YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

THE
MADISON PAPERS.

THE

PAPERS

OF

JAMES MADISON,
PURCHASED BY ORDER OF CONGRESS;

BEING
HIS CORRESPONDENCE AND REPORTS OF DEBATES DURING
THE CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATION
HIS REPORTS OF DEBli']^&--^'^===^--;^
IN THE ^" ^ -^
FEDERAL CONVENTION;

NOW PUBLISHED FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPTS, DEPOS
ITED IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BY DIRECTION OF
THE JOINT LIBRARY COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS,
UNDER THE SUPERINTENDENCE

OF
HENRY D. GILPIN.
VOLUME IL
WASHINGTON:
LANGTREE & O'SULLIVAN.
1840.

CONTENTS
OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

DEBATES IN THE CONGRESS OF THE CON
FEDERATION, FROM FEBRUARY 19th, 1787, TO
APRIL 25th, 1787.
Monday, February 1 9th .... 581
Insurrection in Massachusetts — Enlistment of troops by Congress
— Motion to stop it rejected.
Wednesday, February 21st . . . 587
Report of the Convention at Annapolis, proposing a Federal Con
vention — New York Delegates move for a Convention— Yiews of
different Members — Congress sanction it.
Tuesday, March 13th . . . 590
Refusal to remove the the military stores from Springfield — Con
ference of Mr. Madison and Mr. Bingham with Mr. Gardoqui rel
ative to the navigation of the Mississippi — Discontents in the West
ern Territory — Posts held by the British.
Tuesday, March 20th . • , . 595
Mr. Jay's report relative to the effect of British treaty of peace —
Obligations imposed on the States by treaties.
Wednesday, March 21st . . • . 595
Effect of treaties on the States.

IV CONTENTS.
Friday, March 23d .... 597
Proposal to reduce salaries — Civil List.
Wednesday, March 28th . . • 598
Discontinuance of enlistments— Military establishment— Seizure
of Spanish property by General Clark-Representations of Virginia
relative to disturbances in the Western Territory.
Thursday, March 29th .... 598
Ordinance for settlement of public accounts — Complaints from Illi
nois — Seizure of Spanish property by General Clark — Unsettled
state of the Westem Territory — Navigation of the Mississippi —
Conference of Virginia Delegates with Mr. Gardoqui.
Friday, March 30th .... 602
Mr. Jay's report on the admission of Mr. Bond as British Consul —
Subject postponed — Representations of North Carolina relative to
discontents in the Western Territory — Navigation of the Missis
sippi — Negotiation between Mr. Jay and Mr. Gardoqui.
Monday, April 2d  604
Resolution to lay" the negotiation between Mr. Jay and Mr. Gar
doqui before Congress.
Tuesday, April 10th .... 605
Future seat of Congress.
Wednesday, April 11th . . . . 605
Future seat of Congress.
Wednesday, April 18th .... 606
Negotiation between Mr. Jay and Mr. Gardoqui— Motion to send
Mr. Jefferson to Madrid— Referred to the Secretary for Foreign
Affairs.
Thursday, April 19th .... 608
Representations of Virginia relative to the navigation of the Mis
sissippi.
Monday, April 23d .... 609
Mr. Jay's report against sending Mr. Jefferson to Madrid.
Wednesday, April 25th . . . _ qqq
Motion that a vote of nine States is requisite to authorize suspen
sion of the use ofthe Mississippi, not decided by Congress.

CONTENT S.

CORRESPONDENCE DURING AND SUBSEQUENT
TO THE DEBATES IN THE CONGRESS OF
THE CONFEDERATION, FROM FEBRUARY 15th,
1787, TO NOVEMBER 2d, 1788.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, February
15, 1787  615
Insurrection in Massachusetts.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, February
18, 1787  615
Navigation of the Mississippi — Treaty of peace with England — In
fraction of it by the States — Federal Convention — ^Views of it by
the States — Enlistment of troops on account of the msurrection in
Massachusetts — Dutch Minister complains of preferences in treaty
with France — Seizure of Spanish property by General Clark.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, February
25, 1787 ... .619
Congress sanction the Federal Convention — Embarrassment of the
treasury — Prospect of disunion.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, March 11,
1787  620
Insurrection in Massachusetts — Appointments by States of Dele
gates to the Federal Convention — Negotiations between Mr. Jay
and Mr. Gardoqui.
To Thomas Jefferson. New York, March 19,
1787  622
Mr. Jay's report relative to the effect of the British treaty of peace
—^Navigation of the Mississippi — Opinions of several States in re
gard to it — Disturbances in the Western Territory on account of it
— ^Views of French about it — Dutch Minister complains of prefer
ences in the treaty with France — Insurrection in Massachusetts —
Vermont — Survey of public lands — Paper money in Virginia.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, March 25,
1787 ...... 627
Mr. Henry — Navigation of the Mississippi — ^Views of France about

VI CONTENTS.
It— Time of meeting of the Federal Convention— Resolutions of
Congress on the effect of treaties on the States.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, April 2,
1787  629
Mr. Gardoqui— Representations of Virginia relative to the seizure
of Spanish property by General Clark — ^Views of several States
relative to the Mississippi— Rhode Island against the Federal
Convention.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, April 8,
1787  630
Marriage of French subjects in America — Propositions in the Fed
eral Convention expected from Virginia — Mr. Madison's ideas of a
Federal Constitution.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, April 15,
1787  634
General Washington as President of the Federal Convention — Doc
tor Franklm also a Delegate — Claims of British creditors under the
treaty of peace — Approaching meeting of the Federal Convention
— Debates relative to the future seat of Congress — -Number of
States required to authorize a suspension of the use of Mississippi.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, April 22,
1787 . . ... 637
Sale of public lands— Land jobbers — Copper coinage — Opinions in
Massachusetts and Connecticut relative to the Federal Convention
To Thomas Jefferson. New York, April 23,
1787 ...... 639
Resolutions of Congress on the effect of treaties on the States—
Survey and sale of public lands— Govemment of the Western Ter
ritory—Settlement of public accounts and claims of the States-
Navigation of the Mississippi, and views of the States on it— Pro-
ceeduigs of States relative to Federal Convention.
To General Washington. New York, Sep
tember 30, 1787 .... 643
Debates in Congress on Federal Constitution- Proposal to amend
it there— Transmitted to the States — Opinions on it.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, October 7
1787  '^47
Requisitions on the States— Western Territory-Indians— Opin-

CONTENTS, "VU
ions in Massachusetts on Federal Constitution — Mr. Adams is to
retum home.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, October
21, 1787  649
Opinions on Federal Constitution in different States.
To Thomas Jefferson. New York, October
24, 1787  650
Proposal of amendments by Congress — R. H. Lee — Dana — Mason —
Return of Mr. Adams — Reappointment of Mr. Jefferson — Exchange
of French for Dutch creditors not approved — State of foreign .loans
— Sales of public lands.
To General Washington. New York, Octo
ber 28, 1787 .... 652
Prospects for establishment of Federal Constitution-^Mr. Charles
Pinckney — Navigation of Potomac.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, November
18, 1787  654
Opinions on Federal Constitution.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, December
2, 1787  664
Dissensions in Holland — Commencement of the Federalist — Pro
ceedings of States on Federal Constitution.
To Thomas Jefferson. New York, December
. 20, 1787 .... 656
Tobacco contract with France — Proceedings of States on Federal
Constitution — Prohibition by Virginia of certain imports — ^Reduced
state of the Treasury — Indians — British ports.
To General Washington. New York, De
cember 20, 1787 .... 659
Mr. R. H. Lee's views on Federal Constitution — Mr. Mason's —
Mr. Jay's — Navigation of Potomac — Proceedings of States on Fed
eral Constitution.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, January
10, 1788  661
Mr. Randolph's views of Federal Constitution— Mr. Henry's— Mr.
S. Adams's— Proceedings of States on it— Proposal of second Con
vention.
Vol. II.— a*

viii contents.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, January
20, 1788 . . . . ¦ . . ^^^
European news— Prcceedbgs of States on Federal Constitution.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, January
27, 1788 . . • .666
Mr. C. Griffin elected President of Congress— Proceedings in Con
vention of Massachusetts— Mr. Gerry and Mr. Dana— Criticisms
on views of Mr. Randolph, Mr. Gerry, and Col. Mason.
To General Washington. New York, Febru
ary 3, 1788  668
Proceedings in Convention of Massachusetts.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, March 3,
1788  670
Proceedings of States on Federal Constitution.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, July 2,
1788  671
Mr. Jefferson's opinions on Federal Constitution — Future seat of
Congress.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, July 16,
1788  672
Proceedings in Convention cf New York.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, July 22,
1788  672
Proceedings in Convention of New York.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, August
11, 1788  673
Future seat of Congress.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, AugTist 22,
1788 .... '¦", ¦ . 674
George Clinton's views on Federal Constitution— Proposal for sec
ond Convention.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, Septem
ber 14, 1788 ..... 675
Proceedings of Congress for organizing the Federal govemment —
Future seat of Congress.

contents. IX
To Edmund Randolph. New York, September
24, 1788  676
State of trade in Virginia — British debts — British ports — Naviga
tion of Mississippi.
To General Washington. New York, Septem
ber 26, 1788  677
Resolutions of Congress relative to navigation of Mississippi.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, October
18, 1788  679
Effect of American Revolution on reform in Europe — Mr. Madi
son's sentiments on being a candidate for Congress.
To Edmund Randolph. New York, November
2, 1788  680
Feelings of opponents of Federal Constitution towards Mr. Madi
son — His sentiments on being a candidate for Congress.

DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION,
FROM MONDAY, MAY 14th, 1787, TO MONDAY,
AUGUST 6th, 1787.
Introduction  685
Confederacies — Meeting of Colonial Deputies at Albany, in 1754 —
Congress of 1774 — Declaration of Independence — Articles of Con
federation — Difficulties arising from the public lands, and duties
on foreign commerce — Want of a permanent revenue — E.esolution
of Virginia for a Convention — Meeting of the Convention at An
napolis, in 17S6 — Recommends Federal Convention — Proceedings
of Virginia and other States — Previous suggestions for a Conven
tion by Pelatiah Webster, General Schuyler, Alexander Hamilton,
Richard H. Lee, and Noah Webster — Defects to be provided for
by a Constitution — Mr. Madison's sketch — Meeting of Federal
Convention in 1787 — Manner in which the Reports of the Debates
were taken.

X contents.
Friday, May 25th,  "^21
Organization of Convention— General Washington chosen Presi
dent, and Major Jackson Secretary— Delaware credentials— Com
mittee on Rules.
Monday, May 28th  723
Rules reported— No yeas and nays required— Vote by States — Let
ter from Rhode Island.
Tuesday, May 29th .... 727
Additional rules— Keeping of minutes— Convention goes into Com
mittee of the Whole— Mr. Randolph submits fifteen propositions—
His remarks— Propositions stated— Mr. Charles Pinckney submits
a plan of a Constitution — Plan stated.
Wednesday, May 30th .... 746
Mr. Randolph's _/??-s« proposition withdrawn, and a substitute offer
ed — The proposed government to be National, and to consist of a
Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary.
Mr. Randolph's second proposition — The right of suffrage in the
National Legislature, to be proportioned to the quotas of contribu
tion, or the number of free inhabitants as is best in different cases
— Postponed.
Thursday, May 31st .... 753
Mr. Randolph's third proposition — The National Legislature to
have two branches — Agreed to.
Mr. Randolph's /oarZA proposition — First branch ofthe National
Legislature to be elected by the people — Agreed to — Qualifications
&c. of members of first branch — Postponed.
Mr. Randolph's ^/«/( proposition — Second branch ofthe National
Legislature to be chosen by the first branch, from nominations by
State Legislatures — Disagreed to — Qualifications of members of
second branch — Not considered.
Mr. Randolph's sixth proposition — Powers of the National Leg
islature — Each branch to originate laws — Agreed to — National
Legislature to possess all the legislative powers of the Congress
of the Confederation, to pass laws where State Legislatures are
incompetent ; or where necessary to preserve harmony among the
the States ; and to negative State laws contravening the articles
of union or foreign treaties— Agreed to — The National Legislature
authorized to exert the force of the whole against a delinquent
State — Postponed.

CONTENTS. XI
Fridayj June 1st  762
Mr. Randolph's seventh proposition — The National Executive to
possess the Executive powers of the Congress of the Confedera
tion — Amended, to possess power to execute the National laws,
and appoint to offices not otherwise provided for — ^Amendment
agreed to — To be chosen for a term of  years — Amended, for
seven years — Amendment agreed to — To be chosen by the Nation
al Legislature — Postponed.
Saturday, June 2d . . . ' . . 768
Mr. Randolph's seventh proposition — The National Executive to
be chosen by the National Legislature, resumed — ^Agreed to — To
receive fixed compensation — Amended, to receive no salary, but ex
penses to be defrayed — Amendment postponed — Tobejneligiblea
second time — Amended, to be removable on impeachment — Clause
and amendment agreed to — To consist of  persons — Postponed.
Monday, June 4th  781
Mr. Randolph's seventh proposition — The National Executive to
consist of  persons, resumed — ^Amended, a single person —
Agreed to.
Mr. Randolph's eighth proposition — A Council of Revision, to
consist of the National Executive, and a convenient number of the
National Judiciary, to have a negative on acts of National Legisla
ture unless again passed by — Members of each branch — ^Amended,
to give the National Executive alone that power, unless overruled
by two thirds of each branch of the National Legislature — Amend
ment agreed to.
Mr. Randolph's ninth proposition — The National Judiciary to be
established — Agreed to — To consist of one or more supreme tri
bunals and of inferior tribunals — Amended to consist of one supreme
tribimal and of inferior tribunals — Amendment agreed to.
Tuesday, June 5th  792
Mr. Randolph's ninth proposition — The National Judiciary to be
chosen by the National Legislature — Disagreed to — To hold office
during good behaviour and to receive fixed compensation — Agreed
to — To have jurisdiction over offences at sea, captures, cases ol
foreigners and citizens of different States, of National revenue, im
peachments of National officers, and questions of National peace
and harmony — Postponed.
Mr. Randolph's tenth proposition— New States to be admitted—^
Agreed to.
Mr. Randolph's eleventh proposition— Republican government

Xll CONTENTS.
and its territory, except in case of voluntary junction, to be guar.
anteed to each State — Postponed.
Mr. Randolph's t-welfth proposition- The Congress of the Con
federation to continue till a given day, and its engagements to be
fulfilled — Agreed to.
Mr. Randolph's thirteenth proposition— Provision to be made
for amendments of the Constitution, without the assent of the Na
tional Legislature — Postponed.
Mr. Randolph's fourteenth proposition— National and State offi
cers to take an oath to support the National Government — Post
poned. Mr. Randolph's fifteenth proposition— The Constitution to be
ratified by Conventions of the people of the States recommended
by the State Legislatures — Postponed.
Motion to strike out " inferior tribunals" in the ninth proposition
— Agreed to.
Motion to amend the ninth proposition, so as to empower the
National Legislature to institute inferior tribunals — Agreed to.
Wednesday, June 6th . . . . 816
Motion to amend fourth proposition so as to provide that the first
branch of the National Legislature be elected by the State Legis
latures — Disagreed to.
Motion to reconsider the vote on the eighth proposition, so as to
unite a convenient number of the National Judiciary with the Na
tional Executive in the revision of the acts of the National Legis
lature — Disagreed to.
Motions to supply the blank occasioned by the disagreement to
Mr. Randolph's fifth proposition relative to the mode of choosing
the second branch of the National Legislature — To be elected by
the people divided into large districts — Disagreed to — To be ap
pointed by the National Executive out of nominations by the State
Legislatures — Disagreed to — To be chosen by the State Legisla
tures — Agreed to.
Friday, June Sth  821
Motion, on a reconsideration of that part of the sixth proposition
which gives the National Legislature power to negative State laws
contravening the articles of union, or foreign treaties, to extend the
power so as to authorize the National Legislature to negative all
laws which they should judge to be improper — Disagreed to.
Saturday, June Gth .... 828
Motion, on a reconsideration of that part ofthe seventh proposition

CONTENTS. XUI
which declares that the National Executive shall be chosen by the
National Legislature, to substitute therefor that the National Exe
cutive be elected by the Executives of the States, their proportion
of votes to be the same as in electing the second branch of the
National Legislature — Disagreed to.
Monday, June 11th  835
Motion to consider Mr. Randolph's second proposition, as to the
right of suffrage in the National Legislature, which had been post
poned — Agreed to — Motion to substitute therefor that the right of
suffrage in the National Legislature ought not to be according to
the rule in the Articles of Confederation, (an equality, each State
having one vote therein,) but according to some equitable ratio of
representation — Agreed to — Motion that this equitable ratio of re
presentation should be according to the quotas of contribution —
Postponed — Motion that this equitable ratio of representation
should be in proportion to the number of free citizens and inhabit
ants, and three fifths of other persons in each State — Agreed to —
Motion that there should be an equality of suffrage in the second
branch of the National Legislature, each State to have one vote
therein— Disagreed to — Motion that the right of suffrage should
be the same in each branch — Agreed to.
Motion to consider Mr. Randolph's eleventh proposition, guaran
teeing republican government and its territory to each State, which
had been postponed — Agreed to — Motion to amend it, so as to guar
antee to each State a republican Constitution, and its existing laws
— Agreed to.
Motion to consider Mr. Randolph's thirteenth proposition, provi
ding for amendments lo the Constitution, which had been post
poned, agreed to^Motion that provision for amendments ought to
be made — Agreed to — That the assent ofthe National Legislature
ought not to be required — Postponed.
Motion to consider Mr. Randolph's /owj-ieentA proposition, requi
ring oaths of National and State officers to observe the National
Constitution, which had been postponed — Agreed to — Motion to
strike out the part requiring oaths of State officers — Disagreed to
— Proposition agreed to.
Tuesday, June 12th .... 846
Mr. Randolph's _/?/<ee?2<A proposition relative to ratification of the
Constitution by State Conventions considered and agreed to.
Motion to consider that part of Mr. Randolph's fourth proposi
tion relative to the qualifications of the ciembers of the first branch,
which had been postponed — Agreed to — Motion that the members

XIV CONTENTS.
ofthe first branch shall be elected every three years— Agreed to—
Shall be of  years of age— Disagreed to— Shall be allowed a
fixed compensation, to be paid out of the National Treasury-
Agreed to— Shall be ineligible to State or National offices during
their term of service, or for one year after — Agreed to — Shall be
incapable of re-election for  years after, and subject to recall
— Disagreed to.
The part of Mr. Randolph's fifth proposition relative to qualifi
cations of the members of the second branch, considered — Motion
that the members of the second branch shall be of the age of
thirty years— Agreed to— Shall hold their offices for the term oi
seven years — Agreed to— Shall be entitled to no compensation —
Disagreed to — Shall be subject to the same, qualifications as to
compensation and ineligibility as the members of the first branch
—Agreed to.
Wednesday, June 13th .... 855
The part of Mr. Randolph's ninth proposition relative to the juris
diction of the National Judiciary was struck out — Motion that
National Judiciary shall have jurisdiction in cases of national rev
enue, impeachments of national officers and questions of national
peace and harmony — Agreed to— Motion that the judges of the
supreme tribunal be appointed by the second branch (Senate) oi
National Legislature — Agreed to.
Motion to amend that part of the sixth proposition which em
powers each branch to originate acts by restraining the second
(senatorial) branch from originating money bills — Disagreed to.
State of the resolutions (nineteen in number) as adopted by the
Committee of the Whole; and founded on Mr. Randolph's fifteen
propositions.
Friday, June 15th  862
Mr. Patterson submits nine propositions to be substituted for those
of Mr. Randolph — Propositions stated.
Saturday, June 16th ¦ • . . 867
Mr. Patterson's /rs< proposition— The Articles of Confederation to
be revised and enlarged — ^Adjourned.
Monday, June 18th .... 379
Mr. Patterson's first proposition— The Articles of Confederation to
be revised and enlarged, resumed — Motion to amend so as to pro
vide for an adequate govemment of the United States— Post
poned. Mr. Hamilton submits eleven propositions as amendments which

CONTENTS. XV
he should probably offer to those of Mr. Randolph — Read but
not moved.
Tuesday, June 19th . . . . 893
Motion to amend Mr. Patterson's first proposition so as to provide
for an adequate govemment of the United States, resumed — Dis-
' agreed to — Motion to postpone Mr. Patterson's first proposition —
Agreed to.
Motion for the Committee of the Whole to rise and report the
nineteen resolutions founded on Mr. Randolph's propositions as
amended and adopted in committee — Agreed to.
First resolution establishing a National Govemment to consist
of a Legislative, Executive and Judiciary, considered by the Con
vention.
Wednesday, June 20th .... 908
First resolution, establishing a National Govemment, resumed —
' Motion to amend so as to establish a government of the United
States — Agreed to.
Second resolution that the National Legislature consist of two
branches — Motion to amend by striking out National — Agreed to
— Motion to amend by declaring that legislation be vested in the
United States in Congress — Disagreed to.
Thursday, June 21st . . . . 920
Second resolution, that the Legislature consist of two branches, re
sumed — Agreed to.
Third resolution, fixing election, term, qualifications, &c. ofthe
first branch of the Legislature — Motion to amend so as to provide
that the election of the first branch be, as the State Legislatures,
direct — Disagreed to — Motion to amend so as to provide that the
1 term of the first branch be for two years — ^Agreed to.
Friday, June 22d ,. . . . 931
Third resolution fixing election, term, qualifications, &c. of the
first branch, resumed — Motion to amend so as to provide that the
compensation of members of the first branch shall be fixed by the
National Legislature — Disagreed to — Motion to amend, by stri
king out its payment from the National Treasury — Disagreed to —
Motion to amend so as to provide that the compensation shall be
fixed — Agreed to — Motion to amend so as to provide that the
members of the first branch shall be twenty-five years of age —
Agreed to— Motion to amend by striking out the ineligibility of
members of the first branch — Disagreed to.
Vol. II.— B

xvi CONTENTS.
Saturday, June 23d . • • •
Third resolution for fixing the qualifications, &c. ofthe first branch,
resumed— Motion to amend by striking out the ineligibUity of the
members to State offices-Agreed to-Motion to amend by confer
ring their ineligibility to such National offices as had been estab
lished, or their emoluments increased while they were members-
Disagreed to— Motion to confine their ineligibility to National
offices, during one year after their term of service is expired—
Agreed to.
Monday, June 25th . . . • • 9^^
Fourth resolution, fixing election, term, qualifications, &c. of the
second branch of the Legislature— Motions to amend the clause
relating to their term of office by making it six or five years— Dis
agreed to.
Tuesday, June 26th .... 961
Fourth resolution relative to the term of the second branch of the
Legislature, resumed — Motion to amend so as to make their term
nine years, one third to go out every third /ear — Disagreed to — To
make their term six years, one third to go out every second year
— Agreed to — Motion to amend by striking out their compensation
— Disagreed to — Motion to amend so as to provide that their com
pensation be paid by the States — Disagreed to — Motion to provide
that their compensation be paid out of the National Treasury —
Disagreed to — Motion to amend by striking out the ineligibility of
the member to State offices — Agreed to — Motion to confine their
ineligibility to National offices during one year after their term of
service is expired.
Wednesday, June 27th .... 973
Fifth resolution authorizing each branch to originate acts —
Agreed to.
S-ixth resolution defining the powers of the Legislature — Post
poned. Seventh resolution fixing the right of suffrage in the first branch
of the Legislature, considered.
Thursday, June 28th .... 975
Seventh resolution, fixing the right of suffrage m the first branch,
resumed — Motion to amend so as to provide that the right of suf
frage in the first branch should be the same as in the Articles of
the Confederation, (an equality, each State having one vote there
in) — Postponed.

CONTENTS. XVU
Friday, June 29th  987
Amendment proposed to the seventh resolution, so as to give each
State an equal suffrage in the first branch, resumed — Disagreed to
— Remaining clauses of seventh resolution postponed.
Eighth resolution, fixing the same right of suffrage in the second
branch of the Legislature as in the first — Motion to amend so as
provide that each State should have an equal suffrage in the sec
ond branch — Adjourned.
Saturday, June 30th .... 998
Amendment proposed to the eighth resolution, so as to give each
State an equal suffrage in the second branch, resumed — Proposi
tion to amend so as to provide that each State should send an
equal number of members to the second branch ; that in all ques
tions of State sovereignty and of appointments to office, each State
shall have an equal suffrage, and that in fixing salaries and appro
priations, each State shall vote in proportion to its contributions to
the Treasury — Not moved.
Monday, July 2d . . . . 1016
Amendment proposed to the eighth resolutioh, so as to give each
State an equal suffrage in the second branch, resumed — Disa
greed to.
Motion to refer the clauses of the seventh and eighth resolutions,
relating to the suffrages of both branches of the Legislature, to a
Committee — Agreed to.
Thursday, July 5th .... 1024
Report of Committee to amend the seventh resolution so as to pro
vide that the proportion of suffrage of each State in the first branch,
shall be one member for every forty thousand inhabitants of the
description mentioned in that resolution, that each State shall have
one member in the first branch ; that all bills for raising or appro
priating money shall originate in the first branch, and not be alter
ed in the second ; and that no payments shall be made from the
Treasury except on appropriations by law.
Report to amend the eighth resolution so as to provide that each
State shall have an equal suffrage in the second branch.
Friday, July 6th  1036
Clause of the report on the seventh resolution, providing that the
proportion of suffrage of each State in the first branch, should be
one member for every forty thousand inhabitants, resumed— Refer
red to a Committee — Clause of the report on the seventh resolution

xvm contents.
providing that all money bills shall originate in the first branch,
resumed — Agreed to.
Saturday, July 7th .... 1046
Report on the eighth resolution, providing that each State shall
have an equal suffrage in the second branch, resumed — Agreed to.
Monday, July 9th  1051
Report of the Committee, to amend the clause of the seventh res
olution, relative to the proportion of suffrage in the first branch, by
fixing at present the whole number therein at forty-six, and appor
tioning them in a certain ratio among the States, considered — Re
ferred to another Committee.
Report of the Committee, providing that the future number of
members of the first branch may be altered from time to time and
fixed by the Legislature, on the principles ofthe wealth and num
bers of inhabitants of each State — Agreed to.
Tuesday, July 10th ... . 1056
Report of the Committee on the seventh resolution, providing that
at present the whole number of members in the first branch shall
be sixty-five and apportioning them in a certain ratio among the
States — Agreed to — Motion that a census be taken every 
years, and the representation m the fu-st branch be arranged by the
L egisla ture accordingly — Adj oumed.
Wednesday, July 11th ... 1064
Amendment to the seventh resolution, requiring the future repre
sentation to be arranged hy the Legislature according to a periodi
cal census, resumed— Motion to amend it by requiring the Legis
lature to arrange the representation according to a census of the
free inhabitants, taken at least every fifteen years— Agreed to-
Motion farther to amend by requiring the census to include three
fifths of the negroes — Disagreed to.
Thursday, July 12th .... 1079
Seventh resolution, relative to the proportion of suffrage in the first
branch, resumed— Motion to provide that representation and direct
taxation shall be in the same proportion— Agreed to— Motion to
provide that for the future arrangement of representation, a census
shall be taken within six years, and within every ten years after
wards, and that it shall be made according to the whole number
of inhabitants, rating the blacks at three fifths of their number-
Agreed to.

CONTENTS. XIX
Friday, July 13th  1087
Seventh resolution, relative to the proportion of suffrage in the first
branch, resumed — Motion to provide that until the first census he
taken, the pioportion ofthe representatives from the States in the
first branch, and the moneys raised from them by direct taxation
shall be the same — Agreed to — Motion to strike out the amend
ment heretofore made for regulating future representation on the
principle of wealth — Agreed to.
Saturday, July 14th .... 1094
Seventh resolution, relative to the proportion of suffrage in the first
branch, resumed — Motion that the number of representatives in
the first branch from new States, shall never exceed those of the
present States — Disagreed to.
Eighth resolution, relative to the proportion of suffrage in the
second branch, resumed — Motion to provide that the second brailch
shall consist of thirty-six members, distributed among the States
in certain proportions — Disagreed to.
Monday, July 16th . . . . 1107
Seventh and eighth resolutions as amended, and fixing the suffrage
in both branches, resumed — Agreed to.
Sixth resolution defining the powers of the Legislature, resumed
— Motion to amend by giving a specification of the powers not
comprised in general terms — Disagreed to.
Tuesday, July 17th . . . 1114
Sixth resolution, defining the powers of the Legislature, resumed —
Motion to amend, so as to provide that the National Legislature
should not interfere with the govemments of the States in matters
of internal police, in which the general welfare of the United
States is not concemed — Disagreed to— Motion to amend so as to
extend the power of the Legislature to cases affecting the general
interests of the Union — Agreed to — Motion to agree to the power
of negativing State laws — Disagreed to — Motion to provide that
the acts of the Legislature, and treaties made in pursuance of the
Constitution, shall bind the several States — Agreed to.
Ninth resolution, relative to National Executive — Motion to
amend so as to provide that the Executive be chosen by the people
— Disagreed to — That he be chosen by Electors appointed by the
State Legislatures — Disagreed to — Motion to amend bystriking
out the.^Qsision_lhax-th&-Ex©GUtive is,. to..be ineligiblea second
tim^ — ^gjgpd ^" — Mntinn to amend so as to provide that the
term of the Executive should be during good behaviour — Disa-

XX contents.
greed to— Motion to amend by striking out seven years as the Ex
ecutive term— Disagreed to.
Wednesday, July 18th . . . . 1130
Tenth resolution, giving the Executive a negative on acts of the
Legislature not afterwards passed by two thirds — Agreed to.
Eleventh resolution, relative to the Judiciary — Motion to amend
so as to provide that the supreme judges be appointed by the Exe
cutive — Disagreed to — That they be nominated and appointed by
the Executive, with the consent of two thirds ofthe second branch
— Disagreed to— Motion to amend so as to provide that their com
pensation shall not be diminished while in office — Agreed to.
Twelfth resolution, relative to the establishment of inferior Na
tional tribunals, by the Legislature — Agreed to.
Thirteenth resolution, relative to the powers of the National Ju
diciary — Motion to amend by striking out their power in regard to
impeachment of National officers — Agreed to— Motion to amend
so as to provide that their power shall extend to all cases arising
under the National laws, or involving the National peace and har
mony — Agreed to.
Fourteenth resolution, providing for the admission of new States
• — Agreed to.
Fifteenth resolution, providing for the continuance of the Con
gress of the Confederation and the completion of its engagements
— Disagreed to.
Sixteenth resolution, guaranteeing a republican govemment and
their existing laws to' the States — Motion to amend so as to pro
vide that a republican form of government, and protection against
foreign and domestic violence, be guaranteed to each State--
Agreed to.
Thursday, July 19th . . . . 114]
Ninth resolution, relative to the National Executive, resumed—
Motion to amend so as to provide that the Executive be chosen by
Electors chosen by the State Legislatures— Agreed to— Mationjo
amend_so as to pjLQvide that the^Execuiive shall be ineligiblea
second, time— Disagreed to— Motion to amend by making the Exe
cutive term six years — Agreed to.
Friday, July 20th  1152
Ninth resolutioa, relative to the National Executive, resumed— Mo
tion to provide that the number of Electors of the Executive to be
chosen by the State Legislatures shall he regulated by their re
spective numbers of representatives in the first branch, and that

CONTENTS. XXI
at present it shall be in a prescribed ratio — Agreed to — Motion to
amend by striking out the provision for impeaching the Executive
— Disagreed to — Motion to provide that the Electors of the Execu-
• tive shall not be members of the National Legislature, nor National
officers, nor eligible to the supreme magistracy — Agreed to.
Saturday, July 21st . . . : 1161
Ninth resolution, relative to National Executive, resumed — Motion
to provide for the payment of the Electors of the Executive out of
the National Treasury-— Agreed to.
Tenth resolution, relative lo the negative of the Executive on the
Legislature, resumed — Motion to amend by providing that the
Supreme Judiciary be associated in this power — Disagreed to.
Eleventh resolution, relative to Judiciary, resumed — Motion to
provide that the Judges be nominated by the Executive, and ap
pointed, unless two thirds of the second branch disagree thereto —
Disagreed to.
Monday, July 23d  1175
Seventeenth resolution, providing for future amendments — Agreed to.
Eighteenth resolution, requiring the oath of State officers to sup
port the Constitution — Agreed to.
Nineteenth resolution, requiring the ratification of the Constitu
tion by State Conventions — Motion to amend by providing for its
reference to the State Legislatures — Disagreed to — Motion to a
second Federal Convention — Not seconded.
The eighth resolution, relative to the suffrage in the second
branch, resumed — Motion to amend so as to provide that the rep
resentation consist of two members from each State, who shall
vote per capita — Agreed to.
Tuesday, July 24th . . 1188
Ninth resolution, relative to the National Executive, resumed — Mo
tion to amend so as to provide that he be appointed by the National
Legislature, and not by Electors chosen by the State Legislatures,
Agreed. to— Motion to amend so as to provide that the Executive
be chosen by Electors taken by lot from the National Legislature
— Postponed. The resolutions as amended and adopted, together with the
propositions submitted by Mr. Patterson, and the plan proposed by
Mr. C. Pinckney, referred to a Committee of Detail, to report a
Constitution conformable to the resolutions.
Wednesday, July 25th : . . . 1 197
Ninth resolution, relative to the National Executive, resumed—

xxu contents.
( Motion to appoint the Executive by Electors appointed by State
,' Legislatures, where the actual Executiye is re-eligible — Disagreed
; to — Motion to appoint the Executive by the Govemors of States
\ and their Councils— Not passed — Motion that no person be eligible
to the Executive for more than six years in twelve — ^Disagreed to.
\ — Motion to authorize copies to be taken of the resolutions as
adopted — Disagreed to.
Thursday, July 26th .... 1207
, The ninth resolution, relative to the National Executive, resumed
— Motion that the Executive be for seven years, and not re-eligible
;• — ^Agreed to.
The third and fourth resolutions, relative to the qualifications
of the members of the Legislature, resumed — Motion lo require
property and citizenship — Agreed to — Motion to exclude persons
indebted to the United States — Disagreed to.
Statement of the resolutions as amended agreed to, and referred
to the Committee of Detail.
Plan of a Federal Constitution, offered by Mr. Charles Pinckney
on the 29th May, referred to the Committee of Detail.
Propositions offered by Mr, Patterson on the 15th June, referred
to the Committee of Detail.
Monday, August 6th .... 1226
Report of Committee of Detail.
Draught of a Constitution, as reported by the Committee.

DEBATES

IN THE

CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATION,

FEBRUARY 19TH, TILL APRIL 25TH, 1787.

DEBATES IN THE
CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATION,
PROM FEBRUARY 19TH TILL APRIL 25TH, 1787.

In Congress, Monday, February 19, 1787.*

Mr. Pinckney, in support of his motion entered on
the Journal, for stopping the enlistment of troops,
argued that he had reason to suppose the insurrection
in Massachusetts, the real, though not ostensible ob
ject of this measure, to be already crushed; that the
requisition of five hundred thousand dollars for sup
porting the troops had been complied with by one
State only, viz. Virginia, and that but in part ; that
it would be absurd to proceed in the raising of men
who could neither be paid, clothed nor fed, and that
such a folly was the more to be shunned, as the con
sequences could not be foreseen, of embodying and
arming men under circumstances which would be
more likely to render them the terror than the
support of the Government. We had, he observed,
been so lucky in one instance — meaning the dis
banding of the army on the peace — as to get rid of
an armed force without satisfying their just claims ;
but that it would not be prudent to hazard the
repetition of the experiment.
Mr. King made a moving appeal to the feelings of
* From 1783 till this period Mr. Madison was not a member.

582 DEBATES. [1787.
Congress, reminding them that the real object in
voting the troops was, to countenance the exertions
of the Government of Massachusetts ; that the silent
co-operation of these military preparations under the
orders of Congress had had a great and double effect,
in animating the Government and awuig the insur
gents ; that he hoped the late success of the former
had given a deadly blow to the disturbances, yet
that it would be premature, whilst a doubt could
exist as to the critical fact, to withdraw the co-ope
rating influence of the Federal measures. He par
ticularly and pathetically entreated Congress to
consider that it was in agitation, and probably
would be determined by the Legislature of Massa
chusetts, not only to bring to due punishment the
more active and leading offenders, but to disarm
and disfranchize, fot a limited time, the great body
of them; that for the policy of this measure he
would not undertake to vouch, being sensible that
there were great and illustrious examples against it;
that his confidence, however, in the prudence of that
Government, would not permit him to call their
determinations into question; that what the effect
of these rigors inight be it was impossible to foresee.
He dwelt much on the sympathy which they pro
bably wovild excite in behalf of the stigmatized
party ; scarce a man was without a father, a brother,
a friend, in the mass of the people ; adding that, as
a precaution against contingencies, it was the pur
pose of the State to raise and station a small mili
tary force in the most suspected districts, and that
forty thousand pounds, to be drawn from their
impost on trade, had been appropriated accordingly;

1787.] DEBATES. ,583
that under these circumstances a new crisis more
solemn than the late one might be brought on, and
therefore to stop the Federal enlistments, and thereby
withdraw the aid which had been held out, would
give the greatest alarm imaginable to the Govern
ment and its friends, as it wojald look like a disap
probation and desertion of them ; and, if viewed in
that light by the disaffected, might rekindle the
insurrection. He took notice of the possibility, to
vvhich every State in the Union was exposed, of
being visited with similar calamities ; in which event
they would all be suing for support in the same
strain now used by the Delegates from Massachu
setts ; that the indulgence now requested in behalf
of that State might be granted without the least
inconvenience to the United States, as their enlist
ments, without any countermanding orders, would
not go on whilst those of the State were in compe
tition ; it being natural for men to prefer the latter
service, in which they would stay at home, and be
sure of their pay, to the former, in which they might,
with little prospect of it, be sent to the Ohio to fight
the Indians. He concluded with the most earnest
entreaties, and the fullest confidence, that Congress
would not, at so critical a moment, and without any
necessity whatever, agree to the motion, assuring
them that in three or four weeks, possibly in less
time, he might himself be a friend to it, and would
promote it.
Mr. Pinckney, in reply, contended, that if the
measures pursuing by Massachusetts were such as
had been stated, he did not think the United States
bound to give them countenance. He thought them

584 DEBATES. [1787.
impolitic, and not to be reconciled with the genius
of free governments ; and if fresh commotions should
spring from them, that the State of Massachusetts
alone should be at the charge, and abide by the
consequences of their own misconduct.
Mr. Madison would not examine whether the
original views of Congress, in the enlargement of
their military force, were proper or not ; nor whether
it were so, to mask their views with an ostensible
preparation against the Indians. He admitted,
indeed, that it appeared rather difficult to reconcile
an interference of Congress in the internal contro
versies of a State with the tenor of the Confedera
tion, which does not authorize it expressly, and
leaves to the States all powers not expressly dele
gated; — or with the principles of republican govern
ments, which, as they rest on the sense of the
majority, necessarily suppose power and right al
ways to be on the same side. He observed, how
ever, that in one point of our view military precau
tions on the part of Congress might have a different
aspect. Whenever danger was apprehended from
any foreign quarter, which, of necessity, extended
itself to the Federal concerns. Congress were bound
to guard against it, and although there might be no
particular evidence in this case of such a meditated
interference, yet there was sufficient ground for a
general suspicion of readiness in Great Britain to
take advantage of events in this country, to warrant
precautions against her. But waving the question
as to the original propriety of the measure adopted,
and attending merely to the question whether at
this moment the measure ought, from a change of

1787.] DEBATES. 585
circumstances, to be rescinded, he was inclined to
think it would be more advisable to suspend than to
go instantly into the recision. The considerations
wbich led to this opinion were —
First. That though it appeared pretty certain
that the main body of the insurgents had been dis
persed, it was by no means certain that the spirit of
insurrection was subdued. The leaders, too, of the
insurgents had not been apprehended, and parties of
them were still in arms in disaffected places.
Secondly. That great respect is due on such occa
sions to the wishes and representations of the suffer
ing member of the Federal body, both of which
must be judged of by what comes from her repre
sentatives on the floor. These tell us that the mea
sures taken by Congress have given great satisfaction
and spirits to their constituents, and have co-operated
much in baffling the views of their internal enemies ;
that they are pursuing very critical precautions at
this moment for their future safety and tranquillity ;
and that the construction which will be put on the
proposed resolution, if agreed to by Congress, cannot
fail to nlake very unhappy impressions, and may
have very serious consequences. The propriety of
these precautions depends on so many circumstances
better known to the Government of Massachusetts
than to Congress, that it would be premature in
Congress to be governed by a disapprobation.
Thirdly. That every State ought to bear in mind
the consequences of popular commotions, if not
thoroughly subdued, on the tranquillity of the
Union, and the possibility of being itself the scene
of them. Every State ought, therefore, to submit
Vol. I.— 37 *

586 DEBATES. [1787.
with cheerfulness to such indulgences to others as
itself may, in a little time, be in need of. He had
been a witness of the temper of his own State
( Virginia ) on this occasion. It was understood by
the Legislature that the real object of the military
preparations on foot was the disturbances in Massa
chusetts, and that very consideration inspired the
ardor which voted, towards their quota, a tax on
tobacco, which would not have been granted for
scarce any other purpose whatever, being a tax
operating very partially, in the opinion of the people
of that State Avho cultivate that article ; yet this
class of the Legislature were almost unanimous in
making the sacrifice, because the fund was con
sidered as the most certain that could be provided.
Fourthly. That it was probable the enlistments,
for the reasons given, would be suspended without
an order from Congress ; in which case the incon
venience suggested would be saved to the United
States, and the wishes of Massachusetts satisfied at
the same time.
Fifthly. That as no bounty was given for the
troops, and they could be dismissed at any time, the
objections drawn from the consideration of expense
would have but little force.
Sixthly. That it was contended for a continuance
of the apparent aid of Congress, for only three or
four weeks, the merabers from Massachusetts them
selves considering that as a sufficient time.
After the rejection of the motion, as stated on the
Journal, a dispute arose whether the A'ote should be
entered among the secret or public proceedino-s. Mr.
Pinckney insisted that, in the former case his view

1787.] DEBATES.

581

which was to justify himself to his constituents,
would be frustrated. Most of those who voted with
him were opposed to an immediate publication.
The expedient of a temporary concealment was
proposed as answering all purposes.'"

Tuesday, February 20th.
Nothing of consequence was done.

Wednesday, February 21st.

The Report of the Convention at Annapolis, in Sep
tember, 1786, had been long under the consideration
of a committee of Congress for the last year, and
was referred over to a grand committee of the pre
sent year. The latter committee, after considerable
difficulty and discussion, agreed on a report, by a
majority of one only, (see the Journal,)''^ which was
made a few days ago to Congress, and set down as
the order for this day. The Report coincided with
the opinion held at Annapolis, that the Confedera
tion needed amendments, and that the proposed
Convention was the most eligible means of effecting
them. The objections which seemed to prevail
against the recommendation of the Convention by
Congress, were, with some, that it tended to weaken
the Federal authority by lending its sanction to an
extra-constitutional mode of proceeding ; with others,
that the interposition of Congress would be consi
dered by the jealous as betraying an ambitious wish
to get power into their hands by any plan whatever

.588 DEBATES. [1787.
that might present itself Subsequent to the Re
port, the Delegates from New York received instruc
tions from its Legislature to move in Congress for a
recommendation of a convention; and those from
Massachusetts had, it appeared, received information
which led them to suppose it was becoming the dis
position of the Legislature of that State to send
deputies to the proposed Convention, in case Con
gress should give their sanction to it. There was
reason to believe, however, from the language of the
instruction from New York, that her object was to
obtain a new convention, under the sanction of Con
gress, rather than to accede to the one on foot ; or
perhaps, by dividing the plans of the States in their
appointments, to frustrate all of them. The latter
suspicion is in some degree countenanced by their
refusal of the impost a few days before the instruc
tion passed, and by their other marks of an unfederal
disposition. The Delegates from New York, in
consequence of their instructions, made the motion
on the Journal to postpone the Report of the Com
mittee, in order to substitute their own proposition.
Those who voted against it considered it as liable to
the objection above mentioned. Some who voted
for it, particularly Mr. Madison, considered it sus
ceptible of amendment when brought before Con
gress ; and that if Congress interposed in the matter
at all, it would be well for them to do it at the in
stance of a State, rather than spontaneously. This
motion being lost, Mr. Dane, from Massachusetts,
who was at bottom unfriendly to the plan of a con
vention, and had dissuaded his State from coming
into it, brought forward a proposition, in a different

1787.] DEBATES, 589
form, but liable to the same objection with that from
New York. After some little discussion, it was
agreed on all sides, except by Connecticut, who
opposed the measure in every form, that the resolu
tion should pass as it stands on the Journal, sanction
ing the proceedings and appointments already made
by the States, as well as recommending further ap
pointments from other States, but in such terms as
do not point directly to the former appointments.
It appeared from the debates, and still more from
the conversation among the members, that many of
them considered this Resolution as a deadly blow to
the existing Confederation. Doctor Johnson, who
voted against it, particularly declared himself to that
eflfect. Others viewed it in the same light, but were
pleased with it as the harbinger of a better confede
ration. The reserve of many of the members made it dif
ficult to decide their real wishes and expectations
from the present crisis of our affairs. All agreed
and owned that the Federal Government, in its
existing shape, was inefficient and could not last
long. The members from the Southern ahd Middle
States seemed generally anxious for some republican
organization of the system which would preserve
the Union, and give due energy to the government
of it. Mr. Bingham alone avowed his wishes that
the Confederacy might be divided into several dis
tinct confederacies, its great extent and various
interests being incompatible with a single govern
ment. The Eastern members were suspected by
some of leaning towards some anti-republican esta
blishment, (the effect of their late confusions,) or of

590 DEBATES. [1787.
being less desirous or hopeful of preserving the unity
of the empire. For the first time the idea of separate
confederacies had got into the newspapers. It ap
peared to-day under the Boston head. Whatever the
views ofthe leading men in the Eastern States may
be, it would seem that the great body of the people,
particularly in Connecticut, are equally indisposed
either to dissolve or divide the Confederacy, or to
submit to any anti-republican innovations.'^

Nothing noted till
Tuesday, March 13th.
Col. Grayson and Mr. Clark having lately moved
to have the military stores at Springfield, in Massa
chusetts, removed to some place of greater security;
the motion was referred to the Secretary at War;
who this day reported against the same, as his report
will show. No opposition was made to the Report,
and it seemed to be the general sense of Congress
that his reasons were satisfactory. The movers of
the proposition, however, inight suppose the thinness
of Congress (eight States only being present) to bar
any hope of successful opposition.
Memorandum. — Called Avith Mr. Bingham to-day
on Mr. Guardoqui, and had a long conversation
touchuig the Western country, the navigation of the
Mississippi, and commerce ; as these objects relate to
Spain and the United States. Mr. Bingham opened
the conversation with intimating that there was
reason to believe the Western people were exceed
ingly alarmed at the idea of the projected treaty

1787.] DEBATES. 591
which was to shut up the Mississippi, and were
forming committees of correspondence, &c., for
uniting their councils and interests. Mr. Guardoqui,
with some perturbation, replied, that, as a friend to
the United States, he was sorry for it, for they mis
took theh interest ; but that as the Minister of Spain
he had no reason to be so. The result of what fell
in the course of the conversation from Mr. Madison
and Mr. Bingham was, that it was the interest of the
two nations to live in harmony; that if Congress
were disposed to treat with Spain on the ground of
a cession of the Mississippi, it would be out of their
power to enforce the treaty ; that an attempt would
be the means of populating the western country with
additional rapidity; that the British had their eye
upon that field, would countenance the separation of
the western frora the eastern part of North America,
promote the settlement of it, and hereafter be able to
turn the force springing up in that quarter against
Spanish America, in co-operation with their naval
armaments ; that Spain oflfered nothing in fact to the
United States in the commercial scale which she did
not grant to all the other nations from motives of
interest. Mr. Guardoqui would not listen to the idea of a
right to the navigation of the Mississippi by the
United States, contending that the possession of the
two banks at the mouth shut the door against any
such pretension. Spain never would give up this
point. He lamented that he had been here so long
without effecting any thing; and foresaw that the
consequences would be very disagreeable.
What would those consequences be 7 — He evaded

592 debates. [1787.
an answer by repeating general expressions. Spain
could make her own terms, he said, with Great
Britain. He considered the commercial connection
proposed as entirely in favor of the United States,
and that in a little time the ports of Spain would be
shut against fish. He was asked, whether against
all fish, or only against fish from the United States 1
From all places not in treaty, he said, with Spain.
Spain wouid act according to her own ideas. She
would not be governed by other people's ideas of
her interest.
He was very sorry for the instructions passed by
Virginia ; he foresaw bad consequences from them.
He had written to soften the matter as well as he
could, but that troops and stores would certainly
reinforce New Orleans in consequence of the Reso
lutions. He had not conferred at all with the Minister of
Foreign Aflfairs since October, and did not expect to
confer again. He did not expect to remain much
longer in America. He wished he might not be a
true prophet ; but it would be found that we mistook
our interest, and that Spain would make us feel the
vulnerable side of our commerce by abridging it in
her ports.
With an air of ostensible jocoseness, he hinted that
the people of Kentucky would make good Spanish
subjects, and that they would become such for the
sake of the privilege annexed to that character.
He seeraed to be disposed to make us believe that
Spain and Britain understood one another ; that he
knew the views of Great Britain in holding the
Western posts ; and that Spain had it in her power

1787.] debates. 593
to make Great Britain bend to her views. He
affected a mysterious air on this point, which only
proved that he was at a loss what to say to the
probability and tendency of a connection between
Great Britain and the Western settlements, in case
the Mississippi should be given up by Congress.
He intimated that Spain could not grant any inlet
of the American trade by treaty; but that, in case
of a treaty, trade through the Mississippi, as well as
other channels, would be winked at.
In speaking of the Mississippi and the right of
Spain, he alluded to the case of the Tagus, which
Spain had never pretended to a right of navigating
through Portugal. It was observed to him, that, in
estimating the rights of nations in such cases, regard
must be had to their respective proportions of terri
tory on the river. Suppose Spain held only five acres
on each side at the mouth of the Mississippi, would
she pretend to an exclusive right in such case *? He
said that was not the case ; Spain had a great propor
tion. How much? After some confusion and hesitation,
he said, she claimed at least — as far as the Ohio. We
smiled, and asked how far eastwardly from the Missis
sippi 1 He became still more at a loss for an answer,
and turned it off by insinuating that he had conversed
on that matter with the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
He was reminded of the doctrine maintained by
Spain in 1608, as to the Scheldt. He seemed not
to have known the fact, and resolved it into some
political consideration of the times.
He was asked, whether the partition of the British
Empire could deprive this part of it of the rights
Vol, I.— 38

594 debates. [1787.
appertaining to the King of Great Britain as King
of this country ; and even whether the rupture of
Great Britain and Spain could deprive, in justice,
the United States of rights which they held under
the Treaty of 1763, whilst they remained a part of
the British Empire? Whether, in case no such
rupture had happened, the Treaty between Spain
and that part of the Empire would have been dis
solved by the Revolution? &c., &c. He did not
seem well to understand the principles into which
such questions resolved themselves, and gave them
the go-by, referring the claim of Spain principally to
her conquests of the British possessions in North
America. He betrayed strongly the anxiety of Spain to
retard the population of the Western country ; ob
serving that whenever sufficient force should arise
therein, it would be impossible for it to be controlled;
that any conciliating measures that might be taken
now, would have little eflfect on their temper and
views fifty or an hundred years hence, when they
should be in force.
When we rose to take leave, he begged us to
remember what he had said as to the inflexibility
of Spain on the point of the Mississippi, and the
consequences to America of her adherence to her
present pretensions,'^

1787.] debates. 595

Nothing noted till

Tuesday, March 20th.

Mr. Jay's report on the Treaty of Peace taken up.
Mr. Yates objected to the first resolution, which
declares the Treaty to be a law of the land. He
said the States, or at least his State, did not admit
it to be such until clothed with legal sanction. At
his request he was furnished with a copy of the
resolution, for the purpose of consulting such as he
might choose.

Wednesday, March 21st.
The subject of yesterday resumed.
Mr. Yates was now satisfied with the resolutions
as they stood. The words " constitutionally made,"
as applied to the Treaty, seemed to him, on con
sideration, to qualify sufficiently the doctrine on
which the resolution was founded.
The second and third resolutions, urging on the
States a repeal of all laws contravening the Treaty,
(first, that they might not continue to operate as
violations of it; secondly, that questions might be
avoided touching their validity,) underwent some
criticisms and discussions.
Mr. Varnum and Mr. Mitchell thought they did
not consist with the first, which declared such laws

596 DEBATES. [1787,
to be void, in which case they could not operate as
violations. Mr. Madison observed, that a repeal of those con
travening laws was expedient, and even necessary,
to free the courts from the bias of their oaths, which
bound the judges more strongly to the State than to
the Federal authority. A distinction too, he said,
might be started possibly between laws prior and
laws subsequent to the Treaty ; a repealing eflfect
of the Treaty on the former not necessarily implying
the nullity of the latter. Supposing the Treaty to
have the validity of a law only, it would repeal all
antecedent laws. To render succeeding laws void,
it must have more than the mere authority of a law.
In case these succeeding laws, contrary to the Treaty,
should come into discussion before the courts, it
would be necessary to examine the foundation of the
Federal authority, and to determine whether it had
the validity of a Constitution, paramount to the legis
lative authority in each State. This was a delicate
question, and studiously to be av&ided, as it was no
torious that, although in some of tbe States the Con
federation was incorporated with, and had the sanc
tion of, their respective constitutions, yet in others it
received a legislative ratification only, and rested ore
no other basis. He adraitted, hovvever, that the
word " operate '^' might be changed for the better,
and proposed, in its place, the words " be regarded,"
as violations of the Treaty,— which wa.s agreed to'
without opposition.
Mr. King, in the course of the business, observed,.
that a question had been raised in New York
whether stipulations, as tltey might affect citizens.

1787.] DEBATES. 597
only, and not foreigners, could restrain the States
from legislating with respect to the former; and
supposed that such stipulations could not.
The resolutions passed unanimously."'
Nothing till Friday, March 23rd.
The Report for reducing salaries agreed to, as
amended, unanimously. The proposition for reduc
ing the salary of the Secretary of Foreign Aflfairs
to three thousand dollars was opposed by Mr. King
and Mr. Madison, who entered into the peculiar
duties and qualifications required in that oflace, and
its peculiar importance. Mr. Mitchell and Mr,
Varnum contended, that it stood on a level with the
Secretaryship to Congress. The yeas and nays were
called on the question, and it was lost. A motion
was then made to reduce the salary of four thou
sand, to three thousand five hundred. Mr. Clark,
who had been an opponent to any reduction, acceded
to this compromise. Mr. King suflfered his colleague
to vote in the affirmative. There being six States
for reducing to three thousand five hundred, and Mr.
Carrington being on the same side, in opposition to
Mr. Grayson, Mr. Madison gave up his opinion to
so great a majority, and the resolution for three
thousand five hundred passed. The preceding yeas
and nays on the motiohs for reducing to three thou
sand was then withdrawn, and no entry made of it.
It seemed to be the general opinion that the salary
of the Secretary at War was disproportionately low,
and ought to be raised. The Committee would have

598 DEBATES. [1787.
reported an augmentation, but conceived themselves
restrained by their commission, which was to reduce,
not to revise, the Civil List.
Nothing of consequence till
Wednesday, March 28th.
Mr. King reminded Congress of the motion on the
nineteenth day of February for discontinuing the
enlistments, and intiraated that the state of things
in Massachusetts was at present such that no oppo
sition would now be raade by the Delegation of
that State. A comraittee was appointed, in general,
to consider the military establishment, and parti
cularly to report a proper resolution for stopping the
enlistments. The Virginia Delegates laid before Congress sun
dry papers from the Executive of that State relating
to the seizure of Spanish property by General Clark,
and the incendiary efiforts on foot in the western
country against the Spaniards, &c. No comment
was made on them, nor any vote taken.

Thursday, March 29th.
The coraraittee appointed to confer with the Trea
sury Board on the great business of a fiscal settle
ment of the accounts of the United States, reported
that they be discharged, and the Board instructed to
report an ordinance. Mr. King, in explanation, said,
that it was the sense of the Committee and of the
Treasury Board both, that commissioners should be
appointed with full and finnl power.'^ to decide on

1787.] DEBATES. .599
the claims of the States against the Union, &c. The
Report was agreed to netn. con.
Sundry papers from the Illinois, complaining of the
grievances of that country, which had arrived by a
special express, were laid before Congress by the
President, and committed.
Mr. Mitchell, from Connecticut, observed that
the papers from Virginia communicated yesterday
were of a very serious nature ; and showed that we
were in danger of being precipitated into disputes
with Spain, which ought to be avoided if possible ;
and moved that these papers might be referred to
the Coraraittee on the Illinois papers, which was
done without opposition ; Mr. King only observing,
that they contained mere information, and did not in
his view need any step to be taken on them.
The Virginia Delegates communicated to Mr.
Guardoqui the proceedings of the Executive relative
to Clark's seizure of Spanish property, at which he
expressed much regret as a friend to the United
States, though as a Spanish Minister he had little
reason to dread the tendency of such outrages. The
communication was followed by a free conversation
on the Western territory and the Mississippi. The
observations of the Delegates tended to impress
him, — first, with the unfriendly temper which would
be produced in the Western people, both against
Spain and the United States, by a concerted occlu
sion of that river ; secondly, with the probability of
throwing them into the arms of Great Britain;
thirdly, of accelerating the population of that coun
try, after the example of Vermont; fourthly, the
danger of such numbers under British influence, as

600 DEBATES. [1787.
well to Spanish America as to the Atlantic States ;
fifthly, the universal opinion of right in the United
States to the free use of the river ; sixthly, the dis
appointment ofthe people of America at an attempt
in Spain to make their condition worse, as citizens
of an independent State, in amity and lately engaged
in a coramon cause, than as subjects of a formidable
and unfriendly power ; seventhly, the inefficiency of
an attempt in Congress to fulfil a treaty for shutting
the Mississippi, and the folly of their entering into
such a stipulation ; eighthly, that it would be wise in
Spain to foresee and provide for events that could not
be controlled, rather than to make fruitless efiforts to
prevent or procrastinate them.
Mr. Guardoqui reiterated his assertion that Spain
would never accede to the claim of the United States
to navigate the river ; secondly, urged that the result
of what was said was, that Congress could enter into
no treaty at all; thirdly, that the trade of Spain was
of great importance, and would certainly be shut
against the United States, — aflfecting to disregard
the remark that, if Spain continued to use fish, flour,
&c., her interest would restrain her from shutting her
ports against the American competition; fourthly, he
signified that he had observed the weakness of the
Union, and foreseen its probable breach; that he
lamented the danger of it, as he wished to see it
preserved and strengthened, which was more than
France* or any other nation in Europe did. No
reply was made to this reraark. The sincerity of
his declaration as to his own wishes was not free
* From this it may be inferred that he does not regard France as favorable to
the claims of Spain touching the Mississippi.

1787.] DEBATES. 601
from suspicion. Fifthly, he laid much stress on the
service Spain had rendered the United States during
the struggle for their independence, considering it as
laying them under great obligations. The reality
of the service was not denied, but he was reminded
of the interest Spain had in dividing a power which
had given the law to the House of Bourbon, and com
peUed Spain to relinquish, as he said, the exclusive
use of the Mississippi. Sixthly, in answer to the
remark, that Spain was for putting the United
States on a worse footing than they stood on as
British subjects, he not only mentioned the neces
sity which had dictated the Treaty of 1763, but
contended that the recovery of West Florida made
a distinction in the case. It was observed to him
that, as the navigable channel of the Mississippi ran
between the Island and the western shore, Spain
had the same pretext for holding both shores when
Florida was a British Colony, as since. He would
neither accede to the inference nor deny the fact.
Seventhly, he intimated, with a jocular air, the
possibility of the Western people becoming Spanish
subjects ; and, with a serious one, that such an idea
had been brought forward to the King of Spain by
some person connected with the Western country,
but that His Majesty's dignity and character could
never countenance it. It was replied, that that con
sideration was no doubt a sufficient obstacle, but it
was presumed, that such subjects would not be very
convenient to Spain. It would be much more for
the interest of Spain that they should be friendly
neighbors than refractory subjects. It did not ap
pear that he viewed the matter in a diflferent light.
Vol. I.— 38*

602 DEBATES. [1787.
Eighthly, he disclaimed his having ever assented to,
or approved of, any limited occlusion of the Missis
sippi, though in a manner that did not speak a real in
flexibility on that point. Ninthly, it appeared clearly
that the check to the Western settlements was a
favorite object, and that the occlusion of the Missis
sippi was considered as having that tendency.
Tenthly, the futility of many of his arguments and
answers satisfied the Delegates that they could not
appear convincing to hiraself, and that he was of
course pursuing rather the ideas of his Court than
his own.'^

Friday, March 30th.
Mr. Jay's report in favor of the admission of
Phineas Bond as British Consul for the Middle
States, was called for by Mr. Cadwalader. Mr.
Madison said, he was far from being satisfied of the
propriety of the raeasure ; he was a friend in general
to a liberal policy, and admitted that the United
States were more in the wrong in the violation of
the Treaty of Peace than Great Britain ; but still
the latter was not blameless. He thought, how^ever,
the question turned on diflferent considerations : first,
the facility of the Jjnited States in granting privi
leges to Great Britain without a treaty of coramerce,
instead of begetting a disposition to conclude such a
treaty, had been found, on trial, to be raade a reason
against it; secondly, the indignity of Great Britain
in neglecting to send a public Minister to the United
States, notwithstanding the lapse of time since Mr,

1787.] DEBATES. 603
Adams's arrival there, gave them no title to favors
in that line ; and self-respect seemed to require that
the United States sbould at least proceed with dis
trust and reserve.
Mr. Grayson thought, as the Secretary had done,
that it would be good policy to admit Mr. Bond, and
that it could not be decently, and without oflfence,
refused after the admission of Mr. Temple.
Mr. Clark said, he was at first puzzled how to
vote, as he did not like the admission proposed, on
one hand; and, on the other, thought it not decent to
refuse it after the admission of Mr. Temple. On
reflecting, however, that Mr. Temple was admitted
at a tirae when hopes were entertained of a coramer
cial treaty, which had since vanished, and that the
question might be postponed generally without being
negatived, he should accede to the idea of doing
nothing on the subject.
Mr. Varnum animadverted on the obnoxious cha
racter of Mr. Bond, and conceived that alone a suf
ficient reason for not admitting him. The postpone
ment was agreed to without any overt dissent except
that of Mr. Grayson.
The Delegates from North Carolina comraunicated
to Congress sundry papers conspiring with the other
proofs of discontent in the Western country at the
supposed surrender of the Mississippi, and of hostile
machinations against the Spaniards.
It was ordered that they should be referred to the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs for his inforraation. It
was then moved that the pa.pers relative to the sarae
subjects from Virginia, yesterday referred to a com
mittee, should, after discharging the Committee, be

604 DEBATES- [1787.
referred to the Office of Foreign Aflfairs. Mr. Clark
proposed to add " to report." This was objected to
by Mr. King, and brought on some general observa
tions on the proceedings of Congress in the aflfair of
the Mississippi. It was at length agreed that the
reference be raade without an instruction to report.
Mr. Pierce then observed that it had been hinted by
Mr. Madison, as proper to instruct the Secretary of
Foreign Aflfairs to lay before Congress the state of
his negotiation with Mr. Guardoqui, and made a
motion to that eflfect, which was seconded by several
at once.
Mr. King hoped Congress would not be hurried
into a decision on that point, observing that it was
a very delicate one. But he did not altogether like
it; and yet it was of such a nature that it might
appear strange to negative it. He desired that it
might at least lie over till Monday.
Mr. Madison concurred in wishing the same, being
persuaded that the propriety of the motion was so
clear that nothing could produce dissent, unless it
vvere forcing merabers into an unwilling decision.
The raotion was withdrawn, with notice that it
would be renewed on Monday next.'^

Monday, April 2]vd.
Mr. Pierce renewed his motion instructing the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs to lay before Congress
the state of his negotiation with Mr. Guardoqui,
which was agreed to without observation or dissent.

1787.] DEBATES. 605
See Journals till
Tuesday, April Uth.
Mr. Kearney moved that Congress adjourn on the
last Friday in April, to meet on the  day of May,
in Philadelphia. Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia,
Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Rhode
Island, were for it. The merits of the proposition
were not discussed. The friends to it seemed sensi
ble that objections lay against the particular moment
at which it was proposed ; but considering the
greater centrahty of Philadelphia, as rendering a
removal proper in itself, and the uncertainty of
finding seven States present and in the humor
again, they waived the objections. The opinion of
Mr. Madison was, that the meeting of the ensuing
Congress in Philadelphia ought to be fixed, leaving
the existing Congress to remain throughout the
Federal year in New York. This arrangement
would have been less irritating, and would have
had less the aspect of precipitancy or passion, and
would have repelled insinuations of personal con
siderations with the members. The question was
agreed to lie over till to-morrow.

Wednesday, April 12th.
Mr. Varnum moved that the motion for removing
to Philadelphia should be postponed generally. As
the assent of Rhode Island was necessary to make
seven States, no one chose to press a decision : the
postponement was therefore agreed to nem. con., and

606 DEBATES. [1787.
the proceedings of yesterday involved the Yeas and
Nays on some immaterial points struck from the
Journal.

See the Journal till
Wednesday, April 18th.

' )

It having appeared by the Report of Mr. Jay on
the instruction agreed to on Monday, the 2nd in
stant, and on information referred to him concern
ing the discontents of the Western people, that he
had considered the act of seve7i States as authorizing
him to suspend the use ofthe Mississippi, and thathe
had accordingly adjusted vvith Mr. Guardoqui an
article to that effect, that he was also much embar
rassed by the ferment excited in the Western country
by the rumored intention to cede the Mississippi, by
which such cession was rendered inexpedient on one
side ; and, on the other side, by the disinclination in
another part of the Union to support the use of the
river by arras, if necessary. It was proposed by Mr.
Madison, as an expedient which, if it should answer
no other purpose, would at least gain tirae, that it
should be resolved, " That the -present state of the ne
gotiations with Spain, [meaning the step taken under
the spurious authority of seven States,] and of the
aflfairs of the United States, [meaning the temper and
proceedings in the Western country,] renders it
expedient that the Minister Plenipotentiary at the
Court of France should proceed under a special com
mission to the Court of Madrid, there to make such

1787.] DEBATES. 607
representations, and to urge such negotiations, as
will be most likely to satisfy the said Court of the
friendly disposition of the United States, and to
induce it to make such concessions relative to the
Southern limit of the said States, and their right to
navigate the river Mississippi, and to enter into such
commercial stipulations with them, as may most
eflfectually guard against a rupture of the subsisting
harmony, and promote the mutual interest of the
two nations; and that the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs prepare and report the instructions proper to
be given to the said Minister, with a proper commis
sion and letters of credence ; and that he also report
the communications and explanations which it may
be advisable to make to Mr. Guardoqui relative to
this change in the mode of conducting the negotia
tion with his Court."
Mr. King said that he did not know that he should
be opposed to the proposition, as it seemed to be a
plausible expedient, and as something seemed neces
sary to be done ; but that he thought it proper that
Congress should, before they agreed to it, give the
Secretary for Foreign Aflfairs an opportunity of
stating his opinions on it, and accordingly moved
that it should be referred to hira.
Mr. Clark and Mr. Varnum opposed the reference,
it being improper for Congress to submit a principle,
for deciding which no further information was
wanted, to the opinion of their minister. The refer
ence being, however, at length acceded to by the
other friends of the proposition, on the principle of
accommodation, it had a vote of seven States."^

608 DEBATES. [1787.
Thursday, April 19th.
The instructions of Virginia against relinquishing
the Mississippi were laid before Congress by the
Delegates of that State, with a raotion that they
should be referred to the Department of Foreign
Aflfairs, by way of information.
The reference vvas opposed by Mr. King and Mr.
Benson, as unnecessary fbr that purpose, the instruc
tions having been printed in the newspapers.
In answer to this, it was observed, that the memo
rial accompanying the instructions had never been
printed; that if it had, no just objection could be
thence drawn against an official communication ;
that if Congress would submit a raeasure, as they
had done yesterday, to the opinion of their Minister,
they ought at least to supply him with every fact, in
the most authentic manner, which could assist his
judgment; and that they had actually referred to
the same Minister communications relative to the
Western views, less interesting and authentic, and
which he had made the basis of a Report to Con
gress. The motion was lost, Massachusetts and New
York being against it, and Connecticut divided.
Mr. Mitchell, frora the latter State, vvas displeased
at the negatives, as indicating a want of candor and
moderation on the subject.'^

1787.] DEBATES. 609
Monday, April 23rd.
Mr, Jay's report, stating objections against the
motion of Mr. Madison for sending Mr. Jeflferson to
Madrid, was taken into consideration.
Mr. Madison observed, that Mr. Jay had not taken
up the proposition in the point of view in which it
had been penned ; and explained what that was, to
wit, that it was expedient to retract the step taken
for ceding the Mississippi, and to do it in a manner
as respectful and conciliating as possible to Spain,
and which, at the same time, would procrastinate
the dilemma stated by Mr. Jay. He said he was
not attached to the expedient he had brought for
ward, and was open to any other that might be less
exceptionable, Mr. Gorham avowed his opinion that the shut
ting the Mississippi would be advantageous to the
Atlantic States, and wished to see it shut.
Mr. Madison animadverted on the illiberality of
his doctrine, and contrasted it with the principles
of the Revolution, and the language of American
patriots. Nothing was done in the case.

Wednesday, April 25th.
Mr. Madison, observing to Congress that he found
a settled disinclination in some of the Delegations to
concur in any conciliatory expedient for defending
the Mississippi against the operation of the vote of
seven States, and that it was hence become necessary
Vol. I.— 39

610 DEBATES. [1787.
to attack durectly the validity of that measure, to the
end that the adversaries to it, and particularly the
instructed Delegations, might at least discharge
their duty in the case, raade the following motion :
Whereas it appears by the Report of the Secre
tary for th^ Department of Foreign Aflfairs, made on
the 11th instant, that in consequence of a vote
entered into by seven States on the 29th day of August
last, he has proceeded to adjust with Mr. Guardoqui
an article for suspending the right of the United
States to the comraon use of the river Mississippi
below their southern boundary : And whereas it is
considered that the said vote of seven States, having
passed in a case in which the assent of nine States
is required by the Articles of Confederation, is not
valid for the purpose intended by it; and that any
further negotiations in pursuance of the same may
eventually expose the United States to great embar
rassments with Spain, as well as excite great discon
tents and difficulties among themselves : Resolved,
therefore, that the Secretary for the said Department
be informed that it is the opinion of Congress, that
the said vote of seven States ought not to be re
garded as authorizing any suspension of the use of
the river Mississippi by the United States, and that
any expectations thereof, which may have been con
ceived on the part of Spain, ought to be repressed.
Mr. King reminded Congress that this motion was
barred by the rule that no question should be re
vived, which had been set aside by the previous
question, unless the same States, or an equal number,
be present, as were present at the time of such pre
vious question, This rule had been entered mto in

1787.] DEBATES, 611
consequence of a similar motion made shortly after
the vote of seven States had passed. Mr. King con
tended, that this rule was a prudent one, and recora
mended by the practice of all deliberative assem
blies, who never suflfered questions once agitated and
decided, to be repeated at the pleasure of the unsuc
cessful party.
Mr. Madison admitted that the rule, if insisted on,
was a bar to his motion ; but that he had not ex
pected that it would be called up, being so evidently
improper in itself, and the offspring of the intfempe-
rance which characterized the epoch of its birth.
As it was called up, however, it was become neces
sary that a preliminary motion for its repeal should
be raade, and which he accordingly made. His ob
jections against the rule were —
First, that it was an attempt in one Congress to
bind their successors, which was not only impracti
cable in itself, but highly unreasonable in the very
instance which gave birth to the rule. Twelve
States were on the floor at the time ; seven were for
the previous question, five against it. The casting
number, therefore, was but two. Was it not unrea
sonable that eleven States, unanimously of a con
trary opinion, should be controlled by this small
majority when twelve were present ; and yet such
would be the operation of the rule, if eleven States
only should at any time happen to be present,
although they should be unanimous hi the case.
Secondly, the operation of the vote in another
respect was still more reprehensible. In the former
case the eleven States, or even seven, could extri
cate themselves by a repeal of the rule. In case a

6J2 DEBATES. [1787.
number less than seven should wish to justify them
selves by any particular motion, they might be pre
cluded by such a rule. Six States, u^structed by
their constituents to make a particular proposition,
or to enter a particular protest, might be thus fet
tered by a stratagem of seven States. In the case
actually depending, three States were instructed,
and two, if not three, more ready to vote with them.
Thirdly, the practice of other assemblies did not
reach this case, and if it did the reason of it would
be inapplicable. The restriction in other assemblies
related to the same asserably, and even to the same
session. Here the restriction is perpetual. In legis
lative assemblies, no great inconvenience would hap
pen from a suspension of a law for a limited time.
In Executive councils, which are involved in the
constitution of Congress, and particularly in military
operations and negotiations, the vicissitude of events
would often govern, and a raeasure improper on one
day might become necessary the next.
Mr. Clark and Mr. Varnum contended that the
rules of the Congress for the last year were not in
force during the present, and supposed that a repeal
was unnecessary.
In the course of this discussion, the question as
to the validity of the vote of seven States, and the
merits of the proposition of Mr. Madison, barred by
the rule, incidentally came into view. The advocates
of the latter did not maintain the validity, or rather
studiously avoided giving an opinion on it. They
urged only the impropriety of any exposition by
Congress of their own powers, and of the vaUdity
of their own acts. They were answered, that the

1787,] DEBATES. 613
exposition must be somewhere, and more properly
vVith Congress than with one of their Ministerial offi
cers ; that it was absurd to say that Congress, with
inforraation on their table that a treaty with a for
eign nation was going on without a constitutional
sanction, should forbear, out of such scruple, to assert
it, and prevent the dileraraa which would ensue, of
either recognizing an unconstitutional proceeding, or
of quarrelling with the King of Spain ; that Congress
had frequently asserted and expounded their own
powers, and must frequently be obliged to do so.
What was the late address to the States on the
subject of the Treaty of Peace, but an exposition
and vindication of their constitutional powers ? That,
in the vote itself, the entry, " so it was resolved in
the affirmative," asserted it to be valid and constitu
tional; the v^ote of seven States when nine were
required being otherwise to be entered, like a vote of
six States, in the negative.
It appearing to be the inflexible predetermination
of the advocates for the Spanish Treaty to hold fast
every advantage they had got, the debate was
shortened, and an adjournment took place without
any question.
Note. — Mr. King, in conversation repeatedly,
though not in public debate, maintained that the
entry, " so it was resolved in the affirmative," decided
nothing as to the validity of the vote of seven States
for yielding the Mississippi ; and that they amounted
to no more than a simple affirmation, or summary
repetition, of the fact that the said seven States
voted in the manner stated ! ! !

614 debates. [1787.
Thursday, April 26th.
The question on the motion to repeal the rule
was called for after some little conversation. Mr.
Clark moved that it might be postponed, which was
agreed to.
Nothing further was done in this business till
Wednesday, May the second, when Mr. Madison left
New York for the Convention to be held in Phila
delphia. It was considered, on the whole, that the project
for shutting the Mississippi was at an end — a point
deemed of great importance in reference to the
approaching Convention for introducing a change in
the Federal Government, and to the objection to an
mcrease of its powers, foreseen from the jealousy
which had been excited by that project.'^

LETTERS

OF

JAMES MADISON,
subsequent to the debates of 1787,

1787.] 615
LETTERS
TO NOVEMBER 2, 1788,
SUBSECIUENT TO THE DEBATES OF 1787.

TO EDMUND RANDOLPH.
New York, February 15, 1787.
Dear Sir,
Having but recently got here, I had not time to
add a few private lines as I wished, to our public
letter. We have as yet no definitive information
from Massachusetts touching the operations of Gen
eral Lincoln. Little doubt, however, is entertained
that the insurrection will be effectually quelled.
The Legislature of that State seem to have taken
great spirit from the prospect. They have come at
length to the resolution of declaring the existence
of a rebellion, and, it is said, mean to disarm and dis
franchise all who have been engaged in 'it. We
have no information from any other quarter, and I
have not been here long enough to collect any just
idea of the general politics.

TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. New York, February 18, 1787.
Dear Sir,
Congress have received no late intelligence either
from Mr. Jeflferson or Mr. Adams, Nor have any
interesting measures yet taken place since they have
been assembled in force. Those in expectation re-

616 CORRESPONDENCE. [1787.
late to,— first, the Mississippi. On this subject I
have no information to give, not a word having pass
ed concerning it since my arrival. Secondly, the
treaty of peace. This subject is now depending in
the form of a Report from Mr. Jay. I find what I
was not before apprized of, that infractions on the
part of the United States preceded even the viola
tion on the other side, in the instance of the negroes.
If Congress should be able to agree on any measures
for carrying the treaty into execution, it seems prob
able that the fundamental one will be a summons of
the States to remove all legal irapediments which
stand at present in the way. There seems to be no
reason to believe that Great Britain will comply on
any other conditions than those signified in the com
munication of Lord Carmarthen to Mr. Adams,
Thirdly, the proposed Convention in May, A great
disagreeraent of opinion exists as to the expediency
of a recoraraendation frora Congress to the back
ward States in favor of the meeting. In would seem
as if some of the States disliked it because it is an
extra-constitutional measure, and that their dislike
would be removed or lessened by a sanction from
Congress to it. On the other hand it is suggested,
that some would dislike it the more if Congress
should appear to interest themselves in it. I observe
in a late newspaper, that instructions are to be
brought forward in the Legislature here to the
Delegates in Congress, to propose and urge their
interposition in favor of the Convention. What
the sense of the State is on the merit of the pro
ject, is not perfectly clear. A refusal a few days
ago, by a large majority, to grant the impost, does

1787.] correspondence. 617
not augur well. Hopes, however, are entertain
ed. The four States north of it are also still to
declare their sentiments. Massachusetts, it is now
expected, "will appoint deputies to the Convention,
and her example will be much respected by the
three others. The intermediate States from New
York to South Carolina, Maryland excepted, have
made appointments ; and Maryland has determined
to do so, though she has not yet agreed on the indi
viduals. South Carolina and Georgia are supposed
by their Delegates here to be well disposed to back
the plan. Fourthly, the troops raising under the
authority of Congress in Massachusetts. The pros
pect of a close to the turbulent scenes in that quar
ter has produced a motion for stopping the enlist
ments. The Delegates from the New England
States generally, and from Massachusetts in partic
ular, are anxious that the motion should be suspend
ed for a few weeks, that the influence of the military
preparations of the United States may be continued
in favor of their State measures, some of which are
likely to be pretty vigorous, and to try the strength
of their Government. It appears, besides, that the
ringleader of the insurrection has not yet been ap
prehended, and, according to report, still harbours
mischief We begin to experience already the in-
conveniency of the clause in our treaties stipulating
the privileges of the most favored nation. Mr. Van
Berkel has got hold of the late act of our Assembly
in favor of French wines and brandies brought in
French bottoms, and contends that it violates the
Dutch treaty. He has been told that these privi
leges are a requital for equal ones granted on the
Vol. I.— 39*

618 correspondence. [1787.
side of France; and that Holland must pay the price
before she can claim the concession. His answer is,
that nothing is said about compensation in the trea
ty ; that it is expressly stated that the Dutch shall
pay no higher duties than the most favored nation
is, or shall be, obliged to pay. We tell him, the
compensation is necessarily implied; and that a con
trary interpretation would render the treaty too in
convenient to both the parties to be supposed the
true one. He persists in alleging that it is the true
one, that the treaty pursues the carrying policy
marked by a like stipulation in every treaty where
it could be introduced, and that the clause relative
to compensation was intentionally omitted. He
means to bring the matter before Congress, and to
direct the Dutch Consul to protest against the duties
in case of their being exacted. He professes and
appears, notwithstanding, to be anxious for an ami
cable adjustment, and would have forborne to apply
to Congress if we could have authorized a hope that
the law would not be actually put in execution
against Dutch cargoes. As it is, he means to put a
copy of the note to Congress in our hands, that it
may be communicated to the State. I have not yet
thoroughly investigated the question. The letter of
the treaty is on his side, the equity of it on ours. If
his construction be admitted, the United States could
not purchase the West India trade of Great Britain
or France, without letting in Holland to the privi
leges granted on our part, although she should keep
her ports in that quarter shut against us  a consid
eration not only unjust towards us, but creating ob
jections on the part of Great Britain or France. A

1787.] correspondence. 619
very dismal account of Clark's proceedings in the
Western country has been informally laid before
Congress, and will be forwarded to your depart
ment. If the information be well founded, you will
probably receive a confirmation through other chan
nels.'"

TO EDMUND RANDOLIJH, New York, February 25, 1787.
Dear Sir,
The Secretary's despatch will have communica
ted to you the Resolution of Congress giving their
sanction to the proposed meeting in May next. At
the date of my last, a great division of opinion pre
vailed on the subject, it being supposed by some of
the States that the interposition of Congress was
necessary to give regularity to the proceeding, and
by others that a neutrality on their part was a ne
cessary antidote for the jealousy entertained of their
wishes to enlarge the powers within their own ad
ministration. The circumstance which conduced
much to decide the point, was an instruction from
New York to its Delegates, to move in Congress for
some recoraraendation of a Convention. The style
of the instruction makes it probable that it was the
wish of this State to have a new Convention institu
ted, rather than the one on foot recognized. Massachu
setts seemed also skittish on this point. Connecti
cut opposed the interposition of Congress altogether.
The act of Congress is so expressed as to cover the
proceedings of the States, which have already pro-

620 correspondence. [1787,
vided for the Convention, without any pointed recog
nition of them.
Our situation is becoming every day more and
more critical. No money comes into the Federal
Treasury ; no respect is paid to the Federal author
ity ; and people of reflection unanimously agree that
the existing Confederacy is tottering to its foun
dation. Many individuals of weight, particularly in
the Eastern district, are suspected of leaning toward
monarchy. Other individuals predict a partition of
the States into two or more confederacies. It is
pretty certain that, if sorae radical amendment of
the single one cannot be devised and introduced, one
or other of these revolutions, the latter no doubt,
will take place. I hope you are bending your
thoughts seriously to the great work of guarding
against both.'^

to EDMUND RANDOLPH.
New Yoik, March 11, 1787.

Dear Sir,
The Governor of this State is just returned from
his trip to the upper parts of it. He found ev^ery
thing quiet in the place to which suspicions and re
ports carried him. He says also, as I am told, that
Lincoln has restored a calm in that part of Mas
sachusetts which borders on New York, as he had
before done in the other disaflfected parts. Notwith
standing these favorable accounts, there is reason
to apprehend that every thing is not yet rio-ht in

1.787.] correspondence. 621
Massachusetts, and that the discontents are rather
silenced than subdued. The measures taken by the
Legislature of that State prove that such is their
view ofthe matter. They have disfranchized a con
siderable proportion of the disaffected voters ;. have
voted a military force for the purpose of maintain
ing the tranquillity of the commonwealth ; and their
Delegates, in pursuance of instructions, have within
a few days past, put on the Journals of Congress a
representation including an assertion of right to Fed
eral sijipport in case of necessity.
The appointments for the Convention are still go
ing on. Georgia has appointed her Delegates to
Congress, her Representatives in that body also.
The gentleman from that State here at present are
Colonel Few, and Major Pierce, formerly Aid to
General Green, I am told just now, that South
Carolina has appointed the two Rutledges and Ma
jor Butler, Colonel Hamilton, with a Mr. Yates
and a Mr. Lansing are appointed by New York.
The two latter are supposed to lean too much to
wards State considerations to be good members of
an assembly which will only be useful in proportion
to its superiority to partial views and interests.
Massachusetts has also appointed, Messrs. Gorham,
Dana, King, Gerry and Strong compose her deputa
tion. The resolution under which they are appoint
ed restrains them from acceding to any departure
from the principle of the fifth Article of Confed
eration. It is conjectured that this fetter, which ori
ginated with their Senate, will be knocked oflf. Its
being introduced at all, denotes a very diflferent
spirit in that quarter from what some had been led

622 correspondence. [1787.
to expect. Connecticut, it is now generally believed,
will come into the measure.
Nothing has been yet done in the principal busi
ness before Congress ; and I fear the number of
States will not increase so far as to be competent to
it. The negotiations with Spain are carried on, if
they go on at all, entirely behind the curtain. The
business has been put into such a form that it rests
wholly with Jay how far he will proceed with
Guardoqui, and how far he will coraraunicate with
Congress. The instructed States are hence under
sorae erabarrassraent. They cannot deraand inform
ation, of right ; they are unwilling, by asking it of
favor, to risk a refusal ; and they cannot resort to
the present thin Congress with any hope of success.
Should Congress become pretty full, and Pennsyl
vania follow North Carolina, Virginia, and New Jer
sey, in giving instructions, the case may be altered.'^

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON. New York, March 19, 1787.
Dear Sir,
Congress have continued so thin as to be incom
petent to the dispatch of the more iraportant busi
ness before them. We have at present nine States,
and it is not improbable that something may now
be done. The report of Mr. Jay on the mutual vio
lations of the treaty of peace will be araong the first
subjects of deliberation. He favors the British claim
of interest, but refers the question to the court. The
amount of the report, which is an able one, is, that

1787.] correspondence, 623
the treaty should be put in force as a law, and the
exposition of it left, like that of other laws, to the
ordinary tribunals.
The Spanish project sleeps, A perusal of the
attempt of seven States to make a new treaty, by
repealing an essential condition of the old, satisfied
me that Mr. Jay's caution would revolt at so irregu
lar a sanction. A late accidental conversation with
Guardoqui proved to me that the negotiation is ar
rested. It may appear strange that a member of
Congress should be indebted to a foreign Minister
for such inforraation, yet such is the footing on which
the interaperance of party has put the raatter, that
it~ rests wholly with Mr. Jay how far he will com
municate with Congress, as well as how far he will
negotiate with Guardoqui. But although it appears
that the intended sacrifice of the Mississippi will not
be made, the consequences of the intention and the
attempt are likely to be very serious. I have al
ready made known to you the light in which the
subject was taken up by Virginia. Mr. Henry's dis
gust exceeds all measure, and I am not singular in
ascribing his refusal to attend the Convention to the
policy of keeping himseif free to corabat or espouse
the result of it according to the result of the Missis
sippi business, araong other circurastances. North
Carolina also has given pointed instructions to her
Delegates; so has New, Jersey. A proposition for
the like purpose was a few days ago made in the
Legislature of Pennsylvania, but went oflf without a
decision on its raerits. Her Delegates in Congress
are equally divided on the subject. The tendency
of this project to foment distrust among the Atlantic

624 correspondence. [178/.
States, at a crisis when harmony and confidence
ought to have been studiously cherished, has not
been more verified than its predicted eflfect on the
ultramontane settlements. I have credible mforma-
tion that the people living on the Westem waters
are already in great agitation, and are taking meas
ures for uniting their consultations. The ambition
of individuals will quickly mix itself with the ori
ginal motives of resentment and interest. Commu
nication will gradually take place witli their British
neighbours. They will be led to set up for them
selves, to seize on the vacant lands, to entice emi
grants by bounties and an exemption from Federal
burthens, and in all respects play the part of Ver
mont on a large theatre. It is hinted to me that
British partizans are already feeling the pulse of
some of the Western settlements. Should these ap
prehensions nG)t be imaginary, Spain may have equal
reason with the United States to rue the unnatural
atterapt to shut the Mississippi. Guardoqui has been
admonished of the danger, and, I believe, is not in
sensible to it, though he aflfects to be otherwise, and
talks as if the dependence of Britain on the comraer
cial favors of his Court would induce her to play
into the hands of Spain. The eye of France also
cannot fail to watch over the western prospects. I
learn from those who confer here with Otto and De
la Forest, that they favor the opening of the Missis
sippi, disclaiming at the same time any authority to
speak the sentiments of their Court. I find that the
Virginia Delegates, during the Mississippi discus
sions last fall; entered into very confidential inter
views with these gentlemen. In one of them the

1787.] correspondence. 625
idea was communicated to Otto of opening the Mis
sissippi foT exports but not for imports, and of giv
ing to France and Spain some exclusive privileges
in the trade. He promised to transmit it to Vergen
nes, to obtain his sentiments on the whole matter,
and to communicate them to the Delegates. Not
long since Grayson called on him, and revived the
subject. He assured Grayson that he had received
no answer from France, and signified his wish that
you inight pump the Count de Vergennes, observing
that he would deny to you his having received any in
formation from Ameirica. I discover, through sev
eral channels, that it would be very grateful to the
French politicians here to see our negotiations with
Spain shifted into your haiids, and carried on under
the mediating auspices of their Cotirt,
Van Berkel has remonstrated against the late acts
of Virginia, giving privileges to French wines and
brandies in French bottoms, contending that the
Dutch are entitled by their treaty to equal exemp
tions with the most favored nation, without being
subject to a compensation for them, Mr, Jay has
reported against this construction, but considers the
act of Virginia as violating the treaty; — first, as it ap
pears to be gratuitous, not compensatory, on the face
of it ; secondly, because the States have no right to
form tacit compacts with foreign nations. No de
cision of Congress has yet taken place on the sub
ject. The expedition of General Lincoln against the in
surgents has eflfectually succeeded in dispersing
them. Whether the calm which he has restored
will be durable or not, is uncertain. From the pre-
VoL. I.— 40

626 correspondence. [ 1787.
cautions taking by the Government of Massachu
setts, it would seem as if their apprehensions were
not extinguished. Besides disarming and disfrari-
chisitig, fot a limited time, those who have been in
arms, as a condition of their pardon, a military corps
is to be raised to the amount of one thousand or fif
teen hundred men, and to be stationed in the most
suspected districts. It is said that, notwithstanding
these specimens of the teraper of the Governraent, a
great proportion of the oflfenders choose rather to
risk the consequences of their treason, than submit
tp the conditions annexed to the aranesty ; that they
not only appear openly on public occasions, but dis
tinguish theraselves by badges of their character ;
and that this insolence is in raany instances coun
tenanced by no less decisive marks of popular favor
than elections to local offices of trust and authority.
A proposition is before the Legislature of this
State, now sitting, for renouncing its pretensions to
Vermont, and urging the admission of it into the
Confederacy. The diflferent parties are not agreed
as to the form in which the renunciation should be
made, but are likely to agree as to the substance.
Should the oflfer be made, and should Verraont not
reject it altogether, I think they will insist on two
stipulations at least; — first, that their becoming par
ties to the Confederation shall not subject their
boundaries, or the rights of theu- citizens, to be ques
tioned under the ninth Article ; secondly, that they
shall not be subject to any part of the public debts
already contracted.
The Geographer and his assistants have returned
surveys on the Federal lands to the amount of about

1787.] correspondence. 627
eight hundred thousand acres, which it is supposed
would sell pretty readily for public securities, and
some of it, lying on the Ohio, even for specie. It
will be difficult, however, to get proper steps taken
by Congress, so many of the States having lands of
their own at market. It is supposed that this con
sideration had some share in the zeal for shutting
the Mississippi. New Jersey, and sorae others hav
ing no Western lands, which favored this measure,
begin now to penerate the secret.
A letter from the Governor of Virginia informs
me, that the project of paper-money is beginning to
recover from the blow given it at the last session of
the Legislature. If Mr. Henry espouses it, ofwhich
there is little doubt, I think an emission will take
place.""

TO EDMUND RANDOLPH.
New York, March 25, 1787.
Dear Sir,
I have had the pleasure of your two favors of the
first and seventh instant. The refusal of Mr. Henry
to join in the task of revising the Confederation is
ominous ; and the more so, I fear, if he means to be
governed by the event which you conjecture. There
seems to be little hope, at present, of being able to
quash the proceedings relative to the aflfair which
is so obnoxious to him ;* though on the other hand,
there is reason to believe that they will never reach
the object at which they aimed.
* Jay's project for shutting the Mississippi for twenty-flve yearo.

628 CORRESPONDENCE. [1787.
Congress have not changefi the day for meeting
at Philadelphia, as you imagine. The act of Vir
ginia, I find, has done so in substituting the second
day for the second Monday in May, the time recom
mended from Annapolis.
I cannot suppose that Mr. Otto has equivocated
in his explanation to the public touchmg the Flori
das. Nothing of that subject has been mentioned
here, as far as I know. Supposing the exchange in
question to have really been intended, I do not see
the inference to be unfavorable to France. Her
views, as they occur to me, would most probably be
to conciliate the Western people, in common with
the Atlantic States, and to extend her commerce, by
reversing the Spanish policy. I have always wished
to see the Mississippi in the hands of France, or of
any nation which would be more liberally disposed
than the present holders of it.
Mr. Jay's report on the treaty of peace has at
length been decided on. It resolves and declares,
that the treaty, having been constitutionally formed,
is the law of the land, and urges a repeal of all laws
contravening it, as well to stop the complaints of
theh existing as legal impediments, as to avoid need
less questions touchmg their validity. Mr. Jay is
preparmg a chcular address to accompany the Res
olutions, and the latter will not be forwarded till the
forraer is ready,"'

1 787. J CORRESPONDENCE. 629

TO EDMUND RANDOLPH.
New York, April 2, 1787.
Dear Sir,
I have your favor of the fifteenth ultimo. All of
preceding date have already been acknowledged.
The information which you wished to go to Mr.
Guardoqui has been communicated. The real im
pression made by it cannot easily be seen through
the political veil. If he views the state of Western
aflfairs in the true light, his representations to Spain
must convince her that she has no option but be
tween concession and hostilities. It is to be lament
ed that so many circumstances have concurred to
enlist her pride on the side of the latter alterna
tive. The papers accompanying the advice of the Coun
cil as to Clark, have been laid before Congress.
Similar communications have also been made from
North Carolina. The impression they have made
is not unfriendly, I conjecture, to the rights of the
Western people, and it is probable that a rediscus-
sion of these may be produced by the occasion. Our
strength, however, is unequal to any eflfectual vote.
A reinforcement from either Maryland or South
Carolina would, I believe, supply the defect, Penn
sylvania having lately appointed Armstrong in the
place of Pettit, which throws that State into the
right scale. We have some hopes also of Rhode Is
land, She begins to see the policy of some States
in her neighborhood, in excluding the Federal terri
tory from the market at which they oflfer their own.

630 CORRESPONDENCE, [1787,
New Jersey has fully entered into this view of the
matter, and feels no small indignation at it.
Rhode Island has negatived a motion for appoint
ing deputies to the Convention, by a majority of
twenty-two votes. Nothing can exceed the wicked
ness and folly which continue to reign there. All
sense of character as well as of right is obliterated.
Paper-raoney is still their idol, though it is debased
to eight for one."^

TO EDMUND RANDOLPH.
New York, April 8, 1787.
Dear Sir,
Your two favors of the twenty-second and twenty-
seventh of March, have been received since my last.
In a preceding one you ask, what tribunal is to take
cognizance of Clark's oflfence ? If our own laws
will not reach it, I see no possibility of punishing it.
But will it not corae within the act of the last ses
sion concerning treasons and other offences coraraitted
without the coramonwealth 1 I have had no oppor
tunity yet of consulting Mr. Otto on the allegation
of Oster touching the marriage of French subjects
m Araerica. What is the conspicuous prosecution
which you suspect will shortly display a notable
instance of perjury 1
I am glad to find that you are turning your
thoughts towards the business of May next. My
despair of your finding the necessary leisure, as sig
nified in one of your letters, with the probability that
sorae leading propositions at least w^ould be expect-

1787.] correspondence. 631
ed from Virginia, had engaged me in a closer atten
tion to the subject than I should otherwise have
given. I will just hint the ideas that have occurred,
leaving explanations for our interview.
I think with you, that it will be well to retain as
much as possible of the old Confederation, though I
doubt vvhether it may not be best to work the valu
able articles intd the new system, instead of engraft
ing the latter on the former. I am also perfectly
of your opinion, that, in fraraing a system, no mate
rial sacrifices ought to be made to local or tempora
ry prejudices. An explanatory address must of ne
cessity accorapany the result of the Convention on
the main object. I am not sure that it will be prac
ticable to present the several parts of the reform in so
detached a manner to the States, as that a partial
adoption will be binding. Particular States may
view diflferent articles as conditions of each other,
and would only ratify them as such. Others raight
ratify thera as independent propositions. The con-
sequenpe would be that the ratifications of both
would go for nothing. I have not, however, exam
ined this point thoroughly. In truth, my ideas of a
reform strike so deeply at the old Confederation,
and lead to such a systematic change, that they
scarcely admit of the expedient.
I hold it for a fundamental point, that an individ
ual independence of the States is utterly irreconci
lable with the idea of an aggregate sovereignty. I
think, at the same time, that a consolidation of the
States into one simple republic is not less unattain
able than it would be inexpedient. Let it be tried,
then, whether any raiddle ground can be taken,

632 correspondence, [1787,
which will at once support a due supremacy of the
national authority, and leave in force the local au
thorities so far as they can be subordinately useful.
The first step to be taken is, I think, a change in
the principle of representation. According to the
present form of the Union, an equality of suflfrage,
if not just towards the larger members of it, is at
least safe to them, as the liberty they exercise of
rejecting or executing the acts of Congress, is un
controllable by the nominal sovereignty of Congress,
Under a system which would operate without the
intervention of the States, the case would be mate
rially altered, A vote from Delaware would have
the same eflfect as one from Massachusetts or Vir
ginia. Let the national Government be armed with a
positive and complete authority in all cases where
uniform measures are necessary, as in trade, &c.,
&c. Let it also retain the powers which it now
possesses. Let it have a negative, m all cases whatsoever,
on the Legislative acts of the States, as the King of
Great Britain heretofore had. This I conceive to
be essential and the least possible abridgement of
the State sovereignties. Without such a defensive
power, every positive power that can be given on
paper will be unavaUing. It will also give mternal
stability to the States. There has been no moment
gince the peace at which the Federal assent would
have been given to paper-money, &c., &c.
Let this national supremacy be extended also to
the Judiciary departraent. If the Judges in the last
resort depend on the States, and are bound by their

1787.] correspondence. 633
oaths to them and not to the Union, the intention of
the law and the interests of the nation may be defeat
ed by the obsequiousness ofthe tribunals to the pol-
licy or prejudices of the States. It seems at least
essential that an appeal should lie to some national
tribunals in all cases which concern foreigners, or
inhabitants of other States. The admiralty juris
diction may be fully submitted to the National Gov
ernment. A Government formed of such extensive powers
ought to be well organized. The Legislative de
partment may be divided into two branches. One
of them to be chosen every  years by the Legis
latures or the people at large ; the other to consist
of a more select number, holding their appointments
for a, longer term, and going out in rotation. Per
haps the negative on the State laws may be most
conveniently lodged in this branch. A Council of
Revision may be superadded, including the great
ministerial officers.
A national Executive will also be necessary. I
have scarcely ventured to form my own opinion yet,
either of the manner in which it ought to be consti
tuted; or of the authorities with which it ought to be
clothed. An article ought to be inserted expressly guaran
teeing the tranquillity of the States against internal
as well as external dangers.
To give the new system its proper energy, it will
be desirable to have it ratified by the authority of
the people, arid not merely by that of the Legis
latures. I am afraid you will think this project, if not ex-
VoL. 1,-40 *

634 correspondence. [1787,
travagant, absolutely unattainable and unworthy of
being attempted. Conceiving it myself to go no fur
ther than is essential, the objections drawn from this
source are to be laid aside. I flatter myself, how-
ever,^that they may be less formidable on trial than
in contemplation. The change in the principle of
representation will be relished by a majority of the
States, and those too of most influence. The north
ern States will be reconciled to it by the actual su
periority of their populousness ; the Southern by their
expected superiority on this point. This principle
established, the repugnance of the large States to
part with power will in a great degree subside, and
the sraaller States must ultimately yield to the pre
dominant will. It is also already seen by raany,
and must by degrees be seen by all, that, unless the
Union be organized efficiently on republican princi
ples, innovations of a much more objectionable form
may be obtruded, or, in the most favorable event,
the partition of the Empire, into rival and hostile
confederacies will ensue.

TO EDMUND RANDOLPH.
-! New York, April 15, 1787.
Dear Sir,
Your favor of the fourth of April has been receiv
ed since my last. The probability of General Wash
ington's coraing to Philadelphia is, in one point of
view, flattering. Would it not, however, be well for
him to postpone his actual attendance, until some
judgraent can be forraed of the result of themeeting?

1787.] qORRESPONDENCE. 635
It ought not to be wished by any of his friends that
he should participate in any abortiv^e undertaking.
It may occur, perhaps, that the delay would de
prive the Convention of his presiding auspices, and
subject hira, on his arrival, to a less conspicuous
point of view than he ought on all occasions to
stand in. Against this difficulty miist be weighed
the consideration above mentioned, to which may be
9,dded the opportunity which Pennsylvania, by the
appointment of Doctor Franklin, has aflforded of put
ting sufficient dignity into the Chair.
The eflFect of the interposition of Congress in favor
of the treaty at this crisis, was foreseen by us. I
would myself have preferred a little procrastination
on the subject. But the manifest and undeniable
propriety of the thing itself, with the chance that
the Legislature here,, which will adjourn in a little
time until next winter, and which is one of the prin
cipal transgressors, may set an immediate example
of reformation, overruled the arguraent for delay.
The difficulties which, as you suggest, may be left
behind by a mere repeal of all existing impediraents,
will be probably found of a very serious nature to
British creditors. If no other advantage should be
taken of them by the State, than the making the
assent of the creditors to the plan of instalments, a
condition of such further pf ovisions as may not come
within the treaty, I do not know that the existence
of these difficulties ought to be matter of regret. In
every view Congress seem to have taken the most
proper course for maintaining the national charac
ter ; and if any deviations in particular States should
be required by peculiar circumstances, it will be

636 CORRESPONDENCE. [1787.
better that they should be chargeable on such States
than on the United States.
The Maryland Assembly met on the second in
stant, being convened by proclamation. The ex
pected delay, therefore, in her appointments for the
Convention, cannot be admitted among the consid
erations which are to decide the time of your setting
out. I am sorry that punctuality on your part will
oblige you to travel without the company of Mrs,
Randolph, But the sacrifice seems to be the more
necessary, as Virginia ought not only to be on the
ground in due time, but to be prepared with some
materials for the work of the Convention, In this
view, I could wish that you might be able to reach
Philadelphia sorae days before the second Monday
in May,
This city has been thrown into no small agitation
by a motion, made a few days ago, for a short ad
journment of Congress, and the appointment of Phil
adelphia as the place of its reassembling. No final
question was taken, but some preliminary questions
shewed that six States were in favor of it ; Rhode
Island, the seventh State, was at first in the affirma
tive, but one of its Delegates was overcome by the
exertions made to convert him. As neither Mary
land nor South Carolina was present, the vote is
strong evidence of the precarious tenure by which
New York enjoys her metropolitan advantages. The
motives which led to this attempt were probably
with some of a local nature. With others they
were certainly of a general nature.
Mr. Jay was a few days ago instructed to com
municate to Congress the State of the Spanish nego-

1787. ] CORRESPONDENCE. 637
tiation. An unwilling but silent assent was given
by Massachusetts and Connecticut, The Report
shews that Jay viewed the act of seven States as
valid, and has even adjusted with Guardoqui an
article for suspending our use of the Mississippi
during the term of the treaty, A subsequent report,
on a reference of Western information from Virginia
and North Carolina, denotes little confidence in the
event of the negotiation, and considerable perplexity
as to the steps proper to be taken by Congress.
Wednesday is fixed for the consideration of these
reports. We mean to propose that Jefferson be
sent, under a special commission, to plead the cause
of the Mississippi at Madrid."^

TO EDMUND RANDOLPH.
New York, April 22, 1787,
Dear Sir,
I have the pleasure of yours of the eleventh in
stant, acknowledging mine of the second. In some
of your letters I observe you do not say whether
any have been received from me or not, I have not
omitted to write, in a single instance, since our cor
respondence commenced.
The titne approaches so nearly when I shall have
an opportunity of making verbal communications on
confidential points, that I forbear to commit them to
.paper. Congress are deliberating on the plan most
eligible for disposing of the Westem territory not
yet surveyed. Some alteration will probably be

638 CORRESPONDENCE. [ 1787.
made in the ordinance on that subject, in which the
idea of townships will not be altogether abandoned,
but rendered less expensive. An act passed yester
day providing for the sale of the surveyed lands,
under the direction of the Treasury board. The
price to be one dollar at the lowest; the sale is to
be duly advertised in all the States, but the office is
to be opened and held where Congress shall sit.
The original plan of distributing the sale through all
the States was certainly objectionable. To confine
it to one place, and that so remote as New York is,
both from the centre of the Union and the premises
in question, cannot be less so.
The inhabitants of the Illinois complain of the
land-jobbers, particularly Pentecost and Clarke,
who are purchasing titles among them. Those of
St. Vincent's complain of the defect of criminal and
civil justice among them, as well as of military pro
tection. These raatters are before Congress, and
are found to be infinitely embarrassing.
A copper coinage was agreed on yesterday to the
amount of two hundred and odd thousand dollars.
It is to he) executed under a contract between the
Treasury Board and the Coiner, and under the in
spection of a person to be appointed on the part of
the United States, — fifteen per cent, to be drawn
frora this operation uito the Federal Treasury.
A great revolution is taking place in the adrainis
tration in Massachusetts. Bowdoin is displaced in
favour of Hancock. A great proportion of the
Senate is already changed, and a greater is expect
ed in the other branch of the Assembly. A paper
emission there also is much feared by the friends of

1787. ] CORRESPONDENCE. 639
justice. I find that the fetter originally put on the
Deputies from that State to the Convention was
taken oflf in consequence of the recommendatory act
of Congress, and that the commission was adjusted
to that act.
Connecticut has not yet been in Assembly, and, of
course, has not decided on the Convention. I am
told the changes which are taking place in her elec
tions are far from strengthening the probability of
her concurrence."*

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON, New York, April 23, 1787.
Dear Sir,
Congress have agreed to Mr. Jay's report on the
treaty of peace, and to an address which accompa
nies it. Copies of both will no doubt be sent you
from his Department. The Legislature of this
State, which was sitting at the time, and on whose
account the acts of Congress were hurried through,
has adjourned till January next, without deciding
on thera. This is an orainous example to the other
States, and raust weaken much the claim on Great
Britain of an execution of the treaty on her part, as
promised in case of proper steps being taken on
ours. Virginia, we foresee, will be araong the fore
most in seizing pretexts for evading the injunctions
of Congress. South Carolina is not less infected
with the sarae spirit. The present deliberations of
Congress turn on, first, the sale of the Western
lands ; secondly, the government of the Western

640 correspondence. [ 1787,
settlements within the Federal domain ; thirdly, the
final settlement of the accounts between the Union
and its members ; fourthly, the treaty with Spain,
1. Between six and sev^n hundred thousand
acres have been surveyed in townships, under the
land ordinance, and are to be sold forthwith. The
place where Congress sit is fixed for the sale. Its
eccentricity, and remoteness from the premises, will,
I apprehend, give disgust. On the most eligible
plan of selling the unsurveyed residue. Congress are
much divided ; the Eastern States being strongly
attached to that of townships, notwithstanding the
expense incident to it ; the Southern being equally
biassed in favor of indiscriminate locations, notwith
standing the many objections against that mode;
The dispute will probably terrainate in some kind
of compromise, if one can be hit upon.
2. The government of the settlements on the
Illinois and Wabash is a subject very perplexing in
itself, and rendered more so by our ignorance of
many circumstances on which a right judgment de
pends. The inhabitants at those places claim pro
tection against the savages, and sorae provision for
both crimmal and civil justice. It appears also that
land-jobbers are among them, who are likely tb
multiply litigations among individuals, and, by col
lusive purchases of spurious titles, to defraud the
United States.
3. The settlement ofthe public accounts has long
been pursued in varied shapes, and with little pros
pect of success. The idea which has long been
urged by some of us, seems now to be seriously em
braced, of establishing a plenipotentiary tribunal for

1787. ] correspondence. 641
the final adjustment of the mutual claims, on the
great and simple principle of equity. An ordinance
for this purpose has been reported by the Treasury
Board, and has raade some progress through Con
gress. It is likely to be much retarded by the thin
ness of Congress, as indeed is almost every other
matter of importance.
4. The Spanish negotiation is in a very ticklish
situation. You have been already apprized of the
vote of seven States last fall for ceding the Missis
sippi for a term of years. From sundry circum
stances it was inferred that Jay was proceeding
under this usurped authority. A late instruction to
him to lay the state of the negotiation before Con
gress has discovered that he has adjusted with
Guardoqui an article for suspending the use of the
Mississippi by the citizens of the United States.
The report, however, leaves it soraewhat doubtful
how far the United States are coraraitted by this
step, and a subsequent report of the Secretary on
the seizure of Spanish property in the Westem
country, and on inforraation of discontents touching
the occlusion of the Mississippi, shews that the
probable consequences of the raeasure perplex hira
extreraely. It was nevertheless conceived by the
instructed delegations to be their duty to press a
revocation of the step taken, in some form which
would least oflfend Spain, and least irritate the pa
trons of the vote of seven States. Accordingly a
motion was made to the following effect — that the
present state of the negotiation with Spain, and of
the aflfairs of the United States, rendered it expedi
ent that you should proceed, under a special com-
VoL. I.— 41

642 correspondence. [ 1787.
mission, to Madrid, for the purpose of making such
representations as might at once impress on that
Court our friendly disposition and induce it to relax
on the contested points ; and that the proper com
munications and explanations should be made to
Guardoqui relative to this change in the mode of
conducting the negotiation. This motion was re
ferred to Mr. Jay, whose report disapproves of it.
In this state the matter lies. Eight States only
being present, no eflfective vote is to be expected. It
may, notwithstanding, be incumbent on us to try
some question which will at least mark the paucity
of States who abet the obnoxious project. Massa
chusetts and New York alone, of the present States,
are under that description; and Connecticut and
New Hampshire alone of the absent. Maryland
and South Carolina have hitherto been on the right
side. Their future conduct is somewhat problemat
ical. The opinion of New Harapshire is only con
jectured. The conversion of Rhode Island counte
nances a hope that she too may, in this instance,
desert the New England standard.
The prospect of a full and respectable Convention
grows stronger every day. Rhode Island alone has
refused to send Deputies. Maryland has probably
appointed -by this time. Of Connecticut alone doubts
are entertained. The anti-federal party in that State
is numerous and persevering. It is said that the
elections which are now going on are rather dis
couraging to the advocates of the Convention.
Pennsylvania has added Dr. Franklin to her depu
tation. There is some ground to calculate on the
attendance of General Washington. Our Governor,

1787. ] CORRESPONDENCE, 643
Mr. Wythe, Mr. Blak, and Col. Mason will pretty
certainly attend. The last, I am inforraed, is re
nouncing his errors on the subject of the Confedera
tion, and raeans to take an active part in the amend.-
ment of it. Mr. Henry pretty soon resigned the
undertaking. General Nelson was put into his
place, who has also declined. He was succeeded
by Mr. R. H. Lee, who followed his example. Doc
tor M'Clurg has been since appointed, and as he
was on the spot must have been previously con-
sulted."'

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON,
New York, September 30, 1787;
Dear Sirj
I found, on my arrival here, that certain ideas, un
favorable to the act of the Convention which had
created difficulties in that body, had made their way
into Congress. They were patronized chiefly by
Mr. R. H. Lee, and Mr. Dane, of Massachusetts. It
was first urged, that, as the new Constitution was
more than an alteration ofthe Articles of Confederal
tion, under which Congress actedj and even sub^
verted those Articles altogether, there was a consti^
tutional impropriety in their taking any positive
agency in the work. The answer given was, that
the Resolution of Congress in February had recom
mended the Convention as the best means of ob
taining a firm National Government ; that, as the
powers of the Convention were defined, by their
commissions, in nearly the same terms with the

644 correspondence. [ 1787.
powers of Congress given by the Confederation on
the subject of alterations. Congress were not more
restrained from accedmg to the new plan, than the
Convention were from proposing it. If the plan was
within the powers of the Convention, it was within
those of Congress ; if beSyond those powers, the same
necessity which justified the Convention would
justify Congress; and a failure of Congress to concur
in what was done would imply, either that the Con
vention had done wrong in exceeding their powers,
or that the government proposed was in itself liable
to insuperable objections; that such an inference
would be the more natural, as Congress had never
scrupled to recomraend measures foreign to their
constitutional functions, whenever the public good
seemed to require it ; and had in several instances,
particularly in the establishment of the new Western
Governraents, exercised assumed powers of a very
high and delicate nature, under motives infinitely
less urgent than the present state of our aflfairs, if
any faith were due to the representations made by
Congress theraselves, echoed by twelve States in
the Union, and confirmed by the general voice of
the people. An attempt was made in the next place
by R. H. L., to amend the act of the Convention be
fore it should go forth from Congress. He proposed
a Bill of Rights, provision for juries in civil cases,
and several other things corresponding with the
ideas of Colonel Mason. He was supported by Mr.
Melancthon Smith of this state. It was contended
that Congress had an undoubted rio-ht to insert
amendraents, and that it was their duty to make use
of it in a case where the essential guards of libertv

1787. ] correspondence. 645
had been omitted. On the other side, the right of
Congress was not denied, but the inexpediency of
exerting it was urged on the following grounds ; —
first, that every circumstance indicated that the
introduction of Congress as a party to the reform
was intended by the States merely as a matter of
form and respect; secondly, that it was evident,
from the contradictory objections which had been
expressed by the diflferent m.erabers who had anira
adverted on the plan, that a discussion of its merits
would consume much time, without producing
agreement even among its adversaries ; thirdly, that
it vvas clearly the intention of the States that the
plan to be proposed should be the act of the Con
vention, with the assent of Congress, which could
not be the case, if alterations were made, the Con
vention being no longer in existence to adopt them ;
fourthly, that as the act of the Convention, when
altered, would instantly become the mere . act of
Congress, and must be proposed by thera as such,
and of course be addressed to the Legislatures, not
Conventions of the States, and require the ratifica
tion of thirteen instead of nine States, and as the
unaltered act would go forth to the States directly
from the Convention under the auspices of that body,
some States raight ratify the one and sorae the other
of the plans, and confusion and disappointraent be
the least evils that would ensue. These difficulties,
which at one tirae threatened a serious division in
Congress, and popular alterations, with the Yeas
and Nays on the Journals, were at length fortunate
ly terminated by the following Resolution : " Con
gress having received the Report of the Convention

646 correspondence. [ 1787.
lately assembled in Philadelphia, Resolved unani-
mously that the said Report, with the Resolutions and
letter accompanying the same, be transmitted to the
several Legislatures, in order to be submitted to a
Convention of Delegates chosen in each State by
the people thereof, in conformity to the Resolves of
the Convention made and provided in that case."
Eleven States were present, the absent ones, Rhode
Island and Maryland. A more direct approbation
would have been of advantage in this and some
other States, where stress will be laid on the agency
of Congress in the raatter, and a handle be taken
by adversaries of any arabiguity on the subject.
With regard to Virginia and some other States,
reserve on the part of Congress will do no injury.
The circumstance of unanimity must be favorable
every where.
The general voice of this City seeras to espouse
the new Constitution. It is supposed nevertheless
that the party in power is strongly opposed to it.
The country must finally decide, the sense ofwhich
is as yet wholly unknown. As far as Boston and
Connecticut have been heard from, the first im
pression seems to be auspicious. I am waiting with
anxiety for the echo from Virginia, but with very
faint hopes of its corresponding with my wishes.
P. S. A sraall packet of the size of two volumes
octavo addressed to you lately came to my hands
with books of my own from France. General
Pinkney has been so good as to take charge Ox
them. He set out yesterday for South Carolina,
and means to call at Mount Vernon.'"

[1787. correspondence. 647
to edmund randolph.
New York, OclolerV, 1787.
Dear Sir,
Congress are at present deliberating on the requi
sition. The Treasury Board has reported one in
specie alone, alleging the mischiefs produced by
" Indents." It is proposed by a Committee that in
dents be received from the States, but that the con
ditions tying down the States to a particular mode
of procuring them, be abolished ; and that the in
dents for one year be receivable in the quotas of
any year.
St. Clair is appointed Governor of the Western
country, and Major Sarjent, of Massachusetts, the
Secretary of that establishment. A treaty with the
Indians is on the anvil, as a supplemental provision
for the Western country. It is not certain, how
ever, that any thing will be done, as it involves
money, and we sliall have on the floor nine States
one more day only.
We hear nothing decisive as yet concerning the
general reception given to the act of the Conven
tion. The advocates for it corae forward raore
promptly than the adversaries. The sea coast
seeras every where fond of it. The party in Boston
which was thought most likely to make opposition,
are warm in espousing it. It is said that Mr. S.
Adams objects to one point only, viz. the prohibition
of a religious test. Mr. Bowdoin's objections are
said to be against the great number of members
composing the Legislature, and the intricate elec
tion of the President. You will no doubt have

648 CORRESPONDENCE. [ 1787.
heard of the ferraentation in the Assembly of Penn
sylvania.'" Mr. Adams is permitted to return home after
February next, with thanks for the zeal and fidelity
of his services. As the commission of Smith ex
pires at that tirae, and no provision is made for
continuing him, or appointing a successor, the rep
resentation of the United States at the Court of
London will cease at that period.

TO EDMUND RANDOLPH.
New York, October 21, 1787.
Dear Sir,
We hear that opinions are various in Virginia on
the plan of the Convention. I have received, within
a few days, a letter from the Chancellor, by which
I find that he gives it his approbation ; and another
from the President of William and Mary, which,
though it does not absolutely reject the Constitution,
criticises it pretty freely. The newspapers in the
Northern and Middle States begin to teem with
controversial publications. The attacks seem to be
principally levelled against the organization of the
Government, and the omission of the provisions con
tended for in favor of the press, and juries, &c. A
new combatant, however, with considerable address
and plausibility, strikes at the foundation. He rep
resents the situation of the United States to be such
as to render any government iraproper and imprac
ticable which forms the States into one nation, and
is to operate directly on the people. Judging from

1787.] correspondence. 649
the newspapers, one would suppose that the adver
saries were the most nuraerous and the most ear
nest. But there is no other evidence that it is the
fact. On the contrary, we learn that the Assembly
of New Hampshire, which received the Constitution
on the point of their adjournment, were extremely
pleased with it. All the information frora Massa
chusetts denotes a favorable irapression there. The
Legislature of Connecticut have unaniraously recom
mended the choice of a Convention in that State,
and Mr. Baldwin, who is just from the spot, informs
me, that, from present appearances, the opposition
will be inconsiderable ; that the Assembly, if it de
pended on them, would adopt the system alraost
unanimously ; and that the clergy and all the literary
men are exerting themselves in its favor. Rhode
Island is divided; the majority being violently
against it. The temper of this State cannot yet be
fully discerned, A strong party is in favor of it.
But they will probably be outnumbered, if those
whose nurabers are not yet known should take the
opposite side. New Jersey appears to be zealous.
Meetings of the people in diflferent counties are
declaring then: approbation, and instructing their
representatives. There will probably be a strong
opposition in Pennsylvania, The other side, how
ever, continue to be sanguine. Doctor Carroll, who
carae hither lately from Maryland, tells me, that the
pubUc voice there appears at present to be decidedly
in favor of the Constitution. Notwithstanding all
these circumstances, I am far from considering the
public mind as fully known, or finally settled on the
subject. They amount Dnly to a strong presump^
Vol, I.— 41 *

650 correspondence. [1787.
tion that the general sentiment in the Eastern and
Middle States is friendly to the proposed system at
this time.

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.
New York, October 24, 1787.
Dear Sir,
When the plan of the Constitution proposed by
the Convention came before Congress for their
sanction, a very serious eflfort was made by R. H.
Lee and Mr. Dane, frora Massachusetts, to embar
rass it. It was first contended, that Congress could
not properly give any positive countenance to a
measure which had for its object the subversion of
the Constitution under which they acted. This
ground of attack failing, the former gentleman urged
the expediency of sending out the plan with amend
ments, and proposed a number of them correspond
ing with the objections of Col. Mason. This ex
periment had still less effiect. In order, however, to
obtain unanimity, it was necessary to couch the
resolution in very moderate terms,
Mr. Adaras has received permission to return,
with thanks for his services. No provision is made
for supplying his place, or keeping up any repre
sentation there. Your reappouitment for three
years will be notified frora the office of foreign
aflfahs. It was made without a negative, eight
States being present. Connecticut, notwithstand
ing, put in a blank ticket, the sense of that State
having been declared against embassies. Massa-

1787. 1 CORRESPONDENCE, 651
chusetts betrayed some semple on like ground.
Every personal consideration was avowed, and I
believe with sincerity, to have militated against
these scruples. It seems to be understood that
letters to and from the foreign ministers of the
United States are not free of postage ; but that the
charge is to be allowed in their accounts.
The exchange of our French for Dutch creditors
has not been countenanced either by Congress or
the Treasury Board. The paragraph in your last
letter to Mr. Jay, on the subject of applying a loan
in Holland to the discharge of the pay due to the
foreign officers, has been referred to the Board since
my arrival here. No report has yet been made.
But I have little idea that the proposition will be
adopted. Such is the state and prospect of our
fiscal department, that any new loan, however
small, that should now be made, would probably
subject us to the reproach of premeditated decep
tion. The balance of Mr. Adams's last loan will
be wanted for the interest due in Holland, and, with
all the income here, will, it is feared, not save our
credit in Europe from farther wounds. It may well
be doubted whether the present Government can be
kept alive during the ensuing year, or until the new
one may take its place.
Upwards of one hundred thousand acres of the
lands of the United States have been disposed of in
open market. Five raillions of unsurveyed have
been sold by private contract to a New England
company, at two-thirds of a dollar per acre, pay
ment to be made in the principal of the public secu
rities, A negotiation is nearly closed with a New

652 CORRESPONDENCE, [1787.
Jersey company for two millions more on like terms,
and another coraraenced with a corapany of this
city for four raillions,'*^

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON, New York, Oct. 28, 1787.
Dear Sir,
The mail of yesterday brought me your favor of
the twenty-second instant. The coraraunications
from Richmond give me as rauch pleasure as they
exceed ray expectations. As I find by a letter from
a member of the Assembly, however, that Col. Ma
son has not got down, and it appears that Mr. Henry
is not at bottom a friend, I am not without fears that
the corabined influence and raanagement may yet
create difficulties. There is one consideration which
I think ought to have sorae weight in the case, over
and above the intrinsic inducements to embrace the
Constitution, and which I have suggested to some
of my correspondents. There is at present a very
strong probability that nine States at least will
pretty speedily concur in establishing it. What
will become of the tardy remainder ? They must
be either left, as outcasts from the society, to shift
for theraselves, or be corapelled to corae in, or must
come in of theraselves when they will be allowed
no credit for it. Can either of these situations be
as eligible as a prorapt and manly determination to
support the Union, and share its common fortunes ?
My last stated pretty fully the information which
had arrived here from diflferent quarters, concerning

1787.] CORRESPONDENCE, , 653
the proposed Constitution, I recollect nothing that
is now to be added, farther than that the Assembly
of Massachusetts, now sitting, certainly gives it a
friendly reception. I enclose a Boston paper, by
which it appears that Governor Hancock has ushered
it to them in as propitious a manner as could have
been required.
Mr. Charles Pinckney's character is, as you ob
serve, well marked by the publications which I en
closed. His printing the secret paper at this time
could have no motive but the appetite for expected
praise ; for the subject to which it relates has been
dorraant a considerable time, and seems likely to
remain so.
A foreign gentleman of merit, and who, besides
this general title, brings me a letter which gives
him a particular claim to my civilities,, is very
anxious to obtain a sketch of the Potomac and the
route from the highest navigable part of it to the
western waters which are to be connected with the
Potomac by the portage, together with a sketch of
the works going on, and a memorandum of the pro
gress made in them. Knowing of no other channel
through which I could enable myself to gratify this
gentleman, I am seduced into the liberty of resorting
to your kindness ; and of requesting, that, if you
have such a draught by you, your amanuensis may
be permitted to take a very rough copy of it for me.
In making this request I beseech you. Sir, to under
stand that I do it with not more confidence in your
goodness than with the sincerest desire that it raay
be disregarded if it cannot be fulfilled with the most
perfect convenience,'*'

654 CORRESPONDENCE. [ 1787,

TO EDMUND RANDOLPH,
New York, Novetnber 18, 1787.
Dear Sir,
I have not since my arrival collected any ad
ditional information concerning the progress of the
Federal Constitution, I discovered no evidence on
my journey through New Jersey, that any opposition
whatever would be made in that State, The Con
vention of Pennsylvania is to meet on Tuesday
next. The members returned, I was told by several
persons, reduced the adoption of the plan in that
State to absolute certainty, and by a greater ma
jority than the most sanguine advocates had calcu
lated. One of the counties which had been set
down by all on the list of opposition, had elected
deputies of known attachment to the Constitution,
I do not find that a single State is represented
except Virginia, and it seeras very uncertain when
a Congress will be made. There are individual
members present frora several States ; and the at
tendance of this and the neighbouring States may,
I suppose, be obtained when it will produce a
quorum.

TO EDMUND RANDOLPH,
New York, December 2, 1787.
Dear Sir,
Our public letter gave you the latest authentic
information from Europe, A general war seems not
impossible; a war between the Russians and the
Turks has actually commenced. The enterprizing

1787, ] CORRESPONDENCE. 655
movements of the Prussian troops have disconcerted
the patriotic party and their supporters, audit seems
as if the Stadtholder would gain a complete triumph.
What eflfect this raay have on the Government of
that country, I cannot undertake to foretell, I have
never been inclined to think that complete success
to the views of either party would be favorable to
the people. If the Stadtholdership were abolished,
the govemment, unless further changes occurred,
would be a simple aristocracy. Should the patriots,
as they call themselves, be excluded from the govern
ment, the Stadtholder would be an absolute mon
arch. Whilst both continue, they check each other ;
which is absolutely necessary, as the people have
no check on either. The consequence of the people
arises from the competitions of the two for their
favor. In general the lower orders have been parti
zans of the Stadtholder. They are so, it is said,
in the present contest.
We have not more than two or three States as
yet attending. It is altogether conjectural when
the deficiency of a quorum will be made up.
No recent indications of the views of the States
as to the Constitution have corae to my knowledge.
The elections in Connecticut are over, and, as far as
the returns are known, a large majority are friendly
to it. Doctor Johnson says, it will be pretty cer
tainly adopted ; but there will be opposition. The
power of taxing any thing but imports appears to
be the most popular topic among the adversaries.
The Convention of Pennsylvania is sitting. The
result there will not reach you first through my
hands. The divisions on preparatory questions, as

656 CORRESPONDENCE. [ 1787.
they are published in the newspapers, shew that
the party in favor of the Constitution have forty-four
or forty-five vs. twenty-two or twenty-four, or there
abouts. The enclosed paper contains two nurabers of the
Federalist, This paper was begun about three
weeks ago, and proposes to go through the subject,
I have not been able to collect all the nurabers, since
ray return frora Philadelphia, or I would have sent
thera to you. I have been the less anxious, as I
understand the printer raeans to raake a paraphlet of
thera, when I can give them to you in a raore
convenient form. You will probably discover marks
of diflferent pens. I am not at liberty to give you
any other key than that I am in myself for a few
nurabers, and that one besides myself was a mem
ber of the Convention.'™

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON. New York, December 20, 1787.
Dear Sir,
Mr. De la Forest, the Consul here, called on me
a few days ago, and told rae he had information,
that the Farraers General and Mr. Morris, having
found their contract mutually advantageous, are
evading the resolutions of the Committee by tacit ar
rangements for its contmuance. He observed, that
the object of the Farmers was singly profit, that of
the Government two fold, revenue and comraerce.
It was consequently the wish of the latter to render
the raonopoly as little hurtful to the trade with

1787.] correspondence. 657
America as possible. He suggested as an expedient,
that the Farmers should be required to divide the
contracts among six or seven houses, French and
American, who should be required to ship annually
to America a reasonable proportion of goods. This,
he supposed, would produce some competition in the
purchases here, and would introduce a competition
also with British goods here. The latter condition,
he said, could not be well required of, or executed
by, a single contractor, and the Government could
not abolish the farm. These ideas were meant for
you. Since the date of my other letter, the Convention
of Delaware have unanimously adopted the new
Constitution. That of Pennsylvania has adopted it
by a majority of 46 against 23, That of New Jer
sey is sitting and will adopt pretty unanimously.
These are all the Conventions that have met, I
hear from North Carolina that the Assembly there
is well disposed. Mr, Henry, Mr, Mason, R, H, Lee,
and the Governor, continue by their influence to
strengthen the opposition in Virginia, The Assem
bly there is engaged in several mad freaks. Among
others a bill has been agreed to in the House of
Delegates, prohibiting the importation of rum, brandy,
and all other spirits not distilled from some Ameri
can production. All brewed liquors under the same
description, with beef, tallow candles, cheese, &c.,
are included in the prohibition. In order to enforce
this despotic measure, the most despotic means are
resorted to. If any person be found, after the com
mencement of the act, in the use or possession of any
of the prohibited articles, though acquu-ed previously
Vol. I.— 42

6.58 correspondence. [ 1787,
to the law, he is to lose them, and pay a heavy fine.
This is the form in which the bill was agreed to by
a large raajority in the House of Delegates. It is a
child of Mr. Henry, and said to be a favorite one.
They first voted, by a majority of thirty, that all
legal obstructions to the treaty of peace, should
cease in Virginia as soon as laws coraplying with it
should have passed in all the other States. This
was the result of four days' debate, with the most
violent opposition from Mr. Henry. A few days
afterward he renewed his efforts, and got a vote, hy
a majority of fifty, that Virginia would not comply
until Great Britain shall have complied.
The States seem to be either wholly oraittmg to
provide for the Federal Treasury ; or to be with
drawing the scanty appropriations raade to it. The
latter course has been taken by Massachusetts, Vir
ginia, and Delaware. The Treasury Board seeras
to be in despair of raalntaining the shadow of gov
ernment much longer. Without money, the offices
must be shut up, and the handful of troops on the
frontier disbanded, which will probably bring on an
Indian war, and make an impression to our disad
vantage on the British garrisons within our limits,'"

TO general WASHINGTON.
New York, December 20, 1787.
Dear Sir,
I was favored on Saturday with your letter of the
seventh instant, along with which was covered the
prmted letter of Colonel R. H. Lee to the Governor,

1787.] correspondence. 659
It does not appear to rae to be a very formidable
attack on the new Constitution ; unless it should
derive an influence from the names of the correspond
ents, which its intrinsic merits do not entitle it to.
He is certainly not perfectly accurate in the state
ment of all his facts ; and I should infer from the
tenor of the objections in Virginia that his plan of
an Executive would hardly be viewed as an amend
ment of that of the Convention. It is a little singu
lar that three of the most distinguished advocates
for araendraents ; and who expect to unite the thir
teen States in their project, appear to be pointedly
at variance with each other on one of the capital
articles of the system. Colonel Lee proposes, that
the President should choose a Council of eleven, and
with their advice have the appointment of all offi
cers. Colonel Mason's proposition is, that a Coun
cil of six should be appointed by the Congress,
What degree of power he would confide to it, I do
not know. The idea of the Governor is, that there
should be a plurality of co-equal heads, distinguished
probably by other peculiarities in the organization.
It is pretty certain that some others who make a
common cause with them in the general attempt to
bring about alterations, diflfer still more frora them
than they do from each other ; and that they them
selves diflfer as rauch on some other great points, as
on the constitution of the Executive.
You did not judge amiss of Mr. Jay. The para
graph affirming a change in his opinion of the plan
of the Convention, was an arrant forgery. He has
contradicted it in a letter to Mr. J. Vaughan which
has been printed in the Philadelphia gazettes.

660 correspondence. [1787,
Tricks of this sort are not uncomraon with the ene
mies of the new Constitution. Colonel Mason's ob
jections were, as I am told, published in Boston, mu
tilated of that which pointed at the regulation of
commerce. Doctor Franklin's concluding speech,
which you will meet with in one of the papers here
with enclosed, is both mutilated and adulterated, so
as to change both the form and spirit of it.
I am extremely obliged by the notice you take of
my request concerning the Potomac. I must insist
that you will not consider it as an object of any fiir
ther attention.
The Philadelphia papers will have informed you
of the result of the Convention of that State. New
Jersey is now in Convention, and has probably by
this tirae adopted the Constitution. General Irvine,
of the Pennsylvania Delegation, who is just arrived
here, and who conversed with sorae of the members
at Trenton, tells me that great unanimity reigns in
the Convention.
Connecticut, it is pretty certain, will decide also
in the affirmative by a large majority. So, it is pre
suraed, will New Hampshire ; though her Conven
tion will be a little later than could be wished.
There are not enough of the returns in Massachu
setts known for a final judgment of the probable
event in that State. As far as the returns are
known, they are extremely favorable : but as they
are chiefly from the maritime parts of the State, they
are a precarious index of the public sentiment. I
have good reason to believe that if you are in corres
pondence with any gentleman in that quarter, and
a proper occasion should oflfer for an expUcit com-

1788. ] correspondence, 661
munication of your good wishes for the plan, so as
barely to warrant an explicit assertion of the fact,
that it would be attended with valuable eflfects.
I barely drop the idea. The circumstances on
which the propriety of it depends are best known to
you, as they will be best judged of by yourself
The information from North Carolina gave me great
pleasure. We have nothuig from the States south
ofit.'^

TO EDMUND RANDOLPH,
New York, January 10, 1788.
Dear Sir,
I received two days ago your favor of December
twenty seventh, enclosing a copy of your letter to
the Assembly, I have read it with attention, and
I can add with pleasure, because the spirit of it does
as much honor to your candor, as the general reason
ing does to your abilities. Nor can I believe that
in this quarter the opponents of the Constitution
will find encourageraent in it. You are already
aware that your objections are not viewed in the same
decisive light by me that they are by you. I must own
that I differ still more from your opinion, that a
prosecution of the experiment of a second Conven
tion will be favorable, even in Virginia, to the ob
ject which I am sure you have at heart. It is to
me apparent that, had your duty led you to throw
your influence into the opposite scale, it would have
given it a decided and unalterable preponderance ;
and that Mr. Henry would either have suppressed

662

correspondence. [ 1788.

his enraity, or been baffled m the policy which it has
dictated. It appears also that the grounds taken
by the opponents in diflferent quarters forbid any
hope of concord among them. Nothing can be
further from your views than the principles of
diflferent sets of men who have carried on theu: op
position under the respectability of your name. In
this State the party adverse to the Constitution
notoriously meditate either a dissolution of the
Union, or protracting it by patching up the Articles
of Confederation, In Connecticut and Massa
chusetts, the opposition proceeds from that part of
the people who have a repugnance in general to
good government, or to any substantial abridgement
of State powers, and a part of whom in Massa
chusetts are known to aim at confusion, and are
suspected of wishing a reversal of the Revolution,
The minority in Pennsylvania, as far as they are
governed by any other views than an habitual op
position to their rivals, are manifestly averse to
some essential ingredients in a National Govern
ment, You are better acquainted with Mr. Henry's
politics than I can be, but I have for some time con
sidered him as no further concurring in the plan of
amendraents than as he hopes to render it subser
vient to his real designs. Viewing the matter in
this light, the inference with me is unavoidable that
were a second trial to be made, the friends of a good
constitution for the Union would not only find them
selves not a little diflfering from each other as to the
proper amendments; but perplexed and fmstrated
by men who had objects totally diflferent. A second
Convention would, of course, be formed under the

1788, ] correspondence. 663
influence, and composed in a great measure of the
members of the opposition in the several States.
But were the first difficulties overcome, and the
Constitution re-edited with amendments, the event
would still be infinitely precarious. Whatever re
spect may be due to the rights of private judgment,
and no raan feels more of it than I do, there can be
no doubt that there are subjects to which the
capacities of the bulk of mankind are unequal, and
on which they must and will be governed by those
with whom they happen to have acquaintance and
confidence. The proposed Constitution is of this
description. The great body of those who are both
for and against it must follow the judgment of others,
not their own. Had the Constitution been framed
and recoraraended by an obscure individual, instead
of a body possessing public respect and confidence,
there cannot be a doubt, that although it would
have stood in the identical words, it would have
commanded little attention from most of those who
now admire its wisdora. Had yourself. Colonel
Mason, Colonel R. H. Lee, Mr. Henry, and a few
others, seen the Constitution in the sarae light with
those who subscribed it, I have no doubt that Vir
ginia would have been as zealous and unaniraous, as
she is now divided, on the subject. I infer from
these considerations, that, if a governraent be ever
adopted in America, it must result from a fortunate
coincidence of leading opinions, and a general con
fidence of the people in those who may recoraraend
it. The very atterapt at a second Convention
strikes at the confidence in the first ; and the ex
istence of a second, by opposing influence to influ-

664 correspondence, [1788.
ence would in a manner destroy an eflfectual con
fidence in either, and give a loose rein to human
opuiions; which must be as various and irreeon
cileable concerning theories of government, as doc
trines of religion; and give opportunities to designing
men which it might be impossible to counteract.
The Connecticut Convention has probably corae
to a decision before this ; but the event is not known
here. It is understood that a great majority will
adopt the Constitution. The accounts from Massa
chusetts vary extremely according to the channels
through which they come. It is said that S, Adaras,
who has hitherto been reserved, begins to make
open declaration of his hostile views. His influence
is not great, but this step argues an opinion that he
can calculate on a considerable party. It is said
here, and I believe on good ground, that North
Carolina has postponed her Convention till July, in
order to have the previous example of Virginia,
Should North Carolina fall into Mr, Henry's politics,
which does not appear to me improbable, it wUl
endanger the Union more than any other circum
stance that could happen. My apprehensions of
this danger increase every day. The multiplied in
ducements at this moment to the local sacrifices
necessary to keep the States together, can never be
expected to coincide again, and they are counter
acted by so many unpropitious circumstances, that
their efficacy can with difficulty be confided in, I
have no information from South Carolina or
Georgia, on which any certain opinion can be form
ed of the temper of those States, The prevailing
idea has been, that both of them would speedily and

1788,] correspondence, 665
generally embrace the Constitution. It is impos
sible, however, that the example of Virginia and
North Carolina should not have an influence on their
politics. I consider every thing therefore proble
matical from Maryland southward.
We have no Congress yet. The number of
States on the spot does not exceed five. It is prob
able that a quoram will now be soon made, A
delegate from Nevv Hampshire is expected, which
will make up a representation from that State, The
termination of the Connecticut Convention will set
her Delegates at liberty, and the meeting of the
Assembly of this State, will fill the vacancy which
has some time existed in her Delegation.'^

TO EDMUND RANDOLPH,
New York, January 20, 1788.
Dear Sir,
The Count de Moustier arrived a few days ago as
successor to the Chevalier de la Luzerne. He had
so long a passage that I do not know whether the
dispatches brought by hira contain much that is
new. It seems that, although the affairs of Holland
are put into a pacific train, those of the Russians
and Turks may yet produce a general broil in
Europe, The Prussian troops are to be with
drawn, and the fate of the Dutch regulated by ne
gotiation. The intelligence from Massachusetts begins to be
rather ominous to the Constitution, The interest
Vol. I.— 42*

666 correspondence, [1788,
opposed to it is reinforced by all connected with the
late insurrection ; and by the province of Maine
which apprehends difficulties, under the new system,
in obtaining a separate Governraent, greater than
may be otherwise experienced. Judging from the
present state of the intelligence, as I have it, the
probability is, that the voice of the State will
be in the negative. The Legislature of this State
is rauch divided at present. The House of Assera
bly are said to be friendly to the merits of the Con
stitution. The Senate, at least a majority of those
actually assembled, are opposed even to the calling
a Convention. The decision of Massachusetts, in
either way, will decide the voice of this State. The
minority of Pennsylvania are extremely restless
under their defeat ; will endeavour at all events, if
they can get an Asserably to their wish, to under
mine what has been done there ; and will, it is pre
sumed, be emboldened by a negative from Massa
chusetts to give a more direct and violent form to
their attack. So they are also from South Carolina,
as far as they extend.
If I am not misinformed as to the arrival of some
members of Congress in town, a quomm is at length
made up.

TO EDMUND RANDOLPH.
New York, January 27, 1788.

Dear Sir,
A Congress vvas made for the first time on Mon
day last, and our friend C. Griffin placed in the

1788.] CORRESPONDENCE. 667
Chair, There was no competition in the case, which
you will wonder at, as Virginia has so lately sup
plied a President. New Jersey did not like it, I
believe, very well, but acquiesced.
I postponed writing by the last mail, in hopes of
being able by this to acquaint you with the proba
ble result of the Convention of Massachusetts. It
appears, however, that the prospect continues too
equivocal to justify a conjecture on the subject.
The representations vary somewhat, but they all
tend to excite, rather than dirainish, anxiety. Mr.
Gerry had been introduced to a seat for the purpose
of stating facts. On the arrival of thendiscussion at
the Article concerning the Senate, he signified, with
out being called on, that he had important inforraa
tion to coraraunicate on that subject. Mr. Dana
and several others remarked on the impropriety of
Mr. Gerry's conduct. Gerry rose to justify. Others
opposed it as irregular. A warm conversation
arose, and continued till the adjournment ; after
which a still warmer one took place between Gerry
and Dana. The merabers gathered around them,
took sides as they were for or against the Constitu
tion, and strong symptoms of confusion appeared.
At length, however, they separated. It was ex
pected that the subject would be renewed in the
Convention the next morning. This was the state
of things when the post came oflf.
In one of the papers enclosed you will find your
letter to the Assembly reviewed by sorae critic of
this place. I can form no guess who he is. I have
seen another attack grounded on a comparative
view of your objections. Col. Mason's, and Mr. Ger-

668 CORRESPONDENCE. [ 1788
ry's. This was from Philadelphia. I have not the
paper, or I vvould add it.'°'

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON. New York, February 3, 1788.
Dear Sir,
Another mail has arrived from Boston without
terminating the conflict between our hopes and
fears. I have a letter from Mr. King, of the twenty-
seventh, which, after dilating somewhat on the ideas
in his forraer letters, concludes with the following
paragraph : " We have avoided every question
which would have shewn the division of the House.
Of consequence we are not positive of the nurabers
on each side. By the last calculation we made on
our side, we were doubtful whether we exceeded
thera, or they us, in nurabers. They, however, say
that they have a majority of eight or twelve against
us. We by no means despair." Another letter of
the same date, from another member, gives the fol
lowing picture : " Never was there an Assembly in
this State in possession of greater ability and infor
mation than the present Convention ; yet I am in
doubt whether they will approve the Constitution.
There are unhappily three parties opposed to it —
first, all men who are in favor of paper-money and
tender laws, — these are more or less in every part of
the State ; secondly, all the late insurgents and their
abettors,— in the three great westem coimties they

1788,] CORRESPONDENCE, 669
are very numerous ; we have in the Convention eigh
teen or twenty who were actually in Shays' army; —
thirdly, a great majority ofthe members firom the pro
vince of Maine. Many of them and their constituents
are only squatters on other people's land, and they are
afraid of being brought to account ; they also think,
though erroneously, that their favorite plan, of being
a separate State, will be defeated. Add to these
the honest doubting people, and they make a pow
erful host. The leaders of this party are — Mr,
Widgery, Mr, Thomson, and Mr, Nasson, from the
province of Maine ; Doctor Taylor, from the county
of Worcester, and Mr. Bishop, from the neighbour
hood of Rhode Island. To manage the cause against
them, are the present and late Governors, three
Judges of the Supreme Court, fifteen merabers of the
Senate, twenty from among the most respectable of
the clergy, ten or twelve of the first characters at
the bar. Judges of pi-obate. High sheriffs of counties,
and many other respectable people, merchants, «&c..
Generals Heath, Lincoln, Brooks, and others of the
late army. With all this ability in support of the
cause, I am pretty well satisfied we shall lose the
question, unless we can take oflf some of the Opposi
tion by amendments. I do not mean such as are to
be made conditions of the ratification, but recom
mendations only. Upon this plan I flatter myself
we may possibly get a majority of twelve or fifteen,
if not more."
The Legislature of this State has voted a Con
vention on the seventeenth of June.'^

670 CORRESPONDENCE. [1788,
TO EDMUND RANDOLPH.
New York, March 3, 1788.
Dear Sir,
The Convention of New Hampshire have disap
pointed the general expectation. They ha,ve not
rejected the Constitution, but they have adjourned
without adopting it. It was found that, on a final
question, there vvould be a majority of three or four
in the negative ; but in this number were included
some who, with instructions from their towns
against the Constitution, had been proselyted by
the discussions. These concurring with the Fede
ralists in the adjournment, carried it by fifty-seven
against forty-seven, if I am rightly informed as to
the nurabers. The second meeting is not to be till
the last week in June. I have inquired of the gen
tleraen from that quarter, what particularly recom
mended so late a day, supposing it might refer to
the tiraes fixed by New York and Virginia. They
tell rae it was governed by the interraediate annual
elections and courts. If the Opposition in that State
be such as they are described, it is not probable that
they pursue any sort of plan, raore than that of
Massachusetts. This event, whatever cause raay
have produced it, or whatever consequences it may
have in New Hampshire, is no small check to the
progress of the business. The Opposition here,
which are unquestionably hostile to every thing be
yond the federal principle, will take new spirits.
The event in Massachusetts had almost extino-uished
their hopes. That in Pennsylvania will probably
be equally encouraged,'"^

1788.] CORRESPONDENCE. 671

TO EDMUND RANDOLPH.
New York, July 2, 1788.
Dear Sir,
There are public letters just arrived from Jeflfer
son. The contents are not yet known. His private
letters to me and others refer to his public for
political news. I find that he is becoming more and
more a friend to the neio Constitution, his objections
being gradually dispeUed by his ovm further refections
on the subject. He particularly renounces his opinion
concerning the expediency qf a ratification by nine,
and a repeal by four, States, considering the mode
pursued by Massachusetts as the tmly rational one,
but disapproving some of the alterations recommended
by that State. He will see still more roora for dis
approbation in the recommendation of other States.
The defects of the Constitution which he continues
to criticise are, the omission of a Bill of Rights, and
ofthe principle of rotation, at least in the Executive
department. Congress have been some days on the question
where the first raeeting of the new Congress shall
be placed. Philadelphia failed by a single vote
from Delaware, which ultimately aimed at that
place, but wished to bring Wilmington into view.
In that vote New Hampshire and Connecticut both
concurred. New York is now in nomination, and
if those States accede which I think probable, and
Rhode Island which has yet refused to sit in the
question can be prevailed on to vote, which I also
think probable, the point will be carried. In this

672 correspondence. [1788,
event a great handle, I fear, will be given to those
who have opposed the new Government on account
of the Eastern preponderance in the Federal
systera.""

TO EDMUND RANDOLPH,
New York, July 16, 1788.
Dear Sir,
The enclosed papers will give you the latest
intelligence from Poughkeepsie. It seems by no
means certain what the result there will be. Some
of the raost sanguine calculate on a ratification.
The best informed apprehend some clog that will
araount to a condition. The question is made pe
culiarly interesting in this place,, by its connexion
with the question relative to the place to be recom
mended for the meeting of the first Congress under
the new Government.
Thirteen States are at present represented, A
plan for setting this new machine in motion has
been reported some days, but will not be hurried to
a conclusion. Having been but a little time here, I
am not yet fully in the politics of Congress,

TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. New York, July 22, 1788.

Dear Sir,
The enclosed papers will give you a view of the
business in the Convention at Poughkeepsie, It is

1788,] correspondence, 673
not as yet certain that the ratification will take any
final shape than can make New York iraraediately
a member of the new Union, The opponents can
not come to that point without yielding a complete
victory to the Federalists, which must be a severe
sacrifice of their pride. It is supposed too, that some
of them would not be displeased at seeing a bar to
the pretensions of this city to the first meeting ofthe
new Governraent, On the other side, the zeal for
an unconditional ratification is not a little increased
by contrary wishes.

TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. New York August 11, 1788.
Dear Sir,
The length of the interval since my last has pro
ceeded from a daily expectation of being able to
communicate the arrangements for introducing the
new Governraent. The times necessary to be fixed
by Congress have been many days agreed on. The
place of meeting, has undergone many vicissitudes,
and is still as uncertain as ever. Philadelphia was
first named by a member from Connecticut, and was
negatived by the voice of one frora Delaware, who
wished to make an experiment for Wilmington.
New York came next into view. Lancaster was
opposed to it, and failed. Baltimore was next tried,
and, to the surprize of every one, had seven votes.
South Caroluia joining the Southern States and
Pennsylvania in the question. It was not difficult
Vol. I.— 43

674 correspondence. [ 1788.
to foresee that such a vote could not stand. Ac
cordingly the next day. New York carried it on a
second trial and at present fills the blank. Its
success, however, was owing to Rhode Island, whose
Delegates have refused to vote on the final question,
and have actually gone home. There are not at
present seven States for any place, and the result
must depend (unless Rhode Island should return
with instructions, as is given out) on the com
parative flexibility of the Northem and Southern
delegations.

TO EDMUND RANDOLPH.
New York, August 22, 1788.
Dear Sir,
I have your favor of the thirteenth. The eflfect
of Clinton's circular letter in Virginia does not sur
prize me. It is a signal of concord and hope to
the enemies of the Constitution every where, and
will, I fear, prove extremely dangerous. Notwith
standing your own remarks on the subject, I can
not but think that an early Convention will be an
unadvised measure. It will evidently be the oflf-
spring of party and passion, and will probably for
that reason alone be the parent of error and public
injury. It is pretty clear that a majority of the
people of the Union are in favor of the Constitu
tion as it stands, or at least are not dissatisfied with
it in that form ; or if this be not the case, it is at
least clear that a greater proportion unite in that
system than are likely to unite in any other theory.

1788.] correspondence. 675
Should radical alterations take place, thei-efore,
they will not result from the deliberate sense of the
people, but will be obtained by manageraent, or ex
torted by menaces, and will be a real sacrifice of
the public will, as well as of the public good, to the
views of individuals, and perhaps the ambition of
State Legislatures.
Congress have come to no final decision as to the
place for commencing the new Government,'^

TO EDMUND RANDOLPH, New York, September 14, 1788.
Dear Sir,
Your favor of the third instant would have been
acknowledged two days ago, but for the approach
ing completion of the arrangement for the new
Governraent, which I wished to give you the earli
est notice of This subject has long eraployed Con
gress, and has, in its progress, assumed a variety of
shapes, some of them not a little perplexing. The
tiraes, as finally settled, are, January for the choice
of Electors, February for the choice of a President,
and March for the raeeting of Congress, The place,
the present seat of the Federal Government, The
last point was carried by the yielding of the smaller,
to the inflexibility of the greater, number, I have
myself been ready for bripging it to this issue for
some time, perceiving that further delay could only
discredit Congress, and injure the object in view.
Those who had opposed New York along with me
could not overcome their repugnance so soon. Ma-

676 correspondence. [ 1788.
ryland went away before the question was decided,
in a temper which, I believe, would never have
yielded. Delaware was equally inflexible. Pre
viously to our final assent, a motion was made
which tendered a blank for any place the majority
would choose between the North river and the Po
tomac. This being rejected, the alternative reraain
ing was, to agree to New York, or to strangle the
Governraent in its birth. The former as the lesser
evil was of course preferred, and raust now be made
the best of"'

TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. New York, September 24, 1788,
Dear Sir,
I have been favored with yours of the twelfth
instant. The picture it gives of the state of our
country is the more distressing as it seems to exceed
all the known resources for imraediate relief No
thing, in ray opinion, can give the desired facility to
the discharge of debts, but a re-establishraent of that
confidence which will at once make the creditor
more patient and open to the solvent debtor other
means than bringing his property to market. Hovv
far the new Governraent will produce these eflfects,
cannot yet be decided. But the utraost success that
can be hoped from it will leave in full force the
causes of intermediate embarrassment. The addi
tional pressure apprehended from British debts, is
an evil also for which I perceive at present no cer
tain remedy. As far, however, as the favorable

1788,] CORRESPONDENCE, 677
influence of the new Government may extend, that
may be one source of alleviation. It may be ex
pected also that the British creditors will feel seve
ral motives to indulgence. And I will not suppress
a hope that the new Government will be both able
and willing to eflfect something by negotiation.
Perhaps it might not be amiss for the Assembly to
prepare the way by some act or other, fdr drawing
the attention of the first session of the Cbngress to
this subject. The possession of the posts by Great
Britain, after the removal of the grounds of her
coraplaint by the provision in the new Constitution
with regard to the Treaty, will justify a renewal of
our demands, and an interference in favor of Ameri
can citizens on whom the performance of the Treaty
on pur side depends.
Congress have agreed to some resolutions in favor
of the Mississippi which are well calculated to
appease the discontents of our Western brethre^,
You shall soon have a copy of them. They are
grounded on a remonstrance from North Carolina
on that subject. By the way, how has it happened
that the last resolutions of Virginia were never for
warded to the Delegation ?

Dear Sir,

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON,
New York, September 26, 1788,

I subjom two resolutions lately taken by Congress
in relation to the Mississippi, which I hope may

678 CORRESPONDENCE, [1788,
have a critical and salutary eflfect on the temper of
our Western brethren.
In Congress, September 16th,
On report of the Committee, consisting of Mr,
Hamilton, Mr, Madison, Mr. Williamson, Mr. Dane,
and Mr. Edwards, to whom was referred the Re
port of the Secretary for Foreign Aflfairs on a
motion of the Delegates of North Carolina stating
the uneasiness produced by a report ' that Congress
are disposed to treat with Spain for the surrender of
their claira to the navigation of the river Missis
sippi,' and proposing a Resolution intended to re
move such apprehensions.
Resolved, that the said report not being founded
in fact, the Delegates be at liberty to communicate
all such circumstances as may be necessary to
contradict the same, and to remove misconcep
tions. Resolved, that the free navigation of the river
Mississippi, is a clear and essential right of the
United States, and that the same ought to be con
sidered and supported as such.
In addition to these resolutions, which are not of
a secret nature, another has passed arresting all
negotiations with Spain, and handing over the sub
ject, thus freed frora bias frora any former proceed
ings, to the ensuing Government. This last reso
lution is entered on the Secret Journal, but a tacit
perraission is given to the members to make a confir
dential use of it.'°°

1788.] correspondence. 679

to EDMUND RANDOLPH.
New York, October 17, 1788.
Dear Sir,
I have a letter from Mr. Jeflferson, but it contains
nothing of much consequence. His public letters to
w-hich it refers have not yet been comraunicated
frora the office of Foreign Aflfairs. Through other
authentic channels I learn that the States General
will pretty certainly be convened in May next.
The efficacy of that cure for the public maladies
will depend materially on. the mode in which the
deputies may be selected, which appears to be not
yet settled. There is good reason also to presume,
that, as the spirit which at present agitates the
nation has been in a great measure caught from the
Araerican Revolution, so the result of the struggle
there will be not a little aflfected by the character
which liberty may receive from the experiment now
on foot here. The tranquil and successful estab
lishment of a great reform by the reason of the com
munity, must give as rauch force to the doctrines
urged on one side as a contrary event would do to
the policy maintained on the other.
As Col. Carrington will be with you before this
gets to hand, I leave it with him to detail all matters
of a date previous to his departure. Of a subse
quent date I recollect nothing worth adding. I
requested hira also to confer with you in full confi
dence on the appointments to the Senate and House
of Representatives, so far as my friends may con
sider me in relation to either. He is fully possessed

680 correspondence. [1788.
of my real sentiraents, and will explain them more
conveniently than can be done on paper. I mean
not to decline an agency in launching the new
Government if such should be assigned me in one of
the Houses, and I prefer the House of Representa
tives, chiefly because, if I can render any service
there, it can only be to the public, and, not even in
imputation, to rayself At the sarae time my pre
ference, I own, is somewhat founded on the sup
position that the arrangeraents for the popular
elections may secure me against any competition
which would require on my part any step that would
speak a solicitude which I do not feel, or have the
appearance of a spirit of electioneering which I
despise.

to EDMUND RANDOLPH. New York, November 2, 1788.
Dear Sir,
I received yesterday your favor of the twenty-
third ultimo. The first countenance of the Assem
bly corresponds vvith the picture which my imagina
tion had formed of it. The views of the greater
part of the opposition to the Federal Government
have, ever since the Convention, been regarded by
me as permanently hostile, and likely to produce
every eflfort that might endanger or embarrass it.
My last letter, with Colonel Carrington's communi
cations to which it referred, will have sufficiently
explained my sentiments with regard to the legis
lative service under the new Constitution. My

1788.] correspondence, 681
first wish is to see the Government put into quiet
and successful operation ; and to aflford any service
that may be acceptable from me for that purpose.
My second wish, if that were to be consulted, would
prefer, for reasons formerly hinted, an opportunity
of contributing that service in the House of Represen
tatives, rather than in the Senate; provided the
opportunity be attainable from the spontaneous suf
frage of the Constituents. Should the real friends
of the Constitution think this preference inconsistent
with any priraary object, as Colonel Carrington
tells me is the case with some who are entitled to
peculiar respect, and view ray renouncing it as of
any material consequence, I shall not hesitate to
coraply. You will not infer from the freedom with
which these observations are made, that I am in the
least unaware of the probability that, whatever
my inclinations or those of my friends may be, they
are likely to be of little avail in the present case, I
take it for certain that a clear majority of the As
sembly are eneraies to the Government, and I have
no reason to suppose that I can be less obnoxious
than others on the opposite side. An election into
the Senate, therefore, can hardly come into question,
I know also that a good deal will depend on the
arrangeraents for the election of the other branch ;
and that much may depend, moreover, on the steps
to be taken by the candidates, which will not be
taken by me. Here again, therefore, there must be
great uncertainty, if not improbability, of my
election. With these circumstances in view, it is
irapossible that I can be the dupe of false calcula
tions, even if I were in other cases disposed to in-
VoL, I.— 43*

682 correspondence, [1788.
dulge them, I trast it is equally impossible for the
result, whatever it may be, to rob me of any re
flections which enter into the internal fund of com
fort and happiness. Popular favor or disfavor is no
criterion of the character maintained with those
whose esteem an honorable ambition must court.
Much less can it be a criterion of that maintained
with one's self And when the spirit of party directs
the public voice, it must be a little mind, indeed,
that can suflfer in its own estimation, or apprehend
danger of suflfering in that of others,""

• x-^

DEBATES

FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787.
BY JAMES MADISON.

A MEMBEK

INTRODUCTION

Note. — The following paper is copied from a rough draught in the hand
writing of Mr. Madison. The particular place it was intended to occupy in his
works is not designated ; but as it traces the causes and steps which led to the
meeting of the Convention of 1787, it seems properly to preface the acts of
that body. The paper bears evidence, in the paragraph preceding its conclusion,
that it was written at a late period of the life of its author, when the pressure of
ill health, combined with his great age, in preventing a final revision of it.

As the weakness and wants of man naturally lead
to an association of individuals under a common au
thority, whereby each may hav^e the protection of
the whole against danger from without, and enjoy
in safety within the advantages of social intercourse,
and an exchange of the necessaries and comforts of
life ; in like manner feeble coraraunities, independent
of each other, have resorted to a union, less intiraate,
but with comraon councils, for the coramon safety
against powerful neighbours, and for the preservation
of justice and peace among theraselves. Ancient
history furnishes examples of these confederate asso-
ciationSj though with a very imperfect account of
their structure, and of the attributes and functions
of the presiding authority. There are examples of

686 INTRODUCTION TO THE
modern date also, some of them still existing, the
modifications and transactions of which are suffi
ciently known.
It remained for the British Colonies, now United
States of North America, to add to those examples,
one of a more interesting character than any of
them ; which led to a system without an example
ancient or modern, A system founded on popular
rights, and so combining a federal form with the
forms of individual republics, as may enable each to
supply the defects of the other and obtain that ad
vantage of both.
Whilst the Colonies enjoyed the protection of the
parent country, as it vvas called, against foreign dan
ger, and were secured by its superintending control
against conflicts among themselves, they continued
independent of each other, under a common, though
limited, dependence on the parental authority. When,
however, the growth of the oflfspring in strength and
in wealth awakened the jealousy, and tempted the
avidity of the parent, into schemes of usurpation
and exaction, the obligation was felt by the former
of imiting their counsels and eflforts, to avert the
impending calamity.
As early as the year 1754, indications havinff been
given of a design in the British government to levy
contributions on the Colonies without their consent
a meeting of Colonial deputies took place at Al-

debates in the CONVENTION, 687
bany, which attempted to introduce a comprom
ising substitute, that might at once satisfy thie British
requisitions, and save their own rights from violation.
The atterapt had no other eflfect, than, by bringing
these rights into a raore conspicuous view, to invig
orate the attachraent to them, on the one side ; and
to nourish the haughty and encroaching spirit on the
other.''' In 1774, the progress made by Great Britain in
the open assertion of her pretensions, and the appre
hended purpose of otherwise maintaining theiri by
legislative enactments and declarations, had been
such that the Colonies did not hesitate to assemble,
by their deputies, in a formal Congress, authorized
to oppose to the British innovations whatever meas
ures might be found best adapted to the occasion ;
without, however, losing sight of an eventual recon
ciliation. '°'
The dissuasive measures of that Congress being
without eflfect, another Congress was held in 1775,
whose pacific eflforts to bring about a change in the
views of the other party being equally unavailing,
and the commencement of actual hostilities having
at length put an end to all hope of reconciliation,
the Congress, finding, moreover, that the popular
voice began to call for an entire and perpetual disso
lution of the poUtical ties which had connected them
with Great Britain, proceeded on the memorable

688 INTRODUCTION TO THE
Fourth of July, 1776, to declare the thirteen Colo
nies Jtidependent States.
During the discussions of this solemn act, a Com
mittee, consisting of a member from each Colony,
had been appointed, to prepare and digest a form of
Confederation for the future raanageraent of the
comraon interests, which had hitherto been left to
the discretion of Congress, guided by the exigencies
of the contest, and by the known intentions or occa-
, sional instructions of the Colonial Legislatures.
It appears that as early as the twenty-first of July,
1775, a plan, entitled "Articles of Confederation and
perpetual union of the Colonies," had been sketched
by Doctor Franklin, the plan being on that day
subraitted by hira to Congress ; and though not
copied into their Journals, remaining on their files in
his handwriting. But notwithstanding the term
" perpetual" observed in the title, the Articles pro
vided expressly for the event of a return of the Col
onies to a connection with Great Britain.'"
This sketch became a basis for the plan reported
by the Committee on the twelfth of July, now also
remaining on the files of Congress in the hand-wri
ting of Mr. Dickinson. The plan, though dated after
the Declaration of Independence, was probably drawn
up before that event ; since the name of Colonies, not
States, is used throughout the draughtl'' The plan
reported was debated and amended froin time to

debates in the CONVENTION. 689
time, till the seventeenth of November, 1777, when
it was agreed to by Congress, and proposed to the
Legislatures of the States, with an explanatory and
recommendatory letter."^ The ratifications of these,
by their delegates in Congress, daiy authorized, took
place at successive dates ; but were not completed till
the first of March, 1781, when Maryland, who had
made it a prerequisite that the vacant lands acquired
from the British Crown should be a common fund,
yielded to the persuasion that a final and formal es
tablishment of the Federal Union- and Government
would raake a favorable irapression, not only on other
foreign nations, but on Great Britain herself
The great difficulty experienced in so framing the
Federal system, as to obtain the unanimity required
for its due sanction, may be inferred from the long
interval, and recurring discussions, between the com
mencement and completion of the work ; from the
changes made during its progress ; from the language
of Congress when proposing it to the States, which
dwelt on the impracticability of devising a system
acceptable to all of them ; from the reluctant assent
given by some ; and the various alterations proposed
by others ; and by a tardiness in others again, which
produced a special address to them from Congress,
enforcing the duty of sacrificing local considerations
and favorite opinions to the public safety, and the
necessary harmony: nor was the assent pf some of
44

690 INTRODUCTION TO THE
the states finally yielded without strong protests
against particular Articles, and a reliance on future
amendments removing their objections. It is to be
recollected, no doubt, that these delays might be
occasioned in some degree by an occupation of the
public councils, both general and local, with the de
liberations and raeasures essential to a revolutionary
strusrgle; but there must have been a balance for
these causes in the obvious motives to hasten the
establishment of a regular and efficient government ;
and in the tendency of the crisis to repress opinions
and pretensions vvhich might be inflexible in another
state of things.
The principal difficulties which embarrassed the
progress, and retarded the completion, of the plan
of Confederation, raay be traced to — first, the natural
repugnance of the parties to a relinquishment of
power; secondly, a natural jealousy of its abuse in
other hands than their own; thirdly, the rule of
suffrage among parties whose inequality in size did
not correspond with that of their wealth, or of their
military or free population ; fourdily, the selection and
definition of the powers, at once necessary to the
federal head, and safe to the several members.
To these sources of difficulty, incident to the
formation of all such confederacies, were added two
others, one of a temporary, the other of a perraanent
nature. The first was the case of the Crown lands,

DEEATlES IN THE CONVENTION. 691
so called because they had been held by the British
Crown, and being ungranted to individuals when
its authority ceased, were considered by the States
within whose charters or asserted limits they lay,
as devolving on them ; whilst it was contended by
the others, that, being wrested fi'om the dethroned
authority by the equal exertions of all, they resulted
of right and in equity to the benefit of all. The
lands being of vast extent, and of growing value,
were the occasion of much discussion and heart
burning; and proved the most obstinate of the im
pediments to an earlier consummation of the plan of
federal government. The State of Maryland, the
last that acceded to it, held out as already noticed,
till the first of March, 1781 ; and then yielded only
to the hope that, by giving a stable and authoritative
character to the Confederation, a successful terraina
tion of the contest might be accelerated. The dis
pute was happily coraproraised by successive sur
renders of portions of the territory by the States
having exclusive claims to it, and acceptances of
them by Congress.
The other source of dissatisfaction was the pe
culiar situation of some of the States, which, having
no convenient ports for foreign coramerce, were
subject to be taxed by their neighbours, through
whose ports their comraerce was carried on. New
Jersey, placed between Philadelphia and New

692 INTRODUCTION TO THE
York, was likened to a cask tapped at both ends ;
and North Carolina, between Virginia and South
Carolina, to a patient bleeding at both arms. The
Articles of Confederation provided no remedy for
the coraplaint ; which produced a strong protest on
the part of New Jersey, and never ceased to be a
source of dissatisfaction and discord, uMil the new
Constitution superseded the old.
But the radical infirraity of the " Articles of Con
federation" was the dependence of Congress on the
voluntary and siraultaneous corapliance with its
requisitions by so raany independent coraraunities,
each consulting more or less its particular interests
and convenience, and distrusting the corapliance of
the others. Whilst the paper emissions of Congress
continued to circulate, they were employed as a
sinew of vv'ar, like gold and silver. When that
ceased to be the case, and the fatal defect of the
political system was felt in its alarming force, the
war was merely kept alive, and brought to a suc
cessful conclusion, by such foreign aids and tem
porary expedients as could be applied ; a hope pre
vailing with many, and a wish with all, that a state
of peace, and the sources of prosperity opened by it,
would give to the Confederacy, in practice, the
efficiency which had been inferred from its theory.
The close of the war, however, brought no cure
for the public embarrassments. The States re-

DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 693
lieved from the pressure of foreign danger, and
flushed with the enjoyment of independent and
sovereign power, instead of a diminished disposition
to part with it, persevered in omissions and in
measures incompatible with their relations to the
Federal Govemment, and with those among them
selves. Having served as a member of Congress through
the period between March, 1780, and the arrival of
peace, in 1783, 1 had become intiniately acquainted
with the public distresses and the causes of them.
I had observed the successful opposition to every
atterapt to procure a reraedy by new grants of
power to Congress. I had found, moreover, that
despair of success hung over the compromising
principle of April, 1783, for the public necessities,
wdiich had been so elaborately planned and so im
pressively recommended to the States. Sympa
thizing, under this aspect of aflfairs, in the alarm of
the friends of free governraent at the threatened
danger of an abortive result to the great, and per
haps last, experiment in its favor, I could not be in
sensible to the obligation to aid as far as I could in
averting the calamity. With this view I acceded to
the desire of my fellow citizens of the County, that
I should be one of its representatives in the Legisla
ture, hoping that I might there best contribute to
inculcate the critical posture to which the Revolu-

\ \

694 INTRODUCTION TO THE
tionary cause was reduced, and the merit of a lead
ing agency of the State in bringing about a rescue
of the Union, and the blessings of liberty staked on
it, from an impending catastrophe.
It required but little time after taking my seat in
the House of Delegates in May, 1784, to discover,
that, however favorable the general disposition of
the State might be towards the Confederacy, the
Legislature retained the aversion of its predecessors
to transfers of power from the State to the Govern
ment of the Union ; notwithstanding the urgent de
mands of the Federal Treasury, the glaring inade
quacy of the authorized mode of supplying it, the
rapid growth of anarchy in the Federal system, and
the animosity kindled araong the States by their
conflicting regulations.
The teraper of the Legislature, and the wayward
course of its proceedings, may be gathered from
the Journals of its sessions in the years 1784 and
1785.'^ The failure, however, of the varied propositions in
the Legislature, for enlarging the powers of Con
gress ; the continued failure of the efforts of Con
gress to obtain from them the means of providing
for the debts of the Revolution, and of countervailing
the coraraercial laws of Great Britain, a source of
much irritation, and against which the separate
eflforts of the States were found worse than abortive;

DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 695
these considerations, with the lights thrown on the
whole subject by the free and full discussion it had
undergone, led to a general acquiescence in the
Resolution passed on the twenty-first of January,
1786, which proposed and invited a meeting of
Deputies from all the States, as follows :
" Resolved, that Edmund Randolph, James Madi
son, Jr., Walter Jones, St. George Tucker, and
Meriwether Smith, Esquires, be appointed Commis
sioners, who, or any three of whom, shall meet such
Coramissioners as may be appointed in the other
States of the Union, at a tirae and place to be
agreed on, to take into consideration the trade of
the United States ; to examine the relativ^e situa
tions and trade of said States; to eonsider how far
a uniform system in their commercial regulations
may be necessary to their comraon interest and their
permanent harraony; and to report to the several
States such an act, relative to this great object, as,
when unanimously ratified by theni, will enable the
United States in Congress, eflfectually to provide for
the same."
The Resolution had been brought forward some
weeks before, on the failure of a proposed grant of
power to Congress to collect a revenue from com
merce, which had been abandoned by its friends in
consequence of material alterations made in the
grant by a Committee of the Whole. The Resolu-

696 INTRODUCTION TO THE
tion, though introduced by Mr. Tyler, an mfluential
member, — who, having never served in Congress,
had more the ear of the House than those whose
services there exposed them to an imputable bias, —
was so little acceptable, that it was not then per
sisted inT Being now revived by him, on the last
day of the session, and being the alternative of
adjourning without any eflfort for the crisis in the
aflfairs of the Union, it obtained a general vote ; less,
however, with some of its friends, frora a confidence
in the success of the experiraent, than from a hope
that it might prove a step to a more Comprehensive
and adequate provision for the wants of the Con
federacy.'"' It happened also, that Coramissioners, appointed
by Virginia and Maryland to settle the jurisdiction
on waters dividing the two States, had, apart from
their official reports, recommended a uniformity in
the regulations of the two States on several subjects,
and particularly on those having relation to foreign
trade. It appeared at the same time, that Mary
land had deemed a concurrence of her neighbouys,
Delaware and Pennsylvania, indispensable in such
a case ; who, for like reasons, would require that of
their neighbours. • So apt and forcible an illustration
of the necessity of an uniformity throughout all the
States could not but favor the passage of a resolu-

DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 697
tion which proposed a Convention having that for
its object.
The Commissioners appointed hy the Legislature,
and who attended the Convention, were Edmund
Randolph, the Attorney of the State, St. George
Tucker and Jaraes Madison. The designation of
the time and place to be proposed for its meeting,
and comraunicated to the States, having been left to
the Coramissioners, they named, for the time the first
Monday in September, and for the place the city of
Annapolis, avoiding the residence of Congress, and
large coraraercial cities, as liable to suspicions of an
extraneous influence.
Although the invited meeting appeared to be
generally favored, five States only assembled ; some
failing to raake appointments, and some of the indi
viduals appointed not hastening their attendance;
the result in both cases being ascribed mainly to a
belief that the time had not arrived for such a po
litical reform as might be expected from a further
experience of its necessity.
But in the interval between the proposal of the
Convention and the tirae of its meeting, such had
been the advance of public opinion in the desired
direction, stimulated as it had beenby the eflfect of
the contemplated object of the meeting, in turning
the general attention to the critical state of things,
and in calling forth the sentiments and exertions of
44*

698 INTRODUCTIONTO THE
the most enlightened and influential patriots, that
the Convention, thin as it was, did not scruple to
decline the limited task assigned to, it, and to recora
raend to the States a Convention with powers ade
quate to the occasion. Nor had it been unnoticed
that the coraraission of the New Jersey deputation
had extended its object to a general provision for
the exigencies of the Union. A recommendation for
this enlarged purpose w^as accordingly reported by
a committee to whom the subject had been referred.
It was drafted by Col. Hamilton, and finally agreed
to in the following form :
" To the Honorable, the Legislatures of Virginia,
Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New
York, the Coraraissioners from the said States, re
spectively, asserabled at Annapolis, humbly beg
leave to report :
"That, pursuant to theu: several appointments,
they met at Annapolis, in the State of Maryland,
on the eleventh day of September instant; and
having proceeded to a communication of their
powers, they found that the States of New York
Pennsylvania and Virginia, had, in substance, and
nearly in the same terms, authorized their respec
tive Coraraissioners ' to raeet such coramissioners as
were, or might be, appointed by the other States of
the Union, at such tirae and place as should be
agreed upon by the said Commissioners, to take

DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 699
into consideration the trade and coraraerce of the
United States ; to consider how far an uniforra sys
tem in their comraercial intercourse and regulations
might be necessary to their common interest and
permanent harraony; and to report to the several
States such an act, relative to this great object, a§,
when unanimously ratified by them, would enable
the United States in Congress assembled eflfectually
to provide for the same.'
" That the State of Delaware had given similar
powers to their Commissioners, with this diflference
only, that the act to be framed in virtue of these
powers is required to be reported ' to the United
States in Congress asserabled, to be agreed to by
them, and confirmed by, the Legislature of every
State.' " That the State of New Jersey had enlarged the
object of their appointraent, erapowering their cora
missioners, ' to consider how far an uniform system
in their commercial regulations, and other important
matters, might be necessary to the common interest
and permanent harraony of the several States ;' and
to report such an act on the subject, as, when rati
fied by thera, ' would enable the United States in
Congress assembled eflfectually to provide for the
exigencies of the Union.'
" That appointments of Commissioners .have also
been made by the States of New Hampshire, Mas-

700 INTRODUCTION TO THE
sachusetts, Rhode Island, and North Carolina, none
of whom, however, have attended ; but that no in
formation has been received by your Commissioners
of any appointment having been made by the States
of Maryland, Connecticut, South Carolina or Georgia.
" That the express terras of the powers to your
Commissioners supposing a deputation from all the
States, and having for object the trade and com
merce of the United States, your Comihissioners did
not conceive it advisable to proceed on the business
of their mission under the circumstances of so partial
and defective a representation.
" Deeply impressed, however, with the magnitude
and importance of the object confided to them on
this occasion, your Commissioners cannot forbear to
indulge an expression of their earnest and unani
mous wish, that speedy measures may be taken to
eflfect a general meeting of the States in a future
Convention, for the same and such other purposes,
as the situation of public aflfairs may be found to
require. " If, in expressing this wish, or in intimatmg any
other sentiment, your Coraraissioners should seem to
exceed the strict bounds of their appointment, they
entertain a full confidence, that a conduct dictated
by an anxiety for the welfare of the United States
will not fail to receive an indulgent construction.
" In this persuasion, your Commissioners submit an

DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 701
opinion, that the idea of extending the powers of
their Deputies to other objects than those of com
merce, which has been adopted by the State of New
Jersey, was an improveraent on the original plan,
and will deserve to be incorporated into that of a
future Convention. They are the more naturally
led to this conclusion, as, in the course of their reflec
tions on the subject, they have been induced to think
that the power of regulating trade is of such com
prehensive extent, and will enter so far into the
general system of the Federal Governraent, that to
give it efficacy, and to obviate questions and doubts
concerning its precise nature and liraits, may require
a correspondent adjustment of other parts of the
Federal system.
" That there are important defects in the system of
the Federal Government, is acknowledged by the
acts of all those States which have concurred in the
present meeting. That the defects, upon a closer ex
amination, raay be found greater and raore nuraerous
than even these acts imply, is at least so far probable,
from the embarrassments which characterize the
present state of our national aflfairs, foreign and do
mestic, as may reasonably be supposed to merit a
deliberate and candid discussion, in some mode which
will unite the sentiments and councils of all the
States. In the choice of the mode, y^our Corarais
sioners are of opinion, that a Convention of deputies

702- INTRODUCTION TO THE
frora the difierent States, for the special and sole
purpose of entering into this investigation, and di
gesting a plan for supplying such defects as raay be
discovered to exist, will be entitled to a preference,
from considerations vvhich vvill occur without being
particularized. "Your Commissioners decline an enumeration of
those national circurastances on which their opinion,
respecting the propriety of a future Convention with
more enlarged powers, is founded ; as it vvould be an
useless intrusion of facts and observations, most of
vvhich have been frequently the subject of public
discussion, and none of which can have escaped the
penetration of those to whora they w^ould in this
instance be addressed. They are, however, of a
nature so serious, as, in the view of your Commis
sioners, to render the situation of the United States
delicate and critical, calling. for an exertion of the
united virtue and vvnsdom of all the merabers of the
Confederacy. " Under this impression, your Commissioners, with
the raost respectful deference, beg leave to suggest
their unaniraous conviction, that it may essentially
tend to advance the interests of the Union, if the
States by whom they have been respectively dele
gated would themselves concur, and use their en
deavors to procure the concurrence of the other
States, in the appointment of Comraissioners, to meet

DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 703
at Philadelphia on the second Monday in May next,
to take into consideration the situation of the United
States; to devise such further provisions as shall
appear to them necessary to render the constitution
of the Federal Government adequate to the exigen
cies of the Union ; and to report such an act for that
purpose, to the United States in Congress asserabled,
as, when agreed to by them, and afterwards con
firmed by the Legislatures of every State, will eflfect
ually provide for the sarae.
" Though your Commissioners could not with pro
priety address these observations and sentiments to
any but the States they have the honor to represent,
they have nevertheless concluded, frora raotives of
respect, to transrait copies of this Report to the
United States in Congress assembled, and to the
Executives of the other States."'™
The recoraraendation was well received by the
Legislature of Virginia, which happened to be the
first that acted on it ; and the example of her com
pliance was made as conciliatory and irapressive as
possible. The Legislature were unanimous, or very
nearly so, on the occasion. As a proof of the mag
nitude and solemnity attached to it, they placed
General Washington at the head of the deputation
from the State ; and as a proof of the deep interest
he felt in the case, he overstepped the obstacles to
his acceptance of the appointment.

704 INTRODUCTION TO THE
The law complying with the recommendation
from Annapolis vvas in the terms following :
" Whereas, the Comraissioners who assembled at
Annapolis, on the fourteenth day of September last,
for the purpose of devising and reporting the means
of enabling Congress to provide eflfectually for the
comraercial interests of the United States, have re
presented the necessity of extending the revision of
the Federal system to all its defects; and have
recommended that deputies for that purpose be
appointed by the several Legislatures, to meet in
Convention in the City of Philadelphia, on the
second Monday of May next, — a provision which
seems preferable to a discussion of the subject in
Congress, where it might be too much interrupted
by the ordinary business before them, and where it
would, besides, be deprived of the valuable counsels
of sundry individuals who are disqualified by the
constitutions or laws of particular States, or re
strained by peculiar circumstances, from a seat in
that Assembly :
" And whereas, the General Assembly of this
Commonwealth, taking into view the actual situa
tion of the Confederacy, as well as reflecting on the
alarming representations made from time to time,
by the United States in Congress, particularly in
their act of the fifteenth day of February last, can
no longer doubt that the crisis is arrived at whicli

DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 705
the good people of America are to decide the solemn
question, whether they will, by wise and magnan
imous efforts, reap the just fruits of that independence
which they have so gloriously acquired, and of that
union which they have cemented with so much of
their coraraon blood ; or whether, by giving way to
unmanly jealousies and prejudices, or to partial and
transitory interests, they will renounce the auspicious
blessings prepared for them by the Revolution, and
furnish to its enemies an eventual triumph over
those, by whose virtue and valour, it has been ac
complished :
"And whereas, the same noble and extended
policy, and the same fraternal and aflfectionate
sentiments, which originally determined the citizens
of this Comraonwealth to unite with their brethren
of the other States, in establishing a federal govern
ment, cannot but be felt with equal force now, as
motives to lay aside every inferior consideration,
and to concur in such farther concessions and pro
visions, as may be necessary to secure the great ob
jects for which that government was instituted, and
to render the United States as happy in peace, as
they have been glorious in war.
"Be it, therefore, enacted, by the General Assembly
of the Comraonwealth of Virginia, That seven Com
missioners be appointed by joint ballot of both
Houses of Assembly, who, or any three of them, are
45

706 INTRODUCTION TO THE
hereby authorized as Deputies from this Common
wealth, to meet such Deputies as may be appointed
and authorized by other States, to assemble in Con
vention at Philadelphia, as above recomrtiended, and
to join with them in devising and discussing all such
alterations and farther provisions, as may be neces
sary to render the Federal Constitution adequate to
the exigencies ofthe Union; and in reporting such an
act for that purpose, to the United States in Congress,
as when agreed to by thera, and duly confirmed by the
several States, will eflfectually provide for the same.
" And be it further enacted. That in case of the death
of any of the said deputies, or of their declining their
appointments, the Executive are hereby authorized
to supply such vacancies ; and the Governor is re
quested to transmit forthwith a copy of this act to
the United States in Congress, and to the Executives
of each of the States in the Union."* '"
A resort to a General Convention, to re-model the
Confederacy, was not a new idea. It had entered
at an early date into the conversations and specula
tions of the most reflecting and foreseeing observers
of the inadequacy of the powers allowed to Congress.
In a pamphlet published in May, 1781, at the seat of
Congress, Pelatiah Webster, an able though not con
spicuous citizen, after discussing the fiscal system of

• Dravra by J. Madison, passed the House of Delegates November 9th, the
Senate November 23d — ajid Deputies appointed December 4th 1786.

DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 707
the United States, and suggesting, among other re
medial provisions, one including a national bank, re
marks, that " the authority of Congress at present is
very inadequate to the performance of their duties ;
and this indicates the necessity of their calling a
Continental Convention fot the express purpose of
ascertaining, defining, enlarging and limiting, the
duties and powers of their Constitution," '™
On the first day of April, 1783, Colonel Hamilton,
in a debate in Congress, observed, " that he wished,
instead of them (partial Conventions), to see a gen
eral Convention take place; and that he should
soon, in pursuance of instructions from his constitu
ents, propose to Congress a plan for that purpose,
the object of which would be to strengthen the
Federal Constitution." He alluded, probably, to the
resolutions introduced by General Schuyler in the
Senate, and passed unanimously by the Legislature,
of New York in the summer of 1782, declaring, that
the Confederation was defective, in not giving Con
gress power to provide a revenue for itself, or in not
investing them with funds from established and pro
ductive sources ; and that it would be advisable for
Congress to recommend to the States to call a gene
ral Convention to revise and amend the Confedera
tion." It does not appear, however, that his expect
ation had beeh fulfilled."'
In a letter to James Madison frora R. H. Lee, then

708 INTRODUCTION TO THE
President of Congress, dated the twenty-sixth of
Noveraber, 1784, he says : "It is by many here sug
gested as a very necessary step for Congress to take,
the calling on the States to form a Convention for
the sole purpose of revising the Confederation, so
far as to enable Congress to execute with more en
ergy, eflfect and vigor the powers assigned to it, than
it appears by experience that they can do under the
present state of things." The answer of Mr. Madison
remarks : " I hold it for a maxim, that the union of
the States is essential to their safety against foreign
danger and internal contention ; and that the perpe
tuity and efficacy of the present system cannot be
confided in. The question, therefore, is, in what
mode, and at what moraent, the experiraent for sup
plying the defects ought to be made."
In the winter of 1784-5, Noah Webster, whose
political and other valuable writings had made him
known to the public, proposed, in one of his publica
tions, "anew system of government which should
act, not on the States, but du-ectly on individuals,
and vest in Congress full power to carry its laws
into eflfect."™
The proposed and expected Convention at Anna
polis, the first of a general character that appears to
have been realized, and the state of the public mind
awakened by it, had attracted the particular atten
tion of Congress, and favored the idea there of a

DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 709
Convention with fuller powers for amending the
Confederacy.* It does not appear that in any of these cases the
reformed system was to be otherwise sanctioned
than by the Legislative authority of the States ; nor
whether, nor how far, a change was to be made in
the structure of the depository of Federal powers.
The act of Virginia providing for the Convention
at Philadelphia was succeeded by appointments from
the other States as their Legislatures were assem
bled, the appointments being selections frora the raost
experienced and highest standing citizens. Rhode
Island was the only exception to a compliance with
the recommendation from Annapolis, well known to
have been swayed by an obdurate adherence to an
advantage which her position gave her, of taxing her
neighbours through their consumption of imported
supplies, an advantage which it w^as foreseen would
be taken frora her by a revisal of the Articles of
Confederation. As the public mind had been ripened for a salu
tary reform of the political system, in the interval
between the proposal and the meeting of the Com
missioners at Annapolis, the interval between the
last event and the meeting of deputies at Phdadel-

* The letters of Wm. Grayson, March 22, 1786, and of James Monroe, of
April 28th, 1786, both then raembers, to Mr. Madison, state that a proposition
for auch a Convention had been made .

710 INTRODUCTION TO THE
phia had continued to develope more and more the
necessity and the extent of a systematic provision
for the preservation and government of the Union.
Among the ripening incidents was the insurrection
of Shays, in Massachusetts, against her government ;
which was with difficulty suppressed, notwithstand
ing the influence on the insurgents of an appre
hended interposition of the Federal troops.
At the date of the Convention, the aspect and
retrospect of the pohtical condition of the United
States could not but fill the public raind with a
gloora which was relieved only by a hope that so
select a body would devise an adequate remedy for
the existing and prospective evils so impressively
demanding it.
It was seen that the public debt, rendered so
sacred by the cause in which it had been incurred,
remained without any provision for its payment.
The reiterated and elaborate eflforts of Congress to
procure frora the States a raore adequate power to
raise the raeans of payment, had failed. The eflfect
of the ordinary requisitions of Congress had only dis
played the inefficiency of the authority making them,
none of the States having duly complied with them,
some having failed altogether, or nearly so ; while
in one instance, that of New Jersey,* a compliance

•A letter of Mr. Grayson to Mr. Madison of March 32, 1786, relating the
conduct of New Jersey, states this fact.

DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 711
was expressly refused ; nor was more yielded to the
expostulations of raembers of Congress deputed to
her Legislature, than a mere repeal of the law,
without a compliance. The want of authority in
Congress to regulate comraerce had produced in for
eign nations, particularly Great Britain, a raonopo-
lizing policy, injurious to the trade of the United
States, and destructive to their navigation ; the ira-
becility, and anticipated dissolution, of the Confed
eracy extinguishing all apprehensions of a counter
vailing policy on the part of the United States.
The same want of a general power over commerce
led to an exercise of the power, separately, by the
States, which not only proved abortive, but engen
dered rival, conflicting and angry regulations. Be
sides the vain attempts to supply their respective
treasuries by imposts, which turned their commerce
into the neighbouring ports, and to coerce a relax
ation of the British monopoly of the West India
navigation, which was attempted by Virginia,* the
States having ports for foreign comraerce, taxed and
irritated the adjoining States, trading through thera,
as New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South
Carolina. Sorae of the States, as Connecticut, taxed
iraports from others, as from Massachusetts, which
complained in a letter to the Executive of Virginia,
* See the Journal of her Legislature.

712 INTRODUCTION TO THE
and doubtless to those of other States. In sundry
instances, as of New York, New Jersey, Pennsyl
vania and Maryland, the navigation laws treated
the citizens of other States as aliens. In certain
cases the authority of the Confederacy was disre
garded, as in violation, not only of the Treaty of
Peace, but of treaties with France and Holland ;
which were complained of to Congress. In other
cases the Federal authority was violated by treaties
and wars with Indians, as by Georgia ; by troops
raised and kept up without the consent of Congress,
as by Massachusetts ; by compacts without the con
sent of Congress, as between Pennsylvania and Nevv
Jersey, and between Virginia and Maryland. From
the Legislative Journals of Virginia it appears, that
a vote refusing to apply for a sanction of Congress
was followed by a vote against the communication
of the compact to Congress. In the internal admin
istration of the States, a violation of contracts had
become familiar, in the form of depreciated paper
made a legal tender, of property substituted for
money, of instalment laws, and of the occlusions of
the courts of justice, although evident that all such
interferences affected the rights of other States,
relatively creditors, as well as citizens creditors
within the State. Among the defects which had
been severely felt was want of an uniformity in cases
requiring it, as laws of naturalization and bank-

DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 713
ruptcy, a coercive authority operating on individ
uals, and a guarantee of the internal tranquillity of
t^e States.
As a natural consequence of this distracted and
disheartening condition of the Union, the Federal
authority had ceased to be respected abroad, and
dispositions were shown there, particularly in
Great Britain, to take advantage of its imbecility,
and to speculate on its approaching downfall. At
home it had lost all confidence and credit ; the un
stable and unjust career of the States had also for
feited the respect and confidence essential to order
and good governraent, involving a general decay of
confidence and credit between man and man. It
was found, moreover, that those least partial to
popular government, or most distrustful of its effi
cacy, were yielding to anticipations, that from an
increase of the confusion a govemment might result
more congenial with their taste or their opinions ;
whilst those most devoted to the principles and
forras of Republics were alarraed for the cause of
liberty itself, at stake in the American experiraent,
and anxious for a system that would avoid the in-
efficacy of a mere confederacy, without passing into
the opposite extrerae of a consolidated govemment.
It was known that there were individuals who had
betrayed a bias towards monarchy, and there had
always been some not unfavorable to a partition of
45*

714 INTRODUCTION TO THE
the Union into several confederacies ; either from a
better chance of figuring on a sectional theatre, or
that the sections would requu-e stronger govem
ments, or by their hostile conflicts lead to a mon
archical consolidation. The idea of disraeraberraent
had recently raade its appearance in the newspapers.
Such were the defects, the deforraities, the dis
eases and the ominous prospects, for which the Con
vention were to provide a remedy, and which ought
never to be overlooked in expounding and appre
ciating the constitutional charter, the remedy that
vvas provided."^
As a sketch on paper, the earliest, perhaps, of a
Constitutional Government for the Union (organized
into the regular departments, with physical means
operating on individuals) to be sanctioned by the
people of the States, acting in their original and
sovereign character, was contained in the letters of
James Madison to Thomas Jeflferson of the nine
teenth of March; to Governor Randolph of the
eighth of April ; and to General Washington of the
sixteenth of April, 1787, for which see their respec
tive dates.™
The feature, in these letters which vested in the
general authority a negative on the laws of the
States, was suggested by the negative in the head
of the British Empire, which prevented collisions
between the parts and the whole, and between the

DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 715
parts themselves. It was supposed that the substi
tution of an elective and responsible authority, for
an hereditary and irresponsible one, would avoid the
appearance even of a departure from Republican
ism, But although the subject was so viewed in the
Convention, and the votes on it were more than once
equally divided, it was finally and justly abandoned,
as, apart from other objections, it was not practi
cable among so many States, increasing in nuraber,
and enacting, each of them, so many laws. Instead
ofthe proposed negative, the objects of it were left
as finally provided for in the Constitution.'"
On the arrival of the Virginia Deputies at Phila
delphia, it occurred to them, that, from the early
and prominent part taken by that State in bringing
about the Convention, sorae initiative step might be
expected from them. The Resolutions introduced
by Governor Randolph were the result of a con
sultation on the subject, with an understanding that
they left all the Deputies entirely open to the lights
of discussion, and free to concur in any alterations
or modifications which their reflections and judg
ments might approve. The Resolutions, as the
Journals show, became the basis on which the pro
ceedings of the Convention commenced, and to the
developements, variations and modifications of which
the plan of govemment proposed by the Convention
may be traced.™

716 INTRODUCTION TO THE
The curiosity I had felt during my researches into
the history of the most distinguished confederacies,
particularly those of antiquity, and the deficiency I
found in the means of satisfying it, more especially
in what related to the process, the principles, the
reasons, and the anticipations, which prevailed in
the formation of them, determined me to preserve, as
far as I could, an exact account of what might pass
in the Convention whilst executing its trust ; with
the magnitude of which I was duly impressed, as I
was by the gratification promised to future curiosity
by an authentic exhibition of the objects, the
opinions, and the reasonings, frora which the new
systera of government was to receive its peculiar
structure and organization. Nor was I unaware of
the value of such a contribution to the fund of
materials for the history of a Constitution on which
would be staked the happiness of a people great
evenin its infancy, and possibly the cause of liberty
throughout the world.
In pursuance of the task I had assumed, I chose a
seat in front of the presiding member, with the other
members on my right and left hands. In this
favorable position for hearing all that passed, I
noted, in terms legible and in abbreviations and
marks intelligible to myself, what was read from
the Chair or spoken by the raembers ; and losing not
a moment unnecessarily between the adjournment

DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 717
and reassembling of the Convention, I was enabled
to write out my daily notes during the session, or
within a few finishing days after its close, in the ex
tent and form preserved in my own hand on my
files. In the labor and correctness of this I was not a
little aided by practice, and by a familiarity with the
style and the train of observation and reasoning
which characterized the principal speakers. It
happened, also, that I was not absent a single day,
nor more than a casual fraction of an hour in any
day, so that I could not have lost a single speech,
unless a very short one.
It may be proper to remark, that, with a very
few exceptions, the speeches were neither furnished,
nor revised, nor sanctioned, by the speakers, but
written out from ray notes, aided by the freshness of
my recollections. A further remark may be proper,
that views of the subject might occasionally be
presented, in the speeches and proceedings, with a
latent reference to a compromise on sorae middle
ground, by mutual concessions. The exceptions
alluded to were, — first, the sketch furnished by
Mr. Randolph of his speech on the introduction of
his propositions, on the twenty-ninth day of May ;
secondly, the speech of Mr. Hamilton, who happened
to call on me when putting the last hand to it,
and who acknowledged its fidelity, without sug-

718 INTRODUCTION TO THE
gesting more than a very few verbal alterations
which were made ; thirdly, the speech of Gouverneur
Morris on the second day of May, which was com
municated to him on a like occasion, and who acqui
esced in it without even a verbal change. The
correctness of his language and the distinctness of
his enunciation were particularly favorable to a
reporter. The speeches of Doctor Franklin, ex
cepting a few brief ones, were copied from the writ
ten ones read to the Convention by his colleague,
Mr. Wilson, it being inconvenient to the Doctor
to remain long on his feet.
Of the ability and intelligence of those who com
posed the Convention the debates and proceedings
may be a test ; as the character of the work which
was the oflfspring of their deliberations must be
tested by the experience of the future, added to that
of nearly half a century which has passed.
But whatever raay be the judgraent pronounced
on the corapetency of the architects of the Constitu
tion, or whatever may be the destiny of the edifice
prepared by them, I feel it a duty to express my
profound and soleran conviction, derived from my
Ultunate opportunity of observing and appreciating
the views of the Convention, collectively and indi
vidually, that there never was an assembly of men,
charged with a great and arduous trust, who were
more pure m their raotives, or more exclusively or

DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 719

<»

anxiously devoted to the object committed to them,
than were the members of the Federal Convention
of 1787, to the object of devising and proposing a
constitutional system which should best supply the
defects of that which it was to replace, and best
secure the permanent liberty and happiness of their
country.

DEBATES /^^^^^f^

FEDERAL CONVENTION OF V

Monday, May 14th, 1787,
Was the day fixed for the meeting of the Deputies
in Convention, for revising the federal system of
government. On that day a siriall number only had
assembled. Seven States were not convened till,

Friday, May 25th.

When the following members appeared :
From Rufus King.
Robert Yates, and
Alexander Hamilton
David Brearly,
William Churchill Houston, and
William Patterson, l'
Robert Morris, f3.^
Thomas Fitzsimons,
James Wilson, and
Gouverneur Morris.
George Read, ^. j^i
Richard Basset, and
Jacob Broom.

Massachusetts,
New York,
New Jersey,

Pennsylvania,

Delaware,

Vol. I.— 46

722

DEBATES IN THE

[ 1787.

Virginia, George Washington,
Edmund Randolph,
John Blair,
James Madison,
George Mason,
George Wythe, and
James McClurg.
North Carolina, Alexander Martin,
Williara Richardson Davie,
Richard Dobbs Spaight, and
Hugh Williamson,
South Carolina, John Rutledge,
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney,
Charles Pinckney, and
Pierce Butler-.
Georgia, William Few. llT^-" Vir",.:^ . U'r
Mr. Robert Morris informed the member^ asseiri-
bled, that, by the instruction and in behalf of the
deputation of Pennsylvania, he proposed George
Washington, Esquire, late Coramander-in-Chief, for
President of the Convention.* Mr. John Rutledge
seconded the raotion, expressing his confidence that
the choice would be unaniraous; and observing,
that the presence of General Washington forbade
any observations on the occasion which might
otherwise be proper.
General Washington was accordingly unanimous
ly elected by ballot, and conducted to the Chair by

* The nomination came with particular grace from Pennsylvania, as Doctor
Franklin alone could have been thought of as a competitor. The Doctor was
himself to have made the nomination of General Washington, but the state of
the weather and of his health confined him to his house.

1787.] federal convention, 723
Mr. R, Morris and Mr. Rutledge ; from which, in a
very emphatic manner, he thanked the Convention
for the honor they had conferred on him ; reminded
them of the novelty of the scene of business in which
he was to act, lamented his want of better qualifica
tions, and claimed the indulgence of the House
tovvards the involuntary errors which his inexperi
ence might occasion.
Mr. Wilson moved that a Secretary be appointed,
and nominated Mr. Temple Franklin.
Colonel Hamilton nominated Major Jackson. On
the ballot Major Jackson had five votes, and Mr.
Franklin two votes.
On reading the credentials of the Deputies, it was
noticed that those from Delaware were prohibited
frora changing the Article in the Confederation
establishing an equality of votes among the States."'
The appointment of a Committee, on the motion
of Mr. C. Pinckney, consisting of Messrs. Wythe,
Hamilton, and C. Pinckney, to prepare standing
rules and orders, was the only remaining step taken
on this day.

Monday, May 28th.
In Convention, — From Massachusetts, Nathaniel
Gorham and Caleb Strong ; from Connecticut,
Oliver Ellsworth ; from Delaware, Gunning Bed^
FORD ; from Maryland, James McHenry ; from Penn
sylvania, Benjamin Franklin, George Clymer,
Thomas Mifflin, and Jared Ingersoll, — took their
seats.

724 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
Mr. Wythe, from the Committee for preparing
mies, made a report, which employed the delibera
tions of this day,
Mr. King objected to one of the rules in the re
port authorizing any member to call for the Yeas
and Nays and have them entered on the minutes.
He urged, that as the acts of the Convention were
not to bind the constituents, it was unnecessary to
exhibit this evidence of the votes ; and improper, as
changes of opinion would be frequent in the course
of the business, and would fill the minutes w'ith con
tradictions. Colonel Mason seconded the objection, adding,
that such a record of the opinions of members would
be an obstacle to a change of them on conviction ;
and in case of its being hereafter promulged, must
furnish handles to the adversaries of the result of
the meeting.
The proposed rule was rejected, nem. con. The
standing rules agreed to were as follows :
RULES.
" A House to do business shall consist of the Depu
ties of not less than seven States ; and all questions
shall be decided by the greater number of these
which shall be fully represented. But a less num
ber than seven may adjourn from day to day.
" Imraediately after the President shall have taken
the Chair, and the members their seats, the minutes
of the preceding day shall be read by the Secretary.
" Every member, rising to speak, shall address the
President ; and, whilst he shall be speaking, none

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 725
shall pass between them, or hold discourse with
another, or read a book, pamphlet, or paper, printed
or manuscript. And of two merabers rising to speak
at the sarae tirae, the President shall name him who
shall be first heard.
" A member shall not speak oftener than tvyice,
without special leave, upon the sarae question ; and
not the second time, before every other who had
been silent shall have been heard, if he choose to
speak upon the subject.
" A motion, made and seconded, shall be repeated,
and, if written, as it shall be when any meraber
shall so require, read aloud, by the Secretary, be
fore it shall be debated ; and may be withdrawn at
any time before the vote upon it shall have been
declared. " Orders of the day shall be read next after the
minutes ; and either discussed ©r postponed, before
any other business shall be introduced.
" When a debate shall arise upon a question, no
motion, other than to amend the question, to com
mit it, or to postpone the debate, shall be received,
"A question which is complicated shall, at the
request of any member, be divided, and put separ
ately upon the propositions of which it is com
pounded. " The determination of a question, although fully
debated, shall be postponed, if the Deputies of any
State desire it, until the next day,
" A writing which contains any matter brought on
to be considered shall be read once throughout, for
information ; then by paragraphs, to be debated ;
and again, with the amendments, if any, made on

726 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
the second reading; and afterwards the question
shall be put upon the whole, amended, or approved
in its original form, as the case shall be.
" Committees shall be appointed by ballot ; and
the merabers who have the greatest number of
ballots, although not a majority of the votes pre
sent, shall be the Committee. When two or more
members have an equal number of votes, the mem
ber standing first on the list, in the order of taking
down the ballots, shall be preferred.
" A meraber may be called to order by any other
meraber, as well as by the President ; and may be
allowed to explain his conduct, or expressions, sup
posed to be reprehensible. And all questions oi
order shall be decided by the President, without ap
peal or debate.
"Upon a question to adjourn, fbr the day, which
may be made at any time, if it be seconded, the
question shall be put without a debate.
" When the House shall adjourn, every member
shall stand in his place until the President pass
hira."*

* Previous to the arrival of a majority of the States, the rule by which they
ought to vote in the Convention had been made a subject of conversation
among the members present. It was pressed by Gouverneur Morris, and
favored by Robert Morris and others from Pennsylvania, that the large States
shauld unite in firmly refusing to the small States an equal vote, as unreason
able, and as enabling the small States to negative every good system of gov
emment, which must, in the nature of things, be founded on a violation of that
equality. The members from Virginia, conceiving that such an attempt
might beget fatal altercations between the large and small States ; and that it
would be easier to prevail on the latter, in the course of the deliberations, to
give up their equality for the sake of an effective government, than, on taking
the field of discussion, to disarm themselves of the right, and thereby throw
themselves on the mercy of the larger States, discountenanced and stifled the
project.

1787.] FEDERAL convention. 727
A letter from sundry persons of the State of
Rhode Island, addressed to the Chairman of the
General Convention, was presented to the Chair by
Mr. Gouverneur Morris ; and, being read, was
ordered to lie on the table for further considera
tion.* Mr. Butler moved that the House provide against
interruption of business by absence of members,
and against licentious publications of their proceed
ings. To which was added, by Mr. Spaight/ a
raotion to provide, that, on the one hand, the House
raight not be precluded by a vote upon any question
from revising the subject raatter of it, when they see
cause, nor, on the other hand, be led too hastily to
rescind a decision which was the result of raature
discussion. Whereupon it was ordered, that these
motions be referred for the consideration of the
Committee appointed to draw up the standing rules,
and that the Committee make report thereon.
Adjourned till to-morrow, at ten o'clock.

Tuesday, May 29th.
In Convention, — John Dickinson, and Elbridge
Gerry, the former from Delaware, the latter from
Massachusetts, took their seats. The following

For thfe letter, see Appendi.t, No. 1.

728 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
mies were added, on the Report of Mr. Wythe, from
the Committee —
" That no member be absent from the House, so
as to interrupt the representation of the State, with
out leave.
" That Committees do not sit whilst the House
shall be, or ought to be, sitting.
"That no copy be taken of any entry on the
Joumal during the sitting of the House, without
leave of the House.
" That members only be permitted to inspect the
Journal. " That nothing spoken in the House be printed,
or otherwise published, or communicated without
leave. " That a motion to reconsider a matter which
has been determined by a majority, may be made,
with leave, unanimously given, on the same day on
which the vote passed ; but otherwise, not without
one day's previous notice ; in which last case, if the
House agree to the reconsideration, some future day
shall be assigned for that purpose."
Mr. C. Pinckney moved, that a Committee be ap
pointed to superintend the minutes.
Mr. G. Morris objected to it. The entry of the
proceedings of th^ Convention belonged to the
Secretary as their impartial officer. A Committee
might have an interest and bias in moulding the
the entry, according to their opinions and wishes.
The motion was negatived, five Noes, four Ayes.
Mr. Randolph then opened the main business : —
He expressed his regret, that it should fall to him,
rather than those who were of longer standmg in

X

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 729
life and political experience, to open the great sub
ject of their mission. But as the Convention had
originated from Virginia, and his colleagues sup
posed that some proposition was expected from
them, they had imposed this task on him.
He then commented on the difficulty of the crisis,
and the necessity of preventing the fulfilment of the
prophecies of the Araerican downfall.
He observed, that, in revising the federal system
we ought to inquire, first, into the properties which
such a government ought to possess ; secondly, the
defects of the Confederation ; thirdly the danger of
our situation; and fourthly, the remedy.
1, The character of such a government ought to
secure, first, against foreign invasion; secondly,
against dissensions between members of the Union,
or seditions in particular States ; thirdly, to procure
to the several States various blessings of which
an isolated situation was incapable ; fourthly, it
should be able to defend itself against encroachment;
and fifthly, to be paramount to the State Constitu
tions. 2. In speaking of the defects of the Confederation,
he professed a high respect for its authors, and con
sidered them as having done all that patriots could
do, in the then infancy of the science of constitu
tions, and of confederacies ; when the inefficiency of
requisitions was unknown — no commercial discord
had arisen among any States — ^no rebellion had ap
peared, as in Massachusetts — foreign debts had not
become urgent — the havoc of paper-money had not
been foreseen — treaties had not been violated — and
perhaps nothing better could be obtained, from the
Vol. I.— 46*

730 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
jealousy of the States with regard to their sover
eignty. He then proceeded to enumerate the defects: —
First, that the Confederation produced no security
against foreign invasion ; Congress not being per
mitted to prevent a war, nor to support it by their
own authority. Of tliis he cited many examples ;
most of which tended to shew, that they could not
cause infractions of treaties, or of the law of nations,
to be punished ; that particular States might by
their conduct provoke war without control ; and
that, neither militia nor drafts being fit for de
fence on such occasions, enlistments only could be
successful, and these could not be executed without
money. Secondly, that the Federal Government could not
check the quarrel between States, nor a rebellion in
any, not having constitutional power nor means to
interpose according to the exigency.
Thirdly, that there were many advantages which
the United States might acquire, which were not
attainable under the Confederation — such as a pro
ductive impost — counteraction of the commercial
regulations of other nations — pushing of commerce
ad libitum, &c. &c.
Fourthly, that the Federal Government could
not defend itself against encroachments from the
States. Fifthly, that it was not even paramount to the
State Constitutions, ratified as it was in many of the
States. 3. He next reviewed the danger of our situation ;
and appealed to the sense of the best friends of the

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 731
United States — to the prospect of anarchy from the
laxity of government every vvhere — and to other
considerations. 4. He then proceeded to the reraedy ; the basis of
vvhich he said must be the republican principle.
He proposed, as conforraable to his ideas, the
following resolutions, which he explained one by
one. 1. "Resolved, that the Articles of Confederation
ought to be so correcte'd and enlarged as to accom
plish the objects proposed by their institution ;
namely, " common defence, security of liberty, and
general welfare."
2. " Resolved, therefore, that the rights of suflfrage
in the National Legislature ought to be proportioned
to the quotas of contribution, or to the number of
free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may
seem best in diflferent cases.
3. " Resolved, that the National Legislature ought
to consist of two branches.
4, " Resolved, that the merabers of the first branch
of the National Legislature ought to be elected by
the people of the several States every  for
the term of  ; to be of the age of  years
at least ; to receive liberal stipends by which they
may be compensated for the devotion of their time
to the public service ; to be ineligible to any office
established by a particular State, or under the
authority of the United States, except those pecu
liarly belong to the functions of the first branch,
during the term of service, and for the space of
 after its expiration; to be incapable of re
election for the space of  after the expiration

732 DEBATES IN THE [1787,
of their term of service, and to be subject to re
call. 5. " Resolved, that the members of the second
branch of the National Legislature ought to be
elected by those of the first, out of a proper number
of persons nominated by the individual Legislatures,
to be of the age of  years at least ; to hold their
offices for a term sufficient to ensure their indepen
dency; to receive liberal stipends, by which they
may be compensated for the devotion of their time
to the public service ; and to be ineligible to any
office established by a particular State, or under the
authority of the United States, except those pecu
liarly belonging to the functions of the second
branch, during the terra of service ; and for the
space of  after the expiration thereof.
6. " Resolved, that each branch ought to possess
the right of originating acts ; that the National
Legislature ought to be erapowered to enjoy the
legislative rights vested in Congress by the Con
federation, and moreover to legislate in all cases to
which the separate States are incompetent, or in
which the harmony of the United States may be in
termpted by the exercise of individual legislation ;
to negative all lavvs passed by the several States
contravening, in the opinion of the National Legis
lature, the Articles of Union, or any treaty subsist-
mg under the authority of the Union ; and to call
forth the force of the Union against any member of
the Union failing to fulfil its duty under the Articles
thereof 7. " Resolved, that a National Executive be insti
tuted ; to be chosen by the National Legislature for

1787. J FEDERAL CONVENTION, 733
the term of  ; to receive punctually, at stated
times, a fixed compensation for the services ren
dered, in which no increase nor diminution shall be
made, so as to aflfect the magistracy existing at the
time of increase or diminution ; and to be ineligible
a second time; and that, besides a general authority
to execute the national laws, it ought to enjoy the
executive rights vested in Congress by the Confed
eration, 8. " Resolved, that the Executive, and a conve
nient number of the national Judiciary, ought to
compose a Council of Revision, with authority to
examine every act of the National Legislature, be
fore it shall operate, and every act of a particular
Legislature before a negative thereon shall be final;
and that the dissent of the said Council shall amount
to a rejection, unless the act of the National Legis
lature be again passed, or that of a particular Legis
lature be again negatived by  of the members
of each branch.
9. " Resolved, that a National Judiciary be estab-
ished; to consist of one or raore supreme tribunals,
and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National
Legislature ; to hold their offices during good behav
iour, and to receive purictually, at sta-ted times, fixed
conipensation for their services, in which no increase
or diminution shall be made, so as to aflfect the persons
actually in office at the time of such increase or dimi
nution. That the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals
shall be to hear and determine, in the first instance,
and of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine,
in the dernier resort, all piracies and felonies on the
high seas ; captures from an enemy ; cases in which

734 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
foreigners, or citizens of other States, applying to
such jurisdictions, may be interested ; or which re
spect the collection of the national revenue; im
peachments of any national officers, and questions
which may involve the national peace and har
mony. 10. " Resolved, that provision ought to be made
for the admission of States lawfully arising within
the limits of the United States, whether from a
voluntary junction of governraent and territory, or
otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices
in the National Legislature less than the whole,
11. " Resolved, that a republican government, and
the territory of each State; except in the instance of
a voluntary junction of government and territory,
ought to be guaranteed by the United States to
each State.
12. " Resolved, that provision ought to be made
for the continuance of Congress and their authorities
and privileges, until a given day after the reform of
the Articles of Union shall be adopted, and for the
completion of all their engagements.
13. " Resolved, that provision ought to be made
for the amendment of the Articles of Union, when
soever it shall seem necessary ; and that the asserit
of the National Legislature ought not to be required
thereto. " 14. Resolved, that the legislative, executive,
and judiciary powers, within the several States
ought to be bound by oath to support the Articles
of Union.
" 15. Resolved, that the amendments which shall
be oflfered to the Confederation, by the Convention,

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 735
ought, at a proper time or times, after the approba
tion of Congress, to be submitted to an assembly
or assemblies of representatives, recommended by
the several Legislatures, to be expressly chosen by
the people to consider and decide thereon."
He concluded with an exhortation, not to suflfer
the present opportunity of establishing general
peace, harmony, happiness and liberty in the United
States to pass away unimproved.*
It was then resolved, that the House will to
morrow resolve itself into a Committee of the
Whole House, to consider of the state of the Ameri
can Union ; and that the propositions moved by Mr.
Randolph be referred to the said Comraittee.
Mr. Charles Pinckney laid before the House the
draft of a federal government which he had pre
pared, to be agreed upon between the free and inde
pendent States of America :
PLAN OP A FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.!
We, the people of the States of New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Providence Plant
ations, Connecticut, Nevv York, New Jersey, Penn
sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain,
declare, and establish the following Constitution, for
the government of ourselves and posterity.

* This abstract of the speech was furnished to James Madison by Mr.
Randolph, and is in his hand-writing.
t See Appendix, No. 3., for notes on Mr. Pinckney's plan.

736 DEBATES IN THE [1787.

Article I.
" The style of this government shall be, The
United States of America, and the government shall
consist of supreme legislative, executive and judicial
powers. Article II,
" The legislative power shall be vested in a Con
gress, to consist of two separate Houses ; one to be
called the House of Delegates ; and the other the
Senate, who shall meet on the  day of
 in every year.
Article III.
" The members of the House of Delegates shall
be chosen every •  year by the people of the
several States ; and the qualification of the electors
shall be the sarae as those of the electors in the
several States for their Legislatures. Each member
shall have been a citizen of the United States for
 years ; and shall be of  years
of age, and a resident in the State he is chosen for.
Until a census of the people shall be taken in the
raanner hereinafter mentioned, the House of Dele
gates shall consist of  , to
be chosen frora the diflferent States in the following
proportions : for New Hampshire,  ; for
Massachusetts,  *— ; for Rhode Island, 
for Connecticut,  — ; for Nevv York, 
for New Jersey,  ; for Pennsylvania, 
for Delaware,  ; for Maryland, 

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 737
for Virginia,  — ¦ — ; for North Carolina,  ;
for South Carolina,  ; for Georgia,  ;

and the Legislature shall hereinafter regulate the
number of Delegates by the number of inhabitants,
according to the provisions hereinafter raade, at the
rate of one for every  thousand. All money
bills of ev'ery kind shall originate in the House of
Delegates, and shall not be altered by the Senate.
The House of Delegates shall exclusively possess
the power of impeachment, and shall choose its own
officers ; and vacancies therein shall be supplied by
the executive authority of the State in the repre
sentation from which they shall happen.
Article IV,
" The Senate shall be elected and chosen by the
House of Delegates; which House, immediately
after their meeting, shall choose by ballot 
Senators from among the citizens and residents of
New Hampshire ;  from araong those of
Massachusetts;  from among those of Rhode
Island;  from among those of Connecticut;
 from among those of Nevv York ; 
from among those of New Jersey ;  from
among those of Pennsylvania ;  from among
those of Delaware ;  from among those of
Maryland ;  from among those of Virginia ;
 from araong those of North Carolina ;
 from among those of South Carolina ; and
 from among those of Georgia. The Sen
ators chosen from New Harapshire, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, and Connecticut, shall form one class ;
Vol. I.— 47

738 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
those from New York, Nevv Jersey, Pennsylvania,
and Delaware, one class ; and those from Mary
land, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Georgia, one class. The House of Delegates shall
number these classes one, two, and three ; and fix
the times of their service by lot. The first class
shall serve for  years ; the second for 
years ; and the third for  years. As their
times of service expire, the House of Delegates shall
fill them up by elections for  years ; and
they shall fill all vacancies that arise from death or
resignation, for the time of service remaining of the
raerabers so dying or resigning. Each Senator shall
be  years of age at least ; and shall have
been a citizen of the United States for four years
before his election ; and shall be a resident of the
State he is chosen from. The Senate shall choose
its own officers. Article V.
" Each State shall prescribe the time and manner
of holding elections by the people for the House of
Delegates ; and the House of Delegates shall be the
judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of
their members.
" In each House a majority shall constitute a
quorura to do business. Freedom of speech and
debate in the Legislature shall not be impeached, or
questioned, in any place out of it ; and the merabers
of both Houses shall in all cases, except for treason,
felony, or breach of the peace, be free from arrest
during then- attendance on Congress, and in going
to and returning from it. Both Houses shall keep

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 739
Journals of their proceedings, and publish them, ex
cept on secret occasions ; and the Yeas and Nays
may be entered thereon at the desire of one 
of the merabers present. Neither House, without
the consent of the other, shall adjourn for more than
—.  days, nor to any place but where they are
sitting. " The members of each House shall not be eligible
to, or capable of holding, any office under the Union,
during the time for which they have been re
spectively elected ; nor the members of the Senate
for one year after. The members of each House
shall be paid for their services by the States which
they represent. Every bill which shall have passed
the Legislature shall be presented to the President
of the United States for his revision ; if he approves
it, he shall sign it ; but if he does not approve it, he
shall return it, with his objections, to the House it
originated in; which House, if two-thirds of the
members present, notwithstanding the President's
objections, agree to pass it; shall send it to the other
House, with the President's objections; where if
two-thirds of the raembers present also agree to
pass it, the sarae shall become a law; and all bills
sent to the President, and not retumed by him
within  days, shall be laws, unless the Legis
lature, by their adjournment, prevent their retum ;
in which case they shall not be laws.
Article VI.
" The Legislature of the United States shall have
the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts,
and excises ;

740 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
To regulate commerce with all nations, and
among the several States ;
To borrow money and emit bills of credit ;
To establish post-offices ;
To raise armies ;
To build and equip fleets ;
To pass laws for arming, organizing, and dis
ciplining the militia of the United States.
To subdue a rebellion in any State, on application
of its Legislature ;
To coin money, and regulate the value of all
coins, and fix the standard of weights and raeas
ures; To provide such dockyards and arsenals, and
erect such fortifications as may be necessary for the
United States, and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction
therein ;
To appoint a Treasurer, by ballot ;
To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme
Court ;
To establish post and inilitary roads ;
To establish and provide for a national university
at the seat of government of the United States ;
To establish uniform rules of naturalization ;
To provide for the establishment of a seat of gov
ernment for the United States, not exceeding 
miles square, in which they shall have exclusive
jurisdiction ;
To raake rules concerning captures from an en
emy; To declare the law and punishment of piracies
and felonies at sea, and of counterfeiting coin, and
of all oflfences against the laws of nations ;

1787.] federal convention. 741
To call forth the aid of the militia to execute the
laws of the Union, enforce treaties, suppress insur
rections, and repel invasions ;
And to make all laws for carrying the foregoing
powers into execution.
" The Legislature of the United States shall have
the power to declare the punishment of treason,
which shall consist only in levying war against the
United States, or any of thera, or in adhering to their
eneraies. No person shall be convicted of treason
but by the testimony of two witnesses.
" The proportion of direct taxation shall be regu
lated by the whole nuraber of inhabitants of every
description ; which number shall, within  years
after the first meeting of the Legislature, and within
the terra of every  year after, be taken in the
manner to be prescribed by the Legislature.
" No tax shall be laid on articles exported from
the States ; nor capitation tax, but in proportion to
the census before directed.
" All laws regulating commerce »shall require the
assent of two-thirds of the merabers present in each
House. The United States shall not grant any title
of nobility. The Legislature of the United States
shall pass no law on the subject of religion ; nor
touching or abridging the liberty of the press ; nor
shall the privilege of the writ of Habeus Corpus
ever be suspended, except iri case of rebellion or
invasion. " All acts raade by the Legislature of the United
States, pursuant to this Constitution, and all trea
ties made under the authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme law of the land ; and all judges

742 debates in the [1787.
shall be bound to consider them as such in their de
cisions. Article VII.
"The Senate shall have the sole and exclusive
power to declare war; and to make treaties; and
to appoint ambassadors and other ministers to for
eign nations, and judges of the Supreme Court.
" They shall have the exclusive power to regulate
the raanner of deciding all disputes and controver
sies now existing, or which raay arise, between the
States, respecting jurisdiction or territory.
Article VIII.
" The executive power of the United States shall
be vested in a President of the United States of
America, which shall be his style ; and his title
shall be His Excellency. He shall be elected for
 years ; and shall be re-eligible.
" He shall from time to time give information to
the Legislature, of the state of the Union, and rec
omraend to their consideration the measures he may
think necessary. He shall take care that the laws
of the United States be duly executed. He shall
commission all the officers of the United States;
and, except as to ambassadors, other ininisters, and
judges of the Supreme Court, he shall nominate,
and, with the consent of the Senate, appoint, all
other officers of the United States. He shall receive
public ministers from foreign nations ; and may cor
respond with the Executives of the diflferent States.

1787.] federal convention. 743
He shall have power to grant pardons and reprieves,
except in irapeachments. He shall be Coraraander-
in-Chief of the array and navy of the United States,
and of the railitia of the several States ; and shall
receive a compensation which shall not be in
creased or dirainished during his continuance in
office. At entering on the duties of his office, he
shall take an oath faithfully to execute the duties of
a President of the United States. He shall be re
moved frora his office on impeachment by the House
of Delegates, and conviction in the Suprerae Court,
of treason, bribery, or corruption. In case of his
reraoval, death, resignation, or disability, the Presi
dent of the Senate shall exercise the duties of his
office until another President be chosen. And in
case of the death of the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Delegates sliall do so.
Article IX.
" The Legislature of the United States shall have
the power, and it shall be their duty, to establish
such courts of law, equity, and admiralty, as shall
be necessary.
" The judges of the courts shall hold their offices
during good behaviour ; and receive a compensa
tion, which shall not be increased or diminished
during their continuance in office. One of these
courts shall be termed the Supreme Court ; whose
jurisdiction shall extend to all cases arising under
the laws of the United States, or aflfecting arabassa
dors, other public ministers and consuls ; to the trial
of impeachment of officers of the United States ; to

744 debates in the [1787.
all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. In
cases of impeachraent aflfecting ambassadors, and
other public ministers, this jurisdiction shall be ori
ginal ; and in all other cases appellate. " ' ,'? • *
" All criminal oflfences, except in cases of im
peachment, shall be tried in the State w^here they
shall be committed. The trials shall be open and
public, and shall be by jury.
Article X,
" Imraediately after the first census of the people
of the United States, the House of Delegates shall
apportion the Senate by electing for each State, out
of the citizens resident therein, one Senator for ev
ery  raembers each State shall have in the
House of Delegates. Each State shall be entitled
to have at least one member in the Senate.
Article XI.
" No State shall grant letters of marque and
reprisal, or enter into treaty, or alliance, or con
federation ; nor grant any title of nobility ; nor,
without the consent of the Legislature of the United
States, lay any impost on imports ; nor keep troops
or ships of war in tirae of peace ; nor enter into
compacts with other States or foreign powers ; nor
emit bills of credit ; nor make any thing but gold,
silver, or copper, a tender in payment of debts ; nor
engage in war, except for self-defence when actually
invaded, or the danger of invasion be so great as not
to admit of a delay until the Govemment of the

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 745
United States can be informed thereof And to
render these prohibitions eflfectual, the Legislature
of the United States shall have the power td revise
the laws of the several States that may be supposed
to infringe the powers exclusively delegated by this
Constitution to Congress, and to negative and annul
such as do. Article XII.
" The citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all privileges and immunities of citizens in the sev
eral States. Any person, charged with crimes in
any State, fleeing from justice to another, shall, on
deraand of the Executive of the State frora which
he fled, be delivered up, and removed to the State
having jurisdiction of the oflfence.
Article XIII.
" Full faith shall be given, in each State, to the
acts of the Legislature, and to the records and judi
cial proceedings of the courts and magistrates, of
every State. Article XIV.
" The Legislature shall have power to admit new
States into the Union, on the same terms with the
original States ; provided two-thirds of the members
present in both Houses agree.
Article XV.
" On the application of the Legislature of a State,
Vol. I.— 44*

746 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
the United States shall protect it against domestic
insurrection. Article XVI.

" If two-thirds of the Legislatures of the States
apply for the same, the Legislature of the United
States shall call a convention for the purpose of
araending the Constitution ; or, should Congress,
with the consent of two-thirds of each House, pro
pose to the States araendraents to the sarae, the
agreeraent of two-thirds of the Legislatures of the
States shall be sufficient to raake the said amend
ments parts of the Constitution.
" The ratification of the  conventions of
 States shall be sufficient for organizing this
Constitution." Ordered, that the said draft be referred to the Com
mittee of the Whole appointed to consider the state
of the American Union.
Adjourned.

Wednesday, May 30th.
Roger Sherman, from Connecticut, took his seat.
The House went into Committee of the Whole on
the state of the Union. Mr. Gorham was elected
to the Chair by ballot.
The propositions of Mr. Randolph which had been
referred to the Committee being taken up, he moved,
on the suggestion of Mr. G. Morris, that the first of his

1787.] federal convention. 747
propositions, — to wit : " Resolved, that the Articles of
Confederation ought to be so corrected and enlarged,
as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institvr
tion ; tiamely, common defence, security of liberty, and
general loelfare," — should mutually be postponed, in
order to consider the three following :
" 1. That a union of the States merely federal
will not accomplish the objects proposed by the
Articles of Confederation, namely, common defence,
security of liberty, and general welfare.
" 2. That no treaty or treaties among the whole
or part of the States, as individual sovereignties,
would be sufficient.
" 3. That a national governraent ought to be es
tablished, consisting of a supreme Legislative, Exec
utive and Judiciary."
The motion for postponing was seconded by Mr.
G. Morris, and unaniraously agreed to.
Sorae verbal criticisras were raised against the
first proposition, and it w^as agreed, on motion of
Mr. Butler, seconded by Mr. Randolph, to pass on
to the third, which underwent a discussion, less,
however, on its general merits than on the force
and extent of the particular terms national and
supreme. Mr. Charles Pinckney vvished to know of Mr.
Randolph, whether he meant to abolish the State
governments altogether. Mr. Randolph replied, that
he meant by these general propositions merely to
introduce the particular ones which explained the
outlines of the system he had in view.
Mr. Butler said, he had not made up his mind on
the subject, and was open to the light which discus-

748 DEBATES IN THE [1787
sion might throw on it. After some general obser
vations, he concluded with saying, that he had
opposed the grant of powers to Congress heretofore,
because the whole power was vested in one body.
The proposed distribution of the powers with diflfer
ent bodies changed the case, and would induce hira
to go great lengths.
General Pinckney expressed, a doubt whether the
act of Congress recommending the Convention, or
the comraissions of the Deputies to it, would au
thorize a discussion of a systera founded on different
principles frora the Federal Constitution.
Mr. Gerry seemed to entertain the same doubt.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris explained the distinction
betvveen a federal and a national, supreme govern
ment ; the former being a mere compact resting on
the good faith of the parties ; the latter having a
coraplete and compulsive operation. He contended,
that in all coraraunities there must be one supreme
power, and one only.
Mr. Mason observed, not only that the present
Confederation was deficient in not providing for
coercion and punishment against delinquent States ;
but argued very cogently, that punishraent could
not in the nature of things be executed on the States
collectively, and therefore that such a governraent
was necessary as could directly operate on indi
viduals, and would punish those only whose guilt
required it.
Mr. Sherman adraitted that the Confederation had
not given sufficient power to Congress, and that
additional powers were necessary ; particularly that
of raising money, which he said w^ould involve many

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 749
other powers. He admitted also, that the general and
particular jurisdictions ought in no case to be con
current. He seeraed, however, not to be disposed to
make too great inroads on the existing systera;
intimating, as one reason, that it would be wrong to
lose every araendraent by inserting such as would
not be agreed to by the States.
It was raoved by Mr. Read, and seconded by Mr.
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, to postpone the
third proposition last oflfered by Mr. Randolph, viz.
" that a national government ought to be established,
consisting of a supreme Legislative, Executive, and
Judiciary," in order to take up the following, viz.
" Resolved, that, in order to carry into execution
the design of the States in forraing this Convention,
and to accomplish the objects proposed by the
Confederation, a more eflfective government, con
sisting of a Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary,
ought to be established." The motion to postpone
for this purpose was lost:
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, South
Carolina, aye — 4; New York, Pennsylvania, Vir
ginia, North Carolina, no — 4.
On the question, as moved by Mr. Butler, on the
third proposition, it was resolved, in Comraittee of
Whole, "that a national government ought to be
established, consisting of a supreme Legislative,
Executive, and Judiciary," — Massachusetts, Penn
sylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, aye — 6 ; Connecticut, no — 1 ; New
York divided'™(Colonel Hamilton, aye, Mr. Yates,
no). The following Resolution, being the second of

750 DEBATES IN THE [1787-
those proposed by Mr. Randolph, was taken up, viz,
" that the rights qf suffrage in the National Legis
lature ought to he proportioned to the quotas of con
tribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as
the one or the other rule may seem best in different
cases." Mr. Madison, observing that the words, " or to the
number of free inhabitants," might occasion debates
which would divert the Comraittee from the general
question whether the principle of representation
should be changed, moved that they might be struck
out. Mr. King observed, that the quotas of contribu
tion, which would alone remain as the measure of
representation, would not answer ; because, waiving
every other view of the raatter, the revenue might
hereafter be so collected by the General Govern
ment that the sums respectively drawn from the
States would not appear, and would besides be
continually varying.
Mr. Madison admitted the propriety of the ob
servation, and that some better rule ought to be
found. Colonel Hamilton moved to alter the resolution
so as to read, " that the rights of suflfrage in the
National Legislature ought to be proportioned to
the nuraber of free inhabitants." Mr. Spaight
seconded the raotion.
It vvas then moved that the resolution be post
poned ; which vvas agreed to.
Mr. Randolph and Mr. Madison then moved the
following resolution : " that the rights of suflfrage in
the National Legislature ought to be proportioned."

1787.] federal convention. 751
It was moved and seconded to amend it by
adding, " and not according to the present system ;"
which was agreed to.
It was then moved and seconded to alter the
resolution so as to read, " that the rights of suflfrage
in the National Legislature ought not to be ac
cording to the present system."
It vvas then moved and seconded to postpone the
resolution moved by Mr. Randolph and Mr. Madison ;
which being agreed to, —
Mr. Madison moved, in order to get over the
difficulties, the following resolution: "that the
equality of suflfrage established by the Articles of
Confederation ought not to prevail in the National
Legislature ; and that an equitable ratio of repre
sentation ought to be substituted." This was sec
onded by Mr. Gouverneur Morris, and, being gen
erally relished, vvould have been agreed to ; when —
Mr. Read moved, that the whole clause relating
to the point of representation be postponed; re
minding the Committee that the Deputies from
Delaware were restrained by their commission from
assenting to any change of the rule of suflfrage, and
in case such a change sbould be fixed on, it might
becorae their duty to retire from the Convention.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris observed, that the valu
able assistance of those members could not be lost
without real concern ; and that so early a proof of
discord in the Convention, as the secession of a
State, would add much to the regret; that the
change proposed was, however, so fundaraental an
article in a national government, that it could not
be dispensed with.

752 debates in the [1787.
Mr. Madison observed, that, whatever reason
might have existed for the equality of suflfrage when
the Union was a federal one among sovereign States,
it must cease when a national government should
be put into the place. In the former case, the acts
of Congress depended so much for their efficacy on
the co-operation of the States, that these had a
weight, both within and without Congress, nearly
in proportion to their extent and importance. In
the latter case, as the acts of the General Govern
raent would take eflfect without the intervention
of the State Legislatures, a vote frora a small State
would have the same efficacy and importance as
a vote frora a large one, and there was the same
reason for diflferent nurabers of representatives from
different States, as from counties of diflferent extents
within particular States. He suggested as an ex
pedient for at once taking the sense of the raembers
on this point, and saving the Delaware Deputies
from embarrassment, that the question should be
taken in Committee, and the clause, on report to the
House, be postponed without a question there.
This, however, did not appear to satisfy Mr. Read.
By several it was observed, that no just construc
tion of the act of Delaware could require or justify
a secession of her Deputies, even if the resolution
were to be carried through the House as well as
the Comraittee. It vv^as finally agreed, however,
that the clause should be postponed ; it being under
stood that, in the event, the proposed change of
representation would certainly be agreed to, no ob
jection or difficulty being started frora any other
quarter than from Delaware.

1787.] federal convention. 753
The motion of Mr. Read to postpone being agreed
to, — The Committee then rose; the Chairman re
ported progress; and the House, having resolved to
resume the subject in Committee to-morrow, —
Adjoumed to ten o'clock.

Thursday, May 31st.
William Pierce, from Georgia, took his seat.™
In the Committee of the Whole on Mr. Randolph's
Resolutions, — The third Resolution, " that the Na
tional Legislature ought to consist of two branches,"
vv^as agreed to without debate, or dissent, except
that of Pennsylvania, — given probably frora cora-
plaisance to Doctor Franklin, who was understood
to be partial to a single house of legislation.
The fourth Resolution, first clause, " that the
members of the first branch of the National Legisla
ture ought to he elected hy the people ofthe several
States," being taken up :
Mr. Sherman opposed the election by the people,
insisting that it ought to be by the State Legisla
tures. The people, he said, iramediately, should
have as little to do as may be about the govern
ment. They want information, and are constantly
liable to be misled.
Mr. Gerry. The evils we experience flow from
the excess of democracy. The people do not want
virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots. In
Massachusetts it had been fully confirmed by ex
perience, that they are daily misled into the most
Vol. I.— 48

754 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
baneful measures and opinions, by the false reports
circulated by designing men, and vvhich no one on
the spot can reflite. One principal evil arises from
the want of due provision for those employed in the
administration of govemment. It would seem to be
a maxim of democracy to starve the public servants.
He mentioned the popular clamor in Massachusetts
for the reduction of salaries, and the attack made on
that of thfe Governor, though secured by the spirit
ofthe Constitution itself He had, he said, been too
republican heretofore: he was still, however, re
publican; but had been taught by experience the
danger of the levelling spirit.
Mr. Mason argued strongly for an election of the
larger branch by the people. It was to be the grand
depository of the democratic principle of the govern
ment. It was, so to speak, to be our House of
Commons. It ought to know and sympathize with
every part of the community; and ought therefore
to be taken, not only from diflferent parts of the
whole republic, but also from diflferent districts of
the larger merabers of it; which had in several
instances, particularly in Virginia, different interests
and views arising from difference of produce, of
habits, &c. &c. He admitted that we had been too
democratic, but was afraid we should incautiously
run into the opposite extreme. We ought to attend
to the rights of every class of the people. He had
often wondered at the indiflference of tbe superior
classes of society to this dictate of humanity and
policy ; considering, that, however affluent their cir
cumstances, or elevated their situations, might be,
the course of a few years not only might, but cer-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 755
tainly would, distribute their posterity throughout
the lowest classes of society. Every selfish motive,
therefore, every family attachment, ought to recom
mend such a system of policy as would provide no
less carefully for the rights and happiness of the
lowest, than ofthe highest, order of citizens.
Mr. Wilson contended strenuously for drawing
the most numerous branch of the Legislature im
mediately from the people. He was fbr raising the
federal pyramid to a considerable altitude, and for
that reason wished to give it as broad a basis as
possible. No government could long subsist with
out the confidence of the people. In a republican
government, this confidence was peculiarly essential.
He also thought it wrong to increase the weight
of the State Legislatures by making them the
electors of the National Legislature. All interfer
ence between the general and local governments
should be obviated as much as possible. On ex
amination it would be found that the opposition of
States to Federal measures had proceeded much
more from the officers of the States than from the
people at large,
Mr. Madison Considered the popular election of
one branch of the National Legislature as essential
to every plan of free government. He observed, that
in some of the States one branch of the Legislature
was composed of men already removed from the
people by an mtervening body of electors. That
if the first branch of the General Legislature shoidd
be elected by the State Legislatures, the second
branch elected by the first, the Executive by the
second together with the first, and other appoint-

756 DEBATESINTHE [ 1787.
ments again made for subordinate purposes by the
Executive, the people would be lost sight of alto
gether ; and the necessary sympathy between them
and their rulers and officers too little felt. He was
an advocate for the policy of refining the popular
appointments by successive filtrations, but thought it
might be pushed too far. He wished the expedient
to be resorted to only in the appointment of the
second branch of the Legislature, and in the Execu
tive and Judiciary branches of the govemment. He
thought, too, that the great fabric to be raised would
be more stable and durable, if it should rest on the
solid foundation of the people themselves, than if it
should stand raerely on the pillars of the Legisla
tures. Mr. Gerry did not like the election by the people
The maxims taken from the British constitution
were often fallacious when applied to our situation,
which was extren^ely diflferent. Experience, he
said, had shown that the State Legislatures, drawn
immediately from the people, did not always possess
their confidence. He had no objection, however, to
an election by the people, if it were so qualified that
men of honor and character might not be unwilling
to be joined in the appointments. He seemed to
think the people might nominate a certain nuraber,
out of which the State Legislatures should be bound
to choose.
Mr. Butler thought an election by the people an
iiripracticable mode.
On the question for an election of the first branch
of the National Legislature, by the people, Massa-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 757
chusetts. New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North
Carolina, Georgia, aye— <o; New Jersey, South
Carolina, no — 2 ; Connecticut, Delaware, divided.
The remaining clauses of the fourth Resolution,
relating to the qualifications of members of the Na
tional Legislature, being postponed, nem. con., as
entering too much into detail for general proposi
tions, —
The Committee proceeded to the fifth Resolu
tion, that the second [or senatorial^ branch of the
National Legislature ought to be chosen by tlie first
branch, out of persons nominated hy the State Legis
latures. Mr. Spaight contended, that the second branch
ought to be chosen by the State Legislatures, and
moved an amendment to that eflfect.
Mr. Butler apprehended that the taking so many
powers out of the hands of the States as was pro
posed, tended to destroy all that balance and secu
rity of interests among the States which it was
necessary to preserve ; and called on Mr. Randolph,
the mover of the propositions, to explain the extent
of his ideas, and particularly the number of mem
bers he meant to assign to this second branch.
Mr. Randolph observed, that he had, at the time
of oflfering his propositions, stated his ideas as far as
the nature of general propositions required ; that
details made no part of the plan, and could not per
haps with propriety have been introduced. If he
was to give an opinion as to the number of the sec
ond branch, he should say that it ought to be much
smaller than that of the first ; so small as to be
exempt from the passionate proceedings to which

758 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
numerous asserablies are liable. He observed, that
the general object was to provide a cure for the
evils under which the United States labored ; that
in tracing these evils to their origin, every man had
found it in the turbulence and follies of democracy ;
that some check therefore was to be sought for,
against this tendency of our governments ; and that
a good Senate seemed most likely to answer the
pm'pose. Mr. King reminded the Committee that the choice
of the second branch as proposed, (by Mr. Spaight)
viz., by the State Legislatures, would be impracti
cable, unless it was to be very numerous, or the idea
of proportion araong the States was to be disre
garded. According to this idea, there must be
eighty or a hundred merabers to entitle Delaware
to the dioice of one of thera.
Mr. Spaight withdrew his motion.
Mr. Wilson opposed both a nomination by the
State Legislatures, and an election by the first
branch of the National Legislature, because the
second branch of the latter ought to be indepen
dent of both. He thought both branches of the
National Legislature ought to be chosen by the
people, but was not prepared with a specific propo
sition. He suggested the mode of choosing the
Senate of New York, to wit, of uniting several elec
tion districts for one branch, in choosing members
for the other branch, as a good model.
Mr. Madison observed, that such a mode would
destroy the influence of the smaller States asso
ciated with larger ones in the same district ; as the
latter would choose from within themselves, al-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 759
though better men might be found in the former.
The election of Senators in Virginia, where large
and small counties were often formed into one dis
trict for the purpose, had illustrated this conse
quence. Local partiality would often prefer a resi
dent within the county or State, to a candidate of
superior merit residing out of it. Less merit also in
a resident would be more known throughout his
own State.
Mr. Sherman favored an election of one member
by each of the State Legislatures.
Mr. Pinckney raoved to strike out the " nomina
tion by the State Legislatures ;" on this question —
* Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jer
sey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, no — 9 ; Delaware, divided.
On the whole question for electing by the first
branch out of nominations by the State Legisla
tures — Massachusetts, Virginia, South Carolina, aye
—3 ; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsyl
vania, Delaware, North Carolina, Georgia, no — 7.
So the clause was disagreed to, and a chasm left
in this part of the plan.'^
The sixth Resolution, stating the cases in which the
Natioital Legislature ought to legislate, was next
taken into discussion. On the question whether each
branch should originate laws, there was an unani
mous affirmative, without debate. On the question
for transferring all the legislative powers of the ex
isting Congress to this assembly, there was also an
unanimous affirmative, without debate.
* This question is omitted in the printed Journal, and the votes applied to
the su£ceeding one, instead of the votes as here stated.

760 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
On the proposition for giving legislative power in
in all cases to which the State Legislatures were indi
viduaUy incompetent, — Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Rut
ledge objected to the vagueness ofthe terra ^'¦incom
petent," and said they could not well decide how to
vote until they should see an exact enuraeration of
the powers comprehended by this defi-uition.
Mr. Butler repeated his fears that vve were run
ning into an extreme, in taking away the powers of
the States ; and called on IMr. Randolph for the ex
tent of his meaning.
Mr. Randolph disclaimed any intention to give
indefinite powers to the National Legislature, de
claring that he was entirely opposed to such an
inroad on the State jurisdictions ; and that he did
not think any considerations whatever could ever
change his deterraination. His opinion was fixed on
this point.
Mr. Madison said, that he had brought with him
into the Corivention a strong bias in favor of an
enumeration and definition of the powers necessary
to be exercised by the National Legislature; but
had also brought doubts conceming its practica
bility. His wishes remained unaltered ; but his
doubts had become stronger. What his opinion
might ultimately be, he could not yet tell. But he
should shrink from nothing which should be found
essential to such a form of government as would
provide for the safety, liberty and happiness of the
community. This being the end of all our delibera
tions, all the necessary means for attaining it must,
however reluctantly, be submitted to.
On the question for giving powers, in cases to

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 761
which the States are not corapetent — Massachu
setts, New York, Nevv Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela
ware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye — 9; Connecticut, divided, (Sherman,
no, Ellsworth, aye.)
The other clauses, giving potoers necessary' to pre
serve harmony among the States, to negative all State
laws contravening, in the opinion of the National
Legislature, the Articles of Union, dow'n to the last
clause, (the wbrds, " or any treaties subsisting under
the authority of the Union," being added after the
words " contravening, &c. the Articles of the Union,"
on motion of Doctor Frariklin) were agreed to with
out debate or dissent.
The last clause of the sixth Resolution, autlwr-
izing an exertion of the force of the whole against a
delinquent Slate, came next into consideration.
Mr. Madison observed, that the more he reflected
on the use of force, the more he doubted the practi
cability, the justice and the efficacy of it, when ap
plied to people collectiv^ely, and not individually.
An union of the States containing such an ingredient
seemed to provide for its own destruction. The use
of force against a State would look more like a de
claration of war than an infliction of punishment;
and would probably be considered by the party at
tacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by
which it might be bound. He hoped that such a
system would be framed as might render this re
source unriecessary, and moved that the clause be
postponed. This motion was agreed to, nem. con.
The Committee then rose, and the House ad
journed. Vol. I.--48*

762 DEBATES IN THE [1787,

Friday, June 1st.
William Houstoun, from Georgia, took his seat.
The Committee of tlie Whole proceeded to the
seventh Resolution, that a National Executive be in
stituted, to be chosen by the National Legislature for
the term of  years, 6fC., to be ineligible there
after, to possess the Executive jJowers of Congress, c^c.
Mr. Pinckney was for a vigorous Executive, but
was afraid the executive powers of the existing
Congress inight extend to peace and war, &c. ;
which Would render the Executive a monarchy of
the worst kind, to wit, an elective one.
Mr. Wilson moved that the Executive consist of
a single person. Mr. C. Pinckney seconded the mo
tion, so as to read " that a National Executive, to
consist of a single person, be instituted."
A considerable pause ensuing, and the Chairman
asking if he should put the question. Doctor Frank
lin observed that it was a point of great importance,
and wished that the gentlemen would deliver their
sentiments on it before the question was put.
Mr. Rutledge animadverted on the shyness of
gentlemen on this arid other subjects. He said it
looked as if they supposed themselves precluded, by
having frankly disclosed their opinions, from after
wards changing them, which he did not take to be
at all the case. He said he was for vesting the
executive power in a single person, though he was
not for giving him the power of war and peace. A
single man would feel the greatest responsibility,
and administer the public aflfairs best.

1787.] federal convention. 763
Mr. Sherman said, he considered the executive
magistracy as nothing more than an institution for
carrying the will of the legislature into eflfect ; that
the person or persons ought to be appointed by and
accountable to the legislature only, which was the
depository of the supreme will of ^ the society. As
they were the best judges of the business which
ought to be done by the executive department, and
consequently of the number necessary from time to
time for doing it, he wished the number might not
be fixed, but that the legislature should be at liberty
to appoint one or more as experience might dictate.
Mr. Wilson preferred a single magistrate, as giv
ing most energy, dispatch and responsibility to the
office. He did not consider the prerogatives of the
British monarch as a proper guide in defining the
executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were
of a legislative nature ; among others, that of war
and peace, &c. The only powers he considered
strictly executive were those of executing the laws,
and appointing officers, not appertaining to, and ap
pointed by, the legislature.
Mr. Gerry favored the policy of annexing a coun
cil to the Executive, in order to give weight and
inspire confidence.
Mr. Randolph strenuously opposed an unity in the
executive magistracy. He regarded it as the foetus
of monarchy. We had, he said, no motive to be
governed by the British government as our proto
type. He did not mean, however, to throw censure
on that excellent fabric. If we were in a situation
to copy it, he did not know that he should be op
posed to it ; but the fixed genius bf the people of

764 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
America required a diflferent form of government.
He could not see why the great requisites for the
executive department, vigor, dispatch, and responsi
bility, could not be found in three men, as well as in
one man. The Executive ought to be independent.
It ought, therefore, in order to support its indepen
dence, to consist of more than one.
Mr. Wilson said, that unity in the Executive, in
stead of being the foetus of monarchy, would be the
best safeguard against tyranny. He repeated, that
he was not governed by the British model, which
was inapplicable to the situation of this country; the
extent of which was so great, and the manners so
republican, that nothing but a great confederated
republic would do for it.
Mr. Wilson's motion for a single magistrate was
postponed by common consent, the Committee seem
ing unprepared for any decision on it ; and the first
part of the clause agreed to, viz. " that a national
Executive be instituted.'"^*
Mr. Madison thought it vvould be proper, before a
choice should be made between a unity and a plu-
rahty in the Executive, to fix the extent of the ex
ecutive authority; that as certain powers were in
their nature executive, and must be given to that
department, vvhether administered by one or more
persons, a definition of their extent would assist the
judgment in determining how far they might be
safely entrusted to a single officer. He accordingly
moved that so much of the clause before the Com
mittee as related to the powers of the Executive
should be struck out, and that after the words "that
a national Executive ought to be instituted," there

/

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 765
be inserted the words following, viz. "with power
to carry into eflfect the national laws, to appoint to
offices in cases not otherwise provided foi*, and to
execute such other powers, ' not legislative nor judi
ciary in their nature,' as may from time to time be
delegated by the national Legislature." The words
" not legislative nor judiciary in their nature," were
added to the proposed amendment, in consequence
of a suggestion, by General Pinckney, that improper
powers might otherwise be delegated.
Mr. Wilson seconded this motion.
/ Mr. Pinckney moved to amend the amendnient
by striking out the last member of it, viz. " and to
execute such other powers, not legislative nor
judiciary in their nature, as may frora time to time
be delegated." He said they were unnecessary, the
object of thera being included in the "power to
carry into eflfect the national laws."
Mr. Randolph seconded the motion.
Mr. Madison did not know that the words were
absolutely necessary, or even the preceding words,
" to appoint to offices, &c.," the whole being, per
haps, included in the first meraber of the proposition.
He did not, however, see any inconvenience in
retaining them ; and cases might happen in which
they might serve to prevent doubts and miscon
structions. In consequence of the motion of Mr. Pinckney,
the question on Mr. Madison's motion vvas divided ;
and the words objected to by Mr. Pinckney struck
out, by the votes of Connecticut, Nevv York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina,
and Georgia — 7, against Massachusetts, Virginia,

766 debates in the [1787.
and South Carolina — 3 ; the preceding part of the
motion being first agreed to, — Connecticut, divided ;
all the other States in the affirmative.
The next clause in the seventh Resolution, re^
lating to the mode of appointing, and the duration
of, the Executive, being under consideration, —
Mr. Wilson said, he was almost unwilling to de
clare the mode which he wished to take place, being
apprehensive that it might appear chimerical. He
would say, however, at least, that in theory he was
for an election by the people. , Experience, particu
larly in New York and Massachusetts, showed that
an election of the first magistrate by the people
at large was both a convenient and successful mode.
The objects of choice in such cases must be persons
whose merits have general notoriety.
Mr. Sherman was for the appointment by the
Legislature, and for raaking him absolutely de
pendent on that body, as it was the will of that
which was to be executed. An independence of
the Executive on the supreme Legislature, was, in
his opinion, the very essence of tyranny, if there
was any such thing.
Mr. Wilson moved, that the blank for the term
of duration should be filled with three years, ob
serving, at the same time, that he preferred this
short period on the supposition that a re-eligibility
would be provided for.
Mr. Pinckney moved, for seven years.
Mr. Sherman was for three years, and against the
doctrine of rotation, as throwing out of office the
men best qualified to execute its duties.
Mr. Mason was for seven years at least, and for

1787.] federal convention. 767
prohibiting a re-eligibilty, as the best expedient, both
for preventing the eflfect of a false complaisance on
the side ofthe Legislature towards unfit characters ;
and a temptation on the side of the Executive to
intrigue with the Legislature for a re-appointment.
Mr. Bedford was strongly opposed to so long a
term as seven years. He begged the Committee to
consider what the situation ofthe country would be,
in case the first magistrate should be saddled on it
for sueh a period, and it should be found on trial that
he did not possess the qualifications ascribed to him,
or should lose them after his appointment. An im
peachment, he said, would be no cure for this evil,
as an impeachment would reach misfeasance only,
not incapacity. He was for a triennial election,
and for an ineligibility after a period of nine years.
On the question, for seven years, — New York,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, aye
— 5 ; Connecticut, North Carolina, South Carol
ina, Georgia, no 4 ; Massachusetts, divided. There
being five ayes, four noes, and one divided, a ques
tion was asked, whether a majority had voted in
the affirmative. The President decided that it was
an affirmative vote.'^
The mode of appointing the Executive was the
next question.
Mr. Wilson renewed his declarations in favor of
an appointment by the people. He wished to derive
not only both branches of the Legislature from the
people vvithout the intervention of the State Legis
latures, but the Executive also, in order to make
them as independent as possible of each other, as
well as of the States.

768 debates in the [1787.
Colonel Mason favors the idea, but thinks it im
practicable. He wishes, however, that Mr. Wilson
might have time to digest it into his own form.
The clause, " to be chosen by the National Legisla
ture," was accordingly postporied.
Mr. Rutledge suggests an election of the Execu
tive by the second branch only of the National
Legislature. The Comraittee then rose, and the House ad
journed.

Saturday, June 2nd.
William Samuel Johnson, from Connecticut,
Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, from Maryland, and
John Lansing, Jun., frora New York, took their
seats. In Committee of the Whole, — It was moved and
seconded to postpone the Resolutions of Mr. Ran
dolph respecting the E.xecutive, in order to take up
the second branch of the Legislature ; which being
negatived, — by Massachusetts, Connecticut, Dela
ware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia — 7; against Nevv York, Pennsylvania, Mary
land- — 3; the mode of appointing the Executive was
resumed, Mr. Wilson made the following motion, to be
substituted for the mode proposed by Mr. Ran
dolph's Resolution, " that the executive magistracy
shall be elected in the following manner : That the
States be divided into  districts and that the

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 769
persons qualified to vote in each district for mem
bers of the first branch of the National Legislature
elect  — members for their, respective districts
to be electors of the executive magistracy ; that the
said electors of the executive magistracy meet at
~-.  , and they, or any  of them, so
raet, shall proceed to elect by ballot, but not out of
their own body,  person- in whora the execu
tive authority of the National Governraent shall be
vested." Mr. Wilson repeated his arguraents in favor of
an election without the intervention of the States.
He supposed, too, that this mode would produce
more confidence araong the people in the first
magistrate, than an election by the National Legis
lature. Mr. Gerry opposed the election by the National
Legislature. There would be a constant intrigue
kept up for the appointment. The Legislature and
the candidates would bargain and play into one
another's hands. Votes would be given by the
former under promises or expectations from the
latter, of recompensing them by services to members
of the Legislature or their friends. He liked the
principle of Mr. Wilson's motion, but fears it would
alarm and give a handle to the State partizans, as
tending to supersede altogether the State author
ities. He thought the community not yet ripe for
stripping the States of their powers, even such as
might not be requisite for local purposes. He
was for waiting till the people should feel more
the necessity of it. He seemed to prefer the taking
the suflfrages of the States, instead of electors ; or
Vol. I.— 49

770 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
letting the Legislatures nominate, and the electors
appoint. He was not clear that the people ought
to act directly even in the choice of electors, being
too little informed of personal characters in large
districts, and liable to deceptions,
Mr. Williamson could see no advantage in the
introduction of electors chosen by the people, who
vvould stand in the same relation to tbem as the
State Legislatures; whilst the expedient vvould be
attended with great trouble and expense.
On the question for agreeing to Mr. Wilson's
substitute, it was negatived, — Pennsylvania, Mary
land, aye — 2; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Nevv
York,* Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, no — 8."° >
On the question, for electing the Executive by
the National Legislature, for the term of seven years,
it was agreed to, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
York, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye— 8; Pennsylvania, Maryland,
no— 2.
Doctor Franklin moved, that what related to the
corapensation for the services of the Executive be
postponed, in order to substitute, " vvdiose necessary
expenses shall be defrayed, but who shall receiv^e
no salary, stipend, fee, or reward whatsoever for
their services." He said, that, being very sensible
of the eflfect of age on his memory, he had been
unwilling to trust to that for the observations which
seemed to support his motion, and had reduced

* New York, in the printed Journal, divided.

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 771
them to writing, that he might, with the permission
of the Committee, read, instead of speaking, them.
Mr. Wilson made an oflfer to read the paper, which
was accepted. The following is a literal copy of
the paper :
" Sir, it is with reluctance that I rise to express
a disapprobation of any one article of the plan for
which we are so much obliged to the honorable
gentleman who laid it before us. From its first
reading I have borne a good will to it, and in general
wished it success. In this particular of salaries
to the Executive branch, I happen to diflfer: and
as my opinion may appear new and chimerical, it
is only from a persuasion that it is right, and from
a sense of duty, that I hazard it. The Committee
will judge of my reasons when they have heard
them, and their judgraent raay possibly change mine.
I think I see inconveniences in the appointment of
salaries ; I see none in refusing them, but, on the
contrary, great advantages.
" Sir, there are two passions which have a power
ful influence on the aflfairs ofmen. There are am
bition and avarice ; the love of power, and the love
of raoney. Separately, each of these has great force
in prompting men to action; but when united in
view of the same object, they have in many minds
the most violent eflfects. Place before the eyes of
such men a post of honor, that shall be at the same
time a place of profit, and they will move heaven
and earth to obtain it. The vast number of such
places it is that renders the British govemment so
tempestuous. The straggles for them are the true
sources of all those factions, which are perpetually

772 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
dividing tne nation, distracting its councils, hurrying
soraetiraes into fruitless and mischievous wars, and
often compelling a submission to dishonorable terms
of peace.
" And of what kind are the men that will strive
for this profitable pre-eminence, through all the
bustle of cabal, the heat of contention, the infinite
mutual abuse of parties, tearing to pieces the best of
characters 1 It will not be the wise and moderate,
the lovers of peace and good order, the men fittest
for the trust. It will be the bold and the violent,
the men of strong passions and indefatigable activity
in their selfish pursuits. These will thrust them
selves into your government, and be your rulers.
And these, too, will be mistaken in the expected
happiness of their situation: for their vanquished
competitors, of the same spirit, and from the same
motives, will perpetually be endeavouring to distress
their administration, thwart their measures, and
render them odious to the people.
" Besides these evils. Sir, though we raay set out
in the beginning with raoderate salaries, we shall
find that such will not be of lorig continuance!
Reasons will never be wanting for proposed aug
mentations. And there will always be a party for
giving more to the mlers, that the rulers may be
able in return to give more to thera. Hence, as all
history informs us, there has been in every state
and kingdom a constant kind of warfare between
the governing and governed, the one striving to ob
tain more for its support, and the other to pay less.
And this has alone occasioned great convulsions,
actual civil wars, ending either in dethroning of the

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 773
princes, or enslaving of tbe people. Generally, in
deed, the ruling power carries its point, the revenues
of princes constantly increasing ; and we see that
they are never satisfied, but always in want of more.
The raore the people are discontented with the op
pression of taxes, the greater need the prince has of
raoney to distribute araong his partizans, and pay
the troops that are to suppress all resistance, and
enable him to plunder at pleasure. There is scarce
a king in an hundred, who would not, if he could,
follow the exaraple of Pharaoh, get first all the
people's money, then all their lands, and then make
them and their children servants for ever. It will
be said, that we don't propose to establish kings. I
know it : but there is a natural inclination in man
kind to kingly governraent. It soraetiraes relieves
thera frora aristocratic domination. They had
rather have one tyrant than five hundred. It gives
more of the appearance of equality among citizens,
and that they like. I am apprehensive, therefore,
perhaps too apprehensive, that the government of
these States may in future tiraes end in a monarchy.
But this catastrophe I think raay be long delayed,
if in our proposed system we do not sow the seeds
of contention, faction, and tumult, by making our
posts of honor, places of profit. If we do, I fear
that, though we do employ at first a number, and
not a single person, the number will in time be set
aside ; it will only nourish the foetus of a king, as
the honorable gentleman from Virginia very aptly
expressed it, and a king will the sooner be set over us.
" It raay be imagined by sorae that this is an Uto
pian idea, and that vve can never find men to serve

774 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
US in the Executive department without paying
them well for their services. I conceive this to be
a mistake. Sorae existing facts present themselves
to me, which incline me to a contrary opinion. The
high-sheriflf of a county in England is an honorable
office, but it is not a profitable one. It is rather ex
pensive and therefore not sought for. But yet, it is
executed and well executed, and usually by sorae of
the principal gentlemen of the county. In France,
the office of Counsellor, or member of their judiciary
parliament, is more honorable. It is therefore pur
chased at a high price : there are indeed fees on the
law proceedings, which are divided among them,
but these fees do not araount to raore than three per
cent on the sura paid for the place. ¦ Therefore, as
legal interest is there at five per cent, they in fact
pay two per cent for being allowed to do the judiciary
business of the nation, which is at the same time
entirely exempt from the burden of paying them any
salaries for their services. I do not, however, mean
to recommend this as an eligible mode for our Ju
diciary department. I only bring the instance to
show, that the pleasure of doing good and serving
their country, and the respect such conduct entitles
them to, are sufficient motives with sorae rainds to
give up a great portion of their time to the public,
without the mean inducement of pecuniary satisfac
tion. " Another instance is that of a respectable society
who have made the experiment, and practised it
with success more than one hundred years. I raean
the Quakers. It is an established rule with them
that they are not to go to law ; but in their contro-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 775
versies they iriust apply to their monthly, quarterly,
and yearly meetings. Committees of these sit with
patience to hear the parties, and spend much time
in composing their diflferences. In doing this, they
are supported by a sense of duty, and the respect
paid to usefulness. It is honorable to be so employ
ed, but it is never made profitable by salaries, fees
or perquisites. And, indeed, in all cases of public
service, the less the profit the greater the honor.
" To bring the matter nearer home, have we not
seen the great and raost iraportant of our offices, that
of General of our armies, executed for eight years
together without the smallest salary, by a patriot
whom I will not now oflfend by any other praise ;
and this, through fatigues and distresses, in common
with the other brave men, his military friends and
companions, and the constant anxieties peculiar to
his station ? And shall we doubt finding three or
four men in all the United States, with public spirit
enough to bear sitting in peaceful council for per
haps an equal term, merely to preside over our civil
concerns, and see that our laws are duly executed 1
Sir, I have a better opinion of our country. I think
we shall never be without a sufficient number of
wise and good men to undertake and execute well
and faithfully the office in question.
" Sir, the saving of the salaries that may at first be
proposed is not an object with me. The subsequent
mischiefs of proposing them are what I apprehend.
And therefore it is, that I move the amendment. If
it is not seconded or accepted, I must be contented
with the satisfaction of having delivered my opinion
fjrankly and done my duty."

776 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
The motion was seconded by Col. Hamilton, with
the view, he said, raerely of bringing so respectable
a proposition before the Comraittee, and which was
besides enforced by arguraents that had a certain
degree of weight. No debate ensued, and the pro
position was postponed for the consideration of the
members. It was treated with great respect, but
rather for the author of it, than from any apparent
conviction of its expediency or practicability.'^
Mr. Dickinson raoved, " that the Executive be
raade removable by the National Legislature, on
the request of a raajority of the Legislatures of in
dividual States." It was necessary, he said, to place
the power of reraoving soraewhere. He did not like
the plan of irapeaching the great officers of state.
He did not know how provision could be made for
removal of them in a better mode than that which
he had proposed. He had no idea of abolishing the
State governments, as some gentlemen seemed in
clined to do. The happiness of this country, in his
opinion, required considerable powers to be left in
the hands of the States.
Mr. Bedford seconded the motion.
Mr. Sherman contended, that the National Legis
lature should have power to remove the Executive
at pleasure.
Mr. Mason. Some mode of displacing an unfit
magistrate is rendered indispensable by the falli
bility of those who choose, as well as by the corrup
tibility of the man chosen. He opposed decidedly
the making the Executive the mere creature of the
Legislature, as a violation of the fundamental princi
ple of good government.

1787. ] federal convention. 777
Mr. Madison and Mr. Wilson observed, that it
would leave an equality of agency in the small with
the great States ; that it would enable a minority of
the people to prevent the removal of an officer who
had rendered hiraself justly crirainal in the eyes of
a majority ; that it would open a door for intrigues
against him in States where his administration,
though just, might be unpopular ; and might tempt
him to pay court to particular States whose leading
partizans he might fear, or wish to engage as his
partizans. They both thought it bad policy to in
troduce such a mixture of the State authorities,
where their agency could be otherwise supplied,
Mr. Dickinson considered the business as so im
portant that no man ought to be silent or reserved.
He went into a discourse of some length, the sum of
which was, that the Legislative, Executive and Ju
diciary departments ought to be made as indepen
dent as possible ; but that such an Executive as
some seemed to have in conteraplation was not con
sistent with a republic ; that a firra Executive could
only exist in a limited monarchy. In the British
government itself the weight of the Executive arises
from the attachments which the Crown draws to
itself, and not merely from the force of its preroga
tives. In place of these attachments we must look
out for something else. One source of stability is
the double branch of the Legislature. The di
vision of the country into distinct States formed the
other principal source of stability. This division
ought therefore to be maintained, and considerable
powers to be left with the States. This was the
ground of his consolation for the future fate of his

178 DEBATES IN the [1787.
country. Without this, and in case of a consolida
tion of the States into one great republic, we might
read its fate in the history of smaller ones. A lira
ited monarchy he considered as one of the best gov
ernments in the world. It was not certain that the
game blessings were derivable from any other form.
It was certain that equal blessings had never yet
1 een derived from any of the republican forms. A
limited monarchy, however, was out ofthe question.
The spirit of the tiraes, the state of our aflfairs for
bade the experiment, if it vvere desirable. Was it
possible, moreover, in the nature of things, to intro
duce it even if these obstacles were less insuperable?
A house of nobles was essential to such a govern
ment, — could these be created by a breath, or by a
stroke of the pen ? No. They were the growth of
ages, and could only arise under a complication of
circumstances none of which existed in this country.
But though a form the most perfect, perhaps, in it
self, be unattainable, we must not despair. If an
cient republics have been found to flourish for a mo
ment only, and then vanish forever, it only proves
that they were badly constituted ; and that we ought
to seek for every remedy for their diseases. One of
these remedies he conceived to be the accidental
lucky division of this country into distinct States ; a
division which sorae seemed desirous to abolish alto
gether. As to the point of representation in the Natiorial
Legislature, as it inight aflfect States of diflferent
sizes, he said it must probably end in mutual con
cession. He hoped that each State would retain an
equal voice at least in one branch of the National

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 779
Legislature, and supposed the suras paid within each
State would form a better ratio for the other branch
than either the number of inhabitants or the quan
tum of property.
A motion being made to strike out, " on request
by a majority of the Legislatures of the individual
States," and rejected — (Connecticut, South Caro
lina and Georgia, being aye ; the rest, no,) the ques
tion was taken on Mr. Dickinson's motion, " for
making the Executive removable by the National
Legislature at the request of a majority of State
Legislatures," which was also rejected, — all the
States being in the negative, except Delaware,
which gave an affirmative vote."*
The question for making the Executive ineligible
after seven years, was next taken and agreed to, —
Massachusetts, New York, Delaware, Maryland, Vir
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 7 ; Con
necticut, Georgia,* no — 2 ; Pennsylvania, divided.
Mr. Williamson, seconded by Mr. Davie, moved
to add to the last clause the words, " and to be re
movable on impeachment and conviction of mal
practice or neglect of duty ;" which was agreed to.
Mr. Rutledge and Mr. C. Pinckney moved, that the
blank for the number of persons in the Executive be
filled with the words, "one person." He supposed
the reasons to be sp obvious and conclusive in favor
of one, that no member would oppose the motion.
Mr. Randolph opposed it with great earnestness,
declaring that he should not do justice to the country
which sent him, if he were silently to suflfer the

* In the printed Journal, Georgia, aye.

780 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
establishment of a unity in the Executive depart
ment. He felt an opposition to it which he believed
he should continue to feel as long as he lived. He
urged — first, that the permanent teraper of the
people was adverse to the very semblance of mon
archy ; secondly, that a unity was unnecessary, a
plurality being equally corapetent to all the objects
of the departraent ; thirdly, that the necessary con
fidence would never be reposed in a single magis
trate; fourthly, that the appointments w^ould gen
erally be in favor of sorae inhabitant near the centre
of the coraraunity, and consequently the reraote parts
would not be on an equal footing. He was in favor
of three members of the Executive, to be drawn
from diflferent portions of the country.
Mr. Butler contended strongly for a single magis
trate, as most likely to answer the purpose of the
reraote parts. If one raan should be appointed, he
would be responsible to the whole, and would be
irapartial to its interests. If three or more should
be taken from as many districts, there would be a
constant struggle for local advantages. In military
matters this would be particularly mischievous.
He said, his opinion on this point had been formed
under the opportunity he had had of seeing the
manner in which a plurality of military heads dis
tracted Holland, when threatened with invasion by
the imperial troops. One man was for directing the
force to the defence of this part, another to that part
of the country, just as he happened to be swayed by
prejudice or interest.
The motion vvas then postponed ; the Committee
rose ; and the House adjourned.

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 781

Monday, June 4th.
In Committee of the Whole. — The question was
resumed, on motion of Mr. Pinckney, seconded by
Mr. Wilson, 'shall the blank for the number ofthe
Executive be filled with a single person ?'
Mr. Wilson was in favor of the motion. It had
been opposed by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr.
Randolph) ; but the arguments used had not con
vinced him. He observed, that the objections of Mr.
Randolph were levelled not so rauch against the
measure itself, as against its unpopularity. If he
could suppose that it would occasion a rejection of
the plan ofwhich it should forra a part, though the
part were an important one, yet he vvould give it up
rather than lose the whole. On exaraination, he
could see no evidence of the alleged antipathy of
the people. On the contrary, he was persuaded
that it does not exist. All know that a single
magistrate is not a king. One fact has great weight
with him. All the thirteen States, though agreeing
in scarce any other instance, agree in placing a
single magistrate at the head of the governraent.
The idea of three heads has taken place in none.
The degree of power is, indeed, diflferent ; but there
are no co-ordinate heads. In addition to his former
reasons for preferring a unity, he would mention
another. The tranquillity, not less than the vigor,
of the govemment, he thought, would be favored
by it. Among three equal members, he foresaw
nothing but uncontrolled, continued, and violent
animosities; which would not only interrupt the

782 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
public administration, but diflfuse their poison through
the other branches of governraent, through the
states, and at length through the people at large.
lif the members were to be unequal in power, the
principle of opposition to the unity was given up.
If equal, the making thera an odd number vvould
not be a reraedy. In courts of justice there are two
sides only. to a question. In the legislative and ex
ecutive departraents, questions have coraraonly many
sides. Each raember, therefore, might espouse a
separate one, and no two agree.
Mr. Sherman. This matter is of great importance,
and ought to be well considered before it is deter
mined. Mr. Wilson, he said, had observed that in
each State a single raagistrate was placed at the
head of the govemraent. It vvas so, he admitted,
and properly so ; and he wished the same policy to
prevail in the Federal Government. But then it
should be also remarked, that in all the States there
was a council of advice, without which the first
magistrate could not act. A council he thought
necessary to make the establishment acceptable to
the people. Even in Great Britain, the King has
a council; and though he appoints it himself, its
advice has its weight with him, and attracts the
confidence of the people.
Mr. Williamson asks Mr. Wilson, whether he
means to annex a Council.
Mr. Wilson means to have no Council, which
oftener serves to cover, thari prevent malpractices.
Mr. Gerry was at a loss to discover the policy of
three raerabers for the Executive. It would be ex
tremely inconvenient in many instances, particularly

1787.] federal convention. 783
in military matters, whethel- relating to the railitia,
an army, or a navy. It would be a general with
three heads.
On the question for a single Executive, it was
agreed to, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylva
nia, Virginia, (Mr. Randolph and Mr. Blair, no;
Doctor McClurg, Mr. Madison, and General Wash
ington, aye ; Colonel Mason being no, but not in the
House, Mr. Wythe, aye, but gone horae), North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 7; Nevv
York, Delaware, Maryland, no — 3.'^
The first clause of the eighth Resolution, relating
to a council of revision, vvas next taken into consider
ation. Mr. Gerry doubts whether the Judiciary ought
to forra a part of it, as they will have a sufficient
check against encroachments on their own depart
ment by their exposition of the laws, which involved
a power of deciding on their constitutionality. In
some States the judges had actually set aside laws,
as being against the Constitution. This was done,
too, with general approbation. It was quite foreign
from the nature of their office to make them judges
of the policy of public measures. He moves to post
pone the clause, in order to propose, " that the
National Executive shall have a right to negative
any legislative act, which shall not be afterwards
passed by  parts of each branch of the
National Legislature."
Mr. King seconded the motion, observing that the
judges ought to be able to expound the law, as it
should come before them, free from the bias of having
participated in its formation.

784 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
Mr. Wilson thinks neither the original proposition
nor the araendraent goes far enough. If the Legisla
tive, Executive, and Judiciary ought to be distinct
and independent, the Executive ought to have an
absolute negative. Without such a self-defence, the
Legislature can at any raoraent sink it into non
existence. He vvas for varying the proposition, in
such a raanner as to give the Executive and Judici
ary jointly an absolute negative.
On the question to postpone, in order to take
Mr. Gerry's proposition into consideration, it was
agreed to, — Massachusetts, New York, Pennsyl
vania, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye — 6 ; Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
no — 4.
Mr. Gerry's proposition being now before the
Committee, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Hamilton move,
thatthe last part of it (viz. "which shall not be after
wards passed by  parts of each branch of the
National Legislature"), be struck out, so as to give
the Executive an absolute negative on the laws.
There was no danger, they thought, of such a power
being too much exercised. It was raentioned by
Colonel Hamilton that the King of Great Britain
had not exerted his negative since the Revolution.
Mr. Gerry sees no necessity for so great a control
over the Legislature, as the best raen in the cora
raunity would be comprised in the two branches of it.
Doctor Franklin said he was sorry to differ from
his colleague, for whom he had a very great respect,
on any occasion, but he could not help it on this.
He had had some experience of this check in the
Executive on the Legislature, under the proprietary

1787.] federal convention. 785
government of Pennsylvania, The negative of the
Governor was constantly made use of to extort
money. No good law whatever could be passed
without a private bargain with him. An increase
of his salary, or some donation, was always made a
condition; till at last it became the regular practice,
to have orders in his favor on the Treasury, pre
sented along with the bills to be signed, so that he
might actually receive the former before he should
sign the latter. When the Indians were scalping
the vyestern people, and notice gf it arrived, the
concurrence of the Governor in the means of self-
diefence could not be got, till it was agreed that his
estate should be exempted from taxation: so that
the people were to fight for the security of his
property, whilst he was to bear no share of the
burden. This was a mischievous sort of check. If
the Executive was to have a Council, such a power
would be less objectionable. It was true, the King
of Great Britain had not, as was said, exerted his
negative since the Revolution ; but that matter was
easily explained. The bribes and emoluments now
given to the members of parliament rendered it
unnecessary, every thing being done according to
tlie will ofthe ministers. He was afraid, if a nega
tive should be given as proposed, that more power
and money would be demanded, till at last enougH
would be got to influence and bribe the Legisla
ture into a complete subjection to the will of the
Executive. Mr. Sherman was against enabling any one man
to stop the will of the whole. No one man could
be found so far above all the rest in wisdom. He
Vol. 1,-50

786 DEBATES IN the [1787,
thought we ought to avail ourselves of his wisdom
in revising the laws, but not permit him to overrule
the decided and cool opinions of the Legislature.
Mr. Madison supposed, that, if a proper proportion
of each branch should be required to overrule the
objections of the Executive, it would answer the
same purpose as an absolute negative. It would
rarely, if ever, happen that the Executive, consti
tuted as ours is proposed to be, vvould have firmness
enough to resist the Legislature, unless backed by a
certain part of tl\e body itself The King of Great
Britain, with all his splendid attributes, vvould not
be able to withstand the unanimous and eager wish
es of both Houses of Parliaraent. To give such a
prerogative would certainly be obnoxious to the
temper of this country, — its present temper at least.
Mr. Wilson believed, as others did, that this pow
er would seldom be used. The Legislature would
know that such a power existed, and would refrain
from such laws as it vvould be sure to defeat. Its
silent operation would therefore preserve harmony
and prevent raischief The case of Pennsylvania
formerly was very diflferent from its present case.
The Executive was not then, as now to be, appoint
ed by the people. It will not in this case, as in the
one cited, be supported by the head of a great em
pire, actuated by a diflferent and sometimes opposite
interest. The salary, too, is now proposed to be
fixed by the Constitution, or, if Doctor Franklin's
idea should be adopted, all salary whatever inter
dicted. The requiring a large proportion of each
House to overrule the Executive check, might do in
peaceable times ; but there might be tempestuous

1787. I FEDERAL CONVENTION. 787
moments in which animosities may ran high be
tween the Executive and Legislative branches, and
in which the former ought to be able to defend
itself Mr. Butler had been in favor of a single execu
tive magistrate ; but could he have entertained an
idea that a complete negative on the laws was to be
given him, he certainly should have acted very dif
ferently. It had been observed, that in all coun
tries the executive power is in a constant course of
increase. This was certainly the case in Great
Britain. Gentlemen seemed to think that we had
nothing to apprehend from an abuse of the executive
power. But why might not a Cataline or a Crom
well arise in this country as well as in others ?
Mr. Bedford was opposed to every check on the
Legislature, even the council of revision first pro
posed. He thought it would be sufficient to mark
out in the constitution the boundaries to the legisla
tive authority, which would give all tlie requisite
security to the rights of the other departments. The
representatives of the people were the best judges of
what was for their interest, and ought to be under
no external control whatever. The two branches
would produce a sufficient control within the Legis
lature itself.
Col. Mason observed that a vote had already
passed, he found — he was out at the time— for vest
ing the executive powers in a single person. Among
these powers was that of appointing to offices in
certain cases. The probable abuses of a negative
had been well explained by Doctor Franklin, as
proved by experience, the best of all tests. Will

788 DEBATES IN THE [1787,
not the same door be opened here ? The Executive
may refuse its assent to necessary measures, till new-
appointments shall be referred to hun; and, having by
degrees engrossed all these into his own hands, the
Ainerican Executive, like the British, will, by bribe
ry and influence, save himself the trouble and odium
of exerting his negative afterwards. We are, Mr.
Chairman, going very far in this business. We are
not indeed constituting a British government, but a
more dangerous monarchy, an elective one. We are
introducing a nevv principle into our system, and not
necessary, as in the British government, where the
Executive has greater rights to defend. Do gentle
men mean to pave the way to hereditary monarchy 1
Do they flatter themselves that the people will ever
consent to such an innovation ? If they do, I ven
ture to tell them, they are mistaken. The people
never will consent. And do gentlemen consider the
danger of delay, and the still greater danger of a
rejection, not for a moment, but forever, of the plan
which shall be proposed to them ? Notwithstanding
the oppression and injustice experienced ainong us
from deraocracy, the genius of the people is in fav^or
of it; and the genius of the people must be con-
suited. He could not but consider the Federal sys
tem as in eflfect dissolved by the appointment of this
Convention to devise a better one. And do gentle
men look forward to the dangerous interval between
extinction of an old, and the establishment of a new,
government; and to the scenes of confusion vvhich
may ensue 1 He hoped that nothing like a monar
chy would ever be attempted in this country. A
hatred to its oppressions had carried the people

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 789
through the late Revolution. Will it not be enough
to enable the Executive to suspend oflfensive lavv^s,
till they shall be coolly revised, and the objections
to them overruled by a greater majority than was
required in the first instance ? He never could agree
to give up all the rights of the people to a single
magistrate. If more than one had been fixed on,
greater powers might have been entrusted to the
Executive. He hoped this attempt to give such
powers would have its weight hereafter, as an argu
ment for increasing the number of the Executive.
Doctor Franklin. A gentleman from South Car
olina, (Mr. Butler) a day or two ago called our at
tention to the case of the United Netherlands. He
wished the gentlerrian had been a little fuller, and
had gone back to the original of that government.
The people being under great obligations to the
Prince of Orange, whose wisdom and bravery had
saved them, chose him for the Stadtholder. He did
very well. Inconveniences, however, were felt from
his powers ; which growing more and more oppres
sive, they were at length set aside. Still, however,
there was a party for the Prince of Orange, which
descended to his son ; v^v^ho excited insurrections,
spilled a great deal of blood, murdered the De
Witts, and got the powers re-vested in the Stadt
holder, Afterwards another prince had power to
excite insurrections, and make the Stadtholdership
hereditary. And the present Stadtholder is ready
to wade through a bloody civil war to the establish
ment of a monarchy. Col. Mason had mentioned
the circumstance of appointing officers. He knew
how that point would be managed. No new ap-

790 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
pointment would be suflfered, as heretofore in Penn
sylvania, unless it be referred to the Executive ; so
that all profitable offices will be at his disposal.
The first man put at the helm will be a good one.
Nobody knows what sort may come afterwards.
The Executive will be always increasing here, as
elsewhere, till it ends in a monarchy.
On the question for striking out, so as to give the
Executive an absolute negative, — Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, no— 10,"°
Mr, Butler moved that the Resolution be altered
so as to read, " Resolved, that the national Execu
tive have a power to suspend any legislative act for
the term of  ."
Doctor Franklin seconded the motion,
Mr, Gerry observed, that the power of suspend
ing might do all the mischief dreaded from the nega
tive of useful laws, without answering the salutary
purpose of checking unjust or unwise ones.
On the question for giving this suspending power,
all the States, to wit, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
were, no.
On a question for enabling tioo-thirds of each
branch of the Legislature to overrule the provision-
ary check, it passed in the affirmative, sub silentio ;
and was inserted in the blank of Mr. Gerry's mo
tion. On the question on Mr. Gerry's motion, which
gave the Executive alone, without the Judiciary,

1787.] federal convention. 791
the revisionary control on the laws, unless overruled
by two-thirds of each branch, — Massachusetts, New
York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Car
olina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8; Connecti
cut, Maryland, no — 2.
It was moved by Mr. Wilson, seconded by Mr.
Madison, that the following amendment be made to
the last Resolution : after the words " national Ex
ecutive," to add " and a convenient number of the
national Judiciary."
An objection of order being taken by Mr. Hamil
ton to the introduction of the last amendment at
this time, notice was given by Mr. Wilson and Mr.
Madison, that the same would be moved to-morrow;
whereupon Wednesday was assigned to reconsider
the amendment of Mr. Gerry.
It was then moved and seconded to proceed to the
consideration of the ninth Resolution submitted by
Mr. Randolph ; when, on motion to agree to the first
clause, namely, " Resolved, that a national Judiciary
be established," it passed in the affirmative, nem.
con. It was then moved and seconded, to add these
w^ords to the first clause of the ninth Resolution,
namely, " to consist of one supreme tribunal, and of
one or more inferior tribunals ;" which passed in the
affirmative.'" The Committee then rose, and the House ad
journed.

792 debates in the [1787.
Tuesday, June 5th.
Governor Livingston, of New Jersey, took his seat.
In Committee of tlie Whole. — The words " one or
more" were struck out before "inferior tribunals,"
as an amendment to the last clause of the ninth Res
olution. The clause, " that the national Judiciary
be chosen by the National Legislature," being under
consideration. Mr. Wilson opposed the appointment of Judges
by the National Legislature. Experience showed
tbe impropriety of such appointments by numerous
bodies. Intrigue, partiality, and concealment were
the necessary consequences. A principal reason for
unity in the Executive was, that officers might be
appointed by a single, responsible person.
Mr. Rutledge was by no means disposed to grant
so great a power to any single person. The people
will think we are leaning too much towards monar
chy. He was against establishing any national tri
bunal, except a single supreme one. The State tri
bunals are most proper to decide in all cases in the
first instance.
Doctor Franklin observed, that two modes of
choosing the Judges had been mentioned, to wit, by
the Legislature, and by the Executive, He wished
such other modes to be suggested as might occur to
other gentlemen ; it being a point of great moment.
He would mention one which he had understood was
practised in Scotland. He then, in a brief and en
tertaining manner, related a Scotch mode, in which
the nomination proceeded from the lawyers, who

1787.] federal convention. 793
always selected the ablest of the profession, in order
to get rid of him, and share his practice among
themselves. It was here, he said, the interest of the
electors to make the best choice, which should al
ways be raade the case if possible.
Mr. Madison disliked the election of the Judges by
the Legislature, or any numerous body. Besides the
danger of intrigue and partiality, many of the mem
bers were not judges of the requisite qualifications,
The legislative talents, vvhich were very diflferent
from those of a Judge, commonly recommended men
to the favor of legislative assemblies. It was known,
too, that the accidental circumstances of presence
and absence, of being a member or not a member,
had a very undue influence on the appointment. On
the other hand, he was not satisfied with referring
the appointment to the Executive. He rather in
clined to give it to the Senatorial branch, as nume
rous enough to be confided in ; as not so numerous
as to be governed by the motives of the other branch;
and as being sufficiently stable and independent to
follow their deliberate judgments. He hinted this
only, and moved that the appointment by the Legis
lature might be struck out, and a blank left, to be
hereafter filled on maturer reflection. Mr. Wilson
seconds it. On the question for striking out, — Mas
sachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
Georgia, aye — 9 ; Connecticut, South Carolina, no
—2.'°= Mr. Wilson gave notice that he should at a future
day move for a reconsideration of that clause which
respects inferior tribunals."
Vol, I,— 50*

794 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
Mr. Pinckney gave notice, that when the clause
respecting the appointment of the Judiciary should
again come before the Committee, he should move
to restore the " appointment by the National Legis
lature." The following clauses of the ninth Resolution
were agreed to, viz., " to hold their offices during
good behaviour, and to receive punctually, at stated
limes., a fixed compensation for their services, in rvhich
no increase nor diminution shall be made so as to affect
the persons actually in office at the time of such increase
or diminution."
The remaining clause of the ninth Resolution
was postponed.
The tenth Resolution was agreed to, viz., " that
provision ought to he made for the admission of States,
latvfully arising within the limits of the IJnited States,
whether from a voluntary junction of government
and territory, or otherwise, with the consent of a num
ber of voices in the national legislature less than the
whole." The eleventh Resolution /br guaranteeing to Slates
republican government and territory, t^c, being
read, —
Mr. Patterson wished the point of representation
could be decided before this clause should be con
sidered, and moved to postpone it ; which was not
opposed, and agreed to, — Connecticut and South
Carolina only voting against it.
The twelfth Resolution, for continuing Congress
till a given- day, and for fulfiUing tlieir engagements,
produced no debate.
On the question, Massachusetts, New York,

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 795
New Jersey,* Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8 ;
Connecticut, Delaware, no — 2.
The thirteenth Resolution, to the eflfect that
provision ought to be made for hereafter amending the
system now to he established, without requiring the
assent of the National Legislature, being taken up, —
Mr. Pinckney doubted the propriety or necessity
of it,
Mr. Gerry favored it. The novelty and diffi
culty of the experiraent requires periodical revision.
The prospect of such a revision would also give
interraediate stability to the governraent. Nothing
had yet happened in the States where this provision
existed to prove its impropriety. — The proposition
was postponed fbr further consideration ; the votes
being, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina,
aye — 7 ; Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 3.
The fourteenth Resolution, requiring oath from
the State officers to support the National Government,
— was postponed, after a short, uninteresting con
versation; the votes, — Connecticut, New Jersey,
Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye
— 6 ; New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North
Carolina, no — 4; Massachusetts, divided.
The fifteenth Resolution, for recommending con
ventions under appointment of the people to ratify
the new Constitution, (fee, being taken up, —

New Jersey omitted in the printed Journal.

796 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
Mr. Sherman thought such a popular ratification
unnecessary; the Articles of Confederation providing
for changes and alterations, with the assent of Con
gress, and ratification of State Legislatures.
Mr. Madison thought this provision essential.
The Articles of Confederation themselves were de
fective in this respect, resting, in many of the States,
on the legislative sanction only. Hence, in conflicts
between acts of the States and of Congress, espe
cially where the former are of posterior date, and
the decision is to be made by State tribunals, an
uncertainty must necessarily prevail ; or rather per
haps a certain decision in favor of the State author
ity. He suggested also, that, as far as the Articles
of Union were to be considered as a treaty only, of
a particular sort, among the governments of inde
pendent states, the doctrine might be set up that a
breach of any one Article, by any of the parties, ab
solved the other parties from the whole obligation.
For these reasons, as well as others, he thought it
indispensable that the new Constitution should be
ratified in the most unexceptionable form, and by
the supreme authority of the people themselves.
Mr. Gerry observed, that in the Eastern States
the Confederation had been sanctioned by the
people themselves. He seemed afraid of referring
the new system to them. The people in that
quarter have at this time the wildest ideas of gov
ernment in the world. They were for abolishing
the Senate in Massachusetts, and giving all the
other powers of government to the other branch of
the Legislature,
Mr. King supposed, that the last Article of the

1787.] FEDERAL convention, 797
Confederation rendered the Legislature competent
to the ratification. The people of the Southern
States, where the Federal Articles had been ratified
by the Legislatures only, had since, impliedly, given
their sanction to it. He thought, notwithstanding,
that there might be policy in varying the mode.
A convention being a single house, the adoption
may more easily be carried through it, than through
the Legislatures, where there are several branches.
The Legislatures also, being to lose power, will be
most likely to raise objections. The people having
already parted with the necessary powers, it is im
material to them, by which government they are
possessed, provided they be well employed.
Mr. Wilson took this occasion to lead the Com
mittee, by a train of observations, to the idea of not
suflfering a disposition in the plurality of States, to
confederate anew on better principles, to be defeated
by the inconsiderate or selfish opposition of a few
States. He hoped the provision for ratifying would
be put on such a footing as to admit of such a partial
union, with a door open for the accession of the
rest.* Mr. Pinckney hoped, that, in case the experiment
should not unanimously take place, nine States
might be authorized to unite under the same govern
ment. The fifteenth Resolution was postponed, nem. con.
Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Rutledge moved, that

• This hint was probably meaht in terrorem to the smaller States of Now
Jersey and Delaware. Nothing was said in reply to it.

798 DEBATESINTHE [1787.
to-raorrow be assigned to reconsider that clause of
the fourth Resolution which respects the election of
the first branch of the National Legislature ; which
passed in the affirraative, — Connecticut, New York,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye —
6 ; Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, no — 5,
Mr. Rutledge having obtained a rule for recon
sideration of the clause for establishing inferior tri
bunals under the national authority, now moved
that that part of the clause in the ninth Resolution
should be expunged; arguing, that the State tri
bunals might and ought to be left in all cases to de
cide in the first instance, the right of appeal to the
supreme national tribunal being sufficient to secure
the national rights and uniformity of judgments ;
that it was making an unnecessary encroachraent
on the jurisdiction of the States, and creating unne
cessary obstacles to their adoption of the new
systera. Mr. Sherman seconded the motion.
Mr. Madison observed, that unless inferior tri
bunals were dispersed throughout the Republic with
^naZ jurisdiction in many cases, appeals would be
multiplied to a most oppressive degree; that, be
sides, an appeal would not in many cases be a re
medy. What was to be done after iraproper ver
dicts, in State tribunals^ obtained under the biassed
directions of a dependent judge, or the local pre
judices of an undirected jury ? To reraand the
cause for a new trial would answer no purpose. To
order a new trial at the supreme bar, would oblige
the parties to bring up their witnesses, though ever

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 799
SO distant from the seat of the court. An eflfective
Judiciary establishment commensurate to the Legis
lative authority, was essential. A government, with
out a proper Executive and Judiciary, would be the
mere trunk of a body, without arms or legs to act or
move. Mr. Wilson opposed the motion on like
grounds. He said the admiralty jurisdiction ought
to be given wholly to the National Govemment, as
it related to cases not within the jurisdiction of
particular States, and to a scene in which contro
versies with foreigners would be niost likely to hap
pen. Mr. Sherman was in favor of the motion. He
dwelt chiefly on the supposed expensiveness of
having a new set of courts, when the existing State
courts would answer the same purpose.
Mr. Dickinson contended strongly, that if there
was to be a National Legislature, there ought to be
a National Judiciary, and that the former ought
to have authority to institute the latter.
On the question for Mr. Rutledge's motion to
strike out " inferior tribunals," it passed in the
affirmative, — Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 6;
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no — 4 ;
Massachusetts, divided.
Mr. Wilson and Mr. Madison then moved, in pur
suance of the idea expressed above by Mr. Dickin
son, to add to the ninth Resolution the words follow
ing : " that the National Legislature be empowered
to institute inferior tribunals." They observed, that
there was a distinction between establishing such

800 debates in the [1787,
tribunals absolutely, and giving a discretion to the
Legislature to establish or not to establish them.
They repeated the necessity of some such provision.
Mr, Butler, The people will not bear such in
novations. The States will revolt at such encroach
ments. Supposing such an establishment to be use
ful, we must not venture on it. We must follow the
example of Solon, who gave the Athenians not the
best government he could devise, but the best they
would receive.
Mr. King remarked, as to the comparative ex
pense, that the establishraent of inferior tribunals
would cost infinitely less than the appeals that would
be prevented by thera.
On this question, as moved by Mr. Wilson and
Mr. Madison, — Massachusetts, New Jersey,* Penn
sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Car
olina, Georgia, aye — 8; Connecticut, South Carolina,
no— 2 ; New York, divided.'"*
The Committee then rose, and the House ad
journed.

Wednesday, June 6th.
In Committee of the Whole. — Mr. Pinckney, ac
cording to previous notice, and rale obtained, raoved,
" that the first branch of the National Legislature
be elected by the State Legislatures, and not by the
people;" contending that the people were less fit
* In the printed Journal, New Jersey, no.

1787.] federal convention. 801
judges in such a case, and that the Legislatures
would be less likely to promote the adoption of the
new government if they were to be excluded from
all share in it.
Mr. Rutledge seconded the raotion.
Mr. Gerry. Much depends on the raode of elec
tion. In England the people will probably lose
their liberty from the smallness of the proportion
having a right of suflfrage. Our danger arises from
the opposite extreme. Hence in Massachusetts the
worst irien get into the Legislature. Several mem
bers of that body had lately been convicted of in
famous criraes. Men of indigence, ignorance, and
baseness, spare no pains, however dirty, to carry
their point against men who are superior to the arti
fices practised. He was not disposed to ran into
extremes. He was as much principled as ever
against aristocracy and' raonarchy. It was neces
sary, on the one hand, that the people should appoint
one branch of the governraent, in order to inspire
thera with the necessary c6nfidence ; but he wished
the election, on the other, to be so raodified as to
secure more eflfectually a just preference of merit.
His idea was, that the people should nominate cer
tain persons, in certain districts, out of whom the
State Legislatures should make the appointment.
Mr. Wilson. He wished for vigor in the govern
ment, but he wished that vigorous authority to flow
immediately from the legitimate source of all au
thority. The government ought to possess, not only,
first, the force, but second, the mind or sense, of the
people at large. The Legislature ought to be the
most exact transcript of the whole society. Repre-
VoL. I.— 51

802 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
sentation is made necessary only because it is im
possible for the people to act collectively. The
opposition was to be expected, he said, frora the
governments, not frora the citizens of the States.
The latter had parted, as, was observed by Mr.
King, with all the necessary powers ; and it was im
material to them by whom they were exercised, if
well exercised. The State officers .were to be the
losers of power. The people, he supposed, would be
rather more attached to the National Government
than to the State Govemments, as being more impor
tant in itself, and more flattering to their pride. There
is no danger of improper elections, if raade by large
districts. Bad elections proceed frora the smallness
of the districts, which give an opportunity to bad
men to intrigue theraselves into office.
Mr. Sherman. If it were in vievv to abolish the
State Governraents, the elections ought to be by the
people. If the State Governments are to be con
tinued, it is necessary, in order to preserve harmony
between the National and State Governments, that
the elections to the forraer should be raade by the
latter. The right of participating in the National
Governraent would be sufficiently secured to the
people by their election of the State Legislatures.
The objects of the Union, he thought were few, —
first, defence against foreign danger; secondly,
against internal disputes, and a resort to force;
thirdly, treaties with foreign nations ; fourthly, regu
lating foreign commerce, and drawing revenue from
it. These, and perhaps a few lesser objects, alone
rendered a confederation of the States necessary.
All other matters, civil and criminal, would be much

1787.] federal convention. 803
better in the hands of the States. The people are
more happy in small than in large States. States
may. indeed, be too small, as Rhode Island, and
thereby be too .subject to faction. Some others
were, perhaps, too large, the powers of governraent
not being able to pervade thera. He was for giving
the General Government power to legislate and ex
ecute within a defined province.
Col. Mason. Under the existing Confederacy,
Congress represent the States, and not the people of
the States ; their acts operate on the States, not on
the individuals. The case will be changed in the
new plan of government. The people will be re
presented ; they ought therefore to' choose the Re
presentatives. , The requisites in actual representa
tion are, that the representatives should sympathize
with their constitiients ; should think as they think,
and feel as they feel ; and that for these purposes
they should be residents among thera. Much, he
said, had been a.lleged against democratic elections.
He admitted that much might be said ; but it was
to be considered that no governraent was free frora
imperfections and evils ; and that improper elections
in many instances were inseparable from republican
governments. But corapare these with the advan
tage of this forra, in favor of the rights of the people,
in favor of human nature ! He was persuaded there
was a better chance for proper elections by the peo
ple, if divided into large districts, than by the State
Legislatures. Paper-money had been issued by the
latter, when the former were against it. Was it to
be supposed, that the State Legislatures, then, would

804 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
not send to the National Legislature patrons of such
projects, if the choice depended on tliem ?
Mr. Madison considered an election of one branch,
at least, of the Legislature by the people immedi
ately, as a clear principle of free government ; and
that this mode, under proper regulations, had the
additional advantage of securing better representa
tives, as well as of avoiding too great an agency of
the State Governments in the general one. He dif
fered frora the member from Connecticut, (Mr. Sher
man,) in-thinking tlie objects raentioned to be all the
principal ones that required a national government.
Those were certainly iraportant and necessary ob
jects; but he combined with them the necessity of
providing more eflfectually for the security of private
rights, and the steady dispensation of justice. In
terferences with these were evils which had, more
perhaps than any thing else, produced this Conven
tion. Was it to be supposed, that republican liberty
could long .exist under the abuses of it practised in
some of the States ? The gentleman (Mr. Sher
man) had admitted, that in a very small State fac
tion and oppression would prevail. It w^as to be
inferred, then, that wherever these prevailed the
State was too sraall. Had they not prevailed in the
largest as well as the smallest, though less than in
the smallest ? And were we not thence admonished
to enlarge the sphere as far as the nature of the
government would admit ? This was the only de
fence against the inconveniences of democracy, con
sistent with the democratic form of government.
All civilized societies would be divided into diflferent
sects, factions, and interests, as they happened to

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 805
consist of rich and poor, debtors and creditors, the
landed, the manufacturing, the comraercial interests,
the inhabitants of this district or that district, the
followers of this political leader or that political
leader, the disciples of this religious sect or that
religious sect. In all cases where a majority are
united by a common interest or passion, the rights
ofthe minority are in danger. What motives are to
restrain them'? A prudent regard to the maxim,
that honesty is the best policy, is found by experi
ence to be as little regarded by bodies of irien as by
individuals. Respect for character is always dimi
nished in proportion to the number among whom the
blame or praise is to be divided. Conscience, the
only remaining tie, is known to be inadequate in in
dividuals ; in large numbers, little is to be expected
from it. Besides, religion itself may become a mo
tive to persecution and oppression. These observa
tions are verified by the histories of every country,
ancient and modern. In Greece and Rome the rich
and poor, the creditors and debtors, as well as the
patricians and plebeians, altemately oppressed each
other with equal unmercifulness. What a source of
oppression was the relation between the parent
cities of Rome, Athens, and Carthage, and their re
spective provinces ; the former possessing the power,
and the latter being sufficiently distinguished to be
separate objects of it 1 Why was America so justly
apprehensive of parliamentary injustice? Because
Great Britain had a separate interest, real or sup
posed, and, if her authority had been admitted, could
have pursued that interest at our expense. We
have seen the mere distinction of color made, in

806 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
the most enlightened period of time, a ground of the
most oppressive dominion ever exercised by raan
over raan. What has been the source of those un
just laws coraplained of among ourselves ? Has it
not been the real or supposed interest of the major
number ? Debtors have defrauded their creditors.
The landed interest has borne hard on the mercan
tile interest. The holders of one species of property
have thrown a disproportion of taxes on the holders
of another species. The lesson we are to drjiw from
the whole is, that where a majority are united by a
common sentiment, and have an opportunity, the
rights of the minor party becorae insecure. In a
republican governraent, the majority, if united, have
always an opportunity. _ The only remedy is, to en
large the sphere, and thereby divide the comraunity
into so great a number of interests and parties, that,
in the first place, a majority will not be likely, at
the sarae raoment, to bave a common interest sepa
rate from that of the whole, or of the minority ; and
in the second place, that in case they should have
such an iriterest, they may not be so apt to unite in
the pursuit of it. It was incumbent on us, then, to
try this remedy, and, with that view, to frame a re
publican system on such a scale, and in such a forra,
as will control all the evils which have been experi
enced. Mr. Dickinson considered it essential, that one
, branch of the Legislature should be drawn iramedi
ately from the people ; and expedient, that the other
should be chosen by the Legislatures of the States.
This combination of the State Governments with
the National Government was as politic as it was

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 807
unavoidable. In the formation of the Senate, we
ought to carry it through such a refining process as
will assimilate it, as nearly as may be, to the House
of Lords in England. He repeated his warm eulo-
giuins on the British Constitution. -He was for a
strong National Goverument; but for leaving the
States a considerable agency in the system. The
objection against raaking the forraer dependent ou
the latter might be obviated by giving to the Senate
an authority permanent, and irrevocable for three,
five or seven years. Being thus independent, they
vvill check and decide with uncomraon freedom.
Mr. Read. Too rauch attachraent is betrayed to
the State Governraents. We must look beyond
their continuance. A National Government must
soon of necessity swallow them all up. They will
soon be reduced to the mere office of electing the
Natiooal Senate. He was against pa.tching up the
old Federal system : he hoped the idea would be
dismissed. It would be like putting new cloth on
an old garment. The confederation was founded on
temporary principles. It cannot last: it cannot be
araended. If we do not establish a ^ good govern
ment on new principles, we must either go to ruin,
or have the work to do over again. The people at
large are wrongly suspected of being averse to a
General Government. The aversion lies among
interested men who possess their confidence.
Mr. Pierce was for an election by the people as
to the first branch, and by the States as to the
second branch ; by which means the citizens of the
States would be represented both individually and
collectively.

808 DEBATESINTHE [ 1787.
General Pinckney wished to have a good Na
tional Govemment, and at the same tirae to leave a
considerable share of power in the States. An
election of either branch by the people, scattered as
they are in raany States, particularly in South
Carolina, was totally irapracticable. He differed
frora gentleraen who thought that a choice by the
people would be a better guard against bad mea
sures, than by the Legislatures. A majority of the
people in South Carolina were notoriously for
paper-money, as a legal tender ; the Legislature had
refused to make it a legal tender. The reason was,
that the latter had some sense of character, and were
restrained by that consideration. The State Legis
latures, also, he said, would be more jealous, and
more ready to thwart the National Government, if
excluded from a participation in it. The idea of
abolishing these Legislatures would never go down.
Mr. Wilson would not have spoken again, but for
what had fallen from Mr. Read ; namely that the
idea of preserving the State Governments ought to
be abandoned. He saw no incompatibility betvveen
the National and State Governments, provided the
latter were restrained to certain local purposes;
nor any probability of their being devoured by the
former. In all confederated systems, ancient and
modern, the reverse had happened ; the generality
being destroyed gradually by the usurpations of the
parts composing it.
On the question for electing the first branch by
the State Legislatures as moved by Mr. Pinckney,
it was negatived, — Connecticut, New Jersey, South
Carolina, aye — 3 ; Massachusetts, New York, Penn-

1787.] federal convention, 809
sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, Georgia, no — 8.^*^
Mr. Wilson moved to recorisider the vote exclu
ding the Judiciary from a share in the revision ofthe
laws, and to add, after "national Executive," the
words, "with a convenient nuraber of the national
Judiciary;" reraarking the expediency of reinforcing
the Executive with the influence of that depart
raent. Mr. Madison seconded the motion. He observed,
that the great difficulty in rendering the Executive
corapetent to its own defence arose from the nature
of republican government, which could not give to
an individual citizein that settled pre-eminence in
the eyes of the rest, that weight of property, that
personal interest against betraying the national
interest, whi<?h appertain to an hereditary magis
trate. In a republic personal merit alone could be
the ground of political exaltation ; but it Would
rarely happen that this merit would be so pre
eminent as to produce universal acquiescence. The
executive magistrate would be envied and assailed
by disappointed competitors : his firraness therefore
would need support. He would not possess those
great emoluments from his station, nor that per
manent stake in the public interest, which would
place him out of the reach of foreign corruption.
He would stand in need therefore of being controlled
as well as supported. An association of the judges
in his revisionary function would both double the
advantage, and diminish the danger. It would also
enable the Judiciary department the better to defend
51*

810 debates in THE [1787.
itself against legislative encroachments. Two ob
jections had been made, — first, that the judges
ought not to be subjectto the bias which a parti
cipation in the making of laws might give in the
exposition of them ; secondly, that the Judiciary
department ought to be separate and distinct from
the other great departments. The first objection
had some weight ; but it was much diminished by
reflecting, that a small proportion of the laws
coining in question before a judge would be such
wherein he had been consulted ; that a small part
of this proportion vvould be so ambiguous as to
leave room for his prepossessions ; and that but a
few cases would probably arise in the life of a
judge, under such ambiguous passages. How much
good, on the other hand, would proceed from the
perspicuity, the conciseness, and the systematic
character which the code of laws would receive
from the Judiciary talents. As to the second ob
jection, it either had no weight, or it applied with
equal weight to the Executive, and to the Judiciary
revision of the laws. The maxim on which the ob
jection was founded, required a separation of the
Executive, as well as the Judiciary, from the Legis
lature and frora each other. There would, in truth,
however, be no improper mixture of these distinct
powers in the present case. In England, whence
the maxim itself had been drawn, the Executive
had an absolute negative on the laws; and the
supreme tribunal of justice (the House of Lords),
formed one of the other branches of the Legislature.
In short, whether the object of the revisionary
power was to restrain the Legislature from en-

1787.] federal convention. 811
croaching on the other co-ordinate departments, or
on the rights of the people at large ; or frora passing
laws unwise in th^ir principle, or incorrect in their
form; the utility of annexing the wisdom and
weight of the Judiciary to the Executive seemed
incontestable. Mr. Gerry thought the Executive whilst standing
alone vvould be more impartial than vvhen he could
be CQ-vered by the sanction and seduced by the so
phistry of the Judges.
Mr. King. If tlie unity of the Executive was
preferred for the sake of responsibility, the policy of
it is as applicable to the revisionary, as to the exec
utive, power.
Mr. Pinckney had been at first in favor of joining
the heads of the principal departments, the Secre
tary at War, of Foreign Aflfairs, «&c. in the Council
of Revision. He had, however, reliiic[uished the
idea, from a consideration that these could be called
on by the executive magistrate, whenever he pleased
to consult them. He was opposed to the introduc
tion of the judges into the business.
Colonel Mason was, for giving all possible weight
to the revisionary institution. The executive power
ought to be well secured against legislative usurpa
tions on it. The purse and the sword ought never
to get into the same hands wliether legislative or
executive. Mr. Dickinson. Secrecy, vigor, and despatch are
not the principal properties required in the Execu
tive. Important as these are, that of responsibilitTf
is more so, which can only be preserved by leaving
it singly to discharge its functions. He thought, too.

812 DEBATESINTHE [1787.
a junction of the Judiciary to it involved an im
proper mixture of powers.
Mr. Wilson reraarked, that the responsibility re
quired belonged to his executive duties. The revi
sionary duty wasan extraneous one, calculated for
collateral purposes.
> Mr. Williamson was for substituting a clause re
quiring two-thirds for every eflfective act of the
legislature, in place of the revisionary provision.
On the question for joining the judges to the Ex
ecutive in the revisionary business, — Connecticut,
New York, Virginia, aye — 3 ; Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Nortli
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 8.
Mr. PiNCKNfiY gave notice, that to-morrow he
should move for the re-consideration of that clause
in the sixth Resolution adopted by tile Committee,
vvhich vests a negative in the National Legislature
on the laws of the several States.
The Committee rose, and the House adjourned.

Thursday, June 7th.
I'll Commillee of ihe Whole — Mr. Pinckney, ac
cording to notice, moved to reconsider the clause
respecting the negative on State lavvs, which was
agreed to, and to-morrow fixed for the purpose.
The clause providing for the appointraent of the
second branch of the National Legislature, having
lain blank since the last vote on the raode of elect
ing it, to wit, by the first branch, Mr. Dickinson
now raoved, " that the members of the second branch
ought to be chosen by the individual Legislatures."

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION, 813
Mr. Sherman seconded the motion ; observing,
that the particular States would thus become inter
ested in supporting the National Govenment, and
that a due harmony between the tvyo govemments
would be maintained. He admitted that the two
ought to have separate and distinct jurisdictions, but
that they ought to have a mutual interest in sup
porting each other.
Mr. Pinckney. If the small States should be
allowed one Senator only, the number will be too
great ; there will be eighty at least.
Mr, Dickinson had two reasons fpr his motion —
first, because the sense of the States would be better
collected through their Governments, than immedi
ately from the people at large ; secondly, because
he wished the Senate to consist of the most distin
guished characters, distinguished for their rank in
life and their weight of property, and bearing as
strong a likeness to the British House of Lords as
possible ; and he thought such characters more likely
to be selected by the State Legislatures, than in any
other mode. The greatness of the number was no
objection with him. He hoped there would be
eighty, and tvpice eighty of them. If their number
should be small, the popular branch could not be
balanced by theni. The Legislature of a numerous
people ought to be a numerous body.
Mr. Williamson preferred a small number of Sen
ators, but wished that each State should have at least
one. He suo-gested twenty-five as a convenient num
ber. The diflferent modes of representation in the
diflferent branches will serve as a mutual check.

814 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
Mr. Butler was anxious to know the ratio of rep
resentation before he gave any opinion.
Mr. Wilson. If we are to establish a National
Governraent, that gov¬ernraent ought to flovv\ frora
the people at large. If one branch of it should be
chosen by the Legislatures, and the other by the
people, the two branches will rest on diflferent foun
dations, and dissensions will naturally arise between
thera. He vvished the Senate to be elected by the
people, as well as the other branch; the people
might be divided into proper districts for the pur
pose ; and he moved to postpone the motion of Mr.
Dickinson, in order to take up one of that import.
Mr. Morris seconded him.
Mr. Read proposed " that the , Senate should be
appointed by tbe Executive raagistrate, out of a
proper nuraber of persons to be nominated by the
individual Legislatures." He said, he thought it his
duty to speak his mind frankly. Gentlemen he
hoped would not be alarraed at the idea. Nothing
short of this approach towards a proper model of
government would answer the purpose, and he
thought it best to come directly to the point at once.
His proposition was not seconded nor supported.
Mr. Madison. If the raotion (of Mr. Dickinson)
should be agreed to, vve must either depart from the
doctrine of proportional representation, or admit into
the Senate a very large number of merabers. The
first is inadraissible, being evidently unjust. The
second is inexpedient. The use of the Senate is to
consist in its proceeding with raore coolness, with
more system, and with raore wisdom, than the pop
ular branch. Enlarge their nuraber, and you cora-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 815
municate to them the vices which they are meant
to correct. He differed from Mr. Dickinson, who
thought that the additional number would give ad
ditional weight to the body. On the contrary, it
appeared to him that their weight would be in an
inverse ratio to their numbers. The exaraple of the
Roman i tribunes was applicable. They lost their
influence and power, in proportion as their number
was augnjented. The reason seemed to be obvious :
they were appointed to take carfe of the popular
interests and pretensions at Rome ; because the peo
ple by reason of their nurabers could not act in
concert, and were liable to fkll into factions among
themselves, and to become a prey to their aristo
cratic adversaries. The more the representatives
of the people, therefore, were raultiplied, the more
they partook of the infirmities of their constituents,
the more liable they becarae to be divided among
themselves, either from their own indiscretions or
the artifices of the opposite faction, and of course the
less capable of fulfilling their trust. When the
weight of a set of men depends merely on their per
sonal characters, the greater the number, the greater
the weight. When it depends on the degree of po
litical authority lodged in them, the smaller the
number, the greater the weight. These considera
tions might perhaps be combined in the intended
Senate ; but the latter was the material one.
Mr. Gerry. Four modes of appointing the Senate
have been mentioned. First, by the first branch of
the National Legislature, — this would create a de
pendance contrary to the end proposed. Secondly,
by the National Executive, — this is a stride towards

816 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
monarchy that few will think of Thirdly, by the
people ; the people have two great interests, the
landed interest, and the commercial, including the
stockholders. To draw both branches from the peo
ple will leave no security to the latter interest ; the
people being chiefly composed of the landed interest,
and erroneously supposing that the other interests
are adverse to it. Fourthly, by the individual Le
gislatures, — the elections being carried through this
refinement, will be most like to provide sorae check
in favor of the coramercial interest against the land-
ed| vvitlidut which, oppression will take place; and
no free government can last long where that is the
case. He was therefore in favor of this last.
Mr. Dickinson.* The preservation of the States
in a certain degree of agency is indispensable. It
will produce that collision between the diflferent.
authorities which should be wished for in order to
check each other.. To atterapt to abolish the States
altogether, would degrade the councils of our coun
try, would be impracticable, would be ruinous. He
compared the proposed national system to the solar
system, in which the States were the planets, and
ought to be left to raove freely in their proper orbits.
The gentleraan frora Pennsylvania (Mr. Wilson)
wished, he said, to extinguish these planets. If
the State Governraents were excluded frora all
agency in the national one, and all power drawn

* It will throw light on this discussion to remark that an election by the
State Legislatures involved a surrender of the principle -insisted on by the large
States, and dreaded- by the small ones, namely, that of a proportional repre
sentatioii in the Senate. Such a rule would make the body too riumerons, a
the'smallesf State must elect one member at least.

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 817
from the people at large, the consequence would be
that the National Govemment would move in the
same direction as the State Governments now do,
and would run into all the same mischiefs. The
reform would only unite the thirteen small strearas
into one great current, pursuing the same course
without any opposition whatever. He adhered to
the opinion that the Senate ought to be composed of
a large number ; and that their influence, from family
weight and other causes, vvould be increased thereby.
He did not admit that the Tribunes lost their weight
in proportion as their number was augmented, and
gave a historical sketch of this institution. If the
reasoning (of Mr. Madison) was good, it would prove
that the number of the Senate ought to be reduced
below ten, the highest number of the Tribunitial
corps. Mr. Wilson, The subject, it must be owned, is
surrounded with doubts and difficulties. But we
must surmount thera. The British Govemment can
not be our model. We have no materials for a simi
lar one. Our manners, our laws, the abolition of
entails and of primogeniture, the whole genius of the
people, are opposed to it. He did not see the danger
of the States being devoured by the National Gov
emment, On the contrary, he wished to keep them
from devouring the National Government, He was
not, however, for extinguishing these planets, as was
supposed by Mr. Dickinson ; neither did he, on the
other hand, believe that they would warm or en
lighten the sun. Within their proper orbits they
must still be suflfered to act for subordinate purposes,
for which their existence is made essential by the
52

818 DEBATES IN THE [1787,
great extent of our country. He could not corapre
hend in what manner the landed interest would be
rendered less predominant in the Senate by an election
through the medium of the Legislatures, than by the
people themselves. If the Legislatures, as was now
complained, sacrificed the comuiercial to the landed
interest, what reason was there to expect such a
choice from them as would defeat their own views ?
He vvas for an election by the people, in large dis
tricts, which would be most likely to obtain men of
intelligence and uprightness ; subdividing the dis
tricts only for the accomraodation of voters,
Mr. Madison could as little coraprehend in what
raanner family weight, as desired by Mr. Dickinson,
would be more certainly conveyed into the Senate
through elections by the State Legislatures, than in
sorae other raodes. The true question was, in what
mode the best choice would be made ? If an elec
tion by the people, or through any other channel
than the State Legislatures, proraised as uncorrupt
and impartial a preference of merit, there could
surely be no necessity for an appointment by those
Legislatures. Nor was it apparent that a more use
ful check would be derived through that channel,
than from the people through some ot^her. The
great evils complained of vvere, that the State Le
gislatures run into schemes of paper-raoney, &c.,
whenever solicited by the people, and sometiraes
without even the sanction of the people. Their in
fluence, then, instead of checking a like propensity
in the National Legislature, may be expected to
promote it. Nothing can be more contradictory
than to say that the National Legislature, without a

1787.] FEDERAL convention. 819
proper check, will follow the example of the State
Legislatures ; and, in the same breath, that the State
Legislatures are the only proper check.
Mr, Sherman opposed elections by the people in
districts, as not likely to produce such fit men as
elections by the State Legislatures.
Mr. Gerry insisted, that the comraercial and
monied interest would be more secure in the hands
of the State Legislatures, than of the people at
large. The former have more sense of character,
and will be restrained by that from injustice. The
people are for paper-money, when the Legislatures
are against it. In Massachusetts the county con
ventions had declared a wish for a depreciating pa
per that would sink itself Besides, in sorae States
there are two branches in the Legislature, one of
which is soraewhat aristocratic. There would there
fore be so far a better chance of refinement in the
choice. There seemed, he thought, to be three
powerful objections against elections by districts.
First, it is impracticable ; the people cannot be
brought to one place for the purpose ; and, whether
brought to the same place or not, numberless frauds
would be unavoidable. Secondly, small States,
forming part of the same district with a large one,
or a large part of a large one, would have no chance
of gaining an appointment for its citizens of merit.
Thirdly, a new source of discord would be opened
between diflferent parts ofthe same district.
Mr. Pinckney thought the second branch ought to
be permanent and independent ; and that the mera
bers of it would be rendered more so by receiving
their appointments from the State Legislatures.

820 DEBATESINTHE [1787.
This mode would avoid the rivalships and discon
tents incident to the election by districts. He was
for dividing the States in three classes, according to
their respective sizes, and for allowing to the first
class three members ; to the second, two ; and to the
third, one.
On the question for postponing Mr. Dickinson's mo
tion, referring the appointment of the Senate to the
State Legislatures, in order to consider Mr. Wilson's
for referring it to the people, Pennsylvania, aye — 1 ;
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, no — 10.
CoL Mason, Whatever power may be necessary
for the National Governmerit, a certain portion must
necessarily be left with fhe States. It is impossible
for one power to pervade the extreme parts of the
United States, so as to carry equal justice to them.
The State Legislatures also ought to have some means
of defending themselves against encroachments of
the National Government. In every other depart
ment we have studiously endeavoured to provide for
its self-defence. Shall we leave the States alone
unprovided with the means for this purpose ? And
what better means can we provide, than the giving
them some share in, or rather to make them a con
stituent part of, the national establishment ? There
is danger on both sides, no doubt ; but we have only
seen the evils arising on the side of the State Gov
emments. Those on the other side remain to be
displayed. The example of Congress does not ap
ply. Congress had no power to carry their acts

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 821
into execution, as the National Government will
have. On Mr. Dickinson's motion for an appointment of
the Senate by the State Legislatures, — Massachu
setts, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Dela
ware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 10,'"
Mr. Gerry gave notice, that he would to-morrow
move for a reconsideration of the mode of appointing
the National Executive, in order to substitute an
appointment by the State Executives,
The Committee rose, and the House adjourned.

Friday, June 8th,
In Committee ofthe Whole. — On a reconsideration
of the clause giving the National Legislature a neg
ative on such laws of the States as might be con
trary to the Articles of Union, or treaties with for
eign nations ;
Mr, Pinckney raoved, " that the National Legisla
ture should have authority to negative all laws
which they should judge to be improper." He urged
that such a universality of the power was indis
pensably necessary to render it eflfectual ; that the
States must be kept in due subordination to the
nation ; that if the States were left to act of them
selves in any case, it would be impossible to defend
the national prerogatives, however extensive they
might be, on paper; that the acts of Congress had
been defeated by this means ; nor had foreign trea-

822 DEBATES IN THE [1787,
ties escaped repeated violations : that this universal
negativ^e was in fact the corner-stone of an efficient
national Government ; that under the British Gov
emraent the negative of the Crown had been found
beneficial, and the States are raore one nation now,
than the colonies were then,
Mr. Madison seconded the motion. He could not
but regard an indefinite power to negative legisla
tive acts of the States as absolutely necessary to a
perfect system. Experience had evinced a constant
tendency in the States to encroach on the Federal
authority ; to violate national treaties ; to infringe
the rights and interests of each other; to oppress
the weaker party within their respective jurisdic
tions. A negative was the mildest expedient that
could be devised for preventing these mischiefs.
The existence of such a check would prevent at
tempts to corarait thera. Should no such precaution
be engrafted, the only reraedy would be in an appeal
to coercion.' Was such a remedy eligible ? Was it
practicable ? Could the national resources, if ex
erted to the utmost, enforce a national decree against
Massachusetts, abetted, perhaps, by several of her
neighbours 1 It would not be possible. A small
proportion of the community, in a compact situation,
acting on the defensive, and at one of its extremi
ties, might at any time bid defiance to the national
authority. Any government for the United States,
formed on the supposed practicability of using force
against the unconstitutional proceedings of the
States, would prove as visionary and fallacious as
the government of Congress. The negative would
render the use of force unnecessary. The States

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 823
could of themselves pass no operative act, any more
than one branch of a legislature, where there are
two branches, can proceed without the other. But
in order to give the negative this efficacy, it must
extend to all cases. A discrimination would only
be a fresh source of contention between the two
authorities. In a word, to recur to the illustrations
borrowed- from the planetary system, this prerog
ative of the General Governraent is the great per
vading principle that raust control the centrifugal
tendency of the States ; which, without it, vvill con
tinually fly out of their proper orbits, and destroy
the order and harmony of the political systera.
Mr. Williamson was against giving a power that
might restrain the States from regulating their in
ternal police.
Mr. Gerry could not see the extent of such a
power, and was against every power that was not
necessary. He thought a remonstrance against un
reasonable acts of the States would restrain them.
If it should not, force might be resorted to. He had
no objection to authorize a negative to paper-money
and similar measures. When the confederation was
depending before Congress, Massachusetts was then
for inserting the power of emitting paper-raoney
among the exclusive powers of Congress. He ob
served, that the proposed negative would extend to
the regulations of the railitia, a raatter on which the
existence of the State might depend. The National
Legislature, with such a power, may enslave the
States. Such an idea as this will never be acceded
to. It has never been suggested or conceived among
the people. No speculative projector — and there

824 debates in the [1787.
are enough of that character among us, in politics as
well as in other things — ^lias, in any pamphlet or
newspaper, thrown out the idea. The States, too,
have diflferent interests, and are ignorant of each
other's interests. The negative, therefore, will be
abused. New States, too, having separate views
frora the old States, will nevfer come into the Union.
They may even be under some foreign influence ;
are they in such case to participate in the negative
on the will of the other States ?
Mr. Sherman thought the cases in which the
negative ought to be exercised might be defined.
He wished the point might not be decided till a trial
at least should be made for that purpose.
Mr. Wilson would not say what modifications of
the proposed power raight be practicable or ex
pedient. But, however novel it inight appear, the
principle of it, when viewed with a close and steady
eye, is right. There is no instance in which the
laws say that the individual should be bound in one
case, and at liberty to judge whether he will obey
or disobey in another. The cases are parallel.
Abuses of the power over the individual persons
may happen, as well as over the individual States.
Federal liberty is to the States what civil liberty is
to private individuals ; and States are not more un
willing to purchase it, by the necessary concession
of their political sovereignty, than the savage is to
purchase civil liberty by the surrender of the per
sonal sovereignty which he enjoys in a state of
nature. A definition of the cases in which the neg
ative should be exercised is impracticable. A dis
cretion must be left on one side or the other, — will

1787,] FEDERAL conven noN, 825
it not be most safely lodged on tlie side of the Na
tional Govemment ? Araong tho first sentiments
expressed in the first Congress, one was, that Vir
ginia is no more, that Massachusetts is no more, that
Pennsylvania is no more, &c, — we are now one
nation of brethren; — vve must bury all local interests
and distinctions. This language continued for some
time. The tables at length began to turn. No
sooner were the State Governments formed than
their jealousy and arabition began to display them
selves ; each endeavoured to cut a slice from the
comraon loaf, to add to its own morsel, till at length
the Confederation became frittered down to the
impotent condition in which it now stands. Review
the progress of the Articles of Confederation through
Congress, and compare the first and last draught of
it. To correct its vices is the business of this Con
vention. One of its vices is the want of an eflfectual
control in the whole over its parts. What danger is
there that the whole will unnecessarily sacrifice a
part ? But reverse the case, and leave the whole
at the mercy of each part, and will not the general
interest be continually sacrificed to local interests ?
Mr. Dickinson deemed it impossible to draw a
line between the cases proper, and improper, for the
exercise of the negative. We must take our choice
of two things. We must either subject the States
to the danger of being injured by the power of the
National Government, or the latter to the danger of
being injured by that of the States, He thought the
danger greater from the States. To leave the power
doubtful, would be opening another spring of discord,
and he was for shutting as many of them as possible,
52*

826 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
Mr. Bedford, in answer to his colleague's ques
tion, where would be the danger to the States from
this power, would refer him to the smallness of his
own State, which raay be injured at pleasure with
out redress. It was meant, he found, to strip the
small States of tbeir equal right of suflfrage. In this
case Delaware would have about one-ninetieth for
its share in the gerieral councils ; whilst Pennsyl-
v^ania and Virginia would possess one-third of the
whole. Is there no diflference of interests, no rival-
ship of comraerce, of manufactures ? Will not these
large States crush the small ones, whenever they
stand in the way of their ambitious or interested
views? This shows the impossibility of adopting
such a system as that on the table, or any other
founded on a change in the principle of representa
tion. And after all, if a State does not obey the
law of the new system, mu.st not force be resorted
to, as the only ultiraate remedy in this as in any
other systera? It seems as if Pennsylvania and
Virginia, by the conduct of their deputies, wished to
provide a system in which they would have an
enormous and raonstrous influence. Besides, how
can it be thought that the proposed negative can be
exercised 1 Are the laws of the States to be sus
pended in the most urgent cases, until they can be
sent seven or eight hundred miles, and undergo the
deliberation of a body who may be incapable of
judging of them ? Is the National Legislature, too,
to sit continually in order to revise the laws of the
States? Mr. Madison observed, that the difficulties which
had been started were worthy of attention, and

1787.] federal convention. 827
ought to be answered before the question was put.
The case of laws of urgent necessity raust be pro
vided for by sorae emanation of the power from the
National Governraent into each State, so far as to
give a temporary assent at least. This was the
practice in the Royal Colonies before the Revolu
tion, and would not have been inconvenient if the
suprerae power of negativing had been faithful to
the American interest, and had possessed the ne
cessary information. He supposed that the negative
raight be very properly lodged in the Senate alone,
and that the more numerous and expensive branch
therefore might not be obliged to sit constantly.
He asked Mr. Bedford, what would be the conse
quence to the small States of a dissolution of the
Union, which seemed likely to happen if no eflfectual
substitute was made for the defective systeni ex
isting ? — and he did not conceive any eflfectual sys
tem could be substituted on any other basis than
that of a proportional suflfrage. If the large States
possessed the avarice and ambition with which
they were charged, would the small ones in their
neighbourhood be more secure when all control of a
General Government was withdrawn ?
Mr. Butler was vehement against the negative
in the proposed extent, as cutting oflf all hope of
equal justice to the distant States. The people
there would not, he was sure give it a hearing.
On the question for extending the negative power
to all cases, as proposed by Mr. Pinckney and Mr.
Madison, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
(Mr. Randolph and Mr. Mason, no ; Mr. Blair,
Doctor McClurg and Mr. Madison, aye; Generp'

828 DEBATESINTHE [ 1787.
Washington not consulted,) aye — 3; Connecticut,
New York, New^ Jersey, Maryland, North Carolma,
South Carolina, Georgia, no — 7 ; Delaware, divided,
(Mr. Read and Mr. Dickinson, aye; Mr. Bedford
and Mr. Basset, no)."'
On raotion of Mr. Gerry and Mr. King, to-morrow
was assigned for reconsidering the mode of appoint
ing the national Executive; the reconsideration
being voted for by all the States except Connecticut
and North Carolina.
Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Rutledge moved to add to
the fourth Resolution, agreed to by the Committee,
the following, viz. : " that the States be divided into
three classes, the first class to have three members,
the second two, and the third one member, each ;
that an estimate be taken of the comparative im
portance of each State at fixed periods, so as to as
certain the number of merabers they may from time
to tirae be entitled to." The Committee then rose,
and the House adjourned.

Saturday, June 9th.
Mr. Luther Martin, from Maryland, took his seat.
In Committee of the Whole, — Mr. Gerry, accord
ing to previous notice given by him, moved "that
the national Executive should be elected by the
Executives of the States, whose proportion of v^otes
should be the same with that allowed to the States,
in the election of the Senate." If the appointment
should be raade by the National Legislature, it
would lessen that independence of the Executive,
which ought to prevail ; would give birth to intrigue

1787.] federal convention. 829
and corruption between the Executive and Legis
lature previous to the election, and to partiality in
the Executive afterwards to the friends who pro
moted him. Sorae other mode, therefore, appeared
to him necessary. He proposed that of appointing
by the State Executives, as most analagous to the
principle observed in electing the other branches of
the National Government ; the first branch being
chosen by the people of the States and the second
by the Legislatures of the States, he did not see any
objection against letting the Executive be appointed
by the Executives of the States. He supposed the
Executives would be raost likely to select the fittest
men, and that it would be their interest to support
the raan of their own choice.
Mr. Randolph urged strongly the inexpediency
of Mr. Gerry's raode of appointing the National
Executive. The confidence of the people would
not be secured by it to the National magistrate.
The small States would lose all chance of an ap
pointment frora within theraselves. Bad appoint
ments would be made, the Executives of the States
being little conversant with characters not within
their own small spheres. The State Executives,
too, notwithstanding their constitutional independ
ence, being in fact dependent on the State Legisla
tures, will generally be guided by the views of the
latter, and prefer either favorites within the States,
or such as it may be expected will be most partial
to the interests of the State. A national Executive
thus chosen will not be likely to defend with be
coming vigilance and firmness the national rights
against State encroachments. Vacancies also must

830 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
happen. How can these be filled ? He could not
suppose, either, that the Executives would feel the
interest in supporting the national Executive which
had been iraagined. They will not cherish the great
oak which is to reduce thera to paltry shrubs.
On the question for referring the appointraent of
the national Executive to the State Executives, as
proposed by Mr. Gerry, — Massachusetts, Connecti
cut Nevv York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Mary
land, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no; Dela
ware, divided.™
Mr. Patterson moved, that the Committee resurae
the clause relating to the rule of suflfrage in the Na
tional Legislature.
Mr. Brearly seconds hira. He was sorry, he
said, that any- question on this point was brought
into vievv. It had been rauch agitated in Congress
at the time of forming the Confederation, and was
then rightly settled by allowing to each sovereign
State an equal vote. Otherwise, the smaller States
must have been destroyed instead of being saved.
The substitution of a ratio, he admitted, carried fair
ness on the face of it ; but on a deeper examination
was unfair and unjust. Judging of the disparity of
the States by the quota of Congress, Virginia would
have sixteen votes, and Georgia but one, A like
proportion to the others will make the whole num
ber ninety. There will be three large States, and
ten small ones. The large States, by which he
meant Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Virginia,
will carry every thing before them. It had been
admitted, and was known to him from facts within
New Jersey, that where large and small counties

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 831
were united into a district for electing representa
tives for the district, the large counties always car
ried their point, and consequently the large States
would do so. Virginia with her sixteen votes will
be a solid column indeed, a forraidable phalanx.
While Georgia with her solitary vote, and the other
little States, will be obliged to throw theraselves
constantly into the scale of some large one, in order
to have any weight at all. He had come to the
Convention with a view of being as useful as he
could, in giving energy and stability to the Federal
Govemment. When the proposition for destroying
the equality of votes came forward, he was aston
ished, he was alarmed. Is it fair, then, it will be
asked, that Georgia should have an equal vote with
Virginia ? He would not say it was. What remedy
then ? One only, that a map of the United States
be spread out, that all the existkig boundaries be
erased, and that a new partition of the whole be
made into thirteen equal parts.
Mr. Patterson considered the proposition for a
proportional representation as striking at the ex
istence of the lesser States. He would premise,
however, to an investigation of this question, some
remarks on the nature, structure, and powers of the
Convention. The Convention, he said, was formed
in pursuance of an act of Congress ; that this act
was recited in several of the. commissions, particu
larly that of Massachusetts, which he required to be
read ; that the amendment of the Confederacy was
the object of all the laws and commissions on the
subject ; that the Articles of the Confederation were
therefore the proper basis of all the proceedings of

832 debates in the [1787.
the Convention ; that we ought to keep within its
liraits, or we should be charged by our constituents
with usurpation; that the people of America were
sharp-sighted, and not to be deceived. But the
commissions under which we acted were not only
the measure of our power, they denoted also the
sentiments of the States on the subject of our delib
eration. The idea of a National Governraent, as
contradistinguished from a federal one, never en
tered into the mind of any of them ; and to the pub
lic raind we raust accoraraodate ourselves. We have
no power to go beyond the Federal scherae ; and if
we had, the people are not ripe for any other. We
must follow the people ; the people will not follow
us. The proposition could not be maintained,
whether considered in reference to us as a nation, or
as a confederacy. A confederacy supposes sove
reignty in the merabers coraposing it, and sovereignty
supposes equality. If we are to be considered as a
nation, all State distinctions must be abolished, the
whole must be thrown into hotchpot, and when an
equal division is made, then there may be fairly an
equality of representation. He held up Virginia,
Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, as the three large
States, and the other ten as small ones ; repeating
the calculations of Mr. Brearly, as to the disparity
of votes which vvould take place, and affirming that
the small States vvould never agree to it. He said
there vvas no raore reason that a great individual
State, contributing much, should have more votes
than a small one, contributing little, than that a rich
individual citizen should have more votes than an
iridigent one. If the rateable property of A was to

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 833
that of B as forty to one, ought A for that reason to
have forty times as many votes as B? Such a prin
ciple would never be admitted ; and if it were ad
mitted would put B entirely at the raercy of A. As
A has more to be protected than B, so he ought to
contribute more for the coramon protection. The
same may be said of a large State, which has more
to be protected than a small one. Give the large
States an influence in proportion to their magnitude,
and what will be the consequence ? Their ambition
will be proportionally increased, and the sraall
States will have every thing to fear. It was once
proposed by Galloway, apd sorae others, that Amer
ica should be represented in the British Parliament,
and then be bound by its laws. America could not
have been entitled to more than one-third of the
representatives which would fall to the share of
Great Britain,— would Araerican rights and interests
have been safe under an authority thus constituted ?
It has been said, that if a national Xiovernraent is
to be forraed, so as to operate on the people arid not
on the States, the Representatives ought to be drawn
from the people. But why so? May not a Legis
lature, filled by the State Legislatures, operate on the
people who choose the State Legislatures ? Or njay
not a practicable coercion befound? He adfiiitted
that there was none such in the existing system.
He was attached strongly to the plan of the existing
Confederacy, in which the people choose their legis
lative representatives ; and the Legislatures their fed
eral representatives. No other amendments vvhere
wanting than to mark the orbits of the States with
due precision, and provide for the use of coercion,
53

834 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
which was the great point. He alluded to the hint
thrown out by Mr. Wilson, ofthe necessity to which
the large States might be reduced, of confederating
among theraselves, by a refusal of the others to con
cur. Let them unite if they please, but let them re
member that they have no authority to compel the
others to unite. New Jersey vvill never confederate
on the plan before the Comraittee. She would be
swallowed up. He had rather submit to a mon
arch, to a despot, than to such a fate. He would
not only oppose the plan here, but on his return
home do every thing in his power to defeat it there.
Mr. Wilson hoped, if the Confederacy should be
dissolved, thatamajority, — nay,a minorilyof the States
would unite for their safety. He entered elaborately
into the defence of- a proportional representation,
stating for his first position, that, as all authority
was derived frora the people, equal numbers of peo
ple ought to have an equal . number of representa
tives, and diflferent numbers of people, diflferent num
bers of representatives. This principle bad been im
properly violated in the Confederation, owing to the
urgent circumstances ofthe time. As to the case of
A andB stated by Mr. Patterson, he observed, that,
in districts as large as the States, the number of people
was the best raeasure of their comparative wealth.
Whether, therefore, wealth or numbers was to form
the ratio it vvould be the same. Mr. Patterson
admitted persons, not property, to be the measure of
sufi'rage. Are not the citizens of Pennsylvania
equal to those of New Jersey? Does it require
one hundred and fifty of the forraer to balance fifty
of the latter ? Representatives of diflferent districts

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 835
ought clearly to hold the sarae proportion to each
other, as their respective constituents hold to each
other. If the sraall States will not confederate on
this plan, Pennsylvania, and he presuraed sorae
other States, would not confederate ori any other.
We have been told that each State being sovereign,
all are equal. So each raan is naturally a sovereign
over hiraself,, and all men are therefore naturally
equal. Can he retain this equality when he be
comes a member of civil government ? He cannot.
As, little. can a sovereign State, when it becomes a
member of a federal government. If New Jersey-
will not part with her sovereignty, it is vain to talk
of government. A new partition of the States is
desirable, but evidently and totally impracticable.
Mr. Williamson illustrated the cases by a cora
parison of the diflferent States to counties of different
sizes within the same State ;^ observing that pro
portional representation was admitted to be just in
the latter case, and could not, therefore, be fairly
contested in the former.
The question being about to be put, Mr." Patter
son hoped that as so much depended on it, it raight
be thought best to postpone the decision till to
morrow; which was done, ttem,. con.
The Committee rose, and the House' adjourned.

Monday, June, 11th.
Mr. Abraham Baldwin, from Georgia, took his seat.
In Committee qf the Whole,— The clause concern
ing the rule of suffrage in the National Legislature,
postponed on Saturday, was resumed.

836 debates in the [1787,
Mr, Sherman proposed, that the proportion of
suffrage in the first branch should be according
to the respective numbers of free inhabitants ; and
that in the second branch, or Senate, each State
should have one vote and no more. He said, as
the States would remain possessed of certain in
dividual rights, each State ought to be able to pro
tect itself; otherwise, a few large States will rule
the rest. The House of Lords in England, he ob
served, had certain particular rights under the Con
stitution, and hence they have an equal vote with
the House of Coraraons, that they may be able to
defend their rights.
Mr. Rutledge proposed, that the proportion of
suflfrage in the first branch should be according
to the quotas of contribution. The justice of this
rule, he said, could not be contested. Mr. Butler
urged the same idea ; adding, that money was
power ; and that the States ought to have weight
in the government in proportion tb their wealth.
Mr. King and Mr. Wilson,* in order to bring the
question to a point, moved, " that the right of
suflfrage in the first branch of the National Legis
lature ought not to be according to the rule estab
lished in the Articles of Confederation, but accord
ing to some equitable ratio of representation."
The clause, so far as it related to suffrage in the
first branch, was postponed, in order to consider
this motion.
Mr. Dickinson contended for the actual contribu-

* In the printed Journal Mr. Rutledge is named as the seconder of the
motion.

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 837
tions of the States, as the rule of their represen
tation and suflfrage in the first branch. By thus
connecting the interests of the States with their
duty, the latter would be sure to be performed.
Mr. King remarked, that it was uncertain what
mode might be used in levying a national revenue ;
but that it was probable, imposts would be one
source of it. If the actual contributions were to be
the rule, the non-importing States, as Connecticut
and New Jersey, Would be in a bad situation, in
deed. It might so happen that they would have no
representation. This situation of particular States
had been always one powerful arguraent in favor
of the five per cent, impost.
The question being about to be put. Doctor
Franklin said, he had thrown his ideas of the mat
ter on a paper, which Mr. Wilson read to the Com
mittee, in the words following :
Mr. Chairman, — It has given me great pleasure
to observe, that, till this point, the proportion of
representation, came before us, our, debates were
carried on with great coolness and temper. If any
thing of a contrary kind, has on this occasion ap
peared, I hope it will not be repeated ; for vve are
sent here to consult, not to contend, with each other ;
and declarations of a fixed opinion, and of determin
ed resolution never to change it, neither enlighten
nor convince us. Positiveness and warmth on one
side naturally beget their like on the other, and
tend to create and augment discord and division, in
a great concern wherein harmony and union are
extremely necessary tp give weight to our councils.

838 DEBATES IN THE [1787,
and render thera eflfectual in promoting and se
curing the common good.
"I must own, that I was originally of opinion
it would be better if every member of Congress,
or our national Council, were to consider himself
rather as a representative of the whole, than as
an agent for the interests of a particular State;
in which case the proportion of members for each
State would be of less consequence, and it would
not be very material whether they voted by
States or individually. But as I find this is not
to be expected, I now think the number of re
presentatives should bear some proportion to the
number of the represented ; and that the decisions
should be by the majority of raerabers, not by
the majority of the States. This is objected to
frora an apprehension that the greater States
would then swallow up the sraaller. I do not at
present clearly see what advantage the greater
States could propose to themselves by swallowing
up the smaller, and therefore do not apprehend
they vvould attempt it, I recollect that, in the
beginning of this century, when the union was
proposed of the two kingdoms, England and Scot
land, the Scotch patriots were full of fears, that
unless they had an equal nuraber of representa
tives in Parliament, they should be ruined by the
superiority of the English. They finally agreed,
however, that the diflferent proportions of impor
tance in the union of the two nations should be
attended to,, whereby they vvere to have only
forty members in the House of Commons, and
only sixteen in the House of Lords, A very great

1787,] FEDERAL CONVENTION, 839
inferiority of numbers ! And yet to this day I do
not recollect that any thing has been done in the
Parliament of Great Britain to the prejudice of
Scotland ; and whoever looks over the lists of public
officers, civil and military, of that nation, will find, I
believe, that the North Britons enjoy at least then-
full proportion of emoluraent.
"But, sir, in the present raode of voting by States,
it is equally in the power of the lesser States to
swallow up the greater ; and this is mathematically
demonstrable. Suppose, for example, that seven
smaller States had each three members in the
House, and the six larger to have, one with another
six raembers ; and that, upon a question, two mem
bers of each smaller State should be in the affirma
tive, and one in the negative, they would make : —
affirraatives, 14; negatives, 7; and that all the lar
ger States should be unanimously in the negative,
they would raake, negatives; 36 ; in all, affirmatives,
14, negatives, 43.
" It is, then, apparent, that the fourteen carry
the question against the forty-three, and the mi
nority overpowers the raajority, contrary to the
comraon practice of assemblies in all countries and
ages. " The greater States, sir, are naturally as unwil
ling to have their property left in the disposition of
the smaller, as the smaller are to have theirs in the
disposition of the greater. An honorable gentleraan
has, to avoid this difficulty, hinted a proposition of
equalizing the States. It appears to me an equita
ble one, and I should, for my own part, uot be
against such a measure, if it ritiight be found practi-

840 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
cable. Formerly, indeed, when almost every pro
vince had a diflferent constitution, some with greater,
others with fewer, privileges, it was of importance
to the borderers, when their boundaries were con
tested, whether, by running the division lines, they
were placed on one side or the other. At present,
when such diflferences are done away, it is less ma
terial. The interest of a State is made up of the
interests of its individual raerabers. If they are not
injured, the State is not injured. Sraall States are,
more easily well and happily governed than large
ones. If, therefore, in such an equal division, it
should be found necessary to diminish Pennsylvania,
I should not be averse to the giving a part of it to
New Jersey, and another to Delaware. But as
there would probably be considerable difficulties in
adjusting such a division; and, however equally
made at first, it would be continually varying by
the augraentation of inhabitants in some States, and
their fixed proportion in others, and thence frequent
ly occasion new divisions I beg leave to propose,
for the consideration of the Committee, another
mode, which appears to me to be as equitable, more
easily carried into practice, and more permanent in
its nature,
" Let the weakest State say what proportion of
money or force it is able and willing to furnish for
the general purposes of the Union :
" Let all the others oblige themselves to furnish
each an equal proportion :
" The whole of these joint supplies to be absolutely
in the disposition of Congress ;

1787,] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 841
" The Congress in this case to be composed of an
equal number of delegates from each State :
"And their decisions to be by the majority of in
dividual members voting,
"If these joint and equal supplies should, on par
ticular occasions, not be sufficient, let Congress make
requisitions on the richer and more powerful States
for further aids, to , be voluntarily aflforded, leaving
to each State the right of considering the necessity
and utility of the aid desjred, and of giving more or
less as it should be found proper,
" This mode is not new. It was formerly prac
tised with success by the British govemment with
respect to Ireland and the Colonies, We sometimes
gave even more than they expected, or thought just
to accept ; and in the last war, carried on while we
were united, they gave us back in five years a mil
lion sterling. We should probably have continued
such voluntary contributions, whenever the occa
sions appeared to require them for the common good
of the Empire. It was not till they chose to force
us, and to deprive us of the merit and pleasure of
voluntary contributions, that we refused and resist
ed. These contributions, however, were to be dis
posed of at the pleasure of a government in which
we had no representative. I am, therefore, per
suaded, that they will not be refused to one in which
the representation shall be equal,
"My learned colleague (Mr, Wilson) has already
mentioned, that the present method of votuig by
States was submitted to originally by Congress un
der a conviction of its impropriety, inequality, and
injustice. This appears in the words of their reso-
53*

842 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
lution. It is of the sixth of September, 1774. The
words are :
" Resolved,, that in determining questions in this
" Congress each Colony or Province shall have one
" vote ; the Congress not. being possessed of, or at
" present able to procure, materials for ascertaining
" the importance of each Colony."
On the question for agreeing to Mr. King's and
Mr. Wilson's raotion, it passed in the affirmative, —
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 7;
New York, New Jersey, Delaware, no — 3 ; Mary
land, divided.
It was then raoved by Mr. Rutledge, seconded by
Mr. Butler, to add to the words, " equitable ratio
of representation," at the end of the raotion just
agreed to, the words " according to the quotas of
contribution." On motion of- Mr. Wilson, seconded
by Mr. Pinckney, this was postponed ; in order to
add, after the words, " equitable ratio of representa
tion," the words following: "in proportion to the
whole number of white and other free citizens and
inhabitants of every age, sex and condition, inclu
ding those bound to servitude for a term of years,
and three-fifths of all other persons not comprehend
ed in the foregoing description, except Indians not
paying taxes, in each State" — this being the rule in
the act of Congress, agreed to by eleven States, for
apportioning quotas of revenue on the States, and
requiring a census only every five, seven, or ten
years. Mr. Gerry thought property not the rale of re
presentation. Why, theri, should the blacks, who

1787,] FEDERAL CONVENTION, 843
were property in the South, be in the rule of repre
sentation more than the cattle and horses of thfe
North? On the question, — Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9; New
Jersey, Delaware, no — ^2 ™
Mr, Sherman moved, that a question be taken,
whether each State shall have one vote in the second
branch. Every, thing, he said, depended on this.
The smaller States would never agree to the plan
on any other principle than an equality of, suflfrage
in this branch, Mr. Ellsworth seconded the mo
tion. On the question for allowing each State one
vote in the second branch,-— Connecticut, New York,
New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, aye — 5 ; Massa
chusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, no — 6.
Mr. Wilson and Mr. Hamilton moved, that the
right of suflfrage in the secorid branch ought to be
according to the same rale as in the first branch.
On this question for making the ratio of represen
tation, the same in the second as in the first branch,
it passed in the affirmative, — Massachusetts, Penn
sylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, iSouth Carolina,
Georgia,aye— 6, Connecticut, Nevv York, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, no— S.''"
The eleventh Resolution, for guaranteeing repub
lican government and territory to each State, being
considered, the words " or partition," were, on mo
tion of Mr. Madison, added after the words " volun
tary junction," — Massachusetts, New York, Penn
sylvania, Virginia, North Carolina^ South Carolina,

844 debates in the [1787,
Georgia, aye — 1\ Connecticut, New Jersey, Dela
ware, Maryland, no — 4,
Mr, Read disliked the idea of guaranteeing terri
tory. It abetted the idea of distinct States, which
would be a perpetual source of discord. There can
be no cure for this evil but in doing away States
altogether, and uniting them all into one great
society, Altel-ations having been made in the Resolution,
making it read, " that a Repiiblican constitution, and
its existing laws, ought to be guaranteed to each
State by the United States," the whole was agrfeed
to, nem. con.
The thirteenth Resolution, for araending the na
tional Constitution, hereafter, without consent of the
national Legislature, being considered, several mem
bers did not see the necessity^of the Resolution at
all, nor the propriety of making the consent of the
National Legislature unnecessary.
Col. Mason urged the necessity of such a pro
vision. The plan now to be forraed will certainly
be defective, as the Confederation has been found on
trial to be. Araendments, therefore, will be neces
sary ; and it will be better to provide for them in an
easy, regular and constitutional way, than to trust
to chance and violence. It would be iraproper to
require the consent of the National Legislature, be
cause they may abuse their power, and refuse their
assent- on that very account. The opportunity fbr
such an abuse may be the fault of the Constitution
calling for araendraent.
Mr. Randolph enforced these arguraents.
The words, " without requiring the consent of the

1787,] FEDERAL CONVENTION, 845
National Legislature," were postponed. The other
provision in the clause passed, nem. con.'""
The fourteenth resolution, requiring oaths from
the merabers of the State Govemments to observe
the national Constitution and laws, being consid
ered, —
Mr. Sherman opposed it, as unnecessarily intru
ding into the State jurisdictions.
Mr. Randolph considered it necessary to prevent
that competition between the national Constitution
and laws, and those of the particular States, which
had already been felt. The officers of the States
are already under oath to the States. To preserve
a due impartiality they ought to be equally bound
to the National Government. The national author
ity needs every support vve can give it. The Exec
utive and Judiciary of the States, notwithstanding
their nominal independence on the State Legisla
tures, are in fact so dependent on them, that Unless
they be brought virider sorae tie to the National Sys
tem, they will always lean too much to the State
systems, whenever a contest arises betvveen the
two. Mr. Gerry did not like the clause. He thought
there vv^as as much reason for requiring an oath of
fidelity to the States from- national officers, as vice
versa. Mr. Luther Martin moved to strike out the words
requiring such an oath from the State officers, viz. :
" within the several States," observing, that if the
new oath should be contrary to that already taken
by them, it would be improper ; if coincident, the
oaths already taken vvill be sufficient.

846 derates in the [1787.
On the question for striking out as proposed by
Mr. L. Martin, — Connecticut, New Jersey, Dela
ware, Maryland, aye — 4 ; Massachusetts, New York,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Car
olina, Georgia, no^7.
Question on the whole Resolution as proposed by
Mr. Randolph, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Vir
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye^6 ; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Del-
a.ware, Maryland, no — 5.^°^
The Coraraittee rose, and the House adjourned.

Tuesday, June 12th.
In Committee of the Whole, — The question was
taken on the fifteenth Resolution, to wit, referring
the new system to the people of the United States
for ratification. It passed in the affirmative, — Mas
sachusetts, Pennsylvania,* Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 6 ; Connecticut, New
York, New Jersey, no — 3; Delav^^are, Maryland,
di vided. '^
Mr. Sherman and Mr. Ellsworth moved to fill
the blank left in the fourth Resolution, for the pe
riods of electing the merabers of the first, branch,
with the words, " every year ;" Mr. Sherman observ
ing that he did it in order to bring on some question.
Mr. Rutledge proposed " every two years."
Mr, Jenifer proposed, "every three years ;" ob
serving that the too great frequency of elections ren-
* Pennsylvania omitted in the printed Journal. The vote is there entered
ss of June 11th,

1787,] federal convention. 847
dered the people indiflferent to them, and made the
best men miwilling to engage in so precarious a
service, Mr. Madison seconded the motion for three years.
Instability is one of the great vices of our republics
to be remedied. Three years will be necessary, in
a governraent so extensive, for members to form any
knowledge of the various interests of the States to
which they do not belong, and of which they can
know but little from the situation and aflfairs of their
own. One year will be almost consumed in pre
paring for, and travelling to and from the seat of
national business.
Mr. Gerry. The people of New England will
never giv^e up the point of annual elections. They
know of the transition raade in England from trien
nial to septennial elections, and will consider such
an innovation here as the prelude to a like usurpa
tion. He considered annual elections as the only
defence of the people, against tyranny. He was as
much against a triennial House, as against a hered
itary Executive.
Mr. Madison observed, that if the opinions of the
people were to be our guide, itwould be difficult to
say what course we ought to take. No member of
the Convention co^ld say what the opinions of his
constituents were at this tirae ; much less could he
say what they would think, if possessed of the
information and lights possessed by the merabers
here; and still less, what would be their way of
thinking six or twelve months hence. We ought to
consider what was right and necessary in itself for
the attainment of a proper government, A plan

848 DEBATES IN THE [1787,
adjusted to this idea will recommend itself. The
respectability of this Convention will give weight to
their recommendation of it. Experience will be con
stantly urging the adoption of it ;, and all the most
enlightened ahd respectable citizens will be its ad
vocates. Should we fall short of the necessary and
proper point, this influential class of citizens will
be turned against the plan, and little support in op
position to them can be gained to it from the unre
flecting multitude.
Mr. Gerry repeated his opinion, that it was ne
cessary to consider what the people would approve.
This had been the policy of all legislators. If the
reasoning (of Mr. Madison) were just, and we sup
posed a limited monarchy the best, form in itself, we
ought to recommend it, though the genius of the
people was decidedly adverse to it, and, having no
hereditary distinctions among us, we were destitute
of the essential materials for such an innovation.
On the question for the triennial election of the
first branch, — New York, jVew Jersey, Pennsylva
nia, Delaw^are, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, aye —
7 ; Massachusetts, (Mr. King, aye, Mr. Gorham,
wavering) Connecticut, North Carolina, South Ca
rolina, no--4.°'"
The words requiring members of the first branch
to be of the age of  year^ were struck out,
— Maryland alone, no.
The words " liberal compensation for members"
being considered, Mr. Madison moved to insert the
words, " and fixed." He observed that it would be
improper to leave the members of the National
Legislature to be provided for by the State Legisla-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 849
tures, because it would create an improper depend
ence ; and to leave thera to regulate their own
wages was an indecent thing, and might in time
prove a dangerous one. He thought wheat, or some
other article of which the average price, throughout
a reasonable period preceding, might be settled in
some covenient mode, would form a proper stand
ard. Colonel Mason seconded the motion ; adding, that
it would be improper, for other reasons, to leave the
wages to be regulated by the States, — first, the
different States would make different provision for
their representatives, and an inequality would be
felt among them, whereas he thought they ought to
be in all respects equal ; secondly, the parsimony of
the States might reduce the provision so low, that, as
had already happened in choosing delegates to Con
gress, the question would be, not who were most fit
to be chosen, but who were most willing to serve.
On the question for inserting the words, " and
fixed," — New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
Georgia, aye — 8 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, South
Carolina, no — 3.
Doctor Franklin said, he approved of the amend
ment just made for rendering the salaries as fixed as
possible ; but disliked the word " liberal.'' He
would prefer the word " moderate," if it was neces
sary to substitute any other. He remarked the
tendency of abuses, in every case, to grow of them
selves when once begun ; and related very pleasant
ly the progression in ecclesiastical benefices, from
the first departure from the gratuitous provision for
54

850 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
the apostles, to the establishment of the papal sys
tem. The word " liberal" was struck out, nem con.
On the motion of Mr. Pierce, that the wages
should be paid out of the National Treasury, Massa
chusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye —
8 ; Connecticut, New York, South Carolina, no — 3.
Question on the clause relating to term of service
and compensation of the first branch, — Massachu
setts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary
land, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8 ;
Connecticut, New York, South Carolina, no — 3.
On a question for striking out the " ineligibility of
members ofthe National Legislature to State offices,"
— Connecticut, New York, North Carolina, South
Carolina, aye — 4 ; New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Virginia, Georgia, no — 5 ; Massachusetts,
Maryland, divided.
On the question for agreeing to the clause as
amended, — Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 10; Con
necticut, no — 1.
On a question for making members of the Na
tional Legislature ineligible to any office under the
National Government for the term of three years
after ceasing to be members, — Maryland, aye — 1 ;
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, no — .10.
On the question for such ineligibility for one
year, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina,

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 851
South Carolina, aye — 8 ; New York, Georgia, no —
2 ; Maryland divided.
On the question moved by Mr. Pinckney, for
striking out " incapable of re-election into the first
branch of the National Legislature for  years,
and subject to recall," agreed to, nem, con,'"
On the question for striking out from the fifth
Resolution the words requiring members of the
Senatorial branch to be of the age of  years
at least, — Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
aye — 3 ; Massachusetts, New York, Delaware, Mary
land, Virginia, South Carolina, no — 6 ; North Caro
lina, Georgia, divided.
On the question for filling the blank with " thirty
years," as the qualification, it was agreed to, —
Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 7;
Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, no
—4. Mr. Spaight moved to fill the blank for the dura
tion of the appointments to the second branch of the
national Legislature, with the words " seven years."
Mr. Sherman thought seven years too long. He
grounded his opposition, he said, on the principle,
that if they did their duty well, they would be re
elected ; and if they acted amiss, an earlier oppor
tunity should be allowed for getting rid of them.
He preferred five years, which would be between the
terms of the first branch and of the Executive.
Mr. Pierce proposed three years. Seven years
would raise an alarm. Great mischiefs have arisen
in England from their Septennial Act, which was
reprobated by most of their patriotic statesmen.

852 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
Mr. Randolph was for the term of seven years.
The democratic licentiousness of the State Legisla
tures proved the necessity of a firm Senate. The
object of this second branch is, to control the demo
cratic branch of the National Legislature. If it be
not a firm body, the other branch, being more
numerous, and coming immediately from the people,
will overwhelm it. The Senate of Maryland, con
stituted on like principles, had been scarcely able to
stem the popular torrent. No mischief can be ap
prehended, as the concurrence of the other branch,
and in some measure of the Executive, will in all
cases be necessary. A firmness and independence
may be the more necessary, also, in this branch, as
it ought to guard the Constitution against encroach
ments of the Executive, who will be apt to form
combinations with the demagogues of the popular
branch. Mr. Madison considered seven years as a term by
no means too long. What we wished was, to give
to the government that stability which was every
where called for, and which the enemies of the
republican form alleged to be inconsistent with its
nature. He was not afraid of giving too much
stability, by the term of seven years. His fear was,
that the popular branch would still be too great an
overmatch for it. It was to be much lamented that
we had so little direct experience to guide us.
The Constitution of Maryland was the only one
that bore any analogy to this part of the plan. In
no mstance had the Senate of Maryland created
just suspicions of danger from it. In some instances,
perhaps, it may have erred by yielding to the House

1787.] federal CONVENTION. 853
of Delegates. In every instance of their opposition
to the measures of the House of Delegates, they had
had with them the suffrages of the most enlightened
and impartial people of the other States, as well as
of their own. In the States, where the Senates
were chosen in the same manner as the other
branches of the Legislature, and held their seats for
four years, the institution was found to be no check
whatever against the instabilities of the other
branches. He conceived it to be of great impor
tance that a stable and firm government, organized
in the republican form, should be held out to the
people. If this be not done, and the people be left
to judge of this species of government by the ope
rations of the defective systems under which they
now live, it is much to be feared, the time is not
distant, when, in universal disgust, they will re
nounce the blessing which they have purchased at
so dear a rate, and be ready for any change that
may be proposed to them.
On the question for " seven years," as the term for
the second branch, — New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, aye, — 8; Connecticut,
no — 1 ; Massachusetts, (Mr. Gorham and Mr. King,
aye ; Mr. Gerry and Mr. Strong, no) New York, di
vided.™ Mr. Butler and Mr. Rutledge proposed that the
members of the second branch should be entitled to
no salary or compensation for their services. On
the question,* — Connecticut, Delaware, South Car-
* It is probable the votes here tumed chiefly on the idea that if the salaries
were not here provided for, the members would be paid by their respective States.

854 debates in the [1787.
olina, aye — 3 ; New York, New Jersey, Pennsylva
nia, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia,
no — 7 ; Massachusetts, divided.
It was then moved, and agreed, that the^clauses
respecting the stipends and ineligibility of the sec
ond branch be the same as of the first branch, —
Connecticut disagreeing to the ineligibilty. It was
moved and seconded, to alter the ninth Resolution,
so as to read, " that the jurisdiction of the supreme
tribunal shall be, to hear and determine, in the der
nier resort, all piracies, felonies, &c."
It was moved and seconded, to strike out, " all
piracies and felonies on the high seas," which was
agreed to.
It was moved, and agreed, to strike out, " all cap
tures from an enemy."
It was moved, and agreed, to strike out, "other
States," and insert "two distinct States of the
Union." It was moved, and agreed, to postpone the con
sideration of the ninth Resolution, relating to the
Judiciary. The Committee then rose, and the House ad
journed.

Wednesday, June 13th.
In Committee of the Whole, — The ninth Resolu
tion being resumed, —
The latter part of the clause relating to the juris
diction of the national tribunals, was struck out,
nem. con, ; in order to leave full room for then* or
ganization.

1787.] federal convention. 855
Mr. Randolph and Mr. Madison then moved the
following resolution respecting a national Judiciary,
viz. : " that the jurisdiction of the National Judi
ciary shall extend to cases which respect the col
lection of the national revenue, impeachments of
any national officers, and questions which involve the
national peace and harmony." Agreed to.°°^
Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Sherman moved to insert,
after the words, " one supreme tribunal," the words,
" the judges of which to be appointed by the Na
tional Legislature."
Mr. Madison objected to an appointment by the
whole Legislature. Many of them are incompetent
judges of the requisite qualifications. They were
too much influenced by their partialities. The can
didate who was present, who had displayed a talent
for business in the legislative field, who had, per
haps, assisted ignorant raembers in business of their
own, or of their constitutents, or used other winning
means, would. Without any of the essential qualifi
cations for an expositor of the laws, prevail over a
competitor not having these recomraendations, but
possessed of every necessary accomplishment. He
proposed that the appointment should be made by
the Senate; which, as a less numerous and more
select body, would be more competent judges, and
which was sufficiently numerous to justify such
a confidence in them.
Mr. Sherman and Mr. Pinckney withdrew their
motion, and the appointment by the Senate was
agreed to, nem, con.
Mr. Gerry moved to restrain the Senatorial branch
from originating money bills. The other branch was

856 debates in the [1787.
more immediately the representatives of the people,
and it was a maxim, that the people ought to hold
the purse-strings. If the Senate should be allowed
to originate such bills, they would repeat the experi
ment, till chance should furnish a set of Represen
tatives in the other branch who will fall into their
snares. Mr. Butler saw no reason for such a discrimina
tion. We were always following the British Con
stitution, when the reason of it did not apply. There
was no analogy between the House of Lords and
the body proposed to be established. If the Senate
should be degraded by any such discriminations, the
best men would be apt to decline serving in it, in
favor of the other branch. And it will lead the latter
into the practice of tacking other clauses to money
bills. Mr. Madison observed, that the comraentators on
the British Constitution had not yet agreed on the
reason of the restriction on the House of Lords, in
money bills. Certain it was, there could be no simi
lar reason in the case before us. The Senate would
be the representatives of the people, as well as the
first branch. If they should have any dangerous
influence over it, they would easily prevail on some
member of the latter to originate the bill they wished
to be passed. As the Senate would be generally a
more capable set of men, it would be wrong to disable
them from any preparation of the business, especially
of that which was most important, and, in our repub
lics, worse prepared than any other. The gentle
man, in pursuance of his principle, ought to carry
the restraint to the amendment, as well as the ori-

1787.] federal convention. 857
ginating of money bills ; since an addition of a given
sum would be equivalent to a distinct proposition
ofit. Mr. King differed from Mr. Gerry, and concurred
in the objections to the proposition.
Mr. Read favored the proposition, but would not
extend the restraint to the case of amendments.
Mr. Pinckney thinks the question premature. If
the Senate should be formed on the same proportional
representation as it stands at present, they should
have equal power ; otherwise, if a different principle
should be introduced.
Mr. Sherman. As both branches must concur,
there can be no danger, whichever way the Senate
may be formed. We establish two branches in or
der to get more wisdom, which is particularly needed
in the finance business. The Senate bear their share
of the taxes, and are also the representatives of the
people. ' What a man does by another, he does by
himself,' is a maxim. In Connecticut both branches
can originate, in all cases, and it has been found safe
and convenient. Whatever might have been the
reason of the rule as to the House of Lords, it is
clear that no good arises from it now even there.
General Pinckney. This distinction prevails in
South Carolina, and has been a source of pernicious
disputes between the two branches. The Consti
tution is now evaded by informal schedules of
amendments, handed from the Senate to the other
House. Mr. Williamson wishes for a question, chiefly to
prevent re-discussion. The restriction will have
one advantage ; it will oblige some member in the
54*

858 debatesinthe [ 1787.
lower branch to move, and people can then mark
him. On the question for excepting money-bills, as pro
posed by Mr. Gerry,-— New York, Delaware, Vir
ginia, aye — 3 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jer
sey, Maryland, North Cai'olina, South Carolina,
Georgia, no— 7.'°'
The Committee rose, and Mr. Gorham made re
port, which was postponed till to-morrow, to give an
opportunity for other plans to be proposed — the
Report was in the words following :
1. Resolved, that it is the opinion of this Commit
tee, that a national Government ought to be estab
lished, consisting of a supreme Legislative, Execu
tive and Judiciary.
2. Resolved, that the National Legislature ought
to consist of two branches.
3. Resolved, that the merabers of the first branch
of the National Legislature ought to be elected by
the people of the several States for the term of three
years, to receive fixed stipends by which they may
be compensated for the devotion of their time to the
public service, to be paid out of the National Trea
sury : to be ineligible to any office established by a
particular State, or under the authority of the Uni
ted States, (except those peculiarly belonging to the
functions of the first branch,) during the term of ser
vice, and under the national Government for the
space of one year after its expiration.
4. Resolved, that the members of the second
branch of the National Legislature ought to be
chosen by the individual Legislatures ; to be of the
age of thirty years at least ; to hold their offices for

1787.] federal convention. 859
a term sufficient to ensure their independence, name
ly, seven years ; to receive fixed stipends by which
they raay be compensated for the devotion of their
time to the public service, to be paid out of the Na
tional Treasury ; to be ineligible to any office estab
lished by a particular State, or under the authority
of the United States, (except those peculiarly be
longing to the functions of the second branch,) dur
ing the terra of service, and under the national Gov
ernment for the space of one year after its expira
tion. 5. Resolved, that each branch ought to possess
the right of originating acts.
6. Resolved, that the National Legislature ought
to be empowered to enjoy the legislative rights ves
ted in Congress by the Confederation ; and moreover
to legislate in all cases to which the separate States
are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the
United States may be interrupted by the exercise of
individual legislation ; to negative all laws passed
by the several States contravening, in the opinion of
the National Legislature, the Articles of Union, or
any treaties subsisting under the authority of the
Union. 7. Resolved, that the rights of suffrage in the first
branch of the National Legislature, ought not to be
according to the rule established in the Articles of
Confederation, but according to some equitable ratio
of representation, namely, in proportion to the whole
number of white and other free citizens and inhabi
tants, of every age, sex and condition, including those
bound to servitude for a term of years, and three-
fifths of all other persons, not comprehended in the

860 debatesinthe [ 1787.
foregoing description, except Indians not paying
taxes, in each State.
8. Resolved, that the right of suffrage in the sec
ond branch of the National Legislature, ought to be
according to the rule established for the first.
9. Resolved, that a National Executive be insti
tuted, to consist of a single persofl ; to be chosen by
the National Legislature, for the tenn of seven years;
with power to carry into execution the national
laws ; to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise
provided for ; to be ineligible a second tirae ; and to
be removable on impeachraent and conviction of
malpractices or neglect of duty ; to receive a fixed
stipend by which he may be compensated for the
devotion of his time to the public service, to be paid
out of the National Treasury.
10. Resolved, that the national Executive shall
have a right to negative any legislative act, which
shall not be afterwards passed by two-thirds of each
branch of the national Legislature.
11. Resolved, that a national Judiciary be estab
lished, to consist of one suprerae tribunal, the Judges
of which shall be appointed by the second branch of
the national Legislature, to hold their offices during
good behaviour, and to receive punctually, at stated
times, a fixed compensation for their services, in
which no increase or diminution shall be made, so
as to affect the persons actually in office at the time
of such increase or diminution.
12. Resolved, that the national Legislature be
empowered to appoint inferior tribunals.
13. Resolved, that the jurisdiction of the national
Judiciary shall extend to all cases which respect

1787. J federal CONVENTION. 861
the collection of the national revenue, impeach
ments of any national officers, and questions which
involve the national peace and harmony.
14, Resolved, that provision ought to be made for
the admission of States lawfully arising within the
limits of the United States, whether from a volun
tary junction of government and territory, or other
wise, with the consent of a number of voices in the
national Legislature less than the whole.
15. Resolved, that provision ought to be made for
the continuance of Congress and their authorities
and privileges, until a given day, after the reform of
the Articles of Union shall be adopted, and for the
completion of all their engagements.
16. Resolved, that a republican constitution, and
its existing laws. Ought to be guaranteed to each
State, by the United States.
17. Resolved, that provision ought to be made for
the amendment of the Articles bf Union, whensoever
it shall seera necessary.
18. Resolved, that the Legislative, Executive and
Judiciary powers within the several States, ought
to be bound by oath to support the Articles of
Union. 19. Resolved, that the amendments which shall
be offered to the Confederation by the Convention
ought, at a proper time or times after the approba
tion of Congress, to be subraitted to an asserably or
asserablies recommended by the several Legisla
tures, to be expressly chosen by the people to con
sider and decide thereon.""

862 debates in the [1787.
Thursday, June 14th,
Mr. Patterson observed to the Convention, that
it was the wish of several Deputations, particularly
that of New Jersey, that further time might be al
lowed them to contemplate the plan reported from
the Committee of the Whole, and to digest one
purely federal, and contradistinguished from the
reported plan. He said, they hoped to have such
an one ready by to-morrow to be laid before the
Convention : and the Convention adjourned that
leisure might be given for the purpose.

Friday, June 15th.
In Convention, — Mr. Patterson laid before the
Convention the plan which he said several of the
Deputations wished to be substituted in place of that
proposed by Mr. Randolph. After some little dis
cussion of the most proper mode of giving it a fair
deliberation, it was agreed, that it should be refer
red to a Comraittee of the Whole ; and that, in or
der to place the two plans in due coraparison, the
other sliould be recoramitted. At the earnest re
quest of Mr, Lansing and some other gentlemen, it
was also agreed that the Convention should not go
into Committee of the Whole on the subject till
to-morrow ; by which delay the friends of the plan
proposed by Mr. Patterson would be better pre
pared to explain and support it, and all would have
an opportunity of taking copies.*
* This plan had been concerted araong the Deputation, or members thereof, from
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and perhaps Mr. Martin, from

1787.] federal c 0 n V e n t 1 0 n .\\ ..£,> > SB3

The propositions from New Jersey, moved iJy "Mk:.;
Patterson, were in the words following :
1. Resolved, that the Articles of Confederation
ought to be so revised, corrected, and enlarged, as to
render the Federal Constitution adequate to the ex
igencies of government, and the preservation of the
Union. 2, Resolved, that, in addition to the powers vested
in the United States in Congress, by the present ex
isting Articles of Confederation, they be authorized
to pass acts for raising a revenue, by levying a duty
or duties on all goods or merchandizes of foreign
growth or manufacture, imported into any part of
the United States ; by stamps on paper, vellum or
parchment ; and by a postage on all letters or pack
ages passing through the general post-office ; to be
applied to such Federal purposes as they shall deem
proper and expedient ; to make rules and regulations
for the collection thereof; and the same, from tirae
to tirae, to alter and amend in such manner as they
shall think proper ; to pass acts for the regulation of
trade and comraerce, as well with foreign nations as
Maryland, who made with them a common cause, though on different principles.
Connecticut and New York were against a departure from the principle of the
Confederation, wishiiig rather to add a few new powers to Congress than to
substitute a National Govemment. The States of New Jersey and Delaware
were opposed to a National Government, because its patrons considered a propor
tional representation of the States as the basis of it. The eagemess displayed by
the members opposed to a National Government, from these different motives,
began now to produce serious anxiety for the result of the Convention. Mr.
Dickinson said to Mr. Madison, "You see the consequence of pushing things
too far. Some of the members from the small States wish for two branches in
the General Legislature, and are friends to a good National Govemment ; but
we would sooner submit to foreign power, than submit to be deprived, in both
bwnches of the legislature, of an equality of sufirage, and thereby be throvra
under the domination of the larger States."

864 debates in the [1787.
with each other; provided that all punishments,
fines, forfeitures and penalties, to be incurred for con
travening snch acts, rules and regulations, shall be
adjudged by the common law Judiciaries of the
State in which any offence contrary to the true in
tent and meaning of such acts, rules, and regula
tions, sliall have been committed or perpetrated,
with liberty of commencing in the first instance all
suits and prosecutions for that purpose in the Supe
rior common law Judiciary in such State ; subject,
nevertheless, for the correction of all errors, both in
law and fact, in rendering judgment, to an appeal to
the Judiciary of the United States.
3. Resolved, that whenever requisitions shall be
necessary, instead of the rule for making requisitions
raentioned in the Articles of Confederation, the Uni
ted States in Congress be authorized to make such
requisitions in proportion to the whole number of
white and other free citizens and inhabitants, of eve
ry age, sex, and condition, including those bound to
servitude for a term of years, and three-fifths of all
other persons not comprehended in the foregoing de
scription, except Indians not paying taxes ; that, if
such requisitions be not coraplied with, in the time
specified therein, to direct the collection thereof in
the non-complying States ; and for that purpose to
devise and pass acts directing and authorizing the
sarae; provided, that none of the powers hereby
vested in the United States in Congress, shall be ex
ercised without the consent of at least  States ;
and in that proportion, if the number of confedera
ted States should hereafter be increased or dimin
ished.

1787.] federal convention. 865
4. Resolved, that the United States in Congress
be authorized to elect a Federal Executive, to con
sist of  persons, to continue in office for the
term of  years ; to receive punctually, at
stated tiraes, a fixed compensation for their services,
in which no increase nor diminution shall be made
so as to affect the persons composing the Executive
at the time of such increase or dirainution; to be
paid out of the Federal treasury ; to be incapable of
holding any other office or appointraent during their
time of .service, and for  years thereafter:
to be ineligible a second time, and reraoveable by
Congress, on application by a raajority of the Ex
ecutives of the several States ; that the Executive,
besides their general authority to execute the Fed
eral acts, ought to appoint all Federal officers not
otherwise provided for, and to direct all military
operations ; provided, that none of the persons com
posing the Federal Executive shall, on any occasion,
take comraand of any troops, so as personally to
conduct any military enterprise, as General, or in
any other capacity.
5. Resolved, that a Federal Judiciary be estab
lished, to consist of a supreme tribunal, the Judges
of which to be appointed by the Executive, and to
hold their offices during good behaviour ; to receive
punctually, at stated times, a fixed corapensation for
their services, in which no increase nor dirainution
shall be made so as to affect the persons actually
in office at the time of such increase or diminution.
That the Judiciary so established shall have author
ity to hear and determine, in the first instance, on
55

866 debates in the [1787.
on all impeachments of Federal officers; and, by
way of appeal, in the dernier resort, in all cases
touching the rights of arabassadors ; in all cases of
captures frora an eneray ; in all cases of piracies
and felonies on the high seas; in all cases in which
foreigners may be interested ; in the construction of
any treaty or treaties, or which may arise on any
of the acts for the regulation of trade, or the col
lection of the Federal revenue : that none of the
Judiciary .shall, during the tirae they reraain in
office, be capable of receiving or holding any other
office or appointment dtiring their term of service, or
for  thereafter.
6. Resolved, that all acts of the United States in
Congress, made by virtue and in pursuance of the
powers hereby, and by the Articles qf Confedera
tion, vested in them, and all treaties made and rati
fied under the authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme law of the respective States, so far
forth as those acts or treaties shall relate to the said
States or their citizens ; and that the Judiciary of
the several States shall be bound thereby in their
decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the
individual States to the contrary notwithstanding :
and that if any State, or any body of men in any
State, .shall oppose or prevent the carrying into ex
ecution such acts or treaties, the Federal Executive
shall be authorized to call forth the power of the
confederated States, or so much thereof as may be
necessary, to enforce and compel an obedience to
such acts, or an observance of such treaties.
7. Resolved, that provision be made for the ad
raission of new States into the Union.

1787.] federal convention. 867
8. Resolved, that the rule for naturalization ought
to be same in every State.
9. Resolved, that a citizen of one State commit
ting an offence in another State of the Union, shall
be deemed guilty of the same offence as if it had
been committed by a citizen of the State in which
the offence was committed.*'^"
Adjourned.

Saturday, June 16th.

In Committee of the Whole, on the Resolutions pro
posed by Mr. Patterson and Mr. Randolph, — Mr.
Lansing called for the reading of the first Resolution
of each plan, which he considered as involving prin
ciples directly in contrast. That of Mr. Patterson,
says he, sustains the sovereignty of the respective
States, that of Mr. Randolph destroys it. The latter
requires a negative on all the laws of the particular
States, the former only certain general power for the
general good. The plan of Mr. Randolph in short
absorbs all power, except what may be exercised in
the little local matters ofthe States which are not ob-

* This copy of Mr. Patterson's propositions varies in a few clauses from that
in the printed Journal furnished from the papers of Mr. Brearly, a colleague of
Mr. Patterson. A confidence is felt, notwithstanding, in its accuracy. That
the copy in the Journal is not entirely correct, is shown by the ensuing speech
of Mr. Wilson (June 16), in which he refers to the mode of removing the Ex
ecutive " by impeachment and conviction" as a feature in the Virginia plan
forming one of its contrasts to that of Mr. Patterson, which proposed a removal
" on application of a majority of the Executive? of the States." In the copy
printed in the Journal, the two modes are combined in the same clause ;
whether through inadvertence, or as a contemplated amendment, does not
appear.

868 debates in the [1787.
jects worthy of the supreme cognizance. He ground
ed his preference of Mr, Patterson's plan, chiefly, on
two objections to that of Mr. Randolph, — first, want
of power in the Convention to discuss and propose
it : secondly, the improbability of its being adopted.
1. He was decidedly of opinion that the power of
the Convention was restrained to amendments of a
Federal nature, and having for their basis the Con
federacy in being. The acts of Congress, the tenor
of the acts of the States, the coraraissions produced
by the several Deputations, all proved this. And
this limitation of the power to an amendment of
the Confederacy marked the opinion of the States,
that it was unnecessary and improper to go further.
He was sure that this was the case with his State.
New York would never have concurred in sending
Deputies to the Convention, if she had supposed the
deliberations were to turn on a consolidation of the
States, and a National Government.
2. Was it probable that the States would adopt
and ratify a scherae, which they had never author
ized us to propose, and which so far exceeded what
they regarded as sufficient 1 We see by their seve
ral acts, particularly in relation to the plan of reve
nue proposed by Congress in 1783, not authorized
by the Articles of Confederation, what were the
ideas they then entertained. Can so great a change
be supposed to have already taken place 1 To rely
on any change which is hereafter to take place in
the sentiments of the people, would be trusting to
too great an uncertainty. We know only what
their present sentiments are. And it is in vain to
propose what will not accord with these. The

1787.] federal convention. 869
States will never feel a sufficient confidence in a
General Government, to give it a negative on their
lawvS. The scheme is itself totally novel. There is
no parallel to it to be found. The authority of Con
gress is familiar to the people, and an augmentation
of the powers of Congress will be readily approved
by them.
Mr. Patterson said, as he had on a former occa
sion given his sentiraents on the plan proposed by
Mr. Randolph, he would now, avoiding repetition as
much as possible, give his reasons in favor of that
proposed by himself He preferred it because it ac
corded, — first, with the powers of the Convention;
secondly, with the sentiments of the people. If the
Confederacy was radically wrong, let us return to
our States, and obtain larger powers, not assume
them ourselves. I came here not to speak my own
sentiments, but the sentiments of those who sent me.
Our object is not such a government as may be best
in itself, but such a one as our constituents have au
thorized us to prepare, and as they will approve.
If we argue the matter on the supposition that no
confederacy at present exists, it cannot be denied
that all the States stand on the footing of equal
sovereignty. All, therefore, must concur before any
can be bound. If a proportional representation be
right, why do we not vote so here ? If we argue on
the fact that a Federal compact actually exists, and
consult the articles of it, we still find an equal sove
reignty to be the basis of it. He reads the fifth Ar
ticle of the Confederation, giving each State a vote ;
and the thirteenth, declaring that no alteration shall
be made without unanimous consent. This is the

870 debates in the [1787,
nature of all treaties. What is unanimously done,
must be unanimously undone. It was observed (by
Mr. Wilson) that the larger States gave up the
point, not because it was right, but because the cir
cumstances of the moment urged the concession.
Be it so. Are tbey for that reason at liberty to
take it back 1 Can the donor resume his gift with
out the consent of the donee 1 This doctrine may
be convenient, but it is a doctrine that will sacrifice
the lesser States. The larger States acceded readi
ly to the Confederacy. It was the «raall ones that
came in reluctantly and slowly. New Jersey and
Maryland were the two last ; the former objecting
to the want of power in Congress over trade ; both
of them to the want of power to appropriate the va
cant territory to the benefit of the whole. If the
sovereignty of the States is to be maintained, the
representatives must be drawn iraraediately from the
States, not from the people ; and we have no power
to vary the idea of equal sovereignty. The only
expedient that will cure the difficulty is that of
throwing the States into hotchpot. To say that
this is impracticable, will not make it so. Let it be
tried, and we shall see whether the citizens of Mas
sachusetts, Pennsylvania and Virginia accede to it.
It will be objected, that coercion will be impracti
cable. But will it be more so in one plan than the
other ? Its efficacy will depend on the quantum of
power collected, not on its being drawn from the
States, or from the individuals ; and according to his
plan it may be exerted on individuals as well as ac
cording to that of Mr. Randolph. A distinct Ex
ecutive and Judiciary also were equally provided by

1787.] federal convention. 871
his plan. It is urged, that two branches in the Le
gislature are necessary. Why ? For the purpose of
a check. But the reason for the precaution is not
applicable to this case. Within a particular State,
where party heats prevail, such a check may be
necessary. In such a body as Congress it is less
necessary; and, besides, thc Delegations of the dif
ferent States are checks on each other. Do the
people at large complain of Congress ? No. What
they wish is, that Congress may have more power.
If the power now proposed be not enough, the peo
ple hereafter will make additions to it. With pro
per powers Congress will act with more energy and
wisdom than the proposed National Legislature;
being fewer in number, and more secreted and
refined by the mode of election. The plan of Mr.
Randolph will also be enorraously expensive. Al
lowing Georgia and Delaware two representatives
each in the popular branch, the aggregate number
of that branch wili be one hundred and eighty.
Add to it half as many for the other branch, and
you have two hundred and seventy members, coming
one at least a year, from the most distant as well as
the most central parts of the Republic. In the pre
sent deranged state ofour finances, can so expensive
a system be seriously thought of ? By enlarging the
powers of Congress, the greatest part of this ex
pense will be saved, and all purposes will be an
swered. At least a trial ought to be made.
Mr. Wilson entered into a contrast of the princi
pal points of the two plans, so far, he said, as there
had been time to examine the one last proposed.
These points were : — 1. In the Virginia plan there

872 debates in the [1787.
are tioo, and in some degree three, branches in the
Legislature ; in the plan from New Jersey there is
to be a single Legislature only. 2. Representation
of the people at large is the basis of one ; the State
Legislatures the pillars of the other. 3. Propor
tional representation prevails in one, equality of
suffrage in the other. 4. A single Executive Magis
trate is at the head of the one ; a plurality is held
out in the other. 5. In the one, a majority of the
people of the United States raust prevail ; in the
other, a rainority raay prevail. 6. The National
Legislature is to make laws in all cases to which
the separate States are incorapetent, &c. ; in place
of this. Congress are to have additional power in a
few cases only. 7. A negative on the laws of the
States ; in place of this, coercion to be substituted.
8. The Executive to be reraovable on impeachraent
and conviction, in one plan ; in the other, to be re
movable at the instance of a raajority of the Execu
tives of the States. 9. Revision of the laws provi
ded for, in one ; no such check in the other. 10.
Inferior national tribunals, in one ; none such in the
other. 11. In the one, jurisdiction of national tri
bunals to extend, &c.; an appellate jurisdiction only
allowed in the other. 12. Here, the jurisdiction is
to extend to all cases affecting the national peace
and harraony ; there, a few cases only are marked
out. 13. Finally, the ratification is, in this, to be by
the people themselves ; in that, by the legislative
authorities, according to the thirteenth Article of
the Confederation.
With regard to the power of the Convention, he
conceived himself authorized to conclude nothing, but

1787.] federal convention. 873
to be at liberty to propose any thing. In this par
ticular, he felt himself perfectly indifferent to the
two plans.
With regard to the sentiments of the people, he con
ceived it difficult to know precisely what they are.
Those of the particular circle in which one moved
were comraonly raistaken for the general voice. He
could not persuade himself that the State Govern
ments and sovereignties were so much the idols of
the people, nor a National Government so obnox
ious to them, as sorae supposed. Why should a
National Governraent be unpopular? Has it less
dignity ? Will each citizen enjoy under it less lib
erty or protection ? Will a citizen of Delarvare be
degraded by becoming a citizen of the United States?
Where do the people look at present for relief from
the evils of which they complain? Is it frora
an internal reform of their governments ? No, sir.
It is from the national councils that relief is ex
pected. For these reasons, he did not fear that the
people would not follow us into a National Gov
ernment ; and it will be a further recommendation
of Mr. Randolph's plan, that it is to be submitted
to them, and not to the Legislatures, for ratification.
Proceeding now to the first point on which he
had contrasted the two plans, he observed, that,
anxious as he was for some augraentation of the
Federal powers, it would be with extreme reluc
tance, indeed, that he could ever consent to give
powers to Congress. He had two reasons, either
of which was sufficient, — first, Congress, as a legis
lative body, does not stand on the people ; secondly,
it is a single body,
55*

874 debates in the [1787.
1. He would not repeat the remarks he had for
merly made on the principles of representation. He
would only say, that an inequality in it has ever
been a poison contaminating every branch of gov
ernment. In Great Britain, where this poison has
had a full operation, the security of private rights is
owing entirely to the purity of her tribunals of jus
tice, the judges of which are neither appointed nor
paid by a venal parliaraent. The political liberty
of that nation, owing to the inequality of represen
tation, is at the mercy of its rulers. He means not
to insinuate that there is any parallel between the
situation of that country and ours; at present. But it
is a lesson we ought not to disregard, that the small
est bodies in Great Britain are notoriously the
most corrupt. Every other source of influence
must also be stronger in small than in large bodies
of men. When Lord Chesterfield had told us that
one of the Dutch provinces had been seduced into
the views of France, he need not have added, that
it was not Holland, but one of the smallest of them.
There are facts among ourselves which are known to
all. Passing over others, we will only remark that
the Impost, so anxiously wished for by the public, was
defeated not by any ofthe larger States in the Union.
2. Congress is a single Legislature. Despotism
comes on mankind in different shapes, sometimes in
an Executive, sometimes in a military one. Is
there no danger of a Legislative despotisra ? The
ory and practice both proclaim it. If the Legisla
tive authority be not restrained, there can be neither
liberty nor stability ; and it can only be restrained
by dividing it within itself, into distinct and inde-

1787.] federal convention. 875
pendent branches. In a single House there is no
check, but the inadequate one, of the virtue and
good sense of those who compose it.
On another great point, the contrast was equally
favorable to the plan reported by the Comraittee of
the Whole. It vested the Executive powers in a
single magistrate. The plan of New Jersey, vested
them in a plurality. In order to control the Legisla
tive authority, you must divide it. In order to control
the Executive you must unite it. One man will be
more re^sponsible than three. Three will contend
among theraselves, till one becomes the master of his
colleagues. In the triumvirates of Rome, first, Caesar,
then Augustus, are witnesses of this truth. The
Kings of Sparta, and the Consuls of Rome, prove
also the factious consequences of dividing the Ex
ecutive magistracy. Having already taken up so
much time, he would not, he said, proceed to any of
the other points. Those on which he had dwelt
are sufficient of themselves; and on the decision of
them the fate of the others will depend.
Mr. Pinckney.^"^ The whole comes to this, as he
conceived. Give New Jersey an equal vote, and
she will disraiss her scruples, and concur in the Na
tional systera. He thought the Convention author
ized to go any length, in recommending, which they
found necessary to reraedy the evils which pro
duced this Convention.
Mr. Ellsworth proposed, as a more distinctive
, form of collecting the raind of the Coraraittee on the
subject, "that the Legislative power of the United
States should reraain in Congress." This was not
seconded, though it seemed better calculated for

876 debates in the [1787.
the purpose than the first proposition of Mr. Pat
terson, in place of which Mr. Ellsworth wished to
substitute it.
Mr. Randolph was not scrupulous on the point of
power. When the salvation of the Republic was at
stake, it would be treason to our trust, not to pro
pose what we found necessary. He painted in
strong colours the imbecility of the existing con
federacy, and the danger of delaying a substantial
reform. In answer to the objection drawn from
the sense of our constituents, as denoted by their
acts relating to the Convention and the objects
of their deliberation, he observed, that, as each
State acted separately in the case, it would have
been indecent for it to have charged the existing
Constitution, with all the vices which it might have
perceived iu it. The first State that set on foot this
experiment would not have been justified in going
so far, ignorant as it was of the opinion of others,
and sensible as it must have been of the uncertainty
of a successful issue to the experiment. There arc
reasons certainly of a peculiar nature, where the
ordinary cautions must be dispensed with ; and this
is certainly one of them. He would not, as far as
depended on him, leave any thing that seemed ne
cessary, undone. The present moment is favorable,
and is probably the last that will offer.
The true question is, whether we shall adhere to
the Federal plan, or introduce the National plan.
The insufficiency of the former has been fully dis
played by the trial already made. There are but two
modes by which the end of a General Government
can be attained : the first, by coercion, as proposed

1787.] federal convention. 877
by Mr. Patterson's plan ; the second, by real legis
lation, as proposed by the other plan. Coercion he
pronounced to be impracticable, expensive, cruel to
individuals. It tended, also, to habituate the instru
ments of it to shed the blood, and riot in the spoils,
of their fellow citizens, and consequently trained
them up for the service of arabition. We raust re
sort therefore to a national legislation over individuals ;
for which Congress are unfit. To vest such power
in thera would be blending the Legislative with the
Executive, contrary to the received maxim on this
subject. If the union of these powers, heretofore, in
Congress has been safe, it has been owing to the
general impotency of that body. Congress are,
moreover, not elected by the people, but by the Le
gislatures, who retain even a power of recall. They
have therefore no will of their own ; they are a
mere diplomatic body, and are always obsequious to
the views of the States, who are always encroach
ing on the authority of the United States. A pro
vision for harmony araong the States, as in trade,
naturalization, &c. ; for crushing rebellion, when
ever it may rear its crest ; and for certain other
general benefits, must be made. The powers for
these purposes can never be given to a body inade
quate as Congress are in point of representation,
elected in the raode in which they are, and possessing
no more confidence than they do : for notwithstand
ing what has been said to the contrary, his own ex
perience satisfied him, that a rooted distrust of
Congress pretty generally prevailed. A National
Government alone, properly constituted, will answer
the purpose ; and he begged it to be considered that

878 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
the present is the last moment for establishing one.
After this select experiment, the people will yield
to despair. °"
The Coramittee rose, and the House adjourned.

Monday, June 18th.

In Committee ofthe Whole, on the propositions of
Mr, Patterson and Mr. Randolph, — On raotion of
Mr. Dickinson, to postpone the first Resolution in Mr.
Patterson's plan, in order to take up the following,
viz. : " that the Articles of Confederation ought to
be revised and amended, so as to render the Gov
ernment of the United States adequate to the exi
gencies, the preservation, and the prosperity of the
Union," — the po,stponeraent was agreed to by ten
States ; Pennsylvania, divided.
Mr. Hamilton had been hitherto silent on the bu
siness before the Convention, partly from respect to
others whose superior abilities, age and experience,
rendered him unwilling to bring forward ideas dis
similar to theirs ; and partly frora his delicate situ
ation with respect to his own State, to whose sen
timents, as expressed by his colleagues; he could by
no means accede. The crisis, however, which now
marked our affairs, was too serious to permit any
scruples whatever to prevail over the duty imposed
on every man to contribute his efforts for the public
safety and happiness. He was obliged, therefore, to
declare himself unfriendly to both plans. He was
particularly opposed to that from New Jersey, being
fully convinced, that no amendment of the Confed-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 879
eration, leaving the States in possession of their
sovereignty, could possibly answer the purpose. On
the other hand, he confessed he was much discour
aged by the amazing extent of country, in expect
ing the desired blessings from any general sove
reignty that could be substituted. As to the powers
of the Conv^ention, he thought the doubts started
on that subject had arisen from distinctions and rea
sonings too subtle. A federal governraent he con
ceived to mean an association of independent cora
munities into one. Different confederacies have dif
ferent powers, and exercise them in different ways.
In .some instances, the powers are exercised over
collective bodies, in others, over individuals, as in
the German Diet ; and araong ourselves, in cases of
piracy. Great latitude, therefore, must be given to
the signification of the term. The plan last pro
posed departs, itself, from ihe federal idea, as under
stood by sorae, since it is to operate eventually on
individuals. He agreed, moreover, with the Honor
able gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph), that
we owed it to our country, to do, on this eraergency,
whatever we should deera essential to its happiness.
The States sent us here to provide for the exigencies
of the Union. To rely on and propose any plan
not adequate to these exigencies, merely because it
was not clearly within our powers, would be to
sacrifice the means to the end. It may be said, that
the States cannot ratify a plan not within the pur-
view^ of the Article of the Confederation providing
for alterations and amendments. But may not the
States themselves, in which no constitutional au
thority equal to this purpose exists in the Legisla-

880 debates IN THE [1787.
tures, have had in view a reference to the people
at large ? In the Senate of New York, a proviso
was moved, that no act of the Convention should
be binding until it should be referred to the people
and ratified ; and the motion was lost by a single
voice only, the reason assigned against it being, that
it might possibly be found an inconvenient shackle.
The great question is, what provision shall we
make for the happiness of our country ? He would
first make a comparative exaraination of the two
plans — prove that there were essential defects in
both — and point out sudi changes as might render
a national one efficacious. The great and essential
principles necessary for the support of government
are. 1, An active and constant interest in supporting
it. This principle does not exist in the States, in
favor of the Federal Government. They have
evidently in a high degree, the esprit de corps.
They constantly pursue internal interests adverse to
those of the whole. They have their particular
debts, their particular plans of finance, <fec. All
these, when opposed to, invariably prevail over, the
requisitions and plans of Congress. 2. The love of
power. Men love power. The same remarks are
applicable to this principle. The States have con
stantly shown a disposition rather to regain the
powers delegated by them, than to part with more,
or to give effect to what they had parted with.
The ambition of their demagogues is known to hate
the control of the General Government. It may be
remarked, too, that the citizens have not that anxi
ety to prevent a dissolution of the General Govern
ment, as of the particular governments. A dissolu-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 881
tion of the latter would be fatal ; of the former,
vvould still leave the purposes of government attain
able to a considerable degree. Consider what such
a State as Virginia will be in a few years, a few
compared with the life of nations. How strongly
will it feel its iraportance and self-sufficiency ! 3.
An habitual attachment of the people. The whole
force of this tie is on the side of the State Govern
ment. Its sovereignty is immediately before the
eyes of the .people ; its protection is immediately
enjoyed by them. From its hand distributive justice,
and all those acts which familiarize and, endear a
government to a people, are dispensed to them.
4. Force, by which may be understood a coercion of
laws or coercion of arms. Congress have not the
former, except in few cases. In particular States,
this coercion is nearly sufficient ; though he held it,
in most cases, not entirely so. ,A certain portion of
military force is absolutely necessary in large com
munities. Massachusetts is now feeling this ne
cessity, and making provision for it. But how can
this force be exerted on the States collectively ? It
is impossible. It amounts to a yvar between the
parties. Foreign powers also will not be idle spec
tators. They will interpose; the confusion will
increase ; and a dissolution of the Union will ensue.
5. Influence, — he did not mean Corruption, but a
dispensation of those regular honors and emoluments
which produce an attachment to the government.
Almost all the weight of these is on the side of the
States ; and must continue so as long as the States
continue to exist. All the passions, then, we see,
of avarice, ambition, interest, which govern most
56

882 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
individuals, and all public bodies, fall into the cur
rent of the States, and do not flow into the streara
of the General Governraent. The former, therefore,
will generally be an overmatch for the General
Governraent, and render any confederacy in its very
nature precarious. Theory is in this case fully con
firraed by experience. The Amphictyonic Council
had, it would seem, ample powerc for general pur
poses. It had, in particular, the power of fining and
using force against, delinquent merabers. What
was the consequence ? Their decrees were mere
signals of war. The Phocian war is a striking ex
ample of it. Philip at length, taking advantage of
their disunion, and insinuating himself into their
councils, raade himself master of their fortunes.
The German confederacy affords another lesson.
The authority of Charlemagne seemed to be as
great as could be necessary. The great feudal
chiefs, however, exercising their local sovereignties,
soon felt the spirit, and found the means, of encroach
ments, which reduced the Imperial authprity to a
nominal sovereignty. The Diet has succeeded,
which, though aided by a Prince^tits head, of great
authority independently ofhis imperial attributes, is
a striking illustration of the weakness of confeder
ated governments. Other exaraples instruct us in the
same truth. The Swiss Cantons have scarce any
union at all, and have been more than once at war
with one another. How then are all these evils to
be avoided 1 Only by such a coraplete sovereignty
in the General Government as will turn all the
strong principles and passions above-mentioned on
its side. Does the^ scheme of New Jersey produce

,1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 883
this effect ? Does it afford any substantial remedy
whatever ? On the contrary it labors under great
defects, and the defect of sorae of its provisions will
destroy the efficacy of others. It gives a direct
revenue to Congress, but this will not be sufficient.
The balance can only be supplied by requisitions ;
which experience proves cannot be relied on. If
States are to deliberate on the mode, they will also
deliberate on the object, of the supplies; and will
grant or not grant, as they approve or disapprove
ofit. The delinquency of one will invite and coun
tenance it in others. Ctuotas too, must, in the
nature of things, be so unequal, as to produce the
same evil. To what standard will you resort?
Land is a fallacious one. Compare Holland with
Russia; France, or England, with other countries
of Europe ; Pennsylvania with North Carolina, —
will the relative pecuniary abilities, in those in
stances, correspond with the relative value of land ?
Take numbers of inhabitants for the rule, and make
like comparison of different countries, and you will
find it to be equally unjust. The different degrees
of industry and improvement in different countries
render the first object a precarious measure of
wealth. Much depends, too, on situation, Con
necticut, New Jersey, and North Carolina, not being
coramercial States, and contributing to the wealth
of the commercial ones, can never bear quotas
assessed by the ordinary rules of proportion.
They will, and must, fail in their duty. Their
example will be followed, — and the union itself
be dissolved. Whence, then, is the national rev
enue to be drawn ? From commerce ; even from

884 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
exports, which, notwithstanding the common opin
ion, are fit objects of moderate taxation; from
excise, &c,, &c. — These, though not equal, are less
unequal than quotas. Another destructive ingre
dient in the plan is that equality of suffrage which
is so much desired by the sraall States. It is not in
human nature that Virginia and the large States
should consent to it ; or, if they did, that they should
long abide by it. It shocks too much all ideas of
justice, and every human feeling. Bad principles in
a government, though slow, are sure in their opera
tion, and will gradually destroy it. A doubt has
been raised whether Congress at present have a
right to keep ships or troops in time of peace. He
leans to the negative. Mr. Patterson's plan pro
vides no remedy. If the. powers proposed were ad
equate, the organization bf Congress is such, that
they could never be properly and effectually exer
cised. The members of Congress, being chosen by
the States and subject to recall, represent all the
local prejudices. Should the powers be found effec
tual, they vvill from time to time be heaped on them,
till a tyrannic sway shall be established. The Gen
eral power, whatever be its form, if it preserves it
self, must swallow up the state powers. Otherwise,
it will be swallowed up by them. It is against all
the principles of a good government, to vest the re
quisite powders in such a body as Congress. Tvvo
sovereignties cannot co-exist within the sarae limits.
Giving powers to Congress must eventuate in a bad
government, or in no government. The plan of
Nevv Jersey, therefore, will not do. What, then, is
to be done 1 Here he was embarrassed. The ex-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 885
tent of the country to be govemed discouraged him.
TTie expense of a General Government was also
formidable ; unless there were such a dirainution of
expense on the side of the State Governraents, as
the case would adrait. If they were extinguished,
he was persuaded that great economy might be ob
tained by substituting a General Governraent. He
did not mean, however, to shock the public opinion
by proposing such a measure. On the other hand,
he saw no other necessity for declining it. They are
not necessary for any of the great purposes of com
merce, revenue, or agriculture. Subordinate authori
ties, he was aware, would be necessary. There
must be district tribunals; corporations for local
purposes. But cui bono the vast and expensive ap
paratus now appertaining to the States ? The only
difficulty of a serious nature which occurred to him,
was that of drawing representatives from the ex
tremes to the centre of the community. What in
ducements can be offered that will suffice? The
moderate wages for the first branch could only be a
bait to little demagogues. Three dollars, or there
abouts, he supposed, would be the utmost. The
Senate, he feared,, ifrom a similar cause, would be
filled by certain undertakers, who wish for particular
offices under the government. This view of the sub
ject almost led him to despair that a republican gov
ernment could be established over so great an ex
tent. He was sensible, at the same time, that it
would be unwise to propose one of any other form.
In his private opinion, he had no scruple in declaring,
supported as he was by the opinion of so many of
the wise and good, that the British Governraent was

886 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
the best in the world : and that he doubted much
whether any thing short of it would do in America.
He hoped gentlemen of different opinions would bear
with hira in this, and begged them to recollect the
cliange of opinion on this subject which had taken
place, and was still going on. It was once thought
that the powder of Congress was amply sufficient to
secure the end of their institution. The error was
now seen by every one. The members most tena
cious of republicanism, he observed, were as loud as
any in declaiming against the vices of democracy.
This progress of the public mirld led him to anticipate
the time, when others as well as himself, would join
in the praise bestowed by Mr. Neckar on the British
Constitution, namely, that it is the only government
in the world "which unites public strength with indi
vidual security." In every community where indus
try is encouraged, there will be a division of it into
the few and the many. Hence, separate interests
will arise. There will be debtors and creditors, «Stc.
Give all power to the many, they will oppress the
few. Give all power to the few, they wUl oppress
the many. Both, therefore, ought to have the power,
that each may defend itself against the other. To
the want of this check we owe our paper-money,
instalraent laws, &c. To the proper adjustment of
it the British owe the excellence of their Constitu
tion. Their House of Lords is a most noble institu
tion. Having nothing to hope for by a change, and
a sufficient interest, by means of their property, in
being faithful to the national interest, they form a
permanent barrier against every pernicious innova
tion, whether attempted on the part of the Crown or

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 887
of the Commons. No temporary Senate will have
firmness enough to answer the purpose. The Senate
of Maryland which seems to be so much appealed
to, has not yet been sufficiently tried. Had the peo
ple been unanimous and eager in the late appeal to
them on the subject of a paper emission, they would
have yielded to the torrent. Their acquiescing in
such an appeal is a proof of it. Gentlemen diff'er in
their opinions concerning the necessary checks, from
the different estimates they form of the human pas
sions. They suppose seven years a sufficient period
to give the Senate an adequate firraness, frora not
duly considering the araazing violence and turbu
lence of the democratic spirit. When a great ob
ject of government is pursued, which seizes the pop
ular passions, they spread like wild-fire and becorae
irresistible. He appealed to the gentlemen from
the New England States, whether experience had
not there verified the remark. As to the Executive,
it seeraed to be adraitted that no good one could be
established on republican principles. Was not this
giving up the merits of the question; for can there
be a good governraent without a good Executive ?
The English model was the only good one on this
subject. The hereditary interest of the King was
so interwoven with that of the nation, and his per
sonal emolument so great, that he was placed above
the danger of being corrupted from abroad ; and at
the same time; was both sufficiently independent and
sufficiently controlled, to answer the purpose of the
institution at home. One of the weak sides of re
publics was their being liable to foreign influence
and corruption. Men of little character, acquiring

888 DEBATES IN THE [1787,
great pov^'^er, becorae easily the tools of intermed
dling neighbours. Sweden was a striking instance.
The F'rench and English had each their parties dur
ing the late revolution, which was effected by the
predominant influence of the former. Wliat is the
inference from all these observations? That we
ought to go as far, in order to attain stability and
permanency, as republican principles will admit.
Let one branch of the Legislature hold their places
for life, or at least during good, behaviour. Let the
Executive, also, be for life. He appealed to the feel
ings of the members present, whether a terra of seven
years would induce the sacrifices of private affairs
which an acceptance of public trust would require, so
as to ensure the services of the best citizens. On this
plan, we should have in the Senate a permanent
will, a weighty interest, which would answer essen
tial purposes. But is this a republican government,
it will be asked ? Yes, if all the magistrates are
appointed and vacancies are filled by the people, or
a process of election originating with the people.
He was sensible that an Executive, constituted as he
proposed would have in fact but little of the power
and independence that might be necessary. On the
other plan of appointing him for seven years, he
thought the Executive ought to have but little
power. He would be ambitious, with the means of
making creatures ; and as the object of his ambition
would be to prolong his power, it is probable that in
case of war he would avail himself of the emergen
cy, to evade or refuse a degradation from his place.
An Executive for life has not this motive for forget
ting his fidelity, and will therefore be a safer deposi-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 889
tory of power. It will be objected, probably, that
such an Executive will be an electi-oe monarch, and
will give birth to the tumults which characterize
that form of government. He would reply, that
monarch is an indefinite term. It marks not either
the degree or duration of power. If this Executive
magistrate would be a monarch for life, the other
proposed by the Report frora the Committee of the
Whole would be a monarch for seven years. The
circumstance of being elective was also applicable
to both. It had been observed by judicious writers,
that elective monarchies would be the best if they
could be guarded against the tumults excited by the
ambition and intrigues of competitors. He was not
sure that tumults were an inseparable evil. He
thought this character of elective monarchies had
been taken rather from particular cases, than from
general principles; The election of Roman Empe
rors was made by the army. In Poland the elec
tion is made by great rival princes, with independent
power, and ample means of raising commotions. In
the German Empire, the appointment is made by
the Electors and Princes, who have equal motives
. and means for exciting cabals and parties. Might
¦ not such a mode of election be devised among our
selves, as will defend the community against these
effects in any dangerous degree? Having made
these observations, he would read to the Committee
a sketch of a plan which he should prefer to either
of those under consideration. He was aware that it
went beyond the ideas of most members. But will
such a plan be adopted out of doors ? In retmn he
Vol. I.— 56 *

890 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
would ask, will the people adopt the other plan?
At present they will adopt neither. But he sees the
Union dissolving, or already dissolved — he sees evils
operating in the States which must soon cure the
people of their fondness for democracies — ^he sees
that a great progress has been already made, and is
still going on, in the public mind. He thinks, there
fore, that the people will in time be unshackled from
their prejudices ; and whenever that happens, they
will themselves not be satisfied at stopping where
the plan of Mr. Randolph would place them, but be
ready to go as far at least as he proposes. He did
not mean to offer the paper he had sketched as a
proposition to the Committee. It was meant only
to give a more correct view of his ideas, and to sug
gest the amendments which he should probably pro
pose to the plan of Mr. Randolph, in the proper sta
ges of its future discussion. He reads his sketch in
the words following : to wit.
" I. The supreme Legislative power of the United
States of Araerica to be vested in two different bod
ies of men ; the one to be called the Assembly, the
other the Senate ; who together shall form the Le
gislature of the United States, with power to pass
all laws whatsoever, subject to the negative here
after raentioned.
" II. The Assembly to consist of persons elected
by the people to serve for three years.
"HI. The Senate to consist of persons elected to
serve during good behaviour ; theij^ election to be
made by elqictors chosen for that purpose by the
people. In order to this, the States to be divided
into election districts. On the death, removal or re-

y

1787.] federal CONVENTION. 891
signation of any Senator, his place to be filled out of
the district from which he came.
"IV. The supreme Executive authority of the
United States to be vested in a Governor, to be
elected to serve during good behaviour ; the election
to be made by Electors chosen by the people in the
Election Districts aforesaid. The authorities and
functions of tbe Executive to be as follows : to have
a negative on all laws about to be passed, and the
execution of all laws passed ; to have the direction
of war vvhen authorized or begun ; to have,, with the
advice and approbation of the Senate, the power of
making all treaties ; to have the sole appointment of
the heads or chief officers of the Departments of Fi
nance, War, and Foreign Affairs ; to have the nom
ination of all other officers, (ambassadors to foreign
nations included,) subject to the approbation or re
jection ofthe Senate; to have the power of pardon
ing all offences except treason, which he shall not
pardon without the approbatipn of the Senate.
" V. On. the death, resignation, or removal of the
Governor, his authorities to be exercised by the
President of the Senate till a successor be appointed.
^ " VI. The Senate to have the sole power of de
claring war ; the power of advising and approving
all treaties ; the power of approving or rejecting all
appointments^ of officei's, except the heads or chiefs
of the Departments of Finance, War, and Foreign
Affairs. " VII. The supreme Judicial authority to be vest
ed in Judges, to hold their offices during good be
haviour, with adequate and permanent salaries.
This court to have original jurisdiction in all causes

892 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
of capture, and an appellative jurisdiction in all causes
in which the revenues of the General Government,
or the citizens of foreign nations, are concerned.
" VIII. The Legislature of the United States to
have power to institute courts in each State for the
determination of all matters of general concern.
" IX. The Governor, Senators, and all officers of
the United States, to be liable to impeachraent for
mal-, and corrupt conduct ; and upon conviction to
be removed from office, and disqualified for holding
any place of trust or profit : all impeachments to be
tried by a Court to consist of the Chief  , or
Judge of the Superior Court of Law of each State,
provided such Judge shall hold his place during
good behaviour and have a permanent salary.
" X. All laws of the particular States contrary to
the Constitutioii or laws of the United States to be
utterly void ; and the better to prevent such laws
being passed, the Governor or President of each
State shall be appointed by the General Govern
ment, and shall have a negative upon the laws about
to be passed in the State of which he is the Governor
or President.
" XI. No State to have any forces land or naval ;
and the militia of all the States to be under the sole
aud exclusive direction of the United States, the
officers of which to be appointed and commissioned
by them."
On these several articles he entered into explana
tory observations* corresponding with the principles
of his introductory reasoning.®"
The Committee rose, and the House adjourned.
• The speech introducing the plan, as above taken down and written out, was

1787.] federal CONVENTION. 893
Tuesday, June 19th.
In Committee of the Whole, on the propositions of
Mr. Patterson,— The substitute offered yesterday
by Mr. Dickinson being rejected by a vote now
taken on it, — Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Delaware, aye — 4; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
no — 6; Maryland, divided, — Mr. Patterson's plan
was again at large before the Coramittee.
Mr. Madison. Much stress has been laid by some
gentlemen on the want of power in the Convention
to propose any other than a federal '^IdiH, To what
had been answered by others, he would only add,
that neither of the characteristics attached to a. fed
eral plan would siipport this objection. One char
acteristic was, that in a federal government the
power was exercised not on the people individually,
but on the people collectively, on the States. Yet in
some instances, as in piracies, captures, (fee, the ex
isting Confederacy, and in many instances the
araendraents to it proposed by Mr. Patterson, must
operate immediately on individuals. The other
characteristic was, that a federal government de
rived its appointments not iraraediately frora the

seen by Mr, Hamilton, who approved its correctness, with one or two verbal
changes, which were made as he suggested, ' The explanatory observations
which did not immediately follow, were to have' been furnished by Mr. H. who
did not find leisure at the time to write them out, and they were not obtained.
Judge Yates, in his notes, appears to have consolidated the explanatory with the
introductory observations of Mr. HAMiLTOtf (under date of June 19th, a typograph
ical error). It was in the former, Mr. Madison observed, that Mr. Hamilton,
in speaking of popular governments, however modified, made the remark at
tributed to him by. Judge Yates, that they were " but pork still, with a little
change of sauce."

894 debates in the [1787.
people, but from the States which they respect
ively composed. Here, too, were facts on the other
side. In two of the States, Connecticut and Rhode
Island, the Delegates to Congress were chosen, not
by the Legislatures, but by the people at large ; and
the plan of Mr, Patterson intended no change in
this particular.
It had been alleged (by Mr. Patterson), that the
Confederation, having been formed by unaniraous
consent, could be dissolved by unaniraous consent
only. Does this doctrine result frora the nature of
corapacts? Does it arise from any particular stipu
lation in the Articles of Confederation ? If we con
sider the Federal Union as analagous to the funda
mental com.pact by which individuals corapose one
society, and which must, in its theoretic origin at
least, have been the unanimous act of the compo
nent members, it cannot be said that no dissolution
of the corapact can be effected without unanimous
consent. A breach of the fundamental principles
of the compact by a part of the society, would cer
tainly absolve the other part from their obligations
to it. If the breach of any article by any of the
parties, does not set the others at liberty, it is be
cause the contrary is implied in the compact itself,
and particularly by that law of it which gives an
indefinite authority to the majority to bind the whole,
in all cases. This latter circumstance shows, that
we are not to consider the Federal Union as anala
gous to the social compact of individuals : for if it
were so, a majority would have a right to bind the
rest, and even to form a new Constitution for the
whole; which the gentleman frora Nevv Jersey

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 895
would be among the last to admit. If we consider
the Federal Union as analagous, not to the social
corapacts among individual men, but to the Conven
tions araong individual States, what is the doctrine
resulting from- these Conventions ? Clearly, ac
cording to the expositors of the law of nations, that
a breach of any one article by any one party, leaves
all the other parties at liberty to consider the whole
convention as dissolved, unless they choose rather
to corapel the delinquent party to repair the breach.
In sorae treaties, indeed, it is expressly stipulated,
that a violation of particular articles shall not have
this consequence, and even that particular articles
shall reraain in force during war which is in general
understood to dissolve all subsisting treaties. But
are there any exceptions of this sort to the Articles
of Confederation ? So far from it, that there is not
even an express stipulation that force shall be used
to compel an offending member of the Union to dis
charge its duty. He observed, that the violations of
the Federal Articles had been numerous and notori
ous. Among the most notorious was an act of New
Jersey herself; by which she expressly refused to
comply with a constitutional requisition of Con
gress, and yielded no further to the expostulations
of their Deputies, than barely to rescind her vote of
refusal, without passing any positive act of compli
ance. He did not wish to draw any rigid inferences
from these observations. He thought it proper,
however, that the true nature of the existing Con
federacy should be investigated, and he was not
anxious to strengthen the foundations on which it
now stands.

896 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
Proceeding to the consideration of Mr. Patter
son's plan, he stated the object of a proper plan to
be twofold, — first, to preserve the Union ; secondly,
to provide a Government that will remedy the evils
felt by the States, both in their united and individual
capacities. Exaraine Mr. Patterson's plan, and
say whether it promises satisfaction in these re
spects. 1. Will it prevent the violations of the law of
nations and of treaties which, if not prevented, must
involve us in the calamities of foreign wars ? The
tendency of the States to these violations has been
manifested in sundry instances. The files of Con
gress contain complaints, already, from almost every
nation with which treaties have been formed.
Hitherto indulgence has been shown to us. This
cannot be the permanent disposition of foreign na
tions. A rupture with other powers is among the
greatest of national calamities. It ought, therefore,
to be effectually provided, that no part of a nation
shall have it in its power to bring thera on the
whole. The existing Confederacy does not suffi
ciently provide against this evil. The proposed
amendment to it does not supply the oraission. It
leaves the will ofthe States as uncontrolled as ever.
2. Will it prevent encroachments on the Federal
authority? A tendency to such encroachments has
been sufficiently exemplified among ourselves, as
well as in every other confederated republic, ancient
and modern. By the Federal Articles, transactions
with the Indians appertain to Congress, yet in
several instances the States have entered into
treaties and wars with thera. In like manner, no

1787.] federal convention. 897
two or more States can form araong theraselves any
treaties, &c., without the consent of Congress : yet
Virginia and Maryland, in one instance — Pennsyl
vania and New Jersey, in another — have entered
into compacts without previous application or subse
quent apology. No State, again, can of right raise
troops in time of peace without the like consent.
Of all cases of the league, this seems to require the
most scrupulous observance. Has not Massachu
setts, notwithstanding, the most powerful raember of
the Union, already raised a body of troops 7 Is she
not now augmenting thera, without having even
deigned to apprise Congress of her intentions ? In
fine, have we not seen the public land dealt out to
Connecticut to bribe her acquiescence in the de
cree constitutionally awarded against her claim on
the territory of Pennsylvania ? For no other pos
sible motive can account for the policy of Congress
in that measure. If we recur to the examples of
other confederacies, we shall find in all of them the
same tendency of the parts to encroach on the au
thority of the whole. He then reviewed the Am
phictyonic and Achaean confederacies, among the
ancients, and the Helvetic, Germanic, and Belgic,
among the moderns; tracing their analogy to the
United States in the constitution and extent of their
federal authorities ; in the tendency of the particular
members to usurp on these authorities, and to bring
confusion and ruin on the whole. He observed,
that the plan of Mr. Patterson, besides omitting a
control over the States, as a general defence of the
Federal prerogatives, was particularly defective in
two of its provisions. In the first place, its ratifica-
57

898 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
tion was not to be by the people at large ; but by
the Legislatures. It could not, therefore, render the
acts of Congress, in pursuance of their powers, even
legally paramount to the acts of the^States. And
in the second place, it gave to the Federal tribunal
an appellate jurisdiction only even in the criminal
cases enumerated. The necessity of any such pro
vision supposed a danger of undue acquittal in the
State tribunals, — of what avail would an appellate
tribunal be after an acquittal? Besides, in most, if
not all, of the States, the Executives have, by their
respective Constitutions, the right of pardoning, —
how could this be taken from thera by a legislative
ratification only ?
3. Will it prevent trespasses of the States on each
other ? Of these enough has been already seen. He
instanced acts of Virginia and Maryland, which gave
a preference to their own citizens in cases where the
citizens of other States are entitled to equality of
privileges by the Articles of Confederation. He con
sidered the emissions of paper-money, and other kin
dred measures, as also aggressions. The States, rela
tively to one another, being each of thera either debt
or or creditor, the creditor States raust suffer Unjust
ly frora every eraission by the debtor States. We
have seen retaliating acts on the subject, which
threatened danger, not to the harmony only, but the
tranquillity of the Union. The plan of Mr. Patter
son,' not giving even a negative on the acts of the
States, left them as much at liberty as ever to exe
cute their unrighteous projects against each other.
4. Will it secure the internal tranquillity of the
States themselves ? The insurrections in Massachu-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 899
setts admonished all the States of the danger to
which they were exposed. Yet the plan of Mr. Pat
terson contained no provisions for supplying the de
fect of the Confederation on this point. According
to the republican theory, indeed, right and power be
ing both vested in the majority, are held to be sy
nonymous. According to fact and experience, a mi
nority may, in an appeal to force, be an overmatch
for the majority; — in the first place, if the minority
happen to include all such as possess the skill and
habits of military life, with such as possess the
great pecuniary resources, one-third may conquer the
remaining two-thirds ; in the second place, one-
third of those who participate in the choice of rulers,
may be rendered a majority by the accession of
those whose poverty disqualifies them from a suf
frage, and who, for obvious reasons, must be more
ready to join the standard of sedition than that of
established government ; and, in the third place,
where slavery exists, the republican theory becomes
still more fallacious.
5. Will it secure a good internal legislation and
administration to the particular States ? In devel
oping the evils which vitiate the political system of
the United States, it is proper to take into view
those which prevail within the States individually,
as well as those which affect them collectively;
since the former indirectly affect the whole, and
there is great reason to believe that the pressure of
them had a full share in the motives which produced
the present Convention. Under this head he enu
merated and animadverted on, — first, the multiplicity
of the laws passed by the several States ; secondj^y

900 debatesinthe [1787.
the mutability of their laws ; thirdly, the injustice
of them ; and fpurthly, the impotence of them ; — ob
serving that Mr. Patterson's plan contained no
remedy for this dreadful class of evils, and could
not therefore be received as an adequate provision
for the exigencies of the coraraunity.
6. Will it secui'e the Union against the influence
of foreign powers over its members ? He pretended
not to, say that any such influence had yet been
tried : but it was naturally to be expected that oc
casions would produce it. As lessons which claimed
particular attention, he cited the intrigues practised
among the Amphictyonic confederates, first by the
Kings of Persia, and afterwards fatally, by Philip of
Macedon; among the Achaeans, first by Macedon,
and afterwards, no less fatally, by Rome ; araong the
Swiss, by Austria, France and the lesser neighbour
ing powers ; among the members ofthe Germanic
body, by France, England, Spain and Russia ; and in
the Belgic republic, by all the great neighbouring
powers* The plan of Mr. Patterson, not giving to
the general councils any negative on the will of the
particular States, left the door open for the like per
nicious machinations araong ourselves.
7. He begged the smaller States, which were most
attached to Mr. Patterson's plan, to consider the
situation in which it would leave thera. In the first
place they would continue to bear the whole expense
of maintaining their Delegates in Congress. It ought
not to be said, that, if they were willing to bear this
burthen, no others had a right to complain. As far
as it led the sraaller States to forbear keeping
up a representation, by which the public business

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 901
was delayed, it was evidently a matter of common
concern. An examination of the minutes of Con
gress would satisfy every one, that the public busi
ness had been frequently delayed by this cause ; and
that the States most frequently unrepresented in Con
gress were not the larger States. He reminded the
Convention of another consequence of leaving on a
sraall State the burden of raaintaining a representa
tion in Congress. During a considerable period of
the war, one of the Representatives of Delaware, in
whom alone, before the signing of the Confederation,
the entire vote of that State, and after that event one
half of its vote, frequently resided, was a citizen and
resident of Pennsylvania, and held an office in his
own State incompatible with an appointment from
it to Congress. During another period, the same
State was represented by three Delegates, two of
whom were citizens of Pennsylvania, and the third
a citizen of New Jersey. These expedients must
have been intended to avoid the burden of support
ing Delegates from, their own State. But whatever
might have been the cause, was not in effect the
vote of one State doubled, and the influence of an
other increased by it ?'"^' In the second place the co
ercion on which the efficacy of the plan depends can
never be exerted but on themselves. The larger
States will be irapregnable, the smaller only can feel
the vengeance of it. He illustrated the position by
the history of the Amphictyonic confederates; and
the ban of the Gerraan Empire. It was the cob
web which could entangle the weak, but would be
the sport of the strong.
8. He begged them to consider the situation in

902 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
which they would remain, in case their pertinacious
adherence to an inadmissible plan should prevent
the adoption of any plan. The contemplation of
such an event was painful ; but it would be prudent
to subrait to the task of examining it at a distance,
that the means of escaping it might be the moTe
readily embraced. Let the union of the States be
dissolved, and one of two consequences raust happen.
Either the States raust remain individually inde
pendent and sovereign ; or tvvo or more confedera
cies raust be formed araong them. In the first event,
would the sraall States be more secure against the
ambition and power of their larger neighbours, than
they would be under a General Government perva
ding with equal energy every part of the Empire,
and having an equal interest in protecting every
part against every other part ? In the second, can
the smaller expect that their larger neighbours
would confederate with them on the principle of the
present Confederacy, which gives to each meraber
an equal suffrage ; or that they would exact less
severe concessions from the smaller States, than are
proposed in the scheme of Mr, Randolph.
The great difficulty lies in the affair of representa
tion ; and if this could be adjusted, all others would
be surmountable. It was admitted by both the gen
tlemen from New Jersey, (Mr, BrearlY and Mr.
Patterson,) that it would not be just to alloic Vir
ginia, which was sixteen times as large as Dela
ware, an equal vote only. Their language was, that
it would not be safe for Delaware to allow Virginia
sixteen times as many votes. The expedient pro
posed by them was, that all the States should be

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 903
thrown into one mass, and a new partition be made
into thirteen equal parts. Would such a scheme be
practicable ? The dissimilarities existing in the
rules of property, as well as in the manners, habits
and prejudices, of different States, araounted to a
prohibition of the attempt. It had been found im
possible for the power of one of the raost absolute
princes in Europe (the King of France,) directed by
the wisdom of one of the most enlightened and pa
triotic rainisters (Mr. Neckar) that any age has pro
duced, to equalize, in sorae points only, the different
usages and regulations of the different provinces.
But admitting a general amalgaraation and reparti
tion of the States to be practicable, and the danger
apprehended by the smaller States from a propor
tional representation to be real, — would not a par
ticular and voluntary coalition of these with their
neighbours, be less inconvenient to the whole com
munity, and equally effectual for their own safety ?
If New Jersey or Delaware conceived that an ad
vantage would accrue to them frora an equalization
of the States, in which case they would necessarily
forra a junction with their neighbours, why might
not this end be attained by leaving them at liberty
by the Constitution to form such a junction when
ever they pleased ? And why should they wish to
obtrude a like arrangement on all the States, when
it was, to say the least, extreraely difficult, would
be obnoxious to raany of the States, and when nei
ther the inconvenience, nor the benefit of the expe
dient to themselves, would be lessened by confining
it to themselves ? The prospect of many new
States to the westward was another consideration

904 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
of importance. If they should come into the Union
at all, they would come when they contained but
few inhabitants. If they should be entitled to vote
according to their proportion of inhabitants, all
would be right and safe. Let them have an equal
vote, and a more objectionable minority than ever,
might give law to the whole.°'^
On a question for postponing generally the first
proposition of Mr. Patterson's plan, it was agreed
to, — New York and New Jersey only being,- no.''"
On the question, moved by Mr. King, whether the
Committee should rise, and Mr. Randolph's proposi
tion be reported without alteration, which was in
fact a question whether Mr. Randolph's should be
adhered to as preferable to those of Mr. Patterson, —
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 7;
New York, New Jersey, Delaware, no — 3 ; Mary
land, divided.
Mr. Randolph's plan as reported fi-ora the Com
mittee [q. V. June 13th] being before the House,
and —
The first Resolution, "that a national Govern
ment ought to be established, consistmg, (fee," being
taken up,
Mr. Wilson observed that, by a national Govern
ment, he did not mean one that vvould swallow up
the State Governments, as seemed to be wished by
some gentlemen. He was tenacious of the idea of
preserving the latter. He thought, contrary to the
opmion of Colonel Hamilton, that they raight not
only subsist, but subsist on friendly terras with the
former. They were absolutely necessary for certain

1787.] federal convention. 905
purposes, which the former could not reach. All
large governments must be subdivided into lesser
jurisdictions. As examples he mentioned Persia,
Rome, and particularly the divisions and subdivisions
of England by, Alfred.
Colonel Hamilton coincided with the proposition
as it stood in the Report. He had not been under
stood yesterday. By an abolition of the States, he
meant that no boundary could be drawn between
the National and State Legislatures; that the former
must therefore have indefinite authority. If it were
limited at all, the rivalship of the States would
gradually subvert it. Even as corporations, the ex
tent of some of them, as Virginia, Massachusetts, /
&c., would be formidable. As States, he thought/
they ought to be abolished. But he admitted the |
necessity of leaving in them subordinate jurisdic
tions. The examples of Persia and the Roman
Empire, cited by Mr. Wilson, were, he thought, in
favor of his doctrine, the great powers delegated to
the Satraps and Proconsuls having frequently pro
duced revolts and schemes of independence.
Mr. King wished, as every thing depended on this
proposition, that no objection might be improperly
indulged against the phraseology of it. He con
ceived that the import of the term " States," " sove
reignty," " national," " federal," had been often used
and applied in the discussions inaccurately and de
lusively. The States were not " sovereigns" in the
sense contended for by some. They did not possess
the peculiar features of sovereignty, — ^they could not
make war, nor peace, nor alliances, nor treaties.
Considering them as political beings, they were
57*

906 debates in the [1787.
dumb, for they could not speak to any foreign
sovereign whatever. They were deaf, for they
could not hear any propositions frora such sovereign.
They had not even the organs or faculties of defence
or offence, for they could not of themselves raise
troops, or equip vessels, for war. On the other side,
if the union of the States comprises the idea of a
confederation, it comprises that also of consolida
tion. A union of the States is a union of the men
composing thera, frora whence a national character
results to the whole. Congress can act alone with
out the States ; they can act, and their acts will be
binding, against the instructions of the States. If
they declare war, war is de jure declared ; captures
made in pursuance of it are lawful ; no acts of the
States can vary the situation, or prevent the judicial
consequences. If the States, therefore, retained
some portion oftheir sovereignty, they had certainly
divested themselves of essential portions of it. If
they forraed a confederacy in some respects, they
formed a nation in others. The Convention could
clearly deliberate on and propose any alterations
that Congress could have done under the Federal
Articles. And could not Congress propose, by vir
tue of the last Article, a change iii any article what
ever, — and as well that relating to the equality
of suffrage, as any other ? He made these remarks
to obviate some scruples which had been expressed.
He doubted much the practicability of annihilating
the States ; but thought that much of their power
ought to be taken from thera,^'*
Mr. Martin said, he considered that the separa
tion from Great Britain placed the thirteen States

1787.] federal convention. 907
in a state of nature towards each other ; that they
would have remained in that state till this time, but
for the Confederation ; that they entered into the
Confederation on the footing of equality ; that they
met now to amend it, on the same footing ; and
that he could never accede to a plan that would in
troduce an inequality, and lay ten States at the
mercy of Virginia, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania.
Mr. Wilson could not admit the doctrine that
when the colonies became independent of Great
Britain, they became independent also of each other.
He read the Declaration of Independence, observing
thereon, that the United Colonies were declared to
be free and independent States ; and inferring, that
they vvhere independent, not individually but unitedly,
and that they were confederated, as they were in
dependent States.
Colonel Hamilton assented to the doctrine of Mr.
Wilson. He denied the doctrine that the States
were thrown into a state of nature. He was not
yet prepared to admit the doctrine that the Confed
eracy could be dissolved by partial infractions of it.
He admitted that the States met now on an equal
footing, but could see no inference from that against
concerting a change of the system in this particular.
He took this occasion of observing, for the purpose
of appeasing the fear of the small States, that two
circumstances would render them secure under a
national Government in which they might lose the
equality of rank which they now held : one was the
local situation of the three largest States, Virginia,
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. They were sepa
rated from<>each other by distance of place, and

908 debates in the [1787.
equally so, by all the peculiarities which distinguish
the interests of one State from those of another.
No combination, therefore, could be dreaded. In
the second place, as there was a gradation in the
States, frora Virginia, the largest, down to Dela
ware, the sraallest, it would always happen that
arabitious combinations among a few States might
and Would be counteracted by defensive combina
tions of greater extent among the rest. No combi
nation has been seen among the large counties,
merely as such, against lesser counties. The more
close the union of the States, and the more complete
the authority of the whole, the less opportunity will
be allowed to the stronger States to injure the
weaker.""' Adjourned.

Wednesday, June 20th

In Convention, — Mr. William Blount, firom North
Carolina, took his seat.
The first Resolution of the Report of the Com
mittee of the Whole being before the House-
Mr. Ellsworth, seconded by Mr. Gorham, moves
to alter it, so as to run " that the government of the
United States ought to consist of a supreme Legis
lative, Executive and Judiciary." This alteration,
he said, would drop the w^ord national, and retain
the proper title " the United States." He could not
admit the doctrine that a breach of any of the Fed
eral Articles could dissolve the whole. It would be
highly dangerous not to consider the Confederation

1787.] federal convention, 909
as still subsisting. He wished, also, the plan of the
Convention to go forth as an araendraent of the Ar
ticles ofthe Confederation;, since, under this idea the
authority of the Legislatures could ratify it. If they
are unwilling, the people will be so too. If the
plan goes forth to the people for ratification, several
succeeding conventions within the States would be
unavoidable. He did not like these conventions.
They were better fitted to pull down than to build
up fconstitutions.
Mr. Randolph did not object to the change of ex
pression, but apprised the gentleraan who wished
for it, that he did not admit it for the reasons assign
ed ; particularly that of getting rid of a reference to
the people for ratification.
The motibn- of Mr. Ellsworth was acquiesced in,
nem, con.
The second Resolution, " that the national legis
lature ought to consist of two branches," being taken
up, the word " national" struck out, as of course.
Mr. Lansing observed, that the true question here
was, whether the Convention would adhere to, or
depart from, the foundation of the present confed
eracy ; and moved, instead of the second Resolution,
" that the powers of legislation be vested in the
United States in Congress." He had already
assigned two reasons against such an innovation as
was proposed, — first, the want of competent powers
in the Convention ; secondly, the state of the public
mind. It had been observed by (Mr. Madison), in
discussing the first point, that in two States the
Delegates to Congress were chosen by the people.
Notwithstanding the first appearance of this reraark,

910 debates in the [1787
it had in fact no weight, as the Delegates, however
chosen, did not represent the people, merely as so
many individuals ; but as forraing a sovereign State.
Mr. Randolph put it, he said, on its true footing,
namely that the public safety superseded the scruple
arising from the review of our powers. But in order
to feel the force of this consideration, the same im
pression must be had of the public danger. He had
not himself the same impression, and could not there
fore dismiss his scruple. Mr. Wilson contfended,
that, as the Convention were only to recommend,
they might recommend what they pleased. He
differed much from him. Any act whatever of so
respectable a body must have a great effect ; and
if it does not succeed will be a source of great dis
sensions. He admitted that there vvas no certain
criterion of the public mind on the subject. He
therefore recurred to the evidence of it, given by the
opposition in the States to the scheme of an Impost.
It could not be expected that those possessing sove
reignty could ever voluntarily part with it. It was
not to be expected from any one State, much less
from thirteen. He proceeded to raake sorae obser
vations on the plan itself, and the arguraents urged
in support of it. The point of representation could
receive no elucidation frora the case of England.
The corruption of the boroughs did not proceed from
their comparative smallness; but from the actual
fewness ofthe inhabitants, sorae ofthem not having
more than one or two. A great inequality existed
in the counties of England. Yet the like complaint
of peculiar corruption in the small ones had not
been made. It had been said that Congress repre-

1787.] federal cpnventipn. 911
sent the State prejudices, — will not any oth^r body
whether chosen by the Legislatures or people of
the States, also represent their prejudices? It had
been asserted by his colleague (Colonel Hamilton),
that there was no coincidence of interests among the
large States that ought to excite fears of oppression in
the smaller. Ifit were true that such a uniformity of
interests existed among the States, there was equal
safety for all of them whether the representation re
mained as heretofore, or were proportioned as now
proposed. Jt is proposed that the General Legislature
shall have a negative on the laws of the States.
Is it conceivable that there will be leisure for such a
task ? There will, on the most moderate calculation,
be as many acts sent up from the States as there
are days in the year. Will the members of the
General. Legislature be competent judges? Will
a gentleraan frora Georgia be a judge ofthe expedi
ency of a law vyhich is to operate in Nevv Hamp
shire ? Such a negative would be more injurious
than that of Great Britain heretofore was. It is said
that the National Government must have the influ
ence arising from the grant of offices and honors.
In order to render such a government effectual, he
believed such an influence to be necessary. But if
the States will not agree to it, it is in yain, woi'se
than in vain, to make the proposition. Ifthis influ
ence is to be attained, the States must be entirely
abolished. Will any one say, this would ever be
agreed to? He doubted whether any General
Government, equally beneficial to all, can be at
tained. That now under consideration, he is sure,
must be utterly unattainable. He had another ob
jection. The system was too novel and complex.

912 debates in the [1787.
No man could foresee what its operation will be,
either with respect to the General Government, or
the State Governments. One or other, it has been
surmised, raust absorb the whole.™
Col. Mason did not expect this point would have
been reagitated. The essential differences between
the two plans had been clearly stated. The princi
pal ohjections against that of Mr. Randolph were,
the icarit of power, and the icant of practicability.
There can be np weight in the first, as the fiat is not
to be here, but in the people. He thought with his
colleague (Mr. Randolph,) that there were, besides,
certain crises, in which all the ordinary cautions
yielded to public necessity. He gave as an exara
ple, the eventual treaty with Great Britain, in- form
ing which the Commissioners of the United States
had boldly disregarded the improvident shackles of
Congress; had given to their country an honorable and
happy peace, and, instead of being censured for the
transgression of their powers, had raised to themselves
a monument more durable than brass. The impracti
cability of gaining the public concurrence, he thought,
was still more groundless. Mr. Lansing had cited
the attempts of Congress to gain an enlargement of
their powers, and had inferred frora the raiscarriage
of these attempts, the hopelessness of the plan which
he (Mr. Lansing) opposed. He thought a very dif
ferent inference ought to have been drawn, viz. that
the plan which Mr. Lansing espoused, and which
proposed to augment the powers of Congress, never
could be expected to succeed. He meant not to
throw any reflections on Congress as a body, much
less on any particular merabers of it. He meant,
however, to speak his sentiments without reserve on

1787.] federal convention. 913
this subject ; it was a privilege of age, and perhaps
the only compensation which nature had given for
the privation of so many other enjoyraents ; and he
should not scruple to exercise it freely. Is it to be
thought that the people of America, so watchful
over their interests, so jealous of their liberties, will
give up their all, will surrender both the sword and
the purse, to the same body, — and that, too, not cho
sen iramediately by themselves ? They never will.
They never ought. Will they trust such a body
with the regulation of their trade, vvith the regula
tion of their taxes, with all the other great powers
which are in contemplation ? Will they give un
bounded confidence to a secret Journal, — to the in
trigues, to the factions, which in the nature of things
appertain to such an asserably ? If any raan doubts
the existence of these characters of Congress, let
him consult their Journals for the years '78, '79, and
'80. It will be said, that if the people are averse to
parting with povver, why is it hoped that they will
part with it to a national Legislature? The proper
answer is, that in this case they do not part with
power : they only transfer it from one set of imme
diate representatives to another set. Much has been
said of the unsettled state of the mind of the people.
He believed the mind of the people of America, as
elsewhere, was unsettled as to some points, but set
tled as to others. In two points he was sure it was
well settled, — first, in an attachment to republican
government; secondly, in an attachment to more
than one branch in the Legislature. Their constitu
tions accord so generally in both these circumstances,
that they seem almost to have been preconcerted.
58

914 debates in the [1787.
This must either have been a miracle, or have re
sulted from the genius of the people. The only ex
ceptions to the establishment of two branches in the
Legislature are the State of Pennsylvania, and Con
gress ; and the latter the only single one not chosen
by the people theraselves. What has been the con
sequence ? The people have been constantly averse
to giving that body further powers. It was ac
knowledged by Mr. Patterson, that his plan could
not be enforced without military coercion. Does he
consider the force of this concession ? The most
jarring elements of nature, fire and water them
selves, are not more incompatible than such a mix
ture of civil liberty and military execution. Will the
militia march from one State into another, in order
to collect the arrears of taxes frora the delinquent
members of the Republic ? Will they raaintain an
army for this purpose ? Will not the citizens ofthe
invaded State assist one another, till they rise as one
man and shake off the Union altogether ? Rebellion
is the only case in which the military force of the
State can be properly exerted against its citizens.
In one point of view, he was struck with horror at
the prospect of recurring to this expedient. To
punish the non-payraent of taxes with death was a
severity not yet adopted by despotisra itself; yet
this unexampled cruelty would be mercy corapared
to a railitary collection of revenue, in wiiich the bay
onet could raake no discriraination betvveen the in
nocent and the guilty. He took this occasion to
repeat, that, notvyithstanding his solicitude to estab
lish a national Government, he never would agree
to abolish the State Governments, or render thera

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 915
absolutely insignificant. They were as necessary as
the General Governraent, and he would be equally
careful to preserve them. He was aware of the
difficulty of drawing the line between them, but
hoped it was not insurmountable. The Convention,
though comprising so many distinguished characters,
could not be expected to make a faultless Govern
ment. And he would prefer trusting to posterity
the amendment of its defects, rather than to push
the experiment too far.^*^
Mr. LutherMartin agreed with Colonel Mason
as to the iraportance of the State Governments : he
would support them at the expense of the General
Governraent, which was instituted for the purpose of
that support. He saw no necessity for two branch
es ; and if it existed. Congress raight be organized
into two. He considered Congress as representing
the people, being chosen by the Legislatures, who
were chosen by the people. At any rate. Congress
represented the Legislatures ; and it was the Legis
latures, not the people, who refused to enlarge their
powers. Nor could the rule of voting have been the
ground of objection, otherwise ten of the States raust
always have been ready to place further confidence
in Congress. The causes of repugnance raust there
fore be looked for elsewhere. At the separation
from the British Empire, the people of America pre
ferred the establishment of themselves into thirteen
separate sovereignties, instead of incorporating them
selves into one. To these they look up for the secu-r
rity of their lives, liberties, and properties ; to these
they must look up. The Federal Government they
formed to defend the whole against foreign nations

916 debates in the [1787.
in time of war, and to defend the lesser States
against the ambition of the larger. They are afraid
of granting power unnecessarily, lest they should de
feat the original end of the Union ; lest the powers
should prove dangerous to the sovereignties of the
particular States which the Union was meant to sup
port ; and expose the lesser to being swallowed up
by the larger. He conceived also that the people of
the States, having already vested their powers in their
respective Legislatures, could not resume them with
out a dissolution of their Governments. He was
against conventions in the States — was not against
assisting States against rebellious subjects — thought
the federal plan of Mr. Patterson did not require
coercion more than the national one, as the latter
must depend for the deficiency of its revenues on re
quisitions and quotas — and that a national judiciary,
extended into the States, would be ineffectual, and
would be viewed with a jealousy inconsistent with
its usefulness.*^
Mr. Sherman seconded and supported Mr. Lan
sing's motion. He admitted two branches to be ne
cessary in the State Legislatures, but saw no neces
sity in a confederacy of States. The examples were
all of a single council. Congress carried us through
the war, and perhaps as well as any government
could have done. The coraplaints at present are,
not that the views of Congress are unwise or un
faithful, but that that their powers are insufficient
for the execution of their views. The national
debt, and the want of power somewhere to draw
forth the national resources, are the great raatters
that press. All the States were sensible of the de-

1787.] federal caNVENTioN. 917
feet of power in Congress. He thought much might
be said in apology for the failure of the State Legis
latures, to comply with the Confederation. They
were afraid of leaning too hard on the people by ac
cumulating taxes; no constitutional rule had been,
or could be observed in the quotas ; the accounts al
so were unsettled, and every State supposed itself in
advance, rather than in arrears. For want of a gen
eral system, taxes to a due amount had not been
drawn from trade^ which was the most convenient
resource. As almost all the States had agreed to the
recommendation of Congress on the subject of an
impost, it appeared clearly that they were willing to
trust Congress with power to draw a revenue from
trade. There is no weight, therefore, in the argument
drawn frora a distrust of Congress ; for money mat
ters being the most important of all, if the people
will trust them with power as to them, they will
trust them with any other necessary powers. Con
gress, indeed, by the Confederation, have in fact the
right of saying how much the people shall pay, and
to what purpose it shall be applied ; and this right
was granted to them in the expectation that it would
in all cases have its effect. If another branch were
to be added to Congress, to be chosen by the people,
it would Serve to embarrass. The people would not
much interest theraselves in the elections, a few de
signing men in the large districts would carry their
ppints ; and the people would have no more confi
dence in their new representatives than in Congress.
He saw no reason why the State Legislatures should
be unfriendly, as had been suggested, to Congress.
If they appoint Congress, and approve of their mea-

918 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
sures, they would be rather favourable and partial
to them. The disparity of the States in point of
size he perceived was the main difficulty. But the
large States had not yet suffered from the equality
of votes enjoyed by the smaller ones. In all great
and general points, the interests of all the States
were the sarae. The State of Virginia, notwith
standing the equality of votes, ratified the Confed
eration without even proposing any alteration.
Massachusetts also ratified without any material dif
ficulty, &c. In none of tlie ratifications is the want
of two branches noticed or complained of To con
solidate the States, as some had proposed, would dis
solve our treaties with foreign nations, whicii had
been formed with us, as confederated States. He
did not, however, suppose that the creation of two
branches in the Legislature would have such an ef
fect. If the difficulty on the subject of representation
cannot be otherwise got over, he would agree to
have tvvo branches, and a proportional representa
tion in one of- them, provided each State had an
equal voice in the other. This was necessary to se
cure the rights of the lesser States ; otherwise three
or four of the large States would rule the others as
they please. Each State, like each individual, had
its peculiar habits, usages, and raanners, which con
stituted its happiness. It would not, therefore, give
to others a power over this happiness, any more than
an individual would do, when he could avoid it. "*
Mr. Wilson urged the necessity of two branches ;
observed, that if a proper model was not to be found
in other confederacies, it was not to be wondered at.
The number of them was small, and the duration of

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 919
some at least short. The Amphictyonic and Achae
an were formed in the infancy of political science ;
and appear, by their history and fate, to have con
tained radical defects. The Swiss and Belgic con
federacies were held together, not by any vital prin
ciple of energy^ but by the incumbent pressure of
formidable neighbouring nations. The German
owed its continuance to the influence of the House
of Austria. He appealed to our own experience
for the defects of our confederacy. He had been
six years, of the twelve since the commencement of
the Revolution, a inember of Congress, and had felt
ali its weaknesses. He appealed to the recollection
of others, whether, on many important occasions,
the public interest had not been obstructed by the
small raerabers of the Union. The success of the
Revolution was owing to other causes, than the con
stitution of Congress. In many instances it went
on even against the difficulties arising from Congress
theraselves. He adraitted that the large States did
accede, as had been stated to the Confederation in
its present form. But it was the effect of necessity
not of choice. There are other instances of their
yielding, from the same motive, to the unreasonable
measures of the small States. The situation of
things is now a little altered. He insisted that a
jealousy would exist between the State Legislatures
and the General Legislature; observing, that the
members of the forraer would have views and feel
ings very distinct in this respect from their constit
uents. A private citizen of a State is indifferent
whether power be exercised by the General or State
Legislatures, provided it be exercised most for his

920 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
happiness. His representative has an interest in its
being exercised by the body to which he belongs.
He will therefore view the National Legislature with
the eye of a jealous rival. He observed that the
addresses of Congress to the people at large had
always been better received, and produced greater
effect, than those made to the Legislatures.^
On the question for postponing, in order to take
up Mr. Lansing's proposition, " to v^est the powers of
legislation in Congress," — Connecticut, New York,
New Jersey, Delaware, aye — 4; Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Car
olina, Georgia, no — 6 ; Maryland, divided.
On motion of the Deputies from Delaware, the
question on the second Resolution in the Report
from the Committee of the Whole, was postponed
till to-morrow.
Adjourned.

Thursday, June 21st.

In Convention, — Mr. Jonathan Dayton, from New
Jersey, took his seat.
The second Resolution in the Report from the Com
mittee of the Whole, being under consideration, —
Doctor Johnson. On a comparison of the two
plans which had been proposed frora Virginia and
New Jersey, it appeared that the peculiarity which
characterized the latter was its being calculated to
preserve the individuality of the States. The plan
from Virginia did not profess to destroy this individ
uality altogether ; but was charged with such a ten-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 921
dency. One gentleraan alone (Col. Hamilton), in
his animadversions on the plan of Nevv Jersey,
boldly and decisively contended for an abolition of
the State Governments. Mr. Wilson and the gen
tleman from Virginia, who also were adversaries of
the plan of Nevv Jersey, held a different language.
They wished to leave the States in possession of a
considerable, though a subordinate, jurisdiction.
They had not yet, however, shewn how this could
consist with, or be secured against, the general sove
reignty and jurisdiction vvhich they proposed to give
to the National Governraent. If this could be
shewn, in such a raanner as to satisfy the patrons
of the New Jersey propositions, that the individu
ality of the States would not be endangered, many
of their objections would no doubt be removed. If
this could not be shewn, their objections would have
their full force. He wislied it, therefore, to be well
considered, whether, in case the States, as was pro
posed, should retain some portion of sovereignty at
least, this portion could be preserved, without allow
ing them to participate effectually in the General
Government, without giving them each a distinct
and equal vote for the purpose of defending them
selves in the general councils.
Mr Wilson's respect for Doctor Johnson, added
to the importance of the subject, led him to atterapt,
unprepared as he was, to solve the difficulty which
had been started. It was asked, how the General
Government and individuality of the particular
States could be reconciled to each other, — and how
the latter could be secured against the former?
Might it not, on the otiier side, be asked, how the

58

*

922 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
former was to be secured against the latter ? It
was generally admitted, that a jealousy and rival-
ship would be felt, between the general and par
ticular Governments. As the plan now stood,
though, indeed contrary to his opinion, one branch
of the General Governraent (the Senate, or second
branch) was to be appointed by the State Legisla
tures. The State Legislatures, therefore, by this
participation in the General Government, would
have an opportunity of defending their rights. Ought
not a reciprocal opportunity to be given to the Gen
eral Government of defending itself, by having an
appointment of some one constituent branch of the
State Governments. If a security be necessary on
one side, it would seem reasonable to demand it on
the otiier. But taking the matter in a more general
view, he saw no danger to the States, from the Gen
eral Government, In case a combination should be
made by the large ones, it would produce a general
alarra among the rest, and the project vvould be
frustrated. But there was no temptation to such a
project. The States having in general a similar in
terest, in case of any propositions in the National
Legislature to encroach on the State Legislatures,
he conceived a general alarm would take place in
the National Legislature itself; that it would com
municate itself to the State Legislatures ; and would
finally spread among the people at large. The Gen
eral Government Avill be as ready to preserve the
rights of the States, as the latter are to preserve the
rights of individuals, — all the members of the for
mer having a common interest, as representatives
of all the people of the latter, to leave the State

1787.] federal convention. 923
Governments in possession of what the people wish
them to retain. He could not discover, therefore,
any danger whatever on the side from which it was
apprehended. On the contrary, he conceived, that,
in spite of every precaution, the General Govern
ment would be in perpetual danger of encroach
ments from the State Governments.^'
Mr. Madison was of opinion, — in the first place,
that there was less danger of encroachment frora
the General Governraent than from the State Gov
ernments I and in the second place, that the mis
chiefs frora encroachraents would be less fatal if
made by the former, than if raade by the latter.
1. All theexamples of other confederacies prove the
greater tendency, in such systems, to anarchy than
to tyranny ; to a disobedience of the members, than
usurpations of the Federal head. Our own experi
ence had fully illustrated this tendency. But it will
be said, that the proposed change in the principles
and form ofthe Union will vary the tendency; that
the General Governraent will have real and greater
powers, and will be derived, in one branch at least,
from the people, not from the Governraents of the
States. To give full force to this objection, let it be
supposed for a moraent that indefinite power should
be given to the General Legislature, and the States
reduced to corporations dependent on the General
Legislature,^why should it follow that the General
Government would take from the States any branch
of their power, as far as its operation was beneficial,
and its continuance desirable to the people ? In
some of the States, particularly in Connecticut, all
the townships are incorporated, and have a certain

924 debates in the [1787.
liraited jurisdiction, — have the representatives of the
people of the townships in the Legislature of the
State ever endeavoured to despoil the townships of
any part of their local authority ? As far as this
local authority is convenient to the people, they are
attached to it ; and their representatives, chosen by
and amenable to them, naturally respect their at
tachraent to this, as much as their attachment to
any other right or interest. The relation of a Gen
eral Government to State Governments is parallel.
2. Guards were more necessary against encroach
ments of the State Governments on the General
Government, than of the latter on the former. The
great objection made against an abolition of the
State Governments was, that the General Govern
ment could not extend its care to all the minute ob
jects which fall under the cognizance of the local
jurisdictions. The objection as stated lay not
against the probable abuse of the general power,
but against the iraperfect use that could be made of
it throughout so great an extent of country, and over
so great a variety of objects. As far as its operation
would be practicable, it could not in this view be
improper ; as far as it would be impracticable, the
convenience of the General Government itself would
concur with that of the people in the maintenance
of subordinate governments. Were it practicable
for the General Government to extend its care to
every requisite object without the co-operation of
the State Governments, the people would not be less
free as members of one great Republic, than as mem
bers of thirteen sraall ones. A citizen of Delaware
was not more free than a citizen of Virginia ; nor

1787.] federal convention. 925
would either be more free than a citizen of Araerica.
Supposing, therefore, a tendency in the General
Governraent to absorb the State Governments, no
fatal consequence could result. Taking the reverse
as the supposition, that a tendency should be left in
the State Governments towards an independence on
the General Governraent, and the gloomy conse
quences need not be pointed out. The iraagination
of them must have suggested to the States the
experiraent we are now making, to prevent the
calamity, and must have forraed the chief raotive
with those present to undertake the arduous task.
On the question for resolving, " that the Legisla
ture ought to consist of two branches," — Massachu
setts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 7; New
York, New Jersey, Delaware, no — 3; Maryland, di
vided.'^ The third Resolution of the Report being taken
into consideration —
General Pinckney moved, " that the first branch,
instead of being elected by the people, should be
elected in such manner as the Legislature of each
State should direct." He urged, — first, that this lib
erty would give more satisfaction, as the Legisla
tures could then accommodate the mode to the con
venience and opinions of the people ; secondly, that
it would avoid the undue influence of large counties,
which would prevail if the elections were to be
made in districts, as must be the mode intended by
the report of the Comraittee ; thirdly, that otherwise
disputed elections raust be referred to the General
Legislature, which would be attended with intolera-

926 debates in the [1787.
ble expense and trouble to the distant parts of the
Republic. Mr. L. Martin seconded the motion.
Col. Hamilton considered the motion as intended
manifestly to transfer the election from the people
to the State Legislatures, which would essentially
vitiate the plan. It would increase that State influ
ence which could not be too watchfully guarded
against. All, too, must admit the possibility, in case
the General Government should maintain itself, that
the State Governments might gradually dwindle in
to nothing. The system, therefore, should not be
engrafted on what might possibly fail.
Mr. Mason urged the necessity of retaining the
election by the people. Whatever inconvenience
may attend thc democratic principle, it must actuate
one part ofthe Government. It is the only security
for the rights of the people.
Mr. Sherman would like an election by the Le
gislatures best, but is content with the plan as it
stands. Mr. Rutledge could not admit the solidity of the
distinction between a mediate and immediate elec
tion by the people. It was the same thing to act by
one's self, and to act by another. An election by
the Legislature would be more refined, than an elec
tion immediately by the people; and would be more
likely to correspond with the sense of the whole
community. If this Convention had been chosen by
the people in districts, it is not to be supposed that
such prpper characters would have been preferred.
The Delegates to Congress, he thought, had also

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 927
been fitter raen tlifin would have been appointed by
the people at large.
Mr. Wilson considered the election of the first
branch by the people not only as the corner-stone,
but as the foundation of the fabric ; and that the
difference between a raediate and iraraediate elec
tion was iraraense. The difference was particularly
worthy of notice in this respect, that the Legisla
tures are actuated not raerely by the sentiment of
the people ; but have an official sentiment opposed
to that of the General Government, and perhaps to
that of the people themselves.
Mr. King enlarged on the same distinction. He
supposed the Legislatures would constantly choose
men subservient to their own views, as contrasted
to the general interest j and that they might even
devise modes of election that would be subversive
of the end in view. He remarked several instances
in which the view^s of a State might be at variance
with those of the General Government ; and men
tioned particularly a competition between the Na
tional and State debts, for the raost certain and pro
ductive funds.
General Pinckney was for making the State
Governments a part of the general system. If they
were to be abolished, or lose their agency, Soutli
Carolina and the other States would have but a
small share of the benefits of governraent.
On the question for General Pinckney's motion,
to substitute " election of the first branch in such
mode as the Legislatures should appoint," instead of
its being "elected by the people," — Connecticut,
New Jersey, Delaware, South Carolina, aye — 4;

928 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
North Carolina, Georgia, no — 6; Maryland divided!"
General Pinckney then moved, " that the first
branch be elected Jy the people in such mode as the
Legislatures should direct ;" but waived it on its
being hinted that such a provision might be more
properly tried in the detail of the plan.
On the question for the election of the first branch
" by the people," — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9 ; New
Jersey, no — 1 ; Maryland divided.
The election of the first branch " for the term
of three years," being considered, —
Mr. Randolph moved to strike out " three years,"
and insert " tvvo years." He was sensible that
annual elections were a source of great mischiefs in
the States, yet it was the want of such checks
against the popular intemperance as were now pro
posed, that rendered them so mischievous. He
would have preferred annual to biennial, but for
the extent of the United States, and the incon
venience whicii would result from them to the
representatives of the extreme parts of the Em
pire. The people were attached to frequency of
elections. All the Constitutions of the States, ex
cept that of South Carolina, had established an
nual elections.
Mr. Dickinson, The idea of annual elections was
borrowed from the ancient usage of England, a
country much less extensive than ours. He sup
posed biennial would be inconvenient. He preferred
triennial; and in order to prevent the inronveni-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 929
ence of an entire change of the whole number at
the same moraent, suggested a rotation, hy an
annual election of one-third.
Mr. Ellsworth was opposed to three years,
supposing that even one year was preferable to
two years. The people were fond of frequent elec
tions, and raight be safely indulged in one branch
of the Legislature. He raoved for " one year."
Mr. Strong seconded and supported the raotion.
Mr. Wilson, being for raaking the first branch an
effectual representation of the people at large, pre
ferred an annual election of it. This frequency was
most farailiar and pleasing to the people. It would
not be more inconvenient to them than triennial elec
tions, as the people in all the States have annual
meetings with which the election of the national
Representatives might be made to coincide. He
did not conceive that - it would be necessary for
the National Legislature to sit constantly, perhaps
not half, perhaps not one-fourth of the year.
Mr. Madison was persuaded that annual elec
tions would be extremely inconvenient, and appre
hensive that biennial would be too rauch so; he did
not mean inconvenient to the electors, .. but to the
Representatives. They would have to travel seven
or eight hundred miles from the distant parts of the
Union ; and would probably not be allowed even a
reimburseraent of their expenses. Besides, none of
those who wished to be re-elected would remain at
the seat of government, confiding that their absence
would not affect them. The members of Congress
had done this with few instances of disappointment.
But as the choice was here to be made by the
59

930 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
people themselves, who would l^e much less com
plaisant to individuals, and much more susceptible
of impressions frora the presence of a rival candi
date, it must be supposed that the members from the
most distant States would travel backwards and
forwards at least as often as the elections should be
repeated. Much was to be said, also, on the time
requisite for new members, who would always
form a large proportion, to acquire that knowledge
of the affairs of the States in general, without
which their trust could not be usefully discharged.
Mr. Sherman , preferred annual elections, but
would be content with biennial. He thought the
Representatives ought to return home and mix
with the people. By remaining at the seat of
governraent, they would acquire the habits of the
place, which might differ from those of their con
stituents. Colonel Mason observed, that, the States being
differently situated, such a rule ought to be forraed
as would put t^era as nearly as possible on a level.
If elections were annual, the raiddle States would
have a great adA^antage over the extrerae ones. He
wished thera to be biennial, and the rather as in
that case they would coincide with the periodical
elections pf Sputh Carplina, as well pf the other
States. Colonel Hamilton urged the necessity of three
years. There ought to be neither too much nor too
little dependence on the popular sentiraents. The
checks in the other branches of the Government
would be but feeble, and would need every auxiliary
principle that could be interwoven. The British

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 931
House of Commons were elected septennially, yet
the democratic- spirit of the Constitution had not
ceased. Frequency of elections tended to make the
people listless to them ; and to facilitate the success
of little cabals. This evil was coraplained of in all
the States. In Virginia it had been lately found ne
cessary to fbrce the attendance and voting of the
people by severe regulations.
On the question for striking out " three years," —
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania. Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 7;
New York, Delaw^are, Maryland, no — 3 ; New Jer
sey divided.
The motion for " two years" was then inserted,
nem. con.^^
Adjourned.

Friday, June 22d,
In Convention, — The clause in the third Resolu
tion, " to receive fixed stipends, to be paid out of the
National Treasury," being considered, —
Mr. Ellsworth mov^d to substitute payment by
the States, but of their own treasuries : observing,^
that the raanners of dicerent States- were very
different in the style of living, and in the profits ac
cruing frora the exercise of like talents. What
would be deeraed, therefore, a reasonable compensa
tion in some States, in others would be very unpopu
lar, and might irapede the systera of which it made
a part.

932 debatesinthe [1787.
Mr. Williamson favored the idea. He reminded
the House of the prospect of new States to the
westward. They would be too poor — would pay
little into the coraraon treasury^ — and would have
a different interest frora the old States. He did
not think, therefore,, that the latter ought to pay
the expense of men who wpuld be eraployed in
thwarting their measures and interests.
Mr. Gorham wished not to refer the matter to the
State Legislatures, who were always paring down
salaries in such a mariner as to, keep out of office
men most capable of executing the functions of
them. He thought, also, it would be wrong to fix
the compensation by the Constitution, because we
could not venture to make it as liberal as it ought
to be, without exciting an enmity against the whole
plan. Let the National Legislature provide for their
own wages from time to time, as the State Legisla
tures do. He had not seen this part of their power
abused, nor did he apprehend an abuse of it,
Mr, Randojlph said he feared we were going too
far in consulting popular prejudices. Whatever re
spect might be due to them in lesser matters, or in
cases where they formed the permanent character
of the people, he thought it neither incurabent on,
nor honorable for; the Convention, to sacrifice right
and justice to that consideration. If the States
were to pay the merabers of the National Legisla
ture, a dependence would be created that would vi
tiate the whole system. The wliole nation has an
interest in the attendance and services of the mem
bers. The National Treasury therefore is the proper
fimd for supporting them.

1787.] federal convention. 933
Mr. King urged the danger of creating a depend
ence on the States by leaving to them the payment
of the members of the National Legislature. He
supposed it would be best to be explicit as to the
compensation to be allowed. A reserve on that
point, or a reference to the National Legislature of
the quantum, would excite greater opposition tlian
any sura that would be actually necessary or proper.
Mr. Sherman contended for referring both the
quantum and the payment of it to the State Legis
latures. Mr. Wilson was against ^2;m^ the compensation,
as circumstances would change and call for a change
of the amount. He thought it of great moment
that the members of the National Governraent should
be left as independent as possible of the State Gov
ernraents in all respects.
Mr. Madison concurred in the necessity of pre
serving the compensations for the National Govern
ment independent on the State Governments ; but
at "the same time approved oi fixing them by the
Constitution, which might be done by taking a
standard which would not vary with circuinstances.
He disliked particularly the policy, suggested by
Mr, Williamson, 6f- leaving the merabers frora the
poor States beyond the mountains to the precarious
and parsimonious support of their constituents. If
the Western States hereafter arising should be ad
mitted into the Union, they ought tp be cpnsidered
as equals and as brethren. If their representatives
were to be associated in the comraon councils, it
was of common concern that such provisions should

934 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
be made as would invite the most capable and re
spectable characters into the service.
Mr. Hamilton apprehended inconvenience from
fixing the wages. He was strenuous against ma
king the national council dependent on the legisla
tive rewards of the States. Those who pay are
the masters of those who are paid. Payment by
the States would be unequal, as the distant States
would have to pay fbr the same term of attendance
and more days in travelling to and from the seat of
government. He expatiated emphatically on the
difference between the feelings and views of the
peiople and the governments of the States, arising
from the personal interest and official inducements
which must render the latter unfriendly to the Gen
eral Government,
Mr. Wilson moved that the salaries of the first
branch " be ascertained by the National Legisla
ture and be paid out of the National Treasury."
Mr. Madison thought the raembers of the Legis
lature too much interested, to ascertain their own
compensation. It would be indecent to put their
hands into the public purse for the sake of their
own pockets.
On this question, " shall the salaries of the first
branch be ascertained by the national Legislature ?"
^New Jersey, Pennsylvania, aye— ^2; Massachu
setts, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, no— 7 ; New YoA,
Georgia, divided.
On the question for striking out " National Trea
sury," as moved by Mr. Ellsworth, —
Mr. Hamilton renewed his opposition to it. He

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 935
pressed the distinction between the State Govern
ments and the people. The forraer would be the
rivals of the General Government. The State Le
gislatures ought not, therefore, to be the paymasters
of the latter. j
Mr. Ellsworth. If we are jealous of the State
Governments, , they will be so of us. If on going
home I tell them, we gave the General Govern
ment such powers because we could not trust you,
will they adopt it ? And without their approbation
it is a nullity.^^®
On the question, — Massachusetts,* Connecticut,
North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 4 ; New Jer
sey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
no— ^5 ; New York, Georgia, divided ; so it passed in
the negative.
On a question^ for substituting " adequate com
pensation" in place of "fixed stipends," it was
agreed to, nem. con., the friends of the latter being
willing that the practicability oi fixing the com
pensation should be considered hereafter in forming
the details.^"
Jt was then moved by Mr. Butler, that a ques
tion be taken on both points jointly, to wit, " ade
quate compensation to be paid out of the National
Treasury." It was objected to as out of order, the
parts having been separately decided pn. The Pres
ident referred the question of order to the House,
and it was determirjed to be in order, — Connecticut,
* It appeared that Massachusetts concurred, not because they thought the
S'tate Treasury ought, to be substituted ; but because they thought nothing
should be said on the subject, in which case it would silently devolve on the
National Treasuiy to support the National Legislature

936 DEBATESINTHE [1787.
New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina,
South Carolina, aye — 6; New York, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, Georgia, no — 4; Massachusetts, divided.
The question on the sentence was then postponed
by South Carolina, in right of the State.^*^
Col. Mason moved to insert " twenty-five years of
age as a qualification for the merabers of the first
branch." He thouglit it absurd that a raan to-day
should not be permitted by the law to make a bar
gain for himself, and to-morrow should be author
ized to manage the affairs of a great nation. It was
the mpre extraordinary, as every man carried with
him, in his own experience, a scale for measuring
the deficiency of young politicians ; since he would,
if interrogated, be obliged to declare that his politi
cal opinions at the age of twenty-one were too crude
and erroneous to merit an influence on public mea
sures. It had been said, that Congress had proved
a good school for our young men. It might be sp,
for any thing he knew ; but if it were, he chose
that they should bear the expense of their own edu
cation. Mr. Wilson was against abridging the rights of
election in any shape. It was the same thing
whether this were done by disqualifying the objects
of choice, or the persons choosing. The motion
tended to damp the efforts of genius and of laudable
ambition. There was no more reason for incapaci
tating youth than age, where the requisite qualifica
tions vvere found. Many instances might be men
tioned of signal services, rendered in high stations,
to the public, before the age of twenty-five. The

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 937
present Mr. Pitt and Lord Bolingbtoke were striking
instances. On the question for inserting " twenty-five years
of age,'? — Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Ma
ryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
aye, — 7; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Georgia, no
—3 ; New York, divided.^''
Mr. Gorham moved to strike out the last member
of the third Resolution, concerning ineligibility of
members of the first branch to office during the term
of their membership, and for one year after. He
considered it unnecessary and injurious. It was
true, abuses had been displayed in Great Britain;
but no one could say how far they might have con
tributed to preserve the due influence of the Govern
raent, nor what might have ensued in case the con
trary theory had been tried.
Mr. Butler opposed it. This precaution against
intrigue w^as necessary.. He appealed to the exam
ple of Great Britain ; where men get into Parlia
ment that they might get offices for themselves or
their friends. This was the source of the corruption
that ruined their government.
Mr. King thought we were refining too much.
Such a restriction on the members would discourage
merit. It would also give a pretext to the Execu
tive for bad appointments, as he might always plead
this as a bar to the choice he wished to have made.
Mr. Wilson was against fettering elections, and
discouraging raerit. He suggested, also, the" fatal
consequence in tirae of war, of rendering, "perhaps,
the best commanders ineligible ; appealed to our
situation during the late war, and indirectly leading
59*

938 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
to a recollection of the appointment of the Com
mander-in-Chief out of Congress.
Coloner Mason was for shutting the door at all
events against corruption. He enlarged on the
venality and abuses, in this particular, in Great
Britain ; and alluded to the multiplicity of foreign
embassies by Congress. The disqualification he
regarded as a corner-stone in the fabric.
Colonel Hamilton. There are inconveniences on
both sides. We must take man as we find him ;
and if we expect hira to serve the public, raust in
terest his passions in doing so. A reliance on pure
patriotism had been the source of many of our errors.
He thought the remark of Mr. Gorham a just one.
It was impossible to say what would be the effect
in Great Britain of such a reform as had been urged.
It was known that one of the ablest politicians
(Mr. Hume) had pronounced all that influence on
the side of the Crown wliich went under the name
oi corruption, diO. essential part of the weight which
maintained the equilibrium of the Constitution.
On Mr. Gorham's motion for striking out "in
eligibility," it vvas lost by an equal division of the
votes, — Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Georgia, aye — 4 ; Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia,
South Carolina, no — 4 ; New York, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, divided.
Adjourned.^^

Saturday, June 23d.
In Convention,~the third. Resolution being re
sumed, —

1787.] federal convention. 939
On the question, yesterday postponed by South
Carolina, for agreeing to the whole sentence, " for
allowing an adequate compensation, to be paid out
of the Treasury of the United States," — Massa
chusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Vir
ginia, aye-^-5 ; Connecticut, New York, Delaware,
North Carolina, South Carolina, ho— 5; Georgia,
divided. So the question was lost, and the sentence
not inserted.^*
General Pinckney moves to strike out the in
eligibility of merabers of the first branch to offices
established " by a particular State." He argued from
the inconvenience to which such a restriction would
expose both the merabers of the first branch, and the
States wishing for their services; and from the
smallness ofthe object to be attained by the restric
tion. It would seem frora the ideas of some, that
we are erecting a kingdom to be divided against
itself: he disapproved such a fetter on the Legisla
ture. Mr. Sherman seconds the motion. It would seem
that we are erecting a kingdora at war with itself
The Legislature ought not to be fettered in such a
case.^ On the question, — Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8; Massachusetts, Penn
sylvania, Delaware, no-^3.
Mr. Madison renewed his motion, yesterday made
and waived, to render the members of the first
branch " ineligible during their term of service, and
for one year after, to such offices only, as should be
established, or the emoluraent augmented, by the

940 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
Legislature of the United States during the time of
their being members." He supposed that the un
necessary creation of offices, and increase of salaries,
were the evils raost experienced, and that if the
door was shut against them, it might properly be
Id't open for the appointment of members to other
offices as an encouragement to the legislative ser
vice. Mr. Alexander Martin seconded the motion.
Mr. Butler. The amendment does not go far
enough, and would be easily evaded.^*
Mr. Rutledge was for preserving the Legislature
as pure as possible, by shutting the door against ap
pointraents of its own raembers to office, which was
one source of its corruption.
Mr. Mason. The. motion of my colleague is but a
partial remedy for the evU. He appealed to him as a
witness ofthe shameful partiality ofrthe Legislature
of Virginia to its own members. He enlarged on
the abuses and corruption in the British Parliament
connected with the appointment oif its members. He
could not suppose that a sufficient number of citi
zens could not' be found who would be ready, with
out the inducement of eligibility to offices, to under
take the Legislative service. Genius and virtue, it
may be said, ought to be encouraged. Genius, for
aught he knew, might; but that virtue shouldbe en
couraged by such a species of venality, was an idea
that at least had the merit of being new.
Mr. King remarked that we were refining too
much in this business ; and that the idea of prevent
ing intrigue and solicitation of offices was chimeri
cal. You say, that no member shall himself be eli-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 941
gible to any office. Will this restrain him from
availing himself of the sarae means w-hich would
gain appointments for hiraself, to gain them for his
son, his brothei*, or any other object of his partiali
ty ? ' We were losing, therefore, the advantages on
one side, without avoiding the evils on the other.
Mr. Wilson supported the motion. The proper
cure, he said, for corruption in the Legislature was
to talce from it the power bf appointing to offices.
One branch of corruption vvould, indeed, remain,
that of creating unnecessary offices, or granting un
necessary salaries, and for that the araendraent
would be a proper remedy. He animadverted on the
impropriety of stigraatiz^ing with the narae of venality
the laudable ambition of rising into the honourable
offices ofthe Governraent, — an ambition most likely to
be felt in the early and most incorrupt period of life,
and which all wise and free governments had deera
ed it sound policy to cherish, not to check. The
raembers of the Legislature have, perhaps, the hard
est and least profitable task of any who engage in
the service of the State. Ought this merit to be
made a disqualification ?
Mr. Sherman observed that the motion did not go
far enough. It might be evaded by the creation of
a new office, the translation to it of a person from
another office, and the appointment of a meraber of
the Legislature to the latter. A new embassy
might be established to a new^ Court, and an ambas
sador taken from another, in order to create a vacan
cy for a favorite member. He admitted that incon
veniences lay on both sides. He hoped there would
be suffiqient inducements to the public service with-

942 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
out resorting to the prospect of desirable offices ; and
on the whole was rather against the motion of Mr.
Madison. Mr. Gerry thought, there was great weight in the
objection df Mr. Sherman. He added, as another
objection against admitting the eligibility of mera
bers in any case, that it would produce intrigues of
ambitious men for displacing proper officers, in order
to create vacancies for theraselves. In answer to
Mr. King, he observed, that, although members, if
disqualified themselves, might still intrigue and ca
bal for their sons, brothers, &c,, yet as their own in
terests would be dearer to them than those of their
nearest connexions, it might be expected they
would go greater lengths to promote them.
Mr. Madison had been led to this motion, as a
middle ground between an eligibility in all cases and
an absolute disqualification. He admitted the prob
able abuses of an eligibility of the members to offices
particularly within the gift of the Legislature. He
had witnessed the partiality of such bodies to their
own members, as had been remarked of the Virginia
Assembly by his colleague (Colonel Mason). He
appealed, however, to him in turn to vouch another
fact not less notorious in Virginia, that the back
wardness of the best citizens to engage in the Le
gislative service gave but too great success to unfit
characters. The question was not to be viewed on
one side only. The advantages and disadvantages
on both ought to be fairly compared. The objects
to be aimed at were td fill all offices with the fittest
characters, and to draw the wisest and most worthy
citizens into the legislative service. If, on one hand,

1787.] federal convention. 943
public bodies were partial to their own raerabers, on
,the other, they were as apt to be misled bytaking
characters on report, or the authority of patrons and
dependents. All who had been concerned in the ap
pointment of strangers, on those recommendations
must be sensible of this truth. Nor would the partial
ities of such bodies be obviated by disqualifying their
own members. Candidates for office would hover
round the seat pf government, or be found among
the residents there, and practise all the means of
courting the favor of the raerabers. A great pro
portion of the appointments made by the States
were evidently brought about in this way. In the
General Government, the evil must be still greater,
the characters of distant States being much less
known throughout the United States, than those of
the distant parts of the same State. The elections
by Cpngress had generally turned on raen Jiving at
the Seat of the Federal Government, or in its neigh
bourhood. As to the next object, the impulse to the
legislative service was evinced by experience to be
in general too feeble with those best qualified for it.
This inconvenience would also be more felt in the
National Governraent than in the State Govern
ments, as the sacrifices required from the distant
members would be much greater, and the pecuni
ary provisions, prpbably, mpre disproportionate. It
would therefore be impolitic to add fresh objections
to the legislative service by an absolute disqualifi
cation of its merabers. The point in question was,
whether this vvould be an objection with the most ca
pable citizens. Arguing from experience, he conclu
ded that it would. The legislature of Virginia would

944 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
probably have been without many of its best mem
bers, if in that situation they had been ineligible to
Congress, to the Governraent, and other honourable
offices of the State.
Mr, Butler thought characters fit for office would
never be unknown.
Colonel Mason; If the members of the Legisla
ture are disqualified, still the honours of the State
will induce those who aspire to them to enter that
service, as the field in which they can best display
and inlprove their talents, and lay the train for their
subsequent advancement.
Mr. Jenifer remarked, that in Maryland the Sen
ators, chosen for five years, could hold no other of
fice; and that this circumstance gained them the
greatest confidence of the people.
On the question for agreeing to the motion of Mr.
Madison, — Connecticut, Nevv Jersey, aye— -2; New
York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 8-
Massachusetts, divided.
Mr. Sherman moved to insert the w^ords, "and
incapable of holding" after the words "ineligible
to," which was agreed to without opposition.
The word "established," and the words "under
the national government," were struck out of the
third Resolution.
Mr. Spaight called for a division of the question,
in consequence of which it was so put as that it
turned on the first member of it, on the ineligibility
of members during the term for which they were
elected — whereon the States were, Connecticut,
New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Vir-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 945
ginia. North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 8 ,
Pennsylvania, Georgia, no — 2; Massachusetts, di
vided. On the second member of the sentence, extending
ineligibility of raembers to one year after the term
for which they were elected, —
Colonel Mason thought this essential to guard
against evasions by resignations, and stipulations for
office to be fulfilled at the expiration of the legisla
tive term.
Mr. Gerry had known such a case.
Mr. Hamilton. Evasions could not be prevented,
— as by proxies — by friends holding for a year, and
then opening the way, cfec.
Mr. Rutledge admitted the possibility of evasions,
but was for contracting them as far as possible. On
the question, — New York, Delaware, Maryland,
South Carolina, aye — 4; Massachusetts, Connec
ticut, New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, Geor
gia, no — 6 ; Pennsylvania, divided.™
Adjourned.

Monday, June 25th.
In Convention, — The fourth Resolution being taken
up,— Mr. Pinckney spoke as follows :
The efficacy of the system will depend on this
article. In order to form a right judgment in the
case, it will be proper to examine the situation of
this country more accurately than it has yet been
done. 60

946 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
The people of the United States are perhaps the
most singular of any we are acquainted with.
Among thera there are fewer distinctions of for
tune, and less of rank, than among the inhabitants
of any other nation. Every freeman has a right to
the same protection and security ; and a very mode
rate share of property entitles them to the possession
of all the honors and privileges the public can be
stow. Hence, arises a greater equality than is to
be found among the people of any other country ;
and an equality whicli is more likely to continue. I
say, this equality is likely to continue ; because in a
new country, possessing immense tracts of uncultiva
ted lands, where every temptation is offered to emigra
tion, and where industry must be rewarded Avitli com
petency, there Avill be few poor, and iew dependent.
Every member of the society almost will enjoy an
equal power of arriving at the supreme offices, and
consequently of directing the strength and senti
ments of the whole community. None will be ex
cluded by birth, and few by fortune, from voting for
proper persons to fill the offices of government. The
whole community will enjoy, in the fullest sense,
that kind of political liberty which consists in the
poAver, the members of the State reserve to them
selves, of arriving at the public offices, or at least,
of having votes in the nomination of those who fill
them. If this state of things is true, and the prospect of
its continuance probable, it is perhaps not politic to
endeavour too close an imitation of a gov¬ernraent
calculated for a people whose situation is, and whose
views ought to be, extremely different.

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 947
Much has been said of the Constitution of Great
Britain. I will confess that I believe it to be the
best constitution in existence ; but, at the same
time, I am confident it is one that will not or cannot
be introduced into this country, for many centuries.
If it were proper to go here into a historical disser
tation on the British Constitution, it raight easily be
shown that the peculiar excellence, the distinguish
ing feature, of that governraent cannot possibly be
introduced into our system — that its balance between
the Crown and the people cannot be made a part of
our Constitution, — that we neither have nor can
have the members to compose it, nor the rights,
privileges and properties of so distinct a class of
citizens to guard, — that the raaterials for forming
this balance or check do not exist, nor is there a
necessity for having so permanent a part of our Le
gislative, until the Executive power is so constituted
as to have something fixed and dangerous in its
principle: By this I raean a sole, hereditary, though
limited Executive.
That we cannot have a proper body for forming
a Legislative balance between the inordinate power
of the Executive and the people, is evident from a
review of the accidents and circumstances which
gave rise to the peerage of Great Britain. I believe
it is well ascertained, that the parts which compose
the British Constitution arose imraediately from the
forests of Germany ; but the antiquity of the estab
lishraent of nobility is by no raeans clearly defined.
Some authors are of opinion that the dignity denoted
by the titles of dux and cmnes, was derived from the
old Roman, to the German, Empire ; while others

948 DEBATESINTHE [ 1787.
are of opinion that they existed among the Germans
long before the Romans were acquainted with them.
The institution, however, of nobility is immemorial
araong the nations who may properly be termed the
ancestors of Great Britain. At the time they were
suraraoned in England to become a part of the
national council, the circumstances which cdn-
tributed to make thera a constituent part of that
Constitution, raust be well known to all gentlemen
who have had industry and curiosity enough to
investigate the subject. The nobles, with their
possessions and dependents, composed a body per
manent in their nature, and formidable in point of
power. They had a distinct interest both frora the
King and the people, — an interest which could only
be represented by themselves, and the guardianship of
which could not be safely intrusted to others. At
the time they w^re originally called to form a part
of the national council, necessity perhaps, as much
as other causes induced the monarch to look up to
them. It was necessary to demand the aid of his
subjects in personal and pecuniary services. The
power and possessions of the nobility would not
permit taxation from any assembly of which they
were not a part : and the blending of the deputies
of the coramons with them, and thus forraing what
they called their parler-ment, was perhaps as much
the effect of chance as of ^ny thing else. The com
raons were at that tirae corapletely subordinate to
the nobles, whose consequence and influence seem to
have been the only reasons for their superiority ; a
superiority so degrading to the commons, that in the
first summons, we find the peers are called upon to

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 949
consult, the commons to consent. From this time
the peers have coraposed a part of the British Legis
lature ; and notwithstanding their power and influ
ence have dirainished, and those of the coraraons
have increased, yet still they have always forraed
an excellent balance against either the encroach
ments of the Crown or the people.
I have said that such a body cannot exist in this
country for ages ; and that until the situation of dur
people is exceedingly changed, no necessity vA'ill
exist for so perraanent a part of the Legislature.
To illustrate this, I have reraarked that the people
of the United States are more equal in their circura
stances than the people of any other country ; that
they have very few rich men among them — by rich
men I mean those whose riches may have a danger
ous influence, or such as are esteemed rich in Eu
rope — perhaps there are not one hundred such on
the continent ; that it is not probable this number
will be greatly increased; that the genius of the
people, their mediocrity of situation, and the pros
pects Avhich are afforded their industry, in a coun
try which raust be a new one for centuries, are un
favorable to the rapid distinction of ranks. The
destruction of the right of primogeniture, and the
equal division ofthe property of intestates, will also
have an effect to preserve this mediocrity ; for laws
invariably affect the manners of a people. On the
other hand, that vast extent of unpeopled territory,
which opens to the frugal and industrious a sure
road to competency and independence, will effectu
ally prevent, for a considerable time, the increase pf
the poor or discontented, and be the means of pre-

950 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
serving that equality of condition wliich so eminent
ly distinguishes us.
If equality is, as I contend, the leading feature of
the United States, where, then, are the riches and
wealth whose representation and protection is the
peculiar province of this permanent body ? Are
they in the hands of the few who may be called
rich, — ^in the possession of less than a hundred citi
zens ? Certainly not. They are in the great body
of the people, among whom there are no men of
wealth, and very few of real poverty. Is it proba
ble that a change will be created, and that a ncAV
order of men will arise ? If under the Britisli gov
ernment for a century no such cliange was produced,
I think it may be fairly concluded it will not take
place while even the semblance of republicanism re
mains. How is this change to be effected ? Where
are the sources from whence it is to floAv ? From
the landed interest ? No. That is too unproductive,
and too much divided in most of the States. From
the monied interest ? If such exists at present, lit
tle is to be apprehended from that source. Is it to
spring frora commerce ? I believe it would be the
first instance in wliich a nobility sprang from mer
chants. Besides, sir, I apprehend that on this point
the policy of the United States has been much mis
taken. We have unwisely considered ourselves as
the inhabitants of an old, instead of a nevv, country.
We have adopted the maxims of a state full of peo
ple, and manufactures, and established in credit.
We have deserted our true interest, and instead of
applying closely to those improvements in domestic
policy which would have ensured the future impor-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 951
tance of our commerce, we have rashly and prema
turely engaged in scheraes as extensive as they are
imprudent. This, hovvever, is an error which daily
corrects itself; and I have no doubt that a few more
severe trials will convince us, that very different
commercial principles ought to govern the conduct
of tiiese States.
The people of this country are not only very dif
ferent from the inhabitants of any state we are
acquainted with in the modern world, but I assert
that their situation is distinct from either the people
of Greece or Rome, or of any states we are acquaint
ed Avitli among the ancients. Can the orders intro^
duced by the institution of Solon, can they be found
in the United States ? Can the railitary habits and
manners of Sparta be reserabled to our habits and
manners ? Are the distinction of patrician and ple
beian known among us ? Can the Helvetic or Bel
gic confederacies, or can the unwieldy, unmeaning
body called the Germanic Empire, can they be said
to possess either the same, or a situation like ours ?
I apprehend, not. They are perfectly different, in
their distinctions of rank, their constitutions, their
manners, and their policy.
Our true situation appears to me to be this,-^a
new extensive country, containing within itself the
materials for forming a government capable of ex
tending to its citizens all the blessings of civil and
religious liberty — capable of making them happy at
home. This is the great end of republican estab
lishments. We mistake the object of our Govern
ment, if we hope or wish that it is to make us re
spectable abroad. Conquest or superiority among

952 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
other powers is not, or ouglit not ever to be, the ob
ject of republican systems. If they are sufficiently
active and energetic to rescue us from contempt, and
preserve our -domestic happiness and security, it is
all we can expect from them, — it is more than al
raost any other governraent ensures to its citizens.
I believe this observation will be found generally
true, — that no two people are so exactly alike in
their situation or circurastances, as to adrait the ex
ercise of the sarae government with equal benefit ;
that a system raust be suited to the habits and ge
nius of the people it is to govern, and raust grow out
of tiiera.
The people of the United States raay be divided
into three classes, — professional men, who raust, from
their particular pursuits, always have a considerable
weight in the government, while it remains pppular,
— commercial men, who may or raay not have weight,
as a wise or injudicious commercial policy is pur
sued. If that commercial policy is pursued which I
conceive to be the true one, the merchants of this
country will not, or ought not, for a considerable
time, to have much weight in the political scale.
The third is the landed interest, the owners and cul
tivators of the soil, who are,^nd ought ever to be,
the governing sprmg in the systera. These three
classes, however distinct in their pursuits, are indi
vidually equal in the political scale, and may be
easily proved to have but one interest. The de
pendence of each on the other is mutual. The mer
chant depends on the planter. Both must, in pri
vate as well as public affairs, be connected with the
professional raen ; who in their turn must in some

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 953
measure depend on thera. Hence it is clear, from
this manifest connexion, and the equality which I
before stated exists, and must, for the reasons then
assigned, continue, that after all there is one, but
one great and equal body of citizens coraposing the
inhabitants of this country, among whom there are
no distinctions of rank, and very few or none of for
tune. For a people thuB circumstanced are we, then, to
form a Governraent ; and the question is, what sort
of governraent is best suited to them ?
Will it be the British Government ? No. Why ?
Because Oreat Britain contains three orders of peo
ple distinct in their situation, their possessions, and
their principles. These orders, combined, form the
great body of the nation ; and as in national expen
ses the wealth of the whole community must con
tribute, so ought each coraponent part to be duly
and properly represented. No other combination of
power could forra this due representation, but the one
that exists. Neither the peers or the people could
represent the royalty ; nor could the royalty and the
people form a proper representation for the peers.
Each, therefore, must of necessity be represented by
itself, or the sign of itself; and this accidental mix
ture has certainly formed a Government admirably
well balanced.
But the United States contain but one order that
can be assimilated to the British nation — this is the
order of Comraons. They will not, surely, then, at
tempt to form a Governraent consisting of three
branches two ef which shall have npthing tp repre
sent. They will net have an Executive and Senate
60*

954 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
[hereditary], because the King and Lords of Eng
land are so. The same reasons dp not exist, and
therefore the same provisions are not necessary.
We must, as has been observed, suit our Govern
ment to the people it is to direct. These are, I be
lieve, as active, intelligent and susceptible of gopd
governraent as any people in the world. The con
fusion which has produced the present relaxed state
is not owing to them. It is owing to the weakness
and [defects] of a government incapable of combi
ning the various interests it is intended to unite, and
destitute of ehergy. All that we have to do, then,
is to distribute the poAvers of government in such a
manner, and for such limited periods, as, wliile it
gives a proper degree of permanency to the magis
trate, will reserve to the people the right of election
they Avill not or ought not frequently to part vvith.
I am of opinion that this may easily be done ; and
that, with some amendments, the propositions before
the Committee will fully answer this end.
No position appears to me more true than this ;
that the General Government cannot effectually
exist Avithout reserving to the States the possession
of their local rights. They are the instruments
upon which the Union must frequently depend for
the support and execution of their powers, hovvever
immediately operating upon the people, and not
upon the States.
Much has been said about the propriety of abolish
ing the distinction of State Governments, and having
but one general system. Suffer me for a moment
to examine this question,*'^

* The residue of this speech was not furnished, like the above, by Mr. Pinckney.

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 955
The raode of constituting the second branch being
under consideration, the word " national" was struck
out, and "United States" inserted.
Mr, Gorham inclined to a compromise as to the
rule of proportion. He^ thought there was some
weight in the objections of the sraall States. If
Virginia should have sixteen votes, and Delaware
with several other States together sixteen, those
frora Virginia would be raore likely to unite than the
others, and would therefore have an undue influ
ence. This remark was applicable not only to
States, but to counties or other districts of the same
State. Accordingly the Constitution of Ma,ssacliu-
setts, had provided that the representatives of the
larger districts should not be in an exact ratio to
their numbers; and experience, he thought, had
shown the provision to be expedient.
Mr. Read. The States have heretofore been in
a sort of partnership. They ought to adjust their
old affairs before they opened a new account. He
brought into view the appropriation of the coramon
interest in the western lands to the use of particular
States, Let justice be done on this head ; let the
fund be applied fairly and equally to the discharge
of the general debt ; and the sraaller States, who
had been injured, would listen then, perhaps, to
those ideas of just representation which had been
held out.
Mr. Gorham could not see how the Convention
could interpose in the case. Errors he allowed had
been coraraitted on the subject. But Congress were
now using their endeavours to rectify them. The
best remedy would be such a government as would

956 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
have vigor enough to dp justice thrpughout. This
Avas certainly the best chance that could be afford-
to the smaller States.
Mr, Wilson. The question is, shall the raerabers
of the second branch be chosen by the Legislatures
of the States ? When he eonsidered the amazing
extent of country — the immense population which is
to fill it — the influence of the Government we are to
form wall have, not only on the present generation of
our people and their multiplied posterity, but on the
whole globe, — he- vvas lost in the magnitude of the
object. The project of Henry IV. and his states
men, was but the picture in miniature of the great
portrait to be exhibited. He was opposed to an
election by the State Legislatures. In explaining
his reasons it was necessary to observe the twofold
relation in which the people vvould stand ,^first, as
citizens of the General GoA^ernment ; and secondly,
as citizens of their particular State. The General
Government was meant for them in the first capacity:
the State Governments in the second. Both sov-
ernraents Avere deriA-ed from the people — both meant
for the people — both therefore ought to be regulated
on the sarae principles. The same train of ideas
which belonged to the relation of the citizens to
their State Governments, were applicable to their
relation to the Gerieral Govermnent; and in forming
the latter we ought to proceed by abstracting as
rauch as possible from the idea of the State Govern
ments. With respect to the province and object
of the General Government they should be consider
ed as having no existence. The election of the
second branch by the Legislatures will introduce

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 957
and cherish local interests and local prejudices.
The General Government is not an assemblage of
States, but of individuals, for certain political
purposes ; it is not meant for the States, but for the
individuals composing them; the individuals, there
fore, npt the States, ought to be represented in it.
A proportion in this representation can be preserved
in the second, as well as in the first, branch ; and
the election can be made by electors chosen by the
people for that purpose. He moved an amendment
to that effect ; which was not seconded.
Mr. Ellsworth saw no reason for departing from
the mode contained in the Report. Whoever chooses
the member, he Avill be a citizen of the State he is
to represent ; and will feel the same spirit, and act
the same part, whether he be appointed by the peo
ple or the Legislature. Every State has its particu
lar views and prejudices, which will find their way
into the general council, through Avhatever channel
they may flow. Wisdora was one of the character
istics which it was in conteraplation to give the se
cond branch, — would not raore of it issue frora the
Legislatures than from an iraraediate election by the
people ? He urged the necessity of raaintaining the
existence and agency of the States. Without their
co-operation it would be impossible to support a
republican governraent over so great an extent of
country. An array could scarcely render it practi
cable. The largest States are the worst governed.
Virginia is obliged to acknowledge her incapacity to
extend her government to Kentucky. Massachu
setts cannot keep the peace one hundred miles from
from her capital, and is now formirtg an army for its

958 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
support. How long Pennsylvania may be free from
a like situation, cannot be foreseen. If the princi
ples and materials of our Government are not ade
quate to the extent of these single States, how can
it be imagined that they can support a single gov
ernment throughout the United States ? The only
chance of supporting a General Government lies in
grafting it on those of the indiAudual States.
Doctor Johnson urged the necessity of preserving
the State Governraents, Avhich would be at the raer
cy of the General Government on Mr. Wilson's
plan. Mr. Madison thought it would obviate difficulty if
the present Resolution were postponed, and the
eighth taken up, which is to fix the right of suffrage
in the second branch.
Mr. Williamson professed himself a friend to
such a system as Avould secure the existence of
the State Governments. The happiness of the peo
ple depended on it. He was at a loss to give his
vote as to the Senate until he knew the number of
its raembers. In order to ascertain this, he moved
to insert, after " second branch of the National Le
gislature," the words, " who shall bear such propor
tion to the number of the first branch as one to  ,"
He Avas not seconded.
Mr, Mason. It has been agreed on all hands that
an efficient government is necessary ; that, to render
it such, it ought to have the faculty of self-defence;
that to render its different branches effectual, each of
them ought to have the same power of self-defence.
He did not wonder that such an agreement should
have prevailed on these points. He only wondered

1787. ] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 959
that there should be any disagreement about the ne
cessity of allowing the State Governments the same
self-defence. If they are to be preserved, as he con
ceived to be essential, they certainly ought to have
this power ; and the only raode left of giving it to
thera was by allowing thera to appoint the second
branch of the National Legislature.
Mr. Butler, observing that we were put to diffi
culties at every step by the uncertainty whether an
equality or a ratio of representation would prevail
finally in the second branch, raoved to postpone the
fourth Resolution, and to proceed to the eighth Res
olution on that point. Mr. Madison seconded him.
On the question, — New York, Virginia, Soutii Car
olina, Georgia, aye — 4; Massachusetts, Connecticut.
Nevv Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
North Carolina, no — ^7.
On a question to postpone the fourth, and take up
the seventh. Resolution, — Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 5; Massa
chusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Penn
sylvania, Delaware, no — 6.
On the question to agree, " that the members of
the second branch be chosen by the individual Le
gislatures," — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York,
New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9; Pennsylvania,
Virginia, no — 2.*^^'
¦* It must be kept in view that the largest States, particularly Pennsylvania
and Virginia, always considered the choice of the second branch by the State
Legislatures as opposed to a proportional representation, to which they were
attached as a fundamental principle of just government. The smaller States,
who had opposite views, were reinforced by the menibers from the large States
most anxious to secure the importance ofthe State Governments.

960 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
On a question on the clause requiring the age of
thirty years at least, — it was unaniraously agreed to.
On a question to strike out the words, " sufficient
to ensure their independence," after the word
" terra," — it Avas agreed to.
The clause, that the second branch hold their offi
ces for a term of " seven years," being considered, —
Mr. Gorham suggests a term of " four years," one
fourth to be elected every year.
Mr. Randolph supported the idea of rotation, as
favorable to the wisdora and stability of the corps ;
Avhicli might possibly be always sitting, and aiding
the Executive, and moves, after " seven years," to
add, "to go out in fixed proportion;" Avhich was
agreed to.
Mr. Williamson suggests "six years," as more
convenient for rotation than seven years.
Mr. Sherman seconds him.
Mr. Read proposed that they should hold their
offices "during good behaviour." Mr. R. Morris
seconds him.
General Pinckney proposed " four years." A long
er time would fix them at the seat of governraent.
They would acquire an interest there, perhaps trans
fer their property, and lose sight of the States they
represent. Under these circumstances, the distant
States would labor under great disadvantages.^^"
Mr. Sherman moved to strike out " seven years,"
in order to take questions on the several proposi
tions. On the question to strike out " seven,"— Massa
chusetts, Connecticut, Nevv York, New Jersey, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 7; Penn-

1787.] federal convention. 961
sylvania, Delaware, Virginia, no — 3; Maryland, di
vided. On the question to insert " six years," which failed,
five States being, aye ; five, no ; and one, divided,
— Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia,
North Carolina, aye — -5 ; Massachusetts, New York,
New Jersey, South Carolina/ Georgia, no — -5;
Maryland divided. '
On a motion to adjourn, the votes were, five for,
five against it; and one divided, — ^Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, aye — 5)
Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, no — 5 ; Maryland divided.
On the question for "five years," it was lost,
— Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia,
North Carolina, aye — 5; Massachusetts, New York,
New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, no^5 ; Mary
land divided.
Adjourned.

Tuesday, June 26th.

¦In . Convention, — -The duration of the second
branch being under consideration, —
Mr. Gorham moved to fill the blank with " six
years," one-third of the members to go out every
second year.
Mr. Wilson seconded the motion.
General Pinckney opposed six years, in favor of
four years. The States, he said, had different in
terests. Those of the Southern, and of South
Carolina in particular, were different from the
61

962 debates in the [1787.
Northern. If the Senators should be appointed for
a long term, they would settle in the State where
they exercised their functions, and Avould in a little
time, be rather tlie representatiA^es of that, than of
the State appointing them.®^'
Mr, Read moved tliat the term be nine years.
This Avould admit of a very convenient rotation,
one third going out triennially. He Avould still
prefer "during gpod behaviour;" but being little sup
ported in that idea, he was willing to take the
longest term that could be obtained.
Mr. Broom seconded the motion.
Mr. Madison. In order to judge of thp form to
begiA^en to this institution, it will be proper to take a
view of the ends to be served by it. These AA'ere, —
first, to protect the people against their rulers,
secondly, to protect the people against the transient
impressions into which they themselves might be
led. A people deliberating in a temperate moment,
and with the experience of other nations before
them, oa the plan of government most likely to
secure their happiness, Avould first be aware, that
those charged vvith the public happiness might
betray their trust. An obvious precaution against
this danger would be, to divide the trust- betAveen
different bodies of men, Avho might Avatch and
check each other. In this they would be governed
by the same prudence which has prevailed in or
ganizing the subordinate departments pf govern
ment, where all business liable to abuses is made to
pass through separate hands, the one being a check
on the other. It would next occur to such a people,
that they themselves were liable to temporary

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 963
errors, through want pf infprmation as to their true
interest; and that men chosen for a short term,
and erapipyed but a sraall pprtipn pf that in public
affairs, might err from the same cause. This re-'
flection would naturally suggest, that the govern
ment be so constituted as that one of its branches
might have an opportunity of acquiring a competent
knowledge of the public interests. Another re
flection equally becorriing a people on such an occa^
sion, would be, that they theraselves, as vvell as a
numerous body of representatives, were liable to
err, also, from fickleness and passion* A necessary
fence against this danger would be, to select a
portion of enlightened citizens, whose limited num
ber, and firmness, might seasonably interpose against
impetuous counsels. It ouglit, finally, to occur to a
people deliberating on a government for themselves,
that as different interests necessarily result from
the liberty meant to be secured, the major interest
might, under sudden impulses, be tempted to com
mit injustice on the minority. In all civilized
countries the people fall into different classes, having
a real or supposed difference of interests. There
will be creditors and debtors ; farmers, merchants,
and manufacturers. There will be, particularly,
the distinction of rich and poor. , It was true, as
had been observed (by Mr.^ Pinckney), we had
not among us those hereditary distinctions of rank
which were a great- source of the contests in the
ancient governments, as well as the modern States
of Europe ; nor those extremes of wealth or poverty,
which characterize the latter. We cannot, how
ever, be regarded, even at this time, as one homo-

964 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
geneous mass, in which every thing that affects a
part will affect in the same manner the whole.
In framing a system which vve wish to last for ages,
we should not lose sight of the changes which ages
will produce. An increase of population will of
necessity increase the proportion of those who will
labor under all the hardships of life, and secretly
sigh for a more equal distribution of its blessings:
These may in time outnuraber those who are placed
above the feelings of indigence. According to the
equal laws of suffrage, the power will slide into the
hands of the forraer. No agrarian atterapts have
yet been made in this country ; but symptoms of a
levelling spirit, as we have understood, have suffi
ciently appeared in a certain quarter, to give notice
of the future danger. Hoav is this danger to be
guarded against, on the republican principles?
How is the danger, in all cases of interested coali-
itions to oppress the minority, to be guarded against?
Among other means, by the establishment of a
body, in the government, sufficiently respectable for
its wisdom and virtue to aid, on such emergencies,
the preponderance of justice, by throAvang its weight
into that scale. Such being the objects of the
second branch in the proposed Government, he
thought a considerable duration ought to be given
to it. He did not conceive that the term of nine
years could threaten any real danger ; but, in pur
suing his particular ideas on the subject, he should
require that the long term allowed to the second
branch should not commence till such a period ot
life as would render a perpetual disqualification to
be re-elected, little inconvenient, either in a public

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 965
or private view. He observed, that as it was more
than probable Ave were now digesting a plan which
in its operation Avould decide for ever the fate of
republican government, we ought, not only to pro
vide every guard to liberty that its preservation could
require^ but be equally careful to supply the defects
which ourownexperiencehadparticularly pointed outr
Mr. Sherman. Government is instituted for those
who live under it. It ought, therefore to be so consti
tuted as not to be dangerous to their liberties. The
more permanency it has, the worse, if it be a bad gov
ernment. Frequent elections are necessary to pre
serve the good behaviour of rulers. They also tend
to give permanency to the governraent, by preserAdng
that good behaviour, because it etisures their re-elec
tion. In Connecticut elections have been very fre
quent, yet great stability and uniformity, both as to
persons and measures, have been experienced from
its original establishment to the present time; a pe
riod of more than a hundred and thirty years. He
wished to have provision made for steadiness and
wisdom, in the system to be adopted,; but he thought
six, or four, years would be sufficient. He should be
content Avith either.
Mr. Read wished it to be considered by the small
States, that it was their interest that Ave should be
come one people as much as possible ; that State at
tachments should be extinguished as much as possi
ble; that the Senate should be so constituted as to
have the feelings of citizens of the whole.
Mr, Hamilton, He did not mean to enter partic
ularly into the subject. He concurred with Mr.
Madison in thinking vve were now to decide forever

966 debates in the [1787.
the fate of republican government ; and that if Ave did
not give to that form due stability and wisdom, it
would be disgraced and lost among ourselves, dis
graced and lost to mankind forever. He acknowl
edged himself not to think favorably of republican
government; but addressed his remarks to those
who did think favorably of it, in order to prevail
on them to tone their government as high as possi
ble. He professed himself to be as zealous an advo
cate fbr liberty as any man vyhatever; and trusted
he should be as willing a martyr to it, though he dif
fered as to the form in which it was most eligible.
He concurred, also, in the general observations of
Mr. Madison on the subject, which might be sup
ported by others if it were necessary. It was cer
tainly true, that notbing like an equality of property
existed ; that an inequality would exist as long as
liberty existed, and that it would unavoidably result
from that very liberty itself. This inequality of
property constituted the great and fundamental dis
tinction in society. When the Tribunitial power
had levelled the boundary between the patricians
and plebeians, what followed ? The distinction be
tween rich and poor was substituted. He meant
not, however, to enlarge on the subject. He rose
principally to remark, that Mr. Sherman seemed
not to recollect that one branch of the proppsed Gov
ernment was so formed as to render it particularly
the guardians of the poorer orders of citizens ; nor to
have adverted to the true causes of the stability
which had been exemplified in Connecticut. Under
the British system, as well as the Federal, many of
the great powers appertaining to government, par-

1787.] fed eral- CON vention. 967
ticularly all those relating to foreign nations, were
not in the hands of the government there. Their
internal affairs, also„w-ere extremely simple, owing
to sundry Causes, many of wliich were peculiar to
that country. Of late the Governraent had entirely
given way to the people, artd had in fact suspended
many of its ordinary functions, in order to prevent
those turbulent scenes which had appeared else
where. He asks Mr. Sherman, Avhether the State, at
this time, dare impose and collect a tax on'' tlie peo
ple ? To these causes, and not to the frequency of
elections, the effect, as far as it existed, ought to be
chiefly ascribed.
Mr. Gerry wished we could be united in our ideas
concerning a permanent Government. All aim at
the sarae end, but there are great differences as to
the means. One circumstance, he thought, should
be carefully attended to. There was not a one-
thousandth part of dur fellow-citizens who were not
against every approach tpwards monarchy, — Will
they ever agree to a plan which seems to make such
an approach ? The Convention ought to be ex
tremely cautious in what they hold out to the people.
Whatever plan may be proposed will be espoused
with warmth by many, out of respect to the quarter
it proceeds from, as Well as from an approbation
of the plan itself And if the plan should be^f such
a nature as to rouse a violent opposition, it is easy to
foresee that discord and confusion will ensue ; and it
is even possible that we may become a prey to for
eign powers. He did not deny the position of Mr.
Madison, that the majority wfll generally violate just
ice when they have an interest in so doing ; but did

968 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
not think there was any sueh temptation in this
country. Our situation was different from that of
Great Britain ; and the great body of lands yet to
be parcelled out and settled would very much pro
long the difference. NotAyithstanding the symptoms
of injustice which had' marked many of our public
councils, they had not proceeded so far as not to
leave hopes that there Avould be a sufficient sense of
justice and virtue for the purpose of government.
He adraitted the evils arising from a frequency of
elections, and would agree to give the Senate a du
ration of four or five years. A longer term would
defeat itself It never would be adopted by the
people. Mr. Wilson did not mean to repeat what had
fallen from others, but would add an observation or
two which he believed had not yet been suggested.
Every nation may lie regarded in two relations, first,
to its own citizens ; secondly, to foreign nations. It
is, therefore, not only liable to anarchy and tyranny
within, but has wars tp aypid and treaties to obtain
from abrpad. The Senate will probably be the de
pository of the ppwers concerning the latter objects.
It ought therefore to be raade respectable in the
eyes of foreign nations. The true reason Avhy Great
Britain has not yet listened to a commercial treaty
with us has been, because she had no confidence in
the stability or efficacy of our Government. Nine
years, with a rotation, will provide these desirable
qualities ; and giye our Govemment an advantage
in this respect over monarchy itself In a monar
chy, much must always depend on the temper of the
man. In such a body, tlie personal character will

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 969
be lost in the political. He would add another ob
servation. The popular objection against appoint
ing any public body for a long term, was, that it
might, by gradual encroachments, prolong itself, first
intp a bpdy for life, and finally become a hereditary
one. It would be a satisfactory answer to this ob
jection, that as one^tliird would go out triennally,
there would be alvvays three divisions, holding their
places for unequal times, and consequently acting
under the influence of different views, and different
impulses. On the question fpr nine years, one-third to go out
triennially, — Pennsyh^ania, Delaware, Virginia, aye
^3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Nevv York, Nevv
Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, no — 8.
On the question for six years, one-third td go out
biennally, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylva
nia, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
aye — 7 ; New York, New Jersey, South Carolina,
Georgia, no — 4.^^
The clause of the fourth Resolution, " to receive
fixed stipends by which they may be compensated
for their services" being considered,—
General Pinckney proposed, that no salary sliould
be allowed. As this (the Senatorial) branch was
raeant to represent the Avealth of the country, it
ought to be composed of persons of wealth ; and if
no allowance was to be raade, the wealthy alone
would undertake the service, He mpved tp strike
out the clause.
Doctor Franklin seconded the motion. He wish
ed the Convention to stand fair vvith the people.
61*

970 debates in the [1787.
There were in it a nuraber of young raen who Would
probably be of the Senate. If lucrative appoint
ments should be recoramended, we might be charge
able vvith having carved out places for ourselves.
Oh the question, — Massachusetts, Connecticut,*
Pennsylvania, Maryland, South Carolina, aye- — 5 ;
NeAV York, New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, North
Carolina, Georgia, no — 6.
Mr. Williamson raoved to change the expression
into these words, to wit, "to receive a corapensation
for the devotion of their time to the public service."
The motion was secdnded by Mr, Ellsworth, and
agreed to by all the. States except South Caro
lina. It seemed to be raeant only to get rid ofthe
word " fixed," and leave greater roora for raodifying
the provision on this point.
Mr. Ellsworth moved to strike out, " to be paid
out of the National Treasury," and insert, " to be
paid by their respective States." If the Senate vvas
meant to strengthen the Government, it ought to
have the confidence of the States. The States wili
have an interest in keeping up a representatipn, and
will raake such provision for supporting the members
as will ensure their attendance.
Mr. Madison considered this as a departure from
a fundamental principle, and subverting the end in
tended by allowing the Senate a duration of six
years. They would, if this motion should be agreed
to, hold their places during pleasure; during the
pleasure of the State Legislatures. One great end

» Quere. Whether Connecticut should not bo, no, and Blelaware, aye '
J. M.

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 971
of the institution was, that being a fifm, wise and
impartial body, it might not only give stability to the
General Government, in its operations On individu
als, but hold an even balance among different Statfes.
The motion would make the Senate, like Congress,
the mere agents and advocates of State interests and
views, instead of being the impartial umpires and
guardians of justice and the general good. Con
gress had lately, by the establishraent of a board
with full powers td decide on the rautual claims be
tween the United States and the individual States,
fairly acknowledged theraselves td be unfit for dis
charging this part of the business referred to tbem
by the Confederation.
Mr, Dayton considered the payment of the Senate
by the States as fatal to their independence. He
Was decided for paying them out of the National
Treasury. On the question for payment of the Senate to be
left to the States, as mov^ed by Mr. Ellsworth, it
passed in the negative, — Connecticut, New York,
New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 5 ; Mas
sachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Vir
ginia, North Carolina, no — 6.^"
Col. Mason. He did not rise to raake any raotion,
but to hint an idea Avhich seemed to be proper for
consideration. Ohe important object in constituting
the Senate Avas, to secure the rights of property.
To give them weight and firmness for this purpose,
a considerable duration in office was thought neces
sary. But a longer term than six years would be
of no avail in this respect, if needy persons should
be appointed. He suggested, therefore, the propriety

972 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
of annexing to the office a qualification of property.
He thought this would be very practicable ; as the
rules of taxation Avould supply a scale for measuring
the degree of wealth possessed by every man.
A question was then taken, whether the Avords
"to be paid put pf the National Treasury," should
stand, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Ma
ryland, Virginia, aye — 5; Connecticut, New York,
New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Geor
gia, no- — 6,
Mr. Butler moved to strike out the ineligibility
of Senators to State ofiices.
Mr. Williamson seconded the motion.
Mr. Wilson reraarked the additional dependence
this vvould create in the Senators on the States.
The longer the time, he observed, allotted to the
officer, the more coraplete will be the dependence, if
it exists at all.
General Pinckney was for making the States, as
much as could be conveniently done, a part of the
General Government If the Sehate was to be ap
pointed by the States, it ought, in pursuance of the
sarae idea, to be paid by the States ; and the States
ought not to be barred frora the opportunity of call
ing members of it into offices at home. Such a re
striction would also discourage the ablest men from
going into the Senate.
Mr. Williamson moved a Resolution, so penned
as to admit of the two following questions, — first,
vvhether the merabers of the Senate should be ineli
gible td, and incapable of holding, offices under the
United Elates ; secondly, whether <fec. under the par
ticular States.

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 973
On the question to postpone, in order to consider'
Mr. Williamson's Resolution, — Connecticut, Penn
sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Car
olina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8; Massachu
setts, New York,, New Jersey, no-^3.^^
Mr. Gerry and Mr. Madison move to add to Mr.
Williamson's first question, " and for one year there
after." On this araendraent, — Connecticut, New York,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, aye — 7 ; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Penn
sylvania, Georgia, no — 4.
On Mr. Williamson's first question as araended,
viz, " ineligible and incapable &c. for one year «Stc."
— agreed to unaniraously.
On the second question as to ineligibility, <&c. to
State ofiices, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
aye — 3 ; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Dela
ware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, no — 8.
The fifth Resolution, " that each branch have the
right of originating acts," was agreed to, nem. con?'^
Adjourned.

Wednesday, June 27th.
In Convention, — Mr. Rutledge moved to postpone
the sixth Resolution, defining the powers of Con
gress, in order to take up the seventh and eighth,
which involved the most fundamental points, the
rules of suffrage , in the two branches ; which was
agreed to, nem. con.

974 debates in the [1787.
• A question being proposed on the seventh Resolu
tion, declaring that the suffrage in the first branch
should be according to an equitable ratio, —
Mr. L. Martin contended, at great length, and
Avith great eagerness, that the General Govern
ment was meant merely tp preserve the State Gov
ernments, not to govern individuals. That its powers
ought to be kept Avithin narrow limits. That if too
little power was given to it, more might be added ;
but that if too much, it could never be resumed.
That individuals, as such, have little to do, but with
their own States ; that the General Government has
no more to apprehend from the States composing
the Union, while it pursues proper measures, than a
government over individuals has to apprehend from
its subjects. That to resort to the citizens at large
for their sanction to a new government, will be
throwing them back into a state of nature ; that the
dissolution of the State Governments is involved in
the nature of the process ; that the people have no
right to do this, without the consent of those to
whom they have delegated their power for State
purposes. Through their tongues only they can
speak, through their ears only can hear. That the
States have shewn a good disppsition to comply
with the acts of Congress, weak, contemptibly weak,
as that body has been ; and have failed through in
ability alone to comply. That the heaviness of the
private debts, and the waste of property during the
war, were the chief causes of this inability, — that
he did not conceive the instances mentioned by Mr.
Madison, of compacts between Virginia and Mary^
land, between Pennsylvania and New Jersey, or of

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 975
troops raised by Massachusetts for defence against
the rebels, to be violations of the Articles of Con
federation. That an equal vote in each State was
essential to the Pederal idea, and was founded in
justice and freedom,, not merely in policy. That
though the States may give up this right of sove
reignty, yet they had not, and ought not. That the
States, like individuals, Avere in a state of nature
equally sovereign and free. In order to prove that
individuals in a state of nature are equally free and
independent, he read passages from Locke, Vattel,
Lord Soraers, Priestley. To prove that the case
is the sarae with states, till they surrender their
equal sovereignty, he read other passages in Locke
and Vattel, and also Rutherford, That the States,
being equal, cannot treat or confederate so as to
¦give up an equality of A'otes, Avithout giving up their
liberty. That the propositions on the table Avere a
system of slaA'ery for ten States. That as Virginia,
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania have forty-two
ninetieths of the Azotes, they ean do as they please,
without a miraculous union of the other ten. That
they Avill have nothing to do but to gain over one of
the ten, to make them complete masters of the rest;
that they can then appoint an Executive, and Judi-
ciaryj and Legislature for them, as they please.
That there was, and would cpntinue, a natural pre
dilection and partiality in men for their own States ;
that.the states, particularly the smaller, would never
allow a negative to be exercised over their laws :
that no State, in ratifying the Confederation, had
Objected to the equality of votes ; that the com
plaints at present ran not against this equality, but

976 DEBATES IN THE [1787
the want of power. That sixteen merabers from
Virginia would be raore likely to act in concert,
than a like nuraber formed of metnbers from differ
ent States. That instead of a junction of the small
States as a reraedy, he thought a division of the
large States would be more eligible. This was the
substance of a speech Avhich was continued more
than three hours. He was too much exhausted, he
said, to finish his reraarks, and reminded the House
that he should to-morrow resume them.
Adjourned. '

' Thursdaa', June 28th.
In Convention,- — Mr. L. Martin resumed his dis
course, contending that the General Government
oughtto be formed for the States, not for individ
uals: thatif the States AVer e to haA^e Azotes in pro
portion to their numbers of people, it would be the
same thing, whether their Representatives were
chosen by the Legislatures or the people ; the
smaller States would be equally enslaved. That
if the large States have the sarae interest with the
smaller, as was Urged, there could be no danger in
giving them an equal vote ; they would not injure
theraselves, and they could not injure the large ones,
on that supposition, without injuring theraselves ;
and if the interests were not the sarae, the inequality
of suffrage would be dangerous to the sraaller States.
That it will be in vain to propose any plan offensive
to the rulers of the States, whose influence over the
people will certainly prevent their adopting it.
That the large States were weak at present in pro-

1787.] federal convention. 977
portion to their extent ; and could only be made for
midable to the small ones by the Weight of their
votes. That in case a dissolution of the Union
should take place, the small States Would have
nothing to fear from their power ; that if, in such a
case; the three great States should league themselves
together, the other ten could do so too ; and that he
had rather see partial confederacies take place, than
the plan on the table. This was the substance of
the residue of his discourse, which vvas delivered with
much diffuseness, and considerable vehemence.^^
Mr. Lansing and Mr. Dayton moved to strike put
" hot," so that the seventh article might read, " that
the right of suffrage in the first branch ought to be
according to.the rule established by the Confedera
tion." Mr. Dayton expressed great anxiety that the
question might not be put till to-mprrpw, Gpvernpr
Livingston^ being kept away by indispositiouj, and
t}ie representation of New Jersey thereby suspended.
Mr. Williamson thought, that, if any political
truth could be grounded on matheraatical demonstra
tion, it was, that if the States were equally sove
reign now, and parted with equal proportions of
sovereignty, that, they would remain equally sove
reign. He cQuld not comprehend how the smaller
States would be injured in the case, and wished
some gentleman would vouchsafe a splutipn pf it.
He observed that the small States, if they had a
plurality of voteSj would haye an interest in throw
ing the burdens off their towu shoulders on those of
the large ones. He begged that the expected addi
tion of new States from the westward might be ta-
62

978 debatesinthe [ 1787.
ken into view. They vvould be small States ; they
would be poor States ; they would be unable to pay
in proportion to their numbers, their distance from
market rendering the produce of their labor less val
uable ; they wotild consequently be tempted to com
bine for the purpose of laying burdens on commerce
and consumption, which would fall with greater
weight on the old States.
Mr. Madison said, he was much disposed to cpn
cur in any expedient, not inconsistent with funda
mental principles, that could remove the difficulty
concerning the rule of representation. But he could
neither be convinced that the rule contended for
was just, nor that it vvas necessary for the safety of
the small States against the large States. That it
was not just, had been conceded by Mr. Brearla-
and Mr. Patterson themselves. The expedient pro
posed by them was a new partition of the territory
of the United States. The fallacy of the reasoning
drawn from the equality of sovereign states,, in the
formation of compacts, lay in confounding mere trea
ties, in which were specified certain duties to which
the parties vvere to be bound, and certain rules by
which their subjects were to be reciprocally gov
erned in their intercourse, with a compact by which
an authority was created paramount to the parties,
and making laws for the government of them. If
France, England and Spain were to enter into a
treaty for the regulation of commerce, &c., with the
Prince of Monaeho, and four or five other of the
smallest sovereigns of Europe, they would not hesi
tate tp treat as equals, and tp make the regulations
perfectly reciprocal. Would the case be the same,

1787.] federal convention. 979
if a Council were to be formed of deputies' frorii
each, with authority and discretion to raise money,
levy troops, deterraine the value of coin, &c. 1
Wpuld thirty pr fprty millidns df pepple submit their
fortunes intp the hands of a few thpusands? If
they did, it wpuld^ pnly prove that they expected
more from the terror of their superior force, than
they feared from the selfishness of their feeble asso
ciates. Why are couhties of the same States repre
sented in proportion to their numbers? Is it be
cause the representatives are chosen by tlie people
themselves ? So will be the Representatives in the
National Legislature. Is it because the larger have
more at stake than the .smaller ? The case will be
the same with the larger ^nd smaller States. Is it
because the laWs are to operate immediately ori
their persons and properties ? The same is the case,
in some degree, as the Articles of Confederation
stand ; the same will he the case, in a far greater
degree, under tlie plan proposed to be substituted.
In the cases' of captures, of piracies, and of offences
in a Federal army, the property and persons of indi
viduals depend on the laws of Congress. By the
plan proposed a complete power of taxation, the
highest prerogative of supremacy, is proposed to be
vested in the National Government. Many other
powers are added which assimilate it to the gov
ernment of individual States. The negative pro
posed on the State laws will make it an esseritial
branch of the State Legislatures, and of course will
require that it should be exercised by a body, estab
lished on like principles with the branches of those
Legislatures. That it is not necessary to secure the

/980 : debates in THE [1787.
small States against the large ones, he conceived tO
be equally obvious. Was a combination of the large
ones dreaded? This must arise either from soriie
interest comraon to Virginia, Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania, and distinguishing them from the
other States^ or froni the raere circumstance of simi
larity of size. Did any such common intei:est exist?
In point of situation, they could not have been more
effectually separated from each other, by the raost
jealous citizen of the irioSt jealous States. In point
of raanners, religioUj and the other circurastances
which soraetiraes beget affection between different
coramunities, they were not more assimilated than
the other States. In point of the staple productions,
they were as dissimilar as any three pther States in
the Union. The staple of Massachusetts was fish,
of Pennsylvania fiour, of Virginia tobacco. Was a
combination to be apprehended frora the mere cir
cumstance of equality of size ? Experience sug
gested no such danger. The Journals of Congress
did not present any peculiar associatidn of these
States in the votes recorded. It had never been
seen that different counties in the same State, con
formable in extent, but disagreeing in other circum
stances, betrayed a propensity to such combinations.
Experience rather taught a contrary lesson. Among
individuals of superior elninence and weight in so
ciety, rivalships were much more frequent than coali
tions. Araong independent nations, pre-eminent over
their 'neighbours, the same remark was verified.
Carthage and Rome tore orie another to pieces, in
stead of uniting their forces to devour the weaker
nations of the earth. The Houses of Austria arid

1787.] FEDERAt, C0NVE,NTI0N. 981^
France were hostile as long as they reinained the
greatest powers of Europe. England and France
have succeeded to the pre-erainence and to the en-
mity. To this principle We owe perhaps our lib-'
erty. A coalition between those powers would' have
been ftital to us. Among the principal members of
ancient and modern confederacies, we find the same
effect from the, same cause. The, contentions, not
the coalitions, of Sparta, Athens, and Thebes, proyed
fa?tal to the smaller raembers of the Amphictyonic
confederacy. The contentions, not the combina
tions, of Russia and Austria, have distracted and
oppressed the German Enlpire. Were the large
States formidable, singly, to their smaller neigh
bours ? On this supposition, the latter ought to
wish for such a, General Gpvernment as will operate
with equal enejigy on the former as on themselves.
The more lax, the band, the more liberty the larger
will have to aYail themselves of their supterior force.
Here again, experience was an instructive taionitor.
What is the , situation of the weak corapared With
the strong, in those, stages of civilization in which
the violence of individuals , is least; controlled by an
efficient governraent ?,,. The heroic period of ancient
Greece, the feudal licentiousness of tlie raiddle ages
of Europe, the existing, condition of ^ tlie American
savages, answer this question. .-What is the situa
tion of the minor sovereigns iin the great society of
independent natipns, in which thfe riiore (powerful are
under, no control, but the norainal authority .of, the
law of nations ? Is not the danger to theviforiner
exactly in proportion to their weakness ? But there
are cases still more in point What was the condi-

982 DEBATES IN THE [1787-
tion of the weaker raembers of the Amphictyonic
confederacy ? Plutarch (see Life of Themistocles)
will inform us, that it happened but too often, that
the strongest cities corrupted and awed the weaker,
and that.judgment went in favor of tfie more power
ful party. What is the condition of the lesser States
in the German confederacy? We all know t^at
they are exceedingly trampled upon, and that they
owe their safety, as far as they enjoy itj partly to theii
enlisting themselves under the rival banners of the
pre-eminent members, partly to alliances with neigh-
boiiring princes, which the constitution of tlie Em
pire dpes not prohibit, W^hat is the state of things
in the lax system of the Dutch confederacy ? Hol
land contains about half the people, supplies about
half the money, and by her influence silently and
indirectly governs the whole republic. In a word,
the two extremes before us are, a perfect separation,
anda perfect incorporation of the thirteen States.
In the first case, they would be independent nations,
subject to no law but the law of nations. In the
last, they would be mere counties of one entire re
public, subject to one common law. In the first
case, the smaller States would have every thing to
fear from the larger. In the last they would have
nothing to fear. The true policy of the small
States, therefore, lies in promoting those principles,
and that form of government, which wfll most ap
proximate the States to the condition of counties.
Another consideration may be added. If the Gen
eral Government be feeble, the larger States, dis
trusting its continuance, and foreseeing that their
importance and security may depend on their own

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 983
size and strength, will never submit to a partition.
Give to the General Government sufficient energy
and permanency, arid you remove the objection.
Gradual partitions of the large, and junctions of the
small States, will be facilitated, and time may effect
that equalization which is wished for by the small
States now, but can never be accomplished at once.
Mr. Wilson. The leading argument of those who
contend for equality of votes araong the States is,
that the States, as such, being equal, and being re
presented, not as districts of individuals, but in their
political and corporate capacities, are entitled to an
equality of suffrage. According to this mode of rea
soning, the representation ofthe boroughs in England,
which has been allowed on all hands to be the rotten
part of the Constitution, is perfectly right and proper.
They are, like the States, represented in their cor-
poi-ate capacity ;, like the States, therefore, they are
entitled to equal ^voices-— Old Sarum to as many as
LdridOrj. And instead of the mjury supposed hith
erto to be done to London, the true ground of com
plaint lies with Old Saruiri: for London instead of
tvvo, which is her proper share, sends four represen
tatives to Parliaraent.*^^
Mr. Sherman. The question is, not what rights
naturally belong to man, but how they may be
most equally and effectually guarded in society.
And if some give up more than others, in order to
obtain this end, there can be no room for complaint.
To do otherwise, to require an equal concession
from all, if it would create danger to the rights
of some, would be sacrificing the end to the means.
The rich man who enters into society along with

•984 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
the poor man gives up more than the poor man, yet
with an equal vote he is equally safe. Were he td
have more votes than the poor-man, inpropdrtion to
his superior, stake, the rights of the poor man would
imraediately cease to be secure. ' ' This consideration
prevailed when the Articled df Confederation were
formed.^'^ . r,-. m,, i,
The determination of thc^ qhestibn, for striking out
the vvord " not,'' was put off' till to-morrow, at the
request of the Deputies fro^m New York.
I Doctor Franklin. JMr. President, The small pro-
.gress Ave have fnadp after four or five weeks close
attendarice I arid continual reasonings with each
.other-^our different sentiraents on alraOst every
fquestion, several of the last producing as raany noes
as ayes— is, methinks, a melancholy proof of the
imperfection of the huraan understanding. We in
deed seera to feel our own want of political wisdom,
since vye havebeen running about in search of it.
We have gone back to ancient history for models
of government, and examined the different forms
of those republics which, having been formed with
the seeds of their own dissolution, now no 'longer
exist. And we have viewed moderri states all
round Europe, but find none of their constitutions
suitable to our circurastances.
In this situation of this ' Assembly, groping as it
were in the dark td find political truth, and scarce
able to distinguish it' When presented to us, how has
it happened. Sir, that we have not hitherto once
thought of hriiribly applying to the Father of lights,
to illuhiiriate our undftrstandings ? In the beginning
bf the contest with Great Britain, when we were

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 985
sensible of danger, we had daily prayer in this
room for the divine prptectipn. Our prayers; sir,
were heard, and they were gracipusly answered.
All of us who were engaged in the struggle rifust
have observed frequent instances of a superintending
Providence in pur favpr. Tp that kind Prpvidence
Ave pwe this happy pppprtunity of corisulting in
peace on the, means of establishing our future na
tional- felicity. And have we now forgotten that
powerful friend? Or do we imagine that we no
longer need his assistance? I have lived. Sir, a
long time, and the longer I live, the more convincing
proofs I see of this tvuihr^that God governs in the
afifgirs of men. And if a sparrow cannot fall to the
ground without his notice, is it probable that an
erapire can rise without his aid ? We have been
assured. Sir, in the sacred writings, that " exicBpt
the Lord build the house they labor in vain that
bufld it." I firmly believe this; and I alsodbelieve
that without his concurring aid we shall succeed in
this political building no better than the builders of
Babel. We shall be divided by our little partial
local interests ; our projects wfll be confounded ;
and we ourselves shall become a reproach and by
word down to future ages. And what is worse,
mankind may hereafter, froni this unfortunate in
stance, despair of establishing governments by
human wisdom, and leave it ;to chance, war, and
conquest. I therefore beg leave to move— that henceforth
prayers imploring the assistance of Heaven, arid
its blessings on our deliberations, be held in this
Asserably every morning before we proceed to
62*

986 DEBATESINTHE [1787.
business, and that one or more of tbe clergy of this
city be requested to officiate in that service.
Mr. Sherman seconded the motion.
Mr. Hamilton and several others expressed their
apprehensions, that, hpwever proper such a resolu
tion might have been at the beginning of the Con
vention, it might at this late day, in the first place,
bring on it sorae disagreeable aniraadversions ; and
in the second, lead the public to believe that tbe
embarrassments and dissensions within the Conven
tion had suggested this measure. It was answered,
by Doctor Franklin, Mr. Sherman, and others, that
tbe past omission of a duty could not justify a
further omission; that the rejection of suCh a pro
position woiild expose the Convention to more un
pleasant animadversions thari the adoption of it;
and that the alarm put of doors that might be ex
cited for the state of things within would at least
be as likely to do good as ill.
Mr. Williamson observed, that the true cause
of the omission could not be mistaken. The Con
vention had no funds.
Mr. Randolph proposed, in order to give a favor
able aspect to the measure, that a sermon be
preached at the request of the Convention on the
Fourth of July, the anniversary of Independence;
and thenceforward prayers, &c, to be read in the
Convention eA^ry morning. Doctor Franklin sec
onded this motion. After several unsuccessful at
tempts for silently postporiing this matter by ad
journing, the adjournment was at length carried,
without any vote on tbe motion.^'

1787.] FEDERAL convention. 987

Friday, June 29th.
In Convention-^Doctot Johnson. The contro
versy must be endless, whilst gentlemen. differ in the
grounds of their arguments; those on one side con
sidering the States as districts of people composing
one political society : those on the other, corisidering
them as so many political societies. The fact is,
that the States do exist aS" political soeieties, and a
govermnent is to be formed for them in their polit
ical capacity, as well as for the individuals, com
posing them. Does it not seem to follow, that if
the States, as such, are to exist, they must be armed
with some power- of self-defence? This is the idea
of Colonel Mason, who appears to have looked to
the bottoni of this matter. Besides the aristocratic
and other interests, which ought to have the means
of defending themselves, the States have their inter
ests as such, and are equally entitled to like means.
On the whole he thought, tljat, as in sortie respects
the States are to be considered in their political
capacity, and in others as districts of individual
citizens, the two ideas embraced on different sides,
instead of being opposed to each other, ought to be
combined ; that in one branch the people pught tp
be represented, in the o^^er the States, , ;
Mr. Gorham. The States, as now confederated,
have no doubt a right to refuse tobe consolidated, or
to be formed into any new system. But he wished
the small States, Avhich seemed most ready to object,
to consider which are to give up most, they or the
larger ones. He conceived that a rupture of the

988 DEBATESINTHE [ 1787.
Union Avould be an event unhappy for all; but
surely the large States would be least unable to
take care of theraselves, and to raake connections
with one another. The weak, therefore, were most
interested in establishing some general system for
maintaining order. If, among' individuals composed
partly of vArfeak, and partly of strong, the fprmer
most need the prptectipn pf law and governraent,
the case is exactly the sarae with weak and pow
erful States. What would be the situation of Del
aware, (for these things he found raust be spoken out,
and it might as well be done iat first as last); what
would be the situation of Delaware in case of a
separation of the States? Would she not be at the
mercy of Penrtsyl vania ? Would not her true inter
est lie in being consolidated with her ; and ought
she riot now to wish for such a union with Penn
sylvania, under one 'Government, as will put it out
of the power of Pennsylvania to oppress her ? No
thing can be raore ideal than the danger apprehended
by the States frora their being formed into one na
tion. Massachusetts was prigirially three colonies,
viz. ; old Massachusetts, Plymouth, and the Province
of Maine. These apprehe'risions existed then. An
incorporation' took place ; all parties were safe and
satisfled; and every distinction is now forgotteri.
The case was simflar with Connecticut and New
Haven. The dread of uniori was reciprocal ; the
eorifeequence of it equally salutary and satisfactory.
In like manner. New Jersey has been made one so
ciety' oiit df tWp parts. Should a separation of the
States take place, the fate of New Jersey would be
worst of all. She has no foreign coramerce, and

1787.,] FEDERAL CONVE NTION . 989
can have but* little. iPennsylvania and New York
will continue to levy taxes on her consumption. If
she consults her interest, she would beg of all things
to be annihilated. The apprehensions of the small
States ought to be appeased by another reflection.
Massachusetts will be divided. The Province of
Maine is already cons'idered as approaching the
tel*m of its annexation to it : and Pennsylvania will
probably not increase, considering the present state
of her population, and other events that may hap
pen. On the whole, he considered a union of the
States as necessary to their happiness, and a firm
General Government as necessary to their union.
He should .consider it his duty, if his colleagues
viewed the matter in the same light he did, to
stay here as lorig as any other State would reraain
with thera, in order to agree on sorae plan that
could, with propriety, be recomraended to the people.
Mr. Ellsworth did npt despair. He still trusted
that sorae gopd plan pf gpvernment would be devised
and adopted. ^
Mr. Read. He should ha^e no objection to the
system if it were truly national, but it has too much
of a federal mixture in it. The little States, he
thpught, had npt much tp fear. He suspected that
the large States felt their want of energy, and
wished for a General Government to supply the de
fect. Massachusetts was evidently laboring under
her weakness, and he believied Delaware would not
be in much danger if in her neighbourhood. Dela
ware had enjpyed tranquillity, and he flattered him
self wpuld continue tp dp sp. He was not, however,
so selfish as not to wish for a gppd General Gpvern-

990 debates in the [1787.
ment. In order to obtain one, the whole States
must be incorporated. If the States remain, the
representatives Of the large ones will stick together,
and carry every thing before them. The Execu
tive, also, will be chosen nnder the influence of this
partiality, and will betray it in his administration.
These jealousies are inseparable from the scheme of
leaving the States in existence. They must be done
away. The ungranted lands, also, which have been
assumed by particular States, must be given up.
He repeated his approbation of the plan of Mr.
Hamilton, and wished it to be substituted for that
on the table.
Mr. Madison agreed with Doctor Johnson, tliat
the mixed nature of the Government ought to be
kept in view ; but thought too much stress was laid
on the rank of the States as political societies.
There was a gradation, he observed, from the small
est corporation, with the most limited powers, to the
largest empire, with the most perfect sovereignty.
He pointed out the linritations on the sovereignty of
the States, as now confederated. Their laws, in re
lation to the paramount law of the Confederacy,
were analagous to that of bye-laws to the supreme
law within a State. Under the proposed Govern
ment the powers pf the States will be much farther
reduced. According to the views of every member,
the General Government will have powers far be
yond those exercised by the British Parliament
wheri the States were part of the British Empire.
It wfll, in particular, have the power, without the
consent of the State Legislatures, to levy money di
rectly from the people themselves; and therefore,

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 991
not to divest such unequal portions of the people as
composed the several States of an equal voice, would
subject the system to the reproaches and evils which
have resulted from the vicious representatipn in
Great Britain.
He entreated the gentlemen representing the small
States to renounce a principle which vvas confessedly
unjust; which could never be admitted; and which,
if admitted, raust infuse raortality into a Constitution
which vve vyished to last forever. He prayed them
to ppnder well the cpnsequences of suffering the
Confederacy to go to pieces. It had been said that
the want of energy in the large States would be a
security to the sraall. It was fo*rgotten that this
want of energy proceeded from the supposed securi
ty of the States against all external danger. Let
each State depend on itself for its security, and let
apprehensions arise of danger from distant powers or
from neighbouring States, and the larigriishing con
dition of all the States, large as well as small, would
soon be transformed into vigorous and high-toned
Governments. His great fear aa^s, that their Gov
ernments would then have too iriuch energy; that
this might not only be formidable in the large to the
small States, ) but fatal to the internal liberty of
all. The same causes which have rendered the old
world the theatre of incessant wars, and have ban
ished liberty from the face of it, would soon produce
the sarae effects here: The weakness and jealousy
pf the small States wpuld quickly intrpduce spme
regular military force, against sudden danger from
their powerful neighbours. The example would
be folloAived by others, and wpuld spon becpme

992 DEBATES IN THE ', il787.
uniyersal. In time pf actual war, great discretion
ary powers are constantly given , to the Execu
tive magistriate. , Constant apprehension of i war
has the same , tendency to. render the head' too
large for the body, A standing railitary force, with
an overgrown Executive, will not long be safe cora
panions to liberty. The raeans of defence against
foreign danger have been always the instruraents of
tyranny at horae. Araong the Romans it was a
standing maxim, to excite a war whenever a revolt
was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the ar
mies kept up under the pretext of defending, have
enslaved, the people. It is, perhaps, questionable,
whetiier the best concerted systera of absolute power
in Europe, could maintain itself, in a situation where
no alarms of external danger could tame the people
to the domestic yoke. The insular situation of
Great Britain Avas the principal cause of her being
an exception to the general fate of Europe. It has
rendered less defence necessary, and admitted a kind
of defence which could not be used for the purppse
of oppression. These consequences, he conceived,
ought to be apprehended, whether the States should
run into a total separation from each other, or should
enter into partial confederacies. Either event would
be truly deplorable ; and those Avhp might be acces
sary to either, could never be forgiven by their coun
try, nor by themselves.^
* Mr. Hamilton observed, that individuals forming
political societies modify their rights differently, with
regard to suffrage. Examples of it are found in aU

«-

* From this date he was absent till the 13th of

1787.]. FEDERAL CON VENTION . 993
the States. In all of them, sorae individuals are de
prived of the right altogether, not having the requi
site qualification of property. In sorae of the States,
the right of suffrage is allowed in some cases, and
refused in others. To vote for a member in one
branch, a certain quantum of property; to vote for
a member in another branch of the Legislature, a
higher quantum of property, is required. In like
manner. States raay modify their right of suffrage
differently, the larger exercising a larger, the sraall
er a sraaller, share of it. But , as States are a col
lection of individual men, wliich ought we to respect
most, the rights of the people composing them, or of
the artificial beings resulting from the composition ?
Nothing could be more preposterous or absurd than
to sacrifice the former to the latter. It has been
said, that if the sraaller States renounce their equali
ty, they renpunce at the sarae tirae their liberty. The
truth is, it is a cpntest fpr ppwer, not for liberty.
Will the raen coraposing the small States be less
free than those composing the larger ? The State
of Delaware liaAang forty thousand souls will lose
power, if she has one-tenth only of the votes allowed
to Pennsylvania having four hundred thousand ; but
wfll the people of Delaware be less free, if each citi
zen has an equal vote with each citizen of Pennsyl
vania? He admitted that common residence within
the sarae State would produce a certain degree of
attachment ; and that this principle might have a
certain influence on public affairs. He thought,
however, that this might, by some precautions, be in
a great measure excluded : and that no material in-
couA^enience could result from it ; as there could not
63

994 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
be any ground for combination among the States
whose influence was raost dreaded. The only con
siderable distinction of interests lay between the
carrying and non-carrying States, which divides,
instead of uniting, the largest States. No consider
able inconvenience had been found from the division
of the State of New York into different districts of
different sizes.
Some of the consequences of a dissolution of the
Union, and the establishment of partial confedera
cies, had been pointed out. He Avould add another
of a most serious nature. Alliances will immedi
ately be formed with different rival and hostile na
tions of Europe, who will foment disturbances araong
ourselves, and raake us parties to all their oAvn quar
rels. Foreign nations having Araerican dominion
are, and raust be, jealous of us. Their representa
tives betray the utraost anxiety for our fate ; and for
the result of this ineeting, which raust have an essen
tial influence on it. It had been said, that respecta
bility in the eyes of foreign nations was not the
object at which we aimed ; that the proper object
of republican government was domestic tranquillity
and happiness. This was an ideal distinction. No
government could give us tranquillity and happiness
at home, which did not possess sufficient stability
and strength to make us respectable abroad. This
was the critical moment for forming such a govern
ment. We should run every risk in trusting to fu
ture amendments. As yet we retain the habits of
union. We are weak, and sensible of our weakness.
Henceforward, the motives wfll becorae feebler, and
the difficulties greater. It is a miracle that we are

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 995
now here, exercising our tranquil and free delibera
tions on the subject. It would be raadness to trust
to future miracles. A thousand causes must obstruct
a re-production of tliem.*^
Mr. Pierce considered the equality of votes under
the Confederation as the great source of the public
difficulties. The members of Congress werC advo
cates for local advantages. State distinctions must
be sacrificed, as far as the general good required,
but without destroying the States. Though from a
sraall State, he felt himself a citizen of the United
States. •
Mr. Gerry urged, that we never were independent
States, were not such now, and never could be, even
on the principles of the Confederation. The States,
and the advocates for them, were intoxicated with
the idea of their sovereignty. He was a meraber of
Congress at the tirae the Federal Articles were
forraed. The injustice of allowing each State an
equal vote was long insisted on. He voted for it,
but it was against his judgraent, and under the pres
sure of public danger, and the obstinacy of the lesser
States. The present Confederation he considered
as dissolving. The fate of the Union will be decided
by the Convention. If tliey do not agree on sorae
thing, few delegates will probably be apppinted to
Congress. If they do, Congress will probably be
kept up till the new systera should be adopted. He
lamented that, instead of coming here like a band
of brothers, belonging to the sarae family, we seemed
to have brpught with us the spirit pf political nego
tiators. Mr. L. Martin remarked, that the language, of

996 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
the States being sovereign and independent, was once
familiar and understood ; though it seemed now so
strange and obscure. He read those passages in the
Articles of Confederation which describe them in
that languague.
On the question, as raoved by Mr. Lansing, shall
the word " not " be struck out ? — Connecticut, New
York, New Jersey, Delaware, aye — 4 ; Massachu
setts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, no — 6 ; Maryland, divided.
On the motion to agree to the clause as reported,
" that> the rule of suffrage in the first branch ought
not to be according to that established by the Articles
of the Confederation," — Massachusetts, Pennsylva
nia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Geor
gia, aye — 6 ; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Delaware, no — 4 ; Maryland, divided.
Doctor Johnson and Mr. Ellsworth moved to
postpone the residue of the clause, and take up the
eighth Resolution.
On the question, — Connecticut, New York, New.
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9 ; Massa
chusetts, Delaware, no — 2.
Mr. Ellsworth moved, " that the rule of suffrage
in the second branch be the sarae with that estab
lished by the Articles of Confederation." He was
not sprry, on the whole, he said, that the vote just
passed had deterrained against this rule in the first
branch. He hoped it would becorae a ground of
coraproraise with regard to the second branch.
We were partly national, partly federal. The pro
portional representation in the first branch was

1787.] federal convention. 997
conformable to the national principle, and would
secure the large States against the small. An
equality of voices was conforraable to the federal
principle, and was necessary to secure the small
States against the large. He trusted that on this
riaiddle ground a coraproraise would take place.
He did not see that it could on any other, and if no
coraproraise should take place, our meeting would
not only be in vain, but worse than in A^ain. To the
eastward, he was sure Massachusetts was the only
State that would listen to a proposition for exclu
ding the States, as equal political societies, from an
equal voice in both branches. The others would
risk every consequence rather than part with so
dear a right. An attempt to deprive them of it was
at once cutting the body of America in two, and, as
he supposed would be the case, somewhere about
this part of it. The large States he conceived
would, notwithstanding the equality of votes, have
an influence that Would maintairi their superiority.
Holland, as had been admitted (by Mr. Madison),
had, notwithstanding a like equality in the Dutch
confederacy, a prevailing influence in the public
measures. The power of self-defence was essential to
the small States. Nature had given it to the sraall
est insect of the creation. He could never admit
that there was no danger of combinations araong
the large States. They will like individuals find
out and avail themselves of the advantage to be
gained by it. It was true the danger would be
greater if they were contiguous, and had a more
immediate and comraon interest. A defensive com
bination of the sraall States was rendered more

998 debates in the [1787.
difficult by their greater number. He would men
tion another consideration of great weight. The
existing Confederation was founded on the equality
of the States in the article of suffrage, — was it
meant to pay no regard to this antecedent plighted
faith. Let a strong Executive, a Judiciary, and
Legislative power, be created, but let not too much
be attempted, by which all may be lost. He was
not in general a half-way man, yet he preferred
doing half the good we could, rather than do
nothing at all. The other half may be added
when the necessity shall be more fully experienced.
Mr. Baldwin could have wished that the powers
of the general Legislature had been defined, before
the mode of constituting it had been agitated. He
should vote against the motion of Mr. Ellsworth,
though he did not like the Resolution as it stood in
the Report of the Coraraittee of the Whole. He
thought the second branch ought to be the repre
sentation of property, and that, in forming it, there
fore, some reference ought to be had to the relative
wealth of their constituents, and to the principles
on which the Senate of Massachusetts was consti
tuted. He concurred Avith those who thought it
would be impossible for the General Legislature
to extend its cares to the local matters of the States!
Adjourned.

Saturday, June SOth.
In Convention,— Mx. Brearly moved that the
President write to the Executive of New Hamp-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 999
shire, informing it that the business depending
befpre the Convention was of such a nature as to
require the immediate attendance of the Deputies
of that State. In support of his motion, he observed
that the difficulties ofthe subject, and the diversity
of opinions called fbr all the assistance we could
possibly obtain. (It was well understood that the
object was to add New Hampshire to the nuraber
of States opposed to the doctrine of proportional
representation, which it was presumed, from her
relative size, she must be adverse to).
Mr. Patterson seconded the motion.
Mr. Rutledge could see neither the necessity nor
propriety of such a measure. They are not unap-
prized of the raeeting, and can attend if they choose.
Rhode Island might a,s well be urged to appoint and
send deputies. Are we to suspend the business
until the Deputies arrive ? If we proceed, he hoped
all the great points would be adjusted before the
letter could produce its effect.
Mr. King said he had written more than once as
a private correspondent, and the answer gave him
every reason to expect that State would be repre-
resented very shortly, if it should be so at all. Cir
cumstances of a personal nature had hitherto pre
vented it. A letter could have no effect.
Mr. Wilson wished to know, whether it would be
consistent with the rule or reason of secrecy, to
communicate to New Hampshire that the business
was of such a nature as the motion described. It
would spread a great alarm. Besides, he doubted
the propriety of soliciting any State on the subject,
the meeting bemg merely voluntary.

1000 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
On motion of Mr, Brearly,
New York, New Jersey, aye — 2 ; Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro
lina, no — 5; Maryland, divided; Pennsylvania, Del
aware, Georgia, not on the floor.^'^
The motion of Mr. Ellsworth being resuraed,
for alloAVing each State an equal vote in the second
branch, — ¦
Mr. Wilson did not expect such a motion after
the establishraent of the contrary principle in the
first branch ; and considering the reasons which
w^ould oppose it, even if an equal A^ote had been al
lowed in the first branch. The gentleman from
Connecticut (Mr. Ellsworth) had pronounced, that
if the motion should not be acceded to, of all the
States north of Pennsylvania one only would agree
to any General Governraent. He entertained more
favorable hopes of Connecticut and of the other
Northern States. He hoped the alarras exceeded
their cause, and that they would not abandon a
country to which they were bound by so raany
strong and endearing ties. But should the deplored
event happen, it would neither stagger his senti
raents nor his duty. If the minority of the people
of America refuse to coalesce with the majority on
just and proper principles ; if a separation must
take place, it could never happen on better grounds.
The votes of yesterday against the just principle of
representation, were as twenty-two to ninety, of the
people of America. Taking the opinions to be the
sarae on this point, and he was sure, if there was
any room for change, it could not be on the side of
the majority, the question will be, shall less than

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. lOOl"
one- fourth of the United States withdraw themselves
frora the Union, or shall raore than three-fourths re
nounce the inherent, indisputable and unalienable
rights of raen, in favor of the artificial systera of
States ? If issue must be joined, it was on this
point he would choose to join it. The gentleman
from Connecticut, in supposing that the preponder
ance secured to the majority in the first branch had
removed the objections to an equality of votes in
the second branch for the security of the minority,
narrowed the case extremely. Such an equality
will enable the minority to control, in all cases
whatsoever, the sentiments and interests of the
majority. Seven States wfll control six : seven
States, according to the estimates that had been
used, composed twenty-four ninetieths of the whole
people. It would be in the power, then, of less
than one-third to overrule two-thirds, whenever a
question should happen to divide the States in
that manner. Can we forget for whom we are
forming a Governraent? Is it for men, or for the
imaginary beings called States? Will our honest
constituents be satisfied with raetaphysical distinc
tions ? Will they, ought they to, be satisfied with
being told, that the one-third corapose the greater
number of States ? The rule of suffrage ought on
every principle to be the same in the second as in
the first branch. If the Government be not laid on
this foundation, it can be neither solid nor lasting.
Any other principle will be local, confined and tem
porary. This wfll expand with the expansion, and
grow with the growth of the United States. Much
has been said of an imaginary combination of three
63*

1002 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
States. Sometimes a danger of monarchy, some
tiraes of aristocracy, has been charged on it. No
explanation, however, of the danger has been vouch
safed. It would be easy to prove, both from reason
and history, that rivalships would be more probable
than coalitions ; and that there are no coinciding in
terests that could produce the latter. No answer
has yet been given to the observations of Mr. Madi
son on this subject. Should the Executive raagis
trate be taken from one of the large States, would
not the other two be thereby thrown into the scale
with the other States ? Whence, then, the danger
of monarchy ? Are the people of the three large
States more aristocratic than those of the small
ones? Whence, then, the danger of aristocracy
frora their influence 1 It is all a raere illusion of
names. We talk of States, till we forget what they
are composed of Is a real and fair majority the natu
ral hot-bed of aristocracy ? It is a part of the defini
tion of this species of government, or rather of ty
ranny, that the smaller nuraber governs the greater.
It is true that a majority of States in the second
branch cannot carry a law against a raajority of the
people in the first. But this reraoves half only of the
objection. Bad governments are of two sorts, — first,
that which does too little ; secondly, that which does
too much ; that which fafls through weakness, and
that which destroys through oppression. Under
whieh of these evfls do the United States at present
groan ? Under the weakness and inefficiency of its
governraent. To reraedy this weakness we have
been sent to this Convention. If the motion should
be agreed to, we shall leave the United States fet-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1003
tered precisely as heretofore; with the additional
mortification of seeing the good purposes of the fair
representation of the people in the first branch, de
feated in the second. Twenty-four will still con
trol sixty-six. He lamented that such a disagree
ment should prevail on the point of representation ;
as he did not foresee that it would happen on the
other point most contested, the boundary between
the general and the local authorities. He thought
the States necessary and valuable parts of a good
system. Mr. Ellsworth. The capital objection of Mr.
Wilson, " that the rainority will rule the raajority,"
is not true. The power is given to the few to save
thera frora being destroyed by the raany. If an
equality of votes had been given to thera in both
branches, the objection might have had weight. Is
it a novel thing that the few should have a check on
the many ? Is it not the case in the British Consti
tution, the wisdom of which so raany gentleraen
have united in applauding ? Have not the House of
Lords, who forra so sraall a proportion of the nation,
a negative on the laws, as a necessary defence of
their peculiar rights against the encroachments of the
Comraons ? No instance of a confederacy has exist
ed in which an equality of voices has not been exer
cised by the raerabers of it. We are running from
one extrerae to another. We are razing the founda-=
tions of the building, when we need only repair the
roof No salutary measure has been lost for want
of a majority of the States to favor it. If security
be all that the great States wish for, the first branch
secures them. The danger of combinations among

1004 debates in THE [1787.
them is not imaginary. Although no particular abu
ses could be foreseen by him, the possibility of them
would be sufficient to alarm him. But he could ea
sily conceive cases in whicii they might result from
such combinations. Suppose, that, in pursuance of
sorae commercial treaty or arrangement, three or
four free ports and no raore were to be established,
would not corabinations be forraed in favor of Bos
ton, Philadelphia, and sorae port of the Chesapeake ?
A like concert raight be forraed in the appointment
of the great offices. He appealed again to the obli
gations of the Federal pact, which was still in
force, and which had been entered into with so much
solemnity; persuading himself that some regard
would stfll be paid to the plighted faith under which
each State, small as well as great, held an equal
right of Suffrage in the general councfls. His re
marks were not the result of partial or local view^s.
The State he represented (Connecticut) held a mid
dle rank.===
Mr. Madison did justice to the able and close rea
soning of Mr. Ellsworth, but must observe that it
did not always accord with itself On another oc
casion, the large States were described by him as
the aristocratic States, ready to oppress the small.
Now the small are the House of Lords, requirino- a
negative to defend them against the raore nuraerous
Commons. Mr. Ellsworth had also erred in say
ing that no instance had existed in which confede
rated states had not retained to themselves a perfect
equality of suffrage. Passing over the German sys
tera, ui which the King of Prussia has nine voices,
he reminded Mr. Ellsworth of the Lycian confede-

1787.] federal CONVENTION. 1005
racy, in which the component members had votes
proportioned to their importance, and which Mon
tesquieu recoraraends as the fittest raodel for that
forra of governraent. Had the fact been as stated by
Mr. Ellsworth, it would have been of little avail to
hira, or rather would have strengthened the arguments
against him ; the history and fatp of the several cpn-
federacies, modern as well as ancient, demonstrating
some radical vice in their structure. In reply to the
appeal of Mr. Ellsworth to the faith plighted in
the existing federal compact, he remarked, that the
party claiming frora pthers an adherence to a com
mon engagement, ought at least to be guiltless itself
pf a violation. Of all the States, hoAA'ever, Connec
ticut was perhaps least able to urge this plea. Be
sides the various oniissions to perforra the stipulated
acts, frora which no State was free, the Legislature
of that State had, by a pretty recent vote, positively
refused to pass a law for complying with the requi
sitions of Congress, and had transmitted a copy of
the vote to Congress. It was urged, he said, con
tinually, that an equality of votes in the second
branch Avas not only necessary to secure the small,
but would be perfectly safe to the large ones ; whose
majority in the first branch was an effectual bul^
wark. But notwithstanding this apparent defence,
the -ma^erity of States raight still injure the raajority
of the people. In the first place, they could obstruct
the wishes and interests of the raajority. Secondly,
they could extort raeasmres repugnant to the wishes
and interest of the raajority. Thirdly, they could
impose measures adverse thereto; as the second
branch will probably exercise some great powers.

1006 debates in the [1787.
in which the first will not participate. He admitted
that every peculiar interest, whether inany class Of
citizens, or any description of States, ought to be
secured as far as possible. Wherever there is dan
ger of attack, there ought to be given a constitu
tional power of defence. But he contended that the
States were divided into different interests, not by
their difference of size, but by other circumstances ;
the most material of which resulted partly from cli
mate, but principally from the effects of their having
or not having slaves. These two causes concurred
in forming the great division of interests in the
United States. It did not lie between the large and
small States. It lay betvveen the Northern and
Southern ; and if any defensiA^e poAver were neces
sary, it ought to be mutually given to these two in
terests. He was so strongly impressed with this
important truth, that he had been casting about in his
mind for some expedient that would answer the pur
pose. The one which had occurred was, that, instead
of proportioning the votes of the States in both branch
es, to their respective numbers of inhabitants. Com
puting the slaves in the ratio of five to three, they
should be represented in one branch according to
the number df free inhabitants only ; and in the
other according to the whole number, counting the
slaves as free. By this arrangement the Southern
scale would have the advantage in one House and
the Northern in the other. He had been restrained
from proposing this expedient by two considerations;
one was his unwillingness to urge any diversity of
interests on an occasion where it is but too apt to
arise of itself; the other was the inequality of pow-

1787.] federal convention. 1007
ers that must be vested in the two branches^ and
which would destroy the equilibrium of interests.
Mr. Ellsworth assured the House, that, what
ever raight be thought of the Representatives
of Connecticut, the State was entirely Federal in
her disposition. He appealed to her great exertions
during the war, in supplying both raen and raoney.
The muster-rolls would show she had more troops
in the field than Virginia. If she had been de
linquent, it had been frora inability, and not raore
so than other States.
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Madison animadverted on the
delinquency ofthe States, when his object required
him to prove that the constitution of Congress was
faulty. Congress is not to blame for the faults
of the States. Their measures have been right,
and the only thing wanting has been a further
power in Cpngress tp render them effectual.
Mr. Davie was much erabarrassed, and wished
fpr explanatipns. The Report of the Coraraittee,
allowing the Legislatures to choose the Senate, and
establishing a proportional representation in it,
seeraed to be irapracticable. There will, according
to this rule, be ninety raerabers in the outset, and
the number will increase as new States are added.
It was impossible that so numerous a body could
possess the activity and other qualities required in
it. Were he to vote on the comparative merits
of the Report, as it stood, and the amendment, he
should be constrained to prefer the latter. The ap
pointraent of the Senate by electors, chosen by the
people for that purpose, was, he conceived, liable
to an insuperable difficulty. The larger counties or

1008 debates in the [1787.
districts, thrown into a general district. Would cer
tainly prevail over the smaller counties or districts,
and merit in the latter would be excluded alto
gether. The Report, therefore, seemed to be right
in referring the appointment to the Legislatures,
whose agency in the general systera did not appear
to hira objectionable, as it did to sorae others. The
fact was, that the local prejudices and interests
which could not be denied to exist, would find
their way into the national councils, whether the
Representatives should be chosen by the Legisla
tures, or by the people themselves. On the other
hand, if a proportional representation was attended
with insuperable difficulties, the making the Senate
tlie representative of the States looked like bringing
us back to Congress again, and shutting out all the
advantages expected from it. Under this view of
the subject, he could not vote for any plan for the
Senate yet proposed. He thought that, in general,
there were extremes on both sides. We were
partly federal, partly national, in our union ; and
he did not see why the Government raight not in
sorae respects operate on the States, in others on
the people.
Mr. Wilson adraitted the question concerning the
nuraber of Senators to be erabarrassing. If the
smallest States be allowed one, and the others in
proportion, the Senate will certainly be too numer
ous. He looked forward to the time when the
smallest States will contain a hundred thousand
souls at least. Let there be then one Senator
in each, for every hundred thousand souls, and
let the States not having that number of in-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1009
habitants be allowed one. He was wflling him
self to submit to this temporary concession to the
small States ; and thrcAV out the idea as a ground
of compromise.
Doctor Franklin. The diversity of opinions
turns on two points. If a proportional representa
tion takes place, the small States contend that
their liberties will be in danger. If an equality of
votes is to be put in its place, the large States
say their money will be in danger. When a broad
table is to be made, and the edges of planks do
not fit, the artist takes a little from both, and
makes a good joint. In like manner, here, botli sides
must part with sorae of their deraands, in order that
they raay join in some accommodating proposition.
He had prepared one which he would read, that it
might lie on the table for consideration. The
proposition was in the words following :
" That the Legislatures of the several States shall
choose and send an equal number of delegates,
namely,  , who are to corapose the
second branch of the General Legislature.
" That in all cases or questions wherein the sove
reignty of individual States raay be affected, or
whereby their authority over their own citizens
may be diminished, or the authority of the General
Governraent Within the several States augraented,
each State shall liav'e equal suffrage.
" That in the appointment of all civil officers
ofthe General Governraent, in the election of whom
the second branch may by the constitution have
part, each State shall have equal suffrage.
64

1010 DEBATESINTHE [1787.
" That in fixing the salaries of such officers, and
in all allowances for public services, and generally
in all appropriations and dispositions of money to
be drawn out of the general Treasury ; and in all
laws for supplying that Treasury, the Delegates
of the several States shall have suffrage in propor
tion to the suras whicii their respective States do
actually contribute to the Treasury."
Where a ship had raany owners, this was the
rule of deciding on her expedition. He had been
one of the rainisters from this country to France
during the joint war, and would have been very
glad if allowed a vote in distributing the money to
carry it on.
Mr. King observed, that the simple question was,
whether each State should have an equal vote in the
second branch ; that it must be apparent to those
gentlemen who liked neither the motion for this
equality, nor the Report as it stood, that the Report
was as susceptible of melioration as the motion ;
that a reforra would be nugatory and norainal only^
if we should make another Congress of the proposed
Senate ; that if the adherence to an equality of votes
was fixed and unalterable, there could not be less
obstinacy on the other side ; and that we were in
fact cut asunder already, and it was in vain to shut
our eyes against it. That he was, however, filled
with astonishment, that, if we were convinced that
every man in America was secured in all his rights,
we should be ready to sacrifice this substantial good
to the phantom of State sovereignty. That his feel
ings were more harrowed and his fears more agita
ted for his country than he could express ; that he

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1011
conceived this to be the last opportunity of providirig
for its liberty and happiness : that he could not,
therefore, but repeat his amazement, that when a
just govermnent, founded on a fair representation of
the people of Araerica, was within our reach, we
should renounce the blessing, froiri an attachment to
the ideal freedom and importance of States, That
should this wonderful illusion continue to prevail,
his mind Avas prepared for every event, rather than
sit down under a Government founded on a vicious
principle of representation, and whicii must be as
short-lived as it would be unjust. He might prevail
on himself to accede to some such expedient as had
been hinted by Mr. Wilson ; but he never could
listen to an equality of votes as proposed in the
motion. Mr. Dayton. When assertion is given for proof,
and terror substituted for argument, he presuraed
they would have no effect, however eloquently spo
ken. It should have been showm that the evils we
have experienced have proceeded frora the equality
now objected to ; and that the seeds of dissolution
for the State Governraents are not soAvn in tbe Gen
eral Governraent. He considered the systera on the
table as a novelty, an amphibious monster; and was
persuaded that it never would be received by the
people. Mr. Martin Would never confederate, if it cpuld
npt be done on just principles.
Mr. Madison would acquiesce in the concession
hinted by Mr. Wilson, on condition that a due inde
pendence should be given to the Senate. The plan
in its present shape makes the Senate absolutely

1012 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
dependent on the States. The Senate, therefore, is
only another edition of Congress. He knew the
faults of that body, and had used a bold language
against it. Still he would preserve the State rights
as carefully as the trial by jury.
Mr. Bedford contended, that there was no raiddle
way between a perfect consolidation, and a raere
confederacy of the States. The first is out of the
question ; and in the latter they must continue, if
not perfectly, yet equally, sovereign. If political
societies possess ambition, avarice, and all the other
passions which render them formidable to each
other, ought we not to view them in this light here ?
Will not the same motives operate in America as
elseAvhere ? If any gentleman doubts it, let him
look at the votes. Have they not been dictated by
interest, by arabition? Are not the large States
evidently seeking to aggrandize theraselves at the
expense of the sraall ? They think, no doubt, that
they have right on their side, but interest had blind
ed their eyes. Look at Georgia. Though a sraall
State at present, she is actuated by the prospect of
soon being a great one. Soutii Carolina is actuated
both by present interest, and future prospects. She
hopes, too, to see the other States cut down to her
oAvn dimensions. North Carolina has the same mo
tives of present and future interest. Virginia fol
lows. Maryland is not on that side of the question.
Pennsylvania has a direct and future interest. Mas
sachusetts has a decided and palpable interest in the
part she takes. Can it be expected that the small
States will act from pure disinterestness. Look at
Great Britain. Is the representation there less une-

1787.] FEDERAL CPNVENTIPN. 1013
qual ? But we shall be tpld again, that that is the
rptten part pf the Cpnstitutipn. Have not the bor
oughs, however, held fast their constitutional rights ?
And are we to act with greater purity than the rest
of mankind ? An exact proportion in the represen
tation is not preserved in any one of the States. Will
it be said that an inequality of power will not result
from an inequality of votes. Give the opportunity,
and ambition will not fail to abuse it. The whole
history of mankirid proves it. The three large
States have a comraon interest to bind them to
gether in commerce. But whether a combination,
as we supposed, or a corapetition, as others supposed,
shall take place among thera, in either case the
sraall States must be ruined. We raust, like Solon,
make such a government as the people will approve.
Wfll the smaller States ever agree to the proposed
degradation of thera ? It is not true that the people
will not agree to enlarge the powers pf the present
Cpngress. The language of the people has been,
that Congress ought to have the power of collecting
an impost, and of coercing the States where it may
be necessary. On the first point they have been
explicit, and, in a raanner, unanimous in their decla
rations. And must they not agree to this, and simi
lar measures, if they ever raean to discharge their
engagements ? The little States are willing to ob
serve their engagements, but will meet the large
ones on no ground but that of the Cpnfederation.
We have been told, with a dictatorial air, that this
is the last raoraent for a fair trial in favor of a good
government. It will be the last, indeed, if the pro
positions reported from the Committee go forth to

1014 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
the people. He was under no apprehensions. The
large States dare not dissolve the Confederation. If
they do, the sraall ones will find sorae foreign ally,
of more honor and good faith, Avho will take them
by the hand, and do thera justice. He did not raean,
by this, to intiraidate or alarra. It was a natural
consequence, which ought to be avoided by enlar
ging the Federal powers, not annihilating the Fed
eral systera. This is AA^hat the people expect. All
agree in the necessity of a more efficient govern
raent, and why not raake such an one as they de
sire r-"
Mr.ELLswoRTH. Under a National Governraent,
he should participate in the national security, as re
raarked by Mr. King; but that was all. What he
wanted was domestic happiness. The National
Governraent could not descend to the local objects
on which this depended. It could only erabrace ob
jects of a general nature. He tumed his eyes, there
fore, for the preservation of his rights, to the State
Governraents. From these alone he could derive
the greatest happiness he expects in this life. His
happiness depends on their existence, as much as a
new-born infant on its mother for nourishraent. If
this reasoning was not satisfactory, he had nothing
to add that could be sp.
Mr. King was for preserving the States in a sub
ordinate degree, and as far as they could be necessa
ry for the purposes stated by Mr. Ellsworth. He
did not think a full answer had been given to those
Avho apprehended a dangerous encroachment on
their jurisdictions. Expedients might be devised,
as he conceived, that would give them all the secu-

1787.] FEDERAL CPNVENTIPN. 1015
rity the nature pf things would adrait of In the es
tablishment of societies, the Constitution was to the
Legislature, what the laws were to individuals. As
the fundaraental rights of individuals are secured by
express provisions in the State Constitutions, why
may not a like security be provided for the rights of
States in the National Constitution? The Articles
pf LTnipn between England and Scotland furnish an
example of such a prpvisipn, in favpr of sundry
rights of Scotland. When that union was in agita
tion, the same language of apprehension which has
been heard from the sraaller States, was in the
mouths of the Scotch patriots. The articles, how
ever, have not been violated, and the Scotch have
fdund an increase of prosperity and happiness. He
was aware that this will be called a mere paper se
curity. He thought it a sufficient answer to say,
that if fundamental articles of corapact are no suffi
cient defence against physical power, neither will
there be any safety against it, if there be no cora
pact. He could not sit down without taking sorae
notice of the language of the honorable gentleman
from Delaware (Mr. Bedford). It was not he that had
uttered a dictatorial language. This intemperance
had marked the honorable gentleraan himself It
was not he who, with a vehemence unprecedented
in that House, had declared himself ready to turn
his hopes from our comraon country, aud court the
protection of some foreign hand. This, too, was the
language of the honorable meraber himself He
was grieved that such a thought had entered his
heart. He was more grieved that such an expres
sion had dropped from his lips. The gentleman

1016 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
could only excuse it to himself on the score of pas
sion. For himself, whatever might be his distress,
he would never court relief frora a foreign power.
Adjourned,

Monday, July 2d.
In Convention, — On the question for allowing each
State one vote in the second branch, as raoved by
Mr. Ellsworth, it was lost, by an equal division of
votes, — Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Dela
ware, Maryland,* aye — 5 ; Massachusetts, Pennsyl
vania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
no— 5; Georgia, divided (Mr. Baldwin aye, Mr.
Houston, no),
Mr. Pinckney thought an equality of Votes in the
second branch inadraissible. At the sarae time,
candor obliged him to admit, that the large States
would feel a partiality for their own citizens, and
give tiiera a preference in appointments: that they
might also find sorae coramon points in their coramer
cial interests, and promote treaties favprable tp them.
There is a real distinction between the Northern
and Southern interests. North Carolina, South Car
olina and Georgia, in their rice and indigo, had a
peculiar interest which might be sacrificed. How,
then, shall the larger States be prevented from ad
ministering the General Governmerit as they please,
without being themselves unduly subjected to the
wfll of the smaller ? By allowing them some, but
* Mr, Jenifer not being present, Mr, Maktin alone voted.

1787.] federal convention. 1017
not a full, proportion. He was extreraely anxious
that something should be done, considering this as
the last appeal to a regular experiment. Congress
have failed in alraost every effort for an amendment
of the Federal system. Nothing has prevented a
dissolution of it, but the appointment of this Conven
tion; and he could not express his alarras for the
consequence of such an event. He read his raotion
to fprm the States intp classes, with an appprtipn-
ment pf Senatprs ampng them (see Article 4, pf his
plan — ante, page 737.)
General Pinckney was willing the mptipn might
be considered. He did not entirely approve it. He
liked better the motion of Doctor Franklin, (q. v.
June 30, page 1009). Some coraproraise seeraed to
be necessary, the , States being exactly divided on
the question for an equality of votes in the second
branch. He proppsed that a Cpmmittee cpnsisting
pf a meraber frpm each State sheuld be apppinted
tp devise and repprt some coraproraise.
Mr. L. Martin had no objection to a coraraitment,
but no modifications whatever could reconcile the
smaller States to the least dirainutipn pf their equal
spvereignty.
i Mr. Sherman; We are npw at a full stpp ; and
npbpdy, he supppsed, meant that we shpuld break
iup withput doing spmething. A cpmmittee he
thpught mpst likely tp hit pn sprae expedient.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris* thought a Comraittee
advisable, as the Convention had been equally di-

* He had just retumed from New York, having left the Convention a few
days after it commenced business.
64*

1018 DEBATES IN THE [1787
vided. He had a stronger reason also. The raode
of appointing the second branch tended, he was sure,
to defeat the object of it. What is this object?
To check the precipitation, changeableness, and
excesses of the first branch. Every man of ob
servation had seen in the deraocratic branches of
the State Legislatures, precipitation — in Congress,
changeableness — in every department, excesses
against personal liberty, private property, and per
sonal safety. What qualities are necessary to con
stitute a check in this case ? Abilities and -virtue
are equally necessary in both branches. Something
more, then, is now wanted. In the first place, the
checking branch must have a personal interest in
checking the other branch. One interest must be
opposed to another interest. Vices, as they exist,
must be turned against each other. In the second
place, it must have great persomal property ; it must
have the aristocratic spirit ; it must love to lord it
through pride. Pride is, indeed, the great principle
that actuates both the poor and the rich. It is this
principle which in the forraer resists, in the latter
abuses, authority. In the third place, it should be
independent. In religion, the creature is apt to
forget its Creator. That it is otherwise in political
affairs, the late debates here are an unhappy proof
The aristocratic body should be as independent,
and a,s firra, as the deraocratic. If the merabers of
it are to revert to a dependence on the democratic
chpice, the democratic scale vvill preponderate.
All the guards contrived by America have not
restrained the Senatorial branches of the Legisla
tures from a servile coraplaisance to the democratic.

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1019
If the second branch is to be dependent, we are
better without it. To make it independent, it
should be for life. It will then do wrong, it wfll be
said. He believed so ; he hoped so. The rich will
strive to establish their dorainion, and enslave the
rest. They always did. They always wfll. The
proper security against thera is to forra therii into a
separate interest. The two forces will then control
each other. . Let the rich mix with the poor, and in
a cominercial country they will establish an oligar
chy. Take away coraraeree, and the deraocracy
will triuraph. Thus it has been all the world over.
So it will be araong us. Reason tells us we are but
men ; and Ave are not to expect any particular
interference of Heaven in our favor. By thus com
bining, and setting apart, the aristocratic interest,
the popular interest will be combined against it.
There will be a mutual check and mutual security.
In the fourth place, an independence for life, involves
the necessary permanency. If we change om*
measures nobody will trust uS, — and how avoid a
change of measures, but by avoiding a change of
men ? Ask any man if he confides in Copgress — if
he confides in the State of Pennsylvania — if he will
lend his money, or enter into contract ? He will
tell you, no. He sees no stability. He can repose
no cpnfidence. If Great Britain were to explain
her refusal to treat with us, the same reasoning
would be employed. He disliked the exclusion
pf the second branch frora holding offices. It is
dangerous. It is like the imprudent exclusion of
the military officers, during the war, from civil ap
pointments. It deprives the Executive of the prin-

1020 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
cipal source of influence. If danger be apprehended
from the Executive, what a left-handed way is this
of obviating it ! If the son, the brother, or the
friend can be appointed, the danger may be even in
creased, as the disqualified father, &c. can then
boast of a disinterestedness which he does not pos
sess. Besides, shall the best, the most able, the
most virtuous citizens not be permitted to hold
offices? Who then are to hold them? He was
also against paying the Senators. They will pay
theraselves, if they can. If they cannot, they will
be rich, and can do without it. Of such the second
branch ought to consist ; and none but such can
compose it, if they are not to be paid. He contend
ed, that the Executive should appoint the Senate,
and fill up vacancies. This gets rid of the difficulty
in the present question. You may begin with any
ratio you please, it will come to the sarae thing.
The raerabers being independent, and for life, raay
be taken as well from one place as frora another.
It should be considered, too, how the scherae could
be carried through the States. He hoped there was
strength of mind enough in this House to look truth
in the face. He did not hesitate, therefore, to say
that loaves and fishes must bribe the demagogues.
They must be raade to expect higher offices under
the General, than the State Governraents. A
Senate for life will be a noble bait. Without such
captivating prospects, the popular leaders Avill op
pose and defeat the plan. He perceived that thc
first branch was to be chosen by the people of the
States, the second by those chosen by the people.
Is not here a government by the States — a govern-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1021
ment by compact between Virginia in the first and
second branch, Massachusetts in the first and second
branch, (fee. ? This is going back to raere treaty.
It is no governraent at all. It is altogether de
pendent on the States, and will act over again the
part which Congress has acted. A firm govemment
alone can protect our liberties. He fears the in
fluence of the rich. They will have the same effect
here as elsewhere, if Ave do not, by such a govem
ment, keep them within their proper spheres. We
should remember that the people never act from
reason alone. The rich will take the advantage
of their passions, and make these the instruments
for oppressing them. The result of the contest will
be a violent aristocracy, or a raore violent despot
isra. The scheraes of the rich will be favored by
the extent of the country. The people in such
distant parts cannot communicate and act in con
cert. They will be the dupes of those who have
more knowledge and intercourse. The only se
curity against encroachraents, will be a select and
sagacious body of raen, instituted to watcli against
them on all sides. He meant only to hint these
observations, without grounding any motion on
thera. Mr. Randolph favored the commitment, though he
did not expect much benefit from the expedient. He
animadverted on the warm and rash language of
Mr. Bedford on Saturday ; rerainded the sraall
States that if the large States should corabine, some
danger pf which he did not deny, there would be a
check in the revisionary poAver o'^ the Executive ;
and intiraated, that, in order to render this still more

1022 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
effectual, he Avould agree, that in the choice of an
Executive each State should have an equal vote.
He was persuaded that two such opposite bodies as
Mr, Morris had planned could never long cp-exist.
Dissensions would arise, as has been seen even be
tween the Senate and House of Delegates in Mary
land ; appeals Would be made to the people ; and
in a little time comraotions would be the result. He
AA^as far from thinking the large States could sub
sist of themselves, any more than the small; an
avulsion Avould involve the whole in ruin ; and he
was determined to pursue such a scherae of gov
ernment as would secure us against such a calamity.
Mr. Strong was fdr the coraraitment ; and hoped
the mode of constituting both branches would be
referred. If they should be established on different
principles, contentions would prevail, and there
would never be a concurrence in necessary mea
sures. Doctor Williamson. If we do not concede on
both sides, our business raust soon be at an end.
He apprpved of the commitment, supposing that, as
the Comraittee would be a smaller body, a corapro
raise would be pursued with raore coolness.
Mr. Wilson objected to the Coraraittee, because it
would decide according to that very rule of votinf
which was opposed on one side. Experience in
Congress had also proved the inutflity of Corarait
tees consisting of raerabers from each State.
Mr. Lansing would not oppose the coraraitment,
though expecting little advantage from it.
Mr. Madison o'^posed the coraraitment. He had
rarely seen any other effect than delay from such

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1023
committees in Congress. Any scheme of compro
mise that could be proposed in the Committee might
as easily be proposed in the House ; and the report
of the Cpraraittee, where it contained raerely the
opinion of the Coraraittee, would neither shorten the
discussion, nor influence the decision ofthe House.
. Mr. Gerry was for the commitraent. Something
must be done, or we shall disappoint not pnly
America, but the whple world. He suggested a
consideration of the state we should be thrown into
by the failure of the Union. We should be without
an umpire to decide controversies, and must be at
the mercy of events. What, too, is to become of our
treaties — what of our foreign debts — what of our
doraestic ? We must make concessions on both
sides. Without these, the Constitutions of the sev
eral States would never have been formed.
On the questipn fpr cpmraitting, generally, — Mas
sachusetts, Cpnnecticut, New Yprk, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro
lina, Georgia, aye— 9; New Jersey, Delaware, no
—2. On the question for committing it " to a inember
from each State," — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virgmia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 10 ;
Pennsylvania, no — 1 .
The Committee, elected by ballot, were, Mr. Ger
ry, Mr. Ellsworth, Mr. Yates, Mr. Patterson, Dr.
Franklin, Mr. Bedford, Mr. Martin, Mr. Mason,
Mr. Davy, Mr. Rutledge, Mr. Baldwin.
That time might be given to the Comraittee, and
to such as chose to attend to the celebrations on the

1024 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
anniversary of Independence the Convention ad
journed till Thursday.

Thursday, July 5th.
In Convention, — Mr. Gerry delivered in, frora the
Committee appointed on Monday last, the following
Report:'^ " The Committee to whom was referred the eighth
Resolution of the Report from the Comraittee ofthe
Whole House, and so much of the seventh as has
not been decided on, submit the following Report :
" That the subsequent propositions be recomraend
ed to the Convention on condition that both shall
be generally adopted.
" 1 . That in the first branch of the Legislature each
of tlie States now in the Union shall be allowed one
member for every forty thousand inhabitants, of the
description reported in the seventh Resolution of the
Coraraittee of the Whole House : that each State
not containing that nuraber shall be allowed one
member : that all bills for raising or appropriating
money, and for fixing the salaries of the officers of
the Government ofthe United States, shall originate
in the first branch of the Legislature, and shall not
be altered or amended by the second branch ; and
that no money shall be drawn from the public Trea
sury but in pursuance of appropriations to be ori
ginated in the first branch.
" 2. That in the second branch, each State shall
have an equal vote."*
* This Report was founded on a motion in the Committee made by Doctor

1787.] Federal coNVEN'TioN. 1025
Mr. Gorham observed, that, as the report consisted
of propositions mutually conditional, he wished to
hear some explanations touching the grounds on
Avhich the conditions were estimated.
Mr. Gerry. The Coraraittee were of different
opinions, as well as the Deputations frora which the
Committee were taken ; and agreed to the Report
merely in order that some ground of accoraraodation
raight be proposed. Those opposed to the equality
of votes have only assented conditionally ; and if the
other side do not generally agree, will not be under
any obligation to support the Report.
Mr. Wilson thought the Coraraittee had exceeded
their powers.
Mr. Martin was for taking the question on the
whole Report.
Mr. Wilson was for a division of the question;
otherwise it would be a leap in the dark.
Mr. Madison could not regard the privilege of ori
ginating raoney bills as any concession on the side of
the small States. Experience proved that it had no
effect. If seven States in the upper branch wished
a bill to be originated, they might surely find sorae
meraber frora some of the same States in the lower
Franklin. It was barely acquiesced in by the members from the States op
posed to an equity of votes in the second branch, and was evidently considered
by the members on the other side, as a gaining of their point. A motion was
made by Mr, Sheeman, (who acted in the place of Mr. Ellsworth who waa
kept away by indisposition), in the Committee, to the following effect, "that
each State should have an equal vote in the second branch ; provided that no
decision therein should prevail unless the majority of States concurring should
also comprise a majority of the inhabitants of the United States." This mo
tion was not much deliberated on,- nor approved, in the Committee. A similar
proviso had been proposed, in the debates on the Articles of Confederation,
in 1777, to the articles giving certain powers to "nine States;" See JouT'
nals of Congress for 1777. page 468.
Vol. L— 65

1026 debates in the [1787.
branch, who would originate it. The restriction as
to araendraents was of as little consequence. Amend
ments could be handed privately by the Senate to
merabers in the other House. Bills could be nega
tived, that they might be sent up in the desired shape.
If the Senate should yield to' the obstinacy of the
first branch, the use of that body, as a check, would
be lost. If the first branch should yield to that of
the Senate, the privilege would be nugatory. Ex
perience had also shown, both in Great Britain, and
the States having a similar regulation, that it was a
source of frequent and obstinate altercations. These
considerations had produced a rejection of a like mo
tion on a former occasion, when judged by its own
merits. It could not, therefore, be deemed any con
cession on the present, and left in force all the ob
jections AA^hich had prevailed against allowing each
State an equal voice. He conceived that the Con
vention was reduced to the alternative, of either de
parting from justice in order to conciliate the smaller
States, and the minority of the people of the United
States, or of displeasing these, by justly gratifying
the larger States and the raajority of the people. He
could not hiraself hesitate as to the option he ought
to make. The ConA'ention, with justice and a ma
jority of the people on their side, had nothing
to fear. With injustice and the minority on their
side, they had every thing to fear. It was in
vain to purchase concord in the Convention on
terms which would perpetuate discord among their
constituents. The Convention ought to pursue a
plan which would bear the test of examination,
which would be espoused and supported by the en-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1027
lightened and impartial part of America, and which
they could theraselves vindicate and urge. It should
be considered, that, although at first raany may judge
of the system recommended by their opinion of the
Convention, yet finally all will judge of the Conven
tion by the systera. The raerits of the systera alone
can finally and effectually obtain the public suf
frage. He was not apprehensive that the people of
the sraall States would obstinately refuse to accede
to a governraent founded on just principles, and
promising them substantial protection. He could
not suspect that Delaware would brave the conse
quences of seeking her fortunes apart from the other
States, rather than submit to such a Government;
much less could he suspect that she would pursue the
rash policy, of courting foreign support, which the
warmth of one of her Representatives (Mr. Bed
ford) had suggested ; or if she should, that any for
eign nation would be so rash as to hearken to the
overture. As little could he suspect that the people
of New Jersey, notwithstanding the decided tone of
the gentleman from that State, would choose rather
to stand on their own legs, and bid defiance to
events, than to acquiesce under an establishment
founded on principles the justice of which they could
not dispute, and absolutely necessary to redeera
them from the exactions levied on them by the com
merce of the neighbouring States. A review of oth
er States would prove that there was as little reason
to apprehend an inflexible opposition elsewhere.
Harmony in the Convention was, no doubt, much to
be desired. Satisfaction to all the States, in the first
instance, stfll more so. But if the principal States

1028 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
corapreheuding a raajority of the people of the Uni
ted States, should concur in a just and judicious
plan, he had the firmest hopes that all the other
States would by degrees accede to it.
Mr. Butler said, he could not let doAvn his idea
of the people of America so far as to believe they
would, from raere respect to the Convention, adopt
a plan evidently unjust. He did not consider the pri
vilege concerning raoney bills as of any consequence.
He urged, that the second branch ought to represent
the States according to their property.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris thought the form as well
as the matter of the Report objectionable. It seem
ed, in the first place, to render araendraent impracti
cable. In the next place, it seemed to involve a
pledge to agree to the second part, if the first should
be agreed to. He conceived the whole aspect of it
to be wrong. He came here as a Representative of
America ; he flattered himself he came here in some
degree as a Representative of the whole human race ;
for the whole human race will be affected by the
proceedings of this Convention. He wished gentle
raen to extend their views beyond the present rao
ment of time; beyond the narrow limits of place
frora which they derive their political origin. If he
were to believe sorae things which he had heard, he
should suppose that we were asserabled to truck and
bargain for our particular States. He cannot de
scend to think that any gentleraen are really actua
ted by these views. We must look forward to the
effects of what we do. These alone ought to guide
us. Much has been said of the sentiments of the
people. They were unknown. They could not be

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1029
known. All that we can infer is, that, if the plan
we recoraraend be reasonable and right, all who
have reasonable minds and sound intentions will em
brace it, notwithstanding what had been said by
some gentleraen. Let us suppose that the larger
States shall agree, and that the sraaller refuse ; and
let us trace the consequences. The opponents of the
systera in the smaller States will no doubt make a
party, and a noise for a time, but the ties of interest,
of kindred, and of common habits, which connect
them with other States, will be too strong to be
easily broken. In New Jersey, particularly, he
was sure a great raany would foUow the senti
ments of Pennsylvania and New York. This coun
try must be united. If persuasion does not unite
it, the sword will. He begged this consideration
might have its due weight. The scenes of hor
ror attending civil comraotion cannot be described;
and the conclusion of thera will be worse than the
term of their continuance. The stronger party will
then make traitors of the weaker; and the gal
lows and halter will finish the work of the sword.
How far foreign powers would be ready to take
part in the confusions, he would not say. Threats
that they will be invited have, it seems, been thrown
out. He drew the raelancholy picture of foreign in
trusions, as exhibited in the history of Gerraany, and
urged it as a standing lesson to other nations. He
trusted that the gentleraen who raay have hazarded
such expressions did not entertain thera till they
reached their own lips. But returning to the Report,
he could not think it in any respect calculated foi
the public good. As the second branch is now con-

1030 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
stituted, there will be constant disputes and appeals
to the States, which will undermine the Generai
Governraent, and control and annihilate the first
branch. Suppose that the Delegates frora Massa
chusetts and Rhode Island, in the upper house, dis
agree, and that the former are outvoted. What re
sults ? They will unmediately declare that their
State will not abide by the decision, and make
such representations as Avill produce that effect.
The same may happen as to Virginia and other
States. Of what avail, then, will be what is on
paper ? State attachments, and State importance,
have been the bane of this country. We cannot
annihilate, but we may perhaps take out the teeth
of, the serpents. He wished our ideas to be enlarged
to the true interest of man, instead of being chcum-
scribed within the narrow compass of a particular
spot. And, after all, hoAV little can be the motive
yielded by selfishness for such a policy ? Who can
say, whether he himself, much less whether his chil
dren, will the next year be an inhabitant of this or
that State ?
Mr. Bedford. He found that what he had said,
as to the sraall States being taken by the hand, had
been misunderstood, — and he rose to explain. He
did not mean that the small States Avould court the
aid and interposition of foreign powers. He meant
that they vvould not consider the federal compact as
dissolved until it should be so by the acts of the
large States. In this case, the consequence of the
breach of faith on their part, and the readiness of
the small States to fulfil then- engagements, would
be that foreign nations having deraands on tiiis

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1031
Country, would find it their interest to take the
small States by the hand, in order to do themselves
justice. This was what he meant. But no man
can foresee to what extremities the sraall States raay
be driven by oppression. He observed, also, in
apology, that sorae allowance ought to be raade for
the habits of his profes,sion, in which warrath was
natural and sometimes necessary. But is there not
an apology in what was said by (Mr, Gouverneur
Morris), that the sword is to unite — by Mr. Gorham,
that Delaware must be annexed to Pennsylvania,
and New Jersey divided between Pennsylvania and
New York ? To hear such language without emo
tion, would be to renounce the feelings of a man
and the duty of a citizen. As to the propositions of
tlie Comraittee, the lesser States have thought it
necessary to have a security somewhere. This has
been thought necessary for the Executive magistrate
of the proposed government, who has a sort of neg
ative on the laws ; and is it not of more importance
that the States should be protected, than that the
Executive branch of the Governraent should be
protepted? In order to obtain this, the smaller
States have conceded as to the constitution of the first
branch, and as to money bills. Ifthey be not grat
ified by correspondent concessions, as to the second
branch, is it to be supposed they will ever accede
to the plan ? And what will be the consequence,
if nothing should be done ? The condition of the
United States requires that something should be
imraediately done. It will be better that a defective
plan should be adopted, than that none should be
recommended. He saw no reason why defects

1032 debates in the [1787.
might not be supplied by meetings ten, fifteen or
twenty years hence.
Mr. Ellsworth said, he had not attended the pro
ceedings of the Committee, but was ready to accede
to the coraproraise they had reported. Some com
promise was necessary ; and he saw none more con
venient or reasonable.
Mr. Williamson hoped that the expressions of in
dividuals would not be taken for the sense of their
colleagues, much less of their States, which was not
and could not be known. He hoped, also, that the
meaning of those expressions would not be miscon
strued or exaggerated. He did not conceive that (Mr.
Gouverneur Morris) meant that the sword ought to
be drawn against the smaller States. He only point
ed out the probable consequences of anarchy in the
United States. A similar exposition ought to be
given of the expressions of (Mr. Gorham). He was
ready to hear the Report discussed ; but thought the
propositions contained in it the most objectionable
of any he had yet heard.
Mr. Patterson said that he had, when the report
was agreed to in the Coramittee, reserved to himself
the right of freely discussing it. He acknowledged
that the warrath complained of was improper ; but
he thought the sword and the gallows little calcula
ted to produce conviction. He complained of the
manner in which Mr. Madison and Mr. G. Morris
had treated the small States.
Mr, Gerry. Though he had assented to the Re
port in the Comraittee, he had very material objec
tions to it. We were, however, in a peculiar situa
tion. We were neither the same nation, nor dflferent

1787.] federal convention. 1033
nations. We ought not, therefore, to pursue the one
or the other of these ideas too closely. If no com
promise should take place, what will be the conse
quence. A secession he foresaw would take place;
for some gentlemen seemed decided on it. Two
different plans will be proposed, and the result no
raan could foresee. If we do not corae to sorae
agreeraent araong ourselves, some foreign sword will
probably do the work for us.
Mr. Mason. The Report was meant not as spe
cific propositions to be adopted, but merely as a
general ground of accommodation. There raust be
some accommodation on this point, or we shall make
little further progress in the work. Accomraodation
was the object of the House in the appointment of
the Comraittee, and of the Comraittee in the report
they had made. And, however liable the Report
might be to objections, he thought it preferable to
an appeal to the world by the different sides, as had
been talked of by some gentlemen. It could not be
more inconvenient to any gentleman to remain ab
sent from his private affairs, than it was for him, but
he would bury his bones in this city, rather than
expose his country to the consequences of a disso
lution of the Convention without any thing being
done. The first proposition in the Report for fixing the
representation in the first branch, " one meraber
for every forty thousand inhabitants," being taken
up,— Mr. Gouverneur Morris objected to that seale of
apportionraent. He thought property ought to be
taken into the estimate as well as the number of
Vol. I.— 65 *

1034 debates in the [1787.
inhabitants. Life and liberty were generally said
to be of more value than property. An accurate
view of the matter would, nevertheless, prove that
property was the main object of society. The savage
state was more favorable to liberty than the ciAdl-
ized ; and sufficiently so to life. It was preferred by
all men who had not acquired a taste for property;
it was only renounced for the sake of property which
could only be secured by the restraints of regnlar
governraent. These ideas raight appear to sorae
new, but they were nevertheless just. If property,
then, was the main object of government, certainly
it ought to be one ineasure of the influence due to
those who were to be affected by the government.
He looked forward, also, to that range of new States
which would soon be formed in the West. He
thought the rule of representatation ought to be so
fixed, as to secure to the Atlantic States a preva
lence in the national councils. The new States wfll
know less of the public interest than these ; wiU
have an interest in many respects different ; in par
ticular will be little scrupulous of involAdng the
coraraunity in wars the burdens and operations of
which would fall chiefly on the raaritune States.
Provision ought, therefore, to be raade to prevent
the raaritime States frora being hereafter outvoted
by thera. He thought this might be easily done, by
irrevocably fixing the nuraber of representatives
which the Atlantic States should respectively have,
and the nuraber which each new State will have.
This would not be unjust, as the western settlers
would preAdously know the conditions on which
they were to possess their lands. It would be poli-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1035
tic, as it would recomraend the plan to the present,
as well as future, interest of the States which must
decide the fate of it.
»Mr. Rutledge. The gentleraan last up had spo
ken sorae of his •eeirii*rients precisely. Property was
certainly the 'principal object of society. If nura
bers should be made the rule of representation, the
Atlantic States would be subjected to the western.
He moved that the first proposition in the Report be
postponed, in order to take up the following, viz. :
" that the suffrages of the several States be regu
lated and proportioned according to the suras to be
paid towards the general revenue by the inhabitants
of each State respectively: that an apportionment
of suffrages, according to the ratio aforesaid shall be
made and regulated at the end of  years from
the first meeting of the Legislature of the United
States, and at the end of every  years ; but
that for the present, and until the period above men
tioned, the suffrages shall be for New Hampshire
 , for Massachusetts  , «&c."
Col. Mason said, the case of new States was not
unnoticed in the Coramittee; but it was thought,
and he was hiraself decidedly of opinion, that if they
made a part of the Union, they ought to be subject
to no unfavorable discriminations. Obvious consid
erations required it.
Mr. Randolph concurred with Mr. Mason.
On the question on Mr. Rutledge's motion, —
South Carolina, aye — 1 ; Massachusetts, Connecti
cut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela
ware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no — 9 ;
Georgia, not on the floor. Adjourned.

1036 debates in the [1787.
Friday, July 6th.
In Convention, — Mr. Gouverneur Morris raoved to
comrait so rauch of the Report as relates to " one
meraber for every forty thousand inhabitants." His
view was, that they might absolutely fix the num
ber for each State in the first instance ; leaving the
Legislature at liberty to provide for changes in the
relative iraportance of the States, and for the case
of new States.
Mr. Wilson seconded the raotion; but with a
view of leaving the Coramittee under no implied
shackles. Mr. Gorham apprehended great inconvenience
frora fixing directly the nuraber of Representatives
to be allowed to each State. He thought the num
ber of inhabitants the true guide ; though perhaps
some departure raight be expedient from the full
proportion. The States, also, would vary in their
relative extent by separations of parts of the largest
states. A part of Virginia is noAV on the point of
a separation. In the province of Maine, a Conven
tion is at this time deliberating on a separation from
Massachusetts. In such events the number of Rep
resentatives ought certainly to be reduced. He
hoped to see all the States made sraall by proper
divisions, instead of their becoraing forraidable as
was apprehended to the small States. He con
ceived, that, let the government be modified as it
might, there would be a constant tendency in the
State Governments to encroach upon it : it was of
importance, therefore, that the extent of the States
should be reduced as much, and as fast, as possible.

1787.] federal convention. 1037
The stronger the government shall be made in the
first instance, the more easily will these divisions be
effected; as it will be of less consequence in the
opinion of the States, whether they be of great or
sraall extent.
Mr. Gerry did not think with his colleague, that
the larger States ought to be cut up. This policy
has been inculcated by the middling and small States,
ungenerously and contrary to the spirit of the Con
federation. Ambitious men will be apt to solicit
needless divisions, till the States be reduced to the
size of counties. If this policy should still actuate
the small States, the large ones could not confeder
ate safely with them; but would be obliged to
consult their safety by confederating only with one
another. He favored the commitment, and thought
that representation ought to be in the combined
ratio of numbers of inhabitants and of wealth, and
not of either singly.
Mr. King wished the clause to be coraraitted,
chiefly in order to detach it from the Report, with
which it had no connection. He thought, also, that
the ratio of representation proposed could not be
safely fixed, since in a century and an half our cora
puted increase of population would carry the nura
ber of Representatives to an enorraous excess ; that
the nuraber of inhabitants was not the proper index
of ability and wealth; that property was the
priraary object of society; and that, in fixing a
ratio, this ought not to be excluded frora the esti
mate. With regard to new States, he observed that
there was something peculiar in the business, which
had not been noticed. The United States were now

1038 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
admitted to be proprietors of the country North
West of the Ohio. Congress, by one of their ordi
nances, have impoliticly laid it out into ten States,
and have raade it a fundaraental article of corapact
with those who raay become settlers, that as soon as
the number in any one State shall equal that of the
sraallest of the thirteen original States, it raay claim
admission into the Union. Delaware does not con
tain, it is computed, more than thirty-five thousand
souls; and for obvious reasons will not increase
much for a considerable time. It is possible, then,
that if this plan be persisted in by Congress, ten
new votes may be added, without a greater ad
dition of inhabitants than are represented by the
single vote of Pennsylvania. The plan, as it re
spects one of the new States, is already irrevocable ;
the sale of the lands having coraraenced, and the
purchasers and settlers will iraraediately becorae
entitled to all the privileges of the corapact.
Mr. Butler agreed to the commitment, if the
Committee were to be left at liberty. He was per
suaded, that, the more the subject was examined,
the less it would appear that the number of in
habitants would be a proper rule of proportion.
If there were no other objection, the changeableness
of the standard would be sufficient. He concurred
with those who thought some balance was necessary
between the old and the new States. He contended
strenuously, that property was the only just meas
ure of representation. This was the great object
of government ; the great cause of war ; the great
means of carrying it on.
Mr. Pinckney saw no good reason for committing.

1787.] federal convention. 1039
The value of land had been found, on full investiga
tion, to be an irapracticable rule. The contributions
of revenue, including iraports and exports, raust be
too changeable in their araount ; too difficult to be
adjusted ; and too injurious to the non-coraraercial
States. The number of inhabitants appeared to
him the only just and practicable rule. He
thought the blacks ought to stand on an equality
with the whites; but would agree to the ratio
settled by Congress. He contended that Congress
had no right, under the Articles of Confederation, to
authorize the adraission of new States, no such case
having been provided for.
Mr. Davy was for committing the clause, in order
to get at the raerits of the question arising on the
Report. He seeraed to think that wealth or proper
ty ought to be represented in the second branch;
and numbers in the first branch.
On the motion for coraraitting, as raade by Mr.
Gouverneur Morris, — Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro
lina, Georgia, aye — 7 ; New York, New Jersey, Dela-
aware, no — 3 ; Maryland, divided.
The merabers appointed by ballot were Mr. Gou
verneur Morris, Mr. Gorham, Mr. Randolph, Mr,
Rutledge, Mr. King.
Mr. Wilson signified, that his view in agreeing to
the coraraitment was, that the Coramittee might con
sider the propriety of adopting a scale similar to that
established by the Constitution of Massachusetts,
which would give an advantage to the small States
without substantially departing from the rule of pro
portion.

1040 debates in the [1787*
Mr. Wilson and Mr. Mason moved to postpone
the clause relating to money bills, in order to take
up the clause relating to an equality of votes in the
second branch.
On the question of postponement, — New York,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8; Massa
chusetts, Connecticut, North Carolina, no^3.
The clause relating to equality of votes being tra
der consideration, —
Doctor Franklin observed, that this question
could not be properly put by itself, the Comraittee
having reported several propositions as mutual con
ditions of each other. He could not vote for it if
separately taken ; but should vote for the whole to
gether. Colonel Mason perceived the difficulty, and sug
gested a reference of the rest of the Report to the
Coraraittee just appointed, that the whole might be
brought into one view.
Mr. Randolph disliked the reference to that Com
mittee, as it consisted of merabers frora States op
posed to the wishes of the small States, and could
not, therefore, be acceptable to the latter.
Mr. Martin and Mr. Jenifer moved to postpone
the clause till the Coramittee last appointed should
report. Mr. Madison observed, that if the uncomraitted
part of the Report was connected with the part just
coraraitted, it ought also to be committed ; if not
connected, it need not be postponed tfll report should
be made.
On the question for postponmg, moved by Mr. Mar-

1787.] FEDERAL CpNVENTlON. 1041
TIN and Mr. Jenifer, — Connecticut, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, aye — 6;
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South Carolina, no
¦ — 3 ; Massachusetts, New York, divided.
The first clause, relating to the originating of mo
ney bills, was then resumed.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris was opposed to a restric
tion of this right in either branch, considered merely
in itself, and as unconnected with the point of repre
sentation in the second branch. It will disable the
second branch from proposing its own money plans,
and give the people an opportunity of judging, by
comparison, of the raerits of those proposed by the
first branch.
Mr. Wilson could see nothing like a concession
here, on the part of the smaller States. If both
branches were to say yes or no, it Avas of little con
sequence which should say yes or no first, which
last. If either was, indiscriminately, to have the
right of originating, the reverse of the Report would,
he thought,, be most proper ; since it was a maxira,
that the least nuraerous body was the fittest for de
liberation — -the most numerous, for decision. He
observed that this discrimination had been trans-
scribed frora the British into several American Con
stitutions. But he was persuaded that, on exami
nation of the American experiraents, it would be
found to be a ' trifle light as air.' Nor could he
ever discover the advantage of it in the parliaraen
tary history pf Great Britain. He hpped, if there ,
was any advantage in the privilege, that it wpuld
be ppinted put.
Mr. Williamspn thought that if the privflege
Vpl. I.— 66

1042 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
were not common tP bpth branches, it pught rather
to be confined to the second, as the bills in that case
would be more narrowly watched, than if they ori
ginated with the branch having most of the popular
confidence, Mr. Mason. The cpnsideratipn which weighed
with the Cpmmittee was, that the first branch
would be the immediate representatives of the peo
ple ; the second would not. Should the latter have
the power of giving away the people's money, they
might soon forget the source from whence they re-
ceiA'^ed it. We might soon have an aristocracy. He
had been much concerned at the principles which
had been advanced by some gentlemen, but had the
satisfaction to find they did not generally prevafl.
He was a friend to proportional representation in
both branches ; but supposed that some points raust
be yielded for the sake of accommodation.
Mr. Wilson. If he had proposed that the second
branch should have an independent disposal of
public money, the observations of (Colonel Mason)
Would have been a satisfactory answer. But no
thing could be farther from what he had said. His
question was, how is the power of the first branch
increased, or that of the second diminished, by giv
ing the proposed privilege to the former ? Where
is the difference, in which branch it begins, if both
must concur, in the end ?
Mr. Gerry would not say that the concession was
a sufficient one on the part of the small States.
But he could not but regard it in the light of a con
cession. It would raake it a constitutional principle,
that the second branch were net ppssessed of the

1787.] federal convention. 1043
confidence of the people in money matters, which
would lessen their weight and influence. In the
next place, if the second branch were dispossessed
of the priAdlege, they would be deprived of the op
portunity which their continuance in office three
times as long as the first branch would give them,
of making three successive essays in favor of a par
ticular point.
Mr. Pinckney thought it evident that the conces-
sipn was whplly on one side, that of the large
States ; the privilege of originating money bills be
ing of no account.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris had waited to hear the
good effects of the restriction. As to the alarra
sounded, of an aristocracy, his creed was that there
never was, nor ever will be, a civilized society with
out an aristocracy. His endeavour was, to keep it
as much as possible from doing mischief The re
striction, if it has any real operation, will deprive
us of the services of the second branch in digesting
and proposing money bills, of which it will be raore
capable than the first branch. It wfll take away
the responsibility of the second branch, the great
security for good behaviour. It will always leave a
plea, as to an obnoxious raoney bill, that it was dis
liked, but could not be constitutionally amended,
nor safely rejected. It will be a dangerous source
of disputes between the two Houses. We should
either take the British Constitution altogether, or
make one for ourselves. The Executive there has
dissolved two Houses, as the only cure for such dis
putes. Will our Executive be able to apply such a
remedy ? Every law, directly or indu-ectly, takes

1044 DfiBAtES IN THE [1787.
money out of the pockets of the people. Again,
what use raay be made of such a privilege in case
of great eraergency ? Suppose an eneray at the
door, and raoney instantly and absolutely necessary
for repelling hira, — may not the popular branch
avail itself of this duresse, to extort concessions from
the Senate, destructive of the Constitution itself?
He illustrated this danger by the example of the
Long Parliament's expedients for subverting the
House of Lords ; concluding, on the whole, that the
restriction would be either useless or pernicious.
Doctor Franklin did not raean to go into a
justification of the Report ; but as it had been asked
what would be the use of restraining the second
branch frora meddling with money bills, he could
not but reraark, that it was always of importance
that the people should know who had disposed
of their money, and how it had been disposed of
It was a maxira, that those who feel, can best judge.
This end would, he thought, be best attained, if
money affairs were to be confined tp the iraraediate
representatives of the people. This was his in
duceraent to concur in the Report. As to the danger
or difficulty that raight arise from a negative in the
second branch, where the people would not be
proportionally represented, it might easily be got
over by declaring that there should be no such
negative ; or, if that will not do, by declaring that
there shall be no such branch at all.
Mr. Martin said, that it was understood in the
Committee, that the difficulties and disputes which
had been apprehended should be guarded against in
the detaflmg of the plan.

1787.] FE DERAL CONVENTION. 1045
Mr. Wilson. The difficulties and disputes wfll
increase with the attempts to define and obviate
thera. Q,ueen Ann was obliged to dissolve her
Parliaraent, in order to terminate one of these ob
stinate disputes between the two houses. Had it
not been for the mediation of the Crown, no one
can say what the result would have been. The
point is still sub judice in England. He approved
of the principles laid down by the Honourable
President* (Doctor Franklin) his colleague, as to
the expediency of keeping the people informed
of their money affairs. But thought they would
know as much, and be as well satisfied, in one way
as in the other.
General Pinckney was astonished that this point
should have been considered as a concession. He
reraarked, that the restriction as to money bills
had been rejected on the merits singly considered,
by eight States against three; and that the very
States which now called it a concession were then
against it, as nugatory or improper in itself
On the question whether the clause relating to
money bills in the Report of the Coraraittee con
sisting of a member from each State, should stand
as part of the Report, — Connecticut, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, aye — 5;
Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, no — 3;
Massachusetts, New York, Georgia, divided.
A question was then raised, whether the question
was carried in the affirmative; there being but

He was at that time President of the State of Pennsylvania

1046 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
five ayes, out of eleven States present. For the
words of the Rule, see May 28th.
On this question,— Massachusetts, Cpnnecticut,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
North Carolina, South Carclina, Geprgia, aye— 9 ;
New York, Virginia, no — 2.
(In several preceding instances like votes had
sub silentio been entered as decided in the affirm
ative.) Adjourned

Saturday, July 7th.
In Convention, — The question, shall the clause
" allowing each State one vote in the second branch,
stand as part of the Report," being taken up, —
Mr. Gerry. This is the critical question. He
had rather agree to it than have no accomraoda
tion. A Governraent short of a proper national
plan, if generally acceptable, would be preferable
to a proper one which, if it could be carried at all,
would operate on discontented States. He thought
it would be best to suspend this question till the
Comraittee appointed yesterday should raake re
port. Mr. Sherman supposed that it was the wish of
every one that sorae General Governraent should be
established. An equal vote in the second branch
would, he thought, be raost likely to give it the ne
cessary Adgor. The small States have more vigor
in their Governraents than the large ones ; the more
influence therefore the large ones have, the weaker

1787.] federal CPNVENTIPN. 1047
will be the Gpvernment. In the large States it Avfll
be mpst difficult tp cpllect the real and fair sense cf
the peppla Fallacy and undue influence will be
practised with mpst success ; and imprpper men will
mpst easily get intp pffice. If they vpte by States
in the secpnd branch, and each State has an equal
vote, there must be always a majority of States, as
well as a majority of the people, on the side of pub
lic measures, and the Governraent will have decision
and efficacy. If this be not the case in the second
branch, there raay be a majprity of States against
public measures ; and the difficulty of corapelling
thera to abide by the public determination will ren
der the Government leebler than it has ever yet
been. Mr. Wilson was not deficient in a conciliating
teraper, but firmness was sometiraes a duty of higher
obligatipn. Cpnciliatipn was also misapplied in this
instance. It was pursued here rather araong the
representatives, than araong the constituents ; and it
would be of little consequence if not established
among the latter ; and there could be little hope of
its bein^ established among thera, if the foundation
should not be laid in justice and right.
On the question, shall the words stand as part of
the Report ? — Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, aye — 6 ; Penn
sylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, no — 3; Massa
chusetts, Georgia, divided.*
Mr. Gerry thought it would be proper to proceed

* Several votes were given here in the affirmative, or were divided, because
.another final question was to be taken on the whole Report.

1048 DEBATES IN THE [l787.
to enumerate and define the powers to be vested in
the General Government, before a question on the
Report should be taken as to the rule of representa
tion in the second branch.
Mr. Madison observed, that it would be impossible
to say what powers could be safely and properly
vested in the Governraent, before it was known in
what raanner the States were to be represented in
it. He was apprehensive that if a just representa
tion were not the basis of the Government, it would
happen, as it did when the Articles of Confederation
were depending, that every effectual prerogative
would be withdrawn or withheld, and the new
Government would be rendered as irapotent and as
short-lived as the old.
Mr. Patterson would not decide whether the
privilege concerning money bills were a valuable
consideration or not ; but he considered the mode
and rule of representation in the first branch as fully
so ; and that after the establishment of that point,
the sraall States would never be able to defend
themselves without an equality of votes in the sec
ond branch. There was no other ground of accom
modation. His resolution was fixed. He would
meet the large States on that ground, and no other.
For himself, he should vote against the Report, be
cause it yielded too much.
Mr, Gouverneur Morris, He had no resolution
unalterably fixed except to do what should finally
appear to him right. He was against the Report
because it maintained the improper constitution of
the second branch. It made it another Congress, a
mere whisp of straw. It had been said (by Mr.

nSlj FEDEilAL fcdlSrVENTl'iON. 104^
Gerry), that the new Gpvernraent wptild t)e partly
natipnal, partly federal ; that it ptight in the fir^
quality to protect individuals ; in the second, the
State. But in What quality Was It to protect the
aggregate interest of the Whple ? Aftipng the many
provisions which had been urged, he had seen nOne
for suppprting the dignity and splendot of the Araeri
can Empire. It had been one of ottr greatest Uiis-
fprtunes that the great pbjects of the natiofl had
been sacrificed constantly tP Ipcal vieWs ; in like
manner as the general interest of States had been
sacrificed to those of the counties. What is tp be
the check in the Senate ? Npne J tttiless it be tp
keep the majority of the people ffom injuring par
ticular States. But partictilar States otight to be
injured for the sake of a majority of the people, in
case their conduct should deserve it. Stippose they
should insist on claims evidently uftjust, and pttrsue
thera in a mariner detrimental to the whole body :
suppose they should give theraselves up to foreign
influence : Ought they to be protected in such cases ?
They were originally nothing raore than colonial
corporations. On the Declaration of Independence,
a Government was to be formed. The small States
aWare of the necessity of preventing anarchy, and
taking advantage of the moment, extorted from the
large ones an equality of votes. Standing now on
that ground, they demand, under the new system,
greater rights, as raen, than their fellow-citizens of
the large States. The proper answer to them is,
that the sarae necessity ofwhich they formerly took
advantage does not now exist ; and that the large
States are at liberty now to consider what is
Vol. I.— 66*

1050 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
right, rather than what may be expedient. We
must have an efficient Government, and if there be
an efficiency in the local Governments, the former
is impossible. Germany alone proves it. Notwith-.
standing their comraon Diet, notwithstanding the
great prerogatives of the Emperor, as head of the
Empire, and his vast resources, as sovereign pf
his particular dpminions, no union is maintained;
foreign influence disturbs every internal operation,
and there is no energy whatever in the general gov
ernment. Whence does this proceed? From the
energy of the local authorities ; frora its being con
sidered of raore consequence to support the Prince
of Hesse, than the happiness of the people of Ger
many. Do gentlemen wish this to be the case here?
Good God, Sir, is it possible they can so delude thera
selves ? What if all the Charters and Constitutions
of the States were thrown into the fire, and all their
demagogues into the ocean — what would it be to the
happiness of America ? And wfll not this be the
case here, if we pursue the train in which the busi
ness lies? We shall establish an Aulic Councfl,
without an Emperor to execute its decrees. The
sarae circurastances which unite the people here
unite thera in Gerraany. They have there a com
mon language, a coraraon law, common usages and
manners, and a common interest in being united*
yet their local jurisdictions destroy every tie. The
case was the same m the Grecian states. The Uni
ted Netherlands are at this tirae torn in factions.
With these exaraples before our eyes, shall we form
establishments which must necessarfly produce the
same effects? It is of no consequence from what

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1051
districts the second branch shall be drawn, if it be
so constituted as to yield an asylura against these
evils. As it is now constituted, he must be against
its being drawn frora the States in equal portions ;
but shall be ready to join in devising such an araend
raent ofthe plan, as will be most likely to secure
our liberty and happiness.
Mr. Sherman and Mr. Ellsworth moved to post
pone the question on the Report from the Committee
of a meraber froni each State, in order to wait for
the Report from the Comraittee of five last appoint
ed, — IVlassachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Penn
sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, aye — 6 ; New York,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
no — 5.
Adjourned.

Monday, July 9th.
In Convention, — Mr. Daniel Carroll, from Mary
land, took his seat.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris delivered a Report from
the Committee of five raerabers, to whom was
committed the clause in the Report of the Com
mittee con^sting of a meraber from each State,
stating the proper ratio of representatives in the
first branch to be as one to every forty thousand
inhabitants, as follows, viz :
" The Committee to whora was referred the first
clause of the first proposition reported from the
Grand Committee, beg leave to report :
"That in the first peetmg of the Legislature

1052 debatesinthe [1787.
the first branch thereof consist of fifty-six raembers,
of which number NeW Hampshire shall have 2,
Massachusetts 7, Rhode Island 1, Connecticut 4,
New York 5, New Jersey 3, Pennsylvania 8, Dela
ware 1, Maryland 4, Virginia 9, North Carolina 5,
South Carolina 5, Georgia 2.
" But as the present situation of the States may
probably alter, as well in point of wealth as in the
nuraber of their inhabitants, that the Legislature be
authorized from tirae to tirae to augraent the nura
ber of Representatives. And in case any Of the
States shall hereafter be divided, or any two or
more States united, or any new States created
within the liraits of the United States, the Legisla
ture shall possess authority to regulate the number of
Representatives in any of the foregoing cases, upon
the principles of their wealth and number of in
habitants." Mr. Sherman wished to know, on what principles
or calculations the Report was founded. It did not
appear to correspond with any rule of numbers, or
of any requisition hitherto adopted by Congress.
Mr. Gorham. Some provision of this sort was
necessary in the outset. The number of blacks
and whites, with some regard tb supposed wealth,
was the general guide. Fractions could not be
observed. The Legislature is to make alterations
from tune to tirae, as justice and propriety may
require. Two objections prevailed against the rule
of one meraber for every forty thousand inhabitants.
The first was, that the representation would soon
be too numerous, the second that the Western
States, who may have a dflferent mterest, might,

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. l053
if admitted on that principle, by degrees outvote
the Atlantic. Both these objections are removed.
The number will be small in the first instance, and
may be continued so. And the Atlantic States,
haying the Gbvernment in their owa hands, may
take care of their own interest, by dealing out the
right of representation in safe proportions to the
Western States. These were the views of the
Comraittee. Mr. L. Martin wished to know whether the
Committee were guided in the ratio by the wealth,
or nuraber of inhabitants, of the States, or both ;
noting its variations from former apportionments
by Congress.
Mr. Gouverneur IVfpRRis and IVJr. Rutledge
mpved tp ppstppne the first paragraph, relating tp
the number of merabers to be allowed each State in
the first instance, and to take up the second para
graph, authorizing the Legislature to alter the
nuraber from time to time according to wealth and
inhabitants. The motion was agreed to, nem. con.
On the question on the second paragraph, taken
without any debate, — Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9; New
York, New Jersey, no — 2.
Mr. Sherman moved to. refer the first part, ap
portioning the representatives, to a Committee of a
member from each State.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconded the motion ; ob
serving that this was the only case in which such
committees were useful.
Mr. Williamson thought it would he necessary ta

1054 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
return to the rule of numbers, but that the Westem
States stood on different footing. If their property
should be rated as high as that of the Atlantic
States, then their representation ought to hold a like
proportion. Otherwise, if their property was not
to be equally rated.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris. The Report is little
more than a guess. Wealth was not altogether dis
regarded by the Comraittee. Where it was ap
parently in favor of one State whose nurabers were
superior to the nurabers of another, by a fraction
only, a member extraordinary was allowed to the
former ; and so vice versa. The Comraittee raeant
little raore than to bring the matter to a point for
the consideration of the House.
Mr. Read asked, why Georgia was allowed two
merabers, when her number of inhabitants had stood
below that of Delaware ?
Mr, Gouverneur Morris. Such is the rapidity
of the population of that State, that before the plan
takes effect, it will probably be entitled to two Rep
resentatives. Mr. Randolph disliked the Report of the Commit
tee, but had been unwilling to object to it. He was
apprehensive that, as the number was not be chang
ed, till the National Legislature should please, a pre
text would never be wanting to postpone alterations,
and keep the power in the hands of those possessed
of it. He was in favor of the coraraitment to a
member frora each State.
Mr. Patterson considered the proposed estimate
for the future according to the corabined mies of
numbers and wealth, as too vague. For this reason

1787.] federal convention. 1055
New Jersey was against it. He could regard negro
slaves in no light but as property. They are no
free agents, have no personal liberty, no faculty of
acquiring property, but on the contrary are them
selves property, and like other property entirely at
the will of the master. Has a man in Virginia a
number of votes in proportion to the number of his
slaves ? and if negroes are not represented in the
States to which they belong, why should they be
represented in the General Government. What is
the true principle of representatipn ? It is an expe
dient by which an assembly of certain individuals,
chosen by the people, is substituted in place of the
inconvenient meeting of the people themselves. If
such a meeting of the pepple was actually to take
place, would the slaves vote? They would not.
Why then should they be represented? He was
also against such an indirect encouragement of the
slave trade ; observing that Congress, in their Act
relating to the change of the eighth Article of Con
federation, had been ashamed to use the term
" slaves," and had substituted a description.
Mr. Madison reminded Mr. Patterson that his
doctrine of representation, which was in its principle
the genuine one, raust forever silence the pretensions
of the sraall States to an equality of votes with the
large ones. They ought to vote in the sarae pro
portion in which their citizens would do, if the peo
ple of all the States were collectively raet. He
suggested as a proper ground of compromise, that
in the first branch the States should be represented
according to their number of free inhabitants ; and
in the second, which had for one of its primary ob-

10^6 debates in the [17S7.
jects the guardianship of property, according to the
whole nuraber, including slaves.
Mr, Butler urged warmly the justice and neces
sity of regarding wealth in the apportionment of
representation. Mr. King had always expected, that, as the South
ern States are the richest, they would not league
themselves with the Northern, unless sorae respect
were paid to their superior wealth. If the latter
expect those preferential distinctions in coraraeree,
and other advantages which they wfll derive from
the connexion, they must not expect to receive them
without allowing sorae advantages in return. Elev
en out of thirteen of the States had agreed to con
sider slaves in the apportionraent of taxation ; and
taxation and representation ought to go together.
On the question for committing the first paragraph
of the Report to a raeraber frora each State, — Mas
sachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsyh'ania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Geor
gia, aye — 9 ; New York, South Carolina, no— 2.
The Committee appointed were Messrs, King,
Sherman, Yates, Brearly, Gouverneur Morris,
Read, Carroll, Madison, Williamson, Rutledge,
Houston, Adjourned.

Tuesday, June 10th.
In Corwentionf'^Mr. King reported, from the Com
mittee yesterday appointed, " that the States at the

1787,] federal convention. 1057
first meeting of the General Legislature, should be
represented by sixty-five members, in the following
proportions, to wit : — New Hampshire, by 3 ; Massa
chusetts, 8 ; Rhode Island, 1 ; Connecticut, 5 ; New
York, 6 ; New Jersey, 4 ; Pennsylvania, 8 ; Dela
ware, 1 ; Maryland, 6 ; Virginia, 10 ; North Caroli
na, 5 ; South Carolina, 5 ; Georgia, 3."
Mr. Rutledge moved that New Hampshire be re
duced from three to two merabers. Her numbers
did not entitle her to three, and it was a poor State.
General Pinckney seconds the raotion.
Mr. King. New Hampshire has probably more
than 120,000 inhabitants, and has an extensive coun
try of tolerable fertility. Its inhabitants may there
fore be expected to increase fast. He reraarked that
the four Eastern States, having 800,000 souls, have
one-third fewer representatives than the four South
ern States, having not more than 700,000 souls, ra
ting the blacks as five for three. The Eastern peo
ple will advert to these circurastances, and be dissat
isfied. He believed them to be very desirous of uni
ting with their Southern brethren, but did not think
it prudent to rely so far on that disposition, as to
subject them to any gross inequality. He was fully
convinced that the question concerning a difference
of interests did not lie where it had hitherto been
discussed, between the great and sraall States ; but
between the Southern and Eastem. For this rea
son he had been ready to yield soraething, in the
proportion of representatives, for the security of the
Southem. No principle would justify the giving
thera a majority. They were brought as near an
equality as was possible. He was not aA^erse to giv-
VoL. I.— 67

1058 debates in the [1787.
ing them a stfll greater security, but did not see how
it could be done.
General Pinckney. The Report before it was
coraraitted was more favorable to the Southem
States than as it now stands. If they are to form
so considerable a minority, and the regulation of
trade is to be given to the General Government,
they will be nothing more than overseers for the
Northern States. He did not expect the Southern
States to be raised to a majority of representatives ;
but wished them to have something like an equality.
At present, by the alterations of the Comraittee in
favor of the Northern States, they are reraoved fur
ther from it than they were before. One member
indeed had been added to Virginia, which he was
glad of, as he considered her as a Southern State.
He was glad also that the merabers of Georgia were
increased. Mr. Williamson was not for reducing New Harap
shire frora three to two, but for reducing sorae others.
The Southern interest raust be extremely endan
gered by the present arrangeraent. The Northern
States are tp have a raajority in the first instance,
and the means of perpetuating it.
Mr. Dayton observed, that the line between
Northern and Southern interest had been improp
erly drawn; that Pennsylvania was the dividing
State, there being six on each side of her.
General Pinckney urged the reduction ; dwelt on
the superior wealth of the Southern States, and in
sisted on its having its due weight in the Govern
ment. Mr. Gouverneur Morris regretted the turn of the

1787.] federal convention. 1059
debate. The States, he found, had many represen
tatives on the floor. Few, he feared, were to be
deemed the Representatives of America. He
thought the Southern States have, by the Report,
more than their share of representation. Property
ought to have its weight, but not all the weight. If
the Southern States are to supply money, the North
ern States are to spill their blood. Besides, the
probable revenue to be expected from the Southern
States has been greatly overrated. He was against
reducing New Hampshire.
Mr. Randolph was,opposed to a reduction of New
Hampshire, not because she had a full title to three
merabers ; but because it was in his contemplation,
first, to make it the duty, instead of leaving it to the
discretion, of the Legislature to regulate the repre
sentation by a periodical census ; secondly, to require
more than a bare majority of votes in the Legisla
ture, in certain cases, and particularly in coraraercial
cases. On the question for reducing New Harapshire
frora three to two Representatives, it passed in the
negative, — North Carolina,* South Carolina, aye — ¦
2 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Ncav Jersey, Penn
sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia,*
no— 8.
General Pinckney and Mr. Alexander Martin
moved that six Representatives, instead of five, be
alloAved to Nortii Carolina.
On the question it passed in the negative,— -North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 3 ; Massa-

* In the printed Journal, North Carolina, no ; Georgia, aye.

lOeO debates in the [1787.
chusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no — 7.
General Pinckney and Mr. Butler made the
sarae motion in favor of South Carolina.
On the question, it passed in the negative, — Dela
ware, North Carolina, Soutii Carolina, Georgia, aye
— 4 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, no — ^7.
General Pinckney and Mr. Houston moved that
Georgia be allowed four instead of three Represen
tatives ; urging the unexampled celerity of its popu
lation. On the question, it passed in the negative, — Vir
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye
— 4 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, no — 7.
Mr. Madison moved that the nuraber allowed to
each State be doubled. A majority of a Quorum of
sixty-five members was too sraall a number to repre
sent the whole inhabitants of the United States.
They Avould not possess enough of the confidence of
the people, and would be too sparsely taken from
the people, to bring with them all the local informa
tion which would be frequently Avanted. Double
the number wfll not be too great, even with the fu
ture additions frora the new States. The additional
expense was too inconsiderable to be regarded in so
important a case. And as far as the augmentation
might be unpopular on that score, the objection was
overbalanced by its effect on .the hopes of a greater
number of the popular candidates.
Mr. Ellsworth urged the objection of expense;
and that the greater the nuraber, the more slowly

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION.
would the business proceed ; and the less probably
be decided as it ought, at last. He thought the
number of representatives too great in most of the
State Legislatures ; and that a large number was
less necessary in the General Legislature, than in
those of the States ; as its business would relate to
a few great national objects only.
Mr. Sherman would have preferred fifty to sixty-
five. The great distance they will have to travel
will render their attendance precarious, and will
make it difficult to prevafl on a sufficient number
of fit men to undertake the service. He observed
that the expected increase frora new States also
deserved consideration.
Mr. Gerry was for increasing the number beyond
sixty-five. The larger the number, the less the
danger of their being corrupted. The people are
accustomed to, and fond of, a numerous representa
tion ; and will consider their rights as better secured
by it. The danger of excess in the number raay be
guarded against by fixing a pomt within which the
nuraber shall always be kept.
Colonel Mason adraitted, that the objection drawn
from the consideration of expense had weight both
in itself, and as the people might be affected by it.
But he thought it outweighed by the objections
against the sraallness of the number. Thirty-eight
will, he supposes, as being a majority of sixty-five,
forra a quorum. Twenty will be a majority of
thirty-eight. This was certainly too small a num
ber to make laws for America. They would neither
bring with them all the necessary information re
lative to various local interests, nor possess the ne-

1062 debates IN THE [1787.
cessary confidence of the people. After doubling the
number, the laws might still be raade by so few as
alraost to be objectionable on that account.
Mr. Read was in favor of the motion. Two of
the States (Delaware and Rhode Island) would
have but a single raeraber if the aggregate number
should remain at sixty-five ; and in case of accident
to either of these, one State would have no Repre
sentative present to give explanations or informa
tions of its interests or wishes. The people would
not place their confidence in so small a number.
He hoped the objects of the General Government
would be much more nuraerous than seeraed to be
expected by sorae gentleraen, and that they w^ould
becorae raore and more so. As to the new States,
the highest number of Representatives for the whole
raight be limited, and all danger of excess thereby
prevented. Mr. Rutledge opposed the motion. The
Representatives were too numerous in all the
States. The full number allotted to the States
may be expected to attend, and the lowest possible
quorum should not therefore be considered. The
interests of their constituents will urge their at
tendance too strongly for it to be omitted : and he
supposed the General Legislature would not sit
more than six or eight weeks in the year.
On the question for doubling the number, it
passed in the negative,— Delaware, Virginia, aye 
2; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, no — 9.
On the question for agreeing to the apportion
ment of Representatives, as amended by the last

1787.] federal CONVENTION. i©63
Committee, it passed in the affirmative, — Massa
chusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Penn
sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Car
olina, aye — ^9 ; South Carolina, Georgia, no — 2.
Mr. Broome gave notice to the House, that he
had concurred with a reserve to himself of an inten
tion to claim for his State an equal voice in the
second branch; which he thought could not be
denied after this concession of the small States as to
the first branch.
Mr. Randolph moved, as an amendment to the
Report of the Comraittee of five, " that in order to
ascertain the alterations in the population and
wealth of the several States, the Legislature should
be required to cause a census and estimate to be
taken within one year after its first meeting ; and
every  years thereafter ; and that the Legis
lature arrange the representation accordingly,"
Mr. Gouverneur Morris opposed it, as fettering
the Legislature too much. Advantage may be
taken of it in tirae of war or the apprehension of it,
by new States to extort particular favors. If the
mode was to be fixed for taking a census, it raight
certainly be extremely inconvenient : if unfixed, the
Legislature may use such a mode as wiil defeat the
object; and perpetuate the inequality. He was
always against such shackles on the Legislature,
They had been found very pernicious in most of the
State Constitutions. He dwelt much on the danger
of throwing such a preponderance into the western
scale; suggesting that in time the western people
would outnumber the Atlantic States. He wished
therefore to put it in the power of the latter to

1064 debates in the [1787.
keep a majority of votes in their own hands. It
was objected, he said, that, if the Legislature are
left at liberty, they will never re-adjust the repre
sentation. He admitted that this was possible, but
he did not think it probable, unless the reasons
against a revision of it were very urgent ; and in
this case, it ought not to be done.
It was raoved to postpone the proposition of Mr.
Randolph, in order to take up the following, viz. :
" that the Coraraittee of eleven, to whora was re
ferred the Report of the Comraittee of five on the
subject of Representation, be requested to furnish
the Convention with the principles on which they
grounded the Report ;" which was disagreed to, —
South Carolina alone voting in the afiirmative.
Adjourned.

Wednesday, July Uth.
In Convention, — Mr. Randolph's motion, requi
ring the Legislature to take a periodical census for
the purpose of redressing inequalities in the repre
sentation was resumed.
Mr. Sherman was against shackling the Legisla
ture too rauch. We ought to choose wise and good
men, and then confide in thera.
Mr. Mason. The greater the difficulty we find in
fixing a proper rule of representation, the raore
unwflling ought we to be to throw the task from
ourselves on the General Legislature. He did not
object to the conjectural ratio which was to pre
vafl in the outset; but considered a revision from

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1065
time to time, according to sorae perraanent and pre
cise standard, as essential to the fair representation
required in the first branch. According to the pres
ent population of Araerica, the northern part of it
had a right to preponderate, and he could not de
ny it. But he wished it not to preponderate here
after, when the reason no longer continued. Frora
the nature of man, we raay be sure that those who
have power in their hands will not give it up, while
they can retain it. On the contrary, we know that
they will always, when they can, rather increase it.
If the Southern States, therefore, should have three-
fourths of the people of America within their limits,
the Northern will hold fast the majority of Repre
sentatives. One-fourth will govern the three-fourths.
The Southern States will complain, but they may
complain frora generation to generation without
redress. Unless sorae principle, therefore, which
will do justice to them hereafter, shall be inserted
in the Constitution, disagreeable as the declaration
was to him, he raust declare he could neither vote
for the system here, nor support it in his State.
Strong objections had been drawn from the dan
ger to the Atlantic interests frora new Western
States. Ought we to sacrifice what we know to
be right in itself, lest it should prove favorable to
States which are not yet in existence? If the
Western States are to be adraitted into the Union,
as they arise, they raust, he would repeat, be treated
as equals, and subjected to no degrading discrimina
tions. They wfll have the same pride, and other
passions, which we have ; and will either not unite
with, or wfll speedily revolt from, the Union, if they
Vol. I.— 67*

1066 DEBATES IN THE [1787,
are not in all respects placedT on an equal footmg
with their brethren. It has been said, they will be
poor, and unable to make equal contributions to the
general treasury. He did not know but that, in
time, they would be both raore nuraerous and raore
wealthy, than their Atlantic brethren. The extent
and fertility of their soil raade this probable ; and
though Spain might for a time deprive them of the
natural outlet for their productions, yet she will, be
cause she must, finally yield to their demands. He
urged that numbers of inhabitants, though not al
ways a precise standard of wealth, Avas sufficiently
so for every substantial purpose.
Mr. Williamson was for making it a duty of the
Legislature to do what was right, and not leaving it
at liberty to do or not to do it. He raoA'cd that Mr.
Randolph's propositions be postponed, in order to
consider the following, " that in order to ascertain
the alterations that raay happen in the population
and wealth of the several States, a census shall be
taken of the free white inhabitants, and three-fifths
of those of other descriptions on the first year after
this governraent shall have been adopted, and every
year thereafter ; and that the representation

be regulated accordingly."
Mr. Randolph agreed that Mr. Williamson's pro
position should stand in place of his. He observed
that the ratio fixed for the first meeting was a mere
conjecture ; that it placed the power in the hands
of that part bf Araerica which could not always be
entitled to iti; that this power would not be volun-
tarfly renounced ; and that it was consequently the
duty of the Convention to secure its renunciation,

1787.] federal convention, 1067
when justice raight so require, by some constitu
tional provisions. If equality between great and
sraall States be inadmissible, because in that case
unequal numbers of constituents would be represent-
ted by equal numbers of votes, was it not equally
inadmissible, that a larger and more populous dis
trict of Araerica, should hereafter have less repre
sentation than a smaller and less populous district?
If a fair representation of the people be not secured,
the injustice of the Government will shake it to its
foundations. What relates to suffrage, is justly sta
ted by the celebrated Montesquieu as a fundaraental
article in Republican Governraents. If the danger
suggested by Mr. Gouverneur Morris be real, of
advantage being taken of the Legislature in pressing
moraents, it was an additional reason for tying their
hands in such a raanner, that they could not sacri
fice their trust to raoraentary considerations. Con
gress have pledged tlie public faith to new States,
that they shall be admitted on equal terms. They
never would, nor ought to, accede on any other.
The census must be taken under the direction of
the General Legislature. The States will be too
much interested, to take an irapartial one for them
selves. Mr. Butler and General Pinckney insisted that
blacks be included in the rule of representation
equally with the Avhites ; and for that purpose
moved that the words "three-fifths" be struck out.
Mr. Gerry thought that three-fifths of them was,
to say the least, the full proportion that could be
admitted. Mr. Gorham. This ratio was fixed by Congress

1068 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
as a rule of taxation. Then, it was urged, by the
Delegates representing the States having slaves,
that the blacks were still more inferior to freemen.
At present, when the ratio of representation is to be
established, we are assured that they are equal to
freemen. The arguraents on the forraer occasion
had convinced him, that three-fifths was pretty near
the just proportion, and he should vote according to
the same opinion now.
Mr. Butler insisted that the labor of a slave in
South Carolina was as productive and valuable, as
that of a freeman in Massachusetts ; that as wealth
was the great means of defence and utility to the
nation, they were equally valuable to it with free
men; and that consequently an equal represen
tation ought to be allowed for them in a governraent
which was instituted principally, for the protection
of property, and was itself to be supported by prop
erty.' Mr. Mason could not agree to the raotion, notwith
standing it was favorable to Virginia, because he
thought it unjust. It was certain that the slaves
were valuable, as they raised the value of land, in
creased the exports and iraports, and of course the
revenue, would supply the raeans of feeding and sup
porting an array, and might in cases of emergency
become themselves soldiers. As in these important
respects they were useful to the coraraunity at large,
they ought not to be excluded frora the estiraate of
representation. He could not, however, regard them
as equal to freemen, and could not vote for them as
such. He added, as worthy of remark, that the
Southern States have this peculiar species of proper-

\ \ \ \

1787.] federal CONVENTION. 1069
ty, over and above the other species of property
coraraon to all the States.
Mr. Williamson reminded Mr. Gorham that if the
Southern States contended for the inferiority of
blacks to whites when taxation was in view, the
Eastern States, on the sarae occasion, contended for
their equality. He did not, however, either then or
now, concur in either extreme, but approved of the
ratio of three-fifths.
On Mr. Butler's motion, for considering blacks as
equal to whites in the apportionraent of representa
tion, — Delaware, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 3 ;
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Nevv Jersey, Pennsyl
vania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no — 7;
New York, not on the floor.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris said he had several ob
jections to the proposition of Mr. Williamson. In
the first place, it fettered the Legislature too much.
In the second place, it would exclude some States
altogether who would not liaA^e a sufficient number
to entitle them to a single representation. In the
third place, it will not consist with the resolution
passed on Saturday last, authorizing the Legislature
to adjust the representation from time to time onthe
principles of population and wealth ; nor with the
principles of equity. If slaves were to be consid
ered as inhabitants, not as wealth, then the said
Resolution would not be pursued ; if as wealth, then
why is no other wealth but slaves included ? These
objections may perhaps be removed by araendraents.
His great objection was, that the number of inhab
itants was not a proper standard of wealth. The
amazing difference between the comparative num-

l070 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
bers and wealth of different countries rendered all
reasoning superfluous on the subject. Numbers
might with greater propriety be deemed a measure
of strength, than of wealth ; yet the late defence
made by Great Britain, against her numerous ene
mies proved, in the clearest manner, that it is entirely
fallacious even in this respect.
Mr. King thought there was great force in the ob
jections of Mr. Gouverneur Morris. He would,
hpwever, accede tp the prpppsitipn for the sake of
doing something.
Mr. Rutledge contended fpr the admission of
wealth in the estimate by which representation
should be regulated. The Western States will not
be able to contribute in proportion to their nurabers ;
they should not therefore be represented in that pro
portion. The Atlantic States wfll not concur ni
such a plan. He moved that, " at the end of 
years after the first raeeting of the Legislature, and
of CA^ery  years thereafter, the Legislature shall
proportion the representation according to the prin
ciples of wealth and population."
Mr. Sherman thought the nuraber of people alone
the best rale for measuring wealth as well as repre
sentation ; and that if the Legislature were to be
governed by wealth, they would be obliged to esti
mate it by numbers. He was at first for leaving the
matter wholly to the discretion of the Legislature •
but he had been convinced by the observation of
(Mr. Randolph and Mr. Mason), that the periods and
the rule, of revising the representation, ought to be
fixed by the Constitution.
Mr. Read thought, the Legislature ought not to

1787.] federal convention. 1071
be too much shackled. It would make the Consti
tution like religious creeds, embarrassing to those
bound to conform to thera, and raore likely to pro
duce dissatisfaction and schism, than harmony and
union. Mr. Mason objected to Mr. Rutledge's motion, as
requiring of the Legislature something too indefinite
and impracticable, and leaving them a pretext for
doing nothing.
Mr. Wilson had himself no objection to leaving
the Legislature entirely at liberty, but considered
wealth as an irapracticable rule.
Mr. Gqrham. If the Convention, who are com
paratively so little biassed by local views, are so
rauch perplexed, how can it be expected that the
Legislature hereafter, under the full bias of those
views will be able to settle a standard ? He was
convinced, by the arguraents of others and his own
reflections, that the Convention ought to fix some
standard or other.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris. The argument of oth
ers and his own reflections had led hira to a very
different conclusion. If we cannot agree on a rule
that will be just at this tirae, how can we expect to
find one that wfll be just in all times to corae ? Sure
ly those who come after us will judge better of
things present, than we can of things future. He
could not persuade himself that numbers would be
a just rule at any time. The remarks of (Mr. Ma
son) relative to the Western country had not changed
his opinion on that head. Araong other objections,
it must be apparent, they would not be able to fur
nish men equally enlightened, to share in the admin-

1072 DEBATES IN THE [1787,
istration of our coraraon interests. The busy haunts
of men, not the reraote wilderness, was the proper
school of political talents. If the western people
get the power into their hands, they will ruin the
Atlantic interests. The back members are always
raost averse to the best raeasures. He inentioned
the case of Pennsylvania formerly. The lower part
of the State had the power in the first instance.
They kept it in their own hands, and the country
was the better for it. Another objection with him,
against adraitting the blacks into the census, was,
that the people of Pennsylvania would revolt at the
idea of being put on a footing with slaves. They
would reject any plan that was to have such an ef
fect. Two objections had been raised against leav
ing the adjustment of the representation, from tirae
to time, to the discretion of the Legislature. The
first was, they would be unwilling to revise it at all.
The second, that, by referring to wealth, they w^ould
be bound by a rule which, if willing, they would be
unable to execute. The first objection distrusts their
fidelity. But if their duty, their honor, and their
oaths, will not bind them, let us not put into their
hands our liberty, and all our other great interests ;
let us have no goA'^ernraent at all. In the second
place, if these ties will bind thera, we need not dis
trust the practicabflity of the rule. It was folloAved
in part by the Comraittee in the apportionraent of
Representatives yesterday reported to the House.
The best course that could be taken would be to
leave the interests of the people to the representa
tives of the people.
Mr. Madison was not a little surprised to hear this

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION, 1073
implicit confidence urged by a member who, on all
occasions, had inculcated so strongly the political
depravity of men, and the necessity of checking one
vice and interest by opposing to them another vice
and interest. If the representatives of the people
would be bound by the ties he had mentioned, what
need was there of a Senate ? What of a revisionary
power ? But his reasoning was not only inconsist
ent with his former reasoning, but with itself At
the sarae time tirae that he recoraraended this impli
cit confidence to the Southern States in the North
ern majority, he was still more zealous in exhorting
all to a jealousy of a western majority. To recon
cile the gentleman with himself, it must be imagined
that he deterrained the huraan character by the
points of the corapass. The truth was, that all raen
having power ought to be distrusted, to a certain de
gree. The case of Pennsylvania had been mention
ed, where it was adraitted that those who were pos
sessed of the power in the original settlement never
adraitted the new settlements to a due share of it.
England was a still more striking example. The
power there had long been in the hands of the bor
oughs — of the minority — who had ppposed and de
feated every reform which -had been attempted.
Virginia was, in a less degree, another example.
With regard to the Western States, he was clear and
firm in opinion, that no unfavorable distinctions were
admissible, either in point of justice'or policy. He
thpught alsp, that the hope of contributions to the
Treasury frora them had been much underrated.
Future contributions, it seeraed to be understood on
all hands, would be principally levied on imports
Vpl. I.— 68

1074 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
and exports. The extent and fertility of the West
ern soil would for a long tirae give to agriculture a
preference over manufactures. Trials would be re
peated tfll sorae articles could be raised from it, that
would bear a transportation to places where they
could be exchanged for imported manufactures.
Wheneyer the Mississippi should be opened to them,
which would of necessity be the case as soon as
their population would subject them to any consid
erable share of the public burden, imposts on tiieir
trade could be collected with less expense, and great
er certainty, than on that of the Atlantic States. In
the mean time, as their supplies must pass through
the Atlantic States, their contributions would be levied
in the same manner with those of the Atlantic States.
He could not agree that any substantial objection
lay against fixing nurabers for the perpetual stand
ard of representation. It Avas said, that representa
tion and taxation were to go together ; that taxation
and wealth ought to go together; that population
and wealth were not measures of each other. He
admitted that in different climates, under different
forms of govemment, and in different stages of civil
ization, the inference was perfectly just. He would
admit that in no situation numbers of inhabitants
were an accurate raeasure of wealth. He contend
ed, however, that in the United States it was suffi
ciently so for the object in contemplation. Al
though their cliwiate varied considerably, yet as the
governments, the laws, and the raanners of all, were
nearly the sarae, and the intercourse between dif
ferent parts perfectly free, population, mdustry, arts,
and the value of labor, would constantly tend to

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION, 1075
equalize themselves. The value of labor might be
considered as the principal criterion of Avealth and
ability to support taxes; and this would find its
level in different places, where the intercouse should
be easy and free, with as rauch certainty as the
value of money or any Other thing. Wherever la
bor would yield raost, people would resort ; till the
corapetition should destroy the inequality. Hence
it is that the people are constantly swarming from
the more, to the less, populous places — from Europe
to Araerica — frora the Northern and raiddle parts of
the United States to the Southern and Westem.
They go where land is cheaper, because there labor
is dearer. If it be true that the same quantity of
produce raised on the banks of the Ohio is of less
value than on the Delaware, it is also true that the
sarae labor vvill raise twice or thrice the quantity in
the former, that it will raise in the latter, situation.
Colonel Mason agreed with Mr. G. Morris, that
Av^e ought to leave the interests of the people to
the representatives of the people ; but the objection
was, that the Legislature would cease to be the
representatives of the people. It would continue so
nb longer than the States now containing a raajority
of the people should retain that majority. As soon
as the southern and western population should pre
dominate, which raust happen in a few years, the
power would be in the hands of the minority, and
would never be yielded to the majority, unless
provided for by the Constitution.
On the question for postponing Mr. Williamson's
motion, in order to consider that of Mr. Rutledge,
it passed in the negative, — Massachusetts, Pennsyl-*

1076 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
vania, Delaware, South Carolina, Georgia, aye —
5; Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, no — 5.
On the question on the first clause of Mr. Will
iamson's motion, as to taking a census of the free
inhabitants, it passed in the affirmative;— Massachu
setts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Vir
ginia, North Carolina, aye — 6; Delaware, Mary
land, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 4.
The next clause as to three-fifths of the negroes
being considered, — ¦
Mr. King, being much opposed to fixing nurabers
as the rule of representation, was particularly so
on account of the blacks. He thought the admission
of them along with whites at all, would excite great
discontents among the States having no slaves.
He had never said, as to any particular point, that
he would in no event acquiesce in and support it ;
but he would say that if in any case such a declara
ation was to be made by hira, it would be in this.
He remarked that in the temporary allotment of
representatives made by the Comraittee, the South
ern States had received raore than the nuraber
of their white and three-fifths of their black inhabi
tants entitled them to.
Mr. Sherman. South Carolina had not more
beyond her proportion than New York and New
Hampshire; nor either of thera raore than was
necessary in order to avoid fractions, or reducing
thera below their proportion. Georgia had raore;
but the rapid growth of that State seeraed to justify
it. In general the allotraent raight not be just, but
considering all ckcumstances he was satisfied with it.

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1077
Mr. Gorham .supported the propriety of establish
ing nurabers as the rule. He said that in Massa
chusetts estimates had been taken in the different
towns, and that persons had been curious enough to
compare these estimates with the respective num
bers of people; and it had been found, even in
cluding Boston, that the raost exact proportion
prevailed between numbers and property. He was
aware that there raight be some weight in what had
fallen from his colleague, as to the umbrage which
might be taken by the people of the Eastern States.
But he recollected that when the proposition of
Congress for changing the eighth Article of the
Confederation was before the Legislature of Massa
chusetts, the only difficulty then was, to satisfy
them that the negroes ought not to have been
counted equally with the whites, instead of being
counted in the ratio of three-fifths only.*
Mr. Wilson did not well see, on what principle
the adraission of blacks in the proportion of three-
fifths could be explained. Are they adraitted as '
citizens — then why are they not admitted on an
equality with white citizens ? Are they admitted i
as property — then why is not other property ad- ,
mitted into the computation ? These were difficul- !
ties, however, which he thought raust be overruled ;
by the necessity of coraproraise. He had some ap- '
prehensions also, from the tendency of the blending
of the blacks with the whites, to give disgust to the
people of Pennsylvania, as had been intimated by

* They were then to have been a rule of taxation only.

j^QYg DEBATES IN THE [1787.
his colleague (Mr. Gouverneur Morris). But he
differed from himin thinking numbers of inhabitants
so incorrect a measure of wealth. He had seen the
western settlements of Pennsylvania, and on a
comparison of them with the city of Philadelphia
could discover little other difference, than that
property was more unequally divided here than
there. Taking the same number in the aggregate,
in the two situations, he believed there would be
little difference in their wealth and abflity to con
tribute to the public wants.
I Mr. Gouverneur Morris was compelled to de-
' clare himself reduced to the dflemma of doing m-
i justice to the Southern States, or to human nature;
i and he must therefore do it to the former. For he
i could never agree to give such encouragement to
the slave trade, as would be given by allowing
them a representation for their negroes; and he
did not believe those States would ever confederate
on terms that would deprive them of that trade.
On the questipn for agreeing to include three-
fifths of the blacks, — Cpnnecticut, Virginia, North
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 4; Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,* South
Carolina, no — 6.
On the question as to taking the census " the first
year after the meeting of the Legislature," — ^Massa
chusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Vir
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 7; Con
necticut, Maryland, Georgia, no— 3.

* Mr, Carroll said, in explanation of the vote of Maryland, that he wished
the -phraseology to hc so altered as to obviate, if possible, the danger which
had been expressed of giving umbrage to the Eastern and Middle States,

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1079
On filling the blank for the periodical census with
fifteen years, — agreed to, nem, con.
Mr, Madison moved to add, after " fifteen years,"
the words " at least," that the Legislature niight an
ticipate when circurastances were likely to render a
particular year inconvenient.
On this raotion, for adding " at least," it passed in
the negative, the States being equally divided, —
Massachusetts, Virginia, North Carolina, South Car
olina, Georgia, aye — 5; Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, no — 5,
A change in the phraseology of the other clause,
so as to read, " and the Legislature shall alter or
augment the representation accordingly," was agreed
to, nem. con.
On the question on the whole resolution of Mr,
Williamson, as amended,^ — Massachusetts, Connec
ticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no— 9 ; so
it was rejected unanimously.
Adjourned,

Thursday, July 12th,
In Convention, — Mr, Gouverneur Morris moved
to add to the clause empowering the Legislature to
vary the representation according to the principles
of wealth and nurabers of inhabitants, a proviso,
" that taxation shall be in proportion to representa
tion," Mr. Butler cpntended again, that representatipn
shpuld be accerding tc the full number pf inhabit-

1080 debates in the [1787.
ants, including all the blacks ; admitting the justice
of Mr. Gouverneur Morris's raotion.
Mr. Mason also adraitted the justice of the princi
ple, but was afraid embarrassraents raight be occa
sioned to the Legislature by it. It might drive the
Legislature to the plan of requisitions.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris admitted that sorae ob
jections lay against his raotion, but supposed they
would be removed by resteaining^ the rule to direct
taxation. With regard to indirect taxes on exports
and imports, and on consumption, the rule would be
inapplicable. Notwithstanding what had been said
to the contrary, he was persuaded that the imports
and consumption were pretty nearly equal through
out the Union.
General Pinckney liked the idea. He thought it
so just that it could not be objected to ; but foresaw,
that, if the revision of the census was left to the dis
cretion of the Legislature, it would never be carried
into execution. The rule must be fixed, and the
execution of it enforced, by the Constitution. He
was alarmed at what was said* yesterday, concern
ing the negroes. He was now again alarmed at
what had been thrown out concerning the taxing of
exports. South Carolina has in one year exported
to the araount of £600,000 sterling, all Avhich was
the fruit of the labor of her blacks. Wfll she be
represented in proportion to this araount ? She wfll
not. Neither ought she then to be subject to a tax
on it. He hoped a clause would be inserted in the
system, restraining the Legislature from taxmg ex
ports.

f By Mr. Gouverneur Morris,

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1081
Mr. Wilson approved the principle, but could not
see how it could be carried into execution ; unless
restrained to direct taxation.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris having so varied his mo
tion by inserting the word " direct," it passed, nem..
con., as follows : " provided always that direct taxa
tion ought to be proportioned to representation."
Mr. Davie said it was high time now to speak out.
He saw that it was raeant by sorae gentleraen to de
prive the Southern States of any share of represen
tation for their blacks. He was sure that North
Carolina would never confederate on any terms that
did not rate them at least as three-fifths. If the
Eastern States meant, therefore, to exclude them
altogether, the business was at an end.
Doctor Johnson thought that wealth and popula
tion were the true, equitable rules of representation ;
but he conceived that these two principles resolved
themselves into one, population being the best mea
sure of wealth. He concluded, therefore, that the
number of people ought to be established as the rule,
and that all descriptions, including blacks equally
with the whites, ought to fall within the coraputa
tion. As various opinions had been expressed on
the subject, he would raove that a coraraittee might
be appointed to take them into consideration, and
report thera.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris. It had been said that
it is high tirae to speak out. As one raeraber, he
would candidly do so. He came here to form a
corapact for the good of Araerica. He was ready
to do so with all the States. He hoped, and believed,
that all would enter into such a compact. If they
Vol I.— 68 *

1082 debates in the [1787.
would not, he was ready to join with any States
that would. But as the compact was to be volun
tary, it is in vain for the Eastern States to nisist on
what the Southern States wfll never agree to. It
is equally vam for the latter to require, what the
other States can never adrait ; and he verily believ
ed the people of Pennsylvania will never agree to
a representation of negroes. What can be desired
by these States more than has been already propo
sed — that the Legislature shall from time to time
regulate representation according to population and
wealth? General Pinckney desired that the rule of wealth
should be ascertained, and not left to the pleasure
of the Legislature; and that property in slaves
should not be exposed to danger, under a govern
ment instituted for the protection of property.
The first clause in the Report of the first Grand
Comraittee was postponed.
Mr. Ellsworth, in order to carry into effect the
principle established, raoved to add to the last clause
adopted by the House the words following, " and
that the rule of contribution by direct taxation, for
the support of the Governraent of the United States,
shall be the nuraber of white inhabitants, and three-
fifths of every other description in the several States,
until sorae other rule that shall raore accurately as
certain the wealth of the several States, can be
devised and adopted by the Legislature."
Mr. Butler seconded the motion, in order that it
might be coramitted.
Mr. Randolph was not satisfied with the motion.
The danger will be revived, that the ingenuity of

1787.] federal convention. 1083
the Legislature may evade or pervert the rule, so
as to perpetuate the power where it shall be lodged
in the first instance. He proppsed, in lieu pf Mr.
Ellsworth's motion, "that in order to ascertain
the alteratiens in representation that may be re
quired, from time to time, by changes in the relative
circumstances of the States, a census shall be taken
within two years from the first raeeting of the Gen
eral Legislature of the United States, and once
within the terra of every  years afterwards, of
all the inhabitants, in the raanner and according to
the ratio recoramended by Congress in their Res
olution of the eighteenth day of April, 1783, (rating
the blacks at three-fifths of their number) ; and that
the Legislature of the United States shall arrange
the representation accordingly." He urged strenu
ously that express security ought to be provided for
including slaves in the ratio of representation. He
laraented that such a species of property existed.
But as it did exist, the holders of it would require
this security. It was perceived that the design was
entertained by sorae of excluding slaves altogether ;
the Legislature therefore ought not to be left at
liberty. Mr. Ellsworth withdraws his raotion, and sec
onds that of Mr. Randolph.
Mr. Wilson observed, that less umbrage would
perhaps be taken against an admission of the slaves
into the rule of representation, if it should be so ex
pressed as to make them indirectly only an ingredient
in the rule, by saying that they should enter into the
rule of taxation ; and as representation was to be
according to taxatioft, the end would be equally at-

1084 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
tained. He accordingly mov^ed, and was seconded,
so to alter the last clause adopted by the House,
that, together with the amendment proposed, the
whole should read as follows: "provided always
that the representation ought to be proportioned
according to direct taxation ; and in order to ascer
tain the alterations in the direct taxation which raay
be required frora time to time by the changes in the
relative circumstances of the States, Resolved, that
a census be taken within two years from the first
meeting of the Legislature of the United States,
and once within the terra of every  years af
terwards, of all the inhabitants of the United
States, in the raanner and according to the ratio
recoraraended by Congress in their Resolution of
the eighteenth day of April, 1783 ; and that the
Legislature of the United States shall proportion
the direct taxation accordingly."
Mr. King. Although this amendment varies the
aspect somewhat, he had still two powerful objec
tions against tying down the Legislature to the rule
of numbers, — first, they were at this tirae an uncer
tain index of the relative wealth of the States ; sec
ondly, if they were a just index at this tirae, it can
not be supposed always to continue so. He was far
from wishing to retain any unjust advantage what
ever in one part of the Republic. If justice was not
the basis of the cmnection, it could not be of long
duration. He mUst be short-sighted indeed who
does not foresee, that, whenever the Southern States
shall be more numerous than the Northern, they can
and will hold a language that wfll awe thera into
justice. If they threaten to separate now in case

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1085
injury shall be done thera, will their threats be less
urgent or effectual when force shall back their de
mands. Even in the intervening period, there will
be no point of time at which they will not be able
to say, do us justice or we will separate. He urged
the necessity of placing confidence to a certain de
gree in every government, and did not conceive that
the proposed confidence, as to a periodical re-adjust
ment of the representation, exceeded that degree.
Mr, Pinckney moved to araend Mr. Randolph's
motion, so as to make " blacks equal to the whites
in the ratio of representation." This he urged was
nothing more than justice. The blacks are the la
borers, the peasants, of the Southern States. They
are as productive of pecuniary resources as those
of the Northern States. They add equally to the
wealth, and, considering money as the sinew of war,
to the strength^ of the nation. It will also be politic
with regard to the Northern States, as taxation is
to keep pace with representation.
General Pinckney moves to insert six years in
stead of two, as the period, coraputing frora the first
meeting of the Legislature, within which the first
census should be taken. On this question for insert
ing six years, instead of " two," in the proposition of
Mr. Wilson, it passed in the affirmative, — Connecti
cut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, South
Carolina, aye — 5; Massachusetts, Virginia, North
Carolina, Georgia, no — 4 ; Delaware, divided.
On the question for filling the blank for the peri
odical census with twenty years, it passed in the
negative, — Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
aye — 3; Massachusetts, Delaware, Maryland, Vir-

1086 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no
—7. On the question for ten years, it passed m the af
firmative, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro
luia, Georgia, aye — 8 ; Connecticut, New Jersey, no
—2. On Mr. Pinckney's raotion, for rating blacks as
equal to whites, instead of as three-fifths, — South
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 2; Massachusetts, Con
necticut (Doctor Johnson, aye). New Jersey, Penn
sylvania (three against two), Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, no — 8.
Mr. Randolph's proposition, as varied by Mr.
Wilson, being read for taking the question on the
whole, —
Mr. Gerry urged that the principle of it could not
be carried into execution, as the States were not to
be taxed as States. With regard to taxes on im
posts, he conceived they would be more productive
where there were no slaves, than where there were ;
the consuraption being greater.
Mr. Ellsworth. In case of a poll-tax there
would be no difficulty. But there would probably
be none. The sum allotted to a State may be
levied without difficulty, according to the plan used
by the State in raising its own supplies.
On the question on the whole proposition, as pro
portioning representation to direct taxation, and both
to the white and three-fifths of the black inhabit
ants, and requiring a census within six years, and
within every ten years afterwards, — Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1087
Georgia, aye — 6; New Jersey, Delaware, no — 2;
Massachusetts, South Carolina, divided.
Adjourned.

Friday, July 13th.
In Convention, — It being moved to postpone the
clause in the Report of the Comraittee of Eleven as
to the originating of raoney bills in \he first branch,
in order to take up the following, "that in the
second branch each State shall have an equal
voice," —
Mr. Gerry moved to add, as an amendment to
the last clause agreed to by the house," that from
the first meeting of the Legislature of the United
States till a census shall be taken, all moneys to
be raised for supplying the public Treasury by
direct taxation shall be assessed on the inhabi
tants of the several States according to the num
ber of their Representatives respectively in the
first branch." He said this would be as just before
as after the census, according to the general prin
ciple that taxation and representation ought to go
together. Mr. Williamson feared that New Harapshire will
have reason to coraplain. Three raembers were
allotted to her as a liberal allowance, for this reason
among others, that she might not suppose any ad
vantage to have been taken of her absence. As
she was still absent, and had no opportunity of de
ciding whether she would choose to retain the number
on the condition of her being taxed m proportion

1088 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
to it, he thought the number ought to be reduced
from three to two, before the question was taken on
Mr. Gerry's motion.
Mr. Read could not approve of the proposition.
He had observed, he said, in the Committee a back
wardness in sorae of the raerabers frora the larg**
States, to take their full proportion of Representa
tives. He did not then see the motive. He now
suspects it was to avoid their due share of taxation.
He had no objection to a just and accurate adjust
ment of representation and taxation to each other,
Mr. Gouverneur Morris and Mr. Madison an
swered, that the charge itself involved an acquittal ;
since, notwithstanding the augmentation of the nura
ber of members allotted to Massachusetts and Vir
ginia, the motion for proportioning the burdens there
to was made by a member from the forraer State,
and was approved by Mr. Madison, from the latter,
who was on the Committee. Mr. Gouverneur Morris
said, that he thought Pennsylvania had her due share
in eight members ; and he could not in candour ask
for more. Mr. Madison said, that haAang always con
ceived that the difference of interest in the United
States lay not between the large and small, but the
Northern and Southern States, and finding that the
nuraber of raerabers allotted to the Northern States
was greatly superior, he should have preferred an
addition of two members to the Southern States,
to wit, one to North and one to South Carolina,
rather than of one member to Virginia. He liked
the present motion, because it tended to moderate
the views both of the opponents and advocates for
rating very high the negroes.

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1089
Mr. Ellsvvorth hoped the proposition would be
withdrawn. It entered too much into detail. The
general principle was already sufficiently settled.
As fractions cannot be regarded in apportioning the
number of Representatives, the rule will be unjust,
until an actual census shall be made. After that,
taxation may be precisely proportioned, according
to the principle established, to the number of inhabi
tants. Mr. Wilson hoped the raotion would not be with^
drawn. If it should, it will be raade from another
quarter. The rule will be as reasonable and just
before, as after, a census. As to fractional numbers,
the census will not destroy, but ascertain thera.
And they will have the sarae effect after, as before,
the census; for, as he understands the rule, it is to
be adjusted not to the number of inhabitants, but of
'Representatives. Mr. Sherman opposed the motion. He thought
the Legislature ought to be left at liberty ; in which
case they would probably conform to the principles
pbserved by Congress.
Mr. Mason did not know that Virginia would be
a loser by the proppsed regulation, but had sorae
scruple as to the justice of it. He doubted rauch
whether the conjectural rule which Was to precede
the census would be as just as it Would be rendered
by an actual census.
Mr. Ellsworth and Mr. Sherman raoved to post
pone the raotion of Mr. Gerry.
On the question, it passed in the negative, — Con
necticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, aye— 4 \
Vol. I.— 69

1090 debatesinthe [1787.
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Caro
lina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 6,
On the question on Mr, Gerry's motion, it passed
in the negative, the States being equally divided, —
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 5; Connecticut, New Jer
sey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, np — 5.
Mr. Gerry finding that the loss of the question
had proceeded from an objection, with some, to the
proposed assessment of direct taxes on the inhab
itants of the States, which raight restrain the Legis
lature to a poll-tax, raoved his proposition again, but
so varied as to authorize the assessraent on the
States, which leaves the raode to the Legislature,
viz : " that from the first meeting of the Legislature
of the United States, until a census shall be taken,
all moneys for supplying the public Treasury by di
rect taxation shall be raised frora the said several
States, according to the number of their Representa
tives respectively in the first branch."
On this varied question, it passed in the affirraa
tive, — Massachusetts, VirginiajH^oith Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 5 ; Connecticut, New Jer
sey, Delaware, Maryland, no — 4 ; Pennsylvania, di
vided. On the raotion of Mr. Randolph, the vote of Mour
day last, authorizing the Legislature to adjust, from
time to time, tbe representation upon the principles
of wealth and numbers of inhabitants, was reconsid
ered by comraon consent, in order to strike out
wealth and adjust the resolution to that requiring pe
riodical revisions according to the nuraber of whites
and three-fifths of the blacks. The raotion was in

1787,] FEDERAL CONVENTION, 1091
the words following : — " But as the present situation
of the States may probably alter in the number of
their inhabitants, that the Legislature of the United
States be authprized, frpm time tp time, tp appprtipn
the number pf Representatives ; and in case any pf
the States shall hereafter be divided, pr any two or
more States united, or new States created within
the liraits of the United States, fhe Legislature of
the United States shall possess authority to regulate
the number of Representatives in any of the forego
ing cases, upon the principle of their number of in
habitants, according to the provisions hereafter
mentioned," Mr, Gouverneur Morkis opposed the alteration,
as leaving still an incoherence. If negroes were to
be viewed as inhabitants, and the revision was to
proceed on the principle of nurabers pf inhabitants,
they pught tp be added in their entire nuraber, and
net in, the prpportion of three-fifths. If as property,
the word wealth was right ; and striking it out would
prpduce the very incpnsistency which it was raeant
to get rid of The train of business, and the late turn
which it had taken, had IM hira, he said, into deep
meditation on it, and he would candidly state the
result, A distinction had been set up, and urged,
between the Northem and Southern States, He
had hitherto considered this- doctrine as heretical.
He stfll thought the distinction groundless. He
sees, however, that it is persisted in ; and the South
em gentlemen will not be satisfied unless they see
the way open to their gaining a majority in the pub
lic councfls. The consequence of such a transfer of
power from the maritime to the interior and landed

1092 DEBATES IN THE [1787,
interest, will, he foresees, be such an oppression to
commerce, that he shall be obliged to vote for the
vdcious principle of equality in the second branch, in
order to provide some defence for the Northern
States against it. But to come more to the point,
either this distinction is fictitious or real ; if fictitious,
let it be dismissed, and let us proceed with due con
fidence. If it be real, instead of attempting to
blend incompatible things, let us at once take a
friendly leave of each other. There can be no end
of demands for security, if every particular inter
est is to be entitled to it. The Eastern States
raay claim it for their fishery, and for other objects,
as the Southern States claim it for their peculiar
objects. In this struggle between the two ends of
the Union, what part ought the Middle States, in
point of policy, to take? To join their Eastern
brethren, according to his ideas. If the Southern
States get the power into their hands, and be joined,
as they will be, with the interior country, they will
inevitably bring on a war with Spain for the Missis
sippi. This language is already held. The interior
country, having ho property nor interest exposed on
the sea, will be little affected by such a war. He
wished to know what security the Northern and
Middle States wfll have against this danger. It
has been said that North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Georgia only, will in a little tirae have a ma
jority of the people of Araerica. They raust in
that case include the great interior cpuntry, and
every thing was to be apprehended frora their* get
ting the power into their hands.
Mr. Butler. The security the Southern States

1787. J FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1093
want is, that their negroes raay not be taken from
them, which sorae gentleraen within or without
doors have a very good raind to do. It was not sup
posed that North Carolina, South Carolina and
Georgia would have raore people than all the other
States, but raany raore relatively to the other States,
]than they now have. The people and strength of
Araerica are evidently bearing southwardly, and
soutii westwardly.
Mr. Wilson. If a general declaration would sat
isfy any gentleman, he had no-indisposition to declare
his sentiments. Conceiving that all raen, wherever
placed, have equal rights, and are equally entitled
to confidence, he viewed without apprehension the
period when a few States should contain the supe
rior number of people. The majority of people,
Avherever found, ought in all questions, to govern the
rainority. If the interior country should acquire
this majority, it will not only have the right, but
will avail itself of it, whether we will or no. This
jealousy misled tlje .policy of Great Britain with re
gard to Araerica. 'The fatal maxims espoused by
her were, that the Colonies were growing too fast,
and that their growth must be stinted in time. What
were the consequences ? First, enmity on our part,
then actual separation. Like consequences will
result on the part of the interior settlements, if like
jealousy and policy be pursued on ours. Further,
if numbers be not a proper rule, why is not sorae
better rule pointed out ? No one has yet ventured
to attempt it; Congress have never been able to
discover a better. No State, as far as he had heard,
had suggested any other. In 1783, after elaborate

1094 DEBATES IN THE [1787,
discussion of a raeasure of wealth, all were satisfied
then, as they now are, that the rule of numbers does
not differ much from the corabined rule of nurabers
and wealth. Again, he could not agree that prop
erty was the sole or primary object of govemment
and society. The cultivation and iraprovement of |
the human mind was the most noble object. With
respect to this object, as well as to other personal
rights, nurabers were surely the natural and precise
raeasure of representation. And with respect to
property, they could not vary rauch frora the precise
measure. In no point of view, however, could the
establishment of numbers, as the rule of representa
tion in the first branch, vary his opinion as to the
irapropriety of letting a vicious principle into the
seeond branch.
On the question to strike out wealth, and to make
the change as moved by Mr, Randolph, it passed in
the affirmative, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9; Dela
ware, divided.
Mr. Read moved to insert, after the word " di
vided," " or enlarged by addition of territory ;" which
was agreed to, nem, con.*
Adjourned.

Saturday, July 14th.
In Convention, — Mr. L. Martin called for the
question on the whole Report, including the parts
* His object probably was to provide ibr such cases as an enlargement of
Delaware by annexing to it the peninsula on the East side of the Chesapeake.

1787.] federal convention. 1095
relating to the origination of money bills, and the
equality of votes in the second branch,
Mr. Gerry wished, before the question should be
put, that the attention of the House might be turned
to the dangers apprehended from Western States.
He was for admitting them on liberal terms, but not
for putting ourselves into their hands. They will,
if they acquire power, like all men, abuse it. They
will oppress comraerce, and drain our wealth into
the Western country. To guard against these con
sequences, he thought it necessary to limit the nura
ber of new States to be admitted into the Union,
in such a manner that they should never be able to
outnuraber the Atlantic States. He accordingly
moved, " that in order to secure the liberties of the
States already confederated, the nuraber of Repre
sentatives in the first branch, of the States which
shall hereafter be established, shall never exceed in
number, the Representatives frorn such of the States
as shall accede to this Confederation."
Mr. King seconded the raotion.
Mr. Sherman thought there was no probability
that the nuraber of future States would exceed that
pf the existing States. If the event should ever
happen, it was too remote to be taken into con
sideration at this time. Besides, we are providing
for our posterity, for our children and our grand
children, who would be as likely to be citizens
of new western States, as of the old States. On
this consideration alone, we ought to raake no such
discrimination as was proposed by the motion.
Mr. Geirry. If some of our chfldren should re
move, others will stay behind, and he thought in-

1096 debates in the [1787,
cumbent on us to provide for their interests. There
was a rage for emigration from the Eastern States
to the western country, and he did not wish those
remaining behind to be at the mercy of the erai^
grants. Besides, foreigners are resorting to that
country, and it is uncertain what tum things raay
take there.
On the question for agreeing to the motion of Mr.
Gerry, it passed in the negative, — Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, aye — 4; New
Jersey, Virginia, Nortii Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, no — 5 ; Pennsylvania, divided.
Mr. Rutledge proposed to reconsider the two
propositions touching the originating of raoney bills,
in the first, and the equality of votes in the second,
branch. Mr. Sherman was for the question on the whole
at once. It Was, he Said, a conciliatory plan ; it had
been considered in all its parts ; a great deal of time
had been spent upon it ; and if any part should now
be altered, it would be necessary to go over the
whole ground again.
Mr. L. Martin urged the question on the whole.
He did not like many parts of it. He did not like
having two branches, nor the inequality of votes in
the first branch. He was willing, however, to make
trial of the plan, rather than do nothing.
Mr, Wilson traced the progress of the report
through its several stages ; remarking, that when on
the question concerning an equality of votes the
House was divided, our constituents, had they voted
as their Representatives did, would have stood as
two-thirds against the equality, and one-third only

1787.] federal convention. 1097
in favor of it. This fact would ere long be known,
and it would appear tbat this fundaraental point has
been carried by one-third against two-thirds. What
hopes will our constituents entertain when they find
that the essential principles of justice have been
violated in the outset of the Government ? As to
the privilege of originating money bills, it was not
considered by any as of rauch raoraent, and by raany
as improper in itself He hoped both clauses would
be reconsidered. The equality of votes was apoint
of such critical importance, that every opportunity
ought to be allowed for discussing and collecting
the mind of the Convention upon it.
Mr, L, Martin denies that there were two-thirds
against the equality of votes. The States that
please to call themselves large, are the weakest in
the Union. Look at Massachusetts — look at Vir
ginia — are they efficient States? He was for letting
a separation take place, if they desired it. He had
rather there should be two confederacies, than one
founded on any other principle than an equality
of votes in the second branch at least.
Mr, Wilson was not surprised that those who say
that a rainority does more than a raajority, should
say the minority is stronger than the majority.
He supposed the next assertion will be, that they
are richer also ; though he hardly expected it would
be persisted in, when the States shall be called on
for taxes and troops.
Mr. Gerry also animadverted on Mr. L. Martin's
remarks on the weakness of Massachusetts. He
favored the reconsideration, with a view, not of de-
VoL. I.— 69*

1098 debates in the [1787.
stroying the equality of votes, but of providing that
the States should vote per capita, which, he said,
would prevent the delays and inconveniences that
had been experienced in Congress, and would give a
national aspect and spirit to the management of
business. He did not approve of a reconsideration
of the clause relating to money bills. It was of
great consequence. It was the corner stone of the
accoraraodation. If any meraber of the Convention
had the exclusive privilege of making propositions,
would any one say that it Avould give hira no advan
tage over other members ? The Report was not
altogether to his mind ; but he would agree to it as
it stood, rather than throw it out altogether.
The reconsideration being tacitly agreed to, —
Mr. Pinckney moved, that, instead of an equality
of votes, the States should be represented in the
second branch as follows : New Hampshire by two
merabers ; Massachusetts, four ; Rhode Island, one ;
Connecticut, three ; New York, three ; New Jersey,
two ; Pennsylvania, four ; Delaware, one ; Mary
land, three ; Virginia, five ; North Carolina, three ;
South Carolina, three ; Georgia, two ; raaking in the
whole, thirty-six.
Mr. Wilson seconds the raotion.
Mr. Dayton. The sraaller States can never give
up their equality. For himself, he would in no event
yield that security for their rights.
Mr. Sherman urged the equality of Azotes, not so
much as a security for the small States, as for the
State Governments, which could not be preserved
unless they were represented, and had a negative hi
the General Govemment. He had no objection to

1787.] federal convention. 1099
the members in the second branch yoting per capita,
as had been suggested by (Mr. Gerry).
Mr. Madison concurred in this motion of Mr.
Pinckney, as a reasonable coraproraise.
Mr. Gerry said, he should like the motion, but
could see no hope of success. An accomraodation
must take place, and it was apparent from what had
been seen, that it could not do so on the ground of
the motion. He was utterly against a partial con
federacy, leaving other States to accede or not ac
cede, as had been intimated.
Mr. King said, it was always with regret that he
differed from his colleagues, but it was his duty to
differ frpm (Mr. Gerry) pn this pccasion. He con
sidered the proposed Governraent as substantially
and forraally a General and National Government
over the people of Anierica. There never Avill be a
case in which it will act as a Federal Government,
on the States and not on the individual citizens,
And is it not a clear principle, that in a free govern
ment, those who are to be the objects of a govern
ment, ought to influence the operations of it ? Wliat
reason can be assigned, why the sarae rule of repre
sentation should not prevail in the second, as in the
first, branch ? He could^ conceive none. On the
contrary, every view of the subject that presented
itself seemed to require it. Two objections had
been raised against it, drawn, first, frora the terms
of the existing compact ; secondly, from a supposed
danger to the smaller States. As to the first objec
tion, he thought it inapplicable. According to the
existing Confederation, the rule by which the public
burdens is to be apportioned is fixed, and must be

1100 debates in the [1787.
pursued. In the proposed Government, it cannot be
fixed, because indirect taxation is to be substituted.
The Legislature, therefore, will have full discretion
to impose taxes in such raodes and proportions as
they raay judge expedient. As to the second objec
tion, he thought it of as little weight. The General
Government can never wish to intrude on the State
Governments. There could be no temptation. None
had been pointed out. In order to prevent the in
terference of raeasures which seeraed raost likely to
happen, he would have no objection to throwing all
the State debts into the Federal debt, raaking one
aggregate debt of about $70,000,000, and leaving it
to be discharged by the General Government. Ac
cording to the idea of securing the State GoA'ern-
ments, there ought to be three distinct legislatiA'e
branches. The second was admitted to be neces
sary, and was actually meant, to check the first
branch, to give more wisdom, systera and stabflity
to the Government ; and ought clearly, as it Was to
operate on the people, to be proportioned to them.
For the third purpose of securing the States, there
ought then to be a third branch, representing the
States as such, and guarding, by equal votes, their
rights and dignities. He would not pretend to be as
thoroughly acquainted with his iraraediate constitu
ents as his colleagues, but it was his firra belief that
Massachusetts would never be prevafled on to yield
to an equality of votes. In New York, (he was
sorry to be obliged to say any thing relative to that
State in the absence of its representatives, but the
occasion required it), in New York he had seen that
the most powerful argument used by the considerate

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1101
opponents to the grant of the Impost to Congress,
was pointed against the vicious constitution of Con
gress with regard to representation and suffrage.
He was sure that no government would last that
was not founded on just principles. He preferred
the doing of nothing, to an allowance of an equal
vote to all the States. It would be better, he
thought, to submit to a little more confusion and
convulsion, than to submit to such an evil. It was
difficult to say what the views of different gentle
men raight be. Perhaps there might be some who
thought no Government co-extensive with the Uni
ted States could be established with a hope of its
ansAvering the purpose. Perhaps there raight be
other fixed opinions incompatible with the object we
are pursuing. If there were, he thought it but can
did, that gentleraen should speak out, that we raight
understand one another.
Mr, Strong. The Convention had been ranch di
vided in opinion. In order to avoid the consequences
of it, an accoramodation had been proposed. A
coramittee had been appointed; and though some of
the members of it were averse to an equality of
vptes, a repprt had been made in favor of it. It is
agreed, on all hands, that Congress are nearly at an
end. If no accoramodation takes place, the Union
itself must soon be dissolved. It has been suggested
that if we cannot come to any general agreement,
the principal States may forra and recoraraend a
scheme of governraent. But will the small States,
in that case, ever accede to it ? Is it probable that
the large States themselves will, under such circum
stances, embrace and ratify it? He thought the

1102 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
small States had made a considerable concession, in
the article of money bflls, and that they might nat
urally expect some concessions on the other side.
Frora this view of the raatter, he was corapelled "to
give his vote for the Report taken altogether.
Mr. Madison expressed his apprehensions that if
the proper foundation of government was destroyed,
by substituting an equality in place of a proportional
representation, no proper superstructure would be
raised. If the small States really wish for a gov
ernment armed with the powers necessary to secure
their liberties, and to enforce obedience on the larger
raerabers as well as theraselves, he could not help
thinking them extremely mistaken in the means.
He reminded them of the consequences of laying
the existing Confederation on improper principles.
All the principal parties to its corapilation joined
immediately in mutilating and fettering the Govern
ment, in such a manner that it has disappointed
every hope placed on it. He appealed to the doc
trine and arguments used by themselves, on a for
mer occasion. It had been very properly observed
(by Mr. Patterson), that representation was an ex
pedient by whicii the meeting of the people them
selves was rendered unnecessary ; and that the rep
resentatives ought therefore to bear a proportion to
the votes which their constituents, if convened,
would respectively have. Was not this reraark as
applicable to one branch of the representation as
to the other ? But it had been said that the Govern
ment would, in its operation, be partly federal, partly
national; that although in the latter respect the
representatives of the people ought to be in propor-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION, 1103
tion to the people, yet in the former, it ought to be
according to the number of States. If there was
any solidity in this distinction, he was ready to
abide by it ; if there was none, it ought to be aban
doned. In all cases where the General Govemment
is to act on the people, let the people be represented,
and the votes be proportional. In all cases where
the Government is to act on the States "as such, in
like manner as Congress now acts on thera, let the
States be represented and the votes be equal. This
was the true ground of coraproraise, if there was any
ground at all. But he denied that there was any
ground. He called for a single instance in which
the General Governraent was not to operate on the
people individually; The practicability of raaking
laws, with coercive sanctions, for the States as polit
ical bodies, bad been exploded on all hands. He
observed that the pepple pf the large States would,
in some Way or other, secure tp themselves a weight
proportioned to the importance accruing from their
superior numbers. If they could not effect it by a
proportional representation in the Government, they
would probably accede to no government which did
not, in a great measure, depend for its efficacy on
their voluntary co-operation ; in which case they
would indirectly secure their object. The existing
Confederacy proved that where the acts of the Gen
eral Government were to be executed by the par
ticular Governraents, the latter had a weight in pro
portion to their importance. No one AVould say,
that, either in Congress or out of Congress, Dela
ware had equal weight with Pennsylvania. If the
latter was to supply ten times as much money as

1104 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
the former, and no compulsion could be used, it was
of ten times more iraportance, that she should vol
untarily furnish the supply. In the Dutch Confede
racy the votes of the provinces were equal. But
Holland, which supplies about half the raoney, gov
erned the Avhole Republic. He enuraerated the ob
jections against an equality of votes in the second
branch, notwithstanding the proportional representa
tion in the first. 1. The rainority could negative
the will of the raajority of the people. 2. They
could extort raeasures, by raaking them a condition
of their assent to other necessary raeasures. 3. They
could obtrude measures on the raajority, by virtue
of the peculiar powers which would be vested in
the Senate. 4. The evil, instead of being cured by
time, would increase with every new State that
should be adraitted, as they raust all be admitted on
the principle of equality. 5. The perpetuity it would
give to the preponderance of the Northern against
the Southern scale, was a serious consideration. It
seemed now to be pretty Avell understood, that the
real difference of interests lay, not between the large
and sraall, but betAveen the Northern and Southern,
States. The institution of slavery, and its conse
quences, formed the line of discrimination. There
were, five States on the Southern, eight on the North
ern side of this line. Should a proportional repre
sentation take place, it Avas true, the Northern
would StiU outnumber the other; but not in the
sarae degree, at this time; and every day would
tend towards an equilibrium.
Mr. Wilson would add a few words only. If
equality in the seeond branch was an error that

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION, 1105
time would correct, he should be less anxious to
exclude it, being sensible that perfection was unat
tainable in any plan ; but being a fundamental and
a perpetual error, it ought by all means to be
avoided, A vice in the representation, like an error
in the first concoction, must be followed by disease,
convulsions, and finally death itself The justice
of the general principle of proportional representa
tion has not, in arguraent at least, been yet contra
dicted. But it is said that a departure from it, sp.
far as to give the States an equal vote in one branch
of the Legislature, is essential to their preservation.
He had considered this position maturely, but could
not see its application. That the States ought to
be preserved, he admitted. But does it follow, that
an equality of votes is necessary for the purpose ?
Is there any reason to suppose that, if their preser
vation should depend more on the larg-e tlian on the
small States, the security of the States, against the
general government, would be diminished? Are
the large States less attached to their existence,
more likely to corarait suicide, than the small ? An
equal vote, then, is not necessary, as far as he can
conceive, and is liable, among other objections, to
this insuperable one,-^-the great fault of the existing
Confederacy is its inactivity. It has never been a
complaint against Congress, that they governed oyer
much. The coraplaint has been, that they have
governed too little. To remedy this defect we were
sent here. Shall we effect the cure by establishing
an equality of votes, as is proposed ? No : this very
equality carries us directly to Congress, — to the
system Avhich it is our duty to rectify. The small
Vol, I.— 70

o

1106 DEBATESINTHE [1787.
States cannot indeed act, by virtue of this equality,
but they may control the governraent, as they have
done in Congress. This very measure is here prose
cuted by a minority of the people of America. Is
then, the object of the Convention likely to be ac
complished in this way ? Will not our constituents
say, we sent you to form an efficient government,
and you have given us one, more complex, indeed,
but having all the weakness of the former govern
ment. He was anxious for uniting all the States
under one government. He knew there were sorae
respectable men who preferred three Confederacies,
united by pffensive and defensiv^e alliances. Many
things may be plausibly said, spme things may be
justly said, in favor of such a project. He could not,
however, concur in it himself; but he thought
nothing so pernicious as bad first principles.
Mr. Ellsworth asked two questions, — one of Mr.
Wilson, whether he had ever seen a good measure
fail in Congress for want of a majority of States in
its favor ? He had hiraself never known such an
instance. The other of Mr. Madison, whether a
negative lodged with the majority of the States,
even the smallest, could be more dangerous than
the qualified negative proposed to be lodged in a
single Executive Magistrate, who must be taken
frora sorae one State ?
Mr. Sherman signified that his expectation was
that the General Legislature would in sorae cases
act on the federal principle, of requiring quotas.
But he thought it. ought to be empoAvered to carry
then own plans into execution, if the States should
fafl to supply their respective quotas.

1787,] federal convention. 1107
On the question for agreeing to Mr, Pinckney's
motion, for allowing New Hampshire two ; Massa
chusetts, four, &c. it passed in the negative, — Penn
sylvania, Maryland, Virgmia, South Carolina, aye —
4; Massachusetts, (Mr. King, aye, Mr. Gorham ab
sent), Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, North
Carolina, Georgia, no — 6.
Adjourned.

Monday, July 16th.
In Convention, — On the question for agreeing to
the whole Report, as araended, and including the
equality of votes in the second branch, it passed in
the affirraative, — Connecticut, New Jersey, Dela
ware, Maryland, North Carolina, (Mr. Spaight no)
aye — 5; Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina,
Georgia, no — 4 ; Massachusetts, divided (Mr. Gerry,
Mr. Strong, aye ; Mr. King, Mr, Gorham, no).
The whole thus passed is in the words following,
viz, " Resolved, tbat in the original forraation of the
Legislature of the United States, the first branch
thereof shall consist of sixty-five raerabers, of which
number New Harapshire shall send, 3 ; Massachusetts,
8 ; Rhode Island, 1 ; Connecticut 5 ; New York, 6 ;
Nevv Jersey, 4; Pennsylvania, 8 ; Delaware, 1; Mary
land, 6; Virginia, 10; North Carolina, 5; South
Carolina, 5 ; Georgia, 3. But as the present situa
tion of the States raay probably alter in the nuraber
of their inhabitants, the Legislature of the United
States shall be authorized, from time to tune, to

1108 debates in the [1787",
apportion the number of Representatives, and in
case any of the States shall hereafter be divided, or
enlarged by addition of territory, or any two or more
States united, or any new States created within the
limits of the United States, the Legislature of the
United States shall possess authority to regulate the
number of Representatives in any of the foregoing
cases, upon the principle of their number of inhabi
tants, according to the provisions hereafter mention
ed : provided alvvays, that representation ought to
be proportioned according to direct taxation. And
in order to ascertain the alteration in the direct tax
ation, which may be required from time by the
changes' in the relative circumstances of the
States —
"Resolved, that a census be taken within six
years from the first raeeting of the Legislature of
the United States, and once within the term of
every ten years afterwards, of all the inhabitants of
the United States, in the manner and according to
the ratio recommended by Congress in their Resolu
tion of the eighteenth day of April, 1783 ; and that
the Legislature of the United States shall proportion
the direct taxation accordingly,
" Resolved, that all bills for raising or appropria
ting money, and for fixing the salaries of officers of
the Governraent of the United States, shall oriain-
ate in the first branch of the Legislature of the
United States ; and shall not be altered or amend
ed in the second branch ; and that no money shall
be drawn from the public Treasury, but in pursu
ance of appropriations to be originated in the first
branch.

1787.] federal convention. 1109
" Resolved, that in the second branch of tlie Legis
lature of the United States, each State shall have
an equal vote."
The sixth Resolution in the Report from the Com
mittee of the Whole House, whicii had been post
poned, in order to consider the seventh and eighth
Resolutions, was now resumed, (see the Resolution.)
" That the National Legislature ought to possess
the legislative rights vested in Congress by the Con
federation," was agreed to, nem. con.
" And moreover to legislate in all cases to which
the separate States are incompetent ; or in which
the harmony of the United States may be interrupted
by the exercise of individual legislation," being read
for a question, —
Mr. Butler calls for some explanation of the ex
tent of this power ; particularly of the word incompe
tent. The vagueness of the terms rendered it im
possible for any precise judgment to be formed.
Mr. Gorham. The vagueness of the terms consti
tutes the propriety of them. We are now establish
ing general principles, to be extended hereafter into
details, which will be precise and ex:plicit.
Mr. Rutledge urged the objection started by Mr.
Butler ; and raoved that the clause should be com
mitted, to the end that a specification of the pow^ers
comprised in the general terras, raight be reported.
On the question for coraraitment, the votes were
equally divided, — Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia,
South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 5; Massachusetts,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Caro
lina, no — 5. So it was lost;
Mr. Randolph. The A^ote of this morning (invol-

1110 debates in the [1787,
ving an. equality of suffrage in the second branch)
had embarrassed the business extremely. All the
powers given in the Report from the Coraraittee of
the Whole were founded on the supposition that a
proportional representation was to prevail in both
branches of the Legislature. When he came here
this morning, his purpose was to have offered some
propositions that might, if possible, have united a
great raajority of votes, and particularly might pro
vide against the danger suspected on the part of the
smaller States, by enumerating the cases in which
it might lie, and allowing an equality of votes in
such cases.* But finding from the preceding vote,
that they persist in deraanding an equal vote in all
cases ; that they have succeeded in obtaining it ;
and that New Y6rk, if present, would probably be
on the sarae side ; he could not but think we were
unprepared to discuss this subject further. It will
probably be in vain to corae to any final decision,
with a bare raajority on either side. For these rea
sons he wished the Convention to adjourn, that the
large States might consider the steps proper to be
taken, in the present solemn crisis of the business ;
and that the sraall States might also deliberate on
the means of conciliation.
Mr. Patterson thought with Mr. Randolph, that
it was high time for the Convention to adjourn ; that
the rule of secrecy ought to be rescinded ; and that
our constituents should be consulted. No concilia
tion could be admissible on the part of the sraaller
* See the paper, in the Appendix, communicated by Mr. Randolph to J.
Madison, July 10, No, —

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. llll
States, on any other ground than that of an equality
of votes in the second branch. If Mr. Randolph
would reduce to form his motion for an adjournment
sine Se, he w^ould second it with all his heart.
General Pinckney wished to know of Mr. Ran
dolph, whether he meant an adjournment sine die, or
only an adjournment for the day. If the former was
meant, it differed much from his idea. He could
not think of going to South Carolina, and returning
again to this place. Besides it was chimerical, to
suppose that the States, if consulted, would ever
accord separately and beforehand.
Mr. Randolph had never entertained an idea of an
adjournment sine die ; and was sorry that his mean
ing had been so readily and strangely raisinterpre-
ted. He had in view raerely an adjournraent till to
morrow, in order that some conciliatory experiraent
might, if possible, be devised ; arid that in case the
smaller States should continue to hold back, the
larger might theri take such measures— he would
not say what — as might be necessary.
Mr. Patterson seconded the adjournment till to
morrow, as an opportunity seemed to be wished by
the larger States to deliberate further on conciliatory
expedients. On the question for adjourning till to-morrow, the
States were equally divided, — New Jersey, Pennsyl
vania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, aye — 5 ;
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware^ South Caro
lina, Georgia, no — 5 ; so it was lost.
Mr. Broome thought it his duty to declare his
opinion against an adjournment sine die, as had
been urged by Mr. Patterson. Such a measure, he

1112 debates in the [1787.
thought, would be fatal. Soraething must be done
by the Convention, though it should be by a bare
majority. Mr. Gerry observed, that Massachusetts was op
posed to an adjournment, because they saw no new
ground of compromise. But as it seemed to be the
opinion of so many States that a trial should be
made, the State would now concur in the adjourn
ment. Mr. Rutledge could see no need of an adjourn
ment, because he could see no chance of a corapro
raise. The little States were fixed. They had re
peatedly and soleranly declared themselves to be so.
All that the large States, then, had to do was, to
decide whether they would yield or not. For his
part, he conceived, that, although we could not do
what Ave thought best in itself, we ought to do some
thing. Had we not better keep the Government up
a little longer, hoping that another convention will
supply our omissions, than abandon every thing to
hazard ? Our constituents will be very little satis
fied with us, if we take the latter course.
Mr. Randolph and Mr. King renewed the motion
to adjourn till to-morrow.
On the question,— Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, aye— 7 ; Connecticut, Delaware, no
— 2; Georgia, diAaded.
Adjourned. [On the morning following, before the hour of the
Convention, a number of the members from the larger
States, by coraraon agreement, met for the purpose

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1113
of consulting on the proper steps to be taken in con
sequence of the vote in favor pf an equal representa
tion in the second branch, and the apparent inflexi
bility of the smaller States on that point. Several
merabers frora the latter States also attended. The
time was wasted in vague conversation on the sub
ject, without any specific proposition or agreement.
It appeared, indeed, that the opinions of the raera
bers who disliked the equality of votes differed rauch
as to the importance of that point; and as to the
policy of risking a failure of any general act of the
Convention by inflexibly opposing it. Several of
them — supposing that no good governraent could or
would be built on that fbundation ; and that, as a
division of the Convention into two opinions was
unavoidable, it would be better that the side cora
prising the principal States, and a raajority of the
people- of Araerica, should propose a scherae of gov
ernraent to the States, than that a scherae should
be proposed on the other side — would have concur
red in a firra opposition to the smaller States, and in
a separate recommendation, if eventually necessa
ry. Others seemed inclined to yield to the smaller
States, and to concur in such an act, however iraper
fect and exceptionable, as might be agreed on by
the Convention as a body, though decided by a bare
majority of States and by a rainority of the people
ofthe United States. It is probable that the result
of this consultation satisfied the sraaller States, that
they had nothing to apprehend frora a union pf the
larger in any plan whatever against the equality pf
vptes in the second branch.]
Vol. I.— 70*

1114 debates in the [1787.
Tuesday, July 17tH,
In Convention, — Mr. GouYerneur Morris moved to
reconsider the whole Resolution agreed to yesterday
concerning the constitution ofthe two branches ofthe
Legislature. His object was to bring the House to a
consideration, in the abstract, ofthe powers necessary
to be vested in the General Governraent. It had been
said. Let us know how the governraent is to be model
led, and then we can determine what powers can be
properly given tp it. He thought the raost eligible
course was, first to deterraine on the necessary powers,
and then so to modify the Government, as that it raight
be justly and properly enabled to administer thera.
He feared, if we proceeded to a consideration of the
powers, whflst the vote of yesterday, including an
equality of the States in the second branch, reraain
ed in force, a reference to it, either mental or ex
pressed, would raix itself Avith the merits of every
question concerning the powers. This motion was
not seconded. [It was probably approved by seve
ral members who either despaired of success, or
were apprehensive that the attempt would inflarae
the jealousies of the snialler States.]
The sixth Resolution in the Report of the Cora
mittee of the Whole, relating to the powers, which
had been postponed in order to consider the seventh
and eighth, relating to the constitution, of the Na
tional Legislature, was now resumed.
Mr. Sherman observed, that it would be difficult
to draw the line between the powers of the Gene
ral Legislature, and those to be left with the States ;

1787.] federal convention. 1115
that he did not like the definition contained in the
Resolution ; and proposed, in its place, to the words
" individual legislation," inclusiYe, to insert " to make
laws binding on the people of the United States in
all cases which may concern the comraon interests
of the Union ; but not to interfere with the govern
ment of the individual States in any raatters of in
ternal police which respect the government of such
States only, and wherein the general welfare of the
United States is not concerned."
Mr. Wilson seconded the amendment, as better
expressing the general principle.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris opposed it. The inter
nal pplice, as it wpuld be called and understpod by
the States, pught tp be infringed in raany cases, as
in the case pf paper-rapney, and pther tricks by
which citizens pf pther States raay be affected.
Mr. Sherman, in explanatipn of his idea, read an
enumeration of powers, including the power of
levying taxes on trade, but not the power of direct
taxation, Mr. Gouverneur Morris remarked the omission,
and inferred, that, for the deficiencies of taxes on
consumption, it must have beeri the raeaning of Mr.
Sherman that the General Governraent should re
cur to quotas and requisitions, which are subversive
of the idea of govemraent.
Mr. Sherman acknowledged that his enuraeration
did not include direct taxation. Sorae provision, he
supposed, raust be raade for supplying the deficiency
pf pther taxation, but he had not formed any.
On the questipn pn Mr. Sherman's motion, it
passed in the negative, — Cpnnecticut, Maryland, aye

1116 DEBATES IN the [1787.
— 2 ; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Del
aware, Virginia, Nprth Carolina, South Carplina,
Georgia, no — 8. i
Mr, Bedford moved that the second member of
the sixth Resolution be so altered as to read, " and
raoreover to legislate in all cases for the general in
terests of the Union, and also in those to which the
States are severally incompetent, or in which the har
mony of the United States may be interrupted by
the exercise of individual legislation."
Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconds the motion.
Mr. Randolph. This is a formidable idea, indeed.
It involves the power of violating all the laws and
Constitutions of the States, and of interraeddling
with their police. The last raeraber of the sentence
is also superfluous, being included in the first.
Mr. Bedford. It is not raore extensive or formi
dable than the clause as it stands : no State being
separately competent to legislate for the general in
terest of the Union.
On the question for agreeing to Mr. Bedford's mo
tion, it passed in the affirmative, — Massachusetts,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
North Carolina, aye — 6; Connecticut, Virginia,
South Carolina, Georgia, no — 4.
On the sentence as araended, it passed in the
affirraative, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jer
sey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, aye — 8 ; South Carolina, Georgia,
no— 2.
The next clause, " To negative all laws passed by
the several States contravening, in the opinion of
the National Legislature, the Articles of Union, or

1787,] FEDERAL CONVENTION, 1117
any treaties subsisting under the authority of the
Union," was then taken up.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris opposed this power as
likely to be terrible to the States, and not necessary
if sufficient Legislative authority should be given to
the General Government.
Mr. Sherman thought it unnecessary ; as the
Courts of the States would not consider as valid any
law contravening the authority of the Union, and
which the Legislature would wish to be negatived.
Mr. L. Martin considered the power as iraproper
and inadraissible. Shall all the laws of the States
be sent up to the General Legislature before they
shall be perraitted to operate ?
Mr. Madison considered the negative on the laws
of the States as essential to the efficacy and security
of the General Governraent. The necessity of a
General Governraent proceeds from the propensity
of the States to pursue their particular interests, in
opposition to the general interest. This propensity
will continue to disturb the systera unless effectually
controlled. Nothing short of a negative on their
laws will control it. They will pass laws which
will accoraplish their injurious objects before they
can be repealed by the General Legislature, or set
aside by the National tribunals. Confidence cannot
be put in the state tribunals as guardians of the
National authority and interests.^ In all the States
these are raore or less dependent on the Legisla
tures. In Georgia they are appointed annually by
the Legislature, In Rhode Island the Judges who
refused to execute an unconstitutional lavv were
displaced, and others substituted, by the Legislature,

1118 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
who would be the willing instruments of the wicked
and arbitrary plans of their masters. A power of
negativing the iraproper laws of the States is at
once the mest mild and certain means of preserving
the harraony of the systera. Its utility is sufficiently
displayed in the British systera. Nothing could raain
tain the harmony and subordination of the various
parts of the Empire, but the prerogative by which the
Crown stifles in the birth every act of every part tend
ing to discord or encroachraent. It is true the prerog
ative is sometiraes raisapplied, through ignorance or
partiality to one particular part of the Erapire ; but
we have not the sarae reason to fear such raisappli-
cations in our system. As to the sending all laws
up to the National Legislature, that might be ren
dered unnecessary by some emanation of the power
into the States, so far at least as to give a temporary
effect to laws of immediate necessity.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris w^as more and more op
posed to the negative. The proposal of it would
disgust all the States. A law that ought to be
negatived, willbe set aside in the Judiciary depart
ment ; , and if that security should fail, may be re
pealed by a National law.
Mr. Sherman. Such a power involves a wrono-
principle, to wit, that a law of a State contrary to
the Articles of the Union would, if not negatived, be
valid and operative,
Mr. Pinckney urged the necessity of the negative.
On the question for agreeing to the power of
negativing laws of States, &c. it passed in the
negative, — Massachusetts, Virginia, North Carolina,
aye— 3; Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,

1787.] federal convention, 1119
Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, no
—7, Mr, L, Martin moved the following resolution,
"That the Legislative acts of the United States
made by virtue and in pursuance of the Articles
of Union, and all treaties made and ratified under
the authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme law of the respective States, as far as those
acts or treaties shall relate to the said States, or
their citizens and inhabitants ; and that the Judici
aries ofthe several States shall be bound thereby in
their decisions, any thing in the respective laws
of the individual States to the contrary notwith
standing ;" which was agreed to, nem. con.
The ninth Resolution being taken up, the first
clause, " That a National Executive be instituted,
to consist of a single person," was agreed to, nem.
con. The next clause, " To be chosen by the National
Legislature," being considered, —
Mr. Gouverneur Morris was pointedly against
his being so chosen. He will be the raere creature
of the Legislature, if appointed and irapeachable by
that body. He ought to be elected by the people
at large, by the freeholders of the country. That
difficulties attend this raode, he admits. But they
have been found superable in New York and in Con
necticut, and would, he believed, be found so in the
case of an Executive for the United States. If
the people should elect, they will never fail to pre
fer some man of distinguished character, or ser
vices; some man, if he might so speak, of conti
nental reputation. If the Legislature elect, it wfll

1120 debates in the [1787.
be the work of intrigue, of cabal, and of faction ;
it will be like the election of a pope by a con
clave of cardinals; real merit will rarely be the
title to the appointment. He moved to strike out
" National Legislature," and insert " citizens of the
United States."
Mr, Sherman thought that the sense of the nation
AA^ould be better expressed by the Legislature, than
by the people at large. The latter will never be
sufficiently informed of characters, and besides Avill
never give a majority of votes to any one man. They
will generally vote for some man in their own State,
and the largest State will have the best chance for
the appointraent. If the choice be made by the
Legislature, a majority of voices may be made ne
cessary to constitute an election.
Mr. Wilson. Two arguraents have been urged
against an election of the Executive raagistrate by
the people. The first is, the example of Poland,
where an election of the suprerae raagistrate is at
tended with the most dangerous comraotions. The
cases, he observed, were totally dissimilar. The
Polish nobles have resources and dependants Avhich
enable them to appear in force, and to threaten the
Republic as well as each other. In the next place,
the electors all assemble at one place ; which Avould
not be the case Avith us. "The second argument is,
that a majority of the people would never concur.
It might be answered, that the concurrence of a
majority of the people is not a necessary pririciple
of election, nor required as such in any of the
States. But aUowing the objection all its force, it
may be obviated by the expedient used in Massa-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1121
chusetts, where the Legislature, by a raajority of
voices, decide in case a majority of the people do
not concur in favor of one of the candidates. This
would restrain the choice to a good noraination at
least, and prevent in a great degree intrigue and
cabal. A particular objection with hira against an
absolute election by the Legislature was, that the
Executive in that case would be too dependent to
stand the mediator between the intrigues and sinis
ter views of tbe Representatives and the general
liberties and interests of the people.
Mr. Pinckney did not expect this question would
again have been brought forward; an election by
the people being liable to the most obvious and stri
king objections. They will be led by a few active
and designing men. The raost populous States, by
combining in favor of the same individual, will be
able to carry their points. The national Legisla
ture being raost iraraediately interested in the laAvs
made by theriiselves, will be most attentive to the
choice of a fit raan to carry thera properly into exe
cution. Mr. Gouverneur Morris. It is said, that in case
of an election by the people the populous States will
corabine and elect whom they please, Just the
reverse. The people of such States cannot corabine.
If there be any corabination, it raust be among their
Representatives in the Legislature. It is said, tbe
people will be led by a few designing men. This
might happen in a small district. It can riever hap
pen throughout the continent. In the election of a
Governor of New York; it soraetiraes is the case in
particular spots, that the activity and intrigues of
Vol. I— 71

1122 debates in the [1787.
little partizans are successful ; but the general voice
of the State is never influenced by such artifices.
It is said, the raultitude will be uninformed. It
is true they would be uninforned of what passed
in the Legislative conclave, if the election were
to be raade there ; but they wiil not be uninform
ed of those great and illustrious characters which
have merited their esteem and confidence. If the
Executive be chosen by the national Legislature,
he will not be independent of it ; and if not inde
pendent, usurpation and tyranny on the part of
the Legislature will be the consequence. This was
the case in England in the last century. It has
been the case in Holland, where their Senates have
engrossed all power. It has been the case every
where. He was surprised that an election by the
people at large should ever have been likened to the
Polish election of the first Magistrate. An election
by the Legislature will bear a real likeness to the
election by the Diet of Poland. The great raust be
the electors in both cases, and the corruption and
cabal which are known to characterize the one
would soon find their way into the other. Appoint
raents raade by numerous bodies are always worse
than those made by single responsible mdividuals
or by the people at large.
Col. Ma^on. It is curious to remark the different
language held at different times. At one moraent
we aire told that the Legislature is entitled to thor
ough confidence, and to indefinite power. At an
other, that it wfll be governed by intrigue and cor
ruption, and cannot be trusted at all. But not to
dwell on this inconsistency, he would observe that a

1787.] federal conventipn, 1123
gpvernraent which is to last ought at least to be
practicable. Would this be the case if the proposed
election should be left to the people at large ? He
conceived it would be as unnatural to refer the
choice of a proper character for Chief Magistrate to
the people, as it would, to refer a trial of colors to a
blind man. The extent of the country renders it
irapossible, that the people can have the requisite
capacity to judge of the respective pretensions of the
candidates. Mr. Wilson could not see the contrariety stated
by (Col. Mason.) The Legislature might deserve
confidence in some respects, and distrust in others.
In acts Avhich Avere to affect thera and their constitu
ents precisely alike, confidence was due ; in others,
jealousy was warranted. The appointraent to
great offices, where the Legislature raight feel
many motives not coramon to the public, confidence
was surely misplaced. This branch of business,
it was notorious, was the most corruptly man
aged, of any that had been coraraitted to legislative
bodies. Mr. Williamson conceived that there was the
sarae difference between an election, in this case, by
the people and by the Legislature, as between an
appointment by lot and by choice. There are at
present distinguished characters, who are known
perhaps to almost every man. This will not always
be the case. The people will be sure to vote for
some raan in their own State ; and the largest State
will be sure to succeed. This wfll not be Virginia,
hpwever. Her slaves will have np suffrage. As
the salary pf the Executive will be fixed and he

1124 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
will not be eligible a second time, there wfll not be
such a dependence on the Legislature as has been
imagined. On the question on an election by the people, in
stead of the Legislature, it passed in the negative, —
Pennsylvania, aye — 1 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut,
NcAA' Jersey, DelaAvare, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 9.
Mr, L, Martin moved that the Executive be cho
sen by Electors appointed by the several Legisla
tures of the individual States.
Mr. Broome seconds.
On the question, it passed in the negative, — Dela
ware, Maryland, aye — 2; Massachusetts, Connecti
cut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Car
olina, Soutii Carolina, Georgia, no — 8.
On the question on the words, " to be chosen by
the National Legislature," it passed unanimously in
the affirraative.
" For the terra of seven years,"— postponed, nem.
con., on motion of Mr. Houston and Mr. Gouverneur
Morris. "To carry into execution the national laws," —
agreed to, nem con.
" To appoint to offices in cases not otherwise pro
vided for," — agreed to, nem. con.
" To be ineligible a second time,"- Mr. Houston
moved to strike out this clause,
Mr. Sherman seconds the raotion.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris espoused the raotion.
The ineligibflity proposed by the clause, as it stood,
tended to destroy the great raotive to good be
haviour, the hope of being reAvarded by a re-appoint-

1787.] federal convention, 1125
ment. It was saying to him, make hay wliile the
sun shines.
On the question for striking out, as raoved by Mr,
Houston, it passed in the affirmative, — Massachu
setts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ma
ryland, Georgia, aye — 6 ; Delaware, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, no — 4,
The clause, " for the term of seven years," be
ing resumed, — ,
Mr. Broome was for a shorter term, since the
Executive Magistrate was now to be re-eligible.
Had he remained ineligible a second tirae, he Should
have preferred a longer terra.
Doctor M'Clurg* moved to strike out seven years,
and insert "during good behaviour." By striking
out the words declaring hira not re-eligible, he was
put into a situation that would keep him dependent
forever on the Legislature ; and he conceived the
independence of the Executive to be equally essen
tial with that of the Judiciary department.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconded the motion. He
expressed great pleasure in hearing it. This was
the way to get a gopd Government. His fear that
so valuable an ingredient would not be attained had
led hira to take the part he had done. He was in
different how the Executive should be chosen, pro
vided he held his place by this tenure.
Mr. Broome highly approved the raotion. It ob
viated all his difficulties.

* The probable object of this motion was merely to enforce the argument
against the re-eligibility of the Executive magistrate, by holding out a tenure
during good behaviour as the alternative for . keeping him independent of tha
Legislature.

1126 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
Mr. Sherman considered such a tenure as by no
means safe or admissible. As the Executive Mag
istrate is now re-eligible, he will be on good be
haviour as far as will be necessary. If he behaves
well, he will be continued ; if otherwise, displaced,
on a succeeding election.
Mr. Madison.* If it be essential to the preserva
tion of liberty that the Legislative, Executive, and
Judiciary powers be separate, it is essential to a
maintenance of the separation, that they should be
independent of each other. The Executive could
not be independent of the Legislature, if dependent
on the pleasure of that branch for a re-appointraent.
Why was it deterrained that the Judges should not
hold their places by such a tenure ? Because they
might be tempted to cultivate the Legislature, by
an undue complaisance, and thus render the Legis
lature the virtual expositor, as well as the maker
of the laws. In like raanner, a dependence of
the Executive on the Legislature would render it
the executor as well as the maker of laAvs ; and
then, according to the observation of Montesquieu,
tyrannical laws may be made that they may be
executed in a tyrannical manner. There was an
analogy between the Executive and Judiciary de
partments in several respects. The latter executed
the laws in certain cases as the forraer did in others.
The former expounded and applied them for certain
purposes, as the latter did for others. The difference

* The view here taken of the subject was meant to aid in parrying the
animadversions likely to fall on the motion of Doctor McClurg, for whom J. M.
had a particular regard. The Doctor, though possessing talents of the highest
order, was modest and unaccustomed to exert them in public debate.

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1127
between thera seeraed to consist chiefly in two
circumstances, — first, the collective interest and se
curity were much raore in the power belonging to
the Executive, than to the Judiciary, departraent;
secondly, in the administration of the forraer, rauch
greater latitude is left to opinion and discretion,
than in the adrainistration of the latter. But if the
second consideration proves that it will be raore
difficult to establish a rule sufficiently precise for
trying the Executive, than the Judges, and forras an
objection to the same tenure of office, both consider
ations prove that it might be raore dangerous to
suffer a union betAveen the Executive and Legisla
tive powers, than between the Judiciary and Legis
lative powers. He conceived it to be absolutely
necessary to a Avell constituted Republic, that the
two first should be kept distinct and independent
of each other. Whether the plan proposed by the
motion was a proper one, was another question ; as
it depended on the practicability of instituting a
tribunal for impeachraents as certain and as ade
quate in the one case, as in the other. On the
other hand, respect for the raover entitled his pro
position to a fair hearing and discussion, until a less
objectionable expedient should be applied for guard
ing against a dangerous union of the Legislative and
Executive departments.
Colonel Mason. This motion was made some
time ago, and negatived by a very large majority.
He trusted that it would be again negatived. It
would be impossible to define the misbehaAaour in
such a manner as to subject it to a proper trial ;
and perhaps still more impossible to compel so high

1128 DEBATES IN THE [1787,
an offender, holding his office by such a tenure, to
submit to a trial. He considered an Executive
during good behaviour as a softer narae only for an
Executive for life. And that the next would be an
easy step to hereditary raonarchy. If the raotion
should finally succeed, he raight himself live to see
such a revolution. If he did not, it was probable
his children or grand chfldren would. He trusted
there were few men in that House who wished for
it. No State, he was sure, had so far revolted from
republican principles, as to have the least bias in its
favor. Mr. Madison was not apprehensive of being
thought to favor any step towards monarchy. The
real object Avith hira was to prevent its introduction.
Experience had proved a tendency in our govern
ment to throw all power into the Legislative
vortex. The Executives of the States are in general
little more than cyphers ; the Legislatures om
nipotent. If no effectual check be devised for re
straining the instability and encroachments of the
latter, a revolution of sorae kind or other would be
inevitable. The preservation of republican govern
raent therefore required sorae expedient for the
purpose, but required evidently, at the sarae time,
that, in devising it, the genuine principles of that
form should be kept in view.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris was as little a friend to
monarchy as any gentleman. He concurred in the
opinion that the way to keep out monarchical gov
ernmerit was to establish such a Republican govern
ment as would make the people happy, and prevent
a desire of change.

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1129
DocT. McClurg was not so rauch afraid of the
shadow of monarchy, as to be unwilling to approach
it ; nor so wedded to republican governraent, as not
to be sensible of the tyrannies that had been and raay
be exercised under that forra. It was an essential
object with hira to raake the Executive independent
of the Legislature ; and the only raode left for effect
ing it, after the vote destroying his ineligibility a
second time, was to appoint him during good be
haviour. On the question for inserting " during good be
haviour," in place of " seven years [with a re-eligi
bility]," it passed in the negative, — New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, aye — 4 ; Massa
chusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, no — 6.*
On the raotion to strike out " seven years," it passed
in the negative, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Del
aware, North Carolina, aye — 4 ; Connecticut, New
Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia,
no— 6.t

* This vote is not to be considered as any certain index of opinion, as a num
ber in the affirmative probably had it'chiefly in view to alarm those attached to
a dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, and thereby facilitate some
final arrangement of a contrary tendency. The avowed friends of an Executive
" during good behaviour" were not more than three or four, nor is it certain they
would have adhered to such a tenure.
An independence of the three great departments of each other, as far as possi
ble, and the responsibility of all to the will of the community, seemed to be gene
rally admitted as the true basis of a well constructed Government.
t There was no debate on this motion. The apparent object of many in the
affirmative was to secure the re-eligibi]jty by shortening the term, and of many in
the negative to embarrass the plan of referring the appointment and dependence
of the Executive to the Legislature,
Vol, I.— 71*

1130 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
It was now unanimously agreed, that the vote
which had struck out the words " to be ineligible a
second tirae," should be reconsidered to-raorrow.
Adjourned.

Wednesday July 18th.
In Convention,— On raotion of Mr, L. Martin to
fix to-raorrow for reconsidering the vote concerning
the ineligibflity of the Executive a second time, it
passed in the affirraative, — Massachusetts, Connecti
cut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 8 ; New Jer
sey, Georgia, absent.
The residue of the ninth Resolution, concerning
the Executive, was postponed till to-raorroAV.
The tenth Resolution, "that the Executive shall
have a right to negative legislative acts not after
wards passed by two-thirds of each branch," was
passed, nem, con.
The eleventh Resolution, " that a National Judici
ary shall be established to consist of one supreme
tribunal," agreed to nem. con.
Onthe clause, "The judges of which to be ap
pointed by the second branch of the National Legis
lature," —
Mr. Gorham would prefer an appointment by the
second branch to an appointment by the whole Le
gislature ; but he thought even that branch too nu
merous, and too little personally responsible, to en-

1787.] federal convention. 1131
sure a good chpice. He suggested that the Judges
be appointed by the Executive with the advice and
consent of the second branch, in the mode prescribed
by the Constitution of Massachusetts. This raode
had been long practised in that comitry, and was
found to answer perfectly well.
Mr, Wilson would still prefer an appointraent by
the Executive; but if that could not be attained,
would prefer, in the next place, the raode suggested
by Mr. Gorham. He thought it his duty, however,
to move in the first instance, " that the Judges be
appointed by the Executive."
Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconded the raotion.
Mr. L. Martin was strenuous for an appointraent
by the second branch. Being taken from all the
the States, it would be best informed of characters,
and most capable of making a fit choice.
Mr. Sherman concurred in the observations of Mr.
Martin, adding that the Judges ought to be diffused,
which would be more likely to be attended to by
the second branch, than by the Executive.
Mr. Mason. The raode of appointing the Judges
may depend in some degree on the raode of trying
irapeachraents of the Executive. If the Judges
were to forra a tribunal for that purpose, they surely
ought not to be appointed by the Executive. There
were insuperable objections besides against referring
the appointraent to the Executive. He raentioned,
as one, that as the seat of governraent must be in
sorae one State; and as the Executive would re
main in office for a considerable tirae, for four, five,
or six years at least, he would insensibly forra
local and personal attachraents within the particular

1132 debates in the [1787.
State that would deprive equal merit elsewhere of
an equal chance of proraotion.
Mr. Gorham. As the Executive wfll be respon
sible, in point of character at least, for a judicious
and faithful discharge of his trust, he will be careful
to look through all the States for proper characters.
The Senators will be as likely to forra their attach
raents at the seat of government where they reside,
as the Executive, If they cannot get the man of
the particular State to which they raay respectively
belong, they will be indifferent to the rest. Public
bodies feel no personal responsibility, and give full
play to intrigue and cabal, Rhode Island is a full
illustration of the insensibility to character pro
duced by a participation of numbers in dishonourable
measures, and of the length to which a public body
may carry wickedness and cabal.
Mr, Gouverneur Morris supposed it would be
iraproper for an irapeachraent of the Executive to
be tried before the Judges. The latter would in
such case be drawn into intrigues with the Legisla
ture, and an impartial trial would be frustrated.
As they would be much about the seat of govern
ment, they might even be previously consulted,
and arrangements might be raade for a prosecution
of the ExecutiA'c. He thought, therefore, that no
argument could be drawn from the probability of
such a plan of impeachments against the motion
before the House.
Mr. Madison suggested, that the Judges might be
apppinted by the Executive, with the concurrence
of one-third at least of the second branch. This
would unite the advantage of responsibility in the

1787.] federal convention. 1133
Executive, with the security afforded in the second
branch against any incautious or corrupt nomination
by the Executive.
Mr. Sherman was clearly for an election by the
Senate. It would be composed of men nearly equal
to the Executive, and would of course have on the
whole raore wisdora. They would bring into their
deliberations a raore diffusive knowledge of charac
ters. It would be less easy for candidates to intrigue
with thera, than with the Executive Magistrate.
For these reasons he thought there would be a better
security for a proper choice inthe Senate, than in
the Executive.
Mr. Randolph. It is true that when the appoint
ment of the Judges was vested in the second branch
an equality of votes had not been given to it. Yet
he had rather leaA'e the appointment there than give it
to the Executive. He thought the advantage of per
sonal responsibility might be gained in the Senate,
by requiring the respective votes of the raembers to
be entered on the Journal. He thought, too, that
the hope of receiving appointments would be raore
diffusive, if they depended on the Senate, the raem
bers of which would be diffusively known, than if
they depended on a single man, who could not be
personally known to a very great extent ; and con
sequently, that opposition to the systera would be so
far weakened.
Mr. Bedford thought, there were solid reasons
against leaving the appointment to the Executive.
He must tmst more to information than the Senate.
It would put it in his power to gain over the larger
States by gratifying them with a preference of their

1134 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
citizens. The responsibility of the Executive, so
much talked of, was chimerical. He could not be
punished for mistakes.
Mr. Gorham remarked, that the Senate could have
no better information than the Executive. They
must like hira trust to inforraation from the members
belonging to the particular State where the candi
date resided. The Executive would certainly be
more answerable for a good appointment, as the
Avhole blarae of a bad one would fall on him alone.
He did not mean that he would be answerable under
any other penalty than that of public censure, which
with honourable rainds was a sufficient one.
On the question for referring the appointment of
the Judges to the Executive, instead of the second
branch, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, aye — 2; Con
necticut, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Caro
lina, South Carolina, no — 6 ; Georgia, absent.
Mr. Gorham moA'^ed, " that the Judges be nomina
ted and appointed by the Executive, by and with
the advice and consent of the second branch ; and
every such nomination shall be made at least 
days prior to such appointraent." This raode, he
said, had been ratified by the experience of a hun
dred and forty years in Massachusetts. If the ap
pointraent should be left to either branch of the
Legislature, it will be a raere piece of jobbing.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconded and supported
the raotion.
Mr. Sherman thought it less objectionable than an
absolute appointraent by the Executive; but dis
liked it, as too much fettering the Senate.
On the question on Mr. Gorham's motion, — ^Mas-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1135
sachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, aye —
4; Connecticut, Delaware, North Carolina, South
Carolina, no — 4 ; Georgia, absent.
Mr. Madison moved, " that the Judges should be
nominated by the Executive, and such nomination
should becorae an appointraent if not disagreed to
within  days by two-thirds of the second branch."
Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconded the motion.
By comraon consent the consideration of it was
postponed till to-morrow.
" To hold their offices during good behaviour, and
to receive fixed salaries," — agreed to, nem. con,
" In which [salaries of Judges] no increase or
diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons
actually in office at the tirae."
Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved to strike out " or
increase." He thought the Legislature ought to be
at liberty to increase salaries, as circumstances
might require ; and that this would not create any
improper dependence in the Judges.
Doctor Franklin was in favor of the raotion.
Money raay not only becorae plentier ; but the busi
ness of the Department may increase, as the country
becomes raore populous.
Mr. Madison. The dependence will be less if the
increase alone should be permitted ; but it will be
iraproper even so far to permit a dependence. When
ever an increase is wished by the Judges, or may be
in agitation in the Legislature, an undue complai
sance in the forraer may be felt towards the latter.
If at such a crisis there should be in court suits to
which leading merabers of the Legislature raay be
parties, the Judges will be in a situation whieh

1136 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
ought not to be suffered, if it can be prevented. The
Variations in the value of money may be guarded
against by taking for a standard wheat or some
other thing of permanent value! The increase of
business wfll be provided for by an increase of the
number who are to do it. An increase of salaries
may easily be so contrived as not to affect persons
in office.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris. The value of money
may not only alter, but the state of society may
alter. In this event, the sarae quantity of wheat,
the same value, would not be the same corapensa
tion. The araount of salaries must always be regu
lated by the manners and the style of living in a
country. The increase of business cannot be provi
ded for in the supreme tribunal, in the way that has
been mentioned. All the business of a certain de
scription, whether more or less, raust be done in
that single tribunal. Additional labor alone in the
Judges can provide for additional business. Addi
tional corapensation, therefore, ought not to be pro
hibited. On the question for striking out, " or increase," —
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Dela
ware, Maryland, South Carolina, aye— 6; Virginia,
North Carolina, no — 2 ; Georgia, absent.
The whole^ clause, as amended, was then agreed
to, nem. con.
The twelfth Resolution, " that the National Legis
lature be empowered to appoint inferior tribunals,"
being taken up,—
Mr. Butler could see no necessity for such tribu
nals. The State tribunals might do the business.

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1137
Mr. L. Martin concurred. They will create jeal
ousies and oppositions in the State tribunals, with
the jurisdiction of which they will interfere.
Mr. Gorham. There are in the States already
Federal Courts, with jurisdiction for trial of piracies,
<fec. coramitted on the seas. No complaints have
been made by the States or the courts of the States.
Inferior tribunals are essential to render the au
thority of the National Legislature effectual.
Mr. Randolph observed, that the courts of the
States cannot be trusted with the administration of
the National laws. The objects of jurisdiction are
such as will often place the general and local policy
at variance.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris urged also the necessity
of such a provision.
Mr- Sherman was willing to give the power to the
Legislature, but wished them to make use of the
State tribunals, whenever it could be done with
safety to the general interest.
Col. Mason thought many circurastances might
arise, not novv to be foreseen, which might render
such a power absolutely necessary.
On the question for agreeing to the twelfth Reso
lution, erapowering the National Legislature to ap
point inferior tribunals, — it was agreed to, nem. con.
The clause of "Impeachraents of national officers,"
was struck out, on raotion for the purpose.
The thirteenth Resolution, " The jurisdiction of
the National Judiciary, (fee." being then taken up,
several criticisras having been raade on the defini
tion, it was proposed by Mr. Madison so to alter it
as to read thus ; " tbat the jurisdiction shall extend
Vol. I.— 72

1138 debates in the [1787.
to all cases arising under the national laws ; and to
such other questions as may involve the national
peace and harmony;" which was agveed to, nem. con.
The fourteenth Resolution, providing for the ad
mission of new States, was agreed to, netn. con.
The fifteenth Resolution, " that provision ought to
be made for the continuance of Congress, <fec. and
for the completion of their engageraents," being con-
sidered,-^- Mr. Gouverneur Morris thought the assumption
of their engagements raight as well be oraitted ; and
that Congress ought not to be continued till all the
States should adopt the reform ; since it may be
corae expedient to give effect to it whenever a cer
tain number of States shall adopt it.
Mr. Madison. The clause can mean nothing
more than that provision ought to be made for pre
venting an interregnum ; which must exist, in the
interval between the adoption of the new Govemment
and the comraenceraent of its operation, if the old
Government should cease on the first of these events.
Mr. Wilson did not entirely approve of the man
ner in which the clause relating to the engagements
of Congress was expressed; but he thought some
provision on the subject would be proper in order to
prevent any suspicion that the obligations of the
Confederacy raight be dissolved along with the
Government under which they were contracted.
On the question on the first part, relating to the
continuance of Congress, — Virginia, North Caro
lina, South Carolina,* aye— 3 ; Massachusetts, Con-

In the printed Journal, South Carolina, no.

1787,] fe DERAL convention. 1139
necticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Geor
gia, no — 6, The second part, as to the corapletion
of their engageraents, was disagreed to, nem. con.
The sixteenth Resolution, " That a republican
Constitution and its existing laws ought to be guar
anteed to each State by the United States" being
considered, —
Mr, Gouverneur Morris thought the Resolution
very objectionable. He should be very unwilling
that such laws as exist in Rhode Island should be
guaranteed. Mr. Wilson. The object is merely to secure the
States against dangerous comraotions, insurrections
and rebellions.
Col. Mason. If the General Govemraent should
have no right to suppress rebellions against partic
ular States, it will be in a bad situation indeed. As
rebellions against itself originate in and against in
dividual States, it raust reraain a passive spectator
of its own subversion.
Mr. Randolph. The Resolution has two objects, —
first, to secure a republican governraent ; secondly,
to suppress domestic comraotions. He urged the
necessity of both these provisions.
Mr. Madison inoved to substitute, " that the con
stitutional authority of the States shall be guaran
teed to thera respectively against domestic as well
as foreign violence."
Doctor McClurg seconded the raotion.
Mr. Houston was afraid of perpetuating the ex
isting Constitutions of the States. That of Georgia
was a very bad one, and he hoped would be revised
and araended, It may also be difficult for the Gen-

1140 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
eral Gov^ernment to decide between contending par
ties, each of which claira the sanction of the Con
stitution. Mr. L. Martin was for leaving the States to sup
press rebellions theraselves.
Mr. Gorham thought it strange that a rebellion
should be known to exist in the Erapire, and the
General Govemraent should be restrained frora in
terposing to subdue it. At this rate an enterprising
citizen raight erect the standard of raonarchy in a
particular State, might gather together partizans
frora all quarters, might extend his vicAVs from State
to State, and threaten to establish a tyranny over
the whole, and the General Government be com
pelled to remain an inactive witness of its own de
struction. With regard to different parties in a
State, as long as they confine their disputes to words,
they will be harmless to the General Government
and to each other. If they appeal to the sword, it
wfll then be necessary for the General Governraent,
however difficult it raay be, to decide on the merits
of their contest, to interpose and put an end to it.
Mr. Carroll. Some such proAdsion is essential.
Every State ought to Avish for it. It has been
doubted whether it is a casus foederis at present ;
and no roora ought to be left for such a doubt here
after. Mr. Randolph moved to add, as an amendment to
the motion, " and that no State be at liberty to forra
any other than a republican government."
Mr. Madison seconded the motion.
Mr. Rutledge thought it unnecessary to insert
any guarantee. No doubt could be entertained but

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1141
that Congress had the authority, if they had the
means, to co-operate with any State in subduing a
rebellion. It was and would be involved in the na
ture of the thing.
Mr. Wilson raoved, as a better expression of the
idea, " that a republican form of Government shall
be guaranteed to each State; and that each State
shall be protected against foreign and domestic
violence." This seeraing to be well received, Mr. Madison
and Mr. Randolph withdrew their propositions, and
on the question for agreeing to Mr. Wilson's raotion,
it passed, nem, con.
Adjourned.

Thursday, July 19th.
In Convention, — -On re-consideration of the vote
rendering the Executive re-eligible a second tirae,
Mr. Martin moved to re-instate the words, " to be
ineligible a second time."
Mr. Gouverneur Morris. It is necessary to take
into one view all that relates to the establishment
of the Executive ; on the due formation of which
raust depend the efficacy and utility of the union
araong the present and future States. It has been
a raaxira in political science, that republican govern
ment is not adapted to a large extent of country,
because the energy of the executive magistracy
cannot reach the extreme parts of it. Our country
is an extensive one. We must either then renounce
the blessings of the Union, or provide an Executive

1142 DEBATES IN THE [1787,
with sufficient vigor to pervade every part of it.
This subject was of so much iraportance that he
hoped to be indulged in an extensive view of it.
One great object of the Executive is, to control the
Legislature, The Legislature wfll continually seek
to aggrandize and perpetuate theraselves ; and will
seize those critical moraents produced by war, in
vasion, or convulsion, for that purpose. It is neces
sary, then, that the Executive raagistrate should be
the guardian of the people, even of the lower classes,
against legislative tyranny ; against the great and
the wealthy, who in the course of things will ne
cessarily corapose the legislative body. Wealth
tends to corrupt the mind ; — to nourish its love of
power; and to stimulate it to oppression. History
proves this to be the spirit of the opulent. The
check provided in the second branch was not meant
as a check on legislative usurpations of power, but
on the abuse of laAvful powers, on the propensity
of the first branch to legislate too much, to run into
projects of paper-money, and sirailar expedients. It
is no check on legislative tyranny. On the contrary
it raay favor it ; and, if the first branch can be
seduced, raay find the means of success. The Ex
ecutive, therefore, ought to be so constituted, as to
be the great protector of the mass of the people. It
is the duty of the Executive to appoint the officers,
and to comraand the forces, of the Republic ; to ap
point, first, rainisterial officers for the adrainistration
of public affairs ; secondly, officers for the dispensa
tion of justice. Who will be the best judges whether
these appointments be well made ? The people at
large, who will know, will see, will feel, the effects

1787.] federal CONVENTION . 1143
of them. Again, who can judge so well of the dis
charge of railitary duties for the protection and
security of the people, as the people theraselves,
who are to be protected and secured? He finds,
too, that the Executive is not to be re-eligible. What
effect will this have? In the first place, it Avill
destroy the great incitement to merit, public esteem,
by taking away the hope of being rewarded with a
re-appointment. It may give a dangerous turn to
one of the strongest passions in the Iiuman breast.
The love of farae is the great spring to noble and
illustrious actions. Shut the civil road to glory,
and he raay be compelled to seek it by the sword.
In the second place, it will tempt hira to make the
most of the short space of time allotted him, to ac
cumulate wealth and provide for his friends. In the
third place, it will produce violations of the very
Constitution it is meant to secure. In moments of
pressing danger, the tried abilities and established
character of a favorite magistrate will prcA'ail over
respect for the forms of the Constitution. The
Executive is also to be impeachable. This is a
dangerous part of the plan. It will hold hira in
such dependence, that he will be no check on the
Legislature, will not be a firm guardian of the
people and of the public interest, He will be the
tool of a faction, of sorae leading deraagogue in the
Legislature. These, then, are the faults of the Ex
ecutive establishraent, as now proposed. Can no
better establishment be devised ? If he is to be the
guardian of the people, let him be appointed by the
people. If he is to be a check on the Legislature,
let him not be impeachable. Let him be of short

1144 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
duration, that he may Avith propriety be re-eligible.
It has been said that the candidates for this office
wfll not be known to the people. If they be known
to the Legislature, they must have such a notoriety
and eminence of character, that they cannot pos
sibly be unknown to the people at large. It cannot
be possible that a raan shall have sufficiently dis
tinguished hiraself to merit this high trust, without
having his character proclaimed by fame through
out the Empire, As to the danger from an unim
peachable magistrate, he could not regard it as
forraidable. There raust be certain great officers
of state, a rainister of finance, of war, of foreign
affairs, &c. These, he presumes, will exercise their
functions in subordination to the Executive, and
will be amenable, by impeachraent, to the public
justice. Without these rainisters, the Executive
can do nothing of consequence. He suggested a
biennial election of the Executive, at the time of
electing the first branch ; and the Executive to hold
over, so as to prevent any interregnum in the ad
ministration. An election by the people at large,
throughout so great an extent of country, could not
be influenced by those little combinations and those
momentary lies, which often decide popular elec
tions within a narrow sphere. It will probably be
objected, that the election will be influenced by the
members of the Legislature, particularly of the first
branch ; and that it will be nearly the sarae thing
with an election by the Legislature itself It could
not be denied that such an influence would exist.
But it raight be answered, that as the Legislature or
the candidates for it, would be divided the enmity

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1145
of one part would counteract the friendship of an
other; that if the adrainistration of the Executive
were good, it would be unpopular to oppose his re
election ; if bad, it ought to be opposed, and a re-
appointraent prevented; and lastly, that in every
view this indirect dependence on the favor of the
Legislature could not be so mischievous as a direct
dependence for his appointment. He saw no alter
native for making the Executive independent of the
Legislature, but either to give hira his office for
life, or raake him eligible by the people. Again, it
might be objected, that two years would be too
short a duration. But he believes that as long as he
should behave hiraself well he would be continued
in his place. The extent of the country would se
cure his re-election against the factions and discon
tents of particular States. It deserved considera
tion, also, that such an ingredient in the plan would
render it extreraely palatable to the people. These
were the general ideas which occurred to hira on
the subject, and which led hira to wish and raove
that the whole constitution of the Executive might
undergo re-consideration.
Mr. Randolph urged the motion of Mr, L. Martin
for restoring the words making the Executive ineli
gible a second time. If he ought to be independent,
he should not be left under a temptation to court a
re-appointment. If he should be re-appointable by the
Legislature, he will be no check on it. His revision
ary power will be of no avail. He had always
thought and contended, as he still did, that the dan
ger apprehended by the little States was chimerical ;
but those' who thought otherwise ought to be pecu-
VoL. I.— 72*

1146 DEBATES IN THE [1787,
liarly anxious for the raotion. If the Executive be
appointed, as has been deterrained, by the Legisla
ture, he Avill probably be appointed, either by joint
ballot of both houses, or be norainated by the first
and appointed by the second branch. In either case
the large States will preponderate. If he is to court
the same influence for his re-appointment, will he
not raake his revisionary power, and all the other
functions of his administration, subservient to the
views of the large States ? Besides, is there not
great reason to apprehend, that, in case he should
be re-eligible, a false coraplaisance in the Legisla
ture raight lead thera to continue an unfit raan in
office, in preference to a fit one ? It has been said,
that a constitutional bar to re-appointraent, will in
spire unconstitutional endeavours to perpetuate hira
self It may be answered, that his endeavours can
have no effect unless the people be corrupt to such
a degree as to render all precautions hopeless ; to
which raay be added, that this arguraent supposes
him to be more powerful and dangerous, than other
arguments which have been used admit, and conse
quently caUs for stronger fetters on his authority.
He thought an election by the Legislature, with an
incapacity to be elected a second time, would be
more acceptable to the people than the plan sug
gested by Mr. Gouverneur Morris.
Mr. King did not like the ineligibility. He thought
there was great force in the remarks of Mr. Sher
man, that he who has proved himself most fit for an
office, ought not to be excluded by the Constitution
frora holding it. He would therefore prefer any
other reasonable plan that could be substituted. He

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1147
was much disposed to think, that in such cases tbe
people at large would choose wisely. There was
indeed some difficulty arising from the improbability
of a general concurrence of the people in favor of
any one man. On the whole, he was of opinion
that an appointment by electors chosen by the peo
ple for the purpose would be liable to fewest objec
tions. Mr. Patterson's ideas nearly coincided, he said,
with those of Mr. King. He proposed that the Ex
ecutive should be appointed by electors, to be cho
sen by the States in a ratio that would allow one
elector to the smallest, and three to the largest,
States. Mr. Wilson. , It seeras to be the unaniraous sense
that the Executive should not be appointed by the
Legislature, unless he be rendered ineligible a second
time : he perceiA^ed with pleasure that the idea was
gaining ground of an election, mediately or iramedi
ately, by the people.
Mr. Madison. If it be a fundamental principle of
free government that the Legislative, Executive and
Judiciary powers should be separately exercised, it
is equally so that they be independently exercised.
There is the sarae, and perhaps greater, reason Avhy
the Executive should be independent of the Legisla
ture, than why the Judiciary should. A coalition of
the two former powers, would be more imraediately
and certainly dangerous to public liberty. It is es
sential, then, that the appointment of the Executive
should either be drawn from some source, or held by
some tenure, that will give him a free agency with
regard to the Legislature. This could not be, if he

1148 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
was to be appointable, from time to tirae, by the
Legislature. It was not clear that an appointraent
in the first instance, even with an ineligibility after
wards, would not establish an iraproper connection
between the two Departraents. Certain it was, that
the appointment would be attended vvith intrigues
and contentions, that ought not to be unnecessarily
admitted. He was disposed, for these reasons, to
refer the appointment to some other source. The
people at large was, in his opinion, the fittest in it
self It would be as likely as any that could be
devised, to produce an Executive Magistrate of dis
tinguished character. The people generally could
only know and vote for some citizen whose merits
had rendered him an object of general attention and
esteera. There was one difficulty, however, of a
serious nature, attending an iraraediate choice by the
people. The right of suffrage was much raore diffu
sive in the Northern than the Southern States ; and
the latter could bave no influence in the election, on
the score of the negroes. The substitution of Elec
tors obviated this difficulty, and seeraed on the whole
to be liable to fewest objections.
Mr. Gerry. If the Executive is to be elected by
the Legislature, he certainly ought not to be re-eli
gible. This would raake hira absolutely dependent.
He was against a popular election. The people are
uninforraed, and would be raisled by a few designing
men. He urged the expediency of an appointment
of the Executive, by Electors to be chosen by the
State Executives, The people of the States will
then choose the first branch ; the Legislatures of the
States, the second branch of the National Legisla-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1149
ture ; and the Executives of the States, the National
Executive. This he thought would form a strong
attachraent in the States to the National systera.
The popular mode of electing the Chief Magistrate
would certainly be the worst of all. If he should
be so elected, and should do his duty, he will be
turned out for it, like Governor Bowdoin in Mas
sachusetts, and President Sullivan in New Hamp
shire. On the question on Mr, Gouverneur Morris's mo
tion, to reconsider generally the constitution of the
Executive, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jer
sey, and all the others, aye.
Mr. Ellsworth moved to strike out the appoint
raent by the National Legislature, and to insert, " to
be chosen by Electors, appointed by the Legislatures
of the States in the following ratio ; to wit : one for
each State not exceeding two hundred thousand in
habitants ; two for each above that nuraber and not
exceeding three hundred thousand ; and three for
each State exceeding three hundred thousand."
Mr. Broome seconded the raotion.
Mr. Rutledge was opposed to all the modes, ex
cept the appointment by the National Legislature,
He will be sufficiently independent, if he be not re-
eligible. Mr. Gerry preferred the motion of Mr. Ells
worth to an appointment by the National Legisla
ture, or by the people ; though not to an appoint
ment by the State Executives. He moved that the
Electors proposed by Mr. Ellsworth should be
twenty-five in nuraber, and allotted in the following
proportion : to New Harapshire, one ; to Massachu-

1150 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
setts, three ; to Rhode Island, one ; to Connecticut,
tvA^o ; to New York, two ; to New Jersey, two ; to
Pennsylvania, three; to Delaware, one; to Mary
land, two ; to Virginia, three ; to North Carolina,
two ; to South Carolina, two ; to Georgia, one.
The question, as raoved by Mr. Ellsworth, being
divided, on the first part " Shall the National Execu
tive be appointed by Electors ?" — Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
aye— 6; North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
no — 3 ; Massachusetts, divided.
On the second part, " Shall the Electors be cho
sen by the State Legislatures?" — Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8; Vir
ginia, South Carolina, no — 2.
The part relating to the ratio in which the States
should choose Electors was postponed, nem, con.
Mr. L. Martin raoved that the Executive be ineli
gible a second time.
Mr. Williamson seconds the motion. He had no
great confidence in electors to be chosen for the spe
cial purpose. They would not be the raost respec
table citizens ; but persons not occupied in the high
offices of governraent. They would be liable to
undue influence, which raight the more readfly be
practised, as some of them will probably be in ap
pointment six or eight raonths before the object of it
comes on.
Mr. Ellsworth supposed any persons might be
appointed Electors, except, solely, merabers of the
National Legislature.
On the question, " Shall he be ineligible a second

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION, 1151
trine?"- North Carolina, South Carolina, aye— 2;
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsyl
vania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia,
no— 8,
On the question, " Shall the Executive continue
for seven years ?" It passed in the negative, — * Con
necticut, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 3 ; * New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
no — 5 ; Massachusetts, North Carolina, divided.
Mr. King was afraid we should shorten the term
too much.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris was for a short term, in
order to avoid impeachments, which would be other
wise necessary.
Mr. Butler was against the frequency of the
elections. Georgia and South Carolina were too
distant to send electors often.
Mr. Ellsworth was for six years. If the elec
tions be too frequent, the Executive will not be firm
enough. There must be duties which will make
him unpopular for the moment. There wfll be outs
as well as ins. His administration, therefore, will be
attacked and misrepresented.
Mr. Williamson was for six years. The expense
will be considerable, and ought not to be unnecessa
rily repeated. If the elections are too frequent, the
best raen will not undertake the service, and those
of an inferior character will be liable to be cor
rupted. On the question for six years, — Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
.  i  _  _  r^
* In the prmted Joumal, Connecticut, no : New Jersey, aye.

1152 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye — 9 ; Delaware, no.
Adjourned.

Friday, July 20tfl.
In Convention, — The proposed ratio of Electors
for appointing the Executive, to wit : one for each
State whose inhabitants do not exceed two hundred
thousand, &c., being taken up, —
Mr. Madison observed that this would make, in
time, all or nearly all the States equal, since there
were few that would not in time contain the nura
ber of inhabitants entitling them to three Electors;
that this ratio ought either to be made temporary,
or so varied as that it would adjust itself to the
growing population of the States.
Mr, Gerry moved that in the first instance the Elec
tors should be allotted to the States in the following
ratio: to New Hampshire, one; Massachusetts, three ;
Rhode Island one; Connecticut, tAvo; New York,
two ; New Jersey, two ; Pennsylvania, three ; Dela
ware, one ; Maryland, two ; Virginia, three ; North
Carolina, two ; South Carolina, two ; Georgia, one.
On the question to postpone in order to take up
this motion of Mr. Gerry, it passed in the affirma
tive, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 6 ; Connec
ticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no — 4.
Mr. Ellsworth raoved that two Electors be al
lotted to New Harapshire. Some rule ought to be

1787,] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1153
pursued; and New Hampshire has raore than a
hundred thousand inhabitants. He thought it would
be proper also to allot two to Georgia.
Mr. Broom and Mr, Martin moved to postpone
Mr. Gerry's allotment of Electors, leaving a fit
ratio to be reported by the Committee to be ap
pointed for detailing the Resolutions.
On this motion,— New Jersey, Delaware, Mary
land, aye — 3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Penn
sylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, no — 7.
Mr. Houston seconded the motion of Mr. Ells
worth to add another Elector to New Hampshire
and Georgia.
On the question, — Connecticut, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye — 3 ; Masssachusetts, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, no — 7.
Mr. Williamson raoved as an amendment to Mr.
Gerry's allotment of Electors, in the first instance,
that in future elections of the National Executive
the number of Electors to be appointed by the sev
eral States shall be regulated by their respective
numbers of representatives in the first branch, pur
suing as nearly as raay be, the present proportions.
On the question on Mr. Gerry's ratio of Elec
tors, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 6;
New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, no — 4.
On the clause, " to be removable on impeachment
and conviction for malpractice or neglect of duty,"
(see the ninth Resolution), — ^^
Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Gouverneur Morris raoved
Vol. I— 73

1154 DEBATES IN THE '[1787.
to strike out this part of the Resolution. Mr.
Pinckney observed, he ought not to be impeachable
whilst in office.
Mr. Davie. If he be not impeachable whflst in
office, he will spare no efforts or means whatever to
get himself re-elected. He considered tbis as an
essential security for the good behaviour of the Ex
ecutive. Mr. Wilson concurred in the necessity of making
the Executive impeachable whilst in office.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris. He can do no criminal
act without coadjutors, who raay be punished. In
case he should be re-elected, that will be a sufficient
proof of his innocence. Besides, who is to impeach ?
Is the impeachment to suspend his functions ? If it
is not, the raischief will go on. If it is, the im
peachment will be nearly equivalent to a displace
ment ; and will render the Executive dependent on
those who are to impeach.
Colonel Mason. No point is of raore importance
than that the right of impeachment should be con
tinued. Shall any man be above justice? Above
all, shall that man be above it who can comrait the
raost extensive injustice ? When great criraes were
committed, he was for punishing the principal as
well as the coadjutors. There had been much de
bate and difficulty as to the mode of choosing the
Executive. He approved of that which had been
adopted at first, namely, of referring the appointment
to the National Legislature. One objection against
Electors was the danger of their being corrupted by
the candidates, and this furnished a peculiar reason
in favor of impeachraents whilst in office. Shall

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1155
the man who has practised corruption, and by that
means procured his appointment in the first in
stance, be suffered to escape punishraent by repeat
ing his guilt ?
Doctor Franklin was for retaining the clause as
favorable to the Executive. History furnishes one
exaraple only of a First Magistrate being forraally
brought to public justice. Every body cried out
against this as unconstitutional. What was the
practice before this, in cases where the Chief Magis
trate rendered himself obnoxious ? Why, recourse
was had to assassination, in whicii he was not only
deprived of his life, but of the opportunity of vin
dicating his character. It would be the best way,
therefore, to provide in the Constitution for the
regular punishraent of the Executive, where his rais-
conduct should deserve it, and for his honorable
acquittal, where he should be unjustly accused.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris adraits corruption, and
some few other offences, to be such as ought to be
impeachable; but thought the cases ought to be
enuraerated and defined.
Mr. Madison thought it indispensable that some
provision should be made for defending the com
munity against the incapacity, negligence, or per
fidy of the Chief Magistrate. The limitation of the
period of his service was not a sufficient security.
He raight lose his capacity after his appointment.
He might pervert his administration into a scherae
of peculation or oppression. He might betray his
trust to foreign powers. The case of the Executive
magistracy was very distinguishable from that of
the Legislature, or any other public body, holding

1156 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
offices of limited duration. It could not be presumed
that all, or even the majority, of the raerabers of
an Assembly would either , lose their capacity for
discharging, or be bribed to betray, their trust.
Besides, the restraints of their personal integrity
and honor, the difficulty of acting in concert for
purposes of corruption was a security to the public.
And if one or a few merabers only should be seduced,
the soundness of the remaining members would
maintain the integrity and fidelity of the body. In
the case of the Executive magistracy, which was to
be administered by a single man, loss of capacity or
corruption Avas raore Avithin the compass of probable
events, and either of them might be fatal to the
Republic. Mr. Pinckney did not see the necessity of im
peachments. He was sure they ought not to issue
from the Legislature, Avho Avbuld in that case hold
them as a rod oA'er the Executive, and by that
raeans effectually destroy his independence. Ife
revisionary power in particular would be rendered
altogether insignificant.
Mr, Gerry urged the necessity of irapeach
raents, A good magistrate wfll not fear them. A
bad one ought to be kept in fear of them. He
hoped the maxim would never be adopted here, that
the chief magistrate could do no wrong.
Mr. King expressed his apprehensions that an
extreme caution in favor of liberty, might enerA'-ate
the governraent we were forming. He wished the
House to recur to the primitive axiom, that the
three great departments of government should be
separate and mdependent ; that the Executive and

1787.] FEDERAL convention. 1157
Judiciary should be so as well as the Legislative ;
that the Executive should be so equally with the
Judiciary. Would this be the case if the Executive
should be impeachable? It had been said, that the
Judiciary would be impeachable. But it should
have been reraerabered, at the same time, that the
Judiciary hold their places not for a liraited tirae,
but during good behaviour. It is necessary, there
fore, that a forra should be established for trying
raisbehaviour. Was the Executive to hold his
place during good behaviour ? The Executive was
to hold his place for a liraited tirae, like the members
of the Legislature, Like them, particularly the
Senate, whose members would continue in appoint
ment the same term of six years, he would periodi
cally be tried for his behaviour by his electors, who
would continue or discontinue him in trust according
to the manner in which he had discharged it. Like
them, therefore, he ought to be subject to no inter
raediate trial, by irapeachraent. He ought not to
be impeachable unless he held his office during good
behaviour, a tenure which would be most agreeable
to him, provided an independent and effectual forum
could be devised. But under no circumstances
ought he to be impeachable by the Legislature.
This Avould be destructive of his independence, and
of the principles of the Constitution. He relied on
the vigor of the Executive, as a great security for
the public liberties.
Mr. Randolph. The propriety of impeachments
was a favorite principle with him. Guilt, wherever
found, ought to be punished. Tlie Executive will
have great opportunities of abusing his povver; par-

1158 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
ticularly in time of war, when the military force,
and in some respects the public money, will be in
his hands. Should no regular punishraent be pro
vided, it will be irregularly inflicted by turaults and
insurrections. He is aware of the necessity of pro
ceeding with a cautious hand, and of excluding as
rauch as possible the influence of the Legislature
frora the business. He suggested for consideration
an idea which had fallen (frora Colonel Hamilton),
of coraposing a forum out of the Judges belonging to
the States ; and even of requiring some preliminary
inquest, whether just ground of irapeachraent ex
isted. Doctor Franklin raentioned the case of the Prince
of Orange, during the late war. An arrangeraent
was raade between France and Holland, by which
their two fleets were to unite at a certain time and
place. The Dutch fleet did not appear. Every
body began to wonder at it. At length it was sus
pected that the Stadtholder was at the bottom of
the matter. This suspicion prevailed more and
more. Yet as he could not be impeached, and no
regular exaraination took place, he remained in his
office ; and strengthening his own party, as the party
opposed to him became formidable, he gave birth to
the most violent aniraosities and contentions. Had
he been impeachable, a regular and peaceable in
quiry would have taken place, and he would, if
guUty, have been duly punished,— if innocent, re
stored to the confidence of the public.
Mr. King remarked, that the case of the Stadt
holder was not applicable. He held his place for
life, and was not periodically elected. In the former

1787.] federal CPNVENTIPN, 1159
case, irapeachraents are proper to secure good be
haviour. In the latter, they are unnecessary ; the
periodical responsibility to the Electors being an
equivalent security.
Mr. Wilson observed, that if the idea were to be
pursued, the Senators who are to hold their places
during the sanie terra with the Executive, ought to
be subject to irapeachraent and reraoval.
Mr. Pinckney apprehended that sorae gentleraen
reasoned on a supposition that the Executive was
to have powers which would not be coraraitted to
hira. He presuraed that his powers would be so
circurascribed as to render irapeachraents unneces
sary. Mr. Gouverneur Morris's opinion had been chang
ed by the arguraents used in the discussion. He was
now sensible of the necessity of irapeachraents, if the
Executive was to continue for any length of tirae in
office. Our Executive was not like a raagistrate
having a life interest, rauch less, like one having an
hereditary interest, in his office. He raay be bribed
by a greater interest to betray his trust ; and no one
would say that we ought to expose ourselves to the
danger of seeing the First Magistrate in foreign pay,
without being able to guard against it by displacing
him. One would think the King of England well
secured against bribery. He has, as it Avere, a fee '
simple in the whole Kingdom. Yet Charles II, was ^
bribed by Louis XIV. The Executive ought, there
fore, to be impeachable for treachery. Corrupting
his Electors, and incapacity, were other causes of
impeachment. For the latter he should be punish
ed, not as a man, but as an officer, and punished on-

1160 debates in the [1787.
ly by degradation from his office. This Magistrate
is not the King, but the prime minister. The people
are the King. When we raake hira amenable to
justice, however, we should take care to provide
some mode that will not make him dependent on the
Legislature. It was moved and seconded to postpone the
question of irapeachraents ; which was negativ
ed, — Massachusetts and South Carolina, only, being
aye. On the question. Shall the Executive be reraova
ble on impeachraents, (fee. ? — Connecticut, New Jer
sey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8; Massachusetts,
South Carolina, no — 2.
" The Executive to receive fixed corapensation," —
agreed to, nem. con.
" To be paid out of the National Treasury," —
agreed to, NeAV Jersey only in the negative.
Mr. Gerry and Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved,
"that the Electors of the ExecutiA'e shall not be
members of the National Legislature, nor officers of
the United Stated, nor shall the Electors themselves
be eligible to the supreme raagistracy." Agreed to,
nem. con.
Doctor McClurg asked, whether it would not be
necessary, before a coramittee for detafling the Con
stitution should be appointed, to deterraine on the
raeans by which the Executive is to carry the laws
into effect, and to resist combinations against them.
Is he to have a railitary force for the purpose, or to
have the coramand of the Mflitia, the only existing
force that can be applied to that use ? As the ReS'

1787.] federal convention. 1161
olutions now stand, the Coraraittee will have no de
terrainate directions on this great point.
Mr. Wilson thought that some additional direc
tions to the Comraittee would be necessary.
Mr. King. The Coraraittee are to provide for
the end. Their discretionary power to provide for
the means is involved, according to an established
axiom. Adjourned.

Saturday, July 21st.
In Convention, — Mr. Williamson raoved, " that
the Electors of the Executive should be paid out of
the National Treasury for the service to be perforra
ed by thera." Justice required this, as it was a na
tional service they were to render. The raotion was
agreed to, nem. con.
Mr. Wilson raoved, as an araendraent to the tenth
Resolution, " that the Supreme National Judiciary
should be associated with the Executive in the re
visionary power." This proposition had been before
made and failed; but he was so confirmed by reflec
tion in the' opinion of its utility, that he thought it
incumbent on him to make another effort. The Ju
diciary ought to have an opportunity of remonstra
ting against projected encroachraents on the people
as well as on theraselves. It had been said, that the
Judges, as expositors of the laws, would have an
opportunity of defending their constitutional rights.
There was Aveight in this observation ; but this
power of the Judges did not go far enough. Laws
Vol. I.— 73*

1162 debates in the [1787.
may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous,
may be destructive ; and yet raay not be so uncon
stitutional as to justify the Judges in refusmg to give
thera effect. Let thera have a share in the revision
ary poAver, and they wfll have an opportunity of
taking notice of those characters of a law, and of
counteracting, by the weight of their opinions, the
improper views of the Legislature. — Mr. Madison
seconded the motion.
Mr. Gorham did not see the advantage of employ
ing the Judges in this way. As Judges they are not
to be presumed to possess any peculiar knowledge
of the mere policy of public raeasures. Nor can it
be necessary as a security for their constitutional
rights. The Judges in England haA'c no such addi
tional provision for their defence, yet their jurisdic
tion is not invaded. He thought it would be best to
let the Executive alone be responsible, and at most
to authorize him to call on the Judges for their
opinions. Mr. Ellsworth approved heartily of the motion.
The aid of the Judges will give more Avisdora and
firmness to the Executive. They wfll possess a sys
tematic and accurate knowledge of the laws, which
the Executive cannot be expected always to possess.
The Law of Nations also Avill frequently come into
question. Of this the Judges alone will have cora
petent information.
Mr. Madison considered the object of the motion
as of great importance to the raeditated Constitu
tion, It would be useful to the Judiciary Depart
ment by giving it an additional opportunity of de
fending itself against Legislative encroachraents. It

1787.] federal conventipn. 1163
would be useful to the Executive, by inspiring addi
tional cpnfidence and firmness in exerting the re
visionary power. It would be useful to the Legis
lature, by the valuable assistance it would give in
preserving a consistency, conciseness, perspicuity,
and technical propriety in the laws, qualities pecu
liarly necessary, and yet shamefully wanting in our
Republican codes. It would, moreover, be useful to
the coraraunity at large, as an additional check
against a pursuit of those unwise and unjust raea
sures which constituted so great a portion of our
calamities. If any solid objection could be urged
against the motion, it raust be on the supposition
that it tended to give too much strength, either to
the Executive, or Judiciary. He did not think there
was the least ground for this apprehension. It was
much more to be apprehended, that, notwithstand
ing this cp-pperatipn of the two departments, the
Legislature would still be an overmatch for them.
Experience in all the States had evinced a powerful
tendency in the Legislature to absorb all power into
its vortex. This was the real source of danger to
the American Constitutions ; and suggested the ne
cessity of giving every defensive authority to the
other departments that was consistent with republi
can principles.
Mr. Mason said, he had always been a friend to
this provision. It would give a confidence to the
Executive, which he would not otlierwise have, and
without which the revisionary power would be of
little avafl.
Mr. Gerry did not expect to see this point, which
had undergone full discussion, again revived. The

1164 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
object he conceiA'ed of the revisionary power was
merely to secure the Executive department against
Legislative encroachment. The Executive, there
fore, who will best know and be ready to defend his
rights, ought alone to have the defence of thera.
The motion Avas liable to strong objections. It was
combining and mixing together the Legislative and
the other departments. It was establishing an im
proper coalition between the Executive and Judi
ciary departments. It was making statesmen of the
Judges, and setting thera up as the guardians of the
rights of the people. He relied, for his part, on the
Representatives of the people, as the guardians^of
their rights and interests. Itwas raaking the ex
positors of the laws the legislators, which ought
never to be done. A better expedient for correcting
the laws would be to appoint, as had been done in
Pennsylvania, a person or persons of proper skill, to
draw bills for the Legislature.
Mr. Strong thought, with Mr. Gerry, that the
power of raaking, ought to be kept distinct from
that of expounding, the laws. No maxim was bet
ter established. The Judges in exercising the func
tion of expositors might be influenced by the part
they had taken in passing the laws.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris. Some check being ne
cessary on the Legislature, the question is, in what
hands it should be lodged ? On one side, it was con
tended, that the Executive alone ought to exercise
it. He did not think that an Executive appointed
for six years, and impeachable whilst in office, would
be a very effectual check. On the other side, it was
urged, that he ought to be reinforced by the Judici-

1787.J FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1165
ary department. Against this it was objected, that
expositors of laws ought to have no hand in making
them, and arguments in favor of this had been drawn
from England. What weight was due to them
might be easily deterrained by an attention to facts.
The truth was, that the Judges in England had a
great share in the legislation. They are consulted
in difficult and doubtful cases. They raay be, and
sorae of thera are, members of the Legislature.
They are, or may be, members of the Privy Coun
cil ; and can there advise the Executive, as they will
do Avith us if the motion succeeds. The influence
the English Judges may have, in the latter capacity,
in strengthening the Executive check, cannot be as
certained, as the King, by his influence, in a raanner
dictates the laws. There is one difference in the
tvvo cases, however, which disconcerts all reasoning
frora the British to our proposed Constitution, The
British Executive has so great an interest in his pre
rogatives, and such powder for raeans of defending
them, that he will ncA'^er yield any part of them.
The interest of our Executive is so inconsiderable
and so transitory, and his means of defending it so
feeble, that there is the justest ground to fear his
want of firraness in resisting encroachments. He
was extremely apprehensive that the auxiliary firm
ness and weight of the Judiciary would not supply
the deficiency. He concurred in thinking the pub
lic liberty in greater danger from Legislative usur
pations, than from any other source. It had been
said that the Legislature ought to be relied on, as
the proper guardians of liberty. The answer was-
short and conclusive. Either bad laws will be

1166 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
pushed, or not. On the latter supposition, no check
will be wanted. On the former, a strong check
will be necessary. And this is the proper supposi
tion. Emissions of paper-raoney, largesses to the
people, a reraission of debts, and sirailar measures,
will at sorae tiraes be popular, and will be pushed for
that reason. At other tiraes, such raeasures will coin
cide with the interests of the Legislature theraselves,
and that will be a reason not less cogent for pushing
thera. It may be thought that the people will not be
deluded and misled in the latter case. But experience
teaches another lesson. The press is indeed a great
means of diminishing the evil ; yet it is found to be
unable to prevent it altogether.
Mr. L. Martin considered the association of the
Judges with the Executive, as a dangerous innova
tion; as well as one that could not produce the par
ticular advantage expected from it. A knowledge
of raankind, and of Legislative affairs, cannot be pre
sumed to belong in a higher degree to the Judges
than to the Legislature. And as to the constitution
ality of laws, that point will come before the Judges
in their official character. In this character they
have a negative on the laws. Join them with the
Executive in the revision, and they wfll have a
double negative. It is necessary that the Supreme
Judiciary should have the confidence of the people.
This wiU soon be lost, if they are employed in the
the task of reraonstrating against popular measures
of the Legislature. Besides, in what mode and pro
portion are they to vote in the Council of Revision ?
Mr. Madison could not discover in the proposed
association of the Judges with the Executive, in the

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1167
revisionary check on the Legislature, any violation
of the maxim which requires the great departraents
of power to be kept separate and distinct. On the
contrary, he thought it an auxfliary precaution, in
favor of the raaxira. If a constitutional discriraina
tion of the departraents on paper were a sufficient
security to each against encroachments of the oth
ers, all further provisions would indeed be superfluous.
But experience had taught us a distrust of that se
curity ; and that it is necessary to introduce such a
balance of powers and interests as will guarantee
the provisions on paper. Instead, therefore, of con
tenting ourselves with laying down the theory in the
Constitution, that each department ought to be sepa
rate and distinct, it was proposed to add a defensive
power to each, which should raaintain the theory in
practice. In so doing, we did not blend the depart
ments together. We erected effectual barriers for
keeping them separate. The raost regular exaraple
of this theory was in the British Constitution. Yet
it was not only the practice there to adrait the
Judges to a seat in the Legislature, and in the Ex
ecutive Councils, and subrait to their previous exam
ination all laws of a certain description, but it wa§
a part of their Constitution that the Executive
might negative any law whatever ; a part of their
Constitution which had been universally regarded as
calculated for the preservation of the whole. The
objection against a union of the Judiciary and Ex-
ecutiA^e branches, in the revision of the laws, had
either no foundation, or was not carried far enough.
If such a union was an improper raixture of powers,
or such a Judiciary check on the laws was inconsist-

1168 DEBATESINTHE [ 1787.
ent with the theory of a free constitution, it was
equally so to admit the Executive to any participa
tion in the raaking of laws; and the revisionary
plan ought to be discarded altogether.
Colonel Mason observed, that the defence of the
Executive was not the sole object of the revisionary
power. He expected even greater advantages from
it. Notwithstanding the precautions taken in the
constitution of the Legislature, it would still so
rauch resemble that of the individual States, that it
must be expected frequently to pass unjust and per
nicious laws. This restraining power was therefore
essentially necessary. It would have the effect, not
only of hindering the final passage of such laws,
but would discourage demagogues from attempting
to get them passed. It has been said (by Mr, L.
Martin), that if the Judges were joined in this
check on the laws, they would haA^e a double nega
tive, since in their expository capacity of Judges
they would have one negative. He would reply,
that in this capacity they could impede, in one case
only, the operation of laws. They could declare an
unconstitutional law void. But with regard to every
law, however unjust, oppressive or pernicious, that
did not come plainly under this description, they
would be under the necessity, as Judges, to give it
a free course. He wished the further use to be made
of the Judges of giving aid in preventing every im
proper law. Their aid will be the more valuable,
as they are in the habit and practice of considering
laws in their true principles, and in all their conse
quences. Mr. Wilson, The separation of the departments

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1169
does not require that they should have separate ob
jects; but that they should act separately, though
on the same pbjects. It is necessary that the twp
branches pf the Legislature shpuld be separate and
distinct, yet they are beth tp act precisely on the
same object
Mr. Gerry had rather give the Executive an ab
solute negative for its own defence, than thus to blend
together the Judiciary and ExecutiA^e departments.
It will bind them together in an offensive and defen
sive alliance against the Legislature, and render the
latter unwilling to enter into a contest with them.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris was surprised that any
defensive provision for securing the effectual separa
tion of the departments should be considered as an
iraproper mixture of them. Suppose that the three
powers were to be vested in three persons, by cora
pact araong theraselves ; that one Was to have the
power of raaking, another of executing, and a third
of judging, the laws. Would it not be very natural
for the two latter, after having settled the partition
on paper, to observe, and would not candor oblige
the forraer to admit, that, as a security against legis
lative acts of the forraer, which raight easily be so
framed as to undermine the powers of the two
othei^s, the two others ought to be arraed with a
vetp for their own defence; or at least tp haA^e an
pppprtunity pf stating their pbjectipns against acts
pf encrpachraent ? And wpuld any one pretend,
that such a right tended to blend and confound
powers that ought to be separately exercised ? As
well might it be said that if three neighbours had
three distinct farms, a right in each to defend his
Vol. I.— 74

1170 debates in the [1787.
farm against his neighbours, tended to blend the
farras together.
Mr. Gorham. All agree that a check on the
Legislature is necessary. But there are two ob
jections against admitting the Judges to share in it,
which no observations on the other side seem to
obviate. The first is, that the Judges ought to carry
into the exposition of the laws no prepossessions
with regard to them ; the second, that, as the Judges
will outnumber the Executive, the revisionary check
would be thrown entirely out of the Executive
hands, and, instead of enabling him to defend him
self, would enable the Judges to sacrifice him.
Mr. Wilson. The proposition is certainly not
liable to all the objections which have been urged
against it. According to (Mr. Gerry), it will unite
the Executive and Judiciary in an offensive and
defensive alliance against the Legislature. Accord
ing to (Mr. Gorham), it will lead to a subversion of
the Executive by the Judiciary influence. To the
first gentleman the answer was obvious: that the
joint weight ofthe two Departments was necessary
to balance the single weight of the Legislature. To
the first objection stated by the other gentleman it
might be answered, that, supposing the preposses
sion to mix itself with the exposition, the evil would
be over-balanced by the advantages proraised by
the expedient. To the second objection, that such
a rule of voting raight be provided, m the detafl, as
would guard* against it.
Mr. Rutledge thought the Judges of all men the
most unfit to be concerned in the Revisionary Coun
cfl. The Judges ought never to give their opinion

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1171
on a law, till it comes before them. He thought it
equally unnecessary. The Executive could advise
with the officers of state, as of War, Finance, &c.,
and avail himself of their information and opinions.
On the question on Mr. Wilson's motion for
joining the Judiciary in the revision of laws, it passed
in the negative, — Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia,
aye — 3 ; Massachusetts, Delaware, North Carolina,
South Carolina, no — 4; Pennsylvania, Georgia, di
vided ; New Jersey, not present. ^
The tenth Resolution, giving the Executive a quali
fied veto, requiring two-thirds of each branch of the
Legislature to overrule it, was then agreed to nem, con.
The motion made by Mr. Madison, on the eight
eenth of July, and then postponed, "that the
Judges should be nominated by the Executive, and
such nominations become appointments unless dis
agreed to by two-thirds of the second branch of the
Legislature," was now resumed. ^^3
Mr. Madison stated as his reasons for the motion :
first, that it securedtheresponsibility of the Executive,
who would in general be raore capable and likely to
select fit characters than the Legislature, or even the
second branch of it, who might hide their selfish
motives under the number concerned in the appoint
ment. Secondly, that in case of any flagrant parti
ality or error in the nomination, it raight be fairly
presumed that two-thirds of the second branch
would join in putting a negative, on it. Thirdly,
that as the second branch was very differently
constituted, when the appointment of the Judges
was forraerly referred to it, and was now to be com
posed of equal votes from allthe States, the pruiciple

1172 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
of compromise which had prevailed in other in
stances required in this that there should be a con
currence of two authorities, in one of which the
people, in the other the States, should be represented.
The Executive magistrate would be considered as a
national officer, acting for and equally sympathizing
with every part of the United States. If the second
branch alone should have this power, the Judges
might be appointed by a minority of the people,
though by a raajority of the States ; which could
not be justified on any principle, as their proceedings
were to relate to the people rather than to the
States ; and as it would, moreover, throw the ap
pointments entirely into the hands of the Northern
States, a perpetual ground of jealousy and discon
tent would be furnished to the Southern States.
Mr. Pinckney was for placing the appointraent in
the second branch exclusively. The Executive will
possess neither the requisite knowledge of charac
ters, nor confidence of the people, for so high a trust.
Mr, Randolph would have preferred the mode
of appointraent proposed forraerly by Mr. Gorham,
as adopted in the Constitution of Massachusetts, but
thought the raotion depending so great an iraprove
ment of the clause as it stands, that he anxiously
wished it success. He laid great stress on the re-
sponsibflity of the Executive, as a security for fit
appointraents. Appointraents by the Legislatures
have generally resulted from cabal, frora personal
regard, or some other consideration than a title
derived from the proper qualifications. The sarae
inconveniences wiU proportionally prevafl, if the ap
pointraents be referred to either branch pf the Legis^

1787.] federal convention. 1173
lature, or to any other authority administered by a
number of individuals.
Mr. Ellsworth would prefer a negative in the
Executive on a noraination by the second branch,
the negative to be overruled hy a concurrence of two-
thirds of the second branch, to the mode proposed by
the motion, but preferred an absolute appointment
the second branch to either. The Executive will
be regarded by the people with a jealous eye.
Every power for augraenting unnecessarily his influ
ence will be disliked. As he will be stationary, it was
not to be supposed he could have a better knowledge
of characters. He will be raore open to caresses and in
trigues than the Senate. The right to supersede his no
raination will be ideal only. A nomination under such
circumstances will be equivalent to an appointment.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris supported the raotion.
First, the States, in their corporate capacity, will
frequently have an interest staked on the deterrain
ation of the Judges. As in the Senate the States
are to vpte, the Judges ought not to be appointed
by the Senate. Next to the impropriety of being
judge^ in one's own cause, is the apppintment of the
Judge. Secondly, it had been said, the Executive
would be uninformed of characters. The reverse
was the truth. The Senate will be so. They must
take the character of candidates from the flattering
pictures drawn by their friends. The Executive, in
the necessary intercourse with every part of the
United States requhed by the nature of his ad
ministration, will or may have the best possible in
formation. Thirdly, it had been said that a jealousy
would be entertained of the Executive. If the Ex-

1174 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
ecutive can be safely trusted with the comraand
of the array, there cannot surely be any reasonable
ground of jealousy in the present case. He added,
that if the objections against an appointraent of the
Executive by the Legislature had the weight that
had been allowed, there must be some weight in
the objection to an appointraent of the Judges by
the Legislature, or by any part of it.
Mr. Gerry. The appointment of the Judges, like
every other part of the Constitution, should be so
modelled as to give satisfaction both to the people
and to the States. The mode under consideration
will give satisfaction to neither. He could not con
ceive that the Executive could be as well informed
of characters throughout the Union, as the Senate.
It appeared to hira, also, a strong objection, that
two-thirds of the Senate were required to reject a
nomination of the Executive. The Senate would be
constituted in the same manner as Congress, and the
appointraents of Congress have been generally good.
Mr. Madison observed, that he was not anxious
that two-thirds should be necessary, to disagree to a
nomination. He had given this forra to his motion,
chiefly to A^ary it the more clearly from one which
had just been rejected. He was content to obviate
the objection last made, and accordingly so varied
the motion as to let a raajority reject.
Col. Mason found it his duty to differ from his col
leagues in their opinions and reasonings on this sub
ject. Notwithstanding the form of the proposition,
by Avliich the appointment seemed to be divided
between the Executive and Senate, the appoint
ment was substantially vested in the former alone.

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1175
The false complaisance which usually prevails in
such cases will prevent a disagreeraent to the first
norainations. He considered the appointment by
the Executive as a dangerous prerogative. It might
even give hira an influence over the Judiciary De
partraent itself He did not think the difference of
interest between the Northern and Southern States
could be properly brought into this arguraent. It
would operate, and require sorae precautions in the
case of regulating navigation, comraerce and ira-
posts; but he could not see that it had any connec
tion with the Judiciary departraent.
On the question, the motion being now, " that the
Executive should nominate, and such norainations
should becorae appointraents unless disagreed to by
the Senate," Masschusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
aye — 3 ; Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 6. ^^
On the question for agreeing to the clause as it
stands, by which the Judges. are to be appointed by
the second branch, — Connecticut, Delaware, Mary
land, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye
— 6 ; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, no — 3 ;
so it passed in the affirraative.
Adjourned. -

Monday, June 23d.
In Convention, — Mr. John Langdon and Mr. Nich
olas GiLLMAN, from New Harapslure, took then-
seats. The seventeenth Resolution, that provision ought

1176 debates in the [1787.
to be made for future amendments of the Articles
of the Union, was agreed to, nem. con.
The eighteenth Resolution, requiring the Legisla
tive, Executive and Judiciary of the States to be
bound by oath to support the Articles of Union, was
taken into consideration.
Mr. Williamson suggests, that a reciprocal oath
should be required from the National officers, to sup
port the Governraents of the States.
Mr. Gerry raoved to insert, as an araendraent,
that the oath of the officers of the National Gov
ernraent also should extend to the support of the
National Governraent, which was agreed to, nem. con.
Mr. Wilson said, he was never fond of oaths, con
sidering thera as a left-handed security only. A
good governraent did not need them, and a bad one
could not or ought not to be supported. He was
afraid they raight too rauch trammel the members
of the existing government, in case future alterations
should be necessary ; and prove an obstacle to the
seventeenth Resolution, just agreed to.
Mr. Gorham did not know that oaths would be of
much use ; but could see no inconsistency between
them and the seventeenth Resolution, or any regular
amendment of the Constitution. The oath could
only require fidelity to the existing Constitution.
A constitutional alteration of the Constitution could
never be regarded as a breach of the Constitution,
or of any oath to support it.
Mr. Gerry thought, with Mr. Gorham, there could
be no shadow of inconsistency in the case, Nor
could he see any other harm that could result from the
Resolution. On the other side, he thought one good

1787.] federal convention. 1177
effect would be produced by it. Hitherto the officers
of the two Governments had considered them as
distinct from, and not as parts of, the general sys
tem, and had, in all cases of interference given a
preference to the State Governments. The pro
posed oath will cure that error.
The Resolution (the eighteenth) was agreed to,
nem con.
The nineteenth Resolution, referring the new
Constitution to Assemblies to be chosen by the peo
ple, for the express purpose of ratifying it, was next
taken into consideration.
Mr. Ellsworth moved that it be referred to the
Legislatures of the States for ratification. Mr. Pat
terson seconded the motion.
Colonel Mason considered a reference of the plan
to the authority of the people, as one of the most im
portant and essential of the Resolutions. The Le
gislatures have no power to ratify it. They are the
mere creatures of the State Constitutions, and can
not be greater than their creators. And he knew
of no power in any of the Constitutions — he knew
there was no power in some of them — that Could be
competent to this object. Whither, then, must we
resort? To the people,"with whom all power re
mains that has not been given up in the constitutions
derived from them. It was of great moraent, he ob
served, that this doctrine should be cherished, as the
basis of free governraent. Another strong reason
Avas, that admitting the Legislatures to have a com
petent authority, it would be wrong to refer the
plan to them, because succeeding Legislatures, hav
ing equal authprity, could undo the acts of their
Vol. I.— 74*

1178 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
predecessors ; and the National Govemment would
stand in each State on the weak and tottering foun
dation of an act of Assembly. There was a remain
ing consideration, of sorae weight. In sorae of the
States, the governraents were not derived frora the
clear and undisputed authority of the people. This
was the case in Virginia. Some of the best and
wisest citizens considered the Constitution as estab
lished by an assumed autiiority. A National Con
stitution derived from such a source would be ex
posed to the severest criticisras.
Mr. Randolph. One idea has pervaded all our
proceedings, to wit., that opposition as well from the
States as from individuals, will be raade to the sys
tera to be proposed. Will it not then be liighly im
prudent to fumish any unnecessary pretext, by the
mode of ratifying it? Added to other objections
against a ratification by the Legislative authority
only, it may be remarked, that there have been in
stances in which the authority of the comraon law
has been set up in particular States against that of
the Confederation, which has had no higher sanction
than Legislative ratification. Whose opposition will
be most likely to be excited against the system?
That of the local demagogues who will be degra
ded by it, frora the importance they now hold.
These will spare no efforts to impede that progress
in the popular mind, which will be necessary to the
adoption of the plan; and which every meraber will
find to have taken place in his own, if he will cora
pare his present opinions with those he brought with
hira into the Convention. It is of great iraportance,
therefore, that the consideration of this subject

1787.] FEDERAL CPNVENTIPN. 1179
should be transferred frora the Legislatures, where
this class of raen have their full influence, to a field
in which their efforts can be less raischievous. It is
moreover worthy of consideration, that some of the
States are averse to any change in their Constitu
tion, and will not take the requisite steps, unless ex
pressly called uppn, to refer the question to the
people. Mr. Gerry. The arguments of Colonel Mason
and Mr. Randolph prove too rauch. They prove an
unconstitutionality in the present Federal system,
and even in some of the State Governments. Infer
ences drawn from such a source must be inadraissi
ble. Both the State Governraents and the Federal
Govemraent have been too long acquiesced in, to be
now shaken. He considered the Confederation to
be pararaount to any State Constitution. The last
Article of it, authorizing alterations, raust conse
quently be so as well as the others ; and every thing
done in pursuance of the article, must have the same
high authority with the article. Great confusion,
he was confident, would result frora a recurrence to
the people. They would never agree on any thing.
He could not see any ground to suppose, that the
people will do what their rulers will not. The ru
lers wfll either conform to, or influence the sense of
the people.
Mr. Gorham was against referring the plan to the
Legislatures. 1. Men chosen by the people for the
particular purpose will discuss the subject more can
didly than merabers of the Legislature, who are to
lose the power which is to be given up to the Gene
ral GJovernment. 2. Some of the Legislatures are

1180 debates in the [1787.
composed of several branches. It wfll consequently
be raore difficult, in these cases, to get the plan
through the Legislatures, than through a Conven
tion. 3. In the States, raany of the ablest raen are
excluded frora the Legislatures, but raay be elected
into a Convention. Araong these may be ranked
many of the clergy, who are generally friends to
good government Their services were found to be
valuable in the formation and establishment of the
Constitution of Massachusetts. 4. The Legislatures
will be interrupted with a variety of little business ;
by artfully pressing which, designing raen wfll find
means to delay frora year to year, if not to frustrate
altogether, the national system. 5. If the last Arti
cle of the confederation is to be pursued, the unani
mous concurrence of the States will be necessary.
But will any one say that all the States are to suffer
themselves to be ruined, if Rhode Island should per
sist in her opposition to general measures ? Some
other States might also tread in her steps. The
present advantage, whieh New York seeras to be so
much attached to, of taxing her neighbours by the
regulation of her trade, raakes it very probable that
she will be of the number. It would, therefore, de
serve serious consideration, whether provision ought
not to be made for giving effect to the system, with
out waiting for the unaniraous concurrence of the
States. Mr. Ellsworth. If there be any Legislatures
who should find theraselves incompetent to the rati
fication, he should be content to let them advise with
their constituents and pursue such a mode as would
be competent. He thought more was to be expected

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1181
from the Legislatures, than from the people. The
prevailing wish of the people in the Eastern States
is, to get rid of the public debt ; and the idea of
strengthening the National Government carries with
it that of strengthening the public debt, It was
said by Colonel Mason, — in the first place, that the
Legislatures have no authority in this case; and in
the , second, that their successors, having equal
authority, could rescind their acts. As tb the second
point he cpuld not admit it to be well founded. An
act to which the States, by their Legislatures, raake
theraselves parties, becoraes a corapact frora which
no one of the parties can recede of itself As to the
first point, he pbserved that a new set pf ideas
seeraed tp have crept in since the Articles of Con
federation were established. Conventions of the
people, or with power derived expressly frora the
people, were not then thought of The Legislatures
were considered as competent. Their ratification
has been acquiesced in without complaint. To
whom have Congress applied on subsequent occa
sions for further powers ? To the Legislatures, not
to the people. The fact is, that we exist at present,
and we need not inquire how, as a federal society,
united by a charter, one article of which is, that
alterations therein raay be raade by the Legislative
authority of the States. It has been said, that if the
Confederation is to be observed, the States must
unanimously concur in the proposed innovations. He
would answer, that if such were the urgency and
necessity of our situation as to warrant a new com
pact among a part of the States, founded on the
consent of the people; the same pleas would be

1182 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
equally valid, in favor of a partial compact, founded
onthe consent ofthe Legislatures.
Mr, Williamson thought the Resolution(the nine
teenth) so expressed, as that it raight be submitted
either to the Legislatures or to Conventions recom
raended by the Legislatures. He observed that
sorae Legislatures were evidently unauthorized to
ratify the systera. He thought, too, that Conven-
tions Avere to be preferred, as more likely to be com
posed of the ablest raen in the States.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris considered the inference
of Mr. Ellsworth frora the plea of necessity, as ap
plied to the establishraent of a new systera, on the
consent of the people of a part ofthe States, in faA'^or
of a like establishraent, on the consent of a part of
the Legislatures, as a non-sequitur. If the Confeder
ation is to be pursued, no alteration can be made
without the unanimous consent of the Legislatures.
Legislative alterations not conformable to the Fed
eral compact would clearly not be valid. The
Judges would consider them as null and void.
Whereas, in case of an appeal to the people of
the United States, the supreme authority, the
Federal corapact raay be altered by a majority
of them, in like raanner as the Constitution of a
particular State maybe altered by a majority ofthe
people of the State. The amendment moved by
Mr. Ellsworth erroneously supposes, that we are
proceeding on the basis of the Confederation. This
Convention is unknown to the Confederation.
Mr. King thought with Mr. Ellsworth that the
Legislatures had a corapetent authority, the acqui
escence of the people of America in the Confedera-

1787.] federal convention. 1183
tion being equivalent to a formal ratification by the
people. He thought With.. Mr. Ellsworth, also,
that the plea of necessity was as valid in the one
case, as the other. At the same tirae, he preferred
a reference to the authority of the people ex
pressly delegated to Conventions, as the raost
certain raeans of obviating all disputes and doubts
concerning the legitimacy of the new Constitution,
as well as the most likely means of drawing forth
the best men in the States to decide on it. He
reraarked that araong other objections, raade in
the State of New York to granting powers to
Congress, one had been, that such powers as would
operate within the States could not be reconcfled
to the Constitution, and therefore were not grant-
able by the Legislative authority. He considered
it as of some consequence, also, to get rid of the
scruples which sorae -merabers of the State Legis
latures raight derive frorii their oaths to support
and raaintain the existing Constitutions.
Mr. Madison thought it clear that the Legislatures
were incorapetent to the proposed changes. These
changes woiild raake essential inroads on the State
Constitutions ; and it would be a novel and danger
ous doctrine, that a Legislature could change the
Constitution under which it held its existence.
There raight indeed be sorae Constitutions within
the Union, which had given a power to the Legisla
ture to concur in alterations of the Federal corapact.
But there were certainly some which had not ; and
in the case of these, a ratification raust of necessity
be pbtained from the people. He considered the
difference between a system founded on the Legisla-

1184 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
tures only, and one founded on the people, to be the
true difference between a league or treaty, and a
Constitution, The former, in point of moral obliga
tion, might be as inviolable as the latter. In point
of political operation, there were two important dis
tinctions in favor of the latter. First, a law viola
ting a treaty ratified by a pre-existing law raight be
respected by the Judges as a law, though an unwise
or perfidious one. A law violating a Constitution
established by the people theraselves, would be con
sidered by the Judges as null and void. Secondly,
the doctrine laid down by the law of nations in the
case of treaties is, that a breach of any one article
by any of the parties frees the other parties frora
their engageraents. In the case of a union of people
under one constitution, the nature of the pact has
always been understood to exclude such an interpre
tation. Comparing the two modes, in point of ex
pediency, he thought all the Considerations which
recomraended this Convention, in preference to Con
gress, for proposing the reforra, were in favor of
State Conventions, in preference to the Legislatures
for examining and adopting it.
On the question on Mr. Ellsworth's motion to
refer the plan to the Legislatures of the States, —
Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, aye — 3; New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 7.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris raoved, that the reference
of the plan be raade to one General Convention,
chosen and authorized by the people, to consider,
amend, and establish the same. Not seconded.
On the question for agreeing to the nineteenth

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1185
Resolution, touching the raode of ratification as re
ported frora the Coraraittee of the Whole, viz, to
refer the Constitution, after the approbation of Con
gress, to asserablies chosen by the people, — New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylva
nia, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Car
olina, Georgia, aye — 9; Delaware, no — I, ^
Mr. Gouverneur Morris and Mr. King moved,
that the representation in the second branch consist
of  merabers from each State, who shall vote
per capita,
Mr. Ellsworth said he had always approved of
voting in that mode.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris raoved to fill the blank
with three. He wished the Senate to be a pretty
nuraerous body. If two raerabers only should be
allowed to each State, and a raajority be made a
quorura, the power would be lodged in fourteen
raerabers, which was too sraall a number for such a
trust. Mr. Gorham preferred two to three members for
the blank. A small nuraber was most convenient
for deciding on peace and Avar, &c., which he ex
pected would be vested in the second branch. The
number of States wfll also increase. Kentucky,
Vermont, the Province of Maine and Franklin, wfll
probably soon be added to the present nuraber. He
presuraed also that sorae of the largest States would
be divided. The strength of the General GoA^ern-
ment will be, not in the largeness, but the smallness,
of the States.
Col. Mason thought three from each State, inclu
ding new States, would make the second branch too
Vol. I.— 75

1186 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
nuraerpus. Besides pther pbjections, the additional
expense ought always to forra one, where it was net
absolutely necessary.
Mr. Williamson. If the nuraber be too great, the
distant States will not be on an equal footing with the
nearer States. The latter can more easily send and
support their ablest citizens. He approved of the
voting per capita.
On the questipn fpr filling the blank with " three,"
— Pennsylvania, aye — 1 ; Nevv Hampshire, Massa
chusetts, Cpnnecticut, Delaware, Virginia, Ncrth
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — Q,^
On the question for filling it with " two," — agreed
to, nem..con.
Mr. L. Martin was opposed to voting per capita,
as departing from the idea of the States being repre
sented in the second branch.
Mr. Carroll was not struck with any particular
objection against the raode; but he did not wish so
hastily tp make so material an innovation.
On the question on the Avhole raotion, viz. : " the
second branch to consist of two raerabers frora each
State, and to vote per capita," — New Harapshire,
Msssachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Dela
ware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye — 9 ; Maryland, no — 1.
Mr. Houston and Mr. Spaight moved, " that the
appointraent of the Executive by Electors chosen
by the Legislatures of the States," be reconsidered.
Mr. Houston urged the extrerae inconveniency and
the considerable expense of drawing togetiier raen
frpra all the States for the single purpose of electing
the chief magistrate.

1787.] federal convention. 1187
On the question, which was put without debate,—
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Dela
ware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye
—7; Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, no— 3.
Ordered, that tomorrow be assigned for the recon
sideration ; — Connecticut and Pennsylvania, no ; all
the rest, aye.
Mr. Gerry moved, that the proceedings of the
Convention for the establishment of a National Gov
ernraent (except the part relating to the Executive)
be referred to a Coraraittee to prepare and report a
Constitution conforraable thereto.
General Pinckney rerainded the Convention, that
if the Committee should fail to insert some security
to the Southern States against an eraancipation of
slaves, and taxes on exports, he should be bound by
duty to his State to vote against their report, ^g.
The appointment of a Coramittee, as moved by
Mr. Gerry, was agreed to, nem. con.
On the question. Shall the Committee consist of
ten members, one from each State present ? — all the
States were no, except Delaware, aye.
Shall it consist of seven members ? — New Harap
shire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, Soutii
Carolina, aye — 5 ; Pennsylvania, Delaware, Vir
ginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no — 5.
The question being lost by an equal division of
votes, it was agreed, nem. con.y that the Committee
should consist of five members to be appointed to
morrow. Adjourned.

1188 debates in the [1787.
Tuesday, July 24th.
In Convention, — The appointraent of the Execu
tive by Electors being reconsidered, —
Mr. Houston raoved that he be appointed by the
National Legislature, instead of " Electors appointed
by the State Legislatures," according to the last de
cision of the raode. He dwelt chiefly on the iraprob-
ability that capable men would undertake the ser
vice of Electors from the more distant States.
Mr. Spaight seconded the raotion.
Mr. Gerry opposed it. He thought there was no
ground to apprehend the danger urged by Mr. Hous
ton. The election of the Executive Magistrate wfll
be considered as of vast iraportance, and will
create great eamestness. The best raen, the Gov
ernors of the States, will not hold it derogatory
frora their character to be the Electors. If the mo
tion should be agreed to, it will be necessary to
make the Executive ineligible a second time, in
order to render him independent of the Legislature ;
which was an idea extremely repugnant to his way
of thinking.
Mr. Strong supposed that there would be no
necessity, if the Executive should be appomted by
the Legislature, to make him ineligible a second
time ; as new Electipns of the Legislature will have
intervened ; and he will not depend fpr his second
appointment on the same set of men that his first
was received from. It had been suggested that grat
itude for his past appointment would produce the
sarae effect as dependence for his future appointment.
He thought very differently. Besides, this objection

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1189
would lie against the Electors, who would be objects
of gratitude as well as the Legislature. It was of
great iraportance not to make the government too
complex, which would be the case if a new set of
men, like the Electors, should be introduced into it.
He thought, also, that the first characters in the
States would not feel sufficient motives to undertake
the office of Electors.
Mr. Williamson was for going back to the ori
ginal ground, to elect the Executive for seven years,
and render him ineligible a second tirae. The pro
posed Electors would certainly not be raen of the
first, nor even of the second, grade in the States.
These would all prefer a seat in the Senate, or the
other branch of the Legislature. He did not like
the unity in the Executive. He had wished the
Executive power to be lodged in three raen, taken
from three districts, into which the States should be
divided. As the Executive is to have a kind of veto
bn the laws, and there is an essential difference of
interests between the Northern and Southern States,
particularly in the carrying trade, the power will be
dangerous, if the Executive is to be taken from part
of the Union, to the part frora which he is not taken.
The case is different here from what it is in Eng
land ; where tbere is a sameness of interests through
out the kingdora. Another objection against a
single magistrate is, that he will be an elective king,
and will feel the spirit of one. He Avill spare no
pains to keep hiraself in for life, and will then lay a
train for the succession of his children. It was
pretty certain, he thought, that we should at some
time or other have a king ; but he wished no pre-

1190 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
caution to be oraitted that might postpone the event
as long as possible. Ineligibflity a second time ap
peared to hira to be the best precaution. With this
precaution he had no objection to a longer term than
seven years. He would go as far as ten or twelve
years. Mr. Gerry moved that the Legislatures of the
States should vote by ballot for the Executive, hi
the same proportions as it had been proposed they
should choose Electors ; and that in case a raajority
of the votes should not centre on the sarae person,
the first branch of the National Legislature should
choose two out of the four candidates having raost
votes; and out of these two the second branch
should choose the Executive.
Mr. King seconded the raotion ; and on the ques
tion to postpone, in order to take it into considera
tion, the noes were so predominant, that the States
were not counted.
On the question on Mr. Houston's motion, that
the Executive be appointed by the National Legis
lature, — New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jer
sey, Delaware, North Carolina, Soutii Carolina,
Georgia, aye — 7; Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Mary
land, Virginia, no — 4.
Mr. L. Martin and Mr. Gerry raoved to re-instate
the ineligibility of the Executive a second tirae.
Mr. Ellsworth. With raany this appears a
natural consequence of his being elected by the
Legislature. It was not the case with hira. The
Executive he thought should be re-elected if his
conduct proved hira worthy of it. And he wfll be
more likely to render himself worthy of it if he be

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1191
rewardable with it. The most eminent characters,
also, will be raore willing to accept the trust under
this condition, than if they foresee a necessary de
gradation at a fixed period.
Mr. Gerry. That the Executive should be in
dependent of the Legislature, is a clear point. The
longer the duration of his appointment, the more
wfll his dependence be dirainished. It will be
better, then, for hira to continue ten, fifteen, or even
twenty years, and-^be ineligible afterwards.
Mr. King was for making hira re-eligible. This
is too great an advantage to be given up, for the
sraall effect it will have on his dependence, if im
peachments are to lie. He considered these as
rendering the tenure during pleasure.
Mr. L. Martin, suspending his motion as to the
ineligibility, moved, " that the appointnient of the
Executive shall continue for eleven years."
Mr. Gerry suggested fifteen years.
Mr. King twenty years.* This is the medium
life of princes,
Mr. Davie eight years.
Mr. Wilson. The difficulties and perplexities
into which the House is thrown, proceed from the
election by the Legislature, which he was sorry had
been re-instated. The inconvenience of this raode
was such, that he would agree to almost any length
of time in order to get rid of the dependence which
must result from it. He was persuaded that the
longest term would not be equivalent to a proper

. This might possibly be meant as a caricature of the previous motions, in
order to defeat the object ofthem.

1192 debatesinthe [1787.
mode of election, unless indeed it should be during
good behaviour. It seemed to be supposed that
at a certain advance of life a continuance in
office would cease to be agreeable to the officer, as
well as desirable to the public. Experience had
shown in a variety of instances, that both a capacity
and inclination for public service existed in A^ery
advanced stages. He mentioned the instance of a
Doge of Venice who was elected after he was eighty
years of age. The Popes have generally been
elected at very advanced periods, and yet in no case
had a more steady or a better concerted policy been
pursued than in the Court of Rorae. If the Execu
tive should come into office at thirty-five years of
age, which he presumes may happen, and his con
tinuance should be fixed at fifteen years, at the age
of fifty, in the very prirae of life, and with all the
aid of experience, he must be cast aside like a useless
hulk. What an irreparable loss would the British
jurisprudence have sustained, had the age of fifty
been fixed there as the ultimate limit of capacity or
readiness to serve the public. The great luminary
Lord Mansfield^ held his seat for thirty years after
his arrival at that age. Notwithstanding what had
been done, he could not but hope that a better mode
of election would yet be adopted; and one that
would be more agreeable to the general sense of
the House. That time might be given for further
deliberation, he would raove that the present ques
tion be postponed till to-morrow. ,
Mr. Broom seconded the motion to postpone.
Mr. Gerry. We seera to be entirely at a loss on
this head. He would suggest whether it would not

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1193

be advisable to refer the clause relating to the
Executiye to the comraittee of detail to be appoint
ed. Perhaps they wfll be able to hit on something
that may unite the various opinions which have been
thrown out.
Mr. Wilson. As the great difficulty seeras to
spring from the raode of election, he would suggest
a raode which had not been raentioned. It was,
that the Executive be elected for six years by a
sraall nuraber, not raore than fifteen of the National
Legislature, to be drawn frora it, not by ballot, but
by lot, and who should retire iramediately and make
the election without separating. By this mode in
trigue would be avoided in the first instance, and the
dependence would be diminished. This was not, he
said, a digested idea, and might be liable to strong
objections. Mr. GouyERNEUR Morris. Of all possible modes
of appointment that by the Legislature is the worst.
If the Legislature is to appoint, and to irapeach, or
to influence the impeachraent, the Executive will be
the mere creature of it. He had been opposed to
the irapeachment, but was now convinced that im
peachments must be provided for, if the appointraent
was to be of any duration. No raan would say, that
an Executive known to be in the pay of an enemy
should not be removable in some way or other. He
had been charged heretofore, (by Col. MasoN), with
inconsistency in pleading for confidence in the Le
gislature on sorae occasions, and urging a distrust on
others. The charge was not well founded. The
Leo-islature is worthy of unbounded confidence m
some respects, and liable to equal distrust m others.
Vol. I.— 75*

1194 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
When their interest coincides precisely with that of
their constituents, as happens in many of their acts,
no abuse of trust is to be apprehended. When a
strong personal interest happens to be opposed to
the general interest, the Legislature cannot be too
much distrusted. In all public bodies there are two
parties. The Executive will necessarily be more
connected with one than with the other. There
will be a personal interest, therefbre, in one of the
parties, to oppose, as well as in the other to sup
port, him. Much had been said of the intrigues
^hat will be practised by the Executive to get into
office. Nothing had been said on the other side, of
the intrigues to get hira out of office. Sorae leader
of a party will alvvays covet his seat, will perplex
his administration, will cabal with the Legislature, till
he succeeds in supplanting him. This was the way
in which the King of England was got out, he meant
the real king, the Minister. This was the way in
which Pitt (Lord Chatham) forced hiraself into
place. Fox was for pushing the raatter still further.
If he had carried his India bill, which he was very
near doing, he would have made the Minister the
king in forra alraost, as well as in substance. Our
President wfll be the British Minister, yet we are
about to make him appointable by the Legislature.
Something has been said ofthe danger of raonarchy.
If a good governraent should not now be forraed, if a
good organization of the Executive should not be
provided, he doubted whether we should not have
soraething worse than a liraited monarchy. In or
der to get rid of the dependence of the Executive on
the Legislature, the expedient of making him ineli-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1195
gible a second tirae had been devised. This was as
much as to say, we should give hira the benefit of
experience, and then deprive ourselves of the use of
it. But make him ineligible a second tirae — and
prolong his duration even to fifteen years — wfll he,
by any wonderful interposition of Providence at that
period, cease to be a man ? No ; he will be unwil
ling to quit his exaltation ; the road to his object
through the Constitution will be shut ; he will be in
possession of the sword ; a civil war will ensue, and
the comraander of the victorious array, on which
ever side, wfll be the despot of Araerica. This con
sideration renders hira particularly anxious that the
Executive should be properly constituted. The
vice here would not, as in some other parts of the
systera, be curable. It is the raost difficult of all,
rightly to balance the Executive. Make hira too
weak — the Legislature will usurp his power. Make
him too strong — he wfll usurp on the Legislature.
He preferred a short period, a re-eligibflify, but a
different raode of election. A long period would
prevent an adoption of the plan. It ought to do so.
He should hiraself be afraid to tmst it. He was not
prepared to decide on Mr. Wilson's mode of election
just hmted by him. He thought it deserved con
sideration. It would be better that chance should
decide than intrigue.
On the question to postpone the consideration of
the resolution on the subject of the Executive,—
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, aye
 4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no— 6;
Delaware, divided.

1196 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
Mr. Wilson then moved, that the Executive be
chosen every  years by  Electors, to
be taken by lot from the National Legislature, who
shall proceed imraediately to the choice of the Ex
ecutive, and not separate until it be raade.
Mr. Carroll seconds the motion.
Mr. Gerry. This is committing too much to
chance. If the lot should fall on a set of unworthy
men, an unworthy Executive raust be saddled on
the country. He thought it had been demonstrated
that no possible mode of electing by the Legislature
could be a good one.
Mr. King. The lot might fall on a majority from
the same State, which would ensure the election of
a man from that State. We ought to be govemed
by reason, not by chance. As nobody seeraed to be
satisfied, he wished the raatter to be postponed.
Mr. Wilson did not move this as the best mode.
His opinion remained unshaken, that we ought to
resort to the people for the election. He seconded
the postponement.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris observed, that the chan
ces were alraost infinite against a majority of Elec
tors from the same State.
On a question whether the last motion was in or
der, it was determined in the affirmative, — ayes, 7;
noes, 4.
On the question of postponement, it was agreed
to, nem. con.
Mr. Carroll took occasion to observe, that he
considered the clause declaring that direct taxation
on the States should be in prppprtion to representa
tion, previous to the obtaining an actual census, as

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1197
very objectionable ; and that he reserved to himself
the right of opposing it, if the report ofthe Comrait
tee of detafl should leave it in the plan.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris hoped the Coraraittee
would strike out the whole of the clause proportion
ing direct taxation to representation. He had only
raeant it as a bridge* to assist us over a certain
gulf; having passed the gulf, the bridge raay be
removed. He thought the principle laid down with
so mucn strictness liable to strong objections.
On a ballot for a comraittee to report a Constitu
tion conforraable to the Resolutions passed by the
Convention, the raembers chosen were : —
Mr. Rutledge, Mr. Randolph, Mr. Gorham, Mr.
Ellsworth, Mr. Wilson.
On motion to discharge the Comraittee of the
Whole frora the propositions subraitted to the Con
vention by Mr. C. Pinckney as the basis of a Con
stitution, and to refer thera to the Coramittee of De
tail just appointed, it was agreed to, nem, con.
A like raotion was then made and agreed to, nem.
con., with respect to the propositions of Mr. Patter
son. Adjourned.

Wednesday, July 25th.
In Convention, — The clause lel ating to the Execu
tive being again under consideration, —
» The object vi?as to lessen the eagemess, on one side, for, and the opposition,
on the other, to the share of representation claimed by the Southem States on
account of the negroes.

1198 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
Mr. Ellsworth raoved, " that the Executive be ap
pointed by the Legislature, except when the raagis
trate last chpsen shall have cpntinued in office the
whole terra for which he was chosen, and be re-eli
gible ; in which case the choice shall be by Electors
appointed by the Legislatures of the States for that
purpose." By this raeans a deserving raagistrate
raay be re-elected without making him dependent on
the Legislature.
Mr. Gerry repeated his remark, that an election
at all by the National Legislature was radically and
incurably wrong ; and moved, " that the Executive
be appointed by the Governors and Presidents of the
States, with advice of their Councfls; and where
there are no Councfls, by Electors chosen by the
Legislatures. The Executives to vote in the follow
ing proportions, viz :  ¦  ."
Mr. Madison. There are objections against every
mode that has been, or perhaps can be, proposed.
The election must be made, either by some existing
authority under the National or State Constitutions,
— or. by sorae special authority derived frora the
people, — or by the people theraselves. The two ex
isting authorities under the National Constitution
would be the Legislative and Judiciary. The lat
ter he presuraed was out of the question. The
forraer Avas, in his judgraent, liable to insuperable
objections. Besides the general influence of that
mode on the independence of the Executive, in the
first place, the election of the chief magistrate would
agitate and divide the Legislature so much, that the
public interest would raaterially suffer by it. Pub
lic bodies are always apt to be thrown into conten-

1787.] federal convention. 1199
tions, but into more violent ones by such occasions
than by any others. In the second place, the can
didate would intrigue with the Legislature ; would
derive his appointraent frora the predorainant fac
tion, and be apt to render his adrainistration subser
vient to its views. In the thhd place, the rainisters
of foreign powers would have, and would raake use
of, the opportunity to raix theh intrigues and influ
ence with the election. Liraited as the powers of
the Executive are, it will be an object of great mo
raent with the great rival powers of Europe who
have Araerican possessions, to have at the head of
our government a man attached to their respective
politics and interests. No pains, nor perhaps ex
pense, will be spared, to gain from the Legislature
an appointment favorable to their wishes. Gerraany
and Poland are witnesses of this danger. In the
fonner, the election of the Head of the Erapire, till
it became in a manner hereditary, interested all Eu
rope, and was much influenced by foreign , inter
ference. In the latter, although the elective magis
trate has very little real power, his election has at
all times produced the most eager interference of
foreign princes, and has in fact at length slid en
tirely into foreign hands. The existing authorities
in the States are the Legislative, Executive and Ju
diciary. The appointment of tjie National Execu
tive by the first was objectionable in raany points of
view, sorae of which had been already mentioned.
He would mention one which of itself would decide
his opinion. The Legislatures of the States had
betrayed a strong propensity to a, variety of perni
cious measures. One object of the National Legis-

1200 debates in the [1787.
lature was to control this propensity. One object
of the National Executive, so far as it would have
a negative on the laws, was to control the Na
tional Legislature, so far as it might be infected with
a similar propensity. Refer the appointment of the
National Executive to the State Legislatures, and
this controlling purpose may be defeated. The Le
gislatures ean and will act with some kind of regu
lar plan, and will proraote the appointraent of a man
who will not oppose himself to a favorite object.
Should a raajority of the Legislatures, at the tirae
of election, have the sarae object, or different objects
of the sarae kind, the National Executive would
be rendered subservient to thera. An appoint
ment by the State Executives was liable, among
other objections, to this insuperable one, that being
standing bodies, they could and would be courted,
and intrigued with by the candidates, by their par
tizans, and by the ministers of foreign powers. The
State Judiciaries had not been, and he presumed
would not be, proposed as a proper source of ap
pointraent. The option before us, then, lay be
tween an appointment by Electors chosen by the
people, and an iraraediate appointraent by the peo
ple. He thought the forraer raode free frora raany
of the objections which had been urged against it,
and greatly preferable to an appointment by the Na
tional Legislature. As the Electors would be chosen
* for the occasion, would meet at once, and proceed
. immediately to an appointment, there would be very
little opportunity for cabal, or corruption : as a further
precaution, it might be required that they should
' meet at some place distinct from the seat of govern-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION, 1201
ment ; and even that no person within a certain dis
tance of the place at the time, should be eligible.
This mode, however, had been rejected so recently,
and by so great a majority, that it probably would
not be proposed anew. The remaining raode was
an election by the people, or rather by the qualified
part of thera at large. With all its iraperfections,
he liked this best. He would not repeat either the
general arguraents for, or the objections against,
this mode. He would only take notice of two diffi
culties, which he admitted to have weight. The
first arose frora the disposition in the people to pre
fer a citizen of their own State, and the disadvan
tage this would throAv on the sraaller States. Great
as this objection raight be, he did not think it equal
to such as lay against every other raode which had
been proposed. He thought, top, that some expedi
ent might be hit upon that would obviate it. The
second difficulty arose from the disproportion of
qualified voters in the Northern and Southern States,
and the disadvantages which this mode would throw
on the latter. The answer to this objection Avas —
in the first place, that this disproportion Avould be
continually decreasing under the influence of the
republican laws introduced in the Southern States,
and the more rapid increase of their population ; in
the second place, that local considerations must give
wav to the general interest. As an individual from
the Sputhern States, he was willing to make the
sacrifice. Mr. Ellsworth. The pbjectipn drawn frpm the
different sizes pf the States is unanswerable. The
citizens pf the largest States wpuld invariably pre-
Vpl. I.— 76

1202 debates in the [1787.
fer the candidate within the State ; and the largest
States would invariably have the man.
On the question on Mr. Ellsworth's motion, as
above, — New Hampshire, Connecticut, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, aye — 4 ; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Del
aware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, no — 7.
Mr. Pinckney moA'^ed, " that the election by the
Legislature be qualified with a proviso, that no per
son be eligible for more than six years in any twelve
years." He thought this would have all the advan
tage, and at the same tirae avoid in sorae degree the
inconvenience, of an absolute ineligibflity a second
tirae. Col. Mason approved the idea. It had the sanc
tion of experience in the instance of Congress, and
some of the Executives of the States. It rendered
the Executive as effectually independent, as an inel
igibflity after his first election ; and opened the way,
at the same time, for the advantage of his future
services. He preferred on the whole the election
by the National Legislature ; though candor obliged
him to admit, that there was great danger of foreign
influence, as had been suggested. This was the
most serious objection, with him, that had been
urged, Mr. Butler. The two great evfls to be av^oided
are, cabal at home, and influence frora abroad. It
will be difficult to avoid either, if the election be
made by the National Legislature. On the other
hand the Gpvernraent should not be raade so cora
plex and unwieldy as to disgust the States. This
would be the case if the election should be referred

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1203
to the people. He liked best an election by Electors
chosen by the Legislatui^es of the States. He was
against a re-eligibility at all events. He was also
against a ratio of votes in the States. An equality
should prevafl in this case. The reasons for depart
ing from it do not hold in the case of the Executive,
as in that of the Legislature.
Mr. Gerry approved of Mr. Pinckney's motion, as
lessening the evil.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris was against a rotation
in every case. It formed a political school, in which
we were always governed by the scholars, and not
by the masters. The evfls to be guarded against in
this case are,— first, the undue influence of the Le
gislature ; secondly, instabflity of councfls ; thirdly,
misconduct in office. To guard against the first, we
run into the second evil. We adopt a rotation which
produces instability of councils. To avoid Scylla
we fall into Charyhdis. A change of men is eyer
followed by a change of raeasures. We see this
fully exeraplified in the vicissitudes araong ourselves,
particularly in the State of Pennsylvania. The
self-sufficiency of a victorious party scorns to tread
in the paths of their predecessors. Rehoboam will
not iraitate Soloraon. Secondly, the rotation in of
fice wfll not prevent intrigue and dependence on the
Legislature. The man in office will look forward to
the period at which he will becorae re-eligible. The
distance of the period, the improbability of such a
protraction of his life, wfll be no obstacle. Such is the
nature of man--forraed by his bencA-olent Author, no
doubt, for wise ends — that .although he knows his
existence to be liraited to a span, he takes his mea-

1204 DEBATESINTHE [ 1787.
sures as if he were to live forever. But taking an
other supposition, the inefficacy of the expedient
will be manifest. If the magistrate does not look
forward to his re-election to the Executive, he will
be pretty sure to keep in view the opportunity of his
going into the Legislature itself He will have little
objection then to an extension of power on a theatre
where he expects to act a distinguished part ; and
. wfll be very unwflling to take any step that raay
endanger his popularity with the Legislature, on his
influence over which the figure he is to raake will
depend. Finally, to avoid the third evil, irapeach
raents will be essential ; and hence an additional
reason against an election by the Legislature, He
¦ considered an election by the people as the best,
¦ by the Legislature as the worst, raode. Putting
both these aside, he could not but favor the idea
of Mr. Wilson, of inti*oducing a raixture of lot. It
will dirainish, if not destroy, both cabal and de
pendence. Mr. Williamson was sensible that strong objec
tions lay against an election of the Executive by the
Legislature, and t^at it opened a door for foreign
influence. The principal objection against an elec
tion by the people seeraed to be, the disadvantage
under which it would place the sraaller States. He
suggested as a cure for this difficulty, that each raan
should vote for three candidates ; one of thera, he
observed, would be probably of his oAvn State, the
other two of sorae other States ; and as probably of
a small as a large one.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris liked the idea ; suggest
ing as an araendraent, that each man should vote for

1787.] FEDERAL CPNVENTIPN. 1205
twp perspns, pne pf whora at least should not be of
his own State.
Mr. Madison also thought soraething valuable
raight be raade of the suggestion, with the proposed
araendraent of it. The second best man in this case
would probably be the first in fact. The only ob
jection which occurred was, that each citizen, after
having given his vote for his favorite fellow citizen,
would throw away his second on some obscure citizen
of another State, in order to ensure the object of liis
first choice. But it could hardly be supposed that
the citizens of many States would be so sanguine of
having their favorite elected, as not to give their
second vote with sincerity to the next object of their
choice. It might, moreover, be provided, in favor of
the smaller States, that the Executive should not be
eligible raore than  tiraes in  years frora
the same State.
Mr. Gerry. A popular election in this case is
radically vicious. The ignorance of the people
would put it in the power of some one set of men
dispersed through the Union, and acting in concert,
to delude thera into any appointraent. He observed
that such a society of men existed in the Order of
the Cincinnati. They are respectable, united and
influential. They wfll, in fact, elect the Chief Mag
istrate in every instance, if the election be referred
to the people. His respect for the characters com
posing this Society, could not blind him to the dan
ger and irapropriety of throwing such a power into
their hands.
Mr. Dickinson. As far as he could judge from
the discussions which had taken place during his

1206 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
attendance, insuperable objections lay against an
election of the Executive by the National Legisla
ture ; as also by the Legislatures or Executives of
the States. He had long leaned towards an election
by the people, which he regarded as the best and
purest source. Objections he was aware lay against
this mode, but not so great, he thought, as against
the other modes. The greatest difficulty, in the
opinion" of the House, seeraed to arise from the par
tiality of the States to their respective citizens. But
might not this very partiality be turned to a useful
purpose ? Let the people of each State choose its
best citizen. The people will know the most em
inent characters of their own States ; and the peo
ple of different States will feel an emulation in
selecting those of whom they will have the greatest
reason to be proud. Out of the thirteen names thus
selected, an Executive Magistrate may be chosen
either by the National Legislature, or by Electors
appointed by it.
On a question which was raoved, for postponing
Mr, Pinckney's raotion, in order to make way for
some such proposition as had been hinted by Mr.
Williamson and others, it passed in the negative, —
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Virginia, aye — 5 ; New Harapshire, Massachusetts,
Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
no — 6.
On Mr. Pinckney's motion, that no person shall
serve in the Executive more than six years in
twelve years, it passed in the negative, — New
Hampshhe, Massachusetts, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye— 5; Connecticut, New Jersey,

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1207
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no
—6. On a raotion that the raerabers of the Comraittee
be furnished with copies of the proceedings, it was
so deterrained, South Carolina alone being in the
negative. It was then moved, that the members of the
House might take copies of the Resolutions which
had been agreed to ; which passed in the negative,
— Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia,
North Carolina, aye — 5; New Hampshire, Massa
chusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, South Carolina,
Georgia, no — 6-
Mr. Gerry and Mr. Butler moved to refer the
resolution relating to the Executive (except the
clause making it consist of a single person) to the
Comraittee of detail.
Mr. Wilson hoped that so iraportant a branch
of the system would not be committed, untfl a
general principle should be fixed by a A^ote of the
House. Mr. Langdon was for the coraraitment.
Adjourned.

Thursday, July 26th.
In Convention,— Mr. Mason, In every stage of
the question relative to the Executive, the difficulty
of the subject and the diversity ofthe opinions con
cerning it, have appeared. Nor have any of the
modes of constituting that Department been satis-

1208 debates in the [1787.
factory. First, it has been proposed that the elec
tion should be raade by the people at large ; that is,
that an act wliich ought to be perforraed by those
who know raost of erainent characters and qualifica
tions, should be performed by those who know least;
secondly, that the election should be made by the
Legislatures of the States ; thirdly, by the Executives
of the States. Against these modes, also,, strong ob
jections have been urged. Fourthly, it has been
proposed that the election should be made by Elec
tors cliosen by the people for that purpose. This
was at first agreed to ; but on furtiier consideration
has been rejected. Fifthly, since which, the raode
of Mr. Williamson, requiring each freeholder to
vote for several candidates, has been proposed. This
seeraed, like raany other propositions, to carry a
plausible face, but on closer inspection is liable to
fatal objections. A popular election in any forra, as
Mr, Gerry has observed, would throAV the appoint
raent into the hands of the Cincinnati, a society for
the raembers of which he had a great respect, but
which he never wished to have a preponderating in
fluence in the government. Sixthly, another ex
pedient was proposed by Mr. Dickinson, whicii is
liable to so palpable and material an inconvenience,
that he had little doubt of its being by this time
rejected by himself It would exclude every man
who happened not to be popular within his own
State ; Ihough the causes of his local unpopularity
might be of such a nature, as to recoraraend him to
the States at large. Seventhly, among other ex
pedients, a lottery has been introduced. But as the
tickets do not appear to be in much demand, it wiU

1787.] federal convention, 1209
probably not be carried on, and nothing therefore
need be said on that subject. After reviewing all
these various modes, he was led to conclude, that
an election by the National Legislature, as originally
proposed, was the best. If it was liable to objec
tions, it was liable to fewer than any other.^ He
conceived, at the sarae time, that a second election
ought to be absolutely prohibited. Having for his
primary object — for the polar star of his political
conduct— -the preservation of the rights of the
people, he held it as an essential point, as the very
palladium of civil liberty, that the great officers of
state, and particularly the Executive, should at fixed
periods return to that raass frora which they were
at first taken, in order that they raay feel and re
spect those rights and interests which are again to
be personally valuable to them. He concluded with
moving, that the constitution of the Executive, as
reported by the Coraraittee of the Whole, be re
instated, viz, " that the Executive be appointed for
seven years, and be ineligible a second tirae."
Mr. Davie seconded the motion.
Doctor Franklin. It seems to have been iraagined
by sorae, that the returning to the raass of the people
was degrading the magistrate. This he thought
was contrary to republican principles. In free gov
ernments the rulers are the servapts, and the people
their superiors and sovereigns. For the former,
therefore, to return araong the latter, was not to de
grade, but to promote, thera. And it would be ira
posing an unreasonable burden on thera, to keep
them always in a state of servitude, and not allow
them to become again one of the masters.
Vol. I.— 76*

1210 debates in the [1787.
On the question on Col. Mason's motion, as above,
it passed in the affirmative, —
New Harapshire, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 7;
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, no — 3; Mas
sachusetts, not on the flbor.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris was now against the
whole paragraph. In answer to Col. Mason's posi
tion, that a periodical return of the great officers of
the state into the raass of the people was the palla-
diura of civil liberty, he would observe, that on the
same principle the Judiciary ought to be periodically
degraded ; certain it was, that the Legislature ought,
on every principle, yet no one had proposed, or con
ceived that the raerabers of it should not be re-eli
gible. Ill ansAvbr to Doctor Franklin, that a return
into the raass of the people would be a promotion,
instead of a degradation, he had no doubt that our
Executive, like most others, would have too much
patriotism to shrink from the burthen of his office,
and too much modesty not to be willing to decline
the promotion.
On the question on the whole Resolution, as
amended, in the words following : " that a Natibnal
Executive be instituted, to consist of a single person,
to be chosen by the National Legislature, for the
terra of seven years, to be ineligible a second tirae,
with power to carry into execution the national
laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise pro
vided for, to be reraovable on irapeachment and con
viction of raal-practice or neglect of duty, to receive
a fixed corapensation for the devotion of his tirae to

1787.] federal convention. 1211
the public service, to be paid out of the national
Treasury,"-^it passed in the affirmative, —
New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 6 ; Pennsyl
vania, Delaware, Maryland, no — 3 ; Massachusetts,
not on the floor; Virginia, divided — Mr. Blair and Col.
Mason, aye ; General Washington and Mr. Madison,
no. Mr. Randolph happened to be out of the House.
Mr. Mason raoved, " that the Coraraittee of Detail
be instructed to receive a clause requiring certain
qualifications of landed property, and citizenship of
the United States, in merabers of the National Le
gislature ; and disqualifying persons having unsettled
accounts with, or being indebted to, theUnited States,
frora being members of the National Legislature."
He observed that persons of the latter descriptions
had frequently got into the State Legislatures, in
order to promote laws that might shelter their delin
quencies ; and that this evil had crept into Congress,
if report was to be regarded.
Mr. Pinckney seconded the motion.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris. If qualifications are
proper, he would prefer thera in the electors, rather
than the elected. As to debtors of the United
States, they are but few. As to persons having un
settled accounts, he believed them to be pretty many.
He thought, however, that such a discrimination to
be both odious and useless, and in many instances,
unjust and crael. The delay of settleraent had
been raore the fault of the public, than of the indi
viduals. What will be done with those patriotic
citizens who have lent money, or services, or prop
erty, to their country, without having been yet able

1212 DEBATESINTHE [1787.
to obtain a liquidation of their clairas ? Are they
to be excluded ?
Mr. Gorham was for leavmg to the Legislature
the providing against such abuses as had been raen
tioned. Col. Mason raentioned the parliaraentary qualifi
cations adopted in the reign of Q,ueen Anne, which
he said had met with universal approbation.
Mr. Madison had Avitnessed the zeal of raen hav
ing accounts with the public, to get into the Legis
latures for sinister purposes. He thought, howcA^er,
that if any precaution were taken for excluding
thera, the one proposed by Col. Mason ought to be
re-raodelled. It raight be well to limit the exclu
sion to persons who had received money from the
public, and had not accounted for it.
Mr, Gouverneur Morris. It was a precept of great
antiquity, as well as of high authority, that we should
not be righteous overmuch. He thought we ought
to be equally on our guard against being wise over
much. The proposed regulation would enable the
Government to exclude particular persons from office
as long as they pleased. He mentioned the case of the
Coraraander-in-Chief 'S presenting his account for se
cret services, which, he said, was so raoderate that ev
ery one was astonished at it ; and so siraple that no
doubt could arise on it. Yet, had the Auditor been dis
posed to delay the settleraent, how easily he raight
have effected it, and how cruel would it be in such a
case to keep a distinguished and meritorious citizen
under a temporary disabflity and disfranchisement.
He mentioned this case, raerely to illustrate the objec
tionable nature of the proposition. He was opposed to

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1213
such minutious regulations in a Constitution. The
parliamentary qualifications quoted by Col. Mason
had been disregarded in practice ; and were but a
scherae of the landed against the raonieJ interest.
Mr. Pinckney and General Pinckney inoved to
insert, by way of amendment, the words, " Judiciary
and Executive," so as to extend the qualifications to
those Departraents ; which Avas agreed to, nem. con.
Mr. Gerry thought the inconvenience of excluding
a few worthy individuals, who raight be public
debtors, or have unsettled accounts, ought not to be
put in the scale against the public advantages of
the regulation, and that the motion did not go far
enough. Mr. King observed, that there might be great
danger in requiring landed property as a qualifica
tion: since it might exclude the moneyed interest,
whose aids may be essential in particular eraer
gencies to the public safety.
Mr. Dickinson was against any recital of qualifi
cations in the Constitution. It was irapossible to
make a complete one ; and a partial one would, by
iraplication, tie up the hands of the Legislature from
supplying the omissions. The best defence lay in
the freeholders who were to elect the Legislature. [
Whilst this resource should remain pure, the public
interest would be safe. If it ever should be coiTupt, ^
no little expedients would repel the danger. He
doubted the policy of interAveaving into a republican
Constitution a veneration for wealth. He had al
ways understood that a veneration for poverty and
vhtue were the objects of republican encourage
ment. It seemed improper that any man of merit

1214 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
should be subjected to disabilities in a republic,
where merit was understood to forra the great title
to public trust, honors, and rewards.
Mr. Gerry. If prpperty be one object of gov
ernraent, provisions to secure it cannot be ira
proper. Mr. Madison raoved to strike out the word " land
ed," before the Avord " qualifications." If the propo
sition should be agreed to, he Avished the Coramittee
to be at liberty to report the best criterion they
could devise. Landed possessions were no certain
evidence of real wealth. Many enjoyed them to a
great extent who were more in debt than they were
AA^orth. The unjust laAVS of the States had proceed
ed more from this class of men, than any others. It
had often happened that men who had acquired
landed property on credit got into the Legislatures
with a view of promoting an unjust protection
against their creditors. In the next place, if a
small quantity of land should be raade the standard,
it would be no security ; if a large one, it would
exclude the proper representatives of those classes
of citizens, who were not landholders. It vvas
politic as well as just, that the interests and rights
of every class should be duly represented and under
stood in the public councils. It was a provision
every where established, that the country should be
divided into districts, and representatives taken from
each, in order that the Legislative assembly raight
equally understand and syrapathize with the rights
of the people in every part of the coraraunity. It
was not less proper, that every class of citizens
should have an opportunity of making then- rights

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1215
be felt and understood in the public councfls. The
three principal classes into which our citizens were
divisible, were the landed, the commercial, and the
manufacturing. The second and third class bear, as
yet, a small proportion to the first. The proportion,
however, will daily increase. We see in the popu
lous countries of Europe now, what we shall be
hereafter. These classes understand much less of
each other's interests and affairs, than men of the
same class inhabiting different districts. It is par
ticularly requisite, therefore, that the interests of
one or twp pf thera, shpuld not be left entirely to the
care or irapartiality of the third. This must be the
case, if landed qualifications should be required ;
few of the mercantile, and scarcely any of the manu
facturing, class, choosing, whilst they continue in
business, to turn any part of their stock into landed
property. For these reasons he wished, if it were
possible, that some other criterion than the mere
possession of land should be devised. He concurred
with Mr. Gouverneur Morris in thinking that
qualifications in the electors would be much more
effectual than in the elected. The forraer would
discriminate between real and ostensible property
in the latter ; but he was aware of the difficulty of
forming any uniform standard that would suit the
different circurastances and opinions prevailing in
the different States.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconded the raotion.
On the question for striking out " landed,"— New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia; aye— 10; Maryland, no. 1.

1216 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
On the question on the first part of Colonel Ma
son's proposition, as to "qualification of property
and citizenship," as so araended, — New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8;
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, no — 3.
The second part, for disqualifymg debtors, and
persons having unsettled accounts, being under con
sideration, —
Mr. Carroll moved to strike out, " having unset
tled accounts."
Mr. Gorham seconded the raotion ; observing, that
it Avould put the coraraercial and raanufacturing part
of the people on a worse footing than others, as they
would be most likely to have dealings with the
public. Mr. L. Martin. If these words should be stmck
out, and the remaining words concerning debt
ors retained, it will be the interest of the latter
class to keep their accounts unsettled as long as
possible. Mr. Wilson was for striking them out. They put
too much power in the hands of the auditors, who
might corabine with rivals in delaying settlements,
in order to prolong the disqualifications of particular
men. We should consider that we are providing a
Constitution for future generations, and not merely
for the peculiar circumstances of the moment. The
time has been, and will again be, when the public
safety may depend on the voluntary aids of individ
uals, Avhich wfll necessarily open accounts with the
public ; and When such accounts wfll be a charac
teristic of patriotism. Besides, a partial enumera-

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1217
tion of cases wfll disable the Legislature from dis-
qualifiying odious and dangerous characters.
Mr. Langdon was for striking out the whole
clause, for the reasons given by Mr, Wilson, So
many exclusions, he thought, too, would render the
system unacceptable to the people.
Mr, Gerry, If the arguments used to-day were
to prevail, we might have a Legislature coraposed
of public debtprs, pensioners, placeraen and contrac
tors. He thought the proposed disqualifications
would be pleasing to the people. They will be con
sidered as a security against unnecessary or undue
burdens being iraposed on thera. He moved to add,
" pensioners" to the disqualified characters ; which
was negatived, — Massachusetts, Maryland, Georgia,
aye— 3 ; New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, South Carolina,
no — 7; Nortii Carolina, divided,
Mr, Gouverneur Morris, The last clause, rela
ting to public debtors, will exclude every importing
merchant. Revenue will be drawn, it is foreseen, as
much as possible from trade. Duties, of course, will
be bonded ; and the merchants will remain debtors
to the public. He repeated that it had not been so
much the fault of individuals, as of the public, that
transactions between them, had not been more gen
erally liquidated and adjusted. At all events, to
draw from our short and scanty experience rules
that are to operate through succeeding ages, does
not savor much of real wisdom.
On the question for striking out, " persons having
unsettled accounts with the United States,"— New
Hampshu-e, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylva-
VoL, I.— 77

1218 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
nia, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, aye — 9; New Jersey, Georgia,
no— 2.
Mr, Ellsworth was for disagreeing to the re
raainder of the clause disqualifying public debtors ;
and for leaving to the wisdora of the Legislature,
and the virtue of the citizens, the task of providing
against such evils. Is the sraallest as well as the
largest debtor to be excluded ? Then every arrear
of taxes will disqualify. Besides, how is it to be
known to the people, when they elect, who are, or
are not, public debtors. The exclusion of pension
ers and placeraen in England is founded on a con
sideration not existing here. As persons of that
sort are dependent on the crown, they tend to in
crease its influence.
Mr. Pinckney said he was at first a friend to the
proposition, for the sake of the clause relating to
qualifications of property ; but he disliked the exclu
sion of public debtors ; it went too far. It would
exclude persons who had purchased confiscated
property, or should purchase western territory of the
public ; and raight be some obstacle to the sale of
the latter.
On the question for agreeing to the clause dis
qualifying public debtors, —
North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 2; New Hamp
shire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South
Carolina, no — 9. ^'
Colpnel Maspn observed that it would be proper,
as he thought, that some prpvisipn shpuld be made m
the Cpnstitutipn against chposing for the seat of the

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1219
General Governraent the city or place at which
the seat of any State Governraent might be fixed.
There were two objections against having them at
the sarae place, which, without mentioning others,
required some precaution on the subject. The first
was, that it tended to produce disputes conceming
jurisdiction. The second and principal one was,
that the intermixture of the two Legislatures tended
to give a provincial tincture to the national delibe
rations. He moved that the Coraraittee be instructed
to receive a clause to prevent the seat of the Na
tional Governraent being in the same city or tovvn
with the seat of the Government of any State, long
er than untfl the necessary public buildings could
be erected.
Mr. Alexander Martin seconded the motion.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris did not dislike the idea,
but was apprehensive that such a clause raight make
enemies of Philadelphia and New York, which had
expectations of becoming the seat of the General
Grovernment. Mr. Langdon approved the idea also ; but suggest
ed the case of a State moving its seat of government
to the national seat after the erection of the public
buildings, Mr, Gorham, The precaution may be evaded by
the National Legislature, by delaying to erect the
public buildings.
Mr. Gerry conceived it to be the general sense of
America, that neither the seat of a State Govern
ment, nor any large commercial city should be the
seat of the General Government.
Mr. Williamson liked the idea ; but knowing how

1220 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
much the passions of men were agitated by this
matter, was apprehensive of turning them against
the system. He apprehended, also, that an evasion
might be practised in the way hinted by Mr. Gor
ham. Mr. Pinckney thought the seat of a State Govern
ment ought to be avoided ; but that a large town,
or its vicinity, would be proper for the seat of the
General Government.
Col. Mason did not raean to press the raotion at
this tirae, nor to excite any hostile passions against
the systera. He was content to withdraw the mo
tion for the present.
Mr. Butler was for fixing, by the Constitution,
the place, and a central one, for the seat of the Na
tional Governraent.
The proceedings since Monday last were unani
mously referred to the Comraittee of Detail ; and
the Convention then unaniraously adjourned till
Monday, August 6th, that the Coraraittee of Detail
might have time to prepare and report the Consti
tution. The whole Resolutions, as referred, are as
follows :
1. Resolved, That the Government of the United
States ought to consist of a supreme Legislative, Ju
diciary, and Executive.
2. Resolved, That the Legislature consist of two
branches. 3. Resolved, That the raembers of the first branch
of the Legislature ought to be elected by the people
of the several States for the term of two years • to
be paid out of the public treasury ; to receive an

1787.] federal convention. 1221
adequate corapensation for their services ; to be of
the age of twenty-five years at least ; to be ineligi
ble to, and incapable of holding, any office under the
authority of the United States (except those pecu
liarly belonging to the functions of the first branch)
during the term of service of the first branch.
4. Resolved, That the members of the second
branch of the Legislature of the United States ought
to be chosen by the individual Legislatures ; to be
of the age of thirty years at least ; to hold their offi
ces for six years, one-third to go out biennally ; to
receive a compensation for the devotion of their tirae
to the public service ; to be ineligible to, and inca
pable of holding, any office under the authority of
the United States (except those peculiarly belonging
to the functions of the second branch) during the
term for which they are elected, and for one year
thereafter. 5. Resolved, That each branch ought to possess
the right of originating acts.
6. Resolved, That the National Legislature ought
to possess the legislative rights vested in Congress
by the Confederation ; and, moreover, to legislate in
aU cases for the general interests of the Union, and
also in those to which the States are separately in
competent, or in which the harmony of the United
States may be interrupted by the exercise of indi
vidual legislation.
7. Resolved, That the legislative acts of the Uni
ted States, made by virtue and in pursuance of the
Articles of Union, and all treaties made and ratified
under the authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme law of the respective States, as far as

1222 debates in the £1787.
those acts or treaties shall relate to the said States,
or their citizens and inhabitants ; and that the Judi
ciaries of the several States shall be bound thereby
in their dedsions, any thing in the respective laws
of the individual States to the contrary notwith
standing. 8. Resolved, That in the original formation of the
Legislature of the United States, the first branch
thereof shall consist of sixty-five members ; of which
number. New Hampshire shall send . three,
Massachusetts  eight,
Rhode Island  one,
Connecticut  five,
New York  six,
New Jersey  four,
Pennsylvania  eight,
Delaware  one,
Maryland  six,
Virginia  ten,
North Carolina  five.
South Carolina  five,
Georgia  three.
But as the present situation of the states, may prob
ably alter in the number of their inhabitants, the Le-
gislature of the United States shall be authorized,
frora time to tirae, to apportion the nuraber of represen
tatives ; and in case any of the States shall hereafter
be divided, or enlarged by addition of territory, or
any two or raore States united, or any new States cre
ated within the limits of the United States, the Le
gislature of the United States shall possess authority
to regulate the number of representatives, in any of

1787.] federal convention. 1223
the foregoing cases, upon the principle of their num
ber of inhabitants, according to the provisions here
after mentioned, naraely — Provided always, that
representation ought to be proportioned to direct
taxation. And in order to ascertain the alteration
in the direct taxation, which may be required from
time to time, by the changes in the relative circum
stances of the States, —
9. Resolved, That a census be taken within six
years from the first meeting of the Legislature of
the United States, and once within the term of every
ten years afterwards, of all the inhabitants of the
United States, in the raanner and according to the
ratio recoraraended by Congress in their resolution
pf the eighteenth of April, 1783 ; and that the Le
gislature of the United States shall proportion the
direct taxation accordingly.
10. Resolved, That all bills for raising or appro
priating money, and for fixing the salaries of the
officers of the Government of the United States,
shall originate in the first branch of the Legisla
ture of the United States, and shall not be altered
or amended by the second branch; and that no
money shall be drawn from the public treasury, but
m pursuance of appropriations to be originated by
the first branch.
11. Resolved, That in the second branch of the
Legislature of the United States, each State shall
have an equal vote.
12. Resolved, That a National Executive be insti
tuted, to consist of a single person ; to be chosen by
the National Legislature, for the term of seven
years ; to be ineligible a second time ; with power

1224 DEBATES IN THE [1787,
to carry into execution the national laws ; to appoint
to offices in cases not otherwise provided for ; to be
removable on irapeachment, and conviction of mal
practice or neglect of duty ; to receive a fixed com
pensation for the devotion of his time to the public
service, to be paid out of the public treasury.
13. Resolved, That the National Executive shall
have a right to negative any legislative act ; which
shall not be afterwards passed, unless by two third
parts of each branch of the National Legislature.
14. Eesolved, That a National Judiciary be estab
lished, to consist of one suprerae tribunal, the Judges
of which shall be appointed by the second branch
of the national Legislature ; to hold their offices du
ring good behaviour; to receive punctually at stated
times, a fixed compensation for their services, in
which no diminution shall be made so as to affect
the persons actually in office at the tirae of such di
minution. 15. Resolved, That the National Legislature be
empowered to appoint inferior tribunals.
16. Resolved, That the jurisdiction of the Na
tional Judiciary shall extend to cases arising under
laws passed by the General Legislature ; and to such
other questions as involve the national peace and
harraony. 17. Resolved, That provision ought to be made
for the admission of States lawfully arising within
the limits of the United States, whether from a
voluntary junction of government and territory,
or otherwise, with the consent of a number of
voices in the National Legislature less than the
whple.

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1225
18. Resolved, That a republican forra of govern
ment shall be guaranteed to each State ; and that
each State shall be protected against foreign and
doraestic violence.
19. Resolved, That provision ought to be raade
for the araendraent of the Articles of Union, when
soever it shall seera necessary.
20. Resolved, That the Legislative, Executive and
Judiciary poAvers, within the several States, and of
the National Government, ought to be bound, by
oath, to support the Articles of Union.
21. Resolved, That the araendraents which shall
be offered to the Confederation by the Convention
ought, at a proper tirae or times, after the approba
tion of Congress, to be subraitted to an asserably, or
assemblies, of representatives, recomraended by the
several Legislatures, to be expressly chosen by the
people to consider and decide thereon.
22. Resolved, That the representation in the sec
ond branch of the Legislature of the United States
shall consist of tvvo members from each State, who
shall vote per capita.
23. Resolved, That it be an instruction to the
Committee to whom were referred the proceedings
of the Convention for the establishraent of a Nation
al Government, to receive a clause, or clauses, re
quiring certain qualifications of property and citizen
ship in the United States, for the Executive, the
Judiciary, and the merabers of both branches of the
Legislature of the United States. "^
With the above Resolutions were referred the
propositions offered by Mr. C. Pinckney pn the
VoL.L-77*

1226 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
twenty-ninth of May, and by Mr. Patterson on the
fifteenth of June.
Adjourned.

Monday, August 6th.
In Convention, — Mr. John Francis Mercer, from
Maryland, took his seat.
Mr. Rutledge delivered in the Report of the Com
mittee of Detail, as follows — a printed copy being
at the sarae tirae furnished to each raeraber :
We the people of the States of New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Providence Plan
tations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Penn
sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Car
olina, South Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, de
clare, and establish the following Constitution for
the government of ourselves and our posterity.
Article I.
The style of the Government shall be, " The Uni
ted States of Araerica." Article II.
The Government shall consist of supreme Legis
lative, Executive, and Judicial powers.
Article III.
The legislative power shall be vested in a Con
gress, to consist of two separate and distinct bodies
of men, a House of Representatives and a Senate;

1787.] federal convention. 1227
each of which shall in all cases have a negative on
the other. The Legislature shall meet on the first
Monday in December in every year.
Article IV.
Sect. 1. The raembers of the House of Represen
tatives shall be chosen every second year, by the
people of the several States coraprehended within
this Union. The qualifications of the electors shall
be the sarae frora time to time, as those of the elec
tors in the several States, of the most numerous
branch of their own Legislatures.
Sect. 2. Every member of the House of Repre
sentatives shall be of the age of twenty-five years at
least ; shall have been a citizen in the United States
for at least three years before his election ; and shall
be, at the time of his election, a resident of the State
in which he shall be chosen.
Sect. 3. The House of Representatives shall, at
its first formation, and until the nuraber of citizens
and inhabitants shall be taken in the manner here
inafter described, consist of sixty-five members, of
whom three shall be chosen in New Hampshire,
eight in Massachusetts, one in Rhode Island and
Providence Plantations, five in Connecticut, six in
New York, four in New Jersey, eight in Pennsylva
nia, one in Delaware, six in Maryland, ten in Vir
ginia, five in North Carolina, five in South Carolina,
and three in Georgia.
Sect. 4. As the proportions of numbers in differ
ent States will alter from time to time ; as some of
the States may hereafter be divided ; as others may

1228 debates in the [1787.
be enlarged by addition of territory ; as two or raore
States raay be united ; as new States will be erected
within the limits of the United States, the Legisla
ture shall, in each of these cases, regulate the num
ber of Representatives by the number of inhabit
ants, according to the provisions hereinafter made,
at the rate of one for every forty thousand.
Sect. 5. All bills for raising or appropriating
money, and for fixing the salaries of the officers of
government, shall originate in the House of Repre
sentatives, and shall not be altered or amended by
the Senate. No money shall be drawn frora the
public treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations
that shall originate in the House of Representa
tives. Sect. 6. The House of Representatives shall have
the sole power of irapeachraent. It shall choose its
Speaker and other officers.
Sect. 7. Vacancies in the House of Representa
tives shall be supplied by writs of election frora the
Executive authority of the State in the representa
tion frora whieh they shall happen.
Article V.
Sect. 1. The Senate ofthe United States shall be
chosen by the Legislatures of the several States.
Each Legislature shall choose two members. Va
cancies raay be supplied by the Executive until the
next raeeting of the Legislature. Each raember
shall have one vote.
Sect, 2, The Senators shall be chosen for six
years ; but iramediately after the first election, they

1787,] federal convention, 1229
shall be divided, by lot, into three classes, as nearly
as raay be, nurabered one, two, and three. The
seats of the members of the first class shall be
vacated at the expiration of the second year ; of the
second class at the expiration of the fourth year ;
ofthe third class at the expiration ofthe sixth year;
so that a third part of the members may be chosen
every second year.
Sect. 3, Every member of the Senate shall be pf
the age pf thirty years at least ; shall have been a
citizen in the United States fpr at least fpur years
befpre his electipn ; and shall be, at the time pf his
election, a resident of the State for which he shall
be chosen.
Sect, 4, The Senate shall choose its own Presi
dent and other officers. Article VI.
Sect. 1. The times, and places, and manner of
holding the elections of the members of each House,
shall be prescribed bythe Legislature of each State;
but their provisions concerning them may, at any
time, be altered by the Legislature of the United
States. Sect, 2. The Legislature of the United States
shall have authority to establish such uniform quali
fications of the merabers of each House, with regard
to property, as to the said Legislature shall seem
expedient. Sect. 3. In each House a raajority of the raerabers
shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a
smaller number may adjourn from day to day.

1230 debates in the [1787.
Sect. 4. Each House shall be the judge of the
elections, returns, and qualifications, of its own
raerabers. Sect. 5. Freedora of speech and debate in the
Legislature shall not be irapeached or questioned in
any court or place out of the Legislature; and' the
merabers of each House shall, in all cases, except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privi
leged from arrest during their attendance at Con
gress, arid in going to and returning from it.
Sect. 6. Each House may deterraine the rules of
its proceedings ; raay punish its members for dis
orderly behaviour ; and may expel a meraber.
Sect. 7. The House of Representatives, and the
Senate, when it shall be acting in a legislative
capacity, shall keep a journal of their proceedings ;
and shall, frora time to tirae, publish thera ; and the
yeas and nays of the merabers of each House, on
any question, shall, at the desire of one fifth part of
the raembers present, be entered on the Joumal.
Sect. 8. Neither House, without the consent of the
other, shall adjourn for more than three days, nor to
any other place than that at which the two Houses
are sitting. But this regulation shall not extend to
the Senate when it shall exercise the ppwers raen
tioned in the  Article.
Sect. 9. The merabers of each Hpuse shall be in
eligible tp, and incapable pf holding, any office under
the authority of the United States, during the time
for which they shall respectively be elected: and
the raembers of the Senate shall be ineligible to,
and incapable of holding, any such office for one
year afterwards.

1787.] federal convention. 1231
Sect. 10. The members of each House shall re
ceive a compensation for their services, to be ascer
tained and paid by the State in which they shall be
chosen. Sec; 11. The enacting style of the laws of the
United States shall be, " Be it enacted, and it is
hereby enacted, by the House of Representatives,
and by the Senate of the United States, in Congress
assembled." Sect. 12. Each House shall possess the right of
originating bills, except in the cases befpre men
tipned. Sect. 13. Every bill, which shall have passed the
Hpuse pf Representatives and the Senate, shall, be
fere it becpmes a law, be presented tp the Presi
dent pf the United States fpr his revision. If, upon
such revision, he approve of it, he shall signify his
approbation by signing it. But if, upon such re
vision, it shall appear to him improper for being
passed into a law, he shall return it, together with
his objections against it, to that Hpuse in which it
shall have priginated; whp shall enter the pbjec
tipns at large on their Journal, and proceed to re
consider the bill. But if, after such reconsideration,
two-thirds of that House shall, notwithstanding the
objections of the President, agree to pass it, it shall,
together with his objections, be sent to the other
House, by which it shall likewise be re-considered,
and if approved by two-thirds of the other House
also, it shall become a law. But in all such cases,
the votes of both Houses shall be deterrained by
Yeas and Nays; and the names of the persons
voting for or against the bill, shall be entered on

1232 debates in the [1787.
the Journal of each House respectively. If any bill
shall not be returned by the President Avithin seven
days after it shall have been presented to hira, it
shall be a law, unless the Legislature, by their ad
journraent, prevent its return ; in which case it shall
not be a law. Article VII.
Sect. 1. The Legislature of the United States
shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, du
ties, imposts and excises ;
To regulate comraerce with foreign nations, and
among the scA'cral States ;
To establish an uniform rule of naturalization
throughout the United States ;
To coin raoney ;
To regulate the value of foreign coin ;
To fix the standard of weights and raeasures;
To establish post-offices;
To borroAV raoney, and erait bills on the credit of
the United States ;
To appoint a Treasurer by ballot ;
To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme
Court ;
To make rules concerning captures on land and
water ;
To declare the law and punishment of piracies
and felonies coraraitted on the high seas, and the
punishraent of counterfeiting the coin of the United
States, and of offences against the law of nations ;
To subdue a rebellion in any State, on the appli
cation of its Legislature;

1787.] federal convention. 1233
To make war ;
To raise armies ;
To bufld and equip fleets ;
Tp call fprth the aid ofthe militia, in order tp
execute the laws of the Union, enforce treaties, sup
press insurrections, and repel invasions ;
And to make all laws that shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing
powers, and all other powers vested by this Consti
tution in the Government of the United States, or
in any department or office thereof
Sect, 2. Treason against the United States shall
consist only in levying war against the United
States, or any of them ; and in adhering to the ene
mies of the United States, or any of thera. The
Legislature of the United States shall have power
to declare the punishment of treason. No person
shall be convicted of treason, unless on the testimo
ny of tAVO witnesses. No attainder of treason shall
work corruption of blopd, npr fprfeiture, except du
rmg the life pf the perspn attainted.
Sect. 3. The prppprtipns pf direct taxatipn shall
be regulated by the whple number pf white and
pther free citizens and inhabitants pf every age, sex
and cpnditipn, including these bpund to servitude
for a term of years, and three-fifths of all other per
sons not cpmprehended in the foregoing description,
(except Indians not paying taxes) ; which number
shall, within six years after the first meeting of the
Legislature, and within the term of every ten years
afterwards, be taken in such a manner as the said
Legislature shall direct.
Sect, 4. No tax or duty shall be laid by the Le-
78

1234 debates in the [1787,
gislature on articles exported from any State ; nor
on the migration or iraportation of such persons as
the several States shall think proper to adrait ; nor
shall such migration or importation be prohibited.
Sect, 5, No capitation tax shall be laid, unless in
proportion to the census herein before directed to be
taken. Sect. 6. No navigation act shall be passed with
out the assent of two-thirds of the members present
in each House.
Sect. 7. The United States shall not grant any
title of nobility. Article VIII.
The acts of the Legislature of the United States
made in pursuance of this Constitution, and all trea
ties made under the authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme law of the several States, and
of their citizens and inhabitants ; and the Judges in
the several States shall be bound thereby in their de
cisions, any thing in the Constitutions or laws of the
several States to the contrary notwithstanding.
Article IX.
Sect. 1. The Senate of the United States shall
have power to raake treaties, and to appoint ambas
sadors, and Judges of the Supreme Court.
Sect. 2. In all disputes and controversies now sub
sisting, or that may hereafter subsist, between two
or more States, respecting jurisdiction or territory,
the Senate shall possess the following powers: —

1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1235
Whenever the Legislature, or the Executive authori
ty, or lawful agent of any State, in controversy
with another, shall by raeraorial to the Senate, state
the matter in question, and apply fo^, a hearing, no
tice of such meraorial and application shall be given,
by order of the Senate, to the Legislature, or the
Executive authority, of the other State in contro
versy. The Senate shall also assign a day for the
appearance of the parties, by their agents, before
that House. The agents shall be directed to ap
point, by joint consent, coraraissioners or judges to
constitute a court for hearing and deterraining the
niatter in question. But if the agents cannot agree,
the Senate shall narae three persons out of each of
the several States; and frora the list of such per
sons, each party shall alternately strike out one, un
til the nuraber shall be reduced to thirteen; and
from that number, not less than seven, nor raore
than nine, naraes, as the Senate shall direct, shall,
in their presence, be drawn out by lot ; and the per
sons whose naraes shall be so drawn, or any five of
thera, shall be coraraissioners or judges to hear and
finally determine the controversy ; provided a major
ity of the judges who shall hear the cause agree in
the deterraination. If either party shall neglect to
attend at the day assigned, without showing suffi
cient reasons for not attending, or being present
shall refuse to strike, the Senate shall proceed to
norainate three persons out of each State, and the
Clerk of the Senate shall strike in behalf of the
party absent or refusing. If any of the parties
shall refuse to submit to the authority of such court,
or shall not appear to prosecute or defend then-

1236 DEBATES IN THE [1787.
claim or cause, the court shall nevertheless proceed
to pronounce judgment. The judgraent shall be final
and conclusive. The proceedings shall be transmitted
to the President of the Senate, and shall be lodged
among the public records for the security of the par
ties concerned. Every comraissioner shall, before
he sit in judgraent, take an oath to be adrainistered
by one of the Judges of the Supreme or Superior
Court of the State where the cause shall be tried,
" well and truly to hear and determine the matter in
question, according to the best of his judgment,
without favor, affection, or hope of reward."
Sect. 3. All controversies concerning lands claimed
under different grants of two or raore States, whose
jurisdictions, as they respect such lands, shall have
been decided or adjusted subsequently to such
grants, or any of thera, shall, on application to the
Senate, be finally deterrained, as near as raay be,
in the same manner as is before prescribed for de
ciding controversies between different States.
Article X.
Sect. 1. The Executive power of the United
States shall be vested in a single person. His style
shall be, " The President of the United States of
America," and his title shall be, " His Excellency."
He shall be elected by ballot by the Legislature.
He shall hold his office during the term of seven
years ; but shall not be elected a second tirae.
Sect. 2. He shall, frora tirae to tirae, give inforraa
tion to the Legislature, of the state of the Union.
He may recommend to their consideration such

1787.] FEDERAL CPNVENTIPN. 1237
measures as he shall judge necessary, and expedient.
He may convene them on extraordinary occasions.
In case of disagreement between the two Houses,
with regard to the time of adjournraent, he may
adjourn them to such time as he thinks proper. He
shall take care that the laws of the United States
be duly and faithfully executed. He shall commis
sion all the officers of the United States ; and shall
appoint officers in all cases not otherwise provided
for by this Constitution. He shall receive Anibas-
dors, and may correspond with the supreme execu
tives of the several States. He shall have power
to grant reprieves and pardons, but his pardon shall
not be pleadable in bar of an irapeachment. He
shall be Commander-in-chief of the army and navy
of the United States, and pf the militia pf the sev
eral States. He shall, at stated times, receive fpr
his services a ccmpensatien, which shall neither be
increased npr diminished during his cpntinuance in
office. Befere he shall enter pn the duties pf his
department, he shall take the fpUowing oath or af
firmation, " I  solemnly swear, (or affirm) that
I wiU faithfully execute the office of President of
the United States of America." He shall be re
moved from his office on impeachraent by the House
of Representatives, and conviction, in the Supreme
Court, of treason, bribery or corruption. In case of
his removal, as aforesaid, death, resignation, or disa
bflity to discharge the powers and duties of his of
fice, the President of the Senate shall exercise those
ppvyers and duties, untfl anpther President pf the
United States be chpsen, pr until the disabflity pf
the President be rempved.

1238 DEBATESINTHE [1787.

Article XI.
Sect. 1. The Judicial power of the United States
shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such
inferior courts, as shall, when necessary, frora tirae
to tirae, be constituted by the Legislature of the
United States.
Sect. 2. The Judges of the Suprerae Court, and
of the inferior courts, shall hold their offices during
good behaviour. They shall, at stated tiraes, receive
for their services a corapensation, which shall not
be diminished during their continuance in office.
Sect. 3. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
shall extend to all cases arising under laws passed
by the Legislature of the United States ; to all cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls ; to the trial of impeachments of officers of
the United States ; to all cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction ; to controversies between two
or more States, (except such as shall regard territory
or jurisdiction) ; between a state and citizens of
another State ; between citizens of different States ;
and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and for
eign states, citizens or subjects. In cases of im
peachment, cases affecting arabassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and those in which a State
shall be party, this jurisdiction shall be priginal.
In all the other cases beforementioned, it shall be
appellate, with such exceptions, and under such reg
ulations, as the Legislature shall raake. The Le
gislature may assign any part of the jurisdiction
above mentioned (except the trial of the President

1787.] FEDERAL CPNVENTIPN. 1239
of the United States) in the manner, and under the
limitations which it shall think prpper, tp such infe
rior courts, as it shall constitute from time to time.
Sect. 4. The trial of all criminal offences (except
in cases of impeachment) shall be in the State
where they shall be committed; and shall be by
jury. Sect. 5. Judgment, in cases of impeachraent, shall
not extend further than to removal from office, and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor,
trust or profit, under the United States. But the
party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and sub
ject ^o indictment, trial, judgraent and punishment
according to law. Article XII.
No State shall coin money ; nor grant letters of
marque and reprisal ; nor enter into any treaty, alli
ance or confederation ; nor grant any title of no-
bflity. Article XIII.
No State, without the consent of the Legislature
of the United States, shall emit bills of credit, or
make any thing but specie a tender in payment of
debts; nor lay imposts or duties on imports; nor
keep troops or ships of war in time of peace ; nor
enter into any agreement or compact with another
State, or Avith any foreign power; nor engage in any
war, unless it shall be actually invaded by enemies,
or the danger of invasion be so imminent as not to
admit of a delay until the Legislature of the United
States can be consulted.

1240 debates in the [1787.

Article XIV.
The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
priAdleges and iramunities of citizens in the several
States. Article XV.
Any person charged with treason, felony or high
misderaeanour in any State, who shall flee from
justice, and shall be found in any other State, shall,
on demand of the Executive power of the State from
which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the
State having jurisdiction of the offence.
Article XVI.
Full faith shall be given in each State to the acts
of the Legislatures, and to the records and judicial
proceedings of the courts and magistrates, of every
other State. Article XVII.
New States lawfully constituted or established
within the limits of the United States may be ad
mitted, by the Legislature, into this government ; but
lo such admission the consent of two-thirds of the
merabers present in each House shall be necessary.
If a new State shall arise within the liraits of any
of the present States, the consent of the Legislatures
of such States shall be also necessary to its admis
sion. If the admission be consented to, the new
States shall be admitted pn the sarae terras with

1787.] federal convention. 1241
the original States. But the Legislature may make
conditions with the new States, concerning the pub
lic debt which shall be then subsistmg.
Article XVIII.
The United States shall guarantee to each State
a republican form of government ; and shall protect
each State against foreign invasions, and, on the
application of its Legislature, against domestic vio
lence. Article XIX.
On the application of the Legislatures of two-
thirds of the States in the Union, for an amendment
of this Constitution, the Legislature of the United
States shall call a conventipn fpr that purppse.
Article XX.
The members of the Legislatures, and the Execu
tive and Judicial officers of the United States, and
of the several States, shall be bound by oath to sup
port this Constitution. Article XXI.
The ratification of the Conventions of  States
shall be sufficient for organizing this Constitution.
Article XXII.
This Constitution shall be laid before the United
States in Congress assembled, for their approbation ;
and it is the opinion of this Convention, that it
78*

1242 debates in the [1787.
should be afterwards submitted to a Convention
chosen in each State, under the recommendation of
its Legislature, in order to receive the ratification of
such Convention. Article XXIII.
To introduce this government, it is the opinion of
this Convention, that each assenting Convention
should notify its assent and ratification to the Uni
ted States in Congress assembled ; that Congress,
after receiving the assent and ratification of the
Conventions of  States, should appoint and
publish a day, as early as may be, and appoint a
place, for coraraencing proceedings under this Con
stitution ; that after such publication, the Legisla
tures of the several States should elect merabers of
the Senate and direct the election of merabers of the
House of Representatives ; and that the merabers
of the Legislature should raeet at the tirae and place
assigned by Congress, and should, as soon as raay
be after their meeting, choose the President of the
United States, and proceed to execute this Consti
tution. '^'
A motion Avas made to adjourn till Wednesday, in
order to give leisure to examine the Report ; which
passed in the negative, — Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Virginia, aye — 3 ; New Harapshhe, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, North Carolina, South Carolina, no — 5.
The House then adjourned till to-morrow at
eleven o'clock.

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