Yale University Library
39002027964536

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YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY
THE LIBRARY ASSOCIATES

Gift of the
REVEREND T. LAWRASON RIGGS

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Col. Arthur L. Wagner, U. S. A.

REPORT

OF THE

Santiago Campaign

1898

By
ARTHUR L. WAGNER
Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. A.
Assistant Adiutant-General

January, 1899

Kansas Citv, Mo.
Fbankx-in Hudson Publishing Co.
1908

Copyrighted 1908
By
Franklin Hudson Publishino Co.
Kansas City, Mo,

Publisher's Notice.
No introduction of Colonel Wagner is nec
essary. As an author of known reputation on
military subjects and as one of the pioneers in
promoting professional study in the Army, his
name is not only well known in military circles,
but to the general public as well. The report
herein printed was sent us, with other papers,
by his widow for publication, and, though ten
years have elapsed since the stirring events de
scribed in the report transpired, we take great
pleasure in publishing it, not only because
of our high regard and friendship for Colonel
Wagner, but because it seems to us that the
publication will be of great benefit to the Army.
From this report it appears that a Bureau
of Military Information in the Field was estab
lished by the Commanding General of the Army
and placed under charge of Colonel Wagner.
Under his instructions Colonel Wagner pro
ceeded to Cuba, but for reasons shown in the
report was unable to organize the Bureau or
to accomplish any useful work in connection
therewith. He then offered his services to

General Lawton and became a volunteer aid on
the latter's staff. In this position he had ex
ceptional opportunities for observing the con
duct of the Santiago expedition through all its
phases, and has given us a report thereon in
his own lucid and inimitable style.
The account begins with the mobilization of
the troops at Tampa, follows the naval expedi
tion over the seas to Cuba, describes the land
ing, the theater of operations, the battles of
Las Guasimas, El Caney and San Juan, and
the subsequent siege and surrender of the city.
Throughout the report Colonel Wagner
comments freely upon the situation from the
standpoint of a military critic, and in conclu
sion gives his views upon various features of
the campaign, such as smokeless powder, the
artillery, dismounted cavalry, infantry organi
zation, ammunition supply, intrenching tools,
uniforms, volunteers, staff and line, signal
corps, etc.
We publish his report as a tribute to his
memory and for the benefit of his surviving
comrades in arms.
June I, 1908.

CONTENTS.

Page
The Santiago Expedition — Lack of System and
Preparation,  . 19
The Military Problem,. ... ... 35
The Landing  .41
Colonel Wagner's Services Declined by the Corps
Commander — Volunteer Aid to General Lawton, 47
Las Guasimas, ... .  51
Comments on the Landing — Lack of Supplies after
Las Guasimas, . . .... -57
The Army Advances— Colonel Wagner Is Deprived
of His Aid — Reconnaissance, ... 61
The Plan of Battle,  69
The Battle Begins— El Caney,  73
General Lawton Receives Orders to Break off the
Engagement at El Caney,  76
San Juan, .  . • 78
Demonstration Against Aguadores, 89
After the Battle — General Lawton's March to San
Juan, .  -93
July 2d— The "Night Attack "—Shall the Army
Retreat?  98
A Truce,  100
General Comments,  105
Smokeless Powder,  112

Page
The Artillery,.  u6
Dismounted Cavalry,  122
Infantry Organization,  124
Ammunition Supply,  127
Black Powder, . .  129
Intrenching Tools,  . . 131
Uniforms,  . . 132
Volunteers,  133
Stafif and Line, ... .... . 136
Signal Corps,  . . 139
Pack Trains,  . .... 142
Transportation of Wounded, ... 144
Mail Service,  . . 145
The Enemy,  . . 148

Detailed in Charge of a Bureau of Military
Information in the Field.
Headquarters Department of Dakota,
Adjutant-General's Office,
St. Paul, Minnesota,
January 15, 1899.
To Brigadier-General John C. Gilmore, Assistant
Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C:
Sir: — In compliance with the verbal orders
of the Major-General Commanding, I have the
honor to submit the following report on my
observations of the military operations in the
Province of Santiago de Cuba. A brief pre
liminary report was submitted by me at Ponce,
P. R. ; but th§ preparation of a detailed account
of my observations has been delayed, owing to
my illness from Cuban fever, which for some
months rendered impracticable on my part the
labor of preparing an extended report.

On the I ith day of June, 1898, 1 received from
the Commanding-General in person the foUow-
11

12 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
ing order, which I was enjoined, at the time, to
regard as confidential, with the exception that
I was to show it to General Shafter, and under
take no duties without his knowledge and
consent:

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 13

(Confidential) "Headquarters op the Army,
"In the Field, Tampa, Fla.,
"June II, 1898.
"Colonel: — On your arrival at Santiago de
Cuba you will, as soon as practicable, call upon
General Garcia and consult with him in regard
to further operations in the Island of Cuba.
You will also inform yourself fully as to the
strength, condition and character of his forces.
You will present this communication to Gen
eral Shafter at a suitable time in the course of
the operations, who will afford you every facility
for carrying out my instructions. I desire that
you consult him fully in regard to everything
pertaining to your duties. Immediately after
the icapture of Santiago de Cuba or the termina
tion of the operations in that region, you will
report at once by cable, and proceed immediate
ly with the officer, interpreter and clerk with
you to join my headquarters.
' ' Very respectfully. Nelson A. Miles,
' ' Major-General, Commanding.
"To Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur L. Wagner, As
sistant Adjutant-General."

14 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
I was also enjoined to be extremely careful
to avoid in every way anything that might be
construed as a recognition by my superiors of
the Cuban forces as the army of an independent
power or belligerent nation.
Shortly after my departure from Tampa, a
bureau of military information at the Head
quarters of the Army in the field had been es
tablished by the following order, which was
communicated to the Commanding-General of
the Vth Army Corps:

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 15

"Headquarters of the Army,
"In the Field, Tampa, Fla.,
"June 4, 1898.
The Commanding General, Fifth Army Corps:
"Sir, — ^The Major-General Commanding the
Army directs me to communicate to you the
following for your information and guidance:
"A Bureau of Military Information in the
Field is hereby established in connection with
the Headquarters of the Army, and is placed
under the charge of Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur
L. Wagner, Assistant Adjutant-General, who
will be under the direct orders of the Command
ing General.
"The Bureau of Military Information will
be charged with the following duties:
" I . The collection and collation of all sta
tistical information in regard to the probable
theaters of operations of the Army.
"2. The collection and preparation for
ready reference of the Commanding General,
of all information relative to the positions and
conditions of hostile forces, and the Cuban
insurgents. "3. The conduct of such reconnaissance
as may be necessary to carry out the above, ex
cepting such reconnaissance as may be ordered

16 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
by the Corps Commanders and other subordi
nate commanders in accordance with their own
functions. "4. The secret service, embracing the em
ployment of spies and special scouts, guides,
interpreters, etc.
"The Bureau will at all times furnish to
Corps Commanders all information that may
seem to be of value to them, and they in turn
are requested to forward to Lieutenant-Colonel
Wagner any information which they may deem
of value to the Bureau in the exercise of its
designated functions. "Very respectfully, F. MiCHLER,
"Assistant Adjutant-General "

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 17
My status with the expedition is clearly
shown by the instructions set forth above.
Under the confidential instructions first men
tioned, I was given certain specific duties which
were to be performed at the beginning and at
the end of the operations. In the meantime I
was to perform such duties as might be assigned
to me by General Shafter under the order es
tablishing the Bureau of Military Information,
and generally to perform any military duty that
he might find appropriate to my rank and corps.*
I was accompanied by my assistant, Cap
tain Edward Anderson, U. S. V. (ist Lieut. 7th
U. S. Cav'y.), Mr. Griffith L. Johnson, stenog
rapher, and Rev. A. J. Diaz, interpreter. I was
also provided with funds for use in secret service.
?See p. 140, where Colonel Wagner states that no use was
made of the Bureau of Information except by detailing one of its
officers as assistant adjutant-general of a brigade and permitting
another to serve as volunteer aid. — Publisher.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 19

The Santiago Expedition. — Lack of System
and Preparation.
The expedition consisted of the Fifth Army
Corps, to which was attached a battalion of
engineers, a detachment of signal troops, thir
teen squadrons of cavalry, four batteries of
light artillery, of four guns each, one Hotch-
kiss mountain battery of four guns, and two
batteries of heavy artillery armed with four
siege guns, four siege howitzers and eight field
mortars. A pneumatic field-gun was manned
by a detachment of the ist U. S. Vol. Cavalry,
and there was a Gatling battery of four pieces
under charge of Lieutenant Parker, of the Ninth
Infantry. The infantry, cavalry and engineers
were provided with 500 rounds of ammunition
per man, and all the troops were supplied with
fourteen days' field and ten days' travel rations,
in addition to which sixty days' field rations
were taken by the Chief Commissary for issue
as circumstances might require. The soldiers
were provided with shelter-tents and each car
ried a blanket-roll.
The transports began arriving at Tampa

20 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
early in May, and were, as quickly as possible,
put in order to receive supplies and troops.
Not only had they to be thoroughly policed and
supplied with fuel and water, but it was neces
sary to fit them with bunks and stalls for the
use of the men and animals. Thus, owing to our
lack of military preparation, it became neces
sary to go through the labor and delay of alter
ing all manner of steamers into troop-ships, at
a time when celerity of movement was of imper
ative importance and delay was both dangerous
and costly.
There was much confusion and delay in load
ing the transports. This was due to many
causes, chief of which was the fact that the
organizations instead of being mobilized (*. e.,
raised to their full strength, fully supplied and
equipped with everything requisite for a cam
paign) before their concentration at Tampa,
were in many, if not most, instances really
mobilized only after their concentration. None
I of the organizations were supplied with suita
ble clothing for a tropical campaign, but went
into the field wearing the same uniform, minus
the overcoat, that they would have worn in
Montana or northern New York in the winter.
Clothing, camp and garrison equipage had to
be issued to the various commands after their
arrival at Tampa, and the equalizing of the

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 21
transportation among the different regiments,
the supply of the light batteries, and the com
pletion of the equipment for all the organiza-/
tions, caused an enormous amount of labor, all
of which, under a proper military system, could
and would have been done before the troops
started for Tampa. Many of the officers of the',
supply departments were inexperienced; and,!
though all worked energetically, there was all
the friction attendant upon the hurried solutioA
of an important practical problem by untried,
men. The neglect of the shipping quarter
masters to mark on the outside of the cars
a list of the stores carried within frequently
necessitated an overhauling of a vast quantity!
of stores in order to find certain needed articles,
and added to the general confusion. The con
gestion of the railroad was a serious drawback,
but not an unavoidable one. The private traf
fic on the railroads of the Plant System could
not have been stopped without grave and un
necessary inconvenience to the civil popula
tion, but provision should have been made to
give the right of way to important military
trains and the portion of the road from Tampa
to Port Tampa should have been taken under
control of the military authorities to the extent
of side-tracking all private freight between th^
two points, and especially the trains of idle

22 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
sight-seers, who used the road to the serious
detriment of the Army.
The lack of anything like a carefully-
thought-out system was everywhere manifest
in the embarkation of the expedition. The case
was one of emergency and everything was neces
sarily done in haste; but the haste was not al
ways of the kind that implies speed. The Chief
Quartermaster evidently was not given the
power, in all cases, to enforce such regulations
as he found necessary for the proper and expe
ditious embarkation of the command; and at
least one instance is known of a regiment seizing
and holding a transport that had been desig
nated for another. Troops were placed aboard
the transports before the loading had been com
pleted, and they were thus kept in a confined
position when they would have been more
comfortable ashore; and in the meantime they
were consuming water which had to be replen
ished before the expedition sailed. The trans
ports were deficient in quantity and unsuit
able in quality; and, as a result, the men were
crowded to a degree that, from a hygienic point
of view, was simply shocking. If rough weather
had been encountered on the passage the distress
and sickness resulting from overcrowding would
have gone far towards incapacitating the com
mand for the work of an arduous campaign.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 23
But the deficiency of the transports in number,
and quality is a subject for regret rather than
censure. At the beginning of the war the Unit-i
ed States did not possess a single troop-ship,;
and in the necessity of preparing in haste an
expedition for the invasion of Cuba, the best
use had to be made of the means at hand.
If we are to profit from our experience, we
should remember in similar cases in future:
I. An officer with full authority to give
orders in the name of the commanding general
of the expedition should be charged with the
loading of the transports. His authority should
in this matter be supreme and beyond question.
2. No troops should be embarked until the
completion of the loading of the vessel. Unless
circumstances imperatively demand otherwise,
none of the troops should be embarked until all
the vessels have their load of freight. The
troops could then be placed aboard immediately
before sailing. If time permits, the men should
be practiced in embarking and debarking.
3. The supplies of all kinds immediately
necessary for each organization should be on
the same vessel with it.
4. A list of the contents of each vessel
should be made out by the quartermaster in
charge, one copy given to the Commanding
General, one retained by the Chief Quarter-

24 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
master, and a copy given to the chief of each
supply department, so far as it relates to the
stores under his charge.
5 . If possible, the stores should be so load
ed that upon disembarkation it would be prac
ticable to unload completely and promptly one
or two vessels so as to have them available for
emergency transportation without carrying with
them a part of the supplies needed by the
command. 6. Every car bringing supplies to the place
of embarkation should be marked with a card
showing in detail the nature of its contents.
All commissary stores in cars and trains should
be in the form of complete rations.
J 7. All companies, either railroad or steam
ship, engaged in carrying troops in time of war^
especially in an emergency, should be made to
regard military interests as paramount. Trans
portation companies, it seems to me, were, dur
ing the campaign, treated with a degree of un
necessary consideration, evincing timidity, by
the military authorities, which was not always
in accordance with the best interests of the
Nation. On the manner in which the command was
embarked by Lieutenant-Colonel C. F. Hum
phrey (now brigadier-general of Volunteers),
D.Q.D.G., there can justly be no comment but

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 25
praise. The faults existing were in no manner
due to him, but were in a great measure over
come by his indefatigable and Herculean labor.
Tampa having been found in many respects
undesirable as a point of embarkation, there
has been some adverse comment upon its selec
tion. I desire to state that in a projet of opera
tions submitted by me before the outbreak of
hostilities with Spain, New Orleans, Mobile and
Tampa were recommended as points of simul
taneous embarkation for troops destined for the
invasion of Cuba. The same points were recom
mended by a joint Military and Naval Board con
sisting of Captain A. S. Barker, U.S.N. , and
myself, and later by a board consisting of
Lieutenant - Colonel Theodore Schwan (now
brigadier - general of Volunteers and colonel),
A.A.G., myself, and Major W. H. Carter (now
lieutenant-colonel), A.A.G. In each case these
three points were recommended as points for
simultaneous embarkation of completely mohil^
ized troops, not as points of organization and(
supply. What circumstances demanded the
assembling and outfitting of the entire force at
Tampa I do not know.
The embarkation of the command was prac
tically completed on the evening of June 8th,
the various organizations occupying transports
as follows. The number in each case indicates

26

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

the number of the transport, which was painted
in large white figures on the smokestacks and
sides of the vessels.

Organizations and
Commanding Officers.
ist Infantry,
Lt.-Col. W. H. Bisbee.
2d Infantry,
Lt.-Col. W. M. Wherry.

3d Infantry,
Colonel John H. Page.
4th Infantry,
Lt.-Col. A. H. Bainbridge.
6th Infantry,
Lt.-Col. H. C. Egbert.
7th Infantry,
Colonel D. W. Benham.

8th Infantry,
Major C. H. Conrad.
9th Infantry,
Lt.-Col. E. P. Ewers.
loth Infantry,
Lt.-Col. E. R. Kellogg.

On What Ships.

Seguranpa (12). Regiment.
Yucatan (8). Hdqrs., Band,
Cos. C and G.
Clinton (32). Cos. D and B.
San Marcos (18). Cos. A,
E, F and H.

Breakwater (29). Regiment.
Concho (14). Regiment.
Miami (i). Regiment.
Iroquois (25). Hdqrs., Cos.
A, B, C, D and F.
D.H. Miller (ig). Cos. E, G
and H.
Comal (7). Co. I.
Seneca (5).. Regiment.
Santiago (2). Regiment.
Alamo (6). Hdqrs., Band,
Cos. C, D, E and G.
Santiago (2). 1 Battalion.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

27

Organizations and
Commanding Officers.

I2th Infantry,
Lt.-Col. R. Comba.
13th Infantry,
Major P. H. Ellis.
1 6th Infantry,
Colonel H. A. Theaker.
17th Infantry,
Lt.-Col. J. T. Haskell..

20th Infantry,
Major Wm. S. McCaskey.
2 ist Infantry,
Lt.-Col. Chambers McKibbin.

22d Infantry,
Lt.-Col. J. H. Patterson.
24th Infantry,
Lt.-Col. E. H. Liscum.

25th Infantry,
Lt.-Col. A. S. Daggett.
2d Mass. Vols.,
Colonel E. P. Clarke.

On What Ships.

Cherokee (4). Regiment.
Saratoga (20). Regiment.
San Marcos (18). Regiment.
Cherokee (4). Hdqrs. and 2
Companies.
Iroquois (25). Cos. C, G, H
and K.
Manteo (36). 2 Cos.
Maitewan (26). Regiment..
Saratoga (20). Hdqrs.,
Band, Cos. C, D, E, H.
City of Washington (i6).
Cos. A, B, F and G.
Orizaba (24). Regiment.
City of Washington (16).
Regiment.
Concho (14). Regiment.
Knickerbocker (13). Hdqrs.
and 8 Cos.
Seneca (5). 2 Cos.
Manteo (36). 2 Cos.

28

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

Organizations and
Commanding Officers.
71st New York Vols.,
Lt.-Gol. W. A. Downs.
ist Cavalry,
Lt.-Col. C. D. Viele.
2d Cavalry,
Major W. A. Rafferty.

3d Cavalry,
Major H. W. Wessels.
6th Cavalry,
Lt.-Col. Henry Carroll.
9th Cavalry,
Lt.-Col. J. M. Hamilton.
loth Cavalry,
Lt.-Col. S. T. Norvell.
ist Vol. Cavalry,
Colonel Leonard Wood.
Engineer Battalion,
Captain E. Burr.
Light Arty. Battalion,
Major J. W. Dillenback,
Captain AUyn Capron,
Captain C. L. Best,
Captain G. S. Grimes,
Captain C. D. Parkhurst.

On What Ships.

Vigilancia (23). Regiment.
Leona (21). Regiment.
Morgan (30). Major Raf
ferty and Troop C.
Mattewan (26). Troops F
and D.
Stillwater (28). Troop A.
Rio Grande {22). Regiment.
Rio Grande (22). Regiment.
Miami (i). Regiment.
Leona (21). Regiment.
Yucatan (8). Regiment.
Alamo (6). Battalion (2
Cos.)
Berkshire (9).
Comal (7). Lt. Batty. E,
ist Arty.
Comal (7). Lt. Batty.i K,
ist Arty.
Berkshire (9). Lt. Batty.
A, 2d Arty.
Berkshire (9). Lt. Bat. F,
2d Arty.

LTHE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

29

Organizations and
Commanding Officers.
Siege Arty. Battalion,
Captain W. Ennis,
Captain A. S. Cummins.
Balloon Signal Detachm't,
Major J. E. Maxfield,
Major F. Greene.

On What Ships.

Orizaba (24). Batty. G, 4th
Arty.
Orizaba (24). Batty. H, 4th
Arty.
Rio Grande (22).
Seguranfa (12).

The several divisions and brigades were constituted
as follows:
FIRST DIVISION.
Brigadier-General J. F. Kent.

First Brigade.

Brig.-Gen.
H. S. Hawkins
6th Infantry,
1 6th Infantry,
71st N.Y. Vols.

Second Brigade.

Colonel
E. P. Pearson.
2d Infantry,
loth Infantry,
2 ist Infantry.

Third Brigade.

Colonel
C. A. Wikoff.
9th Infantry^
13th Infantry
24th Infantry .

SECOND DIVISION.
Brigadier-General H. W. Lawton.

First Brigade.

Second Brigade.

Third Brigade.

Colonel
J. J. Van Home.
8th Infantry,
2 2d Infantry,
2d Mass. Vols.

Colonel
Evan Miles.
ist Infantry,
4th Infantry,
25th Infantry.

Brig.-Gen.
A. R. Chaffee.
7th Infantry,
12th Infantry,
1 7th Infaritry.

30 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
CAVALRY DIVISION.*
Major-General Joseph Wheeler.

First Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. S. S. Sumner.
3d Cavalry,
6th Cavalry,
9th Cavalry,

Second Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. S. B. M. Young.
ist Cavalry,
loth Cavalry,
ist U. S. Vol. Cavalry.

ist Squadron, 2d Cavalry (Mounted).
INDEPENDENT BRIGADE
Brigadier-General J. C. Bates.

3d Infantry, 20th Infantry.

The headquarters of General Shafter were on
the Seguranca; those of Generals Wheeler, Law-
ton and Kent were on the Alleghany, Santiago
and Iroquois respectively.
The force embarked consisted, in round num
bers, of 15,000 enlisted men and 800 officers.
There were also about 2,200 horses and mules
on the transports. The Cavalry Division was
dismounted, with the exception of the squadron
of the 2d Cavalry under Major Rafferty.
The expedition was expected to sail on the
morning of June 9th; but, owing to a report,
communicated officially from the Navy Depart
ment, that Spanish war-vessels had been seen
in the Nicholas Channel, the departure of the
transports was delayed until June 14th. What
foundation there was for the report in regard to
Each regiment consisted of two dismounted squadrons, the
third having been left at Tampa. — Publisher.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 31
the Spanish vessels, I have never been able to
ascertain. As the report came officially, the
delay was certainly dictated by the most or
dinary prudence, as a fleet of transports would
in themselves be helpless in the presence of hos
tile war-vessels, and it would be a difficult mat
ter for the convoy to protect the transports
against the assaults of a smaller number of ves
sels determined to destroy the troop-ships at
the risk of their own annihilation. Neverthe
less the delay was unfortunate, as time was
pressing, the troops in the transports were un
comfortable, and each passing day brought us
nearer to the sickly season.
On the 14th of June the fleet of transports
sailed. The convoy consisted of the Annapolis,
Helena and Castine, which were reinforced at
Dry Tortugas by the Indiana, Detroit, Panther,
Yosemite, Bancroft, Vesuvius, Scorpion, Wasp,.
Eagle and Wampatock. The fleet sailed in three
columns, with intervals of 800 yards, the ships
of each column being at a distance of 400 yards
from each other. The order of sailing of the
war-vessels and transports is shown in the dia
gram on the following page. The fleet was
favored with pleasant weather and a smooth
sea, and the expedition arrived off Guantanamo
early on the morning of the 20th of June. From
this point the Seguranca steamed to the fleet of

32 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
war- vessels lying off the harbor of Santiago, and
Admiral Sampson came aboard to consult with
General Shafter. The Seguranca, accompanied
by the Gloucester, steamed to Aserraderos, where
General Shafter and Admiral Sampson had a
conference with General Garcia at the camp of
General Jesus Rabi, of the Cuban Army. In
compliance with my orders (already quoted), I
went ashore at Aserraderos and consulted Gen
eral Garcia in regard to the matters mentioned
in my instructions. I was received by him with
great courtesy, and given full and unreserved
information, the essence of which I communi
cated on the same day by cable to the Major-
General Commanding. My first impression of
the Cuban soldiers was much more favorable
than the opinion formed as the result of later and
more extended observation. They were better
disciplined and better equipped than I had ex
pected them to be, and their ready obedience of
their officers, and their manifest good care of
their arms more than neutralized the unfavor
able impression created by their ragged attire
and general tatterdemalion appearance. It was
not until a later date that I discovered that,
whatever their merits as bushwhackers might
be, they were practically useless in battle.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

33

ORDER OF CRUISING.

INTERNATIONAL SIGNAL T. C. F.

0
Vesuvius. 11
i6oo tl

i6oo yds.

I

o
Scorpion. I I
i6oo Jt

0 8oo 0 8oo 0 8oo 0
Annapolis. Castine. Helena. Indiana.

400 o
Miaflii. o
Santiago.
O— 1600— O
Panther. o

400
O O (ist Division.)
Berkshire. Alleghany.
o o
San Marcos.
O — i6oo— 0
D. H. Miller. Yosemite.
o

o

o

0— 1600— o
Wompatuck. Yucatan. o o
Alamo.
O— Naval Ship.
O — Transport.

Cherokee. Seguranga. Saratoga.
0 0 0
Seneca. Iroquois. Morgan.
800 800
0 800 0 800 O 800 0
Bancroft. Manning. Hornet. Detroit.
400 400
O O O (2d Division.)
Mattewan. Stillwater. Rio Grande.
0 0 0
Comal. Vigilancia.

o o o I !
0
Wasp.

o
Orizaba. o o
Leona.

-1600 — O
Eagle.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 35

THE MILITARY PROBLEM.
The military problem to be solved by the
commander of the expedition can be briefly
stated. The Spanish fleet, consisting of four
armored cruisers and three torpedo-boat de
stroyers, was blockaded in the harbor of Santi
ago by a superior American naval force.* The
harbor is about five miles long, and the city is
about four miles from the sea entrance. This
entrance is about two miles long and varies in
width from one-eighth to five-eighths of a mile.
The harbor then gradually widens until at the
northern part it is about two miles broad. The
entrance was planted with submarine mines and
the harbor was defended by the Morro Castle, a
stone work partly cut in the rock, having a com
mand of about 1 80 feet above the sea, and a full
command over the opposite shore, which has an
elevation of about 60 feet. On the same side of
the harbor, and about 340 yards north of Morro
was the Estrella battery, having a straight field
of fire down the harbor. A quarter of a mile
north of Estrella battery was the Santa Catalina
battery, and about 1,100 yards further north
*See Map No. i.

36 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
was the Punta Gorda battery. On the west of
the entrance of the harbor, about three-eighths
of a mile above the Morro, was the battery of
La Socapa. West of the entrance on the open
sea front, about two and one-eighth miles from
Morro, was the Cabanas battery; while to the
east, about one and one-fourth miles from Morro,
and also on the open sea front, was the Fortal-
eza de Aguadores, a fortification quite obsolete.
Nothing definite was known in regard to the
armament of these batteries, but it was not be
lieved to be formidable. They were, however,
of sufficient strength to protect the torpedo field
from countermining, and it was not deemed
prudent by our Navy to attempt to force the
harbor while the mines were still intact, at the
risk of a loss of vessels which might reverse the
relative strength of the fleets. The military
force was therefore to capture the batteries, thus
insuring the destruction of the torpedoes, and
'forcing the Spanish fleet to leave the harbor as
the only alternative to being annihilated in it by
our own naval force.

SANTIAGO THEATER OF
OPERATIONS
JUNE 20 - JULY 17

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 37

Theater of Military Operations.
The theater of the principal military opera
tions in Cuba lies in a valley between the Sierra
Maestre and the sea.* This theater is about
twenty miles in length, and varies in width from
a mere strip of land at Daiquiri, where a spur of
high hills comes down to the sea, to a wide
stretch of about seven miles from Aguadores
north to El Caney and San Miguel. The region
mentioned can be termed a valley only in com
parison with the mountainous region which
bounds it on the north; for it consists of a series
of hilly spurs which form the water-sheds of a
number of small rivers emptying into the sea.
These streams are the Daiquiri, the Demajayabo,
the Juragua, the Guasima and the Aguadores.
Though termed "rivers," these streams are mere
creeks, ordinarily easily f ordable, though at times
so swollen by rains as to be serious obstacles.
The principal one of these rivers is the Agua-
doresf, which enters the sea about two and a
half miles east of the entrance to Santiago harbor
*See Map No. 2.
t The Americans called this the San Juan River, the Aguadores
being a tributary, as shown on the map. — Publisher.

38 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
Ascending this stream about three miles, in a
northerly direction, we find it separating into
two branches, one of which, known as the San
Juan River, extends, almost due north, for about
three miles to its source beyond the San Miguel
.Hill. At a distance of about a mile and a half
from its junction with the Aguadores, the San
Juan receives the waters of a tributary known
as Purgatorio Creek, which extends in a north
westerly direction beyond Cuabitas. About half
a mile above the mouth of the Purgatorio, the
San Juan receives another affluent, which ex
tends to the northeast, its course lying about a
mile west of El Caney. From its junction with
the San Juan, the Aguadores extends east about
a mile to El Pozo, then in a northeasterly direc
tion for about a mile, where it forks, one branch
extending to the northeast and the other to the
southeast to their sources, each about two miles
above the junction. A little less than half a mile
from its junction with the San Juan, the Agua
dores receives the waters of Las Guamas Creek,
which is often termed the Aguadores River,
it being fully as large as the other branch. Las
Guamas Creek extends to the northeast a little
more than a mile to the vicinity of Mariana je,
then extends almost due north to its source be
yond El Caney. About a mile above Marianaje

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN 39
the stream forks, one branch extending to the
northeast, and the other north to a point about
half a mile south of El Caney, where it again
divides, one branch passing to the east and an
other to the west of the town The Aguadores,
Las Guamas, and San Juan flow through a verit
able valley, bounded on the south and west by
hills and on the north by foot-hills which rise
gradually until they form a part of the Sierra
Maestre. From Siboney a single-track, narrow-gauge
railway extended to Santiago, passing along
the seashore. A road, known as El Camino
Real, passes from Daiquiri over the water
shed to Siboney, thence over a similar range
to the valley of the Aguadores, and thence
over the San Juan hills and another range
nearer the city, to Santiago. Another road,
leading from Guantanamo, passes several miles
to the north of El Camino Real, and en
ters the theater of operations at El Caney,
from which point it leads in a southwesterly
direction to Santiago. These two principal
roads were poor, especially El Camino Real,
Whose name would seem to have been given it
in a spirit of sarcasm, as it was execrably bad.
The other roads in the region considered were
such in name only, being generally mere trails

40 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
or bridle-paths. The soil is rich and the vegeta
tion is of the rank luxuriance known only»in the
tropics. In many places it was impossible to
penetrate it without using a machete, and it often
complet^y shut out the view of the surrounding
landscape.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 41

The Landing.
Small garrisons of Spanish troops were at
Daiquiri, Siboney, Sardinero and Aguadores, the
main body of the Spanish Army being in San
tiago. As a result of the conference with Gen
eral Garcia, General Shafter decided to effect
a landing at Daiquiri, about eighteen miles east
of Santiago; From this point the force, pushed
forward toward Santiago, could uncover the
landing at Siboney, which was then to be used
as a second place of debarkation. It was de
cided that feints should be made at the dif
ferent points along the coast from Cabanas on
the west to Guantanamo on the east. General
Demetrio Castillo, who had 500 Cubans a short
distance east of Daiquiri, was to be reinforced
with 500 more men from Garcia's force, and was
to move forward and attack the town in con
junction with the landing of our troops. He
was to be in rear of Daiquiri on the morning of
the 2 2d. Five hundred more of Garcia's troops,
under General Rabi, were to attack Cabanas;
while General Garcia himself, with the remain
der of his force, was to remain for the present at

42 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
Aserraderos. I have never been able to learn
definitely the exact strength of Ga^-cia's army.
As first reported by me in cable message to
the Major-General Commanding, it amounted to
8,000 men; but I have reason to believe that
this very considerably exceeds the real number
that Garcia had, and that his command probably
never numbered more than 5,000 during the
campaign. The choice of a landing-place was judicious.
It would, it is true, have been practicable to
land nearer the city, and at a later date, when
we had troops on the shore and in contact with
the enemy, the choice of Cabafias as a landing-
place would doubtless have been better. But
in the first instance it was desirable to get all the
troops ashore with as little opposition as pos
sible, in order that they might be supplied with
rations and ammunition, and that all necessary
preliminaries to a determined and sustained ad
vance might be taken. The enemy, of course,
labored under the disadvantage which a com
mander standing on the defensive always in
curs — the point of attack being unknown to
him, he could not distribute troops at the dif
ferent landing-places along the shore without
incurring the risk of being overwhelmed by
superior numbers at some point, A manifest
attempt to land at Siboney or Aguadores would

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 43
have enabled the Spanish commander to con
centrate a considerable number of troops to
oppose it, whereas he could not have seriously
resisted the landing at Daiquiri without incur
ring the danger of being cut off by a force land
ing at Siboney. As to the landing at Aguadores,
it would have been practicable for the Spaniards
to oppose it with a very considerable force which
they could have safely detached at such a short
distance from the city; and considerations of
supply, of water, camping facilities for the
troops, etc., made that point undesirable as a
landing-place. According to the plan agreed
upon by the military and naval commanders. Ca
banas, Aguadores, Siboney and Daiquiri were to
be simultaneously bombarded by the Navy, and
feints'" were to be made at each place. The Army
was to land in the following order: Second Di
vision, with Gatling detachment. Bates' brigade
(reserve for Lawton), Cavalry Division (Wheel
er), First Division (Kent), Squadron of 2d Cav
alry (Rafferty) . In case serious opposition was
encountered, the field artillery was to be landed
at once; otherwise it was to follow the cavalry
squadron. Three days' field rations and 100
rounds of ammunition were issued to each sol
dier, and 100 rounds of cartridges per man were
ordered on shore at once for distribution. On
the morning of the 2 2d, the Scorpion, Vixen and

44 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
Texas opened fire at Cabafias; the Eagle and
Gloucester at Aguadores; the Hornet, Helena and
Bancroft at Siboney; and the Detroit, Castine,
Wasp and New Orleans at Daiquiri. It would
seem that some provision for proper reconnais
sance, and for communication between the fleet
and the Cubans on shore, would have obviated
the necessity for some of this bombardment.
The Spaniards had evacuated Daiquiri about
five o'clock in the morning, after setting fire to
the wharf and some sheds, and the troops of Gen
eral Castillo were in possession of it when the
bombardment began; but no provision had been
made for communication between Castillo and
the fleet, and the important information of the
abandonment of Daiquiri and its environs were
not conveyed to the American commander.
After a furious cannonade all along the shore at
the points mentioned, which lasted about half
an hour, and which is said to have resulted in
the loss of one Spaniard, killed at Siboney, and
two Cuban soldiers, wounded at Daiquiri, the
landing began. So far as Daiquiri was con
cerned, this bombardment was simply "noise
and fury, signifying nothing."
But slight damage had been done to the
wharf by the Spaniards, and it was of much as
sistance in effecting the landing. The wharf was
of crib- work, about 40x30 feet, and was con-

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 45
nected with the shore by a piled tramway about
150 feet long. There was a small system of
water- works at this point, which furnished a
considerable supply of pure water for the troops
and transports.
The landing was made in small boats belong
ing to the transports, supplemented with a num
ber borrowed from the Navy. The Navy also
furnished some launches, each of which took
from four to six boats in tow, and as soon as a
signal was given they started for the shore.
The landing was effected without much difficulty \
and with the loss of only two men, who were'
drowned; but could have been greatly expedited
had there been lighters provided beforehand for
this purpose. As it was, there was only oncj
lighter with the entire fleet of transports. This!
was the Laura, which was able to carry half a
regiment at a time. The Manteo and the Cum
berland, two light-draft steamers, were after
wards utilized as lighters, but, so far as I can
learn, they were not employed in the landing.
(A large steam lighter, which had been ordered
to join the fleet while the expedition was still
organizing, had to put into Pensacola for repairs,
and never joined. A lighter was lost off Sand
Key, Florida, and a tug-boat deserted on the
first night out. I do not know how it happened
that sufficient lighters were not provided for the [

46 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
landing of the troops and supplies. It would
certainly seem to have been practicable to pro
cure them, and they would have greatly facil
itated the landing.) By sunset on the first day
the greater part of Lawton's force was landed,
and his entire division, with a few troops of
Wheeler's command, was placed on shore dur
ing the night. No horses or mules had been
landed; an oversight which was very unfortu
nate in the operations immediately following
the landing.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 47

Colonel Wagner's Services Declined by
THE Corps Commander. — Volunteer
Aid to General Lawton.
It had been my expectation, in view of the
orders establishing a Bureau of Military Infor
mation in the Field, to have charge of a certain
portion of the reconnaissance work at the head
quarters of the Corps, but this duty was claimed
by the Chief Engineer, General Ludlow, by
virtue of Paragraph 1472 of the Army Regula
tions, and as he was directed by General Shafter
to prepare a map of the route from Daiquiri to
Santiago, I turned over to him all my notes in
regard to Santiago and its vicinity, including all
the information that I had been able to gain
in regard to the place of landing. In his letter
transmitting his report to General Shafter he
gave me full credit for the information given
and the service rendered. I append (marked
"A") a copy of General Ludlow's letter, as I
have not seen any reference to it in any subse
quent reports.* Though I was provided with
an able assistant, Captain Anderson, with an ex
pert stenographer, with an excellent interpreter,
* This letter was not submitted to the publisher, but, in lieu
thereof, a personal letter from General Ludlow to Colonel Wagner;
this letter is printed as an appendix.

48 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
and with ample funds to be employed in secret
service, I was informed by the Corps Commander
that he had nothing for me to do. Not wishing
to remain a mere idle spectator, and orders
having been given to the effect that no persons
except those actually on duty with the troops
should be allowed to land from the Seguranca,
I offered my services, with the permission of
General Shafter, as volunteer aid to General
Lawton. My offer being immediately accepted,
I went ashore with General Lawton, and con
tinued to serve on his staff in the capacity of a
volunteer aid until the arrival of the Major-
General Commanding the Army, when I at once
resumed my duties on the staff of the latter.
Captain Anderson, finding himself without occu
pation on the vessel, requested and obtained
permission to go ashore as a member of the fight
ing force, he being a sharpshooter and provided
with a rifle. As soon as I had landed, I was
placed by General Lawton in charge of the recon
naissance of the Division, and before nightfall
I had reconnoitered some distance beyond a
ruined house known as "Demajaybo," about
two miles from Siboney, and had ascertained
that the enemy was still in that town. During
the night Lawton's advance rested a short dis
tance east of Demajaybo. The ' ' Camino Real ' '
was found to be scarcely more than a mere trail.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 49
At many points it had been washed out by the
heavy rains; it was rough beyond description,
and was bordered on each side by dense tropical
undergrowth, which in some places was almost
impenetrable. The road was not, however,
altogether impracticable for wagons, even before
it was improved by the troops, and was no worse,
so far as traction was concerned, than many
"frontier" roads with which our officers are
familiar. General Lawton's orders on landing were to
seize the village of Siboney, take up a strong
defensive position there, and hold it in order to
cover the landing at that place. On the morn
ing of the 23d I was placed by him in command
of his advance guard, with authority to give all
necessary orders in his name.
The regiment designated as the advance
guard was not ready when it should have been,
owing to a delay in preparing breakfast for the
men and in providing them with water. An
other regiment was accordingly substituted as
the advance guard, but this caused some delay,
and the march did not begin until fully thirty
minutes after the appointed time. This was to
me a matter of great vexation, as the advance
guard would have been able, had it started at
the designated time, to intercept a Spanish
battalion, which it could undoubtedly have

50 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
defeated. As it was, the retreating battalion
passed within sight of a patrol consisting of four
men, under Captain Getty, of the 2 2d Infantry,
who sent a messenger back as quickly as possible
with the information. As there was not a
mounted man in the entire command, from the
General down, all movements had to be made
on foot, and the hostile battalion was able to
escape before the reinforcements, which moved
at double time, could be brought up. The vil
lage was, however, abandoned by the Spaniards
so hastily that they left flying on one of the
blockhouses a flag belonging to the Talavera
battalion. I ordered this flag pulled down, and
it was turned in to me, and by me duly turned
over to the Commanding General of the Divi
sion. The men who pulled down this flag were
Corporals Newman and Boyle and Privates Key-
ser, Cooley and Houghtaling, all of Company
B, 2 2d Infantry. This was the first flag cap
tured in Cuba, and it was duly forwarded to
Washington with a statement to that effect.
As I was in command of the advance guard at
the capture of Siboney, and as the flag was
pulled down by my order and duly turned in
by me, I claim the honor of having captured the
first Spanish flag that was taken in Cuba.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 51

Las Guasimas.
As soon as Siboney was occupied. General
Lawton immediately carried out his orders by
taking up a strong defensive position. No ag
gressive movement was attempted, nor was it
permissible under existing orders. A small force
of Cubans, however, under General Demetrio
Castillo, pushed forward and attacked the Span
ish rear guard near Las Guasimas, about three
miles from Siboney. The Cubans were rather
roughly handled and lost a number of men
wounded, one of them mortally. At 9:20 a. m.,
the village being completely occupied, and the
different brigades of Lawton's division being
assigned to their respective positions, the cap
ture of the place was reported to General Shaf
ter. Several hours later General Wheeler ar
rived at Siboney. In the course of the afternoon
he held a conference with General Young, Col
onel Wood and General Castillo, at Castillo's
house in the village, and made a reconnaissance
of the Spanish position at Las Guasimas. I
knew personally of the conference and the recon
naissance, and I notified General Lawton that

52 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
I believed preparations were being made for an
attack by a portion of the Cavalry Division upon
the Spanish position. He endeavored to com
municate with General Shafter in regard to the
matter, but the Seguranca was standing a num
ber of miles out from the shore, there was a high
sea running, and he was unable to establish com
munication with the vessel. Young's brigade
of Wheeler's division began to arrive at Siboney,
from Daiquiri, late in the afternoon. Its march
continued during the night, the ist Cavalry
arriving shortly before daylight. Sumner's bri
gade was left at Daiquiri. On the morning of
the 24th General Wheeler pushed forward from
Siboney with Young's brigade, consisting of two
squadrons of the ist U. S. Volunteer Cavalry,
one squadron of the loth U. S. Cavalry and one
squadron of the ist U. S. Cavalry. With this
command was also a Hotchkiss mountain bat
tery of four guns, under Captain Watson, loth
Cavalry. The regular troops, under the imme
diate command of General Young, advanced on
El Camino Real; the Volunteer Cavalry, under
Colonel Wood, advancing by a trail that passes
over the hill just west of Siboney. These trails
unite at Las Guasimas. They are at no point
more than a mile and a half apart, but the inter
vening country consists of such a dense jungle
of tropical vegetation that communication be-

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 53
tween the two columns was difficult almost to
the degree of impossibility. The plan of attack
contemplated that Wood's column should move
forward to a point, marked during the recon
naissance, where the two roads are not more
than half a mile apart; arrived at this point he
was to file to the right and get in touch with the
regulars, who were to extend their left for the
same purpose. The enemy's position was a
strong one, well intrenched, and so situated as
to be able to sweep both roads with its fire. The
Spaniards were provided with a piece of artil
lery, which I understand was a rapid-fire gun,
but of this I have been unable to obtain accurate
information. Wood's column came under fire
before it had reached the designated point, and
was obliged to advance some distance before it
could establish communication with the right
column. Young, having reached the designated
position, opened fire. The attack was made
with great gallantry. After the loth Cavalry
had extended to the left and gotten in touch
with the volunteers, the entire line rushed for
ward to the assault and carried the Spanish
position. Shortly after the firing began at Las Guas
imas, a courier rode back in great haste and
brought to General Lawton an urgent request
from General Wheeler to move up to his assist-

54 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
ance. Before this message was received. Law-
ton had Chaffee's brigade on the march and the
others under orders. The ist Brigade followed
the 3d on the Camino Real, and Colonel Miles'
brigade was directed to move by a road on the
right, which, from the best information that
could be obtained, would bring it in a position
to strike the Spanish left flank. It is claimed
by some that the Spaniards did not abandon
their position until they observed this turning
movement of Miles' brigade. I do not know
whether this is true or not. My belief, from
what I have been able to learn, is that the Span
iards were thrown out forcibly by the attack of
Young's brigade. Lawton's division arrived on
the field just at the close of the action. Many
comments were made at the time, and have been
repeated since, in regard to the action of the
Commanding General of the Cavalry Division
in moving forward to attack the Spaniards at
Las Guasimas. It is certain that the orders
given by the Corps Commander contemplated
no such movement. Lawton was to be in ad
vance. He was to be followed by Wheeler,
after whom were to come Kent and Bates. It
was intended that the entire army should be
disembarked and concentrated at Siboney, and
that it should be supplied with requisite rations
and ammunition before beginning a forward

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 55
movement. This plan was disarranged con
siderably by Wheeler's forward movement. It
is to be said, however, in support of the action
of the Commander of the Cavalry Division, that
he was at the time the senior officer on shore;
that the difficulty of communicating with the
Corps Commander was so great that an oppor
tunity presenting itself for a successful stroke
against the enemy might pass before the con
ditions could be reported to Corps Headquar
ters and orders in the case received; and that
under the circumstances he might be expected
to use his own discretion.
A statement has been 'made at different
times that Wood's column was taken by sur
prise — ^practically ambushed — ^by the Spaniards,
and that this was owing to a neglect to provide
a suitable advance guard. Such was not the
case. Owing to the difficulties of the trail,
Wood's column had to march in many places
in single file, and in no place could he march on
a broad front. Owing to the nature of the
undergrowth, it was impossible to use flankers
without retarding the advance of the column to
a ruinous degree. The advance party and sup
port of the advance guard each moved forward
"entire," with suitable distances and preceded
by a "point" of four men. This was good tac-

56 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
tics, and the only disposition suited to the cir
cumstances. After the battle Lawton's division estab
lished its bivouac at Sevilla, about one mile be
yond the battlefield. The 2d and 3d brigades
of Kent's division, which had been engaged in
making a feint near Cabafias on the 2 2d, began
debarking on the 25th, the ist Brigade landing
the day before. General Hawkins having re
ceived orders direct from Corps Headquarters.
Young's brigade, of the Cavalry Division, en
camped just in rear of Lawton, and was soon
joined by Sumner's brigade. Kent's entire di
vision was ashore by the 27th, and encamped
just in rear of Wheeler. Corps Headquarters
still remained on the Seguranca, General Wheel
er was placed in command of all the troops at
the front, with positive instructions, however,
not to bring on an action without orders. On
the 2 2d General Ludlow had been sent to bring
Garcia's contingent from Aserraderos. This was"
accomplished on the 24th, and Garcia's troops
proceeded to join the command at the front, his
main force bivouacking in rear of Kent's, a de^
tachment being sent to cover Lawton's front.
Note. — ^The losses of the Americans at Las Guasimas were i
officer and 15 enlisted men killed, 6 officers and 43 enlisted men
wounded. The Spanish official reports claim that 1,500 meu with
two pieces of artillery took part in the combat at Las Guasima s ;
of this number, they lost 3 officers and 9 men killed, and 24 men
wounded.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 57

Comments on the Landing. — Lack of Sup
plies AFTER Las Guasimas.
Whatever question there may be in regard
to the value or usefulness of the Cuban troops
as a portion of the armed force in the Santiago
campaign, the measures taken to transport them
were unfortunate, to say the least. The vessel
that went after them carried with it the Engineer
Battalion, whose services would have been of
incalculable benefit in repairing the pier at Dai
quiri, in constructing a similar work at Siboney,
and in repairing the roads. These troops, far
from being held back, should have been pushed
well to the front, if not in the actual advance of
the Army. Not only would their services as
engineers have been valuable, but they would
have constituted at any time a body of infantry
of marked excellence. As it was, however, they
proceeded to Aserraderos, where they construct
ed a pier to facilitate the embarkation of the
Cubans, a work of doubtful utility at best, and
one which I understand fell down under the
weight of the embarking troops, throwing many
of them into the water. There was later a feeble

58 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
attempt to construct a wharf at Daiquiri, and a
small wharf was built at Siboney, which was re
placed at a later date by a larger one made by a
Michigan volunteer regirrient. I have no wish to
criticise the engineer operations further than to
state actual facts. The exalted reputation of
the Engineer Corps and the recognized excellence
of its personnel, both commissioned and enlisted,
certainly justified the Army in expecting greater
assistance from it than was actually rendered.
The action at Las Guasimas and the conse
quent hurrying forward of Lawton's command
to the support of Wheeler had a serious effect
upon the question of supplies. Such a move
ment not having been contemplated, no supplies
were ready to be sent at once to Las Guasimas,
while the troops at that point were in immediate
need of rations, and Young's brigade was also in
want of a new supply of ammunition. The force
at Las Guasimas could have been supplied in two
ways. First by withdrawing it to Siboney and
carrying out the original orders to hold that
point on the defensive until the force should be
supplied. Second, by sending supplies forward,
in any way possible, to the troops in their new po
sition. The former would have been unwise, as it
would have given, both to the enemy and to our
own troops, the impression of a retrograde move
ment after an action, and the moral effect would

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 59
have been bad. The second method, therefore,
was the only one that could be entertained. As
a result there was for some days a serious lack
of supplies, though a sufficiency of hard bread,
bacon and coffee was sent to keep the troops
from actual suffering, and this was soon supple
mented with rations of sugar and canned roast
beef; the latter, however, being so unpalatable
that it was rarely eaten. Such was the lack of
medical instruments and supplies that I saw the
Chief Surgeon of a Division cut a bullet from the
shoulder of a wounded Cuban toy with a pocket
knife, and heard him inform a sick officer for
whom he had prescribed quinine that there was
none on hand. How this lack of such vital es
sentials as surgical instruments and the most
ordinary medicines, in the presence of the enemy,
occurred, I do not know. The plain facts are
sufficient to imply a bunder somewhere. For
a number of days no tobacco was sent forward,
and the discomfort endured by the troops in con
sequence of the failure of this supply was some
thing that can be readily understood by persons
who habitually use tobacco, but is beyond the
comprehension of those who do not.
Much of the ^elay in forwarding essential
supplies to the command was doubtless due to
a want of information as to the location of the
various stores in the transports. On June 24th

60 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
all regimental quartermasters were ordered to
their regiments. They knew where their reg
imental stores were in the vessels, and would
have been able to forward promptly the supplies
needed, while they were of very little use at the
front until they were provided with transporta
tion. Four empty wagons were all that were
sent to the front on the morning of the 24th of
June, though the remainder were "set up" and
put in use as quickly as possible. It was not
until the fifth day after landing that a sufficient
supply of ammunition for the Army was ashore.
As far as possible, Siboney was used as a depot
for subsistence stores and for the landing of
reinforcements; Daiquiri being used as a depot
for ammunition, forage, land transportation and
general supplies.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 61

The Army Advances. — Colonel Wagner Is
Deprived of His Aid. —
Reconnaissance .
On the 26th of June, Lawton moved beyond
Sevilla and established his headquarters at a
point about five miles from Santiago. He was
followed by the other divisions, which retained
their relative positions. The light batteries, as
soon as they were fitted out, were sent to the
front, and, passing Kent's division, encamped
near Wheeler. The mounted squadron under
Major Rafferty encamped near the light batter
ies. The 33d Michigan and one battalion of the
34th Michigan Volunteers arrived on this day.
My individual duties at this time consisted of
reconnaissance work in front of Lawton's divi
sion, and inspection of the outposts belonging
to the same. This work was undertaken by
me voluntarily, as no duty had been assigned to
me at • General Shaffer's headquarters. The
Chief Engineer having been assigned at those
headquarters to general reconnaissance work, I
had given him a list of young officers of my ac
quaintance, graduates of the Infantry and Cav-

62 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
airy School, who were skilled in topographical
reconnaissance. I retained two officers (Lieu-
tenan Guy H. B. Smith, 4th Infantry, and Lieu
tenant David P. Cordray, 17th Infantry) for
topographical reconnaissance in Lawton's divi
sion. I had understood that my work in recon
naissance, etc., was to be entirely for the infor
mation of the Division Commander, and totally
independent of any work u.ndertaken in the same
line from Corps Headquarters. At the same
time that I was conducting this reconnaissance
for General Lawton, Major W. D. Beach, U. S.
Vol. Engineers (captain, 3d Cavalry), was con
ducting similar work for General Wheeler. I
was surprised to find that the reconnaissance
work was soon practically taken out of the hands
of the division commanders by an order from
Corps Headquarters, which directed that all offi
cers engaged in reconnoitering should submit
daily, at 5 o'clock p. m., to Lieutenant-Colonel
Derby, Chief Engineer, a report of their observa
tions, accompanied with a map. As I was su
perior in rank to the Chief Engineer, and was
performing the reconnaissance work voluntarily,
I declined to place myself under his orders, and,
with the approval of the Division Commander,
I continued my reconnaissance for the informa
tion of the latter alone. The two lieutenants
whom I had on duty with me were thereupon

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 63
detailed, by orders from Corps Headquarters, to
report to Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, for recon
naissance duty under his directions. This step,
I understand, was taken without any consulta
tion with the Division Commander. It certainly
was taken without any consultation with myself.
On the 28th of June, General Shafter came
ashore. On this day General Ludlow, who had
been succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel Derby as
Chief Engineer, was assigned to the command
of the ist brigade of Lawton's division. Cap
tain Anderson, who was on duty with me by
virtue of the authority of the Commanding Gen
eral of the Army, was taken away from me and
detailed as assistant Adjutant-General, on the
staff of General Ludlow. This detail was made
without any consultation with myself, and with
out notifying me that it was contemplated. As
a result, my topographical reconnaissance was
brought to a standstill, but I continued to do
duty with the outposts, to perform such recon
naissance as I could make in person, and gener
ally to do the best I could under the difficult
circumstances in which I found myself.
On the 29th of June, General Shafter, with
his staff, came up to the front, and the head
quarters' camp was established alongside of the
headquarters of the 2d Division. On the same
day Garcia's entire contingent was moved to the

64 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
front, and constituted an advanced outpost, as
it were, for the Army. Shortly after arriving at
the front. General Shafter rode out to inspect
the different positions of the command, and to
inform himself, by personal observation, of their
situation. Owing to his physical condition and
the intense heat of the morning, the exertion was
more than he was able to endure, and a few
hours after his arrival at the front he was suffer
ing from heat-prostration to such an extent as to
be utterly helpless, and to fill the minds of those
about him with apprehension that the Army was
about to be deprived of its commander before
coming into serious contact with the enemy.
He rallied, however, and before nightfall was
able apparently to attend to his duties as usual.
On the 30th of June a general reconnaissance
was made of the enemy's position. General
Shafter in person rode out as far as El Pozo.
General Lawton and General Wheeler were also
both engaged in reconnaissance, part of the time
together and part of the time separately. With
General Lawton were his three brigade comman
ders. General Breckinridge and his two aids, and
myself. The position at El Caney was care
fully reconnoitered. About 300 yards west of
Shaffer's headquarters a road branches to the
right nearly north, and goes in the direction of
El Caney, about four miles distant. This road

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 65
forms with the Guantanamo road and the Ca
mino Real a rude triangle, which is covered with
a dense growth of tropical vegetation, threaded
here and there by passage-ways known as roads,
but which are mere trails. About a mile south
of El Caney a trail branches from the road men
tioned and leads first west and then northwest,
to the Guantanamo road, which it joins about
three-quarters of a mile southwest of the village.
About half a mile from the point where this trail
leaves the main trail, or road first mentioned, a
path branches (a little west of north) to El
Caney, and passes around a ridge to the south
of, and commanding, the village about half a
mile distant. The main trail intersects the
Guantanamo road about two miles east of the
town. About half a mile southeast of the vil
lage is a stone fort, about 45 x 35 feet, with walls
about eighteen inches thick, on the east, south j
and west side of which was a trench about three !
feet deep, the approaches to which were covered
by a barb- wire entanglement. About one hun
dred yards south of the town, on lower ground,
was a small wooden blockhouse. At the north
west of the town was a wooden blockhouse,
similar, but larger than the one at the south.
About one mile northeast of the town, upon the
foot-hills of a high ridge, was another wooden
blockhouse. At different high points on the

66 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
ridge to the north of the main road from El
Caney to Santiago were solitary blockhouses,
which, from their inaccessible situation, were
practically free from attack, which were occupied
by lookouts, and from which we could from
time to time see heliograph signals flashing.
After reconnoitering the position at ElCaney,
General Lawton and his party returned to the
ford of the Aguadores near Corps Headquarters,
and then proceeded west to an abandoned sugar-
house known as "El Pozo." After reconnoiter
ing this vicinity, they went north about a mile
to a ruined hacienda known as "Marienaje,"
from which point the party returned to camp.
The reconnaissance served to familiarize the
brigade commanders with the general features
of the terrain on which the operations of the fol
lowing day against El Caney were to be con
ducted; but it had not resulted in locating defi
nitely the positions of the Spaniards on all parts
of the field. The Ducrot (or Ducoureau) house,
which stands out as a prominent landmark near
the point where the El Caney-Santiago road
crosses the San Juan River, was supposed to be
within the enemy's lines, and to be held with a
considerable force. A reconnaissance made by
myself, on foot, with a small patrol consisting of
twelve Cuban soldiers, developed the fact that
the Ducrot house was not within the Spanish

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 67
lines and that the El Caney-Santiago road was
open for some distance beyond that point. In
this reconnaissance, which extended about two
miles beyond our outposts, more than a mile
beyond the most advanced parties of the Cubans,
and close to the Spanish position, I was accom
panied by Mr. Mendoza, a Cuban gentleman
serving as a volunteer aid on the staff of General
Lawton. He was of much assistance to me, as
the Cuban soldiers demurred against going so far
beyond their lines with so small a force, and, be
ing able to talk with them in their own language,
he was able to induce them to continue. As a
result of this reconnaissance, I was able to give
the Division Commander a rough map showing
a new trail, until then undiscovered, which was
used by General Ludlow in moving up to his
position in front of El Caney. General Chaffee
had carefully reconnoitered in person the ground
over which he was to move on the following
morning; and a daring reconnaissance made by
him in the evening enabled him to locate defi
nitely the position of the enemy at El Caney.
In this reconnaissance he approached so close to
the enemy's outposts as to be able to overhear
their conversation. But, though Lawton had
studied his ground with care and had gained
valuable information of the position of the
enemy in his front at El Caney, the reconnoiter-

68 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
ing of the enemy's position in general was in
complete and unsatisfactory. The reconnais
sance in front of El Pozo was not sufficient to
locate the enemy's position or to gain a knowl
edge of the ground over which the troops must
move in pushing forward to the attack. This
is the more to be regretted for the reason that a
proper reconnaissance could have been so easily
effected. A half-dozen small patrols, each under
the command of an officer — ^and there were
many able young officers who would have been
only too glad to undertake the task — directed
to push forward until the enemy was touched
upon or his position absolutely discovered, would
have resulted in gaining information that would
have saved an infinitude of trouble on the fol
lowing day. As it was, only such general view
of the country in front of El Pozo was obtained
as Moses may be supposed to have gotten of the
Promised Land when he viewed it from Mount
Pisgah.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 69

The Plan of Battle.
In the afternoon the plan of battle was an
nounced by General Shafter to the division com
manders. This plan contemplated the attack
upon El Caney at 7 a. m. the following day, by
Lawton's division, to which was attached Ca-
pron's battery of four guns. As soon as the
troops were well engaged at El Caney, the divi
sions of Wheeler and Kent, with three batteries
of light artillery, were to move against the
Heights of San Juan in front of El Pozo, the ex
pectation being that El Caney would speedilyf all,
and that Lawton would then swing around and
strike the enemy in the left flank simultaneously
with the attack in front. Tactically this plan
was as good as any that could have been devised.
The faults lay in its execution, and these were,
in my opinion, due primarily, and above all, to
the lack of proper reconnaissance of the ground
west of El Pozo. I understand that the reasons
given for the attack upon El Caney were that
that place would form a point of support for a
Spanish attack upon the right and rear of our
troops engaged at San Juan; a consideration not

70 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
to be ignored, for El Caney was on the Guan
tanamo road, was the point of junction of a
number of roads coming from the northeast,
north and northwest, and Spanish reinforcements
were reported en route from several points, nota
bly from Holguin. It would consequently be
necessary either to mask El Caney with a suffi
cient force to prevent a sortie by its garrison at
a critical moment, or to capture it and thus clear
the ground before our main attack should be
made. I believed at the time, and I still believe,
that these reasons were sound. Knowing that
the attack would begin not later than 7 o'clock
the following morning, I had no doubt that El
Caney would be in our possession by 10 o'clock
at the latest. I had underestimated the stub
bornness of the Spanish defense and the enor
mous advantages conferred upon troops in in
trenched positions by the use of smokeless pow
der, but I think my views on the subject were
those entertained by every officer who had given
the situation any thought, and the belief seemed
general that Lawton would make short work of
El Caney. During the combined attacks upon
the front and flank of the main Spanish position.
General Duffield was to push forward from Si
boney and make a demonstration, along the rail
road, against Aguadores, the object being to hold
the Spanish forces at that point and prevent

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 71
them from moving against the left flank of the
force engaged in the attack on the position of
San Juan. Duffield's attack at this point was
to be facilitated by a vigorous bombardment of
the Spanish works by the Navy. General Duf
field was at this time in command at Siboney,
General Bates, with his independent brigade,
having been ordered to the front.
In the afternoon the Army began to move
into position for battle. Lawton was to bivouac
in front of El Caney and be ready for the assault
early in the morning. Chaffee took up a posi
tion to the east of the town, Ludlow on the west.
Colonel Miles in reserve near the Ducrot house,
expecting eventually to form on Ludlow's right.
Garcia moved to the north of El Caney to prevent
reinforcements from entering, and to cut off the
retreat of the garrison. General Kent and Gen
eral Sumner (who was now in command of the
Cavalry Division, owing to the illness of General
Wheeler), preceded by Grimes' battery, were to
move to the vicinity of El Pozo; Major Dillen
back, with the other two batteries, being in readi
ness to move at a moment's notice in the morn
ing. Major Rafferty, with the mounted squad
ron, was to move as soon as the road was clear.
Three days' rations were to be issued to all the
men, but, for some reason unknown to me, they
do not seem to have all been supplied. The

72 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
troops were in position by midnight, the Cavalry
Division in the vicinity of El Pozo, Grimes about
250 yards to the west of that point, the cavalry
being in the rear and around the battery. Kent
bivouacked on the Santiago road near Corps
Headquarters. The 2d brigade (Pearson) was
in the advance, the 3d brigade (Wikoff) next,
and the ist brigade (Hawkins) slightly in rear
of Headquarters, with orders to move out early
in the morning.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 73

The Battle Begins. — El Caney.
The artillery was to open on El Caney* at 7
o'clock in the morning, but some troops, sup
posed to be cavalry, moving out from the city
in plain view at the northwest of the town, the
artillery opened upon them at 6:30, and the bat
tle began. Capron's battery opened fire from
position 2,300 yards south of the town. The
effect of the cannonade was feeble. There were
only four guns in position where twenty-four
could have been effectively used. The fact that
these guns were supplied with black powder was
not in this case to their disadvantage, as they
were not opposed by artillery. They were at
long rifle-range from the Spanish position, and
the enemy's infantry was kept too busy by our
own to devote any attention to the artillery.
There being many points in the vicinity of the
town where artillery preparation was necessary
for the infantry assault, the mistake was made
of scattering the fire too much, and it was not
until a later period of the day that the artillery
at this point did any effective work. Grimes'
* See Map No. 3. This map shows the position of the troops
at about 12:30, just before the charge on San Juan Ridge. —
Publisher

74 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
battery opened fire at El Pozo about an hour
after the engagement had opened, at El Caney,
and from the time his battery began its fire, two
distinct actions were being waged at the same
time, one at El Caney and the other at San Juan.
The former engagement will be considered first.
Chaffee's brigade on the right deployed along
the Guantanamo road east of the town, the 1 7th
Infantry on the road, the 7th in the center, and
the 12th on the left. Ludlow deployed on the
west of the town, the 2d Massachusetts on the
right, the ist Battalion of the 2 2d Infantry in
the center, and the 8th Infantry on the left.
The 2d Battalion of the 2 2d Infantry, which had
been detached on reconnaissance to the left, was
afterwards brought into line on the left of the
8th Infantry. Colonel Miles deployed on Lud
low's right at about 11:30 and came into action
about noon, the 25th Infantry on the right, the
4th Infantry on the left connecting with the 2d
Massachusetts, the ist Infantry being in reserve
supporting the artillery at the position already
mentioned. It had now become evident that
the capture of El Caney would be more difficult
than had been expected. General Bates' bri
gade, which had come up from Siboney, was ac
cordingly sent forward to reinforce Lawton, and
at this time orders were given to General Sum
ner, then in front of San Juan, to move forward

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 75
and connect with Lawton, who was reported as
sorely pressed. Though it was evident that the
task before Lawton at El Caney was a serious
one, there was no necessity for sending reinforce
ments, for there was not a single moment during
the entire battle of El Caney when the issue of
the contest could be regarded as doubtful. Bate^
arrived about noon, and after crossing the Agua'-
dores River,* came into action between Miles
and Chaffee, the 3d Infantry, on the right, con
necting with the 12th, the 20th on the left con
necting with the 25th.
* Las Guamas Creek. — Ed.

76 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

General Lawton Receives Orders to Break
Off the Engagement at El Caney.
During the progress of the battle, about i :3o
p. m.. General Lawton received orders from the
Corps Commander to break off the engagement
at El Caney, and move to the assistance of Kent
and Wheeler at San Juan, who were reported as
needing help. This, in my opinion, was the
critical moment of the entire day. The troops
at El Caney had already been ' ' blooded. ' ' Had
the attack been broken off, the reasons could not
have been explained to the men, they would not
have understood their withdrawal, and they
would have felt that they had been defeated. The
news of their apparent discomfiture at El Caney
would have preceded them to San Juan, for such
tidings are transmitted with inconceivable rapid
ity, and though they would have brought to the
latter field a physical reinforcement, it would
have been more than neutralized by the depress
ing moral effect of the supposed defeat on our
right. I cannot understand why this order was
given. Surely if it was necessary to attack El
¦Caney or to mask it in order to prevent an attack

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 77
upon our right and rear, it is hard to understand
why orders should have been given to withdraw
the entire force (which Shaffer's order specified)
to San Juan without leaving any troops what
ever to hold in check the Spanish force which
Lawton had been attacking and which would
have been emboldened by his withdrawal. For
tunately, the importance and gravity of the situ
ation were fully appreciated by General Lawtoh,
who took upon himself the responsibility of de
laying the execution of the order until he could
represent the true condition of affairs to the
Corps Commander. For this purpose he took
with him the aid. Captain J. C. Gilmore, Jr., who
brought the order, and riding the lines under
a heavy fire, with his entire staff, he pointed out
fully the situation, in order that the aid on re
turning might represent the true situation to
General Shafter. In the meantime the artillery
had been directed to concentrate its fire upon the
stone fort, and it did effective work at last, de
molishing large portions of the stone walls, de
moralizing the garrison and preparing the way
for Chaffee's attack. Before four o'clock the
attack had succeeded at all points, and El Caney
was in our possession.
Note. — ^The losses of the Americans at El Caney were 4 offi
cers and 77 enlisted men killed, 25 officers and 335 enlisted men
wounded. The Spanish official reports state that 1,700 men took
part in the combats at San Juan and El Caney; of this num
ber, they lost 50 officers and over 500 men killed and wounded. —
Publisher.

78 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

San Juan.
Meanwhile the action had been raging fierce
ly at San Juan. At dawn Hawkins' brigade
had moved out and marched to the vicinity of
El Pozo, where it was ordered to bivouac in the
field awaiting further orders. Grimes' battery
opened fire at about 7 :3o a. m., and, a short time
later, Hawkins received the expected orders and
moved forward with his brigade, the 6th Infant
ry in advance, followed by the i6th Infantry and
the 71st New York. In the meantime, the Cav
alry Division had moved forward at 7 o'clock,
the ist Brigade in advance, the 6th Cavalry
leading, followed by the 3d and 9th.* The 2d
Brigade followed in the order, from front to rear,
of the "Rough Riders," the ist Cavalry and the
loth Cavalry. The ist Brigade was under the
command of Lieutenant-Colonel Carroll; the 2d
Brigade was commanded by Colonel Wood,
General Young being absent sick. About three-
quarters of a mile from El Pozo, Sumner halted
to await orders. After remaining here for near-
* The 9th Cavalry squadron was in the lead; the other squad
ron of this regiment was at Daiquiri. — Publisher

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 79
ly an hour, under a heavy artihery fire, and with
in effective rifle-range of the hostile position, he
received orders to move to Guamas Creek and
hold it. When about half way to the creek he
received from Lieutenant-Colonel McClemand,
General Shafter's adjutant-general, the orders
already mentioned to move by the right flank
to assist Lawton. Kent in the meanwhile was
moving forward with his remaining brigades,
the 3d Brigade in advance, the 13th Infantry
leading, followed by the 9th and 24th. Both
divisions now found themselves in a totally un
known region, in a tropical jungle so dense that
movements were practically limited to the road
and the object of the assault could not be seen.
General Kent and General Hawkins rode for
ward to make, under fire, a reconnaissance which
should have been made before by others; and,
coming in view of the blockhouse known as Fort
San Juan, they both decided that it was the key
to the enemy's position, and determined to make
it the object of their attack. In this reconnais
sance they were greatly assisted by Lieutenant
Ord, of the 6th Infantry, who climbed a tree in
order to obtain a view of the enemy's position.
The Spanish position was on a chain of hills
about three-eighths of a mile west of the San
Juan River and commanding the fords of the
Aguadores and San Juan, where tftese streams

80 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
are crossed by the Camino Real. The crest of
these hills is about 125 feet above the valley.
The eminence known afterwards as Fort San
Juan Hill projected, bastion-like, from the main
chain, trending back gradually on the south, but
bending almost at a right angle at the north, and
then making a similar turn and continuing to
the north in a height known as San Juan Hill.
In front of this hill, its slope touching the San
Juan River, is another height, known later as
Kettle Hill, or Sugar-House Hill. Between Ket
tle Hill and San Juan Hill was a large pond,
which formed a serious obstacle to the advance
of troops against the position. The chain of
heights is irregular and not easily described; but
the three hills mentioned were the principal feat
ures of the battle-field. On all these hills were
trenches covered with barb- wire entanglements;
and on the most southemly one, and giving its
name to it, was a loopholed block-house, known
as Fort San Juan. The nature of the position
was, at the time, absolutely unknown to the
advancing troops, and it was a veritable terra
Hncognita even to those in command. The troops
pushed along blindly, not knowing where they
were going, and, owing to the lack of intelli
gent orders regulating the march, the road was
distressingly crowded. General Kent had been
ordered to give the cavalry the right of way, but.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 81
owing to the delay caused by the "tailing out"
of the Cavalry Division in moving along the
narrow road and crossing at unknown fords, he
felt compelled to push on, and the road was now
blocked by the parallel columns of the infantry
and cavalry divisions moving along a narrow
road scarcely suited to the rapid movement of
a single battalion. This condition was greatly
aggravated and "confusion worse confounded"
was caused by a captive balloon with its detach
ment pushing down the road, and marking dis
tinctly the advance of our troops, upon whom
and the balloon the enemy now opened a heavy
fire of shrapnel and musketry. Under this fire
the balloon was soon punctured, and it descended
to the ground, to the infinite satisfaction of every
one, except perhaps the officers occupying it, for
the fire which it had drav/n upon the column is
estimated to have caused a loss of from sixty to
one hundred men. The sole result of this re
markable balloon reconnaissance was the dis
covery of a trail leading to the left, which might,
and should, have been discovered by the recon
naissance of a single small patrol, and which
would have been speedily found by the advanc
ing troops themselves. For the first time in
military history a balloon was seen practically
on the skirmish line, and it will probably be the
last time that such an exploit will be witnessed.

82 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
It is hard to understand what fantastic concep
tion of the art of war could have caused such a
reconnaissance to be seriously contemplated in
the first place.
General Hawkins moved the 6th Infantry
forward, the i6th following to form on its left.
It was expected that these two regiments would
flank the enemy's position, and it was intended
in the meantime to place the 71st New York
between the 6th Infantry and the Cavalry Divi
sion to make a frontal demonstration. But the
New York regiment had been deflected by Gen
eral Kent along the trail to the left already men
tioned, with a view to forming it in its position
on the left of the brigade. It was found, how
ever, that when the 6th and i6th regiments of
infantry had deployed, they did not flank the
enemy's position, but were in front of it, and
under such a heavy fire that an attack was neces
sary as the only alternative to a retreat. They
were accordingly directed to assault the enemy's
position, which they did successfully, and with
a degree of gallantry that will ever cast a luster
over the Regular Army.* In the meantime, the
71st New York, coming under a heavy fire, be
came demoralized, and refused to move forward.
*The assault at this time was made by the whole line, the
left of the dismounted cavalry joining the right of the infantry in
the attack upon the San Juan Block-House. The center and right
of the cavalry first carried Kettle Hill and then pushed on to the
heights in their front. — Ed.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 83
Many of the men broke in panic to the rear.
General Kent and his staff officers forming a
cordon for the purpose of stopping them. Find
ing that it was impossible to get this regiment
as a body to move forward, he ordered them to
lie down in the thicket, so as to clear the way for
the troops in the rear. The 3d Brigade, advanc
ing rapidly, marched over the prostrate forms
of the 71st New York in the order already men
tioned, the 13th in the lead, followed by the 9th
and 24th. As soon as it was possible for the
brigade to deploy, the 13th Infantry formed line,
the ist battalion of the 24th forming on its left,
the ist battalion of the 9th on the left of the ist
battalion of the 24th, the 2d battalion of the
latter regiment forming the extreme left of the
line, and the 2d battalion of the 9th being in rear
of the 13th. This alteration of the battalions
of these two regiments was due to the difficulties
of the terrain and the confusion incident to the
blocked roads. Whether the 2d battalion of the
9th Infantry was purposely placed in the rear of
the 13th or not, I have been unable to ascertain.
As soon as the 3d Brigade was deployed it was
pushed forward to the assault, and it gallantly
carried the enemy's position, which it reached
almost simultaneously with the 6th and i6th
Regiments. Colonel Wikoff, having been killed,
was succeeded by Lieutenant - Colonel Worth,

84 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
who was almost immediately wounded, succeed
ed in turn by Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum. Lis
cum was soon wounded, and the command de
volved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers, who did
not know that he was in command of the bri
gade until the hostile position had been carried.
As soon as the enemy's position had been cap
tured, the order of the brigade was rectified, the
24th Infantry being placed on the right, the 9th
in the center, and the 13th on the left. The
time of the capture of Fort San Juan Hill is given
variously by different officers, but was probably
made about i :30 p. m.
While Kent was thus engaged, the Cavalry
Division had not been idle. The ist Brigade
had succeeded in deploying to the right of the
road, the 9th Cavalry on the right, the 6th Cav
alry in the center, and the 3d Cavalry on the left,
its left flank resting on the road. The 2d Bri
gade had been cut in two by the balloon detach
ment, and the leading regiment, the Rough
Riders, which had become separated some dis
tance from those in its rear, had marched about
half a mile by the flank, passing the ist Brigade,
the movement being undertaken in compliance
with the hazy orders to establish connection
with, and lend assistance to, Lawton. This
movement to the right was soon abandoned,
however, and the ist and loth Cavalry were

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 85
placed in rear of the ist Brigade and support
ed by the Rough Riders. The enemy's lines
at Kettle Hill were then gallantly stormed
by the Division, the 2d Brigade pushing
through and uniting with the ist, the two bri
gades and the different regiments composing
them mingled together in the assault. The
assault was made over extremely unfavorable
terrain. The division deployed about 800 yards
from the enemy, and with the exception of a belt
of tropical forest about 150 yards on each side of
the river, the ground, from the place of deploy
ment to the hostile position, was open and com
pletely fire-swept; the only obstacles being barb-
wire fences, which seriously impeded the advance
of the troops while affording them no shelter.
Kettle Hill was carried by the cavalry about the
same time that Fort San Juan Hill was carried
by the infantry.* The Cavalry Division then
moved forward from Kettle Hill and carried the
main positionf at San Juan at about 2 : 30 in the
afternoon, being supported by the 13th Infantry,
which in response to a call for assistance had
been sent over from Kent's division. The 13th
Infantry remained with the Cavalry Division
until the following day. As soon as the enemy's
position had been carried, the troops immedi-
* See foot-note page 82.
t That portion of the San Juan Heights north of the El Pozo-
Santiago road. — Ed.

86 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
ately proceeded to shelter themselves as best
they might in the captured intrenchments, upon
which a heavy fire was poured from the enemy's
main position in front of Santiago. In the as
saults on Kettle Hill and San Juan Hill, the
courage and energy of Colonel Roosevelt, of the
Rough Riders, were so conspicuous as to com
mand general admiration. There is no doubt
that to the influence of his personal qualities the
successful issue of the attack was largely due.
With characteristic energy and gallantry. Gen
eral Wheeler, who was sick when the battle be
gan, rose from his bed, and resumed command
of the Cavalry Division before the close of the
action. The 2d Brigade of Kent's division, under
Pearson, which had been under a severe artillery
fire since noon, came into action about 2:30
p. m., the loth and 2d Infantry being directed
to the left to follow the 3d Brigade, while the
2 ist moved along the main road to support
Hawkins. The 21st advanced to the hill, where
it formed on the left of Hawkins' brigade, and
immediately entered the action. In the mean
time Pearson endeavored to deploy his remain
ing regiments to cross the stream and attack in
line. But, finding this was impracticable, he
crossed in column, deployed on the left of the
troops already in action, the loth Infantry on

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 87
the right, the 2d on the left, and in a gallant
charge drove back the enemy in his front.
In the battles of the ist of July the part
played by the artillery was very disappointing
to the Army. As soon as Grimes' battery had
opened fire its smoke at once rendered it a plain
target for the enemy, and at the same time ob
scured its own aim. At the end of three-quar
ters of an hour its fire ceased. Shortly after
noon the batteries of Best and Parkhurst were
brought up and formed on Grimes' left, and the
artillery was again in action at intervals until
the advance of our infantry up the slopes lead
ing to the enemy's position rendered it necessary
to suspend the fire of our batteries. About 2
o'clock p. m.. Best's battery went to the front
and took position on the firing-line; but as soon
as it had come into action it received such a con
centrated fire from the hostile infantry and artil
lery that it was quickly compelled to withdraw.
It first withdrew down the slope, and then to the
position at El Pozo. The services of the Gat
ling battery were conspicuous and of great value.
This battery consisted of four Catlings, cal. .30.
It was unable to come into action until about
1:15 p. m., when its commander, who had with
difficulty pushed through the crowded road,
crossed the ford and came into position with
three guns, at a range of about 700 yards from

88 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
the Spanish position. One gun had been de
tached under the orders of Lieutenant Miley,
A.D.C., and was not returned to the battery
until about 5 p. m. A very effective rain of
bullets was kept up by the Gatlings against Fort
San Juan,* until the advance of our infantry
up the slope necessitated a cessation of the fire.
As soon as the position had been carried, the
Gatling battery went to the support of the Cav
alry Division and lent valuable assistance in the
capture of San Juan Hill.f It remained with
the cavalry till the close of the action, being re
inforced, about 5 p. m., by the gun that had been
withdrawn, and which had in the meantime been
idle. The firing continued along the lines until
about 7:30 p. m. The troops were now in posi
tion along the captured ridge about a mile and
a half from Santiago.
* San Juan Block-House. — Publisher.
t That part of San Juan Hill, or San Juan Heights, north of
the El Pozo-Santiago road. The Gatling guns did not join the
cavalry until later in the afternoon, after the Heights had been
captured. — Publisher.
Note. — The losses of the Americans at San Juan, July 1-3,
were 15 officers and 127 enlisted men killed, 69 officers and 945 en
listed men wounded. — Publisher.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 89-

Demonstration Against Aguadores.
In the meantime General Duffield had con
ducted the demonstration ordered against the
Spanish position at Aguadores, his command,
consisting of the 33d Michigan, moving along
the line of the railroad. The terrain in the vi
cinity of the Aguadores River is exceedingly
difficult. The only practicable route is afforded
by the railroad, which, on approaching the river,
passes through a steep defile formed by a high
hill on the north and a lower hill on the south,
the latter terminating on the side of the sea in
a narrow beach. Before entering the sea the
river expands into a lagoon, fringed seawards
with low rocks. The railroad bridge extends
partly across the lagoon and partly over the
sandy beach, the river entering the lagoon some
distance above. The bridge is about 700 yards
in length and was intact until the 30th, when the
Spaniards blew up about 40 feet of the structure
at the west end. The lagoon affords a serious
obstacle, but it was not at the time unf ordable.
The Spaniards were located in rifle-pits on the
west bank, on each side of the bridge, where they

93 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
could await in confidence the attack of a vastly
greater force in their front, but were seriously
exposed to a fire from the Navy. General Duf
field entrained the ist battalion and part of the
2d battalion of the 33d Michigan at 3:30 a. m.,
moving forward by rail to a point about a mile
and a half from the bridge. Here the troops
were detrained, and the cars were sent back for
the remainder of the command. At 9:30 a. m.
part of the troops were deployed and opened fire.
The command halted at the extremity of the
bridge, and no serious attempt was made to
cross — ^perhaps none was contemplated. The
fire of the Spaniards was kept down by the Navy,
and the demonstration continuedu ntil about
3 p. m., when the command was again placed on
the cars and withdrawn to Siboney, where it
arrived about 6 p. m. This demonstration is
supposed to have fulfilled the object of keeping
the Spaniards in position, but the force of the
enemy at that point was so small that they prob
ably could not have accomplished anything had
they been withdrawn from our front. The oper
ation was generally regarded as a failure, though
its success seems to have been problematical
from the first. If Duffield's command could
have been landed on the west bank of the river,
it could have taken the enemy in flank, and
doubtlesoulds c have effected important results.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 91
The landing on the west side would, however,
have been extremely difficult because of the
rocky coast, and though the enemy could have
been driven from his entrenchments by the
Navy, the fire of the vessels would have neces
sarily ceased before our troops could have moved
to the assault, and it is by no means certain that
the attack could have been successfully carried
out. At any rate, it would have been exceed
ingly difficult, considering the nature of the
raw troops with which the demonstration was
conducted. My report of the battle of El Caney is based
mainly upon my own personal observation. I
was with General Lawton at 4 a. m. on July ist,
and remained with him throughout the entire
engagement, except when detached by his orders
in my capacity as volunteer aid. General J. C.
Breckinridge, Inspector-General, U. S. Army,
was also with General Lawton, and though I do
not feel that it lies within my province to make
any report in regard to officers who are my supe
riors in rank, I cannot refrain from expressing my
admiration for the bearing of General Breckin
ridge in battle, where he seemed to seek danger
with an ardor characteristic rather of a young
soldier than of one who had grown gray in mili
tary service and had long been familiar with war.
The personal example of an officer of his rank

92 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
voluntarily in the perils of battle, upon that day,
and upon subsequent occasions, undoubtedly
produced a good effect upon the troops. My
report of the battle of San Juan is based upon
information obtained from officers who partici
pated in it.
Just before the final capture of El Caney, the
demand for assistance being urgent. General
Bates, after a conference with General Chaffee,
withdrew his men, in compliance with orders,
and went to take a position on the left of Kent.
He arrived on the line about 2 :3o a. m., his com
mand having been marching and fighting stead
ily more than twenty -four hours.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 93

After the Battle. — General Lawton's
March to San Juan.
General Lawton received orders to move as
soon as possible, after capturing El Caney, and
take a position, on the Santiago road, on the
extreme right, joining Sumner. He began his
march immediately after the battle, and halted
sometime after dark, near the Ducrot house.
His division had been engaged all day, and evi
dently could not have received the three days'
full rations contemplated before the battle be
gan, as many of the men were without food,
and after their extremely fatiguing day many
of them, to my knowledge, sought to appease
their hunger by eating unripe mangoes which
they plucked from the trees. After the com
mand had gone into bivouac near the Ducrot
house, General Lawton with his staff started
out to locate the position which he was to take
up. He had been informed that if he would
go out to the front, he would meet there a staff
officer who would direct him to the position that
he was to take. Riding along with his staff in
the moonlight, he suddenly encountered the fire

94 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
of a Spanish outpost, and was compelled to with
draw. Returning to his command, he sent out
a strong patrol of Cubans to reconnoiter. The
staff -officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, also went
out to the front, and, presumably in order to in
dicate his whereabouts to General Lawton, began
singing "John Brown's Body" in a loud voice.
He was soon fired upon by the Spanish picket,
and left the vicinity. He was not seen by Gen
eral Lawton until the following morning. This
certainly was a novel incident in military history,
and I doubt if another case can be found where
a division commander has been expected to ride
out beyond his own lines in order to find a staff
officer to direct his further movements. Wheth
er Lieutenant-Colonel Derby was fired upon be
fore or after General Lawton and his staff en
countered the Spanish outpost, I have never
been able to ascertain. It has been frequently
reported that General Lawton's command was
fired upon by the Spaniards on their right. The
plain facts of the case are exactly as I have stated
them. General Lawton and his staff, moving
forward for the purpose mentioned, were fired
upon and compelled to withdraw. About 2:30
a. m., no report from the Cubans having been
received, General Lawton again started out on
a reconnaissance, but was overtaken by orders
to withdraw, by way of the artillery position

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 95
near El Caney and the Corps Headquarters, and
thence to cross the San Juan River in rear of
Wheeler's division and form on the right of the
latter. He began his march at once, reached
the San Juan River at daylight, and about noon
his command, greatly fatigued, having been
marching and fighting nearly thirty hours on
light rations, reached a position which it could
have taken up by a march straight to the front,
not more than 600 yards from its bivouac near
the Ducrot house. I have never been able to
understand the cause for this movement, nor
has anybody who was in a position to know ever
explained it to me. It seems to have been
undertaken from a fear of a heavy attack on
Lawton's right. In view of the fact that the
Spaniards had been driven by force from all the
positions which they occupied, that they were
undoubtedly in the demoralized condition of a
defeated army, that they had been engaged all
day in a serious battle, it was hardly to be ex
pected that their morale would be sufficient to
enable them, after their disastrous defensive
fight, to assume vigorous, offensive operations
in the night. It seems strange that the move
ment should have been ordered before Lawton
could^ascertain definitely, by a reconnaissance,
the strength and location of the hostile force on
his right.

96 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
The 34th Michigan and 9th Massachusetts
arrived 'at^^Siboney on the ist of July and were
ordered at once to the front. Their landing was
completed in the afternoon, and, after a night
march extremely trying to new troops, they ar
rived at the captured position at 8 a. m., where
they were placed in support of Bates on the ex
treme left. General Duffield was directed to
keep the 33d Michigan at Siboney and to con
tinue the demonstration against Aguadores the
next day should it be necessary. During the
night Major Dillenback moved his batteries for
ward to San Juan Hill, where gun-pits were con
structed. Four six-mule-wagon-loads of picks
and shovels had been brought up by Lieutenant-
Colonel Derby during the night, by means of
which the troops strengthened their position.
Owing to illness, resulting from fatigue and
heat-prostration. General Shafter was unable,
on the ist of July, to exercise the influence on
the course of the battle that a commanding gen
eral is ordinarily expected to exert. Early in
the day he took his position on a high hill near
his headquarters in order to get a better view of
the field; but, unfortunately, the nature of the
country was such that an unobstructed view
could not be obtained, nor, owing to the general
use of smokeless powder by the two contending
armies, could the course of the battle be traced

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 97
by the lines of smoke, as might have been done
a few years ago. In the afternoon he rode to
El Pozo, but, owing to his illness, was compelled
to return to his headquarters. His ph^'^sical
infirmity thus prevented him from being present
with the troops, and the peculiar topography of
the country rendered it impossible for him to
gain speedy information in regard to the condi
tion of affairs at the front. As a result, his aids
were compelled in some cases to give important
orders on their own responsibility; the subordi
nate commanders were in many instances com
pelled to act upon their own initiative; and the
confusion was greatly heightened by the lack of
knowledge of the terrain over which they were
operating, and also bythe fact that,the brigades
and divisions,wereLbut newLy organized,^and.had
had no experience jn operating together. Situ
ated as they were in a dense jungle, receiving a
heavy fire from an enemy whom they could not
see, the troops were in a situation to which I can
find no parallel, save, perhaps, that^ojLBraddock's
command at the.tjattle of Mpn,Qng.ahela. "With
less resolute and efficient troops and less able
and determined subordinate commanders, the
battle at San Juan might have terminated as
disastrously as the famous battle mentioned..

98 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

July 2d. — ^The "Night Attack." — Shall the
Army Retreat?
On the 2d of July the Spaniards opened fire
from their trenches near the city, and the action
was continued the greater part of the day. As
already stated, Lawton was in position at noon.
Garcia was placed on his extreme right. About
3 o'clock p. m., the 34th Michigan was ordered
to support Kent's division in the center, but was
not actively engaged. The 9th Massachusetts
remained with Bates. In the morning Dillen
back, encountering a heavy fire, drawn upon
him by the smoke from his batteries, fell back to
El Pozo, and later in the day the batteries were
pushed forward to the front and left of that
place. At 10 p. m. occurred what is known as
the ' ' Spanish night attack. ' ' This consisted of a
heavy fusillade from the opposing lines, and
lasted about an hour. I do not think the enemy
made any attack at all. I have been unable to
find any person who saw any hostile troops mov
ing forward from their trenches. The fire prob
ably began by accident from one army or the
other, and was taken up all along the line on both

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 99
sides. The Spaniards suffered very heavily as
a result of this engagement, and, as I have since
learned, many of them retreated into the city
in a condition of panic. On this day the demon
stration against Aguadores was continued by a
battalion of the 33d Michigan.
On the evening of the 2d of July a council of
war was held by General Shafter, and the ques-
tioii_of_a,.j;etigat.j¥^^ What con
ditions or representations caused the idea of a
retrograde movement to be entertained by the
Corps Commander, I do not know. I do know,
however, that the morale of the troops at the
time was excellent, and that as late as the loth
of July the rumor that a retreat had been con
templated on the evening of the 2d was gener
ally received with incredulity by the officers in
the trenches.

100 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

A Truce.
On the 3d of July, Cervei-a's fleet left the
harbor, and in the engagement which followed
it was entirely destroyed. On land desultory
firing was continued until about 10 a. m., when
General Shafter summoned the Spanish com
mander to surrender. During the correspond
ence a truce was agreed upon and all firing
ceased. On this day General Escario entered
Santiago with 2,800 Spanish troops, having made
a brilliant march from Manzanillo, for the pur
pose of coming to the assistance of his belea
guered comrades at Santiago.
On the night of the 4th and the morning of
the 5 th of July several thousand non-combat
ants, mostly women, children and old men, who
had been expelled from the city by the Spanish
commandant, in view of a threatened bombard
ment, came out from Santiago and passed
through our lines, with the consent of General
Shafter. For a number of days this exodus
I continued, until the refugees amounted to about
20,000. Most of them gathered at El Caney,
but some went to Siboney and Daiquiri. As far

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 101
as possible, they were provided with food from
the commissary stores of the Army, though the
Chief Commissary was already heavily taxed to
supply rations to the troops in the trenches.
Yellow fever, which soon made its appearance
among the troops, was probably introduced by
these refugees.
Negotiations relative to the surrender of
Santiago and its garrison continuing, the truce
was extended from time to time until the loth
of July. During the truce the 6th and i6th
Infantry were detached from Kent's division
and assigned to Lawton. The 8th Ohio, the
xst D. C. and the ist Illinois regiments of volun
teers arrived, the two latter being assigned to
Lawton and being placed on the right of Wheeler.
Lawton continued to extend his lines to the
right, and several field mortars were placed
in position. During the truce the Spaniards
were also intrenching, and their position was
much stronger and would have been much more
difficult to carry by assault at the expiration of
the truce than when the negotiations first began. ,
About 4 p. m., on the loth of July, the truce ex- j
pired, and a heavy fire of artillery and musketry
was opened all along the line.* This firing con
tinued until nearly dark, the casualties, however,
* For the general position of the troops at this time, see Map
No. 3-

102 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
being but slight upon our side. On this occasion
the batteries of Capron and Parkhurst (the lat
ter under Lieutenant Hinds, Captain Parkhurst
having been wounded) were in the trenches with
Lawton's infantry and did excellent work. The
remaining batteries, under Major Dillenback,
were in position to the left and front of El Pozo,
a mile in rear of the infantry, much to the dis
satisfaction of the troops in the trenches, who
were only from 600 to 800 yards from the
enemy's works. Desultory firing was continued
on the following day until negotiations were
again opened, and everything again became
quiet along the lines. General Randolph, Chief
of Artillery, had arrived on the 9th, and Taylor's
and Riley's field batteries were hurried up to the
line. Ludlow's brigade was moved around to
the right, and the investment of the city was
practically complete on the twelfth.
On the nth of July, Major-General Nelson
A. Miles, commanding the Army, arrived at
Siboney, and reached Shafter's headquarters
the following day. The influence of the Com
manding General was immediately felt. The
morale of the troops rose appreciably, and all
felt that matters would soon be brought to a
decisive issue. The negotiations for the sur
render were pushed, and preparations were made
to carry the Spanish lines by assault in case the

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 103
negotiations should fail. Before coming ashore.
General Miles had arranged with the Navy to
co-operate in effecting a landing at Cabafias, of
the troops that had accompanied him on the
transports Yale and Columbia, consisting of the
6th Massachusetts, the 6th Illinois, and four
regular batteries of light artillery. Other troops,
whose arrival was soon expected, were to be
landed^at the same point. But these measures
proved unnecessary, though the presence of the
Commanding General and his vigorous prepara
tions, of which the enemy was aware, certainly
hastened the satisfactory termination of the
negotiations. On the 13th, General Miles and
General Shafter went beyond the lines and had
a conference with General Toral, the Spanish
commander. The terms of the surrender were
definitely settled on the 14th, and General Miles
at once returned to Siboney and started almost
immediately for Porto Rico. I had been at the
front from the time of the landing of the first
troops until the morning of the 6th of July, when
I went back to Corps Headquarters, where I was
ill with fever until the evening of the 9th. On
the morning of the loth I again went to the front
and was present in the engagements of the loth
and nth of July. Upon my application. Cap
tain Anderson was returned to duty with me,
though not until the 9th of July. While he was

104 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
with me in Cuba, and subsequently in Porto
Rico, his services were invariably characterized
by thoroughness, faithfulness, ability and cour
age. On the 1 2th of July, I reported to the
Major-General Commanding the Army, and re
sumed my functions as a member of his staff.
My personal observation of the Santiago cam
paign ended with the departure of the expedi
tion for Porto Rico.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 105

General Comments.
I have already stated that the plan of the
battle was, in my opinion, tactically sound, but
that the faults were those of execution, and that
these resulted primarily from the lack of proper
reconnaissance . It was certainly good tactics i
to combine a front and flank attack, and had
these attacks been so timed as to be made sim
ultaneously, there is no doubt that the Spanish
position would have been carried without great
difficulty and certainly without serious loss.
Owing, however, to an ignorance of the loca
tion of the Spanish lines, the divisions of Kent
and Wheeler were moved forward to await the
result of Lawton's attack in a position where
they were under fire not only of artillery, but of
infantry. It is impossible to suppose that the
location of the Spanish position could have been
known, for no commander would deliberately
require, or expect, troops to remain inactive in
a position where they were subjected to heavy
loss. As things really were, an attack was the
only alternative to a retreat, and, to the ever
lasting credit of our troops, they took the bull

106 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
by the horns and moved forward to an attack
as gallant as any recorded in the annals of war
fare. The task before them was an extremely
difficult one. They were required to make a
front attack upon an intrenched position, being
entirely unaided by the artillery preparation that
infantry has a right to expect as a preliminary to
such an assault. The attack was rendered all
the more difficult because of the new conditions
resulting from the use of smokeless powder,
which gave the enemy an unobstructed aid and
a clear view of the movements of our troops.
When the hostile position was carried, our Army
was practically without reserves; all the troops
being required in the assault.
The Spanish force at El Caney, as nearly as
I have been able to ascertain, consisted of 550
men, under the command of General Vara del
Rey, who was killed in the battle. I have heard
surprise expressed that so stubborn a defense
could be conducted against such numerical odds;
but there is nothing in the warfare of the past
to justify such surprise. More than twenty
years ago the view was entertained by some of
the best tactical authorities that, with opposing
forces equal in arms and morale, a successful
front assault upon a well-intrenched position
would require odds of 6 to i in favor of the as
sailants, even with the aid of an effective artil-

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. -107
lery. In the battle of Woerth, in the Franco-
German War, the intrenched position of Froesch-
weiler, held by less than a division of French
troops, could not be carried until the Germans
had thrown against it the entire sth Corps, and
the greater part of the i ith Corps, in a combined
front and flank attack, though the assault had
been prepared by a vigorous and effective fire
of 84 guns, of the best artillery in the world,
from the opposing heights of Dieffenbach. At
El Caney the artillery preparation for the attack
was feeble, and the position had to be carried
by the infantry with very little assistance from
its "indispensable companion." Moreover, the
Mauser rifle of the Spanish infantry at El Caney
was immeasurably superior to the Chassep6t of
the French infantry at Woerth, the latter arm
being indeed greatly inferior to the Springfield;
and, above all, smokeless powder had now con
ferred upon the defense an advantage before
unknown. The Spanish positions at San Juan
and El Caney were, in reality, advance posts of
the main lines near the city. The former was
open to reinforcement at any time from the main
lines; the latter was cut off, and had to depend
solely upon its own garrison. I have not been
able to ascertain definitely the strength of the
enemy at San Juan. The least estimate upon
which any reliance can be placed gives the Span-

108 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
ish force on this part of the field at 750 men with
2 mountain guns. The entire force in Santiago
at the time is reliably given as 6,000 men, of
which number 2,500 soldiers and 1,000 sailors
and marines were in the portion of the main lines
east of the city. As it is scarcely to be assumed
that the Spanish commander would allow his
lines at San Juan to be overwhelmed without
giving them assistance, it cannot be doubted
that the troops in that position received con
siderable reinforcements from the main lines,
though to what extent such aid was sent can
only be conjectured. Our forces engaged on
the ist of July numbered about 13,000 men,
about 7,500 being engaged at San Juan and
5,500 at El Caney. Our losses were 1,584 killed
and wounded. It is a curious fact, as illustrat
ing the difference in the magnitude of the mili
tary operations in the two wars that, the loss
of the Army of the Potomac at Fredericksburg
was almost equal to the total strength of our
army at San Juan-El Caney; and it is also
worthy of note that the percentage of loss of the
assailants in the Cuban battle was nearly as
great as in the unskillful and desperate front
attack made by Bumside nearly thirty-six years
ago. 
It has been supposed by some ill-informed
¦critics that the successful assault on the posi-

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 109
tion at San Juan was a refutation of the theories
that have long been held in regard to a front at
tack upon an intrenched position. For myself, I
see no reason whatever to change the opinion
which I have expressed in "Organization and
Tactics," p. 158, as follows:
' ' With the increased range and power of fire
arms, front attacks have become more and more
difficult and costly. So true is this that unless
the assailant has a great superiority in numbers
or morale, a front attack is almost sure to fail."
In the attack in question our troops were
certainly superior both in number and in morale.''
Even then the attack, though successful, was
obtained at a cost of life that could have been
easily avoided with more skillful tactical ar
rangements. Had the enemy's position been
carefully ascertained beforehand, it would, I
am confident, have been evident that the divi
sions of Kent and Wheeler should not have
moved forward from their bivouacs until the
issue of the engagement at El Caney was known.
It is more than probable that Lawton would
have been unmolested by the Spanish force in
Santiago while he was engaged at El Caney, for
in order to attack him the Spaniards would have
been compelled to leave their intrenchments
and abandon all the tactical advantages con
ferred by the defensive. With proper patrol-

no THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
ling and reconnaissance conducted at the time,
any offensive movement by the enemy could
have been promptly ascertained, the two divi
sions mentioned could have marched to Law-
ton's assistance before the Spaniards could have
reached him, and they would have had the ad
vantage of striking the enemy in the open in
stead of encountering him in a strong position
of his own choosing. The fact that the capture
of El Caney required many more hours than was
originally expected makes no difference what
ever in the matter. The divisions of Kent and
Wheeler could have been kept in position out of
fire until the capture of El Caney, even though
they had not moved until the following day.
With the demoralizing effect of a defeat at El
Caney, and with Lawton in a position to strike
their left flank, I think it may well be doubted
whether the Spaniards would have made any
attempt at resistance in the position at San Juan,
and I believe that they would have fallen back
at once to their lines in the vicinity of the city.
If they had remained, it would have been so much
the better for us and so much the worse for them.
But while there was nothing in the battles
in Cuba to justify an alteration of the theories
held generally by military men in regard to a
front attack, the conduct of our troops at San
Juan certainly demonstrated the fact that, con-

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. Ill
trary to the generally accepted opinion, it is
possible for troops to make a flank march under
a heavy fire of infantry. This was done at San
Juan, not only when the cavalry division was
marching to the right* before the attack on Ket
tle Hill, but afterwards when a similar march
was necessary in order to pass around the pond.
It is to be noted, however, that the troops who
were able to perform such a feat were troops of
the highest excellence, and the execution of a
flank march under heavy infantry fire is not
likely to be performed as a matter of choice by
any intelligent commander merely because it
was shown at the battle of San Juan that such a
thing might possibly be done with exceptionally
fine troops.
* These troops were more or less concealed by trees and under
brush, and therefore not subject to well-aimed fire. In fact, it has
been claimed by some that the Spaniards did not believe, until the
balloon made its appearance near " Bloody Ford," that the Amer
icans would attempt so dangerous a movement as massing along
San Juan Creek, in easy rifle range of the Spanish trenches. It is
a well-known fact that when the balloon did appear, the intensity
of their fire greatly increased.

112 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

Smokeless Powder.
The Santiago campaign was the first in which
our Army used smokeless powder, and, with the
exception of the brief war between Greece and
Turkey in 1897, it was the first in which such
powder has ever been used in war. The results
were interesting; not that they developed any
thing unforeseen, but mainly as a confirmation
of views already entertained in regard to the use
of the new ammunition. Four years before the
Spanish War, I wrote (' ' Organization and Tac
tics," p. 187) as follows:
"The advantages of smokeless powder will
probably rest with the defensive rather than the
offensive. The position of the defenders was
formerly outlined with smoke; and the com
mander acting on the offensive could thus give
the assailing troops a proper direction from the
beginning of the fight. This will now be much
more difficult, and as a change of direction is
hard to execute with troops under fire- — as it is
likely to cause a crowding in one place and an
opening out in another part of the assailant's
line, and a separation of reserves from their

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 113
proper front — ^more time must be taken in recon
noitering the position. This, combined with the
fact that the assailant, both in reconnaissance
and attack, is in full view of the defender, who
can also clearly see the various objects in the
assailant's path to which he has ascertained the
range, manifestly gives a great advantage to the
defensive. This advantage is increased by the
fact that the firing-line of the defender, lying
down, scarcely offers a perceptible target to the
assailant, while the firing-line of the latter, al
though also comparatively invisible when under
cover, affords a full target when it moves for
ward. The firing-line of the defender must, for
reasons already stated, devote its attention to
the firing-line of the assailants; but a second
firing-line, when the nature of the position ad
mits of employing one, may open with volleys
or magazine fire on the plainly visible supports
and reserves, and, by shattering them, bring the
enemy's firing-line to a standstill for want of the
physical and moral reinforcement necessary for
i ts forward impulsion. The effect of smokeless
powder on the morale of the troops is as yet an
unanswered question. The killed and wounded,
formerly concealed to a great degree by a merci
ful curtain of smoke, will now be exposed to full
view, and the horrors of the battlefield may
effect the nerves of the soldiers to a degree for-

114 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
merly unknown. It is more likely, however,
that this will not materially affect the troops.
Men never despise danger, but their pride, com-
bativeness and excitement neutralize the instinct
of self-preservation. The bewilderment pro
duced by the atmosphere of smoke, and the
sense of danger caused by losses coming from
beyond a veil concealing the enemy, will no
longer exist; and the men, seeing clearly, will
doubtless be in less perplexity and in better
heart than under the old conditions. This,
combined with the fact that the men will be
continually within the view of their officers,
will probably render fire-discipline an easier
matter than it was formerly. It seems probable,
on the whole, that the introduction of smokeless
powder will make the tactical handling of troops
easier than it was under the old conditions;
though the commander of a large force will
seriously miss the indications of the progress
of the combat formerly afforded by the smoke
which marked the lines."
If the tense be changed in the above from
the future to the past, it will answer without
other alteration for a report upon the use of
smokeless powder in the campaign under con
sideration. As to the morale of the men, I am

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 115
of the opinion that it had been improved instead
of impaired by the introduction of smokeless
powder; the absence of the bewilderment caused
by smoke more than compensating for the clearer
view of the casualties of battle.

116 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

The Artillery.
Much disappointment was felt throughout
the Army at the inefficiency of our artillery; for
the professional qualifications of our artillery
officers and the excellent training of our light
batteries caused more to be expected- than, as
we can now see, was just. In the first place, the
artillery was greatly insufficient in number. In
all armies under the sun the proportion of artil
lery with troops in the field varies from 3 to 4^
guns per 1,000 men. In the Santiago campaign
we had .about i gun per 1,000 soldiers. The
difficult nature of the country furnished very
little excuse for so small a proportion of artil
lery. Guns can be taken to the front if those
who are in command of them are determined
that they shall be; and no ground is so difficult
that it will not afford positions for artillery if
there be a determination to find places for it.
The artillery was, however, sorely handicapped
in the nature of its ammunition. For the first
time in history, this arm, supplied with the old
black powder, was engaged with opponents pro
vided with smokeless powder. If both sides

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 117
had been using the same antiquated ammuni^
tion, they would have been on the same equality
as in past wars; but under the conditions that
existed on the ist of July, our artillery found its
aim obscured, and at the same time presented
a conspicuous target to its opponents by the
smoke raised by its anachronistic ammunition.
Smokeless powder was generally, but not exclu
sively, used by the Spanish artillery. One gun,
at least, in the enemy's line used black powder,
and with the results similar to those that gener
ally followed the use of like ammunition by our
own artillery. In the engagement on the loth
of July, this piece, which was a muzzle-loader,
in position opposite the trenches occupied by the
2d Infantry, was able to fire only three shots.
The fire of a considerable part of our infantry
line was concentrated upon the gun, and I have
been credibly informed that seven Spaniards
were successively shot down in attempting to
insert a single friction-primer in the vent.
After the surrender, the gun is said to have
been found indented and spotted with count
less bullet-marks and the sponge-staff riven
into splinters.
There was much dissatisfaction felt by the
infantry because of the position of Dillenback's
artillery in the engagements on the loth and
nth of July. As I have already stated, Dillen-

118 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
back was about a mile in rear of the infantry,
the latter being between 600 and 800 yards from
the enemy's trenches. Viewed from the cold
standpoint of gunnery alone, without consider
ing any moral influences, there can be no doubt
that Dillenback's position was one from which.
effective work could be done. The guns were
within good effective range of the enemy, and it
is well known that at a distance of 2,500 yards
from the enemy, a battery can safely fire over its
own infantry if the latter are not less than 150
or more than 2,000 yards in advance of the guns.
The average infantry soldier, however, under
stands little about the science of gunnery, and
to his mind the position of the artillery so far to
the rear was merely an indication of timidity.
Rather than to remain where they were, it would
have been better for the batteries to advance to
the infantry trenches, even though they had fired
nothing but blank cartridges, for the infantry
would then have felt, at least, the encourage
ment that is always given by the close and vigor
ous co-operation of the artillery. The two bat
teries with Lawton's division on the loth of July
were in the trenches with the infantry, and I am
satisfied from my own observation that it would
have been possible for the other batteries to have
been similarly located. It was unfortunate that

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 119
no siege-guns were brought to bear upon the
enemy's lines. Two of the siege-guns were land
ed at Daiquiri; the rest remained on board the
transports. Why the siege artillery was not
brought forward I do not know.
There was a Sims-Dudley dynamite gun,
under charge of Sergeant Borrowe, accompany
ing the ist Volunteer Cavalry. It is said to
have done effective work on several occasions,
though its fire was generally very inaccurate.
Owing mainly to the delicacy of the breech
mechanism, the gun frequently got out of order,
causing a suspension of its fire until it could be
repaired. It fired only twenty shots in the en
tire campaign. The only time that I personally
saw this gun was on the nth of July, and un
fortunately it had then just gotten out of order,
and I was unable to judge of its efficiency by
personal observation. The general impression
seems to be, however, that the defects of the gun
can be so remedied as to make it a valuable
weapon. There were also two Colt automatic
guns, which seem to have been quite satisfactory,
though better results might have been obtained
from them had they been mounted on wheeled
carriages, instead of tripods.
The campaign was a short one, and it is al
ways dangerous to generalize from individual
instances; but the battles of the ist of July at

120 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
least demonstrated one feature in modem war
fare about which there was very general doubt
before — ^viz., the feasibility of using machine
guns with the attacking columns in an assault.
It had been universally conceded that such guns
would be of great value on the defensive, and
especially in flank positions, but there was much
doubt as to the possibility of their being able to
withstand fire from the opposing infantry if used
in an attack at short range. That such guns can
be used in a vigorous tactical offensive was clear
ly demonstrated, and a positive lesson in warfare
in this respect was taught in the capture of the
position at San Juan. It is a mistake, however,
to suppose that these guns can be invariably
used where the use of field artillery would be
impracticable. True, our light batteries en
countered infantry fire and were compelled to
withdraw; while the Gatlings encountered in
fantry fire and were not only able to continue
in action, but kept the opposing fire down. We
should not forget, however, that the Gatlings
were supplied with smokeless powder, and the
artillery with the ammunition of a by -gone age.
Had the artillery been provided with the smoke
less powder and the Gatling guns with the black,
a different story might have been told. I do not
think there was anything in the course of these
two battles that could reasonably effect any

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 121
change in the opinions long held in regard to the
use of field artillery. I believe that field artil
lery, led with energy, courage and perseverance
and supplied with smokeless powder, can still be
used on the offensive as well as on the defensive,
and that the effect of the modem shrapnel is so
great that artillery can still easily hold its own
against anything in its front.

122 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

Dismounted Cavalry.
rhe operations around Santiago partook es
sentially of the nature of a purely infantry cam
paign. Wheeler's Cavalry Division bore its full
share of the fighting, and no troops engaged are
entitled to greater credit; but the Cavalry Divi
sion fought dismounted, and was to all intents
and purposes infantry. It may perhaps be
justifiable to doubt whether any other body of
cavalry in the world could have performed the
same work as that so well carried through by
the Cavalry Division in Cuba; for the American
cavalry, essentially dragoons of the highest type,
had been trained with equal care in mounted
and dismounted action. But though the Cav
alry Division was able to do excellent work as
infantry, it is to be regretted that there was not
in the army of invasion a greater number of
mounted troops. The officers and men of Raf-
ferty's squadron gained just commendation for
the valuable work performed by them, but the
squadron was generally broken up into troops
and even into squads performing escort and
orderly duty. I have no hesitancy in saying.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 123
from my own knowledge, that a force of cavalry
used on reconnoitering duty would have been
of inestimable value, and I am satisfied that if
a single mounted troop had been with Lawton
on the morning of the 23d of June, the campaign
would have opened with the capture of a Span
ish battalion.

124 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

Infantry Organization.
The regular infantry regiments consisted of
two battalions, of four companies each (the two
skeleton companies not having been filled up);
the volunteers, of three similar battalions. I
think the experience of the recent war has de
monstrated the fact that it is unwise to have
skeleton battalions in the infantry regiments,
unless such battalions be in excess of the actual
fighting strength desired for war. The theory
upon which these skeleton battalions have been
maintained in the past is, that in time of war
they could be immediately filled up, and the Reg
ular Army thus increased considerably beyond its
peace footing. It seems certain, however, that
whenever war breaks out, the demand for the
services of the Regular Army, as the only avail
able body of trained troops, will be so immediate,
that no time will be allowed for filling out the
skeleton organization; and as the Army stands
in time of peace, so will it enter upon the first
campaign of the war. If, however, a skeleton
battalion in each regiment be maintained only
for the purpose of supplying additional officers

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 125
in time of war, there can be no doubt of the wis
dom of the system; for the demands for regular
officers of the line for service in volunteers, both
staff and line, will always be so great in time of
war that unless a surplus be provided in the
peace organization, the fighting efficiency of the
regular regiments will be seriously crippled by
the diminution of the number of officers on duty
with the troops.
The tactics of the infantry was well adapted
to the circumstances of the action and the nature
of the terrain, and does not seem to have been
characterized in any instance by a spirit of blind
adherence to the drill-book. Indeed, the prac
tical tactical training in field exercises given at
most of our posts, for some years before the war,
bore good fruit when our troops found them
selves in actual battle. There was considerable
uniformity in the tactical methods of the regular
regiments. In some instances the ist battalion
was entirely deployed on the firing-line, the 2d
battalion being held in reserve. In other cases
the stress of circumstances caused the whole line
to be deployed immediately. In every case that
came under my observation, or of which I learned
as a result of inquiry, the regimental reserves
were all employed in the first line when the final
assault began. As far as I can learn, squads
were used in open-order fighting in only one

126 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
instance — ^viz., by the 71st New York. I am
told that the noise and confusion created by the
squad leaders contributed not a little towards
the panic which seized that regiment. I have
long been of the opinion that the squad system
has more defects than advantages, and I think
it would be advisable to have the Drill Regula
tions so revised as to admit of a simple and
prompt deployment without attempting to use
the squad system.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 127

Ammunition Supply.
The fire-discipline of the regular regiments
was excellent, and their training in field exer
cises and target practice was undoubtedly of
inestimable value. I am informed that the ex
penditure of ammunition during the entire day
on the ist of July, did not exceed loo rounds
per man. The ease with which the troops were
supplied with ammunition was, to my mind,
one of the most remarkable things of the cam
paign. The subject of the supply of ammu
nition for the firing-line has been discussed
throughout the military world for many years,
and m.uch thought and care have been devoted
to the subject in all the armies of Europe. In
the Santiago campaign the troops were kept
supplied with ammunition by means of pack-
trains which brought up the ammunition and
deposited the boxes at convenient places, as
close as possible to the firing-line. Men de
tailed for this purpose took the cartridges from
these boxes and distributed them where they
were needed. In fact, the solution of the vexed
problem of supplying ammunition in battle

128 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
seems to be found in the words "pack-mules
and courage." In supplying the troops with
ammunition, the work performed by Lieutenant
Cabiness (now captain), 24th Infantry, and
Lieutenant William Brooke, 4th Infantry, was
especially gallant and meritorious.

h

The Krag-Jorgensen rifle, with which all the
egular troops were armed, was found to be a
thoroughly satisfactory weapon. There was at
first, on the part of som.e of our officers, a belief
that it was inferior to the Mauser; but I think
this was largely due to the fact that they had
seen personally the effects of the fire of the
Mauser without realizing fully the destruction
that had been wrought by their own weapons.
The Krag-Jorgensen is simple in its action, ac
curate in its fire, strong and well-made, and the
fact that it can be used either as a single-shooter
or a magazine-gun is greatly in its favor.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 129

Black Powder.
The volunteer regiments, with the exception
of the Rough Riders, were armed with the
Springfield rifle, using black powder. The dis
advantages under which they labored, from
their unfortunate armament, had not been un
foreseen, but had been commented upon fre
quently before the war began. Yet the argu
ment had been frequently advanced that the
Springfield was a much simpler rifle than the
Krag-Jorgensen, and that it would consequently
be a better one to place in the hands of untrained
troops. The natural reply that this argument,
if carried to its logical conclusion, would justify
arming the volunteers with spears and clubs, as
being still simpler weapons, does not always
seem to have been relished by the advocates of
the old rifle. Certainly those who condemned
the Springfield rifle before the war found their
views abundantly sustained by the experience
of battle. On one occasion, on the loth of July,
I heard orders given to the 2d Massachusetts to
cease firing, and this regiment remained in the
line without firing a shot, because it was felt that

130 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
the target afforded by its smoke, and the an
noyance caused by the same smoke to the troops
on its left, were so harmful as to more than neu
tralize any good results that could be obtained
from its fire. A practical criticism of the Spring
field rifle was found in the fact that after the ist
of July no Krag-Jorgensen rifle could be left
lying around unguarded without being taken by
some volunteer — an act of appropriation too
clearly justified by the instinct of self-preserva
tion to be characterized as a theft. I am in
formed that enough spare Krag-Jorgensen rifles
were available after the battle for arming a bat
talion of volunteers; but, for some reason un
known to me, these troops were compelled to
retain the old Springfield. At least one lesson,
I think, has been learned from the experience
of the Santiago campaign, and it is probable
that no American troops, of any kind, will ever
again be deliberately sent into the field with a
weapon which is known to be markedly inferior
to that possessed by their opponents.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 131

Intrenching Tools.
It was unfortunate that each infantry soldier
was not provided with a good intrenching tool.
The necessity for such implements was immedi
ate and urgent as soon as the Spanish position
had' been carried, and it would have been much
better if the men had been provided with im
mediate means of making good intrenchments,
instead of being compelled, while waiting for
picks and shovels to be sent up from the rear,
to construct hasty intrenchments with halves
of canteens, pocket-knives and finger-nails.
The best intrenching tool is probably the Linne-
mann spade, or some modification of it. If such
tools had been provided, many of them doubtless
would have been thrown away before the ist of
July; but none would have been lost after that
date. I was strongly impressed with the utility
of the machete carried by the Cuban troops.
It is not only a weapon, but a tool adapted to
many diverse uses. For hewing through trop
ical undergrowth, cutting through barb-wire
fences, for many purposes of camp use, and as a
weapon, it is alike valuable. It would probably
be well, especially when trOops are operating in
the tropics, to provide each non-commissioned
officer with a machete.

132 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

Uniforms.
The uniform worn by the troops in the San
tiago campaign was naturally unsatisfactory,
as it was one which had been adopted for a dif
ferent climate. The blouse was universally dis
carded. The blue flannel shirt was uncomfort
ably warm, and was frequently worn outside of
the trousers. In a few cases I noticed men car
rying their trousers, evidently preferring to
march bare-legged rather than endure the dis
comfort of wearing them. The khaki uniform
was worn by many of the officers, and was also
furnished to the enlisted men of the Rough
Riders. It was not altogether a satisfactory
uniform. It is very neat when new, but it
speedily becomes dirty, and the material is not
as cool as it should be. Linen uniforms would
undoubtedly be more satisfactory, so far as com
fort is concerned; but unless they could be
frequently washed and ironed — generally im
practicable in a campaign — ^they would become
even more untidy in appearance than the khaki
uniforms.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 133

Volunteers.
There was but one organization — ^viz., the
71st New York — that did not perform during
the campaign the utmost that could reasonably
have been expected of troops. Yet the deplor
able conduct of this regimicnt should not excite
surprise. It was composed of good material,
but most of the men were raw recruits, none of
them had ever seen active service, their officers
were inexperienced, and suddenly finding them
selves in a situation not only of great danger,
but of great confusion, they behaved as raw
troops generally would behave under the same
circumstances. It is but just to this regiment
to recall the fact that the volunteers who fled at
Bull Run had at that time been in service nearly
a month longer than the 71st New York had
been at the time of the battle of San Juan. The
xst United States Volunteer Cavalry, generally
known as the "Rough Riders," constituted a
body of volunteer troops totally different from
the raw levies that we can ordinarily expect in
time of war. They were well armed, well offi
cered, contained a considerable sprinkling of old

134 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
soldiers of the Regular Army, and consisted
largely of men inured to hardship and trained
to the use of aims. The remainder of the per
sonnel consisted of young men of high social
position, fond of an adventurous life, and pos
sessing all the advantages of athletic training.
In regard to the employment of volunteers,
the campaign in Cuba taught nothing that was
not already known by all who were familiar with
our military history. The volunteer troops,
when they have become thoroughly trained, well
disciplined — in brief, when they have become
regulars in everything but name, are equal to
any troops in existence; but raw volunteer regi^
ments are of very little^_yalue. They do not
admit of ready handling in maneuvering, and
they are extremely uncertain in their action.
A raw regiment may do well, but is m^ore likely
to break under circumstances of danger, es
pecially where the situation is somewhat bewil
dering. The quality of the regular regiments
was excellent. The great care which, for a num
ber of years, had been exercised in selecting
recruits, and the careful training of the men in
target practice and gymnastic exercises, pro
duced gratifying results when these regiments
were called into action. One of the m^ost nota
ble features of the campaign was the cheerful
ness of the regular troops under circumstances

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 135
of extreme discomfort, and the almost total ab
sence of grumbling. Their gallantry in action
has been frequently and justly lauded, but I do
not think their cheerful and willing endurance
of distressing hardships has received as much
commendation as it deserves.

136 TBE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

Staff and Line.
A comparison of the Staff and Line in the
operations in Cuba has more than once been
made, and quite generally to the credit of the
latter. There is no doubt that the Line was in
its efficiency greatly superior to the Staff; but
the reasons are not far to see. The regiments
of the Line were all officered with regular offi
cers, who were performing, in the field, duties
for which they had been carefully trained in
time of peace. The_Staff consisted_of a hetero
geneous aggregation of officers,, some of_sKh£an
had had experience in the regular staffjdepart-
ments in7"time of peace, many more who _hajj
been taken from the Line to perform duties to
which they were not fully accustomed, and many
others who had been commissioned from civil
life outright without any special training in their
staff duties, and in some instances without any
military knowledge whatever. I know person
ally of a number of cases where newly appointed
staff officers holding the rank of assistant adju
tant-general, inspector-general, etc., were pro
vided with assistants in the form of able lieuten-

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 137
ants of the regular service, who instructed them
in their duties and performed the greater part
of their work. It would be invidious to specify
the names of such staff officers, but probably
every officer who was in the campaign in Cuba
well knows of such instances. It is impossible
to have an efficient staff when the officers are
provided in such a manner. If provision were
made for a skeleton battalion for each regiment
in time of peace, this battalion consisting of
officers alone, it would be possible to have a cer
tain number of line officers constantly under
instruction for staff duties; and such officers
could be used with the best results in time of
war. Whether such officers would be selected
because of their merits on the outbreak of a war
may perhaps be open to reasonable doubt, but
at any rate it would seem to be wise to have
them available.
The lack of a thoroughly efficient staff at the
several headquarters is not surprising, for not
only were most of the staff officers new to the
duties which they were then performing, but in
no single case had the numbers of the staff been
working together before. The orders for march
ing the different commands do not seem to have
been clear and explicit; otherwise the spectacle
would hardly have been seen of two divisions at
the same time on a single crowded road; and

138 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
the defective intelligence transmitted to the
headquarters of the Corps Commander is shown
by the fact already mentioned, that two divi
sions were sent to await quietly, in a fire-swept
zone, the result of an engagement some miles
away. Very little stress seems to have been
placed on any but topographical reconnaissance.
The officers sent out on this duty were compe
tent and well qualified for the performance of
the task assigned to them, and the maps turned
in by them were sufficient to give a clear idea of
the country that they had explored. But an
exploring patrol engaged in mapping a region
necessarily makes slow progress, and is not
sufficient for prompt reconnaissance. If there
were any attempts originating at Corps Head
quarters to send out small patrols for the pur
pose of locating the enemy or doing such ' ' scout
ing" as is necessary for the prompt location of
an enemy's force, regardless of cartographical
details, such attempts did not come under my
observation. A few patrols, ordered to push
forward regardless of map-making, could have
located the enemy's position at San Juan and
the approaches leading to it, and could have
given a reasonably clear idea to the two division
commanders of the ground over which they were
to operate, even though the description had been
unaccompanied with a map.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 139

Signal Corps.
The work performed by the Signal Corps
during the campaign was excellent. The Signal
troops were under the comm-and of Lieutenant-
Colonel F. Green, U. S. Vols, (ist lieutenant
U. S. Signal Corps), and consisted of a detach
ment of 35 men under command of Captain G.
W. S. Stevens, U. S. Vols., charged with the duty
of maintaining telegraphic and telephonic com
munication, and a balloon detachm-ent of 23 men
under Major J. E. Maxfield, U. S. Vols. Both
Major Maxfield and Captain Stevens are officers
of the Regular Army. Not only was a tele
graph line promptly established from Siboney
to General Shafter's headquarters, but the de
tachment followed on the heels of the attacking
troops, and a wire was quickly established from
Corps Headquarters to the headquarters of the
several divisions at the front. The wire used
consisted of a light rubber-covered cable, having
a core of one copper and seven steel wires. This
was laid over the brush or on the ground som.e
distance back from the road, so as to secure it
from being cut or broken. The work of this

140 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN
detachment has been universally praised. The
use made of the balloon in reconnaissance on the
day of the battle has been frequently mentioned
and as often censured. Its employment on the
firing-line was unprecedented in war, and will
probably be regarded in military history as an
erratic and ill-advised exploit. Had the balloon
been kept at Corps Headquarters, an observer
ascending in it and using a telescope could have
obtained much information that would have
been transmitted immediately to the Corps Com
mander. It is but just to the officers of the
Signal Corps to state that they were not respon
sible for the aeronautic eccentricity at San Juan.

As shown in the narrative portion of this
report, no use was made of the Bureau of Mili
tary Information except by detailing one of its
officers as assistant adjutant-general of a brigade
and permitting another to serve as a volunteer
aid. There was consequently no opportunity
for. demonstrating the use that can be made of
such a bureau. The order creating the Bureau
of Military Information in the Field, at the
Headquarters of the Army, is in thorough accord
with the customs obtaining in European armies.
Such a bureau should in no way attempt to

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 141
monopolize the reconnaissance work, nor should
it interfere with duties of that description per
formed under the direction of corps and division
commanders; but it should be required to make
such special reconnaissance as might be neces
sary for the information of the Commanding
General, should have control of the secret ser
vice, and should be charged with the shifting and
collating of all information sent in to head
quarters. I believe that a bureau organized as
set forth in the order quoted in this report
would be of great value; but the utilization of
such a bureau implies a certain degree of system
and intelligent organization in the military force
to which it is attached.

142 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

Pack-Trains.
The first assignment of field transportation
to the Army was as follows: 25 wagons and i
pack-train to each division; 5 wagons to the
independent brigade; 15 wagons and i pack-
train as ammunition-train; i wagon to each
troop of mounted cavalry; i wagon to each bat
tery, and remaining wagons and i pack-train
as a corps train. This assignment was not, how
ever, actually carried into effect, it being deemed
advisable to limit the transportation of each
division to 2 pack-trains; all the other trans
portation, including ambulances and i pack-
train, being formed into a corps train immediate
ly attached to the headquarters of the corps.
This distribution probably answered the pur
poses of supply as well as any that could have
been devised under the circumstances. The
thorough efficiency of the pack-trains, which
were under the charge of ist Lieutenant A. A.
Cabiness, 24th Infantry, was a matter of general
comment and invariable praise. Without them
the Army could not have been supplied with
rations and ammunition, unless it had delayed

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 143
its advance while waiting many days for the
preparation of the wagon-trains and the neces
sary improvement of the roads. There were
eight trains in all, each consisting of i pack-
master, I cargador (having special charge of the
loading), i cook, i blacksmith, n packers, 50
pack-mules, i bell-mare, and 15 riding-mules.
In ordinary "frontier" duty in our Western
States, a force of 13 men constitutes a sufficient
personnel for a pack-train; but in Cuba, owing
to the density of the underbrush and the con
sequent difficulties of the trail, 1 5 men were not
enough, and the packers were seriously over
worked. In tropical countries it would prob
ably be better to employ smaller trains; each
having 35 pack-mules and a personnel of 12 men,
including packmaster, cargador and blacksmith.
The pack-saddle used was the aparejo, so well
known to officers who have served in our Indi
an campaigns, and it seems to have given the
best of satisfaction. The first pack-trains were
started out from Daiquiri, leaving that point in
the morning and returning in the night. They
were subsequently all loaded at Siboney, be
tween which point and the front they were con
stantly going and coming during the military
operations. After the roads had been put in a
reasonable degree of repair, most of the supplies
were hauled to the front in wagons.

144 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

Transportation of Wounded.
Owing to the insufficient number of ambu
lances with the Army, it was necessary to trans
port the wounded from the field to the hospital
near the Corps headquarters, and thence to
Siboney, in ordinary wagons. Much distress
ing and needless suffering was thus inflicted
upon men who deserved better treatment; and
I have no doubt that in some cases this rude
means of transport was responsible for the fatal
termination of wounds where recovery would
otherwise have been certain. As nearly as I
have been able to learn, there were only three
ambulances available for the entire Army.
How this happened I do not know. It certainly
would seem that a sufficient number should
have been on hand, for it could scarcely have
been expected that Santiago would fall without
at least one battle, and it could hardly have
been thought that in an army of 15,000 men,
the number of wounded would be so small
that three ambulances would suffice for their
transportation.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 145

Mail Service.
The lack of anything like a systematic mail
service was seriously felt. The mail arrived
with no regularity, and frequently after reach
ing Siboney it was delayed in its transit to Corps
Headquarters, from which point its transmis
sion to the officers and men in the trenches was
delayed indefinitely. Even messages by cable
were not promptly transmitted to those for
whom they were intended. By way of illustra
tion, I may cite the fact that a cable message to
me from the Major-General Commanding the
Army required two days for its transmission
from Siboney to General Lawton's headquarters.
The necessity for prompt and safe carrying of
letters to soldiers in the field has long been recog
nized, and in the European armies the mail ser
vice is regulated with as much care as that which
provides the troops with rations. It requires
very little knowledge of human nature for a
person to appreciate the cheering influence of
letters from home to a soldier who is serving in
the midst of hardships and danger; or to realize
the depressing influence occasioned by the anx-

146 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
iety of a soldier who feels that he is cut off from
those who are most dear to him. It was doubt
less due to the hurried nature of the expedition
that many of the influences calculated to im
prove, or at least to sustain, the morale of the
troops were omitted. Every soldier should re
gard hunger, thirst, fatigue and danger as neces
sary incidents in a military life, but it is depress
ing to hirn to feel that he is required to endure
unnecessary hardships, and that his physical
well-being seems to be a matter of unconcern to
those in command. An apparently needless
deprivation of tobacco, and the sight of wounded
comrades hauled off the field in springless, jolt
ing army wagons, when he knows that ambu
lances are provided by the Goverment that he
serves, are likely to cause discontent on the part
of the soldier, and this feeling is further in
creased when he finds that no care is taken to
keep him in communication with home. I am
fain to believe that these things were all un
avoidable; but they were certainly deplorable,
and care should be taken to guard against their
repetition in future. But few congratulatory
orders were issued, and the influence of one of
the orders was anything but good upon a portion
of the command that had rendered heroic service
in the battle of San Juan. The order issued on
the 4th day of July, congratulating the troops

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 147
upon their victory, referred mainly to the 2d
Division and the Cavalry Division. The only
reference to the troops of Kent's division was
as follows: ' ' In these efforts he [General Wheel
er] was ably seconded by Brigadier-General
Kent, with the ist Division on the extreme left,
who also captured the works on his front."
The men of this division felt, whether rightly
or wrongly, that the brunt of the battle had
fallen upon them; that they contributed more
than either of the other two disivions to win the
victory. The slight mention of them in the
order quoted caused, to my knowledge, a feeling
of discontent and anger on the part of many offi
cers and men of the ist Division.

148 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

The Enemy.
The defense made by the Spaniards was
characterized by courage rather than skill.
Taking their posts in front of Santiago, they
waited in a purely passive manner for the Amer
ican attack. There were many places on the
road from Siboney to Santiago where a small
force, acting as a rear guard, could have seriously
delayed our advance, and could have caused us
to pay dearly for the ground gained ; but no such
attempts were made. Knowing the country
thoroughly, it would have been possible for the
Spaniards to send out at night a number of har
assing patrols to alarm our camps, to cause con
fusion, and to give to our men the impression
that they had in front of them an alert and active
enemy. It is very possible, however, that they
were deterred from so doing by the fact that the
country was even better known by the Cubans
than themselves, and that small patrols attempt
ing to harass our camps would have incurred
great danger from the outlying force of Garcia's
men. If this was the case, the Cubans undoubt-

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 149
edly contributed not a little to the security and
safety of our Army.
The Spanish blockhouses were peculiar struct
ures, the lower part consisting of stone or of
wood banked up with earth about four feet, the
upper portion being constructed of wood, the
blockhouse affording two tiers of fire. These
blockhouses were sometimes isolated, and some
times connected by means of intrenchments.
The trenches were generally narrow in profile,
and the earth was, in many cases, thrown to the
rear instead of being used as an embankment to
the front. There was little or no slope to the
trenches, owing to the tenacious nature of the
soil. The intrenchments were generally short
and detached, so as to make enfilade fire difficult.
They were usually provided with barb-wire en
tanglements, although the barb- wire obstacles
encountered were frequently nothing more than
ordinary barb- wire fences. This campaign fur
nished the first instance of the employment of
barb- wire as a military obstacle, though its use
had been long foreseen, and the necessity of pro
viding nippers for the purpose of cutting the
wire had been set forth in tactical works author
ized by the War Department. In a number of
cases the mistake was made of placing the in
trenchments on the actual crest instead of the

150 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
military crest of the slope. As a result, when
our troops neared the enemy's works they found
themselves to a certain degree protected by the
ground in front. I noticed with much surprise
that when our troops had taken up a position on
the captured crest, the same mistake was made,
in some instances, of locating the trenches on
the actual crest when the military crest was
some distance beyond it.

The demoralization of the Spaniards was so
great on the 3d of July, as a result of their unsuc
cessful battles and the loss of their fleet, that a
vigorous assault at that time would probably
have been entirely successful, and not very
costly in life. The continued truces, however,
gave them an opportunity to strengthen their
positions, and, above all, to recover their lost
morale. I do not think there was a time after
Cervera's fleet left the harbor when the American
Army could not have carried the place by as
sault; but at any time after the 4th of July it
would have been at a cost of life too heavy to
be incurred except as a last resort. Had Cer
vera's fleet remained in the harbor, it would have
delayed, but could not have prevented, thecapt-

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 151
ure of the city by the Army. If the enemy had
been driven out of his intrenchments by assault,
it would, it is true, have been impossible for the
victorious troops to hold the captured position
in the face of the heavy fire that would have been
poured upon them from the fleet. It would
have been an act of suicidal madness to attempt
to oppose armored vessels armed with many
rapid-fire guns in addition to their heavy bat
teries, with the fire of infantry aided only by a
few light field-pieces, and such a contest could
not have been contemplated a moment. The
investment would, nevertheless, have been com
pleted. The lines would necessarily have been
much farther back from the city, and conse
quently would have been much more extended;
but reinforcements were available, and were,
in fact, on the way. A much longer delay would
have been occasioned, and doubtless a heavy
loss of life from disease would have been incur
red; but I am satisfied that if the Spanish ves
sels had remained in the harbor, Santiago must
have eventually fallen into the hands of the
Army, and with it the hostile fleet. The block
ade, by land and sea, being completed, it would
have been a mere matter of starvation. Never
theless, the departure of Cervera from the harbor
removed the most formidable obstacle in the wav

152 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
of our military success, and a more valuable
stroke of good fortune could not have been
wished for by our Army.
Respectfully submitted. Arthur L. Wagner,
Lieutenant-Colonel,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 153

APPENDIX.
Board on Marine Transport Regulations.
Room F 7, Army Building,
New York, October 8, 1898.
Dear Col. Wagner: — Replying to your
note of the 5th, I take much pleasure in giving
you my recollection as to the reconnaisance
made by you on the afternoon of June 30. The
general reconnaisance made during the morn
ing by General Lawton and the brigade com
manders of the Second Division, viz.. General
Chaffee, Colonel Miles, mj^self, and others, was
with the view of developing the topographical
details necessary for formulating the plans for
the attack upon El Caney early the next morn
ing, and was made as nearly complete as the
time allowed, particularly in the matter of se
lecting a preliminary position for the artillery
southeast of Caney, and the roads to be taken
by General Chaffee's and my brigades for the
investment of Caney on the east and west.
As you state, the general reconnaissance
ended near Marianaje, as time did not permit

154 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.
of further exploration. It was important, how
ever, to determine the circumstances in the vi
cinity of the Ducrot House, where General
Miles' brigade was to rendezvous the next day,
and to which the march of my brigade, early in
the morning, would be directed preliminary to
moving northward across all the roads leading
into Santiago from El Caney. In this respect
the reconnaissance made by you ,was of the
greatest value, as it developed the fact that the
Spaniards had withdrawn from the vicinity of
the Ducrot House, as was proved by your reach
ing the house by one road and returning by an
other. That evening I was glad to receive the
information from you, and was much obliged
for the copy of the little field plan of your recon
naissance which you were kind enough to give
me, and of which I made use the next day.
In moving my brigade on the morning of the
first of July, from bivouac on the road near the
position occupied by Capron's Battery, I prac
tically moved directly towards" the Ducrot
House, reaching the main road between Caney
and Santiago in that vicinity, and then rapidly
moving eastward and northward to cover all
the exits from Caney. Your information en
abled me to do this with the greater rapidity
that I was saved the necessity for skirmishing
in my front or extending reconnaissance for the

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 155
safety of my flank, and I felt secure in the
movement eastward towards Caney, leaving the
Ducrot House in my rear, in advance 'of the
arrival there of General Miles' brigade, as had
been intended.
If this information shall be of any value to
you as part of the military record of the cam
paign, I shall be very glad.
I observe that General Lawton has sick
leave and is on his way home, when doubtless
any deficiencies in his report can be readily
supplied. With much regard. Very truly yours,
William Ludlow.
To Col. Arthur L. Wagner, Headquarters of the
Army, Washington, D. C.

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