troops. The Saxon Government
ran the risk of not being indemnified for the additional
expenses incurred by the circuitous route taken by
the troops ; but it must be acknowledged that no
difficulties were raised in any quarter, and that much
wTould have been at stake had they passed through
Prussian territory. Both Governments had full
control over the conduct of the military, but not over
that of other individuals, the result of whose pro
vocations might have been incalculable.
If, as I have mentioned above, the conduct of
the two Powers was full of contradictions before the
Peace of Vienna, it was still more so after that event.
These contradictions served the schemes of Prussia
very effectually ; to Austria they were disastrous.
Without them, the one would have gained nothing,
the other lost nothing. They were ignes fatui which
Prussia herself had lighted.

270 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
Among the unpleasantnesses that occurred, we
must include the difficulty of deciding, after a country
had been acquired by conquest, who was the rightful
master of that country. That Duke Frederick of
Augustenburg had been proclaimed as such to
Germany and to Europe, did not prevent Austria
and Prussia from treating his claim as an open
question, and trying to decide it by legal advice.
This course was always connected by Austria with a
recognition of the priority of the Augustenburg claim ;
but it was opposed by other Federal Governments,
who regarded the recognition of Duke Frederick as
irrevocable. Among these we may name Bavaria,
Saxony, and the Grand Duchy of Hesse. Hanover
had always been hostile to the Augustenburg claims.
The view taken by the above Governments was in
accordance with the legal aspect of the question, as
well as with the dignity of the Confederation — cer
tainly much more so than the view which ultimately
prevailed. Austria and Prussia asserted that the
declaration at the London Conference was a mere
proposal, and had been designated as such in the
protocols. These were drawn up under the imme
diate supervision of the Russian Ambassador, and
were far from being unobjectionable, but independently
of this consideration the word ' proposition ' is used
in French diplomatic language in a sense totally
different from the ordinary one : it does not mean
' proposal,' but ' declaration.' It could not possibly
have been the intention to submit the question of
succession to a German State to the decision of a
European Conference. In a compromise there is

CONTRADICTORY POLICY 271
generally a provision for the satisfaction of all
parties. With the exception of France, where the
four names of the Pretender were the subject of
many jokes — ' May his reign be as long as his
name ! ' exclaimed a French paper — all the parties
negotiating with Germany had strong objections to
the Duke of Augustenburg. The most important
point was the wording of the declaration made at
the London Conference, which stated that ' the
hereditary Prince of Augustenburg had not only the
strongest right to the succession in the opinion of
Germany, but his claims were certain to be recognised
by the Federal Assembly, and would unite the
suffrages of the immense majority of the population
of the Duchies. ' I mentioned above that Austria
allowed a certain priority to the Augustenburg claims.
This was partly due to the Augustenburg agent at
Vienna, von Wydenbrugk, formerly Minister of
Weimar, a man as clever as he was amiable, whom I
had occasion to see very frequently at Vienna during
the days of exile in 1866. I will not decide whether
the Duke of Coburg, who was a friend and relative of
Count Mensdorff, had a share in influencing Austria's
views. But it is certain that Vienna was more inclined
to embrace the opinions of the Central States than
those of Prussia. It was a misfortune — not because the
Duchies became a Prussian Province, but because
nothing was done in Vienna to avert the war of 1866
— that the opinion prevalent in that capital (which was
indeed sound from an Austrian point of view, as
Austria could only lose money and be involved in
political complications if she had possessions in the

272 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
North of Germany) was not expressed at the
very beginning, instead of gaining ground gradually,
and only exercising full influence when Austria
had still more bound herself to Prussia, and when
the movement in the Duchies in favour of annex
ation was becoming general. If the Imperial Cabinet
had come forward immediately after the Peace
of Vienna with a suitable manifestation, Bismarck's
intrigues would have been impeded if not baffled.
I have no intention to censure Austria for not
having taken so bold a step ; but I am convinced
that she might thereby have secured many objects
at once. Public opinion in Germany might have
been propitiated for a long time, the Confederation —
the value of which for Austria might have been
measured by the aversion in which it was held by
Prussia — might have been renovated and revived, and
Prussia might at the same time have been reconciled.
This could have been easily done by making the Duke
of Augustenburg a prisoner, and promising to assist
him only on the condition of his yielding to Prussia's
demands. Considering the course events have taken,
the Prince and his friends could scarcely say that such
a step would have been outrageous ; and the consider
ation would have gained ground that it is easier for an
unformed State to make concessions than for one
already in existence. Austria would thus have com
manded the situation, and she would have had no
interest'in preventing Kiel and the military and civil
authority beyond the Elbe from falling into the power
of Prussia. Instead of this, the hereditary Prince
showed himself intractable during the negotiations at

THE TREATY OF GASTEIN 273
Berlin because he reckoned on Austrian support.
What followed, belongs to irrevocable history.
Another opportunity offered itself which might
have been advantageous to Austria. It was the
last time I offered good but unheeded advice.
According to my annual custom I went to Gastein
in 1865, and stayed a few days at Vienna on my
way home. I was received by the Emperor, had
frequent interviews with Count Mensdorff, and dined
in his villa at Weidlingen with him, Count Bloome,
and Count Maurice Esterhazy. I left a memorandum
with Count Mensdorff in which I developed my ideas.
I proceeded from the consideration that Austria was
placed, in consequence of her co-possession and
occupation of the Duchies, in a dilemma peculiarly
likely to result in warlike complications. I presumed
that she was as desirous of avoiding war with Prussia
as she was of obtaining an honourable solution. I
put the question whether this state of things involved
any specific Austrian interest, and I answered it in the
negative. Acknowledging that Austria had only
fought and conquered in the interests of Germany, I
came to the conclusion that it would be advisable for
her to apply to the official representative of Germany,
the Federal Assembly, and to demand a decision on
the question whether the German Confederation
wished her to remain in the Duchies or not. If the
answer were in the negative, Austria would with
draw her troops with unsullied honour : if in the
affirmative, she would command the majority of the
Federal Assembly ; and, in case of a conflict, she
would be able to insist on their material aid.
vol. 1 s

274 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
I think this opinion does not betray a secret desire
on my part to provoke war. As far as I could gather
from our conversations, Count Mensdorff seemed to
like the idea. It may have been less acceptable to
Count Bloome and Count Esterhazy, and it had
already been decided to send the former to Gastein.
When I became Austrian Minister a year later, I
enquired in vain for that memorandum. It had never
been placed before the Emperor.
When I arrived at Gastein, the Convention to
which that watering-place gave its name had already
been concluded. Count Bismarck said to me : ' We
have made a less combustible arrangement with
Austria.' The arrangement turned out, as usual, to
be utterly unworkable. When two partners have
two estates or factories and quarrel over the manage
ment, the best way to preserve peace is to divide the
property between them. But if they continue to
manage the business in common, things become worse
than before, each party not only maintaining his own
opinion, but going his own way. Of course Austria
found herself in the wrong when new and unavoid
able conflicts arose. When she availed herself of
her undoubted right of convoking the Provincial
Diet of Holstein, this was a betrayal of Prussia ; but
when deputations of the Holstein nobility were sent
to Berlin to ask for annexation, this was no betrayal
of Austria !
It is easy to understand that amidst these
manoeuvres of the Great Powers the German Con
federation was becoming more and more exposed to
a process of dissolution ; but it is less easy to under-

AN HISTORICAL DESPATCH 275
stand, and therefore the more to be appreciated, that
Austria's appeal to the Confederation in 1866 was not
made in vain. And yet even at the present time
Austrian papers constantly talk of 'the wretched
times ofthe Bundestag.' I consider that it redounds
to the praise of Bavaria, Saxony, and the Grand
Duchy of Hesse that they held up the standard of the
Confederation even in the most unpropitious times ;
and that, seeing their motion for the instalment of the
hereditary Prince of Augustenburg rejected — al
though it was fully warranted by the course of events
— they withdrew from the conflict with the following
declaration :
' The Governments of Bavaria, of the Kingdom of
Saxony, and of the Grand Duchy of Hesse will not
enter into a detailed account of the action of the
Governments of Austria and Prussia since the 6th of
April. They consider it would be idle to recall to
mind that steps have been taken which tend more
and more to bring the national question of Schleswig-
Holstein to a definite conclusion, without aUowing the
Prince, who is the lawful heir, the Duchies them
selves, or the Confederation, to state their views. If,
as would appear to be the case, the majority of the
Federal Assembly is inclined to regard this conduct,
if not with approval, at least with silence, the three
Governments are bound to respect its decision, how
ever they may regret it ; and it is not in their power
to induce the Confederation to assume a different
attitude. But they think that they owe it to them
selves, after having exhausted all the means afforded
them by the Federal Constitution, to declare that so

276 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
long as the Confederation has no prospect of coming
to a decision in this matter on the principle of legal
rights, they consider their task and action on this
subject in the Federal Assembly as at an end, and
that henceforth they will limit themselves to an
emphatic and decided protest against any arrange
ment not based on the above principle.'

CHAPTER XXVII
1866
THE LAST SIX MONTHS OF THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION.
The reader who bears in mind the events narrated
in the preceding chapters, and who realises the treat
ment undergone by the Confederation, not from the
people, but from their rulers, will find it difficult at
the present time to believe that its end was an event
surprising to the majority of its contemporaries ; and
yet, however people may shut their eyes to the fact,
it was so to all except the few who had been working
for its dissolution.
The well-known Deputy Braun- Wiesbaden, who
never knew me personally, but who often did me the
honour of writing about me, related in a feuilleton of
the Viennese Neue Freie Presse, to which I shall
refer later on, that Prince Wittgenstein, the Minister
President of Nassau, had said with regard to my re
form project of 1861 : ' How is it possible to reconstruct

278 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
the Bund? To cut the hump off a hunchback
would be a fatal operation.' This idea looks as if it
emanated from my old friend Wittgenstein, whose
presence always put the members of a Ministerial
Conference of the Central States in a good humour ;
but the simile might have been used in another sense.
Hunchbacks are not of a pleasing exterior, nor was
the Confederation. But as a rule they are not
incapable — rather the reverse ; and the Confederation
might have done good work had its enemies allowed
it to do so. If, however, nothing else is done with a
hunchback than to make him the butt of ridicule and
the victim of ill-treatment, he is certainly not likely
to play a briUiant part. In spite of adversity, the
Confederation showed remarkable tenacity ; and it
may be asserted with full conviction that it would
have been even more tenacious if the blows which
were aimed at it had proceeded from a stronger
Power. The tenacity of the Confederation was, indeed,
so strong, that the end could only be brought about
by an open rupture of all Federal bonds. It is useless
to examine the question as to who was in the right
in 1866 — Austria, who proposed, in consequence of
Prussia's arbitrary measures in Holstein, the mo
bilisation of the Federal forces ; the Central States,
which assented to this motion ; or Prussia, who pro
fessed to see in that assent a violation of the Federal
Constitution. A Federal rupture had undoubtedly
taken place long before by the alliance of Prussia and
Italy, an alliance concluded for a mutual war
against a member of the Confederation. That act

THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION 279
was in direct opposition to the fundamental laws of
the Confederation, and the sole example of its kind
during the fifty years of the existence of that body.
In view of the above considerations, the events
that occurred during the first half of 1866 lose much
of their interest. They were, more or less, logical
results of those of 1865 — especially of the circum
stance that Austria returned to the Confederation
and the Augustenburg cause only after she had acted
to their prejudice jointly with Prussia, and had made
the Gastein Treaty entirely for the benefit of that
Power. That treaty gave Austria an indefinite and
precarious position, and Prussia the opening for a
definite and permanent conquest.
Austria, as I have said, returned to the Con
federation, and that body knew how to forget the
past ; but the logical consequences of actions are not
to be averted by subsequent repentance. Three
years previously, Austria said : ' In a Federal matter
I cannot prevent the Confederation from rejecting
my motions, and I cannot force it to join me ; but
nothing prevents me from allying myself to Prussia
as a European Power, and doing what the Con
federation refuses to do.' Now Prussia said : ' I am
on the point of quarrelling with Austria, and pro
bably of deciding the quarrel by force of arms.
Federal law forbids any member of the Confedera
tion to go to war apart from the other members ;
but nothing prevents me from acting in the capacity
of a European Power, of seeking allies, and of treat
ing as enemies those countries of the Confederation
that do not join me or do not guarantee strict

280 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
neutrality.' That Prussia in this case went farther
than Austria, does not alter the principle. The most
essential difference between the position assumed in
Europe by Austria in 1863, and by Prussia in 1866,
was that Prussia thereby forwarded her own interests,
while Austria went directly in opposition to hers.
When the conflict was imminent, the much-abused
German Central States, who laboured under the
aversion not only of the Berlin press, but also of
that of Vienna, assumed an attitude free from pre
sumption, from party-spirit, from hatred to Prussia,
and especially from pusillanimity. Their policy accu
rately represented the Federal point of view, and
also the cause of peace in the most unmistakable
manner ; for it may be affirmed with full certainty
that, although not one of the German Governments
desired war, some of them did not perceive the
necessity of supporting the Central States by united
military preparations. The fact that in this respect
Saxony did not shirk her task, but placed herself in
a position to appear on the decisive day with a
complete and fully equipped armyT, made her suffer
severely from the wrath of her mighty neighbour,
but also secured for her an honourable page in
history.

CHAPTER XXVIII
1866
RETROSPECT ON THE COMMENCEMENT OF A NEW ERA.
Before I give my reminiscences of the events immedi
ately preceding the war, I do not think it superfluous
to review in a last historical retrospect the state of
things which now came to a close — the Confederation,
and, which was closely connected with it, the in
dependence of the various German States.
I daresay that many of my readers, even those
who are most favourable to me, may have asked,
when perusing the preceding chapters, how it was
possible that I should have regretted the end of a
creation unsympathetic to the people and condemned
and undermined by their Governments ; whether, in
spite of my emigration to Austria, I continue a
German ; and whether as such I should not rejoice at
the transformation which gave birth to a powerful
and united Empire.

282 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
In more than one passage of this work I have
already stated that I appreciate as much as any
body the greatness of that Empire. As an Austrian
it is not for me to put questions and to decide them
as to the future of united Germany ; and the excellent
footing on which Austria and Germany now stand
is so far from being unwelcome to me, that it was
I who first laid the foundation of it. Nor can anyone
suppose that personal considerations may have biassed
my views and judgment ; for the year 1866, without
which there would have been no Franco-German
War and no German Empire, opened for me the
path to unexpected honours and briUiant, though
transient days of celebrity which would never have
dawned for me had the Confederation survived and
flourished. But I should be totally impervious to
truth did I not see that, independently of all political
rivalry between the two most powerful sovereigns
of Germany, the final solution of the German question
in the form it has assumed, could not have been that
of Austria's choice, chiefly because it had a deep
and pernicious influence on her internal affairs. It
is remarkable that those populations of Austria who
suffered most from it, were the very people who
consoled themselves the soonest — I mean her German
inhabitants. If I leave the Austrian for the German point of
view, I must say that in the life of nations as in
private life, it does not become a man who has
suddenly acquired wealth or power to be ashamed
of his past or to ignore what was good or meritorious
in it.

COMMENCEMENT OF A NEW ERA 283
Was the German Confederation in reality so
objectionable ? It is a fact that during the fifty
years of its existence, external peace was undisturbed,
and Germany was not involved in a single war. It is
said — and I myself said so in my last speech at the
Delegation of 1871 — that this happy result was owing
to the long understanding between Austria and
Prussia. Undoubtedly. But this understanding was
created and facilitated by the Confederation as the
connecting link. So long as that understanding lasted,
no German Government had any other programme
than complete union with those united Powers. Only
when Prussia began after 1848 to pursue the policy of
gradually expelling Austria from Germany, did it
become inevitable that some Governments should side
with Prussia, others with Austria. But we must not
forget that not one of the German Governments of
that time ever took a single step that might have
warranted foreign countries in interfering in German
affairs. If there were times when excessive deference
was shown to Russia, and later on perhaps to France,
we must look for the reason elsewhere than in Frank
fort. For years the German Courts were trained by
Vienna and Berlin in the fear of God and of the Czar
Nicholas, and they did not give the first example of
subservience to Napoleon III. But when the
moment came for the German Confederate Princes to
defend themselves and their country, as in 1840 and
1859, they rose nobly and patriotically as one man.
And I must add this consideration, which is often
overlooked in the present day : It is highly satis
factory and desirable to be always hearing of the

284 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
German Empire and its Allies for the preservation of
peace. But the more welcome the result of these
efforts, the more essential is their necessity. This is
a logical and irrefragable conclusion. In the days of
the German Confederation we heard little of such
efforts, because peace was regarded as a matter of
course — which it has ceased to be since 1866 and 1870.
The severe judgment passed on the Confederation
was extended to the system of Federal Union, and the
restrictions on the independence of the Federal States.
But can it be forgotten that the representative system
did not owe its origin and development to the two
great Powers, in whose dominions it was only intro
duced after having flourished for twenty or thirty years
in the German Central States, in spite of the
opposition of Vienna and Berlin ? Can it be main
tained that this system, which has long been identified
with progress in Germany, as in France and Italy,
only acquired full development and respect in the
German Empire ? There are still many who advocate
the imposition of limits to popular representation ; but
not one of them will assert that the time will not come
when the representative system will be wanted, not as
a curb for the higher, but as a safety-valve for the
lower classes. These times are sure to come, and a
grave responsibility will fall on those who are now
using their power to bring that system into discredit.
Not only in this sphere of political organisation,
but also in legislation and administration, it was the
smaller and not the great States that took the lead
and did much that was beneficial. I will instance the
construction of railways. The Niirnberg-Fiirth line was

COMMENCEMENT OF A NEW ERA 285,
the first short railway in Germany, and the Leipzig -
Dresden, afterwards continued to Magdeburg, was the
first long one. I was Secretary of Legation at Berlin
when the Committee of the Leipzig-Dresden railway
was formed. How many times did I hear sneering
remarks on ' the Saxon wiseacres ! ' The Minister of
Foreign Affairs, who became later on my uncle by
marriage, confidentially warned me not to have any
thing to do with this undertaking. And need I
remind my readers how powerfully arts and sciences
were promoted by the multiplicity of the German
cities where Kings held their Court ? It may be
retorted that there is nothing to prevent the Minor
States from continuing to pursue this beneficial course.
But I must point out that there is more than one of
the most important branches of legislation and
administration in which they are no longer able to
have a decisive voice. There is further a lack — from
what causes I need not state — of that spirit of mutual
emulation among the independent sovereigns which
was so powerful in promoting many undertakings.
Faithful to the principle of describing things
as they were, and not as people imagined them to be,
I have perhaps been too sincere in this part of
my memoirs. Truth has benefitted, but I must
protest against any insinuation that I may have had
the bold thought of depreciating the present by
my description of the past. I never presumed to
apply to myself the verse of Lucan :
' Victrix causa diis placuit, sed victa Catoni.'
Had I done so, I should have withdrawn into sulky
retirement. The Germans cannot have discovered any

286 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
such tendency in my demeanour at Vienna, Paris, and
London. As I said in a former passage, the events
of 1866 and 1870 may be compared to volcanic erup
tions. Where the fragments fall, there they lie, and
it would be folly to wish to replace them in their
former positions. Independently of this obvious con
sideration, I am not unaware of the fact that the
German States adopted with sincerity and self-
sacrifice the new order of things. This applies
especially to my native country, where the King him
self gives the example of true and uncontested loyalty
to the empire. It is a slander to say that Saxony is
hostile to the empire. No one is hostile to the
empire, although the same cannot be said of Imperial
legislation, and the very painful consequences of the
law of naturalisation may have made many sigh for
the good old times.
In the vast German empire there is one man who
will, I am convinced, appreciate my ideas, because his
acts are in accordance with them. That man is
Prince Bismarck. Would he, who only obeys his
own thoughts, assert so strongly the rights of the
various German States represented in the Federal
Council, even to the detriment of the German Parlia
ment, if he had not learnt to appreciate their value at
the very time when one would never have expected
from his Frankfort reports that he should find in
them the most lasting materials for the edifice he has
constructed ?

CHAPTER XXIX
1866
THE PRECURSORS OF THE WAR.
In Biedermann's work, ' Thirty years of German
History,' which has been already quoted, it is stated
at p. 455, Vol. II : ' Nothing could prevent Herr von
Beust from driving the country to war, or Herr von
der Pfordten from yielding to the pressure thus put
upon him ; ' and in a note he adds that ' Herr von der
Pfordten confessed this to Herr von Friesen,' alluding
to the Memoirs of the latter. It is remarkable that
the author of ' Thirty Years of German History '
founds his assertion on an authority the credibility of
which he himself had questioned, and which he
accused in a later book of distorting history in the
most flagrant manner. It would be strange if Herr
von der Pfordten had really made such a confession,
for his language in the Bavarian Chamber was far
more warlike than mine in the Saxon Chamber, and,

288 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
as chef de file of the Central States, he urged the
wavering Saxon Government to adopt the Austrian
proposal of mobilisation. Under all the circumstances,
however, the statement attributed to him may perhaps
have been considered natural, nay pardonable. In
those days, when Pfordten and Friesen were negotiat
ing at Berlin, their object was to save at the last
moment as much as possible. I had been dismissed
and was politically no more — by which I do not mean
to say that it would have been justifiable to cast one's
faults on the shoulders of a defenceless man ; but I
would recommend leniency towards those who were
fulfilling a most arduous task under such difficulties as
then surrounded the envoys of the vanquished
Powers. But I shall revert to Bavaria later on.
I know well that that assertion of the author
of ' Thirty Years of German History ' does not
stand alone. But I have chosen it because it
expresses in the strongest words what others veil
in guarded terms. The accusation that Saxony
wished for war, is founded on her military prepara
tions. What I said above, I repeat ; not one of the
German Governments wished for war. Austria did
not wish it. The Emperor William assured me
at Gastein in 1871 that he only decided on war
after severe struggles and with a heavy heart ; but
I needed not this assurance to be convinced of the
fact. I leave the question as to whether the same
could be said of his Ministry for others to answer.
Prince Bismarck certainly cannot be accused of
having taken up the idea of war as a sudden

THE PRECURSORS OF THE WAR 289
inspiration. I was assured by one of his Petersburg
colleagues that when he was Ambassador in the
Russian capital, shortly before he entered the
Ministry, he spoke of war with Austria as part
of his programme. But I do not attach excessive
weight to this or to any other oral tradition. Written
statements, however, cannot be repudiated, and we
often see in his Frankfort reports not only the pro
bability, but the certainty of this war maintained
and proved.
As to the military preparations, I mentioned
in a former chapter of this work in speaking of
the Austria of Metternich, that her traditional policy
was one of contradictions. It was the same in
1866 : the war came both too early and too late.
At the beginning of June, a fortnight before the
declaration of war, General Baron Ringelstein, who
was stationed at Teplitz, was sent on a secret mission
to Dresden. He was commissioned to induce Saxony
to march her army into Bohemia. I have never
been able to find out what gave rise to this step.
It was certainly not prompted by suspicion. It is
possible that Austria remembered the beginning of
the seven years' war, and the lawless occupation of
Saxony by Frederick the Great, of which the Saxon
army became the victim. But what she did not
consider was that the Federal point of view would
have again been abandoned had the Cabinet of
Dresden yielded, and Prussia would thus have
obtained a welcome weapon. Of course, the Cabinet
of Dresden did not yield. It was, however, a plea
sure to me to make the acquaintance of Baron
vol. 1 x

290 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
Ringelstein. Some weeks later I met that amiable
and accomplished officer at Teplitz, where he took
charge of my horses just in time to save them from
the enemy ; and we only saw each other again quite
recently, as during the period that I was Minister at
Vienna he occupied a remote post. We talked of
former times, and he said: 'I have never forgotten
your words to me in Dresden ! ' ' What words ? ' I
asked. ' You said : " Let them box your ears three
times rather than declare war before you are ready ! " '
Armaments require not only money, but time,
especially if lost time has to be made up. Every
thing depended on gaining time, and an excellent
opportunity for so doing was offered by the Congress
proposed by Napoleon III. Austria declined that
Congress, or, which amounted to the same thing,
accepted it with such restrictions that it never came
to pass. She stipulated that no arrangement should
be discussed which would give one or more of the
States represented at the Congress an extension of
territory or of power. She was thinking of the
Venetian provinces when she made this condition.
The despatch sent from Vienna to Paris, London,
and St Petersburg, is to be found in the ' Calendar
of European History' edited by Schultes. It is
impossible to find a more honest or dignified docu
ment ; but neither honesty nor dignity would have
been jeopardized had Austria waited to produce
her stipulations until the Congress was assembled.
As the despatch in question admits, the terms of the
invitation were not such as to warrant the interpre
tation that a cession of territory would be demanded.

THE PRECURSORS OF THE WAR 291
It might have been called dishonest (although politics
have their own standard of morality), had Austria,
by making overtures to Italy, raised hopes which she
had no intention of gratifying ; but here there was no
question of rejecting a probable demand, and no rule
of honesty could forbid diplomacy from using its
option to accept or to avoid a negotiation without
undertaking special responsibilities. How thoroughly
this is understood by the great master of modern
policy can be testified by Count Benedetti. It has
been said that Count Mensdorff, who only accepted
his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs — a
post that he neither solicited nor desired — from a
feeling of military obedience, thought with his usual
modesty that he was not equal to the task of taking
the lead in a European Congress. In another part
of my Memoirs, I do full justice to the eminent and
insufficiently appreciated qualities of Count Mens
dorff; I may therefore be allowed to say that he
should not have regulated his conduct according to
the dictates of military obedience, but that having
accepted his post, he should have also taken the
Presidency of the Congress. One thing, however,
seems to have been forgotten in this matter. The
Prusso-Italian Treaty was no longer a secret, and
its result could only be that Prussia had a decided
interest in preventing an understanding at the
Congress between Austria and Italy. Under these
circumstances there was no danger of any insidious
demands being made to Austria.
Next to armaments, an essential portion of pre
parations for war consists in a thorough sympathy

292 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
and union between the allied forces, and this was
lacking in the case of Austria's most important ally.
It is not easy for me to speak of the conduct of
Bavaria in 1866. I have experienced much happiness
in that country, I was always fond of it, and I
remember it with affection. My difficulty is enhanced
by the necessity of mentioning a man with whom I
had close business relations for many years, and whose
high qualities I fully appreciated. I am therefore
convinced that my judgment will be dispassionate and
impartial. During the Conference of the Central
States that was held at Augsburg in April, I noticed
that strong sympathy with Prussia was expressed in
the language of the Bavarian Minister ; and the
impression it made upon me was so vivid that I
thought for a moment of going to Vienna, instead of
returning to Dresden, in order to ask Count Mensdorff
seriously whether Austria would not do better to
come to an agreement with Prussia, even at a
sacrifice. Nevertheless I thought it well to submit
this question to my Royal Master, and his opinion led
me to relinquish my idea. But I was amazed when I
heard from Pfordten at the next Conference, held at
Bamberg, a repetition of the language he had used
before 1850.* It was in accordance with this apparent
change of policy that although General von der Tann
was sent to Vienna before the war began, to arrange
for a junction of. the Bavarian with the Austrian
Army in Bohemia, no such step took place. Bavaria
did not wish to deprive herself of her troops, and thus
* Biedermann says in his historical work already quoted, that Pfordten expressed
himself at the Bamberg Conference very disparagingly as to Austria's military posi
tion. This could not have been during the sitting of the Conference.

THE PRECURSORS OF THE WAR 293
the common cause was ruined, for the Bavarians
would have formed the left flank at Koniggratz, and
it was just through the weakness of the left flank that
Austria lost the battle.
It was unavoidable that such contradictory
behaviour should have called forth the bitterest
criticism, giving rise to the suspicion that Bavaria
was following her own selfish interests ; but I am
fully convinced that although Pfordten deserved
many reproaches, he did not deserve that of duplicity
or secret treachery. His whole soul was torn by con
flicting emotions. I soon got the better of the
surprise of Olmiitz. But Pfordten never forgot that
80,000 men were then placed by Bavaria at Austria's
disposal, merely to be informed in the most contemp
tuous tones that they were not wanted. Few know as
I do how thoroughly his hand was paralyzed in 1866 by
the recollection of 1850. He was, moreover, a strong
adherent of the cause of the Duke of Augustenburg,
and was highly displeased at Austria's conduct
towards that Prince. And he was further tempted
by ebullitions of Bavarian patriotism and chauvinism.
He even hinted something about re-acquiring the
district of the Inn. Thus my judgment, even at that
time, pronounced him guilty of vacillation, but not of
intentional breach of faith.

CHAPTER XXX
1866
DECLARATION OF WAR, AND COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES.
As a further refutation of the reproach that I had
' driven the Powers to war,' I may allege the attitude
of the Saxon Government against Austria's proposal
for the mobilisation of all the Federal Corps d' Armee
excepting the Prussian — a proposal the acceptance of
which is well-known to have resulted in the separa
tion of Prussia from the Federal Assembly, and the
declaration of war. Dresden warned Vienna, and
only decided on assenting to the motion after Bavaria
had done so ; an instructive commentary on the
assertion, mentioned in the preceding chapter, that
Pfordten pointed me out to Berlin as the instigator
of war. Saxony certainly did not deserve this reproach.
To the very last moment the Cabinet of Dresden
entertained the hope of a peaceful compromise — a

DECLARATION OF WAR 295
fact proved by my passing the two nights previous
to my departure for Bohemia in arranging my papers
and in burning some of them. But we were far from
giving way to a carelessness that would have been
criminal under the circumstances. On the contrary,
all preparations were made for the possible commence
ment of hostilities, with a precision which I am the
more ready to praise as I had but a small share in it.
The Ministers of War and Finance, Rabenhorst and
Friesen, deserve the chief credit. The Saxon troops,
consisting of 30,000 men and 75 guns, were ready
the day after the die was cast at Frankfort, and three
days later they were prepared to enter Bohemia.
Care had been taken that a portion of the gold and
valuables, as well as the inestimable treasures of the
Green Vaults of Dresden, should be packed up and
sent to Munich, under the care of an official of high
rank and proved honesty, Geheimrath Baron von
Weissenbach. The day after the decision given at
Frankfort, a special train conveyed these treasures
via Prague to Munich, where the Bavarian Govern
ment prepared a fire-proof vault for their reception.
On a former occasion I had the opportunity of
declaring emphatically that Saxony did not conclude a
Special Treaty with Austria in 1866 any more than
she did in 1850, and that she only fought bythe side of
Austria in fulfilment of her Federal duties. Friesen
stated this officially in the Saxon Chambers after the
conclusion of peace. Many, people were of opinion
that under such circumstances it would have been
more constitutional and appropriate if the Saxons
had joined the Bavarian troops. The issue of the

296 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
military negotiations between Austria and Bavaria
is a sufficient justification of the measures of the
Saxon Government ; but if the arrangement made
with General von der Tann had been carried out,
Saxony would have undertaken the task of protecting
the feebly-defended northern portion of Bavaria,
thereby enabling the Bavarian Army to take part in
an action that might have resulted in a victory,
and relinquishing all claim to the support of Austria
during the negotiations for peace.
The union of the Saxon with the Austrian Army
gives me the opportunity of refuting an error which
I have repeatedly noticed. I have heard the opinion
expressed in Austrian military circles, that the great
mistake of the war was that an advance was not made
at the right moment to prevent the junction of the
forces of the Crown Prince with those of Prince
Frederick Charles; and that this was not done be
cause the King did not wish his country to be used
as a battlefield. Now there was certainly never a
monarch more parentally solicitous for the welfare of
his people than King John, but his kind heart would
not have yielded to such a weakness. He never said
anything of the kind, as is proved by the following
letter from Baron Werner, then the Austrian envoy
at Dresden : — Dresden, 8th May 1866.
I have the satisfaction of being able to announce
to your Excellency that, in consequence of our
conversation of yesterday, I am authorised to give
you the emphatic declaration that if Prussian troops
occupy Saxony, Austria is ready to send, at the

DECLARATION OF WAR 297
request of the Saxon Government, Austrian troops
into that country, and that Austria will consider
the occupation of Saxony by Prussia as a Federal
rupture, that is, as a ' casus belli.' I have the
honour to be, etc. (Signed) Werner.
If all necessary preparations were made for those
who were to leave the country, the same may be said
with equal justice of what was to remain. After it
had been decided that the King was to cross the Saxon
frontier with me and with the Minister of War, his
Majesty appointed for the period of his absence an
Interim Government bearing the title of ' Landes-
Commission,' and consisting of the three remaining
Ministers, von Falkenstein, von Friesen and Dr
Schneider, to whom was added General von Engel.
This Government at once entered on its duties. It
had to endure stormy days and bitter trials ; the more,
therefore, does it deserve unbounded applause for its
zealous and prudent fulfilment of the arduous duties
entrusted to it.
Events now took their natural course. The first
step taken for the execution of what had long been
planned was the Prussian Note, the pith of which was
as foUows :
' The Royal Prussian Government can only see in
the Saxon vote a direct act of hostility against Prussia
as well as a violation of the Federal Compact ; and the
geographical position of the kingdom of Saxony makes
it impossible for Prussia to overlook the hostile
attitude assumed by the Royal Saxon Government.'
Saxony was then requested to place her troops on

298 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
a peace-footing, and to assent to the convocation of a
German Parliament by Prussia. Prussia stated that
she would in that case on her side guarantee the
sovereign rights and the territory of Saxony in
accordance with the Prussian proposals of reform, that
is, subject to the supremacy of Prussia. Should this
offer be rejected, Saxony would be treated as an
enemy. The answer was demanded and sent on the same
day; it was to the following effect :
' The Fundamental Laws of the Confederation
exclude the possibility of its dissolution. The Con
federation acts within its competency when deciding
on the partial or total mobilisation of its forces ; and
as unanimity is not requisite for a decision on this
subject, the decision of the majority is under the
Constitution valid. Consequently, the Royal Saxon
Government could not yield to the first of the
Prussian demands without being faithless to its Federal
duty. With regard to the second, the Saxon Govern
ment is wiUing to give all possible assistance to the
convocation of a German Parliament ; but it will do
this, in conformity with the request of the Saxon
Chambers, in the sense ofthe election of a Parliament
for all Germany ; and it maintains that the writs for
the election should not be issued by any single
Government. If, under these circumstances, the
Government of his Majesty the King of Prussia
should really find a reason in the rejection of the
proposed alliance for considering the kingdom of
Saxony as in a state of war with Prussia, and
should act accordingly, the Saxon Government could

COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES 299
only protest strongly and emphatically against
such a measure, appealing to the Confederation for
help, by virtue of the Fundamental laws of that
body.' The Prussian envoy left Dresden, and the Prussian
troops entered Saxony ; but in consequence of the
orders suspending all railway traffic, and the destruc
tion of the bridge over the Elbe near Riesa, they
could only advance slowly, while the Saxon troops
were approaching Bohemia. On Wednesday, the
14th of June, the decision of Saxony was announced
at Frankfort ; on Saturday, the Queen, the Crown
Princess, and Princess George went with their
children in a steamer to Aussig. The Royal Princes
were of course with the army. The Queen Dowager
Marie remained behind, and it is owing to her
energetic intervention that many parks and gardens
were spared during the perfectly superfluous con
struction of fortifications.* Princess Amelie, whose
dramatic works are well-known, also remained at
Dresden. In the afternoon the King left the capital
for Giesenstein, near the frontier on the Teplitz Road,
where I arrived in the evening.
I remember two occurrences of that day, which
were very characteristic of the King.
His Majesty had set forth several hours previously
on horseback, accompanied by the Minister of War
and some officers of high rank. I would gladly have
joined the cavalcade, but my six horses, which I
* At that moment Prussia was very imperfectly acquainted with the strength
and the movements of the Austrian Army. It happened one day that a general
alarm was raised by the Prussian troops at Dresden because a patrol of Hungarian
Hussars had advanced during a reconnoitring expedition as far as Freiburg, some
distance from the frontier.

300 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
would not sacrifice, had already been sent on to
Prague, and the Master of the Horse could not place
one at my disposal. The party halted before the
Palace of the Grosse Garten, and I drove up in a
carriage. Messages arrived from which it appeared
that they had started too early, and they all returned
to the town. Soon afterwards I proceeded to the
Royal Palace, and found the King, not a prey to his
own thoughts, as might have been supposed under the
circumstances, but perusing a pile of documents with
as much attention and composure as he would have
shown in times of the profoundest peace.
I passed the night at Geisenstein, where I received
many messages from Dresden, so that I only retired
to rest very late. Early in the morning I was
awakened by an order from the King to proceed to
his room. He said to me : ' I have slept very little,
and have been thinking of the state of affairs. I hope
we shall be victorious, and then it might be thought
we could get back our old country.* But I do not
wish it. It would revive and perpetuate old animosi
ties, only giving us disaffected subjects in return.'
In reply I assured his Majesty that I had never
reckoned on such a question arising when diplomacy
should take up the matter that was now being decided
by the sword ; but that, if circumstances should bring
it about, I must reserve the right of discussing it
from several points of view. I thought to myself
that some time would elapse before it became
necessary to get up early on this account.
These two occurrences are characteristic. The
* The districts of which Saxony was deprived by Frederick the Great.

COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES 301
one shows us a calm and easy conscience ; the other,
the constant desire of keeping it unsullied by any
reproach, and the total absence of any ambitious
design exceeding the bounds of strictest duty.
The King remained on the frontier some days
longer, in order to be present when his army was
crossing it ; but I was sent on to Prague, where
several of my officials were waiting for me, and where
I was received most heartily by the commanding
officer, Count Clam-Gallas. The house where he and
his beautiful and amiable wife dispensed their hospi
tality belongs to my most pleasing recollections.
Some days later I returned to Teplitz, and thence I
accompanied the King to Prague, where he met with
an enthusiastic reception.
I have treated these events with minuteness
because I wished to dispel the idea that the invasion
of the Prussians caused a panic.
The news I received from Dresden gave accounts
of the conduct of the Prussians which were very
unpleasant to me and very discreditable to them.
My colleague Friesen, who has never been accused of
hostility to Prussia, alludes to these incidents in his
Memoirs, a book far from friendly to me, in the
following terms :* ' These events caused the more
excitement because their singularity stamped them
* I gladly add to this passage the following from the same work : ' The attitude
of the public of all classes towards the Prussians was dignified and quiet, but reserved.
The concerts which usually take place at Dresden in the summer in public places
were suspended ; and the public resorts, excepting those frequented by the lowest
classes, were deserted. The ladies of the upper and middle classes were seldom
visible in the streets, and then only in deep mourning. There was no intercourse
between the native population and the Prussian officers and soldiers.'
I do not quote these words from hostility to Prussia, but only because they prove
how unfounded was the reproach that the policy of the Government was not in
unison with the feelings of the people.

302 MEMOIRS QF COUNT BEUST
with the character of petty and personal revenge.' I
•do not hesitate to dwell on this subject, especially as
my rectification of details may induce the reader to
form a less harsh judgment.
I begin with the excesses that were committed
in my villa at Laubegast, but must first mention an
occurrence relating to them. My wife, who has
plenty of courage, and who gave proofs of it during
the May insurrection, remained in the villa with
her sons, who were still very young. Although I
believed they would be less molested there than in
the town, I did not omit before my departure to
telegraph to Paris to request the diplomatic protec
tion of France for my family. My wish was gratified
in the most courteous manner, and not only was the
French envoy at Dresden informed of it, but the
French envoy at Berlin, Benedetti, also received
orders to take the necessary steps with the Prussian
Government. Before these preliminaries were com
pleted, however, the French envoy at Dresden,
Baron Forth Rouen, who had held this post for
eleven years, and who was and continued to be my
sincere friend, had urgently requested my wife to
leave her country house, and he himself escorted her
to Dresden, where she took up her abode with the
children and their tutor, not in my official residence,
but in one of the large hotels. Some days later
Baron Rouen conveyed my family safely across the
frontier. On the day when my family left the villa, the
unpleasant episode took place to which I have already
alluded. Most of the servants remained in the villa,

DECLARATION OF WAR 303
which looked on one side towards the Elbe and on
the other towards the Pillnitz road. Perhaps
nothing would have happened if the entrance facing
the road had been locked. But a man-servant whose
curiosity led him to stand at the open door looking
at the troops marching by, was asked to whom the
villa belonged, and he unfortunately gave my name.
The consequence was that the troops at once broke in,
and extraordinary outrages were committed. That
all my wine was consumed was not unpardonable.
The same cannot be said of the brutal ill-treatment
and outrages to which my servants, men and women,
were subjected. Nor is there an excuse for the
forcing of the locks and the wanton destruction of
the furniture. Insurgents entered my house in 1849,
but on my return I found everything uninjured with
the exception of a portibre which had been torn.
I must not omit to point out, however, that this
was of course not done under instructions from the
Prussian Government.

CHAPTER XXXI
THE HOPEFUL DAYS OF PRAGUE AND THE SORROWFUL DAYS OF VIENNA
 THE WAR ENDS AND MY CAREER AT DRESDEN WITH IT.
During my stay at Prague I should certainly not
have believed that the same Dr Herbst who headed
a deputation to me of the professors of the University
would be my colleague two years later; that I
myself would take my seat in the Bohemian Diet
within a twelvemonth; and that I would after
wards take the oath of allegiance as an Austrian
Minister in the Hradschin. All this was far from
my thoughts, for we indulged in dreams of the
victorious entry of the Austrians and Saxons into
Dresden. The true report of the victory at Custozza
was followed by others which were false, but which
were readily believed. Everybody was elated, and
the Pilsener beer was so excellent !
The whole of the diplomatic corps of Dresden as
sembled at Prague, with the exception of the English
Minister, who had been recalled, and whose successor

THE HOPEFUL DAYS OF PRAGUE 305
had not yet arrived. I had the means of correspond
ing with Dresden through trusty messengers, and I
was thus spared the trial that weighed so heavily
upon me during the six following weeks in Vienna :
enforced idleness, with an office of responsibility and
many cares. My time at Prague was greatly taken
up by my representations to the Bavarian Govern
ment, supported by letters from the King to Prince
Charles of Bavaria, urging the advisability of a
Bavarian expedition to Bohemia. If these repre
sentations had been listened to, the issue of the
battle of Koniggratz would have been very different,
for it was lost through the weakness of the left
Austrian flank. The proceedings of the Bavarian
Government in this matter are explained in the
previous chapter.
The happy days of Prague were of short duration.
Only too soon did we receive information as to the
position and the movements of the Austrian and
Prussian forces which appeared ominous to the
military authorities. The King again joined his troops,
and would have been present at the first engagement,
had- not Marshal Benedek dissuaded him from doing
so. I received orders to proceed to Pardubitz,
from which place, railway communication being
totally suspended, the journey to Vienna had to
be continued in carriages drawn by the King's horses.
I was in the same carriage with his Majesty and
the two Adjutants-General, von Witzleben and
von Thielau. The road was so thronged with
ambulances and other military conveyances that
we were compelled to drive at a very ' slow pace
vol. 1 ' u

306 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
almost all the time. 'If we are being pursued,
the Hussars will soon overtake us,' said the King
in a jesting tone, but with a mien that showed
how fully he realised the gravity of our position.
Early in the morning we arrived at Deutsch-Brod,
and in the evening at Iglau, where we passed the
night, and where I was thankful to the Burgomaster
for his hospitality. The next day was the day
of Koniggratz. We arrived in the afternoon at
Briinn, where I saw for the first time Dr Giskra,
the Burgomaster, who was afterwards Minister.
The news from the battlefield was not yet decisive ;
and we continued our journey to Vienna by rail,
not without hope. At 2 a.m. we arrived in the
Austrian capital. The station was brilliantly lighted
and lavishly decorated with flowers ; and we perceived
the Emperor on the platform in full military attire,
but with a face as white as his uniform. He greeted
the King with the appalling news of the lost
battle. As stated before in these Memoirs, I originally
began them with the period of five years during which
I was Minister at Vienna, and the first chapter
I devoted to the period between Koniggratz and
my retirement from the Saxon Ministry. This period
of seven weeks deserved a minute description in
the history of my Austrian career, as, although there
was then no idea of my entering the Austrian
service, I was frequently called in to exercise my
influence on Austrian affairs. I was particularly
concerned in the cession of the Venetian Provinces
to the Emperor Napoleon, and in the mission to

THE SORROWFUL DAYS AT VIENNA 307
Paris, which was intrusted to me by the Emperor
with the King's sanction.
The day of Nikolsburg was not a surprise. I was
summoned one morning to the Emperor. I found
Count Mensdorff and Count Esterhazy with him.
He told me he was determined to conclude peace, but
that he would continue the war if the King of Saxony
desired it. I had discussed everything repeatedly
with the King, and was able to reply without hesita
tion : ' If your Majesty were to declare your resolu
tion to continue the war unless the King desired
peace, my Master would say that he was prepared to
fight to the last extremity. But to insist on war
when your Majesty is peacefully inclined, would be
too great a responsibility for the King to assume.'
The Emperor then enquired as to the conditions to
which the King would accede ; I answered : ' The
integrity of Saxony and her admission as a member
ofthe South German Confederation.' I received the
promise that both conditions should be fulfilled.
I then repaired with the two Ministers to the
Imperial Chancellerie, where instructions for the
Austrian Plenipotentiaries were drawn up in accord
ance with the Emperor's decision.
It is essential that I should here insert the letter
in which I offered my resignation as well as the
King's answer.* Both letters were made public at
the time.
* I must mention that my entrance into the service of the Emperor of Austria was
not in the remotest degree connected with my retirement from that of the King of
Saxony. It was not until the beginning of September that I was informed at
Gastein of my nomination.

308 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
Vienna, 15th August 1866.
Sire, — Your Majesty deigned to agree to my
proposal that I should take part in the impending
negotiations for peace at Berlin. I received this
favour with special gratitude, as I demanded it in
order to remove all doubts as to my readiness to bear
the weight of the momentous duties imposed upon me
by the present position of affairs, and as to my desire
to place the actions of your Majesty's Government in
the truest light and to give the negotiations a firmer
foundation by refuting many false suppositions. But
the Cabinet of Berlin has refused to consent to my
participation in the negotiations.
As your Majesty will remember, I submitted, on
the day the preliminaries of peace were signed by
Austria and Prussia, the question to your Majesty
whether I might not be a hindrance to the agreement
that it is now advisable to make with the Royal
Prussian Government.
The refusal of Prussia confirms me in the opinion
that that hindrance should be removed, and I consider
it my duty to your Majesty and the country to place
my resignation at your Majesty's feet, however
deeply it may pain me to withdraw under present
circumstances from your Majesty's service.
Thus a ministerial career, extending over more
than seventeen years, comes to an end. Its commence
ment, like its close, was marked by a vital crisis
of our public affairs.
I feel myself free from the reproach of having
been the cause of such crisis in either case : I am
only conscious of having done my duty, and defended
lawful rights in accordance with the principles and
feelings of my Master and King.
I beo- your Majesty to continue to me your

CORRESPONDENCE 309
royal favour, and to believe my assurance that I shall
ever bear in mind the great happiness I felt in
devoting my powers to the Fatherland under your
Majesty's direction, and that I shall ever be anxious
to show myself worthy of the countless evidences of
confidence and indulgence which I have received from
your Majesty. I have the honour to be, Sire, with
the profoundest respect, your Majesty's most humble
and obedient subject Fd. Freiherr von Beust.
The King's answer was as follows :
Schonbrunn, l§th August 1866.
My dear Minister of State, Freiherr von
Beust, — -Last night I received your letter, in which
you ask to be allowed to resign the functions you
have hitherto exercised. I recognise in the motives
that induce you to take this step, the same faithful
devotion to your sovereign and Fatherland that you
have displayed throughout your official career.
I need not tell you how painful it is to me to
entertain the thought of our separation. You stood
by me, ever since my accession, in prosperity and
in adversity, giving me daily opportunity of becoming
acquainted with your brilliant gifts as a statesman,
your unwearied industry, and your unshakeable loyalty.
Your advice was always conscientious and well-
considered ; it was prompted solely by your insight
into affairs, and not by your likes or dislikes, and has
proved by the experience of many years to be bene
ficial. We soon agreed on the most important
subjects, and as I was convinced that you took no
important steps without my knowledge, I could rely
on your implicit obedience to my orders even when
you differed from my views.

310 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
If I nevertheless agree to your request, it is in
consideration of the political reasons you allege.
Those reasons demand the sacrifice of my personal
wishes and sentiments to the welfare of my country.
I therefore consent to your resignation, with the
assurance that my gratitude for the important services
you have rendered to me and my late brother, and my
sentiments of sincere friendship and esteem, will ever
be the same towards you in spite of the change of
circumstances. With true esteem and sincere affection, I remain,
Dear Minister of State, Freiherr von Beust, Yours
most devotedly, John.
Another letter from the King, which was sent to
me the next day, was not made public. I preserved
it carefully as a precious souvenir. It' is a complete
refutation of the assertion that the published letter
was only the result of an urgent request made by me
for some sign of favour, and I therefore insert it here.
Schonbrunn, 17th. August 1866.
My dearest Friend, — I hope you will not let
yourself be prevented from coming to see me whenever
you like. Things have not come to such a pass that
I cannot see you as long as you remain here, if it is
only convenient to you. Yours most devotedly, John.
I went to take some rest at Gastein, then almost
deserted, and I was accompanied by the last Saxon
envoy to the Confederation, Geheimrath von Boss.
He had served under me for many years ; he was a
man of great merit, and I had a sincere friendship for
him. It was by a last delicate attention of the King's

END OF MY DRESDEN CAREER 311
that he was commissioned to bear me company on
entering upon a condition of solitude and isolation to
which I was not accustomed. My brother, then
' Oberberghauptmann ' in Saxony, was led to Gastein
by the same sympathetic feeling. But my exit from
the stage was not to be of long duration.

CHAPTER XXXII
1866
MY NOMINATION AS AN AUSTRIAN MINISTER.  RECAPITULATION OF
EVENTS AT VIENNA.  MY PARIS MISSION.  THE PRELIMINARIES OF
NIKOLSBURG.  THE FORGETFULNESS OF EXILE.
Perhaps in my whole life there never was a moment
when I experienced greater surprise than on receiving
my nomination to the Austrian service. This nomina
tion was in truth especially remarkable in view of
the circumstances by which it was attended. For
some time previously, rumours had reached me that
such an appointment was probable, but I never be
lieved them, and I can say in all sincerity that I
never indulged in thoughts of so great a change of
fortune. I was thoroughly devoted to my native
land and to its dynasty. I can boldly challenge any
one to bring forward a single word of mine, written
or spoken, to prove that I had any other ambition
than that of faithfully serving my country and my
King ; and this ambition was only strengthened by

MY NOMINATION AS AN AUSTRIAN MINISTER 313
my once hearing the King say to one of my friends :
'I should like, if possible, to lend him to someone
for a year.' I felt myself happy in the considerate
and flattering confidence of that admirable sovereign.
My thoughts and desires were fully satisfied by the
part assigned to me in the affairs of the German
Confederation ; and though I liked to receive com
pliments like that of the Emperor Napoleon : ' c'est
un aigle en cage,' they did not ruffle the repose of
my mind.
My nomination to the service of Austria had
been under consideration long before it actually took
place. I know that the idea was suggested at
Vienna, shortly after the sudden death of Prince
Schwarzenberg, by Count Nesselrode, the Russian
Chancellor, who was very intimate with me, and
who frequently made lengthy stays at Dresden,
his daughter being married to the Saxon Ambassador,
Baron Seebach. Although the suggestion was made
at a time when Vienna and St Petersburg were on
the most friendly terms, it had an effect totally
different from that which Nesselrode wished to pro
duce. It aroused, as I was credibly informed, sus
picion rather than favour.
I do not carry my modesty so far as to deny
that my appointment would have been far more
useful before 1866 than after that date, especially as
regards German affairs. I am sure that I would
have succeeded in preserving Austria's dominant
position, and making disasters like those of 1866
impossible. Even my political enemies cannot deny
that I enjoyed the highest consideration among the

314 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
German Central States, for they constantly vilified
me as the instigator of the Federal policy. That
which really diminished my influence in those States,
and fettered my actions, was the very natural jealousy
with which I was viewed as a Saxon Minister. As
an Austrian Minister, I would not have laboured
under that disadvantage. I would have been able
to secure for Austria the third group in the Federal
Assembly in a compact phalanx; but, wiser than
my predecessors, I would have made Austria uphold
and respect that group, thus saving it from the
painful experience of frequently making sacrifices for
Austria, and then being surprised by the tidings
of an agreement between that power and Prussia.
Although I would have been in a position to secure
for Austria a far from contemptible ally in Germany,
it would be a great mistake to suppose that I would
have proved a hindrance to an understanding with
Prussia. I had, indeed, during my Dresden tenure
of office, been repeatedly in disfavour at Berlin ; but
strange to relate, I had also been several times a
persona gratissima in the Prussian capital, especially
during the Crimean War, and afterwards when the
second crisis of the Zollverein was brought about by
the Franco-Prussian Treaty of Commerce. Whoever
would take the trouble of reading the Prussian
newspapers of all shades of the years 1854, 1855,
and 1862, would find proofs in abundance of that
assertion. But even at Berlin the jealousy I have
above referred to was not wanting. What was con
sidered arrogance and unwarrantable assumption of
authority in the Saxon Minister, would have been

RECAPITULATION OF EVENTS AT VIENNA 315
regarded as natural and justifiable in an Austrian
Minister. It should further be borne in mind that
I would have had to deal with the predecessors of
Bismarck, the overweening ambition of the latter
not yet entering into the sphere of actual politics.
And with regard to the Iron Chancellor himself,
I will only remind the reader that he wrote to me a
few days after his accession to power in 1862, holding
out hopes of a possible agreement.
It is certain that I was often mentioned with
favour at Vienna. In the years 1849 and 1850,
Prince Felix Schwarzenberg called me 'his best
lieutenant.' I was one of the foremost champions
of Austria during the Italian War ; and the Federal
fidelity of Saxony naturally led her to sympathise
with Austria, who was desirous of upholding the
Confederation. But it must not be forgotten that I
never sacrificed the independence of my Government,
and that I never hesitated to oppose the Austrian
Government when necessary with the same firmness
as the Prussian. I did this, as already mentioned,
during the Crimean War, and during the crisis of
the Zollverein in 1862. My projected reform of the
Confederation, which I produced in 1861, and in
which for the first time it was proposed that Austria
should alternately assume with Prussia the presidency
ofthe Federal Assembly, was more bitterly criticised
at Vienna than at Berlin. And finally, in the
Schleswig-Holstein question, I opposed both Govern
ments simultaneously. It seems to me that these trans
actions are sufficient evidence that my conduct betrayed
no hope or desire of entering the service of Austria.

316 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
After this retrospect, I must return to the
explanation of the cause of my extreme astonishment
at my nomination when it really came to pass. For
this purpose I must go back several months in my
narrative. The result of the battles in Bohemia, so disastrous
for Saxony and Austria, led me to Vienna by the
side of the King. Early in the morning an Imperial
Aide-de-camp appeared with orders that I should
appear at Schonbrunn at 9 o'clock to be present
at a conference. I found there Count Maurice
Esterhazy, with the Emperor and the King. Count
Mensdorff had been sent by his Majesty to the
army. The subject of the Conference was the question
of the cession of the Venetian Provinces to France,
which was agreed to. This decision was attacked
both at the time and afterwards, especially in Court
circles. I never concealed the fact that I voted
in favour of it, not knowing what I afterwards
discovered, that the cession had been contemplated
even before the war in case Austria should prove vic
torious. The measure was indicated by the situation,
and it was of decided use. It became imperative
owing to the necessity of sending the Southern Army
to Bohemia, and to the hope that France would
offer her assistance in return. The former object
could not have been attained by a direct cession,
as Italy was bound by her Treaty with Prussia
to continue the war in spite of it, which it would
be difficult to do after the Venetian Provinces
became French territory ; the second object also

RECAPITULATION OF EVENTS AT VIENNA 317
was attained. I have never been able to understand
why this transaction should have been considered
an outrageous one, nor why the Italians should
have been so indignant. It has never happened in
history that a defeated enemy has acquired territory,
but the cession to France had a precedent in that
of Lombardy, with this difference, that the present
cession was not made to the victor, and that the
defeated enemy derived all the benefit from it. That
this act, as I have already said, was not without
use so far as the expected assistance of France went,
was, indeed, owing to an accident. After the
Conference I returned to Vienna, and went a few
hours later to the Chancellerie, where I heard, to
my great amazement, that the telegram conveying
the Emperor's decision had not yet been sent to
Paris. It was not despatched until late in the
afternoon. This delay was attended with the most
beneficial results. Prince Metternich received the
telegram at 9 p.m., and took it at once to the Tuileries.
Napoleon was delighted at the news, and gave
orders for its appearance in the Moniteur. On the
following day Prince Napoleon, Lavalette and Rouher
came and protested before the Emperor against
the acceptance of an offer which would offend Italy
and burthen France with an obligation towards
Austria. It was too late, for the. Moniteur had
already announced the acceptance of Austria's
offer. If the telegram had been sent at once it
would have arrived at Paris in the course of the
morning, and the protests of Prince Napoleon and
his friends would undoubtedly have been effectual.

318 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
But Napoleon III could not avoid the moral
obligation which was dreaded by the opponents
of the proposal. I was in a position to urge this
obligation upon him, as I shall show later on ; and
it has been proved that the intervention of Benedetti
contributed powerfully towards the acceptance of
the conditions of peace, which were, all things
considered, moderate for Austria. The Emperor
William said to me at Gastein in 1871: 'I have
been most generous to Austria ; I did not wish to
be involved in a war with France.'
During the following week I held no further com
munication with the Ballplatz ; and I was only once
summoned to the Hofburg in company with the King,
when the news was received of the sudden dispersion
of the Bundestag. On the 9th of July, very late at
night, Count Maurice Esterhazy entered my room,
and told me that the Emperor wished to speak to me,
and that there was a question of my being sent to
Paris in order to induce the Emperor Napoleon to
intervene more forcibly on behalf of Austria. Though
not prepared for this mission, I was not surprised at
it. It was known in Vienna that I had been
occasionally in personal communication with the
Emperor of the French, and that he had always
accorded me a sympathetic reception. I did not fail
to perceive that the mission had little prospect of
success, and that it would debar me for ever from
returning to my post -at Dresden. These considera
tions could not make me draw back, and I determined
to fulfil the mission with which I was entrusted.
Perhaps I might be successful at least in obtaining

MY PARIS MISSION 319
something for poor Saxony, — which I actually
did. Count Esterhazy conducted me to the Emperor,
and it was on that occasion that I became acquainted
with the corridors of the Burg, having hitherto only
passed up the grand staircase opposite the chief
entrance. I did not hesitate to declare that I was
ready to undertake the mission if the King would
allow me to do so, though I did not conceal my doubts
as to the prospect of success. I received neither
written nor oral instructions. Everything was left to
my discretion, and the Emperor gave me an autograph
letter as my credentials.
How often have I read in the National Liberal
papers expressions like the following : ' Beust went
to see his friend Napoleon.' ' Beust was amusing
himself in Paris.' In a feuilleton of the Neue Freie
Presse Herr Braun- Wiesbaden wrote some years
later that I ' was a great fool to scamper off to
Paris.' I said nothing ; but now that I am writing
history, I may be allowed — not for my own sake, but
for that of the cause I served — to recall that Imperial
autograph, which I preserve as a precious heirloom.
The next evening I left for Paris, and the
Emperor Napoleon received me a few hours after my
arrival. I had conferred previously with Prince
Metternich and Count Seebach, the Saxon Ambas
sador, and had been informed by them that it was too
late. Prince Reuss, who was then the Prussian envoy
at Munich, but had previously been accredited to the
Court of the Tuileries, where he was very much liked,

320 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST.
had been sent to Paris on a secret mission, leaving at
the very moment of my arrival. Had I been sent
the day after Koniggratz, I might have been more
successful. I had but little hope from the first, and even less
when I saw the Emperor and heard him speak. It
was a great misfortune for Austria that he was at
that moment suffering intense pain from an internal
complaint, which greatly impaired both his physical
and his intellectual powers. A year later I saw him
at Salzburg as vigorous, both bodily and mentally, as
ever. But in 1866 he did nothing but mutter ' Je ne
suis pas pr6t a la guerre.' I endeavoured in vain to
instil into him a more enterprising spirit. ' Sire,' I
said, 'je ne demande pas que vous fassiez la guerre,
je suis malgre tout assez bon AUemand pour ne pas
meme le desirer, mais il ne s'agit pas de cela. Vous
avez cent milles hommes a Chalons, dirigez-les sur la
frontiere, faites partir une escadre pour la mer du
Nord, c'est tout ce qu'il faut. La ligne d'operation de
l'armee prussienne est deja trop etendue pour que
celle-ci ne soit pas obligee de faire halte ; a Vienne, a
Munic, a, Stuttgart on reprend courage, et I'Allemagne
vous accepte avec , reconnaissance comme mediateur.
Si vous ne faites pas cela, vous aurez peut-etre vous-
m6me la guerre avec la Prusse dans cinq ou six ans,
et alors je vous promets que toute 1' Allemagne
marchera avec elle.'
I also had an interview with Drouyn de Lhuys.
Although more in favour of Austria than of Prussia,
he advised the immediate conclusion of peace, and
when I addressed the above words to him, he rode the

MY PARIS MISSION 321
high horse and rejoined : ' Si on nous attaque, nous,
nous saurons bien nous defendre.'
Later on, when I was Ambassador in Paris,
Drouyn de Lhuys spoke to me in great detail about
the events of 1866, and laid stress on the fact that by
his advice energetic steps had been decided upon,
but were frustrated by other influences. Count
d'Harcourt says the same in his book about Drouyn
de Lhuys. I do not contradict either ; but I cannot
forget that in those critical times Drouyn de Lhuys
was the representative of the policy which was
adopted and not of that which was rejected.
Nevertheless I succeeded in two points. For
Austria, I obtained from the Emperor Napoleon the
acknowledgment of his moral obligation to take her part
in the approaching negotiations for peace, in considera
tion of the cession of the Venetian Provinces. In
this I was most loyally supported by Count Walewski,
then President of the Corps Legislatif, a relative of
the Emperor and my friend.* For Saxony I obtained
the promise that France would insist upon the main
tenance of the integrity of her territory. I may say
that at that time I saved Saxony from utter annihila
tion : for, however favourably Austria may have been
disposed towards her, it may well be doubted whether
Austria could have persisted in her support of Saxony
* During the debates of the delegations in 1870-1, Giskra stated that Bismarck,
when Briinn was occupied in 1866, had sent for him, who was then the Burgomaster
of Briinn, and had requested him to inform the Vienna Cabinet that Prussia was
ready to conclude peace at Briinn, provided it were done at once and before France
intervened : and that the conditions of peace then imposed were moderate, as no war
indemnity was demanded, and South Germany was to be left under the supremacy
of Austria. I have already stated why I refrained from contradicting this statement
at the time. It was perfectly groundless, and can only have originated in a mis
understanding. The French mediation, far from being injurious, was of signal
advantage to Austria.
VOL. I X

322 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
had France not been there to back her. I saw the
two leaders of the Austrian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs on the day of the Nikolsburg Convention, and
I was thoroughly acquainted with what was going on
behind the scenes ; and I know that the case was as I
have stated it.*
After staying a few days in Paris, I sent a report to
Count Mensdorff. On my return to Vienna, I found
everyone in better spirits. The Archduke Albrecht
had arrived with the Southern Army : all spoke of
energetic resistance and a continuation of the war. I
was invited to a State dinner at Schonbrunn in honour
of the King of Hanover, who had just taken refuge in
the Austrian capital. The Emperor spoke kindly
and gratefully of my Paris mission. I shall always
say that I never experienced the ' gratitude of the
House of Austria,' from him, but only at times from
* My Mission to Paris reminds me of a memorable negotiation with Baron .Tames
Rothschild. The Saxon Government had taken care that all the portable treasures
of the palace should be sent to Munich, where a fire-proof vault in one of the state-
buildings was placed at our disposal. As General Rabenhorst deserves the credit of
having got the army ready for war, so the Minister of Finance, von Friesen, deserves
that of having removed these treasures at the right moment. Several days before
the Prussians entered the town, they were conveyed via Prague to Munich. They
consisted of part of the contents of the Griine Gewblbe, State papers, and cash.
There was no fear of their being stolen, as they were in the custody of the Geheim-
rath von Weissenbach, whose long services to the State were a guarantee of hii
integrity ; but when the skirmishes in the North of Bavaria ended so unfortunately,
there was reason to fear that the Prussians would advance as far as Munich, and I
found myself responsible for a property worth more than 40,000,000 thalers. My
first thought was how to remove the gold, which was packed up in casks. I hit upon
the idea of investing it with the Rothschilds' of Paris. They offered two per cent.
interest. These terms were, under the circumstances, acceptable. When everything
seemed settled, old Baron James looked at me with his weak eyes, and said : ' Pray
tell me : are not the Prussians in Dresden ? ' 'Of course they are,' I answered : ' or
I should not be here.' ' In that case,' said Baron James, ' I shall give up the money
if the Prussians ask for it.' 'You would certainly not lose by that transaction,'
I replied, 'but I cannot agree to leave the money with you on those terms.' I
then entered into communication with the Swiss envoy in Paris, who obtained the
consent of the Canton of Zurich to take charge of the treasure if necessary ; and I
telegraphed to Munich that a, special train should be held in readiness the moment
the Prussians crossed the Danube. But the truce soon made this measure superfluous

THE PRELIMINARIES OF NIKOLSBURG 323
his well-beloved subjects. Count Mensdorff and
Count Esterhazy ignored my mission altogether ; I
did not receive from the Ministry either thanks or
payment towards the expenses of my journey. I
gave myself the pleasure, when I assumed office in
the Ballplatz, of leaving this debt unpaid.
The sanguine hopes of the Austrians were of short
duration ; the lost battles on Hungarian soil, and the
other symptoms that were showing themselves in that
country, produced great depression. The spirit of
the Viennese population, which had been martial and
patriotic even after Koniggratz, gave way to complete
discouragement and utter indifference. The peace of
Nikolsburg was not a surprise.
I have seldom met a man who presented more
psychological contradictions than the late Count
Mensdorff. His chivalrous sense of honour and
devotion to his Imperial master were well known
and valued, as were his excessive modesty and un
assuming disposition. Less known, perhaps, was
his ability, which was certainly remarkable, but was
combined with an absolute incapacity to make his
views prevail. In his conversations with me he
always showed a strong and acute judgment, subor
dinated, however, to other considerations which were
absolutely inscrutable. It may have been owing to
his habits of military discipline that he decided to
obey the Emperor's commands, and to accept the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs after he had repeatedly
stated that he had not the qualities necessary for
that post ; but this excuse cannot apply to his con
duct in the year 1866, when he might probably

324 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
have prevented the war had he emphasized his sound
views as to the result of the conflict by a decided
refusal to remain in the Cabinet. This tendency
to sink his individuality was illustrated in an almost
ludicrous way during his tenure of office by his
acceptance of the co-operation of Count Maurice
Esterhazy. On the few occasions when I visited
him, I never took my seat to talk about business
but the door opened, and little Esterhazy entered,
and sat down by the side of the Minister as a music-
master seats himself by his pupil. Although
Mensdorff severely condemned all the despatches
that aggravated the situation and prepared war, he
was weak enough to sign them.
Count Maurice Esterhazy was his exact opposite.
Count Mensdorff's judgment perceived what was
practical and advisable ; Count "Esterhazy's showed
itself in negation. The former could never carry
his recommendations, the latter always succeeded in
carrying his objections. At the Austrian embassy
there was for many years a man of great wit and
originality, a native of Ragusa. He described Count
Esterhazy admirably by saying that he was a man
who passed his life in looking through a microscope
at a drop of water, for the purpose of discovering
a lot of insects which the Creator never intended
us to see. I have good cause to believe that it was
owing to him that the advice .which I offered as
Saxon Minister in 1865, shortly before the Conven
tion of Gastein, and which would, in all likelihood,
have preserved Austria from the war of 1866, was
rejected.

THE PRELIMINARIES OF NIKOLSBURG 325
On the lamentable day of the Nikolsburg Con
vention these Ministers vied with each other in
asserting that they had never wished for the war
which had ended so unfortunately. These assertions
could not justify either of them, and least of all
Count Esterhazy, for his objections, even more than
Count Mensdorff's want of firmness, induced Austria
to reject the Paris Conference which she had already
accepted, and which might in any case have afforded
her three weeks more for preparations. I have been
assured by those who know, that his secret thought
was that a duel between Prussia and Austria was
inevitable as a question of honour, and that in the
result neither party being a gainer, Germany would
be divided between the two, both parties adopting
with regard to their new German possessions the
internal policy hitherto pursued by Bismarck in
Prussia. It was partly owing to this secret thought,
which, however, was not kept secret, .that Bavaria
assumed so lukewarm an attitude on the outbreak
of hostilities, thereby causing the disasters which
ensued. The integrity of Saxony was conceded at Nikols
burg; but as soon as the demand for her admittance
into the South German Confederation was broached,
Bismarck sprang up from his chair, threatening
to break off the negotiations. I was prepared for
this refusal, and had made the request in order to
have something to yield.
I did not, however, as already stated, myself
take part in the Conference. When we were assured
of Prussia's readiness to negotiate peace, I proposed

326 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
to the King that I should be entrusted with the
negotiation. In the very improbable event of Berlin
not opposing my appointment, I would have been of
great use, owing to my accurate knowledge of all
the episodes which preceded the war, and to my
consequent ability to dispel many regrettable mis
constructions of Saxon policy. But my admission
was most unlikely, and this afforded a ground to
provoke a refusal which would furnish an excellent
reason for my resignation and facilitate the King's
acceptance of it.
The four weeks that elapsed between the signature
of the Nikolsburg Preliminaries and my resignation
were the saddest period of my life. The loneliness of
exile made itself felt more and more, though I felt it
rather for the King's sake than for mine. The
Austrians looked upon me as an unwelcome visitor
at the ' Romische Kaiser,' and the man whose
energetic conduct had been praised to the skies by
the Vienna papers, who had even in Prague been
hailed as a 'true man,' was now frowned upon as
the supposed promoter of the war. No supposition
could have, been more absurd or mistaken. I had
indeed always endeavoured to keep Austria on
Federal ground ; but my advice had only one draw
back : that of never being followed. In vain did
I implore Austria to espouse the cause of the Central
and Minor States in the question of the Duchies,
as their attitude was in accordance with the senti
ments of the whole nation; in vain did I implore
Count Rechberg, through the agency of Count
Apponyi, after the Duke of Augustenburg had

THE FORGETFULNESS OF EXILE 327
been proclaimed at the London Conference, to
complete the transaction by a Federal decision ; in
vain did I recommend a satisfactory conclusion of the
Conference by a plebiscite of the inhabitants of the
Duchies ; — in vain did I urge Austria to oppose
the withdrawal of the Federal troops from Holstein ;
in vain did I warmly recommend, immediately
before war was declared, the acceptance of the
Paris Conference ; — in vain did I protest against
the introduction of the proposal of mobilisation in the
Federal Assembly on the 14th of June.
Saxony was the only central State whose arma
ments were completed ; but not with a warlike
intention. So much did I hope that war would be
averted, that I passed two nights in sorting and
burning my papers after the Prussian declaration
of war was issued.
But Vienna was glad to have a scapegoat. Such
mutability is engrained in human nature, and it was
my error not to have borne this truth in mind in
the following year of dazzling popularity. But what
most deeply wounded me was the total absence of
the hospitality due to the friend and confederate.
Count Mensdorff quite forgot my presence. Only
two days before my departure did I receive an
invitation, which I of course refused. I wrote to
a friend in Saxony : ' To-morrow I leave Vienna.
I will shake the dust off my feet. I will not return
there in a hurry.' I did not leave without present
ing myself to the Emperor. His Majesty received
me graciously, but the audience barely lasted ten
minutes.

328 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
How great was my surprise, when, a week later,
the Kanzleidirektor, Ritter von Braun, entered my
room at Gastein one evening with the intelligence
that the Emperor offered me the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.

CHAPTER XXXIII
1866
INCOGNITO MINISTER AT GASTEIN.  FIRST RECEPTION BY THE EMPEROR
AT ISCHL.  LETTER FROM THE KING.  VOYAGE TO SWITZERLAND
AND ON THE RHINE.  VISIT AT PRAGUE.  CARDINAL PRINCE
SCHWARZENBERG AND COUNT BELCREDI.  THE THREE BROTHERS
THUN.  ARRIVAL AT THE BALLPLATZ.  ADDRESS TO THE
OFFICIALS.
It would have been an affectation quite foreign to
my nature had I hesitated to accept office. Never
theless it would be a great mistake to suppose that
I had no choice left, and that I must have been
only too thankful to be raised from such a depth
of wretchedness to such a pinnacle of greatness. I
was indeed at that moment an exile from my native
land, but what a host of incredible transformations
had I witnessed ! My attachment to my country
was sincerg and profound ; it led to my attachment
to the Minor States, for, which I have as often
been censured ; and my ambition might have been
gratified at a far less cost had it taken another course.

330 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
My enemies have never denied that I was gifted with
versatility and talent ; I could therefore have found
a future at home under very easy conditions, instead
of entering unknown spheres, beset with countless
difficulties. But here too I was prompted by my
feelings. For the time being, my return to Germany
only offered me the alternative of defection or con
spiracy. I was made for neither.
I therefore gratefully accepted what was offered
me. Staatsrath Braun had received instructions to
consult my wishes. I had none in particular. When
I saw Herr von Braun again, and he told me that the
Emperor was in the habit of rising at 5 a.m., and
sometimes summoned the Ministers at 7, I expressed
one wish only : that his Majesty should never send
for me before 9 o'clock, as I went to bed late and
did not get up early. The Emperor never forgot to
comply with this request.
Thus, not much more than a fortnight after my
resignation, I found myself again a Minister. I am
telling the truth when I declare that, in spite of a
natural feeling of pride and gratification, the loss of
the independence I had long wished for, and had at
last attained, filled me with regret. That elastic
nature which has often been recognised in me soon
fitted itself into the new circumstances. I had
already entered into relations which would have
enabled me to derive advantages from the use of my
pen that hitherto had been forbidden to me, and the
prospect thus opened out had great charms for me.
But I speedily made myself familiar with my new
career.

INCOGNITO MINISTER AT GASTEIN 331
I attached one condition to my acceptance — that
my nomination should be kept secret until the
negotiations for peace between Prussia and Saxony
were concluded ; for I knew only too well that the
disclosure of the news would injure my native country.
I observed the strictest silence on the subject. The
Cabinet of Vienna was less prudent ; but Prussia
so fully believed in my political death and burial, that
she never dreamed of my resurrection.
I was still in correspondence with the Saxon
envoy at Vienna, Herr von Konneritz, and, by his
intervention, indirectly with the King. My constant
advice was that his Majesty should return to Saxony
under whatever conditions might be imposed, and
above all draw nearer to the frontier. This was done
soon afterwards, the King removing to Teplitz.
I remained some weeks longer at Gastein, the
Austrians taking me for a dismissed Saxon Minister,
while I was actually a Minister in their own Govern
ment. I felt very much encouraged at repeatedly
hearing the wish expressed that I should enter the
service of Austria. From Salzburg I received orders
from the Emperor to proceed to Ischl ; in the latter
place I saw him for the first time as my sovereign,
but this was still, or should have been, a secret. The
Emperor informed me that Count Mensdorff and
Count Esterhazy were about to resign, adding that he
had the greatest confidence in Count Belcredi and
would be very unwilling to part with him. My reply
was that I should think it very bold on my part, as a
stranger who had yet to make himself acceptable, to
demand a tabula rasa, and that it was my duty to

332 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
make myself acquainted with persons and things
before venturing to pronounce an opinion as to any
change of office. I only record this very obvious
remark because, as I shall mention later on, I was at
first treated with more distrust than confidence by
Count Belcredi. The Emperor said he hoped I
would always express my opinions without reserve,
which I cordially promised to do, and I cannot
reproach myself with ever having left that promise
unfulfilled. My relations with the Emperor at once became
most satisfactory. I was an old acquaintance of his
Majesty, and had frequently been in communication
with him on former occasions ; he had taken a great
liking to me, and I had always felt the profoundest
esteem for him. I had received the highest Imperial
order fourteen years previously from the Emperor's
hands, and I therefore took my place beside his
Majesty at the next „ Corpus Christi procession as
Doyen of the order of St Stephen. I was, in fact,
something more than a knight errant in Austria.
At Ischl I received my first letter of congratula
tion. It was from the King. He expressed the
sincerest pleasure at my nomination, and unbounded
reliance in my abilities. He added some excellent
advice, concluding with the foUowing words : ' You
write very well — I do not allude to your handwritino-
— -but bear in mind that the pricks of a needle often
cause more pain and anger than blows.'
I had not asked for that audience at Ischl ; it was
a solace to me, as it gave me a certain feeling of
security, but it eould not fail to be made known and

RECEPTION BY THE EMPEROR AT ISCHL 333
to rouse the attention of the Press. I hastened to
leave Ischl, and went first to Switzerland. Had I
not been full of anxiety for the fate of my native
country, that time would have been one of the happiest
of my life. I had sent home my valet, who was
entitled to a pension from the Saxon Government, and
I was glad to travel about alone with very little
luggage. Accepting the invitation of an old and
devoted friend, I proceeded to Darmstadt. Perhaps
no one except myself has ever been so violently and
savagely attacked as Baron Dalwigk ; but, as in my
case, the attacks on him increased or diminished
according to the apparent safety or insecurity of bis
position ; and he was only condemned when his
opponents felt sure that he would never return to
power. Even his enemies, however, acknowledged
his talent for administration. In German policy he
espoused my views, and ¦ never swerved from them.
Had all the German Central States produced men
like Dalwigk to support me, Germany would have
been organised in a triple union of Austria, Prussia,
and the Minor States, and I am firmly convinced that
we should then have had not one of the three wars of
1859, 1866, and 1870.
Meanwhile the negotiations between Prussia and
Saxony were drawing to a close. I went to Munich
and then to Prague, to which town I was summoned
by an Imperial order. The Emperor was making a
progress through Bohemia, accompanied by the
Minister of State, Count Belcredi. I reached Prague
before his Majesty arrived, and went for several days
to Count Chotek's country seat at Grosspriesen,

334 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
near the Saxon frontier, in order to have a meeting
with my family. I was warned by the authorities
not to go too- near the frontier, as a Prussian
patrol might cross it (of course by mistake), and carry
me off a prisoner.
At last peace between Prussia and Saxony was
concluded, and the moment arrived for me to take up
my official duties. I again put up at the ' Englische
Hof,' where I had been staying in the month of June,
and the recollection of those days of hope and disap
pointment — of the false bulletins of victory and the
sudden awakening — prompted me to serious medita
tion. At Prague I met three companions of my
youth, with whom I may say, I almost grew up, as
their mother and mine were intimate friends — the
three Counts Thun von Tetschen. These, who were
my only intimate Austrian acquaintances, became in
less than a twelvemonth the only men in Austria
with whom I never exchanged another word — a
thing that had never happened to me before, thanks
to my only too forgiving and placable disposition.
The three brothers Thun, whom I had known when
we were all children, frequently came from Tetschen
to Dresden, and about 1830 their opinions were very
liberal. Their sympathies were always with the
Czechs, although they were not influenced by family
traditions in that direction ; and I often heard Leo say :
' I am not a German ; I am a Bohemian.' Francis,
the eldest, a man of noble and exceedingly sympathetic
and artistic temperament, was very free in his views
and opinions, as was partly shown by the mesalliance
he contracted. The second, Fritz, always seemed to

VISIT AT PRAGUE 335
me the most practical of the three. In the Central
States we had a very high opinion of him, especially
at the time when he was the presiding envoy at the
Federal Assembly, and we greatly regretted that
Prince Schwarzenberg was replaced by Count Buol
and not by him. He was fully appreciated especially
by Pfordten. The speeches he made at the Bohemian
Landtag in 1867, however, were not calculated to give
his hearers a high opinion of his statesmanlike
capacity, whether they agreed with him or not. But
Fritz Thun was decidedly the right man in the right
place on several occasions, especially when he was
envoy at Berlin. Had he been left there, much
pernicious irritation would have been avoided. The
third brother, Leo, was even in his youth considered
the most gifted. The gloomy fire of his eyes and the
abrupt style of his language always betrayed his
impassioned and obstinate nature, which, indeed, fully
justified what he said as to his nationality.
Of these three intimate friends of my youth,
Francis welcomed me with cordial pleasure, while Leo
received me, as the French say, ' comme un chien dans
un jeu de quilles.' To him the appointment of a
stranger was an abomination, and he let me know it.
Fritz, although he was not exempt from a similar feel
ing, overcame it, and offered to stand up for my rights
among his Bohemian fellow countrymen. He had
left the diplomatic service, and I intended to induce
him to return to it. As he did not wish to withdraw
from the superintendence of his estates, I proposed
to appoint him to the Embassy at Munich, where he
had always been, and still was, very popular, and

336 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
where he could easily have combined the management
of his property with his diplomatic pursuits. He did
not accept my offer ; but I continued for some time to
be in friendly relations with him. The change in his
sentiments, which soon became total estrangement,
may be dated from the Bohemian Diet of 1867.
He was proceeding with other members of the
Diet to Vienna in order to explain to the
Emperor the opposition of the majority, when I
stopped him at Bohmisch-Triibau by a telegram
stating that the decree for the dissolution of the
Diet had been issued. With Leo I had a passage
of arms in the Upper House. He became my
bitterest opponent on the question of the Concordat,
and our political divergence degenerated, to my great-
regret, into social estrangement.
Another meeting at Prague I shall never forget.
I paid my respects to Cardinal Prince Schwarzenberg,
having known him in former days when his brother,
my great friend, was Minister. The Cardinal, who
knew nothing of my appointment, and to whom I
was not empowered to reveal it on the day of my
visit, asked my opinion as to which of the Austrian
diplomatists I considered most fitted to succeed
Count Mensdorff. I gave him my impartial opinion
as to various personages who might be considered
qualified for the post. A few days after he dined
with the Emperor and the new Minister. I hastened
to explain why I had been so reticent ; but this
incident probably had something to do with the
aversion he afterwards showed me. It has been
imputed to his influence that I was at first only

CARDINAL PRINCE SCHWARZENBERG 337
Minister of Foreign Affairs, not Minister of the
Imperial House. But the Emperor appointed me
to the latter post a fortnight afterwards at
Vienna. At last the day of my nomination arrived. I was
sworn in by Count Belcredi. In compliance with the
Emperor's wish, I first had an interview with the
Minister of State! Count Belcredi received me with
the not very encouraging remark that my appoint
ment would produce a very bad impression, ' because
of your being,' he said, ' a stranger, a German and a
Protestant.' I merely replied that I had not sought
the honour conferred on me, but that I would do
my best to prove myself worthy of it. Count
Belcredi then expressed his apprehension lest I
should drag Austria into another war ; but I
succeeded in reassuring him completely on this point.
Our conversation ended more favourably than it
began. I avoided entering into details of internal
administration, by pointing out that I should first
have to make myself acquainted with them. What
most influenced Count Belcredi in my favour was my
decided opinion that it would not be opportune for
the Ministry to issue a programme on the Emperor's
return to Vienna. He was relieved by this declara
tion, which, however, I was only prompted to make
by the consideration that I did not wish to commit
myself to any particular course of action with my
imperfect knowledge of the situation. Count
Belcredi then took me to my colleagues, who were
assembled expressly for the occasion. I appeared
before them like a candidate before his constituents,
vol. 1 Y

338 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
and I had to answer various questions. The most
searching were those of the Hungarian Court
Chancellor, Majlath, who seemed to give me credit
for very scant sympathy towards Hungary, and
to suspect my Germanising tendencies. I remained
on the best terms with this amiable and gifted man,
whose end was destined to be so terrible ; and later
on, when I was going too far for his highly conser
vative views, I often reverted in thought to his
dread of my hostility to Hungary. Another of his
fears proved equally groundless. He expected a
universal outcry against the extradition of Count
Teleki ; but so long as I was an Austrian Minister,
this transaction was never discussed, * and the asser
tion that I was reminded of Teleki's extradition by
anonymous letters was utterly untrue. I must
here admit to the credit of the Austrians that the
cowardly practice of sending anonymous letters
which flourishes everywhere else, is so little pre-

* This extradition of Count Teleki was made at the time the subject of the most
venomous and unjustifiable attacks on the Saxon and Austrian Governments.
Teleki came to Dresden with a forged English passport ; and after seeing this
document, I gave orders that he should be advised to take his departure as soon as
possible. This hint was without result, which may have been owing to the advice of
a certain Hungarian family which was then in the Saxon capital. Thus Teleki's own
imprudence brought about a search of his house and his arrest. From that moment
it was impossible to remove him by merely giving him orders to quit the country,
considering the existing Treaties ; nor was it possible to evade his extradition. But
he was not given up until the promise was made that his life should not be in danger ;
and while the English papers were writing about his ill-treatment in prison, he was in
reality well housed and fed in an official domicile, and even furs were given him on
his journey. What I expected was that he would be confined at Josephstadt while
burning questions were still the order of the day in Hungary, but that, when the ex
citement had subsided, he would be liberated. Instead of this, it was thought well at
Vienna to set him at liberty in return for a promise given to his Majesty not to inter
fere in public affairs ; thus stultifying in the most painful manner the Saxon Govern
ment, from whom the extradition had been demanded. It has been maintained that
Teleki shot himself out of remorse at not having kept his promise ; but from what
I heard in Hungary, I am inclined to attribute his suicide to baffled ambition rather
than to any other feeling.

ARRIVAL AT THE BALLPLATZ 339
valent at Vienna that I received only one or two
of these missives.*
Although I had expressed myself in opposition
to a programme of the entire Ministry, I thought
it well to issue, in my capacity of Minister of Foreign
Affairs, a circular to the Imperial embassies. I
drew it up without delay. The Emperor was as
pleased with its contents as with its rapid production.
I quote the following passages :
'Much as I desire to apply my experiences,
collected in another field of activity, to the Imperial
service, I nevertheless consider myself severed from
my political past ever since the day when I became an
Austrian by the will of his Imperial and Royal Apostolic
Majesty ; and I will only bring into my new position
the testimony of the deeply honoured sovereign
whom I am conscious of having served with zeal and
fidelity. I should be totally forgetful of the duties of
my new career, were I thought capable of entering on
it with prepossession or animosity. I feel myself
free from both of these sentiments.
' The Imperial Government must now concentrate
all its efforts in the task of obliterating the traces
of a disastrous war, and there should be no doubt
that it will pursue the policy of peace and mediation
which it has always carried out. But if the unfor
tunate issue of the recent conflict makes that policy
a necessity, it also imposes upon the Government
the duty of being more jealous than ever of its
* Soon after my appointment I received letters from time to time, addressed to
me in a lady's handwriting, and containing maxims, proverbs, and other useful
advice in the Austrian dialect. I remember one of them, which I often quoted :
' Learn every language spoken in the Austrian empire, so that you may be able to
tell every man in his mother tongue that he is an ass. '

340 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
dignity. I am convinced that the Imperial embassies
will always maintain that dignity, and they will
find in me never-failing support.'
I hope to prove in the course of this narrative
that I was not untrue to any of the words I then
wrote. The Emperor was travelling through several other
parts of Bohemia whilst I was returning to Vienna
in company with the amiable and accomplished
Vice-Admiral Baron Wiillerstorff, then Minister
of Commerce. I took up my quarters in Vienna
as usual at the ' Romische Kaiser.' It is easy to
imagine what feelings inspired me on entering the
rooms which I had left a few months previously in a
very different frame of mind.
Next day I visited Count Mensdorff, who received
me, still occupying Metternich's old arm-chair, in the
most cordial manner, and only asked me for a few days'
delay to prepare his departure. He gave up to me
the two rooms looking on the ' Bellaria,' and for a
fortnight I lived in the house with him and his family.
There was, indeed, no reason for any disagreement
between us. Count Mensdorff knew that I had done
nothing to accelerate his resignation ; and I had the
consciousness, which every successor is not able to
enjoy, of not having so much as formed the remotest
wish for my predecessor's fall.
It has even been stated that Count Mensdorff
himself proposed me to the Emperor as his successor,
and the motive alleged was that he desired to frustrate
the schemes of an ambitious diplomatist who wanted
to usurp his place. I always doubted this story,

ADDRESS 10 THE OFFICIALS 34 r
such petty malice not being consistent with Count
Mensdorffs character. I am much more inclined to
credit what has often been told me, that he was
opposed to my appointment, not from any personal
dislike, but because he feared that I desired a war of
retaliation. Many inaccurate conjectures have been
made as to the origin of my appointment. It has
been attributed to King John and the Crown Prince
Albert. Both have denied that they had any hand in
it ; and I know them too well to believe that, with
their extreme scrupulousness, they would undertake
the responsibility of taking a step not within their
competence. I am sure that they spoke well of me
when asked for their opinion, and that they must
have influenced my appointment ; but the original idea
most probably originated with the Emperor alone.
Immediately after my installation, all the officials
of the Ministry assembled in the great reception-
room, and I addressed them in a cordial speech, in
which I begged them always to show me the greatest
frankness, adding that I expected them in return to
abstain from all criticism in my absence. Count
Mensdorff told me the same day with much amuse
ment that an official who came to ask him for his last
signature, had said to him : ' That was what I call a
really good speech.'

CHAPTER XXXIV
1866
RETROSPECT.
Before I proceed to narrate my reminiscences of the
period of five years during which I had the honour of
being an Austrian Minister, I may indulge in a
retrospect — as I did on taking office — of the time
preceding my tenure of power, and of my own past as
a Saxon Minister.
Great was the surprise and anger, in spite of
affected indifference, at the news that the very man
whom the National Liberal papers fancied they had
despatched with their blows as he lay prostrate on the
battle-field, was suddenly resuscitated as the Minister
of a great empire. But even in circles where there
had been no hostility towards me, no decided
sympathy was shown ; on the contrary, there was a
good deal of doubt and suspicion. One of the envoys
in Paris — not the Austrian one — said : ' II a enterre

RETROSPECT 343
la Saxe, il a enterre la Confederation, il va enterrer
l'Autriche ; ' and an eminent contributor to the Revue
des Deux Mondes, who afterwards became a great
friend of mine, wrote to one of my acquaintances : ' II
est facheux qu'il n'ait pas la main heureuse.'
If those days had not been so sad for my beloved
Saxony, nothing could have amused me more than
the croaking of the National Liberal papers on the
subject of my administration, which they declared
was most disastrous to Saxony. Those who were
never tired of so describing it, had attained their
object, and had no further cause for complaint ; and
the only question remaining was whether the state of
things I had endeavoured to maintain was or was not
such as a conscientious Minister ought to uphold
even at the risk of a war.
Was the German Confederation really so unen
durable ? For fifty years it secured internal peace
for Germany, and preserved Europe from wars. That
Germany was not involved in the first great European
war, that of the Crimea, was entirely owing to the
Confederation. The Italian War, which prepared
that of 1866, might have been avoided, had Vienna
appreciated, and Berlin respected, the Confederation
more than was actually the case.
And how strangely has the idea of the Trias,*
which I represented, been distorted ! It is worthy
of notice that this combination, which was even
identified with ' Rheinbundelei,' f never received any
sympathy in foreign countries, least of all in France.
* The scheme for dividing Germany into three groups, composed of Austria,
Prussia, and the smaller States.
See page 107.

344 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
The French Cabinet perceived plainly what Germany
was so blind as to ignore, that the third group could
not be tampered with, and that it would be the best
bulwark against special alliances with foreign
Powers, such as that of Prussia with Italy, as it
would then side with the Power not making the
alliance. As to the argument drawn from the state of
Italy before it was united, there was really no
analogy between Italy and Germany. In the former
country there was no Confederation of the various
States; each of them depended more or less on
foreign Powers. Even Piedmont followed the lead
of Austria up to 1847 ; those States which belonged
to branches of the House of Austria did so naturally,
and Naples oscillated between the influence of Austria
and that of France.
Very different was the state of affairs in the
various States of the German Confederation. Was
there one of them that Gladstone, could have held up
to public abhorrence as he did the kingdom of
Naples ? I was on a short visit to Saxony after 1870,
at the time when Prince Bismarck was first attempt
ing ^to make the railways of the various States an
Imperial monopoly. This measure excited bitter
opposition, which a National Liberal paper deplored
with the words : ' This narrow, local spirit reminds us
of the worst times of Beust.' ' Nay, it explains the
worst times of Beust,' said I to a friend. In those
times the Saxon had not yet the gratification of
having conquered Alsace, but the Alsatian manu
factories were not competing with the Saxon ; nor

RETROSPECT

345

had the Saxon the gratification of possessing a navy
ready equipped for war ; but the products of his
industry were being sent across the sea far more
frequently than now. He had not the satisfaction of
being a member of the greatest military power in
Europe ; but he enjoyed the harmless pleasure of
hearing Saxony raise her voice in the Confederation,
and seeing her Minister become a member of a
European Conference. He paid for this less dearly
than now, when he is obliged to contribute sixty
thousand men to the Imperial army — three times the
number that was then considered sufficient to preserve
the peace and security of the country. And finally,
he did not possess the satisfaction of knowing that if
he were ill-treated at Buenos- Ayres, a man-of-war
would be sent to punish his tormentors. Such a
disaster/liowever, rarely happened, while he was often
in a position to want help and support in Paris,
London, and St Petersburg, in which case he used to
receive from the Saxon Ministers at those places
every possible assistance, as they had both time and
means to devote to him. Now, on the other hand,
the German embassy throws him into the common
pot, where little remains for each individual, consider
ing the multitude of applicants. Moreover, in former
days, it was the direct interest of the Saxon Ministers
abroad to attend to the wants of their countrymen, as
they were anxious that the^Chambers should not carp
at the Budget for Foreign Affairs.*
* If it be said that the war of 1870 involved the necessity of a firmer cohesion of
Germany, it can be retorted that that war would not have taken place without the
war of 1866. No human being ever dreamt of waging war on the German Confedera
tion, and had France attacked Germany, the latter would have been as united as she
was in 1840.

346 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
At the same time, if I give due prominence to the
good qualities, nay, the advantages of a previous con
dition of things, this is not with the intention of making
my German contemporaries dissatisfied with their
present condition. If I am asked the question : Was
I right in battling for seventeen years for the mainten
ance of the state of affairs that was then in existence ?
I think I may reply in the affirmative. Such a policy
offered something certain and tolerable ; while the
policy intended to replace it was uncertain, had not
yet been attempted, and was likely, if unsuccessful, to
bring upon Germany the most appalling disasters.
Prince Bismarck was supported by two powerful
factors : rare genius and unexampled good fortune.
The former was under his control ; the latter not.
Had fortune turned her back upon him in 1866 and he
had used upon himself the revolver he is said to have
carried in view of that contingency, he would have
prepared a terrible future for Germany.
In 1 866 there was no Emperor Nicholas to put a stop
to hostilities, as in 1850 ; and Prussia would not have
emerged from defeat without great loss of territory.
If she could Hot forget the wound inflicted upon her
pride by Olmiitz, which caused her no material loss,
how could she have resigned herself to give up any
of her dominions ? Germany would have been dis
tracted by perpetual civil wars. I have often
heard Austrians themselves maintain the utterly false
opinion that Bismarck was right in believing that
sooner or later Austria and Prussia must have come
into collision, and that one of them must have been
victorious. Those who speak thus overlook the fact

RETROSPECT

347

that the position of the rivals was not similar.
Victorious Prussia could expel her defeated enemy
from Germany : victorious Austria could not. All
things considered, it may be said that I was defeated,
but not that I was mistaken.

CHAPTER XXXV
THE LAST MONTHS OF 1866
THE MINISTRY AND THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS.  THE ANTI-PRUSSIAN
FEELING PREVALENT IN VIENNA.
My position as a newly -appointed Minister in a foreign
country was abnormal, and therefore beset with
difficulties, more especially if it is considered that I
became, in a most important department, the chief
of a considerable number of persons whose high rank
was likely to make them reluctant to obey the foreign
intruder. On the whole, I must gratefully acknow
ledge that those with whom I stood in official rela
tions received me, not only with the obedience due
to the Emperor's commands, but with obliging
courtesy. One man alone did not conceal his dis
appointment, and his answer to my circular was
distinguished from the rest by its arrogant tone.
I was, however, greatly assisted by the fact that
I had been, not merely acquainted, but intimate for

THE MINISTRY AND THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS 349
years with some of the most eminent members of
Austrian diplomacy.
Among these the most prominent was Prince
Eichard Metternich. He was for three years
Austrian envoy at Dresden, where he made his debut
in very early youth. We had often met since,
especially during my Paris Mission in 1866. Thus we
were mutually on the footing of comrades, and I have
had reason to think well of him ever since. Even in
the critical year 1870, I could accuse him of nothing
but excessive optimism — certainly not of ill-will.
Prince Metternich has been greatly misjudged, and
not appreciated as he deserved. He was clear-sighted,
well versed in business routine, and possessed much
judgment and industry. His remarkable facility in
writing French was very agreeable to me, and I never
had cause to complain of any infringement on his part
of diplomatic forms. His chief defect was an innate
indolence of disposition, which prevented him from
seeing beyond the task immediately before him and
from deriving information from other than official
circles. Thus it came to pass that both the
attitude of France in 1866 and her weakness in
1870 came upon him as a surprise. But it should not
be forgotten that this social self-isolation was ' correct.'
I myself, when Ambassador in Paris, found that it is
impracticable to adopt freer views with impunity.
The Ambassador in London, Count Apponyi, was
also one of my old friends. In younger days we met
in Paris, and very often subsequently, above all in
London, where I was staying in 1859 on a Mission,
and in 1864 as a Member of the Conference on Danish

350 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
Affairs. We remained excellent friends, in spite of
various unavoidable differences caused by the diverg
ence of the views of the Austrian Cabinet and those
of Germany, which I represented. Count Apponyi
belonged to the old Austrian school, which considered
the first principle of correct diplomacy to be self-
effacement and utter abstinence from any initiative
not prescribed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
If in 1864 he had been able to make Vienna accept
my advice, which he fully appreciated, the war of 1866
would certainly not have taken place.
The strongest evidence of the diplomatic tradition
above referred to was given, to my great surprise, by
Count Apponyi himself, on the occasion of the
Luxemburg affair and the London Protocol of 1867.
No Cabinet had done more for the pacific settlement
of that conflict than the Cabinet of Vienna, and the
solution resulting from the London Protocol was
chiefly due to its exertions, as official publications
have placed beyond doubt. But Count Apponyi's
self-effacement was such that the Protocol mentioned
all the Powers by name except Austria.
A third Austrian diplomatist with whom I was
intimate was Baron Kiibeck, hitherto presiding
envoy at the Federal Assembly in Frankfort. I had
known him many years previously, when he was
Secretary of Legation, and I was Saxon Resident
Minister in London. I had communications with
him later on at the Congress of Princes in Frankfort
in 1863, and at the London Conference, and I had
reason to praise the business capacity and the obliging
courtesy of the Austrian representative. But even

THE MINISTRY AND THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS 351
Baron Kiibeck, although extremely conscientious and
industrious, paid homage to the old-fashioned maxim
that it was better to do too little than too much.
More than once he surprised me by his optimism,
which was not very consistent with his complaints of
Prussia. I was in the habit of making almost
annually, on my return from Gastein, a trip through
South Germany and on the Rhine, and I always
visited Baron Kiibeck at Frankfort. He invariably
ended our interviews by saying : ' We must own that
things have improved,' when they were becoming
worse and worse every day. In 1866, after the
Bundestag had been compelled to escape from
Frankfort and to take refuge at Augsburg, only to
decree its own dissolution after the events of Nikols
burg, Baron Kiibeck came to Vienna, and paid me a
visit in order to mingle his sorrows with mine. ' My
dear Kiibeck,' I said, ' we have gained one point :
lou can no longer say that things have improved.'
It was a true pleasure to me to be able to suggest
him to his Majesty as the first representative of
Austria at the Italian Court. He filled this post in
a manner that fully justified all expectations. He
knew how to make himself agreeable without the
slightest loss of dignity. The good feeling between
Italy and Austria, the merit of which I can in part
ascribe to myself, was not established after my retire
ment, but long before that event, and the Italian
representatives in Vienna, Marchese Pepoli and
Count Robilant, were highly pleased at my concilia
tory attitude. The missions of Moring and Sonnaz
also took place during my administration. In 18 70

352 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
after the fall of the temporal Power, Baron Kiibeck
was unwilling to migrate to Rome ; and as it
happened at the same time to be necessary, in conse
quence of Count Karolyi's appointment as the first
Ambassador to the German empire in Berlin, to re
move Count Wimpffen to some other embassy, Baron
Kiibeck was nominated, at my suggestion, to the post
at Constantinople, which had become vacant by the
retirement of Baron Prokesch.
Baron Kiibeck would have been the right man in
the right place at Constantinople under the existing
circumstances — an excellent man of business, laborious,
calm and conciliatory. I have never been able to
discover why Count Andrassy cancelled his nomina
tion, and it is certain that this step was the indirect
cause of Kiibeck's untimely death. He was appointed
Ambassador to the Holy See, and he died of the
effects of the Roman climate.
I now come to the last of my old Austrian friends
— Baron, afterwards Count Prokesch. When he was
Ambassador in Berlin I had had a great deal to do
with him, and found much that was attractive in his
genial spirit, even though our views did not always
coincide. We were on the most friendly terms, and
he was sincerely delighted at my nomination. At
first our relations were excellent, but later on we
differed because his Turcophilism quand-mime could
not be reconciled with my more modern views. He
did me a great injustice, however, by believing up to
the day of his death that it was I who brought about
his dismissal. When I accompanied the Emperor to
Constantinople in 1869, we found Prokesch, who was

THE MINISTRY AND THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS 353
nearly eighty years old, very much altered, and the
Emperor was even more struck than I was at the
failure of his mental powers — indeed so much so, that
his Majesty spoke to me on the advisability, nay the
necessity, of giving him a successor. I objected to
this, on the ground that Ali Pasha, who was then
still living, placed great confidence in him. The
result was that he was not pensioned until two years
later. In the Ministry itself I was no less fortunate
in finding old friends, among whom I must mention
Baron Meysenbug and Baron Biegeleben. These
two men were the objects of numerous attacks,
partly because of the ultramontane views with which
they were credited, partly because of the acrimony
of their language against Prussia, with which they
were both reproached not without justice (Baron
Biegeleben was the greatest offender in this
respect) and which contributed in no small degree to
the final rupture. It would have been very easy
for me to obtain permission to make radical changes
in the department ; but I rejected every suggestion
to that effect, not from personal considerations, but
because I have always been reluctant to come to
a decision to anybody's prejudice and to support
any measure that had the appearance of persecution.
This characteristic has often been alleged against me
as a proof of weakness ; and it has indeed given me
more anxiety than advantage, more ingratitude than
thanks. Yet I do not regret having possessed it ; for
if I enjoy in my old age a happy and peaceful mind,
this is chiefly owing to the consciousness that I
vol. 1 z

354 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
have never injured anybody intentionally, not even
my enemies.
I must acknowledge that in the house in the
Ballplatz no one placed any difficulties in my way,
and to this I especially alluded in my farewell speech
at the time of my resignation.
In the Diplomatic Corps, too, I found old friends :
Lord Bloomfield, the Due de Gramont, Count Stackel-
berg, Baron von Werther, and several representatives
of the minor States. The whole Diplomatic Corps
was present at my first reception, and I remember
that Baron Meysenbug, to whose house everybody
went afterwards, came to me with the words : ' Grand
succes sur toute la ligne.'
I must not leave it unrecorded that he who
showed me most sympathy and confidence was no less
a personage than the Papal Nuncio. He exclaimed,
' Che caro uomo ! ' to a lady of my acquaintance : and
he said to me : ' Je le dis a tout le monde ; ayez
confiance dans le Barone di Beust.' When the
question of the Concordat reached its unavoidable
development, Monsignore Falcinelli said to me, half
in sorrow, half in 'anger : 'Savez-vous ce que me
disent mes amis ? Ils me repetent sans cesse : qu'est
ce que vous nous avez chante avec le Barone di
Beust ? ' But even in the midst of the most trying
conflicts, this disappointed admirer of mine never had
cause to complain of my conduct, and I know that he
praised my behaviour repeatedly in his reports.
It is easy to understand that, considering my
antecedents, I had to keep my eye on the Prussian
representative in particular. It happened that Baron

THE ANTI-PRUSSIAN FEELING 355
Werther was my Avife's cousin. On the day of my
arrival I paid him a visit, and had a very satisfactory
explanation with him. Baron Werther had been
nominated to his post, but had not yet presented
his credentials. He begged me to tell him frankly
whether I would prefer anyone else as Ambassador ;
but I did not take the hint. Nevertheless, the re
appointment of Baron Werther after the events of
1866 was not a happy inspiration. The Prussian
Government acted on the well-meant but mistaken
view that an Ambassador whose conciliatory nature
was known at Vienna would be acceptable in that
city ; but it forgot that under the circumstances
anybody would be preferable to the man with whom
Austria had had to deal before her defeat. Baron
Werther never got over the unjust, though natural,
treatment which he received ; but he could never
accuse me of having had a part in it. The bitterness
which he felt in consequence, contributed in no slight
degree to the mistakes which were afterwards com
mitted, especially in his notorious despatch on the
coronation at Pesth, while I was doing everything
in my power to throw the veil of oblivion over the
past, and to restore friendship and peace. I shall go
further into this subject later on, and will here
only record one fact that bears upon it. When
Count Wimpffen was ^about to go on leave in the
summer of 1867, Count Bismarck said to him
on his departure : ' Give Baron Beust my hearty
salutations.' At Berlin the same thing happened twelve
years later, on my appointment as Ambassador in

35b MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
Paris. At first there was a great outcry against my
nomination, which was followed by a sort of condescend
ing indifference. I immediately gave orders to the
official papers not to enter into any controversy
with native or foreign journals about articles hostile
to me. While I was thus careful to keep my debut
unconnected with any aggressive action or demon
stration against Prussia, the independent press — even
that section of it which was most partial to Germany
— frequently published sharp attacks on the Berlin
Cabinet. Immediately after Koniggratz and Nikolsburg the
general feeling was indeed resigned and peaceful, but
by no means sympathetic, or free from rancour and
suspicion. Whatever machinations might have been
going on at that time against Prussia, they did not
emanate from the Ballplatz.
The notion that my appointment was welcomed
and even prompted by France was equally false. On
the contrary, the first impression it produced in Paris
might almost be called unfavourable. Napoleon III
feared my supposed desire for revenge on Prussia and
the complications it might entail, which would have
been very unwelcome and disagreeable to him. The
friendly relations of the following years were only
established by degrees.

CHAPTER XXXVI
1866
THE EMPEROR.  COUNT BELCREDI.  AUSTRIAN POLICY IN GERMANY. 
ITALY AND THE EAST.
Before speaking of my colleagues, I must not forget
a more eminent personage — the Emperor. Many
years later, in the speech I delivered in Paris at the
banquet of the Austrian colony on the occasion of the
Emperor's silver wedding, I mentioned some of my
reminiscences ofthe year 1866, and I cannot do better
than repeat the words I then used : ' Almost daily I
had the opportunity of observing the Emperor's
devotion to his duty after the severe blows of fate,
and if I were not attached to his Majesty by tenfold
bonds of grateful attachment, the recollection of those
days would suffice to fill me with the profoundest
admiration.' With regard to my colleagues, I must chiefly
describe Count Belcredi, the Minister of State, as I

358 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
had little direct communication with the others. My
relations with them were agreeable, and I do not
remember that they were ever otherwise.
My appointment was not pleasing to Count
Belcredi ; but if we at last came to an open rupture,
this was as little due to steps taken by him against
me, as to intrigues directed by me against him.
Every attempt was made to divide us, and I do not
doubt that people did their best to predispose each
of us against the other. The Liberal newspapers
expressed the greatest astonishment and disapproval
at my having decided to enter a Cabinet of which
Count Belcredi was a member. When I had done so,
many people urged me to rid myself of so oppressive
a yoke. A Deputy, who was a friend of mine, ob
served in reply to my remark that Count Belcredi
was a clever dialectician : ' Say, rather, an admirable
one ; and that is the very reason why he must go ! '
If there was irritation or annoyance before the crisis
which culminated in Count Belcredi's resignation,
this was chiefly owing to our subordinates, for whose
actions neither of us can be responsible. Our rupture
was brought about by very important questions — the
extraordinary Reichsrath* and the compromise with
Hungary. Before throwing light on the circumstances which
resulted in the events of February 1867 and in my
becoming President of the Ministry, I will give an
account of what I did up to that time in the department
confided to my care, that of Foreign Affairs. This is
especially necessary as many people are labouring under
* See page 376.

COUNT BELCREDI 359
the delusion that I either merely took advantage of
the repose consequent upon the defeat of Koniggratz,
or trod upon ground unknown to me. My first en
deavour was to acquaint myself with the tasks Austria
would have to perform. At that time it was indeed
inevitable that one should look back on the past, and
enter on a critical examination of it, for a period
extending beyond my immediate predecessors to
Metternich himself.
In the days of the first Eastern War, Count Buol
was reproached for having desired to maintain
Austria's position in three quarters at once — in
Germany, in Italy, and in the East — thus again
bearing witness to the truth of the proverb : ' Qui trop
embrasse, mal etreint.' I always considered this
reproach very unjust so far as the desire to maintain
Austria's position was concerned ; but it was certainly
deserved as regards the measures taken to uphold
that position.
Austria might then have played a great part with
brilliant success had she understood the conditions
under which alone she could play it. A few remarks
will show how little this was the case.
To begin with Italy, Metternich's saying :
' Fltalie est une expression geographique,' produced an
outcry when it became known in 1847 ; thirty,
twenty, or even ten years earlier, it would have been
regarded as a truism. There was no political Italy ;
Austria possessed a large portion of Italian
territory ; another considerable portion was in
the hands of branches of the Imperial dynasty -
two of the Italian kingdoms at that time owed their

360 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
very existence to a close union with Austria ; and the
Papal States recognised in that Power their chief
protector. For such a commanding position to be
lost, it was not sufficient that national risings, easily
quelled, should take place, that one of the Italian
sovereigns should make a hostile invasion in time of
peace, ending with his defeat, or that, finally, a war
with a great Power should have ended disastrously
for Austria. This concatenation of events could
never have occurred, had things not been treated
in Vienna with Olympian tranquillity, and had
the Austrian Cabinet realised the fact that
more was wanted to uphold its commanding
position than police supervision and military inter
vention. When the Kings of Sardinia and of Naples
still felt themselves dependent on Austria, it was
essential to keep them in a state of vassalage, not
merely by averting revolutionary tendencies, but
by preventing at the right moment such a system
of government as would make these tendencies end
in an explosion. The very opposite policy was
followed : not merely in Naples and in Sardinia,
but in the countries ruled by Princes of the House
of Hapsburg, the sovereigns were allowed to do
exactly as they pleased. The Duke of Modena was
allowed to act as a petty tyrant, the Grand Duke
of Tuscany as a Liberal dilettante ; and when events
culminated in their expulsion, Austria was good-
natured enough to introduce her troops, and take
upon herself all the odium, to say nothing of the
sacrifices of blood and money. How strange it is
that Austria did not become wiser with experience !

¦ AUSTRIAN POLICY IN GERMANY 361
The generosity of Olmiitz can be paralleled by
the generosity of Novara. What power could then
have prevented Austria from deriving full advantage
from her victory? Certainly not Prussia, where
I myself was a witness of the idolatry for Radetzki.
Now-a-days the war indemnity of seventy-five millions
appears almost ridiculous. And that was all that
Austria took. Yet then was the time to do what '
Bismarck did in 1866 with the South German
Governments — treat the Italian States with consid
eration, but insist on their binding themselves by
treaty to a state of dependence on Austria.
Let it not be objected that Austria did not possess
in Italy that which helped to construct Prussia's pre
dominance in Germany : the national element. If
the events in question had happened since 1848, that
objection would have some justification. But we are
talking of what might have happened ten, twenty,
and thirty years previously. The problem was, to
grant the just demands of the States and inhabitants
of Italy, and to prevent the growth of national as
pirations, which were, in Italy as in Germany, the
instruments of the discontented and the turbulent.
But as events proceeded, Austria became only the
corporal and the policeman ; and she was hated, not
withstanding the fact that her administration of
Lombardy was so admirable that even at the present
day the Milanese look back with regret on the pros
perity they enjoyed in the time of the Austrian
regime, although they naturally do not wish to return
to the old political condition of things.
Even in 1849, after the battle of Novara, there

36t MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
was still time to pursue another course. Austria had
granted a Constitution almost at the same time. Had
this Constitution been carried out, instead of being
suspended and, after a lapse of two years, abolished,
the Piedmontese machinations would have been
frustrated, and the contrast would have been avoided
between the constitutional regime of Piedmont and
the revival of the absolute regime in Austria. Instead
of this, the Concordat was concluded, and thereby
Cavour was furnished with his strongest weapon
against Austria.
As to Germany, it could not be said with regard
to Austria : ' Fuori i Tedeschi ! ' for the heart of the
Austrian empire was German, and its capital a city
far more German than of any other nationality. He
who has not quite lost his memory for the past, must
acknowledge that the time is not very remote when
the Austrians were much more popular than the
Prussians throughout Germany even to the coast of
the North Sea. How much could have been done
with that popularity ! How little exertion was
wanted ! A passive attitude would have sufficed.
But Austria preferred even here to play the part of a
policeman, and thus to 'travailler pour le Roi de
Prusse.' During the reign of Frederick William the
Third, it was Prussia's great object to suppress all
constitutional movements, especially as she had
promised a Constitution herself; and Austria, who
had promised nothing, who had much less cause to
fear a combination against herself in the Central
States, did Prussia the favour of placing herself in
the foremost rank on this question at the Federal

ITALY AND THE EAST ¦>(,

ou.>

Assembly, thereby exposing herself to such odium
that when times became more stirring after 1840, the
German people looked upon Austria as the incarna
tion of reaction, while Prussia was regarded as her
unwilling and enforced accomplice, and consequently
as the Messiah of the future. I well remember what
in the early days of my diplomatic service was the bug
bear of Metternich's policy . In conversation everybody
feared to express a Liberal opinion, as it might be
reported at Vienna, and ruin the speaker's future
career. In the East affairs were very different. Here
Austria had no problems to solve, as in Italy and
Germany. Prince Metternich was assuredly in the
right when he considered that Turkey would never
again be a dangerous neighbour, and that her vicinity
was far preferable to whatever might take her place.
But even in this case Austria played the most
odious part. Her attitude against the Greek War
of Liberation did not prevent its success, and
resulted in her exclusion from the list of European
Powers under whose protection the Kingdom of
Greece was placed. The injury thus inflicted on
Austria in the public opinion of Europe down to the
present time is incalculable. But even then it had
become a maxim to proceed to such lengths in the
support of the principle of Legitimacy as to allow the
Sultan to do what he liked, thus showing him the
same indulgence as was granted to the Italian Princes.
This became even more the case during and after the
Peace of Paris, and I could not help saying when I
became an Austrian Minister : ' We have identified

364 MEMOIRS QF COUNT BEUST
ourselves with the principle of Legitimacy in Italy —
it has been driven out, and we with it ; in Germany
we have identified ourselves with the Confederation —
it has been dissolved, and our influence in Germany
has gone with it; do we mean to wait until the
Sultan, with whom we are now identifying ourselves,
is driven out, when we shall lose our influence and
prestige in Turkey too ? '

CHAPTER XXXVII
1866
Austria's problems in the east. — my programme in the first red
book. — my despatch of the 1st of january 1867.  revision
of the treaty of paris.  evacuation of the citadel of
belgrade.
At the Lord Mayor's dinner which took place in
1878 after the Congress of Berlin, Lord Beaconsfield
made a brilliant speech in praise of the Treaty of
Berlin, pointing out in particular how Turkey had been
strengthened by being relieved of the burthen and
anxiety of Bulgaria and Bosnia. After dinner I
said to him : ' The idea that you have just expressed
is clever but not new. The same was said of us when
we were relieved of our Italian anxieties ; but the
consequence was that some years later we were also
relieved of our German anxieties, both anxieties com
bining against us for our liberation.'
This second relief coincided with my entrance
into office. The territory that still gave us anxiety

366 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
was the East. It claimed and received my at
tention. I had numerous occasions, even before I entered
the Austrian service, of occupying myself with
Eastern questions, and even of taking an active part
in them. I have already stated the circumstances
by which I obtained, notwithstanding my modest
position, a more thorough knowledge of the pending
negotiations than any other Minister of the Central
States ; and the steps I took in the Eastern question
soon after my appointment as Austrian Minister of
Foreign Affairs were inspired and explained by my
former experiences in Eastern affairs.
The thoughts resulting from these experiences
developed in me the following programme : Revision
of the Treaty of Paris so as to allow the right of
control to accompany the obligation of protection ; a
benevolent attitude towards the Christian inhabitants
of the contiguous Turkish Provinces, without prejudice
to the integrity of the Turkish Empire ; opposition
to the Russian monopoly of this attitude towards the
Slav population ; and the inclusion of Russia in the
programme by a just and innocuous concession,
namely : the abolition of the so-called neutralisation of
the Black Sea, by which Russian men-of-war are ex
cluded from its waters.
It will be remembered that in my correspondence
with the Russian Chancellor, Count Nesselrode, in
the year 1855, I stated that such an unnatural
restriction could not last, and that ten or twelve years
would not elapse before some one demanded its with
drawal, little thinking that the person to whom I

MY PROGRAMME IN THE FIRST RED BOOK 367
referred would be myself. In fact, this restriction
could practically only have the result of deeply
offending the national pride of Russia, and of leaving
a permanent bitterness which was the more natural as,
though the restriction prevented the Russian fleet
from occupying the Black Sea, it did not prevent the
Turkish and other fleets from taking up their position
it its neighbourhood, thus placing Russia at an excep
tional disadvantage.
I became still more convinced that this restriction
was practically of very little use when I was in com
munication on the subject with London and Paris
early in 1867. At both places the Cabinets pro
tested, and reminded me of the bloodshed in the
Crimean War ; but when I put the question whether
a second Crimean War would be fought if Russia
were gradually to construct a fleet at Nikolaieff,
the reply was in the negatiAre.
Two steps were taken towards the execution of
my programme : the withdrawal of the Turkish garri
son from the citadel of Belgrade, and the despatch
to Prince Metternich ofthe 1st of January 1867.
How often have I been condemned for recom
mending the evacuation of Belgrade ! And yet no
urgent reason could be adduced for regretting this
step. On the contrary : had the very small Turkish
garrison still been at Belgrade in 1868, it is more
than probable that a sanguinary conflict would have
taken place after the assassination of Prince Michael.
And moreover, I was assured by everybody who
knew the locality that the so-called citadel was a
mere heap of stones, quite incapable of defence, and

368 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
that the little garrison would therefore only have
served to compromise the Turkish army or to cause
unnecessary provocation.
All that relates to the proposal to revise the Treaty
of Paris is fully detailed in the despatch addressed by
me on the 1st of January 1867 to Prince Metter
nich.* Events have proved the justice of the views
expressed in that despatch. The Russo-Turkish War
of 1877 showed the hollowness of the protection
guaranteed to the Ottoman empire by the Peace of
Paris, and Russia's arbitrary proceedings in 1870 on
the question of the Black Sea caused the question of
the integrity of the Ottoman empire, which had been
the object of the solicitude of Paris and London, to
dwindle into insignificance ; while if my proposal had
been attended to at .the right moment, the powers
might have obtained valuable concessions from Russia
as regards Turkey in return for the abolition of the
provisions relative to the Black Sea. The failure of
the attempt I then made — which Dr Busch in his
' Reichskanzler,' even describes as an intrigue against
Prussia and Germany — was chiefly owing to the
accident that my confidential despatch, which was
only written with a view to sound the various Govern
ments on the subject, was prematurely published, in
consequence of an unexplained indiscretion or inatten
tion on the part of the French Cabinet. One of
the results of its premature publication was that
my suggestion, which was erroneously supposed to
have been made with the concurrence of Russia, was
by no means favourably received at St Petersburg.
* Appendix D.

EVACUATION OF THE CITADEL 369
The explanation is that Prince Gortschakoff, though
he already contemplated the abolition of the restrictive
article of the Treaty of Paris, wished to reserve the
credit of the achievement -to himself. I have even
been assured that he never forgave me for trying to
forestall him in this respect. This, of course, only
increased and aggravated the disinclination which was
felt in Paris and London to such a measure.

vol. 1 A 1

CHAPTER XXXVIII
1866
LIBERAL OR REACTIONARY ?  ENLIGHTENED DESPOTISM.  COMPROMISE
WITH HUNGARY.
If in foreign questions I was no novice, I was the
more so in 'those of internal administration. In
Saxony, it is true, I was at the head of the Home
Department, taking part in its reorganisation, and
fighting many hard battles in the Chambers on
Constitutional questions ; but I could not ignore the
fact that in Austria I found myself face to face with
totally different elements and conditions, and that I
had to avoid nothing more carefully than the incon
siderate application of foreign remedies. My first task
was to [acquire information. It was for this reason,
as I have already stated, that I rejected every
suggestion of alterations in other departments, and
was opposed to the issue of any programme. This did
not prevent me, however, from constantly discussing
internaFquestions with Count Belcredi.

LIBERAL OR REACTIONARY 371
An old uncle of mine, who had long been envoy
of the Grand-ducal Saxon courts to the Confederation,
said to me one day : ' The man who has never been
a Liberal in his youth is either deficient in head or
in heart.' I do not think that I ever showed myself
wanting in either, and I must own that in my youth,
when Liberalism implied quite as much as Socialism
does now, I had very strong Liberal leanings. I owe
this especially to my studies at the University of
Gottingen, and to the English school, then brilliantly
represented by Heeren and Sartorius. The July
Revolution — its influence on Germany, and on Saxony
in particular, which in 1831 entered the ranks of the
Constitutional States — and the Polish Insurrection,
all took place after I had left the University, and
made a deep impression on my mind. As I advanced
in years, my views became more mature, but I have
never been anti-Liberal. If I Avas decried as re
actionary during the first part of my Saxon adminis
tration, it w7as owing to the course events had taken.
I found in 1849 a country more undermined by
democratic societies than any other German State,
and in a condition of semi-anarchy ; and I and my
colleagues had at first nothing to do but to restore
order and prevent the recurrence of such a state
of things. I do not claim credit for the fact that
the long and sanguinary Insurrection of May was
not followed by a single execution ; but it clearly
proves the falsehood of the then current description
ofthe Saxon administration as 'ultra-reactionary.'
When I came to Austria I was often obliged
to hear the assertion that what Austria wanted,

372 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
was an 'enlightened despotism.' 'Very true,' I
said ; ' but when despotism is introduced it is unfor
tunately neither enlightened, nor desirous of being
so, and I am therefore of opinion that much more
can be done with a constitutional system.' Nor
had I long to wait for an opportunity of proving
the soundness of my views.
I cannot say that during the five years of my
tenure of office at Vienna I lived in a Castle of
Indolence. This would, indeed, by no means have
suited my inclination ; on the contrary, scarcely
had I assumed my duties than I was called upon,
although at that time only Minister of Foreign
Affairs, to give my attention to an internal question
of extreme importance and of decisive influence on
the prestige and power of the Austrian empire in
Europe — the question of the Hungarian Compromise.
In Austria, but still more in foreign countries, I
have constantly heard people say, sometimes with
praise, sometimes with blame, that I was the creator
of the Compromise and the originator of the Dualistic
System, not to say its inventor.
I do not claim that honour ; but no less a person
than Count Andrassy has said that without me the
Compromise would have had to wait a long time for
its completion. I do not regret what I did, and I am
ready to assume the whole responsibility of what was
a most ungrateful task. But that the view above
stated is a mistaken one is proved by the following
circumstances :
1. The separate position of Hungary ' in the
Monarchy before 1848.

COMPROMISE WITH HUNGARY 373
2. The state of Hungary after the Revolution.
3. The failure to enter into a timely arrangement
while the claims of Hungary were as yet moderate.
4. The concessions made before 1866 ; and
5. The more exacting demands of Hungary after
1866. With regard to the state of things before 1848, I
cannot adduce any better authority than Dr Herbst,
that same Dr Herbst who attacked my policy towards
Hungary in the Reichsrath of 1867 more sharply than
anybody else. In one of his last speeches to the
constituents of a Bohemian district he, said, as reported
in the Neue Freie Presse of the 30th of May 1885 :
' The principle of the Unity of the State has only
been altered in form by the Dualistic System. Hungary
never belonged to Austria, like Bohemia and Southern
Austria. The Hungarian Constitution had shown
itself full of vitality for many years, and when it was
revised and restored in 1867, nothing was revived
which had not previously existed and flourished.'*
The Dualistic System was not, therefore, a novelty
imported by the ' imported statesman.'
I need not enter into details on the state of
Hungary during the interval between the suppression
of the Rebellion and the Italian War. What has
been written on the subject up to the present date,
chiefly by the Kossuth Party, is much exaggerated,
and the same may be said of Madame Adam's Patrie
Hongroise,\ which describes a reign of terror as of a
* These remarks and those that follow were only inserted by me on a recent
revision of my M.S., whioh explains the appearance of so recent a date as 1885 in a
chapter written many years previously. ,
t In the concluding part of this work I shall give details about Madame Adam
and my acquaintance with her.

374 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
second Alba, and horrors like those of the guillotine
during the French Revolution. I remember the
progress made by the Emperor through Hungary in
1852, when the papers were full of descriptions of
floating banners and maidens clad in white. In the
same year Prince Bismarck was entrusted with a
special mission to Vienna ; and when he Avent to the
palace at Buda to pay his respects to the Emperor,
he sent his wife a long description of a popular fete
given by the people in honour of his Majesty. I
also remember Haynau's fits of kindness to the
populace at Pesth. It must in justice be acknow
ledged that the Imperial Government in Hungary
was not one of constant ill-treatment and oppres
sion ;* the condition of the Hungarians was not
so intolerable, but they prized their Constitution
above everything else, and knew how to suffer
for it. There are few instances of Hungarians
entering the Imperial service, especially as regards
appointments outside of Hungary ; while another
race,t which complains quite as much of its hav
ing been deprived of the old Constitution of its
country, never disdained the Imperial service. The
presence for a time at Pesth of the Archduke
Albrecht, and the subsequent appointment of Count
Palffy as Governor, were conciliatory steps, but the
chasm between Austria and Hungary remained.
I was not the first to pursue the path I chose.
* The relative contentment of the Hungarians was illustrated by the Figaro of
Vienna in a series of letters purporting to be written by a Hungarian vagrant : ' What
have I gained ' he says, ' by the change pf administration ? When Bach was Minister,
if I stole a goose I got six weeks' imprisonment, and board and lodging free. Now I
get twenty -five lashes, and nothing free.'
t The Czechs.

COMPROMISE WITH HUNGARf 375
Others had advanced a considerable way upon it, and
the question was whether to advance or to go back.
I found the Government in a state of vacillation
between advancing and retreating. It was either my
fault or my merit, as the reader may consider it, that
I put an end to this condition of affairs.
The following facts will justify my assertion that
before my entrance into office considerable progress
had been made on the path of conciliation.
The speech from the throne of the 14th of
December 1865, as well as the royal message of the
3rd of March 1866, was full of consideration for the
views of the Hungarians, and great stress was laid on
the Emperor's wish to induce the Hungarian Diet
to take measures for a mutual arrangement. Both
documents contain positive concessions of great im
portance, involving a departure from the policy
formerly pursued. In the speech from the throne it
was frankly admitted, with regard to that portion of
the laws of 1848 which concerned the operation of
the rights of the sovereign and the limitations of the
executive poAver, that their legality was open to an
objection.' The speech further announced that the
Crown itself would remove the obstacle to a com
promise by abandoning the point of view of strict legal
continuity, thus clearly acknowledging that the Prag
matic Sanction, as the fundamental law of the State,
guaranteed the independence of the internal juris
diction and administration of the kingdom of
Hungary and its dependencies. The justification of
Hungarian independence within these limits was
acknowledged without any reservation. The speech

376 MEMOIRS OF COUNT BEUST
further expressly held out the prospect of a coronation,
which was to take place on the condition that the
enactments of the laws of 1848 should undergo careful
revision and be altered in accordance with existing
circumstances. As to the state of Hungary after the battle of
Koniggratz, a very short retrospect will suffice.
When Usedom's notorious despatch became known in
1868, there was a universal outcry of indignation
at Vienna. I took the liberty of saying that the
contents of the despatch were neither new to me
nor to the public. There was therefore no reason
to judge Prussian policy more severely, but there
was reason to judge my proceedings in Hungary
less harshly.
I must finally add another circumstance to the
five already enumerated : the voices which were
raised even in Austria for the necessity of an
agreement. Kaiserfeld spoke as follows in the Styrian Diet,
as reported by the Neue Freie Presse of the 11th
of December 1866: 'Peace with Hungary means
the existence or the non-existence of Austria, and
that peace must be concluded without delay. An
extended Reichsrath would produce only national,
not political parties, thus making Parliamentary
Government impossible. Only a Constitutional
Austria is possible.'
Giskra also said in the Moravian Diet : ' I
consider the Agreement with Hungary absolutely
necessary for the existence and development of
Austria.' (Neue Freie Presse, 26th January 1869.)

COMPROMISE WITH HUNGARY 377
The press teemed with similar utterances. I
will only mention the leading article of the Neue Freie
Presse of the 12th of February 1867, which says :
' A compromise, even a disadvantageous compromise,
is, in short, the lesser evil.'

END of vol. 1.

APPENDIX

A
Despatch from Baron Beust to the Saxon Envoy in
London relative to the Bamberg Conferences.
Mr Forbes m'a donne' lecture d'une depeche de Mr le comte de
Clarendon, concernant les conferences de Bamberg, qui semblent
avoir cause un vif deplaisir a Sa Seigneurie. Vous connaissez, Mr
le comte, les re'sultats de ces conferences. Nous n'avons eu jusqu'ici
aucune raison de les regretter, et les doutes memes qui auraient pu
naitre a ce sujet, ont entierement disparu a la suite de la reponse
des cabinets de Vienne et de Berlin a la note que les huit cours
representees a Bamberg leur avaient presentee.
Quelque satisfaisante que soit ainsi la solution de la question
qui restait a regler entre les deux grandes puissances et les autres
^tats de la confederation appelles a acceder au traite du 20 avril,
nous n'en serions pas moins disposes a tenir compte des sus-
ceptibilites du cabinet britannique, dont le jugement ne saurait
nous etre indifferent, et a lui fournir telles explications qui fussent
de nature a l'eclairer sur les intentions qui nous ont guides, si
les representations que Mr Forbes s'est trouve charge de nous
faire, avaient ete revetues des formes analogues a la dignite que
tout gouvernement souverain, quelle que soit Petendue du pays
qu'il represente, doit Stre jaloux de faire respecter.

380 APPENDIX
Le langage que Mr le comte de Clarendon a cru devoir
nous tenir est tel qu'il fallait tous les egards que nous devons au
gouvernement de Sa Majeste britannique, pour nous decider a ne
pas preferer le silence a une reponse. Cependant, afin de faire
de cette depeche l'objet d'un examen consciencieux, j'en ai de
mande au Ministre d'Angleterre une communication ecrite. Mr
Forbes ne s'y est pas cru autorise. II me semble que, lorsqu'un
gouvernement ne craint pas d'entrer dans de pareilles explications
avec un gouvernement etranger, et qu'il va meme, ainsi que je
l'ai appris depuis — car la depeche a ete communiquee ailleurs par
les Missions britanniques — a donner a ses accusations du reten-
tissement, il serait au moins juste de mettre le governement a
qui s'adressent des reproches aussi graves, en mesure de les peser
murement et d'y opposer une defense raisonn.ee. J'ai du me con-
tenter d'une seconde lecture et d'imprimer le mieux possible dans
ma memoire les principaux passages de la piece en question.
Mr le comte de Clarendon se flatte que les Etats representes
a Bamberg recevront une reponse qui sera proportionnee a leur
intervention mal. inspiree ("ill-advised interference." Vous voyez
que par ma traduction je cherche a adoucir le mot). Cette re
ponse est aujourd'hui connue de tout le monde. Nous ignorons
si le Cabinet britannique en est satisfait, ainsi que nous l'esperons
sincerement ; ce qui est bien certain, c'est qu'elle nous satisfait,
et qu'il en resulte clairement que les deux grandes puissances
allemandes n'ont trouve dans la note que nous leurs avions
adressee, aucun sujet Sd'y voir une intervention mal inspiree ; et
cependant s'il y avait eu lieu a nous faire un pareil reproche
— Mr le comte de Clarendon sera assez juste pour le recon-
naitre — c'eiit ete bien plutdt aux Cabinets de . Vienne et de
Berlin a nous l'adresser. Mais independamment du blame que
notre conduite parait avoir encouru a Londres, j'ai quelque peine
a m'expliquer ce qui a pu amener Lord Clarendon a y voir une
intervention quelconque. La question que l'on appelle la question
d'Orient a ete debattue a differentes reprises dans des conferences
auxquelles la Confederation germanique est restee etrangere, et
je ne sache pas qu'aucun des governements allemands de second
ordre se soit permis d'intervenir dans ces debats. C'est a la suite
d'un traite conclu entre l'Autriche et la Prusse, et d'une invitation
que ces deux puissances ont addressee aux autres Etats de I'Al
lemagne, que ceux-ci ont ete mis en demeure de se prononcer
sur une question federate. II s'agissait done de remplir a la fois
un devoir, et d'user d'un droit, dans l'exercice duquel nous ne
saurions reconnaitre a aucune puissance etrangere le pouvoir de

APPENDIX 381
nous imposer des limites, ni admettre une intervention fut-elle la
mieux inspiree.
Je ne puis passer ici sous silence que l'Envoye de France
m'a egalement communique une depeche de son Gouvernement
a la suite des conferences de Bamberg, et je me plais a constater
que dans cette depgche, portant le cachet d'une politesse exquise,
Mr Drouyn de Lhuys s'est abstenu de tout commentaire sur les
resolutions de Bamberg, et s'est borne a relever un seul point,
savoir la faculte que nous avions revendiquee pour la Confede
ration d'etre representee dans les negociations ulterieures. C'est
la une question que nous ne croyons pas douteuse, mais dont
une discussion meme anticipee devait nous paraitre parfaitement
convenable. En repassant dans ma memoire la suite de la depeche de Mr
le comte de Clarendon, j'arrive a des reproches qui s'adressent plutot
a la Russie qu'a nous-memes. Cette puissance est accusee d'avoir
de tout temps [seme la discorde en Allemagne, et d'effrayer les
Gouvernements allemands par le fant6me de la revolution. Sans
pretendre faire l'avocat de la Russie, comme nous le reproche un
autre passage de la depeche, il m'est difficile de trouver la premiere
de ces accusations tout-a-fait juste, en songeant a la maniere dont
la Russie est intervenue dans les affaires de I'Allemagne pendant
les annees ou des complications interieures menagaient l'union et la
paix de I'Allemagne, et ou tous les efforts du Cabinet de St Peters-
bourg tendaient a aplanir les differends survenus entre les deux
grandes puissances allemandes.
Quant a la revolution dont la Russie se servirait avec nous
comme d'un epouvantail, personne mieux que moi n'a ete a meme
d'en connaitre la portee. Appelle aux affaires au commencement
de I'annee 1849, je m'assis en face du fantdme dont les formes se
dessinaient tres-nettement autour de moi ; et deux mois plus tard
je le vis ensanglanter pendant six journees consecutives les rues de
Dresde. J'ai appris alors comment il faut s'y prendre avec le spectre, et
les souvenirs de cette epoque m'autorisent a repondre a Lord
Clarendon, qu'on peut tres-bien croire a l'existence du fantdme, sans
6tre soupconne de le redouter. II est vrai que Lord Clarendon dans
la ingme depeche nous fait observer comment il n'y a rien a craindre
de la revolution aujourd'hui que l'Autriche est alliee avec l'Angle-
terre et la France. Je serais le premier a repousser les conclusions
malveillantes que l'on pourrait tirer de cette combinaison, mais ce
que je ne puis admettre non plus qu'avec une certaine reserve, c'est
que la revolution soit desarmee, comme nous le dit egalement Lord

382 APPENDIX
Clarendon, par la politique populaire des grands Cabinets. L'experi-
ence des annees 1848 a 1849 nous a laisse de trop graves legons,
pour ne pas nous mefier de cette deroute apparente des partis
revolutionnaires en presence de l'initiative des Gouvernements.
Mais, suivant la depeche de Lord Clarendon, c'est la Russie qui,
apres avoir proche la crainte de la revolution, s'est chargee de la
patroniser, de la faire elle-meme, car deja ses agents parcourent la
Hongrie pour fomenter des troubles. Je n'ai pas de notions
particulieres sur ce qui se passa dans ces deux pays ; mais place par
la confiance du Roi a la tete du Ministere de l'lnterieur et de l'ad-
ministration de la Police, j'ai ete a meme d'observer les aliees et
venues des agents revolutionnaires en Allemagne, et je dois dire que
le pays d'ou ils nous venaient, n'etait point la Russie, et que les
passeports dont ils se trouvaient munis n'etaient point des passeports
russes. II y a ensuite une consideration dont je ne puis pas
entierement me defendre. S'il est vrai que c'est la Russie qui
patronise la revolution : comment se fait-il que les partis qui ont
chance d'y gagner et qui y travaillent sourdement et ouvertement
depuis des annees, ne cessent de prgcher la guerre contre cette
puissance 1
Qu'on me pardonne ces digressions ; je con viens qu'elles ont
aussi peu de rapport avec la grande question du moment qu'il n'y
en avait entre la note de Bamberg et notre pretendue peur de la
revolution. Malheureusement il me reste a repondre a des attaques in-
finiment plus directes et plus graves. Lord Clarendon nous accuse
litteralement ' d'etre aveugies au point de ne pas comprendre
que dans une grande crise les petites jalousies doivent se taire,
et de sacrifier les interets de I'Allemagne a des intrigues russes.'
Je serais curieux de savoir ce qui a pu autoriser Mr le comte
de Clarendon a nous reprocher de petites jalousies, et a expliquer
notre maniere d'envisager les interets de I'Allemagne — matiere
dans laquelle, par parenthese, nous croyons le dernier des gou
vernements allemands meilleur juge que l'Etranger — par des
intrigues dont nous serions on dupes ou complices. Lord Cla
rendon n'a pas juge a propos de eiter un seul fait ou acte a
l'appui de pareilles suppositions, et, en effet, il lui aurait ete difficile
d'en trouver. Une accusation lancee aussi legerement rend toute
defense inutile ; nous ne pouvons que la regretter profondement.
II en est de meme du reproche qu'on nous adresse, enfin, d'avoir
donne a l'Europe le spectacle de I'Allemagne desunie. Les faits
mimes y repondent mieux que ne le pourrait une defense eioquente.
L'union de I'Allemagne n'a jamais ete mieux assume qu'elle ne Test

APPENDIX 383
dans ce moment, et jamais le principe federal n'a fait de meilleures
preuves. Les deux grandes puissances allemandes ont temoignees
par leur declaration du 16 juin combien elles tiennent a relever la
constitution federale et a respecter la position independante des
autres Etats confederes ; et ceux-ci a, leur tour, en se ralliant aux
deux Puissances, apres un examen mvir et consciencieux de leurs
propositions et avec l'intention bien marquee de placer le but de
l'union allemande au-dessus de toute autre consideration, ont rempli
dignement leur tache comme Etats independants et comme Con
federes. Nous ne craignons done point les souvenirs de Bamberg, dont la
dep£che de Lord Clarendon finit en quelque sorte par nous menacer.
Nous n'avons jamais eu d'autre pretention que de faire un acte
allemand ; ce n'est pas nous qui nous plagons sur le terrain
europeen. Si on nous y appelle, nous avons le ferme espoir que le
meme esprit de justice et d'equite qui a deja dicte le jugement de
I'Allemagne, prevaudra egalement dans les conseils de l'Europe.
Je terminerai par une derniere reflexion. Vous savez que la
note de Bamberg fut concertee et adoptee par huit Gouvernements
allemands ; d'apres ce qui me revient, la depeche que m'a communi
que Mr Forbes n'a ete adressee qu'au Gouvernement du Roi seul.
Je ne demande pas d'explications de ce fait. Ce qui precede vous
prouvera que nous ne reculons pas devant la responsabilite d'un acte
dont nous sommes solidaires.
Vous savez, Mr le Comte, quel prix le Gouvernement du Roi
attache a des sentiments bienveillants du Gouvernement de la
Reine; vous concevez done aisement combien ces explications ont
du m'etre penibles ; mais je suis certain qu'elles ne deplairont pas
au Cabinet de Sa Majeste britannique. Le Gouvernement Anglais,
si jaloux de faire respecter partout le droit et d'empecher qu'il n'y
soit porte atteinte, ne voudra pas nous faire un crime de tenir au
n6tre ; et Lord Clarendon avec son esprit edaire et impartial, loin
de s'offenser de notre franchise, y verra l'empreinte de la verite, et
regrettera, j'en suis sur, de nous avoir suppose des mobiles qui nous
sont etrangers.
Vous donnerez lecture de cette depeche a, Mr le comte de Claren
don, et vous etes autorise a en donner copie, si elle vous etait
demandee. Recevez, etc., (signe) BEUST.

384 APPENDIX

B
Correspondence between Baron Beust and Count
Nesselrode relative to the Crimean War
A Son Excellence Monsieur le Baeon de Beust.
St Peteksboubg, lb 14-26 Novmnhre 1855.
Monsieur le Baron, — Je m'empresse de repondre a la lettre
confidentielle que Votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser
le 12 Novembre dernier, a, son retour de Paris, et dont le contenu a
fait l'objet de mes plus serieuses meditations. Avant d'entrer dans
le fond des questions traitees par vous avec une superiorite de vues
et une lucidite de pensee si remarquables, j'eprouve le besoin de
vous offrir tous mes remerciments du nouveau service rendu a notre
cause par le voyage que vous avez entrepris a Paris. Nul plus que
vous, Monsieur le Baron, n'etait en mesure d'y faire entendre la
verite sur la seule politique que doit suivre I'Allemagne dans la con-
joncture actuelle, pour sauvegarder a la fois son intent propre et
celui de l'Europe toute entiere. Si la franchise energique de votre
langage, loin de blesser l'Empereur des Frangais, nous a valu de sa
part un accueil distingue et des marques de sa confiance, nous ne
pouvons que nous feiiciter de ce nouvel hommage rendu a la fermete
de vos principes et a la noblesse de votre caractfere.
J'arrive maintenant a l'examen des dispositions pacifiques qui
nous ont ete temoignees et qui confirment, ainsi que vous l'avez con
state, les ouvertures faites par le Comte Walewski a Monsieur le
Baron de Seebach.
Croyez bien, le Cabinet de St Petersbourg veut la paix, aussi sin-
cerement pour le moins qu'on la desire a, Paris, et qu'il n'a pas tenu
a lui de repondre plus explicitement aux manifestations du Cabinet
des Tuileries que je ne l'ai fait dans la lettre ci-jointe au Baron de
Seebach, destinee a, etre mise sous les yeux du Comte Walewski. J'y
ajouterai quelques explications pour votre information particuliere,
en retour de votre confiance envers moi et de votre sympathie pour
la Russie. Vous me faites l'honneur de me dire qu'a Paris on n'a pas trouve
de solution du 3 me point differente de celles qui furent discutees aux
conferences de Vienne. Nous nous trouvons a regard de ce noeud
de la question dans une position absolunient semblable. Ce que nous
avons repousse aux conferences de Vienne, nous le repoussons encore
aujourd'hui. Nous ne demandons, comme alors, que le maintien des
droits de souverainete sur notre territoire et la conservation de

APPENDIX 385
l'honneur et de la dignite du pays. En acceptant les quatre points
prealables comme bases de negociations, nous etions sans doute pre
pares a de sacrifices, — le langage de nos Pienipotentiaires a Vienne et
leurs declarations officielles aux conferences en font pleinement foi, —
mais apres avoir vu nos differentes propositions rejetees par la con
ference presque sans discussion, bien que les Pienipotentiaires allies
eussent reconnu que la meilleure paix serait celle qui concilierait
l'honneur de la Russie avec TinterSt de l'Europe et l'independance de
la Turquie, est-ce bien a nous a faire de nouvelles propositions?
Vous avez constate vous mSme, Monsieur le Baron, combien l'Empereur
des Frangais tient a l'alliance anglaise ; n'est-il done point a prevoir
qu'avant d'entamer avec nous une negociation serieuse, il fera part
a son allie de nos propositions pour regler en definitive sa reponse
sur l'accueil que nos ouvertures auront trouve a Londres % Nous
sommes si persuades de l'intimite de cette alliance, que l'acceptant
comme une necessite dominant la situation, nous avons instruit le
Baron de Seebach de faire remarquer dans ses entretiens avec le Comte
Walewski que nous ne pretendons nuUement obtenir de la France
des facilites pour la paix, qu'elle ne serait point certaine de voir
adopter par son alliee.
Les difficultes qui s'opposent encore a la conclusion de la paix
sont, d'apres ce que je viens d'avoir l'honneur de vous exposer, en
premier lieu dans la situation, independantes de ceUes qui tiennent a
la forme et a la substance du traite a venir, a regard desquelles,
comme 1' Empereur des Frangais, nous sommes egalement obliges de
ne point depasser certaines limites.
En vous faisant part, sans detour ni arriere-pensee, des reflexions
que m'ont suggeresles pourparlers qui ont eu lieu a Paris, il est presque
superflu de vous faire observer que la presente reponse est aussi
strictement confidentielle que l'a ete votre lettre, pour laquelle je vous
reitere ici me plus vives actions de grace.
Veuillez les agreer, Monsieur le Baron, ainsi que I'assurance de
ma haute consideration et de mon invariable attachement.
(signe) NESSELRODE.
A Son Excellence
Monsieur le Chancelier Comte de Nesselrode.
Dkesde, lb 9 Decembre 1855.
Monsieur le Comte, — Je viens de recevoir par l'entremise de
Monsieur le Baron de Budberg la lettre que Votre Excellence m'a
fait l'honneur de m'ecrire a Ia date du 26 mois passe, et je m'empresse
de Lui en offrir mes remerciments bien sinceres.
S'il m'est permis de regretter profondement de ne pas voir
VOL. I B 1

386 APPENDIX
partagees par Votre Excellence les vues que j'ai ose Lui exposer, ma
reconnaissance, je le sens, n'en doit etre que plus vive, car c'est me
donner un preuve bien precieuse de votre confiance, Monsieur le
Comte, que d'accueillir, comme vous l'avez fait, des developpements
qui ne s'accordaient gufere avec votre maniere de voir.
Ce serait abuser de votre indulgence extreme que de revenir sur
le sujet de ma lettre, car je ne dois pas oublier que c'est une decision
supreme, sur laquelle est basee la v6tre.
Cependant, Monsieur de Budberg ayant bien voulu entrer avec
moi dans une discussion de la question qui m'a si vivement pre-
occupe, j'ai pris la liberte d'user du droit de replique en tachant de
justifier par des arguments puises dans ma conviction la plus intime
des conseils que je persiste a croire salutaires, tant dans 1 'intent de
I'Allemagne que de celui de la Russie.
Monsieur de Schrceder vient de s'acquitter des ordres que votre
Excellence lui a transmis en dernier lieu par le teiegraphe. J'ai cru
pouvoir m'autoriser de ce message pour engager Monsieur de Bud
berg a, communiquer a, Votre Excellence ma lettre, s'il le jugeait
convenable. Je ne suis pas homme a changer ni de principes, ni de
sentiments, mais j'agis en conscience, et si la sagesse du Cabinet
Imperial avait reussi a trouver une issue meilleure, personne n'en
serait plus content que moi.
Veuillez agreer, Monsieur le Comte, I'assurance renouveiee de
la plus haute consideration avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'etre,
Monsieur le Comte, de Votre Excellence, etc. (signe) BEUST.
A Monsieur de Budberg, Ministre de Russie A Berlin.
Dkesde, le 9 Decembre 1855.
Monsieur le Baron, — Monsieur de Schrceder m'a exactement
remis la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser a la date
du 3 du mois courant, et a laquelle se trouvait jointe la reponse de
Monsieur le Chancelier a, celle que par votre obligeante entremise je
m'etais permis de lui faire parvenir.
Lorsque j'eus l'avantage de vous voir ici, vous m'avez permis de
vous exposer avec franchise mes vues sur les exigences de la situation
actuelle ; vous ne m'en voudrez done pas de l'aveu que je vous fais
en toute sincerite du decouragement ou m'a jete la reponse du Comte
de Nesselrode. Je me feiicite aujourd'hui de ne pas trop m'etre
presse de vous en ecrire, car les nouvelles le plus recentes qu'on me
dit avoir ete transmises de Petersbourg a Berlin par le teiegraphe
me permettent d'entrevoir une lueur d'esperance pacifique qui ne
pergait pas precisement a tra vers les communications que je vous dois.

APPENDIX 387
Malgre l'autorisation que les dernieres lignes de votre obligeante
lettre semblent m'en accorder, vous sentez bien, Monsieur le Baron,
qu'il ne peut pas entrer dans ma pensee de continuer ma correspon
dance avec Monsieur le Chancelier a moins d'y etre specialement
engage par Son Excellence. Je dois comprendre que les ouvertures
qui viennent de m'etre faites ont pour base une decision supreme, et
je craindrais d'ailleurs d'abuser etrangement de l'indulgence que
Monsieur le Comte de Nesselrode m'a encore temoignee cette fois-ci
en accueillant de la maniere la plus aimable des paroles qui ne
s'accordaient guere avec sa maniere de voir. C'est pour cette m6me
raison que j'ai de nouveau recours a votre obligeance eprouvee, en
vous priant d'etre aupres de Monsieur le Chancelier l'interprete de
ma vive et profonde reconnaissance.
Mais en meme temps, Monsieur le Baron, vous me permettrez, je
l'espere, de revenir en forme de causerie confidentielle avec vous, sur
le sujet de ma lettre a Monsieur le Comte de Nesselrode. Vous
jugerez vous-meme, s'il y a lieu ou non d'en faire part a, Monsieur le
Chancelier. Je vous dirai franchement que je m'y trouve entraine par un
double motif, d'abord par le desir de me rendre utile dans la faible
mesure de mes moyens, et ensuite par une consideration d'amour —
propre. Je tiens, je l'avoue, a justifier mes propres idees en presence
d'une autorite superieure.
II n'a pu m'echapper que dans l'etat actuel de choses, la soi-disante
sollicitude pour l'integrite de l'Empire ottoman ne necessite d'aucune
fagon de nouvelles garanties contre les vues ambitieuses qu'on s'est
piu a, preter a la Russie, mais il m'a semble que precisement dans
l'etat actuel des choses il s'agissait moins de la Turquie et de la
question d'Orient proprement dite, que de la situation que les evfene-
ments ont cree a la Russie et d'ou il importe de la faire sortir dans
son propre interet aussi bien que dans celui de l'Europe.
Votre lettre, Monsieur le Baron, comme celle de Monsieur le
Chancelier, me font observer que la Russie ne saurait accepter des
conditions blessantes pour son honneur et sa dignite. Je serais
desoie qu'on put me croire capable de meconnaitre la valeur et la
portee de cette consideration. Ce qui peut vous prouver combien
je sais I'apprecier au contraire, c'est qu'il y a environ huit mois,
lorsque la demande de limitation se trouvait formuiee pour la pre
miere fois, j'ai declare hautement dans des pieces officielles qu'un
grand empire comme la Russie ne pouvait y souscrire sans avoir
accepte la chance des armes. Mais aujourd'hui nous ne pouvons
guere nous dissimuler le changement de situation amene par les
evenements. Je sais bien que la Russie n'en est pas reduite a

388 APPENDIX
accepter toute condition qu'il plairait a ses ennemis de. lui imposer.
Cependant il n'en est pas moins positif qu'apres une defense heroique
Sevastopol est tombe, que la flotte est detruite, et que les allies se
trouvent maitres de plusieurs positions importantes sur votre terri-
toire. Lorsque, se trouvant dans une situation semblable, une
puissance belligerente veut la paix, il me semble qu'il lui est
impossible de maintenir comme absolu le refus de toute condition
portant une atteinte quelconque a sa dignite. > II me parait que les
questions de dignite doivent forcement se regler sur les necessites du
moment, et que le plus grand empire ne peut pas etre cense avoir
forfait a son honneur, lorsqu'aprfes avoir vaillamment combattu il
juge de son interlt d'acheter par une paix, onereuse en apparence
plutdt qu'en realite, l'avantage et la facilite de retrouver les moyens
necessaires de Sparer ces mimes pertes dans d'autres circonstances.
Afin de vous faire connaitre toute ma pensee sous ce dernier point de
vue, je me permettrai de vous transmettre l'extrait ci-joint de ma
lettre a Monsieur le Chancelier. II est bien possible que vous en
jugiez autrement, et je m'y resigne d'avance. Mais je crois de mon
devoir d'appeler toute votre attention sur les consequences tres-
facheuses que peut entrainer un refus peremptoire de toute condition
impliquant un sacrifice d'amour propre et de dignite de la part de la
Russie par rapport a la politique a venir des neutres.
Veuillez ne pas vous meprendre sur le sens de mes paroles.
Vous connaissez mes principes aussi bien que mes sentiments.
Mais vous devez comprendre que du moment oii la necessite d'un
sacrifice pareil ressort de la situation m§me, un refus absolu d'y
souscrire met en doute la volonte de faire la paix, et qu'il constitue la
supposition du contraire, je dirai plus, la necessite d'une guerre
prolongee. Or, dans un moment ou de jour en jour le besoin du
retablissement de la paix se fera sentir davantage, il est evident
qu'une manifestation pareille ne saurait faciliter la politique suivie
jusqu'a present par les neutres, mais qu'elle doit la rendre difficile
au plus haut degre.
Je le repfete, je crois remplir un devoir envers vous en vous
signalant de pareils ecueils, et je le fais au risque soit de vous de-
plaire, soit de prlcher un converti, car c'est plut6t cette derniere
chance que les nouvelles les plus recentes de Petersbourg me
permettent d'envisager.
Si, comme vous le voyez par l'extrait de ma lettre a Monsieur
le Chancelier, nous recommandons aujourd'hui des concessions dont
nous hesitions autrefois a appuyer la demande, je ne pense pas que
vous puissiez nous trouver en contradiction avec nous-mimes et je
serais bien loin de regretter en rien la politique suivie par la Con-

APPENDIX 389
federation. Cette politique etait, comme elle l'est aujourd'hui, sage
dans l'interet de I'Allemagne, amicale pour la Russie. Si nous nous
sommes refuses lors des conferences de Vienne a peser sur la Russie
dans le sens de Interpretation occidentale du troisieme point, c'est
que nous pouvions et voulions maintenir intacte a la Russie la
chance des armes en Crimee. L'attitude garciee par l'Europe
centrale empeche a I'heure qu'il est les puissances occidentales de
faire des pretentions au dela de celles formulas avant la prise de
Sevastopol ; et, forts de cette conviction, nous pouvons et devont
appuyer sur la necessite d'en finir avec la guerre aujourd'hui qu'il
nous est impossible d'en attendre des resultats qui permettent une
solution equitable et moderee.
Vous me parlez d'indiscretions commises au sujet des pour
parlers entre Monsieur de Seebach et le Comte Walewski. S'il y
en a eues je le deplore vivement, mais soyez bien certain que pour
ma part, j'en suis parfaitement innocent. Je puis vous certifier que
je n'en ai fait part a personne excepte a Monsieur de Schrceder, et
que nos agents diplomatiques n'en ont pas regu le plus petit mot.
Permettez-moi enfin de prevenir un malentendu possible. II
parait qu'a Petersbourg on a attache un importance particulilre a ce
que le Cabinet des Tuileries, a la mime epoque ou Ton me tenait a
Paris un langage pacifique, avait fait des demarches a Vienne pour
aniener l'Autriche a des nouveaux engagements contre la Russie.
Vous sentez bien que je ne puis pas pretendre etre initie dans les
negociations qui se poursuivent entre Vienne et Paris. Cependant
s'il s'agit peut-ltre du projet d'une nouvelle demonstration que
l'Autriche devait etre engagee a faire de concert avec la Confedera
tion germanique, je dois dire qu'a Paris on ne m'en a pas fait de
mystfere, et qu'en autant que des propositions analogues devaient
etre portees a la difete de Francfort, je puis me flatter d'avoir con-
tribue a les emplcher comme inopportunes.
C'est avec un veritable plaisir que je profite de cette occasion
poar vous reiterer, Monsieur le Baron, les assurances de ma haute
consideration et de mon sincere devouement. (signe) BEUST.

39°

APPENDIX

C

Despatch to the Saxon Minister Herr von Konneritz,
at "Vienna, relative to the Italian War.
Dbesden, April 15, 1859.
Your Excellency has already been informed that the Imperial and
Royal Cabinet has sent to the Royal Court a confidential communi
cation on the Mission of his Imperial and Royal Highness Arch
duke Albrecht to Berlin ; and I do not doubt that Count Buol will
allow you confidentially to examine this important document.
After having submitted it to his Majesty, our most gracious
master, I send your Excellency the following instructions, in com
pliance with his Majesty's wish.
First of all you will be good enough to express to Count Buol
the thanks of the Royal Government for the confidential communi
cation above referred to, and ask him to express them in the name
of his Majesty the King to his Imperial and Royal Apostolic
Majesty. Your Excellency will, at the same time, express the hope that
the happily-chosen mediation of the august envoy of his Apostolic
Majesty may succeed in directing the undoubtedly beneficial dis
positions of the Royal Prussian Government into such a channel as
to bring about an agreement, so ardently desired by us, between
the Courts of Vienna and Berlin, tending to the power and
security of the Germanic Confederation.
We eagerly look forward to the promised further communications
as to the success of the mission of his Imperial Highness the Arch
duke. As meanwhile Count von Buol's circular expresses the wish
that the German Governments should at once take forthcoming events
into consideration, I do not hesitate to express in a few sentences our
views on the subjects in question.
1. As soon as Austria makes the promised communication to the
Bund, the Royal Government will give its vote according to Article
XLVII of the Vienna Agreement, viz., for a recognition of the
danger threatening the Confederate territory, and for war prepara
tions. We do not doubt that thus far the votes of all the Con
federate States, Prussia included, will be unanimous.
2. We should look upon a wider resolution, in favour of im
mediate participation in the war, thereby involving a declaration of
war by the Bund, as certain of success if Prussia were to give it
her assent. In the contrary case we would earnestly recommend

APPENDIX 391
the consideration of the consequences of a resolution carried in
opposition to the Prussian vote, not so much from anxiety as to
Germany's position in case she were attacked by France, as in that
case (independently of the Prussian contingent which would of course
be placed in the field) the Upper Rhine would be sufficiently pro
tected by the Austrian forces and those of the other Confederate
States. We do not doubt, moreover, that Prussia would defend
Germany against such an attack with all the resources at her dis
posal. What we rather fear is that, knowing Prussia to be in the
background, France would not venture to attack Germany ; and
that the Bund would then find it difficult to take part, without the
aid of Prussia, in an offensive war against France which could only
be of advantage to Austria, and that thus the sacrifices made by
the Bund would be fruitless. It would appear to us far more
practicable, in the supposed case of Prussia not taking part in the
war as a European Power, to reserve for a later resolution the
assistance contemplated by Article XLVII of the Vienna Agreement,
as we are of opinion that this would more easily open the way to
an entire agreement with Prussia, and that an opposite course
would only too surely bring about the eventuality contemplated at
the end of this despatch, which is certainly to be avoided as much
as possible. 3. We cannot unreservedly agree to the supposition that if
Prussia were to offer her assistance as a great Power, all the
German governments would join her, ' without attaching decisive
importance to the mere form of union,' and we think it our duty to
say so at the present moment. We are ready to fulfil our duties as
a member of the Bund in the widest and most unselfish sense ; but
in the interest of the Bund itself, which it is our duty to defend,
we adhere to the necessity of maintaining its constitution most
rigorously in these serious times. We entertain all the more the
belief that an exceptional deviation from that Constitution cannot
be intended by the Courts of Vienna and Berlin, as the unanimous
and sincere adhesion of the Bund is beyond all doubt, and we
cannot even conceive what reasons of expediency could justify any
exception to this unanimity.
With equal candour we give our opinion (4) on the concluding
sentence of bhe Imperial circular, from which we are obliged to
differ. Should Prussia wish to object to a constitutional resolution of
the Bund, it would become the task of the other Governments to
secure the execution of that resolution by all the means at their
disposal. But we could not allow the sovereigns of Germany, who

392 APPENDIX
might be of another opinion, to take measures to enforce their views
independently with or without the formal registration of the views
of the majority. We would not hesitate to protest against such a
proceeding, if it did not remain within the bounds of Article XLII
of the Vienna Agreement, and if the Bund had not full command
over the contingents of the States in question.
We are convinced that the Imperial and Royal Cabinet will
justly appreciate this sincere opinion, and that it will not ignore the
consideration that it is of extreme importance to preserve the in
tegrity of the constitution of the Bund against any opposition,
(which that Cabinet itself thinks might be attempted) to constitu
tional decisions.
Your Excellency will further perceive from the preceding remarks
that I have only developed the views of the Royal Government
with regard to an eventual conference of the Confederation, without
alluding to the negotiations now pending between the great Cabinets
on the subject of a universal disarmament and the convocation of a
Congress. My telegraphic despatch of the day before yesterday has placed
your Excellency in the position of announcing the decided view of
our Government that the last French proposal might be accepted
without danger, and without prejudice to the views of Austria, pro
vided only a brief limit of time were allowed for summoning the
Congress, and deciding the question of disarmament. It seemed to
us to be worthy of consideration whether the French proposal had
merely a formal character, or whether it was the foundation of a
policy of delay. In the former case, a decision would be possible in
the first days of the Congress ; in the latter, the dissolution of the
Congress after eight days would be justified.
Finally, we request your Excellency, when expressing yourself
in accordance with the above views to Count von Buol, to lay stress
on the fact that the eventuality of an aggressive proceeding on the
part of Austria, as mentioned in the Minister's circular, is not
alluded to only because his Majesty feels confident that the wisdom
of his Majesty the Emperor will leave no means untried which
can prevent a, decision so all-important to the political position of
Austria and Germany. (signed) BEUST.

APPENDIX 393

D
Despatch to Prince Metternich relative to the
Black Sea.
Le Baron de Beust au Prince de Metternich A Paris.
Viennb, LE ler Janvier 1867.
Pendant le sejour que vous venez de faire a Vienne, je vous ai
entretenu, mon Prince, de nos graves preoccupations par rapport
aux affaires d'Orient et a notre intention de nous ouvrir a ce sujet
en toute confiance au Cabinet de Tuileries.
La situation ou se trouve en ce moment la Turquie merite en
effet l'attention serieuse des Cabinets. Toutes les nouvelles s'accor-
dent a faire pressentir que l'insurrection de Candie, bien que com-
primee dans la majeure partie de l'ile, n'en continuera pas moins a
couver jusqu'au printemps. Dans la plupart des autres parties de
l'Empire ottoman habitees par des Chretiens tout est prepare pour
une levee de boucliers ; les excitations venant de Grece alimentent
sans cesse la fermentation dans les provinces limitrophes, et il est tel
point du territoire turc ou l'agitation s'est deja, a I'heure qu'il est,
traduite en lutte ouverte.
Nous n'avons pas a analyser ici les causes qui ont determine cet
entrainement soudain des esprits, ni a examiner les fautes qui
peuvent avoir contribue a l'acceierer ou les moyens par lesquels il
eut ete possible d'arreter les progrfes du mal.
Ce qu'il y a de certain, c'est que cet etat de choses est de
nature a faire surgir de graves dangers pour la paix de l'Europe, si
les Puissances ne s'appliquent, en temps opportun, a prendre des
raesures efficaces pour les prevenir.
II est impossible de se dissimuler que les remedes a I'aide des
quels on a cherche, dans le cours des dernieres annees, a maintenir
le status quo en Orient, se sont montres insuffisants a maitriser des
difficultes que chaque jour est venu accroitre.
En effet, la marche des evenements qui ont ensanglante l'ile de
Crfete semble denoter un certain amoindrissement dans la force de
resistance dont dispose le Gouvernement du Sultan, puisqu'un
territoire d'une etendue peu considerable dont, il est vrai, la position
insulaire augmente l'importance, est en etat de tenir si longtemps
en echec la puissance mussulmane.
D'un autre c6te, depuis la signature du traite de Paris de 1856,
la condition generale des Etats europeens a subi des modifications
notables et, grace aux succes remportespar le principe de nationalise

394 APPENDIX
en dehors de la Turquie, le desir d'obtenir des triomphes pareils a
du se faire jour avec un redoublement de vivacite au sein des
populations chretiennes de cet empire, meme independamment de
toute impulsion de l'etranger.
La physionomie de l'Orient prise dans son ensemble se presente
done aujourd'hui sous un aspect essentiellement different de celui
qu'elle avait en 1856, et les stipulations de cette epoque, aussi bien
que les conventions speciales dont elles furent suivies, depassees
qu'elles sont, sur plus d'un point important, par les evfenements sur-
venus depuis, ne suffisent plus aux necessites de la situation actuelle.
Ajoutons que, tout en reconnaissant la Conference de Paris
comme virtuellement existante, l'on ne saurait disconvenir qu'elle
s'est montree au-dessous de sa tache ou, tout au moins, que les
circonstances ont tourne de fagon a lui en rendre l'accomplissement
impossible. La Conference a ete amenee, par la force des choses, a
enterrer "plus d'une des dispositions capitales de l'Acte de 1856.
C'est ainsi qu'elle a donne le coup de grace a celle qui consacrait la
separation des Principautes danubiennes, en autorisant l'etablisse-
ment d'un corps politique unitaire. C'est ainsi que, tout recemment
encore, a la chute du dernier Hospodar, elle n'a pu faire respecter les
traites pour la nomination de son successeur. En plus d'une
occasion le r6le de la Conference de Paris s'est borne a donner, apr6s
coup, sa sanction a des faits accomplis en dehors de son action, et
qui etaient en desaccord avec les conventions placees sous sa
sauvegarde. II y a la plus de motifs qu'il n'en faut pour faire aux Cabinets
de serieuses reflexions et pour les engager a se demander ce qu'il y
aurait a faire dans le but de preserver l'Europe des convulsions ou
la jetterait l'ecroulement subit de la domination ottomane, et si le
moment n'est pas venu de proceder a une revision du traite de Paris
du 30 mars 1856 et des actes subsequents, a operer de commun
accord par les Puissances qui les ont conclus, le Royaume de Italie
prenant aujourd'hui la place du Royaume de Sardaigne.
Cette revision aurait, ^ ce nous semble, a se proposer un double
but. Le traite de Paris a laisse dans le vague la pensee de ses auteurs
en ce qui concerne les droits des populations chretiennes sujettes du
Sultan. Enjnentionnant expressement le Hat-houma'ioum, le traite
a donne, il est vrai, une consecration indirecte aux dispositions de
cet acte ; mais les generalites dans lesquelles se renferme le firman,
qui ne faitjqu'ebaucher les institutions destinees a proteger les ra'iah,
sont loin de leur offrir des garanties serieuses. La premiere tache
de la Conference de revision consisterait done a dissiper ces incerti-

APPENDIX 395
tudes, cause incessante de mecontentement pour les Chretiens de la
Turquie. Toutes les Puisiances intgressees auraient a s'occuper
soigneusement de cette question, chacune d'elles mettant en lumiere
le point de vue auquel elle est portee a I'envisager suivant sa
position particulifere ; et ces points de vue divers seraient ensuite dis-
cutees en Conference. Cette maniere de proceder nous parait offrir
le meilleur moyen d'arriver a un resultat qui, une fois obtenu,
serait presente a la Sublime Porte avec toute l'autorite qui
appartient a un avis unanime de l'Europe.
En nous pronongant dans des termes aussi positifs, nous
n'entendons nuUement anticiper sur la forme qu'on jugerait conven-
able d'adopter pour faire agreer au Gouvernement ottoman les proposi
tions de la Conference. II va sans dire que cette forme devrait etre
de nature a menager autant que possible l'autorite de la Porte et a
faciliter son consentement. Mais en presence du danger qu'il s'agit
de conjurer, le but qu'on se propose d'atteindre serait manque
d'avance si le moindre doute devait subsister sur l'efficacite de cette
intervention de l'Europe.
Le travail que les Puissances assumeraient de cette manifere est,
nous le savons, loin d'etre facile ; il l'est d'autant moins qu'eUes
devraient se garder surtout de tailler sur un seul et meme patron
des combinaisons qui auraient a s'appliquer a des contrees si di verses
entre elles sous le rapport de la religion, de la race, du degre de
civilisation et des interets materiels.
Pour cette meme raison, il faudrait examiner miirement la
question de savoir quelle serait la marche la plus convenable a suivre
pour s'enquerir des besoms de chaque province. Selon nous, le mode
qui se recommanderait de preference serait d'en charger les organes
de chacun des Gouvernements interesses, lesquels, afin d'etre bien
renseignes, devraient consulter des hommes speciaux appartenant au
pays et dont l'impartialite et la rectitude de jugement leur seraient
connues. A cfite de cet objet principal qu'une revision du traite de Paris
doit avoir en vue, il en est un autre, non moins important a nos
veux : celui de s'assurer du concours loyal et sincere de toutes les
parties intervenantes. A ce point de vue on ne saurait nier que
le traite de 1856 n'a pas atteint completement son but. Comme ce
traite etait destine a terminer une guerre que la Porte et ses Allies
avaient soutenue avec succes contre la Russie, il devait paraitre in
dispensable d'y introduire des clauses restrictives de la libre dis
position d'une partie des moyens d'action que cette derniere Puis
sance pourrait, dans un cas donne, vouloir diriger contre l'Empire
ottoman. On s'y sentait d'autant plus dispose que, pour tout le

396 APPENDIX
reste, on entendait epargner a la Cour de St. Petersbourg des con
ditions trop onereuses. Aussi fut-elle menagee en ce qu'on ne lui
demanda qu'une cession de territoire de peu d'importance, et le prix
de la lutte se resuma dans les entraves imposees aux mouvements
de la Russie du c6te de la Turquie. On esperait, par la, garantir
l'Europe, pendant un long delai, des complications dont la menagait
la question d'Orient. Tout en rendant justice aux motifs qui, a
cette epoque, ont dicte les determinations de l'Europe, on ne saurait
se dissimuler que c'est aller contre la nature des choses que d'inter-
dire a un Etat d'une etendue et d'une population aussi immense sa
liberte d'allures dans le cercle de son action legitime. Une pareille
interdiction etait peu propre a detourner, a la longue, les complica
tions que l'on avait a cceur d'eviter. Toute compression excessive a
pour effet de provoquer 1'expansion de la force comprimee dans une
autre direction et, de toute maniere, en agissant comme on l'a fait,
on a rendu difficile au Gouvernement russe de prendre de bon ccaur
sa position dans le concert europeen nouvellement etabli pour les
affaires d'Orient.
Autant qu'il s'agit done des restrictions dont nous venons de
parler, il importe de distinguer ce qui est possible cie ce qui ne Test
pas. A notre avis, il y a lieu de tenir compte, dans une mesure
convenable, du r61e naturel qu'assure a la Russie en Orient la
coinmunaute des institutions religieuses, et de se menager, par une
attitude conciliante, le concours sincere de cette Puissance dans les
affaires de Levant.
La question que nous traitons ici merite, croyons-nous, d'etre
prise en consideration le plus promptement possible. II serait a
desirer, selon nons, qu'un concert nouveau put s'etablir dans des
. formes differentes de ceUes qui ont preside jusqu'ici a Taction de la
Conference de Paris. Des dissentiments regrettables ont trop
souvent paralyse cette action, et il nous semble preferable d'entrer
sans hesiter dans une voie nouvelle pour assurer l'entente des
Puissances. Si les Cabinets partageaient les vues que nous venons d'exposer,
nous proposerions que chacun d'eux voulut bien, par les moyens
indiques plus haut, se procurer les informations necessaires au sujet
des vceux et des besoins des differentes populations chretiennes sou-
mises a la Porte, et que les materiaux ainsi recueillis fissent l'objet
des deliberations d'une Conference composee des pienipotentiaires de
toutes les Cours garantes.
Une question a examiner serait celle de savoir s'il conviendrait
d'admettre a cette Conference un Representant de la Sublime Porte.
Nous sommes loin de meconnaitre que le respect du a l'independance

APPENDIX

397

de la Turquie conseillerait de la faire intervenir dans ces deliberations.
Mais,plusles dangers qu'il s'agit de conjurer sont graves et imminents,
et plus on doit etre penetre de l'urgence qu'il y a d'avoir recours
aux moyens les plus efficaces ; or, l'on ne saurait disconvenir que la
participation da la Porte rendrait on ne peut plus difficile aux
Puissances d'arriver a une entente avec toute la promptitude com-
mandee par les circonstances. On devrait done, ce nous semble,
s'attacher a demontrer au Gouvernement ottoman que son propre
interlt, loin de souffrir de son absence de la Conference, exigerait
aux contraire qu'il restat etranger a ses travaux. L'attitude
d'abstention pleine d'egards dont toutes les Cours ont fait preuve
dans la question des Principautes, dans celle de Candie, et m6me
dans celle de Serbie, doit edairer la Porte sur les veritables inten
tions de l'Europe a, son egard. D'un autre c6te, elle ne peut fermer
les yeux aux sinistres lueurs qui traversent aujourd'hui son empire
et doivent lui faire craindre un embrasement general. Nous ne
mettons done point en doute que les Cabinets reussiront a, la con-
vaincre de l'impossiblite de conserver desormais, sans modification,
le regime d'administration actuel, et a lui donner confiance dans les
vues aussi desinteressees que bienveillantes" qui inspire ront leurs pro
positions. Nous pensons aussi que la Porte accueillera avec recon
naissance les mesures que les Puissances garantes jugeront propres
a creer un ordre de choses durable dans la presqu'ile des Balkans.
En revanche, et c'est par la que nous compietons l'expression
de notre pensee, il nous reste a, enoncer un vceu dont l'accomplisse-
ment aurait, a notre avis, pour le Gouvernement ottoman infiniment
plus de valeur que sa participation aux travaux de la Conference.
Dans notre opinion, il serait aussi injuste qu'imprudent d'imposer
une pareille intervention a la Turquie sans la mettre a l'abri des
mouvements insurrectionnels qui la menacent. Si les Puissances s'en-
gagent dans la voie que nous venons d'indiquer, elles doivent le faire
connaitre aussit6t a l'Europe entiere et partant aux populations
chretiennes de la Turquie, mais en mime temps elles doivent haute-
ment manif ester l'intention de ne pas souffrir que la revolte vienne
traverser leurs deliberations. Ces populations doivent etre prevenues
que ce n'est qu'en rentrant dans I'ordre et en gardant une attitude
parfaitement calme qu'elles peuvent compter sur une intervention
en leur faveur, et qu'autrement l'Europe avisera aux moyens de les
contenir. Veuillez, mon Prince, donner lecture de la presente deplche a
Monsieur le Marquis de Moustier, et lui faire connaitre notre intention
de transmettre une communication analogue aux Cabinets de Berlin,
de Florence, de Londres et de Saint-Petersbourg. Mais, avant de faire

398 APPENDIX
cette derniere demarche, nous serions heureux que le Gouvernement
de Sa Majeste l'Emperor des Frangais voulut bien nous communiquer
sa maniere de voir, disposes que nous sommes a tenir compte des
modifications qui lui sembleraient utiles.
Recevez, etc. etc. (signe) BEUST.

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