Cuba
YALE
UNIVERSITY LLBRARY

CUBA ;

THE POLICY

ENGLAND, MÉXICO, AND SPAIN,

WITH REGAKD TO

THAT ISLAND.

AN ENGLISHMAN.

LONDON :
JAMES RIDGWAY, 169, PICCADILLY.

MDCCCXXX.

LONDON :
PRINTED BY T. BUETTELL, RUPERT STREET, HAYMARKET.

CUBA, &c.

To English ears the ñame of any foreign
country may seem at present a strange and
ill-timed interruption. But the world will not
move on with us, and stand still at our bidding
in all its other portions. However we may be
disturbed or distressed within, so long as there
is contention around us, we must remain on
our guard and keep our eyes open. It will not
do to say, We will relieve the landlords, we will
diminish the taxes, we will aid the manufac-
turers, we will legislate for game, and beer, and
tithes, and India; and then we will begin to
consider our relations with foreign powers.
Then it may be too late : and while we are
attending to the treatment of our internal dis-
eases, according to the lowering or exciting
system of the fashionable physician, taking
steel and tonics, or cathartics and water-gruel,
we may overlook the impending blow that will
lop off a hand, or cripple a member. Nay, it is

6

possible that while empirics and sages are
rivalling each other in examining our native
herbáis, and plying our English laboratories,
remedies may bé obtained from abroad, easier
and more efficacious than any to be found in
domesticpharmacopceias ; — remedies which will
do no sudden violence to any part or function
of the political body; alteratives which, al-
though it is not asserted that they will work
an entire cure, at least cannot possibly be in-
jurious, and will probably more fully realize
their humbler pretensions, than the nostrums
of any Birmingham Sangrado, or Kensington
Diaforus. In our foreign policy we may find
the means of giving a tenfold greater impulse
to our commerce and manufactures than could
be gained by any internal jugglery of mono-
polies and bounties ; and by it our position
among other nations may better be strength-
ened and secured than by an infinite aug-
mentation in the numbers of our soldiers, sai-
lors, and diplomatists.
Of foreign questiohs few are more pressing,
and none of greater ultímate importance, than
that which concerns the interest and duty of
England with regard to México, and more
especially in respect of Cuba.

In North America are but two independent
powers; the eider, which was a part of our em-
pire, and has now twice been at war with us,
has gained imposing extent and vigour, and is
hastening on towards a maturity almost porten-
tous, inasmuch as it will more and more develop
a spirit of rivalry, if not of hostility to England.
The other great North American community,
that of México, still young and unstable, and
but newly weaned from the leprous bosom of
its parent kingdom, stands side by side with
the United States, and between them there is
abundant cause of emulation or enmity. Along
the whole of a great boundary, whatever is
taken from the one is gained by the other; ñor
is it wonderful that the transatlantic journals
should have teemed with reports of a design
for giving over a fertile and important province
of the Southern Confederacy to the widening
territories of our democratic progeny . For this
transfer an able, energetic, and subtle minister
of the United States is said to have laboured
and intrigued ; and in truth it would not be
very surprising if, during the crude and un-
steady noviciate of the younger commonwealth,
a riper, a firmer, and a conterminous power
should be able to rob or defraud her. Every

8
thíng lost to México would be so much taken
away from the only independent North Ame
rican counterpoise to our great North American
rival. In truth, there can be little question that if
the United States continué for some years to
increase, as they have hitherto done, and daily
to augment and invigorate their internal re-
sources and their military and commercial
marine, and are allowed at the same time to
act on the other states of their continent, un-
watched by us, and as may seem best for their
own exclusive interests, their leagues of amity
and alliance, and their advantages of neigh-
bourhood and of kindred institutions, will
enable them to overrule the policy, and dictate,
without fear of remonstrance, the tariffs of all
America, and in the first place that of México ;
and in what spirit those tariffs will be con-
ceived, and with what strictness enforced, the
present commercial code of Washington and
the practice of New York may sufficiently
teach us.
The interest of England, with regard to
México, most precisely coincides with that
which assuredly is her duty. No one, indeed,
desires that she should defy or menace any go-

9

vernment. But without drawing the sword she
may interpose a peaceful shield. This is all
that any one would wish ; and this mere pru-
dence requires. The contest between Spain
and this immense and productive ex-colony has
already injured, and continúes most deeply to
injure, the Ínter ests of Britain. In the ex
penses of war the Mexican Government has
been compelled to waste the means which
should have provided for the payment of its
creditors. Imminent danger and constant
excitement prevent the mind of the country
from directing itself to peaceful and improving
labour. During this state of things, no one can
soberly look forward to the secure develop-
ment of national resources, or to the uninter-
rupted increase of those wants, tastes, and
habits which stimulate exertion and awaken
foreign commerce. In a yet unsettled society,
the agitations and doubts of warfare are the
parents, on the one hand, of indolent indiffer-
ence, and on the other of lawless tumult. Of
these there is in México far less than previous
experience would have entitled us to expect.
But there is enough to diminish profits, to de-
populate marts,to keep wide regions of fertility
desoíate, and to scare away or depress the

10
industry of a people, which, if it were busy and
cheerful, would be boundlessly productive.
This is, and must be the case during the con-
tinuance of the war. But if it were to termí
nate in the triumph of Spain, what would be
the results ? What could they be but the re-
establishment of the oíd Colonial System, and
palsying monopoly, and the disavowal of the
Mexican debt; or at least its acknowledgment
by a power long since bankrupt?
To determine whether the Colonial System
would be re-established, we need only consider
what are the views and interests of the Spanish
Government. Is it probable that Ferdinand
would give more free institutions to his colo-
nies than to the mother country,- — and that, as
some inclement winds are softened by passing
over a tract of ocean, and some diseases cured
by a sea-voyage, — the will of a despot would
change its nature and be humanized in Cross
ing the Atlantic ? Will a people who have
once breathed the air of liberty, again submit
their necks to the burden without a murmur ?
And, to subdue this insolent temper of resist-
ance, what discipline can be employed but
stripes and solitude; stripes that will weaken
their energies of production, and-tame their de-

11

sires of enjoyment; and isolation, by means of
Spanish monopoly, which will cut off from them
the means of selling their produce and grati-
fying their tastes ? Intercourse with strangers
supplies another standard than that set up by
the Court : with it come thought, books, in-
ordinate wishes, the consciousness of strength,
and the example of free-agency. Is it likely
that these risks will be voluntarily incurred by
a haughty mother country and absolute king ?
Without monopoly could the productions of
Spain enter into competition with those of
England, France, and Germany ? Read the
oíd commercial code for the colonies, or ask
the Messrs. Baring ! Yet, if Spain could not
thus forcé her commodities into those vast
markets, where would be the profit of her sub-
jugation of America? The costs of the war and
the after military occupation would absorb far
more than all that any but a popular, and in-
dependent government could now draw from
a reluctant, impoverished people. By the
renewal, therefore, of Spanish authority in
México, the possibility of all future commercial
transactions between the two countries would
be ended ; and the public debt, the great evi-
dence and result of our past financia! inter-

12
course, would be at once declared bad and
desperate, wiped out in short by that wet
sponge which, to thé bankrupt debtor, is the
only chemical agent that can at all compénsate
the want of the golden elixir.
But can the English Government do any
thing to exelude these dangérs, without, at the
same time, violating the rights of nations, or
entangling herself in perilous coñtests ? Lét
us inquire.
When the Spaniards had been driven from
México, and the throne of Iturbide, with all
its accompanying pageantry, had vanished, like
a shifted scene from the stage, a national cry
aróse in favour of an invasión of Cuba. The
federal Government, thereupon, assembled
troops at Campeachy, and called for the co-
operation of Colombia. Terror seized on the
friends of legitimacy, — those, that is, who seek
to bastardize every government that has not
sprung from the spawn of oppression. A like
alarm invaded all the good easy folks (of whom
such swarms surround us) who long for
nothing but the well-being of others, sup-
posing it is to cost them neither trouble, ñor
money, ñor thought ; and who, therefore, de-
light to indulge in the reverie of a general

13

torpor; even although it should leave a great
change in the organization of a great country
but half accomplished, and consequently al-
together ineffective. A storm of accusations
burst on México, — sentimental sighs and
shrieks of terror resounded against her. Some
asserted, that her proselyting zeal would ruin
the cause of liberty ; others proclaimed, that a
democratic general was about to march through
Cuba, with the torch of revolution in his hand,
announcing instant freedom to the slaves,
spreading the contagión of anarchy through
the whole West Indies, and co-operating, at
last, with the liberáis and carbonari of Europe,
for the final desolation of the world. These
follies were believed by some as unquestion-
able truths, and employed by others, among
whom was Mr. Canning, as useful pretexts
and aids, in very different designs.
In truth, the Mexicans, in 1824, were free
enough from the delirious dreams of ambition.
They were as little disposed to engage in chi-
valrous adventures as the licentiate, Pero
Pérez, and the barber, Mr. Nicholas, them-
selves. They knew that, being surrounded
by nature with tempestuous, unwholesome,
and lonely shores, scarcely broken by any

14
ports, they were forbidden, at least for ages,
to think of becoming a maritime nation : yet
except in this character, how could they hope
to keep possession of an island which is the
envy of all the world ? The Mexicans had
no views of this kind; but, made sharpsighted
by the instinct of their own position, they
perceived that Cuba would become the chief,
if not the only obstacle to their national inde-
pendence ; that from Cuba they would always
be insecure ; from Cuba always disturbed.
They proposed, therefpre, to invade that
island, not as being itself their object, but
because there only could they conquer their
liberty and tranquillity ; and because in it, and
the discontent and spirit of its inhabitants,
they might, perhaps, hope to raise up a
valuable alliance for their own new-born
freedom. That these considerations were just may be
very shortly demonstrated. Ferdinand can-
not possibly collect together a considerable
body of troops at any spot in the whole wide
península, without bringing on himself, and in a
more violent and decisive form, a renewal of
the events of the year 1820. . In Spain, the
discontent of the nation at the blind des-

15
potism of their Government, is sure to find
an irresistible support in the disgust of the
soldiery at the prospect of being sent to
America. The expense and uncertainty of at
once making the voyage from Cádiz or Co-
runna to Vera Cruz with a complete expe-
dition, and the time which it would allow for
preparation on the part of the enemy, are
also ampie reasons against this mode of pro-
ceeding. The Government, therefore, re-
quires an advanced post and depót, to which
it may leisurely and safely send successive,
unconnected, and, therefore, obedient detach-
ments. This strong-hold must be so far from
the shores of Europe as to take from the
troops all thought of forcibly returning. It
must also have in itself abundant resources
for supplying, and preparing these military
pilgrims ; who will scarcely endure the naked-
ness and hunger of eremites, without resorting
to the carnal weapon. For these purposes
Spain can only choose between the Canary
Islands, Porto Rico, and Cuba : but the
Canaries are extremely poor, and, at a short
distance from the península; Porto Rico is
also poor, circumscribed, and opposite the
coasts of Colombia, where there is nothing

16
to gain ; it is also so far from México (whither
they are determined to go), that it would be
absurd to start from it when they are about to
venture on a coup de main, their only possible
mode of attack. No ; Cuba is the only nest
where, if the mousing owl is to hawk at and
slay the eagle of Guatimozin, it can wait and
sharpen its claws.
The vicinity of Cuba, its ports, arsenals,
and forests, its wealthy and numerous popu-
lation, aye, even the insalubrity of the climate,
where the troops are, as it were, seasoned
and prepared by the yellow fever, against the
diseases of the Tierra Caliente of México, all
point out this island as the proper haunt and
refuge of the intrigues against the new States ;
at once a resting-place, and starting-post for
every Spanish expedition. If Cuba be, by any
means, debarred from injuring the Mexicans,
they will at once lay down their arms, and,
from that moment, their laws will begin to be
of really absolute authority.
At the period, however, of which I have
spoken, the designs and preparations of
México and Colombia were suddenly struck
from without, as if by some "petrific mace,"
with motionless impotence. It is needless now

17
to recur to the details of the foreign infiuenee
then exerted, and to lay open misfortunes of a
five years' standing ; regrets and accusations
would be alike unavailing, and I prefer to speak
of the situation in which México andEngland
are at present placed with regard to Cuba.
The expedition to Tampico was a glorious
and pregnant event for México. It has
proved that Spain cannot count on having a
single partisan in her ancient colony.
When Cortes invaded the Empire of Mon-
tezuma, — a strange land with an unknown
population, — he found there interpreters,
friends, allies, nay, auxiliary armies. The new
Cortes of the nineteenth century, Barradas,
when he set foot on the soil of a common-
wealth filledwith the descéndants of Spaniards,
and speaking their language, could not draw
one Mexican to the banner of Castile and
Arragon, to which, three centuries ago, victory
there seemed bound as if by a spell : all petty
discussions, all party difierences, were sud-
denly laid aside and forgotten ; and the whole
country rose, to a man, and compelled the in-
vaders to capitúlate.
Spain can now no longer make dupes of
other governments, by pretending to reckon

18
on co-operation from her former subjects ;
Europeans will no longer be alarmed for the
results of any internal diíferences in the young
republic ; and the Mexicans can never again
reproach each other with any pretended at-
tachment to their ancient rulers.
Yet, as long as the Spaniards choose to
menace, it will be impossible for the Mexi
cans to desist from their defence. There is
still the same fleet at the Havannah ; -there
are almost the same troops; six hundred
leagues of unfortified coast lie open to them
as before ; and three or four thousand men
may be landed as easily as ever on some un-
guarded point. The expedition would fail,
and the troops probably be sacrificed, — no
doubt ! but what cares Ferdinand ? He will
at least gain the advantage of doing some
little injury, and raising considerable disturb-
ance, among those whom he detests.
It would be bold to question that Spain
still meditates hostility to México ; for it was
scarcely known that Barradas had been com-
pelled to re-embark his disarmed soldiers,
before letters and journals from Madrid pro
claimed that new preparations were in hand,
and that a second attack was determined on.

19
It was ásserted that Barradas was treache-
rous, Laborde incapable, and Vives jealous.
Every conceivable cause for the defeat was
assigned, except the resolution of the Mexi
cans. Pretences the most absurd were put
forward, and every noisy, cumbrous, impo-
tent engine was brought into play, to con-
vince Europe, and especially the governments
of Europe, that there are still chances, nay
a certainty, of success. Nothing is omitted
which might serve to show, that, although
the conspiracy has been detected and baffled,
the ides of March in truth are not yet over.
In fact, so long as Spain continúes her hos-
tility, and so long as it is certain that three
days' sail will take a vessel from the* Havan
nah to Campeachy, and eight to Vera Cruz,
the Mexicans must remain on their guard.
Ferdinand will give no assurance of his
pacific intentions ; and were he to do so, he
is not exactly the philosophic moralist, or
chivalrous man of honour, on whose word a
rebellious colony might rely. Such being the
case, and Spain being unable to give us any
guarantee of her good will, supposing she
were so inclined, México must needs remain
in a state of alarm and excitement, exhaust-

20
ing her finan ees by thé mainténance of an
army disproportioned to her population and
her revenue, — exposed to all the dangers with
which military predominance threatens a re-
public, — compelled to neglect her civil organi-
zation, — and disabled from establishing that
system of economy, which alone can reanímate
her credit, and provide for the payment of her
foreign creditors.
Neither will Spain permit the intervention
of any third power; — she has already and
repeatedly refused it. Yet it has been shown,
and is indeed obvious enough, that the inte
rests of England require an immediate termi-
nation of this lingering contest. Spain can
never succeed : but the mere threat of foreign
invasión is more injurious to the mutual
objeets of Mexican and English commerce,
than would be the instant realization of their
Quixotic menace.
But how can the English Government
interfere ? Advice, good offices, and so forth,
have over and over been rejected by Ferdi-
nand. While, on the other hand, a tone of
command might disturb Europe, and even-
tually lead to colusión.
Spain, we know, makes war on México

21
only from Cuba, and only by means of the
resources of that island. It is not the busi-
ness of England to play again the game of
1762, and seize the Havannah by forcé. But
why should she prevent this being done by
México and Colombia, if they have the requi-
site means and courage ? There are perhaps
Englishmen who believe that their Govern
ment opposes no obstacle to such an enter-
prise. It is certain, howe ver, that duxing
the last fiye years the parties most deeply
interested have constantly affirmed the will of
England to be the only impediment to this
attempt. If this statement be true, surely
we ought to withdraw our interdict ; if false,
it would be well to disabuse the world, and
to declare openly that we do not meddle in
the matter*.
But if, from regard for Spain, or from fear
of a negro insurrection in the West Indies,
we will not permit an attack on Cuba by
México or Colombia, we ought not for a
moment to hesitate in laying a similar injunc-
tion on their enemy. Let our Government
instantly declare that no warlike expedition
* Our silence serves the cause of Spain as well as would
our explicit declaration in her favour.

22
shall sail either from Cuba, or against it, and
neither party can have any pretenee to com-
plain of a want of reciprocity. It may or
may not be true that we have before secretly
interfered in this question ; but we are now
bound to declare that we will act impartially,
either for war or peace, and that hostilities
shall be permitted to neither party, or to both.
In the one way, or the other, the war will
soon be at an end ; for the new States, if not
stopped by any interloper, will speedily wrest
Cuba from Spain; or, if Spain be prevented
from using Cuba as a strong-hold against
them, her solé means of offence will be
terminated.

finís.

LONDON :
PRINTED BY T. BRETTELL, RUPERT STREET, HAYMARKET.

3768