YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY HISTORY GREEK REVOLUTION BY GEORGE FINLAY, LL.D. Hod. Member of the Royal Society of Literahare, Member of the American Autiquariau Society, Corresponding Member of the ArchEeological Institute at Rome, Knight Gold Crosa of the Greek Order of the Redeemer AUTHOR OP THE "HISTORY OF GREECE UNDER FOREIGN ttOMIKATION," FTC. IN TWO VOLUMES VOL. II. WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS £ EDINBUEGH AND LONDON MDCCCLXI PRINTED BT WII.I.TAJI BLACT^OOD AND SONS, EDINBURGH, CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME. BOOK THIRD. THE SUCCESSES OF THE GBEEKS. CHAPTER IV. THE CONDITION OF GREECE AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE. Firmness of Sultan Mahmud, He adopts a conciliatory policy, Great fire destroys the Turkish armaments in 1823, Plan of campaign for 1823, . Negligence of the Greek government, Olympian armatoli plunder Skiathos and Skopelos, Operations of the Turks, Death of Marco Botzares, . . . . Advance of the Othoman army, Siege of Anatolikon, Operations of the Greek and Turkish fleets, Escape of eight Psarian sailors, Violation of Ionian neutrality, Misconduct of the sailors in the Greek fleet, Surrender of the Turks in the Acrocorinth, Lord Byron in Greece, First Greek loan contracted in England, First civil war, Mohammed Ali engages to assist the sultan, The political state of Greece in 1824, Position of Kolettes, Position of Mavrocordatos, . Second civil war, .... Characters of Zaimes, Londos, and Sessini, Evil effects of the two civil wars, . Wasteful expenditure of the two loans, Anecdotes, ..... Military expenditure, Naval expenditure, .... 24 5 6 77 9 10 12 13141618 20 21 2226 28 28 30 3233 343437 38 4142 43 VI CONTENTS. BOOK FOURTH. THE SUCCESSES OF THE TURKS. CHAPTER I. NAVAL SUCCESS. — IBRAHIM IN THE MOREA. Page Destruction of Kasos, . . . . 47 Destruction of Psara, . . . .49 Expedition of Mohammed Ali, . 53 The Bairam at Makry, . 54 Naval battles off Budrun, . 55 Failure of the Turks at Samos, . . .60 Ibrahim driven back when off Crete, 61 He lands in Greece, ... . 62 Greeks unprepared for defence, . . .63 Greek army defeated, . . 65 Egyptians take Sphakteria, ... 67 Escape of the brig Mars, ... . 70 Capitulation of Pylos and Navarin, . 70 Success of Miaoulis at Modon, ... 72 Kolokotrones appointed commander-in-chief, . 74 Death of the archimandrite Dikaios, . 75 Defeat of Kolokotrones at Makryplagi, 77 Ibrahim repulsed at Lerna, ... 78 Defeat of Kolokotrones at Trikorphas, Ibrahim ravages the Morea, . . 81 Receives orders to aid in the siege of Mesolonghi, . 82 CHAPTER II. THE SIEGE OF MESOLONGHI. Operations of Reshid Pasha, .... 84 State of Mesolonghi, . .85 Number of the garrison and of the besiegers, . . 85 Arrival of the Othoman fleet, . . .87 Arrival of the Greek fleet, . S8 Difficult position of Reshid, ... .89 The mound, . . . . .90 Treason of Odysseus, ..... ,92 Military operations in continental Greece, ... .94 Reshid withdraws to a fortified camp, . . .96 Operations of the Turkish and Greek fleets, . . . 97 Ibrahim arrives before Mesolonghi, . c>g Lethargy of the Greeks and of their government, . 99 9 CONTENTS. Vll Turks take Vasiladi and Anatolikon, Offers of capitulation rejected, Turkish attack on Klissova repulsed, Defeat of the Greek fleet under Miaoulis, Final sortie, .... Fall of Mesolonghi, . Page 101102103 104 106110 CHAPTER III. THE SIEGE OF ATHENS. Ibrahim's operations in the Morea during 1826, . Reshid's operations in continental Greece, Athens invested, and battle of Khaidari, Death of Goura, .... Grigiottes throws himself into the Acropolis, Karaiskaki's operations to raise the siege, Fabvier throws himself into the Acropolis, State of Greece during the winter of 1826-27, Expeditions under Gordon, Burbaki, and Heideck, General Sir Richard Church, .... Lord Cochrane (Earl of Dundonald), Election of Capodistrias as president of Greece, Naval expedition under Captain Hastings, Greek traders supply Reshid's army with provisions, Operations of Church and Cochrane to relieve Athens, Massacre of the garrison of the monastery of St Spiridion, Karaiskaki's death, ..... Defeat of Sir Richard Church at the Phalerum, Evacuation of the Acropolis, Conduct of Philhellenes in Greece, England, and America, Lord Cochrane's naval review at Poros, Sufferings of the agricultural population, Assistance sent from the United States, 112 114116118 119121124126 131 135137138139142143146 148149152154157 158 159 BOOK FIFTH. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GEEEK KINGDOM. CHAPTER I. FOREIGN INTERVENTION. — BATTLE OF NAVARIN. Conduct of Russia, . Conduct of Great Britain, Congress of Verona, 160161 162 viii CONTENTS. Pass Russian memoir relating to the pacification of Greece, 163 Effects of this memoir, .... 165 Turkey complains of the conduct of Great Britain, . 167 Greece seeks the protection of Great Britain, . 169 Protocol of 4th April 1826, . 172 Destruction of the janissaries, . . 173 Treaty of 6th July 1827 for the pacification of Greece, 174 State of Greece in 1827, ... 174 Victory of Hastings at Salona, . 176 Battle of Navarin, . . 178 Greek slaves carried to Alexandria, 183 Greek troops cross into Acarnania, 185 Hastings takes Vasiladi, 186 Death of Hastings, . . . 188 Russia declares war with Turkey, . . . 189 French troops compel Ibrahim to evacuate the Morea, 192 CHAPTER II. PRESIDENCY OF COUNT CAPODISTRIAS. — JANUARY 1828 TO OCTOBER 1831. Character of Count John Capodistrias, . . 195 First administrative measures of the president, 198 His opinions and policy, . 198 Organisation of the army, . 200 Fabvier's resignation, . . 205 Operations in Eastern and Western Greece, . 206 Termination of hostilities, . . . 207 Civil administration, . . 208 Viaro Capodistrias, . 210 Financial administration, . 213 Judicial administration, 216 Public instruction, . 218 National assembly of Argos, . . 219 Protocols of the three protecting powers, . . . 221 Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg sovereign of Greece, 224 Prince Leopold's resignation, . , 228 Capodistrias becomes a tyrant, ...... 230 Hostility to the liberty of the press, . 231 Tyranny of Capodistrias, . ... 233 Affair of Poros, ... . 235 Destruction of the Greek fleet, 238 Sack of Poros, . , 240 Family of Mavromichales, ... , 242 Assassination of Capodistrias, . 245 CONTENTS. IX CHAPTER III. ANARCHY. — 9TH OCTOBER 1831 TO 1ST FEBRUARY 1833. Page The governing commission refuses to grant a general amnesty after the murder of Capodistrias, . 248 Second national assembly of Argos, 250 Romeliot military opposition, 252 Agostino Capodistrias president of Greece, . 254 Romeliots expelled from Argos, 255 Sir Stratford Canning's memorandum, 255 Romeliots invade the Morea, 257 Conduct of the residents, 259 Agostino ejected from the presidency, 260 New governing commission, 261 State of Greece, 262 Anarchy, 266 French troops garrison Nauplia, . 269 Djavellas occupies Patras, . 270 Kolokotrones rallies the Capodistrians, . 271 National assembly of Pronia, 272 Constitutional liberty in abeyance, . 277 Intrigues of the senate, . 278 Municipal institutions arrest the progress of anarchy in the Morea, 279 Condition of Messenia, . . . 281 Position of Kolokotrones and Kolettes, . . . 283 True nature of the municipal institutions of Greece under the Turks not generally understood, . 284 Attack on the French troops at Argos, . 285 Establishment of the Bavarian dynasty, . 287 CHAPTER IV. BAVARIAN DESPOTISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION.— FEBRUARY 1833 TO SEPTEMBER 1843. Landing of King Otho, 290 The regency, its members and duties, . 293 Royal proclamation — administrative measures, . . 300 Military organisation, 302 Civil administration — municipal institutions, . 305 Financial administration — monetary system, 308 Judicial organisation, • 312 The Greek church — reforms of the regency, . 314 Synodal Tomos, . 318 Monasteries, • 319 Public instruction, 320 x CONTENTS. Page Restrictions on the liberty of the press, 321 Roads— Order of the Redeemer, . • 322 Quarrels in the regency, . • 324 Kolokotrones's plot and Armansperg's intrigue, . 326 Armansperg's administration, . . • 333 Bavarian influence, . • ¦ 336 Disputes with England, . 341 Alarming increase of brigandage, . • 342 Insurrections in Maina and Messenia, . 345 Brigandage in 1835, . ¦ 350 General Gordon's expedition, . . • 353 Insurrection in Acarnania, . . ¦ • • 357 Opinions of Lord Lyons and General Gordon on the state of Greece, . 361 Brigandage continues, . . 363 King Otho's personal government, . . . 365 Attacks on King Otho in the English newspapers, 367 Causes of the Revolution of 1843, . . . 368 Revolution, ...... . 372 Observations on the constitution, . . . . 377 Conclusion, ... ... .381 Appendix — Hastings's memorandum on the use of steamers armed with heavy guns, 385 Napier's memorandum on military operations against Ibrahim Pasha, 390 Index, . ... 393 HISTORY OF the GREEK EEVOLUTION. BOOK THIRD. THE SUCCESSES OF THE GEEEKS. CHAPTER IV. THE CONDITION OF GREECE AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE. " Toiyapovv xwpls twv &\\(i>v, ol to koivo. x€Lp'tC0VT€s irapb. pev toTs "EWrio-u', iav t6.7im.vtov fx6vov lutTTevQiHiffiv, avTiypaiptis ^xoptcs SeKa, Kai trtfrpaytOES Toa- ai/Tas Kai udprvpas $nr\ao-iovs ob Si/vavrai T-npe?v T-hv -niffTLV." — PoLYBlUS, vi. 56, 13. Not to mention other defects, no Greek who is intrusted with public money can refrain from peculation, even if ten commissioners be appointed to watch over the expenditure, and though ten bonds be signed with twice as many witnesses as a security for his honesty. Firmness of Sultan Mahmud— He adopts a conciliatory policy — A great fire at constantinople destroys his armaments in 1823— plan of campaign for 1823 — negligence of the greek government — Olympian armatoli plunder Skiathos and Skopelos — Operations of the Turks — Death of Marco Botzares — Advance of the Turkish army — Siege of Anatolikon — Operations of the Greek and Turkish fleets — Escape of eight Psarian sailors — Violation of Ionian neutrality — Misconduct of the sailors on board the Greek fleet — Surrender of the Turks in the Acrocorinth — Lord Byron in Greece — First Greek loan contracted in England — First civil war — Mohammed Ali engages to assist the sultan — The political state of Greece in 1824— Position of Kolettes— Of Mavrocordatos— Se cond civil war — Evil consequences of the two civil wars — Wasteful expenditure of the two loans— Anecdotes — Military expenditure — Naval expenditure. The successes of the Greeks during the year 1822 established Greece as an independent state, and forced VOL. II. A 2 GREECE INDEPENDENT. book iii. even those who were hostile to the Eevolution to ac- ^AAlL knowledge that the war was no longer a struggle of the Porte with a few rebellious rayahs. The import ance of the Greek nation could no longer be denied, whatever might be the failings of the Greek govern ment. The war was now the battle of an oppressed people against a powerful sovereign. The inha bitants of Greece, whether of the Hellenic or the Alba nian race, fought to secure their religious liberty and the independence of their country. Sultan Mahmud fought to maintain Othoman supremacy and the divine right of tyranny. Both were supported by strong feelings of religious and national antipathy ; but the strength of the Greek cause lay in the hearts of the people, and that of the Turkish in the energy of the sovereign. Between such enemies there could neither be peace nor truce. To the friends of civil and religious liberty the cause of Greece seemed sure of victory. A nation in arms is not easily conquered. Holland established her independence, under greater difficulties, against a far greater power than the Othoman empire in the present time. Switzerland was another example of the success of patriotism when the people are determined to he free. The people in Greece had adopted that deter mination, and they neither counted the cost of their struggle, nor shrank from encountering any hardships to gain their end. The noble resolution of the Greeks and of the Chris tian Albanians in Greece to live or die free, encoun tered a firm determination on the part of Sultan Mahmud to re-establish his authority even by the ex termination of the inhabitants of liberated Greece. When his fleets were defeated and his armies de stroyed ; when Eussia threatened his northern frontier, and Persia invaded his eastern provinces ; when, to PUBLIC OPINION IN EUROPE. 3 meet his expenditure, he was cheating his subjects by a.d. isas. debasing his coinage ; when the janissaries revolted in " his capital, and the timariots and spahis refused to march against the rebellious infidels ; when rival pashas fought with one another instead of marching against the Greeks ; and when all Turkey appeared to be a scene of anarchy, the inflexible sultan pursued steadily his great object of preserving the integrity of the Othoman empire. When European statesmen treated him as a frantic tyrant, he was revealing to Lord Stratford de Eedcliffe the sagacious policy which raised that, skilful diplomatist to his profound mastery of Eastern questions. The shattered fabric of the falling empire was for some years upheld by the pro found administrative views, the unwearied persever ance, and the iron character of Sultan Mahmud. He was an energetic, if not a great man, and his calm melancholy look was an index to his sagacious and saturnine intellect. The spectacle of a duel between such a sovereign and the resuscitated Demos of Greece, was a spectacle that deservedly excited the attention of civilised na tions. Mohammedanism and Christianity, tyranny and liberty, despotism and law, were all deeply com promised in the result. The massacres at Chios and the defeat of Dramali were considered proofs that the sultan could not reconquer the Greeks, and Christen dom could not allow him to exterminate a Christian people. Public opinion — the watch-dog whose bark sounds as an evil omen in the ear of rnonarchs — began to growl a warning to Christian kings not longer to neglect the rights of Christian nations, and statesmen began to feel that the sympathies of the people in Western > Europe were at last fairly interested in the cause of Greece. But the friends of the holy alliance still argued that anarchy was inflicting hourly more 4 POLICY OF THE SULTAN. book m. misery in Greece than the sultan's government in- ,CHAP,IV" flicted annually on the Greeks in Turkey ; that the extortions of Kolokotrones and Odysseus, and the mis- government of Mavrocordatos, produced greater evils than the faults of pashas and the errors of Sultan Mahmud ; and that the power and resources of the Othoman empire rendered the success of the Greek Eevolution hopeless. The friends of Greece, on the other hand, replied, that if the Greek chiefs were worthless, and the Greek government weak, the will of the people was strong, and the nation would prove unconquerable. The Greeks, they said, might yet find a government worthy of their cause, and the liberties of Greece might find a champion like William of Orange or Washington ; or, if liberty produced no ehampion, war might give the nation a chief hke Cromwell or Napoleon. The animosity of the belligerents was never more violent than at the commencement of 1823, but the resources of both were for the time exhausted. The sultan, finding that his indiscriminate cruelty had only strengthened the Greeks in their determination to oppose his power, changed his policy, and began to treat them with mildness. Many who had been thrown into prison merely as hostages, were released, and the Greek communities generally were allowed to enjoy their old municipal privileges, and manage their own financial affairs. Strict orders were transmitted to all pashas to act equitably to the Greek subjects of the Porte. Some slight concessions were also made in order to conciliate Eussia, and negotiations were opened with Persia, which eventually terminated the war with that power.1 Even the sympathy of Western nations in the Greek cause was not overlooked. Sultan 1 The treaty of peace between Turkey and Persia was signed on the 28th July 1823, but it was not published at Constantinople until the month of October, and not ratified bythe Shah of Persia until January 1S24. FIRE AT CONSTANTINOPLE. 5 Mahmud knew little of public opinion, but he was not a. d. 1823. ignorant of the power of popular feeling. The early events of his life, and the state of his capital, had taught him to fear insurrections. He was persuaded by his own judgment, as well as by foreign ambassa dors and his own ministers, that Christian nations might force kings and emperors to defend the Greeks, and that it would be wise to avert a combination of the Christian powers for such a purpose. He therefore ordered the new capitan - pasha, Khosref Mehemet, called Topal, to assure the English ambassador and the Austrian internuncio, that the Othoman fleet would not lay waste the defenceless islands of the Archipelago, and that terms of submission would be offered to all Christians who had taken up arms. The sultan's preparations for the campaign of 1823 were suddenly paralysed by a great disaster. The arsenal and cannon foundery at Tophana were de stroyed by fire. An immense train of artillery had been prepared for the army of Thessaly ; twelve hun dred brass guns were ready to arm new ships in the port ; an extraordinary supply of ammunition and military stores was packed up for service : all these materials were destroyed by one of the most terrible conflagrations ever witnessed, even by the inhabitants of Constantinople. Besides the artillery arsenal, fifty mosques and about six thousand houses were de stroyed. A large part of Pera was reduced to ashes. This fire was attributed by public rumour to the malevolence of the janissaries, and that rumour was believed by Sultan Mahmud. Fifteen ortas were under orders to march against the Greeks. They dared not refuse marching against infidels, but without the ma terials of war, destroyed by this conflagration, their de parture was useless. They had now gained time to organise an insurrection, and their discontent alarmed 6 CAMPAIGN OF 1823. book iii. the sultan to such a degree that, contrary to the CHAF' IV' established usage of the empire, he did not appear in public on several occasions. But neither his personal danger, nor the destruction of his artillery, abated his energy. A small fleet was fitted out, and, instead of making a decisive attack on the Greeks, it was resolved to harass them with desultory operations. The capitan- pasha hoisted his flag in a frigate, and his fleet was un encumbered by a single line-of-battle ship. The finan cial difficulties of the Turkish government were met by a new issue of debased money, which was at that time the substitute for a loan. By the old plan of de basing the coinage, the loss fell on the sultan's own subjects ; by the new plan of borrowing money, it is sure to fall on strangers, and in all probability on the subjects of Queen Victoria. The sultan's plan of campaign was as usual well devised. An army was destined to invade the Morea. Instead of entering the peninsula by the Isthmus of Corinth, it was to cross the gulf at Lepanto, and establish its headquarters at Patras. The garrison of Corinth was to be provisioned and strengthened by the Othoman fleet. Elis and Messenia offered facilities for the employment of the Turkish cavalry. Abundant supplies of all kinds might be obtained from the Ionian Islands to fill the magazines of the army at Patras, Modon, and Ceron. Yussuf Berkoftzalee, who was well known to the Greeks by his exploits in Moldavia, was ordered to advance from Thessaly through Eastern Greece, with a strong body of cavalry. The main army, consisting of Guegs under Musta'i Pasha of Scodra, and Tosks under Omer Vrioni, pasha of Joannina, was ordered to advance through Western Greece. A junction was to be effected either at Lepanto or at Patras, where the Othoman fleet was to meet the army. NEGLIGENCE OF GREEK GOVERNMENT. 7 Mavrocordatos had been driven from office by his a. d. 1823. own mismanagement. His successors at the head of the Greek government were too ignorant to adopt measures for retarding the advance of the Turks, and too selfish to think of anything but their personal in terests. The people stood ready to do their duty, but the popular energy was left without guidance. The captains and best soldiers were far from the frontier, collecting and consuming the national revenues. The Morea was filled with well-paid troops ; but few were disposed to quit the flesh-pots of the districts in which they had taken up their quarters ; so that, when the campaign opened, Greece had no army in the field. Eeshid Pasha (Kiutayhe) commenced the military operations of the year 1823, by treading out the ashes ofthe Eevolution that still smouldered on Mount Pelion. He subdued Trikheri in conjunction with the capitan- pasha, and drove the Olympian armatoli from their last retreat in Thessaly.1 The Olympian armatoli escaped to Skiathos and Skopelos, where they maintained themselves by plun dering the inhabitants, while Yussuf Berkoftzalee was laying waste Eastern Greece. In the month of July, the inhabitants of Skiathos were driven from their houses by these Greek troops, who took possession of the town, and consumed the grain, oil, and wine which they found stored up in the magazines. Parties of soldiers scoured the island, and seized the sheep and goats as if they had been in an enemy's country. The inhabitants fled to an ancient castle about five miles from the town, with as much of their property as they could save, and defended this strong position against their intrusive countrymen. The armatoli were so much pleased with their idle life, varied with goat hunts and skirmishes with the natives, that they re- 1 See. voi. i. p. 246. book hi CHAP. IV ARMATOLI PLUNDER SKIATHOS. . fused to obey the orders they received from the Greek government, to join a body of troops in Euboea. Ad miral Miaoulis visited Skiathos on the 11th of October, and found the inhabitants in a state of destitution and distress. They were shut up in the castle, and their supplies were exhausted, while the soldiers were con suming the last remains of their property in the town. The authority, the solicitations, and the reproaches of Miaoulis, were employed in vain to expel the armatoli from the island, and the lawless soldiery did not quit Skiathos until they had consumed everything on which they could lay their hands. While the Olympian armatoli were ruining Skiathos and plundering Skopelos, Yussuf Berkoftzalee was laying waste Phocis and Bceotia. Many villages, and several monasteries on Parnassus and Helicon, which had hitherto escaped devastation, were plundered and burned. Kastri, the village which occupies the site of Delphi, was pillaged ; but instead of establishing him self at Salona, opening communications with Lepanto, and co-operating with the army of Mustaii Pasha, Berkoftzalee fixed his headquarters at Thebes, sent his infantry to Negrepont, and pushed forward his foraging parties into the plain of Athens. Kolettes, like Mavrocordatos, was eager for military glory, and even more unfit for military command. He now persuaded the other members of the govern ment to appoint him commander-in-chief of a Greek army which he was to assemble in Eubcea. He had no military qualifications but a portly frame and the Albanian dress ; but these physical and artificial ad vantages induced the stout Zinzar Yallachian to de spise the moral courage and the patriotic disinterested ness of his phanariot rival, whose frame, though smaller, was far more active. When the Turks appeared, Kolettes fled and abandoned Euboea to its fate. OPERATIONS OF THE TURKS. 9 Odysseus, however, who commanded the Greek force a. d. 1823. in the southern part of the island, defeated the Mussul- mans in a skirmish near Kanystos. As a trophy of his victory, he sent fifty heads and three living Turks to Athens. The modern Athenians deliberately stoned these three unfortunate prisoners to death. Mustal Pasha assembled his army at Ochrida. It consisted of five thousand Mohammedan Guegs, and three thousand Catholic Miridits. These Catholics, who speak the Guegh dialect of the Albanian lan guage, boast of their descent from the Christians who fought against the Turks under their national hero Skanderbeg, or George Castriot. But their hatred of the orthodox Greeks has long since bound them in a closer alliance with the Mussulman tribes in their neighbourhood, than with any body of Christians. On the present occasion, the Miridits formed the advanced guard of Mustai's army. They upheld the military glory of their race, and ridiculed the vanity of the Greeks, who attempted to filch from them the glory of Skanderbeg. The Greeks made no preparations to oppose Mustai'. Mavrocordatos had quitted Mesolonghi. While he re mained there, he concentrated in his own person the three offices of President of Greece, Governor-General of the Western Provinces, and Commander-in-Chief of the Etolian army ; but when he departed he left three persons to execute the duties of commander-in-chief. This absurd arrangement would doubtless have created anarchy had it not already existed, and it tended to increase the disorders that already prevailed. Almost every chief, both in Etolia and Acarnania, engaged in quarrels with his neighbours. Sometimes they fought in order to decide who should march to encounter Mustai's army, and the prize of victory was liberty to stay at home and plunder the peasantry. In most 10 DEATH OF MARCO B0TZARES. book in. cases their proceedings were an inexplicable enigma; ™^IAL and their most intelligent countrymen could only tell strangers, what indeed was very evident without their communication, that the conduct of the captains and primates was ruining the people. The advance of Mustai's army was signalised by one of the most brilliant exploits of the war. The first division of the Othoman force consisted of four thousand men, Catholics and Mussulmans, under the command of Djelaleddin Bey. It encamped in the valley of Karpenisi, near an abundant fountain of pure water, which forms a brook as it flows from its basin, shaded by a fine old willow-tree. At midnight on the 21st of August 1823 the orthodox Tosks surprised the camp of the Catholic and Mussulman Guegs. Marco Botzares, at the head of three hundred and fifty Suliots, broke into the midst of their enemies and rushed forward to slay the bey. The Othoman troops, roused from sleep, fled with precipitation, -leaving their arms behind. Had the Greek captains descended with the armatoh of Etolia and Acarnania from the villages in which they were idly watching the flashes of the Suliot arms, they might have annihilated the Turkish force. But Greek envy sacrificed the Albanian hero. The bey of Ochrida had pitched his tent in a mandra or walled enclosure, built to protect beehives or young lambs from badgers and foxes. Botzares reached this wall, and, not finding the entrance, raised his head to look over it, in order to discover a means of enterine; it with his followers. The alarm had now roused Djelaleddin's veterans, who were familiar with nocturnal surprises. Several were on the watch when the head of Botzares rose above the wall, and showed itself marked on the grey sky ; a ball immediately pierced his brain, and the Suliots took up his body. Even then a few hand-grenades DEATH OF MARCO BOTZARES. 11 would have driven Djelaleddin's guard from the en-A.D. 1823. closure, and completed the defeat of the Turkish force; but the Suliots had learned nothing of the art of war during their long intercourse with the Eussians, French, and English in the Ionian Islands. Like most warlike savages, they despised the improvements of science; and the consequence was, that their victorious career was now stopped by a rough wall, built as a defence against foxes and badgers. But before retiring with the body of their leader, they collected and carried off their booty. No attempt was made to interrupt their retreat to Mikrokherio, where they arrived accompanied by a train of mules caught in the camp, and laden with spoil. Horse-hair sacks filled with silver-mounted pistols, yataghans, and cartridge-cases, were fastened over pack-saddles like bags of meal, and long Albanian muskets were tied up in bundles like fagots of fire wood. The booty was very great, but the death of Marco Botzares cast a gloom over their spirits. The Greek soldiers in the neighbouring villages of Tranak- horio and Nostimo, when it was too late, became ashamed of their inactivity, and reproached their captains for causing the death of the bravest chief in the Greek army. As the news of the loss spread, the whole nation grieved over the noble Suliot. The affair at Karpenisi is one of the examples of the secondary part which the rival dominant races of Othomans and Greeks often bore in the war of the Greek Eevolution. The Othomans who accompanied the army of Mustaii were still in the plain of Thessaly. The Greeks were encamped idly on the hills. The battle was fought between the Catholic Guegs and the orthodox Tosks. The troops of Djelaleddin remained in possession of the field of battle, and buried their dead on the spot. Two English travellers who passed the place during CHAP. IV. 12 ADVANCE OF OTHOMAN ARMY. book hi. the following summer saw a number of small wooden crosses fixed over the graves of the Miridits. The Suliots who bore a part in this memorable exploit near the fountain and the old willow-tree, were long distinguished by the richly ornamented and strangely mounted arms they wore ; but many regretted their dearly- purchased splendour, and thought the night accursed on which it was obtained, saying, that it had been better for them and for Greece had Markos still lived, and they had continued to carry the plain rifles of their fathers. The success of the Suliots did not retard the advance of Mustai. His Guegs pressed on, eager to avenge their losses and wipe off the stain on their military reputation. The Greeks abandoned their positions at Tranokhorio, and made an unsuccessful attempt to defend the valley between the two precipitous moun tains of Khelidoni and Kaliakudi. The road from Karpenisi to Yrachori runs through a succession of frightful passes and giant rocks. It may be compared with the most difficult footpaths over the Alps. The great mountain Kaliakudi closes the entrance by a wall of precipices, broken by one chasm, through which the river of Karpenisi forces its passage to join the Achelous. In this pass a skir mish took place, and the Greeks boast of an imaginary victory at Kaliakudi. To any one who has visited the monastery of Brusd, it must be evident that three hundred men, inspired with the spirit of Markos Bot zares, might have stopped an army as numerous as that of Xerxes or of Brennus. But the Albanians of Mustai drove the Greek armatoli before them through the sublime valleys whicii diverge from Brusd. It has been said that Mustai sowed distrust among the Greek chiefs, by promising capitanliks to some venal leaders. He could hardly have ventured to march SIEGE OF ANAT0LTK0N. 13 through the pass of Brusd had he not been assured a. d. isjs. that he should find no enemy to oppose him. At Vrachori Mustai found Omer Vrioni with an army of Mussulman Tosks. The dialects of the Guegs and Tosks do not afford a better means of com municating than those of the Irish and the Welsh. The dress of the two tribes is as dissimilar as their speech. The white kilt of the Tosk forms as strong a contrast with the red tunic of the Gueg, as the grey top-coat of Paddy with Sandy's checkered plaid. The followers of the two pashas quarrelled, and the pashas did not agree. In October 1823 their united force attacked Ana- tolikon, a small town in the Etolian lagoons, about five miles west of Mesolonghi. The Greeks had only a mud battery, mounting six guns, to defend the place. In the hour of need they allowed William Martin, who had deserted with another seaman from an Eng lish ship, to constitute himself captain of a gun.1 He dismounted the only piece of artillery the Turks placed in battery. The pashas found it impossible to do any thing but bombard the place from a couple of mortars, which they planted out of reach of the fire of the Greeks. Their shells did little damage, and only about twenty persons were killed and wounded. On the 11th of December Mustai raised the siege, and retired to Epirus, through the unguarded pass of Markynoros. Before commencing his retreat, he buried some guns which arrived too late to be of any use, and in order to conceal them from the Greeks, he surrounded them with a low wall of masonry, and ornamented the place like a Turkish cemetery. The Greeks showed the spot with pride, boasting of the beys who had fallen under 1 Martin's companion died of typhus fever at Mesolonghi shortly after Mustai 's defeat. Martin was left without either pay or rations, and imprisoned by the Greeks for insubordination. From his own mouth the author learned that he must have died of want had he not been relieved by Mr Blackett. 14 OPERATIONS OF THE HOSTILE FLEETS. book in. their deadly fire ; but when Kiutayhe' besieged Meso- CHAP. IV. ... , -i ¦ • IT- longhi in 1825, he commenced operations by digging up the brass guns in the tombs of the beys. The new Othoman admiral Khosref, called Topal or. the lame pasha, was a man of a courteous disposition and considerable ability — far better suited to be minister of foreign affairs than capitan -pasha. He was not more of a sailor, and quite as great a coward, as his unworthy predecessor Kara Mehemet, but he knew better how to make the officers of the fleet obey his orders. He issued from the Dardanelles at the end of May with a fine fleet, composed of fourteen frigates and twenty corvettes and brigs, attended by forty transports. On the 4th of June he landed three thousand Asiatic troops at Kargstos, and sent several transports laden with military stores to Negrepont. He then sailed past Hydra, threw supplies into Coron and Modon, and landed a body of troops and a large sum of money at Patras on the 20th of the same month. Instead, however, of remaining on the western coast of Greece, to support the operations of Mustai, who was still at Ochrida, he hastened back to the Dardanelles. The Albanians of Hydra and Spetzas displayed neither activity nor zeal during the year 1823. The Greeks of Psara, Kasos, and Samos, on the contrary, were never more active and enterprising. The Psarians made a descent on the Asiatic coast at Tchanderlik, on the site of Pi tan e in iEolis, where they stormed a battery, burned the town, and carried off the harem of a bey belonging to the great house of Kara Osman Oglou of Magnesia. The booty gained by plundering the town was increased by the receipt of ten thousand dollars as ransom for the bey's family. The shores of the gulf of Adrymetti were then plundered, and con tributions were levied on the Greeks of Mytilene. CONDUCT OF GREEK FLEET. 15 The ravages committed on the coast of Asia Minor a. d. 1823. caused the Mussulman population to break out into open revolt. The sultan was accused of sparing the Giaours to please the Christian ambassadors at Con stantinople, and the people called on all true believers to avenge the slaughter of the Turks at Tchanderlik and other places by murdering the Greeks. In many towns the Christians were attacked by fanatical mobs, and at Pergamus several hundred Greeks perished before the Othoman authorities could restore order. During the autumn Miaoulis sailed from Hydra with a small fleet. On his return he complained bitterly of the misconduct of those under his command. Some of the ships of Hydra delayed joining him. At Psara quarrels occurred between the Albanian and Greek sailors: and on the 5th of October the Psarians, in de fiance of Miaoulis, seized some Turkish prisoners on board a Hydriot brig, and carried them on shore. Several were publicly tortured before the town hall of Psara, and the rest were murdered in the streets. When the fleet reached Skiathos fresh disorders broke out. The efforts of the admiral to expel the Olympian armatoli, who were plundering the island, proved ineffectual, as has been already mentioned, partly in consequence of the misconduct of the Albanian sailors. A fight took place on shore between the Hydriots and Spetziots, in which three Spetziots were killed and eight wounded. These dissensions rendered all co-operation between the ships of the three islands impossible, and Miaoulis returned to Hydra on the 1 6th of October almost in a state of despair. The conduct of the sailors had been insolent and mutinous during the whole cruise. They landed at Lithi, on the west coast of Chios, without orders, robbed the poor Greek peasants of their oxen, plundered the men of their money, and violated the women. Com- 16 ESCAPE OF PSARIAN SAILORS. book in. plaints of these acts were laid before Miaoulis, but he CHAP. IV. ¦ was unable to punish the offenders. Admiral Miaoulis and six brigs were exposed to great danger off Mount Athos on the 27th of Septem ber. A Turkish squadron, consisting of five frigates . and four sloops-of-war, gained the wind of the Greeks while their ships lay in a calm. A cannonade of three hours and a half ensued, in which several thousand shot were fired ; but as the Turks declined engaging their enemy at close quarters, the Hydriots escaped through the Turkish line with the loss of only eight men killed. The Turks declared that they did not lose a single man ; and it is not improbable that they never ventured within range of the smaller guns of the Greek ships. A romantic event during this cruise deserves to be recorded : On the 1st of October the Psarian admiral picked up a boat with eight of his countrymen on board, who were drifting about in the Archipelago without either provisions or water. They had encoun tered strange vicissitudes during the previous fort night. An Austrian schooner had seized them in the gulf of Smyrna, where they were looking out for prizes without papers from the Greek government. They were delivered to the Turkish authorities as pirates, and put on board a small vessel bound for the Dardanelles. At the lower castles they were trans ferred to a boat manned by fifteen Turks, which was to convey them to the bagnio at Constantinople. They proceeded to Tchanek-skelessi, where most of the Turkish boatmen slept ashore. The Psarians con trived to kill those who remained on board without noise, and, casting loose the moorings, they were carried by the current beyond the lower castles before day break. There they were met by a contrary wind, without provisions and with only one jar of water. CONDUCT OF THE HYDRIOT SAILORS. 17 In this difficulty they were forced to put into a secluded a d. 1823. creek in Tenedos, and two of their number, who were dressed like the Greek sailors who serve in the Turkish "fleet, walked to the town to purchase bread and carry back two jars of water. One of them had fortunately succeeded in concealing a small gold coin in the upper leather of his slippers before he was searched by the lynx-eyed janissaries of Smyrna. The two Psarians "remained all day in a Greek wine-shop kept by an ''Ionian, as the safest place of concealment, bought 'bread, and procured water. In the evening they walked back to their companions, who had found water, but were famished with hunger. At midnight "they left Tenedos ; but before they could reach any Greek island the wind became calm or contrary, and .they had been rowing incessantly for thirty -six hours, ^endeavouring to reach Psara, when they were picked up by Admiral Apostoles. A Greek squadron was sent to relieve Anatolikon, when it was besieged by Mustai Pasha. Before the Hydriot and Spetziot sailors would embark they in sisted on receiving a month's pay in advance. The primates made their mutinous behaviour during the previous cruise a pretext for refusing to make any advance. The Greeks of Psara, with more patriotism, immediately sent a few brigs and a fire-ship to Hydra, 'where their promptitude to serve the cause of their country was regarded as an offence. The Hydriots, who were intent only on the question of pay, attacked the Psarian sailors, in order to punish them for giving a bad example to the rest of the Greek navy. Several : Psarians were cruelly beaten, and a civil war was on :the point of breaking out. Shame, and the expecta tion of being speedily repaid by Lord Byron, at last i induced the Hydriot primates to advance the sum (required to fit out seven vessels and two fire-ships, VOL. II. B 18 VIOLATION OE IONIAN NEUTRALITY. book in. The fire-ships of Hydra were generally prepared as F' jobs, and were rarely of any service. One of these could not go farther than Navarin. The Hydriot squadron was joined by five Spetziot brigs and a fire- ship. Miaoulis, disgusted with the insubordination displayed in the preceding cruise, remained on shore, and the command was given to Captain Pinotzi, who hoisted a broad pennant, for the Greeks mimicked the external signs of naval organisation, though they ne glected the essentials of discipline and tactics. Mav rocordatos embarked to resume his dictatorship in Western Greece, expecting to find a firm support in the influence of Lord Byron, who had recently arrived at Cephalonia. On the 11th of December 1823 this squadron fell in with a Turkish brig off the Skrophes. Five Greek ships came up with her, and raked her with their broadsides until she was in a sinking state. None of these vessels ventured to run alongside and carry her by boarding, so that she was enabled to reach Ithaca, where the Turks expected to find protection under the English flag. This brig mounted twenty-two six- pounders, and carried a crew of eighty men, besides twenty passengers. She had sailed from Previsa the day before with a large sum of money for the garrison of Patras. The Greeks had too often violated their most solemn treaties to care much about violating Ionian neutrality, when it appeared that they could do so with impu nity. The sailors landed on Ithaca, and murdered the Turks who attempted to defend their ship. The brig was seized as soon as she was abandoned by her crew, and the treasure on board was transferred to the Greek ships. The captain, who refused to quit the deck, was slain. The brig presented a terrible spectacle to her captors. Upwards of forty VIOLATION OF IONIAN NEUTRALITY. 19 Turks had been killed during the action, and their a. d. 1823. dead bodies were found piled up between decks, in order that they might be taken ashore for burial. While some of the Greek sailors were plundering the stranded vessel, others were shooting down the Turks on shore, whose flight was impeded by the people of the island. The arrival of a company of English soldiers saved thirty-five men, who were carried to the lazaretto. Every one of these had received severe wounds. The English government was justly indignant at this conduct on the part of a Greek claiming the rights of an organised force, and sailing under a broad pennant. It seemed intolerable that a navy which pretended to enjoy all the advantages accorded to Christian governments, should commit atrocities that would have disgraced Algerine pirates. The be haviour of the Greeks was on this occasion peculiarly offensive, for the neutrality of the Ionian Islands had been rendered by the British government extremely advantageous to Greece. Kalamos was at that very time serving as a refuge to the population of Acarnania and Etolia, which had fled from the armies of Omer Vrioni and Mustai. Karaiskaki, a distinguished cap tain, was receiving not only protection, but also medi cal assistance gratis, and hundreds of families of Greek armatoli were then fed by the British government; yet the newspapers of the Continent afford evidence that at this time the Greeks were calumniating Eng land over all Europe from Marseilles to St Petersburg. Among the wounded Turks who were carried into the lazaretto of Ithaca, there was one man of a noble aspect and of dignified manners, who had been left for dead all night on the beach. In the morning he was found breathing, and carried to the lazaretto to die. But after his wounds were dressed, his face and hands 20 MISCONDUCT OF THE GREEK FLEET. book m. washed, and his green turban arranged on his head, he CHAP IV, ^^ ,-m '¦ — muttered a few words of thankfulness in Greek, and made signs for a pipe. He smoked one or two pipes, and the two English surgeons who were attending him thought it not improbable that he would die smoking. The pipes, however, appeared to restore him, and he gradually recovered. His convalescence was long; and during the time he remained in Ithaca, the fluency with which he spoke Greek, and the good sense he dis played in his conversation, made him a favourite. He had been cadi of Tripolitza just before the Eevolution broke out, but had accompanied Khurshid's army to Thessaly. This man considered the Othoman empire on the verge of ruin ; but he ridiculed the idea of its being replaced by a Greek kingdom. He feared a coalition of the Christian powers. The Greek vessels returned to Mesolonghi with their booty, and quarrelled about the division of the spoil. A schooner, with several chests of treasure on board, attempted to escape, but was brought back by force, and anchored in the midst of the Hydriot brigs, Mavrocordatos, who was an involuntary spectator of these disgraceful scenes, attempted in vain to persuade the Hydriots to make an honourable division of their dishonest gains. On the 1 7th of December a scheme of division, modelled on the system of shares in the mercantile operations of the islanders, was adopted. The share of one of the Hydriot ships, which had sailed shamefully under-manned, with only forty-eight seamen on board, but which drew shares for seventy- one, amounted to 77 okas of paras, measured by weight, and 267 gold mahmudie's in coin, besides other plunder, estimated at 770 piastres.1 1 An English gcntlemau, onco a midshipman in the navy, was accidentally ou board the Hydriot squadron as a volunteer, nud witnessed the events above narrated. SURRENDER OF THE ACROCORINTH. 21 No sooner was the division of the treasure termi- a. d. 1823. nated than the crews demanded pay for a second month in advance. Application was made to Lord Byron, but he considered it impolitic to purchase the service of such ill-manned ships, and hopeless to ex pect honourable service from such disorderly and mutinous crews. The Hydriots quitted Mesolonghi, and they so timed their voyage that they made Hydra on the 29th December, the very day on which the month paid in advance ended. The Ionian government forgot its dignity in aveng ing the injury it had received. The Lord High Com missioner issued a violent proclamation, upbraiding Mavrocordatos in rather unseemly terms for calling himself a prince, which certainly was no violation of Ionian neutrality. The sultan called upon the Ionian government for indemnification for the loss he had sustained in consequence of their neglect to enforce neutrality, and his demand was immediately recog nised. The Greek government foolishly refused to re fund the money, until the British government, losing patience, ordered Captain Pechell in H.M.S. Sybille to enforce the claim. Several Greek ships were then seized, and not released until an indemnity of forty thousand dollars was refunded. The Greeks had regained possession of the Acro- corinth before the Albanian pashas had raised the siege of Anatolikon. The Turks capitulated on the 7th November 1823. On this occasion the firmness and honourable conduct of Niketas, supported by the soldiers under his immediate orders, prevented Greece from being stained by another infamous massacre. But all the energy and activity of Niketas could not prevent four or five Turks from being murdered on the way from Corinth to Kenchries. The indifference shown by Kolokotrones to the disorderly conduct of CHAP. IV. 22 LORD BYRON. book in. the Greek troops under his command on this occasion, induced many to believe that he would have willingly seen a repetition of the massacres of Tripolitza. In the autumn of 1823 Lord Byron directed the attention of all Europe to the affairs of Greece by joining the cause. He arrived at Mesolonghi on the 5th of January 1824. His short career in Greece was unconnected with any important military event, for he died on the 19th of April ; but the enthusiasm he awakened perhaps served Greece more than his per sonal exertions would have done, had his life been pro longed. Wherever the English language was known, an electric shock was felt when it was heard that " The pilgrim of eternity, whose fame Over his living head like heaven was bent, An early but enduring monument," had died " where his young mind first caught ethereal fire." The genius of Lord Byron would in all probability never have unfolded either political or military talent. He was not disposed to assume an active part in pubhc affairs. He regarded politics as the art of cheating the people, by concealing one-half of the truth and mis representing the other; and whatever abstract enthu siasm he might feel for military glory was joined to an innate detestation of the trade of war. Both his character and his conduct presented unceasing contra dictions. It seemed as if two different souls occupied his body alternately. One was feminine, and full of sympathy; the other masculine, and characterised by clear judgment. When one arrived the other departed. In company, his sympathetic soul was his tyrant. Alone, or with a single person, his masculine prudence displayed itself as his friend. No man could then arrange facts, investigate their causes, or examine their LORD BYRON. 23 consequences, with more logical accuracy, or in a more a. d. 1823. practical spirit. Yet, in his most sagacious moment, the entrance of a third person would derange the order of his ideas, — judgment fied, and sympathy, generally laughing, took its place. Hence he appeared in his conduct extremely capricious, while in his opinions he had really great firmness. He often, however, dis played a feminine turn for deception in trifles, while at the same time he possessed a feminine candour of soul, and a natural love of truth, which made him often despise himself quite as much as he despised English fashionable society for what he called its brazen hypocrisy. He felt his want of self-command ; and there can be no doubt that his strongest reason for withdrawing from society, and shunning public affairs, was the conviction of his inability to com press the sympathies which were in opposition to his judgment. No stranger estimated the character of the Greeks more correctly than Lord Byron. At Cephalonia he sometimes smiled at the enthusiasm of Sir Charles Napier, and pointed out where the soldier's ardour ap peared to mislead his judgment. It may, however, be observed, that to nobody did the Greeks ever unmask their selfishness and self-deceit so candidly. Almost every distinguished statesman and general sent him letters soliciting his favour, his influence, or his money. Kolokotrones invited him to a national assembly at Salamis. Mavrocordatos informed him that he would be of no use anywhere but at Hydra, for Mavrocordatos was then in that island. Constantine Metaxa, who was then governor of Mesolonghi, wrote, saying that Greece would be ruined unless Lord Byron visited that fortress. Petrobey used plainer words. He in formed Lord Byron that the true way to save Greece was to lend him, the bey, a thousand pounds. With 24 LORD BYRON. book hi. that sum not three hundred but three thousand Spar- CHAr" IV" tans would be put in motion to the frontier, and the fall of the Othoman empire would be certain. Every Greek chief celebrated his own praises and Lord Byron's liberality, but most of them injured their own cause by dilating too eloquently on the vices and crimes of some friend or rival. Lord Byron made many saga cious and satirical comments on the chiaroscuro of these communications. He wrote : " Of the Greeks I can't say much good hitherto, and I do not like to speak ill of them, though they do of one another." He knew his own character so well, that he remained some time at Cephalonia, not venturing to trust him self among such a cunning and scheming set, fearing lest unworthy persons should exercise too much influ ence over his conduct. This feeling induced him to avoid familiarity with the Greeks, even after his ar rival at Mesolonghi, and with Mavrocordatos his in tercourse was not intimate. Business and ceremony alone brought them together. Their social and mental characteristics were not of a nature to create recipro cal conndence, and they felt no mutual esteem. Lord Byron did not overlook the vices of the Greek leaders, but at the same time he did not underrate the virtues of the people. The determined spirit with which they asserted their independence received his sincere praise, even while the rapacity, cruelty, and dissensions of the military weighed heavily on his mind. Nothing, during his residence at Mesolonghi, distressed him more than the conduct of the Suliots whom he had taken into his pay. He saw that he had degraded himself into the chief of a band of personal followers, who thought of nothing but extorting money from their foreign leader. Three hundred Suliots were enrolled in his band ; of these upwards of one hundred demanded double pay and triple rations, pretending LORD BYRON. 25 to be officers, whose dignity would not allow them to a. d. i823. lounge about the coffee-houses of Mesolonghi unless they were attended by a henchman or pipebearer. Lord Byron, annoyed by their absurd pretensions, re membered Napier's plans for the formation of a small regular military force, and lamented his own inability to carry them into execution. Colonel Leicester Stan hope (the Earl of Harrington) increased his irritation by appearing as the agent of the Greek committee, and giving in to all the pedantic delusions of the literati. The typographical colonel, as Lord Byron sarcastically termed him, seemed to think that news papers would be more effectual in driving back the Othoman armies than well-drilled troops and military tactics. The political information which Lord Byron ex tracted from Mavrocordatos in their personal inter views, and the proceedings of that statesman in the conduct of the public administration, revealed the thousand obstacles to the establishment of an honest government in Greece. A mist fell from Lord Byron's eyes. He owned that his sagacity was at fault, and he abandoned all hope of being able to guide the Greeks, or to assist them in improving their administration. Not long before his death, he frequently repeated, that with Napier to command and form regular troops, with Hastings to arm and command a steamer, and with an able financier, Greece would be sure of victory. Then, too, he began to express doubts whether circumstances had authorised him to recommend the Greek loan to his friends in England. He was struck by the fact that a majority of the Moreot captains and primates opposed pledging the confiscated Turkish property as a security to the lenders. He feared that the proceeds of a loan might be misspent by one party, and the loan itself disowned by another. Bo wring and the CHAP. IV. 26 GREEK LOAN. book in. bankers, he said, would secure their commissions and their gains, but he feared many honest English families might lose their money by his Philhellenism. Lord Byron's knowledge of the prominent defects of the Greek character, his personal experience of their rapacity, and his conviction that selfishness was the principal cause of a civil war in Argolis which broke out about the time of his arrival at Mesolonghi, made him an advocate for the formation of a strong central government. Order was, in his opinion, the first step to liberty. The Earl of Harrington talked as if he considered Lord Byron's desire for order a proof of his indifference to liberty. Lord Byron was, however, a far wiser counsellor than the typographical colonel, and, had he lived, might have done much to arrest the factious madness and shameless expenditure which rendered the English loans the prize and the aliment of two civil wars. The first Greek loan was contracted early in 1824. The Greeks received about £300,000, and they engaged to pay annually £40,000 as interest, as the capital of the debt created was £800,000 at five per cent. The lenders risked their money to deliver Greece, and they have never received a shilling of interest or a syllable of gratitude from the thousands whom their money enriched. Indeed, the Greeks generally appear to have considered the loan as a small payment for the debt due by civilised society to the country that pro duced Homer and Plato. The modern Greek habit of reducing everything to a pecuniary standard, made Homer, Plato, & Co. creditors for a large capital and an enormous accumulation of unpaid interest. A worse speculation, in a financial point of view, than the Greek loan, could not have been undertaken. Both the loan contractors and the members of the Greek committee knew that the revenues of Greece in FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION. 27 1 823 fell short of £80,000. Yet with this knowledge a. d. ium. they placed the absolute control of a sum equal to nearly four years' revenue of the country in the hands of a faction engaged in civil war. Foreigners were amazed at this display of financial insanity on the London Stock Exchange. Future years have proved that the disease returns in periodical fits, which can only be cured by copious bleeding. Though the contractors of the Greek loan, when they paid over the money to a government engaged in civil war, could not be ignorant that the money would be diverted from carrying on hostilities against the Turks, in order to be employed in warring with domestic rivals, various attempts were made to check its wasteful expenditure during the year 1824. Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer, now her Majesty's ambassador at Constantinople, visited Greece, by request of the contractors of the loan, " to see if the nature of the Greek government warranted the payment of the por tion not yet advanced." Sir Henry stated the following observations for the benefit of his countrymen, as the result of his experience : " We (the English) have generally busied ourselves about the government of Greece, which really was no business of ours ; while the management of our money, in which we might be thought concerned, has been left entirely in the hands of the Greeks."1 General Gordon was subsequently invited to return to Greece, which he had left shortly after the fall of Tripolitza, in order to watch over the expenditure of the second loan; but he wisely refused to have anything to do with the business when he read the instructions on which he was to act. He has re corded his deliberate opinion of the men who were intrusted with the expenditure of the English loans in very strong terms : " With, perhaps, the exception of 1 An Autumn im Greece, By H. Lytton Bulwer, Esq. 8vo. London, 1826. BOOK III CHAP. IV. 28 FIRST CIVIL WAR. Zaimes, the members of the executive are no better than public robbers." 1 The internal history of Greece, from the defeat of Dramali to the arrival of King Otho, attests the truth of this severe sentence. The country was ruined by intestine broils, originating in private rapacity. Amidst these disorders, two civil wars stand out with disgraceful prominence, as having consumed the proceeds of the Engbsh loans, abandoned Psara and Kasos to be conquered by the Turks, and prepared the Morea to be subdued by Ibrahim Pasha. The first of these civil wars was called the war of Kolokotrones, because that old chieftain was its prin cipal author. It commenced in November 1823, and finished in June 1824. It was concluded as soon as the news reached the belligerents that an instalment of the first English loan had arrived at Zante. Panos, the eldest son of Kolokotrones, who held possession of Nauplia, immediately surrendered it to the executive body on receiving a share of the English money. This transaction took place on the 5th of June 1824. While the Greeks were fighting among themselves, Sultan Mahmud was smoothing away the obstacles which impeded the co-operation of his powerful vassal, Mohammed Ali, pasha of Egypt, in attacking them. By his prudent arrangements he secured the zealous support of the Egyptian pasha. Mohammed Ali was already disposed to chastise the Greeks for the losses he had sustained from their cruisers. He also feared that a prolonged contest with the insurgent Christians might end in bringing a Eussian fleet into the Medi terranean. He therefore received the proposals made to his political agent at Constantinople in the most con ciliatory spirit. The sultan invested his son Ibrahim with the rank of vizier of the Morea, and wrote a flattering letter to the great pasha himself, calling him 1 History of the Greek Revolution, ii. ?2. GREEK GOVERNMENT IN 1824. 29 the champion of Islam. Mohammed Ali received this a. d. 1824. letter with the warmest expressions of pleasure, and engaged to send a powerful fleet and army to attack the Greeks. He had not yet been inspired by French intrigue with delusive visions of making himself the founder of an Arab empire. The Greeks heard with indifference of the pre parations which were going on at the dockyards of Constantinople and Alexandria. They treated the rumoured co-operation of the sultan and the pasha as impossible. They insisted on supposing that Mo hammed Ali reasoned like themselves. They thought that the pasha must want his own money for his own schemes, and deluded themselves with the idea that he was more likely to act against the sultan than for him. They argued that he must be more anxious to establish his own independence than to destroy theirs. Their whole souls were absorbed in party contests for wealth and power, until they were awakened from their de lusive dreams by a series of terrible calamities. It has been mentioned that the Kolokotrones's civil war embittered the last months of Lord Byron's life, by doubts of the propriety of intrusting the Greeks with large sums of money. He foresaw that selfish ness would find more nutriment in foreign loans than patriotism. The executive government which defeated the re bellion of Kolokotrones was supported by a majority in the legislative assembly. It cannot be said that the members of this assembly were freely chosen by the people ; yet, on the whole, its feelings represented those of the best portion of the Greek population. Many were well-meaning men, who could clothe their thoughts in energetic and eloquent language, but few had any experience in legislation and politics. Their deliberations rarely conducted them to practical resolu- 30 GREEK GOVERNMENT IN 1824. book hi. tions, and their incapacity prevented their exercising -^^ — - any control over the financial affairs of their country. The consequence of this inaptitude for business was, that George Konduriottes and Kolettes exercised ab- solute power in the name of the executive body. The government which vanquished the faction of Kolokotrones was formed by a coalition of three par ties : the Albanian shipowners of Hydra and Spetzas ; the Greek primates of the Morea ; and the Bomeliot captains of armatoli. The chief authority was con ceded to the Albanian shipowners ; George Konduriottes of Hydra was elected president of Greece, and Botasses of Spetzas, vice-president. It is necessary to record the sad truth, that two more ignorant and incapable persons were never intrusted with the direction of a nation's affairs. The Greeks are the most prejudiced of all Europeans when there is a question of the purity of the Hellenic race, and no people regards education with more favour; yet with all this nationality and pedantry they intrusted their public affairs, in a period of great difficulty, to two men who could not address them in the Greek language, and whose intellectual deficiencies prevented them from expressing their thoughts with clearness even in the corrupt Tosk dialect which they habitually used. The descendants of Pericles and Demosthenes submitted tamely to these aliens in civilisation and race, because they were orthodox and wealthy. The interest of the president and vice-president was identical with that of the shipowners of Hydra and Spetzas, and it was directly opposed ±o the formation of a national navy. The money placed at their dis posal was wasted in paying inefficient ships, and hir ing the support of mutinous sailors ; and they refused to purchase and arm a single steamer at the recom mendation of Captain Hastings, when such a vessel GREEK GOVERNMENT IN 1824. 31 might have frustrated the operations of Mohammed a. d. 1824. Ali, and prevented Ibrahim Pasha from landing in ~ the Morea. Had they possessed a very little naval knowledge and a small share of patriotism, they might have obtained the glory of initiating the change in naval warfare which is in progress throughout all maritime nations.1 The party of the Moreot primates was next in im portance to that of the naval islanders ; but this party soon forfeited its influence and fell into contempt, by the unprincipled selfishness of its leading members. Had the Moreot primates supported the just demands of the people for a system of publicity in financial business, they might have become the guardians of the liberties of Greece, and the founders of their coun try's constitution. They were, perhaps, the only persons capable, from their administrative experience, of plac ing the existing municipal institutions in harmony with the action of the central government. The Eomeliot captains of armatoli, though they al ready possessed great territorial and political influence when the government of Konduriottes entered on office, had not yet constituted themselves into a distinct party in the state. Kolettes now succeeded by his schemes in uniting them together, and allying them with himself by the ties of a common interest. He purchased their services by securing to them a large share of the English loans ; and he taught them to maintain themselves in provincial commands, in imita tion of the old system of armatoliks. Kolettes acted as their agent and representative in the executive body. That astute Vallach was the first to perceive how their political influence might be rendered supreme in libe rated Greece, by imitating the administrative practice 1 The memoir which Hastings laid before Konduriottes's government is sub-. joined in Appendix I. 32 KOLETTES. book in. of Ali of Joannina, with which he was well acquainted. AAA jje conducted their bargains for pay and rations with the central government ; he assisted them in obtain ing contracts for farming the taxes of the provinces of which they had obtained the military command ; and he regulated with them the number of the per sonal followers they were to be permitted to charge on the public revenues as national troops. The position which Kolettes created for himself by these arrangements rendered him the most influential politician in the government, and nothing but his want of personal courage and honesty prevented him from being the first man in Greece. It has been already said that he was a Zinzar Vallachian, and not a Greek, and all the moral and physical peculiarities of that race were strongly marked both in his mind and his personal appearance. Both contrasted with those of the Greeks and Albanians by whom he was surrounded. He exhibited neither the boorish pride of the Albanian islanders, nor the loquacious self-sufficiency of the Greek logiotati. With patience and stolid silence he profited by the blunders of his colleagues, always himself doing and saying as little as possible. He trusted that others, by their restless intrigues and precipitate ambition, would ruin their own position, and leave the field open for him. His policy was crowned with success. Hypsilantes, Mavrocordatos, Konduriottes, and Zaimes, all ruined their own per sonal position by exhibiting more ambition than capa city. The second civil war, called the War of the Primates, constituted Kolettes the leader of the Eomeliot mili tary faction, and victory rendered that faction the most powerful party in Greece. During the period of Bavarian despotism, Kolettes was sent as minister to the court of Louis Philippe, and those who saw MAVROCORDATOS. 33 and conversed with him in Paris were surprised at the a. d. 1824. political reputation he had enjoyed in Greece. When ~ they listened to the grave and portly Vallach, in his Albanian habiliments, uttering platitudes with an ora cular air, they felt inclined to apply to him Fox's observation on Lord Thurlow's first appearance on the woolsack : " That fellow is a humbug ; no man can be as wise as he looks." Kolettes, however, only acted a wise look, though it must be owned that he was not a bad actor. In England, Mavrocordatos was supposed to be at the head of a powerful constitutional party. If this had ever been possible, he had destroyed that possibil ity by abandoning the presidency of Greece to play the commander-in-chief at Petta. The testimony of English Philhellenes and well-informed foreigners was, however, unavailing to undeceive the British public. The delusion appears to have originated among the Greeks settled in Western Europe, who believed that Mavrocordatos was the most disinterested statesman in Greece, and that a strong constitutional party ought to exist in a free country. But Mavrocordatos, by his grasping ambition, his schemes for governmental cen tralisation, his personal mismanagement, and his poli tical indecision, had ruined his influence before the year 1824. Feeling his position changed, and ill satis fied unless he was the first man at the seat of govern ment, he lingered at Mesolonghi during the whole of the important year 1824, and allowed all parties to learn that public business could go on perfectly well without him. In Western Greece his administration, after Lord Byron's death, was neither honourable to himself nor advantageous to the country. A civil war broke out in the district of Vlochos between two rival captains, Staikos and Vlachopulos. Its continuance was ascribed VOL. II. c 34 SECOND CIVIL WAR. book in. to his imprudence and indecision. His civil adminis- — tration was unpopular. He gave his support to John Soutzos, the eparch of Venetico, who was stigmatised as the most corrupt and rapacious phanariot in Greece. Before quitting Mesolonghi to return to the seat of government, Mavrocordatos convoked an assembly of captains and eparchs, to concert measures for defend ing the country against the incursions of the Turks, and for reforming internal abuses. His dictatorial authority authorised him to take this step, but he ought to have perceived its imprudence. Its effect was to legalise the system of capitanliks, which had been tacitly revived, and to consolidate the personal independence of the military chiefs, who learned to act in concert whenever it was their interest to resist the central government. The peasants were not blind to the effect of Mavrocordatos's conduct. They saw that it would perpetuate a state of anarchy, and many were so alarmed that they fled to Kalamos, declaring that the prince, as they still called their governor-general, had assembled a pack of wolves to debate how the sheep could be preserved from the eagles and reserved for their own eating. The second civil war, or war of the primates, was not of long duration. Zaimes was the principal author of this iniquitous movement, and his object was to deprive Konduriottes and those who supported his government of the wealth and influence they enjoyed, by disposing of the proceeds of the English loans. In appearance and manners Andreas Zaimes was a perfect gentleman. His disposition was generous, and his private conduct upright ; but his position as a hereditary primate made him ambitious, while nature had made him neither energetic nor courageous. He thrust himself forward as a statesman and military SECOND CIVIL WAR. 35 chief, but he was too weak for a political leader, and a. d. 1824. utterly unfit for a soldier. Andreas Londos was next in rank and influence among the conspirators. He was a warm personal friend of Zaimes, and the constant affection which the two Andreas showed to one another in prosperity and adversity was most honourable to both. It proved that they had virtuous stuff in their hearts. Londos was brave and active. His personal courage, however, proved of no use to his party, for, instead of establish ing order and enforcing discipline among his followers, he allowed them to commit as great depredations on the property of the Moreot peasants, as were com mitted by the most lawless chief of Eomeliot arma- tob. Londos was at this time addicted to riotous debauchery.1 Both Zaimes and Londos had assumed the position of Turkish beys, and the Greek government allowed them to collect the taxes and administer the greaterpart ofthe public affairs of their respective districts. They pre tended to employ the revenues for the public service, and in maintaining troops to blockade Patras. But it was too evident that they surrounded themselves with bands of personal followers withdrawn from the armies of Greece, and that Patras was hardly blockaded at all. Sessini of Gastuni was another influential man in the party of the primates. He was descended from a Venetian family, and had studied medicine in his youth. Shortly after the retreat of the Mussulmans 1 Lord Byron used to describe an evening passed in the company of Londos at Vostitza, when both were young men, with a spirit that rendered the scene worthy of a place in Don Juan. After supper, Londos, who had the face and figure of a chimpanzee, sprang upon a table, which appeared to be a relic of the Venetian domination, and whose antiquity rendered the exploit a dangerous enterprise, and commenced singing through his nose Rhiga's Hymn to Liberty. A new cadi, passing near the house, inquired the cause of the discordant hubbub. A native Mussulman replied, " It is only the young pri mate Londos, who is drunk, and is singing hymns to the new panaghia of the Greeks, whom thev call Eleftheria." 36 SECOND CIVIL WAR. book m. from Lalla, he contrived to assume a position in Elis — - between that of a voevode and a pasha. He became receiver-general of taxes, paymaster of troops, and farmer-general of confiscated Turkish estates. He adopted the pride and many other vices of the Osman- lees. His household was maintained with considerable pomp. The courtyard was filled with well- caparisoned horses ; the galleries were crowded with armed follow ers. He never quitted his dwelling without a suite of horsemen, armed guards on foot, and grooms leading Persian greyhounds. His sons were addressed as beys; and Ibrahim Pasha, when he occupied Gastuni, was much amused by the tales he heard from the peasantry, who said they had been compelled to fall down on their knees whenever they addressed a word to the medical primate, even in reply to the simplest question.1 Notaras, Deliyannes, and Kolokotrones, all joined the war of the primates, which broke out in November 1824. 1 Many stories were current concerning the manner in which Sessiui had collected his wealth ; one may be mentioned, relating to the loss of a part of bis ill-gotten riches. Whether true or false, it excited much amusement at Zante. Madame Sessini resided in that island, and acted as her husband's agent Before the war of the primates commenced, he wished to place some of his treasure where it would be secure against the Greek government in case of de feat. He wished, however, to do this with great secrecy, for many valuable jewels had been deposited with him by Turkish families who had been obliged to escape in a hurry to Patras at the outbreak of the Revolution. His enemies accused him of intending to declare that these deposits were lost in the civil war. Sessini wrote to inform his wife that he would send the most valuable jewels in his possession to her in a cheese and skin of butter, with peculiar marks. The letter miscarried ; and when the cheese and the skin of butter arrived, the lady, having a large supply of both, sold them to a bakal or grocer, who had often purchased previous consignments which she had received from old Sessini. A few days passed before the lost letter arrived. When it reached the lady she hastened to the bakal, but he denied all knowledge ofthe jewellery. He showed her a cheese with the mark for which she sought untouched, and a skin of butter unopened. The accounts of the customhouse showed that she had only imported cheese aud butter. Lawyers and justice could not aid her. The bakal kept the treasure, and the world laughed at Madame Sessini and her rapacious husband. But it was said that the bakal proved himself a better man than the primate, and that he restored a valuable jewel to a Turkish family who had intrusted it to the keeping of Sessini, when that family passed by Zante on its way to Alexandria. The whole story may be the creation of an idle brain, but it deserves notice as a specimen of popular rumour. Si non i rcro e ben trovato. EVILS OF THE CIVIL WARS. 37 Kolettes was at this time the most active member of a. d. im. Konduriottes's government. In six weeks he marched _ an overwhelming force of Eomeliot armatoli into the Morea, and crushed the rebels. Had the Greek govern ment displayed similar energy in arraying the forces against the Turks during the years 1823 and 1824, the war might have changed its aspect. Panos Koloko trones, the eldest son of the old klepht, after plundering the peasants of Arcadia like a brigand, was slain in a trifling skirmish. Old Kolokotrones and Deliyannes were made prisoners, and confined in a monastery at Hydra. Sessini sought safety at Zante ; but the English government was determined to discountenance the unprincipled civil broils of the Greeks, and refused him permission to land. He had no resource but to submit to the clemency of the executive body, and join Kolokotrones in prison. Zaimes, Londos, and Niketas fled to Acarnania, where Mavrocordatos allowed them to hide themselves, and where they were protected by Zongas. Konduriottes and Kolettes used their victory with impolitic barbarity. Their troops plundered innumer able Greek families who had taken no part in the civil war of everything they possessed. The working oxen of the peasantry were carried off, and in many villages the land remained unsown. The sheep and goats having been also devoured by the armatoli, the people were left to starve. The progress of Ibrahim Pasha in the following year was greatly facilitated by the mis- government of Konduriottes, the barbarity of Kolettes, and the inhuman ravages of the Eomeliot troops. The two civil wars are black spots in the history of the Greek Eevolution. No apology can be offered for those who took up arms against the government in either case, but in the second civil war the conduct of the primates was peculiarly blamable. Patriotism 38 EXPENDITURE OF THE LOANS. book hi. had certainly nothing to do with a contest in whicii 0HAF' Zaimes and Londos were acting in concert with Kolo kotrones. Ambition and avidity were the only motives of action. The coalition of the primates and military chiefs was based on a tacit pretension which they en tertained of forming a territorial aristocracy in the Morea. The leaders of the rebels knew that the great body of the people were discontented, and eager to con stitute a national representation capable of controlling the executive body and enforcing financial responsibil ity. Zaimes and Kolokotrones attempted to make this patriotism of the people a means of binding them with fresh fetters. Had the primates given a thought to the interests of their country, they would have supported the demands of the people in a legal way, and there can be no doubt that they would have soon secured a majority in the legislative assembly, even as it was then constituted. Their rebellion inaugurated a long period of administrative anarchy, wasted the resources of Greece, and created a new race of tyrants as despotic as, and far meaner than, the hated Turks. The victors in the civil wars were as corrupt as the vanquished had been rapacious. The members of the executive wasted the proceeds of the loans with dis honesty as well as extravagance ; and the anomalous condition to which Greece was reduced by the stupidity of its government, cannot be exhibited m a clearer light than by tracing the way in which the money was consumed. The first sums which arrived from England in 1824 were absorbed by arrears due on public and private debts. The payments made had no reference to the necessities of the public service, they were determined by the influence of individual members of the govern ment. The greater part of the first loan was paid over to the shipowners and sailors of what was called the EXPENDITURE OF THE LOANS. 39 Greek fleet; and the lion's share was appropriated to a. d. i 824. the Albanians of Hydra and Spetzas. The civil wars ~ engulfed considerable sums. Eomeliot captains and soldiers received large bribes to attack their country men. No inconsiderable amount was divided among the members of the legislative assembly, and among a large body of useless partisans, who were characterised as public officials. Every man of any consideration in his own imagination wanted to place himself at the : head of a band of armed men, and hundreds of civil ians paraded the streets of Nauplia with trains of kilted followers, uke Scottish chieftains. Phanariots and doctors in medicine, who, in the month of April 1824, were clad in ragged coats, and who lived on scanty rations, threw off that patriotic chrysalis before summer was past, and emerged in all the splendour of brigand life, fluttering about in rich Albanian habiliments, re fulgent with brilliant and unused arms, and followed by diminutive pipe-bearers and tall henchmen. The small stature, voluble tongues, turnspit legs, and Hebrew physiognomies of these Byzantine emigrants, excited the contempt, as much as their sudden and superfluous splendour awakened the envy, of the native Hellenes. Nauplia certainly offered a splendid spectacle to any one who could forget that it was the capital of an impoverished nation struggling through starvation to establish its liberty. The streets were for many months crowded with thousands of gallant young men in picturesque dresses and richly ornamented arms, who ought to have been on the frontiers of Greece. To the stranger who saw only the fortress of Nauplia filled with troops, Greece appeared to be well prepared to resist the whole force of the Othoman empire. Veteran soldiers and enthusiastic volunteers were nu merous. Military commands were distributed with a bountiful hand. Ehodios, the Secretary of State, who 40 EXPENDITURE OF THE LOANS. book m. had studied medicine, was made colonel of the regular ¦ — - troops. It is needless to say that the appointment soon made them as irregular as any other troops in Greece. Military chiefs were allowed to enrol under their private banners upwards of thirty thousand men, and pay was actually issued for this number of troops from the proceeds of the English loans. But over these troops the Greek government exercised no direct con trol. No measure was taken even to verify the numbers of the men for whom pay and rations were furnished. Everything was left to the chiefs, who contracted to furnish a certain number of men for a certain amount of pay and a fixed number of daily rations. Amidst this lavish military expenditure, Modon, Coron, Patras, and Lepanto were left almost unwatched, and without any force to keep up a regular blockade. The illegal gains made by drawing pay and rations for troops who were never mustered, quite as much as the commissions of colonel given to apothecaries, and of captain to grooms and pipe-bearers, demoralised the military forces of Greece. The war with the sultan seemed to be forgotten by the soldiers, who thought only of indulging in the luxury of embroidered dresses and splendid arms. This is the dominant passion of every military class in Turkey, whether Greeks, Al banians, or Turks. The money poured into Greece by the loans suddenly created a demand for Albanian equipments. The bazaars of Tripolitza, Nauplia, Me solonghi, and Athens were filled with gold- embroidered jackets, gilded yataghans, and silver-mounted pistols. Tailors came flocking to Greece from Joannina and Saloniki. Sabres, pistols, and long guns, richly mounted, were constantly passing through the Ionian Islands as articles of trade between Albania and the Morea. The arms and dress of an ordinary palikari, made in imitation of the garb of the Tosks of Southern ANECDOTES. 4 1 Albania, often cost £50. Those of a chiliarch or a a.d. is?*. strategos, with the showy trappings for his horse, gene- ~ rally exceeded £300. These sums were obtained from the loans, and were abstracted from the service of the country. The complaint that Greece was in danger of being ruined by this extravagant expenditure was general, yet everybody seemed to do his utmost to in crease the evil by spending as much money as possible in idle parade. Strange stories were current at the time concerning the large sums of money which indivi duals contrived to amass. The Arabs, who took Sphak- teria and slew the henchman of Mavrocordatos, were said to have found about £300 in his belt, in English sovereigns and Venetian sequins. This man had been appointed an officer in the Greek army, though he knew nothing of military service, and had only learned to carry a gun, as a municipal guard, when it was his duty to protect the vineyards of Vrachori from the hostilities of the dogs of the Turkish quarter and the invasions of the foxes of the neighbouring hills. Makrys was for a time the hero of Mesolonghi, and the captain of the neighbouring district, Zygos. He was a brave man, but a lawless, and, consequently, a bad soldier. His early years were passed as a brigand, and he often recounted how he had lived for many days on the unbaked dough he had prepared from pounded Indian-corn. He first gained wealth by par ticipating in the plunder and massacre of the Jews and Turks of Vrachori. The English loans increased his treasures, which the exaggerations of the people of Mesolonghi swelled to a fabulous amount. Yet, with all his wealth, he was in the habit of drawing pay and rations for five hundred men, when he had only fifty under arms. Amongst the literary Greeks it has been the fashion to talk and write much concerning the patriotic spirit 42 MILITARY EXPENDITURE. book m. and the extraordinary military exploits of the klephts, ^AAHl as if these robbers had been the champions of Greek liberty. But the truth is, that these men were mere brigands, who, both before the Eevolution, during the revolutionary war, and under the government of King Otho, have plundered the Greeks more than they were ever plundered by the Turks. It is not to be supposed that military anarchy was established without some opposition on the part of many patriotic Greeks. But its opponents were civil ians, and men generally without either practical ex perience or local influence. The treatment which the few who ventured to make any efforts to put some restraint on the frauds and peculations of the military chiefs received at the hands of the soldiery, prevented this kind of patriotism from finding imitators. Before the siege of Mesolonghi by the army of Reshid Pasha, a patriotic commissary made an attempt to force the chiefs in the Greek camp to muster their followers, in order that no more rations might be issued than were really required, as he found that a large sum was ex pended by the Greek government in transporting pro visions to the camp, while the chiefs who received these provisions as rations for their soldiers compelled the peasants to carry them back to Mesolonghi. The soldiers of Makrys, instigated by their leader, declared that to muster troops was an arbitrary and despotic act, and pronounced that the reforming commissary was an enemy to constitutional liberty. The troops re solved that the rights of the military should not be violated by this undue assumption of power on the part of the central government, and they carried their resolution into effect by beating the patriotic commis sary, and plundering the public magazine. The un fortunate man was confined to his bed for several days, and, if his patriotism was not diminished, we may be NAVAL EXPENDITURE. 43 sure that he was more prudent and reserved in exhibit- a. d. 1824. ing a virtue which had proved so distasteful to the ~ defenders of his country, and so calamitous to himself. His friends gave him no consolation during his con valescence. They reproached him with not commenc ing his reforms by cutting off the extra rations which were issued to Katzaro, the captain of the body-guard of Mavrocordatos, who drew fifty rations, and did duty with only seven armed followers ; or with General Vlachopulos, who pretended to be the leader of four hundred soldiers, but who was said to be unable to muster more than about eighty. These abuses were universal. Mr Tricoupi informs the world that the veteran Anagnostaras, who fell at Sphakteria, marched against the enemy with only seventeen armed peasants, though he was paid by the Greek government to en rol seven hundred men.1 Ghoura subsequently drew twelve thousand rations, when he commanded only from three to four thousand men.2 It is vain for his torians and orators to tell us that true patriotism existed in the hearts of men so wanting in common honesty. Men who combine heroism and fraud ought to be praised only in French novels. The waste of money on the navy was even greater than on the army. Ill-equipped and dull -sailing ves sels were hired to take their place in the Greek fleet, because their owners belonged to the faction of Kon duriottes and Botasses. Fire-ships were purchased and fitted out at an unnecessary expense, because their pro prietors wished to dispose of useless vessels. The great number of fire-ships belonging to the island of Hydra, which were consumed during the years 1824 and 1825 without inflicting any loss on the Turkish fleet, attest 1 Tricoupi, iii. 206. Phrantzes considers Anagnostaras, the archimandrite Dikaois, and Odysseus, as the three principal corrupters of the Greek soldiery. —Vol. ii. p. 343, note. 2 Gordon, ii. 231, 267. Phrantzes, ii. 403, note. 44 FINANCIAL DISHONESTY. book in. the maladministration which took place in this de- CHAP. IV. t x partment of the naval service. The sailors, who were spectators of the jobs of the primates and captains, became every month more insolent and disorderly. During one cruise they landed at Santorin, and, not content with carrying off large supplies of grapes and figs, they deliberately plundered the cotton plantations, and sent boat-loads of cotton on board their ships, as if they had conquered a lawful prize in an enemy's territory. Yet all these disorders, abuses, waste, and extrava gance seem hardly sufficient to explain the rapidity with which the proceeds of the loans disappeared; and indeed it required the assistance of equal extra vagance and similar jobbing in London and New York to empty the Greek treasury. But the thing was done quickly and effectually. Early in the year 1826, the government at Nauplia had spent every farthing it could obtain, and made a vain attempt to raise a loan of £800,000 among the Greeks themselves, which was to be immediately repaid from the pro ceeds of sales of national lands. This property had been pledged only a short time before by the same government to the English bondholders as a security for the second loan. The Greeks, who were better in formed concerning the proceedings and bad faith of their countrymen than strangers, would not advance a single dollar. The dishonesty of the government, the rapacity of the military, and the indiscipline of the navy, were forerunners of the misfortunes of the nation. BOOK FOURTH. THE SUCCESSES OF THE TURKS. CHAPTEE I. NAVAL SUCCESSES — IBRAHIM IN THE MOREA. " Heaven's cause Won us not victory where wisdom was not.' Destruction of Kasos — Destruction oi? Psara — Expedition oe Moham med Ali — TheBairah at Makry — Naval battles oef Budrun — Failure oe the Turks at Samos — Ibrahim driven back erom Crete — Ibrahim lands in Greece — Greeks unprepared for defence — Defeat of the Greek armt — Egyptians take Sphakteria — Escape of the brig Mars — Capitulation of Navarin— Success of Miaoulis at Modon — Koloko trones general in the Peloponnesus — Defeat of the Greeks and death of the archimandrite Dikaios at Maniaki — Defeat of Koloko trones at Makryplagi — Ibrahim repulsed at Lerna — Defeat of Kolokotrones at Trikorpha — Ibrahim ravages the Morea— Receives orders to aid in the siege of Mesolonghi. The tide of success which had hitherto borne the Greeks onward to glory and independence began to ebb in 1824. Sultan Mahmud studied the causes of the disasters of his fleets and armies, and laboured with stern industry to remedy their defects. He ob served that his own resources were not diminished by his losses, while those of the Greeks were daily declin ing, and were sure to be utterly exhausted if he could prolong the contest for a few years. He therefore changed his plans. Instead of invading Greece, where 46 PREPARATION OF THE SUL.TA1N. book iv. the great mass of the population was determined to — ^-— defend its liberty with desperate courage, he resolved to destroy all the outlying resources of his enemy he- fore attempting to attack the centre of their power. He saw that the first step to reconquering Greece was to recover the command of the sea. This, he soon discovered, was easier than was generally supposed. The Greeks were not in a condition to replace the loss of a few ships; the Othoman empire could rebuild a fleet every year. The destruction, therefore, of a single ship and a few sailors, was cheaply purchased by the conflagration of a line-of-battle ship or a frigate; the ruin of a Greek naval island by the sacrifice of an Othoman fleet. The sultan selected Psara and Kasos as the first objects of attack. They were the most exposed naval stations of the Greeks. Their cruisers inflicted the most extensive losses on the Turkish population, and their destruction would be more popular in the Othoman empire than any victory either by land or sea. Psara was the cause of intoler able evils to the Mussulmans in Thrace and Asia Minor ; Kasos was an eyesore and a torment to Syria and Egypt. Mahmud- and Mohammed Ali concerted their operations to attack the two islands suddenly and simultaneously with two fleets. Their plans were framed with skill and executed with vigour. The commercial activity of Kasos adds another to the proofs already mentioned that the principles of the sultan's policy were better than the administration of his authority. Christians or Mussulmans, Yezidees and Nestorians, Druses and Maronites, were often pros perous and contented under the sultan's government, but rarely either the one or the other when their affairs were conducted by Othoman officials. Secluded valleys, like the valley of the river of Arta, were carefully cultivated ; barren rocks, like Hydra, were peopled by DESTRUCTION OF KASOS. 47 active seamen. The Vallachs of Kalarites and Syrako, A. d. 1824. and the Albanians of Hydra, administered their own ~ affairs without being controlled by a pasha or a voevode. Kasos afforded a striking example of the advantages to be derived from the sultan's protection, when it could be obtained without the evils of the Othoman administration. This island is about twelve miles long, and in its aridity and iron-bound coast it resembles Hydra. It also has no secure port ; yet at this time it contained seven thousand inhabitants, who owned fifteen square-rigged vessels and forty smaller craft, all of which had for three years been employed in plundering the islands of Crete, Rhodes, and Cyprus, and ravaging the coasts of Karamania, Syria, and Egypt. It was said that the Kasiots usually mur dered their captives at sea; and there is reason to fear that the accusation is well founded, for few Turkish prisoners were ever brought to the island. Indeed, during the years 1821 and 1822 the inhabitants had difficulty in procuring bread for themselves, and could not feed their enemies. Mercy, it must be owned, was a virtue as little practised by the Christian as by the Mussulman combatants at the commencement of the Greek Revolution, and few lives were spared from motives of humanity. Sultan Mahmud expected to paralyse the Greeks with terror, by destroying Kasos and Psara at the same time. But the Egyptian fleet was ready for action before that of the capitan -pasha could leave Constantinople. The force destined by Mohammed Ali to attack Kasos consisted of three frigates and ten sloops of war, under the command of Ismael Gibraltar Pasha. On board this squadron three thousand Al banians were embarked under Hussein Bey Djeritlee, an able officer, who fell afterwards at Mesolonghi. CHAP. I. 48 DESTltUU'l'lUJN UU .K.AISUS. book iv. Kasos was ill fortified, and the inhabitants neglected CHAP I_ , ° every precaution which common prudence ought to have suggested for preventing a landing. The Albanians effected tlieir landing on the 19th of June 1824, during the night, not far from the usual landing-place, and they scaled the rocks that commanded the Kasiot batteries without encountering any resistance. The surprise was complete. The islanders dwelt in four villages situated high in the mountain. The troops of Hussein climbed the rugged ascent in silence, and fell unexpectedly on the villagers. The men capable of bear ing arms were slain without mercy. The old women shared their fate, but the young women and children, who were deemed suitable for the slave-market of Alexandria, were carried on board the ships. The Kas- iots posted in the batteries near the beach stood firm. But the Albanians, experienced in mountain warfare, occupied the higher grounds, and crept forward, under the cover of rocks and stones, until they could shoot the islanders at their guns. Fourteen square-rigged vessels and about thirty small craft were captured, and five hundred Kasiot seamen were slain. The Alba nians lost only thirty killed and wounded. Upwards of two thousand women and children were enslaved. The Albanians were allowed twenty-four hours to plunder, and to collect booty and slaves. The instant that term was expired, Ismael Gibraltar and Hussein took effective measures to restore order, and gave pro tection to every Greek who submitted to the sultan's authority. The news of this sad disaster spread consternation through all Greece. It was a forewarning of the vigour of their new enemy ; but the admonition was given in vain. A. greater calamity followed. Khosreff Pasha sailed from the Dardanelles in the month of May, before the DESTRUCTION OF PSARA. 49 Greeks had any cruisers out to watch his movements, a. d. 1824. After a feint attack on Skopelos, the Othoman fleet ~ returned to Mytilene, where it was soon joined by transports carrying three thousand janissaries. The capitan -pasha then embarked four thousand Asiatic troops and sailed for Psara. His force consisted of thirty-eight frigates, corvettes, and brigs, and forty transports, with about eight thousand soldiers. Psara is a high rocky island, smaller than Kasos. Its northern and eastern sides are precipitous and were considered unassailable. The town is situated in the south-western part. Below it, to the west, there is a good roadstead sheltered by a rocky islet, called Antipsara. A small port to the south of the town also affords shelter to a few vessels. The native Psarians amounted to seven thousand souls ; but in the year 1824 there were so many refugees from Chios, Kydo- nies, and Smyrna, residing in the island, that the population exceeded twelve thousand. About a thou sand of the Romeliot armatoli, who had plundered Skiathos, were now engaged to defend Psara. Every point where it was supposed that the Turks would attempt to land was fortified. The Psarians unfor tunately overrated their own knowledge of military affairs, and greatly underrated the skill and enterprise of their enemy. Two hundred pieces of artillery were mounted in ill-constructed and ill-placed batteries. Extraordinary success in privateering had rendered the Psarians presumptuous. They spoke of the Turks as cowards, and of Sultan Mahmud as a tyrant, a fool, and a butcher. Foreigners who possessed military knowledge in vain pointed out to them the defects of their batteries ; their advice was treated with con tempt. Their domineering conduct was insupportable to their countrymen in the Archipelago ; they were the tyrants of the Greek islands on the Asiatic coast. VOL. II. D 50 DESTRUCTION OF PSARA. book iv, They seemed to emulate the insolence of the ancient CHAr. I. •* ..... Athenians. To complete the similarity, they com menced hostilities with the Samians, who refused to receive a Psarian governor and a Psarian tax-collector. Samos was blockaded, and the Turks of Asia Minor were relieved from the depredations of the Greeks, while the privateers of Psara were pursuing and plun dering the privateers of Samos. The Psarians were also accused of neglecting to aid the brave inhabitants of Trikheri in their last struggle with the Turks, and of pillaging the Greeks of Mount Pelion, whom their neglect had compelled to acknowledge the sultan's authority. Unlike the Athenians of old, the Psarians placed more confidence in their stone batteries than in their wooden walls. As sailors, they knew the inferiority of their ships ; their utter ignorance of the art of war made them fancy that their batteries were impreg nable. They laid up the greater part of their ships in the roadstead of Antipsara, and employed the crews as gunners on shore. The island was defended by four thousand well-armed men, but these men were without order and without a leader ; they were consequently little better than an armed mob. The safety of Psara depended on the activity of the Greek fleet, and on the skill of the Psarians in using fire-ships. Unfortunately for Greece, the plan of de fence adopted by the local government threw away the best chance of success. Upwards of fifteen hun dred seamen, who had acquired great naval skill, some degree of discipline, and some knowledge of marine artillery when embarked in small vessels, were ren dered of little use by being mixed up with undis ciplined armatoli in ill-constructed batteries without artillery officers. The capitan-pasha consumed six weeks in making DESTRUCTION OF PSARA. 51 preparations which ought to have been completed in a. d. 1824. as many days. The Greek government had, therefore, ~~ ample time to send a fleet to meet him in the narrow seas, to oppose his embarking troops at Mytilene, and to attack his transports when he attempted to effect a landing at Psara. The avarice of the Hydriot pri mates and the self-sufficiency of the Psarians prevented Greece from profiting by the delay. The attack on Psara was skilfully conducted. Khos- reff with ten ships opened a heavy cannonade on the batteries, while he detached a part of his fleet in a direction which rendered it visible from the town, and which induced the Psarians to expect that it intended to debark troops. The attention of the islanders was diverted by this simple stratagem. In the mean time a body of Arnaouts and Asiatics landed at a small open beach and stormed a battery manned by fifty armatoli. They then climbed the mountain, conceal ing themselves as much as possible from observation until they reached the heights above the town. On gaining that point they unfurled the Turkish flag, and announced their success to the capitan-pasha and the astonished Greeks by a discharge of firearms. At a signal from the Othoman flag-ship a hundred boats, filled with troops, immediately pushed off, and attacked simultaneously all the batteries at the roadstead. After a short engagement the Turks were everywhere victorious. Terror seized both the armatoli and the Psarians. All who saw a chance of escape fled. Those whose retreat was cut off made a desperate resistance, and no Psarian laid down his arms. What yesterday had been insolence and pride to-day was converted into patriotism. But the valour which, under the guidance of discipline and science, might have repulsed the Turks, could only secure an honourable death. Eight thousand persons were slain or reduced to slavery ; about 52 DESTRUCTION OF PSARA. b ook iv. four thousand, chiefly Psarians, succeeded in getting CHAP. I. 1-1 1 • on board vessels in the port and m putting to sea while their enemies were engaged in the sack of the town. The victorious Turks slew every male capable of bearing arms, and the heads of the vanquished were piled into one of those ghastly pyramidal trophies with which Othoman pashas then commemorated their triumphs. One hundred vessels of various sizes fell into the hands of the capitan-pasha. Only twenty vessels escaped. The Turks of Asia Minor were frantic with joy, and their cruelty might have equalled that of the Greeks at Navarin and Tripolitza, had their avarice not in duced them to spare the women and children for the slave-markets of Smyrna and Constantinople. Great were the festivities on the coasts of Thrace and Asia Minor when it was known that the dwellings of the Psarians were desolate, and the sailors who had plun dered the true believers were slain. The Albanians of Hydra and Spetzas had been slow to aid the Greeks of Kasos and Psara. This neglect was not caused by any prejudice of race, but by ig noble feelings of interest. When the terrible catas trophe of Psara was known at Hydra, fear for their own safety inspired the islanders with a degree of activity, which, if displayed a few weeks earlier, might have saved both Kasos and Psara. Both at Hydra and Spetzas, soldiers were hired to defend the islands during the absence of the sailors, who hastened on board their ships, and the whole Greek fleet put to sea. The capitan-pasha had returned to Mytilene with the booty and slaves captured at Psara before Miaoulis appeared ; so that the Greek fleet could only save a few of the fugitives who had concealed themselves in caverns and in secluded ravines. Two transports with some of the captives on board were also captured in EXPEDITION OF MOHAMMED ALI. 53 the port. Khosreff celebrated the Courban Bairam at a. d. 1824. Mytilene. It was his intention to attack Samos, and, " had he carried that project immediately into execution, it would have had a good chance of success. The blockade of Samos by the Psarians had thrown the affairs of that island into confusion, and the people were ill prepared for defence. But the month which the capitan-pasha wasted at Mytilene was not left un employed. The fate of Kasos and Psara awakened all the energies of the Samians, and when the Greek and Turkish fleets appeared in the waters of Samos at the same time, the capitan-pasha did not venture to make an attempt to land troops. After some manoeuvring, he bore up for Budrun, where he was to effect his junction with the Egyptian fleet. Mohammed Ali, having resolved to become the sul tan's agent for reconquering the Morea, prepared for the enterprise with prudence and vigour. He had been previously engaged in forming a fleet, of which one of the finest ships, called the Asia, had been recently fitted out at Deptford. A fleet of twenty-five sail was now prepared for sea, and a hundred transports were collected in the port of Alexandria to receive troops, provisions, and military stores. Everything necessary for a long voyage was supplied in profusion, and eight thousand men and a thousand horses were embarked. An experienced English seaman who was present, de clared that the stores were carefully packed, and that the transports could not have embarked the same number of men and the same amount of material in less time in most English ports, though the operation would of course be performed at home with less noise and fewer men. This service, like all other military and naval business in Egypt at this time, was organised and directed by French and Italian officers who had served in the armies of Napoleon I. 54 BAIRAM AT MAKRY. book iv. Ibrahim sailed from Alexandria on the 19th July AAA 1824. The difficulty of getting clear of the Egyptian coast during the strong north winds which prevail in summer, forced the transports to beat up in small squadrons; and the whole sea between Egypt, Cyprus, and Crete was crowded with ships. A few Greek cruisers might have made great havoc, and secured valuable prizes — perhaps frustrated the expedition. But, at this time, the supineness and civil wars of the Greeks formed a discouraging contrast with the activity and harmony of the Turks. On the 2d of August Ibrahim put into the Gulf of Makry, where he found two of his frigates repairing the damage they had sustained in a gale of wind. Many of the transports had already reached this ren dezvous. The pasha landed the troops to celebrate the feast of Bairam, and the ceremonies of this great Mohammedan festival were performed in a very im posing manner. In the afternoon the whole army was drawn up on the beach. When the sun went down, bright-coloured lanterns were hoisted at the mast heads of all the ships, and a salute was fired from every gun in the fleet. The troops on shore followed the example, firing by platoons, companies, and bat talions as rapidly as possible, until their fire became at last a continuous discharge of musketry along the whole line, which was prolonged in an incessant roar for a quarter of an hour. The spectacle was wild and strange, in a deserted bay, overlooked by the sculptured tombs of the ancient Telmessus. Ibrahim seemed to be rivalling the folly of Caligida. Suddenly, when the din of artillery and musketry had swelled into a sound like thunder, every noise was hushed, and, as the smoke rolled away, the thin silver crescent of the new moon was visible. A prolonged shout, repeated in melancholy cadence, rose from the army, and was HOSTILE FLEETS. 55 echoed back from the fleet. A minute after, a hundred a. d. 1824. camp-fires blazed up as if by enchantment. The line _ was broken, and the busy hum of the soldiers hastening to receive their rations of pilaf, reminded the spectator that the pageant on which he had gazed with delight was only a transient interlude in a bloody drama. The Egyptian fleet, after quitting Makry, proceeded to Budrun. In passing Rhodes it was ordered to bear up and come to anchor. The reason for this strange order was never known. Ibrahim's frigate gave the signal, and let go its anchor in sixty fathoms. Another frigate, in her zeal to obey the signal, let go her anchor in a hundred and fifty fathoms, and of course lost anchor and cable. A day or two after, Ibrahim's frigate drove into deeper water, and her crew being unable to get up the anchor, the pasha ordered her captain to be bastinadoed on the quarterdeck. There can be no doubt that if Miaoulis had possessed the power of ap plying the cat-o'-nine-tails to the backs of his mutinous sailors, the Greek fleet would have been a more dan gerous adversary to the Egyptian than it proved. Ibrahim joined the capitan-pasha at Budrun on the 1st of September. Their united fleets consisted of a seventy-four, bearing the flag of Khosreff, twenty frigates, twenty-five corvettes, and forty brigs and schooners, with nearly three hundred transports of all sizes and shapes. Great improvements had been made in the Othoman fleet during the preceding winter, but it was far from being in good order. The ships were in general so over-masted, and so heavily rigged, that they could not have carried their spars for an hour during a heavy gale in the Channel. Even in their own seas, the miltems, or summer gales, caused great confusion, and English seamen gave a good picture of the fleet in that condition, by speaking of the Othoman navy as being adrift in the Archipelago. CHAP. 6 FIRST BATTLE OFF BUDRUN. book iv. The Greek fleet, consisting of between seventy and - eighty sail, mounting eight hundred and fifty guns, and manned by five thousand able seamen, appeared in the channel between Cos and the island of Kappari on the 5th of September. The Turkish fleet got under weigh and stood out to engage it. The capitan-pasha, though a man of some administrative capacity, was a coward. He fancied every Greek brig was a fire-ship prepared to blow him up, like his predecessor Kara Ali, and, to avoid that fate, he always contrived that some accident should prevent his ship from getting into danger. On this occasion, he carried away his maintop-sail and his topgallant-yard while in stays, and then ran behind Orak to refit. The Greeks endeavoured to throw their enemies into confusion, hoping that when the ships were crowded together a favourable opportunity would occur for using their fire-ships. This object seemed nearly gained, when four frigates stood boldly on to gain the weather- gage of the Greeks. They were endeavouring to force Miaoulis and the leading ships of the Greek fleet under the guns of the fort of Cos. The naval skill of the Hydriots baffled this manoeuvre. An Egyptian cor vette at the same time engaged a Greek pretty closely for ten minutes, and did not haul off until her captain was killed. The frigates of Ibrahim and Ismael Gib raltar ran along the Greek line firing with steadiness, but at too great a distance to do much damage, and quite out of range of the smaller guns of their op ponents. A fire-ship was directed against Ibrahim's frigate, but it drifted past, and consumed itself harm lessly in the midst of the Othoman fleet. The Egyptians succeeded in forcing another fire-ship under the guns of Cos, where it was abandoned by its crew with such pre cipitation, that it fell uninjured into the hands ofthe Turks, who examined its construction with the greatest SECOND BATTLE OFF BUDRUN. 57 interest. These two failures diminished the fear with a. d. 1824. which the Greek fire-ships had been hitherto regarded. The first battle off Budrun was more favourable to the Turks than to the Greeks. A long day was spent by the hostile fleets in an incessant cannonade, and much powder was wasted beyond the range of any guns. To the Turks this was of use as practice ; and if we take into account the number of ships engaged, the inexperience of the crews and officers, and the advantage which the narrow channel afforded to the light ships and naval skill of the Greeks, it appeared surprising that the Turks escaped with so little loss. Among the Constantinopolitan division of the fleet there was often considerable disorder. Several ships ran foul of each other. Most fired their broadsides as the guns were laid before getting under weigh, so that when the Greeks were to windward the shot were seen flying through the air like shells, and when the enemy was to leeward the broadsides lashed the sea into a foam at a hundred yards from the muzzles of the guns, while the Greeks were a mile distant. The day ended in a much greater loss of jib-booms and spars than of men on the part of the Turks. The Greeks lost two fire-ships. It is supposed that not twenty men were killed on both sides. Ibrahim was extremely proud of his exploits. It was his first naval engagement. He had baffled one Greek fire-ship and captured another. Half-a-dozen such battles would give him the command of the sea. The Greek fleet anchored in the bay of Sandama. On the 10th of September the Turks again stood out of Budrun. Their object was to force a passage to Samos. Several ships endeavoured to get to windward of the Greeks by standing out to Leros, and for a time it seemed probable that Miaoulis, who lay becalmed near the rock Ataki with a dozen brigs, would be cut 58 SECOND BATTLE OFF BUDRUN. book iv. off from the rest of the fleet, and be surrounded by the AAA enemy.1 The breeze, which had hitherto only favoured the Turks, at last reached the Greeks, who knew how to employ it to the best advantage. A confused en gagement ensued, in which both parties suffered several disasters. A Greek fire-ship was dismasted, but was burned by its own crew before it was abandoned. Three fire-ships, manned by Albanian islanders, were successively launched against an Egyptian brig, which disquieted the Greeks by the skill and daring of its manoeuvres. For a moment the brig seemed to be en veloped in flames, and the report was spread through the Greek fleet that it was destroyed. This was a mistake. The little brig emerged from the flames un injured, while the three fire-ships, drifting away, burned harmless to the water's edge. The sight of four fire- ships consumed in vain, inspired the Turks with unusual boldness. The Tunisian commodore led his squadron to attack the Greeks with more courage than caution. Two Hydriot fire-ships bore down upon him, and one grappled his frigate, which was blown up. The crew con sisted of four hundred men, and she carried two hundred and fifty Arab regular troops. The commodore, the colonel of the troops, and about fifty men, were picked up by Greek boats. All the rest perished at the time, and most of those then saved were subsequently mur dered at a massacre of Turkish prisoners in Hydra.2 1 Gordon, ii. 154, by some mistake writes Zatalia instead of Ataki. Tricoupi, who habitually transposes the ancient and modern names of his authorities, misled by the word, supposes that the fleets were off Attaleia, which is at least two hundred miles distant. — Tricoupi, iii. 164. Gordon's information concerning the naval operations in 1S24 was in part drawn from the journal of an Englishman in Ibrahim's fleet, which was lent to him by the author on his complaining that he had found great difficulty in obtaining accurate accounts of the movements of the Greek fleet from the Greek islanders. 2 Sir James Emerson Tennent, in A Picture of Greece in 1S25, by James Emerson, vol. i. 244, gives an account of this massacre, of which he was an eyewitness. Two hundred innocent and helpless prisoners were butchered like sheep in the public square of Hydra, and no primate or captain made an effort to save their lives. This unparalleled act of atrocity was caused by a mere rumour that a Hydriot vessel had been blown up by a Turkish slave, though it was as probable that it was destroyed by the carelessness of its crew. SECOND BATTLE OFF BUDRUN. 59 A Turkish corvette was also destroyed by a Psarian a. d. 1824. fire-ship. These losses so terrified the Turks that they hauled off, and both fleets returned to their former anchorages. In this second engagement the Egyptians remained almost inactive. Ibrahim and Gibraltar, who were neither of them deficient in courage, were not disposed to expose their ships to secure victory for a capitan- pasha who kept always at a distance from the enemy. Jealousy also prevailed between Ibrahim and Khosreff. The superior rank of the capitan-pasha had enabled him to assume airs of superiority, which had mortified the Egyptian. It was now necessary to secure the cordial co-operation of Ibrahim, since it was evident that it would be impossible for the Othoman fleet alone to effect a debarkation at Samos. After a few days had been passed in negotiations and ceremonious visits, Ibrahim consented to send all his frigates to assist the Turks, and encamped his own troops at Budrun until the capitan-pasha's operations should be finished. It may be here observed, that if the Greeks had en deavoured to learn the truth concerning their enemies, they might easily have ascertained that they were now about to encounter a much more dangerous enemy than any who had previously attacked them. While the Egyptian regulars remained at Budrun they main tained strict discipline. Neither in the town nor in the neighbouring country were the Christians molested in any way by Ibrahim's soldiers, though two thousand Albanians, whose services had been transferred by the capitan-pasha to the Egyptian expedition, could hardly be prevented from plundering Mussulman and Chris tian alike. Ibrahim had accepted their services in order to keep them as a check on the Turks in the Cretan fortresses. The Greek and Turkish fleets met again between 60 FAILURE AT SAMOS. book iv. Icaria and Samos. Some severe skirmishing ensued, AAA in which the Greeks compelled the capitan-pasha to abandon the project of landing on Samos. Heavy gales during the latter part of September dispersed both fleets, and the capitan-pasha returned to the Dardanelles early in October, leaving several Othoman frigates and corvettes with the Egyptian fleet. The Greek fleet was about the same time weakened by the departure of the Psarians, but Miaoulis con tinued to harass the Egyptians. An engagement took place off Mytilene, in which Nicodemos, the only Psarian who remained with the Greek fleet, burned a Turkish corvette, and two other fire-ships destroyed an Egyptian brig. Again, however, a Hydriot fire-ship was burned uselessly in consequence of the timidity, the indisci pline, or the inexperience of the crew. Ibrahim was so dissatisfied with the conduct of his captains in this engagement, that he expressed his displeasure in strong terms. He ordered the captain of the brig wliich had been burned to be strangled for abandoning his ship too precipitately, and he ordered another captain to he bastinadoed on his own quarterdeck, for running foul of a frigate in order to escape a Greek fire-ship. The season was far advanced before the Egyptians returned to Budrun. Most of the Greek ships, without waiting for orders, sailed for Hydra and Spetzas. Miaoulis remained with twenty-five sail, and con tinued to watch the enemy with indefatigable zeal. Ibrahim lost no time in embarking his army in order to reach Crete, where a considerable number of men and a large amount of mihtary stores had already arrived direct from Alexandria. On the 13th of November 1824, while the whole Egyptian fleet was approaching Crete, about twenty Greek brigs hove in sight, and bore down on the trans ports, which were far ahead of the men-of-war. A IBRAHIM DRIVEN BACK FROM CRETE. 61 single frigate, which was much to windward of the a. d. 1824. others, was surrounded by five Greek brigs, and might easily have been carried by boarding her from stem and stern, had the Greek islanders ventured to come to close quarters. Their timid manoeuvres allowed her to escape, which she did in the most unseamanlike way, by running towards the middle of the transports with all her studding-sails set. The Greeks, who outsailed her, passed successively under her stern, and raked her with their broadsides. A fire-ship was also sent down on her, and her studding-sails caught fire, but they were cut away, and the fire prevented from spreading to the other sails. The aversion of the Hydriots to encountering the Turks sword in hand, prevented their taking advantage of the confusion produced by the conflagration. A bold attack would have insured either the capture or the destruction of the frigate. In the afternoon all the transports had retired behind the men-of-war, and Ibrahim Pasha, his admiral Ismael Gibraltar, with nine more frigates, formed a line to protect them. The Greek force before night was in creased to forty sail. Two fire-ships were directed against one of the Egyptian frigates, but she avoided them without much trouble. The night came on dark and squally, and the Egyptians were ordered to bear away between Crete and Kasos. Next morning a number of transports assembled under the lee of Karpathos, where they found Ibrahim's frigate. They then made sail for Rhodes ; but as that island affords no anchorage during the winter, -the bay of Marmorice, on the opposite coast, was fixed on for the general rendezvous. In the engagement of the 13th the Greeks captured only seven or eight tran sports, but they dispersed the convoy so completely that many vessels bore away for Alexandria. A. few, however, by holding on their course, gained Suda in 62 IBRAHIM LANDS IN GREECE. book iv. safety. At Marmorice Ibrahim degraded eleven cap- ¦ CHAF" tains for neglecting to keep to windward of the trans ports, according to orders. The Greeks allowed themselves to be deluded into a belief that Ibrahim would not dare to renew his voyage to Crete during the winter. They returned to Hydra with their prizes, and the persevering pasha sailed from Marmorice on the 5 th of December, and before the end of the year 1824 he reached Suda, where he observed to one of the European officers of his suite, " As we have now outmanoeuvred the Greeks at sea, we shall certainly find little difficulty in beating them on shore." A calm survey of the campaign of 1824 at last con vinced the Greeks that their navy was inadequate to obtain a decisive victory over the Turks. The expedi tion against Samos had indeed been frustrated, and seven Turkish ships had been destroyed. But to oh- tain these successes, twenty-two Greek fire-ships had been consumed. On the other hand, the Turks had to boast of the destruction of Kasos and Psara, and of having captured nearly a hundred and fifty Greek vessels, and slain about four thousand Greek seamen. The Greeks could only hope for ultimate success by changing their system of warfare. Captain Hastings urged them to purchase steam-ships, arm them with heavy guns, and make use of shells and hot shot. Had his proposition been promptly accepted, and its execu tion intrusted to his zeal and activity, Greece might still have been saved by her own exertions. When Ibrahim Pasha quitted Alexandria in July 1824, he made a vow not to put his foot on shore until he landed in Greece. On the 24th of February 1825, he debarked at Modon with four thousand regular in fantry and five hundred cavalry. His fleet immedi ately returned to Crete, and soon came back, bringing the second division of his army, consisting of six thou- NEGLECT OF THE GREEKS. 63 sand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and a strong a. d. 1825. corps of field artillery. On the 21st of March the ~ ~ Egyptian army encamped before Navarin. After the unfortunate battle of Petta, the Greeks banished every semblance of military discipline from their armies in the field. At the beginning of 1825 no words were strong enough to express their contempt for the regular troops of the Egyptian pasha. They said that the Arabs would run away at the sight of the armatoli, who had always been victorious over the bravest Mussulmans in the sultan's empire. This self- confidence had prevented them taking any precautions against an enemy they despised. For more than six months the Greek government had known that Nava rin would be the first fortress attacked, yet no measures had been adopted for putting it in a state of defence. Yet a small sum laid out at Navarin might have ren dered it capable of a prolonged resistance, and nothing was so likely to disgust Mohammed Ali with the war in Greece as a long and expensive siege. Such an enterprise would also have afforded the Greek navy frequent opportunities of cutting off the supplies of the besieging army. At this crisis of the Revolution, the president of Greece, George Konduriottes, showed himself utterly unworthy of the high trust he had received from the nation, and Kolettes proved himself ignorant and in capable. The Greek government had for several months been paying thirty thousand men, who were called soldiers ; when it now became necessary to march against the invaders of the Morea, ten thousand men could not be collected. The sycophants who sur rounded Konduriottes persuaded him to take the command of the army. The president departed from Nauplia with great pomp, mounted on a richly capari soned horse, which he hung over as if he had been a 64, GREEK AND EGYPTIAN ARMIES. book iv. sack of hay, supported by two grooms. His ungrace- Jf^I_L fui exhibition of horsemanship was followed by a long train composed of secretaries, guards, grooms, and pipe-bearers. " As he passed under the lofty arched gateway of Nauplia on the 28 th of March, the cannon from the ramparts and from the fortress above pealed out their loud salutations, and were answered by the batteries on the shore and the shipping in the harbour."1 Mavrocordatos, whose presidency had been character ised by a similar attempt to play the generalissimo, accompanied Konduriottes as a cabinet counsellor. An old Hydriot sea-captain, named Skourti, who had dis played some skill as a sailor, and some courage on the quarterdeck, was named lieutenant-general of the Greek army. So little idea had the president of the real point where danger was to be apprehended, that he proposed besieging Patras. When he reached Tri- pofitza, he found that a storm had burst on another quarter. The natural imbecility of Konduriottes got the better of his pride, and he could not conceal his incapacity to form any resolution. He felt that he ought to hasten in person to Navarin, and he set out ; but instead of taking the direct road, he turned off to Kalamata, lingered there a moment, and then regained the seat of government without ever seeing an enemy. The simplicity with which Ibrahim Pasha took the field formed a striking contrast to the pomp affected by the Hydriot president and the Greek captains. The aspect of the two armies was equally dissimilar. The gold of the English loan glittered profusely in the embroidered jackets and richly ornamented arms of the Greek soldiers, while in the Egyptian army the dress and the arms were plain and simple. The Greek officers were equipped for show ; the Egyptian for 1 Historical Sketch of the Greek Revolution, by Dr S. G. Home, who was an eyewitness, page 226. DEFEAT OF THE GREEKS. 65 service. The Greek camp seemed to contain an acci- a. d. 1825. dental crowd of armed men. The Egyptian camp ex- hibited strict discipline and perfect order. One half of the regular troops was engaged in constant exercise or unceasing labour, while the other half reposed. The artillery and material for a siege were brought up from Modon to the camp with order and celerity. The first attempt of the Greeks to interrupt Ibra him's operations was made by the veteran chieftain Karatassos, and it was defeated with severe loss. The armatob found to their surprise that the Arab boys, who had been disciplined by Ibrahim, were more dangerous enemies than the bravest Arnaouts the Greeks had ever encountered. Karatassos stated that this was the case to the executive government. His opinion was disregarded. It was said that he praised the discipline of the Egyptians to excuse his defeat and he had conducted his attack carelessly because he was envious of the honour conferred on Captain Skourti, and wished to be named commander-in-chief. Ibrahim formed the sieges of Navarin and of the old castle on the ruins of Pylos at the same time. Navarin contained a garrison of sixteen hundred men ; Pylos of eight hundred. The flower of the Greek army advanced to relieve these two places, with the intention of faUing on the rear of the besiegers, who were divided into two separate bodies, and compelled to keep up communications with Modon. The Greeks were com manded by Skourti. Their force exceeded seven thou sand, and was composed of Romeliot armatoli, -choice Moreot troops, and a band of Suliots. Ibrahim, who divined the plan of his enemy, did not allow him to choose his point of attack. On the 19th of April he attacked the Greek position at the head of three thou sand regular infantry, four hundred cavalry, and four guns. The Suliots under Djavella and Constantine VOL. II. E 66 DEFEAT OF THE GREEKS. book iv. Botzares, the armatoli under Karaiskaki, and the Al- . CHAF' "' banians of Argolis under Skourti, received the Egyp tians in positions which they had themselves selected for their encampment. They were supported by a body of irregular cavalry, consisting in great part of Servians and Bulgarians. The leader, Hadji Christos, made a gallant show. He was surrounded by a retinue in imitation of a pasha of three tails, with kettledrums, timbileks, and a topuz-bearer. After a short halt, which Ibrahim employed in re connoitring the Greek position, the first regiment of Arabs was ordered to charge the Suliots and armatoli with the bayonet. The regulars marched steadily up to the Greek intrenchments without wavering, though many fell. As they approached the enemy their officers cheered them on in double-quick time to the assault ; but the best troops of Greece shrank from their encounter, and after a feeble resistance fled in every direction. A few round shot and a charge of cavalry dispersed the rest of the army and completed the victory. The vanquished Greeks fled in wild con fusion, leaving six hundred men dead on the field. The Egyptians, particularly the cavalry, collected a rich booty ; and silver-mounted arms, which had been thrown away by the Turks after their defeats at Valtetzi and Dervenaki, were now in hke manner abandoned by the fugitive Greeks to insure their escape. This affair at Krommydi — for it cannot be called a battle — convinced every military friend of Greece that the best Greek irregular troops were unfit to encounter the most ordinary disciplined battalions in a pitched battle in the plain. A few days after this victory, Hussein Djeritlee, the conqueror of Kasos, arrived at the Egyptian camp with reinforcements. Hussein had the eye of a soldier, and he immediately pointed out to Ibrahim that his SPHAKTERIA TAKEN. 67 engineer, Colonel Romey, had not selected the best a. d. 1S25. position for the batteries he had constructed against Navarin. Without having read Thucydides, Hussein also observed that the island of Sphakteria was the key of Navarin. It commanded the port, and its pos session would render the defence of both Navarin and Pylos impracticable. He proposed to change the whole plan of attack. Ibrahim followed his advice, and in trusted him with the direction of the operations against Sphakteria. When Ibrahim opened his trenches before Navarin, that fortress was ill supplied with provisions and am munition. The neglect both of the government and the officers commanding in the place had been so great, that when the Egyptians cut off the water of the aque duct half the cisterns were empty. Even Sphakteria had been left without defence. At last an effort was made to prevent the island from being occupied by the enemy. Eight brigs were at anchor in the harbour. Tsamados, who commanded one, the Mars, landed three eighteen-pounders, which he had embarked at Nauplia, and constructed a battery on the point of Sphakteria, in order to prevent the Egyptian ships from entering the port.1 Though it was evident that this battery could oppose no obstacle to a landing of the Egyptians in other parts of the island, it was only with great difficulty that several foreign officers in Navarin could persuade the Greeks to take more effectual measures for the defence of Sphakteria. Mavrocordatos, who possessed more moral courage as well as more activity and ability than Konduriottes, fortunately visited Navarin to concert measures for its relief when the president fled back from Messenia. Mavrocordatos, Sakturi, the governor, and Tsamados, succeeded by their co-operation in getting four more 1 These guns were intended by the Greek government for the siege of Patras. 68 SPHAKTERIA TAKEN. book iv. guns in battery on the island, to protect the only spot — where it was supposed that the Egyptians would at tempt to land.1 On the Sth of May 1825, the Egyptian fleet, carry ing three thousand troops, stood out from Modon, and on reaching Sphakteria opened a cannonade on the Greek batteries. Under cover of the smoke, a regi ment of Arab regulars and a body of Moreot Turks, who had volunteered to lead the attack, effected a landing. Hussein Bey led them on to charge the Greeks who defended the guns, but Romeliots, Moreot klephts, and artillerymen, all fled at his approach, and abandoned the batteries without offering any resist ance. The Arab bayonet swept all before it. Tsama dos, who had landed with a few of his crew to assume the direction of a carronade belonging to his ship, stood his ground, and died bravely at his post. He was a member of the Hydriot aristocracy, and had shown himself more inclined to the introduction of discipline in the Greek fleet, and to avail himself of scientific improvements, than the rest of his country men. He commanded his own brig, and on several occasions he had displayed a degree of naval skill and personal courage which had obtained for him warm praise from Miaoulis. His amiable character, his youth, his enlightened views, and his true patriotism, rendered his death a national calamity at this moment. The veteran Hetairist, Anagnostaras, who had for feited a good name won at the siege of Tripolitza by his subsequent avarice and rapacity, was recognised by a Moreot Mussulman, and slain to avenge the blood of the slaughtered Turks. The victor carried the rich arms of Anagnostaras during the whole campaign of 1825. 1 Collegno — Diario dell' Asedio di Xararino, p. 54 — says there were twelve guns in battery on the 7th of May, but other authorities equally well in formed agree iu giving the number as only seven. SPHAKTERIA TAKEN. 69 Count Santa Rosa, a Piedmontese exile, fell also in a. d. 1825. this affair. No man's death was more sincerely re gretted, and none fell to whom death was so welcome. The Greek deputies at London, at the suggestion of some of the liberal counsellors by whom they were sur rounded, invited Santa Rosa to serve in Greece. On his arrival at Nauplia he found the members of the Greek government turned from him with pride. Everything he said was treated with contempt, and he himself with neglect. Yet, as he understood much better than Mavrocordatos, Kolettes, and Rhodios the extent of the danger to which Greece was then exposed, he deemed it dishonourable to abandon her cause at such a crisis. His services not having been accepted, he was serving at Sphakteria as a volunteer. After receiving a severe wound, he refused to surrender, and was killed by an Arab soldier, who found a small su^n of money and a seal in his possession. The sight of this seal enabled a friend in the Egyptian camp to learn his fate.1 Three hundred and fifty Greeks were killed, and two hundred taken prisoners, at Sphakteria. The victorious Arabs gained considerable booty, for the majority of the slain wore silver-mounted arms, and their belts were lined with English gold. Sovereigns soon circu lated in the bazaar of Modon, and the war became ex tremely popular in the Egyptian army. There were five brigs remaining in the harbour of Navarin when Hussein Bey stormed the island. They 1 This seal was given to the author by a Philhellene who was taken prisoner a few days later. Collegno accompanied Santa Rosa to Greece. Like every foreigner, his feelings were wounded by the treatment his friend received, and he reproaches the Greeks with their ingratitude. Tricoupi gave a strong example of this national vice. His funeral oration in memory of those who fell at Sphakteria, amidst much hyperbole concerning Greek courage, omitted all mention of Santa Rosa's name, though he and many of his hearers knew well that Santa Rosa was one of the very small number who fell honourably fighting. The neglect was the more disgraceful, because the orator had known Santa Rosa personally, and knew his virtues.— Collegno, Diario, p.. 118. 70 CAPITULATION OF PYLOS. book iv. immediately stood out to sea, one only lingering at the entrance of the port. This was the Mars, which sent its boats to the shore to bring off the captain, Mavrocordatos and Sakturi escaped in these boats, and brought on board the news that Tsamados had refused to abandon his post, and had fallen doing his duty, Sakturi did not think of returning to his at Navarin. He left the governorship to anybody who wanted it, and remained on board the Mars, though there was both time and opportunity to return to his post. The Mars was obliged to pass through the Egyptian fleet, and receive the broadsides of several frigates, yet she lost only two men killed and seven wounded, so trifling was the danger in the severest naval engage ment during this war, unless when fire-ships were suc cessful. Lord Byron, who witnessed the firing of two Turkish men-of-war endeavouring to prevent the Greeks from taking possession of a stranded brig, quaintly observed, " These Turks, with so many guns, would prove dangerous enemies if they should happen to fire without taking aim." Three days after the conquest of Sphakteria, Pylos capitulated. The garrison, consisting of seven hundred and eighty-six men, laid down its arms, and the Greeks were allowed to depart uninjured. Navarin was feebly defended. The Romeliot troops in the place were eager to capitulate. George Mavro- michales, who afterwards assassinated Capodistrias, displayed great determination, and urged his country men to defend the place to the last. He harangued the soldiers, and opposed all terms of capitulation. It was evident, however, that the fortress could not hold out many days. All hope of relief, both by land and sea, was cut off. Ibrahim offered honourable terms of capitulation. He was desirous of winning the Greeks to submit to his government, and for this purpose he CAPITULATION OF NAVARIN. 71 was eager to exhibit proofs of his humanity. He had a. d. ms. estabhshed his military superiority ; he wished now to place his civil and financial administration in contrast with that of the Greek government. He expected by his treatment of the garrison of Navarin to facilitate his future conquests. The Greeks laid down their arms and surrendered all their property. The field-officers alone were allowed to retain their swords. The whole garrison was transported to Kalamata in neutral vessels, under the escort of a French and Austrian man-of-war. Ibrahim, who thought that the British government showed undue favour to the Greek cause, refused to allow any mention of an English escort to be inserted in the capitulation. On the 21st of May the Greeks marched out of Navarin to embark in the transports prepared for their reception. A crowd of Moreot Turks from Modon and Coron, excited by a few survivors of the massacre of Navarin, assembled to waylay the Greeks as they were embarking. But Ibrahim was a man of a firmer char acter and more enlarged political views than the pri mates and chieftains of Greece. He had foreseen the attempt, and he adopted effectual measures for pre venting any stain on his good faith. A body of regular cavalry prevented the Turks from approaching the ground; and the unarmed Greeks marched securely to the ships between lines of Arab infantry with fixed bayonets. George Mavromichales and latrakos of Mistra were detained as hostages for the release of the two pashas who were detained by the Greeks after the capitulation of Nauplia. George Mavromichales, like Ali of Argos, had refused to sign the capitulation. The exchange was soon effected. We have often had occasion to observe that the Greek fleet arrived too late to avert disaster. It mattered little whether the Greek government was destitute of 72 SUCCESS AT MODON. book iv. money or rolling in wealth, whether the scene of danger chap. I. n> i ¦ ¦, ° was near or far off, the same supineness and selfishness always characterised the proceedings of the Albanian islanders. At Chios, at Kasos, at Psara, at Sphakteria, and at Mesolonghi, the neglect of the Greek govern ment and the sordid spirit of the Hydriots were equally conspicuous. A small squadron put to sea when the news of Ibrahim's landing in the Morea reached Hydra, but it was so weak that Miaoulis could not prevent Hussein Bey from conquering Sphakteria, and gaining possession of the magnificent harbour of Navarin, where the Egyptian fleet was anchored in safety, even before the fortress capitulated. But when Miaoulis reached Modon, he observed that a part of the Egyptian fleet was still at that place, and by instant action he hoped to inflict such a loss on Ibrahim as might delay the fall of Navarin, and perhaps save the place. On the 12th of May he sent six fire-ships simul taneously into the midst of the Egyptian squadron as it lay at anchor. The attack was well planned and promptly and. boldly executed. The conflagration was terrible, and accident alone prevented it from being more extensive. A fine double-banked frigate, the Asia, which, it has been mentioned, was fitted out at Deptford, three sloops of war, and seven transports, were destroyed ; but on shore the fire was prevented from destroying anything but a magazine of provisions.1 The explosion of the powder-magazines of the ships of war was heard both in Ibrahim's camp and in Navarin ; and for some time a report prevailed that all the trans ports and military stores had been destroyed. Suc cessive couriers soon brought exact accounts of the real loss sustained. Ibrahim was satisfied that it was not sufficient to interrupt his operations for a single 1 The Egyptians reported their loss as one frigate, two brigs, and eight trans ports.— Collegno, Diario, 75. KOLOKOTRONES GENERAL-IN-CHIEF. 73 hour. The Greeks considered this affair of Modon as a a. d. 1825. brilliant achievement; with equal justice, the Egyptians regarded it as an insignificant disaster.1 Even the fall of Navarin did not entirely awaken the Greeks from the lethargy and corruption into which they had sunk. The government did every thing in its power to conceal the disgrace sustained by the Greek army, and the people were willing to be deceived. The news of the capitulation spread slowly, and was in some degree neutralised by fabricated re ports of imaginary successes.2 Ibrahim advanced towards the centre of the Pelo ponnesus before the Moreots made any national effort to repel his invasion. Selfishness and party animosity were more powerful than patriotism. But the timid Konduriottes observed with alarm many signs of his own declining influence, and of the reviving power of the Peloponnesian primates and chieftains. The de parture of the Romeliot troops, who had quitted the Morea when they heard of the invasion of Western Greece by Kiutayhe, left the executive body without a strong military force on which it could depend. The nullity of Konduriottes, the administrative ignorance of Kolettes, the licentiousness of the archimandrite Dikaios, and the shallow presumption of Rhodios, added to the fiscal corruption of the civil officials and the rapacity and dissensions of the military, enabled the municipal authorities to recover some portion of their former power. They raised a cry for the de liverance of Kolokotrones and the other primates and chiefs imprisoned at Hydra ; and the people soon sup- 1 Two eyewitnesses give accurate information concerning the siege of Navarin — Collegno in his Diario, and Dr Millingen in Memoirs of the Affairs of Greece. 8 Some time elapsed before the Greek newspapers alluded to the fall of Navarin, and the private journals of many Philhellenes which the author has examined record reports of victories which, though generally circulated, were entirely without foundation. CHAP. I. 74 KOLOKOTRONES GENERAL-IN-CHIEF. book iv. ported their demand in a voice which the government did not dare to disobey. It was necessary to raise a new army in order to replace the armatoli who had abandoned the defence of the Peloponnesus. Kolokotrones was the only man whom the Moreots were inclined to follow to the field. There was therefore no alternative but to reinstate him in his former position as general-in-chief of the Peloponnesian forces, to release all who were in prison for their share in the second civil war, and to conciliate the two primates, Zaimes and Londos, who had re turned from exile, and declared their wish to serve their country and forget past dissensions. Kondu- riottes's government proclaimed a general amnesty: thanksgivings were offered up in the churches of Nauplia for the happy change which had taken place in the hearts of the rulers of Greece ; harangues in praise of forgiveness and concord were now uttered by men who had hitherto been the most violent instigators of discord and vengeance. By these timely and politic concessions, Konduriottes, Kolettes, and Rhodios pur chased, immunity for the violence and peculation which had characterised their public administration. Kolo kotrones resumed his former power and his old habits. The severe lesson he had learned, and the calamities he had brought on his country, had not moderated the egoism of his ambition. His administrative and mili tary views were as confined as ever, and his avarice remained insatiable. The archimandrite Dikaios (Pappa Phlesas) was still Minister of the Interior. He was the most unprincipled man of his party, and had been, with Kolettes, the most violent persecutor of the Moreot chiefs. The universal indignation now expressed at his conduct convinced him that it would be dangerous for him to remain at Nauplia, where his licentious life and gross peculation DEFEAT AT MANIAK1. 75 pointed him out as the first object of popular ven- a. d. 1825. geance, and the scapegoat for the sins of his colleagues. ' The archimandrite was destitute of private virtue and political honesty, but he was a man of activity and courage. Perhaps, too, at this decisive moment a sense of shame urged him to cancel his previous mis deeds by an act of patriotism. He asked permission of the government to march against the Egyptians, boasting that he would vanquish Ibrahim or perish in the combat. The permission was readily granted, though little confidence was felt in his military con duct. He quitted Nauplia with great parade, attended by a body of veteran soldiers ; and when he reached the village of Maniaki, in the hills to the east of Gar- galiano, his force exceeded three thousand men. The bold priest possessed no military quality but courage. He posted his troops in an ill-selected posi tion, and awaited the attack of Ibrahim, who advanced in person to carry the position at the head of six thousand men on the 1st of June. Many of the archi mandrite's troops, seeing the superior force of the Egyptians, deserted during the night, and only about fifteen hundred men remained. The pasha's regulars were led on to storm the Greek intrenchments in gallant style, and a short and desperate struggle en sued. The Greeks were forced from their position before they fled. The affair was the best contested during the war, for a thousand Greeks perished by the Arab bayonets, and four hundred Arabs lay dead on the field.1 In spite of the defeat and the severe loss sustained by the Greeks, they gained both honour and courage by the battle of Maniaki. The national spirit, which had been greatly depressed by the flight of the Romeliots, and by the ease with which the Egyptians had taken Sphakteria, again revived at seeing so great 1 Phrantzes, ii. 347-351. CHAP. I. 76 DEATH OF DIKAIOS. book iv. a loss inflicted on Ibrahim's army by a body of men consisting in great part of armed Moreot peasants. Very little had been expected from Dikaios as a mili tary leader. He had selected his position ill, and he had not known how to construct proper intrenchments, but he had given his followers an example of brilliant courage, and died nobly at his post. The result in duced the Greeks to expect a great victory when the Moreot soldiery took the field under their tried cham pion Kolokotrones. The indefatigable Ibrahim lost no time in profiting by his victory. After allowing his troops to plunder the town of Arcadia, he marched to occupy Nisi and Kalamata, which the Maniats, who called themselves Spartans, abandoned at his approach. On the 10th of June he made a short incursion into Maina, but, seeing the mountaineers prepared to dispute his progress, he advanced no farther than Kytries. Kolokotrones was now in the field. It is said that he wished to destroy the walls and citadel of Tripo- litza, but that the executive body refused to sanction this measure, fearing lest it should tend more towards rendering Kolokotrones master of the Morea than to wards defending the country against Ibrahim Pasha.1 Kolokotrones made his dispositions for defending the passes between Messenia and Arcadia by establishing magazines at Leondari, and fixing his headquarters at Makryplagi, where his troops constructed their tam- bouria or stone intrenchments to cover the defile. His force was considerable, but he was incompetent to employ it to advantage. A thousand Greeks were posted at Poliani, a village which commands a difficult passage over the northern slopes of Mount Taygetus. But in spite of the advantage of the ground, Koloko trones made his dispositions so ill that he allowed the 1 Phrantzes, ii. 356. DEFEAT OF KOLOKOTRONES. 77 Egyptians to turn his flank. The general-in-chief of a. d. 1825. the Peloponnesus always appeared to be more ignorant of Greek topography than the Egyptian pasha. The troops at Poliani were left without provisions. Their officers, who usually derive a considerable profit from the extra rations they draw, hastened to Makryplagi to upbraid Kolokotrones with his neglect, which they ascribed to his avarice. Ibrahim profited by this mis conduct. Advancing along an almost impracticable mountain track, he gained possession of Poliani, and on the 16th June compelled the Greeks to abandon the pass of Makryplagi. The superiority of Ibrahim to Kolokotrones as a general, and the inferiority of the irregular Greek troops to the regular Arab battal ions, were never exhibited in a more decisive manner. The Greeks had selected their own positions in an al most impracticable country, with which they were well acquainted. They were routed by a foreign force which could make no use of its cavalry and artillery, and on ground where even regular infantry was com pelled to act almost as irregulars. Kolokotrones was perhaps a better military chief than Dikaios, but he wanted his bravery and patriotism. The Greek army fled to Karitena, leaving the road to Tripolitza without defence ; and Ibrahim on reach ing that city found it abandoned by its inhabitants and garrison. He found in it large stores of provi sions, which the officers commanding in the place had neglected to destroy. Without losing a moment, the pasha pushed on to the plain of Argos with about five thousand men, hoping to gain possession of Nauplia either by surprise or treachery. On the 24th of June he reached the mills of Lerna. Nauplia was thrown into a state of the wildest con fusion by his unexpected appearance. A report of treason spread among the citizens, and several persons 78 IBRAHIM DEFEATED AT LERNA. \ book iv. were accused of holding treasonable correspondence AAA with the enemy. Among these was George Orphan- ides, a friend of Kolettes, who was tried and acquitted.1 The patriotism of the people awakened with a sense of the magnitude of the danger to which their coun try was exposed. Captain Makryannes and Con stantine Mavromichales, who afterwards assassinated Capodistrias, with about three hundred and fifty soldiers, hastened over to defend the mills of Lerna as soon as the Egyptians were descried on the hills. Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes and several Philhel lenes followed as volunteers. A large quantity of grain for the supply of Nauplia was stored at Lerna. Its loss would have endangered the safety of that fortress. The mills of Lerna were surrounded by a stone wall, flanked by the celebrated marsh and a deep pond. The garrison was supported by two gunboats anchored within musket-shot of the shore. There was, however, a small break in the wall, which the Greeks, with their usual carelessness, had neglected to repair. Through this space a company of Arabs attempted to force an entrance into the enclosure. They crowded over the breach, and attempted to form in the court ; but before they could get into order, they were charged by Mak ryannes and a band of Greeks and Philhellenes sword in hand, who cut down thirteen on the spot, and drove the rest back over the breach. The Greeks then occu pied the wall of the enclosure, and opened loop-holes. Ibrahim, finding that the garrison was prepared for a desperate defence, and was constantly receiving re inforcements, did not venture to renew the attack. He marched on to Argos to pass the night ; and after remaining there a day or two, and reconnoitring the environs of Nauplia, he returned with his little army 1 Tricoupi, iii. 221. CAPTAIN HAMILTON OF THE CAMBRIAN. 79 to Tripolitza on the 29th of June, without the Greeks a. d. 1S25. venturing to attack him on the way. As Ibrahim carried with him no provisions on this expedition, it has been inferred that he trusted to some secret intelligence, and expected to gain an en trance into Nauplia by treachery. It seems, however, that he counted rather on surprise and intimidation. The arrival of Captain Hamilton in the Cambrian, accompanied by another frigate and a sloop of war, appears to have hastened his departure. Hamilton landed at Nauplia with a number of his officers, and held a private conference with the members of the Greek government. He encouraged them, and every person with whom he spoke, to put the place in the best state of defence ; and he took up such a position with his ships as induced both the Greeks and the Egyptians to infer that he proposed aiding in the defence of the fortress. A report was spread and generally believed at the time, that, in case of an attack, the Greeks were authorised to hoist the English flag, and place their country under British protection.1 Ibrahim, who was informed of all that passed, retired immediately ; but he drew off his troops without precipitation, and took such precautions to secure his flanks that Kolo kotrones, with the whole forces of the Morea, did not attempt to make the Kakeskala of Mount Parthenius a scene of triumph to the Greeks like the defile of Dervenaki. The army of Ibrahim received consider able reinforcements shortly after his return to Tripo litza. Early in July Kolokotrones had assembled upwards of ten thousand men on the hills overlooking the great Arcadian plain.2 He then occupied Trikorphas, and began to make preparations for blockading Tripolitza. 1 Tricoupi, iii. 224. 2 Phrantzes, ii. 367; aud Tricoupi, iii. 226. 80 SECOND DEFEAT OF KOLOKOTRONES. book iv. Ibrahim, on the 6th of July, anticipated his design by _^AA making a simultaneous attack on all his positions. The pasha directed the attack on Trikorphas in person. Kolokotrones made a feeble resistance, but the Greeks lost two hundred men, most of whom were killed in their flight after they had abandoned their intrench ments.1 The Greek army was completely defeated, but the soldiers felt that they had been worsted in consequence of the bad dispositions of their chiefs, and they did not disperse. They rallied in the mountain passes that lead into the great Arcadian plain, and showed by their activity and perseverance that they only required an abler chief to keep Ibrahim blockaded in Tripolitza. After his defeat, Kolokotrones invited the Maniats to hasten to his assistance, declaring that he had still four thousand men under arms at Karitena and three thousand at Vervena.2 Kolokotrones, with his usual mihtary incapacity, neglected to fortify the mills of Piana, Zarakova, and Davia, from which the garrison of Tripolitza obtained the necessary supplies of flour. The siege of Tripolitza by the Greeks ought to have taught him the import ance of keeping possession of these mills ; but even experience could not teach him foresight where his own personal interests were not directly and immedi ately concerned. The Egyptian pasha profited by his enemy's neglect. He seized and fortified these mills, and secured their communications with Tripohtza by a line of posts which he established in the mountains. His foraging parties then covered the plains of Arca dia from Mantinea to Megalopolis, and collected large quantities of grain. On the Sth of August Ibrahim drove Hypsilantes and 1 Phrantzes, ii. 370. 2 Phrantzes, ii. 372, who gives Kolokotrones's letter. It proves that Phrantzes assigns an erroneous date to the affair of Trikorphas. OPERATIONS OF IBRAHIM. 81 Mavromichales from the camp at Vervena, established a.d. 1825, a strong garrison at Leondari, and returned to Modon on the 13th. Soon after his departure from Arcadia, the Greeks surprised the post at Trikorpha, and re covered possession of the mills of Piana and Zarakova ; but when Ibrahim returned to Tripolitza, before the end of the month they were again driven from their conquests. Ibrahim then led his troops through Tzakonia to Monemvasia, laying waste the country in every direc tion. The Greeks nowhere opposed him with vigour. Their spirit seemed broken, and they contented them selves with following on his flanks and rear to way lay foragers and recapture small portions of his plunder. x He was now intent on destroying the resources of the population. The Egyptians carried on a war of extermination ; the Greeks replied by a war of brigandage. The ultimate result of such a system of warfare was inevitable. The invaders were fed by supplies from abroad ; the country could not long furnish the means of subsistence to its defenders. Famine would soon consume those who escaped the sword. During the expedition to Tzakonia, Colonel Fabvier, who had been appointed to command a body of Greek regulars, made an attempt to surprise Tripolitza. It failed, in consequence of the irregulars under Andreas Londos not making the concerted diversion. On returning to Tripolitza, and finding everything in good order, Ibrahim marched to Arcadia (Cypa- rissia), carrying off all the provisions from the dis tricts through which he passed, and laying waste the towns of Philiatra and Gargaliano. The campaign 1 Tricoupi says, " tous ix^P°',s efi\airTav KAnrToiroKefiovvTes" (iii. 233); and no great injury could they inflict by such contemptible warfare. VOL. II. F 82 OPERATIONS OF IBRAHIM. book iv. of 1825 terminated when he reached Modon on the CHAP. 1. _ _. _ 30th ot September. Mohammed Ali was induced by the sultan to send large reinforcements to Ibrahim about this time, and to order him to co-operate with Reshid Pasha in the siege of Mesolonghi. CHAPTER II. THE SIEGE OF MESOLONGHI. ' Pride points the path that leads to liberty. Back to the struggle, baffled in the strife, War, war is still their cry — war even to the knife." Operations of Reshid Pasha — State of Mesolonghi — Number of its gar rison AND OF ITS BESIEGERS — ARRIVAL OF THE OTHOMAN FLEET — ARRIVAL of the Greek fleet — Difficult position of Reshid — He constructs a mound — Treason of Odysseus — Military operations in continental Greece — Reshid withdraws to a fortified camp — Operations of the Turkish and Greek fleets — Ibrahim arrives before Mesolonghi — Lethargy, of the Greeks and of their government — The Turks take Vasiladi and Anatolikon — Offers of capitulation rejected — Turkish attack on Klissova repulsed — Defeat of the Greek fleet under Miaoulis — Final sortie — Fall of Mesolonghi. The second siege of Mesolonghi is the most glorious mihtary operation of the Greek Revolution : it is also one of the most characteristic of the moral and political condition of the nation, for it exhibits the invincible energy of the people in strong contrast with the in efficiency of the military chiefs, and the inertness and ignorance of the members of the government. Never was greater courage and constancy displayed by the population of a besieged town ; rarely has less science been shown by combatants, at a time when military science formed the chief element of success in warfare. Greek patriotism seemed to have concentrated itself within the walls of Mesolonghi. Elsewhere hostilities languished. While the citizens of a small town, the 84 OPERATIONS OF RESHID. v book iv. fishermen of a shallow lagoon, and the peasants of a " — desolated district, sustained the vigorous attack of a determined enemy, the fleets and armies wasted their time and their strength in trifling and desultory opera tions. An undisciplined population performed the duty of a trained garrison. Here, therefore, the valour of the individual demands a record in history. Yet, though private deeds of heroism were of daily occur rence, the historian shrinks from selecting the acts of heroism, and the names of the warriors that deserve pre-eminence. All within the town seemed to be in spired by the warmest love for political hberty and national independence, and all proved that they were ready to guarantee the sincerity of their feeling with the sacrifice of their lives. Reshid Pasha of Joannina, who, it has been already said, was generally called Kiutayhe' by the Greeks and Albanians, had distinguished himself at the battle of Petta. When he assumed the command of the Otho man forces destined to invade Western Greece in the year 1825, much was expected by the sultan from his known firmness and ability. On the 6th of April he seized the pass of Makrynoros, which the Greek chief tains neglected to defend, and where the Greek govern ment had only stationed a few guards under the com mand of Nothi Botzares, a veteran Suliot. No three hundred Greeks were now found to make an effort for the defence of these Western Thermopylae.1 Reshid advanced through Acarnania without encountering any opposition. The inhabitants fled before him. Many, with their flocks and herds, found shelter under the English flag in Calamo, where the poor were main tained by rations from the British government ; others retired to Mesolonghi, and formed part of the garrison which defended that place. On the 27th of April, 1 Tricoupi, iii. 231. STATE OF MESOLONGHI. 85 Reshid established his headquarters in the plain, and a. d. 1825. two days afterwards he opened his first parallel against Mesolonghi, at a distance of about six hundred yards from the walls.1 His force then consisted of only six thousand men and three guns. Mesolonghi was in a good state of defence. An earthen rampart of two thousand three hundred yards in length extended from the waters of the lagoon across the promontory on which the town was built. This rampart was partly faced with masonry, flanked by two bastions near the centre, strengthened towards its eastern extremity by a lunette and a tenaille, and pro tected where it joined the lagoon to the west by a battery on an islet called Marmaro, distant about two hundred yards from the angle of the place. In front of the rampart a muddy ditch, not easy to pass, sepa rated the fortress from the adjoining plain. Forty- eight guns and four mortars were mounted in battery. The garrison consisted of four thousand soldiers and armed peasants, and one thousand citizens and boat men. The place was well supplied with provisions and ammunition at the commencement of the siege, but there were upwards of twelve thousand persons to feed within the walls. The army of Reshid never exceeded ten thousand troops, and a considerable part of it never entered the plain of Mesolonghi, for he was obliged to employ about two thousand men in guarding a line of stations from Makrynoros and Karavanserai, on the Ambracian Gulf, to Kakiscala on the Gulf of Patras, in order to keep open his communications with Arta, Previsa, Le panto, and Patras. But in addition to his troops, Reshid was accompanied by three thousand pioneers, muleteers, and camp-followers.2 It was not until the 1 Gordon, ii. 233.. Tricoupi, iii. 287. 2 Compare Gordon, ii. 233, and Tricoupi, iii. 281. Reshid's commissariat 86 PROGRESS OF THE SIEGE. book iv. commencement of June that the besiegers obtained a — supply of artillery from Patras, which increased their force to eight guns and four mortars. For several weeks, therefore, Reshid trusted more to the spade than to his fire, and during this time he pushed forward his approaches with indefatigable industry. Early in June he had advanced to within thirty yards of the bastion Franklin, which covered the western side of the walls. But his ammunition was then so much reduced that he was compelled to fire stones from his mortars instead of shells.1 While the Turks were working at their approaches, the Greeks constructed traverses and erected new bat teries. Little progress had been made in the active opera tions of the siege, when a Greek squadron of seven sail arrived off Mesolonghi on the 10th of June. It encouraged the besieged by announcing that Miaoulis would soon make his appearance with a large fleet, and by landing considerable supplies of provisions and am munition. The garrison, confident of success, began to make frequent and vigorous sorties. In one of these, Routsos, a native of Mesolonghi, was taken prisoner by the Turks, and was terrified into revealing to the enemy the position of the subterraneous aqueducts which supplied the town with water. The supply was immediately cut off, but fortunately the besieged found fresh water in abundance by digging new wells, so that very little inconvenience was felt, even during the distributed twenty-five thousand rations at the commencement of this cam paign. A deduction of one-third must be made in estimating the number of men then actually under arms. A few weeks of actual service usually reduced a Turkish army to one-half of the number of the rations issued. It must also be observed that Reshid detached two thousand men under his kehaya to dis lodge the Greeks from Salona. 1 Gordou, Fabvier, and Tricoupi, all indicate the position and nature of the defensive works of Mesolonghi with sufficient accuracy. The bastion Franklin to the west, and the bastion Botzares to the east, formed the centre. Between them was the battery Koraes. Against these the principal attack of Reshid was directed. ARRIVAL OF THE TURKISH FLEET. 87 greatest heat of summer, from the destruction of the a. d. 1825. aqueducts. The besiegers, who had pushed on their operations with great activity, at last made an attempt to carry the islet of Marmoras by assault, which was repulsed, and entailed on them a severe loss. On the 10th of July the Greeks met with their first great disappointment. The defenders of Mesolonghi were looking forward to the arrival of the fleet, which they fondly expected would compel Reshid to raise the siege. Several vessels were descried in the offing. Their joy reached the highest pitch, and they over whelmed the advanced-guard of the besiegers, which consisted of Albanians, with insulting boasts. Soon, however, fresh ships hove in sight, and it was evident that the fleet was too numerous and the ships too large to be Greek. The red flag became visible both to Turks and Greeks, and gradually the broad white streaks on the hulls and the numerous ports showed that the fleet was that of the capitan-pasha. The be sieged were greatly depressed, but their constancy was unshaken. Reshid now assumed the offensive with great vigour. He introduced a number of flat-bottomed boats into the lagoon, gained possession of the islands of Aghio- sostis and Prokopanistos, which the Mesolonghiots had neglected to fortify, and completely invested the place both by sea and land. On the 28th of July he made a determined attack on the bastion Botzares, and on the 2d of August he renewed the assault by a still more furious attempt to storm the bastion Franklin, in which a breach had been opened by his artillery ; but both these attacks were gallantly repulsed. Before the assault on the bastion Franklin, Reshid of fered terms of capitulation to the garrison of Mesolonghi. His offers were rejected, and, to revenge his defeat, he ordered Routsos and some other prisoners to be be- CHAP. 88 ARRIVAL OF GREEK FLEET. book iv. headed before the walls. Reshid had expected to carry Mesolonghi by assault before the arrival of the Greek fleet, of whose approach he had been informed by the cruisers of the capitan-pasha before it was known to the besieged. The Greek fleet, consisting of forty sail of the best ships which Greece still possessed, under the command of Miaoulis, Saktures, Kolandrutzos, and Apostales, was descried from Mesolonghi on the 3d of August. Next day the Othoman fleet manoeuvred to obtain an advantageous position. The Hydriot squadron in the end succeeded in getting the weather-gage of the ad vanced ships of the Turks ; but the Greeks, in spite of this success, could not break the line of the main division, which consisted of twenty-two sail. Three fire-ships were launched in succession against the capi- tan-pasha's flag-ship ; but the Turks no longer enter tained a senseless fear of these engines of attack, and -they manoeuvred so well that the blazing vessels drifted harmless to leeward without forcing them to break their line of battle. Khosreff was, nevertheless, so intimidated by the determined manner in which the Greeks directed their attacks against his flag, that he avoided a second engagement. He claimed the victory in this indecisive engagement merely because he had escaped defeat, and he made his orders to effect a prompt junction with the Egyptian fleet a pretext for sailing immediately for Alexandria. His cowardice left the flotilla of Reshid in the lagoon without support, and as the Greeks had captured one of the transports laden with powder and shells for the army before Mesolonghi, the besiegers were again ina dequately supplied with ammunition for their mortars. Miaoulis aided the Mesolonghiots in driving the Turks from all the posts they occupied in the lagoons, and in destroying their flotilla. Five of the flat- DIFFICULTIES OF RESHID. 89 bottomed boats were captured by the Greeks, who a.d. 1825. recovered the command of the whole lap-oon.1 The ~ Greek fleet then sailed in pursuit of the capitan-pasha, leaving eight ships to keep open the communications between the besieged and the Ionian Islands, and to prevent any supplies being sent by sea to the besieg ing army. Reshid was now placed in a very difficult position. He received his supplies of provisions with irregularity, and his stores of ammunition were so scanty that he could not keep up a continuous fire from his guns, and was compelled to abandon the hope of carrying the place by an artillery attack. He had no money to pay his troops, and was unable to prevent the Al banians from returning home, though he allowed all who remained double rations.2 The besieged daily expected to hear that a Greek army had occupied the passes in the rear of Reshid, and felt confident that he would be forced to raise the siege at the approach of winter. If he persisted in maintaining his position, it was thought that his army must perish of want and disease. The armatoli of Romelia, who had quitted the Peloponnesus after their defeats at Navarin, were said to be marching into the mountains behind Lepanto, whose rugged surface is familiar to classic readers from the description which Thucydides has left us of the destruction of the Athenian army under Demosthenes. Reshid weighed his own resources and estimated the activity of the Greek irregulars with* sagacity. His guns could not render him much service, but he still believed that the spade would enable him to gain possession of Mesolonghi before winter. He set his 1 Tricoupi, iii. 303, says seven. a Tricoupi, iii. 305. Yet only twelve thousand rations were now issued daily in Reshid's camp. 90 THE MOUND. book iv. army to raise a mound by heaping up earth, and this ° primitive work was carried forward to the walls of the place in defiance of every effort which the besieged made to interrupt the new mode of attack. So strange a revival of the siege operations of the ancients excited the ridicule of the Greeks. They called the work " the dyke of union," in allusion to the mound which Alex ander the Great constructed at the siege of Tyre. The mound was commenced at about a hundred and sixty yards from the salient angle of the bastion Franklin, and it made an obtuse angle as it approached the place. It was from five to eight yards broad at the base, and so high as to overlook the ramparts of the besieged. By indefatigable perseverance, and after much severe fighting in the trenches, the Turks carried the mound to the ditch, filled up the ditch, and stormed the bastion Franklin. Even then they could not effect an entry into the place, for the Greeks had cut off this bastion from all communication with the rest of the defences, and they soon erected batteries which com pletely commanded it. The besieged then became the assailants, and after a desperate struggle they drove the Turks from their recent conquest. On the 31st of August all the ground they had lost was regained, and they prepared for a great effort against the mound. Several sorties were made in order to obtain exact knowledge of the enemy's trenches. At last, on the 21st of September, a great sortie was made by the whole garrison. The Turkish camp was attacked in several places with such fury that Reshid was unable to conjecture against what point the principal force was directed. He was in danger of seeing his bat teries stormed and his guns spiked. The fighting was severe, but the Greeks carried the works that pro tected the head of the mound, and maintained pos session of their conquest until they had levelled that THE MOUND DESTROYED. 91 part of it which threatened their defences. While a. d. 1825. every spade in Mesolonghi was destroying the mound, ~ bodies of troops cleared the trenches, and prevented the enemy from interrupting the work. As the Greeks had foreseen, rain soon rendered it impossible for Reshid to repair the damage his works had sustained. The garrison of Mesolonghi received considerable reinforcements after the capitan -pasha's departure. At the end of September it still amounted to four thou sand five hundred men, and was much more efficient than at the commencement of the siege. Hitherto the fire of the Turkish artillery had been so desultory and so ill directed, that not more than one hundred per sons had been killed and wounded in the place. This trifling loss during a six months' siege induced the Greeks to form a very erroneous idea of the efficiency of siege-artillery, while the facility with which pro visions and ammunition had been introduced inspired them with a blind confidence in their naval superiority. The only severe loss they had suffered had been in their sorties, and in these they had hitherto been al most invariably the victors. The operations of the Greek army to the north of the Isthmus of Corinth were feeble, desultory, and unsuccessful. The leaders could not be prevailed upon to act in concert. Party intrigues, personal jealousies, and sordid avidity, prevented them from combining at a time when it was evident that a vigorous effort would have deUvered Mesolonghi. Northern Greece was then occupied by a numerous body of armatoli. Even in the year 1830, after the losses sustained at Mesolonghi and Athens, Capodistrias assembled six thousand veterans belonging to this army.1 By a 1 Parliamentary Papers : Communications with Prince Leopold relating to the sovereignty of Greece ; Count Capodistrias to Prince Leopold, 25th March (6th AprU) 1830, p. 42. 92 TREASON OF ODYSSEUS. book iv. bold advance, the communications of Reshid with his ¦c A ' ' resources in Arta, Previsa, and Joannina might have been cut off. The treason of Odysseus has been urged as an apology for the inactivity of the Romeliots at the opening of the campaign of 1825, but it ought to have excited them to increase their exertions, as it rendered their services more necessary. But very little patriotism was displayed this year by the arma toli, either before or after the treason of Odysseus. Odysseus was a man of considerable ability, but he was too selfish to become a dangerous enemy to a na tional cause ; and when he became openly a traitor, his career was soon terminated. He would not trust him self in the power of the Turks, and the Turks knew him so well that they would afford him no assistance unless he openly joined their army. In trying to over reach everybody he overreached himself, and was easily overpowered. On the 19th of April 1825 he surren dered himself a prisoner to Goura at Livanates. The treason of Odysseus is the most celebrated in stance of treachery among the Greeks during their Re volution. But it derives its importance more from the previous fame of the traitor, and from his tragic end in the Acropolis of Athens, than from the singularity and baseness of his conduct. Many chiefs of armatoli, who, like Odysseus, had been bred up in the service and imbibed the moral corruption of Ali of Joannina, felt like Albanian mercenaries rather than Greek pa triots. Several committed acts of treason — Gogos, Varnakiottes, Rhangos, Zongas, Valtinas, and the Moreot captain Nenekos, were aU as guilty as, some of them even more guilty than, Odysseus. Gogos was a far greater criminal, and his treachery on the field of Petta inflicted a deeper wound on Greece. Odysseus never attached any importance to political independence aud national liberty. His ambition was TREASON OF ODYSSEUS. 93 to ape the tyranny of Ali in a small sphere. His con- a. d. 182s. duct from the commencement of the Revolution testified that he had no confidence in its ultimate success. He viewed it as a temporary revolt, which he might render conducive to his own interests. He attempted at times to make use of popular feelings which he did not under stand, and whose strength he was of course unable to estimate. His opinions prepared him to act the traitor, but he was so far from being a man of a daring charac ter, that a prudent government might have retained him in its service, and found in him a useful instrument, for he possessed more administrative capacity than most of the Romeliot chiefs. Kolettes's influence caused Konduriottes's government to leave him without em ployment, and to stop the pay and rations of the soldiers who followed his banner. When he saw chiefs of inferior rank, who had previously served under his orders, named captains of districts, and observed that every soldier who quitted his band received a reward, he became alarmed for his personal safety. He be lieved that Kolettes designed to treat him as he had treated Noutzas and Palaskas, and fear made him a traitor. He opened a negotiation with the Turks, with the hope of securing to himself a capitanlik in Eastern Greece like those held by Gogos and Varnakiottes in Western Greece, but the Turks would not trust him unless he joined them openly. When forced to choose his side, it was fear of Kolettes which decided his con duct. A small body of Mussulman Albanians was then sent to his aid, but his movements had been long watched, and he was quickly surrounded by superior numbers. Goura, his former lieutenant, commanded his assailants, and to him he surrendered himself a prisoner. Goura did not deliver him up to the ven geance of the members of the government. He was kept prisoner in the Acropolis until the disastrous 94 OPERATIONS IN CONTINENTAL GREECE. book iv. measures of Konduriottes and Kolettes roused general 1!L_!__ indignation. Goura then feared that Odysseus might escape, and regain his former power. Interest pre vailed over gratitude, and Odysseus was murdered on the night of 16th July. After the murder, his body was thrown from the Frank tower in the southern wing of the Propylsea, in order to give credit to the assertion that he perished by a fall in attempting to escape. Thus one of the most astute of the Greek chiefs fell a victim to the policy of a rude Albanian soldier whom he had raised to a high rank.1 And the son of that Andrutsos, who first raised the standard of revolt against the Othomans in 1769, is the traitor at whose name the finger of scorn is pointed by every Greek. Odysseus perished like his patron and model, Ali of Joannina, a sacrifice to his own selfishness ; and he will be execrated as long as the memory of the Greek Revolution shall endure. On the 17th April 1825, Abbas Pasha crossed the Sperchius with two thousand men and two guns. The surrender of Odysseus, who had been expected to make a vigorous diversion, prevented this small force from advancing southward until the kehaya of Reshid marched into the heart of Etolia with about the same number of chosen Albanians. The kehaya routed the Greek captain Saphaka, who attempted to oppose his progress, occupied Vetrinitza, defeated the Greeks a second time at Pentornea, and entered Salona in triumph, where he was joined by Abbas Pasha at the end of May. About the same time, the RomeHot troops, who had 1 Tricoupi mentions that Goura tortured his benefactor to learn where his treasures were concealed, iii. 240. Odysseus fortified a cavern near Velitza (Titliorea), of which Trelawney, who married his sister, kept posses sion until he was severely wounded by Fenton and Whitcombe, who were suborned by agents of the Greek government to assassinate him. Tricoupi erroneously supposes this cavern to be the Corycian Cave, and quotes Pau- sanias, who proves the contrary. OPERATIONS IN CONTINENTAL GREECE. 95 abandoned the Morea after their defeat by Ibrahim, a. d. i825. formed a camp at Dystomo, round which large bodies of Greek troops rallied. This force arrested the ad vance of the Turks, who were inferior in number. But anarchy prevailed among the Greek leaders, and prevented them from availing themselves of their superiority. Abbas Pasha was allowed to establish himself at Salona, and no attempt was made to raise the siege of Mesolonghi. The military operations of the Greeks in continental Greece during the whole campaign of 1825 were conducted in the same desul tory and feeble manner as in the Peloponnesus. Goura was commissioned by the Greek government to enrol six thousand veteran soldiers. He assumed the chief command at Dystomo, where the troops under his orders drew daily eleven thousand six hun dred rations, though their number hardly ever exceeded three thousand men.1 A trade in provisions was openly carried on both by the officers and the soldiers. They sold their surplus rations to the families of the peasants, whom patriotism had induced to abandon their villages rather than submit to the Turks. While the advanced-guard of the army of Eastern Greece skirmished with the Turks at Salona, a body of troops under Karaiiskaki and Djavellas marched into Western Greece. Karaiiskaki threw himself into the rear of Reshid's position. Djavellas forced his way into Mesolonghi on the 19th of August.2 The sum mer was consumed in trifling skirmishes, in struggles for booty, or in contests of military rivalry. The country was laid waste, and truth compels the his torian to record that the cultivators of the soil suffered quite as much from the rapacity of their countrymen 1 Compare Tricoupi, iii. 249, with Captain Humphrey's Journal, p. 312. 2 Gordon, ii. 240, mentions that Djavellas entered Mesolonghi with only twenty-five men, yet he drew rations for one thousand. CHAP. II. 9G RESHID'S FORTIFIED CAMP. book iv. who came to defend them, as from the Turks who came to plunder them.1 The Turks occupied Salona until the 6th of November, when it is the immemorial cus tom of the Albanian and Turkish militia to return home, for the habits of the timariot system are still preserved.2 The victory which the garrison of Mesolonghi ob tained over the besiegers on the 21st of September, convinced Reshid that he must think rather of defend ing his own position from the sorties of the Greeks than of prosecuting the siege. He had almost matured his plan when a vigorous sortie of the besieged, on the 13th of October, inflicted a severe loss on his army, and accelerated his retreat from the trenches. He im mediately fortified the position which he had selected for his camp at the foot of Mount Zygos, and on the 17th of October withdrew the remains of his army to this new station. His cavalry enabled him to keep open his communications with Krioneri, where his supplies of provisions were usually landed. He now anxiously awaited the return of the capitan-pasha, and the reinforcements which Ibrahim Pasha was about to bring. But with all his vigour and ability, had the Greeks employed the superiority which they possessed at this time with skill, courage, and unanimity, his position might have been rendered untenable long before assistance could arrive. He had not now more than three thousand infantry and six hundred cavalry fit for service. The garrison of Mesolonghi was more numerous, and a considerable body of Greek troops under Karaiiskaki and other captains had occupied 1 The armatoli were truly apvtZv 7)8' Zplrpwv {-iriSrifiioi apira/CTrjpej. 2 The troops of the Othomans then took the field on St George's Day (5th May), after the horses of the spahis had eaten their green barley, and broke up their camp to return home on St Demetrius's Day (7th November), in order to superintend the cultivation of their property by their Christian tenants. It deserves notice that the spring is much later in Macedonia and Greece than in corresponding latitudes in Italy and Spain. NAVAL OPERATIONS. 97 strong positions in his rear. Nothing but the irrecon- a. d. 1825. cilable jealousies of the Greek chieftains and their ~~ military ignorance, which prevented their executing any combined operations, saved Reshid's army from destruction. The pasha remained for a month in this dangerous situation, liable to be attacked by an over whelming force at any moment, but determined to persist in his enterprise — to take Mesolonghi, or perish before its walls. The Greeks amused themselves with destroying the works of the besiegers; but their confidence in their ultimate success was so great that they executed even this triumphant labour with extreme carelessness. They also committed a blamable oversight in not transporting to Mesolonghi a supply of grain which had been eoUected in magazines on the western coast of the Morea, consisting of the produce of the land- tax from the rich plains of Elis and Achaia. The sea was open, and these supplies might have been re moved without difficulty. The Othoman fleet returned to Patras on the 18th of November, saved Reshid's army from starvation, and furnished him some reinforcements and ample supplies of ammunition. The Greek fleet, which ought to have engaged the Othoman in the waters of Patras, did not reach the entrance of the gulf until the capitan-pasha had terminated the delicate operation of landing stores at Krioneri. A series of naval engagements took place, in which the Turks succeeded in baffling the attempts of the Greeks to cut off their straggling ships and to capture their transports. Both parties boasted of their success. The capitan-pasha kept open his communications with Patras and Krioneri. Miaoulis threw supplies into Mesolonghi, and kept open its communications with the Ionian Islands. The real victory remained with VOL. II. Q 98 IBRAHIM AT MESOLONGHI. book iv. the Turks ; their fleet kept its station at Patras. The — Greek fleet quitted the waters of Mesolonghi on the 4th December 1825, and returned to Hydra. A new and more formidable enemy now appeared before Mesolonghi. The campaign in the Peloponnesus had proved that neither the courage of the armatoli nor the stratagems of the klephts were a match for the discipline and tactics of the Egyptians ; and Ibra him now advanced to attack the brave garrison of Mesolonghi, confident of success. He encountered no opposition in his march from Navarin to Patras. The pass of Kleidi was left unguarded, and he captured large magazines of grain which the coUectors of the tenths had stored at Agoulinitza, Pyrgos, and Gastouni, and which ought either to have been previously trans ported to Mesolonghi or now destroyed. These sup plies proved of great use to Ibrahim's army during the siege.1 On the 29th of November a council of war was held by the Othoman pashas at Lepanto, to settle the plan of their operations. The capitan-pasha, Ibrahim, Reshid, and Yussuf were present, and they engaged mutually to support one another as much as lay in their power, to act always with unanimity, and to prosecute the siege with vigour. They kept their pro mises better than the Greek chiefs usuaUy kept theirs. Yussuf at this meeting pointed out the measures which had enabled him to defend Patras for nearly five years. He soon after quitted Greece, being raised to the rank of pasha of Magnesia as a reward for his prudence and valour.2 The month of December was employed by Ibrahim in forming magazines at Krioneri, and bringing up ammunition to his camp before Mesolonghi. Heavy 1 Phrantzes, ii. 358, note. " Gordon, ii. 244. Tricoupi, iii. 325. GREEK LETHARGY. 99 rains rendered it impossible to work at the trenches, a. d. 1825. The whole plain, from the walls of the town to the banks of the Fidari, was under water, or formed a wide expanse of mud and marsh. The Egyptian soldiers laboured indefatigably, and the order which prevailed in their camp astonished Reshid, who was said to have felt some irritation when he found that Ibrahim never asked him for any assistance or advice, but carried on his own operations with unceasing activity and perfect independence. A horrid act of cruelty, perpetrated by Reshid, was ascribed to an ex plosion of his suppressed rage. A priest, two women, and three boys, were impaled by his order before the walls of Mesolonghi, because they had conveyed intel ligence to their relatives in the besieged town.1 The Greek government became at last sensible that it had too long neglected the defence of Mesolonghi. It had often announced that Reshid was about to raise the siege, and, believing its own sayings, it had ne glected to do anything to force him to retreat. It now learned with surprise that Reshid's camp was well supplied with provisions ; that the garrison of Meso longhi was in want of ammunition; and that the Greek troops sent to cut off the supplies of the Turks were in danger of starvation. An attempt was made to raise money by selling national lands; but as these lands were already mortgaged to the English bond holders, and the sale of national lands was expressly prohibited by national assemblies, the bad faith of the members of the government was too apparent for Greeks to part with their money on such security. The conduct of the members of the executive body 1 Gordon, ii. 253, and Tricoupi, iii. 331, both say that several children suffered. They were boys above twelve years of age. Children under that oge would have been compelled to embrace Mohammedanism. Reshid, who was religious as well as inhuman, would have seized the opportunity of making forced converts had the law of Mohammed allowed it. 100 GREEK LETHARGY. book iv. was in this case both impolitic and dishonest. It — - proved that they were dishonourable enough to violate every national engagement, and so incapable that they made a display of their bad faith without any profit. A sum sufficient to enable a Greek fleet to put to sea was soon raised by private subscription. Individual patriotism has generally displayed itself on every emer gency in Greece, when not thwarted by the action of the government. Many Greeks who were not wealthy subscribed largely; ministers of state, shipowners, chieftains, and officials, who had enriched themselves with the produce of the EngUsh loans, or by farming taxes, endeavoured to conceal their wealth by their illiberality.1 The sums collected equipped twenty Hydriot and four Psarian ships. On the 21st of January 1826 these vessels, reinforced by three Spetziot brigs which had remained in the waters of Mesolonghi, forced the Turkish cruisers to retire under the guns of Patras, and enabled the besieged to communicate directly with the Ionian Islands, and lay in stores of provisions and ammunition for two months. The crews of the Greek ships were only paid in advance for a single month. The spirit of patriotism was not then powerful in the Albanian islands ; and the Hydriot saUors, in order to escape being obliged to give their services to their country for a single hour gratuitously, sailed from 1 Dr Howe, the well-known philanthropist of Boston, Mass., who was present, records the manner in which the people expressed their feelings when Professor Gennadios addressed an appeal to their patriotism at a public meeting in the square of Nauplia (Historical Sketch of the Greek Revolution, p. 329) :— " Gen nadios threw down his purse. ' There is my all ; I give it to my country as freely as I would to my child. I am ready to serve in any occupation for a year, and pay the whole salary I receive into the public treasury.' The crowd was moved to tears. Many voices were raised offering money. The public excitement forced the chiefs and rich men to come forward, though un willingly, and a scornful laugh was raised as their names were called out." Compare the vauntings of Tricoupi, iii. 332. The letter of the President soliciting subscriptions is given in the Hydriot newspaper, 'O *fo.or tou Nifiov, December 14 (28), 1825. VASILADI AND ANATOLIKON TAKEN. 101 Mesolonghi, after remaining in its waters only a fort- a.d. 1826. night.1 : Three weeks after the departure of the Greek ships, Ibrahim commenced active operations. On the 25th of February he opened his fire from batteries mounting forty pieces of artillery, and on the 27th and. 28th two unsuccessful attempts were made to storm the walls by the united forces of the Turks and Egyptians. The gallant resistance of the besieged convinced Ibrahim that it would cost too much to take the place by storm, unless he could attack it by sea as well as by land. He soon launched a flotilla of thirty-two flat- bottomed boats, and obtained the complete command of the lagoon. Vasiladi, the fort which commanded the entrance of the lagoon which leads from the sea directly to the town, was taken by storm on the 9th of March 1826, and Anatolikon capitulated on the 13th. The Greeks now perceived that the progress of the besiegers, although not very rapid, would soon render the place untenable. The supplies of provisions re ceived in January, added to what was then in the public magazines, ought to have furnished abundant rations to the whole population until the end of April; but these stores were wasted by the rapacity of the soldiery.2 Ibrahim and Reshid contrived to be well informed of everything that was said or done within the waUs of Mesolonghi, and they learned with pleasure that watchfulness and patience would soon force the Greeks to surrender the place or to die of hunger. The moment appeared favourable for offering a cap- 1 It is curious to read the accounts which were given of the deplorable con dition of the Egyptians and Turks before Mesolonghi at this time in the Greek newspapers, and in the MS. journals of Philhellenes. The Arab regulars of Ibrahim's army in particular were supposed to be then enduring a series of calamities which would exterminate them in a few weeks. 2 Gordon, ii. 267, states this in his usual candid manner: — "We have one reproach to address to the Suliot chiefs, and particularly to Nothi Botzares ; it is, that, whenever things wore a favourable aspect, they did not bridle their incurable improvidence and love of peculation." CHAP. II. 102 NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CAPITULATION. book iv. itulation, but the besieged rejected all negotiation with disdain. Sir Frederic Adam, the Lord Pligh Com missioner in the Ionian Islands, convinced that the loss of Vasiladi and Anatolikon rendered the fall of Meso longhi inevitable, endeavoured to prevent farther blood shed. He visited Krioneri in a British ship-of-war, and offered his mediation. But the two pashas were now sure of their prey, and as the Greeks refused to treat of a capitulation directly with their enemies, Sir Frederic was obliged to retire without effecting any thing — an example of the folly of too much zeal in other people's business. As soon as he was gone, Ibra him and Reshid sent a written summons to the gar rison, pretending that the Greeks had expressed a wish to negotiate terms of capitulation. They offered to allow all the Greek troops to quit Mesolonghi on laying down their arms, and they engaged to permit the in habitants who desired to leave the town to depart with the garrison ; but they declared also, that aU those who wished to remain should be allowed to retain possession of their property, and should enjoy ample protection for themselves and their families. To this summons the Greeks replied, that they had never expressed any wish to capitulate ; that they were determined to de fend Mesolonghi to the last drop of their blood ; that if the pashas wanted their arms they might come to take them ; and that they remitted the issue of the combat to the will of God.1 The only post in the lagoon of which the Greeks held possession, was the small islet of Klissova, about a mile from Mesolonghi, to the south-east. This post was defended by a hundred and fifty men under Kitzo Djavellas. The Greeks were advantageously posted, 1 The summons was dated the 2d of April 1826. Both it and the reply of the Greeks are curious and characteristic documents. They are printed by Tricoupi, iii. 401, 402. ATTACK ON KLISSOVA. 103 and protected by a low rampart of earth from the a.d. 132a. artillery of their assailants ; while a low chapel, with an arched roof of stone, served them as a magazine and citadel. On the 6th of April the Albanians of Reshid attacked Klissova. The shallow water prevented even the flat-bottomed boats of the Turks from approaching close to the shore, so that the attacking party was compeUed to jump into the sea and wade forward through the deep mud. While the gunboats fired showers of grape, the Greeks kept themselves hid under their earthen rampart; but as soon as the Albanians were in the water, they rose on their knees, and, resting their long guns on the parapet, poured such a well- directed volley on their enemies, that the foremost fell dead or wounded, and the rest recoiled in fear. Several officers were standing up in the boats directing the landing : they offered a conspicuous mark to the best shots among the Greeks, and most of them fell mortally wounded. The Albanians retired in confusion. Ibrahim then ordered his regular troops to renew the attack. The result was similar ; but the Egyptians were led back a second time to the attack, and again retreated under the deadly fire of the Greeks. Seeing the advantage which the defenders of Klissova derived from their position, Ibrahim ought to have abandoned the assault and kept the islet closely blockaded until he could bring up a few mortars. But he was eager to prove that his regulars were superior to the Alba nians of Reshid. He therefore ordered Hussein, the conqueror of Kasos, Sphakteria, and Vasiladi, to make a third attack. Hussein led his men bravely on, but as he stood up in his boat giving orders concerning the formation of the storming parties, he was struck by a musket-ball, and fell down mortally wounded. The steady fire of the Greeks prevented the regulars from completing their formation. The men turned 104 FAILURE OF THE GREEK FLEET. book iv. and scrambled back into the boats in complete dis- — order. After this repulse the pashas drew off their troops. Five hundred men were kiUed or wounded in this vain attempt to storm a sandbank defended by a hundred and fifty good marksmen. The victory of Klissova was the last success of the Greeks during the siege of Mesolonghi. Provisions began to fail, and rations ceased to be distributed to any but the men who performed service. Yet as re lief by sea was hourly expected, the garrison remained firm. At last the Greek fleet made its appearance, but the hope it inspired was soon disappointed. The Turks were in possession of the lagoon, and Miaoulis arrived without any flat-bottomed boats to enable him to penetrate to Mesolonghi. A. feeble attempt was made by the Hydriots on the 13th of April to pene trate into the lagoon by the channel of Petala ; but it was easily repulsed, and never renewed. The naval skill of the Greeks no longer insured them the com mand of the sea, nor did they now possess the heroic enterprise which they had often displayed during the first years of the Revolution. They had refused to adopt any scientific improvements either in their ships or their artiUery ; the Turks had done both. Miaoulis entered the waters of Mesolonghi with the same ships as those with which he had combated Kara Ali; the Turkish fleet, which stood out of the Gulf of Lepanto to engage him, was very different in construction and armament from the fleets that sailed from Constanti nople in 1821 and 1822. The Turks kept their line of battle, and held their position to windward of the Greeks, exchanging broadsides, and frustrating all the manoeuvres of their enemy to bring on a general action or cut off straggling ships. On the 15 th of April Miaoulis found that the Turks had completely closed the communication with the PROVISIONS FAIL. 105 lagoon, and held their position between him and the a. d. 1826. shore. He attempted to throw their line into con- fusion by sending down a fire-ship on two frigates ; but the exposed vessels tacked, kept the weather-gage, and allowed the blazing brulot to drift away to lee ward- and consume itself ineffectually. Fire-ships had ceased to be a terror to the Turks. The Greek fleet at this time consisted of only thirty sail, and the Turkish of sixty ; but at the commencement of the war this disparity would have hardly enabled the Othomans to keep the sea. It now insured them a decided victory. Miaoulis, baffled and cut off from all communication with the besieged, was driven out to sea, and the be sieged town was abandoned to its fate. The glory of the Greek navy was tarnished by the tameness with which it declined to close with the enemy, and re treated without an effort to emulate the heroism of the defenders of Mesolonghi. When the Greek fleet departed, the magazines of Mesolonghi did not contain rations for more than two days. The garrison had now to choose whether it would perish by starvation, capitulate, or cut its way through the besiegers. It resolved to face every dan ger rather than surrender. The inhabitants who were unable to bear arms, the women, and the chUdren, showed as much patience and courage in this dreadful situation as the veteran soldiers hardened in Turkish warfare. A spirit of Greek heroism, rare in the Greek Revolution — rare even in the history of mankind — per vaded every breast. After deliberate consultation in a numerous assembly, it was resolved to force a passage for the whole population through the besiegers. Many would perish, some might escape ; but those who fell and those who escaped would be alike free. The plan adopted for evacuating the town was well devised ; but its success was marred by several accidents. CHAP. II. 106 PREPARATIONS FOR A SORTIE. book iv. About sunset on the 22d of April 1826 a discharge of musketry was heard by the besieged on the ridge of Zygos. This was a concerted signal to inform the chiefs in Mesolonghi that a body of fifteen hundred armatoli, detached from the camp of Karaiiskaki at Platanos, was ready to attack the rear of the Turks and aid the sortie of the besieged. The garrison was mustered in three divisions. Bridges were thrown across the ditch, and breaches were opened in the walls. There were still nine thousand persons in the town, of whom only three thousand were capable of bearing arms. Nearly two thousand men, women, and children were so feeble from age, disease, or starv ation, that they were unable to join the sortie. Some of the relations of these helpless individuals volun tarily remained to share their fate. The non-comba tants, who were to join the sortie, were drawn up in several bodies, according to the quarters in which they resided, or the chiefs under whose escort they were to march. The Mesolonghiots formed themselves into a separate band. They were less attenuated by fatigue than the rest ; but being collected from every quarter of the town, their band was less orderly than the emigrants from the country, who had been disciplined by privation, and accustomed to live and act together during the siege. Most of the women who took part in the sortie dressed themselves in the fustinello, like the Albanians and armatoli, and carried arms like soldiers ; most of the children had also loaded pistols in their belts, which many had already learned how to use. At nine o'clock the bridges were placed in the ditch without noise, and a thousand soldiers crossed and ranged themselves along the covered way. Un fortunately a deserter had informed Ibrahim of the projected sortie, and both he and Reshid, though they FINAL SORTIE. 107 gave little credit to the information that the whole a. d. 1826. population would attempt to escape, adopted every ~ precaution to repulse any sortie of the garrison. When the non-combatants began to cross the bridges the noise revealed to the Turks the positions in which crowds were assembled, and on these points they opened a terrific fire. Crowds rushed forward to escape the shot. The shrieks of the wounded and the splash of those who were forced from the bridges were unnoticed ; and in spite of the enemy's fire the greater part of the inhabitants crossed the ditch in tolerable order. The Mesolonghiots still lingered behind, re tarded by their interests and their feelings. It was no easy sacrifice to quit their property and their rela tions. For a considerable time the garrison waited patiently for them under a heavy fire. At last the first body of the Mesolonghiots crossed the ditch, and then the troops sprang forward with a loud shout and rushed sword in hand on the Turks. Never was a charge made more valiantly. The eastern division of the garrison, under Nothi Botzares, struggled forward to gain the road to Bochori ; the central division, under Kitzos Djavellas, pushed straight through the enemy's lines towards the hills ; and the western division, under Makry, strove to gain the road to the Kleisura. All three intended, when clear of the Turks, to effect a junction on the slopes of Zygos, where the road ascends to the monastery of St Simeon. Almost at the moment when the garrison rushed on the Turks, that portion of the Mesolonghiots which was then on the bridges raised a cry of " back, back." Great part of the Mesolonghiots stopped, fell back, and returned into the town with the military escort which ought to have formed the rearguard of the sortie. The origin of this ill-timed cry, which weak- BOOK iv, CHAP. II. 108 FINAL SORTIE. ened the force of the sortie and added to the victims in the place, has excited much unnecessary speculation. It evidently rose among those who were in danger of being forced into the ditch. It was repeated so loudly that it created a panic. The three leading divisions bore down aU opposition. Neither the yataghan of Reshid's Albanians, nor the bayonet of Ibrahim's Arabs, could arrest their impetu ous attack ; and they forced their way through the labyrinth of trenches, dykes, and ditches, with com paratively little loss. Only some women and children, who could not keep up with the column as it rushed forward over the broken ground, were left behind. But for the information whicii had been given by the traitor, the greater part of the defenders of Mesolonghi would have escaped. In consequence of that informa tion, Ibrahim and Reshid had taken the precaution to send bodies of cavalry to watch the roads leading to Bochori, St Simeon, and Kleisura. The horsemen fell in with Greek columns when they were about a mile beyond the Turkish lines, and were beginning to feel secure. The division of Makry was completely broken by the first charge of the cavalry. The others were thrown into confusion. All suffered severely, yet small bands of the garrison stiU kept together, and, by keep ing up a continuous fire, enabled numbers of women and children to rally under their protection. At last the scattered remnants of the three divisions began to recover some order on reaching the slopes of Zygos, where the irregularities of the ground forced the cavalry to slacken the pursuit. The fugitives prepared to enjoy a short rest, and endeavoured to assemble the stragglers who had eluded the swords of the horsemen. They thought that the fire they had kept up against the cavalry would draw down the fifteen hundred men of Karaiskaki's corps to FINAL SORTIE. 109 their assistance. While they were thus engaged in a. d. ma. giving and expecting succour, a body of Albanians, placed in ambuscade by Reshid to watch the road to the monastery of St Simeon, crept to tlieir vicinity un- perceived, and poured a deadly volley into their ranks. Instead of friends to assist them, they had to encounter one thousand mountaineers, well posted, to bar their progress. The Greeks, surprised by unseen enemies, could do nothing but get out of the range of the rifles of the Albanians as far as possible. The Albanians fol lowed and tracked them in order to secure their heads, for which the pashas had promised a high price. The loss of the Greeks was greater at the foot of the hills, where their own troops ought to have insured their safety, than it had been in forcing the enemy's lines and in resisting the charges of the cavalry. Most of the women and chUdren who had dragged themselves thus far, were so exhausted that they were taken prisoners. About midnight small parties of the garrison of Mesolonghi, and a few women and children, succeeded in reaching the post occupied by the Greek troops ; but instead of fifteen hundred men they found only fifty, and only a very small supply of provisions to relieve their wants. Here they learned also, with dis may, that the camp at Platanos was a prey to the ordinary dissensions and abuses which disgraced the mUitary classes of Greece at this period. The weary fugitives, in order to escape starvation, were soon com pelled to continue their march to Platanos. Even there they obtained very little assistance from the chiefs of the armatoli; and when they had rested about a week, they resumed their journey to Salona. Many perished from wounds, disease, and hunger on the road. About fifteen hundred reached Salona during the month of May, straggling thither generally in small bands, and often by very circuitous roads, which they had followed \ CHAP. II. 110 FALL OF MESOLONGHI. book iv. in order to procure food. Of these about thirteeii hundred were soldiers ; there were several girls in the number of those who escaped, and a few boys under twelve years of age. As soon as Ibrahim and Reshid found that the greater part of the garrison had evacuated Mesolonghi, they ordered a general assault. Their troops occupied the whole line of the walls without encountering resistance. The Greek soldiers whom wounds or disease had pre vented from marching, had established themselves in different buildings. The party which occupied the principal powder-magazine, when surrounded by the Turks, and summoned to surrender, set fire to the powder and perished in the explosion. It was not until morning dawned that the Turkish officers allowed their men to advance into the interior of the town, though several houses near the waUs had been set on fire during the night. A whole day was spent by the conquerors in plundering Mesolonghi. A second powder-magazine was exploded by its defenders, who perished with their assailants. A windmill, which served as a central depot of ammunition, was defended until the 24th of April, when its little garrison, having exhausted their provisions, set fire to the powder, pre ferring death to captivity. The loss of the Greeks amounted to four thousand. Ibrahim boasted that the Turks had collected three thousand heads ; and it is probable that at least one thousand perished from wounds and starvation beyond the limits which the besiegers examined. The nearest points where the fugitives could find security and rest, were Petala, Kalamos, and Salona. The conquerors took about three thousand prisoners, chiefly women and children. About two thousand escaped ; for be sides those who reached Salona, a few found refuge in the villages of Etolia, and some of the inhabitants of FALL OF MESOLONGHI. Ill Mesolonghi and of the surrounding country evaded a. d. me. the Turkish pursuit by wading into the lagoon, and ultimately reached Petala and Kalamos, where they received protection and rations from the British gov ernment. Many deeds of heroism might be recorded. One example deserves to be selected. The Moreot primates have been justly stigmatised as a kind of Christian Turks ; and, as a class, their conduct during the Greek Revolution was marked by ambition and selfishness. Yet a Moreot primate displayed a noble example of the purest patriotism at the fall of Mesolonghi. Papadia- mantopulos of Patras, a leading Hetairist, was one of the members of the executive commission intrusted with the administration of Western Greece. In the month of February he visited Zante to hasten the de parture of supplies. His friends there urged him to remain. They said that as he was not a soldier he could assist in prolonging the defence of Mesolonghi more effectually by remaining at Zante, to avail himself of every opportunity of sending over supplies, than by serving in the besieged town. But the noble old gentle man silenced every entreaty by the simple observation : " I invited my countrymen to take up arms against the Turks, and I swore to live and die with them. This is the hour to keep my promise." He returned to Mesolonghi, and died the death of a hero in the final sortie.1 The conduct of the defenders of Mesolonghi will awaken the sympathies of freemen in every country as long as Grecian history endures. The siege rivals that of Platsea in the energy and constancy of the besieged ; it wants only a historian like Thucydides to secure for it a like immortality of fame. 1 Gordon, i. 266, and Tricoupi, iii. 356, both mention the conduct of Papa- diamantopulos with just praise. CHAPTER III. THE SIEGE OF ATHENS. " August Athena ! where, Where are thy men of might, thy grand in soul?" Ibrahim's operations in the Morea during 1826 — Reshid's operations in continental greece — commencement oe the siege oe athens, and battle oe kha1dari — death oe gotjra grigiottes throws himself into the Acropolis — Karaiskaki's operations to raise the siege — Fabvier throws himself into the Acropolis — State of Greece DURDsa the winter 1826-27 — -expeditions for the relief of athens under Gordon, Bdrbaki, and Heideck — General Sir Richard Church — Lord Cochrane (Earl of Dundonald) — Election of Count Capodistrias to be president of Greece — Naval expedition under Captain Hastings — Greek traders supply Reshid's army with provisions — Operations of Church and Cochrane before Athens — Massacre of the garrison of the monastery of St Spiridion — Karaiskaki's death — Defeat of Sir Richard Church at the Phalerum — Evacuation of the Acropolis — Conduct of Philhellenes in Greece, England, and America — Lord Cochrane's naval review at Poros — Sufferings of the Greeks — Assistance sent from the United States. After the conquest of Mesolonghi, the Othoman fleet returned to Constantinople, and the Egyptian to Alexandria. The Greeks, with their reduced naval strength, were therefore again left masters of the sea Ibrahim Pasha returned to the Morea in order to complete the conquest of his own pashalik. After re viewing his troops at Patras, he found himself compelled to open the campaign of 1826 at the head of only four thousand infantry and six hundred cavalry. With this insignificant army he marched against the Greeks, laid waste the fields of that part of the population of Achaia which had not submitted to his authority, and drove IBRAHIM S OPERATIONS IN 1826. 113 the inhabitants into the inaccessible regions of Mount a. d. 1826. Chelmos, where the snow still lay thick on the ground. During this foray he captured many prisoners, and carried off large herds of cattle and innumerable flocks of sheep. A small detachment was sent to reconnoitre the monastery of Megaspelaion ; but at this time no attack was made on it. The monks imagined a miracle. They recounted that a high wall stood up before the Egyptian troops, and closed the road by which they endeavoured to reach the holy building. Terrified by this proof that God opposed their undertaking, they marched back to Kalavryta.1 From Kalavryta Ibrahim marched to Tripolitza. Near Karitena he was joined by considerable reinforce ments from Modon. The summer was employed in a series of expeditions for laying waste the country and starving the population into submission. The crops being generally ready for the sickle, or already reaped, were either destroyed or carried off. Great quantities of grain were burned, and great quantities were transported to Tripolitza. From the 15th of May to the 14th of November 1826 the Egyptian troops carried on the work of destruction almost with out interruption. Achaia, Elis, Arcadia, Messenia, and Laconia were devastated, villages were burned to the ground, cattle were driven away, and the inhabitants, when captured, were either shot or sold as slaves. The desolation produced was so complete, that during the following winter numbers of the peasantry, parti cularly women and children, died of actual starvation. 1 The ecclesiastic Phrantzes boasts of his own belief in this miracle, which took place on the 7th May 1826. On the 6th July 1827, Ibrahim reconnoitred the monastery in person, and made an attack on it. The monks were pre pared, and the monastery was garrisoned by Greek troops, who repulsed the attack, which Ibrahim did not renew. The monks were generally suspected of having entered into a secret arrangement with the Egyptian pasha, but Phrant zes assures us that this was not the case. — Phrantzes, ii. 441, note 1, and 495. VOL. II. H CHAP. III. 114 Ibrahim's operations in 1826. book iv. During the summer Ibrahim made two attempts to penetrate into Maina — the first from the pass of Armyros on the west side, the other from Marathonesi on the east coast. Both were repulsed by the Maniats, who availed themselves of the natural difficulties which the precipitous gorges of Mount Taygetus offer to the advance of an invader. The military operations of Kolokotrones and the other Peloponnesian chiefs were conducted without union, vigour, or judgment. An abortive attempt had been made to surprise Tripolitza, while Ibrahim was absent besieging Mesolonghi.1 After Ibrahim returned to the Morea, the faculties of Kolokotrones appeared to have been paralysed. The only success he obtained was carrying off a few mules from the Egyptian con voys, and recovering a small portion of the booty taken from the peasantry, which he employed to feed his own followers. At the end of the year Ibrahim found his troops so worn out by fatigue and disease, that he was compelled to suspend his operations until he received fresh rein forcements from Egypt.2 Mohammed Ali showed some hesitation in prosecuting the war against the Greeks at this time. He was watching the progress of the negotiations between the sultan and the courts of Great Britain and Russia, and he wished to learn whether his son would be allowed to complete the conquest of the Morea, and retain permanent posses sion of it, before expending more money in the under taking. In the mean time Reshid Pasha laboured strenuously to re-establish the sultan's authority in continental 1 See a boasting extract from a despatch of Kolokotrones in Fabvier, Histoire du Siege de Mesolonghi, 331. The disorder that prevailed in the Greek armies is well described in the graphic dialect of the old klepht, as reported in Aitfrijo-is Sv/xPcivTwv tjjs 'EWtivlktis *u\5js, 'A.6qv., 1846. 2 See the plan of campaign proposed by Sir C Napier in Appendix- OPERATIONS OF RESHID. 115 Greece. His road to fame and power lay in his abso- a. d. me. lute devotion to Sultan Mahmud's interests, and his _ faithful execution of the orders he received from the Porte. During the month of June 1826 he fixed his head quarters at Mesolonghi, and many of the Greek chief tains submitted to him, and publicly recognised the sultan's authority. Rhangos, Siphakas, Dyovuniattes, Kontoyannes, and Andreas Iskos aU owned allegiance to the Porte, accepted the rank of captains of arma toli, and forgot the heroism of the defenders of Meso longhi. As soon as the affairs of Western Greece were settled on a footing that promised at least a temporary security for the restoration of order, Reshid marched into Eastern Greece, occupied the passes over G£ta, Knemis, Parnassus, and Parnes, strengthened the gar rison of Thebes, and organised regular communica tions by land between Larissa and Chalcis in Eubcea. He entered Attica before the crops of 1826 were gathered in. The exactions of Goura had exceeded those of Odysseus, for Odysseus, like his patron, Ali of Joan nina, allowed no extortions but his own, while Goura permitted his mercenaries to glean after the harvest of his own rapacity had been gathered in. A. great pro portion of the Attic peasantry was driven to despair, and the moment Reshid's forces appeared in the Rata- dema, or hilly district between Parnes and the channel of Eubcea, they were welcomed as deliverers. On ad vancing into the plain of Athens, they were openly joined by the warlike inhabitants of Menidhi and Khasia, who vigorously supported Reshid's government as long as he remained in Attica. The contributions which Goura levied under the pretext of preparing for the defence of Attica were 116 DEFEAT AT KHAlDARI. book iv. exclusively employed for provisioning the Acropolis, : — - and in garrisoning that stronghold with four hundred chosen mercenaries in his own pay. These men were selected from those whom the civil war in the Morea had inured to acts of tyranny, and they were taught to look to Goura and not to the Greek government for pay and promotion. The citizens of Athens were not allowed to form part of the garrison of their own citadel. The Turks took possession of Sepolia, Patissia, and Ambelokepos without encountering serious opposition. On the 28th of June, Reshid arrived from Thebes, and established his headquarters at Patissia. His army did not exceed seven thousand men, but his cavalry, which amounted to eight hundred, were in a high state of efficiency, and he had a fine train of artillery, con sisting of twenty-six guns and mortars. The siege of Athens was immediately commenced. The hUl of the Museion was occupied, and batteries were erected at the little chapel of St Demetrius, and on the level above the Pnyx. He soon obtained a brilliant victory over the Greeks. About four thousand armatoli had been concentrated at Eleusis. The Greek chiefs who commanded this army proposed to force their way into the town of Athens, and expected to be able to maintain them selves in the houses. Reshid divined their object, and forestalled them in its execution. On the night of the 14th of August he stormed the town, and drove the Athenians into the Acropolis, into which Goura could not refuse to admit them. The Greek troops persisted in advancing from Eleusis, though they seem to have formed no definite plan. Their numbers were insufficient to hold out any reasonable probability of their being able to recover possession of Athens. The irregulars amounted to two DEFEAT AT KHA'iDARI. 117 thousand five hundred under the command of Karais- a. d. 1826. kaki, the regulars to one thousand five hundred under ~ Fabvier. The Greek force crossed the mountains by a pathway which leaves the Sacred Way and the monastery of Daphne to the right, and took up a position at a farmhouse with a small tower called Khaidari. Instead of pushing on to the Olive Grove, and stationing themselves among the vineyards, where the Turkish cavalry and artillery would have been useless, they awaited Reshid at Khaidari. On the 20th of August the attack was made, and the Greeks were completely defeated. The two leaders endeavoured to throw the whole blame of the disaster on one another, and they succeeded in convincing everybody who paid any attention to their proceedings that both of them had displayed great want of judgment. Nobody sus pected either of them of want of personal energy and daring, but both were notoriously deficient in temper and prudence.1 Kara'iskaki soon regained his reputation with his own soldiers, by sending a large body on a successful foray to Skourta, where they captured a numerous herd of cattle destined for the use of the Turkish army. Fabvier withdrew his corps to Salamis. Reshid bombarded the Acropolis hotly for some time, but seeing that his fire did the besieged little injury, he attempted to take the place by mining. Though he made little progress even with his mines, he persisted in carrying on his operations with his characteristic perseverance. A body of Greek troops, consisting of Ionians and Romeliots, made two unsuccessful attempts to relieve the besieged. The summer dragged on without anything 1 The best account of this affair is by Friedrich Mulier, Denlcwurdigkeiten aus Griechenlanid, 17. See also Gordon, ii. 336. CHAP. III. 118 DEATH OF GOURA. book iv. decisive, when the death of Goura drew public atten tion to the dangerous position of the garrison and the neglect of the Greek government. The soldiers in the Acropolis manifested a mutinous spirit in conse quence of the ineffectual efforts made to reUeve them. Many succeeded in deserting during the night, by creeping unobserved through the Turkish lines. To prevent these desertions Goura passed the night among the soldiers on guard, and in order to secure the as sistance of the enemy in preventing the escape of his men, he generally brought on a skirmish which put them on the alert. On the 13th of October, whUe ex changing shots with the Turkish sentinels, he was shot through the brain. His opponent had watched the flash of the powder in the touch-hole of Goura's rifle.1 A cry of indignation at the incapacity and negli gence of the members of the Greek government was now raised both in Greece and the Ionian Islands. Greece had still a numerous body of men under arms in continental Greece, yet these troops were inactive spectators of the siege of Athens. General Gordon, who had recently returned to Greece, records the general opinion when he states that these troops were con demned to inaction by the bickerings of their leaders.2 Some attempts were at last made to interrupt Reshid's operations. Fabvier advanced into Bceotia with the intention of storming Thebes ; but being; de- serted by his soldiers, he was compeUed to fall back without attempting anything. Reshid, who was well informed of every movement made by the Greeks 1 Sourmeles, 164 ; Tricoupi, iv. 74. Goura's widow was kUled, with ten female companions and attendants, three months later, by the roof of the Erech- theion falling in. The Athenian historian Sourmeles says that she was already betrothed to Grigiottes, by the persuasion of her intriguing brother Anastasios Loidorikes, who had induced her to lay aside her widow's weeds. He exclaims, 'iBou fanarla yvvaucbs Kai avaiStla p 189 a Gordon, ii. 343. GRIGIOTTES ENTERS THE ACROPOLIS. 119 through the Attic peasants who acted as his scouts, sent a. n. is26. forward a body of cavalry, which very nearly succeeded in occupying the passes of Cithseron and cutting off Fabvier's retreat to Megara. On his return, Fab vier was left by the Greek government without pro visions; and attempts being made in the name of Karaiskaki and Niketas, perhaps without their autho rity, to induce his men to desert, he found himself obliged to withdraw the regular corps to Methana in order to prevent its dissolution.1 Karaiskaki advanced a second time to Khaidari. This movement enabled Grigiottes to land unobserved in the Bay of Phalerum, near the mouth of the Cephis- sus, and to march up to the Acropolis, into which he introduced himself and four hundred and fifty men without loss. As Athens was now safe for some time, Karaiskaki moved off to Mount Helicon, where a few of the in habitants stiU remained faithful to their country's cause. He expected to succeed in capturing some of the Turkish magazines in Boeotia, and in intercepting the supplies which Reshid drew from Thessaly by the way of Zeituni. The Acropolis was now garrisoned by about one thousand soldiers, but it was encumbered by the pre sence of upwards of four hundred women and children. The supply of wheat and barley was abundant, but the clothes of the soldiers were in rags, and there was no fuel to bake bread. Reshid, who determined to prose cute the siege during the winter, made arrangements for keeping his troops well supplied with provisions and military stores, and for defending the posts which protected his communications with Thessaly. The Turks neglected to keep a naval squadron in the channel of Euboea, though it would always have 1 Friedrich Mulier, 22. 120 ATTEMPTS TO RAISE THE SIEGE. book iv. found safe harbours at Negrepont and Volo. The AAA Greeks were therefore enabled to transport a large force to attack any point in the rear of Reshid's army. It was in their power to cut off all the supplies he received by sea, and, by occupying some defensible station in the northern channel of Euboea, to establish communications with Karaiskaki's troops on Mount Helicon, and form a line of posts from this defen sible station to another of a simUar kind on the Gulf of Corinth. Talanta and Dobrena were the sta tions indicated. But instead of attempting to aid the army, the Greek navy either remained idle or engaged in piracy. Faction also prevented a great part of the Greek army from taking the field, and the assist ance which the Philhellenic committee "in Paris trans mitted to Greece was employed by its agent, Dr BaUly, in feeding Kolokotrones's soldiers, who remained idle in the Morea, without marching either against the Egyptians or the Turks. Konduriottes and Koloko trones, formerly the deadliest enemies, being now both excluded from a place in the executive government, were banded together in a most unpatriotic and dis honourable opposition to a weak but not ill-disposed government, composed of nearly a dozen members, many of whom were utterly unfit for political em ployment of any kind.1 Some feeble attempts wrere made to organise attacks on Reshid's rear; but each leader was allowed to form an independent scheme of operations, and to abandon his enterprise when it suited his convenience. 1 General Gordon, who served under this executive, thought more favour ably of it than the author of this work, who watched its proceedings as a volunteer under Captain Hastings. The General says, " The president, Zaimes, had considerable merit, and the government contained several men of fair talent and business-like habits," ii. 300. Their names were — Zaimes, presi dent, Petrobey of Maina," A. Deliyannes, Tsamados, Hadji, Anargbyros, Mon- archides, Tricoupi, Vlachos, Zotos, Demetrakopulos. This government re moved from Nauplia, where it fell too much under the control of the Moreot military faction, to Egina, on the 23d of November 1826. KARAiSKAKIS OPERATIONS. 121 The command of one expedition was intrusted to a. d. 1826. Kolettes, a man destitute both of physical and moral courage, though he looked a very truculent personage, and nourished a boundless ambition. The feeble gov ernment was anxious to prevent his allying himself with Konduriottes and Kolokotrones, and to effect that object he was placed at the head of a body of troops destined to destroy the magazines of the Turks in the northern channel of Eubcea. Nobody expected much from a mUitary undertaking commanded by Kolettes, but the selfish members of the executive body, as usual, consulted their personal and party interests, and not their country's advantage, in making the nomination. Kolettes collected the Olympian armatoli who had been living at free quarters in Skiathos, Skopelos, and Skyros for two years. The agents of the French Phil hellenic committees supplied the expedition with pro visions and miUtary stores, and Kalergy, a wealthy Greek in Russia, paid a considerable sum of money into its mUitary chest. Kolettes's troops landed near Ta- lanti in order to gain possession of the magazines in that town, but the Turks, though much inferior in number, defeated them on the 20th November 1826. The armatoli escaped in the ships, and Kolettes aban doned his mUitary career, and returned to the more con genial occupation of seeking importance by intriguing at Nauplia. Karaiskaki about the same time began active opera tions at the head of three thousand of the best troops in Greece. Though he was compelled to render all his movements subordinate to the manner in which his troops could be supplied with provisions, he displayed both activity and judgment. His object was to throw his whole force on the rear of Reshid's army, master his line of communications, and destroy bis magazines. The diversion, which it was expected would be made CHAP. III. 122 VICTORY AT ARACHOVA. book iv. by Kolettes's expedition, would enable Karaiskaki's troops to draw supplies of provisions and ammunition from the channel of Eubcea through Eastern Locris, as well as from Megara and the Gulf of Corinth. The victory of the Turks at Talanti occurring before the Greek troops had entered Phocis, Karaiskaki deter mined to cut off the retreat of Mustapha Bey, who had defeated Kolettes, and proposed falling back on Salona. Both Turks and Greeks were endeavouring to be first in gaining possession ofthe passes between Mounts Cirphis and Parnassus. Karaiskaki sent forward his advanced- guard with all speed to occupy Arachova, and his men had hardly established themselves in the village before they were attacked by a corps of fifteen hundred Mus sulman Albanians. Mustapha Bey had united his force with that of Elmas Bey, whom Reshid had ordered to occupy Arachova and Budunitza, in order to secure his communications with Zeituni. The beys endeavoured to drive the advanced-guard of the Greeks out of Arachova before the main body could arrive from Dystomo to its support, but their attacks were repulsed with loss. When Karaiskaki heard of the enemy's movements, he took his measures with promptitude and judgment. He occupied the Triodos with a strong body of men, to prevent the Albanians falling back on Livadea; and he sent another strong body over Mount Cirphis to take possession of Delphi, and prevent them from marching on to Salona. While the beys lingered in the hope of destroying the advanced-guard of the Greeks, they found themselves blockaded by a superior force. They were attacked, and lost the greater part of their baggage and provi sions in the engagement. During the night after their defeat they made a bold attempt to escape to Salona by climbing the precipices of Parnassus, which the Greeks left unguarded. The darkness and their expe- KARAISKAKI S OPERATIONS. 123 rience in ambuscades enabled them to move off from a. d. 1826. the vicinity of Arachova unobserved, but a heavy fall of snow surprised them as they were seeking paths up the rocks. At sunrise the Greeks followed them. Escape was impossible, for the only tracks over the precipices which the fugitives were endeavouring to ascend, were paths along which the shepherd follows his goats with difficulty, even in summer. They were all destroyed on the 6th of December. Their defence was valiant, but hopeless ; quarter was neither asked nor given. Many were frozen to death, but three hundred, protected by the veU of falling snow, suc ceeded in climbing the precipices and reaching Salona. The heads of four beys were sent to Egina as a token of victory.Karaiskaki was unable to follow up this success ; want of provisions, more than the severity of the weather, kept his troops inactive. Reshid profited by this in action to strengthen his posts at Livadea and Budun- itza. Part of the Greek troops at last moved north ward to plunder his convoys, while the rest spread over the whole country to obtain the means of subsistence which the Greek government neglected to supply. The Turks intrenched themselves at Daulis. Omer Pasha of Negrepont at last attacked the Greek camp at Dys tomo, and this attack compelled Karaiskaki to return and recall the greater part of his troops. After many skirmishes the Turks made a general attack on the Greeks at Dystomo on the 12th of February 1827, which terminated in their defeat. But the country was now so completely exhausted that Karaiskaki was compelled to abandon his camp and fall back on Megara and Eleusis, where the presence of his army was deemed necessary to co-operate in a direct attack on Reshid's force before Athens. After Goura's death, several officers in the Acropolis CHAP. III. 124 FABVIER SUCCOURS ATHENS. book iv. pretended to equal authority. Grigiottes was the chief who possessed most personal influence. AU measures were discussed in a council of chiefs, and instability of purpose was as much a characteristic of this small assembly of military leaders as it was of the Athenian Demos of old. One of the chiefs, Makriyannes, who distinguished himself greatly when Ibrahim attacked the mills at Lerna, was charged to pass the Turkish lines, in order to inform the Greek government that the supply of powder was exhausted, and that the garrison was so disheartened that succour must be sent without delay. Makriyannes quitted the Acropolis on the 29th November 1826, and reached Egina in safety. His appearance awakened the deepest interest. He had distinguished himself in many sorties during the siege, and he was then suffering from the wounds he had re ceived. His frank and loyal character inspired general confidence. The members ofthe executive government again felt the necessity of immediate action. Colonel Fabvier, who had brought the regular corps into some state of efficiency at Methana, was the only officer in Greece at this time capable of taking the field with a force on which the government could place any reliance. He was not personally a favourite with the members of the executive body. They feared and distrusted him, and he despised and distrusted them. Fortunately the news of Karaiskaki's victoiy at Ara chova rendered him extremely eager for immediate action. The fame of his rival irritated his jealous disposition and excited his emulation. He therefore accepted the offer to command an expedition for the relief of Athens with pleasure, and prepared to carry succour to the Acropolis with his usual promptitude, and more than his usual prudence. Fabvier landed with six hundred and fifty chosen men of the regular corps in the Bay of Phalerum, about FABVIER ENTERS THE ACROPOLIS. 125 midnight on the 12th December 1826.1 Each manA. d. 182b. carried on his back a leather sack filled with gunpowder. The whole body reached the Turkish lines in good order and without being observed. They were formed in column on the road which leads from Athens to the Phalerum, a little below its junction with the road to Sunium, and rushed on the Turkish guard with fixed bayonets, while the drums sounded a loud signal to the garrison of the Acropolis to divert the attention of the besiegers by a desperate sortie. Fabvier cleared all before him, leading on his troops rapidly and silently over the space that separated the enemy's lines from the theatre of Herodes Atticus, under a shower of grape and musket-balls. To prevent his men from delaying their march, and exchanging shots with the Turks, Fabvier had ordered all the flints to be taken out of their muskets. A bright moon enabled the troops of Eeshid to take aim at the Greeks, but the rapidity of Fabvier's movements carried his whole body within the walls of the Acropolis, with the loss of only six killed and fourteen wounded. In such enterprises, where the valour of the soldier and the activity of the leader were the only qualities wanted to insure success, Fabvier's personal conduct shone to the greatest advantage. His shortcomings were most manifest when patience and prudence were the qualities required in the general. His men carried nothing with them into the Acro polis but their arms, and the powder on their backs. Even their greatcoats were left behind, for Fabvier proposed returning to the vessels which brought him on the ensuing night. The garrison of the Acropolis was sufficiently strong, and any addition to its numbers would only add to the difficulties of its defence by increasing the number of kUled and wounded, and exhausting the provisions. Unfortunately, most of the 1 Friedrich Mulier, 25. CHAP. III. 126 STATE OF GREECE. book iv. chiefs of the irregular troops wished to quit the place and leave the regular troops in their place, and they took effectual measures to prevent Fabvier's departure by skirmishing with the Turks, and putting them on the alert whenever he made an attempt to pass their lines. It is also asserted with confidence, by persons who had the best means of knowing the truth, and whose honour and sagacity are unimpeachable, that secret orders were transmitted from the executive gov ernment at Egina to Grigiottes, to prevent Fabvier from returning to Methana.1 This unprincipled con duct of the Greek government and the mUitary chiefs in the Acropolis caused great calamities to Greece, for Fabvier's presence hastened the faU of Athens, both by increasing the sufferings of the garrison, and by his eagerness to quit a fortress where he could gain no honour. After the nomination of Sir Richard Church as generalissimo of the Greek troops, Fabvier's im patience to quit the Acropolis and resume his separate command at Methana was immoderate; and Gordon asserts that, had only Greeks been in the Acropolis, it might have held out until the battle of Navarin saved Greece. Greece fell into the chronic state of political anarchy during the latter part of the year 1826, which perpet uated the social demoralisation that continued visibly to influence her history during the remainder of her struggle for independence. The executive body, which retired from Nauplia to Egina in the month of Nov ember, was the legal government ; but its members were numerous, selfish, and incapable, and far more intent on injuring their rivals in the Peloponnesus, who established a hostile executive at Kastri (Hermione), than on injuring the Turks who were besieging Athens. 1 This accusation is repeated by Gordon, ii. 400, who was on terms of inti macy with several members of the government. STATE OF GREECE. 127 Kolokotrones, who was the leader of the faction at a. d. is26. Kastri, formed a coalition with his former enemy Kon- ~ duriottes, and this unprincipled alliance endeavoured to weaken the influence of the government at Egina, by preventing Greece from profiting by the mediation which Great Britain now proposed as the most effectual means of saving the Greek people from ruin, and the inhabitants of many provinces from extermination. The Treaty of Akerman, concluded between Russia and Turkey on the 6th of October 1826, put an end to the hopes which the Greeks long cherished of seeing Russia ultimately engaged in war with the sultan. But this event rather revived than depressed the Russian party in Greece, whose leading members be lieved that the emperor would now interfere actively in thwarting the influence of England. At the same time, the agents of the French Philhellenic committees displayed a malevolent hostility to British policy, and seized every opportunity of encouraging faction, by distributing supplies to the troops of Kolokotrones, who remained idle, and withholding them from those of Karaiskaki, who were carrying on war against the Turks in the field.1 The active strength both of the army and navy in Greece began to diminish rapidly about this time. The people in general lost all confidence in the talents and the honesty both of their military and political leaders. The bravest and most patriotic chiefs had fallen in battle. Two names, however, still shed a bright light through the mist of selfishness, Kanaris and. Miaoulis, and these two naval heroes belonged to adverse parties and different nationalities. The Greek navy was un employed. A small part of the army was in the field against the Turks ; the greater part was engaged in collecting the national revenues, or extorting their 1 Gordon, ii. 356. 128 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. book iv. subsistence from the unfortunate peasantry. The ship- AAA owners and sailors, who could no longer find pro fitable employment by serving against the Turks, en gaged in an extensive and organised system of piracy against the ships of every Christian power, which was carried on with a degree of cruelty never exceeded in the annals of crime. The peasantry alone remained true to the cause of the nation, but they could do little more than display their perseverance by patient suf fering, and never did a people suffer with greater con stancy and fortitude. Many died of hunger rather than submit to the Turks, particularly in the Morea, where they feared lest Ibrahim should transport their families to Egypt, educate their boys as Mohammedans, and sell their girls into Mussulman harems. The Philhellenic committees of Switzerland, France, and Germany redoubled their activity when the pro ceeds of the English loans were exhausted. Large supplies of provisions were sent to Greece, and assisted in maintaining the troops who took the field against the Turks, and in preventing many families in different parts of the country from perishing by starvation. The presence of several foreigners prevented the executive government at Egina from diverting these suppUes to serve the ambitious schemes of its members, as shame lessly as Konduriottes's government had disposed of the English loans, or as Kolokotrones's faction at this very time employed such supplies as it could obtain. Colonel Heideck, who acted as the agent of the King of Bavaria ; Dr Goss of Geneva, who represented the Swiss committees and Mr Eynard ; Count Porro, a noble Milanese exile ; and Mr Koering, an experienced German administrator,1 set the Greeks an example of 1 This singular man came to Greece with Dr Goss, who assisted him in escaping from the Continent on receiving his word of honour that he was not flying from any fear of criminal law : yet even Dr Goss never knew his real name. He was of great uso to Dr Goss in organising the manner of distributing FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. 129 prudence and good conduct by acting always in con- a. d. 1828. cord. Two Philhellenes, General Gordon and Captain Frank Abney Hastings, had also some influence in preventing the executive government at Egina from completely neglecting the defence of Athens. General Gordon returned to Greece at the invitation of the government with £l5,0Q0, saved from the pro ceeds of the second loan, which was placed at his absolute disposal. He was intimately acquainted with the mUitary character and resources of both the belli gerents. He spoke both Greek and Turkish with ease, and could even carry on a correspondence in the Turkish language. His History ofthe Greek Revolution is a work of such accuracy in detail, that it has served as one of the sources from which the principal Greek historian of the Revolution has compiled his narrative of most mUitary operations.1 Gordon was firm and sagacious, but he did not possess the activity and de cision of character necessary to obtain commanding influence in councU, or to initiate daring measures in the field. Captain Hastings was probably the best foreign officer who embarked in the Greek cause. Though calm and patient in council, he was extremely rapid and bold in action. He brought to Greece the first steam-ship, which was armed with heavy guns for the use of sheUs and hot shot ; and he was the first officer who habitually made use of these engines of war at the stores sent by the various committees, and he displayed a degree of administrative experience, and an acquaintance with governmental business, which could hardly have been acquired by service in an inferior position. To wealth or rank, even to the ordinary comforts of life, he seemed to have re signed all claim. Though of some use to Capodistrias, he was neglected by thai statesman, who feared him as a Liberal ; and he died of fever during the president's administration. 1 Compare Gordon's History of the Greek Revolution, 2 vols. 8vo, 1832, with 2. TpiKovw-n 'la-Topia rrjs "E.KKi)viKr)s 'Eiravaa-Tcicreois, 4 vols., 1853. Any portion of the military operations of the Turkish armies will afford proof. VOL. II. I CHAP. TIL ISO FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. book iv. sea. At this time he had brought his ship, the Kar- teria, into a high state of discipline. Mr Gropius, the Austrian consul at Athens, who then resided at Egina, was also frequently consulted by individual members of the executive body. His long residence in the East had rendered him well ac quainted with the character and views of the Greeks and Turks, but his long absence from Western Europe had prevented him from acquiring any profound poh tical and administrative views. Mavrocordatos and Tricoupi were generaUy the medium through which the opinions of the foreigners who have been mentioned were transmitted to the majority of the members of the executive body. Mavrocordatos possessed more administrative capacity than any of his countrymen connected with the govern ment at Egina ; but the errors into which he was led by his personal ambition and his phanariot education had greatly diminished his influence. Tricoupi was a man of eloquence, but of a commonplace mind, and destitute of the very elements of administrative know ledge. These two men served their country well at this time, by conveying to the government an echo of the reproaches which were loudly uttered, both at home and abroad, against its neglect ; and they assisted in persuading it to devote all the resources it could command to new operations for the relief of Athens. It has been already observed, that the simplest way of raising the siege of Athens was by interrupting Reshid's communications with his magazines in Thes saly. The Greeks could easily bring more men into the field than Reshid, and during the winter months they commanded the sea. An intelligent government, with an able general, might have compelled the army before Athens to have disbanded, or surrendered at dis cretion, even without a battle; for with six thousand GORDONS EXPEDITION. 131 men on Mount Parnassus, and a few ships in the a. d. 1827. northern and southern channels of Eubcea, no supplies, — either of ammunition or provision, could have reached Reshid's army. The besiegers of Athens might also have been closely blockaded by a line of posts, ex tending from Megara to Eleutherae, Phyle, Deceleia, and Rhamnus. This plan was rejected, and a number of desultory operations were undertaken, with the hope of obtaining the desired result more speedily. The first of these ill-judged expeditions was placed under the command of General Gordon. Two thou sand three hundred men and fifteen guns were landed on the night of the 5th February 1827, and took possession of the hill of Munychia. Thrasybulus had delivered Athens from the thirty tyrants by occupying this position, and the modern Greeks have a pedantic love for classical imitation.1 In spite of this advan tage, Reshid secured the command of the Piraeus by preventing the Greeks from getting possession of the monastery of St Spiridion, and thus rendered the per manent occupation of Munychia utterly useless. While Gordon was engaged in fortifying the desert rock on which he had perched his men, the attention of the Turks was drawn off by another body of Greeks. Colonel Burbaki, a Cephaloniot, who had distinguished himself as a cavalry officer in the French service, offered to head a diversion, for the purpose of enabling Gordon to complete his defences. Burbaki descended from the hills that bound the plain of Athens to the west, and advanced to Kamatero near Menidi. He was accompanied by eight hundred irregulars ; and Vassos and Panayotaki Notaras, who were each at the head of a thousand men, were ordered to support him, and promised to do so. Burbaki was brave and enthu- 1 " 'O @pa 1 Gordon, ii. 389. My own journal says only three. We both paid parti- t cular attention to the effect of the artillery. The hill is named Xypete in Colonel Leake's plan of Athens and its harbours. VOL. II. K BOOK CHAP. III. 146 MASSACRE OF THE ALBANIANS. iv. 25th, opened a plunging fire on the ships in the Piraeus, and by a chance shot cut the main-stay of the Hellas. There was little community of views between the lord high admiral and the generalissimo. Cochrane ob jected to granting a capitulation to the Albanians in the monastery, as tending to encourage obstinate resist ance in desperate cases, and he reproached the Greek chiefs with their cowardice in not storming the build ing. The irregulars refused to undertake any operation until they gained possession of the monastery. There could be no doubt that a storming party, supported by a couple of howitzers, ought to have carried the place without difficulty. Church determined to make the attempt, and Gordon, who commanded the artillery, was ordered to prepare for the assault on the morning of the 28th of AprU. In an evil hour the generalissimo changed his plans. Surrounded by a multitude of counseUors, and destitute of a firm wUl of his own, he concluded a capitidation with the Albanians, without consulting Lord Cochrane or communicating with General Gordon. Karaiskaki was intrusted with the negotiations. The Albanians were to retire from the monastery with arms and bag gage. Several Greek chiefs accompanied them as hostages for their safety. But the generaUssimo took no precautions for enforcing order, or preventing an undisciplined rabble of soldiers from crowding round the Mussulmans as they issued from the monastery. He must have been grossly deceived by his agents, for his report to the Greek government states " that no measures had been neglected to prevent the frightful catastrophe that ensued." Nothing warranted this assertion but the fact that Karaiskaki DjaveUas, and some other chiefs, accompanied the Albanians as host ages. As soon as Lord Cochrane was aware that the com- MASSACRE AT ST SPIRIDION. 147 mander-in-chief of the army had opened negotiations a. d. 1827. with the Albanians, he ordered Major Urquhart to withdraw the Hydriots from their post near the mon astery to the summit of Munychia. The Albanians had not advanced fifty yards through the dense crowd of armed men who surrounded them as they issued from St Spiridion's, when a fire was opened on them. Twenty different accounts were given of the origin of the massacre. It was vain for the Mussulmans to think of defending themselves ; their only hope of safety was to gain the hill occupied by the Turkish artillery. Few reached it even under the protection of a fire which the Turks opened on the masses of the Greeks. Two hundred and seventy men quitted the monastery of St Spiridion, and more than two hundred were murdered before they reached the hiU. " The slain were immediately stripped, and the infuriated soldiers fought with each other for the spoil," as we are told by a conscientious eyewitness of the scene.1 This crime converted the Greek camp into a scene of anarchy. General Gordon, who had witnessed some of the atrocities which followed the sack of Tripolitza, was so disgusted with the disorder that prevailed, and so dissatisfied on account of the neglect with which he was treated, that he resigned the command of the artillery and quitted Greece. Reshid Pasha, on being informed of the catastrophe, rose up and exclaimed with great solemnity, "God wiU not leave this faith lessness unpunished. He will pardon the murdered, and inflict some signal punishment on the murderers."2 1 Gordon, ii. 391. s The author was serving as a volunteer on the staff of General Gordon, and accompanied him to join the storming-party on the 28th of April. It had been observed from Gordon's yacht, which was anchored in the Piraeus, that communications passed between the Albanians and the Greeks during the whole morning. The Hydriots were also seen retiring to the summit of Munychia. As Gordon passed in his boat under the stern of Lord Cochrane's yacht, the CHAP 148 KARAiSKAKIS DEATH. book iv. Nothing now prevented the Greeks from pushing on to Athens but the confusion that prevailed in the camp and the want of a daring leader. Some skirmishing ensued, and in one of these skirmishes, on the 4 th of May, Karaiskaki was mortally wounded. His death increased the disorder in the Greek army, for he ex ercised considerable personal influence over several Romeliot chiefs, and compressed the jealousies of many captains, who were now thrown into direct communi cation with the generalissimo. Karaiskaki fell at a moment favourable to his repu tation. He had not always acted the patriot, but his recent success in Phocis contrasted with the defeats of Fabvier, Heideck, and Church in a manner so flatter ing to national vanity, that his name was idoUsed by the irregular troops. He was one of the bravest and most active of the chiefs whom the war had spared, and his recent conduct on more than one occasion had effaced the memory of his unprincipled proceedings author prevailed on him to seek an explanation of what was going on. Coch rane said that he, as admiral, had refused to concur in a capitulation, unleEB the Albanians laid down their arms, and were transported as prisoners of war on board the fleet. He added, that he feared Church had concluded a capitu lation. While this conversation was going on, the author was watching the proceedings at the monastery with his glass, and, seeing the Albanians issue from the building into the armed mob before the gates, he could not refrain from exclaiming, " All those men will be murdered ! "' Lord Cochrane turned to Gordon aud said, " Do you hear what he says ? " to which the general replied, in his usual deliberate manner, " I fear, my Lord, it is too true." The words were hardly uttered when the massacre commenced. The author landed immediately to examine the effect of the frigate's fire on the monastery. He witnessed a strange scene of anarchy and disorder, and while he remained in the building two Greeks were killed by shot from the guns on the hill. The Hydriots under Major Urquhart mutinied at being deprived of their share of the spoil. Lord Cochrane sent Mr Masson to pacify them with this message, " My reason for ordering the Hydriots to muster on Munychia was to remove the forces under my command from participating in a capitulation, unless the Turks surrendered at discretion. My objects were to preserve the honour of the navy unsullied, and at the same time to secure an equal distri bution of the prize-money." The author visited the yacht of the generalissimo shortly after, and found the staff on board in high dudgeon at what they called the treachery of the Greeks. He did not see the generalissimo. The feeling among the Philhellenes in the camp, and there were many officers of many nations, was amazement at the neglect on the part of the generalissimo.— MS. Journal, 28th April 1827. KARA'iSKAKIS DEATH. 149 during the early years of the Revolution; indeed, it a.d. 1827. seemed even to his intimate acquaintances that his mind had expanded as he rose in rank and importance. His military talents were those which a leader of irre gular bands is called upon to employ in casual emer gencies, not those which qualify a soldier to command the numerous bodies required to compose an army. He never formed any regular plan of campaign, and he was destitute of the coolness and perseverance which sacrifices a temporary advantage to secure a great end. In personal appearance he was of the middle size, thin, dark-complexioned, and haggard, with a bright ex pressive animal eye, which, joined to the cast of his countenance, indicated that there was gypsy blood in his veins. His features, whUe in perfect repose, wore an air of suffering, which was usually succeeded by a quick unquiet glance.1 Sir Richard Church now resolved to change his base of operations from the Piraeus to the cape at the eastern end of the Bay of Phalerum. Why it was sup posed that troops who could not advance by a road where olive-trees, vineyards, and ditches afforded them some protection from the enemy's cavalry, should be expected to succeed better in open ground, has never been explained. On the night of the 5th May the generalissimo trans ported three thousand men, with nine field-pieces, to his new position, but it was nearly daybreak before the whole were landed. It was then too late to reach the Acropolis before sunrise, and the road lay over open downs. Gordon calls the operation " an insane project," and says that " if the plan deserves the sever est censure, what shall Ave say to the pitiful method in which it was executed 1 "2 1 Compare the characters of Karaiskaki by Gordon, ii. 393, and Tricoupi, iv. 151. 2 A Philhellene who arrived from Ambelaki just in time to take part in the CHAP. III. 150 BATTLE OF THE PHALERUM. book iv. Early dawn found the Greek troops posted on a low ridge of hills not more than half-way between the place where they had landed and the Acropolis. A strong body of Othoman cavalry was already watching their movements, and a body of infantry, accompanied by a gun, soon took up a position in front of the Greek advanced-guard. The position occupied by the Greeks was far beyond the range of any guns in the Turkish lines, but Sir Richard Church, who had not examined the ground, was under the erroneous impression that his troops had arrived within a short distance of Athens, and counted on some co-operation on the part of the garrison of the Acropolis. Had he seen the position, he could not have aUowed his troops to remain on ground so ill chosen for defence against cavalry, with the imperfect works which they had thrown up. The advanced-guard had not completed the redoubt it had commenced, and the main body, with the artillery, could give no support to the advanced-guard.1 Reshid Pasha made his dispositions for a cavaby attack. They were similar to those which had secured him the victory at Petta, at Khaidari, and at Kamatero. He ascertained by his feints that his enemy had not a single gun to command the easy slope of a ravine that led to the crest of the elevation on which the advanced redoubt was placed. Two successive charges of cavalry were repulsed by the regular troops and the Suliots, action, and who was one of the four who escaped, wrote a few days after : — " Believing that the object was to reach Athens by a coup-de-main, I was much surprised to find that the troops did not quit the seaside until near morning. Nevertheless they had some time to fortify themselves before they were attacked. Unfortunately, no disposition had been made, and the troops were dispersed without order." — Letter of Lieut. Myhrbergh to Gen. Gordon, dated 9th May 1827. 1 The report of Sir Richard Church, printed in Lesur, Annuaire Historique pour 1827, App. 127, contains many inaccuracies. The author not only wit nessed the engagement from his tent on the summit of Munychia, but he rode over the ground with Mr Gropius, the Austrian consul-general in Greece, who had also seen the battle, while the bones of the slain still remained unburied, and the imperfect intrenchments of the Greeks were exactly in the same state as on the morning of the attack. He then compared his notes and recollec tions with the known facts and the configuration of the ground. BATTLE OF THE PHALERUM. 151 who formed the advanced-guard of the Greek force, a. d. 1827. But this small body of men was left unsupported, while the Turks had collected eight hundred cavalry and four hundred infantry in a ravine, by which they were protected until they charged forward on the summit of the ridge. The third attack of the Turks decided the contest. The cavalry galloped into the imperfect redoubt. A short struggle ensued, and completed Reshid's victory. The main body of the Greeks fled before it was attacked, and abandoned the guns, which remained standing alone for a short interval before the Turkish cavalry took possession of them, and turned them on those by whom they had been deserted. The fugitives endeavoured to reach the beach where they had landed. The Turks followed, cutting them down, until the pursuit was checked by the fire of the ships. Sir Richard Church and Lord Cochrane both landed too late to obtain a view of the battle. The approach of the Turkish cavalry to their landing-place compelled them to regain their yachts. Reshid Pasha, who di rected the attack of the Turkish cavalry in person, was slightly wounded in the hand. Fifteen hundred Greeks fell in this disastrous battle, and six guns were lost. It was the most complete defeat sustained by the Greeks during the course of the war, and effaced the memory of the rout at Petta, and of the victories gained by Ibrahim Pasha in the Morea. The Turks took two hundred and forty prisoners, all of whom were beheaded except General Kalergy, who was released on paying a ransom of 5000 dollars,1 and who lived to obtain for his country 1 Kalergy's leg was broken, and he was made prisoner by an Albanian bey. Reshid wished his head to be piled up with those of the other prisoners, but his captor insisted on receiving 5000 dollars before he would part with it, as Kalergy had promised him that sum. Fortunately the Turkish military chest was not in a condition to allow the pasha to purchase a single head at so high a price. The money was immediately raised among Kalergy's friends, and was remitted from St Petersburg as soon as Kalergy's uncle heard of his nephew's misfortune. 152 EVACUATION OF THE ACROPOLIS. book iv. the inestimable boon of representative institutions by CHAP. III. 1 • i ITi- the Revolution of 1843, which put an end to Bavarian domination, and completed the establishment of the independence of Greece. The battle of Phalerum dispersed the Greek army at the Piraeus. Upwards of three thousand men de serted the camp in three days ; and the generalissimo was so discouraged by the aspect of affairs, that he ordered the garrison of the Acropolis to capitulate.1 Captain Leblanc, of the French frigate Junon, was requested to mediate for favourable terms, and was furnished with a sketch of the proposed capitulation. This precipitate step on the part of Sir Richard Church drew on him a severe reprimand from the chiefs in the Acropolis, who treated his order with contempt, and rejected Captain Leblanc's offer of mediation with the boast, that " we are Greeks, and we are determined to live or die free. If, therefore, Reshid Pasha wants our arms, he may come and take them." These bold words were not backed by deeds of valour. Church abandoned the position of Munychia on the 27th of May, and the garrison of the Acropolis then laid aside its theatrical heroism. Captain Corner, of the Austrian brig Veneto, renewed the negotiations for a capitulation, and the arrival of the French admiral, De Rigny, brought them to a speedy termination. The capitulation was signed on the 5th of June. The gar rison marched out with arms and baggage. About fifteen hundred persons quitted the place, including four hundred women and children. The Acropolis still contained a supply of grain for several months' con sumption, and about two thousand pounds of powder, but the water was scarce and bad. There was no fuel 1 Jourdain, Memoires Historiques et Militaires sur les Erinements de la Grece depuis 1822 jusqu'au Combat de A'avarin. See also Tricoupi, iv. 160. Not much reliance can be placed either on the accuracy or the judgment of Jourdain, but he prints a few documents. OPERATIONS AFTER THE FALL OF ATHENS. 153 for baking bread, and the clothes of the soldiers were a. d. 1827. in rags. The surrender of the Acropolis, following so quickly after the bombastic rejection of the first proposals, caused great surprise. The conduct of Fabvier was severely criticised, and the behaviour of the Greek chiefs was compared with the heroism of the defenders of Mesolonghi. The sufferings of those who were shut up in the Acropolis were undoubtedly very great, but the winter was past, and had they been inspired with the devoted patriotism of the men of Mesolonghi, they might have held out until the battle of Navarin. The conduct of Reshid Pasha on this occasion gained him immortal honour. He showed himself as much superior to Sir Richard Church in counsel, as he had proved himself to be in the field. Every measure that prudence could suggest was adopted to prevent the Turks from sullying the Mohammedan character with any act of revenge for the bad faith of the Greeks at the Piraeus. The pasha patrolled the ground in person, at the head of a strong body of cavalry, and saw that his troops who escorted the Greeks to the place of em barkation performed their duty. The faU of Athens enabled Reshid to complete the conquest of that part of continental Greece which Karaiskaki had occupied ; but the Turks did not ad vance beyond the limits of Romelia, and the Greeks were allowed to remain unmolested in Megara and the Dervenokhoria, which were dependencies of the pashalik of the Morea, and consequently within the jurisdiction of Ibrahim Pasha. Many of the Romeliot chiefs now submitted to the Turks, and were recognised by Reshid as captains of armatoli. In his despatches to the sultan he boasted with some truth that he had ter minated the military operations with which he was intrusted, and re-established the sultan's authority in 154 CONDUCT OF PHILHELLENES. book iv. all that part of continental Greece placed under his -^— — - command, from Mesolonghi to Athens. The interference of foreigners in the affairs of Greece was generally unfortunate, often injudicious, and some times dishonest. Few of the officers who entered the Greek service did anything worthy of their previous reputation. The careers of Norman, Fabvier, Church, and Cochrane, were marked by great disasters. Frank Hastings was perhaps the only foreigner in whose character and deeds there were the elements of true glory. But it was by those who called themselves PhUhel- lenes in England and America that Greece was most injured. Several of the steam-ships, for which the Greek government paid large sums in London, were never sent to Greece. Some of the field-artiUery pur chased by the Greek deputies was so ill constructed that the carriages broke down the first time the guns were brought into action. Two frigates were contracted for at New York ; and the business of the contractors was so managed that Greece received only one frigate after paying the cost of two. The manner in which the Greeks wasted the money of the English loans in Greece has been already re corded. It is now necessary to mention how the Greek deputies, and their English and American friends, mis appropriated large sums at London and New York. It wUl be seen that waste and peculation were not mon opolies in the hands of Greek statesmen, Albanian shipowners, and captains of armatoli and klephts. English politicians and American merchants had also their share.1 1 Dr Home, Historical Sketch of the Greek Revolution, 376, says, "The shame ful waste of a large part of the loan, and the numerous peculations which were committed upon it, have not been fully exposed to the world ; but enough has been exposed to show that the London Greek committee shamefully neglected its duty ; that some of its members meanly speculated on the miseries of Greece ; that others committed, what in men of lesser note would have been called LORD COCHRAN E'S STEAMERS. 155 The grandest job of the English Philhellenes was a.d. 1827. purchasing the services of Lord Cochrane to command a fleet for the sum of £57,000, and setting apart £150,000 to build the fleet which he was hired to command. Lord Cochrane was engaged to act as a Greek admiral in the autumn of 1825. He went to reside at Brussels while his fleet was building, and arrived in Greece in the month of March 1827, as has been already mentioned, before any of the steam-ships of his expedition. Indeed, the first vessel, which was commenced at London by his orders, did not arrive in Greece until after the battle of Navarin. The persons principally responsible for this waste of money and these delays were Mr Hobhouse, now Lord Broughton; Mr Edward El lice; Sir Francis Burdett; Mr Hume; Sir John Bo wring, the secretary of the Greek Committee; and Messrs Ricardo, the contractors of the second Greek loan. Sir Francis Burdett was floating on the cream of Radicalism, and Lord Brough ton was supporting himself above the thin milk of Whiggery by holding on vigorously at the baronet's coat-tails. Both these gentlemen, however, though they were guilty of negligence and folly, kept their hands pure from all money transactions in Greek bonds. The Right Honourable Edward Ellice was a contractor for the first Greek loan, but was not a bear, at least of Greek stock. In a letter to the Times he made a plain statement of his position in Greek affairs, and owned candidly that he had been guilty of " ex treme indiscretion in mixing himself up with the Greek deputies and their affairs." What he said was no doubt perfectly true; but we must not overlook fraud; and it is well known too that Orlando and Luriottes, the Greek deputies, proved themselves fools and knaves." A pamphlet, however, was published defending the Greek deputies, written by an Italian lawyer, Count Palma, who was afterwards a judge in Greece. — Summary Account of the Steamboats for Lord Cochrane' 's Expedition : London, 1826. CHAP. III. 156 LORD COCHRANE S EXPEDITION. book iv. that it was not said until Greek affairs had ceased to discount the political drafts of the Whigs, and a less friendly witness might perhaps have used a stronger word than "extreme indiscretion." The conduct of Mr Hume and Sir John Bowring was more reprehen sible, and their names were deeply imbedded in the financial pastry which Cobbett called " the Greek pie," and which was served with the rich sauce of his savoury tongue in the celebrated Weekly Register} Where there was both just blame and much calumny, it is difficult and not very important to apportion the exact amount of censure which the conduct of each individual merited. The act which was most mjurious to Greece, and for the folly of which no apology can be found, was intrusting the construction of aU the engines for Lord Cochrane's steamers to an engineer (Mr Galloway), who faded to construct one in proper time. He contracted to send Captain Hastings' steamer, the Perseverance (Karteria), to sea in August 1825. Her engines were not ready until May 1826.2 When the Greeks were reduced to despair by the successes of Ibrahim Pasha, the government ordered the deputies in London to purchase two frigates of moderate size. With the folly which characterised all their proceedings, they sent a French cavalry officer to build frigates in America. The cavalry officer fell into the hands of speculators. The Greek deputies neglected to perform their duty. The president of the Greek Committee in New York, and a mercantile house also boasting of PhilheUenic views, undertook the construction of two leviathan frigates.3 The sum of £150,000 was expended before any inquiry was made. 1 Cobbett's Weekly Registei; vol. Ix. Nos. 7, 8, and 10, Nov. and Dec. 1826. z Compare Gordon, ii. 275. 3 Gordon, ii. 275, says, On the western side of the Atlantic the Greeks were yet more infamously used by some of their pretended friends than on the easteru. COCHRANE S FIRST NAVAL REVIEW. 157 It was then found that the frigates were only half a. d. 1827. finished. The American Philhellenes who had con- tracted to build them became immediately bankrupts, and the Greek government, having expended the loans, would have never received anything for the money spent in America, had some real Philhellenes not stepped forward and induced the government of the United States to purchase one of the ships. The other was completed with the money obtained by this sale, and a magnificent frigate, named the Hellas, mounting sixty-four 32-pounders, arrived in Greece at the end of the year 1826, having cost about £200,000. Shortly after the defeat of Sir Richard Church at the Phalerum, Lord Cochrane assembled the Greek fleet at Poros. His first naval review was a sad spec tacle of national disorganisation, and presented an unlucky omen of his future achievements. The ships of Hydra and Spetzas were anchored in the port ; but before their Albanian crews would get their vessels under weigh, they sent a deputation to the arch-ad miral asking for the payment of a month's wages in advance. They enforced their demand by reminding Lord Cochrane, with seamanlike frankness, that he had received funds on board his yacht for the express pur pose of paying the fleet. His lordship replied, that he had already expended so much of the money intrusted to him in the abortive attempt to raise the siege of Athens, that he could only now offer the sailors a fortnight's wages in advance. This proposal was con sidered to be a violation of the seaman's charter in the Albanian Islands, and it was indignantly rejected by the patriotic sailors. In vain the arch-admiral urged the duty they owed to their country. No seaman could trust his country for a fortnight's wages. With out waiting for orders, the crews of the ships ready for sea weighed anchor and returned to Hydra and 158 SUFFERINGS OF THE GREEKS. book iv. Spetzas, from whence some of them saUed on pri- CHAP. III. IT ' JT vateering and piratical cruises. The spectacle of this dispersal of the Greek fleet, though humiliating, was impressive. The afternoon was calm, the sun was de scending to the mountains of Argolis, and the shadows of the rocks of Methana already darkened the water, when brig after brig passed in succession under the stern of the Hellas, from whose lofty mast the flag of High Admiral of Greece floated, unconscious of the disgraceful stain it was receiving, and in whose cabin sat the noble admiral steadily watching the scene. The whole of Greece was now laid waste, and the sufferings of the agricultural population were so ter rible, that any correct description even by an eyewit ness would be suspected of exaggeration. In many districts hundreds died of absolute starvation, and thousands of the diseases caused by insufficient nour ishment. The islands of the Archipelago, which escaped the ravages both of friends and foes, did not supply grain in sufficient quantity for their own consumption. Poverty prevented the people from obtaining suppUes of provisions under neutral flags. During this period of destitution, which commenced towards the end of 1826, and continued until the harvest of 1828, the greater part of the Greeks who bore arms against the Turks were fed by provisions supplied by the Greek committees in Switzerland, France, and Germany. The judicious arrangements adopted by Mr Eynard at Geneva and Paris, and the zeal of Dr Goss, General Heideck, and Mr Koering in Greece, caused the limited resources at their disposal to render more real service than the whole proceeds of the English loans. While the Continental committees were supporting the war, the Greek committees in the United. States directed their attention to the relief of the peaceful SUPPLIES FROM AMERICA. 159 population. The amount of provisions and clothing a. d. 1827. sent from America was very great. Cargo after cargo arrived at Poros, and fortunately there was then in Greece an American Philhellene capable, from his know ledge of the people, and from his energy, honour, and humanity, of making the distribution with promptitude and equity. Dr Home requires no praise from the feeble pen of the writer of this History, but his early efforts in favour of the cause of liberty and humanity in Greece deserve to be remembered, even though their greatness be eclipsed by his more mature labours at home. He found able coadjutors in several of his countrymen, who were guided by his counsels.1 Thou sands of Greek famUies, and many members of the clergy and of the legislature, were relieved from severe privations by the food and clothing sent across the Atlantic. Indeed, it may be said without exaggera tion that these supplies prevented a large part of the population from perishing before the battle of Na varin. In the summer of the year 1827 Greece was utterly exhausted, and the interference of the European powers could alone prevent the extermination of the population, or their submission to the sultan. 1 Mr or Colonel Miller, Dr Russ, and Mr Stuyvesant. BOOK FIFTH. FOUNDATION OE THE GREEK KINGDOM. CHAPTER I. FOREIGN INTERVENTION — BATTLE OF NAVARIN. " Earth is sick, And Heaven is weary of the hollow words Which states and kingdoms utter when they talk Of truth and justice." Conduct of Russia — Conduct of Gbeat Britain — Congress of Verona — Russian memoir on the pacification of Greece in 1823 — Effect of this memoir — Turkey complains of the conduct of the British government — Greece places herself under the protection of Eng land — Protocol of the 4th April 1826 for the pacification of Greece — Destruction of the janissaries — Treaty of the 6th July 1827 for the pacification of Greece — State of Greece ln 1827 — Victory of Hastings at Salona — Battle of Navarin — Greek slaves carried off to Alexandria — Greek troops cross into Arcarnania — Hastings takes Vasiladi — Death of Hastings — Russia declares war with Turkey — French troops compel Ibrahim to evacuate the Morea. AVhen the Greeks commenced the Revolution, they were firmly persuaded that Russia would immediately assist them. Many acts of the Emperor Alexander I. authorised thi3 opinion, which was shared by numbers of well-educated men in Western Europe. But what ever might have been the wish of the emperor per sonally, policy prevailed over feeling. The sovereigns of Europe feared a general rising of nations. Monarchs CONDUCT OF RUSSIA. 161 were alarmed by a panic fear of popular movements, a.d. 1827. and the judgment of statesmen was disturbed by the conviction that cabinets and nations were pursuing adverse objects. There was a strong desire among a part of the Russian population to take up arms against the sultan in order to protect the Greeks, because they belonged to the same Oriental Church. But the con servative policy of the emperor, the selfishness of his ministers, and the power of his police, prevented any active display of Philhellenism in Russia. Time rolled on. Year after year the Greeks talked with laudable perseverance of the great aid which Russia was soon to send them. Philhellenes from other nations arrived and fought by their side ; large pecuniary contributions were made to their cause by Catholics and Protestants, but their coreligionaries of orthodox Russia failed them in the hour of trial. The cabinet of St Petersburg coolly surveyed the struggle, weighed the effect of exhaustion on the position of both the combatants, and watched for a favourable moment to extend the influence of Russia towards the south, and for an opportunity of adding new provinces to the empire. The conduct of Great Britain was very different. The British cabinet was more surprised by the Greek Eevolution, and viewed the outbreak with more aver sion than any other Christian government. The events in Vallachia, and the assertions of the Hetairists in the Morea, made the rising of the Greeks appear to be the result of Russian intrigue. The immediate suppression of the revolt seemed therefore to be the only way of preventing Greece from falling under the protection of the Emperor Alexander, and of hindering Russia from acquiring naval stations in the Mediterranean. The British government consequently opposed the Revolu tion ; but it had not, like that of Russia, the power to VOL. 11. l . CHAP. I. 162 CONGRESS OF VERONA. book v. coerce the sympathies of Britons. British Philhellenes were among the first to join the cause, and in merit they were second to none. The names of Gordon, Hastings, and Byron wiU be honoured in Greece as long as disinterested service is rewarded by national gratitude. The habits of the English people, long accustomed to think and act for themselves in public affairs, en abled public opinion to judge the conduct of the Greeks without prejudice, and to separate the crimes which stained the outbreak from the cause which con secrated the struggle. It is necessary, however, to look beyond the East in order to form a correct judgment of the policy of the cabinets of Europe with regard to the Greek Revolu tion. The equilibrium of the European powers was threatened with disturbance by a war of opinion. Two camps were gradually forming in hostUe array, under the banners of despotism and liberty. The Greek question was brought prominently forward by the Continental press, because it afforded the means of indulging in political discussion without aUusion to domestic administration, and of proclaiming that principles of political justice were applicable to Greeks and Turks which they dared not affirm to be appli cable to the subjects and rulers in Christian nations. The affairs of Greece were brought under discussion at the Congress of Verona in 1822. A declaration of the Russian Emperor, and the protocols of the con ferences, proclaimed that the subject interested aU Europe; but the view which the Congress took of the war in Greece showed more kingcraft than statesman ship. It was identified too closely with the demo cratic revolutions of Naples, Piedmont, and Spain. Yet so great was the fear of any extension of Russian influence in the East, that even the members of the RUSSIAN MEMOIR OF 1823. 163 Holy Alliance preferred trusting to the chance of its a. d. 1827. suppression by the sultan rather than authorise the ~ czar to interfere. In the mean time, Russia persuaded France to un dertake the task of suppressing constitutional liberty in Spain, as a step to a general concession of the right of one nation to interfere in the internal affairs of another when it suspects danger from political opinions. The march of the French armies beyond the Pyre nees placed the cabinets of France and England in direct opposition. England replied to the destruction of constitutional liberty in Spain by acknowledging the right of the revolted Spanish colonies in America to establish independent states. George Canning de lighted the liberals and alarmed the despots on the Continent by boasting in parliament that he had called a new political world into existence to redress the balance of the old. The phrase, though somewhat in flated, has truth and buoyancy enough to float down the stream of time. At the same time the British government adopted the energetic step of repealing the prohibition to export arms and ammunition, in order to afford the Spanish patriots the means of ob taining supplies and of resisting the French invasion.1 While the English cabinet was thus incurring the danger of war in the West, it exerted itself to prevent hostilities in the East. The ambassadors of England and Austria induced the sultan to take some measures to conciliate Russia in 1823. A note of the reis- effendi was addressed to the Russian government, an nouncing the speedy evacuation of the transdanubian principalities, and a desire to renew direct diplomatic relations between the sultan and the czar. After much tergiversation in the usual style of Othoman diplomacy, the Porte opened the navigation of the 1 By an order in council, 26th February 1823. CHAP. I. 164 RUSSIAN MEMOIR OF 1823. eookv. Bosphorus to the Russian flag, and the Emperor Alexander sent a consul-general to Constantinople.1 From this time Russia began to take a more active part than she had hitherto taken in the negotiations relating to Greece. The activity of the Philhellenic committees alarmed the Holy Alliance. The success of the French in Spain encouraged the despotic party throughout Europe. Russia, availing herself adroitly of these feelings, seized the opportunity of resuming her relations with Turkey, and of laying before the European cabinets a memoir on the pacification of Greece. The principal object of this document was the dis memberment of Greece, in order to prevent the Greek Revolution from founding an independent state. The statesmen of Russia, having watched dispassionately the progress of public opinion in the West, had arrived at the conclusion that if monarchs delayed much longer assuming the initiative in the establishment of peace between the Greeks and Turks, Christian nations might take the matter in their own hands. Russia naturaUy wished to preserve her position as protector of the Greeks, and to retain the honour of being the first Christian government that covered her coreli- gionaries with her orthodox aegis. The Russian plan of pacification was calculated to win the assent of the Holy Alliance, by suppressing everything in Greece that appeared to have a revolu tionary tendency. It proposed to retain the Greeks in such a degree of subjection to Turkey that they would always stand in need of Russian protection. It contemplated annihilating the political importance of the Greeks as a nation, by dividing their country into three separate governments. By creating powerful 1 The notes relating to these negotiations are printed in Archives Diploma- tiqu.es, vi. 31, and Lesur, Annuaire Historique, 1823. RUSSIAN MEMOIR OF 1823. 165 classes in each of these governments with adverse in- a. d. 1827. terests, it hoped to render any future national union impossible ; and by allowing the sultan to keep Otho man garrisons in the Greek fortresses, the hostile feel ings of the Greeks would be kept in a state of irritation, and they would continue to be subservient to Russia in all her ambitious schemes in the Turkish empire. The three governments into which Russia proposed to divide Greece, were to be ruled by native hospodars, and administered by native officials chosen by the sultan. The islands of the Egean Sea were to be se parated from the rest of their countrymen, and placed under the direct protection of the Porte, with such a guarantee for their local good government as could be obtained by the extension of a municipal system similar to that which had existed at Chios, at Hydra, or at Psara.1 As a lure to gain the assent of the members of the Holy Alliance to these arrangements, Russia urged the necessity of preventing Greece from becoming a nest of democrats and revolutionists, by paralysing the political energy of the nation, which could easily be effected by gratifying the selfish ambition of the lead ing Greeks. Personal interest would extinguish na tional patriotism in Greece, as it had done at the Phanar, and in Vallachia and Moldavia.2 When the contents of this memoir became known, they caused great dissatisfaction both in Greece and Turkey. 1 An extract from this memoir was published in 1824, and this extract is translated by Tricoupi, iii. 385; but a complete copy was printed in the Courier de Smyrne, 1828, Nos. 37 and 38. The hospodarats were — 1. Thessaly, with Eastern Greece ; 2. Epirus and Western Greece ; 3. The Morea with Crete. The islands which were to enjoy municipal governments are not enumerated. 2 The expressions deserve to be quoted : — " Paralyser l'influence des re- volutionaires dans toute la Grece ; " and " que la creation de trois principaute's Grecques, en diminuant l'etendue et les forces respectives de chacune de ces provinces, offre une nouvelle guarantee a la Porte : qu'elle offre enfin un puissant appat aux principales families de la Grece ; et qu'elle pourra servir a les detacher des interets de l'insurrection." CHAP. I. 166 EFFECT OF THE RUSSIAN MEMOIR. book v. The sultan was indignant that a foreign sovereign should interfere to regulate the internal government of his empire, and propose the dismemberment of his dominions as a subject of discussion for other powers. He naturally asked in what manner the Emperor Alexander would treat the interference of any Catholic sovereign in favour of Polish independence, or of the sultan himself in favour of Tartar Mohammedanism. The Greeks were astonished to find the Emperor Alexander, whom they had always believed to be a firm friend, coolly aiming a mortal blow at their na tional independence. Their own confused notions of politics and religion had led them to infer that the orthodoxy of the czar was a sure guarantee for his support in all measures tending to throw off the Otho man yoke both in their civU and ecclesiastical govern ment. They were appalled at the Machiavelism of a cabinet that sought to ruin their cause under the pre text of assisting it.1 Great Britain was now the only European power that openly supported the cause of liberty, and her counsels bore a character of vigour that commanded the admiration of her enemies. To the British gov ernment the Greeks turned for support when they saw that Russia had abandoned their cause. In a com munication addressed to the British Foreign Secretary, dated the 24th August 1824, they protested against the arrangements proposed in the memoir, and adjured England to defend the independence of Greece and frustrate the schemes of Russia. This letter did not reach George Canning, who was then at the Foreign Office, until the 4th November, and he replied on the 1st of December. By the mere fact of replying to a 1 The unpopularity of Russia was greatly increased by the expulsion of many Greek families from the dominions of the Emperor Alexander at this time. Some of these families were conveyed to Greece at a considerable ex pense by the Philhellenic committees of Switzeilaud.— Gordon, ii. 83. EFFECT OF THE RUSSIAN MEMOIR. 167 communication of the Greek government, he recognised a. d. im. the right of the Greeks to secure their independence, - ¦ - and form a new Christian state. Mr Canning's answer contained a distinct and can did statement of the views of the British cabinet. Mediation appeared for the moment impossible, for the sultan insisted on the unconditional submission of the Greeks, and the Greeks demanded the immediate recog nition of their political independence. Nevertheless, the English minister declared that, if at a future period Greece should demand the mediation of Great Britain, and the sultan should accept that mediation, the British government would wUlingly co-operate with the other powers of Europe to facilitate a treaty of peace, and guarantee its duration. In the mean time Great Britain engaged to observe the strictest neutrality, adding, however, that as the king of England was united in alliance with Turkey by ancient treaties, which the sultan had not violated, it could not be expected that the British government should involve itself in a war in which Great Britain had no concern.1 The moderate tone of this state-paper directed public opinion to the question of establishing peace between the Greeks and the sultan. It also convinced most thinking men that the object of Russian policy was to increase the sultan's difficulties, not to establish tran quillity in Turkey. The British Parliament, in parti cular, began to feel that the English ambassador at Constantinople must cease to support many of the demands of Russia. The memoir of 1823, therefore, though able and well devised as a document addressed to cabinets and diplomatists, became a false step by being subjected to the ordeal of public opinion. The morality of nations was already better than that of 1 For the letter of the Greek government, and Canning's answer, see Lesur, Ann. Hist., 1824, p. 627. Tricoupi gives Canning's letter a wrong date, iii. 390. CHAP. I. 168 TURKEY COMPLAINS OF ENGLAND. book v. emperors and kings. For a time all went on smoothly, and meetings of the ambassadors of the great powers were held at St Petersburg in the month of June 1824, to concert measures for the pacification of the East. Early in the year 1824, the influence of England at Constantinople diminished greatly, in consequence of the public manifestations of Philhellenism. The sultan heard with surprise that the Lord Mayor of London had subscribed a large sum to support the cause of the Greeks ; that Lord Byron, an English peer, and Colonel theHonourable LeicesterStanhope (Earl of Harrington), an officer in the king's service, had openly joined the Greeks ; that the British authorities in the Ionian Islands granted refuge to the rebellious armatoli ; and that English bankers supplied the insurgents with money. The sultan attributed these acts to the hostUe disposition of the government. Neither Sultan Mahmud nor his divan could be persuaded that in a free country public opinion had a power to control the action of the executive administration in enforcing the law. The sultan could not be expected to appreciate what Con tinental despots refuse to understand — that English men legally enjoy and habitually exercise a right of political action for which they are responsible to society and not to government. In the year 1823, the sym pathies of Englishmen, with all those engaged in defend ing the inalienable rights of citizens, were so strong, that the British government feared to act in strict accord ance with the recognised law of nations. The people considered that the duties of humanity were more binding than national treaties. But as the ambassador at Constantinople could not urge popular feelings as an excuse for violating national engagements, the sultan had the best of the argument when he formally complained to the cabinets of Europe of the conduct of England to Turkey. ENGLISH PROTECTION. 169 On the 9th April 1824, a strong remonstrance was a.d. 1827. presented to Lord Strangford, the English ambassador ' at Constantinople. The reis-effendi remarked, " that it was absurd to suppose that any government, what ever might be its form of administration, did not possess the power of preventing its subjects from carrying on war at their own good pleasure, and of punishing them for violating existing treaties between their own country and foreign governments." And the Othoman minister argued that, if such were the case, the peace of Europe, which the English government protested its anxiety to maintain, would be left dependent on the caprice of private individuals, for one state might say to another, " I am your sincere and loyal friend, but I beg you to rest satisfied with this assurance, and not to feel dis satisfied if some of my subjects sally out and cut the throats of yours." This candid and just remonstrance concluded by demanding categorically that British subjects should be prohibited from carrying arms against Turkey, and prevented from supplying the Greeks with arms, money, and ammunition.1 The British government was not insensible to the truth contained in this document. Colonel Stanhope was ordered home, and the Lord High Commissioner in the Ionian Islands issued a proclamation prohibiting the deposit of arms, military stores, and money, destined for the prosecution of the war in Greece, in any part of the Ionian territory. While diplomacy advanced with cautious steps to wards foreign intervention, the events of the war moved rapidly in the same direction. The disastrous defeats of the Greek armies by the Egyptian regulars paralysed the government, and overwhelmed the nation with despair.2 The navies of France and Austria assumed 1 This curious document is printed in Lesur, Ann. Hist., 1826, p. 649. 2 Tricoupi, iii. 262. CHAP. I. I/O ENGLISH PROTECTION. book v. a hostile attitude. The Emperor Alexander titaiSu ' the independence of Greece as a mere political chimera, the delusion of some idle brain.1 On the other hand, the recognition of all blockades established by the naval forces of Greece, the PhilheUenic sentiments of Hamil ton, the British commodore in the Levant, and the fame of George Canning's policy, all combined to make the Greeks fix their hopes of safety on England. On the 25th of August 1825, an act was signed by a vast majority of the clergy, deputies, primates, and naval and military chiefs of the Greek nation, placing Greece under the protection of the British government.2 This act empowered the British cabinet to treat concerning the pacification of Greece with a degree of authority which it had not previously possessed ; and George Canning now ventured to advocate the establishment of a Greek state, as the surest means of pacifying the East. He, like many other friends of Greece, believed that liberty would engender the love of justice, that the Greeks would become the allies of England from national sympathies, as well as from interest, and that, under a free and enlightened administration, the Greeks would enable political liberty and Christian civilisation to confer great benefits on the population of Eastern Europe and Western Asia. Russia would lose the power of making reUgious fanaticism an engine for producing anarchy in Turkey as a step to conquest, and perhaps the Greeks would emulate the career of English colonies, and, by rapid advances in population and industry, repeople and regenerate the desolate re gions of European Turkey. Reasonable as these hopes were in the year 1825, the Greeks have aUowed thirty- 1 " '0'A\4£avSposxlf>-a>pav &7reKaAei tJ)v ave£aprni AiaSiKaoia, published at Egina in 1830 pp. 11 and 110. * NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF ARGOS. 219 be built in different parts of Greece, but he had shown a.d. 1829. so little forethought in the business, that many were soon converted into barracks for soldiers. In the towns, government did very little to promote public education, and the governors named by the president more than once prevented teachers from opening pri vate schools. The education of the clergy was utterly neglected, and a race of priests remained, whose ignor ance was a disgrace to the Orthodox Church, and who increased the national corruption. Capodistrias suc ceeded in deceiving the Liberals in France, Germany, and Switzerland, into a belief that he was labouring sincerely to improve public instruction, but his personal views are exemplified by two acts. He ordered the professor of Greek literature at Egina not to read the Gorgias of Plato with his pupils, and he made war on the press at Nauplia.1 The arbitrary conduct of the president created a constitutional opposition to his administration, and he found himself obliged to convoke a national assembly, in order to give a sanction to his dictatorial power. His popularity with the people in the Morea was very great, for his government had delivered them from the Egyptians, and established some better guarantees for the protection of life and property than had previously existed. In a freely-elected chamber of deputies he would have been sure of a large majority, but he wished to silence all opposition, and he adopted many violent and Ulegal measures to exclude every man -whom he deemed a Liberal. In a number of districts where the character of his opponents seemed likely to insure their election, he proposed himself as a candidate ; and after securing his own election, it was generally not difficult to obtain the nomination of one of his own partisans in his place. 1 Thiersch, De VEtcU Actuel de la Grece,i. 22 and 54; Tricoupi, iv. 291. CHAP. II. 220 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF ARGOS. book v. The national assembly of Argos was opened by Capo distrias in a Russian uniform on the 23d July 1829. The assembly ratified everything the president had done, and intrusted him with all the additional power he desired. Only the laws which he approved and re commended wrere passed. He did not venture to obtain his nomination to the presidency for life, for it would have been imprudent to take so important a step in the settlement of the government of Greece without the previous consent of the three allied powers. But he obtained an act of the assembly, declaring that the de cisions of the conferences of London should not be held to be binding on Greece untU they were ratified by the Greek legislature.1 He trusted to his own diplomatic skill for rendering this law subservient to his schemes concerning the sovereignty of Greece. The Panhellenion was replaced by a senate, but the organisation of this senate was left by the assembly entirely in the hands of the president. It was a consultative and not a legislative councU, and its consent was not indispensable to any laws except those relating to the permanent disposition of the national lands. Capodistrias was also empowered to name a regency in case of his death, which was to conduct the govern ment until the meeting of a national assembly. The proceedings of the national assembly of Argos were opposed to the free spirit of the national assem blies of the earlier period of the Greek Revolution. The principle of government nomination too often re placed the old usage of popular election, and tortuous ways were adopted instead of direct courses. Thus, in appointing the senate, sixty-eight names were sub mitted by the assembly to the president, who selected twenty-one of these candidates to be senators. The 1 reviKJ; 'Etprifneph, No. 53, 30th July 1829. PROTOCOLS. 221 senate was then completed by the addition of six mem- a. d. 1829. bers named by the president. The establishment of two chambers to share the le gislative power, was contemplated by the assembly, but the president was intrusted with the arrangements necessary for calling the legislature into existence.1 The excessive confidence of the deputies misled Capodistrias into the conviction that his power was irresistible, and from this time his conduct became more arbitrary, and his personal partisans more in solent. The proceedings of the three protecting powers gave him great anxiety. He detested England, mistrusted France, and doubted the sentiments of the Russian cabinet, for he felt that he was not admitted to its secrets. The nomination of Prince Leopold of Saxe- Coburg (Leopold, king of the Belgians) to be sovereign of Greece, disappointed his hopes and irritated his feel ings. He had laboured to convince Europe that he was the only man capable of organising a state in Greece. His ambition was legitimate. But his own double- dealing had prevented even Russia from assuming the responsibility of advocating his cause. Had his conduct not been marked by duplicity, and had he sought to attain his object by honest and legal measures, it is probable that he would have succeeded. Diplomacy is not in the habit of working miracles, and neither an Epaminondas nor a Washington was likely to arise among the semi- Venetian aristocracy of Corfu. The three powers conducted their conferences at London in a slow and vacUlating manner. The prin ciples which ought to have regulated their proceedings were lucidly announced in a report drawn up by their representatives at Poros, on the 12th December 1828.2 1 TsviKii 'Eipriuspls, No. 53. The decree is dated 22d July (3d August) 1829 2 Parliamentary Papers— Protocol of a conference of the representatives of Great Britain, France, and Russia, held at Poros 12th December 1828. CHAP. II. 222 PROTOCOLS. book v. The measures then recommended were embodied in a protocol signed at London on the 22d March 1829, and were not very dissimilar from those which were ulti mately adopted when Greece was declared a kingdom in 1832.1 The frontier of the Greek state was drawn from the Gulf of Volo to the Gulf of Arta. The annual tribute to the sultan was fixed at about £30,000. The Turks who had possessed land in Greece were allowed to sell their property. An hereditary sovereign was to be chosen by the three protecting powers, who, though he acknowledged the suzerainty of the Porte, was to enjoy complete independence in all business relating to the political government and the internal administra tion. This plan, warmly supported by Sir Stratford Canning (Lord Stratford de Redcliffe), might have been carried into execution without delay, had the Earl of Aberdeen, who was then Foreign Secretary, been as well acquainted with the state of Turkey and Greece as Sir Stratford. Unfortunately the Earl of Aberdeen treated the question with diplomatic pedantry. While Capodistrias w*as intriguing, while Sultan Mahmud was fuming with rage, and whUe the population of Greece was perishing from misery, the English Foreign Secretary insisted on reserving to each of the 'Allied courts the right of weighing separately the objections which the indignant sultan might make to the proposed arrangements ; and England and France sent ambassa dors to Constantinople to open negotiations with the Othoman government. In the mean time the success of Russia compelled the sultan to sign the treaty of Adrianople on the 14th September 1829 ; and an article in this treaty bound the sultan to adhere to the treaty of 6th July 1827 for the pacification of Greece, and to adopt the provisions 1 Compare the Protocol of the 22d March 1S29 with Annex A to the Protocol ofthe 26th April 1S32. PROTOCOLS. 223 of the protocol of the 2 2d March 1829.1 The alarm of a. d. 1829. the sultan at the progress of the Russian army had induced him to make this concession a few days sooner to the ambassadors of England and France. On the 9th September the reis-effendi notified to them the sultan's adhesion to the treaty, and pledged himself to adopt all the decisions of the powers for carrying it into execution.2 The Russians took advantage of the vagueness of this communication to exact a precise re cognition of the protocol of the 22d of March in their treaty of peace, and in order to prevent the Porte from making use of its habitual tergiversations and delays, they bound the sultan to name a plenipotentiary for executing the stipulations of the protocol in conjunc tion with commissioners of the Allied powers. The policy of the British cabinet received a severe rebuke. Great Britain had prevented France from , , establishing the pacification of Greece, by sending the French troops in the Morea to compel the Turks to evacuate continental Greece. France yielded to the counsels of Lord Aberdeen, and Russia profited by his lordship's blunder. The courts of England and France felt humiliated by the position in which Russia had placed them. The sultan was obsequious ; the Greeks were grateful. Capodistrias perhaps expected with secret tremulation , to hear that he was named hospodar of the Morea. To give the negotiations a new turn, and neutralise the credit of Russia, a decisive step was taken in a differ ent direction. By the protocol of 3d February 1830, Greece was declared an independent state, but the boon of independence was rendered a punishment by dimin ishing the extent of the country. A new frontier was , , drawn from the mouth of the Achelous to the mouth 1 Lesur, Annuaire Historique, 1829. See the 10th article of the treaty. 2 Parliamentary Papers, Annex B to Protocol of 3d February 1830. CHAP. II. 224 LEOPOLD SOVEREIGN OF GREECE. book v. of the Sperchius. Diplomatic ignorance could hardly have traced a more unsuitable line of demarcation, All Acarnania and a considerable part of Etolia were surrendered to the sultan. That part of the continent in which Greek is the language of the people was an nexed to Turkey, and that part in which the agricultural population speaks the Albanian language was attached to Greece. With such a frontier it was certain that peace could only be established by force ; yet the protocol de clared that no power should send troops to Greece with out the unanimous consent of the Allies. Lord Aber deen's injudicious protocol concluded with a foolish paragraph, congratulating the Allied courts on having reached the close of a long; and difficult negotiation. The sovereignty of the diminished state was offered to and accepted by Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg.1 The Porte immediately accepted these arrangements. It was not blind to the advantage of retaining posses sion of Acarnania and great part of Etolia. On the other hand, Capodistrias availed himself of the un suitable frontier to thwart the execution of the proto col. He was so sure of the nation's support, that he did not give himself any trouble to conceal his dupli city. He declared that the decree of the national as sembly of Argos deprived him of the power of giving a legal sanction to the provisions of the protocol signed by the Allied powers. He pretended that he was placed in a position of great difficulty; that he feared to convoke a national assembly, as the deputies would either protest against the proceedings of the Allies, or violate their duty to their country and their instructions from their electors; but that he would accept the protocol on his own responsibility.2 The 1 Parliamentary/ Papers. Prince Leopold accepted the sovereignty on the 11th February 1830. 2 ParUamentary Papers, Annex F, Protocol, 14th May 1830 ; Lesur, Ann. Hist., 1829— Documents, p. 111. LEOPOLD SOVEREIGN OF GREECE. 225 ministers of Great Britain, France, and Russia knew a. d. mo. that he had drawn up the instructions of the electors to the deputies with his own hand, and they could not overlook the fact, that while he manifested extreme tenderness for the consciences of the deputies, he showed no hesitation in violating his own duty as president of Greece by setting aside a national decree, and accepting the protocol in an illegal manner, in order to obtain its repudiation, if it suited his convenience, at a later period. Greece was so tortured by her provisional condition that the nomination of Prince Leopold was accepted by the people as a boon. Addresses of congratulation were spontaneously prepared. There was an outbreak of national enthusiasm ; and many officials, believing that Capodistrias was sincere in the assurance which he gave in public, that he was anxious to give the new sovereign a cordial reception, signed these ad dresses. At first the president did not venture to oppose the general feeling, but he announced that previous approval of the government was necessary in order to give the addresses a legitimate character. Shortly after, he ventured to proclaim that every ad dress which had not been submitted to the revision of the agents of his government previous to signature, emanated from obscure emissaries of the opposition. He was seriously alarmed at the eagerness to welcome the new sovereign in order to put an end to his own provisional administration. His devoted partisans alone knew his private wishes, and they endeavoured to pre vent the spontaneous addresses from being signed, and delayed their transmission to the prince.1 After the resignation of Prince Leopold, Capodistrias treated the signature of the spontaneous addresses as an act of 1 Parliamentary Papers, Annex C, Protocol, 26th July 1830; Circular to Civil Governors of Greece, dated 2d June 1830. VOL. II. P CHAP. II. 226 LEOPOLD SOVEREIGN OF GREECE. book v. hostility to his government, and dismissed many offi cials who were innocent of any wish to join the op position, but who had been misled by his own assur ance into a belief that he wished the prince to receive a hearty welcome. In order to neutralise the effect of the popular demonstrations in the prince's favour, the civil governors in the provinces were ordered to prepare other addresses. Many of these were not cir culated for signature until the resignation of Prince Leopold was known to Capodistrias, and several of them were antedated.1 From this period, the secret police, which had been gradually formed under the direction of Viaro and Gennatas, acquired additional power. It became, as in many countries on the continent of Europe, a ter rible social scourge.2 The preference which the great body of the people had shown for a foreign sovereign filled the heart of Capodistrias with rage. He could not repress his feelings, and even to strangers he often inveighed bitterly against the ingratitude of his countrymen. Yet he endeavoured to persuade the world that the Greeks viewed the nomination of Prince Leopold with dissatisfaction, if not with absolute aversion, and he succeeded so far as to create an impression that the Greeks were at least divided in opinion. He alarmed Prince Leopold with the fear of meeting an unfavour able reception. He attempted to disgust the prince by suggesting the necessity of his changing his ret gion, though it was well known that the Greek clergy were as eager to welcome a Protestant sovereign as the laity. 1 The address of the Psarians was signed at Egina on the 20th July, hut it was dated 7th June. Capodistrias did not inform the prince that the ad dresses were ready to be transmitted to England until the 26th of July. He was then aware that the prince had resigned on the 21st of May. 2 Thiersch, i. 27; Pellion, 177. LEOPOLD SOVEREIGN OF GREECE. 227 The condition of Greece at the time of Prince Leo- a. d. 1830. pold's nomination explains the proceedings of Capo- ~ distrias. Most of the ablest and most influential men had been driven from the public service, and excluded from the assembly of Argos. The senate was com posed of the president's creatures. The government had not received a permanent organisation. No ad ministration of justice gave a sure guarantee for life and property to private individuals. The people sus pected that the country was retained in this provi sional state to further the president's schemes of per sonal ambition. The nomination of Prince Leopold took Capodistrias by surprise, while he was preparing to convince Europe that the Greeks would not accept a foreign sovereign, and to persuade Liberals that the constitutional governments of England and France ought to admit the principle of popular election. He knew how to manage that universal suffrage should elect him sovereign of Greece. When he found his hopes baffled, and saw himself without any national support, he acted like a diplomatist, and not like a statesman. Instead of convoking a national assembly and adopting a national policy, he played a game of personal intrigue. He accepted the protocol to thwart its execution. He violated the law of Greece to keep the conduct of the negotiations in his own hands, and he deceived the prince with false representations. Prince Leopold, on the other hand, acted impru dently in accepting the sovereignty of Greece before he had made up his mind to assume the immediate direction of the government. And his resignation, after having accepted the sovereignty, deserves severe reprobation. Princes can only be punished for trifling with the fortunes of nations by the judgment of his tory. The British government also acted most injudi ciously, both in pressing him to accept, and in permit- CHAP. II. 228 PRINCE LEOPOLD S RESIGNATION. book v. tine; him to double about after accepting. The ob- jections he made to the arrangements of the protocol ought to have warned Lord Aberdeen that the prince was not the man suitable for the contingency. In deed, it seems strange that the unfriendly correspond ence which preceded Prince Leopold's nomination did not awaken a deeper sense of the responsibility due to the suffering inhabitants of Greece in the breasts both of the prince and of the British ministers. If Prince Leopold really believed, as he wrote to Lord Aberdeen on the 3d February 1830, "that he could imagine no effectual mode of pacifying Greece without including Candia in the new state," it was his duty to refuse the government of Greece untU Candia formed part of his sovereignty. Yet he was content to give up Candia and accept the sovereignty on the 11th of the month. The Allies were fairly warned not to permit ulterior negotiations on questions concerning which they were determined to make no concessions, but they neglected the warning. In the correspondence between the British government and Prince Leopold, which was laid before parliament, the prince appears as a rhetorician and not a statesman, and as a diplomatist and not an administrator.1 Even the dark picture Capodistrias drew of the state of Greece, and the difficulties likely to await the prince on his arrival, did not warrant Prince Leopold's retiring from his engagement. But Prince Leopold all along trifled with the awful responsibUity he had as sumed. It was his duty, the moment he accepted the sovereignty of Greece, to invite some Greek who had acquired practical experience in public business dur ing the Revolution, to attend his person and act as 1 Parliamentary Papers — Communications with Prince Leopold relating to the sovereignty of Greece, particularly letters of Lord Aberdeen to Prince Leopold, 31st January 1830, and Prince Leopold to Lord Aberdeen, 3d February 1830. PRINCE LEOPOLDS RESIGNATION. 229 secretary of state. He ought immediately to have a. d isso. summoned a council of state, of which he might have ~ invited Capodistrias to name a few members. With constitutional advisers, Prince Leopold would have found all his difficulties vanish. The bad faith of Capodistrias in his dealings with the prince is proved by the simple fact that he did not immediately send to London such men as Glarakes, Rizos, Psyllas, and Tricoupi, for he had employed them all in high office, and knew that, whatever might be their deficiencies, they were men of education and personal integrity. The president may be excused for trusting party leaders Uke Mavrocordatos, Metaxas, or Kolettes; but when the prince asked for a confidential adviser, it was insulting Greece to send Prince Wrede, a young Bavarian, who had arrived in the country after the termination of the war, and who knew very little more of the social and political condition of Greece than the Greeks knew of his existence. Indeed, Capodistrias himself knew only that the man he sent was called Prince Wrede, and had been recommended to General Heideck. It would have been almost impossible, among the foreigners then in Greece, to have selected a person so utterly incompetent to furnish Prince Leo pold either with information or counsel. Jealousy and duplicity, as usual, were too strong in the breast of Capodistrias to admit of his concealing them. Prince Leopold, after wearying the AUies and tor menting the English ministers with his negotiations, resigned the sovereignty of Greece on the 17th May 1830. Whether he would have gained in Greece the honour he has won as a wise ruler on the throne of Belgium, cannot be known ; but when we reflect how many years of anarchy he would have saved the Greeks, it must be owned that he would have served humanity well by estimating more accurately than he CHAP. II. 230 . TYRANNY OF CAPODISTRIAS. book v. did estimate it the responsibilities he incurred when he accepted the sovereignty of Greece. The position of Capodistrias had been changed, and his power was shaken, by the nomination of Prince Leopold, nor did he recover his equanimity on the prince's resignation. As often happens to successful intriguers, he found himself now embarrassed by his false pretences and provisional measures. He had told the Greeks that it was necessary to put an end to the Revolution. They re-echoed his own phrases, and clamoured for the establishment of permanent institu tions, and, above all, for legal tribunals. Capodistrias was puzzled to find that the people to whom he looked for support, were thwarting his measures when they believed they were assisting him to gain popularity. The president's firmness was further shaken by the French Revolution of July 1830, which placed Louis Philippe on the throne of France. This event encou raged the members of the constitutional opposition in Greece to commence an open and systematic hostUity to his arbitrary measures. Shortly after this, he was still further alarmed by the insurrection in Poland, which he feared would prevent Russia from support ing the principles of the Holy Alliance against Eng land and France. He was now compelled to hear his conduct arraigned. He was reproached with perpe tuating anarchy in Greece, and with calumniating the Greeks as enemies of order. His administrative capa city was called in question, and his misgovernment was pointed out. But the mass of the nation wished reform, not change of government ; and even his illegal proceedings were submitted to with patience. Viaro, it is true, became every day more hateful on account of his insolence ; Agostino every day more ridiculous on account of his vanity. Henceforward the government of the president be- TYRANNY OF CAPODISTRIAS. 231 came rapidly more tyrannical. Arrests were made a. d. 1830. without legal warrants. Spies were generally employed by men in office. Viaro, Mustoxidi, and Gennatas, collected round them a herd of Ionian satellites, who made a parade of the influence they exerted in the public administration. The partisans of Capodistrias began to believe that he would succeed in obtaining the presidency for life. Agostino, his younger brother, pretended to be his political heir. He acted the gene ralissimo of Greece, and formed a body-guard of per sonal dependants, who were better clothed and paid than the rest of the army. This conduct excited in dignation among the veteran armatoli, who conceived a deep-rooted resentment against the whole Capodis- trian family. The Revolution established the liberty of the press, of which the Greeks had made a moderate and intelli gent use. As early as 1824, political newspapers of different parties were published simultaneously at Me solonghi, Athens, and Hydra. In 1825 the government found it necessary to establish an official gazette (TevLicr) 'Effyrmepis) at Nauplia. Capodistrias silenced the press, and the Greeks, unable to discuss their grievances, resorted to force as the only means of removing them. Polyzoides, a man of moderate opinions, a lawyer, and a Liberal, deemed the time favourable for the establishment of a political and literary newspaper of a higher character than any which had survived the hostility of the president's government. There is no doubt that he contemplated strengthening the Liberal party, and gaining proselytes to the constitution. His conduct was strictly legal. By the law of Greece the press was free ; but to comply with the police exigen cies of a suspicious government, copies of the prospectus of the new paper, which was called the Apollo, were sent to the minister of public instruction, and to the CHAP. II. 232 HOSTILITY TO THE PRESS. book v. president. Viaro, who acted as minister of justice, sent to inform the editor, that as no law existed regu lating the publication of newspapers, the power of licensing their publication belonged to the government. The pretension was very Venetian, and in direct oppo sition to the law declaring the press to be free. Poly- zoides resolved to obey the law; Viaro was determined to enforce his authority. Early on the morning fixed for the publication of the Apollo, the chief of the police of Nauplia, followed by a strong guard, entered the printing-office and seized the press, then at work, without presenting any warrant. The editor sought redress from Viaro, and presented a petition to the senate, but his demands were neglected. It was evident that the wUl of Count Capodistrias was more powerful than the law of Greece. The president had himself inaugurated a new period of revolution. Men's minds were excited, and the Libe ral party was irritated. The state of pubUc affairs, both in Greece and on the continent of Europe, caused information to be eagerly sought after from other sources than the government papers, and the Greeks waited anxiously for the result of the contest between Capodistrias and the Apollo. A law circumscribing the liberty of the press was passed hurriedly through the senate. But while Viaro was pluming himself on his victory, the Apollo made its appearance at Hydra on the 31st March 1831, and its publication was continued under the protection of the Albanian municipality of that island untU the assassination of Capodistrias.1 Maina had already resisted the president's authority. Hydra now called the legality of his proceedings in question. The president attempted to apologise for 1 The Apollo was published twice a-week. While revising these pages, I have turned over the numbers of this paper, and I am surprised to find so much moderation and good sense iu political articles written amidst the storm of party passions that then prov.vled. TYRANNY OF CAPODISTRIAS. 233 his arbitrary acts, by pleading the provisional nature a. d. 1830. of his government. His greatest fear Avas publicity. He felt that his motives would not bear investigation better than his deeds. He had succeeded in silencing the press abroad, and it now braved him at home. The Courier of Smyrna had criticised his measures with freedom, and published his edicts with severe comments. By the intervention of the Russian minis ter at Constantinople, he obtained from the Othoman government an order to the editor to abstain from criticising the conduct of the president of Greece.1 Capodistrias advanced in the path of tyranny ; the Greeks prepared for open insurrection. Many persons were arrested on suspicion, and remained in prison without being accused of any offence or brought to trial.2 Some just and more unjust accusations were made against men who disapproved of the president's conduct. Actions before provisional courts of judica ture were commenced for official acts performed dur ing the Revolution ; yet no private individual was allowed to seek redress in the same courts for recent acts committed in violation of the president's own laws by the president's officials. Lazaros Konduriottes of Hydra, one of the most patriotic men in Greece, and one of the few whose public and private charac ter was alike irreproachable, was accused, of complicity with pirates. Several eminent men were exiled, and others only escaped the vexations of the police by seeking a voluntary banishment.3 Judges. were dis missed from office becaused they refused to transcribe and pronounce Ulegal sentences at the suggestion of 1 Cimrier de Smyrne, 28th November 1830. 2 Compare the picture of Greece drawn by Sir Stratford Canning in a Memorandum dated 28th December 1831, Annex A to Protocol of 7th March 1832. 3 Men of different parties and discordant opinions were united in opposition to Capodistrias at this time : HypsUantes, Mavrocordatos, Miaoulis, Kondu riottes, Tombazes, Tricoupi, Klonares, Zographos, Phai makides, Church, and Gordon. CHAP. II. 234 TYRANNY OF CAPODISTRIAS. book v. Viaro. Klonares, a man of some legal knowledge, ahd of an independent character, was dismissed for signing one of the addresses to Prince Leopold which had not been submitted to the president's revision. Another judge publicly declared that he was driven from the bench because he refused to give an unjust decision in conformity with the desire of the Corfiot minister of justice. Sessines of Gastuni, the president of the senate, who had been raised to his high office on account of his servUity, at last hesitated to support the tyranny of the president, and was instantly dis missed. Extraordinary tribunals, which acted without fixed rules of procedure, whose members were destitute of legal knowledge, and removable at pleasure, and from whose judgments there was no appeal, were multiplied. Insurrections followed. The president was particu larly irritated by prolonged disturbances on the part of the students of Egina, because these disorders drew attention to his vicious system of pubUc education, and demonstrated the falsehood of the reports he had caused to be circulated in Western Europe. His difficulties were increased by the disorder in his financial administration. Many of his partisans in the Morea were alienated by his allowing Kolokotrones to enrol an armed band of personal followers, as in the worst times of the Revolution, and collect the cattle- tax. Kolokotrones, as might have been foreseen, acted the part of a military tyrant. He not only persecuted his own personal enemies, but allowed a similar licence to the brigands who followed his banner. Greece was relapsing into a state of anarchy, and several provinces were at last in open revolt. Maina paid no taxes, and the Maniats were only prevented from plundering Messenia by the presence of the French troops. Hydra had constituted itself an AFFAIR OF POROS. 235 independent state, governed by its municipal magis- a. d. iS3i. trates. It collected the national revenues in several islands of the Archipelago, and maintained a part of the Greek fleet which espoused its cause. Syra, the centre of Greek commerce, made common cause with Hydra. Capodistrias had driven its merchants into open opposition, by attempting to fetter their trade with the restrictions of the Russian commercial system. A general cry was raised for the convocation of a na tional assembly, and the president perceived that he must either make concessions to regain his popularity, lay down his authority, or employ force to keep posses sion of his power. He chose the last, and instead of assembling the deputies of the nation, he commenced a civU war, trusting to the assistance of Russia for the means of crushing Hydra. Some management was necessary to prevent the diplomatic agents of England and France in Greece from protesting against any employment of force. The president expected to succeed in re-establishing his authority in Syra without a contest, and the loss of Syra would undermine the power of Hydra ; for the revenues of the customs were the principal resource of the opposition for the payment of their fleet. The best ships of Greece lay disarmed in the port of Poros, but Capodistrias had still a few ships at sea, and these might serve as a cover for obtaining succour to the Greek flag from the Russian admiral. The plan of making an attack, apparently with Greek ships, but in reality with Russian forces, was well devised, but it was betrayed to the Hydriots by one of the president's confidants. The Hydriots determined to anticipate the attack. Kanaris, who was a devoted partisan of the presi dent, commanded the corvette Spetzas, which was fully manned, and lay at anchor in the port of Poros. CHAP. II. 236 AFFAIR OF POROS. book v. The municipal government of Hydra ordered Miaouhs with two hundred sailors to hasten to Poros, and take possession of the ships and arsenal. The brave old admiral departed immediately with only about fifty men, accompanied by Antonios Kriezes as his flag- captain, and by Mavrocordatos as his political coun sellor. On the night of the 27th July 1831 he seized the arsenal and the disarmed ships, and, hoisting his flag in the Hellas, summoned Kanaris on board. That officer, refusing to surrender the corvette to an order of the municipality of Hydra, was put under arrest, and a party of Hydriots took possession of his ship. The character of Capodistrias seemed to undergo a revolution when he heard that he had lost his fleet and arsenal. He no longer talked of the blessings of peace, of his own philanthropic feeUngs, and of the duties of humanity. He declared that he would wash out the stain of rebellion in the blood of his enemies. He called the Hydriots a band of barbarians and pirates, who assailed his authority because it had arrested them in a career of crime and piUage. He now spoke of law, to implore its vengeance, and of justice, to assert that the leaders of the opposition ought all to die the death of traitors. His expressions and his manner breathed a fierce desire to gratify his personal revenge. The news of Miaoulis's success reached Nauplia while the ministers of France and England, and the commanders of their naval forces, were absent. The Russian admiral, Ricord, who was at anchor in the port, was induced by Capodistrias to saU immediately to Poros with the ships under his command. At the same time, the president sent a battalion of infantry, two hundred regular cavalry, and a strong body of irregulars, by land, to assist in regaining possession of the town. AFFAIR OF POROS. 237 Admiral Ricord arrived and summoned Miaoulis a. d. issi. to surrender the arsenal and the ships in the port to the Greek government ; but Miaoulis replied that the municipality of Hydra was the only legally constituted authority to which he owed obedience until the meet ing of the national assembly. He therefore referred the Russian admiral to the authorities at Hydra, add ing that he was resolved to retain possession of the fleet and arsenal as long as the municipality of Hydra left him in command. Ricord threatened to use force; Miaoulis retorted that he knew his duty as well as the Russian admiral. Affairs remained in this position for several days, when the commanders of the French and English naval forces entered the port accidentally before re turning to Nauplia.1 They were consequently igno rant of the resolutions which might have been adopted by the residents of the Allied powers at Nauplia, and to prevent bloodshed they arranged with Ricord and Miaoulis that matters should remain in their actual condition until they should visit Nauplia and return with the decision of the Allies. It seemed at the time a strange proceeding, that both commanders should go to search for this decision, when the pre sence of one at least wTas required at Poros to watch the Russian admiral, who was guarding both the entrances into the port with a superior force, and could close them at any moment. In the mean time, the residents of England and France, having returned to Nauplia, gave the president written assurances of the desire of their courts to maintain tranquillity in Greece under the existing government. But they excited the president's distrust by speaking of conciliation, by recommending the con- 1 The French officer was Captain, afterwards Admiral, Lalande ; the English, Captain, afterwards Admiral, Lord Lyons. CHAP. II. 238 DESTRUCTION OF THE FLEET. book v. vocation of a national assembly, and by refusing to order their naval forces to co-operate with Admiral Ricord in attacking the Hydriots. The Russian admiral did not wait the return of the French and English commanders to commence hosti lities. On the 6th of August a boat of the Russian brig Telemachus, which was guarding the smaller entrance, prevented a vessel bringing provisions from Hydra from entering the port. An engagement took place, in which both parties lost a few men, but the Russians succeeded in compeUing the vessel to return to Hydra. As soon as Capodistrias found that the English and French residents declined countenancing his schemes of vengeance, he sent off pressing solicitations to the Russian admiral to lose no time in recovering posses sion of the Greek fleet ; and to the officers of the troops on shore to occupy Poros at every risk. He then pretended to listen to the counsels of the resi dents, and promised to convoke a national assembly. Some days later a proclamation was issued, dated 1st (13th) August, convoking the assembly on the 8th (20th) September.1 The message of Capodistrias was received by Ad miral Ricord as an order to attack MiaouUs, and his operations, in a military point of view, were extremely judicious. He formed a battery to command the town and the smaller entrance ; and having by this cut off the communications of Miaoulis with a part of the Greek fleet, he ordered the Russians to take pos session of the corvette Spetzas and a brig, which were anchored in Monastery Bay. At the same time the Greek troops attacked Fort Heideck, which was occu- 1 The existence of this proclamation, however, was not known even at Nauplia until after the events of Poros. A translation will be found in Lettres et Documents Officiels rdatifs au Derniers Evenements de la Grece, 123. This work was distributed in Paris by order of Mr Eynard of Geneva. DESTRUCTION OF THE FLEET. 239 pied by Hydriots. The Russians and the president's a. d. i83i. troops were completely victorious. The corvette Spet- zas was blown up, the brig was taken, and Fort Heideck was deserted by its garrison. Miaoulis had now only thirty men on board the Hellas, and the other vessels under his orders were as ill manned. On the day after the victory of the Russians, the inhabitants of Poros offered to capitulate, and it was arranged with Admiral Ricord that a hundred and fifty Greek regular troops should occupy the town, in order to save it from being plundered by the irre gulars. During the night several vessels filled with the families of those who feared the vengeance of Capodistrias were allowed to pass the Russian squadron unmolested. On the 13 th of August a hundred and fifty Greek regulars entered the town of Poros. Admiral Ricord had promised to wait the return of Captains Lalande and Lyons. The Allied powers were bound by protocol to take every step relating to the pacification of Greece in concert. Miaoulis reposed perfect confidence in this arrangement until he was awakened from his security by the operations in Mon astery Bay. And on the morning of the 13th August he observed that the Russian ships removed to sta tions which placed his ships under their guns. He sent an officer on board the Russian flag-ship to re quest Admiral Ricord to retain his previous position until the return of the French and English naval com manders, according to his promise ; and he instructed the officer, in case the Russian admiral persisted in taking up a hostile position, to add that Miaoulis, though his crews were insufficient for defence, would destroy his ships rather than surrender them. Cap tain Phalangas was ordered to make a similar commu nication to Captain Levaillant of a French brig-of-war, 210 SACK OF POROS. book v. which had just entered the port. LevaiUant urged AAA the Russian admiral to wait the return of Lalande and Lyons, but without success. Miaoulis inferred that something extraordinary, and not favourable to the views of Capodistrias, must have occurred to induce Ricord to violate his promise. He knew that the pre sident's object in getting possession of the Greek fleet was to enable the Russians to re-estabUsh his power at Syra and Hydra under cover of the Greek flag. To save his country, he resolved to destroy the ships which might serve as cover for attacking it. At half- past ten, just as the Russian admiral had taken up his new position, a terrific explosion was heard, which was almost instantaneously followed by a second. Thick columns of smoke covered the Greek ships, and when they cleared away, the magnificent frigate HeUas, and her prize, the corvette Hydra, were seen floating as wrecks on the water.1 Miaoulis and their crews escaped in their boats to Hydra. The troops of Capodistrias rushed into the town of Poros in defiance of the capitulation, and immediately took possession of the arsenal. They then commenced plundering the houses, as if the place had been a hostUe city taken by assault after the most obstinate resistance. The inhabitants most hostile to the government of the president having carried off their movables to Hydra, only the innocent who trusted to Admiral Ricord's assurance of protection remained. They were piUaged of all they possessed, and treated with inhuman cruelty. On this occasion, both officers and men behaved in the most disgraceful manner ; and the sack of Poros is an indelible stain on the conduct of the Greek army, on 1 The letter of Capodistrias, printed in Mr Eynard's Lettres et Documents, p. 125, gives a correct account of the events at Poros, until he cuts short the narrative, on arriving at the catastrophe, by inserting a letter of Kanaris. This is one of the president's usual artifices of composition. He thus communicates the catastropho without the necessity of alluding to the cause of the conduct of Miaoulis. SACK OF POROS. 211 the character of Capodistrias, and on the honour of a. d. issi. Admiral Ricord. The Russian admiral might easily have put a stop to the cruelties which were perpetrated under his eyes, yet for twenty-four hours he permitted every crime to be committed with impunity. Justice was powerless, unless when some Poriot slew a soldier to defend the honour of his family. The historian is not required to sully his pages with a record of the deeds of lust and rapine which were committed by the Greek troops, but his verdict must be pronounced, as a warning to evil-doers. There is no scene more disgraceful to the Greek character in the history of the Eevolution ; and horrible tales of pillage, rape, and murder, then perpetrated, long circulated among the people. Anecdotes of cruel extortion and base avidity were told of several officers. When all was over, the troops returned to Nauplia and Argos with horses stolen from the peasants of Damala, which were heavily laden with the plunder of Poros. The sack of Poros sowed the seeds of disorder in the Greek regular corps, and ruined the reputation of Capodistrias. General Gerard endeavoured in vain to bring back the army to a sense of duty, by blaming the conduct of the troops at Poros with great severity. Khodios, the minister of war, who was a creature of Capodistrias, protected the worst criminals, and de prived the reproaches of the French general of their influence. This conduct increased the insubordination which the licence at Poros had created.1 Capodistrias was soon alarmed to find that even his own partisans spoke with indignation of the conduct of the Russian admiral and of the Greek troops. His enemies proclaimed that, in his eagerness to revenge himself on Miaoulis, he had given up the innocent in habitants of a Greek town to pillage and slaughter 1 Pellion, 214. VOL. n. Q CHAP. II. 242 FAMILY OF MAVROMICHALES. book v. To withdraw public attention from the sack of Poros, he r.TT*T> TT. ¦*¦ ¦ 1 1 1 mi was now anxious to talk of a national assembly. The meeting of that assembly was inevitable, but the elec tions were not likely to be effected without some fierce contests. The president openly acted as the unscru pulous chief of an unprincipled party ; but an avenging fate was at hand. He had indulged his appetite for a bloody vengeance; he was now sacrificed as a victim to private revenge. The distinguished part which several members of the family of Mavromichales acted at the commence ment of the Revolution, has been recorded in the earlier pages of this work. The best men of the house fell in battle. Kyriakoules and Elias are names which Greece wUl always honour. Petrobey, the chief of the family, though a man of no poUtical capacity, was viewed by Capodistrias with ignoble jealousy. He enjoyed considerable influence in Maina, and Maina possessed a considerable degree of political indepen dence. Capodistrias believed that centralisation was the direct path to order, and it was certainly the quickest way of increasing his personal authority. The influence of the famUy of Mavromichales appeared to be the principal obstacle to the success of his plans in Maina, and he removed its members from every official position which they occupied at his arrival in Greece. His persecutions constituted them the natural champions of the provincial franchises and fiscal im munities of the Maniats. The lawless liberty that reigned in Maina was ex tremely offensive to the despotic principles of Capodis trias. He found both bad habits and criminal practices more powerful than either the local or the national gov ernment. Murder was legalised by written contracts. Bonds signed by living individuals were shown to the president, in whicii the penalty, in case of non-fulfil- FAMILY OF MAVROMICHALES. 243 ment, was a clause authorising the holder to murder a. d. 1831. the obligant, or two of his nearest relations. Capodis- trias considered it to be his duty to put an end to a state of society so disgraceful to orthodox Christians in the nineteenth century. He imagined that the people of Maina would aid him in his honourable enterprise, not reflecting that the deeds of vengeance whicii ex cited his indignation were considered by the native population as a necessary restraint on a ferocious and faithless race, in a region and among a class where the law was powerless. Murder in Maina answered the same purpose as duelling in other countries where the state of society was less barbarous, and assassination was a privilege of Maniat gentility. Personal jealousy made Capodistrias select the family of Petrobey as the scapegoats for the sins of Maina. The acts of rapine on shore and of piracy at sea which other Maniats committed were overlooked, and all the strength of the Greek government was employed to crush the detested house of Mavromichales. During the celebration of Easter 1830, Janni, the brother of Petrobey, commonly termed the King of Maina, in company with one of the bey's sons, excited the people of Tzimova to revolt against the president's government. Many complaints had been laid before the Greek government against the acts of violence and extortion committed by this king of misrule, which he found it no easy matter to explain. He there fore declared himself the champion of the privileges of Maina, in order to evade answering for his own mis deeds. The people were in this way induced to make his cause their own. Janni Mavromichales seized the customhouse, and collected the public revenues in order to pay the men who took up arms. But this revolt was soon suppressed by the president, who persuaded George Mavromichales, the second son of 241 FAMILY OF MAVROMICHALES. book v. Petrobey, to hasten from Argos to Maina, with the AAA assurance that all the disputes between the Greek government and the family of Mavromichales should be promptly and satisfactorily arranged if Janni would come in person to Nauplia. George believed Capo distrias ; Janni believed George, and accompanied his nephew to the seat of government. The president soon violated his word. He put Janni under arrest, and ordered prosecutions to be commenced against both him and his son Katzakos, who had attempted to assassinate his own cousin Pierakos. In the month of January 1831, Katzakos escaped from Argos, and about the same time Petrobey left Nauplia to return to Maina in General Gordon's yacht, which happened to sail for Zante. An insurrection had already broken out under the leading of Constan tine, one of the bey's brothers. The yacht, not being able to touch at Maina, landed the bey at Katakolo, where he was immediately arrested, and sent back to Nauplia as a state prisoner. He was now detained on a charge of treason, and a committee of the senate, with Viaro for chairman, prosecuted the action against him. He was accused of inciting a rebellion in Maina, and of deserting his duty as a senator.1 An extraordinary tribunal, with his prosecutor Viaro as president, was created to try him, and he was imprisoned as a cri minal in Itch-kale. About the same time Constantine Mavromichales was decoyed on board ship by Kanaris and carried to Nauplia, where he and George were placed under arrest. Public sympathy was now strongly awakened in favour of the Mavromichales family. It was thought that Petrobey was severely treated, Constantine un fairly entrapped, and George unjustly detained. Con- 1 The report of the committee is given in Eynard's Lettres et Documents, 127. it forms a general act of impeachment against the whole family. ASSASSINATION OF CAPODISTRIAS. 245 stantine and George were allowed to walk about freely a. d. i83i. within the fortress of Nauplia, attended by two guards during the day. They were loud in their complaints. The mother of Petrobey, an old lady approaching her ninetieth year, petitioned the president to release the bey, who remained in prison untried. No proof could be found of his complicity in his brother's insurrection, and it was not a crime for a senator to quit Nauplia without a passport. It was reported that both the Eussian minister Baron Riickmann and Admiral Ricord advised the president to release Petrobey. It is cer tain that Capodistrias consented to allow the prisoner to dine on board the Russian flag-ship at Admiral Eicord's invitation. It was generally supposed that this permission implied a pardon for past offences ; and when Petrobey, on quitting Admiral Ricord's table, was conducted back to prison, even the partisans of the president were astonished at his conduct. It seems that Admiral Ricord had assured several persons that he would persuade the president to release the bey, and that his interference irritated Capodistrias, who became frequently peevish and changeable after the affair of Poros. Constantine and George were exasperated and alarmed by what they supposed to be a sudden and unfavourable change in the president's views. Three days after Petrobey's visit to Admiral Ricord, at early dawn on the 9th October 1831, Capodistrias walked as usual to hear mass in the church of St Spyridion. As he approached the low door of the small church, he saw Constantine Mavromichales standing on one side and George on the other. He hesitated for a moment, as if he suspected that they wished to address him, and would willingly have avoided the meeting. But after a momentary pause, he moved on to enter the church. Before he reached 246 ASSASSINATION OF CAPODISTRIAS. book v. the door he fell on the pavement mortally wounded CHAP II by a pistol-ball in the back of the head. In the act of falling he received the stab of a yataghan through the lungs, and he expired without uttering a word. Two guards were in attendance on the Mavro michales, and two orderlies accompanied the presi dent. The assassins attempted to save themselves by flight. The pistol of one of the orderlies wounded Constantine, who was overtaken and slain. His body was carried to the square, where it remained exposed naked to the insults of the populace for several hours. It was then dragged through the streets and thrown into the sea. The whole town was alarmed by the report of the pistols ; the news of the president's assassination spread instantaneously, and the whole population poured into the streets. Yet George Mavromichales succeeded in escaping into the house of the French resident, though at a considerable distance from the scene of the murder. A furious mob followed close at his heels, and de manded that he should be delivered up. His pur suers proclaimed themselves the avengers of blood, and threatened to force open the doors of the French re sidency and tear the assassin to pieces. Baron Eouen informed them that France must protect the refugee until a formal demand was made for his surrender to justice by the lawful authorities. In a few hours the demand was made ; but to save the criminal from the vengeance of the people, it was found necessary to convey him to the insular fort of Burdjee. His guilt was unquestionable, the proof was incontestable. He was condemned by a council of war, and executed on the 2 2d of October. Greece had been depraved by the tyranny of Capo distrias ; she was utterly demoralised by his assassi- ASSASSINATION OF CAPODISTRIAS. 247 nation. She exchanged the sufferings of illegality for a. d. 1831. the tortures of anarchy. The name of Capodistrias remained for some time a party spell, but time has proved the avenger of truth. His talents, his eloquent state papers, and his private virtues, receive their merited praise ; but with aU his sophistry, his cunning insinuations, and false pretences, they proved insufficient to conceal the wrongs which his vicious system of administration in flicted on Greece. CHAPTER III. ANARCHY. 9TH OCTOBER 1831 TO 1ST FEBRUARY 1833. ' In rank oppression, in its rudest shape, The faction chief is but the sultan's brother, And the worst despot's far less human ape ." Prophecy of Dante. Governing commission refuses to grant a general amnesty — Second national assembly at Argos — Romeliot military opposition — Agos tino president oe Greece — Romeliots expelled from Argos — Sra Stratford Canning's memorandum — Romeliots invade the Morea — Conduct of the residents — Agostino ejected from the presidency- Governing commission— State of Greece — Anarchy — French troops garrison Nauplia — Djavellas occupies Patras — Kolokotrones rallies the capodistrians — national assembly at pronla — constitutional liberty in abeyance — intrigues of the senate— municipal institu tions arrest the progress of anarchy in the morea — condition of Messenia — Position of Kolokotrones and Kolettes — True nature of the municipal institutions in greece not generally understood — Attack on the French troops at Argos — Establishment of the Ba varian DYNASTY. The assassination of Capodistrias destroyed the whole edifice of his government, which for some time had derived an appearance of stability from nothing but his talents and personal influence. The persons whom he had selected to act as his ministers and official in struments employed his name as their segis, and rallied round his brother Agostino, who had been treated as the president's heir, from motives of flattery, at a time when no one contemplated the possibility of his ever succeeding to power. The senate was filled with the most daring and REFUSAL OF GENERAL AMNESTY. 249 unprincipled partisans of the Capodistrian policy. A a. d. i83i. few hours after the president's murder it appointed a governing commission to exercise the executive power until the meeting of the national assembly. This commission consisted of three members — Count Agos tino Capodistrias, Kolokotrones, and Kolettes. Agos tino was named president. His incapacity, joined to the irreconcilable hostility between the other two members, induced the senate to believe that it could retain the powers of government in its own hands. The people judged more correctly, and prognosticated an approaching civil war. A general amnesty for political offences was instinctively felt to be the only means of preserving any degree of order. A few poli tical leaders and military chieftains, who desired to fish in troubled waters, determined to frustrate all attempts at pacification. A. large body of well-paid Moreot troops looked to Kolokotrones as their leader; a stUl larger number of the veteran soldiers of con tinental Greece, whose pay was in arrear, considered Kolettes as their political advocate. The municipality of Syra made a vain endeavour to consign past contentions to oblivion by acknowledging the authority of the governing commission. The con stitutionalists at Hydra made conciliatory proposals to the new executive. They asked for a general amnesty for all political offences except the assassination of the president, and they required that the governing com mission should be increased to five members by the aggregation of two persons chosen from among the constitutionalists. These proposals were rejected with disdain. Count Agostino pretended that a national assembly could alone grant a general amnesty, and the members of the commission, in order to avoid receiv ing two colleagues, declared that they had no power to enlarge the executive body. The reply was evasive, CHAP. III. 250 SECOND ASSEMBLY OF ARGOS. book v. and felt to be insulting. The exiles only wished a guarantee against governmental prosecutions until the meeting of the national assembly, and they knew that the senate had the power to add to the body it had created. The contest for absolute power by the Capodistrians, and for life and property as well as liberty by the con stitutionalists, was now resumed with embittered ani mosity. Both parties saw that their safety could only be secured by the command of a devoted majority in the national assembly, and both prepared to secure success in the coming elections by force of arms. Hydra was kept closely blockaded by the Russian fleet. The influence of the Capodistrians in the Morea gave them a considerable majority in the second na tional assembly at Argos; but they derived much of their authority as a party from the open support of the Russian admiral, Ricord. In some places, the Capodistrians, though they formed a minority, ob tained the assistance of a military force, and held a meeting, in which they elected a deputy, in violation of every legal and constitutional form. Vet these deputies were received into the assembly, and their elections were declared valid. Both parties circulated atrocious calumnies against their opponents. The Capodistrians accused the French and English of being privy to the assassination of the president. Agostino boasted of his hatred to the French. He dismissed General Gerard from his command in the Greek army, and he intimated to General Gueheneuc, who commanded the French army of occupation in the Morea, that the financial condition of the country imposed on the Greek government the obligation of observing the strictest economy in paying foreigners. On receiving this intimation, the French general SECOND ASSEMBLY OF ARGOS. 251 immediately recalled all the French officers in the a. d. i83i. Greek service, in order to prevent their being dis- " missed in the same manner as General Gerard. The constitutionalists at Hydra spread a report that the murdered president had bribed six Hydriot traitors to assassinate the leaders of the opposition ; and it was generally believed that Agostino and Admiral Ricord had sworn to send Miaoulis, and all the sailors who had taken part in the affair of Poros, to Siberia. The proximity of Argos to the garrison of Nauplia and to the Russian fleet gave the Capodistrians the command of the town. The deputies of Hydra were not even allowed to land at Lerna, for it was con sidered to be the safest way to exclude opposition. Those of Maina were stopped at Astros. To prevent even a murmur of dissatisfaction with the actual government from being heard in the assembly, the senate named a commission, which was ordered to verify the election of. -each deputy before he was allowed to take his seat in the assembly. This un constitutional proceeding was supposed to have been counselled by Russia, and awakened very general dis satisfaction even in the Capodistrian party. The mUitary chiefs of continental Greece came to the assembly as deputies from the districts in which they possessed local influence, or to which the majority of their followers belonged. They cared little for con stitutional liberty, but they were now ready to join any opposition, unless they were allowed to receive the high pay and ample rations which were enjoyed by the followers of Kolokotrones and the other Capodis trian chiefs. Kolettes was in a position to assist them in their object, and they had not forgotten the libe rality with which he had poured the proceeds of the English loans into their hands. Kolettes was not a babbler, like most Greek statesmen. The astute Val- CHAP. III. 252 ROMELIOT OPPOSITION. book v. lachian could assume an oracular look and remain silent when he wished to conceal his thoughts. In the present case, his prudence led Agostino and his counsellors to suppose that he was intent on retaining his place in the executive body. But it was evident that a number of the continental chiefs would openly oppose the election of Agostino to the presidency of Greece, even though Kolettes might remain neutral. It was resolved to crush this opposition before it could make common cause with the constitutionalists. Several Romeliot captains belonged to the Capodistrian party ; of these the most influential were the Suliot chief Kitzos Djavellas, and Rhangos, a captain of armatoli, who on one occasion, as has been already mentioned, joined the Turks. The Romeliot chiefs came to Argos attended by bands of followers, who, according to the established usage of Greece, were supplied with rations by the government. In this way the partisans of Kolettes assembled about five hundred good soldiers at Argos. All these men had claims for arrears of pay, and most of them had individual grievances, which Capodistrias had neglected to redress. Kolettes warmly supported their claims, and assured them that he would do everything in his power to obtain justice. He was aware that he must unite his cause with theirs, for without their support his political influence would be annihilated. He was distrusted by Agostino, disliked by Admiral Ricord, and hated by Kolokotrones. For some days before the opening of the assembly, the different factions employed their time in arranging their plans. Some individuals doubtless acted from patriotic motives, but the conduct of the majority of the Romeliots, as well as of the Capodistrians, was guided by self-interest and personal ambition. The Romeliot chiefs, finding themselves in a ROMELIOT OPPOSITION. 253 minority, demanded that the constitutional deputies a.d. mi. who had met at Hydra should be allowed to take their ' seats in the assembly, This demand was rejected, on the ground that new deputies had been elected, and that these new elections had received the sanction of the commission named by the senate. The Romeliots then drew up a protest containing a declaration of their principles.1 They characterised the nomination of the governing commission by the senate as an illegal act; they objected to the appointment of the commission to verify the elections of deputies by the senate as an unconstitutional infringement of the right of the national assembly; and they proclaimed their adhesion to the following principles and reso lutions: That national union ought to precede the meeting of a national assembly; that the national assembly ought to verify the elections of its members, and appoint its own guard, as on former occasions. The order in which the constitutional rights of the nation were to be discussed was also fixed, and reso lutions were proposed, relative to the choice of a sovereign and to the nature of the provisional gov ernment which was to act until his arrival. The attempt to interfere with the proceedings of the AUied cabinets displeased their diplomatic agents at Nauplia, and inclined them to favour Agostino and the Capodistrians. The rival parties trusted more to force than to right. Each assumed that it was the national party, and two hostile assemblies were opened on the same day. The deputies of the Capodistrian party, to the num ber of a hundred and fifty, met on the 1 7th of De cember 1831 in the church ofthe Panaghia, and, after taking the prescribed oath, walked in procession to the schoolhouse, which had been fitted up as the place 1 Dated 18th (30th) November 1831. CHAP. III. 254 AGOSTINO PRESIDENT. book v. of meeting for the national assembly. A strong guard, under the command of Kitzos Djavellas, and an escort of cavalry, under Kalergy, secured a public triumph to the Capodistrians. They met in security, elected their president, issued a proclamation, and pro ceeded to business. The Romeliots were not strong enough to make any public display ; but they also held their meeting, elected their president, and issued their proclamation. They called upon the residents of the Allied powers, as protectors of Greece, to enforce a general amnesty, and they invited the French troops in the Morea to occupy Argos to preserve order. The residents, know ing that neither party was disposed to obey the law or listen to the dictates of justice, aUowed things to take their course. On the 20th December, Agostino Capodistrias was elected president of Greece, and invested with all the authority which had been conferred on his murdered brother. He and Kolokotrones had already resigned their power as members of the governing commission named by the senate, into the hands of the national assembly. Kolettes, not recognising the Capodistrian assembly, and not having resigned his power, pretended to be the only man now entitled to conduct the exe cutive government. The Capodistrians feared that, if the Romeliots were allowed time to summon the deputies from Hydra and Maina to their aid, they might be strong enough to overthrow7 the government. To prevent this they resolved to expel the Romeliot chiefs from Argos before additional troops could arrive to reinforce Kolettes's partisans. Agostino Capodistrias, Admiral Ricord, Kolokotrones, Metaxas, and Djavellas all agreed that an immediate attack was necessary to insure victory. Once driven beyond the Isthmus of SIR STRATFORD CANNINGS MEMORANDUM. 255 Corinth, the Romeliots might be treated as lawless a. d. lssi. bands of brigands intent on plunder. A Russian lieutenant named Raikoff, who had been promoted by Capodistrias to the rank of colonel, was summoned from Nauplia, with four guns and a com pany of artillerymen, to assist the government troops already in Argos. Raikoff was a warm partisan, and pretended to be a confidential agent of Russian policy. Strengthened by this reinforcement, the troops of Agos tino attacked the Romeliots. A fierce civil war was carried on in the streets of Argos for two days, before the Romeliots, though inferior in number and ill sup plied with ammunition and provisions, were expelled from the town and compelled to retreat to Corinth. Sir Stratford Canning arrived at Nauplia to be a witness to these proceedings. The three powers had at last come to an agreement on Greek affairs, and selected a Bavarian prince to be king. Sir Stratford was on his way to Constantinople as English ambas sador to obtain the sultan's recognition of the Greek kingdom, and he visited Nauplia to announce to the Greeks the arrangements which had been adopted by the Allies, and to prepare them to receive their king with order and unanimity. Sir Stratford found that Agostino was a fool utterly incapable of appreciating his position, and he counselled conciliatory measures, and urged the necessity of moderation, in vain. The empty head of the Corfiot was inflated with presump tion. Before quitting Greece, Sir Stratford .communi cated to Agostino a memorandum on the state of the country, urging him in strong terms to terminate the civil war he had commenced.1 Though the observa tions in this document produced no effect on the Greek government, and very little on the ulterior conduct of 1 Parliamentary Papers, Annex A to the Protocol of 7th March 1832. The memorandum is dated 28th December 1831. CHAP. III. 256 SIR STRATFORD CANNINGS MEMORANDUM. book v. Mr Dawkins, Baron Rouen, and Baron -de Riickmann, the residents of the three Allied powers at Nauplia, yet they were so judicious that they made a deep impres sion on the ministers in conference at London. The anarchy in Greece threatened to render Sir Stratford's mission to the sultan useless ; and he warned Agostino that, by destroying the houses of the peaceful inhabit ants of Argos, and plundering their shops, as a prelude to a bloody intestine war, Greece proclaimed herself in the face of Europe to be unworthy of the indepen dent position as a nation to which the AlUed powers were endeavouring to elevate her. This memorandum was supported by formal notes of the residents, recom mending Agostino to publish a general amnesty and convoke a free national assembly. But shortly after the departure of Sir Stratford from Greece, the residents ceased to insist on the measures they had advised ; and Admiral Ricord, who had never moderated the violence of his language, continued to encourage the Capodis trians to push their attacks on the constitutionalists with vigour. He gave them hopes of being able to expel the French army of occupation from the Morea, and he pointed out to them the necessity of perpet uating their authority by forcing themselves on the new sovereign as ministers and senators. The position of the French troops who were protecting Messenia from being plundered by the Maniats was rendered so confined that they were obliged to drive the Capodis trian troops out of the town of Nisi, in order to keep open their communication with their headquarters at Modon, and secure a safe passage to the peasantry who brought provisions to their camp. The political atmosphere of Europe was too troubled during the year 1831 to enable the Allies to give more than a casual glance at the affairs of Greece, whose unsettled condition was gradually destroying the im- ROMELIOTS INVADE THE MOREA. 257 portance of the country in the solution of what states- a. d. 1832. men called the Eastern question. The attention of Great Britain and France had been absorbed by the creation of the kingdom of Belgium ; Russia had been occupied with the insurrection of Poland. But during the winter the condition of Europe became more tran quil, and the fate of Greece was again taken into con sideration. On the 7th January 1832 a protocol was signed, authorising the residents at Nauplia to recog nise the provisional government named by the national assembly, which, it wras supposed, was a free meeting. On receiving this protocol, the residents, who knew that Sir Stratford Canning's memorandum was on its way to London, thought fit to recognise Agostino Capodistrias as president of Greece. On the 13 th of February another protocol was signed, offering the throne of Greece to Prince Otho, a boy seventeen years old, the second son of the King of Bavaria.1 In the mean time the Romeliots were preparing to avenge their defeat at Argos. Their preparation went on slowly, until they heard that the Allies had chosen a king for Greece. They saw immediately that it was necessary to overthrow the government of Agostino, in order to have a share in welcoming the new mon arch, and a claim to participate in the distribution of wealth and honours which would take place on the king's arrival. After their retreat from Argos, the Romeliots formed a camp at Megara. The meeting, which arrogated to itself the title of a national assembly, met at Perachora, where it was strengthened by the arrival of the depu ties from Hydra and Maina. Kolettes was supported by most of the eminent men in Greece. Konduriottes, 1 Everything that can be urged in favour of this unfortunate choice will be found in Thiersch, De l'Etat Actuel de la Grece, i. 308-314. Before the elec tion, Thiersch, who was one of the prince's teachers, considered that it would be absolutely necessary for King Otho to join the Greek Church, i. 313. VOL. II. R CHAP. III. 258 ROMELIOTS INVADE THE MOREA. ¦bookv. Miaoulis, Mavromichales, and Mavrocordatos, and a respectable body of constitutional deputies, sanctioned his proceedings. But the Romeliots looked to arms and not to justice for victory. Constitutional liberty was a good war-cry, but military force could alone open the road to power. The numbers of armed men collected at Megara at last rendered an advance on Nauplia necessary to procure subsistence. Every effort that revenge, party zeal, and sincere patriotism could suggest, was employed to urge on the soldiers. Com missions were distributed with a lavish hand among the bravest veterans. Civilians were suddenly made captains. Kolettes and the military chieftains cared nothing for moral and political responsibility ; their sole object was to conquer power, and about the means they were quite indifferent. Mavrocordatos and the constitutionalists felt that the recognition of Agostino's government by the residents cut off aU hope of a gene ral amnesty, a free national assembly, or a legal admin- , istration, without a decided victory of the Romeliots. , It was thought that the residents would not venture to employ the forces of the Allies to support a govern- ; ment which had rejected their own advice as weU as the warnings of Sir Stratford Canning. The Greek . leaders knew that none of the residents possessed the firm character, any more than the enlightened views, of Sir Stratford, and it was inferred with diplomatic . sagacity that the instructions received with the pro tocols of the 13th aud 14th February 1832 would place the residents in a false position with their cabinets.1 Their recognition of a government illegally ' constituted had rendered the pacification of Greece ; impossible without further violence. Agostino, less sagacious than the constitutionalists, believed that his N 1 Thiersch has published a letter in which Mavrocordatos examines the state of public affairs in Greece at this time with ability and moderation.— -* Vol. i. p. 327. CONDUCT OF THE RESIDENTS. 259 recognition by the residents was equivalent to a guar- a. d. 1832. antee on the part of the Allied powers ; and he ex pected to see the troops of France support him at the Isthmus of Corinth as decidedly as the fleet of Russia had supported his brother at Poros. At this late hour the residents made a feeble attempt to avert a civil war. They invited the general com manding the French army of occupation to occupy the Isthmus of Corinth, and authorised Professor Thiersch, who had visited Greece as an unrecognised agent of the Bavarian court, to negotiate with the deputies and mihtary chiefs at Perachora and Megara. Thiersch favoured the constitutional party. He had been long in communication with the Philhellenic committees on the Continent. In the year 1829 he had advocated the election of Prince Otho to the sovereignty of Greece, and he had communicated with the Bavarian court on the subject. The object of his present tour was under stood to be, to prepare the minds of the Greeks for the choice of a Bavarian prince ; and now, when Otho was elected king, he stepped forward as a diplomatic agent of Bavaria, and was treated as such both by the re sidents and by the leaders of all parties among the Greeks. The prudence of the constitutionalists, and the pas sions ofthe military chiefs, rejected every arrangement based on the continuance of the presidency of Agos tino and the ratification of the acts of the assembly by which he had been elected. The mission of Thiersch failed, and its failure rendered the position of Agostino untenable. Those who had hitherto supported him perceived that they had ruined their cause by placing too much power in his hands, and by attempting to prolong his authority beyond the legal majority of the king chosen by the protecting powers. Agostino de termined to cling to power, but the rapid advance of CHAP. III. 260 AGOSTINO EJECTED. book v. the Romeliots soon dispelled his hopes of Russian sup- port and his visions of future greatness. On the 6th of April the government troops stationed at the Isthmus of Corinth fled before the constitu tionalists without offering any resistance. The heroes of the sack of Poros, the cavalry of Kalergy, and the generalship of Kolokotrones, the veteran commander- in-chief of the Peloponnesian army, were unable to retard the advance of the invaders, who marched straight to Argos. The residents were now in an awkward and not very honourable position. By an extraordinary piece of good-luck, they were relieved from the foolish part they were acting. On the very day the Romeliot troops entered Argos, the protocol of the 7th March 1832 arrived at NaupUa, and they were instructed to carry out the principles of Sir Strat ford Canning's memorandum. It was easy for them to treat their recognition of Agostino's presidency as a temporary expedient, adopted to avoid a civU war, until they received the definitive instructions now placed in their hands. The memorandum declared " that the interests of the Greeks, and the honour of the Allies, required a system of provisional govern ment calculated to preserve the country from anarchy." This could, in the present crisis of affairs, only be attained by ejecting Agostino from the presidency. On the 8th of April they addressed a vague diplo matic note to the president they had recognised, invit ing him to contribute to the execution of the protocol of the 7th of March. Agostino, trusting to the secret aid of Admiral Ricord, replied with a request for a copy of the document to which they aUuded, and which had not yet been officially communicated to the Greek government. The residents were alarmed at his endeavour to gain time, and, their own interests being at stake, they proceeded with great promptitude to GOVERNING COMMISSION. 261 eject him from office. His incapacity secured them an a. d. 1832. easy victory in a personal interview. Without wasting ~" their time in composing diplomatic notes, they walked to the government -house, while Agostino was still chuckling at his supposed victory over the diplomatists, entered his presence, and informed him without cere mony that he must immediately send his resignation to the senate. So far their conduct was extremely judicious, but they had not the clear heads which enable men to stop short in action at the precise limit of justice and prudence. In the spirit of diplomatic meddling, which involves nations in as much embar rassment as military ambition, they made the ejected president add a recommendation to the senate to ap point a commission of five persons to govern Greece untU the king's arrival. Agostino was rendered amen able to their orders by a hint that any delay would produce a decree of the senate deposing him from the presidency. Convinced that his cause was hopeless, he wrote his resignation, and shortly after quitted Greece, with the body of his murdered brother, in a Russian ship. The expedient of establishing peace by a diplomatic compromise, after allowing every passion which civil war excites to rage for three months, was a violation of common sense that could not prove successful. The same diplomatists had refused to prevent a civil war by enforcing a compromise before the opening of the assembly at Argos ; yet they now imagined that their interference would avert anarchy. The Romeliot troops paid very little attention to these manoeuvres. They were resolved to reap the fruits of their victory, and it was not by naming a commission in which a hostile senate would be able to secure a majority that this end could be attained. Foreign interference rarely saves a nation from the direct consequences of its own CHAP. III. 262 STATE OF GREECE. book v. vices, and anarchy was the natural result of the re^ peated illegalities which every party in Greece had committed. The conduct of the residents deserves reprehension. They evidently thought more of concealing their own incapacity and inconsistency than of serving the cause of the Greeks, in the measures they adopted for carry ing the protocol of the 7th of March into execution. They established a phantom of government, which they knew would be unable to pacify the country, because it appeared to them to offer the political combination least at variance with their own proceedings. Had they endeavoured to act in accordance with the laws and institutions of Greece, it is possible that they might have failed in preventing the Greeks from faUing into a state of anarchy, but they would have saved them selves from all reproach. "When the senate first as sumed illegal powers, it was the duty of the residents to refuse to recognise its iUegal acts. In the present crisis, had they paid any attention to the constitution of Greece, even as established by Capodistrias, they would have recommended the representation of both parties in the senate, and avoided the incongruity of composing an executive government of two hostUe factions. The Russian resident wished the senate to remain unaltered, as it consisted entirely of Russian partisans, andwas completely under the guidance of Admiral Ricord. But the EngUsh and French resi dents knew that its composition rendered the pacifica tion of Greece impossible. The English resident, how ever, moved partly by jealousy of French influence, and partly by distrust of Kolettes's character, adopted the Russian policy concernmg the immutability of the senate. In conformity with the suggestion conveyed in the resignation of the presidency by Agostino, the senate STATE OF GREECE. 263 named five persons whom the residents indicated as a a. d. 1832. governing commission. When the Romeliots heard the ~ names that were pleasing to the diplomatists, they treated the election with contempt, and marched for ward to attack Nauplia. The fortress was impreg nable, but they had many stanch partisans within its walls, and expected to enter without much diffi culty. The senate was terrified ; the residents had again thrust themselves into a false position. It was necessary to effect a new diplomatic compromise, and for this purpose Kolettes was invited to con fer with the diplomatists at the house of the French resident. On the 10th of April, Kolettes rode into Nauplia in triumph. He had now the nation, the army, the senate, and the three protecting powers at his feet. Unfortu nately for the Greeks, with all his talents as an in triguer, he had neither the views of a statesman nor the principles of a patriot. He had climbed to the elevation of a Cromwell or a Washington, and he stood in his high position utterly incompetent to act with decision, and prevented by his own absolute incapa city from serving either the constitutional cause or the interests of the Romeliot troops who had raised him to power. Fourteen days were consumed in diplomatic shuffling and personal intrigues before the names of a new gov erning commission were finally settled. It was then composed of seven members, and not of five, as recom mended by the residents. The constitution of Greece was grossly violated by this election ; for the senate, at the instigation of the diplomatists, persisted in in vesting the governing commission with the executive power until the king's arrival, though both by law and invariable practice that power could only be conferred until the meeting of a national assembly, when it CHAP. III. 264 STATE OF GREECE. book v. required to be ratified or reconstituted by a decree of the representatives of the nation. The object of the Capodistrians was to prevent the national assembly electing a president of the constitutional party. They even succeeded in paralysing the action of the consti tutionalists in the governing commission, by enacting that the presence of five members was necessary to give validity to its decisions. Now, as there were two stanch Capodistrians in the commission, and one con stitutional member, who was too iU to attend, it was evident that the two Capodistrians could arrest the action of the executive authority at any crisis by preventing a decision. Three members of the commis sion, Kolettes, Konduriottes, and Zaimes, were sup posed to represent the constitutional opposition to the Copodistrian system ; but the residents and the leading Capodistrians were aware that Zaimes was already a renegade. Two members were recognised to be the representatives of the Romeliot troops — Prince Deme trius HypsUantes and Kosta Botzares.1 Two members, as has been said, were stanch Capodistrians — Metaxas and Koliopulos or Plapoutas. This executive com mission had a cabinet composed of seven ministers, who were all constitutionalists ; but with the excep tion of Mavrocordatos, they were men without adminis trative knowledge, mere rhetoricians, who could clothe commonplace thoughts in official Greek. Even Mavro cordatos was misplaced as minister of finance. These ministers were severely blamed for accepting office without fixing a day for the meeting of the national assembly, and without insisting that the power of 1 HypsUantes expressed his repugnance to become a member of this com mission in strong terms, and his observations exhibit good sense and patriotism, but he was persuaded by his friends to withdraw his objections. He was already suffering from the disease which soon after terminated his life. His letter is given by Thiersch, i. 369. In mentioning the nomination of Kosta Botzares, Thiersch observes that the Romeliot Greeks still regarded the Albanian tribe of Suliots with jealousy. — Vol. i. p. 381. STATE OF GREECE. 265 the governing commission should terminate when the a. d. 1832. assembly met. Their friends excused their neglect of ~~ constitutional principles by pleading the power of the residents ; but those who scanned their political lives with attention, observed that they frequently contrived to advance their own interests by sacrificing the cause they adopted.1 Public opinion demanded the immediate convocation of a national assembly. To save the country from an archy it was necessary to reconstitute the senate, ac cording to the principles of conciliation laid down in Sir Stratford Canning's memorandum, and it might have been found necessary to throw the responsibility of maintaining order on Kolettes by creating him dic tator. But the residents, the Russian admiral, the senate, and the ministers in office, were all opposed to the meeting of a national assembly. The Capodistrian party soon recovered from its de feat. It succeeded in retaining possession of a con siderable portion of the revenues of the Morea, and received active support from Admiral Ricord. The Romeliots, after overthrowing Agostino's government, daily lost ground. The commission of seven was either unable or unwilling to reward their services. The soldiers soon determined to reward themselves. They treated the election of the commission as a tem porary compromise, not as a definitive treaty of peace, and they marched into different districts in the Morea, to take possession of the national revenues as a security for their pay and rations. Wherever they established themselves, they lived at free quarters in the houses of the inhabitants. The financial administration of Mavrocordatos was 1 Christides was Minister of the Interior, and General Secretary of State; Mavrocordatos, of Finance; Tricoupi, of Foreign Affairs; Zographos, of War; Balgares, of the Marine; Klonaris, of Justice; and Rizos Neroulos, of Eccle siastical Affairs and Public Instruction. 266 ANARCHY. book v. not calculated to moderate the rapacity of the troops. CHAP. III. . . n , . The governing commission raised money by private bargains for the sale of the tenths, and the proceeds of these anticipated and frequently illegal sales were em ployed to reward personal partisans, and not to dis charge the just debts due to the soldiers for arrears of pay. A small sum judiciously expended would have sent many of the Romeliot troops to their native mountains, where, as peace was now restored, they would have willingly returned, had they been able to procure the means of cultivating their property. The troops were neglected, while favoured chieftains were allowed to become farmers of taxes, or were authorised to collect arrears due by preceding farmers. These proceedings gave rise to intolerable exactions. The chieftains often paid their followers by allowing them to extort a number of rations from the peasantry, and defrauded them of their pay. Some drew pay and rations for a hundred men without having twenty under arms. Numbers of soldiers were disbanded, and roved backwards and forwards, plundering the viUages, and devouring the sheep and oxen of the peasants. Professor Thiersch informs us that the bands of Theo dore Grivas on the side of the constitutionalists, and of Thanasapulos on the side of the Capodistrians, spread terror wherever they appeared by their exac tions and cruelty.1 Eight thousand Romeliots were at this time living at free quarters in the Morea, and it was said that they levied daily from the population upwards of twenty thousand rations. The governing *_ Grivas had taken into his pay a body of Mussulman Albanians. Compare Thiersch, i. 71, 121, 123, 182. "Les capitaines presque sans exception gai> daient l'argent pour eux, et les troupes resterent dans l'ancien etat d'exinani- tion," p. 123. " Les plus grands desordres apparurent a la vente des dimes, oh il y eut un commfirage de captnines, de primats, de haut employe's, et pour ainsi dire des compagnies organisees qui pendtrerent meme dans quelques minist^res et jusqu'au milieu du gouvernement," p. 1S2. It must be re membered that Professor Thiersch is the panegyrist of Kolettes and a partisan of the Romeliots. ANARCHY. 267 commission solicited pecuniary advances from the three a. d. 1832. protecting powers, pretending that they would employ ~ them for alleviating the misery of the people ; but the Allies wisely refused to advance money, which they saw, by the misconduct of the government, would have been wasted in maintaining lawless bands of personal followers in utter idleness. The position of the two hostile parties soon became clearly defined. The greater part of the Morea ad hered to the Capodistrian party, as the surest means of obtaining defence against the exactions of the Rome liot soldiery. Several Moreot primates and deputies, who had hitherto acted with the constitutionalists, now abandoned the cause of the governing commission. Even in Romelia the Capodistrians possessed a rally- ing-point at Salona, where Mamoures maintained him self with a strong garrison. In the Archipelago, Tinos continued faithful to the Capodistrians, and served as a refuge for the officials of the party who were expelled from the other islands. Spetzas and Egina were also prevented from acknowledging the authority of the governing commission by ships of war commanded by Andrutzos and Kanaris. AU liberated Greece was now desolated by anarchy. Long periods of maladministration on the part of the government, and a cynical contempt for justice and good faith on the part of the civil and military leaders, had paralysed the nation. The Revolution, to all ap pearance, had been crowned with success. The Turks were expelled from the country, and Greece formed an independent state. Yet Greece was certainly not free, for the people were groaning under the most cruel oppression. The whole substance of the land was de voured by hosts of soldiers, sailors, captains, generals, policemen, government officials, tax-gatherers, secre taries, and political adventurers, all living idly at the CHAP. III. 268 ANARCHY. book v. public expense, while the agricultural population was perishing from starvation. Evil habits, and the difficulty of procuring the means of subsistence, may form some excuse for the rapine of the soldiery, but no apology can be offered for the conduct of the members of the governing commission and of the ministry, who increased the miseries of the people by their malversations, or countenanced the dis honesty of their colleagues by retaining office. Honour as well as patriotism commanded every man who had a sense of duty, either to put a stop to the devastation of the country or resign his place as a ruler or a min ister. The tenacity with -which those who caUed them selves constitutionalists clung to office has fixed an indelible stain on their own political character, and destroyed the confidence of the Greek people in the honesty of public men. When Mavrocordatos, Tricoupi, Klonares, and Zographos, abandoned the cause of civil liberty, they destroyed all trust in the good faith of the statesmen of the Greek Revolution. The immediate effect of their misconduct was to constitute Theodore Kolokotrones, the veteran klepht, the champion of the people's rights.1 Before the constitutional ministers had been a month in office, their weakness had increased the insubordina tion of the military classes, and their misconduct had 1 Alexander Soutzos echoes the popular feeling in a poem written in August 1832 :— Bwfiobs els T^jv Stx^votav Vra irdO-n twv tyaivovv Kai tous SeffTroTas tuv /*' alaxpas ua-pias StKaidvovv. 2t^i/ Bc^iaV tt]s tpepovaa crvvraypM. Kai i-iiuovs 'H 'Avapxia jue Kpavyas irepl7raTe? cttoOs Spinous, TIoMtikoI, TIo\GfjiiKol ju' avaiSeiav fieyii\Tjv, Tlaav oi \6koi xa'PoyTal €l's T^lv avefi.o£d\-nv, 'Apird^ovv Tas vpoa-65oos pias, yofivdvovv tov \a6v pas, Kai CMretfles real 6/raKTOv to orpaTiwTiKiv fxas Sav iuppia/ievo SAoyov tov Pao-Tay/ibv Sep ?x€'j &c- He also satirises the high officials for their desertion of the cause of consti tutional liberty. One of them speaks thus : — To aivTaypiA. fias Kvptf; — to aivray/ia as x°P*"V M-finws to TravSptvO-i)Kafit : ch t! pas xpwpttiei; FRENCH GARRISON NAUPLIA. 269 alienated their own partisans to such a degree, that a. d. 1832. they found it necessary to invite the French troops to occupy Nauplia and Patras, as the only means of securing their personal safety and the prolongation of their power. On the 19th of May 1832 General Corbet entered Nauplia; but at Patras the governing commission was not so fortunate as to obtain French assistance, and that place fell into the hands of the Capodistrians. The loss of Patras was caused by gross negligence on the part of Zographos, the minister of war. Ignorant of official business, and absorbed in personal intrigues, he left the Greek troops without instructions concerning their future conduct. The regular troops in garrison at Patras had supported the Capodistrians while in power, but they were disposed to obey the government, and not to follow the personal fortunes of any president. The hostility of Kolettes to the regular corps was notorious, and, through the neglect of Zographos, both the officers and men at Patras were easily persuaded by the parti sans of Russian influence that it was the intention of the governing commission to disband the regular troops. While brooding over this report, which threatened them with the loss of a large amount of arrears of pay, they heard that French troops were invited to garrison Patras. They concluded that they wTere cheated by the minister of war, and betrayed by the governing commission. As long as they remained in garrison at Patras they were sure of being regularly supplied with rations and clothing, and of obtaining from time to time advances of pay ; but once expelled from the town, they believed that they would be allowed to starve. The Capodistrians formed a strong party in the town, and they availed themselves of the excited feelings of the soldiers to declare, that regular troops who deli vered a fortress like Patras to foreigners would render CHAP. III. 270 DJAVELLAS" OCCUPIES PATRAS. book v. themselves guilty of treason. The constitutionalists had accused Capodistrias of seUmg Greece to the Rus sians; the Capodistrians now accused the constitu tionalists of selling Nauplia and Patras to the French. The regular troops mutinied, deposed their command ing officer, who refused to sign a manifesto justifying their revolt, and invited Kitzos Djavellas, who was then at Vostitza, to assume the chief command at Patras. Djavellas, who had retreated from the RomeUots, was at the head of about five hundred irregulars, and he was looking out for a position in which he could maintain his followers, and defend himself against the attacks of the Kolettists. He hastened to Patras, and entered it before the arrival of the French. When they made their appearance, Djavellas transmitted to their commanding officer a formal protest against the autho rity of the governing commission, and he refused to obey the order to admit the French troops into the fortress. The French commander, considering that it was the object of the Allies to maintain order and not to enforce the authority of any party, immediately re tired, and the residents, who wished to avoid blood shed, left Djavellas in peaceable possession of Patras.1 Thus, by the incapacity of Zographos and the decision of Djavellas, the Capodistrians remained in possession of the commercial town of Patras, and of the fortresses of Rhion and Antirhion, with the command of the entrance into the Gulf of Corinth, until the arrival of King Otho. This success emboldened the enemies of Kolettes. A great part of the Morea, and several districts of con- 1 Thiersch has printed the correspondence of Djavellas. It must not he supposed that the letters were really written by the Suliot chief, who could hardly write a common note. Like most of the military documents of the Revolution, they were composed by a secretary. Nothing has falsified the history of the Greek Revolution more than the ambitious eloquence of pe dantic secretaries. KOLOKOTRONES RALLIES THE CAPODISTRIANS. 271 tinental Greece, refused to admit the officials named a. d. 1832. by the governing commission. The demogeronts, wherever they were supported by the people, assumed the management of public as well as local business. They had been appointed by Capodistrias. They feared anarchy more than despotism, and they naturally sought protection from the military leaders of the Capodistrian party. The greater part of Arcadia and Achaia resisted the authority of the governing commission, while Ar- golis, Corinthia, and Laconia, generally acknowledged its power. Messenia and Elis were the scenes of fre quent civil broils. In Phocis the Capodistrians main tained their ascendancy. Kolokotrones, who held the rank of commander-in- chief of the Peloponnesian militia, stepped forward as the defender of the local authorities against the central government. His personal interest, his party-connec tions, and his hatred of Kolettes, determined bis con duct. Had he acted from patriotic motives, he would have caught inspiration from the high national position into which accident had thrust him. The agricultural population was alarmed, and the astute old klepht seized the favourable moment for uniting his cause with the cause of the people, but his confined views and innate selfishness prevented his employing the power thus placed at his disposal for the general good. Kolokotrones called the Peloponnesians to arms, and pronounced the proceedings of the governing com mission to be illegal, in a proclamation dated the 22d June 1832.1 Metaxas and Plapoutas had informed him that they had secured the co-operation of Zaimes in paralysing the action of the executive government. The Russian admiral had prompted him to proclaim 1 The original proclamation is printed by Gennaios Kolokotrones, in a work- entitled Aiatpopa eyypaipa Kai t-maToXal aipopavra Tas Kara, to 1832 avfifiao-us Kara, t\v 'EWdSa avu/j.a\ias Kai avapx'ias, p. 21 i. Thiersch gives a translation, 272 CIVIL WAR RENEWED. book v. that the senate was the only legitimate authority in CHAP. III. # t . . f-i ' existence. The residents remained silent. Griva, the most lawless of the Romeliot chiefs, advanced without orders from the governing commission, and occupied Tripolitza at the head of a thousand men. The Capodistrians were already prepared to encounter the invaders of the Morea, and Gennaios Kolokotrones, who had more military courage, though less political sagacity than his father, had already formed a camp at Valtetzi. The tide of success now flowed in favour of the Capodistrians. The advance of Griva was stopped. Elias Mavromichales was repulsed in his attempts to gain a footing in the rich plain of Messenia. The Capodistrians under Kalergy made a bold attempt to seize the mills at Lerna, but the attempt was defeated, though it was openly favoured by the Russian admiral Civil war recommenced in many districts, and bands of troops, who recognised no government, plundered wherever they could penetrate. The prudence of Kolokotrones, whom age had ren dered more of a politician than a warrior, might have led him to avoid engaging in open hostiUties against a government acknowledged by the protecting powers, on the eve of the king's arrival, had he been allowed to remain in undisturbed possession of the profits which he drew from his office as commander-in-chief in the Peloponnesus. But the members of the governing commission forced him into resisting their authority by appointing Theodore Griva to the chief command in the districts of Leondari and Phanari. The occu pation of these places by the Kolettists would have rendered Kolokotrones little better than a prisoner in Karitena. Amidst these scenes of anarchy a national assembly met at Pronia. The members of the governing com- CIVIL WAR RENEWED. 273 mission, the ministers in office, the senators, the resi- a.d. 1832. dents of the Allied powers, and the Russian admiral, were all hostile to the meeting. But a general amnesty before the king's arrival was necessary for pacifying the country, and a general amnesty could not be pro claimed without the sanction of a national assembly. It was also indispensable to obtain the assent of the nation to the election of the king chosen by the Allies. A national assembly could not therefore be entirely dispensed with, though it was feared that a national assembly would abolish the senate and choose a new executive government. Had a national assembly met immediately after the nomination of the governing commission, a civil war might have been avoided by the election of a senate, in which both the constitu tionalists and Capodistrians, the Romeliots and the Moreots, the Hydriots, the Spetziots, and the Psarians, might have been duly represented, and in which local interests might have moderated factious passions. But the intrigues of Greek politicians and foreign diploma tists delayed the meeting for three months, and when it took place, old passions had been rekindled with fiercer animosity by fresh injuries. The violence of faction now exposed the corruption of political society in Greece, without a veil, to the examination of strangers. All ties were torn asunder in the struggle to gratify individual selfishness. The Suliots, Djavellas and Botzares, fought on different sides. Hydriot pri mates were found who deserted the cause of Hydra. The only great political body into which patriotism was likely to find an entrance, was the national assem bly, and even there its voice was in great danger of being overpowered by party zeal. The illegal position and arrogant assumptions of the senate caused much animosity ; the residents of the three powers were dis- VOL. II. s CHAP. HI. 274 ASSEMBLY OF PRONIA. book v. trusted, because they appeared in league to support the illegal powers of the senate. As soon as the assembly of Pronia met, a majority determined to abolish the senate, though it was openly supported by the residents. Many members believed that, as the residents had tamely submitted to the armed opposition of Djavellas at Patras, and had regarded with indifference the renewal of the civil war by Griva, Kolokotrones, and Kalergy, they would offer no opposition to the abolition of the senate. The diplomatists, however, regarded the senate with peculiar favour. They had made use of it to eject Agostino from the presidency, and to create a new government. Its very Ulegality made it a useful in strument, should it be necessary to employ force to establish King Otho's authority, for its abolition would always be a popular measure, and might serve as a pretext for the assumption of absolute power. On the other hand, the national assembly was considered to be doubly dangerous, because it was legally invested with great power, and not likely to be guided by the sug gestions of foreign diplomatists in making use of that power. Such was the state of Greece and the condition of parties when the national assembly of Pronia com menced its sittings. Nothing presaged that it would be able to establish order in the country.1 1 Professor Thiersch asserts that he could have restored order had he been furnished with 100,000 dollars. The assertion only proves that he knew very little of arithmetic. It would not have sufficed to obtain the evacuation ofthe Morea by one-half of the Romeliot irregulars who were plundering the peasan try. He says, " II y avait bien un moyen de sortir encore d'embarras. Jede- vais me mettre a la tete des affaires, et commeucer le gouvernement du roi, vol. i. 167. Had the worthy professor done so, in all probability he would have prevented King Otho from coming to Greece. He is a perfect Wagner the famulus in politics. " Wie nur dem Kapf nicht alle Hofnung schwindet Der immerfort an schalem zeuge klebt, Mit gier'ger hand nach Gehiitzen griibt Und froh ist wenn er Regenwurrner findet." ASSEMBLY OF PRONIA. 275 The assembly commenced its sittings on the 26th of a. d. 18S2. July 1832. On the 1st of August' it passed a decree proclaiming a general amnesty, and on the 8th it rati fied the election of King Otho ; but on the same day it abolished the senate. Of the legality of this measure there was no doubt, and had it occurred immediately after the expulsion of Agostino, it might have tran- quillised Greece. Prudence now suggested that its abolition had become impolitic, since the residents had become its advocates ; and the majority of the assembly would have acted judiciously, had it only reformed the existing senate on the principle of Sir Stratford Can ning's memorandum. The constitutionalists formed a large majority in the assembly, and they were irritated by the conduct of the Greek ministers who had de serted the constitutional cause. The senate was com posed of Capodistrians, and it Avas adopting active measures to increase the violence of the civil war wThich was desolating the country. The governing commis sion and the Greek ministers took part with the senate against the representatives of the nation; and the resi dents, taking advantage of this conduct on the part of the executive, protested against the decree of the na tional assembly, asserting that it was a violation of the principles of the pacification they pretended to have established. Large bodies of Romeliot troops were quartered in the village of Aria, at a short distance beyond Pronia. The soldiers beset the gates of Nauplia and the doors of the assembly every morning clamouring for pay. The governing commission promised to pay their arrears ; but it failed to keep its promise. The minis ters were accused of this violation of the public faith in order to produce the catastrophe which ensued, and their friends and the senators incited the soldiers to demand payment from the national assembly. On the CHAP. III. 276 ASSEMBLY OF PRONIA. bookv. 26th August the soldiers of Grigiottes burst into the fHAP ttt " ~-^ , hall of the assembly, dragged the president from his seat, insulted and ill-treated many deputies, and carried off the president and several deputies, as hostages for the payment of their arrears, to their quarters at Aria. This disgraceful riot put an end to the last national assembly in revolutionary Greece.1 This scene of military violence forms an important event in the history of Greece. It prolonged the re volutionary state of the country for eleven years, by placing constitutional liberty in abeyance. It threw the people into an unquiet and dangerous temper, by sweeping away those free institutions which had in fused energy into the nation during its struggle for independence. The executive power was made the prize of a successful faction. The central government was not established on a legal basis, and the mUitary chiefs ceased to acknowledge its control. Eleven years of Bavarian domination was the expiation of the violence committed at Pronia. Prince Demetrius HypsUantes died in the month of August. About the same time, a deputation, consist- 1 Papadopulos Vretos, an Ionian, was then Baron de Riickmann's doctor. He tells us that he dined with the Russian resident the day after the dissolu tion of the assembly. After dinner, the English resident, Mr Dawkins, called and narrated the following occurrence, which makes the Ionian infer that the British cabinet destroyed the liberty of Greece. He makes the EngUsh resident say, " As I was riding out yesterday with Griffith" (his secretary, who spoke Greek well), " we were surrounded by a crowd of filthy palikaria, shouting and gesticulating like demons. All spoke at the same time, and all appeared to he delivering set speeches, so that the road was an oratorical pandemonium. When I could find an opportunity to make myself heard, I asked Griffith what was the play they were acting for our private edification. After many vain efforts he obtained a partial hearing. The soldiers declared they had no bread, no clothes, and no money. It would have been superfluous for them to have told any one who looked at them that they were without credit. I saw that in stantly. They wished my Excellency to take their case into consideration and provide for their wants. I stated to them that my functions did not allow me to become their commissary ; but, pointing with my whip to the hall of the na tional assembly, I said, that I believed there were many persons in that build ing who possessed great experience as commissaries and paymasters. They seized my hint with wonderful alacrity, and set off running and whooping like wild Indians. Griffith and I took a long ride, and when we returned in tbe evening we heard of the great event of the day."— Melanges Politiques, p. 23. CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY IN ABEYANCE. 277 ing of three members, two of whom were members of a. d. i?82. the governing commission, was sent to Munich with addresses of congratulation to the kings of Greece and Bavaria.1 The commission was thus left incomplete, for the presence of five members was required to give validity to its acts. Yet on this occasion the residents did not protest against the virtual dissolution of the executive government of Greece. Greece surely stood in greater want of a legal executive than of an illegal senate; but the diplomatists looked on with indif ference, while the governing commission committed suicide. Greece was now without any legal central authority. The senate had been abolished by the national as sembly, and the national assembly had been dissolved by the soldiery. The senate made the protest of the foreign diplomatists a ground for prolonging its exist ence. Three places in the governing commission were vacant; two had been occupied by constitutionalists, one by a Capodistrian. The senate attempted to violate the terms of the pacification sanctioned by the residents, and named three Capodistrians. George Kon duriottes, the president, resisted this pretension, but, possessing neither the talents nor the energy necessary for carrying on a contest with the senate, he with drew to Hydra. Only three members of the govern ment now remained at Nauplia — Kolettes, Zaimes, and Metaxas — and they claimed the whole executive power. It was generally felt that chance had made as good a selection as it was possible to make under the cir cumstances. The senate yielded at last to public opinion, and passed a decree investing these three men with the whole executive power. But the intrigues of Admiral Ricord soon deter mined a majority of the senators to repudiate this 1 Kosta Botzares, Plapoutas, and Admiral Miaoulis. CHAP. III. 278 INTRIGUES OF THE SENATE. book v. decree, and all Greece was astonished by the strange intelligence that seven senators had secretly quitted Nauplia. On the 21st November these seceders were joined at Astros by the president, Tsamados, and two additional members, and met by Kolokotrones with a body of Moreot troops. Ten of the thirteen senators who had signed the address to the King of Bavaria were now present. They had carried with them the government printing-press, and they issued proclama tions annulling the decree which had invested Kolettes, Zaimes, and Metaxas with the executive power until the king's arrival. Trusting to the miUtary force of the Capodistrian party under Kolokotrones, and to the support of the Russian admiral, the seceders assumed the executive authority. On this occasion, Kolettes, Zaimes, and Metaxas acted with sense and courage. They took prompt measures to secure order and maintain their authority within the wTalls of Nauplia. Beyond the fortress they were powerless. The residents recognised them as the legal government, and the French garrison placed their persons in security. The senate, having failed to produce a revolution, sought revenge by increasing the existing anarchy. It appointed a military commission to govern Greece, consisting of several powerful chiefs. Kolokotrones, Grigiottes, Djavellas, and Hadgi Christos, Moreots and Romeliots, Albanians and Bulgarians, formed an al liance, and leagued together. Anarchy reached such a pitch, that the minister of war, Zographos, informed the minister of finance, Mavrocordatos, that it was impossible to obtain an exact account of the numbers of the soldiers who were drawing pay and rations. Of the number of men actually under arms he had no idea.1 1 Rapport des Ministres, 28th November 1832 ; Thiersch, i. 448. INTRIGUES OF THE SENATE. 279 At first sight the conduct of the seceding senators a. d. 1832. looks Uke the proceedings of maniacs ; but the Capo- distrians had never abandoned the scheme of Agos tino, and they still hoped, by seizing the forcible direction of the administration in the greater part of the Morea, to compel the regency whicii would goA^ern Greece during the king's minority, to purchase their support by appointing them senators for life. The Eussian admiral supported them in their desperate schemes, while the Russian resident, remaining passive, was at liberty to disavow their proceedings in case of failure. It is needless to follow these abortive intrigues further. The senators, finding that they had no chance of obtaining effectual support from the Greeks, adopted the extraordinary expedient of endeavouring to procure assistance from Russia, by naming Admiral Ricord pre sident of Greece. This act of treason and folly proves the justice with which Capodistrias had been reproached for selecting his senators from the most ignorant and unprincipled political adventurers. Some persons have supposed that there was malice as well as folly in the conduct of the senators ; and that, though they were eager to proclaim that they preferred Russian pro tection to Greek independence, they also intended to hint to Admiral Ricord that it was his interest and the interest of other Russian agents to purchase her silence in order to throw a veil over many intrigues. Amidst the general anarchy, the commission of seven generals was unable to place any restraint on the sol diery. The men under arms no longer obeyed their officers, but formed bands like wolves, hunting for their prey under the boldest plunderer. A veil may be dropped on their proceedings. But it is of some importance to explain in what manner a part of the Morea escaped their ravages. The revival of the municipal institutions of the CHAP. III. 280 MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS. book v. Morea at this period has been already mentioned. The weakness of the government relieved the local authorities from the incubus of a tyrannical central administration, which had been imposed on them by Capodistrias. The exigencies of the time forced them to act without waiting for the initiative of ministers and the orders of prefects. The condition of the country and the agitation of the people again made the municipal authorities feel that they were respon sible to their fellow-citizens, by whom they were sup posed to be elected. They were often called upon to make arrangements for quartering and feeding troops, who came to defend or plunder the country, as circum stances might determine. They were compelled to collect the public revenues to meet these demands; to arm strong bodies of peasantry, and to form alliances with neighbouring municipalities, in order to check the rapacity of the soldiery. Their difficulties induced them to look to Kolokotrones for assistance, whose military force was so far inferior to that of the Rome liots as to render it imperative on him to form an aUiance with the people. His office as commander-in- chief in the Morea, and his personal relations with most of the local magistrates chosen during the ad ministration of Capodistrias, pointed him out as the natural defender of the agricultural population. The difficulty was to make the old klepht feel that it was his interest to protect and not to plunder ; that his robberies must be confined to the central administra tion ; and that he must aid and not command the local authorities. The end was partially attained, and in many districts the demogeronts acquired sufficient power to protect their municipalities against the mili tary chiefs of the Capodistrian faction, and to repulse the attacks of the Romeliot troops. The governino; commission and the constitutional MESSENIA. 281 ministers forfeited their claim to the allegiance of the a. d. 1832. Greeks, by their neglect to restrain the exactions of the _ Romeliots, who had raised them to power. Strangers had a better opportunity of observing the evil effects of their misconduct in Messenia than in other parts of the country, as the presence of the French army of occupation enforced neutrality within certain limits, and yet left free action to the rival factions in its im mediate vicinity. Great part of the rich plain which extends from Taygetus to Ithome was national property. States men and chieftains, Romeliots and Moreots, were eager to become the farmers of the public revenues. The bey of Maina and the whole of his ambitious and needy family aspired to quarter themselves, with all their Maniat adherents, in this rich province. The native peasantry and the opponents of the Mavro michales were alike hostile to the pretensions of the Maniats. Party intrigues were carried on in every village, and no province was more tormented by the incessant strife which makes the municipal adminis tration of the Greeks a field for the exhibition of strange paroxysms of selfishness. Some of the demo geronts allied themselves with Kolokotrones; some discontented citizens formed connections with the family of Mavromichales. The presence of a French garrison at Kalamata complicated the politics of the municipal authorities in Messenia. Their local interests and personal feel ings favoured the French, who had protected them from being plundered by the Maniats, and who af forded them a profitable market for their produce. But the Capodistrian faction, excited by Kolokotrones and Admiral Ricord, were indefatigable in calumniat ing and intriguing against the French. The officers commanding the Kalamata sought to tranquillise the 282 MESSENIA. book v. people, by inviting the peasantry to pursue their — labours, and by assuring the demogeronts of their readiness to assist in maintaining order in the neigh bourhood of their encampment. But the partisans of Kolokotrones pointed to the neutrality proclaimed by the residents at Nauplia, and to the retreat of the French troops from Patras, as proofs that the French could not interfere in the internal administration of Messenia. The French were accused of being consti tutionalists like the Maniats, and the agricultural population feared the lawless conduct of the adherents of the family of Mavromichales. Kolokotrones had already convinced many that he was acting sincerely as the protector of the people. To him, therefore, the demogeronts of most of the vUlages in Messenia turned for support. Niketas came with a smaU body of chosen troops to protect the agricultural population from an invasion of the Maniats. The Mavromichales were not de terred by these preparations for defence. They had claims on the governing commission for their long opposition to Capodistrias, which they did not think were entirely cancelled by the assassination of the president. They pretended that they were entitled to be the tax-gatherers of Messenia, and their followers were eager to exchange the black bread of the lupin- meal, which formed their hard fare in Kakovouli, for the wheaten cakes and roast lambs.1 Elias Mavromichales, called Katzakos, invaded the district between the lower ridges of Taygetus and the Pamisus more than once at the head of three or four hundred men. But his progress was always arrested by Niketas, who was a better soldier, and who, in addi tion to his superior skill in partisan warfare, was sup- 1 Kakovouli, or the land of evil counsel. The lupins are ground after the culse has been long steeped in water to extract some injurious matter. The bread is black, hard, and bitter. KOLOKOTRONES AND KOLETTES. 283 ported by the whole of the population in the plain a. d. 1832. capable of bearing arms. The approach of the Maniats caused excessive terror, and the alarm was justified by their conduct. The French troops at Kalamata saw more than one Greek village suddenly attacked and plundered by the modern Spartiates, as the Maniats termed themselves. The armed men descended from their mountains attended by numbers of women, whose duty it was to carry off the booty. These women were seen by the French returning, carrying on their back bundles of linen, bedding, and household utensils, and driving before them asses laden with doors, win dows, and small rafters.1 Niketas, however, invariably succeeded in driving Elias and his Maniats back into the mountains. Arrangements were ultimately adopted which put an end to these devastating forays of the Maniats. Niketas placed himself at the head of a band of veterans, and moved about from village to village watching the slopes of Taygetus, and taking care that the armed peasantry should always be informed where they were to join him in case of any attack. The demogeronts were in this way enabled to provide the supplies of money and provisions necessary for the defence of the district, and the agricultural population was not pre vented from cultivating the land. Kolokotrones and Kolettes were the two great party leaders at this time, but neither possessed the talents necessary to frame, nor the character necessary to pur sue, a fixed line of policy. Accident alone determined their political position, and made the first, though a partisan of despotic power, the defender of liberal in stitutions, and the second, though calling himself a constitutionalist, a tyrant, and the enemy of a national assembly. Like their partisans, they had no honest 1 Pellion, 316. CHAP. III. 284 MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS NOT UNDERSTOOD. book v. convictions, and they drifted up and down with the current of faction without an effort to steer their course according to the interest of Greece. Kolettes came into the Morea to establish constitutional liberty. His followers plundered the country, and dispersed the national assembly. Kolokotrones was the instrument of the Capodistrians and the Russians to perpetuate despotic power. His position compeUed him to be come the champion of order and liberty. There is no doubt that though many arbitrary and unjust acts could be cited against Kolokotrones and Djavellas, yet greater security for Ufe and property existed in the provinces over which their authority extended, than in the provinces which submitted to the governing commission. But it is certam that this result was obtained by the accidental revival of na tional institutions, and not by the patriotism or the wisdom of the leaders of the Capodistrians. The mih tary chiefs on both sides were equally rapacious ; the political leaders equally ignorant, selfish, and corrupt. Honest men of both parties kept aloof from the public administration. Both Greeks and foreigners had praised the muni cipal organisation of Greece which existed under the Turkish domination ; and it undoubtedly tended to check in some degree the evils which resulted from the excessive fiscal rapacity of the Othoman government. Yet it could do but little to protect the people from in justice ; for the municipal magistrates were responsible to their Othoman rulers, not to those who elected them, or to the law of the land, for the exercise of their autho rity. It made Greeks the instruments of Othoman oppression, and in this way it introduced a degree of demoralisation into the local administrations, which the Revolution failed to eradicate. It may be truly said that this vaunted institution never protected the ATTACK ON THE FRENCH. 285 liberties of the people except by accident. The law a. d. 1833. had no power to restrain the selfishness of the local magistrates. The primates employed the municipali ties, like the Turks, as fiscal engines for their own convenience. The military chiefs were the enemies of every species of order and organisation. The torpid ministers, the literary enthusiasts, and the intriguing politicians, who acted an important part during the Revolution, allowed the local institutions to be de stroyed, and they had not the capacity necessary for organising an efficient central administration. At the end of the year 1832 Greece was in a state of almost universal anarchy. The government acknow ledged by the three powers exercised little authority beyond the walls of Nauplia. The senate was in open rebeUion. The Capodistrians under Kolokotrones and DjaveUas had never recognised the governing commis sion. A confederation of military chiefs attempted to rule the country, and blockaded the existing govern ment. The commission of three members, which exercised the executive power, alarmed at the prospect of being excluded from power before the king's arrival, implored the residents to invite the French troops to garrison Argos. Four companies of infantry and a detachment of artiUery were sent from Messenia by General Gue- heneuc to effect this object. In the mean time, General Corbet, who commanded at Nauplia, detached two companies and two mountain-guns to take possession of the cavalry barracks at Argos, in order to secure quarters for the troops from Messenia. The town was filled with irregular Greek soldiery, under the nominal command of Grigiottes and Tzokres. These men boasted that they would drive the French back to Nauplia, and that Kolokotrones would exterminate those who were advancing from Messenia. The prudent precautions 286 ATTACK ON THE FRENCH. book v. of the French officers prevented the troops beins at- CHAP. III. J- O tacked on their march, and the whole force united at Argos on the 15th of January 1833. On the foUowing day the French were suddenly at tacked. The Greeks commenced their hostilities so unexpectedly, that the colonel of the troops, who had arrived on the preceding evening, was on his way to Nauplia to make his report to General Corbet when the attack commenced. The French soldiers who went to market unarmed were driven back into the barracks, and a few were killed and wounded. But the hostUe conduct of the Greek soldiery had prepared the French for any sudden outbreak, and a few minutes sufficed to put their whole force under arms in the square before their quarters. The Greek troops, trusting to their numbers, attempted to occupy the houses which commanded this square. They were promptly driven back, and the streets were cleared by grape-shot from the French guns. The Greeks then intrenched them selves in several houses, and fired from the windows of the upper stories on the French who advanced to \ dislodge them. This species of warfare could not long '• arrest the progress of regular troops. The French ! succeeded in approaching every house in succession with little loss. They then burst open the doors and windows of the lower story, and, rushing up-stairs, i forced the armatoli and klephts to jump out of the windows, or finished their career with the bayonet. In less than three hours every house was taken, and the fugitives who had sought a refuge in the ruined citadel of Larissa were pursued and driven even from that stronghold. Never was victory more complete. The French lost only forty killed and wounded, while the Greeks, who fought chiefly under cover, had a hundred and sixty killed, and in all probabUity a much greater number ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BAVARIAN DYNASTY. 287 wounded. Grigiottes was taken prisoner, but was soon a. d. 1833. released. A Greek officer and a soldier accused of an attempt at an assassination were tried, condemned, and shot.1 While the Greek troops were plundering their coun trymen and murdering their allies, the three protecting powers were labouring to secure to Greece every ad vantage of political independence and external peace. A treaty was signed at Constantinople on the 21st July 1832, by which the sultan recognised the kingdom of Greece, and ceded to it the districts within its limits still occupied by his troops, on receiving an indemnity of forty millions of piastres, a sum then equal to £462,480.2 The Allied powers also furnished the king's government with ample funds, by guarantee ing a loan of sixty mUlions of francs. The indemnity to Turkey was paid out of this loan.3 The AUied powers also secured for the Greek mon archy an official admission among the sovereigns of Europe, by inviting the Germanic Confederation to recognise Prince Otho of Bavaria king of Greece, which took place on the 4th October 1832.4 The protectors of Greece have often been reproached for the slowness of their proceedings in establishing the independence of Greece ; yet when we reflect on the anarchy that prevaUed among the Greeks, the difficulties thrown in their way by Capodistrias, the desertion of Prince Leopold, and the small assistance they received from Bavaria, we ought rather to feel surprise that they succeeded at last in establishing the Greek kingdom. 1 Compare Pellion, 363 ; Lacour, Excursions en Grece, 260. Both had access to official accounts, and yet they differ in their statements of the French loss. 2 Parliamentary Papers, Annex A to Protocol of 30th August 1833. Each of the three powers guaranteed a separate series of bonds for twenty millions of francs, or £781,273, 6s. 8d. sterling. The contract between the Greek government and the house of Rothschild was signed 12th January 1833. The loan was effected at 94, interest at 5 per cent. 4 Klubers Quellensammlung zu dem offentlichen Recht des Teutschen Bundes. Fortsetssung, 1832, p. 75. CHAP. III. 288 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BAVARIAN DYNASTY book v. The King of Bavaria concluded a treaty of alliance l-.II A D TTT _ ^^ ** between Bavaria and Greece on the 1st November 1832. He engaged to send 3500 Bavarian troops to support his son's throne, and relieve the French army of occupation. This subsidiary force was paid from the proceeds of the Allied loan ; for Bavaria had neither the resources, nor, to speak the truth, the generosity, of France.1 A convention was signed at the same time, authorising Greece to recruit volunteers in Bavaria, in order that the subsidiary force might be replaced by German mercenaries in King Otho's service.2 On the 16th January 1833, the veterans of the Greek Revolution fled before a few companies of French troops ; on the 1st of February King Otho arrived at Nauplia, accompanied by a small army of Bavarians, composed of a due proportion of infantry, cavalry, artiUery, and engineers.3 As experience had proved that there were no statesmen in Greece capable of governing the country, it was absolutely necessary to send a regency composed of foreigners to administer the government during King Otho's minority. The persons chosen were Count Armansperg, M. de Maurer, and General Heideck. The Bavarian troops landed before the king. Their tall persons, bright uniforms, and fine music, contrasted greatly to their advantage with the small figures and well-worn clothing of the French. The numerous 1 The French government was desirous of obtaining the joint guarantee of King Louis of Bavaria to the loan, iu order to facilitate the progress of the measure through the French Chambers. But King Louis refused, alleging that neither the state of his finances nor the interests of Bavaria allowed him to aid his son in raising money for Greece. Yet he took care that his son should expend large sums of Greek money in Bavaria without any advantage to Greece. — Klubers Pragmatisehe Geschichte der Nationalen und Politischen Wiedcrgcbarts Griechcnlands, p. 509. 2 The treaty is printed in the Greek Government Gazette, 'E(/>7)/uepli ttjs KvPepv-tiacus, No. 18; the convention in No. 20, 1S33. 3 King Otho embarked at Briudisi on board the English frigate Madagascar, commanded by Captain (Lord) Lyons, on the 15th January 1833, and was joined at Corfu by a fleet of transports bringing the Bavarian troops from Trieste. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BAVARIAN DYNASTY. 289 mounted officers, the splendid plumes, the prancing a. d. 1833. horses, and the numerous decorations, crosses, and ~~ ornaments of the new-comers, produced a powerful effect on the minds of the Greeks, taught by the casti gation they had received at Argos to appreciate the value of military discipline. The people welcomed the king as their saviour from anarchy. Even the members of the government, the mUitary chiefs, and the high officials, who had been devouring the resources of the country, hailed the king's arrival with pleasure ; for they felt that they could no longer extort any profit from the starving population. The title, however, which the Bavarian prince assumed — Otho, by the grace of God, King of Greece — excited a few sneers even among those who were not republicans ; for it seemed a claim to divine right in the throne on the part of the house of Wittel- spach. But every objection passed unheeded ; and it may be safely asserted that few kings have mounted their thrones amidst more general satisfaction than King Otho. VOL. II. CHAPTER IV. BAVARIAN DESPOTISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLU TION. FEBRUARY 1833 TO SEPTEMBER 1843. 1 "What ! shall reviving thraldom again be The patched-up idol of enUghtened days ? Shall we who struck the lion down — shall we Pay the wolf homage ? " Landing of King Otho — The begenct, its membees and duties— Royal proclamation — Administrative measures — Military organisation — Civil administration — Municipal institutions — Financial admin istration — Monetary system — Judicial organisation — The Greek Church, reforms introduced by the regency — Synodal Tomos— Monas teries — Public instruction — Restrictions on the press — Roads — Order of the Redeemer — Quarrels in the regency — Kolokotrones's plot— Armansperg intrigue — Armansperg's administration — Bavarian influence— Disputes with England — Alarming increase of brigand age — Insurrections in Maina and Messenia — Brigandage in 1835— General Gordon's expedition — Insurrection in Acarnania — Opinions of Lord Lyons and General Gordon on the state of Greece — Brigand age continues — King Otho's personal government — Attacks on King Otho in the English newspapers — Causes of the Revolution of 1843— Revolution — Observations on the constitution — Conclusion. King Otho quitted the English frigate which con veyed him to Greece on the 6th February 1833. His entry into Nauplia was a spectacle well calculated to inspire the Greeks with enthusiasm. The three most powerful governments in Europe combined to establish him on his throne. He arrived escorted by a numerous fleet, and he landed surrounded by a powerful army.1 King Otho was then seventeen 1 Twenty-five ships ofwar aud forty-eight transports were anchored in the bay of Nauplia, aud three thousand Bavarian troops had already landed. LANDING OF KING OTHO. 291 years old.1 Though not handsome, he was well grown, a. d. i83s. and of an engaging appearance. His countrymen spoke favourably of his disposition. His youthful grace, as he rode towards his residence in the midst of a brilliant retinue, called forth the blessings of a delighted population, and many sincere prayers were uttered for his long and happy reign. The day formed an era in the history of Greece, nor is it without some importance in the records of European civilisation. A new Christian kingdom was incorporated in the international system of the West at a critical period, for the maintenance of the balance of power in the East. The scene itself formed a splendid picture. Anarchy and order shook hands. Greeks and Albanians, moun taineers and islanders, soldiers, sailors, and peasants, in their varied and picturesque dresses, hailed the young monarch as their deliverer from a state of society as intolerable as Turkish tyranny. Families in bright attire glided in boats over the calm sea amidst the gaily decorated frigates of the Allied squadrons. The music of many bands in the ships and on shore enlivened the scene, and the roar of artiUery in every direction gave an imposing pomp to the ceremony. The uniforms of many armies and navies, and the sounds of many languages, testified that most civilised nations had sent deputies to inaugurate the festival of the regeneration of Greece. Nature was in perfect harmony. The sun was warm, and the air balmy with the breath of spring, whUe a light breeze wafted freshness from the sea. The landscape was beautiful, and it recalled memories of a glorious past. The white buildings of the Turkish town of Nauplia clustered at the foot of the Venetian fortifications and cyclopean foundations that crown its 1 King Otho was born on the 1st June 1815. CHAP. IV. 292 LANDING OF KING OTHO. book v. rocky promontory. The mountain citadel of Palamedes r TV •'J- " frowned over both, and the island fort of Burdjee, me morable in the history of the Revolution, stood like a sentinel in the harbour. The king landed and mounted his horse under the cyclopean walls of Tyrinthus, which were covered with spectators. The modern town of Argos looked smiling even in ruin, with the Pelasgic foundations and medieval battlements of the Earissa above. The Mycenae of Homer w7as seen on one side, while on the other the blue tints and snowy tops of the Arcadian and Laconian mountains mingled in the distance with the bluer waters of the Egean. Enthusiasts, who thought of the poetic glories of Homer's Greece, and the historic greatness of the Greece of Thucydides, might be pardoned if they then indulged a hope that a third Greece was emerging into life, which would again occupy a briUiant position in the world's annals. Political independence was se cured : peace was guaranteed : domestic faction would be allayed by the equity of impartial foreigners, and all ranks would be taught, by the presence of a settled government, to efface the ravages of war, and cultivate the virtues which the nation had lost under Othoman domination. The task did not appear to be very dif ficult. The greater part of Greece was uninhabited. The progress of many British colonies, and of the United States of America, testify that land capable of cultiva tion forms the surest foundation for national prosper ity. To insure a rapid increase of population where there is an abundant supply of waste land, nothing is required but domestic virtue and public order. And in a free country, the rapid increase of a population enjoying the privilege of self-government in local affairs, and of stern justice in the central administra tion, is the surest means of extending a nation's power. The dreamer, therefore, who allowed visions of the in- LANDING OF KING OTHO. 293 crease of the Greek race, and of its peaceful conquests a. d. 1333. over uncultivated lands far beyond the limits of the ' new kingdom, to pass through his mind as King Otho rode forward to mount his throne, might have seen what was soon to happen, had the members of the regency possessed a little common-sense. The rapid growth of population in the Greek kingdom would have solved the Eastern question. The example of a well-governed Christian population, the aspect of its moral improvement, material prosperity, and constant overflow into European Turkey, would have relieved European cabinets from many political embarrassments, by producing the euthanasia of the Othoman empire. Prince Otho of Bavaria had been proposed as a can didate for the sovereignty of Greece before the elec tion of Prince Leopold. It was then urged that, being young, he would become completely identified with his subjects in language and religion.1 But the Allies rejected him, thinking that a man of experience was more likely to govern Greece well, than an inexperienced boy of the purest accent and the most unequivocal orthodoxy. Eloquent and orthodox Greeks had not distinguished themselves as statesmen ; and though they might be excellent teachers of their language and ecclesiastical doctrines, they had given no proof of their being able to educate a good sovereign. The resignation of Prince Leopold, and the refusal of other princes, at last opened the way for King Otho's election, and he became King of Greece under extremely favourable circumstances. King Louis of Bavaria was authorised to appoint a regency to govern the kingdom until his son's majority, which was fixed to be on the 1st June 1835, at the completion of his twentieth year.2 1 Thiersch,!. 308-313. See note, vol. ii. p. 257 of this woik. 1 Treaty of 7th May 1832, Art. ix. x. CHAP. IV. 294 THE REGENCY. book v. The regency was invested with unlimited power, partly through the misconduct of the Greeks, and partly in consequence of the despotic views of King Louis. The Uberality of the three powers supplied the regents with an overflowing treasury. It has been already stated that the regency was composed of three members, Count Armansperg, M. de Maurer, and General Heideck. Count Armansperg was named president. Mr Abel, the secretary, was invested with a consultative voice, and appointed supplemental member, to fill any vacancy that might occur. Mr Greiner was joined to the regency as treasurer, and director of the finance department. Not one of these men, with the exception of General Heideck, had the slightest knowledge of the condition of Greece. Count Armansperg enjoyed the reputation of being a very liberal man for a Bavarian nobleman at that time. He had been minister of finance, and he filled the office of minister of foreign affairs when the first attempt was made to obtain the sovereignty of Greece for King Otho. His ministerial experience and his rank rendered him well suited for the presidency of the regency, which gave him the direction of the foreign relations of the kingdom, and, what both he and the countess particularly enjoyed, the duty of holding public receptions and giving private entertainments. The count's own tact, aided by the presence of the countess and three accomplished daughters, rendered the house of the president the centre of polished society and of political intrigue at Nauplia. It was the only place where the young king could see something of the world, and meet his subjects and strangers without feeling the restraint of royalty, for M. de Maurer lived like a niggard, and General Heideck like a recluse. M. de Maurer and Mr Abel were selected for their offices on account of their sharing the political opinions THE REGENCY. 295 of Count Armansperg.1 Maurer was an able jurist, but a. d. 1833. he was destitute both of the talents and the temper required to form a statesman. He knew well how to frame laws, but he knew not how to apply the prin ciples of legislation to social exigencies which he met with for the first time. On the whole, he was a more useful and an honester man than Count Armansperg, but he was not so well suited by the flexibility of his character to move among Greeks and diplomatists, or to steer a prudent course in a high political sphere. Both Armansperg and Maurer took especial care of their own personal interests before they gave their services to Greece. They bargained with King Louis for large pensions on quitting the regency, and they secured to themselves ample salaries during their stay in Greece. Count Armansperg expended his salary hke a gentleman, but the sordid household of M. de Maurer amused even the Greeks. General Heideck was the member of the regency first selected. He had resided in the country, and had been long treated as a personal friend by the King of Bavaria. King Louis was well aware that, though Heideck was inferior to his colleagues in political knowledge, he was more sincerely attached to the Bavarian dynasty, and his majesty always entertained some misgivings concerning the personal prudence or the political integrity of the other members. Heideck, during his first visit to Greece, had acquired the repu tation of an able and disinterested administrator. As a member of the regency, he paid little attention to anything but the organisation of the army ; and he rendered himself unpopular by the partiality he showed 1 Mr Ahel, after his return to Bavaria, became a violent partisan of the ultra montane party, fought a duel with Prince Oettingen-Wallerstein, and succeeded his adversary as minister of the interior. He held that office from 1838 to 1817, when Lola Montes caused the ultramontane party to be ejected from power. 296 THE REGENCY. book v. to the Bavarians, on whom he lavished rapid promo- CHAP. IV. 1 1 f 1 /» tion and high pay, whUe he left the veterans of the Revolution without reward and without employment. He was accused of purchasing popularity at Munich by wasteful expenditure in Greece, and of doing very little to organise a native army when he had ample means at his disposal. The members of the regency were men of experience and strangers. It was natural to count on their cor dial co-operation during their short period of power. Yet the two leading members, though they had been previously supposed to be political friends, were hardly installed in office before they began to dispute about personal trifles. Mean jealousy on one side, and in flated presumption on the other, sowed the seeds of dissension. Count Armansperg, as a noble, looked down on Maurer as a pedant and a law-professor. Maurer sneered at the count as an idler, fit only to be a diplomatist or a master of ceremonies. Both soon engaged in intrigues to eject their colleagues. Maurer expected that, by securing a majority of votes, he should be able to induce the King of Bavaria to support his authority. Armansperg, with more experience of courts, endeavoured to make sure ofthe support ofthe three protecting powers, whose influence, he knew, would easily mould the unsteady mind of King Louis to their wish. The cause of Greece and the opinions of the Greeks were of no account to either of the intriguers, for Greek interests could not decide the question at issue. It would probably have been the wisest course at the beginning to have sent a single regent to Greece, and to have given him a council, the members of which might have been charged with the civil, military, finan cial, and judicial organisation of the kingdom; though it must be confessed that no wisdom could have fore seen that two Bavarian statesmen would surpass the THE REGENCY. 297 Greeks in " envy, hatred, and malice, and all unchari- a. d. 1833. tableness." Count Armansperg galled the pride of Maurer by an air of superiority, which the jurist had not the tact to rebuke with polite contempt. Maurer was impatient to proclaim publicly that the title of president only conferred on the count the first place in processions and the upper seat at board meetings, and he could not conceal that these things were the objects of his jealousy. The count understood society better than his rival. When strangers, misled by the fine figure and expression of Maurer, addressed him as the chief of the regency, the lawyer had not the tact to transfer the compliments to their true destination, and win the flatterers by his manner in doing so, but he left time for the president to thrust forward. his common-looking physiognomy with polished ease, vindicate his own rights, and extract from the abashed strangers some additional outpouring of adulation. The Countess of Armansperg increased the discord of the regents by her extreme haughtiness, which was seldom restrained by good sense, and sometimes not even by good man ners. She was so imprudent as to offend Heideck and Abel as much as she irritated Maurer. It is necessary to notice this conduct of the lady, for she was her hus band's evU genius in Greece. Her influence increased the animosity of the Bavarians, and prolonged the misfortunes of the Greeks. The position of the regency was delicate, but not difficult to men of talent and resolution. A mode rate share of sagacity sufficed to guide their conduct. Anarchy had prepared an open field of action. It was necessary to create an army, a navy, a civil and judicial administration, and to sweep away the rude fiscal system of the Turkish land-tax. We shall see how the Bavarian regency performed these duties. CHAP. IV. 298 DUTIES OF THE REGENCY. book v. The first step was to put an end to the provisional system of expedients by which Capodistrias and his successors had prolonged the state of revolution. It was necessary to make the Greeks feel that the royal authority gave personal security and protection for property, since their loyalty reposed on no national and religious traditions and sympathies. It required no philosopher in Greece, when King Otho arrived, to proclaim " that all the vast apparatus of government has ultimately no other object or purpose but the dis tribution of justice; and that kings and parliaments, fleets and armies, officers of the court and revenue, ambassadors, ministers, and privy councillors, were aU subordinate in their end to this part of the administra tion."1 The reign of anarchy coming after the despot ism of Capodistrias, had enabled the people to feel instinctively that, in order to secure good government, it was indispensable that the laws and institutions of the kingdom should be more powerful than the wUl of the king and the action of government. The second step was to prepare the way for national prosperity, by removing the obstacles which prevented the people from bettering its condition. There was no difficulty in effecting this, since uncultivated land was abundant, and the Allied loan supplied the regency with ample funds. The system of exacting a tenth of the agricultural produce of the country kept society beyond the waUs of towns in a stationary condition. Its immediate abolition was the most certain method of eradicating the evUs it produced. Relief from the oppression of the tax-collector, even more than from the burden of the tax, would enable the peasantry to cultivate additional land, and to pay wages to agri cultural labourers. An immediate influx of labourers would arrive from Turkey, and the increase of the 1 Hume's Essay of the Origin of Government. DUTIES OF THE REGENCY. 299 population of Greece would be certain and rapid. One- a. d. 1833. tenth would every year be added to the national capital. The regency required to do nothing but make roads. The government of the country could have been carried on from the customs, and the rent of national property. The extraordinary expenses of or ganising the kingdom would have been paid for out of the loan. The regency did nothing of the kind ; it retained the Turkish land-tax, neglected to make roads, spent the Allied loan in a manner that both weakened and corrupted the Greek nation, and left the great question of its increase in population and agricultural prosperity unsolved. The members of the regency complained that the want of labour and capital impeded the success of their plans of improvement ; yet they seemed to have overlooked the fact that if they had abolished the tenths, the people would easily have procured both labour and capital for themselves. Labour was then abundant and cheap in Turkey ; capital in the hands of Greeks was abundant in every commercial mart in the Mediterranean. Yet the Bavarians talked of estab lishing agricultural colonies of Swiss or Germans, and of inviting foreign capitalists to found banks. It may be confidently asserted that the Greek monarchy would have realised the boast of Themistocles, and rapidly expanded from a petty kingdom to a great state, had the regency swept away the Turkish land-tax, and left the agricultural industry of Greece free to make its own career in the East. On the day of the king's landing, a royal procla mation was issued, addressed to the Greek nation ; the ministers in office were confirmed in their places, and the senate was aUowed to expire, without notice, of the wounds it had inflicted both on itself and its country. CHAP. IV. 300 ROYAL PROCLAMATION. book v. The royal proclamation was nothing more than a collection of empty phrases, and it disappointed public expectation by making no allusion to representative institutions nor to the constitution. It revealed clearly that the views of the Bavarian government were not in accordance with the sentiments of the Greeks. The silence of the regency on the subject of the Greek constitution was regarded as a claim on the part of King Otho to be an absolute monarch. The omission was generally blamed; but the acknowledged necessity of investing the regency with legislative power, in order to enable it to introduce organic changes in the administration, prevented any public complaint. It caused the Greeks, however, to scrutinise the measures of the Bavarians with severity, and to regard the members of the regency with distrust. The King of Bavaria had solemnly declared to the protecting powers that the individuals selected to govern Greece during his son's minority " ought to hold moderate and con stitutional opinions;" the Greek people had therefore an undoubted right to receive from these foreign states men a distinct pledge that they did not intend to establish an arbitrary government.1 The distrust of the Greeks was increased, because the omission in the royal proclamation was a deliberate violation of a pledge given by the Bavarian minister of foreign affairs, when the object of King Louis was to win over the Greeks to accept his son as their king. The Baron de Gise then declared that it would be one of the first cares of the regency to convoke a national assembly to assist in preparing a definitive constitution for the kingdom.2 The royal word, thus pledged, was guaran teed by a proclamation of the three protecting powers, 1 Parliamentary Papers, Annex A to Protocol of 26th April 1832. 2 The letter of Baron de Gise, dated 31st July 1832, is printed in Recueil des TraiUs, Actes, et Pieces conccrnans la Fondation de la RoyautS en Grece et le Trace de ses Limites (Nauplie, 1833), p. 62. ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES. 301 published at Nauplia, to announce the election of King a. d. 1833. Otho. In this document the Greeks were invited to aid their sovereign in giving their country a definitive constitution.1 They answered the appeal of the Allies on the 15th of September 1843. The oath of allegiance demanded from the Greeks was simple. They swore fidelity to King Otho, and obedience to the laws of their country. The first measures of the regency had been prepared at Munich, under the eye of King Louis. In these measures too much deference was paid to the adminis trative arrangements introduced by Capodistrias, which he himself had always regarded as of a provisional nature ; and the modifications made on the Capodis trian legislation were too exclusively based on German theories, without a practical adaptation to the state of Greece. The King of Bavaria had little knowledge of financial and economical questions, and he had no knowledge of the social and fiscal wants of the Greek people. He thought of nothing but the means of carrying on the central administration, and in that sphere he endeavoured honestly to introduce a well- organised and clearly defined system. The laws and ordinances which the regency brought from Bavaria would have required only a few modifications to have engrafted them advantageously on the existing insti tutions. Their great object was to establish order and give power to the executive government. The armed bands of personal followers which had enabled the military chiefs to place themselves above the law, to defy the government, and plunder the people, were disbanded. A national army was created. The scenes of tumultuous violence and gross peculation which General Heideck had witnessed in the Greek armies, had made a deep impression on his mind. 1 Parliamentary Papers, Annex D to Protocol of 26th April 1832. CHAP. IV. 302 MILITARY ORGANISATION. book v. Warned by his experience, the regency arrived with an army capable of enforcing order; and it fortunately found the Greek irregulars so cowed by the punishment they had received from the French at Argos, that they submitted to be disbanded without offering any resist ance. It must not, however, be concealed, that the regency abused the power it acquired by its success. Bavarian officers, who possessed neither experience nor merit, were suddenly promoted to high mUitary com mands, many of whom made a short stay in Greece, and hardly one of whom bestowed a single thought on the future condition of the country. The national army soon received a good organisa tion in print.1 In numbers it was unnecessarUy strong. Upwards of five thousand Bavarian volunteers were enroUed in the Greek service before the end of the year 1834, and almost as many Greek troops were kept under arms. This numerous force was never brought into a very efficient condition. Faction and jobbing soon vitiated its organisation. The regency was ashamed to publish an army-list. Promotion was conferred too lavishly on young Bavarians, whUe Greeks and Philhellenes of long service were left un- employed. It was a grievous error on the part of General Heideck to omit fixing the rank and verifying the position and service of the Greek officers who had served during the Revolution, by the publication of an official army-list whUe the personal identity of the actors in every engagement was weU known. The bold measure of disbanding the irregular army was a blow which required to be struck with prompti tude and followed up with vigour in order to insure success. It is idle to accuse the regency of precipi tancy and severity, for something like a thunderbolt could alone prevent an organised resistance, and a 1 'E. arrear. A number of veteran armatoli, to whom pen- ~ " sions had been assigned on condition of their residing at Lepanto and Vrachori, were completely neglected, and were so discontented with the conduct of the government, that when the house of Pharmaki was attacked, and the firing was heard in the whole town of Lepanto, not one would move from the walls to assist that gallant chief. The landed proprietors and the peasantry were almost as much irritated at the neglect shown by the government as the starving soldiers. Loud complaints were made that the population in the provinces was left without defence, while Armans perg was lavishing crosses of the Redeemer on diplo mats, and pay and promotion on Bavarians whose service in Greece had been confined to marching from Nauplia to Athens, when the king removed his capital from the first of these cities to the second. As soon as Armansperg's intrigues were crowned with success, he got rid of Lesuire as well as Kolettes, and General Schmaltz became minister of war. About the same time Mr Dawkins was recalled, and Sir Ed mund Lyons was named British minister at King Otho's court. At the recommendation of Sir Edmund, Armansperg named General Gordon to the command of an expedition which was sent to clear Northern Greece of brigands. Gordon was not attached to any political party : he distrusted Kolettes, and had little confidence in Armansperg ; but he knew the country, the people, and the irregular troops, as weU as any man in Greece. On the 1 1th of July he left Athens with his staff; and after visiting Chalcis, in order to make himself fully acquainted with the state of the troops of which he had assumed the command, he formed his plan of operations. His measures were judicious, and they VOL. ii. z 354 GORDON S EXPEDITION. book v. were executed with energy. A body of regular troops : — - was sent forward from Chalcis by Thebes, Livadea, and Salona, to Loidoriki, whither Gordon proceeded, following the shore of the channel of Euboea to the mouth of the Sperchius. He stopped a couple of days at Patradjik (Hypate) to post the troops necessary to guard the passes on the frontier, and then descended by the defiles of Oeta and Korax to Loidoriki, where he was joined by the regulars from Chalcis. By this rapid march he effectually cleared aU Eastern Greece of brigands. They all moved westward, for they saw that if any of them remained in Phocis they would have been hunted down without a chance of escape. At Loidoriki, Gordon divided the force under his orders into three divisions. It was much more diffi cult to drive the brigands westward from the Etolian mountains than it had been to clear the more open districts in Eastern Greece. One division of the army kept along the ridge of the mountains which bound the Gulf of Corinth to the north. The centre, with the general, marched into the heart of the country, through districts cut by nature into a labyrinth of deep ravines, and descended to Lepanto from the north east, after passing by Lombotina and Simon. The right division moved up northward to Artolina, in order, if possible, to cut off the brigands from gaining the Turkish frontier. The principal body of the brigands, consisting of one hundred and thirty, maintained its position in the immediate vicinity of Lepanto for six weeks, and it continued to levy contributions from the country round until the general arrived at Loidoriki. It then broke up into several small bands, and, picking up its out lying associates, gained the Turkish frontier by foUow ing secluded sheep- tracks over the Etolian mountains. The national guards, which the communities in the GORDONS EXPEDITION. 355 provinces of Apokuro and Zygos had taken into their a. d. 1835. pay, as soon as they were sure of effectual support from the troops under Gordon, commenced dislodging the brigands from their positions between the Phidari (Evenus) and the Achelous. From Lepanto, Gordon marched to Mesolonghi and Vrachori. The officers under his orders found no diffi culty in clearing the plains of Acarnania, and when this was effected, he followed the rugged valley of Prousos to Karpenisi, where he arrived on the 11th of August. The arrangements he had adopted for secur ing to the Suliots and the veterans at Lepanto and Vrachori the regular payment of their pensions, and the good conduct of the detachments of regulars which he sent to support the local magistrates, insured active co-operation on the part of the native population. The spirit of order, which the neglect of the royal govern ment had almost extinguished, again revived. In one month after quitting Athens, tranquillity was restored in the whole of continental Greece. But as about three hundred brigands had assembled within the Turkish territory, and marched along the frontier with military music, it seemed that the difficulty of protecting the country would be greater than that of delivering it. The general's Oriental studies now proved of as great value to Greece as his military activity and geographical knowledge. He opened a correspondence with the pasha at Larissa ; and the circumstance of an Englishman commanding the Greek forces, and of that Englishman not only speaking Turkish fluently, but also writing it like a divan-effendi, contributed more than a sense of sound policy, to secure the co-operation of the Turkish authorities in dispersing the brigands. In the month of October Gordon's mission was ter minated, and he was ordered to resume his duties at Argos, as commander-in-chief in the Peloponnesus. CHAP. IV. 356 GORDONS EXPEDITION. book v. The brigands in Turkey had dispersed, but it was known that many had retired to Agrapha, where they were protected by Tzatzos, the captain of armatoli, and it was supposed that Tzatzos had not taken this step without the connivance of the derven - pasha. Gordon warned the Greek government that brigand age would soon recommence, unless very different measures were adopted from those which Count Ar mansperg had hitherto pursued, both in his civil and financial administration. And he completely lost the count's favour by the truths which he told in a memoir he drew up on the means of suppressing the brigandage, and maintaining tranquilUty on the fron tier. The insecurity which prevailed near the Turkish frontier, even though brigandage had for a moment ceased, is strongly illustrated by the closing scene of Gordon's sojourn in the vicinity. Before quitting Northern Greece he wished to enjoy a day's shooting. On the 5th October he went with a party of friends to Aghia Marina. The brigands, who lay concealed on both sides of the frontier, had official friends, and were well informed of all that happened at Lamia. They were soon aware of Gordon's project. A band lay concealed in the thick brushwood that covered the plain, but did not find an opportunity of attacking him on the road. Soon after sunset the house he occu pied was surrounded while the party was at dinner, but the alarm was given in time to allow the sports men to throw down their knives and forks, seize their fowling-pieces, and run to the garden-wall in front of the building. By this they prevented the brigands from approaching near enough to set fire to the house. A skirmish ensued, in which the assailants displayed very little courage. The firing brought a party of royal troops from Stelida to the general's assistance, but the INSURRECTION IN ACARNANIA. 357 obscurity of the night favoured the escape of the bri- a. d. 1836. gands, and on the foUowing morning all traces of them ' had disappeared.1 The lavish expenditure of Count Armansperg brought on financial difficulties at the end of 1835, and both Russia and France considered his accounts and his ex planations so unsatisfactory, that they refused to intrust him with the expenditure of the third series of the loan.2 The state of Greece was represented in a very different manner by the foreign ministers at the court of Athens. The King of Bavaria, hoping to learn the truth by personal observation, paid his son a visit. He little knew the difficulty which exists in Greece of acquiring accurate information, or of forming correct conclusions, from the partial information which it is in the power of a passing visitor to obtain, even when that visitor is a king. Truth is always rare in the East, and Greece was divided into several hostile fac tions, who were the irreconcilable enemies of truth. On the 7th of December 1835, the King of Bavaria arrived at Athens, where he was welcomed by the councU of state with the assurance that his son's dominions were in a state of profound tranquillity, and extremely prosperous. His majesty was not long- in Greece before he perceived that the councillors of state were not in the habit of speaking the truth. In the month of January 1836, the brigands, who had remained quiet for a short time, reappeared from their places of concealment, and those who had found an asylum in Turkey began to cross the frontier in small bands. Not a week passed without their plun dering some village. Accounts reached Athens of the 1 General Gordon gave the following account of this affair in a private let ter: — "Drosos Mansolas" (afterwards minister of the interior) " ehowed a degree of courage and coolness very uncommon in a Greek logiotatos. He behaved much better than his gun, which burst at the first discharge." 2 Compare Parish, Diplomatic History of the Monarchy of Greece, p. 296, and Annuaire Historique Universelle pour 1835, p. 480. CHAP. IV. 358 INSURRECTION IN ACARNANIA. bookv. unheard-of cruelties they were daily committing to extort money, or to avenge the defeats they suffered during the preceding year. Party spirit and official avidity had at this time so benumbed public spirit in the capital of Greece, that even the Liberal press paid little attention to the miseries of the agricultural population. The peasantry were neglected, for they had no influence in the distribution of places, honours, or profits. In the month of February, however, the evil increased so rapidly, and reached such an alarm ing extent, that it could no longer be overlooked even by Count Armansperg. Six hundred brigands estab lished themselves within the Greek kingdom, ravaging the whole vaUey of the Sperchius with fire and sword.1 An insurrection broke out at this time in Acarnania, which had its sources in the same poUtical and social evils as brigandage. It is peculiarly interesting, how ever, from affording some insight into the pohtical history of Great Britain as well as Greece. Lord Palmerston persuaded the British government that it was for the interest of Great Britain to support the administration of Count Armansperg. This could only be done effectually by furnishing him with money; and to induce Parliament to authorise the issue of the third instalment of the loan, papers were presented to both Houses, proving that the Greek government was in great need of money. But when the want of money was clearly proved, it was objected that the want complained of was caused by lavish expenditure and gross corruption ; and it was even said that Count Armansperg's maladministration was plunging Greece back into the state of anarchy from which the early regency had delivered the country. Additional papers were then presented to Parliament by the Foreign Secretary (which had been all along in his hands), to 1 'AOnva, (Greok newspaper), 4-16 February 1836. INSURRECTION IN ACARNANIA. 359 prove that Greece was in a most flourishing condition, a. d. isse. and that the prosperity she was enjoying was the ~ direct result of the Count's administration.1 The his tory of the insurrection is the best comment on these adverse statements. The leaders of the insurrection in Acarnania were officers of the irregular troops who had distinguished themselves in the revolutionary war. Demo Tzelios, who commanded one body of insurgents, proclaimed that the people took up arms against Count Armansperg and the Bavarians, not against the king and the gov ernment. Nicolas Zervas, another leader, demanded the convocation of a national assembly. A third party displayed the phcenix on its standard, and talked of orthodoxy as being the surest way to collect the Capo^ distrians and Ionians in arms against the government at Athens. All united in proclaiming the constitution, and demanding the expulsion of the Bavarians. The people took no part in the movement. Demo Tzelios entered Mytika without opposition, but was defeated at Dragomestre. Mesolonghi had been left almost without a garrison. The foUy of the government was so flagrant, in the actual condition of the country, that the proceeding looked like treachery. The insurgents made a bold attempt to gain possession of that important fortress by surprise, but they were bravely repulsed by the few troops who remained in the place, and by the inhabitants, who regarded the insurgents as mere brigands. The rebels, though re pulsed, from the walls of Mesolonghi, were nevertheless strong enough to remain encamped before the place and to ravage the plain for several days.2 1 Papers relating to the third instalment of the Greek loan, 1836; and Additional Papers relating to the third instalment of the Greek loan, presented to both Houses, August 1836. 2 'Aflrji/S, 12th (24th) February 1836. See also an account of this attack on Mesolonghi in Dr Fiedler's Reise durch alle theile des K'onigreiches Griechen- land, i. 150. 360 INSURRECTION IN ACARNANIA. book y. These events produced a panic at Athens. Men spoke of the pillage of the Morea in 1824, when Kon duriottes was president, of the sack of Poros by the troops of Capodistrias, and of the anarchy caused by Kolettes and the constitutionalists in 1832. Fortu nately for Greece, the presence of the King of Bavaria prevented a renewal of these calamities. His majesty enabled the Greek government to procure money. Count Armansperg having rejected the plans proposed by General Gordon for averting a renewal of brigand age, was in this emergency again induced to practise the lessons he had learned from Kolettes in suppress ing the insurrection of Messenia. Chieftains were allowed to enrol irregular troops, and reconstitute bands of personal foUowers. Kitzos DjaveUas, Theo dore Griva, Vassos, Mamoures, and Zongas were em powered to raise two thousand men, and to march against the insurgents. These bands of irregulars were followed by large bodies of regular troops. With these forces the country was cleared of insurgents and brigands without difficulty. Gordon had pointed out the operations by which Northern Greece can always be swept of enemies by a superior force in about a month. Before the end of May the last remains of the insurrection were trodden out in Acarnania, and all the large bands of brigands -were again driven into Turkey. Sir Richard Church then made a tour of miU tary inspection, to establish order, redress grievances, and pacify the people. On the 30 th May Sir Edmund Lyons wrote from Athens to Lord Palmerston : "No inroads have been made on the frontier since the end of April, and tranquillity has prevailed throughout the country. General Church is still in Western Greece, and his reports of the loyal feelings of the inhabitants are extremely satisfactory." Others, however, took a very different view of the LORD LYONS ON GREECE. 361 state of the country. The accounts given of the con- a. d. 1836. dition of Greece were so discordant, and the reports '' published in Western Europe were so variously coloured by personal feelings and party spirit, that some notice of this discordance is necessary, in order to show the reader how the streams of politics meander into the river of history. The late Lord Lyons was a warm supporter of Count Armansperg, and appears to have received all the state ments of the count with implicit confidence. On the 24th February 1836, Lyons wrote to Lord Palmerston that " the communes in Greece have the entire direc tion of their own affairs ; the press is unshackled ; the tribunals are completely independent ; private property is scrupulously respected ; the personal and religious liberty of the subject is inviolable."1 Yet not one of these assertions was true.2 While Sir E. Lyons was writing this despatch, the people of Athens were read ing in the Greek newspaper of the morning an account of the attack on Mesolonghi, and an announcement that the insurgents remained unmolested in their camps in Western Greece, while on the frontier brigandage was making gigantic progress.3 In the month of May, General Gordon, who took a view of the state of Greece totaUy different from that taken by Lord Lyons, re signed his command in the Peloponnesus, and before returning to England wrote to a friend at Athens : " From what I know of the state of the Peloponnesus, and the rapid and alarming increase of organised brigandage, I fear this wiU be but a melancholy sum mer. I am assured, and believe, that lately several captive robbers have bought themselves off. Faction is extremely busy, and crime enjoys impunity. Add 1 Parliamentary Papers — Additional Papers, 1836, p. 39. 8 Compare pp. 832, 849, 865, 873 of this volume. 3 'ABnva, 12th (24th) February 1836. 'H\r)(TTein av^dvn fti yiyavriaia CHAP. IV. 362 STATE OF GREECE. book v. to this Church and his heroes (hoc est oleum adde niT a t» tit camino), and we have a pretty picture. The bandits are now plundering in Romelia with crowns in their caps."1 Many brigands were enrolled in the bands which the irregular chieftains were authorised to form in the spring of 1836 ; and after the dismissal of Count Armansperg, Lord Lyons himself complained that one of these amnestied robbers had been seen at a ball, given by a foreign minister at Athens to the King and Queen of Greece.2 The disturbed state of Greece can be proved by better evidence than that of a British minister at Kmg Otho's court, or of a British officer in his service. It can be proved by facts which no party prejudices can distort. From the year 1833 to the year 1838, mUi tary tribunals were constantly sitting to deal out punishment to insurgents or brigands. To strangers who visited Greece, and who examined the events that occurred, instead of trusting to the reports they heard, it seemed that martial law was the only law by which King Otho was able to dispense even a modicum of justice to a great number of his unfortunate subjects.3 During the interval between the dismissal of Count Armansperg and the final expulsion of the Bavarians 1 This last observation alludes to Count Armansperg having granted an amnesty to several of the chiefs of brigands whom Gordon had driven out of Greece in 1835, and to one who had taken part in the attack made on the General at Agbia Marina. 2 An example of the different aspect which Greece presented to the British minister, and to an observant British traveUer, will be found by comparing the Parliamentary Papers of 1836 with Colonel Mure's Journal of a Tour in Greece in 1838. Lord Lyons writes in 1836 — " I denied that the peasantry were impoverished, or that they wore sheep-skins." Yet Colonel Mure in 1838, even in the town of Livadea, remarks that the students " reclined, squatted, romped, and reposed upon their shaggy goat-skin cloaks or hairy capotes, which protected them from the storm by day, and formed their mattress and bedding by night." 8 The following proclamations of martial law will be found in the Govern ment Gazette, 1833, No. 28; 1834, No. 28; 1835, first series, No. 12; second series, No. 3 ; 1836, No. 6. This last military tribunal was established in February 1836, and sat until June 1837. Various amnesties were granted by Count Armansperg, which furnished a supply of criminals for tribunals of a more regular kind at a later period. BRIGANDAGE. 363 in 1843, several trifling insurrections broke out in the a. d. 1839. Peloponnesus ; and continental Greece continued to be tormented by bands of brigands, who committed horrid atrocities. In a single year more than one hundred persons presented themselves to the public prosecutors, who had been tortured or mutilated by brigands and pirates. Men had lost their noses and ears ; women and chUdren had been tortured with indescribable cruelty, in order to force them to reveal where their husbands and their fathers were concealed.1 No tra veller passed through the country without seeing traces of their misdeeds. Colonel Mure found brigandage the subject of conversation at every khan he visited in 1838, and he fell in with victims of the brigands, with gendarmes pursuing brigands, or with brigands themselves, in every part of Greece.2 Even Attica suffered severely from their ravages ; shepherds were repeatedly murdered, and the landed proprietors feared to visit their estates. Several chiefs of robbers maintained themselves in the vicinity of Athens for years, and it was naturaUy supposed that they had found the means of obtaining powerful political protection.3 A singular scene, which occurred when two famous brigands were led out to be executed, confirmed the general belief in some official complicity. On the 5th of August 1839, Bibisi and Trakadha, who had been tried and condemned to death, were ordered to be executed in the vicinity of Athens. The 1 Dr Fiedler says : " Die Landrauber sind schon keine menschen mehr, aber die Seeiauber sind noch viel teuflischer. Es wurde zu emporend sein ihre Suhandthaten zu beschreiben." — ii. 46. 2 Journal of a Tour in Greece, by William Mure of Caldwell, vol. i. p. 241 ; vol. ii. 2, 137, 144, 147, 186, 209, 257, 259, 274, 286, and 291. Compare also Reise durch alle theile des Konigreiches Griechenland in den Jahren 1834 vis 1837, vol. i. 146, 159, 165, 182, 192, 193, 198 ; ii. 45. 3 The first of these local brigands who gained distinction in Attica was named Burduba. After committing several atrocious murders, he was par doned and enrolled in the municipal guard, but he was soon slain by the rela tions of one of his victims. CHAP. IV. 364 BRIGANDAGE. book v. executioner was assassinated at the Piraeus a few days before, and a new executioner was engaged to decapi tate the criminals. An immense crowd was assembled to witness the death of men who were as much admired for their daring as they were feared and hated for their cruelty. The two brigands were surrounded by a strong guard of soldiers. The executioner ascended the scaffold on which the guillotine was placed. After waiting long for orders, he slowly commenced his work, but after some further delay, he fainted, or pretended to faint, and his powers of action could not be suffi ciently restored to enable him to stand. The prefect wished to find another executioner, but the municipal authorities would give him no assistance. The popu lace began to enjoy the comedy they witnessed, instead of the tragedy they had expected to see. A reprieve was called for, and from the foot of the gallows the prefect was persuaded to despatch a message to King Otho asking for a reprieve, which, under the circum stances, it was impossible for his majesty to refuse.1 Bibisi was condemned to imprisonment for life. As usually happens in Greece, both he and Trakadha were soon allowed to escape. They recommenced their robberies in the neighbourhood of Athens. At last they ventured to rob within sight of the royal palace. The court and the Greek ministers were roused from their habitual lethargy. A price was put on Bibisi's head, and he was soon shot by a gendarme, who had himself been a brigand. Trakadha perished even sooner. But brigandage continued to exist in Attica, and to flourish in the greater part of Greece for many years ; and pages might be filled with accounts of robberies, murders, torturing, mutilation, and worse atrocities committed in every part of Greece.2 1 'AS-nva, 26th July 1839. 2 The recent work of Mr Senior gives some account of the extent to which brigandago continued in 1855. KING OTHO GOVERNS. 365 The evils of brigandage fell chiefly on the agricultu- a. d. 1839. ral population, and neither the court, the Bavarians, nor ~ the Greek ministers, appear to have paid any attention to the condition and the sufferings of the agricultural classes. The want of roads confined intercourse and material improvement to the sea-coast and the neigh bourhood of commercial towns. The greater part of Greece, cut off from all hope of bettering its condition, remained in a barbarous and stationary condition. King Otho became his own prime minister after the resignation of Mr Rudhart. His majesty possessed neither ability, experience, energy, nor generosity ; consequently he was neither respected, obeyed, feared, nor loved ; and the government grew gradually weaker and more disorganised. Yet he pursued one of the phantoms by which abler despots are often deluded. He strove to concentrate all power in his own hands. It never occurred to him that it was more politic to perform the duty of a king well, than to perform the business of half-a-dozen government officials with me chanical exactitude. King Otho observed but a very smaU portion of the facts which were placed directly before him ; he was slow at drawing inferences even from the few facts he observed, and he was utterly in capable of finding the means of reforming any abuse from his own administrative knowledge or the resources of his own mind. The king counted on his sincere desire to be the monarch of a prosperous and powerful nation for being able to govern the Greeks, and he expected that his personal popularity and his king-craft would prevent insurrections and suppress brigandage. Unfortunately he took no measures to root out the social evils that caused the one, or the poUtical evils that produced the other. The king could form no firm resolutions him self, and he reposed no confidence in his ministers. CHAP. IV. 366 KING OTHO GOVERNS. book v. They were indeed not worthy of much, for both Bava rians and Greeks displayed far more eagerness to ob tain ministerial portfolios, than zeal in performing the duties of the offices with which they were intrusted. King Otho observed the meanness of their intrigues and the selfishness of their conduct. He distrusted the Bavarians, because he perceived that they looked to Munich for their ultimate reward ; and he despised the Greeks, because they were always ready to abandon the principles they avowed when he offered them either place or profit. With these feelings he attempted to govern without the advice of his ministers; and he only assembled cabinet councils in order to obtain the for mal ratification of measures already prepared in his own closet. Even his majesty's commands were often communicated to his ministers by private secretaries. To insure complete subserviency, no minister was allowed to remain very long in office, and men were usually selected without influence or abiUty, and fre quently without education.1 During the personal government of King Otho, a singular event envenomed the disputes which had arisen between Lord Lyons and the Greek court during Mr Rudhart's administration. The affair has always re mained enveloped in mystery, but its effects were so important that the fact requires notice, though it eludes explanation. It placed the British minister in direct personal hostility to the sovereign at whose court he was accredited, and it was the principal cause of the 1 Count Armansperg taught King Otho to form cabinets of ministers who could not communicate in a common language. He had often two ministers who could only speak Greek, and one who could speak nothing but German. But King Otho carried many things farther in tho wrong direction than his arch-chancellor. The following is the copy of a letter written by a minister of foreign affairs, who held office during delicate negotiations with Lord Palmer ston. It may be said to consist of eighteen words, twelve of which are strangely mis-spelt : — Kupie, aas eSoirio KaTavipiKiviirlTayivTis.A. M tis BaffiAicris otoi afipiov Tplriv tis Tas 7£ li-fi. Bfhoi aas 8ex<*<» V A. M r/ /3a