YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

3 9002 06422 9264

Unfair treatraent of the
admiral and the captains who
dr. stroyed the naval power
of Spain in 1896.

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'I give thfft Books
p/M iAs faumlmg ef a. CeBegt oi./tCf Celof^"

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'Y^ILIE«¥]MII¥EIESIIT¥''

Gift of
Robert W. Neeser
1927

THF UNFAIR TREATMENT

-OF—

IK^iBMIRAL AND THE GABTAINS

"WHO DESTROYED

IN

mM': OFM

WHILE

^ll^gllEROIC'GOiMODORE AND^CAPmiNS

WHO destroyj:d

;itE:PH|QtPpmE SQUADRON OF SPAIN

Hii,yE;; RECfilVED

^HE HI^ST HONORS'CONGRESS CAN GIlEi

BARllAlt!! A Mn.LEI|.I^RINT. CHIOAI»,

PETITION.
TO THE PRESIDENT,
AND THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES :
\';'i' The undersigned, a citizen of the United States, humbly
A " petitions that the thanks of Congress be given to Rear Admiral
William- T. Sampson for his services and success as Rear Admiral
^*'**», in the war with Spain in 1898 ; and that he be made an Admiral by
J Act of Congress, appointment and confirmation, in the manner
' ^^N..^ adopted for such promotion of Commodore George Dewey for his
xs^'v.j^ services and success in that war.
Edward Roby.

PETITION.
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
AND THE SENATE:
The undersigned, a citizen of the United States, humbly
petitions that the ofi&cers of the Navy of the United States who
served on this side of the world in the war with Spain in 1898, who
are deserving of advancement under Section 1506 of the Revised
Statutes may be nominated for advancement, by the President,
and confirmed by tbe Senate, so that their commendation and
rewards respectively, shall bear the same proportion to their deeds,
for which such advancements may be made, as the like commenda
tion and rewards so given to Commodore Dewey and ofiScers of
his squadron bear to their deeds for which they received such
advancements.
Edward Roby.

LEclwarcJl^oliyll

THE UNFAIR TREATMENT

-OF-

THE ADMIRAL AND THE CAPTAINS

"WHO DESTROYED

THE NAVAL POWER OF SPAIN

IN

1898.

TREATED AS UNWORTHY OF RECOGNITION

WHILE

THE HEROIC COMMODORE AND CAPTAINS

WHO DESTROYED

THE PHILIPPINE SQUADRON OF SPAIN

HAVE RECEIVED

THE HIGHEST HONORS CONGRESS CAN GIYE.

Note.
In the following communication reference is made to certain
publications, namely :
(i) Appendix to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of
Navigation, of the Navy Department, A. D. 1898 ; which on the
back is labeled Naval Operations of the War with Spain.
(2) Senate Documents, 55th Congress, 3d Session, Executive
C and D and an added letter, which are bound together and paged
through as pages i to 177. C being a letter from the Secretary
of the Navy to the President of the Senate, with accompanying
documents, — Ordered to be printed on February 8, 1899; and
D being a letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the Chairman of
the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, and accompanying docu
ments — Ordered to be printed February 20, 1899; and the ad
ditional letter bearing date March 2, 1899. The whole having a
title page as follows: Sampson-Schley. Official Communica
tions to the United States Senate.
(3) War Notes on the Spanish- American War No. VIII.
Published by the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Depart
ment, A. D. 1900; entitled, "The Squadron of Admiral Cervera,
by Captain Victor M. Concas y Palau. Formerly Commander of
the armored cruiser Infanta Maria Teresa, and Chief of Staff of
said squadron in the naval battle of Santiago de Cuba. Vice-
President of the Geographical Society of Madrid." Translated
from the Spanish.
The citations from this publication are generally given post
as Concas p. 6-

caa^.iG?

Jp.

v^

s
(4) The Century Illustrated Monthly Magazine of March,
May and October, 1899, in which the following articles are
referred to:
The Oregon's Great Voyage, by Lieutenant Eberle, page 912.
The personal narratives of the battle off Santiago, namely :
The Iowa, by Captain Evans  page 50
The Indiana, by Captain Taylor  " 62
The Texas, by Captain Philip  " 87
The Brooklyn, by Captain Cook  " 94
The Oregon, by Lieutenant Eberle  " 104
The New York, by Captain Chadwick  " iii
The Gloucester, by Lt. Com. Wainwright  " yy
Cable Cutting at Cienf uegos, by Lieut. Winslow .... " 708
(S) Other references are to standard law books; cited in the
usual manner.

The hearsay, cited in this communication, while not compe
tent in a court of justice, is public information, as well authenti
cated as is usual for information to be, on which the people at
large base their beliefs and political action.
The houses of Congress have power to submit it to the
tests. Either house (by its committees) can send for persons and
papers, can administer oaths, can compel testimony, and by the
most searching investigation learn the exact truth, as near as the
frailty of human memory permits it to be preserved.
The people on the spot (the naval officers and men) can be
compelled to give the facts, under oath, if any one doubts the in
formation referred to; and the members of either house of Con
gress are fully competent to draw the proper conclusions from
them.

There has been a rumor afloat, that members of the Senate
believed that Captain Sampson was given command of the fleets
operating against Spain in the Atlantic, and of all the naval opera
tions against Cuba and Porto Rico, because he was a pet of the
President and Navy Department ; and that since the war the Navy
Department have persecuted better men in order to turn to him
honors which they ought to receive; and the rumor is that the
belief is so widely diffused through the Congress, that it caused
the Senate to neglect all nominations for promotion for eminent
and conspicuous conduct in battle or extraordinary heroism which
destroyed the naval power of Spain, in the Atlantic ; after giving
the highest honors to those who destroyed the Philippine squadron
of Spain. Withholding all honors from the deserving under the statute
for promotion, because of a fault believed to exist in the depart
ment at Washington, and proclaiming to the world that they have
done nothing worth mentioning, while the officers of Dewey's fleet
deserved and received the highest honors, is not right.
Allowing a belief in the existence of such enormities in the
administrative department (with all their dangers to the navy,
the officers and men in it, and the cities, coasts and interests to be
protected by it), to pass unnoticed, except by touting all the naval
oiRcers who desefve promotion under the rule established by
statute (Sec. 1506) and the promotions of the officers of Dewey's
fleet, is not right.
And if there is any such reason for utterly neglecting all the
nominations made, and preventing the completion of the nomina
tions by intimation that air such nominations (though deserving
under Section 1506 of the Revised Statutes and by the principle of
the promotions of the officers of Dewey's fleet) will be tumed
down, the Congress owes it to the country, to the Executive De
partment of the Government (thus impeached) and to the naval
officers entitled to such promotions (unless such promotions are
gifts only to be given to favorites of the Senate) to sift the, matter,
and Hnd the truth.
And if, on finding the truth, it shall appear that the vast
campaign against Cuba and the Spanish fleet and the battle which
destroyed the naval power of Spain were conducted by Admiral
Sampson with an ability and courage equal to that of Dewey in
his campaign; and results greater than the loss to Spain of an
army of a million men, doubtless the justice of Congress will make
the proper, though tardy recognition.

THE UNFAIRNESS TO THE OFFICERS 'OF THE
ATLANTIC SQUADRON.
On the first day of May, 1898, the battle of Manila was
fought on the other side of the world. On the seventh of that
month the commanding officer was promoted to admiral and re
ceived the thanks of Congress and a sword. On the second of
June the officers commanding ships, and Captain Lamberton, who
had no ship, were nominated for promotion from five to ten num
bers, and were promptly confirmed by the Senate. And when
the first session of the 55th Congress adjourned every officer and
man of that heroic squadron knew that he, by the medals awarded
and these advances, had been recognized among the nation's great,
and that he held for life and to transmit to his posterity an
acknowledgment and certificate of heroism from an appreciative
country. For reference hereafter attention is asked to the fact, that,
after the commodore, the highest advancements were given to the
commanders of the smallest and weakest ships, and to a man with
out a ship. Commander Edward P. Wood of the little gunboat
Petrel of 892 tons and four guns, was advanced ten numbers;
Commander Asa Walker of the gunboat Concord, of 1710 tons
and six guns, was advanced nine numbers; Captain Benjamin P.
Lamberton, who did not then command a ship, was advanced
seven numbers, and Captain Nehemiah M. Dyer, who com
manded the protected cruiser Baltimore, was advanced seven
numbers. All these promotions, by numbers, were made pursuant to
the Revised Statutes of the United States (Section 1506), "Any
officer of the navy may, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, be advanced, not exceeding thirty numbers in rank, for
eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle, or extraordinary
heroism." After a long peace, with ships and weapons untried in battle,
too far away for any chance of succor or support, should any
mishap fall, they acted; and the Congress inscribed their names
upon the roll of fame, for eminent and conspicuous conduct in
battle, or extraordinary heroism; and, honoring them, the Con
gress honored every man who joined in achieving the victory.

8
Almost two years have elapsed since the close of the war, and
those who met Spain's naval power nearer its home, have rested
under the imputation, that the Congress deemed them, all, un
worthy to be named as eminent or conspicuous in battle, or of
extraordinary heroism, like Wood and Walker and Lamberton
and the rest, who won their honors on that notable first of May.
The First Naval Battle of the War.
As commanders of the weakest and smallest ships received
the highest promotion, for extraordinary heroism, or eminent and
conspicuous conduct in the battle of Manila, our attention is
turned to some of the lower grades of officers in the North Atlan
tic squadron, who were in battle; because the first naval battle,
of the war, was fought by two small ships of a mosquito division
of the squadron under Commander Bowman H. McCalla.
In this battle the Spaniards attacked twice. The first attack
was on the Eagle, and brought on the first naval engagement
afloat, of the war ; during which this small converted yacht of 434
tons, commanded by Lieutenant W. H. H. Southerland, armed
with four six-pounders, and two small Colt's automatic guns,
defeated and put to flight, an enemy's force, consisting of the
Galicia, a torpedo gunboat, and two other gunboats. The Galicia
was of superior size to the Eagle, and of greatly superior arma
ment, having two (almost) five-inch breech-loading rifles, four
six-pounder rapid fire guns, one machine gun and two torpedo
tubes. What armament the other two gunboats bore is not appar
ent from the matter at hand, but it is probable that they also had
more than the four six-pounders of the Eagle.
"Slowly backing the Eagle, with her broadside tO' the enemy,
in order both to change her bearing and to bring as many guns
as possible to bear, the firing became rapid, and in the battle fifty-
nine six-pounder armor-piercing shells were expended." Then
the enemy retreated and the Eagle steamed a little closer in
toward the harbor entrance, and brought on the second engage
ment of the battle.
The enemy's fire was well directed, but the eminent and con
spicuous perfection of the conduct of this part of the battle
neutralized the vastly superior force and wrested victory from it.
There was no turning to avoid the ship of superior size and arma
ment, nor to fly from the numbers to be engaged, but cool, calm

skill and heroic brain conducted to the victory. The commander
of the ship relied upon the fleet commander who had placed him in
the van, and it was well.
In tbe second engagement the gunboats and a fort and an
army on shore attacked the Eagle, and McCalla, with the Marble-
head, finished the battle. His report commends the Eagle's work,
and barely mentions the part he and his ship took in the battle,
seeming to regard the protection of a member of his fleet and the
crushing of a powerful attack, developing the whole force of the
harbor as a mere incident, simply to be mentioned. And, but for
Lieutenant Southerland's two reports, the superb conduct of the
division commander never would have been known.
Had these two officers had an ounce of boastfulness, or had
the newspaper reporters been there to write it up, the heroic first
naval battle of the war would have appeared to have a dramatic
interest and brilliancy rarely equalled.

Commander McCalla.
Before taking up McCalla's conduct in this and subsequent
battles, and extraordinary heroism, a brief mention of his mis
fortune, which casts a peculiar light upon his self-devotion may
be mentioned. He was made a Commander November 3, 1884 ; and in 1885
was selected to take a thousand men and protect the Panama Rail
road and City of Panama, during a revolution ; and did it so well,
that though Aspinwall was burned, nothing within his jurisdiction
was injured. He was a man of ability and the equal of any in his
class. But in 1890 he was sentenced by a bare majority of a
court martial "to be suspended from rank and duty for the period
of three years, and to retain his present number on the list of com
manders while so suspended." Five out of twelve stood for ac
quittal. A court martial is called, like a sheriff's jury, for a particular
trial, or session, and ceases to exist when that is ended. {Runkle
V. U. S., 122 U. S., pp. 555-6.) It is an inferior court of limited
jurisdiction. Its sentence must be conformable to law, or it is
void. {Ibid; Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How., 65, pp. 82-3; Neilson
petitioner, 131 U. S., 176.) The grade of the court is such that
there are no presumptions to sustain its action. {Ibid.)

IO
"All sentences" (but death) "may be determined by a ma
jority of votes." It is its duty "tq adjudge a punishment ade
quate to the nature of the offense ; but the members thereof may
recommend the person convicted as deserving of clemency." This
is the law. (R. S., Sec. 1624, Art. 50, 51.) Art. 48 provides that
"when a court martial sentences an officer to be suspended, it may
suspend his pay and emoluments for the whole or any part
of the time of his suspension." And this limited the power in
such cases, to the mere taking away for the period of suspension
of pay and other tangible profits of the office, capable of estimate
and computation by the court, at the time of rendering judgment,
and forbade the court to let its sentence in any way lap over be
yond the period of suspension, or to touch anything during the
time of suspension which cannot be computed like pay. {Neal v.
Clark, 95 U. S., 704, pp. 708-9; Broom's Legal Maxims, 651,
666.) It is sometimes said that the constitution of the United
States is one of enumerated powers ; and that the national govern
ment has no powers not expressly given or necessary to the exer
cise of those expressly given. It is quite clear that when these
articles of war told just what a summary aggregation can do,
when it suspends an officer, they did not intimate an intention to
commit an unlimited power to extend the penalty through the de
fendant's "W(.hole life to whole or partial loss of the pay and emolu
ments, and to the privileges and advantages that belong to the
office under the statutes ; for, as said by the authority, "the intro
duction of the specific power, in such case, is necessarily exclusive
of all other independent extrinsic powers." Because of such nam
ing of powers in the judiciary act, ordinary powers common to all
other courts of like nature, and necessary to the full exercise of
tbe rights of United States citizens, have been found to be with
held from the courts of the United States, the words being: "Al
though the judicial power of the United States extends to all cases
arising under the laws' of the United States the legislature" (the
congress) "has not thought proper to delegate the exercise of that
power to its Circuit Courts, except ih certain specified cases."
{Mclntire v. Wood, 7 Cranch., 504, p. 506 ; McClung v. Silliman,
6 Wheaton, 598, p. 600; Insurance Co. v. Ritchie, 5 Wallace, 541.)
And this principle certainly applies to courts martial called
into existence by, and deriving their powers only through the arti
cles of war — that is, the articles of Section 1624.

II

The court martial that tried McCalla consisted of twelve
members ; and it acted on two subjects — which were committed to
it by the law of its existence. First it convicted him of some matter
charged, and imposed sentence for that (which was in part valid) ;
second, under the authority committed to it by the law it recom
mended executive clemency; that is, it adjudged that though the
offense was within the letter of the rules, it was not within the
spirit of the laws, and that due administration of justice required
that no punishment should be imposed.
The judgment, against him, was by a vote of seven to five;
the judgment, that the circumstances were such that he did not
deserve any punishment and ought not to be punished, was by
eleven of the triors, only one dissenting from. that.
The executive did not exert his clemency for a year and a
half. The provision that McCalla should retain his number on the
list of commanders, while suspended, had no effect to take away
any pay or emolument during the time of his suspension ; and im
posed no tangible punishment during that time; but the statute
(Section 1467) provides that officers take rank in each grade ac
cording to the date of their commissions, and that the next officer
in rank shall be promoted to the place of a retired officer (Section
1458) ; and, at 62, when retired by age, the pay for life shall be
proportioned to the grade of rank then borne. (Section 1588.)
The first effect of the provision that he should keep the num
ber, struck him November 7, 1897, when he would have been en
titled to the rank of captain, but for that provision of the sentence.
It so happened that during the year and a half the sentence was
in force (in 1890 and 1891 ) nine men were promoted from the list
of commanders or died out of it, above him, so that nine passed
him. It was impossible, in the nature of things, for the court that
imposed the sentence to know when it laid the sentence, how keep
ing his number would punish him, by deprivation of pay when he
should be 62 and for all his life after that ; or how many who were
higher in rank would die or resign while he was suspended. The
court could not know that it would punish him at all. It could
make no computation as to how many above him in rank would
die or resign during the three years, so as to make the punishment
just "adequate to the nature of the offense," as the law required ;
but left the punishment (to be inflicted by that branch of the sen-

12
tence) to depend on things foreign to the offense or the offender,
namely : on the contingencies of the death or resignation of other
men during the time mentioned. Hence this provision of the sen
tence was not within the power conferred upon the court by
Article 51, which was "to adjudge a punishment adequate to the
nature of the offense" — that is, equal to, and measured by the
offense, the computation of which adequacy must be a matter of
judgment, judicially exercised. And this provision of the sen
tence was contrary to Article 48, which forbade the court which
suspended a man, to interfere with the pay or emoluments the law
would give him after the time of his suspension, because of the
age of his commission.
It is an axiom, that one exercising a delegated power is not
authorized to do indirectly that which he is forbidden to do direct
ly. Article 48, by its explicit words, forbade the court martial to
adjudge, that, from and after he shall become 62 years of age,
the- defendant shall be deprived of two thousand dollars per year,
of the pay he would have received, by law, but for this sentence.
The punishment is the result of the words, and is not the
words used in the sentence. The power is "to adjudge- a punish
ment," and -whatever the words may be which are used, if they
produce a penal result not authorized by law, those words in the
sentence are unlawful. {People v. Cooper, 83 111., 585.) "If the
act must necessarily produce a result clearly and unquestionably
forbidden * it ca.nnothe uphe[d,whatever be its form or profes
sion." (Id., p. 591.) Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wallace, 277,
p. 325, also pp. 319, 320; Exparte Garland 4 Wallace, 333, p. 380.
The power to inflict a particular penalty must be clearly au
thorized by the law or the power does not exist. {Sutherland on
Statutes, Sees. 349, 350.) And where power is given to inflict
punishment up to a certain limit, as in Article 48, that specifica
tion, forbids any punishment extending beyond that limit.
A sentence, making the amount of the punishment to depend
on chance, on the accident of death and resignation of other men,
depending not upon the act done nor upon the subsequent conduct
of the offender — a sentence which might inflict no penalty at all,
or might in the remote future punish the person sentenced, be
cause of some extrinsic event — such sentence, if not void under

13
the articles of war as they now stand, would be barbarous, and
should be forbidden by a new statute. At the very first dawning
of Anglo-Saxon liberty it was held to be justice that a man should
be punished according to the greatness of his fault ; and the Nor
mans ratifled the doctrine by solemn Acts or Constitutions.
Magna Charta, Ch. 14 (Stat. Henry III.), 2 Co. Inst., 27:
"A free man shall not be amerced for a small fault, but after
the manner of the fault, and for a great fault after the greatness
thereof. * * *
"And none of the said amercements shall be assessed, but by
the oath of honest and lawful men of the vicinage."
Earls and Barons shall not be amerced but by their peers,
and after the manner of their offense. No man of the church
shall be amerced after the quantity of his spiritual benefice, or
after his lay benefice, but after his lay tenement, and after the
quantity of his offense.
This charter appears to have been adopted by John, in 1215,
and by Henry III. in 12 16, but it appears by Glanville that it was
made in affirmance of the common law. (2 Co. Inst., 27-8.)
Coke, in the proeme to his Second Institute, says that prior
to his time, that is, prior to about 1600, tha,t charter "had been
confirmed, established and commanded to be put in execution by
thirty-two several acts of parliament."
There are two branches of the principle.
1st. The punishment must be proportionate to the offense.
2d. Determining what is in just proportion to the offense,
and assessing the punishment, is a judicial function, to be exer
cised under the sanction of an oath, and with equally careful ap
plication of the judgment of the triors as the function of deter
mining on the guilt of the accused.
This cardinal principle, reasserted in the constitutions of Eng
land before our separation so many times as to be ingrained in our
ideas of civilised government, furnishes the construction for Arti
cle 51, where it requires the court to adjudge that the sentence
imposed is adequate to the nature of the offense, and forbids that
the amount of punishment shall be made contingent or dependent
on any extrinsic consideration.
Commander Chadwick, who became a captain when McCalla,
by law, had a right to the promotion, made most strenuous efforts

14
to have McCalla restored to his place. Every man of those who
moved up by the effect of the sentence (but two) wrote personally
asking his restoration to his place.
In March, 1898, the undersigned presented a memorial or
petition to the President, suggesting McCalla's deserts as an
officer, the above demonstration of the void character and bar
barity of his sentence, and praying for full pardon or that the
sentence be put out of the way, by the executive.
Between the i8tb of April and the 6th of May, 1898, peti
tions, incited by the idea of this void character and barbarity of
the sentence, as well as by the value of the officer, as a naval
officer, were signed by eighty-four senators (all but one who had
sufficient health to do any business), by two hundred and forty-
one representatives, by the Secretary of State and the officers of
that department, and lay the heads and other officers of other de
partments, praying full restoration to the rank, were presented to
the President. The nomination of McCalla for promotion of seven numbers
(proposed August 12, 1898) would have restored him to the place
which was his of right, if his sentence was void in the particular
assailed. That nomination was hung up with the rest of those of the
Cuban fleet.
Meanwhile, even while suspended, McCalla had worked for
his country and profession. There were no tactics studied out
and published for modem steam power fleets, and he prepared a
system of naval tactics with drawings and plates, costing him some
three thousand dollars, and gave the work to the country.
September 11, 1897, having been kept on shore for seven
years, he was given command of the little unprotected craiser
Marblehead, of 2,089 tons, a main battery of ten five-inch guns,
and a secondary battery of six-pounders, etc. Soon after, when
Germany was negotiating with Hayti, with vessels of war, he
was sent to be present and observe, and form part of the situation ;
then he was sent to Navassa Island to exercise a jurisdiction of

15
the United States. (In these things acting for the state depart
ment.) Then he was used in those hot latitudes in preparation for
war; and when the war broke out his ship had had nearly six
months in those waters of marine growths; yet the master had
found means to keep her bottom clean by the work of his crew, so
that the newspapers said she bowled along by the side of the swift
New York to reach blockade runners.
On the 25th of April, 1898, the Navy Department having
learned that the Spanish transports Montserrat and Alicante had
left Martinique on the 23d for Cienfuegos, and advised the ad
miral; the latter detached a small division of the North Atlantic
Squadron, consisting of the third-rate unprotected cruiser Marble-
head, of 2,089 tons, the light draft gunboat Nashville, of 1,371
tone, and the small converted yacht Eagle, of 434 tons, to go for
them, to Cienfuegos, under the command of Commander McCalla.
Newspaper correspondents said that the admiral was very
reluctant to send them, saying that they were going 700 miles from
anything that could support or rescue them, to where they would
encounter whatever force might be in the harbor, which was sec
ond in importance to Spain, in all Cuba; but McCalla relieved
his reluctance, and cordially faced the danger.
The Montserrat and Alicante reached their harbor unloaded,
and left before it was possible for the little fleet to have inter
cepted them. But the little fleet did a day's work at Cienfuegos,
during the one day it was there.
Between daylight on April 29th and 5 o'clock p. m. (when
the state of their coal required them to return to Key West), the
little fleet captured the Argonauta, having a cargo of provisions,
Mauser rifles and ammunition, eight Spanish officers, eight Span
ish soldiers and Spanish mails; it also fought a battle, and prac
tically destroyed the naval power at Cienfuegos, besides learning
all about the port, its defenses and mines, and the list and strength
of the naval forces there. These things were reported to the Ad
miral three days later, and the matters so ascertained were after
wards found to be precisely true.
The inventory showed one line of mines laid across the river ;
the old fort ; a castle above Placido Cove ; a shore battery ; a new
battery, with two large guns, on the heights above the castle ; some
six and eight-inch modern guns not mounted; the torpedo gun-

i6
boat Galicia (described by Southerland) ; two other gunboats; and
eleven armed steam launches. (Appendix, 185.)
The Battle.
On their arrival, the Galicia came out from the inner
harbor, and McCalla placed his ships so that she could
not escape and give notice of their presence, and she went back.
At 10:55 the Nashville having signaled that a steamer was in
sight, was sent to capture her. At 12:10 the commanding officer
of the Eagle was directed to take his position off the mouth of the
river, while the Marblehead steamed to the Nashville and prize
two miles away. It had just reached there, when the Eagle sig
naled that the torpedo gunboat was coming out ; and the Marble
head at once steamed towards the Eagle ; and Lieutenant Souther
land fought the first engagement of the battle, while the Marble
head was coming; and said, in his first report, that when the
enemy retired appearances indicated that one of the gunboats had
been struck ; then the Eagle steamed a little closer in toward the
harbor entrance, and was fired upon by a shore battery, a guard of
infantry and a gunboat, which appeared coming out. Lieutenant
Southerland, in his report to the Admiral written that day, said:
"This fire was promptly returned. Within a minute or two the
Marblehead, which in the interval had been coming towards us at
full speed, opened fire with her five-inch rifles, and succeeded in
silencing both battery and gunboat. Two of the enemy's shot
passed close over this vessel, another close astern, and another
within a few feet of the bowsprit." (Appendix, p. 186.)
In his report, under Article 260, dated September 15, 1898,
Lieutenant Southerland said:
"Within a few minutes, one of the gunboats again appeared,
and with a fort on shore opened fire on the Eagle, which was
promptly returned, this vessel in the meantime having steamed a
little closer toward the harbor entrance. The Eagle's fire during
this second attack was of short duration, as the Marblehead, which,
upon the firing of the first gun, had started at full speed to the
Eagle's assistance, arrived within a few minutes, and, with a well
directed fire, from her splendidly handled battery, soon silenced
the enemy's fire both ashore and afloat." (Appendix, 349.)
"Commander McCalla's division left Cienfueg'os in the after
noon of April 29th, for Key West, the Eagle being temporarily
detached with despatches for the Admiral." (Appendix, 349.)

17
The Spaniards did good line shooting at the Marblehead and
all but two of their shots, which fell short, passed over her. (Ap
pendix, 184.)
This battle was at the entrance of a great port, the second in
importance to Spain of all the ports of Cuba. It was 700 miles
from Key West, and nearly as much from the nearest Ameri
can ship. That is, it was about as far from a friendly port as
Manila is from Hong Kong. The duty of ascertaining the force
of Spain in and around that port required the risking of a battle
against unknown odds. The Eagle was placed to observe and
blockade, and draw their fire ; and when the attack was made on
her she fought as if she was a battleship. It was her business to
do her best; it was the division officers' business to order her to
fly or to come to her. And her's was probably the first naval en
gagement, fought on one side, victoriously, with modern six-
pound rapid-fire guns.
It appears on pages 473-4 of "Naval Operations of the
War with Spain' (otherwise cited herein as "Appendix"), that
Commodore Schley arrived with the Flying Squadron off Cien
fuegos on May 21st ; that on May 22d he stood in close to examine
the port and twice went close in to the mouth of the harbor ; and
that on the 23d he wrote, "I am by no means satisfied that the
Spanish Squadron is not at Cienfuegos. The large amount of
smoke in the harbor would indicate the presence of a number of
vessels." Yet, at that time there was no naval force in that harbor
that was not there when the Eagle stood her ground, and the un
protected cruiser Marblehead swept up to fight all they would send
out. The whole battle savors of the heroic period of chivalry. The
little ships gave their defiance to all comers, and then opposed
their skill and prowess with their weapons, to all who might come
out. More than three times the force of the Eagle was sent against
her. One shell from the Galicia's 4.72 inch guns would destroy
her. The six-pounder rapid-fire guns and the machine guns could
tear her to pieces ; but she brought her little battery of six-pound
ers to bear, and fought as if she was armored. As for McCalla —
the challenge had been taken up, and the Eagle was in the fight.
How much more force could be brought against them was not con-

i8
sidered. The Eagle must be sustained. On the firing of the first
gun, the Marblehead went at full speed, to her assistance ; and so
handled her battery that she was worth a dozen ships less perfectly
conducted. A sailor in the fleet about Santiago and Guantanamo in June
and July, says : "No one ever called McCalla's ship, the Marble
head, by her official name ; she was known as The Tub of Blood.
The name stuck to her. She earned the title, too ; for it seemed
impossible for any one to get into trouble anywhere, without hav
ing her bob up and take a part in it."
He also said : "When the fleet was lying off Key West, Mc
Calla used to keep his crew at target practice day and night. The
men learned to shoot by sunlight, by moonlight, by searchlight,
and without light. The captain used to watch every shot; and I
don't think there was another set of marksmen in the navy who
were the equal, altogether, of the Marblehead's crew. McCalla
used to say that they could hit a fly as far as it could be seen with
a glass; and I guess he was right. When war was declared he
started out, and his ship did nothing except make trouble for
Spain." This man said : "McCalla never seemed to sleep. Whenever
anything happened he was on deck himself, and he knew the de
tails of every transaction."
Members of his crew said that during the whole war he never
slept in his cabin nor in a bed, but in the pilot house, or anywhere
nearest to where he would be wanted.
Young men from Detroit who were on the Yosemite in Guan
tanamo bay, said: "The Marblehead was an odd looking tub.
Not a piece of polished metal on her to keep the men rubbing. The
men said, the word is out that we are down here to fight, and not
to do useless work in this heat ; so all the brass and polished work
is painted, to keep it. It's a hundred and forty in the boiler rooms
and not a man sick. Quarterdeck or any cool place is good enough
for men that are shoveling coal or working the guns when they
are wanted." "He taught every man to swim. They can do anything."
This gossip casts a side light on the conduct of all, so that the
ship, the guns, the men, seemed to act by intuition; and every

19
man was inspired by perfect confidence, that all would be right.
It is necessary to see this aspect ; for its quiet action in battle may
be that eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle which the
statute for promotions had in view.
It shows why the incident of the rescue of the Eagle, and the
silencing of everything afloat and ashore was, to the Commander,
only the common thing, not to be specially spoken of.
April 29th the Nashville had burst a steam box; and she
limped back to Key West, while the Marblehead towed the prize
the Argonauta and tbe Eagle went with the despatches to the
Admiral. The slow progress (towing another ship), the repairs
tc the Nashville, and coahng, took four days' extra time; and Mc
Calla's little fleet consisting of the Marblehead, Nashville, Eagle
and Windom began the blockade of Cienfuegos on May 8th. This
blockade lasted from the 8th to the i6th of May ; when the fleet
was ordered to Key West, by means of one of the swift aux
iliaries, because of the approach of Cervera's powerful squadron.
During this eight days McCalla's fleet was full of "trouble
for Spain." Just how much time was spent in actual battle is not
recorded ; but the decks of the Marblehead were cleared for action,
the guns loaded, and battle ammunition at hand all the time.
Nearly a hundred miles of coast was swept of light houses and
aids to night navigation; the fortifications were tried, developed
and known; communications were established with the shore and
everything Spanish in and about Cienfuegos was inventoried.
Among battles, which on the Spanish side were bloody, was
one that grew out of the fact of 1,200 Spanish cavalry garrison
ing five blockhouses; where they waited the dispersal of some
1,700 Cuban cavalry, to descend upon the Cuban invalid camp,
where some 5,000 old men, wounded men, women and children
.were collected, and to butcher and destroy them. The Cubans in
some way communicated with McCalla thirty miles east of Cien
fuegos, that their cavalry could not keep together another week,
for want of food and forage, and asked his aid ; and on the return
toward Cienfuegos the Marblehead demolished five forts or
blockhouses, and with the Cubans destroyed the cavalry power
of Spain in that part of the island. It was a bloody battle in which
the conduct of the commander of the Marblehead was eminent
and conspicuous.

20

On the loth of May Commander McCalla called the Com
mander and Lieutenant of the Nashville on board the Marblehead
and arranged for the cutting of the cables. The work itself was
to be done by two launches protected by two armed steam cutters
in command of Lieutenant Winslow, of the Nashville, Lieutenant
Anderson and Ensign Magruder, of the Marblehead. The two
lieutenants were in the launches with the working party while the
ensign had charge of the cutters with machine guns, etc.
The full detail of the marvelous work is given in an article
written by Lieutenant Winslow and published in the Century
Magazine of March, 1899, at page 708.
The cable house was situate about 25 feet from the water's
edge, and a line of rifle pits ran within 50 feet of the water's edge,
so concealed by tall grass and bushes that they could not be seen ;
and back of this the land was irregular, and was overgrown with
long grass, vines and bushes. From this low strip, a hill, of sharp
ascent, rose to about 300 feet in height, the acclivity being of rocky
and irregular surface and covered with trees and dense chapparal ;
nature forming there better cover and rifle pits than man could
have made.
McCalla left the revenue cutter Windom to protect the collier
Saturn; placed the Nashville about 1,400 yards south-east of the
cable house, and with the Marblehead took a position command
ing the entrance of the harbor to give battle to any Spanish
man-of-war that might come out, on the one hand, and on the other
hand, to cross the flre of the Nashville above and about the boats.
The ships first fired on and destroyed the cable house till it
was nothing but a pile of masonry.
Then the boats pulled in with their oars ; and, in their work,
were repeatedly within little more than a boat's length of the
shore; the armed cutters lying a little outside, firing upon the
rifle pits, to keep the enemy down.
The boats were directly in front of the rifle pits, and hardly
a hundred feet from them, when their danger drew the fire of the
ships all around them, in a furious cannonade. The Marblehead
fired so close that the men in the boats ducked, and it seemed as if
the shells could not come closer without hitting the boats. But
the men in the boats realized that they had to risk a hit from their
own ships or receive the fire of the enemy at close enough range
for pistol shots.
The men worked on; and admired the perfect markmanship
of the gunners of the Marblehead— due to months of practice be
fore the war.

21
As the hours wore on, a regiment poured in to the rifle pits
and covers, and the number of the enemy rose to 1,500 or 1,700
men. When the cables had been cut, and the large numbers of the
enemy had made it too dangerous for the boats to remain, they
coolly withdrew; but some of them had been killed by troops in
the tower of the lighthouse and dwelling of the keeper, both of
stone, and the Marblehead cut them down. Lieutenant Winslow
says that they were cut down by shell after shell almost with the ac
curacy of a saw, so that no soldier escaped, and there was left only
heaps of debris. He says the accuracy of the fire bore tribute to
the untiring energy of Commander McCalla in bringing his crew
to so high a state of efficiency and marksmanship. It was marvel
ous gunnery that for three hours, in rolling ships on ocean swells,
swept the beach close to the boats above and around them and the
ragged hill without an injury to one of our own men from any
shot from ship or launch. When the great re-enforcements occu
pied the light house, the Windom was ordered to join the battle.
On our side two were mortally wounded; and eight others
were struck. Among them Lieutenant Winslow in a launch was
shot in the hand and Commander Maynard, of the Nashville, on
board his ship, was struck with a rifle ball, above the heart, and
put out of the fight ; though the ball was so spent as not to enter.
It was said that of the enemy more than 300 were slain, and that
the conduct of the battle was eminent, conspicuous and marvelous.
Other engagements of daily occurrence filled out the eight
days of this blockade.
May 1 6th, the little fleet steamed toward Key West, under
orders from the department; and under like orders returned and
reached Cienfuegos May 24th, where they were incorporated in
the flying squadron. From May 24th the Marblehead accom
panied that squadron, and at the beginning of its blockade at San
tiago, at dusk of the evening of the 28th, was placed, with the
Vixen, close to that port as an inner picket line. The order was
to be two miles inside of the fleet. This seems to have been the
position, either lying to, off the harbor, or steaming to and fro in
side of the heavier ships (except during the 30th, when the heavier
ships fired their guns toward the Colon, from a distance of four to
six statute miles), until June i, at 4:45 a. m., when smoke was
sighted to the eastward, which proved to be the New York and
Oregon.

22
From the ist to the 7th of June, the Marblehead had its place
in the blockading circle off Santiago, and in the attack on the bat
teries of June 6th, the little cruiser had her place in the attacking
line between the great armored Brooklyn and the battleship Texas.
At midnight the Marblehead was withdrawn from the block
ade and sent with the Yankee to Guantanamo bay.
The bay was entered at daylight on June 7th, notwithstand
ing its forty-four mines ; and at half-past 6 two six-pounder shells
from the Marblehead struck the cable house on Fisherman's Point,
within one foot of each other, destroying the union of the two
large with the two small cables, completely severing communica
tion at this point for the time being; and at noon the boats of the
Marblehead cut one of the inside cables. The reconnoissance of
the bay was completed during the day and reported to the Admiral
at night; and about noon of June Sth the Marblehead retumed
with the collier Stirling and took charge, and from that hour no
news, from the outer world, reached the Spanish army at Guan
tanamo City or Caimenara.
With the naval force and marines under his command and
the Cuban auxiliaries, whose motions were controlled by his ad
vice Commander McCalla bottled up 7,000 Spanish troops, and
neutralized them during the war, keeping them from marching
on the rear of our army investing Santiago — and holding them
substantially paralyzed until they finally surrendered to him, under
the terms agreed upon at Santiago.
Whether the conduct of this Commander was that character
ized by tbe statute as eminent or conspicuous in battle or of ex
traordinary heroism during all the time in Guantanamo bay ; this
was very near to that, namely : the education of the whole ship's
company so that when the ship took charge of this important bay,
and steamed over its mine fields, reconnoitered its coasts held by
7,000 Spanish troops and forts, drove back and shut up and ulti
mately destroyed its naval defenses, did as they had done at Cien
fuegos, all that could be done by such a ship and body of r^en ; and
did all they were sent to do.
The first camp on Cuban soil was of marines very much under
his charge; the first and second battle on land were by those ma
rines, and Cuban allies acting as he indicated.
The nation watched with terror for that little body of troops
ashore ; but the gunners who had mowed the grass with shell pass
ing from the rolling ocean, above their comrades' heads in boats,
saw the ships placed, and knew they guaranteed their men on

23
shore from being overwhelmed, though all the forces of Spain
were brought against them.
It was not all done by the Marblehead or by McCalla. Seniors
in rank were often in the fighting line. The mighty guns of the
Oregon, Massachusetts and Indiana were, by the newspapers, said
to have joined, though the Marblehead moved into the position of
danger nearest the unraised mines, or the torpedo boats of the
inner bay ; but whoever came and of whatever rank — all cordially
joined in McCalla's battles and worked as harmoniously as if by
rank they were under his command. No one questioned his au
thority in or about that bay.
Another danger, McCalla had seen in 1880, in the same bay,
when a Spanish man-of-war lay under Fisherman's Point, para
lyzed by yellow fever ; its officers and men dying of this scourge.
Aware that on the health of the fleet depended the safety of the
army; that if the ships became infected the campaign could not
be carried on. The responsibility for the health of the forces in
Guantanamo bay was cast upon McCalla, and the quarantine he
established was applied to all comers — high and low alike — and
prevented the appearance of the yellow fever in the ships and
camp. The Commander's care of the fighting men was noticeable.
When the marines landed, from his own experience at Rio,
Panama and elsewhere, and on the recommendation of the surgeon
of the ship and of a colonel and surgeon of the Cuban army, he
had the village burned ; saying, the security of our men from dis
ease, of course, outweighs all feelings of sympathy for the unfor
tunate owners of the buildings and contents. And he reported to
the admiral on June 12th, "An order which I found necessary to
give the commanding officer of the U. S. S. Panther in order to
relieve the fighting force." "Sir. Break out immediately, and
land, with the crew of the Panther, 50,000 rounds of 6-millimeter
ammunition. In future, do not require Colonel Huntington to
break out or land stores or ammunition, with members of his com
mand. Use your own officers and crew for this purpose. And
supply the commanding officer of marines promptly with any
thing he may require."
Ashore and afloat the men were kept supplied with food, as
good as could be had — and care was taken of it to keep it good.
After war had closed and $16,000 was (by the wrecking
company) asked to raise a gunboat (the Sandoval) sunk in the
inner bay ; a lieutenant and fourteen men of the Marblehead raised
her in twelve days and she was added to our navy.

24
And in eleven months, of which from the first of December
till the middle of August were spent in torrid waters but one man
died of disease and two from wounds in battle, of all the company
of the Marblehead.
It was not strange that with the campaign fresh in mind, the
necessity for and value of Guantanamo bay appreciated, at the
banquet at the peace jubilee in Chicago, when the toast. The Navy,
had been proposed, the President of the United States should
have directed that McCalla be called on and introduced as the
hero of Guantanamo bay.
In addition to above work of June 7th, the News Almanac
says that on that day the cruiser St. Louis, protected by the Mar
blehead and Yankee, cut the French cable off the port of Caimen
ara in Guantanamo bay.
The Marblehead was to remain in charge of the bay. (App.,
488.) Like authorities say that the Marblehead crew raised forty-
three mines in Guantanamo bay.
( These pages in parenthesis below, under dates in June, refer
to pages of "The Naval Operations of the War with Spain," other
wise known as "Appendix.")
Spanish papers (recovered by McCalla) showed that thirty-
one of the forty-four contact mines guarding the approach to
Caimenara were planted between the 2d and 9th of the May pre
ceding their raising. (448.) They were, therefore, fresh, and
afforded occupation for many days; especially, considering that
7,000 Spanish troops were in the vicinity to harass the workers,
from the cover of forests, etc.
June loth. The Panther arrived, and Marine Battalion of
600 landed, and encamped, naming this first camp "Camp
McCalla." (441,489.) And from that time they were constantly
under fire, but repulsed every attack.
The holding of the position at Guantanamo bay was of the
utmost importance to the navy, as it furnished a base for the oper
ations against Santiago, and Admiral Cervera's division.
Owing to the dense undergrowth, affording safe shelter to
the Spanish sharp shooters, it was impossible for the vessels by
shelling the shore to keep the enemy from harassing those on
board the ships with their Mauser rifles to such an extent as to
make it dangerous for them to remain there. (441.)

25
June I2th, during a very severe attack. Dr. Gibbs (a surgeon
of thenavy) was killed; and McCalla reported the battle and sent
for Dr. Arnold to take his place. (491.)
The Marblehead took part in each of the fights from the nth
to the 14th, except that at Cuzco Wells on the 14th. And during all
the time from June 7th to the close of the war McCalla kept in
close touch witb the Cubans, and made of them very valuable aux
iliaries, whether as reinforcements to the marines or as operating
separately — whereby the 7,000 Spanish soldiers there were kept
from all communication with the Spanish force at and about San
tiago (453) and from moving on the rear of our army or to rein
force the main army of Spain. (See pp. 492-500.) The value of
this work is shown by General Shaffer's letter of July 4th:
"Through negligence of our Cuban allies Pando, with 5,000 men,
entered the city of Santiago last night. This nearly doubles their
forces." (App., 609.) Had these 7,000 appeared on our rear it
might have been disastrous.
June 15th the Texas was sent to Guantanamo for the pur
pose of assisting the Marblehead in the destruction of a fort.
(448.) The Suwannee was also sent for the same purpose. The
fort was severely bombarded by these ships and destroyed.
Both the Marblehead. and the Texas had narrow escapes from
torpedoes, one being picked up by the Marblehead's screw and the
other being dislodged by the Texas was picked up by the Marble
head's launch. (448, 453, 494, 499> 447-')
A Spanish spy was captured by the Cubans on the i ith, en
deavoring to carry despatches from Guantanamo to Santiago
(453).. McCalla was most energetic in making the Cubans useful
as auxiliaries (500) ; and had their advice and co-operation (492,
502), as he had had at Cienfuegos. (424,403.) Colonel Vietas,
a Cuban physician and a Colonel of the Cuban forces, rendered
him invaluable advice as to deaUng with the yellow fever, which
was all around our fleet and troops in and around Guantanamo
bay. In the Senate Documents (55th Congress, 3d Session, Execu
tive C and D), entitled, "Sampson-Schley: Official Communica
tions to the United States Senate," at page 158 is a report of Com
mander McCalla, dated June 16, 1898, showing how close he was
in touch with the Cubans, and their aid in battle on the 14th ; and

26
at pages i6i, 164, 167, Commodore Schley's letter gives the signals
used by the Cubans about Cienfuegos very graphically, and shows
the promptness with which their information was given to Mc
Calla, and its reliability.
June 2Sth a force was sent by Commander McCalla, under
command of Colonel Huntington, of the Marine Corps, consisting
of two companies of marines, and two-thirds of the force of
Cubans under Colonel Thomas, to determine whether the enemy
still occupied the extremities of Jicacol Point, in Guantanamo bay.
The landing was covered by the Marblehead, the Eagle and the
Helena ; and when the reconnoisance had been completed and the
soldiers re-embarked, the Marblehead proceeded to drag for mines,
and found and raised four. ¦ (502.)
Gradually the occupation extended into the inner bay, com
pelling surrender of the gunboat Sandoval, etc. (which was treach
erously sunk after surrender).
Enough of detail has been given to make it clear that the gos
sip was right that no one could be in trouble anywhere, but the
Marblehead would come up and relieve it. And it is remarkable
that with contact mines made by the French and many of them
recently put down, numbering a great many, and each lying in am
bush with all the dangers of a battle ; 7,000 Spanish soldiers armed
with mauser rifles to avail of the dense forests around the bay,
forts and batteries covering the bay and channels ; and yellow fever
on every side ; not a ship or boat was lost by the navy ; not a man
was lost in the bay or camp by yellow fever; the bay was made
wholly available for the navy and transports; and the Spanish
army, there, was made as completely unavailable to Spain, as if it
had been captured in the first ten days.
After the war, and McCalla had been sent to Nor folk,, Navy
Yard as Captain of the yard, he was sent with the Vulcan and
Potomac and another ship to- examine, and if possible recover the
Maria Teresa, ashore on Cat Island.
In the fall of 1899 he was assigned to the command of the
Cruiser Newark (then at San Francisco, for repairs). She was
needed at the Philippines, and though not nearly done, McCalla
sailed, and completed the repairs at sea. Mindful of expense

27
to the country, and of the desires of the men in the field, he offered.
to carry mail, and they gave him 900 bags — a big tug boat load,
that filled all available space, including the Captain's cabin; and
in that condition he met the worst typhoon of years, and rode it
out, though for two days it kept the Captain on the deck or in
the pilot house.
Arrived, he was sent north with his ship and some gunboats,
and captured a province, and with his launches met and pro
visioned the invading army ninety miles from the coast (at
Appari).

August 10, 1898, the President advanced certain officers under
the statute for conduct in battle, and among them Commander
McCalla, who was designated as advanced and promoted to Cap
tain, taking rank next to Captain Goodrich. One newspaper gave
the advance as seven numbers, and another gave it as six ; but the
list of promotions was not acted on by the senate.
On February 3, 1900, the Comptroller of the Treasury sug
gested that McCalla was put out of the Navy, as of August 10,
1898, by the joint action of the President and the Senate, without
notice and without cause; and that judgment should be obtained
against him for the salary he has been paid, since that date.
The Comptroller says, that August 10, 1898, the President
advanced Commodore Sampson eight numbers and appointed him
a Rear Admiral ; Captain Philip five numbers and appointed him
a Commodore ; Commander McCalla five numbers and appointed
him a Captain.
That afterwards, the President nominated Lieutenant-Com
mander Pillsbury "to be a Commander, vice Commander Bowman
H. McCalla, advanced and promoted."
That the advancements of Sampson, Philip and McCalla were
not confirmed by the Senate and became null (citing authorities).
That the nomination of Lieutenant-Commander Pillsbury "to
be a commander from the loth day of August, 1898, vice Com
mander Bowman H. McCalla, advanced and promoted," and con
firmation thereof by the Senate put McCalla out of the navy. And
in support of this proposition he cites three decisions of the Su
preme Court of the United States, one decision of the Court of
Claims, and one comptroller's decision, namely: McElrath v. U.

28
S., I02 U. S., 426; Blake v. U. S., 103 U. S., 227; Keyes v. U. S.,
109 U. S., 336; Quackenbush v. U. S., 33 Court of Claims Cases,
355 ; ^w re Stevens, 6 Comp., Dec. 17.
In the case of McElrath v. U. S., judgment had been entered
against McElrath for the pay he had received after having been
so put out by the President by and with the consent of the Senate ;
and the judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court, (p. 440.)
McCalla's condition, as suggested by the Comptroller, is
worse than that, supposed, of the son who asked bread of his
father and he gave him a stone. Here, the President attempted to
cherish the navy, and reward distinguished service that could be
rendered only in battle, by the highest honor in his power; that
of special promotion (in which the Senate joins) under the statute
provided for such cases; and, by a slight oversight, contrary to
the intention of the President and the Senate, the attempt to honor
and reward proved a catapult, which hurled the subject of honor
into the air, stripped him of his rank, his profession, and his office,
and left him stunned and destroyed. It was not a betrayal with a
Judas' kiss, and the words, "Hail, master," because the intent to
deliver him up to judgment was lacking; but the accidental words
in Pillsbury's nomination "to be a Commander vice Commander
Bowman PI. McCalla, advanced and promoted," had the effect of
a fatal judgment, stripping him of all he had, and casting him out.
It is probable that the Attorney General may be of opinion
that the Comptroller of the Treasury is wrong; but his will be
only an opinion, and cannot remove the cloud and danger cast over
McCalla, which at all times will attend his services and his life,
and at any time may put him to a lawsuit to fight in a line for
which he is peculiarly unfitted to maintain as best he may his claim
for a mere place in the navy.
There are but two things which can establish his right to be
a naval officer, beyond question or peradventure ; one, would be a
judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States in a case be
tween him and the United States, and such judgment could only
be rendered in the exercise of an appellate jurisdiction ; and could
not be obtained in less than two years. The other would be an act
of Congress, approved by the President, which would promptly
put him in his place, and make it sure.

29
THE CAPTAINS AND ADMIRAL.
Meanwhile, with the close of this session of Congress, two
years will have elapsed since the close of the Spanish war, due to
the destruction of the naval power of Spain, and the acts of the
fleet that destroyed that power have not been acknowledged — but,
instead, have been turned down.
The Maine.
The comity of nations, which have commercial relations with
each other is such, that national ships of war visit the ports of
other nations, their safety guaranteed by the owner of the port to
be as great as that of ships belonging to the port. The understand
ing called international law affords this guaranty. This warranty
extends to individual traders or travelers, and if they are wronged
01 injured in a foreign place, the nation governing the place is
called upon for reparation.
In March, 1898, the Viscaya visited the port of New York, re
mained at will, and went away in safety protected by this comity
and law of nations.
The Maine so entered the port of Havana and was treated as
the guest of Spain. She was assigned a place to anchor ; and led
to the very buoy where she was to moor. In the harbor of Havana
mines had been placed by the government of Spain. The govern
ment of Spain was engaged in a campaign against its people; of
cruelty and extirpation, then deemed incredible. Its success would
destroy the market for large amounts of America's productions,
and cut off the supply of much that American markets needed.
Knowledge of its fiendish murder of a nation — killing all by slow
torment and certain means of death, with malice, prepense and
aforethought, would rouse the American heart and might wake
the civilized world, if it was known; and the Maine was not an
acceptable visitor ; for, however this nation might be moved either
by avarice or humanity, it might annoy Spain in its purposes. De-
stiuction of the ship and all on her would strike terror to the na
tion of shopkeepers and soft humanitarians, and make them stand
aloof from meddling with Spain, which gloated in terrible deeds
of war and blood. The United States, abhoring scenes of blood,
the duel, the cock fight, even the public meeting of two men to
fight with fists, under careful rules, would seek an excuse to avoid
collision with warlike Spain ; whose fleets encircled the world ; and

30
whose army in Cuba, 3,000 miles from home, was nearly ten times
as great as the army of the United States.
The motive — the weapon — the opportunity — and the result.
Many a murderer, convicted on less evidence, has confessed
before he has been executed for the crime.
The catastrophe fell ; and both before and after it the officers
of Spain, in public gatherings and dinners, rejoiced, and celebrated
the destruction of the Maine.
One man of the Maine, on whom fell the immediate duty of
caring for the wreck, the wounded and the dead, retained his head.
From the hour of the explosion, he would not place a foot, in
peace, on Spanish soil. Gloom filled him ; his work proceeded ; and
like a spectre he regarded the wreck, the castle, the town, and the
power of Spain.
He knew his ship and all his companions had come, with
safety guaranteed ; had been placed by the government, which was
the guarantor ; and had been blown up. And Spain had done ab
solutely nothing, to turn aside the prima facie proof of guilt. The
child standing among broken dishes, with his ball bat in his hand,
is not more infantile in his surmise — "I guess they must have
broke themselves"- — than was the government of Spain, in its in
difference to and explanation of the calamity — done in its very
hands. *
Wainwright knew that his companions had gone where they
•were sent by the United States; had rested where tbey were placed
by Spain; and, in an instant, had been destroyed. And Spain had
not cleared it up. Spain had not shown where her mines were
placed.
The Gloucester. Lieutenant Commander Wainwright.
At the battle of Santiago, the smallest and weakest ship of the
beleaguring force, was the Gloucester, a converted yacht, of 786
tons. So weak, that a one-pounder automatic gun, would destroy
her. Her place in the blockading squadron was at the eastermost
point, and the nearest to the shore ; half way between tbe battle
ship Indiana and the land. She was at the point where she was
placed by Admiral Sampson ; but she was so long and light she
would not' keep her head up against the wind, and when the Maria
Teresa came out, her stern, and not her prow, was pointing to the
harbor.

31
The admiral's order of June 2d, was the standing .order, to
her, with the other blockading ships : "If the enemy tries to es
cape, the ships must close and engage, as soon as possible; and
endeavor to sink his vessels, or force them to run ashore in the
channel. It is not considered that the shore batteries are of suffi
cient power to do any material injury to battleships."
This yacht was nearest the Morro, and any gun on it was
powerful enough to sink her.
This was the order, and the only order, for her conduct.
At 9 :37 the Maria Teresa appeared. As soon as it was pos
sible the engines of the Gloucester were moving at full speed, and
the little ship was turning to "close and engage." As the arrriored
cruisers came on (from the first of which the powerful Brooklyn
turned), she threw her little three and six-pound shells at them.
There was temptation to shoot under the stern of the last cruiser,
and try to damage the steering gear or propellor. But the big
ships were engaged and in the smoke ; and tbe commander of the
Gloucester had his head with him. He looked for the destroyers,
who might follow and torpedo our battleships, or escape to the
south or eastward ; so he slowed down, and kept east of the Indi
ana, and raised his head of steam, till the Pluton and the Furor
came out. Then he read a signal on the Indiana ; which told him,
that he might pass the Hne of fire of the Indiana without danger
from her guns ; and the little ship was pushed forward with a
speed which she increased to seventeen knots to close with the
two of the most modern war ships in the world, either of which
would alone have been a match for the attacking ship. An auto
matic one-pounder was swinging closer and closer, till its rain of
shot was within sixty feet of the Gloucester. Had they come the
sixty feet nearer, they would have destroyed her. Shot and shell
from the ships whistled about her ; and shell from the batteries on
shore played around her, as she neared the destroyers ; but there
was no stay — "close and engage as soon as possible and endeavor to
sink the enemy's vessels" was the order obeyed. The Teresa and
Oquendo turned. Lieutenant Huse called attention to it, and he
and Wainwright, both, thought they were turning to escape back
into the harbor, and would pass, so that they would destroy the
Gloucester at close range. There was time for the Glouceste,r to
turn and escape, as the Brooklyn had done when the Teresa pointed
toward her. The Gloucester did not swerve ; but, faster and faster,
closed in with the destroyers, so that they would be sunk with the
Gloucester, by the fire of their own vessels. And all the time, every

32
gun, watched by the Commander, was kept up to its utmost power
of destruction. The shots told so that the enemy could not hit
the Gloucester. The distance was reduced to 600 yards, and
nearly all her shots struck their mark.
Disaster to her was not to be. The Teresa and Oqendo
sought the beach, the Pluton, worsted, ran upon the rocks. The
Furor disabled and uncontrollable rushed in circles, and surren
dered ; and, a little later, threw her head high in the air, and sank
in the deep ocean.
The order for the battle had been obeyed.
Just as the Furor became uncontrollable the New York, com
ing up from the east under the fire of all the batteries, fired two
or three shots at her ; and the Admiral seeing that the eastern ves
sels of the fleet were defeated and would not escape, kept on under
high speed, through the fire of the Socapa battery, to mark how
the Indiana, Oregon, Iowa and Texas bad obeyed the order for
the fight. In all the naval battles of the world there have been few more
perfectly described by the statute for promotions "for eminent
and conspicuous conduct in battle, or extraordinary heroism" than
Wainwright and those under his command.
The professional opinion of The Admiral, under whose eye
the Gloucester's whole battle was fought, is given in his report of
July 19, 1898 (Appendix, 508) :
"The skillful handling, and gallant fighting of the Gloucester,
excited the admiration of every one who witnessed it, and merits
the commendation of the navy department. She is a fast, an en
tirely unprotected auxiliary vessel — the yacht Corsair — and has
a good battery of light rapid-fire guns. She was lying about two
miles from the harbor entrance to the southward and eastward,
and immediately steamed in, opening fire upon the larger ships.
Anticipating the appearance of the Pluton and Furor the Glouces
ter was slowed (thereby gaining more rapidly a high pressure of
steam), and when the destroyers came out she steamed for them at
full speed, and was able to close to short range, while her fire was
accurate, deadly and of great volume.
"During this fight, the Gloucester was under the fire of the
Socapa battery.
"Within twenty minutes from the time they emerged from
Santiago harbor, the careers of the Furor and the Pluton were
ended, and two-thirds of their people killed. The Pli^ton was

33
beached and sunk in the surf. The Furor sank, in deep water, a
few minutes later.
"The destroyers probably suffered much injury from the fire
of the secondary batteries of the battleships Iowa, Indiana and
Texas; yet I think a very considerable factor in their speedy
destruction, was tbe fire, at close range, of the Gloucester's battery.
"After rescuing the survivors of the destroyers, the Glouces
ter did excellent service in landing and securing the crew of the
Infanta Maria Teresa."
In his report to the Admiral, of July 6, 1898, Commodore
Schley said:
"The dense smoke of the combat shut out from my view the
Indiana and Gloucester; but as these vessels were closer to your
ftagship, no doubt their part in the conflict was under your imme
diate observation." (Id., 518.)
The other eye witnesses to the work of the Gloucester in this
battle, in addition to the Admiral, were those on the Indiana, the
Iowa and the Texas, whose captains respectively mention it in
their reports (pp. 531, 538, 528), Captain Taylor, of the Indiana,
speaks of the odds against which the Gloucester fought (p. 531) :
"We then devoted our attention to prevent the escape of the de
stroyers, which appeared m,ore than a match for the Gloucester ,
she being the only small vessel near, to engage them."
Of course those on the New York were witnesses of the
Gloucester's fight. Captain Chadwick mentioned it in his report,
of the part taken by his own ship (p. 520).
THE BIG SHIPS.
Pages 135 and 136 of the pamphlet containing the letter of the
Secretary of the Navy to the President of the Senate, dated Feb
ruary 6, 1899, and papers annexed, show that the Admiral recom
mended, that each officer commanding a big ship be advanced five
numbers, etc. ; and stated that the conduct of all the commanding
officers was (as evidenced by the destruction of every ship of the
enemy') such as to call for such recognition.
He also said "though the Massachusetts was not in the action,
the destruction of the Spanish squadron was the inevitable out
come of weeks of arduous and dangerous blockade which had no
precedent in its method, and of which that ship bore its full part,"

34
The Admiral has presented a question of law, as well as the
question whether such promotions are politic, and will tend to ac
complish the purposes for which the statute was passed.
The statute provides for such promotions, only "for eminent
and conspicuous conduct in battle, or" (for) "extraordinary hero
ism" anywhere.
If the extraordinary heroism was limited to battle the words
"in battle" would have been placed at the end of the sentence.
Ward and Victor Blue are believed to have exhibited extraordinary
heroism. Such an engineer as that of the Prairie Belle might save
an army or a ship, by extraordinary heroism. There is a story of
McCalla standing over the magazine of his ship (years ago) when
fire was working into it, while volunteer members of the crew,
under his guidance, stopped the fire. Such an act might be so
done by an officer or men as to be extraordinary heroism.
The President nominated four persons to be advanced for ex
traordinary heroism, namely :
Captain Charles D. Sigsbee to be advanced three numbers.
Lieutenant Cameron McR. Winslow five numbers.
Lieutenant Edwin A. Anderson five numbers.
Liejitenant Victor Blue five numbers.
Captain Sigsbee on the St. Paul, alone blockading San Juan,
maneuvered against a Spanish cruiser and the destroyer Terror,
and almost destroyed the latter under the protection of batteries of
modern 8 and lo inch guns, with eminent and conspicuous skill
in the battle, in which the slightest mistake would have lost bis
ship. It was eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle. (Ap
pendix, 220-3) ; but the nomination was placed on the ground of
extraordinary heroism. Lieutenants Winslow and Anderson
had charge of cable cutting boats at Cienfuegos, and Lieutenant
Blue penetrated to Santiago, and reported on the Spanish fleet.
The admirals determined that Lieutenant H. H. ^Ward is
entitled to be advanced ten numbers. He remained in Spain and
reported the conditions, etc., of the Spanish navy, which was ex
traordinary heroism in the service of his country.
But the question of law and politic action, now under con
sideration, is under the other clause.

35
Can and should the Captains of the big ships be promoted
for eminefit and conspicuous conduct in battle?
In the first place there are not many of them : the New York,
Massachusetts, Indiana, Oregon, Iowa, Texas, Brooklyn. The
New York cost $2,985,000; the Massachusetts, $3,020,000; the
Indiana, $3,020,000; the Oregon, $3,222,810; tbe Iowa, $3,010,-
000 ; the Texas, $2,500,000 ; the Brooklyn, $2,986,000.
By the time they are fully armed and equipped, the expense
added is so great, that they are called five million dollar ships.
A man, fit to command one of them, carries a good deal of
eminent and conspicuous conduct with him all the time.
They require the working of about as many mechanical appli
ances, and of as varied mechanical attainments, as the operation
of the largest trunk line railroad, or the largest steel or iron
works. And a man fit to run one would, with his training in a
little different direction, be fit to manage big railroads or works.
The Fair in Chicago pays its general manager $25,000 a year, and
he has nothing to do with the finances. The Federal Steel Com
pany pays its president $50,000 a year. The United States needs
to keep in its employ men competent to command a five million
dollar ship in battle, and not make a mistake.
It is true that the naval officers are educated by the United
States, that they have a steady job, and sure pay. But in ordinary
life, railroads and business establishments are constantly hiring
away the best men from other railroads and business estabUsh
ments, or attempting it.
It seems expedient for the United States to recognize abso
lutely perfect conduct in battle, by the captain of a big ship.
It is probable that Admiral Sampson did not reason it all out
in this way, but he got to the result with straight "horse sense,"
just as the one in actual control of a great railroad, steel works or
store would have done; and he blurted it out with the fewest
words : "That each officer commanding a big ship be advanced
five numbers." The question of the policy of such promotions is hardly res
integra. The discussion is handicapped by three precedents.
Every commander of a ship in Dewey's Squadron was pro
moted, though it could not be known that any one ship (except
the little gunboat Petrel) had sunk a Spanish ship.

36
For extraordinary heroism in a steam launch that accom
panied the Merrimac when Hobson sunk her, June 3d, Naval Ca
det Joseph W. Powell was advanced two numbers, and confirmed
June 28, 1898 ; and for eminent and conspicuous conduct in bat
tle at Cardenas, on May 11, 1898. Lieutenant John B. Bernadou
was advanced ten numbers and confirmed, July i, 1898.
The naval power of Spain was not destroyed nor broken un
til its main fleet was overcome off Santiago, and, the precedent
having been made, fairness requires that the men shall be treated
alike, and that those who killed the big ships of Spain shall be
honored in the same manner and degree with the others.
The Admiral has specially mentioned the Massachusetts, and
given his reason why her captain should be promoted. Do the
facts stated by the Admiral, as furnishing the reason, show that
the conduct of her commander was conduct in battle ?
We will state the facts more at iarge :
In May, 1898, the whole effective naval force of Spain,
which had crossed the Atlantic (except the destroyer Terror), en
tered the harbor of Santiago, namely: the Colon, Teresa, Viscaya,
Oquendo, Mercedes, Furor and Pluton.
On the 29th the Commodore sighted the Cristobal Colon in
the harbor, another of the Viscaya class, and the tops of another,
etc. (Appendix, 404.)
On May 31, the Commodore having transferred his flag to
the Massachusetts, she with the Iowa and New Orleans stood in
"to injure or destroy the Colon." The Commodore says they
went in until their distance was about 7,000 yards, and fired at
her. (Appendix, 427, 428.)
The Captain of the Massachusetts says, that at daybreak on
the 29th, they made out a man-of-war lying at anchor inside the
harbor entrance, and later a second man-of-war and two smaller
vessels ; that on the 30th the enemy were still in sight in the en
trance; the Massachusetts, New Orleans and Texas in column
on the blockade; that at 11 a. m. the signal was made from this
vessel : The Massachusetts, New Orleans and Iowa will go in
after dinner to a distance of 7,000 yards, and fire at the Cristobal
Colon with 8 12 and 13 inch guns." At i :3o p. m. the Ma'ssa-
chusetts (leading), the New Orleans knd the Iowa steamed in to

37
about 8,000 yards ; then turntu, passed the entrance, and opened
fire ; the range used increasing from 7,500 to 9,500 yards. They
turned southward, headed west, and passing again, fired toward
the ships. (Appendix, 416, 4^^ .)
The commander of the Iowa says that May 29 at 7:40 they
sighted a man-of-war in the entrance to the harbor, and during
the forenoon made out the Cristobal Colon and two vessels of
the Viscaya class; that on May 31st, the range, at which their
guns were first fired, was such that the sights were set for 8,500
yards ; but the shots fell short, and they were set at 9,000 yards
during the run. During the second passage, the sights were first
set for 9,500 yards and increased to 11,000, and nearly all tbe
shots fell short. (Appendix, 419, 420.)
The enemy returned our fire from ships and batteries, but
without any effect. (Id., 417.) ,
If that was a battle, where all the shots fell short or missed on
both sides, there was no eminent or conspicuous conduct, which
can be noted from the reports. Seven thousand yards is four stat
ute miles; 8,000 yards is above four and a half; 9,000 yards is
above five and a quarter; and 11,000 yards is six and a quarter
statute miles. All of them appear to be safe distances.
The distance, from the harbor, at which the blockade was
kept, prior to the first of June, is not very clear ; apparently, the
unprotected cruiser Marblehead lay six miles off from the en
trance to the harbor, and the big ships, from one to three miles
farther off. (Appendix, 426, 416, 404.)
The Assembly.
When the health of Admiral Sicard became such that he felt
obliged to withdraw from the position of commander of the naval
force of the North Atlantic Squadron, it naturally devolved upon
the next in command. Captain William T. Sanipson. He had,
doubtless, exercised such power, during the illness of his pre
decessors, as the squadron was at sea. On the 26th of March,
1898, at Key West, by direction of the Secretary of the Navy,
Captain Sampson formally assumed the command, and hoisted
his pennant, on board of the armored cruiser New York. (Ap
pendix, 163.)
This was, as a temporary arrangement, pending the selection
of an officer to command the fleet in war; it was authorized by
Section 1434 of the Revised Statutes.

38
It is said that the Secretary of the Navy then wrote to each
commander of a ship in that fleet, asking who he would desire to
have command the fleet in which he was to serve ; and that all but
one, named Captain W. T. Sampson in their replies.
This was a novel, but a republican method of election. It
was conducted by the secret ballot. It was an ideal election, in
that the voters were intelligent; were acquainted with the quali
fications of those they might name; were deeply interested — for
their success or failure in life might depend on the commander
they got ; were uninfluenced, for there were no parties, no candi
dates and no caucusing ; and .voted at their leisure, in writing, and
by a sealed ballot.
April 2 1st, Captain Sampson was assigned to command the
naval forces, with tbe rank of rear admiral, and was ordered to
hoist the flag of a rear admiral. He received the appointment and
order, by telegraph, at Key West ; and April 22d, off Havana Har
bor, he delivered the President's proclamation of blockade, with
proper orders to the several commanders under him. (Appendix,
167-8.) May 28th, the Secretary of the Navy telegraphed to the Ad
miral : "Schley telegraphs from Santiago de Cuba, he must go to
Key West, with his squadron for coal. * * * How soon,
after arrival of Schley at Key West, could you reach Santiago de
Cuba with New York and Oregon, the Indiana and some lighter
vessels, and how long could you blockade there ?"
* * * * !|C
"Consider if you could seize Guantanamo and occupy as a
coaling station." (Appendix, 398.)
He answered:
"Three days. / can blockade indefinitely.
"I think that I can occupy Guantanamo.
"Would like to start at once with New '7 ork and Oregon, ar
riving in two days." (Appendix, 399.)
Permission was granted the same day. (Id., 399.) The hour
of the day is not given, and two days from receipt of the telegram
must have been at evening or night of May 31st.
The log of the Marblehead reads :
"June 1st. Blockading off Santiago de Cuba until 4:45 a.
M. when smoke was sighted to the eastward, which proved to be
the New York, Oregon and Mayflower." (Id., 427.)

39
The Admiral had got there.
It was but two days and a very few hours after permission to
start was given, when the New York and Oregon and little May
flower, were there to blockade and to fight the entire naval power
of Spain. They had come nearly a thousand miles, and if the ocean had
been as naked of ships as they thought it was, there would prob
ably have been a naval battle developed in less than thirty-three
days ; and a chance to mention extraordinary heroism in battle.
There was no delay when the admiral was summoned.
There was no danger in the perilous service he proposed, in
which he did not intend to share.
It happened that the Massachusetts, Iowa, Brooklyn, Texas,
New Orleans, Marblehead, Vixen, etc., were still off Santiago.
The Blockade.
June 1st the Admiral arrived with the New York and the
Oregon, and shortly after that he placed the ships in battle array,
within reach of the guns of the fortifications, and issued orders for
their guidance by day, by night, in case the enemy's ships should
come out, and for other contingencies. And in addition to these
maneuvers, for the destruction of the enemy, he ordered some
particular attacks.
Was this a battle from about lune ist to the destruction of the
fieet luly 3d, within the meaning of the statute?
The Admiral said, in his report of July 15, 1898:
"I regard this complete and important victory, over the Span
ish forces, as the successful finish, of several weeks of arduous and
close blockade; so stringent and effective during the night, that
the enemy was deterred from making the attempt to escape at
night, and deliberately elected to make the attempt in daylight.
"That this was the case, I was informed by the commanding
officer of the Cristobal Colon.
"It seems proper, to briefly describe the manner, in wlych,
this was accomplished.
"At the time of my arrival before the port, the moon was at
its full ; and there was sufficient light, during the night, to enable
any movement outside of the entrance to be detected.

4©
"But with the waning of the moon, and the coming of dark
nights, there was opportunity for the enemy to escape, or for his
torpedo boats to make an attack upon the blockading vessels.
"It was ascertained that the Merrimac, so gallantly taken into
the channel, on June 3d, did not obstruct it.
"I therefore maintained tbe blockade as follows :
"To the battleships was assigned the duty, in turn, of light
ing the channel.
"Moving up to the port, at a distance of from one to two
miles from the Morro, the distance depending upon the condition
of the atmosphere, the lighting ship threw a search-light beam
directly up the channel, and held it steadily there.
"This lighted up the entire breadth of the channel, for half
a mile inside of the entrance, so brilliantly that the movement of
small boats could be detected.
"Stationed close to the port were three picket launches ; and,
at a little distance farther out, three small picket vessels; and,
when they were available one or two of our torpedo boats.
"With this arrangement, there was a certainty that nothing
could get out of the harbor undetected.
"After the arrival of the army, when the situation forced,
upon the Spanish admiral, a decision, our vigilance increased.
"The night blockading distance was reduced to two miles for
all vessels ; and a battleship was placed alongside the searchlight
ship, with her broadside trained upon the channel, in readiness to
fire, the instant a Spanish ship should appear.
"The commanding officers merit the greatest praise, for the
perfect manner, in which they entered into this plan, and put it
into execution.
"The Massachusetts, which, according to routine, was sent
that morning to coal at Guantanamo, like the others, had spent
weary nights upon this work, and deserved a better fate than to be
absent that morning." (Appendix, 509, 510.)
During the Boer war, military critics have been telling us,
that with modern long-range arms, of great precision, battles are
liable to be spun out over months of time: — one or both parties
aiding their defense or attack by moving or lying behind protec
tions, and making one step in the battle to-day and another a
week hence, etc.
A writer in London (February 24, 1900) says: "The birth
of this new martial era is now chronicled in all tbe letters coming

41
from the front, which are based upon sound military judgment,
that war has been stripped of the greatest part of its exhilaration,
and its individual and collective heroism." He quotes from a
letter : "The Boer fights with his head, seldom with his muscles ;
our men fight with their muscles, seldom with their heads. They
have come out here determined to earn a Victoria cross, or to dis
tinguish themselves by displaying conspicuous bravery in the field.
It is magnificent, but it is not war. The brain will have to win the
battles." The London writer comments: "It is a change which robs
war of half its martial glory, a change which minimizes valor, and
substitutes the cool, silent brain of a good chess player, for the
charge of the light brigade."
In the Cuban war, valor and heroism were recorded, equal to
the times of romance; but in the navy, experience, learning and
thought must control. the great scientific forces, must produce and
educate skill as well as power and endurance in muscle in bone and
nerve and -eye, must develop combination of purpose and action in
men and use in material things ; or else the highest valor, and the
purest heroism, may be only blind and useless sacrifice, like the
charge of the light brigade. This combination, of qualities with
numbers, bad so grown up in the navy of the United States that
Lieutenant Winslow, writing of the volunteering to cut the cables
at Cienfuegos, says : "I believe that there could be no situation,
however hazardous, where the enlisted men of our navy, would not
gladly accompany their officers." (The Century Magazine,
March, 1899, p. 711.)
The heroic lieutenant unconsciously gives a picture of the
combination of this modern war. The men knew him and Lieu
tenant Anderson, who were to go with them. All the selection of
men and materials, and methods of action on the spot was left to
his head; except that they must not go on shore. All knew the
capacity of their ships and armament and crews; and rested se
cure in what they knew of the superior and commanding officers,
who would remain with the ships. The ships were (as they be
lieved they would be) in exactly the right place. The Marblehead
against the entrance of the harbor, would fight any Spanish man-
of-war or boat, that might come out; and was placed just right
to unite in giving, with tbe Nashville, the most perfect aid to them,
against the infantry and artillery on shore.
The boats were directly in front of the rifle pits and hardly
a hundred feet from them. The cannonade from the ships passed

42
close over their heads. The shells of the Marblehead could hardly
have come closer without hitting the boats. "We realized that we
had to take the chance of an accidental hit from our ships, or re
ceive the fire of the enemy at pistol range. And the men worked
on in disregard of both." (Id., 715.)
The enemy had been re-enforced. Fifteen hundred Mauser
rifles with machine guns, and with smokeless powder, had been
brought against them, and were getting in their work at very short
range, the bullets hitting the boats and water around them, and
decimating the crews. The ships were firing swiftly — furiously to
check that fire — and under all that — no man knowing but he or all
might, in the next instant, be called by the deadly messenger — it
was necessary to man the oars and pull the boats clear of the break
ers. "The men were perfectly cool and showed no sign whatever
of fear or uneasiness." And they calmly moved from under that
blizzard of missiles, to tbeir ships, (p. 716.)
It is a picture of the combination of modern war.
The mutual confidence, and mutual dependence, necessary
where mariners meet the duties and perils of the sea, are infinitely
increased by the additions of modern science to the material con
ditions of modern war.
"Section 1506. Any officer of the navy, may, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate be advanced not exceeding thirty
numbers in rank for eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle."
The use of the words "eminent" and "conspicuous" has
changed with the introduction of rifles, that can shoot through a
tree or a stone wall, and send a bullet farther than a man can see
another. Yet the intent and meaning of the statute remains ; and
the conduct which wins the battle is within that meaning. The
modern conduct, that fits the officers and men and all the appli
ances, through repeated exercise, and continues the influence,
while the decisive action is fought under orders given long be
fore — and watches to see those plans executed, and to supply any
failure, must be such conduct, as the statute now contemplates, or
there can be no such approval given to the conduct of the higher
officers. The coaling of a battleship is as much a part of her action in
any service (if needed), as supplying ammunition to artillery or
troops on land.
It was to be necessary for the fleet to act in concert with the
land forces ; and as there were ships enough for effective blockade

43
it was better that the Admiral be on or near the flagship, when con
sulting with the army, to be ready for any plan agreed on or any
emergency ; and the movement of the ship, for such purpose, might
be a maneuver in tbe battle itself.
The Thirty-Three Day Battle.
June 2 the order, under which the final conflict was con
ducted, was issued by the Admiral.
"The fieet off Santiago de Cuba will be organized during the
operations against that port and the Spanish squadron, as follows :
First Squadron (under the personal command of the commander-
in-chief), — New York, Iowa, Oregon, New Orleans, Mayflower,
Porter. Second Squadron (Commodore Schley), — Brooklyn,
Massachusetts, Texas, Marblehead, Vixen.
"Vessels joining subsequently will be assigned by the com
mander-in-chief. "The Vessels will blockade Santiago de Cuba closely, keeping
about six miles from the Morro in the daytime, and closing in at
night, the lighter vessels well inshore.
"The first squadron will blockade on the east side of the
port, the second squadron on the west side.
"// the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and en
gage, as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink his vessels, or
force them to run ashore in the channel.
"It is not considered that the shore batteries are of suffi
cient power to do any material injury to battleships.
"In smooth weather the vessels will coal on station.
"If withdrawn to coal elsewhere, or for other duty, the block
ading vessels, on either side, will cover the angle thus left vacant."
(Appendix, 481, 511.)
A diagram accompanied that order of battle, showing the
position the ships were to occupy, (p. 482.)
On June 2 the Secretary advised the Admiral that an army
of 20,000 men, with artillery and cavalry, expected to start from
Tampa, on June 4th. (p. 482.)
June 3 the Merrimac was sunk. It afterwards appeared that
she had gone beyond the narrow place in the entrance, and did no
good. (Id., 437, 495.)

44
The Admiral telegraphed the Secretary of the Navy : "Beg
troops to move with all possible celerity. Six ships, the Spanish
Squadron in the harbor of Santiago, are unable to avoid being
captured or destroyed." (Id., p. 483.)
"Observations to-day, by a reliable Cuban, in accordance with
my instructions, make four Spanish armored vessels, and- two
Spanish torpedo destroyers in Santiago."
The Admiral then gives number of Spanish forces, etc., in
garrison. (Id., 483.)
The communication of the Secretary of the Navy to the
Admiral, of May 6, is here to be remembered.
"The Department is perfectly willing that you should expose
your ships to the heaviest guns of land batteries, if, in your opin
ion, there are Spanish vessels of sufficient military importance,
protected by these guns, to make an attack advisable; your chief
aim being, for the present, the destruction of the enemy's prin
cipal vessels." (Id., 367, 368.)
June 4, the battle line was pushed in closer.
The Admiral ordered: "The Texas, Massachusetts, Iowa
and Oregon will take position 4,000 yards" (2 marine, 2^ statute
miles), "from Estrella Point, and opposite the entrance to the port
of Santiago, in the order named, from west to east ; in such posi
tion as to be able to observe the wreck of the Merrimac, and will
fire upon any parties which may be seen working about it.
"If fire be opened, by the batteries, it will be returned, and an
endeavor made to destroy tbem.
"In case of opening fire upon the batteries, the Brooklyn,
Marblehead and the Vixen will take an enfilading position 4,000
yards to the westward of the entrance and well inshore, and the
New York, New Orleans and the Yankee a similar position to the
eastward, and will engage the batteries at the same time with the
battleships." (Id., 511, 512.) ,
June 5. Launches were sent in at night to picket the entrance
to the harbor. (Id., 512.)
The Admiral gave an order for the Brooklyn, Marblehead,
Texas, Massachusetts as tbe westem column; and tbe New
York, Yankee, New Orleans, Oregon and Iowa as the eastern
column to engage the batteries on the morrow, at the same time
taking bearings and distances with all practicable accuracy. (Id.,
484.)

45
June 6. The engagement began at 7 :38 a. m.
The flagship New York began at 6,000 yards, and soon ran
within 3,000 (one and a half marine miles), and finally approached
to 1,900 yards range (less than a mile). (Id., 438-9.)
The Massachusetts was of tbe western column. The execu
tive officer reports : "Following the flagship, and other ships of
the west squadron, we countermarched twice, and were upon the
firing line three times. The first time the range was over 5,000
yards. The third time, the range was 3,200 yards and nearly con
stant, and our fire was correspondingly more effective during that
time." (Id., 439.)
The Admiral reported by telegraph: "Bombarded forts at
Santiago to-day from 7 :30 to 10 a. m., and have silenced works
quickly, without injury of any kind, though stationed within 2,000
yards." (Id., 485.)
The log of the Colon shows that several men were sent to the
hospital from the Mercedes ; that Commander Costa, the executive
and five men of that ship were killed, and two ensigns and 12 men
wounded. (Id., 434.)
June 7. General order No. 9, — containing a careful system
of signals, for the event of one or more Spanish ships coming out,
to ensure their destruction; with directions, that all officers will
familiarize themselves with the "chase" signals in the general sig
nal book, — was issued by the Admiral. (Id., 517.)
The cordon tightened.
"Three picket launches, detailed from the ships of the squad
ron each evening, will occupy position one mile from the Morro —
one to the eastward, one to the westward, and one to the south
ward, of the harbor entrance.
"On a circle drawn, with a radius of two miles from the
Morro, will be stationed three vessels : the Vixen to the westward,
from half a mile to a mile from the shore; the Suwanee south of
the Morro; and the Dolphin to the eastward, between half a mile
and a mile from the shore.
"The remaining vessels will retain their positions already
occupied, but they will take especial care to keep within a four
mile circle.
(Signals are provided for, and keeping the engines in readi
ness.) "I again call attention to the absolute necessity of a close
blockade of this port, especially at night and in bad weather. In

46
the daytime, if clear, the distance shall not be greater than six
miles ; in the night, or in thick weather, not more than four miles.
"The end to be attained justifies the risk of a torpedo attack,
and that risk must be taken.
"The escape of the Spanish vessels at this juncture would be
a serious blow to our prestige, and to a speedy end of the war.
"Attention is called to the provisional signals established by
general order number 9." (p. 485-6.)
June 8, a new blockading power was introduced: The .Search
Light. The Admiral reported: "This was undoubtedly one of the
most important elements in making the blockade successful, in that
it made it impossible (as was stated on board the New York, by
the Captain of the Colon) for the Spanish squadron to leave at
night. "The entrance was, by this means, brilliantly lighted, so that
the movements of the smallest boat could be seen within.
"A later modification, kept a second battleship close to the
illuminating ship, so that the first of these two should be able to
use her guns, without disturbing the illumination." (Id., 486.)
The log of the Colon, from this day to the third of July,
speaj<s of this search light" blockade. (Id., 434-6.)
The order of the Admiral was :
"During the dark hours of the night search lights will be used
as follows :
"The Iowa, Oregon and Massachusetts will take turns, of
two hours each, in keeping one search light directly on the harbor
entrance, maintaining carefully, during that time, their blockading
positions. "The picket launch and vidette, stationed south of the Morro,
will move to one side or the other, sufficiently to get clear of the
beam of light.
"The vessel on each flank, the Brooklyn and the Texas on the
western side, the New York and New Orleans on the eastern side,
will take two hours turns, in using one search light from time to
time on the coast line, swinging it towards the Morro, but avoiding
the illumination of the flanking videttes on the inside line. The
light should never be turned off more than five minutes at a time.

47
From time to time the horizon outside will be swept. Not less
than three minutes should be employed in sweeping through an
arc of 90 degrees." (Id., 486.)
June 10. The second search light order.
"The use of search lights during the dark hours of last night
clearly indicates that the lights can be used with the greatest effi
ciency, if sufficient care is taken for this purpose.
"It is absolutely necessary that the beam of light should be
held steadily up the channel into the harbor.
"Under these circumstances, it is believed to be practically
impossible for a vessel to escape detection, in any attempt to come
out. "I, therefore, enjoin the commanding officers of the Iowa and
Oregon and Massachusetts to move forward into their positions,
not more than two miles from the entrance, with the entrance
bearing north by east.
"Tbe Iowa, arriving first at 7 :30, will place her light squarely
up the entrance into the harbor, and hold it steadily, except during
the time required to change from one search light to another.
"At the end of two hours from 7 :30 p. m., she will tfe relieved
by the Massachusetts, and go back to her blockading position three
miles from the entrance." (Id., 489.)
June II. The third search light order.
"Until further orders the battleships Iowa, Oregon and Mas
sachusetts will employ their search lights in the manner so success
fully employed during the last two nights.
"Care will be taken, however, to go in close enough to make
the light wholly effective for the purposes desired.
"The picket boats report, that the lights at times are too weak,
because of the distance of the ships.
yfi 3p Jp 3(*
"Regard must be had for the state of the atmosphere. If it is
hazy, an effective illumination of the harbor entrance will require
a closer approach." (Id., 490, 513.)
Blockade order: "When on the blockade, vessels will, unless
for some special temporary reason for the contrary, habitually
head tozuard the land instead of away from it." (Id., 514.)

48
June 12. Blockade Order.
"While blockading the Spanish fleet in Santiago de Cuba, ves
sels will hereafter maintain a blockading distance of four miles
during the daytime.
"This distance will not be exceeded except by permission or
under special circumstances." (Id., 514.)
Despatch to Secretary : "Lieutenant Blue has just returned,
after a detour of seventy miles, to observe Santiago harbor. He
reports that the Spanish squadron is all there." (Id., 492.)
(The report of Lieutenant Commander Delehanty and that of
Lieutenant Blue are given in the appendix at pages 443-5.)
June 14. "During the night the Vesuvius went in close to
shore and fired three shots, two at the western battery, and one
into the channel between Cay Smith and mainland." (Id.)
Just after daylight the New Orleans was ordered in, and
engaged the battery, to the east of the Morro, with the idea of pre
venting ^ continuation of work, and the replacing of guns which
might have been dismounted.
She soon became actively engaged with both batteries, and
fired with accuracy and effectiveness for about twenty minutes.
Though a number of shells fell near the New Orleans and
flagship, neither was struck. (Id.)
June 15. Blockading Order.
"The commander-in-chief desires again to call the attention of
commanding officers to the positions occupied by the blockading
fleet, especially during the daytime ; and it is now directed that all
ships keep within a distance of the entrance to Santiago of four
miles; and this distance must not be exceeded." (Id., 493, 514.)
An Order for Bombardment was issued on this day*
"An examination indicates that the Spaniards have been add
ing to the defenses to the east and west of the entrance.
"Apparently there are mounted on the left of the westem bat
tery two ship's guns, and on the right hand of the same battery two
or three old guns.
"On the eastern battery to the right of the light house are
mounted three old guns, and possibly several smaller rapid-fire
guns.

49
"The squadron will be prepared to-morrow morning at early
daylight to shell both of these batteries.
"Arrived at a distance of 3,000 yards, each ship will stop and
turn to present her broadside: The New York, New Orleans,
Oregon and Iowa turning with port helm, and the Brooklyn,
Texas and Massachusetts with starboard helm.
"All vessels should endeavor to arrive on the firing line at the
same moment.
"After turning, distance should be closed to 400 yards.
"The vessels will retain the positions thus taken as nearly as
possible, moving in closer if necessary, in order to see their targets
and render their fire effective.
"On signal from the commander-in-chief all vessels will open
fire ; or fire will be opened in case the enemy begins.
"Bearings will be taken carefully, and distances obtained with
all practicable accuracy.
"The Vixen will take position inshore, on the western side,
and the Scorpion on the eastern side, and look out for the musketry
fire from shore.
"They will be slightly outside the flank ship and where they
can enfilade any infantry fire directed upon the ships.
"The fire will be deliberate, and, after the batteries are
silenced, will be carefully directed to their destruction.
"Ammunition will not be thrown a^yay.
"Careful instructions will be given to gun captains not to fire
unless they can see their mark, which, in this case, will be the
enemy's guns." (Id., 493, 514.)
"Reduced charges will be used in all guns of eight-inch cal
iber and above, with the corresponding sight marks, to increase
the angle of fall of the projectiles, and the probability of destroy
ing the batteries." (Id., 494.)
June 16. The Bombardment.
"Following the order of battle of the 15th, the batteries were
bombarded at early dawn.
"They were quickly silenced, and the fire was continued half
an hour ; and probably did much damage, as no shots were fired at
the ships as they withdrew." (Id., 494.)
Report telegraphed.
Bombarded the batteries on June 16 for forty-two minutes.

50
Firing very accurate.
The batteries were silenced completely.
Fleet not injured. (Id., 495.)
Report of bombardment by letter.
"On the morning of June 16, the batteries at the entrance of
Santiago de Cuba were subjected to a severe bombardment by the
fleet, the ships occupying approximately the same positions as dur
ing the bombardment of June 7.
"A nearer range than that used cannot be used to advantage,
on account of the height of the cliffs.
"The firing was deliberate, and, in general, most excellent.
"The batteries were quickly silenced; and, after firing with
deliberation, for some forty minutes, the fleet returned to its block
ading position, witbout any shot, whatever, from the batteries fol
lowing this movement.
"This fact undoubtedly shows the efficiency of our fire."
(Id., 499.)
Captain Chadwick of the New York reported that tbey moved
close under the western battery (on the east of the channel), they
fired at about 1,800 yards.
"Firing continued until 6 o'clock; and no shot having been
returned from the batteries, for some time, the fleet resumed
blockacking stations." (Id., 453.)
The executive officer of the New York reported, that "the
ship opened fire at 5 :24, at a distance of 3,000 yards. A few shots
from this ship were fired at the western battery, but the greater
part of the fire was directed to the battery to the eastward of the
Morro." There was but little return fire and this ship was not struck.
332 shots fired. (Id., 453-4.)
Captain Higginson of the Massachusetts, reported that the
fire of that ship was directed at the west battery, and some of the
shots were seen to strike in the battery. (Id., 454.)
The executive officer of that ship says: "When the broad
side was first brought to bear, the range was about 5,000 yards,
(2^ naval miles, almost 3 statute miles). ¦ Three eight-inch shots
were fired from, that position ; and then the ship was headed in,
and brought into action again at about 3,500 yards, which approx
imate range was kept during the rest of the engagement. The

51
smoke interfered badly with pointing, and with noting the falls;
the enemy's works being directly to windward." He gives account
of a number of shots :
"At first our fire was returned vigorously by two guns in
the west part of the earthwork, in fact, they fired first ; but their
fire was silenced before very long."
The ship was struck once, by a fragment of a six-inch shell.
(Id., 454-5.)
June 17, the Admiral telegraphed :
"A deserter from the Reina Mercedes states that the Merri
mac does not block up the channel, she is too far in the harbor.
"There is no possibility, however, of anything coming out
without our knowledge.
"A battleship is, every night,. at a distance of one mile from
entrance, illuminating the channel most clearly-.
"1 again urge earnestly that the army move with all possible
celerity. Fine weather may end any day." (Id., 495.)
The Admiral also sent the Secretary a captured letter showing
the condition of the Spaniards.
On this day an attempt was made to examine Cabanas bay
witb two steam cutters, one from the New York, and the other
from the Massachusetts. The bay was viewed, but the cutters
were subjected to severe fire, at short range, and were struck
seventeen times. (Id., 499, 500.)
On the 19th General Garcia visited the Admiral on the flag
ship. (Id., 500.)
On the 20th, General Shaffer reached the blockade line at
noon; and the Admiral went with him to Acerraderos, 18 miles to
the west, where they visited Generals Garcia and Rabi; and
arrangements were there made in reference to future operations,
including the debarkation of the army, on the enemy's coast.
(Id., 497, 500.)
June 21, pursuant to the arrangements made on the 20th the
Admiral issued this Order of Battle, Order for Blockade, and
Prophecy :
"The army corps will land to-morrow morning; the entire
force landing at Daiquiri.

52
"The landing will begin at daylight, or as soon thereafter as
practicable. "General Castillo, with i,ooo men, coming from the eastward
of Daiquiri, will assist in clearing the way for an unopposed land
ing, by flanking the Spanish forces at that point.
"Simultaneously with the shelling of the beach and block
houses at Daiquiri, the Esenada de los Altares, and Aguadores
(both to the eastward of Santiago), and the small bay of Cabanas,
(about two and a half miles to the westward of Santiago), will
be shelled by the ships stationed for the purpose.
"A feint (in force) of landing at Cabanas will be made: —
about ten of the transports (the last to disembark their forces at
Daiquiri), remaining, during the greater part of the day, about
two miles to the southward of Cabanas, lowering boats and making
apparent preparations for disembarking a large body of troops.
"At the same- time General Rabi, with 500 Cuban troops, wiU
make a demonstration on the west side of Cabanas.
"The following vessels are assigned to bombard the four
points mentioned above: At Cabanas the Scorpion, Vixen and
Texas; at Aguadores, the Eagle and Gloucester; at Esenada de
los Altares the Hornet, Helena and Bancroft; at Daiquiri the
Detroit, Castine, Wasp and New Orleans — the Detroit and Castine
on tbe western flank, the Wasp and New Orleans on the eastern
flank. "All the vessels named will be in their positions by daylight.
"Great care will be taken to avoid the wasteful expenditure of
ammunition. "The firing on Daiquiri will begin on signal from the New
Orleans. "At Cabanas it is probable that after a few minutes, unless
the firing is returned, occasional dropping of shots from tbe
smaller vessels will be sufficient, but the semblance of covering a
landing should be maintained, the ships keeping close in. »
"At Aguadores and Ensenada de los Altares the same rule
should prevail.
"At Daiquiri, the point of actual landing, vessels will, of
course, use their artillery until they have reason to believe that
the landing is clear. They will take care to make the firing delib
erate and effective. As General Castillo's column approaching
from the eastward, is likely to come within range of the guns,
sharp-eyed quartermasters, with good glasses will be stationed to

53
look out for the Cuban flag; and care will be taken not to direct
the fire toward any point Tvhere that flag is shown.
On the Blockade.
, "The Texas and Brooklyn will exchange blockading stations ;
the Texas going inside to be near Cabanas.
"The Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Iowa and Oregon, will retain
their blockading positions, and will keep a vigilant watch on the
harbor mouth.
"The Indiana will take the New Orleans' position in the
blockading line, east of Santiago, and between the flagship New
York and the shore.
"This is only a temporary assignment for tbe Indiana, to
stiengthen the blockading line during the landing, and avoid any
possibility of the enemy breaking through, should he attempt to
get out of the port.
For landing troops.
"The Suwanee, Osceola and Wompatuck will be prepared to
tow boats. "Each will be provided with two five or six-inch lines, one
on each quarter, each long enough to take in tow a dozen or more
boats. "These vessels will report at the New York at three a. m.
on June 22, prepared to take in tow tbe ship's boats, which are to
assist in tbe landing of troops, and convey them to Daiquiri.
"The Texas, Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Iowa, Oregon, New
York and Indiana will send all tbeir steam cutters, and all their
pulling boats, (with the exception of one retained on board each
ship) to assist in the landing.
"These boats will report at the New York at 3 A. m.
"Each boat, whaleboat and cutter will have three men ; each
launch five men; and each steam cutter its full crew; — and an
officer for their own management.
"In addition to these men — each boat will carry five men,
(including one man capable of acting as coxswain) , to manage and
direct the boats belonging to the transports.
"Each steam launch will be in charge of an officer, who will
report to Captain Goodrich.
"Care will be taken, in the selection of boat-keepers and
coxswains, to take no men who are gunpointers, or who occupy
positions of special importance at the battery.

54
"Unnecessary oars and impedimenta should be removed from
the pulhng boats, for tbe greater convenience of the transportation
of troops, but each boat should retain its anchor and chain.
"Captain C. F. Goodrich, commanding the St. Louis, will
have, on the part of the navy, general charge of the landing.
"The New Orleans will send her boats to report to Captain
Goodrich, upon her arrival at Daiquiri.
Order for blockade, and Prophecy.
"The attention of commanding officers of all vessels engaged
in blockading Santiago de Cuba is earnestly called to the necessity
of the utmost vigilance from this time forward, both as to main
taining stations and readiness for action, and as to keeping a close
watch upon the harbor mouth.
"If the Spanish Admiral ever intends to attempt to escape, that
attempt will be made soon." (Appendix, 497-8, 515.)
June 22. General Shaffer to the Admiral.
"I shall commence landing this morning.
"It is my intention to proceed from Daiquiri to Santiago as
rapidly as I can, and take some of my land transportation.
"The animals are in absolute need of some rest, and, for that
reason, I may not get very far to-day.
"I request you to keep in touch during the advance; and be
prepared to receive any message I may wish to transmit from along
the bluffs, or any of the small towns, and to render any assistance
necessary." (Id., 498.)
The bombardment was carried on at all tbe places named in
the order. At the extreme west. Captain Philip of tbe Texas lying off
Cabanas had a long continued engagement with the Socapa Bat
tery, in making the feint at that point (p. 615). The engagement
lasted for two hours, and in it one man was killed and 8 wounded
on the Texas, (p. 498.)
At 10 :30 the Admiral left the blockade and went to the east
ward to observe the progress. He found the vessels stationed as
required by tbe order given, actively firing on Aguadores, Ensen
ada de los Altares, (locally known as Siboney), and at Daiquiri.
The coast was cleared by tbis firing and the landing proceeded.
The landing was very difficult, because of a heavy sea (the heaviest
of the month till then) ; raised by a stiff gale, from the south.
(Id., 500.)

55
The Admiral wrote to the Secretary of the Navy :
"I shall keep the Indiana, for a few days, in order to send
each of our heavy ships successively to Guantanamo, to complete
their coaling. Heretofore they have been sent only in the morn
ing, to return to tbe blockade at night. As soon as this shall bave
been accomplished, I expect to return ber to the north side." (Id.,
500-1.) June 30. General Shaffer to the Admiral.
"I expect to attack Santiago to-morrow morning.
"I wish you would bombard the forts at Aguadores, in sup
port of a regiment of infantry, which I shall send there early to
morrow; and also make such demonstration as you think proper
at tbe mouth of the harbor, so as tO' keep as many of the enemy
there are possible." (Id., 503, 615.)
On this day a large number of eight-inch shells, were fired
into Santiago city, from near Aguadores, by tbe New York and
Oregon. (Id., 617.)
July I, in accordance with the preceding request of General
Shaffer, the New York, Suwanee and Gloucester took position, and
awaited the arrival of the troops, and then so fired as to dislodge
and drive away the enemy; about noon a field piece was brought
down the gorge, and fired four or five times at the troops. The
New York on observing this, enfiladed the gorge, (p. 503.)
In this junction with the army directions were given by the
army by signal ; and each detail was so attended to, that the move
ment, desired, was made easily. (Id., 515-7.)
Then the New York and Oregon again threw shells into
Santiago. They were fired over the ridges, with an elevation for
8,500 yards (p. 455) . The range was from 3^ to 4 miles (p. 503) .
Eighteen 8-inch shells fell into tbe city. (p. 607.)
"General Shaffer's compliments to Admiral Sampson.
"Wishes him to keep up his fire on Santiago, on the water
front. "Enemy bas six-inch guns there, annoying us very much in
our moves. "Our troops are watching within a hundred yards of the city,
on the east side.

56
"Will assault at daylight to-morrow morning." (Id., 503.)
July 2. In accordance with the request of General Shaffer,
tbe batteries at the entrance of the harbor were heavily bombarded
for two hours in the morning. (Id., 504.)
The reports of the. officers show, that the New York, the
Indiana, the Massachusetts, the Oregon, the Texas and the Brook
lyn participated in the bombardment; and, tbat it was terrific.
That the western battery was not utterly destroyed, was owing to
the failure -of the great shells to explode. After it was silenced,
the Massachusetts, Oregon and Indiana united in firing on the
Punta Gorda battery ; and they also fired up the inlet, with sights
to carry the shells three miles and a half. During the action,
shells burst near the New York, and some passed over her ; many
shots fell near the Indiana, and more shells passed over, and
struck near, the Massachusetts, than in any previous action. (Id.,
456-8.) Lieutenant Staunton telephoned to General Shaffer, at 9:45,
that "it will be impossible to force an entrance into tbe harbor until
we (the navy) can clear the channel of mines, a work of some
time, after forts are taken possession of by your troops."
At 10 -.go the Admiral received from General Shaffer a tele
phone message :
"It is impossible for me to say when I can take batteries at
entrance to harbor.
"If they are as difficult to take as those which we have been
pitted against, it will be some time and a great loss of life.
"I am at a loss to see why the navy cannot work under a
destructive fire, as well as the army.
"My loss yesterday was over five hundred men.
"By all means keep up fire, on everything in sight, until de
molished. "I expect, however, witb time and sufficient men, to capture
the forts, along the bay."
At 11:20. "Terrible fight yesterday — But my line is now
strongly intrenched, about three-fourths of a mile from town.
"/ urge that you make effort immediately to force the en
trance, fo avoid future losses among my men; which are already
very heavy.
"You can now operate, with less loss of life, than I can."
(Id., 608.)

57
The picture of these two men at the time appears in tbeir
despatches. Shafter in the bitter excitement of the most tremendous effort,
and heartrending losses, carrying his army against cannon and
rifle shot, the downpour of the skies, disease and threatened starva
tion, urges the naval officer, with the excited earnestness of the
juncture, and from his thought of how the navy may help.
The Admiral, with his alacrity curbed by thirty-three days
opposition of the obstacles before him, seeing the channel so nar
row that one ship sinking there would close it, and mined — He
had been on a ship in the war of 1 86 1-4 when a torpedo blew her
up. He had been president of the court of inquiry on the Maine —
266 lives for one shot. The channel was an ambushed path — in
which death for eight hundred lurked in every foot. He hesi
tates — this Admiral so swift to act — who checks at no danger,
where the result may be worth the risk — and then comes up to the
demand — ready, with fhe means for performance.
His answer to the General is :
"Our trouble, from the first, has been that the channel fo the
harbor is well strown witb observation mines, which would cer
tainly result in sinking one or more of our ships, if we attempted
to enter the harbor; and by sinking of a ship" (in that narrow
entrance) "the object, of the attempt to enter the harbor, would
be defeated, by the preventing of further progress on our part."
"It was my hope that an attack on your part, of these shore
batteries from the rear, would leave us at liberty to drag the chan
nel for torpedoes."
"// if is your earnest desire fhat we should force our entrance,
I will at once prepare fo undertake it.
"We have, in our outfit at Guantanamo forty countermining
mines, which I will bring here with as little delay as possible, and
if we can succeed in freeing the entrance of mines, by their use,
/ will enter the harbor."
Let us get so we can pass through that narrow entrance, and
no mines in the bay shall defer our advance.
July 3. The day of fhe Great Engagement.
Who set fhe battle in array?
Who directed the action, and saw fo fhe execution of the
orders for battle?

58
The first squadron, under the personal command of the com
mander-in-chief on that day, consisted of the New York, Glou
cester, Indiana, Iowa, Oregon, Hist and Ericsson, (pp. 481-2.)
The second squadron (under Commodore Schley) consisted
of the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas and Vixen. (Id.) Of
these the Massachusetts was, on that day, at Guantanamo, coaling.
The first squadron regularly blockaded on the east side of
the port, and the second squadron on the west side.
The diagram of their places accompanying the order, showed
that the first squadron would occupy six-elevenths of the circle,
the, Iowa being due south from the Morro. (Id., pp. 481-2.)
When the Maria Teresa was sighted, tbe Iowa was in its
usual blockading position, due south of the Morro, and distant
between three and four miles. (Id., 537.)
The place of the New York, in the blockading line, was to the
eastward of the Iowa and to the westward of tbe Gloucester and
Indiana. On that day the Indiana was in fact but about two miles
eastward from tbe Morro.
At 8:50 the New York started eastward flying the signal,
"Disregard the movements of the commander-in-chief."
In his letter, of March 2, 1899, to the chairman of the Com
mittee on Naval Affairs of the Senate, the Secretary of the Navy
says : "This signal is one which is frequently made in squadron,
and is never held as, in any sense, a relinquishment of command.
It is made where, for any reason, the flagship leaves its assigned
position in formation. At such times, it is made to avoid confu
sion, which would result if other vessels, fixing their positions
with reference to the flagship, were to move with her." (Senate
Document, pp. 174-5.)
Thursday, May 26, at 5 : 12 p. m. the flagship Brooklyn made
signal to the "flying squadron" : "Follow the motions of com
mander-in-chief." (Appendix, 421, 425.) At 6:30 p. m. she
made the signal, "Disregard motions of commander-in-chief."
(Id., 425.)
May 29 off entrance to Santiago de Cuba at 6 :30 a. m. she
signaled: "Follow motions of commander-in-chief." (Id.,
426.)

59
In the navy the senior officer present has the command, unless
there has been a special designation of some officer for command
under Sections 1434, 1464 of the Revised Statutes. Hence, when
the Commodore on May 26 at 6 :30 p. m. signaled to the Flying
Squadron, "disregard motions of commander-in-chief," he did not
abdicate the command of tbe Flying Squadron, and turn it over
to Captain Higginson (of the Massachusetts) the senior officer
present. If he abdicated, when and how did he resume command ?
Again, in case the giving of that signal was an abdication of
command by Admiral Sampson, it was no more than turning the
command of the first squadron over to Captain Evans as the senior
officer present in that squadron. It did not operate to turn the
command of the first squadron, which was blockading on the east
of the entrance to Santiago, to the commander of the second
squadron, which was blockading on the west of tbe entrance to
Santiago. Tbe command of the two squadrons, as squadrons, was dis
tinct. The commodore had been by general order explicitly
assigned to the command of fhe second squadron. By the same
order tbe Admiral was assigned to the local command of the first
squadron. The commodore did not become commander of the
first squadron in place of its commander, because he was not pres
ent with the first squadron, and the distinct division of tbe two
squadrons and their commands had never been modified.
Further, the Admiral was commander of all squadrons operat
ing in the North Atlantic ; and he was present and operating the
whole fieet against Santiago.
At 8:50 the New York left its place (having thus signaled
that the other ships were not to follow her) and proceeded at from
5 to 7 miles an hour toward Siboney, (which is nine miles from
entrance to Santiago harbor) .
The object of the visit was, to concert, with General Shafter,
a combined attack, by army and naval forces, on the batteries at
the entrance of Santiago harbor; which, being carried, the navy
would at once remove the mines, and the Admiral would go in
with the fleet.
At 9 :35 tbe Maria Teresa came out. At this time the New
York had been moving 45 minutes, and had gone three-quarters
of the hour's run ; whicb was from three miles and three-quarters
to five miles and a quarter. The stations of the Indiana and

6o
Gloucester on the blockade were about a mile and a quarter east of
the New York, so that she was about four miles, or 8,000 yards, to
the east of those ships, when the Teresa came out.
It will be remembered that on the 31st of May the Massa
chusetts (as flagship) with the Iowa and New Orleans, went into
action, which was intended principally to injure and destroy the
Colon, (Appendix, 428) ; and that their distance at the beginning
of the "engagement" was 8,000 yards and was increased to 9,500
yards (pp. 416-7) ; while the distance of the Iowa from her mark
was 9,500 yards at the first section of the engagement, and 11,000
yards in the last half of the engagement, (pp. 419, 420.)
The New York was not only within gunshot of the Gloucester
and Indiana, but tbe Spanish ships as they came out of the harbor
were in plain sight, (pp. 520, 551, 547.)
On July 4 (the next day) the Hist reported : "At 9 :3s a. m.
while immediately astern of the flagship New York, following her
to Altares, and when about five miles eastward of Morro Castle,
the enemy was discovered leaving the harbor."
On July 5th the Ericsson reported that they were then be
tween five and six miles eastward of the Morro when the enemy
came out.
This would make the New York about three or four miles east
of the Indiana, which was about two miles from the Morro.
The distance is not very important, though the New York
was about on the blockading line up to the 7th of June, and every
ship of the blockading fleet was in sight. She was nearer the
entrance to the harbor than the blockade had been maintained prior
to June first.
Lieutenant Ushur, commanding the Ericsson, says (in his
report of July 4), that, by the time he had tumed to the westward,
the flagship New York had hoisted signal 260: "Close in toward
harbor entrance, and attack vessels." (p. 547.)
Lieutenant Hazeltine, commanding the Hist, says in his re
port of July 4 : "Turned immediately with port helm, and steamed
full speed to the westward, in wake of flagship. About 9 :45 flag
ship made general signal : "Close in to mouth of harbor and at
tack enemy. * *
Speed at first seven knots, increasing gradually to 11." (Id.,
552.) Captain Chadwick, commanding the New York, reported July
4 : "Firing was heard, and a ship was seen leaving the harbor en-

Gi
trance. The helm was at once put over. The crew was called to
general quarters. Signal : 'Close in toward harbor entrance and
attack vessels' made. And the ship headed back for the enemy."
(p. 520.) Admiral Sampson reported July 15.
At the moment the enemy's vessels came out "the flagship
New York was four miles east of her blockading station, and
about seven miles from the harbor entrance." (Id., 506.)
"The New York turned about, and steamed for the escaping
fleet, flying the signal : 'Close in toward harbor entrance and at
tack vessels;' and gradually increasing speed, until, toward the
end of the chase, she was making 16^ knots, and was rapidly clos
ing on the Colon."
Reports of the Ships of the Blockading Line.
The Gloucester.
The report of Lieutenant Commander Wainwright, command
ing the Gloucester, and of Lieutenant Huse, the executive officer,
(Appendix, 540, 541), show, that the ship fought the battle, under
and with a most intelligent conception of the order of June 2 : "If
the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close, and engage, as soon
as possible, and endeavor to sink his vessels."
The ship disregarded the Morro. Its power had been learned,
in repeated bombardments ; it waited till closing was possible, (in
view of the fire of the battleships), raising steam till it could make
17 miles an hour, and then closing to within 600 yards. It was
neared and surrounded by a hail of shot, but was almost miracu
lously preserved. It was pushing to lay close to the Furor and
Pluton to compel the Viscaya and Oquendo to sink the Furor and
Pluton with her, if they (returning to the harbor) should fire at
her. Obedience to the order of the Admiral was the battle of the
Gloucester, that day.
The New York arrived while "the Indiana and Gloucester
were actively engaged with the Pluton and Furor, and fired some
four-inch shell at the one nearer the port, toward which she was
headed and seemed attempting to return." (p. 520.)
The Admiral reported that the New York fired "a few shots
at one of the destroyers, thought at the moment to be attempting
to escape from the Gloucester." (p. 507.)

62
The entire battle of the Gloucester from the beginning to the
end was under the eye, and in the personal presence of the Admiral.
(p. 508.) Having momentarily taken part, to prevent the escape of
one of the enemy's ships, and having seen that she could not
escape ; the flagship New York stood on to the westward, leaving
the Gloucester which had shown herself so capable, to look after
the survivors in the Furor and Pluton. (p. 520.)
The particular orders of the Admiral directing the actions of
the Gloucester at and after that time need not be repeated — it is
enough that the Gloucester was under the personal direction of
the Admiral, all through. The Indiana.
The Indiana is another ship that was nearer to the flagship
of the Admiral than to that of the Commodore from the beginning
to the close of the battle. (Appendix, 518.)
The Indiana is one of the most powerful ships of the navy.
That Captain Taylor, who commanded her, is an officer whose
conduct is always eminent, and who is relied upon by all others
under all circumstances, is apparent from the reports and letters of
all officers of other ships, who at any time have referred to him or
his ship. In command of the fleet (consisting of the Indiana and seven
other naval ships), he convoyed General Shaf ter's army to San
tiago (Appendix, 676) ; and on the 22d of June "as soon as the
ships were in position, and the debarkation about to begin, the
Indiana hauled down the senior officer's pennant, and stood to the
westward, to take station assigned in the blockading line." (Id.,
677.) The Indiana was placed where she was, by the Admiral,
"to strengthen the blockading line during the landing" of the
troops "and avoid any possibility of fhe enemy breaking through,
should he attempt to get out of the port." (Id., 497.)
The Commodore did not see the Indiana (Id., 518) ; the In
diana did not see any signal on the Brooklyn, and received no
order from the Commodore eitber before or during the battle. The
Indiana belonged to the first squadron of the blockading fleet,
which was under the immediate personal command of the Admiral.
(Id., 481.) If the Indiana did not see the signal hoisted on the
flagship of the Admiral, it was because the course of the flagship

63
was directly toward the Indiana, and the motion, of the flagship,
would put the edge of the signal flag toward the Indiana. (See
Maps, pp. 593, 533.) But the Captain of the Indiana had his
orders from the Admiral. He knew what he was placed there for ;
and his conduct in the battle was perfect. The line of fhe enemy
could not head east, because of it.
July 4, the next day after tbe battle, he reported :
"At 9:37 a. m. noted two guns from the Iowa and general
signal, 'Enemy's ships escaping' flying." (Id., 530.)
(This signal was given by the Iowa pursuant to the order of
the Admiral issued June 7. (Page 517.)
"At once cleared ship for action, and the men were at the
guns in a remarkably short time." (Id., 530.)
"The Spanish squadron was seen emerging from the harbor."
(Id.) Tbe position of the Indiana when the Spanish squadron came
out was 4,200 yards (about south-east by south) from the Morro.
Captain Taylor said : "At this time we bad only begun to close
in on the entrance according to your instructions, and had barely
gathered way." (Id., 532.)
"This ship fired on all of them" (the Spanish ships) "as they
came out, one by one; and continued tbe action, later, by firing
principally on the Maria Teresa, Oquendo, Furor and Pluton."
(Id., 530.) "The initial fire of the last two ships was directed at
this vessel, and, although falling very close, only striking the ship
twice." (Id.) Captain Taylor noted tbe effect of tbe shots of the
Indiana (a thirteen-inch shell seen to enter the Maria Teresa, ex
ploded, and set fire to her ) . After the Maria Teresa and Oquendo
were vanquished, he devoted special attention to prevent the escape
of the destroyers.
The Resolute following in line with the Indiana gave her
commander opportunity to see the battle of the Indiana from the
time the water around her was alive with the first broadside of the
Teresa, through the broadsides of the Viscaya, Colon and
Oquendo. She was the first to close with the enemy and her shells
were the first to reach the Teresa, Viscaya, Oquendo, Colon,
Furor and Pluton, and did reach them with terrible effect.
(App., 536.)
It is apparent that the Indiana guarded every point of her part
of the line of battle, and did her full share in the destruction of
five of the ships, considering her position ; her first duty being to

64
prevent the possibility of any ship of the enemy breaking through
to tbe eastward; where the transports were, which duty was per
formed. "The enemy's vessels headed to the westward, and our ships
headed in the same direction, keeping as nearly abreast of them as
possible." (Id., 530.)
On a map, (opposite page 533), Captain Taylor shows tbe
course of the Indiana to the westward, in the battle, and its posi
tion at II :35, wben the Viscaya went ashore, as well as that of the
flagship New York at that moment; when the Admiral signaled
the Indiana to "go back to the blockade off Santiago" (Id., 533),
and continued on full speed to tbe westward. It will be seen by
this map that when the Viscaya was running ashore the course of
the battle had brought the New York and Indiana "within about
half a mile of the Viscaya, and within from an eighth to a quarter
of a mile of each other.
The Oregon.
The Oregon was the next ship on the blockading line. She
belonged to the first squadron, under the personal command of the
Admiral (Id., 481.)
Captain Clark and the Oregon had made a record, for eminent
and conspicuous conduct, from March 19 till they took their place,
in the blockading line of Santiago. It needed only that the con
duct be continued in battle, to be eminent and conspicuous conduct
in battle. The ship lay at Puget Sound when tbe Maine was destroyed.
She left San Francisco March 19th. May 6tb, because she was
needed in tbe fleet of fhe Admiral, she parted from ber consorts
near Rio, and pushed her swift way, alone, up tbe map of the
Atlantic ; intending to fight the whole fleet of Spain if necessary ;
every man wearing, on his cap, the legend, "Remember the Maine."
On May Sth she was at Bahia. Tbe Navy Department tele
graphed: "Proceed. Avoid the Spanish fleet if possible. We
believe that you will defeat it, if it be met" ; and she swept into tbe
Atlantic, and north, with battle plan all made, to fight the Spanish
fleet alone. Every man on board knew tbe chance of such a battle,
and glowed to meet the enemy. May 26 tbe ship reached Key
West after her voyage of 14,000 miles; and had hardly coaled.

65
when she was called to steam another thousand miles to Santiago ;
and she, -with the New York, went there, to blockade, and to fight
tbe fleet of Spain.
That would have been a fight — with the great speed and power
of those two ships, and the nerve and fighting qualities of their
captains, and the Admiral.
In his report of the battle of Santiago, written the next day
(Appendix, 526), Captain Clark says:
"For a short time there was an almost continuous fiight of
projectiles over this ship."
"As soon as it was evident that the enemy's ships were trying
to break through and escape to the westward we went ahead at
full speed, with the determination of carrying out, to the utmost,
your order: "If the enemy tries to escape, the ships, must close
and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink bis vessels
or force them to run ashore." (Admiral's order, June 2, p. 481.)
How the Oregon fought is briefly told by an eye-witness, the
commander of the Resolute. (App., p. 536.)
(By 10:30) "our speed had increased to sixteen knots."
When the Viscaya went ashore, "only the Cristobal Colon was left,
and for a time it seemed as if she migbt escape." (Id., 526.)
Twice the thirteen-inch shells from the forward turret of the
Oregon had done their work on the Viscaya, and she turned so tbat
the after guns and even the six-pounders played on her at close
range, as the Oregon plowed by, in tbe wake of the Colon, — still
increasing speed and slowly gaining on the Spanish ship. At ten
minutes to one Captain Clark said tb Lieutenant Eberle, "try a
thirteen-inch shell on her," and soon an eleven hundred pound pro
jectile was flying after her. The big guns continued to fire slowly
and deliberately, and the sixth shot dropped directly ahead of the
Colon. The race was won, and the Colon turned toward the shore.
At twelve minutes after one, a thirteen-inch shell struck under the
Colon's stern, and her colors fell. The Colon bad surrendered.
The Iowa.
The Iowa was the next ship on the blockading line. She
belonged to the first squadron, under the personal command of tbe
Admiral. (Appendix, 481.)

66
Tbe position of the Iowa was such, that those on her could
look farther into the harbor of Santiago, than those on any other
ship. At sundown of July second, six columns of smoke were
seen rising from the harbor. Lieutenant Hill thought that they
indicated a movement of tbe Spanish fleet ; and the quartermaster
and the signal man, on watch, bent on the signal 250, "Enemy's
ships coming out," which had been prescribed by tbe Admiral in
his order of June 7. (p. 517.) So the signal floated out, the in
stant that the first ship of the enemy was seen from the Iowa. The
general alarm for action sounded through the ship, and a gun was
fired before the Captain reached tbe deck.
The ship had its orders from the Admiral, and they were exe
cuted without another suggestion from any one outside of the ship.
There was steam for a speed of about five knots. The engines
rung full speed ahead, and the battery made ready for firing. The
order to close and engage was executed.
The first shot was fired at 6,000 yards. Then the range was
rapidly reduced to 2,500, and afterwards to 2,000, and to 1,200
yards. In his report of July 4 Captain Evans said :
"When it was certain that the Maria Teresa would pass ahead
of us, the helm was put to starboard, and tbe starboard broadside
delivered, at a range of about 2,500 yards.
"The helm was then put to port; and the ship headed across
the bow of the second ship. As she drew ahead, the helm was
again put to starboard, and she received, in turn, the full weight
of our starboard broadside, at a range of about 1,800 yards.
"The Iowa was again headed off, with port helm, for tbe third
ship ; and, as she approached, the helm was put to starboard, until
our course was approximately fhat of the Spanish ship. In this
position, at a range of 1,400 yards the fire of the entire battery,
including rapid-fire guns, was poured into the enemy's ship."
(P- 537-) "About 1 1 :30 the New York passed in chase of tbe° Colon."
(Id.) Captain Clark, of the Oregon, wrote, in his report of July 4 :
The Spanish ships "turned to the westward and opened fire."
"For a short time, there was an almost continuous flight of
projectiles, over this ship ; but when our line was fairly engaged.

67
and fhe Iowa had made a swift advance, as if fo ram or close, the
enemy's fi,re became defective, in train as well as range." (Id.,
526.) "After having received on board the rescued crew of the Vis
caya, the Iowa proceeded to the eastward, and resumed the block
ading station, in obedience to the signal made by the Admiral
about II :30." (Appendix, 539.)
The Texas.
The Texas was the next ship on the blockading line and be
longed to the second squadron. (Commodore Schley.) (Id.,
481.) The Texas had a history also.
Of 4,000 tons less size than the other battleships, she carried
twelve-inch guns.
For three or four years before the Spanish war, the news
papers had been publishing accounts of her ill luck and ill behavior ;
had told how she was top heavy, imperfect, and almost unsea
worthy ; a ship that never should be sent to sea.
While in dry dock, at Norfolk navy yard, she was called the
"lopsided old hoodoo Texas."
Captain Philip was put in command of her in October, 1897 ;
and, from that time, she held her own, witb all ships of her class.
The account of the month of June, 1898, shows her as a steady
fighting ship.
June 4, the Admiral put her in with tbe Iowa and Massachu
setts, to watch the wreck of the Merrimac, lying two miles from
the wreck. June 6 she was in the bombardment of the batteries.
June 15 she was in the bombardment of the forts at Caime-
nera, which silenced them. The action being fought at anchor,
at 2,300 yards.
June 16 she was in the bombardment of the batteries at the
mouth of Santiago harbor.
June 22d she had a long engagement with the Socapa battery
while the troops were landing at Daiquiri.
July 2 she participated in the bombardment of the batteries.
July 3d the final battle of Santiago was reached.

68
Captain Concas, commander of the Maria Teresa, the flag
ship, in bis book on The Squadron of Admiral Cervera (Navy De
partment War Notes, No. VIIL), at page 65, says of our ships:
"The great experience gained in the bombardments of Puerto Rico,
Santiago and Daiquiri had served not only to train their men, but
to overcome the numerous difficulties arising from the complicated
mechanism of the mounts and breeches of modern guns ; and wbich
were experienced by Dewey's squadron at Cavite on May ist, and
by Sampson's at San Juan."
"As for us we had no opportunity to acquire the skill, so
necessary to prevent what happened on board of the Viscaya in
practice, and on the Teresa in combat."
Many modern ships are built to ram the enemy. This is a
maneuver in which no ship can be exercised, in training ; and none
can learn defense or escape, by successive trials. It would be likely
to be fatal to one or both of the participating ships, and to all on
board, so that there is no drilling for that department of war.
And when Captain Philip, of the Texas, faced that danger,
in the battle of Santiago, so suddenly, and shouted— "&acfe both
engines hard" — to tbe astonished engineers, and in a twinkling the
ship was racing against herself — and the collision was averted, he
met an untried danger by conduct in battle which was eminently
and conspicuously right.
It would have been safer for tbe Texas to have fought the
whole Spanish fleet alone, than to have struck or been struck.
She and her four hundred men would bave gone to the bottom, and
perhaps the Brooklyn and five hundred and sixty more.
Captain Concas, from outside of the conning tower of tbe Teresa
(P- 73 )> saw the stopping of the Texas, to let tbe Brooklyn pass.
(P- 75-) From "the Teresa, in doubling Cay Smith only the Texas
could be seen, and soon afterwards the Iowa." (Concas, j). 72.)
As Captain Concas then stood on the conning tower of the Teresa,
leading the attack upon our ships, it is probable that Captain Philip
was correct in his report (Appendix, 528) : "At 9 :35, the Morro,
bearing N. by E. -J E., distant 5,100 yards, fhe enemy's ships were
sighted standing out of the harbor.
"Immediately, general signal 250 was made :" (Enetay's ships
coming out, p. 517.) "This signal was followed by the Iowa's, al
most at the same time."

69
"The ship a.y per order" (pp. 514, 481) "was heading in
toward the entrance ; and went ahead full speed, putting helm hard
a starboard, and ordering forced draft on all boilers — ^the officer
of the deck having given the general alarm, and beat to quarters
for action, at the same time." (Appendix, p. 528.)
Captain Philip writes :
"The battle was a direct consequence of the blockade. And
upon the method and effectiveness of .the blockade was very
largely dependent the issue of the battle."
"When the Spanish Admiral at last made his dash to escape
we were ready — ready with our men, with our guns, with our
engines." "The Texas was churning a white wake, before the
first black prow of Cervera's squadron had fairly showed around
Puntilla. Within three minutes of the time when the alarm was
given, she was under way at full speed, and firing with every man
at his post."
"I was half way up the steps leading from the cabin to the
main deck, wben the gongs sounding tbe general alarm smote my
ear, with a fierceness that made me jump. On deck, officers and
men were running to tbeir assigned stations in time of action. I
heard some one cry — they are coming out. Glancing toward the
Morro, I saw three wreaths of smoke, blackening the blue sky over
tbe bills. It was just 36 minutes after 9 by our clock. The ship
was already under way, headed in. From our signal halyards flew
the flags, representing general signal No. 250 : — The enemy is at
tempting fo escape. Just as I reached the bridge, the foremost, of
the advancing Spanish ships, poked her nose around Puntilla. As
she swung around, she fired, and almost immediately, afterward,
our forward six-inch spoke. The first shell fired, by Cervera, threw
up a column of water short of us, and between the Texas and the
Iowa. On each- side, of the Texas, tbe Brooklyn, and the Iowa,
were coming up, with a tremendous rush. The dash of these two
ships, as soon as the alarm was given, straight for the enemy, with
cascades of water pouring away from their bows, was one of the
most beautiful sights of the battle. Farther east the Oregon and
the Indiana were also headed in, ready for business. From some
of the ships fluttered the same signal that we displayed — the enemy
is attempting to escape." (The Century Magazine of May, 1899,
pp. 88, 89.)
Who set the battle in array?
What conduct, of commanding officers of ships, could be more

70
eminent and conspicuous, than that, which permeated every part,
and burst spontaneously into execution of the Admiral's order, for
the exigency, and then directed the ship in the midst of the battle,
as tbe battle required ?
We will read a little farther in the Captain's narrative of the
battle :
"The first shots of the Texas were directed at the Teresa at
long range, as we were steaming almost direct for tbe harbor en
trance. "In a very few minutes the engagement had become general.
"Every one, of the Spanish vessels, fired as she came broad
side on, in rounding the western point of the harbor entrance ; and
the whistle of the shells, over our heads, became unpleasantly fre
quent. Occasionally, I saw a column of water shoot straight up
in the air, where one of their shells had struck near the ship ; but,
as nearly as I could tell, most of their shots bad too great elevation,
and were passing harmlessly over us.
"/ had altered the Texai' course to fhe westward, seeing that
that was the direction in which the Spanish squadron was going.
"Then occurred the incident tbat caused me more alarm than
anything Cervera did that day.
"As the Texas veered westward, tbe Brooklyn was plowing
up tbe water, at a great rate, in a course almost due north, direct
for the oncoming Spanish ships, and nearly a mile away from the
Texas. "The smoke from our guns began to hang so heavily and
densely over the ship, that for a few minutes we could see nothing.
We might as well have had a blanket tied over our heads.
Suddenly a whiff of breeze, and a lull in the firing, lifted the
pall, and there, bearing towards us across our bows, turning on her
port helm, with big waves curling over her bows, and great clouds
of black smoke pouring from her funnels was tbe Brooklyn.
"She looked as big as the Great Eastern, and seemed so near,
that it took our breath away.
"Back both engines hard — went down the tube to the aston
ished engineers ; and, in a twinkling the old ship was racing against
herself. "The'coUision which seemed imminent was averted, and as the
big cruiser glided past, all of us on tbe bridge gave a sigh of relief.
"Had the Brooklyn struck us then, it would have been an end
of the Texas and her half thousand men. Had the Texas rammed

71
the Brooklyn it would have been equally disastrous ; for the Texas
was not built for ramming, and she would have doubled up like a
hoop. "This happened about a quarter to ten." (Tbe Century Mag
azine of May, 1899, pp. 90, 91.)
"From that time on the Texas did her part in the battle with
the Spanish ; and, when the Colon alone was escaping, something
might happen to the Oregon; it was very clearly the duty of the
Texas to keep along in the chase, with all her energies. It gives
me pleasure to be able to write, tbat, old ship as she is, and not
built for speed, the Texas held ber own and even gained on the
Colon, in that chase." (Id., p. 94.)
Captain Concas writes : The Colon "was closely pursued by
the Oregon, which could sink her without herself receiving the
least injury, and the Brooklyn, an armored cruiser, of more speed
and better armament, and the New York and the Texas, steadily
gaining on her; a powerful combination from which it was impos
sible to escape." (Concas, p. 78.)
On the 6th of July, about midnight, the Texas and the Massa
chusetts being on searchlight guard, at tbe mouth of Santiago
channel, the cruiser Reina Mercedes was seen by tbe Massachu
setts, coming out of tbe harbor of Santiago ; both ships opened fire,
and there, in the darkness, the last Spanish man-of-war was sunk
opposite Estrella cove. (Appendix, 557-8.)
(The Reina Mercedes was a protected cruiser of the same dis
placement as the Boston, and having been raised and repaired she
now classes with the Boston, New Orleans and Baltimore, as a
second-rate, in our navy.)
The New York.
The cost of tbis ship has been given above as $2,985,000, one
thousand dollars less than the Brooklyn ; these figures being given
by the first book of statistics at hand ; another statistician gives tbe
cost as $3,249,224.45 ; making her the most costly ship in the navy.
She is an armored cruiser, and swift. In some respects her armor
is slightly heavier than the Brooklyn ; but the latter, being more re
cently built, is a better ship, is larger, is swifter, and carries a
heavier battery.
Still the New York is a magnificent ship, and is the strongest
and best ship, in the navy, but the battleships and the Brooklyn.

72
Commanded by Captain Chadwick, in the war with Spain she
was in action —
April 27th with the batteries at Matanzas. (App., 181, 182.)
May 13th with the forts at San Juan, Porto Rico. (378, 379.)
June 6th with the forts and batteries at Santiago. (438.)
• June i6th with the forts and batteries at Santiago. (453-4.)
July 1st at Aguadores. (455.)
July 2d with forts and batteries at Santiago. (456.)
July 3d in the battle with Cervera's fleet. (520-522.)
In each engagement witb forts and batteries she led the at
tack. In the action at San Juan, and in each of the tbree engage
ments- with the forts and batteries at Santiago, she ran in, to with
in 1,800 yards. A distance whicb, at Santiago, was as near as it
was possible to be, and see the guns of the enemy, because of their
position on the bluffs. These engagements developed the force
of those batteries ; and made the fleet ready to cut out the Spanish
fleet from under them, whenever it should come out from the mine
fields. Captain Chadwick writes of the actions of the ship on July
3d, when the Spanish fleet was destroyed:
"The flagship was turned for Siboney, accompanied by the
Hist and the torpedo boat Ericsson, in order tbat the Admiral and
his staff might meet the appointment, made with General Shafter,
to discuss combined operations against the entrance, so that the
fieet might enter and destroy the Spanish Squadron.
"The officer of the deck sent word asking if he should in
crease the speed. But he was told to go at an easy gait; which
was fortunate, in that — when the Admiral, who was on deck, saw
the smoke of a shot inside the entrance, we were not so far away
as we otherwise should have been.
"I was just coming from below, when I saw thaf the ship had
begun to turn. I at once went forward, sending word to t^e chief
engineer to get up all tbe steam possible.
"In the time of telling this, all hands were at their stations
for action. "As I reached the bridge, tbe chief quartermaster said : there
comes the second ship.
¦ "He called them one by one. as they appeared.
"There came a considerable interval before the torpedo boat'
destroyers appeared.

73
"All stood westward, well under the land.
"Our ships, by this time, had also taken a parallel westerly
course. "Every ship was clearly visible, a cloud of smoke hanging
about each.
"It seemed to me only a few moments, when Ensign Brumby,
my aide, said to me : There is one of the Spanish ships turning in
shore afire ; and only a few moments after : there is another. And
tbe Teresa and Oquendo were on the beach, having made but six
and six and a half miles, respectively, from the harbor entrance.
"Appeals were being sent by messenger, by voice tubes, and
by telephone, to the engine room, to rush the fires.
"We had started with steam on four of the six boilers, and
hot water in the fifth. The sixth was ready for lighting; whicb
had been done at once.
"The New York and the Brooklyn bave the peculiarity of
having four sets of engines.
"The two after sets are used ordinarily, and with these the
New York can make a good seventeen and a half knots, as was
done later that morning.
"We were rapidly coming to tbe fray, the farther part of tbe
scene being much obscured by great billowy clouds of powder
smoke, against wbich were silhouetted the Gloucester, and the tor
pedo boat destroyers, firing in a very lively manner.
"We were close under the batteries, but paid no attention to
the shots, which came over us.
"One of the torpedo boat destroyers had now turned, and was
evidently heading toward the port.
"We stood in a little closer, to head her off.
"The farther one, at this time, got a shot in her boilers, from
one of our ships ; and I shall never forget the wonderful, swift,
jet of silvery steam, like an ostrich feather, that leaped 500 feet
into the air. She was clearly done for.
"But the actions, of her comrade, made me think she was en
deavoring to escape, and two or three shells were fired at her, from
our starboard bow four-inch gun.
"We could not stop, witb an enemy yet unsurrendered ahead.
And, quickly coming up with the Indiana (between ten and eleven
miles beyond the port) we signaled her to go back and resume the
blockade, lest another Spanish ship might come out of the harbor,
to annoy the transport fleet.
"The Iowa, Texas, Brooklyn and Oregon were on our port
bow, in the order named, from aft forward.

74
"Between the Iowa and the Texas was the Viscaya, still
headed west ; and, directly ahead of us, was the Colon.
"The baffle, by this time (11:05) had moved eighteen miles
from fhe harbor entrance; and the Viscaya turned in with colors
down, and headed for the beach.
"She steamed in rather slowly, and at such distance crossed
our bows that the crews were virtually face -to face, and we looked
at each other, victors and vanquished ; the former without a cheer,
the latter huddled forward.
"We were abreast of her almost at the moment of her strik
ing on the reef, inside of whicb is the little harbor of Acerraderos.
"The Iowa, by the Admiral's orders, remained where she was,
and was engaged in the rescue of the Viscaya's men.
"We were close inshore, witb the Colon still directly ahead ;
and we settled down to the chase, sending the men to dinner, so
that all should be ready for action as we knew we surely should.
"I said, to Admiral Sampson, that I knew tbey could not hold
out at high pressure, whereas we were sure of our own men.
"Machinery is a good deal of an unknowable world in the
Spanish mind, and I felt absolutely certain of overhauling them.
"Our own ship was quivering, fore and aft, and had set up
the pleasant jingling of certain metallic objects on the bridge,
which we l^iew meant high speed.
"The Chief Engineer had reported, that the engines were
doing their best; and bad also reported, some time before, that
everything was ready for coupling the forward engines if de
sired. "The officer of the deck every few minutes counted the indi
cator showing the turns of the screw.
"Tbe two forward ships, tbe Brooklyn and the Oregon, had
begun to fire occasional eight-inch shells; and we were carefully
noting their fall.
"But the Oregon found that these did not reach, and opened
with her thirteen-inch guns.
"She fired six, beginning at 4.8 land miles, rising to 5.4 miles,
and the last at a trifle over 5 miles.
"The Colon now turned in, and hauled down her colors."
(The Century Magazine for May, 1899, pp. 111-113.)
In his report, written the next day. Captain Chadwick wrote :
"The ship had started at 8 :50 for the army landing at Siboney."

75
"A few minutes after the crew had been called to quarters for
Sunday inspection, firing was heard, and a ship was seen leaving
the harbor entrance.
"The helm was at once put over, the crew called to general
quarters, signal "Close in toward harbor entrance and attack ves
sels,' made, orders given to spread all fires, and the ship headed back
for tbe enemy, whose ships were seen successively, coming out at
high speed.
"The nearer ships had immediately engaged ; and, by the time
we were off the entrance, one, the flagship, was already afire, and
was soon ashore.
"The Indiana and Gloucester were actively engaged with the
torpedo boats. This ship fired some four-inch shell af the one
nearer the port, toward which she headed, and seemed attempting
to return. But she was, already, practically out of the fight.
"The boiler, of the more advanced one, had blown up, show
ing a vast column of condensed steam.
"During this time, the batteries, whose line of fire we had
crossed close fo, repeatedly fired upon us, but without effect. No
return was made to this fire.
¦'This ship stood on, leaving fhe Gloucester to look after the
survivors of the torpedo boats.
"By this time the second cruiser was ashore and burning,
while fhe Viscaya and fhe Colon were still steaming rapidly west
ward. "The Indiana was now signaled (11:26 a. m. ) to retum to
the blockading position, to look after anything which might be
there. "Very shortly tbe Viscaya turned shoreward. Smoke began
to issue from her afterpart; and by the time tbat she was ashore
at Acerraderos, 15 miles west of Santiago, she was ablaze.
"The Iowa had signaled, a little before, tbat she had surren
dered ; and stopped off this place ; where she gave much assistance
in the rescue of the Viscaya's people.
"This ship stood on in chase of the Cristobal Colon, with,
ahead of us, the Brooklyn, Oregon, Texas and Vixen ; the Oregon
being much nearer inshore of tbe two headmost ships, but not in
gunshot. "We were rapidly increasing our speed.
"About 12:^0 fhe Oregon opened fire; and some of her shell
were observed to strike beyond the Colon.

76
"This made her capture a foregone conclusion; and shortly
after i o'clock, she turned toward shore, and soon struck her
colors. "By the time we arrived, a boat was alongside her, from the
Brooklyn ; and Captain Cook, the boarding officer, came alongside
this ship and reported.
"This ship then sent a boat fo fake possession, the commanding
officer going in the boat.
"I arranged for the transfer of the crew and officers — a di
vision to each ship present. While aboard, however, tbe Resolute
arrived, and it was arranged to transfer the whole number to her.
"I had taken with me the fleet surgeon, an engineer officer,
and tbe carpenter, to examine and make secure everything neces
sary. "The engineer officer reported to me that she was making
water aft.
"I had soundings taken and found eight feet at tbe bow, and
seventy at the stern; so that but a small portion of the ship was
ashore. "The Oregon was signaled fo take charge; and fhe men were
hastened on board; a number being sent from this ship.
"At II p. m. the flagship returned to Santiago, leaving the
Texas and .Oregon in charge of tbe prize.
"Though this ship was not able to come to action with any of
the larger ships, on account of her distance to the eastward, every
nerve was strained to do so ; and all was done tbat could be done.
"Our speed had rapidly increased so tbat we were going six
teen knots at the end.
"We were immediately astern, while all others were consid
erably to seaward.
"We were thus in a position to prevent a possible doubling to
the rear, and escape to the south-east.
"The officers and crew, as tbey always have done, acted in the
most enthusiastic and commendable manner. They have wprked
into so complete a system, that the ship is, practically, instantane
ously ready for action." (Appendix, 520-2.)
In a supplemental report Captain Chadwick corrects his state
ment as to speed, showing that the speed of the ship had increased
to not less than seventeen knots (instead of sixteen, as given in the
first report) ; and that there could "be no question that this ship
would have quickly overhauled the Colon, had she continued her
flight, and wou.ld have ensured her capture, had there been an acci
dent of any sort to the other ships, in pursuit." (Id., 522.)

11
The Brooklyn.
At 9 :30 a. m. the enemy were signaled by the Iowa as coming
out, and were seen by the watchman who reported it to the officer
of the deck. The executive officer immediately gave the order:
"Clear ship for action and general quarters." Signal was made at
the same time : "Enemy coming out."
The ship stood for the enemy. Orders were given to get
steam on all boilers. Tbe ship started at about twelve knots speed.
The head of the Spanish squadron, in column, was just outside
the harbor of Santiago, heading about south-west. The Brooklyn
opened fire on the leading ship in five minutes from tbe discovery.
'(App., 522-3.)
"Tbe Brooklyn then wore round to starboard." "The enemy
hugged the shore to the westward." (Id., 523.)
The shell passing over the Brooklyn fell very thick about the
Vixen, some passing over her. At this time the firing was very
fast, and the whistling of the shell incessant. (523.)
The Brooklyn was making about 14 knots as tbe Oregon came
up on ber starboard quarter at a distance of about 600 yards and
maintained her position, though tbe Brooklyn soon increased her
speed to 15 knots, and was making 16 knots just before the Colon
surrendered. (523.)
The Commodore's report to the Admiral was that when the
Spanish were discovered, "Signal was made to the Western Divis
ion as prescribed in your general orders, and there was immediate
and rapid movement inward by your squadron, and a general en
gagement." (App., 517.)
It is apparent that
(i) In tbis ship, the action was begun, under tbe standing
orders of the Admiral, precisely as in the other ships ; that, as re
quired by those orders, the ship was in constant readiness; that,
as required by those orders, as soon as the enemy was seen, the
signal, "Enemy's ships coming out" was made, and tbe ship was
prepared for action and moved forward, to close and engage the
enemy. (2) That, when the Brooklyn started forward, the enemy
was "just outside of the harbor, heading about south-west."
(Whether the phrase, "the enemy hugged the shore to the west
ward," was intended to state that at first the enemy bugged the

78
shore running to the westward, or that the enemy had passed the
Brooklyn and hugged the shore to the westward of the Brooklyn
when she had worn round to tbe starboard, cannot be determined
by the language used in the report.)
(3) That the Brooklyn, with a port helm, wore round to the
starboard is also apparent.
(4) It also appears, from the report, that shells from the
enemy were passing over the Brooklyn, wben she was in the battle
line with the other ships (so tbat passing over ber they would fall
around the Vixen west of her, and in range with her, from the
Teresa), just as they were passing over the Oregon (App., 526),
the Texas (Magazine article, p. 91), the Iowa (Id., 53), when, as
Captain Evans says, a torrent of projectiles was sailing over them,
harmlessly exploding in the water beyond.
(5) And it is apparent, that when the Brooklyn put herself
behind, and in the rear of the Oregon, Iowa and Texas (as the
battle then stood), she was very likely to get hit, a great many
times, by the shells which had passed low over them.
The Brooklyn is the largest and finest armored cruiser in the
navy ; and is next to the battleships in fighting p>ower. She is of
9,215 tons' displacement; is 400 feet long and 64 wide. Has 3
inches of armor on the sides ; 5-| inches on the turrets, and 4 to 8
inches on the barbettes.
She has a main battery of eight 8-inch, and twelve 5-incb
guns, of latest style; and a secondary battery of 12 six-pounder,
4 one-pounder guns, and 4 Gatling guns.
Her speed is 22 knots, which is 25-J statute miles.
She carries 561 officers and men.
The Maria Teresa was an armored cruiser, protected at the
water line, by a compound steel belt, 11.8 inches thick; and had
two eleven-inch guns, mounted in strong and perfectly protected
barbettes, practically invulnerable, save to 8-incb guns and those
of larger caliber.
She had also ten 5^-inch antiquated rapid-fire guns with
their shields, but no other protection of any kind, and exposed to
all the splinters of the boats and equipment. The ammunition
hoists for these guns were entirely unprotected.
The smaller rapid-fire armament was not numerous, and bad
no protection of any kind.
The armored sides, and the barbettes, were vulnerable to the

79
eight-inch guns of the Brooklyn, if at close range. The ship was
overloaded with wood, both in her decks, and in the quarters and
installations. (Concas, 64, 42.)
The Viscaya and Oquendo were duplicates of the Teresa.
The experience of the Viscaya and Oquendo demonstrated,
that if the Brooklyn had steamed alongside of and close to the
Teresa, her minor guns, machine guns and riflemen would have
made it impossible to fire any gun on the Teresa, but the 11 -inch
guns, wbich were the only ones with any protection. And it is
apparent, that, if at close range, it would have been very difficult
to fire them.
At close range, where the high initial velocity would carry
tbe eight-inch shells through tbe armor of the sides or barbettes of
the Teresa, the disparity between an eight and eleven-inch gun
would be very little; for the eight-inch would have the advantage
of more rapid firing.
Besides, the two eleven-inch guns would be handicapped by
the small gun and small arm fire, seeking every crevice, and making
it difficult to aim, or do anything with the eleven-inch guns.
So the Maria would have stood on, with two fighting guns
against eight; with the 12 five-inch guns, the 12 six-pounder guns,
and the 4 one-pounder guns of tbe Brooklyn shooting through her
unarmored parts, scattering splinters, exploding shells, and firing
the ship in hundreds of places; and the Gatling guns pouring a
flood of bullets.
If it came to real fighting — taking such doses at close range
as the Spaniards got, the Brooklyn could have destroyed all four
of the Spanish ships, in succession.
They had a nominal speed of 20J knots, but not one of them
could make 16 (Concas, 87) ; and neither could have shaken off
the Brooklyn, if with the speed she had, and could make, the
Brooklyn had settled herself to run beside her.
When the Spanish fleet was seen coming out, the Gloucester
was north, and a little eastward of the Indiana. The Indiana was
near south-east by south of the Morro and two miles to the east
ward of it. The Oregon a mile and a half southward of tbe Indi
ana, was a mile east of the Morro. The Iowa, about a mile due
west of the Oregon, was about due south of the Morro.

8o
Tbus the positions of these four ships, the Gloucester, the
Indiana, the Oregon and the Iowa, were all east of the entrance
to the harbor, and half a mile or so east of the point where the
Teresa came out, at the head of the column.
The Texas was a little more than a mile north and as far west
of the Iowa.
The Brooklyn was a little more than a mile west of the Texas,
and somewhat south of her.
In order to close in and engage, it was necessary for the
Gloucester, the Indiana, the Oregon and the Iowa to move west-
v/ard ; and as the enemy was in column, standing westward under
full steam, it was necessary for the Gloucester, Indiana, Oregon
and Iowa, after they had reached a point as close as they would en
gage (if they would keep in the engagement at all), to stand west
ward also, in irregular column, adapting their action to the move
ments of the enemy, as far as the speed and armament, of each,
would permit her to do.
The Texas and the Brooklyn, in closing, were bound to adopt
their movements to the battle line, of which they formed a part,
unless the Brooklyn chose to return to her proper station, and stop
"the head of the column of escaping ships.
The Texas did adapt her movement to the battle line. She
started tovvr|ird the north, and tben veered westward. Captain
Philip altered her course to the westward, when he saw that was
the direction in which the Spanish fleet was going. (Century
Magazine, May, 1899, pp. 88, 90.)
At that time the Brooklyn was running at considerable speed
due north, apparently to stop tbe head of the Spanish column ; and
was a mile from the Texas. While the Brooklyn was so running,
the srnoke of the guns of the Texas drifted over her, so that she
had, in effect, run into a fog bank. (Id., 90-1.)
At this time, the Brooklyn put ber helm to port and turned
round to the starboard (that is, to the eastward).
If she had so turned, with both engines running ahead as
usual, she would have made the arc of a circle half a mile in
diameter.
The Effect of the Turn of the Brooklyn.
First. As the Texas was already turning toward the west
ward, when the Brooklyn began to tum to tbe eastward (to make
a circle that way) the Brooklyn would strike the Texas or the

8i
Texas would strike the Brooklyn, or one would cross the course
of the other, just before or just after that other passed.
Captain Philip says, that the smoke around tbem on the Texas
became so thick they could see nothing ; but might as well have had
tbeir heads in a bag. That after a few minutes the smoke lifted,
and he saw tbe Brooklyn bearing towards them, and across fheir
bows. That she seemed close on to them. That he ordered both
engines backed hard; and as quick as it was possible both engines
of the Texas were backing at full speed to stop her ; and the col
lision was averted. Captain Philip also says, that the Texas is not
strong enough to ram ; and had she rammed the Brooklyn or tbe
Brooklyn rammed her, she would have gone to the bottom witb ber
complement of men numbering nearly four hundred.. (Id., 91.)
Of course, if the Texas, weighing 6,300 tons, had struck the
Brooklyn, it is probable that the Brooklyn and her 560 men would
have accompanied the Texas to the bottom.
The second effect, was to tbe Brooklyn itself. The ship was
struck twenty times by whole shot and many times by pieces of
bursting shell. (App., 525.)
If she had kept her place in the battle, she probably would not
bave been hit any more than the Iowa, for the Spaniards univer
sally shot over the ship they were shooting at. Getting in behind
the Texas and Iowa and Oregon, the Brooklyn caught the shells
aimed at them, which passed over and dropped beyond them.
The third effect, of this turning a circle, was, that it reduced
the time the Brooklyn could be in the battle to the shortest possible
period. She was going east on her circle, as fast as she could, and
the Teresa was going west in a straight line as fast as she could.
If there had been no ships for tbe Brooklyn to run behind, their
speed in passing each other would have been equal to the com
bined speed of both — tbat is, 25 to 30 miles an hour. As it was
the Brooklyn had her broadside to bear, only until in half a mile
of the circle she ran behind the Texas, and stood on behind the
Texas, Iowa and Oregon.
The Texas was also put out of her relative place in the west
ward moving column, and was put out of the battle for a time.
The fourth effect of tbis turning, was to let the Spaniards
through ; and to convert the battle into a chase. The line of battle
was destroyed. Tbe force holding the point of the left retreated,

82
and opened a place where part of the enemy escaped. The Colon
escaped beyond the reach of the most powerful gun. And had to
be pursued forty-five miles or more.
The fifth effect was to let the captain of the leading Spanish
ship write, for the world" to read, that after his ship had received
in succession the fire of tbe Indiana, the Oregon, the Iowa, and
the Texas she put ber bow "toward the armored cruiser Brooklyn,
which turning to starboard presented her stern to us, and fired her
two after turret guns, moving to southward." (Concas, 74.)
He dwells on tbe taunt:
Page 65. "The armored cruisers Brooklyn and New York
were each superior to ours, above all, in having all the armament
protected; and, being more recently constructed, everything had
been avoided in them, which could furnish food for flames. The
Texas, although better armed, was very similar to our ships of the
Viscaya class, having been constructed at the same period, and,
in conjunction with the others, was a very powerful ship; as ours
would have been, had they had the support of some large armor-
clads." (How delicately he makes it clear that his ships were anti
quated, with unprotected armament, and alone, while the Brooklyn
was all that modern achievement could make her, with protected
armament ; free from dangers by fire ; and supported by powerful
battleships, through whose fire his ship had come, when he pointed
ber bow toward the great Brooklyn, and she turned her stern to
him, and ran away behind the battleships.)
Page 73. "What she did do was to make a turn which
brought us astern, as described by the Chief Engineer of the Ore
gon, on pages 544 and 545 of the Engineering Magazine for Janu
ary of this year."
Page 74. "In the account of the battle, given by the engineer
of the Oregon, he confirms the fact that the Brooklyn, seeing tbe
intention of the Teresa to attack ber, made the maneuver we have
indicated." "The position of tbe Brooklyn, and the fact of her being close
to the others, which advanced as she receded, caused the Texas
and fhe Iowa to come between the Teresa and the Brooklyn."
That is what every navy in the world has got to read to-day.
And they have compared tbe writer, intrepidly facing that terrible
line of battleships, with bis antiquated cruiser, pointing his ship

83
at the finest cruiser in the world, set to keep the end of a line, and
supported there by three battleships, and seeing her desert her
place, and fly to the rear of the battleships, presenting her stern
to him, in flight, and firing her two after turret guns, moving to
southward, (p. 74.)
The word taunt is above used. The accomplished Spaniard
did not write the matter for a taunt. He wrote it for his own peo
ple to read, for a picture and for a comparison.
The narrative is so written, and by the naval officer whose
bugles sounded the last echo of those sounded at Grenada (p. 74)
— whose heroic daring, and calm assault against infinite odds, had
never been excelled in all tbe battles with 'the Moors — that his
story is already the property of the world, and a part of the world's
history.

It has been said that common people, even the Senate of the
United States, or any not educated naval officers are not com
petent to form an opinion upon the propriety of that loop.
The Congress makes laws for the government of the navy.
How can it do so, if incompetent to understand a naval matter of
such a character?
At first, questions between ships were adjudged by the Ad
miral in his ship. Then there were port admirals. And now in
the United States every District Court is a Court of Admiralty,
and for a hundred and eleven years the* Supreme Court has bad
jurisdiction of appeals in admiralty, and a naval or maritime edu
cation has never been a qualification required of a judge.
These courts enter judgments, which are conclusive, on ques
tions of collision, negligence, contributory negligence, and all tbe
controversies that may arise about the management of ships.
The principles, applicable, are the same, which now occupy
a large proportion of tbe time of every court of record, of general
jurisdiction, in every county in the whole United States. Personal
injury cases, killing cattle, burning from sparks, etc. — an infinite

84
variety of cases depend on the law on negligence : and generally it
does not take a railroad man to tell whether a railroad employe has
been negligent.
The law of the road is all based on the same principles. A
man oh horseback is not bound to turn to the right, but he must
govem himself as prudence, at tbe time, under the circumstances
requires. {Dudley v. Bolles, 24 Wend., 465, p. 472. )
The defendant being a trooper had wounded plaintiff's leg by
negligently firing a pistol. The injury was unintentional. It was
a case of mere negligence. The plaintiff recovered his damages by
reason of the injury. {Blin v. Campbell, 14 Johns., 14.)
In McAllister v. Hammond (6 Cowen, 342), cases are cited,
running back two or tbree hundred years, which show that where
the negligence of a responsible person in a point where duty re
quires that he should not be negligent toward another injures that
other, the injured person may recover his damages. The action
may lie whether the injury is immediate or consequential. And
whether the negligence is gross or not, the circumstances will de
termine the extent of the injury and of the responsibility. As the
same dpctrine applies everywhere to-day, it is apparent that the
principles, at the bottom of this inquiry, are of very common appli
cation and use ; and the only question is : Do we know enough to
apply those principles to the facts before us ?
A loss by collision, without any fault on either side is a loss
by the perils of the sea. {Peters v. Warren Ins. Co., 14 Pet., 99.)
Lack of proper skill and knowledge on the part of those in
charge of a vesel, or want of care, will make her liable for dam
age done. {St. lohn v. Paine, 10 How., 557; Chamberlain v.
Ward, 21 How., 548 and 572 ; The Lady Pike, 21 Wallage, i.)
It is only an application of the old maxim, which is the foun
dation of the customary rule and common law of contact, where
people are associated and made interdependent for any cause —
Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas — So use your own (power or
function in the joint enterprise) as not to injure others in the same
enterprise.

8s
There is a general rule of navigation that applies upon all
waters and between all classes of craft, whether on the ocean or
in harbors or bays, on the great lakes, the Mississippi, or lesser
lakes or rivers, between sail vessels, or steam vessels or between
steam and sail, or steam vessels and flat boats or rafts, or between
any other conjunction of floating craft; and that rule is, that if
one is hampered in her view of dangers by fog, darkness or other
wise, or is hampered in control of her action by circumstances, as
currents, movements of other vessels, her position or equipment,
or anything which deprives the navigator of knowledge of the
surroundings, or of the power freely to control her movements, and
the other is sailing free with full power in her navigator, to choose
his course, he is guilty of negligence, if he chooses a course which
puts the first named vessel in any hazard, or appearance of hazard ;
and if any collision does actually take place the free vessel is
chargeable for all losses to botb vessels and their cargoes, and for
all personal injuries resulting, because the collision is the result of
faulty navigation, of negligence, of putting the vessels to a hazard
which it was the duty of the navig^jtor of the free vessel to avoid
altogether. The owners of the other vessel and goods on board,
and the persons thereon, have a right to be entirely free from
hazard, from the ship, which could, at the option of its commander,
entirely avoid putting them to hazard. If the hazard passes with
out any injury to the wronged, it is damnum absque injuria — an
assault without any battery — a threatening of injury without doing
it; but if the hazard results in injury the owner and navigator of
the free vessel are chargeable for all results, because tbe hazard
ing of the other vessel was bad navigation, bad conduct in navi
gating, negligence in the performance of the duties involved in
navigating the vessel.
This rule appears by all the cases cited below.
Between sailing vessels, if one vessel has the wind free, and
consequently the power of controlling its movements, and the other
has not, it is the duty of tbe former to avoid collision with the lat
ter ; and neglect to do so is negligence which makes her liable for
the result of any hazard incurred.
St. lohn V. Paine, lo How., 557.
The Schooner Ann Caroline, 2 Wall., 538.
Bentley v. Coyne, 4 Wall., 509.
The Mary Eveline, 16 Wall., 348.
Note to St. lohn v. Paine, 13 L. C. P., Co. Edition, U. S.
Reports, pages 537-541-

86
The rule above stated is applied between steam vessels.
U. S. Co. V. N. Y. & Va. S. Co., 24 How., 307.
Sturgis V. Clough, 21 How., 451.
In the latter case one steamer proceeded in a direction which,
the navigator knew, must produce a collision unless the other
would get out of the way ; and he expected tbat she would get out
of the way. ( See also St. lohn v. Hasbrouck, 20 L. C. P. Co., Edi
tion U. S. Reports, 645.) In the first above cases, the pilot made
an excuse, which showed that he knew that the order he obeyed,
was given without knowing what its effect would be. In each
culpable negligence was held to be established.
It has been said that on tbe Brooklyn it was expected tbat the
Texas would keep out of the way.
It is also said that on the bridge of the Brooklyn some one
spoke of the Texas, and mentioned the danger to her, from the
turning of the Brooklyn to starboard ; and that an officer in author
ity said : "Damn the Texas; let her fake care of herself."
Captain Philip says that the smoke (when the Brooklyn
turned) bung over the Texas, so dense that they could see nothing.
That they might as well have had a blanket tied over their heads.
In The Hypodame, 6 Wall., 216, the collision was in conse
quence of an unexpected change of course of the colliding steamer.
The court quotes from The Delaware v. The Osprey, 2 Wallace,
Jr., 268 : "But when one is blind and the other knows it, he should
not put himself within reach of injury by any mistake of the blind."
In The Vanderbilf, 6 Wall., 225, it was held that though
steamers had a right to ascend on either side of the river, in tbe
daytime, when the view is not obstructed or obscured by fog, yet,
when a steamer found she was approaching a fog bank on a part
of the river where descending boats were liable to be, it was a
fault that she did not turn aside and avoid the place where the
descending boat was liable to be ; and that turning away too late,
did not excuse tbe negligence in running where she was liable to
strike a befogged boat.
See also The Dove, i Otto, 381.
The Belgenland v. lensen, 1 14 U. S., 355.

87
The decisions seem to be, that the Brooklyn changing her
course, was bound to see to it, that she would not hazard another
of the ships, by collision with her.
Snow V. Hill, 20 How., 543.
Ure V. Coffman, 19 How., 56.
Nelson v. Leland, 20 How., 48.
The Great Republic, 23 Wall., 20.
The Pennsylvania, 19 Wall., 125.
The fact that the Brooklyn had the open sea to turn to port
or westward, made her tum to starboard (eastward) bad naviga
tion, and negligence of the hazard to other vessels in the fleet,
which were to the eastward, and were naturally standing, or liable
to stand, to the westward.
Pearce v. Page, 24 How., 228.
Trefz V. Bull, 12 How., 466.
The Ann Caroline, 2 Wall., 538.
Rogers v. The Sf. Charles, 19 How., 108.
The New York v.'Rae, 18 How., 223.
The Favorite, 18 Wall., 598.
The Morning Light, 2 Wallace, 550.
The Lady Pike, 21 Wall., i.
The Clarifa, 23 Wall., i.
The Mabey & Cooper, 14 Wall., 204.
Of course this is not a collision case ; and these legal questions
apply, only, as they tend to show, whether or not the captain of
the Brooklyn is entitled to commendation for such "eminent and
conspicuous conduct in battle" as is within the intent and meaning
of the statute of promotions.
And as affecting that question reference is made to the Arti
cles of War.
R. S., Sec. 1624, Art. 4. "The punishment of death, or such
other punishment as a court martial may adjudge, may be in
flicted on any person in the naval service —
"Tenth, Who intentionally or willfully suffers any vessel of
the navy to be * * improperly hazarded."
"Thirteenth. Or, in time of battle, displays cowardice, negli
gence or disaffection ; or withdraws from or keeps out of danger
to which he should expose himself."
Nineteenth. Or does not do his utmost, to overtake and cap
ture or destroy any vessel which it is his duty to encounter.

88
The Gun Fire of the Brooklyn.
The Appendix (at pages 574-592) contains an examination
of the wrecks of the four armored Spanish ships.
It states that the Maria Teresa was struck twice by 12-inch
shells ; twice by 8-inch ; four times by 5-inch ( i ranging forward,
I ranging aft ; the other two not stated) ; once by a 4-inch shell.
That the Oquendo was struck four times by 8-inch shells; once
by a 5-inch shell, ranging forward; and seven times by 4-inch
shells. That the Viscaya was struck five times by 8-inch shells;
five times by 5-inch; and five times by 4-inch shells. That the
Colon was struck once by a 5 or 6-inch shell, and twice by 5-inch
shells. From this report newspapers have argued, that as the Brook
lyn was the only ship carrying 5-inch guns, this proved that the
Brooklyn did most of the firing.
In two instances, tbe report says the hole was by a 4 or 5-inch
shell, and it is put down in this computation as a 4-inch, because
the statement is not accurate enough <to prove anything definite
as to the size.
Tlie holes measured in the first three vessels, were in iron or
steel, tbat had been more or less bent and torn by explosions, and
wrenched by the heat of tbe burning of the ships. They could
not be. clean cut, because the shells were all pointed and would
punch with tbe point and tearing through are apt to push aside
more or less of the penetrated plate or bar. The angle, at which
the shell struck, would affect the size and character of the hole
left. So also if the plate or other matter punctured was of un
equal thickness where punctured, or of unequal soundness,
tenacity, or elasticity.
It is said, that, in many cases, shells will make a smaller or a
larger hole than the shell ; just as a bullet, fired through a man, will
sometimes make a hole on the side it enters so small, that if one's
finger is just the size of the bullet, it is difficult or impossible to
push it into the hole ; while on the other side of the body, wliere it
passed out, the hole may be more than two inches in diameter.
It is said that a shell at different distances from tbe gun will
make different sized holes.
The backing of the plate, whether it hangs loose or is rigidly
fixed, and the material of which it is composed, will make a differ
ence. And a piece of steel may spring back so as to close the
hole half up.

89
But in most instances the tearing of the steel or iron will
show which way the shell went through it.
The report on the Teresa says: "The after smoke stack
bas a 5-inch hole through it ranging from aft forward." (App.,
576.) ¦ The report on the Oquendo shows that nearly all the shells
ranged from aft forward or across the ship ; it mentions two 4 or
5-inch shells ranging forward; one hole from a 5-inch or a 6-inch
shell ; and one s-inch hole ranging forward and across the deck.
(App., 581.)
It seems pretty clear, tbat the Brooklyn could not have fired
any one of those shells that struck tbe Teresa or Oquendo ranging
from aft forward. The Teresa was the first ship in the column,
the Oquendo was the last. When the Teresa was more than a
mile from the Brooklyn, and was pointed and running towards the
Brooklyn, the Brooklyn ran behind tbe Texas, Iowa and Oregon.
Mr. Harlow says, in effect, that while the Brooklyn was be
hind the battle line, the Teresa and Viscaya passed her, so that
they "bore well on her starboard bow"; and that "for the next
fifteen minutes the Brooklyn sustained and returned the fire of the
two leading ships" (the Teresa and Viscaya). (App., 545.)
This may account for all the 5-inch shells that struck the Teresa
and Viscaya. Still it seems singular that in fifteen minutes the
Brooklyn should have struck the Teresa and Viscaya nine times
with shells from her twelve five-inch guns, and the Indiana, Ore
gon and Texas, with their fourteen six-inch guns, firing from
much nearer than the Brooklyn, with their broadsides bearing on
the broadsides of the Teresa, Vicaya and Oquendo, in forty min
utes, did not hit one of them; and with their eight 13-inch guns
the Indiana and Oregon did not hit one of them. It seems singu
lar that the Brooklyn made nine hits with twelve guns in fifteen
minutes, while the other ships (except the Iowa), though better
placed and nearer, and having forty minutes, did not make a hit
with twenty-two guns.
The Brooklyn was not at any time in a position to have made
a hole in the Oquendo ranging forward, and the estimate on the
size of that hole must be a mistake.
The logic, of the shot hole examination, is, that the Iowa
and Brooklyn were the only ones that hit the Teresa, Viscaya and
Oquendo, with anything larger than a six-pounder shell ; and the
only use of the Indiana, Oregon and Texas was to shoo them
along for the marksmen of the Brooklyn and Iowa to kill.

go
Perhaps the examiners intended to hedge in these words:
"The intense flames to which the three ships were subjected, and
the serious explosions of magazines and torpedo heads, caused by
the heat of the flames, have so completely consumed all articles,
and material of inflammable nature, that it has been impossible to
describe more definitely and in detail the effect of the gun fires.
(App., 591.)
It is evident, that to accept the apparent deductions to be
drawn from the examination of the burned hulls, is to discredit
the statement of Captain Concas and every other eye-witness of the
fire of the Indiana, Oregon and Texas.
Rear Admiral Pluddeman of the German navy says: "The
caliber of the hits admits of some margin." (2 War Notes, p. 7.)
Tbe Colon was not burned.
The examination shows, that it was struck three times by
6-pounders; also that a 5 or 6-inch projectile pierced the plating
and went through the ship ; also that one 5-inch shell went through
the superstructure plating ; and "A 5-inch, armor piercing projec
tile struck the armor, at an angle of about 45 degrees from aft.
It penetrated nearly through, and the projectile rebounded."
(App., 590.)
"One 6-pounder shell struck in armor," "penetration 2 or 3
inches." (Ib.)
The five-inch shells seem to bave been fired by the Brooklyn.
And it must have been before the Colon escaped; for, after her
escape, the Brooklyn had not a gun aboard that could reach her;
and the eight-inch guns would carry nearly twice as far as the
five-inch. The penetration of the 5-inch shell, at an angle of 45 degrees,
shows that, if it had struck at right angles, if would have gone
clear through the armor — even though it was fired at a distance
of two or three miles. And the penetration of the six-pounder,
indicates that tbe armor was soft, and penetrable.
The work, of the five-inch shell, proves, that, if the Brooklyn
had kept her place in the battle line, and had closed and laid her
broadside at short range with the Colon, she had twenty guns that
would penetrate the armor of the Colon; and her secondary battery
would have destroyed everything outside of the armor.

91

Timidity.
Captain Concas in places insinuates, and in other places
pointedly suggests, that timidity was evidenced by all or some of
our fleet. So published to the world, an analysis of the conduct of the
campaign, cannot well pass it entirely, although we shall not dwell
upon it.
That the Flying Squadron did go, as shown on the map oppo
site page 402 of the Appendix, or as charted by the Iowa, as
shown on page 423, is clear.
That is to say: it is clear, that the flying squadron ran by
Santiago on May 26, on a line about twenty-eight miles south of
the entrance, and stopped at eight o'clock at night; that it went
from there west, on the same line, and stopped at 8 a. m., on the
27th of May, about twenty-eight miles south, and seven miles
west of the entrance to Santiago ; that it drifted about north by
west five miles, to a point where it lay at noon. May 27, about
twenty-two miles from the entrance to Santiago; that it ran due
west about twenty-five miles to a point where it stopped at eight
at night. May 27 ; that the Iowa drifted nearly north four miles to
a point where it was at eight in the morning of May 28th; that
from there it drifted south by east two miles to a point where it
was at noon May 28th; and the squadron drifted north by east
from where it was at eight p. m. May 27, two miles, to where it
was at 8 a. m. May 28, and drifted four more miles, on the same
course, to where it was at noon May 28. (The map of the course
of the Iowa, p. 423, and that of the body of the fleet do not exactly
concur. Probably some of the ships moved their engines a little
to counteract their drift, or the Iowa may have used its engines.)
The squadron appears to have moved, from the last named place,
due east about thirty miles, to a point which it reached at eight
p. M. May 28th, fourteen miles south of the entrance to Santiago,
wb,ere it stopped; and in the morning of the 29th of May ran in,
to a point seven miles due south of the entrance to Santiago.
Whether the squadron remained as close as this, or this was only
a reconnoissance, when it ran in to that distance and off again,
to fourteen miles is not clear. (Appendix, 404.)

92
Captain Concas says: "The maneuvers of the hostile
squadron up to the 29th were uncomprehensible to us." (Concas,
P- 57-) It is clear that the Colon, and one of the heaviest Spanish
cruisers, were seen from the Brooklyn, the flagship (App., 404),
the Massachusetts (App., 416), and the Iowa (App., 419),
moored head and stern, one across the western and the other
across the eastern channel, all day on the 29th, 30th and 31st; and
that they were not attacked during the 29th or 30th of May.
It is also clear that on May 31st the Commodore shifted his
pennant from the armored cruiser Brooklyn, to the heavy battle
ship Massachusetts, and in the afternoon ran in with the battle
ships Massachusetts and Iowa and protected cruiser New
Orleans, to a point not less than three and a half marine miles
(over four statute miles), and variously estimated above that, and
countermarched back and forth, and fired at the moored ships;
but, from so great a distance, that neither the twelve-inch guns
of the Iowa, nor the thirteen-inch guns of the Massachusetts,
could reach the Colon, though sighted for a range of five and a
half nautical miles, or nearly six and a half statute miles. (App.,
pp. 419-20.) a
The log of the Colon says : "Our shot falling short, on
account of the enemy keeping at too great a distance." (App.,
P- 433-) Captain Concas says: "On May 31 the Admiral stationed
the Colon at the head of the channel, with her broadside bearing
on the harbor entrance. But the ship had only six inch guns;
and, although these were primed, the fact that the hostile ships
remained at a distance (7,000 yards, according to Schley's official
report), at whicb heavy artillery only could be effective, which
was entirely lacking from our only protected ship, made it ad
visable to recall her within the harbor, and Admiral Cervera. did
so, in order not to expose her to no purpose." (Concas, pp. 58-9.)
As she was moored, it is pretty apparent, that if the Mas-
sacjiusetts and Iowa and Brooklyn, or either of them, had gone in,
to within a mile or two, before firing a gun, and had then brought
their broadsides to bear, they would have sunk her that day, as
well as the other ship moored there, before either would or could
have moved.

93
The Commodore reported that "this reconnoissance devel
oped the fact that the fortifications are well provided with long
range guns of large caliber." (App., 427.)
Also by telegraph: "The fire was returned without delay,
by the heavy batteries fo the east and to the west of entrance,
large caliber, long range." (App., 428.)
Those were the same batteries, that the Admiral's flagship,
the New York, engaged at 1,800 yards (which is less than a
marine mile) on June 6th, June i6th, June 22d, July 2d; and
which the New York and Indiana, and even the Gloucester, Hist
and Ericsson utterly disregarded, during the whole engagement
of July 3d.
The order for the battle of June 6, commanded formation of
"Western column, heading north, Brooklyn, Marblehead,
Texas, Massachusetts;
"Eastern column, heading north. New York, Yankee, New
Orleans, Oregon, Iowa.
"The Commander of each division, will make such signals,
as may be necessary, to bring his division into position, forming
circles, drawn at three thousand yards from the eastern and west
ern batteries." The distance of three thousand yards is repeated in the order.
(Appendix, 484.)
The New York at the head of the eastern column opened
fire at a distance of 6,000 yards from the battery east of the
Morro, and worked in, to within two thousand yards of the
Morro, where it engaged in deliberate firing. (Id., 484-5, 438.)
There is no report from the Brooklyn ; but the Massachusetts
must have followed the head of the column. It went into action
at 5,000 yards ; but closed in so, that, "the third time the range
was 3,200 yards, and nearly constant." (Id., 439.)
It is necessary to mention this in connection with the more
certain evidences of the inclination of the Brooklyn to keep at a
distance from guns shooting toward her; and also in connection
with the idea, that in the western battery were guns of large cali
ber and long range. (Id., 427, 428.) The circumstance alone,
with the light we have on it, would have very little weight.
The order for the engagement of June i6th placed the New
York, New Orleans, Oregon and Iowa in one column, and the

94
Brooklyn, Texas and Massachusetts in the other, and required
them to run in, to within 3,000 yards of the batteries before pre
senting their broadsides; and then ordering, that "The vessels
will retain the positions thus taken as nearly as possible, moving
in closer, if necessary, in order to see their targets and- render the
fire effective." (Id., 493.)
Again the New York moved in close to the battery, west of
the Morro, and fired at about 1,800 yards. (Id., 453.)
Again we have to depend on the report of the Massachusetts :
"When the broadside was first brought to bear, the range was
about 5,000 yards. Three eight-inch shots were fired from that
position; and then the ship was headed in, and brought into
action again, at about 3,500 yards ; which approximate range was
kept, during the rest of the engagement." (Id., 454.)
In the action of July 2d the Massachusetts and Texas did
some of their firing at 2,500 yards, showing that the greater dis
tance, in the earlier actions, was not necessitated by the high
position of the batteries attacked, (p. 457.)
There seems to be no question that in the action of July 3d,
the Brooklyn was the most western of the heavy, armored ships
in the battle lihe;
That she was far enough west so that she could have laid
herself across the line of the Teresa (the leading Spanish ship)
or maneuvered on or close to that line, and rammed the Teresa,
or forced her to fight at close range ; where the high initial velocity
of the shells from the eight eight-inch guns of the Brooklyn,
would have made either gun, as effective as either of the only two
available guns of the Teresa ;
That the Teresa, a weaker ship, and of practically no avail
able battery against the Brooklyn, had received in succession the
whole fire of the battleship Indiana, the battleship Oregon, the
battleship Iowa, and the battleship Texas, before she reached the
line where she would bave met the Brooklyn in her order* and
that she was in fact destroyed by tbose ships (Concas, p. 75) ;
That if the Brooklyn had cut off the Teresa, she would also
have cut off the Colon (which had only six-inch guns) ; would
have been closely supported by the Texas, the Iowa and the
Oregon, and the Colon would not have escaped ;
That if the Brooklyn had not met the Teresa and Colon, and
fought them" to a standstill, but had turned to the west, as the

95
Texas, Iowa and Oregon and Indiana did when they saw they
could not close up with the leading ships and stop them, but that
they would pass them to the westward, she would have had an
open sea to maneuver in, and would have brought her starboard
batteries into action, where they could remain in action, and where
she would be ahead of the column of flying Spanish ships. (Cap
tain Concas says "the turn was to starboard, although it would
seem reasonable for it fo have been made fo port," that is, west
ward. Concas, p. 74 note) ;
There seems to be no question that the Brooklyn, not only
did not fight the Teresa with ram and guns on its line of flight, —
and the Colon ; did not so turn, and engage them, as to remain in
action, but did desert its position in the line of battle, and turn so
as to put itself out of the battle in the shortest time possible,
and run in behind, and in the rear of, the Texas, Iowa and
Oregon ;
That afterwards, though a swift ship, it did not make speed
enough to overtake the Colon, before that ship was overtaken by
the guns of the Oregon, and yielded to her and the pursuit of the
Texas and New York: the Oregon being a ship of only two-
thirds of the speed of the Brooklyn; and the Texas and New
York being also slower ships ;
That, while accompanying the column of ships, in pursuit of
the Colon, the Brooklyn kept well out of range of the guns of the
Colon; and there is no evidence that the Brooklyn ever would
alone^ have cut off the Colon and engaged her at close range;
where the guns, speed and ram of the Brooklyn could have been
effectual, against the Colon ; or, even, would have engaged her at
any range to do any good, though supported by the approaching
Texas, Oregon, New York, and torpedo boat Ericsson. For we
must not forget that Lieutenant Usher, with his tgg shell torpedo
boat, 149 feet long and 15^ feet wide, with 24 knots of speed,
wanted to tackle the Colon alone ; and later the same day, when
it was beUeved that a battleship of Spain was approaching the
military landing and the transports east of Santiago, he pushed
his tiny ship at full speed east to fight her single-handed.
And finally, there seems to be no question, that Concas had
the right to say, of himself and his wofully battle crushed ship,
"/ put our bow toward the armored cruiser Brooklyn," in all the
pride of her freshness, perfection and great fighting power and
strength, "and she put to starboard (though it would seem rea
sonable for it to have been to port), presented her stern to us,"

96
and fled, "and fired her two after turret guns as she fied south
ward. In the account of the battle given by the eilgineer of the
Oregon, he confirms the fact that the Brooklyn, seeing the inten
tion of the" dying "Teresa to attack her, made the maneuver
which we have indicated."
"The position of the Brooklyn, and the fact of her being
close to the others, which advanced as she receded, caused the
Texas and fhe Iowa to come between the Teresa and the Brook
lyn. For this reason, as to keep on this course would .have been
to run the danger of being rammed by these two ships," "we
agreed, that it was impossible to continue, so the Admiral ordered
me to put her prow toward the coast.''
"At that time the Brooklyn was about 5,416 yards, and the
Texas and Iowa, about 3,250 yards from us." (Concas, p. 74.)
After that, a half-hearted pursuit of a ship which the Brook
lyn bad dodged and allowed to escape, in which the Brooklyn
gained very little on the Oregon, a ship of but two-thirds her
speed, and on the old Texas, of but little more than two-thirds
of her speed, and was rapidly being overtaken by the New York,
of one knot less than the Brooklyn's speed, was not "conduct in
battle" ; and, would not even palliate the desertion of her place
in the battle line, and flight from it.
The words: "Damn the Texas. Let her take care of her
self," as spoken on the bridge of the Brooklyn, when she was
headed so as to strike the fog or smoke bank in which the Texas
was known to be approaching her, are too well authenticated to
be passed without mention.
If the man who says he heard those words has not lied, in a
most important point, so tbat he should be driven out of the navy,
they prove a condition of nervousness and fear, sufficient to unseat
the reason of the officer at tbe time he uttered them.

THE ADMIRAL.
Every detail of that tremendous campaign of blockade, of
Cuba and Porto Rico, was under the supervision and control of
the Admiral ; and he was responsible therefor.
Straightening out the indentations, the coast lines of Cuba
and Porto Rico make about two thousand miles of coast, and the

97
distance, by the route of ships from the west end of Cuba to the
east end of Porto Rico is fifteen hundred miles.
This blockade was estabUshed, rendered effective, and accom
pUshed its object, all in the short space of three months.
It was begun by a navy estimated to be the sixth in effective
ness among the navies of the world.
Captain Concas says of the close p. 74 :
"The sound of my bugle was the last echo of those which,
history tells us, were sounded at the capture of Granada. It was
the signal that the history of four centuries of grandeur was at an
end, and fhat Spain was becoming a nation of the fourth class."
"The bugle" referred to by Captain Concas "gave the signal
for the commencement of the battle" (p. 73) at half-past nine of
the third of July; the battle closed at thirty-five minutes past
eleven, when the Viscaya surrendered and ran ashore, (Maps
opposite pp. 593 and 533 of the Appendix) ; and the chase of the
Colon closed at fifteen minutes after one, when she surrendered
and was beached. (App., 509, 593.)
Spain had become a nation of the fourth class.
The mine beneath the Maine, and the bursting magazine,
had hurled a nation from its place.
In detail, the engagements, under fhe eye of fhe Admiral,
were as follows:
April 27, the Admiral was in the engagement with the bat
teries at Matanzas, whicrh was 'necessary to prevent blockade run- ,
ning on that part of the coast. (Appendix, 181-2.)
May 12, he was in the engagement with the fortifications at
San Juan, Porto Rico. (App., 378-9.) This engagement was
necessary (with the fleet of Spain upon the ocean), to determine
the character and strength of that port. For it was evident that
if it was as strong as Havana, or even capable of siege, it would
form a naval base for Spain, if its fleet could get there. And if it
should prove too strong for the Admiral's fleet, then the way
must be so watched that tbe Spanish fleet could not get there.
The engagement accomplished its purpose, and demonstrated, to
the Admiral, that the place could not be held by Spain, when it
should be expedient to take it. Captain Concas says that it was
the first named, of harbors, for the fleet of Cervera to enter ; and

98
adds : "We had to discard it altogether, because, as the United
States Admiral has said with good reason, he could have taken
it whenever he pleased." (Concas, pp. 46, 51.)
From noon May 26, a fleet was in the vicinity of Santiago,
keeping twenty miles and upwards from the entrance.
It is difficult to tell the distance, at which the large ships were
kept from the entrance to Santiago, during the 29th, 30th and
31st, as no definite data seem to be given. It has been said that
the distance was ten or eleven miles.
The Colon, and another man of war, were seen during the
29th and 30th, at the entrance of the harbor (App., 416, 419) ;
but no shots were fired towards them till the 31st. On that day
the Massachusetts, New Orleans and Iowa were ordered to run
in to a distance of 3^ nautical miles and fire at the Colon; and
they steamed in to about 4 miles and fired (pp. 416-7) ; during
the action the distance was increased to 5^ miles. (Id., 417,
419-420.) The Commodore reported to the Secretary of the Navy, on
June 1st, that "the reconnoissance developed the fact that the
Spanish vessels are in the harbor, and' fhat the fortifications are
well provided with long range guns of large caliber." (427.)
By telegraph he reported: "Reconnoissance was intended prin
cipally to injure and destroy Colon. The fire was returned with
out delay by the heavy batteries, to the east and to the west of
entrance, of large caliber and long range." (Id., 428.)
It is necessary to refer to this, to understand what the
Admiral was informed of the defenses of the harbor, when he
arrived June ist.
June 2d, the Admiral gave the order, under which the fleet
of Cervera was finally destroyed, and set the blockade six miles
from the entrance, in the daytime, closing in at night. He had
already determined that the shore batteries were not of sufficient
power to do any injury to battleships. (481-2.)
The secretary of the navy advised him that an army of 20,000
would start from Tampa on the 4th, and he begged them to move
with the utmost celerity. He knew the risks from storms, and
the rainy season, coming on.
On June 4, the battle line was pushed in closer. June 5, he
set pickets at the entrance of the harbor at night; and on June
6 made a general bombardment of the batteries, in which he car-

99
ried his flagship, and the line following it, to within a mile of the
batteries ; which was as near as he could approach and see them,
owing to the height of the hills.
June 7 he gave out a system of signals; among which was
the signal given by every ship when the Teresa started out; and
he pushed the pickets nearer, and doubled them ; and required the
ships, at night and in bad weather to go in close, risking torpedo
attack, that the enemy might not escape. And again he impressed
the signals on the fleet.
June 8 he gave the searchlight order; and later added to it,
so that two battleships were all night within a mile of the entrance.
It was under this arrangement that the Massachusetts and Texas
sunk the Mercedes at midnight. Searchlights,, battleships, pickets
and videttes, from the 8th on, closed the harbor. Vigilant orders
to increase the efficiency were given on the loth and nth. The
blockading ships were required to head toward the land, so- as to
be ready to close and engage; and the dayUght blockade line was,
on the I2th, brought within four miles. On the 3d from a Cuban,
and on the 12th through Lieutenant Blue, the Admiral had certain
intelligence that the Spanish fleet was all there. On the night of
the 13th the Vesuvius was tried; and on the 14th a battery, on
which the enemy was at work, was bombarded.
On the 15th, the commanding officers, of ships, had the duties
of close blockade impressed upon them. Examination showed
that the Spaniards were trying to improve their defenses„and on
the i6th they were bombarded, the vessels being ordered to move
in, close enough to see the guns. The Admiral, as before had
the flagship run in, to within 1,800 yards (a statute mile) ; and
there it did its work.
June 17th the Admiral again urged earnestly, that the army
might move with the utmost celerity, because the fine weather
might end any day.
The bay of Cabanas was reconnoitered; and on the 19th
General Garcia visited the flagship.
On the 20th General Shafter arrived; and the Admiral con
certed with him, and the Cuban generals, the plans for debarka
tion. On the 2 1st the arrangements were made ; and on the 22d,
the army being ready for debarkation, the Admiral furnished
boats, and men to operate the transport's boats, and made assaults
upon the shore from Cabanas to Siboney. The Indiana was
placed where it would be impossible for the enemy to break
through, and touch tbe transports. The blockading ships were

ICO
warned to the utmost vigilance and readiness for action ; coupjed
with the prophecy : If the Spanish admiral ever intends to escape,
that attempt will be made soon.
Alas ! The fine weather had ended. It took all the sailors'
skill and power to land the troops — and took days. The troops
were deluged with rain, and delayed by every difficulty that man
or nature could produce to block their way.
But, on the 30th, the army was nearing Santiago; and the
Admiral threw his shells into the city itself. General Shafter an
nounced, that he would attack Santiago on the ist of July; and,
at his request, a naval force, under the eye of the Admiral him
self, sent their shot and shell where the signals from the army
asked that it be done ; and then with the Oregon, the New York
again shelled the city itself.
The assault was not made on the city on the first ; but General
Shafter sent a message that it would take place on the second,
and asked co-operation.
Things had come on, as the Admiral had begged a month
earlier. The army attacked by land, and the Admiral turned all
his batteries loose against the forts and harbor. The war from
day to day had been gathering force and now it crowded in on
Santiago from every side.
This, was bringing the end nearer than the Admiral then
knew. "At the end of midwatch the" Spanish "flagship signaled :
Light fi.res under all boilers" ; "have steam ready by two o'clock
in the afternoon." "At five, they beat to general quarters, and
loaded their batteries." "At 6 p. m. they weighed anchor; but
anchored again at 8." (Log of the Colon. App., 435, 436^)
Blanco had heard the siege; and Spain had echoed his order
to the Spanish fleet, to leave the doomed harbor. It is apparent,
that they thought their fieet should have tried to move long before
— before the Admiral of the beleaguring force had gathered every
strand of the control. The delay, of that night, was because the
men of the Viscaya could not be got ready for that day, and must
have rest. (Concas, 68-70.) They had been fighting in the
trenches on land. (Id.)
Not knowing how well the plans had worked, or how near
the work had come to forcing out the fleet, messages passed be
tween the General and the Admiral, in the lurid glare of the ter
rible sacrifices and trials of the army, and the Admiral agreed
to do as Shafter wished; and planned to carry the Morro or

IOI
Socapa batteries with marines, assaulting the defenses at the en
trance with the fleet, and counter-mining or removing the mines
at the entrance, and entering the harbor with the fleet. (App.,
504-) But that night the mountain peaks four or five thousand feet
high, about Santiago, were lighted up with burning blockhouses,
as their garrisons were withdrawn; and on the 3d of July the
event for which the Admiral had worked, planned, maneuvered
and fought, for 33 days, came. The Spanish fleet came out and
attempted to escape.
The foggy morning had become a day so clear that the out
lines of the distant mountains were plainly visible, and every
ship on the blockade was in sight from the deck of the New York,
as she was slowly steaming toward Siboney, where the Admiral
was to arrange with General Shafter for his co-operation in carry
ing, with the marines, those batteries tbat protected the mines, in
the narrow throat of the harbor.
The flagship was about seven miles from the harbor entrance
when fhe Admiral (first of all on the ship) saiv the smoke of a
shot inside the entrance, and tumed the flagship to go into the
fight. The signal of command to the fleet to "close in toward harbor
entrance and attack the enemy" was made ; but on the instant the
first Spaniard was seen the Admiral saw that the command was
obeyed, because it had been given June 2d, urged by the Admiral
and instilled into each commander almost daily in various forms,
diffused through the fleet by him, so that every man had got by
heart and hourly looked for the signals he appointed for them,
to learn and act upon; and yet more solemnly enjoined, as each
later day had brought great actions to bring on this close.
As the Admiral steamed westward under tbe batteries doing
their worst, he saw every ship, move forward, close in and engage
the enemy. He saw the Indiana doing exactly the work, for which he
had placed her where she was, and enjoined upon her captain;
making it impossible for the Spaniards to break through, to where
the transports were. He saw the Gloucester, cast her tiny mis
siles at the great ship, then bide her time, and close, with her
swift rush, upon the torpedo gun boats, that might in the melee,
endanger and destroy the strongest of our fleet. And he came
up to her aid, and joined the fight, just at the time, when the flag-

102
ship would have saved her, if the Viscaya and Oquendo had had
life enough to have run back to Santiago, and would have finished
the destroyers, if the last preceding five minutes had not done for
them. The Admiral directed the further action of the Gloucester,
as he went by about lo :35.
Meanwhile the Teresa and Oquendo had gone ashore, and the
Admiral sent the Hist to them, and followed the battle.
Like the Indiana, the Oregon, Iowa and Texas needed no
new order for the battle; and they had none. But the flagship
followed, now gaining upon all but the little Ericsson, which ran
at her side, and at ii :35 the flagship, the Indiana, the Iowa and
the Ericsson were within half a mile of the Viscaya as she cast
herself ashore. The Admiral made no stop, but ordered the
Indiana to go back and blockade the mouth of the harbor, and
pressed on in chase of the Colon, directing the Iowa to take charge
of the Viscaya. The swifter Ericsson was hauling away from the
New York, and by signal asked the Admiral for leave to- continue
the chase ; but he hoisted a negative ; and, in passing, "by wigwag
signal" directed the Ericsson to pick up men in the water astern.
The Admiral directed tbe Iowa to care for the crew of the Vis
caya and then return to her blockading station ; whicb orders she
obeyed. (Appendix, 539.)
Gaining on everything : the Vixen, Texas, Oregon, Brooklyn
and Colon, tbe flagship steamed on. By coupling on her other
boilers, she could add four knots to her speed, but she was gain
ing steadily, and the Oregon fired her big guns in the view of the
Admiral. At the sixth shot the Colon gave the signal of surrender, and
the battle and the chase were over.
Commodore Schley in his report notes, that the Admiral's
flagship was coming up rapidly, at the time. (App., 518.) ?
Not an order had been given, from the Brooklyn, to the
Texas or Oregon.
They had obeyed the orders of the Admiral, and used the
discretion, which those orders gave, to reach tbe result, those
orders were intended to accomplish. It was not a using of discre
tion, but was intelligent obedience, carried through by tbe most
intense zeal.

103
Commodore Schley reported to the Admiral July 6 :
"At 9 :35 A. M. Admiral Cervera" and fleet came out "and at
tempted to escape to the westward." "Signal was made to the
Western Division as prescribed by your general orders; and there,
was immediate and rapid movement inward by your squadron, and
a general engagement at ranges, beginning at i,ioo yards and
varying to 3,000 yards, until the Viscaya was destroyed."
It seems, that what has been called the offensive telegram to
the Secretary of the Navy was exactly right, and literally true.
Apology has been made for it, that the Admiral never saw
it, and that the wording was by Lieutenant Staunton, his secre
tary, a man not tactful in the use of words ; yet, it seems, that by
analyzing the event, and putting the- matters down in proper
juxtaposition, in black and white, that telegram was not only
literally true, but was frue in substance and matter of fact.
"The fleet under my command offers the nation, as a Fourth
of July present, the whole of Cervera's fleet. It attempted to
escape at 9 :30 this morning. At two the last ship, the Cristobal
Colon, had run ashore 75 miles west of Santiago, and hauled
down her colors. The Infanta Maria Teresa, Oquendo and Vis
caya were forced ashore, burned and blown up, within twenty
miles of Santiago. The Furor and Pluton were destroyed within
four miles of the port." (App., 505.)
It was once regarded as. a truth, that republics are ungrateful.
Will this republic withhold the honor from the man who
commanded from the beginning to the end in the destruction of
the fleet of Spain? Who planned and forwarded each step;
whose scope expanded to take in the debarkation of the army,
co-operation with it; the reduction of the forts by land approach,
the raising of the mines, in the entrance, and carrying the fleet in
to fight its battle in the harbor of Santiago? Whose cordon
closed upon the enemy until it forced him out? Whose orders
then destroyed him ? And who was present, an eye-witness, and
participant, assuring the completeness of the victory ?
The effect and value of the victory is told by the leading
Captain of the vanquished :
"It hurled his country at the feet of the victor," and "de
prived Spain of the only power still of value to her, without

104
which, a million soldiers could be of no service; of the only power
which could have weight in a treaty of peace." (Concas, p. 73.)

A few comments of Captain Concas, which touch the work
of the Admiral, may be quoted in conclusion :
"The bombardment of San Juan took place May 12th, and
demonstrated that the defense of that island was a mistaken idea."
(P- 5I-) Speaking of the bombardments of Santiago, Captain Concas
says : "This could not fail to be very profitable to the blockading
squadron, as it was a veritable battle drill." "A drill which bas
no precedent in the world." (p. 58.)
"In regard to gunnery, the enemy had had a great deal of
practice, * spending fabulous sums in target practice, as shown
in all the annuals of tbe world. In addition to this, the great
experience gained in the bombardments of Porto Rico, Santiago,
and Daiquiri, had served not only to train their men, but to over
come tbe numejrous difficulties, arising from the complicated
mechanism of the mounts and breeches of modern guns, and
which were also experienced by Dewey's squadron at Cavite on
May I, and by Sampson's at San Juan, as appears from the
United States official reports. As for us, we had fired in practice
but two shots witb each of our 11 -inch guns, and therefore we
had no opportunity to acquire the skill, so necessary to prevent
what happened on board the Viscaya in practice, and on the
Teresa, in combat." (p. 65.)
"The superiority of the Americans, was due to- the large
amount of firing they had done. And even the extremely prudent
bombardments of the Morro and Socapa, at Santiago de Cuba,
had given them great practice in firing at long range. Our 5.5-
inch gun^ were fired for the first time on this occasion." (pp.
80-1.) The effect of all the drill, and habit in the use of what was
needed to be used in battle, is quaintly illustrated by Captain
Concas' remark on the Oregon : "We will reply, simply, that for
the Oregon the battle was nothing more than an exercise."
(p. 87.) "The Oregon, whose speed was so fatal to us." (p. 88.)

I05
As to the blockade he says : "The blockade constantly grew
more strict ; the ships coming so close at night that sometimes the
cries of the watch could be heard." (p. 59.)
"In the descriptions which have been made, a posteriori, of
the effects of the fire on our lost ships, they have even gone so far
as to say to which hostile ship each one of the projectiles belonged;
and from this which seems fo us ridiculous * * the conclu
sion has been drawn, that the Americans made three per cent, of
hits; which, although an acceptable percentage under these cir
cumstances, and when firing in actual war, we roundly deny; be
cause the casualties were enormous in the upper batteries, where
projectiles scarcely show; and it is certain that the number of
hits made is more than double."
"In order to give a convincing proof tbat tbe number of hits
found on our ships, is very much less than those which we actually
sustained, we will state that on the bridge of tbe Maria Teresa,
all who were outside of the conning tower were killed or wounded.
I personally saw seven projectiles strike there. One of which,
(no doubt of large caliber) cut one of my orderlies in two, and
another put me and the whole staff out of -action, (p. 81.)
"If only those had hit which showed their marks, it would
have been impossible for the conflagration to attain the propor
tions and rapidity that it did." (p. 82.)
Admiral Pluddemann says, that "at the end of the battle all
the Spanish vessels were under water to the upper deck, so tbat
the really mortal injuries could not be verified. (War Notes No.
2, p. 6.) He says "the superstructures, on the deck of the Vis
caya, had been almost complefly destroyed, by the end of the
battle. (Id., p. 7.) He also speaks of a large shell, that went
through the roof of the forward turret of the Oquendo, and, ex
ploding, killed the whole crew in the turret; another that hit a
shield on the'Teresa, and exploding, in the rear of it, killed every
one in the vicinity; and that another struck the battery deck aft
and exploded, killing every one there. Also that two (12 or 13-
inch) shells struck so close together tbat their shot holes were
merged into one; and that fragments, from them, when they
exploded, tore a hole four feet square in the ship, on tbe opposite
side. (Ib., 7.)
It seems quite clear, that the number of shells that struck the
Teresa, Viscaya and Oquendo, by far exceeded the numbers that
made holes in the parts of the wrecks of those ships, which now

io6
appear above water. Tbe numbers that struck the Furor and
Pluton have not been counted at all. Certainly three per cent, of
the shots fired — the number whose holes have been identified
above water on tbe three wrecks — gives no adequate idea of the
fatality of the fire ; five ships were destroyed, and one, conquered,
ran ashore. Whatever the number of shots, that struck their mark, the
entire fleet of Spain, in those waters, was destroyed, more than
600 were slain, and the naval power of Spain was swept from the
earth. Without disparaging the achievement of Manila bay on May
1st, it may be said that this was a greater victory.
In the battle of Manila the Spaniards had not one single
armored ship, and the total tonnage of the Spanish fighting ships
was but 8,722 tons.
In the round up of Santiago, the Spanish had the Teresa,
Viscaya and Oquendo, armored cruisers of 7,000 tons each; and
the Colon of 6,800 tons was an armored battleship of great speed ;
the torpedo boat destroyers, the Pluton, the Furor and the' Terror-
were of 380 tons each. (Concas, 42.) These torpedo boat de
stroyers were of the most modern, swiftest and most dreaded of
modern warships. (The Terror was not at Santiago because she
broke down and was left by the fleet, when it entered the Carib
bean Sea.)
One other ship, almost as good as any in the Spanish fleet
destroyed at Manila, which was destroyed by the blockade and
battle of Santiago, was the Reina Mercedes — a protected cruiser
of 3,090 tons (90 tons larger than the Boston) and having a good
modern battery. (The Spaniards gave her size as 3,900 tons.
War Notes No. 6, p. 35.)
Tbis brings the tonnage of fighting ships, blockaded and de
stroyed at Santiago, up to 31,650, as against 8,722 destroyed at
Manila. The fleet destroyed at Manila, was the working fleet of small
ships, kept about the Philippines ; the fleet destroyed at Santiago
wasthe fiower of fhe Spanish power on ivhich fhey founded their
hopes of a powerful navy. (Concas, p. 82.)
It seems that equal dealing, man for man, requires that the
admiral, captains, officers and men, who, thus, by bombardments,
blockade and battle, destroyed the naval power of Spain, should
be remembered and honored on the same scale, with the commo
dore, captains, officers and men who destroyed the outlying
Manila fleet.
Edward Roby.

107
PROMOTIONS CONFIRMED.
Advancements made in consequence of service during the
Spanish-American war, which were confirmed by the Senate.
Confirmation of June 6, 1898:
For eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle, under Section
1,506 R. S. {Battle of Manila) :
Captain Frank 'Wildes, 5 numbers;
Captain Joseph B. Coghlan, 6 numbers ;
Captain Charles V. Gridley, 6 numbers ;
Captain Nehemiah M. Dyer, 7 numbers ;
Captain Benjamin P. Lamberton, 7 numbers ;
Commander Asa Walker, 9 numbers ;
Commander Edward P. Wood, 10 numbers.
North Atlantic Squadron.
For extraordinary heroism while in charge of the steam
launch which accompanied tbe collier Merrimac for the purpose
of rescuing her gallant force when that vessel was, under the
command of Naval Constructor Hobson, run into the mouth of
the harbor of Santiago, Cuba, on the 3d instant (June) and dex
terously sunk in the channel :
Naval Cadet Joseph W. Powell, advanced two numbers, and
commissioned an Ensign. Confirmed June 28, 1898.
For eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle at Cardenas
on May 11, 1898, under Section 1,506, R. S. :
Lieutenant John B. Bernadou, 10 numbers. Confirmed July
I, 1898.

Promotions made Provisionally by the President,
Aug. 12, 1898.
Nominations Made December 7, 1898.
Not Acted on by the Senate.
The following named officers, of the Navy, to be advanced
for eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle, namely :
Commodore William T. Sampson, to be advanced 8 numbers
in rank and to be a Rear- Admiral.
Commodore Winfield Scott Schley, to ke advanced 6 numbers
and to be a Rear-Admiral.

io8
Capt. John W. Philip, advanced 5 numbers and to be a Com
modore. Capt. Francis J. Higginson, advanced 3 numbers.
Capt. Robley D. Evans, advanced 5 numbers.
Capt. Henry C. Taylor, advanced 5 numbers.
Capt. Francis A. Cook, advanced 5 numbers.
Capt. Charles E. Clark, advanced 6 numbers.
Capt. French E. Chadwick, advanced 5 numbers.
Lieutenant-Commander Raymond P. Rodgers, advanced 5
numbers. Lt.-Commander Seaton Schroeder, advanced 3 numbers.
Lt.-Commander Richard Wainwright, advanced 10 numbers.
Lt.-Commander John A. Rodgers, advanced 5 numbers.
Lt.-Commander James K. Cogswell, advanced 5 numbers.
Lt.-Commander William P. Potter, advanced 5 numbers.
Lt.-Commander Giles B. Harber, advanced 5 numbers.
Lt.-Commander Newton E. Mason, advanced 5 numbers.
Lt. Alexander Sharp, Jr., advanced 5 numbers.
Lt. Harry P. Huse, advanced 5 numbers.
Chief Engineer Charles J. MacConnell, advanced 2 numbers.
Chief Engineer John L. Hannum, advanced 2 numbers.
Chief Engineer Alexander B. Bates, advanced 3 numbers.
Chief Engineer Robert W. Milligan, advanced 3 numbers.
Chief Engineer Charles W. Rae, advanced 3 numbers.
Chief Engineer Warner B. Bayley, advanced 2 numbers.
Past Asst. Engineer George W. McElroy, advanced 3 num
bers. Chief Engineer George Cowie, advanced 3 numbers.
Commander Bowman H. McCalla, restored to his original
position in the Navy list and to be a Captain.
Lt. Benjamin Tappan, advanced 5 numbers.
Lt. Thomas M. Brumby, advanced 5 numbers.
Ensign Harry H. Caldwell, advanced 5 numbers.
Ensign William P. Scott, advanced 5 numbers.
Naval Cadet WUliam R. White, advanced 5 numbers.
Tbe following named officers to be advanced for extraordi
nary heroism, namely :
Captain Charles D. Sigsbee, 3 numbers.
Lt. Cameron McR. Winslow, advanced 5 numbers.
Lt. Edwin A. Anderson, 5 numbers.
Lt. Junior Grade Victor Blue, 5 numbers.

I09

Nominations of January 3, 1899.
Not Acted on by Senate.
The following named officers in the Navy to be advanced for
eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle, under the provisions
of Section 1,506, R. S. :
Lt.-Commanders Frederick Singer, John B. Briggs, George
P. Colvocoresses and John A. Norris, to be advanced 5 numbers
in rank, etc.
Lieutenant Edward M. Humes, to be advanced 5 numbers in
rank and to be a Lieutenant-Commander, etc.
Lieutenant Corwin P. Rees, to be advanced 5 numbers in
rank, etc.
Chief Engineers James Entwistle, John D. Ford, Richard
Inch, George B. Ransom, Frank H. Bailey and Reynold T. Hall,
to be advanced 3 numbers in rank, etc.

no

List Recommended for Nomination.
List of Officers of the Navy Who are Determined by
THE Board of Admirals convened under the Department's
Order of August 30, 1898, to be Eniitled to Promotion or
other Reward under the Terms of said Order : promotions
recommended.
name. rank. (numbers.)
Ward, H. H  Ensign. 10
Buck, W. H  .Ensign. 8
Newcomb, F. H . . . . : Lieut. Revenue Cutter Service. 7
Dillingham, A. C  Lieut. 2
Helm, J. M  Lieut. 5
Magruder, T. P  Ensign. 5
Jungen, C. W"»  Lieut. 5
Crosley, W. S  Ensign. 2
Harlow, C. H  Lieut. 2
Hunker, J. J  Comdr. 3
PurceU, J. L  Lieut. 2
Todd, C. C  Comdr. 3
Ward, A  Lieut. 2
Young, L  Lieut. 3
Proctor, A. M  A. Engr. i
Lyon, F  Asst. Engr. i
Offley, C. N  P. A. Engr. i
Reeves, J. M  Asst. Engr. i
MuUer, F  Mate. 5
Marix, A  Lt. Comdr. 2
Swinburne, W. T  Comdr. 2
Morton, J  Asst. Engr. i
Gait, W  Paymaster. i »
The name of Lieutenant W. H. H. Southerland ought to be
added to the above lists.