HISTORY or THS FORIIETH OHIO VOLUNTEER JOHN N. BEACH, LONDON, OHIO: SHSPBERD * CBAIG, FBINTBBS, 1184. PREFACE. This volume is offered to survivors of the regiment ae an outline history only ; a bare statement of events with which we were closely identified, arranged chronologic ally, leaving comrades to supply details from memory. A more minute history would require access to official reports, orders etc., which the writer has not been able to obtain. What there is of the military history of the Officers and Men has been obtained under great difficulties. When the writer first determined to make a complete ros ter of the regiment, he expected to find all the material for such a paper in the Adjutant-General's offica, at Co lumbus, but beyond the original muster-in rolls, this office has no records of our regiment, all others being at Washington Oity. Personal application for permis sion to copy, as well as a similar application by Ac^'utant- GeneAl Smith, of our State, was met by the statement that no copy of the rolls could be made by others than the clerks of the Department, and that they were so pressed with work that the courtesy was impossible. Por this reason, all facts as to recruits, promotions, transfers, discharges, deaths, etc., have been obtained through a very general correspondence with comrades, many of whom have valuable memoranda. Great care has been taken to verify all statements as to those killed, dying in hospital, discharged or transferred ; and all those enrolled and not thus accounted for, or by muster-out, may fairly be presumed to have served out their full time. Doubtless, errors and imperfections will be found in the roster, but it may serve as a basis for another, when some one, with better facilties, may undertake a more perfect record. As it is, the writer offers the result of his labors to his old comrades with the hope that they will find it of interest and value. West Jkffbrson, 0., Jnne, 1884. CONTENTS. Organization 9 Ordered to the Field II Battle of Middle Creek 14 Piketon 18 Down Sandy : 21 Up Sandy Again 26 Franklin, Tennessee 28 First Battle of Franklin 30 Tullahoma Campaign 33 Wartrace and Tullahoma 35 Chicamauga Campaign , 37 Battle of Chicamauga 42 Moccasin Point and Shellmound 49 B,attle of Lookout Mountain 53 Missionary Ridge and Ringgold 57 Winter Quarters 62 Blue Springs 63 Atlanta Campaign 66 From Resaca to Ackworth 69 From Ackworth to the Chattahoochie 73 Seige of Atlanta 80 Jonesboro, Lovejoy, and Atlanta 83 Pursuit of Hood v 88 Driven by Hood 92 Battle of Franklin 97 APPENDIX. Honor to Whom Honor is Due 103 Letter from DiUion P. Current. — Capture of Com pany "H" 105 Vlll A Visit to the Battle Fields about Chattanooga 107 Amount of Ammunition used in Battle 112 Letter from Lieutenant Richard B. Cowling 113 Letter from Assistant Surgeon William H. Matchett..ll6 Letter from Lieutenant Colonel James Watson 120 Letter from Charles W. Wheeler, of Company "E" 122 Influence of Imagination on Wounded Men 124 Reduction of Transportation in 1863 and 1864.— Field Hospital after Battle of Chicamauga 127 Letter from Lieutenant J. M. Wasson. — Adventures in Southern prisons 132 The Great Flood at Piketon 140 BRIEF MILITARY HISTORIES. Field and Staff 145 Non-Commissioned Staff 149 Band 150 Company "A" 151 Company "B" 162 Company "C" -.. 172 Company "D" 182 Company "E" 191 Company "F" 200 Company "G" 208 Company "H" 217 Company "I" 227 Company "K" 235 Additional Names 243 Summary of Casualties, &c 244 iiISTOR."5r FORTIETH REGIMENT 0. V. INFANTRY, ORGANIZATION. The first call of the President for three hundred thou sand men to aid in putting down the rebellion was made at a time when the conditions for recruiting were not fa vorable or encouraging. The result of the battle of BuU Run had shattered the hopes of. the North that a cam paign of sixty days would end the war. Up to mid summer of 1861 the magnitude and duration of the strife inaugurated I at Fort Sumpter had not been dreamed of, but when twice sixty days had passed and found the South not only with armies daily growing stronger, but with the plainly expressed sympathy of France and Eng land, as well as the good-will of no inconsiderable element in States not seceded, the extent and serious character of the undertaking gradually dawned upon the Northern mind. In August of that year it was proposed to raise another Ohio regiment, and Governor Dennison commissioned Jona,than Cranor, late a Captain in the Eleventh O. V. I., Lieutenant-Colonel, with authority to recruit such regi ment, to be called tlie Fortieth 0. V. I. The appointment was made at th^ su^^estion of Major McDowell, of the 10 HISTORY OF THE regular army, later a Major-General. With such authori ty, Lieut. Col. Cranor set about the work assigned him, and early in September recruiting was fairly commenced. The several companies were enrolled as follows ; Company "A" was enrolled by William Jones, at West Jefferson, Madison Co., Ohio, reported at Camp Chase, September 10th, and was mustered into the service Sep tember 19th, 1861. Company "B" was enrolled by James Haworth, at Wilmington, Clinton Co., Oh o, entered Camp Chase, Sep tember 13th, anJ was mustarjd into the service Septem ber 19th, 1861. Company "C" was enrolled by Thomas Acton, at Lon don, Madison Co., Ohio, reported at Camp Chase, Sep tember 10th, and was mustered into the service Septem ber 21st, 1861. Company "D" was enrolled by James Watson, at Lon don, Madison Co., Ohio. re])orted at Camp Chase, Sep tember 10th, and was mustered into the service September SOth, 1861. Company "E" was enrolled by John D. Gennett, at Versailles, Darke Co., Ohio, entered Camp Chase, Sep tember 19th, and was mustered into the service October 5th, 1861. Compary "F" was enrolled at Camp Chase by John L. Reeves and John F. Mahon, and was mustered into the service December 12th, 1861. Company "G" was enrolled by Charles G. Matchett, at Camp Chase, and was mustered into the service November 21, 1861- . Company "H" was enrolled at Camp Chase by Wm. Cunningham and Mathew 0. Junkin, and was mustered into the service November 21st, 1881. Company "I" was enrolled at Camp Chase by Andrew FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 11 R. Calderwood, John W. Smith, and Milton Kemper, and was mustered into the Service December 9th, 1861. Cojnpany "K" was enrolled at Camp Chase by Alexan der A. Knapp, and was mustered into the service Novem ber .SOth, 1861. On December llth, 1861, the organization was com pleted and mustered in as a regiment. During all the time following the enrollment and mus tering of companies, the work of drill, and training in the duties of the Camp had gone steadily forward, so that by the time of the completion of the organization, the regiment was a body of men noticeable in the Camp for its discipline and splendid material, and its apparent efficiency was a matter of pride to officers and men. ORDERED TO THE FIELD. For some months following the attack upon Fort Sumpter the position of Kentucky was that of neutrality. Absurd as this position seems now in the light of subse quent events, yet it was fairly maintained until in July, no ^rmed bodies of either beligerent being found in the State until the 9th of that month, when Bishop General Polk occupied Columbus, Ky., with a large Rebel force. Preceding this, however, much recruiting for either side was done in the State, but the points of rendevous were, for the Rebels, along the northern line of Tennessee, and for the NationaUsts, in Indiana, opposite Louisville, and it was not until July 2nd that Camp Dick Robinson, a few miles below Lexington, was established for recruiting purposes for our army. This period of neutrality was probably no disadvantage to the North, for although the loyalty of Kentucky to the Urdon cannot be doubted, as 12 HISTORY OF THE in proof of it she sent fifty-five thousand brave soldiers into the Union armies, yet there was a large element, and the ruUng class, that were Secessionists, and who would have forced Kentucky out of the Union had the war been precipitated upon her territory early, as it was in Vir ginia. From July there was no farther hesitation on either side in occupying strategic points in the State, or sending forces where they were needed. The mountain region of Eastern Kentucky'was decided in its adherence to the Union, and yet there were sufficient Southern sym pathizers among the mountaineers to invite the Confeder ate forces there for subsistence among the people, and to prevent enlistment in Federal regiments. In October, Colonel WilUams had collected, at Prestonburg on Big Sandy, a force of two thousand, and from this position threatened an invasion of Central Kentucky by way of McCormick's Gap. To repel this threatened invasion. General Nelson was ordered from Maysville with a small force, and marching by way of Olympia Springs and Hazel Green, at both places having spirited engagements with Rebel cavalry, he reached Prestonburg, only to find that the enemy had retreated. Pressing forward. Nelson overtook the enemy a* thfe mouth of Ivy Creek, October Sth, when, after a sharp engagement, the Rebels retreated in disorder. General Nelson continued his march to Piketon, but the Rebel's having retreated through Pound Gap, our forces were withdrawn to Louisville. Soon after the close of Nelson's campaign up Sandy, the Valley was again Overrun by irregular bands of Rebel soldiers, and the loyal populatioh subjected to many an noyances and depredations; and early in December Hum phrey Marshall, wiibh a force estimated at from three to six thbttSaiid mto, invaded Eaatern Kentucky and took a position on the road from PaintvUle to Prestonburg. FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 13 To expel this invading force. General Buell, commanding the Department of the Ohio, organized the Eighteenth Brigade, Army of the Ohio, composed of the Fortieth and Forty-second Ohio Infantry, the Fourteenth and Twenty-second Kentucky Infantry, three battalions of Woodford's Kentucky Cavalry, and McLaughlin's squad ron of Ohio Cavalry, with Colonel James A. Garfield in command. To take our place in this new organization, and be ready for our part in the proposed campaign, our regiment left Camp Chase in the afternoon of December 17th, and went by rail to Paris, Kentucky, and went into camp on the farm of Brutus Clay, where we remained long enough to be supplied with the necessary wagon train. Leaving there, the regiment marched for Prestonburg with a view of getting to the. rear of Marshall's position near Paint- ville. On this march we passed through Mt. Sterling, Hazel Green, McCormick's Gap, and Saliersville. The march was a hard one, the roads were wretched, the mules unbroken and almost unmanageable, the rain almost in cessant, and take it altogether it was a march that would have tried the patience and stamina of veterans. At Licking Station the march was interrupted for two days by high water, and no means of crossing the streams, and before advancing, the regiment was ordered to Paintville instead of Prestonburg. Meantime, Colonel Garfield, with the larger portion of the brigade, had marched up the Sandy Valley from Cat- lettsburg, and on the evening of January 7th, encamped near Paintville, Colonel Bolles with his West Virginia cavalry having driven the enemy's cavalry from a strong pdsitioh at the mouth of Jennings Creek. On the 8th, Colonel Garfield With his own regiment, and a portion of the Fourteenth Kentucky, made a demonstration against 14 HISTORY OF THE Marshall's position, two miles south of P.^intville, but found it abandoned, the enemy having become alarmed at Garfield's approach in front, and our position at Licking Station with the apparent purpose of getting in his rear at Prestonburg. BATTLE OF MIDDLE CREEK. Our regiment rested at Paintville on the 8th, for the purpose of drawing supplies of clothing, shoes, and ra tions. Colonel Garfield ha,ving fallen back from his ad vance, the entire brigade was at Paintville on the night of January 8th, Leaving a strong reserve under Lieutenant Colonel Sheldon, the brigade advanced on the moming of the 9th, towards Prestonburg ; Colonel Cranor, with four companies, commanded by Captains Jones, Acton, Reeves and Knapp, being in advance. No enemy was found until after night-fall, when our advance was fired upon at Ab bott Mountain. Farther progress for the night being im practicable, the troops bivouacked, and without fires, or shelter from a cold, drenching rain, passed a wretched night. It is not probable that Colonel Garfield on the morning of the 10th had any clear conception of the po sition of the enemy, as in fact, from the nature of the country, and the lack of any considerable demonstration on the preceding night, it was impossible that he should have. So, when the battle was opened on the 10th, it was the result of several detachments being sent forward to feel the enemy. On the right, two companies of Ken tncky troops were sent forward to develop the enemies dispositions for defense, while on the left, Captain Jones and Captain Reeves, with two hundred men from the Fortieth Ohio, crossed Middle Creek, and at one o'clock FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 15 became engaged with the enemy. The reinforcement of these two advanced detachments soon brought on the bat tle. Colonel Garfield ordered Colonel Cranor, with five hundred men from the several regiments of the brigade, to the left, there to take command. The main force of the enemy was concentrated on our left, where the fight ing, although irregular, was at times severe, and continu ed with but slight advantages to either side for several hours. During this engagement upon the left, the enemy made an attempt to turn the right of our little army, but was handsomely repulsed. The reserve, under Lieut. Col. Sheldon, having now arrived, at 4 p. m. Colonel Gar field made preparation to jjress the enemy at all points^ but before any general advance of our line had been made, Colonel Cranor ordered Captain Knajjp, of the Fortieth, and Captain Williams, of the Forty-second Ohio, to charge the enemy in their immediate front with the bayo net, an order that was executed in the most gaUant style, and before which, just as the early gloom of a winter night fell upon the scene, the enemy fled, and the battle was ended. This, the first battle in which our regiment was engaged, was remarkable in many respects, and in none more so than in the disparity in numbers and losses. On our side the force actually engaged did not exceed nine hundred, and Colonel Garfield reports his losses as one killed and seven wounded. Humphrey Marshall's forces were esti mated at not less than thirty-five hundred, and Van Horn, in his History of the Army of the Cumberland, places the loss of the enemy at one hundred and twenty-five kiU ed. This would give them a loss in wounded, supposing the usual ratio of killed to wounded, at over six hundred, or a total of say eight hundred. In the absence of any such numbers left on the field, and any official report by 16 HISTORY OF THE Humphrey Marshall, I think Van Horn's estimate should be considered as somewhat loosely made. Another re markable thing was the prompt success of the expedition in the face of so many difficulties. There is no doubt but that Marshall's forces were largely overestimated. Late in 1861 there was a disposition to greatly exaggerate the force of the enemy in Kentucky. General Buel, Janu ary 3d, 1862, in writing General Halleck, estimates the enemy's force at eighty thousand men on a line from Bowling Green to Columbus, Kentucky. This was ex clusive of the forces under Zollicoffer advancing from Cumberland Gap, and those under Marshall in the Sandy Valley. The results of the campaign against ZolUcoffer, and that against Forts Donaldson and Henry, demon strated the comparative weakness of the enemy, and it is now understood that their forces did not reach half the number estimated by General Buell. Pollard, in his "Lost Cause," in speaking of the inadequacy of General Johnson's force for any forward movement late in 1861, says, "the people of the South were as much imposed . upon by this false estimate of the Confederate forces in Kentucky, as were the people of the North;" and says farther, "that it is doubtful if General Johnson ever had over twenty- three thousand men at Bowling Green, where General Buell estimated their force at forty thousand." In view of these facts, I think we may safely say that Marshall's forces on Sandy were overestimated as to num bers. If not, it is difficult to understand why Marshall, a veteran officer, who had won distinction as the leader of Kentucky troops in the Mexican war, should have per mitted the movements of our separate columns until we leisurely got into position at Middle Creek without oppo sition. Familiar as he was with the topography of East ern Kentucky, and knowing as he must haye known, our FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 17 exact strength, if he had three or four thousand men, it is surprising that he did not strike Cranor's column on its march through the mountains, or Garfield's as it march ed up Sandy, but should remain idle until the separate col umns should form a junction and attack him at leisure. But granting that he had no more than half the force gen erally conceded to him, the result of the campaign was no less remarkable than gratifying. To the people of the North the news of our success came like a gleam of sun shine on a cloudy day. For nearly a year they had given freely of their men and treasure, and in return had the disasters at Big Bethel, Ball's Bluff, Bull Run, and Bel mont, a series of reverses that almost seemed to demons trate that Southern impetuosity was more than a match for Northern patriotism. Skirmish though it was, when compared with later contests, yet it was the first of a series of victories that scattered the clouds of doubt from Northern minds, and gave prestige to the National arms. Followed as it was, soon, by the defeat of General ZoUi coffer at Mill Springs, and the capture of Forts Donald son and Henry, it should be grouped with these more important engagements, and should have its fair share of praise when we come to consider the events that first caused a feeling of doubt throughout the South as to the ultimate success of their cause. On January llth the brigade moved to Prestonburg, but the difficulties in getting supplies at this point caus ed its withdrawal to Paintville, where it went iiito camp. February 1st, the question of supplies having been solv ed, the force again moved up Sandy by steamer to Pike ton, the movement having for its object the final expul sion of Humphrey Harshall from the State. When we reached Piketon the enemy had passed Pound Gap, fifty iniles to the south, anJl no farther pursuit was attempted. 18 HISTORY OF THE PIKETON. The retreat of Humphrey Marshall virtually ended the mission of the Eighteenth Brigade in Sandy Valley, as there were no subsequent efforts on the part of the enemy to invade Eastern Kentucky. True, a few weeks later a body of Virginia militia, reported at five hundred, took possession of Pound Gap and threw up intrenchments. The place probably was intended to be held as a post of observation. On the 14th of March, with six hundred infantry and one hundred cavalry, Colonel Garfield marched against the position, and on the evening of the 15th reached the foot of the mountain two miles north of the Gap. On the morning of the 16th, sending the caval ry up the Gap road, thus attracting the attention of the enemy, he ordered Colonel Cranor, with a portion of the Fortieth Ohio and one company of the Twenty-second Kentucky, to make a flank movement, hoping to surprise the enemy. With the one company of Kentucky troops in advance. Colonel Cranor and his detachment crept up the mountain side through the brush, the movement be ing somewhat concealed by a driving snow storm, and reached a point within a few hundred yards before the enemy discovered his approach. The enemy opened fire upon our skirmish line, when Colonel Cranor rapidly ad vanced his whole line. Taken completely bj^ surprise, after the exchange of a few volleys the enemy fled down the southern slope of the mountain, our cavalry pursuing them vigorously for several miles into Virginia. Our. troops passed the night at the foot of the mountain, and in the abandoned Rebel camp, and the next morning, after burning all stores that could not be carried away, the expedition started on its return to Piketon. A few days later. Colonel Garfield, with the larger por- FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INB'ANTRY. 19 tion of the brigade, was ordered to Louisville, leaving Colonel Cranor in command of the detachment consist ing of our regiment. Sixteenth Kentucky Infantry, and McLaughlin's squadron of cavalry. Our life at Piketon was uneventful in a military point of view, and yet it was not without interest. There was sufficient of exciting rumors of an approaching enemy to keep us on the alert and to justify occasional scouts by infantry and cavalry. In addition to this, there was a novelty in thus being isolafed from the world that had its charms. During the months of February and March there was unprecedented high water, the river rising at one time seventy-two feet in eighteen hours. During these floods large steamers came up to Piketon ; one, the Bostona, a large Ohio River packet, making several trips to this point. Even as late as the middle of April the "Sandy Valley," a small but elegantly fitted stern-wheeler, continued its trips to our camp. With such conven iences, of course we were well supplied with rations and forage, an'd got our mails with considerable promptness and regularity, but after the middle of April the river subsided and the condition of things was materially changed. For a few weeks later, however, the "Little Eva," a large flat-boat, with a steam engine as motive power, accasionally came up, but its capacity was too small to be pf advantage in bringing forward military stores. The little nondescript, however, was always wel come, and its shrill whistle down the stream was hailed with a shout. Long after its last trip the camp was fre quently aroused from its lethargy by some warrior imi tating the whistle of the "Little Eva" from a point below the camp. After the withdrawal of the steamers, all our supplies were brought in "push boats" from the mouth of Sandy, 20 HISTORY OF THE a distance of one hundred and thirty miles. These boats were sixty feet long and eight or ten feet wide, and were pushed against the rapid current by crews of lusty men. They were our only means of receiving suppUes and were efficient, but it was a slow and laborious method of mov ing freight or passengers. It being found too slow for postal purposes, our mails were brought up in a canoe, Jake Houston, of Company "A," making several trips in a canoe with the mail to and from the mouth of Sandy. The special feature, however, of our stay at Piketon, and one the longest to be remembered by survivors, was the large amount of sickness among the troops. The Forty-second Ohio left Sandy near the middle of March, only three months from the time of leaving Camp Chase, and yet a history of that regiment reports their loss by death up to that time at eighty-five. This was much larger than ours, but the year we spent on Sandy was raore disastrous to our regiment than either of the two following years, when in Tennessee and Georgia we partici pated in several great battles, and for months was almost constantly under fire. Up to the time of leaving Eastern Kentucky in February, 1863, our losses were: From resignation on account of ill health, fourteen ; discharged for disability, fifty-one ; died from disease, eighty-three ; casualties, three ; making a total loss of one hundred and fifty-one, nine-tenths of this loss being in the first four months after leaving Camp Chase. This alarming mortfility among a body of men who, a few inonths previous, were remarkable for their vigor, was not due to any epidemic, as we had nothing of the kind during the year, but arose largely from exposure, and pos sibly somewhat from want of attention to proper hygiene, a niatter which was much mpre closely looked afteir later in the service. The march through' the mountains to FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 21 Paintville was one of constant exposure and hardship. With a wagon train larger than would have been allowed to a division of troops in 1864, and with mules unbroken and unreliable, it was no small labor to the men to get the train along by pushing and pulling. This, with the continuous rain, and full streams which the men were often compelled to wade, keeping constantly wet for days, broke down hundreds of men, so that on their arrival at Paintville they were in a state of exhaustion. Then came two more days of exposure and excitement at Middle Creek, then two weeks of encampment in what was liter ally a sea of mud at Paintville, all of which made the men fit subjects for the virulent form of typhoid fever, and the intractable form of diarrhoea that followed and continued through all our stay at Piketon. In addition to these primary causes there were errors in cooking, in location of camps, a want of proper policing of camps, and many other mistakes that the same officers and men would not have made a year later. It is not to be sup posed that all our deaths during the year occurred at Piketon ; Many of them died at our Post Hospital at Ashland, a few at Louisa, and a still less number at home. The mortality among the sick at Piketon, however, was so great that scarcely a day passed without a dead com rade being carried from one or the other of the hospitals. DOWN SANDY. During the months of April and May our life at Pike ton becaine extremely monotonous, and the men watched with some pleasure the gradual diminution of our for age and commissary stores, as the probabilities were that when these failed we would go down the river. At last 22 HISTORY OF THE the order to move to Prestonburgh came, and on the 13th of June the movement was made. This movement with our trains was a matter of no little difficulty, as ihe floods had washed away all traces of roads. Several days of preliminary work by the Pioneer corps were required be fore the train could be sent forward. The sick and most of the stores were sent down on push-boats. The troops got excellent camping grounds at Prestonburgh, and our month's stay there was very pleasant. The people were social, and many of the officers were quartered in the village. The notable event of our stay there was a cele bration of the Fourth of July, one feature of it being an excellent dinner gotten up by Company "D," to which the regiment was invited. Another event of importance to us, while at Prestonburgh, was the visit of the Paymaster, who was received with the utmost cordialty. July 18th. Ordered still farther down the river to Louisa. Stores and sick sent down the river on push-boats. On the passage down. Major McLaughlin, of our cavalry, died. He had been ill for some weeks, and had been urged by friends to go home on sick leave, but with a stern sense of duty he refused to leave his squadron. Just as the boats were starting out on the morning of the 19th, he looked long and intently at the beautiful scenery and expressed great deUght in everything around, and an hour later,-just as we were passing Lost Creek Shoals, he died. His wife, who had been notified of his iUness, was then on her way up Sandy to visit him, and met the body at Louisa. We remained in Louisa nearly two months, having what is usually caUed a "good time." In other words, there was no duty other than picket, daily drill and dress parade. For the first time in our Sandy Ufe, dress-parade became a matter of interest. The town contained a few FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 23 hundred inhabitants, nearly all of whom came out to see our dress-parades, which gave to our camp a somewhat lively appearance. Another feature of our encampment at Louisa, was a large influx of visitors from Ohio. Quite a number of ladies from home spent several weeks with us, making camp life seem very much like a pic-nic. September 13th. Moved down to Cattletsburgh, at the mouth of Sandy. I do not think any farther movement was contemplated just then, or if any, it is more than probable that our destination was Louisville. The tide of war was against us in Tennessee, in fact we had been nearly driven from the State. General Bragg was strain ing every nerve to outstrip Buell in a race to Louisville. General Nelson had met with a disastrous defeat at Rich mond, Kentucky, August 30th ; General Morgan had been compelled to abandon Cumberland Gap, and with his force of ten thousand men was in full retreat through Kentucky, while Colonel Lightburn was being driven from the Kanawha Valley ; in fact, it looked as though the war was to be transferred from the Tennessee to the Ohio River. The position of Colonel Lightburn was so critical that troops were hurried to his aid, we leaving Cattletsburg September 16th, and^reaching GallipoUs the next day. Lightburn's troops were encamped at Point Pleasant, a few miles above, while our regiment went into camp one mile above Gallipolis, on the Ohio side of the river. Whatever the emergency might have been calling for the concentration of troops there, it had evi dently passed before we reached GaUipolis. Many new regiments were ordered there, which, with General Mor gan's force just arrived after its forced march of two hundred and fifty miles from Cumberland Gap, made quite an army. But in a short time this imposing force melted away, the larger portion of it embarking with 24 HISTORY OF THE General Morgan for Vicksburg, smaller detachments going elsewhere, and we remaining at Gallipolis. At this point the Eighty-fourth Indiana Infantry was assigned to our brigade, and an acquaintence began that only ter minated with the muster-out of our regiment. The gal lant Hoosier regiment was by our side on many long marches and in many hard-fought battles in 1863 and 1864. While at Gallipolis our life was but a little variation from that in the Sandy Valley, consisting of only the ordinary camp duties. One event, however, broke the monotony. Information having been received that Col. Jenkins, with a force of five hundred rebels was at Buffalo Shoals, a few miles up the Kanawha from Point Pleasant, an expedition was organized and sent out for its capture. Colonel Tully, with infantrj^ and cavalry, was to proceed UD the eastern bank of the Kanawha and get in the rear of the enemy, while Colonel Cranor, with eight hundred men, went down the Ohio River twelve miles by steamer. and disembarking at dark, marched all night, reaching the vicinity of the enemy just at day-light. The enemy proved to be in much stronger force than had been report ed and strongly entrenched. Not hearing from Colonel Tully, and deciding that an attack by his force alone was anwise, Colonel Cranor ordered a retreat, and the column returned to Gallipolis. October 14th. We were ordered to Guyandotte, Va., an old town on the Ohio River, the main portion of which had been bumed by order of Colonel Zeigler, ofthe Fifth Virginia Federal Infantry, some months previous, in re taliation for some depredations by the rebels. At this point our brigade consisted of our own regiment, the Eighty-fourth Indiana, McLaughlin's Cavalry, and the One-Hundred and .Seventeenth Ohio Infantry, stationed FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 25 at Ashland. The troops having been for some time all withdrawn from Sandy Valley, the Confederates had again become troublesome ; irregular bands of soldiers, or guer rillas, annoying the citizens in many ways. So loud and frequent were the calls for protection from the citizens that Colonel Cranor determined to make a demonstration with a portion of his force, hoping to ^surprise and cap ture some of the marauding bands and frighten others from the country. With eight hundred men he marched to Cattlettsburgh, October 24th, intending from there to go as far Southwest as Grayson, thence by Louisa and Trout Hill to Guyandotte, thus effectually scouring the region suffering most from rebel presence. Por some days before starting there had been rumors of an aggre gation of these rebel gangs at some point up the Guyan dotte River, but the rumors did riot take shape to deserve attention until the evening of the 24th, when Colonel Trussler, of the Eighty-fourth Indiana, who had been left in command at Guyandotte with a small force, thought they were sufficiently definite to justify a notice to Col onel Cranor, then at Cattletsburgh, that our camps were in danger from an attack from Guyandotte Valley. On receipt of this information. Colonel Cranor abandoned his expedition and marched rapidly back to Guyandotte, and was greatly chagrined to find that the alarm causing his backward movement was unfounded. On October 3oth another scout with a less force was made into the ' country towards Sandy, but no force of the enemy was met and the expedition returned without results. 26 KISTCIRT OP THB UP SANDY AGAIN. November I4th the brigade moved to Cattletsburgh, mouth of Sandy River. Both officers and men of our regiment had a great aversion to spending another winter in Eastern Kentucky, where no opportunity for active service or distinction was afforded. Prior to leaving Guyandotte, Colonel Cranor had gone to Cincinnati to make a personal appeal to General Wright to have us transferred to a more active theatre of war, and we march ed to Cattletsburgh fully expecting from there to go to LouisviUe and farther South. On the 17th Colonel Cra nor returned, bringing the news that the new Military District of Eastern Kentucky had been made, with him self in command, with headquarters in the field. On the 19th the troops, with the exception of a small guard, were sent to Louisa, the District Headquarters still re maining at Cattletsburgh. During the winter our regi ment escaped with but little sickness ; the Eighty-fourth Indiana, however, suffered severely, an epidemic of measles putting large numbers in hospital For some weeks previous to our reoccupation of the Sandy Valley, Colonel John Diltz, of Piketon, had been engaged in recruiting the Thirty-ninth Kentucky Infan try, the rendezvous being at Piketon. November 19th Colonel Diltz started six push-boats loaded with guns, clothing, &c., for his regiment, up Sandy. November 26th these boats had reached Louisa without guard, when . Major Taylor, in command there, sent a small force from our regiment to guard the boats. At the mouth of Geor ges Creek, twelve miles above Louisa, Major Taylor deemed it unsafe to proceed farther, and proposed to guard the boats at that point until the Thirty-ninth FORTIETH OHI6 VOL. INFANTRY, 27 Kentucky could march down the river and take charge of them. Acting under the instructions of Colonel Diltz, who regarded the valley as being clear of any rebel force. Lieutenant Hamden, in charge of the boats, discharged the guard furnished thus far by Major Taylor, and pro ceeded on up the river. December 1st, one hundred men of the Thirty-ninth met the boats, and on the morning of the 4th another detachment had arrived, making in all nearly two hundred and fifty men with the boats. On this morning, December 4th, the expedition was attacked two miles above Prestonburg, the guard routed and boats captured- The loss was considerable. Colonel Diltz, in Ms report of the matter to Department Headquarters, complained of the inadequate protection afforded by Colonel Cranor. This led to an investigation which showed that Colonel Cranor was ignorant of the starting of the boats, had not been caUed upoa for a guard, and that the guard furnished by Major Taylor, at Louisa, was at his own suggestion and not in response to any demand made by Colonel Diltz, and no blame could be attached to Colonel Cranor or Major Taylor. Continued ill health led to the resignation of Colonel Cranor, February 5th, 1863, a loss that was fully appreci ated by every man in the regiment. Colonel Cranor had not been popular with the regiment for some months after its organization. His military training as a subordinate in the regular army, made him a strict disciplinarian as commander of a regiment, requiring of each man prompt obedience to orders, and proper deference to rank. These qualities, which first attracted the attention of Major Mc DoweU to him while in command of a company in the Eleventh Ohio, and which doubtless caused his appoint ment, with authority to recruit the Fortieth, did not fully Buit the democratic notions of the rank and file of our 28 HISTORY OF THB regiment, and they were disposed to look upon him as something of a martinet, if not something of a tyrant. A few months however, of Colonel Cranor's efficient drill and discipline, changed all this feeling, and every one not only accorded him rare ability as a commander, but re gretted that we shpuld not have him with us in a new field, where his seniority, as well as rare fitness for com mand, would give him an opportunity for distinction, which our isolated position for a year had denied to the officers and men of the regiment. The resignation of Colonel Cranor was followed by the promotion of J. E. Taylor to Colonel, William Jones to Lieutenant-Colonel, and Thomas Acton to Major. In February 1863, orders came for the transfer of our regiment and the Eighty-fourth Indiana, to Tennessee and on the 19th of the month companies "A," "B," "C," "I," "H" and "K" left on the Swan and Transfer, and on the 21st, the remaining companies followed on the Leslie Combs and proceeded to Nashville, reaching there March the 1st, and were placed in camp two iniles south of the city.' We were assigned to the First Brigade, First Divis ion, Reserve Corps, Army of the Cumberland, this being a new name for the Army of Ohio, so we were stiU in our old army organization. Our new brigade was ma,de! up of, the Fortieth Ohio, Eighty-fourth Indiana, and Ninety- sixth and One Hundred and Fifteenth Illinois. It was well known later as Whittaker's brigade, and although subsequently much strengthened by additions, it always retained the above named regiments in its organizatdon. . FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 29 The bloody, but undecisive battle of Stone River, fought on the last days of 1862, left the Army of Rosecrans grouped in and about Murfreesboro, while the enemy had fallen back to the general line of Duck river, Por some months following General Rosecrans gave his attention to the recuperation and re-enforcement of his army pre paratory to another campaign. Although no attack in force was apprehended from the enemy, yet with his great superiority in cavalry he was able to annoy us greatly, in many instances capturing out-posts, and keeping the whole army on the lookout. Mareh 4th, a general recon noissance was made to ascertain the strength and position of the enemy in our front. On this date, Colonel Coburn started from Franklin with a force of three thousand, and met the enemy three miles north of Spring Hill, the en emy retreating and our forces occupying Spring Hill. The next day he made a farther advance, but at Thomp son's Station he met the enemy and was defeated with a loss of half of his command. On March Sth, the day of Colonel Coburn's defeat, we were hurried from Nashville to support the expedition, but did not reach Franklin in time to be of service. The enemy however, still holding a threatening position at Spring Hill, on the 9th, General Granger advanced against him, driving him from Spring Hill, and on the day fol lowing, drove him across Rutherford's Creek near Colum bia. The high, waters of Rutherford's Creek and Duck River prevented any farther pursuit, and the expedition returned to Franklin on the 12th. In this short, but sharp campaign, our regiment participated, a proper in troduction to its future comrades of the Army of the Cumberland. During our stay in FrankUn the duty was very heavy — as in addition to the large- picket force maintained in out 30 HISTORY OF THE front, large details were made daily to work on Fort Gran ger, a large earthwork on the north bank of Harpeth River, and commanding the town and railroad crossing. Aside from the hard work, the stay in camp at Franklin was pleasant, as we were in a delightful situation, and in di rect communication with Nashville and home. The cav alry of the enemy however, still continued to hover in our front, and on March 25th General Forrest, attacked, and captured,at Brentwood, midway between NashviUe and Franklin, two regiments of our Division, the Twenty- second Wisconsin, and the Ninteenth Michigan. Early in April, the mounted force of the enemy in our front was so greatly increased that some alarm was felt for the safety of our reserve corps of seven thousand men at Franklin. General Van Dorn with nine thousand cavalry, two regi ments of infantry, aud several pieces of artillery, was re ported at Spring Hill, and along the pike south of there to Columbia, and on April 9th, General Stanley was or dered from Murfreesboro, by way of Triune, to strengthen General Granger at Franklin. FIRST BATTLE OF FRANKLIN. It is quite probable that the movement of General Stan ley from Murfreesboro on the 9th, precipitated the attack made on FrankUn at noon on the 10th. If Van Dorn could have had any hopes of a successful attack on Fran- Un, he knew that it must be made before General Stanley could reach there. On the morning of the 10th, our regiment, with Captain Matchett of company "G.," in command, was sent out to picket our front south of FrankUn. Although we had a strong cavalry picket stiU farther out, yet, apprehensive' FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 31 of danger. Captain Matchett disposed his small force so as to best resist and attack. At the Carter House, a some what prominent feature in another and greater battle, companies "A." "B." "E." and "I." were left as a reserve ; companies "G." and "H." were sent forward on the Col umbia pike, company "C." to the left on a divergent pike, while companies "D." and "F." were posted on a pike leading to the right. While in this position, a large mounted force suddenly drove in our cavalry, and made a furious attack on our advance posts, but were so warm ly received, that it fell back in some disorder. Company "C." being peculiarly exposed. Captain Matchett ordered "A." and "B." to its sunport, these companies coming up just in time to check a second attack, and save company "C." from capture. Although these initial assaults had been bravely met and repulsed, yet it was evident that the enemy was in such force that it was impossible to hold that position much longer, and when' Captain Matchett saw a long line of battle advancing he ordered his men to fall back slow ly, still keeping up their fire upon the enemy. This ret rograde movement was the signal for the rapid advance of a great mass of mounted rebels, and before we could reach the protection of the town, the enemy was upon us, dashing beyond us, through the village, and down to the pontoon bridge. The artillery of Van Dorn was advanced and took position at the Carter House, and from that point threw shell into Fort Granger, and our camps on the north side of Harpeth River. At this time, our regi ment was broken into detatchments, each man, or group of men, fighting the enemy wherever he appeared, in front or rear. Although the charge of Van Dorn through and over our regiment, through the town, and almost up to the muzzles of the guns in Port Granger, was a brilUant and 32 HISTORY OF THE daring feat, yet it was fruitless, as unsupported by infan try, the daring riders had to get out of Franklin more rapidly than they entered. The big guns of the Fort opened upon them, and the rapid movement of our forces just across the river, caused them to fall back, leaving dead and wounded all along their track of advance and retreat. It is difficult to understand the object of this attack. There is no doubt of the fact that Van Dom had a force sufficiently large to seriously endanger our small Corps at Franklin, but the attack on the 10th was not made with a, persistence which promised any good results. It is probable that, knowing of General Stanley's approach, his dash into Franklin was in hope of capturing our reg iment ; this failing, he got out of the way promptly, not wishing to take the chances of finding General Stanley in his rear. ' The- losses of the enemy are not certainly known, as the killed and wounded in the extreme front were doubt less removed. In, and near the town, we found eleven of their dead, among them three officers. In addition to this, we captured about fifty, m ost of them wounded The loss to our regiment was all from companies "A.," "B." and "C." The killed, were Sergeant Wilson Bur rows of Company "A."; Tom Huntingdon, and Wash Link of Company "C," and Babb of Company "B." Woolheather and Brady of Company "C," died of wounds the same night. A strange feature of the casualities was the almost entire absence of any but mortal wounds. In addition to those above r mentioned, I do not remember of but one other wounded man in our regiment. Morrow of Company "B." There were ten missing, captured, so our total loss was sixteen. The remainder of our stay at Franklin was witiiout epecjifil incident FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 33 TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN. AU through the later part of winter arid the spring of 1863 there was a continuous, and somewhat acrimonious correspondence between General Halleck, Commander-in- Chief, and General Rosecrans, with regard to an immedi ate advance against Bragg, the former, urging an aggres sive campaign at once, the latter, making repeated calls for reinforcements, and declining to move until his army could be jbrought up to his ideal standard of efficiency. Month after mpnth passed with no decided changes in the ' relative position of the two armies, but early in June there were indications of an advance in the near future^ At this time Bragg occupied a strong position, his in fantry front extending from Wartrace to Shelbyville, with strong bodies of cavalry on either flank. At Shelbyville was General Polk's Corps, strongly intrenched, and pre pared for any attack, which it seemed probable Rosecrans would make when he saw fit to move. Rosecrans, how ever, not wishing to encounter the formidable opposition certain to be met with in General Polk's front., determin ed- to keep up an appearance of an attack on Shelbyville, while the real movement should turn the right of Bragg's ¦ army, thus forcing him from his intrenchments, and to a battle on ground of his own selection. The first step in this movement against Shelbyville was the transfer of our corps from Franklin to Triune, thirteen miles on the road to Murfeesboro. The march was raade June 2d, our reg iment being the rear guard, and getting into camp aftfe'r dark. We remained at Triune three weeks, during whieh time there were many reconnoissances, many dashes of the enemy upon our lines; and each day bringing with it 34 HISTORY OF THE rumors of an attack. On June llth, so apprehensive were we of an attack in force that the troops were kept nnder arms all day j and on the 13th, our brigade was sent out on a reconnoissance, but retumed at dark, with no other incident than a slight skirmish with our old friends, Van Dorn's cavalry. June 23d, our corps was moved to Salem, within five miles of Murfreesboro. Our movements were only a part of a general plan, and for several days our position was not greatly changed, waiting for proper disposition of forces on our left ; the whole movement doubtless being delayed by incessant rains that, from the 24th, rendered the roads almost impassable. On the 27th, we marched towards Shelbyville, our advance encountering the enemy at Guy's Gap, and after a sharp fight, forcing him back upon a strong line of earthworks four miles north of Shelbyville. It now being apparent that General Polk with the main part of his infantry had abandoned Shel byville, and withdrawn across Duck River, General Stan ley, with Minty's brigade of cavalry, charged the intrench ments and routed the enemy, pushing him into Shelby ville. General Mitchell coming up on the right flank, the defeat was total, our forces following the retreating foe closely into, and through the town. The results of the action was the capture of all of the enemy's artillery, and about five hundred prisoners, while two hundred were either killed or drowned in attempting to swim Duck River. Our regiment took no part in the capture of Shelbyville, our brigade having been halted for the night at Guy's Gap. The next, day, we marched back to within eight miles of Murfreesboro, and on the 29th returned again to within five[[miles of Shelbyville ; these apparently aimless movements doubtless being made with reference to opera- FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 35 tions of other portions of the army. June 30th we march ed into Shelbyville, our part of the Tullahoma campaign being finished. The part borne by the reserve corps in this short but de cisive campaign, seems tame in comparison with some of its experience a few months later, but no part of the army was more honorably or conspicuously engaged than we were. The entire loss to our army in the campaign of nine days, which forced Bragg from his entrenched line from Wartrace to Shelbj'ville, and gave us possession of middle Tenijessee, was only eighty-five killed, four hun dred and eighty-two wounded, and thirteen captured. During our stay at Shelbyville our regiment was quar tered in and about the town, doing duty as provost guard. The people of the town seemed much pleased with the advent of the "Yankees," as, when our corps marched in with banners flying, it was greeted with cheers and wav ing handkerchiefs, and if the population were not mainly loyal to the old flag, they had a happy faculty of concili ating what just then was the dominant power. WARTRACE AND TULLAHOMA, We remained at Shelbyville until July 3d, when much to our regret, we were ordered to Wartrace, eight miles distant, on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad. Marched at 7 A. m. in a drenching rain which continued all day. The road was in a wtetched condition, the streams all full, through which the men had to wade. Got into camp at 6 p. m., our regiment occupying an old rebel camp at the junction of the two railroads. The country, for quite a distance around Wartrace, had been occupied by Bragg's army, and was in a horribly filthy 36 HISTORY OF THE condition, and out principal duty for several days was to thoroughly clean up our camps and surroundings. The difference between the Federal and Confederate armies in attention to sanitary condition of their camps was seen here as elsewhere, the latter seeming to have given no at tention to this matter, allowing the dirt and filth that must accumulate about a camp, to remain undisturbed. With us, the most thorough policing was enforced. Not only was it the duty of the officers of each company and regiment to see that the quarters were thoroughly swept each morning, but a medical officer from the. brigade was detailed each day whose duty it was to report any failure in the performance of such duty on the part of a company or regiment. By these means our camps were kept sciu- pulouslj' clean. The country around Wartrace was very fine, and there being no enemy near us, men and officers enjoyed frequent rides into the country. July 8th, the first train of cars arrived from Nashville, and the next day, the road was sufficiently repaired to allow them to go on to Tullahoma. With our communication to the rear undisturbed, our six weeks stay at Wartrace, although monotonous, was rather pleasant. The only incident of interest was the visit, August 3d, of General Rosecrans and staff, who came to review the troops. To most of us this was the first view of the leader of the army, but to our regiment. General Garfield was an old acquaintence. His greeting to the men of our regiment, many of whom he had known per sonally on Sandyj was cordial in the extreme. August 12th received orders to march. Marched at 3 p. M., and encamped at 9 p. m., south of Duck River. At dawn on the 13th, our regiment in the advance, we started for Tullahoma, and went into camp there at noon. Agaitt BO unfortunate as to get into an abandoned rebel camp. FOKTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 37 where we remained until the 17th, when we moved into ,town, our regiment being quartered on the railroad near the depot. While at Tullahoma, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones of our regiment, was in command of the Post, Col onel Taylor having gone home on recruiting service. The village was a co,sy looking place in spite of the previous presence of a large army. There were numerous fine springs in the vicinity, and the place had been for some years quite a summer resort, A large hotel for accommo dation of visitors was used by us as a hospital. Several large forts, with long lines of breastworks reaching for mi'es into the country, showed how difficult it Avould have been to have forced Bragg out by a direct approach. When Bragg abandoned Tullahoma on the night of July 29th, and tetreated rapidly across Duck River, the Cumberland Mountains, and the Tennessee River, the former pressure from General Halleck for an immediate advance against the enemy's new position at Chattanooga was resumed. As in the spring. General Rosecrans de clined to move until the conditions were favorable. The repair of the railroad to Bridgeport, 'the ripening of the growing com in the country, and more cavalry were three things he deemed essential to a successful advance, July 25th the trains were running to Bridgeport, but it was not until August 16th, that the advance began. CHICAMAUGA CAMPAIGN. It is difficult to conceive a more difficult task than that assigned our army. Chattanooga has such natural de fenses on the north as to make a direct approach in the face of a determined enemy not at all promising. The Cumberland Mountains were to be passed, then, if ap- 38 HISTORY OF THE preached by way of McMinnville, Waldron's Ridge, and last, the Tennessee River ; or, if crossing the Tennessee at Bridgeport, then came Sand Mountain, and Lookout Mountain standing almost impassable barriers in our way. The difficulties of a direct advance were so great that Rosecrans decided to force the evacuation of Chat tanooga as he had done Tullahoma by a flank movement. This plan depended for its success upon deceiving the enemy, leading him to suppose a direct attack was in tended, while the real movement should be rapidly made on his left flank. In pursuance of this plan, August 16th the movement of infantry and artillery was commenced across the Cumberland Mountains, and in a few days quite a force was in Sequatchie Vallej'. From this point, two brigades of cavalry were sent over Waldron's Ridge, and were there joined by two other brigades coming in from the extreme left at Pikeville, making in all six or seven thousand men in the Tennessee Valley. This force occupied the north bank of the river from William's Is land to Kingston, the main force however, being opposite Chattanooga, and at the mouth of North Chickamauga Creek. The shelling of the city by Wilder's artillery, the long front occupied by our men, and the presence of large bodies of infantry in Sequatchie VaUey, had the desired ef fect in entirely misleading General Bragg as to Rosecran's plan of campaign. While his attention was given to the threatened attack in front, or an effort to turn his right flank by crossing the Tennessee at the mouth of North Chickamauga, where Sherman did the following year, the real movement to the enemy's left was in progress. This movement cannot be noticed here in detail ; it only need be said that the army commenced crossing the river Au gust 29th, at Caperton's Ferry, Bridgeport, Battle Creek, and Shellmound ; that by September 4th, nearly the en- FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 39 tire army was on the south bank ; that September 7th, and Sth, Chattanooga was being evacuated, and on the 9th, General Crittenden rnarched in and took peaceable pos session. With scarcely a skirmish, without loss, and as the result of the most brilliant strategy, Chattanooga, the objective of all movements of our army since Stone River battle, the gateway to the South and East Tennes see, thus fell into our hands. In all the war there was nothing more brilliant, nothing more completely success ful, than the movements by which Rosecrans forced the rebel army out of Chattanooga. While the feint on the left and in front of Chattanooga was in progress, we were lying quietly at Tullahoma, but the movement to the right, the first steps of which was the crossing of the Tennessee from August 29th to Sep tember 4th, soon caused an advance of the reserve corps. While at Tullahoma our brigade had been scattered, the Ninety-sixth lUinios being at EsteUe Springs, the One Hundred and Fifteenth Illinois at Fosterville, Company "E." of our regiment at Manchester, and Company "F." seven miles out doing guard duty at a bridge. The ad vance of the army in front reunited our detachments, and September 7th we started on the campaign that ended ^. at Chickamauga. On this day, marched thirty milea apjd encamped at Cowan, foot of Cumberland Mouritaift.^ , The roads were very dusty, and the march was very fatig uing. September 8th, marched early ; all day crossing the mountians. Roads rough, many wagons breaking down, dust intolerable, altogether a hard day's work, and all were glad to get into camp at dark within four miles of Anderson. September 9th, marched to Stevenson, getting there at 3 p. m. The heat, dust, and hard work of, the three preceding days caused many of the men to break down, some of whom were left in general hospital at 40 HISTORY OF THE Stevenson. September 10th, marched to Rridgeport,. reaching there at 3 p. m., and going into camp one and a half miles down the river from the railroad bridge across the Tennessee. September llth, remained in camp all day. September 12th, crossed the river and went into camp. The evacuation of Chattanooga probably led to the im pression that our campaign was about closed, at least everybody went to work to clean up the ground as if for a long stay. While thus occupied, orders came to store all tents, baggage, everything that could hinder a rapid movement, and with twelve days rations be ready to march at daylight next moming. All the afternoon and evening was thus spent, packing personal effects, overhauling the sick list, and determing who should remain, and in load ing the few wagons that were to accompany us. Septem ber 13th, marched early and steadily, with scarcely a halt until dark, when we were halted to allow coffee to be made. Rested until 11 p. m. when we took the road again and marched all night. In the morning of the 14th had our first view of Lookout Mountain, and as we passed over the nose of the mountain had a fine view of Chattanooga, the little town that for nearly two years had been the ob jective of large armies. Passing down into Chattanooga Valley, and crossing Chattanooga Creek, we got into camp at Rossville, five miles south of Chattanooga at noon. By way of explanation of our sudden movement from Bridgeport, a brief notice of the movements of the advance corps of our army is required. Chattanooga having been evacuated, our army in three columns, was in full pursuit of, what was supposed to be a retreating army. General Thomas in the centre, with one corps was marching straight for LaFayette ; Crittenden with another corps was on the Ringgold road, while McCook with a third corps, was far to the right, straining every nerve to get, in FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 41 the rear of Bragg's fleeing army. By the 10th, the day after our occpation of Chattanooga, all of our widely separated corps met with such opposition as to demon strate that the enemy was no longer retreating, but was possibly in such force and position as to endanger the safety of our culumns which were too far apart to be of any assistance to each other. Pollard, in his Southern His tory, says that an attack on our columns in detail was ordered by Bragg to be made on the 10th. General Bragg then had almost his entire army at Lafayette, near which was General Thomas with a single corps. The plan was to fall upon General Thomas with such a mass as to in sure his distraction, then, by a rapid, march to Rossville and out the Ringgold road, crush Crittenden's corps, and finally, by a retrograde movement intercept the corps of McCook before it could escape to the westward of Look out Mountain and annihilate it. When we consider the strength of Bragg's army, vastly superior to ours when all of its parts were united, we cannot doubt that the at tacks ordered to be made on our separated corps on Sep tember 10th, if made with the vigor and determination that characterized the assaults on our lines on the 20th, would have been "successful. But they were not made on the 10th, nor at all, until time had been allowed for the concentration of our army. The precarious condi tion of our army on the llth, 12th and 13th, accounts for the forced march of the Reserve Corps, or our portion of it, fifom Bridgeport to Rossville. 42 HISTORY OF THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. On the 15th and 16th, the Second Brigade of our Divis ion, General Mitchell's, reached Rossville. For several days our regiment had entire rest, although sounds of distant cannonading heard nearly every day kept us on the alert. On the morning of the 17th, General Steed- man, with Mitchell's brigade, made a reconnoissance to Ringgold, but finding the enemy in force, he returned to Rossville on the moming of the 18th. Later in the day of the 18th, our brigade, with a section of the Eighteenth Ohio Battery, was ordered forward on the Ringgold road, and when four miles out our advance was fired into. The brigade was halted, a line of battle formed, and with com panies "A" and "B" of our regiment in front as skirmish ers, we advanced. A sharp skirmish followed, we having one killed. Ninety-sixth Illinois, and three wounded. At dark firing ceased and our brigade, with companies "A" and "B" of our regiment still in front, bivouaced for the night in line of battle. On the morning of the 19th our regiment was sent to the support of its two advanced companies, and was soon engaged with the enemy, Forrest's cavalry dismounted, and fighting as infantry. Advancing, driving the enemy across a small stream, other regiments were sent to its support, and desultory, but sharp fighting was continued through the day, resulting in a loss of about fifty killed and wounded. In our regiment we had three killed, Daniel Lilly, Company "A," and Benjamin Diets and John Winters, Company "H," and fourteen wounded. During the day our Second Brigade, with General Steadman, came up from Rossville, and at night our Division lay on its arms, the men without blankets and not permitted to FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 43 make fires, suffering greatly through the night. Our hos pital for the day was at McAfee's Church, a little frame structure near a fine spring, and near which General Steadman was quartered. There was no disturbance duri ing the night, and when the morning came, bright and beautiful, the warm sun scattering the dense fog which hung over the low-lands about us, we were greatly sur prised at the quiet iri our front. Our wounded had all been sent to Chattanooga the night previous, and every thing was in readiness for the battle which we all expect ed to begin with the daylight, but the morning came and showed us no enemy in our front, and in fact the, quiet to our right, three miles distant, where the day previous the roar of battle was continuous, almost lead us to be lieve the enemy had retreated. At 8^ o'clock, however, the sounds of battle to our right showed that the battle of the day preceding was not decisive. These sounds continued, growing into a roar that shook the pines above our heads, but about McAfee's Church everything was as quiet as though the group about it was the ordinary con gregation gathered there for service on that Sunday morn ing. To understand this quiet, and our subsequent move ments, it will be necessary to glance for a moment at what had transpired in our front and rigjit on the 19th. On the 17th our army was at Crawfish Springs, the left being at Lee's Mills. On the 18th, it being evident that the enemy would attempt a crossing lower down, our army was extended to the left. Up to the 17th we still held the crossings of the Chickamauga on the roads lead ing back to Rossville, but on the night of the 18th the infantry of the enemy effected a crossing at Reid's, but after a single brigade had crossed, Colonel Dan McCook, with a brigade of our corps, succeeded in burning the 44 HISTORY OF THE bridge. During this night three-fonrths of the rebel army had crossed to the west bank of the Chickamauga, a fact that was entirely unknown to General Thomas. On the moming of the 19th, Colonel McCook, supposing the bri gade which had crossed at Reid's bridge was insulated, suggested a movement for its capture, a suggestion which General Thomas followed by sending General Brannan with two brigades to reconnoitre the road to the burnt bridge, and if practicable, capture the brigade supposed to be separated from any support by the Chickamauga. This tentative movement brought on the battle of the 19th, as instead of a single brigade, the rebel army was found on the west bank of Chickamauga. The heaviest fighting of the 19th was on our center and left. The re sult of the day's work was favorable to us, but not deci sive. During the night, General Thomas, in anticipation of an attack from a largely superior force the next morn ing, drew back and shortened his line, the same move ment being made by Bragg with his right, shortening that part of his line, and massing his forces for a determined attack on General Thomas' left on Sunday morning. This condition of affairs explains the quiet in our front on Sunday morning. During all the forenoon of Snnday we remained quiet with the roar of battle only a few miles away. It seemed as though friend and foe had forgotten us, and men and officers chafed at the enforced idleness. At 11 a. m.. Gen eral Granger having come up from Rossville, it was de termined to march to the right. Although ordered to hold the roads back to Rossville and Chattanooga, yet there being no enemy in our front, and the roar of the guns seeming so mueh Uke an appeal for help. General Granger deteirmined to respond. Marching through the woods from the Ringgold road, we struck the Lafayette FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY; 45 road, along which we marched, guided by the sound of the cannon. Near Cloud Spring we found the road in possession of Forrest's cavalry, which we brushed away. At this point was a sad sight. The grounds about the Spring had been the site of our hospital. In the fluctua tions of the battle on Saturday and Sunday forenoon, the place had been run over by the enemy, and hundreds of wounded were laying about without attention. The battle sounds indicating the position of our lines, we left the road at Cloud Spring and marched at a sharp angle with the road through the fields to the right, the rebel cavalry hovering upon our left and rear, killing and wounding some of our men, but failing to arrest our progress. The position of our army at this time was critical in the extreme. During the forenoon the right had been broken into fragments, and sent whirling back to Ross ville and Chattanooga, bearing with it General Rose crans. General Thomas, unaware of the extent of the disaster on his right, was still fighting stoutly, and hbld- ing at bay overwhelming numbers. At any time after noon Thomas had no more than sixteen thousand men, exclusive of Steedman's two brigades, all of these being engaged, and not a regiment in reserve, while opposed to him was not less than forty thousand, many of whom were fresh, having up to that time been held in reserve. The enemy, equally ignorant as General Thomas of the xiomplete demoralization of our right wing, and still sup posing it to be in fighting condition, lost valuable time in cautious approaches to our right, but by the middle of fhe afternoon they had developed General Thomas' exact position and were getting in on his flank and rear in such force as to make the result of the next hour's work be yond all doubt a rebel success. Thomas' line had 46 HISTORY OF THE shrunken to only a few hundred yards in length, occupy ing a circular ridge, its convexity to the enemy ; to the right of this, and at nearly right angles with it, was a ridge held by the enemy, and through a gorge of which a large force was advancing to a position exactly in the rear of our sorely tried army. At this critical moment, when all hope of reinforcements with which to beat back the new danger must have fled. General Thomas saw a body of troops approaching from the north through the fields. The clouds of dust so obscured the column that it was impossible to distinguish whether it was friend or foe. Sending a staff-officer to meet it, with instructions to wave his hat if it were reinforcements he waited in suspense until the signal was given that help was approaching, when he rode down the hill from the Snodgrass House to meet General Granger, and hastily explaining to him the situation, sent him with his two brigades to the point of danger not three hundred yards distant. As the enemy moved down the northern slope of the ridge, and through the gorge, to the rear of General Thomas' right flank, our two brigades, led by General Steedman, charged the ad vancing foe with a fury that could only have been an outgrowth of the impending danger, and in twen+y min utes the rebel host had melted away and both gorge and ridge was held by bur brigades. For a half hour there was a lull, the enemy forming and massing for a desper ate charge aU along our line, during which time our two brigades had formed line of battle from the right of Gen eral Brannan, who up to our arrival had held the extreme right of Thomas' army. At 4 p. m. the blow came. All along our line the battle raged with the greatest fury. Eight divisions, nearly all of Bragg's army, making as sault after assault upon the ridge held by less than twenty thousand of our forces. Brannan's division, with our FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 47 two bi*igades, did not number over six thousand men, and in our immediate front was Longstreet's corps of ten brigades, or not less than twenty thousand men. This corps made repeated and most determined assaults on our position, but was repeatedly repulsed, our men per sistently holding the position gained in the first charge- As night approached the efforts of the enemy became less, and at sundown General Thomas, by order of General Resecrans, commenced the withdrawal of his troops to Rossville. This was effected without loss to our brigade, but some of the force, who were last to leave were fiercely assailed by the enemy and suffered severely. Taking the Dry Valley road we marched leisurely, the enemy not pursuing, and at midnight we were in our old camp at Rossville. Worn out, the men dropped down to sleep by the side of wounded men who had drifted back from the battle-field, and awoke next morning to find the grounds about the Spring and Ross House covered with wounded and bleeding men. Such was our part in the battle of Chickamauga. No history of the battle fails to mention the prominent part of our two brigades, and yet no history gives sufficient prominence to the importance of our timely arrival on Sunday afternoon. And yet without General Granger's two brigades at the critical moment, the utter rout, if not annihilation of General Thomas' few divisions was abso lutely certain. Our valor was fully appreciated by the enemy, as General Hindman, whose division we routed in our first charge, declared that "he had never seen Federal troops fight so well, while he had never seen Confederate troops fight better." Another evidence of the valor of our men is the unexampled losses. In our two brigades of less than four thousand men, we lost, between 2 p. m. and sundown seventeen hundred and thirty-two in killed 48 HISTORY OF THB and wounded, or over forty-five per cent, of our entire force. September 21st, after drawing rations, fell back towards Chattanooga, and after a short rest was ordered to the summit of Mission Ridge. Fires were built along the ridge at night, and breast-works were thrown up as if the position was to be permanently held, but during the night our forces were quietly withdrawn within the de fenses of Chattanooga; the enemy following the next moming and occupj'ing Mission Ridge and Lookout Mountain, from which lofty position he looked down upon the "Gateway" to the East and South, but which he was to possess nevermore In this battle we lost two valuable officers : First-Lieu tenant Cyrenius Van Mater, of Company "G," and Captain Benj. F. Snodgrass, formerly of "G," but then in com mand of Company "A." Both of these gentlemen had enlisted as privates, and had fairly won their promotion by strict attention to duty, their soldierly bearing, and the exhibition of many qualities that entitled them to command. In the withdrawl from Mission Ridge on the night of the 21st, we were unfortunate in losing one entire com pany. Captain Meagher, in command of Company "H," and some others, detailed from the regiment, in aU about one hundred men, was on picket, and when the forces were withdrawn, failed to receive notice, if any was sent, of the movement. The next morning when the enemy advanced, our picket had a short but desperate fight^ but of course was overpowered, and of the number captured faelongingj to Company "H," nineteen died in rebel prisons. FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 49 MOCCASIN POINT AND SHELLMOUND. September 22d. Our brigade marched through the city, across the river, and went into position on Moccasin Point, opposite Lookout Mountain. Just above our camp, on the point of the ridge nearest Lookout, was the Eighteenth Ohio Battery, which for the next several weeks kept up an artillery duel with the enemy's guns on top of Lookout. On the same day that we occupied Moccasin Point, our wounded were all moved across the river to thc Stringer farm, one and a half miles north of Chattanooga, and from this point, all those able to travel were given a twenty days furlough. For many days after our army was in the defenses of the city, there was a general expectation of an attack by the enemy, but aside from artillery firing, and an occa sional sortie, there was no disturbance. Bragg, looking down from his place on Mission Ridge, upon our forts and long lines of earth-works around the city, wisely forebore to assault them, preferring the more tedious, but more promising process of starvation. During the seige of Chattanooga, although there was no absolute suffering among the troops from want of food, yet the men were for weeks on exceedingly short rations. There were great losses from starvation, however, among the horses and mules. Our base of supplies was at Bridgeport and Ste venson, only an hour's ride distant by rail, and a few hours by steamer,' but the engmy holding Lookout, and the south bank of the river, effectually controlled this short line, leaving us only a route over Waldron's Ridge, a distance of seventy miles, and the worst road imaginable. 50 HISTORY OF THB It was impossible to supply the necessary rations and forage by this long route. The unusual, and continued hard work soon began to show its effect on the poorly fed stock, and within a few weeks we lost ten thousand mules and horses from starvation. They became so weak that they would drop down dying in the harness, and so thick ly were their dead bodies strewn along the narrow moun tain roads, that one could walk a long distance by step ping from one carcass to another. October 2nd, General Wheeler captured our train in Sequatchie Valley, coming up from Bridgeport, where it was left when we marched from that place September 13th, burning four hundred wagons, and killing, or taking away with him, sixteen hundred mules. This train con tained the tents, blankets, and many of the knapsacks of the men, as well as all of the personal effects of the offi cers of our brigade. The loss was a serious inconven ience to men who had been without blankets, or a clean shirt for nearly a month. October 9th, by previous order of the President, there was a consolidation of the several corps of the Army of the Cumberland, the Fourth Corps being formed by unit ing the Twentieth and Twenty-first. The Reserve Corps was abandoned, it mainly going to the Fourteenth Corps. Our brigade, however, was sent to the Fourth Corps, and was known as the Second Brigade, First Division, Fourth Army Corps, Army of the Cumberland. October 19th, General Rosecrans transferred the com mand of the Army of the Cumberland to General Thomas, by order of the President. "Old Rosy," as he was famil- Uarly called in our army, had gone before the transfer was generally known, and when his farewell to his army was circulated, there was a feeling of profound regret among officers and men. FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 51 The question of supplies was becoming a serious one, and without an early solution of it, the fate of the army was easily foreseen. Without a shorter line to Bridge port and Stevenson, the army must soon give up Chatta nooga. The plan of relief was originated by General Rosecrans before he was removed, and was subsequently carried out by General Grant. The initial step was the floating of troops on pontoon bridges from above the city, past Lookout, to Brown's Ferry, there to secure a lodgement on the left bank of the river. The movement was made on the night of October 26th, and was success ful. In support of this movement our regiment was ordered down to the Ferry on the 27th, where our men threw up intrenchments, and remained in line of battle during the night at a point between our camp on Mocca sin Point and Lookout. The 28th, opened with heavy artillery firing from our batteries on Moccasin Point and the rebel guns on Lookout. Later in the day, the guns on Lookout were turned towards Bridgeport, where the Eleventh Corps, the advance of Hooker's column from Bridgeport, was passing towards Brown's Ferry. At one A. M., October 29th, the rebels made a fierce assault on Geary's Division, Twelfth Corps, then somewhat isolated at Wauhatchie, several miles back from Brown's Ferry, in Lookout Valley. The continued roll of musketry convinced us that there wps hot work across the river, and prepared us for the order to march at daylight. Crossed the pontoon at sunrise, and marched about four miles along the western base of Lookout. During this march we were constantly under fire from the big guns on Lookout, but our brigade only lost four, one killed and three wounded, all of the Ninety-sixth Illinois. The battle of Wauhatchie had ended before our arrival, but we remained in position until the afternoon of the 30th, .52 HISTORY OF THE when we marched back to our camp on Moccasin Point. The movement of the last few days had settled the question of supplies. General Hooker had a firm hold on Lookout Valley, the river was opened to Bridgeport, and Chatta nooga was no longer in a state of siege. October 31st, received orders to be ready for an early march next morning down the river towards Bridgeport. November 1st, marched early, crossing the pontoon bridge, after being detained by a break in the bridge for several hours, and going into camp on the same ground where we had halted for breakfast on the moming of September 14th. During the day, met Colonel Taylor coming to rejoin his regiment after an absence of two months on recruiting service. November 2nd, marched at daylight, and reached Shellmound before night. November 3d, our regiment, with the Ninety-sixth Illinois, was sent two miles up Nickajack Cove, where we went into camp on the mountain side. The locality having plenty of timber, the men at once began the erection of cabins, and in a week's time had a village of rough, but comfortable log- cabins. November 6th, a train of cars came down from Bridgeport, the first since Bragg evacuated Middle Ten nessee in June. This, and the Paymaster on the ISth, were the most notable events of our first three weeks stay at Shellmound. November 19th, drew six days rations, an indication of work, and on the 20th ordered to move. Left everything in camp but forage and rations, marched two miles, and after standing about for several hours in a drenching rain, marched back to camp, where we remained all of next day. November 23d, marched early, going bj'^ way of Whiteside, and getting into camp in Lookout Valley at dark. FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY, 53 BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN. The order for us to return to camp on the 20th, was in consequence of delay in the execution of General Grant's plans. The assault on Lookout was to have been made on the 21st, instead of the 24th, as it was. The general plan of action was as follows : General Sherman was to effect a crossing of the Tennessee below the mouth of South Chickamauga, and assault the northern extremity of Mission Ridge ; General Thomas was to concentrate his forces on his left to act in concert with Sherman, while Hooker, with Geary's Division of the Eleventh Corps, and two brigades of our corps, was to hold Look out VaUey, and make a demonstration against the enemy upon the face of the mountain. Up to the 23d, there was no expectation of Hooker doing more than simply en gage theenemy's attention, and prevent him from detatch- ing forces from Lookout to the right of Bragg's line, where the real effort was to be made. On the 23d, how ever, there were two events that changed the possibilities for General Hooker. The advance of our forces in the centre, one division of our own corps being prominent in the movement, drove the enemy from his intrenched lines, held for many weeks, back to the line of Orchard Knob, a position we, held. This new position not only gave us a good point from which to assault on the 25th, but it caused Bragg to transfer a full division from Look out to strengthen his right, and centre, against what seemed a threatening demonstration. Another event of the day was the failure of Osterhau's division of Sher man's army to cross the river at Brown's Ferry. The pontoon having broken, with the division on the left bank. .54 ' HISTORY OF THE it was ordered to report to General Hooker. Thus, the withdrawal of a rebel division from Lookout, and the addition of a division to General Hooker's slender forces, made the splendid victory of the next day possible. What was intended on the 21st, to have been a mere feint, on the 24th, was a grand success, by which the left wing of Bragg's army was hurled from a position that seemed impregnable. At 4 A. M. of November 24th, we were under arms and ready to advance. Recent rains had so swollen Lookout creek that it was not fordable. and Geary's division, with our brigade, was sent to cross the creek higher up, while the remaining force should construct bridges to cross in front, the crossing to be covered by our position on the right bank of the creek. The movement was promptly made, we crossing the creek at 8 A. m., and by 11 A. M. the entire force of ten thousand men were on the right bank. Our movement up the creek, shrouded in the morning mist as it was, did not seem to be noticed by the enemy, his attention being centered on Osterhau's di vision, which was making preparation to force a crossing in his front. With Geary's division in front, and our bri gade a short distance in the rear, our right being near the palisades, we advanced around the face of the mountain, until at 11 A. M. we connected with Osterhau's division on our left, thus extending our line of battle from the palisades to the base of the mountain. Thus in position, the whole line advanced, while the batteries on Moccasin Point, and others posted on available hills in Lookout Valley, kept up a steady fire upon the face of the moun tain, preventing concentration, or change- of position of the rebel forces. Climbing over boulders, and creeping through the brush, our part of the line advanced cau tiously until the enemy was developed, when it pushed FORTIBTH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 55 forward rapidly, regardless of the fierce fire in front, and the plunging shot from the mountain top, driving the enemy about one mile to a line of breastworks, which were charged and captured. At this point Geary's divis ion halted in obedience to orders, that the whole line might be readjusted preparatory to a further advance, but our brigade, thoroughly aroused and forgetful of orders, pushed through the front line, and continued the pursuit of the demoralized enemy. Our regiment in advance, the brigade charged two additional lines of works, capturing them with a section of artillery at the Craven House, and the right of our regiment, led by Lieut Col. Jones, pushing on far beyond the rest of our line, and at one time was actually in the rear of the rebel line of battle, a position of danger from which it escaped by a prompt retrograde movement. The rapid movement of the right of our line, and especially our brigade, resulted in turning the left flank of the enemy's position on the face of the mountain, and gave us many hundred prisoners, who thus cut off from retreat toward the Summertown road, and exposed to the deadly fire- of our artillery from the Valley, prompt ly surrendered, and were gathered in by Osterhau's divis ion. At the point where Lieut. Col. Jones, with a portion of our regiment wisely fell back, the enemy, having been rein forced from the top of the mountain, made a more deter mined stand, and our troops having nearly exhausted their ammunition, and a heavy fog settling down upon the face of the mountain, enveloping both armies, no farther efforts to seize the Summerton road were made, the heavy fighting ceasing at 2 p. m. Later, communica tion with Chattanooga having been opened, fresh troops came up the mountain, bringing ammunition, and reliev ing our brigade, which was allowed to drop back out of 56 HISTORY OF THE line of the severe skirmish fire which was kept up until near midnight. Without blankets, overcoats, or shelter, and with no chance for the always welcome hot coffee, our men dropped down upon the wet ground and shivered through the night. History will differ as to whether the capture of Lookout was a battle or not. General Grant is reported as saying it was nothing more than a skirmish. To any one famil iar with the ground over which we advanced, and the great advantage the enemy had in position, it will always be a matter of surprise that our success was so sudden and so complete. Whether it arose to the dignity of a battle or not, there is no other feature of the war that will so long live in poetry and painting, or is so firmly fixed in the memory of the hundred thousand spectators who from Mission Ridge and Chattanooga Valley, with strain ed eyes watched the progress of this struggle amid the mist, and fog, and battle-smoke that hung over the front of Lookout. And whatever there was of honor, whatever there was of glory, whatever there was to live in history, in this brilliant dash across the face of the mountain, our brigade should have its full share, for it was it, and more especially our regiment, that reached the flank and rear of the enemy's defenses, thus cutting off, and rendering certain the capture of the larger part of their forces in their works at the foot of the mountain. The losses in our regiment were eleven killed, viz : Major Thos. Acton, Jacob Long and Nelson Glaze, Com pany "A;" James W. Scroggy, Company "B ;" Richard Evans and George Kenzla, Company "C ;" Creighton Allen, Richard Beetle, Edward Goodlandor, and William Emmett Bigelow, Company "D," and Irvine Smith, Company "K," and fifteen wounded. Among the latter was private Wylie Church, Company "I," who died in FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 57 » hospital at Bridgeport, a few weeks later, and Sergeant Daniel CoUett, Company "B," who died from his wound some months later. The death of Major Acton produced a profound sensa tion in our regiment, as he had the love of his old com pany and the respect of the entire cammand. He was "Offieer of the Day," and in fuU dress uniform, a fact which possibly invited the fatal bullet. Before daylight on the morning of the 2.5th, we were ready for action, fully expecting that the morning would bring a renewal of the struggle, with its shot and shell from the summit, and the fierce fire in front, but just as the sunlight touched the brow of Lookout, a shout arose from our lines, a shout by a single soldier, caught up by another, by a hundred, by a thousand, by ten thousand, and spreading away down into our camps in Chattanooga Valley, sixty thousand men echoed our greeting to our flag, which, from the Point of Lookout, floated in the "golden dawning of a grander day." The mountain was ours. MISSIONARY RIDGE AND RINGGOLD. During the entire day of the 24th, comparative quiet had prevailed along the lines of our army fronting Mis sion Ridge. The movements on the 23d and 24th, how ever, which gave Sherman a hold on the northern extremity of Mission Ridge, and advanced the Unes of our centre several hundred yards to Orchard Knob, found everything in readiness for the great work yet to be done- 58 HISTORY OF THE General Grant still had in view the success of General Sherman on the right wing of Bragg, and it is somewhat curious to notiee how the great cuccess at Mission Ridge came contrary to the proposed plan. Lookout was as saulted to prevent a concentration of the enemy in front of Sherman ; General Thomas was weakened to strength en Sherman where the main attack was to be made, but victory came at unexpected points. First, the left wing of Bragg's army was tumbled off of Lookout by us on the 24th ; next, the weakened rebel centre was pierced by General Thomas, while . yet . Sherman was thundering away at the right flank of Bragg's army. The heavy fog, or mist, which hung over the valley, and around the foot of the mountain on the morning of the 25th, prevented us knowing if the enemy had given up his hold on the valley or not, and to develop his po sition, our regiment was sent forward to reconnoitre. Advancing down the east side of the mountain, and into the valley, the evidence of evacuation was complete, as the rebel dead, and abandoned guns and stores, all spoke of precipitate flight during the night. This determined, our forces moved down from the mountain in obedience to orders to move out on the road to Rossville. At the crossing of Chattanooga creek, a deep stream, with pre cipitous banks, we were detained several hours, the enemy having burned the bridge in his retreat. The crossing effected, we advanced rapidly towards Rossville, pushing the enemy before us up Mission Ridge and through the gap. At Rossville our forces were disposed as follows ; Osterhaus' division, marching through the gap, took position on the eastern slope of the ridge, our two bri gades in the gap, and Geary's division on the western slope, and thus formed, we were ordered to sweep the ridge towards the north. FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 59 Meantime, while we were marching from Lookout, and getting into position at Rossville, the rest of the line was not idle. Sherman had been pounding away at Hardee on the north end of Mission Ridge since daylight, Gen eral Thomas sending division after division to his support, while Bragg made a corresponding depletion of his centre to strengthen Hardee. At length the opportunity for the centre came, and six cannon shots from Orchard Knob gave the signal to advance at 4 p. m., and the historic charge on the ridge was made, Wood's division of our corps being the first to reach the summit. While General Thomas' troops were struggling up the ridge in front of Orchard Knob, General Hooker gave the order for the rapid advance of our Une. The enemy here held a breast work thrown up by us on the night of September 21st, and made a sharp resistance, but our two brigades dashed forward, sweeping all before them, the rebels fleeing down the mountain side only to be captured by Osterhaus, or along the ridge to fall into the hands of one of Thomas' divisions now advancing tort^ards us. Our captures at this point amounted to two thousand men, and one gun. among the prisoners beirig a son of John C. Breckinridge, ' At sunset our work was done, and we held Mission Ridge the whole length of its front. General Hardee only still holding his position opposite Sherman. Bivouaced for the night on the rocky summit we had so nobly won. November 26th, ordered in pursuit of the enemy. At 10 A. m., marched back to Rossville, and out on the Ring gold road, passing over the same route taken by our brigade September 18th, and the scene of our battle September 19th. At Chickamauga, and Pea Vine creek, we were greatly delayed, the enemy having burned the bridges. Crossing the men on a temporary bridge, swim ming the horses acrosSj and leaving the artillery, we pressed 60 HISTORY OF THE forward, overtaking their rear guard ¦ at sunset, and skir mishing with them until midnight, when we halted forthe night. November 27th, moved early, our brigade in the rear* Our advance began skirmishing with the rear guard as ear ly as nine o'clock. Pressing them closely, many captures were made before reaching Ringgold, through which theen- emy was pushed, but who finally made a stand on Taylor's Ridge, and in the gap through Avhich the railroad passes, just east of town. The position was a strong one. A ridge several hundred feet high, through which was a narrow gorge. The ridge and front was held by Cleburne. and the gap was defended by a battery of artilery. Our artillery had not yet come up^ but Hooker determined to feel the enemy at once, and a brigade of Osterhaus' divis ion was sent forward, and meeting with opposition, other brigades were sent in support, until a strong line of bat tle was pressing upward toward the summit. Up to this time, the enemy's defense had not been vigorous, but now he showed his strength by delivering a terrific fire in front, while he sent a brigade to either flank of the as saulting column. Our men fought gallantly, but were forced to retire, which they did slowly, closely followed by the enemy, who made a desperate effort to push us across the railroad and into the town. At this juncture, Geary's division was ordered up, and a brigade sent to the left, where a gorge seemed to offer some protection to an assaulting column, but which proved the most fatal point in the line, as the enemy, concentrating there, was enabled to pour in a most destructive cross and enfilading fire. The brigade struggled up the gorge, however, the , Seventh 01>io reaching' the summit^ but no column CQuld stand the terrible fiie pf the enemy long, an4 our forces fell back, the Seventh Qbio alfpost annihilated. Just ai FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 61 this time, our brigade marched through town, and form ing in line of battle at the railroad, was about to be sent to the assistance of the assaulting column, but General Geary, seeing the utter hopelessness of the attack, with drew the troops. This assault was ill-timed and disastrous, and was said to have subjected General Hooker to sharp censure from General Grant, who came up in the evening. November 28th, sent our wounded back towards Chat tanooga on flat cars, which were pushed by our men as far as Chickamauga Station, ambulances taking the wounded from that point. Our brigade engaged in tear ing up the railroad. Destroyed ab otit one mile of track, heating, and twisting the irons, so that nothing but a roll ing mill could ever make them again available. Night very cold, and as the men had neither overcoats nor blank ets, there was much suffering. 29th and 30th, idle in camp, the only duty keeping up good fires. December 1st, marched at 2 A. m. in the direction of Chattanooga, our march being made by the light of the burning town Marched all day steadily, and halted for the night on the ground where we formed for an advance on Lookout No vember 24th. The day was very cold, the ground being frozen hard, the roads rough, and the men, from expos ure, and want of sleep on account of cold, as well as the long day's march, were as much broken down at night as at any time during their service. December 2nd, marched early and steadily, reaching Shellmound at 3 p. M. Never did home seem more delightful, more comfortable, than did our cabins perched on the hillside, to our weary, foot sore regiment. 62 HISTORY OF THE WINTER QUARTERS. After our retum to Shellmound. we had several weeks of uninterrupted rest. The winter was exceptionally cold, January 1st still being remembered North and South as the "Cold New Year's day." Our regiment however, was comfortably housed, well clothed, and well fed, so that the winter passed pleasantly. Contrary to expecta^ tion, the severe campaign caused no sickness, and a few days rest removed all trace of the hard work. The good health of the regiment I think is proven by an entry in my diary. Under the supervision of Steward Otwell, and Will Carver a squad of men had worked a week in the erection of a commodious log cabin for a Hospital. It being finished, I wrote in my diary January 19th : "Doc tors Isaminger and Matchett looking sharp after a patient to put in our new Hospital." During our stay at Shellmound, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones resigned on account of ill health. This, and the loss of Major Acton at Lookout, caused the promotion of Captain Watson, Company "D," to Lieutenant-Colonel, and Captain Reeves, of Company "F," to Major. . Our rest gave time for consideration of the question of re- enlistment. At one time, the feeling was so strong as to make it probable that enough would re-enUst to continue the Fortieth as a Veteran organization, but only "E," "G,'' "I" and "K" finally had a sufficient number of veterans to hold their organization, although every company had quite a number of re-enlistments. By the middle of January the weather had greatly mod erated, and by the last week in the month it was delight ful, almost like April weather in Ohio. This pleasant • FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 63 weather made the men restless, and long for a more active life and change of locality, so, when orders to march came on the 25th, everybody commenced preparationn with alacrity. BLUE SPRINGS. January 26th, marched at 10 A. m. and when two miles out from Shellmound went into camp, waiting for our wagon train to get through the "Narrows." 27th, marched and camped for the night at Whiteside. 28th, marched at 7 A. M. and went into camp at 3 p. m. at foot of Look out Mountain, waiting for our trains to pass over the "Nose" of Lookout. 29th, marched through Chattanooga, and out by Orchard and Bald Knobs, and camped at foot of Mission Ridge. 30th, marched leisurely, passing over Mission Ridge and went into camp about noon at Tyner's Station, where we remained until February 3d, when we marched to Ooltewah, fifteen miles east of Chattanooga. By February 6th our brigade was grouped about Blue Springs, four miles south of Cleaveland, on the road to Dalton. During February there was much anxiety felt for the .small army of General Sherman, who on the 3d of the month left Vieksburg with twenty thousand men, and pushed boldly for the interior of Mississippi. This move ment was to have been supported by a column of eight thousand cavalry which left Memphis February 1st, feut '64 HISTORY OF THE which was met, and beaten by the enemy before forming a junction with Sherman. This failure arrested Sherman's movement at Meridian, one hundred miles east of Vicks burg. To make a diversion in favor of Sherman, by pre venting Bragg from detatching any forces to assist Gen eral Johnson, who was opposing Sherman, or, in case any considerable force had been sent from Bragg to Missis- sipi, to attack his position at Dalton, our division, with Long's Cavalry, and three divisions from General Thomas' army, were put in motion towards Dalton February 22nd. Only the movements of our regiment and brigade will be noticed here. February 22nd, marched early and camped at Red Clay, fifteen miles from Dalton. • Several deserters came in dur ing the day, and the citizens along our line of march seemed delighted at our advance. 23d, marched at 2 p. ivr. rapidly towards Tunnel Hill. Colonel Long, with the cavalry, skirmished heavily with the enemy, driving his videttes to within four miles of Dalton. Camped for the night at 10 P. m. on Tiger Creek; about three miles from Ringgold. 24th, marched at 9 a. M., falling back to Dr. Lee's on Red Clay road, thence again toward Tunnel Hill by another road. Reached a point within one mile of Tun nel Hill, but at dusk, fell back again to Dr. Lee's. 25th, marched at 4 a. m. taking the road to Dalton. Demon stration all along the line against the enemy, our brigade encountering the enemy in Rocky Face Valley, and skir mishing with him all day, losing four killed and twenty- five wounded. After night fell back again to Dr. Lee's. It being demonstrated that the enemy was in strong position, and with superior fbrces, any farther efforts to dislodge him were deemed hazardous, and even to longer maintain our threatening attitude was deemed unwise, and on the 27th we commenced olir return march. FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 65 and reached our camp at Blue Springs the next day. March 1st, ordered to Charleston, eleven miles north of Cleveland, at the crossing of the Hiawasa river by thc East Tennessee railroad. Left camp at 9 a. m. and reach ed Charleston at sunset, having inarched all day in a drenching rain. Just across the river, in the village of Calhoun, was a large number of sick, left by Long's bri gade of cavalry when it started on the late reconnois sance. Dr. Isaminger, of our regiment, took charge of them, fitting up an old Academy building for a hospital. iMarch 9th, returned to Blue Springs, and went into camp near division headquarters. March 22d was characterized by a heavy snow storm. The snow was ten inches deep, a thing unknown there. The citizens seemed to think the Yankees had brought with them their New England weather. April 10th, the brigade was formed in a square to witness a most humili ating scene. A member of our regiment, by sentence of Court Martial, had his head shaved and was drummed through the camp. Whatever previous breaches of dis cipline he may have been guilty of, later, he was a good ¦,?oldier, and was killed at Kenesaw, Georgia, in June fol- fowing- The month of April passed with but Httle of interest. There were the usual rumors of an attack by the rebels, or an early advance on our part, and by the 27th, orders to send all extra luggage back to Bridgeport, gave prom ise that a movement in the near future was probable. On the 29th, the baggage was sent away, and on May 2d, .^11 soldiers unfit for active service were ordered to report with discriptive rolla at Brigade hospital preparatory to being sent to the rear. , t)6 HT.STORV OF THK ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. At noon. May 3d, we marched out on the road to Dal ton, going into camp at Red Clay. May 4th, marched early and encamped at 3 P. m at Catoosa Springs, where we rested until May 7th, waiting for the concentration of the Grand Army of Sherman in front of Dalton. At this time our brigade was coniposed of the following regi ments : 40th Ohio Infantry, 35th Indiana Infantry, 51st Ohio Infantry, 84th Indiana Infantry, 99th Ohio Infantry, 96th Illinois Infantry, 21st Kentucky Infantry, 115th Illinois Infantry. tt was the Second Brigade, First Division, Fourth Corps, Army of the Cumberland, a position we retained through the campaign. The first movement of our forces contemplated the forcing of the enemy from Tunnel Hill, and a threatened direct attack upon his main position in front of Dalton, while the real attack should come from a portion of our army sent through Snake Creek gap to operate upon the lines of communication in his rear, thus forcing him from his strong position at Dalton, and compelling him to give battle on ground of our selection. On the 7th, the initial step of this proposed plan of operations was taken by the advance of the Fourteenth corps upon Tunnel Hill, where it met with some resistance, but upon the ap pearance of our corps coming up on the left, the enemy retired to Buzzards Roost, we occupying Tunnel Hill at noon. From our position on Tunnel Hill Ridge, the enemy was plainly seen occupying Rocky Face Ridge, an impassible mountain, cloven by Mill Creek, the gap FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. b7 through which it and the railroad passed, being known as Buzzard's Roost. On the Sth, our division, in Une of battle, advanced one mile into the valley facing Rocky Face, skirmishing with the enemy through the day, but retired to Tunnel Hill at night. On the 9th and 10th, very decided demonstrations were made against the enemy at all points, and although there was no determin ed assault, the pressure was sufficiently great to keep the enemy fully occupied, which was the purpose of General Sherman. Meantime, General McPherson, with the Army of the Tennessee, had passed through Snake Creek Gap, and reached the vicinity of Resaca as early as the afternoon of the 9th, but finding it strongly fortified, and his flank exposed to an attack from Dalton, he prudently fell back to the southern mouth of the gap, a position, he prepared to hold, thus keeping the road open for the army which was to follow. On the 10th, it being evident that Mc Pherson would fail to reach the communications of the enemy, arrangements were made for the transfer of the whole army, with the exception of our corps, to the rear of Dalton, and on the llth, orders for this movement were issued. At sunrise on the 12th, the movement com menced through Snake Creek Gap, and by evening nearly tiie whole army was concentrated near McPherson at the southern mouth of the gap. During the 12th, there was no force in front of Dalton but our corps and Stoneman's cavalry, a fact probably not known to the enemy. Dur ing the night of the 12th, Johnson's army was quietly withdrawn, and on the morning of the 13th, we marched through Buzzard's Roost, and passing through Dalton at noon, went into camp for the night nine miles south. -Marched early on the 14th, taking the main road to Resaca. Skirmishing commenced early, and continued until it was 68 HISTORY OF THE lost in the roar of battle. In the battle of the afternoon our division occupied the left of the line, and although all through the day the enemj^ had been pressed slowly back, yet late in the afternoon there were evidences of a concentration upon our left that looked much like an offensive movement. It was not long before all doubt upon this point was removed, as the enemy came down upon our front and flank in overwhelming numbers. The assault was so desperate, and in such force, that our regi- merits -wavered, and fell back in disorder. The exposed position of our division had been reported to General Thomas, who, in anticipation of what occurred, had or dered a division from the Twentieth corps to our support, and without its prompt appearance our division would have been badly handled, as without reserves, it was being driven by a force it could no longer withstand. The credit of the repulse of the enemy at this point, however, should not be given wholly to the troops from Hooker's ijorps, as the Fifth Indiana Battery, posted in a position by General Stanley in anticipation of a possible reverse. had sensibly cooled the ardor of the pursuing foe before the infantry got into position. The writer was in a posi tion to witness the exciting scene, and until then, had no conception how rapidly guns could be fired. As the . stream of fugitives .from the front came drifting back tcf. the left of the battery, closely follow«d by the enemy in overwhelming numbers, the six guns were brought into action, and for a half hour there was almost a oontinuo^^^ stream of fire from their muzzles, hurling grape and can- nister at short; range into the faces, and enfilading the line . of the pursuers, a fire so hot and steady that the enemy . halted. At this juncture a division from Hooker's corps came uf> and the enemy was effectually checked. Or the 15th there was heavy fighting, mainly by • l-'OKTIETH OHIO VOL, INFANTRY. 69 Hooker's corps, although along the whole front of our ¦corps there was heavy skirmishing and artillery firing all day, but with no decided successes. During the night the. onemy abandoned Resaca, and by morning his entire army was south of the Oostenaula. FROM HESAOA TO ACKWORTH. ' In thc pursuit of the enemy from Resaca, as from Buz- •/ard Roost, and in fact during the whole campaign, thc. Army of the Cumberland was the central column, follow ing in the direct path of the retiring foa Early in the , morning of the 16th, the Fourth corps marched through Resaca, a little hamlet whose few houses showed the ef fect of our artillery the day previous. The march for the . day was slow, as we were constantly enga,ged with the rear guard of the enemy which stubbornly resisted our ad vance. On the 17th, the front of our corps was covered ¦ by a heavy rear guard of the retreating foe, and skirmish- ; ing commenced early. The enemy, cavalry, artillery, and , at aome points infantry, were disposed in successive lines', behind barrioades, and were evidently wiUing to be attack- . ed. When pushed from the first position they withdrew through the lines of the second, only to take another and, similar position in the rear. In this manner, we pressed them back all .day, and in the evening, so vigorous was our. press,ure, that ^ batl^e «eeHaed imminent, but night coming . . on the fighJijig ce^,&ed,,and we encamped for the night a, 70 HISTORY OF THE few miles from Adairsville. Marched on the 18th through Adairsville, meeting with no opposition during the day, and encamped at night near Kingston. At 8 A' m. our corps, our division leading, marched toward Cassville. The enemy was soon developed and pressed slowly back for several miles, when a strong force was seen approach ing in two lines of battle. Our division and Wood's di vision were promptly deployed in front, with Newton's in support, and awaited the onset. The enemy, seeing our readiness, halted and covered the front of his Unes witb barricades. Our artillery, however, forced him from his first line, and night coming on, the enemy withdrew from our front, and we went into camp near Cassville, where the whole army was concentrated. It is well known that the Confederate General Johnson on the 18th, planned an attack on Schofield's army when it was beyond supporting distance from the other corps ; and that on the 19th a general engagement was contemp lated, and the threatened, attack on our corps on the evening of that day, was the opening of what was ex pected by the enemy to be a decisive battle : but Generals Hood and Polk, who were in our front, suddenly decided their positions untenable, and the plan was abandoned. The question of responsibility between Johnson and his Lieutenants, Hood and Polk, for the failure of the pro posed battle, forms interesting chapters in several South ern histories. On the night of the 19th, the enemy abandoned his strong positions about Cassville, and marching through Cartersville, crossed the Etowah the next day. For the next three days the army, grouped about Cass ville, rested, waiting until the railroad could be repaired and suppUes brought up. On the 23d, with twenty days rations in the wagons, the army raarched, not directly FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 71 upon the enemy in his strong position at Altoona, but making along detour to the right, aiming to get upon his railroad communications at Marietta. Our corps left camp in the afternoon, and crossing the river four miles south of Kingston, halted for the night at Euharlee. Marched at 9 a. m. on the 24th, passing through Styles- boro, and crossing a spur of the mountains, camped on Raccoon Creek, near Bumt Hickory. 25th, march to wards Dallas resumed. Geary's division of Hooker's corps in the advance, met the enemy in force, the collision bringing on a bloody engagement known as the battle of New Hope. All the divisions of Hooker's corps being up, at 5 p. M. a desperate assault was made upon the enemy's position, w'hich was repulsed, to be repeated again and again, but the position was too strong, and at dark our forces drew off. During the fight a terrific thunder storm came up, but the roar of artillery, and the rattle of mus ketry, could be heard above the elemental war. Our corps had been rushed up in support of Hooker, but only reached the field at the close of the battle. During the night, however, we got into position on Hooker's left. It was now evident that Johnson's army was squarely across our road to Dallas, and prepared to dispute our further progress. The 26th was spent in concentration of the army, and placing its several corps in position. In getting our position our brigade was under a heavy fire, not only from the skirmishers, but from the main line of the enemy. The opposing armies were quite near each other, in strong intrenchments, with the artillery in com manding positions. So close were the enemy's lines in our front that for several days almost an incessant fire was kept up from the breastworks, the pickets being re Ueved at night, and each man on the picket line covering himself by digging a pit, or securing the shelter of a 72 HISTORY OF THE ¦ friendly log. At no time during the campaign were we exposed to a more fatal fire from sharp-shooters, as the slightest exposure was sure to invite a bullet. On the 27th, an effort was made to turn the right flank of the enemy, and for this purpose, Wood's division of our corps was withdrawn from the line, and with a portion of the Fourteenth corps, was sent to the left to feel for the right flank of Johnson's army. At 5 p. m. an attack was made, resulting in a repulse and a great loss. Preceding and during the attack, pur portion of the line kept the enemy fully occupied in our front. The day's work resulted in a loss of fifteen hundred to our corps. During the 28th, we were engaged in brisk skirmishing. On the 29th, thc enemy demonstrated in our front, and all through the day we were engaged, although no direct attacks were made. The demonstration against us was a feint to cover an attack on our extreme left, which was re pulsed with great loss to the enemy, a fair offset to the losses in our corps on the 27th. During the next few day.s our army was shifted gradually to the left, the movement be ing made in the face of the enemy, and each new position being strongly intrenched, even if intended to be occupied only for a few hours. The enemy, recognizing the fact that he could not prevent us reaching the railroad, aban doned his long line of intrenchments on the night of the 4th of June, and fell back to another line a few miles; north of Kenesaw. Resting on the 5th, we moved leisurely on the 6th, and at 10 p. m. got into camp at Ackworth. FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INF.\NTRY. FROM ACKWORTH TO THE CHATTAHOOCHIE. Our army remained quietly at Ackworth awaiting the arrival of supplies, and pleasanter weather. The rain, which commenced on the 4th, was almost continuous un til thc last week of the month, making the roads almost impassable. In addition to the drenching rains, the weather was unusually cold, making campaigning an or deal that tested the hardihood and patience of our men. On the 10th, the whole army moved forward, feeling for the enemy, who was understood to occupy a chain of hills from Kenesaw to Lost Mountain, with Pine Mountain midway between these points, and considerably in front of the main line. Left camp at 8 a. m., marching towards Marietta, and skirmishing with the enemy in the after noon. Next day, made but slight change ; in fact the rain was so continuous that all active operations were .suspended. On the 14th our forces were again in motion, and the Army of the Cumberland was drawn closely around the front of Pine Mountain, our brigade occupy ing a central positipn. The movements of the day were accompanied with sharp fighting. In the afternoon, a shot from the Fifth Indiana battery, posted with our brigade, killed General Polk, who, with Johnson and Hardee, were .pibserving our movements from the top of Pine Mountain. -That night Pine Mountain was abandoned, and early on the 15th we marched over the mountain, driving the enemy from a line of out works beyond. The main line was , reached about one mile from Pine Mountain. Geary's division of Hooker's corps, assaulted this line just to our right, but, was forced tp retire with a loss of several hun- 74 HISTORY OF THE dred men. At this point, our line was so close to that of the enemy as to make exposure as dangerous as though on the skirmish line. Pickets were relieved in the dark ness of night, and each man protected himself by a gopher hole, a pile of stones, or rails. It was at this point that Captain Simonson, our Chief of Artillery, was killed by a rebel sharpshooter. He was crawling along on the skir mish line, to be able from personal observation to better direct the fire of one of his batteries, rolling a log before him for protection, when hewas killed by a bullet through his head. On the 16th there was skirmishing all along the line, and on our right changes were made that endangered Lost Mountain, the rebel left. In the aftemoon there was heavy cannonading, which was continued far into the night. From a position on Pine Mountain, the night af forded the grandest exhibition of fireworks imaginable. From Kenesaw, and all.' along the line of hills to Lost Mountain, the enemy's 'guns|were belching forth flameS) while our artillery was in full play. During the night of the 16th the enemy abandoned Lost Mountain, and several miles of intrenchments, his left falling back three ' miles, to a new line pf works already prepared, on the Marietta side of Mud Creek. On the 17th, we moved forward, driving the enemy's skirmish line before us across Mud Creek, and our skirmishers in trenching on the west bank of the little stream, from which position the enemy made two attempts to dislodge them during the night. On the 18th an advance of the other two divisions of our corps, secured a position and intrenched within a hundred yards of the enemy's works- During the night the enemy withdrew. Early ' on the I9th, our division leading, our corps advanced, and forc ing the enemy across Nose's Creek, halted. The enemy's FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 75 position was well defined, and so strong that two weeks constant pressure resulted in no important change in rel ative position. On the morning of the 20th, General Stanley, with two brigades of our division, crossed Nose's Creek, and driv ing back the enemy's skirmishers, fortified his position. In the aftemoon, our strong skirmish line still farther pressed the enemy back, carrying a hill covered with a dense undergrowth. The brigade followed promptly and at once threw up barricades, which enabled us to hold the hill in the face of the most desperate assaults. Kir- by's brigade, of our division, carried a hill near by at the same time, but was not so fortunate as to hold it, the enemy driving our forces from it with loss. The operations at this point on the 20th of June, find little place in history, but after Chickamauga, it was the bloodiest day in the history of our regiment. Most of the regiment was on the skirmish line, and took part in the movement which gave us the hill, the movement re sulting in slight loss when compared with what followed after dark. At this time, the skirmish line had been re lieved, and was in the rear, but just after dark the regi ment was ordered forward to reinforce the Thirty-fifth Indiana, which for some time had been resisting very determined efforts of the enemy to break our line. In the darkness, considerable time was lost in getting into position, and when an advance was made it was only to find the enemy in quiet possession of that portion of the Une where the Thirty-fifth Indiana had been a short time previous. Lieutenant-Colonel Watson, who was leading the way in this movement, was captured before it was known to the regiment that any portion of our works had been abandoned, although the silence at this point was ominous, while the roar of battle to the right and left 76 HISTORY OF THE was continuous. The true state of affairs having been ascertained, Colonel Taylor ordered an immediate ad vance of the regiment, and after a short, but desperate struggle, in which bayonets were used, guns used as clubs, »nd men hauled over the works by the hair of the head, we retook and held the barricade against repeated as saults of the enemy. As evidence of the severity of this night engagement, we mention the fact that t-«'0 hundred wounded from our two brigades came into hospital that pight, our regiment contributing a large proportion of this number. Although there was continuous fighting during the next week, including an attack on General Hooker by Hood's corps on the 22d, as it did not involve our regiment, de tails need not be mentioned here. On the 27th an assault was made at two points on the rebel centre, one of these being immediately in our front. The assaulting columns were Davis' division of the Fourteenth corps, and New ton's division of our corps. At 8 A. M. Davis' division occupied the intrenchments thrown up by our brigade, while we were inoved to the left to Support Newton. For twenty minutes before the assaulting columns moved, all the artillery available poured a concentrated fire upon the points to be attacked, while McPherson and Schofield made strong demonstrations on the eneriiy's flank. The distance to the rebel line was about six hundred yards, arid the way was rough, and hear the enemy's Une, waS obstructed by felled trees, the branches interwoven, form ing a mesh through which it was alrnost impossible td force a passage. Frorii the start, Davis' division waS fitibjected to a galling fire of artillery arid musketry, bnt re gardless of this, it pushed forward until the enemy's W0rk6 were reached. Exhausted With their rapid ria'oVeriient, and despairing of carrying t'he wdi-ks, thfe;^ halted. TbeSi- FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. Tl position was critical. To retreat was annihilation, to re main was hazardous, but choosing this, they protected themselves as best they could until night, when they for tified their position within a few yards of the enemy's works. Newton's assault, which we were to support, failed be fore reaching the rebel works. The obstructions and entanglements held the column under such a terrific fire that it was recalled, our division not being ordered for ward. Our loss in these assaults was not less than three thousand men, and only demonstrated that the enemy's works were impregnable. A sad feature of the engage ment was the terrible fate of some of the wounded. During the fight, the leaves and grass caught fire, and many wounded, left lying between the lines, -were literal ly roasted, preseriting a horrible sight when brought into our hospital. These assaults were unfortunate, and there must have been some doubt as to their propriety among military men, and General Sherman has taken some pains to ex plain his reasons for ordering them. At 9 p. m. of the same day, he wrote General Thomas as follows : "Are you willing to risk the move on Fulton, cutting loose from our railroad?" Says General Thomas in reply: "What force do you think of moving with? If with the' greater part of the army, I think it decidedly better than butting against breastworks twelve feet thick, and strong ly abatised," which was as near a criticism as the grim old soldier probably c'ai'ed to make on the work of his superior. The result of these assaults probably precipitated the flanking movement which followed a i&m days later, a little delay being necessary to fill the wagons with sup- j^ies. 78 HISTORY OF THE June 28th and 29th, comparative quiet in our front. The sick and wounded being sent to Big Shanty station for transfer to hospitals in the rear. June 30th, the ene my made a feeble demonstration in our front, but were easily repulsed. Captain Charles Converse, Company "D," was killed, and half a dozen of our regiment wounded. July 2d, the flanking movement commenced, General McPherson moving to the right, threatening Johnson's rear, while our army remained in position in front, keep ing the enemy as fully occupied as possible. During the night the enemy vacated the line about Marietta, and on the morning of the 3d, we marched through their works at the point where Newton had made the assault on June 27th. An examination of these defenses showed how hopeless an assault would be. Marched to the right of Marietta, through the grounds of the Military Academy, and on the direct road to Atlanta. Overtook rear guard of the enemy four miles south of Marietta, and drove them forward into a strong line of earthworks. By mid night our lines were pushed close up to the enemy where we intrenched. On the 4th our division, our brigade leading, charged the enemy in our front, Smj'rna camp ground, capturing their skirmish line, and developing their main line. About one hundred of our division wounded. July .5th. Enemy again fell back from our front last night. Moved forward to the Chattahoochie at Vining's station. Supposed the enemy were all across the river, but found strong force still on the right bank in strong position at the railroad crossing. From the high hill at Vining's station, we got our first view of Atlanta, the "Spectral City," eight or ten miles distant. It seemed so near that we felt that our campaign was nearly ended, 6ut it took us nearly two months longer to get into the FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 79 city. On the 7th, locomotive with train from the North, steamed into our camps, its whistle being ansAvered by another in the rebel lines not a mile distant. July 9th, Johnson withdrew the remainder of his forces across the river, burning the bridges after him. In our immediate front, with the exception of artillery firing accasionally, CA-erything was quiet from the 6th to the 10th. On the 10th, our division moved to the left, farther up the river to Phillips' Ferry, where the 23d corps had crossed on the Sth. Idle on the llth, but On the 12th crossed the Chat tahoochie in the afternoon, and moving down the left bank went into camp at Power's Ferry about fourteen miles from Atlanta. Everything quiet on the 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th ; no firing even by pickets. On the 17th, moved suddenly in the afternoon down the riA'er in sup port of our Third division, which was covering the cross ing of the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps at Pace's Ferry, and returned to camp at night. By the 17th our entire army Avas across the Chattahoo chie. and in the following position : Army of the Cum berland, our corps being its left, on the right. Twenty-third corps to our left, and the Army of the Tennessee the ex treme left. The proposed movement was a right-wheel, the right of the Army of the Cumberland being the pivot. The enemy were on the south bank of the Chattahoochie below the mouth of Peach Tree Creek, and along a line of hills on the south side of this creek. At 8 a. m. marched on the road to' Atlanta, crossed Nancy's Creek, and halted at Buckhead, scA'en miles from Atlanta. The I9th, was passed in efforts to secure a position on the south bank of Peach Tree Creek. Our diA'ision marched in the aftemoon toward Decatur, driving the rebel cavalry before us and across the north fork of the creek, on the south side of which we went into camp five miles from 80 HISTORY OF THE Atlanta. On the morning of the 20th, General Howard with Wood's division joined us, and we moved forward to form a junction with the Twenty-third corps. This movement drew us out of the battle of Peach Tree Creek that afternoon. The battle was expected to crush the Army of the Cumberland, but only Hooker's corps, and Newton's division of our corps, were engaged. The de feat of the enemy was decided. During the day we ad vanced on the Cross Keys road toward Atlanta, skirmish ing heavily, and at 11 a. m. were brought to a halt by the enemy in our front. July 21st, skirmishing all day, our skirmish Unes being crowded as closely as possible to the enemy and intrenched. Captain Clement F. Snodgrass, in command of Company "A," killed on skirmish line. During the night the enemy abandoned his Peach Tree Creek line of works and withdrew into the defenses im mediately around the city. On the morning of the 22d we moved forAvard early and soon found the enemy in a line of works quite near the city. SEIGE OF ATLANTA. In the grand right wheel of the whole army, which ibegan on the 18th, the several armies were approaching Atlanta on widely separated, but converging roads. The Army of the Cumberland was the right, and the pivot, iwhile General McPherson, with the Army of the Tennes- FORTIETH OHIO VOL. IXF.^NTRY. 81 see, was several miles to the left, nnd having a much longer road to travel than Ave of th i right. During this moA'ement there Avere neccessarily gaps between the armies, and the enemy had chosen the time to strike Hooker's Corps on the 20th, Avhen Schofield and McPher son Ave're too far to the left to be of assistance. Not sat isfied Avith this, another assault was made on the 22nd, this time on our extreme left, Avhere McPherson, with the Army of the Tennessee, Avas getting into position. The attack was sudden, unexpected, and mado with despera tion, and for a time was successful, but Avas finally re pulsed with a loss to us of thirty-five hundred in killed, Avounded, and missing, while of the enemy, three thou sand were left dead on the field. On the e.'/ening of the 22cl, our lines on the north and east Averc close up to the city, so near that at many points Ave could look into its streets. In closing in upon Atlanta, thc Army of the Tennessee, and the cavalry still farther to the left, had destroyed the railroad to the east beyond any possibility of early repair, and our armies settled doAvn in front of the city Avatching for a chance to assault or inviting one from the enemy. Thc experience on both sides hoAvever, was such that there was no disposition to assault fortified" lines, and for many AAceks there Avas not much to change, the monotony of skirmish firing. This was continuous night and clay, to Avhich was added oc casionally cannonading, the artillery all along our lines for miles pouring tons of shot and shell upon the doomed city, intending, as General Sherman says, to make it of "little value as a large machine shop, and future depot of supplies." This continued picket firing .resulted in many casualties daily, not only on the picket line, but in thc quarters,. as men were frequently killed behind the works by bullets descending... By July 25th .the train was up to 82 HISTORY OF THE our camp, the great bridge across the Chattahoochie hav ing been rebuilt in six days. During all this period of apparent Avaiting for an op portunity to brea'c th? eii-i-ny-'s line, moA'em3-i';s wore quietly going on having in view the breaking of the Macon raUroad, the only channel of supplies now left to the enemy. Infantry was quieti)' AvithdraAA'n from our left and sent to the right, so that by August 1st our corps, which. had been in the right Aving of the army, was the extreme left. This movement to the left commenced on the 27th, at the same time strong bodies of caA'alry moA-ed from either flank, all thc movements, both of infantry and cavalry, having in A'iew the breaking of the railroad south of Atlanta. On the 28th, while the Sixteenth Corps Avas getting into position near Ezra Church, on. our extreme right, the enemy attacked it suddenly, and Avith great force. Although the Irunt of the battle Avas borne by ?¦wo diA'isions of Logan's corps, the repulse Avas decided, the enemy leaving seven hundred dead upon the field. But to return to our own movements. Our position from 23d to 27th was much exposed, the only safety being close up under the works. On the 27th our brigade moved one mile to the rear, occupying an old rebel line of A\-orks. Army of the Tennessee moved in our front froni left to right. Heavy cannonading in our front. 28th, went to the front and found a 64-pound rebel shell in my quarters of the day previous. In afternoon, heaA'y firing several miles to our right ; battle of Ezra Church. To August 1st, quiet in our brigade. At dark, August 1st, moved to the left to take the place of the Twenty-third corps which goes to the right. Our Brigade Headquarters at the "Soap Factory" where we were intrenched, two hundred yards in rear of main line, from which we had a fine view of the city. August 3d, demonstration ordered FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 83 in our front. Our brigade advanced against the rebel skirmish line, carrying it at some points, but being force 1 to retire. Loss inconsiderable. On the 5th the demon stration was repeated, probably to attract attention from our right. On the night of August 9th, the artillery all along our . lines opened on the city, and Avas replied to vigorously by the enemy's batteries, keeping up a most infernal music for several hours. The same entertain ment on the night of the 14th, continuing without a mo ment's cessation all night. In the afternoon our division made another demonstration against the enemy in our front. Found the enemy ready for us. Tavo of the Ninety-sixth Illinois killed, and several wounded in our brigade. JONESBORO, LOVEJOY AND ATLANTA. August 25th, the seige of Atlanta was abandoned. The stretching of our army many miles to the right, reaching for the railroad, failed in its object, as we ahvays found the enemy behind works too strong to be assaulted, and the cavalry raids about Atlanta had also failed in serious ly interfering with the enemy's coirimunications. The sick and wounded, and surplus wagons, having been sent back to an intrenched position north of the Chattahoo chie, to be guarded by the Twentieth Corps, the remainder of the ariny commenced the movement around the city. Our corps, Gen. David S. Stanly now in command, General 84 HISTORY OF THE Howard having been assigned to the head of an army, a vacancy made by the death of McPherson, moved out of the trenches at dark,, losing quite a number of stragglers during the night. Halted at 2 A. M. of the 26th. March ed at 8 A. M., the enemy shelling us as Ave moved out. Went to the right and encamped eight miles southAvest from Atlanta. 27th, marched at 8 a. m., skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry and forming line of battle near Mount Gilead Church. 28th, rested until 4 p m., when we moved to West Point railroad and encamped for the night. 29th, engaged in tearing up the raUroad towards Atlanta. Our brigade thoroughly destroyed two miles of the track, burning the ties and heating and twisting the iron. Rested in afternoon. Encamped at Red Oak. On the 30th, moved eastward toward Macon railroad, our ad vance division skirmishing with the enemy. Slst, moved toward Rough and Ready on Macon road, Avhere, in con nection with the Twenty-third Corps, we thrcAv up barri cades facing Jonesboro. Continued skirmishing through the day. Encamped half a mile from the railroad. Dur ing the day, a division of the Fourteenth Corps had reached the railroad, and from stragglers captured, learn ed that two corps of Hood's army had passed +0 Jones boro. The Army of the Tennessee, on our extreme right, and going by way of Lickskillet and CampbeUton, was now in front of Jonesboro. The orders for September 1st, required a concentration of all the forces at Jonesboro. Our corps moved early* to the railroad, and began: the work of destruction toward' Jonesboro. In the afternoon the battle of Jonesboro Avas fought, resulting in a signal victo?*y for our army. When the' battle opened, our division was rushed forward, but we were so delayed by the thickandeigrowth, and .the sturdy resistance of the i enemy's skirmishers, that,^ FORTIEl'H OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 85 although deployed, the fury of the battle had passed be fore aVc reached the field. Night closed the contest, tie enemy faUing back to Lovejoy Station, our forces bivouac- ing on the battlefield. Early in the morning of the 2d, our corps pushed on in pursuit, reaching the starion at noon. We Avere promptly formed in line of battle, our division on the left, and at 3 p. m. the order to advance was given. A nearer approach to the enemy shoAvC'l his position across the railroad to be too strong to assault, and particularly as this point of approach Avas completely swept by Hood's artillery. Supposing that the Army of the Tennessee would hold the enemy by an attack on his left, a movement that was to ha\-e been co-operative Avith our advance. General Stanly made an effort to turn the right flank of the enemj'. Our division; Avith Wood's, Avas sent to the left, but the ground was so broken, the streams and marshes were so numerous, that Ave did not get into position until 6 p. m., when the order was giA'en to charge. Wood's division dashed forward and seized the enemy's works, but could not retain its hold, Avhile our division was exposed to such a sweeping fire of artillery, and the ground before it bemg open, the order to charge was coun termanded. Both divisions intrenched. On the 3d, 4th, and 5th, our regiment occupied a more exposed position than at any time in the campaign. In our immediate front there was a den^e undergrowth which hid the enemy from view, but Avhich did not prevent their buUets pass ing over'and through our camp. The picket firing was incessant, and any exposure above the breastAvork was hazardous. John Gray, of Company "C," was killed at this point byabuUett from the enemy's Une, while stand ing on a slight elevation just in rear of our works. To go back a little. During the night of September 1st, loud: sounds were heard in direction i of Atlanta. On 86 HTSTORV OF THE the morning of the 2d a reconnoisance from the Chatta hoochie Avas met by the Mayor, avJio formally surrendered the city. General Hood, in evacuating on the night of the 1st, destroyed immense quantities of supplies and ammunition, and it Avas the explosion of the latter that Ave had heard at Jonesboro, and Avas the first intimation of the abandonment of the place. On the 3d the cam paign Avas declared at an end, and orders issued for the return of the armies to Atlanta for rest. On the 3d, 4th and 5th, our sick and Avounded, and trains Avere being sent to the rear. On the night of the 5th, Ave quietly withdrcAv from our intrenchments and fell back to Jones boro, where the Fourteenth Corps had remained after the battle of the 1st. The night march was a hard one, as the recent rains rendered the roads almost impassable, Our brigade halted at 2 A. m. of the 6th, Avhere Ave remain ed all that day. Moved e.nrly on the morning of the 7th. and encamped for the night within eight nriles of Atlanta. No skirmish firing, and no looking out for the enemy. On the Sth, marched early, passing through Atlanta and out on tne Augusta railroad, our brigade going into camp two miles from the city, near the battle-ground of July 22d. For nearly a month following the occupation of At lanta our forces had uninterrupted rest. The change from the constant picket firing, the constant watchful ness, the continuous strain on the mental and physical man of the preceeding four months, was wonderful. So far as we were concerned, the war seemed to have ended with our campaign, and our camps soon took on all the appearance of permanent quarters. The frame buildings in and around Atlanta afforded material for huts, and it was not long nntil "Headquarters," and many company quarters, were substantially fitted up as if for the winter. FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. »7 The usual policing of the grounds daily Avas enforced, and our camps AA'ere models of cleanliness. This thor ough "housekeeping" Avas a matter of surprise to the enemy. The day following our evacuation ofthe trenches in front of the city, the Atlanta papers amid all their rejoicing at what they supposed Avas a falling back of our army, found space to compliment General Whittaker on the cleanliness of the ground occupied by his brigade, a position they recognized by papers, reports, &c., left in camp. But while the army Avas thus resting, General Sherman vvas not idle. To him, it must have been a period of greater anxiety than any during the campaign. The cap ture of Atlanta, from the opening of the campaign in Maj'-, had been looked upon as a fixed fact by officers and men, and it is not at all probable that Sherman was any less certain of this than Avere his men. But Atlanta Avas "ours, and fairly Avon." What next? Hood's army Avas still in our front, and AA'ith it there, further progress Avas difficult. His army could be pushed back, as it had been from Dalton to Lovejoy, but the long line over Avhich supplies were brought for a great army could not be .far ther stretched Avith safety. The "March to the Sea," de monstrated that the country was able to supply the army while moA'ing rapidly, but a campaign that required time to clear an enemy out of intrenchments, and to re build bridges, Avould have required supplies from North ern depots. That no backward movement Avas contemp lated by our great Captain, or by General Grant, is shoAvn by the act of sending away the citizens, the accumulation of stores, and the construction of a shorter line of M'orks around Atlanta by which a comparatively small garrison could hold the city against a large army. Whatever doubt there may have been as to our next moA'ement was removed by the enemy September 20th, 88 HISTORY OF THE PURSUIT OF HOOD. Up to September 20th, Hood's army had remained at Lovejoy wha e we left it. On that day he moved to Pal metto. This, in connection Avith Forrest's appearance in Tennessee Avith eight thousand cavalry, indicated Hood's intention of getting on to the railroad in our rear, thus eompelling the Avithdrawal of our ai-my from Atlanta, or failing in this, to invade Tennessee. This latter plan was not impracticable. With the Tr.ans-Mississippi forces of Smith and Magruder, and the large number of desert ers Avhich he hoped a northern movement would recall to his ranks, joined to his army, he might fairly expect to enter Tennessee Avith as large an arrry as faced us at Dalton in May. With such an armyin his rear, Sherman must abandon Atlanta and the territory gained in a four months struggle. So reasoned Hood and his advisors. To meet the possible danger in the rear. General Thomas was sent north to provide for defense. On the 29.th of September Hood began crossing the Chattahoochie, and by October 1st the rebel army Avas all on the north bank. October 2d, Stewart's corps struck the railroad north of Marietta, Avhile the remainder of the rebel infantry mov ed towards DaUas. By the 4th. haAdng captured the garrisons at Big Shanty and Ackworth, the enemy was advancing on Allatoona, where Ave had an immense quan tity of supplies. On the 5th, this position Avas assaulted by French's rebel division, which, after a desperate strug gle, Avas repulsed. From the 5th to the 10th the inten tions and movements Of the enemy were not well under stood, but on the llth the Avhole • rebel army. moved rapidly toward Resaca, and on the same day demanded FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 89 its surrender. General Baum refusing to capitulate. Hood made no attack, but sent detachments to break up the railroad toAvard Dalton, the garrison of Avhich place sur rendered to him on. the 13th. Thus, in ten days. Hood had effectually broken the railroad from Big Shanty to Dalton, having captured all the garrisons excepting those at Allatoona and Resaca. Leaving General Hood at Resaca, aa'c will go back to note our OAvn movements. At midnight of October 2d, orders were received for marching ; the Twentieth Corps to remain iu Atlanta and at Chattahoochie bridge, Avhile the remainder of the army should go in pursuit of Hood. Our division marched at daylight on the 3d, crossing the river by the bridge near the railroad and going into camp five miles from Marietta, near Smyrna camp ground Avhere our brigade fought July 4th. October 4th, marched at 8 a. m. passed through Mar ietta and encamped in the old rebel line of works near where oiir brigade charged them June 20th. October 5th, marched slowly. Battle at Allatoona in progress. Gen eral Sherman, Avho was with our corps, Avhile signaling from 'Kenesaw assurance of support to General Corse at Allatoona, witnessed the repeated repulse of the enemy at that, point. Encamped for the night at Pine Mountain. The enemy having withdrawn from the railroad, our arm iesTested on the 6th. Prom our position on Pine Moun tain we had a fine view Of the relative position of the armies. Our corps in the centre. Army of the Tennessee on the Powder Spring road to our left, Army of the Ohio on Burnt Hickory road to our right, the wings far in ad vance, the line of camp fires Stretching out a great cres cent, while far in advance of the horns Of the crescent. could be 'Seen Hood's camp j&res near Dallas. On the 7th, while at Pine ^Moutitain, Companies '5A," 'B;""G*'^and "D" were mustered out, with several offijfsers, 90 HISTORY OF THE among them being Colonel Taylor and Assistant-Surgeon Matchett. At 4 p. m. on the Sth, moved to the railroad one mile south of Ackworth. Night very cold. 9th, moved to west of railroad and went into camp. Went to work "fixing up" as if to stay. October 10th, marched at 3 p. M., crossed Alatoona Mountain and Etowah River, and at 10 p. M. bivouaced at CartersA'ille. In passing through Alatoona Gap, saAv evidences of the scA'cre fight there on the 5th. The freshly made graves and great num'oers of rebel wounded, attested the severe loss of the enemy. It being understood on the llth. that General Hood was marching on Rome, our armies were put in motion -with orders to be concentrated in and about that place by the evening of the 12th. Marched early on the llth, and encamped for the night one mile from Kingston on the Rome road. 12th, marched early. A tedious march, the Fourteenth corps Avi Ih its train being on the same road and the road rough and hilly. Got into camp three miles from Rome at 10 p. m. General Hood did not attack Rome, but had moved rapidly on Resaca, a fact that Avas un known to us on llth and 12th. In the p. m. of 13th, we were marched rapidly towards Resaca via Calhoun. Biv ouaced in Ridges Valley. 14th, marched at daylight, passing through Calhoun and Resaca, and encamped for the night on the ground where the Fifth Indiana Battery eo effectually repulsed the enemy on the evening of May 14th.. At. this juncture it seemed practicable to bring Hood to bay. He was at Dalton, his line of retreat being through Snake Creek Gap, the route of our flanking column in May. . Sherman, at Resaca, disposed his forces to inter rupt his retreat and force him to fight. The Army of the Tennessee moved early on the 15th, to the southern en trance, of the gap, meeting the enemy and checking his FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 91 advance; the cavalry were sent to Buzzards Roost to threaten the enemy there, while our corps marched in p. M. over the Chattogata Mountain, expecting to strike the enemy in flank. Reached the gap at dark, only to find the Army of the Tennessee in pursuit of the enemy, he having taken the alarm and retreated by the northern entrance before it could be closed by cur cavalry. At 10 A. m. 16th, marched out northern entrance of Snake Creek Gap, through Villainow, and went into camp at 4 p. m. on the Lafayette road. 17th, army resting. All broken down teams, surplus baggage &c. sent to Chattanooga. On the 18th, army again in motion, and by 20th Avas grouped in and about Gaylesville, Ala. Up to this date it seemed probable that Hood intended a crossing of the Tennessee at Bridgeport, or at some point east of Muscle Shoals, an cA'ent doubtless earnestly desired by General Sherman, he telegraphing General Thomas to give Hood a "free pass" over such a route. If such a crossing had been made Sherman Avould undoubtedly have continued the pursuit, but by the 20th, Hood's position far to the westward indicated no disposition to cross the Tennessee at, any point east of Decatur, and all pursuit Avas aban doned. At Gaylesville, scA'cral days were spent in actiA'e preparation for the great "March to the Sea" by Sherman with sixty thousand men, Avhile our corp s, Avith all dis mounted cavalry, was to be sent to General Thomas. The writer having been absent for the next twenty days, has no personal knowledge of the moA'cments of our reg iment and Avill only say that our corps left Gaylesville on the 27th, and reached Pulaski, Tenn., on November 1st and 2d, where he rejoined the regiment November 14th. The entry in my diary for that day is : "Found the brig ade about one mile from town. Isaminger has just got our quarters fixed comfortable. Tent, fire-place and 92 HISTORY OF THE bunks," which, as the afternoon was cold and snow fall ing, was not an uncomfortable prospect. DRIVEN BY HOOD. November 1881 presented the remarkable spectacle of two .great armies that for six months, like tvvo pugilists, had been clutching at each others throat, and dealing ponderous blows, turning their backs on each other, one marching south and the other north, each intent on an invasion of the enemy's territory. The one, a hundred thousand strong, had forced the other of half that num ber back a hundred miles, but so adroitly had the lesser army been handled that after four months of continuous fighting it was intact, and able to force the larger army into a retrograde movement of more than a hundred miles. Sherman, with sixty thousand men, was on his great march through the South. With Hood on the Ten nessee, and the vise-like grasp of Grant on Lee's army in Virginia, there were no forces in the Confederacy that could oppose the veteran and victorious legions of Sher man. There is nothing of more thrilling interest in all the hisjiory of the war than the story of Hood's invasion of Tennessee. The interest North and South was more cen tred around him during November than Sherman. Under the circumstances there could have been but little appre hension felt, north, as to Sherman's success, and setting FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 93 aside the question of supplies, there Avas none ; while the movement of Hood to the north indicated that thc South did not hope to oppose Sherman, but fully expected the success of Hood in Tennessee to more than offset any damage done by Sherman in his bisection of the Confed eracy. In the North the anxiety at this time was intense. The great disparity in the strength of Hood's army and that opposing him Avas sufficient ground for alarm, while the great disaster to our cause whieh a defeat of General Thomas would be was appreciated. Even after the battle of Franklin, in which Hood lost one-fifth of his army, the anxiety in the North Avas scarcely lessened, and his pres ence in front of Nashville was a menace that was looked upon with solicitude. The campaign Avas disastrous to Hood's army to a degree not paralleled by any other of the war, hence it has been criticised as illy planned and badly managed, but it Avas so nearly a success that we should credit him with judgement in its planning as well as au dacity in its execution. At the opening of the campaign Hood had forty thou sand infantry, twelve to fifteen thousand cavalry, and the usual force of artillery for an army of that proportion, a larger force than that with which Johnson confronted Sher man in May. Not only was his army numerically strong, but no army of the Confederacy was ever so completely stripped of all incumbrances, was ever more confident. In this army were no less than forty-one Tennessee regi ments, made up of men who had.been driven from their homes months and years before, and who now, as they looked with wistful eyes toAvard Columbia, and Franklin, and NashviUe, and the great North beyond, felt an assur ance of success that prepared them for any sacrifice. To oppoae this formidable army, Thomas had a move able aarmy of not over tw,enty-one thousand infamtry, viz : 94 HISTORY OF THE Twenty-third corps and two divisions of our corps, and four thousand cavalry. In all his department he had less than fifty thousand men, all of whom, aside from our little army at Pulaski, were in garrisons at points neces sary to hold. Unable to meet Hood in the field until he could be reinforced, his efforts Avere directed to delaying his march north until he could organize an army from returning soldiers, and troops promised him from Mis souri. The duty of retarding Hood's progress fell upon General Schofield at Pula.ski, and so far as is necessary to illustrate the movements of our oavu regiment, vre will notice the progress of events from November 19th. At this date it was evident that Hood Avas aiming for Colum bia instead of Pulaski, but so slow Avere his movements that it Avas not until the 21st"that Schofield commenced the removal of public propert}' to the rear. On the 22d, the Twenty-third corps fell back towards Columbia, guarding the trains. On the 23d, our division marched at dark, halted at midnight for a rest, and again marched, reaching Lynville just at daylight. Continued the march on the 24th, and reached Columbia just at dark, a dis tance of twenty one miles. This rapid march was in support of Cox's division of the Twenty-third corps, which preceded us, and reached Columbia just in time to save the town from capture. As soon as we arrived we were formed in line of battle and intrenched. At tbis point strong works were throAvn up, while the cavalry on either flank was so placed as to oppose the crossing Of Duck River by the enemy, and to give notice of his move ments. 25th, at work on breastworks. The enemy in ¦ our front evidently dismounted cavalry. Skirmishirig in front all day. 26th, Hood's infantry in our front, press ing our lines. Enemy charged and took a portion of our Une at 5 A. m., but were driven out at 7 a. m. General FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 95 Cox, with tAVO brigades, crossed and intrenched on the north side of Duck River last night, and on the night of the 26th, an effort was made to cross the entire force, but a severe storm and the darkness of the night prevented the movement. Night of the 27th, crossed to the north bank of the river. The 2''th it Avas c^ear that the enemy would cross Duck River above and beloAV Columbia, and at 8 A. M. on the 29th, our tAvo divisions marched toAvard Franklin, but when foilr miles out, our division, Kim ball's was halted and formed in line of battle facing east, General Stanle}', with Wagner's division, going on to Spring Hill, Avhere he arrived barely in time to prevent the capture of our trains by thc rebel cavalry. Later in the day heavy bodies of infantry appeared and attacked our single division Avith no support nearer than twelA'e miles. The enemy's attack Avas made Avith spirit, but coming under the fire of several batteries of artillery that, en route to the rear, had been fortunately halted there, he fell back, supposing the heavy artillery fire indicat ed a large infantry force. As night came on a corps of rebel infantry was in line of battle facing the Franklin , pike, while tAvo others were near. Meantime, Cox's divis ion of the Twenty-third corps was still at Columbia, opposing what seemed a determined effort of the enemy to cross at that point. Hood, unable to cross his artil lery at other points, massed it at Columbia v/here it Avas so used as to lead Schofield to think that the larger part of the rebel army was still at that point, a mistake that was near being fatal. At 3 p. m., Avhen Schofield left Duck . River, ten-twelfths of the rebel army were in his rear, and on Stanley's flank at Spring Hill. Reaching Spring Hill at 7 p. m., he left there at 10 p. m. with the Twenty-third corps and pushed on to Franklin, leaving Stanley with the Fourth corps to guard and bring forward 96 HISTORY OF THE the trains. At 7 p. m. General Cox left his position in front of Columbia, and we our position on Rutherford's Creek at midnight, our division getting into Spring Hill at 2 A. M. of the SOth. This night march was rapid but silent, as for a long distance we were within a half mile of the camp-fires of the rebel army. So far, all was Avell, but the peril Avas still imminent. A train of eight hun dred wagons was still in and about Spring Hill, and it was not until 5 a. m. that the'last wagon was started. Our position was to the right and rear of the train, and soon after daylight the advance of the enemy commenced skirmishing with us. At noon we halted on a ridge of hills south of Franklin, and Avent into position as if we intended to defend that point. Not a mile in our rear was the rebel army, which, on observing our halt, deploy ed to the right and left of the pike, spreading out like two great wings, and with a long line of battle marched steadily toward us across the beautiful valley. It not being our purpose to fight there, and the enemy having been delayed long enough to allow our trains to get well • out of the way, we withdrew rapidly and at 3 p. m. ato were within our defenses at Franklin. General Schofield with the Twenty-third corps had reached Franklin at daylight, and had thrown a line of works a mile and a half long around the town on the south side. The works were crescent shaped, a grea* bow, drawn from the river above to the river below ' the town. Our division occupied the right of our line, and it was the extreme right tip of this crescent where our regiment was posted, and as the assault was made direct ly On the centre of the crescent, we Were but slight, par ticipants in the great battle. FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 97 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN. It was not General Schofield's wish to fight at Frank lin. He was straining every nerve to get his trains across the Harpeth, and was less apprehensive of an attack there than he was of the enemy crossing above or below and getting on his flank or rear. In fact, up to 4 p. m. it was not believed that the enemy would attack. More than half our force Avas on the north side of Harpeth, so dis posed as best to protect the trains then moving toAvard Nashville, and to counteract any efforts at flanking move ments by the enemy. Not more than ten thousand men were in our line. Of these, two brigades were posted at some distance in advance with orders to fall back in case of an attack, and one brigade, Opdycke's, of our corps, having been the rear guard during the day, was in re serve. From our position, comparatively unexposed, we had a fine view of the first .steps of the assault, and it was worth a year of one's lifetime to witness the marshaling .and adyanQe of the rebel line of battle. Emerging from the woods in the most perfect order, twQ corps in front an^ iQue in reserve, ppthing could be more suggestive of strength, .and discipline, ftnd resistless power than was this long line of gray ai4vancing over the plain. Massing on ;tbe Cplvmbia pike, tbe great waye came rolling on, pushing .a.way .the %WQ brigades and following them close ly, poured through our line of Avorks, and almost withput Ajstruggje, Hood had thus gained a Ipdgpafnt in the yery (jftntre of .our line- The enemy made haste to stfengthep the hstid Qif jfeh? iCOlupm thus tjhruit t^hrpugh pur c^nt^e, 98 HISTORY OP THE and using batteries captured, commenced enfilading our line. The teams from the captured batteries went thun dering to the rear, which, with a stream of frightened camp-folloAvers, and men from the two brigades that came rushing back from the front, created the impression that the disaster was fatal. The forces of Hood Avere all con centrating at this point, and the advantage so early and so easily gained, promised to General Hood the destruc tion of the only army that lay between him and the Ohio River. The moment was critical ; General Stanley, in his report, says that it AA'as the most so of any he had ever known in battle. At 4 p. M., when the battle began. General Stanley was with Schofield in Fort Granger, on the north side of Harpeth River, but at the first sound of battle he rode rapidly to the scene, arriving there just as the rebel wedge was being driven through our line of Avorks. Approach ing Opdycke's brigade, then one or two hundred yards in rear of our works, he Avas about to order it forward, but found it already with fixed bayonets ready for the ad vance. The impetuous charge of this brigade, led in person by Stanley and Opdycke, soon turned the tide of battle, and in twenty minutes the enemy was driven from the intrenchments and the army saved. For the next two hours assault after assault was made upon our line in a desperate effort to make another break and regain the advantage obtained at first, but each attempt was re pulsed with great loss. The firing was kept up with more or less severity until 11 p. m., and at midnight we fell back through the town, across the Harpeth, and marched for Nashville. This night march was about the most wearisome of any in our experience. The road was crowded with wagons, artillery and infantry, all struggl ing forward, the men nearly ready to drop down for 'want FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 99 of sleep, having had none since the 28th. At daylight of December 1st, we were at Brentwood Hills, nine miles from NashviUe, where we halted for breakfast. In after noon, reached the defenses of Nashville, where we drop ped down to sleep regardless of all the surroundings. It has always been a matter of surprise that Ave escap ed so easily from Duck River and Spring Hill on the 29th. Save an attack by Forrest's cavalry, which was easily repulsed, and later, one by cavalry and infantry, which gave General Stanley and his one division some hard fighting, there was no attempt all that day and night when our little armj', incumbered by its trains, Avas stretched from Duck River to Spring Hill, to strike us a serious blow. Had an attack been made on Stanley at Spring Hill, or on Schofield as he moved from Columbia to Spring Hill in the afternoon of the 29th, or on our di vision at any time prior to our arrival at Spring Hill at 2 A. M. of the 30th, with anything like the ferocity that characterized the assault at Franklin, the result Avould almost certainly have been the capture or destruction of Schofield's army. General Hood, in his "Advance and Retreat," lays the blame for the failure on General Cheat ham, who, he avers, had repeated orders to attack on the 29th. A paper read by an officer in Forrest's cavalry, at a meeting of the Southern Historical Society, intimates that it was Hood's own indecision and want of confi dence, and lack of capacity to comprehend the condition of affairs at the critical moment, that led to the failure to attack with vigor. The surprise at this lack of general ship was not all on our side ; the rank and file of Hood's army seemed to know that a golden opportunity to strike a fatal blow had passed when our rear guard left Spring Hill at daylight on the SOth. In a recent visit to Ring gold, Georgia, the writer met Dr. J. S. Glenn, Surgeon of 100 HISTORY OF THE the First Georgia Infantry (Confederate), and who was with Cleburne's division Avhen it made the attack on Stanley at Spring Hill on the afternoon of the 29th. He attributed mueh of the failure to press the attack imme diately to the unexpected heavy fire from thirty pieces of artillery, Avhich, on their way to Franklin, had fortunate ly been placed in battery on .an eminence near the villagey and Avhich indicated the presence of a large infantry force. This, however, did not account for the lack of prompt action a Uttle later, and the failure was discussed freely by all grades of the rebel army, it being generaUy under stood that Cheatham had failed in executing orders with his usual promptness. The loss of life at Franklin Avas probably greater than in any battle of the Avar, considering the number engaged and the small spot of ground fought over. Our loss in killed and wounded was twenty-three hundred, one half of which was in the two brigades that were exposed in front. The enemy's losses were nearly seven thousand, a large proportion of this number being at the point where our lines were broken, and where repeated attacks were made to again effect a breach. As evidence of the great loss of life at this point, it is said that Colonel Stafford, of the rebel army, was found in the. ditch erect, the dead having fallen around him so thickly that when he re ceived the fatal bullet he did not fall, but Avas found next morning "stiffened in death and partly upright, seeming still to command the ghastly line of his comrades lying beneath the parapet." On December 1st, Hood followed us, and by next morn ing was in our front. Our position in the line was just to the right of the Granny White pike, and from it we had a fine view of the rebel line, one and a half miles distant, their cftmp-fires presenting &m8gnifieent spectdcle FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 101 at night. Our men immediately commenced intrenching, and this, with the heavy details for picket, made the few remaining days of our service more than ordinarily hard. On the 6th, 7th and Sth, mustering out of officers was in progress, and on the 10th the A'eterans and recruits, and all OAving further serA'ice, were transferred to the Fifty-first Regiment Ohio Veteran Volunteers. Such are the outlines of our regimental history, drawn as faithfully as the meagre records from which to gather facts, and personal recollections, weakened by a lapse of twenty years, would allow. It is a story of three years of sacrifice, of devotion to duty — a record of noble deeds of which we may be justly proud. TAventy years make great changes. The youth of our regiment who survive, are now gray-haired, while the middle-aged of twenty years ago are looking back over a life nearly spent. These changes in individuals are not more marked than in the political Avorld, the life of the nation. States then separated are again united ; political differences, questions in dispute between the North and South, difficulties in the Avay of reconcilliation that seemed insurmountable, have melted away as have the trenches and earthworks that sheltered the opposing armies, until now, the Great Rebellion seems like a thing of the far past. Busied with the duties of everyday life, that great episode in our lives is thought of less and less every day, but there are times Avhen it comes back in all its freshness ; Avhen the march, the lonely picket, the skir mish line, the line of battle, the assault in the face of blazing batteries, seem but events of yesterday, and Avith thoughts of these comes a fiood of recollections of dead comrades left far up Sandy, or who gave up their lives in the prisons of the South, or, gathered from the battle-fields ol Tennessee and Georgia, sleep in the beautiful cemeteries at Murfeesboro, Nashville, Chattanooga and Marietta. May the grass grow green over the graves of these our dead heroes. JLIPiFEliTIDIX:. HONOR TO WHOM HONOR IS DOE. It is quite surprising that there should have been dis pute as to the comparative value of the services of the different commands participating in the battle of Lookout Mountain. Where each one bore its part so well, one would suppose that the proper credit would have been cheerfully conceded to all. But such was not the case. While yet. the smoke of battle hung over the mountain side, wrangling as to whom belonged the credit of the brilliant victory began. The forces under Hooker on that day were strangers to each other, and from widely separated districts. Geary's division of the Twelfth corps Avas just from thc Army of the Potomac, Osterhaus' division had just arrived with Sherman from the Missis sippi, while Whittaker's and Gross' brigades of our divis ion, were from the Army of the Cumberland, and it was natural that each should look with some jealousy upon any claims that disparaged its own prowess. The moA'cment that gave us the mountain with so little loss, comparatively, was the rapid advance of our right wing, Geary's diA'ision and our brigade, Gross being with Osterhaus on the left near the foot of the mountain. This movement, which flanked the main rebel force on the mountain side, and left it to fall into Osterhaus' hands an easy prey, was led by Geary's division up to a certain point, where it halted in obedience to orders, that the whole (ine might be readjusted. If this order had been fully 104 HISTORY OP THE obeyed, it would have cost us scores of lives, as it would have allowed the retreat up the mountain of the rebel force in front of Osterhaus, and this, manning the works near the Craven House, would have required a struggle to dislodge it. But fortunately, our brigade, not under standing the order, or Avith the bappy inspiration that prompted our troops the next evening at Mission Ridge to make the memorable assault without orders, ran through Geary's division, charging the several lines of works be fore reaching the Craven House, and the right of our reg iment reaching a point in the rear of the rebel line. This rapid advance of our regiment, clutching thc rebel left at a point so near the Summertown road that Lieutenant- Colonel Jones, who led the right wing of our regiment, insists that if supported by one thousand men, the move ment would have put us in possession of the road, thus virtually giving us control of the mountain, was the no table feature of the battle. With this known to every body, yet the sun had not gone down before the claim was made that the credit of this bold .dash belonged to Geary's division, and a somewhat acrimonious dispute was had between General Whittaker and officers of the eastern division over the matter. In proof of the just ness of our claim General Whittaker pointed to the dead of our regiment, lying near the captured guns, and aU along the line of advance from the point where Geary's division halted. The dispute was closed by General Whittaker ordering Colonel Taylor of our regiment to take charge of the guns, and a squad was accordingly ide- itailed who hauled them down the mountain by moonligjhct and turned them over to the Ordnance officer. The foj- iowioag «opy of the receipt now in ipoeaession pf Hw. iReese N.iOren, shows to whom ibelonged .the credit pf csip- 4urijag the guns : fortieth ohio vol. infantry. 105 Camp at Lookout Creek, | November 25th, 1863. j Received of J. N. Oren, Sergeant of Company "B" Fortieth 0. V. I., tAvo pieces of Artillery, captured by the Fortieth regiment 0. V. I at the battle of Lookout Moun tain. B. F. Croxton, First Lieutenant and Ordinance Officer, First Division Fourth A. C . Another fact, though of small interest, in connection with the capture of Lookout Mountain has been pervert ed. A hundred thousand men saw our flag flying from the point of Lookout in the early dawn of November 25th, where for Aveeks the flag of ths en3my had baen a target for our guns on Moccasin Point, and the question was, "Who placed it there?" The credit has been awarded to many, but it properly belon|,s to a member of the Eighth Kentncky regiment of our brigade. This fact was so Avell known then that it is surprising that the credit should ever ha\'e been claimed for any one else. LETTER FROM DILLON P. CURRENT — CAPTURE OF COM- The capture of Company "H," and the long imprison ment of its officers and men, was an event of peculiar sadness. On the night of September 21 the company, with some other details, in all about one hundred men, were on picket, our forces then occupying Mission Ridge. During the night our army was withdrawn within the de fenses of Chattanooga. By some mistake Company "H" was not relieved, or called in, or if orders were given for its recall, they never reached Captain Meagher, in command 106' HISTORY OF THE of the picket. When the rebels advanced on the morn ing of the 22d, they soon had our picket surrounded and captured, although not until after a desperate resistance. The Avriter has no official report of the strength of the company, on that moming, but he has b^en able to get the names of thirty-eight of the company who were captured, which was doubtless nearly its full strength. Of these, nineteen, just one half, died in rebel prisons. Dillon P. Current, to whom the author is under many obliga tions for facts relating to the history of Company "H," was among tbe captured, and in a recent letter, he so clearly pictures the horrors of prison life in the South in 1863-4 that an extract is given here. He writes : "I am sorry that our company history has not been fiir nished you more completely. A company that was al ways ready for duty, however haz-ardous, need not be ashamed of its history, and it Avill always be a matter of regret that there are no records now that will give the fate of every man, that it might go into the history of our regiment * -* * The first blood spilled in our regiment was from our company. J. A. McConkey, who was mor tally wounded on a scout from Piketon, Avas the first man of our regiment to lay down his life on the altar of his country * « * I give you all the facts I can recall con cerning our capture, but no one but the Recording Angel can tell the sufferings of those taken prisoners on that memorable 22d of September, 1863. The long weary months of confinement in crowded, filthy pens, dying by inches, eaten up by vermin, .ind starving to death ; of all this, you can have no conception. Men who would, starve to death, with almost daily offers of plenty to eat on condition that they would desert their flag, men who chose death in its most horrid form, before dishonor, de serve to have their names written on tablets of silver in FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 107 letters of gold, and it is a proud recollection that not one of our company even contemplated such a step, although two-thirds of our whole number died, the most horrible of deaths, died from starvation. Years have passed since then, but the horrors of my three hundred and fifty-five days of prison life are fresh in my memory," A VISIT TO THE BATTLE FIELDS ABOUT CHATTANOOGA, A visit to a battle-field giA'es one a better idea of the battle than can be obtained from written history, even when aided by the most accurate maps. The battles of Lookout Mountain and Mission Ridge AA'ere so simple in plan, and their execulion so slight a departure from the plan, that they are to some extent easily understood, but even they are better understood after one has walked over the face of the mountain, or driven out to Fort Wood, to Orchard Knob, along the base of Mission Ridge, and climbed the steep hill up which our lines charged on thc evening of November 25, 1863. But I think it impossible fqr any one to get a clear idea of the battle of Chicka mauga without a v?sit to the field, and a talk with per sons who live there and thoroughly understand the topography of the neighborhood. With certain localities fixed in the mind from previous personal acquaintance, or from reading well written histories, an interview Avith these old citizens will make all the complicated move?, ments of the great battle plain. The "writer spent some time at Chattanooga in 1881, and again in 18S3, and during both visits look oc- 108 HISTORY OF THE casion to go over all the battle-fields, interviewing every ope who, from actual observation, had any knoAvledge of the inovements of the armies in that vicinity in the fall of 1863, and as comrades who look over these pages may sometime go over the same ground, a few words as to the shortest road to all the points of interest may not be out of place. Of course you will go to the top of Lookout. Tha view from here is worth a visit to Chattanooga aside from any associations with the Avar. The Smoky Mountains of North Carolina in the dim distance to the east. Mis sion Ridge to the east, Waldron's Ridge to the left, with the Tennessee River coming in from the east and striking the base of Lookout with such force as to turn it back upon itself, thus forming Moccasin Point — aU these are seen at a glance and make up a picture that one is not apt to forget. But unless you have a guide, thoroughly familiar with local history, you will miss much of inter est and value, as every feature of the grand view has as sociations that add much to the interest with Avhich they are looked at. Three hundred feet from the top of Lookout is the Craven House, an object perhaps as well remembered by our army encamped in Chattanooga Valley in November, 1863 as any other. It is possible to reach this by creep ing down the rocks from the summit, but you will fie more, likely to go direct from Chattanooga. It is a long walk from the city, and if you have a party, you wiU be likely to take a carriage, which after an hour or two of struggling among the boulders on the mountain side, will land you at Mr. Craven's. The house, from the foot of the mountain, looks much like that which stood there in 186J, long and low, with a porch fronting the city. The present house, however, replaces the old one which was FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 109 burned down, and is a half story higher than the old one, otherwise similar. Mr. and Mrs. Craven are aged people, but intelligent and exceedingly courteous. They occu pied this spot all through the seige of Chattanooga and up to within two days of the capture of the mountain, and are thoroughly familiar with all the movements in the valley beneath. Sitting on his "stoop," with the aid of a poAA'erful glass, he will f oint out to you the rebel line during the seige, from the base of Lookout all the Avay round the city to the river on the north, will show you Fort Wood, Orchard Knob, where the Star Fort was, Cameron HiU, and our lines drawn close about the city. Our battery on Moccasin Point was an old acquaintance, and he and Mrs. Craven aa'UI laugh heartily as they tell you how they used to Avatch for the puff of smoke from our guns, and get under cover from the shell they knew would burst in the vicinity. They do not think their house was the target, but shells aimed at the Point, three hundred feet above, were apt to burst in uncomfortable proximity. From this "stoop" you can almost see BroAvn's Ferry, and he will point out to you our line of march from our camp on Moccasin Point down to the ferry, October 27th, and again on the 29th, Avhen we crossed the pontoon to go to the support of Geary at Wauhatchie. Mr. Craven was, and is, a staunch rebel, but enjoys a visit from those who drove his friends from the mountain. In visiting the battle-field of Chickamauga, you will drive to Rossville and there take the Ringgold road which will take you to McAfee's Church. If, hovvever, you have only one day, it will be better to take the right hand road from Rossville, which will take you to Crawfish Spring, thirteen miles from Chattanooga, as from the spring you can take in the entire field on your retum to the city. Crawfish Spri ng is a curiosity of itself, a great column of 110 HISTORY OF THE jvater bursting out from the base of a hill, and well worth a Adsit from Chattanooga. About the spring was located the hospital for the right wing of our army, as Cloud Spring Avas selected for the same purpose for the left wing on September 19th, 1863. At this point you will find Mr. Lee, proprietor of what was known as Lee & Gordon's Mills twenty years ago. He is exceedingly affable and wiU give you a better idea of the movements of both armies from the 15th to the 19th of September, 1863, than you can get from any history. From the spring you will drive to Lee's MiUs, two miles distant, where the Lafayette road crosses the Chickamauga. Leaving here you wiU drive towards Chattanooga on the Lafayette road a short distance, when turning to fhe left, you will go through the fields where the right wing of our army was shattered on Sunday forenoon, passing the spot where stood the widow Clem's house, now burned, General Rosecran's headquarters on Saturday, September 19th, until you reacht the Snodgrass House, five miles from the springs, and three miles from Lee's Mills. The Snodgrass House stands on the northern end of the Horse-Shoe Ridge, where General Thomas made his gallant fight on Sunday aftemoon. This house was General Thomas' headquar ters from Saturday night at midnight until he left the field Sucday evening. Mr. Snodgrass was with him all day on Sunday, and wUl point you to the exact spot where he stood most of the day beneath a large oak. He wiU show you our exact Une of march through his farm from the north, after leaving the Lafayette road at Cloud Spring, and from his door will point out the place, only a few hundred feet to the west, where we charged Hind man's division, then just coming over the ridge. Mr. Snodgrass is infirm from age, but if you will take him in your carriajge he will go with you to this point, which FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. Ill many of you will recognize, and from there will go over the ridge and point out the position of the rebel line. All along this line you will find graves, many of the bodies having been removed, however, for burial elsewhere. One trench, holding the dead of a Kentucky Confederate regiment, has never been disturbed, and a board at one end says that fifteen of the regiment lie buried there. Hundreds and thousands of visitors have gone over these grounds in the last tAventy years, yet if you will look care fully you will find battered bullets, fragments of canteens or cartridge boxes, and not unfrequently pieces of a skele ton. All about the summit of the ridge you will notice the wounds in the trees, now overgrown, but leavdng a scar. At the house Mrs. Snodgrass will show you pistols, bayonets, bullets and broken sabers, and for a trifle will alloAv you to bring away some of these relics. From Snodgrass' you Avill drive east through the AVOods to the Layfayette road, the trees along the route showing ugly scars, and shallow pits from Avhich bodies have been removed being seen at many points. Reaching the road you will inquire at a farm house, just where the battle of Saturday, September 19th, Avas, and will be told that it was all around there, that in the yard around the house where you make the inquiry, men of both armies fell dead. The same story will be told you at other houses as you go towards Chattanooga until you reach Cloud Spring, so that in all the seven miles ride from Crawfish Spring you have not been off the battle field. You will hardly recognize Cloud Spring as it is now in an enclosed field, and the ground around is overgrown with brush and briars. You will find here William H. Hargrave, Second Lieutenant Company "K" First Con federate Georgia regiment. His left arm is useless from a shot through the shoulder received from our men Sep- 112 HISTORY OF THE tember 19th, in sight of his own house. A half hour's talk with him will be pleasant and profitable, as he can give you a clear idea ofthe rebel movements on that part of the Une on Saturday, and of our movement from IMc- Afee's Church on Sunday forenoon. He will point out a large pit not far from the Spring where were buried eighty "Yankees" after the battle, using the term "Yankee" when speaking of our soldiers Avith as little idea of disrespeci as we use the word "Rebel" when speaking of the Con federate soldier. From Cloud Spring you w'll drive a mile farther on the Layfayette road toAvards Chattanooga, when leaving it you will turn to the right, and crossing another mile of woods, you will reach the Ringgold road at McAfee's Church, where you will find everything looking exactly the same as you left it twenty years ago. From the church you will return to the city by way of Rossville Gap, in passing through which you will have a vieAV of the ground over which our brigade charged up the hill in the evening of NoA'ember 25th, 1863, and of the Ross House, now over one hundred years old, around which so many hundreds of our wounded were gathered on the morning after the great battle. AMOUNT OF AMMUNITION USED IN BATTLE. It is difficult to understand, or appreciate how much amunition is used in a battle. Those who have gone over a battle field and seen the undergrowth of timber almost entirely shot away, or, as at Kenesaw, seen head logs a FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRV. ll;> foot through, beat into shreds, as if with a trip-hammer, can have some idea of the storm of lead and iron neces sary to produce such results, but even they cannot under stand the vast amount used. General Jacob D. Cox, 'm his "Franklin and Nashville," says that at the battle oC •Franklin, a hundred wagon loads of amunition were used from the train of Fourth Corps alone. Astounding as this statement is, it does not give one so clear an idea of the amount of lead shot away in a battle as a statement of Mrs. Snodgrass, around whose house the storm of bat tle raged so fiercely on Sunday afternoon, September 20. 1863. In answer to a question as to how the battle af fected them financially, she said that everything on their farm was destroyed, and that she and her children vvould have starved if it had not been for the lead they gatherefl -from the battle field. She said that they gathered hun dreds and thousands of pounds of bullets whicli they sold in Chattanooga at five cents per pound. This crop did not fail them for some years, and even yet the plow turns up many bullets, although they are no longer an article of commerce. LETTER FROM LJEUTENANT RICHARD B. COWLING. In. cprrespondence with comrades during the prepara tion of this work, thpy^riter has come into possession of many interesting reminiscences and histories of personal adventures, spmp of which should he placed on record. The following extract from a letter from R. B. Cowling, il4 HISTORY OP THB of Company "D," now of London, Ohio,,wiU be found of interest : * * * "I was appointed by General Steedman his division Postmaster, about a month before the battle of Chickamauga, and at his request accompanied his staff and was with him through that memorable battle of Sun day, September 20th, 1863. In the woods beyond the little log house on the hill, that was used as a field hospi tal, occurred the hottest fight of the most famous battle of the war. The charges and counter charges of the first hour after our arrival on the field had so decimated Steedman's staff that I thought at one time all would be killed. At one time, between 3 and 4 o'clock, the condi tion of affairs was decidedly critical. The desperate assaults of the enemy, in overwhelming numbers, caused our line to waver, and there was a feeling that all was lost. At this moment Steedman seized the flag of the One Hundred and Fifteenth Illinois, which regiment was falling back in some disorder, and galloping to the top of the hill, rode back and forth between the lines of battle where it seemed a man could not live a minute, and shouted to his men : "Boys, you may go back, but the old flag shall not." The effect was electrical. Never was enthu siasm greater. The inspiration that came from that fear less ride brought the boys to the top of the hill with yells, and a momentary victory was secured. At this point Steedman gave me a written order to carry to another. part of the field. Putting it in my blouse pocket with other orders, I started. In galloping over the field, pick ing my way amid the dead and wounded, I heard my name called, and looking around I saw a young Corporal, a mere boy, belonging to our regiment, with whom I had been on picket many times, whose right leg had been torn off close to his body, as I supposed, by a shell. He had FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 115 torn up his blouse to staunch the blood, and begged most piteously that I should bring him a Surgeon. My orders requiring dispatch, I rode on hoping to return soon, but I never saw him again. At this point I either lost my way, or the lines had been changed, for I ran into a squad of rebel cavalry. LeaA'ing the road I took to the woods, the rebels following and shooting at me until I ran into General Sheridan's division.* His salutation was : "Who in the hell are you?" I replied that I AA'as a courier from Steedman. He asked me the position of our forces in front, and on my replying, he ordered an advance of his deployed and depleted division, which did not seem to number a thousand men. By this time it was nearly dark. Having lost my orders in my flight, my mission unfulfilled, and with gloomy forebodings, I hitched my horse and slept at the foot of Mission Ridge, to wake the next morning and find myself between the pickets of the two armies. Hastily mounting my Sleek, but blind and wind-broken mare, I rode rapidly into Chattanooga and reported to Steedman, who expressed surprise at seeing me, as he supposed I had been killed as most of his mes sengers of the day previous had been. Then and there for the first time, we drank together from the same can teen." * * * * Sheridan had been driven with the right wing of our anny in the forenoon, had fallen back to Bossville and was now coming out on the Lafayette road to Thomas' support. 116 HISTORY OF THE LETTER FROM ASSISTANT-SURGEON WM. H. MATCHETT. In a recent letter from Dr. William H. Matchett, Green ville, Ohio, furnishing the facts as to his several details for duty AA'hile Assistant Surgeon of our regiment, and which facts are given elsewhere, there is much of general interest. When we left FrankUn, June 2d, 1863, Dr. Matchett Avas on duty in the Post Hospital at that place, and on that day was ordered to remove the sick in Hos pital, and those left by the troops moving, to Nashville, and return and close the Hospital, turning over the prop erty to the quarter-master. The first part of the duty performed, he returned to Franklin, and his subsequent oxperience is best told by himself. He writes as follows : * * * "Having performed this duty (i. e. removing the sick to Nashville) and returned to Franklin, I found all in trouble at the hospital. The enemy had captured the town and taken possession of the hospital. They had taken the horses of Dr. Casterline and Dr. Cleary, as well as their clothes, blankets, and everything about the building that they wanted, and departed without making any effort to cross the river and attack the fort then gar- isorii,ed by the Eighty-fifth Indiana, Colonel Baird com manding. I proceeded to collect the remaining effects, and hunt up the nurses who were hid in the garret, and loading the property into Avagons of citizens pressed into the service for the purpose, at dark onthe Sth of June, 1 crossed the bridge over Harpeth, and turned the stores over to the quarter-master as ordered. As I approached the fort I noticed quite a commotion in the camp of the Eighty-fifth Indiana, and inquired of Surgeon Hobbs the cause. Just then a squad of cavalry rode up having in FORTIETH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 117 charge two soldiers with white havelocks on their caps. V ithout replying to my inquiry as to the cause of the excitement. Dr. Hobbs said, 'Thank God, there they are.' Colonel Williams, a son of Captain Williams, U. S. A., who fell at the battle of Monterey, Mexico, and his Adju tant, Lieutenant Peters, both of the rebel army, were taken as spies in the camp of the Eighty-fifth Indiana. They represented themselves to be Inspectors of U. S. A. and had papers in their posession signed by Secretary of War, and General Rosecrans authorizing them to in spect the Post at Franklin. They were politely received by Colonel 'Baird, and claiming to have been robbed by the rebels. Colonel Baird presented them with fifty dollars. After a pleasant interview they started on their return to Nashville just at dark. , Colonel Watkins, of the Sixth Kentucky Cavalry, who was present, suspected they were not what they seemed, and the suspicion growing stronger after they had left, he sent a squad of men after them. Upon being brought back into camp, and charged with being spies, they made no farther effort at concealment of their true character. They were tried by a court- martial the same night, convicted, and by order of Gen eral Rosecrans, hung the next morning, June 9th, at 9 o'clock and 45 minutes, I being detailed by Colonel Baird to decide when they were dead. They were hung from a small walnut tree, I think, near the spring between our old camp and Fort Granger. The hanging was a bung ling affair. A scantling was spiked to the body of the tree at a right angle, a lower limb being sawed off a few feet from the tree and acting as a brace to the horizontal scantling. To the latter the ropes were attached, and to the necks of the victims, who stood upon a board placed across the body of an army wagon. All things being ready, the wagon was driven from leneath, and the poor 118 HISTORY OF THE men were left dangling in the air. Colonel Williams strugghid for four or five minutes, motioning with his hand to tighten the knot, then grasping the rope above his head, lifted himself up, turned his head in the noose, and dropping himself suddenly, succeeded in strangUng himself. The adjutant^ died in a few minutes and without ¦A struggle. This incident in my army life can never be forgotten. The victims had neither their arms pinioned, nor their faces covered, so all the horror of such a death was un disguised, and I must confess was more than my nerves could well stand. The regiment, Eightj'-fifth Indiana, was draAvn up in a hollow square, standing at 'arms port,' and in a position that all could see the doomed men as they were choked to death, and I do not think there was a dry eye among all the hundreds of men who had looked upon death in battle without emotion, but this terrible scene unmanned them all. Life extinct, we cut the bodies down and buried them there with the other silent dead of that unnatural war. Colonel Watkins said that this Colonel Williams was a lieutenant in the regular army in the same company with himself when the war broke out, and that he had served as an aid to General Scott for several months in 1861. He had an alius, Anson LaAA'rence, and was said to have taken this name that he might inherit a valuable estate in the South. All these facts were elicited during the trial, at which I was present. I never ean forget my feelings at see ing these noble looking men executed. I never thought it right, but thought they should have been locked up, kept in close confinement until time would have more fully shown the degree of their guilt. Yet this is war, in exorable war. * * * I rejoined the regiment at Tullahoma, at noon June FORTIETH OHIO VOL. I.MFANTRY. 119 15th. Settled our mess account, and on the 16th, took charge of the General Hospital at Tullahoma, where I re mained until September ISth, when I again went to the front. I found my pony at Bridgeport with all the bag gage of the regiment left there Avhen you marched from there. In company with Robt. Davis, Hospital Steward of the Eighty-fourth Indiana, and leading poor Roan. sick with the distemper, I started to find the regiment. Staid all night in the woods near Whiteside. Next d;iy marched all alone, Davis, myself and pony, reaching the foot of Lookout at night. Next morning, SOth, met a horseman who told us of the hard fighting beyond the Mountain. (Chickamauga). Davis Avould go no further, and returned to Bridgeport. I Avent over the Mountain alone, leading Roan, and in the evening of the 20th fell in with Speers' East Tennessee brigade of our corps just as the stampede occurred in the gap at Rossville. Not being able to hear anything of our regiment or brigade, I drifted back with the Tennesseans until Point of Rocks near the Craven farm was reached, where General Speers halted his command, and threw up barricades. Hero we had quite a skirmish with the enemy, having several wounded. On the 22d, Surgeon A. T. Lea. Sixth East Tennessee Infantry, gave me a certificate to show that 1 had been with him on duty for the last two days, and bo- fore daylight on the 23d, I crept dovcn the mountain, and crossing on driftwood under the railroad bridge over Chattanooga Creek, slipped along the river bank under cover of tall weeds until I got within our lines. Reported to Surgeon Perin, Medical Director, and was ordered on duty in the Field Hospital across the riA'er from Chatta nooga." 120 HISTORY OF THE LETTER FROM LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JAMES WATSON. In addition to many great battles, the advance from Dalton to Atlanta was characterized by continued skir mishing, and daily fierce and bloody struggles, many of the latter being scarcely mentioned in history. What we, of our regiment, speak of as the "Battle of Kenesaw" was only one of scores of fierce struggles that occurred in different parts of our long line during the campaign. Scarcely a day passed without similar engagements in which a single brigade, or possibly a regiment, would suffer severely. To us the 20th of June, 1864, AA'as a day and night that is scarcely less distinctly remembered than is the 20th of September, 1863, as the former was scarcely less disastrous to us than the latter. The account given in preceeding pages is meagre, only giving the general features of the engagement. Knowing of what interest any details will be to comrades, the writer has no hesita tion in giving place to the following letter from Lieuten ant-Colonel James Watson, written in response to a re quest that he furnish his recollections of the fight at Kenesaw. He writes : * * * "I find that I remember but little, and, in fact, know but little of the Kenesaw business except that which was, as it were, personal to myself So far as my individual adventure is concerned I can give you a brief statement of that, although I hardly suppose you want that. I was that day in charge of the skirmish line in front of our brigade, having about one hundred and fifty men ; of these about one-third were killed and wounded, so you see we had a hot time of it. The rebel skirmish line was FOKTH-TH OHIO VOL. INFANTRY. 121 posted in the AVf-( ds rnd undogroAvth that skirted the hills, and sometimes but a few steps inten'ened betAveen the opposing .«kirniisliers as the respective lines Avere, at different points, pushed forward and backward. After a hard day's Avork in which there A^as more than usual close and dangerous fighting-. Ave Avere relieved and went back to get our supper.^. I fonnd U]ion reaching our regimental line, that Jack, the cook, liad been demoralized. While holding the mule that carried our n}eFS outfit, tbat ani mal was shot through the neck, and in fear that the next ball might strike him. Jack lad fled, 25 Discharged for disability 92 Wounded* 143 Cftjitured ,. 88 *The rifiiiiber of wdUttded recorded falls short of the actual number, as many slightly wounded were never reported. Aside from this, the above summary is substantiaUy correct.